ABSTRACT

STRUCTURE IN DIVERSITY: VARIATIONS IN PRODUCTIVITY
AND EFFICIENCY IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE

By

Barry Harwell Michie

This is a study of the economic life of Indian cultivators. The
problem posed is the marked variations in agricultural productivity and
efficiency found across and within cultivating groups distinguished by
unequal control over productive resources. It is in part a methodo-
logical problem, how to explain distributions rather than just aggre-
gated averages. The problem is not one of unlimited variation, but
rather the discovery of limits or bounds of tolerance, the properties of
the system which allow or disallow variability in agriculture perfor-
mance.

In the approach, an economic field and its relationship to other
domains of socio-cultural life are defined and explored. Economics is
not seen as a separate, discrete entity and this relationship helps
explain features in the economy and why variation occurs. The aim of
the study is to discover the structure which underlies surface appear—
ances, that there is structure in diversity.

The study is micro-level, focusing on two villages in different
districts of Rajasthan state, India. Basic economic features of distri-

bution and organization are examined within the context of broader

Barry Harwell Michie

levels of integration, e.g., markets and government development pro-
grams. Data were collected by survey research from a randomly selected
ten percent sample stratified on the basis of landholding size. Other
information was collected through participant observation and unstruc—
tured interviews.

Variation is associated with both "traditional" peasant agricul-
ture and commercial farming. Although both villages are affected by
development programs, variation was present prior to the introduction of
new agricultural techniques and is not simply a reflection of innovation
lag.

Differences in access to resources partially explains such varia-
tions. Of greater interest, however, is the problem of variations which
exist among cultivators having equal access to productive resources.
Where it is possible to hold opportunity constant, the problem is one
of explaining why some allocate their resources more efficiently, are
more productive and change their production strategies to take advantage
of new opportunities whereas others do not. The problem is particularly

' operation—

difficult if one starts from the assumption of "rationality,'
alized more often than not in the economic context as an inherent dis—
position for individuals to maximize material gain.

In the approach used in this study, economic behavior is influenced
not only by individual predilections, but also by the environment of
socio-economic relations. It is affected by the nature and distribution
of resources and socio-cultural organization centering on production.
Social relations, obligations, values and understandings also affect

commitments to material ends and compete for the allocation of produc-

tive resources. Production strategies and thus productivity and

Barry Harwell Michie

efficiency are not solely determined by potential return, but also by
ideas of what is sufficient, desirable and necessary -- subjectively
defined by actors within their own context —- and competing demands on
their resources arising from the society in which they live. The prob—
lem is turned around from investigating the "rationality" of cultivators
from an outside "objective" perspective to examining the range of alter-
natives they have and their response to it.

This range of production alternatives is bounded by a system of
constraints and incentives. If cultivators depend only on agriculture
(which few do), this is ultimately constrained at one end by the great—
est return possible with the most productive and efficient use of
resources. At the other end the constraint is the minimum return neces-
sary to sustain and maintain the cultivating household. In some cases
these constraints are close together, in which case cultivators must
make the best use of their resources simply to survive. Other culti—
vators with more resources have wider latitude. They may have a large
number of alternatives, not all of which approximate the greatest
return, but provide a level of satisfaction.

What comes out in the study is a distribution of production
strategies. At one end is peasant subsistence agriculture. At the
other is commercial farming. There is not, however, a simple corre-
lation between distribution of resources, strategy pursued or levels of
productivity and efficiency. There is, rather, a mix with many permu-
tations. Given the alternatives most cultivators have, they can either
be productive or underproductive, efficient or inefficient.

There is little to channel production behavior into a uniform pat—

tern. The only absolute demand that must be met from agriculture is

Barry Harwell Michie

food to provision the household (and this is conditioned by other
sources of income). This can be met with a peasant strategy outside the
monetized market context. Variability in levels of production and
efficiency reflect different consumption requirements of households and
the various ways in which they can be filled. The only obligation a
cultivator has is to fall somewhere within a range of viability, not
operate at a loss and provide for some minimum level of consumption

satisfaction.

STRUCTURE IN DIVERSITY: VARIATIONS IN PRODUCTIVITY

AND EFFICIENCY IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE

By

Barry Harwell Michie

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to

Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Anthropology

1976

C) Copyright by
BARRY HARWELL MICHIE

1976

To my parents

Roy and Lucille Michie

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many to whom I owe a great debt of gratitude for guidance
in the preparation of this study. My committee chairman, Charles
Morrison, and committee members, Harry Raulet and Kenneth David, have
given much in time, discussion and encouragement. Their help on various
drafts and clarification of issues and ideas are greatly appreciated.
Former members of the committee who have left the university also helped
formulate the problem and approach: Ralph Nicholas, Scott Cook and
Leonard Kasden. Special thanks go to Ralph Nicholas for encouraging me
to enter anthropology, a decision I have never regretted. Special
thanks also go to Bernard Gallin, Chairman of the Department of
Anthropology, for his interest and support throughout my program.

Though I am grateful for their kind assistance, full responsibility for
this study and the ideas contained herein are my own.

Field research was supported by a Junior Fellowship from the
American Institute of Indian Studies. Shri P. R. Mehendiratta,
Director, American Institute of Indian Studies, New Delhi, and his staff
were very hospitable and supportive of both my own and my wife's pro-
jects. I especially appreciate having worked through this fine insti-
tute. I also thank members of the Statistical Laboratory of the
National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi, under the
direction of Shri B. K. Mitra for their patient assistance in processing

data.
iv

Affiliation and sponsorship were provided by the Department of
Sociology, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. I am extremely grateful to
Professor T. K. N. Unnithan, Head of the Department of Sociology for
providing affiliation and assistance while in the field. The hospi-
tality shown by he and his wife will always be remembered. Shri Nirmal
Singh, Department of Sociology, was also very helpful in implementing my
project and discussing fieldwork as it progressed. Shri K. C. Pande of
the Social Sciences Research Centre and Shri P. C. Mathur and Professor
Iqbal Narain, Department of Political Science, were also very helpful.
Special thanks go to Professor C. P. Bhambhri, now at Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi, for his help in facilitating our association with
the University of Rajasthan. The warmth of hospitality extended to both
of us is most appreciated.

The University of Udaipur, Department of Extension Education, gave
invaluable assistance for field work in Bharatpur. Dr. D. K. Mishra,
Shri M. S. Lodha and Shri Godhara took an active interest in our
research and Shri Godhara took time out from his busy schedule to help
survey possible field sites and introduce us into "Shivpura."

Extension personnel in both villages were extremely helpful in dis—
cussing programs and local conditions. Patwaris gave unstintingly
including long lectures, in clarifying land tenure systems and helping
draw up sample lists. Their assistance helped greatly to cut down the
otherwise lengthy spade work.

Perhaps most thanks go to the people with whom we had the good for—
tune to spend our time in the field. The openness of informants was
especially appreciated as was their good humored patience and interest

in my lengthy questions about their affairs. In both villages the

vi

warmth of friendships will never be forgotten. The most difficult part
of field work was having to leave.

A continuing debt is owed Kusum Nair who as friend, mentor and
mother-in-law has helped immeasurably in formulating issues and ideas.
It was through her encouragement that I chose the topic of this study.
Her career in rural studies and wealth of experience have been an
invaluable aid in my efforts.

Final thanks are to my wife, Aruna, with whom I was fortunate to
have conducted field work. While doing her own concurrent research and
writing, she has given much support to mine and has provided a greater
insight into the subject than I would have achieved on my own. Our long
hours of discussion and argument of points have added much to this
study. I also owe her greatly for editing and typing of my defense

draft, as I do to Judy DeJaegher for typing this final copy.

List of

List of

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tables .

Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION .

CHAPTER

I.

II.

III.

THE PROBLEM OF VARIATION . . . . .

The Nature of the Problem: Hanumangarh and Shivpura .
Approaches to the Problem. . . . . .
Critique of Operations Research. . . . . . .

Relationship Between Economic and Socio- Cultural Domains .

Definition of Economics: The Formalist— Substantivist
Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Definition of an Economic Field.

Critique of "Rationality". . . . . .

Critique of Maximization and Economizing .

Uncertainty and Risk .

Satisficing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maximization of Utility. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Socio- Cultural Environment

Range of Alternatives.

SELECTION OF SITES AND GENERAL BACKGROUND.

Selection of Sites .

Physical and Demographic Background.
History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Land Relations . . . . . . . . . .
Agricultural Programs. . . . . . . . . .
Administration . . . . . . . . . .

THE SETTING: HANUMANGARH AND SHIVPURA . . . . . . .
Hanumangarh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shivpura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Historical Background: Hanumangarh. . . . . . . .

vii

ix

. xii

ll

17
22
23
26

29
33
35
36
37
38
39
41
45

50

50
55
58
6O
63
67

77

77

82
86

viii

CHAPTER

Historical Background: Shivpura . . . . . .
Comparison: Hanumangarh and Shivpura. . . .

IV. THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE . . . . . .

Power and Authority Structure. . .

The Social Relations of Production .
Tractorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Irrigation . . . . .

Effects of Mechanization . .

The Jajmani System and Caste Relations .
Changes in the System.

V. ECONOMIC LIFE: INCOME, ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
AND PRODUCTION . . . . . . .

Parameters of Economic Activity.

Spread of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . .
Market Imperfections . . . .

Range of Viable Alternatives .
Profitability. . . .

Other Sources of Income. . .

Cash and Kind Economic Spheres .

The Peasant Mode of Production .

Commercial Farming . . . . . .

Implications . . . . . . . . .
Production: Averages and Distribution . . . .
Allocation of Resources. . . . . . . . . . .
Implications and Conclusions .

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . .

95

. 100

. lO7

. 112
. 114
. 117
. 118
. 119
. 125
. 127

. 149

. 149

150

. 151
. 152
. 153
. 154
. 156
. 159
. 163
. 163
. 164
. 169
. 179

. 205

1.1.

1.2.

1.3.

1.4.

2.1.

2.2.

2.3.

3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
3.4.

3.5.

3.6.

4.1.

4.2.

4.3.

LIST OF TABLES

Range of Variation Showing Averages, Highs and Lows in
Production Performance — All Land: Hanumangarh and
Shivpura. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Percentage Share of Total Production, Returns, and Sales
for the Ten Percent of Cultivating Households Having the
Greatest Gross Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Range of Variation Showing Averages, Highs and Lows in
Production Performance — Irrigated Land: Hanumangarh and
Shivpura. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Range of Variation Showing Averages, Highs and Lows in
Production Performance — Unirrigated Land: Hanumangarh

and Shivpura. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Area and Production of Principle Crops in Rajasthan,
1971-72 0 o o o o I o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0

Distribution of Land Ownership: Rural Rajasthan, 1960-61

Distribution of Operational Holdings: Rural Rajasthan,
1960—6]. 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0

Population and Work Force: Hanumangarh and Shivpura.
Land Use Pattern: Hanumangarh and Shinura .

Land Ownership by Caste - Full Sample: Hanumangarh .
Land Ownership by Caste - Full Sample: Shivpura. . . . .

Distribution of Castes by Size Category - Full Sample:
Hanumangarh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Distribution of Castes by Size Category — Full Sample:
Shivpura. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Average Assets Per Household by Size Category: Hanumangarh .

Average Assets Per Household by Size Category: Shivpura.

Caste Distribution by Size Category: Hanumangarh . . . .

ix

18

19

21

21

73

74

75

. 102
. 103

. 104

104

105

106

136

137

. 138

.10.

.11.

.12.

.13.

.14.

.10.

.11.

.12.

Caste Distribution by Size Category: Shivpura.
Castes Represented: Hanumangarh and Shivpura .

Man Days Required Per Acre for Various Agricultural
Operations by Season. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Households Owning and Hiring Bullocks and Tractors:
Hanumangarh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Households Owning and Hiring Bullocks and Tractors:
Shivpura. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Irrigation Facilities: Hanumangarh .
Irrigation Facilities: Shivpura. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Number of Households Making Grain Payments to Kamins:
Hanumangarh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Number of Households Making Grain Payments to Kamins:
Shivpura. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Number of Households Making Grain Payments by Caste:
Hanumangarh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Number of Households Making Grain Payments by Caste:
Shivpura. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Household Composition: Hanumangarh and Shivpura. . . . .

Distribution of Land, Income and Expendable Resources by
Household Composition: Hanumangarh and Shivpura.

Adoption and Use of High Yielding Varieties: Hanumangarh .

Adoption and Use of High Yielding Varieties: Shinura.
Average Income Per Household: Hanumangarh.

Average Income Per Household: Shivpura

Production Performance All Land: Hanumangarh . . . . .

Production Performance All Land: Shinura. . .

Production Performance Irrigated Land: Hanumangarh .

Production Performance Irrigated Land: Shivpura. . .

Production Performance Unirrigated Land: Hanumangarh .

Production Performance Unirrigated Land: Shivpura.

. 138

. 139

. 140

. 141

. 142

. 143

144

. 145

. 146

. 147

. 148

. 182

. 183

. 184

. 184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

5.13.

5.21.

5.22.

5.23.

xi
Distribution of Highs and Lows in
All Land: Hanumangarh. . . . .

Distribution of Highs and Lows in
All Land: Shinura . . . . . . .

Distribution of Highs and Lows in
Irrigated Land: Hanumangarh. .

Distribution of Highs and Lows in
Irrigated Land: Shivpura . . . .

Distribution of Highs and Lows in
Unirrigated Land: Hanumangarh.

Distribution of Highs and Lows in
Unirrigated Land: Shivpura . . .

Average Resources Per Household:

Average Resources Per Household:

Production Performance

Production Performance

Production Performance

Production Performance

Production Performance

Production Performance

Hanumangarh .

Shivpura.

Average Resource Allocation Per Household:

Average Resource Allocation Per Household:

Use of Operational Holdings: Hanumangarh .

Use of Operational Holdings: Shivpura.

Effective Landholding and Its Use by Household Composition:

Hanumangarh and Shivpura. . . .

Hanumangarh

Shivpura.

. 193

194

. 195

. 196

197

198

. 199

. 199

. 200

201

202

. 203

. 204

2.1.

2

.2.

LIST OF FIGURES

Map of Rajasthan. . . .

Political and Administrative Hierarchy.

xii

72

76

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the economic life of Indian cultivators.* The
problem posed is the marked variations in agricultural productivity and
efficiency found across and within cultivating groups distinguished by
unequal control over productive resources. It is in part a methodo—
logical problem, how to explain distributions rather than just aggre-
gated averages. The problem is not one of unlimited variation, but
rather the discovery of limits or bounds of tolerance, the properties of
the system which allow or disallow variability in agricultural perfor-
mance.

In the approach, an economic field and its relationship to other
domains of socio-cultural life are defined and explored. Differences in
access to resources partially explains variation, but controlling for
differential access, social and cultural features also affect production
behavior. Economics is not a separate, discrete entity and this rela-
tionship helps explain features in the economy and why variation occurs.
The aim of the study is to discover the structure which underlies sur-
face appearances, that there is structure in diversity.

This study has its origins in the author's general interest in

problems of economic and social change in rural India. To an extent it

 

*I use the word "cultivator" as a generic term to avoid confusion
in terminology. "Farmer" implies a commercial orientation. "Peasant"
implies a subsistence orientation. I use these latter terms only when
these meanings are intended.

is an applied rather than an exclusively academic interest. It is
related to ongoing governmental programs effecting change not only in
agricultural technology and production but also in the lives and well-
being of a great many people. This discussion is directed in part to
those in development, be they policy makers, advisors, administrators,
or field workers. I feel it incumbent on myself to address problems and
issues of directed change due to the role it has had in shaping the
environment and processes on which this research was conducted. It is
all the more important that [do so since development programs will con-
tinue to have a role in effecting change.

This dissertation, other than serving its immediate academic pur-
pose is intended to be part of the opening dialogue between anthropolo-
gists and those involved in directed change, a dialogue fostered by
neither party being able to ignore the other. For anthropologists work—
ing in developing nations and addressing questions of economic and
social change, "developers" —- domestic and foreign -- are as much a
part of the current scene as are "the peOple" being studied. Further-
more, whether anthropologists like it or not, public policy in the new
states has an effect on the situations studied. There is also a growing
awareness among those in development of the approaches and perspectives
anthropologists have regarding questions of change, that problems and
issues of intervention involve more than technical answers, that the
introduction of technology and the manipulation of economic infrastruc—
tures have consequences which have ramifications beyond areas of their
immediate concern. Developers are beginning to turn to anthropology and
other social sciences for advice in understanding the broader nature of

the problems they address, the construction and implementation of

programs, and achieving some measure of control over the consequences
which their intervention generates (see Lipton, 1968: passim).

For better or worse, anthropologists find themselves occupying the
position of critic toward developers. This arises from the different
positions each has in orientation toward and involvement in questions of
change. First, anthropologists -— particularly if foreigners -- are
usually outsiders, both to the social situation and the programs of
intervention. In effect they tend to play the role of critic, usually
after the fact, if they are indeed moved by issues of directed change at
all. As a consequence anthropologists are often seen by developers as
thorns in their sides, having the luxury of equivocation or dilettantish
indulgence in matters about which they do not have to made decisions.
Developers (let alone the program recipients) have to live with their
successes and failures. On the other hand, anthropologists as advocates
of the people they study tend to see developers as bulls in a china
shop, having little idea of what socio-economic and cultural arrange-
ments are or what the consequences of their intervention are in terms of
those arrangements.

Second, anthropologists view themselves as observers and analysts;
one of their cardinal rules has been the non-interference and non-
manipulation of the situation they study. Divorced from action they
have not had to confront moral and ethical problems involved in inter-
vention and look upon "development" with a jaundiced eye. This sets up
an underlying antagonism toward those in development who attempt to
alter social arrangements, behavior, and their economic base to bring
about change in their product. Who are the interventionists, what

interests do they represent, whose standards and values are being

applied, and to whom are the benefits of change -- if any -- accruing?
These are issues which disconcert anthropologists, most of whom shy away
from any involvement in them in the name of pure academic and personal
integrity. These are questions which people involved in development are
asking as well, particularly with regard to alternative models and
approaches, income and wealth distribution, displacement and unemploy-
ment, and a growing disenchantment with gross indicators such as GNP.
Third, anthropologists are students of socio-cultural life, con-
cerned with questions of interrelationships, organization, and behavior
of people in their physical, social and cultural environment. Devel-
opers are oriented toward intervening and producing tangible results
calculated in terms of quantity and magnitude of material things in
relation to policy objectives. More often than not they do not con-
sider socio-cultural arrangements or what alterations their programs
cause in those arrangements. Occasionally, they are confronted by
"exogenous" factors such as political interference or the non-accep-
tance of what they provide. These things are usually seen as annoying

obstacles. Working with a ceteris paribus paradigm and a limited set of

 

behaviorial assumptions, the well-being of people is coterminous with
material well-being. This is to be tackled and measured in terms of the
market value and distribution of goods and services and on occasion,

the distribution of productive resources.

To an extent there is more concern with indicators and measurement,
e.g., miles of road, quantities and prices of inputs, acres under culti-
vation, margins of profit, and levels of production, than with the socio-
cultural and behavioral processes they represent. The point of conver—

gence is the assumed welfare function that directed change is intended

to fulfill. And this must take into account social and cultural dimen-
sions of how people and resources are organized in the task of making a
livelihood, how this articulates with other features of social life, and
what it all means to those people involved. This is the domain of the
anthropologist.

Developers and anthropologists need not be adversaries. Both
parties often share the same normative concerns. AnthrOpologists who
have worked with the disadvantaged, dispossessed, or poorer segments of
society -- particularly in complex stratified societies -- can hardly
disagree that structural changes need to be made, that people need and
want better housing, clothing, food and some meaningful control over
their destiny. The manner in which this is to be achieved is a matter
of debate -- as developers well know within their own circles. A dia-
logue with anthropologists can and should be fruitful.

Anthropologists interested in questions of economic and social
change in contemporary societies such as India cannot help but be con-
fronted by issues of directed change. This was one of the concerns
going into the selection of the t0pic and locality of this study. I was
further confronted by it while in the field. One of the recurring ques-
tions asked me, particularly while talking with small farmers, landless
laborers and tenants was, "Why should we waste our time talking with
you? It is nice of you that you have an interest in our problems, will
write a book and become a big professor. But what is in it for us, what
can you do in return, and how will our discussion help us improve our
lot?" Pure academic research, the pursuit of knowledge for knowledge's
sake founders on the lips of the informant. Leaving aside the question

of academic integrity, what is our integrity in the eyes of the people

we study? My only possible reply to their question was that hopefully I
could help through writing and being heard. But I could promise
nothing. This was good enough for most of them, and I did get inter—
views. But to use this answer simply as a technique to elicit infor-
mation to further the aims of anthropology is nothing but a confidence
game. This study must be directed to extra-anthropological concerns.

The value of this study for the non-anthropological audience is as
a case study of how agricultural production is organized and how and why
cultivators interact in their economic environment as they do. It is
useful to go beyond statistical indicators and their relationships to
see what socio-cultural processes they indicate. Indicators do not have
an independent existence and they are not the same as "the economy." It
is necessary to discover how people individually and in groups, combined
with physical resources are organized, and to what ends in order to
understand what it is that is changing. This can and must lead to some
rethinking about the nature of developmental problems where and if they
exist, the behavioral assumptions on which programs are based, and what
the range of effects are beyond the narrowly defined quantitative
objectives of a program. It is one thing to have a notion of what
should be -- the intended results and benefits of intervention —- but
this must be rooted in an understanding of what is, how or if it is to
be transformed, and what ultimate value it has for society. To this
end, the areas of investigation in this study are local economic organi-
zation, the programs including their content, aims, operational assump-
tions, and their impact at the local level.

My interest in economic and social change also serves an academic

concern; one beyond the writing of a dissertation. It permits an

exploration of issues and problems in economic anthropology. Among
these is the relationship between economic and other socio-cultural
institutions, i.e., economics as culturally mediated social behavior.
At issue here are the parameters of economic behavior, those boundaries
which account for organizational and behavioral patterns found not only
at the level of individual producers, but between and within groups of
producers and for the organization of production as a whole.

The basic issue is whether the constraints and incentives which
form these parameters are solely economic in a material and technical
sense, such as access to productive resources, technology and the pro-
fitability of their different combinations. Or does the environment
including social organization and ideational features also influence
economic behavior?

A related issue is one of approach. Is economic behavior a matter
of individual actors each pursuing individual advantage who in the
aggregate give form and structure to the economy? Or is it a matter of
individual actors behaving within socio-economic constraints and incen-
tives and the values and understandings of the culture in which they
live? To expand: what latitude do cultivators have in their economic
activities? What are their options within the economic system and what
influences them -- as individuals or groups -— in the decisions they
make and the strategies they pursue?

There are other issues which bear on types and strategies of econo-
mic behavior, in this case peasant and commercial agriculture which con-
cern differences in the organization of economic activity, the ends pur-

sued, the relationship between production units and other segments of

the economy and whether these things are amenable to analysis with the
same categories and concepts.

Also of concern are questions regarding change. Development pro—
grams have opened new alternatives for cultivators, alternatives which
are more productive and profitable. Yet the old production strategies
have remained viable options. Is change solely based on alterations in
the quantity, quality, and access to resources and the profitability of
their combination, or is it also a consequence of social and cultural
processes which make particular options unviable or undesirable? Con-
versely, does stasis result from the unavailability of resources and
methods? Or is it also a result of social and cultural factors which
make changes in economic strategy unviable or undesirable?

On a broad level, these are the issues to be covered in the follow-
ing discussion both theoretically and in the context of two villages in
Rajasthan, India.

More specifically, the investigation tries to explain the marked
variations found among cultivators in the productivity and efficiency of
their agricultural activities. This feature is associated with both
"traditional" peasant and commercial agriculture in India. It was pre-
sent prior to the introduction of new agricultural technology and is not
simply a reflection of risk or adoption lag.

Differential access to resources partially explains variation,
particularly on an aggregated level. What remains unanswered, however,
is the variation which exists among cultivators enjoying equal access to
productive resources. Where it is possible to hold constant the fea—
tures of opportunity and risk, one still must explain why some culti-

vators use resources more efficiently, are more productive, and/or shift

production strategies to take advantage of opportunities whereas others
do not. This problem is particularly difficult if one simply starts
with an analysis of physical resources and the assumption of "ration-
ality," operationalized most often in economic analysis as an inherent
disposition for individuals to maximize material gain.

The analytical approach used here is to delimit an economic field
and examine its structure in relation to the larger socio—cultural
environment. Economic behavior is seen as influenced not only by
individual predilections for material gain but also by features of the
economic field -- the nature and distribution of resources combined with
the socio-cultural organization centering on the obtaining of a liveli-
hood. Answers can be found in the range of alternatives present within
an economic field and the impinging socio-cultural environment which
influences the manner in which resources are allocated, used, and the
ends they serve. The wider environment of social relations, obliga-
tions, values and understandings affect commitments to material ends
and/or compete for the allocation of productive resources.

Production strategies (and consequently levels of productivity and
efficiency) are not solely determined by what is technically possible.
They are also determined by actors' subjective notions of what is suffi—
cient, desirable, and possible, and competing demands on their resources
arising from the social context in which they live. The problem is
turned around from testing the "rationality" of cultivators in an
"objective" sense, to examining the range of viable alternatives avail-
able to them and their response to it.

In essence this is a study of how cultivators allocate their

resources, what things influence them in decision making, how economic

10

activity is organized and to what ends, and what the consequences are
for productivity and efficiency in their agricultural operations. The
basic question being asked is, what accounts for variation?

The study is admittedly modest in scope. In matters of content
the two villages surveyed are not necessarily representative of all
Indian villages, nor is their agriculture necessarily representative of
all Indian agriculture. That India contains a multitude of social
groupings, sub-systems, regional variations, and agricultural zones is
well documented. The problem inherent in a micro-study is to sort the
particular and unique from the general and more universal. A study of
this kind can only be done, however, on the micro—level, as it is only
here that the socio-cultural dimensions of the problem are apparent.
Replications of this study can be made to check, or to refine the find-
ings and conclusions. I would argue that the features outlined here
have wider applicability -- not in content particularly but in form. To
this end, the aim of this study, not unlike other South Asian social

inquiry, is to find the macrocosm within the microcosm.

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF VARIATION

The reader may wonder why variation in production behavior should
be the topic of this study. In a sense the question is the opposite of
what most social scientists pose. Within social anthropology the main-

stream deals with a discovery and explanation of the regularities of

 

social life, a concern perhaps best summed up by Radcliffe-Brown,

My own view is that the concrete reality with which the
social anthropologist is concerned in observation, description,
comparison and classification, is not any sort of entity but a
process. . . . The process itself consists of an immense multi-
tude of actions and interactions of human beings, acting as
individuals or in combinations or groups. Amidst the diversity
of the particular events there are discoverable regularities,
so that it is possible to give statements or descriptions of
certain general features of the social life of a selected
region. (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952: 4)

 

Expanding on this view, Fredrik Barth states the following,
The "general features," the regularities in social life,
thus have to do with the repetitive nature of acts, which we
observe in our investigation of a social system. Our first
descriptive characterization of our findings, then, must be
one involving frequencies. No matter how crude our tech-
niques for registration and counting are, our claim must be
that we have discovered some non-random frequency distri-
bution in actions. The patterns we report may most realis-
tically be viewed as frequency distributions around a mode.
My argument . . . is briefly . . . that our models should

be designed to explain how the observable frequency pat-
terns, or regularities, are generated. (Barth, 1966: l)

 

Neither of these statements contains elements with which anthro—

pologists, or social scientists generally, take exception. They include

11

12

several features which should be stressed as they are incorporated and
expanded upon in this study.

In both statements the abstract nature of the models social anthro—
pologists construct is clear. Models help in understanding social
reality but are not reality itself. Reality is a continuum full of
diverse actions, from which regularities and general features can be
isolated. A systematic approach isolates the various constituent ele—
ments, and describes and explains their interrelationship in order to
explain the particular features of social reality examined. This is
what Barth means when he speaks of discovering how observable patterns
and regularities are generated. Emphasis is on explaining the regulari-
ties or modes that are discovered. Observed behavior that does not
approximate the mode is for the most part regarded as so much "noise"
in the universe of social activity.

However, part of this study is an attempt to expand our models in
order to take into account more of this "noise." This in no way
implies -- and I take pains at the outset to stress this -- that modes
of behavior are not discoverable nor that we should dispense with them.
Modes will be discussed as the study gets into the subject at hand. The
main point, however, is an explanation for the wide range of variabil—
ity in behavior. In Barth's terms, I am more concerned with the distri—
bution than the mode. Variability does not occur haphazardly, but has a
structure and order of its own. Here the bounds of tolerance or the
parameters of constraints and incentives which allow or disallow varia-
tions are important. In the course of such an analysis, both the mode
and the distribution should be accounted for. The extremes in a range

of variation may have great significance for understanding the feature

13

to be examined, and are not simply "noise." They may also have implica-
tions for the assumptions on which our explanatory frameworks rest and
for generalizations we draw from analysis.

Another problem of focusing solely on modalities is that of an
implied uniformity in behavior in response to impinging structural
conditions. This is anthropology's "folk model" of analysis which as
perceived by non-anthropologists has people and groups behaving as if
they were automatons. Intuitively we know this is not so. Not all
people behave the same way under the same conditions. For instance, in
patrilineal societies sister's son does not always joke with mother's
brother, although the structure of their relationship can be charac-
terized as one of low authority and high affect in which joking more
often occurs than not. It is useful to keep in mind the distinction
between what is average, and uniformity.

Quite often the regularities we perceive in the continuum of social
life obscure more than they reveal. This may be a result of our choice
of indicators which are external to the feature to be explained. Some-
times the indices take on a reality of their own and are confused with
the activity being measured. The following example serves as an illu-
stration.

A study is made of a select region to determine what affects farm-

' production behavior. The underlying behavioral assumption is that

ers
of economic rationality; farmers as maximizers of profit calculated on

the basis of market values. Costs and levels of production are examined
in relation to the market price of agricultural commodities. An aggre-

gated analysis of fluctuations in these variables shows a positive pro-

duction response to increases in the margin of profitability. From the

_v_._'_'—e

14

indicators, the inference is drawn that farmers expand production during
good times to take advantage of profits and adjust their production
downward as profitability declines. Their behavior appears to be
explained by that of the indicators and the assumption of economic
rationality appears to be valid.

However, all farmers might not be responding in this manner. Ten
percent of them accounting for a disproportionate share of total produc-
tion might behave in such a "rational" manner. The other ninety percent
may not respond at all, or may react negatively to such fluctuations.
Some may not be linked directly into cash factor or product markets and
are insulated from any effect the monetized market has. Others may have
these links but may lower production as profitability increases since
they can realize the same income with less effort. The volume of pro-
duction by the top ten percent and the difference their production makes
in the aggregated index overshadows the effect of the other ninety per-
cent of farmers. Upon closer examination the behavioral assumption,
substantiated at one level of analysis loses most of its validity.

There are several points to be made with the above example. First,
levels of analysis are confused. The conclusion derived from aggre-
gated analysis is invalid for the level of behavior to which it pro-
portedly applies.

Second, the conclusion that farmers are "rational," in the mold of
"economic man" appears to work well also at the aggregated level. But
here too there are problems of applicability. The indices used are mea-
sures of things and their market value. They are external to human
behavior and interaction. The behavioral assumptions involved can only

be imputed since human activity is not itself examined. These

15

assumptions have applicability with regard to the "behavior" of the
indicators and not the behavioral process that generated them. Unless
there is some "perverse" relationship demonstrated, e.g., backward
sloping labor supply curves in relation to wage scales or backward bend-
ing production curves in relation to profitability, such behavioral
assumptions are rarely called into question. In other like situations,
the assumption of economic rationality may well hold true, but again
this can only be imputed.

Third, this case contains problems of explanations and interpre-
tation regarding variations in behavior which are apparent as one moves
away from aggregated analysis. The fact that a small percentage of
farmers can affect the indicators emphasizes the point that an explana-
tion of a particular feature may well lie in the extremes of what is
observed rather than in the average.

The significant extreme in this case does form a pattern, one among
several. These patterns would include the "rational" group of farmers
maximizing profit, those who are insulated from the cash economy and who
produce with other objectives in mind, and a group of satisficers who
although participating in the cash economy, are not motivated by mater-
ial gain. It would be easy to dismiss the latter two as lazy, indif-
ferent, or "irrational" but these terms do not explain their behavior.
Their behavior is so much "noise" in the universe. And yet in this
case, these people form the overwhelming majority of farmers.

Alternative explanations for these farmers can be anticipated in
the above discussion. The "economic man" model applies to the ten per-
cent of farmers maximizing profit. A "satisficing" model would explain

those who respond negatively to opportunities in the market. A

16

satisficing or risk aversion model might apply to those not directly
involved in the monetized market, but a peasant model is more appro-
priate. In the peasant case, production is based on the exploitation of
kind and family labor resources with minimal cash inputs. Producing
primarily for household consumption, output in their case is a function
of the number of working members, kind resources held, and the house—
hold's consumption requirements (Chayanov, 1966: 5). The cash value of
their kind and products is irrelevant to decision making.

Using these additional frameworks, things seem to be fairly clear.
Each model provides a reasonable explanation for the type of behavior
observed. Each also provides an element of rationality for each beha-
vior type as divergent behavior patterns become understandable in view
of their objectives. But the issue becomes more like the proverbial tar
baby. The more one probes to get answers, the more one gets mired down.
These models might explain each type of behavior as separate entities.
But they do not explain how all three can be found together. The
explanations are not interchangeable nor does one know why cultivators
come to occupy one position rather than another. The question of what
accounts for these variations in production behavior remains. What are
the properties of the system which generate them and allow them to
exist?

