'1“ _» “—5,-2.va ‘——— -— —— - QIMERSIONS OF THE SELF AND . SUUAEORAL SELF -CONSCEOUSNESS 3:“ THE .PERCEFHDH 0F OTHERS- mssa'tzzgnn " mite 5; FM, 1;. {if i! (2.3 “in" mg 1”“!“V n F 'r u: m9; = éfi Ugeii Eu? 4;“; #54:“; “xii 322*??? {43f 9": ~~ -l = .- g H» {A .-}£O¢Y:1rj§l_m1‘w.? t3“)! ‘ 0‘ a _‘ £391" ' LELM'AEE 1" ' - Q‘ . 5.... ' .P‘,‘:.l~’..§.nt;ftfl State e; “-3. Umvemty I. A v’? .‘menqu This is to certify that the thesis entitled DIMENSIONS OF THE SELF AND SITUATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE PERCEPTION OF OTHERS presented by ROBIN RICHARD VALLACHER has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph-D- degree in lsmhologx Major professor Date January 16. 1975 0-7639 I! Imomo air HUAG & SflNS' 300K BINDERY INC. LIBRARY BlNDE R5 canine-nu mum“ /:"'°‘f5 Cb/\ ABSTRACT {X DIMENSIONS OF THE SELF AND SITUATIONAL SEW-CONSCIOUSNESS /1/ IN THE PERCEPTION or OTHERS A By Robin Richard Vallacher Because of its obvious relevance to the understanding and prediction of social behavior, social psychologists long have been interested in the processes whereby we come to know and evaluate others - that is, with person perception. This interest has stimulated consider— able research, and a considerable body of literature addressed to a wide variety of issues has developed. SOmewhat inexplicably, however, two central issues have received but scant attention. The first con- cerns the commonality between selfb and other-perception. To what extent is a person's perception of himself relevant to an understanding of his perception of others? What is the nature of this commonality? The second issue involves the manner in which specifiable situational factors impinge on a person's construal of others. The dearth of re- search pertaining to this issue is particularly surprising, given the concern for situational determinants of behavior that is manifest in other areas of social psychology. The specific question addressed was how and to what degree situational self-consciousness - a condition common to interpersonal encounters and hence relevant to person percep— tion - influences the manner in which we structure our perception of others. Separate experiments were performed to examine the two issues. In both studies, subjects - college-aged females - completed several Robin Richard Vallacher selfbconcept scales and a measure of perceptual field independence. Then, at a later session subjects in both studies described each of several stimulus persons in terms of the same traits that had been employed earlier for self-description. Five of the Stimulus persons, common to both studies, were female confederates of the experimenter posing as interviewees in a job interview setting. Each confederate interview'was presented as a short segment on videotape. In addition to descriptions of these stimulus persons, the degree of perceived similarity with and attraction for each interviewee was assessed. In Experiment 1 only, descriptions and perceived similarity ratings were obtained for two additional stimulus persons: a "close friend“ of the subject, and a "mutually disliked” other. Experiments 1 and 2 also differed in that the latter was designed to assess the influence of sit- uational self-consciousness on person perception. In particular, one half of the subjects in Experiment 2 were informed thatduring the viewb ing of the videotaped segments they themselves would be observed by means of two videotape cameras mounted on the wall. A structural orientation was adopted to derive the major self- concept and person perception variables. That is, rather than measuring specific elements of self- and person perception, such as dominance or social value, the manner in which specific elements of content are re- lated was assessed. These variables reflected the theoretical and empirical approaches of Witkin (Witkin 5151., 1954; Within 3131., 1962) and of Scott (1963, 1969, 1974, in press). In addition, certain nonstructural variables were examined, namely, self-esteem, perceived similarity, and attraction. The general hypothesis of Experiment 1 was that there is a Robin Richard Vallacher structural commonality in self- and person perception. More specific- ally, indices of differentiation, evaluative centrality, and certainty in self-perception were expected to be associated with conceptually similar indices of person perception. Correlational analyses provided partial support for the hypothesized commonality. The pattern of results suggested that (l) a differentiated view of oneself is asso- ciated with interpersonal discrimination (articulation); (2) evaluative centrality in self-perception is associated with global descriptions (low dimensionality) and evaluative centrality in person perception; and (3) certainty in self-perception is associated with certainty in the perception of unacquainted others and with low articulation. Results suggested that, contrary to prediction, self-concept certainty appears to be associated with a relatively undifferentiated cognitive structure. Although unexpected, this conclusion is interpretable from a perspective that emphasizes the "multiple-selves" nature of self-conception. That is, to the extent that differentiated individuals view themselves from a variety of perspectives, corresponding perhaps to various roles, it follows that they should be somewhat uncertain of a "core" or situa- tionally transcendent self-concept. The major hypothesis of Experiment 2 was that subjects in the self-conscious condition would demonstrate a less differentiated cog- nitive structure regarding the stimulus persons than would subjects in a control condition. Specifically, because of heightened arousal and/or a divided focus in information processing, self-conscious subjects were expected to demonstrate relatively low dimensionality and articulation in their descriptions of interviewees. The results demonstrated, however, that only articulation was significantly affected by the manipulation of selfhconsciousness. It was concluded that dimensionality, which refers Robin Richard Vallacher to the discrimination among construct descriptive terms, is less sensi- tive to situational forces than is articulation, which is a more "process" determined measure of differentiation. A secondary hypothesis in Experiment 2 was that the effects of situational self-consciousness, while hypothesized to hold for all individuals generally, would nonethe- less be more manifest for uncertain than for certain self-concept sub- jects because of the farmer's greater predisposition toward self—conscious- ness. This hypothesis received marginal support. The implications of the obtained results for an understanding of person perception in the initial stages of the acquaintance process were discussed. DIMENSIONS OF THE SELF AND SITUATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE PERCEPTION OF OTHERS By Robin Richard Vallacher A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Psychology 1975 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS During the preparation of this dissertation, I was fortunate to receive competent advice, as well as moral encouragement, from several people. It is unlikely, in fact, that this research would have been attempted at all, had it not been for the thoughtful criticism and sincere encouragement I received for some rather vague, yet persistent ideas concerning identity and interpersonal behavior. In particular, much needed encouragement to explore these ideas was provided by Dr. Joel Aronoff. Dr. Lawrence A. Messe', meanwhile, was helpful in phrasing these ideas in a fashion that was amenable to rigorous meth- odological exploration. At later stages, when fine points of the theoretical develop- ment and details of the procedure were being worked out, constructive criticism was provided by all members of my dissertation committee. In addition to Dr. Messe' - the committee chairman - and Dr. Aronoff, the committee consisted of Dr. James L. Phillips and Dr. William D. Crano. My discussions with Dr. Phillips and Dr. Crano were of partic- ular relevance to the development of my operational approach to cognitive structure. In addition, clarification of several important ideas was fostered through my interactions with Daniel M. Wegner, a fellow graduate student who was coming to grips with related issues for his own disser- tation. Finally, in addition to providing a unique perspective on the present research, Dr. Gary E. Stollak was warm, empathic, and genuine enough to sit in at the oral defense of the dissertation in place of ii Dr. Crano, who was on sabatical leave at the time. To these people, and to the friends and lovers who provided encouragement when I most needed it, I am very grateful. Thank you. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABIJESOIOOOQOOOOOOOO00......O0.0.0.0000...OOOOOOOOOCOCCOQ I. IDITROWCTION...0......OOCOOCOOOOOOOOOOC.0...‘................ Self-concept and person perception........................ Structural commonality in self- and other-perception..................................o The Witkin approach: "Psychological differentiation". Summary of Witkin approach............................ SCOtt approach: ”Structure of natural cognitions".... Summary of Scott approach............................. Situational self-consciousness and person perception...... "Arousal" interpretation.............................. "Equilibrium" interpretation.......................... Summary............................................... II. EXPERIMENT l................................................ Overview.................................................. Hypotheses................................................ Method.................................................... Subjects.............................................. Session 1 procedure and instrumentation............... Self-concept variables................................ Session 2 procedure and instrumentation............... Person perception variables........................... ResultSOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00.0.0000000.00.00.00.000000000000 iv Page 14 15 21 22 23 25 27 28 28 28 29 29 30 32 33 37 39 Factor structure of self— and person perception...... Relationships among self-concept variables........... Relationships among person perception variables...... Relationships between self-concept and person perception mriableSoeeeeeeooeeeeeeeoeeeeeoeeeeeeo Summary.............................................. III. EXPERIMENT 2.............................................. . Overview................................................. Hypotheses............................................... Method................................................... SubjeCtSOOOOOOOOOO0......OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO.0.... Session 1 procedure and instrumentation.............. Self-concept variables............................... Session 2 procedure and instrumentation.............. Person perception variables.......................... Results.................................................. Preliminary analyses................................. Test of hypotheses................................... IV. GENERAL DISCUSSION......................................... V. SUMMARY.................................................... APPENDICES A. IMPRESSION FORMATION................................. B. COMMON FACTOR STRUCTURE OF SELF-IMAGE TEST AND II‘JPIR‘ESIOPI SCALEé‘)..........C.OOOOCOOC...0.0.00.0...O. BIBLIOGRAPI-IYOCCO0........00.;00000000000000000000OOOOOOOOOOOOOO. Page 39 Al 49 53 56 56 56 57 57 57 58 58 60 60 60 62 70 84 87 96 98 Table l. 2. 3. A. 5. 