PGPE PAUL I
AND THE ROMAN REVGLUHON
6F THE BGH-H'é CE'M'ER‘I’

The-sis for the Degree of Fla. D.
mamam SMTE UNIVERSITY
DAVED HARRY MILLER
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Michigan State
University

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled
Pope Paul I and
the Roman revolution
of the eighth century

presented by

David Harry Miller

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. History

degree in

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POPS PAUL I
AND THE ROMAN REVOLUPION
OF $53 SIEHTH cssruar

by David harry killer

Though the general subject of the origin and nature of
the papal states in the eighth century has been frequently
studied. most of these studies are out of date and inadequate.
On the other hand, the pontificate of Paul I has never been '
adequately treated at all. Most scholars have been deceived
by the lack of obviously violent or dramatic events during
the pontificate of Paul I and have concluded that the period
was of little importance, being no more than a continuation
of the pontificate of his brother and predecessor, Stephen 11.
Consequently, it is desirable that both the general history
of the Roman revolution in the eighth century and the pon-
tificate of Paul I be treated. This dissertation divides
roughly into two portions. The first portion is concerned
with a re-examination of the origin and nature of the sover-
eign ecclesiastical republic of Home and central Italy ruled
by the popes. The second portion is an examination of the pon-
tificate of Paul I and an attempt to assess the importance
of that pontificate and its place in the developing Carolin-
gian world order.

The major source of evidence for the pontificate of

David harry Killer
Paul I is the Codex Carolinug. ;he letters of Pope Paul in
the codex form a major portion of the collection. host of
Paul's letters are undated. and consequently a major element
in interpreting Paul's pontificate lies in working out an
accurate and acceptable chronology of his correspondence.
The sources for the eighth century background of Paul's per-

iod are more varied. The early letters in the Codex Carolinus,

 

other papal correSpondence, papal biographies in the Liber

Pontificalis and various annalistic materials are all rele-

 

vant. Throughout the study it has been necessary to try to
avoid the mistake so often made by others of taking the sourCes
out of the context of the eighth century and of the papal

world view.

This discussion of the pontificate of Pope Paul I is de-
pendent upon the establishement of two hypotheses in the first
portion of the study. the first of these hypotheses is that
of the gradual emergence, between 726 and 756, of an idea of

a new state in Italy, the Sancta Dei Ecclesia_Res gublica Bo-

 

manorum. Ehe sources for this new political idea are to be
found in the papal correspondence and the bioxraphies of the

Liber Pontificalis. The gradual evolution of the idea meant

 

that it was never clearly defined, and this aspect of the idea
is crucial to the second hypothesis. ihe second hypothesis
is that in the Franco-papal alliance of 754 there was a fail-
ure to define clearly the nature of the roles of the partici-
pants. There was no commendation of Stephen II to Pepin. There
was no donation of land in 75h, 755, or 756. The patriciate

of the Romans was a new and undefined creation. The openended~

David harry killer
nessof the concepts thus in use by 756 determired the histor-
ical context of the pontificate of Paul; i.e., the pontificate
of Paul was the period when force of circumstance caused the
conditions of the alliance to begin to be defined. :he emerg-
ing clarity of the alliance revealed that it had become an
entirely different sort of arrangement than that originally
intended by Home. Beginning under Paul and continuing until
800 A.D.. the alliance changed until a point was reached at
which the Patrician of the Romans had become emperor in fact,
though not in name. at the same time the pontificate of Paul
marked the failure of the papacy to take into account and
deal with the problem of a disgruntled and ambitious lay ar-
istocracy. That failure created the staae upon which domestic
Roman politics were played throughout the Middle Ages. In re-
gard of Italy the work of Paul I enabled the papacy to reach
a political acccmodation with the Lombard kingdom which was,
however, destroyed by the effects of internal chaos in the
Roman state caused by failure to organize the regime to ac-
conmodate the aristocracy. Hence the pontificate of Paul I
was of the utmost importance in the development of the idea
of the Carolingian Empire and the medieval papacy's position

in Rome and in Italy.

POPE PAUL I
AND THE ROMAN REVOLUTION
OF THE EIGHTH CENTURY
by

David Harry Miller

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History

1967

REFACE

The work which follows is thoroughly revisionist. It is
the author's belief that the so-called "Middle Ages" may not
be isolated as a self-contained period, intrinsically differ-
ent from the period Which followed it, without doing violence
to the truth and creating a distortion in one's view of the ‘
vpast. The "Middle Ages" was the period When the name of Europe
became more than a geographic label -- the age, in short,
when European civilization and society were created and ex-
perienced early development. while one may look upon the early
period of the "Middle Ages" as a "dark age" in which the civ—
ilization of the ancients Was barbarized, that is an empty
approach. Such an approach is based on viewing the "dark age"
in a negative fashion as a period when the only fact of im-
portance was the death of the old. That Roman civilization
and language were barbarized is not important, because Bur-
opean civilization and society is not Roman.

The secret of the "dark ages" is that here began the
creation and subsequent evolution of the institutions, cul-
ture and attitudes of which western, European, Christian civ-
ilization largely consisted.

European civilization was a new civilization. not a sub-

11

culture of the old. Ehe period When it began to emerge was a
vibrant and creative one. The problems confronting thosefirst
Europeans were legion, but they were safely surmounted because
those peOple were able to build institutions strong enough to
nurture a new society and to enable it to survive. The central
institution of Early European society was the Christian Church.
Its social, cultural and spiritual influences on the society
around it were of such far-reaching importance that the his-
tory of Early Europe is inseparable from the history of the
church.

The eighth century was one of the most crucial periods
in the development of Latin Christianity. In the course of
this one century the Spiritual monarchy of the bishop of Home
over Christian society was established in EurOpe, the final
dissolution of the bonds holding Rome to the Byzantine Empire
were dissolved and the first Germanic empire of the Middle
Ages was created.

The general subject of this dissertation is the papacy
of the eighth century and the alliance between the Franks
and the popes. Its central concern is the pontificate of
Pope Paul I covering the years 757-767. Its purpose is to pro-
vide an exposition of the problems and policies of Paul as
ruler of the newly created papal state in his relations with
the Franks, the Lombards and.to a lesser degree, with the
semi-oriental empire of Byzantium. For the most part it treats
material which has been only cursorily examined by previous
scholars. While the pontificates of the incumbents of the pap-

al throne precedhg and succeeding Paul I have been treated
111

at length by other authorities, the pontificate of Paul I has
been largely neglected. It is one of the premises upon which
this study is based that such in-attention is not warranted:
the pontificate of Paul I was a most important and formative
period in the development of the papacy, and the effects of
this period are visible throughout the rest of the eighth
century and beyond.

Though Paul I is the main subject and a study of his
pontificate the principal object of this dissertation, other
themes and questions must perforce be considered. The con-
ditions under which Paul I labored were set during the pon-
tificate of his brother, Stephen II, who, in order to resolve
a complicated problem while yet preserving the independence
of action of Rome and the papal curia, embarked upon a long
and hazardous Journey from Rome into the Frankish kingdom in
the year 75“. The consequences of that Journey radically al-
tered the affairs of Italy and Europe at large and determined
in no small way the future development of Western society.

Another of the premises of this investigation is that
the study of these critical developments must begin with a
series of events antecedent to 75h; for though this earlier
period, too, has been much discussed, the present study ap-
plies to earlier treatments a revisionist approach. Thus a
secondary object of this dissertation will be to establish
certain theses upon which an understanding of the origin of
the papal states and of the period 754-767 and beyond must

rest.

iv

It would be difficult indeed to sufficiently acknowledge
my indebtedness to Richard E. Sullivan. The advice he gave in
the preparation of this dissertation is only a fraction of
what he has done on my behalf. His qualities as teacher,
scholar and human being are such that the inestimable pleasure
of having been his student has enriched my life and made the
doctoral program a more meaningful eXperience than it might
otherwise have been.

I am also indebted to Professors Marjorie Gesner and
Eleanor Huzar for their aid, encouragement and instruction.
and to Dr. T. T. B. Ryder, Visiting Professor, who has read
my MS and substituted for Professor Huzar during her sabbati-
cal leave.

I must acknowledge that I should never have been able to
pursue a graduate career at Michigan State University without
the aid of my old teacher and warm personal friend Themistocles
C. Rodis of Baldwin-Wallace College. His labors on my behalf
shall never be forgotten.

There are also three ladies to whom the mere existence
of this work must be attributed and to whom, I hOpe, it brings
some pleasure. Without the struggles and deprivations under-
gone by my mother from the time I was born and the desire for
learning which she instilled in her children. the coal-miners
son could never have become a scholar. To her this work is, in
a very special sense, dedicated. My sister, Professor Barbara
Perkins, and my wife, Agnes, have given me the encouragement
and confidence necessary in the pursuit of a graduate degree
and my wife's patience and support has been immeasureable.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Archivio della Societa Romana di Storia
Patria.

Bibliotheca rerum Germanicarum, ed.
P. Jaffe, 6 vols. Berlin, 1865-1873.

 

Bibliotheque de l'école des chartes.

Bibliotheque des écoles d'Athens et de
Rome.

 

Bibliothegue de la Faculté des lettres
de l'universite de Paris.

Bulletin de la Littérature Ecclésiastigue
Byzantinische Zeitschrift.

Cambridge Medieval History, ed. by J.R.
‘Tanner, C. H. Prévité-Orton and Z. 1.
Brooke, 8 vols. Cambridge, 1936.

Sir R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, A History

of Medieval Political Thought in the
West, 6 vols. New York, 1962.

Deutsche Zeitschrift fgr_Geschichtswiss-
enschaft.

Deutsche Zeitschrift fgrgKirchenrecht.

 

Dumbarton Oaks Papers.
Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte.
Charles Joseph Hefele et h. Leclercq,

Histoire des Concilgs, ll vols. Paris,
1910.

 

Historisches Jahrbuch.

 

Historische Vierteljahrschrift.

Historisch§_Zeitschri§t.

 

Regesta Pontificum Bomanorum, 2nd ed..
ed. by P. Jaffé et H. Hattenbach. Craz,
1957.

vi

mg: 2:31 1.5—1 e .s 51 {are 11.891.93.16 .632 -31.. '.Yl.1_8,20,1.r_¢.-

{NA
-‘C- .vv- 0--

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MQ; Monumento erraniae Pi 1tgriga.
” £23. Boistolarum.

a. Lela.

SS. Scriptores

SS. rerézser. Scriptores reium errqnicarum

SS. rer. Lang. Scripto :zs rerum Lan: chardie>ruv at

‘— Italicarum saeculi UZ—IX

SS. rer. he;J Scriptores rerum herovin Zicarum.

M163 Mitteilungen des Instituts fur ester-

 

 

reichischen Geschichtsforschung.

NkGI-thtingen Nachrichten der kbniglichen resellschaft
der .;issenschaften zu Gettin'en, philo-
log isch- historische Klasse.

 

 

 

Oelsner Ludwig Oelsner, Jahrbucher des frank-
ischen Reiches unter_Kbnig Pippin.
Leipzig. 1871.

PatrologZae curgus completusL_series
;raeca, ed. J.-P. Nigne, 161 vols.
Paris, 1857-1903.

'“J

PL Patrologiae cursus gompletus, series
Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 vols.
Paris, l8Uh-l903.

RHWF Recueil des Historiens des Gauges et de
de la France, ed. par Bouquet, nouvelle
ed. de L. Delisle, 19 vols. Paris, 1869-
1880.

 

BIS Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, ord. L..A,

Muratori, nuova ed. d1 G. Carducci, v. 1- .

Citta del Castello. 1900-.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

fig Revue Historique.

ESQ; Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia.

3Q Remische ggartalschrift_fur christliche
Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte.

;: Studi e Iesti.

Egg Theologische Literatgggeituna.

[E Vortrage und Forschungen;

ZSSRI Zeitschrift deg Savigny-Stiftung fur
giigtsgeschichteL_germanistische Abtei-

vii

éSSMk Aeitschrift dgr Saviwny-Stiftung_fUr
hechtheschichte, kanonistische Abtgil-

 

 

 

Egg.
ékg' Zeitschrift fur kircheggeschichte.
a. anno.
a.m. anno mundi.
2p. Bpistola,
Epp. instolae.
cap. capitula.

viii

jABLE OF cowcswrs
Preface................................................ii
List of Abbreviations..................................vi
List of Appendices.....................................xi
Part I: The Roman Revolution of the eighth century......l
Chapter I: Introduction..............................2

Chapter II: The Imperial restoration and the Lombard

invasion.‘OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOC0.0.0.0...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOCIS

Chapter III: The iconoclastic diSpute and the end of
Byzantine dominion in Latin Italy...................l9

Chapter IV: The Franco-papal alliance and the treaties
Of 755 and 75600000000000000000.0000.eeeeeeoooooeoeoul

Chapter V: The significance of the Franco-papal
alliance and the reSpective positions of the in-
v01ved partieSOOO...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO.OI.0.00.06]-
Chapter VI: The situation through 756...............75
Part II: The pontificate of POpe Paul I................8O
Chapter VII: POPe Paul Ieeeeooooeoeeeooooeeococoon..81

Chapter VIII: The Lombards and POpe Paul: The attain-
ment of an equilibrium of power in Italy..,......,..85

Chapter IX: The testing of the position of the repub-
lic and the strength of the alliance by the
emperorOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00.00.00.00...00.0.000106

Chapter X: The alliance in transition..............122

Chapter XI: The republic..........0.00.0.0...0.0.0.1,4‘0

ix

Part III: con-01118101100ecoooooOOQQQoooooooooooo0.000.000152
Appendices.............................................161

BibliographyooIOOCOOOIOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.00.00000000000192

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

The
the

The

The
the

LIST OF APPENDICES

Page

chronology of the letters of Pope Paul
COdeX CarellnuSOOOOOOOOOO0.0.0.0000000162

Frankish and Roman missi..............172

historical context of the fabrication
Donation of Constantine............:..l7u

Bibliographical Essayoooooooocoo-00.00.09.180

xi

PA HT 1

THE HUMAN HEJOLUTION
CF Th7? ;;I-3HTP CEI‘TTUh‘Y

CHAPfiER I
INTRODUCTION
The reconquest of Justinian and the reincorporation of
the papacy into the Byzantine state in the mid-sixth century
created a situation from which only trouble could result; for
the role of the emperor in the affairs of church and state
posed a threat to the ecclesiastical position of the papacy.
and the papacy's pretensions to ecclesiastical supremacy could
never have been harmonized with the views of either the emp-
eror or the rival patriarchs of the East. The ensuing con—
flicts were of long duration. often brutal and generally det-
rimental to Rome's position within the imperial structure.
Finally. one such quarrel. over the use of icons, proved to
be so virulent that it was no small factor in the final sep-
aration of the papacy from the Hellenic-oriental empire.1
It is highly significant that these conflicts between
Home and Constantinople were both mitigated and exacerbated

by the growing impotence of the imperial government to pro-

 

1 Louis Bréhier et Rene Aigrain. Gr_goire le Grand les
étates barbares et la conguéte arab§1_j90- 257. Vol. V of L'
Histoire de l'église, éd. par A. Fliche et V. Martin. 21 vols.
(Paris. 191W). 13. 1733

3
tect Italy from Lombard conquest; for while imperial weakness
in Italy made the Lombard power more formidable, it also fos-
tered the development of the papacy as leader of the Latin
peoples of central Italy and as a semi-independent polity
centered in the Duchy of Home. The result was that after a
long period of struggle the papacy found itself an independent
state holding a vague leadership over Latin Italy's people in
a territory which was de facto outside imperial rule.2

The lack of Byzantine protection in Italy and the con-
sequent increases in the strength of the Lombard kingdom, a-
long with the regeneration of Lombard leadership through a
short series of able and willful monarchs, made the position
of this fledgling papal state and its supporters a difficult
one. For the Lombard kings Luitprand and Aistulf threatened
to complete the conquest of Italy, an eventuality viewed
with considerable distaste in Rome.

Thus the papacy found itself shut of its imperial master
only to be about to be dominated by another. In order to
strengthen its position in Italy the papacy needed force. It
could not command force of its own; therefore, it had to bor-
row someone else's. For reasons which will become obvious.

the Frankish power north of the Alps was chosen. The result

 

2 In this connection it is interesting to observe that
throughout the central period of the eighth century Venice,
an important imperial enclave in northern Italy, engaged in
continual constitutional experimentation without any inter-
ference by imperial representatives impotent to act. Between
737 and 769 Venice experienced seven violent changes of gov-
ernment. Andreae Danduli Chronica. VII, 3-11, BIS. XII. i.
11u-119 . _"

L;

was the journey of Stephen II into Francia and the negotia-
tion of a series of agreements that revolutionized the sit-

uation in Italy and had highly significant consequences for

the rest of the Mediterranean world.

ChAPTEB II

THE INPERIAL RESTORATION AND TEE LOEBARD INVASION

Between the termination of the western line of emperors
in #76 and the reign of the Emperor Justinian, Italy. though
theoretically a province of the Roman Empire. lay outside the
real sphere of imperial rule. Through Justinian's reconquest
Italy was temporarily wrenched back into the imperial orbit.

The first step in the reorganization of Italy after the
reconquest was the Pragmatic Sanction of_55#. the purpose of
which was to restore the empire by restoring the ancient
privileges of Rome -- a wholly impractical design typical of
the entire reconquest.1 Predictably. in Spite of Justinian's
hOpes. the restoration was never more than that of a shadow.
It is reasonably certain that a Roman Senate had permanently

ceased to exist. even as a sham assembly. by the time of Pope

 

1 Detailed information on Byzantine administration may

be obtained from Charles Diehl. "Justinian: The Imperial Re-
storation in the West". 9gp, II. 1. l-Zfi. or P. Villari. The
Barbarian Invasions of Italy. tr. by L. Villari (London. 1902)
pp. BOEff. Also see Carlo Calisse. A History of Italian Law,
tr. by L. Register (London. 1928). in the early sections and
Fernand Lot. C. Pfister at F. L. Ganshof. Les destineés de
l'empire en occident de 395 a 888. Vol. I of Histoire générale:

Histoire du mgyen age. éd. par G. Glotz (Paris. 1928).

 

 

6

Gregory I.2 The imperial administration in the hands of the
Exarch (imperial deputy) had. in practice. little authority
due to a lack of power to enforce its decisions; real author-
ity lay with the regional dukes who controlled the army and
who gradually achieved great importance. In general. as one
might expect. the troublous times following the restoration
led to the growth of great landed estates. For those who had
little or no security were forced to seek protection by be-
coming the dependants of those who could offer security. and
those who held positions of power were able to use it to their
own advantage. Gradually. too. the organized imperial military
system broke down to be replaced by urban militia controlled
by local aristocrats. who therefore gained considerable pow-
er and naturally endeavored to gain more. Indeed. even had it
worked as designed. the imperial administration would have
done little to benefit Italy; one of Justinian's first acts
had been to collect retroactive taxes for the years that Italy
lay under Gothic governance.3 Thus the general result of the
reconquest was that having been racked by a long Roman-Gothic

war. Italy was then plundered by the army and administration.

 

2 Charles Diehl. Etudes sur 4l'administration byzantin

dans l'Exarchat de Ravenne. 568-751 (New York. n. d. ). pp. 126-
I?7. The word Senatus. reappearing in later documents. merely
refers to the local aristocracy. rather than to the old Roman
institution of civic rule. Also see Thomas Hodgkin. Italy and
her Invaders. 8 vols. (Oxford. 1892- 1899). VI. 562-563 for an
objection. Hodgkin feels that a diluted and weak senate. strong-
ly reduced in importance. may have survived for a time.

 

3 Diehl. CMH. II. 1. 21.

7

The effect of the reconquest on the church was hardly
less severe than on the general Italian population. Theoret-
ically. the church had regarded the Roman Empire as the earth-
ly expression of a unified Christian society in which to be
'Roman' and 'Christian' were synonymous. The emperor was a
Christian ruler; a member of the church universal and there—
fore subject to the leaders of the church in matters eccles-
iastic. This idea of the co-extension of the Christian church
and the Roman Empire had been a solace to churchmen in Italy
inasmuch as it affirmed the unity of Christian society at a
troubled time. But to be a de facto as well as a de iure part
of the empire proved to be a mixed blessing. Though the church
in Italy under the Ostrogothic rule had been subject to a
temporal power it could not control. after the imperial rest-
oration the temporal power over the church proved to be one
which would meddle theologically as well as exert political
control. Accordingly. the relative independence of the papacy
in religious affairs faced a serious challenge in the form of
the caesarOpapism of New Home.

Hence. while it may be necessary to give assent to Abbe
Duchesne's caution that it is essentially inaccurate to Speak
of sixth. seventh and eighth century pOpes as subordinates of
the emperors.’4 one must note that in the same period the pap-
acy had to struggle for its existence as an institution. The

papacy. holding that Matthew XVI;_18-l9 meant that the pope

 

h L. Duchesne. The Beginnings of the Temporal Sovereignty
of the Popes. tr. by A.H. Mathew (London. 1908?. pp. 13-19.

ruled a church comprising all of the faithful. developed a
claim to a doctrinal and jurisdictional primacy over the
church which corresponded to the pringipatus of Roman polit-
ical theory. This doctrine was a fixed part of the papacy's
theory by the end of Pope Leo I's pontificate.5 By the end of
the fifth century the concepts of auctpritas and potestas

had also been developed in Rome. Auctggitas. power based on
right. was held by the pope and potestas. power based on force
was distributed among secular rulers. Thus the empire was a
benefice bestowed by God. and. as a divine gift. the exercise
over it was subject to review by the vicars of God. the
popes.6 The theoretical position of the pOpes as supreme pon~
tiffs of the church had thus been worked out by the time of
Gregory I. But St. Gregory and his predecessors had counted
themselves as Romans and loyal subjects of the Roman Empire.
not fouseeing. perhaps. that papal supremacy was a doctrine
inconsistent with the pope's position as the subject of a
temporal ruler. And the institution to which the papacy was
thus held to be subordinated. the Roman emperorship. was by
nature diSposed towards caesarOpapism. the control of theo-

logical affairs by an emperor who was actually considered

 

5 walter Ullmann. Principles of Government_gnd Politics
in the Middle_Ages (New York. 19617} pp. 32. 37.

6 Ibid.. pp. 57-58. Though the doctrine that all rulers.
good or bad. are divinely instituted was held by Pope Gregory.
the subsequent struggles of the church made such a view un-
tenable. and the Gelasian theory that Christ was the last Priest-
king and that the priest is accountable to God for all men,
including rulers. is more indicative of the church's view in
the seventh and eighth centuries. Carlyle. I. 147-191.

more than a mere secular potentate.7 In fact, the caesars of
New Home were in the habit of styling themselves as the "Thir-
teenth Apostle of Christ". Thus. at the same time that polit-
ical control of Italy by the empirewas deteriorating. relig-
igous quarrels arose which compounded the estrangement. The
seventh century was marked by a series of conflicts between
Home and ConstantinOple which. though they were concerned

with doctrinal questions, were basically Greek challenges to

Roman principatus on religious matters. Before the seventh

 

century was fairly under way the first of these quarrels er-
upted in the form of a christological decree of the Emperor
Heraclius. Heraclius was faced with Persian conquest of the
rich and important provinces of the east; most of the people

of these provinces adhered to a monOphysitic view of Christ's

 

nature and thus were not particularly rabid in their attach-
ment to the orthodox empire. In order to placate the relig-
ious feelings of his subjects in these provinces and to in-
duce them to greater zeal in the imperial cause Heraclius

introduced the doctrine of monothelitism to try to smooth

 

7 It may even be argued that the Roman Emperors were by
nature caesarOpapistic. of. Hans von Schubert. Staat und Kir—
che von Constantin bis Karl dem Grossen (Kiel. 1906). pp. 5-
E; "The at least latent regal-sacerdotal tendencies of the

T:‘asterrfl emperors were given their permanent complexion
through Justinian". Walter Ullmann. The Growth of Papal Gov-
ernment in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (London. 19657: p. 31.
The concept of Roman rulership. oriental mysticism and des-
potism. and the heritage of Constantine's interference on be-
half of the church combined under Justinian and his followers
to blossom forth as a full-blown caesaropapistic attitude
characteristic of nearly all Byzantine monarchs, who viewed
the church as an organ of the state.

 

10

over doctrinal deviation. But the eastern provinces to Which
Leraclius made this religious concession were soon lost: no
sooner had the Persians been subdued. and Byzantine power
worn out in the process. than had hordes of Arabs emerged
from their desert homes in a flood that brought the empire
new troubles as the freshly re-conquered provinces of the
east were lost forever. But even though the necessity of the

monothelite dogma had now been destroyed. Heraclius' succes-

 

sor. Constans II. retained it. Constans made some attempt to
reconcile the papacy to the doctrine by changing some aspects
of it. but POpe Martin. soon to be a hero of the faith. con-
demned Constans' Typos along with keraclius’dcthesis at the
Lateran Synod of 648. In retaliation Constans had hartin
arrested and deported to the Crimea, where he at length died
from the brutal treatment accorded him at the hands of the
"Thirteenth Apostle". Constans also struck at Rome by de-
taching Ravenna from Rome's jurisdiction. The monothelite
heresy continued to divide East and West. In 680 a grave
emergency in the east. precipitated by the defeat of imper-
ial armies by an invading Bulgar horde. led Constantine IV
to try to reconcile the difference by a council at Constan-
tinOple, the Sixth Ecumenical. which condemned monothelitism.
The tenuous peace thereby established. being a concession of
necessity, was short-lived. In 691 Justinian II held the
Concilip in Trullo (Quinsext) by which a series of measures
inimical to Rome's superiority were passed. Pope Sergius I

refused to recognize the validity of the proceedings and

ll

Justinian II tried to arrest him, the attempt being frustrat-
ed by the Italian militia. Each of these encounters contrib-
uted to a slow deterioration of papal-imperial relations.

The situation was further complicated by developments
within the empire. Perhaps the chief effect of Justinian I's
reconquest lay in its generally deleterious effects on the
empire. From the end of the reconquest the empire gradually
ceased to be Roman in any way. The empire was beset by peril
of invasion in the east and suffered diminution of territory
and great ethnic change -- it lost its universality and its
Roman characteristics and became even more of an oriental
deSpotism than it had been.8 Historical deveIOpments forced
the emperors to confine their attentions to the east.9 Asia
Minor and the Asian hinterland had become the most important
sectors of interest, and from Asia Hinor came the real strenrth
of medieval Byzantium.lo The idea of the unity of East and
Rest had become an enormous anachronism; Justinian's failure

to realize this had been nearly fatal to Byzantium.ll his

 

8 Charles Diehl et Georges Marcais, Le monde oriental_de

395*; 1081, 28 éd.. Vol. III of Hi§tgire GénErale: Histoireh‘
du moyen age, éd. par G. Glotz (Paris, l9h47, pp. 211-235.

 

9 George Ostrogorsky, "The Byzantine Empire in the Morld
of the Seventh Century", 99:, XIII, (1959), 10. Through the
re-conquest the imperial treasure was vastly depleted neces-
sitating cut—backs in the money eXpenditures necessary for
western defense so that the needs of defense in the East might
be met. See A. Vasiliev, History of the gyzantine Empire, 2nd
English ed., 2 vols. (Madison, 1§517} I, lUl-IDZ.

10 Ostrogorsky, DOP, XIII, (1959). 3.

ll Vasiliev, I, 1u2.

1’)

-‘w

successors did not fail to profit by the lesson; Eeraclius
and those who followed him completely abandoned Justinian's
policy, and with it the concept of the universal empire.12
Imperial policy was now formed to meet problems of defense
in the East; the lest had become subordinate to greater de-
signs. As the empire became weaker and more Hellenized and
orientalized its influence in Home and Italy declined. It is
not possible to Speak of a cultural unity or understanding
of East and West after the seventh century.13
On the other hand, the restoration of the empire in

Italy did bring some benefit to the church in Italy. Under-
the imperial misrule the church acquired considerable polit-
ical influence in local affairs. The episcopacy enjoyed an
important role in urban government and attained some element
of control over imperial officials; also the bishOps gained
an immense economic power. Koreover, the effect of imperial
weakness in Italy was to stimulate the assumption of civil
and military reSponsibility by the papacy begun as early as
the pontificate of Gregory the Great, when imperial abdica-
tion of responsibility pulled the papacy into the vacuum thus
created. Though the defense of central Italy was technically

the duty of the Exarch of Ravenna, it had become, for the most

part, the responsibility of the pope by the end of the sixth

 

12 Louis Brehier, Le monde byzantin, 2 tomes (Paris,
1948). I, 46.

13 Hans von Schubert, Geschichte der christlichen Kirche
impFruehmittelalter (Tuebingen, 19217} pp. 2&6:237.

 

 

13
century. At the same time the position of tte papacy in Rome
beman to change sivnificantly inasmuch as the lay power in
Rome could not begin to attain the sort of prestige enjoyed
by the popes and, though by the end of the sixtt century there
were two separate administrations in Home, the ducal and the
papal, the effective povernance of the city was in papal
hands.14 The deveIOpment of papal power in this direction
was also stimulated by the economic position of the papacy.
The use of papal wealth by iregory I to assist the peeple
transformed papal economic power into political power.15
hence, even during the period of firm papal loyalty to hew.
Home force of circumstance Has already setting conditions in
such a way as to make the papacy the potential leader in
Italy. And at a time when an irevitable contraction of the
empire, without which Byzantine survival was not possible,
was setting in, the imperial attempt to continue to claim
Italy was becoming more and more unrealistic. The doman Smpire
was in the process of becoming the Byzantine jmpire —- a

process Which implied the secession of the papacy and Gone

rom the empire.

The situation caused by the conflict of papal interest

and imperial aims was not without further complication. TF6

Lombard invasions beqan in the third quarter of the sixth

 

1“ Calisse. p. 1h.

1‘ i . . s .
J .abriele Pepe, Le moyen age_baroare en italie, tr. de
J. Connet (Paris, 1956), p. lab.

century at a point When the par thhicg had been broken and

 

not replaced by a par JOEQMJ, Italy was already exhausted by

 

the ruirous wars of Justinian's reconquest and the fleecing
of the country by imperial tax-collectors and the army. Ihe
Byzantine resistance was ineffectual and the Germanic war—
horde soon held all of northern Italy, except for the en-
clave of Venice.

Soon after the first stage of invasion the Lombard horde
broke up into smaller groups each pursuing its own ends. In-
ternal conflict and the absence of a strong hand put an end
to immediate erploitation of the situation by the Lombards.
Following the murder of Alboin and the death of Cleph an
interregnum ensued during which the Lombard dukes ruled each
in his own enclave. hence it is not possible to speak in
terms of a Lombard 'state' until the reorganization after
590 when Authari's rule brought some unity to the war-bands.
But even after that reorganization the central government of
the Lombards was rarely able to rule firmly because the sep-

aratist tendencies of the powerful Duchies of Benevento .nd

U

Spoleto tended to the creation of hereditary and nearly in-
dependent states within the state.

The most obvious question of interest at this point con-
cerns the position of the conquered population in the Lombard
state. There are sources enough to assure us of the servile
position into which they were thrust, but these reports are
exaggerated. Romans remained freemen instead of being gener-

ally enslaved and administration and public law were uniform

15

as applied to Romans and Lombards with the exception that
Roman land-holders paid a special tax.16 In the early period
the major factor separating Romans and Lombards was the Ari-
anism of the Lombards. After the conversion of the Lombards
to orthodox Catholicism the Lombards adopted many life-forms
of the Romans and by the time of Luitprand some distinctions
were so blurred that it was difficult to tell who lived by
17

what law. After Luitprand Romans were counted as members

of the tribe, holding full status as exercitales; they had

 

full vergeld, living only in private-law situations under

18

Roman law.
The major importance of the Lombard invasions in regard

of the Roman state was two-fold. First, the inability of the

empire to defend central Italy against the Lombard eXpansion

weakened the already strained ties between Rome and Constan-

 

16 Rothari supposedly legislated for all Italy and brougn
all persons under the same law. But Roman law, deeply en-
grained in the life of Italy, survived by force of custom and
because it was recognized as the law of the church, Villari,
pp. 3&1-342. In practice Fomans and Lombards each lived under
his own law for purposes of private-law and mixed suits were
Judged according to Lombard law, J. B. Bury, The Invasion of
Europe bypthe Barbarians (New York, 1963), p. 269. Concernin:
special taxes on Romans, see Ibid., p. 271, and Villari, p.

297.
Ernst Mayer, Italienische VerfassunQSgeschichtc, 2

 

1?
Bde. (Leipzig, 1909), I, 25-28. Capitulare 49, cap. 3, L;;,
LL: Sectio II, ed. A. Boretius (Bannover, 1838), I, 190.
After the conquest of Lombardy by Charles there was some dif-
ficulty in straightening out the legal systems in use. The
counts were to be required to make clear what law their court

would use.

18 E. hayer, I, 35ff. Some details are cloudy, but ev-
idence is sufficient to indicate the enfranchisement of Ron-
ans in the Lombard state.

 

16

ople. Second, the Opposition of the Latin Italian to Lombard
pressure proved to afford a unifying factor amongst the sub-
jects of caesar in Italy. The Lombard dominion was not by
ordinary measure a severe one. Yet the adjectives applied to
the Lombards by surviving Roman sources are of the most vit—
uperative sort. The objection of Romans in 'imperial' Italy
to Lombard dominion was due to feeling -- the deep-seated
emotional conviction of a Boman's superiority over a barbar-
ian.

The antagonisms between Lombards and nonans grew in the
eighth century to a breaking point. The process to that end
began with the succession of Luitprand to the Lombard throne.
Luitprand was one of the ablest men to wear the Iron CrOWn
and his qualities of spirit were heroic. He left no doubt
concernin? his orthodoxy and attachment to the Roman church.
he was generous to the church and he recognized the pOpe's
ecclesiastical position.19 The essential cause of strife be-
tween Home and Pavia was Luitprand's determination to achieve
a union of Italy under his scepter. This was the end in view
in every situation, no matter Whom he sided with or against

20

at any particular time. Thus it was political conflict

 

19 Johannes Heller, Das Papsttum, 5 Bde., 2. Aufl.
(Basel, 1951), I, 354.

20 Ludo Moritz hartmann, Ceschichte Italiens in hittel-
alter, 3 Bde. (“otha, 1900), II, ii, 126. Indeed, there is lit-
tle doubt that if any power existed in the eighth century that
had the energy and force to give union to Italy it nus Lombar-
dy under Luitprand. One might be tempted to argue that it was
the failure of the Lombards to successfully unite Italy -- a
failure complete by 77h -- which allowed the disunion charact-
eristic of medieval and modern Italy to develop.

 

17

rather than religious disagreement which led to this hostil-
ity. Both the papacy and the Lombard Kingdom came to compete
in this period for control of the ex-imperial lands of cen—
tral Italy. The papacy's interests therein were two-fold:
first to prevent the Lombards from further enlargement of
their kingdom through control of the formerly imperial lands
and second, to preserve their independence in the Duchy of
Home.

Because of the importance of Rome's position and his
own orthodoxy Luitprand first aimed at peaceful union with
the church in the acquisition and rule of Italy.21 But all
he obtained was the implacable opposition of Home. Under
Luitprand's rule the Landeskirche in his dominion was being

transformed into a Staatskirche; undoubtedly the popes fear-

ed that they would be drawn into this Staatskirche and be-

 

come mere Lombard metrOpolitans.22 Thus control of Home had
become an object of Luitprand's policy and resistance to the
Lombards the chief point of papal policy.

Luitprand became king in 712. His first task was to

consolidate his power; the duchies were independent and not

 

21 Ealler, I, 35H.

22 Von Schubert, Christlichen Kirche, p. 253. This fear
motivated papal policy in steering a middle course between
Greek and Lombard: "L'incorporation du siege de Home a ce
royaume Lombard eut été de toute évidence une catastrophe
pour 1e successeur de Saint Pierre, a une époque on son au-
torité oecumenique était encore tres sérieusement mise en
cause par les prétentions du patriarche de Constantinople,
qu'é paulait solidement l'empereur, dont il était le collab-
oratuer direct", Louis Halphen, Charlemagne et l'empire car—

olingien (Paris, 1947), p. 16.

 

18
until he controlled them could 2e rule securely and concen-
trate on eXpansion. Eventually he was able to force the Ob-
edience of the dukes, but this success prompted the pOpes to
seek alliance with the restless elements of the kingdom to

23

derail Luitprand's policy. However, fortune favored Luit-
prand; Leo III'S policies and the papal Opposition to them
gave Luitprand the opportunity he needed. Siding first with
the one and then With the other, he used their animosity to
make some gains in territory and improve his position.
Hence, by the beginning of the eiahth century the ele-
ments of a three-way conflict in central Italy were already
well developed. The tense situation thus established lacked

only the action of Leo III in 726 to precipitate the Roman

revolution Of the eighth century.

 

23 H. Pabst, "Geschichte des lanfiobardischen Eerzortuns",
Egg, II, (1862), U7u-u76. It seemed, immediately after his
accession, that he had forgotten the duchies; he ignored
their insults and omissions and behaved as though neither
Benevento nor Cpoleto really belonged to the kingdom. he
waited nine years for the rizht moment and when it came he
acted with such cleverness that the question never became
one Of Open war. See pp. h75ffl.for the details. Further in-
formation on the history of Italy under the Lombards may be
obtained from the followinm works: Carlo G. tor, L'eta fgpd-
ale, 2 vols. (hilan, 1952-53). 3. Pochettino, I Lengobardi
nell'Italia meridionale (Caserta, 1930), and Luigi salva-
torelli, L'Italia medioevale: dalle invasioni_barbarichg_3311
inizi del secolo XI (Milan, 1938). '*

 

 

 

CLAETCn Ill
LES ICONOCLALPIC DIQP"IS
zklfi) L373 ‘J£?) OI?
.flkiiWLNS JOAIJION IN LATIE ITALY

‘
1

Beginning in the early eighth century each of the taree
protagonists in the developinr struggle for central Italy
came under the leadership of a strony hand. As Ling Luitprand,
POpe Gregory II and Emperor Leo IlI took control of their

respective offices a new and more violent phase of the stru:~

e1

(’9

was opened. Ihe homan revolution of the eighth century
had begun.
Leo III, Jmperor of Byzantium, was the first of a low;

se ies of military adventurers from the Armenian frontier to

H

seize the throne of Byzantium. On Leo's accession Italy Was
the only remaining holdini of the empire in the lest; the
empire had becone a hellenic-orientalized state and Leo's
reign and that of his son, Constantine V, erar a period of
reorganization of the empire around that fact.1 The reign of
Leo III was remarkable for many reasons, not least of which

was that the policies which he pursued provoked the separa-

tist revolution in Italy which led to the events of 754.

 

l n o
nrehier, I, 7Q-88.

l9

“O
(I.

rhe severity of the {inputes brou ht about by Leo were
argravated by the fact that the pope of the time, ire cry ii,
was a ran who was certainlr as strong willed as Leo. Che
story of the conflict of wills of these tic men is Without
doubt one of the most interesting stories in papal history.
Indeed, it is not idly claived that the process of papal lib-
eration bezan under Greiory 11.2

By the time of #regory II's accession as pontiff the
Work of the poses as secular lords in home had caused the
borders between ecclesiastica and political affairs to be-
come blurred to the point that, in the minds of the papal'
curia and the people, St. Peter seemed to have replaced
caesar as head of the state.3 Gregory held a relatively in-
dependent position Which allowed him, as leader of the Latin
Italians, to maintain a position in opposition to both the

Lombards and the Greeks.

 

2 t- ,
Ullmann. rapal Government,ip. 45.

 

3 Keller, I, 356. In fac , though documentary evidence
of direct papal rule in Home does not appear until Zac,ary's
pontificate, a survey of the pontificate of drezory II leads
one to the conclusion that he governed Home. he may still
have governed in the emperor's name, but govern he did. Un-
til the end of Crercry II's life, when the Exerch Eutychius
appeared in Home, there was no power in Rome to govern the
pOpe or force him to do Leo's bidding. One can only conclude
that whatever administration existed we. firmly in fire ory's
hands. This is probably true of the duchy at large,

4 i ,
firich Caspar, deschichte des Iapsttun von den Anfdnq-

en bis zur hbhe der Heltherrschaft, 2 Ede. (luebingen, 1933),
II, 61450

21

In 726 Leo, pressed for money to carry out reform in
the empire, doubled the indiction, or fiscal year, thereby
doubling the taxes for 726. The church was at the time the
most wealthy sinrle land-holder in imperial Italy and, as
the burden of the increased taxation would therefore cost
the church a great deal, Gregory II, in his capacity as lord
and protector of the patrimonies of the church, protested
the tax and refused to pay. Indeed, the church's burden of
the tax was so large that the papal biographer saw the doub-

5

led indiction as directed primarily against the church. Zhe
papal Opposition afiainst the taxes was so pleasing to the
Italian people that Gregory was seen as in support of a
'national' revolution.6 The imperial reSponse to the pontiff's
refusal to obey in the tax dispute was the epitome of inept-

7

ness; Leo ordered the death of the offending cleric. Low-

 

5 Vita Gregorii II, in Liber Pontificalis, éd. par L.
Duchesne. BEAR, 2;é ser.. 3 tomes (Paris, 18867, I, #03;
"...e0 quod censum in provincia ponere praepediebat et suis
opibus ecclesias denudare...."

 

6 CaSpar, ggsphichte des Papsttums, II, 645-6u6.‘rhe
term 'national' is used to denote the Latin Italians of cen-
tral Italy and originates with Caspar.

