A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PERCEPTOAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF ARTHUR COMBS AS IT RELATES TO THEEDUCATION

OF TEACHERS

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

PHILIP BRUCE VANDE‘R VELDE
1959

“+5513

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PERCEPTUAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF ARTHUR COMBS AS IT RELATES TO
THE EDUCATION OF TEACHERS

presented by

PHILIP BRUCE VANDER VELDE

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

_ee.u._deqree in PHILOSOPHY OF
EDUCATION

 

@flffl/flé 2':

Major professor

Date September 22; 1969

0-169

ABSTRACT

A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PERCEPTUAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF ARTHUR COMBS AS IT RELATES TO
THE EDUCATION OF TEACHERS

by

Philip Bruce Vander Velde

Currently there are many conflicting points of view
concerning the most effective means of educating teachers.
The intent of this dissertation is to critically analyze
one of these orientations to teacher education, that of the
perceptual or phenomenological theory of Arthur Combs, in
regard to its basic theoretical assumptions, concepts, and
generalizations. The intent of this analysis is to better
enable those responsible for the education of teachers to
assess the possible relevance of phenomenological theory
for curricular decision-making.

The method of analysis employed is that of both
formal and informal philosophical analysis. Questions are
asked about the perceptual theory of Combs both in regard
to the scientific and the ethical assumptions which are
made. The criteria of assessment used are those of the
internal consistency of phenomenological theory, the

adequacy of the key theoretical constructs, the capacity

L
l

 

Philip Bruce Vander Velde

For explanation and control, and the capacity of the theory
'to enable the educator to make decisions concerning value
conflicts.

Two major writings of Combs, Individual Behavior and

 

The Professional Education of Teachers, occupy the major

 

focus of analysis. Articles of Combs are analyzed only
when they contain material relevant to the different from
the psychological and social theories in the above
mentioned books.

The intent of Combs was to provide a concept of the
individual and his behavior which would enable educators
to deal more effectively and humanly with people than have
past "adjustment" or operant theories of individual
behavior. After extensive analysis of basic assumptions
and concepts, the conclusion reached is that phenomeno-
logical theory offers no better tool for the analysis os
individual behavior than do past theories. The basically
ethical concept of the individual which Combs attempts to
develop in his notion of the adequate personality is itself
an adjustment theory and a form of ethical relativism.

At the level of explanation and prediction of
behavior, aside from the lack of evidence from research,

perceptual theory is found to be lacking in constructs
I with enough empirical import to support the identification
of behaviors which it attempts to explain. The question

is also raised as to the necessity of the inference to

Philip Bruce Vander Velde

the phenomenal field of the individual in order to
facilitate prediction and control of behavior.

The social theory contained in Individual Behavior

 

and The Professional Education of Teachers is also shown

to be inadequate, due to the fact that phenomenological

theory uses the natural individual as its basic unit of

social analysis. It cannot provide an adequate concept

of society, social order, and culture using the perceptual

field of the individual as the foundation of its social

theory. The question of the capacity of the theory to

provide an adequate concept of the individual is also raised.
The perceptual theory of Combs does appear to be very

appealing to teachers in programs of teacher education.

The question is asked as to why it is so appealing given

its weak theoretical base. The conclusion reached is that

the theory is couched in a language which has a great amount

of emotional appeal. Due to this appeal, the theory is a

persuaSive rather than an educational device for instructors

in colleges of teacher education.

A PHILOSOPHICAL AUALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL
ASSUMPTIOWS OF THE PERCEPTUAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF ARTHUR COVBS AS IT RELATES TO

THE EDUCATION OF TEACHERS
By

Philip Bruce Vander Velde

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
College of Education

1969

Chapter

II.

III.

IV.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . .
BASIC THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS,
GENERALIZATIONS . . . . . .

The Point of View . . .

The Perceptual Field . . . .
Personal Adequacy: The Individual's
One Need . . . . . . .
Perceptual Theory, Prediction, and
Explanation . . .

THE ADEQUATE PERSONALITY . . . . . .

An Ethical Concept of Adequacy

A Positive View of Self . . .
Acceptance . . . . . . . . .
Identification . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . .

THE ADEQUATE PERSONALITY AND SOCIETY .

Introduction . . .

Basic Assumptions . .

The Necessity of Inference to the
Phenomenal Field . . . . .

Society as Consensus . . . .
Social Change, Institutional Persons
and Social Order . . .

The Conservative Bias of Perceptual Theory
Society and Conflict . . . . . . .
The Good Society . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . .

ii

Page

87

88
92

96
101

Page

Chapter

V. PERCEPTUAL THEORY AND TEACHER EDUCATION . . . 104
A Critical Introduction . . . . . . . . 10A
Basic Orientation . . . . . . . . . 110
The Helping Relationship . . . . . . . 119
A Critical Analysis of Combs'
Basic Orientation . . . . . . 122
The Language of Perceptual Theory
as a Positive Reinforcer . . . . . . . 139
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . 1A3

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1A6

iii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The intent of Arthur Combs in Individual Behaviorl

 

and The Professional Education of Teachers2 is to set

 

forth and develop ideas that he feels are crucial to the
understanding of human behavior. He notes at the outset

of Individual Behavior that although humanity has produced

 

a vast and powerful technology in the physical sciences
there is now a much more urgent need for a science which
will enable us to control ourselves as well as the physical
universe.
The greatest problems of our times are no longer
the production and control of 'things' but of
communication and cooperation among people. Having
won control over our physical universe, we find
ourselves confronted with a new problem, the problem
of how to control ourselves.

Although Individual Behavior was written (2nd edition)

 

in the later 50's, the concerns of Combs and the need for

an adequate science of human behavior are still evident

 

1Arthur Combs and Donald Snygg, Individual Behavior
(New York: Harper and Row, 1959) (Hereafter abbreviated
as IB).

 

2Arthur Combs, The Professional Education of Teachers
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1965) (Hereafter abbreviated
as PET).

 

311-3, p. 3.

and relevant today. Having recently landed men on the
moon, we still see that the problems which most perplex
us on earth are those concerning war, hunger, and social
injustice. As Combs notes, the problems have existed for
centuries, but the onset of the nuclear age has made them
manifest to the point that scientific endeavor be devoted

to the understanding of human interaction and behavior.“

One must add that the solutions to these problems are no
more evident now than they were in the late 50's and that,
if anything, these social problems have become more intense
and complex. One can only sympathize with the humanitarian
concern with which Combs approaches the problems of human
behavior in the light of the new problems which have come
to light since the book was published. If the human race
and indeed life itself is to be sustained, we must
necessarily concern ourselves with the solutions to
problems such as the control of population, human aggres-
sion, wide-spread contamination of our natural resources,
and the exploitation and impoverishment of billions of
people.

This humanitarian spirit will guide this disserta-
tion in its attempt to analyze the writings of Combs.
The focus will be on the relationship of Combs' theories
to the problems of education in general, but especially

on the problem of teacher education. Although the focus

 

ulbid.

...-

Lu

 

is on education, it is obvious that the problems faced
in education are not necessarily unique to the field;
much of this writing must necessarily concern itself,
therefore, with problems which range over a number of
subject matter areas. Two books will take up almost
the entirety of the analysis contained in the

dissertation: Individual Behavior and The Professional

 

 

Education of Teachers. I have chosen to concentrate on
these two because an analysis of articles by Combs in
professional journals evidences aspects of his theory
which are contained in the books which are the focus of
our considerations.

Combs and myself are both concerned with the
problem of knowledge of human behavior and then proceeds
we can best understand human behavior. Combs asks how
to set forth a perceptual theory which he contends
produces understandings better than existing psychological
theory. The present discussion will question the adequacy
of Combs' perceptual theory in terms of its explicit and
implicit assumptions and how well it enables us to
understand human behavior and the social problems which
it entails. The task of Combs was a tremendous under-
taking. My task is of much smaller proportions, but
nevertheless an assential activity in the field of

educational theory.

b

.«g.

f'.

Of perceptual theory, Dr. Combs states:

Perceptual psychology is a personal, dynamic,
treatment-oriented view of behavior invented

very largely by clinical psychologists, whose
problem, like that of the teacher, is the behavior
of individuals. It is a psychology directly
concerned with human perceptions, beliefs, and
values, and many teacher-education programs have
already incorporated this frame of reference into
their curricula. It fits so well the needs of
educators as to seem almost tailor—made for the
teaching profession.

The above is from The Professional Education of Teachers

 

which came into print six years after the second edition

of Individual Behavior. Thus, we can see that perceptual

 

theory has made a significant appeal to those concerned
with the education of teachers. Yet, however appealing,
a psychological theory must bake "theoretical bread" if
it is to have lasting significance for education and for
society, and my concern will be to assess the soundness
of perceptual theory in relation to problems of social
science and social philosophy.

The task of the educator is essentially two-fold;
the educator must first determine what is to be taught
and then determine which teacher behaviors will best
produce the desired behavioral outcome. The first task
is in essence a philosophical undertaking as it involves
the justification of the valued behavior. The second is

the task of the behavioral scientist as it involves the

 

5§_._E_'I_', p. 58.

production of a theory with predictive power. Combs sees
perceptual psychology as fulfilling both of these functions
as he views the theory as a psycho-philosophical orientation
to behavior. In The Professional Education of Teachers he
calls his theory a perceptual-existential approach to
behavior. Although Combs does not mention or develop any
of the traditional philosophical problems involved in a
theoretical undertaking of the scope of his, his writings
nevertheless imply that the considerations of perceptual
theory will suffice for a more formal view of "the best
that man can be." The intent of this dissertation is to
critically analyze perceptual theory as to its capacity
to fulfill both of these functions.

We then can begin by asking three basic questions
of Combs' perceptual theory. Does perceptual theory
facilitate the formulation of sound educational goals or
objectives? Does the theory enable the educator to
predict behavioral outcomes given certain teacher behavior?
And, does the perceptual-existential approach enable the
educator to analyze the social context of the school in
order to better deal with the pressing social problems in
which schools are involved?

A further consideration will be the evaluation of
a theoretical approach to education which basically
disregards the more formal philosophical concerns in

relation to theory building. Nowhere in the writings

of Combs does one find him concerned with the
metatheoretical problems involved in the scientific

and ethical theorizing in which he is engaged. It will
be my intent to show why these problems should have
received their due consideration by Combs.

The over—all objective will be to analyze perceptual
theory in regard to the feasibility of its implementation
in programs of teacher education. In order that this may
be accomplished, the following chapters will present and
analyze Combs' basic theoretical assumptions, his view
of the selféactualized or adequate personality, and
social theory respectively. The final chapter will then
attempt, in the light of the considerations of the more
formal aspects of the perceptual-existential approach,
to critically evaluate perceptual theory as an analytical

tool for educators engaged in the preparation of teachers.

CHAPTER II

BASIC THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS,
GENERALIZATIONS AND
ASSUMPTIONS

The Point of View

 

Basic to the understanding of a perceptual or
personal theory of human behavior is the distinction
made between seeing human behavior as an outside observer
and seeing the behavior from the point of View of the
behaver himself. Combs makes the distinction early in

Individual Behavior; from his point of view, the

 

distinction is crucial for any understanding of human
behavior from the perceptual frame of reference. If
human behavior is to be understood, it must be seen from
the perceptual or personal frame of reference of the
individual who is behaving.

People do not behave according to facts as

others see them. They behave according to

facts as they see them. What governs behavior

from the point of view of the individual

himself are his unique perceptions of himself

and the world in whifh he lives, the meanings

things have for him.

Combs attempts early to emphasize the distinctive

differences between what might be called the objectivist

 

lI_B, p. 17.

or behaviorist orientation which has characterized
American psychology during the twentieth century and his
own point of view which might be labelled a subjectivist
or introspectionist position. Rychlak terms the two
frames of reference as introspection and extraspection.2

If the theorist takes an extraspective

perspective or frame of reference, he

defines his abstractions from his vantage

point as observer, regardless of his point

of view of the object of the study.3
An introspectionist on the other hand adopts the point
of view of the object of the study. The extraspectionist
frame of reference has been dominant in American
psychological tradition since Watson, with the modern
stimulus-response theorists dominating the psychological
scene today. The major figure in the introspectionist
tradition is Freud, according to Rychlak, with the
non—Freudians being representative of the position today.
Perhaps the two orientations could best be characterized
today as clinical and experimental. Combs represents a
third orientation other than Freudian or stimulus—response

but still under Rychlak's classification would be in the

introspectionist camp. In The Professional Education of

 

 

2Joseph Rychlak, The Philosophy of Science for
Personalit Theor (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
19 , pp. 27, 2 .

 

31bid.

Teachers Combs calls his frame of reference "Third Force
Psychology."I4

Combs, however, classifies Freudian theory as an
extension of the objectivist or extraspectionist approach
in that Freudian theory "was really an extension of the
8-H approach: it included not just immediate stimuli,
but the whole gamut of experiences to which a person had
been subjected in his lifetime."5 The 3-H and Freudian
perspectives are objective positions or descriptive ways
of looking at behavior in that they look for causes of
behavior and they "lead to mechanistic or manipulative
ways of working with people . . . . The personal or
perceptual point of view is "designed to facilitate and
assist learning rather than to control and direct it."
The perceptual frame of reference then attempts to
understand behavior as resulting from the perceptual
field of the behaver and not as a result of the forces
causing or causes of the perceptual field itself. Combs
does want to find the causes of behavior and to understand
behavior but "the immediate causes of behavior are to be
found in the perceptions existing for the behaver at the

moment of acting."6 Combs sees the distinction as crucial

 

“PET, p. 11.

51b1d.

6PET, p. 13.

10

as "it is probable that such failure to understand how
things seem to other people is the most persistent source
of difficulties in human relationships. To understand
human behavior . . . it is necessary to understand the
behaver's perceptual world, how things seem from his point
of view."7

It would be useful at this point to analyze just
exactly what Combs' position is in regard to the function
of psychological theory. It would appear that there has
been a change in attitude from the position taken in

Individual Behavior and The Professional Education of

 

 

Teachers. As noted earlier (see page 1), Combs' earlier
attitude in the formulation of his perceptual frame 0f
reference was that the function of the social sciences
is to control human behavior, while in the latter formu—

lation of this frame of reference in The Professional

 

Education of Teachers is to "facilitate and assist." It

 

is somewhat crucial to note the basic vagueness of Combs'
perception of the function of psychological theory, for
entailed in this essential vagueness is a much more
serious vagueness in regard to the domain of phenomena
and relationships over which perceptual theory is to
preside. The question must be asked as to what tradi-

tional fields or domains of subject matter Combs is

 

7Ibid.

ll

delving into. Third Force psychological theory seems to
range much farther than traditional psychological theory
in terms of the domain of its subject matter; Combs fails
to recognize by and large that if the theoretical constructs
are to range over traditional philosophical and
metatheoretical problems, he also must explore the
problems entailed by these concerns. Whether Combs is
correct or incorrect, he must concern himself with the
domain over which his theory is to facilitate understanding.
It will be useful for us to bear this in mind in exploring
the basic theoretical constructs of the theory.

When Combs states that the function of the perceptual
point of view is to "facilitate and assist" rather than
to "manipulate and control," he is taking a metatheoretical
stance on the function of psychological theory; and, in so
doing, ought to have clarified why the traditional concepts
of explanation, prediction and control are inadequate as
meatheoretical criteria for the adjudication of scientific
theory as it relates to human behavior. It would further
appear essential that an explicit distinction be made as
to how "facilitate and assist" differ from the norms of
explanation, prediction, and control. Perhaps when one
is facilitating and assisting, one is controlling behavior
in a good way rather than controlling in a bad way. The
function of teaching for Combs is in some way to produce

changes in the learner. In any case, it is not Combs'

12

point of view that the teacher does not attempt to change
behavior in some way and why "facilitate and assist" are
better in describing this change than is the word "control"
ought to have been considered. One can appreciate the

fact that Combs sees a good deal wrong with traditional
educational practices, yet it is the obligation of a
theoretician to provide criteria for assessing the faults
of preceding systems and the merits of his own.

A further point to note in Combs' basic frame of
reference is that he takes the individual or natural
person as his fundamental unit of analysis when attempting
to provide an explanation of human behavior. "Perceptual
psychology . . . tells us that behavior is only a symptom,
the surface manifestation of what is going on within the
individual."8 In this Combs assumes the traditional bias
os psychological theory in using the natural person as
the unit of analysis. It would at first thought seem
natural that a psychologist would choose the individual
as the basis for analysis as this is what psychologists
have always done; however, one must also see that this is
an assumption and not a given. Behavior may well be the
function of something other than the individual even
though it is the individual who does the behaving. The
individual's self may well be "the center of his world"

and perceptions which he has about himself may cause

 

8PET, pp. 13, 1M.

l3

behavior; yet it is questionable, even given the above,
that the individual is the explanatory principle for
behavior or even for the individual himself. It may be
that it is the individual which needs explaining if we
are to understand the individual's behavior.

We have seen that it is Combs' intent to provide
a view of human nature which will allow us to understand
the human individual and to better solve the problems
which humans must face in living in an interdependent
society. Why the natural person or individual should
possess the explanatory power for solving social problems
is again a question which is open to doubt.9 When dealing
with social problems, we are attempting to produce a
social ethic; that the individual can provide us with the
organizing principle necessary for the good society is

questionable. Thus at two levels-—the behavior of the

 

9The assumption Combs is making closely parallels
the assumptions made by classical economic theory.
Dewey's analysis of the viability of these assumptions
in Liberalism and Social Action and throughout his
writings clearly brings into doubt the tenability of the
assumption that the individual can be the basic unit in
social analysis or in making any critical analysis of
any aspect of a society. Although Combs does not state
that he has been influenced by the assumptions and tenets
of classical economic theory, it will become quite evident
in our analysis that he has, as has much of contemporary
psychological theory, been thoroughly influenced by the
psychological aspects of conservative economic theory. It
should also be noted at this point that these assumptions
provide a basically positivistic orientation towards
social science and that this is exactly what Combs is
reacting against in regard to past psychological theory.

 

1L:

individual and the production of principles necessary
for the ordering of a society—-the assumption that the
individual must be the starting point of analysis is
suspect and thus must be kept in mind as we further
analyze Combs' perceptual theory.

The point of View of perceptual psychology is
that of the perceptual world of the individual which
according to the theory better enables us to understand
human nature and human behavior. We have noted basic
vagueness in the formulation of the theory in regard to
what Combs assumes the function of psychological theory
is and why the individual should be considered the basic
unit of analysis for individual behavior and social
theory. We must now proceed to develop Combs' perceptual
theory in terms of its basic theoretical constructs and
to more fully explore the assumption that the natural
person and his perceptions are a basis for understanding

persons, their behavior, and their interrelationships.

