


POPE PAUL I  
AND THE ROMAN REVOLUTION  
OF THE EIGHTH CENTURY

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.  
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY  
DAVID HARRY MILLER

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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled  
Pope Paul I and  
the Roman revolution  
of the eighth century

presented by

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of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in History

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Richard S. Levin".

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Date May 18, 1967

## ABSTRACT

### POPE PAUL I AND THE ROMAN REVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH CENTURY

by David Harry Miller

Though the general subject of the origin and nature of the papal states in the eighth century has been frequently studied, most of these studies are out of date and inadequate. On the other hand, the pontificate of Paul I has never been adequately treated at all. Most scholars have been deceived by the lack of obviously violent or dramatic events during the pontificate of Paul I and have concluded that the period was of little importance, being no more than a continuation of the pontificate of his brother and predecessor, Stephen II. Consequently, it is desirable that both the general history of the Roman revolution in the eighth century and the pontificate of Paul I be treated. This dissertation divides roughly into two portions. The first portion is concerned with a re-examination of the origin and nature of the sovereign ecclesiastical republic of Rome and central Italy ruled by the popes. The second portion is an examination of the pontificate of Paul I and an attempt to assess the importance of that pontificate and its place in the developing Carolingian world order.

The major source of evidence for the pontificate of

Paul I is the Codex Carolinus. The letters of Pope Paul in the codex form a major portion of the collection. Most of Paul's letters are undated, and consequently a major element in interpreting Paul's pontificate lies in working out an accurate and acceptable chronology of his correspondence. The sources for the eighth century background of Paul's period are more varied. The early letters in the Codex Carolinus, other papal correspondence, papal biographies in the Liber Pontificalis and various annalistic materials are all relevant. Throughout the study it has been necessary to try to avoid the mistake so often made by others of taking the sources out of the context of the eighth century and of the papal world view.

This discussion of the pontificate of Pope Paul I is dependent upon the establishment of two hypotheses in the first portion of the study. The first of these hypotheses is that of the gradual emergence, between 726 and 756, of an idea of a new state in Italy, the Sancta Dei Ecclesia Res Publica Romanorum. The sources for this new political idea are to be found in the papal correspondence and the biographies of the Liber Pontificalis. The gradual evolution of the idea meant that it was never clearly defined, and this aspect of the idea is crucial to the second hypothesis. The second hypothesis is that in the Franco-papal alliance of 754 there was a failure to define clearly the nature of the roles of the participants. There was no commendation of Stephen II to Pepin. There was no donation of land in 754, 755, or 756. The patriciate of the Romans was a new and undefined creation. The opened-



ness of the concepts thus in use by 756 determined the historical context of the pontificate of Paul; i.e., the pontificate of Paul was the period when force of circumstance caused the conditions of the alliance to begin to be defined. The emerging clarity of the alliance revealed that it had become an entirely different sort of arrangement than that originally intended by Rome. Beginning under Paul and continuing until 800 A.D., the alliance changed until a point was reached at which the Patrician of the Romans had become emperor in fact, though not in name. At the same time the pontificate of Paul marked the failure of the papacy to take into account and deal with the problem of a disgruntled and ambitious lay aristocracy. That failure created the stage upon which domestic Roman politics were played throughout the Middle Ages. In regard of Italy the work of Paul I enabled the papacy to reach a political accommodation with the Lombard kingdom which was, however, destroyed by the effects of internal chaos in the Roman state caused by failure to organize the regime to accommodate the aristocracy. Hence the pontificate of Paul I was of the utmost importance in the development of the idea of the Carolingian Empire and the medieval papacy's position in Rome and in Italy.

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by  
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## PREFACE

The work which follows is thoroughly revisionist. It is the author's belief that the so-called "Middle Ages" may not be isolated as a self-contained period, intrinsically different from the period which followed it, without doing violence to the truth and creating a distortion in one's view of the past. The "Middle Ages" was the period when the name of Europe became more than a geographic label -- the age, in short, when European civilization and society were created and experienced early development. While one may look upon the early period of the "Middle Ages" as a "dark age" in which the civilization of the ancients was barbarized, that is an empty approach. Such an approach is based on viewing the "dark age" in a negative fashion as a period when the only fact of importance was the death of the old. That Roman civilization and language were barbarized is not important, because European civilization and society is not Roman.