7 Kite Gregorii II. Pp. 403-uou. Several attempts were
made. The first plot was one involving, according to Duchesne
(Liber Pontificalis, I, #12n.), "...deux officiers supérieurs
dc l'armEE et par un dignitaire ecclésiastique; le gouverneur
de Rome s'abstient de la favoriser ostensiblement". The of-
ficers seem to have been the Duke Basil and the Chartularius
Jordannes while the ecclesiastic was the Subdeacon John Lur-
ion. The plan was approved by the Spatharius Narinus (the
governor) sent by Leo to Rome to rule the duchy. harinus was
not a prominent character in future events, perhaps he was
withdrawn. Though this plan failed it provided the tone for
Leo's dealings with Gregory in the future.

(\
PO

ever, popular feelin: was so stronrly anti-imperial that the
people, aided by Lombard arms, rose up and were able to pre-
vent the execution of the emperor's order.8

The situation was further complicated by the fact that,
in the same year, Leo had taken a most unpOpular step; the
prohibition of the use of icons within the empire, which
caused general unrest in the East as well as in the nest.9
sealizin: the weizht of Roman Opinion in ecclesiastical af-
fairs and determined to jet Gregory's approval, Leo offered
Gregory a proposition: either he expressed his approval of
the iconoclastic decree, in which case he should have the
emperor's gratitude (it being implied that the matter of
resistance to taxes would be forgotten), or not, in which
case Leo would depose him.10 The pope refused to comply, as
did Germanus, the Patriarch of Constantinople, who was later
deposed by Leo to be replaced by a man more amenable to Leo's

.Nil]. 0 11

w "-‘~—.-m-

8 Vita Gregprii II, p. 404. John Lurion and Jordannes
were killed and Basil was forced into a monastery. Cf. gagli
historiaigangobardorum, VI, #9, ygg, SS. rer. Lang. (hannover,
1878). p. 181.

9

 

Nicgphorus Breviarum Hietoricuq, g;, C, 9630.

10 Vita Gregorii II, p. “ON: "3t 51 adquiesceret ponti-
fex, gratiam imperatoris haberet; si et hoc fieri praepedir-
et, a suo gradu decederet."

 

11 Hefele-Leclerq. III, 11, 676. A Roman council in 727
apparently condemned the doctrine but no precise canons sur—
vive. Cf. Nicephorus Breviarum Historicum, p. 966a.

23

At this juncture it is interestinq to note that Eregory
apparently did not consider himself in full rebellion against
the empire. Luitprand, King of the Lombards, seeing the chaos
in imperial Italy, judged the time fair for increasinr his
conquests from the empire and attacked Byzantine holdings,
probably in Venice and the Pentapolis, while a revolt also
broke out in the same areas.12 In response to this Gregory
wrote to the authorities concerned admonishing them to re-
main loyal to the emperor and the empire, and to aid the
Exarch.13 Thus we see that Gregory II held a seemingly ambi-
valent attitude vis-a-vis Leo III. On the one hand he pro-.
tested his loyalty to the empire and exerted himself, where

possible, to prevent the diminution of imperial territory in

 

12 Vita Gregorii II. p. 404: "Igitur permoti omnes Pen-
tapolenses atque Venetiarum exercita contra imperatoris ius-
sionem restiterunt...."

 

13 Johannis Diaconi Chronigon Venetum, ycH, es, VII, ed.
3. H. Pertz (Hannover. l8h6), p. 12. Epistolae Lanjobardicae
Collectae, Ep. XI (Jaffé-.Jattenbach, 2177), L;H, 322.. III,
ed. M. Gundlach (Berlin, 1892), p. 702. "Quia pecato faciente
Ravennancium civitas, quae caput extat omnium, ab nec dicen-
da gente Longobardorum capta est, et filius noster eximius
dominus exarchus apud Venecias, ut cognovimus, moratur, de-
beat nobilitas tua ei adhereret cum eo nostra vice pariter
decertare, ut ad pristinum statum sanctae rei publicae et
imperiali servitio dominorum filiorumque nostrorum Leonis et
Constantini magnorum imperatorum ipsa revocetur Havennancium
civitas, ut zelo et amore sanctae fidei nostrae in statu rei
publicae et imperiali servicio firmi persistere Domino coho-
perante valeamus". Letter XI was to Duke Ursus of Venice.
Letter XII (Jaffe-Hattenbach, 2178), p. 702, was the same
letter addressed to the Patriarch of Grado. Vita Gregorii LI,
p. #04: "...numquam se in eiusdem pontificis condescendere
necem, sed pro eius magis defensione viriliter decertarent
...." The papal biographer also notes that Rome's love and
faith for the empire continued unabated, p. 407: ”...in fide
persisterent rogabat, sed ne desisterent ab amore vel fide
Romani imperii ammonebat."

 

 

22;

Italy. 0n the other he protested against Leo's policies in
the most vigorous laneuage.

At this point it may be of interest to take note of the
two famous letters sent to Leo III by Gregory II concerning
Leo's religious views.lu The language of the letters was
strong and the theme of them was that the emperor ought to
cease promoting heresy and interfering in religious affairs.
First the emperor was chided rather roughly by Pope Gregory
as beina more ignorant than a child in the matter of the def-
erence due to icons.15 Then the pope lectured the emperor
on political and ecclesiastical behaviour and theory. He in-

sisted that the popes derived their power and authority from

St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles,16 and admonished Leo that

 

14 Sanct Greecrii II Romani Pontificis Spistolae, Epp.

XII- XIII (Jaffe- attenbach, 2180, 2182), PL, LXXXIX, 511- 52a.
These letters have been the subject of great controversy.
hany doubt their authenticity. Hodgkin, whose views are typ-
ical of this group, feels that the true copies do not now ex-
ist. hodgkin, VI, 505. Erich Caspar has investigated the prob-
lem of these letters and rejects the notion that they are
Spurious; see Hrich Caspar, "Papst Gregor II und der Bilder-
streit", ZKJ, LII, (1933), 29-31 et passim.

l5 Gregprii II Epistolae, Ep. XII (Jaffé- .attenbach,
2180), p. 516: "Averte cogitationes tuas malas, te obtestor;
et libera animam tuam a scandalis et exsecrationibus quibus
ab universo mundo incesseris, quandoquidem vel a puerulis
parvis illuderis. Obito scholas eorum qui elementis imbuuntur,
et dic: Ego sum eversor et persecutor imaginum, et confestim
tabellas suas in caput tuum projicient, quodque a sapienti-
bus minime doceri potuisti, ab insipientibus edocebere."

16 Ibid. "Voluimus et nos, utpote qui facultatem et
potestetem atque auctoritatem a sancto Petro principe apos-
tolorum habemus, tibi poenam irrogare...."

 

d03ma was not the business of enperors, just as civil affairs

17

were not the business of churchren. he further inforxed

the emperor that because of his ecclesiastical policy he rad
himself damned himself.18 Ihinking, no doubt, of the imper-
ially inepired attempts on his life he wrote to Leo that if
Leo continued to insult him and attempted to harm him he
would not argue but would merely leave Nose and travel the
short distance to Campania, and then the emperor mirkt just
as well "chase the wind’.19 For the pOpe had no need to fear
a power which could not rule Italy and could only make Home

dangerous for him because Home was on the sea, and thus vul-

nerable to the Greek fleet,20 particularly when the whole

 

17 Ibid., p. 518: "ecis, imperator, sanctae Ecclesiae
dogmata non imperatorum esse, sed pontificum, quae tuto de-
bent dogmatizari. Idcirco Ecclesiis praepositi sunt pontif-
ices a reipublicae negotiis abstinentes; et imperatores ergo
similiter ab ecclesiasticis abstineant, et quae sibi cormissa
sunt capessant, Consilium autem Christi amantium imperatorum
et piorum pontificum virtus est une, quando cum pace atque
charitate res administrantur. Scripsisti ut concilium uni-
versale comeretur, et nobis inutilis ea res visa est." On
this point drezory was obviously stretchin: it a bit; he had
great interest and activity in civil affairs.

18 Ibid., p. 516: "...facultatem et potestatem atque
auctoritatem a sancto Petro principe apostolorum habemus,
tibi poenam irregare; sed quoniam in teipsum exeecrationer
ineessisti, tibi habeto illam cum consiliariis tuis, quos
complecteris."

19 Ibid.. p. 519: "Quod si nobis insolenter insultes,
et minas intentes, non est nobis necesse tecum in certamen
descendere: ad quatuor et viainti stadia secedet in region-

em Campaniae Bomanus pontifex; tum tu vade, ventos persequere.”

20 Ibid., p. 520: "Scis Romam ulcisci imperium tuum non
posse, nisi forte solam urbem prOpter adjacens illi mare ac
navigia; ut enim ante diximus, si ad quatuor et viginti sta-
dia Home fuerit egressus papa, nihil tuas minas extimescit."

26

vest looked to the vicar of St. Peter, Whom they venerated
as a god on earth.21 He warned Leo that if he sent arms to
enforce his iconoclastic views in the Jest blood would flow
of which Leo alone would be guilty.22

Leo's response to this heady barrage of advice and crit-
icism from Gregory was to claim to be both pope and caesar.23
To this Gregory replied that Leo's imperial predecessors did
not try to act in such a fashion but co-Operated with the
popes and reSpected the church.2u Here again Gregory is ob-
viously ignoring the recent past in order to get across a
clear theoretical position on the relationship of the two
powers in the state. Then he again admonished Leo that dogma
was a concern for pepes, not emperors, since emperors, un-

like churchmen, did not have the sensus (mind) of Christ and

that Leo should leave the church to its own business and the

 

21 Ibid. "...Occidens universus ad humilitatem nostram
convertit oculos, ac licet tales non simus nos, illi tamen
magnopere nobis confidunt, et in eum, cujus denuntias te
imaginem eversurum atque deleturum, sancti scilicet Petri,
quem omnia Occidentis regna velut deum terrestrem habent."

22 Ibid. "Totus Occidens sancto principi apostolorum
fide fructus offert. Quod si quospiam ad evertendam imagi-
nem miseris sancti Petri, vide, protestamur tibi, innocentes
sumus a sanguine quem fusuri sunt; verum incervices tuas et
in caput tuum ista recident."

23 lélg,. Ep. XIII (Jaffé-Jattenbach, 2182), p, 521;
"Imperator sum et sacerdos."

2” Ibid.

27

pope would leave the state to its own affairs.25

‘hough they reveal Srezory as a man who no longer took
much account of Greek power in Italy,26 these letters indi-
cate that he still thought in terms of a church within the
empire, inasmuch as their theoretical basis was the Gelasian
doctrine of the separation of powers Within the state.

Deepite the admonitory tone of these letters Grerory's
lecturing failed to impress Leo or make his Spirit quail, and
the conflict in Italy continued apace. Duke EXhilaratus, one
of the local magnates, made an attempt to hold Campania a-
gainst the adherents of Rome and to persuade the populace to
kill the pope and to follow Leo's orders, but his activities
27

were stepped by the Romans. A similar aristocratic oppos-
ition by the Duke Peter was again met by the Romans who

blinded him, while in Ravenna the Exarch Paul, Who himself

 

25 Ibid.. p. 522: "Audi humilitatem nostram, imperator;
cessa, et sanctam Ecclesiam sequere, prout invenisti atque
accepisti; non sunt imperatorum dogmata, sed pontificum, quo-
niam Christi sensum nos habemus."

26 Gustav Kruger, Das Papsttum, seinefggee und ihre Tra

32;, 2. Aulf. (Tubingen, 1932 , p, 2h,

27 Vita Gregprii II, p. #05: "Ipsis diebus Exilaratus
dux, deceptus diabolica instigatione, cum filio suo Hadriano,
Campanie partes tenuit, seducens populum ut oboedirent imper-
atori et occiderent pontificem". They were killed by the Ho—
mans. Cf. Duchesne. Liber Pontificalis, I, 413n: "Hadriano
filio Exhilarati, qui praestito sacramento in apostolica con-
fessione Epiphaniam diaconam inlicito ausu in uxorem habet,
anathema sit." Apparently, then, Exhilaratus and Hadrian
had old grievances against Pope Gregory II to revenge. Cf.
Bréhier ct Aigrain, p. 414.

 

 

28

had made several attempts on the life of the pOpe which were
foiled by the Lombards and Romans,28 was killed in a riot
between adherents of the two parties.29 A new exarch soon
arrived with orders to kill the pope and again the Romans
and the Lombards defended the pope, followina Which Eutychius,
the new exarch, was excommunicated.30

Eutychius, however, being perhaps the most able Greek
representative yet sent, perceived the inherent danger to
Greek power in Italy of a Lombard-papal coalition. Playing
on the desire of Luitprand to control Rome, Eutychius ap-
proached him with a proposition. The papal biographer tells
that he entered into a conspiracy with Luitprand and that an
agreement was made between them by which their combined forces
would seek two goals: first, the submission of the Lombard
duchies in the south of Italy which were allied to the pOpe,
and second, the reduction of Home to obedience to the em—

pire.31

 

28 Vita Gregorii II, p. 404.

 

29 Ibid.. p. 405: "Igitur dissensione missa in partibus
Ravennae, alii consentientes pravitati imperatoris, alii cum
pontifice et fidelibus tenentes, inter eos contentione mota,
Paulum patricium occiderunt."

30 l2;§.. pp. 405-406. Eutychius tried to induce some
Romans to kill the pope and the 'optimates' of Home.

31 Ibid.. p. 407: "30 vero tempore, saepius dicti Eu-
tychius patricius et Luitprandus rex inierunt consilium ne-
fas ut congregate exercita rex subiceret duces Spolitinum
et Beneventanum, exarchus Romam...."

 

29

Then the combined Lombard and imperial forces drew up
before Rome, Gregory was able to persuade Luitprand to draw
back from attacking, and Luitprand in turn used his good of-
fices to bring Crerory and the exarch tOgether.32 The attempt
was successful and peace under the exarch's presence in Rome
was maintained for a time. Indeed, the peace seemed so com-
plete that when a rebellion in Tuscanr threatened to raise
an anti-caesar in Italy, Gregory gave his blessinj to the
exarch's efforts to suppress it.33

Thus we see that the two fold aspect of Gregory II's
policy seems reinforced. He had been looked upon as the lead-
er of an Italian revolution and as having secret ambitions

for the territorial aggraadizement of the Roman church in

Italy. Yet throughout the proceedings he professed his loy-

 

32 Ibid.. p. 408: "Ad quem egressus pontifex eique prae—
sentatus potuit regis mollire animos commonitione pia, ita ut
se prosterneret eius pedibus et promitteret nulli inferre
lesionem. Atque sic ad tantam eum conpunctionem piis monitis
flexus est ut quae fuerat indutus exueret et ante corpus ap-
ostoli poneret, mantum, armilausiam, balteum, Spatam atque
ensem deauratos, necnon coronam auream et crucem argentc n.
Post oratione facta obsecravit pontificem ut memoratun ex-
archum ad pacis concordiam suscipere dignaretur: quod et fec-
tum est. Et sic recessit, rege deelinante a malis quibus in-
crat consiliis cum exarcho."

33 Ibid. The people raised an emperor named Pctasius,
who subsequently called himself Tiberius, and wanted to lead
him as emperor to ConstantinOple and enthrone him there. "EX-
archus vero haec audiens turbatus est. Quem sanctissimus pa-
pa confortans, cum eum proceres ecclesiae mittens atque ex-
ercitus, profecti sunt." Though it is worth noting as sugges-
ted by Ludo Moritz Hartmann that the reason for Gregory's
assistance to the exarch may have been motivated by a desire
to avoid having a local caesar to play second fiddle to,
(Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Byzantinischen Verwaltung
in Italian (Kew York, n.d.§, p. 23) it more likely that Ye
hesitated to support an overt act of treason.

 

 

3o

alty to the empire in word, and finally in deed. How is one
to explain hirirfy’L Judging from the ideology implicit in his
letters one findscnmself constrained to agree with Eenri

Hubert that Gregory's task was to avoid obeying a heretical

35

emperor without Open treason. Assuminz, then, that Gregory's
ultimate loyalty to the empire remained untarnished, one
findscnmself confronted by an obvious question. Consider the
trials and tribulations undergone by the papacy from the
sixth throurh the eighth centuries, and the increased dif-
ficulties in the eighth century, all caused by willful, her-
etical emperors who accomplished nothing in the way of def—
ending Italy or the church. In such a situation what hold
could the empire, now no longer Roman in any wai, have on
the loyalty or imagination of a man like Gregory II? Some
argue that Gregory did not wish total rebellion as the power
(1,36

most likely to profit was the Lombar an argument to which

 

I

BL Some, most notably C. Bayet, argue that secession
from the empire was never considered by Gregory II and that
he only opposed iconoclasm, "Remarques sur le caractere et
les consequences du voyage d'Etienne III en France", 33, XX,
(1882), 90. On the other hand, Erich Caspar supposes that
Gregory had planned secession but found his plans ruined by
the foreboding presence of the exarch in Rome toward the end,
which killed home as a center of revolution, Geschichte des
Papsttums, II, 662. However, in £33, LII, (1933), 68-70
CaSpar argues that Gregory had had no secession idea. It
ought to be noted that Eutychius drOps out of the main affairs
after this and was no longer prominent.

n‘.‘

35 Eenri Hubert, etude sur la formation des états de
l'église", 35, LXIX, (1899), 12.

36 William Barry, The Papal Monarchy from Saint Gregory
the Great to Boniface VIII (London, 1902), p. 71.

 

31

some weight need be given. Others, who indeed ought to know
better, argue that he maintained his allegiance because he
still needed imperial protection from the Lombards.37 Eut
one can scarcely assent to this inasmuch as since Crcgory I's
time the popes had provided their own best defense against
the Lombards. The simplest and most reasonable answer is that
while the empire might be plagued by bad or heretical emper-

ors, who might be rebuked or deposed, it yet remained the

Roman Empire -- the respublipa Romanorum of the Christian

 

people -- and it is to this idea that the papacy clings and
is faithful throughout the eighth century and beyond. Even.
when the possibility of remaining under the theoretical tu-
telage of Byzantium can no longer be admitted. the idea of
and loyalty to the republic of the Romans and the Christian
people remains. The key to papal behaviour in this period
and the next is the developing concept that the lordship or
principatus of the republic is transferable. It does not es-
sentially adhere to Byzantium but to Home. It can be taken
away from the Greeks and held in Home by the pOpe, or it
can be given to another. Only when this is kept in mind may
eighth century papal history be made intelligible!

In 731 the indomitable Gregory II, by natural causes,
went the way Leo III was unable to send him by force. He was
succeeded by a third Gregory. Gregory III seemed by nature

a less argumentative man and one more interested in the Spirit

 

37 George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State.
tr. by Joan Hussey (New Brunswick, 1957), p. 1&5.

\ a)
(0

than in worldly matters. This has prompted some to view his
election in 731 as a blow to the idea of national revolution
against the Greeks and a loss of control by the diaconal

'3 .
circle in the curia.’8

But such did not prove to be so in
fact; for Gregory III followed his predecessor's lead in
protesting iconoclasm. Soon after his election Gregory sent
a letter requesting restoration of images by Leo, but Leo

39,1.

prevented it from arriving. his blunder on Leo's part
made certain that his experiences with Gregory II would be
repeated -- Leo's action was in practice a complete diplom-
atic break?o As an answer to Leo's provocation Gregory
held a Roman synod which formally excommunicated all icono-

41

clasts. Leo himself was declared excommunicate and deposed,

 

38 r _
Caspar, ueschichte des Papsttums, II. 664.

 

39 Kite Gregorii III, in Liber Pontificalis, I, 415-
ulo. A priest named George was sent with the first letter,
but fear of the emperor caused him to return without de-
livering the letter. After being reprimanded he Was sent
out again with the letter, but this time he was arrested
by an imperial official and sent to Sicily where he was de-
tained in exile for one year.

#0 Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums, II. 66h: "Das
war der diplomatische Bruch in aller Form."

”1 Vita Gregorii III, p. #16: "...adversus eandem ven-
erationem sacrarum imaginum....depositer atque destructor
et profanator vel blasphemus extiterit. sit extorris a cor-
pore et sanguine domini nostri Iesu Christi vel totius
ecclesiae unitate atque conpage."

 

 

33

but atain Leo detained the lerate sent by the p0p6.u2 Unable
to gain his way by persuasion and learning nothinc by the
past, Leo sent an army to attack iregory, but the arrics of
Ravenna and Venice resisted.”3 lmpotent row to qet back at
Grerory by any other means, Leo deprived the See of Home of
those ecclesiastical provinces subordinate to Home which
were still under effective inperial control (South Italy and
the Balkans), and assigned them to the Patriarchate of Con—
stantinople. This formal act of Leo's marked the severance
of effective political ties between Home and Byzantium, for
When Leo took this step he put the papacy Wholly outside the
empire. The lands of the Patriarchate of Constantinople came
to coincide with the real limes of the empire at last.hu The
empire was finally a fully Byzantine state.

Hence it must be concluded that deSpite papal theoret-
ical interest in the concept of empire, by the end of the
730's Greek power in central Italy was dead. He must dis-

agree with those who argue a surviving connection of the

 

42
Corpus Chronicorum_Bononiensium, Cronaca B, a. 732,

Egg, XJIII, 398. Cf. Joannis Jonarae Annales, XV, 4, £1,
CXXXIV, 1323. Vasiliev, I, 259. regards this as the point
of papal independence: "Following this stepl:the council of
731:]midd1e Italy detached itself from the Byzantine Empire
and became completely controlled by papal and western Euro—
pean interests. Southern Italy still remained under Byzan-
tine sway." It is clear that he regarded Leo's action of
731 as re00gnition of the loss of central Italy. Concerning
the detention of the papal legate see Vita Gregorii 1;},
pp. filo-417. '

 

 

 

”3 Andreae Danduli Chronica, VII, 3, p. 113.

an Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, p. 1&6.

 

r i . 4 - a
papacy With the greeks in uregory III's time. 5 For by are;-

0

ry 111's death the enbryo of the future homan state in cen-
tral Italy, the Duchy of Home, was firmly ruled by the pope,
who may even have coined his own money.u6 Gregory was by any
measure more powerful in Italy than the emperor, and he was
the last pope to bother being confirmed in his election by
imperial officials.u7
Seeing the condition of papal-imperial affairs under Greg—
ory and keeping in mind his much-discussed call for aid to the

Franks in 739 it is no surprise that many writers in later ages

)9.
considered him to have broken with the cmpirc.+v however, it

 

“5 Bayet, 3g, XX, (1882), 90-91. Hubert, fig, LKIX,
Q899), 25-26. Hubert claims that the Duke of nome was still
an imperial maaistrate. This cannot be accepted. If it were
so, then the empire would have been able to controlljregory,
but as can be seen, there was no power in Home other than
'3reaory's and no one to stand effectiufly in his way.

I

46 The coinage of money by Grevory III has been SUflgéS-
ted by Horace K. hann, The Lives of the popes in the fiddle
Ages, 2nd ed. (London, 1925}, 1, ii, 2764277. The suggestion
is also supported by Luigi Pizzamiglio, Studi storici intor-
no ad alcune_prime monete papali (Roma, 1876), pp. 23-26. It
is unfortunate that more complete information is not avail-
able on this matter. If the truth of this suggestion could
be demonstrated it would go far to reveal the total degree
of papal governance in Rome.

4?

 

 

Bréhier et Aigrain, p. 416.
#8

The first suggestion of this appears in Fredegarii
Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 22, ed. B. irusch, Egg,;§;.
rer. Mer.. (Hannover, 1888), II, 179: "...eo pacto patrato,
ut a partibus imperatoris recederet et Romano consulto prae-
fato principe Carlo sanciret." Some later writers supposed'
the secession to have occurred before 739; for example,
Cronica Pontificum et Imperatorum Tiburtina, ed. 0. Holder-
Egger, Egg, §§J (Berlin, 1903), XXXI, 2513 "...et fecit re-
cedere totam Italian a potestate Leonis Augusti heresiarche
...et ipsum imperatorem excommunicavit et reano privavit."
See also hartini Oppaviensis Chronicon, ed. L. Uefland,i;§i,

 

 

 

35

might be more to the point to observe that in Gregory III's

time the term res publioa ceases to refer to the Ereek enpire

 

at large and becomes fixed as a reference to Latin Italy.49
By 739, then, the Roman pontiffs and the Italy they led
stood outside the penumbra of Greek rule and the so-called
Byzantine Tmpire. Latin Italy stood, in effect, alone with
the pepe at its head. The Romans had disowned the Creek EEET
ileug and he had disowned them -- but in the eyes of the So-
mans the res publica Romanorum continued to exist in Italy.
In the succeeding pontificate the papacy maintained its
independence and eXpanded its role in the affairs of Latin.
Italy. hile it may be true that Pope Z9 chary, Gregory II I's
successor, was more interested in religion than politics and
that in his pontificate the Roman party of clerics slipped

into the background, one cannot assent to the assertion that

 

gs. (hannover, 1872), XXII, 425: "Hic Gregorius cum Leonem
imperatorem de deposicione ymaginum Christi et sanctorum in-
corrigibilem vidisset, Roman et Ytaliam et HeSperiam totam
ab eius iure discedere fecit....". Cf. Romualdi Salernitani
Chronicon, a. 739. §;§,'VII, i, 1M0.

 

#9 Hubert, 5;, LXIX, (1899), 30. It ought to be pointed
out that while one agrees with Hubert on this point he is
contradicting an earlier statement of his own in this same
article; see p. 34, note U5.It ought to be noted that in his
approach to Charles Martel Gregory III made no reference to
the empire but to the defense of the "...eclesiam Dei et pe-
culiarem populum....", Codex Carolinus, ed. by J. Gundlach,
Ep. I (Ob nimium dolorem -— Jaffel”attenbach, 2250), LGE,

__2. (Kannover, 1892), III, 477. See also Ibid.. 3p. II (rim-
ia fluctuamur -- Jaffe-Uattenbach, 2252), pp. ~h77-h79. Be-
cause of the necessity of revising the chronology of Some of
the letters of the Codex Carolinus it is necessary to be able
to positively identify each letter to avoid confusion. There-
fore, each citation from the Codex will include the number of
the letter in the edition cited, the incipit, the Jaffe-
Tattenbach register number and, when applicable, a revised
number.

 

3:2

Zachary lacked the Homwn touch in Italian pOlitics.5O The
situation during his pontificate simply happened to be an en-
tirely different one.

Though Zachary, like his predecessors, wrote to the new
emperor, Constantine V, asking him to restore images, the
struxgle over iconoclasn had ended in Italy. A stalenate had
been reached. Relations between Home and Constantinople be-
came more peaceful because they no longer were of capital
importance to either party: the Greeks were simply no lonqer

51

a power to be reckoned with in Italy and the history of

Zachary's period shows that he pretty well reckoned without
them.
Io begin With Zachary ruled without Greek approval; he

52

made no request for confirmation of his election. he was

 

50

51 The reign of Constantine V was marked with endless
discord. Soon after his father's death in 741 his brother-
in-law, Artabazua revolted and usurped the throne. Constan-
tine won in 7&3, iicgphorus Breviarum Histgricun, p. 966c-
970a. Artabazus seems to have been the champion of icono-
dulism and after his demise the persecutions went on, 3211.
970c-971c. In addition dangers from external enemies, the
Bulgars and the Arabs, threatened the empire and took mos
of Constantines time. The Bulgars posed a major threat and
Constantine spent a siznificant portion of his reign fight-
in: them. The net result was that Constantine paid less at-
tention to Italy than any basileus before him, Cstroqorsky,
Byzantine State, p. 151.

Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums. II. 735.

 

 

52 Hubert, gs, (1899), 31, asserts that confirmation was
obtained from the duke. But he cites no source and one sus-
pects that his reasoning is that if the pope did not set it
from the exsrch or emperor he must have gotten it from the
duke. Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums, II, 738, sucqests that
papal letters to Constantine contained a request, but this
is dubious. See Ottorino Bertolini, "I rapporti di Zaccaria
con Constantino V e con Artavasdo", ASRBP, Ser. 3, IX (1955),
21. He neither asked, sot, not needed confirmation; cf. hart-
mann, Untersuchunggg, p. 25.

 

the power in Home and the duehy and the duke were subordi-

5

KI.)

nate to him. Zachary, like Tremory III. may even have coin-
‘4
ed money for circulation in hone or the duchy.“ He also en-
gaged in diplomacy and entered into international arreements
With the Lombards in a manner befittini a sovereign lord, and
evidence indicates that his claims of lost ducal land from
Luitprand were made as sovereign lord and rightful owner of
the land in question.55
Zachary's adept management of affairs shows through in
his policy toward the Lombards. For both Gregory II and
Gregon III sided with Luitprand's enemies at every possible

moment, and, by using the hostility of the king and the dukes,

or of the Jreeks to the Lombards, they maintained their pos-

 

53 Vita Zachariis, in Liber Pontificalis, I, 429. Uhen
Zachary went to negotiate with the Lombards he "...relicta
Romana urbe iamdicto Stephano patricio et duci ad jubernan-
dum...." HSgr. Duche she notes that "On voit par cette phras

que la duc de Rome etait, eu ce temps-la, subordonne de fait
au papc". Liber Pontificalig, I, #37n.

 

 

L'.’

4
J Pizzamiglio, pp. 26-27.

55 Vita Zachariis. p. 323: "...-b ,ciev rage abstulte
sunt a ducatu Romano civitfates IIII....qusttuor civitat:s
qui pro e0 periersnt...." Luitprand propised to return (r d-
dere) the cities. Zachary was "...vere pas stor populi sibi a
Deo credit....". and in a political way as the conte at in-
plies. Ibid.. p. 427. The four cities were "...per donationis
reconcessit....", Ibid. In as king peace Zachary discussed the
borders of the duchy as "...per circuitum firiun reipublicae
...." Ibid. Then he went to ?'venna to aid the starch, who
was utterly dependent on such aid, he made no mention of the
emperor. The land was given back to “cvcnra "...ad partem
reipublicae restituit...." (Itid) and Zachary was the ob—
vious protector of it. The lands were restored to Zachary
Without any mention being made of the emperor. Cf. F. J.
woan=s—Jachson "The Papacy, to Charles the ireat". C: L,
XXll, 095.

 

II,

ition -- however Wank it was. hnner Pepe Lechiry a new soi-
icy was begun and carried out With ability. 3y abandoning
both the ireeks and the Lonhard dukes, and acting in the
~ene of the duchy he removed those alliances which had rude
his predecessors the enemies of the king, and he achieved
peace.

Lachary's path was even more successful with Luitprand's
successor, Ratchis. Batchis was an orthodox believer who had,

in addition, strong Rowan syrpathies which alienated his

following° he was FflTTiCd to a ioman ard his policies were

9
/

stronrly influenced by Eome.53 About 7&9 latchis, followinf
Luitprand's unity policy, attacked Perugia and the Penta—
polis. Eein; asked to cease by Zachary he did so and, ac-
cording to the chronicler, entered a monastery in a fit of
piety.57 But the chronicler does not tell all the story; the
Lom ard nobles, incensed at Ratchis' action deposed him,
forced him to retire to the religious life, and made his
brother, Aistulf, kins.58 Aistulf was much more indiSposed
to let Rome interfere with his plans, and one wonders wheth-
er Zachary would have been able to achieve an acconmiation
With him had he lived.

The events of the period extending from the conquest
of Justinian to the death of FOpe Zachary in 752 demonstra ed

the inability on both the theoretical and practical planes,

 

/
53 Oelsner, p. 116.

57 Chronicon Salernitanun, cap. 1, ed. 3. F. Pertz, LEE,
§§J III (Eannover, 18397, p. E71.

58 Ludo Moritz Eartmann. "Italy under the Lombards", CNK,
II, v11. 215. ~—---

' 1

of the p9p9cy tc reN9in Vithin the theocr9cy of ire ori nt9l
Empire of Br"“ntium The deterioration of imperial political
control over It9ly, the ol:position of Cons taiitinople and Zone
over various religious issues and the hyzantinizetion and
contraction of he empire meant that the peaceful eo- -exist-
once of Home with New Home had become iniuossible. The cl9ins
of the newly byzantinized empire to rule in roman Italy were
decidedly anachronistic. In 9.1dition the deveIOpnent of the
papacy in Rome and in rcg9rd of the Uest brought it to 9
point at which the prospects of inclusion in the empire were
undesirfiifle. Cy the time of firegory II the papacy had become
the reel secular fiovernnent of Home 9nd was b Jnnin' to de-
velop its jurisdiction9l and do m9tic prir'9cy in the north

of Europe. the iconoclastic dispute sin rpered the antagon-
isms between Home 92x1 the erperor and precipitated 9n enti-
imperial reaction in central Italy of which the pagaey was
the naturel he9d. Thus, while in theory Greeory II held to
the idea of the co-extension of the empire and the church,
and spoke in .el9s i9n tenns of the church within the empire,

he also expressed the new position of the po e. "e drew

U

y,

D"

attention to the fruits of the nission9ry 19 or of St. Eon-
if9 ce and Spoke of m9kinff 9 trip to these nery converted
lands. At the same time he noted th9t caesar had no real
control over him. Thus while implicitly 9cknouledging

the empire, Gregory II also drew attention to the real st9te

of affairs -- a papacy outside the empire. But though this

F43

was so, it was so in 9 quelified

C0

ense he Eyzantine Erpire

did not have power in Italy, but Italy was part of the 3 man

Empiie. The Zomeh Empire was the republic of the x sens shd

it inhered essentially in love. The pjircipatus of the rwpub—

 

lic Was “ssocilt With Home, not Constantinople.59 It was

of this empire and this republic that firezory II and his fol—
lowers were conscious. Ihen by 731 the E zentine Empire ro
longer ruled in Fome the republic was still part of the pol-
itical vocabulary of the papacy. The pOpes were indepe nient

sovereign rulers, but as such they considered themselves nem-

O

bers of a republic -- e republic which had nothinq to do with
Byzantium. Under Stephen II this republic was more clearly
defined. By 755 Stephen II was pc-kin: and thinking in terrs
of a Roman republic which was the same as the church of God.60
According to falter Jllnenn the republic of the flora.s had a
two-fold significance. The Romans were first of all the people
in Italy im.ediatey subject to Home and secondly, the Christ-
ian people who followed Roman orthodoxy.61 Both of these ideas

as to the meaning of the word "Roman" are of acute importance

in what follows.

 

o

5’ Alfred Lombard. Consten_tin V Empereur des fiomeins,
Vol. XVI of EFL-Paris (Paris. 1902 ). p. 65.

60 .

Codex Carolinus, hp. VI (Dun regr i vestri -- Jeffe-
Jattcnbach, 2322), p. E89: "...beato Petro sancteeque Dei
ecclesiae, rei publice Eomenorum,...." It may also be er-
qued that as St. Peter and the pope may be viewed as hevinj
replaced Jupiter haximus and Caesar as master of Home and
vicar, sancte Dei ecclesiee reippublice is identical Iith
respublice sanctac Dei ecclesiac, Franz Kampers, "Iioma ee-
terna und Sancta Dei ecclesia rei publicae Romanorun", FJb,
XLIV. (192a), 2u0—243. "“'

61

 

Ullnenm Growth of Papal fiovernment, pp. 61-63.

CI-ZAP’i' El? IV

THE FRANCO-PAPAL ALLIANCE
AND THE ihEATIEs OF 755 AND 756

In a situation in which the papacy wished to avoid be-
ing subjected to Lombard control, and in which no aid could
be expected from the ireeks, even if wanted -- only one ale
ternative existed: an approach to an outside power.

Gregory III had seen this clearly and in 739 he sent embas-
sies to Charles Martel offering him the Roman consulate if
he would aid Gregory against the Lombards.1 It is doubtful

if Martel did very much to aid the pope2 for he certainly

 

1 Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes. cap. 22, pp.
178-179. Erich Caspar, Eippin und die rbmische Kirche (Ber-
lin, 1914), p. a, points out that the initiative inapproach-
ing Martel may have lain with the Roman magnates. The offer
of the office was supposed to place him in the position of
those previous high military officials who had born it. How-
ever that may be. we must disagree with CaSpar on two points:
first, that the offer did not mean separation of Italy and
Byzantium. They were already separate. and one must conclude
with A. Gasquet ("Le royaume Lombard; ses relations avec 1'
empire Grec et avec la France", RH, XXXIII (1887). 79) that
Gregory III would not want Martel in alliance with the em-
pire. Second. CaSpar' s assertion that the arrangement placed
Home in Martel's mundepurdium. p. 8. Such an assertion takes
no account of either the sources or the thought of the pope.
'Cf. Codex Carolinus, Epp. I (Ob nimium dolorem -- Jaffé-Nat-
tenbach, 2255) et II (Nimia fluctuamur -- Jaffé-wattenbach.

2252). pp. 476-479.

2 In the Divisio R_gnorum of 806 (Capitulare #5, MGR, LL:
Sectio 11.1.1297 Charlemagne noted that his grandfather had
1

 

 

42

did not send an army. Though Franco-Lombard relations had
been rather complicated and often stormy during the hero-
vingian period due to Frankish interests in southern Gaul
and Bavaria, to which northern Italy was in some ways an
important adjunct3and because of Lombard contacts with and
interest in Bavaria, Charles Martel and Luitprand were far
too close for Martel to go to war. Luitprand had continued
the Lombard policy of close connections with Bavaria and had
been closely involved in Bavarian problems but seems to have
come at last to some sort of settlement there recognizing
Martel's interests.3 Both rulers apparently desired to avoid
conflict. The two kingdoms were the first in the Germanic
world, each with Special problems and obvious spheres of
interest. and they seem to have chosen to co-operate rather
than oppose each other. In 737 Martel was being closely
pressed in his war with the Saracens. In that situation he
asked for and received aid from Luitprand.)+ By that time a

near alliance between the two powers seemed to be in effect

 

undertaken to protect the papacy: "...ut ipsi tres fratres
curam et defensionem ecclesiae Sancti Petri suscipiant si-
mul. sicut quondam ab avo nostro Karolo...." If this is to
be taken in any way seriously it can only mean that diplo-
matic pressure may have been placed on Luitprand by Charles
Martel, (Robert Boltzmann, Die Italienpolitik der Merowinp-
er und des Kbnig§_Pi ppin. 2..Auf1. (Darmstadt,1962), p. 36).
In Ep. IIMKNimia fluctuamur -- Jaffé-dattenbach, 2252), of
the ngex Carolinus POpe Gregory III warned Martel "Non cre-
das fili. falsidicis suggestionibus ac suasionibus eorundem
resum.". p. #78.

3 Pauli Historia Langobardorum, VI, 53-54. p. 183.

h Ibid.. VI, 54. p. 183.

43

and confirmed through the symbolic adoption of hartel's son
Pepin by the Lombard.5

DeSpite these close relations under Martel and Luitprand
time brought the Franks ever more closely under the influence
of Rome. This was done chiefly through the work of the saint-
ly Boniface, papal-sponsored missionary in the east Frankish

lands,6 and after 742 the reformer of the church in the main

 

5 Ibid.. v1. 53. p. 183.

6 The conversion of the east Germanic tribes was a mat-
ter which interested the Arnulfings very much in that it was
considered that the advance of Christianity in these regions
would solidify their control over them. From the moment in
690 when St. Willibrord sought out Pepin of Heristal's active
support the Anglo-Saxon missions were to be bound up unmis-
takably and intimately with the politics and successes of the
Arnulfing house. In addition a first bond had been created
between the Arnulfings and Home in as much as these Anglo-
Savon monks were most insistent on that point above all.
Boniface was the chief agent of papal interest in the north
in these years and when Gregory II spoke of going north to
Leo III he undoubtedly had in mind reaping the benefit of
Boniface's labors: "Nuper siquidem ab interioroi Occidente
preces illius quem septetum appellant accepimus, qui vultum
expetit nostrum Dei gratia. ut ad impartiendum ei sanctum
baptisma illuc proficiscamur, ac ne socordiae negligentiae-
que nostrae ratio nobis reddenda sit, ad iter nos accingimus",
Gregorii II Epistolae, Ep. XII (Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2180), pp.
520-521. And again: "Habeto partem cum illis: nos. prout an-
te scripsimus tibi. viam ingredimur Dei benignitate in ex-
tremas Occidentis regiones versus illos qui sanctam baptisma
efflagitant. Cum enim illus episcopos misissem, et sanctae
Ecclesiae nostrae clericos, nondum adducti sunt ut capita sua
inclinarent et baptizarentur eorum principes, quod exoptent.
ut eorum sim susceptor. Hac de causa nos ad viam Dei benig-
nitate accingimus. ne forte damnationis et incuriae nostrae
rationem reddamus". Ibid.. Ep. XII (Jaffé-Nattenbach. 2182).
p. 52#. Boniface had created by the time of Pope Zachary a
large, Rome-oriented and Rome-organized church in the heart-
land of Germany and he had made the pope head of a large and
thriving church in the north. It is worth noting Boniface's
oath as bishop in 723 -- it is one of direct obedience to the
p0pe but makes no reference to the emperor -- the new province
in the north was to be attached to Home but not to the empire.
It thus tended to put the papacy more effectively out of the
empire. S. Bonifatii et Lulli Epistolae. ed. E. Dummler, Ep.
XVI, MG H, _22. III (Berlin. 1892). pp. 265-266.

nu

Frankish kingdom.7 At the same time Pope Zachary. being

faced with Aistulf's intransigence. revived the policy of
approach to the Franks. It is even suggested by some that by
747 Pepin and Zachary had reached an understanding? At any
rate, about 750 Pepin sent two high officers, the Archbishop
of Hurzburg and the royal chaplain, to Zachary to ask whether
he who did not have power should still be called king.9
Zachary returned the right answer and in late 751 Pepin was

crowned by Boniface, the papal legate.10

 

7 At Charles Martel's death the realm of the Franks was
divided between Pepin and Carlomann. Carlomann's interest in
church affairs meant an improvement in Boniface's relations
with the state. Carlomann realized that the best interest of
the realm required religious reform and called Boniface in
to accomplish the Job. The Anglo-Saxon idea of the theocrat-
ic nature of kingship and the Christian vocation of monarchy
proved a useful tool for the Arnulfing house in Francis, but
it also proved a snare to bring the Franks into St. Peter's
service. The end result was the creation of a church with
strong Roman ties.