The real world is, of course, not made of hypothetical situations,
and there is little point in further elaboration on this example. A
warrant has been made, however, for a systematic investigation of varia-
tion in organization and behavior as they occur in a particular
environment. Accounting for such variations is important for a fuller

understanding of particular features examined and for comprehending

17

things at a systems' level. The occurrence and persistence of variation
under the same conditions has implications for our explanatory frame—
works, their assumptions and the generalizations we derive from analy—
sis.

It should be obvious to the reader that the above case is trans-
parent. It contains an agenda for issues to be examined in this study.
Although the study is not concerned with fluctuations in production, the
types of production behavior and their relative frequencies correspond
to what was found in the field. The problem is the same; that of fit-
ting the various pieces together into a coherent whole, to explain the

occurrence of divergent behavior within the same environment.

The Nature of the Problem: Hanumangarh and Shivpura*

 

To provide a reasonable and accurate explanation for the production
behavior of cultivators in the two villages surveyed is similar to the
problems found in the case presented above. Combining cash costs with
the cash value of household labor and other kind inputs, production
costs are exceeded by the market value of their product. In one vil-
lage, hereafter referred to as Hanumangarh, cultivators as a whole
realize an 8 percent return over investment. In the other village,
hereafter referred to as Shivpura, the average return to investment is
39 percent. One might conclude that cultivators in these two villages

are exhibiting "rational" behavior as they seem to operate their

 

*Hanumangarh and Shivpura are pseudonyms. The two villages are
found in Rajasthan in Jaipur and Bharatpur districts respectively and
are roughly equidistant from Jaipur and Bharatpur cities. They are the
same villages studied by Aruna N. Michie (Michie, 1975: passim).

18

holdings with at least some rough cost-benefit calculus based on market
values.

Upon closer examination, however, a broad range appears in pro-
ductivity, profits made, and returns to investment. Without controlling
for quality of land or size of operation, the range in both villages
appears as follows:

TABLE 1.1. Range of Variation Showing Averages, Highs and Lows
in Production Performance - All Land: Hanumangarh and Shivpura

 

 

 

Hanumangarh Shivpura

Average High Low Average High Low
(No. of Households) (44) (1) (l) (10) (l) (1)
Productivity
@ Acre (Kgs.)* 356 1477 00 326 781 42
Profits
@ Acre (Rs.) 32 1148 -788 98 474 —143
Z Return to
Investment 8% 225% -100% 39% 157% -60%

 

Note: One rupee equals $.13. One U. 8. dollar equals Rs. 7.50.

* Includes cereals, lentils, oilseed, and spices.

Ten percent of the cultivators represent a disproportionate share
of the gross totals. Four of the forty—four households in Hanumangarh
and one out of ten households in Shivpura constitute the following

shares.

19

TABLE 1.2. Percentage Share of Total Production, Returns, and
Sales for the Ten Percent of Cultivating Households
Having the Greatest Gross Production

 

 

 

Hanumangarh Shinura
All Top 10% All Top 10%
(No. of Cultivators Total % Share Cultivators Total % Share
Households) (44) (4) (10) (1)

Production (Kgs.) 117,944 67,015 57% 56,486 23,130 41%
Gross

Return (Rs.) 149,586 84,728 57% 61,337 22,973 38%
Produce

Sold (Kgs.)* 37,476 33,280 90% 8,520 5,000 59%

 

* Includes cash sales only; excludes kind exchanges and debt repayment
in kind.

Although cultivators as a whole operate their holdings at a profit,
a sizeable proportion operate at a loss. Computing total cash and kind
costs against the market value of produce, thirty-one of the forty-four
households in Hanumangarh, and five of the ten in Shivpura are not
making a profit. In both villages those 10 percent of households with
the highest gross production operate at a profit. In Hanumangarh, this
group receives a 34 percent return to investment, or about four times
the average. In Shivpura, the top household received a 157 percent
return, or roughly four times the village average.

This distribution presents several problems for interpretation. A
standard cost-benefit analysis shown in the tables leads to a rather
confusing and paradoxical set of circumstances. One might expect some
cultivators to operate at a loss but certainly not the overwhelming
majority of them. Agriculture appears to be a draining sink for most

cultivators. One might conclude most of them are going broke and that

20

they will be either forced out of agriculture or will have to improve
their performance. Neither of these is the case as will be discussed
below.

One might look for other factors to explain this apparently dismal
performance. Unfortunately these data are not diachronic to show pro—
duction fluctuations over time for the households surveyed. There is
evidence from district records and the statements of cultivators, that
production during 1971-72 was low due to poor rainfall. Most land is
unirrigated and agriculture is dependent on monsoon rains which are
variable from year to year. It can be argued that cultivators have
adapted to this climatic feature by following a low risk strategy which
in years of good rains provides a large return and in bad years entails
little loss. Over the long run, yearly production averages out at a
higher point than reflected in the 1971-72 figures. Thus, over time
most cultivators operate at a profit or at least break even. We will
return to this later but even controlling for climate a wide range of
variation exists and besides, the climate affects each farmer uniformly.
This variation is apparent in the following tables which separate

irrigated from unirrigated land.

21

TABLE 1.3. Range of Variation Showing Averages,
Highs and Lows in Production Performance -
Irrigated Land: Hanumangarh and Shivpura

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hanumangarh Shivpura
Item
Average High Low Average High Low
(No. of Households) (21) (1) (1) (7) (1) (1)
Productivity
@ Acre (Kgs.) 498 1026 213 644 1500 367
Profits
@ Acre (Rs.) 82 450 -788 233 824 —158
% Return to
Investment 15% 88% -58% 56% 147% -29%
* Includes cereals, lentils, oilseed and spices.
TABLE 1.4. Range of Variation Showing Averages,
Highs and Lows in Production Performance -
Unirrigated Land: Hanumangarh and Shivpura
Hanumangarh Shivpura
Item
Average High Low Average High Low
(No. of Households) (32) (l) (l) (9) (l) (1)
Productivity
@ Acre (Kgs.) 141 2800 00 183 415 42
Profits
@ Acre (Rs.) -44 2717 -511 39 296 -154
% Return to
Investment 18% 558% -100% 21% 174% -58%
* Includes cereals, lentils, oilseed and spices.
Computing the cash value of all inputs against the cash value of

products, nine of the twenty-one households in Hanumangarh and one of

the seven households in Shiqura cultivating irrigated land operate at a

loss. Of those cultivating unirrigated land, twenty-five of the

22

thirty-two households in Hanumangarh and six of the nine households in
Shivpura make no profit.

A number of things stand out in this distribution. Obviously
irrigated land gives higher yields, profits and percentage of return to
investment. The distribution for irrigated land is narrower than for
unirrigated land, particularly for returns to investment. As irrigated
land is less subject to the vagaries of rainfall, cultivators have more
control over their physical environment. Although there is wider dis-
tribution of unirrigated land, there is also a lesser rupee loss for
those making no profit. This tends to support the low risk argument for
cultivators, at least on their unirrigated lands.

Despite this, there is still a wide distribution, particularly on
irrigated land. The question remains why such variations exist and also

why it is that so many cultivators operate at a loss.

Approaches to the Problem

 

The discussion of production in the two villages has so far served
an expository purpose, to lay out the bare bones of the problem.
Furthermore, it has centered on particular indicators and relationships
without examining the organizational and behavioral features which have
generated them. If economics is to be seen as a form of social acti-
vity involving the combination of human and non-human resources to meet
culturally defined ends (Firth, 1961: 123), these relationships must be
spelled out in order to build a framework with which to approach the
problem.

The social and cultural context in which economic behavior occurs

is not simply something of interest in and of itself or an appendix to

23

economics. Rather, it defines the manner in which human groups are
organized to secure and use the material conditions of their existence.
Economies are not concrete entities discrete from other human acti-
vities and concerns. An "economy" is first a conceptual construct which
provides a way of looking at things. Depending on one's conceptual
framework, things "economic" have an internal character -- specific to
that realm we conceptually isolate as economic -- as well as an external
character in that they are related to and are part of other realms of
human activity (after Bateson, 1972: 73-87 and Godelier, 1972: Part
III). Although things economic often appear as discrete entities, this
is more an artifact of the analytical technique than a reflection of the

object of study itself.

Critique of Operations Research

 

For instance, the cost-benefit analysis employed above in the
statement of the problem is a technique developed for analyzing produc—
tion behavior in a monetized market setting.* It is a formal procedure
which involves sets of calculations that enable one to minimize or maxi-
mize some objective function. The calculation is indifferent to the
actual objects being manipulated. It presupposes that objects, insti-
tutions and relationships between actor units exist and are defined and
that manipulation is the only problem to be solved (Godelier, 1972:

254).

 

*It is recognized that this technique can be applied to any number
of situations and not solely to monetized market exchanges. It is just
as applicable to a purely subsistence situation, e.g., energy expended
against energy obtained.

24

The problem of this procedure lies in the a_priori assumption of
what the objects of manipulation are, how humans and resources are
organized, what the standard of value is and to what objectives activity
is directed. These things in one setting may differ in another and must
be specified before analysis is undertaken. Furthermore, there is the
problem of unidimensionality; that activity is directed toward the
obtaining of cash income. In reality objectives are often multiple.
The same resources are often used for the attainment of different ends
which necessitates multiple evaluations of their use.

If used in a monetary market situation, a cost-benefit analysis
assumes the presence of certain conditions. Production units are firms
acting as individuals to obtain factors of production and dispose of
products through exchange. The objective is clear; to earn a cash
return greater than that expended in producing the item sold. Finally,
an assumed connection exists between these units and the market, which
imparts a formal arrangement with its attendant logic and imperative
into the relationship.

The market acts as the integrating mechanism through and by which
production units organize, operate and evaluate their activities.
Factors of production and products are commodities exchanged for cash
with other economic units, cash being both the medium of exchange and
the standard of value. The appropriation, combination and utilization
of factors of production are evaluated by their cash cost. Also
included is the imputed cash value of any non-cash expenditure such as
the producer's time and labor which, although being his own, is poten—

tially a commodity exchangeable for salary or wages.

25

The producer sells commodities to others (other production units,
middlemen, or consumers). The costs of production are evaluated against
the return received through sales and the return must at least equal the
cost. It is imperative that producers exchange commodities and eval-
uate their operations in this manner. In order to sustain the enter-
prise, cash must be obtained for reinvestment which can only be accom-
plished through exchange of commodities. Over the long run a profit
must also be made to ensure viability. If the producer operates at a
loss, productive resources cannot be maintained or replenished; ulti-
mately the business collapses.

This formal arrangement can be modified by the extent to which fac-
tors of production are obtained through exchange. Inputs that are
obtained from other sources, e.g., family labor or other kind inputs
generated, utilized, expended and replenished within the enterprise, do
not have to be evaluated according to their market cost. Only those
items obtained through inter-unit exchange necessarily have to be
accounted for in this manner and only a return over those costs must be
made to ensure viability (after Galeski, 1972: 9—13).

This analytical technique can be applied to any type of production
unit. Although production entails the organization of human and non-
human resources to create need or want satisfying things, the speci-
ficity of that organization and things created is irrelevant to analysis
as long as the process is mediated by the market and items can be
reduced and expressed in exchange equivalences. The same relationship
obtains whether it is a one person operation, a family enterprise or a

multi-national corporation, whether the concern is producing foodstuffs,

26

automobiles, or Hostess Ding-Dongs.* The same logic and formal set of
principles apply.

"All things being equal" (ceteris paribus), production will follow

 

the constraints and incentives of supply and demand, cost-benefit, and
profit margins as represented and measured in the market's own terms.
Production units have no choice but to consider these things in their
operations. They must ensure a return over investment simply to remain
viable, protect assets and generate income for consumption. Profit-
ability does not necessarily play upon any predilection for accumulation
and gain, but is rather a necessary condition for production to take
place in a monetized exchange economy. Thus this technique and the
assumptions on which it is based are only applicable under certain con—

ditions, conditions not entirely met in the two villages studied.

Relationship Between Economic and Socio-Cultural Domains

 

The interrelationship between production units and the market in

combination with the ceteris paribus assumption that it allows, provides

 

for a conceptualization of economics as a discrete entity regulated by
its own principles and logic apart from the wider social and cultural
context. Yet in any empirical situation, economics consists of organ-
ized combinations of humans and other resources directed toward satis—
fying needs and wants. There cannot be form without substance. Econo-
mic exchange cannot exist without human actors or without things of

value to the actors being produced, distributed, exchanged or consumed.

 

*A brand name of a popular American snack food as nourishing as its
name is sensible.

27

That is, the social and cultural context defines the relationships, the
objects that are manipulated and the ends being served.

Economic, social and cultural features penetrate one another.
Social relations are internal to the economic process as are cultural
features. Similarly, things economic are involved in other social pro-
cesses and serve culturally defined ends. It is in the interior/exter-
ior articulation of economy/society/culture that give economic phenomena
meanings that are not discernible apart from the cultural and social
context (after Cook, 1973: 813).

Economics is socially organized to the extent that persons and
groups have more or less specific rights, duties and obligations toward
one another and also with regard to goods and services (after Beteille,
1965: 110). This permits an analysis of the social relations of produc-
tion. The distribution of resources within a population influences the
manner in which people come together in the production process. The
possession or control of land, labor, capital or technological expertise
-- either singly or in combination -- engenders sets of relationships
between people bringing different things to the production process. For
instance in the two villages surveyed, these define the relations
between landowners, tenants, laborers, artisans and creditors.

These relationships set in motion a chain of other interactions
which affect the production of goods and services upon whose measurement
the formal operations research analysis is based. What people bring to
the production process determines their manner of participation. How
they participate determines their allocation of goods and services from
production, profits and wages either in cash or kind. These are fur-

ther distributed through exchange for other desired or needed

28

consumption items (included is investment in production as things are
consumed in the act of production). This in turn affects the demand for
commodities and hence the producer's calculations of supply-demand,
cost-price, profit margins and volume of production (after Cook, 1973:
814).

Culture is linked inextricably with economics. The economic pro-
cess is imbued with meaning by the participants. Exchanges and rela—
tionships define the participants not only for economic activity, but
for other activities as well. Economic activity is influenced by
beliefs, values, preferences, morals and understandings. Things are
produced and circulated through the economy because they are needed,
desired or valued. They reflect understandings about how much of what
things are necessary or desirable. Goods do not mechanically satisfy
needs and wants but are evaluated by subjective criteria (e.g., taste,
aesthetics, quality, fashionability) and also by such things as the
prestige that accrues to the possessor or consumer. In other words,
culture helps define the objects which formal analysis measures and
manipulates.

The articulation of economics with the socio-cultural domain is not
unidirectional. Things produced, circulated and consumed are instru-
mentalities which serve social and cultural purposes. Economics is an
aspect of these other domains in so far as their functioning involves
the production and use of material means. Economics is organically
linked to such things as politics, religion, kinship, social strati-
fication and group formation which along with it make up the content of
the life of a society. Economic activity provides the material means

for their realization (Godelier, 1972: 257, 263). An economy does not

29

exist of and for itself but serves the hierarchy of socio-cultural needs

of society.

Definition of Economics: The Formalist-Substantivist Debate

 

This leads to an overdue statement of what is meant by "economics"
and its relationship to this study. To return to an earlier point, an
economy is not a concrete, discrete thing that can be isolated and dis—
sected into its constituent elements as can be done with a biological
organism (Cook, 1973: 812). It is foremost an heuristic construct
allowing for an analysis and understanding of particular aspects of
human activity.

The first problem is to specify what is "economic," something which
has concerned anthropologists for some time and has provided a subject
for much argument and polemic. It is not the intention of this dis—
cussion to go into the formalist-substantivist debate in any great depth
as it is considered to be practically a dead issue and little purpose
would be served by doing so. The differences between the two have been
reconciled in the approach adopted in this study (Cook, 1973; Godelier,
1972).

Briefly, formalists define the economy as an aspect of all human
behavior. It is found in any activity involving a relationship between
ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.

It does not attempt to pick out certain kinds of behavior, but
focuses attention on a particular aspect of behavior, the form
imposed by the influence of scarcity. . . . We do not say that
the production of potatoes is economic activity and the pro-
duction of philosophy is not. We say rather that, in so far
as either activity involves the relinquishment of other

desired alternatives, it has its economic aspect. (Robbins,
1968: 96-97)

 

30

included is the notion of maximization: choice is exercised to allocate
scarce means to obtain desired ends and this endsameans relationship is
calculated rationally to receive the greatest return for the means
expended (Burling, 1968: 179). In short, economics is the study of
economizing behavior; that aspect of any purposive, goal oriented acti—
vity which involves the allocation of scarce means to multiple ends to
achieve the maximum return of whatever is desired.

The most problematic part of this definition is the explicit denial
that economics deals with any particular thing or activity. Firth,
while accepting this definition modifies it by inserting the element of
materiality as well (Firth, 1967: 3—4). But by and large, these prin—
ciples are assumed to be applicable to almost any activity. In effect,
everything comes under the purview of economics as long as it involves
the allocation of scarce means to alternative ends (Robbins, 1968: 97;
Burling, 1968: 177; LeClair and Schneider, 1968: 455). Time too can be
considered a scarce resource and thus every human action becomes economic
by definition. As Cook and Godelier note, such a definition ". .. deals
with everything in society but in fact with nothing" (Cook, 1973: 809);
". .. while all purposive action comes to be called economic in prin-
ciple, no action actually remains economic in fact" (Godelier, 1972: 253).

The substantivists also suffer conceptual and operational diffi—
culties. They differentiate two meanings of "economic." One is the
formal definition, the endsemeans relationship and the necessity of
choice conditioned by scarcity, as discussed above. The substantive
meaning is based on empirical reality, the process by which a socio-
cultural system provisions itself. The formal definition follows the

rules of the mind and is logically deductive. The substantive

31

definition follows the roles of nature -- that humans universally must
secure the material conditions of their existence to survive and repro-
duce themselves -- and this is inductive (after Cook, 1968).

The substantivists hold that the formal and substantive definitions
coincidentally apply to only one type of economy, a price regulated mar-
ket economy such as western capitalism. In such an economy, all social
actors obtain their livelihood through the exchange of material goods or
services as producers, workers and consumers; or as buyers and sellers.
The institution of price regulated markets, which logically exist prior
to activity, creates scarcity by establishing the relationship of
scarce means, i.e., money as wages, profits or purchasing power, to
alternative ends. Actors must rank their preferences and objectives and
rationally calculate costs and returns of each. These conditions it is
argued, are not necessarily found in all empirical situations and thus
the applicability of the formal definition depends on the existence of
particular institutional settings (Polanyi, 1968; Dalton, 1968; Sahlins,
1972).

In the substantivist view, economics is an instituted process. It
is the interaction between man and his environment (including other men)
which results in a continuous supply of material things (Polanyi, 1968:
126). It is a process which provisions society, Inn: no institution is
economic in and of itself. Insofar as any one functions to provision
society, it has an economic aspect and is part of the economic process
(Sahlins, 1972: 185). The process is imbedded in social institutions
which may perform various functions other than the provisioning one.
Economics thus follows the dictates of those institutions of which it is

a part and therefore, cannot be a separate or self—regulating entity.

32

Only analyses of the institutionalized manner in which societies provi—
sion themselves allow for comparison and the construction of general-
ities. Analyses based on the formal logico—deductive principles which
are institutionally specific do not permit this (Dalton, 1968: xxxii).

The substantivists have problems similar to those of the formal-
ists. Nothing is demarcated as economic. With the exception of western
market institutions in which the economy appears to emerge as a separ-
able entity, economics appears as an aspect of other institutions.
Although a field of activity is implied —- the material provisioning of
society -- it dissolves into other areas of human concern, e.g., kin-
ship, religion or politics. Emphasis is placed on exterior relations
with other areas of activity (the opposite of the formalists' emphasis
on interior relations and internal consistency). Neither are components
of the process specified, e.g., production, distribution, exchange and
consumption, other than the general notion of provisioning, acquisition
and appropriation. Thus the substantivists also find themselves without
a specific field of inquiry.

They are also devoid of any general theory about economic behavior.
There is provision for descriptive analysis which leads to the delinea—
tion of process types, reciprocity, redistribution and exchange. Using
it, one can also articulate economics with social and cultural features
of the environment in which the process occurs. By doing so, one rein-
forces the functionalist approach in anthropology, that economics is a
part of society and culture. But a broad functionalist umbrella does
not tell us much about economic behavior and organization pg£_§g, nor

does it allow for the specificity as to what is and what is not

33

economic. As with the formalists, everything in society may have an
economic aspect, but nothing is economic itself.

Neither approach sufficiently comes to grips with the nature and
scope of economic inquiry. The formalists argue for deductive models
and principles, but fail to delineate the phenomena to which they
apply. The substantivists are no more successful. They do help
clarify, but not successfully interrelate the distinction between
reality, and reality as conceived by theory. Each has a different point
of departure and emphasizes different levels of analysis. Both wind up
talking by each other without being able to pin down the nature and
scope of the phenomena over which they are debating.

The two approaches are not incompatible. Portions of each can be
used once the field of inquiry is established. Formal constructs should
reflect the reality with which they deal, hence the importance of speci-
fying the scope of reality to which they apply. Reality only becomes
intelligible within a conceptual framework or context which allows one
to analyze it (after Cook, 1973: 810). To have form, there must be sub-

stance; to understand substance, there must be a conceptual framework.

Definition of an Economic Field

 

Interestingly, both parties deal with material flows, provisioning,
the earning or making of a livelihood and the socio-cultural relations
by which they occur. It is surprising that this implied field of acti-
vity has not been given formal recognition by either.

The concept of an economic field serves several purposes. It sets
out consistent criteria by which things are economic or are related to

economics; i.e., it divides the universe into manageable units and

34

categories. It is a construct which allows one to generate propositions
about the relations between elements in the field. One can also discern
the articulation between economics and other fields of human activity.
Essentially, one is able to set boundaries and delineate a heuristic
field for inquiry without separatingix:entirely from other things which
may be of relevance.
Cook has formulated such a definition of the economic field which

is used with some modification in this study.

The economy is a culturally mediated field of a human popula-

tion's activity in which its members interact with their

physical and social environment in the calculated attempt to
acquire, directly or indirectly, a living. (Cook, 1973: 810)

' refers to the distinction

The phrase "directly or indirectly,‘
between management units producing to meet their consumption needs
directly, e.g., peasant households, and those involved in interunit
exchange, e.g., commercial farmers or market intermediaries. These are
not mutually exclusive categories. One would be hard pressed to find
any individual or management unit which does not participate in
exchange activities at all. The distinction lies in primary orienta-
tion; the direct acquisition of need satisfying things through produc-
tion or through production/exchange and/or exchange.

"Acquire . . . a living" refers to obtaining wealth or usable items
to satisfy subsistence and acquisitive wants. The emphasis is on acti-
vities which sustain, maintain and reproduce the social unit. This does
not, however, exclude other activities such as the production, transfer
and use of material wealth for prestige, ceremonial, political, status

maintenance and enhancement, or other non—subsistence purposes. The

point is an economy does not function solely to keep people alive.

35

"Calculated attempt" implies that economic activity is purposive
and entails choice. It is a rational process in which actors tailor
their means or choose between alternative means to at least attain cer-
tain minimal ends. Choice does not necessarily imply conditions of
scarcity, although limited time and effort may apply to almost all
situations. For instance, Polanyi points out the necessity of choice
where there are two different ways containing the same advantages and
disadvantages, to attain the same end. There can be scarcity of means
without choice, only one possible combination of limited means to attain
an end. This is applicable only under those circumstances where the end
has been defined and is being pursued. There is still choice involved
in setting the end, even though the decision may ultimately come down to
the choice between living and dying. Also, an abundance of means, far
from diminishing the difficulties of choice, would rather increase them.
Scarcity is a matter of fact and may or may not be present in a given

situation (Polanyi, 1968: 125).

Critique of "Rationality"

 

Economic activity as a rational process implies that means used in
pursuing an end should be appropriate to the task and that ends be col-
lectively coherent and not contradictory (Godelier, 1972: 12). Ration-
ality is relevant to the means-ends relationship and not to the process
whereby ends are defined as objectives worthy of pursuit. Thus one can—
not assume that to produce only enough grain to feed onself is irra-
tional whereas producing as much grain as possible under the same
resource and market conditions for sale, profit and to feed oneself is

rational. Whatever the end, one should choose one's means accordingly.

36

Rationality refers to the means-end relationship and not to the setting
of goals. In effect, there is no such thing as a rational goal

(Polanyi, 1968: 124; Srinivas, 1966: 52). This is important to keep in
mind as it relates directly to the problem of variation, divergent goals

within the same environment.

Critique of Maximization and Economizing

Rationality does imply economizing, that is, minimizing costs in
attaining a given objective. But this does not imply a universal maxi—
mization principle which tends to channel behavior in a particular dir-
ection. Operationalized to its simplistic form in most economic dis-

" that demand for material

cussion, maximization means "more is better,
things is insatiable. This assumes that actors will inevitably tend
toward those activities and strategies which bring the greatest material
reward (which leads one to wonder about university professors). This is
the supposed engine which drives the economic process and also explains
change.

According to this line of thought, economic behavior reflects the
constraints of an opportunity structure. This is comprised of physical
and information resources (including technology); marketing and regu-
latory institutions, communications and transportation; a degree of mar-
ket imperfections, risk and uncertainty; and potential cost—benefit
ratios for different combinations of things and strategies pursued. Out
of the range of alternatives contained in such an environment, the actor
chooses the strategy which brings the best return. This holds for pro-

duction, exchange and consuming behavior. For a producer in a monetized

economy, this is interpreted as cash profits. That combination of

37

things which brings the greatest profit is the one which the "econo—
mically rational" actor will gravitate toward.

The constraints of the opportunity structure determine upper limits
of productivity and efficiency. The performances of individuals and the
economy as a whole should reach an equilibrium approximating this level.
Low productivity is due to the lack of opportunity to efficiently pro-
duce more. Change in the strategy and performance of actors occurs due
to changes in opportunities which either diminish or increase the
returns to be had. Given the opportunity, economic actors will turn
sand into gold. This is the basic argument at least implicit in most
approaches to economic development. Manipulate the opportunity struc-
ture to ensure greater productivity with profitability, and growth will
occur. Maximization of material return is the engine to be freed.
Greed, properly channeled, is of the highest social utility (Schultz,

1964; Papanek, 1967; Blair, 1971; Asian Development Bank, 1968).

Uncertainty and Risk

 

Apart from the problem of assuming the ends of economic behavior,
i.e., that economic actors maximize material return, there are other
criticisms to be made. Many authors have qualified this approach to
take into account uncertainty and risk.

In few situations do people have perfect knowledge concerning the
outcome of their activities. All that is certain is the result of
strategies pursued in the past. The further one departs from past beha-
vior, the less certain are the consequences. This confirms the wisdom
of: "We will do today what we did yesterday unless there are very good

reasons for doing otherwise" (Boulding, 1961: 86-87). In such a

38

situation, an actor may search for additional information on the pro-
bable results of other strategies and will take up alternatives despite
uncertainty if past performance has not yielded desired results. Simi-
larly, people do not often wholly commit themselves to new ventures but
commit a small portion of their resources in trial runs (Wharton, 1971:
572).*

In this line of criticism the assumption remains that maximizing
underlies economic behavior. It argues that pe0ple are maximizers and
were it not for uncertainty and risk, they would opt for the most pro-
fitable strategy. It does, however, incorporate a satisficing notion as
actors remain satisfied with a particular strategy unless things become
too had, even though they may be aware of potentially more rewarding

strategies.

Satisficing

 

The satisficing argument, as developed by Simon, comes from psycho-
logy and centers on the notion of satiation. Action stems from drives
and ceases when they are satisfied. Satisfaction is conditioned by the
environment and may be specified by an aspiration level which is
adjusted up or down on the basis of the actor's experience. For
instance, if applied to the behavior of a business firm, the goal is not
necessarily to maximize profit, but perhaps to attain a certain level of
return or a share of the market. Studies of marketing behavior in which
businessmen apply a standard mark-up to establish the selling price of
commodities instead of charging what the market will bear support this

argument. Other studies have shown that firms with a declining share of

 

*See also Cancian, 1972: passim and Ortiz, 1973: passim.

39

the market strive to increase sales more than other firms whose shares
of the market are steady or increasing. When performance falls short of
aspirations or expectations, the search for new alternatives and adop-
tion of different strategies is induced (Simon, 1967: 10-12).

The concept of satisficing is central to my argument and it is
applicable to subsistence agriculture. Cultivating techniques and
levels of production are adjusted to meet the food requirements of the
household. The search for new alternatives begins when current produc-
tion falls below requirements, due for instance to the increase in size
of household. Once that level has been achieved through searching out
new alternatives, bringing more land under cultivation or intensifying
cultivation, behavior stabilizes and production levels off even though

the potential has not been reached.

Maximization of Utility

 

Another problem brought out by Simon is the extention of the maxi—
mization principle beyond material or monetary rewards. An actor's
satisfaction (or utility function) may include more than material things
such as pleasure derived from a particular occuption, leisure time, or
other activities which bring prestige, grace, salvation, power, reknown
or goodwill. These other activities may make one forego material
reward (they have an opportunity cost) or may entail the use of
resources that could otherwise be used to earn such rewards. If an
actor maximizes utility in this sense, he will have to balance material
gain against "psychic income." But if "psychic income" is allowed into
the utility function, maximization loses its definitiveness and power of

explanation (Simon, 1967: 9).

40

With this argument, maximization becomes a tautological principle.
Since actors are by definition maximizers of utility, their utility
function determines their behavior whatever the mix of material and
"psychic" utility may be. Therefore, whatever behavior an actor
exhibits, it is a reflection of his utility function. No matter what an
actor does, he is maximizing. This principle explains every human act,
and hence explains nothing.

At the very most this approach allows for a post mortum of what an

 

actor was doing. But it does not explain why a particular actor or sets
of actors choose to do one thing over another, nor why with identical
circumstances and opportunities, actors will exhibit divergent behavior.
Neither does it explain behavior with regard to material ends, why some
peOple prefer more and others less of material rewards. As in
Godelier's criticism of operations research (page 23 above), the maxi-
mization principle and its corollary of rational choice are incapable of
defining the objects toward which behavior is directed. As a conse-
quence neither can they explain behavior toward a particular object or
set of objects, e.g., material rewards, since by definition, all beha-
vior is ultimately maximizing behavior and therefore, rational.

In operations research, it is assumed that actors already have
defined their universe, ranked combinations of alternatives within it
and have set their respective courses of action in accordance with the
subjective evaluations of utility. Actors draw their own indifference
curve (ultimately between material reward and "psychic income"), and
economic analysis proceeds from there (Heath, 1976: 8-10). The ability
to predict behavior with this approach stems from actors making deci-

sions on the basis of past experience. The problem remains, however, of

41

explaining how actors arrive at their particular utility function and

set on their course of action.

Socio-Cultural Environment

In order to answer this question one has to go beyond individuals
and the general form of purposive action. One must know the structure
of the relationships of which they are a part. Instead of starting with
the individual's subjective evaluations of utility, it is more fruitful
to begin with the environment in which actors operate (after Godelier,
1972: 25).

The environment sets limits to the possible forms behavior can
take. It also sets limits to the material things manipulated in the
processes of production, transfer and utilization. It defines how the
economic process is to be carried out and what the relations are between
individuals and groups involved. It also defines valued objects, as
well as valued positions and life styles which require material means
for their realization. This is a socio-cultural process, not an idio-
syncratic one. In short, human beings are not only individuals, but are
also physical, social and cultural beings subject to the constraints,
incentives, definitions, meanings and categories of the system of rela-
tionships in which they participate.

In order to live and reproduce, people must adapt to their physical
environment. They must at least provide for minimum shelter, warmth,
protection and energy requirements. A particular physical environment
-- composed of mineral, animal and plant resources -- presents limita-
tions, possibilities and imperatives for these things to be accomplished.

The physical setting must contain exploitable material resources.

42

Humans must have the means to exploit those resources. Technology --
equipment, techniques, skills and knowledge —- provides the means for
such exploitation and mediates the relationship between a population
and its physical environment. Economic behavior than is partially an
ecological process which partakes of energy flows and transfers as well
as material flows and transformations which make all forms of socio—
cultural life possible.

By this criterion, economics is concerned primarily with the mater-
ial realm. But some people make their living by providing a service
which does not involve the use of material means. Non—material ser-
vices can be included in the economic field insofar as they provide
their performers with the material conditions of their existence. For
instance, a Brahmin priest recites scriptures, performs rituals and
gives advice to his clientele. In return he either receives cash,
grain, cloth, land, and/or cattle. A service such as a free concert,
although it has an economic aspect as it involves the production, trans-
fer and use of material things for its performance, is not economic.

Within the economic field, a human population interacts with its
social environment to acquire a living. Individuals are involved in
person-to-person relationships, are members of groups in relation to
other groups and are participants in larger incorporating processes and
formations, e.g., families, villages, castes, states, politics or market
exchange networks. People hold particular statuses and perform appro-
priate roles containing obligation, rights, duties, responsibilities
and expectation vis-a-vis others in the community. As participants
they are subject to the constraints and incentives which govern the

larger whole.

43

These relations can be conceived as a system in which its consti-
tuent parts: individuals, concepts, institutions or things, are linked
by rules which define and govern their combination. Rules are explicit,
willed principles created, applied and followed to organize social life.
Every known population has had rules and one might argue they are a
necessary condition for human life. Through some modicum of order, life
is predictable, has purpose and people know what to expect from one
another. Unrelated objects (and people) are deprived of meaning and
purpose; objectless relations are deprived of existence (Godelier, 1972:
258).