The secret of the "dark ages" is that here began the creation and subsequent evolution of the institutions, culture and attitudes of which Western, European, Christian civilization largely consisted.

European civilization was a new civilization, not a sub-

culture of the old. The period when it began to emerge was a vibrant and creative one. The problems confronting those first Europeans were legion, but they were safely surmounted because those people were able to build institutions strong enough to nurture a new society and to enable it to survive. The central institution of Early European society was the Christian Church. Its social, cultural and spiritual influences on the society around it were of such far-reaching importance that the history of Early Europe is inseparable from the history of the church.

The eighth century was one of the most crucial periods in the development of Latin Christianity. In the course of this one century the spiritual monarchy of the bishop of Rome over Christian society was established in Europe, the final dissolution of the bonds holding Rome to the Byzantine Empire were dissolved and the first Germanic empire of the Middle Ages was created.

The general subject of this dissertation is the papacy of the eighth century and the alliance between the Franks and the popes. Its central concern is the pontificate of Pope Paul I covering the years 757-767. Its purpose is to provide an exposition of the problems and policies of Paul as ruler of the newly created papal state in his relations with the Franks, the Lombards and, to a lesser degree, with the semi-oriental empire of Byzantium. For the most part it treats material which has been only cursorily examined by previous scholars. While the pontificates of the incumbents of the papal throne preceding and succeeding Paul I have been treated

at length by other authorities, the pontificate of Paul I has been largely neglected. It is one of the premises upon which this study is based that such in-attention is not warranted: the pontificate of Paul I was a most important and formative period in the development of the papacy, and the effects of this period are visible throughout the rest of the eighth century and beyond.

Though Paul I is the main subject and a study of his pontificate the principal object of this dissertation, other themes and questions must perforce be considered. The conditions under which Paul I labored were set during the pontificate of his brother, Stephen II, who, in order to resolve a complicated problem while yet preserving the independence of action of Rome and the papal curia, embarked upon a long and hazardous journey from Rome into the Frankish kingdom in the year 754. The consequences of that journey radically altered the affairs of Italy and Europe at large and determined in no small way the future development of Western society.

Another of the premises of this investigation is that the study of these critical developments must begin with a series of events antecedent to 754; for though this earlier period, too, has been much discussed, the present study applies to earlier treatments a revisionist approach. Thus a secondary object of this dissertation will be to establish certain theses upon which an understanding of the origin of the papal states and of the period 754-767 and beyond must rest.

It would be difficult indeed to sufficiently acknowledge my indebtedness to Richard E. Sullivan. The advice he gave in the preparation of this dissertation is only a fraction of what he has done on my behalf. His qualities as teacher, scholar and human being are such that the inestimable pleasure of having been his student has enriched my life and made the doctoral program a more meaningful experience than it might otherwise have been.

I am also indebted to Professors Marjorie Gesner and Eleanor Huzar for their aid, encouragement and instruction, and to Dr. T. T. B. Ryder, Visiting Professor, who has read my MS and substituted for Professor Huzar during her sabbatical leave.

I must acknowledge that I should never have been able to pursue a graduate career at Michigan State University without the aid of my old teacher and warm personal friend Themistocles C. Rodis of Baldwin-Wallace College. His labors on my behalf shall never be forgotten.

There are also three ladies to whom the mere existence of this work must be attributed and to whom, I hope, it brings some pleasure. Without the struggles and deprivations undergone by my mother from the time I was born and the desire for learning which she instilled in her children, the coal-miner's son could never have become a scholar. To her this work is, in a very special sense, dedicated. My sister, Professor Barbara Perkins, and my wife, Agnes, have given me the encouragement and confidence necessary in the pursuit of a graduate degree and my wife's patience and support has been immeasurable.

