


THE DYNAMICS OF POWER AND CONFLICT
IN VILLAGE INDIA -A CASE STUDY

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
KONDAPALLI RANGA RAO
1969



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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE DYNAMICS OF POWER AND CONFLICT IN VILLAGE INDIA-A CASE STUDY

by

Kondapalli Ranga Rao

This is a study of the dynamics of political power and conflict in a village community in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India. Specifically the study focuses on the impact of Panchayati Raj, i.e., democratic decentralization on the interrelationships between caste, class, power and conflict. With the village community as the frame of reference the problem at hand was analyzed from a structural-historical perspective. 'Reputational' and 'event analysis' methods were adopted for ascertaining the nature of leadership and the pattern of conflict in the village between the years 1945 and 1968. The researcher stayed in the village for about four months and collected the data through interviewing and from records. No prepared questionnaire was used.

The basic findings are: The power structure of a relatively isolated community tends to be monolithic, that is, that the persons who have greatest power in its socio (religious)-administrative system tend to be the same persons who have greatest power in the economic system and consequently in the political system as well. As the society becomes modernized and as the community becomes increasingly involved

in the larger societal complex, however, to start with political power would tend to become autonomous from the hereditary social or administrative status and would tend to depend upon economic power. Consequent upon democratic decentralization, however, some political power would diffuse into the local social and economic strata as well.

In a relatively isolated stratified community the upper socio-economic stratum (or one individual) with administrative positions would dominate the populace and political conflict, if any, would be covert (or a sort of pseudo-social domination). As the community becomes modernized, and as it becomes involved in the larger societal complex, however, overt conflict would develop between individuals of the upper but adjacent high-ranking socio-economic strata. Consequent upon democratic decentralization economic dominants come to hold power and political conflict would continue to take the form of vertical factional conflict, with some element of horizontal (inter-strata) conflict side by side. However, if a faction maintains political affiliation with a leftist party, that faction may have more representation from the lower social and economic strata. Whether it would lead to inter-class or inter-caste conflict, ultimately depends upon the political circumstances of the region. A period of revolution may encourage class conflict; otherwise, it may take the form of conflict between the upper and lower social strata (castes).

THE DYNAMICS OF POWER AND CONFLICT
IN VILLAGE INDIA -A CASE STUDY

By

Kondapalli Ranga Rao

Prof. J.A. Sengco was my

thesis advisor and I am indebted to him for his guidance and

I place on record my deep appreciation for his kind advice and

the kind advice and guidance given to me during the preparation of this

the preparation of this thesis. I am also indebted to the

guidance committee, headed by Prof. J.A. Sengco, and

and D.E. Morrison were also helpful in the preparation of this

of their valuable advice and suggestions. I would also like to

During my first year of the graduate work at Michigan State University,

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Michigan State University,

provided the necessary financial assistance for a trip to

India for fieldwork. The Asia Cultural Development Council,

Inc., New York, supported my final year of graduate work at

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made possible due to their assistance. I gratefully thank

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The Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, provided the necessary financial assistance for a trip to India for fieldwork. The Agricultural Development Council, Inc., New York, supported my final year of graduate work at the Michigan State University. Preparation of the thesis is made possible due to their assistance. I gratefully thank Dr. W.T. Ross, Director of the Asian Studies Center, M.S.U.,

and Dr. A. Russell Stevenson, Administrative officer of the Agricultural Development Council, New York for their kind interest. In a way Professors J.A. Beegle and D.E. Morrison were responsible for getting me the Council's support. My heartfelt thanks are also due to them.

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¹ Weiner, Myron, "India: Two Political Cultures," in L.W. Bys (ed) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 207.

² Government of India, National Sahas Committee Report, 1957. Also Mandia, Nation Building and Village Development, New York, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964, pp. 204-205.

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relations in a village
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

As put by Myron Weiner, "While most other nations of Asia and Africa have generally been moving in the direction of greater authoritarianism, India has moved toward a greater democratization of power."¹ The Indian Constitution abolished all distinctions based on caste and religion; popular governments based on adult suffrage were introduced in all states; many states passed land reform legislation eliminating large concentration of landed property; community development programs were introduced in all the states; and finally, in the year 1959 a few states introduced panchayati raj or democratic decentralization to be followed subsequently by all other states. While all these changes had their impact on the socio-economic and political life of the villages, panchayati raj was supposed to have profound consequences for political power and leadership not only at the larger societal level but also at the village community level as well.²

¹Weiner, Myron, "India: Two Political Cultures," in L.W. Pye (ed) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965, p.207.

²Government of India, Balwant rai Mehta Committee Report, 1957. Also Bendix, Nation Building and Citizenship, New York, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964, pp. 284-290.

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Statement of the Research Problem:

This study is concerned with the dynamics of power relations in a village community in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India. Specifically, it focuses attention on the impact of panchayati raj on political power and conflict.

Here we define power as the capacity to control or influence others. Accordingly, by political power we mean the capacity to control or influence the decisions pertaining to a given community, and by political conflict as the contest for political power. In viewing the impact of panchayati raj on political power, we are concerned with the class and status backgrounds of the political leaders in the village. It is proposed to ascertain whether there is any difference in the class and caste backgrounds of the leaders before and after panchayati raj. While viewing the impact of panchayati raj on political conflict, we are interested in finding the effects of political equalitarianism, consequent upon the introduction of panchayati raj, on the nature of political conflict. It is proposed to determine whether the conflict is between different strata or factions, or something else.'

Frame of Reference and Approach to the Study of the Problem:

We wish to study the proposed problems in the context or frame of reference of the village community. We define the village community as a "social system encompassing a territorial unit within which members carry on most of their

Prinivas, M.N., "The Village and Social Change in the Indian Village," Economic Weekly, Vol. 12, 1948, pp. 1375-1378.

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day-to-day activities necessary in meeting common needs."³ We assume that the village community "functions as a social unit with boundaries which result from interaction between its economic base, its social base, and the prevailing system of power relations,"⁴ and as such the village community is a suitable place to observe power relations. This is not, however, a study of the entire community but the study of power relations in it. We take the community as a background insofar as it helps us explain the dynamics of power relations.⁵

In this study we will try to avoid the fallacy of assuming that the village community is a closed locality system "as if the larger society does not exist."⁶ The notion of the "self sufficient village republic" is nothing but a myth.⁷ Under the panchayati raj three tier system each village is vertically linked with the surrounding region

³ Loomis, Charles P. and J. Allan Beegle, Rural Sociology: The Strategy of Change, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957, p. 22.

⁴ Form, William H. and Delbert C. Miller, Industry, Labour and Community, New York, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960, p. 534.

⁵ Arensberg, Conrad, "The Community-Study Method," American Journal of Sociology, Sept. 1954, p. 120.

⁶ Steward, Julian H., Area Research Theory and Practice, Social Service Research Council, 1950, Bulletin 63.

⁷ Srinivas, M.N., "The Myth of Self-Sufficiency of the Indian Village," Economic Weekly, Vol. 12, 1960, pp. 1375-1378.

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and state. Hence, we assume that the village is a "part-society" if not an exact microcosm of the larger nation-society.

With community as the frame of reference, we propose to approach the problems of power and conflict from a structural-historical perspective. In this study our interest is in "power," "status," and "class" and their inter-relationships. The structural approach allows us to explain "the existence of some element of social behaviour, however, "element" may be defined, by its relations to other elements and the relations of these elements to one another in some configuration, a social structure or social system."⁸ Mills,⁹ Lynds,¹⁰ Hunter¹¹ and other sociologists made use of this approach. Further, since we are also interested in the study of change in the relations between "class," "status," and "power", we feel, in line with Moore, that "the principal basis of organizing a discussion of social change is structural."¹² Following Mills we also

⁸ Homans, G.C., "Contemporary Theory in Sociology," in Faris (ed) Handbook of Modern Sociology, Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally & Co., 1964, p. 961.

⁹ Mills, C.W. Power Elite, Fair Lawn, New Jersey: Oxford University Press, 1959.

¹⁰ Lynd, R.S. and H.M. Lynx, Middletown in Transition, New York, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1937.

¹¹ Hunter, F., Community Power Structure, Chapel Hill, North Carolina: North Carolina University Press, 1953.

¹² Moore, W.E., Social Change, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, p. 25.

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feel that a sociological or structural study "requires an historical scope of conception and a full use of historical materials."¹³ Schulze lamented the stress on the "mere contemporary" to the neglect of "historical depth" in the community power structure studies.¹⁴ Form and Miller, too, echo the same feeling.¹⁵ Finally, it is believed that today the developing countries are arenas for conflict between the old and the new, and, therefore, a theoretical approach which "regards conflict as abnormal, or that invests equilibrium with a special value"¹⁶ is a handicap in studying communities in these countries.

Review of Literature:

Let us now briefly review some of the relevant theoretical literature and deduce meaningful hypotheses for the guidance of this study.

Sociologists since Weber considered "class," "status," and "power" the three main dimensions of social stratification. Marx felt that the upper economic class which owns

¹³ Mills, E.W., The Sociological Imagination, New York, New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961, p. 145.

¹⁴ Schulze, R.O., "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite Society," in Janowitz (ed), Community Political Systems, New York, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, pp. 20 to 80.

¹⁵ Form and Miller, cited.

¹⁶ Srinivas, M.N., Social Change in Modern India, Berkeley, California: The University of California Press, 1967, pp. 159-160.

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the principal means production in a society was also the ruling class, and that it also controlled the means of political domination.¹⁷ Michels contradicted Marx's thesis as indicated by the following:

"The Marxist's thesis of the identity between the economic and political class does not express the whole truth of historical analysis. Our own studies convince us that the leading economic groups maintain always a rather distant relationship to political power." ¹⁸

Bottomore says that although "economic dominance has very often been the basis for political rule," political power "itself may create new social classes, new property rights, new privileges," etc.¹⁹ Commenting upon Marx's thesis, Bottomore writes that "since political democracy is such a recent growth Marx can hardly be blamed for having failed to consider all its implications for the association between economic and political power."²⁰ Marshall²¹ and Bendix²² with Bottomore, see the importance of adult suffrage or "citizenship" in creating new loci of power in a society. In fact, while he gave much importance

¹⁷ Bottomore, T.B., Classes in Modern Society, London, England: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1965, p. 61.

¹⁸ Michels, R., First Lectures in Political Sociology, Harper & Torch, 1965, pp. 108-109.

¹⁹ Bottomore, cited, p. 14.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 62.

²¹ Marshall, T.H., Class, Citizenship and Social Development, Anchor Books, 1950.

²² Bendix, cited.

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to economic position Marx did take notice of the importance of adult suffrage. He wrote;

"The carrying of universal suffrage in England would, therefore be a far more socialistic measure than anything which has been honoured with that name in the continent. Its inevitable result, here, is the political supremacy of a working class." ²³

Thus, even though the above discussion is limited to the societal level, it would not be wrong to assume that at the community level while political power normally is a function of economic or class position, the introduction of adult suffrage would by itself create new loci of power and consequently leaders would emerge from among the lower classes as well.

Community power structure studies by Hunter²⁴ and Miller²⁵ show that a very few leaders who are mainly businessmen control the decisions of the communities. The authors conclude that the communities they studied present elitist or pyramidal power structures. While these sociologists took to positional and reputational approaches, Dahl²⁶ found in the community a pluralistic structure, that the leaders varied from one issue-area to the other, and

²³ From Bottomore, cited, p. 62.

²⁴ Hunter, cited.

²⁵ Miller, D.C., "Decision-Making Cliques in Community Power Structures: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City," American Journal of Sociology, November, 1958, pp. 299-310.

²⁶ Dahl, Who Governs, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

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that the economic dominants were not the only community influentials. In subsequent studies sociologists too have come out with different varieties of power structures. Hence Bonjean says that "today no one would deny the existence of different patterns of leadership in different communities or in the same community over time."²⁷ Form and Miller suggest five models of community power structures, but conclude that "there is always a tendency for political power to become a direct handmaiden to economic power."²⁸

For our purposes Schulze's conclusions seem to be very pertinent. He found that:

"The power structure of a relatively isolated and self-contained community tends to be monolithic, that is, that the persons who have greatest power in its economic system tend to be the same persons who have greatest power in its socio-political system. As the community becomes increasingly involved and interrelated in the large societal complex, however, its power structure bifurcates, resulting in two crucial and relatively discrete power sets, the economic dominants and the public leaders."²⁹

Of course, we have to note that even in the community studied by Schulze the "potential" of the economic dominants was considerable and the public leaders could not effectively take community decisions independent of the former.

²⁷ Bonjean and Olson, "Community Leaders: Directions of Research," Administrative Science Quarterly, December, 1964, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 290.

²⁸ Form and Miller, cited, p. 501.

²⁹ Schulze, cited, p. 22.

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In a village study in the state of Madras, India, Beteille found that "the processes of economic change and political modernization have led the productive system and the organization of power to acquire an increasing degree of autonomy." But Beteille does not treat his findings to be conclusive as there are no comparable studies in other parts of the country.³⁰ Hence, following Schulze and Beteille, we propose to test the hypothesis that a traditional community will be dominated by a few economic dominants and that the power structure will be monolithic. As the community gets more politically modernized and gets involved more and more with the larger system, it will have a polyolithic power structure and political leaders grow independent of the economic dominants.

In the traditional agricultural communities land is the main source of economic power. In most of such societies some individuals have been given land by the rulers and these grants usually carried with them some administrative responsibilities. These individuals thus became a part of the ruling elite, and thus maintained great political power. As put by Lenski, "Land ownership, when divorced from public office, was valued chiefly as a means to obtain prestige and economic security while public office was used

³⁰ Beteille, A., Caste, Class and Power, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1966, p. 225.

³¹ Meyer, A.C., "The Dominant Caste in a Region of Central India," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 14, 1958, pp. 457-27.

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primarily for political and economic advancement."³¹ In Indian villages there always existed two or three officials who were appointed by the government and whose positions were hereditary. Usually these officials also belonged to higher castes. Hence, we assume that in a traditional community, given the same economic position, people with public office will have more political power. With political modernization, however, their position will diminish.

In the Indian context it is also essential to take caste status into account. In India, membership in an upper caste gave prestige and the Brahmins enjoyed ritual power. This ritual power carried with it political power too. The Indian constitution has abolished the caste system and it is gradually disappearing. However, in the rural areas prestige and deference are still largely graded along caste lines. Hence we assume that in similar economic positions these who belong to upper castes have more access to political power than those belonging to lower castes. Political modernization may, however, stimulate leadership from among the lower castes. It is believed that elections would help those with numerical strength to gain positions of political power. Studies of Indian villages by Srinivas,³² Mayer,³³

³¹ Lenski, G.E., Power and Privilege, New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966, p. 229.

³² Srinivas, M.N. "The Social System of a Mysore Village," in Marriott (ed) Village India, Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1966.

³³ Mayer, A.C., "The Dominant Caste in a Region of Central India," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 14, 1958, pp. 407-27.

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Nicholas,³⁴ Orenstein,³⁵ Beteille³⁶ and others show that the influence of the Brahmins has weakened considerably in the villages. Among the non-Brahmins the upper caste peasant groups with major portions of the lands in the village are reported to be holding the positions of key influentials in the village. It is also reported that the castes are more and more becoming, in Parsons term, adaptive structures with functions such as group security and solidarity. But none of the studies made a conscious effort to investigate the process of political mobility from among the lower castes consequent upon the introduction of panchayati raj.

The Nature of Political Conflict:

Sociologists differ in their views as to the importance of cooperation and conflict in the Indian village communities. Some argue that in the villages conflict is rife and that the village community is a product of coercive integration between the high and low castes. Others emphasize the harmony of caste interaction and social unity. Nevertheless, the fact is that the village social system reflects both cooperation and conflict. However, one should note that "greater political equalitarianism provides more opportunities for political mobility and also stimulates

³⁴ Nicholas, R., Structures of Politics in the Villages of Southern Asia, in Singer and Cohen (ed): Structure and Change in Indian Society, Chicago, Illinois: Aldine Publishers, 1968.

³⁵ Orenstein, H., Gaon: Conflict and Cohesion in an Indian Village, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965.

³⁶ Beteille, cited.

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aspirations to politically influential positions,"³⁷ and that in any political system "where power is transferred to old bodies or new bodies of power are created, there is invariably an increase in political conflict."³⁸ Hence, it is believed that with the introduction of panchayati raj there will be an increase in political conflict.

We have been following the definition that power is the capacity to control or influence others. But we have to note that the capacity of an individual is rooted in organizations and cliques. Hunter recognized this when he wrote that "power of the individual must be structured into associational, clique or institutional patterns to be effective."³⁹ Following the definition of power by Weber as "the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal act even against the resistance of others,"⁴⁰ Dahl and other political scientists conceived power in individualistic terms.⁴¹ Presthus, a political scientist, saw this defect. He wrote:

³⁷ Seligman, L.G., "Political Mobility and Economic Development," in Smelser and Lipset, (eds), Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, Chicago, Illinois; Aldine Publishers, 1966, p. 342.

³⁸ Weiner, cited, p. 209.

³⁹ Hunter, cited, p. 6.

⁴⁰ Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford Press, 1946, p. 180.

⁴¹ Dahl, R.A., "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, June, 1958, p. 150.

"One shortcoming of Weber's definition is that in focussing upon the individual's aspect of power, it neglects, to some extent, its more important social dimension. This is a crucial omission, for even though the power of individuals qua individuals can be empirically determined, ... individual's power is always worked only within some larger framework of institutional power." 42

Vidich and Bensman show that in villages politics are focused upon personalities rather than issues. But they believe that in order to ascertain the strength of the leaders one should look for the groups from which they draw their support. 43

There is a controversy among the social scientists as to the importance of caste in the field of political conflict at the village level. Some feel that with panchayat raj, caste groups come into conflict with one another. Srinivas observed that in the villages a caste group with high economic, political, and ritual power is the dominant caste. In case it is also numerically quite large its dominance is considered decisive. Others feel that not only the leaders of the dominant caste but also the leaders of the other castes get split into factions and, therefore, the element of caste is neutralized. 44

Nicholas finds the elements of both horizontal and vertical cleavages in two villages of Bengal, India. After

42 Presthus, R., Men at the Top, Oxford Press, 1964, p. 50.

43 Vidich, A. and J. Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society, New York: Anchor Books, 1960.

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making a comparative study of various research reports on political conflict in about 20 villages in India, Nicholas concludes:

1. "The dominant mode of political conflict in Indian villages is between factions.... A faction is a non-corporate political conflict group, the members of which are recruited by a leader on the basis of diverse ties.
2. Inter-caste conflict is only important in village politics where the dominant caste is less than half of the total village population, and
3. Most of this conflict is not between castes which are in adjacent hierarchical positions, but between high ranking dominant castes and populous low-ranking castes." 44

The above conclusions are worth testing in the context of a village community in some other parts of the country. Nicholas' conclusions, however, do not touch the composition of factions along class lines. While it is true that sociologists such as Heberle⁴⁵ and Beqiraj⁴⁶ argue that in peasant rural communities conflict will not take the form of class conflict, we believe that with politicization of the entire community and society there will be

⁴⁴ Nicholas, cited, pp. 278-279.

⁴⁵ Heberle, R., Social Movements, Des Moines, Iowa: Apple Century Crofts, 1951.

⁴⁶ Beqiraj, Peasantry in Revolution, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966.

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developing a tendency for some faction to attract relatively more affluent classes while the other faction attracts relatively poorer sections of the community. This may, of course, depend upon the nature of the leaders and the political affiliations of the leaders. A leader with leftist affiliations may have more following from among the lower classes.

Our analysis has been made on the assumption that power is mainly potential and that it is inclusive of "influence." Danzger points out that if power is defined as potential, "the central query would be who can wield power when he so desires?" and not "who wields power."⁴⁷ Danzger argues, if the former is the proper question, then one would be interested "with describing the resources controlled by the leadership and perhaps with spelling how these resources facilitate the exercise of power." According to him this approach not only focuses attention on the relative power of each leader but also makes understood the changing power relations in community. He writes:

"A second difficulty for research on power is inherent in the definitions used by both Hunter and Weber. Both define power in terms that tend to force the investigator to focus on the powerful, to overlook the power of the less powerful, to fail to differentiate the areas or scopes of power, to neglect the ongoing dynamics of power relations -- the give and take involved. Instead, the investigator is forced to focus on

⁴⁷ Danzger, H.M., "Community Power Structure: Problems and Continuities," American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No. 5, October, 1964, p. 713.

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who had made what successful power decisions. Power is seen as a relationship in which the actor exercising power is either able to get his way, in which case he has power, or unable to get his way, in which case he has no power." 48

In another context Lenski also echoes the same belief. He writes that "it may be well to take note of Simmel's observation that where the rule of law or right prevails, there is always a two-way flow of influence between the more powerful and the less powerful."⁴⁹ Bierstedt's stress on taking into account the various sources of power of the contenders, illustrates the same viewpoint.⁵⁰

It is here believed that by following Danzger's method of counting all the resources of each of the leaders in the conflict, it would provide us with a measure of the relative capacity of each leader to influence community decisions in a given context. We would assume that one's ability to succeed in a conflict is a function of the resources -- human and non-human -- at one's disposal. This would be the nearest possible approach to counting "the lines of action available to each actor in the situation" as conceived by Abramson, et. al.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 714.

⁴⁹ Lenski, cited, p. 58.

⁵⁰ Bierstedt, R., "An Analysis of Social Power," American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, 1950, pp. 730-738.

⁵¹ Abramson, et al., "Social Power and Commitment: A Theoretical Statement," American Sociological Review, Vol. 23, February 1958, pp. 15-23.

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In the foregoing discussion we concluded that factions are formed on the basis of many ties that the leader has with his followers or dependents. Srinivas suggested that other things being equal one's ability to control others is a function of patron-client relationships. He says, "the relationships of master and servant, land-owners and tenants, and creditor and debtor ... viewed collectively as the relationships of patrons and clients... are the bases of vertical relationships between individuals and, through them, between families."⁵² One would expect that with the land reform legislation the landowner-tenant relationship would not necessarily be reflected in the leader-follower relationship. Whether creditor-debtor and master-servant relationships would lead to leader-follower relationship depends upon the alternative sources of loans and income available in a community. Blau states that among others the two factors that give independence to the subordinates are the availability of alternative resources and a lack of need of the particular services.⁵³ This is in line with Emerson's statement that "power resides implicitly in the others dependency."⁵⁴ With the increasing

⁵² Srinivas, cited.

⁵³ Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life, New York, New York: John Wiley, and Sons, 1964.

⁵⁴ Emerson, "Power Dependence Relations," American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, February 1962, pp. 31-41.

conflict between the economic dominants, consequent upon the introduction of panchayati raj, one would assume that the pressures on the low-income groups would be less, consequently creditor-debtor or master-servant relationship would not necessarily lead to leader-follower relationship as in the traditional community.

Oscar Lewis⁵⁵, Nicholas, and others reported the importance of kinship relations in the formation of factions. But in a recent village study Sharma⁵⁶ reports that kinship is not that important in faction formation. One would assume that with more and more political modernization kinship would become less and less important and instead political party affiliations may gain more and more importance.

Indian village studies do not pay attention to the study of concrete disputes in the villages. Casually, many report that with the introduction of panchayati raj village disputes are being more and more referred to courts of justice and many a time the disputes turn into violent conflict. A study of such cases would tell us more about political conflict, its sources, and also the actual ways in which the leaders try to win over the others. Hence, a study of cases of village disputes will be studied for purposes of the analysis of political power and conflict.

⁵⁵ Lewis, O., Village Life in Northern India, Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1958.

⁵⁶ Sharma, Emerging Pattern of Rural Leadership in India, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, 1966.

Model of Analysis:

Since we are interested in the study of the impact of panchayati raj on a village community power structure, we will use a before and after model of analysis. We use what Hyman calls a "pseudo-longitudinal design."⁵⁷ Hyman makes a distinction between genuine and pseudo longitudinal research designs. He classifies studies by Lynds and Redfield, Middletown in Transition and A Village that Chose Progress respectively. as being genuine. These authors compared communities at two different points in time, and the study made at one time became a baseline study for the study made at a later time. Where there is no such baseline study, the investigator makes historical reconstruction of relevant facts in the past and then a comparison is made between this reconstructed past and the present. Since we have no baseline study, the pseudo-longitudinal model of analysis is utilized here.

A NOTE ON THE SELECTION OF VILLAGE AND COLLECTION OF DATA:

Selection of the Village:

The Telangana region of the state of Andhra Pradesh experienced a Communist led, armed peasant revolt during the years 1948 to 1950. The Nalgonda district generally and the Suryapeta taluk in particular was the central locus of the revolt. Early introduction of progressive land reform

⁵⁷ Hyman, "Research Design," in Ward (ed), Studying Politics Abroad, Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1964, pp. 153-234.

leslation in the region was the result of the revolt. In line with other areas of the country, general elections based on adult suffrage were introduced in the area and slowly Communist domination faded out. The introduction of panchayati raj or democratic decentralization further reduced the strength of Communism in the region.* But, in Suryapeta taluk many villages continued under the influence of Communism. The researcher was curious in finding out the circumstances under which the Communists continued to wield influence and power in the villages which had been so democratized under the panchayati raj. Hence it was decided to choose a village the panchayat of which was controlled by Communists, and then to devote attention to the analysis of the nature of the dynamics of power and conflict, if any, between different strata or factions over the period of the period of time.

The researcher had visited the suryapeta Panchayati Samiti on August 25, 1967 and began to collect basic information about the village panchayat. During the course of sitting with the panchayati extension officer of the Samiti, the researcher found that some residents of the village Haripur discussed the political situation in the village. On inquiry it was revealed that the village had been for a long time under the domination of the Communists and the president of the Samiti was never a non-Communist. In 1966

*See Appendix No. 1.

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the president was ousted due to some allegations against him consequent upon a violent conflict between the Congressites and the Communists. On obtaining further details concerning the village, the researcher felt this village would fit the research design which had been drafted earlier.

Selection of this village also seemed to meet the criticism⁵⁸ that many researchers of Indian village communities selected villages which necessarily had a "dominant caste" and consequently village conflict revolved around that caste. The village Haripur did not have any single dominant caste. Hence on this count also it was decided that Haripur village would be ideal for the present study.⁵⁹

Establishment of rapport:

Unlike many community studies, much of the problem of establishing rapport with the residents of the village was solved even before the researcher entered the village. Since the situation in the village was somewhat tense and a case against the ex-president of the panchayat was pending in the court, leaders of the rival factions almost daily

⁵⁸ "The commonest kind of village described in the recent anthropological literature in India is one...dominated by a single caste.... Whether this is the 'typical' village in India may lie open to question" B.S. Cohn; Anthropological Notes on Disputes and Law in India, American Anthropologist, Vol. 67, 12/1965, p. 86.

⁵⁹ By no means we take this village as the 'typical' one. At best it presents a situation for the study of the working of democratic decentralization in a village which was once under feudal regime and now is under the influence of the Communists.

approached the panchayat extension officer and the officer would introduce them to the researcher. Friendly discussions with them as well as his University affiliation (suggesting disinterest in active local politics) made the local leaders trust the researcher. The eldest Deshmukh of the village, once a dominant figure but now settled in the taluk headquarters, was also helpful in creating rapport with the local leaders. In fact the Deshmukh was by then regarded by many as one disinterested in village politics. Sympathetic understanding of the purpose of the research by the taluk Congress and Communist leaders also was instrumental in encouraging cooperation from the village leaders of all factions. Thus, about 15 days stay in Suryapeta was sufficient to make the researcher acceptable to the village leaders.

However, the researcher did not choose to go to reside in the village then since the leaders were at that time busy with the case in the court of law and the villagers, in their absence, would not fully cooperate.⁶⁰ The village Patwari, the keeper of land records, too was reported to have gone out of the village for some time. Even so, he visited the village along with the panchayat officer

⁶⁰ Access to the lower level leaders or general masses is possible only through the important Community leaders. The latter are the opinion leaders too.

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accompanied by a local Communist leader for two days. Subsequently the researcher stayed in the village for about one month during 1968, and for about two months from June through August, 1968. A short visit of two weeks was again made during December, 1968.

Collection of data:

Notwithstanding choice of the community case study method and appreciation of its merits,⁶¹ the researcher was also aware of its weaknesses.⁶² To the extent possible factual and quantitative material was gathered on various aspects, thus avoiding mere impressionistic statements. All the statements made in the Text are the outcome of the information elicited from the informants and drawn from factual evidence.

Basic socio-economic data as to family size, sex, age, education, occupation and caste were gathered through individual enumeration of each of the families in the village. Information as to owner-tenant, master-servant, creditor-debtor, and kinship relations was elicited from the caste heads or from the creditors, landlords etc. with

⁶¹See: Vidich, Bensman, & Stein (ed): Reflections on Community Studies, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York, 1964, p. XI - Preface.

⁶²See N.J. Smelser: Sociology and the other Social Sciences in Lazarsfeld, Sewell, Wilensky (ed): The Uses of Sociology, Basic Books, Inc. New York, 1967.

occasional checking with their counterparts. Details regarding land ownership over a period of time was drawn from the official records kept with the village accountant.

List of voters and wards at the time of the two panchayat elections could be had from the village panchayat office. Political affiliation of each of the families was determined with the help of two leaders from each of the two factions during each of the election periods.

Selection of the informants:

In the initial stages, the informants were the five village leaders -- 2 Congress party members, 2 Communists and one neutral -- introduced by the panchayati extension officer. The Deshmukh living in the town was also an informant. Having had from them sufficient information regarding some of the main events in the village between 1947 and 1968, the researcher began to contact and collect information from other individuals mentioned by the six original informants. These informants aided in the reconstruction of the sequence of events in the village. Thus, about 12 persons were helpful in a major way.

Gradually, after the enumeration of the households was completed, a list of 25 knowledgeable, including the above 12, was prepared. They included: 10 heads of the ten populous castes, 2 village officials, and 13 village leaders not included in the two previous categories. These knowledgeable were useful in providing information on various events from various points of view and also in

determining the reputation of the "activists" in each of the periods under study. It may be pointed out that many of activists were from the twelve informants who were helpful in the initial stages.

Analysis of events;

Contrary to expectation, conflict in the village did not concern any basic issues of community importance. In fact, since no community developmental activity was undertaken by the panchayat, there could be no occasion on which an issue could arise. Under the circumstances, only inter-personal disputes came to be important events around which political conflict centered during and after the panchayat elections. Hence all the important events or disputes which had village-wide ramifications had to be carefully recorded and analyzed. In many cases the disputes were those which were referred to courts and they could be re-constructed with relative ease. But with regard to the others more effort was needed. Nonetheless, in order to arrive at the truth of each of the cases opinions of various people, leaders and non-leaders, had to be elicited. All twenty-five knowledgeable were useful in this enterprise.

In view of the nature of this study, no prepared questionnaire was used during the course of the investigation. Notes on each interview were recorded and the nature of each further interview depended on the material gathered during the previous one. Only in this way was a meaningful and standing of the problems discussed in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.

coherent picture of the village political situation possible.

Organization of the Material and of the Text.