7. LIST OF TABLES Page INTERCORRELATIONS OF SELF-CONCEPT VARIABLES............... 42 INTERCORRELATIONS OF PERSON PERCEPTION VARIABLES.......... 45-46 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELF-CONCEPT AND PERSON PERCEI’TIOIN VARIABLES...OOOOOOOIOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOI...00.... 50 INTERCORRELATIONS OF PERSON PERCEPTION VARIABLES.......... 63 SUMMARY OF MUETIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SITUATIONAL SELF—CONSCIOUSNESS AND PEIiSOI‘I PERCEPTION...OOCOOOOOOOCOOOOCOOOOOOOO0.0.0.0.0... 64 MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS ON ACTIVITY ARTICULATION AS A FUNCTION OF SITUATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-CONCEPT CERTAINTY........... 65 MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS ON COMPETENCE ARTICULATION AS A.FUNCTION OF SITUATIONAL SELF—CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-CONCEPT CERTAINTY........... 66 MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS ON SOCIAL VALUE ARTICULATION AS A FUNCTION OF SITUATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF—CONCEPT CERTAINTY........... 66 U. Bi 5-1 V! uu I I. INTRODUCTION Most people, psychologists and laymen alike, would agree that the way we perceive and relate to others is intimately associated with the way we perceive ourselves. Reflection and everyday observation provide considerable evidence to reinforce the plausibility of some sort of relationship between self— and other-perception. It seems clear, for example, that the perception of others as threatening is associated with low ”self-esteem," and that attention to the interpersonal warmth of others is associated with sensitivity to similar aspects of oneself. It is somewhat surprising, then, and even more disheartening, to discover that the nature and extent of this commonality in self-perception and person perception has received relatively little attention from social psychologists. Rather, research into the nature of person perception (of. Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970; Tagiuri, 1969; um & Knapper, 1968) has proceeded, for the most part, independently of research into the self-concept (cf. Gergen, 1971; Wylie, 1961, 1968). The present research represents an attempt to bridge the gap, so to speak, between self- and person perception. In addition to a benign neglect of self-concept factors in the perception of others, the person perception literature is deficient in its attention to possible situational factors, and, perhaps more im- portantly, to the possible significance of perceiver-situational inter- actions. A viewpoint in social psychology that has achieved considerable ascendance in recent years is that behavior may be best understood as an interaction between the person and the situation (see, e.g., Hunt, 1967). There is no reason to believe that person perception is exempt from this general law, since even perception of impersonal objects is influ- enced by the context of the perceiver (Gregory, 1966). While extensive 1 2 conceptual and empirical consideration has been given to the situa— tional context surrounding the stimulus person (i.e., the,2e§§§1x§d) in studies of person perception, virtually no attention has been devoted to the situational context surrounding the.p§;ggiyez. This ”imbalance“ in the person perception literature is perhaps understand- able when one considers the methodological difficulties inherent in any attempt to abstract features of real-world situations and to manipulate them adequately in a laboratory setting. But a concern for methodological purity m is inexcusable when one considers the sacrifice in theoretical relevance that is seemingly contingent on such a concern. Despite the fact that person perception occurs, in- variably, in specifiable contexts - ~most often, interpersonal situa- tions - we know virtually nothing about how situational forces impact on an individual's perception of others. Thus, in addition to a concern with self-concept factors in person perception, the present research examines the role of a perva- sive situational factor in the perception of others. More specifically, in Experiment 1 several self-concept factors, reflecting primarily a ”structural" orientation, were examined in relation to certain struc- tural components of the perception of both unacquainted and acquainted others. The research reported as Experiment 2 is an examination of the role situationally induced self-consciousness plays in structuring our perceptions of unacquainted others. W23 Theory and research concerning the self-concept are dis- appointing at best. Little in the way of enlightenment regarding the self -- its developnent, its role in perceptual and behavioral function- ing, or its significance as an individual difference variable - has been 3 achieved since the seminal contributions of the early symbolic inter- action theorists (cf. Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). To be sure, consider- able attention has been devoted to the self-concept (Gergen, 1970; Wylie, 1961, 1968), but the accumulating literature is characterized by conflict in theory and inconsistency in empirical findings. For example, self-esteem, the most popular self-concept dimension, has been discussed conceptually in terms of a generalized self-acceptance (Rogers, 1951), perceived competence (White, 1960), the resolution of identity crises (Erikson, 1950), self-consistency (Lecky, 1945), and inferiority-superiority (Adler, 1956). Moreover, empirical investi- gations of the behavioral correlates of self-esteem have yielded equiv- ocal and often inconsistent results. Some studies, for example, have demonstrated a monotonic relationship between self-esteem and conform- ity (Cohen, 1959), while other investigations have demonstrated a non- monotonic relationship (e.g., Cox & Bauer, 1964; Gergen & Bauer, 1966). Similarly, while many theorists and researchers have concluded that high self-esteem is associated with mental health (e.g., Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1951; Rosenberg, 1965; Turner & Vanderlippe, 1958), there is evidence that individuals with very high scores on measures of self- esteem are highly defensive and rigid (e.g., Bramel, 1962; Cohen, 1959; Pepitone, 1968). Structural cgmmogglitz in gelf— ang gthez-pegceptiog While the lack of coherence in the self-concept literature is typically attributed to operational confoundings and other methodological inadequacies (see Wylie, 1968), it well may be that the underlying problem reflects something more basic than these shortcomings. If the self can be thought of as an object of cognition - granted, a very "special" object - then theory and research in cognition become 4 relevant to an understanding of the self. In recent years, social psychological research concerned with cognitive functioning has shifted from an emphasis on the content and evaluative properties of cognition to a greater emphasis on structural properties, such as differentiation and integration, which describe the manner in which specific elements of content are related. However, self theories for the most part have not examined structural aspects of the self, emphasizing instead almost ex- clusively the evaluative component of the self (i.e., self-esteem, self- regard, selfhacceptance) and specific dimensions of self-perception (e.g., social value, dominance, and competence). Structural aspects of perception and cognition are, of course, more general across diverse domains than are specific dimensions of content. It is unlikely, for example, that an individual would describe his best friend and Great Britain in terms of the same attributes. It does seem conceivable, however, that an individual would demonstrate. comparable degrees of, say, differentiation in his descriptions of these two entities. Attention to the structural components of cognition and perception, moreover, might well reveal an individual's basic orientation to the world: 'the patterning of perception, the manner in which elements of experience are interrelated - this is the very essence of phenomeno— logical considerations. It is well established, in fact, that individu- als do reliably differ from one another in various structural properties of cognition (Kagan & Kogan, 1970). An examination of the structural properties of self— and person perception, therefore, may demonstrate an underlying commonality with regard to these two domains. Structural considerations hgyg been applied to person perception, generating a fairly extensive and coherent body of research (e.g., Bieri, 1955; Crockett, 1965; Rosenberg & Sedlack, 1972; Schrauger, 1967; Signell, w%;hmsnwmmn,mah Several arguments may be advanced in support of a structural commonality in self— and person perception. First of all, the very nature of self- and person perception argues for such a commonality. There is consensus among virtually all self-concept theorists that an individual de- velops a conception of himself through interpersonal processes. One of the most important of these processes is social comparison (Festinger, 1954; see Gergen, 1971). That is, as an individual interacts with and observes another person, he develops attitudes not only toward the other person but, through comparison with other, attitudes toward himself as well. There is a common experiential basis, in other words, for self— and other percep— tion. Since self-perception and person perception reflect common experien- ces, and since individual differences in structural properties of cognition regarding a class of stimulus objects are, in large measure, a function of experience with those objects (Bieri, 1971; Kagan & Kogan, 1970; Scott, 1963), it follows that there should be a structural commonality in the perception of self and others. Secondly, it may be that structural properties of cognition regarding a class of stimulus objects reflect the degree of emotional or affective involvement with those objects. A certain degree of de- tachment or lack of emotional involvement seems requisite for clear and differentiated perceptual-cognitive functioning. Conversely, strong affective or emotional concern regarding a stimulus object may prevent one from attaining the degree of detachment necessary to view the stimulus from more than one perspective. In this regard, it is inter- esting to note that structural properties associated with cognitive differentiation are inversely related to the salience of the evaluative or "good-bad" factor in the perception«of others (Crockett, 1965; 6 Schrauger, 1967; Scott, 1969). To the extent, then, that an indi- vidual can be characterized by a general affective or emotional orien- tation toward himself and others (see, e.g., Rogers, 1951), there should be a structural correspondence in his perception of self and others. Finally, it seems likely that individual differences in structural properties of cognition, particularly in structural complex- ity or differentiation, are related to differences in analytic capacity. That is, analytic capacity - the ability to perceive a whole in terms of its component parts - clearly provides the,pgt§nti§l for perceiving self and others in a dissecting, multidimensional manner. There is some empirical support, in fact, that individual differences in analytic capacity are manifest in person perception. In particular, Iangley (1971) found that analytic capacity, as indicated by scores on the Concealed Figures Test (Thurstone, 1944), was associated with dimensionality in the descriptions of acquainted others who fit certain roles (see Bieri, 1955). If analytic capacity is manifested in one’s self-perception as well, then a structural similarity