# ABBREVIATIONS

<u>ASRSP</u>	<u>Archivio della Societa Romana di Storia Patria.</u>
<u>BRG</u>	<u>Bibliotheca rerum Germanicarum, ed. P. Jaffé, 6 vols. Berlin, 1864-1873.</u>
<u>BEC</u>	<u>Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes.</u>
<u>BEAR</u>	<u>Bibliothèque des écoles d'Athens et de Rome.</u>
<u>BFL-Paris</u>	<u>Bibliothèque de la Faculté des lettres de l'université de Paris.</u>
<u>BLE</u>	<u>Bulletin de la Littérature Ecclésiastique</u>
<u>BZ</u>	<u>Byzantinische Zeitschrift.</u>
<u>CMH</u>	<u>Cambridge Medieval History, ed. by J.R. Tanner, C. W. Previté-Orton and Z. I. Brooke, 8 vols. Cambridge, 1936.</u>
Carlyle	Sir R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, <u>A History of Medieval Political Thought in the West</u> , 6 vols. New York, 1962.
<u>DZG</u>	<u>Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.</u>
<u>DZK</u>	<u>Deutsche Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht.</u>
<u>DOP</u>	<u>Dumbarton Oaks Papers.</u>
<u>FDC</u>	<u>Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte.</u>
Hefele-Leclercq	Charles Joseph Hefele et H. Leclercq, <u>Histoire des Conciles</u> , 11 vols. Paris, 1910.
<u>HJb</u>	<u>Historisches Jahrbuch.</u>
<u>EVjs</u>	<u>Historische Vierteljahrschrift.</u>
<u>HZ</u>	<u>Historische Zeitschrift.</u>
Jaffé-Wattenbach	<u>Regesta Pontificum Romanorum</u> , 2nd ed., ed. by P. Jaffé et W. Wattenbach. Graz, 1957.

<u>MAH</u>	<u>Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire.</u>
<u>MGH</u>	<u>Monumenta Germaniae Historica.</u>
<u>Epp.</u>	<u>Epistolarum.</u>
<u>LL.</u>	<u>Leges.</u>
<u>SS.</u>	<u>Scriptores.</u>
<u>SS. rer. Ger.</u>	<u>Scriptores rerum Germanicarum.</u>
<u>SS. rer. Lang.</u>	<u>Scriptores rerum Langobardicarum et</u> <u>Italicarum saeculi VI-IX.</u>
<u>SS. rer. Mer.</u>	<u>Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum.</u>
<u>MIÖG</u>	<u>Mitteilungen des Instituts für öster-</u> <u>reichischen Geschichtsforschung.</u>
<u>NKGW-Göttingen</u>	<u>Nachrichten der königlichen Gesellschaft</u> <u>der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philo-</u> <u>logisch-historische Klasse.</u>
<u>Oelsner</u>	<u>Ludwig Oelsner, Jahrbücher des fränk-</u> <u>ischen Reiches unter König Pippin.</u> <u>Leipzig, 1871.</u>
<u>PG</u>	<u>Patrologiae cursus completus, series</u> <u>Graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne, 161 vols.</u> <u>Paris, 1857-1903.</u>
<u>PL</u>	<u>Patrologiae cursus completus, series</u> <u>Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 vols.</u> <u>Paris, 1844-1903.</u>
<u>RHGF</u>	<u>Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de</u> <u>de la France, ed. par Bouquet, nouvelle</u> <u>ed. de L. Delisle, 19 vols. Paris, 1869-</u> <u>1880.</u>
<u>RIS</u>	<u>Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, ord. L. A.</u> <u>Muratori, nuova ed. di G. Carducci, v. 1-</u> <u>Citta del Castello, 1900-.</u>
<u>RH</u>	<u>Revue Historique.</u>
<u>RSCI</u>	<u>Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia.</u>
<u>RQ</u>	<u>Römische Quartalschrift für christliche</u> <u>Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte.</u>
<u>ST</u>	<u>Studi e Testi.</u>
<u>TLZ</u>	<u>Theologische Literaturzeitung.</u>
<u>VF</u>	<u>Vorträge und Forschungen.</u>
<u>ZSSRz</u>	<u>Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für</u> <u>Rechtsgeschichte, germanistische Abtei-</u> <u>lung.</u>



ZSSRk

Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für  
Rechtsgeschichte, kanonistische Abteil-  
ung.

ZKG

Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.

a.

anno.

a.m.

anno mundi.

Ep.

Epistola.

Epp.

Epistolae.

cap.

capitula.