Not all activity is defined or directed by conscious design. Acti-
vities, structures, processes and relationships have certain conse—
quences that are not always anticipated or willed. These are the
unintentional properties of a system; ones to which people must adapt.
Societies make successive adjustments in their rules and patterns of
relations when the situation demands. .A society submits to such laws
without necessarily having explicit or theoretical awareness of them
(Godelier, 1972: 260-261). Similarly in natural law, falling bodies do
not have to be aware of gravitation for it to have its effect.

But in social systems, there is no clear cause and effect principle
whereby one, a combination, or all possible things will be altered to
bring about an accommodation. For instance, a swidden based society
favoring large families which leads to population growth will have to
make some accommodation when there is no more land for expansion. Whe-
ther this involves infanticide, birth control, later marriages,
restricted access to land, internecine warfare, or whatever, is not

determined by the unfavorable land-population ratio. Change is

44

influenced by the properties of all domains within the system each of
which has a limiting effect on the others and influences the range of
possible forms which can appear in any one (Godelier, 1972: 257-263).

Whether one's analysis is diachronic or synchronic, the initial
problem is to delineate the relevant levels and structures —- broadly
techno-environment-economic, social and cultural —- and specify their
correspondences. One level, however, cannot be reduced to or deduced
from any other.

We must therefore tackle the problem of the laws of corre-
Spondence between structures without allowing ourselves to be
affected by any implicit philosophy of causality in the
social domain. . . . such as the idea that the non-economic
can be reduced to the economic, or deduced from it -- or the
other way around. . . . (T)he influence of the overall social
(including physical and cultural) structure always enters in
between one event and another, and giving to each of them .

. the field of its effects, whether intentional (conscious),

or not. (Godelier, 1972: 259)

From an evolutionary perspective, the effect of the material-
techno—economic domain is primary in a cumulative and teleological
sense. This holds as a general principle as the elaboration of socio—
cultural forms presupposes the material means for their realization.
And the material means are obtained only through economic processes.
But in shorter term analyses, such as the synchronic one of this study,
there is no simple causal relationship flowing from a material-techno-
economic base to structure to superstructure. There is evidence to
demonstrate mutually limiting effects in the correspondence between
economic and non-economic domains within a system and also for individual

behavior (Cook, 1973: 816, 819; Godelier, 1972: passim; Ribeiro, 1970:

428; Vogt and O'Dea, 1975: passim).

45

Range of Alternatives

 

The point to be emphasized is the mutually limiting effect Operat—
ing between different domains of human reality. This can be conceived
as a system of constraints and incentives which set limits or ranges of
tolerance around possible forms of organization and individual behavior
which can appear in any one.

For economic activity these limits arise partially from within the
domain itself, those things directly involved in the production, trans-
fer and use of goods and services. These are set by the physical
resources present, i.e., what can be extracted and used given climate,
minerals, flora and fauna. Technology sets parameters in that equip—
ment, knowledge, skills and techniques contain possibilities and limits
to what, how much, and in what state of transformation things from the
physical environment can be exploited and put to use. Technology also
requires certain necessary relationships between individuals and groups
as in the organization of work, specialization or cooperative effort.
The relationship between the size of population, its physical environ-
ment and technology may lead to differential access to and control over
productive resources. This limits what individuals and groups have to
work with to acquire a living. The economic infrastructure sets limits,
e.g., the presence, extent and complexity of markets, transport and
regulatory institutions (including development agencies in the case of
the two villages studied).

Combining these parameters, one can delimit the range of possible

forms that economic activity can take. The particular combination has

 

implications for the productivity and efficiency of management units,

sectors and the economy as a whole. Given a configuration of these

46

things (which may differ across management units), there is likely to be
a range of possible and viable alternatives which management units can
pursue, not all of which are equally materially rewarding. This range
is constrained by the upper limits of productivity and efficiency given
resources and opportunities present and at the lower end by the impera—
tive to produce, make or earn enough to ensure the viability of the
management unit.

For specific management units this range may be wide, for others
narrow. For instance, an agricultural household with plenty of land and
resources has more latitude in specific production strategies, levels of
productivity and efficiency than a household with a small plot and few
resources from which it makes a living. The minimal levels of produc-
tivity and efficiency that ensure adequate income iknr survival are dif—
ferent for each. In any situation, performance is bounded by the maxi-
mal and minimal possibilities contained in the resource and opportunity
structure.

The only obligation a management unit has, is to fall somewhere in
this range. Economic performance is not solely conditioned by the maxi-
mum material return, but also by the floor of viability below which it
is possible for the unit to maintain and reproduce itself. Where each
unit, and by extension the economy as a whole, falls in this range is
also conditioned by the social and cultural environment in which it
operates (Godelier, 1972: passim; Sahlins, 1972: passim; Nair, 1969:
Chapter 29).

Within the framework of a given technology the level of
operative efficiency . . . will be determined in the final
analysis, not by the Olympian heights of the potential of pro-

duction and profit, but by the floor of economic and technical
feasibility and social expectation below which it is impossible

47

to farm. And the scale and spread of efficiency . . . will
depend upon whether this floor is the same for all, or dif-
ferent for various strata and sections. If there is a signi-
ficant differential in levels, there will be a corresponding
differential in response and effort, even to similar and
equal opportunities. (Nair, 1969: 231-232)

It is in the interior-exterior relationship between economic and
non-economic domains that economic behavior is to be understood. As
non-economic activities and relationships involve material means for
their realization they have economic implications. Furthermore, it is
in these relationships and activities for which things are produced,
transferred and used that objects or economic process take on definition
and meaning which they do not find in themselves (Godelier, 1972: 257).
It is not a matter of more being better, but rather more in relation to
what, and more so, how much of what for what purpose.

The need for a cultivating household to acquire material things is
related not only to biological requirements and the personal likes and
dislikes of its members. The household also exists socially. The var-
ious rights, duties, and obligations which stem from relations with kin,
fellow community members and subordinate-superordinate relations (e.g.,
a state or landlord who makes claims on production or income), require
material means and energy for their accomplishment. These also act as
demands which must be met (Wolf, 1966: 1-17). The floor of viability
thus is based on biological needs and social needs which may determine
the minimal and optimal levels in the range of possibility.

By optimal level I mean that level of productivity and efficiency
necessary for the discharging of obligations and the support of non-

economic activities, relations and institutions. This level does not

necessarily correspond to the maximum possible production of goods and

48

services, "but this optimum expresses the 'social necessity' of their
production" (Godelier, 1972: 290). This represents a cutoff point above
which production of goods and services fulfills no function. In the
absence of goods and services entering into social competition -— parti-
cularly in primitive subsistence economies -- there is no need to pro-
duce beyond the limit of socially necessary wants (Godelier, 1972: 290).
Even where goods and services do enter into social competition to demon-
strate such things as difference in status, prestige or power, there is
an optimal cutoff point in their production. They may be monopolized by
some while others are denied their acquisition by convention or law.
With similar effect, people often pursue strategies of status mainte-
nance (which does not deny that some attempt upward mobility). If a
particular level of production or acquisition satisfies this need and
also other duties and obligations, there is no need to produce or
acquire more even if it is available. This is particularly true for
those in positions of dominance.*

Surplus capacity to produce may be present and may be perceived by
the actors. But there is no necessity for that surplus to be realized.
"The system, having thus defined sufficiency, does not realize the sur-
plus of which it is perfectly capable" (Sahlins, 1972: 68).

The point to be emphasized is material means and the wants and
needs they satisfy do not appear in an economy on their own and are not

acted upon by individuals in a vacuum pursuing their idiosyncratic

 

*One is reminded of a remark attributed to Nelson Rockefeller, the
substance of which was being, a Rockefeller, i.e., being at the top of
the socio-economic ladder, what else is there to do in life but become
President. There are counterparts on a smaller scale in the two vil-
lages studied.

49

utility. Value and utility are properties of things existing in rela-
tional contexts. Things produced, transferred and used, are parts of
the total system of relations which make up the life of a particular
population.

The explanation then, for different strategies, organization and
performance in economic activity is linked to the socio-cultural
environment. This becomes most evident where controls are made for dif-
ferences in resources and opportunities across a population. The range
of possible forms is ultimately bounded by material resources, techno-
logy and the infrastructure which set minimal and maximal levels. But
where there is a gap between the minimal and maximal levels, the influ-
ence of socio-cultural constraints and incentives is most evident.

For agricultural production, the range of forms, strategies and
performances in the two villages studied is very wide. Even within
categories of cultivators defined by their access to and control over
resources, the range is still wide. To what degree this is a function
of purely technical and infrastructural considerations and to what
degree this is a function of the socio-cultural environment are the main

questions of the study.

CHAPTER II

SELECTION OF SITES AND GENERAL BACKGROUND

Selection of Sites

 

The selection of Rajasthan as a research area was guided by several
considerations. It is "less developed" than Haryana, Punjab and parts
of Uttar Pradesh which have undergone significant changes in the organi-
zation of production and are well down the road toward mechanized and
commercialized agriculture. Rajasthan was not chosen for its pristine
state but on the desire to analyze the process of change from the ground
up. As this study is a first step in a continuing line of research on
problems of economic change, I wanted to study agricultural production
and community life at a point prior to the full effects of "moderni-
zation."

Another consideration was familiarity with the region. Both I and
my wife* had lived in Rajasthan for a number of years (1966-68) and were
conversant with rural life, agricultural practices and programs and
local dialect. Language was an important factor. Rajasthani is a dia-
lect of Hindi which I speak. Language competency is extremely important
for research and helps immeasurably to keep one's sense of balance while

in the field. The ability to communicate avoids the paranoia of the

 

*She conducted research concurrently in the same villages on the
effect of economic change on political attitudes and behavior. (See
Michie, 1975: passim.)

50

51

"outsider" and permits easy access to information and control on the
quality of data. A major problem in using interpreters, particularly
for graduate students, is the rather equivocal relationship involved in
supervision. Interpreters are usually other university students, one's
peers. A11 interviews and collection of materials were done personally
with a bit of help on the few occasions when the local dialect was too
thick.

In short, Rajasthan was selected partly because of its familiarity.
Conditions were conducive for field work on the problems outlined. The
choice also avoided many of the logistical problems facing anthropolo-
gists entering the field for the first time.

As one of the problem areas was the effect of development programs
on economic behavior, I wanted to focus on those districts involved in
the Intensive Agricultural Areas and High Yielding Varieties programs
(IAA and HYV). Jaipur and Bharatpur districts were chosen because other
districts in these programs had been affected by prolonged drought.
Originally Udaipur District in southern Rajasthan was to be surveyed as
well. It has a unique pattern of small holdings, high percentage of
irrigated land and double cropping. Work in Udaipur was not possible.
Cultivators had been unable to grow crops for over a year and it would
have been awkward to ask them about agricultural production under famine
conditions. Another district, Sri Ganganagar, was a possibility. It is
one of the most productive districts in India, is canal irrigated, but
lies on the border with Pakistan. Aside from Government of India's
objections to research being done in border areas, the district is popu-

lated heavily by Punjabi migrants. This would have added a complicating

52

ethnic variable. The choice ultimately came down to Jaipur and
Bharatpur.

Although these districts were among the first to participate in the
programs, not all villages were covered by them initially. It was
important to chose villages which had been early participants. I
assumed that such villages would be affected more and differences across
cultivating households would be more pronounced than in non-program
areas. As the study was to test for and examine different responses of
cultivators to their economic environment, it was essential to find vil-
lages where the bounds of tolerance were the greatest and variations a
possibility.

Bharatpur and Jaipur districts also provide bases for comparison.
Bharatpur lies in a richer agricultural zone, is one of the more produc-
tive districts in Rajasthan, haszihigh degree of mechanization and
adoption of new agricultural techniques and is generally considered a
more "progressive" region. Jaipur on the other hand is not as well
endowed in physical resources, is not as affected by development pro—
grams and although a "good" agricultural area is not as "progressive" as
Bharatpur. I was particularly interested in examining the effects of
mechanization, development programs and the commercialization of agri-
culture. Each district provides a control on the other with regard to
the effect of these things on local production patterns and cultivators'
response to them. This comparative framework helped sharpen and modify
the analysis and conclusions, each area contributing to the study as a
whole.

In both districts, the choice narrowed down to a handful of vil-

lages. Final selection was based on distance from urban centers.

53

Villages closer to towns had a high degree of truck farming and gentle-
men farmers. The research problem also focused on the effect of socio-
cultural features on economic behavior. Thus, I assumed that villages
with numerous castes engaged in agriculture would demonstrate the

effect of divergent obligations, expectations, life—styles and dominant-
subordinant relations on economic activities. Another consideration was
the receptivity on the part of villagers to outsiders coming into their
midst. Both villages were extremely hospitable and people were very
patient and interested as field work progressed.

In both villages, there were problems in drawing a sample of culti-
vating households. I wanted to interview only those people making pro-
duction decisions: actual cultivators. Unfortunately, there are no
lists of cultivators. In Hanumangarh (Jaipur District), I attempted a
house-to—house survey to distinguish cultivators from non-cultivators
and landowners from tenants. This proved unmanageable as a minimum of
one-half hour was spent with each and there are over one thousand house-
holds. Furthermore, I received a considerable amount of misinformation,
particularly from large landowners who suspected my motives and who were
afraid because they owned more land than is permitted under the ceiling
legislation.

Sample lists were made from land records with the help of patwaris
(land registrars).* They were able to distinguish landlords from owner
cultivators and to combine dispersed titles into single management

units. Tenants were identified from voters' lists which record each

 

*Initially I avoided patwaris as they have a general reputation
among cultivators for corruption and I did not want to be identified
with them. In both villages they were luckily honest and conscientious,
a fact corroborated by cultivators themselves.

54

household by ward. These lists were verified with the aid of informants
from the wards.

Seven hundred and sixty households of cultivators were identified
in Hanumangarh. Out of a randomly selected ten percent, forty—four were
available or willing to be interviewed. In Shivpura (Bharatpur Dis—
trict), one hundred and fifty households were identified, out of which

"informants," and

ten were interviewed.* As such, the sample represents
the field method employed is a combination of survey research and parti-
cipant observation in which any biases of mine are controlled by the
random selection of these "informants."

Detailed information on agricultural production and other economic
activities was collected from each person interviewed. All information
was based on their activities and performance during the cropping sea-
sons of rabi, 1971-72, and kharif, 1972, and is based on recall. Though
it might have been better to have collected information for the two sea-
sons in the same crop year, the timing of field work made this impos-
sible.

The sample itself is a stratified one: the cultivators were chosen
by land size. The small category includes those households operating
five or less acres. The medium size includes those with more than five

and up to and including ten acres. The large category holds more than

ten acres each. In subsequent analysis I further broke down the strata

 

*A total of four persons refused to be interviewed. Difficulties
in finding other cultivators was compounded by the distance of hamlets
in Hanumangarh. After trudging for several miles I would find infor-
mants gone for the day. I generally made three attempts in such cases
before giving up. Additionally, several respondents had moved away
either permanently or for seasonal work.

55

by type of landholding and have also distinguished owner cultivators

from tenants and owner-cum—tenants.

Physical and Demographic Background

 

Rajasthan is in the northwest central part of India (see map,
Figure 2.1). Geographically and historically, it has been on the
periphery of the country. It is not part of the north Indian heartland,
the rich alluvial plain of the Jumna and Ganges Rivers. Neither is it
on major overland routes or sea coasts -- the major points of entree for
invaders over the centuries. The Aravalli Mountains bisecting the state
from southwest to northeast and the western Thar Desert are barriers
against penetration into the region. Delhi, the historical fulcrum of
imperial power in north India, lies to the northeast. Routes to central
and southern India lie to the east.

Several important trade routes were in Rajasthan although never
under outside control. ‘Camel caravans travelled across the Thar to the
Indus valley further west. Another trade route through eastern and
southern regions connected Agra with the Gujerat city of Ahmedabad and
port cities along the Gulf of Cambay. Aside from these few routes,
Rajasthan was not well integrated with other areas. Even today it is
only moderately well connected by rail with surrounding regions. The
present road network is mainly of the post-independence era (Pal, 1968:
153-160).

Present day Rajasthan is bounded by Pakistan on the west. The
international boundary runs through the Thar Desert. To the north are
the states of Punjab and Haryana, well watered riverine plains which

form the "breadbasket" of the northern wheat growing zone. To the east

56

lies the Gangetic plain of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, a broken
mountainous region of central India. Gujerat, to the south, is also a
well watered and agriculturally rich region.

Rajasthan is semi—arid having few rivers, and falls on the tail end
of the monsoon from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. These two
monsoon winds lose most of their moisture across the Gangetic plain and
the mountain ranges of Gujerat. In the Thar Desert, rainfall is very
scanty; in places of the far west it averages less than six inches per
year. Rainfall is higher east of the Aravallis. The southeast portion
has an average of thirty to thirty—five inches, and the northeast,
between twenty to twenty-five. Most rain falls during the summer months
of June through September with occasional winter showers from October
into January. Rainfall is highly variable from year to year -- twenty-
five percent or more —— resulting in frequent drought. Most rivers of
any consequence are found east of the Aravalli range and are tributaries
into the Jumna system to the east (Cobb and Coleby, 1966: 78—96; Spate
and Learmonth, 1967: 47-71; Pal, 1966: 9—11; Government of Rajasthan,
1974a: 15-16).

Rajasthan is the second largest state in the Indian Union. It
covers some 132,129 square miles, approximately 10.5 percent of the
total area. Although the land area is large, Rajasthan has only 4.7
percent of the total pOpulation or 25.8 million persons and ranks tenth
among the twenty-nine states and territories. This is in large part due
to the ecological features described; most people are found where higher
population densities can be supported. In the western Thar region the
density per square mile drops below nine persons and in the eastern part

goes to 476. The state average is 194. It is a predominantly agrarian

57

state with 82 percent of the population in rural areas and around 85
percent of the rural work force engaged in agriculture (India Republic,
1971: 3, 7-29; Government of Rajasthan, 1974b: 30-34).

Rajasthan is part of the wheat zone of north India. Agriculture as
in most of the country, is predominantly rain fed. The major cropping
season, kharif, is during the monsoons: July/August through October/
November. The main crops taken are millet, sorghum, and maize as well
as subsidiary crops of lentils and gram. The other main season, £321,
in which wheat, barley, gram, and oilseed are grown runs through the
cold dry winter of October/November through March/April. These crOps
are grown on irrigated land, or that not planted during kharif which
retains moisture from the monsoons. The gab} crop is aided by occa—
sional light showers in January and February. A third interim crop,
gaid_£gbi_is possible on lands with good irrigation and runs through the
dry summer months between rabi and kharif. Small millets can be grown,
but the area under cultivation is miniscule in comparison with the other
seasons.

Most cropped land is under cereals. In 1971-72, 87 percent was
planted to food grains, 9 percent to oilseed and the rest to other fiber
and cash crops (see Table 2.1).* Of the total area planted, only 17
percent was irrigated (Government of Rajasthan, 1974a: 19-34). The
emphasis on food grains is an indication of a major orientation toward
subsistence grain agriculture.

Although most acreage is under millets (bajra), the staple for most

cultivators, yields are low compared to other crops. Millet is an

 

*The figures refer to gross cultivated area. Double crOpped land
is counted twice (See Table 2.1).

58

unirrigated kharif crop and is thus subject to fluctuations in produc-
tivity. For instance, 23133 yields ranged from 40 to 120 kilograms per
acre during 1968-70. Irrigated gab; crops fare better. During the same
years, wheat yields were between 410 to 535 kilograms per acre (Govern-
ment of Rajasthan, 1974a: 18).

Despite the fluctuations, productivity is below the levels possible
for both irrigated and unirrigated crOps. The different yields are par-
tially due to the nature of the cr0ps themselves. Wheat and barley
yield more than millets and maize when all are grown under optimal
conditions. However, before we begin our discussion of productivity,

some more regional background is in order.

History

Because of its geography, Rajasthan has been on the fringes of cen-
tral historical events. Until 1947—56, it was divided into several
princely states which had never been absorbed into north Indian empires.
Rajasthan's history is filled with stories of maharajas and battles
fought among competing princes and against imperial domination.

Over the past one thousand years the Rajasthani princes maintained
their autonomy against the Muslim Afghan and Mughal empires and the
Marathas of central India. Aside from attempts to bring central and
southern India under their hegemony, time focus of the empires was to
the east, along the Gangetic plain and to the northwest into the Punjab
and beyond.

During the British period, Rajasthan, with the exception of one
province directly in the middle, never became part of British India, but

through a series of subsidiary treaties in the early 18003, came under

59

British hegomony. The states retained authority over internal affairs
while control over foreign affairs and defense was ceded to the British.
The states also provided military contingents and tribute to the govern-
ment of British India. Present day Rajasthan includes twenty-one erst-
while princely states and chiefdoms, which after Indian independence in
1947 acceded to the Indian Union and were reorganized into the present
political and administrative unit in 1955 (Tod, 1957: passim; Kanungo,
1965: 1-6; Pal, 1968: 35-91).

The princely states were organized in a manner similar to other
areas of north India before the Muslim dynasties were established in the
thirteenth century. Kingdoms were clan territories held by rights of
conquest. Members of the ruling clan —- usually Rajputs -- were copar-
ceners of the common estate according to genealogical connection with
the founding ancestor. The senior lineage constituted the royal line
and following the role of primogeniture and patrilineal descent, the
office of £212 passed to the eldest son. The gala or chief was in prin-
ciple, the first among equals and was but one of the many coparceners of
the clan territory. Below the senior lineage were other lineages and
their subdivisions corresponding to politico-administrative divisions
down to the village level. Each level collected revenue and maintained
law and order within its jurisdiction. A portion of the revenue was
passed to superior levels in the hierarchy and some was retained for
maintaining the administrative apparatus -- including the military which
could be utilized by the superordinate chief -- and for personal con-
sumption. Leadership positions at all levels were mostly filled accord-
ing to the rule of primogeniture. This order appears to be feudal and

has often been referred to as such, but in actuality is a tribal form of

60

organization with the trappings of an archaic state (Thorner, 1956: 133—
150; Tod, 1957: passim; Fox, 1971: passim; Minturn and Hitchcock, 1966:
10-12; Chakravarty, 1975: 22—39).

This, of course, is an ideal model of state organization. The
important point to note is the kin-based nature of the princely states
and the idea of the state being a clan territory. In actual practice,
the picture was never so simple as evidenced by tenurial and revenue

administrative systems.

Land Relations

 

Land tenure and revenue systems in Rajasthan present .a variety of
classifications, principles, rights and cesses prior to the enactment of
land reform and the regularization of the system for the whole state in
the 19503. One author lists at least forty-five different categories
of rights which existed in the various states (Singh, 1964: 45).

In all princely states, rights over the use of land and its pro-
ducts were divided between the cultivator tenant, revenue assignee or
grantee and the state in the person of the gala. Land was not private
property although tenancies sometimes became heritable, transferable and
could be sublet. Most cultivators were tenants-at—will although in some
states legal provisions gave security of tenure to certain classes; this
a pre-independence twentieth century phenomenon (Kherie, 1948: 89-90).

Cultivators were either direct tenants of the state or various
assignees and grantees. These arrangements fall into two basic cate-
gories: the jagirdari system involving intermediaries between the
cultivator and the state, and khalsa, or the raja's lands directly

administered by the ruler and court.

61

Under the jagirdari system (not too unlike the zamindari system
under the British), assignees and grantees were clansmen of the ruling
house. Some also were subjugated chiefs not entirely dispossessed of
their territories. Grants were also given to managers of temples,
mosques, educational and charitable institutions for their support, and
to various officials and individuals who had performed services for the
state. These grants and assignments could be in perpetuity or only for
the lifetime of the assignee. Most depended on payment of revenue, but
others were free grants based on alliegance to the grantor and ulti—
mately to the £212: Assignees, or jagirdars, did not own the land, but
only had rights to revenue (Singh, 1964: 21—57; Kherie, 1948: 83-94).

Under the khalsa system, cultivators were the direct tenants of the
gala and revenue was collected by his representative. The latter often
was a tax farmer who bought the right to collect revenue -- whatever he
could extract -- and passed a fixed sum on to the state. In other
areas, revenue collection was administered by a tehsildar; a regular

official of the state bureaucracy. Under the khalsa system, land was

either leased out to a general body of cultivators —- and their headman
(patel) was responsible for collecting the revenue -- or taxes were

assessed directly on individual cultivators or holdings (Singh, 1964:
21-57; Kherie, 1948: 83-94).

Under all systems, tenants were usually chosen from those castes
who were traditionally agriculturalists, others who had forgone tradi-
tional occupations, or individuals who had reputations for being good
cultivators. Revenue was paid in kind as a share of the crop (the
ancient division of the grain heap), according to the productive capa-

city of the land and/or in the form of cash rents based on the market

62

value of average production. Aside from these rents, taxes, levies and
cesses were exacted in the form of free labor (bagag) on the raja's or
jagirdar's personally cultivated land, festival taxes and for use of
common grazing lands (Singh, 1964: 21-57; Guleri, 1916: 467-487; Kherie,
1948: 83-94).

During the 19508 a series of bills were passed which abolished the
jagirdari and khalsa systems. Former Eajaa_and jagirdars were allowed
to retain land under their direct supervision -- within limits of ceil-
ings provisions —- and they as well as former tenants are now classified
as tenants of the state, or khatedars. Virtually all rights of owner-
ship have been extended to them (Singh, 1964: 61-78; Government of
Rajasthan, 1952, 1958, 1959: all passim).

Land relations, despite the reforms of the 19503, remain inequal.
The former jagirdars are no longer intermediaries, but have retained
large portions of their former lands. Also those cultivators who were
favored tenants on large pieces of land, were able to retain it and
their dominant position. The reforms, although eliminating the onerous
burden of assignees and £§l§§ from the cultivator, did little to redis-
tribute land on an equal basis.

The following data on land distribution are dated as no compre-
hensive survey has been conducted since 1960-61 (see Tables 2.2 and
2.3). They do, however, point to the basic pattern which had not
changed much over the decade preceding this study.

The average ownership holding is about twelve acres although this
is a misleading figure. Of those households owning land, 17 percent own
about 60 percent of the total in holdings of twenty acres of more. At

the low end, 43 percent of owners own less than 7 percent of the land in

63

holdings of five acres or less. In terms of operational holdings (land
owned and leased) the figures do not change very much: the average
holding is about fourteen acres. About 19 percent of households operate
60 percent of the land on holdings of twenty acres or more. Similarly,
at the low end, 36 percent of households operate less than 7 percent of
the land on holdings of less than five acres.* This distribution com-
bined with the fact that most irrigated land tends to be owned by the
larger cultivators concentrates productive resources in relatively few

hands.

_agricultural Programs

 

By and large it is the larger cultivators who are the beneficiaries
of official agricultural programs. As local elites, they have better
access to development and extension officers and are able to command
more attention from them. There is also a built—in bias on the part of
most extension personnel who view larger cultivators as more productive
and efficient, at least potentially so, and see larger scale commercial
farming as the way to modernize agriculture. It is also easier to work
with a few large cultivators to cover an amount of acreage than it is to
thinly spread oneself over many small cultivators.

The current strategy for agricultural change is the outgrowth of

problems associated with population increase and poor cropping years in

 

*The average ownership and operational holdings in Rajasthan are
higher than the national averages: 4.97 and 6.17 acres respectively
(India Republic, 1968, 1970: 13 and 48, 52 respectively). This is due
to the lower population density of the state and that holdings in the
extremely arid regions of the west are by necessity larger if culti-
vators are to attain bare subsistence. The averages for areas in the
eastern part of the state come closer to the all-India averages.

64

the late 19508. Agricultural programs were part of the earlier commu—
nity development schemes and aggregate production had increased but not
at a rate sufficient to meet expanding food requirements. A concerted
effort was initiated in the early 19608 to increase food production.

The first program, the Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme
(IADP) started on a pilot basis in 1960-61 in three districts, one of
which Pali, is in Rajasthan. The approach was formulated by a team of
Ford Foundation specialists working with the Indian Planning Commission.
IADP was gradually extended to thirteen more districts over the next
three years and became a model for subsequent programs.

The basic approach channels limited resources into those areas
which have the most growth potential. Potential is determined by soils,
irrigation facilities, physical and institutional infrastructure and
past performance. The approach calls for an "integrated" or "package of
practices" which provides cultivators with improved equipment, better
physical inputs, cheaper credit and information concerning improved
cultivatingpractices. To give the farmer added incentive to adopt the
package, a pricing policy sets minimum prices for major agricultural
commodities. These prices are supported by the Food Corporation of
India, a public corporation, at receiving centers throughout the states,
to protect cultivators from price fluctuations and thus ensure the
profitability of the package of inputs (Ford Foundation Agricultural
Production Team, 1959: passim; India Republic, 1969: 106).

The scheme involves several other measures including land reform.
Land reform refers specifically to security of tenure rather than land
redistribution. It is based on the rationale that cultivators are

unwilling to invest in land they farm only temporarily. According to

65

this line of reasoning, security of tenure enables cultivators to invest
productively for their own self interest. On the assumption that there
is insufficient land for everyone to have an "economic" holding, non-
agricultural employment would have to be generated for the landless.
There is fear that land redistribution would be counter-productive:
We recognize the need for considering programmes for the

relief of those who have no land, and of those who cultivate

too little land. But it is imperative to achieve this objec-

tive in ways that will not retard the increases in food produc-

tion which are vital to national welfare. Some progress can

be made by arranging for reallocation, improvement and opera-

tion of potentially productive lands that are now idle, or

are being used very ineffectively. Care should be exercised,

however, so as not to break up farms that are efficiently and

productively Operated. (Ford Foundation Agricultural Produc-

tion Team, 1959: 29)

It is assumed that low productivity in Indian agriculture is a con-
sequence of backward technology, poorly developed markets and the lack
of profitability. Thus it is assumed that cultivators will be attracted
to the program if it is profitable. Cultivators are seen as economi—
cally rational beings who shift their production strategies in response
to profitability.*

The Intensive Agricultural Districts Programme was amended in
1964-65 to become the Intensive Agricultural Areas Programs (IAAP).

IAAP was extended into many more districts showing potential for growth.
The two villages studied were among the first in their districts to be
included. As opposed to IADP, IAAP concentrates on major grain crops
rather than comprehensive agricultural development. The same format

remains, resting on a combination of extension personnel, improved

inputs, credit, price supports and the profit motive.

 

*Following this rationale, there is no agricultural production or
income tax. This is to provide cultivators with an added incentive.

66

The real impact, however, has come with the hybridization of
cereals. Hybrid varieties of wheat were developed in the early 19603
and after field trials were introduced into those districts under IAAP
in 1966-67. This new program called the High Yielding Varieties
Program (HYV), was also introduced that year into the two villages
studied. Hybrid millets and maize were introduced later. These new
seeds present a tremendous potential for increased production and
stirred talk in the later 19603 and early 19708 of the Green Revolution
in India and the rest of Asia.

Of all the new varieties, wheat has met with the most success.
Under Optimal conditions the wheat hybrids more than double the produc—
tion of indigenous varieties. They are shorter and thus not prone to
lodging and are more responsive to fertilizer. The aim of the HYV pro-
gram has been to increase production for each crop in its respective
season. The hybrids also have shorter maturation periods, allowing for
multiple croppings. In many areas with assured irrigation, three crOps
can now be taken instead of two.

On the other hand, hybrids require more labor, irrigation, and if
not properly fertilized, produce less than traditional varieties. They
also require higher investments. The new inputs are available only
through monetized markets -- through either the open market or extension
agencies and cooperatives. They present cultivators with a new set of
relationships and ways of evaluating production performance which is not

present for the cultivation of indigenous varieties.

67

Administration

 

The administrative framework in which programs are implemented con—
sists of several levels. These levels correspond to parallel political
divisions (see Figure 2.2).

Rajasthan is divided into twenty—six districts. Each contains a

number of tehsils (revenue units) and panchayat samitis (development

 

blocks). The tehsils are headed by a tehsildar who is responsible for
land records, crop estimates and collection of land revenue. Beneath
him and his assistants are patwaris who are responsible for keeping land
records and crop estimates for their respective "circle" of villages.
They are also the officials to whom landowners pay their tax. Patwaris
are the most maligned of all local officials. They are generally viewed
by villagers as corrupt grasping individuals who take bribes in boundary
disputes and either overcharge or pocket revenue money.

Land revenue is based on the quality of land, the basic subdivi-
sions of which are irrigated, unirrigated and pasture land. Land tax is
nominal and constitutes a minute fraction of cultivators' overhead. It
is the only tax levied on cultivators. In 1972-73, the time in which
field work was conducted, government pr0posed an income tax on persons
earning a joint income of more than Rs. 5,000/- ($666.00) from agricul-
ture and business.

The tehsildar is also responsible for certain law and order issues
and works closely with the local police. He is also a magistrate and
hears some civil cases, usually those regarding land disputes.

The development block covers approximately one hundred villages.

At the lowest level are the village level workers (gram sevaks) who work

 

directly with farmers in their circle of approximately ten villages.

68

They are under the direction of the block staff provided by the state
government. This staff is responsible for distributing improved inputs,
conducting demonstrations and disseminating information to farmers
directly and through the village level workers. These agents are
usually university trained specialists in agronomy, plant pathology and
other agricultural sciences. They work under an administrator called
the block development officer. The entire staff comes under the super—
vision of the district offices which in turn are responsible to the
state ministries.

