ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL‘BEHAVIOR IN RURAL
INDIA

' Dissértation for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY-
ARUNA NAYYAR MICH-IE'
'-~1975'

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ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL

BEHAVIOR IN RURAL INDIA

By

Aruna Nayyar Michie

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1975

I ' ABSTRACT

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR IN RURAL INDIA

BY

Aruna Nayyar Michie

This study is an attempt to discover the effects of agrarian
change on the political behavior of farmers, agricultural tenants and
landless labor in Rajasthan state, India. Agricultural change was
studied in the context of India's Intensive Agricultural Areas and High
Yielding Varieties Programmes. The field work was done in two villages
of Jaipur and Bharatpur districts of Rajasthan from July 1972 to June
1973. Data were processed in India from June through August 1973.

The study has its origins in political development literature
which emphasizes the uneven nature of economic development that results
in strains on the political system. This tends to occur in "developing"
countries when new institutions of government are characterized by low
levels of legitimacy. It is partially a result of the dichotomization
in the minds of economists and political scientists alike between growth
and the social and political ramifications of change. This dichotomy
in practice is reinforced by the configuration of power on the village
level.

In order to study the impact of agricultural change on political
behavior, the methodology of political economy suggested by Norman T.

Uphoff and Warren Ilchmanl was followed. The analysis is focused on the

Aruna Nayyar Michie

effects of change on the maximization of growth and equality (social and
economic) as these goals are posited by Government of India for the nation.

It was found that programs for agricultural production have
increased economic and social inequality in rural areas. The dispersal
of public goods and services and judicious use of patronage by local
elites however, has legitimized the role of a Congress Party-dominated
government as the main distributor of values in society. The adapta—
tion of "traditional" economic and political forms (particularly patron-
client relationships) to the modern political system serves to make
landless tenants and laborers more dependent economically on landed
elites. This is occurring at the same time as agrarian change, parti-
cularly mechanization, makes the elite less dependent on the services
of these groups.

The Congress Party has won the support of the landless by promising
to abolish untouchability, provide land to the tiller, and by the pro-
vision of public services. All of these measure, though largely sym-
bolic, have increased the villager's perceptions of the Congress Party's
capacity which enables it to continue winning elections even though its
programs for agricultural change increase polarization.

Data were collected using a combination of survey research and
participant observation. The questionnaires used are appended to the
study. Finally, policy alternatives are suggested which should maximize
the government's own goals of growth with equality. Their implementa-
tion requires a different perception of political expediency on the part

of ruling elites in India.

 

1Norman T. Uphoff and Warren F. Ilchman, The Political Economy of
Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

 

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL

BEHAVIOR IN RURAL INDIA

By

Aruna Nayyar Michie

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1975

© Copyright by
ARUNA NAYYAR MICHIE

1975

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many persons to whom I owe a great debt for their
assistance in different capacities and stages of this study. The
Department of Political Science, Michigan State University provided
financial assistance for my graduate work through a teaching assistant-
ship. My committee chairman, Timothy M. Hennessey, and the committee
members: Frank Pinner and Robert W. Jackman helped to shape the pro—
ject and offered assistance any time it was needed. I owe much to
their patience and ability. Former members of the committee who
either left Michigan State University or were on leave when the study
was written up, also helped formulate the problem and field approach:
David V. J. Bell, John Collins, Alan P. Grimes, Robert Melson, Ellen
P. Mickiewicz, and Nicholaas Luykx of the Department of Agricultural
Economics. Masuma Downie helped edit the final draft and Judy DeJaegher
patiently typed the final copy.

The field research was funded by a grant from the Midwest
Universities Consortium for International Acitivities, Inc. Richard 0.
Niehoff, former Liaison Officer, was especially helpful and understand-
ing about the delay in conducting field work necessitated by the Indo-
Pakistan war of 1971. The grant was handled by Michigan State University
through the Asian Studies Center under the direction of William T. Ross.
Funding for data processing was provided by a grant-in-aid from the

Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, to the National

iii

iv

Council of Applied Economic Research, Delhi. The continuing interest
of Shri J. P. Naik, Member-Secretary, ICSSR was especially heartening
when I would get depressed by the research findings. Members of the
Statistical Laboratory at NCAER under the direction of Shri B. K. Mitra
processed the data. Their warmth and interest will never be forgotten.
Though I am grateful for the assistance from these institutions, full
responsibility for the study is mine. The views expressed herein are
my own and do not reflect those of the agencies or their personnel.

Field sponsorship and affiliation were provided by the Department
of Political Science, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. I am extremely
grateful to Shri S. P. Verma, former Chairman of the department for the
sponsorship and to Dr. Iqbal Narain for his guidance. Shri K. C. Panda
and Shri P. C. Mathur spent hours with me working on the questionnaire
and approach. With their background and experience in Indian rural
research, they pointed out variables which I otherwise would not have
considered. Shri Nirmal Singh, Department of Sociology, University of
Rajasthan also discussed the project with me and offered useful sugges-
tions. The warmth and hospitality shown my husband and myself by these
persons as well as Dr. C. P. Bhambhri of Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi, and Professor T. K. N. Unnithan, Head of the Department of
Sociology will always be remembered. To Dr. Bhambhri we owe a special
debt as he encouraged and facilitated our association with the
University of Rajasthan.

The University of Udaipur, Department of Extension Education was
instrumental in assisting field work done in Bharatpur district. Here
the assistance given by Dr. D. K. Misra, Shri M. S. Lodha, and Shri

Godhara was greatly appreciated. Shri Godhara took days out of his busy

schedule in Bharatpur to take us to a number of villages before we
decided upon "Shivpura." Having known members of the department pre-
viously, it was also a matter of personal satisfaction to renew our
association.

Shri Ram Singh, Home Commissioner, Government of Rajasthan expe-
dited official clearance for the research. Shri V. S. Verma, Director,
Census of Rajasthan not only showed us great hospitality, but gave us
valuable suggestions in sample selection and methods of census taking.
Electoral statistics were obtained from the Election Commission, Jaipur.
Shri P. R. Mehendiratta, Director, American Institute of Indian Studies,
New Delhi,and his staff, though bearing no formal responsibility for me,
helped in numerous ways: by their hospitality and assistance in solving
administrative matters with a minimum of tribulation.

But the study is based on field work. The persons in the districts
and villages where I worked are perhaps the most important. The exten-

sion personnel at the panchayat samitis of "Hanumangarh" and Kumher

 

gave freely of their time to discuss problems of extension, fertilizer,
pesticides, and seed. The Patwaris in Hanumangarh and Shivpura, espec-
ially the former, spent literally hours lecturing on land tenure systems
and legislation in Rajasthan. They also helped make up lists of farm-
ers, tenants and laborers from which the samples were drawn. The

sarpanchas and other elected officials of both villages talked freely

 

about agriculture and change and personally saw to our housing and com-
fort. Obviously, were it not for the openness with which informants
talked with me this study could never have been done. Though each inter-
view took approximately one and a half hours, better than twice that

amount of time was Spent with each family and neighbors as they offered

vi

a meal, milk, or simply took advantage of my presence to ask a range

of questions about the United States, Delhi, or even if Neil Armstrong
really landed on the moon. Were there to be a dedication of this study,
it would be to the persons interviewed, and particularly to Kalu Khatik
(whom the reader will meet) and his kind who will be instrumental in
shaping rural politics in the years to come.

Finally, a long standing intellectual debt is owed to my parents
who are almost exclusively responsible for arousing my curiosity about
sectors of my country that, given my urban origins, I might otherwise
have had no inclination to explore. My mother's years and rural study
and discussions with myself helped point directions in which I might
proceed. And my debt to my husband is great. While doing his own
field work and writing he not only acted as a support for mine, but also

spent hours discussing and arguing points of this study with me.

List of Tables.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER I. THE ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER II. THE SETTING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER III. THE SPREAD OF AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION . . . . .
CHAPTER IV. CHANGES IN SECURITY 0F TENURE AND EMPLOYMENT .
CHAPTER V. PERCEPTIONS OF WELL-BEING. . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER VI. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASIS.
CHAPTER VII. POLITICAL OPTIONS: ACTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS.
CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . . .
APPENDICES:

APPENDIX A. FIELD METHODS AND PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . .
APPENDIX B. THE RESPONDENTS QUESTIONNAIRE. . . . . . . . .
APPENDIX C. THE LEADERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE . . . . . . . . . .
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . .

vii

. viii

xi

ll

36

69

104

128

148

167

198

227

233

252

255

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

3.8

3.9

3.10

3.11

3.12

3.13

4.1

4.2

LIST OF TABLES

The Distribution of Candidates, Seats, and
Votes in Lok Sabha Elections, 1952-67 . .

The Distribution of Candidates, Seats, and
Votes in State Assembly Elections, 1952-67.

Hierarchy of Castes in Hanumangarh and Shivpura .
Sample Breakdown by Strata. . .
Adoption of Hybrid Seed by Crop and Farm Size . . . .

Intention to Use Hybrid Seed in the Future
by Farm Size. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Use of Chemical Fertilizers by Farm Size. . . . .

Intention to Use Chemical Fertilizers in the
Future by Farm Size . . . . . . . . . . .

Use of Chemical Pesticides by Farm Size . .

Percent of Irrigated Land by Farm Size.

Utilization of Credit by Farm Size.

Leaders Identified by Respondents . . . . . . . . .

Whether Respondents Have Difficulty Getting Inputs
On Time by Farm Size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Who Respondents Feel Get the Inputs Readily .
Availability of Credit by Size of Farm.
Sources of Credit Used by Farm Size . . . . . . . . .

Whether Respondents Use Extension Advice by
Farm Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reasons Why It is More Difficult to Lease Land. . . .

Whether Agricultural Laborers Find More or Less
Employment in Agriculture Now Than Previously . .

viii

4O

41

57

66

71

71

73

73

75

76

78

85

86

87

88

9O

93

113

115

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

4.3

5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

5.6

5.7

5.8

5.9

5.10

5.11

6.1

6.2

6.3

6.4

6.5

7.1

7.2

7.3

7.4

ix
Whether Farmers Require More or Less Non-Family
Labor Now . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Respondents' Evaluation of Levels of Well-Being .
Respondents' Perceived Changes in Food Intake .
Respondents' Perceptions of Changes in Income .

Groups of People Considered to be Better Off by
Respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Percent of Sample Strata Perceiving Specific Groups
are Better Off. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Perceived Changes in Village Conditions by Sample
Strata. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Perceived Reasons for Changes in Village Conditions
by Sample Strata. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Respondents' Perceived Needs. . . . . . . . . .
Others' Needs as Perceived by Respondents .

Respondents' Perceptions of Who Can Fulfill Their
Needs 0 O O C O O O O C O O O C C O O C C O O 0

Responsibility for Distribution of Inputs .
Respondents' Perceptions of the Family Vote .
Respondents' Perceptions of Caste Vote. .

Bases on Which Respondents Feel Their Families
Make Political Choices. . . . . . . . . .

Bases on Which Respondents Feel Their Caste
Community Makes Political Choices . . . . .

Bases on Which Individual Respondents Make
Political Choices . . . . . . . . . . . .

Respondents' Perceptions of the Importance of
Voting by Farm Size . . . . . . . . . .

Reasons Why Respondents Feel Voting is Important
by Farm Size. 0 O O O O O C O O O O O 0

Issues Felt to be Individually Important.

Issues Considered Important by Friends.

124

129

132

133

134

136

138

139

142

143

146

147

152

152

155

156

157

168

169

171

172

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

7.5

7.6

7.7

7.8

7.9

7.10

7.11

7.12

7.13

Issues Considered Important by Villagers.

Respondents' Perceptions of Why People's Welfare
Is the Task of Political Leaders and Officers

by Farm Size. . . . . . . .

Respondents' Views of Whether Parties Can Control

Government. . . . . . . . .

Respondents' Perceptions About Whether Leaders

Take an Interest in Their Well-Being.

Why Respondents Feel Leaders Are Not Interested

in Them . . . . . . . . . .

Have Problems Ever Been Discussed With Leaders? .

Changes Respondents Would Like to See in the

Functioning of Government .

How Respondents Feel Desired Changes May Be

Effected. . . . . . . . . .

Respondents' Voting Record. .

173

175

177

178

179

180

184

185

188

Figure 2.1
Figure 2.2

Figure 3.1

LIST OF FIGURES

Rajasthan State. . . . . . . . . . .

Electoral-Administrative Structures in India .

Output Per Hectare For Farm Size Groups.

xi

43

44

98

INTRODUCTION

This study has its origins in questions raised in my mind over
several years. Where one's interests originate is probably less impor-
tant than the shape they assume through work and study, both of which
have been instrumental here. Armed with an undergraduate degree in
Government, I had the unique opportunity of spending almost two years
in the rural areas of Rajasthan state, India. In an administrative
capacity, it was my task to "programme" young Americans into rural work
to aid India's rural development. I had the chance to see how schemes
are conceptualized and their implementation at the local level.

The experience raised more questions than it answered. Changes
in rural India have been vast since independence in 1947. The exten-
sion of education and other social services into the countryside are
not simply statistics: the qualitative differences are consequential.
The establishment of an open political system encouraging participation
and free political activity has also made a difference to people's
lives. Finally, government's assumption of responsibility for its
citizens' welfare including the intention to pursue economic growth
.wigh social and economic equality has given the political process a
unique flavor.

What then raises the questions? The main issue is that the goal
of economic growth -- important though it is -- has taken precedence

over the longer range ones of equality and social justice. Aside from

my own observations (which are admittedly limited) other observers have
been struck by both the lack of change or growth in certain areas, and
the increasing disparities in economic well-being between those who
have always had, and those for whom sufficient food, clothing and shel-
ter remain a dream. Not only journalists and scholars (Indian and for-
eign) but the Government of India itself has recognized the problem.
Solutions are sought, and it is partially toward this effort that this
study is directed. There is a recognition that the very policies
enacted to aid the 40% or so of India's citizens who live below the
officially recognized level of subsistence, have often served to cut
them off from sources of employment, lowering their already abysmal
levels of existence.

Nature too has played a cruel role. Droughts and floods occur
with alarming frequency. Just as the bumper harvests of 1968-69 raised
hopes of self-sufficiency in basic food grains, drought wiped out all
gains. Combined with the floods of 1974, the spectre of famine once
again was raised on the sub-continent. The euphoria of technical break-
throughs in the hybridization of cereals, the Green Revolution, was
replaced by questions such as "... will the Green Revolution turn Red?"l

Since field work was undertaken for this study in 1972-73, another

variable has affected growth: petroleum prices. The new varieties of

 

1A joke once heard about India's problems is as follows: One day
as God was returning home after a full day's work, he heard someone
crying. Turning to see who it was, he found it was the Egyptian
President worried about the Middle East situation. God consoled him
and went on his way. He soon hear another crying voice and found it
was the American President concerned about Viet Nam. God consoled him
also, and just as he had almost reached home,1u3heard another cry.
Returning to earth he found Indira Gandhi in a pool of tears. And God
cried too.

Anonymous.

seed require high doses of chemical fertilizers of which nitrogeneous
ones are especially important. The cost of naptha and other products
such as diesel has risen beyond India's capacity to pay for them.

Beyond these "external" setbacks however, the basic trends of
India's chosen development strategy persist: those who already have
continue to gain often at the expense of those without. As resources
Iggg scarce, the former persons are in a better position to acquire them.
Several points should be noted in this regard.

First, a commitment was made by India's nationalist movement under
the umbrella of the Indian National Congress to economic growth with
equality. The assumption was that overall growth would be reflected in
an increased living standard for all, and that this could be attained
concomitantly with the goal of equality: both economic and social.
These principles are laid out in India's constitution. Each planning
document and every major political party since independence has paid at
least lip-service to them. These goals, however, and the means evolved
for their attainment are the product of an urban and landed rural minor-
ity. While one cannot presume to comment on the strength of the commit-
ment to either growth or equality, one can draw attention to the follow-
ing observable points.

How growth wi£h_equality is to be attained has never been spelled
out. The strategies for growth have emerged over a period of years
since independence. These normally have emphasized production targets
over their impact on social, economic or political relationships.1 In

fact, equitable growth is seen as contradictory to economic development

 

1A8 will be shown below in Chapter I, this is not unique to India.

because (given the skewed distribution of wealth already present) it
involves a radical redistribution of property which is thought to be
counter-productive to growth, at least in the short to medium term.

Second, the particular strategy for agricultural growth developed
during the food crisis of 1957-58. Given this, the emphasis is (perhaps
understandably for the time) on production over social or political
goals or costs. Given a scarcity of resources (primarily land and capi-
tal) the most expeditious strategy is seen as one which invests these
into areas (and persons) where they can be used most efficiently to give
rapid production increases. This may have a certain rationale, but sub-
sequent events have shown that social and political consequences cannot
be separated from the strategies themselves: one cannot speak of "gen—
erations of problems" to be dealt with sequentially once the basic issue
of production is resolved.1

Third, this means that problems of economic growth and change are
inter-disciplinary in nature though they are relegated by custom (and
default) to economists alone. Almost all observers are agreed that no
matter what strategies might be suggested by economists, decisions
regarding their feasibility and implementation are political. Yet
little has been done (until recently) by either economists or other
social scientists to guide policy makers in making the choices. "Poli-
tical development" studies, for example, take the point where economists
leave off analysis to begin their work, taking for granted what econo-

mists have said.2 One result is that post mortems of political systems

 

 

1See Welter Falcon, "The Green Revolution: Generations of Prob-
lems," 1970. (Mimeographed.)

2Even the study by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political
Basis of Economic Development, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1966) though

 

 

abound (which have value as will be seen below). Another is that vari-
ables relevant to both fields are seen as peculiar to one or the other.
Should an overlap be found, the analysis is often neither interrelated
nor focused on similar issues. In the real world such dichotomies do
not exist. Similar parallels can be drawn between political science

and other social science disciplines. The interrelatedness of these
phenomena should be obvious to the political scientist who accepts as a
definition of his discipline that it is the process of the authoritative
allocation of values in society.

The definition of politics includes process, and therefore, change.
While there is abundant change in systems of government per se, a
remarkable amount of it is due to alterations in patterns of the distri-
bution of values in economic and social life. This is most apparent in
the "developing world" where central political authorities take respon-
sibility for "modernizing" or even creating their nations, thus deliber-
ately seeking to alter the allocation of values.

Here lies a fertile field for the political scientist, for both

explaining and predicting political change. The post mortems mentioned

 

above represent an accumulation of research and knowledge upon which
explanations and predictions can be built. Minimally, from them one

can learn "what went wrong,"

and then devise alternate strategies for
change. Combined with impact predictions and focused on policy issues,

such work can present policy makers with a complete set of alternatives

 

it accepts the notion that certain kinds of political forms are neces-
sary for economic development, also accepts the economists' conception
of development. And further, it can be argued that they also see cer-
tain political forms arising from economic change. See Chapter 2, "A
Framework for the Study of the Political Basis of Economic Growth,"
passim. More recent works by economists in particular who argue the
primacy of politics, Gunnar Myrdal, Dudley Seers, and Michael Lipton,
among others, are cited where appropriate below.

from which they can choose. This approach often referred to as "poli-
tical economy", serves the ends of both theory building (by explaining
and predicting) and of "relevance" which operationally would seem to be
addressed to policy studies.1 Both descriptive and prescriptive work is
important here: the former defines parameters for policy action while
the latter lays out alternatives.

If the political scientist decides to direct his work toward such
endeavors, he must be willing to invest time and other resources toward
understanding at some minimal level the assumptions made by other disci-
plines involved in the same policy area. Hence the impetus for truly
inter-disciplinary work. In this study, for example, one has first to
understand the economic as well as political assumptions made about

growth in the agricultural sector and the possible alternative

 

1The political economy approach referred to here is derived from
the methodology suggested by Norman T. Uphoff and Warren F. Ilchman in
The Political Economy of Development (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1972), "The New Political Economy," where they state:

 

The focus on interaction of alternatives and valua-
tions, on choices and consequences, gives a quite
different slant. Though in the absence of any signi-
ficant change in the existing environment there may
be a .8 probability of a particular outcome, what
social science should seek to establish are what
actions will raise that probability if the outcome

is desired, or reduce it if undesired. In the
'socio-sphere', unlike the laboratory, outcomes can
be affected by modifying people's estimations of their
net costs or benefits from a particular course of
action. Thus, the knowledge sought is pertinent to
an g§_ante calculus of economic, social, and politi-

cal consequences of choice.
p. 16

It is therefore important to note that it is a methodology referred to
and not the full range of neo-Marxist theoretical assumptions of poli-
tical economy though a nee-Marxist may emphathize with the seeming para-
mountcy of economics in this study.

strategies developed by economists. This does not mean the disciplines
lose their distinctiveness -- only that they gain complementarity.

For this study, once the decision was made to work on the political
implications of a particular strategy for agrarian change, it became
apparent that little material exists on the subject in political
science. Considerable work has been done in other fields on the means
through which change may be effected, the changes each may cause in the
affected parts of the social system involved, and as regards politics,
on how the "failure" of agricultural modernization may contribute to
revolutionary movements. Mbst of the latter works tend to be specu-
lative in that they link the "failure" of agricultural modernization
with other "failures": e.g., the inability of administrative units to
implement policies or more generally, the failure of modern political
institutions to penetrate rural areas. That is, most of these studies
are done from the "top" and do not come to grips with the local dyna—
mics of rural change.

Two notable exceptions to this observation must be cited. The

first, Eric R. Wolf's Peasant Wars of the Twientieth Century,1 links

 

social change arising from the transition from subsistence peasant to
commercial farming with wider political change. He traces political
linkages between urban and rural areas which seemingly make rural parti-
cipation in revolutions possible. This is a highly suggestive piece for
anyone interested in pursuing the subject.

Second, Barrington Moore, Jr.'s The Social Origins of Dictatorship

and Democracy, (despite arguments over the interpretations of particular

 

 

1Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York:
Harper and Row, 1969).

historical events) relates types of agrarian systems and the conditions
under which they change, to particular political outcomes.1 Both works
attempt to come to an understanding of agrarian organization in various
permutations in order to understand rural change and its impact on the
wider political systems involved. It is this link that needs to be
developed, as there are qualitative differences between rural and urban
organization.2

Besides these, there are other works of particular utility for a
variety of more specific purposes which are cited in the study and
bibliography. Still, there is remarkably little appreciation in poli-
tical science of the importance of agrarian systems and change for poli-
tical development. Much emphasis for example, is placed on urban and
state level politics without a recognition of the fact that much of
what occurs at these levels has its roots in "agraria". Some of this
may have to do with the origins of most current political science
research which is based on the modern American experience. In the field~
of political development, it may stem from the emphasis placed on the
dependent variables or indicators of "modernization": industrialization,
urbanization, differentiation, etc. This emphasis tends to treat ante-

cedent conditions as an undifferentiated whole.3 There is some change

 

1Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

 

2The distinctive aspects of rural organization are developed below
in Chapter VI in relation to political mobilization.

3There are exceptions of course. See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social
Mobilization and Political Development," originally published in the
American Political Science Review (September l961),493-Sl4 and reprinted
in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and
Social Change, second edition (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971),
pp. 384-405. Also see David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization

 

 

in outlook, but it is apparent that the importance of agrarian change is
just being rediscovered.1

This study then, is the start of an attempt by one person to under-
stand the relationship between agrarian and political change. The first
chapter is a discussion of the assumptions held by policy makers about
change and the resulting policies. The second chapter provides back-
ground information about India's socio-political environment and the
areas in which field work was conducted. Turning to the data, Chapter
III is focused on the extent to which technical breakthroughs in grain
production have been adopted by the farmers in the villages studied to
see the extent to which stated assumptions about change are empirically
borne out. In Chapter IV I address the effects of economic change on
the socio—economic system of the villages studies; primarily the dis-
placement of agricultural tenants and laborers.

The effects of these changes on villagers' levels of well-being are
discussed in Chapter V, and the next two chapters deal with the impact
of change on the respondents' political outlook and behavior. In the
concluding chapter the results of economic change are analyzed within
the parameters posed by the two goals of growth and equality. Finally,

suggestions are made for an alternative strategy for change which, to

 

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) in which an attempt is
made to develop a typology of "traditional" societies. The Deutsch
article focuses on differential responses to "modernization" which, of
course presupposes differential traditional conditions.

1I use the term "rediscovered" advisedly since many studies of
agrarian change and the role of government in such change used to be
done in the United States -- mainly in the early part of this century.
Agriculture has been rediscovered primarily through studies of "develop-
ing" nations.

10

the author's mind, requires fewer political costs in the longer run
without sacrificing increased production which is obviously and urgently

needed.

CHAPTER I

THE ISSUES

As stated, this study was undertaken to discover the effect of
agricultural change if any, on the political attitudes and behavior of
farmers, agricultural tenants, and landless labor in Rajasthan, India.
Agricultural change was studied in the context of India's Intensive
Agricultural Areas and High Yielding Varities Programmes since it is
under these schemes that the greater part of governmental inputs and
efforts are channeled to increase production and raise the levels of
well-being in the rural sector.

The study has its origins in premises drawn from the body of
thought on political and economic development. There are areas of over-
lap between the two: politics determines the kind and pace of economic
change, while economic change affects the political system through new
demands and conflicts created by differential impact. Central to the
process is the distribution of benefits from economic growth, the
demands placed for these on the political system, and dislocations in
employment and status caused by the process. In the language of poli-
tical economy, there are certain goals posited for the Indian political
system. Foremost among these are those of social and economic quality

and better living standards for all citizens.1 The means used to attain

 

1See the Preamble, The Constitution of India (Delhi: The Govern-
ment Press, 1967).

 

ll

12

any goal may have differing impacts on diverse groups. The purpose of
this study is to discover what these have been for one set of policies
and the costs they have entailed for the political system. An outline
is provided for an alternative approach suggesting means which might
require fewer political costs in the long run.

The bulk of writings on political and economic development stress
their inter-relationship.1 It is one of the accepted notions of poli-
tical development that economic change may intensify existing conflict.
New cleavages are created through the redistribution of goods and ser-
vices. Research has been conducted on differential economic impacts
and some on the effects of these on system maintenance or revolution.
Overall, however, little analysis has been done to analyze the poli—
tical effects of economic change until conflict reaches revolutionary
proportions. Scholars who emphasize system maintenance stress that
variable above the quality of stability required for it. Between total
quiescense and revolution lies a wide range of possible action and
reaction and it is this spectrum that is of interest here.

The primary theme then is that of conflict as a product of econo-
mic change. The assumption is that people regardless of cultural pre-
conditioning respond either positively or negatively to changes affect-
ing their lives. Their reaction will focus on the authority felt to be

responsible for those changes. In this sense, politics reflects

 

1Among many others, see Irving Horowitz, Three Worlds of Develop:
ment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966); Samuel P. Huntington,
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968); and Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: The Twentieth
Century Fund, 1968) and The Challenge of World Poverty (New York: Vin-
tage Books, 1970). Horowitz stresses the revolutionary potential of
change which he sees as perhaps the only certain way in which social
justice can be attained. Huntington, on the other hand, feels the
maintenance of a competitive system is the answer.

 

 

 

 

13

economics. The decision to induce change (and its kind and degree) is
political, but here politics reflects rather than initiates.

Tied to this is another assumption. Economic change increases poli-
tical mobilization. Groups positively affected by economic programs may
see it in their interest to support actively the authority felt to be
responsible for their benefits: an effort might be made either to in-
crease or at least to maintain their present level. Those perceiving
themselves to be deprived may participate to press for changes in policy.
Participation may occur within established processes, or if those are
perceived as hostile, it may be extra-systemic.

The Indian situation adds another dimension. Channels exist for an
expression of support or discontent, and in such situations, conflict
will be contained within the system unless the extent of perceived
deprivation undermines its legitimacy. In the Indian case, the elec-
toral process and devolution of authority for economic development to
the district and block levels provide several potential levels of parti-
cipation and fggi of authority. The electoral process probably hastens
political mobilization. Promises made during campaigns elicit support.
If they are not kept, one should expect support for opposition parties
or candidates to rise over time. If, however, participants doubt they
will receive benefits from any party then they may seek extra-legal
means of expressing discontent. Thus, while an open electoral system
may contain conflict in the short term, it will heighten conflict if
benefits are not/cannot be distributed fairly widely through society.

These are the main assumptions of the study. It should be clear
that the concern here is not with the entire process of political and

economic development: the urban and industrial sectors are omitted.

14

The study deals with a specific problem faced by Indian policy—makers

in changing rural India. Its main findings should be relevant for situa—
tions in which "production first" strategies are pursued with the assump-
tion that resultant social and political changes can be treated sepa-
rately and sequentially. They should be especially relevant if such
strategies are pursued under resource constraints similar to those in
India (a scarcity of land and capital and an abundance of labor).

The study is derived from the central concepts of the development
syndrome.2 The first idea borrowed from the literature is that a major
difference between "traditional" and "modern" politics lies in the
derivation of political legitimacy. Older forms of political authority
derived theirs from transcendental or other sources (e.g., the divine
right of kings). MOdern regimes at least try to gain (or justify) theirs
from the governed. This implies a minimal amount of responsiveness to
the citizens of a polity, but not necessarily representative government
(though this is the case in India). It can mean that as governments
seek to widen their support base by meeting demands from various groups,
power becomes more widely dispersed.3

Central to the concept of responsiveness is the distribution of
goods and services in society. Governments barter these in return for

support. A result that may be at least minimally desired by government

 

1For a good example of "production first" strategies see the Asian
Agricultural Survey (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1968), passim.

2Leonard Binder §£_al., Crises and Sequences in Political Develop-
ment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). See especially,
"Crises of Political Development," by Binder, pp. 3-72.

3See S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization, Protest, and Change (Engle—
wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966); Binder, op; cit.; and John
Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Mbdernization (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1972), passim.

 

15

is a Pareto Optimal situation, but that is seldom feasible since the
goods and services are normally in short supply. Governmental capacity
contributes to the establishment of distribution patterns. Capacity is
at least partially dependent on bases of support. For example, if a
government depends on a feudal landowning class for its power, then the
dispersal of land and other agricultural resources to tenants will be
limited by the landed aristocracy's interests. A mobilized peasantry
may enable government to spread benefits more widely thus expanding its
numerical base of support. By meeting peasant demands, however, power
will also become more widely dispersed which in itself may place con—
traints on future policy options.

Under conditions of change, the question of distribution can reach
crisis proportions when citizens are given and use their equal chances
for participation. They are aware that by so doing they have the oppor-
tunity to obtain benefits others in society have. Since all groups have
interests -- some of which may be diametrically opposed to others -- not
all will be fully satisfied. The resulting conflict is a normal part of
the political process. Much of it may be over scarce economic resources
but can also center on access to power and status. All this is obvious
to the student of political science.

Another point -- also familiar to political scientists -- is that
it is government's role to mediate between conflicting groups. This
can be done by (1) meeting demands where possible, (2) manipulating them,
or substituting other desired goods for those demanded, or (3) by sup-

pressing the groups, their demands or both.1 It is understood that the

 

1One might include Edelman's idea of the substitution of symbolic
for tangible goods. See Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics

16

more developed a polity, the more capacity it has to use the two former
options and they will be preferred. This is related to the idea of poli-
tical development as characterized by responsive, if not representative,
government.1

What is not so apparent to the political scientist is that strate-
gies for economic and political development may be quite divergent, if
not mutually exclusive phenomena. This calls for a discussion of what
economic development often entails.

The main aim of economic development is an increase in a nation's
wealth (measured in a number of ways), with an assumed concomitant
increase in its individual citizen's levels of well-being. These may be
brought about by the application of modern technology to increase pro-
duction and consumption in all sectors of society. Since this study
deals with the agricultural sector of India, the discussion below cen-
ters on its development.

A first step is to distinguish "traditional" agriculture from that
which is considered "modern".2 Typically, the former is characterized
as labor-intensive, using "backward" technology resulting in low produc-
tivity per unit of land and labor input. It is peasant farming: sub-
sistence cultivation with minimal involvement in markets. Cultivation
is a small scale family enterprise: for instance, in feudal systems,

land is divided among tenants on the basis of what a family with animal

 

(Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1967). See especially,
Chapter 2, Part III.

1See Eisenstadt and Binder, op. cit.

2The author's doubts about the utility and validity of these con-
cepts are strong as they are about anything suggesting a strict dichot-
omy. They are suggestive of trends, however, and are used here to illu-
strate the point and because they are commonly used in the literature.

17

power can manage.1 Modern agriculture conversely, utilizes capital-
intensive, advanced technology, and participates fully in monetized mar-
kets. While a family may still own and operate a farm, the scale of
production is considerably expanded with the aid of modern mechanical
implements replacing animal power. Productivity per unit of land and
labor is assumed to be higher with the use of new scientific techniques.

The modernization of agriculture implies a potential for high
returns to investment through the production advantage of new seeds,
chemical fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and farm machinery.
Though the cost of inputs is higher, increased production brings the
farmer greater profits than he could earn previously. However as
improvements are introduced into situations where pressure on land is
high and landownership is concentrated though cultivation is by tenants
and/or agricultural labor, the latter two classes of persons are ren-
dered obsolete. As the scale of production is raised by mechanization,
landowners typically resume their farms for self-cultivation. Bio-
chemical improvements can be used on any sized farm with the same
"returns to scale"; large machines obviously cannot.

Often as agricultural modernization occurs there is no additional
land for displaced persons to colonize. One can argue that high tenancy
rates are partially a result of population pressure on land. Also,
technological change in agriculture (e.g., in the United States and

Europe) arose from the necessity to feed growing populations at a time

 

1See Eric R. Wolf, Peasants, Foundations of Modern Anthropology
Series (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice—Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 1-59. For
modern agriculture, see Theodore Schultz, Transforming Traditional
Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

 

18

when agricultural labor became expensive and scarce. Nonetheless, it
always causes dislocation and affected persons move into urban areas
seeking alternate employment. Industry is seldom able to utilize heavy
flows of labor as it is a sector employing capital intensive technology.
Dislocated peasants are often unskilled and illiterate. The result is
urban slums. In cities migrants are exposed to new goods and amenities
-- and particularly to the rising living standards of the middle and
upper classes. Even factory workers through unions participate in the
upward economic cycle. Thus it is that rising expectations combine
with absolute deprivation to form a potential for revolution.1
Political science is not oblivious to these developments. It deals
with them in the following manner. It accepts the theorem that economic
change can cause instability. The literature traces causes of insta-
bility to rapid transition that leads to anomie, displacement of persons
from traditionally held occupations, rising expectations and greater
inequalities in wealth and power, at least in the short run. A combi-
nation of these leads to competition over power and wealth by mobilized
groups where it may appear in the form of class or communal conflict.
The process also mobilizes groups who may not have been participants in
the political system, causing them to place additional demands on it.
The strain of transition often occurs when political institutions them-

selves are characterized by low levels of legitimacy.2

 

1See Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York:
Harper and Row, 1969); and Barrington Meore, Jr., Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). This syndrome
has, of course, been studied by many scholars and runs through the
development literature, particularly anatomies of military coups d'etat
in Africa and Latin America.

 

 

 

2See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Develop-
ment," in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., Political Development

 

19

The problem is that political scientists tend to agree with current
methods and strategies of economic development, accepting them as inevit-
able.1 That is, modern technology must be applied to production regard-
less of social and political consequences. The divergence between the
desired ends of political and economic development can be further clari-
fied through an exploration of the implicationscflfthis strategy.

Governments function with a scarcity of resources. As economic
growth continues the overall resource pool may increase, but it is sel—
dom sufficient. The economists argue that scarce resources should be
invested in farmers and areas which have the highest growth potential.2
It takes considerably less to raise their productivity and the assump-
tion is that there will be a "ripple effect" whereby other farmers and
areas seeing higher profits will opt voluntarily over time for new tech—
niques. The result is a policy favoring larger farmers over smaller
ones, and wealthier regions over their more impoverished neighbors.

The preferential treatment of larger farmers also has a political
base. These are often citizens who can provide the most support -- both

financial and numerical (through clients) -- for political leaders.

 

and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), pp. 384-405;
Ted Gurr, "A Causal Medel of Civil Strife," American Political Science
Review 62, 4 (December 1968),llO4-1124; and Huntington and Binder, op.
cit.

 

 

1Or at least (which is less justifiable) we tend to assume that

such things are someone else's responsibility, which leaves one with the
conclusion that political and economic development cannot possibly occur
together though history has plenty of cases to the contrary.

2See below: the discussion of the Intensive Agricultural Develop-
ment Schemes in India. Additionally, see W. Arthur Lewis, Development
Planning (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 58-61; John W. Mellor,
The Economics of Agricultural Development (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1970 edition), pp. 296-298.

 

 

20

Where tenants and hired laborers constitute a high proportion of the
agricultural classes, the control held by landowners over their economic
well-being can be translated into political power. If, as in the Indian
case larger landowners are also money-lenders, their control may extend
over smaller owner-cultivators as well. For a government or political
party with limited resources, this is perhaps the cheapest way to gain
support at least in the short run.

There are two areas of conflict arising out of this strategy: the
first is potential inter-regional conflict. Those areas not receiving
benefits may withhold support from ruling parties. Inter-regional con-
flicts are beyond the scope of this study, but analyses of election
results in India can lead one to conclude that they are a possibility.1

The second point of conflict is of concern here: inter-class con-
flict. As mentioned above, tenants and labor normally are displaced in
the course of agricultural modernization. Displacement is not confined
to these two groups though they may be the first; in the longer run, the
small and middle-sized owners also have to go.2 Large machines require
larger farms: landowners who mechanize expand their farms to rational-
ize their capital investment. As arable land is limited, they expand at
the expense of small and middle owners. In primarily agricultural

societies with the land distribution and population of India, this means

the eventual dislocation of the majority of the total population. The

 

1This is dealt with at some length by Francine Frankel, India's
Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971).

2This should be familiar to readers of Moore, op. cit. and to those
who have studied the deve10pment of U.S. agriculture during the 19208
and 308.

 

21

rate at which this occurs is directly related to the rate and scale of
mechanization.1

Few countries are able to provide sufficient alternate employment
for displaced persons which raises several questions. What is an opti-
mum scale of farming given the costs and availability of manual and
animal labor? Alternatively, given scarce capital, what are the costs
of a capital-intensive agricultural sector to the overall economy? What
is the magnitude of potential displacement, and what age the alternate
employment possibilities for these displaced persons? Does the dis-
placement mean a depression of the consumer market that would affect
industrial growth? And finally, what are the political costs of dis-
location? These political costs have two main sources: (1) landowners
are no longer able to control the political choices and behavior of dis-
placed tenants and laborers, and (2) deprivation may radicalize people.
In the former case the costs of paying off displaced persons tend to be
high, and in the latter, the legitimacy of the political system may come
into question. There is a third alternative which may not entail direct
political costs in the short to medium term: citizen apathy and des-
pair. Such quiescence raises questions about the qualitative aspects
of system stability.

In relating this discussion to the Indian context, the following
points need to be kept in mind. While the avowed ideology of the coun-
try is to respond to people's needs to raise living standards for all,
the government's perceived capacity leads it to meet demands of larger

agriculturalists while manipulating those of smaller farmers, tenants

 

1See Frankel and Moore, op. cit.; and Kusum Nair, The Lonely Furrow:
Farming in the United States, Japan, and India (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1969).

 

22

and laborers. This suggests a political imperative preventing wider
responsiveness. As long as landed groups are seen as able political
mobilizers, responsiveness will be restricted.

Even so, government has not totally ignored rural areas; indeed,
it could not do so. Some benefits are required even with the support
of landed interests to gain that of the smaller man. These benefits
are mainly collective goods. Government has increased vastly, the range
of services available particularly in health, education, and transport.
If the dynamic of rural change outlined does obtain, however, personal
deprivation will overshadow gains made by collective goods. Collective
goods, however, are cheaper to distribute than the enactment of policies
dealing with issues of landownership and agricultural growth with equal—
ity. There are no groups who object to schools, clinics, and roads.

That agrarian change is causing displacement and insecurity is
clear in the data. First, as in other areas of India, tenants in the
villages studied are faced with less employment and security of tenure.
Because of the particulars of tenancy legislation discussed further in
the study, they are unable to lease in land as readily as before.

Aside from tenancy laws, agriculture has become a highly profitable
enterprise. This means that landowners who previously saw their land as
security, status symbol, and a means for securing their families' food,
now view it as a commercial enterprise. Instead of leasing it to ten-
ants and sharing the produce with them, they prefer to self-cultivate,
hiring the fewest laborers possible. Active involvement in farming also
gives the politically ambitious landowner control over inputs which in

turn enhances his political stature.

23

Third, self-cultivation is possible with the availability of trac-
tors capable of uniting large holdings into single cultivation units.
This is not possible with animal power. Cultural restrictions which
prohibit a Brahmin from touching a plow are overcome with discs and har~
rows attached to tractors.1 In both villages studied tractors are used
primarily for plowing and hauling produce to market. Increasingly, how-
ever, threshing and chaff cutting are also mechanically done. Tractor-
ization of plowing itself eliminates the need for tenants and teams of
oxen. It is debatable whether the increased man-hours necessitated by
the more intensive cultivation of high yielding variety seeds means that
more labor is hired.

Fourth, even should middle and small farmers desire modern inputs
their access to resources will be restricted by the skewed land distri-
bution pattern. As resources are scarce, those with power and influ-
ence can obtain them. Landownership is by and large, coincident with
power and influence. It has historically been so and the present system
tends to reinforce this. Government is the dominant distributor and the
dispersal of inputs is unavoidably political. That is to be expected,
but what is important is the socio-political setting in which they are
distributed. It is the coincidence of landownership patterns with
caste, status, wealth and political resources that makes the difference.

At the time field work was conducted, smaller cultivators were mak-
ing higher profits than before due to inflationary farm prices which

rose due to the drought among other factors. This has to be seen as a

 

1Traditionally Brahmins may not touch the plow. For an interest-
ing discussion of this, and other distinct caste practices, see Philip
Mason, Patterns of Dominance (London: Oxford University Press, 1971),
Chapter 7.

 

24

short-term windfall assuming that rises in basic food commodities Spark
similar reactions in other sectors of the economy. Further there is a
limit to how high prices can be permitted to rise given non-farm
incomes. As agrarian change proceeds and food shortages are overcome,
larger farmers will displace smaller ones as happened in the United
States. At best small and marginal cultivators can remain as petty
landowners who lease their lands to larger ones or who continue in sub-
sidized subsistence farming protected by the state (similar to Mexican

ejidatarios).1

 

How these issues relate to the political system is the fifth point.
The data show that access to land and employment form the bases of poli-
tical attitudes and activity. Political alternatives are limited for
those with little or no land as they view Congress as the only party
with the capacity to deliver benefits. This suggests that continued
manipulation of demands will lead to increased levels of political
frustration over time.