in self- and person perception is highly plausible. Of course, it could be argued that since "self" and "others" re— flect highly related domains - that is, they both refer to people - then there should be a strong correspondence in specific dimensions of content, as well as in structural properties, with regard to perception in these two domains. No doubt this is the case, as suggested by the example cited earlier in which a person who perceives "warmth" in others is likely to be sensitive to his own "warmth." However, given the per— vasive and often distorting role of ego-defense mechanisms in self-per- ception, the degree of similarity in specific judgments along dimensions of self- and other-perception is likely to be quite attenuated. A person 7 who characteristically employs projection as a defense, for example, may see others as hostile and selfish in contrast to his self-perceived kind- ness and altruism. In short, while similar‘gimensign§,may be utilized in self- and person perception - e.g., hostility-kindness, selfishness— altruism - a comparison of specific dimensiona1,1gggmggt§ in a descrip— tion of oneself and of another person would not be expected to demonstrate a high degree of correspondence. A significant correspondence with regard to the evaluative com- ponent in self- and person perception likewise seems reasonable. That is, the perception of one's own positive (or negative) qualities may reflect a general perceptual sensitivity to positive (negative) qual- ities and thus should be evident in the perception of others as well. An alternative interpretation of the same correspondence in self- and person evaluation relies on notions of threat and defensiveness. For example, a person with low self-esteem, threatened by another person's apparent "superiority," may emphasize negative qualities in his percep— tion of this person, thereby reducing the "superiority" and hence the threat. At any rate, considerable evidence exists to suggest the gen- erality of a positive relationship between "self— and other—acceptance" (e.g., Crandall & Bellugi, 1954; Fey, 1954; Worchel, 1957; Zuckerman, Baer, & Monashkin, 1956), and this evidence is certainly consistent with an interpretation based on a commonality in self— and person perception. Again, however, it is with regard to structural aspects that the greatest correspondence in self— and person perception should be evident. While the mainstream of self-concept theory and research has not reflected a concern with structural variables, two prominent re- search programs, reflecting independent conceptual approaches and domains of interest, have yielded much that is relevant to an understanding of 8 a structural commonality in self- and person perception. One of these - that of H.A. Witkin and his associates (Witkin, Lewis, Hertz- man, Machover, Meissner, & Wapner, 1954; Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Good- enough & Karp, 1962) - has explored the commonality between perceptual differentiation and self-differentiation. The other relevant.series of investigations, conducted by w.A. Scott (Scott, 1963, 1969, 1974, in press) has painstakingly developed and validated measures to reflect "the structure of natural cognitions" and has examined the degree to which the relationships among these properties are general across various "domains," such as self, others, and nations. WWW Witkin aLal. (1954) defined a dimension of personal function- ing based on individual consistencies in analytic capacity across several perceptual tasks. At one end of this dimension - the £i§1g_gependgnt mode of perceiving - perception is strongly dominated by the overall organization of the field, and parts of the field are experienced as "fused." At the opposite extreme - the £i§1g_1gg§peng§nt mode or perceiving - parts of the field are experienced as discrete from organ— ized background. Perception on the part of the field dependent person is global; perception on the part of the field independent person is articu— lated and is said to reflect "internal frames of reference." Such differences in perceptual functioning are hypothesized by Witkin.§t_gl, (1962) to reflect differences in the extent of "psycholog- ical differentiation." Field dependent individuals are described as having failed during development to internalize a stable set of stan- dards with which to view themselves. Thus, they lack a well-developed sense of their own identity and separateness from others, and rely on external sources for self-definition. In contrast, field independent 9 individuals are described as having an awareness of needs, feelings, and attributes which they recognize as their own, and which they identify as distinct from those of others. In a phenomenological sense, "distinctiveness from others" may be defined as the propensity to perceive minimal correspondence between one's own attitudes, expectancies, and behaviors, and those of others. Although the tendency to assume similarity or dissimilarity to others has been identified as a relatively stable individual character- istic (Cronbach, 1955), it has received little attention as an indicator of selfeother differentiation. Wagner and Vallacher (1974), however, employed two separate measures of assumed similarity and found that this construct did in fact relate to field independence in a manner congru- ent with Witkin's hypothesis. The two measures of assumed similarity employed in the wegner and Vallacher study were: (1) the correspondence between a subject's responses on a personality test and his predicted responses on the same test for each of two other people, who were des- cribed briefly in separate paragraphs; and (2) the proportion of a subjectfls acquaintances that he deemed "similar to himself." Field in- dependence - as measured by the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin.gt_a1., 1954), the Concealed Figures Test (Thurstone, 1944), and the Block Design subscale of the wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -— correlated negatively with both of these measures. These results, then, provide strong support for Witkin's paw- chological differentiation hypothesis. Further, these findings suggest the relevance of field independence to the study of person perception, since the tendency to assume similarity to others directly implies a commonality in self— and person perception with regard to content and evaluative dimensions. Moreover, this tendency relates to other aspects 10 of person perception - most notably, to predictive accuracy (Cronbach, 1955, 1958) and to cognitive complexity (Bieri, 1955). In addition to his perceived distinctiveness from others, the field independent person is hypothesized by Witkin to have a highly articulated self-concept. That is, while the field dependent person perceives himself in an unarticulated global fashion, analogous to his perception of spatial phenomena, the field independent person is more likely to perceive himself in terms of various independent dimensions. Support for such a relationship between field independence and self- articulation is provided in a study by Vallacher (1974). Specifically, vallacher found that field independent subjects, as indicated by their scores on the Concealed Figures Test, described themselves in a more differentiated manner on scales tapping an evaluative component of the self-concept than did field dependent subjects. Self-differentiation, then, is a structural aspect of the self- concept that reflects individual differences in perceptual differentia- tion. Moreover, this construct parallels a structural aspect of cognition - cognitive differentiation - that has been studied in the context of person perception. In cognitive complexity research, differentiation refers to two conceptually independent variables (Bieri, 1966). 21m§g§igggli§y refers to the number and/or independence of dimensions which an individual employs in evaluating or defining an object of cog- nition - typically, other people known to the individual. For example, the attributes of intelligence and competence might be essentially syn- onymous (highly correlated across stimulus persons) for one perceiver, but represent two distinct dimensions for another. The second aspect of differentiation, most often referred to as aptignlatign, is the mean number of distinctions among stimuli - again, typically other people - 11 that a perceiver makes on a given dimension. One person, for example, may describe his acquaintances as either “smart" or "dumb," while an- other person may distribute the same people into several distinct categories along a "smart-dumb" dimension. If in fact there is a structural commonality in self- and person perception, then it seems plausible that self-differentiation - cognitive differentiation in self-perception - should be associated with differentiation in the perception of others, that is, with dimensionality and articulation. Witkin's differentiation hypothesis rather directly implies another aspect of the self-concept that seems to have consequences for the manner in which we structure our perceptions of others. According to Witkin 9.11.9.1; (1962), the field independent person is strongly aware of his defining characteristics - he is certain of "what he is like." The field dependent person, in contrast, is said to be less certain of his self-concept. Vallacher (1974; see also Wagner & vallacher, 1974) ex- amined the relative self-concept certainty of field independent and field dependent subjects and provided only equivocal support for the relation- ship hypothesized by Witkin. That is, while field independence related in the predicted manner to self-certainty for males, a significant rela- tionship between field independence and self-certainty was not obtained for females. Although self-concept certainty does not relate to field inde- pendence in a manner entirely predicted by the differentiation hypothesis, there is evidence to suggest that nonetheless it is an important aspect of the self. Bronson (1959), in a study of late adolescents, found that certainty of self-conception was positively correlated with temporal stability of self-rating. Brownfain (1952) similarly concluded that there is a positive relationship between stability and certainty of the 12 self-concept. Moreover, in pilot research for the present study, self- certainty correlated in a significant manner with two separate measures of self-esteem - an attitudinal measure (Rosenberg, 1965) and a measure based on the discrepancy between the real and ideal self-concept. In addition to its relation to other aspects of the self, self- certainty has demonstrable predictive validity. Organ (1973), for ex- ample, found that subjects who were uncertain of their self-concept. scored as more external on Rotter's (1966) I-E scale than did subjects who were certain of their self-concept. Organ interpreted these results within the framework of self-perception theory (Bem, 1967). Mere specifically, Organ argued that the less clear a person is regarding his self-concept, the less his behavior will unambiguously reflect his own goals, values, and personality traits. An uncertain person, therefore, is more likely than a certain person to attribute his behavior to strong external forces or chance. Maracek and Mettee (1972) found that indi- viduals with low self-esteem react differently to success experiences depending upon how certain they are of their negative feelings about themselves. Individuals certain of their low self-esteem were made un- comfortable by feedback indicating self—produced success on a task and they failed to improve their performance on subsequent trials. Indi— viduals