ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN RURAL INDIA


Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.

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ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN RURAL INDIA

By

Aruna Nayyar Michie

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

Submitted to

Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

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Department of Political Science

1975

ABSTRACT

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR IN RURAL INDIA

By

Aruna Nayyar Michie

This study is an attempt to discover the effects of agrarian change on the political behavior of farmers, agricultural tenants and landless labor in Rajasthan state, India. Agricultural change was studied in the context of India's Intensive Agricultural Areas and High Yielding Varieties Programmes. The field work was done in two villages of Jaipur and Bharatpur districts of Rajasthan from July 1972 to June 1973. Data were processed in India from June through August 1973.

The study has its origins in political development literature which emphasizes the uneven nature of economic development that results in strains on the political system. This tends to occur in "developing" countries when new institutions of government are characterized by low levels of legitimacy. It is partially a result of the dichotomization in the minds of economists and political scientists alike between growth and the social and political ramifications of change. This dichotomy in practice is reinforced by the configuration of power on the village level.

In order to study the impact of agricultural change on political behavior, the methodology of political economy suggested by Norman T. Uphoff and Warren Ilchman[1] was followed. The analysis is focused on the

effects of change on the maximization of growth and equality (social and economic) as these goals are posited by Government of India for the nation.

It was found that programs for agricultural production have increased economic and social inequality in rural areas. The dispersal of public goods and services and judicious use of patronage by local elites however, has legitimized the role of a Congress Party-dominated government as the main distributor of values in society. The adaptation of "traditional" economic and political forms (particularly patron-client relationships) to the modern political system serves to make landless tenants and laborers more dependent economically on landed elites. This is occurring at the same time as agrarian change, particularly mechanization, makes the elite less dependent on the services of these groups.

The Congress Party has won the support of the landless by promising to abolish untouchability, provide land to the tiller, and by the provision of public services. All of these measure, though largely symbolic, have increased the villager's perceptions of the Congress Party's capacity which enables it to continue winning elections even though its programs for agricultural change increase polarization.

Data were collected using a combination of survey research and participant observation. The questionnaires used are appended to the study. Finally, policy alternatives are suggested which should maximize the government's own goals of growth with equality. Their implementation requires a different perception of political expediency on the part of ruling elites in India.

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[1]Norman T. Uphoff and Warren F. Ilchman, The Political Economy of Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

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schedule in Bharatpur to take us to a number of villages before we decided upon "Shivpura." Having known members of the department previously, it was also a matter of personal satisfaction to renew our association.

Shri Ram Singh, Home Commissioner, Government of Rajasthan expedited official clearance for the research. Shri V. S. Verma, Director, Census of Rajasthan not only showed us great hospitality, but gave us valuable suggestions in sample selection and methods of census taking. Electoral statistics were obtained from the Election Commission, Jaipur. Shri P. R. Mehendiratta, Director, American Institute of Indian Studies, New Delhi, and his staff, though bearing no formal responsibility for me, helped in numerous ways: by their hospitality and assistance in solving administrative matters with a minimum of tribulation.

But the study is based on field work. The persons in the districts and villages where I worked are perhaps the most important. The extension personnel at the panchayat samitis of "Hanumangarh" and Kumher gave freely of their time to discuss problems of extension, fertilizer, pesticides, and seed. The Patwaris in Hanumangarh and Shivpura, especially the former, spent literally hours lecturing on land tenure systems and legislation in Rajasthan. They also helped make up lists of farmers, tenants and laborers from which the samples were drawn. The sarpanchas and other elected officials of both villages talked freely about agriculture and change and personally saw to our housing and comfort. Obviously, were it not for the openness with which informants talked with me this study could never have been done. Though each interview took approximately one and a half hours, better than twice that amount of time was spent with each family and neighbors as they offered

a meal, milk, or simply took advantage of my presence to ask a range of questions about the United States, Delhi, or even if Neil Armstrong really landed on the moon. Were there to be a dedication of this study, it would be to the persons interviewed, and particularly to Kalu Khatik (whom the reader will meet) and his kind who will be instrumental in shaping rural politics in the years to come.

Finally, a long standing intellectual debt is owed to my parents who are almost exclusively responsible for arousing my curiosity about sectors of my country that, given my urban origins, I might otherwise have had no inclination to explore. My mother's years and rural study and discussions with myself helped point directions in which I might proceed. And my debt to my husband is great. While doing his own field work and writing he not only acted as a support for mine, but also spent hours discussing and arguing points of this study with me.

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INTRODUCTION

This study has its origins in questions raised in my mind over several years. Where one's interests originate is probably less important than the shape they assume through work and study, both of which have been instrumental here. Armed with an undergraduate degree in Government, I had the unique opportunity of spending almost two years in the rural areas of Rajasthan state, India. In an administrative capacity, it was my task to "programme" young Americans into rural work to aid India's rural development. I had the chance to see how schemes are conceptualized and their implementation at the local level.

The experience raised more questions than it answered. Changes in rural India have been vast since independence in 1947. The extension of education and other social services into the countryside are not simply statistics: the qualitative differences are consequential. The establishment of an open political system encouraging participation and free political activity has also made a difference to people's lives. Finally, government's assumption of responsibility for its citizens' welfare including the intention to pursue economic growth with social and economic equality has given the political process a unique flavor.

What then raises the questions? The main issue is that the goal of economic growth -- important though it is -- has taken precedence over the longer range ones of equality and social justice. Aside from

my own observations (which are admittedly limited) other observers have been struck by both the lack of change or growth in certain areas, and the increasing disparities in economic well-being between those who have always had, and those for whom sufficient food, clothing and shelter remain a dream. Not only journalists and scholars (Indian and foreign) but the Government of India itself has recognized the problem. Solutions are sought, and it is partially toward this effort that this study is directed. There is a recognition that the very policies enacted to aid the 40% or so of India's citizens who live below the officially recognized level of subsistence, have often served to cut them off from sources of employment, lowering their already abysmal levels of existence.

Nature too has played a cruel role. Droughts and floods occur with alarming frequency. Just as the bumper harvests of 1968-69 raised hopes of self-sufficiency in basic food grains, drought wiped out all gains. Combined with the floods of 1974, the spectre of famine once again was raised on the sub-continent. The euphoria of technical breakthroughs in the hybridization of cereals, the Green Revolution, was replaced by questions such as "... will the Green Revolution turn Red?"[1]

Since field work was undertaken for this study in 1972-73, another variable has affected growth: petroleum prices. The new varieties of

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[1]A joke once heard about India's problems is as follows: One day as God was returning home after a full day's work, he heard someone crying. Turning to see who it was, he found it was the Egyptian President worried about the Middle East situation. God consoled him and went on his way. He soon hear another crying voice and found it was the American President concerned about Viet Nam. God consoled him also, and just as he had almost reached home, he heard another cry. Returning to earth he found Indira Gandhi in a pool of tears. And God cried too.

Anonymous.

seed require high doses of chemical fertilizers of which nitrogeneous ones are especially important. The cost of naptha and other products such as diesel has risen beyond India's capacity to pay for them.

Beyond these "external" setbacks however, the basic trends of India's chosen development strategy persist: those who already have continue to gain often at the expense of those without. As resources are scarce, the former persons are in a better position to acquire them. Several points should be noted in this regard.

First, a commitment was made by India's nationalist movement under the umbrella of the Indian National Congress to economic growth with equality. The assumption was that overall growth would be reflected in an increased living standard for all, and that this could be attained concomitantly with the goal of equality: both economic and social. These principles are laid out in India's constitution. Each planning document and every major political party since independence has paid at least lip-service to them. These goals, however, and the means evolved for their attainment are the product of an urban and landed rural minority. While one cannot presume to comment on the strength of the commitment to either growth or equality, one can draw attention to the following observable points.

How growth with equality is to be attained has never been spelled out. The strategies for growth have emerged over a period of years since independence. These normally have emphasized production targets over their impact on social, economic or political relationships.[1] In fact, equitable growth is seen as contradictory to economic development

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[1]As will be shown below in Chapter I, this is not unique to India.

because (given the skewed distribution of wealth already present) it involves a radical redistribution of property which is thought to be counter-productive to growth, at least in the short to medium term.

Second, the particular strategy for agricultural growth developed during the food crisis of 1957-58. Given this, the emphasis is (perhaps understandably for the time) on production over social or political goals or costs. Given a scarcity of resources (primarily land and capital) the most expeditious strategy is seen as one which invests these into areas (and persons) where they can be used most efficiently to give rapid production increases. This may have a certain rationale, but subsequent events have shown that social and political consequences cannot be separated from the strategies themselves: one cannot speak of "generations of problems" to be dealt with sequentially once the basic issue of production is resolved.[1]

Third, this means that problems of economic growth and change are inter-disciplinary in nature though they are relegated by custom (and default) to economists alone. Almost all observers are agreed that no matter what strategies might be suggested by economists, decisions regarding their feasibility and implementation are political. Yet little has been done (until recently) by either economists or other social scientists to guide policy makers in making the choices. "Political development" studies, for example, take the point where economists leave off analysis to begin their work, taking for granted what economists have said.[2] One result is that post mortems of political systems

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[1]See Walter Falcon, "The Green Revolution: Generations of Problems," 1970. (Mimeographed.)

[2]Even the study by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1966) though

abound (which have value as will be seen below). Another is that variables relevant to both fields are seen as peculiar to one or the other. Should an overlap be found, the analysis is often neither interrelated nor focused on similar issues. In the real world such dichotomies do not exist. Similar parallels can be drawn between political science and other social science disciplines. The interrelatedness of these phenomena should be obvious to the political scientist who accepts as a definition of his discipline that it is the process of the authoritative allocation of values in society.

The definition of politics includes process, and therefore, change. While there is abundant change in systems of government per se, a remarkable amount of it is due to alterations in patterns of the distribution of values in economic and social life. This is most apparent in the "developing world" where central political authorities take responsibility for "modernizing" or even creating their nations, thus deliberately seeking to alter the allocation of values.

Here lies a fertile field for the political scientist, for both explaining and predicting political change. The post mortems mentioned above represent an accumulation of research and knowledge upon which explanations and predictions can be built. Minimally, from them one can learn "what went wrong," and then devise alternate strategies for change. Combined with impact predictions and focused on policy issues, such work can present policy makers with a complete set of alternatives

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it accepts the notion that certain kinds of political forms are necessary for economic development, also accepts the economists' conception of development. And further, it can be argued that they also see certain political forms arising from economic change. See Chapter 2, "A Framework for the Study of the Political Basis of Economic Growth," passim. More recent works by economists in particular who argue the primacy of politics, Gunnar Myrdal, Dudley Seers, and Michael Lipton, among others, are cited where appropriate below.

from which they can choose. This approach often referred to as "political economy", serves the ends of both theory building (by explaining and predicting) and of "relevance" which operationally would seem to be addressed to policy studies.[1] Both descriptive and prescriptive work is important here: the former defines parameters for policy action while the latter lays out alternatives.

If the political scientist decides to direct his work toward such endeavors, he must be willing to invest time and other resources toward understanding at some minimal level the assumptions made by other disciplines involved in the same policy area. Hence the impetus for truly inter-disciplinary work. In this study, for example, one has first to understand the economic as well as political assumptions made about growth in the agricultural sector and the possible alternative

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[1]The political economy approach referred to here is derived from the methodology suggested by Norman T. Uphoff and Warren F. Ilchman in The Political Economy of Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), "The New Political Economy," where they state:

> The focus on interaction of alternatives and valuations, on choices and consequences, gives a quite different slant. Though in the absence of any significant change in the existing environment there may be a .8 probability of a particular outcome, what social science should seek to establish are what actions will raise that probability if the outcome is desired, or reduce it if undesired. In the 'socio-sphere', unlike the laboratory, outcomes can be affected by modifying people's estimations of their net costs or benefits from a particular course of action. Thus, the knowledge sought is pertinent to an ex ante calculus of economic, social, and political consequences of choice.
>
> p. 16

It is therefore important to note that it is a methodology referred to and not the full range of neo-Marxist theoretical assumptions of political economy though a neo-Marxist may emphathize with the seeming paramountcy of economics in this study.

strategies developed by economists. This does not mean the disciplines lose their distinctiveness -- only that they gain complementarity.

For this study, once the decision was made to work on the political implications of a particular strategy for agrarian change, it became apparent that little material exists on the subject in political science. Considerable work has been done in other fields on the means through which change may be effected, the changes each may cause in the affected parts of the social system involved, and as regards politics, on how the "failure" of agricultural modernization may contribute to revolutionary movements. Most of the latter works tend to be speculative in that they link the "failure" of agricultural modernization with other "failures": e.g., the inability of administrative units to implement policies or more generally, the failure of modern political institutions to penetrate rural areas. That is, most of these studies are done from the "top" and do not come to grips with the local dynamics of rural change.

Two notable exceptions to this observation must be cited. The first, Eric R. Wolf's Peasant Wars of the Twientieth Century,[1] links social change arising from the transition from subsistence peasant to commercial farming with wider political change. He traces political linkages between urban and rural areas which seemingly make rural participation in revolutions possible. This is a highly suggestive piece for anyone interested in pursuing the subject.

Second, Barrington Moore, Jr.'s The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, (despite arguments over the interpretations of particular

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[1]Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

historical events) relates types of agrarian systems and the conditions under which they change, to particular political outcomes.[1] Both works attempt to come to an understanding of agrarian organization in various permutations in order to understand rural change and its impact on the wider political systems involved. It is this link that needs to be developed, as there are qualitative differences between rural and urban organization.[2]

Besides these, there are other works of particular utility for a variety of more specific purposes which are cited in the study and bibliography. Still, there is remarkably little appreciation in political science of the importance of agrarian systems and change for political development. Much emphasis for example, is placed on urban and state level politics without a recognition of the fact that much of what occurs at these levels has its roots in "agraria". Some of this may have to do with the origins of most current political science research which is based on the modern American experience. In the field of political development, it may stem from the emphasis placed on the dependent variables or indicators of "modernization": industrialization, urbanization, differentiation, etc. This emphasis tends to treat antecedent conditions as an undifferentiated whole.[3] There is some change

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[1]Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[2]The distinctive aspects of rural organization are developed below in Chapter VI in relation to political mobilization.

[3]There are exceptions of course. See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," originally published in the American Political Science Review (September 1961), 493-514 and reprinted in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change, second edition (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), pp. 384-405. Also see David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization

in outlook, but it is apparent that the importance of agrarian change is just being rediscovered.[1]

This study then, is the start of an attempt by one person to understand the relationship between agrarian and political change. The first chapter is a discussion of the assumptions held by policy makers about change and the resulting policies. The second chapter provides background information about India's socio-political environment and the areas in which field work was conducted. Turning to the data, Chapter III is focused on the extent to which technical breakthroughs in grain production have been adopted by the farmers in the villages studied to see the extent to which stated assumptions about change are empirically borne out. In Chapter IV I address the effects of economic change on the socio-economic system of the villages studies; primarily the displacement of agricultural tenants and laborers.

The effects of these changes on villagers' levels of well-being are discussed in Chapter V, and the next two chapters deal with the impact of change on the respondents' political outlook and behavior. In the concluding chapter the results of economic change are analyzed within the parameters posed by the two goals of growth and equality. Finally, suggestions are made for an alternative strategy for change which, to

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(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) in which an attempt is made to develop a typology of "traditional" societies. The Deutsch article focuses on differential responses to "modernization" which, of course presupposes differential traditional conditions.

[1] I use the term "rediscovered" advisedly since many studies of agrarian change and the role of government in such change used to be done in the United States -- mainly in the early part of this century. Agriculture has been rediscovered primarily through studies of "developing" nations.

the author's mind, requires fewer political costs in the longer run without sacrificing increased production which is obviously and urgently needed.

CHAPTER I

THE ISSUES

As stated, this study was undertaken to discover the effect of agricultural change if any, on the political attitudes and behavior of farmers, agricultural tenants, and landless labor in Rajasthan, India. Agricultural change was studied in the context of India's Intensive Agricultural Areas and High Yielding Varities Programmes since it is under these schemes that the greater part of governmental inputs and efforts are channeled to increase production and raise the levels of well-being in the rural sector.

The study has its origins in premises drawn from the body of thought on political and economic development. There are areas of overlap between the two: politics determines the kind and pace of economic change, while economic change affects the political system through new demands and conflicts created by differential impact. Central to the process is the distribution of benefits from economic growth, the demands placed for these on the political system, and dislocations in employment and status caused by the process. In the language of political economy, there are certain goals posited for the Indian political system. Foremost among these are those of social and economic quality and better living standards for all citizens.[1] The means used to attain

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[1]See the Preamble, The Constitution of India (Delhi: The Government Press, 1967).

any goal may have differing impacts on diverse groups. The purpose of this study is to discover what these have been for one set of policies and the costs they have entailed for the political system. An outline is provided for an alternative approach suggesting means which might require fewer political costs in the long run.

The bulk of writings on political and economic development stress their inter-relationship.[1] It is one of the accepted notions of political development that economic change may intensify existing conflict. New cleavages are created through the redistribution of goods and services. Research has been conducted on differential economic impacts and some on the effects of these on system maintenance or revolution. Overall, however, little analysis has been done to analyze the political effects of economic change until conflict reaches revolutionary proportions. Scholars who emphasize system maintenance stress that variable above the quality of stability required for it. Between total quiescense and revolution lies a wide range of possible action and reaction and it is this spectrum that is of interest here.

The primary theme then is that of conflict as a product of economic change. The assumption is that people regardless of cultural preconditioning respond either positively or negatively to changes affecting their lives. Their reaction will focus on the authority felt to be responsible for those changes. In this sense, politics reflects

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[1] Among many others, see Irving Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968) and The Challenge of World Poverty (New York: Vintage Books, 1970). Horowitz stresses the revolutionary potential of change which he sees as perhaps the only certain way in which social justice can be attained. Huntington, on the other hand, feels the maintenance of a competitive system is the answer.

economics. The decision to induce change (and its kind and degree) is political, but here politics reflects rather than initiates.

Tied to this is another assumption. Economic change increases political mobilization. Groups positively affected by economic programs may see it in their interest to support actively the authority felt to be responsible for their benefits: an effort might be made either to increase or at least to maintain their present level. Those perceiving themselves to be deprived may participate to press for changes in policy. Participation may occur within established processes, or if those are perceived as hostile, it may be extra-systemic.

The Indian situation adds another dimension. Channels exist for an expression of support or discontent, and in such situations, conflict will be contained within the system unless the extent of perceived deprivation undermines its legitimacy. In the Indian case, the electoral process and devolution of authority for economic development to the district and block levels provide several potential levels of participation and _foci_ of authority. The electoral process probably hastens political mobilization. Promises made during campaigns elicit support. If they are not kept, one should expect support for opposition parties or candidates to rise over time. If, however, participants doubt they will receive benefits from any party then they may seek extra-legal means of expressing discontent. Thus, while an open electoral system may contain conflict in the short term, it will heighten conflict if benefits are not/cannot be distributed fairly widely through society.

These are the main assumptions of the study. It should be clear that the concern here is not with the entire process of political and economic development: the urban and industrial sectors are omitted.

The study deals with a specific problem faced by Indian policy-makers in changing rural India. Its main findings should be relevant for situations in which "production first" strategies are pursued with the assumption that resultant social and political changes can be treated separately and sequentially. They should be especially relevant if such strategies are pursued under resource constraints similar to those in India (a scarcity of land and capital and an abundance of labor).[1]

The study is derived from the central concepts of the development syndrome.[2] The first idea borrowed from the literature is that a major difference between "traditional" and "modern" politics lies in the derivation of political legitimacy. Older forms of political authority derived theirs from transcendental or other sources (e.g., the divine right of kings). Modern regimes at least try to gain (or justify) theirs from the governed. This implies a minimal amount of responsiveness to the citizens of a polity, but not necessarily representative government (though this is the case in India). It can mean that as governments seek to widen their support base by meeting demands from various groups, power becomes more widely dispersed.[3]

Central to the concept of responsiveness is the distribution of goods and services in society. Governments barter these in return for support. A result that may be at least minimally desired by government

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[1]For a good example of "production first" strategies see the Asian Agricultural Survey (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1968), passim.

[2]Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). See especially, "Crises of Political Development," by Binder, pp. 3-72.

[3]See S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization, Protest, and Change (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966); Binder, op. cit.; and John Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), passim.

is a Pareto Optimal situation, but that is seldom feasible since the goods and services are normally in short supply. Governmental capacity contributes to the establishment of distribution patterns. Capacity is at least partially dependent on bases of support. For example, if a government depends on a feudal landowning class for its power, then the dispersal of land and other agricultural resources to tenants will be limited by the landed aristocracy's interests. A mobilized peasantry may enable government to spread benefits more widely thus expanding its numerical base of support. By meeting peasant demands, however, power will also become more widely dispersed which in itself may place constraints on future policy options.

Under conditions of change, the question of distribution can reach crisis proportions when citizens are given and use their equal chances for participation. They are aware that by so doing they have the opportunity to obtain benefits others in society have. Since all groups have interests -- some of which may be diametrically opposed to others -- not all will be fully satisfied. The resulting conflict is a normal part of the political process. Much of it may be over scarce economic resources but can also center on access to power and status. All this is obvious to the student of political science.

Another point -- also familiar to political scientists -- is that it is government's role to mediate between conflicting groups. This can be done by (1) meeting demands where possible, (2) manipulating them, or substituting other desired goods for those demanded, or (3) by suppressing the groups, their demands or both.[1] It is understood that the

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[1]One might include Edelman's idea of the substitution of symbolic for tangible goods. See Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics

more developed a polity, the more capacity it has to use the two former options and they will be preferred. This is related to the idea of political development as characterized by responsive, if not representative, government.[1]

What is not so apparent to the political scientist is that strategies for economic and political development may be quite divergent, if not mutually exclusive phenomena. This calls for a discussion of what economic development often entails.

The main aim of economic development is an increase in a nation's wealth (measured in a number of ways), with an assumed concomitant increase in its individual citizen's levels of well-being. These may be brought about by the application of modern technology to increase production and consumption in all sectors of society. Since this study deals with the agricultural sector of India, the discussion below centers on its development.

A first step is to distinguish "traditional" agriculture from that which is considered "modern".[2] Typically, the former is characterized as labor-intensive, using "backward" technology resulting in low productivity per unit of land and labor input. It is peasant farming: subsistence cultivation with minimal involvement in markets. Cultivation is a small scale family enterprise: for instance, in feudal systems, land is divided among tenants on the basis of what a family with animal

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(Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1967). See especially, Chapter 2, Part III.

[1]See Eisenstadt and Binder, op. cit.

[2]The author's doubts about the utility and validity of these concepts are strong as they are about anything suggesting a strict dichotomy. They are suggestive of trends, however, and are used here to illustrate the point and because they are commonly used in the literature.

power can manage.[1] Modern agriculture conversely, utilizes capital-intensive, advanced technology, and participates fully in monetized markets. While a family may still own and operate a farm, the scale of production is considerably expanded with the aid of modern mechanical implements replacing animal power. Productivity per unit of land and labor is assumed to be higher with the use of new scientific techniques.

The modernization of agriculture implies a potential for high returns to investment through the production advantage of new seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and farm machinery. Though the cost of inputs is higher, increased production brings the farmer greater profits than he could earn previously. However as improvements are introduced into situations where pressure on land is high and landownership is concentrated though cultivation is by tenants and/or agricultural labor, the latter two classes of persons are rendered obsolete. As the scale of production is raised by mechanization, landowners typically resume their farms for self-cultivation. Biochemical improvements can be used on any sized farm with the same "returns to scale"; large machines obviously cannot.

Often as agricultural modernization occurs there is no additional land for displaced persons to colonize. One can argue that high tenancy rates are partially a result of population pressure on land. Also, technological change in agriculture (e.g., in the United States and Europe) arose from the necessity to feed growing populations at a time

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[1]See Eric R. Wolf, Peasants, Foundations of Modern Anthropology Series (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 1-59. For modern agriculture, see Theodore Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

when agricultural labor became expensive and scarce. Nonetheless, it always causes dislocation and affected persons move into urban areas seeking alternate employment. Industry is seldom able to utilize heavy flows of labor as it is a sector employing capital intensive technology. Dislocated peasants are often unskilled and illiterate. The result is urban slums. In cities migrants are exposed to new goods and amenities -- and particularly to the rising living standards of the middle and upper classes. Even factory workers through unions participate in the upward economic cycle. Thus it is that rising expectations combine with absolute deprivation to form a potential for revolution.[1]

Political science is not oblivious to these developments. It deals with them in the following manner. It accepts the theorem that economic change can cause instability. The literature traces causes of instability to rapid transition that leads to anomie, displacement of persons from traditionally held occupations, rising expectations and greater inequalities in wealth and power, at least in the short run. A combination of these leads to competition over power and wealth by mobilized groups where it may appear in the form of class or communal conflict. The process also mobilizes groups who may not have been participants in the political system, causing them to place additional demands on it. The strain of transition often occurs when political institutions themselves are characterized by low levels of legitimacy.[2]

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[1]See Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); and Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). This syndrome has, of course, been studied by many scholars and runs through the development literature, particularly anatomies of military coups d'etat in Africa and Latin America.

[2]See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., Political Development

The problem is that political scientists tend to agree with current methods and strategies of economic development, accepting them as inevitable.[1] That is, modern technology must be applied to production regardless of social and political consequences. The divergence between the desired ends of political and economic development can be further clarified through an exploration of the implications of this strategy.

Governments function with a scarcity of resources. As economic growth continues the overall resource pool may increase, but it is seldom sufficient. The economists argue that scarce resources should be invested in farmers and areas which have the highest growth potential.[2] It takes considerably less to raise their productivity and the assumption is that there will be a "ripple effect" whereby other farmers and areas seeing higher profits will opt voluntarily over time for new techniques. The result is a policy favoring larger farmers over smaller ones, and wealthier regions over their more impoverished neighbors.

The preferential treatment of larger farmers also has a political base. These are often citizens who can provide the most support -- both financial and numerical (through clients) -- for political leaders.

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and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), pp. 384-405; Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife," American Political Science Review 62, 4 (December 1968), 1104-1124; and Huntington and Binder, op. cit.

[1]Or at least (which is less justifiable) we tend to assume that such things are someone else's responsibility, which leaves one with the conclusion that political and economic development cannot possibly occur together though history has plenty of cases to the contrary.

[2]See below: the discussion of the Intensive Agricultural Development Schemes in India. Additionally, see W. Arthur Lewis, Development Planning (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 58-61; John W. Mellor, The Economics of Agricultural Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970 edition), pp. 296-298.

Where tenants and hired laborers constitute a high proportion of the agricultural classes, the control held by landowners over their economic well-being can be translated into political power. If, as in the Indian case larger landowners are also money-lenders, their control may extend over smaller owner-cultivators as well. For a government or political party with limited resources, this is perhaps the cheapest way to gain support at least in the short run.

There are two areas of conflict arising out of this strategy: the first is potential inter-regional conflict. Those areas not receiving benefits may withhold support from ruling parties. Inter-regional conflicts are beyond the scope of this study, but analyses of election results in India can lead one to conclude that they are a possibility.[1]

The second point of conflict is of concern here: inter-class conflict. As mentioned above, tenants and labor normally are displaced in the course of agricultural modernization. Displacement is not confined to these two groups though they may be the first; in the longer run, the small and middle-sized owners also have to go.[2] Large machines require larger farms: landowners who mechanize expand their farms to rationalize their capital investment. As arable land is limited, they expand at the expense of small and middle owners. In primarily agricultural societies with the land distribution and population of India, this means the eventual dislocation of the majority of the total population. The

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[1]This is dealt with at some length by Francine Frankel, India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[2]This should be familiar to readers of Moore, op. cit. and to those who have studied the development of U.S. agriculture during the 1920s and 30s.

rate at which this occurs is directly related to the rate and scale of mechanization.[1]

Few countries are able to provide sufficient alternate employment for displaced persons which raises several questions. What is an optimum scale of farming given the costs and availability of manual and animal labor? Alternatively, given scarce capital, what are the costs of a capital-intensive agricultural sector to the overall economy? What is the magnitude of potential displacement, and what are the alternate employment possibilities for these displaced persons? Does the displacement mean a depression of the consumer market that would affect industrial growth? And finally, what are the political costs of dislocation? These political costs have two main sources: (1) landowners are no longer able to control the political choices and behavior of displaced tenants and laborers, and (2) deprivation may radicalize people. In the former case the costs of paying off displaced persons tend to be high, and in the latter, the legitimacy of the political system may come into question. There is a third alternative which may not entail direct political costs in the short to medium term: citizen apathy and despair. Such quiescence raises questions about the qualitative aspects of system stability.

In relating this discussion to the Indian context, the following points need to be kept in mind. While the avowed ideology of the country is to respond to people's needs to raise living standards for all, the government's perceived capacity leads it to meet demands of larger agriculturalists while manipulating those of smaller farmers, tenants

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[1]See Frankel and Moore, op. cit.; and Kusum Nair, The Lonely Furrow: Farming in the United States, Japan, and India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969).

and laborers. This suggests a political imperative preventing wider responsiveness. As long as landed groups are seen as able political mobilizers, responsiveness will be restricted.

Even so, government has not totally ignored rural areas; indeed, it could not do so. Some benefits are required even with the support of landed interests to gain that of the smaller man. These benefits are mainly collective goods. Government has increased vastly, the range of services available particularly in health, education, and transport. If the dynamic of rural change outlined does obtain, however, personal deprivation will overshadow gains made by collective goods. Collective goods, however, are cheaper to distribute than the enactment of policies dealing with issues of landownership and agricultural growth with equality. There are no groups who object to schools, clinics, and roads.

That agrarian change is causing displacement and insecurity is clear in the data. First, as in other areas of India, tenants in the villages studied are faced with less employment and security of tenure. Because of the particulars of tenancy legislation discussed further in the study, they are unable to lease in land as readily as before.

Aside from tenancy laws, agriculture has become a highly profitable enterprise. This means that landowners who previously saw their land as security, status symbol, and a means for securing their families' food, now view it as a commercial enterprise. Instead of leasing it to tenants and sharing the produce with them, they prefer to self-cultivate, hiring the fewest laborers possible. Active involvement in farming also gives the politically ambitious landowner control over inputs which in turn enhances his political stature.

Third, self-cultivation is possible with the availability of tractors capable of uniting large holdings into single cultivation units. This is not possible with animal power. Cultural restrictions which prohibit a Brahmin from touching a plow are overcome with discs and harrows attached to tractors.[1] In both villages studied tractors are used primarily for plowing and hauling produce to market. Increasingly, however, threshing and chaff cutting are also mechanically done. Tractorization of plowing itself eliminates the need for tenants and teams of oxen. It is debatable whether the increased man-hours necessitated by the more intensive cultivation of high yielding variety seeds means that more labor is hired.

Fourth, even should middle and small farmers desire modern inputs their access to resources will be restricted by the skewed land distribution pattern. As resources are scarce, those with power and influence can obtain them. Landownership is by and large, coincident with power and influence. It has historically been so and the present system tends to reinforce this. Government is the dominant distributor and the dispersal of inputs is unavoidably political. That is to be expected, but what is important is the socio-political setting in which they are distributed. It is the coincidence of landownership patterns with caste, status, wealth and political resources that makes the difference.

At the time field work was conducted, smaller cultivators were making higher profits than before due to inflationary farm prices which rose due to the drought among other factors. This has to be seen as a

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[1]Traditionally Brahmins may not touch the plow. For an interesting discussion of this, and other distinct caste practices, see Philip Mason, Patterns of Dominance (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), Chapter 7.

short-term windfall assuming that rises in basic food commodities spark similar reactions in other sectors of the economy. Further there is a limit to how high prices can be permitted to rise given non-farm incomes. As agrarian change proceeds and food shortages are overcome, larger farmers will displace smaller ones as happened in the United States. At best small and marginal cultivators can remain as petty landowners who lease their lands to larger ones or who continue in subsidized subsistence farming protected by the state (similar to Mexican ejidatarios).[1]

How these issues relate to the political system is the fifth point. The data show that access to land and employment form the bases of political attitudes and activity. Political alternatives are limited for those with little or no land as they view Congress as the only party with the capacity to deliver benefits. This suggests that continued manipulation of demands will lead to increased levels of political frustration over time.

Related to this is the assumption that nations such as India are not doomed to perpetual "backwardness". The argument does imply, however, that if modernization is to mean the advancement of a few to the detriment of the many, stable political change is a moot point. Stability in and of itself may be neither desirable nor undesirable; it depends on the value one assigns to any political system. It is of

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[1]See V. M. Rao, "Village Lease Markets for Agricultural Land," Economic and Political Weekly, Review of Agriculture, IX, #26, June 29, 1974, p. A-58 where he discusses the former possibility. For Mexico, see Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Social Aspects of Agrarian Structure in Mexico," in Stavenhagen, ed., Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 225-270, passim.

concern here, however, in several ways: insofar as it is necessary for policy makers to formulate and implement policies, in relation to attaining the goals of better living standards for all, and insofar as the stated goals of the established system are threatened by the means chosen to reach them.

After all, most of the scientific techniques for raising agricultural productivity (seeds and chemicals) can be utilized on virtually any sized plot. Evidence will be cited to show that the smaller farmer is more productive (per unit of land) than the larger because he has to depend on his small plot for his entire livelihood. Finally, modernization cannot be equated with large agricultural production units in demographic situations similar to India's. The posited goals of better living standards (the necessary component being increased production) and socio-economic equality are not separate sequences of a change process. Means can be found whereby both can be attained or at least pursued concomitantly. This is the major task faced by social scientists concerned with policy making.

The Agricultural Programs

Before proceeding it is necessary to discuss the specific policies and programs enacted for agricultural change in India. The two villages studied were among the first in the state of Rajasthan to be included in the Intensive Agricultural Areas Programme. Agricultural change is assumed to be greater in areas covered by the intensive programs by both the Government of India and outside observers.

The Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme (IADP) was the first concerted effort made by Government of India to increase food production

rapidly. Population growth combined with bad crop years from 1957-59 created food shortages. While agricultural production had been part of earlier community development schemes under the First and Second Five Year Plans, it became apparent that a concentrated effort would have to be made in the area of production alone simply to keep pace with an increasing population.

The Intensive programs grew out of an approach suggested by a Ford Foundation team of experts.[1] With little modification this has remained the basic guideline for agricultural modernization. It calls for an "integrated" or "package" approach to increasing production assuming that if farmers are provided with technical inputs along with the knowledge for their use, production will increase. All farmers should adopt the more profitable techniques given that they are economically rational (or "profit-maximizers"). It is further assumed that backward technology has been the major constraint to higher production.

Recognizing the immense under-utilization of human labor, the Team saw in the "package" approach a means of harnessing labor for productive ends by (1) intensifying cultivation and (2) creating greater employment through public works linked with production activities. The latter would include things such as minor irrigation and soil conservation projects.

Finally, there was the view that resources should be concentrated in those areas where "... the combination of water, soil, and other resources indicate that food production increases will be the greatest."[2]

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[1]The Agricultural Production Team sponsored by the Ford Foundation, Government of India, Report on India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It (New Delhi: Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation, April 1959).

[2]Ibid., p. 5

> More effort should be concentrated on the most promising areas for wheat and rice production, i.e., those which had the most rapid rate of increase in the recent past, and which have also the highest potential for rapid large increases in the years immediately ahead...
>
> These areas will, the Team believes, increase India's food production more rapidly than others, if given allocations of fertilizers in combination with other improved practices, such as plant protection measures, improved seeds and water for irrigation. Attention to other areas should not be reduced. But in the national interest, the Team believes that increased effort should be immediately directed to the most responsive areas.[1] (Emphasis added)

Specific recommendations spelled out the "package" itself. Two major areas of suggestions were (1) better economic and administrative arrangements and (2) the better use of physical and biological resources.

In the first section of its report the Team called for price stabilization at remunerative levels. They suggested that Government set a procurement price for food grains well before the cropping season:

> To encourage increases in food-grain production, the cultivator should be assured of a price which will enable him to invest in fertilizer, seed and new equipment knowing that, with average crop conditions, he can repay any debts with the added income that results from adoption of improved practices. Such assurance would constitute an important incentive to increased production.[2]

Second, the Team pointed to the need for land reform which in their view meant establishing security of tenure rather than any redistribution of land. The main argument was that security would enable cultivators to invest in land improvements. As for the landless, the basic consensus assumed an insufficiency of land to assure all rural persons

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 25.

"adequately" sized farms. For the landless, employment would have to be found elsewhere and joint or cooperative farming arrangements might be made for farmers with marginal holdings. The fear that land redistribution could decrease productivity is clear:

> We recognize the need for considering programmes for the relief of those who have no land, and of those who cultivate too little land. But it is imperative to achieve this objective in ways that will not retard the increases in food production which are vital to national welfare. Some progress can be made by arranging for reallocation, improvement and operation of potentially productive lands that are now idle, or are being used very ineffectively. Care should be exercised, however, so as not to break up farms that are efficiently and productively operated.[1]

Along with security of tenure, the Team recognized the need for consolidation of land holdings to encourage farmers to fully utilize their land and invest in improvements.

The study also called for a number of institutional changes: the provision of adequate credit at reasonable rates through cooperatives, the evaluation of a farmer's credit-worthiness on the basis of production rather than landownership, and the realignment of governmental priorities to meet investments required in the agricultural sector. A part of this was to mobilize and involve local leaders and government functionaries in the field in the process of agricultural modernization to ensure implementation at the local level.

Finally, an urgent plea was made for maximum inputs to be made into seed, fertilizer and pesticides development and manufacture. Better facilities were to be developed for food storage, marketing and

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[1] Ibid., p. 29.

processing. This was the integral concept of presenting the farmer with his "package" of inputs.

These recommendations were put into effect under what came to be known as the Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme (IADP). In the first year (1961-62), select villages in three districts were taken up on a pilot basis. Encouraged by early successes, thirteen additional districts were added. In 1964-65 a similar program was introduced into districts with good agricultural potential around the country. This was called the Intensive Agricultural Areas Programme (IAAP). Both villages studied for this project were among the first to be incorporated into it. Rather than concentrate on all-round agricultural development, this program focused on major crops in each area. According to both government and outside observers, however, the real distinction in agriculture has come with the High Yielding Varieties Programme (HYV), initiated in 1966-67.

The HYV scheme went into effect in those districts already under the IAAP or IADP programs. The basic concept of the "package" still obtains but the main breakthrough is the technical one of hybridization of wheat and rice seed. The new dwarf varieties produce more than double that of indigeneous ones under optimal conditions. The potential of these seeds (the major successes are in wheat), and their consequential contribution to national food stocks in 1967-68 (a year with good rains), started talk of the Green Revolution not only in India, but throughout Asia.

There are two thrusts to the HYV program. One is the increase in food production generally over any given cropping season. The other is the development of seeds of shorter duration which enable land use to be

intensified. Most of the seeds developed have a shorter maturation period enabling farmers to take an additional crop each year. As laid out in the Fourth Five Year Plan, the following are the directions in which the schemes need further development:

> 6.18 The rate of increase in production of foodgrains and major commercial crops envisaged is much higher than that accomplished in the past. Since there is very limited scope for bringing additional land under cultivation, the strategy for realising the production targets is primarily dependent on intensive agriculture and consists of the following key elements:
>
> (1) continued expansion of irrigation facilities and reorientation of irrigation practices; optimum use of water, and in particular, integrated use of ground and surface water; improvement in the utilisation of existing irrigation potential through special programmes; and measures to increase intensity of cropping;
>
> (2) expansion in the supply of fertilisers, plant protection materials, farm machinery and credit;
>
> (3) full exploitation of the possibilities of raising yields opened by the new seed varieties in the case of cereals;
>
> (4) intensive efforts in selected suitable areas for raising the yield levels of major commercial crops; and
>
> (5) improvement in the agricultural marketing system in the interests of the producer along with assurance of minimum prices for major agricultural commodities.[1]

Government agencies increasingly sell only hybrid seeds. All of these need more irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides, which in turn require higher financial outlays by the farmer. Incentives are given to encourage adoption of the new techniques: government finances demonstrations on chosen farmers' fields, supplies are basically

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[1]Government of India, Fourth Five Year Plan Draft, 1969-74 (New Delhi: The Planning Commission, March 1969), p. 113.

subsidized as government absorbs the costs of the extension delivery system. There are no taxes on agricultural income and land tax is nominal.[1] Government's support prices for major food grains have risen consistently over the past five to six years and selling on the free market brings the producer a better rate.[2] Loans and subsidies are available for the purchase of seed, fertilizers and farm machinery or other capital inputs. The idea is to provide the farmer with every incentive to produce more.