Each level of administration is responsible to a parallel political

body. At the village level, gram sevaks are responsible to the chairmen

 

(sarpanchas) of village councils (gram panchayats) composed of directly

 

 

elected local representatives (panchas). The block development staff is

responsible to the panchayat samiti chairman (pradhan) who is elected

 

from among the members of the samiti composed of village headmen. At
the district level, officers are responsible to the district council
chairman (pramukh) who is selected from the pradhans who constitute the

district level council (zilla parishad). Similarly at the state level,

 

ministry officials are responsible to cabinet ministers. Ministers are
members of the states' legislative assemblies and are directly elected
from their constituencies.* They hold their portfolios under a Chief
Minister according to parliamentary procedures. The only directly
elected officials are village council panchas, members of the states'

assemblies and also members of the national parliament.

 

*Neither state nor national cabinet ministers have to be elected
members of the assemblies or parliament. By convention, however, they
are members who are then asked by the chief or prime ministers to help
form the government.

69

Most activity locally surrounds the sarpanchas and the pradhan on
whose recommendations the administrative staff is supposed to act.
Quite often there are problems between the block development officer and
the pradhan over the direction of programs. Where elected representa—
tives are weak, the staff predominates. The latter perceive themselves
to be experts and resent interference from "untrained politicians."
Where there is a strong pradhan -— usually through links with politi—
cians and parties at the district and state levels —— the staff must
follow his directions or risk transfer or suspension through pressure
applied at higher political levels.

Local elections, although officially non-partisan, are openly sup-
ported by political parties who try to co—opt local leaders for state
and national level elections. Locally political support rests on
patron-client relationships which stem from ties of economic dependence
on dominant landed elites. It is this local elite, the large land—
owners and cultivators who through their control over local patronage
command the attention of the administrative staff.

In theory, programs are implemented through a two—way channel of
communication. The state government -— in whose jurisdiction develop-
ment, agriculture and land relations lie -- acts on target guidelines
established by the Indian Planning Commission in the national annual and
five-year plans. Annual targets set the number of acres to be brought
under hybrids, tons of supplies to be distributed, and extra production
expected. These targets are broken down by area —— ultimately to the
level of the village level worker who tries to fill his quota by
encouraging cultivators to join the program. He makes an annual esti-

mate of what is needed in his "circle" and passes this requrest to the

70

block staff. The VLWs' requests are compiled and sent to the district
offices and from there to the state ministry of agriculture. The state
is responsible for procurement of requested supplies and seeing that
they arrive at the local level.

Upon arrival, supplies are sold either at the block offices or
through cultivators' cooperatives. Duringtfimayear under study (1971-
72), seed and pesticides were distributed through the block and ferti—
lizers through the cooperatives. Cultivators can also buy these sup-
plies on the open market from government (National Seeds Corporation) or
private stores in major towns. Inputs are usually more expensive from
the latter although they are often more readily available.

To help finance these new inputs, several credit schemes have been
started. Private banks were nationalized in 1969 and rural branches
have been established since then to make credit available to culti—
vators. The plan is to have banks at every tehsil headquarters. Loans
are available for numerous agricultural purposes: short term recurring
expenses, land improvements, mechanization, ancillary industries such as
dairying, poultry and fisheries, and to enable local merchants supply
improved inputs and equipment. Interest rates range from 8.5 percent
for short term loans (up to one year), of less than Rs. 2,000, to 10.5
percent for short and medium term loans (one to seven years) of more
than Rs. 2,000/-.*

Short and medium term credit is also available through cooperative
societies who receive their lending capital from memberships and the

local banks. Anyone may join the cooperative upon payment of a fee but

 

*Information is from interviews with the Manager of the State Bank
of Bikaner and Jaipur, Hanumangarh.

71

people are usually required to own 2.5 acres to qualify for loans.
Interest rates are 9 percent for all loans and these are given mainly
in kind, e.g., fertilizer.* The administrative secretary of coopera—
tives is a government employee. Officers are elected by the members and
control over the dispersal of loans and supplies tends to be a monopoly
of large cultivators. The c00perative elections also often are arenas
for contests between local political factions.

Cultivators also use other sources of credit in the larger towns.
The Land Mortgage Bank in Jaipur, for example, is a popular source for
financing the purchase of pumping sets. Repayment periods are longer
from these sources which cultivators prefer.

But the most utilized source of credit is the village moneylender.
His credit is readily available either in cash or kind from his shop.
The relationship with the moneylender is a perduring one and both
parties know each other well. Credit can be used for any purpose.
Repayment schedules are flexible, but the credit is very expensive.
Interest rates vary from 12 to 50 percent. The role of the moneylender

in the local economy will be discussed in greater detail later on.

 

*Information is from interviews with the Secretary of the
Hanumangarh cooperative.

72

FIGURE 2.1. Map of Rajasthan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
       

N
AN
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w E
S Meaghan
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Q?
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Source: India, Republic, 1965.

73

 

 

 

 

* In terms of unrefined sugar.

TABLE 2.1. Area and Production of Principle Crops
in Rajasthan, 1971-72
Metric Yield @ Acre
Acres Tonnes (Kgs.)

Cereals 22,108,128 5,017,184

Bajra 12,601,523 1,363,322 108

Jowar 2,281,370 252,613 111

Maize 1,886,386 751,000 398

Wheat 3,740,548 1,888,673 505

Barley 1,098,575 574,879 523

Rice 329,599 159,435 484

Small Millets 170,127 27,262 160
Pulses 9,152,423 1,317,643

Gram 4,058,128 884,773 218

Other kharif

Pulses 4,958,437 394,145 79

Tur 84,343 20,159 239

Other rabi

Pulses 51,515 18,566 360
Oilseed 3,326,838 393,162

Sesamum 1,557,355 81,337 52

Rape & Mustard 947,492 122,698 129

Linseed 233,859 29,811 127

Groundnut 582,903 158,753 272

Castor Seed 5,229 563 108
Other 1,043,151

Sanhemp 31,929 4,510 141

Cotton 825,428 392,799 476

Ginger 254 161 634

Chilies 99,637 23,215 233

Sugar Cane 68,111 1,203,153 1,766*

Potatoes 4,184 5,474 1,308

Tobacco 13,608 3,823 281
Source: Government of Rajasthan, 1974a, pp. 18-28.

74

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76

FIGURE 2.2. Political and Administrative Hierarchy*

FORMAL POLITICAL SYSTEM ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

President of India

 

and Cabinet National Ministries

.5

I

Parliament .

Lok Sabha-_.,Rajya Sabha

(House of (Council of
the People) Stages)

1%
I
State Governor.

I

Chief Ministerl
and Cabinet I
A» I

I I

State Assembly'
(Vidhan Sabha)

 

 

A A
l I
I Prime Minister '
I I
I I
I I
I I
I

 

 

State Ministries

 

 

 

District Council . . .
(21113 Parishad) District Offices
4'
I

Block Louncil

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Panchayat Samiti) Development Block TehSil Police
‘+
I
I
Village Council Village Level Workers Patwaris
(Gram Panchayat) ___.___._
‘I——— Electorate
Key: Directly elected: ;

 

Indirectly elected: - 0.- _..,

* Adapted from Michie, 1975, p. 44. State Governors are appointed by the
President.

CHAPTER III

THE SETTING: HANUMANGARH AND SHIVPURA

Hanumangarh

 

The village selected in Jaipur District, Hanumangarh, is the one in
which most time was spent.* Hanumangarh is situated about seventeen
miles northeast of Jaipur city, the state capital and district head-
quarters. The village is well connected by a paved road which runs from
Jaipur through the village to the city's reservoir a few miles beyond
and ultimately connects with the town of Dausa on the Jaipur—Delhi rail—
way line. Jaipur is about forty—five minutes away and buses run at
intervals of an hour to two hours throughout the day.

Hanumangarh is a large village in both population and area. In
1971, there were about one thousand households and a total population of
just over five thousand (see Table 3.1). About three thousand live in
the village proper and the rest are distributed among the thirty-two
hamlets in the surrounding area. These hamlets range in size from just
a few households to over fifty and each is inhabited by cultivators of
the same caste. Shaped like an irregular, slightly bent potato,
Hanumangarh is about five miles in length and two miles in breadth

covering an area of just under nine thousand acres.

 

*Nine of the sixteen months, from July 1972, to May, 1973, were
spent in Hanumangarh.

77

78

Although the village meets the minimum population criterion for
classification as a town, it falls short on other dimensions such as
population density and percentage of workers not engaged in agriculture.
According to census materials, the total work force is almost 1,600
persons, male and female (see Table 3.1). Out of these, about 60 per-
cent are engaged in agriculture as either cultivators or laborers; a
figure lower than the state average (see p. 57 above). That most women
were reported as non-workers does not square with field observations as
women of cultivating households shoulder a substantial work load. Many
males returned as workers in household industry and construction, per-
form these occupations part time along with agriculture. These are
mainly the low caste leatherworkers and are the pool from which most
agricultural laborers and tenants are drawn. A major part of their
income is from agriculture.

Hanumangarh lies in a valley between hills, upcroppings of the
Aravalli range which pass through the district. The valley opens on the
south-southwest to a plain which extends to another row of hills just
before Jaipur. The Dhund River flows through this plain and one of its
branches, little more than a dry wash outside of the monsoon season,
touches the southern village boundary. Hanumangarh proper is located at
the foot of the western range of hills which rise abruptly and form the
western boundary of the village. To the east lies another range of

sloping hills which form a cul-de-sac in which a neighboring village is

 

found. The Banganga River flows in from the northwest, and is dammed
through the eastern range. The reservoir forms the northern village

boundary.

79

The village lands are bisected by a watershed of low lying sandy
hillocks. To the north, drainage is into the Banganga and to the south
into the Dhund. In the northern zone, soils are a light, sandy alluvium
with low moisture retention. Due to the reservoir, however, the water
table is high (thirty to sixty feet) and there is more land under irri-
gation than in the southern part of the village. To the south, soils
are also alluvial, but heavier and more compact. Water lies at a depth
of eighty to one hundred twenty feet.

Irrigation in the southern half is problematic and expensive.

There are no canals, ponds or streams and thus, all irrigation is from
open dug wells.* Wells are one of the most expensive investments a
cultivator can make. They are ten to twenty feet in diameter and costs
escalate with depth. Investment in irrigation is well worth the effort
but most land is rain fed.

Another problem at the southern end of the village is the presence
of deep gullies, up to sixty feet, out by the tributaries and branches
of the Dhund. A few small dams, or bundhs, have been built across the
larger gullies, but very little has been done to check the fingers of
erosion encroaching on cultivators' fields. Every monsoon, a bit more
land is eaten away.

Although Hanumangarh covers a large area, a substantial part of the
village lands are not cultivable or are not under cultivation (see Table
3.2). Of the almost nine thousand acres, only about 3,400 or 37 percent
are under cultivation. Of this, however, a large portion of land is

under irrigation, nearly one thousand acres, or 29 percent, which is

 

*The same kind of wells are used in the northern zone as no irri—
gation is permitted directly from the reservoir.

80

higher than the state average (see p. 57 above). This was one of the
reasons why the village was included in the IAA scheme.

About 2,500 acres of forest land are under the management of the
state forestry department. These lands are used for grazing and fire-
wood upon payment of a nominal fee to the forestry officers. This area
extends along the western range of hills and was formerly a hunting pre-
serve of the Maharaja of Jaipur containing a variety of wild game, blue
buck, boar, sambhar, and tiger. The present forest is sparse, scrubby
second growth. During the 19503 contracts were given to woodcutters who
stripped the hills practically clean. The animals were driven out ——
much to the villagers' delight as game eat crops and attack people. But
destruction of the forest has had a deleterious effect on rain catchment
and has increased erosion. Foliage is used as cattle fodder during the
dry summer months and trees are stripped bare as grass is exhausted
several months before the monsoon starts.

A large portion of land is fallow which with cultivable wastes lies
primarily in the watershed which is uneven and criss-crossed by gullies.
This could be cultivated with major investments in land levelling and
wells. It can yield a sparse, monsoon crop if the rains are regular.
Some of this land has been given to landless scheduled caste households
(primarily the leatherworkers) in allotments of 3.13 acres. Most have
been unable to cultivate it due to its condition and also because of
violent opposition from caste cultivators who use it to graze their
animals.

Residential areas, stream beds and dry washes, roads and hill areas
not under the forestry department also account for a large part of the

total area. Dry washes and stream beds often are pathways between the

81

hamlets and the village prOper. In places they are encroached upon:
people enclose a plot with an earthen wall and begin cultivating, and
may sometime thereafter make a claim for title to the land. The hilly
areas, devoid of top soil, are unsuited for cultivation. They only have
a few trees and support some grass for grazing animals during the rainy
season.

The onset of the monsoon season is one of the more spectacular
occurrences in Rajasthan as it is in the rest of India. It is preceded
by the hot, dry months of April, May and June during which daytime
temperatures sometimes exceed 115° F. Frequent dust storms blow in from
the Thar Desert. Dust penetrates everything, no matter how tightly
closed. These storms rarely last longer than one-half hour, and while
uncomfortable, do bring some respite. They are often followed by brief
light showers which bring the temperature down.

Throughout summer, a hot dry wind blows from the west, the log,
which acts more like a blowtorch than a cooling agent. The only relief
comes at night as heat irradiates rapidly from the soil after sunset and
night temperatures drop to a comfortable level. Just before the monsoon
the countryside looks baked brown, trees are bare and an ever present
chocolate dust haze hangs in the sky.

With the first monsoon showers in July, everything seems to rejuve-
nate, including people. Dry washes become torrents and village lanes,
streams. Foliage appears on trees and grass begins to grow almost
overnight -- as do the insects. Temperatures drop, but it becomes humid
and sticky.

With the first rains, cultivators begin planting the kharif crop.

August, the month of Savan, after the crops are in, is one of the most

82

beautiful times of the year and is the subject of much song, poetry and
celebration. Fields, pastures, trees and hillsides are suddenly green.
Life, as if having forsaken the world, has suddenly awakened and
dramatically reasserted itself.

The monsoon can be capricious. At the time of field work, the
rains began very well then slackened and stopped. The kharif crop began
to wither and dry. Only after a month did the rains begin again. But
by then the crop was damaged.

Rainfall in Jaipur District averages about twenty-two inches a
year, but can fluctuate 25 percent or more. During the 1972 southwest
monsoon, only twelve inches fell, primarily in the first few weeks of
the three-month season. Combined with rainfall from October to
February, the year's total was only thirteen inches, about 44 percent
below average (Government of Rajasthan, 1974a: 15-16). The timing and
amount of rain has a marked effect on the kharif crop. As we shall see,

Hanumangarh was adversely affected.

Shizpura

Shivpura, the Bharatpur village is quite different from
Hanumangarh. It is some sixteen miles from Bharatpur, the district and
tehsil headquarters. The village is not on a major thoroughfare.
Travelling northwest on a paved road for ten miles from Bharatpur, one
turns onto a partially paved road for another four miles from which a
ruttedznuibumpy cart track proceeds into the village. There is a bus
service: two buses in the morningznuievening connect Shivpura with

small towns on either side of the village.

83

Compared to Hanumangarh, Shivpura is rather small (see Table 3.1
and 3.2). In 1971, there were only 183 households and a total popula—
tion of just under 1,300 residing in one nucleated settlement. The
village is shaped like a rough pentagon and is a little larger than one
and one-half square miles, covering just over one thousand acres.

Shivpura is almost totally agricultural and shows less of the
occupational diversity found in Hanumangarh. The work force, according
to the 1971 census, was just under four hundred persons. Out of these,
84 percent are engaged in agriculture. As in Hanumangarh, field obser-
vation throws these figures into doubt as women are again under-repre-
sented. Only twenty-eight were returned as workers against the total
female population of 588. Women here, as in Hanumangarh, share the work
load with the men: particularly the women of agricultural and lower
castes such as leatherworkers who do field labor. As in Hanumangarh,
the tenant and landless agricultural labor pool is the leatherworking
castes.

Shivpura is absolutely flat and has no topographical features
corresponding to village boundaries. The village is on a small hillock,
perhaps a tell, indicating a long, continuous occupation of the site.
This part of Bharatpur District is east of and outside the Aravalli
range. There are no streams in the area and drainage, following what-
ever contours there are, is to the east into the Jumna system.

The soil in Shivpura is a dark, heavy alluvium and in contrast to
that of Hanumangarh, retains moisture well. If the rains are good,
cultivators can plant an unirrigated rabi crop of wheat, barley or mus-
tard although yields are low, particularly if the same plot is planted

during kharif.

84

The water table is higher than in Hanumangarh, generally between
twenty and thirty feet. Well irrigation is not as problematic. The
quality of water can vary quite markedly as in Hanumangarh. One well
may have sweet water and another, several hundred feet away may be
saline or brackish.* Although the water table is higher, wells here are
also an expensive improvement. As in Hanumangarh, they are open, dug
and masonry lined.

The only other source of water is a pond (talab) on the edge of the
village. This collects runoff during the rainy season and recharges the
nearby drinking water wells. It serves no irrigation purpose and dries
up completely in the summer months.

Shivpura, in contrast to Hanumangarh, covers a small area but has a
higher proportion of land under cultivation as there are no large hilly
anuiwasteareas (see Table 3.1). According to the 1971 census, of the
one thousand acres in the village, about 840 are under cultivation. Of
these, 190 acres are irrigated, or roughly 23 percent of the total.

A sizeable amount, 125 acres lies fallow. These lands are in a low
lying area which is not very fertile. Poor drainage is a major problem
in this part of Bharatpur District. This, and a high water table can
produce water logging and salinity in such low lying areas. As in
Hanumangarh, land has been given to landless scheduled castes, but in
allotments of only two-fifths acres. There has been no Opposition to
their cultivating it but they have experienced poor yields and it is

hardly worth the effort to bring it under production.

 

*One of the ironies in the village is that the main well from which
clean castes draw drinking water is saline and the untouchable well is
sweet.

85

There is very little unused land upon which to expand agriculture.
The village proper takes up fifty acres. The fallow and cultivable
wastes, about 14 percent of the area, can only be brought under culti-
vation with major investments of capital and effort which are beyond the
capacities of the village. As such improvements entail drainage, they
can only be tackled on a regional basis which involves higher levels of
authority and organization.

Most of the agricultural lands are unirrigated and dependent on the
monsoon. Shivpura has much the same climate as Hanumangarh, the hot dry
summers, dust storms and scorching winds. Daytime temperatures also
exceed the 115° mark during the peak of the hot season and nights pro-
vide the only relief.

The effect of the first monsoon showers is as spectacular as in
Hanumangarh. The only difference is the lack of hills and not so many
trees. The brown dusty plains become :1 sea of green. Shivpura though,
did not suffer the effects of scanty rainfall as did Hanumangarh. Dur-
ing the southwest monsoon of 1972, twenty-four inches of rain fell.
Combined with the winter rains during rabi and later showers, the year's
total was twenty-seven inches, 3 percent above the district average of
twenty-six (Government of Rajasthan, 19743: 15-16).

Shivpura is farther east than Hanumangarh and gets on the average,
five more inches of rainfall. This combined with the better soils makes
ShivpuraanuiBharatpur District generally more productive than areas in
Jaipur. Bharatpur is one of the better agricultural areas outside of
Sri Ganganagar and is usually a surplus producing region. Though Jaipur

also often has a surplus, it is more prone to drought.

86

The latitude the physical environment of Shinura provides culti—
vators is wider than that of Hanumangarh. The moisture retaining
characteristic of the soil lessens the dependence on the amount and even
spacing of rain during the monsoon kharif season. It also allows culti-
vators to take a winter £3bi_crop without irrigation, although irri—
gated land is more productive. Water is more easily available and goes
further as fewer irrigations are required than on lighter soils.
Hanumangarh as we have seen, is more dependent on good and timely rains.
The winter rabi is almost exclusively dependent on irrigation facili-
ties.

Population density is different in the two villages: in Shivpura
it is 805 persons per square mile and in Hanumangarh, 438. Pressure on
agricultural land though, is about the same. In Shivpura, there are
.65, and in Hanumangarh, .63 acres of agricultural land per capita.
Although slightly less land is available in Hanumangarh, there are more
land resources for other purposes. The hillsides and uncultivated
wastes provide more grazing land (and fuel resources). There is more
animal husbandry in Hanumangarh than Shinura and goats are a mainstay
of many households. Hardly a goat is to be found in Shivpura. Water
buffalo and cows are found in both villages but in Shivpura, they must
be fed primarily on chaff. The more diversified natural environment
contributes to the greater latitude that people in Hanumangarh have in

their economic activities.

Historical Background: Hanumangarh

 

Historical background is important to the current social and cul-

tural features of Hanumangarh and Shivpura. History has left an imprint

 

 

'
*H

I
b‘

87

and while both villages share the same broad features, they have had
significantly different pasts.

Hanumangarh was an ancient stronghold of the Minas (now a scheduled
tribe) who ruled the area as a clan territory. They and other Mina
clans built fortresses in the Aravalli hills, ruled their immediate
environs and through a loose confederacy, controlled what is now the
Jaipur region.

In the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, a series of events
took place around which much local lore has evolved. The region was an
arena for contests between Rajputs pushed out and invading from the
east, and the indigenous Mina chiefs. One Rajput clan, the Kuchwahas,
were successful in bringing the region under their control after years
of raids and skirmishes with the Minas and other contenders.

Dula Rai, a warrior prince, founded the Kuchwaha dynasty and the
state of Dhundar (named after the Dhund River and later renamed Jaipur
in the eighteenth century). Dula Rai was expelled as a child from his
original clan territory in Gwalior, two hundred miles to the east. He
and his mother were taken in by a Mina chief who raised him in a village
near modern Jaipur. As a young man, he turned on his mentor, slew him
and took the local Mina territory for his own. He contracted a marriage
with the daughter of the Rajput chief of Dausa at which point
Hanumangarh enters the story.

The legend of the fall of Hanumangarh is often recounted by vil-
lagers and bards. According to the local lore, Dula Rai wanted to pass
through Hanumangarh on his way to marry the Dausa princess. His way was
blocked by the Minas who objected to his flying his standard, blowing -

trumpets and beating drums -- perogatives of a chief -- as he passed

88

through. Dula Rai acquiesced but said he was afronted and would have it
out with them on his return.

Upon returning with his bride -- and full display of his insignia
-- a battle ensued in the gorge where the Banganga River cuts through
the hills, east of the village. The Minas were victorious, slaying Dula
Rai and his following. But they left the bride alive as they could not
bring themselves to kill a woman. Flushed with victory, they returned
to their fortress to celebrate with much feasting, drinking and carous-
ing punctuated with quarrels over who showed the most valor.

The bride was left on the battleground, weeping among the bodies of
her husband, his kinsmen and followers with their heads, arms and legs
cut off. As evening approached,21goddess appeared and asked why she was
weeping. The woman pointed to the carnage and related her grief over
losing her husband and being widowed so soon. Taking pity, the goddess
rejoined the arms, legs and heads to the bodies, put weapons back in
their hands and brought them all back to life. The Minas who by this
time were thoroughly deep in their cups and quarreling amongst them-
selves had not posted a watch. Dula Rai stormed the fortress amongst
great slaughter and brought Hanumangarh into his domain. A temple dedi-
cated to the goddess, Jamwa Mata, stands at the spot where she appeared
and is a special shrine for the Jaipur royal family.

The Minas were allowed to remain in their territory and were given
special privileges under the court. They were made guards of the royal
insignia, the prince himself, the archives, treasury and seraglio. They
were also important functionaries at the coronation of the maharaja.

One of the Mina chiefs (not of Hanumangarh) would put the mark of

sovereignty, the tilak, with blood drawn from his own big toe on the

89

forehead of the maharaja being installed (Tod, 1957: 279—282, 347-348;
Sharma, 1969: 20-23; Singh, 1970: 55-56).*

A Rajput fort and palace complex stands on the hillside above the
village. It dominates the entire countryside and impresses one with the
omnipresence of the king and the state that lasted to the 19503. The
Minas claim they built the complex, but this is resolutely denied by
everyone else. There is some evidence that it was built in the middle
seventeenth century (Singh, 1970: 55), and perhaps on the foundations of
the older Mina stronghold. Local lore contends this was one of the
early capitals of Jaipur state. Supposedly, Dula Rai shifted his court
from Dausa, twenty miles to the east, to Hanumangarh where it remained

until it was moved to Amer, twelve miles to the west in the eleventh

 

*This practice eventually fell into disuse but is an interesting
symbolic inversion of the dominant-subordinate relationship between the
Rajputs and the Minas.

Details of the legendary and historical accounts vary greatly in
published form and local oral tradition. The establishment of a "true"
version and the pursuit of exact historical accuracy are essentially
meaningless. What matters is the establishment of Rajput overlordship
and the relations between the Minas and the new rulers.

The above legend, recounted primarily by Minas, reflects more the
ambivalent nature of their position in society and self—identity which
continues down to the present. But for that fatal flaw of drinking,
carousing and infighting (which they cheerfully admit themselves), they
are a great people who otherwise would attain their proper place in the
world. Rulers by birthright, they became subjects. Kshtriyas by right,
they are today considered a lowly scheduled tribe and are burdened with
the reputation of being thieves and cattle rustlers.

This ambivalence is aptly symbolized by their local mother goddess,
Dant Mata (Tooth Mother), who appeared as their protectoress after their
defeat by the Rajputs. Calling out to a Mina herder from within the
mountain above the village, she said she was about to emerge. As she
was horrible to look upon, because of her big teeth, he was not to
become afraid, otherwise she would be unable to come out. The herder
promised not to be frightened but as she emerged, he took fright. She
was stuck half way in and half way out of the mountain. As a result,
her powers were diminished and she is effective only within the village
territory.

90

century. This is not substantiated by any evidence other than local
lore.

In any event, the time period in which these events occurred was
one of constant turmoil. The Kuchwaha princes were but one of many
groups of petty chiefs and Egj§§_fighting over a rather small territory.
Hanumangarh came under their rule fairly early. The magnificence of
Jaipur court and power came much later as the state expanded and rela-
tions were established with the imperial regimes in Delhi and Agra.
Jaipur was a buffer state which through political and marriage alliances
with the Mughals (to the disdain of other Rajput princely houses*),
kept the imperial powers out of Rajasthan while submitting to their
suzerainity. Jaipur princes served in many military and administrative
capacities in the Mughal court.

The part of history most important to Hanumangarh today is its
special relationship with the Jaipur court. The village was a khalsa
area and never came under the jagirdari system. Revenue collection and
land administration at least for the hundred years preceding land reform
in the 19503, was based on the village settlement pattern. Under this
system, headmen, patels, were responsible for the tenurial arrangements
and the collection of revenue. The patels retained part of the revenue
and passed what was due to the tehsil offices located in Hanumangarh

proper.

 

*Akbar, the great Mughal reigning from 1554—1605, married a
Kuchwaha princess by whom Jahangir, his successor was born. The Sisodia
gardens on the outskirts of Jaipur were, according to local lore, built
for a Sisodia princess from Udaipur who married Maharaja Jai Singh II
in 1708. Part of the agreement was that she would not be made to live
within the Kuchwaha capital as they had intermarried with the Mughals.

91

The major tenant castes, Minas, Gujjars, and Haryana Brahmins,* had
their own areas in the village or hamlets, and hereditary patels.
Cultivators were collectively tenants of the state and individuals
occupied land according to their relationship with other coparceners
through patrilineal descent from the original settling families. The
Minas appear to be the original group and only one clan is represented
in Hanumangarh. Other castes, notably the Haryana Brahmins, have up to
ten clans (gotras).

Included in this settlement pattern were arrangements for other
cultivating groups. The Malis have their own lands and hamlet although
they previously lived dispersed on their lands under the control of the
Mina EEEEl- Their lands adjoin those of the Minas.

Two other groups of Brahmins, the Parikhs and Gaurs (distinct
endogamous units) held land under the maufi_system. These lands were
provided by the Jaipur court for services and were used to support
temples and for personal income. These two groups also have hereditary
patels. The Parikhs have their own hamlet and self-cultivate their land
although a number of families live in Hanumangarh proper and lease out
their lands. The Gaurs also live in the village and either self-culti—
vate or lease out their land.

A few Baniya (merchant-cum-money lender) families received land
from the court. They were purveyors to the local administrative

offices and to the maharaja and his retinue when they passed through the

 

*The Haryana Brahmins, as their name implies, were brought into
Hanumangarh from the outside (Haryana?) under court patronage and
settled on uncultivated land several centuries ago. They are rather
hazy about the details of their origins but are completely secular
Brahmins who retain a Brahmin of another caste as their priest.

92

village. Several headmen of the Regar (leatherworker) caste also
received land. An impoverished family of Rajputs (unrelated to the
Kuchwahas) were allowed to settle in the village as were several fami-
lies of Charans (illegitimate offspring of Rajputs).

The recognized cultivators either tilled the land themselves or
sublet it to others. Often sub-tenants were of other recognized culti-
vator groups. But the main body of sub-tenants were drawn from the low
caste communities: Regars, Balais and Khatiks (leatherworkers, tanners
and herder-butchers), and occasionally from service castes, e.g., Nais,
Khattis, Kumhars, Lohars and Muslim Telis (barbers, carpenters, potters,
blacksmiths and oilpressers). Some of these were able to make claims to
the land they had cultivated at the time of land reforms, but most land
remains with those recognized as tenants under the old regime.

The distribution of land was hardly affected by the land reform.
Tenants of the maharaja became tenants of the state, or khatedars. The
transfer was facilitated by the careful land records at the tehsil.
Recognized tenants upheld their claims more easily than their sub-
tenants who with few exceptions were unable to retain land they had
worked, often for generations:k A few muafi holders lost some land, but
most obtained khatedari rights by being "self-cultivators" or through
provisions for khudkasht land. The latter provision allows the eviction

of sub-tenants from land retained for personal use.

 

*One Regar who had been a sub-tenant of a Gujjar cultivator fought
a court case for fifteen years to establish his claim. The case was
finally decided by the Rajasthan Supreme Court in his favor although he
was unable to get dg_facto control of the land. He is thousands of
rupees in debt.

93

Land ceilings are ineffective as they are high and easily circum-
vented. Based on land quality (until 1972-73), they allow thirty stan-
dard acres for a family of five and five additional acres per extra
family member up to a maximum of sixty standard acres. In Hanumangarh,
this was equivalent to thirty-five acres of the best irrigated land for
a family of five and as unirrigated land was of lesser quality, much
more actual acreage could be retained. Large landowning families
usually live jointly and to evade the ceiling, define themselves as
separate nuclear families. The effective management unit remains as
one.

The actual transfer of rights to khatedars took a period of some
six years -- into the early 19603. Land consolidation was undertaken
concurrently as holdings had become fragmented over the generations.
Heirs of an estate are given a portion of each type of land. Consoli-
dation was complicated by the need to establish equivalencies in quali-
ties of land and manipulations by more influential cultivators who tried
to get the best. Today it is rare to find a khatedar holding more than
three separate plots, and these are usually contiguous or in the same
vicinity. Cultivators recognize the advantages of consolidation, but
did not enjoy the intense hostility and mutual suspicion it engendered.

During this period moneylenders were also able to get land. Under
the old regime, land was not a saleable, or mortgageable item. But
cultivators were often in debt to moneylenders. Baniyas were the prin-
ciple moneylending group but some Brahmins and other cultivating castes
also were creditors. Outstanding debts were a lien on the personal
estate of the debtor and often informal arrangements were made -- with

the connivance of a sympathetic patwari -- to give d3 facto control of

94

land to creditors. When land became transferable, many cultivators lost
land through foreclosure, often for sums a fraction of the land's value.
Today it is difficult for a moneylender to foreclose as title transfer
in such cases involves hearings before a magistrate (usually the
tehsildar) and is a long complicated proceeding. Members of scheduled
castes and tribes by law cannot mortgage their land to persons other
than their own communities. This was established for their protection,
but has given rise to a class of moneylenders in their midst.

As a part of the legislation to guarantee tenurial security, rights
have been extended to those cultivators leasing land from khatedars.

Such tenants are classified as ghair-khatedars, or sub-tenants, and

 

their names and particulars of their leases are supposed to be regis-

tered with the patwari. Rents are controlled and ghair-khatedars may

 

not be evicted except for nonpayment of rent or some other breach of
agreement. Although many cultivators lease in land, not a single entry
is found in the registry. No landlord is willing to formalize a con—
tract which can lead to permanent rights for the tenant. All leases
are oral and rents are well above the maximum set by law.* The legal
provisions are easily circumvented if tenants are called hired laborers
who work under the owner's supervision. Tenancies are rotated annually
to make it impossible for tenants to lay claim to permanent rights.
Tenants can claim a plot of land cultivated three years in a row. The
burden of proof is on the tenant and leases, as they are oral, are

difficult to substantiate. Litigation is long, costly and few tenants

 

*By law rents, either as a share of the crop, or in cash, cannot
exceed one-sixth to one-quarter of the crop or its cash value. The
amount depends on what inputs are shared by both parties. In fact,
rents range from one-third to three—fourths of the crop.

95

are in a position to claim their rights. Furthermore, should they try
to establish their rights they are identified as trouble makers and no
one will lease land to them. If they want any land at all, they must

comply with this informal arrangement.

Historical Background: Shivpura

 

Shivpura's history is not surrounded by events and personages of
the semi-mythical past. Local history, despite evidence of ancient
occupation is essentially modern Jat history. The origin of the present
village, the dominant Jat Thakur lineage and the basic tenor of social
life are intertwined with the rise of the Jat state of Bharatpur in the
early eighteenth century. Despite the historical differences, patterns
of dominance and subordination stemming from differential control over
land are remarkably similar to Hanumangarh.