uncertain of their low self—esteem, however, showed significant improvement following feedback indicating self-produced success. Rela- tive to the certain-low esteem subjects, in other words, the uncertain- 1ow esteem subjects had weaker consistency concerns. To what extent is self-concept certainty, which appears to be a meaningful component of the self, relevant to an understanding of person perception? First of all, on the basis of the hypothesized commonality in self— and person perception, it seems likely that a 13 person who is uncertain in his own self-perception may be similarly uncertain in his perceptions of others. .A lack of confidence in one's perceptions of others, moreover, would seem to be associated with relatively "global" or undifferentiated perceptions of others. As indicated earlier (p. 10), undifferentiated person perception may be manifested in two conceptually independent ways: (1) a high degree of correspondence between dimensions of judgment (low dimensionality); and (2) a relative lack of discrimination between stimulus people along judgmental dimensions (low articulation). In addition to considerations of commonality‘p§z_§§, self- concept certainty would seem to be of relevance to an understanding of person perception for reasons of a more "psychological" nature. That is, the degree to which a person is uncertain of his self-image may well be reflected in his concern over how others perceive and evaluate him and this concern may affect his perceptions of them. A highly uncertain individual is likely to be highly concerned with the reactions he elicits from others since such reactions tell him whether he is warm or cold, aggressive or timid, etc. Person perception for such an individual seems likely to reflect a "halo effect" since others are seen mainly as frus— trators or gratifiers of an egocentric "need" (1.9., certainty of self— concept). Uncertain individuals, in other words, "use" others for purposes of self-definition and self-evaluation, and thus may be des— cribed as "self-conscious" rather than "other-conscious." In contrast, a person with a relatively certain self-concept seems likely to be much more "other-conscious." That is, since the certain person has less "need" to focus on himself during his social encounters, he can safely turn his perceptual focus to others. Rather than simply "using" others as reflecting tools for self-definition, the 14 certain person should have more varied constructs in his perceptions of others than should the uncertain person. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the certain self-concept person should be more accepting of others than should the uncertain person. In fact, it seems likely that a highly certain person would be more defensive in his person perception than would a highly uncertain person, since such an individual is sensitive to perceived inadequacies in himself. Assuming a need for positive self-regard (Rogers, 1951), the certain individual would seem likely to project his perceived inadequacies onto Other to defend against the possibility of appearing inferior to Other on these sensitive dimensions. While this perceptual tendency would obviously interfere with balanced person perception, it differs from the "halo effect" that characterizes the uncertain individual's person perception, since the certain person should attend to specific traits. Certainty of self-concept, then, should be related to differ- entiation in person perception. Individuals who are relatively certain of their self-concept should be both more dimensional and more articu— lated in their perceptions of others than should individuals character- ized by self-concept uncertainty. W Overall, the theory of psychological differentiation outlined by Witkin,§t_§1.(l962) is highly relevant to the present research, Since it rather directly implies certain dimensions of the self that seem to be of import to an understanding of individual differences in various components of person perception. In particular, field independence -— the perceptual indicator of psychological differentiation - has been shown to be negatively related to the tendency to assume similarity to others, and thus may be considered a measure of self-other 15 differentiation. Selfhdifferentiation and self-concept certainty are also implied by the differentiation hypothesis, and along with field independence should be related to dimensionality and articulation in the perception of others. Self-concept certainty, in addition, should be related to certainty in person perception. In contrast to the work of Witkin, which has suggested the potential significance of certain structural aspects of the self, the research conducted by Scott (1963, 1969, 1974, in press) has been directed to the identification of the basic structural components of cognition that are general across a variety of domains, including the self. Mereover, while Witkin's contribution has been mainly theoretical in nature, the emphasis in Scott's research has been on the systematic development of several operational definitions for each structural concept, thereby meeting criteria of convergent validity. Noting that prior definitions of structural properties had been proposed independently of a structural model specifying their interrelationships, Scott (1969) outlined a simple conceptual model which serves as a point of reference for several structural properties. According to this model, phenomenal objects are represented as points in "multidimensional cognitive space." The multidimensional space con- sists offintt;1hn§eg,.which are somewhat analogous to "personal cone structs' in Kelly's (1955) theory of personality. That is, attributes, like personal constructs, are employed in the construal of people, objects, and events. An attribute, represented in the model as a line in the multidimensional space, is divided into segments corresponding to characteristics (categories of the attribute) that the person recog- sizes. These segments may approach the size of points for attributes 16 that are finely graded or, more commonly, they may represent coarser categories of the attribute. The point in multidimensional space that defines a phenomenal object is the intersection of normal projections from the segments of several attributes corresponding to characteristics assigned to the object. Phenomenal objects are distinguishable to the extent that they include different combinations of characteristics. Differentiation among objects depends both on.fiimgn§ignality_of the cognitive space and onngtignlatign of the various attributes within it (of. Bieri, 1966). In congruence with the meaning given earlier (p. 10), dimensionality refers to the independence of attributes, that is, the extent to which they order phenomenal objects in different ways. Similarly, Scott's definition of articulation parallels the meaning given to this term earlier (p. 10), namely, the number of reliable distinctions among objects that a person makes on an attribute. The property ofjggntzglity refers to the importance of an attribute for defining objects within a cognitive space. The more cen- tral an attribute, the more objects that are thought of in terms of that attribute. Two attribute constellations in particular are hypothesized by Scott to be highly central, primarily because they are said to arise early in conceptual development. The gffggtiyg attribute represents liking or disliking for an object, and it is closely related to gyaluatixe attributes, which describe an object in terms of "good" and "bad," or "pleasant" and "unpleasant." Since there is evidence that differentiation refers not so much to the use of many independent attributes,‘p§;_§e, as to the decreased importance attached to evaluative attributes (Olshan, 1970; Schrauger, 1967), gynluatiye_ggntzglity is a highly relevant structural variable. 17 Scott (1969, 1974) also defines several "varieties“ of cogni- tive intggzntign, which describe the manner in which phenomenal objects are related. Although these “integration" properties are quite inter- esting, they will not be considered in the context of the present re- search for two reasons. First of all, with the possible exception of igagg_ggmpg;§pili§y, each of these properties directly implies low dimensionality, mathematically as well as conceptually. AIIEQIEEE: gyalngtiz§_ggngi§tgngz, for example, is represented in Scott's model as a close correspondence between the affective attribute and all evalua- tive attributes conceived by the person. Because attributes that are highly correlated with liking will tend to be correlated with each other, a state of high affective-evaluative consistency implies low dimension- ality. Similarly, W (of. Heider, 1958) describes a mode of ”integration" in which objects are differentiated on the basis of only one attribute - the affective attribute. ,Qggtzalizatign, another mode of "integration," consists in treating some small number of attributes as central. In terms of this mode, maximum "integration" is also minimum dimensionality since all phenomenal objects in a given do- main are defined only by their position on a single common attribute. Scott (1969, 1974) has demonstrated that his integration mea- sures are, indeed, negatively correlated with dimensionality. Yet, it is not at all clear conceptually why highly differentiated people cannot at the same time be "integrated." Certainly, integration is an important construct in its own right and is not just simply a lack of differentia- tion. Highly effective decision makers, fer example, are both highly differentiated and "integratively complex" (of. Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967). Scott's "integration" properties, then, are inadequate at best, and the nature of this inadequacy might indicate to some iv' .cu AA 1V L? l (“1 _ 18 observers a major weakness in his dimensional model of cognitive structure. Scott's integration properties are not considered in the present research for a second, perhaps more fundamental, reason. Mest theories in personality and social psychology are explicitly or implicitly pred- icated on the assumption that people attempt to make sense out of their phenomenal worlds - to understand, predict, and control the facets of their experience. "Mental illness," in fact, is often defined in terms of an inability to integrate the elements of one's experience into a coherent and meaningful whole. Conversely, "normal" individuals are' said to be more or less integrated in their interpretation of their ex- perience. If integration indeed does not discriminate well between individuals within a "normal" population, then its importance as an individual difference variable is attenuated. In addition to this basic "need" for integration, psychologists have pointed out a tendency towards greater differentiation with develop- ment generally (see, e.g., Werner, 1957) and with experience regarding particular domains (see, e.g., Bieri, 1971). Differentiation, however, is not typically viewed as a defining element of mental health, as, and everyday observation points to the wide range of individual differences on this variable. It may be that individual differences in differentiation directly reflect not only development and experience, but the "security" of a person's integration. In other words, an individual will differen- tiate as far as he can without threatening his integration. Clinical data attest to the plausibility of this relationship. An emotionally in- secure person, for example, tends to be compulsive in his behaviors and obsessive in his thoughts. By narrowing the range of his cognitions and actions - that