Program Implementation

The official distributive machinery functions as follows. Before each cropping season Village Level Workers (the lowest level of the extension staff) work with farmers in their "circle" (approximately 10 villages) to encourage utilization of new inputs. They forward an estimate of the amount of high yielding seeds required in their area to the Agricultural Extension Officers at the Panchayat Samiti (Development Block Office -- approximately 100 villages). The requests from all VLW's are combined and forwarded to the District Agricultural Officer from whom they go to the state level. It is the responsibility of the state to procure enough seed and other inputs. The State Ministry of Agriculture also sets a target number of hectares it would like to have

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[1] In the year field work was conducted, government proposed a tax on income if a person's joint income from farming and other occupations exceeds Rs. 5,000/- ($666) annually. The highest tax paid in the villages studies was Rs. 150/- ($20.00) for about 200 acres of which 40 were irrigated.

[2] For 1972-73 the wheat procurement price ranged from Rs. 75-85 per quintal depending on the variety. For 1973-74, it rose to Rs. 150/- ($20.00). Free market selling in May 1973 ranged from Rs. 110 (in the village) to Rs. 160 (in Jaipur city) ($14.66 to $21.33). In 1974, prices as high as Rs. 260/- ($34.66) were reported.

covered by the hybrids each season. These are based on the productive capacities of different regions and also on the aims of the National Five Year and Annual Plans. The targets are broken down for each area and field extension agents are expected to work with cultivators to encourage adoption to meet them.

When received the inputs are sold through the Panchayat Samitis and farmers' cooperatives (the former carry seed and pesticides, the latter chemical fertilizers). Samitis are encouraged to conduct one or two-day "training camps" before each cropping season to keep farmers abreast of the latest recommendations and techniques.

Farmers may also purchase seed directly from any outlet of the National Seeds Corporation (NSC) which is the major distributor of officially certified seed. There are branches in both the cities of Jaipur and Bharatpur. Farmers may go to private seed stores or mail-order companies. Some stores sell NSC seed in addition to other stock. These also provide fertilizer and pesticides. All these supplies cost more through private channels though they are often more readily available. Finally, farmers can go directly to the major government seed production farms (though very few actually do so). The Agricultural Universities at Delhi (Pusa), Ludhiana, Pantnagar, and Udaipur will sell directly to the cultivator.

In order to meet the higher capital requirements of the new inputs, official credit is provided. Since nationalization in 1969, all banks have been encouraged to open rural branches for credit supply and small savings. The aim is to establish branches wherever there is a revenue collection center. Interest rates at banks range from 8.5 percent for short-term loans of less than Rs. 2,000/- ($266.66) to 10.5 percent on

either short or long-term loans of Rs. 5,000/- ($666.66). Credit is available for a variety of purposes: small farm improvements, recurring expenses, major capital improvements and investments.

Short-term loans repayable in six months to one year are obtainable for seed, fertilizers, pesticides, labor expenses and water or electricity bills. Most of these are payments in kind. Indirect loans are given for capital improvements: new wells, the repair of old ones or the purchase and installation of pump sets. Payment for these is made to the contractor upon completion of the work. Medium-term loans are repayable between three and five years. In addition to capital investments mentioned above, they also include things such as cement water channels, land levelling, fencing, and the development of ancillary industry such as dairy or poultry farming, orchards and fisheries. Finally, long-term loans repayable in five to seven years are mainly for the purchase of farm machinery. For these farmers are required to own a minimum amount of land: twelve acres for a fourteen horsepower tractor, and thirty acres for a fifty horsepower one, all of which must be irrigated.[1]

Besides banks, further short and medium term credit is provided by local cooperative societies. Anyone may join upon payment of a Rs. 11/- ($1.47) fee. The bulk of the societies' capital is provided by government through the banks. Terms are similar to those at the banks but normally farmers are required to own 2.5 acres in order to qualify.

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[1]Data are from interview between Barry H. Michie and the Bank Manager of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, Hanumangarh.

Interest rates are 9 percent for all types of loans. For large amounts of money, farmers need to go to the banks.[1]

Finally, as far as official sources of credit are concerned, farmers may go to the Land Mortgage Bank. Here both medium and long-term loans are available for capital improvements. The repayment periods are somewhat longer than at the regular banks and hence farmers seem to prefer using this source out of all official credit outlets.

The best utilized source of credit despite the cheaper official funds, is the village money-lender. Credit from this source may be obtained in either cash, grain, or in the form of a monthly credit ceiling at the money-lender's general store for the purchase of items of everyday use. Repayment is normally in kind and is made after each harvest. Interest rates vary in the two villages studied, but range from 12 to 50 percent. The role of the money-lender will be discussed in depth (Chapters III and IV).

One more program for farmers should be noted briefly. It was to begin in Bharatpur in the year following field work (1973-74); lists of farmers to be included were being prepared. This program is to channel farm inputs to small and marginal farmers through the Small Farmers Development Agency and the Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers Development Schemes. By the beginning of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1969) there was widespread recognition in official quarters that the gains of the Green Revolution technologies had accrued mainly to larger farmers holding high status and power in their communities. The aim of these schemes is to circumvent the socio-economic setting which prevents

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[1]Data are from interviews with cooperative chairmen and secretaries in both villages.

wider dissemination of inputs and directly reach cultivators in the lower strata. The idea of the package still obtains and this program will be discussed further in the study.[1]

With this outline of the issues and programs in mind, we turn now to a description of the areas in which research was conducted, along with a brief discussion of the politico-administrative framework and the social setting.

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[1]Data are from V. R. Gaikwad, Small Farmers, State Policy and Implementation (Hyderabad, India: National Institute of Community Development, 1971), The "Introduction."

CHAPTER II

THE SETTING

This chapter provides a background sketch of politics, administrative arrangements and a description of the districts and villages in which research was conducted. Though the following is a simplification of the overall social, economic and political scene, it should provide the necessary points of reference needed to interpret the findings presented in subsequent chapters.

The Politico-Administrative Framework

Having gained independence from Britain in 1947, India became a republic in 1950. The country is a federation of states: most constitutional powers reside with her component states and residual powers belong to the center. India has a parliamentary form of government headed by an indirectly elected President. Elections for parliament and the state assemblies must be held at least every five years. Five general elections have been conducted on the basis of universal adult franchise since 1952.[1] The last parliamentary elections were called one year early in 1971 while the state elections were held on time in 1972.

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[1]The age of majority is 21 years. Elections took place in 1951-52, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1971 (parliament only - called early), and 1972 (states' assemblies - held on schedule). Several states have had mid-term polls with the resignations of their governments, and of course by-elections have been held to fill seats vacated by death, and other causes.

Turnout ranges from 45.7 percent for the first election to 61.33 percent in 1967.[1] These are national figures; there is considerable variation between the states.

The central government has been formed by the Indian National Congress to date; the party has been a dominant force in Indian politics since its rise as the main nationalist movement in the early years of this century.[2] Several states have had opposition governments of both the right and the left, and coalitions as well. The Congress itself has never won a majority of votes: its highest support was 47.78 percent in 1957, and this margin of plurality has declined since then.[3] The fragmented nature of the opposition permits it to retain control at the center.

Each eligible voter elects his member of the state assembly and parliament directly. Approximately nine state constituencies make up one parliamentary one and there are between 700,000 and 1,000,000 persons in the latter. Districting is the prerogative of the Central Election Commision of India and major redrawing of boundaries takes place with each decennial census though changes can be made in between. Each constituency elects only one member. If the population of any constituency is 60 percent or more scheduled caste or tribe, it is

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[1]Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), p. 186.

[2]The party split in 1969: the Prime Minister's wing is called the Congress-Reorganization wing, and the old Congress is referred to as Congress Party-Opposition, or in common political parlance, "The Syndicate". Each contests elections as separate parties.

[3]Indian Election Commission, Report on the Fourth General Elections in India, Vol. I (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1968), pp. 94-95 (adapted).

reserved for candidates of those communities regardless of party affiliation.[1]

The logistics of conducting elections in India are complex. It takes in excess of a million and a half persons in various capacities. Polling booths are situated so that no person has to travel more than three miles. The first elections took more than four months to complete, the ones held in 1967 were completed in one week and less time is required now. The eligible electorate in 1971-72 was 273,134,889 persons.[2]

> Voters queue at the station, and a polling officer checks each voter's identity slip against his name on the electoral roll. The voter's finger is then marked with indelible ink, and he receives two ballots, pink for the assembly, white for the Lok Sabha (parliament). He marks both ballots secretly with a rubber stamp on the symbol of the candidate for whom he wishes to vote, folds the ballots, and drops them into the box. Although the procedure is involved, the number of invalid votes has been relatively small, averaging 3 to 4 percent of the total cast. The whole procedure is scrutinized by polling agents representing each candidate. Their presence and assistance also serve to identify voters and prevent impersonations.[3]

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[1]The scheduled groups are so-called "backward" communities granted certain socio-political privileges in order to integrate them into the mainstream of Indian life. These groups have traditionally been discriminated against: either outcastes or tribal, non-Hindu groups. The Schedule is a Census device for identifying such communities and now is the only published record maintained of caste or tribe. The only other place where caste is listed is in land records. This is for purposes of making special land allotments to outcastes and tribal groups. It also helps the researcher to identify farmers since normally they would list only their first, and father's names both of which might be shared by several other persons. Of course the latter rationale is my own.

[2]Election Commission of India, Report on the Fifth General Election in India, Narrative and Reflective Part (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1973), p. 56.

[3]Hardgrave, op. cit., pp. 164-65.

Though over one hundred parties have contested elections since 1952, few are of national strength and even fewer have lasted through all five elections. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the main ones with their relative strengths both at the state and national levels. Relatively few constituencies (especially rural ones) have more than three-way contests in which all parties are serious contenders. Both villages studied were two-party constituencies with splinter elements of others.

India has twenty-three states, the boundaries of which coincide with those of major cultural/linguistic groups (see Figure 2.1). The state of Rajasthan where field work was done, assumed its present shape in 1956 with the merging of three regions: Rajputana (composed largely of the Rajput princely states), the Matsya Union (including parts of Shekawati and northeastern princely states), and Ajmer which had been directly under British rule. It is the second largest state in the area covering 13,212,956 square miles. The total population is 25,765,806 persons with a density of 194 persons per square mile.[1]

There are twenty-six districts in Rajasthan. Each is divided into a number of tehsils (revenue units), and panchayat samitis (development blocks) (see Figure 2.2). The tehsil staff consists of a tehsildar and a number of patwaris each of whom is responsible for the maintenance of land records and revenue collection in his "circle" of villages. The tehsildar is also responsible for certain law and order issues and for the collection of basic data such as crop estimates, rainfall, etc. He is asked to help during elections and the taking of each decennial census.

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[1]Data are from Census of India, 1971, Series 18, Rajasthan, Part II-A, (General Population Tables - abstracted from several tables).

TABLE 2.1

THE DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES, SEATS, AND VOTES IN LOK SABHA ELECTIONS, 1952-67

Parties	Number of Candidates	Number of Seats Won	% of Seats	% of Votes
1952				
Congress	472	364	74.4	45.00
C.P.I.	49	16	3.3	3.30
Socialist Party	256	12	2.5	10.60
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party	145	9	1.8	5.80
Hindu Mahasabha	31	4	0.8	0.95
Jana Sangh	93	3	0.6	3.10
Ram Rajya Parishad	55	3	0.6	2.03
Republican Party	27	2	0.4	2.36
Other parties	215	35	7.2	11.10
Independents	521	41	8.4	15.80
Total		489		
1957				
Congress	490	371	75.1	47.78
C.P.I.	108	27	5.4	8.92
Praja Socialist Party (S.P. and K.M.P.P.)	189	19	3.8	10.41
Jana Sangh	130	4	0.8	5.93
Republican Party	19	4	0.8	1.50
Hindu Mahasabha	19	1	0.2	0.86
Ram Rajya Parishad	15	--	--	0.38
Other parties	73	29	5.9	4.81
Independents	475	39	7.9	19.39
Total		494		
1962				
Congress	488	361	73.1	46.02
C.P.I.	137	29	5.9	9.96
Swatantra	172	18	3.6	6.80
Jana Sangh	198	14	2.8	6.44
Praja Socialist Party	166	12	2.4	6.84
D.M.K. (Tamilnadu only)	18	7	1.4	2.02
Socialist Party	107	6	1.2	2.49
Republican Party	69	3	0.6	2.78
Ram Rajya Parishad	35	2	0.4	0.55
Hindu Mahasabha	32	1	0.2	0.44
Other parties	64	14	2.9	4.31
Independents	497	27	5.5	12.27
Total		494		

TABLE 2.1--Continued

Parties	Number of Candidates	Number of Seats Won	% of Seats	% of Votes
1967				
Congress	516	283	54.42	40.73
Swatantra	179	44	8.46	8.68
Jana Sangh	250	35	6.73	9.41
D.M.K. (Tamilnadu only)	25	25	4.80	3.90
C.P.I.	109	23	4.42	5.19
Samyukta Socialist Party	122	23	4.42	4.92
C.P.I. (M.)	59	19	3.65	4.21
Praja Socialist Party	109	13	2.50	3.06
Republican Party	70	1	0.19	2.48
Other parties	65	19	3.65	3.67
Independents	865	35	6.73	13.75
Total		520		

Source: Adapted from W. H. Morris-Jones, Government and Politics in India (London: Hutchinson, 1966), pp. 163-66, and from the Indian Election Commission, Report on the Fourth General Elections in India, Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Government Press, 1968), pp. 94-95.

TABLE 2.2

THE DISTRIBUTION OF CANDIDATES, SEATS, AND VOTES IN STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, 1952-67

Parties	Number of Candidates	Number of Seats Won	% of Seats	% of Votes
1952				
Congress	3,153	2,246	68.4	42.20
Socialist Party	1,799	125	3.8	9.70
C.P.I.	465	106	3.2	4.38
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party	1,005	77	2.3	5.11
Jana Sangh	717	35	1.1	2.76
Ram Rajya Parishad	314	31	0.9	1.21
Hindu Mahasabha	194	14	0.4	0.82
Republican Party	171	3	0.1	1.68
Other parties and independents	7,492	635	19.3	32.14
Total		3,283		
1957				
Congress	3,027	2,012	64.9	44.97
C.P.I.	812	176	5.7	9.36

TABLE 2.2--Continued


Parties	Number of Candidates	Number of Seats Won	% of Seats	% of Votes
1957 (cont.)				
Praja Socialist (S.P. and K.M.P.P.)	1,154	208	6.7	9.75
Jana Sangh	584	46	1.5	3.60
Ram Rajya Parishad	146	22	0.7	0.69
Republican Party	99	21	0.7	1.31
Hindu Mahasabha	87	6	0.2	0.50
Other parties and independents	4,863	611	19.7	29.81
Total		3,102		
1962				
Congress	3,062	1,984	60.2	43.53
C.P.I.	975	197	6.0	10.42
Praja Socialist Party	1,149	179	5.4	7.69
Swatantra	1,012	170	5.2	6.49
Jana Sangh	1,135	116	3.5	5.40
Socialist Party	632	64	1.9	2.38
D.M.K. (Tamilnadu only)*	142	50	--	--
Ram Rajya Parishad	99	13	0.4	0.29
Republican Party	99	11	0.3	0.56
Hindu Mahasabha	75	8	0.2	0.24
Other parties and independents	5,313	555	16.8	23.00
Total		3,297		
1967				
Congress	3,443	1,694	48.59	39.96
Jana Sangh	1,607	268	7.70	8.78
Swatantra	978	257	7.37	6.65
Samyukta Socialist Party	813	180	5.16	5.19
D.M.K. (Tamilnadu only)*	174	138	3.96	4.34
C.P.I. (M.)	511	128	3.67	4.60
C.P.I.	625	121	3.47	4.13
Praja Socialist Party	768	106	3.04	3.40
Republican Party	378	23	0.66	1.53
Other parties	430	195	5.59	4.75
Independents	6,774	376	10.79	16.67
Total		3,486		

*In Tamilnadu in 1962 the D.M.K. gained 24.3 percent of the assembly seats and 27 percent of the vote. In 1967 it secured 59.4 percent of the seats and 44.66 percent of the vote.

Source: Ibid.

FIGURE 2.1


RAJASTHAN STATE



SOURCE: Census of India, 1961, Vol. XIV, Rajasthan, Part V-A (Jaipur, India: Census of Rajasthan, 1965).

FIGURE 2.2

INDIA: ELECTORAL-ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES



Key:

Directly elected: ⟶
Indirectly elected: - - - - →

The panchayat samitis have responsibility for local development and cover an area of approximately 100 villages. Government provides a technical staff from the civil services: agricultural, nutrition, and plant protection extension workers, village level workers, school teachers and administrators. It also provides financial and material resources to meet the needs of development schemes. A Block Development Officer is the senior administrator of the samiti and he may be a generalist administrator or increasingly is drawn from the ranks of technicians from the Ministry of Agriculture.

The administrative staff acts on the recommendation of the samiti itself: an indirectly elected council composed of the chairmen of directly elected village councils (gram panchayats). The sarpanchas composing the samiti choose a chairman from among themselves called the pradhan. Where the pradhan and/or members of the samiti are strong personalities, one finds active participation in developmental affairs. All too often, however, the samiti acts as a rubber stamp for governmental programs interfering only if an officer offends local sensitivities or leaders. Samitis and gram panchayats both have taxation powers but as is often the case anywhere, there is reluctance to use them and to rely on government funds.

Each pradhan is a member of his district level council (zilla parishad) and here again, the pradhans elect their chairman who is called a pramukh. Local government thus is indirectly elected. Though village council members are to be elected every five years, the last elections were held nine years ago. Each time an election is scheduled, it is either a year of drought, or there is a war with Pakistan. It is felt that such "unnatural situations" might detract from the fairness

of elections.[1] Local elections are fought on a non-partisan basis though in reality political parties are openly interested in their outcome. Villagers tend to identify panchayat members by their party affiliation.

The Districts

Jaipur and Bharatpur districts were selected for field study (see Figure 2.1). They were among the first to be incorporated into the Intensive Agricultural Areas and High Yielding Varities Programmes. Two main constraints led to their selection from a total of eleven possible districts.[2] The first was the two year drought: the districts of Udaipur, Bhilwara, and Chittorgarh as well as Pali, the original Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme district, were affected to the point that famine-relief and related considerations would have overshadowed all other variables. Second, due to the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the government of Rajasthan requested that research not be conducted in border areas which eliminated Sri Ganganagar, perhaps the most productive district in the state. Kota district, also very productive, had to be omitted because of certain political questions posed by the presence of an atomic reactor.

The remaining districts were Jaipur, Bharatpur, Alwar and Jhalawar. The first three are contiguous with Alwar situated between the other two. Agriculturally and socially Alwar overlaps with Jaipur and Bharatpur. Jhalawar was not included partially because of drought and also due to anticipated linguistic problems.

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[1] There was drought the year field work was conducted and the previous year there had been the war with Pakistan as a result of the Bangladesh conflict.

[2] Census of India, op. cit.

The population of Bharatpur district is 1,490,206 persons with all save 205,095 being classified as rural residents. The total area is 3,124.7 square miles with an overall density of 476.6 persons per square mile.[1] Bharatpur was added to Rajasthan in 1956. It is one of the most agriculturally productive areas of Rajasthan: most persons would name it and Sri Ganganagar as the two most "developed districts" in the state. Rainfall is greater than in other districts: around 60 inches per year.

Jaipur district has the state capital in Jaipur city, a place of considerable tourist fame. It is a fairly large district covering 5,405.4 square miles with a total population of 2,482,385 persons and a density of 455.13 per square mile. Though parts of the district are arid, other areas such as the portion in which field work was conducted have irrigation and are good agricultural regions. Rainfall is less than in Bharatpur: around 35 inches in a normal year.[2]

Both districts used to be independent princely states of British India. Internal affairs were conducted by the traditional rulers (rajas), under the watchful eyes of British commissioners. Each state had separate treaties with the British who controlled foreign affairs, defense and related matters. There was only an indirect link between reform groups in the states and the Congress nationalist movement until fairly late in the 1930s and 40s.[3] The reform groups called praja

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Informal links with the Congress were formed fairly early, but no formal ties were created partially due to the raja's antipathy to the nationalists in general and consequent suppression of anything vaguely related to it.

mandals, merged mainly with the Congress party after independence.[1] Currently, the major political forces are those of the Congress (R) and the right-wing Swatantra and Jan Sangh parties.[2] The former ruling families of both districts have been involved in the Swatantra party: the village studied in Jaipur had elected a Congress member of the state assembly for the first time in 1972, and the member from Bharatpur was the younger brother of the erstwhile maharajah though the village itself was a Congress village.[3]

Land relations in the two areas vary in their legal aspects but are similar in the resulting social stratification. Traditionally, Rajasthan had two dominant systems of land tenure. Large tracts were under what was known as the jagirdari system. Grants covering anywhere from a few to many villages would be given to subjects of rajas for services rendered. Though there have been legal questions raised as to the actual ownership of these areas, the jagirs provided income both for the intermediary landowners (jagirdars), and through them to the state. Land in each jagir was farmed by tenants who normally had hereditary, but oral leases.

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[1]These movements fought mainly for constitutional reforms in the princely states and only in the latter years linked these with a demand for independence. They wanted the formation of representative state assemblies and to limit the rajas' powers. The movements were largely urban. See K. L. Kamal, Party Politics in an Indian State (Delhi: S. Chand, 1969), and Richard Sisson, The Congress Party in Rajasthan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

[2]The Swatantra party was formally dissolved in 1974 -- former members are to work for a non-Communist, anti-Congress coalition group. The Congress (R) is Indira Gandhi's party - see above, p. 37, footnote.

[3]All privileges and titles of the former ruling families have been abolished along with compensation purses paid to them after independence when they lost revenue from their former principalities.

The other main form of agrarian organization was land directly owned by the state called khalsa. The village in Jaipur district was one such area. Here tenants were given rights of cultivation directly by the royal family of that particular state. Again, most leases were hereditary, but oral.

In between these two were special land grants given to priestly families or traders. A number of Brahmins who owned land in the Jaipur village had got it from such muafi grants; these were essentially religious trusts enabling the priests to earn their livelihood. Since Brahmins are forbidden by custom to touch a plow, these lands were also farmed by tenants.

Certain other areas of the state were under "permanent peasant settlements": ryotwari settlements. Neither area studied came under this. Permutations of these main types abounded with small legal differences between them. The major point to be remembered is that most areas were under tenant cultivation with revenue paid (in either cash or kind), to intermediary landowners or directly to the state. Aside from land taxes, tenants might also be requred to furnish free labor to either the state, landlord, or both, to pay extra cesses on ceremonial occasions, use of common grazing lands, etc. The amounts and kinds of taxes varied throughout what is now Rajasthan, however, the consensus is that they were uniformly onerous burdens for tenants to bear.[1]

Shortly after independence, legislation was passed to eliminate the intermediary landlords: jagirdars in Rajasthan, zamindars,

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[1]Data are from Dhool Singh, A Study of Land Reforms in Rajasthan, Report of a Survey Sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee (New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission, 1964), Chapters 2-5.

elsewhere.[1] They were permitted to retain "sufficient" land for self-cultivation, but the purpose was to grant ownership to tenants. These and the former jagirdars are now classifed as "state's tenants," or khatedars. Virtually all ownership rights including those of sale and mortgage have been granted to the khatedars though there is debate on the land's actual ownership which some legal scholars maintain is vested in the state.

The actual redistribution of land is recognized by both official and private observers to have been minimal. Former landlords have kept the bulk of their holdings either by dispersing ownership among members of their rather extensive families, by sharecropping rather than leasing land, or by buying tractors to unify their cultivation units under one or two managers. The Gini Index of Land Equality in India did not change much after reforms were implemented: .63 in 1954 (based on 1951 data), and .59 in 1961 (1961).[2] A better reflection of reality which accounts for dispersed land titles lies in the following data: Of all cultivating households, 64.4% operate only 19.8% of all farmed land, and all of these units are under five acres. As regards ownership, 71.95% of all landowners own 19.98% of the land with all holdings under five acres and average size of holdings is 3.58 acres.[3]

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[1] In Rajasthan there were a series of specific laws passed including the main ones of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, and the Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 383, Table 6.2.

[3] Adapted from the National Sample Survey, Seventeenth Round, Reports #162 (1970), pp. 48 and 52, Tables 12 and 13; #144 (1968), p. 13 Table 2; and #162 (1970), p. 16, Table 16 (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1968 and 1970). Taken from Barry H. Michie, "Variations in Economic Behaviour and the Green Revolution," Economic and Political

Since the Jaipur village was a khalsa one, a majority of cultivators are small owners. These former Jaipur state tenants now have khatedari rights. Even so, there are several larger landowners with holdings in excess of fifty acres: these have been acquired either as muafi grants, through money-lending foreclosures or purchase over the past ten years. Land ceilings (until the year of study) were 35 acres for irrigated land (more for inferior farms) but it is clear that to ignore ceilings is relatively simple.[1]

The Bharatpur village had been under the jagirdari system. Compared with the Jaipur village, more farmers fall into the large farmer category of the sample. Several own in excess of two to three hundred acres spread over several villages. The titles are dispersed to circumvent jagirdari abolition laws.

The villages were chosen from among those in each district which first came under the intensive programs.[2] In Jaipur several of these are now municipalities and two are almost suburbs of Jaipur city with rapidly expanding industrial sectors making agriculture almost secondary. Because of their proximity to the city, much of the land is owned

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Weekly, Vol. VIII, #26, Review of Agriculture (June 1973), pp. A-69-70.

The varied findings suggest that rather than landownership, anyone interested in selecting samples of agriculturalists should use the operational farm unit. The largest farmer found in the land records in both villages "owned" only forty acres, half of which were irrigated. His operational unit, however, was over five hundred acres over three or four villages and all were operated by him and his three sons.

[1] For a further discussion about this see Dhool Singh, op. cit., Chapter 11, et passim.

[2] When the schemes were started pilot villages were chosen in each district. Every year since then, additional ones are added as their potential and government's inputs along with political expediency have allowed.

by urban persons who are "gentlemen farmers" or absentee landlords who are not directly relevant to the study. Some villages close to urban areas tend to concentrate on truck farming which is also not directly relevant to the Green Revolution syndrome.

The situation in Bharatpur is similar with one additional problem. Major land grants have been made to retired military personnel and former retainers of the erstwhile Bharatpur royal family. Many of the grants are close to Bharatpur city so that the grantees tend to dominate the life in those villages. Since they are not really a part of village society, their presence makes for a set of variables not present elsewhere.

Finally, in both areas, villages close to cities make it easy for laborers to migrate for work during agriculturally slack seasons. While this might be interesting by itself, most areas do not have such options so readily available. In order to get a modicum of representativeness, villages further away from cities were chosen. Even in these, as will be seen further in the study, there was some out-migration.

Both villages have a fairly wide spread of cultivating communities which provides a control variable of caste. They have been judged by both government and university personnel[1] as villages with good agricultural potential and represent areas that have made considerable progress over the past five to six years (approximately the duration of the intensive programs). These are also villages known to be receptive to outsiders -- no small necessity in field work. The following sections

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[1]The reference is to district-level government personnel and those of the University of Udaipur Extension Services in Bharatpur. See the Acknowledgements.

give a short description of each village. The names used here and further in the study for villages, farmers and leaders are, of course, not the real ones.

Hanumangarh

Hanumangarh served as "headquarters" for the field study. Situated seventeen miles to the northeast of Jaipur city on a paved road, it is well connected with both Jaipur and the market town of Dausa by buses which run every half hour during peak times and every two hours during the middle of the day. Of a total population of around 5,000, 3,000 persons live in the village proper. The rest reside in 32 hamlets scattered within a radius of four miles. It is thus a very large village bordering on the size of a municipality. As most of the inhabitants are agriculturalists, it retains its census classification as a village.[1]

Historically, Hanumangarh is of some interest to the development of Jaipur state. It was one of the early capitals having been taken by the Rajput prince Dula Rai about one thousand years ago from the "tribal" Minas. The village is built against a hillside and is dominated by a crumbling Rajput fort dating back to the 16th century. The original Mina fortress atop the hill is gone save for rudiments of the foundations. While Minas still constitute a sizable proportion of the population, the fort stands as a lonely monument to Rajput glory. There are now only about four Rajput families (all later migrants), and all of these save one are in rather impoverished circumstances.

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[1]The census guidelines for classifying settlements as municipalities or villages is dependent on the population size, its density, and the proportion whose major occupation is agriculture. Rumor had it that village leaders were interested in keeping Hanumangarh's village classification in order to retain rural development funds.

Over the years Hanumangarh probably served as a marketing and administrative center for the surrounding villages. The central street is bordered by multi-storied stone and mortar houses dating back several centuries. The ground floors of these were shops of various kinds until recently. Most of them are locked now -- the advent of paved roads and bus service has made it possible and more economical for villagers to buy provisions in Jaipur. There are still a few cloth and provision stores. One "general store" carries items of daily use: tea, soap, cigarettes, cooking and kerosene oil, spices, and sticky sugar candies. Virtually any item may be ordered through the store but all can be had more cheaply in Jaipur. There are at least four small flour mills and two licensed country liquor shops. Trading families save for those in the grain trade or who are seriously developing their farms are leaving the village. Some lease their homes to government officers posted there. Commercially, Hanumangarh is a dying village -- agriculture is its dominant occupation.

Reflecting perhaps the increasing importance of agriculture, there has been a growth of developmental agencies in the village. Besides its original designation as a tehsil, it is also a panchayat samiti headquarters with three agricultural extension officers instead of the normal two. There is a health sub-center staffed by a doctor, pharmacist, and nurse-mid-wife. Aside from curative aspects of health care, the center has a village-level health worker in charge of malaria, small-pox and other epidemic control schemes, and a male and female family planning extension team. Nutrition education and child care is the responsibility of the Lady Nutrition Extension Officer who is part of the samiti staff, and her subordinate, Lady Village Level Worker. The government offices

have their full complement of workers, which is not always the case elsewhere.

Hanumangarh's educational needs are met by two primary schools (one for girls only), a middle (grade), and higher secondary school. The latter two are co-educational, limiting girls' enrollment. Initial talks were reportedly started to open a college for which rumor had it that the former maharaja was willing to donate a hunting lodge on the outskirts of the village. Not many young persons go on to higher education; those who do, enroll at one of Jaipur's colleges affiliated with the University of Rajasthan.

Law and order is the responsibility of the local police station (thana). There is a small overnight lockup for arrested persons to wait until they are taken to Jaipur. The thana has another lockup too: this one for stray animals to be impounded until their owners pay the required fines. As was mentioned above, the tehsil offices also aid the police in the maintenance of civil order.

In addition to these agencies, Hanumangarh has a Department of Forests' Range Office in charge of maintaining certain grazing areas. This office is trying to re-forest the surrounding hills which were denuded by lumber contractors about twenty years ago. There is also an office of the State Excise Department whose primary purpose is the collection of taxes levied on the production of tobacco. Finally, Hanumangarh has a branch of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and is headquarters for the local cooperative society. It is a major administrative center.

Hanumangarh is overwhelmingly Hindu in its religious makeup. There are fewer than ten Muslim families and no Jains, Sikhs or any other

religious groups. The Mina community mentioned above as the original ruling group is classified in the Census Schedule as a "tribe". While it may have had a tribal organization several hundred years ago, there is no longer any sociological reason for it to be classified as such any more. Minas are often referred to as "criminal tribes" as one group was involved traditionally in animal husbandry and developed a reputation for cattle and camel rustling. Whatever the origin of their inclusion in the Schedule, they are keen to retain it as it entails benefits such as land allotments, scholarships, and reserved seats in government employment and on all elected bodies. A clue to the real social status of Minas lies in their acceptance by other caste Hindus as a distinct caste of approximately Sudra status. It is not the purpose of this study, however, to debate issues raised by the Schedule.[1]

Occupationally there are four clusters of castes and each cluster is about the same size. At the top are the Brahmins and Baniyas and as stated, they control sizable proportions of land and money-lending. Only one group of Brahmins farms directly: the Haryana Brahmins, some of whom are in the sample. Next, there is a group of owner-cultivators: mainly Minas, Gujjars and Malis. Save for Gujjars, most of these fall in the small to medium range of farmers. Third, one finds the artisans: potters, barbers, carpenters and blacksmiths. Most of these are landless or at best may own marginal farms. A number are also tenants. Finally, there are the outcastes or Harijans: Raigers, Khatiks, and Balais. Each of these is a distinct caste with its own position in the

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[1]For an explanation of the Schedule, see above, p. 38, footnote. A more detailed explanation of caste follows in Chapter VII; here it should be noted that the term as used refers to *jati* (sub-caste), rather than the four-fold *varna* scheme.

ritual hierarchy defining marriage and commensal relations with the others. These provide the bulk of tenants and laborers (see Table 2.3).

TABLE 2.3

HIERARCHY OF CASTES IN HANUMANGARH AND SHIVPURA*

Hanumangarh	Shivpura
Purohit Brahmins (priests and landowners)	Purohit Brahmins (priests)
Haryana Brahmins (landowners)	Baniyas (traders, money-lenders)
Rajputs ("warriors" and landowners)	Jats (farmers)
Baniyas (traders, money-lenders, landowners)	Ahirs (farmers)
Malis (farmers)	Yadavs (farmers)
Gujjars (farmers and animal husbandry)	Garghariya (herders and farmers)
Minas (farmers and animal husbandry)	Kohlis (petty traders, weavers)
Khatti (carpenters)	Chamars (laborers, leather-workers)
Kumhars (potters)	Bhangis (sweepers)
Nais (barbers)	
Lohars (blacksmiths)	
Raigers (laborers, leatherworkers)	Muslim Castes:
Khatiks (laborers, leatherworkers, herders, butchers)	Manihar (traders, bangle makers)
Balais (laborers, leatherworkers)	Telis (oil pressers, laborers)
Bhangi (sweepers)	

*This is a highly general ranking: the middle levels vary according to the group asked to rank itself, as each tends to put itself above the others.

There are two distinct farming regions in the village. On the east land is arid with a water table of 80-120 feet. Irrigation is relatively limited and is done from open dug wells, a number of which are fitted with electric or diesel pumping sets.[1] Tubewells are expensive in Jaipur district due to bedrock. In this area even dug wells are

[1]These are five to six horsepower centrifugal pumps costing around Rs. 3,500 ($466.00).

costly because of the water's depth. Most crops are rain-fed. Animal husbandry is the main cash earner and grain cultivation is seen primarily as a means of feeding one's family. Due to continuous overgrazing by sheep, goats, cattle and buffalos over the past several hundred years, the soil is badly eroded. Gullies of ten to sixty feet criss-cross the landscape. Reclamation work has been marginal. People depend on government and drought years for conservation projects to be undertaken as part of famine relief work.[1] The best land is under cultivation and is irrigated if possible. Landholdings are larger here.

The second farming region is fortunate to have a higher water table of thirty to sixty feet. The wells recharge quickly due to a nearby natural reservoir which supplies water to Jaipur. No irrigation is permitted from this though it was originally dammed for that purpose. Most plots are smaller here but almost all can take two crops a year and even three in some cases.

Soils in both areas of Hanumangarh are of a light, sandy-loam variety with little moisture-retaining capacity. The main crop as in most parts of India is taken in the monsoon season (July to September/ October). It is rain-fed: even if the rains fail, few farmers will use their wells for supplementary irrigation fearing there will be insufficient water for the winter crop. This crop consists mainly of bulrush millet (pennisetum typhoideum). Some farmers grow maize and vegetables

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[1] If an area is declared to be under famine, public works are begun on roads, conservation, irrigation, etc. Affected persons, landowners and landless alike may work on these for wages paid half in cash and half in grain. Much work could be done by individual farmers to build short walls around their fields (called bundhs) to prevent erosion. The government encourages this with little effect. Several fields the author saw decreased several feet in size each year because of a lack of bundhs.

as supplementary crops. The millet forms the basic component of most people's diet though wheat is the preferred grain.

Crops for the winter season are sown from late October through November. The acreage is less than that planted during the monsoon because irrigation is required. Where this is available, farmers plant wheat, barley and vegetables. Where it is limited or non-existent, certain varieties of barley and gram may be sown. Most farmers are mainly grain cultivators. The vegetables are for family consumption and perhaps a little extra cash. Normally one finds a few beds alongside a well. Only two persons interviewed cultivated vegetables as a main crop.[1]

Shivpura

Shivpura presents a rather different set of circumstances. The village is sixteen miles from the nearest city, Bharatpur, which is also the district headquarters and tehsil town. The communication and service facilities are not as extensive here. After travelling ten miles on a paved road, one turns off onto a path of sorts formed by bullock cart ruts leading to the village. Plans have been on the books since the First Five Year Plan to build the road and this is a major election issue every five years.

Shivpura is smaller than Hanumangarh with a population of around 1,400 persons. All inhabitants live in one central settlement rather than in hamlets. Local history has it that one of the kings of

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[1] In view of the fact that Jaipur was so accessible, it is surprising that more did not cultivate vegetables which are highly profitable: much more so than grain. When asked, most farmers maintain they take too much work and that there are no adequate marketing facilities.

Bharatpur had twenty-two sons. Since only the eldest could inherit his father's throne, the rest were given grants of several villages each from which they were to provide for themselves and the state. Shivpura was made a headquarters by one of the sons and today all the village Thakurs claim descent from him.[1] They are the main landowners and their holdings are far more extensive than anyone's in Hanumangarh. The largest farmer here owns around 500 acres over several villages.

Shivpura has a farmers' cooperative and is the headquarters for a Village Level Worker. Funds were raised by the villagers for his house in order to persuade government to post one there. Kumher is headquarters for both the panchayat samiti and the health center. Shivpura residents commute to Kumher for official business on a very old bus which goes in the morning and returns by evening. The village has a small dispensary run by a pharmacist, a lady family planning worker, and a doctor of the traditional Ayurvedic school of medicine.

Education has found the full support of Shivpura inhabitants. They raised funds to build the middle and high schools. The primary school presumably was set up by government. The village council levied a charge on each caste community based on their ability to pay. Today the visitor is told proudly that each of the "nine castes"[2] was responsible for the construction of one room in the school. During the time field work was done, efforts were begun by the sarpanch (village council chairman), to set up a veterinary clinic and seed depot in the village.

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[1] Thakurs are Jats, a major cultivating caste in Rajasthan, Haryana, and Western Uttar Pradesh. They consider themselves to be Rajputs though they are not considered as such by other Rajputs. Bharatpur is unique in having had a Jat ruling house.

[2] In fact, there are more than nine, but this is a local saying.