The Perceptual Field
The basic concept of Combs' perceptual theory is
that of the perceptual or phenomenal field. Basic to
this construCt is the distinction between the objective
situation and the perceived situation. Combs contends
that there are no objective situations when behavior is

seen from the point of view of the behaver. The

15

perceptual field is "not the physical situation or the
objective situation but the perceived situation--the
situation as it appears to the behaver."lO People act
with reference to how a situation appears to them and
not as it appears to an observer viewing the situation.
Thus, behavior "is determined, not by the objective
field, but by a personal way of perceiving which is not
identical to that of any other individual."11

A perceptual field is a person's way of seeing
the world in which he lives. Combs distinguishes this
way of seeing from what he calls "the objective situation."
Thus, Combs describes a phenomena with which we are all
quite fimiliar; two people in a given situation will in
fact see different things in that situation. After
visiting friends my wife will mention numerous things
about how a house was decorated which I had not seen at
all. Again, two people may feel and react quite differ-
ently to something such as a political convention.
However, what is interesting is that Combs uses the
concept of "objective situation" in order to explicate
what is called the "perceptual situation."

What does the term "objective situation" mean for

Combs in this context? "People always behave in accordance

¥

101B, p. 18.

11112, p. 19.

16

with what they believe the objective facts of the
situation to be. A person will not doubt the validity

of his own views and will think that he is basing his
behavior upon objective facts."12 The word "objective"
in these contexts is somewhat misleading as it refers
only to another subjective field or at best a number of
subjective fields which are in agreement. For Combs,

in terms of his basic assumptions, there are no objective
situations but only a number of subjective fields;
objectivity is essentially determined by assumed agreement
of a number of these fields. Thus, the most one can say
about a given situation is that "it seems or appears this
way to me." If we have a number of observers looking at
a portion of behavior, their point of view is objective
for Combs inasmuch as they can agree about what they are
looking at. However, the behavior of an individual is
caused by his perceptions and these may or may not be
objective, i.e. the behavior would be understandable
because it would be like what the observers would have
done.

The way the term "objective" is used by Combs is
somewhat crucial to his entire perceptual theory in that
it leaves us with no criteria with which we can adjudicate
the validity of the theory. Perceptual theory is validated

only in terms of our agreement with it, for Combs provides

g

12;E, p. 19.

fluv
.Ps

>n

4v

 

.rx

7L

VL-

REV

AIa

AK

 

17

no other criteria with which we can determine validity.
Thus, perceptual theory is the way Combs sees the

behavior of individuals and this is a subjective point

of view. Aside from the limited treatment Combs gives

to the notion of objectivity, there may be criteria which
we can use to validate the theory; however, it is a serious

weakness in Individual Behavior and The Professional

 

Education of Teachers in that we begin our analysis with

 

such a vague position in regard to scientific validity.
Combs does believe and states that theories are
validated by whether or not they in fact do what was
intended. Thus, we could say that perceptual theory is
validated if it does enable us to better understand human
behavior and does enable us to facilitate and assist
growth in education. Yet, we have found that the notions
of "understanding," "controlling," "explanation,"
"facilitating," etc. are basically vague and undefined.
Thus, we are left in an initial position of seeing
behavior, including scientific behavior, as caused by a
subjective field, with few comments on how this subjective
{Joint of view can be distinguished from the objective
situation if it can be at all. People may behave in terms
of how the world appears to them, but this does not afford
a very adequate understanding of the people themselves,
their behavior, or how we can best conceptualize this

behavior.

',..

L I

W...

.H‘

II".

‘1‘

g

._.
.7»

SO
na‘

 

 

18

The concept of the perceptual field is arrived at

by inference according to Combs. The field is not directly
observable and is thus inferred by the scientist in order
to better understand human behavior. The concept is much
like the field concept in physics which was developed to
aid in the understanding of electrical phenomena.

When something occurs at one point in space

apparently because something else happened at

another point with no visible means by which

the "cause" can be related to the "effect",

the scientist often says the two events are

connected in a field. The field serves as

kind of a bridge between cause and effect by

which the scientist can deal with a problem

even though he may not be aware of all the

intervening aspects . . . . Using this field,

scientists and engineers have been able to

predict and control electric currents and to

build devises using its properties.1
Thus, the use of the field concept in perceptual theory is
justified by Combs in that it enables the psychologist to
better control and predict behavior. Even though no one
has ever seen a perceptual field, one can nevertheless use
the construct because of its explanatory power. Kaplan
sees this as a justified application of a construct in that
it has a pragmatic function in theory. Combs uses this
line of reasoning as the justification for the introduction
of the term "phenomenal field" "as it makes it possible to
deal with events that behave predictably even though we may

be ignorant of the reasons why or how."lu

 

13l§.rh 19.

lulbid.

19

This writer would agree that scientific constructs
the referent of which is unobservable may be justified
in terms of their pregmatic value. Concepts such as
"field," "atom," and "energy" have been usefully employed
in scientific research even though the reference can or
could not be observed. Yet, there appears to be a distinct
difference between the concept of "field" as used by Combs
and its use in the physical sciences. When the scientist
uses the term "field", he uses it quite consistently and
in any given case in which there is a magnetic phenomena
to be understood, the concept of field is used in the
same manner; he does not speak of subjectively unique
magnetic fields. Thus, the scientist can generalize from
instance to instance; the concept and generalizations
formed from it are applied in the same way in each case.
The field concept as applied to human behavior must be
applied differently in each case as there never are two
fields exactly alike. Indeed, the basic orientation of
perceptual theory was constructed because individual fields
were seen as being so dissimilar.

The basic point in the two distinct applications of
the concept of field is that there are conflicts in some
of the major assumptions of perceptual theory. Later in
Individual Behavior, Combs characterizes the structural
jproperties of the phenomenal field which can be applied

generally in different instances. It would thus seem that

20

he is assuming more for his own perceptual field than he
will give the individual whom he is explaining credit
for as individual behavior is caused by a subjective field.
Is there the possibility that the individual's field may
in fact be objective-~that is, having adequate or necessary
criteria for the field he has? In another sense, is there
something more than the subjective perceptual field which
we can use to understand behavior? Is the field in fact
structured in a necessary way so that I can objectively
generalize apart from the individual?‘ I would suggest at
this point that the notions of prediction and control, as
in the justification of the use of the concept "field" in
the physical sciences, is of paramount importance here.
There do seem to be reasons for insisting that the
understanding of behavior can be accomplished without
necessarily having acquaintance with a particular indiv-
idual. People, in some instances anyway, have very valid,
objective reasons for what they do and these reasons can
be determined without allusion to subjective field with
the further possibility of explaining any given bit of
t>ehavior without inferring a perceptual field. As Combs
notes "all behavior is lawful" but the lawfulness of
behavior may not be dependent on the perceptual field of
the behaver.

Combs defines the perceptual or phenomenal field as

"the entire universe, including himself,_as is experienced

21

by the individual at the instant of action. It is the
individual's personal and unique field of awareness, the
field of perception responsible for his every behavior."15
The perceptual field is the total and single determinant
of behavior. "The concept of complete determinism of

behavior is our basic postulate . . . All Behavior, without

 

exception, is completely determined by, and pertinent to,

the perceptual field of the behaving organism."16 Again,

 

we can plainly see that the basic unit of analysis for
Combs is the individual and his perceptual awareness. It
is the phenomenal field and only this field which needs to
be explored if we are to facilitate and assist learning.
This assumption that the individual perceptual field is
the best unit for psychological and sociological analysis
has implications throughout Combs' writings, but we shall
especially see the ramifications of this assumption in the
educational and social context of perceptual theory.

A further point to note in the above paragraph is
that Combs is assuming a complete determinism of all
behavior. It is difficult in this instance to know exactly
what this explicit assumption means, as the notion of
determinism is not developed to any extent. A number of
forms of determinism have been developed by theorists and

Combs does not identify his brand with anyone. It would

15lg, p. 20.

16Ibid.

22

have been extremely helpful for Combs to have explored
the notion of determinism in regard to behavior, as the
concept has serious rmaifications in any discussion of
the problem of social order, social change, and the
possibility of understanding human behavior. The problem
of determinism has been discussed at length by social
theorists such as Tolcott Parsons and Elijah Jordan and
the possibility of the development of an adequate social
theory of human action is intimately involved with a
theorist's conception of determinism and explanation.
Parsons notes in his discussion of Hobbesian social theory
that, given Hobbes' assumption of determiniSm, the problem
of explaining social order becomes impossible.17

With the assumption of "complete determinism,"
Combs' notions of how Third Force psychology differs from
the more triditional psychological explanations becomes
meaningless. The notion that it is the psychologist's
and teacher's duty to "facilitate and assist" rather than
to "manipulate and control" clearly fails, as there is
nothing but control and manipulation with Combs' "basic
postulate." It would appear that either Combs' notion
of determinism is so vague as to be meaningless or that
perceptual theory has a basic assumption that will not

allow it to do any of the things Combs intends it to do.

 

17Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action
(New York: The Free Press, 1937), pp. 89-9A.

23

In either of these cases, it is a serious discredit to
the perceptual point of view of human behavior as
fundamental theoretical vagueness or inability to explain
are both clearly deterrents to any adequate scientific
inquiry.

Combs introduces the term "phenomenal field" when
he makes a brief remark on the relationship of perceptual
theory to the philosophical school of phenomenology. He
says that the position of philosophical phenomenology
"is essentially the position we have taken-—that behavior
is a function, not of the external event, but of the,

individual's perception of it."18 In doing this, he

equates the terms "perceptual" and "phenomenological"

as synonyms. Again we find a basic vagueness as it is
difficult from the brief quoted statement to see exactly
how perceptual theory is related to philosophical
phenomenalism or, in particular, what brand of
phenomenology. We find a term introduced without any
specification of its meaning. This along with the basic
postulates would seem to indicate that we are dealing
with a theory which can mean all things to all people

in that its basic theoretical constructs and assumptions
are so vague as to be meaningless. Yet, such judgment
should be reserved if made until all of the important

aspects of perceptual theory have been dealt with. Let

 

18E, p. 21.

2A

us go on to look at Combs' notions of the perceptual or
phenomenal field in more depth.

The perceptual field always has "the feeling of
reality" for the behaver. Thus, an individual's behavior
is totally determined by what he takes to be reality. In
his discussion of "the perceptual field as reality," Combs
says that "to each of us the perceptual field of another
person contains much error and illusion; it seems an
individual interpretation of reality rather than reality
itself, but to each individual, his phenomenal field is
reality; it is the only reality he can know. This
perceptual field is far richer and more meaningful than
that of the objective physical world."19 Thus, if we
are to understand the behavior of another that seems
somewhat strange, we must attempt to understand his
phenomenal field and the behavior will then become logical
and meaningful to us. Even the murderer at the time of
his crime feels that what he is doing is the best behavior
for the given situation. Indeed, according to Combs, all
people are on their best behavior at the time of behaving
no matter what that behavior may be. We may later regret
what we have done and doubt the "reality" of our past
behavior, but in the instant of behaving, we act fully in
accord with our perceptual field. One might maintain in

accord with perceptual theory that no one errs knowingly;

1913;, p. 21.

25

however, the basic problem comes in that one would also
be consistent if one asserted that no one errs. This
can be seen at two levels.

First, in terms of rudimentary or simple problem
solving behavior, the problem is solely that which is
conceptualized by the individual in his perceptual
field; in other words, it is consistent with perceptual
theory to assert that problems do not exist outside of
their conception in a phenomenal field; all problems
are phenomenal problems. Thus, the only solution to a
problem can be a phenomenal solution and this need only
be in accord with our phenomenal problem or the manner
in which we have conceptualized the problem. Problems,
in accord with Combs' basic assumptions, do not exist
outside of our perceptual fields. The phenomena we may
have to deal with next Week may make us wonder why we
dealt with last week's problem in the manner we did,
yet last week's problem was a different problem; it
may look or appear similar, but in fact-~or in phenomena--
is different, as we are dealing with a different set of
phenomena for which we must provide another phenomenal
answer which again can not be wrong but can only be in
accord with our formulation or misformulation of the
problem. Again, " . . . to each individual, his
phenomenal field is reality; it is the only reality he

can know." It is the only problem he can know. To ask,

26

when confronted with a problem, the question of whether
or not I am "really" seeing things as they are is
inconsistent with perceptual theory, because our
perceptions are reality for us and the only reality
we can know. I

The second level at which no one can err is that
of the ethical or social. If the perceptual field is
the only reality we can know, then we are left no
principle other than the individual and his perceptions
and desires which can not afford us an ordering
principle for society. If individual perception is
the sole knowable reality, we are left with nothing
other than complete ethical subjectivism if not a
complete solipsism. The individual behaver must find
his rational and ethical reality in something other than
his subjective perceptual field. Combs does not assume
any reality other than the phenomenal field of the
behaver in his discussion of the perceptual field.

Although Combs does not explicitly assume that
there is a reality to be considered apart from the
perceptual field, he nevertheless must implicitly assume
such a reality. In attempting to define and explicate
the notion of "the perceptual field as reality," he uses
phrases such as "objective reality" and "the objective
physical world." A curious sentence already quoted is

that "This perceptual field is far richer and more

 

27

meaningful than that of the objective physical world."
What does "that" mean in the above sentence? The
physical world can not have a perceptual field. Perhaps
what is meant is that if there were a personality which
was devoid of feeling and could stand above all the
ambiguities of human existence, then this personality's
field would not have as much meaning as does that of
the human person. But then it would be meaningless to
assume this as we can only know our own fields and to
speak of someone else's, especially something non-human,
would be inconsistent. Perhaps this is only another
vague sentence which was not formulated too carefully.
Yet, we are still left with the phrase "objective
physical world"; what are we to make of this? It
certainly seems inconsistent to maintain that the only
thing an individual can know is his own perceptual
field and still use phrases like "objective physical
reality." The distinction between the phenomenal

field and the objective world is, however, crucial to
Combs' explication of "phenomenal field." It is, even
for him, that which gives reality to the phenomenal
field of an indiviaual. I would suggest that the
assumption of knowable objective world is necessary

to perceptual theory and is implied in the very
formulation of that theory. However, if we do make

this assumption, we can not then also maintain that

28

the phenomenal field is the only reality. The assumption
of a given reality other than the individual and his
perceptual field is essential if Combs is to explain
error, the individual, and social order. But we must
also recognize that this assumption will alter perceptual
theory considerably. This will be evident in our dis—
cussion of the adequate personality, social implications
of perceptual theory, and the implications for education.

We have considered the phenomenal field and its
general significance as an explanatory concept for
understanding human behavior. We must yet explore the
structural properties of the field as the development of
these structural concepts will be essential to our
discussions of the adequate personality and education.

Combs notes that the field concept in modern
science "has at least four properties: stability,
fluidity, intensity, and direction. . . . These same
four properties are also characteristic of the
phenomenal field, although they are expressed in
somewhat different fashion."20

The perceptual field of the individual is always
in a constant state of change. Because of this
characteristic fluidity, change in behavior is possible.
This characteristic accounts for the individual's

growth and makes learning, reasoning, remembering, and

 

Zola, p. 23.

29

forgetting possible. A characteristic related to
fluidity is the field's stability. If life is to be
maintained, it must have some type of organization or
stability. "To live successfully each of us needs an
organized, stable, predictable field. Without some
stability of the field we could not live at all. The
nature of this organization producing this stability
is the major concern of this book."21

The perceptual field also has a direction.
"At any given time, the field of a given individual
is organized with reference to his need and activity

by which he is trying to satisfy his need at the time."22
The property of direction is related to the property of

stability in that it is organization which produces
direction. Thus, we can see in the person who wants to
be a teacher a directional goal around which his field
is organized. Yet, this same person may be a father,
golfer, and stamp collector; and depending on the role
he is engaged in, the direction of the field will be
determined by the activity which is most important to
him at the time. Given a direction, the course may be
pursued with relative degrees of intensity depending
on how well the individual has discriminated the goal

in his field. The notion of discrimination brings us

 

211bid.

22TH, p. 2A.

 

30

to another distinction which is essential to an
understanding of the perceptual field.

The meaning of any event for a given individual
will be dependent on the status of the figure—ground
relationship of his field at the moment. Given any
perceptual event, the individual will discriminate or
differentiate more or less between the elements of that
event. The elements which are highly differentiated
or focused on are the figure of the event, while those
elements which are simply there or not highly
discriminated are the ground or better, the background.
The notion of differentiation is important for Combs
as he essentially defines learning as a process of
differentiation.

Thus, the direction of the perceptual field at
any given moment will be determined by the figure-ground
relationship or the differentiations made by the individual.
The specificity of direction or how intent a person is
upon achieving an end will vary with the differentiation
of the field. Low-level awareness or lack of
differentiation will produce random behavior in the
individual. Sharp differentiation of the elements of
the field will produce more exacting behavior.

The process of differentiation is essentially the
way the individual perceives his world. "It is the

differentiations an individual is able to make in his

31

Perceptual field that determine the nature of his per-
ceptions--both the direct perceptions of concrete events
apprehended through our sense organs and the perception of
complex events understood only through the medium of
abstract thought."23 The process of differentiation
includes analysis and generalization for Combs and can
thus be seen as the individual's attempt to make sense

out of and cope with his environment. Ordinary language
would term this as a process of thought while in science
it would be the process of inquiry. In any case, thie
process of differentiation for Combs will determine the
adequacy of individual behavior and he does believe that
the differentiations which some people make are more
adequate than those of others. At this point, we can
again see the need for Combs to produce a set of criteria
which can differentiate among differentiations as to

their adequacy. For Combs, the adequacy of an individual's
differentiations is determined by how well those
differentiations satisfy the needs of individuals.

Personal Adequacy: The
Individual's One Need

 

 

Combs maintains that if the social scientist is to
deal effectively with people, he must understand what
these people are about. His thesis is that people are

only about one thing, and that is the achievement of

 

23E: p- 30

32

adequacy in a universe of which man is a continuous
part.2u People appear to have a number of different
and conflicting needs and appear to be motivated by a
number of antithetical desires. Yet, for Combs, all
this seeming diversity is all part of one driving
motive. "Indeed, I believe it is possible to reduce
all these seemingly diverse and confusing goals toward
which people seem to strive to a single, all inclusive
human need which motivates human behavior at all times
and in all places."25

The most outstanding feature of the universe, for
Combs, is that it is organized. "Our universe, above
all things, seems characterized by the maintenance of
its organization. Whatever else may occur, the universe

maintains an order."26

Not only is the universe as a
whole characterized by order, but all the parts of which
it consists maintain an order; as man is a part of the
universe and continuous with it, man also maintains an
order. The order in man is not only chemical and
biological, but phychological as well. Combs feels that
the psychological sciences have overlooked the principle

of order, "and that it is only recently that we have come

to recognize its operation in psychological as well as

 

“2. pp. 39. A0-

25;§. pp. 37, 38.

26TH, p. A0.

33

physical functions."27 The physical environment is not
the sole environment of man. "The universe in which he
lives and maintains his organization is a universe of
ideas, values, societies, and people."28 Thus, man
attempts to maintain the organization of these ideas
and values in the maintenance of a phenomenal or
perceptual self. The need around which this self is
organized is the need for adequacy.

Those parts of the perceptual field "to which we
refer when we say 'I' or 'me'" are the phenomenal self
as Combs defines it. This self includes more than the
perception of the physical self, as it also includes
the perception of the social aspects of the self. As
such, the phenomenal self includes a number of qualities——
such as the self as strong, honest, worthy, provider,
teacher, etc. The phenomenal self is the portion of
the individual's perceptual field which most directs and
determines behavior. It is the self with which most
directs and determines behavior. It is the self with
which the individual identifies; it is his self—identity.