is, by engaging in relatively undifferentiated thought 19 and behavior - such a person can maintain his integration. Within a dimensional model, then, integration is a property which may be assumed rather than precisely measured, at least within a "normal" population. Integration could be assessed in a global fashion, however, through measures that are independent of the underlying model of cognitive structure. For example, an individual's degree of adjustment regarding the particular phenomenal object or objects under consideration could be oba tained. In this light, it is interesting that personal "maladjustment" is associated with high articulation in the domain of self, and with high am- bivalence and low evaluative centrality - two properties associated with high dimensionality - in the domains of self and acquaintances (Scott, 1969, in press). This suggests that perhaps maladjusted individuals are "too differentiated," that is, differentiated to such an extent that their integration regarding self and acquaintances is threatened. A global index of integration could also be obtained by measur- ing the degree of confidence or certainty associated with an individual's cognitions regarding a particular phenomenal object. It seems plausible, for example, that the extent to which an individual has an integrated per- ception of another person should be reflected in the certainty with which he can describe the person. In addition to obvious intuitive appeal, a "certainty" approach to integration receives support from pilot research, in which it was feund that certainty of self-concept is strongly associ- ated (p‘<..01) with selfhesteem, a variable which may be said to reflect "selfhintegration." Because "certainty" can be assessed more readily and 1ess_equivoca11y than can “maladjustment," the former seems the preferable mode of assessing integration. A consistent finding in Scott's research is a significant degree of generality across various "domains" in the relationships between 20 structural properties. ,According to Scott (1969, p. 262), a cognitive domain “consists of phenomenal objects which the person treats as func- tionally equivalent and the attributes by which he comprehends those objects.” Scott has singled out for research purposes five such domains: nations, celebrities, acquaintances, family, and self. within each of these domains, certain relationships between the various structural properties are typically observed. For example, as pointed out earlier, dimensionality is negatively correlated with the "integrative” principles of affective balance and affective-evaluative consistency. Articulation, on the other hand, is positively correlated with affective balance but‘ uncorrelated with affective-evaluative consistency. And, despite the fact that they both reflect important components of cognitive differen- tiation, dimensionality and articulation tend to be uncorrelated. There is evidence, moreover, that the cross-domain generality in the relationp ships observed among structural properties is not attributable simply to response factors or other sources of common method variance. For one thing, each structural property has been assessed with several “tests" which differ considerably from one another. Each of these tests has also been "scored" in different ways to obtain different structural properties. The results of this "multi-method multi-trait" approach (Campbell & Picks, 1959) have demonstrated the convergent validity of these properties. Further, despite the cross-domain generality in interuproperty relationships, there is some domain specificity in the relationships observed between certain structural properties and various criteria. Scott (1962) found a significant correlation between information about nations and dimensionality of that domain. Seferi (1968) reported analogous results for the domain of acquaintances: intimately known 21 persons formed a subdomain with higher-dimensionality than did casually known persons. Finally, as indicated earlier, psychological maladjust- ment - as evidenced by self-report, friends' Judgments, and exposure to psychiatric treatment - was found to be associated with low evaluative centrality, low affective-evaluative consistency, and ambivalence in the domains of self, acquaintances, and family; maladjustment was associated with articulation only in the domain of self (Scott, 1969). Moreover, these results recently have been replicated among college students in three cultures - the U.S., Australia, and Japan (Scott, in press). WW Scott's research represents an ambitious attempt to specify in a comprehensive, yet integrated manner the basic components of cognitive structure. In particular, his simple dimensional model has proven quite useful for defining, and specifying the interrelationships between basic components of cognitive differentiation that are general across a variety of "domains." At the same time, however, the dimensional model appears to be inadequate for purposes of assessing cognitive integration, since in- tegration indices derived from this model directly imply low dimensional- ity. Of course, integration may be assessed with "certainty" ratings re- garding Judgments of phenomenal objects, but such an approach to integra- tion is obviously independent of Scott's conceptual model. Overall, Scott is to be commended, for in his research he has demonstrated greater con- cern for establishing the convergent validity and external validity of basic structural properties than has any other researcher in this area. On the basis of his efforts towards validation, it may be concluded that structural properties represent significant individual difference vari- ables that are general across a wide variety of phenomenal objects and that relate in a meaningful way to certain criteria. ‘d u‘ ‘I ii p. 9. ‘J‘ 'J- ’r_1 22 The evidence cited by Scott, however, provides at best only indirect support for the hypothesized commonality in selfb and person perception. There is no direct evidence, by Scott or anyone else, conp cerning the degree of commonality for a given property across various domains. we do not know, in other words, whether individuals who score “high", relative to others, on a particular property in one domain tend also to score "high" on the same property in another domain. The research reported as Experiment 1 examines this general issue with respect to two domains: self and others. In particular, the focus of Experiment 1 is on how certain self-concept variables relate to concep- tually similar properties underlying the perception of acquainted and unacquainted stimulus persons. Our perception of others most often occurs when we are engaged in social interaction with them. Despite the obvious interpersonal nature of person perception, a perusal of the literature might lead one to suspect that person perception takes place in a social vacuum. The paradigms commonly employed are sensitive at best to only‘gtgtig aspects of the perceiver-perceived relationship (e.g., prior acquaintance, status differences, attitude similarity), and fail to explore gyngmig factors that may affect perception in "realdworld" situations. Admittedly, dynamic situational variables are difficult to bring under sufficient experimental control to warrant unequivocal conclusions regarding their impact in everyday situations. In a dyadic interaction, for example, person perception is affected in subtle and often complex ways by the pattern of verbal and nonverbal behaviors that occur (Argyle, 1969). It is possible, nonetheless, to distill basic components or interpersonal settings, and to examine the effects of these components in a controlled 23 situation. Of course, interpersonal settings may be discussed in terms of a large number of potentially meaningful variables. Perhaps the most basic feature of such settings, however, is that we are simultaneously the subject and the object of perception. we are, in other words, the "observed" as well as the ”observer” in the majority of settings in which person perception typically occurs. Again, however, it is not at all clear from an examination of the literature how, and to what degree, our perception of others is affected by an awareness that we are, at the same time, an object of perception. Experiment 2 represents an attempt to explore this issue. Won Just as we observe others in order to form an impression of them, we are aware that others are, in a like manner, scrutinizing our verbal and nonverbal behaviors in an attempt to understand, predict, and evaluate us. An awareness of being observed, then, is likely to activate a person's self-system and predispose him to a concern with the reactions and evaluations of others towards himself (Argyle, 1969, p. 378). In varying degrees, this concern is likely to produce within the individual an arousal state. Arousal, in turn, can either be facilitative or detri- mental to behavior efficency, depending upon its intensity. In particular, several lines of research in psychology have converged on the notion that the relationship between arousal and perfbrmance may be described in terms of an invertedFU function, according to which maximum behavior efficiency occurs at an "optimal" - neither very high nor very low - level of arousal (e.g., Berlyne, 1960; Hebb, 1955; Hunt, 1963). Although empirical evidence is lacking, it seems reasonable to extend the generality of the invertedAU function to the process of person ". in. v Add .RHU clan MI" 24 perception. That is, there is quite likely an Optimal level of attention from others that facilitates "balanced" (highly differentiated, yet well- integrated) person perception. "Too little" attention from another person or persons may leave us insufficiently motivated (unaroused) to construe a person in a differentiated manner. "Too much" attention from others, on the other hand, may produce anxiety (high arousal), which can interfere with a person's cognitive processes to the point where the person has to "anti-differentiate" in order to maintain an integrated person impression.' In addition to the degree of observational intensity.pgz_§g on the part of others, the nature of the relationship between oneself and the observu ing other is likely to influence what one considers to be an optimal level of observation. We typically are not troubled by, and in fact seek out, the attention of familiar and well-liked others. On the other hand, even.a low level of fecused attention from strangers tends to make us uncomfort- ably self-conscious. Hence, being observed by unknown others is likely to interfere with clear and differentiated person perception. There are no doubt individual differences in what is perceived to be an optimal level of attention from others. Some individuals appear to be painfully self-conscious in even the most casual of settings, while others are quite comfortable with being the center of attention at public gatherings. Argyle and Williams (1969) found consistent individual differ- ences in the extent to which people felt they were being observed, as opposed to being observers, in a variety of situations. Although no correlation was found between this variable and neuroticism, it did correlate significantly, for males only, with Maslow's insecurity scale (2,: .35) and with dominance C: = -.32). Selfbconsciousness is also re- lated to low self-esteem, at least among adolescents (Rosenberg, 1965). Individual differences in selfhconsciousness may also reflect 25 individual differences in self-concept certainty. As noted earlier (p. 13), individuals who are uncertain of their self-concept should demonstrate greater concern than should certain self-concept individuals regarding how other people perceive them. Uncertain individuals, in other words, are predisposed towards greater arousal as a function of being observed than are certain individuals, and therefore should exp perience anxiety (intense arousal) at lower levels of observational intensity. It follows, then, that the person perception of an uncertain selfhconcept person should "suffer" more - that is, it should be less dif- ferentiated - in a situation involving the observation of’onesslf by others than should the person perception of a certain person. War-minim In recent years, there has been a shift in social psychology from motivational/drive paradigms to paradigms reflecting information processing concepts. Dissonance phenomena, for example, have been rein- terpreted in terms of selfhperception theory (Ban, 1967). Similarly, terms such as "attribution," "integrative complexity," and "cognitive style” have become prominent in the lexion of social psychology at the expense of such terms as "tension reduction," ”unconscious motivation," and "need." While the notion of "arousal" -— clearly, a motivational/ drive concept - has been central to the discussion concerning the effects of situational self-consciousness on person perception, it is possible to reach the same conclusions with reference only to concepts emanating from an information processing paradigm. Two assumptions are central to this interpretation. First of all, it must be assumed that a person's total awareness is relatively con- stant across situations, that is, the number of behaviors, cues, and thoughts which a person can consciously entertain at any one time is a? .. 