Shivpura inhabitants are predominantly agriculturalists. As opposed to Hanumangarh, many more of the large landowners are self-cultivators.[1] Though the Thakurs own most of the land, Ahirs and Yadavs are also important landowners. Brahmins and Baniyas are few though the latter are more important than their numbers indicate as they trade in grain and do some money-lending. Once again, the Harijans (outcastes) are landless and form the tenant and labor pool.[2] There are two main Harijan castes: the Hindu Chamars (or Jatavs as they prefer to be called), and Muslim Telis.[3] The artisan community is virtually non-existent: most persons go to Kumher or Bharatpur for pots and plows.

Though they are a minority, there are more Muslim families here than in Hanumangarh. At the time of India's partition, thousands of Muslims were killed in Bharatpur state but none were harmed in Shivpura. Some later left for Pakistan, but during the riots village Thakurs formed vigilante committees which refused any outsider entry into the village thus protecting the Muslim population. The ones remaining range from one family of wealthy traders (Manihars by caste) to the most impoverished Teli laborers.

The first thing that strikes the visitor is the marked contrast in relationships between high and low castes in the two villages. In Hanumangarh, it is rare to see Harijans and caste Hindus chatting

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[1]This does not mean they do not lease out land. Since landholdings are large, they often retain a portion for self-cultivation and lease the rest. Jats, Ahirs, and Yadavs do not have restrictions on use of the plow, etc.

[2]Several have been given land grants by government of 2/5 acres each. Hence they are considered landless both by the author and themselves.

[3]Muslims in India have their own castes. Telis are low in this hierarchy, and being Muslim, are considered outcastes to Hindus anyway.

together outside the necessary interchange required by economic linkages. In Shivpura though commensal restrictions are maintained, social relationships are informal, frank and close by comparison. The sarpanch (village council chairman) has three wives, two of whom are Jat (his own caste) and the middle one is a Chamar (a Harijan) which is rare indeed. Villagers take pains to explain that the Chamar wife is not a concubine, but a properly married wife. The reasons why these differences exist are beyond the scope of this study except to point out that perhaps it is partially due to the fact that Jats dominate the village. Since they are not bound by the same strictures as are Brahmins and Baniyas, they might set a more informal tone for the rest of the community. It also points to the vast diversity one finds between villages.

Though the basic crops grown in Shivpura are the same as in Hanumangarh, agricultural conditions are different. The soils are of a heavier clay-loam variety. They are capable of retaining sufficient moisture to permit farmers to divide their land and take two crops a year without irrigation. A farmer will typically sow millet on half his land in the monsoon leaving the other half fallow. On this he can plant gram, barley and mustard in the winter. The yields improve vastly with irrigation and fertilizers. Wheat is cultivated under irrigation. Mustard is the main cash crop and is sold in Bharatpur or Mathura for oil and oil cake (for fodder). Only one field in the village is planted to vegetables -- they are imported either from Kumher or Nadbai (eight miles away).

The water table is higher than in Hanumangarh: twenty to thirty feet. It is much cheaper to sink tubewells; indeed there are several in the village. Shivpura has no electrical connections though all the

surrounding villages do. Thus all pump sets are diesel.[1] It is rumored that electricity will reach the village by 1975. The northwest portion of village lands are irrigated by canals from the Bareta Bund -- a large artificial lake about one hundred and twenty miles to the north. The canal system is to be expanded so that in the next four to five years most of the northern area will be irrigated from it. Rainfall is more than in Hanumangarh -- 60 inches in a normal year. There is a problem of water logging and soil salinity in part of the village lands due to the high water table and flood irrigation without proper drainage. Parts of Bharatpur district are affected by monsoon floods, but not Shivpura.

Farming is more mechanized than in Hanumangarh. There are at least seven privately owned tractors in Shivpura: only two in Hanumangarh proper. All land preparation and plowing operations are tractorized. The machines are increasingly used for threshing and chaff cutting as well. Produce is hauled to market by tractors. Even with the comparatively large farms, tractor owners need to take on custom work to break even. Thus, even smaller owners can rent tractors for plowing, threshing and chaff cutting operations.

Schedule of Field Work and the Sample

Field work was conducted between May 1972 and August 1973. The first several months were spent selecting the first village, finalizing administrative arrangements with the Governments of India and Rajasthan, and the construction and printing of the questionnaire. Interviews were

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[1]This is an interesting point related to Shivpura's politics discussed further in the study. It was the one Congress village in a Swatantra area.

started after the monsoon harvest and winter sowing in November 1972 and continued off and on until June 1973 with breaks for plowing and harvesting.[1] The remainder of the time was spent in New Delhi for data processing. Translations of the questionnaires used are appended to this study.

Within each village a sample of cultivators and laborers was randomly chosen for in-depth interviews lasting from one to two hours each. The field method is a combination of survey research and participant observation. All interviews were conducted personally in Hindi; the total number was 67. Had assistants been hired, the number of respondents would have been larger. They were not hired because it would have been difficult to get the depth and richness of information desired if highly standardized interviewing techniques were used. The respondents are similar to "informants" used by anthropologists but the author's biases in the selection of informants is controlled for by their random selection.

The sample is stratified: large farmers (over ten acres), medium owners (5.1 to 10.0 acres), small farmers (1.0 to 5.0 acres), and agricultural tenants and laborers. The latter two categories were originally to be discrete but they are not so in the real world. Most "marginal" farmers (those with less than one acre of land) and the landless will lease land whenever they can and also do agricultural labor.

The sizes in each stratum are not haphazard: for extension purposes government has a dividing line separating small from medium

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[1]Interviewing had to be fitted to respondents' schedules. They were free in the evenings after their work in the fields. All interviewing had to stop during the busy agricultural seasons mentioned and during "wedding seasons". See appendices for a more detailed discussion.

farmers at 7.5 acres and large owners are classified as owning over ten or twenty acres of land depending on the area. Marginal cultivators are below 2.5 acres. From these points adjustments were made according to the spread of land ownership in these villages. Within each stratum, the respondents represent a ten percent sample chosen randomly.

Farmers' names were obtained from tehsil records. The relevant unit was not the individual title holder because of dispersed titles, but the operational cultivated unit. Thus titles had to be combined to make up the operational units with the assistance of the local patwaris. In Hanumangarh, the patwari had a reputation for being scrupulously honest. In Shivpura because the patwari had only recently been posted there, the assistance of a retired one was enlisted who was an original resident of the village. He knew each family and its holding. The accuracy of these men's guidance was borne out during interviews as respondents would state their full land holdings rather than the amount in their names in the tehsil records. There were very few discrepancies between what the patwaris stated, and the farmers' statements.

The names of landless tenants and laborers were obtained from voters' lists. In Hanumangarh three wards contain the landless communities. In Shivpura there are no distinct wards, but the patwari mentioned was able to identify landless families directly from the rolls. The list of the landless was checked against the land records to eliminate any duplication. The final sample breakdown was as indicated in Table 2.4.

In addition twelve more interviews were conducted with village "leaders" identified by the original respondents. They were asked in the course of interviews to identify influential persons in both a

TABLE 2.4

SAMPLE BREAKDOWN BY STRATA

Strata	Total Number of Units	Sample Size	Completed Interviews*
Laborers/ tenants	206	21	20
Small farmers	343	34	19
Medium farmers	146	15	12
Large farmers	142	14	16

*Two medium farmers had bought land just prior to the interviews bringing them into the large category. A number of small cultivators could not be contacted either because of seasonal out-migration for work in industry, or for other reasons. If a person could not be contacted after three tries, he was dropped. See appendices for further discussion, and lessons learned.

general and political context. The persons most frequently mentioned were interviewed using a more informal, open-ended questionnaire which is also appended. It is focused on the leaders' attitudes toward change in the two villages and perceptions of their own role in the process.

It had been hoped that political competitiveness could be taken into account when the villages were selected. Two factors prevented this. First, electoral data are now available only for the whole constituency. This means that though a particular constituency may have three or four-way contests, any given village may turn out to be a single party area. This is impossible to determine with accuracy in advance. Second, there are in fact very few villages with more than two

parties seriously contesting any given election.[1] Splinter elements of others may be present but they tend to coalesce with the major ones for electoral purposes. Both villages happen to be two-party areas: Congress and Swantantra were the major contenders in each. In Shivpura, there are Socialist elements and the Jan Sangh is making small inroads. Hanumangarh also has Jan Sangh supporters. These tend to support Swatantra candidates while the Socialists throw in their support with the Congress.

Mention should be made of the social and historical differences in the two villages. The data presented in the following chapters are broken down only by sample strata. Several variables were tried (including villages, caste, education, and age) but the strata showed the most significance. In view of the differences noted above, the following points should be kept in mind. First, the economic and political impacts of agrarian change are important here. Second, these effects are remarkably uniform in both villages and the economic impacts particularly are remarkably similar to those found by other scholars (who are cited where appropriate) elsewhere in India. Third, the basic social configurations are similar (e.g., patron-client relations, caste hierarchies) though particular caste names vary. This means the specifics of the interaction between traditional socio-political forms and the modern system are similar (see Chapter VI below).

With this background in mind a discussion of the data can begin. Chapter III is focused on the spread of agricultural modernization: the extent to which new production techniques have been adopted, and the

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[1] See R. Chandidas, et al., India Votes: A Source Book on Indian Elections (New York: Humanities Press, 1968).

motivational and institutional constraints which prevent their wider dissemination. What is of concern is the assumption made by scholars and planners that all farmers will, given the opportunity, adopt more profitable techniques.

CHAPTER III

THE SPREAD OF AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION

Going through the data it becomes clear that the specific intensive programs cannot be separated from the socio-political institutional setting in which they are implemented. In this chapter, land distribution is seen as the crucial variable affecting access to and adoption of new inputs. India's agricultural development strategy is predicated on the injection of new technology with the assumption that farmers, given the option, will adopt them. The point has already been made that every incentive, technical and legal, has been provided to encourage farmers to produce more. The question now arises as to how far new techniques have spread through the farming population. One needs to remember that production, however, is one part of the developmental effort: an increase in all citizens' livelihood is another.

Adoption of New Inputs

The initial hypothesis regarding the spread of inputs states that: the diffusion of farm inputs and access to them is a function of farm size (the larger ones having better access) which is coincident with political influence. This proposition was found to be valid with one qualification. Inputs flow to those cultivators who have both the power and motivation to get them. Though large farmers find it easier to obtain improved inputs, they are not all adopters. And though more

smaller farmers may wish to obtain the inputs, they cannot. The motivational aspect does not negate the proposition, it adds another variable.

Adoption of the new techniques is low compared with the potential in both villages. Though hybrids are available for a number of crops, only two are used: wheat and millet. No one in the sample has tried the new maize, barley or sorghum seeds though they grow the indigenous varieties.[1] Table 3.1 shows the extent of adoption in Hanumangarh and Shivpura.

Aside from the overall level of adoption which is relatively low, it is striking that use of the new seeds dropped consequentially in 1972-73. Some of this is due to poor rains. It will be recalled that millet is a monsoon crop and thus is seldom irrigated. Because there was uncertainty about the rains, fewer persons were willing to use the hybrids. Additionally, some users of both the millet and wheat hybrids were not satisfied with their performance. Those who are satisfied have said they will continue to use them (see Table 3.2). The farmers who did not obtain satisfactory production levels are those who did not use the full recommended package of practices including irrigation, fertilizer and disease control. This is mainly due to a lack of information. A few respondents maintain that the hybrid varieties do not taste as good as the old ones which is a matter of taste. It should be

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[1] In wheat it is possible to double yields with the new varieties and one can do almost as well with millet. The other three seed varieties still have problems with diseases, but no one had tried them anyway save for one farmer not in the sample in Hanumangarh. This might reflect the fact that maize and sorghum are not major crops, but does not explain the absence of high yielding barley seed.

TABLE 3.1

ADOPTION OF HYBRID SEED BY CROP AND FARM SIZE

Strata	Wheat			Millet			
	Used 1972-73	Used Previously	Never Used	Used 1972-73	Used Previously	Never Used	(N)
Large farmers	25.0	56.2	43.8	37.5	50.0	50.0	(16)
Medium farmers	41.7	41.7	58.3	25.0	58.3	41.7	(12)
Small farmers	15.8	26.3	73.7	0.0	15.8	84.2	(19)
Tenants	0.0	5.0	95.0	0.0	5.0	95.0	(20)
Overall	17.9	29.9	70.1	13.4	28.4	71.6	(67)

TABLE 3.2

INTENTION TO USE HYBRID SEED IN THE FUTURE BY FARM SIZE

Strata	Yes, Definitely	Yes, If Help Given	Not Sure	Definitely Not	Total %	(N)
Large farmers	50.0	18.8	12.5	18.8	100.1	(16)
Medium farmers	50.0	16.6	0.0	33.2	99.8	(12)
Small farmers	26.0	31.6	0.0	42.1	99.7	(19)
Tenants	5.0	65.0	30.0	0.0	100.0	(20)
Overall	29.9	35.8	11.9	22.4	100.0	(67)

noted, however, that among the regular users of hybrids, farmers sow indigenous varieties for home consumption using the hybrids for sale.

Table 3.2 shows the respondents' reactions when asked if they would use hybrid seeds in the future. Lack of proper information is a major hinderance to adoption as over one-third of all respondents say they will use the seeds if they learn how. Size of farm is pertinent as small farmers and tenants feel the lack of information more than do farmers in the other strata. In the category of farmers who maintain they will not take hybrids in the future, there may be some who have given up trying to get the necessary inputs and advice. Here the question of motivation (to be discussed below) may also be important.

Looking at the use of chemical fertilizers, one finds a similar situation (see Table 3.3). Table 3.4 presents respondents' attitudes on the future use of fertilizers. Overall, of those wanting to use them very few make it conditional on irrigation or funds and even fewer appear to require information. Again, however, more of the smaller farmers and tenants say they will not use fertilizers. Of these most say they have tried to get them several times along with the necessary information but have not been successful. Sometimes they are told there is a shortage, but they are quick to point out that plenty of other farmers -- those with more land -- are able to get supplies. Some of the respondents are not able to utilize fertilizers because they lack irrigation. Most of the tenants are faced with this situation. Overall, however, the use of chemical fertilizers is higher than that of any of the improved inputs. This may be partially due to the fact that

TABLE 3.3

USE OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS BY FARM SIZE

Strata	Used 1972-73	Used Previously	Never Used	(N)
Large farmers	50.0	43.8	50.0	(16)
Medium farmers	41.7	50.0	50.0	(12)
Small farmers	21.1	31.7	68.3	(19)
Tenants	5.0	5.0	95.0	(20)
Overall	26.9	29.9	70.1	(67)

TABLE 3.4

INTENTION TO USE CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS IN THE FUTURE BY FARM SIZE

Strata	Yes	Yes, If Help Given	Not Sure	No	Total %	(N)
Large farmers	56.2	6.3	0.0	37.5	100.0	(16)
Medium farmers	75.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	100.0	(12)
Small farmers	42.1	5.3	0.0	52.6	100.0	(19)
Tenants	10.0	10.0	30.0	50.0	100.0	(20)
Overall	40.3	5.8	13.6	40.3	100.0	(67)

they have been promoted since the early 1960s and because the results are dramatic.[1]

[1]Because of these dramatic results, farmers often can ruin crops the first time they try chemicals by using doses far in excess of what is recommended or by not irrigating immediately after the fertilizer is applied. This does not appear to deter them perhaps because they know

The technique considered finally is the use of pesticides (see Table 3.5). Between a fourth and a third of all respondents have used BHC powder (benzine hexachloride) before planting to kill termites which are a major problem in both villages. Considering the extent of termite infestation and the fact that all farmers interviewed are aware of BHC's value, this is still low adoption. In Shivpura some aerial spraying of wheat and mustard has been done by government to control rust and blue beetles, and this has been mentioned by some persons. Besides BHC few farmers know specifically of any other pesticides but say they need help as they lose considerable portions of their crops to various pests and rodents.[1] All respondents know there is a Plant Protection Officer at the panchayat samiti and those who have tried to contact him in both villages (save for one or two large farmers) have failed to get assistance.[2] Some are worried about the effects of pesticides which they have heard are dangerous. These persons are reluctant

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that certain types of manures will do the same, particularly poultry manure which is very high in nitrogen.

Most farmers use nitrogenous fertilizers, either CAN (calcium ammonium nitrate), or urea. Though the soils require phosphates, potash and trace elements, e.g., zinc, very little of these are used. A few farmers in Shivpura used super-phosphates. The reliance on nitrogenous fertilizers, however, is raising concern in official quarters as farmers assume they will get higher yields by using them alone. In fact, the phosphates are crucial at the time the plants get their heads in order to enable the grain to develop to its full capacity.

[1]This is not to say they know nothing about them: they know generic terms such as rat poisons, DDT, sprays for rust, etc., but not the specific chemical names.

[2]There may be another problem here aside from the implied and often openly alleged callousness of the extension personnel. Often farmers come for help only when it is too late. Rust, for example, cannot be fully destroyed once it appears. Its appearance can be controlled, but farmers often do not seek help in time.

TABLE 3.5

USE OF CHEMICAL PESTICIDES BY FARM SIZE

Strata	Used 1972-73	Used Previously	Never Used	(N)
Large farmers	31.3	31.3	68.7	(16)
Medium farmers	41.7	41.7	58.3	(12)
Small farmers	10.5	15.8	84.2	(19)
Tenants	5.0	5.0	95.0	(20)
Overall	19.4	20.9	79.1	(67)

to try them even under guidance.[1] Respondents were asked about their intention to use pesticides in the future. The results are not presented as they all said they would use them if necessary. Given the current usage, this is doubtful.

Since irrigation is a prerequisite for the use of the new technologies, can one say this is the main constraint to their adoption? On a national level it has been suggested that unless irrigation is expanded, the limits of the Green Revolution technologies have been reached. But as can be seen from Table 3.6, irrigation is not a constraint for around 50 percent of the sample. The table includes the nineteen tenants who leased in arid land only for the monsoon crop. Adoption levels are below the potential.

[1]There had been some tragic cases where children died from eating rat poison thinking it to be sweets of some kind. Also, malathion and parathion, used for viral and pest diseases, are sprayed and farmers are acutely conscious of the care required in the spraying operations. If inhaled, they can cause paralysis.

TABLE 3.6

PERCENT OF IRRIGATED LAND BY SIZE OF FARM

Strata	Percent of Irrigated Land							
	0	1-20	21-40	41-60	61-80	Over 80	Total %	(N)
Large farmers	6.3	18.8	46.3	6.3	3.6	18.8	100.1	(16)
Medium farmers	33.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	0.0	41.5	99.7	(12)
Small farmers	36.8	0.0	15.8	5.3	5.3	36.8	100.0	(19)
Tenants	95.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	100.0	(20)
Overall	46.3	5.8	16.4	4.5	3.0	23.9	99.9	(67)

Relevant to this is the intensity of land use. Only 18 cultivators (26.9%) take three crops each year whereas another 16 (23.9%) can easily do so given their irrigation facilities.[1] Twenty-eight farmers (41.8%) take two crops (monsoon and winter) though around 40 (59.7%) have the capacity.[2] Everyone can take a monsoon crop including tenants if they can lease land. As is clear, the land itself is not farmed as intensely

[1]Aside from the monsoon and winter crops, a third one may be taken in summer consisting of vegetables, fodder, and/or an additional crop of millet for either fodder or human consumption. To those who argue that irrigation by the traditional leathern bucket and oxen method is impossible in 115°F., it should be pointed out that most farmers here have electric or diesel pumps thus eliminating labor under the sun. Those taking a third crop irrigate in the evenings anyway for fear of scorching the plants. Power supply was not a constraint in the year field work was done.

[2]This includes Shivpura farmers without wells who can take two crops as some of their neighbors do, by dividing the land for the monsoon and winter crops. See section on Shivpura, Chapter II above.

as it might be and neither are the farmers exploiting the full potential of technologies available to them.

The Issue of Farmer Motivation

The preceding indicates two problem areas of access and motivation. Dealing first with motivation, it is probable that if all farmers are to try to use the new inputs a short-fall in supply will result. In fact, they do not demand them even though they have both land and water. Why should this be the case?

With the exception of perhaps ten percent of the sample, most farmers regardless of farm size follow what is a peasant strategy of farming. Land is seen as a security (or collateral for credit) and a means of food production for the family -- not as a cash earner. Most families sell milk, do casual labor, or send one or two sons into government or private service for cash. Families are not self-sufficient; on the contrary they are dependent increasingly on a monetized market for basic items of daily use: cooking oil, cloth, kerosene, etc. Farming, however, is not seen as a means to obtain these directly. If cash is not available through the methods mentioned respondents will obtain it from the money-lender.

This can be illustrated through three examples. Landless tenants and laborers were asked if they would like some land and how much. All want land; most mention amounts between three and five acres. Why these amounts? The calculation is based on how much a man needs to feed his family and how much he can manage with family labor and two oxen. Every respondent makes the same calculation and the amounts vary according to the number of persons there are in the house. The estimates are based

on the availability of irrigation facilities and include the production of sufficient surplus to get credit or cash to purchase non-farm items. One respondent answered with a touch of whimsy: "How much land? Land is great wealth now; I would like lots. But five acres are enough for my family -- one should not be greedy and ask for more. That would make us as bad as the baniyas who take everything they can!"

Second, when asked what credit is used for, one finds that the majority use it for non-farm purposes (see Table 3.7).

TABLE 3.7

UTILIZATION OF CREDIT BY FARM SIZE

Strata	Use of Credit					
	Farm Inputs Only	Household Expenses, Debt Repayment, Rituals*	Farm Plus Household and Rituals Expenses*	N.A.**	Total %	(N)
Large farmers	43.8	31.1	18.8	6.1	100.0	(16)
Medium farmers	8.3	25.0	58.3	8.3	99.9	(12)
Small farmers	47.4	36.8	10.6	5.3	100.0	(19)
Tenants	45.0	0.0	40.0	15.0	100.0	(20)
Overall	17.9	38.8	25.4	17.9	100.0	(67)

*Includes items such as cloth, or food purchased and the rituals include mainly marriages and death feasts.

**This category includes persons who either cannot get credit (see below under section on "Access and Farm Size") or who have decided to rely on their own production to meet non-farm needs.

This use of credit combined with the discussion above showing that farmers do not fully utilize their land and irrigation resources reinforces the notion that most of them follow a "satisficing" rather than a

"maximizing" strategy of production. This can be illustrated by looking at the third example.

One of the large farmers interviewed named Bachchu owns slightly over fifty acres most of which are used for grazing. Ten acres are irrigated and even these are not fully utilized. A monsoon crop of indigenous millet is planted on ten of the unirrigated acres. If the rains fail, so does his crop. In winter indigenous wheat and barley are planted (mixed) on 4.5 acres of the irrigated land. The family's main income is from milk produced by his own cows, goats and buffalos. There are between twenty and thirty animals in all. Bachchu sows no fodder though he is aware that his milk production would easily double with proper feed.

When asked about inputs and advice, Bachchu maintains he can get anything he wants. This is true since he is a wealthy man and his older brother was chairman of the cooperative society at the time of the interview and a caste patel (headman) besides. Why not use high yielding seed then? "We don't use chemical fertilizers and so can't use the seed."[1] Why not use chemical fertilizers? "We have manure from the cattle which suffices and since I am not interested in producing more grain, what is the use of investing in it?" He has ready access to the extension staff: "I know what their advice is. They tell my brother who tells me; I can find out myself anyway. But I don't take their help because I don't need to produce more. Look, we have more grain than we

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[1]The hybrids require chemical fertilizers. If they are not used, the farmer is likely to lose his full investment. Some newer varieties give marginal returns without them, but (unless chemicals are used) a good crop of indigenous wheat will give better results.

can eat. We sell to the baniyas[1] in the village and take more into Jaipur to sell at the mandi.[2] To do this much I hardly need to sow seed in rows. Even if this weren't so, there are so many more bighas[3] I can put under cultivation. As long as we get enough cash from the milk and enough to eat from the land, why bother with these other things? My brother uses some of them, but I don't see why I should."

Bachchu is not an eccentric. There are Bachchu's in all strata of the sample. The issue of farmers' motivations has been dealt with extensively elsewhere. It is increasingly accepted that any actor has a number of goals in life and pecuniary profit is only one of them.[4] A farmer is not only a producer, he is a father, a member of a caste, and the village community. Each of these roles imposes constraints and demands on his behavior and use of resources. They also imply that he has diverse goals to maximize. Given his range of goals, "productive" resources (both cash and time) may be channeled to non-economic ends: this is clearly illustrated in Table 3.7.

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[1]The grain traders-cum-money-lenders.

[2]Large urban grain market.

[3]Indigenous land measure: Hanumangarh's local equivalent was four bighas to one acre.

[4]See Kusum Nair, The Lonely Furrow: Farming in the United States, Japan and India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969); Colin Leys, "Political Perspectives," in Dudley Seers, ed., Development in a Divided World (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1970), pp. 106-112; Michael Lipton, "A Game Against Nature: Theories of Peasant Decision Making," The Listener (March 28, 1968), pp. 401-403 and "A Game Against Nature: Strategies of Security," The Listener (April 4, 1968), pp. 437-39; and Barry H. Michie, "Variations in Economic Behaviour and the Green Revolution: An Anthropological Perspective," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. VIII, #26, Review of Agriculture (June 30, 1973).

Besides multiple goals, however, in the Indian situation, there is no particular need for the farmer to produce anywhere near the maximum feasible as he remains economically viable without doing so. He has virtually no obligation to the state as land tax is nominal and the state has no further lien on his product. He is in a sellers' market since food is in short supply and prices rise yearly increasing his income. Almost every farmer interviewed says his income has increased over the past five years due to price rises. Some having invested in wells have increased their income from double cropping. As long as the requisite production level for economic viability is determined by subsistence there will be wide variations in adoption and economic performance given individual farmers' divergent goals. The higher the floor of viability the more uniform behavior will be. As regards production, it can be argued that the availability of credit from the money-lender for non-farm activities is a disincentive to increased production as the farmer need not rely on his farming to meet social obligations (except in the long run as he repays his debt). These hypotheses have ramifications for the institutional parameters laid down by government to facilitate agricultural change and are discussed in the final chapter.

Access and Farm Size

The data collected also suggest that many farmers have limited access to the new inputs: this is the other side of the motivational coin. Where the will is present, land size becomes an important constraint. Why this is so requires further elaboration.

It has been shown that land is seen at least as a security and food provider for one's family. Beyond this, land has important social and

political functions everywhere. Production organization as a part of social organization reflects status and other relationships.[1] In India, as in many other parts of the world, land has traditionally been conferred on persons as a reward for services rendered to political authority. In India it followed that duties performed by upper castes tended to be rewarded more: e.g., priests and soldiers (Brahmins and Rajputs) typically received the largest rewards; hence the presence of muafi or jagir holdings.[2] The status enjoyed by these persons is reinforced and legitimized by the ritual hierarchy of caste. The third group whose power is coincidental with land is the baniya community.[3] While some members traditionally enjoyed court patronage (as suppliers of provisions and capital) others gained local power through money-lending activities over the generations.

Landowners' power is also reinforced by the particular production organization in India. Where a majority of persons is dependent on agriculture for sustenance, and where the primary resource, land, is controlled by a few, the power held by those few is out of proportion to their numbers. This is clear where large tracts of land are owned by one family and cultivated by tenants. Where tenancies arose and why they did is beyond the scope of this study except to note that the process was aided by population pressures and the introduction of effective

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[1]See Michie, op. cit., and also Arthur L. Stinchcomb, "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations," in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), pp. 359-71.

[2]There are exceptions to this: sometimes outcaste families were given land grants too. Families like these were found in both villages.

[3]The traders-cum-money-lenders.

law and order enforcement which in effect bound tenants to their landlords until debts were repaid.[1]

The landowners' influence also extends over the small owner-cultivators as most large landowners are also money-lenders. Indeed, money-lending has been their dominant occupation. They may act as marketing agents, and as is discussed below, they are also major suppliers of seed, food and basic consumer items to villagers. Most activities between them and their clients are based on credit.

Returning to the data, one finds that (1) villagers conceive of influence, wealth and land as coincidental, and (2) they feel their own access to resources is constrained by land size. Politically at this point it is sufficient to note that political parties normally rely on traditional elites to pull votes for them during elections.[2] In return, landowners receive a number of policy payoffs and easy access to commodities distributed by the state.

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[1]There are several good sources on the agrarian history of India among which are: William Moreland, The Agrarian System of Moslem India (Cambridge: W. Heffer, 1929); Walter Neale, Economic Change in Rural India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); and Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India (London: Asia Publishing House, 1963). For Rajasthan see reports of the Jagirdari and Zamindari Abolition Commission, and Dhool Singh's Survey of Land Reforms in Rajasthan, op. cit. The coincidence of land and power is recognized in all studies of agrarian societies. For particular lucidity, see Doreen Warriner, Land Reform in Principle and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969). Also see Robert Eric Frykenberg, ed., Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969).

[2]The bulk of literature on Indian politics deals with this. The use of large farmers and/or money-lenders as vote mobilizers is a rather cheap strategy for any party. Intuitively the same should hold true for any country where there is a similar hierarchical social order. See Paul Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), and Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 467-69 where he also points out that no party is generally able to co-opt all village elites which makes for greater competition than one would assume otherwise.

Taking the first point, respondents were asked to name three persons they consider generally influential in the village. These would be persons people respect, or might turn to for solutions to everyday problems. Then about twenty minutes further into the interview in the context of discussing elections, the respondents were asked to name three persons considered to be politically important (see Table 3.8). Not all respondents could name three persons which tends to reflect the fact that they might rely on only one or two persons for advice. Fewer respondents also named politically important persons. This is primarily because of the coincidence in respondents' minds of the two kinds of influence. All respondents named persons in the large landowning class. There is a general consensus on the particular personalities chosen by all respondents with small deviations. For example, Harijans in both villages mention caste headmen (patels) who are also landowners as well as leaders from other communities. The rest of the sample of course, does not see Harijans as particularly influential for the whole village and tend to name persons from the dominant landed castes: Jats in Shivpura, and Brahmins and Baniyas in Hanumangarh. All persons mentioned are presently or have recently been members of elected or other official bodies.

The point is further illustrated in the following discussion of the respondents' perceptions of their access to inputs. Access is broken down into three categories: the receipt of sufficient inputs on time, access to credit, and access to information or advice. Since the questions dealt with access on a rather general level, answers cover both governmental and private sources of each.

TABLE 3.8

LEADERS IDENTIFIED BY RESPONDENTS

Social Attributes of Leaders	Non-Political Leaders		Political Leaders	
	Respondents' Choices			
	1st Choice	2nd Choice	1st Choice	2nd Choice
Caste				
Brahmin	28.3	13.4	8.9	13.4
Rajput	2.9	0.0	2.9	0.0
Baniya	16.4	16.4	4.5	13.4
Mina	17.9	1.5	8.9	6.0
Harijan	11.9	4.5	13.4	6.0
N.A./Don't know	22.6	64.2	62.4	61.2
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	101.0	100.0
Occupation				
Landowner	8.9	8.9	0.0	0.0
Landowner-cum-money-lender	28.3	10.4	16.4	0.0
Elected landowner and money-lender	37.3	16.4	21.2	16.4
Laborer	2.9	0.0	0.0	14.9
N.A./Don't know	22.6	64.2	62.4	68.7
Total (%)	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
Party Affiliation				
Congress	56.5	27.9	28.4	32.9
Swatantra	20.9	8.9	7.8	5.9
Don't know	22.6	64.2	62.4	61.2
Total (%)	100.0	101.0	98.6	100.0

The first dimension deals with the availability of inputs on time (see Table 3.9). Most farmers claim they have difficulty most of the time. Almost all the large farmers can get timely supplies whereas around 75 percent of all others cannot. Of the small farmers and tenants, those who say they have no problems, are persons who save seed at home

TABLE 3.9

WHETHER RESPONDENTS HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING INPUTS ON TIME BY FARM SIZE

Strata	Whether Inputs are Available on Time					
	Normally on Time	Often Has Problems	Never Gets on Time	N.A.*	Total %	(N)
Large farmers	56.3	31.2	12.5	0.0	100.0	(16)
Medium farmers	33.3	25.1	41.6	0.0	100.0	(12)
Small farmers	42.1	10.5	31.6	15.8	100.0	(19)
Tenants/Laborers	30.0	30.0	10.0	30.0	100.0	(20)
Overall	40.3	28.3	22.4	9.0	100.0	(67)

*Includes persons who either save seed at home from previous season or who were unable to lease land during 1972-73.

from the previous crop because they know they are unable to buy any at planting time. Few of these use any additional inputs such as fertilizers. When asked what the problem is, they reply they lack money, credit, and influence with the distributors. "Big people help their own kind -- who looks to us. Even if we are farming some big farmers' lands, do they see to it that we have seed and water? No, we not only pay rent for the land but also for all the inputs as well."

Related to this is the question, "If you are not getting these things, who in your opinion is getting them?" (see Table 3.10). Most mention persons who have plenty of land, influence and money -- the three again being seen as coincident. "Big people, those with large amounts of land. They have money and know officers at the Samiti or in

TABLE 3.10

WHO RESPONDENTS FEEL GET THE INPUTS READILY

Strata	Types of Persons Getting Inputs						
	Gov't. Servants	Big, Influential Farmers	Anyone With Money	No One Due to Scarcity	D.K. N.A.	Total %	(N)
Large farmers	6.3	31.3	56.2	6.3	0.0	100.1	(16)
Medium farmers	0.0	58.3	8.3	0.0	33.3	99.9	(12)
Small farmers	5.2	26.3	26.3	0.0	42.2	100.0	(19)
Tenants/ Laborers	0.0	15.0	25.0	0.0	60.0	100.0	(20)
Overall	3.0	29.9	29.9	1.5	35.8	100.1	(67)

Jaipur and they are listened to."[1] "If a small man even tries to go to the Samiti, he may get to see some clerk, but never anyone who can help him. We are always told the BDO (Block Development Officer) is busy -- but busy with what? Drinking tea with the big men."

One or two farmers mention general scarcity as a problem. These are men from Shivpura who tried unsuccessfully to get hybrid seeds that year. One man said he did not know what the problem was but he could not find supplies most of the time. The rest of the sample feels supplies are plentiful and anyone with ready cash can buy them. Sometimes the Samiti officers sell them on the black market, but they are available for those who try.

[1]The Hindi term used translates as "big men" and has the connotation of wealthy and influential.

Next turning to farmers and tenants' access to credit, it is clear the same constraint of land size is operative (see Table 3.11). The major channels through which it is available are outlined in Chapter I.

TABLE 3.11

AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT BY SIZE OF FARM

Strata	Whether Respondents Get Enough Credit					
	Yes	Sometimes	Never	No Need	Total %	(N)
Large farmers	81.2	18.8	0.0	0.0	100.0	(16)
Medium farmers	16.7	41.7	41.7	0.0	100.1	(12)
Small farmers	15.8	36.8	36.8	10.6	100.0	(19)
Tenants/Laborers	10.0	5.0	75.0	10.0	100.0	(20)
Overall	29.8	40.3	23.9	5.9	99.9	(67)

Most farmers have trouble obtaining credit either all or most of the time. It is interesting that persons who feel no need for credit are small farmers and tenants-cum-laborers. Two small owners have made a conscious break from the cultivators' cycle of perpetual indebtedness. They now rely on their land for both food and additional cash requirements.[1] As far as the tenants are concerned, they are unable to obtain credit without land for collateral. Each year they try to lease any amount of land for the monsoon season and buy seed from whatever little

[1]Both might take loans for major expenses such as marriages, but rely on their own production for household and farm expenses. One contributed Rs. 200/- ($26.66) to the construction of a new physics lab at the High School though he had studied only through the fifth class himself. Both view farming as a business.

they can save from their earnings as casual or agricultural laborers. Both maintain they cannot afford to lease in land for a full year because of their lack of capital.

Credit is a constraint to a point for small farmers as well as tenants and laborers. As land size falls, so money-lenders' interest rates rise. Official credit is available only to those who own 2.5 acres or more. Therefore, for around half of the sample in the small farmers' category, credit is more expensive than it is for any other class of cultivators. As regards the tenants and laborers, most of them cannot obtain any from the regular private sources because of their lack of collateral.[1] A few have long-standing ties with particular money-lending families whose tenants they might have been over several generations. These are able to get loans and repay them through labor and/or cropsharing. While such arrangements mean access to credit, they also make it impossible to repay fully one's debt.

Loans from money-lenders whether taken in cash or kind are normally repaid in kind. Though lenders maintain they are willing to accept payment in cash, their advantage lies in grain since the grain trade is their main income earner. The loan's value is set in kind when it is taken, based on grain prices at the previous harvest. Should a farmer take a loan for his winter crop, he will repay x quintals of wheat or barley at whatever the money-lender chooses to estimate the price will be that year based on the last. Smaller cultivators in particular find the bulk of their crop has been mortgaged before it is sown. The money-lender obtains grain cheaply holding onto it until the market prices rise

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[1]There are special loans available to Harijans for housing construction and other purposes which are discussed below in Chapter IV.

later in the season. Many cultivators find themselves short of food stocks by the middle or end of the cropping season and have to buy back their own produce at inflated rates. Even worse, they often obtain these additional stocks on loan thus adding interest also at inflated rates. It will be recalled that interest rates charged by money-lenders range from 12 to 50 percent *per annum*.[1]

Why do cultivators not utilize official channels where interest is much lower? Some persons do of course, and do so mainly for the purchase of pump sets or other farm machinery (see Table 3.12). Official credit is still vastly under-utilized.

TABLE 3.12

SOURCES OF CREDIT USED BY FARM SIZE*

Strata	Credit Sources					
	Money Lender	Friends, Relatives	State or Land Bank	Panchayat Samiti**	Cooperative	(N)
Large farmers	81.3	31.3	0.0	0.0	37.5	(16)
Medium farmers	83.3	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	(12)
Small farmers	84.2	15.7	5.3	5.3	10.5	(19)
Tenants/Laborers	60.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	(20)
Overall	76.0	26.9	1.5	1.5	11.9	(67)

*Totals are not 100.0% as respondents could give more than one response.

**Only one person had an outstanding loan from this source. The *samitis* no longer extend credit.

[1]Rates vary in the two villages: in Hanumangarh they range from 12 to 24 percent and in Shivpura from 25 to 50 percent. If loans are taken in kind (grain or seed) interest is double that charged for cash and may even be compounded during the year.

Three main reasons are given for not using official credit. The most frequent response is that there is too much red tape involved with government loans. This is true from the cultivator's perspective. He is required for example, to show he has no outstanding debt at any other governmental agency. He needs proof of the requisite amount of land ownership. Official estimates might be asked for unless loans are given in kind (e.g., seed) which have to be submitted by officials at the panchayat samiti or district offices. Technical appraisals might be asked for in some situations: if a farmer wants to install a pump set, he needs an estimate from irrigation engineers to show the well has sufficient water for proper utilization of the pump set. While these procedures have a rationale, they tend to intimidate or baffle some farmers.

Second, several farmers state frankly that government requires payment on time while the money-lender does not. They are afraid their land might be auctioned off by government if they default. This has never actually happened in anyone's memory.[1] On the contrary, several laborers and smaller cultivators' families have lost land through money-lenders' foreclosures. Money-lenders tend to reinforce farmers' fears of governmental action and in at least one case had threatened to

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[1]Long, complex legal provisions make it difficult for government to foreclose. The same is true for money-lenders, but since their debtors are either unable financially or unwilling to deal in court, informal arrangements often mean the cultivator loses de facto control of his land until such time as the debt is repaid which is almost impossible without use of the land. Government on the other hand, aside from the legalities of notices and foreclosure, must grant debt relief in times of natural disasters which occur with alarming regularity. The recuperation of public loans is abysmally low in India. Farmers have been known to take governments loans to repay money-lenders. Such incidents led government to stop all "taccavi" or general purpose cash loans.

withdraw credit from a farmer if he took a loan from the land mortgage bank. To an extent private credit is more flexible in that debts can continue for long periods of time as long as the bulk of the interest is paid each year. Its ready availability, however, means that farmers do not need to rely primarily on their farming to meet expenses. This lowers the floor of production required to remain viable in agriculture and as such, detracts from the potential productivity of farmers.