The Haripur village panchayat was legally constituted in the year 1959. With a view to analyze the impact of this new legal institution on the village power structure and conflict pattern, we follow the "before and after" model. Accordingly we organize our material into pre-panchayati raj and panchayati raj periods. However, since our interest is also in the analysis of the dynamics of power relations over a reasonably long period of time covering certain important events, the period between 1945 and 1968 was selected for our study. This period is divided into the following sub-periods depending upon the nature and importance of the events therein:

1945-1959: Pre-panchayati raj period.

1959-1964: First phase of panchayati raj.

1964-1968: Second phase of panchayati raj.

Analysis of these periods is presented in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.

Further, since this is a study of a community and we expect the societal forces to have an impact on locality social structure, we undertake in chapters 2 and 3 to analyze the major changes at the regional and community levels, respectively. Hopefully, these chapters provide basic material necessary for any kind of meaningful understanding of the problems discussed in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.

In the beginning of each of the analytical chapters (4, 5 and 6), we have stated some working hypotheses. These hypotheses have served to guide our analysis of the material and discussion of the conclusions arrived at in each of the chapters.

The last chapter, chapter 8, presents a brief summary of our findings relating to the impact of panchayati raj as well as our findings regarding the relationships between caste, class, power, and conflict in a changing Indian community.

The village under study is located in Gunturpet, Taluk of Nalgonda district which is a part of the Telangana region of the Telugu-speaking state of Andhra Pradesh (map 1 attached). The Telangana area consists of nine districts and until the year 1956 it was a part of the erstwhile state of Hyderabad. The Telangana area and more particularly the Nalgonda district was the birthplace of some very important social, economic and political revolutionary and reform movements. These movements gave a spurt to the enactment of progressive land reform legislation in the

CHAPTER II: THE TELANGANA REGION


In the first chapter we assumed that a village community was not a closed locality system; rather it was assumed that the village was always linked with the larger society and this linkage with the external system is becoming broader day-by-day as the society becomes more modernized. Even if the village community is not a "micro-cosm" of the "macro nation-society," it certainly reflects to a great extent the changes taking place at the larger societal level. In fact many political, legal and administrative actions in the country in general, and in the region in particular, were intended to bring about structural and cultural changes in the villages.

The village under study is located in Suryapeta, Taluk of Nalgonda district which is a part of the Telangana region of the Telugu-speaking state of Andhra Pradesh (Map 1 attached). The Telangana area consists of nine districts and until the year 1956 it was a part of the erstwhile state of Hyderabad. The Telangana area and more particularly the Nalgonda district was the birthplace of some very important social, economic and political revolutionary and reform movements. These movements gave a spurt to the enactment of progressive land reform legislation in the

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MAP 1

LOCATION OF THE VILLAGE HARIPUR
(SURYAPETA TALUK NALGONDA DISTRICT)



state of Hyderabad: In line with other states Community Development (C.D.) Projects were started in the year 1952. This C.D. Movement brought about many changes in the social, economic and political life of the people besides introducing some important administrative changes. In the year 1956 the Hyderabad state was split into linguistic units and each such unit was merged into the adjacent area with the same language. Thus Andhra Pradesh was formed with Telangana a part of it. Finally in the year 1959, the A.P. state was second in the country to introduce the scheme of Panchayatiraj. In this chapter an account of these socio-economic and political changes in the region is given under the assumption that such an account will help in analyzing and understanding the dynamics of power relations in the village under study.

The Political and Economic Changes - An historical account.

The state of Hyderabad, the largest of all the states in India under the British rule, was ruled by the Nizam, a muslim feudal Prince. The state was made up of three linguistic regions: The Telangana (Telugu speaking area), The Marathwada (Marathi speaking area), and the Karnataka (Kannada speaking area). While the Muslims constituted 11% of the population, the remainder were Hindus. As in the rest of India, the state was administratively formed into districts, each district into taluks, and each taluk into villages. The term village means a revenue

village or a "Mauza" which includes the scattered hamlets known as "Mazras" situated within its limits.¹ Each village is administered by three officials: the Patwari (revenue accountant); Mali Patel (revenue collector), and the Police Patel (who maintains law and order).

The Birth of State Congress Party. -- In British India (i.e. that part which was not under the feudal kingdoms but was directly administered by the British) the Indian National Congress, a political party, was born in the year 1885. By the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century the Congress picked up momentum under the dynamic leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and began to launch mass level agitation through non-violent non-cooperative (with the government) movements for Indian independence from the British rule. The Congress, however, maintained a policy of non-interference with the political situation in the native states. The state of Hyderabad was largely free from any substantial political activity or independence movement until the years 1937-38. The only organization active in the Telangana area around the thirties was the Andhra Mahasabha. This organization was principally non-political and was interested in socio-cultural and linguistic renaissance. The Arya Samaj, a Hindu society, started by Swami Dayananda Saraswati, was however popular only in some towns

¹Census Report: 1951 Nalgonda District, Govt. of Hyderabad, 1954.

and in the capital city, Hyderabad itself.

In the year 1937 the Hyderabad State Congress, the state wing of the Indian National Congress, was formed by some leaders. The Nizam government, however, declared the formation of the political party unlawful as it felt the formation of the party detrimental to the interests of the Nizam and the state. In view of the ban of the government on the Congress party, it could not attract into its fold many leaders who could take active part in the political movement courting satyagraha (non-violent non-cooperation) and imprisonment. Swami Ramananda Tirtha, -- a bachelor Sanyasi (ascetic) from Marathwada one of the founders of the State Congress and a long time president of the party, writes as follows describing his attempts to make the Telangana leaders take part in the satyagraha movement:

"To my sorrow I found that none of the senior members would come. Some of them were honest in that they admitted their inability to offer satyagraha and undergo suffering. After much searching Shri Rari Narayana Reddi came to me and agreed to join the movement along with his colleagues.²

Subsequently, however, a number of young people became active participants in the political movement against the Nizam of the state and in favor of establishing a democratic form of government. Unlike the senior leaders who hailed

² Tirtha, Ramanand; Memoirs of Hyderabad Freedom Movement, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1967, p. 67.

from urban upper classes, these youth were from the middle class as well as from among the general masses in the rural areas.

The Impact of the Communist Party

Sri Ravi Narayan Reddi, from the middle class in Nalganda district, was a long time active member of the Andhra Mahasabha. He joined the Congress party, as described above, in the year 1938. Radical in outlook, Sri Reddi slowly became attracted to the Communist Party of India and left the Congress Party in the year 1941. His entry into the communist party is roughly the beginning of the Party itself in the Telangana area. This change in party affiliation of Sri Reddi created a piquant situation in the Andhra Mahasabha. Having a wide following, he was elected president of the Mahasabha and from that time onward the Mahasabha began to function as the Communist party in disguise. Consequently, the nationalist minded anti-communist senior members of the Mahasabha left the organization and formed the Andhra Conference. Over a period of time while the Andhra Mahasabha almost became converted into the Communist party of the state, the Andhra Conference merged into the Congress itself. Meanwhile the Andhra Mahasabha began to recruit members from the rural and urban masses and in line with the principles of the Communist Party, began to make a plea for the freedom of the state not only from the rule of the Nizam but also for the freedom of the

states and the peasants had to work as wage

masses and the agricultural labour class from the clutches of the landlords. The young and progressive members from among the Congress Party and the Andhra Conference too began to raise the slogan of economic independence for the lower classes along with the political freedom of the state. The Telangana region was largely under the control of the feudal absentee landlords who owned the major chunks of the land in the villages. This structural situation compelled the political parties to think in terms of changes in the socio-economic base as well. As one could guess, by and large, the landlords, even though they had sympathies for the Congress as against the Communist Party, yet, were supporters of the rule of the day since their own very existence and power was a function of the continuation of the Nizam. The Muslims who were in the minority, by and large, would want the flourishing of the rule of the Nizam, the muslim ruler. The situation prevailing around the year 1965 may then be summarized in the words of Swami Ramamandi Thirth thus;

1. "Telangana region was destined to play a prominent role in the freedom struggle. The peculiar land problem had given it a specialty and in all the movements the socio-economic aspect had to be well remembered. By and large the rural parts contained only two categories, the landed aristocracy and the landless peasantry. The landlord though few in number owned big states and the peasants had to work as wage

earners. This resulted in all types of inequalities. The feudal lord was invariably aided by the autocratic regime in order to preserve his own overlordship. Naturally he was opposed to all attempts extricating the peasant from his cruel grip. He was eager to impede the onward march of popular struggle..."

2. The active cadre of Telangana had been absorbed by the Andhra Mahasabha under the leadership of Shri Nargayan Reddi as he was the first to take plunge into the freedom struggle. He had established a strong base in the rural part of Telangana area. As he joined the Communist party a formidable force went over the Communist ranks. The liberal section which formed the old guard had very little to do with the Satyagraha movement and they could not inspire confidence in the new younger sections which had emerged during the last two struggles and which did not see eye-to-eye with the Communists. Many a budding youth with radical vision were taking shape."³

In light of this background, the Congress and Communist parties intensified their agitations against the

³Ibid., pp. 148-166.

Nizam. The latter party tried more than the former to muster as much strength as possible in the rural areas. Looking at the seriousness of the situation the government in the year 1946 lifted its ban on the Congress party with a motive of starting a dialogue with its leaders and attracting them into the government. But the formula would not work effectively. The rulers followed a policy of consolidating communal Muslim elements and entrenching them in power against the Hindu-dominated political parties. Consequently, a Muslim organization, Ittehadul-Musalmeen, was consolidated and its volunteers, the razakars as they are called, were trained in the use of arms as a kind of second line to the regular police and army. Many a Hindu landlord too had sympathies with this organization.

During the years 1946 and 1947 the entire political situation was in turmoil. At the national level it was clear that the Britishers would grant independence to India in the near future. The Muslim League, a Muslim party, was sure to be successful in being able to get Pakistan, a Muslim state, carved out of the Indian sub-continent. With the impending withdrawal of the British imperialism, the princes of the feudal states expected independence of action as to remain sovereign or join the Indian Union or Pakistan as the case may be.

British India was declared independent on the 15th of August, 1947. In accordance with the Instrument of Accession evolved by the Indian Union government under Sri

Jawaharlal Nehru, one by one the princes in India announced their decision to accede to the Union. But the Nizam would not do so. Consequently political activity became more vigorous and the Razakars supported by the Nizam government began to suppress the popular movement with an iron hand. Added to this, during the years 1946-47, the government adopted a policy of levy and compulsory procurement of grain from all types of cultivators. The manner in which the policy was implemented brought heavy suffering to the peasantry. The Communists took this opportunity and attempted to put up a strong opposition to the government and its police. In the Suryapeta taluk around the village under study a number of villagers took to arms and fought the police in the fashion of a guerilla warfare. While the Congress and the Communist parties pressed the village officials, landlords, and the general public not to support the government and not to carry out any of its orders, the government through its police, military and the razakars would harass and imprison those who did disobey and/or those who were known sympathizers with the movement. The communists, of course, took to arson and looting and even threatened to murder those who attempted to foil their tactics in favour of the government. Being unable to put-up with this sandwiched position, many landlords and village officials in Telangana migrated to the neighboring states in the Indian Union. Those who could not do so for various reasons or those who were loyal to the Nizam, moved into the towns and cities.

Looking at the deteriorating political situation in the state, the Union government of India at last took police action on 13th September, 1948 against the Nizam and the Nizam surrendered on the 17th. The state was then placed for some time under military rule followed by a civilian rule under the supervision of the Union government until a popular ministry was formed soon after the general elections based on adult franchise for the first time in the year 1951. This ushers India, after a long period of slavery, into a full-fledged democratic political system.

The Armed Revolution and its Failure:

Soon after the police action, the landlords returned to their villages and again began to continue their reign over the peasantry as in the old regime. Many a landlord and village officials turned to the Congress Party. The Communist party of India declared the congress controlled Union government as bourgeoisie and decided to continue their armed revolution in Telangana with a hope to overthrow the government. They declared that the Nehru government was no better than the former government of Nizam and once the struggle was continued the Nehru rule too could be thrown out. The Party consolidated the land-hungry rural peasant-labor force and took to killing of landlords and village officials and to distributing the lands of the rich among the tenants and the poor. This activity was quite effective in the districts of Nalganda and Khammam.

Fear stricken, many landlords and rich officials again moved out of the villages into towns. Military forces were camped in a number of strategic rural areas. Regular clashes between the military and the armed communists became the order of the day. While the military harassed the people during the day, the communists troubled them during the nights. In the process many were killed and jailed. It was rather difficult for the military to be effective against the communists as such since they were often sheltered by the villagers themselves. The Lambadi thandas, the habitations of the once nomadic but now settled tribal groups who were sparsely spread out around the main villages became the targets of the military for reasons that the communist leaders found these places useful as their shelters and centers of activity.

The Communist party however abandoned its policy of armed revolution as it found itself in a situation of continuously decreasing support from the people and increasing pressure from the government. Many a leader of the movement was either imprisoned or forced out of the state and into the neighboring states. The Congress governments in the adjacent states were equally hostile to them. The Politbureau of the Communist Party of India realized the incorrectness of the policy based on wrong calculations of the then existing situations and decided to contest the general elections for seats in the state legislatures and the national Parliament. As one could see, this in itself

is a great shift in the traditional strategy of the Communist party.

The Bhoodan Movement

When the Telangan region was seized through Communist terrorism and consequent all-around disturbance of normal socio-economic and political life, Acharya Vinoba Bhave, an ascetic and long time associate of Mahatma Gandhi and after Gandhi's assassination the only true living exponent of non-violence in all its Gandhian sense, undertook Padayatra (a walking tour) of the region. He hoped this would help him meet the leaders and public of all walks of life, discuss with them and explain the necessity of voicing grievances, if any, and solving the same through peaceful non-violent means. He met the communist leaders and the government and succeeded in creating a kind of atmosphere necessary for mutual understanding and compromise for bringing the region back to normality. The Communists were already tired of the game of warfare and therefore gave a respectful ear to the Acharya.

Acharya Vinoba Bhave however, was convinced of the need of a progressive policy of land distribution in Telangana, thereby reducing the vast economic inequalities. Being himself, a staunch Gandhian, the Acharya wanted this change to be brought about by peaceful means and by changing the hearts of the landlords by persuading them to part with some portion of their lands for the cause of eradication of poverty and societal improvement. Hence, during

the course of his Padayatra, in April 1951 in the village Pochampalli of Nalgonda district, in his regular prayer meeting, he appealed to the Landlords to do some Bhoodan (gift of land). One landlord instantly declared a donation of some portion of his land. Encouraged by this, the Acharya spread the message wherever he went in India.

The land so donated under the Bhoodan movement was handed over in each state to a committee which later distributed the land, approximately five acres per family, to the landless. The government on its part used to grant loans to such people so that they may buy oxen, etc. It may be said however, that even though the movement gained momentum in Telangana, it by no means was a great success. It may be pointed out in this connection that later the Bhoodan spread into Gramdan (gift of villages) and Sampatidan (gift of property) etc. The ultimate goal of the movement of Bhave was the attainment of Sarrodaya: a social order based upon social service and non-violence and creating a caste and classless society where harmony, without conflict, would prevail. Sarrodaya was the ideal of Mahatma Gandhi.

Land Reform Legislation

Soon after peace returned to the terror-stricken land of Telangana, the civilian government of Hyderabad, under the guidance of the Union government headed by Nehru, passed progressive legislation which is now referred to as the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural

Land Act, 1950. The Act was amended in the year 1954 and on various subsequent occasions. The Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act was passed in 1961.

The 1950 legislative act was mainly intended to fix the land rents, to provide security of tenure, and to bestow substantial rights on the tenants as well as to discourage absentee landlordism. Maximum rents were fixed in terms of multiples of land revenue varying from 3 times to five times depending upon the type of the soil. Except in certain special cases, leasing of the land three years after the commencement of the Act was prohibited. A class of tenants who were in continuous occupation of the lands of the landlords for not less than six years during or before a specified period, were declared "protected tenants" with heritable rights and also with rights to become owners of such occupied lands. In case of non-protected tenants the period of tenure was fixed at five years and this was automatically renewed except where the landlords, following certain conditions, took the land back for personal cultivation. In subsequent modifications the rights of protected tenancy were also conferred on all those tenants who had leased in lands of those landlords who had more than three family holdings. The family holding was defined as that area "which a family of five persons including the agriculturist himself, cultivates personally ... will yield annually a produce the value of which, after deducting fifty percent therefrom as cost of cultivation, is Rs. 800 --

according to the price level prevailing at the time of determination."⁴ In only one district of Khamman all protected tenants owning below the Basic Holding, which is equivalent of 1/3rd of the Family Holding, were declared owners of the leased in land. The land area fixed as the Family Holding varied between 6 and 72 acres depending upon the type of the soil.

The 1961 legislation, which was applicable to Telangana as well as to the Andhra region, prescribed the maximum size of cultivated holdings at 4½ times the family holding. Accordingly the ceiling ranged between 27 and 324 acres.

Thus, as one could see, the legislation was expected to transform the agrarian structure in a major way. But there were a number of legal loopholes in the legislation and these loopholes were taken advantage of by the landlords in the form of evicting the tenants from the land and collecting rents at rates above the prescribed ones. Often, even though a family of the landlord was in actuality an individual joint family of father and son or of two brothers and so on, in official records it was shown as two separate nuclear families thereby making the two families eligible to hold enough land individually and evict the tenants. While such loopholes defeated the purpose of the

⁴Govt. of Andhra Pradesh: The Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950: Govt. Press, Hyderabad, 1958.

legislative reforms, it is important to note that many absentee landlords sold their lands, took other jobs in the villages, or migrated to the towns as they realized fully well that they could no longer maintain the status quo. Added to this, in many parts of Telangana the Agricultural labor force, under the leadership of the Communist Party, began to demand higher and higher wages and the payment of increased wages was not profitable to many small and absentee landlords. Thus, many tenants and small agriculturists and laborers could buy lands. The government also was liberal enough in granting rights of ownership to the poor, particularly to the Harijans on small pieces of land that remained uncultivated and/or unowned. Thus, despite some weaknesses and difficulties the whole process resulted in a better distribution of land and many rather than a few are now in possession of the lands in the rural areas.

Community Development Program

Independent India under the Congress party resolved to adopt parliamentary secular democracy with a federal system of government. A new Constitution came into effect on January 26, 1950. The constitution set out to clear away the differences and repression that arise out of the peculiar Indian caste system and untouchability. Any discrimination on the basis of sex, caste, creed and religion was prohibited. The enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability was declared as punishable under law.

In the year 1952, general elections were conducted on the basis of adult franchise and popular Congress ministries were formed both at the Center and at the state levels. The Congress government under Nehru believed in planned development and accordingly the Planning Commission was established in the year 1950 and the First Five year plan came into operation in 1951.

It was on October 2, 1952, the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi, that the Community development and National Extension projects were initiated in different parts of the country, including the Telangana region. It was so planned that one by one all the 600,000 villages in the country, by the end of 1962, would be covered by the Projects. It was the aim of the C.D. Program to bring about developmental change in the village communities in all the fields such as agriculture and livestock, small scale industries, irrigation and communication, health and sanitation, education, social welfare, etc. A subject matter specialist, the extension officer as he was called, was appointed for each field at the block level and all of such extension officers were put under the administrative control of the Block Development Officer, who was the leader and coordinator of the team. Each of the C.D. blocks was to cover between 60 and 100 villages and was divided into circles of five or six villages supervised by the village level worker or the Gram Sevak (Servant of the village community).

The C.D. Program in India was indigenous but it was shaped by Albert Mayer, an American architect and town planner, who was closely associated with the Etawah Pilot Project. As put by Tinker:

"Mayer tackled community development as a problem in 'social engineering', a question of bringing together administrative skill and technical know-how from outside, united with the local feeling and effort of the rustic folk, in order to achieve a physical and mental transformation in the village milieu. Mayer placed great emphasis upon realizing the 'felt needs' of the people. He insisted that community development must be a cooperative effort between the government and the people."⁵

Finances for the project came from the Ford Foundation and its representative in India, Dr. Ensminger, soon wrote "A Guide for Community Development."

The movement proved useful in many respects. But the rate of development was not as expected by the planners. Research findings point to various cultural, social and administrative impediments to the success of the various types of programs and pinpoint the hostility of the villagers to any programs undertaken by an outside agency, including the government. It was felt that essentially the traditional bureaucratic administrative apparatus did not transform itself into a real developmental administration capable of mobilizing local leadership and the masses. One of the major criticisms levelled against the C.D. program

⁵Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis, Fredrick A. Praeger, N.Y.: 1962, p. 192.

was that it was more beneficial to agriculturists in general and to the upper classes and castes in particular.

To quote Berreman:

"... Community development, as it has been defined in India, is fraught with potential difficulty. Briefly the problem is this: the C.D. Program aims at economic development of rural villages, with emphasis on agriculture, and at the same time it aims at fundamental changes in the social life of villages, with emphasis on democratization. In practice, the program has functioned primarily to improve agricultural productivity. As a result, its effect has been, over much of India, to benefit primarily the farmers -- those who own land -- and these tend to be high caste people who are already the most economically advantaged."⁶

The Indian researchers Dube, Desai and others echoed the same complaint. Dube wrote:

"...nearly 70 percent of its benefits went to the elite group and to the more affluent and influential agriculturists."⁷

The split of Hyderabad State and the formation of Andhra Pradesh:

During the year 1956 a major change took place in the form of reorganization of the 26 states into 14 (now 16) on the basis of linguistic division of the country. The struggle for a linguistic state was first organized by the Telugu speaking people of the composite Madras state.

⁶ Berreman, "Caste and Community Development in India" Human Organization: Vol. 22, Spring, 1963, Nov. 1, 1963.

⁷ Dube, India's Changing Villages, Routledge, Kegan Paul, London, 1958, pp. 82-83.

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One Sri Potti Sriramulu went on fast unto death on December 16, 1952, and large scale riots erupted throughout the state. Consequently the Union government conceded the demand for an Andhra state.

As the agitation for linguistic states became intense all over the country, it was decided to reorganize the states accordingly. The Hyderabad state was split into three of its linguistic regions and the Telugu speaking Telangana area was included with Andhra state to form the present state of Andhra Pradesh.

Without going into detail, it may be necessary to point out that the "effect of re-organization was to give State politics a more intensely regional character; and to make the States a much more important level of power."⁸ The State politics became since then all the more caste politics. The following quote summarizes the situation in Andhra.

One state where politics can be nearly equated with the rivalry of two great castes is Andhra. Before the days of universal suffrage, the Congress Party in Andhra was Brahmin dominated. A caste of wealthy landowners, the Kammas, began to produce Western-educated leaders in the 1930's, who in the face of the Brahmin control of Congress, joined anti-Brahmin Parties, like the Justice Party, and in due course turned to Communism ---, in its militant phase, the Communist party of India was compelled to issue a special directives to take care of its Kamma landlord supporters. The other great landowning 'middle' caste was that of the Reddis, whose emergence into political literacy came later. Their main political objective was to get even with the Kammas, and so they joined

⁸Tinker, cited, p. 134.

Congress; first as Junior Partners with the Brahmins, and then as their supplanters. However, in the 1955 (mid-term) election, when Congress was fighting back, after the Communist had scored on the language issue, it was decided that the caste game must be played with even greater finesse. The coastal, delta region was Kamma territory; the uplands were held largely by Reddis. Congress held off until the C.P. I. had filed its list, and then candidate for candidate, it matched the C.P.I. slate with a Congress slate of opponents belonging to identical castes. That way, with superior organization and funds, Congress could successfully trade upon caste loyalties everywhere." ⁹

In Telangana too the Brahmins (not more than 4%) were the intellectual leaders but in the villages and in the region, they shared power and authority with the Reddis and, to some extent, with Velamas. The Kammas are popular in a few taluks of Khamman district. When Telangana joined Andhra State in 1956, the Reddis became all the more powerful in the state of Andhra Pradesh.

Panchayati Raj:

The system of village panchayati or village government, in India, is, by some, traced back to antiquity. Establishment of village panchayats is included as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy of the Constitution of India. However, the roots of the present system of panchayati raj in India lie in a report submitted in the 1957 by the team for the Study of Community Projects and

⁹ Ibid., pp. 145-146. Also see; L.I. and S.H. Rudolph; "The Political Role of India's Caste Associations," Pacific Affairs, March 1960.

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National Extension Services, set up by the Government of India to probe into the working of the C.D. Program and make appropriate recommendations for an efficient re-organization of the same, if necessary. The Study Team headed by Sri Balwantrai Mehta found that the C.D. Program tended to impinge on the villages from above and there was little local participation since the local leaders in all matters were looking for directives from the government officials. The Team therefore recommended that more responsibility be placed in the elected councils at various levels as it felt that this method would make democracy function at all levels in each state and the leaders would be in a position to act in accordance with local needs and circumstances. The report therefore urged for the establishment of a three-tier institutional structure of the Panchayati Raj: The Panchayati, at the village level; the Panchayat Samiti, at the Block level, and the Zilla Parishad, at the District level. It is to be noted that while the C.D. program attempted to introduce developmental administration in the place of the old revenue-dominated bureaucracy, the Panchayati raj now tried to make the official subordinates to the elected institutions and leaders. At the village level the Panchayati and its President are the real power holders and community planners. At the Block or Samiti level the President is the real authority and the Block Development Officer is an executive under him. At the district the Zilla Parishad and its

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Chairman are more powerful in planning and execution than the District Collector.

The Panchayati raj introduces still another element which is more relevant to us in view of the theoretical and methodological stance we took in the first chapter. These points can be made no better than in the words of Tinker:

"This revolutionary proposal--aimed at liquidating the autocratic district system, which had served Mughas and British alike--was accepted by most of the States. The new order was called Panchayati Raj, no longer Panchayat Raj; instead of village government, government of the villages. The distinction cannot be relegated to the realm of semantics--there is a genuine difference; the 'self-sufficient village' concept was finally relinquished. Henceforth, the village merged into the neighborhood, and the neighborhood into the district.--- The attempt to lower the level of decision making from the district to block, was reversal of the centralizing pressures of the first years of independence." 10

The three-tier pattern was first adopted by the state of Rajasthan and then by the State of Andhra Pradesh. In Andhra Pradesh it took legal form through the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayati Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1959. As per this act, while all the presidents of the village panchayats are ex-officio members of the Panchayati Samiti, all the Samiti Presidents are the ex-officio members of the Zilla Parishad.

Until 1963 Telangana was governed by the Hyderabad Gram Panchayats Act, 1956, -- an act which was passed just

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 193-194.

before the formation of Andhra Pradesh. Since 1964, this region, along with the Andhra region has been governed by the Law of Gram Panchayats in Andhra Pradesh, 1964.

The important provisions were: (of the act of 1956)

- (1) A gram panchayati could be constituted for any village or group or group of villages with a population of not less than, 1,000 and not more than 5,000;
- (2) The Surpanch and Upa-sarpanch could be removed by a two-third majority vote;
- (3) The gram panchayat was eligible for a grant equal to 15% of the land revenue of the village from the government.
- (4) The gram panchayat's empowered to levy pilgrim tax, entertainment tax, professional tax and tax on transfers of immovable property.
- (5) The Panchayat could call upon the villagers to perform such labor as might be necessary for village improvement.
- (6) It could constitute conciliation boards and nyaya panchayatis, if necessary.

But in many villages panchayats were not formed until the Panchayati raj system was adopted in the year 1959.

The act of 1964 aimed at the development of village panchayats as units of local administration vested with powers relative to village life, policy, and economy.

The levy of house tax, vehicle tax and professional tax were made compulsory in order to ensure stable finances. The main revenue however, was derived from the share of land revenue realized in the village and duty levied on transfers of property. Other important features of the Act may be summarized as follows:

- (1) The Administration of each village shall be vested in the gram panchayat;
- (2) Each village has a Gram Sabha which consists of all the adults included in the electoral roll and the sabha meets twice a year in order to suggest the improvement necessary for the village.
- (3) Numbers of members of the Panchayat to be as follows:

<u>Village Panchayat Population</u>	<u>Number of members in the Panchayat</u>
less than 500	5
500 -- 1,499	7
1500-- 2,999	9
3000-- 4,999	11
5000-- 9,999	13
10,000-- 14,999	15
15,000 and over	17

- (4) Reservation of seats be made for women and Harijans or Tribes as follows:

Ladies: One seat, if the total strength of Panchayat is seven or less; two seats if the total strength is more than seven.

Scheduled castes or Tribes: One seat if such population is fifty or less.

- (5) Term of the Panchayat: 5 years.
- (6) Election: The electoral roll is divided into constituencies with equal members; all the members elect the Surpanch and Upa-Surpanch. The village officers can not contest the elections.
- (7) Duties of Panchayats:

A. Obligatory, but not enforceable in the court of law

- 1. construction and maintenance of public buildings and roads
- 2. Lighting of public roads
- 3. Construction and maintenance of drains
- 4. Clearing of streets
- 5. Provision of public latrines and cleaning of the same
- 6. Maintenance of crematoria and burial grounds
- 7. Finding out and providing means of preventing and eradicating of epidemic diseases.
- 8. Sinking and repairing of wells for protected water supply.
- 9. Conservation of manurial resources
- 10. Registration of births and deaths
- 11. Establishment and maintenance of cattle pounds, etc.

B. Optional:

- 1. Construction and maintenance of dharmasalas and choultries.
- 2. Promotion of pre-primary education.
- 3. Provision of playgrounds and parks
- 4. Building libraries
- 5. Encouraging improved methods of cultivation
- 6. Encouragement of cooperatives and warehouses
- 7. Control of fairs
- 8. Implementation of land reforms
- 9. Development of communal harmony

Since the establishment of the Panchayats, the village level worker was, however, expected to carry on his community development and extension work in consultation

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with the president and members of the Panchayat. The Panchayat prepares its annual budget and plan and submits to the Samiti for its approval. In effect the Panchayat President works as the representative of the village in the samiti meetings as he is the ex-officio member of the Samiti and he is one who votes for the election of the Samiti president, who again is a village president himself.

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CHAPTER III: THE VILLAGE HARIPUR

The village Haripur¹ with a population of 2,327 persons distributed over 413 households is situated almost in the middle of the taluk, eleven miles north of Suryapeta, the taluk headquarters and marketing town. The town itself is located on the highway running between the cities Vijayawada and Hyderabad. There is no all weather road connecting Suryapeta with Haripur. A country bullock-cart, non-surfaced roadway is the only link between the two places. During rainy days the roads turn slushy at a number of points making passage of carts or cycles, and for that matter, even walking difficult. A road between Suryapeta and a village three miles from Haripur is now being surfaced and private passenger buses have already started plying over it. The Haripur villagers now travel by cart, or cycle, or on foot the three miles distance and take the bus for town.

Village administration

Haripur may best be described as a semi-feudal village. For about a hundred years a Niyogi Brahmin family was recognized by the Nizam of the Hyderabad state as the Deshmukh and Deshpande of the village. Deshmukh or

¹A pseudonym.

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Deshpande are the honorary hereditary titles conferred by the Nizam on those who have been helpful to his government either in the matter of maintenance of village land records or village law and order. The general public calls the holders of these titles "Dora," the lord. In addition to the title, the Deshmukh family was granted about fifty acres of "seri," partially rent-free, wetland and an honorarium of about Rs. 85/ per annum. The honorarium, or the so-called "rusum" though paltry in amount, carried with it prestige and certain other privileges. However, as a result of the abolition of the princely and jagirdari² system, the Deshmukhs and Deshpandes in the state have ceased to receive the "rusum" and they are now required to pay full tax on the "seri" lands.