8 Iilhelm Gundlach, Die Entstehung des Kirchenstaats und
der curiale Begriff Bes publica Romanorum‘TBreslau. 1899).
pp. 71ff. Though at first Zachary had by intervening in Bav-
aria in 742 damaged his position (Annales Mettenses, a. 7&3,
rec. B. de Simson. MGH, SS. rer. Germ.. X (Hannover. 1905).
pp. 3H- 35). he was able with Boniface's help and Pepin's de-
sire to maintain relations, to salvage it. By 7&5 the process
of rapprochement with Pepin had already begun. In 7&5 Zachary
wrote to him and his brother that if they obeyed Boniface
"...nulla gens ante vestrum conspectum stabit. sed corruent
ante faciem vestram omnes paganae gentes, et eritis victores
...." (Bonifatii Ep_stolae, Ep. LXI. p. 326).

9 Annalee Regni Francorum. a. 749. rec. F. Kurze, MGH.
SS. rer. Germ.. VI (fiannover. 1895). p. 8. It is interestin:
to note as G. L. Burr suggests that the question asked of
Zachary had a significance in terms of the papal-Byzantine
position in Italy. "The Carlovingian Revolution and Frankish
Intervention in Italy", gflfl, II, xviii. 577.

10 Annales Einhardi, a. 750. rec. F. Kurze, MGH, SS. rer.
Germ.. VI (Hannover. IB95). pp. 9-10. On the dates involved
see T. Sickel. "Uber die Epoche der Begierung Pippins", FD},

 

45

Pope Zachary died in 752 and was succeeded by one of
the champions of the revolutionary party among the curia,
Stephen II. Stephen, with his ambitious concept of the pap-
acy, was unable to deal peacefully with Aistulf. He attempt-
ed initially to pursue a policy along the lines set by his
predecessor, but in the face of Aistulf's ambition to unite
Italy under the Iron CrOWn that policy did not succeed. Im-
mediately after Aistulf came to power he had been abLa to
obtain several civigates supposedly subject to the exarchate}1
At about the same time he was able to take advantage of dyn-
astic difficulties in Benevento and Spoleto to consolidate
his power there.12 Finally Ravenna fell to Aistulf in 751
and Rome appeared to be surrounded. With Aistulf in control
of the Exarchate of Ravenna and the duchies to the south,

the free enclave of Rome seemed to be the logical next ob-

jective. Free now to operate directly against Rome Aistulf

 

IV. (1864), 439-453, passim. Hodgkin, VII, 127. suggests
that in 751 Boniface had notified the pope that he was send-
ing Lul with a secret and that the secret was a sounding out
of the pope before the Frankish legates arrived: "Habet enim
secreta quaedam mea, quae soli pietati vestrae profiteri de-
bet...." (Bonifatii Epistolag. Ep. LXXXVI, p. 368).

11 Chronicon Salernitanum, cap. 2. pp. 471-472. Comachio
Ferrara and Istria were the areas in question. The chronic-
ler suggests that this was possible through the treason of
the exarch. Eutychius. but no definite information allows
that to be corroborated. "Per idem tempus Euthicius Romanorum
patricius se Aystulfo tradidit, simulque Comiaculum atque
Ferrariam seu et Istriam pugnando optinuit...."

12 Ottorino Bertolini. "Il primo 'periurium' di Astolfo",
ST, CXXV, (l9h6), 160-161.

46

began a 'great persecution' in and around Rome.13 Cleaving

still to Zachary's policy of diplomacy and accomudation Pope
Stephen sent his brother, Paul the Deacon, and Ambrose the

Primicerius to deal with Aistulf; a truce of forty years was
made, but from the papal point of view it was broken by the
Lombard within four months.14 Clearly the pOpe intended that
the truce meant a peace between an independent and sovereign
Rome and Aistulf. But Aistulf viewed the measure as implying
that Rome fell under a protectorate exercised by himself; he
claimed Jurisdiction over Rome and gave notice of his intent

to levy a census of one gold solidus per annum on the inhab-

itants.15 A Lombard hegemony being incompatible with Stephen's

 

13 Kits Stephanii II, in Liber Pontigioaiis, I, uni:
"Inter haec vero dum magna persecutio a Langobardorum rege
Aistulfo in hac Romans urbe vel subiacentibus ei civitatibus
extitisset et vehemens eiusdem regis sevitia inmineret...."

1h Ibid. "...ilico isdem beatissimus papa, tertio apos-
tolatus ordinationis suae mense, disponens suum germanum,
sanctissimum scilicet Paulum diaconum, atque Ambrosium prim-
icerium, plurimus cum muneribus ad eundem Langobardorum
Aistulfum regem ob pacis ordinandum atque confirmandum fo-
edera misit. Qui praelati viri ad eum coniungentes, inper-
titis muneribus, quasi facilius eadem pro re apud cum in-
petrantes, in quadraginta annorum spatia pacti foedus cum eo
confirmaverunt. At vero isdem protervus Langobardorum rex,
antiqui hostis invasus versutia, ipsa foedera pacis post
poene IIII menses; in perlurii incidens reatu, disrupit...."

 

15 Ibid. "...1psa foedera pacis post poene IIII menses;
in perlurii incidens reatu, disrupit; multas iamfato sanc-
tissimo viro vel cuncto pOpulo Romano ingerens contumelias,
varias illi minas dirigens. Cupiens quippe, Deo sibi con-
trario, cunctam hanc provinciam invadere, honerosum tributum
huius Romane urbis inhabitantibus adhibere nitebatur; per

unumquemque scilicet caput singulos auri solidos annue au-
' ferre iniabat et sui iurisdictione civitatem hanc Romanam
vel subiacentes ei castra subdere indignanter asserebat."
Cf. Pauli Historia Langobardorum Continuatio Tertia, cap. 23,
ed. 0. Holder-Egger, MGH, SS. rer. Lang. (hannover, 1878),
p. 208. It has been asserted that the tribute thus claimed

 

 

.U{ 7

concept of his office within the Roman state and the theory
of the ecclesiastical republic, it was not desireable for
Stephen to concur. In response he sent the abbots of the
monasteries of SS. Vincent and Benedict to treat with Aistulf,
but Aistulf turned them away without seeing them.16

Oblivious to reality, Emperor Constantine V regarded
Pope Stephen as his subject and,soon after Aistulf's refus-
al to negotiate, the Silentiarius John arrived in Home with
imperial instructions to Stephen to assist in dealing with

Aistulf and with an absurd order commanding Aistulf to re-

store the land he had taken.17 This move by the emperor pre-

 

by Aistulf was that normally paid by Home to Byzantium; if
true, the implication is clear. See A. Gasquet, L'empire
byzantin et la monarchie franqge (Paris, 1888), p. 235.
Hartmann, Geschichte ItaliensL_II, ii, 176-177, suggests
that Aistulf was not claiming a direct power over Rome, but
a hegemony exercised as a foederate of the Greeks. It is
probably the case that though Aistulf was not hostile to
Home or the pope, he was intent that his hegemony in Italy
as conqueror of the empire should be recOgnized. Pe would
insist on such recognition from Home Just as he would from
his duchies.

16 Vita Stephanii II. pp. 441-u42; "Cernens vero isdem
sanctissimus papa valide praefati regis perniciosa inminere
sevitia, magnOpere ad se accersitis venerabilium monaster-
iorum sanctorum Vincentii et Benedicti religiosis abbatibus,
sua vice eidem crudelissimo misit regi, obnixe per eos pos-
tulans pacis foedera et quietum utrarumque partium pOpuli
Dei obtinere confirmandam.Quos nempe suscipiens, omnino con-
temptui habens, eorum sprevit monita et ad suae animae det-
rimentum sine effectu causae confusos ad propria absolsit
monasteria, obtestans eos minime ad praefatum sanctissimum
papa declinari."

 

17 Ibid.. p. ##2: “...coniunxit Roma Iohannis, imperi-
alis silentiarius, deferens eidem sanctissimo pontifici ius-
sionem, simulque et aliam ad nomen praedicti regis impii de-
tulit adortationis adnexa verba iussionem, reipublicae loca
diabolico ab eo usurpata ingenio prOprio restitueret domin-
ico."

48

sented Stephen with an opportunity to demonstrate for the

last time the inability of the Greeks to do anything in Italy.
Thus he co-operated for a time to give a justification for a
final turning away from the Greeks. when he finally approached
Pepin it was assuredly not on the emperor's behalf. Pence,
Stephen packed John off to Bavenna accompanied by his bro—
ther Paul to interview Aistulf, but Aistulf put them off by
promising to send a legation to ConstantinOple.18 having ac-
complished nothing John left to return to Constantinople.

He was accompanied by a papal legation sent to request im-
perial aid of a more substantial sort to end the harassment

19

by the Lombards and liberate Italy. EXpecting no aid and

not being disappointed in his eXpectation Stephen sent off
an appeal to Pepin by way of a frankish pilgrim.20 Pepin

sent Abbot Droctegang of Jumiége to Stephen, inviting him

 

18 Ibid. "Quem videlicet imperialem missum confestim
sepefatus sanctissimus papa, cum suo germano praedicto sanc-
tissimo Paulo diacono, ad eundem misit nequissimum Aistulfum
Ravennam. Quibus susceptis, cum inani absolsit reSponso, ad-
herens eidem imperiali misso quendam prOprie gentis nefarium
virum, diabolicis inbutum consiliis, ad regiam properandum
urbem."

19 Ibid. "...misit regiam urbem suos missos et apostol-
icos affatos cum imperiale praefato misso, deprecans imper-
ialem clementiam ut iuxta quod ei sepius exercitandis has
Italiae in partes scripserat, modis omnibus adveniret et de
iniquitatis filii morsibus Romanam hanc urbem vel cunctam
Italiam provinciam liberaret."

20 Ibid.. p. nan: "...cernens prasertim et ab imperiale
potentia nullum esse subveniendi auxilium; tunc quemadmodum
praedecessores eius...Carolo...direxerunt, petentes sibi
subveniri prOpter oppressiones ac invasiones...clam per
quendam peregrinum suas misit litteras Pippino...."

49

to come to Francia, but Stephen sent him back with letters
. n 21 a , y
for Pepin and for the :rankish nobles. tollowinq that ex-

chanfe of letters Pepin sent more mjgsi repeatinw his invi-

tation to visit Francia.22 Yeanwhile Aistulf had occupied

Cecano and the bilertiarius John returned with the imperial
response to Stephen's appeal; Stephen was instructed to ac-
company John to Pavia to support John's demands for the re-
turn of the exarchate.23 While such an absurd measure dem-
onstrated toth Constantine's complete lack of understandin:
of Italian conditions and a flippant disregard for Hope,
POpe Stephen acceded to the request to demonstrate for tte
last time the futility of the papacy's adhesion to the en-
pire. He sent missi to request a safe conduct to Pavia. They
returned to Rome at about the same tine as the two hiihly
distinguished Frankish missi, Chrodegang and Autcharius, ar-

rived to take Stephen to Francia.2u fie Frankish missi help-

21 Codex Carolinus, Ep. IV (Presens Drocteganens --
Jaffé-Mattenbach, 23127. at V (Laeta gaudet -- Jaffé-Jatten-
bach, 2313), pp. 497-488.

22 Vita Stephanii II, p. 44h.

23 Ibid., pp. huh-”45: "Cumque a Langobardis...Ciccan~
ense castellum...usurparet, ilico a regia urbe coniunxit se-
pefatus Iohannis...cum missis ipsius sanctissimi pontificis,
deferens secum et quem deportaverant iniqui Largobardorum
regis missum, simul et iussionem imperialem in qui inerat
insertum ad Langobardorum regem eundem...papam esse proper-
aturum. ob recipiendum Eavennantium urbem et civitates...?

24 Ibid.. p. 445: "...direxit ad eundem blasphemum regem
suum missum pro sua et qui cum eo ituri erant indemnitate;
ipsoque reverso, extemplo et missi iamfati Pippini...coniunx-
erunt, id est Rodigangus epiSCOpus et Autcharius dux, quaten-
us praedictum...papam. iuxta quod petendo miserat, ad suum
Francie regem deducerunt...."

50

ed Stephen to retake Cecano and then accompanied him to
Pavia?5 Stephen left 7ome on the fourteenth of October, 753,
amid the lamentations of his people. Autcharius had cone a-
head to announce the pOpe in Pavia.26 Aistulf sent missi to
meet the papal party outside Pavia and to tell the pOpa that
he would not hear of any tall about the restitution of
lands.27 Determined not to be intimidated, Stephen confron-

ted Aistulf and demanded the return of various civitatesL

 

his demands being seconded by the imperial BléEl- but to no
success.2’ The negotiations obviously being in vain the
Franks intervened and asked Aistulf if he would permit the_
pOpe to go to Francia without Opposition. to Which Aistulf
responded by asking the pope if this were his Wish, obvious-
ly trying to intimidate him and bring division between

Stephen and the Franks. But Stephen stood firm and said he

 

25 Qhronicon Salernitanum, cap, 3, p, 472,

26 Vita Stephanii II, pp. Hflj-Uho: "...egressus est ab
hac Romana urbe ad beatum Petrum apostolum, XIIII die octo-
brii mensis....Itaque unus ex eisdem Francorum missis, scil-
icet Autcharius dux. quantotius praecedens, Ticino eum pre-
stolatus est."

 

27 Ibid.. p. nae: "...direxit ad eum sepefatus Aistolfus
...missos suos, obtestans eum nulla penitus ratione audere
verbum illi dicere petendi Ravennantium civitatem et exarch-
atum ei pertinentum. vel de reliquis republicae 1001s...."

28 Ibid. "Coniungente vero eo Papiam in civitatem et

praedicto nefando regi praesentato...eum petiit ut domini-

cas quas abstulerat redderet oves et propria propriis res-

titueret. Sed nullo modo apud eum inpetrare valuit. ram et

imperialis missus et ille simili modo petiit...et nihil ob-
tinere potuit."

 

29

was determined to go. Aistulf flew into a great rage “grind—
inn his teeth like a lion", but could do nothing overt to
prevent the trip without provoking Pepin's immediate anger.
and on the fifteenth of November, 753, Stephen left Pavia
heading north.30

Leavinq Pavia in haste lest Aistulf repent of his decis-
ion and send riders after them, the papal party pressed on
and crossed the Alps, finally arriving at St. Moritz where
they met Fulrad and Duke Rothard who were to escort them the

31

rest of the way. When Pepin received the news that Stephen's

party had crossed the mountain barrier he sent a party with

32

his son Charles to conduct Stephen to him at Pontion.

 

29 Ibid.. p. 4&6: "Praedicti vero Francorum missi inmin-
ebant fortiter apud eundem Aistulfum ut praefatum...papam
Franciam pergere relaxaret. Ad haec convocans iamdictum bea-
tissimum virum interrogavit si eius Franciam prOperandi esset
voluntas. Quod videlicet ille nequaquam siluit. sed suam illi
prOpalavit voluntatem....Alio vero die praesente Rodigango...
interrogavit...si velle haberet Franciam ambulandi. Et ita
affatus est: 'Quod si tua est voluntas me relaxandi. mea om-
nino est ambulandi'".

30 Ibid.. pp. 446-ufi7: "...unde et leo dentibus fremebat
....XV die novembris mensis...a civitate Papia movens suum
Franciam profectus est iter."

 

31 Ibid.. p. 447.

32 Annales kettenses, a. 753. p. an. "Quad cum nuntia-
tum Pippino fuisset, magno repletus est gaudio, filiumque
suum primogenitum Carolum obviam ei ire precepit, ipsumque
cum honore ad presentiam eius in villa quae dicitur Pons-
Hugonis adducere iussit."

52

flhen they were three miles from Ponthion on the sixth
of January, 754, Pepin advanced himself to meet the pope. The
papal biOgrapher states that Pepin dismounted, prostrated

himself and performed the Efficium stratoris as they entered

33

 

Ponthion amid hymns of praise.
On the next day the negotiations were opened with the

pepe requesting a treaty of alliance by which Pepin would
promise to champion the cause of St. Peter and the republic.3u

Pepin swore his oath to restore the exarchate and the rights

of Peter to the republic as soon as he held his placitum.35

 

33 Vita Stephanii II, p. #47: "...ad fere trium milium
Spatium, descendens de equo suo. cum magna humilitate terrae
prostratus, una cum sua coniuge. filiis et optimatibus, eun-
dem sanctissimum papam suscepit; cui et vice stratoris usque
in aliquantum locum iuxta eius sellarem properavit. Tune
praedictus almificus vir cum omnibus suis extensa voce glor-
iam et incessabiles laudes omnipotenti Deo referens, cum hym-
nis et canticis spiritalibus usque ad praefatum palatium par-
iter cum iamdicto rege omnes profecti sunt...."

3” Ibid.. pp. 447-hh8: "...beatissimus papa praefatum
christianissimum regem lacrimabiliter deprecatus est ut per
pacis foedera causam beati Petri et reipublice Homanorum dis-
poneret." Several of the Frankish sources note that the pope
prostrated himself before Pepin when he requested aid as a
suppliant, cf. ghrpnicon Moissiacense. Egg, §§J I. ed. G.H.
Pertz (Hannover. 1826). p. 293: "Sequenti die una cum clero
suo aspersus cinere et indutus cilicio in terram prostratus,
per misericordiam Dei omnipotentis et merita beatorum apos-
tolorum Petri et Pauli Pippinum regem obsecrans. ut se et po-
pulum Romanum de manu Longobardorum...servitis liberaret."
See also Annales Mettenses. a. 753. p. 45: "Neo antea a terra
surgere voluit, quam sibi predictus rex Pippinus cum filiis
suis et Optimatibus Francorum manum porrigerent et ipsum pro
indioio suffragii futuri et liberationis de terra levaret...."

35 Vita Stephanii II. p. #48: "Qui de presenti iureiur-
ando eundem beatissimum papam satisfecit omnibus eius manda-
tis et ammonitionibus sese totis nisibus oboedire. et ut 1111
placitum fuerit exarchatum Bavennae et reipublice iura seu
loca reddere modis omnibus." For an attempt to reconstruct the
specific terms of this oath see Percy Ernst Schramm, "Das Ver-
sprechen Pippins und Karls des Grossen fur die rbmischen
Kirche", ZSSRk, LVIII, (1938), 180-217.

53

his anxiety quelled for the nonce and looking forward to the
satisfaction of his needs, the pope then spent the remainder

of the winter in the cloister of St. Denis near Paris and in

36

the Spring he recrowned Pepin as king.

37

and made him patric-
ius Romanorum.
At this point the narrative becomes confused; neither

the Liber Pontificalis nor the Frankish chronicles are clear

 

concerning the sequence of events and speak of placita at
both Quierzy and Berny-Riviere. Considering the events in-
volved, difficulties of travel. and so forth. it is probable
that the chronology given by Levillain is close to reality:
in the spring of 754 a placitum was held. following which
negotiations with Aistulf commenced and in the spring of 755
the placitum was held, the host summoned and the war commen-

ced.38 whether the placitum met at Quierzy in 75M and Berny-

 

36 Vita Stephanii II. p. 4&8.

37 Clausula de Pippini in Francorum Regen Consecratione,
RHGF, V, 9-10: "Nam ipse praedictus domnus florentissimus
Pippinus, rex pius. per auctoritatem et imperium sanctae re-
cordationis domni Zacharias Papae, et unctionem sancti chris-
matis, per manus beatorum Sacerdotum Galliarum. at election-
em omnium Franchorum, tribus annis antea in regni solio sub-
limatus est. Postea per manus eJusdem Stephani Pontificis die
uno in beatorum praedictorum Martyrum Dionysii, Bustici et
Eleutherii Ecclesia...in Regem et Patricium, una cum praedic-
tis filiis Carola et Carolomanno in nomine sanctae Trinitatis
unctus et benedictus est." Though there was once some quest-
ion as to the authenticity of this document. by most modern
accounts it is to be accepted and it in no way is out of the
context of the events involved: Leon Levillain, "De l'authen-
ticité de la Clausula de Unctione Pippini". Egg, LXXXVIII,
.(1927). passim, and Ernst Schulz, "Die Clausula de Pippino
keine Phlschung". HVjs, XXIII, (1925-27). uhéff.

38 Leon Levillain. "L'avenement de la dynastie carolin-
gienne et les origines de l'état Pontifical", EEC. XCIV.
(1933). 29h. “‘

54

Riviere in 755 or vice—versa in unknown.

The placitum of 754 was probably the scene of a good
deal of discussion; there seems to have been some opposition
among the Frankish aristocracy to opening hostilities with
the Lombards.39 Before his trip to Prancia Pope Stephen,
apparently knowing of this attitude. had written an exhora-
tory letter to "Omnibus Ducibus Gentis Francorum? urging his
casef‘LO Nhether the opposition Spoken of by Einhard repre-
sented an organized faction or not is difficult to tell. but
it received reinforcement from another quarter; Pepin's
monk-brother Carlomann. Aistulf seems to have taken advante
age of Carlomann's hostility to Pepin to get him to go to
Francis to try to block the alliance and the war.41 Pepin
had usurped the patrimony of Carlomann's sons and Carlomann
may have been involved in intrigue against him, or at least

in touch with elements hostile to Pepin, even while a monk

in Italy. According to Einhard Carlomann received many visits

 

39 Einhardi Vita Karoli Imperatoris, cap. 6. Egg, SQ,
II, ed. G. H. PertngHannover. 1829). p. 4&6: "...cum magna
difficultate susceptum est. quia quidem e primoribus Fran-
corum cum quibus consultare solebat. adeo voluntati eius ve-
nisi sunt, ut. se regem deserturos domumque redituros, lib-
era voce proclamarent...."

#0 Codex Carolinus. Ep. V (Laeta gaudet -- Jaffé-watten-
bach. 23137. p. U88: "...idcirco obsecramus atque coniuramus
vestram sapientissimam caritatem per Deum et per dominum no-
strum Iesum Christum et diem futuri examinis. in quo omnes
pro nostris facinoribus erimus reddituri rationem ante tri-
bunal aeterni iudicis, ut nulla interponatur occasio, ut non
sitis adiutores ab obtinendum filium nostrum a Deo servatum,
Pippinum, excellentissimum regem. pro perficienda utilitate
fautoris vestri. beati apostolorum principis Petri...."

“1 Vita Stephanii II, p. nus.

55

from Frankish pilgrims While at Mt. Soracte, which raises

the question of whether he might not have been in contact
’)

with the opposition to Pepin.ub Apparently Pepin was able to
make his views prevail at the placitum of 75H and the promis-
es made to Stephen were given official sanction. Thereupon
activity to redeem them was now begun.

Beginning with the conclusion of the placitum of 754 and
continuing throughout the rest of the year Pepin tried to
threaten and cajole Aistulf into voluntary compliance with
Pope Stephen's wishes.u3 In fact the Frankish‘miggi made the
trip to Pavia three times in all. and all in \rain.m‘L Finally.
in the spring of 755 the Heerban was sent out and the invas-
ion was commenced.u5 After a short campaign and feeble re-

sistance Aistulf. beskzged in Pavia, surrendered and accept-

”2 Einhardi Vita Karoli. cap. 2. p. 44h. Carl Rodenberg.
Pippin1 Karlmann und Papst Stephen II (Berlin. 1923). pp. 13-
18}

#3 Pepin asked Aistulf to "...partibus Romae hostiliter
non ambularet, et superstitiosas has impias vel contra legis
ordine causas, quod antea Romani numquam fecerant, propter
eius petitionem. facere non debeant" (Fredegariifgcholastici
ContinuationesI cap. 36. p. 183), and "...propter pacis fo-
edera et proprietatis sancte Dei ecclesiae reipublice resti-
tuenda iura...." (Vita Stephanii II. p. ##9). Stephen seems
to have wished to settle the affair peacefully if possible
(wilhelm Martens, Die rbmische Frage unter Pippin und Karl
dem Grossen (Stuttgart. 1881). p. 20), and Pepin seems to"
have been prepared to accede to this and even to buy back
What he wanted: "Et hoc tibi Aistulf mandat Pippinus. quod
si iustitiam sancto Petro reddere vis, dabit tibi XII milia
solidorum" (Annales Mettenses, a. 75h, p. #7).

an

 

Vita Stephagji II, p. U49.

”5 Fredegarii Scholastici_§ontinuationes, cap. 37. p. 193

56

ed terms:2+6 Eavenna, the Pentapolis, Narni and Cecano and all
that fell into their territories, were restored to the pope.
Aistulf paid 30,000 solidi, gave up forty hostages to Pepin,u7
and swore never to leave Frankish leadership (dictione) and

#8

never to harm the pOpe or the republic. ' After restoring

the res sancti Petri Pepin returned to I-‘ranciaf‘9 and left

 

Fulrad in command of a detachment to restore Stephen peace-
fully to Home.50
Soon after Pepin had left Aistulf broke the treaty and

refused to restore the territories in question to Fulrad or

 

“6 Pepin had the advantage and could have finished the

job. but Stephen apparently wished to avoid the destruction
of the Lombard Kingdom and urged him to be merciful. hartmann,
Geschichte Italians. II, ii, 189.

“7 Annales Mettenses, a. 75H, pp. ué-us: "His minis Hei-
stulfus perterritus per manus Pentapolim. Narnias et Cecanum
et reliqua debita, quae sancto Petro debuerat. missis domni
Pippini regis per vadium reddidit et XXX milia solidorum
Pippino regi tribuit. spondens se singulis annis in tributum
V milia solidorum partibus Francorum se fore redditurum. Kaec
omnia iureiurando Heistulfus cum suis optimatibus et omnibus
nobilibus Langobardorum se adimpleturam esse Spopondit et
pro firmitatis causa dedit regi Pippino de nobilibus Lango-
bardorum XL obsides."

“8 Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes. cap. 37,

p. 184: "Hec cernens Aistulfus rex Langobardorum, quod nulla-
tenus se evadere potuisset, pacem per sacerdotes et obtimates
Francorum petens. dictiones superdicto rege Pippino faciens,
et quicquid contra Romanam ecclesiam vel sedem apostolicam
contra legis ordine fecerat, plenissima solutione emendaret
...ut numquam a Francorum ditiones se abstraheret et ulterius
ad sedem apostolicam Bomanam et rem publicam hostiliter num—
quam accederet."

 

#9 Annales Alamannici. a. 753, iGh, gs, I, ed. G.H.

Pertz (Hannover, 1825), p. 28: "...receptus res sancti Petri
reversus est...."

5O Annales Sinhardi. a. 755. p. 13.

57

51

the pOpe. Fulrad was sent back to Francis to witness that

Aistulf was failin: to perform his obligations and, worse,

that he was raiding M? inst Romzin territory. 32 Finally. in

a

the first days of 756 Aistulf besiaged and occupied Rarni
53

sending otephen into a paroxysm of fear. home was so close-

ly invested that Stephen had to send his missi to Pepin by
sea in order to prevent their capture by Aistulf.5u
In early 756 two missi arrived from Constantinople to

see Pepin. Stephen explain ned that Pepin was on the march but

they did not believe him, so he sent them on to harseilles

 

51 Codex Carolings, Ep. VI (Bum regni vestri -- Jaffé-
Nattenbach, 2322f} p.4489: "...ecce iam mendatium et iniqua
perversitas atque eius periurium declaratum est....nec unius
enim palmi terrae spatium beato Petro sanctaeque Dei eccles-
iae. rei publice Romanorum, reddere passus est."

52 Ibid.. 3p. VII (Providi et sapientissimi -— Jaffe-
Uattenbach, “2323). pp. 491-492: "Tamen omnia vester consil-
arius Fulradus...si Deum pre oculis habent, omnia vobis en-
arrare possunt: non emin quia iam reddere, ut constituit,
prepria beati Petri voluit, sed etiam scamaras atque depre-
dationes seu devastationes in civitatibus et locis beati
Petri facere sua imperatione nec cessavit nee cessat....Jid-
ens namque suam deceptionen.iniquus Faistolfus rex, cum suis
Deo destructis iudicibus per blandos servones et suasiones
atque sacramenta inluserunt prudentiam vestram; et plus illis
falsa dicentibus quam nobis veritatem asserentibus credidistis."

53 Ibid.. 3p. VIII (Quanta luctuosa -— Jaffé-Xattenback,
2326), p . 494-498. Io Pepin Stephen cries: "Audi me fili.
audi me et subveni nobis. Ecce a.dest tempus salvandi nos:
salva nos antequam nereamus, chris tis2nissime rer. Ibid..
Ep. IX (Quanta luctuosa II -— Jaffé-:atterhict 2325), pp.
498- ~500 was in the same tone as the above. At the same time
he sent Ep. X (Ego Petrus -— Jahffe-Iattenbach 2327), pp.
501-503, written as though by Peter himself. encouraging, de-
manding and threatening.

54 Vita Stephaniipli. b. 452.

L

‘1 1
"D

\Jl

r:
J

H-

(I;

ive.

‘D

”000%1n13d by his representa Pepin had already
crossei the alps to punish iistulf when they arrived in far-
seilles, and they decided to go on to meet him at Pavia. But
first they tried to insure that the papal missus would not
follow so that they might have a chance to freely give their
master's argtm lents a5ainst the pope.56
Keanwhile Pepin had once more easily reduced Aistulf to
submission. he took one-third of the Lombard treasure-trove,
forced Aistulf to swear obedience to the previous treaty and
revived the annual tribute paid to the Franks by the Lombards
in old KingL untram' s time. 57 Little doubt we s left that
Aistulf's positbn.was that of a vassa 1; he placed himself
under Pepin.'s ditig and may have me de a formal act of hom-

58

age.

 

55 Ibid. "...coniunxerunt in hac Romana urbe imperiales
missi.Geor31us scilicet prota a secreta et Iohanr Hi silen-
tiarius. directi ad praedictum Francorum regem. Quos sus-
cipiens ianfatus beatissimus papa eisdem motionem praelati
Francorur regis nunciavit. Quod quidem illi dubium abuerunt
cred endi. 2t adherens eis missum apostolice sedis, eos Fran-
ciam abs olsit."

56 Ibid. "...haec cognoscentes ipsi imperiales missi,
tristes effecti. nitebantur dolore missum apostolice sedis
detinere....Itaque unus ex ipsis, Georgius...praecedens ap-
ostolice sedis missum, celeriter praenominatum P ancorum ad-
secutus est christianissimum regem."

57 Eredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 38,
p. 185: "Sacramenta iterum vel obsides donat, ut amplius
numquam contra rege Pippino vel proceris Francorum rebellis
et contumax esse non debeat: et tribute, quod Langobardi ad
rege Francorum a lon3o tempore dederunt, annis singulis per
missos suos desolvere deberent."

58 This gave Pepin a legal hold over Aistulf to use in
exercisina his protectorate over Rome. Holtzmann. p. 39.

At about the same time the Greeks arrived from Harseilles
and demanded of Pepin that he restore Eavenra and the other

civitates or perhaps pay a tribute for them-.59 Pepin replied

 

that he would in no may cause the lands of St. Peter and un—
der the rule of the pope to be a11enated'Umrefrom.6O He had
acted on Rome's behalf for love of St. Peter and not for the
approbation of any man.61 In no uncertain languafe Pepin thus
dismissed the claims and demands of the emperor in Italy.
rhere should be no doubt concerning the position of the Greeks
Some have sugxested that as late as Stephen's trip to Fran-
cia the papacy was still an institution of the empire and-
the pope a servant of the emperor -- the implication is that
Constantine V was deceived by Stephen's subsequent acts. Such
a suggestion is in obvious disregard of the previous period
and cannot be admitted. Similarly the idea that the voyaqe

to Francia was the first independent act of the pope is ab-

surd. while it may be true that there was some doubt as to

 

59 Vita Stephanii II, p. 453: "...et nimis eum deprecans
atque plura spondens tribui imperialia munera ut Ravennantium
urbem vel cetera eiusdem exarcatus civitates et castra imper-
iali tribuens concederet ditioni."

60

Ibid. "...asserens isdem Dei cultor mitissimus rex
nulla penitus ratione eusdem civitates a potestate beati
Petri et iure ecclesie Romanae vel pontifici apostolce sedis
quoquo modo alienare...."

61 Ibid. "...adfirmans sub iuramento quod per nullius
hominis favorem sese certamini sepius dedisset, nisi pro a-
more beati Petri et venia delictorum...." Chronicon Saler-
nitanumI cap. 6. pp. 47H-475: "Quomodo alienare talia potero.
ut non pro alia re quam pro sancto Petro certamen gessui."

 

60

the rights of the Greeks, it is because Constantine V deceived
himself. If it took Constantine V till 756 to discover that
Pepin was not his ally in Italy, then that must be put down
to his ignorance of what had been going on in Italy for the
past thirty years. As said before, by the time of Zachary
the Greeks no longer counted in Italy. Jhen they tried to
make their power felt there after 756 they were definitely
counted as enemies. In 757 Stephen II asked Pepin to contin-
ue to keep track of events in Italy and particularly to guard
against the Greeks so that their malice might not be able to
harm the church.62

Once more Pepin left Fulrad behind to see that the cities
of the republic were surrendered to Roman control. Fulrad
went the circuit of every city in the exarchate and the Penta-
polis with the representatives of Aistulf to receive the keys
of the gates and hostages. The keys were then taken to Rome
to the pOpe.63 when Fulrad had satisfied himself that the
conditions of the treaty were fulfilled he returned to Francia

in early 757.5“

 

62 Codex Carolinus. Ep. XI (Explere lingua -- Jaffé-
Uattenbach, 23357} p. 506: "...sancta Dei ecclesia...ab eorum
pestifera malitia liberetur et secura reddatur atque omnia
proprietatis suae percipiat...."

63 Vita Stephanii ll; p. 454. The cities involved were
Ravenna. Arimini. Pensauro, Conca. Fano. Cesina. Sinegaglia,
Esis. Forlimpopoli. Forolivii, Sussubio. Monte Feltri, Acer-
ragic. Monte Lucati, Serra, S. Marino, Vobio. Orbino, Callie,
Luciolis, Egubiq,Comacchio and Narni.

64 Codex Carolinus, Ep. XI (Explere lingua -- Jaffé-
Hattenbach, 2335), p. 504.

 

CHAPTER V

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRANCO-PAPAL ALLIANCE
AND THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE INVOLVED PARTIES

The course of events discussed in the preceding chapter
presentsseveral problems of interpretation. In general pre-
vious interpreters have erred for several basic reasons.
First. they have failed to correctly assess the position of
Stephen II and have therefore suggested interrdetations incon-
sistent and incompatible with that position. Secondb. many
interpreters have taken legalistic positions regarding the
period by assuming that all events took place in a legal-
constitutional context. Third. they have insisted on under-
rating the ideals involved in favor of totally Machiavellian
explainations.

One of the chief problems in accounting for the papal-
Frankish alliance as it was established in 754 lies in dis-
covering the factors which motivated the newly enthroned
king to overrule domestic objections in order to aid Stephen
in a project in which the expected remuneration would be
small. The small gains in Spasmodic tribute paid by the wily

Aistulf could never have offset the responsibilities con-
tracted by Pepin in 754 and neither can it be supposed that

mere gratitude for Zachary's efforts on his behalf in the
61

62
matter of the change of dynasties would dictate so momentous
an undertaking. Johannes Faller, though perhaps his explan-
ation is too restricted, suggests the best approach; Haller
unequivocally asserts that the papal monarchy in central
Italy was founded on the religious subjugation of the Franks
to Rome and St. Peter.1 "St. Peter and always again St. Peter
....only at St. Peter's will had Pepin taken up the sword."2
The king was "...advised and influenced by the greatest
spirits of the new reform...."3 According to Haller the ul-
timate influence determining Pepin's policy in Italy was the
lifetime work of Boniface in the forests of Germany and,
even more significantly, in the court of the Franks.

Though some, with Charles Martel in mind. may argue
that such piety was not characteristic of the Arnulfings, it
need not follow in the case of Pepin. Both Pepin and his
brother Carlomann were pious men: they spent the formative
years of their youth in the monastery at St. Denis. They
were taught by monks in a monkish environment and did not

have the purely political outlook of their father.4 It is

 

1 Johannes Haller. "Die Karolinger und das Papsttum".
HZ, CVIII, (1912). 39. See also Theodor Zwblfer, Sankt Peter.
Apostelfurst und HimmelspfortnerLgseine Verehrung bei den
Angelsachsen und Franken‘ZStuttgart,1929).

2

 

Haller. fig, CVIII, (1912). 57.
3 Ibid.. p. 62.

4 Albert Hauck. Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands, 5 Bde..
8. Aufl. (Berlin, 1953). II. 3-4.

63

obvious from a survey of the material in the early sections
of the Codex Carolinus that Stephen's correSpondence with
Pepin invariably gave heavy stress to the theme of St. Peter,
his power, position and office.5 The probability is very
great that Pepin was Speaking truly when he told the Greek
legation in 756 that he only acted to serve St. Peter.6

However, it would be wise to examine the possibility of

temporal concerns in seeking Pepin's motivation. It must be
recognized that Pepin's domestic enemies, as noted above,
had had some contact with Aistulf, and Pepin obviously acted
in 755-756 to restore Frankish overlordship in Lombardy.7_
It ought to be remarked that the rapprochement of Aistulf
with Pepin's enemies may well have been Aistulf's reSponse
to a growing closeness of Pepin and Rome and that Frankish
overlordship in Lombardy was proven necessary by Aistulf's
perjury.

The major critique of Haller's thesis is that given by
Martin Lintzel. Lintzel reasonably notes that Haller asserted
that there was no political motivation.8 but then he dismiss-
es the religious tone as mere rhetoric and asserts that rel-

igious devotion was circumscribed by political interest and

 

5 Haller, Hz, CVIII, (1912), 55.

6 Idem, Das Papsttum, I, 433.
7 Holtzmann, pp. 37-38.

8 Martin Lintzel, "Der Codex garolinus und die Motive
von Pippins Italienpolitik". fig, CLXI,I119EO), 35.

64

that Pepin was too wise to allow religious sentiments to in-
fluence politics.9

At this point it may be of interest to take into account
the religious psychology of the Franks. Nearly one hundred
years later, in the reign of Louis the Pious, a poem entitled
Heliand (Foly Land) was penned in the cloisters of St. Gall.
The poem is a veritable text-book of popular religious thouaht
in the period. In it the material of the Gospels appears in

Germanic guise. Christ is a Gefolgsherg -- a leader of a

 

warrior-band; the twelve apostles are his comitatus --

 

Gefolgsmanner. The Twelve followed Christ in the Germanic
tradition of Gefolgstreue and Peter's last-minute apostasy
was an example of Herisliz which his later life redeemed. In
turn the Franks thought of Peter, princeps apostolorum, as a
great Chieftain. Pepin considered himself to be a follower
of Peter -- he was Peter's Gefolgsmann or Qgggn, In more
familiar parlance Pepin was Peter's vassal. In the more so-
phisticated thought of ecclesiastical circles the relation-
ship had another aspect -- qualitativly the same. In 751
Pepin had become king merely as the successor of the last
Merovingian. But in 754 as a vassus of St. Peter he entered

into a new kingship. The papal guarantee of Pepin's line and

 

9 Ibid.. pp. 36-39. One must view Lintzel's arguments
with some scepticism due to the time of his writing; he wrote
under Nazi power and his article obviously seeks to give the
impression that Pepin was both a Teutonic warrior-hero and a
Realpolitiker. In addition,of course, one must note that a
religious influence played a part in the political life of
the Arnulfings. From the patronage of missionary efforts to
the obvious ecclesiological policies of Charlemagne, the in-
fluence of Rome is clear.

65

Pepin's guarantee of Rome's dominion and safety made him a
new David to the pope's Samuel.lo Thus though elements of

the old Eglkskfinigtnm were still characteristic of Frankish
kingship, it had now become a Christian kingship.ll The unc-
tion of Pepin by St. Boniface and later by Stephen II brought
the character of Old Testament kingship to Pepin's rulership
and symbolized the union of regnum and sacerdotium.12 Pepin's
kingship became an office in Christian society which, unlike
his war-leadership of the Franks, existed independently of
his personal qualities.13

In its essence, then, one is constrained to argue that
the Haller thesis must stand substantiated.

An alliance of pOpe and Arnulfing was created in Francia
in 754. It is not at all so certain what the nature or terms
of that alliance were. Much of the uncertainty is created by
unfounded interpretations of the meanings to be attached to
the acts of both Stephen II and Pepin.