This phenomenal self is not a physical entity
according to Combs; ". . . it does not exist someplace in
our bodies." The phenomenal self is real to the

individual; but to an outside observer, ". . . the

 

27IB, p. A2.
28_I_B_s p0 “3-

3A

phenomenal self is pure abstraction inferred from
observed behavior and represents only an approximation
of the self experienced by the‘behaver."29 The
phenomenal self is the result of a process of differen-
tiation or it is learned; "it is something each of us
learns as a consequence of his experience with those
who surround him in the process of his growing up."_30

As the individual develops, he learns to cope with
and maintain himself in his environment; and as the
growing individual's environment constantly changes in
the process of growing up, the individual must make new
differentiations about himself and his environment; this
Combs terms "self-enhancement." As both maintenance
and enhancement are parts of the same process and can
be seen as a process of end-means with ends eventually
becoming means, both maintenance and enhancement can be
seen as attempts to satisfy one basic need in the
individual: the need of personal adequacy in the
individual's environment. "Both refer to man's striving
to accomplish . . . an adequate organization."31

Combs has accurately noted in Individual Behavior
that the concept of the need for adequacy has similarities

with other concepts such as "self—actualization,"

 

291%. p. A5.

30PET, p. 15.
31.1.8.9 p0 “5-

35

"self-realization," "growth," and "self—fulfillment."
And in this regard, it is significant to note the highly
valuational aspect to these terms. The concept of
adequacy as used by Combs is an ethical concept, as it
implies qualities that the individual ought to have if
he is to live the good life and if he is to function

as a good citizen in a good society. The ordinary
language meaning of the term "adequate" does not do
justice to the intent of Combs as it usually means just
good enough to get by, or average. The concept of
adequacy for Combs implies that a person be the best
that he can be; that he actualize all of his potential
for growth.

A second point to note is that Combs sees adequacy
as basically a knowing function in the individual,
although he does not state it as such. A person can
maintain himself only insofar as he has the knowledge
necessary to effect this maintenance. Enhancement can
be seen in the same manner, as enhancement comes when
the individual can make new differentiations that will
allow him to cope with a changed environment. In that
knowing is such an important aspect of a given perceptual
field, it is expedient for perceptual theory to contain
criteria for assessing adequacy or knowledge.

If adequacy implies that a person be the best he

can be, then it would indeed appear that all people are

36

always adequate. All people, according to perceptual
theory, always behave in the best way that they can, in
that they always act in accord with their perceptual
field at the moment of action. As was noted before, all
people are on their best behavior at all times if the
perceptual field of the individual is the criteria for
the behavior. As initially defined in Individual Behavior,
the concept of adequacy is vacuous. It becomes impossible
to identify adequacy in perceptual fields unless there
are criteria which function independently of any given
perceptual field. We have consistently seen this
theoretical weakness throughout the initial development
of perceptual theory in Individual Behavior.

Feeling can attach itself to any object; and the
same is true of the drive toward personal adequacy.32
It is an enlightened humanitarian mind which sees that
the motives of people are basically good and not perverse
and sinful as the assumption of many in our culture would
make man out to be. Yet, the desire for the good, or
adequacy, can attach itself to any number of objects, and
the worth of the objects to which this motive may be
attached must be taken into consideration. .As Combs
rightly notes, "the need for adequacy . . . provides the

drive towards health and mobilization of the body's

 

32George Barnett and Jack Otis, Corporate Sociegy
and Education (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1961), p. 23. ‘

 

37

resources to resist the attacks of disease. And it
causes the client in therapy to move toward better
adjustment."33 Yet, the drive toward adjustment must
be directed toward some objects, and the worth of these
objects for adjustment must be determined by rational
criteria. Anything may be valued, but not all things
are of value. To always be motivated to be adequate
may be a necessary condition for adequacy, but it is
not a sufficient condition.

The assumption that all men have a basic driving
need for adequacy does not help us to explain or under-
stand anything any better than we do at present.
According to this assumption, all men of all time have
had the same need as do men today; and to assume this
does not help us to solve the pressing problems of
education in our time; it does not even help us to
understand why we have the problems.

A further point to consider in regard to the
phenomenal field is the notion that it is an ordered
field. The question may be asked as to what type of
order this is, as Combs does not specify any type of
order. Combs is quite correct in noting that a basic
assumption of science is the assumption that we have an
ordered universe; that there is predictable regularity

in the relationships of various aspects of the universe.

 

33213111. p- 16-

38

However, in supposing that the phenomenal field is
ordered, it would appear that the assumption can be
called into question.

The point to note in regard to the phenomenal field
and order is that the field itself may have been ordered
into existence; that is, the make-up of the field may
have come into existence by the orders (causal) of the
life experiences of the individual and this causal order
may in fact be maintained by the individual; however, the
various parts or aspects of the field may be very random
in their relationship to each other. That a person sees
himself as a Christian and a businessman may be explained
in an orderly way through the life experiences of the
individual. The maintenance of these images by the
individual may be explained by the tendency toward
maintenance inherent in the field, yet the relationship
between the two parts themselves may not have any
semblance of order. It would seem that individuals may
in fact have a disorderly phenomenal field and should
set their house in order; this may mean throwing out
elements which create disorder. Not all beliefs which
people hold about themselves or their environment are
logically related; in fact, it might appear that the
opposite is the dominant tendency.

Talcott Parsons makes the distinction between two

types of order when analyzing social order, which he

39

identifies as factual or scientific order, and
normative order.3u Events or phenomena following a
factual order conform to the laws of science and the
statistical laws of probability. Yet in terms of
behavior, or action, as Parsons terms it, two acts

may have no ordered relationship. As behavior is a
function of the phenomenal field for Combs, the parts
of the phenomenal field may have no relation to each
other in any logical sense. "Normative order . . . is
always relative to a given system of norms or normative
elements, whether ends, rules or other norms."35 Thus,
on the social level, order may break down even though
the breakdown can be explained in an orderly scientific
way. In terms of the individual, we may have a mental
breakdown or a breakdown of mental order which can be
explained in terms of its causes or can be seen as an
orderly breakdown of order.

The distinction between the two types of order is
crucial for Combs in terms of the normative character
of the adequate personality. As Otis and Barnett note
in their analysis of Elijah Jordan's philosophy,
"relations constitute the reality of the individual's

personality."36 And for Jordan, ". . . the life of

 

3“Parsons, pp. 91, 92.
35Parsons, p. 91.

35Barnett and Otis, p. 32.

A0

culture, even the life of self culture, is a matter of
the most significant handling and arrangement of objects
that intelligence can make possible."37 If Combs
perceptual theory is to be of a different sort than the
mechanistic psychological theories in that it becomes
an adequate tool for the understanding of the adequate
personality in the normative or ethical sense, a notion
of normative order must be incorporated into the theory.
Thus, if we are to have an idea of what the supremely
healthy individual is, we must be concerned with the
relationships which constitute the reality of the
individual. I would further suggest at this point that
any relevance of perceptual theory for education as a
social institution must be premised on an adequate theory
of normative social order as the facilitation of growth
in individuals will be dependent on the direction of
that growth both for the individual and the society of
which he is a part. We obviously want to facilitate
the growth of the individual in a "healthy" direction
and this can not be done unless we have adequate direct-
ional criteria.

In any case, whether explicit or not, Combs is in
fact assuming a certain position on the normative

adequacy of the elements that compose the phenomenal

 

37Elijah Jordan, Forms of Individuality
(Indianapolis: Progress Publishing Co., 1927),p . 108
(as quoted in Barnett and Otis).

 

A1

field of the adequate personality; and in the next
chapter, when we analyze Combs' discussion of the
adequate personality, we must bear this in mind. Combs
leaves no question in his disucssion of this personality
that we can achieve this personality only in degree and
that it is never reached completely by anyone. When
something is achieved only in degree, the degree of
achievement must be measured by some criteria, and this
criteria will have to include the relationship of the
elements of the phenomenal field of the adequate
personality.

The problem of normative social order can be
further seen in an assessment of perceptual theory in
regard to its capacity for scientific explanation and
prediction which we shall consider next. Aside from the
adequacy of perceptual theory to provide criteria for
education decision-making in relation to instructional
and social problems, we will see that a lack of
consideration of social theory has serious ramifications
in what might be called purely scientific problems.

Perceptual Theory, Prediction,
and Explanation

 

 

We have noted Combs' basic formulation of perceptual
theory in this chapter, and in concluding our consider-
ations we must ask the question as to whether or not
perceptual theory gives us a base to effect the major

purposes of the theory. Initially we find a curious

A2

dilemma in regard to this question. It is difficult to
specify exactly what Combs is attempting to do with
perceptual theory.

As Arthur Combs is a psychologist, we might
normally expect to analyze what he is attempting to do
in terms of the function that psychological theories
have attempted to perform. However, we can not assume
this as Combs' writings evidence an intent which goes
beyond the usually stated functions of psychological
theory.

This can be seen when we look at the way Combs
views the function of perceptual theory in the hands of
a teacher. The task of the teacher is not that of
controlling an educational environment so as to effect
certain pre-established ends. The role of the teacher
"is that of a facilitator, encourager, helper, assister,
colleague, and friend of his students."38 It would
appear that if this is seen to be the role of the teacher,
we can infer that this also is the function of perceptual
theory in the hands of a teacher. However, there are
numerous instances where we can find Combs also viewing

the function of perceptual theory in terms of its ability

 

3822?, P- 16-

A3

to predict and control behavior.39 The assumption that
perceptual theory will effect prediction and control is
implicit in the writings of Combs, but we also see a
distinct bias against using psychological theory to
control the individual in relation to teacher—established
ends.

The traditional point of view when looking at a
science is to see it as a set of laws and generalizations
that will effectively allow us to control the phenomena
under its domain. Although the problem of causation and
subsequent explanation has been relatively simple in the
physical sciences, it has always been a major problem
when dealing with human behavior. What Combs is
implicitly dealing with is exactly this problem of
causation as it applies to sciences of human behavior;
this is a basic dilemma in perceptual theory. Combs,
on the one hand, wants to maintain the status of
perceptual theory as a science and, on the other, wants
to view and treat the explanation of human behavior
differently from the traditional view of physical
causation. This can be seen as the reason why Combs
wants to distinguish perceptual theory from both the S—R

theorists and from Freudian psychology.

 

391B, p. 1, 35, A6 and Donald Snygg and Arthur Combs,
"The Phenomenological Approach and the Problem of
Unconscious Behavior," The Phenomenological Problem,
Alfred Kuenzli, ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959),

pp. 273-27A.

AA

Combs also notes that "the 8—H and psychoanalytical
psychological vieWpoints are objective descriptive ways
of looking at behavior and lead to mechanistic or
manipulative ways of working with people which are often

"HO

not acceptable in modern practice. Combs also notes

in The Professional Education of Teachers that he is not

 

alone in attempting to provide a theoretical framework
which does not treat the individual as a ball in a
billiard game and that a number of contemporary
scientists and philosophers are of the same mind as he.
As we have noted, Combs labels this movement "Third Force
Psychology." The distinguishing feature of this group of
theorists is that they want to see human personality in
terms other than as a result of a series of causes and
want to view man as a process of becoming. Thus we see

a person such as Gordon Allport making a distinction
between the philosophical traditions of the Lockean
psychologists (S—R psychology) and the Leibnitzian
tradition (Third Force Psychology). The distinguishing
factor between the two traditions for Allport is that

of seeing human behavior as purposive. Rollo May,

another psychologist who may be seen as part of the

 

”OPET, p. 11.

ulGordon Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1955), pp. 12—16.

“5

Third Force Movement, makes the distinction in his
concern for human subjectivity and freedom.“2

We can see the conflict between these two
psychological camps as the desire to both preserve
psychology as a science and also to see human behavior
as more than the result of a chain of causal events
which happen to the individual. The basic controversy
is over the concept of causation as it relates to
logical inference made in scientific explanation. The
question becomes that of whether or not the use of the
term 'cause' in the physical sciences can also be the
use of the term in sciences which attempt to explain
human behavior. For our present concerns with Combs'
perceptual theory, our originally noted dilemma can
be seen as a complex metaphysical issue in terms of the
necessity for Combs to develop objective and valid
grounds for the individual as something more than just
another factor in causal relationships.

Thus, a number of questions can be seen at this
point in our evaluation of perceptual theory.

1. Does perceptual theory facilitate prediction
of human behavior?

2. Does the theory provide a framework in which
the individual can be seen as being other
than a minor factor in an S-R complex?

 

"2Rollo May, P§ychology and The Human Dilemma
(Princeton: Van Nostrand Company, 1967), pp. 3—20.

 

A6

3. Does Combs provide valid and adequate
criteria which will enable us to solve
pressing educational problems?

Although Combs and other Third Force psychologists use

very honorific terms such as "freedom," "growth,"

"facilitation," "deep concern for man's being and

becoming," and the "welfare of people," we must demand .:.

more than simple use, as it is these very terms which
have been used so vacuously in the past. The above

questions must bear thoughtful consideration if we 7

 

are to go past the widespread use of honorific terms
which has characterized so much of educational discourse
in the past.

We will look at only one of these three questions
in the remainder of this chapter, as questions two and
three need to be considered in the light of Combs'
statements about the adequate personality and society.
There is no doubt that all three questions are
intimately related, but at present we can deal only
with the question of prediction.

If Combs' perceptual theory does have a better
conceptualization of the individual than mechanistic
theories, it would seem that the prediction of individual
behavior would also be better facilitated. However,
there is little research at present which can validate
this hypothesis. Beyond this, it is a moot question

as to whether or not perceptual theory does in fact

A7

enable us to predict behavior. The question can only
be raised at this point as to whether or not it appears
that there is a theoretical base which might enable
prediction, and to ask the reason(s) why there is a
lack of evidence. Few theories at this point in the
development of social science are capable of much
predictive power; it would appear reasonable at this
point to question the soundness of the theoretical base
rather than to ask the empirical question of whether

or not it has effected valid predictions in the past.

We have seen in our analysis of this chapter that
Combs does not provide us with theoretical terms with
well-specified meanings. We have in fact found that
many of the key terms in the theory are highly vacuous.
It is assumed here that in a theory the use of the terms
can only be as good as the specifications of their use.
It would appear, granted the assumption, that perceptual
theory ought to be highly suspect in its power of
prediction.

Combs, we have seen, takes as one of his basic
assumptions that all behavior is lawful. "It is a
necessary assumption of any science that its subject
matter is regular and lawful. If this assumption

could not be made, there could . . . be no science.”3

 

“3IB, p. 18.

 

I‘

U

I"

i

I .

,r -.

A8

We have also noted that Combs assumes the complete
determination of behavior by the perceptual field. Given
these two assumptions, it is indeed difficult to see how
his views of causation, prediction, and explanation are
in any way different from those of the physical scientist.
However, we also see that Combs is vying for what might
be called more humanistic elements in this process of

the determination of behavior when he speaks of
individuals acting in terms of personal meaning and the
individual's perceptual field being a dynamic factor in
producing behavior. When Combs does speak in this vein,
it is difficult to bring oneself to criticize this
obvious human wormth that he interjects into the phenomena
of scientific explanation, yet extreme criticism must be
brought to bear as Combs does not provide any logical
foundation for individuality or for supposing that his
view of causal explanation is any different from the view
taken in the physical sciences. Although it is important
and good that we ask educators to be warm, humanitarian,
and non-authoritarian in dealing with students, it is
critical that we see these terms as only representing an
emotional force or feeling which can attach itself to any
number of objects and relations between objects. If we
do not specify what type of relationships and Objects to
attach this warmth to and provide the logical foundation

for the object relationships which we create, we may well

. ——- 1 . '

QW—w‘ . ‘ 'H‘Mj‘m-ffi
I
I
D

Hg

find ourselves guilty of killing individuality with love.
Third Force psychologists must specify the logical basis
for the direction of the force which they are exerting.

If we are to suppose that we are to take other
factors into account in our explanations of human behavior,
such as subjectivity, purpose, or intent, we must see this
purposefulness in relation to other objects in the
individual's environment, as purposive behavior can only
have meaning in relation to something else. Combs not
only does not specify adequately what the factor is in
human behavior which distinguishes that behavior from
behavior of the objects of the physical sciences, but he
also does not specify the nature of the individual's
relationship to the objects of his environment which could
possibly provide the grounds for purposive behavior.

Combs in attempting to provide a simple explanation for
the behavior of individuals has essentially lost the
grounds for individuality.

Thus, if we can assume that what Combs is talking
about is the purposiveness of the individual, we can also
see that he has given no substance to the term; because
purpose has meaning only in relation to a greater whole.
Without an adequate specification of the factor which is
uniquely human in the explanation and prediction of
individual behavior, the capacity of perceptual theory

for explanation and prediction must be doubted. We will

50

find in Chapter III that the reason perceptual theory
lacks on adequate basis for understanding individual
behavior is that the theory lacks an adequate development
of social theory. The uniqueness of the individual which
Combs attempts to develop is only to be found in the
individual's capacity for interacting in a social or
cultural whole. Thus, the question concerning the
capacity for prediction has serious implications for
Combs' discussion of the adequate personality and society

with which we will deal in Chapter III.

CHAPTER III

THE ADEQUATE PERSONALITY

An Ethical Concept of Adquaey

The basic need of the individual as defined by
perceptual theory is the achievement of an adequate
perceptual field. We have noted that Combs' idea of
adequacy is highly normative or ethically evaluative
in character. It was also noted that the initial
treatment of the concept of adequacy was rather vague
and that the concept, if it was not to be vacuous,
must entail evaluative criteria. Combs devotes two
chapters in Individual Behavior to the description
of the adequate and inadequate personalities; we will
now explore these chapters to asscertain the specific
characteristics of the perceptual field of the adequate
person.

Combs begins the chapter on the adequate
personality by emphasizing the ethically normative
character of the person he is describing with a
discussion of the psychological concept of adjustment.

Once again we find Combs emphasizing the unique point

51

52

of view of the perceptual psychologist.
The terms "adjustment" and "maladjustment" are
terms from an external frame of reference.
They are objective terms used to describe behavior
as it appears to an outside observer. More often
than not they are applied to evaluations of the
extent to which an individual's behavior conforms
to social expectancy. This approach to the nature
of adjustment is a static one. It establishes a
norm for behavior and thereafter judges individuals
as adjusted or maladjusted depending upon their
degree of conformity to such norms.

When Combs uses the term "norm" in the above context, he

is refering to a statistical norm. He points out that

most psychological and sociological theory have used

these statistical norms to evaluate the behavior of

individuals as "good" or "bad."

He contends that while, statistically, norms may
have some use to the scientist using the external point
of view, they do not provide adequate in the attempt to
understand the behavior of a unique human being.

Many a "maladjusted" individual appears to be

quite well satisfied with himself and many a

seemingly "well-adjusted" person may actually

be a desparately unhappy individual who conforms

to others because he lacks confidence in himself.2
Thus, Combs is contending that behavior may be deceptive
and that what is taken for good or normal social behavior
may be the result of an inadequate perceptual field.
Also, not only can statistically normative behavior be

deceptive, but it can not be a criteria for the worth

__.

lie. p. 237.