For a long time the village was administered by the government through three village officials; patwari, Mali Patel and Police Patel. The three positions are hereditary and honorary. Patwari is the village accountant and does the job of preparing and keeping revenue records. Transfers of land, recording of ownership, tenant rights, etc., have to be carried out through him. The Mali Patel is in charge of the collection of revenue from the Pattadars (owners) or from the tenants in accord with the demand sheet

²'Jagir' is a free gift of villages to one. The awardee is called Jagirdar. The Jagirdari system was abolished in 1949.

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prepared by the Patwari. He is also responsible for depositing the amount so collected with the treasury at the taluk headquarters. The Police Patel looks after the police functions such as maintenance of law and order, reporting to the police officials cases of theft, murder, or any sort of crime, and even a possible threat of disorder and violent conflict. Until the introduction of the panchayati raj in 1959 the police patel was also responsible for maintaining records of births and deaths, collecting of fines from the owners of the impounded cattle, and reporting to the higher authorities the incidence or outbreak of epidemics and asking for relief measures. All such functions are now undertaken by the village panchayat. In this village, contrary to usual patterns, all three official positions are held by the members of the Deshmukh family. About fifty years ago the three brothers of the family had their property divided among themselves and each of them inherited one of the three positions. Now their sons hold them.

Payments made to these village officials in lieu of their services are in the nature of honoraria. The Patwari is paid about five percent and the police and mali patel are paid about two and a half percent each out of the land revenue collected each year from the village. For about 10 years, in recognition of the increasing load of work and the increasing cost of living, the Patwari, Mali Patel and Police Patel are also paid a monthly salary of about 30, 25 and 25 rupees respectively. Notwithstanding

[illegible]

the small amount of remuneration, the positions are coveted in view of the status and prestige attached to them. Of the three, the Patwari post is more sought after as it is vested with the authority to control land records and land revenue. The position of police patel requires a strong man who would have the ability to deal with the situations of conflict in a tactical way.

Traditionally, these three village officials were assisted in the performance of their duties by two types of menial servants: two sethsindis and about ten yetti madigas. Of the two sethsindis, one is a member of the Mala, an untouchable caste; and the other belongs to the Islamic religious group. As the name denotes, Yetti madigas come from the other untouchable Madiga caste. Brothers of each of these families perform their duties by turns, normally one each year. The sethsindis assist the village officials by performing duties such as calling villagers as required, carrying tapals (mail) from the village to the taluk headquarters, and watching the village assisted by the madigas. The duties of the madigas include: assisting the sethsindis, doing odd jobs for the officials, watching and grazing the impounded cattle and making public announcements in the community through the beat of the drum. As partial remuneration these servants were granted by the Nizam tax-free "inam" (gift) lands, about 30 acres each for the Sethsindis and about 40 acres for all the Yetti madigas. Almost ten years ago the popular Congress government

declared ownership rights over these "inam" lands by levying full revenue. The Madigas are no longer required to do any service except that of making public announcements by the beat of drum as and when required by the officials. The sethsindis continue to perform the age-old duties but are paid a monthly salary of about Rs. 33/each a month.

At this juncture it may be pointed out that consequent upon a judgment from the Supreme Court of India, all the village posts are now treated as being non-hereditary. As a reaction to this, the village officials have been demanding the government for payment of compensation for the loss of hereditary rights. The government however is still giving preferential treatment to the sons of the present incumbents of these positions. So far the only qualification required of any village official is simply to pass once a test given by the government each year.

Besides the administrative staff mentioned above, the Nizam government of Hyderabad maintained in the village, as in other villages, various functionaries whose services were available to the officials visiting the community. These functionaries included; a potter, a carpenter, a barber, a washerman and a begari, the village sweeper. The potter would supply earthen pots and cooking utensils, and if required, would cook food. The carpenter would make necessary repairs to the wooden gates of village water tanks, and to the gates of the places where the impounded cattle are kept, and would undertake necessary repairs to the chairs

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and cots used by the visiting officials. The barber would cut hair and do some massage. The washerman would wash clothes and make beds. Finally, the sweeper would keep the choultry (public house) clean. While each of these functionaries belonged to the respective professional castes, the sweeper belonged to the mala caste. In lieu of their services each was granted $3/4$ tax-free inheritable "inam" lands ranging between 6 and 20 acres. Brothers in each of such families provide the services by turns and distribute the lands among themselves. About ten years ago these "inam" lands were declared "rytwari" or "khalsa" with full ownership rights over them, and the owners were no longer required to do the traditional "yetti" services. Revenue, in full, is now levied on these lands.

A word of explanation might be useful at this stage. All the services as performed by the "inam" land grantees came to be referred to as "yetti" meaning literally services for no payment. The village officials and the Deshmukhs used to demand their services for no or little payment in the form of tips on almost every occasion, private or public. This amounted to slavery. There was also a time when the village businessmen and merchants were expected to supply food-stuffs to the visiting officials at no or at nominal costs. The Congress and Communist parties decried this system and accordingly this "yetti" practice has been abolished. Even so, the age-old practice

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still continues to some extent. The researcher found such functionaries doing some odd services for the visiting officials, even now.

Social Stratification:

The population of Haripur is stratified into a number of endogamous hierarchical caste groups, each of which is again divided into exogamous surname or family name groups. A proper understanding of the functioning of the stratification system may require a brief explanation of the Hindu social system as it evolved through generations.

The Hindu social system was traditionally divided into four broad strata called Varnas. This division was based upon the nature of occupation and ritual purity. These four varnas were: The Brahmins (the priests and intellectuals), the Kshatriyas (the warriors and kings), the Vysyas (the merchants and businessmen), and the Sudras (the manual workers). The untouchables were subsequently added as the last rung to the hierarchical social ladder. The first three varnas were of "baptized" through upansayana (the sacred thread wearing ceremony for males), prior to marriage. This ceremony was a mark of spiritual rebirth and accordingly these were called the Dvijas, the twice-born. While the Brahmins and Vysyas remained tee-totallers, the second rank Kshatriyas did not but avoided beef eating. The Sudras were not baptized and continued to be non-vegetarians. Obviously they too accepted the Brahmanical

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social and ethical order and as such avoided beef eating. Those who continued to eat beef and to work with leather came to be treated as polluted and therefore untouchables. As one could imagine, the Sudra varna was quite large and therefore it was divided into different sub-groups or castes (jatis) on the same principle of difference in occupation and ritual purity. The result was that there came to be numerous caste-groups within the Sudra varna and these varied in name from region to region.

A perusal of the village and caste studies show that the Kshatriya caste as such is non-existent in a number of areas in the Southern states of India. Many local rulers belonged to the Sudra agricultural castes. Further, some of those relatively low caste groups which perceived status inconsistency, for they had political power and wealth but not correspondingly high social status, rebelled against the Brahmanical hegemony. In an attempt to sanskritize³ (or brahmanize) themselves and raise the status thereby, some have also donned the sacred thread. Those who rebelled in vain and were not reaccepted or reabsorbed into the socio-religious order, probably were treated as outcasts or outlaws.

³ See: Srinivas, M.N.: A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization, in Bendix and Lipset, (ed): Class, Status and Power, The Free Press, New York, 1966, pp. 552-560.

The Visva Brahmin group of smiths and carpenters seems to be a case of such sort. As a passing reference, mention may be made of the interesting fact that at a time when the British ruled India, the Brahmins were first to become westernized (or desanstritized!) and at that time the Sudras, though they were in competition with the Brahmins, were sanskritizing themselves, and in addition were also becoming westernized.

In our village there are 22 castes grouped into four varnas: The Brahmins, The Vysyas, the Sudras and the Harijans⁴ (untouchables or scheduled castes). Apparently the Kshatriya varna is not found here. The twenty-two castes are stationed in the following chart at appropriate levels of ranking in accord with the local behavior patterns of the castes toward each other.

We have said earlier that the castes are generally graded on the basis of occupation and ritual purity. While this is largely true, it is difficult to say objectively which caste follows an occupation of a higher order of purity. In fact each caste, particularly in the middle range among the Sudras, claims to be equal if not superior to the other. Under the circumstances the two criteria which appeared most useful for the purpose of ranking the castes in a given community, are: (1) the practice

⁴This is a word given to untouchables by Mahatma Gandhi. 'Harijans' means children of God. Since they are scheduled in the Constitution of India, they are called 'Scheduled Castes.' They are granted special privileges.

relating to inter-dining and (2) the inter-personal behavior and words used at the time of addressing one another. An examination of the literature on caste studies gives the impression that researchers have rarely given the latter element due consideration. It appears pertinent to analyze the interpersonal behavior pattern as it actually takes place in the field, for such behavior would give clues to the understanding of the structural change and its direction as well.⁵ (Chart I showing ranking of the castes in the village is attached).

In Haripur two castes are regarded as being of equal rank when there is either the practice of inter-dining or when they do not take food at the hands of one another, and, also when interpersonal behavior is on the basis of perfect equality. The lower castes accept cooked food at the hands of the upper castes, but not vice versa. In case a man is seated on chair or a cot, he would stand up at the sight of a member of the upper castes. In an assembly or meeting, the lower the rank, the greater the distance one would sit or stand from the upper caste. The untouchable is expected to sit or stand at a long distance from the Brahmin. There was a time when no one in the village dared to smoke in the presence of the "Dora."

⁵For a comprehensive ethological treatment of the caste structure of the area, See: Dube, S.C., Indian Village, Routledge Kegan, Paul, London, 1954. I am only pointing to those facts which are not mentioned in his treatment.

CHART NO.1: SHOWING HIERARCHY OF CASTES IN HARIPUR

Caste

rank-level

I <u>Brahmin Varna</u>		
1	(1)(a) Vaidiki Brahmin (priest)	(b) Niyogi Brahmin (Deshmukh) (Administrator)

II <u>Vysya Varna</u>		
2	2. Komati (Business)	

III <u>Sudra Varna</u>		
3	(3)Muslim (4)Reddi or Kapu	(5) Telaga (Agri-culture) (5)Gaundla (oil pressing) (7) Visva Brahmin Kamsali and Kammari (Smithy)
4	(8)Golla (Shepherd)	(9)Kummari (Potter) (10)Mutrase (Agri-culture and Fruit selling) (11)Mere (Stitch-ing) (12)Sale (weaver)
5	(13)Gaundla (Toddy tapper)	
6	(14)Pusala (Vendor)	(15)Chakali (Washerman) (16)Mangali (Barber)
7	(17)Vaddera (earth-work & pig raising)	(18)Yerakala (pig-breeding, and soothsaying) (19)Lambadi (ex-tribals agriculture)

IV <u>Untouchables or Harijans</u> (including Christian converts)		
8	(20)Mala (Agricul-ture and weaving)	(21)Madiga (Leather work)

Note: Within parentheses are given the English equivalent of each caste or the ascribed occupation of each caste.

There is a difference in the usage of the terms of address depending upon the relative status of the addressee. If the addressee belongs to an upper caste, a suffix "garu" is added to the name as an expression of deference or regard; if the addressee is of equal or of not very low status the name of the person is uttered as it is, and, if the addressee is of a lower caste, his name will be either uttered or twisted depending upon the degree of social distance as practiced at that time in the community. To illustrate the point with reference to the chart. Suppose there is a man named "Ramayya" at each of the rank levels and in each of the castes. If it is a Brahmin who is speaking, he would address one at the second and third levels as "Ramayya," and would address others belonging to the lower ranks as "Ramaya," or "Ramiga" or "Ramulu." If it is a Mutrasa stationed at the rank level four, he would address members of other castes of the same rank level as "Ramayya", using the name as it is, members of ranks 3, 2 and 1 as "Ramayya garu," and members of ranks 6, 7 and 8 as "ramiga," "Ramaya," or "Ramulu." Sometimes the members of the castes of adjacent rank levels do not either use words denoting deference or lack of it. Instead, they use words signifying equal status. For example, the Mutrasa at rank level 4 would call the one at rank level 5, as "Ramayya," even though the latter would take food at the hands of the former and on that count the latter is of a lower caste than the former. In the same way, the Vysyas and Reddis address one

another with names or even sometimes with fictitious kinship terms signifying closeness. Of particular significance is the other practice that the Reddis and Telagas of rank level 3 eat food at the hands of all the castes of rank level 4, and the later also eat from the former. Yet the fact remains that the members of the rank level 3 are considered of a higher order and accordingly they are addressed by those of rank level four with deference.

As we can observe from the chart, the Kammari and Kamsali castes are Hindus, no doubt, since they believe in the basic tenets of Hinduism and the trinity of gods. But as once rebellious against Hinduism or Brahmanism, they have been outlawed, and there is no inter-dining between them and any of the other caste groups. Yet, from the point of interpersonal behavior noted above, they are ranked at level 3. Of course, today the castes of levels 7 and 8 are reported eating at the hands of these. Kammari and Kamsali (together with other three castes not found in Haripur), are engaged in handicrafts and are called Visva Brahmins. Separate names are given only to mark their occupation. Otherwise they inter-dine and inter-marry.

In the chart we also notice two other religious groups in the community. They are Muslims and Christians. Muslims as a matter of principle should eat from everyone, but in practice, under the impact of the Hindu system, they eat food only at the hands of the castes ranking five and above, and no one other than the untouchables eat at their hands.

Yet, from the point of interpersonal behavior they are ranked equal to the castes of the rank level three. The Christians in the village are those converted from the Malas and Madigas, and for all practical purposes they are treated as members of these caste groups. Malas and Madigas do not interdine just as is true of their Christian converts.

Before concluding the explanation of the local phenomenon of caste and caste behavior, let us examine two important changes in the rural behavior patterns relevant to an understanding of the socio-political behavior in the village. As we have observed before, an individual "Ramayya" of the lower castes or of the untouchable caste is addressed by the individuals of the upper castes in the tone of "Ramiga," "Ramaya" and "Ramulu." Of these three terms, the term "Ramulu" is respectful or less inferior than the other two. Hence, those individuals from lower castes who are either politically important or who are wealthy are addressed in the third way. Consequent upon politicization and modernization, more and more individuals of lower castes with some political or economic status are being so addressed. But what is important to note is the fact that in the ultimate analysis the status of an individual of the caste system, unlike the status of one in the class system, is linked with the status of his caste group as a whole. As such, unless the status of his caste group as a whole undergoes a change, the lonely individual's status rise is always vulnerable.


Secondly, it has been observed that the taboo on interdining and sitting shoulder to shoulder with the untouchable is adhered to in the village, but not in the town. As many local people have observed, in the village the realities and necessities of life, together with the control of the Gemeinschaft-like social order, compel the individuals of the higher ranks not to mix freely with the lower castes. The upper caste individuals, of course, would mould behavior to the extent essential in a particular situation. Hence somewhat liberal behavior towards the untouchable, though restrained, can be observed in the changed political context. It is a paradox that each one wants to raise his own status relative to other castes and none wants an individual from the lower caste to become one's equal, if not superior.

Thirdly, in this village, as in the region, many of the Vaischnavite Niyogi Brahmin Deshmukhs have been, contrary to Brahmanical prescription, for a long time non-vegetarians and were also used to drinking alcohol. Their ladies have been, until about the time of Police Action of the Hyderabad State in 1968 and shortly after that, in Purdah, that is wearing the veil. These two practices apparently have been adopted from the Reddi Deshmukhs of the area and the Muslim rulers of the time, probably as a matter of competition with the peers in administration, and imitation of the rulers or superiors, to the neglect of religious prescriptions!

Social Ecology:

Haripur, exhibits, as do most Indian villages, peculiar ecological features. As we can see from the map 2 below, each caste group tries to reside in a particular block or locality of its own. On the main street are located, more or less in clusters, one after the other, the important upper caste groups: The Brahmins, Komatis (Vysyas), Kamsalis and Reddis, followed by the Kammara, Sale, Gandla, Mutrasa, Golla, Gaondla and Vaddera. To the north, on a street Telagas and Chakalis reside. To the south are Malas and further south in isolation are the Madigas. The dispersion of the caste groups as we see from the map attached, is the outcome of population growth and consequent congestion which compelled these families to move out of the main street and build houses at other locations. As a result we find the lower level Sudra castes and also the Vysya families building houses on the same street on which the Mala untouchable caste reside. We can however, see the tendency, even after dispersion, for a given caste, insofar as possible to build houses in a cluster. As we will see later, this sort of clustering of castes has its own impact on the nature of political and voting behavior in that a particular caste group becomes dominant in one ward. The two Lambadi hamlets of the village at a distance of one mile are again two clusters in themselves.

MAP 2
VILLAGE HARIPUR



Occupational Choice and Land Distribution

As we have noted, the Hindu social system ascribed occupation on the basis of one's birth into a particular caste group. Presumably it worked well in a society with primitive agricultural and agricultural-based cottage industrial economy. As the economy became more and more mechanized and industrialized, there was a corresponding decline in the cottage industries such as oil pressing and weaving. As population too increased by leaps and bounds, not only the traditional agricultural castes needed more of land, but the service castes also had to go in for agriculture since making a living out of their traditional professions such as washing and haircutting seemed difficult. Consequently, despite the vagaries of nature and the resulting frequent failure of crops, pressure on land increased in the villages since land was considered the source of security. Agrarian unrest is largely a by-product of this intense competition for the land which has become so scarce.

In our village, except the Brahmins and three Komati (or Vysya) families, all work on the farms and do manual labor such as laying roads and digging wells when necessary, irrespective of the traditional assignment of these occupations. The Brahmins related that they would not consider manual work intrinsically debasing, but have been hesitant to take to it out of mere fear of social ostracism. No one in the community considers it a matter against the style of life of his caste to take to sheepraising

and business. The agricultural castes do raise sheep and some of the Harijan Malas are in business. Pig raising is still considered an activity to be undertaken by the lower castes among the Sudras and by the Harijans. Smithing and carpentry are regarded quite respectable jobs, but they are not practiced by other than the respective caste groups for the reason that the particular caste groups, namely Kamsalis and Kammaras, consider it their right. The villagers also do think that way. Moreover, these jobs require specific training in the skills and such skills are not possessed by other caste groups. The case of toddy-tapping is similar. The jobs of washing, haircutting, pot-making, and leather making are not however considered respectable by others. Hence they are strictly followed only by the respective caste groups. Even these service castes themselves consider it defiling to follow any job other than the one traditionally assigned to each of them. The job of village priest is done by the Vaidiki Brahmin and no one wants really to aspire to it.

As we can see from the Appendix No. 2, almost all the caste groups in the village possess lands. As on July 10, 1968 out of the total of 413 families, distributed over 22 castes in the village, 218 or 52.7 percent of the families owned land ranging between one and 350 acres. We may note that between the years 1945 and 1968 the total land possessed by the villagers of Haripur declined from 2,666

to 1,802 acres. Further, during the same period there was a net gain in the case of only six caste groups and there was a net loss in the rest of the 16 groups. Among those who gained are: Vaidiki Brahmin (the priest), Komati, Reddi, Gaundla, Mala, Kamsali and Vaddera. Among those who suffered greatest loss are: Deshmukh Brahmins, Muslims, Golla, Mutrasa, Madiga and Chakali.

It is also significant to note the fact that of the losers those who suffered losses consistently, period after period, were the Deshmukh families, followed by Muslims, Lambadis and Madigas. The Deshmukhs lost about 75 acres to the protected tenants under the land reform legislation. Some of their properties were disposed of in order to maintain their families, in the marriage of daughters, and in educating the children. Two families are said to have sold out their properties as the male heads of the families became seriously addicted to alcohol. Two families however, acquired some property in the towns. The Muslims too sold out their lands to maintain themselves and to pay for ceremonies. The two groups of Deshmukhs and Muslims had their heyday under the Nizam and with his fall these groups too crumbled. These two groups are known for their inability to invest in land and to obtain greater yields. They have their lands cultivated through laborers and much of their income goes toward maintenance of the laborers. Out of a total of 8 owners in the village who leased out their lands to sharecroppers, one is Deshmukh and four are Muslims,

the remaining being one each from Gandla, Madiga and Telaga castes. It is interesting to note that the Lambadis had a good amount of land at their disposal in the year 1946 and in the year 1953 acquired some under protected tenancy, yet, they showed consistent losses period after period. The Madigas too had substantial property in the year 1946 but lost in subsequent years. In the year 1963 some of them acquired about 6 acres under the government scheme of distribution of unowned cultivable land in the village to the poor and particularly to the Harijans, Mala and Madiga. Even so their position did not become better in this respect. It is said by the village Patwari and others that these low caste groups raise loans indiscriminately and then sell away their lands towards repayment of loans. In fact many of them do not own more than an acre each and this small size would not help them substantially.

Of those castes which gained land consistently, the Komati caste is the foremost. Of the 6 Komatis, of course, only one who possessed land in the year 1946 gained much over the period of time. He is the big money lender in the village. The Reddis and Gsaundlas, though gaining, the acreage gained is not considerable. The Vaidiki Brahmin priest again made consistent progress during the period. Malas made overall good progress and many were benefitted by land distribution. Some families progressed on account of money lending too.

Looking at the overall picture of land distribution in the village as it stands in the year 1968, we note that the money lenders acquired more land over the period and, despite losses, Brahmins still own a higher proportion of all land possessed by the villagers. They are followed by Gaundla, Reddi, Grolla, Lambadi, Mala, Komati, Madiga and Telaga, in that order. The Muslims lost considerably during the period. The Golla and Gaundla are the populous groups followed by Lambadi, Madiga, Mala, Vaddera and Mutrasa. The remainder are few in number.

Employment of Agricultural Laborers:

In Haripur, agriculturists who have large sized farms or whose families are small, usually employ agricultural laborers. These laborers are of two types: one is employed on a yearly basis and the other is employed when necessary during the intensive seasons of agricultural operations. As of June, 1968, in the village there were about 210 families owning little or no land, and who depend upon manual labor, largely farm labor. Except the women of Brahmin, Komati, rich Reddi and some rich Telaga castes all other women do work on the farm of transplanting and cutting crops.

Out of the 210 families mentioned above, there are about 150 laborers working on a yearly basis. Of these, 98 are employed by 46 families in our village and the rest go to work in the surrounding villages. Almost all of those who work outside belong to the Lambadi group. As we have

seen earlier, the Brahmins and some of the Komatis do not work on farms except as supervisors. Hence, four such families employ a total of 34 laborers, while the remaining 32 families employ the other 64 laborers. Of the labor population, Madigas and Lambadis are in largest proportions.

Patron-Client System:

As in other peasant communities of India, in Haripur many of the families of the occupational castes such as the carpenter, the leather worker, barber, washerman and potter render their services to the other caste groups. Each family of the servicing caste is normally attached to its patrons agricultural family more or less permanently, receiving "mera", the annual payment in kind, during the harvesting seasons. They are also attached to non-agriculturists, but in that case payments are made monthly or annually in kind or cash. The services rendered by these clients to their patrons or "Yajamanis" on payment of the "mera" are of this nature: The carpenter makes new iron and wooden agricultural implements and also makes repairs to the same. The leather worker supplies leather slippers and also leather goods essential for agricultural purposes. The barber cuts hair. The washerman washes clothes each day and also scrubs and cleans the cooking metal utensils of the Brahmins. And the potter supplies earthen cooking utensils. Whenever special services are rendered, the clients are accordingly "tipped" or paid.

The special services rendered to the patrons are in this form: the carpenter builds houses, carts and makes furniture; the leather worker, who is also drum beater, beats the drum on festive occasions; the barber helped in making bathing arrangements for the relatives; the washerman goes to other villages so as to invite relatives and carries palanquin in marriages; and, then, the potter supplies earthen pots necessary during celebrations. In this village there is only one Brahmin priest and he officiates at all marriages except those of the 6th, 7th, and 8th ranks of the hierarchy chart given earlier. He is paid piecemeal even though he is presented gifts at harvest times.

In Haripur all of the families in each of the service caste groups do not render the traditional services and all of the families from among the rest of the population are also not served on the basis of "mera" payments. The lower castes of fifth rank and below generally do their own washing and hire other services as and when necessary. The servicing families serve each other on the basis of service-exchange or barter system.

It may be essential to point out here the fact that the service castes sometimes function in the form of labor unions. In case there is any trouble between the patron and the client, no one else from the client caste would do the service unless the original client decides it for himself or through his caste council. Only when the caste council and the patron of his caste concerned do not agree

to any acceptable settlement, the matter is taken to the council of village elders which may or may not be the same as the elected village panchayat under the Panchayati Act.

Further, it was observed that slowly the villagers as patrons, wish to do away with the traditional service system as they find that many of the articles necessary for agricultural operation or for household consumption can now better be had from the town in the form of ready made goods and at a lesser cost. Consequently, the client castes, reported a gradual decline in their earnings.

Basic Socio-Demographic Features;

Now let us give brief consideration to certain demographic features of the village.

Types of families; As is evident from Appendix No. 3, despite the idealization of the joint family in India, the village exhibits a larger proportion of nuclear than joint families. The joint families account for only 36% of all families. Of the total 139 joint families there are 105 consisting of two generations, i.e., father and married sons living together. The rest are joint families of married brothers living together. The upper and agricultural families however have a larger proportion of joint families than the lower, and non-agricultural castes. Probably this explains the tendency on the part of the agricultural peasants to maintain joint living. Only six males in the village had two wives.

Households and housing: The 413 households in the village are accomodated in 380 houses. Thus while 327 families own separate houses of their own, small or big, 66 families live in 33 houses, two each.

Like other villages in the region, Haripur has mainly two types of mud-wall houses, thatched and tiled. The poor build one-room thatched houses, and those who are somewhat better off build two-room thatched or tiled houses. The very poor live in circular huts although this is rare. For a long time the village had only one two-storied tiled house owned by the Deshmukh family and for the first time in 1940 that the eldest of the Deshmukhs built a terraced lime and brick house. After the Police Action, however, one terraced one and two two-storied houses of lime and brick were built by another Deshmukh, the village priest, and the village Komati money lender, respectively.

As a general practice, cattle sheds are built on the farms. But those who do not own farms keep the one or two cattle they have in the living room or in a shed adjacent to the main house. Milk cattle in season are, however, kept in the sheds close to the residences.

Sex, Marital status, and education: Out of the total population of 2,327 the male and female population is 51.3 and 48.7 percent respectively. Of the total, married and widowed persons account for 53%. It is significant to note that not only the entire population 20 years and above, but

also some below that age are married. As can be expected the married population below 20 years of age are more largely females than males. Again, among the widowed we find females more frequently than the males. Over 70% of the widows and widowers are over 40 and 45 years of age, respectively.

Haripur is backward in education. Only about 15 percent are educated in the sense of reading and writing Telugu. Of the 342 educated, 200 belong to the younger generation of less than 20 years of age. The only primary school in the village reports about 250 students on its rolls, but average attendance is not more than 100 a day. The figure of 342 excludes youngsters attending school in the first two years of schooling. As is apparent from the Appendix 3, female education still is at a very low level.

As we see many of the educated persons are found in the upper castes and among the Muslims. In the village there are 7 who have passed high school and one who has passed College level (B.A.) of education. Of the 7 one belongs to the Reddi caste, one is from Telaga caste, two are Brahmins and the other three are Muslims. All are employed in government service. Only the Reddi caste member is working as a teacher in the village itself. All the others are spread out in the region.

CHAPTER IV: POWER AND CONFLICT DURING THE PRE-PANCHAYATI RAJ PERIOD (1945-58)

In this chapter we analyze the nature of political power and conflict in Haripur during the period before the introduction of panchayati raj in 1959. Our data suggests the desirability of dividing this period into two sub-periods: 1945 to 1948 and 1949 to 1958. The year 1948 was important in that it was the year in which popular political movements, including the Communist revolt became intensive and the princely state of Hyderabad was terminated through police action by the central government of India. This naturally made a sharp difference in the pre- and post-police action political organization of the region, and of the community under study as well.

Theoretically the pre- and post-police action periods may be properly treated as the period of pre-political democratization and the period of political democratization, respectively. Accordingly, the following working hypotheses are formulated as guidelines for the analysis of the data.

A. Pre-politically democratized period.

Hypothesis number 1.

"In a traditional, semi-isolated community of a pre-politically democratized (i.e. feudal)

society, individuals of the lower social and economic strata do not enter into conflict with the traditional power holders of the upper social and economic strata."

B. Politically democratized period.

Hypothesis number 1.

"Consequent upon societal political democratization, at the community level political power and hereditary social (ritual) status tend to become autonomous and economic dominants begin to assume more power than before. Hereditary public office ceases to be important."

Hypothesis number 2.

"In the initial stages of societal political democratization political conflict at the community level tends to be centered around individuals belonging to the upper but closely adjacent social and economic strata."

Before we move on to the analysis of the material, let us be clear that the analysis itself is woven around certain significant and concrete events with the belief that this would help us group the interplay of different, yet related, forces relevant to a given situation.

1945-1947: The Pre-Communist Revolution Period.

Around the years 1945 to 1947 and for a long time before, the village Haripur was more or less under the

domination of the eldest of the Deshmukh brothers, Sri Deshmukh No. 1.¹ He was the biggest landlord in the village and was also the Police Patel. One of his cousins, Deshmukh No. 2, was the Mali Patel. The Patwari title holder among the Deshmukhs was dead, leaving behind a widow and two sons who were minors. Therefore Sri Reddi No. 1 was temporarily appointed Patwari. The Mala Patel and Patwari, as they themselves confessed, never dared to act against the wishes of Deshmukh No. 1. All the menial servants and the service castes in the village were obedient to him.

The Deshmukh No. 1 would wield his influence and authority through the council of village elders (see Table 1). The members of the Council during the period, as revealed by the fifteen interviewees,² numbered about eight excluding the Deshmukh No. 1. Caste-wise, their affiliations were: One Reddi, three Gaundla, one Mutrassa, one Pusala, one Vaddera, and one Madiga. All were more than 45 years of age. Of the eight members other than the Deshmukh,

¹Generally pseudonyms are given to the persons after their castes. For example if one belongs to Reddi caste he is called Sri (Mr.) Reddi. In case more than one person appears from the same caste, each of such persons is also given a number such as Reddi No. 1, Reddi No. 2 -- etc., in the order they appear in the text. However, the Deshmukh Brahmins are simply called Deshmukh No. 1, Deshmukh No. 2 -- etc.

²Out of the twenty-five knowledgeable selected for interview on matters of village leadership, only fifteen were of the age of about 42 years. Only people of this age could tell anything about the period 1945-47. The younger ones did not have a clear idea of that period.