Pepin made Stephen II a promise at Ponthion shortly

after the pOpe's arrival: he promised to protect Stephen and

Rome against Aistulf. This is indeed meagre and vague infor-

 

10 Walter Mohr, Studien zur Charakteristik des karoling-
ischen Kbnigtums im 8. Jahrhungert (Saarlouis, 1953), p. EC.

11 Theodor Schieffer, Uinfrid-Bonifatiu§_und die christ-
liche Grundlegung Europag (Freiburg, 195h), pp. 260-261.

12 Ibid.. pp. 259-260.

13 Theodor Hayer, "Staatsauffassung in der Karolinaer-
zeit", 13. III, (1956), 171.

/ /
(”M”)

mation. Did it mean protection of the republic? There is no
way of telling. it any rate the Ponthwn promise is not im-
portant enough to merit the attention others have given it.
The main issue is obviously the formal obligations undertaken
by Pepin at his coronation and at the placitum of 754; the
promise of Ponthion was a mere preliminary -- a first assur-
ance to Stephen. Jhatever Pepin did promise at Ponthion does
not figure greatly in the papal View of his obligations;
Stephen's subsequent pleas for aid were based on the more
formal oaths which followedwas is indicated in the inclusion
of Pepin's sons in the pope's appeals.1u The promise of
Ponthion did not obligate them, but the joint-unction at
St. Denis did.15

It is highly probable that the joint-unction of Pepin
and his sons at St. Denis was preceded by a formal oath on

Pepin's part Which was binding on his sons,16 The probability

14 Cf. in the Codex Carolinus, Epp.VI (Dum regni vestri——
Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2322) and VII (Providi et sapientissimi --
Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2323), pp. 448, 491; "Dominis excellentis-
simus filiis Pippino. regi et nostro spiritali compatri seu
Carolo et Carlomanno, idem regibus et utrisque patritiis Ro-
manorum....". Ibid., Ep. IX (Quanta luctuosa II -~ Jaffé-
Uattenbach, 23255, p. 498: "Dominis excellentissimus Pippino,
Carolo et Carlomanno, tribus regibus et nostris Romanorum
patriciis...."

15 MartenS. Pp. 29. 51-52. "...in S. Dionysius wurden
neben Pippin dessen zwei Sbhne mitverpflichtet...."

16 Ibid.. p. 23. Cf. énnales Einhardi, a. 754. p. 13:
"Stephanus papa, postquam a rege Pippino ecclesiae Romanae
defensionis firmitatem accepti, ipsum sacra unctione ad reg—
iae dignitatis honorem consecravit...." Caspar. Pippin und
die rbmische Kirche. p. 40, thinks that it was the unction
of the sons that gaVe Stephen compaternity rights with Pepin.
The unction of the sons, he claims, has the same importance
that Luitprand's adoption of Pepin in years before.

 

 

of an oath and the fact of the implication of the sons are
rdependent Wholly upon the fact that in addition to regal unc-
‘tion the ceremony at St. Denis made Pepin and his young sons
:patricii Romanorum.

The patriciatus Romanorum given Pepin in 754 is one of
t:hose acts around which much of the confusion turns. It has
lseen argued that the patriciate was the old office of the
eexarch and that it gave Pepin the lordship of Italy.17 On

'the contrary, however, no exarch was ever formally titled
lpatricius Romanorum,18 for the patriciate in Greek official
Imanking was an honor —- not an office.19 The fact is, as
FHartens realized, that a distinction must be made between
early Greek patrician and the title given to Pepin; the patric-
.llls Romanorum_was an invention of POpe Stephen II and had
1'lczothing whatever to do with any other office of patrician.20
JIYI fact there was a close association of the patriciate of
Pepin and the new republic of papal conception -- Pepin's
1319tlewas recognition of his understanding and acceptance of

tIEEB papal view.21 There is no need to suppose that Pepin was

\M-

: 17 For arguments of this sort see the following sources:
I"58351:!Heimbucher, Die Papstwahlen unter den Karolingern (Augs-
tfidtrg, 1889), p. 23; heinrich von Sybel, "Die Schenkung der

etrolinger an die Papste", pg, XLIV, (1880), 55; and Efaller,
i122. CVIII, (1912), 46-u7.

18 Hugo Cohn, Die Stellung der byzantinischen Statthalt-
SEZ;_in Ober-_und Mittelitalien (Berlin, 18897, p. 120.

19 Hartmann, Untersuchungen, p. 28.

20 Martens, p. 81.

21 Ibid., p. 84.

6R

tricked by Stephen in 754. The patricius Roranorun held an
office within the vague constitutional structure of the new

:republic. Unfortunately, it was an undefined office. It meant

:1n.the future what the positions of the two parties of the
galliance were able to make it mean.

At the placitum of 75h another formal oath was taken
13y Pepin which was essentially unassociated with the patric-
iate: the more specific obligation of Pepin and the Franks
1:0 force Aistulf to diszoree those territories of the repub-
ilic that he had taken. Since Pepin was effectively obliqated
txy becoming patrician, the obligation imposed on the placitum
Unast have been of another sort. It made Pepin's private pro-

rnj_se an obligation of the Frankish people and gave it a basis

.111 public law.22

In summarizing the events of 75h, then, there are three
Separate events to sort out and distinguish. First, the pre-
1-1Jninary promise by Pepin to protect Stephen. Second the ob-
3~143ation of the Arnulfing house as patricians and therefore
Of‘If‘ioers of the papal state, to defend the republic. Third,
{tlfiee drawing of the Frankish people into the alliance by a

diaczision of the nation in arms to restore the lost territory

‘t<> the republic.23

\————————

22 B. Niehues, "Die Schenkungen der Karolinger an die

PEipste", HJb, II, (1881), 202. See also L. Saltet, "La lecture
‘3U'un texte et la critique contemporaine: les pretendues prom-
‘iESSes de Quierzy et de Rome dans le Liber Pontificalis", BLE,

:1940), 176-206, (1941), 61-85.

23 It is not prOper to infer a change in papal intent be-

tNHeen Ponthion and the placitum of 75”. as Mayer does. AS has
EB--lready been argued, the affair at Ponthion was too formleSS

go

/

Havin~ discussed the liabilities incurred by Pepin in
754 and the acts upon which they were basedait would now be
Europer to discuss the role of Stephen II. Stephen was faced
171th a situation in 75U in Which he had to stave off the
ILombards, save the position, real and theoretical, of the
:republic, and prevent a Greek revival of power. In order to
(10 so he needed outside aid that he could control. He chose
‘the Franks. By making Pepin patrician of the Romans he made
leis new ally a 003 in the still very nebulous constitutional

Inachinery of the republic. One of the factors clouding the

linderstanding of Pepin's role in the republic and the nature

(Jf'the relationship between Pepin and Stephen II is the im-

rnossible suggestion, widely made and based on no evidence,
‘tliat Stephen II, at Ponthion, had commended himself into
IPۤpin's mundeburdium and had become, in effect, Pepin's
vassal. The commendation thesis was first expounded by Jil-
healmGundlach who argued that by this means the intervention

113- Italy became a matter of Frankish public business and not
a private engagement of Pepin?” This idea Was picked up by
SE‘nreral other authorities, of whom the most important was
ElT‘ich CaSpar.25 The thesis hinges essentially upon three

\—

ELhdpreliminary to count. Cf. Ernst Mayer, "Die Schenkunqen
Constantins und Pippins", DZK, 3. Folge, XIV, (1901»), 38-39.
Mayer is one of those who argue that Stephen only wanted his
Initrimony back at first and that the whole concept of the
I‘epublie materialized in the sprine; of 754.

24 Gundlach, pp. 75ff.
r‘ 25 Caspar, Pippin und die rbmische Kirche. pP- 16"17-
‘vf. Peter Rassow, "Pippin und Stephan II", £53, XXXVI, (1916),

497.

7o

ivords or phrases which are gleaned from the sources by Cas-
par: the term defensio taken from the phrase "...non suffer-
eens ad Pippini regis defensionem guerendam veniebat", in the
rinnales Nettenses;26 the term commendare taken from the phrase
"...omnes causas principis apostolorum in vestris manibus
czommendavimus...." from a letter of Stephen to Pepin;27 and
'bhe phrase iustitia beati Petri which is to be found in many
instances in papal correSpondence with Pepin. The fact is
'that these terms and phrases are taken out of context and in-
wrested with a context which is not Justified by the meaning
cbf’the terms as they appear in the sources. while these
Indrases might be applicable in feudal terminology, they are
also reasonably common enough to appear in other usages. If
‘tlie Appales Mettenses reports that Stephen came seeking a
defender, it does not follow that he commended himself after
C469rmanic 1aW. If Stephen used the verb commendlre in his
l(Sitters, even commendare in manibus, it need not have tech-
rlical legal meaning. He might also commend his soul into
C§CHi's hand without entering into a feudal contract after Ger-
Uualiic laW. Similarly it is obvious that iustitia has no nec-
‘EEisary connection with legal commendation. In order for any
(DT‘ these terms to have the significance that Gurdlach and
{zélspar attribute to them, there would have to be a ceremony

CV? formal homage with Stephen kneeling, placing his hands in

\

26 a. 753. p. ”a.

27 Codex Carolinus, 3p. VII (Providi et sapientissimi --
{Taffé-Uattenbach, 23237, p. #96.

71
Pepin's and commending himself and sz-Iearingr fealty to Pepin.
That such ceremonies were by this time the usual form in such
affairs may be seen from the description of the commendation

of Tassilo to Pepin in 757 Which may be found. in the Annales

28 . .
Regni Francorum. Pad Stephen performed such an action we

rnay be sure that the principli Frankish sources would have

noted it, but none do.29 It has also been suggested by the

prOponents of the commendation thesis that the words amicis

amiciJ inimicis inimici occurring: in. two of Stephen's letters

refer to a Germanic oath form associated with a pledge of
fealty. 0f the two citations given by CaSpar for the phrase,

neither occurs in a form in any way recognizable as the Ger-

manic oath formula. It is not reasonable to suppose that a

Roman pope, unfamiliar with Germanic law at best, would, or

eVen could, enter into an engagement under that law. In Spite

or the predilections of German historians, even some of the
v’ery best, everything that happened in the Middle Ages did

nQt take place under the auSpices of fiermanic law. It is one
or the premises of this dissertation that many of the events

heI‘ein discussed took place without any formal legal context

\_________
28 a. 7579 P. 14.

29 See the description of the arrival of Stephen at Pon-

thion; Annales Mettenses, a. 753. P. ’45; Frgiegarii Scholas-
Qgi Continuationes, cap. 36, p. 183. Cf. the following, lit-
(Erature for Opposition to the commendation thesis: Heinrich
I‘sltteis, Lehnrecht und Staathewalt (weimar, 1958), pp. 75ff;
arl Heldmann, "Komnendation und Kbnigsschutz im Vertrage

von Ponthion", lCIbG, XXXVIII, (1920), passim.

 

72

and that the vague and irregular nature of these engarzements

was one of the sources of future trouble. If Pope Stephen

tised some of the words used by Germans in their contracts it
(does not prove that he even understood that they had a tech-
111081 meaning. The Roman pontiff, princeps of the republic.
czould not became the subordinate of any mere barbarian king-
Zlet, however orthodox he might be.

Neither any act which Stephen II performed in Francia
zior the office of patrician gave Pepin any legal powers over
'bhe republic.30 Pepin was an officer of the republic in vir-

tnze of his patriciate. Stephen II held the principatus of the

 

Iwepublic and thus Pepin was his subordinate. The powers of
“blue patriciate were essentially undefined -- there was no
'huasis in either customary or statutary law to define them.
lIIi fact it happened that increasing papal weakness, in time,
ésérve the patrician an upper hand, But under Stephen II the
I?CXpe was obviously the senior partner of the alliance in
53bite of his lack of power. In other terms Stephen held the
‘auctoritas of the republic of the Christian church and Pepin
provided the potestas to support him.31

\—-..—

30 Bernhard Niehues, Geschichte des Verhaltnisses zwisch-
‘311 Kaisertum und Papsttum 1m MittelaltegL 2 Bde., 2. Aufl.

(Idunster, 1877), I. 487:h88,'593.

31 Ullmann. Growth of Papal Governmept, pp. 67-72.

73

Another of the factors reSponsible for clouding the is—
sue is the discussion carried on about donations.32 Neither
1n.754 nor 755—756 did Pepin make a donation to the papacy.

iPhe territories in question were claimed by the pope as lands

illegally and forcefully usurped by the Lombards from the

:republic, and Which legitimately belonged to the republic.

IPepin had no claim on the land. In Spite of the fact that

several scholars, supposing there to have been a donation,

:postulate the existence of an Urtext,33 no such text ever

(existed. The only possible such text is that of the treaties
(3f 755 and 756, which were Lombard agreements to do certain

tddings, not donations made by Pepin. For could the papacy
rhossibly have recognized a situation in which the land in
(111estion became Pepin's by right of conquest, later to be
given to the pope by donation. For if such were the case,
'tlden it legally belonged to Aistulf in the first place. The
aI‘Irangements made in 755 and 756 were by two tri-partite

tI‘eaties in which Aistulf promised to restore land to the

\

32 Here again German historians see a latin word used

111 a.casual fashion in a papal letter as being used in the
QCDritext of German laW. Codex Carolinus, Ep. VI (Dum regni
v6Estri -- Jaffé-flattenbach, 2322), p. #89: "...pro donatio-
11143 paginam beati Petri sanctaeque Dei ecclesiae rei publice
CSilvitates et loca restituenda confirmastis."

33 Karl Lamprecht, Die rbmische Frage von Kbnig Pippin;

fills auf Kaiser Ludwig den Erommen (Leipzig, 1889), p. 78.
Elite Stephanii II, p.—U53: "De quibus omnibus receptis civi—
1Satibus donationem in scriptis beato Petro atque sancte Ho-
Inane ecclesiae vel omnibus in perpetuum pontificibus aposto-

ice sedis emisit possidendas; que et usque actenus in ar-
<3hivo sancte nostrae ecclesiae recondita tenetur."

7M

republic and Pepin guaranteed.Aistulf's performance of that
obligation. Aistulf promised under oath to restore Ravenna

sand other cities to the Romans and Pepin took hostaees to

3b

secure Aistulf's promise.

Exactly what areas were involved in the restitution

zagreement of 755 and 756 is also the subject of some doubt.

IPrincipally this is because the pope claimed a qualitative

:area rather than a set piece of land -- he claimed all that

ihad_been imperial land. Thus we have another source of future

(conflict -- though Stephen II might be satisfied with the

eexarchate or the Pentapolis, his successors could claim

more.

34 Ibid.. pp. 451-953: "...pacem inientes atque in
:Sczripto foedera pactum adfirmantes inter Bomanos, Francos
€31: Langobardos, et obsides Langobardorum hisdem Francorum
JTEIX abstolens, spopondit ipse Aistulfus cum universis suis
1-‘Uld.i.cibus sub terribili et fortissimo sacramento atque in
63Odem pacti foedere per scriptam paginam adfirmavit se ilico
JTENiditurum civitatem Ravennantium cum diversis civitatibus
- - ..Et denuo confirmato anteriore pacto qui per elapsam VIII

illddctionem inter partes provenerat...."

 

CHAPTER VI
THE SITUATION THROUGH 756
The outcome of the restoration of the papacy to the Byz-

antine penumbra was to demonstrate conclusively that the pap-
acy and the emperors could not exist together within the im--
perial framework if both were to preserve their theoretical
and real positions: the emperors as autocrats of a Whole
Society, including state and church, and the popes as patri-
archs of the 3-fest and first patriarch of the Church Universal.
This at a time when two further developments made the in-
appropriateness of papal inclusion in the imperial structure
obvious: I) the contraction of the Roman Empire. ruled from
the east, into a purely Byzantine state, and 2) the increase
11‘1 papal contact and control over the ecclesiastical organ-
ization of Europe proper. The effect of these developments
was to make Greek control over Roman Italy an anachronism and
place the pepes in a position in which their role as western
Datriarchs demanded withdrawal from Greek anereignty. rThe
removal of several sees from Roman jurisdiction by Leo III

111 731 was a singularly appropriate acconudation of fact and

theory, whatever its motivation.

On the other hand, the papacy's theoretical views pre-
75

m

7
vented it from casting aside the idea of Bomanitas and the
Imperium Romanum. The concept of the respublica Romanorum nec-
essarily remained the basis of papal political thought, he“-
ever vague in outline or detail such thought might be. Thus,
inview of other factors, one is constrained to conclude that
gradually the idea that the pope may hold the principatus of
the republic captured the imagination of the Roman party of
the papal curia. One of the most surprising aspects of the
:monumental reverse therein implied is the gradual and elusive
character of the change. In point of fact we must recognize
that Gregory II was master of Home and probably the Duchy of
LRome. The papal state existed de facto by 726. The events of
‘726-731 confirmed it in its existence as did the even 3 of
‘the pontificate of Gregory III. When Zachary became pope the
C§reek empire no longer existed in central Italy. Zachary
lfuled the Duchy of Rome and he appeared to claim a title of
ESorts as protector of the lands of the republic in the old
Eaxarchate. He acted as the sovereign lord of the republic and
Frathered to himself the perquisites thereof. By this time it
11s idle to speak of papal loyalty or treason to New Home.
TDhe resgpublica Romanorum adhered to Rome -- Old Home -- if
its erstwhile masters abandoned it, abused it, or otherwise
forfeited it then the master of Old Rome would hold it. Hence
the respublica sanctae Dei ecclesiae_arose out of the union
of the respublica Romanorum and the Roman see. It is necessary

to realize that the process was a gradual one, no point being

definable as that at which the papacy first thought of its

77
own Sphere of jurisdiction as comprising the republic. Indeee,
the development of this idea remains Openended, so to Speak,
even after 756. At no time was a statement as to the nature
of this republic or its constitutional structure made by its
creators or adherents. On the contrary, it was through the
essentially untheoretical records and deeds of the papacy

that one must examine the concept.

Being threatened as an independently sovereign power in
752 and afterwards by the renewed vimour of Lombard policy
'under Aistulf the papacy needed outside political and mili-
‘tary support. Stephen II found it in the Arnulfing dynasty.
IIn.753-754 Stephen II concluded an alliance with Pepin the
Eihort. Traveling to Francia he received three separate as-
Eiurances. At Ponthion he received a preliminary pledge of
Eiid from Pepin made as an individual. At St. Denis Pepin
Eaccepted the office of patricius Romanorum and thus became a
Eflabordinate of the pOpe. At the placitum of 754 the Frankish
1lation in arms made the Ponthion promise a formal undertakiny
<>f the nation. At no time did the pope make any concession
in the negotiations in Francia in 751+. Indeed, he received
Eall the advantages. He acquired, in Pepin as patricius Ho-
Inanorum, a deputy in his role of pringeps of the republic.
1X11 the evidence argues that Pepin's motives were principally
religious.

Following the events of 754 Pepin.made two expeditions

under arms to Italy in 755 and 756 to aid the pope. In each

73
case treaties, not donations, were the result. Two treaties,
in 755 and in 756, between the Romans, the Lombards and the
Franks, provided that the Lombards should cede certain areas
to the Romans and that Pepin would guarantee Lombard perfor-

mance, as overlord of Lombardy.

By 756, then, conditions stood as follows:

1) Central Italy stood independent as a republic of
which the pOpe was the princeps by virtue of his pontificate,
and Greek power in central Italy was dead. This state, it
should be noted, was not technically a papal state, but a.
Roman state ruled by the pope.

2) Pepin, as patrician, served the pope in a virtually
lindefined capacity. In all probability he was intended to be
‘the pope's military commander. His sons, as patricians, were
iincluded in this arrangement.

3) The nature of the claims to territory made by Stephen
IVere also vague. He claimed a qualitative area: Roman Italy
Sis it had been. It would follow that all Italy might thereby
Toe claimed.

a) The vagueness of the situation was both an example
zand an effect of the openendedness of the concept of the
republic. It would be of paramount importance later. This
'vagueness was the cause of serious and continual uncertain-
ty to both pOpe and Arnulfing far into the future. In 754-
756 the pope and Pepin had Operated essentially on a day-by-

day basis. At the center of their arrangement stood the pat-

.1 {IVE-I'll ii)

‘ '41..) ...ll 2|!!!

l- ; '1 .i I..."

I’ll

till“ I. ' I If

 

III III. II 1 E

79

riciate, Which in reality would mean What circumstances caused
it to mean. Before too very long the patrician proved to be

in a superior position —- at least one factor motivating

Leo III to make Charlemagne emperor in 800 stemmed from a de-

sire to straighten out the confused constitutional tangle.

PART II

THE PONTIFICATE OF POPE PAUL I

m
o

CEAPign til
POPE PAUI l
lope atephen died on April 26, 757. During the course
of his illness he was attended by his brother Paul, the
future pOpe, who ixnored attempts Ofd minor faction to elect
an outsider as pope and stayed with the dyins Stephen rather
than pursue the papal office.1 Nonetheless, after Stephen Ii
(flied Paul was elected and became pope after an interval of
'thirty-five days.2
Paul, like Stephen his brother. had been an orphan of
2a prominent Roman family and entered the service of the
church at an early age during the pontificate of Gregory 11.3
IPaul later made the family mansion in Rome into a monastery
u

Vvhich seems to argue that the two brothers had no other kin.

IEeooming a cleric Paul served in the papal curia, being

1 Vita Pauli, in Liber Pontificalis, I, 463.
2 Vita StephaniiAII. p. 456.

3 Ibid., p. uuo, Vita Pauli, p. 463.

b Duchesne. Beginnings;pf_the Temporal Sovereignty, p. #9

81

82
raised to the diaconate by POpe Zachary.5 The date at which
the brothers became deacons is unknown but as deacons they
both served at the Roman Synod of 744.6 Paul held that of-
fice, presumably as one of the seven curial or Cardinal dea—
cons, during his brother's pontificate. As such he was a
member of the inner council under his brother and undoubted-
ly one of the most influential of the servants of the pope.
He was, at the demise of his brother, the logical head of
the powerful revolutionary party at the center of the curia
and the logical successor as supreme pontiff. hence his el-
ection in 757 was easily effected despite the efforts of a.
rival faction.7

Though some scholars see in Paul a colorless character
in contrast to his brother,8 this assessment is incorrect.
IPaul, like his brother, does not appear to have been unduly
(devoted to the spiritual life and his pontificate was taken
lip with the great political issues facing Home. Paul Was one
<3f the papacy's great champions in secular affairs and a
‘true priest-king after the mold of his brother. As a states-

Inan he was ever on the alert for opportunities to pursue

Idomes advantage, and his policy pursued that advantage with

5 Vita_Pauli, p. 463.
6

 

Duchesne. LibervPontificalis, I, #56n.

7 Vita Pauli, p. #63.

8 Paul Kehr. "Uber die Chronologie der Briefe Papst

Pauls I im Codex Carolinus", N GK-Gottingen, (1896), 104.

 

 

"A

c;
a sinalemindedness that appears to have been a family char-
acteristic. As a rule Paul was extremely stern. lis govern-
ance of Home was draconian in character. He ruled by the
civil law of old Rome and his courts diSpensed many capital
sentences.9 In this respect)though)it is necessary to men-
tion one facet of his character which was both a virtue and
a weakness. Uhile being a stern ruler he was subject to fits
of compassion in weaker moments. His biographer tells how
he would go at nighttime into the prisons and free those
who lay under capital sentences10 and at a mother's plea he

11 Other than these

even forgave treason against himself.
meagre facts about the man and his character there is no
other information available about Paul's life.’Ihe official
loiography included in the Liber Pontificalig is one of the
least valuable in terms of the information it contains, ei-
‘ther about the man or his pontificate.

Though the pontificate of Paul was a seemingly quiet
:period the tasks facing him were great. His chief concern
‘Nas the consolidation of the territorial acquisitions of his

12

'brother, and the general basis of his policies towards the

ILombards and the Greeks was the same as those of his broth-

9 Vita Pauli, p. #63. Cf. Duchesne. Liber Pontificalis,
I, 466n. Barry, p. 84.

 

10 Vita Pauli, p. 463.

11 Codex Carloinus, Ep. XXIX (no. 37, Eximiae et a Dec --
Jaffé-Nattenbach, 2356), p. 535.

12 Emile Amann, L1§pogue carolingienne, Vol. VI of gistgige
de l'église, ed. par A. Fliche et V. Martin (Paris, 19u75. p.19.

 

8’4

er. On the other hand, the Frankish intervention secured by
his brother had fundamentally altered the conditions of po-
litical life in Italy. Though his goal in reSpect of Desi-
derius was to maintain and increase the strength of the re-
public and secure all advantages possible for it, he had al-
so to become accustomed to the limits of his position and
adjust his policies and demands accordingly. In reSpect of
the Franco-papal alliance Paul was responsible for further-
ing the theoretical development of the role of the patrician
in a most important direction. But perhaps the most impor-
tant task facing Paul, and the one at which he failed, was
in the unfulfilled need for reform in the government of the
republic, both to organize a government to fit the new di-
mensions of the state and to accomndate the disenfranchised

elements who resented the clerical monOpoly of power.

CHAPTER VIII
TEE LORBARDS AND POPE PAUL:
TEE ATTAINRENT OF AN EQUILIBRIUN
OF POHdR IN ILALX

The treaties of 755 and 756 had irrevocably and radi-
cally altered the conditions of political life in Italy. The
Roman republic under its priest-kings had undergone a pro-6
found metamorphosis. The Lombard kingdom, having been con-
fronted with a new factor in Italian politics, to which it
could not adjust, had in a short time fallen from its pos-
ition of master of Italy to become a feudal subordinate of
the rising power in the north. Directly following the cul-
mination of this abrupt alteration of the Italian power
structure it was not possible for those immediately concern-
ed in the Italian arena, the papacy and the Lombard leader-
ship, to discern the exact nature of their new positions.
How much territory and power could be gleaned for St. Peter
in the days to come? How abject must the Lombard submission
be? How far could the lord of Pavia go in attempting to sal-
vage some remnant of his position? Unsure, expectant and am-

bitious, the chief protagonists of the struggle felt each

other out over a period of years and eventually arrived at

85

/
so

what seemed to be a modus vivendi:l an equilibrium of their
reSpective powers.

Though the settlement of 756 seemed to have satisfied
Pope Stephen's demands, it was unlikely to be considered a
final measure by the papacy. As mentioned before, the basic
claim of the papacy on behalf of the republic had been a
qualitative and ambiguous one: Roman Italy. From the ambit-
ious point of view of the master of the Roman state the set-
tlement of 756 left the borders of the republic in an unde-
silaHe state. Many Roman towns in the fringe area were
still under Lombard control and various areas seemed necess-
ary to round out the republic as an entity. The areas given
to the papacy did not, then, comprise the total area of the
exarchate as it had been. It was Ravenna and those areas of
the old exarchate which had been conquered by Aistulf which
were given to the republic.2 Areas in the northwest and south-
east of the exarchate and the Pentapolis, Which Luitprand

3

had taken, remained under Lombard rule. Thus, the theme of
the restoration of the plenaria iustitiae of St. Peter and
the republic became a primary theme of the period after

756.4

 

1 Hodgkin, VII, 263.

2 Kehr, pp. 126-27. Cf. Sybel, gg, XLIV (1880), 58, and
Duchesne. Liber Pontificalis, I, 460m.

3 Kehr, p. 127.

4 Ibid.. pp. 128-129.

87

E0 time was wasted by the curia in taking up the theme
of the plenaria iustitiae after the successful conclusion of
the operations of 756. All that lacked was the Opportunity
to assert another claim. While Stephen II still lived that
opportunity presented itself in the form of the death of the
prodigafly unfortunate Aistulf through a hunting accident,
followed by a diaputed succession which allowed the curia to
sell its support to the more likely candidate.

The principal claimant of the woe-beladen Iron Crown
was Desiderius, Duke of the Lombards, who had been made com-
mander of the army in Tuscany by Aistulf. Through his office
Desiderius commanded a reasonably sufficient military force,
though he may have lacked noble supporters in other areas of
Lombardy.5 The chief opponent of Desiderius was the brother
of Aistulf, the late-king Ratchis, who for personal and dy-
nastic reasons renounced the monastic life to prevent the
throne from falling into Desiderius' hands and who seems to
have enjoyed wider support than Desiderius.6 The undesir-

ability of the continuation of Aistulf's line and policy, and

 

5 Vita Stephanii II, p. 45h: "Tune Desiderius quidam
dux Langobardorum, qui ab eodem nequissimo Aistulfo Tusciae
in partes erat directus, audiens praefatum obisse Aistulfum,
ilico adgregans ipsius Tusciae universum exercitum multitu-
dini, regni Langobardorum arripere misus est fastigium."

6 Ibid., pp. 454-h55: "Euius personam diSpectui habens
Hatchisus, dudum rex et postmodum monachus, germanus prae-
fati Aistulfi, sed et alii plures Langobardorum optimates
cum eo, eundem Desiderium Spernentes, plura Transalpium vel
cetera Langobardorum exercitum multitudinem adgregdntes, ad
dimicandum contra eum profecti sunt."

the weakness of Desiderius, which would make him likely to
[e a less purnacious ruler, rendered him the logical candi-
date to receive home's support. Desiderius' position also
made it very likely that he would need outside aid. Qith the
army gathered by Ratchis threatening his candidature, Des-
iderius appealed to POpe Stephen for aid. He promised to re-
spect the republic and to return to the republic the "cities
which remained", i.e., the cities of the exarchate which,
being Luitprand's conquests, had remained in Lombard hands
in 756.7

The negotiations between Desiderius and the pOpe were
carried out by men of the highest position in the curial
bureaguacy. Paul the Deacon and Christopher the Primicerius
were sent by POpe Stephen to deal with Desiderius, and,
finding him most receptive and agreeable, they received from
him a promise to restore the cities in question to the re-
public.8

Having once received Desiderius' agreement concerning

the cities to be restored, Stephen commenced to act on his

 

7 Ibid., p. #55: “Ad haec praefatus Desiderius obnixe
praelatum beatissimum pontificem deprecatus est sibi auxil-
ium, quatenus ipse regalem valeret adsumere dignitatem, Spon-
dens iureiurando, omnem praelati beatissimi pontificis adim-
plere voluntatem; insuper et reipublice se redditurum profes-
sus est civitates quae remanserant, immo et copia daturus
munera."

8 Ibid. "Tunc isdem praecipuus pater et bonus pastor,
inito consilio cum sepefato Fulrado venerabile presbitero et
abbate atque consiliario...Pippini...misit suum germanum,
Paulum...atque Christoforum...una cum praelato Fulrado in
partes Tusciae, ad praedictum Desiderium. Cum quo loquertes
confestim conscriptam paginam terribili iuramento isdem Des-
iderius conctam professus est superius adnexam sponsionem ad-
implere."

\i)

behalf in the matter of the succession. first, he sert an
envoy to the perjured iatchis to persuade him to desist from
unsuitable worldly activities and return to his monastery
and the obedience due his abbot and leave the affairs of the

9

world to others. Then Fulrad, and the other Frankish offic-
ials left in Rome by Pepin, were sent to Uesiderius to re-
ceive his assurances in rezard of the plenaria_}ustitiae and
to aid him in his candidature, and a Roman army was raised
. 10 a ,, a h . t

to assist him. In rulrad s presence nesiderius spore to
return Faenza, Imola, Ferrara, Osimo, Ancona, Belorna and
Umana with all the lands pertaining to each of them, asking

that he be allowed to live in peace with Home and Pepin.11

 

9Ibid. “Eaec vero peracta statim suum missum...cum apo-
stolicis exortatoriis litteris praefato Batchiso vel cunc cti
genti Lanqobardorum direxit...."

10 Ibid. "...properans et praefatus Fulradus venerabilis
abbas cum aliquantis Francis in auxilium ipsius Desiderii,
sed et plures exercitus Eomanorum, si necessitas exijerit, in
eius disposuit occurri adiutorium."

11 Codex Carolinus, Ep. XI (Txplere lin ua -- Jaffé-
Uattenbach, 23357, p. 506: "‘t in praesentia ipsius Folradi
sub iureiurando pollicitus est restituendum beato Pet ro civ-
itates reliquas: Vaventia, Imulas et Ferraria cum eorum fin-
ibus, simul etiam et saltora et omnia territoria, nec non et
Ausimum, Ancona et humane civitates cum eorum territoriis;
et postmodum per Garrinodum ducem et Crimoaldum nobis redden-
dum SpOpondit civitatem Bononiam cum finibus suis....". Cf.
Vita Stephanii II, p. 455: Desiderius "...direxit missum su-
um praelatus sanctissimus pontifex et abstulit de ipsis civ-
itatibus quas...reddere promiserat...id est Faventias cum
castro Tiberiaco seu Cabellum et universum ducatum lerrariae
in integro". Niehues, th, II, (1881), 216- -217 argues that
these cities Were included in the treaty of 756 and never
turned over by Aistulf. Cf. notes 2 and 3 on page 86. Cod:
Carolinus, Ep. XI (Explere linzua -- Jaffé-Hattenbach, 33 ),
p. 506T—"Atque fidelum erga Dec protectum regnum ves trum esse
testatus est et petiit nos, quatenus bonitatem tuam deprecar-
emur, ut cum eo et cuncta gents Langobardorum magnam pacis
concordiam confirmare iubeas."

 

 

\JU 'w

 

v,
C)

By these means then, Desiderius, vir nitissimus, became Kin:

 

of the Lombards in Farch, 757.12

’ hile enaaged in this business Stephen was not blind to
opportunity in other quarters. Capitalizina on the tradition—
al se aratism of the Lombard duchies in the south, he under-
standably reasoned, would keep Desiderius weak and prevent
the strategic encirclenent of the republic. Pence, when in
the same period the Dukes of Lenevento and Spoleto Wished to
graSp the opportunity afforded them by royal weakness and
the diSputed succession to escape royal control, Stephen
was not slow to act. By agreement between Stephen and the.
dukes, they appealed throush him to Pepin to whom they offer-
ed their commendation as vassals.13 By this device the pope
and the dukes hOped to main independence of central control

for the duchies and a further weakening of the Lombard state.

 

12 Ibid. "Nunc autem Dei providentia per manus sui prin—
cipis apostolorum beati Petri simul et per tuum fortissimum
brachium, precurrente industria Deo amabilis viri Folradi,
tui fidelis, nostri dilecti filii, ordinatus est rex super
gentem Lanqobardorum, Desiderius vir mitissimus.” For a note
as to the date of the event, See p. 506n. It is clear that,
considering the vassalage of Aistulf and Desiderius' oath
to Fulrad as Pepin's representative, Desiderius was consid-
ered by the Franks to have been Pepin's vassal and to have
held his throne through Pepin's consent and sufferance.
Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 39, p. 186:
"Lanqobardi una cum consensu praedicto rege Pippino et con-
silio procerum suorum Desiderio in sedem regni instituunt.“
Cf. Chronicon Moissiacense, p. 295.

13 Codex Carolinus, 5p. XI (Explere linaua -- Jaffé-
Uattenbach, 2335), p. 506: "st tam ipsi Spoletini quamque
etiam Beneventani omnes se commendare per nos a Deo ser-
vate excellentiae tuae cupiunt et inminent anhelantius in
hoc deprecandum bonitaten tuam." Chronicon Salernitanum,
cap. 9, p. 475: "Iantum in initio suo regni Spoletini et Ben-
eventani rebelles fuerunt....”

 

 

91

Having completed what looked to be a very satisfactory
piece of business, Pope Stephen II had reason to be in hiah
spirit, for he had secured the borders of the republic and
insured the docility of his neighbors.1u Indeed, Desiderius
appeared to be a veritable client-king of the republic.

The affair was not so easily settled to the curia's ad-
vantage, however. The expected concessions and advantages did
not in fact become reality. The promises made so readily by
Desiderius while he was yet only a claimant to the crown seek-
ing aid were not so easily kept by King Desiderius, respon-
sible for the safety, well-being and integrity of his king-
dom. The cities he had promised to cede to the republic had
been Lombard for fifteen years or more and were not so easily
severed from the kingdom. Moreover, too soft an attitude to-
ward Rome had its pitfalls; the recent presence of the ex-
king-monk Ratchis recalled to memory the anger of the Lombard
aristocracy for one who had held the advantage of the realm
lightly. And besides, no self-reSpecting monarch could be

able to ignore such open treason as the southern duchies had

 

In Codex Carolinus, Ep. XI (Explere lingua -- Jaffé-
'Jattenbach, 23357. p. 505: Pepin was exhorted to continue
his good work so that he may insure "...ut civitates reliquas,
quae sub unius dominii ditione erant connexe atque consti-
tutae, fines, territoria, etiam loca et saltora in integro
matri tuae spiritali, sanctae ecclesiae, restituaere praecip-
iatis; ut populus Dei, quaem a manibus inimicorum redemisti,
in magna securitate et delectatione tuo auxilio adiutus vivere
valeat. Quoniam et filius noster Deo amabilis Fodradus, fid-
elis vester. omnia conspitiens satisfactus est, quod nequa-
quam ipse populus vivere possit extra eorum fines et terri-
toria atque possessiones, absque civitatibus illis, que sem-
per cum eis sub unius dominii ditione erant connexae." he
also cautions Pepin to not let himself be deterred by per-
suasions and promises.

shOWr. hence the arrandemerts made in the sprins of 757 did
not outlive Pope Stephen by very lens and the Lombard rein-
tion to the Bowen advance; made i“ 757 ”es the main theme
of the first few years of Paul's rule.

By early 758 it was apparent that Desiderius was not
goini to effect the promises he had made to the papacy in
his time of necd.l5 Furthermore, Desideriis took positive
steps to reduce the Duchies of Spoleto and Eenevehio to sub-
mission and for that purpose made an apreement of mutual aid
With the 3_eck emissary, George, residing in Naples, which
in Rome it was feared would indicateinminent invasion of the
republic.16

Shortly after having subdued the rebellious dukes Des-
iderius appeared in Home anxious to prevent the pepe from
provoking another Frankish expedition to Italy. By threat
or persuasion Desiderius prevailed upon Paul to send a letter
to Pepin, Which may even have been dictated by the Lombard,
reporting that Desiderius, excellentissigus filius noster,

earnestly desired to make peace and would give Imola to the

pope if Pepin would be his friend and ally and return the

 

15 Ibid.. 3p. XIV (no. 15, Later praesentium -- Jeffe-
fiattenbach, 2338), p. 512: "Unde ceriem a Bee protectam ex-
imietatem vestram reddimus, nihil nos usque hactenus rece-
pisse de his, quae per nostros legatos excellentiae vestrae
petendo mandavimus. Solite nenque perfidi et maligne illi in
magna arrogantia cordis permanentes nequaquam inclinantur
iustitiam beati Petri restituere. Tamen omnia qualiter acta
sunt, referentibus vestris miss 3 agnoscere potestis."

l6 Codicis Carolini Epistolae, Ep. XV (no. 16 -- Jaffé-
Jattenbach, 233§), BEG, ed. P. Jeffé, IV (Berlin, 1867), pp.
74-75. This letter does not appear in fiundlach's edition.
Jaffé's edition carries the remnants of the corrupted text.

 

)J

i l
hostages given by Aistulf in 755 and {56. 7

Desiderius' pre-
cautions, however, were insufficient and)unknown to Desider-
ius, Paul succeeded in sending off a second letter in which
he asked Pepin to disregard the previous letter (Gum tan co-
piosam) since it was sent under the eyes of "the most insid-
ious Kin: of the Lombards".18 Paul then reported the recent
events: Spoleto and Benevento, which Paul emphasized were
Pepin's vassal states, had been attacked and put to fire

and sword.19 Alboin, Duke of Spoleto, who was St. Peter's

and Pepin's man, was captured and the Duke of Benevento

 

l7 Codex Carolinus, Ep. XVI (no. 17, Bum tam cepiosam --
Jaffé-dattenbach, 23h03, p. 513: "Agnoscat siquidem excel-
lentissima bonitas tua, quia coniungens ad limina apostolor-
um excellentissimus filius noster, Desiderius rex, pacifice
atque cum marna humilitate; cum quo salutaria utrarumque
parcium locuti sumus. Et pollicitus est nobis restituere ci-
vitatem Imulas, ea videlicet ratione, ut nostros ad tuam ex—
cellentiam dirigere debeamus missos, et sues hospites quod
ibidem as vos habere videtur recipere debeat, et pacem cum.
eo confirmare studeatis."

18 Ibid.. Ep. XVII (no. 18, Quotiens perSpicua -- Jaffé-
flattenbach, 2343), p. 517. The previous letter was of no
value because of "...inminentibus circumquaque Langobardorum
regis insidiis....Pro quo et nunc per praenominatos nostros
missos alias vobis litteras misimus -- quasi obtempereantes
prefati Desiderii regis voluntati -- suos hospites absolven—
dum et pacem confirmandum; sed, bone, excellentissime fili
et spiritalis compater, ideo istas litteras tali modo exer—
avimus, ut ipsi nostri missi ad vos Franciam valerent trans-
ire, quoniam, Si hoe non egissemus, nulla penitus ratione
per Langobardorum fines transire valuissent. Sed susceptis
ipsis litteris, earum seriem nullo modo perficiatis neque
praefatos hOSpites permittatis part1 Langobardorum restitu-
erae."

 

19 Ibid., p. 515: "Sicque Spolaetinus et Beneventanus,
qui se sub vestra a Deo servata potestate contulerunt ad mag-
nam spretum regni vestri desolavit atque ferro et igne eor-
undem ducatum, loca et civitates devastavit."

\Q
J:

9 W 3
fled.“C Then Desiderius allied With the wreaks to subdue the

Reneventine fugitive in Otrahto, folloWin: which Desiderius
went to home?1

71th this information it is possible to reconstruct the
situation to some extent. Desiderius wished to reduce the
duchies to obedience. In order to do reach them he had to

march across papal territory which he did in the Pentapolis.2'

4\)

Unable to finish the task alone after Spoleto had been re-
duced and the beneventine had fled, he welcomed an offer of
aid from the Greeks. But having accepted their aid and gained
his purpose he deserted that alliance. He had nothing further

to gain by it and probably also realized the dander of con-

 

Ibid. "St conprehensum Alboinum ducem Spoletinum cum
eius satrapibus, qui in fide beati Petri et vestra sacramen-
tum prebuerunt, infixis in eis pessimis vulneribus, in vin-
culis detinet. AdprOpinquante autem eo Benevento, ilico dux
Beneventanus furam arripuit in Otorantinam civitatem."
Annalee Beneventani, a. 759. (Codex 3), Lifid §§, III, ed.