Related to this is the assumption that nations such as India are
not doomed to perpetual "backwardness". The argument does imply, how—
ever, that if modernization is to mean the advancement of a few to the
detriment of the many, stable political change is a moot point. Sta-
bility in and of itself may be neither desirable nor undesirable; it

depends on the value one assigns to any political system. It is of

 

lSee V. M. Rao, "Village Lease Markets for Agricultural Land,"
Economic and Political Weekly, Review of Agriculture, IX, #26, June 29,
1974, p. Ar58 where he discusses the former possibility. For Mexico,
see Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Social Aspects of Agrarian Structure in
Mexico," in Stavenhagen, ed., Agrarian Problems and Peasant Nevements
in Latin America (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 225-270,

passim.

 

 

25

concern here, however, in several ways: insofar as it is necessary for
policy makers to formulate and implement policies, in relation to
attaining the goals of better living standards for all, and insofar as
the stated goals of the established system are threatened by the means
chosen to reach them.

After all, most of the scientific techniques for raising agricul-
tural productivity (seeds and chemicals) can be utilized on virtually
any sized plot. Evidence will be cited to show that the smaller farmer
is more productive (per unit of land) than the larger because he has to
depend on his small plot for his entire livelihood. Finally, moderni-
zation cannot be equated with large agricultural production units in
demographic situations similar to India's. The posited goals of better
living standards (the necessary component being increased production)
and socio-economic equality are not separate sequences of a change pro-
cess. Means can be found whereby both can be attained or at least pur-
sued concomitantly. This is the major task faced by social scientists

concerned with policy making.

The Agricultural Programs

 

Before proceeding it is necessary to discuss the specific policies
and programs enacted for agricultural change in India. The two villages
studied were among the first in the state of Rajasthan to be included in
the Intensive Agricultural Areas Programme. Agricultural change is
assumed to be greater in areas covered by the intensive programs by both
the Government of India and outside observers.

The Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme (IADP) was the first

concerted effort made by Government of India to increase food production

26

rapidly. Population growth combined with bad crop years from 1957-59
created food shortages. While agricultural production had been part of
earlier community development schemes under the First and Second Five
Year Plans, it became apparent that a concentrated effort would have to
be made in the area of production alone simply to keep pace with an
increasing population.

The Intensive programs grew out of an approach suggested by a Ford
Foundation team of experts.1 With little modification this has remained
the basic guideline for agricultural modernization. It calls for an
"integrated" or "package" approach to increasing production assuming
that if farmers are provided with technical inputs along with the know-
ledge for their use, production will increase. All farmers should
adopt the more profitable techniques given that they are economically
rational (or "profit-maximizers"). It is further assumed that backward
technology has been the major constraint to higher production.

Recognizing the immense under-utilization of human labor, the Team
saw in the "package" approach a means of harnessing labor for productive
ends by (l) intensifying cultivation and (2) creating greater employment
through public works linked with production activities. The latter would
include things such as minor irrigation and soil conservation projects.

Finally, there was the view that resources should be concentrated

in those areas where ... the combination of water, soil, and other

resources indicate that food production increases will be the greatest."2

 

1The Agricultural Production Team sponsored by the Ford Foundation,
Government of India, Report on India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It
(New Delhi: Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Ministry of Community
Development and Cooperation, April 1959).

2Ibid., p. 5

27

More effort should be concentrated on the most
promising areas for wheat and rice production, i.e.,
those which had the most rapid rate of increase in
the recent past, and which have also the highest
potential for rapid large increases in the years
immediately ahead...

These areas will, the Team believes, increase
India's food production more rapidly than others, if
given allocations of fertilizers in combination with
other improved practices, such as plant protection
measures, improved seeds and water for irrigation.
Attention to other areas should not be reduced. But
in the national interest, the Team believes that
increased effort should be,immediately directed to
the most responsive areas.Ii(EmPhaSiS added)

Specific recommendations spelled out the."package" itself. Two
major areas of suggestions were (1) better economic and administrative
arrangements and (2) the better use of physical and biological
resources.

In the first section of its report the Team called for price
stabilization at remunerative levels. They suggested that Government
set a procurement price for food grains well before the cropping season:

To encourage increases in food-grain production,
the cultivator should be assured of a price which
will enable him to invest in fertilizer, seed and
new equipment knowing that, with average crop con-
ditions, he can repay any debts with the added
income that results from adoption of improved
practices. Such assurance would constitute n
important incentive to increased production.

Second, the Team pointed to the need for land reform which in their
view meant establishing security of tenure rather than any redistribu-
tion of land. The main argument was that security would enable culti-

vators to invest in land improvements. As for the landless, the basic

consensus assumed an insufficiency of land to assure all rural persons

 

1Ibid.

21bid., p. 25.

28

"adequately" sized farms. For the landless, employment would have to
be found elsewhere and joint or cooperative farming arrangements might
be made for farmers with marginal holdings. The fear that land redis-
tribution could decrease productivity is clear:

We recognize the need for considering programmes for
the relief of those who have no land, and of those
who cultivate too little land. But it is imperative
to achieve this objective in ways that will not
retard the increases in food_production which are
vital to national welfare. Some progress can be
made by arranging for reallocation, improvement and
operation of potentially productive lands that are
now idle, or are being used very ineffectively.

Care should be exercised, however, so as not to
break up arms that are efficiently and productively
operated.

 

Along with security of tenure, the Team recognized the need for consoli-
dation of land holdings to encourage farmers to fully utilize their land
and invest in improvements.

The study also called for a number of institutional changes: the
provision of adequate credit at reasonable rates through cooperatives,
the evaluation of a farmer's credit-worthiness on the basis of produc-
tion rather than landownership, and the realignment of governmental
priorities to meet investments required in the agricultural sector. A
part of this was to mobilize and involve local leaders and government
functionaries in the field in the process of agricultural modernization
to ensure implementation at the local level.

Finally, an urgent plea was made for maximum inputs to be made into
seed, fertilizer and pesticides development and manufacture. Better

facilities were to be developed for food storage, marketing and

 

1Ibid., p. 29.

29

processing. This was the integral concept of presenting the farmer
with his "package" of inputs.

These recommendations were put into effect under what came to be
known as the Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme (IADP). In the
first year (1961-62), select villages in three districts were taken up
on a pilot basis. Encouraged by early successes, thirteen additional
districts were added. In 1964-65 a similar program was introduced into
districts with good agricultural potential around the country. This was
called the Intensive Agricultural Areas Programme (IAAP). Both villages
studied for this project were among the first to be incorporated into
it. Rather than concentrate on all-round agricultural development, this
program focused on major crops in each area. According to both govern-
ment and outside observers, however, the real distinction in agriculture
has come with the High Yielding Varieties Programme (HYV), initiated in
1966-67.

The HYV scheme went into effect in those districts already under
the IAAP or IADP programs. The basic concept of the "package" still
obtains but the main breakthrough is the technical one of hybridization
of wheat and rice seed. The new dwarf varieties produce more than double
that of indigeneous ones under optimal conditions. The potential of
these seeds (the major successes are in wheat), and their consequential
contribution to national food stocks in 1967-68 (a year with good rains),
started talk of the Green Revolution not only in India, but throughout
Asia.

There are two thrusts to the HYV program. One is the increase in
food production generally over any given cropping season. The other is

the development of seeds of shorter duration which enable land use to be

30

intensified. Most of the seeds developed have a shorter maturation per-
iod enabling farmers to take an additional crop each year. As laid out
in the Fourth Five Year Plan, the following are the directions in which
the schemes need further development:

6.18 The rate of increase in production of food-
grains and major commercial crops envisaged is much
higher than that accomplished in the past. Since
there is very limited sc0pe for bringing additional
land under cultivation, the strategy for realising
the production targets is primarily dependent on
intensive agriculture and consists of the following
key elements:

(1) continued expansion of irrigation facilities
and reorientation of irrigation practices;
optimum use of water, and in particular, inte-
grated use of ground and surface water;
improvement in the utilisation of existing
irrigation potential through special pro-
grammes; and measures to increase intensity
of cropping;

(2) expansion in the supply of fertilisers, plant
protection materials, farm machinery and cre-
dit;

(3) full exploitation of the possibilities of
raising yields opened by the new seed varie-
ties in the case of cereals;

(4) intensive efforts in selected suitable areas
for raising the yield levels of major commer-
cial crops; and

(5) improvement in the agricultural marketing
system in the interests of the producer along
with assurance of minimum prices for major
agricultural commodities.
Government agencies increasingly sell only hybrid seeds. All of
these need more irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides, which in turn
require higher financial outlays by the farmer. Incentives are given

to encourage adoption of the new techniques: government finances

demonstrations cu: chosen farmers' fields, supplies are basically

 

1Government of India, Fourth Five Year Plan Draft, 1969-74 (New
Delhi: The Planning Commission, March 1969), p. 113.

 

31

subsidized as government absorbs the costs of the extension delivery
system. There are no taxes on agricultural income and land tax is nomi-
nal.l Government's support prices for major food grains have risen con-
sistently over the past five to six years and selling on the free market
brings the producer a better rate.2 Loans and subsidies are available
for the purchase of seed, fertilizers and farm machinery or other capi-
tal inputs. The idea is to provide the farmer with every incentive to

produce more.

Prpgram Implementation

 

The official distributive machinery functions as follows. Before
each cropping season Village Level Workers (the lowest level of the
extension staff) work with farmers in their "circle" (approximately 10
villages) to encourage utilization of new inputs. They forward an esti-
mate of the amount of high yielding seeds required in their area to the

Agricultural Extension Officers at the Panchayat Samiti (Development

 

Block Office -— approximately 100 villages). The requests from all
VLW's are combined and forwarded to the District Agricultural Officer
from whom they go to the state level. It is the responsibility of the
state to procure enough seed and other inputs. The State Ministry of

Agriculture also sets a target number of hectares it would like to have

 

1In the year field work was conducted, government proposed a tax on
income if a person's joint income from farming and other occupations
exceeds Rs. 5,000/— ($666) annually. The highest tax paid in the vil-
lages studies was Rs. 150/— ($20.00) for about 200 acres of which 40
were irrigated.

2For 1972-73 the wheat procurement price ranged from Rs. 75-85 per
quintal depending on the variety. For 1973-74, it rose to Rs. 150/-
($20.00). Free market selling in May 1973 ranged from Rs. 110 (in the
village) to Rs. 160 (in Jaipur city) ($14.66 to $21.33). In 1974,
prices as high as Rs. 260/- ($34.66) were reported.

32

covered by the hybrids each season. These are based on the productive
capacities of different regions and also on the aims of the National
Five Year and Annual Plans. The targets are broken down for each area
and field extension agents are expected to work with cultivators to
encourage adoption to meet them.

When received the inputs are sold through the Panchayat Samitis and

 

farmers' cooperatives (the former carry seed and pesticides, the latter
chemical fertilizers). Samitis are encouraged to conduct one or two-
day "training camps" before each crapping season to keep farmers abreast
of the latest recommendations and techniques.

Farmers may also purchase seed directly from any outlet of the
National Seeds Corporation (NSC) which is the major distributor of offi-
cially certified seed. There are branches in both the cities of Jaipur
and Bharatpur. Farmers may go to private seed stores or mail-order com-
panies. Some stores sell NSC seed in addition to other stock. These
also provide fertilizer and pesticides. All these supplies cost more
through private channels though they are often more readily available.
Finally, farmers can go directly to the major government seed production
farms (though very few actually do so). The Agricultural Universities
at Delhi (Puss), Ludhiana, Pantnagar, and Udaipur will sell directly to
the cultivator.

In order to meet the higher capital requirements of the new inputs,
official credit is provided. Since nationalization in 1969, all banks
have been encouraged to open rural branches for credit supply and small
savings. The aim is to establish branches wherever. there is a revenue
collection center. Interest rates at banks range from 8.5 percent for

short-term loans of less than Rs. 2,000/- ($266.66) to 10.5 percent on

33

either short or long-term loans of Rs. 5,000/- ($666.66). Credit is
available for a variety of purposes: small farm improvements, recurring
expenses, major capital improvements and investments.

Short-term loans repayable in six months to one year are obtainable
for seed, fertilizers, pesticides, labor expenses and water or electri-
city bills. Most of these are payments in kind. Indirect loans are
given for capital improvements: new wells, the repair of old ones or
the purchase and installation of pump sets. Payment for these is made
to the contractor upon completion of the work. Medium-term loans are
repayable between three and five years. In addition to capital invest-
ments mentioned above, they also include things such as cement water
channels, land levelling,fencing, and the development of ancillary
industry such as dairy or poultry farming, orchards and fisheries.
Finally, long-term loans repayable in five to seven years are mainly
for the purchase of farm machinery. For these farmers are required to
own a minimum amount of land: twelve acres for a fourteen horsepower
tractor, and thirty acres for a fifty horsepower one, all of which must
be irrigated.1

Besides banks, further short and medium term credit is provided by
local cooperative societies. Anyone may join upon payment of a Rs. 11/~
($1.47) fee. The bulk of the societies' capital is provided by govern-
ment through the banks. Terms are similar to those at the banks but

normally farmers are required to own 2.5 acres in order to qualify.

 

1Data are from interview between Barry H. Michie and the Bank
Manager of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, Hanumangarh.

34

Interest rates are 9 percent for all types of loans. For large amounts
of money, farmers need to go to the banks.1

Finally, as far as official sources of credit are concerned, farm-
ers may go to the Land Mbrtgage Bank. Here both medium and long-term
loans are available for capital improvements. The repayment periods are
somewhat longer than at the regular banks and hence farmers seem to pre-
fer using this source out of all official credit outlets.

The best utilized source of credit despite the cheaper official
funds, is the village money-lender. Credit from this source may be
obtained in either cash, grain, or in the form of a monthly credit ceil-
ing at the money-lender's general store for the purchase of items of
everyday use. Repayment is normally in kind and is made after each har-
vest. Interest rates vary in the two villages studied, but range from
12 to 50 percent. The role of the money-lender will be discussed in
depth (Chapters III and IV).

One more program for farmers should be noted briefly. It was to
begin in Bharatpur in the year following field work (1973-74); lists of
farmers to be included were being prepared. This program is to channel
farm inputs to small and marginal farmers through the Small Farmers
Development Agency and the Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers
Development Schemes. By the beginning of the Fourth Five Year Plan
(1969) there was widespread recognition in official quarters that the
gains of the Green Revolution technologies had accrued mainly to larger
farmers holding high status and power in their communities. The aim of

these schemes is to circumvent the socio-economic setting which prevents

 

1Data are from interviews with cooperative chairmen and secretaries
in both villages.

35

wider dissemination of inputs and directly reach cultivators in the
lower strata. The idea of the package still obtains and this program
will be discussed further in the study.1

With this outline of the issues and programs in mind, we turn now
to a description of the areas in which research was conducted, along

with a brief discussion of the politico-administrative framework and the

social setting.

 

1Data are from V. R. Gaikwad, Small Farmersp State Policy and Imple-

mentation (Hyderabad, India: National Institute of Community Develop-
ment, 1971), The "Introduction."

CHAPTER II

THE SETTING

This chapter provides a background sketch of politics, administra-
tive arrangements and a description of the districts and villages in
which research was conducted. Though the following is a simplification
of the overall social, economic and political scene, it should provide
the necessary points of reference needed to interpret the findings pre-

sented in subsequent chapters.

The Politico-Administrative Framework

 

Having gained independence from Britain in 1947, India became a
republic in 1950. The country is a federation of states: most consti-
tutional powers reside with her component states and residual powers
belong to the center. India has a parliamentary form of government
headed by an indirectly elected President. Elections for parliament and
the state assemblies must be held at least every five years. Five
general elections have been conducted on the basis of universal adult
franchise since 1952.1 The last parliamentary elections were called one

year early in 1971 while the state elections were held on time in 1972.

 

1The age of majority is 21 years. Elections took place in 1951-52,
1957, 1962, 1967, 1971 (parliament only - called early), and 1972
(states' assemblies - held on schedule). Several states have had mid-
term polls with the resignations of their governments, and of course
by-elections have been held to fill seats vacated by death, and other
causes.

36

37

Turnout ranges from 45.7 percent for the first election to 61.33 per-
cent in 1967.1 These are national figures; there is considerable varia-
tion between the states.

The central government has been formed by the Indian National Con-
gress to date; the party has been a dominant force in Indian politics
since its rise as the main nationalist movement in the early years of
this century.2 Several states have had opposition governments of both
the right and the left, and coalitions as well. The Congress itself has
never won a majority of votes: its highest support was 47.78 percent in
1957, and this margin of plurality has declined since then.3 The frag-
mented nature of the opposition permits it to retain control at the
center.

Each eligible voter elects his member of the state assembly and
parliament directly. Approximately nine state constituencies make up
one parliamentary one and there are between 700,000 and 1,000,000 per-
sons in the latter. Districting is the prerogative of the Central
Election Commision of India and major redrawing of boundaries takes
place with each decennial census though changes can be made in between.

Each constituency elects only one member. If the population of any

constituency is 60 percent or more scheduled caste or tribe, it is

 

1Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., India: Government and Politics in a
Developing Nation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), p. 186.

 

2The party split in 1969: the Prime Minister's wing is called the
Congress-Reorganization wing, and the old Congress is referred to as
Congress Party-Opposition, or in common political parlance, "The
Syndicate". Each contests elections as separate parties.

3Indian Election Commission, Report on the Fourth General Elections
in India, Vol. I (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1968), pp. 94-
95 (adapted).

38

reserved for candidates of those communities regardless of party affil-
iation.1

The logistics of conducting elections in India are complex. It
takes in excess of a million and a half persons in various capacities.
Polling booths are situated so that no person has to travel more than
three miles. The first elections took more than four months to complete,
the ones held in 1967 were completed in one week and less time is
required now. The eligible electorate in 1971-72 was 273,134,889 per-
sons.

Voters queue at the station, and a polling officer
checks each voter's identity slip against his name
on the electoral roll. The voter's finger is then
marked with indelible ink, and he receives two bal-
lots, pink for the assembly, white for the Lok
Sabha (parliament). He marks both ballots secretly
with a rubber stamp on the symbol of the candidate
for whom he wishes to vote, folds the ballots, and
drops them into the box. Although the procedure

is involved, the number of invalid votes has been
relatively small, averaging 3 to 4 percent of the
total cast. The whole procedure is scrutinized

by polling agents representing each candidate.
Their presence and assistance also serve to iden—
tify voters and prevent impersonations.

 

1The scheduled groups are so-called "backward" communities granted
certain socio-political privileges in order to integrate them into the
mainstream of Indian life. These groups have traditionally been dis-
criminated against: either outcastes or tribal, non-Hindu groups.
The Schedule is a Census device for identifying such communities and
now is the only published record maintained of caste or tribe. The
only other place where caste is listed is in land records. This is for
purposes of making special land allotments to outcastes and tribal
groups. It also helps the researcher to identify farmers since nor—
mally they would list only their first, and father's names both of
which might be shared by several other persons. Of course the latter
rationale is my own.

2Election Commission of India, Report on the Fifth General Election
in India, Narrative and Reflective Part (Delhi: Government of India
Press, 1973), p. 56.

3Hardgrave, op. cit., pp. 164-65.

39

Though over one hundred parties have contested elections since
1952, few are of national strength and even fewer have lasted through
all five elections. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the main ones with their
relative strengths both at the state and national levels. Relatively
few constituencies (especially rural ones) have more than three-way con-
tests in which all parties are serious contenders. Both villages stud-
ied were two-party constituencies with splinter elements of others.

India has twenty-three states, the boundaries of which coincide
with those of major cultural/linguistic groups (see Figure 2.1). The
state of Rajasthan where field work was done, assumed its present shape
in 1956 with the merging of three regions: Rajputana (composed largely
of the Rajput princely states), the Matsya Union (including parts of
Shekawati and northeastern princely states), and Ajmer which had been
directly under British rule. It is the second largest state in the
area covering 13,212,956 square miles. The total population is
25,765,806 persons with a density of 194 persons per square mile.1

There are twenty-six districts in Rajasthan. Each is divided into

a number of tehsils (revenue units), and panchayat samitis (development

 

blocks) (see Figure 2.2). The tehsil staff consists of a tehsildar and
a number of patwaris each of whom is responsible for the maintenance of
land records and revenue collection in his "circle" of villages. The

tehsildar is also responsible for certain law and order issues and for
the collection of basic data such as crop estimates, rainfall, etc. He
is asked to help during elections and the taking of each decennial cen-

SUS .

 

1Data are from Census of India, 1971, Series 18, Rajasthan, Part
II-A, (General Population Tables - abstracted from several tables).

 

40

TABLE 2.1

THE DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES, SEATS, AND VOTES
IN LOK SABHA ELECTIONS, 1952-67

 

 

 

 

Number of Number of 2 Z
Parties Candidates Seats Won of Seats of Votes
1952
Congress 472 364 74.4 45.00
C.P.I. 49 16 3.3 3.30
Socialist Party 256 12 2.5 10.60
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party 145 9 1.8 5.80
Hindu Mahasabha 31 4 0.8 0.95
Jana Sangh 93 3 0.6 3.10
Ram Rajya Parishad 55 3 0.6 2.03
Republican Party 27 2 0.4 2.36
Other parties 215 35 7.2 11.10
Independents 521 _41_ 8.4 15.80
Total 489

1957
Congress 490 371 75.1 47.78
C.P.I. 108 27 5.4 8.92
Praja Socialist Party

(S.P. and K.M.P.P.) 189 19 3.8 10.41
Jana Sangh 130 4 0.8 5.93
Republican Party 19 4 0.8 1.50
Hindu Mahasabha 19 1 0.2 0.86
Ram Rajya Parishad 15 -- -- 0.38
Other parties 73 29 5.9 4.81
Independents 475 _;23 7.9 19.39

Total 494

1962
Congress 488 361 73.1 46.02
C.P.I. 137 29 5.9 9.96
Swatantra 172 18 3.6 6.80
Jana Sangh 198 14 2.8 6.44
Praja Socialist Party 166 12 2.4 6.84
D.M.K. (Tamilnadu only) 18 7 1.4 2.02
Socialist Party 107 6 1.2 2.49
Republican Party 69 3 0.6 2.78
Ram Rajya Parishad 35 2 0.4 0.55
Hindu Mahasabha 32 l 0.2 0.44
Other parties 64 14 2.9 4.31
Independents 497 27 5.5 12.27

Total 494

 

41

TABLE 2.l--Continued

 

 

Number of Number of ‘i? 2
Parties Candidates Seats Won of Seats of Votes

1967

Congress 516 283 54.42 40.73
Swatantra 179 44 8.46 8.68
Jana Sangh 250 35 6.73 9.41
D.MQK. (Tamilnadu only) 25 25 4.80 3.90
C.P.I. 109 23 4.42 5.19
Samyukta Socialist Party 122 23 4.42 4.92
C.P.I. (M.) 59 19 3.65 4.21
Praja Socialist Party 109 13 2.50 3.06
Republican Party 70 l 0.19 2.48
Other parties 65 19 3.65 3.67
Independents 865 __35 6.73 13.75

Total 520

 

Source: Adapted from W. H. Morris-Jones, Government and Politics in
India (London: Hutchinson, 1966), pp. 163-66, and from the Indian
Election Commission, Report on the Fourth General Elections in India,

 

 

Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Government Press, 1968), pp. 94-95.

TABLE 2.2

THE DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES, SEATS, AND VOTES
IN STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, 1952-67

 

Number of

Number of

Z

Z

 

 

Parties Candidates Seats Won of Seats of Votes

1952
Congress 3,153 2,246 68.4 42.20
Socialist Party 1,799 125 3.8 9.70
C.P.I. 465 106 3.2 4.38
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party 1,005 77 2.3 5.11
Jana Sangh 717 35 1.1 2.76
Ram Rajya Parishad 314 31 0.9 1.21
Hindu Mahasabha 194 14 0.4 0.82
Republican Party 171 3 0.1 1.68
Other parties and

independents 7,492 635 19.3 32.14

Total 3,283

1957
Congress 3,027 2,012 64.9 44.97
C.P.I. 812 176 5.7 9.36

42

TABLE 2.2~-Continued

 

 

 

 

Number of Number of Z Z
Parties Candidates Seats Won of Seats of Votes
1957 (cont.)
Praja Socialist
(S.P. and K.M.P.P.) 1,154 208 6.7 9.75
Jana Sangh 584 46 1.5 3.60
Ram Rajya Parishad 146 22 0.7 0.69
Republican Party 99 21 0.7 1.31
Hindu Mahasabha 87 6 0.2 0.50
Other parties and
independents 4,863 611 19.7 29.81
Total 3,102
1962
Congress 3,062 1,984 60.2 43.53
C.P.I. 975 197 6.0 10.42
Praja Socialist Party 1,149 179 5.4 7.69
Swatantra 1,012 170 5.2 6.49
Jana Sangh 1,135 116 3.5 5.40
Socialist Party 632 64 1.9 2.38
D.M.K. (Tamilnadu only)* 142 50 -- --
Ram Rajya Parishad 99 13 0.4 0.29
Republican Party 99 11 0.3 0.56
Hindu Mahasabha 75 8 0.2 0.24
Other parties and
independents 5,313 555 16 8 23.00
Total 3,297
1967
Congress 3,443 1,694 48.59 39.96
Jana Sangh 1,607 268 7.70 8.78
Swatantra 978 257 7.37 6.65
Samyukta Socialist Party 813 180 5.16 5.19
D.M.K. (Tamilnadu only)* 174 138 3.96 4.34
C.P.I. (M.) 511 128 3.67 4.60
C.P.I. 625 121 3.47 4.13
Praja Socialist Party 768 106 3.04 3.40
Republican Party 378 23 0.66 1.53
Other parties 430 195 5.59 4.75
Independents 6,774 376 10.79 16.67
Total 3,486

 

*In Tamilnadu in 1962 the D.M.K. gained 24.3 percent of the assembly
seats and 27 percent of the vote. In 1967 it secured 59.4 percent of
the seats and 44.66 percent of the vote.

Source: Ibid.

43

FIGURE 2.1

RAJASTHAN STATE

 

 

 

 

“amass

   

\\ u
Hanumum -

SOURCE: Census of India, 1961, Vol. XIV, Rajasthan, Part V-A
(Jaipur, India: Census of Rajasthan, 1965).

FIGURE 2.2

INDIA: ELECTORAL-ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

ELECTORAL SYSTEM

President
7' ’9 N'
/ I ‘
/ g ‘
\
/ Parliament \
’ \

I
Lok Sabha

 

\
Rajya Sabha

 

(House of (Council of
the People) States)
A A

I
State Assembly
“9(Vidhan Sabha)

 

District Council
(Zilla Parishad)
4*

 

I
Block Council

(Panchayat Samiti)

an

I

I
Village'Council
(Gram Panchayat)

 

 

 

 

Electorate

 

 

Key:
Directly elected :——-)

Indirectly elected : - - - - 9

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

National Ministries

 

State Ministries

 

District Administration

 

Tehsil
(Revenue Office)
Development Block

 

Village Level Workers

 

45

The panchayat samitis have responsibility for local development
and cover an area of approximately 100 villages. Government provides a
technical staff from the civil services: agricultural, nutrition, and
plant protection extension workers, village level workers, school
teachers and administrators. It also provides financial and material
resources to meet the needs of development schemes. A Block Deve10pment
Officer is the senior administrator of the samiti and he may be a
generalist administrator or increasingly is drawn from the ranks of
technicians from the Ministry of Agriculture.

The administrative staff acts on the recommendation of the samiti
itself: an indirectly elected council composed of the chairmen of dir-

ectly elected village councils (gram penchayats). The sarpanchas com-

 

 

posing the samiti choose a chairman from among themselves called the
pradhan. Where the pradhan and/or members of the samiti are strong per-
sonalities, one finds active participation in developmental affairs.
All too often, however, the samiti acts as a rubber stamp for govern-
mental programs interfering only if an officer offends local sensiti-

vities or leaders. Samitis and gram penchayats both have taxation

 

powers but as is often the case anywhere, there is reluctance to use
them and to rely on government funds.

Each pradhan is a member of his district level council (£1113
parishad) and here again, the pradhans elect their chairman who is
called a pramukh. Local government thus is indirectly elected. Though
village council members are to be elected every five years, the last
elections were held nine years ago. Each time an election is scheduled,
it is either a year of drought, or there is a war with Pakistan. It is

felt that such "unnatural situations" might detract from the fairness

46

of elections.1 Local elections are fought on a non-partisan basis
though in reality political parties are openly interested in their out-
come. Villagers tend to identify panchayat members by their party

affiliation.

The Districts

 

Jaipur and Bharatpur districts were selected for field study (see
Figure 2.1). They were among the first to be incorporated into the
Intensive Agricultural Areas and High Yielding Varities Programmes. Two
main constraints led to their selection from a total of eleven possible
districts.2 The first was the two year drought: the districts of
Udaipur, Bhilwara, and Chittorgarh as well as Pali, the original Inten-
sive Agricultural Districts Programme district, were affected to the
point that famine—relief and related considerations would have over-
shadowed all other variables. Second, due to the Indo-Pakistani war of
1971, the government of Rajasthan requested that research not be con-
ducted in border areas which eliminated Sri Ganganagar, perhaps the most
productive district in the state. Kota district, also very productive,
had to be omitted because of certain political questions posed by the
presence of an atomic reactor.

The remaining districts were Jaipur, Bharatpur, Alwar and Jhalawar.
The first three are contiguous with Alwar situated between the other
two. Agriculturally and socially Alwar overlaps with Jaipur and
Bharatpur. Jhalawar was not included partially because of drought and

also due to anticipated linguistic problems.

 

1There was drought the year field work was conducted and the pre-
vious year there had been the war with Pakistan as a result of the
Bangladesh conflict.

2Census of India, op. cit.

 

47

The population of Bharatpur district is 1,490,206 persons with all
save 205,095 being classified as rural residents. The total area is
3,124.7 square miles with an overall density of 476.6 persons per
square mile.1 Bharatpur was added to Rajasthan in 1956. It is one of
the most agriculturally productive areas of Rajasthan: most persons
would name it and Sri Ganganagar as the two most "developed districts"
in the state. Rainfall is greater than in other districts: around 60
inches per year.

Jaipur district has the state capital in Jaipur city, a place of
considerable tourist fame. It is a fairly large district covering
5,405.4 square miles with a total population of 2,482,385 persons and a
density of 455.13 per square mile. Though parts of the district are
arid, other areas such as the portion in which field work was conducted
have irrigation and are good agricultural regions. Rainfall is less
than in Bharatpur: around 35 inches in a normal year.

Both districts used to be independent princely states of British
India. Internal affairs were conducted by the traditional rulers
(£2125), under the watchful eyes of British commissioners. Each state
had separate treaties with the British who controlled foreign affairs,
defense and related matters. There was only an indirect link between
reform groups in the states and the Congress nationalist movement until

fairly late in the 19308 and 408.3 The reform groups called praja

 

1Ibid.

2Ibid.

3Informal links with the Congress were formed fairly early, but no
formal ties were created partially due to the raja's antipathy to the
nationalists in general and consequent suppression of anything vaguely
related to it.

48

mandals, merged mainly with the Congress party after independence.1
Currently, the major political forces are those of the Congress (R) and
the right-wing Swatantra and Jan Sangh parties.2 The former ruling
families of both districts have been involved in the Swatantra party:
the village studied in Jaipur had elected a Congress member of the
state assembly for the first time in 1972, and the member from Bharatpur
was the younger brother of the erstwhile maharajah though the village
itself was a Congress village.3

Land relations in the two areas vary in their legal aspects but
are similar in the resulting social stratification. Traditionally,
Rajasthan had two dominant systems of land tenure. Large tracts were
under what was known as the jagirdari system. Grants covering anywhere
from a few to many villages would be given to subjects of £3135 for
services rendered. Though there have been legal questions raised as to
the actual ownership of these areas, the jagirs provided income both
for the intermediary landowners (jagirdars), and through them to the
state. Land in each jegi£_was farmed by tenants who normally had

hereditary, but oral leases.

 

1These movements fought mainly for constitutional reforms in the
princely states and only in the latter years linked these with a
demand for independence. They wanted the formation of representative
state assemblies and to limit the rajas' powers. The movements were
largely urban. See K. L. Kamal, Party Politics in an Indian State
(Delhi: 8. Chand, 1969), and Richard Sisson, The Congress Party in
Rajasthan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

 

2The Swatantra party was formally dissolved in 1974 -- former mem-
bers are to work for a non-Communist, anti-Congress coalition group.
The Congress (R) is Indira Gandhi's party - see above, p. 37, footnote.

3A11 privileges and titles of the former ruling families have been
abolished along with compensation purses paid to them after indepen-
dence when they lost revenue from their former principalities.

49

The other main form of agrarian organization was land directly
owned by the state called khalsa. The village in Jaipur district was
one such area. Here tenants were given rights of cultivation directly
by the royal family of that particular state. Again, most leases were
hereditary, but oral.

In between these two were special land grants given to priestly
families or traders. A number of Brahmins who owned land in the Jaipur
village had got it from such mgefi grants; these were essentially reli-
gious trusts enabling the priests to earn their livelihood. Since
Brahmins are forbidden by custom to touch a plow, these lands were also
farmed by tenants.

Certain other areas of the state were under "permanent peasant
settlements": ryotwari settlements. Neither area studied came under
this. Permutations of these main types abounded with small legal dif-
ferences between them. The major point to be remembered is that most
areas were under tenant cultivation with revenue paid (in either cash
or kind), to intermediary landowners or directly to the state. Aside
from land taxes, tenants might also be requred to furnish free labor to
either the state, landlord, or both, to pay extra cesses on ceremonial
occasions, use of common grazing lands, etc. The amounts and kinds of
taxes varied throughout what is now Rajasthan, however, the consensus
is that they were uniformly onerous burdens for tenants to bear.

Shortly after independence, legislation was passed to eliminate

the intermediary landlords: jagirdars in Rajasthan, zamindars,

 

1Data are from Dhool Singh, A Study of Land Reforms in Rajasthan,
Report of a Survey Sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee (New
Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission, 1964), Chapters 2-5.

50

elsewhere.1 They were permitted to retain "sufficient" land for self-
cultivation, but the purpose was to grant ownership to tenants. These
and the former jagirdars are now classifed as "state's tenants," or
khatedars. Virtually all ownership rights including those of sale and
mortgage have been granted to the khatedars though there is debate on
the land's actual ownership which some legal scholars maintain is vested
in the state.

The actual redistribution of land is recognized by both official
and private observers to have been minimal. Former landlords have kept
the bulk of their holdings either by dispersing ownership among members
of their rather extensive families, by sharecropping rather than leasing
land, or by buying tractors to unify their cultivation units under one
or two managers. The Gini Index of Land Equality in India did not
change much after reforms were implemented: .63 in 1954 (based on 1951
data), and .59 in 1961 (1961).2 A better reflection of reality which
accounts for dispersed land titles lies in the following data: Of all
cultivating households, 64.4% operate only 19.82 of all farmed land, and
all of these units are under five acres. As regards ownership, 71.95%
of all landowners own 19.98Z of the land with all holdings under five

acres and average size of holdings is 3.58 acres.3

 

1In Rajasthan there were a series of specific laws passed including
the main ones of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act,
1952, and the Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959.

2Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 383, Table 6.2.

3Adapted from the National Sample Survey, Seventeenth Round,
Reports #162 (1970), pp. 48 and 52, Tables 12 and 13; #144 (1968), p.
13 Table 2; and #162 (1970), p. 16, Table 16 (Delhi: Manager of Publi-
cations, 1968 and 1970). Taken from Barry H. Michie, "Variations in
Economic Behaviour and the Green Revolution," Economic and Political

 

51

Since the Jaipur village was a khalsa one, a majority of culti-
vators are small owners. These former Jaipur state tenants now have
khatedari rights. Even so, there are several larger landowners with
holdings in excess of fifty acres: these have been acquired either as
‘mgafi grants, through money-lending foreclosures or purchase over the
past ten years. Land ceilings (until the year of study) were 35 acres
for irrigated land (more for inferior farms) but it is clear that to
ignore ceilings is relatively simple.1

The Bharatpur village had been under the jagirdari system. Com—
pared with the Jaipur village, more farmers fall into the large farmer
category of the sample. Several own in excess of two to three hundred
acres spread over several villages. The titles are dispersed to circum—
vent jagirdari abolition laws.

The villages were chosen from among those in each district which
first came under the intensive programs.2 In Jaipur several of these
are now municipalities and two are almost suburbs of Jaipur city with
rapidly expanding industrial sectors making agriculture almost secon-

dary. Because of their proximity to the city, much of the land is owned

 

Weekly, Vol. VIII, #26, Review of Agriculture (June 1973)._PP‘ A'69‘
70.

The varied findings suggest that rather than landownership, anyone
interested in selecting samples of agriculturalists should use the Oper-
ational farm unit. The largest farmer found in the land records in both
villages "owned" only forty acres, half of which were irrigated. His
operational unit, however, was over five hundred acres over three or
four villages and all were operated by him and his three sons.

1For a further discussion about this see Dhool Singh, op. cit.,
Chapter 11,_g£ passim.

2When the schemes were started pilot villages were chosen in each
district. Every year since then, additional ones are added as their
potential and government's inputs along with political expediency have
allowed.

52

by urban persons who are "gentlemen farmers" or absentee landlords who
are not directly relevant to the study. Some villages close to urban
areas tend to concentrate on truck farming which is also not directly
relevant to the Green Revolution syndrome.

The situation in Bharatpur is similar with one additional problem.
Major land grants have been made to retired military personnel and
former retainers of the erstwhile Bharatpur royal family. Many of the
grants are close to Bharatpur city so that the grantees tend to dominate
the life in those villages. Since they are not really a part of village
society, their presence makes for a set of variables not present else-
where.

Finally, in both areas, villages close to cities make it easy for
laborers to migrate for work during agriculturally slack seasons.

While this might be interesting by itself, most areas do not have such
options so readily available. In order to get a modicum of representa-
tiveness, villages further away from cities were chosen. Even in these,
as will be seen further in the study, there was some out-migration.

Both villages have a fairly wide spread of cultivating communities
which provides a control variable of caste. They have been judged by
both government and university personnel1 as villages with good agri-
cultural potential and represent areas that have made considerable pro-
gress over the past five to six years (approximately the duration of the
intensive programs). These are also villages known to be receptive to

outsiders -- no small necessity in field work. The following sections

 

1The reference is to district-level government personnel and those
of the University of Udaipur Extension Services in Bharatpur. See the
Acknowledgements.

53

give a short description of each village. The names used here and fur-
ther in the study for villages, farmers and leaders are, of course, not

the real ones.

Hanumangarh

 

Hanumangarh served as "headquarters" for the field study. Situated
seventeen miles to the northeast of Jaipur city on a paved road, it is
well connected with both Jaipur and the market town of Dausa by buses
which run every half hour during peak times and every two hours during
the middle of the day. Of a total population of around 5,000, 3,000
persons live in the village proper. The rest reside in 32 hamlets scat-
tered within a radius of four miles. It is thus a very large village
bordering on the size of a municipality. As most of the inhabitants are
agriculturalists, it retains its census classification as a village.1

Historically, Hanumangarh is of some interest to the development of
Jaipur state. It was one of the early capitals having been taken by the
Rajput prince Dula Rai about one thousand years ago from the "tribal"
Minas. The village is built against a hillside and is dominated by a
crumbling Rajput fort dating back to the 16th century. The original
Mina fortress atop the hill is gone save for rudiments of the founda—
tions. While Minas still constitute a sizable proportion of the popu-
lation, the fort stands as a lonely monument to Rajput glory. There are
now only about four Rajput families (all later migrants), and all of

these save one are in rather impoverished circumstances.

 

1The census guidelines for classifying settlements as municipalities
or villages is dependent on the p0pulation size, its density, and the
proportion whose major occupation is agriculture. Rumor had it that
village leaders were interested in keeping Hanumangarh's village classi—
fication in order to retain rural development funds.

54

Over the years Hanumangarh probably served as a marketing and
administrative center for the surrounding villages. The central street
is bordered by multi-storied stone and mortar houses dating back several
centuries. The ground floors of these were shops of various kinds until
recently. Mast of them are locked now -- the advent of paved roads and
bus service has made it possible and more economical for villagers to
buy provisions in Jaipur. There are still a few cloth and provision
stores. One "general store" carries items of daily use: tea, soap,
cigarettes, cooking and kerosene oil, spices, and sticky sugar candies.
Virtually any item may be ordered through the store but all can be had
more cheaply in Jaipur. There are at least four small flour mills and
two licensed country liquor shops. Trading families save for those in
the grain trade or who are seriously developing their farms are leaving
the village. Some lease their homes to government officers posted there.
Commercially, Hanumangarh is a dying village -- agriculture is its domi-
nant occupation.

Reflecting perhaps the increasing importance of agriculture, there
has been a growth of developmental agencies in the village. Besides its

original designation as a tehsil, it is also a panchayat samiti head-

 

quarters with three agricultural extension officers instead of the nor-
mal two. There is a health sub-center staffed by a doctor, pharmacist,
and nurse-mid-wife. Aside from curative aspects of health care, the
center has a village—level health worker in charge of malaria, small-pox
and other epidemic control schemes, and a male and female family planning
extension team. Nutrition education and child care is the responsibility
of the Lady Nutrition Extension Officer who is part of the samiti staff,

and her subordinate, Lady Village Level Worker. The government offices

55

have their full complement of workers, which is not always the case
elsewhere.

Hanumangarh's educational needs are met by two primary schools (one
for girls only), a middle (grade), and higher secondary school. The
latter two are co-educational, limiting girls' enrollment. Initial
talks were reportedly started to open a college for which rumor had it
that the former maharaja was willing to donate a hunting lodge on the
outskirts of the village. Not many young persons go on to higher educa-
tion; those who do, enroll at one of Jaipur's colleges affiliated with
the University of Rajasthan.

Law and order is the responsibility of the local police station
(thang). There is a small overnight lockup for arrested persons to wait
until they are taken to Jaipur. The £hag§_has another lockup too: this
one for stray animals to be impounded until their owners pay the required
fines. As was mentioned above, the tehsil offices also aid the police
in the maintenance of civil order.

In addition to these agencies, Hanumangarh has a Department of
Forests' Range Office in charge of maintaining certain grazing areas.
This office is trying to re-forest the surrounding hills which were
denuded by lumber contractors about twenty years ago. There is also an
office of the State Excise Department whose primary purpose is the col-
lection of taxes levied on the production of tobacco. Finally,
Hanumangarh has a branch of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and is
headquarters for the local cooperative society. It is a major admini-
strative center.