Bharatpur District borders on the districts of Agra and Mathura in
Uttar Pradesh. Bharatpur city is thirty-five miles from Agra, an early
seat of Muslim imperial power, on the banks of the Jumna River. Akbar,
the Great Mughal of the sixteenth century built his capital city
Fatehpur Sikri ten miles from present day Bharatpur City. The Bharatpur
region is east of the Arvallis on open flat country. Given its terrain
and proximity to seats of imperial authority, it was absorbed early into
the Delhi-Agra based empires as part of the province of Agra.

As in surrounding regions, the dominant groups in Bharatpur are
Jats. From where the Jats originated is a moot question. They estab-
lished themselves long before the Muslim invasions and claim to have

been the original settlers of the area.

96

The royal clan of the house of Bharatpur, of which the Shivpura
Jats are a branch, claim descent from Jadon Rajputs and Lord Krishna,
of the Mahabharata and Bhagavad Gita, whose career and exploits took
place in the Mathura-Vrindavan region now in Mathura District.

Balchand, a Jadon Rajput, resided in Sinsini, now a small village about
five miles from Shivpura. Balchand on one of his plundering expedi—
tions, captured a Jat couple, carried them off to Sinsini and made the
woman his concubine. By her, he had two sons, one of whom is the ances—
tor of the Shivpura lineage and the Bharatpur royal clan. They are
called Sinsini Jats after the village of their ancestor. Although of
mixed ancestory, these Jats claim Rajput or Kshatriya status. During
the imperial periods, they were little more than peasant cultivators
loosely organized in a lineage and clan structure (Drake—Brockman, N.D.:
31).

The empires built on existing clan and kinship structures. In
Bharatpur, village headmen were heads of local Jat lineages who formed
the main body of cultivators. The bane of the system was its segmentary
nature. When the center was weak, provincial governors and local chiefs
arose in rebellion to assert their independence.

In the latter part of Aurangzeb's reign (d. 1707), as the Mughal
empire began to disintegrate, Jat village headmen around Delhi and Agra
began raids against Mughal installations and authority. Their main
chief, Churaman, a Sinsini Jat, was eventually defeated by forces under
the Jaipur prince, Jai Singh II (see above) in 1721. But Badan Singh,
Churaman's brother's son was able to establish control over Agra and
Mathura Districts and lay the foundations of the Bharatpur State

(Majumdar, 1967: 535).

97

Badan Singh had twenty-six sons. Suraj Mal, an adopted son,
extended the state territories to include some thirteen districts, and
his reign (1756-1763) marks the high point of the power of Bharatpur.
Other sons were given control over various villages as jagirdars. The
Jat lineage in Shinura is descended from one of these other sons. They
are very aware of their connection to the Bharatpur ruling family and
several older members of their community have served in the Bharatpur
court administration.*

Their control over the village as coparceners of the clan territory
had a major influence on land and social relations as found today. As
jagirdars collectively responsible through their headman to the state,
they controlled all the land in the village. Their position as control-
lers -- and thereby also of village affairs -- continued after land
reform as they were able to retain much of their land by being the
"actual" cultivators. One senior member is reputed to have over five
hundred acres over several villages. Previously most of his land was
leased to tenants, but by using dispersed titles and the fact that
separate village land registers are not consolidated -— he evaded ceil-
ings and ejected his tenants.

Land not personally cultivated was given out, as today, to tenants.
Tenants came from Brahmin, Ahir, Yadav and Garghariya castes (the latter
three are traditional cultivators) and to a few Chamars (leatherworkers)

who also form the main pool of labor.

 

*One elderly gentlemen had been in New York while in service to
the maharaja.

98

Before partition in 1947, a few Muslim households held tenancies
too.* The richer households migrated to Pakistan after the violence of
partition died down. The few remaining ones are low caste, impoverished
Telis (oilpressers) and one family of Manihars (bangle makers) who have
a thriving business in the bangle trade.

Land reform ended the role of Jats as traditional overlords though
not their dominant position. Their Brahmin, Ahir, Yadav and Garghariya
tenants received title to some land. The Muslim groups completely lost
out as did most of the Chamars. One Chamar household had held a iagig
under the old regime. They performed services for the state a guard of
a sub-treasury and were given control over about sixty acres in another
village. They lost it all during jagirdari abolition and now own one
acre in Shivpura and lease more from Jats. Their case is but one of
several interesting anomolies encountered in the field.** lfimafew house-
holds able to lease land today are Chamar, Teli and a few Brahmin ones.
As in Hanumangarh, leases are oral, and these people are tenants-at-
will.

In contrast to Hanumangarh, however, land consolidation was never
implemented along with land reform. Cultivators in Shivpura who own

only a few acres may have up to ten separate plots located some distance

 

*Bharatpur State was the scene of incredible violence between
Muslim and Hindus during partition. The Shinura Jats, much to their
credit, formed a committee and sealed off the village from the confla-
gration around them not allowing anyone to come in or leave. Nothing
happened in the village, no lives were lost, but the Muslims tenants
gave up any claim they might have made to Jat land.

**Another anomoly encountered in Bharatpur was a group of Brahmins,
Hivasis, who practice polyandry. A few families live in a village
adjacent to Shinura, and are the talk of the area due to their "scan-
dalous" practices.

99

from each other. This has a decided effect on investments people make,
particularly in irrigation. There is less incentive to sink a well that
can irrigate only a portion of one's land. Permission for water chan-
nels to cross neighbors' land is difficult to obtain as channels take up
space wanted for cultivation. Such arrangements as tried in the past
resulted in bitter quarrels and most cultivators feel they are more
bother than they are worth. Joint ventures on wells or sharing of

water are similarly surrounded with constant wrangling. Those with
wells -— on larger plots —- rarely sell or share water with their neigh-
bors. Rights and control over land and water resources are jealously
guarded against any hint of encroachment. Disputes between villagers
usually stem from disagreements over boundaries and right of way privi—
leges with neighboring landowners.

Also in contrast to Hanumangarh, Shivpura has few Baniyas. The
landed caste groups, primarily Jats and Ahirs provide most credit.
Landlord and creditor are often combined in the same individuals. Ten-
ants often borrow for agricultural inputs and living expenses from those
whose land they lease. This is a wonderful arrangement for the landlord
who collects rent, one-half to three-fourths of the crop, and debt
repayment made in undervalued grain. Tenants effectively give landlords
up to 80 percent of their crop between the two payments. Looked at in
a different way, this arrangement provides landowners with very cheap
labor for growing crops, cheaper than hired labor. High productivity is
ensured as tenants try to grow as much as possible simply to get enough
on which to live.

The village in its present form did not exist until around the

beginning of the twentieth century. The 1891 census shows the village

100

to be deserted (Drake-Brockman: N.D.). Whether the village was
uninhabited from the time of the original jag}; endowment in the
eighteenth century to the twentieth century is unclear as several old
buildings point to occupation during that time. The local Thakurs may
have lived elsewhere although they still controlled Shivpura's lands.
They speak of a split with the Jats residing in Sinsini (whom they
regard as cold, ungenerous sorts) after which they moved to their pres-
ent location. The present residential area abuts that of an adjoining
village with only a village lane in between. There is some evidence

the two villages were previously one and due to a schism, Shivpura broke
off. Even today, the two groups of villagers do not mix readily and
Shivpura Jats refer to their neighbor as a distant village. The divi-
sion carries down to the honorific titles used by the Jats in each vil—
lage. Shivpura Jats call themselves Thakurs and the others refer to
themselves as Faujdars. Possibly, the Shivpura Jats first lived in the
adjoining village, underwent a factional dispute, moved in with their
caste fellows in Sinsini, obtained a division of the lands and gradually
moved onto their present site. This is at best conjectural as this was

never volunteered.*

Comparison: Hanumangarh and Shivpura

 

The history of the two villages has produced differences as well as
similarities. Shivpura has been a jagirdari village under the sole con-
trol of the Jats who have maintained their dominant position (see
Tables 3.4 and 3.6). Hanumangarh, a khalsa village, was not controlled

by any one group. Excluding Rajputs, seven of the caste groups

 

*And stupidly, never asked.

101

controlling land under the old regime hold most of the land today (see
Tables 3.3 and 3.5). How groups became dominant is essentially the
same. The skewed distribution of land which existed under princely rule
has continued into the present. Land reform did not substantially alter
the pattern of land control at the local level. The only difference
between the two villages is the singular domination of one caste group
in Shivpura and the somewhat more dispersed inequality in Hanumangarh.
As is true in most agrarian societies, land is a base of power and
wealth. Landowners are at the top of patron-client networks, the ties
of economic interdependence between themselves and others. Those who
control land also control or vie for control over village politics, the
direction of social life and distribution of patronage and public ser—

vices. This will be taken up, in part, in the next chapter.

102

TABLE 3.1. Population and Work Force:

Hanumangarh and Shinura

 

 

Category Hanumangarh Shivpura
Number of Households 1006 183
Total Population 5439 1294
Male/Female 2920/2519 706/588
Scheduled Castes 1445 354
Male/Female 765/680 200/154
Scheduled Tribes 750 15
Male/Female 425/325 8/7
Literate and Educated 1151 407
Male/Female 962/189 372/35
Total Work Force 1591 398
Male/Female 1400/191 370/28
Cultivators (Owner and Tenant) 778 287
Male/Female 703/75 283/4
Agricultural Laborers 178 48
Male/Female 136/42 24/24
Livestock, Forestry,
Fishing and Hunting 22 -—
Male/Female 22/-- --/--
Mining and Quarrying 5 l
Male/Female 5/-- l/—-
Household Industry 127 ll
Male/Female 87/40 ll/--
Non-Household Industry 8 --
Male/Female 8/-— --/--
Construction 51 --
Male/Female 51/-- --/--
Trade and Commerce 41 8
Male/Female 41/—- 8/--
Transport, Communication
and Storage 24 2
Male/Female 24/-- 2/--
Other 357 41
Male/Female 323/34 41/--
Non-Workers 3848 896
Male/Female 1520/2328 336/560

 

Source: Census of India, District Census Handbooks, Jaipur and

 

and Bharatpur, 1971.

 

103

TABLE 3.2. Land Use Pattern:

Hanumangarh and Shivpura

 

 

Land Hanumangarh Shivpura
Classification (Acres) (Acres)
Total Area 8958 1029
Cultivated Area 3431 843
Irrigated (Net)* 1008 186
Irrigated (Gross)** 1237 186
Unirrigated (Net) 2423 657
Unirrigated (Gross) 2633 676
Forests 2812 -—
Groves and Orchards 2 ——
Fallow (up to 5 years) 375 125
Culturable Waste
(01d fallow and grazing lands) 901 11
Not Available for Cultivation
(Mountains, roads, residential) 1437 50

 

Source: Census of India, District Census Handbooks, Jaipur and

 

Bharatpur, 1971.

* Net refers to actual acres.

**Gross refers to cropped area which counts double cropped acres

twice.

I II III .II‘ I. I

 

104

 

 

 

TABLE 3.3. Land Ownership by Caste — Full Sample: Hanumangarh
Number of
Caste Households Irrigated Unirrigated
Brahmins:
Parikh* l 36.00 --
Gaur* 3 15.19 66.22
Haryana* 3 22.37 18.22
Gujjar—Gaur 1 -- 8.13
Rajput* 2 1.56 4.69
Baniya* 1 18.75 48.75
Mali* 7 22.31 18.31
Mina* 10 35.30 18.11
Gujjar* 11 28.72 53.20
Sonar 1 1.25 --
Khatti l .69 -—
Kumhar 2 -- 3.81
Nai l -- —-
Khatik l —- 1.83
Balai 1 —- 2.03
Regar 21 11.03 49.93
( 2.90)** (24.21)**
Totals 67 193.17 293.23
(185.04)** (267.51)**

 

Note: Not all households were interviewed.

* Recognized tenants under old regime.
**Land in actual possession.

 

 

 

TABLE 3.4. Land Ownership by Caste — Full Sample: Shinura
Number of

Caste Households Irrigated Unirrigated
Brahmin 1 5.20 --
Jat* 8 37.85 101.98
Kohli l -- 1.20
Mena l -- 1.32
Chamar 4 -- 8.26
Totals 15 43.05 112.76

 

Note: Not all households were interviewed.

* Former jagirdars.

105

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 3.5. Distribution of Castes by Size Category —
Full Sample: Hanumangarh
Small Medium Large Number of
Caste H seholds
o T O/T o O/T o 0“
Brahmins:
Parikh* - - - - - 1 l
Gaur* - - — l - 2 3
Haryana* - - - 2 - l 3
Gujjar-Gaur - - - l - - l
Rajput* 2 - — - - - 2
Baniya* - - - - — l 1
Mali* 3 - - 3 - l 7
Mina* 6 - 1 2 - l 10
Gujjar* 2 - - 6 - 3 11
Sonar - - l - - - l
Khatti 1 - - — - - l
Kumhar 2 - - - - — 2
Nai - 1 - — — - l
Khatik l - - - - - 1
Balai 1 - — — - - l
Regar 6 8 4 — 3 - 21
Totals 24 9 6 15 3 10 67
Note: Not all households were interviewed.
Key: For this and all subsequent tables:
Small = five or less acres.
Medium = more than five and up to and including ten
acres.
Large = more than ten acres.
0 = Owner
T = Tenant
O/T = Owner-cum-Tenant

* Recognized tenants under old regime.

106

TABLE 3.6. Distribution of Castes by Size Category -
Full Sample: Shivpura

 

 

 

 

Small Medium Large Number of

Caste Households
Brahmin - l - — l
Jat* 2 ' 6 - 8
Kohli l ‘ ‘ ' 1
Mena 1 ' - - 1

Chamar 2 l - 1 4

 

Note: Not all households were interviewed

* Former jagirdars.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE

As stated in Chapter I, the relationship between economic activity
and other domains of social life helps us to understand more fully what
is going on in an economy, and furthermore, why certain features are
there. Articles produced, distributed, exchanged and consumed are part
of social relations. They underwrite and support individual and house—
hold subsistence and also support non-economic relationships and struc-
tures in society. An individual or household is not solely interested
in obtaining the basic necessities of life. As social beings, pe0ple
are part of a network of social interdependencies. There are certain
things people are committed to do or to obtain. These activities
require at least some minimal allocation of resources for their fulfill-
ment.

The effect of this on economic behavior is twofold. For instance,
a cultivating household (solely dependent on agriculture) tries to pro-
duce enough to feed itself, exchange for other required things not pro—
duced in the household and fulfill social obligations. Social obli-
gations may include things such as feasts and ceremonies, gifts and pay-
ments to clientele groups (kamins), gifts to kin, taxes, support of a
temple or gratuities to mendicants. These latter sort of things are
subject to social definition; what is appropriate for the society and

one's position in it. Similarly, items of household consumption are

107

108

subject to social definition -— things such as housing, food, clothing
and other consumer goods.

Looked at in another way, such obligations compete for resources
which otherwise could be allocated to productive activity. The problem
is one of balance between fulfilling social obligations and supporting
a particular life style against the investment of resources into income
earning activity from which they can be supported. When such activities
are balanced, the household has attained self-sufficiency or its own
level of optimal performance, even though a potential exists for higher
production. Thus, social relations and their surrounding definitions
provide an additional set of limits to economic behavior.

In both villages, the specification of the interaction between
society and economy is complicated by differing and at times contra-
dictory categories, principles and dimensions on which relations are
defined. It is difficult to come up with a consistent set of items
which explain the whole set of interactions and behavior observed.

Part of the problem is change. In its most general and broad
outlines, the interdependencies of the old order are dissolving. These
can be characterized as bound, hereditary ties, between patrons and
clients centering on the use of land and the distribution of goods and
services. These ties vertically integrate the community along economic
and ritual dimensions and operate within a subsistence village economy
and polity. These are gradually giving way to contractual arrangements

conducted and evaluated through a cash medium of exchange.* There is a

 

*I am indebted to Kenneth David for the basic idea here. (See
David, 1976: passim.)

109

shift toward the formation of horizontal groups, or classes based on
shared economic interests, which stand opposed to one another.

These changes are due to outside penetration. Government is taking
a direct interest in the agrarian economy and agriculture is being
commercialized. Monetized markets have penetrated the local economy,
bringing in industrial goods. Land relations have been altered through
land reform which has introduced private property restricted by tenancy
legislation. The post-independence political framework based on demo-
cratic elections has changed the nature of local authority, the role
leaders play in the village. All these have produced new sets of
social, economic and political interdependencies within the village and
with higher district and state levels.

Many of the structural changes are masked by the use of old forms
and idiom. In some instances, the old ties are operative and in others,
they are not. Relations are many stranded and change has not affected
each equally. There are multiple and at times, contradictory references
and contexts that define relations.

Dominant landed and wealthy groups continue to dispense patronage
to their clients. But the types of patronage, the channels through
which it flows and the name of the game have changed. Local political
brokers control goods and services coming in through development pro-
grams. Agricultural and housing loans, improved inputs and extension
services, scholarships for students and construction contracts have
been added to the local patronage network. There is less emphasis on
the distribution of locally generated goods and services. New items of
patronage can only be used by certain groups, e.g., agricultural loans

can only be used by cultivators. Other segments such as Harijans are

110

linked into the network through housing loans, land allotments, scholar—
ships, and building contracts channeled through their own leaders. The
trade-offs are patronage for political support where numbers count.

This links the local political brokers into district and state political
networks. The old patron-client system which operated within the local
arena with little outside linkages does not easily lend itself to this
interaction.

Due to mechanization, landowners are less dependent upon artisans,
tenants and labor. But mechanization has differentially affected the
livelihood of the various artisan groups. There is also a tendency
toward the monetization of village services. Traditional crafts and
services are partially done on a piece work basis, cash for specific
work done. Yet, many cultivators continue the traditional grain pay-
ments to those bound to them under the jajmani system, despite the
lessening dependence on their services.

The bound hereditary ties between landowners, tenants and labor are
most affected. Tractorization is displacing tenants and laborers from
the agricultural process. These ties are also loosened by tenancy
legislation which results in the yearly rotation of tenants. Relations
centered on land have become purely contractual with no further rights
or obligations other than those in the seasonal or daily agreement.
Though tenants and laborers are economically more dependent on land-
owners, their employment opportunities in agriculture are shrinking.
Under the old system, they at least could depend on their patrons to
look after them. Even this is now gone.

In the jajmani system, ritual ties appear to be stronger than their

economic counterparts although there is a tendency to keep up the

111

seasonal grain payments to only those groups who perform an economic
function. There is a tendency toward paying dependents only on those
ceremonial occasions when their ritual services are required.

Caste distinctions are maintained and demonstrated by ritual
exchanges and public displays on ceremonial occasions, although some
people are caught between images of "modernity" with its egalitarian
ethic and pressures to uphold the prestige of their caste upon which
much of their status and identity depends.

Status also depends on wealth and class as shown by life styles
and consumptions standards. A rich person who lives poorly and pinches
every penny is a kanjus (miser), who does not win anyone's respect. A
large masonry house, clothes, food and durable consumer items such as
radios and wristwatches are things good in and of themselves, but also
point to status. Status has its owm imperatives.

Economic well-being also enters into expectations of conspicuous

displays on ceremonial occasions. The ability to give -- doweries,
gifts and feasts or the sponsoring of festivals -- to affines, dependent
groups and the village as a whole -- demonstrates the status of the

giver. These obligations are often at odds with people's images of
themselves as modern, progressive and making their own way in the world.
The large cultivators particularly voice their ambivalence, perhaps
because they are more aware of other behavior models and because I was
an outsider. They often speak of tbe old obligations as wasteful and
onerous burdens which should be done away with. But when the time comes
to perform marriages, birth ceremonies and death feasts, they spare no

expense.

112

Power and Authority Structure

 

As we have already noted, social organization in both villages is
influenced by the skewed distribution of land and wealth. Large culti—
vating households hold the majority of village assets (Tables 4.1 and
4.2). They hold the dominant positions and control the distribution of
resources, goods and services. To a great degree caste and class over-
lap (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4).

Though both villages have several caste groups (see Table 4.5), a
major difference is the singular control of the Jats in Shivpura while
control is dispersed among several in Hanumangarh. In Shinura, there
is no question as to who is in control. Inter—caste relations appear
open and relaxed. There is little formalized and stereotyped behavior
between even those castes generally separated by ritual rank. Chamars,
Ahirs, Yadavs, Jats and Brahmins intermingle in daily social life, sit
and chat and joke among themselves. As everyone knows exactly where he
stands, recourse does not have to be made to overt demonstrations of
relative rank.

Hanumangarh is just the opposite. The landed castes compete over
the spoils of village politics. Other castes are seen as a threat to
one's position. To fraternize with ritual inferiors challenges one's
claim to status. Social distance is maintained and reinforced by
actions and speech. No self respecting high caste person will enter the
neighborhood of lower castes unless it is on the most urgent of busi-
ness. Relationships are formal and emphasize relative superiority or
inferiority.

The overall social structure in Shivpura can be conceived as a

single pyramid with Jat landowners on top. All other groups (except

113

perhaps Baniyas and the few shopkeepers) depend on them. The village is
vertically integrated under a single power structure. The elected head—
man, a Jat, is a master politician whose position rests on the distri-
bution of loans, agricultural inputs and other services coming into the
village through the cooperative and the block development offices. By
controlling these, he makes other cultivators dependent on him in return
for political support. Other types of patronage such as building con-
tracts for public buildings, go to the Chamars who have otherwise been
almost entirely displaced as agricultural tenants. These contracts are
channeled by the sarpanch through the Chamar headman who thus owes him

support. These ties are strengthened by the sarpancha's marriage to a

 

local Chamar woman,* who is one of three wives; the other two are Jats.
He also initiates local action for roads, schools, electricity and bar-
gaining for matching government funds for development projects.

Hanumangarh can be conceived as having several power pyramids.
These are controlled by the Gujjars, Minas, Baniyas and Brahmins. No
dominant power exists as these groups compete and are themselves rent by
factional disputes. There is much suspicion of anyone initiating public
undertakings or aspiring to office. As a result, elected positions are
hotly contested. During the 1973 cooperative elections, there were
several Gujjar and Mina candidates as well as a Baniya for the position
of chairman. At the last minute, the Gujjars and Minas agreed on one

candidate to prevent the Baniya from winning.** As a result of

 

*She is not a concubine, but a regularly married woman, a
dharmpatni. She can serve, but not cook for him, however. He points
out that their "masala" (spices) and provisions are kept separately.

 

**Large landowners try to keep control over the cooperative. Dur-
ing the year of study (1972-73), there were no loans given out due to

114

factionalism, the elected sarpanch has been suspended and his appointed
replacement has no following and is ineffectual.

As in Shivpura, the distribution of public goods and services has
entered the local patronage system. People want amenities such as
roads, school additions, water systems and street lights. But local
leadership has difficulty deciding on a course of action, and has even
more problems following through. These things are used by politicians
running for higher office to get support around election time. As there
is no decisive power bloc, outside politicians play competing factions
and demands against each other. The old caste patels still have a mea-
sure of influence and are their local contacts.

The Regar community, in contrast to the Shivpura Chamars, have some
independence of action. Although most do not receive agricultural ser-
Vices, they are eligible for housing loans, scholarships and land allot-
ments.* They own some of the newest and best houses in the village even

though they are among the poorest peOple in the village.

The Social Relations of Production

 

Two sets of relations are the most important for present discus-
sion: those centered on land and agriculture, and those centered on the

production and distribution of goods and services within the village.

 

poor recovery from previous years. Rumor had it that large cultivators
had taken loans at the comparatively low rate of interest and had
reloaned it to others. They had trouble collecting it from the third
parties.

*The types of patronage they receive are available only to sche-
duled castes. They are caught in a situation where they can only vote
for Congress, or not at all, as no other party has any interest in them.
Their payoffs are of the kind which do not conflict with other inter-
ests.

115

As agriculture forms the base of the village economy, changes in the
relations of production and access to land have affected the most
people.

The effects of this change are several. The process of agri—
cultural change in India is one where traditional, labor-intensive
technology based on animal tractive power will be replaced by large-
scale mechanical, capital-intensive inputs.

Traditional technology limits the size of operational holdings. It
is difficult to bring more than fifteen acres under cultivation with a
team of bullocks, wooden implements and a work force comprised of family
labor. For instance, a team of bullocks and one man can plow an acre in
a day. Cultivators plow their land two or three times for the kharif
crop and upward to eleven or twelve times for rabi, Irrigation with the
bullock drawn rope and leather bucket method requires three to four men
with two tandem teams of bullocks four days to irrigate one acre. The
persian wheel (used in Shivpura) requires four men and a team of bul-
locks two and one—half days to irrigate an acre. Similarly, the amount
of hand labor and time needed for the various other operations limits
the amount of land that can be effectively cultivated by one management
unit (see Table 4.6).

Given such constraints, larger landowners lease out land beyond the
amount they can personally manage (if they self-cultivate at all). Non-
cultivating landlords -- who usually have other sources of income such
as trade or moneylending -- lease out all their land. The amount given
to a tenant depends on the number of people asking for it, their repu-
tations as cultivators, tenants' family size, the equipment or bullocks

tenants own and the terms they are willing to accept. It is easier to

116

lease to tenants who assume the managerial role than it is for the owner
to oversee large work gangs and maintain bullocks and a full range of
agricultural implements.

This type of organization produces a mutual dependency between
landowners, tenants and laborers needed for weeding and harvesting.
Before land reform and tenancy legislation, these relationships were
bound and hereditary. People speak of the old ties with landlords as

sambandhiya, a term which means "relations" but connotes being bound or

 

tied together. These were perduring relationships that involved more
than just land. People could rely on their landlord for help in set-
tling disputes, or in illness, for financial aid required for dowries or
death feasts, and for support in lean times caused by poor harvests or
famine. Landlords relied on tenants and laborers to cultivate land, and
for income from rent. They also enlisted client support in factional
disputes and utilized their services for various household duties. It
was a mark of status to have retainers on call.

With the passage of tenancy legislation, landlords are afraid of
losing their land. A tenant who cultivates a piece of land three years
in a row can claim permanent rights even if there is no formally recog-
nized agreement. Their fear has some basis though landlords have the
power and resources to fight a court case. One tenant in Shivpura was
able to successfully press such a claim. Tenants are viewed as a threat
to property, although they are still needed (in Hanumangarh more than
Shivpura). The rotation of tenants protects landlords, but also breaks
the old patron-client ties. The relationship becomes purely con-

tractual. A few cases were found in Hanumangarh where these old ties

117

were still operative, but these were exceptional. In those cases,
tenants worked the same landlord's land, but a different plot each sea-

son .

Tractorization

 

Technological change also affects these relationships. Along with
seeds, fertilizers, and the package of practices, mechanical implements
have been introduced. Several large cultivators have purchased thirty-
five to fifty-five horsepower tractors which permit them to bring more
of their land under personal cultivation. So far tractors are used pri-
marily for plowing and levelling. Weeding, harvesting and threshing
still require much hand labor. However, chaff cutters which attach to
the back of tractors are used for cutting stalks and also for threshing.
Threshing is sometimes also done by driving a tractor in circles over
the piles of unhusked grain. Both methods take a fraction of the time
and labor required by bullocks.

In Hanumangarh there are only three tractors. These are owned by
two large landowners who use them on their own holdings and rent them to
others as they cannot make full use of their equipment to make their
investment worthwhile. These other cultivators increasingly depend on
them. This is particularly true of smaller cultivators who have diffi-
culty maintaining bullocks and are phasing them out. Households with no
bullocks try to rent a tractor for most Operations. Most bullock owning
households rely less on their animals and hire tractors also (see Table
4.7). Bullocks still have their place, however, as none of the tractors
in Hanumangarh have seed drills. Bullocks are needed for rabi_wheat and

barley crOps which require line sowing.

118

The five tractors in Shivpura are owned by different individuals.
There are three more in the neighboring village. These owners also rent
out their machines (see Table 4.8). Though tractors are replacing bul-
locks for field operations, there is no particular tendency toward their
displacement. They are still useful for transportation.* Carts are the
most practical means for transporting things within the village and to
the nearby market towns as Shivpura is not on a major road with truck
transport. Cultivators still take pride in their teams and feed them
grain as well as chaff -— something unheard of in Hanumangarh where

bullocks are small, thin and weak.

Irrigation

 

With the availability of pump sets, irrigation practices are chang—
ing as well. They require less time and labor and more land can be
brought under irrigation.

About 80 percent of the wells in Hanumangarh have electric pump
sets (see Table 4.9). The consolidation of holdings have contributed
to investment in pumps and irrigation generally. With one's land in
one place, the shift from the traditional rope and bucket method can
bring more of it under irrigation. The larger cultivators have all pur—
chased pump sets. Smaller ones are not far behind, installing them on
their own wells or entering joint ventures on wells in which they own a

share.**

 

*Carts are not used in Hanumangarh because of the sandy soil and
gullies. Camels are the chief means of transportation.

**Some joint ventures are with kinsmen. Shares in wells are
usually the result of inheritance patterns.

119

Fewer wells in Shivpura have pumpsets. As the village has yet to
be electrified, pumpsets are powered by diesel engines. These are more
cumbersome and require reserves of oil which is often in short supply.
As mentioned previously, Shivpura has not undergone land consolidation
and thus the amount of land under each well is not much. The rope and
bucket and persian wheel remain in over 60 percent of wells (see Table
4.10). The traditional methods are cheaper to operate and require less
maintenance and cash expense. Furthermore, Shivpura cultivators are not
as dependent on irrigation as are those in Hanumangarh (see Chapter 11).
Only those cultivators with enough land in one place invest in pumps.

And as in Hanumangarh, they are the larger owners.

Effects of Mechanization

 

The effects of mechanization are mixed. Without a doubt machines
are labor saving and relieve much of the drudgery of agricultural work.
They also allow for timely operations. Kharif plowing and sowing must
be done in the first two weeks of the monsoon season. There is also a
limited time after kharif in which the rabi_crop must be planted. Irri-
gation must also be done on time. But these things have an impact of
social relations and how peOple make their livelihood.

Tractors permit landowners to bring more land under personal culti-
vation but also permit them to dispense with tenants. This is somewhat
counterbalanced by increased irrigation (more so in Hanumangarh) as
double cropping creates more labor demand for weeding and harvest. But
what former tenants have lost has not been recouped through additional

wage income. Weeding and harvesting are seasonal jobs. Laborers can

120

rely on only 120 days of agricutural work a year. Furthermore, many
cultivators pool their own labor to avoid cash outlays for hired help.

Despite my concern with the effect of mechanization, I avoided
asking respondents leading questions about these things. I never linked
mechanization with problems of tenancies or employment. The Shivpura
Chamars, however, clearly make the connection. "We have not been able
to get land and demand for our labor has declined ever since the trac—
tors have come." This is one of the first things they said as I was
introducing myself and stating my general interest in agriculture during
the first few days in the village. Their reading of the situation is
borne out by the general lack of tenants in Shinura's tables. There is
only one tenant and he is also a small owner.

Shivpura is more mechanized than Hanumangarh. It has five tractors
for its one thousand cultivated acres, or two hundred per tractor.
Tenants are not in demand as tractors can service most of it. In
Hanumangarh there are only three tractors to service some 3,400 acres,
or over one thousand acres per tractor. As a result, much land is still
given out on lease. Although peeple in the landless category complain
that land is harder to get, they link the shortage to general population
growth. And there are more landless peOple today than ten or twenty
years ago.*

Linked to technological change is the rising profitability of agri—
culture (to be gone into in detail later on). This is one of the com—
pounding factors -- along with population growth -— which has produced

almost total demise of the tenant class in Shivpura. This process is

 

*In times past landowners had difficulty finding tenants. The
bound relationship was especially necessary for the landlord.

121

more evident in Hanumangarh where di3placement has just begun. In many
cases landlords who previously did not cultivate now take an active
interest in agriculture. Being influential persons, they have access to
new seeds, fertilizer and information from extension personnel. They
also have the financial capacity to invest. They provide physical
inputs and assume the managerial role.

Such owners employ families seasonally and personally direct what
is to be grown and the operations to be performed. Lacking the mechani—
cal implements —- not owning tractors nor assured of getting them on
hire -- they need manual labor and bullocks. The hired families provide
these items even though they may have to hire bullocks (and sometimes
tractors) themselves. Families working under these arrangements are
defined as laborers and not tenants though the dividing line between the
two categories is very thin.

Labor is rewarded on a share basis but the landlord is the manager
and decision maker. The arrangement is often beneficial to both
parties. The landlord/manager receives more return and although he
receives a larger protion of the product, the share received by the
labor family is usually larger than what they would net from a regular
tenancy and the use of traditional varieties.* But this is a temporary

state of affairs.

 

*The division of the crop under the landlord-tenant and manager-
laborer agreements is conceived as a number of shares. For unirrigated
land, the crop is divided into two equal shares, one to the land (the
landlord's) and one to the tenant for his labor and other inputs. For
irrigated land there are three equal shares: one each to the land and
well (both the landlord's)anuione to the tenant. Under the manager-
1aborer arrangement, the number of shares increases. On unirrigated
land, there are three equal shares, one each to the land and the physi-
cal inputs (both the landlord's) and one to the laborer. There are four

122

Landowners using this arrangement make it clear that as soon as
they have access to labor saving devices, they will dispense with sea-
sonal laborers. They may need laborers during the peak harvest time,
but will employ them only then for daily wages. The one large culti-
vator in Hanumangarh owning two tractors articulated this very clearly.
He currently gives a generous one-third of the harvest during both sea-
sons to the three families he employs each season. He provides the
seed, fertilizer, tractor plowing and water. The families provide bul-
locks and their own labor. When asked what he will do as he gets the
full range of implements for his tractors, he said he will cut down the
laborers' share to one-sixth, and eventually dispense with them
altogether. This he justifies on the grounds that laborers are ineffi-
cient and he has to make a return on money invested. Although he makes
a cash return over recurring expenses, he still has a negative cash flow
because of tractor payments. Labor is currently necessary, but expen-
sive.