212. p. 237-238.

. ——M mm!’ “-1.” ii?- 1
ET. ' . * . . I I E
E

53

of behavior since a statistical norm denotes "average"
behavior and this may not be good behavior from either
the point of view of the individual or society.

Adjustment in the normative sense is hardly

desirable as a goal for society either. A

society all of whose people were busily

engaged in seeking to be average would soon

find itself hopelessly outmoded and sitting

still while the rest of the world passed by.3
We can see that Combs is vying for a psychological
construct that can describe human behavior as the best
that this behavior can be, and further, he is implying
here that the common practices of a society can not be
the basis for decribing behavior as it "ought to be."

Combs does not use ethical concepts such as

"ought to be" in his description of the adequate
personality; however, one can not come to any other
conclusion than that he is describing the "good man"
and the "good man for society" when he states that

We need a concept of adjustment which represents

an achievement to strive for; a concept which

defines the best man can be Eather than the
average of what he has been.

 

For Combs the natural drive toward adequacy is a
"striving to become the ultimate of what one is capable."
Combs is here talking about what has been the major
concern of ethically oriented philosophy: the self-

actualized person. The concept of the adequate

3E, p. 238.
"is, p. 238.

5A

personality is what "other authors have called . . . by
such names as: 'growth tendency,‘ 'self—consistency,‘
'self—realization,’ 'self—actualization,' and 'self—
fulfillment."5 The point that Combs is attempting to
develop an ethically objective description of the
adequate perceptual field can not be overemphasized
here, as it is a point that Combs does not admit to

or deal with other than saying that he is describing
man as "the best man can be."

That Combs is in fact dealing with an ethical
problem has further ramifications in terms of the basic
non-judgmental position that he assumes in regard to
the function of the school as a social institution.

When we discuss Combs' view of the function of education
in the next chapter, we will see that the concept of

"the helping relationship" will play an important role.
In explicating-this concept Combs will attempt to make
distinctions between such things as "prescribing, making,
molding, forcing, and coercing" and "facilitator,
enunaurager, helper, assister, and colleague."6 The
distxinctions between these sets of concepts will make

a big; difference in the way we approach educational
decijsions regarding what we will do with and to students.

A.tu£Lping relationship, we will see, is basically a

55

non—judgmental position in regard to educational goals.
It will essentially be seen as a relationship which is
non—directive. Inasmuch as people are always seeking
and motivated to do what is best for them, the educator
need not set goals for students, but must facilitate
the achievement of the goals which the student is jwf
already striving for.7 In the discussion of the function E
of psychological theory, it was noted that Combs'
distinction between "facilitation" and "control" was

somewhat vague. The discussion of the adequate person-

 

ality will have a direct bearing on this issue as well
as be crucial to Combs' view of the function of the
educational institution.

Again we see a basic confusion between two
categories: Scientific explanation and ethical judgment.
The perceptual view of adequacy, although supposedly a
purely scientific construct, is in fact an ethical
judgment in regard to individual behavior which entails
that we attempt to control the environment of the
individual so as to force him to be healthy. vLet us now
go on to explore what Combs sees as the adequate
personality and attempt to make some sense out of the
basic vagueness in perceptual theory.

In that human beings have only one basic need,

Combs generally defines the adequate personality "as

__

71bid.

56

one who has achieved a high degree of need satisfaction,"

i.e. adequacy. Thus,

These are people who generally feel capable of

coping with life, who have developed phenomenal

selves so defined as to be highly successful in

the achievement of e fective maintenance and

enhancement of self.
These people function with a minimum of threat and fear
and find life challenging. Exigencies of life can be
handled by the capacities of these people and they "feel
capable of dealing with life effectively and efficiently.
Indeed, they might almost equally well be called
non-threatened personalities."9

One can readily see that the above description of

the adequate personality is both circular and vague.
Essentially, what Combs says initially in attempting to
describe the adequate personality is that adequate
people are adequate. One who satisfies his need is
adequate and adequacy is need satisfaction. Thus,
these are people who generally feel capable of coping
with life "while life is a process of satisfying need,"
"who have developed a phenomenal self so defined as to
be highly successful in the achievement of effective
maintenance and enhancement of self," while adequacy

was originally defined as the maintenance and

enhancement of self. The basic reason for these vacuous

‘

81E. p. 239.
91p, p. 2A0.

 

'I:.”- . -
i

57

statements can be seen in regard to what was noted in
our first discussion of adequacy. For Combs, adequacy
is basically a measure of how well people can solve
their life problems. Both how to maintain oneself

and to enhance oneself in overcoming a changed
environment are matters of conceptualizing a plan of
action that will support these two life functions.
Living demands adequate conceptualization and scientific
theorizing; if we are to determine what this is, we must
develop criteria to evaluate it.

Conceptualization is a process which, in terms of
perceptual theory, results in greater and greater
discriminations within the perceptual field of the
individual. These discriminations, if we can evaluate
them at all, must be represented in the form of
statements that can be evaluated as logically consistent
and empirically true or false. We have seen a basic
lack of concern for matters of evaluation since we
initially began to explore the writings of Combs; this
lack of concern will show in a full analysis of what
Combs says about the adequate personality why Combs is
unable to describe in a viable manner what adequacy is.

We find three major characteristics of adequate
people other than that they are adequate: They "perceive
themselves in generally positive ways;" "they are more

capable of accepting and integrating their perceptions in

58

the perceptual field;" and they "are capable of a wide
identification of self with others."10 Let us explore

these three characteristics.

A Positive View of Self

 

In terms of a positive view of self, " . . . adequate
people see themselves . . . as liked, wanted, acceptable,
able, and worthy." The basic vagueness of these terms
should be noted from the outset. The terms mentioned are
qualities, and we are given no indication of what a
quality is by Combs. How do we recognize when a person
feels "liked" or "wanted" or "worthy?" Further, a person
who deludes himself may feel that he in fact evidences
these qualities. Again, we see a lack of criteria for
the making of a judgment in this area.
The notion of "positive self perceptions" further
suffers when Combs makes the concept relative to the
culture of the individual.
Their phenomenal selves are, for the most part,
defined in positive ways as adequate to deal with
those aspects of life important to the achievement
of need satisfaction in their culture . . . . In
another culture, to be sure, adequate people might
perceive themselves differently.11

Is need satisfaction to be defined by the individual's

culture and thus adequacy to be a function of culture?

Certainly Combs does not want to suggest that all

 

loge, p. 2A0.

lllbid.

59

cultures or all important aspects of a given culture are
"the best they can be." Many cultural and social systems
have evidenced suspect values, including our own.
Certainly the Nazi tormentors feld "liked" and "wanted"
and "respected" by the people who were significant to
them. Are we to suppose a person who commits heinous
crimes such as those committed by the Nazi's to be
adequate--the best that they could be?

At the beginning of this chapter, we noted that
Combs criticizes "adjustment theorists for not
providing an adequate criteria for "the best that man
can be." Combs' notion of "positive self perceptions"
in Individual Behavior is essentially an adjustment
notion which contains a subjectivist ethic. Given the
criteria we have considered, we can neither identify
the adequate person within his culture because the
qualities used in this regard are so vague, nor can
we form any ethically objective nOtion of what the
adequate personality is because of the position of
cultural relativism which is taken.

In Perceiving, Behaving, Becoming, a later writing,
COmbs deals with the problem of conformity or non-conformity
to the individual's social system in regard to positive
self perceptions. We see here a view which is essentially
<1ifferent from that outlined in Individual Behavior, but
which brings us back to the problem of validation of

perceptual discriminations.

60

An essentially positive view of self permits
adequate people to be effective without worry
about conformity or non—conformity. For them,
conformity is not a goal or even a way of
dealing with life, but only an artifact of the
process of problem solving.
Thus, we again see Combs describing this personality in
terms of problem solving behavior. Again, what is it
about the perceptual fields of these peOple that makes
them adequate?

One further characteristic in terms of positive
perceptions that should be considered is that they are
characterized by courage.

Feeling positively about themselves, adequate

persons can meet life expecting to be

successful . . . . ,With such a basic security,

life can be met straight-forwardly. Courage

comes naturally.l3
Courage is not defined by Combs, with the consequence
of not knowing which acts of individuals are courageous
and which are not. However, the notion of courage in
this context is rather important, as it basically brings
us back to the problem of knowledge and further to the

consideration of the individual as the unit of analysis

which explains behavior.

 

12Arthur Combs, ed., Perceiving, Behaving, Becoming
(Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and
Curriculum Development, 1962), p. 53.

 

13Perceiving, Behaving, Becoming, p. 52.

 

6|

Courage entails knowledge as a person must know
which problems he can successfully solve and which he
can not. A person, by Combs' own theory, can not become
adequate unless he experiences success. Success breeds
success for Combs; and a person can only be successful
if he has the insight to select and act upon those
problems at which he will be successful. For even
not attempting a problem can be counted as a success
if it would have been injurious to the person to have
attempted it. This is essentially in accord with the
Platonic notion of courage: Knowledge of what is to
be feared and what is not to be feared. As knowledge
for Combs is a function of the perceptual field, the
origin of this field must be taken into consideration
if we are to explain the individual, his field, and
the courage characteristic of the adequate personality
which results from the field. Either the individual
is the explanatory principle for this knowledge which
the individual can not be, as this leaves us with a
relativism in terms of epistomology, or there is another
Ixrinciple that explains the individual.' If we are to
llave adequate people at all, it must be the latter. The
pxoint is that the individual can not explain individual
befliavior; it is something other than the individual
unlich gives him this quality of courage; courage is not

(naused by individuals; adequate individuals are not the

explanation of themselves .

 

62

Acceptance

 

A second major characteristic of the adequate

personality to be found in Individual Behavior is the

 

capacity for acceptance which the adeduate person has.

An adequate personality is one capable of
admitting any and all experiences and of
integrating this experience into his existing
structure. Such a person can acknowledge his
experience, allow it entrance to his consideration,
and relate it in some fashion to the existing
concppts he holds of himself and the world about
him.

The basic reason why acceptance of experience is crucial
to the adequate personality is that it leads to more
effective behavior. Combs sees acceptance as the "sine
qua non for effective efficient, satisfying behavior,"
since the adequate person's life will be based upon
more and better data which he will have at his disposal.
Thus, the adequate person is able "to profit from his
experience."
As with the characteristic of positive self—

perceptions, acceptance can be seen as another facit
'of problem solving behavior.

A more open perceptual field can encompass

more. Adequate people are thus more likely to

include the generic as well as the specific

aspects of problems or to perceive events or

details that would be missed or would seem

unimportant to others. This is another way of

saying adequate persons behave more
intelligently. . . . 5

 

luIB, p. 2A3.

15Perceiving, Behaving, Becoming, p. 57.

63

Combs also notes that adequate personalities are capable
of decisive decisions when there is adequate data to
act upon, but also they are capable of living comfortably
without making a decision when there is insufficient
data. Thus, these people can "live comfortably with
unsolved problems."

One can not but heartily agree with Combs in the
assertion that adequate people behave intelligently,
yet there are some interesting facets to Combs' analysis
and exposition of acceptance that need to be taken into
consideration if this characteristic of adequacy is not
to be vacuous.

As the adequate personality has the ability to
accept "any and all perceptions into his awareness,"
an interesting question arises as to how a person does
not accept a perception into awareness in terms of
perceptual theory. It was noted earlier that Combs'
perceptual theory gives us no basis for positing any
reality other than subjective perceptions. Given no
reason to believe or assume the existence of any reality
other than perceptions, it is difficult to see how a
perception is not accepted. It would seem that either
a perception is accepted or there was nothing to accept.
Given perceptual theory as a basis, we have no reason
to believe or assume that there is anything which the
individual can reject. What the individual, adequate

or otherwise, perceives ie reality for that person and

6A

none other can be determined. The most that the
perceptual psychologist can say is that from the
perceptive of his subjective field he would assert
that a given person is not perceiving the world in the
same way the scientist is.

If the notion of acceptance is to be meaningful,
there must be a reality other than the subjective
perceptual field which is the basis for determining
whether or not a person possesses this quality. Combs
does in fact assume an objective reality apart from the
individual perception of it throughout his writings;
however, the assumption is implicit in the context of
his discourse in ordinary language. In terms of his
basic theoretical constructs and assumptions, the
positing of a reality other than the perceptual field
which can be dealt with is not made explicit; if one
would take Combs' perceptual theory only in terms of
its fundamental constructs and assumptions, it would
appear that the existence of any reality other than
the perceptual field is being denied. However, it is
essential to perceptual theory in terms of its basic
formulation to assume the existence of a reality which
is other than the perceptions of the individual,if the
theory is to have any validity. It is further evident
that the ordinary language aspects of perceptual theory,

which includes most of the discourse of Combs' writings,

65

implicitly assumes the existence of a reality which can
be dealt with beyond individual perception.

If we are to believe that an individual can deny
the entrance of a perceptual event into his already
existent perceptual field, we must assume the reality
of the thing which is denied. Combs does in fact
implicitly make this assumption; however, he does not
do so in specific terms when he deals with the more
formal aspects of his theory explicitly. The implication
of this is that Combs' perceptual theory does not have
as much explanatory or predictive power as does his use
of ordinary language.

A further interesting characteristic of acceptance
which Combs notes is that it is a function of the
existing perceptual field of the individual.16 This has
an important implication in terms of the relationship
between the adequate personality and problem solving.
What the above characteristic implies is essentially
the distinction which Dewey makes between educative and‘
noneducative experiences.17 A high degree of acceptance
in these terms means simply that the prior experiences
of the individual play an important role in this
acquisition of new experiences. A person characterized

by acceptance has had prior experiences which better

 

16IB, p. 2A3.

17John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York:
Collier Books, 1963), pp. 25-31.

66

enable him to conceptualize and acquire new experiences;
Dewey terms this as growth.

If acceptance is a function of the existing
perceptual field of the individual, there is another
serious implication for perceptual theory. We have
noted Combs' feeling that the explanation of individual
behavior can be found in terms of the perceptual field
at the moment of behavior. However, if acceptance is
to be a significant or meaningful characteristic of
the adequate personality, we must take into consideration
more than just the perceptual field of the behaver at
the moment of behaving if we are to explain the behavior;
the acceptance or non-acceptance of perceptions or
experience can only be fully explained in terms of past
educative or miseducative experiences of the individual.
The individual's perceptual field can not be the
explanatory principle for the acceptance or non-acceptance
of a given experience.

Acceptance is basically a function of what the
sociologist calls socialization or enculturation, and as
such must have an adequate sociological theory if it is
to be a viable scientific construct. Combs does not
provide us with these considerations in his writings.
The ability to solve problems is grounded in the
institutions of society which socialize individuals;
thus, if the concept of acceptance is to be meaningful

in perceptual theory as a theoretical construct, there

67

must be social considerations formally taken into account.
This again indicates that the status of the constructs
of perceptual theory are at the level of ordinary
language.

Combs does deal with social theory in regard to
individual behavior but in a non-formal manner. He
also makes a number of sociological assumptions, but
these are implicit and unanalyzed. We will see in the
next chapter that if perceptual theory is to be taken
seriously as scientific theroy, Combs must consider the
assumptions which he is making in regard to culture, as
the implicit assumptions which he does make contradict
the notion of adequacy as intelligence or the ability
to solve problems.

The statement that acceptance implies the capacity
to admit any and all experiences into awareness is an
over—simplification. The amount of perceptual data
available to a given person is so great that no one
could ever admit it all into his perceptual field.

This has an important implication for the notion of
acceptance, as it implies that acceptance involves
the selection of the most important data for the
individual. Thus, acceptance entails the existence
of adequate criteria within the perceptual field if
the selection of data is to be adequate. It is not
simply the adequate person's capacity to accept data,

but rather his capacity to select the data which are

68

important to him. The selection of important data implies
the existence of criteria by which the selection is made.
The question must be asked as to what the nature of the
perceptual field is which will allow the selection of

the most relevant data. The perceptual field of the
individual can be seen as a system of perceptions or
concepts and the interrelationship between these elements.
A perceptual field is a conceptual system which either
does or does not afford the potential for solving problems
and, thus, can essentially be seen as an epistemological
problem in terms of perceptual theory. Although Combs
makes these epistemological assumptions throughout his
writings, he nowhere treats the problem of knowledge in
any depth.

The above considerations in relation to acceptance
lead to the conclusion that either the concept is vacuous
in terms of scientific theory in its initial stages, or
the construct has the non-scientific status of ordinary
language. It should be noted that most scientific terms
originate in ordinary language, yet if a term is to get
away from the basic vagueness of ordinary language, it
must be subjected to analysis in order to specify its
function within a given theory. Combs fails to do this
in both the cases of positive self-perceptions and

acceptance; we shall see this also evident in his

69

treatment of the third characteristic of the adequate

personality dealt with in Individual Behavior.

 

Identification

 

The third characteristic of the adequate personality
which Combs notes is that of the capacity for
identification. Combs states that:

The concept is in large part a definition of

the relationship between self and society and

must be in harmony with that portion of the

culture important to the individual. We are

so entirely dependent upon the good will and

cooperation of others in our society that it

would be impossible to achieve feelings of

adequacy wéthout some effective relationship

with them1
Thus adequacy becomes a function of the compatibility of
individual goals and values with those of the culture of
which he is a member. If the individual can function
within his culture, he is better able to enhance and
maintain himself.

Another way of looking at identification is in
terms of the self-concept. The self-concept may be so
expanded as to include other people and groups.19 Thus,
"these identifications become basic parts of self and

we therefore speak of my daughter, my country, my

fraternity, my race, me southerners, or mm Texans.

 

18IB, p. 2A6.

19Perceiving, Behaving, Becomimg, p. 5A.

70

Whatever the identification, it becomes part of the
expanded self.2O

It is obvious that not all identification which an
individual makes are conducive to the development of the
self—actualized personality. People can and do identify
with elements and groups of society which neither maintain
or enhance the development of self. People can identify
with the Mafia, the Ku Klux Klan, the military, and the
American middle-class, all of which are suspect in the
cause of self-actualizations. Maslow has indicated that
many of the above identifications actually erode
personality development.21 Identification may be a
characteristic of adequate personalities, yet it is the
kind and nature of the identification which is of
critical importance. Culture must be maintained if
there is to be any chance of maintenance and enhancement
of self, yet individuals can identify with the purposes
of groups which are basically culturally deteriorating.

Unless we can specify the nature of the
relationship of the individual and society which is
conducive to the maintenance and enhancement of both
the individual and culture, the capacity for identi—

fication is a meaningless construct in perceptual

 

201B, pp. 2A6-2A7.

21Abraham Maslow, "Personality Problems and
Personality Growth," in The Self, ed. by Clark Moustakas
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 232-2A6.

71

theory. Combs does not deal with the nature of this
relationship to any great extent. He is content to make
the observation that "The stronger an individual's
identification with others, the more certain it is that

in seeking his own maintenance and enhancement he will

be seeking that of others as well."22 It is not at all
evident that this is the case, and it is a patently

false statement in many instances. Not all identifications
lead a person to be "the best that he can be."