The crux of the matter is that money-lenders provide "untied" credit usable for any purpose without accounting. As mentioned official credit is tied, and for most purposes the cultivator never receives any cash in hand. Loans are only for farm or other productive enterprises. Subsistence cultivators seldom separate farm and household budgets but by the respondents' own reckoning, most of their credit is used for non-farm purposes (as is apparent in Table 3.7 above). A sizable proportion is used for ritual and social obligations, e.g., marriages and death feasts.

The third dimension of access discussed is the availability of advice or information. When asked if they farm according to advice given by extension agents, only 15 percent of all respondents say they try. Most say they do not even try to find out what extension agents advise since the agents have no interest in the small farmers anyway (see Table 3.13).

Many of these respondents have tried unsuccessfully in the past to approach either the village level worker or another member of the samiti staff. Of the 15 percent who try to farm according to extension agents' advice, most are in the large stratum. Of course, there are persons in

TABLE 3.13

WHETHER RESPONDENTS USE EXTENSION ADVICE BY LAND SIZE

Strata	Whether Respondents Use Extension Advice				
	Yes	No	Doesn't Know What Agents Say	Total %	(N)
Large farmers	30.0	25.0	45.0	100.0	(16)
Medium farmers	16.7	16.7	66.7	100.1	(12)
Small farmers	10.6	5.3	84.2	100.1	(19)
Tenants/Laborers	5.0	95.0	0.0	100.0	(20)
Overall	14.9	38.8	46.3	100.0	(67)

each stratum like Bachchu who have no interest in improving their production, and hence make no attempt to contact extension workers.

Of the 70 percent or so who do not get advice, most of the medium and especially the smaller cultivators feel their land is the major hindrance. One of the small farmers puts it this way:

> The government wants more food produced, but they feel only big farmers can do this. The big farmers too never tell Samiti people to come help us though they have the influence to make them do their jobs. This may be because the big farmers too are not interested or don't want us to progress. Why? I don't know. Maybe because then we would not be under their influence. As it is now many small farmers can't save seed enough even though they try to from the previous year's crop. They need it for food and then they are dependent on the big farmer who has a surplus and who is a money-lender as well. But you know, a small man has to work harder than the big one because his small farm is all he has to live on. So why is it that government won't help us? Tell me that! Of course, there are lazy small farmers too -- but on the whole they work harder...

Tenants almost laugh when asked about farming on the advice of the extension staff. Most of them say there is no way they can benefit from the advice even if they get it. "We have no land. What we can lease is the worst land possible because landowners keep the best for themselves. What will we do with advice whatever it is?" "We know what they say, but why should we follow it with no land of our own? Only the next tenant or the landlord himself will profit from it. If landlords and government want higher yields, let them pay for them."

Other comments however reflect another side. "They (the extension agents) won't come to us, nor will they see us if we go there. We have no land. They aren't interested in the small man anyway. Farming has become a business for big people only." "We don't know anyone there (the samiti) and you have to have influence to get these things. Only big farmers have influence. Even the small landowners cannot get anything. And we hear they ask for money. What can we do?" "They don't listen to small men anyway -- do you think they would listen to Harijans?"[1]

One tenant said she tried to farm according to the extension agent's recommendations. Her husband is a pump mechanic at the city water works. He is also fairly influential among a segment of the Raiger (leatherworkers') caste. This family has leased land from the same Brahmin family for two generations. The landlord provides only irrigation facilities and those too have been cut off since he defaulted on the payment of electrical bills for the pump set. Until this happened, the tenants used both high yielding wheat and millet seed: they are the only tenants in the sample who did so.

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[1] Outcastes.

Land presents two constraints for tenants. One is motivational in that they are not prepared to invest in what is not theirs and from which they gain only temporary advantage. Some observers have made the point that landownership may not be the crucial variable. What is necessary is security of tenure.[1] The comments cited above clearly reflect insecurity of tenure and this is discussed at length in Chapter IV.

Myths and Realities of Small Farm Productivity

The second constraint is that neither the extension agents nor the large landowners are interested in tenants' productivity. Landowners who are serious about increasing production by and large do their own farming or supervise their tenants closely, providing proper seed and other inputs. Tractors make it possible for them to dispense with tenants altogether and hire farm managers. Most however do not invest much in their farms; they get food enough for their families as it is, plus a moderate surplus. Their money-lending and grain trading activities are more important.

Interviews conducted with village leaders support the perceptions of small farmers and tenants. The large farmer's desire to control agricultural resources coincides with his belief that small farms cannot produce a surplus. These beliefs further coincide with those of administrators in charge of program implementation who see it as a waste of time to cajole small farmers into adopting new practices.

All leaders feel that agricultural production has increased consequentially with the intensive programs. Some mention that increased

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[1]See Doreen Warriner, op. cit., and the Ford Foundation Report cited above, Chapter I.

irrigation has caused the most change by permitting double cropping. Which groups have benefitted the most from the programs? "Mainly people like myself who have lots of land because we can demand the inputs. The small farmers are in trouble: they neither demand them nor can they really produce much more." (the village headman of Shivpura) "The bigger farmers, of course, and they don't really need the government's help except perhaps for extension advice. It is the smaller man who needs the subsidies and loans -- but he is so far denied access to them and it is the fault of government that thinks there is no use putting so much into the small farmer -- though let me tell you he has to work harder than the big one." (retired patwari, Shivpura) "People who try -- both big and small farmers though the big farmers have much more advantage. They can afford the inputs and also the samiti will give to them first assuming they will have a higher increase in production." (caste headman in Hanumangarh, big farmer and member of the Congress Party).

One large farmer sums it up this way: "How can government expect the small man to make up food deficits? These people have only four or five bighas or land and can barely keep themselves alive. Everyone says they work very hard, but that is not true. It is the man who has at least twenty acres who can produce a surplus. We work hard but government always talks of the small man. When we are the ones who produce for market, why should government give land to Harijans or start programs for small farmers? Are these the real farmers of India?"

Finally, from conversations with extension personnel it becomes clear that while provisions are made for assisting small cultivators, few people feel these are serious attempts to raise their productivity. With a

national food shortage, the effort is aimed at extracting surpluses from larger landowners for urban markets. Schemes to give small cultivators credit or other inputs are viewed as subsidy measures to prevent destitution and enable survival, not as a part of increasing overall productivity.[1] As was pointed out in Chapter I, the idea is to raise production by investing scarce resources into those sectors of agriculture which are assumed to respond the fastest.

The assumption that large farmers will produce more per unit of land is not a valid one. Increasing numbers of studies show it is the smaller cultivator who outproduces the larger given similar irrigation resources. Aside from studies done by others, the following points are clear here though farmers were not asked for precise production figures.[2] (Also see Figure 3.1 for a cross national comparison of farm productivity by farm size.)

As with Bachchu, the lands of most of the larger farmers are vastly under-utilized. Some cite irrigation as a constraint, but few fully exploit such irrigation as they have. Bachchu for example, uses only 4.5 of his irrigated ten acres. Nor do any invest in more than one well and pump set though they have both the personal resources and credit access to do so. Even farmers like Bachchu who rely on animal husbandry rather than grain for income do not fully use their land. Milk production is abysmally low because of a lack of proper feed. A Peace Corps Volunteer in the area working in dairy development started a fodder


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[1] Drawn from discussion with state, district and samiti level personnel. See also the Ford Foundation report, op. cit.

[2] Also see G. R. Saini, "Farm Size, Productivity and Returns to Scale," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. IV, #26 (1969), and Wilfred Malenbaum, Modern India's Economy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp. 148-51.

FIGURE 3.1

OUTPUT PER HECTARE FOR FARM SIZE GROUPS



(For each Country, bar at left represents output per hectare for smallest farm size group. Bars to the right represent successively larger farms with their output per hectare expressed as a percent of that of the smallest size group.)

SOURCE: Peter Dorner and Don Kanel, "The Economic Case for Land Reform," paper presented at the Agency for International Development Spring Review on Land Reform, Washington, D. C., June 1970. (Mimeographed.)

[1](India) Erven J. Long, "The Economic Basis of Land Reform in Underdeveloped Economies," Land Economics (May 1961), pp. 113-23. The paper uses data for the mid- and late 1950s gathered by the Studies in Economics of Farm Management, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. Output as gross value in rupees per acre. Long classified actual farm sizes into four size groups -- smallest, second smallest, second largest, largest -- for each of eight areas in seven states, and presented output per size group as the average of the eight areas. (Data from more than 1,000 farms from seven states.)

[2](Brazil) Roger G. Johnson and Reuben C. Buse, A Study of Farm Size and Economic Performance in Old Santa Rosa, Rio Grande do Sul, Land Tenure Center Research Paper No. 27 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, August 1967), pp. 40-61. Output as net sales per productive hectare, in thousands of cruzeiros (1963). Actual farm sizes included in each size class are: (1) 0 - 10 hectares; (2) 10.1 - 20 hectares; (3) 20.1 - 40 hectares; (4) 40.1 - 100 hectares; and (5) more than 100 hectares. (Sample of 311 farms.)

[3](Brazil, 1950) Solon L. Barraclough and Arthur L. Domike, "Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin American Countries," Land Economics (November 1966), pp. 391-424. Also issued as Land Tenure Center Reprint No. 25 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1966). Output as percent of value of sub-family (smallest) farm production per cultivated hectare. The authors classed actual farm sizes into four groups: sub-family, family, multi-family medium, and multi-family large. (Based on National Census data.)

[4](Colombia, 1960) Ibid., using same measures of output and same farm size criteria. (Based on National Census data.)

[5](Colombia, 1966) Emil Haney, "The Economic Reorganization of Minifundia in a Highland Community of Colombia," Ph.D. thesis in progress, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin. Output as gross value per hectare, in U. S. dollars. Actual farm sizes included in each size class are: (1) less than one hectare; (2) 1 - 2.99 hectares; (3) 3 - 9.99 hectares; and (4) more than ten hectares. (Sample of 203 farms in a highland community of Colombia.)

[6](Mexico, 1960) Folke Dovring, "Land Reform and Productivity: The Mexican Case, A Preliminary Analysis," AERR-83, Department of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Illinois, November 1966, 17 pages. Also issued as Land Tenure Center Paper No. 63 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, January 1969), pp. 2-10. Output as gross value per hectare of arable land, in pesos. Actual farm sizes included in each size class are: (1) less than five hectares in the private sector (average about 1.45 hectares); (2) ejido lands averaging about seven hectares per ejido member (only about two percent of 1.6 million ejido members engage in collective farming); and (3) more than five hectares in the private sector (average about 27 hectares). (Based on National Census data.)

production scheme. Of the thirty or so farmers who took lucerne seed the first year, all but two or three would fall into the small farmer stratum of this study. One would assume they have less land to divert for such a crop.

More small cultivators take more crops each year than the larger farmers.[1] Also more of the former try to find out about the hybrid seeds. Some obtained small amounts in previous years from neighbors and grew them with disastrous results. Often the seed is impure or genetic breakdown has started.[2] They grow them like indigenous varieties not knowing that chemical fertilizers are required, that seed has to be planted shallowly, and that these varieties are prone to diseases which do not affect native strains.

One farmer interviewed owned only 1.5 acres of land. He proudly displayed his half acre of Kalyan Sona wheat during the interview.[3] He was trying it for the first time having got the seed from a friend. When asked how much fertilizer he had used, he replied he had used only a little manure from his animals. The wheat was just beginning to tiller and we recommended that he immediately get some urea and superphosphates or else he would not even get back the cost of his seed.

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[1]This controls for irrigation; a comparison of farmers with similar facilities.

[2]Seed often gets mixed with indigenous types over time. Also since the genetic structure is not very stable, farmers should purchase new stock about every three years or the yields decline. Wheat seed appears to be more stable than maize or other coarse grains, but even there seed stock must be replaced.

[3]One of the wheat hybrids; a white variety developed from the original Mexican imports.

Even with ready cash he was unable to obtain enough of these.[1] "But everyone says these seeds produce more than twice that of desi wheat." "Yes, but not unless you put all these other things on. Didn't anyone tell you?" "No." Narayan's wheat problem was finally solved by an onslaught of aphids for which not even this research team could move the Samiti for a sprayer and pesticides though we were informed the aphids would present a problem for all the surrounding fields. The tale was all too common. Most sprayers were not functioning; those that were in order were being used by the chairman of the samiti and some of his friends.

As a rule, smaller farmers market a higher proportion of their produce than do the large ones. The data here are imprecise but suggest that small cultivators market between 40 and 50 percent of each crop whereas large ones sell only around 25 percent. This is taken from farmers' own estimates for each crop grown and controls for cash crops like mustard in Shivpura, of which everyone sells 100 percent. This may be so for a number of reasons. Smaller farmers being more in debt may have to pay out more at harvest. Or it may be that because they are constrained by a lack of credit for everyday items of consumption, they have to rely on themselves to earn the required amount of cash. Both may be true to a point, but they suggest that small plots exercise a constraint that makes farmers use the land more intensively and part with

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[1] In fact, the cooperative had several quintals of each left in its store house at the end of the cropping season. The cooperative secretary said there simply was not enough demand for them. Not only Narayan, but a number of other farmers had been told that supplies were finished.

a larger share of their produce. This fact is also borne out for other countries such as Mexico.[1]

Finally, a number of the entrepreneurial large farmers who take their farming seriously contend there is a size constraint on efficiency if one is to use the new varieties. The headman of Shivpura puts only a fourth of his sixty irrigated acres under high yielding wheat. As he points out, the high yields promised by government are only possible on relatively small plots because of the intensity of cultivation required. The weeding and irrigation operations in particular require the kind of care which is impossible to exercise on large farms.

Summary

In summarizing the findings of this chapter, it can be seen that the spread of new technologies is not very wide in these two villages. There are two constraints to their adoption. One is the motivation of farmers and this is linked to their perception of farming as a subsistence, rather than a commercial enterprise. The second is the constraint of land size. Even when farmers desire new inputs, they are unable to obtain them if they are in the smaller land ownership categories.

Second, the constraint of land size is perceived by cultivators, village leaders, and governmental personnel. Smaller farmers see this as a result of the coincidence of land ownership, wealth and political influence. The latter two groups (leaders and government personnel)

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[1]See Folke Dovring, "Land Reform in Mexico," paper presented at the Agency for International Development Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, D. C., June 1970, p. 20. (Mimeographed.)

essentially see it as a waste of time and resources to invest in the small or medium cultivator.

Third, on a general level, it appears to be the smaller cultivator who is more interested in new inputs. He also tends to make fuller use of his resources than does the large cultivator though both use less than the maximum amount.

Fourth, these findings raise questions about three basic assumptions of India's approach to agricultural modernization. First, one is led to question the assumption that all farmers will typically respond to more profitable or productive means of production. Second, one has to question the assumption that those who already have more resources to begin with are likely to respond the fastest to new incentives. Third, it appears that adoption patterns may require constraints as well as incentives, which eliminate the less productive patterns of behavior. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is farmers' reliance on expensive but loose credit available from money-lenders to meet household and social obligations. The alternative, more productive behavior of course, would be to channel this credit into farming and to meet non-farm expenses from increased profits.

Finally, even with this evidence, it would seem more rational to divert resources and attention to smaller cultivators who (1) feel the need to depend on their own production and (2) who constitute a far larger base of political support for any political party that chooses to do so.

CHAPTER IV

CHANGES IN SECURITY OF TENURE AND EMPLOYMENT

Agricultural modernization does more than raise farm productivity. The effects of new technology on rural organization were discussed in Chapter I. Here one can see the extent to which rural organization has altered: the emphasis in this chapter is on changes in economic relationships as they form the basis of interdependencies in village society. One finds the first impact of change is felt by the landless: tenants and laborers alike. There is concern in official quarters about rising unemployment levels in India. Some of this is due to normal rises in population. Controlling for that however, the concern exists that tenants and laborers displaced from agriculture migrate into urban areas swelling the ranks of the urban unemployed. The debate continues as to whether the "Green Revolution" is responsible for higher unemployment rates or if more employment is possible through the use of the new technologies.

Institutional Changes: Technology and Legal Framework

It has already been stated that over time, the goals of production have superceded those of equality. This is borne out in the following analysis of the institutional parameters dealing with security of tenure. The data presented show how these parameters in fact constrain tenant security leaving landowners a free hand to develop their resources.

These data also suggest that the new "package" of technologies accelerates obsolescence of tenants and labor.

Unemployment is worse in areas other than Rajasthan where pressure on land is greater and large-scale mechanization has gone further. Desperation has erupted into political violence: some organized, some anomic. The best-known of violent uprisings in recent years is the Naxalbari Movement linked with the Community Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).[1] In this and some other incidents, landless labor and/or tenants have forcibly evicted landowners, harvested crops, and retained the land. There have been murders committed on both sides with government primarily aiding the landowners.

A major point here is that farming is highly profitable in India. A rough calculation based on discussions with farmers in both villages indicates net profits between 40 and 60 percent depending on how well the farmer cultivates: whether he irrigates on time, uses sufficient manure, weeds thoroughly, etc. Even using all recommended inputs to obtain optimal yields (including hybrid seeds) the costs per acre are at most Rs. 700.00 ($93.33). With a yield of 27 to 28 quintals per acre, and a selling price of Rs. 110.00 ($14.66) per quintal of wheat on the open market, the net profit is Rs. 1,913.00 ($255.06) per acre.[2] These

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[1]The movement gets its name from the Naxalbari region of Bengal state where it began. Starting by organizing tea plantation labor, party workers then moved into other agricultural areas. To the author's mind, its mistake was to include university students and other urban elements which made it easier for government to suppress it and this also destroyed the dynamic of rural ideology and participation. The party mentioned is the most "left" and "Peking" oriented of India's four communist parties. It does not contest elections. See Paul R. Brass and Marcus F. Franda, eds., Radical Politics in South Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), passim.

[2]Calculations are based on input recommendations from Government of Rajasthan, Ministry of Agriculture found in the Rajasthan Farm Diary for

calculations do not include allowances for depreciation and replacement of capital investments.[1] The reader will recall that producers have virtually no financial obligation to the state or any other external body and thus are under no constraint to produce the maximum feasible. Given these profits, entrepreneurial farmers have developed their farms well and are reluctant to share gains with tenants and labor. Tractors make it unnecessary to share as much. They also have status value.

Where irrigation has been extended or improved permitting double or triple cropping, the annual labor requirement has obviously risen. There are more harvest and weeding times. Because the biochemical inputs of the Green Revolution require more intensive cultivation, the labor input of each crop has increased somewhat. Looking to these factors, some economists hold that the Green Revolution has increased employment.[2]

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extension workers, 1972, and prices of inputs provided by the Panchayat Samiti officers of Hanumangarh and Kumher, Rajasthan. The selling price is that of wheat on the free market in Hanumangarh after harvest, 1973. The costs of pesticides requirements are estimated because some crops may be afflicted with more diseases than others: to the author's mind a generous amount has been added for these.

[1]Another basis of calculation was provided by the Block Development Officer for Shivpura. This assumes the cultivator uses a tractor on hire, is using Kalyan Sona seed and all recommended practices. It does not include depreciation or replacement for capital improvements.

Costs:			
	Plowing	Rs. 80/-	
	Levelling	Rs. 15/-	
	Sowing	Rs. 25/-	
	Seed	Rs. 80/-	
	Manure (organic)	Rs. 40/-	
	Chemical fertilizer	Rs. 140/-	
	Pesticides	Rs. 25/-	
	Irrigation	Rs. 125/-	
	Weeding	Rs. 15/-	
	Harvesting	Rs. 35/-	
	Threshing and winnowing	Rs. 70/-	
	Total cost per acre	Rs. 650/-	($86.66)

[2]Reams have been written on increased man-hours, man-days, etc. and the Green Revolution. Such precise calculations omit predictions of

The counter argument is that while this may be so, the biochemical components are divisible and "neutral to scale". It is the concomitant increase in the rate and scale of farm mechanization that raises unemployment. This argument needs elaboration before looking at changes in the two villages.

Since farming is profitable and the income earned is not taxed, it has attracted both land speculators and entrepreneurs. Land values have risen rapidly making it difficult for persons of moderate means to buy any. The levels of investment the newcomers are willing and able to make will raise the scale of farming. The two scales (the small subsistence peasant vs. the entrepreneurial, commercial farmer) can coexist only as long as there are food shortages. Once these are overcome (which is within the realm of technical feasibility) the competition of scales will force out the smaller farmer.[1]

Additionally, security of tenure is affected by the institutional framework. The legal provisions regulating rates and conditions of tenancies enacted to safeguard tenants' interests have worked against them. It will be recalled that by 1957-58, most jagirs and zamindari intermediary rights had been abolished. Certain portions of land could be retained by intermediaries for self-cultivation. Tenants are,

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continued mechanization and as such obfuscate the real issue: the rise in the scale of farming required to remain viable over the longer-term.

[1]See V. M. Rao, "Village Lease Markets for Agricultural Land," Economic and Political Weekly, op. cit. where he forecasts the creation of a class of petty land leasors who cannot afford to cultivate themselves and rent their farms to larger farmers.

however, still employed to cultivate these resumed lands as they are also employed on former muafi or ryotwari holdings.[1]

The goals of tenancy reform are (1) to protect tenants from economic exploitation by the landlords, (2) to provide a livelihood and security of tenure for them, and (3) to provide ownership where feasible to the tenants. Three bodies of legislation have been enacted to deal with each of these.

First, in the area of rent regulation, rents cannot exceed one-sixth of the gross product (per tenant) in Rajasthan. In the field no tenant interviewed paid less than one-fourth. The second area of legislation aims at security of tenure: though a landowner has the right to self-cultivate a certain amount of land, some minimum amount of each tenant's holding must be left to him. Further, the tenant cannot be evicted from his holding except for nonpayment of rent or some other grave offense. The final area of legislation provides for the transfer of landownership to the tenant: on non-resumable land, tenants may claim ownership if they have farmed the same plot/s for three consecutive years.[2]

It is impossible to enforce this body of legislation. It does not cover most tenants as it includes only those registered as such (see

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[1]All land holdings regardless of their previous classifications (e.g., muafi or ryotwari) are now called khatedari holdings: translated as "state's tenants". Thus the tenants referred to in this context are what would have the legal classification of sub-tenants, and under these legal provisions should be registered as such in the land records.

[2]Data are from the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Handbook of Agriculture (New Delhi: Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 1969), pp. 722-25. See also Implementation of Land Reforms, A Review by the Land Reforms Implementation Committee of the National Development Council (New Delhi: Planning Commission, August 1966), pp. 122-26.

above). Second, since land is at a premium tenants are in no position to insist on legal rental rates as there are many waiting in line for land who are willing to pay twice or three times that amount. The provisions regarding ownership too are not enforceable as they assume -- incorrectly -- that the state knows which persons are tenants to whom and the plots cultivated by them.

Knowing the limits and loopholes of the legislation, landlords rotate tenants each year so that none has a right to claim help under any provisions for security or ownership. It was pointed out in Chapter II that most leases are hereditary but oral. With the new laws landowners no longer maintain the hereditary tenurial system. They have also made sure that oral leases are unacceptable in court by changing tenants and their plots every year. Only in exceptional cases have tenants kept the same plots year after year: where a degree of trust or perhaps the coercion of high indebtedness exists between landlord and tenant.

Finally, there are few tenants who can afford to take landowners to court. Legal costs are high especially in view of the fact that civil cases may be tied up in court for years.[1] Even if a tenant could afford to go to court, the pressure from landowners on him and his family would be difficult to bear. In the intervening time he would not be able to lease in any land, and if he lost in court, he would probably never again be able to get employment in the village.

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[1]A farmer interviewed by Barry H. Michie fought his claim for twenty years before it was settled in his favor. Three months later he had still not received de facto ownership as its illegal occupant refused to vacate it.

Several implications can be drawn from this discussion, some of which are discussed further in this chapter. Here it is sufficient to point out two points. First, one has to assume that government sees tenancy legislation as providing some kind of symbolic reassurance to the landless since, in fact, no strong attempt has been made to enforce it. Second, it is probable that the nonenforcement is due to two reasons: (1) administrative incapacity,[1] and (2) a fear that enforcement will jeopardize the security of owner-cultivators who are considered important for food production. The latter point follows the logic of the Ford Foundation Report which cautioned against land reforms which might affect "farms that are efficiently and productively operated."[2]

Landowners' attitudes toward the landless can be seen in the following incident which occurred in Hanumangarh several years ago.[3] Government has a scheme through which Scheduled Castes and Tribes are eligible for land allotments. The plots come from land resumed by the state from jagirs or other ceiling legislation. Land classified as "cultivable wastes" is also available for distribution. Much of this is arid and eroded but can be used for farming with proper investments.[4]

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[1]Primarily a lack of sufficient personnel and detailed land records.

[2]India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It, op. cit., p. 29. See above in Chapter I for the full discussion.

[3]I first heard about this approximately three months after arriving in the village. Every respondent in the tenant/labor category verified it and several owner-cultivators also recited the same tale showing how they refused to let the scarce amount of land available go to persons who are not "real farmers."

[4]The required investments are very high: as much as Rs. 30,000 to 40,000 ($4,000.00 to $5,333.00) depending on the extent of erosion and depth of ground water. Estimates are from samiti personnel and the patwari of Hanumangarh.

Traditionally much of it was used for grazing and some for monsoon crops by all villagers.

A number of allotments of 3.13 acres per household were made a few years back. The recipients all Harijans, made ready to start cultivation. Caste Hindus however, made it clear they would not permit Harijans to use the plots though there remained abundant land for grazing. The Harijans, to test their ownership rights, went out in a group to begin plowing. They were met by groups of stave-wielding farmers who literally beat them back. The Harijans reported the incident to the police and asked for protection which was promised. No action followed however, and the police finally told the allottees to choose between themselves and the caste Hindus. Several Harijans interviewed felt the villagers must have "paid off" the police -- otherwise why would they not help? Others felt it portrayed the feeling upper castes have about the legitimacy of Harijans' claim to land at all as it is a scarce commodity. When field work was conducted none of the allottees could farm their plots though the land was recorded in their names and they paid the land tax on it.[1]

Tenancies

With this background the data can be presented. The first point is to ascertain tenants' views on security of tenure and changes in

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[1]These comments refer only to Harijan allottees: the Minas (Scheduled Tribe), faced no problem. Allottees cannot dispose of their land; it may be sold only to other Scheduled community members. This is to prevent exploitation by the higher castes. Some people sold plots to wealthier caste fellows but most lie unused or have been encroached upon by caste Hindu farmers. Similar cases have occurred elsewhere. See N. K. Singh, "Madhya Pradesh: Hunting the Harijans," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. IX, #47 (November 23, 1974), pp. 1937-38.

employment. Next, the discussion is focused on wages earned, days worked, and the farmers' perceptions of their labor requirements.

Of all respondents, 52.2 percent (N=35) try to lease in land whenever they can. Of these around half are landless and 74.2 percent of the rest own less than five acres. In the year field work was done, two-fifths of the landless were unable to lease any land. Of all leasees, 66 percent were able to get between one and four arid acres. The rest save two persons got between four and eight acres of arid land. The two exceptions were able to get irrigated land of less than four acres. This means that except for these two, all tenants had land for only the monsoon crop.

How difficult is it to lease in land? Two questions were asked: is it easier to lease land now compared with five or six years ago, and what are the rents charged and have they changed in the same time period.

In answer to the first question, tenants' perceptions point overwhelmingly to increasing difficulty in leasing land. Of all tenants, 91.4 percent say it is more difficult to get land now. Why? Three reasons dominate and these are given in Table 4.1. Aside from these, there were one or two other comments illustrating why there is more demand for land. Even with one mediocre monsoon crop of millet a man can provide a good part of the food his family needs during the year reducing the amount of cash required for purchasing grain. Such cash as might be earned from casual labor can then be used for other purposes.

What are the terms of tenancies? Rents are normally paid in kind as a fraction of the gross production. Should there be a drought or crop failure the tenant may still be liable to pay a cash rental of

TABLE 4.1

REASONS WHY IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO LEASE LAND*

Reasons	Percentage of Tenants in Agreement
1. More people want land now (general population increase)	11.4
2. Owners are reluctant to lease because of profitability - prefer to self-cultivate to keep profits	68.6
3. Owners are afraid of tenancy provisions and so will not lease	33.3
4. Owners charge too high a rent and so tenants cannot afford to lease	14.3
5. More people want land because of a lack of alternate employment	11.4
6. Because of tractors owners do not want tenants any more - they can self-cultivate	25.7

*Respondents could give more than one reply and so total is not 100 percent (N=35).

between Rs. 2.00 to 4.00 ($.26 to $.50) per bigha leased.[1] In the sample, of those able to get land that year, 68 percent paid a one-half share to the owners. The rest are fairly evenly divided between one-third or one-fourth shares, or cash payments of Rs. 2.00 to 6.00 ($.26 to $.75) per bigha. Those paying cash are in the minority. One man paid three-quarters of the gross since he leased irrigated land. Another is a farm manager receiving a cash salary each month though he thinks of himself as a landless tenant.

[1] In Hanumangarh, 1.6 bighas (standard) equals one acre; in Shivpura, 2.5 bighas (standard) equals one acre. Thus the higher rental rate applies generally to Hanumangarh and the lower to Shivpura.

If tenants pay this much rent, what inputs do owners provide? In 70 percent of the cases owners provide nothing. In 16 percent of the cases tenants are given water, or fertilizer, or both. Some are able to use owners' plows, bullocks, or other hand tools. This supports the contention made earlier that owners are not interested in investing in their tenants' productivity. The best land is kept for self-cultivation or is put under a manager's care. Landowners involved in money-lending are more interested in income from debts owed or the grain trade rather than land investments. Landowners sometimes mention that they do not invest more in their farms because of insecurity caused by the tenancy laws and ceiling legislation. This does not appear to be valid here despite landowners' protestations to the contrary as they are able to evade both bodies of law successfully and without much effort.

Have leasing arrangements changed in any way other than land availability? For about 10 percent of all tenants, there has been no permanent change though particular landowners may vary their terms. For 72 percent however, rents have risen dramatically over the past five to six years. For 95 percent of these, the rental medium has also changed. Previously landlords were interested in cash rents whereas now they increasingly demand payment in kind. This reflects the rise in grain prices -- from the landlord's perspective it is more profitable to be paid in grain which he can store until prices rise further in mid-season. As one tenant said, "Our fortunes run counter to everyone else's. In those days it was harder for us to pay in cash -- who had cash then? Today cash is easier for us to give as we can sell surplus grain at higher prices, but that is precisely why landlords want the grain." Obviously tenants prefer the lower rents of several years ago even if

they were in cash. "That much we could borrow if necessary. How do we borrow half of a crop?"

There are thus several constraints on tenants wishing to lease land. One is the overall availability which is restricted given landowners' preferences for self-cultivation. Secondly, the tenancy provisions create insecurity for the tenant. Third, there is the constraint of high rental rates which in part reflects population pressures on land. With high grain prices more persons want to lease land too which raises rents. With less employment for laborers (see below) they have an increasingly hard time saving the cash needed for seed and other inputs, and this combined with high rents has made it too difficult for some to lease land at all. Finally, the availability of large tractors for either purchase or hire, makes tenants increasingly obsolete.

Agricultural Employment

The effects of agricultural change on employment patterns are shown in Table 4.2.

TABLE 4.2

WHETHER AGRICULTURAL LABORERS FIND MORE OR LESS EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE NOW THAN PREVIOUSLY

Strata	Changes in Employment				
	More Employment	Less Employment	No Difference	Total %	(N)
Owner-cum-laborers	54.5	36.3	9.1	99.9	(11)
Landless laborers	10.0	80.0	10.0	100.0	(20)
Overall	25.8	64.5	9.7	100.0	(31)

Included in this table are only the persons who normally work as farm laborers for wages. Significantly, most of those who find it easier to get employment in agriculture now are owner-cultivators who take on additional work to supplement farm incomes. Often because they are owner-cultivators they are better integrated into farming networks. None are Harijans or regular farm labor. Those finding it easier to find employment now point to the extension of irrigation facilities and consequent double cropping. Some mention that though farmers self-cultivate more, this has increased employment somewhat: "So many zamindars are farming seriously now since they can made money from it. Before they wouldn't even use all their land -- or even lease it. Now they have brought more into cultivation. They do not like to give it out on lease but prefer to take the tractor on hire for the plowing and manage it themselves or hire a manager for the year. But at least if they cultivate more land, there is more work at weeding and harvest time."[1] Seven persons (22.6 percent) however, who normally work in agriculture were unable to find any employment in the fields that year.

Of those facing employment difficulties in agriculture, most feel their problems are due to higher wage levels asked by laborers. Farmers are perceived to hire fewer persons doing more of their own work. Others say that rather than wages farmers want to keep their profits and so work more themselves. There is a difference here in the two villages. While Hanumangarh workers cite higher wages and farm profits as the main reason they cannot find employment, in Shivpura every laborer first mentions the coming of tractors and other mechanical implements. Some

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[1]The use of the word zamindar is colloquial here. This does not refer to the legal term of intermediary landowner. Farmers and laborers tend to use it for anyone who owns consequential amounts of land.

persons in Hanumangarh also mention these factors, but mechanization has gone further in Shivpura. In Hanumangarh the coming of farm machinery is associated primarily with the loss of tenancies; in Shivpura it is associated with an overall drop in employment. With laborers hired only for weeding and harvesting, 73.3 percent of the laborers in both villages estimate they can find work in agriculture for a maximum of 120 days each year (two crops per year). For the rest of the time they rely on other casual jobs.

Unlike laborers in other parts of the country, these farm workers are not necessarily tied to any particular landowner. Some owing debts they are unable to pay may find themselves in a position of working for a single person until the debt is repaid. For the most part however, laborers work wherever jobs are available. Sometimes certain farmers may be more prompt in payment of wages or give workers small fringe benefits such as cigarettes or tea during the day thus attracting more workers. During harvest most persons are able to find work in their own or neighboring villages unless drought or some other disaster has affected the crop.

If most respondents can find work in agriculture for only about 120 days each year, what are they earning and what sources of employment are open to them for the rest of the time? Wage rates are similar in both villages: only during the very peak of harvesting do laborers in Shivpura receive half a rupee more than those in Hanumangarh. Payments may be made in either cash or kind though farmers prefer to pay in cash, and kind payments are calculated on the basis of cash equivalents. During harvest, laborers are paid Rs. 3/- per day for men ($.40), and Rs. 2.50 for women ($.33), and the amount is one rupee less for weeding and other

farm operations. In Shivpura if a farmer is not able to rent a tractor for plowing and has to hire a plowman, he has to pay between Rs. 80-100 ($10.66 - $14.66) for ten days of plowing.[1] In Hanumangarh almost all wages are paid in cash whereas in Shivpura, wages during the monsoon crop are paid in cash and those during the winter are given in kind. This reflects the market price of grains produced: wheat and barley grown in the winter are higher priced than millet (monsoon crop). It is to the producers' advantage to pay in kind for the higher priced grains since for each rupee value he gives away less grain. Tenants and laborers prefer the mixed payment system because they receive some minimal amount of grain for their own use and can then use cash for purchasing other items.[2]

There is no consistent alternate source of employment open to labor. Some find work on a casual daily or piece work basis: tending goats, drawing water, thatching roofs, or doing other odd jobs. The more fortunate might find work on a construction or road gang. Laborers from Shivpura often travel as far as Delhi (80 miles) or Chandigarh (around

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[1]Farmers with larger holdings are especially in need of assistance of plowing because of the time factor. The rate comes to approximately Rs. 10/- per day ($1.33) for the plowman, his plow and two or more oxen. Each team of oxen can barely do one acre per day.

[2]To give the reader some idea of the cost of living in the two villages, here is a list of items with the prices as they were in 1972-73. In some cases as with the grains, a range is given to indicate seasonal fluctuations: Flour: wheat - Rs. 1/- to Rs. 1.60 per kilo (approximately two pounds) ($.13 to $.21); millet - Rs. 0.80 to 1.30 per kilo ($.11 to $.17); Lentils: Rs. 2.50 to 4.00 per kilo depending on variety ($.33 to $.53); Mustard oil: Rs. 4 to 8 per kilo ($.53 to $1.06); Kerosene oil: Rs. 1.00 to 3.00 (black market) per litre ($.13 to $.40); Cloth: for women's skirts, Rs. 20 to 30 per four metre piece ($2.66 to $4.00); for shirts, children's clothing, etc., Rs. 4 to 12 and up per metre ($.53 to $1.60).

200 miles) searching for work in construction which pays as much as Rs. 8/- ($1.06) per day. This is the most lucrative work, yet most of what is earned goes into maintaining the laborers and their travel expenses. Their families are generally left in the village and what meager savings are left go to the village money-lender who has provided their sustenance while the men are away.

As expected, most laborers feel their wages are too low (75 percent) given both the work done and the cost of living. The rest say their wages are basically fair but most of these are owner-cultivators themselves who do agricultural work for supplementary income and hire laborers of their own. One man feels that high prices have hurt farmers also since many of the smaller ones have to buy extra grain on the open market. So how can one expect them to pay their laborers more?

Social Change: The Creation of New Dependencies

Many tenants and laborers had applied for land allotments under the schemes mentioned above for Scheduled communities. What happened to the Hanumangarh allottees has already been recounted. Most persons think the idea is basically good but feel it never can be implemented properly since landowners will not permit it. Many persons applied for land but only few received any: 64 percent of all tenants and laborers applied of which only 20 percent were given any. In Hanumangarh the size of the plots might be considered adequate, but in Shivpura the allotments are only two-fifths of an acre each -- about the size of a small backyard garden. Some of these are saline -- others have long since been encroached upon by other farmers who will not relinquish them.

Beyond these problems some respondents feel land has not been distributed properly. Though half say most of the allotments were made to

the landless for whom they are intended, others are convinced that plots were handed out illegally to persons who bribed the officials: those who already had land and thus the influence to get more. In Shivpura there is a uniformly sarcastic reaction: "The good plots we can't farm because someone else is already on them. The bad ones -- well, who wants one bigha of saline soil that is waterlogged as well? So what does it really matter who got the land?"

Two points should be noted here. First, it has been argued by some economists that the marginal productivity of labor in peasant agriculture is approaching or is zero.[1] On this assumption, farmers obviously cannot be expected to hire any more laborers or even utilize their own time more fully on their farms. This assertion is untenable as is shown clearly by Myrdal and others.[2] Even using indigenous seed varieties, there is a gap between what is actually produced and the potential. In both villages here, farmers are well aware that they can improve their production by cultivating more intensively which requires more labor input for the most part.

Second, the net effect of land allotments is the retention of a tied labor pool for farmers with more land -- particularly when one notes the size and condition of the plots given out. Even if the allottees can farm these, they are not sufficient for subsistence and their

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[1] See Theodore Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, op. cit., passim. The main argument here is that farmers make maximum use of their factors of production including labor.

[2] Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, op. cit., p. 1253; Morton Paglin, "'Surplus' Agricultural Labor and Development: Facts and Theories," The American Economic Review, Vol. LV, #4 (1965), p. 825; and M. R. Haswell, Economics of Development in Village India (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 72.

owners still have to rely on such employment as might be found on other people's farms. The size of plots and the investment required to make them productive suggests their purpose is to prevent destitution not to encourage productivity or even self-reliance.[1] An important social and political implication of this is that the laborers are economically more dependent than ever on a landed elite that increasingly has less need for their services.