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PART I

THE ROMAN REVOLUTION  
OF THE EIGHTH CENTURY

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The reconquest of Justinian and the reincorporation of the papacy into the Byzantine state in the mid-sixth century created a situation from which only trouble could result; for the role of the emperor in the affairs of church and state posed a threat to the ecclesiastical position of the papacy, and the papacy's pretensions to ecclesiastical supremacy could never have been harmonized with the views of either the emperor or the rival patriarchs of the East. The ensuing conflicts were of long duration, often brutal and generally detrimental to Rome's position within the imperial structure. Finally, one such quarrel, over the use of icons, proved to be so virulent that it was no small factor in the final separation of the papacy from the Hellenic-oriental empire.<sup>1</sup>

It is highly significant that these conflicts between Rome and Constantinople were both mitigated and exacerbated by the growing impotence of the imperial government to pro-

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<sup>1</sup> Louis Bréhier et René Aigrain, Grégoire le Grand, les états barbares et la conquête arabe, 590-757, Vol. V of L'Histoire de l'église, éd. par A. Fliche et V. Martin, 21 vols. (Paris, 1947), p. 433.

tect Italy from Lombard conquest; for while imperial weakness in Italy made the Lombard power more formidable, it also fostered the development of the papacy as leader of the Latin peoples of central Italy and as a semi-independent polity centered in the Duchy of Rome. The result was that after a long period of struggle the papacy found itself an independent state holding a vague leadership over Latin Italy's people in a territory which was de facto outside imperial rule.<sup>2</sup>

The lack of Byzantine protection in Italy and the consequent increases in the strength of the Lombard kingdom, along with the regeneration of Lombard leadership through a short series of able and willful monarchs, made the position of this fledgling papal state and its supporters a difficult one. For the Lombard kings Luitprand and Aistulf threatened to complete the conquest of Italy, an eventuality viewed with considerable distaste in Rome.

Thus the papacy found itself shut of its imperial master only to be about to be dominated by another. In order to strengthen its position in Italy the papacy needed force. It could not command force of its own; therefore, it had to borrow someone else's. For reasons which will become obvious, the Frankish power north of the Alps was chosen. The result

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<sup>2</sup> In this connection it is interesting to observe that throughout the central period of the eighth century Venice, an important imperial enclave in northern Italy, engaged in continual constitutional experimentation without any interference by imperial representatives impotent to act. Between 737 and 769 Venice experienced seven violent changes of government. Andreae Danduli Chronica, VII, 3-11, RIS, XII, 1, 114-119.

was the journey of Stephen II into Francia and the negotiation of a series of agreements that revolutionized the situation in Italy and had highly significant consequences for the rest of the Mediterranean world.



## CHAPTER II

### THE IMPERIAL RESTORATION AND THE LOMBARD INVASION

Between the termination of the western line of emperors in 476 and the reign of the Emperor Justinian, Italy, though theoretically a province of the Roman Empire, lay outside the real sphere of imperial rule. Through Justinian's reconquest Italy was temporarily wrenched back into the imperial orbit.

The first step in the reorganization of Italy after the reconquest was the Pragmatic Sanction of 554, the purpose of which was to restore the empire by restoring the ancient privileges of Rome -- a wholly impractical design typical of the entire reconquest.<sup>1</sup> Predictably, in spite of Justinian's hopes, the restoration was never more than that of a shadow. It is reasonably certain that a Roman Senate had permanently ceased to exist, even as a sham assembly, by the time of Pope

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<sup>1</sup> Detailed information on Byzantine administration may be obtained from Charles Diehl, "Justinian: The Imperial Restoration in the West", CMH, II, 1, 1-24, or P. Villari, The Barbarian Invasions of Italy, tr. by L. Villari (London, 1902), pp. 304ff. Also see Carlo Calisse, A History of Italian Law, tr. by L. Register (London, 1928), in the early sections and Fernand Lot, C. Pfister et F. L. Ganshof, Les destinées de l'empire en occident de 395 à 888, Vol. I of Histoire générale: Histoire du moyen age, éd. par G. Glotz (Paris, 1928).