26 somewhat fixed. The second assumption is that a person's total awareness in situations relevant to person perception can be subdivided into self- awareness and other-awareness. It follows from these assumptions that there is an "equilibrium“ in self- and other-consciousness, so that an increase in one is necessarily accompanied by a decrease in the other. This hypothesized equilibrium is analogous to the perception that is fostered by one-way mirrors. That is, depending on one's visual focus, a person can either see a reflection of himself or see through the mirror into the other room. The person cannot, however, clearly see his re- flection and into the other room at the same time. Similarly, in inter- personal situations a person cannot focus on his own performance and still maintain differentiated and integrated perception of others. Under conditions conducive to selfhconsciousness, therefore, a person's perceptual focus will be directed towards himself and, conse- quently, there will be little attention to the variety of cues and behaviors manifested by others. Hence, situational self-consciousness should be associated with relatively low dimensionality since various sources of information about a stimulus person are not attended to. Similarly, there should be interference with the ability to make discrim- inations between people along a given dimension - that is, an interfer- ence with articulation - since subtle cues which aid in such discrimin- ation are not efficiently processed. It seems plausible, as well, that an integrated perception of a stimulus person should be difficult to obtain when one is in a state of self-consciousness. Such a lack of integration, in turn, may be reflected in relative uncertainty regarding one's percep- tion of a stimulus person. Like the "arousal" interpretation, the "equilibrium" interpreta- tion predicts that-the effect of situational self-consciousness on person 27 perception may be moderated somewhat by individual differences in self- concept certainty. Earlier (p. 13), it was maintained that if an indi- vidual is uncertain of his self-concept he is predisposed towards self- consciousness in interpersonal settings. Certain self-concept persons, meanwhile, were described (pp. 13-14) as more likely to manifest other- consciousness in the same settings. Thus, given the same level of ob- servational intensity from others, it seems reasonable to expect that, relative to certain self-concept persons, uncertain persons should demonstrate less differentiated and integrated perception of others.) W Whether discussed in terms of "arousal" or in terms of an "equilibrium" in self- versus other-consciousness, the general effect of situational selfhconsciousness on person perception is to ”simplify" the personfs cognitive structure regarding others. That is, under the scrutiny of others, particularly unfamiliar others, individuals are likely to manifest less differentiated - less dimensional and less articulated - person perception. Although evaluative centrality is considered by Scott (1969) and others (Olshan, 1970; Schrauger, 1967) to be a conceptual as well as an empirical correlate of differentiation, it is not clear from either the 'arousal" or the "equilibrium” interpretation how this vari- able might be affected by situational self-consciousness. Certainty in one's perception of others, posited earlier as an index of integration, should be lower when one is experiencing self-consciousness than when one is not being observed by others. Finally, the effects of situational self-consciousness should be greater for individuals who are uncertain of their Belfbconcept than for those who are somewhat more assured of how they appear to others. II. EXPERIMENT I l W Experiment I was undertaken to test the general hypothesis that there is a structural commonality in the perception of oneself and the perception of acquainted and unacquainted others. Several self-concept factors, reflecting primarily the influence of Witkin 9151. (1962) and of Scott (1969), were derived and, along with a general measure of self- esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), were administered to female college students. Although not a structural variable, selfhesteem was included because of its intuitive importance for an understanding of person perception. At a second session two weeks later, the subjects watched several "candid" job interviews on videotape. Each interviewee was actually one of several female confederates of the experimenter. Following each interview segment, the subjects described the interviewee in terms of the same characteristics which had been employed for selfhdescription at the first session. Subjects also indicated their degree of perceived similarity and liking for the interviewee. Finally, the subjects described a "close friend" and someone they "disliked" in terms of the same charac- teristics used to describe themselves and the interviewees, and they indi- cated their degree of perceived similarity with the "friend" and with the ‘"disliked" person. Certainty judgments on all trait judgments also were obtained. W The self variables reflecting differentiation were expected to demonstrate positive relationships with the person variables reflecting differentiation. In particular: field independence and self-differentia- tion were hypothesized to demonstrate positive correlations with dimension- ality and articulation in person perception, and negative correlations with 28 29 evaluative centrality in person perception; evaluative centrality in self- perception was hypothesized to correlate negatively with dimensionality and articulation, and positively with evaluative centrality in person percep- tion. ' Self-concept certainty was expected to correlate positively with certainty in person perception, positively with dimensionality and articu- lation, and negatively with evaluative centrality in person perception. Field independence was expected to be negatively correlated with the per- ceived similarity measures. Across subjects, the factor structure in self-perception was ex- pected to be similar to the factor structure for each of the stimulus per- sons (interviewees, "friend," and "disliked“ person). In line with the selfhacceptance-other-acceptance hypothesis (Rogers, 1951), positive relationships were expected between self-esteem and liking for each of the interviewees. Self-esteem was also expected to be positively correlated with perceived similarity to "friend," and negatively correlated with perceived similarity to "disliked" person (Heider, 1958). Mamas Subjects The use of college students, usually considered a necessary evil in psychological research, was considered ideal for purposes of the present re- search, since the college experience is generally considered to involve a period of insecurity, identity crises, etc. Thus, self-concept factors were expected to be salient in this age group, and individual differences along various selfhdimensions were expected to be highly manifest in the percep- tion of others. Initially, 173 females from introductory psychology classes at Mich- igan State University were recruited in exchange for course credits. The study was presented as an "opportunity to learn about yourself" by taking 30 some newly developed psychological tests. on a random basis, 110 of these subjects were contacted by telephone to solicit their participation in a second session involving person perception. They were offered their choice of either more course credits or $2.00 in cash for their further participation. While 92 of these subjects agreed to participate, 83 of them actually returned for the second session. Approximately twoéthirds of the returning subjects opted for the course credits rather than the money. Incomplete data on four of the subjects at the second session reduced the final sample to 79. WW Subjects were tested in groups of 20 to 30 persons at the first. session. Four tests were administered. 0n the first test (§21£=Lmag§), developed by the author, the respondent indicated along 7-point scales how well each of 20 trait adjectives described herself. The end-points for the 7-point scales were labeled ”very" and "not at all." ‘The second test (Self: gggtgintx), also developed by the author, measured the respondent's certain- ty regarding her self-perception on the same 20 traits that were presented in the first test. 7-point scales were provided for the certainty judgments (l = very certain; 7 = very uncertain). Although both tests consiéted of the same traits, the traits were presented in a different random order on each test to control for artifactual response influences from one test to the other. The initial items for both tests were 30 adjectives, taken from Gough's (1955) Adjective Check List, which were considered to represent a wide variety of personality dimensions. Pretesting with 90 college students ('70 females and 20 males) yielded 20 adjectives that had both adequate dis- crimination between subjects and moderate to high test-retest reliability over a two-week period for both tests. The resultant tests, composed of 31 the 20 traits, yielded total Selfhimage and Self-certainty scores that had test-retest reliabilities over.a two-week period of .78 and .69, respec- tively (N = 90). However, while the Self-certainty test had high internal consistency (Cronbach's‘glphg_= .83, N = 281), the Selfbimage test was shown to consist of three prominent factors: intellectual good-bad, social good- bad, and activitybpotency. The first two of these correspond closely to factors typically identified in studies of implicit personality theory (Rosenberg & Sedlack, 1972), while the third is one of the factors most of-‘ manfiflwinmmmmdflmmmmlmfluw(%@w,&d,&hmm- baum, 1957). Subjects also took an established test of self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), which consists of 10 statements, half of which are keyed positively and half negatively, to which the respondent strongly