Perhaps recognizing that there never will be sufficient land for all Harijans, government has provided loans for building homes or for the purchase of goats, chickens, pigs or other livestock for alternate sources of income. A good proportion of these loans are captured by Harijan leaders who use them either for building new homes (though many already own large stone and mortar houses) or for money-lending.[2] These leaders increasingly resemble other village notables whose life-styles they emulate. Their homes are built in the "modern" style and in order to raise their social position they have stopped eating meat, drinking liquor and refuse to perform traditional tasks left to leather-workers such as tanning hides.[3]

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[1] Hamza Alavi finds a similar situation in the Canal Colony areas of Pakistan (from discussion with him, 1972), and Stavenhagen, op. cit., cites the same situation for ejidatarios in Mexico.

[2] It is frequently difficult to get precise data on this because of the sensitivity of some recipients. At least four of the five Raiger patels (headmen) however, got loans that year. Harijans make up 27 percent of the village population as of the 1971 census.

[3] Meat, liquor and contact with dead bodies (hides) are all polluting. Such changes in practices are documented for many upwardly mobile groups in India. See Lloyd I. and Suzanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). This does not imply that other castes treat these Harijans as one of them. Rather, such adaptations set leaders apart from the rest of the community whose "backwardness" they rely on for their own distinctiveness.

These leaders are the new intermediaries between the political system and the Harijan communities. They sit on the elected village councils,[1] help decide community matters and most importantly, have a say in the disbursement of loans and allotments of land. Though some loans are taken by them, others are judiciously given out to enhance the leaders' prestige and support. Benefits do get spread in "devious" ways to the community at large. Even if a leader should get a loan for himself, he hires laborers from his own community to build his new home. By using other loans for money-lending, he is able to supply badly needed credit to those who cannot obtain it elsewhere while creating his own patron-client network on which he can draw politically.

The Congress Party relies on these leaders to mobilize Harijan votes at election time. The manner in which governmental credit is used is open knowledge and the trade-off is political support in return for a distributive monopoly.[2] The limits of this strategy are discussed below. Here it is sufficient to note that while Raigers, Chamars or Khatiks may present a united front to other castes, they are divided internally. Some divisions represent traditional rivalries between families and other local disputes.

However, two qualitatively different divisions are emerging. One is between the emergent leadership discussed here (a sort of

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[1]The councils all have provisions for "reserved seats" for Harijans in case they are not elected at large. In Hanumangarh two electoral wards coincide with the main Harijan residential areas; in Shivpura, though the lines are not as clearly established, there were at least four Harijan members.

[2]This is openly discussed by a number of "village leaders" who point out that it is "very profitable" to work for Congress during the elections. They may be reluctant to talk about the specific benefits they receive personally, but point to those received by others.

"petit-bourgeoisie") and the rest. The second is between the older and younger Harijans who see the first division as a result of the co-option of their elders. Upper caste monopoly over goods and services is being replaced by a small Harijan elite drawing its strength from the new distributive mechanisms established by a Congress-dominated political system. The provision of special funds and other schemes for Harijan communities instead of integrating them into the wider society, tend toward the creation of a new group of political entrepreneurs whose existence depends on the distinctions between Harijans and the rest.

Returning now to the laborers: they themselves see their future as lying outside of agriculture. This feeling is stronger in Shivpura where they see mechanization displacing them and land allotments as token payoffs. The only possibility they see in the village is the growth of agriculture-related industry. The sarpanch (elected village headman) plans to open an oil press for locally produced mustard and the production of animal feed using oil cake and grain. These schemes might, according to the sarpanch's estimates, take care of around 20 percent of the landless, but they are not feasible until the road between Shivpura and Bharatpur is completed. "What will the rest do? And what will we all do in the meantime?" This is the constant question.

Permanent out-migration is not a solution for most laborers. It has already been mentioned that many of them do leave the village seasonally for work in the cities where only temporary work is available. This is because of (1) their lack of skills, and (2) the vast numbers of urban unemployed persons. Indeed the construction industry often relies on the cheaper, but seasonal rural migratory labor, and there is no security to the worker once the particular job is completed. Given the

expense of living in cities, these laborers cannot stay on indefinitely without employment. In fact several laborers interviewed have tried staying in cities for long periods of time hoping for permanent employment and have returned home bitter and discouraged.

If these are laborers' perceptions, what of those of the cultivators who require their services? One-third of the owner-cultivators and those tenants who leased land in 1972-73 maintain they need a larger labor input. Most of the rest feel there is no particular difference and two say they need less outside assistance (see Table 4.3). Of these, one says his family can handle more work now as his children are grown-up. The other says that since he uses tractors on hire for plowing and threshing and has a pump set, he no longer requires plowmen, men for irrigation with the traditional leathern bucket and oxen, or women for threshing.

TABLE 4.3

WHETHER FARMERS REQUIRE MORE OR LESS NON-FAMILY LABOR NOW

Strata	Labor Required					
	More	No Difference	Less	N.A.*	Total %	(N)
Large farmers	50.0	31.3	12.5	6.3	100.1	(16)
Medium farmers	33.3	33.3	0.0	33.3	99.9	(12)
Small farmers	26.3	31.6	0.0	42.1	100.0	(19)
Tenants	20.0	40.0	0.0	40.0	100.0	(20)
Overall	31.1	34.3	3.1	31.3	99.8	(67)

*Includes tenants who could not lease land in 1972-73 and those farmers who rely entirely on family labor.

Extended or improved irrigation is the most important factor cited by farmers requiring more labor. Some have sunk new wells, improved old ones or bought pump sets enabling them to take a second crop. Only two or three mention they are using improved techniques requiring more intensive hand cultivation. Some persons point out that laborers today "... just do not work as hard as they did when wages were lower" -- the longer they take to finish a job, the more money they get. Also if they take a long time, more of their friends are employed.

Cultivators were asked if the wages they pay out have risen, fallen or remained the same over the past five to six years. They were further asked if they feel laborers receive a fair wage. Everyone agrees that wages have risen, and on the issue of fairness, the sample is split.[1] "Looking to grain prices now, perhaps they are not paid enough. How can people survive on three rupees a day, or five at the most if a man's wife also works? They usually need around two to three kilos of grain a day, and that in itself will take more than half of their wages. How much is then left for chillies or kerosene, let alone clothes? And then too, they don't work everyday. So in terms of current prices, they are not paid enough, but what can we do?" (50 percent) Cultivators' ambivalence is clear. Combined with a sympathy is a defensiveness about their reluctance to raise wages any further. Few of the rest offer any reason for saying the wages are fair.

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[1]One farmer is an exception. He carries on a system of payment in kind used by his father: five kilos of grain per man per day. This is the rate for grain harvesting and it is slightly less for weeding. Laborers like the payment in kind, but few will work only for him as they also need cash for the purchase of other commodities. This farmer estimates he hires around 25 different men over about twenty days during one cropping season.

When farmers maintain they need additional labor it does not follow they hire more persons. Smaller farmers in particular already hire fewer laborers. In most cases the additional requirement is met by trading work with farm neighbors. One would suspect this might be true elsewhere. Therefore, to calculate the employment potential of the new technologies simply by totalling additional man-days of work is not accurate. It might be a fairly good indicator if landowners control more than ten acres; where labor-sharing is restricted by the size of the plots. Most farmers however, do not have such large farms. Moreover though the new agricultural technologies require more intensive cultivation, it is a minority of farmers who use them anyway. Even those who do, seldom use the full range of recommended inputs and practices.

Summary

In conclusion, the data suggest the following trends. Tenancies are more difficult to come by. Legislation passed to protect tenants' rights has worked to their detriment and it does not appear to be enforceable. Indeed one is led to suspect that government is afraid of enforcing it as it might affect owner-cultivators who are seen as crucial to the aims of food production. Further the introduction of tractors particularly reduces the need for tenants.

Farm mechanization has also lowered employment possibilities in agriculture though both former tenants and farm workers continue to be dependent on farm employment for their livelihood. The process is gradual but one in which the very loosening of economic ties between landowner and tenant/and laborer makes the latter more dependent on the

former. The result appears to be the formation of a "tied" labor pool whose links with the village are strengthened by the marginal land allotments given them by government. Where economic ties are completely broken, the emergent Harijan elite replaces the old patron-client relationship with a new one that further sets the Harijan community apart from the rest of the village.

The points raised here need now to be related to how respondents perceive their own well-being in relation to others and that of the community at large. Of further importance is the sequence of causation in their minds. What has caused these changes and who is responsible for them? These questions are taken up in the following chapters.

CHAPTER V

PERCEPTIONS OF WELL-BEING

Now that the effects of agrarian change on the adoption of new techniques, employment and the pattern of agricultural relations have been considered, we turn to respondents' perceptions of changes in their own lives, in those of others around them, and in the village generally. Of importance is the separation of private and public gain, the felt needs of respondents, and their perceptions of how these needs can be met. The link between economics and the political system is the placement of responsibility for economic change on the political system.

Individual Levels of Well-Being

A basic measure of change in one's life is one's level of well-being. It is a subjective measure which asks people to evaluate change in their situation over a period of time.[1] The concept is a general one, and here it is broken down into three parts: general well-being, improvement or decline in diet, and rise or decline in income. Each respondent was asked to evaluate his situation in relation to these and further asked why he feels the changes have occurred.

First, respondents were asked if they feel they are better off now, worse off, or if there is no particular difference between now and five to six years ago. The results are presented in Table 5.1. The most

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[1]Time span is five to six years -- since the beginning of the intensive schemes.

striking point is that most people are either worse off or have seen no difference in their condition. Breaking down the findings by strata one sees that large farmers are the most evenly divided. A number of reasons explain this.

TABLE 5.1

RESPONDENTS' EVALUATIONS OF LEVELS OF WELL-BEING

Conceptions of Well-Being	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Better off	37.5	41.7	26.3	10.0	28.4
No difference	31.3	33.3	42.1	15.0	29.9
Worse off	31.3	25.0	31.6	75.0	41.8
Total (%)	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

Some of those who are better off use improved practices: seed, fertilizers, and have expanded irrigation facilities. Other farmers in this category point to the price rise of grains on the open market which has helped them. Those of the large farmers who feel worse off claim their crops have been affected by irregular rains.[1] It will be recalled from Chapter III that several farmers who have irrigation facilities will not use them during the monsoon season. They also maintain that

[1]It was mentioned in Chapter II that there had been drought for two years though neither village studied was declared to be under famine conditions.

while grain prices have risen, so has everything else.[1] Larger farmers who feel no difference are those who have not tried new techniques or who hold that though they earn more from higher prices, their families have also grown. Increased household expenses eat up increased income.

The middle-sized farmers are interesting in that a slight plurality have seen their circumstances improve. Of these, most point to increased irrigation, the use of new seeds, and chemical fertilizers. The same farmers who in Tables 3.1 and 3.3 use the new inputs report better levels of well-being here. Those farmers feeling they are worse off point to inflation and increased family expenses such as marriages.

Most small farmers are either worse off or have seen no difference in their levels of well-being. Those who are better off have again either improved their irrigation facilities, or have tried the new techniques. Some use chemical fertilizers, and almost all are previous users of high yielding variety seeds. Most of those who see no improvement or a decline in their position feel this is because of inflation. Some point out that if they could get improved inputs their situation would not be so bad. They say their incomes have risen but so have other prices. Again a few incurred major ritual or other household expenses increasing their indebtedness.

With tenants and laborers, the picture reflects the situation discussed in the previous chapter -- most of them are worse off. The ten percent who feel they are better off have found permanent employment with a farmer's family as tenants-cum-farm managers. The reasons for

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[1]The inflation rate for 1973 was 26 percent and in 1974, 18.8 percent. Taken from the Economic Survey presented to Parliament by the Finance Minister, C. Subramaniam, February 24, 1975. From "Economic Survey for 1974-75," The Statesman Weekly (March 1, 1975), p. 3.

the worse situation of the majority are the same as those cited in the previous chapter: they own no land, are increasingly unable to lease any, and employment in agriculture has decreased. They also cite inflation as a major factor.

The overall figures indicate that less than one-third of the rural population in these villages feels its general level of well-being has risen in the past five to six years. This is despite the fact that both villages are good agricultural areas producing a surplus each year. Additionally, it seems the increase in levels of well-being is related to either expanded irrigation facilities, the use of new techniques, or both. Combining the findings of Chapters III and IV, it is also clear that access to the means of production and increased population is denied to the majority of agriculturalists.

As stated, however, the indicator of well-being is a general one. It may act as an outlet for general complaints. One needs to look at income and food intake also. These two measures are taken to reflect both the subsistence strategy of cultivation (where the household is the main production and consumption unit) and partial involvement in a monetary market. These cannot be measured precisely either since there is no way to get accurate recall about food or income over the past five to six years. This is not seen as problematic here however, since people's subjective evaluations are more important in the formation of attitudes than objective indicators.

This pattern resembles respondents' attitudes toward their general level of well-being which may be because the most important item of expenditure is food. Additional production may first be used in the home before any is marketed. The table also reflects the rise in grain

TABLE 5.2

RESPONDENTS' PERCEIVED CHANGES IN FOOD INTAKE

Changes in Food Intake	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Eat better now	31.3	41.6	31.5	10.0	26.9
No difference	25.0	33.3	36.8	10.0	25.4
Ate better before	43.8	25.0	31.5	80.0	47.8
Total (%)	100.1	99.9	99.8	100.0	100.1
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

price on consumption. The change in laborers' wage payment from kind to cash has thrown them on to a monetary market for the most basic of all essentials, grain. They are victims of wide seasonal price fluctuations without the minimal cushion provided by kind payments.[1] A number of respondents asked the author to eat dinner with them: the meal consisted of one dry millet chappati (unleavened bread), and perhaps a little watery lentils. Some of these families eat only once a day during the agriculturally slack season. If children get hungry in between, they are handed a bit of millet stalk to chew on which is slightly sweet when green.

The final indicator of well-being used was income, and Table 5.3 shows the respondents' perceptions of what had occurred.

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[1] To give the reader an idea of seasonal fluctuations, when field work was conducted, the prices of flour were the following: millet - Rs. 0.80 to 1.30 ($.11 to $.21); wheat - Rs. 1.00 to 1.60 per kilogram ($.13 to $.21).

TABLE 5.3

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGES IN INCOME

Perceived Changes in Income	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Increased income	68.8	50.0	68.4	40.0	56.7
No difference	12.5	25.0	10.0	0.0	10.5
Decreased income	18.8	25.0	21.0	60.0	32.8
Total (%)	100.1	100.0	99.4	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

More persons in each category except tenants and laborers report an increase in income which is due to both the price increases in agricultural commodities and (for the laborers/tenants who fit this) an increase in the wage rates. Some point out their production has increased. The tenants and laborers who cite a decrease in income say this is due to their inability to lease land and the decline in employment opportunities. Owner-cultivators in all categories reporting decreased incomes mention either crop failures due to the rains or increased family expenses.

Combining the three indicators, it is clear that increased income alone is not a satisfactory indicator: partially because of inflation and also because of the subsistence nature of peasant agriculture. A combination, however, indicates that the intensive programs have made positive changes in levels of well-being for only a minority of villagers. Those able/willing to utilize the new techniques have profited.

After six years however, the benefits have accrued to less than one-third of the respondents' while the level of well-being is reduced for most of the tenants and laborers -- or another one-third.

Respondents' Views of Others' Well-Being

Equally important to people's perceptions is their idea of what has happened to others around them. This provides a relative standard against which they can judge their own position. Each respondent was asked first to state generally what kinds of people in his estimation are doing better now that five to six years ago. The question was open-ended and each respondent could give more than one reply of which the first two were coded (see Table 5.4).

TABLE 5.4

GROUPS OF PEOPLE CONSIDERED TO BE BETTER OFF BY RESPONDENTS

Groups Doing Better	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
1. People with a lot of land or employment	31.3	33.3	63.2	60.0	49.3
2. Big farmers and businessmen	0.0	8.3	5.3	10.0	6.0
3. Everyone but farmers	6.3	0.0	0.0	5.0	3.0
4. Scheduled castes (Harijans)	18.8	8.3	0.0	0.0	6.0
5. Most people	18.8	25.0	5.2	5.0	12.0
6. Don't know	25.0	25.0	26.3	20.0	23.9
Total (%)	100.2	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.2
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

Even though respondents name rather general categories, it is clear that farming and access to the factors of agricultural production are considered important for economic well-being. Respondents who feel people with land and water have prospered, point to high agricultural profits. Anyone with basic agricultural resources should do well. More telling is Table 5.5 which shows respondents' evaluations of specific groups. Each respondent was asked whether he perceived each category's position to be better or worse off over the past five to six years. In Table 5.5 only the "better off" responses are shown and there were no "don't know" replies.

The consensus is strong. Besides access to the means of agricultural production, respondents feel others such as leaders, politicians and government servants have prospered. The reasons why they feel this way break down in the following manner.

First, is the belief that most leaders, politicians, government servants and money-lenders come from landed families and use their positions to enrich themselves. Elected officers use inputs on their own farms and share them with larger farmers and/or local leaders who help them get elected. The same is true of government servants -- to stay in the good graces of village leaders, they cater to their needs. Even if others request assistance, no one pays any attention. Those government servants who do not own land at least get regular salaries. If they feel the salaries are insufficient, they take bribes. In any case, none of these persons has to face unemployment as landless persons do, nor do they have to deal with the vagaries of weather and pests as do the farmers. Again, the point is that if one has more resources to begin with (land in the rural context) one is in a position to bargain

TABLE 5.5

PERCENT OF SAMPLE STRATA PERCEIVING SPECIFIC GROUPS ARE BETTER OFF

Specific Groups Evaluated	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
1. Leaders and politicians	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
2. Government servants	87.5	100.0	89.5	100.0	92.5
3. Big farmers	93.8	91.7	94.7	90.0	92.5
4. Money-lenders	68.8	83.3	89.5	100.0	86.5
5. Skilled or semi-skilled labor (masons, carpenters, etc.)	56.3	61.6	78.4	40.0	59.7
6. Small traders or shopkeepers other than money-lenders	50.0	75.0	78.9	80.0	71.5
7. Small farmers	31.3	50.0	31.6	15.0	29.9
8. Landless agricultural tenants	6.2	25.0	21.1	0.0	11.9
9. Landless agricultural labor	25.0	25.0	31.6	10.0	22.4
10. Old landlords (jagirdars)	25.0	58.3	36.8	50.0	41.8
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

for the means to increase one's level of well-being. Without basic resources one is unable to get the attention of the official hierarchy responsible for the distribution of necessary inputs.

Opinion is fairly uniform toward the fate of landless labor and tenants. Though some farmers feel these groups are better off since wages have risen, most say despite this prices have lowered their levels

of well-being. There is some recognition by farmers that employment opportunities in agriculture have decreased due to both the mechanization of plowing and threshing, and the reciprocal labor performed by some cultivators. Other laborers such as masons, carpenters and the like, are seen to have prospered because wages for skilled occupations are higher than agricultural wages, and have also increased over the past five to six years. A mason may get up to Rs. 8.00 ($1.06) per day in the city and only slightly less in the village. Villagers who have built new houses feel the change. It was pointed out in the previous chapter that laborers will try to find work in construction because it is more lucrative (though seasonal).

Another point is the ambivalence shown toward the position of the small farmer by respondents in other categories. The feeling here reflects the notion that one needs abundant land to prosper (also indicative of an extensive, rather than intensive cultivation mentality). Yet as was shown in Chapter III, small farmers work their land the most intensively, market more of their produce, and generally show more motivation to improve their production. The common response by larger farmers is: "Small men -- what can they do? Look how much land it takes to feed my household. They may be receiving better prices, but what can they sell, after all?" "You must have more than five or six acres of land. I don't know how these men survive. I need more land myself, but where is it to come from?" While there is sympathy for the position of the small farmer, the consensus of larger cultivators is that they as well as tenants and laborers will eventually have to leave the agricultural sector.

A final point to mention here is that if one looks at Tables 5.4 and 5.5, they show a slight feeling that Harijans (scheduled castes) and

agricultural laborers are better off. The full import of this is discussed in the following chapters. Here it should be noted this is the beginning of antagonism on the part of larger farmers who are also of higher caste against the special funds and projects channeled to the Scheduled communities. Of particular importance is the distribution of land allotments. In the year field work was conducted (1972-73) new land ceiling legislation was enacted limiting holdings to eighteen acres of irrigated land. This legislation combined with land allotments made large farmers angry with the realization that their land might be taken away only to be given to Harijans who in their eyes are not "real farmers".

Perceptions of Changed Village Conditions

The respondents were also asked if they thought the village was generally better or worse off now than five to six years ago, and why. The results are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.

TABLE 5.6

PERCEIVED CHANGES IN VILLAGE CONDITIONS BY SAMPLE STRATA

Changes Seen In Villages	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Better off	62.5	91.7	84.2	50.0	70.2
No difference	12.5	0.0	10.5	0.0	6.0
Worse off	25.0	8.3	5.3	50.0	23.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

TABLE 5.7

PERCEIVED REASONS FOR CHANGES IN VILLAGE CONDITIONS BY SAMPLE STRATA

Reasons for Change	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
WHY VILLAGE IS BETTER OFF:					
1. High grain prices have benefitted farmers who form majority	18.8	25.0	21.1	2.0	19.4
2. Village amenities: (schools, electricity, health centers, etc.)	37.5	0.0	15.8	10.0	9.0
3. Better farm inputs and assistance to farmers	6.3	33.3	21.1	0.0	13.4
4. More employment and people work harder	0.0	16.6	5.3	0.0	4.5
5. The crops have been good - weather	18.8	16.6	0.0	0.0	7.5
WHY VILLAGE IS WORSE OFF:					
1. High grain prices have affected people badly except for money-lenders who profit	3.0	8.3	21.1	40.0	29.4
2. Crops have been poor	15.6	0.0	5.3	10.0	7.5
3. Less employment and more corruption which hinders access to inputs	0.0	0.0	5.3	20.0	7.5
DON'T KNOW	0.0	0.0	5.3	20.0	1.8
Total (%)	100.0	99.8	100.3	102.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

The reasons why respondents feel this way are given in Table 5.7. First, the condition of the villages is perceived to be dependent on their state of agriculture. The main reasons cited for both better and worse conditions reflect this. Within the strata there are interesting variations. Medium and small farmers generally feel the villages are better off and point specifically to higher grain prices and better inputs. Higher prices presumably mean more to them since (1) they market a higher share of their produce, and (2) incremental increases in income mean more than they do to large farmers who produce more overall (but not per unit of land) to begin with and have no problem meeting their basic household requirements. The tenants and laborers are split on the issue primarily because a number of them see their own position and that of their neighbors as representative of the whole village. These cite the adverse effects of high grain prices.

For those who feel the villages are worse off, the reasons are what one might expect given previous responses. High grain prices are problematic to those having to pay them: tenants, laborers and small farmers who need to buy additional supplies during the year. This is also true of those who say "the crops have been bad"; the implication being that drought has raised prices.

Village amenities are mentioned by some persons most of whom are in the large farmer category. Though agriculture is the dominant concern (determining the floor of subsistence) considerable impact has been made by services such as schools, health care, electricity and roads. The small farmers and tenants/and laborers who mention amenities reason along the following lines. Higher prices help farmers and inputs help those who can get them. Even if these persons are in the minority,

government has helped everyone by providing basic amenities. Who cared about providing villagers with such things before independence? Education in particular is important to a number of Harijans (scheduled castes) who make up the bulk of tenants and laborers, as it is an avenue of upward mobility.

That most respondents see their villages as better off now points to their ability to separate private from public gain. This is important in understanding their political behavior to be discussed later. "I personally have gained nothing since we began elections, but look at the village. Who ever thought of educating village children, let alone Harijan children?" Similar comments were made by almost every respondent at some point during the interviews.

Respondents' Needs

If this is how respondents perceive their own situations and those of others around them, what do they see as their immediate needs? Each person was asked to state three things he and his family would like to have the most. As can be seen from Table 5.8, it is difficult to rank-order the needs even though they are presented as such. Respondents were also asked to state what they think are the basic needs of their friends. The questions were open-ended (the first three responses were coded) and a number of the responses are seen as interrelated by the respondents themselves (see Tables 5.8 and 5.9).

Looking at the two tables, one finds a high degree of consensus. The overall picture indicates the importance of agriculture to both the subsistence cultivator and the entrepreneurial farmers. The general attitude is that if one has land and other inputs, education, housing, credit and improvement of social status will follow. One has to

TABLE 5.8. RESPONDENTS' PERCEIVED NEEDS

Kinds of Needs	Strata and Order of Needs														
	Large Farmers			Medium Farmers			Small Farmers			Tenants/Labor			Overall		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Land	18.8	6.3	0.0	17.6	8.3	0.0	52.6	5.3	10.5	100.0	0.0	0.0	52.2	4.5	3.0
Agricultural inputs/advice	56.3	43.7	37.5	41.6	50.0	25.0	15.8	57.9	36.8	0.0	55.0	25.0	25.4	52.2	31.3
Housing/family*	0.0	0.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	8.3	0.0	5.3	5.3	0.0	20.0	5.0	0.0	6.0	7.5
Education	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	10.5	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	4.5
Improvement of caste/social status	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
Credit	18.8	12.5	6.3	25.0	0.0	25.0	21.1	5.3	5.3	0.0	20.0	20.0	14.9	10.4	13.4
Generally better government performance**	0.0	6.3	0.0	0.0	16.7	8.3	0.0	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	1.5
Consumer items at lower prices	0.0	0.0	6.3	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.7	5.3	0.0	0.0	10.0	1.5	4.5	6.0
Employment and better wages	6.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	3.0	1.5	3.0
Nothing/don't know	0.0	31.3	37.5	8.3	25.0	25.0	5.2	5.3	26.3	0.0	0.0	25.0	3.0	13.4	28.4
Total (%)	100.2	100.1	100.1	100.8	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1

*Including expenses such as daughter(s) marriage(s).
**Including provision of more and better village amenities, erradication of corruption, keeping of electoral promises, etc.

N=67, given in percentages.

TABLE 5.9. OTHERS' NEEDS AS PERCEIVED BY RESPONDENTS

Kinds of Needs	Strata and Order of Needs														
	Large Farmers			Medium Farmers			Small Farmers			Tenants/Labor			Overall		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Land	25.0	6.3	6.3	25.0	8.3	0.0	21.1	10.6	5.3	95.0	5.0	0.0	44.8	4.4	3.0
Agricultural inputs/advice	50.0	50.0	37.5	25.0	41.7	16.7	10.5	31.6	10.5	0.0	45.0	30.0	19.4	41.8	23.9
Housing/family*	0.0	0.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	5.3	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	6.0
Education	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0
Improvement of caste/social status	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Credit	0.0	25.0	6.3	16.6	8.3	25.0	10.5	5.3	5.3	0.0	15.0	15.0	6.3	13.4	12.0
Generally better government performance**	0.0	6.3	0.0	0.0	8.3	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.5
Consumer items at lower prices	6.3	0.0	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	5.3	0.0	5.3	0.0	10.0	5.0	7.5	3.0	3.0
Employment and better wages	6.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.3	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
Nothing/don't know	12.5	12.5	37.5	25.0	33.3	41.7	47.4	52.6	68.4	0.0	10.0	45.0	20.9	26.9	49.2
Total (%)	100.1	100.1	100.1	99.9	99.9	100.0	100.1	100.1	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.9	100.0	100.1

*Including expenses such as daughter(s) marriage(s).
**Including provision for more and better village amenities, erradication of corruption, keeping of electoral promises, etc.

N=67, given in percentages.

recognize that the thrust of the questionnaire may elicit a higher number of "agriculturally oriented" replies than might be given otherwise. Even if this is true, there is a consistency in the responses. The trend of respondents' thoughts is clear.

Subsistence is determined by access to land. The amount of land held determines access to other factors of production. Enough land and other inputs mean wealth and influence, which in turn feed back to provide more wherewithal. In Tables 5.8 and 5.9, one finds even credit is ranked relatively low in the respondents' estimations: thus credit is not a constraint if one has land. High consumer prices need not bother the wealthy; and if land is the issue, employment and wages are not important either. One can live better from farming than from salaried employment. This explains why so few persons including the tenants and laborers cite employment and wages as a primary need: they would much rather have land. In a sense the respondents reduce the argument of subsistence to a very basic level by arguing that land is all they need. Aside from the obvious point that subsistence is a rather basic proposition, however, are the following considerations.

Land use and its distribution defines rural organization. It is not only a factor of production in the classical economic sense, but one's relationship to land reinforces social and ritual hierarchies, determines one's peer group for day-to-day relationships, provides an avenue for social mobility, political authority and careers.[1] Harijans

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[1]This argument is made by T. Scarlett Epstein in South India: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1973), see final chapter, pp. 243-63, and also Arthur Stinchcomb, "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations," in Jason Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley, 1971), pp. 359-62 especially.

want land not only for economic security, but also because they could then break away from the patron-client status of landlord and tenant/laborer. There would be less pressure on them to perform menial tasks, and they could over time become "real" farmers. Even though they might not be able to eat with other caste Hindus, they could meet with them on a similar economic level to discuss common matters; that is, they would overcome their dependent status.

To whom do respondents look for the fulfillment of their needs? The responses are given in Table 5.10. The table reflects the notion that government has taken on the responsibility for people's well-being and that this is its legitimate role. It also reflects belief in the government's capacity to act in this manner. The response that "government generally" can help people get what they want shows not a lack of knowledge about specific institutions, but that they are all responsible for different tasks. In fact there is a rather high level of knowledge about specific offices in the governmental apparatus. For example, respondents were asked if they felt any particular person or agency is responsible for distributing inputs on time. The results are given in Table 5.11.

It has been pointed out in Chapter III that most people do not use governmental channels to obtain either biochemical inputs or credit. Whether they utilize the agencies or not, they feel it is the responsibility of government to see to it that supplies are distributed properly and on time through both official and private channels.

Summary

In this chapter, it is apparent that well-being is linked with access to land and agricultural inputs. Respondents' evaluation of

TABLE 5.10

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF WHO CAN FULFILL THEIR NEEDS

Who Can Help	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Government	87.5	75.0	79.0	60.0	74.6
Congress Party	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	6.0
No one; one has to help one's self	0.0	0.0	5.3	10.0	4.5
Friends - people like myself	6.3	0.0	5.3	5.0	4.5
Cooperative society or bank	12.0	0.0	5.3	0.0	1.5
Tehsil officers - those dealing with land	0.0	0.0	5.3	0.0	1.5
Panchayat Samiti	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	1.5
"Leaders"	6.3	0.0	0.0	5.0	3.0
Money-lenders	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	1.5
Don't know	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	1.5
Total (%)	112.1*	99.9	100.2	100.0	100.1
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

*Does not total 100 percent because one or two respondents gave more than one reply.

well-being also depends on the level of motivation each has. Farmers with higher motivations and with enough land may adopt new techniques, use their land most effectively, and thus increase their profits. Others, as was pointed out earlier, have a lower level of material aspirations and meet their needs with additional income brought by higher prices -- not increased production. All respondents, however, have been affected by inflation (26 percent in 1973). Inflation

TABLE 5.11

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISTRIBUTION OF INPUTS

Persons or Agencies Responsible	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Panchayat/ cooperative	50.0	50.0	47.4	25.0	41.8
Government	25.0	16.7	26.3	10.0	19.4
Private dealers	6.3	16.7	0.0	0.0	4.5
Local leaders	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	1.5
Don't know	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	6.0
Non-applicable*	18.8	16.7	20.3	45.0	28.4
Total (%)	100.1	100.1	100.0	100.0	101.6
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

*Includes tenants without land for the year or people who save seed at home.

combined with less agricultural employment for the landless has lowered this group's level of well-being.

Those persons with more land to begin with are seen by all respondents to have prospered the most. Land would not be a critical variable were it not for its scarcity, the profitability of farming, and the lack of non-agricultural employment opportunities. These factors combined with the changes in agrarian relations caused by tenancy legislation, the introduction of new inputs, and high prices, lead respondents to define their needs in terms of access to land. Finally, government is seen as the institutional setting in which demands are met and mediated. How respondents see this occurring is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASIS

If government is seen as the main mediator of demands, the question now arises how people view the process of voicing demands and getting them met. To discuss this it is necessary to delineate first the groups of villagers supportive of certain kinds of demands and the bases on which political mobilization occurs. This chapter discusses the issue of the social bases of political mobilization and the coincidence between these and political interests. In essence, what are the social bases of political choice?

Literature on Indian politics in the past has stressed "traditional" variables such as caste, religion and region (including ethnic and linguistic differences) as accounting for variations in political behavior.[1] I cannot control for either region or religion, but caste can be considered.[2] The data suggest that "traditional" variables in adaptation to new economic circumstances provide organizational potential for political activity. Once again it is clear that land scarcity,

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[1]Selig Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960) was an early, pessimistic exponent of the view that India's cleavages have fissiparous tendencies. Other, more optimistic works stress the cross-cutting nature of these divisions, e.g., Philip Mason, ed., India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). Others are cited further in the text where appropriate.

[2]Region and religion are constants and not relevant to sample selection.

the legal-administrative framework for development, and the introduction of new technology are the main factors channeling (and at times, constraining) political options and behavior. As the political system already has been defined by respondents as the arena in which demands are mediated and met, data on the interrelationship between social and political variables is related to voting: the most basic of all political activity.

Family and Caste

When one considers agrarian societies, kinship units and locality immediately come to mind as points around which social, economic and political life revolves.[1] Intuitively, this seems true as long as these form the basic economic and production units. In the areas studied, as farming is a family enterprise, it fits this conception. Caste provides an over arching boundary for kinship organization. To the extent that certain kinds of activities are restricted by ritual and historical precedence to certain castes they can also provide a basis for social or political organization. The main factors involved are (1) common interests defined by occupation/ownership of the means of production, (2) a rationalization of those interests by culturally elaborated explanations (such as clan lands, or the ritual hierarchy of caste), and (3) interests defining a common circumstance for the group that differentiates it from others. Locality becomes important in two respects: neighborhood solidarity (which can coincide with caste) or village solidarity vis-a-vis the outside world (see Chapter VII).

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[1]See Andre Beteille, Studies in Agrarian Social Structure (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1974), especially section 4 of "The Social Framework of Agriculture," pp. 94-110. Also see Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Social Classes in Agrarian Societies (New York: Anchor, Doubleday, 1975).

What is clear in the data is that economic issues because of the changes they cause in levels of well-being are the most important ones politically for the respondents. Certain of these may take on communal overtones.[1] Because of the numbers of caste groups however, it is seldom possible to use only caste appeals for political mobilization. How then does one separate the impact of caste from economic variables? A clue lies in the approach taken by writers who have explored the many roles of caste and family including their ability to politically mobilize and organize persons.[2] What is important is to recognize the conditions under which caste might become an important variable and this study provides insight into the question. In the case of the two villages, it has been pointed out that landownership is divided into four main clumps of castes (see Chapter II). Political interests appear to align more along the landownership lines than anything else and thus cut across caste lines. Before continuing, some definitions are in order.

First, the family is taken to mean all individuals living under one roof and sharing the same hearth.[3] This definition goes beyond kinship

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[1] Communal here is used in the same manner as Melson and Wolpe use it. See Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, eds., Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971), see Chapter I "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism" by Melson and Wolpe, pp. 1-2.

[2] See Rajni Kothari, ed., Caste and Politics in India (Delhi: Orient Longman, Ltd., 1970); Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), and his "Two Political Cultures," in Pye and Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); and Lloyd I. and Suzanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

[3] The respondents tend to identify their families this way and it is the definition used by Census of India also.

ties to include the economic unit. One finds that larger landowning families tend to retain a joint-family system while smaller owners and the landless have nuclear families. It is partially out of economic necessity that sons of poor fathers once married, are expected to set up their own households. Larger landowners tend to keep their sons in the same household in order to retain control over all their economic resources.

The operational definition of caste is the sub-caste, or jati. Hindus are divided into four varnas (Brahmins, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Sudra) and anyone born outside of these is an "outcaste" (in Hindi achut or untouchable). Within each varna however, are multitudes of groups called jatis. These are normally confined to particular regions, are endogamous, and maintain their own commensal and social pollution and purity hierarchies with one another. Though landless laborers and tenants in these villages are primarily outcastes, this over-arching term actually includes five distinct jatis who neither intermarry nor share commensal relations. Similarly, in the small farmer category there are at least four castes. The same holds true for the other strata. Finally, each caste may have members who fall into all strata.

How do respondents view the interrelationship between family and caste and politics? They were asked if their families vote together and then if their caste group also votes together. Next they were asked if they voted along with their families and castes. The results are given in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.

There are several interesting points here. First, in a sense, the questions imply an "ought" dimension. Respondents tend to reply with an implication of what should happen, rather than what does in reality.

TABLE 6.1

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE FAMILY VOTE

Family Vote	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Family votes together	93.8	91.7	52.7	90.0	79.9
Respondent votes with family	93.8	83.3	47.4	90.0	77.6
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

TABLE 6.2

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF CASTE VOTE

Caste Vote	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Caste community is seen to vote together	31.3	41.8	15.8	80.0	43.3
Respondent votes with caste community	37.5	41.7	15.8	80.0	44.8
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

The family vote for example, is a reflection of two factors. First, respondents see the family as a close unit functioning together in most, if not all, activities. Thus they assume all members of the household participate in similar ways. On the other hand, it is probably true that most families do vote together and the opinion of the head of household is important in the formation of political attitudes of its

members.[1] There is no method by which precise occurrences can be ascertained, but again, people's perceptions are as important as objective reality.

In Table 6.1, the cohesiveness of the family unit is clear except in the case of small farmers, where the problem may be definitional. Though these respondents maintain nuclear families, it may be that they see the extended kinship network as important for social and political activities. The lower number of small farmers who say their families vote together may thus reflect a lack of knowledge about the vote of other related households.

The results of Table 6.2 clearly show the difference between people's perceptions of what is and what should be. It is almost whimsical to note that except for the landless tenant/labor stratum, it is a minority of the rest who maintain the caste votes together. These persons are either illogical or are representative of those who feel castes should vote together. Each stratum has more than one caste in it and several castes used to vote together until recently. The Minas and Gujjars, for example were known for being a bloc: they were the mainstay of the Swatantra Party.

What the results do reflect are the views of some persons in each caste group interested in cohesive action. Most of these are community leaders (often patels or headmen) in whose interest it is to have the community act together. This reinforces their status in the group and vis-a-vis the wider political system as they can be the brokers between

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[1]Head of household here refers to the person in the family making most important decisions. This may be the eldest son: often as a father ages, he turns such duties over to one or the other of his sons: normally the one who supervises the farming.

the community and benefits coming in from outside. This will be discussed in depth further. The cohesiveness of the tenants and laborers is rather unique and is discussed fully below.

It was mentioned above (p. 149) that social cleavages can provide a base for political organization where common interests are defined by occupation or the ownership of the means of production (land in this context). Turning now to the bases on which families, castes and individuals select particular political parties and candidates, one can see the beginnings of such a definition of interests (see Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5). The responses given are general but they emphasize group benefits to be gained by voting. An important point to note is that since it is a minority of respondents who feel their caste communities vote together, the benefits desired will tend to group along lines other than caste except where the caste boundaries define common circumstances.

The tables, aside from showing that respondents see voting as a means of getting benefits, indicate two other points of interest here. First, there is no particular attachment shown to any political party except insofar one or another is perceived to have the capacity to carry out its program. This is important in defining parameters for political action as will be seen below. Secondly, it is primarily the tenants and laborers who feel their caste communities define their common interests. With this in mind, we turn to a discussion of the interrelationship between caste and landownership. The focus of this community's organization is their lack of land which also coincides with their ritually low status.