Gregory I.<sup>2</sup> The imperial administration in the hands of the Exarch (imperial deputy) had, in practice, little authority due to a lack of power to enforce its decisions; real authority lay with the regional dukes who controlled the army and who gradually achieved great importance. In general, as one might expect, the troublous times following the restoration led to the growth of great landed estates. For those who had little or no security were forced to seek protection by becoming the dependants of those who could offer security, and those who held positions of power were able to use it to their own advantage. Gradually, too, the organized imperial military system broke down to be replaced by urban militia controlled by local aristocrats, who therefore gained considerable power and naturally endeavored to gain more. Indeed, even had it worked as designed, the imperial administration would have done little to benefit Italy; one of Justinian's first acts had been to collect retroactive taxes for the years that Italy lay under Gothic governance.<sup>3</sup> Thus the general result of the reconquest was that having been racked by a long Roman-Gothic war, Italy was then plundered by the army and administration.

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<sup>2</sup> Charles Diehl, Études sur l'administration byzantine dans l'Exarchat de Ravenne, 568-751 (New York, n.d.), pp. 126-127. The word Senatus, reappearing in later documents, merely refers to the local aristocracy, rather than to the old Roman institution of civic rule. Also see Thomas Hodgkin, Italy and her Invaders, 8 vols. (Oxford, 1892-1899), VI, 562-563 for an objection. Hodgkin feels that a diluted and weak senate, strongly reduced in importance, may have survived for a time.

<sup>3</sup> Diehl, CMH, II, 1, 21.

The effect of the reconquest on the church was hardly less severe than on the general Italian population. Theoretically, the church had regarded the Roman Empire as the earthly expression of a unified Christian society in which to be 'Roman' and 'Christian' were synonymous. The emperor was a Christian ruler; a member of the church universal and therefore subject to the leaders of the church in matters ecclesiastic. This idea of the co-extension of the Christian church and the Roman Empire had been a solace to churchmen in Italy inasmuch as it affirmed the unity of Christian society at a troubled time. But to be a de facto as well as a de iure part of the empire proved to be a mixed blessing. Though the church in Italy under the Ostrogothic rule had been subject to a temporal power it could not control, after the imperial restoration the temporal power over the church proved to be one which would meddle theologically as well as exert political control. Accordingly, the relative independence of the papacy in religious affairs faced a serious challenge in the form of the caesaropapism of New Rome.

Hence, while it may be necessary to give assent to Abbé Duchesne's caution that it is essentially inaccurate to speak of sixth, seventh and eighth century popes as subordinates of the emperors,<sup>4</sup> one must note that in the same period the papacy had to struggle for its existence as an institution. The papacy, holding that Matthew XVI, 18-19 meant that the pope

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<sup>4</sup> L. Duchesne, The Beginnings of the Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes, tr. by A.H. Mathew (London, 1908), pp. 13-14.

ruled a church comprising all of the faithful, developed a claim to a doctrinal and jurisdictional primacy over the church which corresponded to the principatus of Roman political theory. This doctrine was a fixed part of the papacy's theory by the end of Pope Leo I's pontificate.<sup>5</sup> By the end of the fifth century the concepts of auctoritas and potestas had also been developed in Rome. Auctoritas, power based on right, was held by the pope and potestas, power based on force, was distributed among secular rulers. Thus the empire was a benefice bestowed by God, and, as a divine gift, the exercise over it was subject to review by the vicars of God, the popes.<sup>6</sup> The theoretical position of the popes as supreme pontiffs of the church had thus been worked out by the time of Gregory I. But St. Gregory and his predecessors had counted themselves as Romans and loyal subjects of the Roman Empire, not foreseeing, perhaps, that papal supremacy was a doctrine inconsistent with the pope's position as the subject of a temporal ruler. And the institution to which the papacy was thus held to be subordinated, the Roman emperorship, was by nature disposed towards caesaropapism, the control of theological affairs by an emperor who was actually considered

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<sup>5</sup> Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (New York, 1961), pp. 32, 37.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 57-58. Though the doctrine that all rulers, good or bad, are divinely instituted was held by Pope Gregory, the subsequent struggles of the church made such a view untenable, and the Gelasian theory that Christ was the last Priest-king and that the priest is accountable to God for all men, including rulers, is more indicative of the church's view in the seventh and eighth centuries, Carlyle, I, 147-191.