Table 1
Council of Village Elders; 1945-47

Srl. No.	Pseudonym	Age	Education	Land Owned in acres	Positions, if any
1					
1	Sri Deshmukh No. 1	45	Urdu & Telugu (R&W)	236	Deshmukh & police Patel
2	Sri Reddi No. 2	47	--	32	Eldest in the Caste
3	Sri Gaundla No.1	52	--	32	Well-to-do
4	Sri Gaundla No.2	54	--	35	Well-to-do
5	Sri Gaundla No.3A	52	--	--	Caste head
6	Sri Mutrasa No.1	48	--	15	Caste head
7	Sri Pusala No. 1	54	--	--	Caste head
8	Sri Vaddera No. 1	40	--	1	Caste head
9	Sri Madiga No. 1	50	--	4	Caste head

R & W = Read and Write

six were the then heads of the respective caste groups and only two of the Gaundla caste were taken on the Council, purely on the basis of individual merit. Except the Deshmukh, others were uneducated. The Deshmukh was well conversant with Urdu and Telugu. At that time the court and state language was Urdu, and knowledge of it was highly valued since it made possible access to officials. Of the nine members, all but three, the Deshmukh No. 1, the Reddi and the Vaddera, are now dead. On the testimony of these three and five other knowledgeable it could be said that only three members, Sri Reddi No. 2, Sri Gaundla No. 1, and Gaundla No. 2, belonged to the inner circle of Sri Deshmukh No. 1. Obviously, these were the well-to-do families in their respective caste groups, and none of these two Gaundlas was a caste head. The other members were invited during public discussions of the village disputes. The Deshmukh No. 1, now settled in the taluk headquarters and who is now about 65 years old, confirmed this finding. On the nature of the selection of the members on the village council, he had this to say:

In those days the members of the council elders (Peddamanushyulu) were not elected. One was chosen more on the basis of one's capacity to express oneself and discuss well. Of course, first preference was always given to the caste heads, and only when they were not competent enough, others were selected. Very poor normally could not function effectively as such ones had to devote much time to family affairs and found it hard to take part regularly in the village discussions and meetings. Many of the elders were also from joint and/or well-to-do families.

Based on information elicited from the fifteen knowledgables as well as the Deshmukh No. 1 himself, it may be said that interpersonal disputes involving intra-caste conflicts were during this period largely left to be decided by the caste councils headed by the caste heads. Cases of this sort included disputes arising out of marital alliances such as divorce, dissension and even betrothal; and matters such as distribution of the patron families among the brothers of each of the servicing castes such as carpenters, washermen, and leather workers. Occasionally, the regional heads, provided such regional councils existed in case of a particular caste such as the Chakalis, or elders from among the neighboring villages were also invited as arbitrators. On many occasions, inter-caste disputes were referred to the village council. Disputes involving division of property and particularly landed property called for the presence of the village Patwari, since it was he who would maintain the land records. Nevertheless, all types of disputes, intra- or inter-caste, involving theft or violence were the concern of the police patel and hence, by virtue of his position as the police patel of the village, all such cases had to be referred to the Deshmukh No. 1.

It may be also necessary to mention in this context the fact that in the village Haripur, and also in the surrounding villages, the upper castes such as the Brahmins,

the Komatis, the Reddis and the Telagas did not have the institution of caste heads as such. Whenever a dispute arose, any one or two intelligent persons in the caste or even outside the caste (but not from the very low ones) agreeable to both disputing parties were invited as arbitrators. In case of other castes, the hereditary caste head was always present, even if someone else took the lead.

As to the stand taken by the elders in each dispute and the nature of punishment meted out to the accused, during the period, nine out of the fifteen interviewees felt that the disputes were settled fairly honestly taking into consideration the merits of each case in accordance with the accepted principles of justice and truth. Six, however, complained that on occasions the village elders took sides and influenced the Deshmukh No. 1, who would render the final verdict. In many cases the accused was fined and the amounts so realized were deposited with the Deshmukh No. 1. But, whether or not these monies were shared by all council members was clear to none. Of course, they felt a share of the amount went toward feeding the higher officials and the Police. Some share was also paid to the aggrieved party. Notwithstanding all such matters, the Deshmukh No. 1 pointedly indicated that during the period of about twenty years of his Pethanam (overlordship) no dispute in the village was ever referred to a court of law. He himself, however, had some disputes with his cousins and other landlords

in the neighboring villages and these had to be settled by the courts of law.

During the course of evening discussions³ with the village folk it was revealed that on occasion the accused, if one who committed theft or adultery, was beaten with Tamarind canes or was made to bend and a heavy stone was placed on his back until he confessed, taking a vow not to repeat the act again. This was, of course, limited to individuals of low castes (rank four and below as in the rank charter in Chapter 2) and/or to the poor ones. Thus, not only power but also justice were assymetrical during this period.

1947-50: The Period of Communist Revolution

In Nalgonda district, besides Sri Ravi Narayana Reddi, one Sri D.V. Rao⁴ emerged as the most influential Communist leaders. Sri Rao was a radical and was known as the first Niyogi Brahmin in the area to marry a widow. Many young men, Brahmin and non-Brahmin, came under his influence. A Brahmin regional youth leader and an activist, who was himself under the influence of Sri D.V. Rao, persuaded an energetic young man from Haripur to join the Communist infected Andhra Mahasabha, as early as 1945. This young man

³During this time when they were at ease the villagers made interesting remarks.

⁴Sri D.V. Rao is now an extremist. As Harrison says, Sri Reddi and Sri Rao led rival factions later. Harrison, s.s.: India: The Most dangerous Decades, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 244.

belonged to Pusala caste and accordingly we shall call him Sri Pusala No. 2. Soon Sri Pusala's friend Sri Kummari joined the Communist Party. Subsequently, by the time Communist agitation took the form of armed revolution in the year 1947, more young men became active members of the village communist band. Let us examine the background of all the members of the Communist village band (Dalam).

As is evident from table 2, all of the members were, at that time, in the age group 18 to 27. Six of them were without any landed property and were agricultural laborers. Others owned small sized farms only. Only Reddi No. 4 had property worth the name. Except four all were uneducated. In caste affiliations four were Pusala, three were Graondlas, and there was one each of the following castes: Reddi, Telaga, Mutrasa, Kummari and Madriga.

In line with their general policy, the Communists started their tirade first against the Deshmukh No. 1, the most influential and authoritarian figure in the village Haripur. A first attempt on his life was made in the early months of the year 1947. The Deshmukh managed narrowly to escape since he came to know of the plot through his own spies. From that time onward he began to stay in the taluk headquarters and would visit the village only now-and-then with necessary precautions. In the first attempt, the Communist band which attacked him were outsiders but they entered the village with the connivance of the village

TABLE 2
Members of the Village Communist Band

Srl. No.	Pseudonym	Age then	Education	Land owned by the family in acres	Position if any
1	Sri Pusala No.2	27	Telugu (R&W)	--	Leader
2	Sri Pusala No.3	25	--	--	--
3	Sri Pusala No.4	22	Telugu (R&W)	--	--
4	Sri Pusala No.5	19	--	--	--
5	Sri Graundla No.3	26	--	2	Son of caste head
6	Sri Gaundla No.4	25	--	4	--
7	Sri Gaundla No.5A	20	--	2	--
8	Sri Mutrasa No.2	27	--	--	--
9	Sri Kummari No.1	23	Telugu (R&W)	2	Deputy Leader
10	Sri Telaga No.1	25	--	3	--
11	Sri Reddi No.4	20	Telugu (R&W)	10	--
12	Sri Madiga No.2	18	--	--	--

R&W = Read and write.

communists. But, after about six months, when a second attempt was made on his life the local band was quite active. This time too Deshmukh No. 1 escaped by taking a swift ride on horseback to the town. Disappointed, the intruders dismantled and demolished his house, thus causing a loss worth about Rs. 10,000. As one narrated; "the Communist band took away even the cloth in the cradle, dropping the small baby in it on the hard floor and forcing the ladies to take the gold bangles off their hands."⁵ Grief stricken, the entire family of the Deshmukh moved to the town and has remained there ever since. The Deshmukh's lands were parcelled out among the poor villagers, including the Lambadis.

By this time three local Muslims, including the one who practiced law at the taluk headquarters, joined the ranks of razakars. These razakars would watch over the developments in the village and report to the government. Basing on such reports the Police would harass the suspects. Soon after the above incident relating to Deshmukh No. 1, Sri Pusala No. 2 and the other Sri Reddi No. 3, were arrested and jailed. Undeterred by this, the Communist band continued to bring pressure on the landlords for contributions to its party and forced the village officials not to cooperate with the officials at the higher echelons. Under

⁵ Taking off the bangles and keeping the hands bare, is a sign of widowhood.

this situation of stress and strain, the village acting Patwari Sri Reddi No. 1 moved to the town. Subsequently, three of the remaining Deshmukh families, and one of the Vaisya families, which was rich, moved on to the nearby villages in Munagala Paragana, a feudal enclave of about forty villages under the Indian Union. In order to protect their properties, all of these families paid donations to the Communist party. Even so, some of the lands of the three Deshmukhs and of the razakar Muslims were also distributed among the poor.

It is of interest to ask at this juncture the question: Why is it that Deshmukh No. 1 was singled out and treated so harshly by the Communists? One obvious and simple answer is that this Deshmukh was the real power wielder in the village. He was the richest person in the village and, unlike the others, he was outspoken in his condemnation of the Communists. Probably the villagers who suffered and who were suppressed under his authority felt happy to see him crushed. But, curiously enough, a strong rumor afloat in the village presented a different version. It was said that the area Brahmin leader mentioned above was responsible for inciting the Communists against Deshmukh No. 1, and he did this mainly for his own selfish reasons rather than for reasons of Communist ideology. This leader's parents had a dispute with Deshmukh No. 1 over the maintenance of an old woman, a common relative of theirs, and over the

management of her property. The leader⁶ was of the view that except for the interference of the Deshmukh No. 1 her property could have gone to his parents, who, according to him, were her rightful successors. Further, this Communist leader and Deshmukh No. 3, the brother of Deshmukh No. 1, married sisters and this relationship, it is alleged, made the former soft toward the latter. While the above noted relations were true, the inner motives of the leader are, however, unclear and this makes it difficult for us to arrive at any firm judgment.

To go back to our main discussion. We noted earlier that three of the local muslim families joined the razakar group and that their lands were distributed by the Communists among the villagers. The Deshmukh No. 1, the Patwari, and the Muslims found it precarious to visit the village. This angered the razakars very much. Many times the police warned the people but it was of no avail. Further, at the state level, the pressure on the Nizam mounted for acceding to the Indian Union. Maddened, the razakars increased their atrocities in a last effort to curb the popular forces. Consequently, in early September, 1948 they and the police made a surprise raid on Haripur and rounded up the people with a view to seizing the Communist workers and their sympathizers.

⁶ Subsequently about ten years later this leader defected to Congress party. He and Sri Deshmukh No. 1 became friends.

All the villagers, male and female, young and old, were made to assemble at one spot and the razakars picked up the suspects, one by one. All the fifteen persons apprehended in this way were made to stand side by side and, one by one, each was shot (see Table 3). All but one, a Golla, were killed. Caste wise, those executed were: 2 Reddis, 5 Gaundlas, 2 Gollas, 3 Mutrasas, one Mere, one Mala and one Madiga. Only two, one Gaundla and one Madiga were members of the village Communist band. All others were either sympathizers or relatives of the band members. All but one were uneducated and were within the age group 16 to 30. The only educated person was a young Reddi boy who came from a fairly well-to-do family. While this boy was alleged to have had Communistic leanings, the other Reddi was charged with providing shelter to his Communist brother, Sri Reddi No. 4 (see Table 2) who was a member of the local band. One Gaundla of 45 years of age was charged with the allegation that he had not been able to prevent his son from supplying food to the Communists. One Mere and one Mutrasa were found fault with for illegally occupying the lands of the Muslims. Of those summarily shot and killed, six were landless and seven held land varying from only one to six acres. The remaining two were Reddis and, one of them, the boy, came from a well-to-do family.

The above massacre was soon reported to the Communist leaders. They visited the village and made inquiries

TABLE 3
Persons Killed by Razakars

Srl. No.	Caste	Age	Education	Land owned by the family	Position if any
1	Reddi	30	--	16	--
2	Reddi	16	Telugu-reading	32	--
3	Graundla	22	--	2	Member of Communist band
4	Gaundla	45	--	5	--
5	Gaundla	16	--	6	--
6	Gaundla	35	--	--	--
7	Gaundla	20	--	3	--
8	Golla	25	--	3	--
9	Golla	20	--	--	(survived)
10	Mutrasa	35	--	2	--
11	Mutrasa	30	--	--	--
12	Mutrasa	24	--	--	--
13	Mere	36	--	--	--
14	Mala	19	--	1	--
15	Madiga	20	--	--	--

as to how it occurred. It was reported to them that the police and razakars did have a talk with a Reddi gentleman, age 54, and that he did not care to put in a word with the police against the murder of his cousin, the Reddi boy. This man was the father of the acting Patwari who moved to the town and his stay in the town further made the Communists suspect his father of a possible complicity with the police. With all furiousness, a decision was taken on the spot and the man was butchered.

The government of the Indian Union under the Congress Party took Police Action against the Nizam and the Nizam surrendered on the 17th of September 1948, two days after the above incident of murder in Haripur. Communists withheld their agitation. The Military Government of Hyderabad granted general amnesty to all those who were imprisoned by the previous regime. Accordingly Sri Pusala No. 2 and Sri Reddi No. 3 were released from the jail. The Deshmukhs, the Vaisya, and the acting Patwari, all those who had earlier migrated, returned home. The Deshmukh No. 1 however would not return.

Peace did not last long. After a brief lull, violence erupted again as the Communists hoped to dethrone the new government as well. The Deshmukh families soon left for the town. But this time there was not so much terror in this village as the razakar Muslims were by then imprisoned by the government and there was none to say a single word publicly against the Communist domination. Even so, as one

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of the local leaders explained, the villagers had not yet recovered from the terrible shock they received at the time of the massacre. Also they were not themselves enthusiastic about plunging into an armed revolution, even though they had a bitter feeling against the government for acting so brutally.

By the end of 1950, the Congress leaders of the region, accompanied by the Military and officials, began to make frequent visits to the village (as they did visit other villages too) with a view to dissuade the public from the influence of the Communists. In accordance with the general changing atmosphere of that time, about ten Communists in the village resigned from the village band. It was said that on one occasion, some of the resigned members of the Communist band helped the Military trap and round up three of the armed guerillas in the vicinity of the village. In the encounter two died and the third Sri Kummari was held and jailed. Sri Pusala No. 2 remained a Communist throughout this period, but reportedly did not have much to do with the village.

1951-1955: Post Police Action Period-Phase 1

Finally, by the end of the year 1950 the Communist party declared its decision to abandon the policy of armed struggle and, with that, normal life slowly returned to the village. The Deshmukh families, except that of Deshmukh No. 1, again returned to Haripur. But their economic position did not remain the same as it had been before the Communist

revolution. But this time they sold a good portion of their land and property for maintenance in the town after the Police Action and for maintenance in Munagala Paragana before it. Of course, three of them built houses constructed in the town since they felt it always safe to have some shelter for use in emergency situations.⁷ (A passing reference may be made of the fact that subsequently some other well-to-do families in the village⁸ acquired houses in the town with a view to diversify their properties and also to keep their children there for education). Having come back, they had to build-up their farming activities anew. The Deshmukh No. 1 and Deshmukh No. 3 too renewed their agriculture. Deshmukh No. 2 tried to renew but failed, and leased out his land. Deshmukh No. 4 subsequently sold his property and went out of agriculture. The Muslim razakar lawyer family too sold out much of its property in the village.'

No sooner normal conditions were restored in the village than the regional Congress leaders made frequent visits to the village. It was an opportune time for them since the Communists were at that time in a confused mood due to the failure of their strategy to overthrow the government

⁷ One family now sold its house for the purpose of performing marriage of their daughter.

⁸ A Komati, a Brahmin, and a Chakali -- All three are Congressites.

and also due to the fact that many of their leaders were in jail under charges of violence and murder. Under these conditions the Communists in Haripur were disheartened and could not openly oppose the activities of the Congress leaders. Having made contacts with the villages, the Congress leaders picked up some six persons to act as members of the village councils and to behave as their spokesmen in the village.

As we can see in the Table 4, out of the six chosen leaders, one was Reddi, two were Gaundla, one was Chakali, one Mala and the other was a Madiga. All of them were in the age group 36 to 48 and only two were educated. Sri Mala No. 1 and Sri Madiga No.3 were Christians. The Madiga was a Christian Preacher turned medical practitioner. He had come to this village some 20 years ago and had married a local Madiga woman and settled down in the village. We may recall, Sri Reddi No. 3 was one who was committed to jail during the Nizam regime and was released after the Police Action. He was believed to be sympathetic to Communists, but declared himself a Congressite. Sri Mala No. 1 did not profess any party affiliation. So did the two Gaundla members. Sri Madiga No. 3 was confirmed Congress Party member and Sri Chakali No. 1 threw himself strongly on the side of the Congress party.

None of the above six was a caste head. But each one of them was economically well off in their respective caste groups. The Chakali was fairly rich and came from these

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TABLE 4

Council of Elders Nominated by Congress in 1951

Srl. No.	Pseudonym	Age	Education	Land Possessed	Party Affiliation	Position if any
1	Sri Reddi No. 3	36	--	30	Com. Sympath. turned Cong. Neutral	--
2	Sri Gaundla No. 5	46	--	14	Neutral	--
3	Sri Gaundla No. 6	48	--	23	Neutral	--
4	Sri Chakali No. 1	43	--	25	Congress	Money-lender
5	Sri Mala No. 1	40	Telugu (R&W)	17	Neutral	Money-lender
6	Sri Madiga No. 3	40	Telugu (R&W) (reads some English too)	16	Congress	Medical doctor

R&W = Read and write.

families which have abstained for long time from practising their profession of washing. Sri Mala No. 1 and Sri Chakali No. 1 were petty money lenders too.

Asked to name the persons who were the village elders immediately after the Communist revolution was over, the 25 knowledgeable gave the names found in Table 5. If we compare Table 5 with Table 4, we can see that while there were only six members nominated to the village council by the regional Congress leaders, the knowledgeable listed about 8 members. Of these eight, surprisingly enough, the two who received the most nominations were the Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Pusala No. 2. The activists named all the eight as given in Table No. 5, but majority of the knowledgeable simply forgot those six nominated by the Congress. Of the six, Sri Reddi No. 3, Sri Gaundla No. 5 and Sri Madiga No. 3 scored higher than others. On probe, it was found that out of the six appointed by the Congress leaders, these three were more vocal in discussions of problems relating to the village. In fact, it was said, that this Council never met by itself without the presence of the regional Congress leaders. Thus the significant conclusion that could be drawn was that since this group of leaders was one which was appointed by the 'government'-supported Congress leaders without the involvement of local public in general, it did not command any local respect, and hence could not gain legitimacy. As a few have remarked, the government

TABLE 5

Nominations Received by the Village Elders During
the Period 1951-55

Srl. No.	Name of the Elder or Council Member	Nominations Received
1	Sri Deshmukh No. 3	22
2	Sri Pusala No.2	20
3	Sri Reddi No. 3	18
4	Sri Gaundla No.5	16
5	Sri Madiga No.3	16
6	Sri Chakala No. 1	13
7	Sri Mala No. 1	13
8	Sri Gaundla No.6	10

of that day being one ruled by the military, the village public, with its horrible experience of massacre at the hands of government police before, could not take its nominees as their own leaders. Added to that, none of the recognized leaders in the village was on the Council. The regional Congress leaders, in their effort not to have either the Communists or any Deshmukh (who were bracketed with Nizam and as having no experience of working with the Congress as public worker or leader) member, had to fall back upon those who did not possess any qualifications which could give them legitimacy. On the other hand, it raised doubts in the minds of the people. Sri Reddi No. 3 too could not command any respect worth the name for the simple reason that he has changed his affiliation from Communist to Congress party. Then the query would be: How did Sri Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Pusala No. 2 come on to the scene and become central figures?

The Two Dominant Figures: 1952-1955

As we have noted earlier, Sri Deshmukh No. 3, along with two other Deshmukh families returned home soon after normalcy came to the village. He was the blood brother of Deshmukh No. 1 the dominant figure under the Nizam regime, and while the latter was addressed Pedda-Dora (senior lord), the former was addressed China Dora (Junior lord). Sri Deshmukh No. 1 meanwhile appointed a Muslim, aged 50, as his deputy (gumasta) to look after the functions of Police Patel.

Soon after the Police Action the Muslims were naturally politically weak and as such the Muslim acting Police Patel was loyal to Sri Deshmukh No. 1 and would consult Sri Deshmukh No. 3 in matters relating to the performance of his duties. This gave added prestige to Deshmukh No. 3. Further, we should recall the fact that even before the Police Action the Communists were considerate toward him at least in part because he was related to the regional Communist leader himself. This built up among the public a kind of feeling of tolerance, if not reverence, toward him. Moreover, Sri Deshmukh No. 3 did not earn a bad name at any time before for he was largely looking after his agriculture when his elder brother was the dominant figure in the village. Thus many factors combined to place him in a coveted position at that time. The public would approach him for all sorts of advice and suggestions.

Sri Pusala No. 2, the Communist gradually settled down in the village. Initially he was calm and quiet in the sense that he did not take active part in village affairs for fear of oppression from the side of the government. He could not look up to the regional leaders for guidance since many of them, including his immediate past regional leader, were in jail. Unable to gauge the future political developments, as explained by him, he also could not dare to take initiative to make the local public rally behind him. Besides, those persons who resigned from the Communist party were hesitant again to come out in the open to support him. Nonetheless, he was confident he had local sympathy.

But, for practical reasons, he felt it better to join hands with Sri Deshmukh No. 3, who himself felt rather neglected by the regional Congress leaders and also, to some extent, by the Congress-chosen local members of the Council. The real attitudes of these two men toward the existing Council could be aptly represented by the following statements.

The Deshmukh No. 3 commented: "What could the members do? They did not know a,b,c of the ways of pacifying the public and approaching the officials. They never had such experience." Sri Pusala No. 2 remarked: "The public never placed confidence in them. They were simply proteges of taluka Congress leaders."

The alliance between Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Pusala No. 2 lead to the tilting of the balance of power in the village Council. Sri Reddi No. 3 came back to associate himself with Sri Pusala No. 2, his old Communist comrade and jailmate. Sri Gaundla No. 5 associated himself with Sri Deshmukh No. 3. It may be noted that the confidant members under Deshmukhs No. 1 were also those belonging to Sri Gaundla No. 5's lineage. It was reported that as a matter of customary allegiance to the Deshmukhs, he came to be a "yes" man of Sri Deshmukh No. 3. Sri Mala No. 1 remained neutral. The other mild Gaundla member too was neutral, and in fact, he seldom attended the village meetings. Consequently, the vocal members, Sri Chakali No. 1 and Sri Madiga No. 3, became a minority and their voice came to be

neglected. Sri Chakali No. 1 remarked: "Sir, you know, the people have a liking for the Doras and the Pusalas!" It was a sarcastic remark meaning "the people were playing in the hands of the Deshmukh No. 3 and the Communist Sri Pusala No. 2." Sri Madiga No. 3, perhaps, tried to be rational when he remarked: "In the general elections of 1952 this area elected the Democratic Front⁹ candidates. As the local leaders saw the results, they began to swing back to Communism. Of course, the Dora was Congress, but with a view to have his say in the village, he had to join hands with the Communist, Sri Pusala No. 2."

1955-56:

Emergence of New Leadership and the beginning of village Factions:

While this is how the political situation was taking shape under the above leaders, another person, a young Komati, was slowly building his potential for leadership. Sri Komati No. 1's father was for a long time a rich man in the village. Even though he did not own sufficient land in the year 1945, meanwhile over the years he acquired considerable property, largely owing to the profession of money lending. Ever after the Police Action, Sri Komati No. 1 gained control of the family, expanded his professional activity as well as agriculture and developed keen

⁹In 1952 Communists and other non-Congressites in Hyderabad state formed The Peoples' Democratic Front. Communists were however the dominant partners.

interest in the affairs of the village. Now he has many debtors in the village among all caste groups and even the Deshmukh No. 3 would now and then take loans from him.

Sri Komati No. 1 also advanced loans to Sri Pusala No. 2. The latter not only did not care to repay the loan, but began to urge others not to pay the exorbitant compound rates of interest levied on the sums advanced by the money lenders in general and by Sri Komati in particular. Sri Komati No. 1 became annoyed by this and pressed Sri Pusala No. 2 for repayment, but the latter would dodge. Having realized that Sri Pusala was trying to evade the payment of the loan, Sri Komati No. 1 began to court support of Sri Mala No. 1, the village elder, and Sri Mala No. 2, both of them being small money lenders. Among the village council members, Sri Reddi No. 3 was also his debtor and hence could also count on his support. As pre-planned, one day Sri Komati No. 1 pressed Sri Pusala to clear off the debt and asked the three above supporters who were present to go into the accounts and calculate the interest. Sri Pusala No. 2 accused all of them for complicity and for exploiting the poor by charging high rates of interest and for trying to keep the poor under their clutches. Heated discussions took place and during the course of exchange of words Sri Pusala used all sorts of abusive language. Feeling insulted, the four managed to have Sri Pusala beaten by a few people who were at hand waiting for orders. Those who did the beating were also, reportedly, the debtors of the three

money lenders and belonged to the Mala caste.

Before proceeding further, it may be stated that Sri Komati No. 1 had, in fact, advanced loans and also made some gifts to Sri Pusala No. 2 with a view of controlling him but had failed. Sri Komati No. 1 was well aware of the fact that Sri Pusala No. 2 was landless and there was no source from which he could earn income. All Sri Pusala No. 2 could do, as put by Sri Chakali No. 1, was to "scratch itching spots" in the village and make money by "professing application or prescription of medicine". Besides this, it is of interest to note the potential on the part of the money lenders as a class to come together and act in concert, and the potential to make use of their clients or debtors for their own ends.

Sri Pusala No. 2 received injuries. He had to be taken to the hospital in the town for medical treatment and the case had to be reported to the Police. Sri Komati and his group appealed to others not to take him to the town and appealed to the Police Patel not to report to the police. Nobody came forward to take Sri Pusala No. 2 to town. Sri Deshmukh No. 3, however, ignored Sri Komati and his associates, forced the Police Patel to report the matter to the Police and himself took Sri Pusala No. 2 to the town on his own cart. Sri Komati and party however rushed to the town and met Sri Deshmukh No. 1, the worst sufferer at the hands of Sri Pusala No. 2 and his communist band. Sr. Deshmukh No. 1 pacified his brother Deshmukh No. 3 and made Sri Komati

and his group bribe the police so as to make them more lenient and, if possible, drop the entire case. Much of the strength of the case depended upon whether or not Sri Pusala No. 2 was issued a certificate by the government doctor to the effect that he received serious blows. The upshot was that he did not. Sri Pusala No. 2 complained that Sri Deshmukh No. 1 was behind the whole affair and the Deshmukh No. 1, pleaded innocence of that, at least. Whatever it was, Sri Pusala No. 2 was helpless when Sri Deshmukh No. 3 conceded to his brother's request. Sri Deshmukh No. 3 was not that intent either upon stirring up things, for he was afraid of his own safety, too! As a compromise the medical charges were made to be borne by Sri Komati. As we notice Sri Deshmukh No. 1's influence was still considerable and he continued to be a force to reckon with.

A short period after this incident, another incident of violence took place, in a way related to the first one, generating a new dimension of conflict in the village. One Sri Gaundla No. 3, a former member of the village Communist band, had by then succeeded his father as the head of the Gaundla caste. One evening, reportedly in a drunken state, he abused the Mala caste as a whole and called them hypocrites for being responsible for the ill treatment and beating of Sri Pusala No. 2 who was only fighting injustice and corrupt practices on the part of the money lenders.

Especially he took the Malas to task who professed to be Communists and followers of Sri Pusala No. 2. This angered the Mala caste group as a whole, but the ones who were responsible for beating Sri Pusala No. 2 kept quiet this time and instigated the so-called Mala Communist workers. Infuriated, Sri Mala No. 3 (the panchayati President in 1967-68), a Communist and close follower of Sri Pusala No. 2, took hold of Sri Gaundla No. 3, slapped him and forced him to be silent. Obviously, this led to a conflict within the active communist group in the village. Further, Sri Gaundla No. 3 complained that even some of the Gaundlas, particularly those belonging to the lineage of Sri Gaundla No. 5 did not come to his rescue even though they had knowledge of the facts. The reason for this, he explained, was that his own lineage and the lineage of Sri Gaundla No. 5 were always at logger heads and the latter were always patronized by the Deshmukhs since they were well-to-do and exploiters of the poor. Thus, while the first incident resulted in a kind of class-conflict, the second resulted in a sort of caste-cum-lineage conflict. It also explains a situation wherein the old animosities were really recalled and interpretations were accordingly made whether a particular act on the part of an actor or a group was intended or not.

1956-1958: Post Police Action Period - Phase II

The cumulative effect of the two incidents was that the group of money lenders under the stewardship of Sri Komati

No. 1 became strong. Accordingly, this group consisted, besides Sri Komati No. 1, two Malas Sri Mala No. 1 and Sri Mala No. 2, both money lenders. Of course Sri Mala No. 2 is wealthier than Sri Mala No. 1. With a view to giving representation to other castes and particularly to the Reddi peasant caste, they almost co-opted Sri Reddi No. 3. In a way it was a kind of reward to Sri Reddi No. 3 for being with them during their conflict with Sri Pusala No. 2. Moreover, he changed his affiliation entirely to Sri Komati No. 1 and became a staunch Congressite.¹⁰ As, one of his cousins remarked, Sri Reddi No. 3 was, at that time, in need of money for his daughter's marriage and he could have a loan from Sri Komati No. 1 only if he would become Sri Komati's legman.

Despite the unity among four of its members, and their self installation as the village elders, they faced more or less the same situation of lack of legitimacy in the village. The villagers did not seem to repose confidence in them and they continued to approach Sri Deshmukh No. 3 for various purposes. Sri Deshmukh No. 3 however, would not take interest in the village affairs. As about ten of our twenty-five knowledgeable have expressed, the Reddis and Telagas felt it below their dignity to approach

¹⁰ This gentleman has migrated to some other district by the time of collection of material for this research project. He was also reported as dead.

the Komati No. 1 and his circle of Malas, the untouchables. In a way, the Komati caste was not considered fit to take upon itself the activity of village administration. Of course, placement of an untouchable in higher positions was despised more vehemently.

A situation of stalemate continued for about two months. At that time, Congress leaders came from the town with a view to canvass for local support during the 1957 general elections. Having sensed the local feelings of bitterness for one another among the Congress supporters, they arranged, through Sri Brahmin No. 1, a non-controversial figure, a meeting across the table and this led the Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Komati' group to work together for the Congress candidates for the state Legislature and Parliament. Naturally, the Communists, owing to the split among themselves couldnot canvass effectively. Thus, though the Communists were finally elected from the legislative and Parliamentary constituencies, Congress gained, reportedly, more support this time from Haripur.

Consequent upon the unity brought about by the efforts of Sri Brahmin No. 1 and the regional Congress leaders, the Council of elders of village Haripur during 1957-58 was composed of the following as shown on Table 6. As is evident, this council of elders consisted of all but one educated persons, and all of them were fairly well-off or rich from among their castes or from the village as a whole. More than that, all of them were Congress partymembers except

TABLE 6

Village Elders During 1957-58

Srl. No.	Pseudonym	Age	Education	Land in acres	Party Affiliation
1	Sri Deshmukh No. 3	46	Telugu-Urdu(R&W)	110	Congress
2	Sri Komati No.1	43	Telugu (R&W)	80	Congress
3	Sri Mala No.1	45	Telugu (R&W)	17	Neutral
4	Sri Mala No.2	40	Telugu (R&W)	34	Congress
5	Sri Reddi No.3	42	--	30	Communist-turned congress
6	Sri Brahmin No.1	45	Telugu (R&W)	20	Congress

R&W = Reading and writing.