TABLE 6.3

BASES ON WHICH RESPONDENTS FEEL THEIR FAMILIES MAKE POLITICAL CHOICES

Bases for Choices	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
We vote for the party that can do what it says it wants done (capacity)	35.7	25.0	31.6	50.0	34.4
We choose someone who will help us the most with things we need for our farms	25.0	16.7	10.5	15.0	16.4
We vote with the caste community as we agree with their decision	0.0	16.7	5.3	15.0	9.0
We go by the reputation of the candidate and his promises	18.8	8.3	0.0	5.0	9.0
Follow the advice of village leaders	10.6	0.0	5.3	0.0	4.5
We vote only for the Congress Party because it is the only one that does anything	10.6	16.7	5.3	5.0	9.0
Non-applicable (do not vote as a family)	0.0	16.7	42.1	10.0	17.9
Total (%)	100.7	100.1	100.1	100.0	100.2
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

Caste and Land

It was mentioned above that conflict can take on the appearance of high vs. low caste conflict, and that landownership is confined basically to caste Hindus. The Harijans or untouchables form the pool of landless

TABLE 6.4

BASES ON WHICH RESPONDENTS FEEL THEIR CASTE COMMUNITY MAKES POLITICAL CHOICES*

Bases of Choice	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Help for the poor	50.0	60.0	50.0	0.0	25.8
Help for landless and scheduled castes	0.0	0.0	0.0	81.3	41.9
Attachment to a particular party or ideology	16.7	20.0	50.0	12.6	19.4
Electoral promises of candidate regardless of his party affiliation	33.3	20.0	0.0	6.3	12.9
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.2	100.0
(N)	(6)	(5)	(4)	(16)	(31)

*Includes only those respondents who in Table 6.2 report their caste community votes together.

labor and tenants. Thus far landed persons in neither village form politically cohesive groups though they can act together at times. While many landed families have switched their political support from the Swatantra to the Congress Party, there are a number of them (not in the sample) who are known to be Jan Sangh or Swatantra supporters.[1] In each stratum of agriculturalists, there are many factions: some of

[1]The actual voting record of respondents is given in the following chapter. Many of the persons referred to here are large landowners who lease out all of their lands. They have no part in production decisions and most are absentee landlords who return to the villages either to collect debts or their share of the crops. Thus, they were not included in the sample.

TABLE 6.5

BASES ON WHICH INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS MAKE POLITICAL CHOICES

Bases of Choice	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Agreement with the family or caste decision	25.0	33.3	15.8	60.1	34.3
Try to see which person or party will help me the most	31.3	41.7	31.6	20.0	29.9
On the basis of party capacity/program	37.6	8.3	15.9	5.0	16.5
Listen to the advice of village leaders	6.3	0.0	10.5	5.0	6.0
Reputation of the candidate (honesty)	0.0	16.6	5.3	0.0	4.5
I vote for the opposition because it can keep a watch on the ruling party	0.0	0.0	10.5	0.0	3.0
Not sure/don't know	0.0	0.0	10.5	10.5	6.0
Total (%)	100.2	99.9	100.1	100.5	100.2
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

which may coincide with particular jatis, and others that cut across caste lines. Many of these factions are fluid and realignments occur as different issues come to the fore.[1]

[1]For further reference see Ramashray Roy, "Caste and Political Recruitment in Bihar," and Andre Beteille, "Caste and Political Group Formation in Tamil Nad," both in Rajni Kothari, ed., Caste and Politics in India, op. cit., pp. 228-94. Also see Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965) and Ralph W. Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis," in Political Systems and the Distribution of Power, A.S.A. Monographs, #2 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

If there is to be competition over scarce resources (e.g., land) then those elements having land to lose (regardless of caste) are likely to coalesce to prevent this from happening.[1] If the dynamic of rural change apparent in the previous chapters continues to polarize groups and intensify demands to the point that an accommodation of interests is not possible without one group having to give up land (or the tenants/laborers their agricultural occupations) then one can expect landed elements to unite and use their political power to hold onto their farms. The anti-Harijan attitudes expressed by some farmers and described in Chapter V show how traditional justification can be used to rationalize one's status and potentially to create organization where none has existed so far.

Cultural appeals have been used by political parties in all parts of India, but these have limited applicability. A purely caste appeal for example, is useful only if there is one numerically dominant group in an electoral constituency. In the case of the two villages studied, the Swatantra Party has pursued the larger and middle cultivator through the use of an anti-land reform platform combined with overtones of anti-Harijan rhetoric as most of those who would profit from reform are Harijans.[2] Such an appeal finds sympathy among farmers most upset by aid given Harijans by the Congress administration. There is considerable anger among farmers who feel the old social system is breaking down at their expense with the cooperation of the Congress dominated political

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[1] See Hung-Chao Tai, Land Reform and Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), Chapter XIII "Rural Stability," section titled "Short-Term Destabilizing Consequences of Land Reform," pp. 428-33.

[2] The reference here is to grass-roots strategy -- not the official proclamations of the party.

system. Though these farmers will not openly disagree with the overall goal of equity, they do voice strong disagreement with what they see as special privileges accorded Harijans. They feel equity is pursued to the detriment of persons like themselves who are "better" and more "legitimate" farmers.[1]

This can be verified through two incidents. One has already been recounted: the case where Harijans in Hanumangarh were not permitted to farm their alloted pieces of land. The second is a similar occurrence which took place several years before field work was undertaken.[2] The Raiger samaj,[3] decided that the community would no longer tan hides and mend shoes. Nor would they work on a barter basis and would demand cash for any work done. Their complaint against the barter system was that the patron families postponed payment of the annual shares of grain to suit their own convenience and that traditional grain payments were no longer commensurate with the work done and not competitive with rates in Jaipur city.[4] A group of angry caste Hindus took one or two Raigers

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[1]Rather similar to the reaction of American whites who feel quotas and special programs to aid minorities are "discrimination in reverse."

[2]The story was recounted by several caste Hindus -- not by Harijans.

[3]Literally "council". Each caste community has traditionally had its own samaj to decide community affairs. Each local group has its own samaj whose leaders (either patels or panchas) meet with leaders of other like samaj leaders from the district or state. In situations like this, they can function almost like a trade union. For further information, see Lloyd I. and Suzanne Rudolph, Modernity of Tradition, op. cit.

[4]The "traditional" economic system called the "jajmani" system is an elaborate network of patron-client relationships revolving around services provided to farmers and other dominant families. Payments are made in kind at harvest time or yearly. Thus a potter will supply X number of pots to a family in return for Y kilos of grain, a priest is "retained" for ceremonial occasions on a similar basis, etc. The relationships between patron (jajman) and client (kamin) families continue through generations: each family has its own barber, potter, priest,

outside the village and administered beatings with the justification that "how can these people tell Brahmins and Baniyas to mend their own shoes?" The Raigers did not give in however, and today in Hanumangarh one cannot have one's shoes mended. One can buy new ones for cash.

This incipient antagonism is likely to grow both as scarce economic resources continue to be channeled into Harijan communities and as the demands for land grow. Leaders from the Harijan and caste Hindu communities are aware of the importance of land distribution as is apparent in the following quotations.[1] This quotation from the Harijan leader shows how communal ties can be used for political purposes.

"People talk about the fact that we vote as a caste. What do they mean by that? Here we are, Chamars, but the Telis (Muslims oil pressers considered untouchable by both Hindus and Muslims) also vote with us and so do the Bhangis (sweepers). In other villages of this constituency, there are Raigers and other Harijan castes. We all try to vote together though we don't eat together or marry each other. There is a caste component in that yes, we are all achuts (untouchables) and no one else will eat our food. Congress took our vote in the first place by promising to abolish untouchability. But what is more important it seems to me is that we are all in the same position with no land and almost no employment. This is despite all one hears of the reserved seats for the

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etc. The occupations are reinforced by caste distinctions which are especially clear in the jobs performed by outcaste communities as they are considered polluting to caste Hindus: leather tanning, midwifery, sweeping, etc. For a discussion of the jajmani system, see William H. Wiser, The Hindu Jajmani System (Lucknow: Lucknow Publishing House, 1939), 1969 edition. With the coming of a monetary economy, the patron-client relationship continues (largely for ritual purposes), though payments may sometimes be made in cash rather than kind.

[1]These quotations are taken from interviews with village leaders identified by the respondents.

scheduled castes and other privileges.[1] If a group of us was to get substantial amounts of land, the vote would split. Indeed, the Harijans who don't vote with us are those already owning land -- many of them vote for Swatantra. Look, even my father used to vote for Swatantra because he felt Congress might take the land away that he has. It is only since I began to take part in politics that he has voted for Congress." (Chamar ward representative of Shivpura, Congress Party member, and son of a large farmer who is now a Harijan money-lender)

Landed leaders in the two villages are also aware of access to land as an important political issue. Further, their comments show sensitivity to the changes in their own traditional status.

"You see, it wasn't only caste, but also the fact that families like mine could pressure people who owed us money or leased out lands to vote the way we wanted them to. Now only a few do so because of our opinions. Some, of course, may value what we say, but they will consider several points of view and then go do what they think is best. Few of us can promise any political parties votes -- though you will see that some of the villagers do. I am not sure what makes the difference except that the vote is secret. But also as people must have told you, land is the crucial question here and this is what matters. Farming is profitable and as prices get higher, more people want land. This is why Harijans vote together -- they want land. The small farmers also want land." (Baniya farmer, son of a major money-lending family of Hanumangarh and former member of the Jaipur district Congress committee)

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[1]The privileges referred to are the special programs for Harijans and the reservation of seats for them on all elected bodies which may be filled by nomination should none be elected at large.

"I built my position in Congress because I could deliver Gujjar votes; but I cannot do this anymore. I have to discuss and argue and promise things to everyone and then even if they promise me they will vote for Congress, they go and do as they please. It is not that my caste fellows reject my family or our position. They still look to us for advice on many things. They will use my influence at all the government offices and get me to speak to the MLA (member of the legislative assembly) no matter for whom they might have voted. They want agricultural inputs and they want to keep their land, and many are afraid that a Congress government will take it away so they have changed their votes. It is very hard for me to convince district Congress committee people that they cannot only rely on my position (as patel). These people must get assistance or else where can I keep my authority? I have had to change my political networks considerably in the past three elections. I am not delivering a Gujjar vote anymore; I am trying to create and deliver the votes of a 'productive' farmer group." (Large farmer, caste patel, also a Congress party member and former chairman of the cooperative society, Hanumangarh)

"There is antagonism between large and small farmers now, let alone between those with land and those without. The big men get richer and there is not much in it for the small farmer and no future at all for the landless in the village. Congress has always paid off the patels or other leaders hoping that they can capture votes for them. I know because I used to be in government service and saw where and how allotments of land are made. They assume these men can at least guarantee their caste vote, but they can't do this now. If you see for yourself, there are wealthy and poor people in each caste, and that is more

important. Also, if you don't keep the same tenants, you can't make them vote the way you want. And now no one can keep the same tenants. So far in this village, the sarpanch has been able to maintain some kind of coalition with the Jatavs (untouchable caste) but how long will that last? Have you talked with the sarpanch as yet? He will tell you." (Former patwari -- land revenue collector, large farmer, Jat by caste, Shivpura)

"Most changes here have been made on government's initiative. It makes the laws and then people like myself try to enforce them. But change is slow in some areas. In agriculture, mainly people like myself have benefitted because we have lots of land and position and can demand the inputs. Ths small farmer is in trouble ... (agricultural labor) has not been helped and can't be until we get some industry. I want to put up an oil press. That would employ some people and bring in income, but first we need our road paved. Government is slow to act. It tells us to give Harijans land -- where is this to come from? Who will give up theirs? Everyone wants benefits and they see government as the agency to get them. I know because it falls on my head when programs do not function properly, and they don't. I am expected to get people out to vote (for Congress), and I try. But it is difficult now because my pull with the voters depends on the benefits that government brings into this village. If we don't get them, on what basis should people listen to me?" (Sarpanch of Shivpura, Congress party member and large Jat farmer)

Collective Political Choice: Tenants and Laborers

Given the importance of land distribution and access to political power, it should be clear why the Harijan castes forming the tenant and labor pool try to vote together. Numbers are the only "political

currency" they possess, and their words tell their appreciation of this fact.

"Our interests (the Harijans') are one because we want equal treatment and land. Besides, there are other factors to consider. Because our desires go against the interests of other groups in the village, those parties who want their support don't want ours. No non-Congress candidates come to us. They know we want land and if they give it to us, they can't keep the support of other groups. If we are to get land -- all the landless that is -- where is it to come from except from the holdings of larger farmers? You see, these issues have the support of other castes too. Others have no land and no jobs and are treated as shabbily as we are. Now Congress hasn't really done anything for us since legislation was passed abolishing discrimination. Because of this, it is no problem to get the older Harijans to vote for Congress. But our younger people say the laws make no difference. We still cannot go into people's homes. And even with government's policy of hiring a certain number of Harijans, how many can they hire after all?

"But," he continues, "how do we change parties? It would be best if parties rotated in power. This situation with Congress being in all the time does no one any good. The party has become complacent and full of corrupt people. But which other party wants a Harijan vote?"

"What about the Communists?" probe question.

"Communists? We hear they are for the small man, but where are they? Sometimes you hear they do things for people in Jaipur and Calcutta. But no Communist has ever come out here. Where do they find their small men?" (Raiger patel's son, farmer and shoemaker, Congress supporter, Hanumangarh)

"Other persons have land or money they can use to get what they want, and we have neither. These two things are what we are after. What we do have is numbers, and if we vote together, we can make a candidate win or lose an election. That is how Congress won here last time." (Raiger patel in Hanumangarh, farmer, Congress supporter)

"We have many differences between us also, but there is one main thing we have in common: we all need land. So we must use our vote to support those who will give it to us." (Khatik laborer, Hanumangarh)

Besides the coincidence shown here between traditional status as defined by caste and a lack of economic resources, is the recognition that the needs and demands of the landless are increasingly contradictory to those of the landed persons in these villages. It is valid to hypothesize that the trend of less employment in agriculture and fewer tenancies is directly responsible for this view. Without alternative sources of sustenance, the contradiction can be expected to grow.

Summary

In summary, it is the particular dynamic of rural change that causes conflict with communal overtones. The new cleavages of the landed vs. the landless are not coincident with any jati because there is no single dominant caste. What can occur however, is a strong anti-Harijan movement, the beginnings of which are indicated by the data. This is because of the coincidence of their ritually low status with economic deprivation and their mobilization into the wider political system by promises that thus far are largely symbolic in nature. Anti-Harijan sentiment can be encouraged by opposition parties to woo supporters away from the

Congress.[1] In this situation, caste will not fully explain political conflict but it may be a compounding factor linking traditional social and cultural concerns to economic transformation.

Finally, the data presented show that even where respondents feel their caste communities do (or should) vote together, this solidarity is viewed as based on mutual economic interests. Numbers count in an election and assuming that persons see most of their caste fellows to be in the same economic situation as themselves (which may or may not be true) a caste provides an existing basis for organizational efforts. This analysis is in agreement with that made by other observers of the Indian political system who have commented on the many faces of the caste system.[2] The particular aspect stressed here will be the economic one because of the changes in traditional relationships brought about by agrarian change and aided by the modern political system. At the same time, given the diversity of caste groups in both villages and the nature of land distribution, concerted political activity requires cross-caste alliances. The propensity for their formation has been shown.

Keeping in mind the relationship between social cleavages and the political system, we turn now to perceived political options of action that can be used to maximize benefits.

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[1]Several observers have pointed to this in other areas. See for example, issues of The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta), for analyses of the Uttar Pradesh by-elections held in February 1974. The Bharatiya Kranti Dal and other "rightist" parties sought the support of middle and larger farmers pointing to the privileges accorded Harijans including the Congress land reform platform.

[2]See above, p. 150, footnote 2.

CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL OPTIONS: ACTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS

The previous chapters indicate that respondents' needs focus on access to land and that they see government as the main agency to meet these needs. This delineates the link that has emerged since independence between individual gain and the political system, or the increased scope of politics in India. This chapter examines respondents' attitudes toward political activity and leadership and perceived options to influence the distribution of benefits. The data also show that under certain circumstances "traditional" social cleavages may provide a basis for political organization.

One finds that political access and influence are constrained by land. Demands for land and employment are manipulated by the provision of public goods and services to rural areas. I maintain these goods are largely symbolic and their political impact is limited over time. The distribution of new farm inputs and development loans is political by virtue of the government's monopoly. In order to retain their influence, traditional elites have captured elective offices and can use the modern political/administrative framework to reinforce their traditional patron-client networks with some realignments. It is within these parameters that we turn now to the data.

Why Vote?

Turning first to attitudes toward voting, the respondents were asked whether or not they consider voting important and why. The results are presented in Table 7.1. Of the respondents who feel voting is not important, one-third say this is because "... it doesn't make any difference to one's life whether one votes or not." These persons see no relationship between their needs and the political system's ability to fulfill them. The other two-thirds say that although voting is supposed to bring one benefits, politicians do not really care about voters. There are thus, no benefits to be got and no point in voting. These respondents are the more disillusioned ones and it may be no accident that slightly more are in the small/middle categories (in Table 7.1) as we have already seen that land size is a constraint to obtaining inputs (Chapter III).

TABLE 7.1

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF VOTING BY FARM SIZE

Whether Voting Is Important	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Yes	93.8	83.3	73.7	95.0	86.6
No	6.2	16.7	26.3	5.0	13.4
Don't know	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

Most respondents however, view voting as utilitarian (Table 7.2). In a way the responses sound like a school lesson recited without meaning or specific content because they are so readily given. Exploring the issues of elections, the attitudes toward leaders and political change however, one finds the lesson is well learned over a period of six general elections. That respondents see the act of voting as something which should bring benefits to them is clear; that most of them feel they have not benefitted personally is also apparent. The interrelationship between these two explains their attitudes.

TABLE 7.2

REASONS WHY RESPONDENTS FEEL VOTING IS IMPORTANT BY FARM SIZE

Reasons	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
To get benefits from parties/candidates supported	50.0	33.3	26.3	70.0	46.3
It is a citizen's duty	18.8	16.0	21.1	10.0	16.4
It is important to let government know what you want	18.8	8.3	5.3	10.0	10.4
For "progress"	0.0	17.0	15.8	0.0	7.3
Party competition is good. A one party system is bad and voting helps keep parties alternating in office	6.3	8.3	5.3	5.0	6.0
Don't know/non-applicable	6.3	17.0	26.3	5.0	13.4
Total (%)	100.2	99.9	100.1	100.0	99.8
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

First, what are the benefits desired by the respondents? They were asked to name issues of importance to them during the last election (1972 state assembly) and then asked to name issues important to their friends and finally those important to villagers at large. The assumption here is that issues of importance should reflect individual benefits desired if respondents see the political system as instrumental to their attainment. The questions regarding issues of importance to others attempt to see if respondents see their needs as different from those of others and thus, if they perceive divergent political interests in their village community. The results are presented in Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5.

Several interesting points are apparent in these tables. Though on the first question the spread of issues cited appears to be large, most persons focus on land, employment, and inputs for farming. The breakdown also indicates that a fairly high proportion feel village amenities are important. This is partially so because electricity is included in this category and some farmers are concerned about getting electrical connections for their fields for pumping sets. Some tenants and laborers are concerned about schools because they view education as a means to better the occupational chances of their children. Third, since several respondents in the small farmer and tenant/laborer categories do not feel government <u>will</u> provide them with private benefits, related issues are not important to them. Finally, there may be a "bandwagon" effect because village amenities have often been poured into villages before elections, and as a result it is likely that they come readily to mind.

The other interesting point in Table 7.3 is that issues are closely aligned with individual needs cited by respondents in Table 5.8. This

TABLE 7.3

ISSUES FELT TO BE INDIVIDUALLY IMPORTANT

Issues	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Village amenities (water, electricity, roads, schools)	18.8	33.3	21.0	20.0	20.1
Land, employment, loans for landless especially Harijans	12.5	8.3	5.2	30.0	14.9
To get a strong party elected that can get something done	6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
More inputs and assistance to farmers plus more land in some cases	25.0	41.5	47.3	10.0	30.0
Village amenities and asistance to farmers	25.0	15.0	10.5	30.0	22.4
"Never heard of any issues" or "there was nothing for me"	12.5	0.0	10.5	0.0	6.0
Don't know	0.0	0.0	5.3	10.0	4.5
Total (%)	100.0	98.1	99.8	100.0	99.4
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

reinforces the view of respondents that government is the agency to supply their needs or at least to see to it that supplies are properly distributed. This is particularly so of those with little or no land and is probably because again, government is seen as responsible for standards of living.

There is some parallel between what individuals consider to be their own important issues and those they think their friends consider

TABLE 7.4

ISSUES CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BY FRIENDS

Issues	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Village amenities (water, electricity, roads, schools)	25.0	33.1	31.6	15.0	29.9
Land, employment and loans for landless, especially Harijans	0.0	8.3	5.2	5.0	6.0
To get a strong party elected that can get something done	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
More inputs and assistance to farmers plus more land in some cases	25.0	33.3	36.8	25.0	29.8
Village amenities and assistance to farmers	12.5	8.3	0.0	40.0	17.9
Never heard/don't know	37.6	15.2	26.3	15.0	16.4
Total (%)	100.1	98.4	99.9	100.0	101.5
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

important. The higher emphasis on village amenities in Table 7.4 reflects respondents' ability to separate private from public gain and the feeling that the political process has not brought everyone private benefits. In lieu of this, public goods and access to them probably form a basis for political discussion among friends.

Table 7.5 shows that most respondents feel village amenities are important to villagers at large. In Hanumangarh most farmers live in hamlets surrounding the village proper. The village is identified with very large landowners and money-lenders. The farmers maintain only

TABLE 7.5

ISSUES CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BY VILLAGERS

Issues	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Village amenities (water, electricity, roads, schools)	87.8	66.6	73.7	55.0	70.1
Land, employment and loans for landless, especially Harijans	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	1.5
To get a strong party elected that can get something done	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
More inputs and assistance to farmers plus more land in some cases	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	1.5
Village amenities and assistance to farmers	6.2	25.0	0.0	15.0	10.4
Never heard/don't know	6.2	8.3	26.3	20.0	16.4
Total (%)	100.2	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.9
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

these persons have the time and resources to worry about such things as schools and health centers. One man said, "Oh, the villagers are more concerned about roads and schools. How do these things matter so much to us? How often do we walk on paved roads, and how long do our children attend school?" In Shivpura, "village concerns" are identified as amenities probably because the villagers have worked together to obtain them (e.g., the high school, Chapter II). Everyone had a part in obtaining and using these. Overall, amenities provide a focal point for local pride: attempts are often made to convince the outsider that

villages are not so "backward" as the city dweller thinks. In the previous chapter it was mentioned that locality may provide an organizational basis for the village vis-a-vis the outside world. Here it is suggested that public services can be central to solidarity based on locality as they serve to unite an otherwise divided population.[1]

Generally, the tables reflect the following processes. Over time, government and the Congress Party as the main link between people and government have become the legitimate distributors of goods and services in society. Weiner points out that "... the changing character of political attitudes and the political process is increasingly the consequence of the introduction of new governmental institutions and of governmental activities."[2] Further, "Decisions that were formerly made within the village now involve a level of governmental activity which may be ten miles or even a thousand miles away from the village. And competition which once occurred within the free market now takes place in the political market or within the governmental apparatus."[3] Since Congress has held power for the longest period of time, it has a virtual monopoly over patronage and its distribution.[4] This lesson is well learned by the electorate. Of importance is the effect of new goods and services on traditional roles and statuses and the new political interests and demands these effects generate.

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[1] See discussion on p. 149 based on Andre Beteille's approach.

[2] Myron Weiner, "India: Two Political Cultures," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 202

[3] Ibid., p. 204.

[4] Ibid., p. 219.

Views of Leadership

The idea that government is the main supplier of goods and services is reinforced by respondents' conceptions of the "duty" of government officers and political leaders. Only five persons in the sample feel it is not the duty of leaders and government officers to look after the welfare and happiness of their people. Of these, one person is not sure who should do this and the others say "people should take care of themselves." The reasons why leaders and government officers are responsible for people's welfare are given in Table 7.6.

TABLE 7.6

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF WHY PEOPLE'S WELFARE IS THE TASK OF POLITICAL LEADERS AND OFFICERS BY FARM SIZE*

Reasons Why	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
They have the power which the ordinary man does not	40.0	25.0	31.3	31.6	32.2
We give them power so they must do this for us	20.0	25.0	37.5	42.1	32.2
By definition of being leaders	33.4	49.8	25.1	26.3	32.2
They benefit financially by helping people (both salaries and corruption)	0.0	0.0	6.3	0.0	1.6
Government listens to them and not to us	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2
Total (%)	100.1	99.8	100.2	100.0	101.4
(N)	(15)	(12)	(16)	(19)	(62)

*Includes only those respondents who agree with the proposition.

It is interesting to note that around one-third of the sample views leaders as holding a kind of "social contract" with the people (see second reason, Table 7.6). Because their power is based on the consent of the governed, they are obliged to look after their wants. The first and third reasons are general, but they too indicate that leaders' position and power obligates them to work for the welfare of the governed. Some of these ideas may come from traditional conceptions of the state and leaders held by respondents: the king is enjoined in traditional political writings to be the guardian of his people.[1] That tradition, however, is common to a number of cultures. The point here is that government's role has expanded considerably since independence (1947) and as pointed out by Weiner, new institutions and activities have penetrated to the local level with a monopoly over functions that used to occur in other (normally private) institutional settings.

The link between people and their government is provided by elections and political parties in the respondents' eyes. This explains why elections are viewed as instrumental to the attainment of needs by so many respondents. The relationship is one where parties are seen to control governmental activities as is shown in Table 7.7.

Comments accompanying the responses given above stress parties' role as the main channels of communication between the electorate and government. "If we don't let the parties know what it is we want, how can government act in our favor?" "The candidates who win are able to tell government what it is we want, and then we can get it."

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[1] Familiar to readers acquainted with Kautilya's Arthashashtra, Part II, translated by R. P. Kangle (Bombay: University of Bombay Press, 1972), second edition, Book 1, Chapter 19, p. 47 et passim.

TABLE 7.7

RESPONDENTS' VIEWS OF WHETHER PARTIES CAN CONTROL GOVERNMENT

Can Parties Control Government?	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants Laborers	Overall
Yes	56.3	66.6	57.8	60.0	59.7
Only Congress can	12.6	0.0	5.3	0.0	4.5
Whichever party is in power can	6.3	8.3	0.0	5.0	4.5
No, they cannot	25.0	8.3	26.3	15.0	19.4
Not sure/don't know	0.0	16.6	10.6	20.0	11.9
Total (%)	100.2	99.8	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

How respondents view the functioning of the distributive process in reality is another matter. Table 7.8 illustrates how they feel it functions for them.

Obviously, there is considerable difference between what respondents see as the duty of leaders and their perception of reality. Table 7.9 expands on why respondents feel this way. The feelings of those respondents who say leaders <u>are</u> interested in their personal situations are not presented in tabular form as there are very few in this category (only 17). The most common reason is that politicians want votes and hence, they have to be interested. One or two respondents feel "leaders are good people and they care."

How many respondents have tried or feel they can talk with political leaders? Do respondents' attitudes toward leaders come from hearsay

TABLE 7.8

RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS ABOUT WHETHER LEADERS TAKE AN INTEREST IN THEIR WELL-BEING

Are Leaders Interested in People's Well-Being	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
No	62.5	75.0	73.7	60.0	70.1
Yes	12.5	25.0	15.9	20.0	17.9
Some do	18.8	0.0	5.2	10.0	9.0
Don't know	6.2	0.0	5.2	10.0	3.0
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

or practical experience? Though both factors are probably important, the results are given as stated in Table 7.10.

Large farmers obviously have the most direct access to political leaders and use it the most. The higher percentage of tenants and laborers who have spoken with political leaders comes from Congress Party efforts to retain a Harijan bloc of votes. Even with this however, the stratum is split and most Harijans within it do not feel they have access to politicians. Some point out that before the elections candidates always come to talk to everyone and then no one has a chance to see them again. Those respondents in all categories who have not talked with leaders feel people like themselves (without money and influence) cannot see party members or elected representatives. The low numbers of small farmers who feel they have access is indicative of the

TABLE 7.9

WHY RESPONDENTS FEEL LEADERS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN THEM*

Reasons Why	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Leaders are interested only in their monetary gain and status	33.3	11.1	20.0	35.7	26.0
They only want the votes so they show interest at election time and vanish	50.0	66.6	46.7	57.1	54.0
They don't really want to help the poor--don't care	16.6	22.2	20.1	7.1	14.0
They care only if they stand for election from their own town or village	0.0	0.0	6.7	0.0	2.0
Not sure/don't know	0.0	0.0	6.7	0.0	2.0
Total (%)	99.9	99.9	100.2	99.9	98.0
(N)	(12)	(9)	(15)	(14)	(50)

*Includes only those respondents who feel leaders are not interested in people's welfare.

constraint of farm size. This constraint at times feeds back to create a lack of interest on their part in the political process as there is nothing to be gained by participating in it.

One respondent, a Khatik by caste[1] was initially hostile when asked for an interview. "What can you people do for me? Some other people from the University have come here. Can you give me my land back? What is the use of interviews?" After some discussion the interview began, and Kalu's case is indicative of the extent of both political mobilization and the dilemma faced by the voter.

[1]A Harijan caste: traditionally involved in herding, wool trade and butchering.

TABLE 7.10

HAVE PROBLEMS EVER BEEN DISCUSSED WITH LEADERS?

Have Respondents Ever Talked With Political Leaders?	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Yes	75.0	50.0	14.0	45.0	44.8
No	25.0	50.0	86.0	55.0	55.2
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

Political Choice and Change

Kalu's parents owned seven and one half acres of irrigated land. He had an older married brother who became ill at the age of eighteen years. The parents went into debt for his treatment and when their son died, they owed the money-lender Rs. 800 ($106.66). Kalu was about sixteen at the time. His family had done well on the land, and borrowed only to meet the hospital bills. Kalu's father however, was unable to repay the full debt on time and the money-lender foreclosed taking all the land whose value then was about Rs. 10,000 ($1,333). As Kalu points out, "What could my father do against the baniya? Take him to court?" The family was left destitute and the loss of the land combined with his age kept Kalu's father from starting another occupation. He had no skills anyway. It fell on Kalu's shoulders to feed and clothe the family.

Kalu began work as an agricultural and casual laborer. He heard government was giving loans to Harijans for houses and animal husbandry

and applied for one after much difficulty. "A herd of forty or fifty goats would be a very good start for us. We could sell milk and with the money expand the herd very quickly." But no one would inform him of the procedures at the panchayat samiti, and at the tehsil he could not get by the clerks to the tehsildar (whose signature was required) without a bribe for which he never had the cash. After talking amongst friends, he and three other young men lied about their ages and registered to vote. They also paid one rupee each and joined the Congress Party. Once in the party, they decided they would have access to elected officers who would help.

During the 1971 (parliamentary) and 1972 (state assembly) elections, Kalu worked hard for the Congress along with other party members. Congress won in the village and Kalu went to Jaipur city to find the newly elected member of the state assembly (MLA) who had promised to help all who worked for his election. Kalu was interviewed for this study in January 1973, and to that date had been unable to see the MLA. He was still waiting to hear of his loan application and felt no action would be taken unless he got the MLA's approval. "I am not a big person in the Khatik community so no one will pay attention to me. If I were a patel (headman) or owned a big plot of land, I would have no problem. Look at Bheru who lives in that big house. He is a big businessman who controls the wool marketing from Hanumangarh. He can see the MLA any time he wants. Why should he need help?

"Now you tell me what I should do. I know what elections are supposed to be about. I also know Congress is the only party that has any interest at all in helping people. But what can a man do beyond what I have already done? I joined the party, I vote, I even work to help the

party win. But for what? I am hardly allowed in the compound of the MLA's house. I have my old parents, my brother's widow, her two children, my wife and a younger brother to support. I am trying to put him through school so he will not have to tend goats as I do. They failed him this year so I have to pay fees twice for the same class. You tell me -- what should I do? Most of all I would like to have the land back. It was got from us illegally but how can I take it to court? With what? Seven and a half irrigated acres! And they went for Rs. 800/-. We would be well off with that -- look how well the farmers here are doing. They get tractors to work for them and the government gives them loans and other help. What do we get except promises that are never kept?

"Yet, what is the alternative to Congress? No other party comes to power. No other party comes to the Harijans for support -- if they did, we might be able to try through other channels. Congress programs are good. I don't read or write, but when we used to work during the elections we would listen to speeches by Indira Gandhi and other leaders on the radio, and they all said good things. 'Garibi hatao' they said.[1] But below the top level of leaders they are all a bunch of scoundrels. You see, the programs are there and money is available -- this country doesn't lack anything. But these people take it all for themselves. Look at the farms and resources of these big farmers. Why should they get loans? And yet they do. I am asking for a loan which would not even affect them, and yet I can't get it."

Here is a clear dilemma. If the electoral system is a way to get benefits, then it is necessary to vote. On the other hand, the spread

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[1]Election slogan for the 1971 parliamentary elections meaning "abolish poverty."

of benefits is restricted to those who already have more to begin with: who have the wherewithal to help parties maintain their positions. As was pointed out in the previous chapters, even benefits that are supposed to go to Harijans are given to those who have the most power in the community. The reader will recall the emphasis in agricultural development on investing resources in those sectors of the farm community where returns are assumed to be the most rapid.[1] There is a coincidence between economic and political expediency whose net result is a marginal increase in production (at best), and dislocation and deprivation of a considerable proportion of the rural population.

If this is perceived to be so, how would respondents like government to change, and how do they see change being brought about? The answers to these questions are in Tables 7.11 and 7.12 below.

There is again a continuity in the respondents' perceptions. Political change involves governmental performance as related to personal benefits: to the acquisition of inputs necessary for sustenance. The respondents citing performance and inputs feel government has some good programs. The Congress Party is viewed as often having "good ideas" whose implementation is impeded by the callousness and corruption of local administrators and politicians. How these changes can be brought about was a more problematic question for the respondents. Table 7.12 gives the results of this.[2]

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[1] See Chapter I.

[2] Corruption as used here refers to bribes, diversion of resources for one's own use, and a general misuse of the intent of governmental programs and resources. The Hindi term used (sifarish) connotes a general misuse of influence for one's personal benefit. (For Hindi speakers: note, this is a corruption of the original term sifarish meaning influence.)

TABLE 7.11

CHANGES RESPONDENTS WOULD LIKE TO SEE
IN THE FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT

Changes Desired	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Improved governmental performance (implementation of stated programs, etc.)	37.5	35.0	26.3	20.0	28.4
Eradication of corruption	31.3	16.7	21.1	10.0	19.4
More inputs for agriculture, including land and extension advice	18.9	35.0	21.1	0.0	16.4
Help poor people especially with employment	0.0	0.0	5.3	30.0	10.4
More emphasis on education, health and other amenities	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	3.0
There should be more contact between government and the people so we know what we can expect	0.0	5.3	0.0	0.0	1.5
Lots should change, can't specify	0.0	0.0	5.3	0.0	1.5
Not sure/not applicable	12.5	8.3	21.1	30.0	19.4
Total (%)	100.2	100.3	100.5	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

Table 7.12 has interesting findings. Almost all respondents see change possible through pressure exerted either by the electorate or political parties which reinforces parties' role as mediators. It also reflects respondents' access to resources. Large farmers have better access and are aware of their ability to get more through normal political channels. The others know theoretically they can obtain more by

TABLE 7.12

HOW RESPONDENTS FEEL DESIRED CHANGES MAY BE EFFECTED

Means of Change	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Large Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
Popular pressure from the people through elections or other participation short of violence	50.0	35.0	31.6	15.0	31.3
Pressure by parties and elected officials	25.0	16.7	10.6	15.0	16.4
Only government can change itself if it wants to	0.0	0.0	15.8	15.0	9.0
By rotating parties in power, one party can become complacent	6.3	25.0	5.3	0.0	7.5
Pressure from higher officers on field workers	6.3	0.0	0.0	10.0	4.5
Only if good people go into administration	0.0	8.3	5.3	5.0	4.5
Not sure/non-applicable	12.5	16.7	31.6	40.0	26.9
Total (%)	100.1	101.7	100.2	100.0	100.1
(N)	(16)	(12)	(19)	(20)	(67)

exerting coordinated pressure on elected officials and government officers, but are not confident enough to use such tactics. Some say it would be possible to go in groups to the *panchayat samiti* to demand inputs they are entitled to, or to vote *en bloc* to throw out elected officers who do not keep their promises. They are timid about using such means feeling that they may not be able to get sufficient numbers to join even if they try. There may also be a fear of some kind of reprisals from others in the village. The high rate of "don't know"

responses reflects despair among the small farmers and laborers mirrored in the story of Kalu.

The data presented thus far show a high degree of knowledge about the political system and its theoretical utility. What is also clear is that most villagers' political efficacy is low. They understand the electoral process, but have a limited view of their own ability to affect the system in ways other than voting. Persons like Kalu have tried with little success which heightens frustration: both his and that of his acquaintances who see his failure. The political mobilization of villagers has occurred mainly because of the link between parties and material benefits. It is precisely the "institutionalization" of both the electoral process and the Congress monopoly that makes people see politics and economic benefits as interrelated. How then do respondents use their votes, and what alternatives do they see?

The Vote

A major methodological problem must be noted before the discussion continues. Respondents were asked for whom they voted in each general election since 1962.[1] It was predicted that changes in the economic sector could be related directly to voting. Those respondents who originally supported Congress but were adversely affected by agricultural change should have changed their party preference. This would fit the respondents' utilitarian view of voting. This was not found to be the case for a number of methodological reasons as well as the complexity of the real world.

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[1] A base-line for political preferences as it was the election just prior to the introduction of the intensive agricultural programs.

First, a recall of votes going back to 1962 is bound to be faulty. This was expected, but it was hoped a trend of changing preferences away from Congress among small farmers and tenants/laborers might be found. In fact, such trends as are apparent in Table 7.13 show the opposite tendency. Further, according to the constituency votes, around one-third of the sample should have voted for the Swatantra Party in 1971, and two-thirds should have done so in 1962. Though the responses show a movement away from Swatantra to Congress, they still do not match the constituency vote for earlier years. The accuracy of recall is probably partially responsible.

Second, it could be that the sample is not representative of the whole constituency which is larger than any given village. Shivpura, for example, was known as a Congress island in a Swatantra constituency and though Hanumangarh's constituency elected a Congress member of parliament in 1967, people said the village voted for a Swatantra candidate. The respondents are randomly chosen, however, and they should show more of a difference than they do in electoral preferences.[1] This leads to a third possibility.

There is a bandwagon effect involved. In Hanumangarh for example, people might say they voted for Congress because the constituency turned to Congress for the first time in 1967. This vote was preceded by an inflow of public benefits both before and after the election and again in 1971 which could enhance this syndrome. Shivpura is very strongly identified with Congress and the sarpanch takes an active part in

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[1]Though the villages are considered political "islands" by their residents, they are not so in reality. Each has groups voting for opposition parties. In informal conversations, people identify each other often by the use of party labels: "A Congressman" for example.