Again we can see that the basic constructs of
perceptual theory lack precise theoretical formulation
because of the lack of an adequate social theory and
the specification of adequate criteria for the application
of these concepts. Both at the levels of formal
psychological and formal social theory, the perceptual
psychology of Arthur Combs goes little beyond the
formulations already existing in the context of ordinary
language. This is not to say that Combs does not make
some very important assumptions in terms of social theory,
but these assumptions are implicit and unexamined. Given
this situation, it would appear that perceptual theory
has little viability for contemporary educational theory
and educators. However, in that much of the language
used in education today is of the ordinary language

variety, and as Combs is receiving a wide hearing through

 

2218, p. 2A7.

72

his books and lectures, it is important that we look at
and analyze what he is saying in terms of the individual
and culture, and further analyze the assumptions which
are being made in relation to recommendations which are
made for educational practive. It will be the intent

to take up Combs' assumptions about the nature of society
in the next chapter, and to devote the last chapter to
the implications of our considerations concerning the

adequate personality and society for education.

Conclusions

Before we begin our analysis of Combs' views of
the adequate person in society, we should take a general
look at our considerations in the first part of this
chapter. At the beginning of this chapter, we noted
Combs' intent to develop a concept of personal adequacy
or self-actualization which was significantly different
from the "adjustment concept" prevalent in past
psychological and sociological theory. In terms of our
analysis, it is evident that the concept of personal
adequacy as developed by Combs is little different from
that of adjustment theorists.

We have noted that the concept of adequacy as used
‘by Conms is essentially vague in that it is extremely
difficult to know when to apply the concept. Combs implies

that the concept must be used in connection with problem

73

solving or intelligence, but the nowhere specifies the
logical and empirical foundations of the perceptual field
which will produce this form of behavior. Thus, although
in some instances it is fairly easy to identify simple
problem—solving behaviors, it is not at all evident what
this means in terms of complex scientific problems or
important social and moral issues. As has been noted,
perceptual theory in regard to specifying the application
of the construct of adequacy has gone little further

than the use of the concept found in ordinary language.
It can be seen in this regard that Combs has not

provided us in any way with a concept of "the best that
man can be" beyond the concepts of this in ordinary
language.

Further, it should be noted that, aside from Combs'
more formal treatment of the concept of adequacy, his use
of ordinary language contains many of the assumptions of
adjustment theories. The assumption is implicit in all
three characteristics of the adequate personality which
were discussed that we must look to the society in which
the individual exists to determine whether the
individual's behavior manifests these traits. Positive
perceptions of self, acceptance, and the capacity for
identification are all bound by reference to current,
practices of a given society. Combs implicitly assumes

that interpretation of the concept of adequacy is bound

7A

to a particular culture at a particular time. In essence,
what he has done is to attempt to provide a morally
objective conception of the best that man can be, while
making a similar set of assumptions as do the theorists
with which he is disagreeing. Implicitly making these
assumptions, Combs of necessity can not improve on the
adjustment theories or on the basic culturally and
ethically relativistic positions of these theorists.
Combs' treatment of adequacy in no way allows the

educator to handle or solve the complex and scientific

 

 

 

a «Ir-W

and social problems that face the educator, since no
criteria for decision making other than the subjective
content of an individual perceptual field are provided.
Given the above considerations, the determination of
adequacy becomes a function of individual perceptual
fields; if a person maintains that he is adequate, there
are no grounds given in perceptual theory to maintain
otherwise. Adequacy is a function of individual judgment

with no logical foundations for the judgment.

CHAPTER IV

THE ADEQUATE PERSONALITY
AND SOCIETY

Introduction

 

4mm
I
I

'As the problems facing the educator are always to

be found in a social context, an adequate conception of

‘. rm“ u'Mx.

the nature of society is crucial if we are to formulate
solutions to these problems. These problems can be
seen as the development of a theoretical social science
so as to facilitate prediction and explanation of
behavior within the social context, and the development
of a social theory which will allow us to provide objective
reasons for the choice of educational objectives. The
task of this chapter will be to analyze what perceptual
theory has to offer the educator in regard to the above
problems.

The objective set for this section is most difficult
to achieve. Combs' treatment of social theory is at a
Inost superficial level and to determine what he actually
Ioelieves in regard to specific aspects of social theory
115 exteremely difficult. We have already noted some of
tflie problems in the basic development of perceptual

ttueory which had implications for social theory. The

75

76

most significant of these is the problem of the individual
being the explanatory principle for himself. It was noted
that even at the psychological level it is difficult to
understand individual behavior if the individual is to be
the sole basis for understanding that behavior.

The analysis of society by Combs becomes extremely
complicated as he attempts to develop social concepts
solely on the basis of his psychological constructs.

Given the basic vagueness of the constructs dealing with
individual behavior, it becomes difficult to specify
what Combs is actually discussing in terms of social
theory because he attempts to understand society solely
in terms of the individual. His basic assumption is
that if only we had a society consisting of adequate
personalities, we would have an adequate society.

Interestingly enough, an adequate self in the

terms we have described it will produce an

individual who not only satisfies his own need,

but will operate to the ultimate satisfaction

of his society as well.1
The sum of a number of good people will be a good society.
Such an analysis might be viable if only we knew what
good or adequate people were, but we have not found an
adequate specification of adequacy in perceptual theory.

We noted earlier that it was Combs' intent to

develop a view of the individual which did not depend on

social customs to determine the best that the individual

 

1&9 p- 2590

77

might be, and his basic failure to provide a
conceptualization which was not an adjustment theory.

Even though Combs does not want to make self—actualization
dependent on the customs of a society, he nevertheless

does not provide anything else given his basic theory, and
we shall see this true in terms of his discussion of social
adjustment and consensus to solve social problems; and we
must question the basic adequacy of this for solving

educational problems.

Basic Assumptions
Initially, we can see two major assumptions Combs
makes: society is build out of the needs of its
individual members; and each society is autonomous in
regard to judgments of its own adequacy or goodness.
The perceptual field of the individual is the basic
unit of social analysis for Combs, and the society is
good which meets the need requirements of these
perceptual fields.
The goal of a society is to meet the needs of
its members. Whether or not it is successfully
meeting this need, however, can only be judged.
by persons having membership in the society.2
Combs begins his chapter on "The Individual and
his Society" with a section entitled "The Personification
Myth." What Combs is essentially attempting to deal

‘with in this section is a very profound and complex issue

 

2IE. p- 336.

78

found in the field of social metaphysics. In his
discussion he posits or assumes the individual to be
the only social reality, although he does not indicate
that he recognizes that he is dealing with a
metaphysical problem. Of the group of culture as a
distinct reality in itself, Combs says

On a consciously superficial level of speech

such personification of groups is convenient

and permissible, but if we are looking for a

frame of reference which will allow us to predict

changes in the way a group behaves, the device of

group personification is a complete failure.

When the entire group is treated as a unit, the

dynamics of action within the group are ignored

and obscured, and, as a consequence, there are

no means of studying or predicting the changes

within the group which lead to changes in its
behavior.3

Again, of institutional realities he says,

The good society must be dynamic. It can ot
be described in terms of its institutions.’

Thus, we see that Combs is assuming that the phenomena
of people living together can only be understood in
terms of the assumption of the needs of the individuals
as being the ultimate and only reality.

The above is further evidenced in Combs'
consideration of why there is a tendency for group
continuity, consistency, and conservatism.

This consistency is acquired, not from some
mysterious quality of the group per ES, but

 

79

through the dynamics of the efforts of

individual members to achieve adequacy.
As the individual does not provide the foundation for an
understanding of the individual, and as the single
perceptual field does not provide us with the criteria
for its own adequacy, it can not but be doubted that
the individual and the contents of his field should
provide us with the necessary principles for the
structuring of social order and the making of educational
decisions. It will be the intent of the remainder of
this chapter to show why, if perceptual theory is to be
taken seriously, Combs must provide a more adequate
social theory and reconsider his basic social assumptions
in regard to the whole of perceptual theory.

Given what Combs considers to be the basic reality
in social analysis, he attempts to construct the notion
of society from the individual perceptual field.

Principle I: Individuals tend to seek adequacy
through identification with people seeking
need satisfaction in ways similar to their
own.6

Principle II: Persons banded together in groups
for the mutual satisfaction of need find

their group purposes most effectively
advanced by tne development of group

 

organization.
512. p. 333.
612. p. 327.

712. p. 329.

80

Principle III: People tend to withdraw from
groups whose approval they are unable
to win or which no longer satisfy need.8
Principle IV: Identification of an individual
with a group leads him to adopt and defend
the standards and behavior of that group.9
On insptection of the above four principles, it can be
seen that Combs is attempting to supply principles which
can evidence the causal factors necessary for the
explanation of behavior of the individual in a group
situation. It is crucial in this regard to see the
theoretical line of reasoning implicit in Combs' statement
of these principles in regard to basic perceptual theory.
Many of the previously made criticisms of perceptual
theory are involved and the analysis of the assumptions
and line of reasoning found in the above principles

should serve to focus many of our considerations to this

point.

The Necessity of the Inference to the Phenomenal Field
Combs wants to provide a theoretical framework in
which the behavior of individuals can be seen as being
immediately caused by the perceptual field of the indivi—
dual, as it is his contention that this is 3mg only cause
of behavior that needs to be considered. Thus, to
understand the nature of the individual, we need only to

infer the nature of the perceptual or phenomenal field

 

8Ibid.

912. p. 331.

81

producing this behavior; and we have only to project
this inference in terms of future environments to
enable us to predicn how the individual will behave
in that future situation.10 Thus, if an individual
sees himself as a person who is basically unwanted,
we have only to project this perceptual field into a
future situation and ask how a person who believes he
is unwanted will behave in that situation.

A number of aspects of the above could no doubt
be argued, but it is important for us to consider at
this point the necessity of the inference to the
phenomenal field. A strong case could be made that
such an inference is totally unnecessary and that equally
valid predictions could be made from simply generalizing
from the overt behavior of the individual and projecting
in future similar situations. A further point can be
made that what the scientist is dealing with in his
attempt to explain and predict is only his own perceptual
field and the overt behavior of the individual, and not
the perceptual field of the person he is observing. It
would appear that it is solely his own perceptions of
the behavior of another with which the scientist is
dealing, and not the field of the individual who is under
observation. The scientist, after all, never knows

whether his inference is correct, as the perceptual fields

 

10The Problem of Unconscious Behavior, p. 22A.

82

of others are not observable. It is only future behavior
which will either confirm or disconfirm any generalizations
which are made about a subject under observation. What we
are in effect saying when we note that a person feels
unwanted is that we have learned the use of the term
"unwanted" to describe the type of behavior which we are
viewing; and that when we apply this term to an individual,
we can expect certain kinds of behaviors from these
individuals in other situations. What the scientist must
concern himself with is not the field of the subject, but
his own conceptualizations of overt behavior.

The call to understand other people by being
sensitive to how they feel and see things should be
appreciated. Yet, this noting of the inability in humans
to react "in a good and sensitive way to others" may
simply be the insensitivity we have to our own
conceptualizations and symbolizations of the behavior
of these persons. Our mistakes in dealing with others
are by the definition of "mistake" only something we
have conceived mis-takenly. To be mis—taken is to have
poorly conceptualized the object under consideration
and its logical relationships to other objects in its
environment. Thus, to not have predicted future behavior
adequately simply is to have mis-taken the object for
what it actually is.

Early in Chapter II, it was noted that Combs'

basic dilemma was that of attempting to describe the

83

phenomenal field in terms other than the language of an
objective reality. It was also noted that Combs must
and implicitly does assume an objective reality other
than the phenomenal field of the individual. The
criticism must be made at this point that if the
"something other" in the scientific explanation of
human behavior is to have any significance at all, it
must be seen in terms of the individual's intent towards
the objects of his environment and this can only be
eeem in terms of the overt acts of relating to those
objects. Thus, to label a person's behavior as
evidencing unwantedness, what we are in effect doing
is relating to his environment as not good or
effective. We are saying that given what the intent
of this person should be in relation to the cultural
whole, he is behaving otherwise; and that this behavior
is neither conducive to the development of culture nor
himself. What the person's phenomenal field is like at
the time has nothing at all to do with whether we
should label him as "unwanted" or not, or with what
type of generalizations will facilitate prediction and
explanation.

We have noted that the question of prediction is
a moot point, but we have also seen that the analysis
of perceptual theory has evidenced many weaknesses which
produce serious doubts to its capacity for this aside

from the lack of evidence one way or the other. It is

8A

suggested here that tme major weakness of perceptual
theory is its basic assumption that the content of the
perceptual field is capable of explaining behavior.
The lack of concern for the cultural order of the
individual results in the inability to provide a
metaphysical or metatheoretical ground for the notion
of scientific understanding, the inability to establish
an ethical concept of individuality, and the inability
to provide an adequate characterization of the
purposiveness of individuals in relation to explanation
and prediction in social science.
Combs states that

The perceptual frame of reference provides

an immediate rather than a historical understanding

of the causation of behavior. It suggests that,

since perceptions exist only in the present, it

should be possible to deal effectively with behavior

through an understanding of present perceptions

even though we do not know anything about the

individual's past!11
He maintains that although a knowledge of the person's
past may explain why a person has the perceptions he
has, the lack of this does not preclude our effectiveness
in dealing with him in terms of his present perceptions.
Thus, a teacher can deal with a child effectively even
though she knows nothing of his past or the environment
from which he comes.

However, it would appear in terms of our analysis

of the necessity of the inference to the perceptual field

 

11.1.2. p. 3114-315.

85

and in terms of the above paragraph, that all Combs is
saying is that a teacher could ignore the behavioral

data of the past and make generalizations from behavioral
data of the present. The idea of "behavioral data of

the present," however, is misleading, as what the teacher
would actually be doing is arbitrarily selecting a
historical starting point and then beginning to
historically generalize from observed behavior. Thus,
even though one might see the behavior of people as the
behavior of billiard balls, causal explanation is not
facilitated by inference to a phenomenal field.

Adding the problem of human purposiveness or the
striving for adequacy makes the problem of eXplanation
even worse in terms of seeing behavior as caused by
the perceptual field. Intent or purpose, as we have
seen, makes no sense apart from the environmental objects
toward which intent is directed. What Combs has done is
to mistake the process of conceptualization and
generalization of the scientist with the necessity of
inferring phenomenal fields and to effectively lose any
substantial concept of individuality as a driving,
dynamic force by appealing to the contents of the field
to define human behavior.

The further problem of "dealing effectively" with
people clearly shows the inadequacy of perceptual theory
as a Viable tool for the educator. If we are to act in

terms of another person or student, we also are directly

86

or intending our energies toward some goal outside of
any perceptual field. The perceptual field itself can
not tell us anything about how a given subject could
be in a better or more effective relationship to the
objects of his world. The purposiveness of the
individual is essentially an ordering activity, and an
adequate conceptualization of human intention can only
occur in relation to a study of the individual's
coherence within his environment. Our intents in the
teaching act can only be adequately determined in
relation to a study of social order.

Given the four principles noted above, it is
plainly evident that he has given little critical
thought to the problem of social order. Combs attempts
to explain the existence of society in terms of the
contents of individual perceptual fields. He implicitly
assumes that the constructs which are basic to his
perceptual theory will also suffice for explaning the
nature of society in regard to social order and that
they will further provide the grounds for the ordering
of the good society. Although there is good reason to
believe at this point that the basic constructs of
perceptual theory will not suffice for explaining the
nature of society, there are a number of interesting
facits to Combs statement about society which need to be

considered. Many of the assumptions and points he makes

I

87

are common to other social theorists and educational

theories.

Society as Consensus

Combs essentially builds a consensus model of
society. He assumes the individual and his perceptions
as given and sees society as a group of individuals
who have common important needs. These individuals
get together and in order to satisfy these common needs,
they realize that they need some type of organization‘
or order. What this order will be is entirely dependent
on the nature of the needs of individuals and can only
be understood in terms of these needs. Thus, what we
have is consensus, i.e. a group of people all sharing
common important goals or needs, and the society will
exist as long as the consensus exists. In that adequacy
is the satisfaction of need, adequacy or self-actualization
is completely dependent on the consensus in regard to
need in that society. The good society then is the one
which satisfies need or fulfills the consensus, and this
condition can be met in many different ways by different
societies.

The remainder of this chapter will explore Combs'
cxsnsensus model in terms of.its usefulness in dealing
with social problems and the capacity of the consensus
model for providing adequate criteria for the social order

Of the good society. We will mainly explore two areas:

88
the capacity for explanation of social change and the
problem of criteria for educational decisions involving
social problems. It will be maintained that the
consensus model is ineffective in handling both problems.
Social Change, Institutional Persons,
and Social Order
It is a trite assertion that we are in an era of
rapid social change. Many traditional values are being
questioned and rejected and ways of living have changed
markedly. Values and life conditions have changed so fast
that people have been set adrift, as it were, in a
complex world without sufficient value bases to guide
them. Many social scientists and psychologists see the
loss of personal identity as being a major social problem
of the day.12 People feel that something is happening to
them to alter their lives in significant ways and they
do not know how or why these changes are taking place.
These changes in modern society effect the educator
profoundly as the school has been an institution
responsible for the transmission of culture and the
teacher must work with students who are products of these
social changes. An adequate educational theory must
enable the teacher to explain why changes are taking

pleace and the desirable relationship of the educational

*

See: Wheelis, The Quest for Identity; Lynd,
EH) Shame and the Search for Identity; Benne, Education
.Egr Tragedy; and May, Psychology and the Human Dilemma.

 

89

institution toward these changes._ Perceptual theory can
not handle either of the above problems.

The weaknesses of perceptual theory are to be found
in the inability to understand the nature of institutional
persons as a reality in social explanation and the
vacuousness of the concept of the "need for adequacy";
however, the major problem is the failure to comprehend
the nature of the institutional person.

If we take a practical example, we can see exactly
why perceptual theory adds little to our understanding
of social stability and change. It is becoming evident
to many that there is a serious problem in the
relationship between human population and the ecological
systems which support that population.13 The problem is
essentially two-fold: the problem of an adequate food
supply and the pollution of the natural resources which
are essential to life. The rapid change in the
population and, thus, the corresponding rapid change in
the social conditions of life need to be understood if
the problems are to be solved.

The solution to the population problem is obvious;
we must control the population increase. The question
can be raised as to why we do not control the population
when we know we must. Most people would readily agree

that inadequate living space, food, and air and water

 

13Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1968).

 

90

supplies are not good for them, and that they would be
more adequate people if the situation could be remedied
or avoided. Yet the population increases, people talk
about doing something about it, and nothing basically
gets accomplished. How do we explain this situation

in terms of perceptual theory?