Sri Mala No. 1, who was consistently neutral in terms of political affiliation. For the first time it did not include a member of the Gaundla caste and instead, the Brahmin member was brought in. From the stand point of caste hierarchy, the first three upper castes and the untouchable caste was represented, leaving out the castes which ranked in between. The Council was not united initially. The Brahmin No. 1 acted as the neutral between Sri Deshmukh No. 3 and the remainder headed by Sri Komati No. 1. As was consistently pointed out by the knowledgeable, Sri Komati No. 1 tried to make friendship with Deshmukh No. 3 for the reason that he wanted to minimize his opposition and thereby collect his loans from the die-hards. As some pointed out and as he also agreed, Sri Deshmukh No. 3 would receive some gifts whenever Sri Komati No. 1 won his case or both of them would share the fines collected from the accused, in case of village conflicts. Other members, except Sri Brahmin No. 1, however were treated to some alcoholic drinks. The Police and the Police Patel would of course, have their usual share. We may here touch simply the point that during the days of the combined leadership of Sri Pusala No. 2 and Sri Deshmukh No. 3, fines and bribes were also reported to have been collected from the parties in conflict.

Sri Pusala No. 2 becomes Police Patel; 1957

Meanwhile a dramatic thing happened. The acting Muslim Police Patel died early in the 1957 and the position remained vacant. Sri Pusala, some how or other, became

disaffected with the Communist leaders at the higher echelons for they could not help him financially. He had no job and had lost face in the village. He was badly in need of some income and some status. At this time the Deshmukh No. 1 wanted some able persons to act as his deputy and hold the position of Police Patel. So Pusala No. 2, in an attempt to try his luck, approached Sri Deshmukh No. 1 and readily got a favorable response from the latter. Sri Deshmukh No. 3 also advised his brother in favor of Sri Pusala No. 2. This served the purpose of the Deshmukh No. 1 in that the once virile man of the village and his opponent would now work as his puppet. Sri Pusala No. 2 received satisfaction that it would now give him a status and authority in the village and this would stand him in good stead against his opponents; Sri Komati and his group.

We shall discuss the onset of panchayati raj and the consequent changes in the village Haripur in subsequent chapters. Let us now take a summary view of the basic conclusions in the light of the hypotheses formulated in the beginning of this chapter.

Conclusion.

During the period from 1945 to 1948 and in fact for quite a long time before, the eldest of the Deshmukh brothers, Sri Deshmukh No. 1, was undisputedly the dominant figure in the village. He belonged to the highest caste (Brahmin), was the biggest landlord, and was the Police Patel of the village as well. Economic, ritual-social,

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and administrative statuses were thus combined in one person. But the dominance of the person was due, more than others, to the administrative public office held and to his membership in the family of the Deshmukhs.¹¹ Of course, there is no gainsaying that the economic and ritual-social statuses remained strong supporting factors.

Sri Deshmukh No. 1 controlled the village, as any other feudal lord would have done, by insulating¹² it from the outside world. He was in effect the 'gate keeper' controlling the administrative channels of communication into and out of the village locality system. Any visiting higher official would only contact Sri Deshmukh No. 1, and others were either totally denied access to the authorities or the access granted, if any, was very selective in nature and scope.

In keeping with tradition, heads of the castes were members of the informal village panchayat or council of elders. But out of the eight only three, one Reddi and two Gaundlas, all three economically well off, were the confidants of Sri Deshmukh No. 1. From all available knowledge

¹¹In the Telanga region all the Deshmukhs and Deshpandas, whether they belonged to the Brahmin, or the Reddi, or Velma non-Brahmin castes, enjoyed power in their capacity as the local agents of the Nizam, the then ruler of the state of Hyderabad.

¹²"An extremely important set of controls operates by giving potential partisans differential access to authorities and to positions which involve the control of resources that can be brought to bear on authorities." Gamson: Power and Discontent, the Dorsey Press, 1968, p. 117.

it appeared that these three leaders were co-opted by Sri Deshmukh No. 1, mainly in order to 'absorb them into the leadership or policy-determining structure'.¹³ This device served as a means of averting threats to his power. Otherwise nearly complete authority was vested in him. No case of competition for his power was ever reported. Some years ago Sri Deshmukh No. 1 and his brother Sri Deshmukh No. 3 quarrelled over the division of property, but there were no signs that this intra-lineage dispute ever took the form of intra-community conflict.

Following the Communist revolt, Sri Deshmukh No.1 and his family moved to the taluk more or less permanently. The position of Police Patel was now assumed by a Muslim and therefore his authority was not felt. With the failure of the Communist revolt the local Communists became inactive, at least temporarily. But the village was no longer insulated from the external forces. The regional Congress Party leaders began to take steps with a view to strengthen their hold in the village.

The village Haripur had contained no one who had ever been active in the Congress Party. The regional leaders selected about six persons to act as their local agents and also to act as the members of the village council

¹³Selznick, G. TVA and the Grass Roots, Berkeley, California, quoted from Gamson, ibid., p. 135.

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of elders. The six represented five local caste groups and did not include any Brahmin or Komati caste members. All six, however, were from among the well-to-do families; and about half of them were also petty money lenders.

Having had the support of the Congress Party, the six persons tried to assert leadership through their positions. But strangely enough they failed to gain confidence of and recognition from the general public. In brief they lacked the needed legitimacy¹⁴ or reputation.¹⁵ Sri Deshmukh No. 3, because of his membership in the Deshmukh family and Sri Pusala No. 2, because of his association with the Communist movement, became more popular than the others.

Of course, eventually the money lenders, Sri Komati No. 1 and Sri Mala No. 2, managed¹⁶ to snub Sri Pusala No. 2, at least temporarily; and out of necessity joined hands (or was co-opted); with Sri Deshmukh No. 3. In a way it

¹⁴"Legitimacy is a crucial intervening variable without which it is impossible to predict whether feelings of hostility arising out of unequal distribution of privileges and rights will actually lead to conflict." Coser, Functions of Social Conflict, The Free Press, New York, 1956, p. 37.

¹⁵"A particularly widespread generation persuasion resource is reputation.... The argument that reputation is a resource has implications for the 'reputation method' of studying power.... Reputation is a form of potential influence." Gramson, cited, pp. 103-105.

¹⁶As Kornhauser posits, common economic interests lead to joint political action for limited goals. Kornhauser, W.A. "Political Sociology," in Broom and Selznick (eds.) Sociology, Evanston, Illinois, Row, Peterson and Company, 1958, pp. 558-599.

was the regional Congress leaders who were largely instrumental in bringing Sri Komati No. 1 and Sri Deshmukh No.3 together so that their alliance might strengthen the Congress locally in the 1957 general elections. Competition for community power, however, continued between the two who belonged to the upper and adjacent social and economic strata.

CHAPTER V: POWER AND CONFLICT

DURING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE PANCHAYATI RAJ (1959-1964)

In this chapter we shall devote our attention (a) to the analysis of the first panchayat elections in Haripur held in 1959, and (b) to the dynamics of power and conflict in the village from 1959 to 1964, the period under the regime of the first elected village panchayat. Somewhat abstractly we formulate the following working hypotheses and treat them as the base for our analysis of the material for this chapter.

Hypothesis number 1.

"In the initial stages of democratic decentralization of a local village community, political power and hereditary social (ritual) status would become almost autonomous, and political power tend to depend largely on economic power."

Hypothesis number 2

"In the initial stages of democratic decentralization political conflict in a village community would take the form of community-wide vertical conflict; but each faction would get supported relatively more by particular strata of the population."

It will be recalled that the Hyderabad Panchayats Act was passed in the year 1956 but in many villages of the then Hyderabad state no panchayats were formed. After the formation of the state of Andhra Pradesh in 1956, the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act of 1959 were passed and this Act necessitated immediate constitution of Panchayats in all the villages of the state for the very formation of Samitis at the block level and Parishads at the district level were contingent upon the formation of the village panchayats. While the members of the village panchayat elect the village president, the village presidents, as ex-officio members of the Samiti, elect the Samiti president. The Samiti Presidents, in turn, elect the chairman of the Zilla Parishad. As we have noted earlier, the Act of 1959 was intended to make elected leaders responsible for the governance and development of the state at various levels--district, block and village--below the level of that of the state legislature.

In order to pick up the thread of our discussion in the last chapter it might be helpful to state at this stage that the Suryapeta Community Development Block was initiated in the year 1957, with Suryapeta town as its headquarters and with Haripur as one of its constituent village communities. Ever since the Block was constituted its extension officers made attempts to encourage leadership at the "grass-roots" level. The Community Development program specified that the extension agents should work for the

development of the villages in active collaboration with the local leaders. These local leaders were also placed incharge of local works such as construction of public roads, water tanks and school buildings in the villages. Involvement in such construction work and programs gave the local leaders advantages both in a material and a non-material sense. Such expected rewards as prestige as well as material benefits made the activists in the villages assume leadership and entrepreneurial roles. One vied with the other in obtaining official recognition and thereby the rewards. The introduction of panchayati raj and the consequent devolution of power and authority on the elected bodies and leaders exacerbated the process and intensified political conflict and cleavage in the village communities.

The Panchayat Elections -- April, 1959:

Selection of the contestants:

In accordance with the spirit of the legislation and in accordance with the understanding reached between the political parties, the panchayat elections were to be conducted purely on an individual rather than on any party basis. Even so, the political parties took active interest in the elections of the village panchayats for the simple reason that the village panchayats were not only the seats of power at the grass-roots but they were also, as per the 1959 Act, the stepping stones toward controlling power and authority at the Block and district levels. Hence the Congress and the Communist parties made a firm bid to control

the village panchayats. Haripur was no exception. No sooner the government made it known that the elections would be conducted in the month of April, than the leaders of the political parties from the taluk headquarters made frequent visits to the village to make the selection of the candidates to contest for the seats in the panchayat. In village Haripur six candidates were to be elected for the panchayat and by the end of February each political party was ready with its candidates.

The regional leaders of the Communist party had a grim job of selecting proper candidates. We may recall that Sri Pusala No.2, the communist leader in the village, had, by that time, taken up the job of police patel and in a way he became the "yes man" of Sri Deshmukh No.1. Sri Reddi No.3, the jailmate of Sri Pusala No.2, became a close associate of Sri Komati No.1 and became a congressite. Sri Kummari No.1, the old associate of Sri Pusala No.2, was not active in the field and also did not command respect. Moreover, he came from a caste which had only one family in the village. Sri Gaundla No.3, who was once a member of the village communist band, and now the caste head, was the first choice of the Communist leaders. But, he had to be dropped for the reason that his choice was opposed by some of his own caste members, allegedly traditional rivals of his family, and also by the Mala members who beat him (as we noted in the last chapter). Finally six candidates as shown in Table 1 were chosen.

TABLE 1

COMMUNIST CANDIDATES FOR ELECTION FOR THE PANCHAYAT, 1959

Srl. No.	Pseudonym	Age	Education	Land Owned by the Family (in acres)	Position if any
1	Sri Reddi No.4	30	Telugu (R&W)	11	Member, Ex-Communist Band
2	Sri Gaundla No.7	33	Telugu (R&W)	10	--
3	Sri Mala No.1	47	Telugu (R&W)	17	Money lender, ex-village elder
4	Sri Mala No.3	40	Telugu (R&W)	37	--
5	Sri Vaddera No.1	40	--	1	Caste head
6	Sri Reddi No.5	25	10th class	12	--

R&W = Read and write

Among the selected group of six persons, only Sri Reddi No.4 was a long time Communist. He was also a member of the village communist band. Sri Mala No.1 was a member of the then existing council of village elders (see Table No.6, Chapter IV). He had never affiliated himself strongly to any political party before. Sri Mala No.3, a cousin of Sri Mala No.1, was a Communist and it was he who helped in the beating of Sri Gaundla No.3. In a way both the Mala candidates were opposed to Sri Gaundla No.3. Sri Vaddera No.1 was a caste head and was taken to be a strong man in his caste.

The choice of Sri Reddi No.5 was somewhat unexpected and needs an explanation. This young man at that time had just dropped out of school at the final stage. He was the son of the Reddi caste member who was killed at the hands of the Communists during the razakar regime. Ever since that incident, his family and brothers were known to be Congressites. Yet, the Communist leaders wanted to have him as he was young, educated and capable of taking charge of the functions of the village panchayat President. The two Mala candidates approached Sri Reddi No.5 and persuaded him to join their group with a promise of making him the president, if their group were to win. Sri Reddi No. 5 agreed to this proposal.

The Congress leaders also went ahead with the selection of their candidates. The candidates as shown in Table 2 were chosen by them. On comparing this table with that

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TABLE 2

CONGRESS CANDIDATES FOR ELECTION FOR THE PANCHAYAT :1959

Srl. No.	Pseudonym	Age	Education	Land Owned in acres	Position, if any
1	Sri Komati No.1	44	Telugu (R&W)	90	Big money lender, ex-elder
2	Sri Reddi No.3	43	--	25	Ex-village elder
3	Sri Brahmin No.1	45	Telugu (R&W)	24	Village priest
4	Sri Deshmukh No.3	47	Telugu & Urdu (R&W)	110	Ex-Deshmukh, ex-elder
5	Sri Gaundla No.3	36	--	3	Caste Head, ex-member of Communist band
6	Sri Mala No.4	32	Telugu (R&W)	5	--

R&W = Read and Write.

of the Table 6, in Chapter IV, we find that the above first four were then village elders, and they were also those who were brought together by the regional Congress leaders, at the time of the second general elections held in the year 1957. Sri Gaundla No.3, having been rejected by the Communist group, was wavering as to whether or not to join the Congress group. Sri Brahmin No. 1 again acted as the moderator and convinced him to join the Congress group. Sri Gaundla No.3 agreed to this proposal as it was the only immediate way open to him to be able to vindicate the opposition. Sri Mala No.4 was the nominee and "yes man" of Sri Mala No.2, the village elder during 1957-58 (see Table 6, Chapter IV).

Comparison between the Congress and Communist Candidates;

A cursory glance at Tables 1 and 2 is enough to perceive the striking differences in the caste and class composition of the two sets of candidates. The Congress group had more representation (3 out of 6) from the two upper castes (2 Brahmin, including the Deshmukh, and one Komati); one from the peasant Reddi caste, one from the Gaundla caste; and one from the Mala caste among the untouchables (scheduled) castes. The Communist group had more representation from among the lower castes and had none from the first two upper castes. The peasant Reddi caste and the Malas were represented by two candidates each, while the Gaundla and Vaddera castes had one candidate each. In comparison, the Congress candidates also belonged

to the larger land owning categories than those of the Communist group. Many of the Communist candidates were also comparatively new recruits to the community-wide leadership roles.

Wards, Candidates and the outcome of the elections:

According to the list prepared by the government there were about 1,086 voters in Haripur in 1959. The village was divided into six wards of 181 members each. In each ward, a candidate from each of the political groups contested. Two Congress candidates from ward No. 1 and Ward No. 2 and four Communist candidates from ward No. 3, 4, 5 and 6 won the elections which were held in the first week of April, 1959.

Let us now look at the caste composition of each of the wards and examine if the caste composition of the wards shows any relation to the caste affiliation of the contestants and their success or failure in getting elected. As is evident from the Table 3, an attempt to the extent possible under the then existing condition, was made by each of the groups to match the caste of the contestants in each ward and also to match the caste of the candidate with that of the populous caste group in the ward. In wards 2, 5 and 6 the caste of the contestants was the same. With regard to the allotment of the candidates to each of the wards, the Communist group was in a better position than the Congress group. The former had Reddi, Gaundla, and Mala candidates representing the wards 1, 2, and 4 respectively

TABLE 3

CASTE COMPOSITION OF WARDS AND OF THE CONTESTANTS: 1959

Srl. No.	Caste	No. of Voters in						Total
		Ward 1	Ward 2	Ward 3	Ward 4	Ward 5	Ward 6	
1	Brahmin (inc. Deshmukhs)	--	13	--	--	--	--	13
2	Komati	--	4	4	--	9	--	17
3	Reddi	25	3	2	--	12	--	42
4	Telaga	21	--	--	--	--	2	23
5	Visva Brahmin (Kamsali & Kammari)	16	10	5	--	--	--	31
6	Muslim	19	26	--	--	--	--	45
7	Gaundla	19	81	43	17	10	6	176
8	Golla	39	7	96	2	67	--	211
9	Chakali	25	8	--	--	--	--	33
10	Mutrasa	8	17	13	--	14	--	52
11	Pusala	--	--	5	--	17	--	22
12	Madiga	--	--	--	90	--	20	110
13	Mala	--	--	--	43	17	25	85
14	Lambadi	--	--	--	--	--	128	128
15	Vaddera	--	7	4	28	30	--	69
16	Others (five castes)	9	5	9	1	5	--	29
Total		181	181	181	181	181	181	1086

Candidates won with
Group affiliationSr. Komati
No.1 (Cong)Sri Gaundla
No.3 (Cong)Sri Vaddera
No.1 (Cmt.)Sri Mala
No.1 (Cmt.)Sri Mala
No.3 (Cmt.)Sri Reddi
No.5 (Cmt.)4 Communists
2 CongressCandidates lost with
Group affiliationSri Reddi
No.4 (Cmt.)Sri Gaundla
No.7 (Cmt.)Sri Brahmin
No.1 (Cong)Sri Deshmukh
No.3 (Cong)Sri Mala
No.4 (Cong)Sri Reddi
No.3 (Cong)2 Communists
4 Congress

and each of these wards had the same caste groups as that of the caste of the contesting candidate populous. At least, it was not smaller than any other caste group in the ward. The Congress group could not count on this advantage except ward No. 2.

In accord with the final outcome, the panchayat comprised two Malas both communists, one Vaddera -- a Communist, one Gaundla -- a Congressite, one Reddi -- a Communist, and one Komati -- a Congressmember. One glaring fact however is that the numerically largest group in the village -- the Gollas, the largest group in Ward No. 4 -- the Madigas, and the single largest group in ward No. 6 -- the Lambadis remained unrepresented in the Panchayat as none was chosen by either of the political groups. Subsequently, Sri Reddi No. 5 and Sri Mala No. 1 were elected President and Vice-president of the Panchayat.

Caste, Class and Political behavior:

As we have noted earlier, the first two wards in Haripur elected Congress candidates. On close evaluation of Table 3, it can be observed that these two wards had more upper caste voters than others. But there were many more voters from the lower castes than from among the upper castes. This would, then, make us suspect the possibility of more upper class voters in the two wards. Hence with a view to determine whether or not caste and class factors influenced political behavior, four influentials, two Congress and two Communist, were asked to point out, if they

could, the political affiliation of all the families in the village as of the date of the panchayat election. The indications, made individually by each of the four were, remarkably similar. There were doubts or contradictions with regard to only 13 families. This would lead us to conclude that there is rarely any behavior in an Indian village which remains strictly personal or secret.

Tables 4 and 5 would certainly suggest the impact of class and caste on political affiliation and voting behavior. As we go from top to bottom on table 4, we find that as the amount of land owned increases there is a corresponding decrease in the percentage of Communist supporters. Similarly, as we move from top to bottom on Table 5 we find that large proportions of the lower castes tend to support Communist candidates rather than Congressites.¹ Appendix 4, with cross tables, would reveal that, by and large, lower castes are more landless, suggesting a roughly monolithic political structure.

We now turn to the analysis of the disputes and political cleavage among the leaders.

Some Local Issues and Disputes (1959-61)

Repairs to the local irrigation tank:

The village Haripur has three rain-fed tanks which are used as the sources of water for irrigation. The land

¹An analysis of the votes cast in the wards could not be undertaken for the reasons that no information was available as to who voted and for whom he voted.

TABLE 4

LANDOWNERSHIP AND POLITICAL FACTIONAL AFFILIATION: 1959

Srl. No.	Size of land owned (in acres)	Total	No. of families					
			Communist		Neutral		Congress	
			No.	% to Col.3	No.	% to Col.3	No.	% to Col.3
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Landless	151	122	81.0	4	2.0	25	16.5
2	One acre and below	56	34	61.0	1	1.7	21	37.3
3	Above one acre 5 and below	125	64	51.2	5	4.0	56	44.8
4	Above 5 to 10 and below	41	16	40.0	3	7.5	22	52.5
5	Above 10 to 15 and below	19	4	18.8	1	7.2	14	74.0
6	Above 15 to 20 and below	9	3	33.0	-	-	6	67.0
7	Above 20 to 25 and below	3	-	-	-	-	3	100.0
8	Above 25 to 30 and below	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	Above 30 to 35 and below	1	-	-	-	-	1	100.0
10	Above 35 to 40 and below	5	3	60.0	-	-	2	40.0
11	Above 40 to 45 and below	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	Above 50 to 55 and below	1	-	-	-	-	1	100.0
13	Above 55 to 60 and below	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	Above 95 to 100 and below	1	-	-	-	-	1	100.0
15	Above 100	1	-	-	-	-	1	100.0
Total		413	246	60.0	14	3.3	153	36.7

TABLE 5

CASTE AND POLITICAL/FACTIONAL AFFILIATION: 1959

Srl. No.	Caste	Total	No. of families					
			Communist		Neutral		Congress	
			No.	% to Col.3	No.	% to Col.3	No.	% to Col.3
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Brahmin	4	-	-	-	-	4	100
2	Komati	6	1	16.5	-	-	5	83.5
3	Reddi	16	5	31.0	1	7.0	10	62.0
4	Teluga	10	1	10.0	2	20.0	7	70.0
5	Visva Brahmin (Kamsali Kammari)	14	3	21.0	3	21.0	8	58.0
6	Muslim	13	3	23.0	1	8.0	9	69.0
7	Golla	70	37	55.0	2	-	31	-
8	Mutrasa	25	21	84.0	-	-	4	16.0
9	Gaundla	65	27	41.5	2	3.2	36	55.3
10	Pusala	11	11	100.0	-	-	-	-
11	Chakali	13	8	61.5	-	-	5	-
12	Vaddera	25	25	100.0	-	-	-	-
13	Lambadi	46	35	76.0	-	-	11	34.0
14	Mala	38	29	76.3	2	5.0	7	18.7
15	Madiga	43	30	70.0	-	-	13	30.0
16	Others	14	10	71.0	1	7.0	3	22.0
Total		413	246	60.0	14	3.3	153	36.7

under one of the tanks was for a long time solely owned by the Deshmukh families. In fact these were the partially rent free Seri lands granted to them by the government. We have noted in the second chapter that these lands are now treated as Khalsa lands and full rent is collected on them. Traditionally, the Deshmukhs gave two acres of land under the tank to six Vaddera families in lieu of their services toward periodical repairs to the tank bund. The Vadders are also now granted full ownership rights over these two acres.

The said tank needed major repairs. Ever since the inception of the Community Development block in the area, Sri Deshmukh No. 1 and Sri Deshmukh No. 3 have been trying to get government sanction and money for its repair. Finally on 1-1-60, the government sanctioned an amount of Rs. 7,000 toward the repair. It was also decided that the level of the sluice be raised from 5'4" to 6' so that the tank may have more storage capacity. The work contract was sanctioned in the name of Sri Deshmukh No.3. Since it was Sri Deshmukh No. 1 who managed to get the sanction and since it was he who could finance it as and when necessary, he also had a share in the work and profits.

Work on the tank started in the summer of 1960. But it could not be completed the same year as one Sri Muslim No. 1, a local man working as a teacher in the nearby village, petitioned against the construction work. He pleaded that about ten acres of land owned by two Muslims,

including himself, and two Harijans would be permanently submerged under the water provided the level of the Sluice was raised to 6 feet. As it was, the ten acres of land was cultivable only during the season of the second crop and during the time of the first crop it was always submerged under the water of the tank. The government ordered an on the spot inspection. The Harijans further represented to the visiting officials that in case the level of the sluice was kept at 6 feet, during heavy rainy seasons their houses would also be submerged under the tank water. In view of these large scale protests the government then ordered that the sluice level be retained at 5 feet 3 inches and not at 6 feet as originally sanctioned.

This incident was a direct confrontation between the Deshmukhs on one hand and the Harijans and the Muslims on the other. It is rumored that Sri Muslim No. 1 knew about the proposed sanction of the repair work even at the time of panchayat elections and he told it to the Harijans and that is why the Harijans were not enthusiastic to vote for Sri Deshmukh No. 3. It is also said that Sri Muslim No. 1 sensed the covert misunderstanding between Sri Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Komati No. 1, and with a view to exploit the situation approached the latter for financial help in the event of a need to go to the court of law against the tank repair. Sri Komati No. 1, on his part, took a promise from the Muslim leader that all the votes of his religious group would be cast in favor of the Congress

group. This secret alliance between them was also said to be a factor in the success of the Congress candidates from wards No. 1 and No. 2 in which the Muslim families were located.

A Dispute Between Sri Muslim No. 1 and his sister

Sri Muslim No. 1, mentioned in the above case, had under his care three of his deceased sister's daughters. Towards their marriage he sold away the one and a half acre property of his late sister. The purchaser was none other than his other married sister living in Haripur. The land remained for a few years in her possession.

Meanwhile it came to be known that Sri Pusala No.2 had illegal sex relations with her. One day her husband saw Sri Pusala No.2 with her in the house. After a wordy duel for a while, other Muslims gathered and bet Sri Pusala. Sri Muslim No. 1 and his brothers admonished their sister but she openly proclaimed her decision to live hereafter with Sri Pusala No.2, and to marry him. The woman, however, wanted not to sever her relations with her kin and therefore wanted her lover to convert to Islam. Subsequently, Sri Pusala No. 2 was converted to Islam, took a Muslim name, and married her.

Being angry with his sister, Sri Muslim No. 1 conceived a plan to teach her a lesson. The property he sold was not yet transferred to her legally. There was also no written document in her favor. Looking at these loopholes,

Sri Muslim No. 1 denied he ever sold the land and tried forcibly to take control of the land and to till it himself. His sister, assisted by Sri Pusala No. 2 and his followers, successfully resisted any such seizure by him. A physical encounter also took place on the farm itself. Having failed to take the land back, Sri Muslim No. 1 decided to go to the court of law.

Sri Pusala No. 2 was desperate. Sri Muslim No. 1 threatened to go to the police officials and report the physical assault on him by Sri Pusala No. 2. In the village Sri Komati No. 1 and his associates were lined up against him. Under this pressure, he resigned the post of acting police patel. But Sri Pusala No. 2 could not afford to lose the land that was in possession with his new wife. So he approached Sri Deshmukh No. 3, Sri Chakali No. 1 and Sri Gaundla No. 5 for advice and help. These were sympathetic to him for they took up the stand that after all the woman bought the land herself and no matter whom she married, the land was hers. So they wrote a sale deed, predated to indicate land was bought by the woman from the eldest daughter of her late sister in the year 1951. We may recall that the said three persons were village elders during the year 1951. They thought a document so written by the elders would have legal strength behind it. Reportedly the woman got her late sister's eldest daughter's signature on it.

Sri Muslim No. 1 was infuriated when he came to know of the above manipulation. So he pleaded in the court of law that all three elders were guilty of the grave criminal activity of writing a false document. The three elders were in deep trouble, but managed to get out honorably. The court ordered that pending final decision, temporarily the land should be kept under the possession of Sri Muslim No. 1.²

Cleavage in the Panchayat and in village leadership:

The above disputes took in quick succession within months after the panchayat elections. In the two disputes Sri Muslim No. 1 was the main actor. While in the first he was pitted against the Deshmukh No. 3, in the second he was pitted against Sri Pusala No. 2, the ex-Communist leader and the then acting village police patel. As a consequence of the first dispute, Sri Deshmukh No. 3 joined hands with Sri Pusala No. 2, against Sri Muslim No.1. We shall recall that Sri Komati No.1 had, on a previous occasion, established a sort of alliance with Sri Muslim No. 1 and this alliance continued later during the course of the second dispute. They found in Sri Pusala No. 2 and Sri Deshmukh No. 3 common enemies. It was an opportune moment for Sri Komati No. 1 to act against them and alienate

²The dispute did not end there. The case is still in the court. Sri Pusala No. 2 did not allow the land to be taken in possession by Sri Muslim No. 1.

them from the sympathies of the village panchayat and from the patronage of the villagers as a whole. Reportedly, Sri Komati No. 1 persuaded Sri Gaundla No. 5 and Sri Chakali No. 1 not to stand by Sri Deshmukh No. 3 so that the latter may alone be found guilty of writing the falsely predated sale deed. The two however could not do so for they were involved in it as much as the Deshmukh was. Further, they needed his influence at the official levels and his skill to tackle the problem, with necessary tact so that they come out of the troubled waters honorably, which they did ultimately.

Now both Sri Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Komati No. 1 turned their attention to the arena of the panchayat board. Sri Deshmukh No. 3 had the sympathies of the two Communist members: Sri Mala No. 3 and Sri Vaddera No. 1, for they were good friends of Sri Pusala No. 2. Sri Komati No. 1 was himself a panchayat member. Another Congress member Sri Gaundla No. 3 became his close associate. We may recall that Sri Gaundla No. 3 had a quarrel with Sri Komati No. 1 and the Malas and was beaten by the latter. Even so, ever since he joined the Congress group and ever since a promise of the votes of the Muslim candidates in his favor was made, Sri Gaundla No. 3 became an ally of Sri Komati No. 1. Sri Mala No. 1 was elected as a Communist candidate as also was Sri Reddi No. 5. Both maintained neutrality in the dispute No. 2. But, it was felt by many at that time that the two were closer to Sri Komati No. 1

rather than to the Communist members of the Panchayat. Sri Mala No. 1 was believed to be so acting under the guidance of Sri Mala No. 2, the Mala influential and the ex-village elder who was himself a money lender and a friend of Sri Komati No. 1. As we have noted, Sri Reddi No. 5 contested as a member of the communist group with the specific promise that he would be made the president. It was alleged by Communists that in his capacity as the President of the village panchayat he cast his vote in favor of a Congress candidate for the presidency of the Panchayat Samiti. As one remarked: "How could he forget the fact that his father was butchered by the Communists, even if he would not openly say so."

The overt neutrality on the part of the President and the Vice President was not without any advantage for Sri Deshmukh No. 3. In the absence of their opposition, the support he had from the two Communist members was enough to be invited to the informal meetings of the elders outside the panchayat meetings. We should note that even after the panchayat was formed, the village disputes continued to be settled outside the framework of the panchayat, and therefore persons outside the panchayat board continued to play leadership roles, exert influence and yield power. Pending the analysis of the influentials during this period, it may be said at this juncture that, more often than not, in the informal court of Justice of the elders Sri Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Komati No. 1 would take sides with

the disputants of a case and some times the deliberations would take personal overtones. It was reported that once there arose a dispute between a Lambadi creditor and a Golla debtor with regard to the repayment of a loan and calculation of the interest. Sri Komati No. 1 supported the creditor and Sri Deshmukh No. 3 pleaded for the reduction of the rate of interest. Sri Komati No. 1 made an allegation that Sri Deshmukh No. 3 was instigating all the debtors against repayment of loans and that he knew one or two specific cases where he did so. Sri Deshmukh No. 3 challenged Sri Komati No. 1 to prove the allegation or else pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/. On his part, he said, he would pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/. in case the allegation was proved. In fact he went home and brought a gold necklace for deposit with the elders in lieu of Rs. 1,000/. The men present there however tried to pacify emotions and did not take the allegation seriously. Even so, it illustrates the intensity of animosity that developed between the two leaders. While Sri Deshmukh No. 3 was struggling hard to maintain his influence and curb his falling prestige, Sri Komati No. 1 was trying to boost his prestige and influence, for in that lies his ability to practice his profession of money lending and recovering loans. Association with Sri Deshmukh No. 3 meant financial loss to Sri Komati No. 1. The former either would want a share in each profit the latter would make or the former would dominate the scene. The best way therefore was to isolate Sri Deshmukh No. 3. Sri Komati No. 1 worked vigorously toward this end.