TABLE 7.13

RESPONDENTS' VOTING RECORD*

Election and Vote	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
1962 - Parliament					
Congress Party	50.0	33.3	21.1	55.0	40.3
Swatantra Party	18.7	25.0	30.8	5.5	20.9
Can't remember/ too young	31.6	40.0	36.8	35.5	35.9
Did not vote	0.0	0.0	10.6	5.5	3.0
Total (%)	100.3	98.3	99.3	101.5	100.1
1962 - State Assembly					
Congress Party	50.0	33.3	21.1	55.0	40.3
Swatantra Party	18.7	25.0	30.8	5.5	20.9
Can't remember/ too young	31.6	40.0	36.8	35.5	35.9
Did not vote	0.0	0.0	10.6	5.5	3.0
Total (%)	100.3	98.3	99.3	101.5	100.1
1967 - Parliament					
Congress Party	68.8	58.3	31.1	75.0	55.2
Swatantra Party	25.0	25.0	47.4	10.0	26.9
Can't remember/ too young	6.3	16.6	15.8	5.0	12.0
Did not vote	0.0	0.0	5.2	10.0	6.0
Total (%)	100.0	99.9	99.5	100.0	100.1
1967 - State Assembly					
Congress Party	62.5	58.3	31.1	75.0	53.7
Swatantra Party	31.2	25.0	47.4	10.0	28.4
Can't remember/ too young	6.3	16.6	15.8	5.0	12.0
Did not vote	0.0	0.0	5.2	10.0	6.0
Total (%)	100.0	99.9	99.5	100.0	100.1

*Given in percentages, N=67.

TABLE 7.13-Continued

Election and Vote	Sample Strata (in %'s)				
	Large Farmers	Medium Farmers	Small Farmers	Tenants/ Laborers	Overall
1971 - Parliament					
Congress Party	68.8	50.0	57.9	85.0	65.7
Swatantra Party	25.0	41.7	21.0	0.0	19.4
Can't remember/ too young	6.3	0.0	5.0	15.0	7.4
Did not vote	0.0	8.3	15.8	0.0	7.5
Total (%)	100.1	100.0	99.7	100.0	100.0
1971 - State Assembly					
Congress Party	87.4	83.4	68.4	85.0	80.6
Swatantra Party	6.3	8.3	10.5	5.0	7.4
Can't remember/ too young	0.0	0.0	10.5	10.0	6.0
Did not vote	6.3	8.3	10.5	0.0	6.0
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0

sustaining this identification. More persons here might well be reluctant to admit having voted for the opposition though some undoubtedly did.

The bandwagon effect might also have been encouraged by the 1971 Bangladesh war. India had just liberated Bangladesh and defeated Pakistan. One can surmise that this probably created more support for Congress. As a control respondents were asked why they thought Congress received such an overwhelming majority in the 1972 election. Only one person cited the war as the main reason: one-third of the rest were not sure, but two-thirds felt it was because of the capacity of the Congress to distribute benefits. Several persons who switched to Congress from Swatantra pointed out, "Opposition parties have done nothing for the

people." "Congress is the only party with a real program and the ability to carry it out," said others. Finally, some persons said, "Congress areas have done much better than non-Congress ones which shows that Congress can do more."

It is still valid to hypothesize that the war probably created a certain amount of euphoria and pride focused on the Congress party. It may well have enhanced people's view of the party's capacity and credibility.

In reality there is likely an element of all these factors involved. It is recognized that voting anywhere by itself is a shaky indicator of political attitudes and participation. While it was disappointing to find little direct correlation between voting and political perceptions as was predicted, the wider picture explaining this is more informative than an affirmation of the original hypothesis.

As Kalu suggests, there is little perceived alternative to the Congress. It has been shown that respondents participate primarily to gain benefits but most feel they have not benefitted personally. The data also show there is concern with village amenities. The critical point here is that villagers separate private from public gain to a considerable extent. Even though most have not personally benefitted, they feel others have and that the villages are better places to live in now.

An elderly laborer says, "Look, in all my life, the total amount of assistance I have received from government is Rs. 35/- ($4.66) as a scholarship for my son. Even that was originally to be Rs. 75/- ($10.00) so that I would have money to pay for the boy's uniform too, but they told me there were no more funds. I am sure the money was there, but

what could I do? Had I protested they might have failed the boy and then he could not get any assistance at all. So why should I vote for Congress? I have gained nothing and the way things are now, my son could not find employment even with a high school degree. But which other party can give us schools and health centers? And which party can do what Congress has done for farmers? They get better seeds, there are more wells, and the prices are good for them. These things may go to those farmers who are powerful, but at least someone gets them. The other parties don't do anything at all. All they talk about is getting Congress out of power. But so what? What will they do then?"

If tenants and laborers in particular feel a Congress dominated political system has been captured by and functions for landed, higher caste persons, why do they continue to support the party? This has been answered partially in that they feel no other party wants their support. Further, however, the Congress has programs for Harijans and it was a Congress government that outlawed discrimination on the basis of caste. While there is impatience with the inactivity of the party, there is a strong feeling that the community is better off with it than any other group. There is also a slight generational difference here.

Younger members of the tenant and labor communities show more impatience with their status than do their parents. In both villages, the older persons have seen a considerable change in their position since independence. Several point out that if they defaulted on taxes or refused to do <u>begar</u> (forced labor) in the "raja's" days, it was not uncommon to have their houses broken down and their men beaten by the <u>raja's</u> retainers. Two respondents mentioned their relatives had died from such treatment. This does not occur anymore: rather their votes

are sought by the ruling party, and there are seats reserved for them on all elective bodies. At least laws have been passed giving them equal status and they have been promised land and loans. So the Congress is good and cannot be faulted for the inactivity of local leaders and government officers. These people are seen to be opportunists who do not believe in what Congress stands for: they become "Congress people" to benefit themselves. But they are not "real" party people.

Younger persons are more impatient since they never lived under the old system. The changes in their lives are not as great. Though most of them vote for Congress, they question both the value of the vote and the party. They see their own interests as contradictory to those of landed elements and caste Hindus. They agree that laws abolishing discrimination are a first step toward equality but point out that in fact, discrimination takes place all the time. They are not welcome in government offices; temples (especially those in villages) often disbar them. Yes, government has legally deeded land to them but refuses to enforce their claim to it in the face of higher caste pressure. Then there are the housing loans: "Who has got the loans? First of all, few have been given out at all. Last Republic Day (January 26) government gave out twenty-six which were the first ones given in three or four years. They all went to Harijans but only to those who are leaders. All persons who got loans are landowners, and have no need of housing assistance. What about those who don't have any home at all?"[1]

These men see Congress strategy as one which keeps their support with a minimum of payoffs. Since no other party wants their community's

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[1]An unofficial, but careful observation of the loan recipients by the author tends to confirm this. Each new house seen built was a "second" home.

demands, the Congress assumes their support by default. Men like Kalu Khatik and younger Raigers would like to see Harijans change their votes to opposition parties even if only for one or two elections. This would show the Congress that it cannot take their support for granted. Their elders argue this is not a feasible alternative since no other party wants them. The sons say this does not matter as the purpose of such action is to prod Congress into activity. Others say it would be enough not to vote for one or two elections: the Congress cannot win without their numbers anyway (they constitute 27 percent of the population). But the young dissidents do not have the status in their communities to implement their suggestions. And as their leaders are the recipients of official benefits, it is in their interest to maintain their alliance with Congress and to pattern their political roles after those of the caste Hindus: to use their traditional authority to be both spokesmen and brokers between their communities and the wider political system. This, again, can be successful only as long as the separate identity and privileges for Harijans are maintained: an integration of the communities would negate it.

As for the large farmers, it is interesting that they have moved from support for the opposition to the Congress. This is particularly so if one considers that Congress abolished jagirdaris, enacted land ceiling legislation, tenancy protection laws, gave land to the landless and enacted anti-discrimination legislation. Not only do these persons vote for Congress, but they also hold most elected positions at all levels. In both of the villages studied, the sarpanchas, members of samitis, state legislatures and parliament are large farmers. Local

cooperatives are also controlled by them.[1] By holding elective office, they have little to fear from higher levels of party personnel who rely on their local strength to keep the party in power. The larger landowners have already bypassed ceiling legislation by dispersing titles to their land. By holding public office they are able to divert resources for their own use and implement policies at the state and local level to suit their own needs. This latter situation is possible because of the devolution of authority for land and property rights and agriculture to the states under the Constitution. The large owners' use of resources makes eminent sense if one considers the monopoly Congress holds over payoffs: a feeling shared by all strata of cultivators in this study. By aligning with Congress, these persons share the monopoly. The goods obtained thereby are judiciously used to maintain authority over other sections of the population: through money-lending and the granting of small official favors such as loans for wells or pump sets.

Summary

Thus it is that traditionally held ritual and economic power has adapted to the "modern" political system. Political parties use traditional power bases to mobilize support in rural areas, and those holding such power use the official monopoly over benefits to maintain it. Recognizing that some modicum of goods and services need to be brought

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[1]For other areas, see W. H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in India (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957); Duncan B. Forrester, "Changing Patterns of Political Leadership in India," The Review of Politics, XXVIII (July 1966); Myron Weiner, "Traditional Role Performance and the Development of Modern Political Parties: The Indian Case," The Journal of Politics, XXVI (November, 1964); and Hung-Chao Tai, Land Reform and Politics, op. cit., pp. 93-97.

into rural areas to convince people that they should participate in the political process, government has supplied a number of public goods and services. These have made a qualitative impact on people's lives strengthening or "institutionalizing" the role of the political system in general and the government in particular to distribute benefits.

But the Congress dominated political system has also done something more than supply public goods. It has promised better living standards for all, inputs for farmers, and land to the landless. The data presented show that much of what has been promised is symbolic in nature: the necessity for increased food production has taken precedence over these aims. Symbolic or not however, the promises themselves have created mobilization and demands. Further the dynamic of agricultural growth and change, having started a process of deprivation for tenants and laborers has created demands on their part which are increasingly contradictory to those of the larger landowners in particular because in order to deal with them, a redistribution of land must take place. The economic forces set in motion to deal with production by catering to the demands of larger producers in the end will erode both their traditional power base (by the displacement of agrarian persons), and the ameliorative effects of the electoral system which until now has acted as an outlet and hope for demands and their satisfaction.

Once government undertakes to be not only the chief dispenser of goods and services, but also seeks to change societal patterns (e.g., aid for Harijans) it will set in motion processes which result in contradictory demands. The data show that although issues other than land and subsistence are important, as economic change deprives some people while raising their expectations of governmental capacity, frustration

may increase unless public and symbolic goods are balanced with those of a private nature.[1]

The problems raised by this process are considerable. If one's economic welfare is closely linked with the fate of one party, and there is no perceived alternative to this, what strategies are open to frustrated participants? There are two: a retreat from any kind of participation (resulting in despair), or some kind of extra-systemic activity to bring the political system's awareness to bear on their problems. The first option is most likely to occur in these two villages which do not as yet have links with other like-minded persons outside of the villages (after Wolf). The second cannot be ruled out though its occurance may not be obvious at the present time.

To the observer, it is obvious that no party can accommodate all demands in society (certainly not at the same time), and the interests must be weighed one against the other to see which ones will (at least) maximize political options for politicians in the longer run, or will (additionally) also help attain goals the political system has set for itself. Once a link is established in the electorate's view between the political process and personal benefits, numbers of demands increase and symbolic or public goods cease to make sufficient impact on participants. Several authors point out this process can lead to immobilisme in the policy making process.[2]

In this study, if land and access to other productive resources are basic to subsistence and these resources through both political leverage and economic rationale become concentrated in the hands of some

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[1]See Tai, op. cit., and Wolf, op. cit.

[2]Eisenstadt, op. cit., and Weiner, Party Building, op. cit.

to the detriment of others, the latter persons' demands will become such that any party will need to rethink its electoral strategy and align itself with one group or the other. Politically the realignment will be necessary because the effect of economic change on traditional channels of mobilization will also alter patterns of mobilization.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding analysis should help explain and predict the political ramifications of agrarian change in India. Despite the startling lack of success in the maximization of the goals of either production or equality, neither Hanumangarh nor Shivpura show signs of political radicalization. The orthodox Marxist might argue that they will in time. The liberal economist might not see points of conflict in the data, or might say a certain amount of conflict is inevitable if growth is to occur. I have followed neither of these paths, though elements of both are used. The study is an attempt at evaluating the maximization of two rather clear goals.

There is the assumption that sufficient knowledge exists in the social sciences to explain and predict trends of change without waiting for revolutions and then analyzing systems post mortem. This makes it possible for the observer also to lay out alternative strategies which might maximize growth and equality more efficiently. To the author's mind, this is the value of the humanistic social sciences: the use of knowledge for the enhancement of real world well-being.

This study, done within the relatively limited perimeters of two of India's millions of villages is replicable and its findings should be applicable to situations where (1) peasant agriculture is under transformation to commercialized forms under similar strategies,

(2) relatively open and competitive political channels exist for mobilization and voicing of demands, (3) the systems function under similar constraints of land and capital with an abundance of labor, and (4) where productive resources are concentrated in the hands of the few.

As a start, agricultural change should be viewed in a broader context as productivity is not the only end pursued by government in the rural areas. As I noted in the "Introduction," changes in the countryside have been consequential. The life span of the average Indian has increased from twenty-nine years (1947) to forty-nine. Mortality rates have dropped and continue to do so as epidemic diseases are controlled and maternity care is extended into rural areas. Fewer people die of malnutrition than did even twenty years ago. During the worst food shortages of 1972-74, the situation was never close to that during the great Bengal famine of 1943. Literacy rates rise annually;[1] better transportation and marketing networks have created greater interdependencies between the urban and rural areas. Education (limited though it still is) has raised rural awareness of and identity with India as a nation; it has served as a major socialization agent. And finally, the ubiquitous transistor radio (and shortly television) has made it possible for New Delhi to communicate with all parts of the country within hours. These are real, documented changes, and normally are considered important components of the development process.

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[1]Literacy rates have risen from 16.6 percent in 1951 to 28.6 percent in 1966 and 29.46 percent in 1971 for the nation as a whole. For Rajasthan, the 1971 figure is less: 19.07 percent. Sources: Government of India, Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66 (Ministry of Education, Government of India, New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1966), p. 423, and Government of Rajasthan, Statistical Abstract, Rajasthan, 1971 (Jaipur, Rajasthan: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Rajasthan, 1971), p. 7.

However, this study has been primarily concerned with two goals of economic growth with equality. As stated in the Fourth Five Year Plan, the far reaching changes required by these goals are officially recognized:

> 1.8 Rapid economic development which is oriented towards establishing social justice must involve refashioning of socio-economic institutions. In part, the social objectives will be the end result of economic development, but in a large measure, their realisation will depend on how the course of development is charted and to what extent an appropriate structure of socio-economic institutions is evolved and operated... It means that major economic decisions and decisions regarding socio-economic relationships will be made by agencies informed with social purpose, that there will be a devolution of functions and that there will be scope for experimentation. Democratic values are given effect to by encouraging the growth of a feeling of participation on the part of the small man, the promotion of enterprise among the disadvantaged classes and the creation of a sense of involvement in the transformation of society among all sections of the community. The broad objectives of planning could thus be defined as rapid economic development accompanied by continuous progress toward equality and social justice and the establishment of a social and economic democracy.[1]

While the quote is rather lengthy, it does spell out the goals of development and highlights some of the problems. The latter (as will be seen below) are implied by the recognized need to evolve "appropriate structures of socio-economic institutions". The data of this study show that neither the goal of rapid economic growth, nor social justice and economic democracy have been maximized. Rather, the opposite appears to have taken place: an increase in economic, and hence social

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[1] Government of India, Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan, 1969-74, Draft (New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission, 1969), pp. 4-5.

and political polarization.[1] To the extent that economic conclusions drawn here are similar to those found elsewhere over approximately the same time period, they are not peculiar to these two villages.[2]

Economic Change and Equality

On a general level, the economic result of technological change is an increasing gap between the entrepreneurial farmers and those following a peasant type of production. There is further economic differential between owner-cultivators of any size holding and the landless tenants and laborers. Without alternatives in other sectors of the economy, those without land are being displaced. Finally, those with less land have benefitted the least from the new biochemical technologies as their access to inputs is restricted by their farm size.[3]

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[1]This is not to say there has been no increase in food production. The annual compound growth rate is 2.7 percent (1952/53 - 1954/55 to 1962/63 - 1964/65), while the population increases at about 2.2 percent annually. This growth rate compares unfavorably with Mexico (6.3 percent), Taiwan (4.3 percent), and the UAR (3.7 percent). Source: FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization, 1966), p. 19.

[2]See Thomasson F. Januzzi, Agrarian Crisis in India (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974); T. Scarlett Epstein, South India: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1973); Francine Frankel, India's Green Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); and Margaret R. Haswell, Economics of Development in Village India (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967). On a general level, see Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1971), and Kusum Nair, The Lonely Furrow (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969).

[3]This is perhaps not so surprising in view of the recognition by scholars that economic growth can increase disparities at least in the short run. See Chapter I, and also Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History, Vol. 23 (December 1963), reprinted in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley, 1971), pp. 557-68, where he argues, "... contrary to what is usually assumed, economic growth can significantly increase the number of losers." p. 562.

Politically, this has an impact because of government's institutionalized role as the main holder and distributor of benefits. The attainment of both private and public goods is now a public matter resulting in higher levels of political mobilization and participation than might have occurred otherwise. Intuitively, a competitive political system should offer opportunity for attaining benefits and release of frustrations when desired goods are not obtained. But because of the configuration of rural power (as it is concentrated in the hands of traditionally landed elites) and a Congress government's distributive monopoly, two main constraints are operative which may suggest areas for further research and testing.

First, though everyone can vote, the power configuration has essentially disenfranchised the landless and small holder. Their access to goods and services is limited by their lack of economic wherewithal. Second, the power configuration constrains information flows to political officials and top level policy planners and party strategists. Because the local landed elites are seen as the major vote mobilizers and have captured local and state elective offices, they control information flows both upwards and downwards. In addition, one might add a third general statement: the approach to growth and suggested policies[1] themselves restrict the perceived political capacity of particularly the Congress party and the policy makers because they justify catering to those farmers who compose local elites. These persons, though they have restricted a wide dispersal of personal benefits, have helped maintain Congress power. Until the information flows and concepts of political capacity are altered, there is little to suggest the currently perceived

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[1]See Chapter I, discussion of the Ford Foundation Team Report.

capacity will permit an alteration of strategy. To operationalize these statements: the power configuration, as shown by the data and discussed at length elsewhere,[1] is based on the ownership of and access to land. Second, political capacity is a function of any political party's view of how support may be mobilized: in the case of these two villages, parties have assumed that local landed elites are the chief mobilizers.

Despite these statements because the economics of rural change alter roles and relationships, and the introduction of competitive electoral structures alone does not permit de facto competition between groups, pressure from those without influence can be anticipated as their interests grow apart from those holding power. That is, policies enacted to aid local supporters of national elites, when they alter traditional interdependencies and roles (e.g., the displacement of tenants and laborers) can mobilize new groups into the polity looking for means to maintain themselves.[2]

Compounding the process are promises of better levels of well-being which although largely symbolic, raise the expectations of the participants.[3] The distribution of goods -- public and private, make it reasonable on the part of the electorate to assume there may be more for all. Political socialization too (via schools, the media,[4] and

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[1]See Chapters III through VII and sources cited on land and political power.

[2]Obviously involved here are the concepts of absolute and relative deprivation. See Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), and Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, #4 (December 1968), pp. 1104-24.

[3]Here the concern is with rising expectations resulting in relative deprivation.

[4]Every respondent save three maintained he tried to listen to the

electoral campaigns) not only integrates people into a new conception of nationhood, but into a wider political and economic system whose lure is a probable increase in personal well-being. The main result of this is that though certain kinds of goods (primarily public services) have been dispersed, power has not shifted beyond its traditional economic base. Indeed, as is argued below, it will not shift until the economic base itself is altered. Following Edelman's discussion of the "mixes" of tangible and symbolic benefits, it might be said there never was any intention of altering the power base. Also continuing after Bachrach and Baratz, such alterations may not be desired as they will alter the "mobilization of bias".[1] After all, to change the economic base is to ask those in power to divest themselves of it. How the wider politico-administrative and economic arrangements benefit local elites while the processes of change at the same time erode their power is the subject of our further discussion.

A Reinforcement of Inequality

First, although tenancy reform includes an ideological component of protection for the landless along with incentives to increase their production, this goal has not been realized. Instead, while tenancy reform increases the owners' hold over their land, it dilutes their socio-political control over the tenant class. In essence, it accepts the traditionally inegalitarian social structure of the country. In

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radio to hear (1) farm price reports or extension programs, (2) news, and (3) folk music, in that order.

[1]Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1964) especially Chapter II, "Symbols and Political Quiescence," and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 43, for definition.

both villages the dominant landowners are not politically cohesive and so cannot bring coordinated pressure to bear on the landless. Only as long as tenants were tied by customary economics to a particular faction or landowner could these mobilization channels function effectively. Tenants and laborers are economically more dependent on the landed groups, but unless the latter act together, the tenants and laborers are subject to cross-pressures politically which widens their scope of choice (though this may not be perceived).

The data have shown how social cleavages of class and caste can provide bases for political organization and the limited activities for which they have already been used. Judging from the data and other areas of India (notably the Naxalbari movement) there is reason to predict that as economic constraints on the landless grow, so will the scope for joint political activity, aided by their ritually low status. This in turn can be expected to increase the landed elite's cohesiveness as they act to counter a perceived threat from below. This cohesiveness will also increase as a function of the investments made by entrepreneurial farmers in their farms. Once they invest considerable amounts of capital, these entrepreneurs can scarcely be expected to acquiesce to land-redistribution.

Second, the land reforms (especially land ceilings) have little or no effect on the pattern of landownership, either in Rajasthan or nationally. The cynic will argue they were never meant to; the more generous would say the good intentions of policy makers were thwarted by a large farmer/administrative coalition which has a vested interest in the retention of landholding patterns as they exist. In any case, not much land is available for distribution under present ceilings and

the loopholes in existing legislation prevent redistribution. As is apparent in the data, political efficacy and access to economic wherewithal are restricted by landownership.

Third, if one accepts these premises, it follows that a continuing flow of agricultural and other payoffs to those who are already better off strengthens those groups both economically and politically. If the situation were to stop there, it could be argued that it is impossible to meet everyone's needs. Therefore, it is logical to invest in those persons likely to give the quickest returns to investment and wait until more resources are generated before turning to the more deprived sections of society.

But the situation does not stop there for several reasons. One is the relocation of displaced persons in other sectors of the economy. In a country with the demographic configurations of India, this is a formidable problem.[1] Second, one cannot discount the enormous amount of

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[1]"Even prior to the varietal revolution, around 95 percent of the farm households in India owned less than 20 acres of land each; 75 percent possessed less than 5 acres. Less than 13 percent had more than 10 acres each. Only 1 percent held 50 acres or more. Depending on the horsepower of tractors, threshers, and other such 'modern' units of agricultural technology, it would mean that 99, 95, or a minimum of at least 75 percent of the farmers would not be able to modernize their production techniques. They would lack the acreage or the managerial talent. In any case, the number of man-hours required to produce considerably larger quantities of food and fibre would be reduced drastically; and as new technology increases the marginal productivity of capital relative to labor, capital will substitute for labor. Moreover, as production functions and assets become concentrated and specialized, millions would be forced into obsolescence and out of agriculture, as in the United States.

"As a first step in the 'modernization' process, even if only the less than five-acre farms are eliminated, some thirty-three million families, aside from the fifteen million or so that do not own any land, would be on the road in India. The question is, where would they go? Storage space could be built fairly quickly for surplus grain. And if the glut becomes too large, it can be destroyed. But a nation cannot put most of itself on the dole, even if money and food are available for distribution." Kusum Nair, The Lonely Furrow, op. cit., pp. 223-24.

political and social mobilization that has already taken place as a result of the participatory channels provided by the political system.

Third, economically, the depression of around 75 percent of the population (see footnote) limits the market for the industrial sector. Beyond the values of equality and conceptions of social justice lies the obvious economic fact that if one is to have industrial growth, a market is necessary. Industry cannot be expected to provide employment for so much "surplus" labor from the countryside as it is already a capital-intensive sector, and thus has a built-in constraint against labor intensive modes of production.

Fourth, the creation of a welfare system or "dole" of sorts is outside the realm of feasibility given the demographic situation. There is, as yet, neither sufficient food nor enough cash to support it. Further, the idea of 75 percent of the rural population on a welfare system makes mockery of the concept of economic development.[1]

This leaves one with the following kinds of conclusions. The first is that property distribution is central because it places constraints on access to private and public benefits as well as to political status and power. It also constrains access to factors of production. Those who argue for or against land redistribution measures generally and on grounds of either more production or social desirability, leave the access variable out. If all farmers are to use improved technology, then planners must come to grips with at least the issue of land use.

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[1]See previous footnote. Also see definition of economic development used for this study, given in Chapter I, where I have stated that economic development implies "an increase in a nation's wealth ... with an assumed concomitant increase in its individual citizens' levels of well-being."

Second, since one is discussing a system with universal suffrage, it must be recognized that numbers lie on the side of the landless and the small/marginal cultivators. Given the loosening of ties between them and the landed elite, one needs to be aware of their interests which are apparently increasingly contradictory to those holding the economic resources of agriculture. The landless and small/marginal farmers are the "free floating" resources of the political system and their political loyalties are increasingly available to those who can meet their needs.

The fact that until 1972, support for Congress grew among all social groups does not mean they are likely to remain there. The party identification of respondents is not high. Landed persons support Congress because they can control the flow of its resources; they would do the same for any other party. The others support it because they still have some hopes of gaining benefits.

If however, benefits are not to be gained, there is every reason to expect that participation will fall off unless there are perceived political alternatives. That such alternatives are not there presently does not eliminate the possibility of their arising in the future.[1] Also persons like Kalu Khatik are those who can provide links between rural and urban political centers through both their political experience

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[1]See Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, op. cit. and Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) as well as within India, the Naxalbari movement and currently moves made by Jayaprakash Narayan an elderly Gandhian leader to form an anti-Congress opposition front to fight corruption and the deprivation of low-income persons.

(and the astuteness gained thereby) as well as family and occupational ties provided by seasonal migration between village and town.[1]

Problems with Existing Solutions to the Welfare Issue

Now if for any reason, one wishes not to alter rural property patterns, the following calculations arise. If one acknowledges that a relocation of displaced persons is virtually impossible in the industrial sector in the foreseeable future, and also that their welfare is important both in terms of political reality and values, then means must be found to keep them viable under the encroachment of a form of production organization that is competitive, large-scale, and capital-intensive. Some kind of marginal, protected farming will have to be devised to provide security for at least the small owner. It has been argued elsewhere that the ejido system in Mexico approximates this pattern.[2] For the landless it has been suggested that massive rural works programs must be started to make productive use of surplus labor.[3] Indeed a "crash" employment program along these lines was launched in 1973-74. The problems these suggestions raise are considerable.

In India, to deal with the small/marginal cultivators, the Small Farmers and Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers Development

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[1]Wolf argues that a rural-urban link is necessary for peasant revolutions. Ibid., conclusions.

[2]See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America(Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor, 1970), and Folke Dovring, "Land Reform in Mexico," paper presented at the Agency for International Development Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, D. C., June 1970. (Mimeographed.)

[3]See V. M. Dandekar and N. Rath, "Poverty in India," Economic and Political Weekly, serially published (January 1971).

Agencies have been started.[1] The effort under these schemes is to circumvent local power configurations by channeling credit and other inputs to these classes of persons only. Some inputs, e.g., animals are anticipated to provide ancillary farm activity for these farmers to increase their income under the assumption that their farms will not provide sufficient wherewithal. Such efforts will have to continue into the indefinite future to subsidize a large class of peasant cultivators who otherwise would be out of agriculture under present growth strategies.

Economically the expenses will be quite out of proportion to the benefits derived. These small/marginal cultivators are the majority of all farmers and they will be put on what is essentially a dole supported by the productive class of large producers and urban taxpayers. The small/marginal farmers will not contribute much to the economy (in either produce or taxes) primarily because the strategies developed for their assistance emphasize rather limited employment and economic viability rather than maximum production. This means a diversion of outlays from other economic sectors including those meant for the larger farmers who will contribute through taxes to maintain their less fortunate brethren.[2]

Economically and politically, there is little reason to assume inputs under these schemes will in fact, go to small/marginal

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[1]See Chapter I and also V. R. Gaikwad, Small Farmers: State Policy and Programme Implementation (Hyderabad, India: National Institute of Community Development, 1971).

[2]Some form of increased agricultural taxation is anticipated in the near future. A commission chaired by Dr. K. N. Raj (economist) has argued for this on the grounds that (1) surpluses in agriculture must be used to reinvest productively, and (2) agriculture cannot continue to be subsidized by the urban/industrial sectors without creating severe monetary and fiscal problems. See Report of the Committee on Taxation of Agricultural Wealth and Income (New Delhi: Government of India, 1972).

cultivators. First definitionally they are problematic on the local level because of dispersed land titles (see Chapter II). Even though personnel responsible for the schemes may try to match ownership to operation, the flexibility inherent in the situation makes it possible for local interests to resort either to withholding of information or outright corruption. Second, because the dispersal of inputs is localized, larger farmers have already been able to manipulate them either for personal use or in order to maintain their locally dominant positions.[1] Again, the point is that as long as power is determined by access to land, the distribution of benefits will follow farm size.

Politically, even if the programs succeed in providing inputs to those for whom they are intended, one can anticipate a backlash from larger farmers. They may first of all, resent their inability to expand their holdings which they will need to do to rationalize their capital investments. And the more investments they make the larger size of farm will be needed. Any further expansion will have to occur at the expense of the small cultivator as there is little additional land to be brought under cultivation.

Second, one can already see the beginnings of a backlash in the attitudes of farmers who resent special programs for Harijans in this study. It should be noted that instead of dampening this resentment, the farm prosperity made possible by the Green Revolution technologies (and high price supports) has intensified it. These feelings come obviously not out of "hard times" but relative farm abundance and

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[1] See Gaikwad, op. cit. Personnel in charge of these schemes are to act only as conduits for inputs which are under the normal agencies such as the samiti, cooperatives, etc. which we have seen are controlled already by large farmers.

promise. Of course there is a caste component as the data show, but of more importance is the fact that land is valued[1] and conflict over its use and distribution can be expected to grow. Caste only reinforces the issue. The conflict will grow as pressure on the land intensifies and the progression of agricultural development demands an expansion of the size of production units. Already there are cases of mistreatment of labor and tenants by larger farmers who will not let them take possession of allotted plots. In this study it occurred in Hanumangarh. Aspirations increase with possibilities.

Third, an uneven distribution of land does little to maximize the goal of equality: either economic or social. The economic component of this is obvious. If the reader will recall how social status follows land size and how patron-client networks operate, the plans for subsidizing a small farmer class can be expected to reinforce, rather than loosen these traditional ties. No matter how mechanized large farms become, one can anticipate a continued need for seasonal labor at certain points in the agricultural cycle.[2] A subsidized small/marginal farm sector will in effect, provide a pool of tied seasonal labor dependent on large farms for incremental amounts of cash income. In a real sense the social effects of this are insidious as this very dependence will lower the poorer sections' ability to demand higher wages and to organize politically as they will fear losing what little they have.

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[1] Its monetary value can be expected to increase with the continued profitability of agriculture.

[2] E.g., during harvest, and for certain kinds of farming: truck farming and until implements are developed, for rice transplanting, etc.

Seeing the state as their "protector" they will lapse into an apathetic quiescence.[1] This in turn will further enforce their unequal status.

The same considerations are relevant to massive rural works programs launched for the landless. They are conceptualized normally as short-term and seasonal solutions to rural employment problems.[2] Admittedly, much work needs to be done on land development, the maintenance and building of roads, minor irrigation works, wells, etc. To assume however, that over the next several decades such schemes can provide sufficient employment (even seasonally) for a majority of the population is at least unrealistic. Presumably there is a limit to how much land can be put under roads, a limit to the points on a map that need be connected by such roads, a limit also to the rate at which these roads need repair, and finally a limit to the number of irrigation schemes and wells that can be built.[3] This pool of workers will also form a tied labor source for our productive farmers with the same social consequences faced by the small/marginal cultivators.

Private Vs. Public Goods

But what of the "trade-off" respondents make between public services and private gain? As far as the wider political picture is concerned,

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[1]See Edelman, op. cit., p. 43 where he states: "The fact that large numbers of people are objectively affected by a governmental program may actually serve in some contexts to weaken their capacity to exert a political claim upon tangible values." Also see Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 376-78 where he discusses the "conservatizing" effect of land reform on peasants. The same dynamic obtains in both situations.

[2]The argument normally states that such programs can provide employment for people during agriculturally slack seasons which supports the contention that the intent is to retain workers for entrepreneurial farmers. See Dandekar and Rath, op. cit.

[3]See Nair, op. cit.

public services have no political risk attached to them: who will argue against better health and roads? It has been argued elsewhere that public goods are mainly what rural areas get in the way of benefits.[1] Compared with land tenures or supplies of inputs to small farmers which often involve "stepping on someone's toes," these services are cheap and have a high political payoff for parties and governments dispensing them in the short term. The real political impact of such goods is with their introduction. Thus it can be argued that public goods and political reliance on them are a function of low information levels.[2]

Such goods rapidly become accepted parts of people's lives. Once schools, roads or health centers are provided their quality may become an issue but qualitative changes are incremental and thus of low political value in the short term.[3] Also such improvements are more important for rural upper classes who are free from the basic economic necessities of feeding and clothing themselves. These groups are more interested in better education for example, because of their links with the urban world or because their children's mobility and ability to be employed in other than traditional occupations depends on it.[4] As the

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[1]See Hung-Chao Tai, Land Reform and Politics: A Comparative Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), Chapter X, "Political Participation," passim.

[2]This is due to the reliance on traditional elites to mobilize electoral support which blocks the dispersal of more than minimal private benefits beyond them.

[3]E.g., a better school principal or doctor who works to improve the clinic will take time to find, get transferred to one's village, and then will take several years to improve the quality of service provided thus deferring the impact. This is why the real political impact of these services is with their introduction.

[4]See Tai, op. cit. "As the governing party, Congress seems ... to rely on its ability to deliver public goods and services to rural areas and on the kisans' (farmers) memories of its historical role in the

data indicate further such persons do not rely on farming for sustenance: the grain trade and money-lending provide it. The "modernization" of these traditional occupations by itself requires the acquisition of new skills in marketing, finance, etc. which are provided by an educational system.

It might be hypothesized that there is some kind of threshold involved here. When people have a modicum of sustenance, other issues may become more important than subsistence.[1] The counter argument is that the people at the bottom of the economic ladder have more to gain from certain public goods (mainly education) as they provide a means of mobility. But again, their ability to press for changes is limited by a combination of their ritually and economically low status.

For smaller farmers, tenants and laborers, food and employment tend to overshadow the importance of these services. This is not to say they are not utilized. But now people have accepted them as a part of their normal life pattern. People go to health centers when they are ill, and their children particularly sons, are sent to school for at least a few years to become literate. So the institutions are functional for a part of each person's existence. Indeed to emphasize a point already made,

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independence movement to retain their sympathies. But the Congress may not entirely succeed in this effort. The kisans are aware that the public goods and services benefit the landowning interests far more than the small farmers, and their memory of Congress' historical accomplishments may erode in intensity with the passage of time." p. 349.

[1]Beyond one's basic requirements for sustenance, other interests and needs are socially and culturally defined. If one views economic activity as a part of wider social organization and action (and places political action into the same framework) this becomes clear. These points have been argued as explanations for peasant economic behavior. See Eric R. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 6, and Barry H. Michie, "Variations in Economic Behaviour and the Green Revolution: An Anthropological Approach," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. VIII, #26, Review of Agriculture, p. A-72 et passim.

government's provision of these services has probably raised the level of demands as the services legitimize government's role as chief distributor, and thus increased people's dependence on it for further change.

If one accepts these premises then it becomes clear that private gain will have to be dealt with at some point. Once one looks at the issues involved, one sees there are obviously more groups and interests to which one must cater, and the processing of demands and weighing their importance relative to each other and the goals of the system, is a complex process especially since even the most advanced systems seldom have perfect information. In the two villages studied, private benefits may judiciously be channeled through traditional leaders in return for support only in the short run. This study indicates that once ties of dependence are loosened and as deprived groups articulate their demands, the volume of demands not only increases, but many are in contradiction to those of present elites.

Since the process of agricultural change has begun to sever ties between landowners and tenants/laborers, a choice has to be made as to which demands are to be supported by any political party. On a more general level, policy makers in India are faced with a choice common to most "modernizing" regimes: whether to continue with a "production first" strategy on the assumption that the equality issue is more easily taken care of once there is something to distribute, or to try and find means to ensure a modicum of both production and equality to avoid the risks of polarization. In keeping with the findings of this study, it would appear there is in reality not much of a choice. Elections are after all based on numbers, and in India if the polarization continues

no party can win with the support of a large farmer/middle-upper class coalition. This calculation requires only the simplest of mathematics.

Yet it is not clear that elections can force parties into realigning their bases of support in order to maximize the equality principle. The line of analysis starting with Robert Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy[1] would hold that even popular mass movement do not ensure equality. Keeping this in mind, one can point to two directions in which the system can move. The logic of both means that present elites probably could not maintain their position over time.

The first is drawn from Eric Wolf's analysis of peasant wars. Here of importance is the link forged between primarily the "middle" peasant and the "marginal men" of primarily urban areas.[2] Thus one has the growth of rural revolutionary potential. Though peasants may not always get what they desire in peasant revolts, neither can elites maintain themselves. Therefore, the rational course of action for an elite would be to realign its programs to minimize such alliances.

The second course of development comes from Moore's analysis.[3] If rural deprivation leads to violence, one can expect greater authoritarian reactions on the part of a rural landed and urban commercial coalition. Moore states that such a reaction can result in a "labor repressive"

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[1]Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: Dover Press, 1959), passim. Also see Robert W. Jackman's discussion of Michels and other literature dealing with the influence of socialist parties and labor unions on equality. Robert W. Jackman, Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis (New York: John Wiley, 1975), Chapter Six, "Socialist Parties, Unions and Social Cleavages," pp. 119-134 especially.

[2]Wolf, op. cit., "Conclusions," passim.

[3]Moore, op. cit., Chapters Seven and Eight.

agricultural system.[1] Such systems are not conducive to increased productivity over time though in the short term they may be able to extract more produce for urban consumption. Further, such systems tend to be unstable even though in reality the condition of rural workers may not be any "worse" than before. Keeping the instability of these two outcomes in mind, we can turn now to policy recommendations.

Policy Alternatives

This study began with an appraisal of the effects of a certain set of policies on the goals of increased production and equality in India and found that changes caused by these policies have resulted in reinforcing inequality and perhaps a marginal increase in production. The reasons have already been stated. If one agrees that decisions to implement policies are primarily political, then it is necessary to convince a politician that the suggestions which follow are not only logical, given the goals of the political system, but politically expedient. It is hoped the previous discussion of the dynamics of change backed by empirical evidence shows the necessity of charting a new course for change.

It is also incumbent on the policy researcher to at least point out feasible alternatives which will maximize the goals the system has set for itself. The recommendations presented below are essentially an outline of a direction in which planners might move. Rather than being taken as a blueprint from which one can build a new structure, they should be treated as a sketch to be offered to economists and administrators from which their work can proceed. The effort in these

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[1] Ibid., pp. 434-35.

recommendations is to alter the configuration of constraints and incentives which govern both production behavior (to maximize production) and which support existing hierarchies in Indian society (to maximize the goal of equality).

1. The Issue of Land

One of the obvious points of the study is that the skewed distribution of land lies at the base of economic and social inequality. A radical redistribution is required to get at least this cause of stratification removed. Economists use a variety of measures to define a viable unit of farm production, and the current trend seems to be in the direction of providing each cultivating family sufficient land to bring it Rs. 6,000 ($800) per year in cash income. If one is to follow this plan, based on the calculations presented in Chapter IV, a ceiling of approximately five to six acres of irrigated land should be placed on all family holdings. The surplus land obtained thereby should not be given first to the landless which is often recommended by persons who maintain that all the landless must be kept in rural areas. It should, rather be given first to those marginal farmers whose holdings fall below the ceiling in order to make their units commercially viable. The land that is then left over may be distributed to the landless (former tenants first, if that is administratively feasible) in units which permit them also to farm viably. A higher ceiling would, of course be necessary for arid land and inferior soils. This would not be difficult to work out as all land holdings are already recorded according to land type.[1] This procedure will leave a number of landless families to whom I will turn below.