Hanumangarh is overwhelmingly Hindu in its religious makeup. There

are fewer than ten Muslim families and no Jains, Sikhs or any other

56

religious groups. The Mina community mentioned above as the original
ruling group is classified in the Census Schedule as a "tribe". While
it may have had a tribal organization several hundred years ago, there
is no longer any sociological reason for it to be classified as such any
more. Minas are often referred to as "criminal tribes" as one group was
involved traditionally in animal husbandry and developed a reputation
for cattle and camel rustling. Whatever the origin of their inclusion
in the Schedule, they are keen to retain it as it entails benefits such
as land allotments, scholarships, and reserved seats in government
employment and on all elected bodies. A clue to the real social status
of Minas lies in their acceptance by other caste Hindus as a distinct
caste of approximately Sudra status. It is not the purpose of this study,
however, to debate issues raised by the Schedule.1

Occupationally there are four clusters of castes and each cluster
is about the same size. At the t0p are the Brahmins and Baniyas and as
stated, they control sizable proportions of land and money—lending.
Only one group of Brahmins farms directly: the Haryana Brahmins, some
of whom are in the sample. Next, there is a group of owner-cultivators:
mainly Minas, Gujjars and Malis. Save for Gujjars, most of these fall
in the small to medium range of farmers. Third, one finds the artisans:
potters, barbers, carpenters and blacksmiths. Mbst of these are land-
less or at best may own marginal farms. A number are also tenants.
Finally, there are the outcastes or Harijans: Raigers, Khatiks, and

Balais. Each of these is a distinct caste with its own position in the

 

1For an explanation of the Schedule, see above, p. 38, footnote. A
more detailed explanation of caste follows in Chapter VII; here it should
be noted that the term as used refers to jati (sub-caste), rather than
the four-fold varna scheme.

57

ritual hierarchy defining marriage and commensal relations with the

others.

These provide the bulk of tenants and laborers (see Table 2.3).

TABLE 2.3

HIERARCHY 0F CASTES IN HANUMANGARH AND SHIVPURA*

 

Hanumangarh

Shivpura

 

Purohit Brahmins (priests and
landowners)

Haryana Brahmins (landowners)

Rajputs ("warriors" and landowners)

Baniyas (traders, money-lenders,
landowners)

Malis (farmers)

Gujjars (farmers and animal
husbandry)

Minas (farmers and animal husbandry)

Khatti (carpenters)

Kumhars (potters)

Nais (barbers)

Lohars (blacksmiths)

Raigers (laborers, leatherworkers)

Khatiks (laborers, leatherworkers,
herders, butchers)

Balais (laborers, leatherworkers)

Bhangi (sweepers)

Purohit Brahmins (priests)

Baniyas (traders, money-
lenders)

Jats (farmers)

Ahirs (farmers)

Yadavs (farmers)

Garghariya (herders and
farmers)

Kohlis (petty traders, weavers)

Chamars (laborers, leather-
workers)

Bhangis (sweepers)

Muslim Castes:

 

Manihar (traders, bangle makers)
Telis (oil pressers, laborers)

 

*This is a highly general ranking:

the middle levels vary according to

the group asked to rank itself, as each tends to put itself above the

others.

There are two distinct farming regions in the village.

land is arid with a water table of 80-120 feet.

0n the east

Irrigation is rela-

tively limited and is done from open dug wells, a number of which are

fitted with electric or diesel pumping

in Jaipur district due to bedrock.

 

sets.l Tubewells are expensive

In this area even dug wells are

1These are five to six horsepower centrifugal pumps costing around

Rs. 3,500 ($466.00).

58

costly because of the water's depth. Most crops are rain-fed. Animal
husbandry is the main cash earner and grain cultivation is seen pri-
marily as a means of feeding one's family. Due to continuous over-
grazing by sheep, goats, cattle and buffalos over the past several hun-
dred years, the soil is badly eroded. Gullies of ten to sixty feet
cries-cross the landscape. Reclamation work has been marginal. People
depend on government and drought years for conservation projects to be
undertaken as part of famine relief work.1 The best land is under
cultivation and is irrigated if possible. Landholdings are larger here.

The second farming region is fortunate to have a higher water table
of thirty to sixty feet. The wells recharge quickly due to a nearby
natural reservoir which supplies water to Jaipur. No irrigation is per-
mitted from this though it was originally dammed for that purpose.

Most plots are smaller here but almost all can take two crops a year
and even three in some cases.

Soils in both areas of Hanumangarh are of a light, sandy-loam var-
iety with little moisture-retaining capacity. The main crop as in most
parts of India is taken in the monsoon season (July to September/
October). It is rain-fed: even if the rains fail, few farmers will use
their wells for supplementary irrigation fearing there will be insuffi-
cient water for the winter crOp. This crop consists mainly of bulrush

millet (pennisetum typhoideum). Some farmers grow maize and vegetables

 

 

1If an area is declared to be under famine, public works are begun
on roads, conservation, irrigation, etc. Affected persons, landowners
and landless alike may work on these for wages paid half in cash and
half in grain. Much work could be done by individual farmers to build
short walls around their fields (called bundhs) to prevent erosion. The
government encourages this with little effect. Several fields the author
saw decreased several feet in size each year because of a lack of bundhs.

59

as supplementary crops. The millet forms the basic component of most
people's diet though wheat is the preferred grain.

Crops for the winter season are sown from late October through
November. The acreage is less than that planted during the monsoon
because irrigation is required. Where this is available, farmers plant
wheat, barley and vegetables. Where it is limited or non-existent, cer-
tain varieties of barley and gram may be sown. Mbst farmers are mainly
grain cultivators. The vegetables are for family consumption and per-
haps a little extra cash. Normally one finds a few beds alongside a
well. Only two persons interviewed cultivated vegetables as a main

crop.

Shivpura

Shivpura presents a rather different set of circumstances. The
village is sixteen miles from the nearest city, Bharatpur, which is also
the district headquarters and tehsil town. The communication and ser-
vice facilities are not as extensive here. After travelling ten miles
on a paved road, one turns off onto a path of sorts formed by bullock
cart ruts leading to the village. Plans have been on the books since
the First Five Year Plan to build the road and this is a major election
issue every five years.

Shivpura is smaller than Hanumangarh with a population of around
1,400 persons. All inhabitants live in one central settlement rather

than in hamlets. Local history has it that one of the kings of

 

1In view of the fact that Jaipur was so accessible, it is surpris-
ing that more did not cultivate vegetables which are highly profitable:
much more so than grain. When asked, most farmers maintain they take
too much work and that there are no adequate marketing facilities.

60

Bharatpur had twenty-two sons. Since only the eldest could inherit his
father's throne, the rest were given grants of several villages each
from which they were to provide fOr themselves and the state. Shivpura
was made a headquarters by one of the sons and today all the village
Thakurs claim descent from him.1 They are the main landowners and their
holdings are far more extensive than anyone's in Hanumangarh. The
largest farmer here owns around 500 acres over several villages.

Shivpura has a farmers' cooperative and is the headquarters for a
Village Level Worker. Funds were raised by the villagers for his house
in order to persuade government to post one there. Kumher is head-

quarters for both the_panchayat samiti and the health center. Shivpura

 

residents commute to Kumher for official business on a very old bus
which goes in the morning and returns by evening. The village has a
small dispensary run by a pharmacist, a lady family planning worker, and
a doctor of the traditional Ayurvedic school of medicine.

Education has found the full support of Shivpura inhabitants. They
raised funds to build the middle and high schools. The primary school
presumably was set up by government. The village council levied a charge
on each caste community based on their ability to pay. Today the visitor
is told proudly that each of the "nine castes"2 was responsible for the
construction of one room in the school. During the time field work was
done, efforts were begun by the sarpanch (village council chairman), to

set up a veterinary clinic and seed depot in the village.

 

1Thakurs are Jats, a major cultivating caste in Rajasthan, Haryana,
and Western Uttar Pradesh. They consider themselves to be Rajputs though
they are not considered as such by other Rajputs. Bharatpur is unique
in having had a Jat ruling house.

2In fact, there are more than nine, but this is a local saying.

61

Shivpura inhabitants are predominantly agriculturalists. As opposed
to Hanumangarh, many more of the large landowners are self-cultivators.1
Though the Thakurs own most of the land, Ahirs and Yadavs are also impor-
tant landowners. Brahmins and Baniyas are few though the latter are more
important than their numbers indicate as they trade in grain and do some
money-lending. Once again, the Harijans (outcastes) are landless and
form the tenant and labor pool.2 There are two main Harijan castes:
the Hindu Chamars (or Jatavs as they prefer to be called), and Muslim
Telis.3 The artisan community is virtually non-existent: most persons
go to Kumher or Bharatpur for pots and plows.

Though they are a minority, there are more Muslim families here
than in Hanumangarh. At the time of India's partition, thousands of
Muslims were killed in Bharatpur state but none were harmed in Shivpura.
Some later left for Pakistan, but during the riots village Thakurs
formed vigilante committees which refused any outsider entry into the
village thus protecting the Muslim population. The ones remaining range
from one family of wealthy traders (Manihars by caste) to the most
impoverished Teli laborers.

The first thing that strikes the visitor is the marked contrast in
relationships between high and low castes in the two villages. In

Hanumangarh, it is rare to see Harijans and caste Hindus chatting

 

1This does not mean they do not lease out land. Since landholdings

are large, they often retain a portion for self—cultivation and lease
the rest. Jats, Ahirs, and Yadavs do not have restrictions on use of
the plow, etc.

2Several have been given land grants by government of 2/5 acres
each. Hence they are considered landless both by the author and them-
selves.

3Muslims in India have their own castes. Telis are low in this
hierarchy, and being Muslim, are considered outcastes to Hindus anyway.

62

together outside the necessary interchange required by economic linkages.
In Shivpura though commensal restrictions are maintained, social rela-
tionships are informal, frank and close by comparison. The sarpanch
(village council chairman) has three wives, two of whom are Jat (his own
caste) and the middle one is a Chamar (a Harijan) which is rare indeed.
Villagers take pains to explain that the Chamar wife is not a concubine,
but a properly married wife. The reasons why these differences exist
are beyond the scope of this study except to point out that perhaps it
is partially due to the fact that Jats dominate the village. Since they
are not bound by the same strictures as are Brahmins and Baniyas, they
might set a more informal tone for the rest of the community. It also
points to the vast diversity one finds between villages.

Though the basic crops grown in Shivpura are the same as in
Hanumangarh, agricultural conditions are different. The soils are of a
heavier clay-loam variety. They are capable of retaining sufficient
moisture to permit farmers to divide their land and take two crops a
year without irrigation. A farmer will typically sow millet on half his
land in the monsoon leaving the other half fallow. On this he can plant
gram, barley and mustard in the winter. The yields improve vastly with
irrigation and fertilizers. Wheat is cultivated under irrigation. Mus-
tard is the main cash crop and is sold in Bharatpur or Mathura for oil
and oil cake (for fodder). Only one field in the village is planted to
vegetables -- they are imported either from Kumher or Nadbai (eight
miles away).

The water table is higher than in Hanumangarh: twenty to thirty
feet. It is much cheaper to sink tubewells; indeed there are several in

the village. Shivpura has no electrical connections though all the

63

surrounding villages do. Thus all pump sets are diesel.1 It is rumored
that electricity will reach the village by 1975. The northwest portion
of village lands are irrigated by canals from the Bareta Bund -- a large
artificial lake about one hundred and twenty miles to the north. The
canal system is to be expanded so that in the next four to five years
most of the northern area will be irrigated from it. Rainfall is more
than in Hanumangarh -- 60 inches in a normal year. There is a problem
of water logging and soil salinity in part of the village lands due to
the high water table and flood irrigation without proper drainage.

Parts of Bharatpur district are affected by monsoon floods, but not
Shivpura.

Farming is more mechanized than in Hanumangarh. There are at least
seven privately owned tractors in Shivpura: only two in Hanumangarh
proper. All land preparation and plowing operations are tractorized.
The machines are increasingly used for threshing and chaff cutting as
well. Produce is hauled to market by tractors. Even with the compara-
tively large farms, tractor owners need to take on custom work to break
even. Thus, even smaller owners can rent tractors for plowing, thresh-

ing and chaff cutting operations.

Schedule of Field Work and the Sample

 

Field work was conducted between May 1972 and August 1973. The
first several months were spent selecting the first village, finalizing
administrative arrangements with the Governments of India and Rajasthan,

and the construction and printing of the questionnaire. Interviews were

 

1This is an interesting point related to Shivpura's politics dis-
cussed further in the study. It was the one Congress village in a
Swatantra area.

64

started after the monsoon harvest and winter sowing in November 1972
and continued off and on until June 1973 with breaks for plowing and
harvesting.1 The remainder of the time was spent in New Delhi for data
processing. Translations of the questionnaires used are appended to
this study.

Within each village a sample of cultivators and laborers was ran-
domly chosen for in-depth interviews lasting from one to two hours each.
The field method is a combination of survey research and participant
observation. All interviews were conducted personally in Hindi; the
total number was 67. Had assistants been hired, the number of respon-
dents would have been larger. They were not hired because it would have
been difficult to get the depth and richness of information desired if
highly standardized interviewing techniques were used. The respondents
are similar to "informants" used by anthropologists but the author's
biases in the selection of informants is controlled for by their random
selection.

The sample is stratified: large farmers (over ten acres), medium
owners (5.1 to 10.0 acres), small farmers (1.0 to 5.0 acres), and agri-
cultural tenants and laborers. The latter two categories were origi-
nally to be discrete but they are not so in the real world. Most "mar-
ginal" farmers (those with less than one acre of land) and the landless
will lease land whenever they can and also do agricultural labor.

The sizes in each stratum are not haphazard: for extension pur-

poses government has a dividing line separating small from medium

 

1Interviewing had to be fitted to respondents' schedules. They
were free in the evenings after their work in the fields. All interview-
ing had to stop during the busy agricultural seasons mentioned and during
"wedding seasons". See appendices for a more detailed discussion.

65

farmers at 7.5 acres and large owners are classified as owning over ten
or twenty acres of land depending on the area. Marginal cultivators
are below 2.5 acres. From these points adjustments were made according
to the spread of land ownership in these villages. Within each stratum,
the respondents represent a ten percent sample chosen randomly.

Farmers' names were obtained from tehsil records. The relevant
unit was not the individual title holder because of dispersed titles,
but the operational cultivated unit. Thus titles had to be combined to
make up the operational units with the assistance of the local patwaris.
In Hanumangarh, the patwari had a reputation for being scrupulously hon-
est. In Shivpura because the patwari had only recently been posted
there, the assistance of a retired one was enlisted who was an original
resident of the village. He knew each family and its holding. The
accuracy of these men's guidance was borne out during interviews as
respondents would state their full land holdings rather than the amount
in their names in the tehsil records. There were very few discrepancies
between what the patwaris stated, and the farmers' statements.

The names of landless tenants and laborers were obtained from
voters' lists. In Hanumangarh three wards contain the landless commun-
ities. In Shivpura there are no distinct wards, but the patwari men-
tioned was able to identify landless families directly from the rolls.
The list of the landless was checked against the land records to elimi-
nate any duplication. The final sample breakdown was as indicated in
Table 2.4.

In addition twelve more interviews were conducted with village
"leaders" identified by the original respondents. They were asked in

the course of interviews to identify influential persons in both a

66

TABLE 2.4

SAMPLE BREAKDOWN BY STRATA

 

 

Total Number Completed
Strata of Units Sample Size Interviews*
Laborers/
tenants 206 21 20
Small farmers 343 34 19
Medium farmers 146 15 12
Large farmers 142 l4 l6

 

*Two medium farmers had bought land just prior to the inter-

views bringing them into the large category. A number of

small cultivators could not be contacted either because of

seasonal out-migration for work in industry, or for other

reasons. If a person could not be contacted after three

tries, he was drOpped. See appendices for further discus-

sion, and lessons learned.
general and political context. The persons most frequently mentioned
were interviewed using a more informal, open-ended questionnaire which
is also appended. It is focused on the leaders' attitudes toward change
in the two villages and perceptions of their own role in the process.

It had been hoped that political competitiveness could be taken
into account when the villages were selected. Two factors prevented
this. First, electoral data are now available only for the whole con-
stituency. This means that though a particular constituency may have
three or four-way contests, any given village may turn out to be a sin-

gle party area. This is impossible to determine with accuracy in

advance. Second, there are in fact very few villages with more than two

67

parties seriously contesting any given election.l Splinter elements of
others may be present but they tend to coalesce with the major ones for
electoral purposes. Both villages happen to be two-party areas: Con-
gress and Swantantra were the major contenders in each. In Shivpura,
there are Socialist elements and the Jan Sangh is making small inroads.
Hanumangarh also has Jan Sangh supporters. These tend to support
Swatantra candidates while the Socialists throw in their support with
the Congress.

Mention should be made of the social and historical differences in
the two villages. The data presented in the following chapters are
broken down only by sample strata. Several variables were tried (includ-
ing villages, caste, education, and age) but the strata showed the most
significance. In view of the differences noted above, the following
points should be kept in mind. First, the economic and political impacts
of agrarian change are important here. Second, these effects are remark-
ably uniform in both villages and the economic impacts particularly are
remarkably similar to those found by other scholars (who are cited where
appropriate) elsewhere in India. Third, the basic social configurations
are similar (e.g., patron-client relations, caste hierarchies) though
particular caste names vary. This means the specifics of the inter-
action between traditional socio-political forms and the modern system
are similar (see Chapter VI below).

With this background in mind a discussion of the data can begin.
Chapter III is focused on the spread of agricultural modernization: the

extent to which new production techniques have been adopted, and the

 

1See R. Chandidas,_g£ al., India Votes: A Source Book on Indian
Elections (New York: Humanities Press, 1968).

68

motivational and institutional constraints which prevent their wider
dissemination. What is of concern is the assumption made by scholars

and planners that all farmers will, given the opportunity, adopt more

profitable techniques.

CHAPTER III

THE SPREAD OF AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION

Going through the data it becomes clear that the specific intensive
programs cannot be separated from the socio-political institutional set-
ting in which they are implemented. In this chapter, land distribution
is seen as the crucial variable affecting access to and adoption of new
inputs. India's agricultural development strategy is predicatedcnlthe
injection of new technology with the assumption that farmers, given the
option, will adopt them. The point has already been made that every
incentive, technical and legal, has been provided to encourage farmers
to produce more. The question now arises as to how far new techniques
have spread through the farming population. One needs to remember that
production, however, is one part of the developmental effort: an

increase in all citizens' livelihood is another.

Adoption of New Inputs

 

The initial hypothesis regarding the spread of inputs states that:
the diffusion of farm inputs and access to them is a function of farm
size (the larger ones having better access) which is coincident with
political influence. This proposition was found to be valid with one
qualification. Inputs flow to those cultivators who have bggh the power
and motivation to get them. Though large farmers find it easier to

obtain improved inputs, they are not all adopters. And though more

69

70

smaller farmers may wish to obtain the inputs, they cannot. The moti~
vational aspect does not negate the proposition, it adds another vari-
able.

Adoption of the new techniques is low compared with the potential
in both villages. Though hybrids are available for a number of crops,
only two are used: wheat and millet. No one in the sample has tried
the new maize, barley or sorghum seeds though they grow the indigenous
varieties.l Table 3.1 shows the extent of adoption in Hanumangarh and
Shivpura.

Aside from the overall level of adoption which is relatively low,
it is striking that use of the new seeds dropped consequentially in
1972-73. Some of this is due to poor rains. It will be recalled that
millet is a monsoon crop and thus is seldom irrigated. Because there
was uncertainty about the rains, fewer persons were willing to use the
hybrids. Additionally, some users of both the millet and wheat hybrids
were not satisfied with their performance. Those who are satisfied
have said they will continue to use them (see Table 3.2). The farmers
who did not obtain satisfactory production levels are those who did not
use the full recommended package of practices including irrigation,
fertilizer and disease control. This is mainly due to a lack of infor-
mation. A few respondents maintain that the hybrid varieties do not

taste as good as the old ones which is a matter of taste. It should be

 

1In wheat it is possible to double yields with the new varieties
and one can do almost as well with millet. The other three seed vari-
eties still have problems with diseases, but no one had tried them any-
way save for one farmer not in the sample in Hanumangarh. This might
reflect the fact that maize and sorghum are not major crops, but does
not explain the absence of high yielding barley seed.

71

TABLE 3.1

ADOPTION OF HYBRID SEED BY CROP AND FARM SIZE

 

Strata Wheat Millet

 

Used Used Never Used Used Never
1972-73 Previously Used 1972-73 Previously Used (N)

 

 

 

 

Large

farmers 25.0 56.2 43.8 37.5 50.0 50.0 (16)
Medium

farmers 41.7 41.7 58.3 25.0 58.3 41.7 (12)
Small

farmers 15.8 26.3 73.7 0.0 15.8 84.2 (19)
Tenants 0.0 5.0 95.0 0.0 5.0 95.0 (20)
Overall 17.9 29.9 70.1 13.4 28.4 71.6 (67)

TABLE 3.2
INTENTION TO USE HYBRID SEED IN
THE FUTURE BY FARM SIZE
Yes, Yes, If Not Definitely Total
Strata Definitely Help Given Sure Not Z (N)

Large farmers 50.0 18.8 12.5 18.8 100.1 (16)
Medium farmers 50.0 16.6 0.0 33.2 99.8 (12)
Small farmers 26.0 31.6 0.0 42.1 99.7 (19)
Tenants 5.0 65.0 30.0 0.0 100.0 (20)

Overall 29.9 35.8 11.9 22.4 100.0 (67)

 

72

noted, however, that among the regular users of hybrids, farmers sow
indigenous varieties for home consumption using the hybrids for sale.
Table 3.2 shows the respondents' reactions when asked if they would
use hybrid seeds in the future. Lack of proper information is a major
hinderance to adoption as over one-third of all respondents say they
will use the seeds if they learn how. Size of farm is pertinent as
small farmers and tenants feel the lack of information more than do
farmers in the other strata. In the category of farmers who maintain
they will not take hybrids in the future, there may be some who have
given up trying to get the necessary inputs and advice. Here the ques-
tion of motivation (to be discussed below) may also be important.
Looking at the use of chemical fertilizers, one finds a similar
situation (see Table 3.3). Table 3.4 presents respondents' attitudes
on the future use of fertilizers. Overall, of those wanting to use
them very few make it conditional on irrigation or funds and even fewer
appear to require information. Again, however, more of the smaller
farmers and tenants say they will not use fertilizers. Of these most
say they have tried to get them several times along with the necessary
information but have not been successful. Sometimes they are told there
is a shortage, but they are quick to point out that plenty of other
farmers -- those with more land -- are able to get supplies. Some of
the respondents are not able to utilize fertilizers because they lack
irrigation. Mast of the tenants are faced with this situation. Over-
all, however, the use of chemical fertilizers is higher than that of

any of the improved inputs. This may be partially due to the fact that

73

TABLE 3.3

USE OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS BY FARM SIZE

 

 

 

Used Used Never
Strata 1972-73 Previously Used (N)
Large farmers 50.0 43.8 50.0 (16)
Medium farmers 41.7 50.0 50.0 (12)
Small farmers 21.1 31.7 68.3 (19)
Tenants 5.0 5.0 95.0 (20)
Overall 26.9 29.9 70.1 (67)
TABLE 3.4

INTENTION TO USE CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS IN
THE FUTURE BY FARM SIZE

 

 

Yes, If Not Total
Strata Yes Help Given Sure No Z (N)
Large farmers 56.2 6.3 0.0 37.5 100.0 (16)
Medium farmers 75.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 (12)
Small farmers 42.1 5.3 0.0 52.6 100.0 (19)
Tenants 10.0 10.0 30.0 50.0 100.0 (20)
Overall 40.3 5.8 13.6 40.3 100.0 (67)

 

they have been promoted since the early 19603 and because the results

are dramatic.1

 

1Because of these dramatic results, farmers often can ruin crops
the first time they try chemicals by using doses far in excess of what
is recommended or by not irrigating immediately after the fertilizer is
applied. This does not appear to deter them perhaps because they know

74

The technique considered finally is the use of pesticides (see
Table 3.5). Between a fourth and a third of all respondents have used
BHC powder (benzine hexachloride) before planting to kill termites
which are a major problem in both villages. Considering the extent of
termite infestation and the fact that all farmers interviewed are aware
of BHC's value, this is still low adoption. In Shivpura some aerial
spraying of wheat and mustard has been done by government to control
rust and blue beetles, and this has been mentioned by some persons.
Besides BHC few farmers know specifically of any other pesticides but
say they need help as they lose considerable portions of their crops to
various pests and rodents.1 All respondents know there is a Plant

Protection Officer at the panchayat samiti and those who have tried to

 

contact him in both villages (save for one or two large farmers) have
failed to get assistance.2 Some are worried about the effects of pesti-

cides which they have heard are dangerous. These persons are reluctant

 

that certain types of manures will do the same, particularly poultry
manure which is very high in nitrogen.

Mbst farmers use nitrogenous fertilizers, either CAN (calcium ammo-
nium nitrate), or urea. Though the soils require phosphates, potash
and trace elements, e.g., zinc, very little of these are used. A few
farmers in Shivpura used super-phosphates. The reliance on nitroge-
nous fertilizers, however, is raising concern in official quarters as
farmers assume they will get higher yields by using them alone. In
fact, the phosphates are crucial at the time the plants get their heads
in order to enable the graintx>develop to its full capacity.

1This is not to say they know nothing about them: they know
generic terms such as rat poisons, DDT, sprays for rust, etc., but not
the Specific chemical names.

2There may be another problem here aside from the implied and often
openly alleged callousness of the extension personnel. Often farmers
come for help only when it is too late. Rust, for example, cannot be
fully destroyed once it appears. Its appearance can be controlled, but
farmers often do not seek help in time.

75

TABLE 3.5

USE OF CHEMICAL PESTICIDES BY FARM SIZE

 

 

Used Used Never
Strata 1972—73 Previously Used (N)
Large farmers 31.3 31.3 68.7 (16)
Medium farmers 41.7 41.7 58.3 (12)
Small farmers 10.5 15.8 84.2 (19)
Tenants 5.0 5.0 95.0 (20)
Overall 19.4 20.9 79.1 (67)

 

to try them even under guidance.1 Respondents were asked about their
intention to use pesticides in the future. The results are not pre-
sented as they all said they would use them if necessary. Given the
current usage, this is doubtful.

Since irrigation is a prerequisite for the use of the new techno-
logies, can one say this is the main constraint to their adoption? On a
national level it has been suggested that unless irrigation is expanded,
the limits of the Green Revolution technologies have been reached. But
as can be seen from Table 3.6, irrigation is not a constraint for around
50 percent of the sample. The table includes the nineteen tenants who
leased in arid land only for the monsoon crop. Adoption levels are

below the potential.

 

1There had been some tragic cases where children died from eating
rat poison thinking it to be sweets of some kind. Also, malathion and
parathion, used for viral and pest diseases, are sprayed and farmers
are acutely conscious of the care required in the spraying operations.
If inhaled, they can cause paralysis.

76

TABLE 3.6

PERCENT OF IRRIGATED LAND BY SIZE OF FARM

 

 

 

Strata Percent of Irrigated Land
Total

0 1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 Over 80 % (N)
Large
farmers 6.3 18.8 46.3 6.3 3.6 18.8 100.1 (16)
Medium
farmers 33.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 0.0 41.5 99.7 (12)
Small
farmers 36.8 0.0 15.8 5.3 5.3 36.8 100.0 (19)
Tenants 95.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 100.0 (20)
Overall 46.3 5.8 16.4 4.5 3.0 23.9 99.9 (67)

 

Relevant to this is the intensity of land use. Only 18 cultivators
(26.9%) take three crops each year whereas another 16 (23.9%) can easily
do so given their irrigation facilities.1 Twenty-eight farmers (41.8%)
take two crOps (monsoon and winter) though around 40 (59.7%) have the
capacity.2 Everyone can take a monsoon crop including tenants if they

can lease land. As is clear, the land itself is not farmed as intensely

 

1Aside from the monsoon and winter crops, a third one may be taken

in summer consisting of vegetables, fodder, and/or an additional crop
of millet for either fodder or human consumption. To those who argue
that irrigation by the traditional leathern bucket and oxen method is
impossible in 115°F., it should be pointed out that most farmers here
have electric or diesel pumps thus eliminating labor under the sun.
Those taking a third cr0p irrigate in the evenings anyway for fear of
scorching the plants. Power supply was not a constraint in the year
field work was done.

2This includes Shivpura farmers without wells who can take two
crops as some of their neighbors do, by dividing the land for the mon-
soon and winter crops. See section on Shivpura, Chapter 11 above.

77

as it might be and neither are the farmers exploiting the full potential

of technologies available to them.

The Issue of Farmer Motivation

 

The preceding indicates two problem areas of access and motivation.
Dealing first with motivation, it is probable that if all farmers are to
try to use the new inputs a short-fall in supply will result. In fact,
they do not demand them even though they have both land and water. Why
should this be the case?

With the exception of perhaps ten percent of the sample, most farm-
ers regardless of farm size follow what is a peasant strategy of farm-
ing. Land is seen as a security (or collateral for credit) and a means
of food production for the family -- not as a cash earner. Most fami-
lies sell milk, do casual labor, or send one or two sons into government
or private service for cash. Families are not self-sufficient; on the
contrary they are dependent increasingly on a monetized market for basic
items of daily use: cooking oil, cloth, kerosene, etc. Farming, how-
ever, is not seen as a means to obtain these directly. If cash is not
available through the methods mentioned respondents will obtain it from
the money-lender.

This can be illustrated through three examples. Landless tenants
and laborers were asked if they would like some land and how much. All
want land; most mention amounts between three and five acres. Why these
amounts? The calculation is based on how much a man needs to feed his
family and how much he can manage with family labor and two oxen. Every
respondent makes the same calculation and the amounts vary according to

the number of persons there are in the house. The estimates are based

78

on the availability of irrigation facilities and include the production
of sufficient surplus to get credit or cash to purchase non-farm items.
One respondent answered with a touch of whimsy: "How much land? Land
is great wealth now; I would like lots. But five acres are enough for
my family -- one should not be greedy and ask for more. That would make
us as bad as the baniyas who take everything they can!"

Second, when asked what credit is used for, one finds that the

majority use it for non-farm purposes (see Table 3.7).

TABLE 3.7

UTILIZATION OF CREDIT BY FARM SIZE

 

 

 

Strata Use of Credit
Household Farm Plus
Farm Expenses, Household
Inputs Debt Repayment, and Rituals Total
Only Rituals* Expenses* N.A.** % (N)
Large farmers 43.8 31.1 18.8 6.1 100.0 (16)
Medium farmers 8.3 25.0 58.3 8.3 99.9 (12)
Small farmers 47.4 36.8 10.6 5.3 100.0 (19)
Tenants 45.0 0.0 40.0 15.0 100.0 (20)
Overall 17.9 38.8 25.4 17.9 100.0 (67)

 

*Includes items such as cloth, or food purchased and the rituals include
mainly marriages and death feasts.

**This category includes persons who either cannot get credit (see below
under section on "Access and Farm Size") or who have decided to rely on
their own production to meet non-farm needs.

This use of credit combined with the discussion above showing that farm-

ers do not fully utilize their land and irrigation resources reinforces

the notion that most of them follow a "satisficing" rather than a

79

"maximizing" strategy of production. This can be illustrated by look-
ing at the third example.

One of the large farmers interviewed named Bachchu owns slightly
over fifty acres most of which are used for grazing. Ten acres are
irrigated and even these are not fully utilized. A monsoon cr0p of
indigenous millet is planted on ten of the unirrigated acres. If the
rains fail, so does his cr0p. In winter indigenous wheat and barley
are planted (mixed) on 4.5 acres of the irrigated land. The family's
main income is from milk produced by his own cows, goats and buffalos.
There are between twenty and thirty animals in all. Bachchu sows no
fodder though he is aware that his milk production would easily double
with proper feed.

When asked about inputs and advice, Bachchu maintains he can get
anything he wants. This is true since he is a wealthy man and his
older brother was chairman of the cooperative society at the time of the
interview and a caste page; (headman) besides. Why not use high yield-
ing seed then? "We don't use chemical fertilizers and so can't use the
seed."1 Why not use chemical fertilizers? "We have manure from the
cattle which suffices and since I am not interested in producing more
grain, what is the use of investing in it?" He has ready access to the
extension staff: "I know what their advice is. They tell my brother
who tells me; I can find out myself anyway. But I don't take their help

because I don't need to produce more. Look, we have more grain than we

 

1The hybrids require chemical fertilizers. If they are not used,
the farmer is likely to lose his full investment. Some newer varieties
give marginal returns without them, but (unless chemicals are used) a
good crop of indigenous wheat will give better results.

80

can eat. We sell to the baniyas1 in the village and take more into
Jaipur to sell at the magdi.2 To do this much I hardly need to sow
seed in rows. Even if this weren't so, there are so many more bighas3
I can put under cultivation. As long as we get enough cash from the
milk and enough to eat from the land, why bother with these other
things? My brother uses some of them, but I don't see why I should."
Bachchu is not an eccentric. There are Bachchu's in all strata of
the sample. The issue of farmers' motivations has been dealt with
extensively elsewhere. It is increasingly accepted that any actor has
a number of goals in life and pecuniary profit is only one of them.4 A
farmer is not only a producer, he is a father, a member of a caste, and
the village community. Each of these roles imposes constraints and
demands on his behavior and use of resources. They also imply that he
has diverse goals to maximize. Given his range of goals, "productive"

resources (both cash and time) may be channeled to non-economic ends:

this is clearly illustrated in Table 3.7.

 

1The grain traders-cumdmoney—lenders.
2Large urban grain market.

3Indigenous land measure: Hanumangarh's local equivalent was four
bighas to one acre.

4See Kusum Nair, The Lonely Furrow: Farming in the United States,
Japan and India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969); Colin
Leys, "Political Perspectives," in Dudley Seers, ed., Development in a
Divided World (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1970), pp. 106-112;
Michael Lipton, "A Game Against Nature: Theories of Peasant Decision
Making," The Listener (March 28, 1968), pp. 401-403 and "A Game Against
Nature: Strategies of Security," The Listener (April 4, 1968), pp. 437-
39; and Barry H. Michie, "Variations in Economic Behaviour and the Green
Revolution: An Anthropological Perspective," Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. VIII, #26, Review of Agriculture (June 30, 1973).

 

 

 

 

81

Besides multiple goals, however, in the Indian situation, there is
no particular need for the farmer to produce anywhere near the maximum
feasible as he remains economically viable without doing so. He has
virtually no obligation to the state as land tax is nominal and the
state has no further lien on his product. He is in a sellers' market
since food is in short supply and prices rise yearly increasing his
income. Almost every farmer interviewed says his income has increased
over the past five years due to price rises. Some having invested in
wells have increased their income from double cropping. As long as the
requisite production level for economic viability is determined by sub-
sistence there will be wide variations in adoption and economic perfor-
mance given individual farmers' divergent goals. The higher the floor
of viability the more uniform behavior will be. As regards production,
it can be argued that the availability of credit from the money-lender

for non-farm activities is a disincentive to increased production as the

 

farmer need not rely on his farming to meet social obligations (except
in the long run as he repays his debt). These hypotheses have ramifi-
cations for the institutional parameters laid down by government to

facilitate agricultural change and are discussed in the final chapter.

Access and Farm Size

 

The data collected also suggest that many farmers have limited
access to the new inputs: this is the other side of the motivational
coin. Where the will is present, land size becomes an important con-
straint. Why this is so requires further elaboration.

It has been shown that land is seen at least as a security and food

provider for one's family. Beyond this, land has important social and

82

political functions everywhere. Production organization as a part of
social organization reflects status and other relationships.1 In India,
as in many other parts of the world, land has traditionally been con-
ferred on persons as a reward for services rendered to political author-
ity. In India it followed that duties performed by upper castes tended
to be rewarded more: e.g., priests and soldiers (Brahmins and Rajputs)
typically received the largest rewards; hence the presence of mg§§i_or
1331; holdings.2 The status enjoyed by these persons is reinforced and
legitimized by the ritual hierarchy of caste. The third group whose
power is coincidental with land is the bagiya_community.3 While some
members traditionally enjoyed court patronage (as suppliers of provi-
sions and capital) others gained local power through money-lending acti-
vities over the generations.

Landowners' power is also reinforced by the particular production
organization in India. Where a majority of persons is dependent on
agriculture for sustenance, and where the primary resource, land, is
controlled by a few, the power held by those few is out of proportion to
their numbers. This is clear where large tracts of land are owned by
one family and cultivated by tenants. Where tenancies arose and why
they did is beyond the scope of this study except to note that the pro-

cess was aided by p0pulation pressures and the introduction of effective

 

lSee Michie, gp;_cit., and also Arthur L. Stinchcomb, "Agricultural
Enterprise and Rural Class Relations," in Jason Finkle and Richard
Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1971), pp. 359-71.

 

 

There are exceptions to this: sometimes outcaste families were
given land grants too. Families like these were found in both villages.

3The traders-cumdmoney-lenders.

83

law and order enforcement which in effect bound tenants to their land-
lords until debts were repaid.1

The landowners' influence also extends over the small owner-culti-
vators as most large landowners are also money-lenders. Indeed, money-
lending has been their dominant occupation. They may act as marketing
agents, and as is discussed below, they are also major suppliers of
seed, food and basic consumer items to villagers. Most activities
between them and their clients are based on credit.

Returning to the data, one finds that (1) villagers conceive of
influence, wealth and land as coincidental, and (2) they feel their own
access to resources is constrained by land size. Politically at this
point it is sufficient to note that political parties normally rely on
traditional elites to pull votes for them during elections.2 In return,
landowners receive a number of policy payoffs and easy access to commo-

dities distributed by the state.

 

1There are several good sources on the agrarian history of India
among which are: William Moreland, The Agrarian System of Moslem India
(Cambridge: W. Heffer, 1929); Walter Neale, Economic Change in Rural
India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); and Irfan Habib, The
,Agrarian System of Mughal India (London: Asia Publishing House, 1963).
For Rajasthan see reports of the Jagirdari and Zamindari Abolition
Commission, and Dhool Singh's Survey of Land Reforms in Rajasthan, op.
cit. The coincidence of land and power is recognized in all studies of
agrarian societies. For particular lucidity, see Doreen Warriner, Land
Reform in Principle and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969). Also
see Robert Eric Frykenberg, ed., Land Control and Social Structure in
Indian History (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969).

 

 

 

 

2The bulk of literature on Indian politics deals with this. The use
of large farmers and/or money-lenders as vote mobilizers is a rather
cheap strategy for any party. Intuitively the same should hold true for
any country where there is a similar hierarchical social order. See Paul
Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1965), and Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 467-69 where he also
points out that no party is generally able to co-opt all village elites
which makes for greater competition than one would assume otherwise.

 

84

Taking the first point, respondents were asked to name three per-
sons they consider generally influential in the village. These would
be persons people respect, or might turn to for solutions to everyday
problems. Then about twenty minutes further into the interview in the
context of discussing elections, the respondents were asked to name
three persons considered to be politically important (see Table 3.8).
Not all respondents could name three persons which tends to reflect the
fact that they might rely on only one or two persons for advice. Fewer
respondents also named politically important persons. This is primarily
because of the coincidence in respondents' minds of the two kinds of
influence. All respondents named persons in the large landowning class.
There is a general consensus on the particular personalities chosen by
all respondents with small deviations. For example, Harijans in both
villages mention caste headmen (patels) who are also landowners as well
as leaders from other communities. The rest of the sample of course,
does not see Harijans as particularly influential for the whole village
and tend to name persons from the dominant landed castes: Jats in
Shivpura, and Brahmins and Baniyas in Hanumangarh. All persons men-
tioned are presently or have recently been members of elected or other
official bodies.

The point is further illustrated in the following discussion of the
respondents' perceptions of their access to inputs. Access is broken
down into three categories: the receipt of sufficient inputs on time,
access to credit, and access to information or advice. Since the ques-
tions dealt with access on a rather general level, answers cover both

governmental and private sources of each.

85

TABLE 3.8

LEADERS IDENTIFIED BY RESPONDENTS

 

Social Attributes Non—Political Political
of Leaders Leaders Leaders

 

Respondents' Choices

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lst Choice 2nd Choice lst Choice 2nd Choice

Caste
Brahmin 28.3 13.4 8.9 13.4
Rajput 2.9 0.0 2.9 0.0
Baniya 16.4 16.4 4.5 13.4
Mina 17.9 1.5 8.9 6.0
Harijan 11.9 4.5 13.4 6.0
N.A.lDon't know 22.6 64.2 62.4 61.2

Total (%) 100 0 100 0 101.0 100.0
Occupation
Landowner 8.9 8.9 0.0 0.0
Landowner-cum-

money-lender 28.3 10.4 16.4 0.0
Elected landowner

and money-lender 37.3 16.4 21.2 16.4
Laborer 2.9 0.0 0.0 14.9
N.A.lDon't know 22.6 64.2 62.4 68.7

Total (%) 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0
Party Affiliation
Congress 56.5 27.9 28.4 32.9
Swatantra 20.9 8.9 7.8 5.9
Don't know 22.6 64.2 62.4 61.2

Total (%) 100.0 101.0 98.6 100 0

 

The first dimension deals with the availability of inputs on time
(see Table 3.9). Most farmers claim they have difficulty most of the
time. Almost all the large farmers can get timely supplies whereas
around 75 percent of all others cannot. Of the small farmers and tenants,

those who say they have no problems, are persons who save seed at home

86

TABLE 3.9

WHETHER RESPONDENTS HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING
INPUTS ON TIME BY FARM SIZE

 

 

 

Strata Whether Inputs are Available on Time

Normally Often Has Never Gets Total

on Time Problems on Time N.A.* % (N)
Large farmers 56.3 31.2 12.5 0.0 100.0 (16)
Medium farmers 33.3 25.1 41.6 0.0 100.0 (12)
Small farmers 42.1 10.5 31.6 15.8 100.0 (19)
Tenants/Laborers 30.0 30.0 10.0 30.0 100.0 (20)
Overall 40.3 28.3 22.4 9.0' 100.0 (67)

 

*Includes persons who either save seed at home from previous season or
who were unable to lease land during 1972-73.

from the previous crop because they know they are unable to buy any at
planting time. Few of these use any additional inputs such as ferti-
lizers. When asked what the problem is, they reply they lack money,
credit, and influence with the distributors. "Big people help their own
‘ kind -- who looks to us. Even if we are farming some big farmers' lands,
do they see to it that we have seed and water? No, we not only pay rent
for the land but also for all the inputs as well."