more than a mere secular potentate.<sup>7</sup> In fact, the caesars of New Rome were in the habit of styling themselves as the "Thirteenth Apostle of Christ". Thus, at the same time that political control of Italy by the empire was deteriorating, religious quarrels arose which compounded the estrangement. The seventh century was marked by a series of conflicts between Rome and Constantinople which, though they were concerned with doctrinal questions, were basically Greek challenges to Roman principatus on religious matters. Before the seventh century was fairly under way the first of these quarrels erupted in the form of a christological decree of the Emperor Heraclius. Heraclius was faced with Persian conquest of the rich and important provinces of the east; most of the people of these provinces adhered to a monophysitic view of Christ's nature and thus were not particularly rabid in their attachment to the orthodox empire. In order to placate the religious feelings of his subjects in these provinces and to induce them to greater zeal in the imperial cause Heraclius introduced the doctrine of monothelitism to try to smooth

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<sup>7</sup> It may even be argued that the Roman Emperors were by nature caesaropapistic, cf. Hans von Schubert, Staat und Kirche von Constantin bis Karl dem Grossen (Kiel, 1906), pp. 5-9. "The at least latent regal-sacerdotal tendencies of the [Eastern] emperors were given their permanent complexion through Justinian", Walter Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (London, 1965), p. 31. The concept of Roman rulership, oriental mysticism and despotism, and the heritage of Constantine's interference on behalf of the church combined under Justinian and his followers to blossom forth as a full-blown caesaropapistic attitude characteristic of nearly all Byzantine monarchs, who viewed the church as an organ of the state.

over doctrinal deviation. But the eastern provinces to which Heraclius made this religious concession were soon lost: no sooner had the Persians been subdued, and Byzantine power worn out in the process, than had hordes of Arabs emerged from their desert homes in a flood that brought the empire new troubles as the freshly re-conquered provinces of the east were lost forever. But even though the necessity of the monothelite dogma had now been destroyed, Heraclius' successor, Constans II, retained it. Constans made some attempt to reconcile the papacy to the doctrine by changing some aspects of it, but Pope Martin, soon to be a hero of the faith, condemned Constans' Typos along with Heraclius' Ecthesis at the Lateran Synod of 648. In retaliation Constans had Martin arrested and deported to the Crimea, where he at length died from the brutal treatment accorded him at the hands of the "Thirteenth Apostle". Constans also struck at Rome by detaching Ravenna from Rome's jurisdiction. The monothelite heresy continued to divide East and West. In 680 a grave emergency in the east, precipitated by the defeat of imperial armies by an invading Bulgar horde, led Constantine IV to try to reconcile the difference by a council at Constantinople, the Sixth Ecumenical, which condemned monothelitism. The tenuous peace thereby established, being a concession of necessity, was short-lived. In 691 Justinian II held the Concilio in Trullo (Quinsext) by which a series of measures inimical to Rome's superiority were passed. Pope Sergius I refused to recognize the validity of the proceedings and

Justinian II tried to arrest him, the attempt being frustrated by the Italian militia. Each of these encounters contributed to a slow deterioration of papal-imperial relations.

The situation was further complicated by developments within the empire. Perhaps the chief effect of Justinian I's reconquest lay in its generally deleterious effects on the empire. From the end of the reconquest the empire gradually ceased to be Roman in any way. The empire was beset by peril of invasion in the east and suffered diminution of territory and great ethnic change -- it lost its universality and its Roman characteristics and became even more of an oriental despotism than it had been.<sup>8</sup> Historical developments forced the emperors to confine their attentions to the east.<sup>9</sup> Asia Minor and the Asian hinterland had become the most important sectors of interest, and from Asia Minor came the real strength of medieval Byzantium.<sup>10</sup> The idea of the unity of East and West had become an enormous anachronism; Justinian's failure to realize this had been nearly fatal to Byzantium.<sup>11</sup> His

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<sup>8</sup> Charles Diehl et Georges Marçais, Le monde oriental de 395 à 1081, 2<sup>e</sup> éd., Vol. III of Histoire Générale: Histoire du moyen âge, éd. par G. Glotz (Paris, 1944), pp. 211-235.

<sup>9</sup> George Ostrogorsky, "The Byzantine Empire in the World of the Seventh Century", DOP, XIII, (1959), 10. Through the re-conquest the imperial treasure was vastly depleted necessitating cut-backs in the money expenditures necessary for Western defense so that the needs of defense in the East might be met. See A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 2nd English ed., 2 vols. (Madison, 1961), I, 141-142.