If people are always seeking to be the best that
they can be, why do they keep on adding to the population
problem when the answer is so obvious? It would seem
quite simple for the individual to act differently given
an awareness of the problem. However, that overpopulation
is a problem does not answer the question as to why we
have the problem. The basic problem is why people behave
in such a way as to add to the problem, and this is what
perceptual theory can not explain because the individual
and his perceptual field are not the basic cause of this
behavior. The individual in this case will not tend to
act morally because he must necessarily tend to conform
his behavior to the institutional realities which form
the basis of his activities. It is the institution of
the family and institutions, such as education, that
support the structure of the family which act through the
individua1.1u If we attempt to explain individual behavior

simply in terms of the individual's perceptual field which

 

1“I am using the term "institution" in the sense of
"ordered or legalized property." See E. Jordan, "The
Structure of Society," Ethics, LV (January 19u5), 81.

91

includes the awareness of the problem, we can not hope
to fully understand why people behave the way they do
when they know better. As Combs also notes, "Most of
us know much better than we behave! We rarely
misbehave because we do not know better."15

Marshall McLuhan notes that "Environments are
invisible. Their groundrules, pervasive structure, and

”16 He also

overall patterns elude easy perception.
contends that these invisible environments both create
social change and have tremendous effects on individual
lives without the knowledge of the cause of changed
behavior on the part of the individual. The social
environment of the individual is the institution; it
is because of and through these institutions that he
acts. It is these pervasive structures in terms of
their determination of behavior which we do not see
and tend to ignore. As Jordan states,
This fact of structure we moderns under the dominance
of democratic and contractual preoccupations, tend
to overlook. For us, society is basically, a
collection of individual persons held together by
subjective ties, and the material substratum of
society is ignored. But society has a structure
independent of subjective relations.l

It is the tendency to see society as a collection of

individual persons in terms of the meeting of individual

 

151B, p. 38“.

16Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium
in the Message, (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), p. 85.

 

17Jordan, "The Structure of Society," P. 79.

92

perceptual fields which keeps us from recognizing the
pervasive influence which institutional environments
have on our behavior. We can make individuals aware of
conditions which do not facilitate their own personal
adequacy and we can ask and cajole them to be virtuous,
but virtuous behavior is not the product of the
individual's will, but of the will of the institutional
person. As Barnett and Otis note,

Virtue . . . can not be taught, since the virtue

of individual acts exists through its corporate

embodiment in the world and this suggests that

no subjective capacity, including kngwledge, can

achieve virtue in an immoral world.l
Thus, social change can not be understood or effected
without a careful examination of the cultural order.
The role of knowledge must be that of shaping cultural

institutions in order to facilitate or effect action of

the desired type.

The Conservative Bias of
Perceptual Theory
The perceptual theory of Combs contains a
distinctly conservative bias which can be seen in two
ways. First, we have already noted the inability to
understand social change, and the consequent lack of

capacity to produce such change. Given a social problem,

Perceptual theory does not provide an adequate basis for

~

18Barnett and Otis, p. 158.

93

doing anything about that problem. We may know that we
know better than we actually behave but, unless we can
understand why this is the case, we can never effect the
institutions necessary for enabling the behavior which
can solve social problems.

Not only this perceptual theory inadequate in
understanding how social change takes place, but it
also does not provide any criteria for social criticism
and thus is essentially supportive of the status quo in,
any social group. We have noted throughout our analysis
of perceptual theory that a crucial problem which
permeates the entirety 0f the theoretical assumptions.
is that of objectivity and scientific validity; this
problem is of central import in any notion of social
change. We saw when discussing the problem of adjustment
theories in relation to self—actualization that Combs'
assumptions, when followed in their implications, resulted
in an adjustment theory in regard to adequacy. Perceptual
theory provides no objective criteria to assess either
the adequacy of the personality or society; thus, whatever
exists in a particular society must be good if it meets
the needs of the members of that social group. As long
as the members of the society are satisfied and there is
a social equilibrium, there is no way to criticize
anything that exists given the assumptions of perceptual

theory. Any social practice from head-hunting to

9“

economic exploitation can be justified as long as it

meets the needs of a particular social group.

Society and Conflict

 

In his discussion of group conflict, Combs states:

The abhorrence of dictatorship, characteristic
of much of the thinking in this country, leads
some people to the dangerous assumption that
societies operating under a dictatorship are doing
so totally without the support of the people in
that society. Because we find this form of
government unacceptable ourselves, it is easy to
jump to the conclusion that persons living under
dictatorships do not like them either. It is
necessary for us to understand, however, that
even a dictatorship exists because it supplies
need satisfaction to its people.

Although Combs does not support dictatorships, he does
not condemn them either as long as they meet the needs
of their members. His position states that we must
understand why people behave the way they do in terms
of their needs; after we have understood, we should let
them live the way they need to. Given this stance in
regard to social orders, Combs goes on to develOp a
position in which social conflict is seen as necessarily
bad.
Of social conflict Combs states:

Conflict between groups is . . . the result of

aggressive and dominating behavior within one

or both groups. Individuals who are unable to

secure adequate satisfaction of need in their own

society often seek such satisfaction by dominating

and aggressive behavior against members of weaker
groups . . . . Adequate people, as we have seen,

1918. p. 335.

are characterized by acceptance and identi—
fication, both antithetical to conflict.20

The picture one gets of a good society is one in which
there is social equilibrium and a minimum of, or no,
conflict. Ideally, we would have a society which does
not change. Indeed, the assumptions of perceptual
theory in fact support a static and closed society.
The adequate or self-actualized person in this society
can only be seen as a person happy with the conditions
which exist because his needs correspond to the social
order which exists. Much in opposition to what Combs
wants, given his assumptions, the adequate personality
can be seen as the happy and content individuals of
Brave New Yorld who are the products of behavioral and
genetic conditioning and whose needs are programmed.
The adequate personality could easily be seen as the
"nigger" who likes being a "nigger", or the sadist who
likes being a sadist, because his social group gave
him this need and provides the social order to satisfy
the need.

The contemporary educator exists in a society and
a world in which there is a great deal of conflict.
There are a number of social movements such as black
militancy and student militancy with which the modern

educator must deal. Perceptual theory is a very inept

tool for educators to use to understand social movements

 

zolé, p. 338.

 

96

and conflict. In fact, operating with the conceptual
apparatuc precludes understanding contemporary social
problems and the necessary conditions of a social order
in which conflict can be supported and channeled to
produce an open, dynamic society which can effect
beneficial change. Perceptual theory further does not
provide criteria whereby the educator can relate to

and deal with the social movements in which the
institution of education exists. One can only evaluate
the direction and effect of social movements if one has
an idea of what a good society is; similarly, as there
was no ethically valid criteria for the adequate
personality, so too perceptual theory does not provide
an objective basis for the ordering of the good society.
However, inasmuch as Combs maintains that perceptual
theory does in fact provide "a culture free criterion
by which the comparative goodness of societies can be
determined," we will devote the remainder of this chapter

to analysis of his concept of the good society.

The Good Society
Much of what Combs says about the good society we
have already noted; thus, much of our analysis at this
point will be summarizing and focusing the more random
preceding comments. In accord with Combs' view of
Personal adequacy, he sees the purpose of society as

being the satisfaction of human need; and "the basic

97

human need is the preservation and enhancement of the
phenomenal self." Thus, the good society is one which
satisfies these needs:

A society is good to the degree that it enables

its members and neighbors to live with health,

security, self respeCt, and dignity. It is good

in the degree to which it aids its members to the

development of selves adequatexto deal with the

world that surrounds them. A society is bad to

the extent that it fails to provide these things

for its members or removes them from its

neighbors.21
Combs contends that the above is a culture free criterion
whereby we can judge any and every society. Thus, we have
only to determine whether or not a given society is in
fact satisfying the needs of its members, whatever the
needs may be. We can see that this enables us to judge
that there may be many good societies although these
societies may be drastically different in terms of
structure and content. Any society which satisfies its
members' needs is a good society for Combs.

The good society must also be dynamic according

to Combs.

All planners of Utopia . . . have made a

fundamental mistake in conceiving of a society

which reaches an ideal state and remains

unchanged thereafter. No static, unchanging

Utopia can be the psychologically satisfying

"good" society which we are seeking. The culture

of such a society must be dynamic and flexible

rather than static, because the individual's
need for the maintenance and enhancement of the

21;B, p. 3&2.

98

phenomenal self can never be completely

satisfied.22
Combs sees an open system which has "as its goal the
process of growth and discovery itself rather than some
more manifest objective." The goal of this dynamic,
good society

. . . is to create the optimum conditions for

individual growth and achievement of adequacy.

Such a society would avoid the dangers of a

planned society, which sooner or leter must

find its plan no longer adequate in a changing

world. A dynamic society, concerned fundamentally

with setting men free, seems far more likely to

evolve and change with the march of human events.23

The writings of Combs are potentially very dangerous

as exemplified in the above quotations. To oppose or
criticize a theory which advocates "optimum conditions
for growth," "facilitation of growth and discovery,"
"setting men free," and "the maintenance and enhancement
of people" is very difficult. However, we need concern
ourselves with the vagueness of the terms being used and
with the actual consequences if the theory were to be
implemented. The basic danger in perceptual theory is
that the rhetoric is extremely persuasive; it uses words
which tend to instill devotion to the theory by their
very use. We have already noted the inadequacy of

perceptual theory in regard to the analysis of social

change and the characteristic conservatism of the theory,

¥

2212, p- 3A3.

2329 p0 3’43'3’4’40

99

and there would seem to be some disparity between what
Combs says he would like to see and the logical
consequences which follow from the adoption of his
major assumptions.

If we are to assess the goodness of a society, we
must determine whether or not it is meeting the needs
of its individual members. The question must be raised
as to how we can determine if a given society is actually
doing this. On this point, Combs says:

The goal of society is to meet the needs of its
members. Whether or not it is successfully
meeting need, however, can only be judged by
those persons having membership in the society.
Even though a society may seem to some outside
observers to be less adequate in providing need
satisfaction for its members than some other
society, this information is irrelevent and
immaterial insofar as the members of a given
group are concerned.2
Given the above criteria, it becomes impossible to
determine the goodness of any society, since goodness
will ultimately be relative to the perceptual field of
the individual. When the goodness of a society is
reduced to the determination by individual fields, we
turn a full circle to the problem of the objectivity
of the contents of individual perceptual fields. It
may be that a given individual has objectively
conceptualized the strengths and weaknesses of his

society, but how are we to determine this? Combs

reduces the determination of the good society to a

 

214E: p 0 336 .

100

complete cultural relativism and thus renders the concept
of "goodness" to a meaningless status in perceptual
theory. The words "good" and "bad", if they are to be
used with any consistency, imply the necessity of
objective standards for the evaluation of the merits of
a given society. Given Combs' "culture free" criterion
for the good society, every society can both be a good
and bad society at the same time in terms of its total
evaluation.

Not only is perceptual theory not capable of
determining whether or not individual needs are being
met, but it also implicitly contains the assumption
that all needs are good needs. Certainly we can not
assume that the fact of the existence of a need implies
that that particular need facilitates the process of
self-actualization in the individual or that the
pervasiveness of that need in a society is conducive to
its being a good society. If there are inadequate
people, and Combs believes there are, then it follows
that the needs which these individuals have should not
be met and, further, implies that these needs should be
eliminated. Combs, when speaking of the individual,
agrees that not all needs are good needs, but assumes,
in dealing with social theory, that indeed all needs

Should be met.

 

101

Conclusion

 

The major problem in perceptual theory is that it
does not explore the philosophical ramifications of many
of the problems involved in the description of individual
behavior. We have noted this problem both at the level
of prediction of behavior and in the attempt to develop
an ethical concept of the adequate personality. In
failing to adequately deal with the epistemological and
ethical problems inherent in the assumption that the
individual perceptual field is the sole reality, Combs
has eliminated the possibility of producing a non-
adjustment concept of the adequate personality, the
possibility of a theoretical framework for the
prediction of individual behavior, and the possibility
of developing a meaningful concept of the individual.
Although the title of his major writing is Individual
Behavior, essentially no individuals are talked about
in the book. Given the basic assumptions, we are left
with individual perceptions which have no logical
relationships to each other, thus precluding the chance
of developing a concept of an integrated personality or
a substantial individual.

Given the assumption concerning the individual
perceptual field as the sole reality to be dealt with
and the problem of the lack of concern for the

relationships that exist between individual perceptions,

102

Combs can not even produce a viable concept of consensual
society. If the individual perceptual field is the only
reality, it becomes senseless to speak of the existence
of consensus. Given the assumptions, the concept of
consensus or the agreement of individual fields is a
reification, and thus vacuous and meaningless. The use
of such a concept could possibly be justified if it

could be shown that it facilitated prediction; however,
Combs does not do this and does not indicate that the
explanation of individual behavior is in any way
dependent on the use of a concept of society. However,
in devoting a significant portion of Individual Behavior
to a discussion of the individual and society, Combs must
at some level believe that the concept of society or
culture is significant. Yet, the use of a concept does
not necessarily give it a meaningful or substantial
significance within a theory.

Combs, it would appear, has used commonplace notions
of social theory as they are contained in popular thought
and some aspects of social science and arbitrarily adds
them to his basic psychological assumptions without
regard for the compatibility of the two domains of
discourse. Combs is correct in implicitly assuming the
necessity for a concept of society in the discussion of
individuals' yet perceptual theory repeatedly evidences

a theoretical irresponsibility for the introduction of

103

terms and assumptions; Combs' use of the term "society"
is a major instance of this irresponsibility.

The theoretical importance of perceptual theory for
solving the pressing educational problems of the day is
extremely limited. Although the avowed intent is to
produce a theory of individual behavior that would allow
the educator to deal more humanly with students, to
enable the educator to better develop adequate or self-
actualized individuals, and to provide a theory
comprehensive enough to solve crucial social and
educational issues, perceptual theory can do none of
these any better than the most commonplace notions we
hold about individuals in our social milieu. Given the
problematic state of our society at this time, one can
not but wonder about the utility of the commonplace
notions or those contained in perceptual theory.

In the next chapter, we shall analyze Combs' view
of teacher education specifically and his views in
education in general. In this analysis many of the
concerns with which we have dealt in regard to the
individual and society will again become evident, as
one must talk about teacher education in the context of
society. The lack of an adequate theory of society
will again evidence itself, because a thorough—going
social and political philosophy is a necessity if one
is to give any positive direction to changes in programs

of teacher education.

CHAPTER V

PERCEPTUAL THEORY AND
TEACHER EDUCATION

A Critical Introduction

 

As I begin to write this last chapter, I must
confess that as I wrote Chapters II, III, and IV that
I had very mixed emotions. These chapters were
essentially negative in their perspective and I was
always wondering how I could be so negative with
such a seemingly warm and humanistic writer as Arthur
Combs. How could Combs have made such a positive
impact on so many of my students and colleagues with
such an ambiguous theoretical base? What Combs is
advocating--a more humane treatment of people, a more
empathicunderstanding of the problems of students—~I
must confess I also believe in. How is it then that
those three chapters could be so cold and negative
in their orientation when dealing with the writings
of a man who is asking for positive and significant
changes in the educational environment of which I am
so critical?

There were many explanations which entered my

mind but none which were basically satisfying. My own

1014

105

natural cynical nature combined with the inherent coldness
of an academic piece of writing suggested that perhaps
I had left out any consideration for the warmth and
emotional aspects of the human situation with which I was
dealing. Perhaps this is the case, yet I sincerely feel,
although I do not like the tone of those three chapters,
that they are academically competent and cognitively
correct. However, I feel that I must change my writing
style for this last chapter in order to say what I think-
needs to be said concerning perceptual theory and teacher-
education.

I feel that the psychological and social theory

contained in Individual Behavior to be unsound, both

 

logically and empirically. The reasons for this are
quite evident in my Chapters II, III, and IV. However,
I am drawn to and impressed with the warmth and concern
for people contained in that piece of writing as I am
equally so with The Professional Education of Teachers.
Aside from perceptual theory being an unsound point Of
view from an intellectual standpoint, I have personally
seen the impact these writings have had on the behavior
of my students and colleagues. The introduction of a
person to perceptual theory with the subsequent
commitment of the person to the theory creates what I
feel to be a very humanizing influence on classroom

behavior; people do in fact from my experience behave

106

differently after studying and understanding perceptual
or phenomenological theory. In that I consider the
theory to be intellectually unsound, this all raises
some perplexing questions in my mind, especially as I
am intimately involved in a program of teacher
education and equally committed to the use of rational
criteria in decision making. Compound this with the
fact that writers such as Jordan, Dewey, and Plato whom
I find to be very intellectually insightful have little
or no impact on the teaching behavior of my students and
it becomes a grave concern to me.

I assume that the goal of teacher education programs
is the development of behaviors on the part of the teacher
which facilitate learning. If this is true, then I must
conclude that perceptual theory is a useful tool in the
college classroom. I must also conclude that those
theories which I find to be intellectually responsible
are very ineffective tools. Thus, Combs is quite
theoretically unsound but very persuasive and Elijah
Jordan theoretically sound but a very ineffective tool
for developing desirable teacher behavior. This leads
me to ask the question as to the justification of
condemning an effective theory which is logically
unsound. Perceptual theory as I have indicated is
filled with contradictory assumptions and vaguities

but it nevertheless is an effective tool in changing

107

the behavior of students so that they will relate better
to students to facilitate learning which is the function
of educational institutions. I find this to be a very
personally perplexing problem. I also find that this
problem has some terrifying ramifications in programs

of teacher education.

I would like now to attempt to explicate a partial
solution to the delimma which I find myself in. Inasmuch
as teacher education institutions attempt to develop
certain behaviors, I can see essentially two distinct
types of behavior which can be developed. We can train
people to perform certain behaviors by providing a
strong positive reinforcement for that behavior. The
performance of the behavior is largely an unconscious
activity. This is evident in people we call "natural"
teachers as they have had past experiences which have
developed certain personality characteristics which
facilitate another person's learning. These behaviors
are carried out largely unconsciously or by habit. When
asked why they behave in these ways the answer is usually
that they feel comfortable behavingthus or they point
to the positive reinforcer which is the cause of the
behavior. The behavior is thus a fixed behavior and
carried out with a minimum of thought.

'A second type of behavior is what can be called

behavior which is pursued with a great deal of conscious

108

intent. People act instead of behave to use Jordan's
terminology. There are reasons why the person acts in
the manner in which he does. There is a conscious effort
to create an effect in the person's environment. The

act is essentially an ordering activity and usually takes
the form of some form of problem solving.

I would now suggest that perceptual theory
facilitates behavior and not acts. I have found myself
with a very perplexing problem regarding perceptual
theory, yet I cannot use perceptual theory to solve my
perplexing problem. Perceptual theory is an effective
tool for changing mine and otheris behavior, but it
does not give me the potential or capacity to act in a
problem solving sense as it provides no objective
criteria which can enable me to order my environment.

I would suggest that the language structure of the
writings and addresses of Combs is condusive to the
development of a sensitivity to the way other people
feel, a more positive evaluation of other people (what
Dewey calls prizing)l and a general human warmth all of
which are essential to effective and stimulating human
interaction. I further conclude that the introduction
of students to perceptual theory is much the same as
the introduction of candy to a child to develop certain

behaviors.

‘

* lDewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1939), p. F.