Related to this is the question, "If you are not getting these
things, who in your Opinion is getting them?" (see Table 3.10). Most
mention persons who have plenty of land, influence and money -- the
three again being seen as coincident. "Big people, those with large

amounts of land. They have money and know officers at the Samiti or in

87
TABLE 3.10

WHO RESPONDENTS FEEL GET THE INPUTS READILY

 

 

 

Strata Types of Persons Getting Inputs
Big, Anyone No One
Gov't. Influential With Due to D.K. Total
Servants (Farmers .. Money Scarcity N.A. % (N)
Large
farmers 6.3 31.3 56.2 6.3 0.0 100.1 (16)
Medium
farmers 0.0 58.3 8.3 0.0 33.3 99.9 (12)
Small
farmers 5.2 26.3 26.3 0.0 42.2 100.0 (19)
Tenants/
Laborers 0.0 15.0 25.0 0.0 60.0 100.0 (20)
Overall 3.0 29.9 29.9 1.5 35.8 100.1 (67)

 

Jaipur and they are listened to."1

"If a small man even tries to go to
the Samiti, he may get to see some clerk, but never anyone who can help
him. We are always told the BDO (Block Development Officer) is busy --
but busy with what? Drinking tea with the big men."

One or two farmers mention general scarcity as a problem. These
are men from Shivpura who tried unsuccessfully to get hybrid seeds that
year. One man said he did not know what the problem was but he could not
find supplies most of the time. The rest of the sample feels supplies
are plentiful and anyone with ready cash can buy them. Sometimes the

Samiti officers sell them on the black market, but they are available

for those who try.

 

1The Hindi term used translates as "big men" and has the connota-
tion of wealthy and influential.

88

Next turning to farmers and tenants' access to credit, it is clear
the same constraint of land size is operative (see Table 3.11). The

major channels through which it is available are outlined in Chapter I.

TABLE 3.11

AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT BY SIZE OF FARM

 

 

 

Strata Whether Respondents Get Enough Credit
Total
Yes Sometimes Never No Need % (N)
Large farmers 81.2 18.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 (16)
Medium farmers 16.7 41.7 41.7 0.0 100.1 (12)
Small farmers 15.8 36.8 36.8 10.6 100.0 (19)
Tenants/Laborers 10.0 5.0 75.0 10.0 100.0 (20)
Overall 29.8 40.3 23.9 5.9 99.9 (67)

 

Most farmers have trouble obtaining credit either all or most of
the time. It is interesting that persons who feel no need for credit
are small farmers and tenants-cumelaborers. Two small owners have made
a conscious break from the cultivators' cycle of perpetual indebtedness.
They now rely on their land for both food and additional cash require-
ments.1 As far as the tenants are concerned, they are unable to obtain
credit without land for collateral. Each year they try to lease any

amount of land for the monsoon season and buy seed from whatever little

 

1Both might take loans for major expenses such as marriages, but
rely on their own production for household and farm expenses. One con-
tributed Rs. 200/- ($26.66) to the construction of a new physics lab at
the High School though he had studied only through the fifth class him-
self. Both view farming as a business.

89

they can save from their earnings as casual or agricultural laborers.
Both maintain they cannot afford to lease in land for a full year
because of their lack of capital.

Credit is a constraint to a point for small farmers as well as
tenants and laborers. As land size falls, so money-lenders' interest
rates rise. Official credit is available onlytxnthose who own 2.5 acres
or more. Therefore, for around half of the sample in the small farmers'
category, credit is more expensive than it is for any other class of
cultivators. As regards the tenants and laborers, most of them cannot
obtain any from the regular private sources because of their lack of
collateral.1 A few have long-standing ties with particular money-lend-
ing families whose tenants they might have been over several genera-
tions. These are able to get loans and repay them through labor and/or
cropsharing. While such arrangements mean access to credit, they also
make it impossible to repay fully one's debt.

Loans from money-lenders whether taken in cash or kind are nor-
mally repaid in kind. Though lenders maintain they are willing to accept
payment in cash, their advantage lies in grain since the grain trade is
their main income earner. The loan's value is set in kind when it is
taken, based on grain prices at the previous harvest. Should a farmer
take a loan for his winter crop, he will repay x quintals of wheat or
barley at whatever the money-lender chooses to estimate the price will
be that year based on the last. Smaller cultivators in particular find
the bulk of their crop has been mortgaged before it is sown. The money-

lender obtains grain cheaply holding onto it until the market prices rise

 

1There are special loans available to Harijans for housing construc-
tion and other purposes which are discussed below in Chapter IV.

90

later in the season. Many cultivators find themselves short of food
stocks by the middle or end of the cropping season and have to buy back
their own produce at inflated rates. Even worse, they often obtain
these additional stocks on loan thus adding interest also at inflated
rates. It will be recalled that interest rates charged by money-lenders
range from 12 to 50 percent pg: appgm.

Why do cultivators not utilize official channels where interest is
much lower? Some persons do of course, and do so mainly for the pur-
chase of pump sets or other farm machinery (see Table 3.12). Official

credit is still vastly under-utilized.

TABLE 3.12

SOURCES OF CREDIT USED BY FARM SIZE*

 

Strata Credit Sources

 

Money Friends, State or Panchayat Coop-
Lender Relatives Land Bank Samiti** erative (N)

 

Large farmers 81.3 31.3 0.0 0.0 37.5 (16)
Medium farmers 83.3 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (12)
Small farmers 84.2 15.7 5.3 5.3 10.5 (19)
Tenants/Laborers 60.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (20)
Overall 76.0 26.9 1.5 1.5 11.9 (67)

 

*Totals are not 100.0% as respondents could give more than one response.

**Only one person had an outstanding loan from this source. The
samitis no longer extend credit.

 

1Rates vary in the two villages: in Hanumangarh they range from
12 to 24 percent and in Shivpura from 25 to 50 percent. If loans are
taken in kind (grain or seed) interest is double that charged for cash
and may even be compounded during the year.

91

Three main reasons are given for not using official credit. The
most frequent response is that there is too much red tape involved with
government loans. This is true from the cultivator's perspective. He
is required for example, to show he has no outstanding debt at any other
governmental agency. He needs proof of the requisite amount of land
ownership. Official estimates might be asked for unless loans are given
in kind (e.g., seed) which have to be submitted by officials at the

panchayat samiti or district offices. Technical appraisals might be

 

asked for in some situations: if a farmer wants to install a pump set,
he needs an estimate from irrigation engineers to show the well has
sufficient water for proper utilization of the pump set. While these
procedures have a rationale, they tend to intimidate or baffle some
farmers.

Second, several farmers state frankly that government requires pay-
ment on time while the money-lender does not. They are afraid their
land might be auctioned off by government if they default. This has
never actually happened in anyone's memory.1 On the contrary, several
laborers and smaller cultivators' families have lost land through money-
lenders' foreclosures. Money-lenders tend to reinforce farmers' fears

of governmental action and in at least one case had threatened to

 

lLong, complex legal provisions make it difficult for government to
foreclose. The same is true for money-lenders, but since their debtors
are either unable financially or unwilling to deal in court, informal
arrangements often mean the cultivator loses d3 facto control of his land
until such time as the debt is repaid which is almost impossible without
use of the land. Government on the other hand, aside from the legalities
of notices and foreclosure, must grant debt relief in times of natural
disasters which occur with alarming regularity. The recuperation of
public loans is abysmally low in India. Farmers have been known to take
governments loans to repay money-lenders. Such incidents led government
to stOp all "taccavi" or general purpose cash loans.

92

withdraw credit from a farmer if he took a loan from the land mortgage
bank. To an extent private credit is more flexible in that debts can
continue for long periods of time as long as the bulk of the interest
is paid each year. Its ready availability, however, means that farmers
do not need to rely primarily on their farming to meet expenses. This
lowers the floor of production required to remain viable in agriculture
and as such, detracts from the potential productivity of farmers.

The crux of the matter is that money-lenders provide "untied" cre-
dit usable for any purpose without accounting. As mentioned official
credit is tied, and for most purposes the cultivator never receives any
cash in hand. Loans are only for farm or other productive enterprises.
Subsistence cultivators seldom separate farm and household budgets but
by the respondents' own reckoning, most of their credit is used for non-
farm purposes (as is apparent in Table 3.7 above). A sizable proportion
is used for ritual and social obligations, e.g., marriages and death
feasts.

The third dimension of access discussed is the availability of
advice or information. When asked if they farm according to advice
given by extension agents, only 15 percent of all respondents say they
try. Most say they do not even try to find out what extension agents
advise since the agents have no interest in the small farmers anyway
(see Table 3.13).

Many of these respondents have tried unsuccessfully in the past to
approach either the village level worker or another member of the samiti
staff. Of the 15 percent who try to farm according to extension agents'

advice, most are in the large stratum. Of course, there are persons in

93

TABLE 3.13

WHETHER RESPONDENTS USE EXTENSION ADVICE BY LAND SIZE

 

 

 

Strata Whether Respondents Use Extension Advice
Doesn't Know What Total
Yes No .,Agents Say % (N)
Large farmers 30.0 25.0 45.0 100.0 (16)
Medium farmers 16.7 16.7 66.7 100.1 (12)
Small farmers 10.6 5.3 84.2 100.1 (19)
Tenants/Laborers 5.0 95.0 0.0 100.0 (20)
Overall 14.9 38.8 46.3 100.0 (67)

 

each stratum like Bachchu who have no interest in improving their pro-

duction, and hence make no attempt to contact extension workers.

Of the 70 percent or so who do not get advice, most of the medium

and especially the smaller cultivators feel their land is the major

hindrance. One of the small farmers puts it this way:

The government wants more food produced, but they
feel only big farmers can do this. The big farmers
too never tell Samiti people to come help us though
they have the influence to make them do their jobs.
This may be because the big farmers too are not
interested or don't want us to progress. Why? I
don't know. Maybe because then we would not be
under their influence. As it is now many small
farmers can't save seed enough even though they try
to from the previous year's crap. They need it for
food and then they are dependent on the big farmer
who has a surplus and who is a money-lender as well.
But you know, a small man has to work harder than
the big one because his small farm is all he has to
live on. So why is it that government won't help
us? Tell me that! Of course, there are lazy small
farmers too -— but on the whole they work harder...

94

Tenants almost laugh when asked about farming on the advice of the
extension staff. Most of them say there is no way they can benefit from
the advice even if they get it. "We have no land. What we can lease
is the worst land possible because landowners keep the best for them-
selves. What will we do with advice whatever it is?" "We know what
they say, but why should we follow it with no land of our own? Only the
next tenant or the landlord himself will profit from it. If landlords
and government want higher yields, let them pay for them."

Other comments however reflect another side. "They (the extension
agents) won't come to us, nor will they see us if we go there. We have
no land. They aren't interested in the small man anyway. Farming has
become a business for big people only." "We don't know anyone there
(the samiti) and you have to have influence to get these things. Only
big farmers have influence. Even the small landowners cannot get any-
thing. And we hear they ask for money. What can we do?" "They don't
listen to small men anyway -- do you think they would listen to
Harijans?"l

One tenant said she tried to farm according to the extension
agent's recommendations. Her husband is a pump mechanic at the city
water works. He is also fairly influential among a segment of the
Raiger (leatherworkers') caste. This family has leased land from the
same Brahmin family for two generations. The landlord provides only
irrigation facilities and those too have been cut off since he defaulted
on the payment of electrical bills for the pump set. Until this hap-
pened, the tenants used both high yielding wheat and millet seed: they

are the only tenants in the sample who did so.

 

1
Outcastes.

95

Land presents two constraints for tenants. One is motivational in
that they are not prepared to invest in what is not theirs and from
which they gain only temporary advantage. Some observers have made the
point that landownership may not be the crucial variable. What is
necessary is security of tenure.1 The comments cited above clearly
reflect insecurity of tenure and this is discussed at length in Chapter

IV.

Myths and Realities of Small Farm Productivity

The second constraint is that neither the extension agents nor the
large landowners are interested in tenants' productivity. Landowners
who are serious about increasing production by and large do their own
farming or supervise their tenants closely, providing proper seed and
other inputs. Tractors make it possible for them to dispense with
tenants altogether and hire farm managers. Most however do not invest
much in their farms; they get food enough for their families as it is,
plus a moderate surplus. Their money—lending and grain trading activi-
ties are more important.

Interviews conducted with village leaders support the perceptions
of small farmers and tenants. The large farmer's desire to control
agricultural resources coincides with his belief that small farms cannot
produce a surplus. These beliefs further coincide with those of admini-
strators in charge of program implementation who see it as a waste of
time to cajole small farmers into adopting new practices.

A11 leaders feel that agricultural production has increased conse-

quentially with the intensive programs. Some mention that increased

 

lSee Doreen warriner, op. cit., and the Ford Foundation Report cited
above, Chapter I.

96

irrigation has caused the most change by permitting double cropping.
Which groups have benefitted the most from the programs? "Mainly peo-
ple like myself who have lots of land because we can demand the inputs.
The small farmers are in trouble: they neither demand them nor can

they really produce much more.‘ (the village headman of Shivpura) "The
bigger farmers, of course, and they don't really need the government's
help except perhaps for extension advice. It is the smaller man who
needs the subsidies and loans —- but he is so far denied access to them
and it is the fault of government that thinks there is no use putting
so much into the small farmer -- though let me tell you he has to work
harder than the big one." (retired patwari, Shivpura) "People who try
-- both big and small farmers though the big farmers have much more
advantage. They can afford the inputs and also the samiti will give to
them first assuming they will have a higher increase in production."
(caste headman in Hanumangarh, big farmer and member of the Congress
Party).

One large farmer sums it up this way: "How can government expect
the small man to make up food deficits? These people have only four or
five bighas or land and can barely keep themselves alive. Everyone says
they work very hard, but that is not true. It is the man who has at
least twenty acres who can produce a surplus. We work hard but govern-
ment always talks of the small man. When we are the ones who produce
for market, why should government give land to Harijans or start pro-
grams for small farmers? Are these the real farmers of India?"

Finally, from conversations with extension personnel it becomes clear

that while provisions are made for assisting small cultivators, few peo-

ple feel these are serious attempts to raise their productivity. With a

97

national food shortage, the effort is aimed at extracting surpluses
from larger landowners for urban markets. Schemes to give small culti-
vators credit or other inputs are viewed as subsidy measures to prevent
destitution and enable survival, not as a part of increasing overall
productivity.l As was pointed out in Chapter I, the idea is to raise
production by investing scarce resources into those sectors of agri-
culture which are assumed to respond the fastest.

The assumption that large farmers gill produce more per unit of
land is not a valid one. Increasing numbers of studies show it is the
smaller cultivator who outproduces the larger given similar irrigation
resources. Aside from studies done by others, the following points are
clear here though farmers were not asked for precise production figures.2
(Also see.Figure 3.1 for a cross national comparison of farm producti-
vity by farm size.)

As with Bachchu, the lands of most of the larger farmers are vastly
under-utilized. Some cite irrigation as a constraint, but few fully
exploit such irrigation as they have. Bachchu for example, uses only
4.5 of his irrigated ten acres. Nor do any invest in more than one well
and pump set though they have both the personal resources and credit
access to do so. Even farmers like Bachchu who rely on animal hus-
bandry rather than grain for income do not fully use their land. Milk
production is abysmally low because of a lack of proper feed. A Peace

Corps Volunteer in the area working in dairy development started a fodder

 

1Drawn from discussion with state, district and samiti level per-

sonnel. See also the Ford Foundation report, op. cit.

2Also see G. R. Saini, "Farm Size, Productivity and Returns to
Scale," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. IV, #26 (1969), and Wilfred
Malenbaum, Modern India's Economy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill,
1971), pp. 148-51.

 

 

98

FIGURE 3.1

OUTPUT PER HECTARE FOR FARM SIZE GROUPS

 
 
 

Relative Output

30
India Brazil Brazil Columbia Columbia Mexico

(For each Country, bar at left represents output per hectare for small—
est farm size group. Bars to the right represent successively larger
farms with their output per hectare expressed as a percent of that of
the smallest size group.)

SOURCE: Peter Dorner and Don Kanel, "The Economic Case for Land
Reform," paper presented at the Agency for International Development
Spring Review on Land Reform, Washington, D. C., June 1970. (Mimeo-
graphed.)

99

1(India) Erven J. Long, "The Economic Basis of Land Reform in
Underdeveloped Economies," Land Economics (May 1961), pp. 113-23. The
paper uses data for the mid- and late 19503 gathered by the Studies in
Economics of Farm Management, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Govern-
ment of India, New Delhi. Output as gross value in rupees per acre.
Long classified actual farm sizes into four size groups -- smallest,
second smallest, second largest, largest -- for each of eight areas in
seven states, and presented output per size group as the average of the
eight areas. (Data from more than 1,000 farms from seven states.)

 

2(Brazil) Roger G. Johnson and Reuben C. Buse, A Study of Farm
Size and Economic Performance in Old Santa Rosa, Rio Grande do Sul,
Land Tenure Center Research Paper No. 27 (Madison: University of Wis-
consin, August 1967), pp. 40-61. Output as net sales per productive
hectare, in thousands of cruzeiros (1963). Actual farm sizes included
in each size class are: (l) 0 - 10 hectares; (2) 10.1 — 20 hectares;
(3) 20.1 - 40 hectares; (4) 40.1 - 100 hectares; and (5) more than
100 hectares. (Sample of 311 farms.)

 

3(Brazil, 1950) Solon L. Barraclough and Arthur L. Domike, "Agra-
rian Structure in Seven Latin American Countries," Land Economics
(November 1966), pp. 391—424. Also issued as Land Tenure Center Reprint
No. 25 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1966). Output as percent of
value of sub-family (smallest) farm production per cultivated hectare.
The authors classed actual farm sizes into four groups: sub-family,
family, multi-family medium, and multi-family large. (Based on
National Census data.)

 

4(Colombia, 1960) Ibid., using same measures of output and same
farm size criteria. (Based on National Census data.)

5(Colombia, 1966) Emil Haney, "The Economic Reorganization of
Minifundia in a Highland Community of Colombia," Ph.D. thesis in pro-
gress, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin.
Output as gross value per hectare, in U. S. dollars. Actual farm sizes
included in each size class are: (1) less than one hectare; (2) l —
2.99 hectares; (3) 3 - 9.99 hectares; and (4) more than ten hectares.
(Sample of 203 farms in a highland community of Colombia.)

6(Mexico, 1960) Folke Dovring, "Land Reform and Productivity: The
Mexican Case, A Preliminary Analysis," AERR-83, Department of Agricul-
tural Economics, Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Illinois,
November 1966, 17 pages. Also issued as Land Tenure Center Paper No. 63
(Madison: University of Wisconsin, January 1969), pp. 2-10. Output as
gross value per hectare of arable land, in pesos. Actual farm sizes
included in each size class are: (1) less than five hectares in the
private sector (average about 1.45 hectares); (2) ejido lands averaging
about seven hectares per ejido member (only about two percent of 1.6
million ejido members engage in collective farming); and (3) more than
five hectares in the private sector (average about 27 hectares). (Based
on National Census data.)

100

production scheme. Of the thirty or so farmers who took lucerne seed
the first year, all but two or three would fall into the small farmer
stratum of this study. One would assume they have less land to divert
for such a crop.

More small cultivators take more crops each year than the larger
farmers.l Also more of the former try to find out about the hybrid
seeds. Some obtained small amounts in previous years from neighbors
and grew them with disastrous results. Often the seed is impure or
genetic breakdown has started.2 They grow them like indigenous varie-
ties not knowing that chemical fertilizers are required, that seed has
to be planted shallowly, and that these varieties are prone to diseases
which do not affect native strains.

One farmer interviewed owned only 1.5 acres of land. He proudly
displayed his half acre of Kalyan Sona wheat during the interview.3
He was trying it for the first time having got the seed from a friend.
When asked how much fertilizer he had used, he replied he had used only
a little manure from his animals. The wheat was just beginning to
tiller and we recommended that he immediately get some urea and super-

phosphates or else he would not even get back the cost of his seed.

 

1This controls for irrigation; a comparison of farmers with simi-
lar facilities.

2Seed often gets mixed with indigenous types over time. Also
since the genetic structure is not very stable, farmers should purchase
new stock about every three years or the yields decline. Wheat seed
appears to be more stable than maize or other coarse grains, but even
there seed stock must be replaced.

3One of the wheat hybrids; a white variety developed from the
original Mexican imports.

101

Even with ready cash he was unable to obtain enough of these.1 "But
everyone says these seeds produce more than twice that of dg§i_wheat."
"Yes, but not unless you put all these other things on. Didn't anyone
tell you?" "No." Narayan's wheat problem was finally solved by an
onslaught of aphids for which not even this research team could move

the Samiti fora sprayer and pesticides though we were informed the
aphids would present a problem for all the surrounding fields. The tale
was all too common. Most Sprayers were not functioning; those that were
in order were being used by the chairman of the samiti and some of his
friends.

As a rule, smaller farmers market a higher proportion of their pro-
duce than do the large ones. The data here are imprecise but suggest
that small cultivators market between 40 and 50 percent of each crop
whereas large ones sell only around 25 percent. This is taken from
farmers' own estimates for each crop grown and controls for cash crops
like mustard in Shivpura, of which everyone sells 100 percent. This may
be so for a number of reasons. Smaller farmers being more in debt may
have to pay out more at harvest. Or it may be that because they are
constrained by a lack of credit for everyday items of consumption, they
have to rely on themselves to earn the required amount of cash. Both
may be true to a point, but they suggest that small plots exercise a

constraint that makes farmers use the land more intensively and part with

 

1In fact, the cooperative had several quintals of each left in its
store house at the end of the cropping season. The cooperative secre-
tary said there simply was not enough demand for them. Not only
Narayan, but a number of other farmers had been told that supplies were
finished.

102

a larger share of their produce. This fact is also borne out for other
countries such as Mexico.1

Finally, a number of the entrepreneurial large farmers who take
their farming seriously contend there is a size constraint on effi-
ciency if one is to use the new varieties. The headman of Shivpura puts
only a fourth of his sixty irrigated acres under high yielding wheat.
As he points out, the high yields promised by government are only pos-
sible on relatively small plots because of the intensity of cultivation
required. The weeding and irrigation operations in particular require

the kind of care which is impossible to exercise on large farms.

Summary

In summarizing the findings of this chapter, it can be seen that
the spread of new technologies is not very wide in these two villages.
There are two constraints to their adoption. One is the motivation of
farmers and this is linked to their perception of farming as a subsis-
tence, rather than a commercial enterprise. The second is the con-
straint of land size. Even when farmers desire new inputs, they are
unable to obtain them if they are in the smaller land ownership cate-
gories.

Second, the constraint of land size is perceived by cultivators,
village leaders, and governmental personnel. Smaller farmers see this
as a result of the coincidence of land ownership, wealth and political

influence. The latter two groups (leaders and government personnel)

 

lSee Folke Dovring, "Land Reform in Mexico," paper presented at the
Agency for International Development Spring Review of Land Reform,
Washington, D. C., June 1970, p. 20. (Mimeographed.)

103

essentially see it as a waste of time and resources to invest in the
small or medium cultivator.

Third, on a general level, it appears to be the smaller culti-
vator who is more interested in new inputs. He also tends to make
fuller use of his resources than does the large cultivator though both
use less than the maximum amount.

Fourth, these findings raise questions about three basic assump-
tions of India's approach to agricultural modernization. First, one is
led to question the assumption that all farmers will typically respond
to more profitable or productive means of production. Second, one has
to question the assumption that those who already have more resources
to begin with are likely to respond the fastest to new incentives.
Third, it appears that adoption patterns may require constraints as well
as incentives, which eliminate the less productive patterns of behavior.
Particularly noteworthy in this regard is farmers' reliance on expensive
but loose credit available from money-lenders to meet household and
social obligations. The alternative, more productive behavior of course,
would be to channel this credit into farming and to meet non-farm
expenses from increased profits.

Finally, even with this evidence, it would seem more rational to
divert resources and attention to smaller cultivators who (I) feel the
need to depend on their own production and (2) who constitute a far
larger base of political support for any political party that chooses to

do so.

CHAPTER IV

CHANGES IN SECURITY 0F TENURE AND EMPLOYMENT

Agricultural modernization does more than raise farm productivity.
The effects of new technology on rural organization were discussed in
Chapter I. Here one can see the extent to which rural organization has
altered: the emphasis in this chapter is on changes in economic rela-
tionships as they form the basis of interdependencies:havillage society.
One finds the first impact of change is felt by the landless: tenants
and laborers alike. There is concern in official quarters about rising
unemployment levels in India. Some of this is due to normal rises in
population. Controlling for that however, the concern exists that ten-
ants and laborers displaced from agriculture migrate into urban areas
swelling the ranks of the urban unemployed. The debate continues as to
whether the "Green Revolution" is responsible for higher unemployment
rates or if more employment is possible through the use of the new tech-

nologies.

Institutional Changgs: Technology and Legal Framework

 

It has already been stated that over time, the goals of production
have superceded those of equality. This is borne out in the following
analysis of the institutional parameters dealing with security of tenure.
The data presented show how these parameters in fact constrain tenant

security leaving landowners a free hand to develop their resources.

104

105

These data also suggest that the new "package" of technologies accele-
rates obsolescence of tenants and labor.

Unemployment is worse in areas other than Rajasthan where pressure
on land is greater and large-scale mechanization has gone further.
Desperation has erupted into political violence: some organized, some
anomic. The best-known of violent uprisings in recent years is the
Naxalbari Movement linked with the Community Party of India (Marxist-
Leninist).1 In this and some other incidents, landless labor and/or
tenants have forcibly evicted landowners, harvested crops, and retained
the land. There have been murders committed on both sides with govern-
ment primarily aiding the landowners.

A major point here is that farming is highly profitable in India.
A rough calculation based on discussions with farmers in both villages
indicates net profits between 40 and 60 percent depending on how well
the farmer cultivates: whether he irrigates on time, uses sufficient
manure, weeds thoroughly, etc. Even using all recommended inputs to
obtain optimal yields (including hybrid seeds) the costs per acre are at
most Rs. 700.00 ($93.33). With a yield of 27 to 28 quintals per acre,
and a selling price of Rs. 110.00 ($14.66) per quintal of wheat on the

Open market, the net profit is Rs. 1,913.00 ($255.06) per acre.2 These

 

1The movement gets its name from the Naxalbari region of Bengal
state where it began. Starting by organizing tea plantation labor,
party workers then moved into other agricultural areas. To the author's
mind, its mistake was to include university students and other urban
elements which made it easier for government to suppress it and this
also destroyed the dynamic of rural ideology and participation. The
party mentioned is the most "left" and "Peking" oriented of India's four
communist parties. It does not contest elections. See Paul R. Brass
and Marcus F. Franda, eds., Radical Politics in South Asia (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), passim.

 

2Calculations are based on input recommendations from Government of
Rajasthan, Ministry of Agriculture found in the Rajasthan Farm Diary for

 

106

calculations do not include allowances for depreciation and replacement
of capital investments.1 The reader will recall that producers have
virtually no financial obligation to the state or any other external
body and thus are under no constraint to produce the maximum feasible.
Given these profits, entrepreneurial farmers have developed their farms
well and are reluctant to share gains with tenants and labor. Tractors
make it unnecessary to share as much. They also have status value.
Where irrigation has been extended or improved permitting double
or triple cropping, the annual labor requirement has obviously risen.
There are more harvest and weeding times. Because the biochemical inputs
of the Green Revolution require more intensive cultivation, the labor
input of each cr0p has increased somewhat. Looking to these factors,

some economists hold thattfluzGreen Revolution has increased employment.2

 

extension workers, 1972, and prices of inputs provided by the Panchayat
Samiti officers of Hanumangarh and Kumher, Rajasthan. The selling price
is that of wheat on the free market in Hanumangarh after harvest, 1973.
The costs of pesticides requirements are estimated because some crops
may be afflicted with more diseases than others: to the author's mind

a generous amount has been added for these.

1Another basis of calculation was provided by the Block Develop—
ment Officer for Shivpura. This assumes the cultivator uses a tractor
on hire, is using Kalyan Sona seed and all recommended practices. It
does not include depreciation or replacement for capital improvements.

Costs: Plowing Rs. 80/-
Levelling Rs. 15/-
Sowing Rs. 25/-
Seed Rs. 80/-
Manure (organic) Rs. 40/—
Chemical fertilizer Rs. 140/-
Pesticides Rs. 25/-
Irrigation Rs. 125/-
Weeding Rs. 15/-
Harvesting Rs. 35/-
Threshing and winnowing Rs. 70/-
Total cost per acre Rs. 650/- ($86.66)
2

Reams have been written on increased man-hours, man-days, etc. and
the Green Revolution. Such precise calculations omit predictions of

107

The counter argument is that while this may be so, the biochemical
components are divisible and "neutral to scale". It is the concomitant
increase in the rate and scale of farm mechanization that raises
unemployment. This argument needs elaboration before looking at changes
in the two villages.

Since farming is profitable and the income earned is not taxed, it
has attracted both land speculators and entrepreneurs. Land values have
risen rapidly making it difficult for persons of moderate means to buy
any. The levels of investment the newcomers are willing and able to
make will raise the scale of farming. The two scales (the small subsis-
tence peasant vs. the entrepreneurial, commercial farmer) can coexist
only as long as there are food shortages. Once these are overcome
(which is within the realm of technical feasibility) the competition of
scales will force out the smaller farmer.1

Additionally, security of tenure is affected by the institutional
framework. The legal provisions regulating rates and conditions of
tenancies enacted to safeguard tenants' interests have worked against
them. It will be recalled that by 1957-58, most jagirs and zamindari
intermediary rights had been abolished. Certain portions of land could

be retained by intermediaries for self-cultivation. Tenants are,

 

continued mechanization and as such obfuscate the real issue: the rise
in the scale of farming required to remain viable over the longer—
term.
1See V. M. Rao, "Village Lease Markets for Agricultural Land,"
Economic and Political Weekly, op, cit. where he forecasts the creation
of a class of petty land leasors who cannot afford to cultivate them-
selves and rent their farms to larger farmers.

108

however, still employed to cultivate these resumed lands as they are
also employed on former mgafi or rzotwari holdings.1

The goals of tenancy reform are (l) to protect tenants from econo-
mic exploitation by the landlords, (2) to provide a livelihood and
security of tenure for them, and (3) to provide ownership where feasible
to the tenants. Three bodies of legislation have been enacted to deal
with each of these.

First, in the area of rent regulation, rents cannot exceed one-
sixth of the gross product (per tenant) in Rajasthan. In the field no
tenant interviewed paid less than one-fourth. The second area of legis-
lation aims at security of tenure: though a landowner has the right to
self-cultivate a certain amount of land, some minimum amount of each
tenant's holding must be left to him. Further, the tenant cannot be
evicted from his holding except for nonpayment of rent or some other
grave offense. The final area of legislation provides for the transfer
of landownership to the tenant: on non-resumable land, tenants may
claim ownership if they have farmed the same plot/s for three consecu-
tive years.

It is impossible to enforce this body of legislation. It does not

cover most tenants as it includes only those registered as such (see

 

 

1All land holdings regardless of their previous classifications
(e.g., muafi or ryotwari) are now called khatedari holdings: translated
as "state's tenants". Thus the tenants referred to in this context are
what would have the legal classification of sub-tenants, and under these
legal provisions should be registered as such in the land records.

 

2Data are from the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Hand-
book of Agriculture (New Delhi: Indian Council of Agricultural Research,
1969), pp. 722-25. See also Implementation of Land Reforms, A Review by
the Land Reforms Implementation Committee of the National Development
Council (New Delhi: Planning Commission, August 1966), pp. 122-26.

 

 

109

above). Second, since land is at a premium.tenants are in no position
to insist on legal rental rates as there are many waiting in line for
land who are willing to pay twice or three times that amount. The pro-
visions regarding ownership too are not enforceable as they assume —-
incorrectly - that the state knows which persons are tenants to whom
and the plots cultivated by them.

Knowing the limits and loopholes of the legislation, landlords
rotate tenants each year so that none has a right to claim help under
any provisions for security or ownership. It was pointed out in Chapter
II that most leases are hereditary but oral. With the new laws land-
owners no longer maintain the hereditary tenurial system. They have
also made sure that oral leases are unacceptable in court by changing
tenants and their plots every year. Only in exceptional cases have ten—
ants kept the same plots year after year: where a degree of trust or
perhaps the coercion of high indebtedness exists between landlord and
tenant.

Finally, there are few tenants who can afford to take landowners to
court. Legal costs are high especially in view of the fact that civil
cases may be tied up in court for years.1 Even if a tenant could afford
to go to court, the pressure from landowners on him and his family would
be difficult to bear. In the intervening time he would not be able to
lease in any land, and if he lost in court, he would probably never

again be able to get employment in the village.

 

1A farmer interviewed by Barry H. Michie fought his claim for
twenty years before it was settled in his favor. Three months later he
had still not received d3 facto ownership as its illegal occupant refused
to vacate it.

110

Several implications can be drawn from this discussion, some of
which are discussed further in this chapter. Here it is sufficient to
point out two points. First, one has to assume that government sees
tenancy legislation as providing some kind of symbolic reassurance to
the landless since, in fact, no strong attempt has been made to enforce
it. Second, it is probable that the nonenforcement is due to two rea-
sons: (1) administrative incapacity,1 and (2) a fear that enforcement
will jeopardize the security of owner-cultivators who are considered
important for food production. The latter point follows the logic of
the Ford Foundation Report which cautioned against land reforms which
might affect "farms that are efficiently and productively operated."2

Landowners' attitudes toward the landless can be seen in the follow-
ing incident which occurred in Hanumangarh several years ago.3 Govern-
ment has a scheme through which Scheduled Castes and Tribes are eligible
for land allotments. The plots come from land resumed by the state from
jagirs or other ceiling legislation. Land classified as "cultivable
wastes" is also available for distribution. Much of this is arid and

eroded but can be used for farming with proper investments.

 

1Primarily a lack of sufficient personnel and detailed land
records.

2India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It, Op. cit., p. 29. See
above in Chapter I for the full discussion.

3I first heard about this approximately three months after arriving
in the village. Every respondent in the tenant/labor category verified
it and several owner-cultivators also recited the same tale showing how
they refused to let the scarce amount of land available go to persons
who are not "real farmers."

 

4The required investments are very high: as much as Rs. 30,000 to
40,000 ($4,000.00 to $5,333.00) depending on the extent of erosion and
depth of ground water. Estimates are from samiti personnel and the
patwari of Hanumangarh.

111

Traditionally much of it was used for grazing and some for monsoon crops
by all villagers.

A number of allotments of 3.13 acres per household were made a few
years back. The recipients all Harijans, made ready to start cultiva-
tion. Caste Hindus however, made it clear they would not permit Hari-
jans to use the plots though there remained abundant land for grazing.
The Harijans, to test their ownership rights, went out in a group to
begin plowing. They were met by groups of stave-wielding farmers who
literally beat them back. The Harijans reported the incident to the
police and asked for protection which was promised. No action followed
however, and the police finally told the allottees to choose between
themselves and the caste Hindus. Several Harijans interviewed felt the
villagers must have "paid off" the police -- otherwise why would they
not help? Others felt it portrayed the feeling upper castes have about
the legitimacy of Harijans' claim to land at all as it is a scarce
commodity. When field work was conducted none of the allottees could
farm their plots though the land was recorded in their names and they

paid the land tax on it.1

Tenancies
With this background the data can be presented. The first point

is to ascertain tenants' views on security of tenure and changes in

 

1These comments refer only to Harijan allottees: the Minas
(Scheduled Tribe), faced no problem. Allottees cannot dispose of their
land; it may be sold only to other Scheduled community members. This
is to prevent exploitation by the higher castes. Some people sold plots
to wealthier caste fellows but most lie unused or have been encroached
upon by caste Hindu farmers. Similar cases have occurred elsewhere.
See N. K. Singh, "Madhya Pradesh: Hunting the Harijans," Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. IX, #47 (November 23, 1974), pp. 1937-38.

 

 

112

employment. Next, the discussion is focused on wages earned, days
worked, and the farmers' perceptions of their labor requirements.

Of all respondents, 52.2 percent (N=35) try to lease in land when-
ever they can. Of these around half are landless and 74.2 percent of
the rest own less than five acres. In the year field work was done,
two-fifths of the landless were unable to lease any land. Of all
leasees, 66 percent were able to get between one and four arid acres.
The rest save two persons got between four and eight acres of arid
land. The two exceptions were able to get irrigated land of less than
four acres. This means that except for these two, all tenants had land
for only the monsoon crop.

How difficult is it to lease in land? Two questions were asked:
is it easier to lease land now compared with five or six years ago, and
what are the rents charged and have they changed in the same time per-
iod.

In answer to the first question, tenants' perceptions point over-
whelmingly to increasing difficulty in leasing land. Of all tenants,
91.4 percent say it is more difficult to get land now. Why? Three rea-
sons dominate and these are given in Table 4.1. Aside from these, there
were one or two other comments illustrating why there is more demand for
land. Even with one mediocre monsoon crop of millet a man can provide
a good part of the food his family needs during the year reducing the
amount of cash required for purchasing grain. Such cash as might be
earned from casual labor can then be used for other purposes.

What are the terms of tenancies? Rents are normally paid in kind
as a fraction of the gross production. Should there be a drought or

crop failure the tenant may still be liable to pay a cash rental of

113

TABLE 4.1

REASONS WHY IT IS MORE DIFFICULT T0 LEASE LAND*

 

Percentage of
Reasons Tenants in Agreement

 

l. Mbre people want land now
(general population increase) 11.4

2. Owners are reluctant to lease
because of profitability - prefer
to self-cultivate to keep profits 68.6

3. Owners are afraid of tenancy
provisions and so will not lease 33.3

4. Owners charge too high a rent and
so tenants cannot afford to lease 14.3

5. More peOple want land because of a
lack of alternate employment 11.4

6. Because of tractors owners do not
want tenants any more - they can
self-cultivate 25.7

 

*Respondents could give more than one reply and so total is not
100 percent (N=35).

between Rs. 2.00 to 4.00 ($.26tx)$.50) per bigha leased.1 In the sample,

of those able to get land that year, 68 percent paid a one-half share to

 

the owners. The rest are fairly evenly divided between one-third or
one-fourth shares, or cash payments of Rs. 2.00 to 6.00 ($.26 to $.75)
per bigh_. Those paying cash are in the minority. One man paid three-
quarters of the gross since he leased irrigated land. Another is a farm
manager receiving a cash salary each month though he thinks of himself

as a landless tenant.

 

lIn Hanumangarh, 1.6 bighas (standard) equals one acre; in Shiv-
pura, 2.5 bighas (standard) equals one acre. Thus the higher rental
rate applies generally to Hanumangarh and the lower to Shivpura.

114

If tenants pay this much rent, what inputs do owners provide? In
70 percent of the cases owners provide nothing. In 16 percent of the
cases tenants are given water, or fertilizer, or both. Some are able to
use owners' plows, bullocks, or other hand tools. This supports the
contention made earlier that owners are not interested in investing in
their tenants' productivity. The best land is kept for self-cultiva—
tion or is put under a manager's care. Landowners involved in money-
lending are more interested in income from debts owed or the grain trade
rather than land investments. Landowners sometimes mention that they do
not invest more in their farms because of insecurity caused by the ten-
ancy laws and ceiling legislation. This does not appear to be valid
here despite landowners' protestations to the contrary as they are able
to evade both bodies of law successfully and without much effort.

Have leasing arrangements changed in any way other than land avail-
ability? For about 10 percent of all tenants, there has been no perma-
nent change though particular landowners may vary their terms. For 72
percent however, rents have risen dramatically over the past five to six
years. For 95 percent of these, the rental medium has also changed.
Previously landlords were interested in cash rents whereas now they
increasingly demand payment in kind. This reflects the rise in grain
prices -- from the landlord's perspective it is more profitable to be
paid in grain which he can store until prices rise further in mid-season.
As one tenant said, "Our fortunes run counter to everyone else's. In
those days it was harder for us to pay in cash -- who had cash then?
Today cash is easier for us to give as we can sell surplus grain at
higher prices, but that is precisely why landlords want the grain."

Obviously tenants prefer the lower rents of several years ago even if

115

they were in cash. "That much we could borrow if necessary. How do we
borrow half of a crop?"

There are thus several constraints on tenants wishing to lease
land. One is the overall availability which is restricted given land-
owners' preferences for self-cultivation. Secondly, the tenancy provi-
sions create insecurity for the tenant. Third, there is the constraint
of high rental rates which in part reflects population pressures on
land. With high grain prices more persons want to lease land too which
raises rents. With less employment for laborers (see below) they have
an increasingly hard time saving the cash needed for seed and other
inputs, and this combined with high rents has made it too difficult for
some to lease land at all. Finally, the availability of large tractors

for either purchase or hire, makes tenants increasingly obsolete.

Agricultural Employment

 

The effects of agricultural change on employment patterns are shown

in Table 4.2.

TABLE 4.2

WHETHER AGRICULTURAL LABORERS FIND MORE OR LESS EMPLOYMENT
IN AGRICULTURE NOW THAN PREVIOUSLY

 

 

 

Strata Changes in Employment
Mbre Less No Total
Employment Employment Difference Z (N)
Owner-cum-laborers 54.5 36.3 9.1 99.9 (11)
Landless laborers 10.0 80.0 10.0 100.0 (20)

Overall 25.8 64.5 9.7 100.0 (31)

 

116

Included in this table are only the persons who normally work as
farm laborers for wages. Significantly, most of those who find it
easier to get employment in agriculture now are owner-cultivators who
take on additional work to supplement farm incomes. Often because they
are owner-cultivators they are better integrated into farming networks.
None are Harijans or regular farm labor. Those finding it easier to
find employment now point to the extension of irrigation facilities and
consequent double cropping. Some mention that though farmers self-
cultivate more, this has increased employment somewhat: "So many
zamindars are farming seriously now since they can made money from it.
Before they wouldn't even use all their land -- or even lease it. Now
they have brought more into cultivation. They do not like to give it
out on lease but prefer to take the tractor on hire for the plowing and
manage it themselves or hire a manager for the year. But at least if
they cultivate more land, there is more work at weeding and harvest
time."1 Seven persons (22.6 percent) however, who normally work in
agriculture were unable to find any employment in the fields that year.

Of those facing employment difficulties in agriculture, most feel
their problems are due to higher wage levels asked by laborers. Farm-
ers are perceived to hire fewer persons doing more of their own work.
Others say that rather than wages farmers want to keep their profits and
so work more themselves. There is a difference here in the two villages.
While Hanumangarh workers cite higher wages and farm profits as the main
reason they cannot find employment, in Shivpura every laborer first men-

tions the coming of tractors and other mechanical implements. Some

 

1The use of the word zamindar is colloquial here. This does not
refer to the legal term of intermediary landowner. Farmers and labor-
ers tend to use it for anyone who owns consequential amounts of land.

117

persons in Hanumangarh also mention these factors, but mechanization
has gone further in Shivpura. In Hanumangarh the coming of farm
machinery is associated primarily with the loss of tenancies; in Shiv-
pura it is associated with an overall drop in employment. With labor—
ers hired only for weeding and harvesting, 73.3 percent of the laborers
in both villages estimate they can find work in agriculture for a maxi:
.EEE.°f 120 days each year (two crops per year). For the rest of the
time they rely on other casual jobs.