G. H. Pertz (hannover, 1839), p. 173: "Domnus Arichis dux et
primus princeps constituitur in Benevento...." Arichis II
was to become a champion of Lombard interests against the
papacy after 77M; H. Beltinz, "Studien zur beneventanischen
Hof im achte Jahrhundert", 292, XVI, (1962), 1&3-145.

21 Codex Carolinus, Ep. XVII (no. 18, Quotiens perspicua
-- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2341), p. 515: "Et confestim diriaens
Neapolim, isdem Desiderius rex accersivit Georgium imperial-
em missum....iniens cum eo consilium atque suas imperatori
dirigens litteras....Nam et hoe cum eodem Georgie...consti-
tuit, ut dromonorum Siciliae stolum in Otorantio civitate
dirisatur, ut tam Creci quamque Lanrobardi ipsam opsidentes
conprehendere valeant civitatem; eamque concedat imperatori
cum hominibus et facultatibus, quae in ea consistunt; et
tantummodo ducem illum atque eius nutritorem Iohannen prae-
dicto regi restituant. Post vero dissolutionem eorundem duc-
atum coniunxit hic ad nos Romae isdem Larsobardorum rex."
22 Ibid. "...Pentapolensium per civitates transiens...
ferre et igne omnia salta et universa, quae ad sumptus homin-
um pertinent, consumpsit...." Deepite this testimony it is nos
probably that Desiderius merely marched across the land.

95
tinued co-operation with the Greeks as a provocation acainst
Pepin. Raving finished his business in the south, he hurried
to Home to keep his relations with Pepin and the pope from
deteriorating completely.

With the action in the south over and no threat to Lone
having materialized, there was no need for Frankish inter-
vention. The claim that the duchies belonsed to Pepin had
been a flimsy one at best. to evidence shows Pepin to have
accepted that claim anyway, and hence he did not take steps
to protect the duchies or retrieve them.23 Since Desiderius
seems to have dropped the Greek alliance almost before it
began, it posed no threat to Rome and did not provoke a Frank-
ish response. Out of this whole exchange, then, the only
questions remaining were those of Desiderius' violations of
the republic's territory and the failure to restore the
plenaria iustitia, as promised. But since the violation pro—
bably did not amount to much it was soon forgotten. Thus
there is absolutely no ground for assentinr to the thesis
of Paul Kehr that at the close of 758 Pepin and Desiderius

came to a private agreement in which Pepin sacrificed the

 

23 hartens, p. 92: "Ba Stephan bald darauf starb, s
hatte Pippin um so weniger Veranlassung sich iracndwie in
die spoletinischen und beneventanischen Verhaltnisse zu misch-
en; er blieb vbllig passiv und liess die Sache auf sich be—
ruhen." The vassalage of the duchies was not existent in fact
but merely in the wishes of the papacy and Pepin never had a
legal or constitutional connection to the duchies, Ibid..

p. 93. Maurice Baumont, "Le pontificat de Paul Ier", Egg,
XLVII (1930), 17: "Paul n'avait pas osé demander formelle-
ment au roi franc d'intervenir pour delivrer les duches du
Sud. Il était preoccupé par une question capitale pour 1'
avenir dc 1'état romain: les 'restitutions' promises par
Didier."

9/»
2:2,
interests of the republic.
Only the question posed by Desiierius' bree ch of pronise

to restore the plenaria iustitiae remained, though in spite

 

q

of that ground of contention no open hostilities eroke out

in Italy. On the one hand Desiderius did not desire war: he
simply refused to redeem his promise. On the other hand Paul
could not accomplish anything ithout Pepin' s intervention,
which he did not receive

There does not seem to have been any further action by

esiderius in violation of the rishts of the republic, and

t1 e continued insistence of the pope on the restitution of
the promised cities was soon interrupted by a seeminrly more
pressinm problem. In late 759 or ea rly 760 Pope Paul receivei
news of a projected Creek invasion of which Ravenna and Rome
were to be the chief targets. Being unable to deal with the
situation alone, he requested of Pepin that Pepin persuade
Desiderius to lend his aid in repulsinp the invasion.25 how-.
ever, as aul's contacts and relations With Desiderius were

not so good as to allow an inmediate allie n1ce of the two,

 

2Z4, 0 's I"
nehr, pp. 138-143.
F
9 C de' Zarolinus, Ep. KKK (no. 21, Praecelsee et a

 

 

 

Deo I -- Jaffc-L.ttenbach 2357), p. 536: "...iubeas...diri—
ere Desiderio Lanrobardorun regi missum, ut, si nece._sitas

fuerit, significatun auxilium nobis pro incursione eorundem
inimicorum inpertire debe t, precipiens Beneventanis atque

Spoletinis seu Tuscaris nobis e vicino consistentibus , ut
ipsi nostro occurrant solatio." Ibid.. 3p. " MKI (no. 22, Prae—

celsae et a Deo II —- Jaffe-.attenbach, 233 ;), p. 537. '...
ut nimis velociter dirigere iubeatis ve stram praeoeptionem
Desiderio resi Lanqobardorum, ut si neces ssita.s exigerit, aux—
ilium prestare debeat tam "‘nnae quemque pent: poleis mari-
timis civitatibus ad dimicindum contra inimicorun inpugnetio-

hem."

owinj to the unfilled desire of the pope, Paul requested
tist Pepin send L'ss. in the coming Perch to negotiate a

settlement with Desiderius and arrenre e cooriii: ed defense

r) /
s"; "_) . o ‘ ' ‘ 1
of the republic. Pepin's responded by admonisning Imul thet

4.

he ought to at least try to accomwdete the Lombard, to which

"\
ueS-

Peul replied thet he was willing to live in peace with
iderius if Desiderius, that excellentissimus vir, would re—

- 27 1.! ' V r ‘r t -.
ciprocste. ihus a first step was taken tONerd Paul s re-
nunciation of his claim to the cities promised by Desiderius.
The requested Frankish m ssi srrived and in April, 760, suc-
ceeded in negotiating a settlement between Desiderius and
Paul by which all the rights of St. Peter were to be return-

ed following the taking of a survey to determine which areas

.1

legitimately belonged to the Lombard Eingdom and what the

.0
_/

2
pope might claim.’ For reasons of a practical nature the

26 Ibid., £1. XXX (no. 21, Praecelsae et 3 Dec I --
.Iaffé-Tdttenbech, 2337), p. 536: "Deprecsntes ct hoc 3 Dec
institutam excellentiam vestram: ut ad nos hoc advenientc
Iiertio menses vestrum dirigere iubestis missun, qui hic Zone
:nobis condenorsri debeat; et ipse, si necessites exiqerit,
ilpud Desiderium imminere debest regem pro eodem nob s trans-
Tflitterdo solstio, quia, ut plenissimae satisfacte 3s vestrn
éxcellentia, non ob aliud ipsi nefandissini n s persequuntur
‘Rreci nisi propter sanctam et orthodoxen fidem et venerendor-
‘Hfl patrum piam traditionem, quam cupiunt distruere atque con-
Culearc."

")

“7 Ibid., Ep. XXXVIII (no. 23, Dun snto vestrae --
.Laffé~wsttenbach, 2359), p. 531: "Quod quidem si ipse excel-
lentissimus vir in Vera dilectione et fide, quam vestrae ex-
cellentiae et sanctae Dei Homane ecclesiae spopondit, perman-
Seritw utique et nos in ceritate firms at stabili pace cun co
pelwmansuri erimus, observentes illud dominicc praeceptioris
GOOUmeuwmn 'Besti pecifici, quonism filii Dei vocabuntur”'.

28 Ibid.. Ep. XIX (no. 2a. Quia excellentia -- Jefffi-“st-
1xnfb30h. 2344). PP. 519-520: "...omnes iustities fsutoris ves-

—\

‘\¢

\0

cost of the acccmafiation to Paul was hat Paul gave up -- at
Pepin's insistence -- the claim to the plenaria iustitiae or-
iginally advanced by Stephen II during the weakness of Les-
iderius.29 Desiderius, on the other hand, seems to have giv-
en up, or promised to give up, an unidentified area or areas
originally ceded to the republic in the treaties With Aistulf
in 755 and 756, which had never been surrendered. lhus it
appears that the arranfiements made in the Spring of 757 were
considered to be of no standing and Pepin seems to have felt
that he was not committed by them. The basis of the agree-
ment of 760 was found in the treaties of 755 and 756 and the
arounds for settling the difference of 757-759 went back to
the situation as it existei in 757. Hence Desiderius was

able to retrieve his promises of 757 and to preserve the

3

i

situation as of the death of Aistulf. He was able to assert
and make good the idea that the treaties of 755 and 756 were
the limits to which Rome might expend.

Having succeeded thus far Desiderius seems to have

 

tri, beati Petri apostolorum principis -- omni videlicet
patrimonia, iura ctiam et loca atque fines et territoria
diversarum civitatum nostrarum Hei publice Romanorum —-
nobis plenissime restituisset. Unde eccae ex parte quidem
eisdem iustitiis nobis isdem Langobardorum rex fecisse din-
oscitur; et reliquas omnes iustitias se profitetur atque
omnino spondet nobis esse facturus.: In this connection an
interesting note is found in the Benedicti Chronicon, cap.
21, :gg, §§, III, ed. G. H. Pertz—(Bannover, 1839), pp. 706-
707, which records an expedition of Pepin during Paul's reign
which obviously never occurred. This may refer to diplomatic
missions. The chronicle says that Tuscany was given to the

pope.

29 Codex.Carolinus, Ep. XIX (no. 2a, Quia excellentia -—
Jaffé-Jattenbaoh, 2355), p. 520.

 

 

99

wished to see how much further he could go. It appears that
he was not much inclined to implement the terms of the ar—
rangements of 760, and efforts to secure his action in this
regard filled a good part of the remainder of Paul's pontif-
icate. Somewhat later Pepin sent a legation to Italy to ver-
ify whether or not the arrangements were being carried out
and it would seem that Desiderius was in some way lagging

in his efforts in that direction.30 Eventually, at some time
in the period 761-762 Pepin had to intervene again. A Frank-
ish legation arrived in home and held an inquiry at which
representatives of Desiderius and of the various cities un—
der dispute were present and they tried to obtain a settle-
ment.31 The main concern was with the borders of the repub-
lic; apparently Desiderius failed to respect the rights of
various cities ceded to the pope. he used, kept or otherwise
violated these riehts in the landed areas around them and

also refused to cede certain areas claimed by the republic.32

 

30 Ibid., Ep. XXII (no. 28, Ad referendas -- Jaffé-Hat-
tenbach, 2358), p. 526: "Quia vero innotuistis: ob hoc vos
praesentes direxisse missos, ut agnoscere...utrum nobis a
parte Lanaobardorum plenariae facte fuissent iustitiae an non,
ipsi omnino cause meritum comperti sunt et callidam versutiam
atque solite falsiloquam propositionem eorumdem vestrorum
nostrorumque emulorum aanoverunt, eisque ad vos revertentibus
Deo prepitio. vestris propalabunt in auribus."

31 Ibid., Ep. XXXIV (no. 29, Dum tam maxima -— Jaffé-
wattenbach, 2361), p. 541: "Prelati denique missi vestri in
nostri presentia cum Langobardorum missis nec non et Penta-
polensium ac singularum nostrarum civitatum hominibus adsis-
tentes, conprobatio coram eis facta est de habitis inter utra-
aque partes aliquibus iustitiis, videlicet de peculiis inter
partes restitutis."

32 Ibid. "Nam de finibus civitatum nostrarum et patri-
moniis beati Petri ab eisdem Langobardis retentis atque in-

 

Ill!!! 1‘. i
' Ii Ill Iii In!" I. I’ll-'...; t.
‘I ill.
I

100

At this inquiry it was arranfied that Frankish and papal lee-

ations, accomparied by the representatives of the civitates,

 

would confer with Desiderius in Pavia and secure his approv-
al of the borders of the republic. Desiderius would be re-
quired to confirm the borders in the presence of the legations
and, by implication, he would guarantee those borders.33 The
pepe, in reviewing these arrangements expressed to Pepin his
doubt over Desiderius' will to obey then and there was indeed
a failure to secure Desiderius' compliance with those terms.
Jhen a legation was sent from Rome to secure the implemen-
tation of the terms of the agreement they achieved nothing.3u
Indeed, relations became more strained. Though papal rhetoric
may have blown the incidents out of proportion, by 762 or

763 Desiderius was raidin: into the territory of the repub-
li035 and tryin: to frifhten Paul into ceasing his complaints

by sending him threatenin: letters. Being without other re-

course in the face of Desiderius' continued refusal to come

 

vasis nihil usque hactenus recepimus; etiam ea, quae primflis
redidderant, denuo invaserunt."

33 Ibid., pp. 541-542: "Unde constitit, ut nostri ac
singularum nostrarum civitatum missi ad Desiderium Lanfobar-
dorum regem cum vestris progredi debeant missis, ut in eorum
atque predicti regis praesentia pro eisdem finibus ac patri-
moniis comprobatio fiat nobisque omnia iuxta pacti seriem
restituantur."

3U Ibid., Ep. XX (no. 32, A Dec institute -- Jaffé-Jatt-
enbach, 2355), p. 521: "St ecce nostri missi nihil inpetrantes
ad nos sine effectu reversi sunt."

35 Ibid. "Et plures depraedationes ex tunc atque multa
et inaudita male in nostris inmittit finibus. Unde ecce suas
confestim direxit litteras, per quas, confidens in sua fero-
citate, Deum prae cculis non habens nec beatum principem apo-
stolorum Petrum metuens, comninationes nobis direxit et inan-
ia detractionum verba protulit."

101

to tern:c Paul once more requested of Pepin that he send his
36
representatives to investigate.
Roman and Frankish attempts to persuade Desiderius to
obey the terms of his agreements and follow the dictates of
his overlord continued to be unrewardinz and the business
continued to drag out. As late as 76h-765 occasional Lombard
raids or other violations of the republic's territory, termed

37

'devastations' by the pope, continued to take place. Thoueh
Pepin continued to send lefations to settle this affair they
seem not to have achieved anythinc tangible and to have re-
ported that Desiderius was unCOOperative.38 However, contin-
ued Frankish diplomatic pressure eventually bore fruit and
by 765 Desiderius seems to have been brousht to heel, though
no information survives as to the circumstances. In 765
Desiderius appears to have been acting as Pepin's aeent in
some respects. Furthermore, it was arranged in 765 that Ho-

man and Lombard legations would finally settle the territor—

 

36
‘ Ibid., p. 522.

37 Cf. n. 34, p. 100. Ibid., Ep. xx: (no. 33. cum mar-
imo -~ Jaffé-Tattenbach, 23575, p. 523: "Etinim. ...dum tan-
tas sedulae ab eisden Lonzobardis devastationes in hostris
finibus ac civitatibus facte fuissent et a nobis ex hoc am-
monitus fuisset, comminationis suae ad nos direxit litteras,
quas neccesitate coacti infra nostris apostolicas litteras
hoc preterito anno vestrae excellentiac direximus intuendas."

38 Ibid., p. 524: "Unde pro vestra amplissima satisfact-
ione adproEationcm fecimus in praesentia praedictorum vestro-
rum fidelium missorum cum 1am dictis Lanqobardorum regis
missis; et satisfacti sunt vestri missi, de tantis iniqui-
tatibus et coanoverunt nostram veritatem et eorum mendacium."

102

ial claims of the republic.39 hence, by the end of Paul's
pontificate, a modus vivendi, thoufih uneasy, had been est-
ablished in Italy between Home and Pavia,“O

The period 757 to 767 in reeard of Roman-Lombard rela-
tions appears to be a disorderly Welter of negotiations and
violations of arreements. Fowever, there is a coherent pat-
tern involved which may be unfolded. The major concern of
Paul in regard of the Lombards was to follow the ambitious
policy of his brother and predecessor and secure additional
territories at the expense of the Lombard kingdom. This con-
cern caused him to seek the weakening of the kingdom for the
sake of the republic. Being entirely dependent upon the mil-
itary support of Pepin, Paul was forced to modify his policies
and desires to suit those of Pepin. In the period from 757
to 767 Pepin was involved with a series of local conflicts
on the borders of his kinsdom which demanded his close and

constant attention.“1 he could not afford to intervene mil-

itarily in Italy in the absence of a most severe crisis.

 

39 Ibid., Ep. XXXVII (no. 38, Votiva cordis -- Jaffé-
Hattenbach, 2364), p. 549: "Cum eodem quippe rege pro ius—
titiis inter partes perficiendis loquente constitit, ut,
nostris eiusque missis per diversas civitates promredien-
tibus, ipse perpetrare fuissent iustitiae. Et ecce...de par-
tibus Beneventanis atque Tuscanensibus et fecimus et ad vic-
em nostras recepimus; nam et de ducatu Spoletino, nostris
vel Langobardorum missis illuc adhuc existentes, ex parte
iustitias fecimus ac recepimus; sed et reliquas, quae reman-
serunt, modis omnibus plenissime inter partes facere student."

#0 Ibid.. Ep. XXXVI (no. 39, Cum regalis -- Jaffé-aatt-
2363), p. 556. Desiderius was still suSpicious of Paul.

“1 Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. ul-5h.

 

 

'i'li‘ilii‘lg-

103

Frankish efforts on home's behalf had to be limited to diplo-
matic action. Similarly Pepin would not wish to push Desider-
ius to a point at which hostilities would result and military
action would become necessary. Under these conditions it was
necessary that the demands of the papacy be limited so that
a crisis could be avoided. Paul's task was to accomfldate him-
self to these circumstances and yet achieve as much as poss-
ible to secure the position of the republic. By 759 he was
brought to understand that Pepin could not intervene mili-
tarily and accordingly he pursued a revised policy calculated
to avoid war with the Lombard. From 759 to 765 he strove by
diplomacy to achieve the fulfillment of the agreements of
756 and the regularization of conditions between Lombardy
and Home. By 765 he had achieved this.

The lack of really adequate sources for Italian history

in the period and the prejudicial tone of the Codex Carolinus

 

creates the possibility that one might underestimate Desider-
ius. A careful assessment of the situation seems to indicate
that he was a reasonable and practical monarch. It is rea-
sonably certain that he learned well in the school kept by
Pepin, wherein Aistulf had failed. In all the events of 757-
767 Desiderius assiduously avoided angering Pepin and provok-
ind the sort of action visited upon Aistulf. he was, first

of all, wise enourh to avoid any real conSpiracy with the

g
(3

eks. Loreover, in his wranglings With Paul he never really
posed a threat to the republic. done or the papacy. ihdt this
was so is evident from the letters of the pope himself, for

thouwh he spoke of devastations and outrares, they occurred

Ion

Recalcitrant thourh Jesiderius was concerninf the complete
cession to Home of the areas promised by Aistulf. he finally
chose the prudent course and yielded to the persistent dip-
lomatic overtures of Paul and Pepin.

The major problem facing Pepin in regard of Italy in this
period was the discharge of his responsibilities towards the
pope without becoming involved in further war. Prudence dic-
tated that he ignore the protectorate created for him by the
papacy over the southern duchies and that the unfair terms
of 757 be allowed to fade away. By diplomacy he achieved in
the end what he had sought to achieve: a workable and peace-
ful situation in Italy and the protection of the interests
of Home which had been guaranteed by treaty in 756.

Hence from the analysis of Roman-Lombard-Frankish af-
fairs in the period 757-767 one must conclude that the pen-
tificate of Paul witnessed the adjustment of all parties to
the novel situation established as of 756. Each had to as-
certain his position vis-a-vis the other two and probe the
possibilities and dangers of the revised political balance
of post-756 Italy. By the end of Paul's pontificate this
seems to have been peacefully accomplished and a political
equilibrium found. Unfortunately it is impossible to ascer-
tain whether this equilibrium would have lasted. for by 76?
the effects of the division of power among the Franks and the

chaotic affairs of Home created a new imbalance which embol-

105

domed Desiderius to test his position once more and press

his position further.

Ifi‘ ‘ v\ " j“\ r
\zlJif 3. 5."; .[ k
‘l'. ‘!“ '{1'1:.I‘ ‘1“"‘\ "fl "7'. ‘ \ '- gt? '\\‘ \ '\ ,:’_"l u“), ‘‘‘‘‘ | -i-/‘
Jn', '-fi.u.Li‘~‘-r. C: -i’. J 130‘.-lu..LDI- U" I 1'1 L tibi-14.4
, \1 V,)' . I“ \_ ‘ I" \ ‘; "\ *‘\ '1 \ *1"? ' 1“ ' 'V— “ ‘ ‘1 ". 'l ' .‘_.--(.‘ J
A334 J a. .1” a mi 1: .2133 : x. l; u: -12 1 Sign- 140-1441 «L :iLLl-i-‘. o ‘4
.VV l‘f- “, ‘ “ ‘\ ‘ fi‘ ’.
"if 1 It .4 -Ll‘-1’...all\.l;i

term and the concept of the

I
\

ihe very existence of th
new ecclesiastical republic of the Romans meant the end of
Roman allegiance to the Byzantine Empire. But the revolution
establishinr the new state on Italian soil was a revolution
of thouvhts rather than of Open deeds. Yo manifesto or de—
claration accompanied the achievemeht of Roman indeperdence
and thUTh the two tri-partite treaties of 755 and 756 im-
plied the official recoznition of the fioran state such a un-
ilateral act had no relevance to imperial law. hence, it
should not be too surprising that the caesar of Rev home
misjudged both the nature and degree of the chance in the
political organization of Italy which culminated in 756.
Constantine V was unlikely to View the pope as anythiny but
an impertinent upstart Who would need only to be taurht a
lesson or two. Similarly it is rather unlikely that Constan-
tine understood the nature of the alliance created between
Pepin and Home or the dearee to which the altered circum-
stances of the Lombard kingdom should affect Desiderius'
attitude toward Rome. Pow should he be able to appreciate

106

107

the depth of the spiritual commitment of Pepin to the pontiff
of Home? It is only natural that he sould discount Pepin's
explan ation to his emissary in 756 as mere camoufla;3_moti-
vated by lust for slaughter and plunder.

Despite the attitude of the Romans as manifested in the
period 730-752, the Byzantine Emperor, oblivious to reality
as it then existed in Italy, continued to act as though his
relationship with the universal pontiff had remained unchanzed
Even as late as 753 he seems to have considered the pope his
subject and avent in Italy as the negotiations with Aistulf
in 753 indicate. however. even the preoccupied basileus could
not fail to perceive the sirnificance of Stephen's actions
in Francis, the nature of which was made clear to Constantine
in 756. hence, besinninq in 756, a fundamental chants occurred
in the Byzantine approach to the Nest. After 756 the papacy
was no lonyer directly approached by the emperor's men. In
fact the papacy seems to have drOpped completely out of Byz-
antine policy considerations. DeSpite these appearances,
however, the papacy was the subject of all Greek policies
in the west. To punish the pOpe, re-assert Byzantine control
over Rome and the area of central Italy, and deprive lone of
its political and territorial inffuence must be recognized
as the very core and basis of Byzantine aims in the pursuit
of its policies in the Nest. Every diplomatic or military
gambit of the basileus directed toward the West during the
pontificate of Paul was undoubtedly motivated by these goals.

having by 756 come to realize what had been aoin? on in Eome

109

and that Byzantium had lonr ceased to have any influcnce
there, the emperor was forced to attempt to deal directly
With the other principals involved. Despite the initial re-
buff afforded Byzantine diplomacy in 756 by Pepin this con-
tinued to be the policy of the emperor. Taking Pepin's ans-
wer to his representative lightly, the basileus endeavored
to Win Pepin over to serve as a Byzantine awent. If that
were not possible he could seek to secure his neutrality or
at least to sow doubt and discord within the alliance.

The imperial diplomatic offensive opened in 757 when
there occurred an exchange of legations between Pepin and the
emperor1 in Which the initiative undoubtedly lay with the
emperor. Though the negotiations produced an initial pledge

of amity between the two powers. such an undefined and mean-

 

1Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. #0. p. 196:
"Dum haec ageretur, rex Pippinus legationem Constantinopolim
ad Constantino imperatore pro amicitiis causa et salutem
patrie sue mittens, similiter et Constantinus imperator leg-
ationem praefato rege cum multa munera mittens, et amicitias
et fidem per legatos eorum vicinsim inter se promittunt."
Annales jinhardi. a. 757. p. 15: "Constantinus imperator
misit Pippino regi multa munera. inter quae et organum; quae
ad eum in Compendia villa pervenerunt. ubi tunc populi sui
generalem conventum habuit." It is impossible to assent to
the assertion that the initiative in these negotiations is
to be attributed to Pepin. Cf. Kehr, p. 111 and Oelsner. p.
290. Pepin had little if anything to gain by these negotia-
tions While the emperor had everything to gain and was in
fact merely pursuing the course begun in 756. In fact it
appears that Pepin was pressured by the emperor to enter into
a marriage alliance With the Byzantines and refused. Coder
Carolinus. XLV (no. 47, Dun omnium electorum -- Jaffé-Iatten—
bach, 2381) p. 562: "Itaque et hoc. peto. at vestri referre
studete memoriam: eo quod, dun Constantinus imperator nite-
batur persuadere...vestrum genitorem ad accipiendum coniugio
filii sui dermanam vestram...3hisylam...neque vos aliae na-
tione licere cOpulari. sed nec contra voluntatem apostolicae
sedis pontificum quoque modo vos audere peraeere."

 

 

 

ll;
in less rict‘vos of dubious North to Constantiwe ?, leqny
was hot lostile to the experor ahd had no particular 9091 it
tte pursuit of '.u’hich the erg-Lire, 'u'as of my importemzc. 0:1

1

e other hand, the irplications of alliance Vith tte “Tees

"’."
h;

would place Pepin in violation of his duty in reSpect of
Rome. hence the negotiations foundered.2

Even thou:h the FQTOtiatiONS were ursucccssful and had
certainly little ihportahce, POpe Stephen seers to have teer
alarmed by tie possibilities suteested by the mere fact that
such neTOtiathFS were ir protress and by the specter of
Franco-7reek cOOperation Which they afforded, inasmuch as.
his safety in Italy was totally depehdent upon the support
and protection of Pepin. For these reasons Stephen took
pause to inform Pepin of the heretical views and activities
of the Fyzahtines, to point out the denier the empire offered
to orthodoxy and the physical WGlI-belh“ of the church, and
to remind Pepin of his obligation to defend Home therefrom.3

Indeed, thoueh Byzantine attempts to enlist Pepin's

sympathies and support in Italy had never such possibility

Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationgs, cap. 40. p. 196:
"hescio, quo faciente, pcstea amicitias, quas inter se mutuo

promisseraht nullatenus sortita est effectu,"

 

 

 

3 Codex Carolinus, Jp. XI (EXplere lingua -- Jeffé-hat-
tenbach, 23357. p. 506: "...ut inspiratus a er...ita dispov-
ere iubeas de parte Grecorum, ut fides sarcta catholica ct
apostolica per te ianra et inconoussa permaneat in eterhum
et sancte Dei ecclesia, sicut ab aliis, et ab eorum pestifera
malitia liberetur et secure reddatur...." It would not be im-
probable that the pope's views and Words reinforced Pepin's
attitude and produced a disinclihation on his part to con-
tinue to be involved with the emperor.

 

110

of success, the empire did pose a very real threat to the
security of the papacy and the republic. The possibility of

a revival of Byzantine power in Italy loomed as a frighten-
ing prospect to the wearer of the Triple Crown. Hence it is
important that it be realized that papal invective against
the nefandissimi Greci was not mere rhetoric. The iconoclast-
ic struggle and persecutions under Leo III and the accompany-
ing imperial attempts to assassinate POpe Gregory II were

not long past. Indeed, Constantine gave evidence of being
even more adamant on the matter of enforcing his religious
policy on the empire by use of violence than had been his‘
father. In 754 Constantine had affirmed his iconoclastic
views and had them legitimized at the Council of Constantin-
ople.u Pope Paul's protests against iconoclasm were ignored
by the emperor and Constantine was involved in several sev-
ere persecutions, particularly against monks.5 Thus there

could be small doubt about the hostility of the basileus to-

 

Ficephorus Breviarum Historicum, pp. 97uc-975a: "Con-
stantinus ubi semel se ad Ecclesiae contumeliam ac pietatis
oppugnationem accinxit, tanquam afflatu impulsuque contrarii
spiritus abreptus, coetum episcoporum colligit octo et tri-
zenta numero supra trecentos....In eo conciebulo fidei can-
onem condiderunt de sacris imaginibus evertendis, cui ab om—
nibus ipmio consensu ac nefario subscriptam est; eaque rel-
iqio omnis pueriliter in foro anathemate damnata."

5 Vita Pauli, p. 464 (Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2365). Theo-
phanis Chronggraphia, a.m. 6257-6263, 3g, CVIII, 879-g99.
Theophanes chronology is difficult to unravel and in re-
gard of the West his dating system is complete nonsense.

Some feel that he places creation at 5500 B.C., and so com-
pute that his anno mundi 6200 is equal to 700 A.D. Cf. Henri
Hubert, "Observations sur la chronoloqie dc Théophane et de
quelques lettres des papes", pg, VI (1897), 505. hubert puts
750 A.D., as a.m. 62u2 in Theophanes.

 

lll

ward the papacy. Loieover, it was inevitable that the emper-
or would look upon the whole concept of the republic and the
activities of the popes as treason. Should the empire ever

retrieve its power in Italy the republic would be destroyed

and the pepe subject to prosecution under the lex maiestatis.

 

Circumstances, however, favored the papacy and the con-
firmation of papal independence; for Greek attempts to remain
control in Italy could not be pursued by force of arms.
Throughout the period of Pope Paul's pontificate, and even
later, a series of major wars waged by the emperor against
the Bulgars, interspersed by raids sustained from Arab forces,
and internal difficulties over the religious question insured
that the Byzantine Empire would be unable to muster up any
kind of a sizeable force to send to Italy or devote more than
a passing interest to events there.6 Hence the chief instru-
ment of Byzantine policy in Italy was the attempted subversion
of those around the pOpe.

In the early period of Paul's pontificate the seditious
activity of the agents of the basileus was directed primarily
at weakening the position of the papacy through subversion
of the Lombards on the one hand and of Roman citizens on the
other.

The failure of Greek negotiations with Pepin in 757 op-
ened the way for a Byzantine attempt to seduce Desiderius

into acting militarily on behalf of the emperor and attacking

 

6 Theophanis Chronographia, a.m. 625u-6267, pp. 971-906.
Nicephorus Breviarum Historicum, pp. 975b-986a.

 

112
Home or the republic. Thus, George, the imperial ament, at-
tempted to engage Desiderius in an anti-Roman coalition in
758. Though the coalition did not effect quite what it had
been designed to do from the imperial point of View, POpe
Paul was undoubtedly correct in assuming that its goal was
to secure a Lombard attack on Rome, Ravenna and the Pentapo-
lis.7 Desiderius, however, was interested only in support
for reducing Otranto, where the Duke of Benevento had taken
refuge. Inasmuch as Desiderius realized that full cooperation
with Constantinople would entail another, possibly final,
Frankish invasion of his land and a subsequent end of his
rule, this coalition was short-lived, being broken by the
withdrawal of the Lombard once he had achieved his object
in respect of the rebellious duchies. On the other hand,
though the Greeks had spoken of an imperial army to be sent
to Italy for an attack on the republic,8 it is to be doubted
that such an army would have materialized. Had George been
able to hold the alliance toqether the republic would have

been attacked, but only by Lombard forces. Desiderius undoubt-

 

7 Codicis Carolini EpistolaelpEp. XV (no. 16 -- Jaffé—
flattenbach, 2339), pp. 74-75.

8 Codex Carolinus, Ep. XVII (no. 18, Quotiens perspicua
-- Jaff5:Wattenbach, 23u1), p. 515: "Cum quo [George] nefar-
iae clam locutus est, iniens cum eo consilium atque suas im-
peratori dirigens litteras, adhortans cum, ut suos imperiales
divigat exercitus in hanc Italiam provintiam. Et ipse Desider-
ius cum universo Langobardorum pOpulo professus est, Dec sibi
contrario, auxilium prelatis imperialibus exercitibus inper-
tire, quatenus -- ex una parte ipse imperatoris exercitus et
ex alia isdem Desiderius cum universo Langobardorum populo --
utrique imperator, quod Dominus non permittat, adimplere va-
leat in quodcumque voluerit voluntatem."

113

edly realized that fleorge's intent was to use Lombard arms to
pursue his master's policy in the grand tradition of Byzantine
diplomacy, and it may be doubted whether Ye took the coalition
seriously at any time, except as a means of reducing Otranto.
Simultaneously with the attempt to obtain the aid of
Desiderius George worked to infiltrate the papal curia itself
in hOpes of causing unrest, distrust and even revolution ir
Home. It has been argued that the disputed election of 757,
in which Theophylact the deacon was supported for the papal
office by a minority party, represented the conflict of the
aims of the curial pro-independence party with an undefined-
element disposed to return to the pastoral care of the Thir-
teenth Apostle.9 Regardless of whether the argument in respect
of Theophylact's candidature may be sustained, it is possible
that such an imperial party existed in Rome, though its size
and composition may never be defined. The momentous step of
Openly abandoning the allegiance to Byzantium, the presence
of men of eastern origin in the curia, and the fact that
George enjoyed some success in his efforts are all suggestive
of the presence of such a group. It is not possible to dis-
cover whether or not George had any part in promoting the
candidature of Theophylact in 757, but his work was probably
begun soon after that. Given the presence of a willing fifth

column within the city, his efforts must have had some effect.

 

9 D ehl, Etudes sur l'administretiou, p. 232. Theophylact
would have been "...un pontife suremcnt dEvouE a la cour byz-
antin, et dispose a remettre aux mains de l'empcreur les ter-
ritoirs conquis a l'église par la politique de son predecess-
cur."

 

In 759 Paul reported to Pepin thit he had discovered that
Larinus, the Cardinal Priest of s. ChrySOgonus, had been in-
volved in plotting with the imperial event and that certain
letters from Constantine V were proof hereof.10 Though Kar-
inus was in Francia, he was there as a papal representative
and this raises the question of whether Creek policy afte-
the failure of open negotiations with Pepin in 757 were dir-
ected toward a subtle anti-Roman propaganda at Pepin's court
of which harinus was the instrument.

Attempts at sedition in Italy seem to have born no
worthwhile fruit. Though we can be certain of none of the
details of the affair of Karinus, we may be sure that the
detection of his disaffection rendenfli the plot ineffective
and ruined a good deal of George's work.

Findinr that the Lombard king had not been really won
to the alliance and seeing that George's effectivness against
Rome had been impaired, the emperor adOpted a new mode of
dealinfi with Italy. In 759-760 rumors of an impending attack
on the maritime cities of the eastward coast of central Italy

, 11 _ . .
ccgan to circulate. From the Archbishop of Ravenna, the

 

10 Codex_Carolinus, Ep. XXV (no. 20, Omnino compertum —-
Jaffé-Uattenbach, 2352), p. 529: "Omnino compertum habet ves-
tra...exce11entia, qualiter harinus...iniqua operatione c ntra
sanctam Dei ecclesiam fidemque othodoxam, Deo sibi contrario,
cum Ceorgio quodam imperiale a secretis consilia contra sedis
nostrae contraria et vestrae simili modo ingeri cupiens. Quoi

quidem et isdem imperator vestrae a Deo protecte excellwntifie
per suas innotuit litteras."
11

Ibid., 3p. XXX (no. 21, Praecelsac et a Dec I —-
Jaffé-Tattenbach, 2357), p. 536: "...coniunxit ad n s...quod,u
Greci...super nos et Ravennantium partes inruere cupiunt atque
motioncm facere."

115

pope's deputy :overnor in the east, Paul received two letters,
threatening such an invasion: he from the emperor ard the
other from Soman sympathizers in Venice.12 By the Spring of
760 adequate measures for the defense of the coast had been
attained through Roman-Lombard coordination arranged diplo-
matically by Pepin.13 The invasion, however, never material-
ized and it is doubtful that it would have done so even had
adequate measures for defense not been taken. Given the em-
battled condition of the Byzantine Empire in the east it is
hardly likely that an army could have been Spared for Italy.
An invasion of Italy could not, in 760, be made with the
same impunity that it could have been made thirty years pre—
viously; despite whatever separated Desiderius and the pope
the influence of Pepin would have assured Lombard resistance
to an imperial army, and in the event of real danger a
Frankish force would also have Opposed the Greeks. To fight
in Italy now would have been to fight the West! The empire

simply did not possess the resources to get caught up in such

 

12 Ibid., Ep. XXXI (no. 22, Praecelsae et a Deo II --
Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2358), p. 537: "...suscepisse nos...syllabas
a...Sergio archiepisc0po Ravennate, quas Leo [gig] imperiali
eius sanctitati Ravennarum provintia visus est direxisse....
Exemplar denique epistole saecretae, directae a quibusdam fi-
delibus Veneticis...Sergio archiepiscopo, simul et ex litteris
quas isdem sanctissimus vir nobis direxit...."

13 Ibid., Ep. XXXVIII (no. 23, Dun tanto vestrae -—
Jaffe-Wattenbach, 2369), p. 551: "...eo quod convenit inter
nos ct eundem Langobardorum regem, ut pariter nos in navenn-
antium urbe praesentare studeamus ad perficiendas quasdam
utilitates...sanctae nostrae ecclesiae, et pertractandum pro
Grecorum malitia, quid cotidie imminent in ipsam Eavennatem

ingredi civitatem."

116

a busiress and indeed never would. lhis bein; the case the
rumors of 759-760 are exposed for what they were -- were noise.
Constantine V was simply attacking Paul’s nervous systen.
Yothinz else demonstrates so well the bankruptcy of imperial
western policy in the early 760's.

Toward the end of Paul's pontificate a much more care-
fully considered and much more impressive threat to Paul's
security was mounted by the basileus. Paul's greatest strength
was the solidity of the alliance between himself and Pepin.
That alliance was based essentially on a religious feeling.
Had not Pepin himself testified to George that he acted for
love of no man, but for St. Peter.lu If Pepin's regard for
St. Peter and Home's religious position was the basis of the
papacy's strength, then the subversion of that regard would
be the key to the papacy's vulnerability. The goal of Constan-
tines new policy then, was the religious disaffection of
Pepin. To achieve such a disaffection it was necessary to
introduce a ground of dispute between Rome and Pepin. By def-
inition this would be a dogmatic question. Such a question
lay easy to hand in iconoclasm. Thus during Paul's pontificate
there was considerable Greek effort to enlist Pepin to the
cause of iconoclasm. In late 762 or early 763 Paul reported

the rumored approach of a legation of six patricians bound

 

1” Vita Stephani} II. p. ”53-

 

 

117

E

a e 1
first for ionc and then for brancia. 3 It has been arvued,
and the areunent is plausible, that this Creek legation marks

the Openin¢ of the negotiations which culminated in the Synod

of Gentilly in 767.16 Paul reCOgnized the dimensions of the

threat posed by these new negotiations and therefore from

the first he took part in them, so that when Pepin's response
was sent Paul participated in it and in all future dealings
on the subject. Thus, in 763 a joint mission was sent to
Constantinople by Pepin and POpe Paul in response to Constan-
tine's overture.17 It is not known exactly what matters were
discussed in Constantinople during the time the legations
were there. It is to be assumed, however, that iconoclasm was
the major subject. The work of the mission in ConstantinOple

appears to have taken considerable time and the mission does

18

not seem to have returned before 765. In order to facilitate

- .o--.—

15 Codex Carolinus, Ep. XX (no. 32, A Dec institute ~-
Jaffé-dattenbach, 23U5), p. 521: "...intimassa nobis...quod
sex patricii...in hac Romana urbe absoluti a regia urbe as
nos properantur. Quid eos velle acturos aut pro qua diriguntur
causa, rei veritatem ignoramus; hoc tantum nobis nuntiatum
est, quod ad nos prOgredi et vestram...."

16 Kehr, p. 125: "...dasz dieser aber kein feindseliaer
war, lehrt die ruhige Haltung des Papstes und die weitere An-
gabe dasz diese Byzantiner, wie man melde, nach Rom bestimnt
seien um von dort weiter nach dem Frankenreiche zu gehen....
Vielleicht aber war sie die Veranlassung, dasz nun ihrerseits
Konig Pippin und Papst Paul Gesandte nach Constantinople sand-
ten."

17 Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXVIII (no. 35. Praemissis nos-
tris -- Jafféluattenbach, 2355), p. 533.

18 Ibid.. Epp. XXIX (no. 37. Eximiae et a Deo -- Jaffé-
Wattenbach, 2356), et XXXVII (no. 38, Votiva cordis -- Jaffé-
wattenbach, 2364), pp. 534, 549.

118

the success of negotiations on the religious question Con-
stantine may have begun to attack the credibility of the pepe
in order to cause Pepin to entertain doubts which might in-
fluence him on the main question. Reports reached Pepin's
ears that Paul was in some way deceiving him and in 76% Paul
protested to Pepin that unidentified parties were lying to
Pepin about Paul and maligning him.19 Similarly the papal
charge that 'enemies' were reported Operating in Bavenna20
reflects, perhaps, another sort of imperial sedition. The
attempts seem to have been without effect. The returning le-
gations were accompanied by a Greek legation. Pope Paul in-
structed Pepin to keep both the Greeks and the Romans with
him until he was able to gather a synod to hear the arguments

21

and to decide upon them. while the legations waited for the

synod to meet the negotiations continued, but the prospects
of success for the Greek cause diminished as the Greek nego-

tiators were unable to gain private access to Pepin.22 The

 

19 Ibid., Ep. XXIX (no. 37, Eximiae et a Deo -- Jaffé-
wattenbach,2356), p. 53“: "...per vestros vobis fuisse nuntia-
tum legatos, quod a quibusdam malignis et mendatium profer-
entibus in istis partibus devulgatum esset, quia si aliqua
nobis necessitas eveniret, nullum nobis auxilium prebere val-
uissetis."