[1]For further discussion along these lines see S. C. Jha, A Critical Analysis of Indian Land Reform Studies (Bombay: Asian Studies Press for

Second, legislation should be passed encouraging absentee landowners to leave the agricultural sector. This can be done in a number of ways. In Taiwan, expropriated landlords were compensated partially in stocks in government enterprises. A similar pattern may be adopted in India and further encouragement (by way of licensing small/medium scale industry for them) to invest in other kinds of enterprises may be found. Judicious use of taxation should be made to make it unprofitable for a landowner to lease out his land. He then has the choice to either self-cultivate his six irrigated acres and squeeze the most out of them, or to leave agriculture to those more interested in it. That is, while legislating against tenancy additional means are to be found to make it totally unattractive for any but the productive owner to remain in agriculture. What is necessary is a constellation of policies that make agriculture unprofitable for the large owner while at the same time mak- it attractive for him to invest his considerable resources (both financial and his business acumen) in other sectors of the economy.

The removal of the landed gentry serves an additional purpose. Tai argues that for the eight countries he studied, and those in which radical land reforms were implemented, the former landowners not only lost the source of their power (which was economically non-productive and socially exploitative) but lost interest over time in rural politics.[1] Here is one way to open the channels of participation in the countryside

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the Indian Institute of Asian Studies, 1971), Chapter II, "Land Distribution Aspect of Agrarian Reform," passim. Also see Doreen Warriner, Land Reform in Principle and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).

[1]Tai, op. cit., section on Taiwan, pp. 334-40. Also see Bernard Gallin, Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

-- but in view of what Huntington calls the "conservatizing" effects of land reform, perhaps further means will have to be devised to keep the new groups of owner-cultivators participating in the political system. I will turn to this below.

The third major area of land reform legislation will have to deal with the fragmentation of holdings due to inheritance patterns.[1] Either the laws governing inheritance will have to change to bar the division of land below a certain minimum or, which is probably simpler, there needs to be a floor of landholding established also.

Thus far the suggestions deal with land reform as a means to equalize status based on landownership. No one would argue that reform will eliminate discrimination on the basis of caste or that factionalism in village politics will vanish. However, insofar as landholdings have obstructed access to the factors of production and political participation, a redistribution along the lines suggested will remove the obstruction.

But what of productivity? Can such small units be economically viable and produce enough to overcome India's food deficits? The answer has partially been given in Chapter III. It is the smaller cultivator who is producing more per unit of land. Additional evidence may be sought in the experience of Japan and Taiwan, where land ceilings are approximately five hectares[2] and where the rapid increases in

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[1] In India, all property is legally to be equally divided among all children. De facto, daughters do not inherit land as inheritance is through the patrilineal line and they "marry out". The sons divide the land. In a sense daughters inherit their share in jewelry and other gifts at marriage and the continuing presents given by parents with the birth of each grandchild and other ritual observances.

[2] Tai, op. cit., pp. 477-78.

production occurred after land distribution took place.[1] Today, Japan ranks above the United States in output of rice per unit of land and is among the top three producers in the world. Taiwan's agriculture is a major export earner for that country.[2] And in Taiwan, more than 60 percent of all farms are below one hectare; while in Japan, (1961) 38 percent of all households own less than 0.5 hectares and only 4.3 percent own more than two hectares each.[3] In all these countries, land and capital are scarce and labor is in abundance. Land and capital must thus be used intensively to provide employment as well as food. Land distribution however will not raise productivity unless a flow of resources continues to the farmers.

2. Farm Productivity

There are two basic policy areas to be noted here. One is that biochemical inputs and mechanical technology suited to small holdings must continue to be channeled to farmers along with advice. Land redistribution as mentioned above, will not increase production by itself though it may encourage the tenant turned owner to take more interest in what is his own. In India, the framework exists for extension work and the provision of inputs. Along these lines one point

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[1] Ibid., and Martin M. C. Yang, Socio-Economic Effects of Land Reform in Taiwan (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970). Also see Anthony Y. C. Koo, "Land Reform in Taiwan," paper presented at the Agency for International Development, Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, D. C., June 1970. (Mimeographed.)

[2] Ibid., and Georg Borgstrom, The Food and People Dilemma (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1973), appendices.

[3] Nair, op. cit., p. 95 (source: Tomomi Ashikaga, Agriculture in Japan, Japan FAO Association and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Government of Japan, Annual Report of the State of Agriculture, 1962).

should be noted. Instead of multiple agencies in rural areas (presently there are banks, cooperatives, panchayat samitis and tehsils) there should be only one unit serving a dual purpose of dispensing inputs and revenue collection. This is important in view of the next point.

Simply by offering new techniques of production, it is obvious from the data that all farmers will not adopt them even if they own land (see Chapter III). Given multiple goals and motivations, all farmers will not be productive no matter how high the support prices are, or how persuasive an extension officer. Thus there is a need to use taxation and inputs to raise the floor of economic viability.[1]

Land should be fairly heavily taxed, not only for the reasons mentioned in the Raj Report (see above) but for those of productivity as well. Tax should be based on what the land can produce given the kinds of inputs available to the farmer (thus the importance of continuing flows of inputs and equal access). Further, the tax should be paid in kind for two reasons. First, if the farmer pays in kind, he has to use his farm produce and cannot rely on either off-farm employment or the money-lender for cash to pay taxes. Second, this is a simple way for the government to acquire buffer stocks. I have not considered a farm income tax because the machinery required for its administration is out of the realm of feasibility at this point. The same ends can be met however, by a "slab" tax on land of the kind suggested.[2]

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[1]See Nair, op. cit., pp. 229-34. "Given the choice of a dozen routes, they will not and cannot be expected to take only one and the same route." p. 230. And "On the contrary the only feasible solution would lie in cutting off the unwanted eleven of the twelve choices." p. 231.

[2]The idea is not new. The Raj Report suggests it, op. cit., and it is used in Taiwan also.

Besides taxation, inputs provided to farmers should also be paid for in kind for the same reasons. This has worked well in Taiwan.[1] If these measures are enacted, then the rationale for one agricultural extension and revenue collection unit makes sense. It can have a farmer's cooperative attached to it which might serve a number of purposes including the marketing of surplus produce (left over after taxes) and the provision and control of certain resources (e.g., the building and maintenance of tubewells, and the provision of implements such as chaff cutters or rice dryers) the investment in which requires cooperative use and investment. If the land distribution is equalized, the problem of a large farmer monopoly of cooperatives will also be gone.

These provisions will also in the long run let official sources of credit and marketing compete effectively with the private money-lender and grain trader. The farmer will be forced, if you will, into producing more. The means for increased production will be held by the new extension/administrative centers which means hopefully the farmers will demand the services to which they are already entitled. These centers will additionally siphon off a portion of farmers' marketable surplus leaving less in the hands of money-lenders who can withhold stocks currently to raise the free market price. With good buffer stocks, government can control the market price of grain in urban areas by withholding or releasing stocks. Aside from relieving landlords of their land, effective official competition should lessen private money-lenders' interest in rural money-lending over time.

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[1] Yang, op. cit.

3. The Landless

Even with large-scale redistribution of land, not all rural families will be able to farm. For the landless a recommendation is made for the encouragement of regional service/business centers in which agricultural based industry using low and intermediate levels of technology can be used to provide the greatest employment potential possible. Such centers will offer needed services to agriculture (pump servicing and maintenance, equipment repair, etc.) as well as draw on locally produced commodities to process and market (dairy units, fruit and vegetable processing).

Again the idea is not new, but it should be viewed with an eye to increasing production as well as maximizing employment.[1] Such centers provide local integration points for the economy. They can also provide points of horizontal integration with other regional units. In terms of social benefits as argued by Epstein, they can provide new channels of mobility for the bottom strata of society by removing them entirely from the old patron-client networks.[2] As she suggests further, if employment in these centers is open to all landless instead of simply those of the Harijan communities, the distinctions referred to in Chapter IV will become blurred on an economic level. Finally, a very important point in favor of these centers is that they will reduce the massive influx of migrants to the already overtaxed cities.

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[1] See W. Arthur Lewis, Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 72-75; John P. Lewis, Quiet Crisis in India (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1962); and Albert Hirschmann, Development Projects Observed (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), and Journeys Toward Progress (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday, 1965).

[2] T. Scarlett Epstein, South India: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1973), Chapter 9.

These then are the main policy implications of this study. To be sure, there are problems associated with each proposal for change that would have to be worked out by persons with expertise in areas other than political science. However, these proposals do suggest means by which the joint issues of growth with equality can be tackled. One end result should be a wider integration of the Indian peasant into the political system as he develops a direct link with the flow of benefits to rural areas. His economic integration and reliance on outside inputs should lead to a greater interest in and ability to affect the forces which manipulate his existence today and which, if allowed to continue unchecked, will end in the destruction of his kind and the creation of a deprived, apathetic citizenry, full of despair.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

FIELD METHODS AND PROBLEMS

As an introduction to the questionnaires this note is about my decision on how to approach the research, the problems encountered and suggestions I might be able to offer anyone interested in similar research.

Before going into the field, I had examined several questionnaires used in other studies conducted in rural areas. Several problems associated with these raised serious questions in my mind about the validity of formal survey research techniques aside from the normal ones that arise in any basic methods book. Yet, obviously there was the need to standardize my interviews to some extent.

The first question raised by other studies conducted by both the University of Rajasthan research projects on elections and those done by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, was the high proportion of "don't know" responses. Part of the problem obviously was that the questions asked were too far removed from a villager's reality. A second problem could be that the Hindi used in the schedules was of a rather "classical" variety seldom heard outside of the classroom. Also apparent was the fact that many questions were essentially "lifted" from the usual U. S. political survey questionnaires and thus aimed at tapping dimensions culturally alien to India's rural setting.

Second, the questionnaires used by others seemed to tap highly general dimensions of respondents' attitudes and my interest lay in discovering rather specific perceptions. In western countries, a number of measures have been developed to deal with political attitudes (e.g., Likert scales, TAT tests). Again, the problem here was to bridge a cultural and perception gap between a "western" attitudinal orientation and the field in which I was working. Further, without knowing what the villagers' perceptions of themselves and their surroundings are, it was difficult to devise new scales and tests.

Third, I began the project with a rather simple question: "If agricultural change is indeed causing the polarization that other observers seem to have found, what kinds of political reactions can one expect to find?" Given my own assumptions about the choices offered the voters in India my initial predictions were that one would find a movement away from the Congress and that there would be a great deal of apathy and anger on the part of the electorate. Accordingly, my first draft of the questionnaire revolved around the issues of political choice and reasons why respondents would have shifted their votes to opposition parties. As the data indicate, precisely the reverse occurred.

Keeping the original point in mind, I discussed my approach and questionnaire with members of the faculty at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, on arrival. They reinforced my hesitancy of using the "usual" voting study questionnaires having conducted surveys themselves. The result was a decision to conduct interviews based on a rather open-ended conversational style. Further, we decided that since I would be living in the villages, it would be important to tap the full

range of village activities and perception through participant observation which could then be evaluated against the more standardized questionnaires. As the study was seen as a training and research experience, we felt that a contribution might be made by using this approach to show other scholars what kinds of areas might be profitably followed in rural research. What evolved was a loose combination of anthropological methodology along with survey research where a random selection of respondents would control any biases in observation I might hold.

This limited the total number of respondents I could interview. If a fairly loose approach were used, it would be difficult to standardize the techniques of a team of interviewers. Others working with a team of interviewers had problems to contend with such as forms not fully and carefully filled out, a high number of "don't know" responses which came from the interviewers' reluctance to probe out of a fear of "contaminating" data, etc. These are normal problems, but they become especially severe if an open-ended questionnaire and participant observation are used. It is hoped that from this experience means can be found in further research to get approximately the same depth of data while expanding the number of respondents.

Three other factors limited the number of respondents and use of informants. First, I myself was a student and would have had essentially to hire my peers at the University of Rajasthan. There would have been a great deal of sensitivity on their part as first, the resources at my command would be much greater than what they could possibly muster for their own dissertations. Also having a peer in a supervisory position would be highly sensitive. Additionally, I did not have the excuse of not knowing the language.

Second, research was conducted shortly after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and the independence of Bangladesh. The Nixon "tilt" toward Pakistan resulted in antagonism against the U. S. and therefore, U. S. funded research. While this did not affect the field work as rural people do not share anti-American views it was strong among students (and some faculty members). Other persons had faced problems and it was well to avoid them as it does not take much for a field site to be "spoiled". This project had full clearance from both the Governments of India and Rajasthan, but that would not protect one from local feelings. At the same time, it should be pointed out that I was in touch with a number of post-graduate students and frankly benefitted greatly from being their peer rather than their "boss".

Third, I had been hopeful that I could interview around 300 persons. This proved impossible for a number of reasons. To find a villager at the time one wants to interview him is almost impossible: at least if one is sensitive to his schedule. I have mentioned in Chapter II that interviews could best be conducted in the evenings: after respondents returned from their fields. Even then it could be problematic as animals had to be watered, dinner had to be cooked and eaten, etc. Persons at the University of Rajasthan had cautioned me that I would be lucky if I got three interviews done each day -- fears proven amply correct.

Besides their own schedules, it was not at all uncommon for me to walk several miles (from one to five) out to a certain hamlet to find my respondents gone to the city or to a wedding. In such cases I made at least two, often three or four visits and then if the persons still were not found, I frankly gave up. These trips were made on foot (no bicycle

could make the trip through sand, and we had no motorized vehicle) and there is a point of diminishing returns.

Even so, I would have expanded the size of the sample but I found with each additional person that I was not getting much variation in response. Therefore, each additional interview was not giving me additional data. Of course there are variations within each stratum along a number of dimensions, but the reasons are amply clear and on the major dimensions there is little variation. Along with other studies cited in the text my economic findings are vindicated, and the political aspects of the study are exploratory. I would maintain, however, the same responses would be got elsewhere.

As regards the questionnaire itself, there are several points to be noted. First of all, the Hindi version is the original and the language used is highly colloquial. This was to make sure interviews could proceed in a casual, conversational style permitting respondents to express their own views without imposing degrees of feeling or concepts of thought. Villagers are excellent at telling the outsider what they think he would like to find out, and thus it is especially important to sit back and let them talk about their problems using questions as guides.

Second, the questionnaire was pretested among village friends who are farmers and laborers in Hanumangarh. A number of questions were bound to be either redundant or they did not carry the ideas intended even though they were thought of in Hindi. What had occurred was that the concept in my mind was not really in Hindi -- I was only translating. These questions, of course were dropped.

Third, the leadership questionnaire is entirely open-ended. I had to be careful about the sensitivities of some leaders interviewed about issues such as land reform and aid to Harijans. Thus, the questions about change in the villages are purposely generally stated to let the respondents highlight the issues themselves.

To sum up the situation, of course it would be desirable to have a larger number of respondents. However, given the circumstances under which I functioned, this was not possible. Moreover, in view of the problems faced by other researchers, I feel I got a depth and richness of data that few other scholars have. This is due entirely to living in the villages and concentrating on relatively specific variables. Further, given the enormous amount of aggregated data in India, it is perhaps time that observers of the Indian scene spent time talking -- in rather straightforward terms at that -- with the people whose lives they presume to change in the name of humanism.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

THE RESPONDENTS QUESTIONNAIRE*

The questions in this questionnaire are part of the required research for my Ph.D. degree.

The information that you give me will be kept completely confidential. Although I know your name, this will not be given to anyone else. All information collected in the course of this research will be used for academic purposes only.

If there are any further questions you may have in this regard, you are welcome to ask me or to direct your inquiries to the Registrar, University of Rajasthan or to the Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Rajasthan.

Respondent's number _____

Village and district _____

Sample stratum of respondent _____

FOR ALL RESPONDENTS

1. Age of respondent _____ years

2. Religion _____

3. Caste _____

4. Sex _____male; _____female

5. Education:
   _____ None
   _____ 1 - 3 years
   _____ Primary
   _____ Middle school
   _____ Higher secondary
   _____ College

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*This questionnaire was developed and administered in the Hindi language. This is a direct translation.

6. Are you originally from this village or have you come here since your birth?
_____ Am from this village
_____ From another town of the same district
_____ From another village of the same district
_____ From another village of another district
_____ From another town of another district
_____ From another state
_____ From another country
_____ Don't know/can't recall

7. (If respondent has come from somewhere else) When did you come here?
_____ Years ago
_____ Don't know/can't remember

8a. Are you a farmer? (Literally: Do you do farming?)
_____ Yes
_____ No

8b. Do you do any other work besides farming or not?
_____ Yes
_____ No

8c. (If yes) What is this other work?
_____ (open-ended)

9a. Does anyone in your house do other work besides farming?
_____ Yes
_____ No

9b. (If yes) Who is this, and what work does he/she do?
_____ (open-ended)

10. Does most of your income come from agriculture or from this other work?
_____ From agriculture
_____ From other work (specify)
_____ Other (e.g., from both)

11. Was your father a farmer?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Don't know

12a. How much land do you own at this time?
_____ Bighas of land (standardized to acres)
_____ Respondent owns no land (skip to question #13a)
_____ Respondent refuses to answer

12b. (If respondent owns land) Is your land all in one piece or are there several pieces? (If several pieces) How many pieces are there?

_____ One piece
_____ Two pieces
_____ Three pieces
_____ More than three pieces

13a. Did/does your father own any land? (If yes) How much land did/does he have?

_____ Bighas of land (standardized to acres)
_____ Has/had no land
_____ Don't know
_____ Refuses to answer

13b. How much land did you receive from your father?

_____ Bighas
_____ He is still alive and the land is in his name
_____ Received no land
_____ No answer

13c. Have you received any land from anyone besides your father -- for example, as part of a dowry or from some other relative?

_____ Bighas
_____ Received no land
_____ No answer

14. (If the land the respondent now owns is more or less than what he received from his father or relatives) The land you own now is more/less than what you received from your father (or relative). When and how did this happen?

_____ (open-ended)

15. Do you lease in or share-crop anyone else's land?

_____ Bighas
_____ No (not within the past several years)

16a. This year you are leasing _____ bighas of land. Do you find it is easier or harder to lease land now than it was 5 - 6 years ago, or is there no particular difference?

_____ Harder to lease now
_____ Easier to lease now
_____ No particular difference
_____ Can't say/don't know
_____ Non-applicable

16b. (If there is any change) Why do you think this has happened?

_____ (open-ended)

17. How many persons do you lease land from at one time?
_____ One person
_____ Two persons
_____ More than two persons
_____ Leases from government - e.g., annual allotment
_____ Non-applicable

18. How do you pay the landowner -- in cash, kind, or both?
_____ (open-ended)

19. Does the landowner supply you with any of the needed farm inputs?
_____ (open-ended)

20. Have these arrangements changed at all over the past 5 - 10 years, or have they remained the same? (If changed) How have they changed?
_____ (open-ended)

21. Do you prefer the present arrangements or were they better before?
_____ Better now
_____ Better previously
_____ No difference
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable

22a. How much of your land is irrigated?
_____ (open-ended)

22b. No code.

23. No code.

24. No code.

25. In how much of your land do you take: three crops, two crops, one crop?
_____ Three crops annually
_____ Two crops annually
_____ One crop annually

26. What crops do you take in <u>kharif</u> and in how much of your land? (Only crop names coded)

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Bighas</u>
_____	_____
_____	_____

27. And which crops do you take during <u>rabi</u> and in how much of your land? (Only crop names coded)

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Bighas</u>
_____	_____
_____	_____

28a. No code.

28b. No code.

29. No code.

30. What amount of each crop do you sell?

Crop	% Sold
_____	_____
_____	_____

31. Where and through whom do you sell your produce?

_____ Landowner
_____ Village grain dealer
_____ Government
_____ Wholesale grain market
_____ Open market
_____ Money lender

32. Do you think you receive a better price for your produce now, or were prices better 5 - 6 years ago?

_____ Prices are better now
_____ Prices are better now, but inputs cost more so we haven't gained much
_____ Prices are worse now
_____ No difference
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable

33. In your opinion why have prices gone up/down?

_____ (open-ended)

34. Do you use Kalyan Sona or any of the other new seeds?

Seed	Bighas
_____	_____
_____	_____

_____ Takes no new seed

35. Have you used any of these seeds before?

Seed	Has Taken Before	Has Not Taken Before
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

36. Since you take _____ seed, why don't you also take _____? (Fill in name of relevant seed as per respondent's cropping pattern)

_____ (open-ended)

37. Why don't you use these new seeds?

_____ (open-ended)

38. (If farmer is using HYVP seed) What do you think of the new seeds? Has your production increased since you have used them?

_____ (open-ended)

39. Will you use these seeds next time?
_____ Yes definitely
_____ Yes, if someone shows us how or they work this time
_____ No
_____ Not sure, don't know
_____ Non-applicable

40. Do you use chemical fertilizers, manure, or both?
_____ Only chemical fertilizers
_____ Only manure
_____ Both
_____ No fertilizers at all
_____ Non-applicable

41. Have you ever used chemical fertilizers before?
_____ Yes - has used chemical fertilizers before
_____ No - has not used chemical fertilizers before
_____ Non-applicable

42. (If respondent does not use chemical fertilizers) Why don't you use chemical fertilizers?
_____ (open-ended)

43. (If farmer uses chemicals) What do you think about chemical fertilizers? Have you found their use beneficial?
_____ (open-ended)

44. Will you use chemical fertilizers next time?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Not sure
_____ Non-applicable

45. Do you use pesticides?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Non-applicable

46. Have you used pesticides before?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Non-applicable

47. (If respondent does not use pesticides) Why don't you use pesticides?
_____ (open-ended)

48. (If farmer uses pesticides) What do you think about the pesticides? Have your yields improved with their use?
_____ (open-ended)

49. Will you use pesticides again?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable

50. Do you farm according to advice given by the Agricultural Extension Officer or the Village Level Worker?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ I don't know what they have to say
_____ I do more than what they say
_____ I do less than what they say
_____ I've never discussed farming with them
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable

51. Do you feel you get enough advice from the Village Level Worker and/or the Agricultural Extension officer?
_____ Yes, enough
_____ No, not enough
_____ I don't want their advice (why?)

52. Generally speaking, are you able to get seeds, fertilizers, etc. on time?
_____ Normally can get on time
_____ Never gets on time
_____ Sometimes
_____ Non-applicable

53. (If respondent feels any difficulty) What seems to be the problem in getting these things on time?
_____ General scarcity in the market
_____ You have to have influence with the people responsible for distribution
_____ Often respondent does not have money to pay when needed
_____ Supplies do not arrive at stores/cooperative on time
_____ Supplies are sold on the black market so they are not available where they should be and we have to pay more
_____ Don't know

54. (If respondent feels any difficulty getting supplies) If you are unable to get these things, who in your opinion is getting them?
_____ (open-ended)

55. From where do you find it is simplest to get inputs?
_____ Panchayat Samiti
_____ Private seed stores or companies
_____ Cooperative society
_____ Open market - ready cash to dealer (baniya)

_____ On loan from dealer (baniya)
_____ Other friends, farmers, or the landlord
_____ Keep at home from previous season
_____ Black market
_____ Don't know

56. Who in your opinion is responsible for seeing that seeds, etc. are given out on time?
_____ (open-ended)

57a. Are you normally able to get sufficient credit for your farming or not?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Sometimes
_____ Have no need for credit
_____ Non-applicable

57b. From where do you normally take loans?
_____ Cooperative society
_____ Panchayat Samiti (loans discontinued, but some respondents have outstanding taccavi loans)
_____ Bank - Land Mortgage or commercial
_____ Relatives
_____ Shopkeeper or money lender
_____ Other farmers and/or friends

57c. On what terms are you able to take loans (only the interest on non-governmental sources coded on a yearly basis)?
_____ (open-ended)

58a. (If respondent is unable to get sufficient credit) Do you hold any particular person or institution responsible for the unavailability of credit?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Not sure
_____ Non-applicable

58b. (If respondent holds person or institution responsible) Who/what is this institution or person?
_____ (open-ended)

59. When you do take loans, what do you find you spend the money on?
_____ Farm inputs only
_____ Farm inputs plus replacement of capital inputs (pumps, etc.)
_____ Household expenses plus farm inputs
_____ Household expenses, festivals and inputs for farm
_____ Household and repayment of old debts
_____ Farm improvements (digging new wells, etc.)
_____ All of the above

_____ Only non-farm expenses (festivals and household)
_____ Non-applicable

60a. No code.

60b. No code

61a. Do you hire labor to work on your farm?
_____ No, use only family labor
_____ Yes, persons hired on a year-round basis (manager, e.g.)
_____ Yes, labor is hired as needed by operations
_____ Labor hired on both year-round and by operation basis
_____ Non-applicable

(If all family labor, skip to Question #66.)

61b. How many laborers do you hire? (Full year estimate)
_____ (open-ended)

62. Do you pay the laborers in cash, kind, or both? And how much do you pay them?
_____ (open-ended)

63. Have the wages for labor gone up or down in the past 5 - 6 years or have they stayed the same?
_____ Wages have risen
_____ Wages have fallen
_____ Wages have remained the same
_____ Non-applicable

64a. In your opinion, do laborers receive a fair wage for their work?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Sometimes (depending on jobs available, etc.)
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable

64b. (If respondent thinks wages are unfair) Why do you feel this way?
_____ (open-ended)

65a. Today, do you require more or less labor than you did 5 - 10 years ago?
_____ More
_____ Less
_____ No difference
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable

65b. (If more or less laborers required) Why do you now need more/less laborers?
_____ (open-ended)

66. Many people and government itself have been talking about land reform. Have you heard anything about this?
_____ Yes
_____ No (Skip to Question #68.)
_____ Non-applicable

67a. What do you think about this program? Is land reform good or not?
_____ It is good
_____ It is bad
_____ Don't know/can't say
_____ Non-applicable

67b. Whom should this program benefit, and whom do you think it actually will benefit?
_____ (open-ended)

68. I have heard that land has been allotted here some time back too. Have you heard anything about this?
_____ Yes
_____ No (Skip to Question #87.)
_____ Non-applicable

69a. What do you think about this? Is it a good program or not?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Not sure, can't say
_____ Non-applicable

69b. Who should benefit from this, and who actually have benefitted from it?
_____ (open-ended)

FOR AGRICULTURAL LABOR ONLY (For others, skip to Question #87)

70. Can you tell me how many days you are able to find work in agriculture during the year?
_____ Days
_____ It varies
_____ Not sure

71. When you work in the fields, do you work for the same farmer/s or do you go wherever there is work or where the pay is best?
_____ Same farmer/s
_____ Wherever work is available
_____ Wherever pay is the best
_____ Non-applicable

72. Is it easy to find agricultural work now, or was it easier about 5 - 6 years ago?
_____ Easier now
_____ Easier then
_____ No particular difference
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable

73. (If any change in availability of work) Why do you think this change has occurred?
_____ (open-ended)

74. Besides agricultural work, is it easier to find other jobs now, or was it easier 5 - 6 years ago?
_____ Easier now
_____ Easier then
_____ No difference
_____ Don't know - never tried to find other work
_____ Don't know/can't say
_____ Non-applicable

75. Besides agricultural labor, what jobs are the easiest to find?
_____ Famine relief
_____ Casual village labor (drawing water, carrying loads, thatching roofs, etc.)
_____ Private labor - construction of houses, etc.
_____ Factory labor
_____ Other
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable

76. When you work in the fields, how are you paid, in cash, kind, or both? And at what rates?
_____ (open-ended)

77a. Do you think you receive a fair wage for your work?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Sometimes
_____ Don't know/can't say
_____ Non-applicable

77b. (If respondent feels wages are unfair) Why do you feel these wages are unfair?
_____ (open-ended)

78. Lots of people including government are talking about land reform. Have you heard anything about this or not?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ No response
_____ Non-applicable

79a. What do you think about this program? Is it good or not?
_____ Yes, it is good
_____ No, it is not good
_____ Don't know/no response
_____ Non-applicable

79b. Whom do you think this program should benefit, and whom do you think it will benefit?
_____ (open-ended)

80. Would you like some land for yourself? If so, how much, and why?
_____ (open-ended)

81. I have heard that land has been allotted around here. Have you heard anything about this or not? (If respondent has heard something about it) What do you think about this program? Is it good or not?
_____ (open-ended)

82. No code.

83. Have people in this village asked for this land?
_____ Lots of people have asked
_____ Some have asked
_____ A few asked
_____ No one has asked
_____ Don't know/not sure
_____ Non-applicable

84. Did you apply for land? If so, have you received any?
_____ (open-ended)

85. (If respondent did not apply for land) Why didn't you apply for any land ?
_____ (open-ended)

86. Have other people received land here? Who are they?
_____ (open-ended)

FOR ALL RESPONDENTS

87. Generally speaking do you feel you are better off now than you were 5 - 6 years ago, or were you better off then?
_____ Better off now
_____ Better off then
_____ No difference
_____ Don't know

88. Do you feel you eat better now than you did 5 - 6 years ago, or did you eat better then?
_____ Eat better now
_____ Ate better then
_____ No difference
_____ Don't know

89. Has your income increased or decreased in this time?
_____ Income is more now (real gain)
_____ Income has fallen (in real terms)

_____ No difference
_____ Don't know

90. Why do you think this has happened?
_____ (open-ended)

91a. Generally what kinds people here seem to be better off now than they were 5 - 6 years ago?
_____ (open-ended)

91b. Of the following kinds of persons, can you tell me who are better off now and who are worse off?

	Better Off	Worse Off	Don't Know
Big farmers	_____	_____	_____
Small farmers	_____	_____	_____
Landless agricultural tenants	_____	_____	_____
Landless agricultural labor	_____	_____	_____
Other laborers (skilled or semi-skilled)	_____	_____	_____
Leaders and politicians	_____	_____	_____
Government servants	_____	_____	_____
Old landlords (jagirdars)	_____	_____	_____
Money lenders	_____	_____	_____
Small traders (other than money lenders)	_____	_____	_____

92. Generally speaking, do you think this village is better off than it was 5 - 6 years ago?
_____ Yes, better off
_____ No, worse off
_____ There is no particular difference
_____ Don't know

93. Why do you think so?
_____ (open-ended)

94. Think about yourself again. What are your own three biggest needs?
_____ (open-ended)
_____
_____

95. What three things do you think your friends need the most?
_____ (open-ended)
_____
_____

96. No code.

97. No code.

98. In your opinion, who can help you meet these needs?
_____ (open-ended)

99. Are you a member of any political party, social or service organization? If so, what is this group/groups and what does/do it/they do?
_____ (open-ended)

100. Whom do you consider to be the 4 - 5 most influential persons in this village? (Only three coded.)
_____ (open-ended)
_____
_____

101. Do you think voting is important or not?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Don't know

102. (If respondent feels voting is important) Why do you think voting is important?
_____ (open-ended)

103. (If respondent feels voting is not important) Why do you feel voting is not important?
_____ (open-ended)

104a. How many times have you voted in the panchayat elections?
_____ Number of times
_____ Never voted (ask #105)
_____ Can't remember

104b. How many times have you voted in the Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha elections
_____ Number of times (skip to #106)
_____ Never voted (ask #105)
_____ Can't remember (skip to #106)

105. (If respondent has either not voted at all or has skipped some elections) Why did you not vote?
_____ (open-ended)

(Skip to Question #114 for non-voters.)

106. Can you recall who you voted for in the 1962 election for the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha?
_____ Lok Sabha
_____ Vidhan Sabha
_____ Can't remember
_____ Did not vote
_____ Was too young

107. (If respondent split his ticket) Can you tell me why you chose _____ for one seat and _____ for the other? (No vote splitting was found, so no replies coded.)

108. And do you remember who you voted for in the 1967 election?
_____ Lok Sabha
_____ Vidhan Sabha
_____ Can't remember
_____ Did not vote
_____ Was too young

109. (If vote split between parties) This time why did you support _____ for one seat and _____ for the other seat?
_____ (open-ended)

110. And did you vote in the 1971 parliamentary election, and for whom?
_____ Party/candidate
_____ Did not vote
_____ Don't remember
_____ Was too young

111. And finally, whom did you vote for in the last Vidhan Sabha election?
_____ Party/candidate
_____ Did not vote
_____ Don't remember
_____ Was too young

112. You first voted for _____ but then you changed your support to _____. Can you tell me why you changed your mind?
_____ (open-ended)

113. Can you tell me why _____ appealed to you more than _____ of a similar party? (Situation was not applicable because in none of the areas were there similar parties contesting). No code.

114. Does your family normally all vote for the same party or candidate?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Sometimes
_____ Not sure
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable - respondent has no family

115. And your caste-fellows, do they normally all vote for the same party or candidate?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Sometimes
_____ Not sure
_____ Don't know

116a. Do you normally vote along with your family?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Sometimes
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable - no family or family does not vote together

116b. Can you tell me on what basis your family decides whom to vote for?
_____ (open-ended)

117a. Do you normally vote with your caste fellows?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Sometimes
_____ Don't know
_____ Non-applicable - caste does not vote together

117b. Can you tell me on what basis your caste community decides whom to vote for?
_____ (open-ended)

118. And on what basis do you yourself select a candidate or party?
_____ (open-ended)

119a. Do you ever read newspapers -- or does anyone ever read them to you?
_____ Read them myself
_____ Someone else reads to me
_____ I don't read and no one reads to me

119b. Do you read/listen to the paper everyday, or sometimes?
_____ Everyday
_____ Sometimes
_____ Very little
_____ Non-applicable

119c. Which paper/s do you read/hear?
_____ Rajasthan Patrika
_____ Rashtradoot
_____ English daily
_____ Other/several
_____ Non-applicable

120a. Do you listen to the radio?
_____ Yes
_____ No

120b. Do you listen to the radio everyday, sometimes, or very little?
_____ Everyday
_____ Sometimes
_____ Very little
_____ Non-applicable

120c. What programs do you especially like to listen to?
_____ News
_____ Folk music
_____ Film music
_____ Farmers' programs
_____ Others

121. Before the last elections there must have been a number of issues discussed. Of these, which did you feel were the most important?
_____ (open-ended)

122. And which issues do you think your friends found to be important?
_____ (open-ended)

123. And what issues did the village generally feel were important?
_____ (open-ended)

124a. Previously we were discussing your own situation. Do you think leaders/politicians take an interest in these things?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Don't know
_____ Some do

124b. Who are these persons and why do they take an interest?
_____ (open-ended)

124c. (If respondent feels leaders are not interested) In your opinion, why aren't leaders interested?
_____ (open-ended)

125a. Have you ever discussed your problems with these people?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Sometimes or a little
_____ I have tried but could not get any access to them.

125b. (If respondent has tried) Who were these people and were they able to do something for you or not?
_____ (open-ended)

126. In your opinion, is there any person, group or party in this village that can do more for the village?
_____ (open-ended)

127a. (If respondent mentions persons) What can these people do?
_____ (open-ended)

127b. (If respondent mentions groups) What can these groups do?
_____ (open-ended)

128. Who do you think are the 4 - 5 most influential persons during elections in this village? (Only three coded.)
_____ (open-ended)
_____
_____

129. Do these or other persons come and talk with you during election time?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ Can't remember
_____ Lots of people come/too many persons come
_____ Non-applicable

130. In your opinion, can parties control what government does?
_____ (open-ended)

131a. Would you like to see anything changed in the way government functions? If so, what?
_____ (open-ended)

131b. How can these changes be brought about?
_____ (open-ended)

132a. Is it the duty of leaders to advance and look after the welfare and happiness of the people?
_____ Yes (skip to #132c)
_____ No
_____ Don't know

132b. (If not) Whose duty is this?
_____ (open-ended)

132c. (If so) Why do you think so?
_____ (open-ended)

133. In the last Vidhan Sabha election the people supported Congress very heavily for the first time. Can you tell me why this change occurred?
_____ (open-ended)

134. Think now of the next year or two -- during that time do you think things will become better or worse for you?
_____ Better
_____ Worse
_____ There will be no change
_____ Don't know

135. Why do you think so?
_____ (open-ended)

136. Can you make an estimate of your cash income for the year?
_____ (open-ended)

137. Number of persons respondent has to support on this income.

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

THE LEADERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE

The purpose of this short questionnaire is to get local leadership's views on issues raised by farmers and agricultural labor in the course of a larger study entitled "Economic Change and Political Attitudes in Rural Rajasthan." The information collected by means of this questionnaire will be kept entirely confidential and it will be used for academic purposes only. This project has been sanctioned by both Governments of Rajasthan and India. Any further questions may be addressed directly to myself or to the Registrar or Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. Your cooperation in filling out this questionnaire is greatly appreciated.

1. Age _____ years

2. Religion _____

3. Caste _____

4. Occupation _____ primary; _____ secondary

5. Education _____ how much; _____ where

6a. Can you tell me what major changes you have seen in this village in the past 5-6 years in economic, social and political life?
_____ (open-ended)

6b. How and why have these changes taken place?
_____ (open-ended)

7. I have been doing my work with farmers and agricultural labor. In your opinion, has there been much change in agriculture since the introduction of the new seeds and the government's new intensive agricultural programs?
_____ (open-ended)

8. Which groups do you think have benefitted the most from these programs?
_____ (open-ended)

9. What are the main obstacles in the way of furthering agricultural development in this area? And what can be done about them?
_____ (open-ended)

10. Besides farmers, how would you evaluate the position of agricultural labor? Do you think they have benefitted from the new programs at all, or have they been left behind?
_____ (open-ended)

11a. What do you feel are the main social and political concerns of people here?
_____ (open-ended)

11b. Do you feel these concerns have changed over the past 5-6 years? If so, how and why do you feel they have changed?
_____ (open-ended)

12. Are you a member or supporter of any political party?
_____ member _____ supporter

13. Have you always been a member/supporter of this party or have you changed parties? (If changed) May I ask what made you change your mind?
_____ (open-ended)

14. (If party member) As member are you now, or have you previously held any elected or party office?
_____ present post
_____ past post
_____ past post
_____ has not held any post

15. Do you regularly attend party meetings, and/or how do you stay in touch with party efforts and directives?
_____ (open-ended)

16. How would you rate the political awareness of this village? Has there been much change in this over the past 5-6 years? How and what has this change been?
_____ (open-ended)

17. Besides this, how would you rate the developmental awareness of the people here? Has this increased or decreased over the past 5-6 years? Why?
_____ (open-ended)

18. In your opinion, what are the major needs of people here?
_____ (open-ended)

19a. What means or channels do you feel are open to people to express their needs and to have them met?
_____ (open-ended)

19b. Do you feel those means function well? What can be done to make them better?

_____ (open-ended)

20. As a respected member of this community are there things you can do/have done to help people meet their needs?

_____ (open-ended)

21. Normally what kinds of people come to you for help?

_____ (open-ended)

22. What traits do you think people respect in a leader? Do you feel leadership today displays those traits?

_____ (open-ended)

23. Do you think the older ties (such as those of jajmans or caste) still play an important role in today's political life? Or has their role changed over the past 5-6 years?

_____ (open-ended)

24. Looking to the next several years, what changes can you see occurring in this village in the areas of:
(i) Economic life

_____ (open-ended)

(ii) Social life

_____ (open-ended)

(iii) Political life

_____ (open-ended)

25a. Of those changes, which do you feel will be positive ones and which will be negative?

_____ (open-ended)

25b. Why do you feel this way?

_____ (open-ended)

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