The more a cultivator enters into the cash economy, the more he
must take the monetized market into account. He must also evaluate the
social relations of production in the same manner. This is a further
reason for breaking ties with dependent groups.

The position of the landless, mainly Chamars and Telis, in Shivpura
is precarious. They are no longer needed as tenants and local wage
labor does not provide them much income. There is little construction
work and there are few local resources on which to base industry. Some

Chamars make shoes they sell locally and at least one person, their

 

shares for irrigated land: one each to the land, the well and physical
inputs (all the landlord's) and one to the laborer.

123

patgl, has taken up carpentry. Their main local source of income
remains agricultural labor.

Some of their men seek employment in Bharatpur, construction work
in Delhi (ninety miles away) and agricultural work during harvest as far
away as Chandigarh in the Punjab (230 miles distant). These people
usually make enough to feed and clothe themselves and have a few meager
savings to see their families through slack periods. Opportunities for
steady employment outside the village are very limited as unemployment
in urban areas is high for unskilled and semi—skilled labor. Harvest
work in other regions is highly seasonal and even that is being mecha—
nized. Harvester-combines have been introduced in areas such as the
Punjab. The migrants return to Shivpura when no work is to be had else—
where. Living expenses are lower in the village. They can call on sup-
port from relatives and the few people in their community who have land.
Occasional local jobs provide some additional income. It is a hand to
mouth existence and one gets the impression they are trapped.*

In Hanumangarh, people in the landless class have more Opportuni-
ties. As discussed above, land is available on lease and there is more
demand for their labor. Few people migrate to find employment. Two
Regar men worked for several years in the textile mills of Ahmedabad,
Gujerat (360 miles to the south) but returned home as they felt there

were better Opportunities locally.

 

*Their sense of helplessness was accentuated by a fire in their
neighborhood a few days before our arrival. Many were left with only
the clothes on their backs and the few possessions they could salvage
from the ashes. They did receive government assistance for rebuilding
and rethatching their houses.

124

The Regars also make shoes and market them in Jaipur. They also
make hand fans from palm fronds which are marketed in Jaipur and the
local bus stop during the hot season. The water works at the nearby
reservoir also provides employment. Almost all pump drivers and
mechanics are from their community.

One Regar and one Khatik hold concessions for licensed liquor
shops. They sell "country liquor" made by the Rajasthan State
Distilleries and do a brisk business within their own communities and
with the Minas. A few Regars have become moneylenders for their own
community, displacing Baniyas. Others have plans to open small retail
food shops and flour mills. Some —- mainly the old leaders -— own
good irrigated land and a very few have made a go of it on allotted
lands.

Those who are better off see no future in agriculture. Sons are
being educated who hope to find civil service jobs or other employment
in the cities. Tenancies provide supplementary income which they see
as coming to an end.

These persons form a burgeoning elite in their own communities.
The majority live under the worst conditions in the village.* Most
depend on tenancies, agricultural labor and construction for their
income. But their's is not a sense of helplessness and total subordi-

nation which pervades their counterpart community in Shivpura. Despite

 

*For example, it was observed that children of families who were
primarily laborers often only had millet stalks to chew on -- to extract
some sugar -- for their evening meal. Other families were observed to
be eating carrion beef. Many people ate only one meal a day which was
comprised of chapatis (flat bread) and perhaps an onion.

125

internal factionalism, they fall in behind their leaders and the Regars,

particularly, present a united front against the rest of the village.

The Jajmani System and Caste Relations

 

Another set of relations in both villages are being altered, but
not to the same degree as land relations. These relations are those of
the jajmani system. Whereas landlord, tenant and labor relations tend
to coincide with caste categories, they are free of caste definitions.
The jajmani system on the other hand partakes of caste definitions. The
services performed and goods produced are done by separate caste groups.
The categories are jajman (patron) and kamin_(client or doer of work).

Centered on cultivating groups are artisans and service groups who
contribute to agricultural production or running of the household.

These relations are spoken of as sambandhi —- bound and hereditary.
Kamins provide services (material and ritual) in exchange for a set
amount of grain.

For instance, in Hanumangarh, payment is based on several criteria.
The leatherworkers (until recently), carpenters, blacksmiths and potters
receive an amount according to the number of plows or teams of oxen in
the jajman's household. Barbers and washermen may receive an amount
pegged to the number of adult males and/or females in the household.

The amount of grain exchanged is fixed and it is not Open to negotia-
tion. Neither is the rate related to actual work done.

Kamins have several jajmans and receive grain from each at harvest.
The total amount received is often substantial and provides the major
income for such families. Aside from grain, kamins also receive other

things such as small cash gifts on festive occasions, old clothing,

126

leaves to make plates (barbers only), grass and fodder for animals and
occasional vegetables from the jajman's garden. Kamins may also lease
land from their jajmans; thus the relationships are often many stranded.

Theoretically, the patron-client relationship cannot be broken. A
jajman cannot arbitrarily change kamins nor a kamin_arbitrarily withhold
services. If there is a break in the relationship, a fight over quality
of service or shortchanging in payment, no other kamin_is supposed to
approach the jajman nor agree to provide services if asked. Despite
such ruptures which can last several years, the two parties are thought
of as being bound together and they must eventually settle their differ-
ences.

The patron—client relationship also involves ritual obligations.
The prOper performance of marriages, birth ceremonies and death feasts
require the services of various kamins, services which can only be pro-
vided by those families bound to the jajman household.

A marriage in Hanumangarh, for instance, requires the family barber
as a messenger between the families and as announcer proclaiming the
amount of gifts exchanged. The carpenter provides a Egrgn (a wooden
lattice frame) which goes over the bride's doorway and is struck with a
sword by the groom as he enters. The carpenter also provides a thamb
(a pole) for Ganesh 2213 (prayer) on which an earthern pot (provided by
the potter) is set filled with rice and auspicious articles. The
Brahmin priest ties a string bracelet on the wrists of the bride and
groom to which are attached an iron ring (from the blacksmith),ailac
ring (from the bangle maker) and a small red cloth pouch filled with
yellow rice (provided by the priest who performs the ceremony). The

bride and groom are also required to worship at the potter's wheel. The

127

involvement of each of these kamins is necessary. If they do not per-
form their function it does not bode well for the success of the cere-
mony.

All rituals serve more than their avowed purpose. Life crises
ceremonies, festivals honoring ancestors, birthdays and exploits of
deities and seasonal festivals provide Opportunities for demonstrating
relationships and ties of interdependency.

Feasts accompanying these events provide opportunities to show per—
sonal and caste rank. The serving and eating of foods follows pro-
scriptions of purity and pollution. Persons of the same caste sit apart
from others but castes of roughly the same rank often interdine.* The
acceptance of food denotes equality or inferiority to the preparer and
server. Refusal denotes superiority or a standoff where neither caste
accepts the other's food. Brahmins are preferred as cooks at such
feasts because everyone can accept food from them. They will only serve
clean castes, however, and this limits the ability of lower castes
(Harijans) to put on feasts to which higher castes attend. They can

only be receivers of food which marks them as inferiors.

Changes in the System

 

Jajmani ties are affected by the same processes that led to the
demise of the landlord, tenant and labor bound relationship. There is
less dependence on the services and goods of kamins as mechanization
increases and industrial goods enter the local bazaars (e.g., plastic

buckets). There is a general consensus among artisan and service groups

 

*Jajmans who interdine with kamins are hesitant to use that term in
referring to them.

128

that the system will end at least in its economic aspect. They say it
will last no longer than the next generation and they are moving into
other occupations. Where their services are still needed, they are per—
formed on a part-time basis.

Such structural changes are masked by the exchanges which still
occur. Cultivators give grain to maintain the ritual tie and some give
out of amicability ("khushi g3”). There is a tendency to stop seasonal
grain payments and only to give payments on ceremonial occasions.
Furthermore, these ritual ties are loosening into generalized relations
between castes. In Shivpura there is talk of engaging anyone of the
appropriate caste for ritual services rather than particular persons
with whom there is a hereditary tie. At the time of field work this was
talk only, but is indicative of the gradual breakdown of the system.

Jajmani ties are stronger in Hanumangarh than they are in Shivpura
even though economic services are taking on a contractual nature. In
one case a jajman fought with his carpenter and there was no communi-
cation between them for several years. The patron had his carpentry
work done by another family on a cash basis with no objection from any-
one. But should the jajman need the ritual servies of a carpenter, he
will have to patch up relations with his hereditary kgmig as no other
carpenter will provide them.

Not all artisan and service castes are linked to the jajmani
system. Of the eighteen castes which are in this category in
Hanumangarh (see Table 4.5) only nine receive grain at harvest and very
few receive from many households (see Table 4.11).

Of those receiving, the Kumhars head the list with Nais a close

second. The Kumhar's wares are still needed as glazed pottery has yet

129

to become a regular item of household use. Earthenware is fragile and
needs constant replacement. The Nais are more important for their
ritual services. People are beginning to use safety razors or frequent
the barber shops which Nais Open in the bazaars. Jajmani work still
provides a major source of income for both groups.*'

The Khattis (carpenters) and Lohars (blacksmiths) are not as impor-
tant to the economy anymore. The one Khatti household in the sample
does receive 90 percent of its grain requirements from jajmans and 10
percent from its own production. No cash was received from jajmans and
its entire cash income was made from contract carpentry work.

The other receiving castes are only peripherally linked into the
system. The Jogis and Kapris are primarily mendicants and their pay-
ments are conceived as alms given out of religious duty. The Balais are
leatherworkers and the very few households giving them grain are not
exactly sure why they do so. It is just their "custom." It is suffi-
cient that the one household who gives to the Dhobi (washerman) is a
Brahmin household. Dhobis traditionally wash the menstrual clothes of
their jajman households' women. Brahmins are more particular about dis-

tance from pollution which the Dhobi can absorb. The one household

 

*The two Kumhar households in the sample receive about 50 percent
of their grain requirements from jajmans. The one Nai receives 95 per-
cent of his requirements from this system. Twenty percent of the
Kumhars' and 10 percent of the Nais' cash income is received from
jajmans. The Kumhars are the least affected by the cash economy. They
have little or no cash input in pottery production and have difficulty
assigning a cash value to their wares. Only 3 percent of their cash
income is from the sale of pots. The remainder comes from salaries.
The Nais receive the rest of their cash income from the sale of leaf
plates used in ceremonial feasts. This is a traditional occupation
along with barbering.

130

which gives to the Bhangi (sweeper) is exceptional. Most households pay
sweepers daily with leftover food and occasionally with Old clothing.

Looking at those who give on the basis of size discriminates things
somewhat. Landowners make payments to more categories than tenant and
owner/tenant households (Table 4.11). Landowners have more equipment to
maintain and are more secure in their occupation and running of their
households.

Looking at giving households on the basis of caste puts things into
sharper relief (Table 4.12). Minas give to the most categories and con-
sistently give to a fuller complement of castes. They are followed by
the Malis and Gujjars.

These three castes are closely allied with the Kumhars, Khattis and
Lohars. They interdine with their kamins (and are reluctant to refer to
them by that term), although they will not interdine among themselves.
The maintenance of relations with kamins marks a household as socially
important (after Gould, 1964: 18). Relations with Khattis and Lohars
distinguish them as important agriculturalists, people of substance who
have the wherewithal to give. This is particularly the case with the
Minas who are in a rather ambivalent position because of their status.
They tend to exceed traditional payments. They give bonuses to kamins
by making payment in pukka rather than kuchcha kilos. One Mina, a large
cultivator, grandly gave a quintal of grain to his Kumhar, fifty kilo-

grams to his Khatti, forty to his Nai and twenty-five to his Lohar.*

 

*Standard payments are made in multiples of kuchcha kilograms or
sers. One kuchcha ser equals 1.6 pukka sers. One pukka s23 is about
equivalent to a metric kilogram and people use kilograms and sers inter-
changeably. Payments to various kamins range from 2.5 to forty
kuchcha sers per season. One of the banes of field work was the
multiple standards of weights and measures. 1 had to continually ask

 

 

131

The Regars tend to function in a similar manner. Their relations
with artisans are an attempt to demonstrate clean status. Relatively
few give grain to Khattis and Lohars. Most of this work is done on a
cash and carry basis. Most households accepting their grain see it as
a simple transaction which happens to follow the jajmani idiom. They do
not provide ritual services. Similarly, Regars' relations with Kumhars
follow the same idiom as it is easier for Kumhars to calculate in grain
for pots and their equivalencies. The Regars, however, do have their
own Nais who provide both barbering and ritual services.

Cultivators of the artisan and service castes, Sonar, Khatti,
Kumhar and Lohar, make the least payments of all. They are kamins them-
selves and usually reciprocate services with ad Egg grain payments on
occasion. The Balai is in much the same position as the Regars; their
payments to artisans, however, are purely contractual with no ritual
Obligations implied. Rajputs are marginal within the local hierarchy
as there are so few that they do not enter local competition. Baniyas
and Brahmins also make few payments. Kamins are not as important to
them for maintaining status as they are large landowners and control
much wealth. They call on kamins for ritual services but give rela-
tively few seasonal payments.

Of the non-receiving castes, the Regars are the most interesting.
About six years prior to field work, they unilaterally severed their
jajmani ties. This was part of a state-wide movement which had the sup-

port Of some politicians looking for Harijan support.

 

informants which standard they were using when they said "kilo." Land
measurements were also complicated.

132

Their decision was met with resistence by all the cultivating
castes. Several confrontations took place in which a few Regar men were
badly beaten. This break occurred about the same time that land was
allotted to them which compounded the confrontation. They were driven
off by other cultivators who use these lands for grazing. Most Regars
have never gained control of their allotments. Although they complained
at the local police station, they received no support. They claim the
police were bribed to look the other way.

Previously they made and repaired leather goods for their jajmans
and received grain payments. Their transactions now are all monetized.
They feel they were cheated under the old system by jajmans reneging on
grain payments and cutting down other benefits. They refuse to do
repair work now and only make new articles. Their former patrons must
patch their own shoes and irrigation buckets or rely on itinerant
cobblers (Mochis) for repairs. Many of their former patrons speak
bitterly about this break and try to boycott Regars' goods. Some go to
Jaipur for leather articles and approach Regars only when they require
labor. As a result, the Regars have lost a source of income but feel
they have more than made up for it with other occupations as well as in
terms of self-respect.

The Regars' decision to "go it alone" involves more than doing away
with patrons and moving into the cash economy. They are also attempting
to raise their status, not necessarily to rise above any superior caste,
but to at least shed their unclean Harijan position. This is one reason
why they have given up doing repair work which is more degrading than
working on new things. They are very conscious of public displays.

Their fine masonry houses are on the road to the bus stop by which

133

everyone must walk. Their funeral processions are the most elaborate of
anyone's in the village. They also put on a showy display for weddings,
although no one will attend them or eat their food. Most have given up
eating carrion beef and try to emulate the life of higher castes.
Breaking jajmani ties is one attempt to get out from under the domi-
nation of their patrons and thus to shed their inferior status. This is
helped by alternative sources of income, the continued reliance of land-
owners on their labor and services as tenants and the political patron—
age given them.

In Shivpura, as in Hanumangarh, not all kamin castes who receive
grain are equally involved in the system (Table 4.13). They have also
been generally more affected by processes of change than kamins in
Hanumangarh as there is less dependence on their goods and services.
Most work is done on a cash basis. Such grain payments as they receive
serve to maintain ritual ties and there is a tendency to keep up pay-
ments only to those whose ritual services are the most important. The
Nais receive from all households. Others receive payments as their
special services are required.

The Kumhars receive grain from only 50 percent of cultivators'
households. Today many families purchase earthenware from the nearby
market towns or use glazed crockery and brass utensils which are more
durable. Only water storage jars are needed for cooling drinking water.
These are replaced as needed and can be purchased from the town at a

fraction of value of grain given Kumhars.*

 

*Standard payments are in multiples of pukka sers. The lowest sea-
sonal payment is five and the highest is fifty. As in Hanumangarh, the
multiple given a family depends on the service provided and the jajman's
household composition.

 

134

There is not enough local demand to support either Khattis or
Lohars. This is not only because Shivpura is small, but also because
of mechanization. One family combines both occupations. They make
bullock carts and do quick repairs on agricultural implements which
most people buy in town. Most of their work is done for cash.

The Dhobi receives grain from only two households. As in
Hanumangarh, one of these households is Brahmin. One Jat also gives
grain but more as a grand gesture. He is a large landowner and is very
wealthy. He is the only Jat giving to Manihars and Bhangis. Manihars
are not dependent on jajmans as they have a thriving bangle business,
marketing in the village and nearby towns. The Jat gives fifty kilo—
grams per season to the Manihar and twenty to the Bhangi.

Only the large cultivating households give grain to the full
complement of £3912 castes. The other owner categories give to fewer
castes with the small owners only giving to one. The large owners are
all Jats and the small owners are all Chamars. The latter have very
little land, under one acre each, and they have problems just providing
for themselves let alone maintaining such relations.

Looking at giving households on a caste basis gives a further
demonstration of Jat dominance (Table 4.14). The Jats are the biggest
givers, even though their position is uncontested. They do not give in
competition with other castes but more so to show their superiority.
And as in Hanumangarh, there is the tendency to use payments as a demon—
stration of their wherewithal, exceeding what is traditionally owed.

The Brahmins are in no position to challenge the Jats for economic
or political supremacy in the village. They are former tenants and are

small and medium sized cultivators. The one Brahmin in the sample is a

135

small shopkeeper as well. He and Brahmins generally are the butts of
Jat jokes de3pite their ritual superiority. The Brahmin maintains
jajmani relations on a regular basis with only those clients whose
services he requires.

The Chamar cultivators maintain relations only with the Nai and
the Khatti-Lohar. Nais are required for ritual services and their pay-
ments to the Khatti-Lohar are strictly business transactions following
the Old idiom.

In both villages, the magnitude of grain exchanged through the
jajmani system is small. About 2 percent of all grain produced by
interviewed households in each village is distributed to clients. The
significance of the system lies in the maintenance of ritual inter-
dependency and the demonstration of relative social rank. As techno-
logical innovations and the cash economy penetrate further into the
villages, displacing goods and services provided by clients, the system
will collapse as an economic institution. The perdurance of the system,
unlike the bound landlord, tenant and laborer relations, is due to its
social significance and because clients are no threat to jajman's posi—
tion and property. It may survive in abbreviated form, without bound
hereditary characteristics and consisting of generalized relations
between castes (as foreshadowed in Shinura). It has lost its signifi-
cance as an institution which integrates social, economic and political
as well as cultural life. New relationships, interdependencies and
means of evaluation are superceding it. At best it will become an arti-
fact Of the past attached only to the ceremonial and ritual life of both

villages.

136

 

 

 

TABLE 4.1. Average Assets Per Household
by Size Category: Hanumangarh
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 T O/T O O/T O
(No. of Households) (l6) (6) (6) (7) (3) (6) (44)
Agricultural: (Primarily land, secondarily bullocks and equipment)

 

Assets Held:
Beginning 71—72
Assets Sold
Value End 71—72

Equity Held:
Beginning 71-72
Value End 71-72

Agriculturally Related:

6427 294
6523 267
5864 294
5840 267

 

Assets Held:
Beginning 71-72
Assets Sold
Value End 71-72

Equity Held:
Beginning 71—72
Value End 71-72

Household:

Assets Held:
Beginning 71-72
Assets Sold
Value End 71—72

Equity Held:
Beginning 71-72
Value End 71-72

Liquid Assets*

 

Beginning 71-72
Value End 71-72

(Houses, durable

1035 1667
100
1428

921

1667
1428

1035
921

4320 15973
134
4392 15255

4164 14940
4392 15255

7500
90 7586

1367

1342

1367
1342

703
208
449

703

347

7146
6948
6896

6948

17
189

15322
15257

15322
15257

(Other livestock)

1754

1773

1754
1616

2837

2854

2837
2854

172
11

3197
3213

3197
3197

833

827

833
793

goods, non—agricultural

3206
3198
3206

3198

2

86312

87120
81478

82749

4171
4153

4171
4153

42409

43495

40909
43495

3837
4083

16989

17133

16125
16272

1604
42
1496

1604
1455

properties)

11177
18
11228

10740
11228

1576
1652

 

* Most of this is invested in moneylending.

TABLE 4.2.

 

137

Average Assets Per Household

 

 

by Size Category: Shivpura
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 o o O/T
(No. of Households) (2) (2) (5) (l) (10)

 

Agricultural:

 

Assets Held:
Beginning 71-72
Assets Sold
Value End 71—72

Equity Held:
Beginning 71-72
Value End 71-72

Agriculturally Related:

 

Assets Held:
Beginning 71-72
Assets Sold
Value End 71-72

Equity Held:
Beginning 71-72
Value End 71—72

Household:

Assets Held:
Beginning 71-72
Assets Sold
Value End 71-72

Equity Held:
Beginning 71-72
Value End 71-72

Liquid Assets

 

Beginning 71-72
Value End 71-72

1595
1595

1595
1595

(Other livestock)

150

135

150
135

(Houses, durable

200

200

200
200

20530
20405

20530
20405

900

810

900
810

3660

4160

3660
4160

500
195

71250
70800

70564
70800

2468
45
2185

2468
2185

21800

23054

21800
23054

3975
2871

5550

5390

5550
5390

300

270

300
270

4000

4000

4000
4000

(Primarily land, secondarily bullocks and equipment)

40605
40339

40262
40339

1474
23
1309

1474
1309

goods, non-agricultural properties)

12072

12799

12072
12799

2088
1475

 

138

TABLE 4.3. Caste Distribution by Size Category: Hanumangarh

 

 

 

 

Small Medium Large All
Caste Sizes
0 T O/T o O/T o

Brahmin - — - 2 - 3 5
Rajput l - - — - - l
Baniya - - - - - l 1
Mali 2 - - 3 - l 6
Mina 4 - l l — l 7
Gujjar - — - l - - l
Sonar - - l - - - 1
Khatti l - - - - - l
Kumhar 2 - - - - — 2
Nai - 1 - - — - l
Balai 1 - — - - - l
Regar 5 5 4 - 3 - 17
Totals 16 6 6 7 3 6 44

 

Note: Compare with Table 3.5, the full sample.

TABLE 4.4. Caste Distribution by Size Category: Shivpura

 

Small Medium Large

 

 

 

All
caSte Sizes
0 O O O/T
Brahmin - l - - l
Jat - - 5 - 5
Chamar 2 1 - l 4
Totals 2 2 5 l 10

 

Note: Compare with Table 3.6, the full sample.

139

 

 

TABLE 4.5. Castes Represented: Hanumangarh and Shinura
Hanumangarh Shivpura
Brahmins: (priest, cultivator Brahmin (priest, culti-
Parikh and landlord) vator and shop-
Gaur . keeper)
Baniya (merchant, money-
Haryana
Gujjar—Gaur lender and land-
lord)
Rajput (cultivator) Jat (cultivator and
Charan (cultivator) landlord)
Baniya (merchant, moneylender Ahir (cultivator and
and landlord landlord)
Kir (Punjabi immigrant Yadav (cultivator)
miller and landlord) Garghariya (cultivator)
Khatri (Punjabi immigrant Khatti (carpenter)
merchant and moneylender) Kumhar (potter)
Jogi (mendicant) Nai (barber)
Kapri (mendicant) Kohli (weaver, shop—
Mali (cultivator) keeper)
Mina (cultivator) Mena (cultivator)
Gujjar (cultivator) Chamar (leatherworker,
. laborer)
Sonar (goldsmith)
Dhobi (washerman)
Khatti (carpenter) Bh i ( r)
Kumhar (potter) ang scavenge
Lohar (blacksmith)
Nai (barber) Muslims:
Kalhar (distiller, merchant) Meo (emmigrant priest)
Kohli (weaver, laborer) Manihar (banglemaker)
Regar (leatherworker, laborer) Teli (Oilpresser)
Balai (leatherworker, laborer)
Khatik (herder, butcher, laborer)
Dhobi (washerman)
Naik (scavenger, watchman)
Bhangi (scavenger)
Muslims:
Sheikh (shopkeeper)
Manihar (banglemaker)
Darji (tailor)
Teli (oilpresser)

 

* This is a rough rank order which corresponds generally to local con—

ceptions and interaction.

A rigorous analysis was not conducted.

140

TABLE 4.6. Man Days Required Per Acre for Various
Agricultural Operations by Season*

 

 

 

Hanumangarh Shivpura
Operation
Kharif Rabi Kharif Rabi
Clearing 2.5 -- 2.5 --
Manuring** 1.5—8.0 -- 1.0-5.0 --
Plowing:
by Bullocks 1 l l l
by Tractor .05 .05 .05 .05
Dragging:
by Bullocks .5 .5 .5 .5
by Tractor .02 .02 .02 .02
Sowing:
by Bullocks l 1 l 1
by Tractor —- -- .l .l
Weeding*** l6 4 10 10
Irrigation:
by Rope and Bucket 12-16 12—16 10-12 10—12
by Persian Wheel -- -- 10 10
by Mechanical Pump 1 l l l
Harvesting 6—12 6-12 6-10 6-10
Threshing: (@ 100 Kgs.)
by Bullocks .5-l.0 .5-l.0 .5-l.0 .5-l.0
by Chaff Cutter .05 .05 .05 .05
by Tractor Tires .05 .05 .05 .05
Winnowing: (@ 100 Kgs.) .l-.25 .1—.25 .1-.25 .l-.25
Transport: (@ 100 Kgs.)**
by Camel .15-.25 .15-.25 -- --
by Bullock Cart -- -- .05-.10 .05-.10
by Tractor Trolley .02-.05 .02-.05 .02-.05 .02-.05

 

* Based on estimates given by cultivators

** Differences depend upon the distance covered.

***Cultivators in Hanumangarh broadcast seed in kharif which requires

more thinning and transplanting.

141

TABLE 4.7. Households Owning and Hiring Bullocks
and Tractors: Hanumangarh

 

 

 

 

Small Medium Large All
Item Si es
0 T O/T o O/T o z
NO. Of Households l6 6 6 7 3 6 44
Bullock Owners 4 l l 4 1 4 15
Total Bullocks lO 4 4 18 2 14 52
Tractor Owners - - - - - 2 2
Total Tractors - - - - - 3 3
Households Hiring
Bullocks 12 5 5 2 3 - 27
Households Hiring
Tractors: 13 4 5 5 2 3 32
Plowing and Sowing 7 4 4 3 1 3 22
Threshing 5 3 3 2 l - l4
Levelling 2 — - 1 - - 3

Households Hiring
Neither 2 - - 2 - 3 7

 

TABLE 4.8. Households Owning and Hiring Bullocks

 

142

 

 

 

 

and Tractors: Shivpura
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 O O O/T
No. of Households 2 2 5 l 10
Bullock Owners — 2 5 l 8
Total Bullocks - 3 16 2 21
Tractor Owners - - (5)* - (5)
Total Tractors - - (5) - (5)
Households Hiring
Bullocks 2 — - — 2
Households Hiring
Tractors: l - 4 - 5
Plowing and Sowing l - 4 - 5
Threshing - - 3 - 3
Levelling - - - - -
Households Hiring
Neither - 2 l l 4

 

* Numbers in brackets:

tractors owned by persons not in sample.

143

 

 

 

TABLE 4.9. Irrigation Facilities: Hanumangarh
I Small Medium Large All
tem Sizes
0 T O/T o O/T o
(No. of Households) (l6) (6) (6) (7) (3) (6) (44)
Households with
Access to Wells 6 2 2 5 2 6 22
Acres Serviced
by Wells 15.13 3.75 5.88 26.37 6.7 86.62 144.5
Total Number of Wells* 5.4 2 1.12 3.72 2.5 11.83 26.57
Owned Wells 5.4 -- 0.12 3.72 0.5 11.83 21.57
Owned Wells
in Service 4.4 -- 0.12 3.72 —- 10.83 19.07
Rented Wells -- 2 l -- 2 -- 5
Rented Wells
in Service —- 1 1 —- 2 -— 4
Wells Operated by:
Rope and Bucket 2 -- .06 2 5 -- -- 4.56
Persion Wheel -— -— -- -- -- -- --
Pump Set 2.4 1 1.06 1.22 2 10.83 18.51
Pump Sets Idle -- 1 -— -— -- —- l

 

* Includes shares held in jointly owned wells.

144

TABLE 4.10. Irrigation Facilities: Shivpura

 

 

 

 

1 Small Medium Large All
tem Sizes
0 O O O/T
(No. of Households) (2) (2) (5) (1) (10)
Households with
Access to Wells — l 5 l 7
Acres Serviced
by Wells - 5.2 30.8 8.8 44.8
Total Number of Wells - l 7.5 1 9.5
Owned Wells - l 7.5 - 8.5
Owned Wells
in Service - - 5.5 - 5.5
Rented Wells — - - 1 l
Rented Wells
in Service - - - l 1
Wells Operated by:
Rope and Bucket - - 2.5 - 2.5
Persian Wheel - - 2 — 2
Pump Set - - 1 l 2

Pump Sets Idle - - 1 - 1

 

145

TABLE 4.11. Number of Households Making Grain
Payments to Kamins: Hanumangarh

 

 

 

Cultivating Households (Givers)
Small Medium Large All

Item .
Sizes

 

O T O/T O O/T O
(No. of Households) (l6) (6) (6) (7) (3) (6) (44)

 

No. of Households
Giving Grain 15 5 5 5 3 6 39

 

 

Kamins (Receivers)

 

Kumhar l3 5 5 5 3 6 37
Nai 12 4 4 4 3 5 32
Khatti 9 l l 5 2 3 21
Lohar 5 1 l 4 - 2 l3
Jogi 3 - 1 1 - - 5
Balai l — - 2 — - 3
Kapri 1 - - l - - 2
Dhobi - - - - - l l
Bhangi - - - - - 1 1

No. of Castes
Receiving 7 4 5 7 3 6 9

 

 

146

TABLE 4.12. Number of Households Making Grain
Payments to Kamins: Shivpura

 

Cultivating Households (Givers)

 

 

 

 

 

Small Medium Large All
Item .
Sizes
0 o 0 O/T
(No. of Households) (2) (2) (5) (1) (10)
No. of Households
Giving Grain l 2 5 1 9
Kamins (Receivers)
Kumhar - 1 4 - 5
Nai 1 2 5 1 9
Khatti-Lohar - l 3 l 5
Dhobi - 1 l — 2
Bhangi — - 1 - 1
Manihar - — l - 1

No. of Castes
Receiving 1 4 6 2 6

 

 

147

TABLE 4.13. Number of Households Making Grain
Payments by Caste: Hanumangarh

 

Item

Cultivating Households (Givers)

 

m
'U

m F4

:1 O

-H L1 m u *4 H mu m .5

E 5 >~ m u 44 m u -H o m .4 m

.C‘. 0.. H 'r-l Cd ”'1 (U u .1: (U m u m (I:
emaciagaaa 2.023523%

no :34 9Q g 2 U U) M M Z m an 2 U E-i 2%

(No. of Households) (5) (1) (1) (6) (7) (1) (1) (1) (2) (1) (17) (1) (12) (44)

 

No. of Households

 

Giving Grain

 

Kamins (Receivers)

 

Kumhar
Nai
Khatti
Lohar
Jogi
Balai
Kapri
Dhobi
Bhangi

No. of Castes

 

Receiving

4 l l. .5 7 l l l. - 1 l4 1 11 37
3 l l. 4 7 l. l - l. - .13 - 9 32
2 l - 5 7 1. - '— - - 4 l. 7 21
— l - 4 6 1. - - - - 1. - S 13
_ _ .. 2 2 ._ - - - - 1. - 3 5
- — — - 2 1 — — — — — - 2 3
- - - - 2 - - — - — - - l 2
l - - - - - - - — - - - l 1
- - - 1 - - - - - - - - l l

 

148

TABLE 4.14. Number of Households Making Grain
Payments by Caste: Shivpura

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cultivating
Households (Givers)
0)
Item to 3
C o
-H H tH w .c
'g m o o r4 m
a t: E “5 3‘3
m a o as as
(No. of Households) (1) (5) (4) (3) (10)
No. of Households
Giving Grain l 5 3 9
Kamins (Receivers)
Kumhar 1 4 - 2
Nai l 5 3 3
Khatti-Lohar - 3 2 2
Dhobi 1 l - 2
Bhangi - 1 - l
Maniar - l - 1

No. of Castes

Receiving 3 6 2 6

 

 

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC LIFE: INCOME, ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

AND PRODUCTION

Parameters of Economic Activigy

 

Generally speaking, the parameters of constraints and incentives
surrounding agriculture are very loose, and there is little to channel
behavior into a more or less uniform pattern. There is a wide range of
production behavior from subsistence peasant agriculture to entre-
preneurial commercial farming. The two often occur side by side.

This partially is due to differential access and control over land
and other resources. Large influential cultivators can more easily
afford improvements and take more risks. They have more options than
small cultivators simply because they have more with which to work. In
Hanumangarh, they account for less than 14 percent of sample households,
but own and operate about 48 percent of cultivated land. In Shivpura,
large landowners constitute 50 percent of sample households and hold 75
percent of cultivated land. Although they have many more members per
household, they have more land, income and expendable resources per
capita, consumption and labor unit than any other group (Tables 5.1 and
5.2).