Unlike laborers in other parts of the country, these farm workers
are not necessarily tied to any particular landowner. Some owing debts
they are unable to pay may find themselves in a position of working for
a single person until the debt is repaid. For the most part however,
laborers work wherever jobs are available. Sometimes certain farmers
may be more prompt in payment of wages or give workers small fringe
benefits such as cigarettes or tea during the day thus attracting more
workers. During harvest most persons are able to find work in their
own or neighboring villages unless drought or some other disaster has
affected the crop.

If most respondents can find work in agriculture for only about 120
days each year, what are they earning and what sources of employment are
open to them for the rest of the time? Wage rates are similar in both
villages: only during the very peak of harvesting do laborers in Shiv-
pura receive half a rupee more than those in Hanumangarh. Payments may
be made in either cash or kind though farmers prefer to pay in cash, and
kind payments are calculated on the basis of cash equivalents. During
harvest, laborers are paid Rs. 3/- per day for men ($.40), and Rs. 2.50

for women ($.33), and the amount is one rupee less for weeding and other

118

farm operations. In Shivpura if a farmer is not able to rent a tractor
for plowing and has to hire a plowman, he has to pay between Rs. 80-100
($10.66 - $14.66) for ten days of plowing.1 In Hanumangarh almost all
wages are paid in cash whereas in Shivpura, wages during the monsoon
crOp are paid in cash and those during the winter are given in kind.
This reflects the market price of grains produced: wheat and barley
grown in the winter are higher priced than millet (monsoon crop). It is
to the producers' advantage to pay in kind for the higher priced grains
since for each rupee value he gives away less grain. Tenants and labor-
ers prefer the mixed payment system because they receive some minimal
amount of grain for their own use and can then use cash for purchasing
other items.2

There is no consistent alternate source of employment open to labor.
Some find work on a casual daily or piece work basis: tending goats,
drawing water, thatching roofs, or doing other odd jobs. The more fortu-
nate might find work on a construction or road gang. Laborers from

Shivpura often travel as far as Delhi (80 miles) or Chandigarh (around

 

1Farmers with larger holdings are especially in need of assistance
of plowing because of the time factor. The rate comes to approximately
Rs. 10/- per day ($1.33) for the plowman, his plow and two or more oxen.
Each team of oxen can barely do one acre per day.

2To give the reader some idea of the cost of living in the two vil-
lages, here is a list of items with the prices as they were in 1972-73.
In some cases as with the grains, a range is given to indicate seasonal
fluctuations: Flour: wheat - Rs. l/- to Rs. 1.60 per kilo (approxi-
mately two pounds) ($.13 to $.21); millet - Rs. 0.80 to 1.30 per kilo
($.11 to $.17); Lentils: Rs. 2.50 to 4.00 per kilo depending on vari-
ety ($.33 to $.53); Mustard oil: Rs. 4 to 8 per kilo ($.53 to $1.06);
Kerosene oil: Rs. 1.00 to 3.00 (black market) per litre ($.13 to $.40);
Cloth: for women's skirts,Rs. 20 to 30 per four metre piece ($2.66 to
$4.00); for shirts, children's clothing, etc., Rs. 4 to 12 and up per
metre ($.53 to $1.60).

119

200 miles) searching for work in construction which pays as much as Rs.
8/- ($1.06) per day. This is the most lucrative work, yet most of what
is earned goes into maintaining the laborers and their travel expenses.
Their families are generally left in the village and what meager savings
are left go to the village money-lender who has provided their suste-
nance while the men are away.

As expected, most laborers feel their wages are too low (75 per-
cent) given both the work done and the cost of living. The rest say
their wages are basically fair but most of these are owner-cultivators
themselves who do agricultural work for supplementary income and hire
laborers of their own. One man feels that high prices have hurt farmers
also since many of the smaller ones have to buy extra grain on the open

market. So how can one expect them to pay their laborers more?

Social Change: The Creation of New Dependencies

 

Many tenants and laborers had applied for land allotments under the
schemes mentioned above for Scheduled communities. What happened to the
Hanumangarh allottees has already been recounted. Most persons think
the idea is basically good but feel it never can be implemented properly
since landowners will not permit it. Many persons applied for land but
only few received any: 64 percent of all tenants and laborers applied
of which only 20 percent were given any. In Hanumangarh the size of the
plots might be considered adequate, but in Shivpura the allotments are
only two-fifths of an acre each -- about the size of a small backyard
garden. Some of these are saline -- others have long since been
encroached upon by other farmers who will not relinquish them.

Beyond these problems some respondents feel land has not been dis-

tributed properly. Though half say most of the allotments were made to

120

the landless for whom they are intended, others are convinced that plots
were handed out illegally to persons who bribed the officials: those
who already had land and thus the influence to get more. In Shivpura
there is a uniformly sarcastic reaction: "The good plots we can't farm
because someone else is already on them. The bad ones —- well, who
wants one bigha of saline soil that is waterlogged as well? So what
does it really matter who got the land?"

Two points should be noted here. First, it has been argued by
some economists that the marginal productivity of labor in peasant agri-
culture is approaching or is zero.1 On this assumption, farmers
obviously cannot be expected to hire any more laborers or even utilize
their own time more fully on their farms. This assertion is untenable
as is shown clearly by Myrdal and others.2 Even using indigenous seed
varieties, there is a gap between what is actually produced and the
potential. In both villages here, farmers are well aware that they can
improve their production by cultivating more intensively which requires
more labor input for the most part.

Second, the net effect of land allotments is the retention of a
tied labor pool for farmers with more land -- particularly when one
notes the size and condition of the plots given out. Even if the allot-

tees can farm these, they are not sufficient for subsistence and their

 

lSee Theodore Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, op.
cit., passim. The main argument here is that farmers make maximum use
of their factors of production including labor.

 

2Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, 0p. cit., p. 1253; Morton Paglin,
"'Surplus' Agricultural Labor and Development: Facts and Theories," Th3
American Economic Review, Vol. LV, #4 (1965), p. 825; and M. R. Haswell,
Economics of Develgpment in Village India (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1967), p. 72.

 

 

 

121

owners still have to rely on such employment as might be found on other
people's farms. The size of plots and the investment required to make
them productive suggests their purpose is to prevent destitution not to
encourage productivity or even self-reliance.1 An important social and

political implication of this is that the laborers are economically more

 

dependent than ever on a landed elite that increasingly has less need

for their services.

 

Perhaps recognizing that there never will be sufficient land for
all Harijans, government has provided loans for building homes or for
the purchase of goats, chickens, pigs or other livestock for alternate
sources of income. A good proportion of these loans are captured by
Harijan leaders who use them either for building new homes (though many
already own large stone and mortar houses) or for money-lending.2
These leaders increasingly resemble other village notables whose life-
styles they emulate. Their homes are built in the "modern" style and
in order to raise their social position they have stopped eating meat,
drinking liquor and refuse to perform traditional tasks left to leather-

workers such as tanning hides.3

 

lHamza Alavi finds a similar situation in the Canal Colony areas of
Pakistan (from discussion with him, 1972), and Stavenhagen, op. cit.,
cites the same situation for ejidatarios in Mexico.

 

2It is frequently difficult to get precise data on this because of
the sensitivity of some recipients. At least four of the five Raiger
patels (headmen) however, got loans that year. Harijans make up 27 per-
cent of the village pOpulation as of the 1971 census.

3Mleat, liquor and contact with dead bodies (hides) are all pollut-
ing. Such changes in practices are documented for many upwardly mobile
groups in India. See Lloyd [.and Suzanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity
of Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). This does
not imply that other castes treat these Harijans as one of them. Rather,
such adaptations set leaders apart from the rest of the community whose
"backwardness" they rely on for their own distinctiveness.

 

122

These leaders are the new intermediaries between the political
system and the Harijan communities. They sit on the elected village
councils,1 help decide community matters and most importantly, have a
say in the disbursement of loans and allotments of land. Though some
loans are taken by them, others are judiciously given out to enhance
the leaders' prestige and support. Benefits do get spread in "devious"
ways to the community at large. Even if a leader should get a loan for
himself, he hires laborers from his own community to build his new home.
By using other loans for money-lending, he is able to supply badly
needed credit to those who cannot obtain it elsewhere while creating
his own patron-client network on which he can draw politically.

The Congress Party relies on these leaders to mobilize Harijan
votes at election time. The manner in which governmental credit is used
is open knowledge and the trade-off is political support in return for
a distributive monopoly.2 The limits of this strategy are discussed
below. Here it is sufficient to note that while Raigers, Chamars or
Khatiks may present a united front to other castes, they are divided
internally. Some divisions represent traditional rivalries between
families and other local disputes.

However, two qualitatively different divisions are emerging. One

is between the emergent leadership discussed here (a sort of

 

1The councils all have provisions for "reserved seats" for Harijans
in case they are not elected at large. In Hanumangarh two electoral
wards coincide with the main Harijan residential areas; in Shivpura,
though the lines are not as clearly established, there were at least
four Harijan members.

2This is openly discussed by a number of "village leaders" who
point out that it is "very profitable" to work for Congress during the
elections. They may be reluctant to talk about the specific benefits
they receive personally, but point to those received by others.

123

"petit-bourgeoisie") and the rest. The second is between the older and
younger Harijans who see the first division as a result of the co-option
of their elders. Upper caste monopoly over goods and services is being
replaced by a small Harijan elite drawing its strength from the new
distributive mechanisms established by a Congress-dominated political
system. The provision of special funds and other schemes for Harijan
communities instead of integrating them into the wider society, tend
toward the creation of a new group of political entrepreneurs whose
existence depends on the distinctions between Harijans and the rest.
Returning now to the laborers: they themselves see their future
as lying outside of agriculture. This feeling is stronger in Shivpura
where they see mechanization displacing them and land allotments as
token payoffs. The only possibility they see in the village is the
growth of agriculture-related industry. The sarpanch (elected village
headman) plans to open an oil press for locally produced mustard and the
production of animal feed using oil cake and grain. These schemes might,

according to the sarpanch's estimates, take care of around 20 percent of

 

the landless, but they are not feasible until the road between Shivpura
and Bharatpur is completed. "What will the rest do? And what will we
all do in the meantime?" This is the constant question.

Permanent outdmigration is not a solution for most laborers. It
has already been mentioned that many of them do leave the village sea-
sonally for work in the cities where only temporary work is available.
This is because of (1) their lack of skills, and (2) the vast numbers of
urban unemployed persons. Indeed the construction industry often relies
on the cheaper, but seasonal rural migratory labor, and there is no

security to the worker once the particular job is completed. Given the

124

expense of living in cities, these laborers cannot stay on indefinitely
without employment. In fact several laborers interviewed have tried
staying in cities for long periods of time hoping for permanent employ-
ment and have returned home bitter and discouraged.

If these are laborers' perceptions, what of those of the culti-
vators who require their services? One-third of the owner-cultivators
and those tenants who leased land in 1972-73 maintain they need a
larger labor input. Most of the rest feel there is no particular differ-
ence and two say they need less outside assistance (see Table 4.3). Of
these, one says his family can handle more work now as his children are
grown-up. The other says that since he uses tractors on hire for plow-
ing and threshing and has a pump set, he no longer requires plowmen, men
for irrigation with the traditional leathern bucket and oxen, or women

for threshing.

TABLE 4.3

WHETHER FARMERS REQUIRE MORE OR LESS NON-FAMILY LABOR NOW

 

 

 

Strata Labor Required
Total

More No Difference Less N.A.* % (N)
Large farmers 50.0 31.3 12.5 6.3 100.1 (16)
Medium farmers 33.3 33.3 0.0 33.3 99.9 (12)
Small farmers 26.3 31.6 0.0 42.1 100.0 (19)
Tenants 20.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 100.0 (20)
Overall 31.1 34.3 3.1 31.3 99.8 (67)

 

*Includes tenants who could not lease land in 1972-73 and those farmers
who rely entirely on family labor.

125

Extended or improved irrigation is the most important factor cited
by farmers requiring more labor. Some have sunk new wells, improved old
ones or bought pump sets enabling them to take a second crop. Only two
or three mention they are using improved techniques requiring more
intensive hand cultivation. Some persons point out that laborers today
"... just do not work as hard as they did when wages were lower" -- the
longer they take to finish a job, the more money they get. Also if they
take a long time, more of their friends are employed.

Cultivators were asked if the wages they pay out have risen, fallen
or remained the same over the past five to six years. They were further
asked if they feel laborers receive a fair wage. Everyone agrees that
wages have risen, and on the issue of fairness, the sample is split.1
"Looking to grain prices now, perhaps they are not paid enough. How can_
people survive on three rupees a day, or five at the most if a man's
wife also works? They usually need around two to three kilos of grain a
day, and that in itself will take more than half of their wages. How
much is then left for chillies or kerosene, let alone clothes? And then
too, they don't work everyday. So in terms of current prices, they are
not paid enough, but what can we do?" (50 percent) Cultivators' ambi-
valence is clear. Combined with a sympathy is a defensiveness about

their reluctance to raise wages any further. Few of the rest offer any

reason for saying the wages are fair.

 

lOne farmer is an exception. He carries on a system of payment in

kind used by his father: five kilos of grain per man per day. This is
the rate for grain harvesting and it is slightly less for weeding.
Laborers like the payment in kind, but few will work only for him as
they also need cash for the purchase of other commodities. This farmer
estimates he hires around 25 different men over about twenty days during
one cropping season.

126

When farmers maintain they need additional labor it does not follow
they hire more persons. Smaller farmers in particular already hire
fewer laborers. In most cases the additional requirement is met by
trading work with farm neighbors. One would suspect this might be true
elsewhere. Therefore, to calculate the employment potential of the new
technologies simply by totalling additional man—days of work is not
accurate. It might be a fairly good indicator if landowners control
more than ten acres; where labor-sharing is restricted by the size of
the plots. Most farmers however, do not have such large farms. More-
over though the new agricultural technologies require more intensive
cultivation, it is a minority of farmers who use them anyway. Even
those who do, seldom use the full range of recommended inputs and prac-

tices.

Summary

In conclusion, the data suggest the following trends. Tenancies
are more difficult to come by. Legislation passed to protect tenants'
rights has worked to their detriment and it does not appear to be
enforceable. Indeed one is led to suspect that government is afraid of
enforcing it as it might affect owner-cultivators who are seen as cru-
cial to the aims of food production. Further the introduction of trac-
tors particularly reduces the need for tenants.

Farm mechanization has also lowered employment possibilities in
agriculture though both former tenants and farm workers continue to be
dependent on farm employment for their livelihood. The process is grad-
ual but one in which the very loosening of economic ties between land-

owner and tenant/and laborer makes the latter more dependent on the

127

former. The result appears to be the formation of a "tied" labor pool
whose links with the village are strengthened by the marginal land
allotments given them by government. Where economic ties are completely
broken, the emergent Harijan elite replaces the old patron-client rela-
tionship with a new one that further sets the Harijan community apart
from the rest of the village.

The points raised here need now to be related to how respondents
perceive their own well—being in relation to others and that of the com-
munity at large. 0f further importance is the sequence of causation in
their minds. What has caused these changes and who is responsible for

them? These questions are taken up in the following chapters.

CHAPTER V

PERCEPTIONS OF WELL-BEING

Now that the effects of agrarian change on the adoption of new
techniques, employment and the pattern of agricultural relations have
been considered, we turn to respondents' perceptions of changes in their
own lives, in those of others around them, and in the village generally.
Of importance is the separation of private and public gain, the felt
needs of respondents, and their perceptions of how these needs can be
met. The link between economics and the political system is the place-

ment of responsibility for economic change on the political system.

Individual Levels of Well-Being

A basic measure of change in one's life is one's level of well-
being. It is a subjective measure which asks people to evaluate change
in their situation over a period of time.1 The concept is a general
one, and here it is broken down into three parts: general well-being,
improvement or decline in diet, and rise or decline in income. Each
respondent was asked to evaluate his situation in relation to these and
further asked why he feels the changes have occurred.

First, respondents were asked if they feel they are better off now,
worse off, or if there is no particular difference between now and five

to six years ago. The results are presented in Table 5.1. The most

 

1Time span is five to six years -- since the beginning of the
intensive schemes.
128

129

striking point is that most people are either worse off or have seen no
difference in their condition. Breaking down the findings by strata
one sees that large farmers are the most evenly divided. A number of

reasons explain this.

TABLE 5.1

RESPONDENTS' EVALUATIONS OF LEVELS OF WELL-BEING

 

Conceptions of

 

 

 

 

Well-Being Sample Strata (in Z's)
Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall
Better off 37.5 41.7 26.3 10.0 28.4
No difference 31.3 33.3 42.1 15.0 29.9
Worse off 31.3 _2§;Q_ _§l;§ __Z§;Q 41.8
Total (%) 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.1
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

Some of those who are better off use improved practices: seed,
fertilizers, and have expanded irrigation facilities. Other farmers in
this category point to the price rise of grains on the open market which
has helped them. Those of the large farmers who feel worse off claim
their crops have been affected by irregular rains.l It will be recalled
from Chapter III that several farmers who have irrigation facilities

will not use them during the monsoon season. They also maintain that

 

1It was mentioned in Chapter II that there had been drought for
two years though neither village studied was declared to be under
famine conditions.

130

while grain prices have risen, so has everything else.1 Larger farmers
who feel no difference are those who have not tried new techniques or
who hold that though they earn more from higher prices, their families
have also grown. Increased household expenses eat up increased income.

The middle—sized farmers are interestingzhmthat a slight plurality
have seen their circumstances improve. Of these, most pointtx>increased
irrigation, the use of new seeds, and chemical fertilizers. The same
farmers who in Tables 3.1 and 3.3 use the new inputs report better
levels of well-being here. Those farmers feeling they are worse off
point to inflation and increased family expenses such as marriages.

Most small farmers are either worse off or have seen no difference
in their levels of well-being. Those who are better off have again
either improved their irrigation facilities, or have tried the new
techniques. Some use chemical fertilizers, and almost all are previous
users of high yielding variety seeds. Most of those who see no
improvement or a decline in their position feel this is because of
inflation. Some point out that if they could get improved inputs their
situation would not be so bad. They say their incomes have risen but so
have other prices. Again a few incurred major ritual or other household
expenses increasing their indebtedness.

With tenants and laborers, the picture reflects the situation dis-
cussed in the previous chapter -- most of them are worse off. The ten
percent who feel they are better off have found permanent employment

with a farmer's family as tenants-cum—farm managers. The reasons for

 

1The inflation rate for 1973 was 26 percent and in 1974, 18.8 per-
cent. Taken from the Economic Survey presented to Parliament by the
Finance Minister, C. Subramaniam, February 24, 1975. From "Economic
Survey for 1974-75," The StateSman Weekly (March 1, 1975), p. 3.

 

131

the worse situation of the majority are the same as those cited in the
previous chapter: they own no land, are increasingly unable to lease
any, and employment in agriculture has decreased. They also cite infla-
tion as a major factor.

The overall figures indicate that less than one-third of the rural
population in these villages feels its general level of well-being has
risen in the past five to six years. This is despite the fact that both
villages are good agricultural areas producing a surplus each year.
Additionally, it seems the increase in levels of well~being is related
to either expanded irrigation facilities, the use of new techniques, or
both. Combining the findings of Chapters III and IV, it is also clear
that access to the means of production and increased population is
denied to the majority of agriculturalists.

As stated, however, the indicator of well-being is a general one.
It may act as an outlet for general complaints. One needs to look at
income and food intake also. These two measures are taken to reflect
both the subsistence strategy of cultivation (where the household is
the main production and consumption unit) and partial involvement in a
monetary market. These cannot be measured precisely either since there
is no way to get accurate recall about food or income over the past five
to six years. This is not seen as problematic here however, since
people's subjective evaluations are more important in the formation of
attitudes than objective indicators.

This pattern resembles respondents' attitudes toward their general
level of well-being which may be because the most important item of
expenditure is food. Additional production may first be used in the

home before any is marketed. The table also reflects the rise in grain

132

TABLE 5.2

RESPONDENTS' PERCEIVED CHANGES IN FOOD INTAKE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Changes in
Food Intake Sample Strata (in %'s)
Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall
Eat better now 31.3 41.6 31.5 10.0 26.9
No difference 25.0 33.3 36.8 10.0 25.4
Ate better before ‘_43;§ 25.0 31.5 80.0 47.8
Total (%) 100.1 99.9 99.8 100.0 100.1
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

price on consumption. The change in laborers' wage payment from kind to
cash has thrown them on to a monetary market for the most basic of all
essentials, grain. They are victims of wide seasonal price fluctuations
without the minimal cushion provided by kind payments.1 A number of
respondents asked the author to eat dinner with them: the meal con-
sisted of one dry millet chappati (unleavened bread), and perhaps a
little watery lentils. Some of these families eat only once a day dur-
ing the agriculturally slack season. If children get hungry in between,
they are handed a bit of millet stalk to chew on which is slightly sweet
when green.

The final indicator of well-being used was income, and Table 5.3

shows the respondents' perceptions of what had occurred.

 

1To give the reader an idea of seasonal fluctuations, when field
work was conducted, the prices of flour were the following: millet -
Rs. 0.80 to 1.30 ($.11 to $.21); wheat - Rs. 1.00 to 1.60 per kilogram
($.13 to $.21).

133

TABLE 5.3

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGES IN INCOME

 

Perceived Changes

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in Income Sample Strata (in Z's)
Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall
Increased income 68.8 50.0 68.4 40.0 56.7
No difference 12.5 25.0 10.0 0.0 10.5
Decreased income 18.8 25.0 21.0 60.0 32.8
Total (%) 100.1 100.0 99.4 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

More persons in each category except tenants and laborers report
an increase in income which is due to both the price increases in agri-
cultural commodities and (for the laborers/tenants who fit this) an
increase in the wage rates. Some point out their production has
increased. The tenants and laborers who cite a decrease in income say
this is due to their inability to lease land and the decline in employ-
ment opportunities. Owner-cultivators in all categories reporting
decreased incomes mention either crop failures due to the rains or
increased family expenses.

Combining the three indicators, it is clear that increased income
alone is not a satisfactory indicator: partially because of inflation
and also because of the subsistence nature of peasant agriculture. A
combination, however, indicates that the intensive programs have made
positive changes in levels of well-being for only a minority of villag-

ers. Those able/willing to utilize the new techniques have profited.

134

After six years however, the benefits have accrued to less than one-
third of the respondents' while the level of well-being is reduced for

most of the tenants and laborers -- or another one-third.

Respondents' Views of Others' Well-Being

Equally important to people's perceptions is their idea of what has
happened to others around them. This provides a relative standard
against which they can judge their own position. Each respondent was
asked first to state generally what kinds of people in his estimation
are doing better now that five to six years ago. The question was open-
ended and each respondent could give more than one reply of which the

first two were coded (see Table 5.4).

TABLE 5.4

GROUPS OF PEOPLE CONSIDERED TO BE BETTER OFF BY RESPONDENTS

 

Groups Doing

 

Better Sample Strata (in 2's)
Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

1. People with a

lot of land or 31.3 33.3 63.2 60.0 49.3

employment
2. Big farmers and

businessmen 0.0 8.3 5.3 10.0 6.0
3. Everyone but

farmers 6.3 0.0 0.0 5.0 3.0
4. Scheduled cas-

tes (Harijans) 18.8 8.3 0.0 0.0 6.0
5. Most people 18.8 25.0 5.2 5.0 12.0
6. Don't know 25.0 25.0 26.3 20.0 23.9

Total (%) 100.2 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.2

(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

135

Even though respondents name rather general categories, it is clear
that farming and access to the factors of agricultural production are
considered important for economic well-being. Respondents who feel
people with land and water have prospered, point to high agricultural
profits. Anyone with basic agricultural resources should do well. MOre
telling is Table 5.5 which shows respondents' evaluations of specific
groups. Each respondent was asked whether he perceived each category's
position to be better or worse off over the past five to six years. In
Table 5.5 only the "better off" responses are shown and there were no
"don't know" replies.

The consensus is strong. Besides access to the means of agricul-
tural production, respondents feel others such as leaders, politicians
and government servants have prospered. The reasons why they feel this
way break down in the following manner.

First, is the belief that most leaders, politicians, government
servants and money-lenders come from landed families and use their posi-
tions to enrich themselves. Elected officers use inputs on their own
farms and share them with larger farmers and/or local leaders who help
them get elected. The same is true of government servants -- to stay
in the good graces of village leaders, they cater to their needs. Even
if others request assistance, no one pays any attention. Those govern-
ment servants who do not own land at least get regular salaries. If
they feel the salaries are insufficient, they take bribes. In any case,
none of these persons has to face unemployment as landless persons do,
nor do they have to deal with the vagaries of weather and pests as do
the farmers. Again, the point is that if one has more resources to

begin with (land in the rural context) one is in a position to bargain

136

TABLE 5.5

PERCENT OF SAMPLE STRATA PERCEIVING SPECIFIC
GROUPS ARE BETTER OFF

 

Specific Groups
Evaluated Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

1. Leaders and

politicians 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2. Government
servants 87.5 100.0 89.5 100.0 92.5
3. Big farmers 93.8 91.7 94.7 90.0 92.5
4. Money-lenders 68.8 83.3 89.5 100.0 86.5
Skilled or semi-
3killed lab°r 56.3 61.6 78.4 40.0 59.7
(masons, carpen-
ters, etc.)
6. Small traders or
shopkeepers other 50.0 75.0 78.9 80.0 71.5
than money-lenders
7. Small farmers 31.3 50.0 31.6 15.0 29.9
8. Landless agricul-
tural tenants 6.2 25.0 21.1 0.0 11.9
9. Landless agricul-
tural labor 25.0 25.0 31.6 10.0 22.4
10. Old landlords
(jagirdars) 25.0 58.3 36.8 50.0 41.8
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

for the means to increase one's level of well-being. Without basic
resources one is unable to get the attention of the official hierarchy
responsible for the distribution of necessary inputs.

Opinion is fairly uniform toward the fate of landless labor and
tenants. Though some farmers feel these groups are better off since

wages have risen, most say despite this prices have lowered their levels

137

of well-being. There is some recognition by farmers that employment
opportunities in agriculture have decreased due to both the mechani-
zation of plowing and threshing, and the reciprocal labor performed by
some cultivators. Other laborers such as masons, carpenters and the
like, are seen to have prospered because wages for skilled occupations
are higher than agricultural wages, and have also increased over the
past five to six years. A mason may get up to Rs. 8.00 ($1.06) per day
in the city and only slightly less in the village. Villagers who have
built new houses feel the change. It was pointed out in the previous
chapter that laborers will try to find work in construction because it
is more lucrative (though seasonal).

Another point is the ambivalence shown toward the position of the
small farmer by respondents in other categories. The feeling here re-
flects the notion that one needs abundant land to prosper (also indica-
tive of an extensive, rather than intensive cultivation mentality). Yet
as was shown in Chapter III, small farmers work their land the most inten-
sively, market more of their produce, and generally show more motivation
to improve their production. The common response by larger farmers is:
"Small men -- what can they do? Look how much land it takes to feed my
household. They may be receiving better prices, but what can they sell,
after all?" "You must have more than five or six acres of land. I
don't know how these men survive. I need more land myself, but where is
it to come from?" While there is sympathy for the position of the small
farmer, the consensus of larger cultivators is that they as well as ten-
ants and laborers will eventually have to leave the agricultural sector.

A final point to mention here is that if one looks at Tables 5.4

and 5.5, they show a slight feeling that Harijans (scheduled castes) and

138

agricultural laborers are better off. The full import of this is dis-
cussed in the following chapters. Here it should be noted this is the
beginning of antagonism on the part of larger farmers who are also of
higher caste against the special funds and projects channeled to the
Scheduled communities. Of particular importance is the distribution of
land allotments. In the year field work was conducted (1972-73) new
land ceiling legislation was enacted limiting holdings to eighteen acres
of irrigated land. This legislation combined with land allotments made
large farmers angry with the realization that their land might be taken
away only to be given to Harijans who in their eyes are not "real farm-

ers".

Perceptions of Changed Village Conditions
The respondents were also asked if they thought the village was
generally better or worse off now than five to six years ago, and why.

The results are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.

TABLE 5.6

PERCEIVED CHANGES IN VILLAGE CONDITIONS BY SAMPLE STRATA

 

Changes Seen In

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Villages Sample Strata (in Z's)
Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall
Better off 62.5 91.7 84.2 50.0 70.2
No difference 12.5 0.0 10.5 0.0 6.0
Worse off 25.0 8.3 5.3 50.0 23.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.1

(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

139

TABLE 5.7

PERCEIVED REASONS FOR CHANGES IN VILLAGE
CONDITIONS BY SAMPLE STRATA

 

Reasons for Change

Sample Strata (in 2's)

 

Large

Medium

Farmers Farmers

Small

Tenants/
Farmers Laborers

Overall

 

WHY VILLAGE IS
BETTER OFF:

1.

High grain prices
have benefitted
farmers who form
majority

Village amenities:
(schools, electri-
city, health cen-
ters, etc.)

Better farm inputs
and assistance to
farmers

More employment and
people work harder

The crOps have been
good - weather

WHY VILLAGE IS
WORSE OFF:

1.

High grain prices
have affected people
badly except for
money-lenders who
profit

Crops have been poor

Less employment and
more corruption which
hinders access to
inputs

DON'T KNOW

Total (%)

(N)

18.8

37.5

18.8

15.6

 

100.0

(16)

25.0

33.3

16.6

16.6

 

99.8

(12)

21.1

15.8

21.1

21.1

 

100.3

(19)

2.0

10.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

40.0

10.0

20.0

20.0

 

102.0

(20)

19.4

13.4

29.4

 

100.0

(67)

 

140

The reasons why respondents feel this way are given in Table 5.7.
First, the condition of the villages is perceived to be dependent on
their state of agriculture. The main reasons cited for both better
and worse conditions reflect this. Within the strata there are inter-
esting variations. Medium and small farmers generally feel the villages
are better off and point specifically to higher grain prices and better
inputs. Higher prices presumably mean more to them since (1) they mar-
ket a higher share of their produce, and (2) incremental increases in
income mean more than they do to large farmers who produce more overall
(but not per unit of land) to begin with and have no problem meeting
their basic household requirements. The tenants and laborers are split
on the issue primarily because a number of them see their own position
and that of their neighbors as representative of the whole village.
These cite the adverse effects of high grain prices.

For those who feel the villages are worse off, the reasons are
what one might expect given previous responses. High grain prices are
problematic to those having to pay them: tenants, laborers and small
farmers who need to buy additional supplies during the year. This is
also true of those who say "the crops have been bad"; the implication
being that drought has raised prices.

Village amenities are mentioned by some persons most of whom are
in the large farmer category. Though agriculture is the dominant con-
cern (determining the floor of subsistence) considerable impact has
been made by services such as schools, health care, electricity and
roads. The small farmers and tenants/and laborers who mention amenities
reason along the following lines. Higher prices help farmers and inputs

help those who can get them. Even if these persons are in the minority,

141

government has helped everyone by providing basic amenities. Who cared
about providing villagers with such things before independence? Educa-
tion in particular is important to a number of Harijans (scheduled
castes) who make up the bulk of tenants and laborers, as it is an ave-
nue of upward mobility.

That most respondents see their villages as better off now points
to their ability to separate private from public gain. This is impor-
tant in understanding their political behavior to be discussed later.
"I personally have gained nothing since we began elections, but look at
the village. Who ever thoughtcflfeducating village children, let alone
Harijan children?" Similar comments were made by almost every respon—

dent at some point during the interviews.

Respondents' Needs

If this is how respondents perceive their own situations and those
of others around them, what do they see as their immediate needs? Each
person was asked to state three things he and his family would like to
have the most. As can be seen from Table 5.8, it is difficult to rank-
order the needs even though they are presented as such. Respondents
were also asked to state what they think are the basic needs of their
friends. The questions were open-ended (the first three responses were
coded) and a number of the responses are seen as interrelated by the
respondents themselves (see Tables 5.8 and 5.9).

Looking at the two tables, one finds a high degree of consensus.
The overall picture indicates the importance of agriculture to both the
subsistence cultivator and the entrepreneurial farmers. The general
attitude is that if one has land and other inputs, education, housing,

credit and improvement of social status will follow. One has to

142

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143

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144

recognize that the thrust of the questionnaire may elicit a higher num-
ber of "agriculturally oriented" replies than might be given otherwise.
Even if this is true, there is a consistency in the responses. The
trend of respondents' thoughts is clear.

Subsistence is determined by access to land. The amount of land
held determines access to other factors of production. Enough land and
other inputs mean wealth and influence, which in turn feed back to pro-
vide more wherewithal. In Tables 5.8 and 5.9, one finds even credit is
ranked relatively low in the respondents' estimations: thus credit is
not a constraint if one has land. High consumer prices need not bother
the wealthy; and if land is the issue, employment and wages are not
important either. One can live better from farming than from salaried
employment. This explains why so few persons including the tenants and
laborers cite employment and wages as a primary need: they would much
rather have land. In a sense the respondents reduce the argument of
subsistence to a very basic leveltnrarguing that land is all they need.
Aside from the obvious point that subsistence i§.a rather basic proposi—
tion, however, are the following considerations.

Land use and its distribution defines rural organization. It is not
only a factor of production in the classical economic sense, but one's
relationship to land reinforces social and ritual hierarchies, deter-
mines one's peer group for day-to-day relationships, provides an ave-

nue for social mobility, political authority and careers.1 Harijans

 

1This argument is made by T. Scarlett Epstein in South India:
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers,
Inc., 1973), see final chapter, pp. 243-63, and also Arthur Stinch-
comb, "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations," in Jason
Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and Social
Change (New York: John Wiley, 1971), pp. 359-62 especially.

 

 

 

145

want land not only for economic security, but also because they could
then break away from the patron-client status of landlord and tenant/
laborer. There would be less pressure on them to perform menial tasks,
and they could over time become "real" farmers. Even though they might
not be able to eat with other caste Hindus, they could meet with them
on a similar economic level to discuss common matters; that is, they
would overcome their dependent status.

To whom do respondents look for the fulfillment of their needs?
The responses are given in Table 5.10. The table reflects the notion
that government has taken on the responsibility for people's well-being
and that this is its legitimate role. It also reflects belief in the
government's capacity to act in this manner. The response that "govern-
ment generally" can help people get what they want shows not a lack of
knowledge about specific institutions, but that they are all responsible
for different tasks. In fact there is a rather high level of knowledge
about specific offices in the governmental apparatus. For example,
respondents were asked if they felt any particular person or agency is
responsible for distributing inputs on time. The results are given in
Table 5.11.

‘It has been pointed out in Chapter III that most people do not use
governmental channels to obtain either biochemical inputs or credit.
Whether they utilize the agencies or not, they feel it is the respon-
sibility of government to see to it that supplies are distributed pro-

perly and on time through both official and private channels.

Summary

In this chapter, it is apparent that well-being is linked with

access to land and agricultural inputs. Respondents' evaluation of

146

TABLE 5.10

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF WHO CAN FULFILL THEIR NEEDS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Who Can Help Sample Strata (in 2's)
Large Medium. Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

Government 87.5 75.0 79.0 60.0 74.6
Congress Party 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 6.0
No one; one has
to help one's self 0.0 0.0 5.3 10.0 4.5
Friends - people
like myself 6.3 0.0 5.3 5.0 4.5
Cooperative society
or bank 12.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 1.5
Tehsil officers -
those dealing with 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 1.5
land
Panchayat Samiti 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 1.5
"Leaders" 6.3 0.0 0.0 5.0 3.0
Money-lenders 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 1.5
Don't know 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 1.5

Total (%) 112.1* 99.9 100.2 100.0 100.1

(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

*Does not total 100 percent because one or two respondents gave more
than one reply.

well-being also depends on the level of motivation each has. Farmers
with higher motivations and with enough land may adopt new techniques,
use their land most effectively, and thus increase their profits.
Others, as was pointed out earlier, have a lower level of material
aspirations and meet their needs with additional income brought by
higher prices —— not increased production. All respondents, however,

have been affected by inflation (26 percent in 1973). Inflation

147

TABLE 5.11

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISTRIBUTION OF INPUTS

 

Persons or Agencies

 

 

Responsible Sample Strata (in 2's)
Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall
Panchayat/
cooperative 50.0 50.0 47.4 25.0 41.8
Government 25.0 16.7 26.3 10.0 19.4
Private dealers 6.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 4.5
Local leaders 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.5
Don't know 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 6.0
Non-applicable* 18.8 16.7 20.3 45.0 28.4
Total (Z) 100.1 100.1 100.0 100.0 101.6
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

*Includes tenants without land for the year or people who save seed at
home.

combined with less agricultural employment for the landless has lowered
this group's level of well-being.

Those persons with more land to begin with are seen by all respon-
dents to have prospered the most. Land would not be a critical variable
were it not for its scarcity, the profitability of farming, and the lack
of non-agricultural employment opportunities. These factors combined
with the changes in agrarian relations caused by tenancy legislation,
the introduction of new inputs, and high prices, lead respondents to
define their needs in terms of access to land. Finally, government is
seen as the institutional setting in which demands are met and mediated.

How respondents see this occurring is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASIS

If government is seen as the main mediator of demands, the question
now arises how people view the process of voicing demands and getting
them met. To discuss this it is necessary to delineate first the groups
of villagers supportive of certain kinds of demands and the bases on
which political mobilization occurs. This chapter discusses the issue
of the social bases of political mobilization and the coincidence
between these and political interests. In essence, what are the social
bases of political choice?

Literature on Indian politics in the past has stressed "tradi-
tional" variables such as caste, religion and region (including ethnic
and linguistic differences) as accounting for variations in political
behavior.1 I cannot control for either region or religion, but caste
can be considered.2 The data suggest that "traditional" variables in
adaptation to new economic circumstances provide organizational poten-

tial for political activity. Once again it is clear that land scarcity,

 

1Selig Harrison, India: The Mbst Dangerous Decades (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1960) was an early, pessimistic exponent of
the view that India's cleavages have fissiparous tendencies. Other,
more optimistic works stress the cross-cutting nature of these divi-
sions, e.g., Philip Mason, ed., India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967). Others are cited further in
the text where appropriate.

 

 

2Region and religion are constants and not relevant to sample selec-
tion.

148

149

the legal-administrative framework for development, and the introduction
of new technology are the main factors channeling (and at times, con—
straining) political options and behavior. As the political system
already has been defined by respondents as the arena in which demands
are mediated and met, data on the interrelationship between social and
political variables is related to voting: the most basic of all poli-

tical activity.

Family and Caste

 

When one considers agrarian societies, kinship units and locality
immediately come to mind as points around which social, economic and
political life revolves.1 Intuitively, this seems true as long as
these form the basic economic and production units. In the areas stud-
ied, as farming is a family enterprise, it fits this conception. Caste
provides an over arching boundary for kinship organization. To the
extent that certain kinds of activities are restricted by ritual and
historical precedence to certain castes they can also provide a basis
for social or political organization. The main factors involved are
(1) common interests defined by occupation/ownership of the means of
production, (2) a rationalization of those interests by culturally
elaborated explanations (such as clan lands, or the ritual hierarchy of
caste), and (3) interests defining a common circumstance for the group
that differentiates it from others. Locality becomes important in two
respects: neighborhood solidarity (which can coincide with caste) or

village solidarity vis-a—vis the outside world (see Chapter VII).

 

1See Andre Beteille, Studies in Agrarian Social Structure (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1974), especially section 4 of "The Social
Framework of Agriculture," pp. 94-110. Also see Rodolfo Stavenhagen,
Social Classes in Agrarian Societies (New York: Anchor, Doubleday, 1975).

 

150

What is clear in the data is that economic issues because of the
changes they cause in levels of well-being are the most important ones
politically for the respondents. Certain of these may take on communal
overtones.1 Because of the numbers of caste groups however, it is sel-
dom possible to use only caste appeals for political mobilization. How
then does one separate the impact of caste from economic variables? A
clue lies in the approach taken by writers who have explored the many
roles of caste and family including their ability to politically
mobilize and organize persons.2 What is important is to recognize the
conditions under which caste might become an important variable and
this study provides insight into the question. In the case of the two
villages, it has been pointed out that landownership is divided into
four main clumps of castes (see Chapter II). Political interests appear
to align more along the landownership lines than anything else and thus
cut across caste lines. Before continuing, some definitions are in
order.

First, the family is taken to mean all individuals living under one

roof and sharing the same hearth.3 This definition goes beyond kinship

 

1Communal here is used in the same manner as Melson and Wolpe use
it. See Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, eds. , Nigeria: Modernization
and the Politics of Communalism (East Lansing: Michigan State University
Press, 1971), see Chapter I "Medernization and the Politics of Communal-
ism" by Melson and Wolpe, pp. 1-2.

 

 

2See Rajni Kothari, ed., Caste and Politics in India (Delhi: Orient
Longman, Ltd., 1970); Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), and his "Two Political
Cultures," in Pye and Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political
Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); and Lloyd 1.
and Suzanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1967).

 

 

 

3The respondents tend to identify their families this way and it is
the definition used by Census of India also.

151

ties to include the economic unit. One finds that larger landowning
families tend to retain a joint-family system while smaller owners and
the landless have nuclear families. It is partially out of economic
necessity that sons of poor fathers once married, are expected to set
up their own households. Larger landowners tend to keep their sons in
the same household in order to retain control over all their economic
resources.

The operational definition of caste is the sub-caste, or ati.
Hindus are divided into four varnas (Brahmins, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and
Sudra) and anyone born outside of these is an "outcaste" (in Hindi EEEEE
or untouchable). Within each za£n§_however, are multitudes of groups
called japis. These are normally confined to particular regions, are
endogamous, and maintain their own commensal and social pollution and
purity hierarchies with one another. Though landless laborers and ten-
ants in these villages are primarily outcastes, this over-arching term
actually includes five distinct j§£i§_who neither intermarry nor share
commensal relations. Similarly, in the small farmer category there are
at least four castes. The same holds true for the other strata.
Finally, each caste may have members who fall into all strata.

How do respondents view the interrelationship between family and
caste and politics? They were asked if their families vote together and
then if their caste group also votes together. Next they were asked if
they voted along with their families and castes. The results are given
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.

There are several interesting points here. First, in a sense, the
questions imply an "ought" dimension. Respondents tend to reply with an

implication of what should happen, rather than what does in reality.

152

TABLE 6.1

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE FAMILY VOTE

 

Family Vote Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

 

Family votes together 93.8 91.7 52.7 90.0 79.9
Respondent votes with
family 93.8 83.3 47.4 90.0 77.6
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)
TABLE 6.2

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF CASTE VOTE

 

Caste Vote Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

Caste community is

seen to vote together 31.3 41.8 15.8 80.0 43.3

Respondent votes with

caste community 37.5 41.7 15.8 80.0 44.8
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

The family vote for example, is a reflection of two factors. First,
respondents see the family as a close unit functioning together in most,
if not all, activities. Thus they assume all members of the household
participate in similar ways. On the other hand, it is probably true

that most families d2_vote together and the opinion of the head of house-

hold is important in the formation of political attitudes of its

153

members.1 There is no method by which precise occurrences can be ascer-
tained, but again, people's perceptions are as important as objective
reality.