Sri Deshmukh No. 3 Becomes Police Patel:

Sri Deshmukh No. 3 apprehended he might lose his prestige if he continued to dabble in village politics. The way he was doing them. He felt he should rather have some official position with which he could talk to the village leaders. The position of village police Patel was readily vacant with the resignation of Sri Pusala No. 2. So he approached his brother Sri Deshmukh No. 1 and was appointed Police Patel. This gave him a new status in the village. He could now say he had no interest in village power politics and was mainly interested in performing his official duties. Yet he could maintain some authority over the village.

Mention may also be made of the fact that about the time Sri Deshmukh No. 3 took up the office of Police Patel in the year 1961, Sri Deshmukh No. 4 a young man and the son and heir of the deceased Patwari, took up the job of village patwari from Sri Reddi No. 1 who was in the job all these years except during 1959 and '60.

Leadership Reputation:

Asked to "please name those you consider were important leaders (Pettandars) in the village during the period between 1959 and '63," the 25 knowledgeable expressed their opinions as shown in Table 6.

Obviously Sri Komati No. 1 gained more popularity during the period closely followed by the village president. The active leaders however expressed the feeling that even

TABLE 6
REPUTATION MENTIONS GAINED BY THE LEADERS : 1959

Srl.No.	Pseudonym	No. of Mentions	Status-Position
1	Sri Komati No.1	21	Panchayat member- big money lender
2	Sri Reddi No.5	20	Panchayat President
3	Sri Mala No.2	18	Money lender
4	Sri Deshmukh No.3	15	Deshmukh and Police Patel
5	Sri Mala No.1	15	Panchayat Vice- President
6	Sri Gaundla No.3	12	Panchayat member- Gaundla Caste Head
7	Sri Brahmin No.1	10	Village Priest

though Sri Reddi No. 5 was the President, Sri Mala No. 2 was more powerful. If this is true, it suggests that he was named by many knowledgeable simply because he was holding the title of village president and since they were not directly in the arena of politics could not make a correct guess of the situation. Further, as we see from the table, out of six panchayat members two were not mentioned at all as leaders, and some outsiders were given more recognition and preference than the panchayat members. Sri Deshmukh No. 3 continues to be recognized as one of the leaders even though admittedly his popularity had gone down considerably over the years. Inclusion of the non-panchayat members in the list of leaders would also mean that in all important matters of village concern or on matters of interpersonal disputes their presence was required. It is also important to note that during the period under discussion except for Sri Reddi No. 5, the President, no other joined the village wide rank of leadership. All others were in the field before the Panchayat elections. Sri Mala No. 3, the panchayat member and a Communist scored eight nominations while Sri Vaddera No. 1, another panchayat member and a Communist, scored only 5 nominations. Thus, evidently their leadership did not yet gain village wide recognition.

Disputes during the period 1963-64:

Local politics take different forms in different time periods and their repercussions and ramifications also vary accordingly. Developments that take place near the

end of the term of office of a regime would have their impact on the impending elections for a period of new rule. The heat generated during elections would be reflected in the events that follow soon after. The so-called middle period probably would have a rather calm atmosphere in which problems affecting the persons and the community would be considered on their own merits. Unless certain dramatic things happen either due to some structural strain from within or due to stress of some forces from without, one would expect the overall socio-political system to remain comparatively less tense during the middle period.

We have so far taken into account the panchayat elections held in April, 1959 and analyzed the important disputes that occurred in the village Haripur soon after. We have noted how these disputes created for a while a tense atmosphere for a time in the village leading to a change in the relative status positions of the community leaders. After the change, status quo continued for a brief period of one year. By and large the Congress group and its sympathizers under the leadership of Sri Komati No. 1 wielded more community power. Then in the year 1963 certain incidents occurred that took the form of factional disputes and which, in turn, had a bearing on the second panchayat elections held in May 1964. The rest of the present chapter therefore presents a picture of two of the local disputes that took place during the year 1963 and during the early months of 1964.

Factionalism within the Gaundla Caste:

We observed earlier that Sri Gaundla No. 5 and Sri Gaundla No. 3 developed strained relations and the cause for this was traced to the long time animosity between their respective lineages on account of a dispute about 10 years ago regarding the ownership of property of land of a widow who belonged to the former lineage by birth and was married into the latter lineage. Over a period of time conflict between these families developed into what Dahl³ calls a cumulative pattern where disagreements piled up over time and the concerned leaders opposed one another for the sake of opposition irrespective of the merit of the issue. In a way the conflict between Sri Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Komati No. 1 falls into this category.

Dispute No. 1: Sri A was suspected of having illicit sex contacts with Sri B's wife. Sri B's relatives came to know of this affair and they wanted to stop this and to teach a lesson to Sri A. So, on one day they connived a quarrel with Sri A and when he became abusive they beat him. Sri Deshmukh No. 3, the then police patel, reported the case to the police and found fault with the offenders. Sri Gaundla No. 5 supported the offenders on the ground that the purpose of the violent action was to stop the adulterous

³Dahl, R.A.: Modern Political Analysis, 1965, Prentice-Hall Inc., New Jersey, p. 78. See also J.S. Coleman, Community Conflict, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1957.

activity on the part of Sri A and hence those who beat him should not be prosecuted. Sri Gaundla No. 3, the caste head, however, pleaded for punishing the offenders. He took the position that the offenders should have first confirmed whether or not the allegation was true and also could have reported the matter to the caste council for necessary action.

Even though finally the police dropped the case, differences between Sri Gaundla No. 5 and Sri Gaundla No. 3 persisted. The caste group as such could not act in a united way in accordance with the traditional practice of settling disputes. Hence the said dispute evaded settlement in a traditional way.

Dispute No. 2: Sri Deshmukh No. 3 offered to sell a 3/4 acre of his irrigated land under one of the village tanks. Sri Gaundla No. 3 owned a small piece of land by the side of this piece offered for sale. So he decided to buy the land, but could not pay the amount on the due date. Sri Deshmukh No. 3 offered to sell it to someone else. Sri Gaundla No. 5 came forward, paid the amount and took the land under his possession.

After about a period of threemonths, one day Sri Gaundla No. 5 received government orders asking him to stop tapping toddy from the 20 palmyrah trees under his control and also not to sell the toddy (fermented juice turned into alcoholic drink) in the market since the monthly tax was not regularly paid to the government. At that time

Sri Gaundla No. 3, in his capacity as the caste head, was the subcontractor responsible for collection and payment of the revenue. Sri Gaundla No. 5 approached the caste head and inquired as to why he made the government take such a sudden action without any prior notice. Sri Gaundla No. 3 retorted "When you have bought the land from China Dora Garu (Deshmukh No. 3) without informing me who had made the bargain earlier, what is wrong in my not telling you about this before?"

With the intervention of the excise officials and some caste elders from other villages, it was settled that Sri Gaundla No. 3 be given one third share of the said land on payment of the proportionate purchase amount, and that Sri Gaundla No. 5 be allowed to continue to tap the palmyrah trees on payment of the tax.

Deferring detailed analysis of the repercussions and further cumulative effects of the above developments to the next chapter it may be just pointed out here that Sri Gaundla No. 5 and his grown son have now seriously started maneuvering politically against Sri Gaundla No. 3. Such maneuverings had wide repercussions on the village panchayat elections in 1964 and the subsequent village politics as a whole. We shall take these up in the next chapter. While thus the material presented in here basically lend support to the hypotheses formulated earlier, we would take up a brief review of the important conclusions arrived at in this chapter.

Conclusion

The first panchayati raj elections were held in the year 1959. The contenders in this election displayed the Communist and the Congress political banners. Communist candidates, supported as they were largely by the lower social and economic strata, captured four out of six seats. From the standpoint of the local levels of living the elected members of both the communist and congress factions, compared with others, were relatively well off economically. Of course the panchayat members of the Congress faction were wealthier than the members of the Communist faction. Among the Communists the untouchable Sri Mala No. 1 rose to the position of the panchayat vice-president, while Sri Reddi No. 5 became the president. Thus, obviously even though generally persons of upper economic strata assumed the roles of village leadership, persons of some of the lower social strata could rise to hold the formal positions. All this was possible mainly due to the impact of political modernization (or democratic decentralization).

Within the Congress faction misunderstandings between Sri Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Komati No. 1 continued to exist despite their combined opposition to the Communists. Sri Deshmukh No. 3 lost the elections. Consequent upon the legal installment of the panchayat president through election, the already dwindling legitimacy attached to his caste and family faded out even more. It is of particular importance to note that Sri Deshmukh No. 3 still had more

landed property than Sri Komati No. 1, but the latter had more liquid wealth (i.e. cash) which could be used for influence without extensive redeployment,⁴ and therefore Sri Komati No. 1 could, over a period of time overtake, at least temporarily, Sri Deshmukh No. 3. Having perceived, social-psychologically speaking, continuous decremental deprivation⁵ of power-status, Sri Deshmukh No. 3 dropped, at least overtly, from the arena of active political conflict and subsequently, as if to make up the loss, took over the job of the Police Patel.

⁴Discussing the 'degree of potential' Gamson distinguishes between highly liquid resources which require little or no redeployment and low liquid resources which need to be redeployed before they are ready to be activated. Gamson, cited; pp. 94-95.

⁵When "actor perceives himself as losing or having lost the object we shall refer to it as decremental deprivation. When...actor has not gained the object we shall refer to it as aspirational deprivation." Morrison, D.E. Relative Deprivation and Rural Discontent in Developing Countries: A Theoretical Proposal. A paper submitted at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., December 27, 1966, p. 5.

CHAPTER VI: POWER AND CONFLICT DURING THE
SECOND STAGE OF THE PANCHAYATI RAJ (1964-68)

This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the second panchayat elections held in Haripur in 1964 and of the pattern of leadership and conflict in the village during the period from 1964 to 1968. The following two hypotheses serve as the basic guidelines for the analysis and discussion of the material presented in this chapter.

Hypothesis number 1.

"In a community with somewhat advanced stage of democratic decentralization some individuals from the relatively lower social and economic strata would come to hold key community positions of power, provided they have acquired a fairly high political status or reputation; otherwise economic dominants would continue to hold power."

Hypothesis number 2.

"In a community which is at a somewhat advanced stage of democratic decentralization and in which one of the conflicting factions is led by the extreme leftists, political conflict would tend to take the form of class conflict

even though it may look prima facie
like vertical conflict cutting across
different socio-economic strata."¹

We have observed before that in the year 1951 the Communist Party of India decided to take part in the general elections and to seek seats in state legislatures as well as in the national parliament. Subsequently it also took part in panchayati raj elections in those states where they were introduced. The Communist Party remained critical of the domestic policies of the Congress government under Sri Jamaherlal Nehru but, by and large, supported its foreign policy based on the principle of co-existence of various socio-political systems in different countries. The sudden Chinese attack on India in 1962 and the ideological differences between the Chinese Communists under Mao and the Russian communists under Krushev brought about a serious cleavage within the rank and file of the Communist Party of India. It became split into a pro-Russian Rightist and a pro-Chinese Leftist group. This rift reached the district, taluk, and village levels in all states including the state of Andhra Pradesh and the Telangana region.

¹In a slightly different context, Herberle says: "To say that a movement is supported by a given class does not mean that every member of that class belongs to the movement." Herberle; "Social Movements," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Macmillan and Company and The Free Press, N.Y., Vol. 15, 1968, p. 443.

In the year 1959 Panchayat elections were held in all the villages in Andhra Pradesh. Ever since the elections, there has been a growth of factional politics and, contrary to the expectations of the Balwant Rai Mehta Committee report, there was a corresponding deterioration in community cooperation as well as in the tempo of community developmental activities in the villages.² With a view to attenuate the conflict between the local leaders at the grass-roots level, the state government announced a grant of Rs. 500/ to a village which elected its panchayat members unanimously in the year 1964. Accordingly some village panchayats were reported to have been elected unanimously. But the unintended consequences of such elections were rather discouraging, if not deplorable. Out of fear of opposition or lack of expected cooperation from the members many presidents did not even collect the basic taxes necessary for performing the bare municipal functions, not to speak of undertaking the developmental activities. Animosities between the leaders continued to exist even if they did not become more acute.³

Thirdly, we may note that in the Telangana region the 1959 Panchayat elections were conducted in accordance

²Rahman, A.T.: Rural Institutions in India and Pakistan, Asian Survey, Vol. VIII, No. 9, Sept. 1968, p. 794.

³Nicholas, R.W. Structures of Politics in the Villages of Southern Asia, in Singer & Cohn (ed.): Structure and Change in Indian Society, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1968.

with the Hyderabad Gram Panchayats Act of 1956. But in the year 1964 Panchayat elections took place as per the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act of 1964. Unlike the former the latter act prescribed reservation of seats for women along with the seats for Harijans (Mala and Madiga). Accordingly, in keeping with the other details laid down in the 1964 Act the village Haripur was to elect nine members out of which two seats each were reserved for the Harijans and for the women. (See Chapter 1 for details of the Act). With this background we shall now move to the analysis of our main research problem.

Formation of Left and Right Communist Groups in Haripur:

We should recall that by the end of 1963 relations between Sri Gaundla No. 5 and Sri Gaundla No. 3 deteriorated and cleavage between them became rather serious. Sri Gaundla No. 5's son, Sri Gaundla No. 8, now became more radical and was determined any how to curb the influence of Sri Gaundla No. 3. As we have noted, at that time Sri Gaundla No. 3, in his capacity as the caste head, was the excise subcontractor for the village and was in charge of collecting revenue on the palmyra trees allotted to each person for tapping the toddy and selling it in the market. Having had some bitter experience at the hands of Sri Gaundla No. 3 (refer to dispute No. 2, Chapter V), Sri Gaundla No. 8 began to probe into the affairs of the contract and discovered that the former was in a way cheating the toddy tapping Grandlas by collecting exorbitant amounts more than

was customary in the area. Sri Gaundla No. 8 took the opportunity to expose the misdeeds of Sri Gaundla No. 3 and to mobilize public opinion against him. But that was not enough and would be ineffective unless real opposition and an organization able to take the excise contract away from Sri Gaundla No. 3 was built up.

At the risk of slight digression it may be pointed out that in accordance with the Gandhian principles, distillation and sale of alcohol or toddy tapping and sale of the same were prohibited by the Congress government of the former state of Madras of which the Andhra region was then a part. After the formation of Andhra Pradesh the Andhra region continued to be dry whereas the other constituent region, namely Telangana, remained wet as usual. The excise department of the state would lease out the palmyrah trees in each village to the highest bidder in the auction conducted each year. More often than not the contractor was a non-Gaundla while the actual toddy tappers were Gaundlas. The excise officials would show all sorts of illegal favors to the contractor and instead collect from him monies as mamuls (literally means: usual payments) from him. The contractor in turn would throw the burden on the toddy tappers. As a result, while the excise officials⁴ and the contractors became rich, the toddy tappers

⁴Graduates prefer these excise jobs as they fetch more money in the form bribes.

remained poor. The Communist Party therefore raised the slogan "tree to the tapper" (in line with the slogan "land to the tiller") and demanded that the middleman be done away with. The Congress government agreed to this and would give preference to the toddy tappers cooperative societies.

Thus, Sri Gaundla No. 8 found the formation of a cooperative society of the village toddy tappers was the best way of consolidating his strength against Sri Gaundla No.3. But he was still a novice in the arts of politics and working with the "higher-ups". He wanted backing of one who was adept at such arts and found Sri Pusala No. 2 to be the proper person available. During this time Sri Pusala No. 2 was jobless and was waiting for an opportune moment to strike against his opponents (Sri Komati No. 1 and his associates). He too was closely watching the situation of conflict between the two Gaundlas and would have liked to join hands with Sri Gaundla No. 8. Sri Pusala No. 2 was interested in communitywide leadership and was having an eye on the ensuing panchayat elections whereas Sri Gaundla No. 8 was interested in consolidating his caste strength. Their aims were thus not mutually exclusive; rather they were complementary. Strength at one level needed support of the forces at the other level. Moreover, the two persons had more or less the same set of opponents. Hence by the time of the second Panchayat elections Sri Pusala No. 2 and Sri Gaundla No. 8 forged an alliance. Sri Mala No. 3, the sitting Panchayat member, was also brought in.

Having regained some of his lost influence in the village Sri Pusala No. 2 now wanted to have association with a political party so that such external support may give him more legitimacy and in turn more support within the local community. He found that Sri Reddi No. 5 and Sri Mala No. 1, despite their close links with the Congress members Sri Komati No. 1 and Sri Mala No. 2, maintained good relations with the rightist, Communist leaders at the taluk level. Under the circumstances the alternative left to him was to turn to the leftist Communist leaders and seek their cooperation. The taluka leaders welcomed this development and promised to back Sri Pusala No.2 and his associates for elections to the village panchayat. It was also agreed that arrangements for the formation of the toddy tappers cooperative union be made at once so that it may affect Sri Gaundla No. 3 adversely in the elections.

Looking at these developments Sri Komati No. 1 and his associates Sri Mala No. 1, Sri Mala No. 2, Sri Reddi No. 5 and Sri Gaundla No. 3 decided to form a rightist communist group in the village and contest elections under that banner. This strategy was felt essential since the possibility of winning panchayat elections under the Congress banner seemed impossible. Because of their declared affinity with the Congress party Sri Komati No.1 and Sri Mala No. 2 did not declare themselves rightist Communists, but gave more than mere tacit support to the group. The two sitting panchayat members, Sri Reddi No. 5 and Sri

Mala No. 1, of course continued to maintain some affiliation with the rightist Communists. The other sitting panchayat member and a Congressite, Sri Gaundla No. 3 however, donned the mantle of rightist Communism, obviously for the sake of putting up strong opposition to his implacable opponents Sri Gaundla No. 8 and Sri Pusala No. 2.

We may note that by this time Sri Reddi No. 3 emigrated from the village and Sri Deshmukh No. 3 and Sri Brahmin No. 1, the Congressites, kept themselves out of active politics.

Selection of the Candidates for Panchayat elections:

The leftist group made selection of candidates as shown in Table 1 to contest the second panchayat elections held in May 1964.

Out of the nine candidates only Sri Mala No. 3 was a member of the panchayat from 1959 to 64. He and Sri Pusala No. 2 were of course the two leaders of the group. The third leader Sri Gaundla No. 8 kept himself out of the arena of contest and instead nominated Sri Gaundla No. 9 in his behalf. The sitting Vaddera member of the Panchayat dropped out voluntarily and in his place his nominee Sri Vaddera No. 2 was selected. Sri Reddi No. 6 was the brother of the current President of the Panchayat, Sri Reddi No. 5, and was approached by the leftist leaders to contest the elections as a member representing the Reddi caste in particular and the upper castes in general. A Muslim candidate was selected at the instance of Sri Pusala No. 2. Having

TABLE 1

LEFT COMMUNIST CANDIDATES FOR 1964 PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS

Srl. No.	Pseudonym	Age	Education	Land Owned in acres	Position, if any
1	Sri Pusala No.2	44	Telugu & Urdu (R&W)	--	Ex-Police Patel and ex-Communist leader
2	Sri Reddi No.6	28	Telugu (R&W)	13	--
3	Sri Muslim No.2	50	--	6	Ex-Seth- sindi
4	Sri Gaundla No.9	34	--	1.50	--
5	Sri Vaddera No.2	35	--	--	--
6	Sri Mala No.3	45	Telugu (R&W)	20	Sitting Panchayat member
7	Sri Madiga No.4	35	--	3	--
8	Srimati Mala No.4	40	--	--	--
9	Srimati Golla No.1	45	--	4	--

R&W = Read and Write

married the sister of Sri Muslim No. 1 and having been converted to Islam, he was trying to soften his strained relations with some of the Muslim families. Sri Muslim No. 2 was also known to be sympathetic to Sri Pusala No.2 and to Communists even though he was an ex-Sethsindi -- a government servant. Of the remaining three, Sri Madiga No.4 and the husbands of Srimati (Mrs) Golla No. 1 and Srimati Mala No.4 were known to be Communist sympathizers and followers of Sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3.

The Rightist wing then made its own selection. As is evident from Table 2, the first three candidates, Sri Reddi No.5, Sri Gaundla No.3, and Sri Mala No. 1, were incumbent panchayat members and they were the visible leaders of the rightist Communist group. Sri Pusala No.3 came to the side of this group because of his anger with his brother Sri Pusala No.2 who had married a Muslim and thus had deserted his Pusala wife. Sri Madiga No.5 and Sri Lambadi No. 1 were nominated by Sri Komati No.1. Sri Madiga No.5 was the brother of Sri Madiga No.4, the leftist nominee. These two were at loggerheads and therefore joined different groups. Sri Reddi No.7 and Srimati Gaundla No.10 were always supporters of Sri Reddi No.5 and Sri Gaundla No.3 respectively. Srimati Golla No.2 was selected as to give representation to the Golla caste and her husband was a debtor to Sri Mala No.2.

TABLE 2

RIGHT COMMUNIST CANDIDATES FOR 1964 PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS

Srl. No.	Pseudonym	Age	Education	Land Owned in acres	Position, if any
1	Sri Reddi No.5	29	11th Class	13	Sitting Panchayat President
2	Sri Gaundla No.3	40	--	2	Caste head & sitting Panchayat member
3	Sri Mala No.1	51	Telugu (R&W)	20	Sitting member of Panchayat Business
4	Sri Pusala No.3	40	--	--	
5	Sri Madiga No.5	38	--	1	--
6	Sri Lambadi No.1	44	--	7	--
7	Sri Reddi No.7	28	--	5	--
8	Srimati Golla No.42 2		--	6	--
9	Srimati Gaundla No. 10	50	--	1	--

R&W = Read and Write.

Wards, Candidates and the election results:

In accord with the Act of 1964, this time village Haripur was divided into nine wards. As is clear from Table 3, in wards 1, 4, 6, and 8 the caste of the two contenders was matched, and, the caste of the contenders was the same as that of the numerically largest or the next largest (as in ward No.6) caste group in the wards.

The Rightist candidates in wards 3, 7, and 9 and the Leftist candidates in wards 2 and 5 belonged to the numerically largest caste in each of the respective wards. Thus, assuming that caste affiliation would influence voting behavior, the Rightist group had a definite advantage over the Leftists.

Looking at the results of the elections, we find that out of the nine wards only in two wards (wards 2 and 3) were Rightists elected. We must recall that in the 1957 elections the two Congress candidates were elected from the then wards 1 and 2 (see Table No. 3, Chapter V). On a careful comparison it should be clear that these two wards in 1959 were split into the first three wards of 1964. Assuming that voting behavior and factional affiliation of the families had not changed much between 1959 and 1964, one would expect the three wards to elect the Congress supported Rightist candidates. Prima facie it appears that the expectation came true in the case of wards 2 and 3 but not in ward No. 1. A probe into the affair and a friendly and leisurely discussion with Sri Reddi No. 5, the Rightist

TABLE 3

CASTE COMPOSITION OF WARDS AND OF THE
CONTESTANTS: 1964

Srl.	Caste	No. of voters in									Total Voters
		Ward 1	Ward 2	Ward 3	Ward 4	Ward 5	Ward 6	Ward 7	Ward 8	Ward 9	
1	Brahmin	-	7	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	11
2	Komati	-	4	-	4	-	3	4	4	-	19
3	Reddi	23	1	9	-	-	-	-	12	-	45
4	Telaga	18	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22
5	Visva Brahmin	15	10	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
6	Muslim	14	23	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	42
7	Golla	18	23	5	92	16	2	57	3	-	216
8	Mutrasa	8	9	22	-	-	-	12	3	-	54
9	Gaundla	4	25	71	21	30	9	15	5	-	180
10	Pusala	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	17	-	22
11	Chakali	20	10	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	32
12	Vaddera	-	9	-	-	42	-	21	-	-	72
13	Lambadi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	125	149
14	Mala	-	-	-	-	-	45	18	26	-	89
15	Madiga	-	-	-	-	28	65	-	28	-	121
16	Others	8	5	-	2	11	4	3	-	-	33
		128	130	128	124	125	128	130	122	125	1142

Candidates
won
(with faction)

Sri Reddi No.6
(Leftist)

Sr. Reddi No.5
(Rightist)

Srimati
Gaundla No.9
(Rightist)

Srimati Golla
No.1(Leftist)

Sri Vaddera
No.2(Leftist)

Sri Mala No.3
(Leftist)

Sri Pusala No.2
(Leftist)

Sri Madiga No.2
(Leftist)

Sri Gaundla
No.8(Leftist)

Candidates
lost
(with faction)

Sri Reddi No.7
(Rightist)

Sri Muslim
No.2(Leftist)

Srimati
Mala No.4
(Leftist)

Srimati Golla
No.2(Rightist)

Sri Pusala
No.3(Rightist)

Sri Mala No.1
(Rightist)

Sri Gaundla
No.3(Rightist)

Sri Madiga
No.3(Rightist)

Sri Lambadi
No.1(Rightist)

candidate, and with Sri Reddi No. 6, the winning leftist candidate, revealed, sociologically speaking, very interesting and illuminating dimensions of local politics. Sri Reddi No.5 and Sri Reddi No.6 were brothers. They entered into a kind of secret pact that no matter what their outward political or factional affiliations were, one would support the other and therefore they would not contest from the same ward. As a result, Sri Reddi No. 6 was elected from ward No. 1 and Sri Reddi No.5 was elected from Ward No.2. Obviously by and large, the voters in the three wards continued to be under the influence of the Congressites, particularly Sri Komati No.1 -- the invisible but powerful supporter of the Rightist group. Subsequently, Sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Reddi No.6 were elected president and vice-president respectively.

On an examination of the Table 3 it should be clear that in wards 3 and 7 the Gaundla and Golla castes, respectively, commanded an absolute majority and in ward No.9 the entire population was that of Lambadis. Even so, except in ward No. 3, in the other two wards candidates belonging to castes other than the populous caste groups got elected. To that extent therefore it would not be wrong to say that caste as a factor or resource did not always determine voting behavior. Obviously it was the political-factional affiliation that did matter here. In wards 1, 4, 6 and 8 the contenders belonged to the same caste and therefore the caste element seems to have been neutralized. Even so,

it is important to note the great importance given to the caste factor at the time of selecting the candidates. As we have noted, the wards 6 and 8 were declared reserved and therefore the Mala and Madiga candidates had to be the contenders. But here also we find that in each of the two wards the castes of the contenders were the same. Further, we may note that in ward No.3, the untouchable and Leftist Mala member lost against the candidate belonging to the populous Gaundla caste in the ward. By the same token in Ward 2 the Muslim, Leftist candidate, lost the election to the upper caste Reddi candidate.

Caste, Class and Political affiliation:

This time again two rightist Communist leaders and two leftist Communists leaders were asked to identify, if they could, the political affiliation of each of the village families on the eve of the 1964 elections. If we were to compare Table 5 with that of the Table 5 in Chapter V, we find that in 1964 there were more neutrals than in 1959. Further in 1964 the neutrals were also slightly more numerous than the Rightists. The cause for the increase in the size of the neutrals may reasonably be attributed to the split in the Communist group and the disintegration of the Congress group. Consequently upon the withdrawal and/or change of group affiliations on the part of the old Congress leaders as well as increasing cross-pressures on them by the rival communist groups, many families were puzzled

and assumed an attitude of non-commitment. As is evident from Table 5 the active Gaundla and Mala caste groups and the traditionally dormant, but populous Golla, Lambadi and Madiga caste groups have a larger percentage of neutrals. As we already know there was a sharp cleavage within the Gaundla caste. Since Sri Mala No. 1 and Sri Mala No. 3 for the first time represented rival factions, conflict within the caste became intense. Representation was given to the Golla, Madiga and Lambadi candidates for the first time in each or one of the rival Communist groups. Consequent pressures and counter pressures for votes pushed many families from these castes toward a neutral position. As can be seen from Table 4 majority of the landless and lower class peasant families are Leftist and the upper classes are more Rightist or neutrals.

On further analysis it emerged that out of the 102 neutral families, as many as 67 were from the former Congressites, 32 from the former Communist supporters, two were former neutrals, and the remaining one family was that of the new patwari. Out of the former 153 Congressite families, 67 remained neutral, 15 turned to Leftist Communism, and the remaining 71 became supporters of the Rightist Communist group. By the same token, out of the 246 former Communist supporters, as many as 197 families remained with the Leftist group, 32 turned neutral, and only 17 became Rightists. Nonetheless we find that the Leftists were more numerous than the Rightists and Neutrals combined.

TABLE 4

LANDOWNERSHIP AND POLITICAL/FACTIONAL AFFILIATION: 1964

Srl. No.	Size of land owned (in acres)	Total	No. of Families					
			Left Communist No.	Neutral		Right Communist No.		
				% to Col.3	No.	% to Col.3	% to Col.3	% to Col.3
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Landless	147	105	71.4	20	13.6	22	15.0
2	One acre and below	65	32	50.0	23	35.4	10	14.6
3	Above one acre to 5 and below	122	54	66.3	37	30.3	31	25.4
4	Above 5 to 10 and below	38	15	40.0	13	33.3	10	26.7
5	Above 10 to 15 and below	18	7	39.0	4	22.0	7	39.0
6	Above 15 to 20 and below	12	3	25.1	1	8.3	8	66.6
7	Above 20 to 25 and below	2	1	50.0	1	50.0	-	-
8	Above 25 to 30 and below	1	-	-	-	-	1	100.0
9	Above 30 to 35 and below	1	-	-	-	-	1	100.0
10	Above 35 to 40 and below	2	-	-	2	100.0	-	-
11	Above 40 to 45 and below	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	Above 45 to 50 and below	2	-	-	-	-	2	100.0
13	Above 50 to 55 and below	2	-	-	-	-	2	100.0
14	Above 95 to 100 and below	1	-	-	-	-	1	100.0
15	Above 100	1	-	-	1	100.0	-	-
Total		414	217	52.4	102	24.6	95	23.0

TABLE 5

CASTE AND POLITICAL/FACTIONAL AFFILIATION: 1964

Srl. No.	Caste	Total	No. of Families					
			Leftist Communist		Neutral		Right Communist	
			No.	% to Col.3	No.	% to Col.3	No.	% to Col.3
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Brahmin	5	-	-	2	40.0	3	60.0
2	Komati	6	2	33.4	-	-	4	66.5
3	Reddi	16	4	25.0	2	12.5	10	62.5
4	Teluga	10	1	10.0	4	40.0	5	50.0
5	Visva Brahmin (Kammari & Kamsali)	14	3	21.3	5	35.7	6	43.0
6	Muslim	13	3	23.0	1	7.7	9	69.3
7	Golla	70	29	41.4	27	38.5	14	20.1
8	Mutrasa	25	21	84.0	1	4.0	3	12.0
9	Gaundla	65	26	40.0	24	37.0	15	23.0
10	Pusala	11	7	63.6	2	18.2	2	18.2
11	Chakali	13	10	76.8	2	15.5	1	7.7
12	Vaddera	25	25	100.0	-	-	-	-
13	Lambadi	46	23	50.0	11	24.0	12	26.0
14	Mala	38	25	66.0	10	26.3	3	7.7
15	Madiga	43	28	65.1	8	18.6	7	16.3
16	Others	14	10	71.4	3	21.5	1	7.1
Total		414	217	52.4	102	24.6	95	23.0

Post-election Conflict:

It may not be presumptuous on our part to characterize the period of 1964 to '68 as a period of political turbulence and to adopt Beals and Siegel terminology, Pervasive factionalism.⁵ A series of incidents of hostility and conflict took place between individuals and groups belonging either to the same or different social or economic strata. Having come back to hold a seat of political power after a period of oblivion, Sri Pusala No.2 the president, seems to have gone all out to suppress the opposition and to exploit every possible incident of interpersonal conflict for his own advantage. Let us examine some such incidents.