agrees, agrees, dis- agrees, or strongly disagrees. Five additional items from Crowns and Mar- lowe's (1964) Social Desirability Scale were embedded among the 10 self- esteem items. The response format of these items was changed to match the format of the self-esteem items. Also embedded among the self-esteem items were two items tapping, respectively, the respondent's clarity of self-con- cept and her confidence in how she is perceived by others. Finally, subjects were administered the Concealed Figure Test (OFT), developed by Thurstone (1944). On this test, the respondent was required to determine whether or not a simple geometric form was embedded in each of 4 complex geometric forms. The CFT consists of 49 such items, and respondents were allowed 10 minutes to complete as many of these items as they could. The score calculated for each subject was the one recommended by Thurstone: the total number right minus the total number incorrect responses. The CFT has been shown to correlate highly with both the Enbedded Figures Test and the Red and Frame Test (Arbuthnot, 1972; wegner & vallacher, 1974; Witkin 32 gflLjfiL.,.l962). The Spearman-Brown odd-even reliability of the OFT on a sample of 63 college students was .86 (Wagner & Vallacher, 1974). Anonymity in test responses was assured by coding tests accord- ing to student identification number. Extensive personalized feedback was promised at the first session and was made available several weeks later. Wise. ‘§alf:gthgz_di££§z§ntigtigg. This is simply the respondent's score on the OFT. W- This variable represents the standard deviation of a subject's responses across the items that loaded on the intellectual good-bad factor of the Self-image test. The particu- lar items were clearuthinking, incompetent (reflected for scoring purposes), mature, and intelligent. Crano & Bettinghaus (1970) developed a measure of cognitive complexity somewhat similar to this, and found within-agreement on their measure across 23 attitude objects, other than the self, to be significant at p < .0001. WWW. ‘ A subject's score on this variable represents the standard deviation of her responses to items that loaded on the social good-bad factor of the Self-image test. The items were timid, awkward, rigid, tense, and aloof. W. A subject's score on this variable represents the standard deviation of her responses to items that loaded on the activity-potency factor. The items were active, independent, excitable, sociable, dominant, and extroverted. Eflalnat11§_g§nixali&x. There is evidence that extreme responses on rating scales, such as the semantic differential, are evaluative rather than merely descriptive in nature (Peabody, 1967). Thus, the evaluative 33 centrality of a subject's selfhconcept was measured by computing the sum of deviations from the scale midpoint (1.) of the 20 trait dimensions, and dividing this sum by the maximum sum possible (3 3g 20 = 60). This measure is operationally similar to one of the measures of evaluative centrality employed by Scott (1969). ‘,§91£:9§zt31nt1. This variable represents the average certainty rating across the 20 scales on the Self-certainty test. A subject's score on this variable is reflected so that high values indicate high certainty. .§§1£:gfi1§fim. A subject's score on this variable is the average value given to the 10 selfhesteem items, all scored in a positive direc- tion, on the Rosenberg selfhesteem test. Approximately two weeks later, 83 subjects returned for a second session dealing with "impression formation," and were tested in groups of 10 to 15 persons. Subjects were seated in a semi-circle, facing a 21" black and white Ampex television console that was connected to an Ampex videotape recorder. To the extent possible, all subjects had a direct and unobstructed view of the television console, although distance from the console varied from 7 to 16 feet. Each subject received an ”Impression Formation" booklet (Appen- dix A), and was instructed to read the following paragraph on the front page: "we are interested in how individuals form an impression of another person after only a brief observation of him or her. You are about to view some short video-taped segments (each about 5 minutes) of different persons being interviewed for a job. In each segment, the interviewee was not aware that she was being taped until after the interview. As you view each taped segment, assume that you are the person con- ducting the interview and that you are trying to form im- pressions about the person being interviewed. Following each taped segment you will complete a short questionnaire concerning your impressions of the interviewee." 34 The experimenter - a male in his mid-20's - explained that the subjects would be observing each of 5 college age females who were being videotaped without their prior awareness while interviewing for a job as a counselor at a summer camp, located in upper New York state, for inner city children. Subjects were told that ”since the interviewee's behavior is spontaneous and candid, you should be able to gain some impression of her by attending closely to not only 'what' she says, but 'how' she says it.” It was explained that following each interview segment, subjects would describe the interviewee by completing the appropriate "impression scale” in their booklet. The experimenter then presented the first interview segment, which was identical in format to the other 4 interview segments. Both the interviewer - a college age male e- and the interviewee were con- federates of the experimenter. During the interview, the interviewer and the interviewee sat in wooden arm chairs facing each other from a distance of approximately 4 feet. The positioning of the camera - be- hind and slightly above the interviewer - allowed the subjects to ob- serve the interviewee from a vantage point that closely approximated that of the interviewer. The interviewer was not visible at any time during the segment; instead, the camera was fixed on the head and body of the interviewee to allow observation of her expressive movements (arms and hands) as well as her facial gestures. The background was simply an offswhite wall, with no pictures, plants, or other effects. The interviewer initially asked several background questions, such as "how long have you been in school?“, "what's your background in counseling7', etc. Later. questions were somewhat more “challenging" and required some thought on the part of the interviewee. For example, she was asked, "how would you handle problem cases that might arise?", 35 and "do you feel you can relate to children of different ethnic and racial backgrounds?" Although the interviewee was familiar with the questions ahead of time, she was not given any explicit instructions on how to respond to them. Rather, she was instructed to answer all questions in the manner with which she felt most comfortable. As a result, there is some variance between the 5 segments in both the style and content of interviewee responses. The interview segment was approximately 5 minutes in length. Upon completion of the first interview segment, subjects com- pleted "impression scale 1." This scale, and the other four "impres- sion scales," required the subject to indicate how well each of 20 trait adjectives described the interviewee. 7-point Likert-type rating scales, whose end-points were "very" and "not at all," were provided for the judgments. The traits were the same traits that had been em- ployed for purposes of selfhdescription at Session 1, but presented in a different random order. In addition, two attitudinal items were presented following the 20 traits: (1) ”Do you feel that this person is generally similar to yourself in personality?"; and (2) "Generally speaking, do you feel that you would like this person?" 7-point re- sponse scales were provided for both of these items. When all subjects had completed “impression scale l,‘I they were asked to go back over the scale and indicate with a ch’eckqnark those trait judgnents of which they felt "fairly certain." If, on the other hand, they did not feel "fairly certain" about a particular trait judgment, they were instructed not to place a check-mark next to it. Following the "certainty" ratings, the experimenter presented the second interview segment and, upon completion of this segment, subjects completed "impression scale 2" and, again, checked those trait 36 judgments of which they felt "fairly certain." This procedure was followed for the remaining three segments as well. Each group received one of two random orders of videotape presentation. After trait judgments and certainty ratings had been obtained on all 5 interviewees, subjects were instructed to complete two addi- tional ”impression scales." Subjects read the following instructions for ”impression scale 6": ' "Think of someone of the same sex with whom you are 'close friendsj' that is, someone you know well that you like and who likes you. Then indicate on a scale of one to seven how well each of each of the following adjectives describes this person." The format of ”impression scale 6" was identical to that of scales 1-5, except that "liking" was not assessed. Trait judgments and certainty ratings on those judgments were obtained on this scale. Finally, subjects completed "impression scale 7", which tapped their perceptions of someone they disliked. Specifically, the following instructions were given at the top of “impression scale 7": ”Think of someone of the same sex with whom you have a "negative relationship;" that is, someone you know well that you dislike and who appears to dislike you. Then indicate on a scale of one to seven how well each of the following adjectives describes this person.‘' The format of "impression scale 7" was identical to that of "impression scale 6," and subjects were instructed to complete this scale in the same manner as the sixth scale. Following completion of the last scale, subjects were verbally questioned regarding their suspicions concerning any deceptions or "hidden purposes." None of the subjects suspected that the interviews were other than candid, and no suspicions were voiced concerning the ex- pressed intent of the study. Subjects were then debriefed, reimbursed with course credits or $2.00, and excused. 37 WW Elngngignglitx. This measure, developed by Scott (1969), refers to the number of dimensions-worth of space utilized by the traits with which a subject comprehended the 7 stimulus persons. It reflects, for each subject, the average intercorrelation of the 20 traits across the 7 stimulus persons. Specifically, dimensionality (Q) is defined by Scott as . m2 2 = _....._..._..'2 , m + 2 :Er where m is the number of traits with positive reliability, and £13 is the sum of inter-trait correlations. Since there were 20 traits employed in the present research, and these were selected in part on the basis of high test-retest reliability, Scott's formula reduces to 200 12= . 