In Table 6.1, the cohesiveness of the family unit is clear except
in the case of small farmers, where the problem may be definitional.
Though these respondents maintain nuclear families, it may be that they
see the extended kinship network as important for social and political
activities. The lower number of small farmers who say their families
vote together may thus reflect a lack of knowledge about the vote of
other related households.

The results of Table 6.2 clearly show the difference between
people's perceptions of what is and what should be. It is almost whim-
sical to note that except for the landless tenant/labor stratum, it is
a minority of the rest who maintain the caste votes together. These
persons are either illogical or are representative of those who feel
castes should vote together. Each stratum has more than one caste in it
and several castes used to vote together until recently. The Minas and
Gujjars, for example were known for being a bloc: they were the main-
stay of the Swatantra Party.

What the results do reflect are the views of some persons in each
caste group interested in cohesive action. Most of these are community
leaders (often patels or headmen) in whose interest it is to have the
community act together. This reinforces their status in the group and

vis-a-vis the wider political system as they can be the brokers between

 

1Head of household here refers to the person in the family making
most important decisions. This may be the eldest son: often as a
father ages, he turns such duties over to one or the other of his sons:
normally the one who supervises the farming.

154

the community and benefits coming in from outside. This will be dis-
cussed in depth further. The cohesiveness of the tenants and laborers
is rather unique and is discussed fully below.

It was mentioned above (p. 149) that social cleavages can provide
a base for political organization where common interests are defined by
occupation or the ownership of the means of production (land in this
context). Turning now to the bases on which families, castes and
individuals select particular political parties and candidates, one can
see the beginnings of such a definition of interests (see Tables 6.3,
6.4 and 6.5). The responses given are general but they emphasize group
benefits to be gained by voting. An important point to note is that
since it is a minority of respondents who feel their caste communities
vote together, the benefits desired will tend to group along lines other
than caste except where the caste boundaries define common circumstances.

The tables, aside from showing that respondents see voting as a
means of getting benefits, indicate two other points of interest here.
First, there is no particular attachment shown to any political party
except insofar one or another is perceived to have the capacity to carry
out its program. This is important in defining parameters for political
action as will be seen below. Secondly, it is primarily the tenants and
laborers who feel their caste communities define their common interests.
With this in mind, we turn to a discussion of the interrelationship
between caste and landownership. The focus of this community's organi-
zation is their lack of land which also coincides with their ritually

low status.

155

TABLE 6.3

BASES ON WHICH RESPONDENTS FEEL THEIR FAMILIES
MAKE POLITICAL CHOICES

 

Bases for Choices Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/

Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall
We vote for the party
that can d° What it 35.7 25.0 31.6 50.0 34.4
says it wants done
(capacity)
We choose someone who
will help us the most
with things we need 25.0 16.7 10.5 15.0 16.4
for our farms
We vote with the
caste community as
we agree with their 0.0 16.7 5.3 15.0 9.0
decision
We go by the reputa-
tion of the candidate 18.8 8.3 0.0 5.0 9.0
and his promises
Follow the advice of
village leaders 10.6 0.0 5.3 0.0 4.5
We vote only for the
Congress Party because
it is the only one 10.6 16.7 5.3 5.0 9.0
that does anything
Non-applicable (do not
vote as a family) 0.0 16.7 42.1 10.0 17.9

Total (%) 100.7 100.1 100.1 100.0 100.2
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Caste and Land

 

It was mentioned above that conflict can take on the appearance of
high vs. low caste conflict, and that landownership is confined basically

to caste Hindus. The Harijans or untouchables form the pool of landless

156

TABLE 6.4

BASES ON WHICH RESPONDENTS FEEL THEIR CASTE
COMMUNITY MAKES POLITICAL CHOICES*

 

.Bases of Choice Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

Help for the poor 50.0 60.0 50.0 0.0 25.8
Help for landless

and scheduled 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.3 41.9
castes

Attachment to a
particular party 16.7 20.0 50.0 12.6 19.4
or ideology

Electoral promises of
candidate regardless

 

 

 

 

 

of his party affilia- 33.3 20.0 0.0 6.3 12.9
tion
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.2 100.0
(N) (6) (5) (4) (16) (31)

 

*Includes only those respondents who in Table 6.2 report their caste
community votes together.

labor and tenants. Thus far landed persons in neither village form
politically cohesive groups though they can act together at times.
While many landed families have switched their political support from
the Swatantra to the Congress Party, there are a number of them (not in
the sample) who are known to be Jan Sangh or Swatantra supporters.1 In

each stratum of agriculturalists, there are many factions: some of

 

1The actual voting record of respondents is given in the following
chapter. Many of the persons referred to here are large landowners who
lease out all of their lands. They have no part in production decisions
and most are absentee landlords who return to the villages either to
collect debts or their share of the crops. Thus, they were not included
in the sample.

157

TABLE 6.5

BASES ON WHICH INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS MAKE POLITICAL CHOICES

 

Bases of Choice Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

Agreement with the
family or caste 25.0 33.3 15.8 60.1 34.3
decision
Try to see which per-
son or party will 31.3 41.7 31.6 20.0 29.9
help me the most
On the basis of party
capacity/Program 37.6 8.3 15.9 5.0 16.5
Listen to the advice
of village leaders 6.3 0.0 10.5 5.0 6.0
Reputation of the
candidate (honesty) 0.0 16.6 5.3 0.0 4.5
I vote for the oppo-
sition because it can
keep a watch on the 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.0 3.0
ruling party
Not sure/don't know 0.0 0.0 10.5 10.5 6.0

Total (%) 100.2 99.9 100.1 100.5 100.2

(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

 

 

 

 

 

which may coincide with particular jatis, and others that cut across

caste lines.

different issues come to the fore.1

 

Many of these factions are fluid and realignments occur as

1For further reference see Ramashray Roy, "Caste and Political
Recruitment in Bihar," and Andre Beteille, "Caste and Political Group

Formation in Tamil Nad," both in Rajni Kothari, ed., Caste and Politics
in India, op. cit., pp. 228-94. Also see Paul R. Brass, Factional Poli-
tics in an Indian State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965)
and Ralph W. Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis," in Political
Systems and the Distribution of Power, A.S.A. Monographs, #2 (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

 

 

 

 

 

158

If there is to be competition over scarce resources (e.g., land)
then those elements having land to lose (regardless of caste) are likely
to coalesce to prevent this from happening.1 If the dynamic of rural
change apparent in the previous chapters continues to polarize groups
and intensify demands to the point that an accommodation of interests
is not possible without one group having to give up land (or the ten-
ants/laborers their agricultural occupations) then one can expect landed
elements to unite and use their political power to hold onto their farms.
The anti-Harijan attitudes expressed by some farmers and described in
Chapter V show how traditional justification can be used to rationalize
one's status and potentially to create organization where none has
existed so far.

Cultural appeals have been used by political parties in all parts
of India, but these have limited applicability. A purely caste appeal
for example, is useful only if there is one numerically dominant group
in an electoral constituency. In the case of the two villages studied,
the Swatantra Party has pursued the larger and middle cultivator through
the use of an anti-land reform platform combined with overtones of anti-
Harijan rhetoric as most of those who would profit from reform are
Harijans.2 Such an appeal finds sympathy among farmers most upset by
aid given Harijans by the Congress administration. There is considerable
anger among farmers who feel the old social system is breaking down at

their expense with the cooperation of the Congress dominated political

 

1See Hung-Chao Tai, Land Reform and Politics (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1974), Chapter XIII "Rural Stability," section
titled "Short-Term Destabilizing Consequences of Land Reform," pp. 428-33.

2The reference here is to grass-roots strategy ~~ not the official
proclamations of the party.

159

system. Though these farmers will not openly disagree with the overall
goal of equity, they do voice strong disagreement with what they see as
special privileges accorded Harijans. They feel equity is pursued to
the detriment of persons like themselves who are "better" and more
"legitimate" farmers.1

This can be verified through two incidents. One has already been
recounted: the case where Harijans in Hanumangarh were not permitted
to farm their alloted pieces of land. The second is a similar occur—
rence which took place several years before field work was undertaken.2
The Raiger §§m§1,3 decided that the community would no longer tan hides
and mend shoes. Nor would they work on a barter basis and would demand
cash for any work done. Their complaint against the barter system was
that the patron families postponed payment of the annual shares of grain
to suit their own convenience and that traditional grain payments were
no longer commensurate with the work done and not competitive with rates

in Jaipur city.4 A group of angry caste Hindus took one or two Raigers

 

lRather similar to the reaction of American whites who feel quotas
and special programs to aid minorities are "discrimination in reverse."

2The story was recounted by several caste Hindus-u-not by Harijans.

3Literally "council". Each caste community has traditionally had
its own samaj to decide community affairs. Each local group has its own
samaj whose leaders (either patels or panchas) meet with leaders of
other like samaj leaders from the district or state. In situations like
this, they can function almost like a trade union. For further infor-
mation, see Lloyd 1. and Suzanne Rudolph, Mbdernity of Tradition, op.
cit.

4The "traditional" economic system called the "jajmani" system is
an elaborate network of patron-client relationships revolving around
services provided to farmers and other dominant families. Payments are
made in kind at harvest time or yearly. Thus a potter will supply x
number of pots to a family in return for Y_kilos of grain, a priest is
"retained" for ceremonial occasions on a similar basis, etc. The rela-
tionships between patron (jajman) and client (kamin) families continue
through generations: each family has its own barber, potter, priest,

160

outside the village and administered beatings with the justification
that "how can these people tell Brahmins and Baniyas to mend their own
shoes?" The Raigers did not give in however, and today in Hanumangarh
one cannot have one's shoes mended. One can buy new ones for cash.

This incipient antagonism is likely to grow both as scarce economic
resources continue to be channeled into Harijan communities and as the
demands for land grow. Leaders from the Harijan and caste Hindu commun-
ities are aware of the importance of land distribution as is apparent in
the following quotations.l This quotation from the Harijan leader shows
how communal ties can be used for political purposes.

"PeOple talk about the fact that we vote as a caste. What do they
mean by that? Here we are, Chamars, but the Telis (Muslims oil pressers
considered untouchable by both Hindus and Muslims) also vote with us and
so do the Bhangis (sweepers). In other villages of this constituency,
there are Raigers and other Harijan castes. We all try to vote together
though we don't eat together or marry each other. There is a caste
component in that yes, we are all achuts (untouchables) and no one else
will eat our food. Congress took our vote in the first place by pro-
mising to abolish untouchability. But what is more important it seems
to me is that we are all in the same position with no land and almost no

employment. This is despite all one hears of the reserved seats for the

 

etc. The occupations are reinforced by caste distinctions which are
especially clear in the jobs performed by outcaste communities as they
are considered polluting to caste Hindus: leather tanning, midwifery,
sweeping, etc. For a discussion of the jajmani system, see William H.
Wiser, The Hindu Jajmani System (Lucknow: Lucknow Publishing House,
1939), 1969 edition. With the coming of a monetary economy, the patron-
client relationship continues (largely for ritual purposes), though pay-
ments may sometimes be made in cash rather than kind.

 

1These quotations are taken from interviews with village leaders
identified by the respondents.

161

scheduled castes and other privileges.1 If a group of us was to get
substantial amounts of land, the vote would split. Indeed, the Harijans
who don't vote with us are those already owning land -- many of them
vote for Swatantra. Look, even my father used to vote for Swatantra
because he felt Congress might take the land away that he has. It is
only since I began to take part in politics that he has voted for Con-
gress." (Chamar ward representative of Shivpura, Congress Party member,
and son of a large farmer who is now a Harijan money-lender)

Landed leaders in the two villages are also aware of access to land
as an important political issue. Further, their comments show sensi-
tivity to the changes in their own traditional status.

"You see, it wasn't only caste, but also the fact that families
like mine could pressure people who owed us money or leased out lands
to vote the way we wanted them to. Now only a few do so because of our
opinions. Some, of course, may value what we say, but they will con-
sider several points of view and then go do what they think is best.

Few of us can promise any political parties votes -- though you will see
that some of the villagers do. I am not sure what makes the difference
except that the vote is secret. But also as people must have told you,
land is the crucial question here and this is what matters. Farming is
profitable and as prices get higher, more people want land. This is why
Harijans vote together —- they want land. The small farmers also want
land." (Baniya farmer, son of a major money-lending family of

Hanumangarh and former member of the Jaipur district Congress committee)

 

1The privileges referred to are the special programs for Harijans
and the reservation of seats for them on all elected bodies which may be
filled by nomination should none be elected at large.

 

 

 

162

"I built my position in Congress because I could deliver Gujjar
votes; but I cannot do this anymore. I have to discuss and argue and
promise things to everyone and then even if they promise me they will
vote for Congress, they go and do as they please. It is not that my
caste fellows reject my family or our position. They still look to us
for advice on many things. They will use my influence at all the govern-
ment offices and get me to speak to the MLA (member of the legislative
assembly) no matter for whom they might have voted. They want agricul-
tural inputs and they want to keep their land, and many are afraid that
a Congress government will take it away so they have changed their
votes. It is very hard for me to convince district Congress committee
people that they cannot only rely on my position (as paggl). These
people must get assistance or else where can I keep my authority? I
have had to change my political networks considerably in the past three
elections. I am not delivering a Gujjar vote anymore; I am trying to
create and deliver the votes of a 'productive' farmer group." (Large
farmer, caste papgl, also a Congress party member and former chairman
of the cooperative society, Hanumangarh)

"There is antagonism between large and small farmers now, let alone
between those with land and those without. The big men get richer and
there is not much in it for the small farmer and no future at all for
the landless in the village. Congress has always paid off the patels or
other leaders hoping that they can capture votes for them. I know
because I used to be in government service and saw where and how allot-
ments of land are made. They assume these men can at least guarantee
their caste vote, but they can't do this now. If you see for yourself,

there are wealthy and poor people in each caste, and that is more

163

important. Also, if you don't keep the same tenants, you can't make
them vote the way you want. And now no one can keep the same tenants.
So far in this village, the sarpanch has been able to maintain some kind
of coalition with the Jatavs (untouchable caste) but how long will that
last? Have you talked with the sarpanch as yet? He will tell you."
(Former patwari -- land revenue collector, large farmer, Jat by caste,
Shivpura)

"Most changes here have been made on government's initiative. It
makes the laws and then people like myself try to enforce them. But
change is slow in some areas. In agriculture, mainly people like myself
have benefitted because we have lots of land and position and can demand
the inputs. The small farmer is in trouble ... (agricultural labor) has
not been helped and can't be until we get some industry. I want to put
up an oil press. That would employ some people and bring in income, but
first we need our road paved. Government is slow to act. It tells us
to give Harijans land -- where is this to come from? Who will give up
theirs? Everyone wants benefits and they see government as the agency
to get them. I know because it falls on my head when programs do not
function properly, and they don't. I am expected to get people out to
vote (for Congress), and I try. But it is difficult now because my pull
with the voters depends on the benefits that government brings into this
village. If we don't get them, on what basis should people listen to

me?" (Sarpanch of Shivpura, Congress party member and large Jat farmer)

Collective Political Choice: Tenants and Laborers

 

Given the importance of land distribution and access to political
power, it should be clear why the Harijan castes forming the tenant and

labor pool try to vote together. Numbers are the only "political

164

currency" they possess, and their words tell their appreciation of this
fact.

"Our interests (the Harijans') are one because we want equal treat-
ment and land. Besides, there are other factors to consider. Because
our desires go against the interests of other groups in the village,
those parties who want their support don't want ours. No non-Congress
candidates come to us. They know we want land and if they give it to
us, they can't keep the support of other groups. If we are to get land
-- all the landless that is -- where is it to come from except from the
holdings of larger farmers? You see, these issues have the support of
other castes too. Others have no land and no jobs and are treated as
shabbily as we are. Now Congress hasn't really done anything for us
since legislation was passed abolishing discrimination. Because of
this, it is no problem to get the older Harijans to vote for Congress.
But our younger people say the laws make no difference. We still can-
not go into people's homes. And even with government's policy of hir-
ing a certain number of Harijans, how many can they hire after all?

"But," he continues, "how do we change parties? It would be best
if parties rotated in power. This situation with Congress being in all
the time does no one any good. The party has become complacent and full
of corrupt people. But which other party wants a Harijan vote?"

"What about the Communists?" probe question.

"Communists? We hear they are for the small man, but where are
they? Sometimes you hear they do things for peOple in Jaipur and
Calcutta. But no Communist has ever come out here. Where do they find
their small men?" (Raiger patel's son, farmer and shoemaker, Congress

supporter, Hanumangarh)

165

"Other persons have land or money they can use to get what they
want, and we have neither. These two things are what we are after.
What we do have is numbers, and if we vote together, we can make a can-
didate win or lose an election. That is how Congress won here last
time." (Raiger page; in Hanumangarh, farmer, Congress supporter)

"We have many differences between us also, but there is one main
thing we have in common: we all need land. So we must use our vote to
support those who will give it to us." (Khatik laborer, Hanumangarh)

Besides the coincidence shown here between traditional status as
defined by caste and a lack of economic resources, is the recognition
that the needs and demands of the landless are increasingly contradic-
tory to those of the landed persons in these villages. It is valid to
hypothesize that the trend of less employment in agriculture and fewer
tenancies is directly responsible for this view. Without alternative

sources of sustenance, the contradiction can be expected to grow.

Summary

In summary, it is the particular dynamic of rural change that causes
conflict with communal overtones. The new cleavages of the landed vs.
the landless are not coincident with any iagi_because there is no single
dominant caste. What can occur however, is a strong anti-Harijan move-
ment, the beginnings of which are indicated by the data. This is because
of the coincidence of their ritually low status with economic deprivation
and their mobilization into the wider political system by promises that
thus far are largely symbolic in nature. Anti-Harijan sentiment can

be encouraged by opposition parties to woo supporters away from the

166

Congress.1 In this situation, caste will not fully explain political
conflict but it may be a compounding factor linking traditional social
and cultural concerns to economic transformation.

Finally, the data presented show that even where respondents feel
their caste communities do (or should) vote together, this solidarity
is viewed as based on mutual economic interests. Numbers count in an
election and assuming that persons see most of their caste fellows to be
in the same economic situation as themselves (which may or may not be
true) a caste provides an existing basis for organizational efforts.
This analysis is in agreement with that made by other observers of the
Indian political system who have commented on the many faces of the
caste system.2 The particular aspect stressed here will be the econo-
mic one because of the changes in traditional relationships brought
about by agrarian change and aided by the modern political system. At
the same time, given the diversity of caste groups in both villages and
the nature of land distribution, concerted political activity requires
cross-caste alliances. The propensity for their formation has been
shown.

Keeping in mind the relationship between social cleavages and the
political system, we turn now to perceived political options of action

that can be used to maximize benefits.

 

lSeveral observers have pointed to this in other areas. See for
example, issues of The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta), for analyses of the
Uttar Pradesh by-elections held in February 1974. The Bharatiya Kranti
Dal and other "rightist" parties sought the support of middle and larger
farmers pointing to the privileges accorded Harijans including the Con-
gress land reform platform.

 

2See above, p. 150, footnote 2.

CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL OPTIONS: ACTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS

The previous chapters indicate that respondents' needs focus on
access to land and that they see government as the main agency to meet
these needs. This delineates the link that has emerged since indepen-
dence between individual gain and the political system, or the increased
gggpe of politics in India. This chapter examines respondents' attitudes
toward political activity and leadership and perceived options to influ-
ence the distribution of benefits. The data also show that under cer-
tain circumstances "traditional" social cleavages may provide a basis
for political organization.

One finds that political access and influence are constrained by
land. Demands for land and employment are manipulated by the provision
of public goods and services to rural areas. I maintain these goods are
largely symbolic and their political impact is limited over time. The
distribution of new farm inputs and development loans is political by
virtue of the government's monopoly. In order to retain their influ-
ence, traditional elites have captured elective offices and can use the
modern political/administrative framework to reinforce their traditional
patron-client networks with some realignments. It is within these para—

meters that we turn now to the data.

167

168

Why Vote?

Turning first to attitudes toward voting, the respondents were
asked whether or not they consider voting important and why. The
results are presented in Table 7.1. Of the respondents who feel voting

"... it doesn't make

is not important, one-third say this is because
any difference to one's life whether one votes or not." These persons
see no relationship between their needs and the political system's
ability to fulfill them. The other two-thirds say that although voting
is supposed to bring one benefits, politicians do not really care about
voters. There are thus, no benefits to be got and no point in voting.
These respondents are the more disillusioned ones and it may be no acci-
dent that slightly more are in the small/middle categories (in Table 7.1)

as we have already seen that land size is a constraint to obtaining

inputs (Chapter III).

TABLE 7 . 1

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE
OF VOTING BY FARM SIZE

 

Whether Voting

Is Important Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall
Yes 93.8 83.3 73.7 95.0 86.6
No 6.2 16.7 26.3 5.0 13.4
Don't know 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

 

 

 

 

 

169

Most respondents however, view voting as utilitarian (Table 7.2).

In a way the responses sound like a school lesson recited without meaning
or specific content because they are so readily given. Exploring the
issues of elections, the attitudes toward leaders and political change
however, one finds the lesson is well learned over a period of six
general elections. That respondents see the act of voting as something
which should bring benefits to them is clear; that most of them feel
The interrela-

they have not benefitted personally is also apparent.

tionship between these two explains their attitudes.

TABLE 7.2

REASONS WHY RESPONDENTS FEEL VOTING IS IMPORTANT BY FARM SIZE

 

 

 

Reasons Sample Strata (in Z's)

Large Medium Small Tenants/

Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall
To get benefits
from parties/candi- 50.0 33.3 26.3 70.0 46.3
dates supported
It is a citizen's
duty 18.8 16.0 21.1 10.0 16.4
It is important to
let government know 18.8 8.3 5.3 10.0 10.4
what you want
For "progress" 0.0 17.0 15.8 0.0 7.3
Party competition is
good. A one party
system is bad and vot- 6.3 8.3 5.3 5.0 6.0
ing helps keep parties
alternating in office
Don't know/non-
applicable 6.3 17.0 26.3 5.0 13.4

Total (%) 100.2 99.9 100.1 100.0 99.8
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

 

 

 

 

 

170

First, what are the benefits desired by the respondents? They were
asked to name issues of importance to them during the last election
(1972 state assembly) and then asked to name issues important to their
friends and finally those important to villagers at large. The assump-
tion here is that issues of importance should reflect individual bene—
fits desired if respondents see the political system as instrumental to
their attainment. The questions regarding issues of importance to others
attempt to see if respondents see their needs as different from those of
others and thus, if they perceive divergent political interests in their
village community. The results are presented in Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5.

Several interesting points are apparent in these tables. Though on
the first question the spread of issues cited appears to be large, most
persons focus on land, employment, and inputs for farming. The break-
down also indicates that a fairly high proportion feel village amenities
are important. This is partially so because electricity is included in
this category and some farmers are concerned about getting electrical
connections for their fields for pumping sets. Some tenants and labor-
ers are concerned about schools because they view education as a means
to better the occupational chances of their children. Third, since
several respondents in the small farmer and tenant/laborer categories do
not feel government gill provide them with private benefits, related
issues are not important to them. Finally, there may be a "bandwagon"
effect because village amenities have often been poured into villages
before elections, and as a result it is likely that they come readily to
mind.

The other interesting point in Table 7.3 is that issues are closely

aligned with individual needs cited by respondents in Table 5.8. This

l [ll.lll llllll 1 ill lull." I'll" I I'll I'll I III III

171

TABLE 7 . 3

ISSUES FELT TO BE INDIVIDUALLY IMPORTANT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Issues Sample Strata (in Z's)
Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

Village amenities
(water, electricity,. 18.8 33.3 21.0 20.0 20.1
roads, schools)
Land, employment,
loans for landless 12.5 8.3 5.2 30.0 14.9
especially Harijans
To get a strong
Patty elatted that 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5
can get something
done
More inputs and assis-
tance to farmers plus 25.0 41.5 47.3 10.0 30.0
more land in some cases
Village amenities and
asistance to farmers 25.0 15.0 10.5 30.0 22.4
"Never heard of any
issues" or "there 12.5 0.0 10.5 0.0 6.0
was nothing for me"
Don't know 0.0 0.0 5.3 10.0 4.5

Total (%) 100.0 98.1 99.8 100.0 99.4

(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

reinforces the view of respondents that government is the agency to

supply their needs or at least to see to it that supplies are properly

distributed.

This is particularly so of those with little or no land

and is probably because again, government is seen as responsible for

standards of living.

There is some parallel between what individuals consider to be

their own important issues and those they think their friends consider

172

TABLE 7.4

ISSUES CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BY FRIENDS

 

. Issues Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

Village amenities
(water, electricity, 25.0 33.1 31.6 15.0 29.9
roads, schools)

Land, employment and
loans for landless, 0.0 8.3 5.2 5.0 6.0
especially Harijans

To get a strong
party elected that
can get something
done

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5

More inputs and assis-
tance to farmers plus 25.0 33.3 36.8 25.0 29.8
more land in some cases

Village amenities and

assistance to farmers 12.5 8.3 0.0 40.0 17.9
Never heard/don't know 37.6 15.2 26.3 15.0 16.4
Total (%) 100.1 98.4 99.9 100.0 101.5
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

important. The higher emphasis on village amenities in Table 7.4
reflects respondents' ability to separate private from public gain and
the feeling that the political process has not brought everyone private
benefits. In lieu of this, public goods and access to them probably
form a basis for political discussion among friends.

Table 7.5 shows that most respondents feel village amenities are
important to villagers at large. In Hanumangarh most farmers live in
hamlets surrounding the village proper. The village is identified with

very large landowners and money-lenders. The farmers maintain only

173

TABLE 7.5

ISSUES CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BY VILLAGERS

 

Issues Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

Village amenities
(water, electricity, 87.8 66.6 73.7 55.0 70.1
roads, schools)

Land, employment and
loans for landless, 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 1.5
especially Harijans

To get a strong
party elected that
can get something
done

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

MOre inputs and assis-
tance to farmers plus 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 1.5
more land in some cases

Village amenities and

 

 

 

assistance to farmers 6.2 25.0 0.0 15.0 10.4
Never heard/don't know 6.2 26.3 20.0 16.4
Total (%) 100.2 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.9
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

these persons have the time and resources to worry about such things as
schools and health centers. One man said, "Oh, the villagers are more
concerned about roads and schools. How do these things matter so much
to us? How often do we walk on paved roads, and how long do our child-
ren attend school?" In Shivpura, "village concerns" are identified as
amenities probably because the villagers have worked together to obtain
them (e.g., the high school, Chapter II). Everyone had a part in
obtaining and using these. Overall, amenities provide a focal point for

local pride: attempts are often made to convince the outsider that

174

villages are not so "backward" as the city dweller thinks. In the pre-
vious chapter it was mentioned that locality may provide an organi-
zational basis for the village vis-a-vis the outside world. Here it is
suggested that public services can be central to solidarity based on
locality as they serve to unite an otherwise divided p0pulation.1
Generally, the tables reflect the following processes. Over time,
government and the Congress Party as the main link between people and
government have become the legitimate distributors of goods and ser—

vices in society. Weiner points out that "

... the changing character
of political attitudes and the political process is increasingly the
consequence of the introduction of new governmental institutions and
of governmental activities."2 Further, "Decisions that were formerly
made within the village now involve a level of governmental activity
which may be ten miles or even a thousand miles away from the village.
And competition which once occurred within the free market now takes
place in the political market or within the governmental apparatus."3
Since Congress has held power for the longest period of time, it has a
virtual monopoly over patronage and its distribution.4 This lesson is
well learned by the electorate. Of importance is the effect of new

goods and services on traditional roles and statuses and the new poli-

tical interests and demands these effects generate.

 

1See discussion on p. 149 based on Andre Beteille's approach.

2Myron Weiner, "India: Two Political Cultures," in Lucian W. Pye
and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 202

3Ibid., p. 204.

4Ibid., p. 219.

175

Views of Leadership

 

The idea that government is the main supplier of goods and services
is reinforced by respondents' conceptions of the "duty" of government
officers and political leaders. Only five persons in the sample feel it
is pg; the duty of leaders and government officers to look after the
welfare and happiness of their people. Of these, one person is not sure
who should do this and the others say "people should take care of them-
selves." The reasons why leaders and government officers are respon-

sible for people's welfare are given in Table 7.6.

TABLE 7 . 6

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF WHY PEOPLE'S WELFARE IS THE TASK
OF POLITICAL LEADERS AND OFFICERS BY FARM SIZE*

 

 

Reasons Why Sample Strata (in X's)
Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

They have the power
which the ordinary 40.0 25.0 31.3 31.6 32.2
man does not

We give them power
so they must do 20.0 25.0 37.5 42.1 32.2
this for us

By definition of

being leaders 33.4 49.8 25.1 26.3 32.2
They benefit finan-
Cially by helping 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 1.6

people (both sala-
ries and corruption)

Government listens to

 

 

 

 

 

them and not to us 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2
Total (%) 100.1 99.8 100.2 100.0 101.4
(N) (15) (12) (16) (19) (62)

 

*Includes only those respondents who agree

with the proposition.

176

It is interesting to note that around one-third of the sample
views leaders as holding a kind of "social contract" with the people
(see second reason, Table 7.6). Because their power is based on the
consent of the governed, they are obliged to look after their wants.
The first and third reasons are general, but they too indicate that
leaders' position and power obligates them to work for the welfare of
the governed. Some of these ideas may come from traditional conceptions
of the state and leaders held by respondents: the king is enjoined in
traditional political writings to be the guardian of his people.1 That
tradition, however, is common to a number of cultures. The point here
is that government's role has expanded considerably since independence
(1947) and as pointed out by Weiner, new institutions and activities
have penetrated to the local level with a monopoly over functions that
used to occur in other (normally private) institutional settings.

The link between people and their government is provided by elec—
tions and political parties in the respondents' eyes. This explains
why elections are viewed as instrumental to the attainment of needs by
so many respondents. The relationship is one where parties are seen to
control governmental activities as is shown in Table 7.7.

Comments accompanying the responses given above stress parties'
role as the main channels of communication between the electorate and
government. "If we don't let the parties know what it is we want, how
can government act in our favor?" "The candidates who win are able to

tell government what it is we want, and then we can get it."

 

1Familiar to readers acquainted with Kautilya's Arthashashtra,
Part II, translated by R. P. Kangle (Bombay: University of Bombay Press,
1972), second edition, Book 1, Chapter 19, p. 47 g£_passim.

 

177

TABLE 7 . 7

RESPONDENTS' VIEWS OF WHETHER PARTIES CAN CONTROL GOVERNMENT

 

Can Parties Control
Government? Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

 

 

 

 

 

Yes 56.3 66.6 57.8 60.0 59.7

Only Congress can 12.6 0.0 5.3 0.0 4.5

Whichever party is

in power can 6.3 8.3 0.0 5.0 4.5

No, they cannot 25.0 8.3 26.3 15.0 19.4

Not sure/don't know 0.0 16.6 10.6 20.0 11.9
Total (Z) 100.2 99.8 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

How respondents view the functioning of the distributive process
in reality is another matter. Table 7.8 illustrates how they feel it
functions for them.

Obviously, there is considerable difference between what respon-
dents see as the duty of leaders and their perception of reality. Table
7.9 expands on why respondents feel this way. The feelings of those
respondents who say leaders age interested in their personal situations
are not presented in tabular form as there are very few in this category
(only 17). The most common reason is that politicians want votes and
hence, they have to be interested. One or two respondents feel "leaders
are good people and they care."

How many respondents have tried or feel they can talk with politi-

cal leaders? Do respondents' attitudes toward leaders come from hearsay

178

TABLE 7.8

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS ABOUT WHETHER LEADERS
TAKE AN INTEREST IN THEIR WELL-BEING

 

Are Leaders
Interested in
People's Well-Being Sample Strata (in 2's)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

 

 

 

 

 

No 62.5 75.0 73.7 60.0 70.1
Yes 12.5 25.0 15.9 20.0 17.9
Some do 18.8 0.0 5.2 10.0 9.0
Don't know 6.2 0.0 5.2 10.0 3.0
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

or practical experience? Though both factors are probably important,
the results are given as stated in Table 7.10.

Large farmers obviously have the most direct access to political
leaders and use it the most. The higher percentage of tenants and
laborers who have spoken with political leaders comes from Congress
Party efforts to retain a Harijan bloc of votes. Even with this how-
ever, the stratum is split and most Harijans within it do not feel they
have access to politicians. Some point out that before the elections
candidates always come to talk to everyone and then no one has a chance
to see them again. Those respondents in all categories who have not
talked with leaders feel peOple like themselves (without money and
influence) cannot see party members or elected representatives. The low

numbers of small farmers who feel they have access is indicative of the

179

TABLE 7.9

WHY RESPONDENTS FEEL LEADERS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN THEM*

 

Reasons Why Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

Leaders are interested
only in their monetary 33.3 11.1 20.0 35.7 26.0
gain and status

They only want the votes
so they show interest at 50.0 66.6 46.7 57.1 54.0
election time and vanish

They don't really want to

 

 

 

 

 

help the poor--don't care 16.6 22.2 20.1 7.1 14.0

They care only if they

stand for election from 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 2.0

their own town or village

Not sure/don't know 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 2.0
Total (%) 99.9 99.9 100.2 99.9 98.0
(N) (12) (9) (15) (14) (50)

 

*Includes only those respondents who feel leaders are not interested in
people's welfare.

constraint of farm size. This constraint at times feeds back to create
a lack of interest on their part in the political process as there is
nothing to be gained by participating in it.

One respondent, a Khatik by caste1 was initially hostile when asked
for an interview. "What can you people do for me? Some other people
from the University have come here. Can you give me my land back? What
is the use of interviews?" After some discussion the interview began,
and Kalu's case is indicative of the extent of both political mobiliza-

tion and the dilemma faced by the voter.

 

1A Harijan caste: traditionally involved in herding, wool trade
and butchering.

180

TABLE 7.10

HAVE PROBLEMS EVER BEEN DISCUSSED WITH LEADERS?

 

Have Respondents
Ever Talked With
Political Leaders? Sample Strata (in %'s)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

 

 

 

 

Yes 75.0 50.0 14.0 45.0 44.8
No ._g5;g 50.0 86.0 55.0 55.2
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

Political Choice and Change

 

Kalu's parents owned seven and one half acres of irrigated land.
He had an older married brother who became ill at the age of eighteen
years. The parents went into debt for his treatment and when their son
died, they owed the money-lender Rs. 800 ($106.66). Kalu was about six-
teen at the time. His family had done well on the land, and borrowed
only to meet the hospital bills. Kalu's father however, was unable to
repay the full debt on time and the money-lender foreclosed taking all
the land whose value then was about Rs. 10,000 ($1,333). As Kalu
points out, "What could my father do against the baniya? Take him to
court?" The family was left destitute and the loss of the land com-
bined with his age kept Kalu's father from starting another occupation.
He had no skills anyway. It fell on Kalu's shoulders to feed and clothe
the family.

Kalu began work as an agricultural and casual laborer. He heard

government was giving loans to Harijans for houses and animal husbandry

181

and applied for one after much difficulty. "A herd of forty or fifty
goats would be a very good start for us. We could sell milk and with
the money expand the herd very quickly." But no one would inform him of

the procedures at the panchayat samiti, and at the tehsil he could not

 

get by the clerks to the tehsildar (whose signature was required) with-
out a bribe for which he never had the cash. After talking amongst
friends, he and three other young men lied about their ages and regis-
tered to vote. They also paid one rupee each and joined the Congress
Party. Once in the party, they decided they would have access to
elected officers who would help.

During the 1971 (parliamentary) and 1972 (state assembly) elec-
tions, Kalu worked hard for the Congress along with other party members.
Congress won in the village and Kalu went to Jaipur city to find the
newly elected member of the state assembly (MLA) who had promised to
help all who worked for his election. Kalu was interviewed for this
study in January 1973, and to that date had been unable to see the MLA.
He was still waiting to hear of his loan application and felt no action
would be taken unless he got the MLA's approval. "I am not a big person
in the Khatik community so no one will pay attention to me. If I were a
.papgl (headman) or owned a big plot of land, I would have no problem.
Look at Bheru who lives in that big house. He is a big businessman who
controls the wool marketing from Hanumangarh. He can see the MLA any
time he wants. Why should he need help?

"Now you tell me what I should do. I know what elections are sup-
posed to be about. I also know Congress is the only party that has any
interest at all in helping people. But what can a man do beyond what I

have already done? I joined the party, I vote, I even work to help the

182

party win. But for what? I am hardly allowed in the compound of the
MLA's house. I have my old parents, my brother's widow, her two child-
ren, my wife and a younger brother to support. I am trying to put him
through school so he will not have to tend goats as I do. They failed
him this year so I have to pay fees twice for the same class. You tell
me -- what should I do? Most of all I would like to have the land back.
It was got from us illegally but how can I take it to court? With what?
Seven and a half irrigated acres! And they went for Rs. 800/-. We
would be well off with that -- look how well the farmers here are doing.
They get tractors to work for them and the government gives them loans
and other help. What do we get except promises that are never kept?

"Yet, what is the alternative to Congress? No other party comes
to power. No other party comes to the Harijans for support -- if they
did, we might be able to try through other channels. Congress programs
are good. I don't read or write, but when we used to work during the
elections we would listen to speeches by Indira Gandhi and other leaders
on the radio, and they all said good things. 'Garibi hatao' they said.1
But below the top level of leaders they are all a bunch of scoundrels.
You see, the programs are there and money is available -- this country
doesn't lack anything. But these people take it all for themselves.
Look at the farms and resources of these big farmers. Why should they
get loans? And yet they do. I am asking for a loan which would not
even affect them, and yet I can't get it."

Here is a clear dilemma. If the electoral system is a way to get

benefits, then it is necessary to vote. On the other hand, the spread

 

1Election slogan for the 1971 parliamentary elections meaning
"abolish poverty."

183

of benefits is restricted to those who already have more to begin with:
who have the wherewithal to help parties maintain their positions. As
was pointed out in the previous chapters, even benefits that are sup-
posed to go to Harijans are given to those who have the most power in
the community. The reader will recall the emphasis in agricultural
development on investing resources in those sectors of the farm commun-
ity where returns are assumed to be the most rapid.1 There is a coinci-
dence between economic and political expediency whose net result is a
marginal increase in production (at best), and dislocation and depriva-
tion of a considerable proportion of the rural population.

If this is perceived to be so, how would respondents like govern-
ment to change, and how do they see change being brought about? The
answers to these questions are in Tables 7.11 and 7.12 below.

There is again a continuity in the respondents' perceptions. Poli-
tical change involves governmental performance as related to personal
benefits: to the acquisition of inputs necessary for sustenance. The
respondents citing performance and inputs feel government has some good
programs. The Congress Party is viewed as often having "good ideas"
whose implementation is impeded by the callousness and corruption of
local administrators and politicians. How these changes can be brought
about was a more problematic question for the respondents. Table 7.12

gives the results of this.2

 

1See Chapter 1.

2Corruption as used here refers to bribes, diversion of resources
for one's own use, and a general misuse of the intent of governmental
programs and resources. The Hindi term used (sifarish) connotes a gen-
eral misuse of influence for one's personal benefit. (For Hindi speak-
ers: note, this is a corruption of the original term sifarish meaning
influence.)

184

TABLE 7.11

CHANGES RESPONDENTS WOULD LIKE TO SEE

IN THE FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT

 

Changes Desired

Sample Strata (in Z's)

 

 

 

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/

Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall
Improved governmental per-
formance (implementation 37.5 35.0 26.3 20.0 28.4
of stated programs, etc.)
Eradication of corruption 31.3 16.7 21.1 10.0 19.4
More inputs for agricul-
ture, including land and 18.9 35.0 21.1 0.0 16.4
extension advice
Help poor people espec-
ially with employment 0.0 0.0 5.3 30.0 10.4
More emphasis on educa—
tion, health and other 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 3.0
amenities
There should be more con-
tact between government 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 1.5
and the people so we know
what we can expect
Lots should change,
can't specify 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5
Not sure/not applicable 12.5 21.1 30.0 19.4

Total (%) 100.2 100.3 100.5 100.0 100.0
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

Table 7.12 has interesting findings.

Almost all respondents see

change possible through pressure exerted either by the electorate or

political parties which reinforces parties' role as mediators.

reflects respondents' access to resources.

It also

Large farmers have better

access and are aware of their ability to get more through normal poli-

tical channels.

The others know theoretically they can obtain more by

185

TABLE 7.12

HOW RESPONDENTS FEEL DESIRED CHANGES MAY BE EFFECTED

 

Means of Change Sample Strata (in %'s)

 

Large Medium Large Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

Popular pressure from the
people through elections
or other participation
short of violence

50.0 35.0 31.6 15.0 31.3

Pressure by parties and
elected officials 25.0 16.7 10.6 15.0 16.4

Only government can
change itself if it 0.0 0.0 15.8 15.0 9.0
wants to

By rotating parties in
power, one party can 6.3 25.0 5.3 0.0 7.5
become complacent

Pressure from higher offi-

 

cers on field workers 6.3 0.0 0.0 10.0 4.5

Only if good peOple go

into administration 0.0 8.3 5.3 5.0 4.5

Not sure/non-applicable 12.5 16.7 31.6 40.0 26.9
Total (%) 100.1 101.7 100.2 100.0 100.1
(N) (16) (12) (19) (20) (67)

 

exerting coordinated pressure on elected officials and government offi-
cers, but are not confident enough to use such tactics. Some say it

would be possible to go in groups to the panchayat samiti to demand

 

inputs they are entitled to, or to vote en blgg_to throw out elected
officers who do not keep their promises. They are timid about using
such means feeling that they may not be able to get sufficient numbers
to join even if they try. There may also be a fear of some kind of

reprisals from others in the village. The high rate of "don't know"

186

responses reflects despair among the small farmers and laborers mirrored
in the story of Kalu.

The data presented thus far show a high degree of knowledge about
the political system and its theoretical utility. What is also clear
is that most villagers' political efficacy is low. They understand the
electoral process, but have a limited view of their own ability to
affect the system in ways other than voting. Persons like Kalu have
tried with little success which heightens frustration: both his and
that of his acquaintances who see his failure. The political mobiliza-
tion of villagers has occurred mainly because of the link between

parties and material benefits. It is precisely the "institutionaliza-

 

tion" of both the electoral process and the Congress monopoly that makes

 

people see politics and economic benefits as interrelated. How then do

 

respondents use their votes, and what alternatives do they see?