20 Ibid., p. 535.

21 Ibid., Ep. XXXVII (no. 38, Votiva cordis -- Jaffé-wat-
tenbach, 233“), p. 549: "...eos (Greeks) aput vos esse detentos,
interim quod, aggregatis vestris sacerdotibus atque obtimati-
bus...."

22 Ibid.. Ep. XXXVI (no. 39. Cum regalis -- Jarre-watten-
bach, 2353). p. 5H4: "...eos [Creeks] pro amore...beati Petri
nequaquam suscipi aut illis respondi adquiescentes absque no-
strorum missuum praesentia...."

119

arguments were simply made in Pepin's presence so that he
acted essentially as an arbiter of orthodoxy. It may be con-
sidered a measure of the failure of the Greeks that at this
stage of the negotiations they once more resorted to attempt-
ing to impeach Paul's credibility by implying that he was a
puppet of his primicerius.23 There is small doubt that by 766
Pepin had come to his decision and that the Greeks had fail-
ed.2u In 767 the formal discussions were heard at the Synod

of Gentilly. If the formal acts of the synod were ever pub-
lished, and we may assume that they were, they have not sur-
vived. The only records we possess concerning the synod are
several brief descriptions in the Frankish annals. These tell
us only that Pepin held a synod at which the questions of icons

and the trinity were discussed between the Greeks and the Ro-

mans at Centilly.25 That the matter finally went against the

 

23 Ibid., p. 546: "Ram illud in ipsis suis apicibus ad-
seruit: quod dilectus filius noster, ChristOphorus primicer—
ius et consiliarius, sine nostra auctoritate, nobis quasi ig-
norantibus, suggestiones illas, quas sepius ei direximus, fec-
isset et alias pro aliis eius ac vestris missis relegisset."

2h Ibid., p. 545: "Direxistis siquidem nobis per eadem
vestra scripta significantes, quod nulla suasionem blandimen-
ta vel promissionum copia vos possit avellere ab amore et
fidei promissione, quam beato Petro...polliciti estis; sed in
ea ipsa vos caritate et sponsionis fide fine tenus fore per-
mansuros."

25 Annales Einhardi, a. 767. p. 25: "Orta quaestione de
sancta trinitate et de sanctorum imaginibus inter orientalem
et occidentalem ecclesium, id est Romanos et Grecos, rex
Pippinus conventu in Gentiliaco villa congregato synodum de
ipsa quaestione habuit." The discussion seems to have attrac-
ted notice from other quarters as well. Late in Paul's period
he received a letter which be forwarded to Pepin from Cosmas
Patriarch of Alexandria, expressing concern lest oriental her~
esy endanger orthodoxy. Codex Carolinus, Ep. XL (no. #1, Quia
spiritus -- Jaffe-wattenbach, 2370), pp. 552-553.

 

120

Greeks is evidenced by a last ditch effort to save the day by
introducing the ex filioque question to offset Roman victory
in the matter of icons.26

Jith the Synod of Gentilly the problems of Paul's rela-
tions with the empire ended. All imperial policies seeking
Paul's destruction had failed.

Greek power died in central Italy in 730. The pontificate
of Paul was merely a confirmation of that fact. The Greeks
had lost their position and would never regain it. By the time
of Paul the Greeks were looked upon simply as a hostile pow-
er and in this the attitude of Paul was no different from
that of his predecessor.

Greek policy toward Italy and the papacy was secondary
to the main interest of the emperor. No real expenditure of
imperial energy or treasure could be made to secure imperial
goals and consequently the sort of policy alternatives open
in regard of the papacy were limited. In all cases but one
the policies of the emperor were unsound. His first approach
to Pepin was based on ignorance of the relationship between
Paul and Pepin. His attempt to persuade Desiderius to fight
for him was not new. In fact, it might be argued that it fail-
ed partly because it had been tried too often and consequent-
ly Desiderius realized that it was a trick to get him to take
the blows for the emperor's profit. Here too it may be argued

that a correct evaluation of Desiderius‘ position would indi-

 

26 Hefele-Leclercq, III, ii, 726.

121

cate that he could not be used. The only well conceived Greek
policy was that of converting Pepin to iconoclasm -- but here
too the voice of the papacy in matters of dogma was underest-
imated in Constantinople.

With reSpect to Pepin it must be recognized that his int-
erest in the Greeks was slight. Bis policy toward Italy did
not allow alliance with them and their heresy made such an
alliance improbable at any rate. He preferred of course to
avoid conflict with them but they posed him no threat in any
case .

The fear of the Greeks felt in Rome was great, but that
threat was overestimated. Paul clearly overestimated them in
the period 758-760 and became panicky because of it. However,
in the negotiations between 762 and 767 Paul seems to have
played a master hand. By insisting upon inclusion in all neg-
otiations and not allowing the Greeks to gain secret access
to Pepin he guarded well against defeat. On the other hand,
it must be admitted that he had the advantage at all times.

He was, so to Speak, on home ground, and he had the sympathies
of Pepin.

Between 756 and 767 the emperor was brought to a full
realization of what had tranSpired in Italy. He came to under-
stand that the alliance of Rome and Pepin was not a mercenary
alliance and he may even have come to understand the Lombard
position vis-a-vis the alliance. Greek power over Rome was
dead. and now even the Greeks realized it. but not till imper-
ial emissaries saluted Charles as basilegs in 812 would they

officiafly acquiesce and recognize reality.

CHAPTER X

105

}"1

'CH3 ALLIANCE IN TRANSI‘

Pepin had obligated himself to the pOpe in 754 in more
than one way. While he promised in some fashion to subdue
Aistulf and accomplish the restoration of the exarchate to
Stephen II, he had also accepted the office of patricius Hg-
manorum and had permitted the same title to be imposed upon
his sons. The treaties of 755 and 756 did not,then. suffice
to quit him of his duties in regard of Home. As an officer
of the Roman state Pepin was permanent protector and agent
of the Holy Father and at his death his sons should in their
turn perform the office and services of the patriciate. But
the office of patrician had never been defined in more than
a vague and general way. Such being the case the nature of
the office and the extension of its powers and prerogatives
should naturally evolve as practice and circumstance should
demand. The alliance upon which the patriciate was based was
also an undefined one. No instrument of international law
establishing and defining the alliance existed and the tri-
partite treaties of 755 and 756 could only define the alliance

in an indirect fashion. Thus, for instance, it was understood

that Pepin should stand as guarantor for the Lombard's per-

122

123
formance of the terms of the agreements. After the flurry of
activity ceased in 56 it was inevitable that the nature of
the office and the alliance should be worked out in greater
clarity. It is understandable that Paul should have attempted

to develop and define the role of Pepin as patricius Romanorum

 

and place the office and the man in a defined position in the
hierarchy of Christian society. Likewise it was unavoidable
that the nature of Paul's dependence upon Pepin should further
define the relative positions of Paul and Pepin. Jhile the
workinq out the nature of the alliance and office was assured—
ly not complete in 767, the pattern had already begun to be
established which led eventually to a complete metamorphosis
of the arrangements envisaged by Stephen II, and to the cor-

onation in 800 of Charles the Great.

The most obvious contrast between the pontificate of Paul
and his brother Stephen II is the absence of Frankish mili-
tary action in Italy during the pontificate of Paul. To the
casual eye this might seem to evidence a cooling off of the
alliance and many have taken the military inactivity of Pepin
in Italy as a sign of inactivity per se in regard of Italy.
Some have even concluded that f0110Wing his two Italian ox-
peditions Pepin felt a disinclination to exert himself any
further on behalf of those tricky priests.1 To assert such a

View, however, would be to reveal a lack of understanding of

 

1 See 3. A. Freeman, fiestern Europe in the Eighth Century
and Onward (London, 190#), p. 203, Bassow, pp. h99-501 and
Rodenberg. p. 105.

 

12h

the alliance created in 75U and would demonstrate a too casual
study of the events of 757-767.

Pope Paul I continued without hesitation the policy of
his brother in regard of the Frankish alliance and his cor-
respondence with Pepin demonstrates that neither he nor the
Romans had any doubts as to Pepin's obligations under the
alliance. The fact of that obligation and the nature of it
found frequent mention in Paul's letters to Francia. Pepin
was the patricius Bomanoruernledged at the risk of his eter-
nal soul to the defense of the pOpe, the church and the re-
public. In nearly every letter Pepin was verbosely reminded
of his promise to Pope Stephen II and St. Peter. Paul told
Pepin that he intended to remain true to the alliance between
them just as his brother had been, until the end. which is
to say, Pepin's obligations should not be allowed to lapse.2

Pepin was constantly addressed in the most complimentary
terms as the most excellent. most Christian, and most power-
ful king, protected by God. Paul and Pepin were "Joined by
the bonds of a Spiritual union".3 The penalty for non-perfor-

mance of his promises was often hinted at to Pepin as Paul

 

2 Codex Carolinus, Ep. XII (no. 12, Cum gravi gemitu --
Jaffé-Wattenbach. 2336), p. 508: "...pacis foedera, quae prae-
1atus beatissime memoriae dominus et germanus meus, sanctissi-
mus pontifex. vobiscum confirmavit, permanentes et cum nostro
populo permanabimus usque in finem."

3 Ibid., Ep. XIV (no. 15, Lator praesentium -- Jaffe-
wattenbach. 2338), p. 511: "Interea, christianissime, Dei pro-
videntia victor rex, gemina festivitatis peregimus gaudia in
eo. quod, optata cordis adepti desideria...in vinculo spiri-
talis foederis pariter sumus adnexi."

noted that St. Peter, to whom Pepin had made his prcwises,
was the keeper of the keys of heaven. It was this same Peter.
Pepin was often reminded, to Whom, alone With Ste hen II,
Pepin owed his own crown and royal name.” :he constant theme
of the pope was that Pepin was the defender and helper of the
Roman church, that same Roman church which was Pepin's spir-
itual mother and the chief anon? all the churches.5
The relationship of Pepin and the papacy as originally
established under Stephen II in 754 was based on a relatively
undefined idea that Pepin was, as patrician, an officer of
the church. Under the aegis of Paul I the curial idea of
Pepin's role becomes much more well defined and exalted.
Through a close study of the correspondence of Paul in the

ngex Carolinus it is possible to see that an idea was emera-

ing in the curia of the role of Pepin as defensor ecclesiae.

 

That Pepin mot his post by election of the pope and for prac-
tical reasons was passed over. Rather Pepin was lauded as
\

the divinely appointed defender and helper of the church.6

 

u Ibid.. Ep. XXI (no. 33, Cum maximo -- Jaffé- attenbach,
2347), p. 523: "Quod quidem nos, dum cor...vestre in menu Dei
est et divina benedictione sanctae unctionis gratia per apo-
stolum eius et regni caelorum clavigerum, beatum Petrum, in
regem...esse dinosceris unctus,...in ea ipsa caritate et dil-
ectione adque promissione, quam caelestis regni ianitori Spo-
pondere studuistis, vos firmiter esse permansurum...."

51bid., Ep. XXXVII (no. 3 , Votiva cordis -- Jaffé-fiat-
tenbach, 236%), p. 549: "...sacrosanctae spiritalis matris
vestrae...caput omnium ecclesarum Dei...."

6 Ibid., Ep. XIII (no. 13, Si interius mente), p. 510:
"...post Deum noster...defensor et auxiliator...."

126
Indeed, God had predestined Pepin from his mother's womb to
be both king and defender of the church.7 It was “od who com-
manded that Pepin rule and who committed the protection of
the church to him.8 By analogy it is inferred that iod pre-
destined Pepin ani his sons to guard the church just as he
sent Hoses to the Israelites in the midst of their lamen-

tations and just as he sent Joshua and David to lead his peo-

 

7 Ibid.. Sp. XVI (no. 17, Dum tam copiosam -- Jaffé-fiat-
tenbach, 23MO), p. 513: "Etenim,...quoniam Deus omnipotens er
utero matris tuae te predestinatum habens, ideo te benedicens
et in regum ungens, defensorem te et liberatorem sanctae suae

ecclesiae constituit...."

8 Ibid., 3p. XXXVI (no. 39, Cum reaalis -- Jaffé-Uatten-
bach, 23535, p. 5uu; "...dominus Deus noster, qui vos regnare

iussit et sanctam suam ecclesiam ad defendam vobis commisit
fl

9 Ibid., Ep. XXXIII (no. 26, Olim omnipotens -- Jaffe-
‘iattenbach, 2360), pp. 539—5uo: "Olim omnipotens Deus, cernens
populi sui Israhelitici lamentationem et impiam ab.uegyptiis
illis infertam obpressionem, misertus est eis, mittens faru-
lum suum Moysen, per quem, sisna et prodigia exercens, eundem
Suum eripuit populum; et per eum legem illis institutens, ad
OFmatem eos illis perduxit requiem. Cui etiam Iosue, ut prae-
‘liaretur bella domini, adnectit atque alios sui divini nonin-
is cultores eis concessit auxiliatores. Bed in omnibus illis
lion ita complacuit eius divina maiestas, sicut in Davit rege
eat propheta, testante eodem misericordissimo Deo nostro in id
(Iuod ait: 'Inveni David servum meum secundum cor veum, in oleo
:sancto unxi eum', cui et regnun et semini eius in aeternum
érloriose tribuit possidendum. Sic enin, praecellentissini et—
<1ue nobilissimi filii, a Bee instituti reges, isdem dominus
Deus noster...in utero natris vos sanctificans, ad tam meanur
Iregale provexit culren,...et oleo sancto vos vestrnnque p ae~
<3ellentissimnm renitorem unguens celestibus replevit benedic-
tSionibus et sanctam suam catholicam et apostolicam ecclesian
Eitque orthodoram christianorum fidem vobis commisit exaltan—
<1Um atque viriliter defendendam." The first words on the theme
(Df Old Testament kingship were put forward by Pope Zachary
43nd Pepe Stephen II in a tentative fashion, but the first
ifull developnent of the idea in its various aspects was due
to Paul I.

and the 'ne" Davii'.9 Just as hoses relieved the Israelites

of their oppressions, so Pepin the 'new Loses' was inspired

10

hv Tod to relieve the oppression of the church. As God les-

0

islated through hoses on Sinai for the redemption of the Peb-

ll ‘ ,
rews, so God through Pepin redeems the church. as hoses

destroyed the abomination and cult of demons, so Pepin re-
? ,. 12 r" WV ,1
Pulsed heresy and the authors of impious dogma. ihe rrahis

are a holy nation and a royal priesthood.13 In effect, then,

 

9 Ibid., 3p. XXXIX (no. 27, Considerantibus nobis --
Jaffé-dattenbach, 2368), p. 552: "Novus quippe Hoyses novus-
que David in omnibus operibus suis effectus est christianise
simus et a Deo protectus filius et spiritalis compater, domnus
Pippinus, Dei nutu victoriosissimus rex, per quem exaltata
Deo ecclesia triumphat et fides catholica ab hereticorum telo
inlibata consistit."

10 Ibid., 3p. XLII (no. 40, Sum divine -- Jaffé-vattenbach,
2372), p. 55a: "Dum divine Scripturarum istoricarum in nostro
memoriale revolvimus et diversorum Dei electorum merita per-
pendimus, et vestra divinae inspirationis studia in nostrae
mentis intuitu conferentes, novum te Koysen in his diebus re-
fulsisse, praecellentissimi fili et spiritalis compater, com-
perimus. Ille quidem, ut Israheliticum populum ex affliaentium
eveneret obpressionibus, a divine maiestate praecepta suscepti;
‘tu quoque, precellentissime atque eximiae rex, ad liberandum
sanctam universalem catholicam et apostolicam Dei ecclesian
divinitus es inspiratus."

11 Ibid. "Per illum denique Dominus in nonte Sina legis
Inandata eidem Ebraico populo observands tradidit et lumine sum
<31aritatis suae inlustravit; per te quoque redemptor noster,
IDei hominunque mediator, ecclesiae suae et universo pepulo
<3hristiano eius pretioso redempto sanguine pacem tribuit et
(eius fidei orthodoxe perfectam contulit defensionem."

12 Ibid.. p. 555: "...et sicut isdem hoyses lerislator ab-
llominationes gentium et culturam demonum exterminavit, ita et
:Eu,...hereticorum schisma et auetores impii dOgmatis respuis-

1."

13 Ibid., Ep. XXXIX (no. 27, Considerantibus nobis --
~Iaffé-Nattenbach, 2368), p. 552: "Et vos quidem, carissimi,
'gens sancta, regale sacerdotium, populus adquisitionis', cui
'benedixit dominus Deus Israhel...."

128

the Vicar of fed on earth, the binder and looser on earth and
in heaven, was makin? this Sernan war-lord his equal and even
his superior! As a 'new hoses' and a 'new David' Pepin, too,
was God's vicar; he ruled with Paul over the City of Cod as
God's representative. Indeed, while Paul held his post only
throuzh mundane election by men, Pepin held his through di-
vine election by God!

As the sons of Pepin were obligated as patricians just
as their father and since the future security of the papacy
demanded continuation of the alliance after Pepin's death,
Paul studiouSly cultivated his relationship with the family
of Pepin, seeking to guarantee the future of the alliance
with indissoluble bonds of love and friendship. At Pepins'
request he was god-father to Giselle, born to Pepin and Eer-
trada in 757,1LL and in 759 he requested that he be allowed
the honor of baptisina another new born member of the royal
family, Pepin's namesake.15 The pope evinced constant solici-
for Bertrada, the 'most excellent and God-fearing daughter
and spiritual co-mother' and Pepin's 'most beloved children'.
Indeed, he held out to Pepin the hepe that his seed should re-

main till the end of the world as rulers of Francis.16 This

 

14 lhlg.. Ep. XIV (no. 15, Lator praesentium -- Jaffé-
Nattenbach, 2338), p, 511,

15 Ibid.. Ep. XVIII (no. 19, Solet epistularis -- Jaffe-
Tattenbach, 2343), p. 519: "Unde obnixe te petimus, ut a sa-
cratissimo baptismatis lavacro eundem eximium vestrum filiun
suscipere mereamur...."

16 Ibid.. Ep. XVII (no. 18, Quotiens perspicua -- Jaffe-
uattenbach, 2341), p. 517: "Semen vestrum Splendissimum usque
in finem mundi euden regni fruatur culmen."

desire to have as close a friendship as possible with the
family led the pope to be ever concerned for their welfare.
In 763 when a campaign led into Aquitaine by Pepin was endan-
gered by the desertion of Tassilo, Juke of Bavaria, Paul anx-
iously asked after Pepin's safety, having heard bad news.17
And when he learned of Pepin's safety he wrote to Pepin of
his great joy.18

Aside from generalized expressions of the greatness of
this family and concern over them Paul desired the continuity
of the alliance With the Arnulfing dynasty after Pepin's
death. This led Paul to try to cultivate with special care

the older sons of Pepin. He clearly viewed Charles and Carlo-

mann as obligated to the church on the same basis as their

 

17 Annales gettenses, a. 763, p. 52. Codex Carolinus,
Ep. XXVII (no. 34, Quotiens fidelium -- Jaffeexatenbach, 2354;
p. 531: "Etenim, dum huis evoluto temporis spatio -- quod nos
nec vestrae sospitatis relationem meruimus suscipere nec pen-
itus agnoscere, quid erga vos ageretur vel qualiter in itinere
quo profecti estis, pereqistis, nimis anxietatis fervore des-
iderii nostri affectio in hoc ipsud addiscendum sedule provo-
catur, presertim dum et a nostris vestrisque inimicis adversa
nobis de ipsis partibus adnuntiantur. Unde desiderium magnum
nobis inheret, vestrae sospitatis gaudia addiscere et vestris
salutaribus profectibus gratulari et contra inimicorum contri-
tionem agnoscere. Pro quo quaesumus, ut certos nos, sicut de-
deramus, per vestros nuntios de vestra prOSperitate et lae-
titia reddere iubeatis quoniam vestra salus nostra est pros-
peritate et vestra exaltatio nostrum procul dubio est gaudium
et immense securitas."

18 Ibid., Ep. XXVIII (no. 35, Praemissis nostris -- Jaffe-
Yattenbach, 2355), p. 532: "...ut noster animus maxima iocun—
ditatis exultet laetitia; quoniam nimio desiderio fervescimus,
vestram sedule addiscere scepitatem et de vestro gaudio exul-
tare; quoniam vestra salus exaltatio est sanctae matris ves-
trae ecclesiae et prOSperitas vestra nostra esse probatur lae—
titia." Somewhat later Paul interceded on Tassilo's behalf to
try to bring peace between him and Pepin, Ibid.. Ep. XXXVI
(no. 39. Cum regalis -- Jaffé-Jattenbach, 2353), pp. 545-546.
The attempt failed.

 

 

13o

father, and in his letters he always referred to them e.s
patricians of the Romans. On several occasions he addressed
letters to the brothers, linking them with their father in
praise, complimenting them on their behaviour and praying

for their prOSperity and aid for the church.19 Paul was clear-
ly anxious to instill in the minds of these youn3 men a no-
tion of the reSponsibility of their position and a desire

to discharge it with honor and dedication.40

 

19 Ibid., pr. MXIII (no. 26, Olim omnipotens -- Jaffe-
Uattenbach, 2360), XX HIT (no. 30, Quanto decoris -- Jaffé- at-
tenbach, 2362), XI JI (no. 36, Lissam relationem -- Jaffé date
tenbach. 2353). pp 530 531 539-540. 543-

20 Paul's success in this regard was only partial. In
769 there seems to have been some sort of quarrel between the
two youn3 kings, Annales Regni Francorum, a. 769, p. 28. In
the next year the dowager, Queen Bertrada, went off to Italy
to make peace with the Lombards and arranr5 ed a marriage alli-
ance with the Lombards for Charles, Annalee Einhardi, a. 770,
p. 31, of. Codex Carolinus, up. XL} (no. W7 Dum omnium --
Jaffé-fiattenbach, 2381), pp. 560-563. Then in 771 the papacy
underwent a violent revolution and an accommdation with Des-
iderius was ma«e. It would seem that after the divisio of 768
a Frankish party opposed to Pepin's Italian policy and repre-
sented by Queen Bertrada attained an influence over Charles
and got him to seek peace with Desiderius, Martin Lintzel,
"Karl der Grosse und Karlmann", 3g, CXL (1929 ), 8-12. Carlo-
mann, however, was opposed to this course and refused to aban-
don his father's policies, Ibid.. p. 12. By 771 Charles, the
pope and Desiderius had reached a position of understanding
and Carlomann was isolated. This precipitated the murder of
Christopher and the Lombard control over Home was achieved in
that year. At this point the alliance seemed wrecked and the
Italian situation to have reverted to a more normal situation,
but in the same year Carlomann died and Charles usurped his
heirs' ri hts ca using: them to flee to Desider ius, Annalee 1e;-
ni Fraxcorur a. 771, p. 32. In 7'72 the papac came into
strong hands once more and EECdrian I renewed the policy of the
alliance. In a stroke the situation as of 767 had been restor-
ed. Desiderius had overreached himself by eSpousin3 the cause
of Carlomann's h irs an:i the affair of 771 had shown Charles
that Desiderius Ias gettin3 too powerful. If a balance was to
be held in Italy the papacy had to be suported. The alliance
went back into operation and Within two years Desiderius was
destroyed.

 

131

The work of the church performed by Pepin and expected
of Charles and Carlomann was of such importance, and because

of this importance so meritorious, that for Pepih there could
m . 21
be no suitable earthly reward ~- only sod could repay him.

His credits were piling up in heaven and a regal crown await-
ed him.22 The names of Pepin and his sons would be inscribed
with those of David, Solomon and the other saints in the Rina-
dom of heaven.23

If Paul exalted Pepin and the Arnulfinz family he did
not lack words of praise for the entire Frankish people. Since
the race of the Franks under the Arnulfin3s fulfilled the com-
mands of God at Paul's behest, they would be rewarded with

earthly pretm ess and dominion, for Pepin would be made the
24

victor over all barbarian nations. God e: (tended his hand

 

21 Codex Ce rolinns, 3p. XXII (no. 28, Ad referendas --
Jaffé-sattenbach, 23H8), p. 525: "...neque praemiorum huius
mundi ad horum remunerationem digna vobis possunt rependi; ver-
umtamen est...Deus, qui iusta caelestis re3ni gaudia et vic-
toriae triumphum inpertire ac retribuere exoellentiae vestrae
potest."

22 Ibid., Ep. XLIII (no. L3, Explere verbis -- Jaffé~vat-
tenbach, 2373), p. 557: "...tu...de quo ism repositam sibi inn
celestibus arcibus praemiorum credat consequi remunerationem.
Ibid.. Ep. XXXI (no. 22, Praecelsae et a Deo II -- Jaffe--..at:I
tenbach, 2358), p. 537: "...quatenus repositam sibi in cael-
estibus re3ni coronam mercedis a domino Deo nostro percipere
mereatur. " Ibid., Ep. XXXV (no. 30, Quanto decoris -- Jaffe-
iattenbach, 2362), p. 543: "...sicut in preesenti vita regal-
em vobis concessit di3nite tem, ita quoque et caelestia vobis
conferat preemiorum 3audia. "

 

23 Ibid.. Hp. XXXIII (no. 26, Olim omnipotens -- Ja ffé-
Iattenbach, #2360), p. 5H0: "...et cum David at Salemone regi-
bus...vestra in caeles tibus re3 nis adscripta sunt nomina."
Ibid., Ep. XLIII (no. 43, Explere verbis -- Jaffé-Jattenbach,
2373), p. 557: "Unde merito,...cum egregio 1110 ac praecipuo
David rege et eximio prophetarum in celestibus re3nis partic-
ipem te esse...."

over Pepin, his fanily ani the whole kin3dom of the Franks
and he gives them victory and will cause their enemies to fall

’9
before them...“5 As Spiritual immortality rewards individuals

who served Sod, earthly immortality would aarue to this people

and the kingdom of the Franks would be conserved until the
end of time.26

The policy of ma intainin3 as close a contact with Pepin
as possible was also pursued by more tan3ib1e methods. Paul

maintained cons itant contact With Pepin thr ough frequent visits
of his Qééél and the maintenance of resident legates in Francia.
Uilcharius, Bishop of Komentum, was sent to Francia in 758

and except for a trip to Ron e in 759 he seems to have stayed
there until 760. George, Bishop of Ostia, was sent to Francia
in 758 and stayed indefinately. Peter, possibly a Cardinal
priest, was sent in 760 and also stayed indefinitely, and

it may also be assumed that Karinus was serving as resident

7

. 2
legate in Francis.

Other means of cementin: affection adepted by Pope Paul

 

24 Ibii.. Ep. XVII (no. 18, Quotiens perspicua -- Jaffe-
lattenbach, “2341), p. 516: "...victorem te super omnes bar—
baras nationes faciat."

25 Ibid.. Ep. X‘(II (no. 28, Ad referendas -- Jaff -Jatten-
bach, 23535. p. 526 "Deus autem omnipotens de throne suae
maies tatis super vos re3numque vestrum atque amantissimam con-
iugem...vestros quidem carnales natos...nec non et super uni-
versum Francorum populum reSpicere digneretur et sui brachii
dexteram super vos extendat atque victorias vobis de caelo

concedat omnesque adversaries ante faciem vestram prosternat
N

26 19l230 E . XXXVII (no. 3. Votiva cordis -- Jaffe-
Wattenbach, 236M), p, 538. ,

27 See Appendix B.

7’2
12'.)

A

were the cedinv of it. Soracte to Pep-1mgC the dedication of
St. Petronilla's tomb to the Franks,29 and the gift of relics
to Frankish religious houses as a mark of gratitude and frieni
ship.30 He also dedicated in Home a church of St. Denis. St.
Denis was a church of which "the name evokes an event of
capital importance in the history of the eighth century: the
journey of Stephen II to Francia".31 Its dedication was "truly
a Monument to the alliance'" and a "'memorial of the foun-
dation of the young Roman state'".32 St. Denis was the patron
saint of the Franks and the dedication of this church in home
was thus a mark of honor which is especially meaningful in
those circumstances.

The pope thus followed a careful policy of cultivating
understanding and friendship with the Franks, by diplomacy,
gesture and word. This much is obvious and undeniable. On
the other hand, however, some have questioned whether this
policy was successful. It has been argued that Pepin knew
nothing of Stephen II's plans to create a state and did not
expect him to demand what he did and that after 756 Pepin

felt that he had been duped by Stephen and had decided to

 

28 £§$§., Ep. XXIII (no. 31, Salubri providentia ~-
Jaffé-Nattenbaoh, 2349), pp. 526-527.

29 gpig.. Ep. XIV (no. 15, Lator praesentium -- Jaffe-
Wattenbach, 2338), pp. 511-512.

0 "QT‘ (\ 'i “ V
3 Annales Fuldenses, a. 765, hen, SE, I, ed. 3. R. Pertz
(Hannover, 18267, p. 3H7.
31 Baumont, p. 11: "Le nom evoquait l'événement capital
dans l'histoire de la papaute du VIIIe 815016: 18 voyage d'
Etienne II en France."

 

2
3 Ib d. "...vraiment un 'monument de l'alliance'...un
'memorial de la fondation du jeune état romain'".

131;
0 9 Q? —. ‘
have nothing more do do with the p pe.” nothine could be
further from the truth. Ihe state in question was already in
existence and Pepin himself became an officer of it. Jhat was

demanded of him was What he had promised. he has been argued

above, the fact that Pepin made no expeditions to Italy after

f‘S‘

756 is not significant in terms of his attitude towards t e

alliance. While it is true that Pepin made no further exped-

itions under arms to discipline the Lombards, this was due

primarily to several factors quite divorced from any desire

on his part to escape from the responsibilities of the alliance,
In the first place Pepin, after 756, nay not have had

sufficient support from his nobles to continue direct inter-

vention in Italy. Therefore his policy had to be conducted

along more cautious lines.3u Second y, there was no need to

field an army in Italy in the years 757-767 since there was

no danger great enough and present enough to warrent it. Des-

J

iderius had not Opened hostilities against home and the “reek
threat of invasion was never more than a rumor. Thirdly, he
had too many great problens to deal with north of the Alps.
In 758 a campaign in Saxony occupied his attention, and from
760 until his death he was engaged in a protracted war with

Jaifar, Duke of Aquitaine.35 It is also reported in Lamberti

 

33

Eoienberg. p. 105.

b,
3' Kohr, Studien, pp. 46-Q7.

35 -

2H. Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 41, p. 194.

Annalee Begni Francorum, a. 758. 760-767, pp. 15, 78'

(xi-o

JJ

“1. ..no . ”.1. . '".:.1 .-i - -
Lnnale: tiat the Franas suiierei a defeat at .eiuahihurc at
#

 

dentifiel slavic bands. Under the cir-

*Jo

the handr cf some un
cuuetences Pepin could not and did not need to do more W n
intervene dipl ornatical ly. One ought to realize that if the
need had arisen for further arned irtei We ntion to stave off an
armed enemy before Home, a Frsnhis. host would have n: r cim
throu h the Alpine passes in sh rt order! In fact such action
was never nee de? and astute diplomacy achieved the ends of
the union. Pepin approached the problem after a practical
fashior, de termi ined to fulfill his oblig« ations to Paul yet to
avoid the necessity of a military confrontation. Hence, he
avoided demanding of Desiderius Vhat Desiderius could not
give. Hence, he naturally i3nored the southern duchies in 759
-- their commenM tion tas of dubious le3a.lity and unnecessary
to maintain the pope's position. To have pushed the matter
mi3 t have provoked real we: . The fact is that Pepin and Paul
enjoyed constant, close, and amicable relations.

Though the legations sent to Italy by Pepin were of
short duration, they were numerous and one may be reasonably
certain that a Frankish missps was nearly always with the
pope. Indeed, one may 3ain an idea of the big h importance
attached to the alliance by a survey of the rank of the rissi
sent to Italy by Pepin —— they were all important
Lan3bard, Rodbert, Felix and hucbald were all described as

inlus tri viri. Andreas and Gunderic were described as sol e —

 

 

 

36 smberti Annale s, a. \
Pertz (Hannover, lc39), p. 36.

 

13:5

tissimi viri. Vulfard was Abbot of St. Martin's of Tours,

 

Jidmar of St. Biquier, Drocteeang of Gemeticense and Earibert
of hurbacense. Gerbert was simply described as an abbot.
Bemedius was the Archbishop of Rouen and was the brother of
Pepin. Autcharius was a duke and Dodo was a count. Conibert
was simply described as a vassal of Pepin and Simeon as a
monk. Wichad and Immo were unidentified by the pope as to
rank and Flaginus was a chaplain.37
hence there is absolutely no 3round for the assertion
that Pepin avoided his commitnsent to Home. Quite the con-
trary, he took the office of patricius Romanorum seriously
and kept his promises to Stephen and St. Peter. The best ev-
idence of this is the total lack of inorimination or threat
in the correSpondence of the pope. If Pepin had failed or
perjured himself we may be sure that Paul would have howled
his an3er and disappointment and threatened Pepin instead of
praising him. Hence, if Paul's letters are to be a guide then
it must be concluded that Pepin satisfied Paul on all points
and that the alliance was maintained in spirit and deed. In-
deed, it would be facetious to assume that a man of Pepin's
mold, having promised in the most solemn manner in the presence
of the church's chief moral judge to serve St. Peter, would
have the temerity to 30 back on his word, all the while be-
lieving, as he would have, that the one he so deceived had the

power to damn him eternally!

 

37 See Appendix B.

137

It has been arqued by various scholars that the office
of patrician made Pepin the pope's constitutional superior.39
This argument was previously refuted. It is, however, true
that the effects of the events from 755 to 767 were such that
by the end of that period the holders of the patriciate had
become the masters of the pope and of the alliance. Several
factors tended to lead in that direction.

First there was the fact that the papacy needed the
Frankish king. The papacy was, in practical terms, the weaker
party to the alliance and had to depend upon the protection
and aid offered by Pepin. Thoueh there was no constitutional
or legal around for this process, the process is in a sense
a classical example of the deveIOpment of legal dependency.
Thus thoueh the argument that Paul's election was conducted
under Frankish auspices because Paul was Pepin's subordinate
through the alliance of 75439 has no validity in fact, it is
nonetheless necessary to appreciate that difficulties over
the election and the partisanship of some Romans for Theophy-
lact meant that Paul needed a Frankish guarantee of his posi-

40

tion. Immo, Pepin's missus, provided such a guarantee. Thus

the Franks, in effect, took part in the election and as guar-

 

38 See page 67, note 17.

39 Heimbucher, pp. M2-b3.

U0 Codex Carolinus, Ep. XII (Gun gravi gemitu -- Jaffe-
flattenbach, 2336), p. 508. A curious note on the role of Inmo
in Rome is provided by the Benedicti Chronicon, cap. 20, p.706
which speaks of a 759 trip of Pepin to Rome (T) where he aid-
ed in Paul's election

 

13.0,

antor's of Paul's position acquired a de facto superiority
which was not defined de iure. havinw once secured the elec-
tion of Pope Paul Pepin immediately acted to elicit a pledge
of loyalty to Paul from the Romansf’L1 The mere fact that the
Romans attested such a pledge to Pepin indicated the degree
to which he was attaininm the superior position. Similarly,
the external weakness of Paul and the fact that he depended
absolutely on the real or implied military support of Pepin
emphasized his dependence. The point is that he who must re-
peatedly ask aid of another is in a position inherently in-
ferior to that of him upon whom he depends.

Second, the theological negotiations of 766-767 with
the Greeks served to emphasize Paul's dependence upon Pepin.
In these affairs Paul was thrust into the secondary role of
waiting upon another's decision: That this should happen to
one whose position entails that he claims supreme theological
and dogmatic authority is doubly significant. In 766-767
Pepin was the arbiter of dogma. Indeed, he became the judae
of the pope.

Third, the theoretical role develOped for Pepin by Paul
gave Pepin a superior position. According to this theory
Pepin was the elect of God, Paul the elect of men. while Paul
was the mere temporal vicar of Peter, Pepin was the fellow of
Moses, David and Solomon. Indeed, the Franks were the chosen

people of the new era and their king was the lord of all

 

L

139

Christian society and first amona the saved.

The conditions of the alliance of 754 were thus slirhtly
altered. xhile the pope Spared no effort to make the alliance
more secure and insure its continuity, he also created a role
for the holders of the patriciate which tended to give theor-
etical basis to the natural course of events by which the
patricians became senior partners to the alliance. hence, by
the end of Paul's pontificate the patricians were definitely
the pOpe's mentors and a firm first step had been taken toward
the creation of the full-blown ecclesiological role adopted
by Charlemagne. The pontificate of Paul, then, is of utmost-
significance inasmuch as there emerge in 757-767 two facts
of singular importance in the series of events and ideas lead-
ing to the coronation of Charlemagne in 800: the nascent ec-
clesiological idea of the role of the Frankish king and the
unconstitutional situation by which a mere king became the
mentor of the spiritual head of the East and the temporal
head of the respublica Romanorum. The one made the coronation

of 800 possible, the other made it necessary.

The ecclesiastical republic of the Romans was not est-
ablished overniaht. fibers was no particular moment one can
positively indicate before which there was no republic and
after which there was. The idea of the state matured slowly-
in the curia through several pontificates. iven when the
period of priest-kings was begun under Stephen II the idea
of the republic was not developed to a point of clear focus,
and it has been pointed out above how this open—endedness of
of the curial idea contributed to the historical context of
the pontificate of Paul.

The republic was a vague entity and it did not know it-
self. Its development had been gradual and vague. Its defin-
ition of its rights was ambiguous. Its relationship to its
secular protector was undefined, and it had no constitution.
The government of the republic had never been consciously
established and was not based on a plan of any sort -- it
simply grew out of the situation. The papacy had historically
exercised great influence on the secular government of home
and Italy, and after ca. 726 the papal curia simply took over
various political tasks. as the pope became more and more the

head of the state the curia became the administrative body of
1140

1C1
1

T1"3 3901-113]? St9+C. .3111; CV81”! though a 13

H

8? bureseracy had

been developed, a crucial weakness characterized the govern—

l The twenty—five cardinal priests formed a senate of
sorts While the seven cardina.l deacons supervised the local
government, assisted by fourteen subdeacons, Duchesne, Be in-
nings of the temppral sovereignty, p. 62. .he central admini-
stration was carried on by the primicerius and the secundiar-
ius as chief secretaries to the pope, finance was handled by
the arcarius and sacellarius and justice by the nomenclator,
Calisse. p. 119 The proto-s crinarius ran the chancellor's of~
fice, probably under the direction of the primicerius, Ibid.

he administration of the lands of the pope was under the var-
ious rejionarii, Ibid. The exercitus lionanus was comrahded by
the military aristocracy tepped by the dukes, but after ca.
750 the office of the chief duke, the Duke of home, was drOp-
ped and the army came to be directly subject to the direction
of t2e EOpe, Duchesne. Beginnings of the Temporal sovereigpty,
pp. .0- 2.

One exception to the unified rule of the republic under
the pope was that the area around davenna was run as a pro-
vince. The ArchbishOps of Ravenna had been traditionally jeal-
ous of Rome and continually tried to escape its jurisdiction.
Under Stephen II the archbishop had tried to provide for the
autonomy of his province by cooperation with Aistulf after the
exarchate ceased to be. Shortly after Aistulf had been defeated
by Pepin and his power within Ravenna broken the citizens of
Ravenna revolted aqainst the archbishop, Sereius, and had sent
him in chains to Rome to be judged and punished by the pope,

De Sancto Sergio, Agnelli Liber Pontificalis Ravennatis, ed.

0. Folder-Eager, SSS, SS. rer. Lane. (Hannover, 1878), p. 379.
When Paul became pepe he made an effort to solve the problem,
though his success was only temporary, by makins Serqius his
Viceroy in Ravenna and the Pentapolis, and thoush S ervius Seems
to have achieved considerable autonomy in his area, it remaine
part of the republic and friction between the two men came to
an end. Sergius seems to have carried out Paul's orders, repor-
ted to him on conditions and otherwise to have been loyal.

This may, however, have been because Paul did not pursue the
matter too hard and exercised a nominal control only. Cf. ng-
ex Carolinus, Ep. XIV (no. 15, Later praesentium -- Jaffé-éat-
tenbach, 2338). p. 512 concerning Sergius’ release and reinstate—
ment and also Ep. XLIX (no. 51, Pervenit ad nos -- Jaffe-Jatten-
bach, 2408). pp. 568-569 and Agnellus' life of Sergius (pp.
379- -381) for the conditions of Sergius' rule in Bavenna under
Paul. After Sergius died there was a disputed succession in the
pontificate of Stephen III, following which Leo became the leg-
itimate archbishop, Vita Stephanii III, in Liber Pontificalis,
I. 477-478. Leo pursued a more agressive policy of autonomy

and tried to escape Rome's rule under Hadrian I, Codex Qgro-
linus, Ep. XLIX (no. 51, Pervenit ad nos -- Jaffé:£attenbach,
25085. pp. 568-569.