10 +fiir2 2 may range between 1 (minimum dimensionality) and 20 (maximum dimension- silty). Articulation. To assess a subject's discrimination of stimulus persons along trait dimensions, the‘fl statistic, a measure derived from information theory (Attneave, 1959; Garner, 1962), was calculated for each of the 20 trait dimensions. If the proportion of the seven stimulus persons in the 1th interval of the 7 interval categories on a given dimen- sion is pa, then 7 fl = -Zpilogzp1 i = l ELis the number of "bits" of information contained in the distribution of stimulus persons on the trait dimension. It reflects the "levelness" of 38 the distribution, and can be thought of as a measure of variance which is independent of the central tendency of the distribution (Coombs, Dawes, 8c Tversky, 1970). In the present research, minimum articulation (h, = 0) would occur if a subject assigned the same dimensional category value to all 7 stimulus persons; maximum articulation (11 = 2.82) would occur if each stimulus person were assigned a different dimensional value. Since the impression scales were expected to be factorially complex, a summary I; measure was to be computed for each factor. That is, the E values for the items that loaded on a given factor were to be averaged to yield a summary 13, value for that factor. We Evaluative centrality in person percep- tion was measured in the same way that evaluative centrality in self- concept was assessed. That is, a score on this variablefor a subject was obtained by first computing the sum of deviations from the scale mid- point (4) of the 20 trait dimensions used to describe a given stimulus person, and dividing this sum by the maximum sum possible (3 z 20 = 60). The mean of these scores over the 7 stimulus persons was taken as a measure of the subject's evaluative centrality. As noted earlier, this measure is patterned after a measure of evaluative centrality employed by Scott (1969). W. This measure reflects the average certainty with which the subject described an interviewee. The munber of traits that were checked as "fairly certain" on impression Scales 1-5 was summed and divided by the number of interviewees (5). W. This variable is a measure of the certainty with which the subject described a close friend on the 20 trait dimensions. It is simply the number of traits on the "impres- sion scale 6" that were checked as "fairly certain." 39 ‘ I2gagzintiye_§eztginty;1engmzl. This variable is the number of traits on ”impression scale 7" - the scale tapping perceptions of a mutually disliked person - that are checked as "fairly certain." szceived sigilggity (interviewees). This variable represents the degree to which the subject assumed similarity in personality with an interviewee. It was computed as the mean response value on the similarity item on impression scales 1—5. High values indicate high perceived similarity. P c ved s it iend . This measure is simply the re— sponse value to the similarity item on "impression scale 6." High values indicate high perceived similarity. P v d im' 1 e . The variable is the response value to the similarity item on "impression scale 7." High values indicate high perceived similarity. Attzggtign. This variable reflects the degree to which the sub- ject felt a potential liking for an interviewee. It was computed as the mean response on the liking item on impression scales 1—5. insults F to 6 el - erc tion The factor structure of the Self-image test and of each of the impression scales was determined by means of principal components factor analyses, rotated to a varimax solution. In support of the hypothesized commonality, the resultant factor structures for the 8 tests were highly similar. In particular, each test demonstrated 3 factors with eignvalues greater than 1.00 that corresponded to those identified in pilot research employing the Self-image test (see p. 31): intellectual good-bad, social good-bad, and activity-potency. The items that loaded on each of the 3 common factors for each test are presented in Appendix B. 40 Hhile 3 factors were generally common to all 8 tests, each test actually consisted of a somewhat more complex factor structure. The "enemy" impression scale and each of the interviewee impression scales, for example, had 4 factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.00. However, the 4th factor was, for the most part, unique to each scale. The Self-image test, meanwhile, actually had 7 factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.00, and the "close friend" impression scale had 6 such factors. This supports the results of a study by Seferi (1968) , which demonstrated that a sub-domain consisting of well-known others had greater dimensionality than a sub-domain consisting of less well-known others. Similarly, Koltuv (1962) found that individuals perceive stronger inter-trait relationships when describing unknown others than when describing known others. The factor analysis of the Selfbimage~test provided cross-valida- tion for the factor analysis of the Selfhimage test performed on the pilot sample (N = 281). Not only were the same general factors identified, but the items that loaded on these factors are identical to those that loaded on these factors for the pilot sample. Thus, for purposes of analyses, the following factors (and their associated items) were defined for the Self- image test: We (clear-thinking, incompetent, mature, intelligent); W (aloof, tense, rigid, timid, awkward); and am (active, independent, excitable, sociable, dominant, extroverted). There is some variance in the item content of the factors identified for each of the 7 impression scales. However, the degree of commonality is sufficient to justify the definition of 3 "person perception" factors for purposes of analyses. The 3 factors (and their associated items) are as follows: Qfigpgtfiggg (clearhthinking, indecisive, competent, independent, mature, intelligent); Aptiyitz (active, humorous, excitable, sociable, ex- troverted); and W (timid, awkward, rigid, tense, dominant). The 41 internal consistency (Cronbach's,glpha) of each of these factors for each of the 7 stimulus persons was uniformly high (mean aim = .86, 3.1). = .09). c is An initial correlational analysis was performed on the self-con- cept variables to examine the extent to which these variables tapped common underlying dimensions and to locate those variables that might be redundant in their relation to the person perception variables. As indicated in Table 1, the self-concept variables are relatively independent: only 8 of the 21 correlations attained statistical significance. The relation- ships that did obtain, however, are worthy of comment. First of all, self-other differentiation (field independence as measured by the OFT) correlated in a significant manner (p < .05) with self-differentiation on the competence factor, and demonstrated a margin- ally significant correlation with self—differentiation on the activity factor (2 < .10). The correlation between self-other differentiation and self-differentiation on the social value factor was nonsignificant, but in predicted direction. Field independent individuals, then, appear to have a somewhat more differentiated self-concept than do field dependent indivi- duals. This finding provides cross-validation for a similar finding ob- tained by vallacher (1974) regarding field independence and self-concept differentiation. It is interesting to note that self-other differentiation did not correlate significantly with self-certainty. Although this finding appears contradictory to Witkin's "sense of separate identity" hypothesis, it confirms an earlier finding and is readily interpretable in terms of sex-role socialization factors (see Wagner & vallacher, 1974). Somewhat surprisingly, the self-differentiation variables did not demonstrate strong intercorrelations. The only correlation that reached significance was between self-differentiation on competence and 42 TABLE 1 INTERCORRELATIONS OF SELF-CONCEPT VARIABLES Variable l 2 3 4 5 6 7 l. Self-other differentiation - 2. Competence differentiation .210* - 3. Social value differentiation .133 .081 - 4. Activity differentiation .179 .259*** .157 __ 5. Evaluative centrality .085 -.035 .264*** .115 - 6. Selfhconcept - certainty .060 .012 .041 .020 .460**** _. 7. Self-esteem -.OS7 -.l82*‘ -.247** -.278*** .168 .270* _. it is $88!- **** p (.05 P < .025 p.<;.01 p< .OOl 43 self-differentiation on activity (2< .01); differentiation of the social value factor was independent of differentiation of both the competence and activity factors. A subject who had a differentiated view of his own social value, in other words, did not necessarily have a differen- tiated view of his competence or activity. This is encouraging for it renders somewhat implausible the interpretation that individual differ— ences in self-differentiation simply reflect differences in response style on rating scales. Self-differentiation on social value demonstrated a highly sigif— icant correlation (p < .01) with evaluative centrality. In this case, however, confounding could conceivably account, in part, for such a rela- tionship. Specifically, extreme responses on the Self-image rating scales contribute directly to high evaluative centrality and, if the ratings are also ambivalent - that is, some are positive and some negative - ex; treme responses would contribute to high differentiatiOn as well. The confounding interpretation is attenuated, though, by the lack of signif— icant correlations between evaluative centrality and the other two self- differentiation factors. Nonetheless, any interpretation of the signif- icant centrality-differentiation correlation that is based on considera- tion of the underlying constructs must be tentative in nature, contingent on replication with unconfounded measures. . The differentiation measures demonstrated significant negative relationships with self-esteem, and in this instance the findings are not attributable to measurement confounding since different instruments were employed to assess differentiation and self-esteem. Thus, subjects with low self-esteem tended to describe themselves in a differentiated manner on scales tapping activity (2 (.01), social value (p < .025), and to a lesser extent, competence (p< .05). This is reminiscent of Scott's 44 (1969) finding that individuals who had a highly differentiated self tended to be somewhat maladjusted psychologically. As suggested earlier (pp. 18-19), it may be that maladjusted or low self-esteem individuals have a self-concept that is "too differentiated," that is, their self- concept integration is threatened. Table 1 further reveals that evaluative centrality is strongly associated with self-concept certainty (p.<:.001). This finding argues for the validity of the self-certainty construct since extremeness of rating has been shown to be highly correlated with confidence of rating (Green, 1954). Moreover, given the significant positive correlation be- tween self-certainty and self-esteem (p < .05) -- a finding which repli- cates that of pilot research - it appears that while highly certain people tend to be highly evaluative in their self-appraisal, the nature of this evaluation tends to be positive rather than negative. In sum, the obtained correlations appear to represent meaningful Irelationships between the self-concept factors. At the same time, the magnitude of these correlations are not large enough to indicate redun- dancy in their relationships with the person perception variables. The relationships among the 12 person perception variables were assessed by correlational analyses. Only 21 out of a possible 132 cor- relations attained statistical significance (see Table 2), indicating that these measures tapped relatively independent aspects of person per- ception. It is interesting that although the articulation measures on the three factors were highly intercorrelated (p (.001 in each case), they demonstrated somewhat divergent patterns of correlations with the other variables. Competence articulation, for example, was negatively correlated 45 II 000. mmo.l mNo. satmom. mQHel *bON.I Ono. wwo.l mosow>hopcfi . shiatsu .e ll *erbmel Hbdel booel mmo.: Nmoel HHH.I owo.l charmer . Ariadne .m II *mmH. OmH. aswmm.l who. ooa. moa.l sesoahm erodes nassseasfim .1. ll semmm. 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