The Vote

A major methodological problem must be noted before the discussion
continues. Respondents were asked for whom they voted in each general
election since 1962.1 It was predicted that changes in the economic
sector could be related directly to voting. Those respondents who
originally supported Congress but were adversely affected by agricul-
tural change should have changed their party preference. This would fit
the respondents' utilitarian view of voting. This was not found to be
the case for a number of methodological reasons as well as the complex-

ity of the real world.

 

1A base-line for political preferences as it was the election just
prior to the introduction of the intensive agricultural programs.

187

First, a recall of votes going back to 1962 is bound to be faulty.
This was expected, but it was hoped a Ezend of changing preferences away
from Congress among small farmers and tenants/laborers might be found.
In fact, such trends as are apparent in Table 7.13 show the opposite
tendency. Further, according to the constituency votes, around one-
third of the sample should have voted for the Swatantra Party in 1971,
and two-thirds should have done so in 1962. Though the responses show
a movement away from Swatantra to Congress, they still do not match the
constituency vote for earlier years. The accuracy of recall is probably
partially responsible.

Second, it could be that the sample is not representative of the
whole constituency which is larger than any given village. Shivpura,
for example, was known as a Congress island in a Swatantra constituency
and though Hanumangarh's constituency elected a Congress member of
parliament in 1967, people said the village voted for a Swatantra candi-
date. The respondents are randomly chosen, however, and they should
show more of a difference than they do in electoral preferences.1 This
leads to a third possibility.

There is a bandwagon effect involved. In Hanumangarh for example,
people might say they voted for Congress because the constituency turned
to Congress for the first time in 1967. This vote was preceded by an
inflow of public benefits both before and after the election and again
in 1971 which could enhance this syndrome. Shivpura is very strongly

identified with Congress and the sarpanch takes an active part in

 

1Though the villages are considered political "islands" by their
residents, they are not so in reality. Each has groups voting for
opposition parties. In informal conversations, people identify each
other often by the use of party labels: "A Congressman" for example.

188

TABLE 7.13

RESPONDENTS' VOTING RECORD*

 

 

Election and Vote Sample Strata (in Z's)
Large Medium Small Tenants/

Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

1962 - Parliament

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Congress Party 50.0 33.3 21.1 55.0 40.3
Swatantra Party 18.7 25.0 30.8 5.5 20.9
Can't remember/
too young 31.6 40.0 36.8 35.5 35.9
Did not vote 0.0 0.0 10.6 5.5 3.0
Total (Z) 100.3 98.3 99.3 101.5 100.1
1962 - State Assembly
Congress Party 50.0 33.3 21.1 55.0 40.3
Swatantra Party 18.7 25.0 30.8 5 5 20.9
Can't remember/
too young 31.6 40.0 36.8 35.5 35.9
Did not vote 0.0 0.0 10.6 5.5 3.0
Total (%) 100.3 98.3 99.3 101.5 100.1
1967 - Parliament
Congress Party 68.8 58.3 31.1 75.0 55.2
Swatantra Party 25.0 25.0 47.4 10.0 26.9
Can't remember/
too young 6.3 16.6 15.8 5.0 12.0
Did not vote 0.0 0.0 5.2 10.0 6.0
Total (%) 100.0 99.9 99 5 100.0 100 l
1967 - State Assembly
Congress Party 62.5 58.3 31.1 75.0 53.7
Swatantra Party 31.2 25.0 47.4 10.0 28.4
Can't remember/
too young 6.3 16.6 15.8 5.0 12.0
Did not vote 0.0 0.0 5.2 10.0 6.0
Total (%) 100.0 99.9 99.5 100.0 100.1

 

*Given in percentages, N=67.

189

TABLE 7.13-Continued

 

Election and Vote Sample Strata (in 2's)

 

Large Medium Small Tenants/
Farmers Farmers Farmers Laborers Overall

 

1971 - Parliament

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Congress Party 68.8 50.0 57.9 85.0 65.7
Swatantra Party 25.0 41.7 21.0 0.0 19.4
Can't remember/
too young 6.3 0.0 5.0 15.0 7.4
Did not vote 0.0 8.3 15.8 0.0 7.5
Total (%) 100.1 100.0 99.7 100.0 100 0
1971 - State Assembly
Congress Party 87.4 83.4 68.4 85 O 80.6
Swatantra Party 6.3 8.3 10.5 5 0 7.4
Can't remember/
too young 0.0 0.0 10.5 10.0 6.0
Did not vote 6.3 8.3 10.5 0.0 6.0
Total (Z) 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 100 0

 

sustaining this identification. More persons here might well be reluc—
tant to admit having voted for the opposition though some undoubtedly
did.

The bandwagon effect might also have been encouraged by the 1971
Bangladesh war. India had just liberated Bangladesh and defeated
Pakistan. One can surmise that this probably created more support for
Congress. As a control respondents were asked why they thought Congress
received such an overwhelming majority in the 1972 election. Only one
person cited the war as the main reason: one-third of the rest were not
sure, but two-thirds felt it was because of the capacity of the Congress
to distribute benefits. Several persons who switched to Congress from

Swatantra pointed out, "Opposition parties have done nothing for the

190

people." "Congress is the only party with a real program and the abil-

ity to carry it out, said others. Finally, some persons said, "Con-
gress areas have done much better than non-Congress ones which shows
that Congress can do more."

It is still valid to hypothesize that the war probably created a
certain amount of euphoria and pride focused on the Congress party. It
may well have enhanced people's view of the party's capacity and credi-
bility.

In reality there is likely an element of all these factors involved.
It is recognized that voting anywhere by itself is a shaky indicator of
political attitudes and participation. While it was disappointing to
find little direct correlation between voting and political perceptions
as was predicted, the wider picture explaining this is more informative
than an affirmation of the original hypothesis.

As Kalu suggests, there is little perceived alternative to the
Congress. It has been shown that respondents participate primarily to
gain benefits but most feel they have not benefitted personally. The
data also show there is concern with village amenities. The critical
point here is that villagers separate private from public gain to a
considerable extent. Even though most have not personally benefitted,
they feel others have and that the villages are better places to live
in now.

An elderly laborer says, "Look, in all my life, the total amount of
assistance I have received from government is Rs. 35/- ($4.66) as a
scholarship for my son. Even that was originally to be Rs. 75/- ($10.00)
so that I would have money to pay for the boy's uniform too, but they

told me there were no more funds. I am sure the money was there, but

191

what could I do? Had I protested they might have failed the boy and
then he could not get any assistance at all. So why should I vote for
Congress? I have gained nothing and the way things are now, my son
could not find employment even with a high school degree. But which
other party can give us schools and health centers? And which party

can do what Congress has done for farmers? They get better seeds, there
are more wells, and the prices are good for them. These things may go
to those farmers who are powerful, but at least someone gets them. The
other parties don't do anything at all. All they talk about is getting
Congress out of power. But so what? What will they do then?"

If tenants and laborers in particular feel a Congress dominated
political system has been captured by and functions for landed, higher
caste persons, why do they continue to support the party? This has been
answered partially in that they feel no other party wants their support.
Further, however, the Congress has programs for Harijans and it was a
Congress government that outlawed discrimination on the basis of caste.
While there is impatience with the inactivity of the party, there is a
strong feeling that the community is better off with it than any other
group. There is also a slight generational difference here.

Younger members of the tenant and labor communities show more
impatience with their status than do their parents. In both villages,
the older persons have seen a considerable change in their position
since independence. Several point out that if they defaulted on taxes
or refused to do pggag (forced labor) in the "raja's" days, it was not
uncommon to have their houses broken down and their men beaten by the
raja's retainers. Two respondents mentioned their relatives had died

from such treatment. This does not occur anymore: rather their votes

192

are sought by the ruling party, and there are seats reserved for them
on all elective bodies. At least laws have been passed giving them
equal status and they have been promised land and loans. So the Con-
gress is good and cannot be faulted for the inactivity of local leaders
and government officers. These people are seen to be opportunists who
do not believe in what Congress stands for: they become "Congress
people" to benefit themselves. But they are not "real" party people.
Younger persons are more impatient since they never lived under the
old system. The changes in their lives are not as great. Though most
of them vote for Congress, they question both the value of the vote and
the party. They see their own interests as contradictory to those of
landed elements and caste Hindus. They agree that laws abolishing
discrimination are a first step toward equality but point out that in
fact, discrimination takes place all the time. They are not welcome in
government offices; temples (especially those in villages) often disbar
them. Yes, government has legally deeded land to them but refuses to
enforce their claim to it in the face of higher caste pressure. Then
there are the housing loans: "Who has got the loans? First of all,
few have been given out at all. Last Republic Day (January 26) govern-
ment gave out twenty-six which were the first ones given in three or
four years. They all went to Harijans but only to those who are lead-
ers. All persons who got loans are landowners, and have no need of
housing assistance. What about those who don't have any home at all?"1
These men see Congress strategy as one which keeps their support

with a minimum of payoffs. Since no other party wants their community's

 

1An unofficial, but careful observation of the loan recipients by
the author tends to confirm this. Each new house seen built was a
"second" home.

193

demands, the Congress assumes their support by default. Men like Kalu
Khatik and younger Raigers would like to see Harijans change their
votes to Opposition parties even if only for one or two elections.

This would show the Congress that it cannot take their support for
granted. Their elders argue this is not a feasible alternative since
no other party wants them. The sons say this does not matter as the
purpose of such action is to prod Congress into activity. Others say
it would be enough not to vote for one or two elections: the Congress
cannot win without their numbers anyway (they constitute 27 percent of
the population). But the young dissidents do not have the status in
their communities to implement their suggestions. And as their leaders
are the recipients of official benefits, it is in their interest to
maintain their alliance with Congress and to pattern their political

roles after those of the caste Hindus: to use their traditional author-

 

ipy to be both spokesmen and brokers between their communities and the

 

wider political system. This, again, can be successful only as long as

 

the separate identity and privileges for Harijans are maintained: an

 

integration of the communities would negate it.

 

As for the large farmers, it is interesting that they have moved
from support for the opposition to the Congress. This is particularly

so if one considers that Congress abolished jagirdaris, enacted land

 

ceiling legislation, tenancy protection laws, gave land to the landless
and enacted anti-discrimination legislation. Not only do these persons
vote for Congress, but they also hold most elected positions at all

levels. In both of the villages studied, the sarpanchas, members of

 

samitis, state legislatures and parliament are large farmers. Local

194

cooperatives are also controlled by them.1 By holding elective office,
they have little to fear from higher levels of party personnel who rely
on their local strength to keep the party in power. The larger land-
owners have already bypassed ceiling legislation by dispersing titles
to their land. By holding public office they are able to divert
resources for their own use and implement policies at the state and
local level to suit their own needs. This latter situation is possible
because of the devolution of authority for land and property rights and
agriculture to the states under the Constitution. The large owners' use
of resources makes eminent sense if one considers the monopoly Congress
holds over payoffs: a feeling shared by all strata of cultivators in
this study. By aligning with Congress, these persons share the mono-
poly. The goods obtained thereby are judiciously used to maintain
authority over other sections of the population: through money-lending
and the granting of small official favors such as loans for wells or

pump sets.

Summary

Thus it is that traditionally held ritual and economic power has
adapted to the "modern" political system. Political parties use tradi—
tional power bases to mobilize support in rural areas, and those holding
such power use the official monopoly over benefits to maintain it.

Recognizing that some modicum of goods and services need to be brought

 

1For other areas, see W. H. Mbrris-Jones, Parliament in India
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957); Duncan B.
Forrester, "Changing Patterns of Political Leadership in India," The
Review of Politics, XXVIII (July 1966); myron Weiner, "Traditional
Role Performance and the Development of Mbdern Political Parties: The
Indian Case," The Journal of Politics, XXVI (November, 1964); and Hung-
Chao Tai, Land Reform and Politics, op. cit., pp. 93-97.

 

 

195

into rural areas to convince people that they should participate in the
political process, government has supplied a number of public goods and
services. These have made a qualitative impact on people's lives
strengthening or "institutionalizing" the role of the political system
in general and the government in particular to distribute benefits.

But the Congress dominated political system has also done something
more than supply public goods. It has promised better living standards
for all, inputs for farmers, and land to the landless. The data pre-
sented show that much of what has been promised is symbolic in nature:
the necessity for increased food production has taken precedence over
these aims. Symbolic or not however, the promises themselves have
created mobilization and demands. Further the dynamic of agricultural
growth and change, having started a process of deprivation for tenants
and laborers has created demands on their part which are increasingly
contradictory to those of the larger landowners in particular because
in order to deal with them, a redistribution of land must take place.

The economic forces set in motion to deal with production by catering

 

to the demands of larger producers in the end will erode both their
traditional power base (byythe displacement of agrarian persons), and
the ameliorative effects of the electoral system which until now has
acted as an outlet and hope for demands and their satisfaction.

Once government undertakes to be not only the chief dispenser of
goods and services, but also seeks to change societal patterns (e.g.,
aid for Harijans) it will set in motion processes which result in con-
tradictory demands. The data show that although issues other than land
and subsistence are important, as economic change deprives some pe0p1e

while raising their expectations of governmental capacity, frustration

196

may increase unless public and symbolic goods are balanced with those
of a private nature.

The problems raised by this process are considerable. If one's
economic welfare is closely linked with the fate of one party, and there
is no perceived alternative to this, what strategies are open to frus-
trated participants? There are two: a retreat from any kind of parti-
cipation (resulting in despair), or some kind of extra-systemic activity
to bring the political system's awareness to bear on their problems.

The first option is most likely to occur in these two villages which do
not as yet have links with other like-minded persons outside of the vil-
lages (after Wolf). The second cannot be ruled out though its occurance
may not be obvious at the present time.

To the observer, it is obvious that no party can accommodate all
demands in society (certainly not at the same time), and the interests
must be weighed one against the other to see which ones will (at least)
maximize political options for politicians in the longer run, or will
(additionally) also help attain goals the political system has set for
itself. Once a link is established in the electorate's View between
the political process and personal benefits, numbers of demands increase
and symbolic or public goods cease to make sufficient impact on parti-

cipants. Several authors point out this process can lead to immobilisme

 

in the policy making process.2
In this study, if land and access to other productive resources
are basic to subsistence and these resources through both political

leverage and economic rationale become concentrated in the hands of some

 

lSee Tai, op. cit., and Wolf, op. cit.

2Eisenstadt, op. cit., and Weiner, Party Building, op. cit.

197

to the detriment of others, the latter persons' demands will become
such that any party will need to rethink its electoral strategy and
align itself with one group or the other. Politically the realignment
will be necessary because the effect of economic change on traditional

channels of mobilization will also alter patterns of mobilization.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding analysis should help explain and predict the poli-
tical ramifications of agrarian change in India. Despite the startling
lack of success in the maximization of the goals of either production
or equality, neither Hanumangarh nor Shivpura show signs of political
radicalization. The orthodox Marxist might argue that they will in
time. The liberal economist might not see points of conflict in the
data, or might say a certain amount of conflict is inevitable if growth
is to occur. I have followed neither of these paths, though elements
of both are used. The study is an attempt at evaluating the maximiza-
tion of two rather clear goals.

There is the assumption that sufficient knowledge exists in the
social sciences to explain and predict trends of change without waiting

for revolutions and then analyzing systems pgst mortem. This makes it

 

possible for the observer also to lay out alternative strategies which
might maximize growth and equality more efficiently. To the author's
mind, this is the value of the humanistic social sciences: the use of
knowledge for the enhancement of real world well-being.

This study, done within the relatively limited perimeters of two
of India's millions of villages is replicable and its findings should
be applicable to situations where (l) peasant agriculture is under

transformation to commercialized forms under similar strategies,

198

199

(2) relatively open and competitive political channels exist for mobili-
zation and voicing of demands, (3) the systems function under similar
constraints of land and capital with an abundance of labor, and (4)
where productive resources are concentrated in the hands of the few.

As a start, agricultural change should be viewed in a broader con-
text as productivity is not the only end pursued by government in the
rural areas. As I noted in the "Introduction," changes in the country-
side have been consequential. The life span of the average Indian has
increased from twenty-nine years (1947) to forty-nine. Mortality rates
have dropped and continue to do so as epidemic diseases are controlled
and maternity care is extended into rural areas. Fewer people die of
malnutrition than did even twenty years ago. During the worst food
shortages of 1972-74, the situation was never close to that during the
great Bengal famine of 1943. Literacy rates rise annually;1 better
transportation and marketing networks have created greater interdepen-
dencies between the urban and rural areas. Education (limited though
it still is) has raised rural awareness of and identity with India as a
nation; it has served as a major socialization agent. And finally,
the ubiquitous transistor radio (and shortly television) has made it
possible for New Delhi to communicate with all parts of the country
within hours. These are real, documented changes, and normally are

considered important components of the development process.

 

lLiteracy rates have risen from 16.6 percent in 1951 to 28.6 per-
cent in 1966 and 29.46 percent in 1971 for the nation as a whole. For
Rajasthan, the 1971 figure is less: 19.07 percent. Sources: Govern-
ment of India, Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66 (Ministry of
Education, Government of India, New Delhi: Government of India Press,
1966), p. 423, and Government of Rajasthan, Statistical Abstract,
Rajasthan, 1971 (Jaipur, Rajasthan: Directorate of Economics and Sta-
tistics, Government of Rajasthan, 1971), p. 7.

 

200

However, this study has been primarily concerned with two goals of

economic growth with equality. As stated in the Fourth Five Year Plan,

 

the far reaching changes required by these goals are officially recog—
nized:

1.8 Rapid economic development which is oriented
towards establishing social justice must involve
refashioning of socio-economic institutions. In
part, the social objectives will be the end result
of economic development, but in a large measure,
their realisation will depend on how the course of
development is charted and to what extent an appro-
priate structure of socio-economic institutions is
evolved and operated... It means that major econo-
mic decisions and decisions regarding socio-economic
relationships will be made by agencies informed with
social purpose, that there will be a devolution of
functions and that there will be scope for experi-
mentation. Democratic values are given effect to

by encouraging the growth of a feeling of partici-
pation on the part of the small man, the promotion
of enterprise among the disadvantaged classes and
the creation of a sense of involvement in the trans-
formation of society among all sections of the com-
munity. The broad objectives of planning could thus
be defined as rapid economic development accompanied
by continuous progress toward equality and social
justice and th establishment of a social and econo-
mic democracy.

While the quote is rather lengthy, it does spell out the goals of
development and highlights some of the problems. The latter (as will
be seen below) are implied by the recognized need to evolve "appropriate
structures of socio-economic institutions". The data of this study
show that neither the goal of rapid economic growth, nor social justice
and economic democracy have been maximized. Rather, the opposite

appears to have taken place: an increase in economic, and hence social

 

1Government of India, Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan,
1969-74J Draft (New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission,
1969), pp. 4-5.

 

201

and political polarization.1 To the extent that economic conclusions
drawn here are similar to those found elsewhere over approximately the

same time period, they are not peculiar to these two villages.2

Economic Change and Equality

 

On a general level, the economic result of technological change is
an increasing gap between the entrepreneurial farmers and those follow-
ing a peasant type of production. There is further economic differ-
ential between owner-cultivators of any size holding and the landless
tenants and laborers. Without alternatives in other sectors of the
economy, those without land are being displaced. Finally, those with
less land have benefitted the least from the new biochemical technolo-

gies as their access to inputs is restricted by their farm size.3

 

1This is not to say there has been no increase in food production.
The annual compound growth rate is 2.7 percent (1952/53 - 1954/55 to
1962/63 - 1964/65), while the population increases at about 2.2 percent
annually. This growth rate compares unfavorably with Mexico (6.3 per-
cent), Taiwan (4.3 percent), and the UAR (3.7 percent). Source: FAQ,
The State of Food and Agriculture (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organi-
zation, 1966), p. 19.

 

2See Thomasson F. Januzzi, Agrarian Crisis in India (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1974); T. Scarlett Epstein, South India:
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1973); Fran-
cine Frankel, India's Green Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1971); and Margaret R. Haswell, Economics of Develgpment in
Village India (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967). On a general
level, see Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: Twentieth Century
Fund, 1971), and Kusum Nair, The Lonely Furrow (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1969).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3This is perhaps not so surprising in view of the recognition by
scholars that economic growth can increase disparities at least in the
short run. See Chapter I, and also Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a
Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History, Vol. 23 (December
1963), reprinted in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., Political
Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley, 1971), pp. 557-68,
where he argues, "... contrary to what is usually assumed, economic
growth can significantly increase the number of losers." p. 562.

 

 

202

Politically, this has an impact because of government's institu-
tionalized role as the main holder and distributor of benefits. The
attainment of both private and public goods is now a public matter
resulting in higher levels of political mobilization and participation
than might have occurred otherwise. Intuitively, a competitive poli-
tical system should offer opportunity for attaining benefits gpd
release of frustrations when desired goods are not obtained. But
because of the configuration of rural power (as it is concentrated in
the hands of traditionally landed elites) and a Congress government's
distributive monopoly, two main constraints are operative which may
suggest areas for further research and testing.

First, though everyone can vote, the power configuration has essen-

 

tially disenfranchised the landless and small holder. Their access to

 

goods and services is limited by their lack of economic wherewithal.

Second, the power configuration constrains information flows togpoli-

 

tical officials and top level policy planners and party strategists.

 

Because the local landed elites are seen as the major vote mobilizers
and have captured local and state elective offices, they control infor-

mation flows both upwards and downwards. In addition, one might add a

 

1
third general statement: the approach to growth and suggested policies

 

themselves restrict the perceived political capacity of particularly the
Congress party and the policy makers because they justify catering to

those farmers who compose local elites. These persons, though they have

 

restricted a wide dispersal of personal benefits, have helped maintain
Congress power. Until the information flows and concepts of political

capacity are altered, there is little to suggest the currently perceived

 

1See Chapter I, discussion of the Ford Foundation Team Report.

203

capacity will permit an alteration of strategy. To operationalize these
statements: the power configuration, as shown by the data and discussed
at length elsewhere,1 is based on the ownership of and access to land.
Second, political capacity is a function of any political party's view
of how support may be mobilized: in the case of these two villages,
parties have assumed that local landed elites are the chief mobilizers.

Despite these statements because the economics of rural change
alter roles and relationships, and the introduction of competitive

electoral structures alone does not permit de facto competition between

 

groups, pressure from those without influence can be anticipated as
their interests grow apart from those holding power. That is, policies

enacted to aid local supporters of national elites, when they alter

 

traditional interdependencies and roles (e.g., the displacement of ten-

 

ants and laborers) can mobilize new groups into the polity lookingtfor

 

2
means to maintain themselves.

 

Compounding the process are promises of better levels of well-being
which although largely symbolic, raise the expectations of the parti-
cipants.3 The distribution of goods -- public and private, make it
reasonable on the part of the electorate to assume there may be more for

all. Political socialization too (via schools, the media,4 and

 

1See Chapters III through VII and sources cited on land and poli-
tical power.

2Obviously involved here are the concepts of absolute and relative
deprivation. See Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century
(New York: Harper and Row, 1969), and Ted Curr, "A Causal Model of
Civil Strife," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, #4 (December
1968), pp. 1104-24.

 

3Here the concern is with rising expectations resulting in relative
deprivation.

4Every respondent save three maintained he tried to listen to the

204

electoral campaigns) not only integrates people into a new conception
of nationhood, but into a wider political and economic system whose
lure is a probable increase in personal well-being. The main result of
this is that though certain kinds of goods (primarily public services)

have been dispersed, power has not shifted beyond its traditional econo-

 

mic base. Indeed, as is argued below, it will not shift until the
economic base itself is altered. Following Edelman's discussion of the
"mixes" of tangible and symbolic benefits, it might be said there never
was any intention of altering the power base. Also continuing after
Bachrach and Baratz, such alterations may not be desired as they will
alter the "mobilization of bias".1 After all, to change the economic
base is to ask those in power to divest themselves of it. How the wider
politico-administrative and economic arrangements benefit local elites
while the processes of change at the same time erode their power is the

subject of our further discussion.

A Reinforcement of Inequality

 

First, although tenancy reform includes an ideological component of
protection for the landless along with incentives to increase their
production, this goal has not been realized. Instead, while tenancy
reform increases the owners' hold over their land, it dilutes their
socio-political control over the tenant class. In essence, it accepts

the traditionally inegalitarian social structure of the country. In

 

radio to hear (1) farm price reports or extension programs, (2) news,
and (3) folk music, in that order.

1Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, 1964) especially Chapter II, "Symbols and Poli-
tical Quiescence," and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and
Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970),
p. 43, for definition.

 

 

205

both villages the dominant landowners are not politically cohesive and
so cannot bring coordinated pressure to bear on the landless. Only as

long as tenants were tied by customary economics to §_particular faction

 

or landowner could these mobilization channels function effectively.
Tenants and laborers are economically more dependent on the landed
groups, but unless the latter act together, the tenants and laborers
are subject to cross-pressures politically which widens their scope of
choice (though this may not be perceived).

The data have shown how social cleavages of class and caste can
provide bases for political organization and the limited activities for
which they have already been used. Judging from the data and other

areas of India (notably the Naxalbari movement) there is reason to pre-

 

dict that as economic constraints on the landless_grow, so will the

 

scope for joint political activity, aided by their ritually low status.

 

This in turn can be expected to increase the landed elite's cohesiveness

as they act to counter a perceived threat from below. This cohesiveness

 

will also increase as a function of the investments made by entrepre-
neurial farmers in their farms. Once they invest considerable amounts
of capital, these entrepreneurs can scarcely be expected to acquiesce
to land-redistribution.

Second, the land reforms (especially land ceilings) have little or
no effect on the pattern of landownership, either in Rajasthan or
nationally. The cynic will argue they were never meant to; the more
generous would say the good intentions of policy makers were thwarted
by a large farmer/administrative coalition which has a vested interest
in the retention of landholding patterns as they exist. In any case,

not much land is available for distribution under present ceilings and

206

the loopholes in existing legislation prevent redistribution. As is
apparent in the data, political efficacy and access to economic where—
withal are restricted by landownership.

Third, if one accepts these premises, it follows that a continuing
flow of agricultural and other payoffs to those who are already better
off strengthens those groups both economically and politically. If the
situation were to stop there, it could be argued that it is impossible
to meet everyone's needs. Therefore, it is logical to invest in those
persons likely to give the quickest returns to investment and wait until
more resources are generated before turning to the more deprived sec-
tions of society.

But the situation does not stop there for several reasons. One is
the relocation of displaced persons in other sectors of the economy.

In a country with the demographic configurations of India, this is a

formidable problem.1 Second, one cannot discount the enormous amount of

 

1"Even prior to the varietal revolution, around 95 percent of the
farm households in India owned less than 20 acres of land each; 75 per-
cent possessed less than 5 acres. Less than 13 percent had more than 10
acres each. Only 1 percent held 50 acres or more. Depending on the
horsepower of tractors, threshers, and other such 'modern' units of
agricultural technology, it would mean that 99, 95, or a minimum of at
least 75 percent of the farmers would not be able to modernize their
production techniques. They would lack the acreage or the managerial
talent. In any case, the number of man-hours required to produce con—
siderably larger quantities of food and fibre would be reduced dras-
tically; and as new technology increases the marginal productivity of
capital relative to labor, capital will substitute for labor. Moreover,
as production functions and assets become concentrated and specialized,
millions would be forced into obsolescence and out of agriculture, as
in the United States.

"As a first step in the 'modernization' process, even if only the
less than five-acre farms are eliminated, some thirty-three million fam-
ilies, aside from the fifteen million or so that do not own any land,
would be on the road in India. The question is, where would they go?
Storage space could be built fairly quickly for surplus grain. And if
the glut becomes too large, it can be destroyed. But a nation cannot
put most of itself on the dole, even if money and food are available for
distribution." Kusum Nair, The Lonely Furrow, pp;_cit., pp. 223-24.

 

207

political and social mobilization that has already taken place as a
result of the participatory channels provided by the political system.
Third, economically, the depression of around 75 percent of the
population (see footnote) limits the market for the industrial sector.
Beyond the values of equality and conceptions of social justice lies
the obvious economic fact that if one is to have industrial growth, a
market is necessary. Industry cannot be expected to provide employment

for so much "surplus" labor from the countryside as it is already a

 

capital-intensive sector, and thus has a built-in constraint against
labor intensive modes of production.

Fourth, the creation of a welfare system or "dole" of sorts is out-
side the realm of feasibility given the demographic situation. There
is, as yet, neither sufficient food nor enough cash to support it.
Further, the idea of 75 percent of the rural population on a welfare
system makes mockery of the concept of economic development.1

This leaves one with the following kinds of conclusions. The
first is that property distribution is central because it places con-
straints on access to private and public benefits as well as to poli-
tical status and power. It also constrains access to factors of produc-
tion. Those who argue for or against land redistribution measures
generally and on grounds of either more production or social desir-
ability, leave the access variable out. If all farmers are to use
improved technology, then planners must come to grips with at least the

issue of land use.

 

1See previous footnote. Also see definition of economic develop-
ment used for this study, given in Chapter I, where I have stated that
economic deve10pment implies "an increase in a nation's wealth ... with
an assumed concomitant increase in its individual citizens' levels of
well-being."

208

Second, since one is discussing a system with universal suffrage,
it must be recognized that numbers lie on the side of the landless and
the small/marginal cultivators. Given the loosening of ties between
them and the landed elite, one needs to be aware of their interests
which are apparently increasingly contradictory to those holding the
economic resources of agriculture. The landless and small/marginal
farmers are the "free floating" resources of the political system and
their political loyalties are increasingly available to those who can
meet their needs.

The fact that until 1972, support for Congress grew among all social
groups does not mean they are likely to remain there. The pepty_identi-
ficationwxfrespondents is not high. Landed persons support Congress
because they can control the flow of its resources; they would do the
same for any other party. The others support it because they still have
some hopes of gaining benefits.

If however, benefits are not to be gained, there is every reason
to expect that participation will fall off unless there are perceived
political alternatives. That such alternatives are not there presently
does not eliminate the possibility of their arising in the future.1
Also persons like Kalu Khatik are those who can provide links between

rural and urban political centers through both their political experience

 

1See Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, QB; cit.
and Barrington Moore,.lr.,Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) as well as within India, the Naxalbari
movement and currently moves made by Jayaprakash Narayan an elderly
Gandhian leader to form an anti-Congress Opposition front to fight cor-
ruption and the deprivation of low-income persons.

209

(and the astuteness gained thereby) as well as family and occupational

ties provided by seasonal migration between village and town.1

Problems with Existing Solutions to the Welfare Issue

Now if for any reason, one wishes not to alter rural property pat-
terns, the following calculations arise. If one acknowledges that a
relocation of displaced persons is virtually impossible in the indus-
trial sector in the foreseeable future, and also that their welfare is
important both in terms of political reality and values, then means
must be found to keep them viable under the encroachment of a form of
production organization that is competitive, large-scale, and capital-
intensive. Some kind of marginal, protected farming will have to be
devised to provide security for at least the small owner. It has been
argued elsewhere that the ejidg_system in Mexico approximates this pat-
tern.2 For the landless it has been suggested that massive rural works
programs must be started to make productive use of surplus labor.3
Indeed a "crash" employment program along these lines was launched in
1973-74. The problems these suggestions raise are considerable.

In India, to deal with the small/marginal cultivators, the Small

Farmers and Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers Development

 

lWolf argues that a rural-urban link is necessary for peasant
revolutions. Ibid., conclusions.

2See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements
in Latin America( Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor, 1970), and Folke
Dovring, "Land Reform in Mexico," paper presented at the Agency for
International Development Spring Review of Land Reform, washington,
D. C., June 1970. (Mimeographed.)

3See V. M. Dandekar and N. Rath, "Poverty in India," Economic and
Political Weekly, serially published (January 1971).

 

 

210

Agencies have been started.1 The effort under these schemes is to cir-
cumvent local power configurations by channeling credit and other inputs
to these classes of persons only. Some inputs, e.g., animals are anti-
cipated to provide ancillary farm activity for these farmers to increase
their income under the assumption that their farms will not provide
sufficient wherewithal. Such efforts will have to continue into the
indefinite future to subsidize a large class of peasant cultivators who
otherwise would be out of agriculture under present growth strategies.
Economically the expenses will be quite out of proportion to the
benefits derived. These small/marginal cultivators are the majority of
all farmers and they will be put on what is essentially a dole supported
by the productive class of large producers and urban taxpayers. The
small/marginal farmers will not contribute much to the economy (in

either produce or taxes) primarily because the strategies developed for

 

 

their assistance emphasize rather limited employment and economic

viability rather than maximum production. This means a diversion of

 

outlays from other economic sectors including those meant for the larger
farmers who will contribute through taxes to maintain their less fortu-
nate brethren.2

Economically and politically, there is little reason to assume

inputs under these schemes will in fact, go to small/marginal

 

1See Chapter I and also V. R. Gaikwad, Small Farmers: State
Policy and Programme Implementation (Hyderabad, India: National Insti-
tute of Community Development, 1971).

 

2Some form of increased agricultural taxation is anticipated in the
near future. A commission chaired by Dr. K. N. Raj (economist) has
argued for this on the grounds that (l) surpluses in agriculture must be
used to reinvest productively, and (2) agriculture cannot continue to be
subsidized by the urban/industrial sectors without creating severe mone-
tary and fiscal problems. See Report of the Committee on Taxation of
Agricultural Wealth and Income (New Delhi: Government of India, 1972).

 

211

cultivators. First definitionally they are problematic on the local
level because of dispersed land titles (see Chapter II). Even though
personnel responsible for the schemes may try to match ownership to
operation, the flexibility inherent in the situation makes it possible
for local interests to resort either to withholding of information or
outright corruption. Second, because the dispersal of inputs is
localized, larger farmers have already been able to manipulate them
either for personal use or in order to maintain their locally dominant
positions.l Again, the point is that as long as power is determined by
access to land, the distribution of benefits will follow farm size.

Politically, even if the programs succeed in providing inputs to
those for whom they are intended, one can anticipate a backlash from
larger farmers. They may first of all, resent their inability to expand
their holdings which they will need to do to rationalize their capital
investments. And the more investments they make the larger size of farm
will be needed. Any further expansion will have to occur at the expense
of the small cultivator as there is little additional land to be brought
under cultivation.

Second, one can already see the beginnings of a backlash in the
attitudes of farmers who resent special programs for Harijans in this
study. It should be noted that instead of dampening this resentment,
the farm prosperity made possible by the Green Revolution technologies
(and high price supports) has intensified it. These feelings come

obviously not out of "hard times" but relative farm abundance and

 

1See Gaikwad, pp; cit. Personnel in charge of these schemes are to
act only as conduits for inputs which are under the normal agencies such
as the samiti, cooperatives, etc. which we have seen are controlled
already by large farmers.

212

promise. Of course there is a caste component as the data show, but of
more importance is the fact that land is valued1 and conflict over its
use and distribution can be expected to grow. Caste only reinforces the
issue. The conflict will grow as pressure on the land intensifies and
the progression of agricultural development demands an expansion of the
size of production units. Already there are cases of mistreatment of
labor and tenants by larger farmers who will not let them take posses-
sion of allotted plots. In this study it occurred in Hanumangarh.
Aspirations increase with possibilities.

Third, an uneven distribution of land does little to maximize the
goal of equality: either economic or social. The economic component of
this is obvious. If the reader will recall how social status follows
land size and how patron-client networks operate, the plans for subsi-

dizing a small farmer class can be expected to reinforce, rather than

 

loosen these traditional ties. No matter how mechanized large farms

 

become, one can anticipate a continued need for seasonal labor at cer-

tain points in the agricultural cycle.2 A subsidized small/marginal

 

farm sector will in effect, provide a pool of tied seasonal labor depen-

 

dent on large farms for incremental amounts of cash income. In a real

 

sense the social effects of this are insidious as this very dependence
will lower the poorer sections' ability to demand higher wages and to

organize politically as they will fear losing what little they have.

 

lIts monetary value can be expected to increase with the continued
profitability of agriculture.

2E.g., during harvest, and for certain kinds of farming: truck
farming and until implements are developed, for rice transplanting, etc.

213

Seeing the state as their "protector" they will lapse into an apathetic
quiescence.1 This in turn will further enforce their unequal status.
The same considerations are relevant to massive rural works pro-
grams launched for the landless. They are conceptualized normally as
short-term and seasonal solutions to rural employment problems.2 Admit-
tedly, much work needs to be done on land development, the maintenance
and building of roads, minor irrigation works, wells, etc. To assume
however, that over the next several decades such schemes can provide
sufficient employment (even seasonally) for a majority of the population
is at least unrealistic. Presumably there is a limit to how much land
can be put under roads, a limit to the points on a map that need be con-
nected by such roads, a limit also to the rate at which these roads
need repair, and finally a limit to the number of irrigation schemes and
wells that can be built.3 This pool of workers will also form a tied

labor source for our productive farmers with the same social conse—

quences faced by the small/marginal cultivators.

Private Vs. Public Goods

 

But what of the "trade-off"respondentsnmke between public services

and private gain? As far as the wider political picture is concerned,

 

lSee Edelman, pp;_cit., p. 43 where he states: "The fact that large
numbers of people are objectively affected by a governmental program may
actually serve in some contexts to weaken their capacity to exert a poli-
tical claim upon tangible values." Also see Samuel P. Huntington, Poli-
tical Order in ChanginggSocieties (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968), pp. 376-78 where he discusses the "conservatizing" effect of land
reform on peasants. The same dynamic obtains in both situations.

 

2The argument normally states that such programs can provide employ-
ment for people during agriculturally slack seasons which supports the
contention that the intent is to retain workers for entrepreneurial
farmers. See Dandekar and Rath, pp; cit.

 

3See Nair, op. cit.

214

public services have no political risk attached to them: who will argue
against better health and roads? It has been argued elsewhere that
public goods are mainly what rural areas get in the way of benefits.1
Compared with land tenures or supplies of inputs to small farmers which

often involve "stepping on someone's toes,"

these services are cheap and
have a high political payoff for parties and governments dispensing them
in the short term. The real political impact of such goods is with

their introduction. Thus it can be argued that public goods and poli-

 

 

tical reliance on them are a function of low information levels.2

Such goods rapidly become accepted parts of people's lives. Once
schools, roads or health centers are provided their quality may become
an issue but qualitative changes are incremental and thus of low poli-
tical value in the short term.3 Also such improvements are more impor-
tant for rural upper classes who are free from the basic economic neces-
sities of feeding and clothing themselves. These groups are more inter-
ested in better education for example, because of their links with the
urban world or because their children's mobility and ability to be

employed in other than traditional occupations depends on it.4 As the

 

1See Hung-Chao Tai, Land Reform and Politics: A Comparative Analy-
§i§ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), Chapter X, "Poli-
tical Participation," passim.

2This is due to the reliance on traditional elites to mobilize
electoral support which blocks the dispersal of more than minimal pri-
vate benefits beyond them.

 

3E.g., a better school principal or doctor who works to improve the
clinic will take time to find, get transferred to one's village, and
then will take several years to improve the quality of service provided
thus deferring the impact. This is why the real political impact of
these services is with their introduction.

4See Tai, op. cit. "As the governing party, Congress seems ... to
rely on its ability to deliver public goods and services to rural areas
and on the kisans' (farmers) memories of its historical role in the

 

215

data indicate further such persons do not rely on farming for suste-
nance: the grain trade and money-lending provide it. The "moderniza-
tion" of these traditional occupations by itself requires the acquisi-
tion of new skills in marketing, finance, etc. which are provided by an
educational system.

It might be hypothesized that there is some kind of threshold
involved here. When people have a modicum of sustenance, other issues
may become more important than subsistence.l The counter argument is
that the people at the bottom of the economic ladder have more to gain
from certain public goods (mainly education) as they provide a means of
mobility. But again, their ability to press for changes is limited by
a combination of their ritually and economically low status.

For smaller farmers, tenants and laborers, food and employment tend
to overshadow the importance of these services. This is not to say they
are not utilized. But now people have accepted them as a part of their
normal life pattern. People go to health centers when they are ill, and
their children particularly sons, are sent to school for at least a few
years to become literate. So the institutions are functional for a part

of each person's existence. Indeed to emphasize a point already made,

 

independence movement to retain their sympathies. But the Congress may
not entirely succeed in this effort. The kisans are aware that the pub-
lic goods and services benefit the landowning interests far more than
the small farmers, and their memory of Congress' historical accomplish-
ments may erode in intensity with the passage of time." p. 349.

1Beyond one's basic requirements for sustenance, other interests and
needs are socially and culturally defined. If one views economic acti-
vity as a part of wider social organization and action (and places poli-
tical action into the same framework) this becomes clear. These points
have been argued as explanations for peasant economic behavior. See Eric
R. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 6,
and Barry H. Michie, "Variations in Economic Behaviour and the Green
Revolution: An Anthropological Approach," Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol. VIII, #26, Review of Agriculture, p. Ar72 et_passim.

216

government's provision of these services has probably raised the level
of demands as the services legitimize government's role as chief distri-
butor, and thus increased peOple's dependence on it for further change.

If one accepts these premises then it becomes clear that pri-
vate gain will have to be dealt with at some point. Once one looks at
the issues involved, one sees there are obviously more groups and inter—
ests to which one must cater, and the processing of demands and weighing
their importance relative to each other and the goals of the system, is
a complex process especially since even the most advanced systems seldom
have perfect information. In the two villages studied, private benefits
may judiciously be channeled through traditional leaders in return for
support only in the short run. This study indicates that once ties of
dependence are loosened and as deprived groups articulate their demands,
the volume of demands not only increases, but many are in contradiction
to those of present elites.

Since the process of agricultural change has begun to sever ties
between landowners and tenants/laborers, a choice has to be made as to
which demands are to be supported by any political party. On a more
general level, policy makers in India are faced with a choice common to
most "modernizing" regimes: whether to continue with a "production
first" strategy on the assumption that the equality issue is more easily
taken care of once there is something to distribute, or to try and find
means to ensure a modicum of both production and equality to avoid the
risks of polarization. In keeping with the findings of this study, it
would appear there is in reality not much of a choice. Elections are

after all based on numbers, and in India if the polarization continues

217

no party can win with the support of a large farmer/middle-upper class
coalition. This calculation requires only the simplest of mathematics.

Yet it is not clear that elections can force parties into realign-
ing their bases of support in order to maximize the equality principle.
The line of analysis starting with Robert Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy1
would hold that even popular mass movement do not ensure equality.
Keeping this in mind, one can point to two directions in which the
system can move. The logic of both means that present elites probably
could ppt_maintain their position over time.

The first is drawn from Eric Wolf's analysis of peasant wars. Here
of importance is the link forged between primarily the "middle" peasant
and the "marginal men" of primarily urban areas.2 Thus one has the
growth of rural revolutionary potential. Though peasants may not always
get what they desire in peasant revolts, neither can elites maintain
themselves. Therefore, the rational course of action for an elite would
be to realign its programs to minimize such alliances.