109

Perceptual theory contains enough emotive words
which enables it to function as a persuasive speech
pattern rather than a logically consistent language
pattern. More logically consistent patterns of
language do not have much impact because they do not
positively reinforce the belief systems of students‘
in teacher education programs. Perhaps the distinction
which John Austin draws in How to Do Things with Words
is relevant here.2 Speech acts can be seen to be of
two types, illocutionary and perlocutionary. Per-
locutionary acts are those speech acts which effect
some behavior such as causing someone to be persuaded,
inspired, encouraged, etc. An illocutionary act is
one which a person does something with the words he is
using such as suggest, order, describe, question,
promise, etc. without necessarily having a perlocutionary
effect with words. Philosophical and scientific systems
are illocutionary acts which attempt to define and order
objects in their domains. A psychological theory then
can conform to all of the rules for making its illocution'
but can also be without much effect on those who read
the theory. However, a theory can also violate all the

rules of the type of illocution which it is but still

 

2John Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Lecture
viii (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962). Also see
Wm. Alston, Philosophy of Language, pg. 3A-AA, Prentice
Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 196 .

110

have great perlocutionary force. I suggest that
perceptual theory is of this latter variety.

I also assume that the function of the educational
institution is to promote problem solving behavior or the
capacity to act, the capacity to order one's environment.
I conclude then that a definite distinction can be made
about learning environments for teachers in that these
institutions can promote a major portion of either of
two types of learning. Institutions which promote the
capacity of teachers to act in classrooms I shall call
institutions for teacher education. Institutions which
facilitate behavioral change I shall call teacher
training institutions. I maintain that an institution
which operates with a perceptual theory of teacher
education will be by and large a training institution.

It will be the intent of the remainder of this
chapter to set forth Combs's views of teacher education
as contained in The Professional Education of Teachers
in the light of the above distinctions which have been

made.

Basic Orientation
Combs maintains that Perceptual or Third Force
Psychology provides institutions of teacher education
witha theoretical framework which can facilitate new
ways of dealing with students in programs of teacher

education and which also can produce new behavioral

111

outcomes. Combs believes that we have outrun the usefulness
of the more traditional psychologies and philosophies in
that new understandings are called for to more adequately
deal with current problems.3
As was noted in Chapter II, Combs contrasts this new

Third Force movement with the traditional operant and
Freudian approaches in psychological theory. Labels which
have been attached to members of this Third Force movement
are "personalists", "humanists", "self-psychologists",
"transactionalists", "existentialists", and many others.
Yet Combs notes they all share "a deep concern with
questions of man's being and becOming."h

Then take a view of behavior that is highly con-

sistent with the experience of superior teachers:

it is a point of view that sees people as growing,

dynamic, organisms. It regards human beings not

as things to be molded but as unique events in

the process of becoming. .
When explicating the basic principles of this movement,
Combs labels it "the perceptual-existential approach to

psychology."5’6 The principles of this movement

 

3PET, pp. 11—12.
“PET, p. 12.
SPET, p. 12.

6A forthright account of the existential orientation
can be found in Existential Psychology. There is no
denying that there is a new movement in psychological
theory as is evident in the above mentioned book, however,
it is not at all clear to me that there is a direct logical
relationship between the principles contained in Existential
Psychology and those contained in The Professional Education
of Teachers.

 

112'

provide for what is called a "self as instrument approach
to teacher education."

It should be noted that although a number of labels
have been mentioned in the attempt to describe this Third
Force Psychology that each of the labels is essentially
vague as existential orientations themselves are
significantly different from writer to writer and Combs
does not make an attempt to specify which existential
orientation he is dealing with nor the relationship of
any particular existential approach to what he is

considering in The Professional Education of Teachers.7

Identifying the movement with a concern for man's being
and becoming is very superficial as most philosophical
movements are in one way or another concerned with man's
being and becoming. I feel that for any reader of PET
to identify perceptual theory with existentialism or

explicit existential psychologies is very dangerous

 

7It might be maintained that an explication of the
principles he is alluding to is unnecessary in that The
Professional Education of Teachers is not directed to an
audience that has the background to deal with such a
philosophical exposition. Yet, when we see the highly
emotive words which Combs uses to describe the perceptual—
existential approach and the fact that the existential
movement itself can be seen to have a "faddish" appeal,
it seems that it is somewhat mandatory to provide such an
explication. If the words which Combs is using are to
have other than a persuasive appeal, a persentation of
the existential theory should be given and its
relationship to perceptual theory should be made
explicit.

 

113

as the relationship of perceptual theory to these
theories is not at all evident.8

Aside from the lack of an explicit relationship
of perceptual theory to other so—called existential
philosophies and psychologies, Dr. Combs does specifically
react to a type of teacher education prevalent in
institutions of teacher education which he sees as
inadequate. Combs is in particular reacting against
what he calls the "competencies approach to teaching."
This approach is depicted as a program which attempts
to determine what expert teachers do and are like, and
then proceeds to develop a program which will produce
these competencies in students in programs of teacher
education. Examples of competencies which are listed
in PET are:

Knows his subject

Know about related subjects

Be adaptable to new knowledge

Understand the process of becoming

Recognize individual differences

Be a good communicator

Develop an inquiring mind

Be available

Be committed

Be enthusiastic
Show tolerance and understanding

 

8Both Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow have called
themselves psychologists with an existential orientation.
However, both of these psychologists who Combs is
possibly alluding to as members of the Third Force
movement are making assumptions quite different than
Combs. Note both of their orientations to the essential
organism as the source of value judgment and one can see
what appears to be a distinct Aristotelian orientation
which is not at all evident in Combs. This is true also
in the case of Eric Fromm. '

11A

Be caring

Have courage

Have personal security

Believe in God.9

Combs notes that research has shown that none of the
attempts to specify a direct correlation between specific
competencies and good teaching has been highly successful.
He does note that attempts to distinguish good teaching
from bad teaching in general terms such as "considerate",
"child-centered", and "concern about structure" have
met-with some limited success. However, Combs maintains
that none of these studies have given us a difinitive
distinction between good and bad teaching. From this he
concludes that "Good teaching it is clear, is not a
'direct function of general traits or methods."10

The practical difficulties of any attempt to base
a teacher education program on the competencies approach
are also enumerated. Combs sees basically three major

difficulties in such an approach. It is contended that

"it is a fallacy to assume that the methods of experts

 

9ggg, pp. 2, 3. It should be noted from the onset
that all of the characteristics which Combs lists are not
stated in behavioral terms which means that they are not
identifiable competencies. This is extremely important
in relationship to the capacity to predict intended
outcomes of any program of teacher education or the
evaluation of the effectiveness of a program. Combs will
argue that the competencies cannot be shown to be
predictors of good teaching. However, it may be that
teacher education programs which are competencies
approach fail not for the reasons which Combs mentions
but for their failure to be scientific.

10PET, p. A.

115

either can or should be taught directly to beginners."11
Just as research has shown that the study habits of good
students cannot be applied to poor students; it also
follows that the methods of expert teachers cannot be
applied to students in teacher education programs.

A second difficulty which is pointed out is that
"The creation of long lists of competencies is likely
to be deeply discouraging and disillusioning to the
young teachers . . . "12 In maintaining that certain
competencies are characteristic of good teaching attaches
an evaluative aspect to those competencies and "the net
effect is to set impossible goals of excellence" that
few young teachers can live up to thus leaving the
young person "defenseless before criticism."

The final criticism which is made of the
practicality of the competencies approach is “the fact
that many of the competencies demanded do not fit the
particular personality, and so could probably never
be achieved anyhow . . . "13 Combs, we will find,
maintains throughout PET that good or effective teaching
is a highly idiosyncratic affair and than any one
competency cannot be indiscriminately applied to any

‘particular individual.

 

1lPET, pp. 5, 6.
12PET, p. 5.

13PET, p. 6.

116

Combs concludes his argument against the competencies
approach in saying:

As we have seen, research on competencies has

been unable to isolate any common trait or practice
of good teachers. But this unanimous failure in
itself demonstrates an important fact: a good
teacher is primarily a unique personality. If
good teachers are unique individuals, we can
predict from the start that the attempt to find

common uniqueness would be unlikely to get results.“l

 

From the above line of reasoning, Combs concludes that
"A good teacher is first and foremost a person, and this
fact is the most important and determining thing about
him."15 As the competencies approach has met with such
universal failure, it is suggested that the "self as
instrument" approach is a much more viable means of
educating teachers as "effective teaching calls for the
discovery of one's own personal idiom." Combs suggests
that the good teacher be defined as one who is " . . . a
unique human being who has learned to use himself
effectively and effeciently to cargy out his own and
societies purposes in the education of others."16. The
remainder of BET is devoted to showing how teacher
.education institutions can go about developing such an
individual.

Combs feels that Third Force Psychology or the

Perceptual—existential approach can both provide us with

 

luPET, p. 6.
ISPET, p. 10.

16PET, p. 9.

 

117

a concept of this unique individual and how to go about
facilitating the growth of this individual in teacher
education programs. Combs sees three principles as basic
to this perceptual-existential approach. The three
principles are essentially contained in our analysis of

Individual Behavior but let us briefly review these in

 

order to make fully explicit at this point Combs's basic
orientation.
The basic principle which was dealt with in Chapter

II is that "all behavior of a person is the direct result

 

of his field of perception at the moment of his _ A
behaving."17 As competencies are overt behavior they can
only be a "symptom" of the actual cause of behavior and
'thus we must conclude that:

If behavior is a function of perception, it

follows that teacher education must concern

itself with the inner life of its students.

Simple exposure to subject matter is not

enough. The maturation of an effective pro-

fessional worker requires-changes in the

student's perceptions--his feelings, attitudes,

and beliefs and his understandings of himself

and his world.18

‘A second principle is that of all the perceptions

which a person holds the most important are those
concerning himself or his self—concept. How a

perspective teacher sees and feels about himself is

 

17PET, p. 12.

18PET, p. in.

118

essential to effectiVe and efficient classroom behavior.
It is further noted that the self—concept of the good
teacher must be basically positive. Teachers must have
adequate self~concepts in the same manner as we noted
the adequate personality must have positive perceptions

of self.

' '1

The third principle is that all people have a basic

 

need for adequacy and are continually striving in the
process of being and becoming to achieve a greater degree

of adequacy. This we noted was a striving for self-

I Mm LWA “m -
G o ' -

maintenance and enhancement. The important implication
of this principle for programs of teacher education is
that students who are learning to become teachers do not
need to be motivated to become good teachers as
efficient behavior is a basic need of the human being.
Thus, "Students may not be motivated as their teachers
would like, but they are always motivated in terms of
their own basic need."19 The teachers of teachers need
not be concerned with any particular competencies as
individual competencies will be the result of the
students incessant striving to become adequate.

If people are always motivated to become as

adequate as they can, they are seeking the same

goals for themselves that their teachers ought

to be seeking for them! The task of the teacher

is not one of perscribing, making, molding,

forcing, coercing, or cajoling; it is one of
ministering to a process already in being. The

 

19PET, p. 16.

119

role required of the teacher is that of

facilitator, encourager, helper, assister,

colleague, and friend of the students.

The Helping Relationship
Thus, because students are always motivated to be

the best that they can be, Combs suggests that the role
of the teacher of teachers be seen in terms of what he 3
calls the helping relationship. This relationship
Combs maintains is a way of relating to people which

facilitates the person's constant striving for adequacy,

and the helping relationship is common to all good

 

counselors, teachers, administrators, clergymen, and
psychotherapists. Combs notes that Fiedler21 when
studying this relationship found that experienced
therapists from all schools of psychotherapy were in
basic agreement as to what this relationship is and
also that "the man on the street" could describe this
relationship as well as the experts. Combs concludes
from this that "It would appear from this that there
is such a thing as a good human relationship, and that
all of us, professional or not, as a consequence of
our experience are able more or less explicitly to

recognize it when we meet it."22

 

20PET, p. 16.

21F. E. Fiedler, "The Concept of An Ideal
'Pherapeutic Relationship," J. Consulting Psychology,
.1950, 1", 239-295-

22PET, p. 17.

120

In duplicating Fiedler's study with a group of
"very good" and "very poor" teachers Combs found that
both groups of teachers were in basic agreement as to
what the ideal helping relationship is in good
teaching. Using the Q-sort method Combs found the
following agreement among good and poor teachers as
to the nature of effective teaching.

Characteristics of the Helping Relationship

1. The teacher directs and guides the student.
The teacher sees the student as a co-worker
on a common problem.

. The teacher greatly encourages and reassures

the student.

The teacher really tries to understand the

student's feelings.

The teacher usually maintains rapport with

the student.

The teacher is well able to understand the

student's feelings.

. The teacher is sympathetic with the student.

. The teacher gives and takes in the situations.

 

5....

mflmmzw

Characteristics of Poor.Teaching

. The teacher is hostile toward the student.

The teacher is rejecting to the students.

. .The teacher's own needs completely interfere
with his understanding of the student.

. The teacher is very unpleasant to the student.
The teacher feels disgusted by the student.
The teacher is seductive toward the student.
The teacher is punitive. A

The teacher cannot maintain rapport with the
student.2

CDNChU'l-l: wan-4

Given this evidence, Combs concludes that if both
good and poor teachers can agree as to the nature of the

helping relationship, then it must be something other

 

23A. w. Combs and D. W. Soper, "The Helping
Relationship as Described by 'Good' and 'Poor' teachers,"
J. of Teacher Education, 1963, 1A, 6u-68.

121

than the ability to describe this relationship which
is condusive to good teaching. "It means that, to be
truly successful in turning out superior teachers, it
is not enough to help students see more clearly what
good teaching relationships are like. Apparently they
know this already!"2u For Combs there is a vast
difference between knowing and behaving and teachers
colleges must be concerned with much more than the
knowing capacities of its students. This something
other with which the college must concern itself is
the content and organization of the perceptual fields
of its students.25 "Whether an individual will be an
effective teacher depends upon the nature of his
private world of perceptions. It follows that the
perceptual world of the student must be a matter of
vital concern to teacher—education problems."26

Colleges of teacher-education must be concerned
with five major areas of the perceptual organization
of its students. The perceptual organization of the
good teacher is such that it is crucial for the teacher
to have:

1. Rich, extensive, and available perceptions
about his subject field.

 

2“Ibid, p. 66.

25A. Combs, "Can We Measure Good Teaching
Objectively?", N.E.A. Journal, 196A, 53, 3A-36+.

26PET, p. 19.

1 Kin-T v1; m1. 9!!qu

122

Accurate perceptions about what people are like.

Perceptions of self leading to adequacy.

. Accurate perceptions about the purposes and
process of learning.

5. Personal perceptions about appropriate methods

for carrying out his purposes.

JIWN

In order to facilitate a person who is characterized by the
helping relationship, colleges must thoroughly deal with
these areas. The remainder of EET is devoted to the expli-
cation of these five areas and the appropriate educational
environment which can facilitate the helping relationship.

A Critical Analysis of Combs's
Basic Orientation

 

Combs's introduction in EET contains many fallacious
lines of thought and is essentially vague although highly
emotive. I wish to point out only a few of the more
critical arguments and assertions. Much has already been
noted in Chapters II, III, and IV about the theoretical
soundness of the three major principles of the perceptual—
existential approach, so I should like to concentrate
mainly on the notions of the "competencies approach" and
what Combs terms as basic agreement concerning the
"helping relationship".

It was noted in an earlier footnote (9) that the
competencies which are mentioned in EET are not
behavioral, that is, from the statement of these

competencies, no one could begin to identify what is

 

27PET p. 20.

 

123

‘meant by the statement. This is crucial to Combs's
argument concerning the competencies approach to good
teaching, and to the notion of being able to predict
outcomes of using certain methods and environments for
the development of effective teachers.

Combs maintains that we cannot objectively measure
what good teaching is and then proceeds as a scientist
to describe the qualities of the perceptual field of
an effective teacher which supposedly causes behavior
on the teacher's part which facilitates learning. It
should be recalled that in Chapter II the problems of
causality and objectivity were dealt with and the
criticism of Combs's views on these two problems is
very applicable here. Combs is essentially saying in
his introduction to EET that we cannot scientifically
identify or produce good teachers and then proceeds
in the name of science to show why it cannot be done.
He then "scientifically" describes the perceptual
organization of the effective teacher and devotes the
remainder of the book to showing how it can be developed.
If we cannot describe objeCtively what we are attempting
to develop in programs of teacher-education, colleges
of teacher-education have no reason to use any
particular method or set any kind of environment for
its students.

Combs is essentially correct in noting that

1competencies approaching in the past have failed to

 

12A

specify the nature of good teaching, however, the
argument can be made that the reason for this is not
that it cannot be done, but rather that the people
responsible for the education of teachers have not
been very scientifically responsible. The list of
competencies contained in EET does not have one

r
behaviorally stated competency which entails that

‘2. J

the people responsible for developing these behaviors

could not because of a lack of agreement as to what

m"f.' IL - C'x

was to be developed. Thus to conclude that effective

 

15"; " L-Lnl

teaching cannot be described in terms of specific
traits, characteristics, or competencies is not
necessarily valid as from the initial unscientific
endeavor to describe successful teaching one cannot
conclude that a more scientific endeavor would not
succeed.

Combs essentially concludes from the inability
of competencies approaches in the past to identify
objectively that effective teachers have common traits
that we must have a subjective view of teacher-education.
I would like to suggest that such a proposal would
essentially place teacher-education in the same position
as the ineffective competencies approach. The trouble
with the competencies approaches in the past has been
that they were what can be termed subjectively based
theories of teacher-education for the simple reason that

the theories had no scientific validity. The basic

125

problem of teachers in the field of teacher—education
is that they must draw from the behavioral sciences
which to this point have behavioral scientists only
limited power of prediction.

The major problem of the behavioral sciences is
that there has been little concern for the problems
of metatheory as it related to the theoretical ,
formulation of these sciences. The basic problem is :
that of developing an objective logic which can .

adequately evidence the relationships involved in

 

the objects which come under the domains of these ;
sciences. The problem of prediction as it relates to
human behavior is indeed a complicated one as it appears
that the logic of the physical sciences is incapable of
handling this relationship, however, the problem
cannot be skirted by another form of subjectivism if
we are to develop adequate programs of teacher-education.
The problem of prediction versus facilitation is
crucial to what Combs calls the "helping relationship"
as he would seemingly conclude that the setting of
environments which would cause or control the behavior
of students to be bad. However, Combs does in fact
specify that certain types of environments better
produce effective teachers. It would appear cruCial
that the distinction between control and facilitation

be made more explicit in this regard.

126

Thus to conclude that the effective teacher is a
"unique individual" simply because the competencies
approach has failed in the past is an unwarranted
conclusion. Aside from the unwarrantedness of the
conclusion, the conclusion is essentially vague and
meaningless. Of course the teacher is a "unique
personality" as are all individuals whether teachers
or not. The further conclusion that "a good teacher
is first and foremost a person" is somewhat of a
platitude which does not even depend on the soundness
of the preceding argument for the conclusion.