<sup>10</sup> Ostrogorsky, DOP, XIII, (1959), 3.

<sup>11</sup> Vasiliev, I, 142.

successors did not fail to profit by the lesson; Heraclius and those who followed him completely abandoned Justinian's policy, and with it the concept of the universal empire.<sup>12</sup> Imperial policy was now formed to meet problems of defense in the East; the West had become subordinate to greater designs. As the empire became weaker and more Hellenized and orientalized its influence in Rome and Italy declined. It is not possible to speak of a cultural unity or understanding of East and West after the seventh century.<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, the restoration of the empire in Italy did bring some benefit to the church in Italy. Under the imperial misrule the church acquired considerable political influence in local affairs. The episcopacy enjoyed an important role in urban government and attained some element of control over imperial officials; also the bishops gained an immense economic power. Moreover, the effect of imperial weakness in Italy was to stimulate the assumption of civil and military responsibility by the papacy begun as early as the pontificate of Gregory the Great, when imperial abdication of responsibility pulled the papacy into the vacuum thus created. Though the defense of central Italy was technically the duty of the Exarch of Ravenna, it had become, for the most part, the responsibility of the pope by the end of the sixth

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<sup>12</sup> Louis Bréhier, Le monde byzantin, 2 tomes (Paris, 1948), I, 46.

<sup>13</sup> Hans von Schubert, Geschichte der christlichen Kirche im Fruehmittelalter (Tuebingen, 1921), pp. 246-247.



century. At the same time the position of the papacy in Rome began to change significantly inasmuch as the lay power in Rome could not begin to attain the sort of prestige enjoyed by the popes and, though by the end of the sixth century there were two separate administrations in Rome, the ducal and the papal, the effective governance of the city was in papal hands.<sup>14</sup> The development of papal power in this direction was also stimulated by the economic position of the papacy. The use of papal wealth by Gregory I to assist the people transformed papal economic power into political power.<sup>15</sup> Hence, even during the period of firm papal loyalty to New Rome force of circumstance was already setting conditions in such a way as to make the papacy the potential leader in Italy. And at a time when an inevitable contraction of the empire, without which Byzantine survival was not possible, was setting in, the imperial attempt to continue to claim Italy was becoming more and more unrealistic. The Roman Empire was in the process of becoming the Byzantine Empire -- a process which implied the secession of the papacy and Rome from the empire.

The situation caused by the conflict of papal interest and imperial aims was not without further complication. The Lombard invasions began in the third quarter of the sixth

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<sup>14</sup> Calisse, p. 14.

<sup>15</sup> Gabriele Pepe, Le moyen age barbare en Italie, tr. de J. Gonnet (Paris, 1956), p. 164.

century at a point when the pax Gothica had been broken and not replaced by a pax Romana. Italy was already exhausted by the ruinous wars of Justinian's reconquest and the fleecing of the country by imperial tax-collectors and the army. The Byzantine resistance was ineffectual and the Germanic war-horde soon held all of northern Italy, except for the enclave of Venice.

Soon after the first stage of invasion the Lombard horde broke up into smaller groups each pursuing its own ends. Internal conflict and the absence of a strong hand put an end to immediate exploitation of the situation by the Lombards. Following the murder of Alboin and the death of Cleph an interregnum ensued during which the Lombard dukes ruled each in his own enclave. Hence it is not possible to speak in terms of a Lombard 'state' until the reorganization after 590 when Authari's rule brought some unity to the war-bands. But even after that reorganization the central government of the Lombards was rarely able to rule firmly because the separatist tendencies of the powerful Duchies of Benevento and Spoleto tended to the creation of hereditary and nearly independent states within the state.