The second course of development comes from Moore's analysis.3 If
rural deprivation leads to violence, one can expect greater authoritarian
reactions on the part of a rural landed and urban commercial coalition.

Moore states that such a reaction can result in a "labor repressive"

 

1Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: Dover Press, 1959),
passim. Also see Robert W. Jackman's discussion of Michels and other
literature dealing with the influence of socialist parties and labor
unions on equality. Robert W. Jackman, Politics and Social Equality;
A Comparative Analysis (New York: John Wiley, 1975), Chapter Six,
"Socialist Parties, Unions and Social Cleavages," pp. 119-134 espec-
ially.

 

 

 

2Wolf, op. cit., "Conclusions," passim.

3Moore, op. cit., Chapters Seven and Eight.

218

agricultural system.1 Such systems are not conducive to increased pro-
ductivity pyerntime_though in the short term they may be able to extract
more produce for urban consumption. Further, such systems tend to be
unstable even though in reality the condition of rural workers may not
be any "worse" than before. Keeping the instability of these two out-

comes in mind, we can turn now to policy recommendations.

Policy Alternatives

 

This study began with an appraisal of the effects of a certain set
of policies on the goals of increased production and equality in India
and found that changes caused by these policies have resulted in rein-
forcing inequality and perhaps a marginal increase in production. The
reasons have already been stated. If one agrees that decisions to
implement policies are primarily political, then it is necessary to con-
vince a politician that the suggestions which follow are not only logi-

cal, given the goals of the political system, but politically expedient.

 

It is h0ped the previous discussion of the dynamics of change backed by
empirical evidence shows the necessity of charting a new course for
change.

It is also incumbent on the policy researcher to at least point out
feasible alternatives which will maximize the goals the system has set
for itself. The recommendations presented below are essentially an out-
line of a direction in which planners might move. Rather than being
taken as a blueprint from which one can build a new structure, they
should be treated as a sketch to be offered to economists and administra-

tors from which their work can proceed. The effort in these

 

lIbid., pp. 434-35.

219

recommendations is to alter the configuration of constraints and incen-
tives which govern both production behavior (to maximize production) and
which support existing hierarchies in Indian society (to maximize the

goal of equality).

l. The Issue of Land

 

One of the obvious points of the study is that the skewed distri-
bution of land lies at the base of economic and social inequality. A
radical redistribution is required to get at least this cause of strati-
fication removed. Economists use a variety of measures to define a
viable unit of farm production, and the current trend seems to be in the
direction of providing each cultivating family sufficient land to bring
it Rs. 6,000 ($800) per year in cash income. If one is to follow this
plan, based on the calculations presented in Chapter IV, a ceiling of
approximately fivetx)six acres of irrigated land should be placed on all
family holdings. The surplus land obtained thereby should ppt_be given
first to the landless which is often recommended by persons who maintain
that all the landless must be kept in rural areas. It should, rather be
given first to those marginal farmers whose holdings fall below the ceil-
ing in order to make their units commercially viable. The land that is
then left over may be distributed to the landless (former tenants first,
if that is administratively feasible) in units which permit them also to
farm viably. A higher ceiling would, of course be necessary for arid
land and inferior soils. This would not be difficult to work out as all
land holdings are already recorded according to land type.1 This proce-

dure will leave a number of landless families to whom I will turn below.

 

1For further discussion along these lines see S. C. Jha, A Critical
Analysis of Indian Land Reform Studies (Bombay: Asian Studies Press for

 

 

220

Second, legislation should be passed encouraging absentee land-
owners to leave the agricultural sector. This can be done in a number
of ways. In Taiwan, expropriated landlords were compensated partially
in stocks in government enterprises. A similar pattern may be adopted
in India and further encouragement (by way of licensing small/medium
scale industry for them) to invest in other kinds of enterprises may be

found. Judicious use of taxation should be made to make it unprofitable

 

for a landowner to lease out his land. He then has the choice to either
self-cultivate his six irrigated acres and squeeze the most out of them,
or to leave agriculture to those more interested in it. That is, while
legislating against tenancy additional means are to be found to make it
totally unattractive for any but the productive owner to remain in
agriculture. What is necessary is a constellation of policies that make

agriculture unprofitable for the large owner while at the same time mak-

 

it attractive for him to invest his considerable resources (both finan-
cial and his business acumen) in other sectors of the economy.

The removal of the landed gentry serves an additional purpose. Tai
argues that for the eight countries he studied, and those in which radi-
cal land reforms were implemented, the former landowners not only lost
the source of their power (which was economically non-productive and
socially exploitative) but lost interest over time in rural politics.1

Here is one way to open the channels of participation in the countryside

 

the Indian Institute of Asian Studies, 1971), Chapter II, "Land Distri-
bution Aspect of Agrarian Reform," passim. Also see Doreen Warriner,
Land Reform in Principle and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).

1Tai, op. cit., section on Taiwan, pp. 334-40. Also see Bernard
Gallin, Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1966).

 

221

-- but in view of what Huntington calls the "conservatizing" effects of
land reform, perhaps further means will have to be devised to keep the

new groups of owner-cultivators participating in the political system.

I will turn to this below.

The third major area of land reform legislation will have to deal
with the fragmentation of holdings due to inheritance patterns.1 Either
the laws governing inheritance will have to change to bar the division
of land below a certain minimum or, which is probably simpler, there
needs to be a floor of landholding established also.

Thus far the suggestions deal with land reform as a means to equal-
ize status based on landownership. No one would argue that reform will
eliminate discrimination on the basis of caste or that factionalism in
village politics will vanish. However, insofar as landholdings have
obstructed access to the factors of production and political partici-
pation, a redistribution along the lines suggested will remove the
obstruction.

But what of productivity? Can such small units be economically
viable and produce enough to overcome India's food deficits? The
answer has partially been given in Chapter III. It is the smaller culti-
vator who is producing more per unit of land. Additional evidence may
be sought in the experience of Japan and Taiwan, where land ceilings

are approximately five hectares2 and where the rapid increases in

 

1In India, all property is legally to be equally divided among all
children. .Qe facto, daughters do not inherit land as inheritance is
through the patrilineal line and they "marry out". The sons divide the
land. In a sense daughters inherit their share in jewelry and other
gifts at marriage and the continuing presents given by parents with the
birth of each grandchild and other ritual Observances.

2Tai, op. cit., pp. 477-78.

222

production occurred pipe: land distribution took place.1 Today, Japan
ranks above the United States in output of rice per unit of land and is
among the top three producers in the world. Taiwan's agriculture is a
major export earner for that country.2 And in Taiwan, more than 60 per-
cent of all farms are help! one hectare; while in Japan, (1961) 38 per-
cent of all households own less than 0.5 hectares and only 4.3 percent
own more than two hectares each.3 In all these countries, land and
capital are scarce and labor is in abundance. Land and capital must
thus be used intensively to provide employment as well as food. Land
distribution however will not raise productivity unless a flow of

resources continues to the farmers.

2. Farm Productivity

 

There are two basic policy areas to be noted here. One is that

biochemical inputs and mechanical technology suited to small holdings

 

must continue to be channeled to farmers along with advice. Land
redistribution as mentioned above, will not increase production by
itself though it may encourage the tenant turned owner to take more
interest in what is his own. In India, the framework exists for exten-

sion work and the provision of inputs. Along these lines one point

 

1Ibid., and Martin M. C. Yang, Socio-Economic Effects of Land

Reform in Taiwan (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970). Also see
Anthony Y. C. Koo, "Land Reform in Taiwan," paper presented at the
Agency for International Development, Spring Review of Land Reform,
Washington, D. C., June 1970. (Mimeographed.)

2Ibid., and Georg Borgstrom, The Food and People Dilemma (North

Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1973), appendices.

 

 

 

3Nair, op. cit., p. 95 (source: Tomomi Ashikaga, Agriculture in
Japan, Japan FAO Association and the Ministry of Agriculture and For-
estry, Government of Japan, Annual Report of the State of Agriculture,
1962).

 

223

should be noted. Instead of multiple agencies in rural areas (presently

there are banks, cooperatives, panchayat samitis and tehsils) there

 

should be only one unit serving a dual purpose of dispensing inputs and
revenue collection. This is important in view of the next point.

Simply by offering new techniques of production, it is obvious from
the data that all farmers will not adopt them even if they own land (see
Chapter III). Given multiple goals and motivations, all farmers will
not be productive no matter how high the support prices are, or how
persuasive an extension officer. Thus there is a need to use taxation

and inputs to raise the floor of economic viabili_y.l

 

Land should be fairly heavily taxed, not only for the reasons men-
tioned in the Raj Report (see above) but for those of productivity as

well. Tax should be based on what the land can produce given the kinds

 

of inputs available to the farmer (thus the importance of continuing

 

flows of inputs and equal access). Further, the tax should be paid ip
.Elfli for two reasons. First, if the farmer pays in kind, he has to use
his farm produce and cannot rely on either off-farm employment or the
money-lender for cash to pay taxes. Second, this is a simple way for
the government to acquire buffer stocks. I have not considered a farm
income tax because the machinery required for its administration is out
of the realm of feasibility at this point. The same ends can be met

however, by a "slab" tax on land of the kind suggested.

 

1See Nair, pp; cit., pp. 229—34. "Given the choice of a dozen
routes, they will not and cannot be expected to take only one and the
same route." p. 230. And "On the contrary the only feasible solution
would lie in cutting off the unwanted eleven of the twelve choices."
p. 231.

2The idea is not new. The Raj Report suggests it, op. cit., and it
is used in Taiwan also.

224

Besides taxation, inputs provided to farmers should also be paid
for in kind for the same reasons. This has worked well in Taiwan.1 If
these measures are enacted, then the rationale for one agricultural
extension and revenue collection unit makes sense. It can have a farm-
er's cooperative attached to it which might serve a number of purposes
including the marketing of surplus produce (left over after taxes) and
the provision and control of certain resources (e.g., the building and
maintenance of tubewells, and the provision of implements such as chaff
cutters or rice dryers) the investment in which requires cooperative
use and investment. If the land distribution is equalized, the problem
of a large farmer monopoly of cooperatives will also be gone.

These provisions will also in the long run let official sources of
credit and marketing compete effectively with the private money-lender
and grain trader. The farmer will be forced, if you will, into produc-
ing more. The means for increased production will be held by the new
extension/administrative centers which means hopefully the farmers will
demand the services to which they are already entitled. These centers
will additionally siphon off a portion of farmers' marketable surplus
leaving less in the hands of money-lenders who can withhold stocks cur-
rently to raise the free market price. With good buffer stocks, govern-
ment can control the market price of grain in urban areas by withholding
or releasing stocks. Aside from relieving landlords of their land,
effective official competition should lessen private money-lenders'

interest in rural money-lending over time.

 

l .
Yang, pp; c1t.

225

3. The Landless

 

Even with large-scale redistribution of land, not all rural fami-
lies will be able to farm. For the landless a recommendation is made
for the encouragement of regional service/business centers in which
agricultural based industry using low and intermediate levels of tech-
nology can be used to provide the greatest employment potential pos-
sible. Such centers will offer needed services to agriculture (pump
servicing and maintenance, equipment repair, etc.) as well as draw on
locally produced commodities to process and market (dairy units, fruit
and vegetable processing).

Again the idea is not new, but it should be viewed with an eye to
increasing production as well as maximizing employment.1 Such centers
provide local integration points for the economy. They can also provide
points of horizontal integration with other regional units. In terms of
social benefits as argued by Epstein, they can provide new channels of
mobility for the bottom strata of society by removing them entirely
from the old patron-client networks.2 As she suggests further, if

employment in these centers is open to all landless instead of simply

 

those of the Harijan communities, the distinctions referred to in
Chapter IV will become blurred on an economic level. Finally, a very
important point in favor of these centers is that they will reduce the

massive influx of migrants to the already overtaxed cities.

 

1See W. Arthur Lewis, Development Planning: The Essentials of
Economic Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 72-75; John P.
Lewis,_gpiet Crisis in India (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Insti-
tution, 1962); and Albert Hirschmann, Development Projects Observed
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), and Journeys
Toward Progress (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday, 1965).

 

 

 

2T. Scarlett Epstein, South India: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow
(New York: Holmes and Meier, 1973), Chapter 9.

226

These then are the main policy implications of this study. To be
sure, there are problems associated with each proposal for change that
would have to be worked out by persons with expertise in areas other
than political science. However, these proposals do suggest means by
which the joint issues of growth with equality can be tackled. One end
result should be a wider integration of the Indian peasant into the

political system as he develops a direct link with the flow of benefits

 

to rural areas. His economic integration and reliance on outside inputs
should lead to a greater interest in and ability to affect the forces
which manipulate his existence today and which, if allowed to continue
unchecked, will end in the destruction of his kind and the creation of

a deprived, apathetic citizenry, full of despair.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

FIELD METHODS AND PROBLEMS

As an introduction to the questionnaires this note is about my
decision on how to approach the research, the problems encountered and
suggestions I might be able to offer anyone interested in similar
research.

Before going into the field, I had examined several questionnaires
used in other studies conducted in rural areas. Several problems asso-
ciated with these raised serious questions in my mind about the validity
of formal survey research techniques aside from the normal ones that
arise in any basic methods book. Yet, obviously there was the need to
standardize my interviews to some extent.

The first question raised by other studies conducted by both the
University of Rajasthan research projects on elections and those done by
the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, was the
high proportion of "don't know" responses. Part of the problem
obviously was that the questions asked were too far removed from a vil-
lager's reality. A second problem could be that the Hindi used in the
schedules was of a rather "classical" variety seldom heard outside of
the classroom. Also apparent was the fact that many questions were
essentially "lifted" from the usual U. S. political survey questionnaires
and thus aimed at tapping dimensions culturally alien to India's rural

setting.
227

228

Second, the questionnaires used by others seemed to tap highly
general dimensions of respondents' attitudes and my interest lay in dis-
covering rather specific perceptions. In western countries, a number of
measures have been developed to deal with political attitudes (e.g.,
Likert scales, TAT tests). Again, the problem here was to bridge a cul-
tural and perception gap between a "western" attitudinal orientation and
the field in which I was working. Further, without knowing what the
villagers' perceptions of themselves and their surroundings are, it was
difficult to devise new scales and tests.

Third, I began the project with a rather simple question: "If
agricultural change is indeed causing the polarization that other obser-
vers seem to have found, what kinds of political reactions c§p_one
expect to find?" Given my own assumptions about the choices offered the
voters in India my initial predictions were that one would find a move-
ment away from the Congress and that there would be a great deal of
apathy and anger on the part of the electorate. Accordingly, my first
draft of the questionnaire revolved around the issues of political
choice and reasons why respondents would have shifted their votes to
opposition parties. As the data indicate, precisely the reverse
occurred.

Keeping the original point in mind, I discussed my approach and
questionnaire with members of the faculty at the University of
Rajasthan, Jaipur,<n1arrival. They reinforced my hesitancy of using
the "usual" voting study questionnaires having conducted surveys them-
selves. The result was a decision to conduct interviews based on a
rather open-ended conversational style. Further, we decided that since

I would be living in the villages, it would be important to tap the full

229

range of village activities and perception through participant observa-
tion which could then be evaluated against the more standardized ques-
tionnaires. As the study was seen as a training and research exper—
ience, we felt that a contribution might be made by using this approach
to show other scholars what kinds of areas might be profitably followed
in rural research. What evolved was a loose combination of anthropo-
logical methodology along with survey research where a random selection
of respondents would control any biases in observation I might hold.

This limited the total number of respondents I could interview. If
a fairly loose approach were used, it would be difficult to standardize
the techniques of a team of interviewers. Others working with a team of
interviewers had problems to contend with such as forms not fully and
carefully filled out, a high number of "don't know" responses which came
from the interviewers' reluctance to probe out of a fear of "contami-
nating" data, etc. These are normal problems, but they become espec-
ially severe if an open-ended questionnaire and participant observation
are used. It is hoped that from this experience means can be found in
further research to get approximately the same depth of data while
expanding the number of respondents.

Three other factors limited the number of respondents and use of
informants. First, I myself was a student and would have had essen-
tially to hire my peers at the University of Rajasthan. There would
have been a great deal of sensitivity on their part as first, the
resources at my command would be much greater than what they could pos-
sibly muster for their own dissertations. Also having a peer in a
supervisory position would be highly sensitive. Additionally, I did not

have the excuse of not knowing the language.

230

Second, research was conducted shortly after the Indo-Pakistan war
of 1971 and the independence of Bangladesh. The Nixon "tilt" toward
Pakistan resulted in antagonism against the U. S. and therefore, U. S.
funded research. While this did not affect the field work as rural
pe0ple do not share anti-American views it was strong among students
(and some faculty members). Other persons had faced problems and it
was well to avoid them as it does not take much for a field site to be
"spoiled". This project had full clearance from both the Governments
of India and Rajasthan, but that would not protect one from local feel-
ings. At the same time, it should be pointed out that I was in touch
with a number of post-graduate students and frankly benefitted greatly
from being their peer rather than their "boss".

Third, I had been hopeful that I could interview around 300 per-
sons. This proved impossible for a number of reasons. To find a vil-
lager at the time one wants to interview him is almost impossible: at
least if one is sensitive to his schedule. I have mentioned in Chapter
II that interviews could best be conducted in the evenings: after
respondents returned from their fields. Even then it could be prob-
lematic as animals had to be watered, dinner had to be cooked and eaten,
etc. Persons at the University of Rajasthan had cautioned me that I
would be lucky if I got three interviews done each day -- fears proven
amply correct.

Besides their own schedules, it was not at all uncommon for me to
walk several miles (from one to five) out to a certain hamlet to find my
respondents gone to the city or to a wedding. In such cases I made at
least two, often three or four visits and then if the persons still were

not found, I frankly gave up. These trips were made on foot (no bicycle

231

could make the trip through sand, and we had no motorized vehicle) and
there is a point of diminishing returns.

Even so, I would have expanded the size of the sample but I found
with each additional person that I was not getting much variation in
response. Therefore, each additional interview was not giving me addi-
tional data. Of course there are variations within each stratum along
a number of dimensions, but the reasons are amply clear and on the pgjpp_
dimensions there is little variation. Along with other studies cited
in the text my economic findings are vindicated, and the political
aspects of the study are exploratory. I would maintain, however, the
same responses would be got elsewhere.

As regards the questionnaire itself, there are several points to be
noted. First of all, the Hindi version is the original and the language
used is highly colloquial. This was to make sure interviews could pro-
ceed in a casual, conversational style permitting respondents to
express their own views without imposing degrees of feeling or concepts
of thought. Villagers are excellent at telling the outsider what they
think he would like to find out, and thus it is especially important to
sit back and let them talk about their problems using questions as
guides.

Second, the questionnaire was pretested among village friends who
are farmers and laborers in Hanumangarh. A number of questions were
bound to be either redundant or they did not carry the ideas intended
even though they were thought of in Hindi. What had occurred was that
the concept in my mind was not really in Hindi -- I was only translating.

These questions, of course were drOpped.

232

Third, the leadership questionnaire is entirely open-ended. I had
to be careful about the sensitivities of some leaders interviewed about
issues such as land reform and aid to Harijans. Thus, the questions
about change in the villages are purposely generally stated to let the
respondents highlight the issues themselves.

To sum up the situation, of course it would be desirable to have a
larger number of respondents. However, given the circumstances under
which I functioned, this was not possible. Moreover, in view of the
problems faced by other researchers, I feel I got a depth and richness
of data that few other scholars have. This is due entirely to living in
the villages and concentrating on relatively specific variables. Fur-
ther, given the enormous amount of aggregated data in India, it is per-
haps time that observers of the Indian scene spent time talking —- in
rather straightforward terms at that -— with the people whose lives they

presume to change in the name of humanism.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

THE RESPONDENTS QUESTIONNAIRE*

The questions in this questionnaire are part of the required
research for my Ph.D. degree.

The information that you give me will be kept completely confi-
dential. Although I know your name, this will not be given to anyone
else. All information collected in the course of this research will
be used for academic purposes only.

If there are any further questions you may have in this regard,
you are welcome to ask me or to direct your inquiries to the Registrar,

University of Rajasthan or to the Head of the Department of Political
Science, University of Rajasthan.

Respondent's number

Village and district

 

Sample stratum of respondent

 

FOR ALL RESPONDENTS
1. Age of respondent years

2. Religion

 

3. Caste

 

4. Sex male; female

5. Education:

None

1 - 3 years
Primary

Middle school
Higher secondary
College

 

 

*This questionnaire was developed and administered in the Hindi
language. This is a direct translation.

233

8a.

8c.

9a.

9b.

10.

11.

12a.

Are you originally

your birth?

Am from this

From
From
From
From
From
From

another
another
another
another
another
another

234

from this village or have you come here since

village
town of
village
village
town of
state

country

the same district
of the same district
of another district
another district

Don't know/can't recall

 

(If respondent has come from somewhere else) When did you come

here?

Years ago
Don't know/can't remember

Are you a farmer?

No

 

(Literally:

Do you do farming?)

Do you do any other work besides farming or not?

Yes
No

 

(If yes) What is this other work?

(open-ended)

 

Does anyone in your house do other work besides farming?

Yes
No

 

(If yes) Who is this, and what work does he/she do?

(open-ended)

 

Does most of your income come from agriculture or from this other

work?

From agriculture
From other work (specify)
Other (e.g., from both)

Was your father a farmer?

Yes
No

 

Don't know

 

How much land do you own at this time?

 

Bighas of land (standardized to acres)

Respondent owns no land (skip to question #13a)

1 l

Respondent refuses to answer

12b 0

13a.

13b.

13c.

14.

15.

16a.

16b 0

 

235

(If respondent owns land) Is your land all in one piece or are
there several pieces? (If several pieces) How many pieces are
there?

One piece

Two pieces

Three pieces

More than three pieces

 

Did/does your father own any land? (If yes) How much land did/
does he have?

Bighas of land (standardized to acres)

Has/had no land

Don't know

Refuses to answer

 

How much land did you receive from your father?
Bighas
He is still alive and the land is in his name
Received no land
No answer

 

Have you received any land from anyone besides your father -- for
example, as part of a dowry or from some other relative?

Bighas

Received no land

No answer

 

(If the land the respondent now owns is more or less than what he
received from his father or relatives) The land you own now is
more/less than what you received from your father (or relative).
When and how did this happen?

(open-ended)

 

Do you lease in or share-crop anyone else's land?

Bighas

No (not within the past several years)

This year you are leasing bighas of land. Do you find it is
easier or harder to lease land now than it was 5 - 6 years ago, or
is there no particular difference?

Harder to lease now

Easier to lease now

No particular difference

Can't say/don't know

Non-applicable

 

 

(If there is any change) Why do you think this has happened?
(open-ended)

 

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22a.

22b.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28a.

236

How many persons do you lease land from at one time?
One person

Two persons

More than two persons

Leases from government - e.g., annual allotment
Non-applicable

 

How do you pay the landowner -- in cash, kind, or both?
(open-ended)

 

Does the landowner supply you with any of the needed farm inputs?
(open-ended)

 

Have these arrangements changed at all over the past 5 - 10 years,
or have they remained the same? (If changed) How have they
changed?

(open-ended)

 

Do you prefer the present arrangements or were they better before?
Better now

Better previously

No difference

Don't know

Non-applicable

 

 

How much of your land is irrigated?
(open-ended)

 

No code.
No code.
No code.

In how much of your land do you take: three crops, two crops, one
crop?

Three craps annually

Two craps annually

One crOp annually

What crops do you take in kharif and in how much of your land?
(Only crop names coded)

Crop Bighas

And which crOps do you take during rabi and in how much of your
land? (Only crop names coded)

CrOp Bighas

No code.

28b.
29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

237

No code.
No code.

What amount of each crop do you sell?
Crop Z Sold

Where and through whom do you sell your produce?
Landowner

Village grain dealer

Government

Wholesale grain market

Open market

Money lender

 

Do you think you receive a better price for your produce now, or
were prices better 5 - 6 years ago?

Prices are better now

Prices are better now, but inputs cost more so we

haven't gained much

Prices are worse now

No difference

Don't know

Non-applicable

 

In your opinion why have prices gone up/down?
(open-ended)

 

Do you use Kalyan Sona or any of the other new seeds?
Seed Bighas

Takes no new seed

Have you used any of these seeds before?

 

 

 

 

 

 

Seed Has Taken Before Has Not Taken Before
Since you take seed, why don't you also take ? (Fill
in name of relevant seed as per respondent's crapping pattern)

(open—ended)

 

Why don't you use these new seeds?
(open-ended)

 

(If farmer is using HYVP seed) What do you think of the new
seeds? Has your production increased since you have used them?
(open-ended)

 

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

238

Will you use these seeds next time?

Yes definitely

Yes, if someone shows us how or they work this time
No

Not sure, don't know

Non-applicable

 

 

Do you use chemical fertilizers, manure, or both?
Only chemical fertilizers

Only manure

Both

No fertilizers at all

Non-applicable

 

 

Have you ever used chemical fertilizers before?
Yes - has used chemical fertilizers before
No - has not used chemical fertilizers before
Non-applicable

(If respondent does not use chemical fertilizers) Why don't you
use chemical fertilizers?
(open-ended)

 

(If farmer uses chemicals) What do you think about chemical ferti-
lizers? Have you found their use beneficial?
(open-ended)

 

Will you use chemical fertilizers next time?
Yes

No

Not sure

Non-applicable

 

 

Do you use pesticides?
Yes
No
Non-applicable

Have you used pesticides before?
Yes
No
Non-applicable

(If respondent does not use pesticides) Why don't you use pesti-
cides?
(open-ended)

 

(If farmer uses pesticides) What do you think about the pesti-
cides? Have your yields improved with their use?
(open-ended)

 

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

 

239

Will you use pesticides again?
Yes

No

Don't know
Non-applicable

 

 

Do you farm according to advice given by the Agricultural
Extension Officer or the Village Level Worker?

Yes

No

I don't know what they have to say

I do more than what they say

I do less than what they say

I've never discussed farming with them

Don't know

Non-applicable

 

Do you feel you get enough advice from the Village Level WOrker
and/or the Agricultural Extension officer?

Yes, enough

No, not enough

I don't want their advice (why?)

Generally speaking, are you able to get seeds, fertilizers, etc.
on time?

Normally can get on time

Never gets on time

Sometimes

Non-applicable

(If respondent feels any difficulty) What seems to be the problem
in getting these things on time?
General scarcity in the market
You have to have influence with the people responSible
for distribution
Often respondent does not have money to pay when
needed
Supplies do not arrive at stores/cooperative on time
Supplies are sold on the black market so they are
not available where they should be and we have to
pay more
Don't know

(If respondent feels any difficulty getting supplies) If you are
unable to get these things, who in your opinion is getting them?
(open-ended)

 

From where do you find it is simplest to get inputs?
Panchayat Samiti
Private seed stores or companies
Cooperative society
Open market - ready cash to dealer (baniya)

56.

57a.

57b.

57c.

58a.

58b.

59.

240

On loan from dealer (baniya)

Other friends, farmers, or the landlord
Keep at home from previous season
Black market

Don't know

Who in your Opinion is responsible for seeing that seeds, etc. are
given out on time?
(open-ended)

 

Are you normally able to get sufficient credit for your farming
or not?

Yes

NO

Sometimes

Have no need for credit

Non-applicable

 

 

From where do you normally take loans?

Cooperative society

Panchayat Samiti (loans discontinued, but some
respondents have outstanding taccavi loans)
Bank - Land Mortgage or commercial

Relatives

Shopkeeper or money lender

Other farmers and/or friends

On what terms are you able tO take loans (only the interest on
non-governmental sources coded on a yearly basis)?
(Open-ended)

 

(If respondent is unable to get sufficient credit) DO you hold
any particular person or institution responsible for the unavail-
ability Of credit?

Yes

NO

Not sure

Non-applicable

 

 

(If respondent holds person or institution responsible) Who/what
is this institution or person?
(Open-ended)

 

When you do take loans, what do you find you spend the money on?
Farm inputs only

Farm inputs plus replacement Of capital inputs (pumps,
etc.)

Household expenses plus farm inputs

Household expenses, festivals and inputs for farm
Household and repayment Of Old debts

Farm improvements (digging new wells, etc.)

All Of the above

241

Only non-farm expenses (festivals and household)
Non-applicable

60a. NO code.
60b. NO code

61a. DO you hire labor to work on your farm?

NO, use only family labor

Yes, persons hired on a year-round basis (manager, e.g.)
Yes, labor is hired as needed by operations

Labor hired on both year-round and by operation basis
Non-applicable

 

(If all family labor, skip to Question #66.)

61b. How many laborers do you hire? (Full year estimate)
(Open-ended)

 

62. Do you pay the laborers in cash, kind, or both? And how much do
you pay them?
(open-ended)

 

63. Have the wages for labor gone up or down in the past 5 - 6 years

Wages have risen

Wages have fallen

Wages have remained the same
Non-applicable

 

 

64a. In your Opinion, do laborers receive a fair wage for their work?
Yes

NO

Sometimes (depending on jobs available, etc.)

Don't know

Non-applicable

 

 

64b. (If respondent thinks wages are unfair) Why do you feel this way?
(open-ended)

 

65a. Today, do you require more or less labor than you did 5 - 10
years ago?

More

Less

No difference

Don't know

Non-applicable

 

 

65b. (If more or less laborers required) Why do you now need more/less

laborers?
(Open-ended)

 

66.

67a.

67b.

68.

69a.

69b.

242

Many people and government itself have been talking about land
reform. Have you heard anything about this?
Yes

NO (Skip to Question #68.)

Non-applicable

What do you think about this program? Is land reform good or not?
It is good
It is bad
Don't know/can't say

Non—applicable

Whom should this program benefit, and whom do you think it act-

ually will benefit?
(open-ended)

 

I have heard that land has been allotted here some time back too.
Have you heard anything about this?

Yes

NO (Skip to Question #87.)

Non-applicable

 

What do you think about this? Is it a good program or not?
Yes
NO
Not sure, can't say
Non-applicable

Who should benefit from this, and who actually have benefitted

from it?
(open—ended)

 

FOR AGRICULTURAL LABOR ONLY (For others, skip to Question #87)

70.

71.

72.

Can you tell me how many days you are able to find work in agri-
culture during the year?

Days

It varies

Not sure

When you work in the fields, do you work for the same farmer/s
or do you go wherever there is work or where the pay is best?
Same farmer/s

Wherever work is available

Wherever pay is the best

Non-applicable

 

 

Is it easy to find agricultural work now, or was it easier about
5 - 6 years ago?

Easier now

Easier then

NO particular difference

Don't know

Non-appliCable

 

73.

74.

75.

76.

77a.

77b.

78.

79a.

243

(If any change in availability of work) Why do you think this

change has occurred?
(open-ended)

 

Besides agricultural work, is it easier to find other jobs now,
or was it easier 5 - 6 years ago?

Easier now

Easier then

No difference

Don't know - never tried to find other work

Don't know/can't say

Non-applicable

 

 

Besides agricultural labor, what jobs are the easiest to find?
Famine relief

Casual village labor (drawing water, carrying loads,
thatching roofs, etc.)

Private labor - construction of houses, etc.

Factory labor

Other

Don't know

Non-applicable

 

When you work in the fields, how are you paid, in cash, kind, or
both? And at what rates?
(open-ended)

 

 

Sometimes
Don't know/can't say
Non-applicable

 

(If respondent feels wages are unfair) Why do you feel these wages

are unfair?
(Open—ended)

 

Lots of people including government are talking about land reform.
Have you heard anything about this or not?
Yes
No
NO response
Non-applicable

 

What do you think about this program? Is it good or not?
Yes, it is good

No, it is not good

Don't know/no response

Non-applicable

79b.

80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

85.

86.

244

Whom do you think this program should benefit, and whom do you
think it will benefit?
(open-ended)

 

Would you like some land for yourself? If so, how much, and why?
(open-ended)

 

I have heard that land has been allotted around here. Have you
heard anything about this or not? (If respondent has heard some-
thing about it) What do you think about this program? Is it good
or not?

(Open-ended)

 

NO code.

Have people in this village asked for this land?
Lots of people have asked

Some have asked

A few asked

NO one has asked

Don't know/not sure

Non-applicable

 

llll

 

Did you apply for land? If so, have you received any?
(Open-ended)

 

(If respondent did not apply for land) Why didn't you apply for
any land ?
(open-ended)

 

Have other people received land here? Who are they?
(open-ended)

 

FOR ALL RESPONDENTS

87.

88.

89.

Generally speaking do you feel you are better off now than you
were 5 - 6 years ago, or were you better Off then?

Better off now

Better off then

No difference

Don't know

 

 

DO you feel you eat better now than you did 5 - 6 years ago, or
did you eat better then?

Eat better now

Ate better then

NO difference

Don't know

 

 

Has your income increased or decreased in this time?
Income is more now (real gain)
Income has fallen (in real terms)

 

245

No difference
Don't know

90. Why do you think this has happened?
(open-ended)

 

91a. Generally what kinds people here seem to be better Off now than
they were 5 - 6 years ago?
(open-ended)

 

91b. 0f the following kinds of persons, can you tell me who are better
off now and who are worse Off?
Better Worse Don't
Off Off Know

 

 

Big farmers
Small farmers
Landless agricultural tenants
Landless agricultural labor
Other laborers

(skilled or semi-skilled)
Leaders and politicians
Government servants
Old landlords (jagirdars)
Mbney lenders
Small traders

(other than money lenders)

 

 

 

 

92. Generally speaking, do you think this village is better off than
it was 5 - 6 years ago?
Yes, better Off
No, worse Off
There is no particular difference
Don't know

93. Why do you think so?
(open-ended)

 

94. Think about yourself again. What are your own three biggest needs?
(open-ended)

 

 

 

95. What three things do you think your friends need the most?
(open-ended)

 

 

 

96. No code.

97. No code.

98.

99.

100.

101.

102.

103.

104a.

104b.

105.

246

In your opinion, who can help you meet these needs?
(Open-ended)

 

Are you a member of any political party, social or service
organization? If so, what is this group/groups and what does/do
it/they do?

(open-ended)

 

Whom do you consider to be the 4 - 5 most influential persons in
this village? (Only three coded.)
(Open-ended)

 

 

 

Do you think voting is important or not?
Yes
No
Don't know

(If respondent feels voting is important) Why do you think voting
is important?
(open-ended)

 

(If respondent feels voting is not important) Why do you feel
voting is not important?
(Open-ended)

 

How many times have you voted in the panchayat elections?
Number of times
Never voted (ask #105)
Can't remember

How many times have you voted in the Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha
elections

Number of times (skip to #106)

Never voted (ask #105)

Can't remember (skip to #106)

(If respondent has either not voted at all or has skipped some
elections) Why did you not vote? .
(open-ended)

 

(Skip to Question #114 for non-voters.)

106.

Can you recall who you voted for in the 1962 election for the Lok
sabha and Vidhan Sabha?

Lok Sabha

Vidhan Sabha

Can't remember

Did not vote

Was too young

107.

108.

109.

110.

111.

112.

113.

114.

115.

247

(If respondent split his ticket) Can you tell me why you chose
for one seat and for the other? (No vote splitting

was found, so no replies coded.)

And do you remember who you voted for in the 1967 election?
Lok Sabha

Vidhan Sabha

Can ' t remember

Did not vote

was too young

 

 

(If vote split between parties) This time why did you support
for one seat and for the other seat?
‘ (open-ended)

 

And did you vote in the 1971 parliamentary election, and for whom?
Party/candidate
Did not vote
Don't remember
Was too young

And finally, whom did you vote for in the last Vidhan sabha
election?

Party/candidate

Did not vote

Don't remember

Was too young

 

 

 

 

You first voted for but then you changed your support to
. Can you tell me why you changed your mind?
(Open-ended)
Can you tell me why appealed to you more than of a

similar party? (Situation was not applicable because in none of
the areas were there similar parties contesting). No code.

Does your family normally all vote for the same party or candidate?
Yes

No

Sometimes

Not sure

Don't know

Non-applicable - respondent has no family

 

 

And your caste-fellows, do they normally all vote for the same
party or candidate?

Yes

No

Sometimes

Not sure

Don't know

 

116a.

116b.

117a.

117b.

118.

119a.

ll9b.

ll9c.

120a.

120b.

248

DO you normally vote along with your family?

Yes

No

Sometimes

Don't know

Non-applicable - no family or family does not vote together

 

 

Can you tell me on what basis your family decides whom to vote for?

 

 

(open-ended)
DO you normally vote with your caste fellows?
Yes
No
Sometimes

Don't know
Non-applicable - caste does not vote together

Can you tell me on what basis your caste community decides whom to
vote for?
(open-ended)

 

And on what basis do you yourself select a candidate or party?
(open-ended)

 

Do you ever read newspapers -- or does anyone ever read them to
you?

Read them myself.

Someone else reads to me

I don't read and no one reads to me

Do you read/listen to the paper everyday, or sometimes?
Everyday

Sometimes

Very little

Non-applicable

 

 

Which paper/s do you read/hear?
Rajasthan Patrika
Rashtradoot

English daily
Other/several
Non-applicable

 

DO you listen to the radio?
Yes
No

 

DO you listen to the radio everyday, sometimes, or very little?
Everyday

Sometimes

Very little

Non-applicable

 

120c.

121.

122.

123.

124a.

124b.

124c.

125a.

125b.

126.

127a.

127b.

249

What programs do you especially like to listen to?
News
Folk‘music
Film‘mnsic
Farmers' programs
Others

Before the last elections there must have been a number of issues
discussed. Of these, which did you feel were the most important?
(open-ended)

 

And which issues do you think your friends found to be important?
(open-ended)

 

And what issues did the village generally feel were important?
(Open-ended)

 

Previously we were discussing your own situation. Do you think
leaders/politicians take an interest in these things?

Yes

NO

Don't know
Some do

Who are these persons and why do they take an interest?
(Open-ended)

 

(If respondent feels leaders are not interested) In your opinion,
why aren't leaders interested?
(Open-ended)

 

Have you ever discussed your problems with these peOple?
Yes
No
Sometimes or a little
I have tried but could not get any access to them.

(If respondent has tried) Who were these people and were they able
to do something for you or not?
(open-ended)

 

In your opinion, is there any person, group or party in this
village that can do more for the village?
(Open-ended)

 

(If respondent mentions persons) What can these people do?
(open-ended)

 

(If respondent mentions groups) What can these groups do?
(open-ended)

 

128.

129.

130.

131a.

l3lb.

132a.

132b.

l32c.

133.

134.

135.

136.

250

Who do you think are the 4 - 5 most influential persons during
elections in this village? (Only three coded.)
‘ * ‘ (open-ended)

 

 

 

DO these or other persons come and talk with you during election
time?

Yes

No

Can't remember

Lots of people come/too many persons come

Non-applicable

 

In your Opinion, can parties control what government does?
(open-ended)

 

Would you like to see anything changed in the way government
functions? If so, what?
(open-ended)

 

How can these changes be brought about?
' ' (Open-ended)

 

Is it the duty of leaders to advance and look after the welfare
and happiness of the people?

Yes (skip to #132c)

No

Don't know

I

(If not) Whose duty is this?
(open-ended)

 

(If so) Why do you think so?
(open-ended)

 

In the last Vidhan Sabha election the people supported Congress
very heavily for the first time. Can you tell me why this change
occurred?

(open-ended)

 

Think now of the next year or two -- during that time do you think
things will become better or worse for you?

Better

WOrse

There will be no change

Don't know

 

 

Why do you think so?
(Open-ended)

 

Can you make an estimate of your cash income for the year?
(open-ended)

 

251

137. Number of persons respondent has to support on this income.

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

THE LEADERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE

The purpose of this short questionnaire is to get local leader-
ship's views on issues raised by farmers and agricultural labor in the
course of a larger study entitled "Economic Change and Political
Attitudes in Rural Rajasthan." The information collected by means of
this questionnaire will be kept entirely confidential and it will be
used for academic purposes only. This project has been sanctioned by
both Governments of Rajasthan and India. Any further questions may be
addressed directly to myself or to the Registrar or Head of the Depart-
ment of Political Science, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. Your
cooperation in filling out this questionnaire is greatly appreciated.

1. Age years

2. Religion

 

 

 

 

3. Caste
4. Occupation primary; secondary
5. Education how much; where

 

 

6a. Can you tell me what major changes you have seen in this village in
the past 5-6 years in economic, social and political life?
(open-ended)

 

6b. How and why have these changes taken place?
(open-ended)

 

7. I have been doing my work with farmers and agricultural labor. In
your Opinion, has there been much change in agriculture since the
introduction of the new seeds and the government's new intensive
agricultural programs?

(open-ended)

 

8. Which groups do you think have benefitted the most from these pro—
grams?
(Open-ended)

 

252

10.

11a.

11b.

12.

l3.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19a.

253

What are the main Obstacles in the way of furthering agricultural
development in this area? And what can be done about them?
(open-ended)

 

Besides farmers, how would you evaluate the position of agricul-
tural labor? DO you think they have benefitted from the new pro-
grams at all, or have they been left behind?

(open-ended)

 

What do you feel are the main social and political concerns of
people here?
(open-ended)

 

Do you feel these concerns have changed over the past 5-6 years?
If so, how and why do you feel they have changed?
(open-ended)

 

Are you a member or supporter of any political party?
member supporter

 

 

Have you always been a member/supporter of this party or have you
changed parties? (If changed) May I ask what made you change your
mind?

(open-ended)

 

(If party member) As member are you now, or have you previously
held any elected or party office?
present post

 

past post

 

past post

 

has not held any post

Do you regularly attend party meetings, and/or how do you stay in
touch with party efforts and directives?
(open-ended)

 

How would you rate the political awareness of this village? Has
there been much change in this over the past 5-6 years? How and
what has this change been?

(Open-ended)

 

Besides this, how would you rate the developmental awareness of
the people here? Has this increased or decreased over the past
5-6 years? Why?

(open-ended)

 

In your Opinion, what are the major needs of people here?
‘ (open-ended)

 

What means or channels do you feel are open to people to express
their needs and to have them met?
" (open-ended)

 

19b.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25a.

25b.

254

DO you feel those means function well? What can be done to make
them better?
(Open-ended)

 

As a respected member of this community are there things you can
do/have done to help people meet their needs?
(open-ended)

 

Normally what kinds of people come to you for help?
(open-ended)

 

What traits do you think people respect in a leader? DO you feel
leadership today displays those traits?
(open-ended)

 

DO you think the older ties (such as those of jajmans or caste)
still play an important role in today's political life? Or has
their role changed over the past 5-6 years?

(open-ended)

 

Looking to the next several years, what changes can you see occur-
ring in this village in the areas of:
(1) Economic life

(Open-ended)

 

(ii) Social life
(open-ended)

 

(iii) Political life
(open-ended)

 

Of those changes, which do you feel will be positive ones and
which will be negative?
(open-ended)

 

Why do you feel this way?
(Open-ended)

 

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