Harassment of Sri Gaundla No.3:

We may recall that on the eve of the elections Sri Gaundla No.8 joined with Sri Pusala No.2 with the main purpose of undermining the influence of Sri Gaundla No.3. Accordingly soon after the elections were over they took a series of actions against Sri Gaundla No.3.

Incident No.1

In accordance with the plans drawn previously rigorous attempts were made to form the toddy tappers cooperative union. The taluka Leftist Communist leaders gave active support and the excise officials too took interest. The

⁵Beals and Siegel: Divisiveness and Social Conflict; An Anthropological Approach. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1967.

officials invited all the Gaundla families to become members of the Union. But as Sri Gaundla No.3 and his associates were indecisive for a long time the Union was constituted initially with twenty members, all leftist-communist supporters. It was also reported that Sri Gaundla No.3 demanded that he be made the president of the Union and that he, in his capacity as the caste head, be given one free share; but Sri Graundla No.8 and his friends did not agree to this. Sri Gaundla No.3 however explained that he asked only for the presidentship and not for an extra share. He felt it essential to become president for he was afraid of being cornered and harrassed on all possible occasions. He said: "It was impossible for me to accept an insignificant position and to be at the mercy of my opponent."

Shortly after the formation of the Union more joined as members and all together there were 44 main shares at the rate of one share to each individual. The 44 shares, however were further subdivided into 55 so as to accommodate as many tappers as possible. Sri Gaundla No.3 would not join. He and ten of his close colleagues took trees on lease from a contractor in the nearby village, but they were not allowed to sell their toddy in Haripur. This meant that these families should spend much of their time in other villages until the toddy was sold out and then return to Haripur quite late at night. It was a real bother each day.

Incident No.2

We may recall that Sri Gaundla No.3 was at first a friend of Sri Pusala No.2 and then became a close ally of Sri Komati No.1. Sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Komati No.1 continued to be opponents. However, soon after the second panchayat elections were over Sri Komati No.1 noticed the tide of local forces going against the Rightist Communists in general and against Sri Gaundla No.3 in particular. He felt his ability to get his things done in the village was contingent upon his relations with the Leftists and accordingly turned to Sri Pusala No.2. It is rumored the newly won friendship cost him a bicycle worth of Rs.200/ -- and 2 bags of rice-paddy. These were reportedly presented to Sri Pusala No.2

For deserting them, Sri Mala No.2, Sri Mala No.1 and Sri Gaundla No.3 all old associates, frowned upon Sri Komati No.1. Sri Gaundla No.3 became particularly irritated at this change of affiliation at a time when he was under severe attack from Sri Pusala No.2. So he began to speak out against the alleged tacit support of Sri Pusala No.2 for Sri Komati No.1 in the latter's exploitation of the poor by way of collecting compounded and exorbitant rates of interest. Any open talk of this sort was naturally damaging to one of the stature of Sri Pusala No.2, the Panchayati President. Moreover, he was a leftist Communist leader in the village and was supposed to espouse the cause of the poor.

Hence upset by the accusation, Sri Pusala No.2 began to form another plot against Sri Gaundla No.3.

We have noted already that during the time of the elections and for some time previous to that, Sri Gaundla No.3 was the excise sub-contractor on behalf of the Haripur Gaundla toddy tappers. At that time he and some other Gaundla colleagues of his took a loan of Rs. 3,000/ -- from Sri Brahmin No. 1 and the amount was spent toward payment of the government revenue relating to the contract. Subsequently, Sri Gaundla No.8 discovered that the entire amount so taken as loan was not spent properly, but a part of it was misappropriated by Sri Gaundla No.3 in contravention of the trust placed in him. An amount of about Rs. 1,300 was still due to Sri Brahmin No.1. Under the instigation of Sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Gaundla No.8, the cosignatories of the promisory note and their supporters, now refused to pay any more toward the loan and made Sri Gaundla No.3 solely responsible for the required redemption. Sri Brahmin No.1 also pressed Sri Gaundla No.3 for immediate payment of the loan, allegedly under the influence of Sri Komati No.1.

Not to be content with that, Sri Gaundla No.8 proposed to his caste members that as a punitive action for violating the trust placed in him Sri Gaundla No.3 should cease to be recognized as the caste head. The motion was carried and Sri Gaundla No.3 was replaced by another person. Thus humiliated Sri Gaundla No.3 fled the village temporarily.

Conflict between Sri Mala No.1 and Sri Mala No.3:

Sri Mala No.1 was the Panchayat member during the period 1959 to '64. He had lost to Sri Mala No.3 in 1964. Sri Mala No.1 and Sri Mala No.2 were supporters of Sri Gaundla No.3 and therefore were now and then finding fault with the actions of Sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3. The latter two did not like this and plotted to harrass Sri Mala No.1, the Rightist Communist supporter.

Sri Mala No.1 and Sri Mala No.3 were paternal cousins and shared a pen for storing haystacks. Suddenly one day Sri Mala No.3 took the entire piece of land under possession and forbade Sri Mala No.1 from using it. In fear of physical blows and violence Sri Mala No.3 kept quiet for the present. Of course he appealed to the village elders suchas Sri Deshmukh No.3 and Sri Brahmin No.1 who were supposedly neutral at that time. But no settlement could be arrived at through the advice of these elders. They recommended transfer of half of the piece of land to Sri Mala No.3. But Sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3 would adamantly oppose any peaceful solution and would not budge an inch from their stand.

Opposition to Sri Pusala No.2:

Due to the above incidents as well as others, slowly the villagers began to become disenchanted with Sri Pusala No.2 and disliked the manner he was conducting himself under the intoxication of unbridled power. So far the Mala leaders

Sri Mala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3 were helplessly watching the developments consequent upon the cleavage between Sri Gaundla No.3 and Sri Komati No.1, two of their old associates. Now that one of them was also ill treated, the two Mala leaders got ready to muster strength. They approached Sri Komati No.1 and warned him of the bad consequences if he were to continue his friendship with Sri Pusala No.2. Having estimated the mounting opposition, Sri Komati No.1 promised to go back into the fold of his previous associates, thus deserting Sri Pusala No.2.

Meanwhile it so happened that some of the amounts collected from the members of the Toddy Tappers Union were not properly accounted for by the then president of the Union. Some members, the sympathizers of Sri Gaundla No.3, became suspicious of the President, Sri Gaundla, No.11, Sri Gaundla No.8 and their adviser Sri Pusala No.2. Looking at this situation Sri Mala No.2 encouraged these dissidents of the Union to contact Sri Gaundla No.3 and to bring him back to the village. Accordingly Sri Gaundla No.3 was brought back home and subsequently was restored to his position of caste head.

Encouraged by these sudden developments Sri Mala No.2, Sri Mala No.1 and Sri Gaundla No.3 went to the taluka Leftist leaders and complained against Sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3. Pending investigation of other problems the leaders decided that half of the land of the pen be given back to Sri Mala No.1 immediately. Sri Mala No.3

complied with the decision. As we can guess, this decision lowered the prestige of Sri Mala No.3 and Sri Pusala No.2 considerably, and they were both denegated within and outside the village Haripur.

After some time the fifteen Gaundla dissidents resigned their membership in the Union. This made Sri Gaundla No.8 and also the Leftist Communist leaders ponder the matter and to take a fresh look at their relations with Sri Pusala No.2. However, no immediate decision was taken. Probably the leaders preferred to watch further developments in the village before an appropriate action was taken.

Sri Komati No. 1 is beaten;

As a legacy of the Nizam rule, almost every village in Telangana had about 10 percent of the land earmarked as Bancharai, the public grazing land. Many villages also had, for some reason or the other, some poramboke lands not being cultivated. As the size of population of the country increased rapidly, pressure on land mounted considerably. The land reform acts did not greatly help to solve the problem of land hunger. The political parties therefore urged the government to distribute the cultivable Bancharai and Poramboke lands among the landless poor. The Congress government accordingly decided to go ahead with the scheme of distributing the available land after retaining at least five percent of the total land in each village as Bancharai. In village Haripur about 30 poor families benefitted from

this scheme. Of course, as per the policy of the government, the Harijans (Mala and Madiga) beneficiaries were more numerous than others.

In Hariipur Sri Komati No. 1 and some other families including Sri Deshmukh No.3 had for a long time some Bancharai land under their plough. The government however used to levy excess taxes on these lands. Sri Pusala No.2 demanded that the Bancharai land under the possession of Sri Komati No.1 be handed over to the village panchayat for distribution among the landless. Sri Komati No.1 refused to go by the wishes of Sri Pusala No.2. Here we shall note that Sri Pusala No.2 became somewhat unpopular with the Communist leaders at the taluk level and also with his colleagues in the village. The best way to restore his prestige was to indulge in such activities as were conceivably intended to serve the cause of the poor. Hence he declared that on an appointed day the Bancharai lands of less than an acre, under the control of Sri Komati No.1 would be parcelled out among the poor whether or not the former agreed to it. Of course, it was also declared that at the same time the two acre Bancharai land under Sri Deshmukh No.3 would also be given to the poor.

On the day fixed, Sri Pusala No.2 and his party went to the designated spot. Sri Komati No.1 too went there along with a party of about 25 men and resisted the seizure of the land by the other party. In the course of physical encounter four of Sri Komati No. 1's supporters received

injuries. Sri Komati No. 1 himself received a major blow on the head and was knocked down as a result.

Sri Komati No. 1 was taken to the taluk headquarters and was admitted to the government hospital. The police arrested the accused, numbering about twelve, including Sri Pusala No.2 and the other panchayat member Sri Mala No.3. A criminal suit was also filed against them in the court of law. The accused were freed on bail pending the final decision of the court. Bail was provided by the Leftist Communist leaders at the taluk headquarters. Terror stricken by the threats of Sri Pusala No.2 and his associates, the Congress members in the village, Sri Deshmukh No.3, Sri Brahmin No. 1, Sri Mala No.2 the parents of Sri Komati No.1, and Sri Gaundla No.3 requested police protection for some time. Police were accordingly stationed in the village for about four months. Meanwhile Sri Deshmukh No.3 petitioned the government to grant ownership rights over the Brancharai land under his possession with the plea that the land was adjacent to his patta (ownership title) land. He claimed the efficiency of his agricultural operations demanded that the bancharai land be kept under him. The Government granted ownership rights as required by him on payment of the purchase amount fixed by the revenue officials.

Suspension of Sri Pusala No.2, the President:

With a criminal case in the court of law against him and his men, Sri Pusala No. 2 faced a difficult problem. There was no one to finance the huge expenditure involved

in fighting the case for an indefinite period. The only alternative left was to misappropriate the panchayat funds and this he did.

His well-known opponents in the village came to know of this secret. In a way, as one revealed, they were expecting Sri Pusala No.2 to act the way he did. It was an opportune time for them to act vigorously against Sri Pusala No.2. So they appealed to the officer-in-charge at the Panchayat Samiti to check on the Panchayat budget. The officer discovered that Sri Pusala No.2 had embezzled to the tune of Rs. 1,680. On the recommendation of the officer the district collector ordered the suspension of Sri Pusala No.2 effective December 20, 1966. A case against Sri Pusala No.2 is still pending with the collector's office.'

Cleavages within the Panchayat:

As per regulations, elections were soon conducted for a new president. The members elected Sri Mala No.3, the close confidant of Sri Pusala No.2. The vice president Sri Reddi No.6 aspired for the position but his claims were overlooked by the members led by Sri Pusala No.2 for fear that Sri Reddi No.6 might not act the way Sri Pusala No.2 might want him to.

As one would expect Sri Reddi No.6 felt insulted and began to make overtures to the Rightist Communist group. According to his own version Srimati Golla No.1, the Leftist panchayat member, also became his supporter. The panchayat board as it stood on December 1, 1967 was split,

into two factions: One, composed of the Right Communists Sri Reddi No.5 and Srimati Guandla No.10 and the Leftist defectors Sri Reddi No.6 and Srimati Golla No.1; and the other composed of Sri Mala No.3, Sri Madiga No.4, Sri Gaundla No. 9, Sri Vaddera No.2 and Sri Pusala No.2. Obviously the faction under Sri Pusala No.2 continued to be stronger than the other one. Despite their wishes, the Reddi brothers could not topple the panchayat headed by Sri Mala No.3. It must be made clear however, that the above said change in affiliations was known to everyone, but no public declaration as such was made by the concerned members. Sri Reddi No.6 and Srimati Golla No.1, continued to be treated as Leftist members.

Sri Pusala No.2 is stripped of his leftist leadership;

Complaints against Sri Pusala No.2's behavior continued to pour into the office of the Left Communists at the taluk headquarters. The two following incidents made a change in the local political situation in Haripur and led the taluka leaders to take drastic action against Sri Pusala No.2.

Incident 1: One Sri Chakali advanced loans both in cash and kind to Srimati Gaundla. In the year 1966, just before Sri Pusala No.2's dismissal as President, he gave away 1/4th acre of her irrigated land toward redemption of the loan. To that effect a document was also written by the Patwari with signatures on it, by the two parties, Sri Chakali and Srimati Gaundla. Sri Pusala No.2 was one who supported the deal. Both the parties were then his supporters.

In the early months of the year 1967 it so happened that one Sri Gaundla No.7 had a quarrel with Sri Chakali. This was also in connection with a loan that the former owed to the latter. When Sri Gaundla No.7 discovered that Sri Pusala No.2 was rather working against his interest, he joined the rightist Communist group. Conflict between Sri Gaundla No.7 and Sri Chakali persisted and the dispute between them evaded settlement to this date (December 10, 1968). Under the circumstance, with a view to pressure Sri Chakali, Sri Gaundla No.7 invited Srimati Gaundla, who was incidentally his paternal uncle's widow, to take her land back in contravention of the written agreement. Her son agreed with the proposal and filed a suit in the court against Sri Chakali. Strange as it may seem Sri Pusala No.2 also supported Srimati Gaundla's son and helped him to go to the taluk headquarters, see the lawyer and file a suit. This angered Sri Gaundla No.8 who actually was instrumental in bringing Sri Pusala No.2 back from oblivion to the political scene. For a long time Sri Gaundla No.8 and his father Sri Gaundla No.5 were also up against Srimati Gaundla for the alleged reason that she was in illicit sexual contact with Sri Chakali ever since her husband's death a few years ago and so long as she was "chummy" with Sri Chakali she did not care to pay heed to their advice. Hence Sri Gaundla No.8 and Sri Gaundla No.5 decided to boycott Sri Pusala No.2, and demanded his stepping down from the leadership of the Leftist Communist group. They also

pleaded with the taluk leaders to take appropriate punitive action against him for changing sides and for supporting Srimati Gaundla and thus breaking the unity of their group.

Incident 2: We have noted that the government had been granting the poor patta (ownership) rights over the Bancharai lands. Sri Gaundla No.3, almost landless, applied for the same and worked toward that end. But suddenly he discovered that to his surprise the two acre piece of land for which he had applied was about to be granted in favor of Sri Pusala No.2. Hurriedly he went to the taluk headquarters and appealed to the revenue authorities against the patwari for his fraudulent attempts in favor of Sri Pusala No.2.⁶ After an on-the-spot inspection the authorities decided in favor of Sri Gaundla No.3. In order to expose the unscrupulous activities of Sri Pusala No.2, Sri Gaundla No.3 also reached the Leftist leaders and reported the entire story in detail.

Curiously enough we see that Sri Pusala No.2 thus became a target of attack both from the Left and the Right. So far the regional leaders of the Leftist Communist did help Sri Pusala No.2 in various ways. They made Sri Komati No.1 withdraw the lawsuit and did not propose any punitive action despite a spate of complaints against him. Of course their problem was to arrange for the substitute. But they could wait no longer. At last, the leaders arrived into the village and declared unconditional withdrawal of their support for Sri Pusala No.2.

⁶The young patwari now stands dismissed for various acts of commission and omission. Sri Reddi No.1 became patwari again.

Rift between Sri Pusala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3:

Stripped of the position of panchayat president and leaders' status in the Leftist group, Sri Pusala No.2 again became helpless. Soon his old friends, including Sri Mala No.3 the new President, and Sri Gaundla No.8 the ally since 1964 elections, would desert him. Sri Gaundla No.3, Sri Mala No.2 and Sri Mala No.1 were jubilant at the changed situation, but wanted to turn Sri Mala No.3 completely against Sri Pusala No.2 so that there may not be any immediate possibility of the two again becoming friends.

The three formed a plot. For a long time Sri Mala No.3 owed some money to Sri Telaga No.1, but was evading repayment despite repeated demands. Sri Telaga No.1 did not press much for fear of being dragged into violent factional politics. With the ouster of Sri Pusala No.2 and the consequent change in the atmosphere in the village, he was strongly persuaded by Sri Mala No.1, Sri Mala No.2 and Sri Gaundla No.3 to press Sri Mala No.3 for repayment. Looking at the slowly but steadily growing strength of the Congress Rightist leaders, Sri Mala No.3 almost gave in and promised to abide by their decision.

After a duration of a few days the said Rightist leaders made Sri Mala No.3 pick a quarrel with Sri Pusala No.2. Despite the fact that he was ousted from the presidency Sri Pusala No.2 continued to keep the Community Radio in his house and play it as and when he deemed fit. On one evening when the radio was on Sri Mala No.3 sent a boy to Sri Pusala No.2 with a demand to have the radio turned over

to him. Sri Pusala No.2, according to his own story, did not take the demand seriously and sent the boy back with empty hands. Reportedly Sri Pusala No.2 also made a casual remark to the boy to the effect that Sri Mala No.3 was probably drunk at the time. Infuriated, Sri Mala No.3 went personally to Sri Pusala No.2 and forced his way into the house in order to seize the radio. Sri Pusala No.2 resisted with all his force and threw Sri Mala No.3 out of the house.

Sri Mala No.3 reported the matter to the inciters. Soon a group of people assembled, marched toward Sri Pusala No.2's residence, attacked him with severe blows and went back with the radio in their possession.

Next day Sri Pusala No.2 went to the taluk headquarters for medical treatment of the bruises he received. He took this opportunity to call on the Leftist leaders and report to them what had happened the previous night. Having sensed the local tide of hatred against him, they advised Sri Pusala No.2 not to take any action which would further confound the already complicated political atmosphere in the village. Unable to have any one to stand by him, Sri Pusala No.2 dared not to report the matter even to the police and reportedly, also requested the police patel, Sri Deshmukh No. 3, not to report the matter to the police.

The Present Situation:

"Given as I was to despair and anguish," remarked Sri Pusala No.2, "I used to make frequent visits to Sri Deshmukh

No.3." Sri Mala No.1, Sri Mala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3, Sri Gaundla No.3, and also Sri Gaundla No.8 frowned upon the gesture of warmth for Sri Pusala No.2 on the part of Sri Deshmukh No.3. In the words of Sri Gaundla No.3, the implacable opponent of Sri Pusala No.2, "China Doravaru" (i.e. Sri Deshmukh No.3) had always a liking for Sri Pusala No.2." Of course so was the attitude of Sri Pusala No.2 for Sri Deshmukh No.3. As per the testimony of three of these opponents of Sri Pusala No.2 the inference could be drawn that the said five leaders have decided on a kind of moratorium according to which no matter what happened none should approach Sri Deshmukh No.3 for any kind of favor or advice and by the same token none should engage in any kind of give-and-take affair with him. In fact, Sri Mala No.2 would pressure Sri Deshmukh No.3 to pay back the loan that was due to him. Alternatively, he asked for liberalizing the conditions of the agreement under which a piece of irrigated land was pledged to him in lieu of the loan amount. Sri Deshmukh No.3 opted for the latter course of action as he had no cash to redeem the loan instantly.

The situation did not however last long. As it should be clear by this time, in the intervening years between 1966 and 1968 the Reddi brothers on the Panchayat were rather overlooked and were not consulted by the Mala brothers. Of course Sri Reddi No.5 meanwhile had a dispute, with his brother Sri Reddi No.1, the ex-patwari. The dispute related to the division and occupancy rights over a

piece of land. Even though this dispute did not get involved in factional politics, both the brothers filed law suits against the other.

Unquestionably this dispute, however, gave a jolt to the long held unity between the Reddi brothers and gave an opening to others to assault their stature. Even so, Sri Reddi No. 5 and Sri Reddi No. 6 stood together and having realized the existing situation began to make friendship with Sri Komati No.1. Sri Telaga No.1, a young man, played the role of mediator between Sri Komati No.1 and Sri Deshmukh No.3 and tried to heal the misunderstandings between the two. Sri Deshmukh No.3 thus began to regain his lost prestige.

Before we move further in the analysis, we must mention the important development that took place in the region. In keeping with the changes at the national level the Leftist Communist Party of the region was split into Marxists and Naxalbarites. The latter name was derived from the armed revolution that was started by pro-Mao extremists in an area around a place called Naxalbari in the North-east state of West Bengal.⁷ The Naxalbarites⁸ declared their disenchantment with parliamentary democracy as practiced in India and gave an open call to the public for accepting

⁷This state is now ruled by the United front led by the Marxist-Leftists and the Rightists.

⁸Sri D.V. Rao, referred to earlier, now belongs to this group.

revolutionary tactics and for relinquishing of seats in any of the democratic institutions. Subsequently some trouble was stirred up in the district of Nalgonda and in some villages around Haripur. Clashes also took place between the rival communist leaders and a few acts of arson and murder were also reported. The Government took stern action against the trouble makers and began to round up all the suspects.

In Haripur Sri Mala No.3 suspected some trouble owing to his Leftist association and extremist leanings. The Mala leaders advised Sri Mala No.3 to announce publicly his complete disassociation with the Communists. With this act all three Mala brothers, Sri Mala No.1, Sri Mala No.2 and Sri Mala No.3 came to be united. Notwithstanding his differences with Sri Gaundla No.3, Sri Gaundla No.8 gave indication of his support to the Mala brothers. Whether he did so under duress of the political situation of the region or with other motives, is difficult to judge.

To take a summary view of the situation as it stood on January 1, 1968. There emerged two loose groups: One made up of Sri Reddi No.5, Sri Reddi No.6, Sri Telaga No.1, Sri Deshmukh No.3 and Sri Komati No.1, and the other composed of Sri Mala No.1, Sri Mala No.2, Sri Mala No.3, Sri Gaundla No.3 and Sri Gaundla No.8. The adjective "loose" has been advisedly used for the reason that there has not as yet developed strong bonds between the members of each of the groups. The "we feeling" is yet to emerge. In the first

group the differences between Sri Deshmukh No.3 and Sri Komati No.1 were not fully resolved. And so was the case in the difference between Sri Gaundla No.3 and Sri Gaundla No.8 of the second group. The groups were also not as yet openly pitted against each other.

Leadership Reputation:

To the question as to "who were to your knowledge and opinion, the important village leaders (a) immediately after the second panchayat elections in the 1966 and then, (b) after the dismissal of Sri Pusala No.2 in the village," the answers elicited from the 25 knowledgeable present the following reputation mentions for each of the village leaders. Since the situation differed before and after the dismissal of Sri Pusala No.2 as the president, the question was accordingly put orally.

From the tables 6 and 7 it should be clear that while Sri Pusala No.2 was named by 23 as a leader during the first period, Sri Mala No.3 was given the largest number of mentions in the next period. While it was true that Sri Pusala No.2 remained quite powerful as the president, it was hard from what we have analyzed so far, to believe that Sri Mala No.3 was that powerful during the second period. Yet from what appears in Table 7 it makes us suspect that Sri Mala No.3 being a president was probably taken to be the real powerful person. At least it reflects the growing recognition of a legitimacy attached to the position of

TABLE NO.6

REPUTATION MENTIONS RECEIVED BY THE VILLAGE LEADERS FOR
THE PERIOD 1964-66 (UNDER SRI PUSALA NO.2 AS THE PRESIDENT)

Srl. No.	Pseudonym	No. of mentions	Status - position
1	Sri Pusala No.2	23	Panchayat president, leftist
2	Sri Mala No.3	21	Panchayat member, leftist
3	Sri Gaundla No.8	16	Leader of a Gaundla group, leftist
4	Sri Reddi No.5	16	Ex-president, leader of the rightist group
5	Sri Gaundla No.3	15	Gaundla caste head, rightist
6	Sri Mala No.2	14	Mala leader & congressite
7	Sri Deshmukh No.3	11	Police Patel & congressite
8	Sri Mala No.1	10	Ex-vice president of the panchayat, rightist

TABLE 7

REPUTATION MENTIONS GAINED BY THE LEADERS DURING
THE PERIOD 1966-68 (AFTER THE DISMISSAL OF SRI PUSALA NO.2)

Srl. No.	Pseudonym	No. of mentions	Status - position
1	Sri Mala No.3	22	Panchayat president, leftist
2	Sri Gaundla No.8	20	A Gaundla leader, leftist
3	Sri Mala No.2	20	A Mala leader, Congressite
4	Sri Gaundla No.3	16	Gaundla Caste head, rightist
5	Sri Reddi No.5	16	Ex-panchayat president, rightist
6	Sri Gaundla No.11	14	President, toddy tappers Union, leftist
7	Sri Reddi No.6	12	Panchayat Vice-President, leftist
8	Sri Mala No.1	12	Mala leader, ex-pt. president, rightist
9	Sri Deshmukh No.3	10	Village police-patel, Congressite
10	Sri Komati No.1	10	Congressite, Money lender

presidency, the elected job. This itself is a desirable trend in that it shows a direction of change from a sacred to a secular society. This is all the more significant looking at the lowly caste background of the president. Since he was considered a confidant of Sri Pusala No.2, even during the first period, Sri Mala No.3 was ranked next to Sri Pusala No.2, the president.

As is evident from the two tables the position of vice-president did not gain recognition, perhaps at least in part due to his passive actions. Sri Reddi No.6, the vice-president, was named by 12 out of the 25 as a leader during the second period, possibly because of the fact that he now began to build his stature in association with Sri Reddi No.5 who commanded a fairly good reputation throughout.

Because of his major part in the panchayat elections and later in the formation of the toddy tappers Union, Sri Gaundla No.8 came to be well recognized as a man next to Sri Mala No.3. Sri Mala No.2 gained in the second period, and so did Sri Gaundla No.3, the reason being obvious from our analysis so far. Because of the important role played by Sri Gaundla No. 11, the President of the Toddy Tappers Union, in curbing the influence of Sri Pusala No.2, he was named as the leader during the second period. The ten activists listed in Table 7, however indicated that on the whole Sri Mala No.2 was actually more powerful and played a major role during the latter period and that Sri Mala No.3

came to depend upon him.

While Sri Mala No.1 maintained more or less the same position throughout, Sri Deshmukh No.1 suffered loss of prestige. Sri Komati No.1 seems to be picking up again after some lapse. In fact his was a precipitous drop. From the position of No.1 leader during the period 1959-64 he came to occupy the last position during the period 1966-68.

Conclusion

The second panchayat election in Haripur took place in 1964. In line with the changes at the regional level, the local Communist leaders formed leftist and rightist factions. Sri Pusala No.2, the ex-Communist leader, staged a come-back to active politics and took up the leadership of the Leftist wing. He was assisted by the factional leaders among the Gaundla and Mala caste groups. Sri Reddi No.5, assisted by the other Gaundla and Mala factional leaders and also Sri Komati No.1, became the spearhead of the Rightist group. Sri Deshmukh No.3 and some other former Congress leaders and followers remained neutral. Some of course joined the Rightist group. Ultimately the Leftist faction with a majority from among the lower economic and social strata won seven out of the nine panchayat seats.

After the elections were over, the Leftist group under Sri Pusala No.2 went all out to suppress opposition. It was a kind of 'class conflict' at work. On many occasions use of violence as a means of settling disputes was encouraged.

Ultimately, due to excesses, Sri Pusala No.2 was removed both from the presidentship and also from the leadership of the Leftist faction. The Communist leaders initially supported Sri Pusala No.2; as the opposition mounted against him they could not help but withdraw their support of him.

With the fall of Sri Pusala No.2, Sri Mala No.3 was elected panchayat president. It is important to note that consequent upon the democratization process Sri Pusala No.2, who was from a relatively lower caste and was without any property, and Sri Mala No.3, who was substantially propertied but of an untouchable caste, could come to power. The Rightist faction tried to oust Sri Mala No.3 from the presidentship, but could not do so for want of enough support from the members of the panchayat.

However, under the changed political situation of the region, Sri Mala No.3 was converted to the Congress Party and thus became one with his lineage members, Sri Mala No.1 and Sri Mala No.2. These three are the economic dominants in the Mala caste group. For various reasons the Gaundla leaders too seem to be willing to cooperate with the Malas. At the other end, the Reddis and the Telagas seem to be joining Sri Komati No.1 and seem to be wooing Sri Deshmukh No.3. If this trend continues, it is but logical that the village conflict that took the shape of class conflict under Sri Pusala No.2 would soon take the shape of caste conflict-- a conflict between the upper castes and the populous

low castes. Whether it would so happen or not depends upon (a) whether Sri Mala No.3 genuinely changed to Congress or changed to it out of duress; and (b) what would be the political situation at the region on the eve of the third panchayat elections to be held in 1969 around May or June, for the leaders at the village level seem to change their affiliations accordingly.

CHAPTER VII: PATRON-CLIENT AND LEADER-FOLLOWER RELATIONSHIPS

In the first chapter containing a theoretical discussion of our research problem we assumed that one's ability to control another was a function of the dependency of one upon the other. Idiographically, following Srinivas and others we expected that in an Indian village patron-client relations such as master-servant, landlord-tenant, and creditor-debtor relationships would form the bases of vertical relationships between the families of the upper and lower strata, and also that these patron-client relationships would have a potential of turning into leader-follower relationships as well. In political terms this meant that all kinds of clientele (or dependents) would become the followers of their respective patrons. If the patrons were to be Congressites the clients would also be Congressites, and if the former were to change their political or factional affiliation so would the latter. In terms of competition for power, such relationships would prove immensely important in that the patron families coming from the same social or economic stratum and united through kinship bonds would form a series of solidary groups headed by their own leaders who would in turn support the primary or main leaders of each of the broader groups for community wide

leadership and positions of authority. In this short chapter we would delineate various forms of patron-client and kinship relations in Haripur and would examine whether or not such relationships manifested themselves in leader-follower relationships.