In defining the good teacher as one who is
" . . . a unique human being who has learned to use
himself effectively and efficiently to carry out his
own and societies purposes in the education of others,"
Combs has done us little more service than the
traditional competencies approaches to teacher-education.
The definition is not stated in behavioral terms which
means that it is impossible to identify the individual
whom he is attempting to describe which means that we
have no idea of what we are attempting to develop. The
definition, however, does have a good deal of emotive
force in our present culture in terms of a long standing
tradition which emphasizes the position of the individual
over against larger organizations. The question as to~
what the important characteristics of the individual

are and why they are the important characteristics is

127

a question which cannot be answered by perceptual
psychology and thus to state that the teacher is a
unique person or individual is quite meaningless given
the theoretical framework of the theory.

Of the three principles which are basic to the
perceptual-existential approach, we have already dealt
with the first two at length. However, let us briefly
review them in terms of their significance for programs
of teacher-education. We noted that the assertion

that all the behavior of a given person is the direct

r I‘MWVLK'»! ”mam

result of his field of perception is a limited concept
in any attempt to explain that behavior because it
assumes that the individual can be the explanatory
principle for himself. The principle is essentially a
subjectivist orientation to science itself and
compounded with the problem of being unable to use
this prinCiple in complex moral and social issues,
the utility of the assumption becomes highly questionable.
Further, in that the perceptual field is not empirically
available to the scientist, it is not at all evident
how this better enables us to understand or predict
human behavior.

The second principle, that of all the perceptions
which a person holds about himself the most important
are those contained in his self-concept, is directly

related to the first principle. The perceptions which

128

one holds may in fact be a cause of his behavior and
the self-concept which a person has of himself may

be the most important of these perceptions, however,
aside from the validity of the statement, it should

be seen that in the study of human behavior these
perceptions are of little consequence as the data which

they might provide is not accessible to the teacher or

Ji 1"" “LL!

the scientist.

Of the third principle, I would like to deal

.- «- “C» '1'..- -.

somewhat more at length as I feel that this principle

 

deals with the area of trust and a basic attitude
towards human beings. The principle is that all people
have a basic need for adequacy and are continually
striving to become the best that they can be.
Consequently, you can trust people to choose what is
best for them in a given situation. A corollary to
this would be that if one gives a student a chance
that he will in fact solve these problems which are
necessary for his survival. I have used sensitivity
'or what Rogers calls encounter groups28 in teaching
my own classes in Foundations of Education and
inevitably what myself and my students have learned
is that if you are to learn and learn about yourself

in a situation which calls for interpersonal

 

~28Carl Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus, Ohio:;
Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co. 1969), pp. BOA-307.

129

relationships, you must trust the other individuals
involved in the situation. Research on teacher
expectation also shows that there is a definite
tendency toward a self-fulfilling prophecy in a
classroom situation.29 There is a definite tendency
to get from people what you expect of them. To view
the human being as being basically motivated toward
evil or bad behavior tends to produce this behavior
in those individuals.

I would further suggest that this third principle

 

has profound implications for the notion of positive a g»-
perceptions of self as notions of Self-worth and trusting
oneself are intimately involved in a basic trust of the
human being. I also suggest that this third principle
of Combs can be behaviorally defined although he does
not do so in any formal way. Trust I believe can be
seen in terms of the expectation that a given individual
will behave in a manner which will solve those problems
necessary to his continued existence. Trust on the
part of the teacher means simply allowing students to
solve those problems which their environment dictates to
them.

The notion of the environment is crucial here

because people will only attempt to solve those problems

 

29Lenore Jacobson and Robert Rosenthal, Pygmalion
in the Classroom (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1968) ppo 3-100

 

130

which their environment wills that they solve. Thus,
a person wills what his environment demands that he
will and further will solve those problems which his
environment will allow him to solve. I would like at
this point to include a long quote from Jordan because
he expresses this so well.

Not only is it true that property, as incorporate
in the social structure, is the instrument of the
individual's will, even while he is following his
most subjective and personal interests and
purposes; but the same corporate property is the
instrument and object of all the common

motives and activities of man when those motives
and activities have conditions favorable to their
realization. That is to say, before there can be
any act of any person that has a guarantee of
reaching its proper end, there must be a system

of environmental things set up in institutions as

a stage upon which this act is to take place . . .
This system of things alone can give reality to

his ends. But this means that these things

become the embodiment of his will; and to an extent
greater than we know, the spontaneity and freedom
of direction of will-energies come to be determined
by the body of things through which they work. That
is to say, that to a greater extent than we are
aware our action is dictated to us by the setup of
fact in which we find ourselves immersed. What we
are to do, how to do it, what is to be the end-—a11
are largely predetermined in the institutional
structure, which suggests the action and is thus
responsible for the idea or impulse from which the
action flows.

Thus, although we can and need to believe that the intent
of the individual is basically good, good intent is not
enough and trust in that intent is not enough as the

individual needs the proper environment that his intent

 

30E. Jordan, The Good Life (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, l9h97] p. 1h“.

 

 

131

may be realized in good ends; and the teacher of teachers,
although needing to trust the will of the students has

the extremely difficult task of setting an environment
which will produce good results from good intentions.

One cannot but agree with Combs that there must be
an initial relationship of trust set up by the teacher
and I believe that if colleges of teacher—education would
set up an environment in which this trust could be
displayed, this would produce more effective teaching‘
behavior in students who are to become teachers. However,
it also must be seen that people although motivated to
become the best that they can be cannot will to be the
best they can unless the institutional environment
facilitates this. Thus, if we are to develop adequate
personalities in programs of teacher—education, we must
begin to see that the structure and content of the
active perceptual field or mind is dependent upon the
order of the objects in which it exists. This is
exactly what perceptual theory cannot do because the
individual perceptual field is its basic unit of
analysis. Perceptual psychology.can induce people to
behave in a trustingmanner, however, it does not provide
the theoretical basis in which this trust can be used to
produce proper ends in teacher education. I would also
suggest that its theoretical base cannot even enable

students to understand what trust actually is.

 

132

We should further note that there is a much
broader implication of the above considerations for the
person concerned with the professional education of
teachers than simply the arena of the classroom. The
perceptual field of the student is not only dependent
upon the institutional structure of the school but also
on the other institutions of our culture. This has vast
ramifications for the necessity of political activity
and prowess of the college instructor and equally for

the education of those who would also attempt to

 

develop adequate personalities in children. It implies L“
that good education cannot take place in an immoral
society. The means used to produce the good teacher
are also ethical and political problems as the perceptual
field is ultimately dependent on the total cultural
order.31

Inasmuch as perceptual theory does not have an
adequate social and cultural theory, it cannot provide
the basis for the ordering of a curriculum which can
produce the best a person can be nor is it an adequate
tool for teachers when they leave the college
environment. Given perceptual theory, a teacher can
trust thata student will learn those things necessary
to "get along" in his environment and this may mean

that students will learn things which are not supportive

‘

2 831Barnett and Otis, Corporate Society and Education,
p. 2 o

133

of the development of the self-actualized individual.
Students may well become the worst that they could be
given trust and a chaotic environment.

Combs also seems to implicitly recognize the fact
that the institutional environment is a dominating
factor in human behavior. In dealing with personal
change he says: A

Personal change is not an objective problem;
it is a subjective one. Objective analysis of
self has been vastly over-rated as a device for
personality change. Effective changes in self
are not brought about by picking at the self.
This practice can even be highly destractive.
Changes in behavior, including changes in one's
personality, are most effectively brought about,
not by introspection and analysis, but through
slow changes in perceptions about outside events
and their relation to the self.32
Aside from the ambiguous use of the words "objective"
and "subjective" there is implicit in the quote the
recognition of the fact that the relation of the self
to its environment is extremely important. However,
also implicit is the assumption that the self is
something other than those relationships. It is the
latter assumption which we have found to be the basis
for the position that the natural individual is the
basic unit for scientific analysis and it is here that
we Can see the major weakness of perceptual theory.

The individual is his relationship to his environment

and it is solely through the analysis of this

 

32m: p- 76-

 

“. .‘O

13A

environment that we can understand the individual. As
Barnett and Otis note: "Relations constitute the
reality of the individual's personality. The order of
fact constituting the church is a relational medium
for the individual and becomes the content and principle
of the individual's life."33 This too is true of the
individual in his relation to the institutional
environment of the school.

Without a thorough examination of the relationship

I of the individual to his cultural environment, the

 

517:).

problem of the scientific explanation and prediction of
behavior becomes unsolvable as it precludes the
possibility of the development of a social logic which
would support such explanation and prediction. Thus,

the notions of the difference between control and the
facilitation of behavior contained in EET become vague

and incapable of being distinguished without an adequate
social or ethical theory. This brings us to the notion
of the "helping relationship" which supposedly corresponds
to Dr. Combs's notion of facilitation.

It was noted that a study by Combs and Soper
indicated that there is basic agreement about the nature
of good teaching and that this could be seen in terms of
the agreement of both good and bad teachers about the

nature of the helping relationship, and the characteristics

 

33Barnett and Otis, pp. 32, 33.

135

of poor teaching. What then of this basic agreement
from which Combs concludes that there is a common
recognition of a good human relationship?

It can be seen on a careful analysis of the
characteristics listed on page (120) that there is
reason to doubt about what the teachers in the study

were agreeing upon. A useful distinction here which r

‘-|“‘

Blackington makes is that between substantial or
grounded and nominal agreement.3u Nominal agreement

can be seen as an agreement that certain words or E

 

phrases should be used in a certain context, however,
this does not necessarily mean that there is agreement
as to the meanings of the words used. Substantial or
grounded agreement is agreement as to what the words
.mean in terms of their actually designating particular
objects or events. Thus to use the phrase "That child
reads well" does not at all entail that all people
using the phrase mean the same thing by it; different
people may use the phrase and mean many different
things by it. To get grounded agreement, one would
have to specify those activities and characteristics
to which the phrase corresponds.

It should be noted that none of the phrases on

which there was agreement as to the characteristics of

 

3”Frank Blackington, "The Continuing Dilemma in
American-Education," Chapter II, (an unpublished
manuscript).

136

good teaching were stated in behavioral terms, that is,
from the phrase itself it is impossible to identify any
specific behavior which corresponds to the phrase. The
question must be raised as to what the subjects of the
experiment were agreeing to. I would strongly suggest
that the participants were agreeing to the use of the
phrase when describing good teaching and that the
question of substantial agreement is open. The phrases
in question contain some very emotionally positive words

and given the structure of our language, it would be

I 11.11 ”M'WLA"€_M-LL2_

very difficult to separate these words from the word 1

 

"good".

On inspection of the phrases we find words and.
phrases such as "directs and guides", "co-worker",
"greatly encourages and reassures", "really tries to
understand", "maintains rapport", "able to understand
the student's feelings", "sympathetic", and "gives and
takes". These words obviously would not be used in
describing something in a negative way and they are all
very positive in their emotional appeal. The most that
Combs and Soper's study indicates is that all teachers
agree as to the proper words to use when attempting to
describe what good teaching is and does not indicate any
substantial agreement as to the meanings of these terms.
The study does indicate that both good and poor teachers
havethesame ability to use words correctly when

describing a teacher in a positive way.

137

Combs's conclusion that the evidence of the research
implies that we do not have to concentrate on helping
students see more clearly what a good teaching relationship
is must also be questioned. The study in no way evidences
that students or anyone else knows what good teaching is.
Combs indicates that colleges of teacher-education must

begin to concentrate on five major areas of their

“A. .‘nI‘II'
.
1

students' perceptual field. It should be noted that the
list on page 121 while supposedly not concerned with
knowledge of what the good teaching relationship is like

 

appear to be very much like kinds of knowledges of this

$5.“

. relationship. Each area is very much involved in some
particular domain of knowledge, and with the limited
concern for epistemological considerations, it is
difficult to see how perceptual theory would be a useful
tool for the teacher of teachers in developing these very
areas.

Combs's mistake is that he has taken the perceptual
field of the natural individual as his basic unit of
analysis and has concluded that if we could only learn
more about this field, we could better understand 1
individual behavior. The point is not that people do not
have perceptual fields or that these fields are
reasonible for behavior, but rather that individuals can
not be understood solely in terms of these fields. The
perceptual or better the conceptual.field of the natural

person can only be understood in terms of the objects to

138

which it is related in terms of its cultural environment.
The understanding of the behavior and acts of the natural
person is to its core an epistemological problem and
Combs's lack of consideration for these problems is the
major weakness in both his psychological and social I
theory.

Combs's emphasis on the wide gap between knowing

.4.‘.‘.‘:'_"1
's

and behaving is essentially a worthwhile distinction as
we do not always behave in the best way we know how. I
always know better than I do, however, the proposal

that this gap between knowing and behaving may be t

 

bridged by concentrating on the perceptual fields of
students is no solution at all. The reason why people
do not behave as well as they know is that their willing
to behave in a certain manner is directly involved with
the nature of the institutional environment which wills
itself that good intents can be realized in behavior.
Thus, the major task of institutions of teacher-education
is to enable its students to adequately conceptualize
learning environments and this is a knowledge function.
If we are to behave as well as we know, we must be able
~to objectively conceptualize these institutional orders
so that the object orders of the institutions can be
reordered to facilitate the desired behaviors.

Inasmuch as values are basic determiners of the
arrangement or order of objects in institutional

environments, the prime problem of institutions of

139

teacher-education is a moral problem; that of determining
a basis for ethical decision-making. The point cannot be
too strongly made that this entails an objective ethical
metatheory which can facilitate the ordering of
institutions which can produce good behavior or acts.

The metatheoretical base of perceptual theory assumes
implicitly a position of ethical relativity which in no
way enables us to go about the business of reordering
teacher-training institutions or the society of which

they are a part.

 

The Language of Perceptual Theory
as aFPositive Reinforcer

-We have noted in our analysis of Combs's research on
the helping relationship that both good and poor teachers
were able to use the correct words in their description of
the good teacher. It should also be noted that this is a
concensual agreement in that it happens that our language
uses certain words in certain ways. Austin would say.
that they were agreeing to the pragmatic rules for the
use of a word (rules which indicate that certain words or
_phrases are to be used to perform a certain speech act
such as questioning, praising, describing, etc.) in an
illocutionary act rather than agreement on the syntactical
or semantical rules. I would suggest that the language
of perceptual theory conforms to the pragmatic rules for

the description of good teaching and as such it becomes

1A0

very difficult not to agree to the pragmatic way in
which it uses words.

The theoretical use of words and phrases which are
associated with the description of a "good" something
tends to illicit agreement on the part of the listener.
In that our language functions so as to consistently
use certain words for certain types of speech acts, one
can agree to the pragmatic use of the word without

agreeing to or even considering the syntactical and

wi. ‘.‘_

sematical use of the word. Thus, in terms of our

 

considerations with perceptual theory it can be seen that
there is a distinct possibility of agreement with its
pragmatic use of words rather than the syntactical and
semantical use which are more important to the theory as
a scientific and philosophical theory.

In his description of perceptual theory Combs uses
the following words and phrases: "personal," "dynamic,"
"treatment-oriented view of behavior," "a psychology
directly concerned with human perceptions beliefs and
values," "a here-and-now psychology," and "a psychology
concerned with face-to-face classroom relationships".35
It is indeed difficult to disagree with a theory which
has these concerns. However, it is difficult to agree

to the use of the theory as an epistemological enterprise

 

3513332, p. 58.

1A1

when there is little consideration given to these-concerns
in the theory.

In his description of the good teachers accurate
beliefs and perceptions about people Combs uses the
following phrases. The good teacher has

1. a general frame of reference that is internal

rather than external. -1
2. a concern with people and their reactions
rather than with things and events.
a concern with the perceptual experience of
people than with objective events. .
the capacity to perceive others as having g
the capacity to solve their own problems.
the capacity to see others as friendly and
enhancing.
the tendency to see people as being of worth
rather than unworthy.
the tendency to see people as essentially
trustworthy and dependable.

04‘ o‘ A" 7‘0"“..1

5W

'..\4L '

 

NOW

Again we can see that the phrases used have a great deal.
of emotional appeal. It would be difficult to even
understand the use of the words if they were stated in
negative terms such as "untrustworthy", "unconcern", and
"seeing others as unfriendly". It is indeed easy for
students who do not have a disposition to be concerned
about the syntactical and semantical aspects of a
theory to basically agree that perceptual theory is
what a theory should do and say things about teaching
the way they should be said.

I Perceptual theorists themselves should be very
concerned about the implications the above considerations

have for teacher-education. I noted earlier that it has

142

been my experience to see students and colleagues change as

a result of their exposure to perceptual theory, and that

their behavior did in fact change as a reault of this.
I would now like to suggest that this change came not
as a result of scientific power which the theory has

but as an identification with the classroom orientation

 

and procedures of those people they identify as being r7—
supporters of a perceptual orientation to behavior.

This may not have a good impact on what they eventually

do in the classroom, and, in terms of perceptual

theory, this cannot even be determined. I am personally i;

pleased when my students emulate my calssroom behavior,
yet I must be very wary as to whether or not this is
good and the reasons for my deciding one way or the
other. Students have a tendency to learn what their
educational environments show to them if either or both
the language patterns are pleasant and similar to what
they are used to hearing or want to hear or the physical
aspects of that environment are pleasant.

As a positive reinforcer either in terms of the
theory itself or the learning situation in which it is
advocated, perceptual theory creates conditions which'
train students rather than educate them. ~Students learn
the behaviors which they identify with the system,

however, the theory itself does not provide the

1&3

theoretical basis for the educating of these students

in terms of its problem solving power.36

Conclusion

 

The "self as instrument" approach to teacher-
education can be a viable constructif this can be seen
as necessitating an objectively valid conceptual system
which can enable the person to understand the conditions T”
for human action and his own capacities for action. The 1
individual and his conceptualization of his world is

very important, however individuals cannot understand

 

themselves or others apart from disciplined conceptual 2
systems. I find it difficult to see how perceptual
theory provides the framework which can produce a viable
conceptual system of the self as instrument in that it
does not provide an adequate basis for the understanding
of the self.
A person is more than the sum of his perceptions
and conceptualizations as these only find their meaning
interms of the cultural environment of the individual.
Effective programing for the educating of teachers must

of necessity focus on the institutional and cultural

 

35It should be noted that only a small portion of
EET_was analyzed. The reason why the remaining chapters
were not subjected to a thorough analysis is that these
chapters do not introduce any assumptions of import other
.than is contained in the basic orientation which Combs
provides in the book. An analysis of these chapters
would prove to bring out and exemplify points which have
already been dealt with at length.

1AA

realities of the individual's existential situation if
they are to produce people capable of handling and solving
the pressing educational problems of the day. These
institutions must provide an environment in which the
present institutional orders can be adequately
conceptualized and evaluated, and this means facing up

to the moral issues involved in the social order.
Traditionally teacher-education institutions have avoided
the value problems which are basic to the very existence

of the institutions. This avoidance cannot only be seen

 

in what has been called "the competencies approach" to .
teacher-education but also in more modern theories of

teacher-education such as the perceptual-existential

approach to the analysis of teachereeducation. Unless

these moral and value issues are made central concerns

in the formulation of educational theory, we will end

up and continue in the chaotic situation which has so

characterized education in the past.

BIBLOGRAPHY

1145

 

Farm.

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1A8

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I.

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