 

 

 

 

 

1&2

ment: the entire stability of this administration depended
upon the pope. His prestige and office alone gave the curia
its mandate to govern. In other words, the especial weakness
of this government Was the relative non-institutionalization
of power. Political power attached to the person of the pOpe
and the necessity of an interregnum followind the pope's death2
meant that in a sense there was no source of power since
there Was no pOpe. The powers of the interim rulers were de-
rived from service to a pope -- not from a constitutional
right. It is during such a period of transition from one pope
to another that the system was most vulnerable. It is also
the case that under such a system the stability and contin-
uity of the administration depended greatly on the character
and personality of the pOpe.

The powers held by the pope by the time of the pontif-
icate of Paul I were absolute. In Rome and the republic all
officers were papal officers, justice was the pOpe's Justice
and the army was the pope's army.3 From this situation emerg-
ed the chief danaer to the papal regime: the military aris-
tocracy which was in control of the army but which was not
included in the power structure. Previously the nobles had
been rulers and they had been accustomed to elect the Duke

of Home, the chief civil and military magistrate, from among

 

2 dhen the pOpe died the administration fell to the arch-
priest, archdeacon and the primicerius, cf. C. Bayet, "Les el-
ections pontificales sous les carolinqiennes au VIII et au.IX
siecle", SS, XXIV (1884), 51-52.

3 d. Sickel, "Die Vertraqe der Papste mit den Karolindern"
DZG, XI (1894), 329-330.

143

their own number. As the duke began to become the pope% sub-
ordinate the power of the nobles began to Wane. Then, after
750, the office of the duke disappeared and administration
and all power in the state fell to the servants of the pope,
the nobility found itself disenfranchised.“

The republic thus found itself beset by a potentially
powerful, disgruntled minority, resentful of government by
clerics, and this particular weakness was aggravated by ano-
ther: the existence of conflictina parties within the curia.
The dominant and most powerful of these parties was that which
carried out the papal revolution -- those of the curia stand-
ing for independence and the concept of curial rule. The pow-
er of this party was buttressed by support from the majority
of the people of Home and the republic. Alongside it existed
a group opposed to movini away from the empire and a party
favoring an approach to the Lombards.

The aristocratic opposition to the curia was probably
not included in any_of these parties. In all liklihood the
aristocracy's goal was simply to acquire power in the state
-- this was to be achieved by supporting curial opposition to
the revolutionaries in hopes of splitting the curia and gain-
ing power. Even during the early years of the revolution ele-
ments of the Roman aristocracy supported the Greeks, solely
in order to dOWn the pOpe. Then when the Greek power was fin-

ally eclipsed they tried approaching Aistulf, hOpine to use

 

u Amann, p. 33.

lad
a Lombard attack to brine down the dominant circle.S
As the alliance of 754 broueht so many other basic
chances in Italy's political structure, so did it radically
effect the alternatives of action open to the Roman aristo-
cracy. The creation of the alliance with the Franks meant
the eclipse of aristocratic opportunity for direct action
within the state, and the support of the curia by the Franks
during the pontificates of Stephen II and Paul I made open
Opposition too dangerous. But the existence of this alliance,
as it altered the conditions of Roman politics, determined
the methods of future aristocratic opposition. If the papacy
was too strongly supported to permit Open aristocratic oppo-
sition, the only course open to the aristocracy was to attempt
to control part of the curia and perhaps even to control the
pope. To elect a pepe as a puppet of their party became the
aristocratic aoal. This was tried for the first time in 757.6

It has been argued that TheOphylact. Paul's rival, was either

pro-Greek or pro-Lombard,7 but in actual fact Theophylact's

 

5 Eenedicti Chronicon, cap. 17. p. 703: "Tune surrerer-
unt viri Romani scelerati, et intimaverunt Astolfu regi, ut
venirent et possiderunt Tuscie finibus et Romanum imperium
usurparent." It may be this incident Which is meant when a
Lombard party is spoken of, of. Leon Homo, Home médiévalg
(Paris, 1956). p. #2. ifi

6 Vita Pauli, p. #63: "...populus huius Ponanae urbis
divisus est; et alii cum TheOphylacto archidiacono tenentes
in eius demo conaregati residebant....plurima pars iudicum et

pOpuli cum eo Paul tenentes quam cum predicto TheOphylacto
I!

 

7 Diehl. l'administration, p. 232. Rudolf Baxmann, gig
Politik der Papste von Sreeorgl_bis Gregor VII, 2 Ede. (Liber-
feldt, 1968), I, 251 claims that he was pro-Lombard.'The pos-
sibility of that is slight, Joseph Lanaen, Geschichte der ro-
nische Kirche, h Ede. (Bonn, 1885), II. 669n.

 

 

 

 

*il'll

1M5

personal views are less important than the fact he was a pos-
sible tool of the aristocracy.8 TheOphylact represented no
more than a small portion of either the curia or the public,
While on the other hand, the revolutionary party which had
brought off the creation of the alliance and the extension

of the republic was likely to have enjoyed the majority of
confidence and support among both the members of the curia
and the non-aristocratic elements of the public. Under honest
and Open conditions Paul could not lose, and Immo's presence
in Home insured the election arainst aristocratic violence

or corruption.

There has always been some confusion concernin: the nature
of Paul's governance of the city and the republic. Lhough
there has been some argument that both Stephen and Paul were
dominated by Christopher, Who served both popes as primicer-
ius,9 this was not true. The fact that Christopher lost con-
trol of the situation in 767 as soon as Paul was dead shows
that it was Paul who was the strong hand in the state, not
Christopher. Indeed, Paul's rule was a harsh one; he seems
to have applied heavy taxation and kept his prisons crowded,
ordering many executions.10 In all probability this harsh-

ness was directed chiefly at the main authors of discontent

 

8 Bayet, 3;, XXIV (1884), 54, argues that Theophylact
was the choice of the clergy, but there is no ground for such
an assertion.

9 3. Mayer, Dsk, XIV (190a). ?.

10 Barry, D. 84. Duchesne. Liber_Pontif10311§. I, béén.
"Le pape Paul parait avoir gouverng durement."

 

1246

-- the lay aristocracy.ll On the other hand Paul seems to
have shown a lack of ability to carry his policy throuwh at
critical moments. Thus he punished the treason of Karinus
only lirhtly,12 and then eventually pardoned him.13 His bio-
grapher notes that he often felt compassion for condemned
men and freed them.lLL

hence it is necessary to conclude that the greatest
failure of the pontificate of POpe Paul was the failure to
give more concrete form to the constitution of the republic
and to find some way of accornfiating the aspirations of the
aristocratic faction to have power in the state. Through the
treaties of 755 and 756 the republic had acquired larye tracts
of land of value and became corres nondinely wealthy and pow-
erful. It would be a most abnormal situation if the lay ar-
istocracy should not desire to share in the "ana~erent of

such a state. It would also be curious if a powerful minority

 

11 Vita §§ephanii_III, p. U75. Pseudo-pope Constantine
(the aristocratic usurperf said at his trial that the people
made him pope "...propter .grabamina ac praeiudicia 111a quae
Romano populo in cesserat donno Iaulus papa." Concilium Roman-
um , IGH, LL: Sectio III, I, 1. ed. A. Vernin hoffLTParnover,
139%; p. 78: "...multa Paulus papa Rona.nis intulit praeiudi-
tia, pro quibus conspecendis me [Cons tantiné] constituerunt
pontificem."

12 Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXV (no. 20, Omnino conpertum --
Jaffé-Sattenbach, 2352i, pp. 529-530.

 

 

 

13 Ibid., E
attenbach, M2356 , p. 535.

14 Vita Pauli, p. #63: "3t 81 pro modico quemquan per in—
iquos satelittes tribulabat, in proximo tamen, pietate notus,
consolationis illi inferebat misericordiam...Sed et carceres
atque alia claustra per eedem noctium secreta visitabat; et
si quos ibidem inveniebat retrusos, a mortis eruens periculo
liberos ire relaxabat.

p. XXIX (no. 37. Wximiae et a Deo -- Jaffe-
)

 

1%?

which had once ruled and had then been reduced to a position
of political impotence should not wish to rezain its position.
The monOpolization of power in the curia, then, created a
tense situation. In such a situation it was foolishness to
refuse to allow a share of the power not to fall into noble
hands, particularly when the military system of the state de-
pended upon aristocratic leadership. The reaction of Paul to
the strong undercurrent of dissent among the lay aristocracy
was predictable yet unwise and danfierous. Unrest was met with
repression and indifference. Further unrest could only result.
Paul's rule was strong enough to contain the unrest, but as,
his life slipped away the aristocratic reaction begs in full
force. The responsibility for the chaos of 767-772 must lay
with Paul in some sense.

In June, 757, Pope Paul lay under the final illness and
the affairs of the curia fell to the care of Christopher the
Primicerius. But it appears that with the pope all but dead
and expected to be so momentarily, the functionina of the
administration could not be taken for granted. A plot had
already begun under the leadership of Duke Toto of Nepi to
hasten the end and elect as pope Toto's brother Constantine.15

Who. as a candidate of the aristocracy would insure a renewal

 

15 Concilium Romanum._269. pp. 83—84: "'Contigit per
transactam quintam indiccionem mense Iunio die vicesima nona
sanctae recordacionis domnum Paulum papam de hac luce divina
vocatione fuisse subtractum. Dum vero in eadem decumberet in-
firmitate, de qua et vitam finivit, illico areptus a diabolo
quidam Nempesini cppidi ortus, Toto nomine, cum suis germanis

atque aliis nefariis complicibus nitebantur eum interficere
fl

1MB

of noble participation in government. Christopher was able to
stave off the actual murder of the expirina pope, but could
not prevent the election of Constantine immediatly followinr
Paul's demise.16 The repression of the adherents of the old
regime began immediately, though Christopher escaped.l7 The
nobles seemed then to be the victors; they had control of

Home and the curia and the principal adherents of the old

curial party were in flight. But after Constantine had worn

 

16 Ibid.. p. 84: "...quod mea infelicitas audiens, hoc
fieri prohibui et convocato eodem Totone vel reliquis iudici-
bus in domucellam meam salutaribus eos adgressus sum monitus
et validis exortatus sum adiuracionibus a tanto reatus flag-
icio caveri. Et vix tandem aliquando eorum procacissimum val-
ui flectere mentem. ne in tali tantoque se inmiscerent pia-
culo. Post haev vero affertis in eadem domo pusillitatis meae
sacrosanctis Christi quattuor evangeliis et venerabili chris-
mate et ceteris Dei mysteriis (sacramentu)m mutuo praebuimus,

uod nullus extra alium eleccionem pontificatus egisset,
?nisi) eum quem ex (suo cons)ilio divine providentia tribuis-
set ex corpore sanctae nostrae ecclesiae, videlicet de sacer-
dotibus (vel diaconi)bus iuxta huius apostolicae sedis trad-
itionem nobis eligeremus antistitem et prestito inter nos eo-
dem (sacramento). eorum credidimus sponsioni. adfirmates et
hoc in eodem sacramenti foedere, ut neminem rusticorum...do-
manae urbis subiacencium castrorum in hanc civitatem ingregi
permitteremus. Illi vero (adiura)ntes...iudicium, in periurii
reatum delapsi sunt et. plurem rusticorum catervam in hanc
Romanam intromitten(tes) urbem, (coe)pere cum armis ostiliter
cuneos constituere. Et dum haec agerentur, saepefatus domnus
Paulus...in iudicio exalavit spiritum. et de praesenti omnes
unanimiter properantes in basilica apostolorum in ipso domin-
ico die denuo sacraments populo prebuimus ob conservandas un-
icuique iustitiae. His vero peractis et cunctis propriis don-
ibus revertentibus, repente adgregantes ipsi nefarius Toto vel
eius germanus Constantinus universam rusticorum cohortem brachio
forti, hisdem Constantinus laicus existens cum armis apostol-
icam invasit sedem et clericus in eodem patriarchio effectus
est."

17 Ibid.. p. 85: "1111 autem concipientes tristiciam cor-
dis mei primitus quidem interficere facientes Gregorium ducem,
habitatorem provinciae Campaniae, ob mei interitum et post-
modum moliebant et me interficere...." Christopher was allowed
to leave Home with his son, Sergius the secundarius.

cur

2e tiara barely a ye‘r Jhristophcr succeeded in xvihint Lor-

bard support to retaxe the city, ej ct Constantine, and elect

as pope a iocile man of his awnchoasiuw.1j I: has been Wide-
ly felt that the choice fell on Stephen III because he has
estimated to be "\ak ari easily controlled. In fact he turned
out to be so -- but who would control him? Stephen III soon
began to resent being herded by Christopher, who also had the
disadvantafe of havina many and powerful enemies. Coming un-
der the influence of these enemies, Stephen III tossed his
erstwhile master to the wolves so that for awhile it seemed

the t Des iderius had at last won the upper M ‘.3.19

 

18 Vita Stephanii III, pp. 469-470. Christopher and

Serfiius "...adiurantes firmiter fheodicinm ducem Spoletinum
et eos trs ns Padun ad Jesiderium suum deduxisset...nitentes
ob hoc redenptionem sanctae Dei ecclesiae per ficere; eosque
sdem Spolet inus dux ad suuw deportavit reriz. 3t d“* ti“.s
obtutibus praesertati fuissent, obni7 e eundem re fem deprecati
sunt eis aux iliun tribui ut talis novit atis error a: ecclesia
Dei amputaretur....3um vcro haec a erentur, coriurirwnrt “rte-
fatus Christophorus et Sergius ir civitete Seatinew, ohsolut-
ia Ion otardorum rege. it praec ceder tee Sergius et Jaldipertus
presbiter cum Restinis et Eurconinis atque eliis Lnnrohardis
ducatus Spolitir.i , eoniunXerunt subito ac repent LC in hanc Ho-
xanam urtt , KKvIllI die Iulii mensis, indictiore V1, veepere
....Hoc cerc audiens Toto et Passibus germani fratres, ignor-
antes in;enium et dolum quod ei proditores inierunt, cucurrer~
unt cl. licts ti? sd...portan....(Ioto killed)...Passibus
vero in Lateranense furiit...adnurtiars suo "ernaro Corstan-
tino quae gesta fuerunt. Boo vero Sue ito fugiit isdem Cons tan-
tinis...." After a brief ixterlude durin_ which Christopher
and Sergius foiled a Lombard plot to take advantage of the
situation 1y electiné the-1r our pop e, Christopher was able to
secure the e-3 ection of Stephen III.

19 gpi3,, pp. £79-U79: "...coniunxit ad beatum Eetrun
antedictus Desiderius rex cum suo...exercitu....Praefatus si-
quidem Paulus [fifiarta] et eius nefandissin'i sequaces, inito
cum praedicto...reve consilio nitebantur populum Eonantw con-
tra eos sedueere ad insurgendun contra praedictes “iriwconhor-
um et Sergium, ut eos interficerent." ChristOpher and Lervius
then went to plead with Stephen III to save ther but they

 

150

Hence the most serious flaw in the republic was that its
government simply firew and was not the result of any sort of
planning. As the nobles were gradually excluded from govern-
ment their resentment grew and as resentment grew they were
repressed by Paul so that their repression finally ended in

the attempted coup d'etat of 767, and the consequent weaker-

were betrayed. In this situation it seems that Desiderius
was able to approach Stephen III through Paul Afiarta. Afiarta
was Christopher's chief enemy within the curia and a natural
ally of Desiderius who had never forqotten how Christopher
blocked his election of Philip in 768. The Lombard element
Within the curia got through to the pOpe and it was his ab-
andonment of his counselor which allowed him to be killed.
Cf. Duchesne, Beginnings of the temporal sovereignty, p. 32.
Also see Ottorino Bertolini, "La Caduta del Primicerio Crist-
oforo". BSCI, I (1947), 364-374, for a study of the Opposi-
tion of Afiarta and ChristOpher. According to Bertolini the
768 divisio and the consequent ambiguity of Frankish policy
weakened the position of Christopher, p. 368. Afiarta's pro-
Lombardism was directed to coform with the new policy laid
out by Queen Bertrada with her son Charles in tow, pp. 368-
369. This line of reasoning seems to be most acceptable. After
the murder of Christopher and Sergius Stephen III wrote a
letter to Charles and Bertrada charging that a conspiracy to
kill him had been hatched by Carlomann's missus Dodo and
Christopher and that Desiderius had come to his aid, Codex
Carolinus, Ep. XLVIII (no. 50, Cum magno dolore -- Jaffg-
Hattenbach, 2388), p. 566: "...nefandissimus Christophorus

et Sergius...consilium inientes cum Dodone, misso germano
tui... nos interficere insideabant. Unde cum eodem Dodone

et eius Francis, cum aliquibus eorum nequissimis consentan-
eis aggregantes exercitum, super nos in Lateranensium...cum
armis ingressi sunt, confringentes et ianuas atque omnes cor—
tinas ipsius venerandi patriarchii lanceiss perforantes, at-
que intus in basilicam domni Theodore papae, ubi nullus aus-
us est alquando vel etiam cum culto ingredi, cum loricis et
lanceis, ubi sedebamus, introierunt; sicque ipsi maligni viri
insidiabant nos interficere....Et vix per multum ingenium,
dum hic apud nos excellentissimus filius noster, Desiderius
...." Though this letter is in all probability merely an
attempt to cover up what really happened (Louis halphen, "La
papauté et le complot Lombard de 771", 33. CLXXXII (1938),
2&2-244), it does indicate that Stephen III and Afiarta were
trying to accOMWdate Charles' new policy vis-a-vis Desiderius
and that Carlomann, holding out for his father's policy was
in the opposition.

 

151

ing of the state allowed the troubles of 771 to occur. Lothinr
seems to have been learned from this for the further reaction
within the curia led by Christopher was to further hinder
aristocratic participation by reshiction of the candidature

of papal elections in 769.20 The nobles had discovered the

key to the situation in control of the government through
control of the pOpe. Indeed the struggle to control the pope
furnished a backdrop for Roman domestic politics far into the
future and the partisan struggles of the Orsini and Colona

were pre-fizured in 767.

 

20 Concilium Romanum1 269. P9- 86‘88-

PART III

COFCLUSION

152

COJCLUSIOH

The pontificate of Paul I was thus one of superficially
modest activity. Following the obviously great chances that
occurred durinx Stephen II's pontificate and beinq followed
by the storwy events of the period 767-772 and the IOET and
eventful pontificate of Hadrian I, the pontificate of Paul I.
has seemed to be a period quiet and uneventful in the stormy
history of the eighth century papacy. Ko vast armies moved
nor did any zreat upheaval characterize the period 757-767.
Thus the period has been passed over as one of sliiht interest
while more excitinq periods have claimed historiars' atten-
tion. Indeed, it seems that the attitude is traditional. for
even Paul's contemporaries saw little of interest in the
problems he confronted and the events of his rule. Neither
Frankish, nor Greek, nor Italian sources of the period pay
much attention to Home or the papacy under Paul. The result
of the relative calm of Paul's pontificate has understandably
led to a misappraisal of the significance of the period. Paul
has been seen as a colorless character not possessed of the
energy orstatecraft of the great popes who stood on either

side of him: Stephen II or Hadrian 1.1

 

1 Kehr, p. 104.

153

15L:

There is some justice in the assertion that the ponti-
ficate of Paul was an extension of Stephen II's. The two men
were brothers. Paul was naturally one of Stephen's closest
counselors and the policies of Stephen II must be considered,
in part at least, the creation of Paul. This beinz the case
it is not surprising that the policies adopted by Paul were
continuations of the policies of Home in the period from 752
to 757. Thus in regard of the Lombards Paul desired to secure
the extension and consolidation of the power of the republic
and assure that the republic could survive as a state along-
side the more powerful Lombards. It would not be untrue to
say that, as in the case of Stephen II, this was the central
goal toward which Faul strove. Similarly Paul, like Stephen,
followed a course in regard of the Franks and the Greeks de-
signed to secure that one, overriding goal. The Greeks were
enemies. The empire could only be treated as a hostile for-
eign power. The Franks were allies and Pepin was a protege.
The rapport and alliance made in 754 were the keystones of
the existence and the security of the pope's republic. Hith—
out Frankish support the republic would cease to exist, or
at any rate, would shrink to include only Home.

On the other hand, Paul did not simply pursue policies
laid out for him as thou:h they had become enshrined as dogma
through their success with Stephen II. The conditions brousht
into being by the alliance had not been tested. The ten-year

pontificate allowed the working out of the implications of a

new situation. Paul's policies were accordinaly suited to the

155

circumstances and changed as he found this or that policy

not productive or safe. hence, when practical considerations
necessitated that a rapprochement with the Lombards be sought
Paul sought it. He bent his desires to fit the circumstances
and by his death had achieved some stability in Italy. The
alliance in Paul's hand became transformed and acquired a
theoretical expression of great significance.

The republic Was not alone in having to come to terms
with a new situation. Because the two Italian expeditions of
Pepin in 755 and 756 had completely altered the political
conditions of Italy, it took some while for the principals
involved to alter their attitudes and to adjust themselves
to these circumstances. While Paul was forced to become more
moderate in his expectations of future gain and had to con-
tent himself with only the full implementation of the treaty
of 756, Desiderius demonstrated that he fully realized the
import of the events of 755 and 756. Though he became un-co-
operative at times, he was careful to go only so far, and
thus avoided provoking a third Italian expedition. The Greeks
had the most difficult time of learninf. In 757 the emperor
simply did not appreciate the extent or depth of the change.
However, by 762 evidence shows that the lesson was at least
partially learned. The Sreek attempt to persuade Pepin to
become an iconoclast demonstrates that the emperor at least
understood the significance and nature of the alliance be-
tween fiome and Pepin. he yet filled to perceive the role of

St. Peter.

156

?te Jreeks were not the only one: who underestimated
the strength of the alliance of 754 and the role of St. Peter
in that alliance. It is foolish to speak of Pepir leavinr,
irnorinr or sabotaaing the alliance. Pepir was Peter's man
and had pledzed his body to Peter's service for the sake of
his soul -— he would not be likely to jeopardize his eternity
by perjury. The alliance, then, was held by both parties.
Pepin made whatever effort he could to carry out the obli-
gations imposed upon him. In the flurry of rumor and supposed
danrer of the period there were only two areas of activity
for Pepin under the alliance. His responsibilities were to
secure the implementation of the terms of the treaty of 756
and to resist Greek efforts to seduce him. he did both. In
spite of the rumors and agitations of the period 757-767 it
is apparent that there was no real danger to Paul's safety.
hence the fact that Pepin sent no army to Italy is neither
surprising nor significant.

Paul tended to be too preoccupied with the pursuit of
his policy towards the Lombards and with cementins the alli-
ance to pay sufficient attention to what was to become the
major problem of Roman political life followins his death.
The acquisition of supreme power by the papacy, the acquisi-
tion of sovereignty by the Roman state and the extension of
the territorial possessions of the republic created a politi-
cal situation of new dimensions and a need for a governmental
revision. The papal curia, which had not been a secular gov-

ernment, took over the duties of secular government without

157

making the constitutional changes necessary, and the most
powerful section of the lay aristocracy was excluded from the
exercise of political power and influence. the resultant al-
ienation of a major portion of the lay aristocracy produced
internal division which, while it was not always obvious in
terms of overt acts against the papacy, was a potential threat
to the security of the republic. The alliance of 754 sufficed
to bridle the activity of the aristocratic faction for a short
while, but with the change of rulers in 757 their activity
resumed. Though Paul seems to have been unaware of the ser-
iousness of this flaw in the fabric of the state, he does
seem to have been aware of the disaffection of the aristocracy
and his solution reflects blind reaction rather than policy.
For instead of working to adjust the conditions and bases of
the Roman political system to accomfldate this class he seems
to have merely taken punitive measures against it. To such
punitive measures short of anihilation of the entire class
would have been in any way efficacious and consequently the
implicit danger of an alienated aristocracy remained to break
forth from time to time.

It is a major thesis of this dissertation that btephen 11
did not subordinate the papacy to Pepin in any way in 754.
On the contrary, if there was any subordination. it was that
of Pepin to the pope. Pepin had made his oath to St. Peter.
There is no need to suppose that that oath need have been
guaranteed by any act under Frankish or Roman law. It was a
religiously sanctioned oath given under formal circumstances.

No one would have questioned its validity. Pepin had also

158

accepted an office which made him the agent of the pOpe. This
too was formally recomnized, and there appears that at least
in terms of what Pepin had to do for the pope, there was no
doubt about what that office entailed. Finally, Pepin was
king only because the pope had made him king. hot in the
sense that the Archbishop of Eheims or St. Boniface miaht
have made him king by granting him the blessing of the church
in his office. The pOpe had made him kins. he had sanctioned
the usurpation of the throne by a man who had no titular
right to it, and his sanction made it possible for the usur-
pation to succeed. hence, in all respects, Pepin was the sub—
ordinate of the pOpe. The fact is however. that Pepin's sub-
ordination was one only in theory. In reality, Pepin. over

a period of years, achieved supremacy over the pope simply
because he had the army which the pope needed and the influ-
ence and power to attain for the pope what the pope wanted
and felt he needed. This fact alone sufficed to make Pepin
the de facto master of Home had he wanted to be so. In addi-
tion the theoretical statements of Pope Paul, which were pro-
bably the result of rhetoric rather than rational development,
hinted at an idea which would make Pepin and his sons the
pope's superiors in theory. Under Charles the Roman patric-
iate became a political leadership over the west and, at the
same time. an ambiguous spiritual leadership over Latin
Christianity. Thus the fact is that the papacy gradually was
faced with a situation which was the reverse of that which

had been intended. The papal reaction was to seek a justifi-

159
cation of the situation by reverting to the idea of the pap-
acy in the empire. hence the coronation of 800. This act,
that of 800, was made possible only by goin: back to a pre-
vious constitutional situation and negating the ideolozical
significance of the creation of the republic. For the idea
of the republic entailed that the pOpe was the head of the
state -— the coronation entailed that an emperor was the head
of state. In effect then, Leo III went back and picked up
the constitutional structure that had obtained before 726 and
in a very real sense Charlemagne was the successor of the
Emperor Leo III. Hence, in spite of whatever significance the
coronation might have in terms of Frankish history, in terms
of papal history the period 726-800 is a unit and the coron-
ation of 800 was the logical culmination of the eighth century
It is superficial to look upon the act of POpe Leo as having
been the product of whimsy or of his immediate political prob-
lems in 800. Though the conditions of Roman political life
in 800 may have been of importance causally in the coronation
they are only so as an immediate and apparent cause -- the
coronation was the logical culmination of nearly eighty years
of Roman political history.

Thus, while it is true that the pontificate of Paul I
bridged the map between Stephen II and Ladrian I and assured
the continuity of Stephen II's work, it was much more than a
mere continuation of that regime. The accommflation of Paul and
Desiderius, the birth of the theocratic role of the patriciate

and continued indifference to a crucial socio-political issue

1
J-

O

Q‘\

made the pontificate of Paul I an important age in its own
rieht. Instead of merely providinr the continuity spoken of
this period set new conditions and the study of the period
from 767 to 800 necessitates close study and understanding of

the reign of the priest-kin: Paul.

APPENDICES

AIPQLJII a
in; CLJOIOLOQI
O? In; L? wins OJ POP; PAUL
[5 IE; CODEX CAROLIAUQ*

The greatest sinile difficulty in dealinr With the pon-
tificate of POpe Paul I in a satisfactory fashion arises from
problems connected With thirty-tfio extant letters attributed-
to Pope Paul in the Codex Carolinus. Only one is distinctly
dated. Of the rest several may be fixed with some certainty
through references to events of known date, but the majority,
if they are to be fix ed chronologically at all, must he fixei
through references to other letters, obvious priority or pos-
teriority to other letters, and a certain amount of pure
conjecture.

ihe principal editions of the Codex Carolinus most wide-
ly used are thoseof Caietanus Cenni, Philip Jeffe and :ilhe l:
Gundlach. Cenni's edition, LOHIU enta Qominationis Iortificit~
first appeared in 176 O in Ho ome, thOUIh it is now most eiiely

known as it appears in Volume XTJIII of the Patroloqiae Lat-

 

 

 

*”he Code? Carolinus is a collection of letters sent to
the Arnulfing rulers of the Frankish kingdom my the Popes
Sregory III, Zachary, Stephen II. Paul I, Stephen III, d
Hadrian I and the anti-pOpe Constantine II. The letters were
collected together by order of Charlemagne in 791.

, i
5

162

 

It. I. ..I [luv II i ll 'llll ‘l‘ I!) I) 1.- ..I

7,1
l(/ ,1:
ina of J.-P. hitne. The edition of Jaffé appeared in 1967 in

his jibliotheca rerur_fierndnicerug, Ii, and Fundlach's edi-

 

tion, by far the most widely used, appeared in 1392 in Volume

III of the gpistolae of the honumenta Eernahiae Iistorica.

 

 

The chronoloxical order of the letters of Paul I has
been riven differently by each of the editors mentioned,
though the order assigned by Jaffé and Qundlach differ only
slightly. Folloninc is a table ShOWinw the order assijned to

the letters by each tain editor:

Letter lunilagh ‘iziié genri
Cum @ravi gemitu 12 12 12
Si interius mente 13 13 15
Lator praesentium 14 1M 13
(missing) 15 15 --
Dum tam copiosam 16 16 17
Quotiens perSpicua 17 17 18
Solet epistuleris 18 18 21
Quia excellentia 19 19 20
A Deo institute 20 2O 38
Cum maximo 21 21 39
Ad referendas 22 22 #2
Salubri providentia 23 23 32
Properans ad nos 2% 2h 16
Omnino conpertum 25 25 19
Kissam relationem 26 26 22
Quotiens fidelium 27 27 29
Praemissis nostris 28 28 23
Eximiee et a Dec 29 29 36
Praecelsae et a Deo I 30 , 3O 25
Praecelsae et a Deo II 31 31 26
Dun 1113 quae 32 2 27
Olim omnipotens 33 33 2
Dum tam maxima 34 3M 29
Quanto decoris 35 3 30
Cum regalis 36 36 37
Jotiva cordis 37 37 #0
Dum tanto vestrae 38 39 33
Considerantibus nobis 39 38 14
Quia spiritus #0 #0 31
Cum caritatis #1 #1 35
Dum divine #2 #2 b1

sxplere verbis #3 #3 3h

 

 

l l.l Iii ll! 1 f. 'llll]

16¢
lore of the above arranimerts of these letters is entire—
ly satisfactory.

Shere is no argument that Cum gravi genitu (:12, J12, 313

 

written in April of 757 is the first letter of the Iaul series
There are also a few others Which may be dated with some ac—

curacy due to references to external events. Lator praesentium

 

(Glh, J14, C13) referring to the birth and baptism of Pepin's
daughter diselle, may be fixed in early 758. Solet epistularis
(318, J18, C21), referrinq to Pepin's son and namesake may

be placed in early 759. A reference to a specific date indicates
that Quia excellentia (:19, J19, C20) was written in April of

760, Quotiens fidelium ($27, J27, CZM), containinr a refer-

 

ence to Pepin's Aquitanian campaign of 763, falls late in

that year, and Eximiae et a Deo (329, J29, C36), referrinv

 

to the severe winter of 763-76h was probably Tritten in 75h.

Salubri providentia (323, J23, C32) may be placed in the per-

 

iod 761-762 through reference to the indiction.
In addition some of the letters fall into natural groups,
having been sent together or in an obvious sequence. Thus Dun

tam copiosam ($16, J16, C17) and Quotiens perspicua (917, J17,

 

1
C18) were sent together as their content testified and follow-
ed a missing letter of the same series of Which Jaffé provides

an epitome. Prgecelsae et a Deo I and II (330-31, J30—31, 325-

 

26) were obviously sent in sequence, and Dum illa quae (332,

 

J32, C27) and Olim omnipotens (C33, J33, C28) were sinultan-

 

1 Codex Carolinus, 3p. XVII (Quotiens perspicua -- Jaffe—
Jattenbach, 2341), p. 517.

 

165

eous since they were carried by the same missus. Two other
letters were simultaneous for the reason that they refer to
the return of that same missus, i.e., Dum tam maxima (G34, J34

C29) and Quanta decoris (G35, J35, C30). For similar reasons

 

it is safe to conclude that Missam relationem (G26, J26, C22)
and Praemissis nostris (328, J28, C23) were simultaneous.

It is also obvious that some groups of letters were se-
quential, though they may have been separated by considerable
passage of time. Thus Omnino conpertum (C25, J25, C19) noting

harinus' treason must follow Properans ad nos (G24, J2u, C16)

 

promoting him.

Other letters, however, are not at all so easy to place.
In 1896 Paul Kehr introduced a rearrangement of the letters
based upon the evidence presented by each of the three pre-
vious editors and upon Kehr's personal insights and reason-
inas. The arrangement of the letters offered by Kehr is the
best currently available and his arguments are most valuable
in respect of those letters which cannot be dated without
some difficulty.

Kehr considers first those letters relating to the Greeks
These he divides into three groups.2 The first group is that
of Eggecelsae et a Deo;;_and II and Dum tantgpvestrae (830,31,
.38! J30, 31, 39, C25, 26, 33) which refer to the pepe's fear

of a Greek invasion.3 Kehr argues that Dum tanto vestrae was

 

166

sent some time after the former lettersfL Since the letters
in this group indicate Roman—Lombard tension, but not Open
war, they are considered to be post-758, and because they

ask for gi§§;_to arrange matters With Desiderius they are
considered to precede guia excellentia (G19, J19, C20), which
was written in April, 760.5 The second group of Greek letters
is composed of Dun illa guae, 011m omnipotens and Consider-
antibus_nobis (G32 33, 39, J32, 33, 38, C27, 28, 14), which
refer to Paul's joy at being delivered from the evil of Creek
invasion.6 The first two are simultaneous, one addressed to
Pepin and the other to his sons, Charles and Carlomann, and
both were taken north by Peter the Primus defensor. The theo-

retical content of Considerantibus nobis is similar to Olim

omnipotens, linking them.7 The whole group obviously follows

 

Quia excellentia. Kehr argues that 81 interius ments and

 

 

Explere verbis ($13, 43, J13, 43, C15, 34) also belong to

this group. However, one is constrained to agree with Cenni,
Jaffé and Cundlach who argue that 81 interius ments is most
likely referring to Paul's elevation and therefore falls in

early 757, after Cum gravi gpmitu. One is also prompted on

 

the basis of internal evidence to doubt whether EXplere verbis

 

may be placed in the second group of Greek letters and to

 

4 Ibid.. pp, 114-115

5 Ibid., p. 115.
6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., p. 116.

157
'7:

afree with Jaffé that the missus liribert is that mentioned

_ 8 .
in the Annales Lazariani as having been in none in 767. Lenr

 

further isolates a third group of letters: Cum maxing, yotiva

 

cordis anr Dun divine (C21, 37, 42, J21, 37, 42, C39, 40, 41)

 

which he argues refer to the pope's reaction to Franco-Ereek
theological negotiations occurring near the end of Paul's pon-
tificate.9 References to a papal-frankish legation to Con-

. 1

stantinople allow Cum magimo and Votive cordis LU -e placed

 

in sequence and Dum divina ray be considered to follow them

 

since it refers to the beginnire of the negotiations in Frencia

occurring in 755-767. On this reckoning Cum regalis (336,J3G,

 

C37) is after Dum divina since it refers to the completion of

 

those negotiations and looks toward the Synod of gentilly in

(‘13

767. Kehr further argues that A Dec institute (320, J20, C )

must also figure in this group since it refers to the arrival

‘.J.)

 

of a Greek mission which he feels served as a prelude to these
4 10

negotiations, and placed A Dec institute_in mid-76 here

he is largely cor ect except that he places A Dec Institute

 

too late -- Eximiae et a Deo (C29, J29, C36) shows that the

 

Franco-papal legates were already in Constantinople and the
negotiations already under way in 763.

Of the remaining letters Kehr also handily disposes.

 

O

 

Annales Kazariani, ESE, §§, I, ed. 3. H. Pertz (Hann-
over, 1826), p. 31. Cf. Jaffg, BEG, IV, l46n.

Q
/ 1 n
{281133, p. 24

10 Ibid., p. 125.

 

III I’ll-it‘ll illi ‘1 {il all]; III! I] I l

168

Properars ad ros (32b, J2M, 016), he argues, is early because

\J

 

 

Pepin's son Iepin, who was born in 759 and died in 762, is

not mentioned, and the theme of the letter is not in accord
» n 11 . . a

with tne general run of letters after {61. as mentionel

above, Onnino conpertum (:25, J25, C19) follows Properans ad

 

nos and it falls in the period of 758-759 since it refers to

 

the activities of Ceorae, the proto a secretis of the emperor
in that period. Dun tan copiosam (316, J16, C17) and guetiens

perspicua (317, J17, C18) along with the epitome of the missin:

 

letter fall into the same period as internal evidence testi-

f"

fied. Kehr arrues that Ad reforendas (122, J22, 0M2) and gun .

 

tam maxima (33%, J34, C29) refer to an identical affair tith
12

 

Ad referendas being later and referring to Dum tam marina.

 

Cum merino (321, J21, C39) is placed after Ad referendas and
1t.13

 

\.

refers to

Thus the chronology worked out by Kehr develOps as fol-

 

lows.
Yo. Date Letter - Gundlach
12 757 April Cum gravi aemitu 12
13 758 early Lator praesentium 1Q
14 758 Propcrans ad nos 24
15 758 (Kissing) 15
16 758 Dun tam c0piosam 16
17 758 Quotiens perspicua 17
18 759 early Solet epistularis 18
19 759? Omnino compertum 25
20 759 late? Praecelsae et a Deo I 30
21 759 late? Praecelsae et a Deo II 31

11 Ibid., p. 133.

12

Ibid., I). 151.

13 Ibid., p. 153.

169

22 760 early Dun tento vestrae 3F
23 730? Si interius mente 13
24 760 dpril Quia excellentia 19
25 760? Jun 111a quae 32
26 760? Olin omnipotens 33
27 76 ? Considerantibus nobis 3

28 760? Explere verbis 43
29 760? Ad referendas 22
30 761? Dum tan marina 34
31 761? Quanto decoris 3

32 762 Salubri providentia 23
33 763 Kissam relationem 6
34 763 Quotiens fideliun 27
35 7a3-4 Praemissis nostris 23
36 764 early Eximiae et a Deo 29
37 764 middle A Deo institute 2

38 765 early Cum maximo 21
39 765 end Votiva cordis 37
40 766 Cum regalis 36
41 766-7 Dum divina 42
42 761-7 Quia spiritus 4O
43 761-7 Cur caritatis 41

For the most part Kehr's arrangement seems to be the
most satisfactory and his arguments are convincinr. There
are only a few points at Which one is prompted to disaqree.

Si interius mente (313, J13, 015) placed by Kehr in 760,

 

seems more likely to belonasas Gundlach and Jaffé decided,

in early 757 as the second letter of the series. In spite of
Kehr's arguments, Sipinterius mente seems more logically to
come in the period immediately following Paul's election and
the reference to partisan activity in Home is very likely
that preceeding Paul's election. It also is to be doubted
whether ggplere verbis may be placed in 760 as Kehr argues.
It need not be part of the second group of Greek letters dis-
cussed by Kehr and may even be part of the third group. It

is also likely that Prgperans ad nos (324, J24, C16) precedes

 

Lator praesentiun (G14, J14, 013) as it in no wise refers

 

170

to the difficulties of 758 with which Lator praesentium and

 

the succeeding letters are concerned. Because both Nissan

relationem (826, J26, 022) and Praemissis nostris (828, J28,

 

C23) refer to the arrival of the same

both refer to Quotiens fidelium ($27,

 

Frankish mission and

J27, C24) they are

simultaneous. A Dec institute (G20, J20, C38), referrinj to

the six Greek patricians which, as Kehr argues, may very well

immediately precede the Franco-papal mission to Constantinople,

is placed too late by Kehr.

If the Franco-papal mission was

in the east in 763 g Deo institute ouqht to be placed in

762-763, rather than mid-764 and Cum maximo (:21, J21, C39),

 

according to internal evidence, follows it by one year. Quia

spiritus (J40, J40, C31) is probably in connection with the

Franco-Greek negotiations and may tentativly be dated 766-7.

be

Thus a final chronology of the letters of Pope Paul will

as follows;

Date

NO.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
3O
31

757 April

757 April-Kay

757-8

758 early
758

759

758

759 early
759?

759 late
759 late
759ex-760in
760 April
760?

760?

760-1

760-1

761-2

761-2
9/761-9/762

Letter

Cum gravi gemitu

Si interius mente
Properans ad nos
Lator praesentium
(missing)

Dum tam copiosam
Quotiens perspicua
Solet epistularis
Omnino conpertum
Praecelsae et a Deo I
Praatelsae et a Deo II
Dun tanto vestrae
Quia excellentia

Dum illa quae

011m omnipotens
Considerartibus nobis
Ad referendas

Dum tam maxima

Quanto decoris
Salubri providentia

Gundlach

12
13
24
14
15
16
17
18
25
3O
31
38
19
32
33
39
22
34
35
23

32 702-3 5 Deo institute 20
33 763-4 Cum maxino 21
34 763 late Quotiens fidelium 2
35 763-4 Praemissis nostris 28
36 763-4 Kissan rclationem 26
37 764 fiximiae et a Dec 29
8 765 Voti‘a cordis 37
39 766 Curr ejgalis 36
40 766-7 Dum divina 42
41 766-7 Quia Spiritus 4O
42 767 Explere verbis 43
43 761-7 Cum caritatis 41

It should also be noticed that accuracy demands that the
two letters of the anti-pope Constantine II, Omnino credimus

and Dun internae, numbered XCVIII and XCIX by Gundlach ouzht

 

 

to be numbered XLlV and XLV. lhe other letters of Stephen 111

and hadrian I have to be renumbered in consequence.