One of the striking features is the relationship between household
composition and wealth. There is an increase in household size as

wealth increases. It is quite often assumed that joint families are a

149

150

security mechanism for the economically disadvantaged. To the contrary,
poorer (small cultivating households) tend to be nuclear and the rich
ones joint. It has been argued that there is a critical ratio between
wealth and household composition below which families will fission and
divide the estate (Rheubottom, N.D.; Owens, 1971; Nicholas, 1961; Cohn,
1961). The critical minimum for these two villages cannot be assessed
as I do not have longitudinal data. General observation, however, sup—
ports the arguments that wealthy groups have joint families to keep
property under one management unit. This perpetuates their dominant
position.

The uneven distribution of resources, particularly land, does set
limits on the production activities of different groups of cultivators.
But there is no strong correlation between enhanced opportunity and
greater productivity and efficiency in agricultural operations. Given
the Options which exist with more resources, larger cultivators can also
afford to be less efficient and productive than their less advantaged
counterparts. Along with other size categories in the two villages, the
large cultivators exhibit a wide range in productivity and efficiency
which cannot be explained by differential access to and control of
resources. They, among all size groups, have the least resource con—
straints. As such, they perhaps provide the best test for the questions
asked here. Differential access to resources is but one set of para-

meters which can lead to variation in production behavior.

Spread of Innovation

 

The great differences which occur between cultivators is partially

due to the introduction of new agricultural methods and technology.

 

151

There is often a lag in the adoption of new technology or use of new
institutions, a feature brought out in studies of the diffusion Of
innovations. Some people are more willing or able to make changes,

and others will adopt a new item after its effectiveness has been demon-
strated (Rogers, 1962: passim). However, this as an explanation is
greatly weakened in the two villages studied as the demonstration effect
has had at least seven years to induce change.

All cultivators know about the new technology and have seen it in
operation. They know it is more productive and remunerative. However,
as a body they are not rushing to adOpt it (in Hanumangarh, parti-
cularly), nor do those who have adopted it (more so in Shivpura) take
full advantage of the opportunity it presents. In Hanumangarh, only 32
percent use high yielding variety seeds whereas in Shivpura, 70 percent
use them. Twenty—five percent of the total acres planted in Hanumangarh
are planted to hybrids. But only 12 percent are under high yielding
varieties in Shivpura despite the fact that all large landowners use
them (Table 5.3 and 5.4). Irrigated land is required for most hybrids
due to large requirements of fertilizer. Wheat and barley can only be
grown with irrigation although hybrid millet (23133) can be grown on
unirrigated land during the monsoon. Irrigation presents little con-
straint to their adoption as in both villages, relatively little irri-

gated land is plantedtx>them at present.

Market Imperfections

 

One might argue that the problem is one of supply, and in fact
improved inputs and services are limited. This, however, is a hypo-

thetical constraint. Demand does not exceed supply. In Hanumangarh,

152

for instance, the cooperative society stocked thirty metric tons of
fertilizer and pesticide, but a sizeable portion remained unsold.
Public channels are, however, monopolized by larger cultivators,
even though they may not fully utilize them. As more influential per-
sons, they can demand attention which other cultivators cannot get.
Small holders often complain about this but can do little to change the
situation. On the other hand, they do not take advantage of information
and resources available to them. Improved varieties and the full range
of other inputs are available from private companies in the cities.
These are only too glad to sell to whomever wants them, and also dis-
pense advice regarding proper cultivation. All cultivators know about
these dealers. People Often go to the city, but few ever make it to
their stores except occasionally to buy vegetable seed. Overall, the
attitude is one of waiting for these things to come to them rather than
actively seeking them out. Most cultivators had never sought advice.
Furthermore, official credit facilities are not highly used. The
local bank in Hanumangarh has only twenty-five outstanding loans total—
ling about Rs. 100,000 (approximately $13,500) after four years in
operation. It services an area of about fifteen miles in radius.
Although moneylenders charge higher rates of interest, they provide the
bulk of credit. Only one respondent in Hanumangarh had borrowed money

from this bank -— for a tractor —- and he himself is a moneylender.

Range of Viable Alternatives

 

Another feature might loosely be termed the art of the possible.
Economic behavior is ultimately constrained by factors which make a

particular strategy (or strategies) viable or unviable. Cultivators can

153

make maximum use of their resources, combining them in such a way as to
be productive as possible and gain the most return over expenditure. At
the same time, there is a floor of viability, or bare subsistence, below
which a cultivator cannot perform and still remain in agriculture,
assuming that agriculture is the sole means of livelihood. Currently,
there is a wide range of viable options in Indian agriculture, and the
difference between the two levels is very great for most cultivators.
This, of course, differs from group to group according to the resources
available.

The point is, the only absolute obligation a cultivator has is to
at least break even and provision and maintain the household. For most
cultivators, this break-even point is far below the maximum level of
productivity and efficiency which could be attained even without making
any changes in the technology and practices used. Given an environment
conducive to variability, variations will occur in response to the dif—
fering orientations cultivators have toward agriculture, the types of
needs and obligations they must meet and the differing avenues they have

for meeting them.

Profitability

 

A contributing feature to this wide range of viability is the pro-
fitability of agriculture. For present purposes it is sufficient to
state that if a cultivator produces for sale on the cash market, employs
hired labor, improved seed, fertilizer, pesticide and the proper culti—
vating techniques, the return over recurring expenses can exceed 100
percent. If expenses for fixed improvements such as irrigation, drain-

age and land levelling are also included, the return is still

 

'1'
g)

154

substantial and there is no reason why such investments cannot be
recouped in a few seasons of operations. The point is that high profit-
ability not only provides an incentive to produce, it also allows for
extremely inefficient and unproductive agriculture. A commercial farmer
can still make a decent profit and net return even if production is as

little as one-quarter and net return a fraction of what they could be.

Other Sources of Income

 

The notion of viability is complicated by a number of things. The
relevant economic unit is in most cases, not the land holding operated
by a particular family, but is rather the household whose members may
engage in a number of economic activities. The consequence of this is
the ability of households to operate their holdings at a low level of
productivity or even below a level that would provide their subsistence.
Again, this differs from group to group according to the resources
available. In the cases of some tenants and small owners, there is not
enough land to provide subsistence no matter what they try. In the case
of larger cultivators, there is often more than sufficient land from
which to support the household. But it can also be operated below the
level that provides minimum support. Other sources of domestic or non—
domestic work provide supplementary income, or in some cases, agricul-
ture supplements these other sources of income.

In the two villages studied, cultivating households typically have
members engaged in a variety of activities and they do not depend solely
on what they produce from the land. This is an important point to keep
in mind. Quite often, discussions of agriculture assume that culti-

vating families are unidimensional in their economic activities, that

 

155

they are strictly agriculturalists. To the contrary, they also engage
in everything from domestic artisan occupations, cottage industry,
animal husbandry, to skilled and unskilled wage labor, petty trading,
moneylending, salaried jobs and businesses, and in some cases, even the
professions (Tables 5.5 and 5.6).

The large households have comparatively high incomes. It is not-
able that other households in Hanumangarh have similar average incomes.
This supports the satisficing argument as an explanation for their pro—
duction behavior. The difference is related to the market orientation
of a few large cultivators who are more like commercial farmers than
subsistence peasants. This is reflected in the percentage of income
earned in cash from agriculture. In Shinura, large cultivators earn
less of their agricultural income in cash although paradoxically, they
engage in more cash crOpping. Mustard is grown on unirrigated land
(against the advice of extension personnel) during 332;. Grain grown on
irrigated land is their main concern and anything produced over subsis-
tence requirements is welcomed but is thought of as a bonus. Simi-
larly, mustard is considered an extra income. It does not jeopardize
irrigated grain production and if it produces well, they receive "mus—
tard notes"; if not, they have their subsistence assured.

In both villages, the percentage of total income derived from agri-
culture is higher for the medium and large size households. Smaller
ones depend more on outside employment. The comparatively larger
incomes for small cultivators in Hanumangarh (in contrast to those in
Shinura) is because of the more varied employment opportunities.

The rather substantial percentage in the money lending category for

small tenants in Hanumangarh is due to one Regar, whose household

156

distorts the distribution for the whole category. His case is inter-
esting in that it points to the varied economic activities which cross-
cut size categories. He is one of several who form the new Regar elite
and he practices agriculture only as a sideline.

By participating in several economic activities, households'
viability is not absolutely bounded by agricultural performance. There
need not be a commitment to stand on agriculture alone even though there
may be the capacity to do 30. Productivity and efficiency in agricul-
tural production may suffer as other sources of income are pursued (see
Epstein, 1973: 255, and Chapter 9). The return from all activities is

usually sufficient to meet household needs.

Cash and Kind Economic Spheres

 

To further complicate this notion of viability, cultivators are
involved in two separate but mutually penetrating spheres of circu-
lation: cash and kind. For most households, production is based on the
exploitation of kind resources held by the family in order to directly
meet domestic food requirements. With the exception of land taxes
(which must be paid in cash but which are nominal), all resources
expended in production can be obtained from within the household,
including rent which tenants pay as a share of the crop.

There is little orientation toward production for cash sales. Cash
is obtained through non-agricultural activities or credit. The vast
majority of cultivators make a dichotomy between agriculture as a source
of food, primarily obtained through exploitation of their own labor and

kind resources, and other activities as sources of cash.

157

These two spheres of circulation should not be understood as an
example of a "dual economy" (after Boeke, 1953: passim). They are not
discrete entities as there are many points of articulation between the
two. People operate in both and an understanding of one is not com-
plete without the other.

Cultivators need cash for consumption and other expenses. They
often earn or borrow money to purchase agricultural inputs as well.
However, they rarely depend on agriculture as the source of cash for
their purchases or to repay debts. A portion of the crop is Often used
to repay debts, but this is done in the form of direct grain transfers
to creditors and is not a cash sale.

The moneylender stands at one point of articulation between these
two spheres. One of the puzzling things encountered in the field was
the high debt overhead many cultivators carry. They have a need for
cash for recurring household and ceremonial expenses. Many have debts
on the moneylenders' books for years which they repay slowly or simply
service the interest. But moneylenders rarely push their debtors for
repayment and there is never any talk of foreclosure. My initial
reaction was that moneylenders must have problems with cash flows. What
is in it for them? They cannot keep giving out money if it is not
returned.

For example, a cultivator might incur a debt of Rs. 1,000 at 18
percent interest to see himself through a cropping season. He repays
only Rs. 750/- at harvest, six months later with no interest paid. This
leaves him with a debt of Rs. 250/~ with R3. 90/— outstanding interest.
If this is left unpaid it builds into a debt of Rs. 355/- at the end of

twelve months when interest is compounded.

158

One might gather that the moneylender would become rather upset,
worried about his liquidity, cash flow and return. But this is not
necessarily the case. The moneylender appears to not even recover his
capital outlay, yet in actual fact he can both recover it and also
receive a profit. The question is how?

Moneylenders give cash, but quite often give credit too for goods
at their local store. Goods are bought from wholesale markets in the
city and charged against the cultivators account at local retail prices
(usually above city retail prices). At the time of giving credit,
repayment is specified in terms of grain. But the exchange rate is very
low; in Hanumangarh it can range from 10 to 50 percent below the average
wholesale price.

Assuming that the cultivator receives Rs. 1,000 of credit from the
moneylender's store, the actual cash outlay the moneylender makes is
about Rs. 910/- (allowing him a 10 percent markup). On the books, the
cultivator has repaid only Rs. 750/-, but he has done so in devalued
grain. Assuming the cultivator gives wheat at Rs. 80/- per quintal (the
government's procurement price is Rs. 83/— to Rs. 85, 1972-73 prices)*
that grain's value is Rs. 1,024 at average wholesale prices. Converting
that grain into cash, the moneylender receives a 13 percent profit. By
playing the grain market and selling at the highest market price, he can
make up to 40 percent profit over his initial outlay. Even had he given
the cultivator the full amount of cash, he still receives at least 2 to

27 percent profit.

 

*Government of India sets minimum Official prices to procure food-
grains to create buffer stocks for times of shortage and to ensure a
"fair" return to cultivators. This was the price of wheat for the year
of study and it has subsequently been raised.

159

Under these circumstances, the high rates of interest charged are
almost peripheral to the real exchanges. They serve primarily to keep
people in debt so devalued grain keeps flowing to the moneylender. What
appears on the books is also irrelevant to what the moneylender earns.
My initial puzzlement stemmed from what appears on the books, i.e.,
transactions which appear as units of cash.*

Despite the exploitative relationship, people prefer private over
official credit. Banks ask for collateral in the form of land or other
assets, timely payments and credit is tied to specific expenses. The
moneylender on the other hand, is not particularly interested in how the
debtor uses the credit, does not demand timely payment, and is always
available on short notice for whatever contingency occurs. It is in
peoples' interest to be on good terms with a moneylender. He provides
credit for death feasts, marriages, and other ceremonies which the bank
will not provide. Paradoxically, the moneylender serves as a cushion to
fall back on and despite the high interest rates charged, credit is
loose. Debts are kept below a ceiling which can be serviced with exist-

ing levels of production.

The Peasant Mode of Production

 

Peasant cultivators who participate in such transactions do not

receive the full market value of their product. But moneylenders'

 

*I never actually saw moneylenders' books. This is a construction
of what happens from cultivators' responses.

Only one cultivator in Shivpura repaid debts in kind. He received
a rate 2 percent above average wholesale prices but as there was a
flourishing black market in Bharatpur district after nationalization of
the grain trade (1973), he was not receiving full value. People were
tight-lipped about the black market and I could not get reliable infor—
mation for average prices for the year. As in Hanumangarh, all produce
was evaluated by me on the official open market price average.

160

appropriation of surplus value does not affect them as much as might be
expected. This is because of the manner in which most cultivators
evaluate production activities. A cost—benefit analysis made by an out-
sider imputing cash market values to domestic labor and kind inputs
expended in relation to the value of the product, bears little resem-
blance to the accounting a peasant cultivator follows, one in which the
expenditure of such resources is evaluated against the domestic consump-
tion needs the product fulfills (see Galeski, 1972: ll).

Peasants minimize cash costs and substitute them with their own
labor and kind resources which are seen as freely expendable. Following
a strategy of self-exploitation, they try to produce enough to meet
domestic food requirements at less cash cost than if they were to pur-
chase food on the market. Also, a surplus can be produced for paying
creditors at less cash cost than actual cash repayment. If on balance
they fulfill household requirements, through the combination of earned
cash, credit and exploitation of their own kind resources, and can ser—
vice any debts incurred, they consider themselves to be performing
satisfactorily. This is the most common strategy: minimal expenditure
of cash and a greater degree of self-exploitation to obtain at least the
minimum necessary to meet obligations and support the household.

Inputs come from self-renewing processes -- family labor, barnyard
manure, bullocks born and raised in the household, and seed from the
last crop -- or from kind exchanges —- grain for implements and hired
labor. There is no clear way of calculating equivalencies between
inputs and the product in purely subsistence agriculture. The costs of
producing an amount of grain are X amount of seed and manure, Y number

of days or months spent on labor, and Z amount of grain to obtain

161

implements or labor. The value of the product is measured against the
household needs it fulfills. The only calculation for a cultivator is
to combine inputs in such a way as to ensure enough product for his own
use. The product is not divisible into returns to factors of produc-
tion. The subsistence cultivator deals with quantities of things in
relation to other things.

The orientation of cultivators toward the monetized market is
minimal. This is reflected in their responses when asked how much more
land they want. In Hanumangarh, small cultivators give an amount which
would bring their holdings up to a level they consider sufficient to
feed their families. A few of the medium cultivators say they have
enough to meet household requirements. Only one large cultivator says
he wants more land. He wants to earn more and also be able to make full
use of his tractor. In Shivpura, everyone wants more land, but the rea-
sons they give are subsistence oriented. No one says he wants land in
order to earn more. Large farmers are concerned about fragmentation of
their holdings and the amounts sons will inherit. The amounts they want
would bring holdings up to what they consider sufficient to support
their son's households.

Another reflection of this is in peOple's response to why they are
in agriculture. The overwhelming answer in both villages is that they
are their own men, they do not have to work under anyone, and agricul-
ture provides means for raising a family. Only two cultivators in
Hanumangarh are in it for money. One is the Baniya large owner and the

other, the Sonar small owner—cum—tenant.*

 

*He provides an interesting case. He gave up a secure government
job as a fourth class servant (errand boy) to become a tenant. He is

162

The partial monetization of production simply adds another quantity
to the calculation, but does provide a basis for establishing equiva—
lencies. This is another point of articulation between cash and kind
spheres of circulation. Farmers are aware of their cash costs and
actual cash expenditure is measured against the cash value of the pro—
duct. If the production of an amount of grain costscnuahundred rupees
plus kind inputs, the cultivator is concerned that the cash value of
that grain should at least equal one hundred rupees. If it is given to
repay debts, it should at least repay that amount and ideally more.

Even though the moneylender appropriates a great deal of surplus value
from this arrangement, the cultivator who reckons in this manner feels
he comes out ahead.

In the two villages, all kind inputs and products can be given cash
values as they enter the monetized market §£_tim§§, But as long as they
are not obtained through the monetized market, cultivators do not have
to evaluate them that way. They only have to calculate actual cash
expenditure against cash return provided that agriculture is their sole
source of income. Other non-agricultural cash income if used for
investment permits them alternatively to evaluate cash expenditure
against the unrealized cash value of the product. In effect, the aim of

peasant production under partially monetized conditions becomes the 'pur—

chase" of "cheap" grain. The point is, this type of satisficing strat-

egy is highly viable and the household can be provisioned even though

agricultural performances is underproductive and inefficient in terms of

 

one of the best cultivators in the village and is one of the few to keep
ahead of his debts. He accounts for most of the highs in the distri—
bution tables and skews the figures for others in his category.

163

the monetized market. Furthermore, as discussed above, most culti-

vators do not have to depend on agriculture for their sole support.

Commercial Farming

 

This way of evaluating production is quite different from commer—
cial farming. If a cultivator wants to adopt new technology and produce
for the market, he must enter a whole new set of relationships and
reorient his calculus of production. Machines and other new inputs are
available only through monetary exchange. Once they are adopted, a
farmer must make a cash profit, at least over the long run, in order to
maintain and replace equipment, acquire further inputs and to support
himself. This is the kind of squeeze the large owner with two tractors
feels. He is building productive capital and although operating with a
negative cash flow, he will make a very good income once his tractor

debts are repaid. Fortunately, he has other income to support the

household during the interim.

Implications

 

Participation in two spheres of exchange and reliance on the kind
sphere for agricultural production has several implications. A culti-
vator who follows the peasant mode of production is not in competition
with other cultivators. With the exception of land for tenancies, there
is little or no competition over factors of production as they primarily
originate from self-renewing processes within the household.

Neither is there competition in the disposal of crops, as they are
consumed primarily by producers. Kind payments to creditors are not
exchanges on a competitive market. Furthermore, produce sold on the

cash market gives the cultivator a very high return. India is a food

164

deficit nation and there is a large demand for grain. There is a guar-
anteed minimum price under government food procurement programs and the
open market prices are much higher. Therefore, there is no reason for
producers to undercut each other.

Due to this, and the ability to circumvent the cash sphere of
exchange, peasant cultivators avoid anything approaching a cost-price
squeeze. Less efficient or productive cultivators do not have to alter
their strategies or leave agriculture. Neither are economies of scale
operative. Small cultivators coexist with large ones. Subsistence
cultivators coexist with commercial farmers.

The problem for the small owner-cultivator and tenant comes when
outside employment and land on lease become less available. As larger
units mechanize more and more operations, the need for hired labor and
tenants decreases. Small cultivators who depend on wage labor must rely
more on their own production. If they cannot produce with their limited
resources, they must leave agriculture. On a national scale, this dis-
placement (based on 1960-61 data) assumes enormous proportions. If all
cultivating households who operate less than five acres leave agri—
culture, only one-fifth of the land will be affected, but over 70 per-
cent of the households (53 million) will have to find alternative means

of support (Michie, 1973: A—74).

Production: Averages and Distribution

 

As outlined in Chapter I, cultivators on the average operate their
holdings at a profit, but paradoxically relatively few actually do so.
The few most productive and efficient cultivators mask the majority who

operate at a loss. Climatic conditions partially explain their dismal

165

performance; why 70 percent operate at a loss in Hanumangarh and 50 per—
cent do so in Shinura. But despite climate, a better explanation lies
in the strategies these cultivators follow and the manner in which they
calculate profit and loss. As discussed above, they only have to
account for actual cash outlays and the return is measured against the
household needs it satisfies.

Subtracting the family labor from the costs of production signi-
ficantly alters the pictures. Return calculated as profits and wages
(Epstein, 1962: 47) brings more of them into the profit category.
Similarly, if one deducts other subsistence costs (except for those met
in kind from the product itself)* more farmers operate at a profit.

When one looks solely at return against all cash outlays** for agri-
culture during the year, the picture is changed even more. Although no
more cultivators make a profit, this represents the household's cash
value return measured against cash expended. For those who operate at a
loss on this dimension, this is a negative cash value flow.***

The only way cost—benefit analysis makes any sense is to look at
the various ways in which it can be calculated, ways in which culti-
vators themselves evaluate their performance. That over one-third of
cultivators in Hanumangarh still operate at a loss by the final method

of calculation, is due to poor rainfall; most cultivators are dependent

 

*Things such as rent, interest, wages and jajmani payments.

**Includes outlays for capital goods, but excludes their depre-
ciation.

***In subsistence peasants' reckoning, they have "purchased" their
food and other products dearly.

 

166

on monsoon cropping.* All cultivators in Shivpura operate at a profit
on the bottom line, but for the two small cultivators whose land is of
such poor quality their efforts are hardly worthwhile. They do the best
they can.

The opportunity cost of family labor and other kind inputs is
included in the calculation of profit. But these are not calculations
cultivators make. They do have some evaluation, of course, of the
amount of work the family expends in relation to return; in Chayanov's
terms, the drudgery of the labor year in relation to the product of the
labor year (Chayanov, 1966: 5—6). But an evaluation of labor expended
in domestic production in relation to what it would bring on the wage
market is another matter. First of all, cultivators overwhelming say
they prefer to work for themselves. "I am no one's slave," is the way
most of them put it. In Simon's terms there is a measure of "psychic
income" involved. Second, they have no way of evaluating return to
labor until the crop is harvested, even if they bother to do so. They
cannot go back in time to make up any difference they might have other—
wise received, and this assumes they would have found wage employment
had they looked for it. Similarly, the expenditure of other kind inputs
can be evaluated only against the total product. They use these things
with the expectation that production will be good, but if there is a
shortfall, there is no turning back.

Looking at production in both villages for the entire year, large

cultivators hold the largest share of total production and value

 

*One overall factor affecting kharif production in Hanumangarh is
the reluctance to irrigate even when water is available. Cultivators
are afraid that if there are no rains at all, their wells will not
recharge for the rabi crop.

167

received from agriculture.* They also make higher profits and percen-
tage return than do the others (Tables 5.7 and 5.8). The same generally
holds true when irrigated and unirrigated land are separated (Tables
5.9, 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12).

The larger cultivators' better performance is a result of their
comparative advantage. But despite their advantage, they like other
size categories, exhibit a wide range in production performance (Tables
5.13 and 5.14). Looking at the highs and lows for all dimensions, they
have about as much spread as the others. Controlling for quality of
land, one might expect the distribution to be less for irrigated land on
which cultivators would have greater control over environmental uncer-
tainty. Yet there is a wide range in both villages for both types of
land (Tables 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, and 5.18).

This is indicative of the latitude cultivators in each category
have. Some produce for cash sales and thus make quite a lot of money.
Most produce primarily for household consumption and realize much less
than they could.

One might argue that resource constraints affect most of the low
producers: they do not have the resources to invest and the additional
input of family labor they have, yields an insignificant return. This
is not the case for either physical resources or labor.

In his section on Indian agricultural policy in Asian Drama, Myrdal

 

concludes that low productivity cannot be explained by such an approach.

 

*Value received is calculated for each village on average wholesale
prices in Jaipur and Bharatpur for produce retained, given as rent, or
given in kind exchange. Produce sold is evaluated on price received and
produce given to repay debts is evaluated on the amount of cash repaid.

168

In a broad sense, the explanation for the low yields and the
failure to capitalize on the potentialities for higher yields
must be the prevailing work practices; in other words, the
failure to make effective use of traditional and well-known
techniques. Without any innovations and even without any
investment other than longer and more efficient work, agricul-
tural yields could be raised very substantially. (Myrdal,
1968: 1235)

 

 

Similar conclusions have been drawn by other economists working in

India. Basing his analysis on the extensive Farm Management Studies,

 

Paglin argues:

. . a strong case can be made that some additions to the
labor force could be productively employed, and there is
little doubt that removal of a sizeable number of agricul-
tural workers would result in a significant decrease in out-
put. The Farm Management Studies computed production func-
tions for specific crops in sample districts; where good fits
and statistically significant results were Obtained, the mar-
ginal product of labor was clearly positive. . . . While addi-
tional labor inputs are usually accompanied by other compli-
mentary inputs, there is much room for use of labor without
capital. Mellor and Moorti in a field study in Uttar Pradesh
found the "differences in yields (per acre) seem to be largely
due to differences in the use of the fixed, low opportunity-
cost inputs, in particular, family labor." (Paglin, 1965: 825)

 

Haswell writes similarly:

On the basic issue of the zero marginal product of labour

the evidence . . . indicates a positive marginal product of

labor against the more generally accepted view that Indian

agriculture suffers from a redundant labour force with a

zero marginal value product . . . (Haswell, 1967: 72)
Many cultivators in the two villages have much the same view. All say
they can improve production. When asked what they have to do to produce
more, their answers reveal the general subsistence orientation. Of all
respondents in Hanumangarh, 32 percent mention more labor input and bet-

ter cultivating techniques such as irrigating, weeding and harvesting on

time. Over 90 percent also mention better inputs and capital

 

169

improvements. In Shivpura, 40 percent mention more and efficient labor
and 70 percent mention better physical inputs.*

When asked why they do not put in more time and effort, many reply
that current levels of production are sufficient. They are aware of the
latitude they have. At the very least they know they can produce more
and this surplus capacity is a security should they have to generate
more income. They also say they cannot afford better inputs because
they are expensive (involving cash outlays) and credit is in short
supply.

However, credit is not a constraint. Few households meet their
expenses from resources generated within the households. A large per-
centage of resources are borrowed (Tables 5.19 and 5.20). As discussed
above, the bulk of credit is supplied by moneylenders. Credit is going

begging at the banks, and cheaper credit at that.

Allocation of Resources

 

The allocation of resources is the crux of the issue. For most
cultivators, low productivity and efficiency are not due to a lack of
resources, but the manner in which they are allocated (Tables 5.21 and
5.22).

Expenditure of resources is, of course, related to their avail-
ability. Expenditure under headings of a productive nature is influ—
enced by the amount necessary for consumption. Resources available per

household increase as size of household increases. As one might expect,

 

*Thirty percent said there was nothing more they could do. Signi—
ficantly, only one of the small cultivators gave this reply. One was a
medium owner, and the other was a large owner who is the most productive
and efficient cultivator in the Shivpura sample.

170

the percentage of expenditures on household consumption (household
recurring) increases in inverse proportion to resources available.

If one disregards tenants of all kinds, the proportion of resources
to agricultural recurring (production costs) tends to increase with the
size of operation. This is explained by larger households having more
expendable resources and more land in which to invest them, and their
ability to fulfill basic consumption requirements more easily. The
high percentage expended by tenants is a consequence of paying rents.

Investment in agricultural capital goods (the heading "Agricultural
Investment") remains fairly even across all strata with the exception of
the large owners. They can more easily invest and they are the ones
paying for pump sets and tractors. Most expenditures under this heading
is for replacement of tools and draft animals. The aim is to maintain
existing assets rather than add to them. This is evidence for the sub-
sistence peasant orientation of most as Opposed to the few following an
expansive commercial strategy.

Expenditures on agriculture—related items (milk animals, camels,
their fodder, custom tractor hire, etc.) increases with size of opera-
tions as well. Tenants generally are the exception. The large culti-
vators who hire out tractors account for the large percent spent for
their category in Hanumangarh. Most expenditures under this heading
come from fodder produced by the household; relatively few families
purchase fodder or new milk animals. Animals are allowed to graze if
fodder requirements are not met within the household, and people rely on
natural reproduction for stock replacement. Almost every family has a
milk animal and with few exceptions, milk is for household consumption.

A few households are engaged in dairy farming, earning a large portion

171

of their cash income from this. Similarly, a few families earn cash
from camel driving. These activities depend on a land base as most
fodder is from one's own production which accounts for the relatively
small percent expended by tenants.

Household investments (houses, other buildings, jewelry and durable
consumer items) are a form of both consumption and savings. Such
investments add to fixed assets. They can be used to support a parti-
cular life style and demonstrate status. With the exception of the few
rental properties in Hanumangarh, expenditure on them is a diversion
from productive undertakings.

Debt repayment accounts for a large portion of expenditures. Com-
paring the amounts repaid against those borrowed (Tables 5.19 and 5.20),
one can estimate the extent to which peOple are able to keep ahead of
their debts. Although resources available are not exactly the same as
resources spent, they are roughly equivalent.* Large cultivators are
able to keep up with their debts more easily than smaller ones. Again
this is a function of their control over more resources, their need for
less credit and their proportionately smaller allocations for consump—
tion.

The other categories are deeper in debt, but as discussed earlier,
this burden is not as heavy as it seems. Most households maintain a
debt ceiling below which they can prolong payments and eventually repay
their creditors. For this particular year, production was low in

Hanumangarh as we have seen. Over the long run, debts can be serviced

 

*Debts carried over from previous years are not included although
their repayments are accounted for.

172

without having to make changes in production strategy. Cultivators
fully expect to repay their debts in the coming years.

The expenditure under ceremonies is the most interesting. With
the exception of household recurring,* the other headings of expendi—
tures relate to activities leading to gain. Yet there is a high pro-
portion of spending on ceremonies.

As discussed in the previous chapter, conspicuous displays support
claims to status. All households have to conduct life crisis cere-
monies on occasion, and often families go into debt for many years in
order to perform them. The interesting thing is that the small tenant
and medium owner-cum-tenant categories in Hanumangarh spend propor-
tionately more on ceremonies than do others. With the exception of one
small tenant, all of these people are Regars. As part of their strategy
of upward mobility, they emphasize showy marriages and funeral pro-
cessions. Other groups spend proportionately less although actual
amounts, as in the case of large cultivators, are more. In Shivpura,
the amounts are much less primarily due to the lack of social competi-
tion.

What is significant about these expenditures is they are almost
entirely in cash which is relatively scarce and could be invested in
improved agricultural inputs.** The celebration of such events are not

good or bad in and of themselves, and in fact, could provide the

 

*Debt servicing does in part build equity, e.g., housing and capi-
tal goods. Equity in the case of housing, however, is a moot point as
houses are rarely bought or sold. People live in caste neighborhoods
which limits the range of potential buyers. It is doubtful that such
investments could be converted into liquid assets.

**Most of the kind expenditure is for alms given in grain to mendi-
cants.

173

incentive for higher productivity and efficiency. But given the loose

 

credit structure and the type of exchapges between moneylenders and

 

debtorslythere is no immediacy to generate cash income to meet such

 

expenses, nor is there any necessity to enter the monetized agricultural

 

market in order to obtain cash.

 

The high allocation for ceremonies also points to the marked effect
of social obligations on resource allocation. People are often
pressured by cross-cutting demands. One good friend (not in my sample)
who often stopped at our house to chat and sort out his affairs provides
a good example.

This person, a Brahmin, comes from a family which for many genera-
tions has been important in village affairs. His father, until retire-
Dment, was an influential merchant and moneylender. Currently they live
in a state of decaying gentility supported by his small income as a
para-medic and accumulated wealth from his father's business. The
family of sixteen members lives in a large, ancient haveli (a multi-
storied masonry residence) of which quite literally three-quarters has
tumbled to the ground. The family owns about six acres of unirrigated
land -- which is rented out -- adjacent to a prosperous irrigated farm
operated by a maternal uncle.

Though his salary is sufficient to meet basic recurring expenses,
his wife continually complains about their poverty and her inability to
wear expensive voile saris of which she is particularly fond. Although
at heart a poet and above such mundane concerns, he does on occasion
feel the barb of her sharp tongue.

In his contemplation about earning more, he often looks to his

land. When we first met, he had about eight thousand rupees from the

174

family's wealth which he could have invested in a well and pump set. We
Often discussed this venture and he would become excited about commer-
cial farming, the profits he would make and he would resolve to become

a farmer like his maternal uncle.

A few days after such a discussion this decision would be dis-
carded. He had an unmarried sister and to find a suitable match for
her, the eight thousand rupees would have to be spent on her marriage.

A search for a husband would be made and negotiations initiated. But
invariably they would fall through as our friend would again begin to
equivocate.

His father was extremely aged and literally at death's door. Since
he had been a powerful and respected community leader, at least eight
thousand rupees would have to be spent on his funeral and death feast.
If this money was not on hand, the ceremonies could not be performed to
family and caste expectations.

During most of one year spent in Hanumangarh, this was the cycle of
decisions made and unmade with nothing resolved until his father died.
Then circumstances forced the issue and the money went into a death
feast.

This example also illustrates the great latitudetmnurpeople have in
the use of resources. This person has his basic requirements assured
and although a highly remunerative opportunity exists, there is no
economic or social necessity for him to take advantage of it. There are

no demands or Obligations which must be met from his agricultural

 

resources .

175

Use of Land

 

Actually, land itself presents little constraint on higher produc-
tivity. The area cultivated is less than that available. The large
households use a dispr0portionate amount of land in comparison with
other categories, but by no means use all (Table 5.23 and 5.24). More-
over, owner cultivators tend not to make full use of their land.