Master-servant relations:

In a village the relationship that approximate master-servant relations are those that are governed by the Jajmani system and also those which fall under employer-employee pattern. We shall take them up separately.

The Jajmani System.

As we have already noted in the Chapter III, under the traditional village agricultural economy the service castes' families are attached to various patron families who are largely agriculturists. In lieu of its service each client family is paid usually in kind during the harvesting seasons. We have to note that at the time of separation the brothers of a client family divide their patrons among themselves and continue to serve accordingly. By and large attachment of a client to a patron is involuntary and therefore is not subject to change at one's will. Any change has to be approved by the caste council or the concerned client families. On occasion the service castes behave in the manner of the labor unions. If a client ceases to serve his patron due to a dispute, other client families do not step in to take up the work. The dispute has to be settled by the concerned

patron and client families with or without the assistance of the respective caste councils or village councils as the situation demands. At the time of our investigation the washermen in Haripur ceased to wash the used utensils of Sri Deshmukh No.3 and no settlement took place even after about three months.

In Haripur there is one Priest (Brahmin), one potter (Kimmari) and two barbers (Mangali) families, and these provide their services to all of the potential patrons in the village (of course subject to permissibility, e.g., the Brahmin does not attend on the lowest castes or the untouchables). Hence their patrons include families of all political or factional identification. Among the 13 washermen (Chakali) families only 8 followed the traditional occupation of washing clothes. In 1959 all the eight families were Communists supporters and their patrons numbering about 208 families¹ belonged to both Communist and Congress groups. In 1964 seven of the washermen remained with the Leftists and the remaining one turned to Rightist Communism. Even so their patrons remained unchanged. The same was the case of the carpenter-cum-iron smithy families. Out of these ten families in the village only eight were actively engaged in their profession. In 1959 one was Communist, 5 were Congressites, and two were neutrals. In 1964 one was Leftist,

¹Except the upper Brahmin, Komati, Telaga, Reddi, Visva Brahmin castes and some others from among the other castes, all the villagers do not regularly employ the washermen.

five were Rightists and two remained neutrals. The 172 agriculturist patron families belonged to all factions and that seems to have affected their work relationship with the clients in the least.

The other servicing caste in the village was the Madiga caste. Out of 43 families only 26 were actively engaged in their traditional occupation of leather work and removal of dead cattle. Of the 26 as many as 21 were Communists in 1959, and about the same number remained under Leftist Communism in the year 1964. The 26 families serve about 120 agriculturists ranging between five and eleven families each. In 1959 only two Communist Madigas had Communists as their patrons; all others had a mixture of both Communists and Congressites among their patrons. The change in factional affiliations on the part of the patrons by 1964 did not affect their previous relationship with the clients. It was found that in the year 1964 the thirty neutral (formerly Congress) or Rightist families of the Brahmin, Komati, Reddi and Telaga castes had as many as 21 leftist Madigas as their clients and only 9 had either Rightist Communists or neutral² clients under them.

Employer-Employee relations:

In the preceding chapters we have noted that in Haripur the lower economic strata contained more Communist supporters in general and Leftist communists in particular. Since it was these lower classes (and also lower castes) who

²Many neutrals were supporters of the Right wing of the Communists.

formed the main bulk of the labor force it is no wonder that many of the employers, Congress or Communist, had to depend upon the services of the Leftist labor force.

In Haripur about 210 families supply about 150 adult laborers³ who work on the farms on an annual basis. Of these 150 attached laborers about 98 were employed by 46 agriculturists in the village itself. Others work in the neighboring villages. In 1968 out of the 46 employers as many as 34 were pro-Congressites or Pro-Rightists and the remaining 12 were pro-Leftists. Only five Leftists and three Congressites, each employing between 1 and 3 laborers, could employ persons belonging to the same political group or faction. All such employers however belonged to the low castes: Gaundla, Golla, Mala and Madiga. The remaining 38 employers, a majority of whom were Congressites, however employed more Leftists than Rightists or Congressites. For example, the four Brahmin Congress families employed as many as 14 leftists and only 4 Rightists; Sri Komati No.1 also had 3 Leftists out of seven laborers under him.

Unlike the relationships under the Jajmani system, relationships under the employer-employee pattern are governed by voluntary and mutual selection of the families concerned. Many of the employers advanced small amounts of loans to the employees. But unless the amounts were quite heavy and also unless the employee worked with the same employer year after year, there seemed to be no political

³We are leaving the casual and child labor force out of the present account.

impact of the employer or the employee. Only seven employees were reported to have been working with the same employer -- 2 with Sri Deshmukh No.1, 3 with Sr. Komati No.1, and 2 with Sri Mala No.2 -- for a period of more than five years. As such, they became Congressites as were their patrons.

In this connection mention may be made of the fact that despite a large supply, because of their large scale affiliation with the Leftist Communist group the labor force had been less affected politically by the employers. On this account however we should not conclude that the labor force was very powerful vis a vis the employers. Some time back the laborers went on a strike in order to press their claims for increase in wages. As a reaction all the employers except the Brahmins and one Komati family decided to work themselves in the fields and if necessary to help one another thus dispensing with the laborers. Consequently, the laborers having no savings or an organization to supply food to fall back upon during the strike period came back to work without pressing for the acceptance of their demands. The four Brahmin or Komati owners who owned large sized farms and who would not themselves work on farms of course suffered for a while.⁴ Others having small sized farms and their men and women being accustomed to work on farms could put up with

⁴This incapacity or unwillingness to work on farms on the part of the Brahmins is at least partly responsible for putting them gradually out of agriculture and out of villages.

the situation without the assistance of the labor force.⁵

Landlord -- Tenant relationships:

Consequent upon the introduction of the land reform and tenancy legislation the big landlords have almost stopped leasing out their lands. As per the information available, in 1968 in Haripur only eight owners leased out (on share cropping) their lands. Of these eight, one was Sri Deshmukh No.2, the Mali Patel, one was an aged man of the only Gandla caste family in the village, one was an aged Telaga who most of the time resides in his daughter's house in a neighboring village, one was Sri Madiga No.3, the medical practitioner; and the remaining four were Muslims employed in government service. All eight and their tenants were Congressites. The Telaga and Madiga landlords have however leased out their lands to their own relatives. Further, all the seven tenants have been tilling the leased in lands for the last two to three years and have their own lands too. The landlords seem to have the feeling that the lands should be leased out and to those who return them back whenever so required. As two of the landlords have remarked they do not also wish to let out their lands to the landless Leftists for they would not advance any grain or cash if required and, moreover, there was always the threat of the

⁵ It should not mean that the wages didnot increase at all. For the last ten years for various reasons wages increased almost double. The labor force gives credit for this rise to the Communist party.

landless picking some quarrel when required to return the land. Thus the similarity of political affiliation between the landlord and the tenants may better be attributed more to the process of selection of the proper candidates rather than to the impact of the landlords on the tenants.

Creditor-Debtor Relationship:

In Haripur as of 1968 there were about 13 professional money lenders, small, and big, old and new, advancing loans to about 121 persons. Of the 13 money lenders Sri Komati No.1 was the only agriculturist-business-cum-money lender having as many as 52 clients. Castewise, the money lenders were: Five Komatis, one Telaga, two Pusala, one Gaundla, two Mala and two Lambadi. Table 1 gives the list of clients under each creditor and the political affiliation of all the families concerned.

As is evident from the table, more so than in other forms of patron-client relationship, the creditors are likely to have political impact on the debtors. It works in two ways. Firstly, the creditor makes a proper selection of the debtor before the loan itself is advanced. Secondly, for the sake of a loan in time of dire need, even a member of a different political affiliation would pledge support to the money lender. The influence of the creditor and his potential power over the debtor was illustrated in the previous chapters on a number of occasions. In fairness to the moneylenders it should be mentioned that many debtors create

TABLE 1
POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF THE
CREDITORS AND DEBTORS (1968)

Srl. No.	Creditor's Affiliation	No. of Debtors		Total
		Congress or Rightist	Leftist	
1	Congress/Rightest	35	16	51
2	Congress/Rightest	3	2	5
3	Congress/Rightest	2	2	4
4	Congress	3	1	4
5	Leftist	1	4	5
6	Congress	6	2	8
7	Leftist	-	6	6
8	Rightist	2	3	5
9	Leftist	1	5	6
10	Congress/Rightest	8	2	10
11	Leftist	2	4	6
12	Rightist	2	3	5
13	Neutral	1	5	6
		66	55	121

problems and change affiliations in due course once their need was fulfilled. As a result, Sri Komati No.1 has been gradually curtailing this sphere of activity and hence the number of petty money lenders grew.

As a passing reference it may be mentioned that one's ability to advance loans largely depends upon the cash one has. It does not necessarily correspond with the size of land owned. It is particularly so in the case of the Deshmukh families. For example Sri Deshmukh No.3 was the biggest landlord in the village next to Sri Deshmukh No.1. Even so he was indebted to Sri Komati No.1, to Sri Telaga No.1, and to Sri Madiga No.2. He has pledged a piece of his land to Sri Madiga No.2. The Deshmukhs do not work hard and do not invest well on land, but spend much on various ceremonies. As a result they get into debt. This was also the case with the Muslims. Hence Sri Deshmukh No.3 though of a high caste, being economically powerless, gradually became powerless politically too. Of course the legitimacy attached to the Deshmukh family was gone long ago.

Kinship Relations:

It is very difficult to arrive at a conclusion regarding the impact of kinship relations on the leader-follower relationship. In each caste group many of the families are related either through birth or marriage. Hence those who are united and those who are separated still maintain relations, either affinal or blood relations.

In Haripur all the 22 castes, small and large, were divided into as many as 75 lineages, the Golla and Gaundla caste having 13 and 14 lineages each. As we can see from Tables 5 of Chapters V and VI, except the Vaddera caste⁶ and few very small ones (such as Kammari, Yerakala etc.), majority of the castes are split into various factions. On examination it was found that about 45 lineages are split politically. This shows unquestionably that blood relationships as such has ceased to be an important factor in consolidating group affiliations. It is still made use of, but has lost its old charisma.

While exact figures are not available, based on disputes we have recorded so far and on other day-to-day disputes reported during the period of research in Haripur, it appears as if the lower castes (and also classes) tend to have more disputes arising out of marital relations whereas the upper castes (and also classes) tend to have more disputes arising out of property relations. In normal course, unlike property disputes, the disputes arising out of strained marital relations do not seem to extend beyond the circle of caste concerned and do not usually last long. The result that follows would then be that among the property-tied people dissensions cut across lineages and there would be relatively smoother relations between the affinals rather

⁶Even it is reported showing signs of fission.

than between the blood relatives who quarrel on division of properties. By the same token, the non-propertyied would have relatively smoother relations between blood brothers rather than between affinals who quarrel on matters such as adultery, divorce, dessertion, alimony, etc. We should also note that marital problems do not usually become public and serious among the middle class/propertyied families in the Indian villages; and the non-propertyied do not have property worth mentioning and worth requiring any attention.

Conclusion

Basing on the above material we would then conclude that with modernization the potential of patron-client relations turning into leader-follower relations would become less. At any rate, in a community where the lower classes are under the influence of a Leftist party, the patron-client relations, with the exception of creditor-debtor relations, would not lead to leader-follower relationships. In a way, of course, with economic and political modernization (which normally go hand in hand), the jajmani system and the traditional sort of master-servant relations themselves are undergoing radical changes.

CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION

This study has attempted an analysis of the changing dynamics of political power and conflict in a village community in the Telangana region of the state of Andhra Pradesh, India, during the period from 1945 to 1968. During this period the village Haripur underwent great political changes. It moved from a feudal organization to a stage of democratic decentralization (panchayati raj). The village also participated in the abortive armed Telangana Communist rebellion (1948-1950) against the princely regime and also against the Congress party regime. Our interest has been in ascertaining the interrelationships between class, caste, power and conflict over the period 1945 to 1968 with an emphasis on the impact of panchayati raj on these interrelationships. Our basic findings may be summarized as follows;

'Caste', 'Class', 'Power', and 'Conflict'.

1. In the first chapter we noted Schulze's contention that the power structure of a relatively isolated community would be monolithic; and, as the community is more and more involved with the larger society its power structure would tend to be polyolithic and the political system would gain independence from the economic system. Lenski posited

that in agricultural societies hereditary public office would serve as a means to economic and political power. We may note that Schulze's contention concerns the communities of the U.S.A. and Lenski's thesis concerns the agricultural communities of the Orient as well. Obviously the American communities had neither hereditary social status comparable to caste nor any hereditary administrative positions.¹ Hence in the background of our present study we should do well to combine the not too discrete conclusions of Lenski and Schulze and, by slight paraphrase, to make the following statement which would clearly illustrate the change in power structure and leadership in Haripur in particular and in Indian village communities in general.

The power structure of a relatively isolated community tends to be monolithic, that is, that the persons who have greatest power in its socio (or religious)-administrative system tend to be the same persons who have greatest power in the economic system and consequently in the political system as well. As the society becomes modernized and as the community becomes increasingly involved in the larger societal complex, however, to start

¹Beteille studied a community in South India and came to the same conclusion as did Schulze. But he too was not concerned much with the hereditary public office. See Beteille; cited.

with political power would tend to become autonomous from the hereditary social or administrative status and would tend to depend upon economic power. Consequent upon democratic decentralization, however, some political power would diffuse into the lower social and economic strata as well.

2. We have also noted in the first chapter that on the basis of his comparative study of village politics in India, Nicholas found prevalence of conflict between factions which cut across the socio-economic strata and some horizontal conflict between high-ranking dominant castes and populous low-ranking castes, but not between castes which were in adjacent hierarchical positions. Nicholas was not primarily concerned with the class composition of the factions and his conclusions were based mainly on studies of the villages, each of which had a dominant caste. Hence, unlike Nicholas, we found conflict between upper adjacent castes in the beginning of societal modernization and as a result of democratic decentralization conflict between high-ranking dominant castes and low-ranking castes seems to be appearing recently.² Nonetheless, based on our analysis in previous chapters we may make the

²This difference between Nicholas' conclusion and ours could be in a way due to the fact that Nicholas' comparison of the various village studies did not take the processual aspect into account to the same degree as we did in our study.

following statement with regard to the direction of the pattern of political conflict:

In a relatively isolated stratified community the upper socio-economic stratum (or one individual) with administrative positions would dominate the populace and political conflict, if any, would be covert (or a sort of pseudo-social domination³). As the community becomes modernized, and as it becomes involved in the larger societal complex, however, overt conflict would develop between individuals of the upper but adjacent high-ranking socio-economic strata. Consequent upon democratic decentralization economic dominants come to hold power and political conflict would continue to take the form of vertical factional conflict, with some element of horizontal (inter-strata) conflict side by side. However, if a faction maintains political affiliation with a leftist party, that faction may have more representation from the lower social and economic strata. Whether it would lead to inter-class or inter-caste conflict, ultimately depends upon the political circumstances

³ A form of domination under which the dominant figure (or class) tries to give the impression that he treats his subordinate as a 'person' and not as a 'means to an end,' whereas he in fact exploits the subordinate. For details: Orestein. op. cit.,

of the region. A period of revolution may encourage class conflict; otherwise, it may take the form of conflict between the upper and lower social strata (castes).

3. Finally, based on this and other studies made by various researchers, we may make the following statement regarding caste, class and conflict.

Despite the theoretical possibility that the status-caste groups would cut across the economic classes, we should note that by and large in Indian society lower castes are also lower classes.⁴ This structural characteristic thus produces the potential of the lower castes/classes turning to class conflict, only if the necessary conditions are provided. Particularly if the lower caste-status groups are denied due share in authority there is the possibility of the lower castes under the vanguard of Communist party, turning to class conflict, notwithstanding the few economically well-to-do families from among them. Having felt disappointed in securing power and prestige commensurate with the numerical size (a by-product of adult suffrage) of their caste

⁴"There is, of course, as Weber pointed out, a strong correlation between status and class positions" in the Western societies. Seymour M. Lipset; "Social Stratification: Social Class" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 15. The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968.

and possibly their increasing (however slow) economic power as well, the well-to-do themselves may well lead the class conflict. Further, it is reported that in many village communities the traditionally upper castes have been losing both economic and political power in favor of the rising upper middle peasant groups. Under the circumstances there is no wonder then if these upper castes who are losing power would join the lower castes against these upper middle classes/castes.

Panchayati raj, Factionalism and Extra-Community Linkage:

Besides the above conclusions, our study also throws some light on the interrelationships between panchayati raj, factionalism and extra-community linkage. Briefly, the interrelationships may be described as follows:

The introduction of Panchayati raj in the year 1959 has definitely increased the scope and intensity of conflict in the village. Formerly while political conflict was either absent (during the dominance of a single figure or caste) or it was limited to persons belonging to the upper socio-economic strata (during the period of societal democratization), now it came to embrace all sections of the community. People took part in the general elections held in the years 1952 and 1957, but since the contestants were then outsiders and sought positions far removed from the community milieu, it was not of great concern to the

localities. After the introduction of Panchayati raj now that the contenders for elective positions of power came from the community itself and each had a stake in the outcome, conflict became intense.

The contenders for power did not fight panchayat elections on certain clearly defined 'issues'. The leaders either stir up some trouble or exploit each possible incident of interpersonal dispute in the community for their own advantage. Not only leaders align and realign depending upon the timely needs and exigencies of the situation, but also they persuade the general public and more particularly the parties of a dispute to change their affiliations accordingly. Consequently disputes and conflicts revolve around personalities and the disputes evade settlement in accordance with the traditional methods. Either the disputes are more and more referred to the courts of law or some external leader or agency is required to settle these factional disputes. This suggests increasing external interference with and influence on local affairs.

It is of particular importance to note that while Panchayati raj has attempted to bring about devolution of certain powers to local bodies, i.e. village panchayats, it also linked each village with the region or Panchayat Samiti at the block level. Control of power at the Samiti level or at the level of Zilla Parishad (district level) necessitated control of the Panchayats at the village level. Hence the

political parties took interest in the village politics more than ever. Consequently each political party began to attract local village leaders into its fold. While the village leaders would exploit the local disputes for their own advantage, the political parties would exploit the differences between the local leaders. As a "snowball" effect the external political linkage provided additional strength and resource to the local activists and this exacerbated local factionalism and defections from one faction to the other. This process seems to be more prevalent particularly in a village such as Haripur (or Namahall)⁵ where there is no single dominant caste. Our findings thus largely support the following thesis of Beals and Siegel:

"...factionalist dispute⁶ comes from the interaction between internal strains and external stresses. This means that whatever the degree of strain in a community, divisiveness develops only where there is an appropriate variety of stress."⁷

We may however add that prolonged 'stress and strain' not only is a source for social movements⁸ but, the resulting factionalism would also serve both as a cause and effect of

⁵A South Indian Village studied by Beals. See Beals & Siegel: cited.

⁶A factional dispute is one which evades easy settlement consequent upon the disruption of normal community activity.

⁷Beals and Siegel: cited, p. 157.

⁸See Smelser, N.J., Theory of Collective Behavior, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

extremistic influence upon the lower social and economic strata, thus stimulating inter-strata conflict as well. It is particularly so in a village such as Haripur which was for a long time under the spell of Communism.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

PANCHAYAT AND GENERAL ELECTIONS AND PARTIES

1. Nalgonda District: Assembly and Parliament (General Elections)

Seats for	1952			1957			1962			1967		
	T	Cong.	Com.	T	Cong.	Com.	T	Cong.	Com.	T	Cong.	Com.
General Assembly	17	1	16	12	3	9	12	4	8	12	9	3
Parlia- ment	2	-	2	2	1	1	2	-	2	2	2	-

Suryapeta Constituency always
returned the Communist candi-
date.

2. Nalgonda District - Panchayat Elections

Seats for	1959			1964		
	T	Cong.	Com.	T	Cong.	Com.
Panchayat Samitis	18	14	4	15	12	3
Zilla Parishad	1	1	-	1	1	

In 1964 due to factions in Con-
gress, Communists became Zilla
parishad chairman. But later he
defeated to Congress.

3. Suryapeta Samiti - Panchayats

Seats for	1959			1964		
	T	Cong.	Com.	T	Cong.	Com.
Panchayat	55	33	22	55	21	34

Suryapeta Panchayat Samiti was
under Congress in 1959. In 1964
it came to Communists

4. Village Haripur Panchayat

Under Communists: both in 1959 and in 1964.

T = total
Cong. = Congress
Comt. = Communist

APPENDIX 2: CHANGE IN LAND AMOUNT OWNED BY EACH CASTE

Srl. No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Caste														
Land Owned (acres)														
% to total owned by all castes														
Land Owned (acres)														
% to total land														
Land Owned (acres)														
% to total land														
Land Owned (acres)														
% total land														
Land Owned (acres)														
Percent														
No. Families with land														
Net gain or loss 1946-68														
1 Brahmin	821.00	31.0	460.10	23.5	358-30	20.2	356-20	20.0	348-10	19.3	4/4	-		
2 Komati	17.04	.69	48.03	2.4	102-20	5.7	113-03	6.1	113-03	6.2	4/6	+		
3 Reddi	210-14	8.00	225-32	11.5	220-33	12.3	224-33	12.5	224-33	12.4	16/16	+		
4 Telaga	87-36	3.3	63-00	3.2	63-00	3.5	66-00	3.6	66-00	3.6	7/10	-		
5 Golla	261-28	9.8	265-23	13.5	177-00	10.0	182-03	10.1	182-03	10.1	50/70	-		
6 Gaundla	234-31	8.8	239-32	12.20	234-10	13.1	245-00	13.6	248-20	13.7	32/65	+		
7 Mutresa	234-28	8.8	106-14	5.8	90-26	5.1	92-26	5.4	95-00	5.2	18/25	-		
8 Chakali	117-38	4.4	68-28	3.5	75-08	4.2	75-08	4.1	75-08	4.1	8/13	-		
9 Muslim	221-16	8.4	73-33	3.8	63-29	3.5	63-29	3.5	60-09	3.3	9/13	-		
10 Lambadi	181-00	6.8	131-19	6.7	117-18	6.6	114-18	6.2	114-18	6.8	37/46	-		
11 Mala	54-01	2.0	95-11	4.8	92-11	5.1	104-16	5.8	123-16	6.8	29/38	+		
12 Madiga	127-00	4.8	111-14	5.6	108-19	6.1	87-19	4.8	87-19	4.8	33/43	-		
13 Kammari	10-11		11-27		12-10		12-02		9-38		7/10	-		
14 Kummari	10-11		6-30		6-30		6-30		6-30		1/1	-		
15 Kamsali	--		19-30		20-10		20-10		20-10		3/4	+		
16 Vaddera	2-00	3.3	7-05	3.5	11-05	4.6	10-30	4.3	10-30	3.7	5/25	+		
17 Yarakala	--		--		--		--		--		0/2	-		
18 Mangali	18-25		11-00		11-00		11-00		10-20		2/2	-		
19 Sale	1-18		--		--		--		--		9/6	-		
20 Gaundla	25-17		9-07		9-07		9-07		4-00		1/1	-		
21 Pusala	7-07		1-20		1-20		1-20		1-20		2/11	-		
22 Mere			-		-		-		-		0/2	=		
Total Land	2643-35		1956-18		1776-06		1796-34		1802-07					

APPENDIX 3: BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Srl.No.	Caste	Types of families			Sex		Age 20 +			Males		Females		Educated	
		Nuclear	Joint	Others	Total	Male	Female	Total	Married	Indivi- dual	Total	Married	Indivi- dual	Male	Female
1	Brahmin	1	2	1	4	6	10	16	5	6	11	4	2	6	9
2	Komati	3	2	1	6	16	18	34	7	9	16	6	3	14	7
3	Reddi	9	5	1	16	38	45	83	21	21	42	19	1	20	7
4	Telaga	5	11	1	10	26	21	47	13	10	23	11	1	13	10
5	Golla	46	20	4	70	191	171	362	99	93	192	93	10	105	10
6	Gaundla	29	29	7	65	174	186	360	95	96	191	88	19	111	52
7	Mutrasa	12	10	3	25	68	69	137	37	35	72	36	5	39	15
8	Chakali	6	7	-	13	48	44	92	24	20	44	22	5	28	-
9	Muslim	8	5	-	13	50	41	91	20	18	38	19	1	19	9
10	Lambadi	23	22	1	46	193	186	379	84	76	160	78	4	82	3
11	Mala	25	8	5	38	103	70	173	49	49	98	49	6	55	23
12	Madiga	29	13	1	43	125	128	253	58	60	118	57	10	66	22
13	Kammari	7	1	2	10	23	16	39	10	11	21	9	3	13	6
14	Kummari	1	-	-	1	7	3	10	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
15	Kamsali	3	-	1	4	6	9	15	3	4	7	3	1	5	5
16	Vaddera	15	8	2	25	69	69	138	36	33	69	32	5	38	13
17	Yerakala	2	-	-	2	9	3	12	3	2	5	2	-	4	-
18	Mangali	1	1	-	2	4	3	7	3	3	6	3	-	3	2
19	Sale	3	1	2	6	9	10	19	5	8	13	5	3	8	3
20	Gaundla	1	-	-	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	-	1	-
21	Pusala	9	1	1	11	26	25	51	11	15	26	11	11	16	2
22	Mere	1	-	1	2	2	5	7	2	3	5	1	2	3	-
Total		238	139	36	413	1194	1133	2327	587	574	1161	550	90	648	342
		413	413	413		2327	2327		1194	1133	2327			423	269
														73	342
														1194	1133
														2327	2327

APPENDIX 4: POLITICAL AFFILIATION ACCORDING TO
CASTE AND LAND SIZE: 1959

Serial No.	Land Size (In acres)	Brahmin		Komati		Reddi		Telaga		Vis. Brahmin											
		T	Ct. Cg. N	T	Ct. Cg. N	T	Ct. Cg. N	T	Ct. Cg. N	T	Ct. Cg. N										
1	Landless	-	-	-	4	1	3	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	2	2	-				
2	One and below	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	2				
3	Above 1-5 and below	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	6	-	3	3		
4	5 - 10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	7	-	5	2	3	-	3		
5	10 - 15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	1	5	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	-		
6	15 - 20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
7	20 - 25	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
8	25 - 30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
9	30 - 35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
10	35 - 40	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
11	40 - 45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
12	45 - 50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
13	50 - 55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
14	95 - 100	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
15	Above 100	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Total		4	-	4	-	6	1	5	-	16	5	10	1	10	1	7	2	14	3	8	3

APPENDIX 4: POLITICAL AFFILIATION: 1959 continued....

Srl.	Muslim			Golla			Mudrasa			Gaudla			Pusala			Chakali							
	T	Ct.	Cg. N	T	Ct.	Cg. N	T	Ct.	Cg. N	T	Ct.	Cg. N	T	Ct.	Cg. N	T	Ct.	Cg. N					
1	4	2	2	-	18	12	5	1	7	6	1	-	24	12	10	2	9	9	-	5	3	2	-
2	-	-	-	-	6	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	7	2	5	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
3	5	-	5	-	31	16	14	1	13	10	3	-	24	9	15	-	-	-	-	4	4	-	-
4	3	1	1	1	9	5	4	-	4	4	-	-	5	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	-	-	-	-	4	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
6	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
7	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	13	3	9	1	70	37	31	2	25	21	4	-	65	27	36	2	11	11	-	13	8	5	-

APPENDIX 4: POLITICAL AFFILIATION: 1959 Continued

srl. no.	Vaddera		Lambadi		Wala		Madiga		Others		Total	
	T	Ct. Cg. N	T	Ct. Cg. N	T	Ct. Cg. N	T	Ct. Cg. N	T	Ct. Cg. N	T	Ct. Cg. N
1	20	20	-	-	11	11	-	-	25	25	-	-
2	1	1	-	-	7	7	-	-	3	1	1	1
3	4	4	-	-	23	15	8	-	7	2	4	1
4	-	-	-	-	5	2	3	-	-	-	-	-
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	25	25	-	-	46	35	11	-	38	29	7	2
									43	30	13	-
									14	10	3	1
									413	246	153	14

LAND SIZE: 1964

Srl. No.	Land Size	Brahmin		Komati		Reddi		Telaga		Vis. Brahmin											
		T	Lt. Rt. N	T	Lt. Rt. N	T	Lt. Rt. N	T	Lt. Rt. N	T	Lt. Rt. N										
1	Landless	1	-	1	2	2	-	-	-	3	1	1	1	1							
2	One and below	-	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	1	2							
3	1 - 5	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	-	5	4							
4	5 - 10	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	3	3	1							
5	10- 15	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	1	4	1	-	-	-							
6	15- 20	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	4	1	1	-	-							
7	20- 25	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-							
8	25- 30	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-							
9	30- 35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-							
10	35- 40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-							
11	40- 45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-							
12	45- 50	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-							
13	50- 55	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-							
14	95- 100	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-							
15	Above 100	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-							
Total		5	-	3	2	6	2	4	-	16	4	10	2	10	1	5	4	14	3	6	5

APPENDIX 5: POLITICAL AFFILIATION: 1964 Continued

Srl. No.	Muslims			Golla			Mutrassa			Gaundla			Pusala			Chakali								
	T	Lt.	Rt. N	T	Lt.	Rt. N	T	Lt.	Rt. N	T	Lt.	Rt. N	T	Lt.	Rt. N	T	Lt.	Rt. N						
1	4	2	2	-	18	9	5	4	7	6	1	-	23	10	7	6	9	6	1	2	5	4	-	1
2	-	-	-	-	7	3	3	1	-	-	-	8	3	-	5	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	5	-	5	-	31	10	5	16	13	10	2	1	23	10	5	8	-	-	-	-	4	4	-	-
4	3	1	1	1	7	3	-	4	4	4	-	-	5	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	1	-	1	-	5	4	-	1	-	-	-	3	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	1
6	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
7	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	13	3	9	1	70	29	14	27	25	21	3	1	65	26	15	24	11	7	2	2	13	10	1	2

APPENDIX 5: POLITICAL AFFILIATION: 1964 Continued

Srl. No.	Vaddera			Lambadi			Mala			Madiga			Others			Total								
	T	Lt.	Rt. N	T	Lt.	Rt. N	T	Lt.	Rt. N	T	Lt.	Rt. N	T	Lt.	Rt. N	T	Lt.	Rt. N						
1	20	20	-	9	8	1	-	23	19	1	3	10	9	1	-	10	8	1	1	147	105	22	20	
2	1	1	-	9	4	1	4	6	3	-	3	26	16	2	8	-	-	-	-	65	32	10	23	
3	4	4	-	-	23	10	7	6	6	2	-	4	5	3	2	-	1	-	-	1	122	54	31	37
4	-	-	-	-	5	1	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	-	1	38	15	10	13	
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	18	7	7	4	
6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	3	8	1	
7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	1	
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	
25	25	-	-	46	23	12	11	38	25	3	10	43	28	7	8	14	10	1	3	414	217	95	102	

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