AIPZLJII :
Ir}; risipdiledi iure 3301.1H IQIfh;I

Id the course of the formation and SeveIOpnent of the
ranco—papal alliance the frequent exchanfe of cornurication

aetneen Pepin and the pope Jas a most important business.

Though the letters of the C iex Carolinus provide us with

 

information COUCeIi37‘ 761- of the affairs ieslt with ii
those communications it certainly was not the full story.

It must be supposed tiat the men fho carried these letters
were also entrusted with important verbal information. In-
portant functionaries such as bishops, abbots or dukes would
not be sent on a journey so long as that between Francia and

Rome merely to carry letters. rK‘hounh we cannot know anythin:

’11

about the verbal conmunications between Pepin and aul, a
review of the comin s and goinrs of the missi and the iden-
tities of these men may give some indication of t.e ma ni-

tude of the affairs at hand and the frequency of Franco-papal

jnat follows is a sinple list of the *arious missi ar-

*‘3

D

a.:ed in chronological order. jach notation will be follow

-
\/

C1.

he the Gundlach edition number of the appropriate letter and

J-‘.

the pare in that edition where the reference may be found:

173

757: Immo, Pepin's nissus’ was in More enl stayel
for Paul's consecration (12; 50?).
757-8: Langburd, irluster vir, carried a letter to

 

Paul; Parinus, a cardinal priest, was then in
Francis (24; 528—529).

759: Vulfard, Abbot of St. Hartin's of Tours, brought
a letter to Paul and Jilcharius, bishop of Lo-
mentum, was recommended to Pepin (1%; 511-512).
Eoibert, inluster_v;£, kept by pope in Home;
Zeorge, Bishop of Ostia, and Stephen a cardinal
priest, sent to Pepin (17; 517).

759: decree of Ostia to stay with Pepin in Francia
(18; 518). Jilcharius still in Francia (25; 530)
Felix and flatbert, viri inlustri, sent to Paul
and uilcharius returned to home (30; 536).

760: hemedius, Pepin's brother and Archbishop of
EoumL sent to Paul along With Duke auto arius
and Paul's missus, Peter the cardinal priest,
was sent to Pepin (19; 519-520). Peter the
primus defensor sent to Pepin (32; 538).-

 

 

 

760-1: Iilcharius again returned to Rome, accompanied.
by Count Dodo and Hichad (22; 525).
761-2: Peter the primus defensor returned to ione with

 

fidmar, Abbot of St. Hiquier, the Abbot 1erbert
and Eucbald, vir inluster (#3; 541).

 

762-3: Conibert, a vessel of Pepin, with some message
for Paul (20; 522).
763-fl: Drocteganz, Abbot of Cemeticense, and Vulfard

were in home (28; 532). Andreas and Cunderic,
sollertissimi viri, arrived with letters (21;
522). George and Peter are still to remain with
Pepin (Ibid.).

765: Peter the notarius and John the mansionarius
have returned to Rome accompanied by Vulfard.
Vulfard was to stay and George and Peter the
cardinal priest are to stay with Pepin or re-
turn home as Pepin pleases (37; 548-9).

766: John the subdeachon, Pampilo the defensor return
to Home with Pepin's missus Flaginus the chap-
lain. Philip the priest and Ursus the cubicu-
larius were sent to Pepin (36; 5hh-5h6 .

767: Count Dodo and Abbot heribert sent to home (#3;
557). John the subdeacon and Peter the primus
defensor were sent to Pepin (#3; 558).

761-7: hemedius and Symeon in Rome (41; 553).

 

It is obvious that there are many gaps in our information
Many of the letters do not mention who carried them. hany gigg:
are mentioned going in one direction but not in the other ani
so forth. Still, the information available is enought to show

the frequency and importance of Franco-Roman diplomatic exchenxe.

AEPJIDIX C

Trill 1 IST 1113:; COIIIEKT 05‘ 1‘11; EAEIEICA‘EIOI‘T CT"

Th3 DOKARIOL 0F CCKSQAKIINS

”here has been, perhaps, no historical document over
which more scholarly diSpute has been held than the Donation
of Constantine. Since the time when Lorenz oYalla unnasked
the document as a fortery scholars have been unable to set-
tle among themselves the question of the date when the docu-
ment was forged and by whom.

Jhile some scholars hold With the View that it was wade
in the ninth-century in Francia, the wcijht of scholarly
Opinion is such that we may be fairly sure that, whatever its
date, the Donation is decidedly not a Frankish, but a Roman,
document.1 It has also been su:

gee ted that the donation was

oririnally fabricated before the eijhth century and slightly

 

H

Herr nn irauert, "Die konstantinische Lchchkung", IJb,
IV (1283), 607- 608, arjues that it was formed for imperial
purposes to counter Byzantine claims in the hint? ~entury.
Ider., "Zur konstantinisohen Schenhunr", LJb, 7 (1884), 117-
120. So also does J. P. hirsch, followinéz the treory first
laid down by Trauert: "Die Heimat der konstantirischen Sctenk-
unr", R-. Xk III (1909), 110—114. Youever, the weight of lit—
erature is against this View and its arguments do not compel
acceptance, of. Carlyle, I, 289 and G. Krueer, "Zur Fraqe
nach der Entstehungszeit der konstantinischen Schenkunr", $12,
(1889), 430, and 3. Loeninr, "Die Sntstehunfi der konstn-
tinischen Schenkungsurkunde", ha, LXU (1890), 195-196.

 

 

175

revised for use in the period after 754.2 however, the docu-
ment undoubtedly was written after 750, and in connection
with the rise and development with the ecclesiastical repub-
lic. This is, however, the only area of general avreement,
and various arguments exist for attributina the document to
the pontificate of this or that pope are abundant.

The major interest in the donation in respect of this
dissertation is in regard of the question whether the docu-
ment oriqinated from the pen of either Stephen II or Paul I,
on indeed, of Christopher.3 Jhile there is no secure around
for assigninq the fabrication of the document to either of
these pontificates and denying the possibility that it was
made later than 767, it is at least reasonable to attempt to
understand the possible circumstances of fabrication in the
period 752-767.

According to the donation the papacy, or the vicarate
of the Son of God, had great power and was exalted above the
empire in honor.4 The pOpe had the position of princeps

over the whole church and in particular over the patriarchal

 

2 Loeninz, p. 209, cf. Krflger, p. 431.

3 Kruger. pp. 459-H60, E. Pfeil, Die frankische und deut-
sche Romidee des frflhen hittelalters (MUnohen, 1929), p. 51,
C. B. Coleman, Constantine the Great and Christianigy, Colum—
bia University_Studies in History,_Economics and Public Law,
Vol. CXLVI (New York, 191%): p. 211, flilhelm Levison, "Kon-
staninische Schenkung und Silvester-Legenda", g1, XXXVIII
(1924), 159-160. Concerning Christopher see Holfmany Cericke,
"Das Glaubensbekenntnis der 'konstantinischen Schenkung'".
ZSSRk, LXXVIII (1961), 68ff.

4 Exegplar Constituti Domni Constantini Imperatoris, cap.
11, ed. by C.B. Coleman in Columbia University_studies in his-
story,_Economics and Public Law, Vol CXLVI (New York, l91h),
p. 233.

 

176

sees of the East.5 as an outward mark of the position of the
Roman pontiff Constantine ceded to him the Lateran palace and
the right to wear an imperial crown, the purple and other
imperial rezalia.6 In accord with this the papal court acquir-

ed the same riéhts as the imperial court.7 The pope was given

 

5 Ibid., cap. 12, p. 233.

6 Ibid., cap. 14, pp. 234-235; "Pro quo concedimus ipsis
sanctis apostolis, dominis meis, beatissimis Petro et Paulo
et per eos etiam beato Silvestrio patri nostro, summo pontif-
ici et universali urbis Romae papae, et omnibus eius success-
oribus pontificibus, qui usque in finem mundi in sede beati
Petri erant sessuri, atque de presenti contradimus palatium
imperii nostri Lateranense, quod omnibus in toto orbe terrare
um prefertur atque precellet palatiis, deinde diadema videl-
icet coronam capitis nostri simulque friaium nec non et sup-
erhumeralem, videlicet lorum. qui imperiale circumdare ad-
solet collum, verum etiam et clamidem purpuream atque tuni-
cam coccineam et omnia imperialia indumenta seu et dianitat-
em imperialium presedentium equitum. conferentes etiam et im-
periala sceptra, simulque et conta atque sirna, banda etiam
et diversa ornamenta imperialia et omnem processionem inper-
ialis culninis et aloriam potestatis nostrae."

I Ibid.. cap. 15, p. 235: "Vivis enim reverentissimis,
clericis diversis ordinibus eidem sacrosanctae Ronanae eccles-
ae servientibus illud culmen, sinqularitatem, potentiam et
precellentiam habere sancimus, cuius emplissimus noster sen-
atus videtur yloria adnornari, id est patricios atque consules
eticii, nee non et ceteris dienitatibus imperialibus eos pro—
mulgantes decorari; et sicut imperialis militia, ita et cler-
um sacrosanctae Romanae ecclesiae ornari diversis, cubicular-
iorum nempe et ostiariorum atque omnium excubiorum ornatus,
ita et sanctam homanam ecclesiam decorari volumus; et ut am-
plissime pontificalis decus prefulaeat, decernimus et hoc, ut
clerici eiusdem sanctae homanae ecclesiae mappulis et lentea-
minibus, id est candidissimo colore, eorum decorari equos et
ita equitari et sicut noster senatus calicamenta uti cum udo-
nibus, id est candido linteamine inlustrari: ut sicut celestia
ita et terrena ad laudem Dei decorentur; pre omnibus autem
licentiam tribuentes ipso sanctissimo patri nostro Silvestrio,
urbis Romae episcopo et papae, et omnibus, qui post eum in
successum et perpetuis temporibus adveherint. beatissimis pon-
tificibus, pro honore et aloria Christi Dei nostri in eadem
magna Dei catholica et apostolica ecclesia er nostra synclitu,
quem placatus proprio consilio clericale voluerit et in nur-
ero religiosorum clericorum connumerare, nullum er omnibus
presumentum superbe aiere."

177

power over Italy or the Jest.8 and Corstantine moved his cap-
ital to the East to assure that where the celestial principate
rested there should be no earthly rival.9

The idea that Stephen 11 was reSponsible for the forgins
of the donation in entirely plausible. fhe most likely contert
for the fabrication during Stephen 11's pontificate is that
of his trip to Francia in 753-754. It has been argued that
the idea that Aistulf should restore land to the pope or make
restitution to Home can only be explained in terms of refer-

10

ence to the Donation of Constantine. It has also been ar-

gued that the officium stratoris performed by Pepin had to

 

have been inspired by that of Constantine. 0n the other hand,

these points need not compel assent. If the officium stgat ris

in the donation could have inspired Pepin's so could Pepin's

have inspired that in the donation.11 Indeed, unless a COpy

of the donation were sent ahead to Pepin it is difficult to

 

8 1222.9 cap. 179 p- 236: "...omnes Italiae seu occid-
entalium regionum provintias, loca et civitates...,"

9 Ibid., cap. 18, p. 236: "Unde congruum prospeximus,
nostrum imperium et regni potestatem orientalibus transferri
ac transmutari regionibus et in Byzantinae provintia in op-
timo loco nomini nostro civitatem aedificari et nostrum illic
constitui imperium; quoniam, ubi principatus sacerdotum et
Christianae religionis caput ab imperatore celeste constitut-
um est, justum non est, ut illuc imperator terrenus habeat
postestaem."

10 The most modern proponent of this view is “alter Ull-
mann. GrOWth of_papa1 government, pp. 58-59. of. Lot, Ganshof
et Pfister, p.—HO9, Caspar, £52, LIV (1935), 145-1U58 and
Eauck, II, 26.

11 Elie Griffe, "A propos de la 'Donatio Constantini'",
BLE, LVIII (1957), 239.

178

see how it could have influenced that action. secondly the
theme of restoration and restitution is not dependent upon

the donation. The lands in question had been wrested from the
republic and were being asked for on behalf of the republic,
not on behalf of the successor of St. Sylvester. Thirdly, no
indication exists in any source that Stephen used the dona-
tion.12 hence, While it may have been made at this time, there
is no evidence that it was either used or needed.

In reqard of the pontificate of Paul I as the period of
fabrication there is again one major situation in reqard of
Which the document might have been useful; that of the oppo-.
sition of the lay aristocracy to curial rule in the city.

In this context the material contained in the donation in re-
gard of the imperial prerOQatives of the pope and the sena-
torial rirhts and position given the Roman clergy acquire
particular sirnificanee. here aeain there are two arguments
against this View, First, that there is no evidence that the
document was used. Second, that Paul in aeneral seems to have
ignored that particular problem anyway. If we assume Christo-
pher to have invented the document it would have been in the
context of the same problem, probably in the period 768—769.

Jhile thenaare possibilities in the period 753-769 there
is also no lack of possibilities for later periods, and the
evidence is just as good for deciding that it was fabricated

by or under Pepe hadrian I, who even seems to have made a

 

12 q i
Colemann, constantine the great, p. 212.

 

williil'lllflii {illili Ii [Illlull Il1.llllllllllllll"i ll!!! . ..

179

13 .
veiled reference to it. ’ It is also suggested by some that

. 14 , . i
the donation was a ninth-century affair made in some to pre-

serve the rirhts of the papacy and linked to the 816 corona-

tion of Louis the Pious.19

A survey of the problem leads one to the conclusion that
the task of asggning a positive date for the fabrication of
the Donation of Constantine is one which is difficult if not
impossible.

Suffice it to say that many possibilities exist and ex-
ternal sources give no indications which one miqht consider
positive. Internal criticism, heretofore, has also been in-
conclusive -- witness the confusion of scholarly opinion.
Hence though one might wonder what conblusions computer an-
alysis might yield, one suspects that the results miaht be
equally inconclusive. One can only conclude of the donation

that it was a product of the Roman chancery in the period

750-850.

 

13 Leaning, pp. 219-233. Joseph Landon, "Entstehunm und
Tendenz der konstantinischen Schenkunqsurkunde", pg, L (1883),
#16-435. Mayer, pgg, XIV (1904), 64-67. Baxmann, I, 28“, and
Martens, pp. 360ff. All of these authorities argue against
that idea.

lLym’erner Ohnsorze, Abendland und Eyzanz (Bad Hombura,
1963), p. 82. Ohnsorge has also suggested that the donation
is connected with Leo III's trip to Francia in sou/5. See,
ldem., "Die konstantinische Schenkuns. Leo III und die Anfanxe
der kurialen rbmischen Kaiseridee", SSRz. LXVIII (1951), 89ffl
See Ruth Bork, "Zu einer neuen These uber die konstantinische
Sphenkuna", Festschrift Adolf Hofmeiste;_(Halle, 1955), pp. 39-
5‘.

15 Lamprecht, p. 119.

 

‘1', ilili'lllllll l ilil‘l‘llflllll' ll‘ll.i .I'

APPEFDIX D
BIBLIOJHAPHICAL ASSAY

while the standard corpus of bibliographies of medieval
history oujht to be familiar to working medievalists, there
are always a few little known or Specialized bibliosraphies
which are worth lookin: at. hence it is wise to begin by .
checking one or two bibliographies of bibliographies. Among
the more well known works of this sort are Theodore Bester-
mann's §::prld Bibliography_of Bibliographies, 3rd edition,

U volumes (Geneva, 1955-1956), and idith K. Coulter's EELQE
to Historical BibliOgraphigs (Berkeley, 1927). while the
latter was issued some time are there have not been so many
new bibliographies in medieval history as to render it er-
ceptionally out of date.

The best readily available, recent, general historical
bibliography is the American Historical Association's Guide
to Historical Literature (New York, 1961), which is well e-
nough known to be part of any historian's stock—in-trade.

The general historical biblioaraphies of durepe are most
easily classified according to national origir. The best among

the Werman offerings is Dahlmann-waitz, Quellenkunde der deut-

 

schen Geschichte, 9. Aufl. (Leipzig, 1931). Also of some use
180

‘ul'..[lll|l1'|ll||llll litii‘llllll': Illllllll‘. illll'i.l '..III- .
lllllnlllllll. III-\ll'llll I." l

181

are 3. Franz's bUcherkugde zur deutschen Ceschiehte (hunchen,
1951), and Karl Jacob's Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte

im hittelaltcr, 6. Auf1., 3 Bde. (Berlin, 1959), both of which

 

have the advantage of being recent. Among French bibliosraph-

ies it is wise to see August holinier's Les sources de l'higp-
oire de France des origines auxpguerres d'Italie in 6 volumes

(Paris, 1901-1906). Finally, in connection with the papacy,

it is always best to review one or two Italian biblionraphies.
Two cramples of such biblioqraphies are Carlo Lozzi's Eibliq—

teca Istorica della antica e nuova Italia in two volumes (hol-

ogna, 1963), and Emilie Calvi's Bibliozrafia'geppxali digiqma

 

in four volumes (Rome, 1906-1912).
The most valuable catesory of biblioaraphy is, of course,
those dealing with medieval history or related topics. Fore-

most amonx these are Louis Paetow's Guide to the Study of

 

hedieval history, in the revised edition (New York, 1931) and

 

August Potthast's Bibliotheca Historica_§edii Aevi in two
volumes of the second edition reprinted in Graz in 1957. C.
Chevalier's ggpertoire des sources historigues du mqyen_a;§

in three volumes (Paris, l905ff) might also be reviewed alon:

With Shirley Jackson Case's A Bibliographical guiigfto‘the

 

history of Christianity_(Chicago, 1931), which does not have

 

too much depth.

Finally, in the matter of periodical material the best
work is the annually issued Internatignale Bibliographic der
Zeitschriftenliteratur published in Leipzig and Osnabruck from
1911 on in two parts, one for/German and the other for non—

German writings.

182

Jhile the array of primary source material available to
a medievalist may not be so vast as to be overwhelming, it is
desirable to have one or two good guides to the sources. Jhe
best of these and the easiest to use are the registers of
various sorts published for the most part in Germany. Among
the most applicable here are Jaffé- attenbach's Regesta Pon-
tificum Homanorum, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (draz, 1956), and Bbhner-
huhlbacher's Die Regesten des haiserreiches_unter den Karo-
linsern (Innsbruck, 1889). Those interested in more direct

information on the Lombard kingdom ouzht to refer to the Lance-

barden Regesten published by L. Bethmann and C. Holder-Hrrer_

 

in the geues Archiv der Gesellschaft fUrgltere deutsche 3e-

———-——

 

schichtskunde, III (1878), 225-318. Less satisfactory, but

 

also of use are Cardinal Baronius' innales Ecclesiastici, ed.

 

by A. Theiner in 37 vols. (Brussels, 1864-1883), which in-
cludes many lon? selections from the sources and LudWia Oels-

ner's Jahrbucher des frankischen Reiches unter Kbni1_Pippin_

 

(Leipzig, 1871), an exceptionally detailed collection of mat-
erial which is useful in guidinm one to the prOper source.

In general concerning primary sources one is cautioned
to check through all the great national source collections
for here and there information related to the subject at hand
may be found. For the most part, however, there are relatively
few important primary sources for this tOpic. Ihe first anon»

these is of course the Coiex Carolinus, the two best editions

 

of which are those of Wilhelm jundlach in the Yonumenta Cer—

 

maniae historica, gpistolae III (Berlin, 1892) and P. Jaffé's

 

 

?ibliotheca Rerum Germanicarun, IV (Berlin, 1867). The next
most valuable source is Louis Duchesne's edition of the Liber

Pontificalis in 3 vols. (Paris, 1886). It is also useful to

 

look through the editions of papal letters in the Patrolo~iae

 

Latina, edited by J.-P. Higne. ihus for instance the Sancti

- —..——.———-..--

Gregorii II dpistolae‘in Volume LXXXIX (Paris, 1850) has been

 

of great value in this research. Some specifically Frankish

sources of value have been the Annales herni Francorum, the

 

Annalee Sinhardi, the Annalee Kettenses and the Continuation

 

 

 

of frederar. The Annalee Begni Francorum and the Annales flin-

 

 

hardi were issued together in 1895 in hannover in the Scrip-p

tores rerum Sermanicarum series of the Monumenta_aermaniae

 

 

Fistorica.‘1he Annales hettenses is available in the same

 

 

series in a 1905 edition. lhe continuation of Fredegar (Chro;
nicorum quae dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes)
is available in an edition by Bruno Krusch in Volume II of the

Scriptores rerun herovineicarum of the Lonunenta Earmaniae

 

Eistorica (Hannover, 1888). Other sources which have proven

 

to be of use are the Chronicon Salernitanum, Konumenta ierman-

 

 

iae Historica, §criptorg§, III (Eannover, 1839), the Concilia

 

aevi Karolini in Volume II of Section III of the Leges of the

Nonumenta Carmaniae Iistorica (Eannover, 1896), and the Liber

 

Pontificalis Ecclesiae Ravennatis of Agnellus in the Bonumentg

 

Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerun Langobardicarum et Ital-

 

icarum (Hannover, 1878). Agnellus was anti-Roman and inaccur-
ate in places and therefore must be used with caution. It has
also been of value to have a look at one or two Greek sources

for the period. The most likely are Eicephorus Breviarum Fis-

 

llllllli‘ii‘l .

1m

toricum, Iatrologiae :raecae, C (Paris, 1865) and :heonhanis

 

 

Chronograph a, lien, CTIII (Paris, 863). One must be careful

 

to note that Theophanes' chronology is generally inaccurate.
For background material one ought to refer to one or all
three of the followinr works on Carolingian history: Louis

Halphen's gharlenagnc ct l'empire carolingicn (Paris, l9h7),

 

Enrelbert Tuhlbacher's Deutsche Gesghighte unter den Karolin -

 

EEQLXStuttgart, 1959) or A. kleinclausz, Charlemagne (Paris,
193“). Thourh the reputation of talphen's work is highest,
Nuhlbacher hives a fuller account of the early Carolin iar
period.

It is more difficult to find really satisfactory work
on early Italian history. One of the best, thoujh out of date,

is Thomas Iodtkin, Italy and her Invaders, 8 vols. (Oxford,

 

1892-1899). Another worthwhile work is Ludo Koritz Fartmann's

Ceschichte Italians im Yittelalter, 3 Ede. (Cotha, 1900).

 

 

Other materials available are Gabriel Pepe's Le royen age bar—

 

bare en Italie (Paris, 1956), Pasquale Villari's The Larbarian

 

Invasions of Italy (London, 1902) and Leon Hero's gone ne—

 

ievale (Paris, 1956). There is a similar difficulty in findina
satisfactory material on Italian law, Carlo Calisse's A hist-
ory‘pf Italian Law (London, 1928) and Ernst Nayer's Italien-

ische Verfassun;sgeschichte, 2 Bde. (Leipzig, 1909) are both

 

useful.

The available literature affordind general coverage of
Byzantine history is more satisfactory and more plentiful.
The two best works are both available in English. These are

A. A. “asiliev's history of the Qyzantine Empire, 2rd ed., 2

I t l...‘ ..l illuial {III [I I ll] I l.l[i [ Ill {‘3 l “

vols. (hadisoa, 1961) and Geor e Ostro;orsky's} istorv of the

nyzartine State (Ken Brunswick, hen Jersci, 1957). Other sur-

 

veys are Louis Lréhier's Le nonde byzantin, 2 tones (Paris,
19H8) and Le monde orientale de 395 a 1081, in the second ed-
ition (Paris, l9hh) co-authored by Charles Oiehl and decries

tar 318.

S bi-
There is certainly a wide selection of general works on

the history of the church and the papacy. Lihistoire de l[_

 

ézlise, edited by A. Fliche and V. Martin affords a fine de~
tailed survey. The relevant material may be found in Volume

7 by Louis Lréhier and 3ene Ai3r’in ( réToire 1e r

~_J

325d; les
etats barl a: .s et la congpete arabe, Paris, 19b?) and Volune

VI by Exile Amann (L'epoque carolin ienfie, Paris, 1947).

 

Albert Eauck's Kirch.enxeschichte Deutschlands, 5 Ede. (Berlin,

 

1954) and Eans von Schubert's 3e§9hichte der chrisglicheg

 

Kirche is Fruhnittelalter (inbingen, 1921) are the best Cernan

 

works among the multitude of church histories available. Be-
fele-Leclercq's Histoire des Conciles, 11 tomes (Paris, 1910)

 

is of value, but like Fliche et Kartin's work it is mainly a
narration based on the sources and is not particularly inter—
pretive. Both these works are primarily valuable as handbooks.
There are four comronly ava.ilable and mos t cxc llcnt treat-
ments of the papacy during this period. ihe best survey is

Erich CaSpar's Seschichte des Papsttums von den An; £5r3er. bis

 

 

zur the der Ueltherrschaft, 2 Ede. (TUbino;en, 1933). Only the

 

first two volumes were published owiny to Caspar's death in

O-

\}
\n

1933. The two volumes only cover the period a far as

'0

Also well worth referrinc to are Louis Duchesne's Ehe Ee3irnin~

 

l ‘I ifi!l‘itf.£u£‘l‘ I‘ll."

of the Temporal Sovereignty3of the P033; (London, 190?) and
Johannes Ialler's Das Paesttun, 5 Bde. (Basel, 1951). fialter
Ullmenn provides a more theoretical approach to the history

of the papacy. Though there was some controversy over the
Grouth of papal Government in the Liddle Agesi 2nd ed. (Lon-
don, 1965), it is one of the Works now becoming standard. Also

of use are bernhard hiehues, Ceschichte des Jerhaltnisses

 

ZWischen Kaisertu: und ngsttum in Nittelalter, 2 Bdc., 2.

 

Aufl. (MUnster, 1877), J. Iosselin, The Power of the_Pope

during the riddle Aves, 2 vols. (London, 1853), Rudolf Earmann,

 

Die Politik der Papste, 2 Ede. (Elberfeldt, 1868), Joseph

 

Langen, ieschichte des rbnischen Kirche, 4 Bde. (Bonn, 18? ),

 

and Jillian Barrm'The Papal Nonarchy frgn Gregory the Greag»

to Boniface the VIII (London, 1902). Gustav Krueer provides

 

a treatment of the ideas and proponents of papal ideolory

Which is short and unencumbered by a narrative: Das Papsttun,

 

Seine Idee und Ihre Trager, 2. Aufl. (TUbingen, 1932).
Finally, among the various sorts of general works one
ought to consult would be a good history of medieval political
thought. The obvious best would be H. J. and A. J. Carlyle,
History of hedieval Poliggcal Thought in the test, 6 vols.,
5th imp. (New York, 1962).
The most pertinent material for a project such as this
is obviously to be found in scholarly monographs and articles.
Such studies on more restricted problems afford much additiond
illumination on the backeround of Italy before the papal-Tr

vue

..‘

..D

ish alliance. Two articles in the Cambridge hedieval history

 

serve as reasonably good introductions to the problem of the

1,9,7
restoration of the inperial power in Italy: Charles Dietl's
"Justinian: the Imperial nestoration in the vest”, I1. i. l-
24, and L. I. Hartmarn's "Imperial Italy and Africa: Admini—
stration", II, viiia, 222-235. ihe reneral condition of pre-
iconoclast Byzantium is the subject of Seorge Ostrogorsky's
"the Byzantine Snpire in the world of the Seventh Century",

in the Dumbarton Oaks Papers, XIII (1959), 1—21. Three ex—

 

cellent monographs provide fine scholarly studies of the Eyz-

antine period of power in Italy: Charles Diehl's Etudes sur

 

l'adninistration byzantine dans l'exarchate de gavenre (Kev

York, n.d.). L. h. Hartmann's Untersuchunaen zur Teschichte

 

 

der byzantinischen Vernaltun3_in Italian (Lew York, n.d.),

and Hugo Cohn's Die Stellung er byzantinischen Statthalter

 

in Ober- und hittelitalien (Berlin, 1889). Kore specific
studies dealin: with iconoclasm are also to hand: Charles

Diehl's "Leo III and the isaurian Dynasty", Cambridge Ledieval

 

History, IV, 1, 1-26, Erich Caspar's "Papst Gregor II und der

Bilderstreit", Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, LII, (1933),

 

29—09, Ottorino Bertolini's "I rapporti di Laccaria con Con-

stantino V e con Artavasdo", Archivio della Societa Rowena d1

 

Storia Patria, third series, IX (1955), 1-21, and Alfred Lon-

 

bard's Constantine V, Empereur des Homains (Bibliothegue de la
faculté des lettres de 1'université de Paris. XVI ) (Paris.

1902). L. N. Hartmann's "Italy under the Lombards". Cambridge

 

hedieval history, II, vii, 194-221, E. Pabst's "Seschichte des

Langobardischen Eerzogtums", in Forschungen zur deutscsen Te-

 

schichte, II (1862), 905-518, A. Gasquet's "Le royaume lovbard:

ses relations avec l'empire Srec et avec la France", gevue

 

lililiiilli'!ll I.“ l[.'l'llllllll I. (I: ‘(I’J' II") I.

198

Historigue, XXXIII (1987). 58-92, ani E. Seltinr's "Studien

 

zum beheventanischcn Eof im achte Jahrhundert", Dumbarton Cake

 

Papers, XVI (1962), 141-193, all offer material relevant to
the papacy's strurfles with the Lombards. although the latter
deals mainly with the post 774 period.

haterial on the development of the idea of the republic
of the Romans under the popes is more difficult to find. For
the most part one has to search through the letters. However,
two works do touch directly on the problem: Franz Kampers'
"Roma aeterna und Sancta Dei ecclesia rei publicae Romanorup",

Historisches Jahrbuch, XLIV (192b), zuo-zug. and wilhelm Sund-

 

lach's Die Entstehunr des Kirchenstaats und der curiale Ee-

griff Res publica Eomanorum (Breslau, 1899). See also Fedor

 

Schneider's Rom und Romgedanae 1m Kittelalter (Koln, 1959).
and E, Pfeil's Die frankische und deutsche Bomidee des fruh-

en hittelalters (hunchen, 1929).

 

The literature concerning the Franco-papal alliance is
both profuse and of high scholarly quality, though it is gen-
erally out of date and greatly in need of revision. Several
French studies of the formation of the alliance are available,
but in general they are not as significant as the equivalent
German works. Among these are C. Bayet's "Remarques sur le
caractere et les consequences du voyage d'étienne III en
France", Revue Historique, XX (1882), 88-105, Henri fubert's
"Etude sur la formation des états de I'ESIise". Idgm. LXIX,
(1899), 1—40, 2H1-272 and Leon Levillain's "L'avenement de la
dynasty carolingienne et les origines de l'état pontifical",

Sibliothegue de l'écolefldespchartes, XCIV (1933), 225-295.

189
The last is especially useful as a chronological guide. Luch
more important are four substantial german mon0"raphs which
among them offer the views which have been renerally accepted:
Eilhelm hartens' 71©.IZE.§EBE Frage unter Lbnig_Pippin und

Karl dem grossen (Stuttgart, 1881), harl Lamprecht's 932,39:

 

mische Frage von hpniz Pippin bis auf Kaiser‘Ludwig den

 

 

 

Trommen (Leipzig, 1889), Erich Caspar's Pippin a§g_die rbmi-

schen Kigche (Berlin, 1914), and CaSpar's "Das lapsttum unter

 

frankischer herrschaft", Zeitschrift_fUr_hirchergeschichte,

 

 

U)

LIV (1935) 132-369. The 1a t two are undoubtedly the most im-
portant works in the field. The major flaw of these four works
and of most of the literature, is the propagation of old myths
about Pepin's donations and Stephen II's commendation. The

German writers are in general characterized by a tendency to

be too leaalistic in their outlook. Also of much use are

 

Robert Holtzmann's excellent little study. Die Italienpolitik
der_§erOWinger und dfisrfibnigs Pippin (Darmstadt, 1952), and
Carl Rodenberg's Pippin,_Karlmann und Papst StephenNII_(Eer-
lin. 1923). Periodical materials provide a large corpus of
literature. Among the best is Johannes Haller’s "Die harolinae~
und das Papsttum", historische Zeitschrift,_CVIII (1921), 38-
76 which offers a refreshing understanding of the spiritual
context of the alliance. Against haller's view is Martin Lint-
zel's "Der Codex Carolinus und die Motive von Pippins Italian—
politik", Historische Zeitschrift, CLXI ( 990), 33-91. Lint-
zel's work suffers from pandering to the Aryar-fleutonic myth-

010gy of the Nazi regime. There is also much more material of

varying quality. Such for instance as J. Sickel's "Kirchen-

190

J

staat und Karolinger". historische Zeitschrift, LXKIIV (1900),

 

385-409 and "Die Vertrage der Papste mit den Karolinmern",
Deutsche Zeitschrift far Seschichtswissenschaft, XI (1894),
301-351, and XII (1894), 1-43. Peter EaSSOW's "Pippin und

Stephan II", Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, XXXVI (1916),

 

u94-502. Ernst hayer's "Die Schenkunaen Constantine und Pippin",
Qeutsche Zeitschrift fur Kirchenrecht, 3. Folge, XIV (190%),
1-69 and Heinrich von Sybel's "Die Schenkungen der Karolinaer
an die Papste", historische Zeitschrift, XLIV (1880), h7-85.

For an answer to Sybel see B. Niehues' article under the same
title in Historisches Jahrbuch, II (1881), 76-99, 201-241.

P. E. Schramm's "Das Versprechen Pippins und Karls des Grossen
fur die rbmischen Kirche", Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung_

fflr Rechtsgeschichte, kanonistische Abteilung, LVIII (1938),
180-217 and Karl Heldmann's "Kommendation und Kbnigsschutz im

Vertraqe von Ponthion", Nitteilungen des Institutshfur aster-

 

reichische Geschichtsforschung, XXXVIII (1920), 5&1—570 are
also interestina.

The material on the pontificate of Paul is both poor and
scarce. The only specific study available is Kaurice Baumont's

"Le pontificat de Paul Ier", hélanges d'archeolggie et d'Eist-

 

 

girg, XLVII (1930), 6-2u. Baumont failed to make a serious
first-hand study and his work is a scissors and paste effort
With little insight. Though Paul Kehr did not undertake a stuy
of the pontificate as such, his "uber die Chronologie der

Briefe Papst Pauls I in Codex Carolinus", Kachrichten von der

 

koniglichen Gesellschaft der dissenschaftgn zgpdbttinéen,

hiloloaisch-historische - , @896; 103-157. is excellent

 

‘lliiiilillilllill‘lllillillilllIEI 1“} .III. ".

191

in achieving its purpose and even offers some insight into
the period.

ihe best periodical work available or the affairs of
Stephen III's pontificate is that of Ottorino Bertolini: "La
caduta del primicerio Cristoforo nelle versioni dei contempor-
anei e 1e correnti antilonaobarde e filolonnobarfie in Roma

alla fine del pontificato di Stefano III", Rivista di Story:

 

della Chiesa in Italia, I (19u7), 227-262, 349-378. Also to

the point are Kartin Lintzel's "Karl der Grosse und Karlmann",
Historische Zeitschrift, CXL (1929), 1-22 and Louis Kalphen's
"La papautc et le complbt lombard de 771", Revue Historiquc,-

CLXAXII (1938), 238-24u.

BIBLIOiZAElY
I. Primary sources:

Arnelli cui et Andreas Liber Pontificalis icclesiae havewnati~

--. 0-7.—

ed. 0. holder-E¢' 3r, horumenta e_*1niae Histories, Scrip-
tores rerun Lan; ocardica rum at Its licarum saeculi TI- IX.
Eannover, 1078.

Andreae Danduli Chronica per extensum descripta, a cura di T.
Pastorelli, herum Italicarun Scriptores, ord. de L. A.

Euratori, XII, l. Eologna, n.d.

Annalee Alanannici, honunenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptorcs,
~. -. . 7—
I. ed. .3. o PértZ. LEAKOVCI‘, 1820.

 

 

:I

Annales Be neventani, honunenta Ternaniae Eistorica, Scriptores,
IlI, ed. G. h. Pertz. Kannover, 1839.

 

Annales Binhardi, honunenta 3e mariae_§istorica, Scriptores
rerum Termanicarug, VI, e1. 2. H. Iertz, rco. F. Kurze.
lannover, 1395.

 

 

Annalee Fuldensrs, horunenta Eermeniae Pistorica, Scriptoras,
I, ei. 3. H. Pertz. Rannovcr. 1826’

 

Annales Yettenses, Ronurenta .-ern.a niae Historica, Scriptores
rerun Eerm? mic-2rum, X, recog. E. de Sirnson. Lanrover,

1905.

Annales .-.. Ll, honumenta Germariae Historica, Scriptores,

I, ed. 3. I. Pertz. hannover, 1926.

Annales Regni Francorum, honumenta Jermaniae histories, Scrip-
tores rerun 3ermanicarum, V1, ed. a. H. Iertz, recot. H.
Kurze. hannover, 1895.

 

Be ne edicti Chronicon, Epnumenta Eermaniae historica, Scri gorse,
III, ed. 3. L. Pertz. Lannover, 1839.

S. Bonifatii et Lulli Epistolae, ed. E. Dummler, Eonuneppa
Germaniae Historica, Epistolarum, III. Berlin, 1892.

Capitularia degun Francorum, ed. Alfr-edus Boretius, Ionurnnta

 

 

 

 

 

fiermaniae Eistorica, nguru: Sectio II. Bannovcr, 933.
Chronicon 1J0 sia ace nse, honumenta Germaniae Historica, Scrip-
tore es, 1, ed. J. h. Pertz. Pannover, 1826.

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Chro.n icon alernit‘ri Io umrrt: 7erfianige Listorica, Scrip—
tores, ;II, ed. E. E. Iertz. Lannover, 1339.

 

 

 

 

 

Chronicorun cues dieuntur Fredejarii Scholastici Cortinuatiorcs,
ed. Bruno Lrusch, Lonuwenta ” m-én ia Ifistorica, Scrip-
tores rerui IeroviL icarum, II. {aniove1, €83:

 

Clausula de Pippgni in Francorum1€e;em Consecratione, RegueiL
do: historiens ies “Rules et 10 la France, ed. par I.
Bouquet, nouvelle ed. par L. Delisle, V. Paris, 869.

Y

Codex 3 arolinus. h. iundlach, Fonunenta dermaniae Fistoric“.

 

 

,3
2L
Up istolarun, III. Berlin, 1892.

 

 

Coiicis Carolini fpistolie, Jib iotlcc” Rerum 2ermshicfirur, ei
- A v n ." «7-..».-. 'h. . '..- - ”‘-..... meow—-m-
P. Jafig; If. aerlir, l7u7.

 

Corcilii 33;; Ka;_1}§l, ed. Albert'ierminhhoff. ypnunenta "er-
.aaiae_hi§ orgce, nggn: Sectio III, II. Eannovei, 1794.

 

 

 

 

goipp§~_0hronico__m_Eono 01:3:1WF a cura di A. Sorbe lli, herun
Italicarum Qprlntorgs, or.. de L.A. Iuratori, XJIII.
Citta d1 G“stello, 1.3.

rorica Pontificum ct IrpeW orum Tiburtina, ed. 0- E0122?-
31;.‘5‘1‘9 I onu -.€,' nt a 713 I'm inlays :.istorice , SCI‘lUtOl‘89, XL‘IXI.
Zerlin, 1903.

Sinhargi fits Axroli Interator is, Konunentg_3ermariae Figjorica,
Scriptores, II, ed. d. H. Pertz. Zannover, 1829.

 

Epistolae Lan Monardicae Collectae, ed. W. Eundlach,

nllmenta
fiermsniae Listorica, :pistolarum III. Berlin, 2.

Lo
1;?

 

 

 

 

 

fixegplagwpo ns tituti Domni Constar tini Imperatoris, ed. by.
C. B. Co let‘r, Columbia UniVJrsity_ Studie in History,
Econon nics and Public Law CfiLvI. New York, 1914.

 

H

S. Cregorii II Ronani pontificis is tolae Let Canones, Estro—
lo;iae our? ,us com plctlls, Ser rics Latina, ed. J.-P. highs,
LXXXIX. Paris, 1850.

 

 

 

 

:.e cursus con ple tu
. Paris, 187h,1P

ls;

qowi‘ac‘
by'.‘ >Jk'
.. ‘......—

82';

 

Johannis DLaconi Chronicon Venetun, Lonumenta Zernaniae Fis-

toricg, Scriptores, VII, ed. a. H. Pertz. hannover, luLm

 

 

Lamberti Annales, Nonunenta Germaniae Histogica, ScriptorcsL
III, ed. 3. h. Pertz. Hannover, 1839.

 

 

Liber Pontificalis, ed. L. Duchesne. Bibliothegue des Ecoles
D'Athens et de Rome, 29 serie, III. Paris, 1986.

 

194

Lartini Cppaviensis Chronicon Pontificum et Impegatorum, ed.
Neiland, Monuments Germaniae Historica, Scriptores,
XXII. Hannover, 1872.

S. Nicephorus Constantinopolitanus Patriarcha Breviarum Pie:
toricum de Rebus Gestis_post Maungli imperium, Patro-
logiae cursus com Jletus, series Graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne,
C. Paris, 1865.

Pauli Historia Langobardorum, ed. L. Bethman et C. waitz,
Monuments Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerun Lange-
bardicarum et Italicarum saeculi VI-IX. Hannover, 1878.

Pauli Historia Langobardorum Continuatio Tertia, ed. 0. Holder-
Egger, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum
Langobardicarum et Italicarum saeculi VI- IX. Remover. c878

Romualdi Salernitani Chrgnicon. a cura d1 C. A. Garufi, Rerum
Italicarun_5criptores, ord. L. A. Muratori. VII. 1.
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Theophanis Chronographia. Patrologiae cursus completus, series
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II. Secondary sources:

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