The higher utilization among tenants is understandable as they do
not lease land they do not intend to cultivate. The high utilization of
small owners in Shivpura is due to their miniscule holdings. The lack
of labor with which to bring land into production may in part explain
the behavior of large owners, but is not the case for other owner cate-
gories when one looks at the availability of land per labor unit (Table
5.25).

Again, the best explanation is found in the latitude people have in
their use of resources. With subsistence assured, particularly for
large landowners, there is no necessity for intensive cultivation. As
the only absolute requirement to be met from land is food (conditioned
by other sources of income), there is little to channel cultivators
into more productive and efficient resource use.

The only other obligation is land revenue which, as was mentioned
earlier, is nominal and can be met from non-agricultural cash income.
The highest tax paid in Hanumangarh is Rs. 300/- on thirty—six acres of
irrigated land. In Shivpura, the highest paid is Rs. 150/— on about
thirty acres, one—third of which is irrigated. This can be met with but a
maximum of three quintals of wheat and revenue in these cases is less than

1 percent of the total value received from production. For smaller

176

cultivators, land revenue is often equal to a couple of rounds at a
local tea shop.*

Given the wide parameters around agricultural production, culti—
vators can still cater to demands which conflict with productive invest-
ments. That they are able to balance these demands at a relatively low
level of production is illustrated by an example of a large cultivator
in Hanumangarh.

This person owns thirteen and one-quarter acres, one—third of which
is irrigated. He had no cash income during 1971-72 and borrowed about
Rs. 12,500 at 18 percent interest from several moneylenders. About
Rs. 1,500 was spent on agricultural inputs, all of which were tradi—
tional ones. Rs. 700 went for capital investments: to replace tools
and a bullock which had died. Rs. 1,300 was used for household con-
sumption, Rs. 2,500 for jewelry, Rs. 200 for a bicycle, and Rs. 6,300
for ceremonial expenses. When asked why he did not use improved agri-
cultural inputs, he complained that credit was scarce.

On irrigated land he produced 328 kilograms of grain per acre and
on unirrigated, 112 kilograms. Overall he received a value of about
Rs. 260 per acre. He operated at a 25 percent loss in relation to total
costs although he received a 25 percent return as profits and wages.

Out of his production, he was able to meet household food requirements,
but only paid off Rs. 500 of his debt. He hopes for better production
next year and will be able to pay off his debts (as those incurred for

jewelry and ceremonies are not yearly recurring expenses) without having

 

*In Shivpura, land revenue assessments have not changed since the
18903.

177

to make any change in his production strategy. He is below the ceiling
he knows he can repay.

One might argue the problem is one of profitability; that the
return from investments in agriculture is not sufficiently remunera-
tive. This is not the case, particularly if one looks at the return
with existing methods. Even with the higher investments required for
the new varieties, the return is very large.

The following estimate of return on investment comes from a
development officer whose family runs a successful commercial farm in
Bharatpur District. It assumes the cultivator hires a tractor and all
labor, has irrigated land, and that he uses the new recommended prac-
tices. The estimate is for one acre of high yielding variety wheat

(Kalyan Sona) which is grown during rabi.

Costs
Plowing Rs. 80/-
Levelling Rs. 15/-
Sowing Rs. 25/-
Seed Rs. 80/—
Manure (organic) Rs. 40/—
Chemical fertilizer Rs. 140/-
Pesticides Rs. 25/-
Irrigation Rs. 125/-
Weeding Rs. 15/-
Harvesting Rs. 35/-

Threshing and Winnowing Rs. 70/-

 

Total Rs. 650/- (per acre cost for Kalyan Sona)
If a cultivator performs all necessary Operations and if there is
no climatic disaster, production should be about twenty quintals (2,000
kilograms). The value of this grain at the government's procurement
price is about Rs. 1,650 at the rate of Rs. 82.50 per quintal. The Open

market price, however, is much higher. During the year of study, wheat

178

rose to Rs. 150/- per quintal.* Valued at the open market price, the
gross receipt would be Rs. 3,000. Even if costs of depreciation and
servicing of debts for capital improvements are included, the return is
still very large.

This is not the highest production possible with Kalyan Sona. It
is possible to get up to twenty-seven quintals per acre. For other
wheat varieties, production up to forty-five quintals is possible
although this is under ideal conditions and on the best of land
(Government of Rajasthan, 1972: 20).

Very few cultivators approach this level. In Hanumangarh, the one
Baniya cultivator produces ten quintals per acre on five acres planted
to Kalyan Sona, applying less than one-quarter the recommended ferti—
lizer dosage. The value received on his crop for that year was
Rs. 3,725 and he made a return of 167 percent over recurring expenses
including his own labor. Similarly, in Shinura a large cultivator pro-
duced twelve and one—half quintals per acres on the eight-tenths acre
he planted a hybrid wheat, also applying about one—quarter of recom-
mended fertilizer. His cr0p was worth Rs. 941 and he received a 24 per-
cent return over recurring expenses including his own labor.

With the exception of the market orientation of a few persons, pro-
duction is geared to consumption and social needs. As for large culti-
vators, they have little difficulty providing for themselves and main-
taining their superior position. Even though they could be more produc-

tive and earn more income, there is no compelling need to do so.

 

*The open market price rose to Rs. 260/— and dropped to Rs. 230/—
during 1974. Some input prices also rose especially petroleum based
fertilizers.

179

The majority of households follow a peasant strategy and are able
to fulfill their goal: that of meeting household consumption require-
ments. This they do despite low productivity as it is supplemented by
income earned from other sources and the moneylender's easy credit.

They are viable economic units, and given their own priorities, are
under no pressure to change. The structure of relationships in which
they participate defines what is sufficient and necessary, and these are

met by existing strategies and levels of production.

Implications and Conclusions

 

I do not want to foster the impression that social and economic
life in either village is in harmonious equilibrium. Land reform,
development programs, the new state and national polity, a monetized
market economy and the commercialization of agriculture are altering
the relationship between the two villages and wider society and in the
process changing local organizational patterns. Social relations of
production are being altered by technological innovations. The distri-
bution of goods and services is changing due to the reorganization of
production patterns, the introduction of industrial goods and resources
flowing in from the outside. Patron-client relations are moving from a
bound to a contractual arrangement with patrons becoming brokers with
higher levels of integration. Clientele bases are being redefined and
large segments of the community are becoming peripheral to the new form
of organization. The manner in which socio-economic relations are
evaluated is also changing, which along with all other alterations leads

to the contradictions and paradoxes encountered.

180

Neither is everyone getting all they may desire from this new
arrangement. Some groups (quite obviously the large cultivators) have
been the major beneficiaries of change and are the ones who control the
process at the local level. Other groups, particularly the landless
laborer-cum—tenants, have been adversely affected. The ties of inter—
dependency which integrated them into the local economy and polity are
broken and they are now dependent on largess from dominant groups.
Neither is there a wholesale acceptance of the status quo. In
Hanumangarh, particularly, there is competition between groups over the
control of goods, services and social processes. There are also
upwardly mobile groups.

Changes are also occurring in agriculture as evidenced by the
orientation of a few cultivators toward the monetized sector and produc-
tion for market sales. The majority of cultivators, however, still fol-
low a subsistence strategy with minimal involvement in monetized agri-
cultural markets.

The degree to which this can be seen as a defense mechanism, that
peasants try to hold the outside world at arms length, is debatable
(Wolf, 1957: passim). First, this strategy can be seen as an adaptation
to the previous set of conditions in which agriculture was not a highly
profitable venture. The enhanced opportunity structure is a relatively
recent phenomenon of the past decade or so. Previously, agriculture's
primary function was only the provisioning of household food require-
ments. Second, people do not act or conceive of themselves as corporate
communities holding off all others. Each village is highly stratified
and lacks the egalitarianism typical of corporate communitieswflrhfl1tends

to spread "life risks" amongst all its members. Ceremonial outlays, for

181

instance, do not act as levelling devices; they emphasize, rather,
distinctions in wealth and status. Third, there are few direct demands
put upon agricultural resources or products by higher levels of
authority. The appropriation of value (primitive accumulation) gener-
ated in the subsistence sector by a monetized capitalist sector does
occur. But this is indirectly, through credit arrangements, and is not
necessarily perceived as such by people being "exploited." Fourth,
cultivators participate in monetized exchanges in other contexts and it
is difficult to conceive of them walling off just agriculture and not
everything else as well.

It is significant that there are few demands put upon agricultural
resources. The necessity to generate the wherewithal to maintain a
household and participate in social life does not have to be entirely
met from agriculture. Given the alternatives, the various ways in which
agriculture can be practiced and evaluated, other sources of income and
the differential effect of social relations on resource allocation, it
is little wonder that such wide variations occur. In effect, the
enhanced opportunity induced by development programs has only added
another alternative to the economic environment. Until less productive
and efficient alternatives become unviable (either through conscious
design or unconscious processes of the system), there is little to
channel production behavior into a more uniform pattern. Variations,

until such time, will persist and endure.

182

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mafia: Honma
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muHCD cowumESmcoo
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183

 

 

 

 

 

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omma coma moma mama amo moma mmmm ooma mmm aam moaa nmaa uacD coaumabmcoo 9
ooma mmoa omma mNNa qu omaa momm mmoa was «mo mmm mom muammo 9
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vow ammo manmvcomxm
amoa coma mmwa coca cum mama comm aam 5mm owm mam awn uacD Honma 9
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mmuam H\o o o o mmuam o H\o o e\o e o
aa¢ mwuma Enawmz aamam aa< mwuma asawmz aamam Emua
musa>a5m numwcmabcmm

 

muaa>a£m 9cm :Hmwsmascmm

moousommm manmwaoaxm 9cm mEoocH .wcma mo coausnauumam

”coauamomaou waonomsom mp

.N.m mam<H

184

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 5.3. Adoption and Use of High
Yielding Varieties: Hanumangarh
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
T O/T O O/T O
(No. of Households) (16) (6) (6) (7) (3) (6) (44)
No. of Adopters 5 l 1 2 2 3 l4
% of Cultivators 31% 17% 17% 29% 67% 50% 32%
Acreage Under
Hybrid Varieties:
Irrigated 1.50 0.00 1.00 7.50 3.75 38.00 51.75
% of Irrigated 9% 0% 13% 18% 32% 31% 26%
Unirrigated 7.31 3.00 0.00 10.62 3.75 7.50 32.18
% of Unirrigated 24% 23% 0% 68% 19% 20% 25%
All Land 8.81 3.00 1.00 18.12 7.50 45.50 83.93
% of All Land 18% 22% 4% 35% 24% 29% 25%
Note: Figures refer to acres planted in both kharif and rabi.
TABLE 5.4. Adoption and Use of High
Yielding Varieties: Shivpura
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 0 O O/T
(No. of Households) (2) (2) (5) (l) (10)
No. of Adopters 0 l 5 l 7
% of Cultivators 0% 50% 100% 100% 70%
Acreage Under
Hybrid Varieties:
Irrigated - 0 8.60 .80 9.40
% of Irrigated - 0% 22% 9% 18%
Unirrigated 0 .80 6.40 5.00 12.20
% of Unirrigated 0% 14% 7% 27% 10%
All Land 0 .80 15.00 5.80 21.60
% of All Land 0% 7% 11% 21% 12%
Note: Figures refer to acres planted in both kharif and rabi.

185

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 5.5. Average Income Per Household: Hanumangarh
I Small Medium Large All
tem Sizes
0 T O/T 0 O/T O
(No. of Households) (16) (6) (6) (7) (3) (6) (44)
Total Income 3461 4566 3932 6297 4345 30769 7911
52-48 69—31 46-54 67-33 27-73 65-35 56-44
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source
Agriculture 847 435 1981 3113 2964 15141 3400
5-95 0-100 10-90 13-87 8-92 41—59 28-72
24.5% 9.5% 50.4% 49.4% 68.2% 49.2% 43.0%
Animal Husbandry 989 1134 819 1734 477 4339 1526
33-67 30-70 60—40 32-68 0-100 59-41 44-56
28.6% 24.8% 20.8% 27.5% 11.0% 14.1% 19.3%
Tractor and 185 -- -- 14_ -- 5600 833
Animal Rentals* 5.3% 0.2% 18.2% 10.5%
Household 104 407 80 -- 80 —- 110
Industry* 3.0% 8.9% 2.0% 1.8% 1.4%
Labor 469 400 552 509 824 -- 433
100-0 100-0 100-0 42-58 100-0 89-11
13.6% 8.8% 13.3% 8.1% 19.0% 5.5%
Business* 152 -- 158 464 -- 1500 355
4.4% 4.0% 7.4% 4.9% 4.5%
Salary* 499 717 330 460 -- 2959 801
14.4% 15 7% 8.4% 7.3% 9.6% 10.1%
Moneylending* -- 887 -- -- -- 530 193
19.4% 1 7% 2.4%
Property Rentals* -— 261 -- -- -- 700 131
(Non-agricultural) 5.7% 2.3% 1.7%
Jajmani Work 197 191 -- -- -- —- _98
0-100 4-96 1-99
5.7% 4.2% 1.2%
Other* 1__ 134 42_ §_ -- -- 31
0 5% 3.0% 1.1% 0.1% 0.4%
Key: Underlined figures: total cash and kind income.

percentage of income in cash and kind
respectively.
percentage of income derived from source.

Hyphenated figures:
Percentage figures:

* Cash income only for all size categories.

186

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 5.6. Average Income Per Household: Shivpura
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 o o O/T
(No. of Households) (2) (2) (5) (1) (10)
Total Income 2099 5360 12884 10927 9027
46-54 49-51 14—86 18—82 20-80
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source
Agriculture _§Z 1557 10008 8005 6134
0—100 46—54 14-86 2-98 14-86
4.2% 29.0% 77.7% 73.2% 68.0%
Animal Husbandry 631 2173 2504 1122 1926
0-100 13—87 3-97 0-100 5-95
30.3% 40.5% 19.4% 10.3% 21.3%
Animal Rentals -- -- ._2 -- .6
100-0 100-0
0.1% 0.1%
Labor 1375 1450 —- 1800 745
71-29 100-0 100-0 89-11
65.5% 27.1% 16.5% 8.2%
Business -- 180 —- -- .3_
100-0 100-0
3.4% 0.4%
Salary -- —- 24 —- 12
100-0 100-0
1.9% 1.3%
Other -- -- 120 -- ‘69
100-0 100-0
0.9% 0.7%

 

187

TABLE 5.7. Production Performance - All Land: Hanumangarh

 

Small Medium Large All

Sizes

 

Item
0 T O/T o O/T o
(No. of Households) (16) (6) (6) (7) (3) (6) (44)

 

No. Acres Planted 48.22 13.75 22.71 56.75 31.00 158.50 330.93
Production:

Kgs. Grain (Total) 9205 1614 9459 17330 6750 69460 113818

@ Household 575 269 1576 2476 2250 11577 2587
@ Acre 191 117 417 305 218 438 344
KgS. Other* (Total) 688 170 74 471 95 2628 4126
@ Household 43 28 12 67 32 438 94
@ Acre 14 12 3 8 3 17 12
Value Received (Rs.) 13565 2611 11887 21787 8893 90843 149586
@ Household 848 435 1981 3112 2964 15141 3400
@ Acre 281 190 523 384 286 573 452
Profits @ Acre (Rs.) -61 -211 95 -33 —93 121 32
% Return -18% —53% 22% -8% ~25% 27% 8%
9* _1_ _1_ 2 9 3 12
P/W - l @ Acre (Rs.) 27 -159 228 157 -12 218 143
% Return 11% -46% 77% 69% -4% 61% 46%
2 1 .11 g 1 g 39.
P/W - 2 @ Acre (Rs.) 85 -145 277 221 8 272 194
% Return 43% -43% 112% 136% 3% 90% 75%
19 _1_ 9. 1 l .6. a
P/W - 3 @ Acre (Rs.) 53 -l34 277 218 6 187 151
% Return 23% -41% 112% 131% 2% 49% 50%
19. 1 s 7 1 s 23:

 

Key: Profits Return to total cash and kind costs.

P/W - 1 = Profits and wages. Profits plus subsistence labor.

P/W - 2 = Profits and wages. Profits plus subsistence labor
and subsistence costs not met from product.

P/W - 3 = Profits and wages. Profits plus subsistence labor and

subsistence costs not met from product, plus cash
depreciation minus cash outlays for capital goods.

* Other includes subsidiary food crops such as lentils.
**A11 underlined figures indicate numbers of households operating
at a profit.

Note: Percentages for return are calculated with original figures
and not the per acre ones.

188

 

 

 

TABLE 5.8. Production Performance - All Land: Shivpura
I Small Medium Large All
tem Sizes
0 o o O/T
(No. of Households) (2) (2) (5) (1) (10)
No. Acres Planted 2.52 10.80 132.60 27.60 173.52
Production:
Kgs. Grain (Total) 146 1760 43880 6200 51986
@ Household 73 880 8776 6200 5199
@ Acre 58 163 331 225 300
Kgs. Other (Total) 1 200 1697 565 2463
@ Household .5 100 339 565 246
@ Acre .4 l9 13 20 14
Kgs. Oilseed (Total) 5 400 1370 262 2037
@ Household 2.5 200 274 262 204
@ Acre 2 37 10 9 12
Value Received (Rs.) 173 3115 49988 8005 61281
@ Household 87 1558 9998 8005 6128
@ Acre 69 288 377 290 353
Profits @ Acre (Rs.) -66 60 139 -64 98
% Return -49% 27% 58% —l8% 39%
.0. 1 .4. 9 .5.
P/W - 1 @ Acre (Rs.) -18 130 238 46 197
% Return -21% 83% 172% 19% 126%
9. 1 1 1 1
P/W - 2 @ Acre (Rs.) -14 204 314 67 263
% Return -17% 242% 501% 30% 293%
Q 1 1 1 l
P/W - 3 @ Acre (Rs.) - 14 213 297 67 253
% Return - 17% 282% 392% 30% 254%
0 2 5 1 8

 

Key: See Table 5.7.

189

 

 

 

TABLE 5.9. Production Performance -
Irrigated Land: Hanumangarh
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 T O/T o O/T o
(No. of Households) (6) (1) (2) (5) (2) (5) (21)
No. Acres Planted 17.32 .75 7.75 41.13 11.75 121.00 199.70
Production:
Kgs. Grain (Total) 6390 480 4800 15550 6040 64180 97440
@ Household 1065 480 2400 3110 3020 12836 4640
@ Acre 369 640 619 378 514 530 488
Kgs. Other (Total) 69 0 0 118 0 1898 2035
@ Household 12 O 0 24 0 380 97
@ Acre 4 0 0 2 0 16 10
Value Received (Rs. 8046 498 5675 18307 7789 83259 123574
@ Household 1341 498 2838 3661 3895 16652 5884
@ Acre 465 664 732 445 663 688 619
Profits @ Acre (Rs. -34 -788 91 -7O —41 168 82
% Return -7% -54% 14% —14% -6% 32% 15%
2 9. 2 2 2 2 23.
P/W - 1 @ Acre (Rs. 106 -635 346 172 80 263 220
% Return 29% -49% 90% 63% 14% 62% 55%
2 2 2 2 2 2 a
P/W - 2 @ Acre (Rs. 204 -577 457 255 110 321 287
% Return 78% -47% 166% 135% 20% 87% 86%
2 .0. 2 2 2 2 28_
P/W - 3 @ Acre (Rs. 149 -364 457 274 109 218 224
% Return 47% -35% 166% 161% 20% 46% 57%
5 2 _2_ 2 2 2 27.

 

Key:

See Table 5.7.

TABLE 5.10.

Production Performance -

 

 

 

Irrigated Land: Shivpura
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 O O O/T
(No. of Households) (0) (l) (5) (1) (7)
No. Acres Planted -- 5.20 39.60 8.80 53.60
Production:

Kgs. Grain (Total) -- 1320 29080 3280 33680
@ Household -- 1320 5816 3280 4811
@ Acre —- 254 734 373 628
Kgs. Other (Total) -~ 190 237 -- 427
@ Household -- 190 47 -- 61
@ Acre -- 37 6 -- 8
Kgs. Oilseed (Total) —- 400 —- -- 400
@ Household -- 400 —- -- 57
@ Acre -- 77 -- -- 7
Value Received (Rs.) -- 2546 28945 3380 34871
@ Household -- 2546 5789 3380 4982
@ Acre -- 490 731 384 651
Profits @ Acre (Rs.) —- 279 314 —158 233
% Return -- 133% 75% -29% 56%
1 .5. 9 .6.

P/W - 1 @ Acre (Rs.) -- 341 489 5 395
% Return -- 229% 203% 1% 155%
1 1 1 1

P/W - 2 @ Acre (Rs.) -- 439 600 37 492
% Return -- 864% 458% 11% 310%
1 .5. 1 1

P/W - 3 @ Acre (Rs.) -- 439 568 37 468
% Return -- 864% 349% 11% 257%
1 5 _1 7

 

Key: See Table 5.7.

191

 

 

 

TABLE 5.11. Production Performance -
Unirrigated Land: Hanumangarh
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 T O/T O O/T O
(No. of Households) (12) (5) (5) (3) (3) (4) (32)
No. Acres Planted 30.90 13.00 14.96 15.62 19.25 37.50 131.23
Production:
Kgs. Grain (Total) 2455 1134 4659 1780 710 5280 16018
@ Household 205 227 932 593 237 1320 501
@ Acre 80 87 311 114 37 141 122
Kgs. Other (Total) 619 170 74 403 95 730 2091
@ Household 52 34 15 134 32 183 65
@ Acre 20 13 5 26 5 19 16
Value Received (Rs.) 5519 2113 6212 3480 1104 7584 26012
@ Household 460 423 1242 1160 368 1896 813
@ Acre 179 163 415 223 57 202 198
Profits @ Acre (Rs.) -77 -179 97 65 -124 -30 -44
% Return -30% -52% 31% 41% -69% —13 % -18%
1 1 1 1 1 .2. .7.
P/W - 1 @ Acre (Rs.) —17 -132 167 117 -68 73 27
% Return —9% —45% 67% 110% —54% 56% 16%
1 1 .2. 1 1 1 E
P/W - 2 @ Acre (Rs.) 18 -120 183 132 -54 112 53
% Return 11% -42% 78% 145% -49% 125% 37%
_6_ 1 1 1 1 1 18.
P/W - 3 @ Acre (Rs.) 19 -120 183 111 -54 97 46
% Return 12% -42% 78% 99% -49% 92% 30%
6 1_ 3 3_ 1_ 3 17

 

Key: See Table 5.7.

192

 

 

 

TABLE 5.12. Production Performance -
Unirrigated Land: Shivpura
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes

0 o o O/T
(No. of Households) (2) (1) (5) (1) (9)
No. Acres Planted 2.52 5.60 93.00 18.80 119.92
Production:
Kgs. Grain (Total) 146 440 14800 2920 18306
@ Household 73 440 2960 2920 2034
@ Acre 58 79 159 155 153
Kgs. Other (Total) 1 10 1460 565 2036
@ Household .5 10 292 565 226
@ Acre .4 2 16 30 17
Kgs. Oilseed (Total) 5 0 1370 262 1637
@ Household 2.5 0 274 262 182
@ Acre 2 0 15 14 13
Value Received (Rs.) 173 569 21043 4625 26410
@ Household 87 569 4209 4625 2934
@ Acre 69 102 226 246 220
Profits @ Acre (Rs.) —66 -154 64 —20 39
% Return -49% -58% 40% -7% 21

2 2 2 2 2
P/W - 1 @ Acre (Rs.) -18 -67 131 65 109
% Return —21% -39% 138% 36% 102%

2 2 2 2 .6.
P/W - 2 @ Acre (Rs.) -14 —15 193 82 161
% Return -17% -13% 572% 50% 273%

2 2 2 2 2
P/W - 3 @ Acre (Rs.) -14 3 198 82 166
% Return -17% 3% 691% 50% 306%

0 1_ 5 1 7

 

Key: See Table 5.7.

193

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194

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196

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198

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199

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 5.19. Average Resources Per Household: Hanumangarh
I Small Medium Large All
tem Sizes
0 T O/T O O/T O
(No. of Households) (16) (6) (6) (7) (3) (6) (44)
Total Resources 6131 7476 5562 8486 8063 39217 11254
71—29 80-20 61—39 49—51 60—40 72-28 68—32
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source:
Own 3471 4567 3962 6512 4358 31617 8070
48—52 69—31 46-54 33-67 27—73 65-35 68—32
57% 61% 71% 77% 54% 81% 72%
Borrowed 2660 2909 1600 1974 3705 7600 3184
97-3 99-1 97-3 97-3 99-1 100-0 98-2
43% 39% 29% 23% 46% 19% 28%
Key: Underlined figures: total cash and kind resources.

Hyphenated figures: percentage of resources in cash and kind
respectively.

Percentage figures: percentage of resources derived from source.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 5.20. Average Resources Per Household: Shivpura
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 o o O/T
(No. of Households) (2) (2) (5) (1) (10)
Total Resources 2870 8597 17675 13139 12445
61-39 66-34 34—66 31-69 40-60
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source:
Own 2104 6004 17203 11131 11336
46-54 52-48 34-66 18-82 35-65
73% 70% 97% 85% 91%
Borrowed 766 2593 472 2008 1109
100-0 100-0 58-42 100-0 91-9
27% 30% 3% 15% 9%

 

200

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 5.21. Average Resource Allocation
Per Household: Hanumangarh
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 T O/T o O/T o
(No. of Households) (16) (6) (6) (7) (3) (6) (44)
Total Allocation 6033 7257 5381 8475 8062 38433 11056
71—29 80-20 60—40 49-51 60-40 72-28 68-32
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Allocated To:
Agriculture 897 1010 1400 2063 3567 10688 2684
(Recurring) 73-27 78-22 51—49 59-41 40—60 75-25 68-32
14.9% 13.9% 26.0% 24.3% 44.2% 27.8% 24.3%
Agriculture* 146 180 11 235 98 3023 535
(Investment) 2.4% 2.5% 0.2% 2.8% 1.2% 7.9% 4.8%
Ag. Related 230 134 180 395 251 4647 841
(Recurring) 56—44 50-50 6-94 30-70 56-44 68—32 61-39
3.8% 1.8% 3.3% 4.7% 3.1% 12.1% 7.6%
Ag. Related 33_ -- 198 230 100 876 202
(Investment) 100-0 100-0 68-32 100—0 100-0 94-6
0.5% 3.7% 2.7% 1.3% 2.3% 1.8%
Household 2913 3240 2914 4420 2794 11409 4347
(Recurring) 56-44 66-34 56-44 29-71 66-34 42-58 48-52
48.3% 44.7% 54.2% 52.2% 34.7% 29.7% 39.3%
Household 1121 575 Z}_ 111 59_ 3977 1060
(Investment) 100-0 91-9 100-0 100-0 100-0 98-2 98—2
18.6% 7.9% 1.4% 1.3% 0.6% 10.3% 9.6%
Ceremonial 693 2118 605 1021 1202 3813 1387
93-7 99-1 95-5 97-3 97-3 96—4 97-3
11.5% 29.2% 11.2% 12.0% 14.9% 9.9% 12.6%
Debt Principa1** ( 577) (1571) ( 701) ( 791) ( 645) (6542) (1581)
74—26 97-3 70—30 51-49 65-35 83-17 80-20
9.6% 21.6% 13.0% 9.4% 8.0% 17.0% 14.3%
Debt Interest** ( 102) ( 31) ( 48) ( 53) ( 56) ( 955) ( 191)
83-17 86-14 60-40 43-57 54-46 80-20 78-22
1.7% 0.5% 0.9% 0.6% 0.7% 2.5% 1.7%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

total cash and kind allocation.

percentage of allocation in cash and kind
respectively.

percentage of allocation to total allocation.

Underlined figures:
Hyphenated figures:

Key:

Percentage figures:

* Cash allocation only for all size categories.
**Not part of totals. Debt repayments have been merged under
appropriate allocation headings.

201

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 5.22. Average Resource Allocation
Per Household: Shivpura
Small Medium Large All
Item Sizes
0 o 0 WT
(No. of Households) (2) (2) (5) (1) (10)
Total Allocation 2870 8402 14804 13139 10970
61—39 66-34 38—62 31-69 43-57
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Allocated To:
Agriculture 145 852 3409 7242 2629
(Recurring) 97-3 54-46 42-58 13-87 35-65
5.1% 10.1% 23.0% 55.1% 24.0%
Agriculture* 10 49_ 860 100 450
(Investment) 0.3% 0.5% 5.8% 0.8% 4.1%
Ag. Related _8 224 963 .62 534
(Recurring) 0-100 45-55 1—99 0-100 4-96
0.3% 2.7% 6.5% 0.5% 4.9%
Ag. Related -- -- -- -— --
(Investment)
Household 2633 5223 7457 5702 5869
(Recurring) 59-41 55-45 19—81 52-48 32-68
91.7% 62.2% 50.5% 43.4% 53.5%
Household* 25 515 1391 -- 804
(Investment) 0.9% 6.1% 9.4% 7.3%
Ceremonial: 42_ 1548 724 .26 684
6-94 97-3 84-16 0-100 89-11
1.7% 18.4% 4.8% 0.2% 6.2%
Debt Principa1** ( _§_) ( 600) (1045) (1100) ( 768)
100-0 100-0 100-0 40-60 92-8
2.8% 7.1% 7.1% 8.4% 7.0%
Debt Interest** ( 14) ( 110) ( 96) ( 167) ( 90)
0.5% 1.3% 0.6% 1.3% 0.8%

 

Key: See Table 5.21.

* Cash allocation only for all size categories.

**Not part of totals.

Debt repayments have been merged under

appropriate allocation headings.

202

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 5.23. Use of Operational Holdings: Hanumangarh
Small Medium Large A11
0 T O/T o O/T o SIZES
(No. of Households) (l6) (6) (6) (7) (3) (6) (44)
Acres Held
Wet - Own 15.13 —- 2.37 26.38 -— 86.62 130.50
Dry - Own 30.97 -- 3.49 16.44 7.25 55.62 113.77
Wet — Rented ( .75) ( 4.88) (11.75) (17.38)
Dry - Rented (13.00) (11.50) (12.00) (36.50)
Effective Holding 61.23 13.75 23.36* 69.20 31.00 228.86 427.40*
Acres Used - Kharif
Wet - Own 10.19 —— .50 19.75 -- 47.13 77.57
Dry - Own 29.90 -- 3.46 15.62 7.25 37.50 93.73
Wet - Rented (00) ( 2.50) ( 5.00) ( 7.50)
Dry - Rented (13.00) (11.50) (12.00) (36.50)
Acres Used — Rabi
Wet - Own 7.13 -- 2.37 21.38 -- 73.87 104.75
Dry - Own 1.00 -— -- -- -- -- 1.00
Wet - Rented ( .75) ( 2.38) ( 6.75) ( 9.88)
Dry - Rented (00) (00) (00) (00)
Total Acres Used
Wet - Own 17.32 -- 2.87 41.13 -- 121.00 182.32
Dry - Own 30.90 -- 3.46 15.62 7.25 37.50 94.73
Wet - Rented ( .75) ( 4.88) (11.75) (17.38)
Dry - Rented (13.00) (11.50) (12.00) (36.50)
Effective Holding 48.22 13.75 22.71 56.75 31.00 158.50 330.93
Intensity of Use
Wet - Own 114% -- 121% 156% -- 140% 140%
Dry - Own 99% -- 99% 95% 100% 67% 83%
Wet - Rented (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Dry - Rented (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Effective Holding 79% 100% 97% 82% 100% 69% 78%

 

Note:

Effective holding is calculated by counting owned irrigated land
twice.

* Figures are adjusted for 1.25 owned irrigated acres uncultivable
during kharif due to flooding.

203

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 5.24. Use of Operational Holdings: Shivpura
Small Medium Large All
Item .
O O O O/T Sizes
(No. of Households) (2) (2) (5) (1) (10)
Acres Held
Wet - Own -- 5.20 30.80 -- 36.00
Dry - Own 1.26 6.00 88.00 1.00 96.26
Wet - Rented ( 8.80) ( 8.80)
Dry - Rented (16.80) (16.80)
Effective Holding 1.26 16.40 149.60 26.60 193.86
2.52* 22.40* 237.60* 27.60* 290.12*
Acres Used - Kharif
Wet - Own -- 2.40 12.80 —— 15.20
Dry - Own 1.26 2.80 38.60 1.00 43.66
Wet - Rented (--) (--)
Dry - Rented ( 7.40) ( 7.40)
Acres Used - Rabi
Wet - Own —- 2.80 26.80 —- 29.60
Dry - Own 1.26 2.80 54.40 1.00 59.46
Wet - Rented ( 8.80) ( 8.80)
Dry - Rented ( 9.40) ( 9.40)
Total Acres Used
Wet - Own -— 5.20 39.60 —- 44.80
Dry - Own 2.52 5.60 93.00 2.00 103.12
Wet - Rented ( 8.80) ( 8.80)
Dry - Rented (16.80) (16.80)
Effective Holding 2.52 10.80 132.60 27.60 173.52
Intensity of Use
Wet - Own -— 100% 129% -- 124%
Dry - Own 200% 93% 106% 200% 107%
Wet - Rented (100%) (100%)
Dry - Rented (100%) (100%)
Effective Holding 200% 66% 89% 104% 90%
100%* 48%* 56%* 100%* 60%*

 

 

 

 

 

 

* Figures with asterisk are for revised effective holding counting

owned unirrigated land also twice.

land although yields for the second crop are poor.

Two crops can be taken on such

204

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