The most obvious question of interest at this point concerns the position of the conquered population in the Lombard state. There are sources enough to assure us of the servile position into which they were thrust, but these reports are exaggerated. Romans remained freemen instead of being generally enslaved and administration and public law were uniform

as applied to Romans and Lombards with the exception that Roman land-holders paid a special tax.<sup>16</sup> In the early period the major factor separating Romans and Lombards was the Arianism of the Lombards. After the conversion of the Lombards to orthodox Catholicism the Lombards adopted many life-forms of the Romans and by the time of Luitprand some distinctions were so blurred that it was difficult to tell who lived by what law.<sup>17</sup> After Luitprand Romans were counted as members of the tribe, holding full status as exercitales; they had full wergeld, living only in private-law situations under Roman law.<sup>18</sup>

The major importance of the Lombard invasions in regard of the Roman state was two-fold. First, the inability of the empire to defend central Italy against the Lombard expansion weakened the already strained ties between Rome and Constan-

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<sup>16</sup> Rothari supposedly legislated for all Italy and brought all persons under the same law. But Roman law, deeply engrained in the life of Italy, survived by force of custom and because it was recognized as the law of the church, Villari, pp. 341-342. In practice Romans and Lombards each lived under his own law for purposes of private-law and mixed suits were judged according to Lombard law, J. E. Bury, The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians (New York, 1963), p. 269. Concerning special taxes on Romans, see Ibid., p. 271, and Villari, p. 297.

<sup>17</sup> Ernst Mayer, Italienische Verfassungsgeschichte, 2 Bde. (Leipzig, 1909), I, 25-28. Capitulare 90, cap. 3, 131, LL: Sectio II, ed. A. Boretius (Hannover, 1888), I, 190. After the conquest of Lombardy by Charles there was some difficulty in straightening out the legal systems in use. The counts were to be required to make clear what law their court would use.

<sup>18</sup> E. Mayer, I, 35ff. Some details are cloudy, but evidence is sufficient to indicate the enfranchisement of Romans in the Lombard state.

ople. Second, the opposition of the Latin Italian to Lombard pressure proved to afford a unifying factor amongst the subjects of caesar in Italy. The Lombard dominion was not by ordinary measure a severe one. Yet the adjectives applied to the Lombards by surviving Roman sources are of the most vituperative sort. The objection of Romans in 'imperial' Italy to Lombard dominion was due to feeling -- the deep-seated emotional conviction of a Roman's superiority over a barbarian.

The antagonisms between Lombards and Romans grew in the eighth century to a breaking point. The process to that end began with the succession of Luitprand to the Lombard throne. Luitprand was one of the ablest men to wear the Iron Crown and his qualities of spirit were heroic. He left no doubt concerning his orthodoxy and attachment to the Roman church. He was generous to the church and he recognized the pope's ecclesiastical position.<sup>19</sup> The essential cause of strife between Rome and Pavia was Luitprand's determination to achieve a union of Italy under his scepter. This was the end in view in every situation, no matter whom he sided with or against at any particular time.<sup>20</sup> Thus it was political conflict

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<sup>19</sup> Johannes Haller, Das Papsttum, 5 Bde., 2. Aufl. (Basel, 1951), I, 354.

<sup>20</sup> Ludo Moritz Hartmann, Geschichte Italiens im Mittelalter, 3 Bde. (Gotha, 1900), II, 11, 126. Indeed, there is little doubt that if any power existed in the eighth century that had the energy and force to give union to Italy it was Lombardy under Luitprand. One might be tempted to argue that it was the failure of the Lombards to successfully unite Italy -- a failure complete by 774 -- which allowed the disunion characteristic of medieval and modern Italy to develop.

rather than religious disagreement which led to this hostility. Both the papacy and the Lombard Kingdom came to compete in this period for control of the ex-imperial lands of central Italy. The papacy's interests therein were two-fold: first to prevent the Lombards from further enlargement of their kingdom through control of the formerly imperial lands and second, to preserve their independence in the Duchy of Rome.

Because of the importance of Rome's position and his own orthodoxy Luitprand first aimed at peaceful union with the church in the acquisition and rule of Italy.<sup>21</sup> But all he obtained was the implacable opposition of Rome. Under Luitprand's rule the Landeskirche in his dominion was being transformed into a Staatskirche; undoubtedly the popes feared that they would be drawn into this Staatskirche and become mere Lombard metropolitans.<sup>22</sup> Thus control of Rome had become an object of Luitprand's policy and resistance to the Lombards the chief point of papal policy.

Luitprand became king in 712. His first task was to consolidate his power; the duchies were independent and not

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<sup>21</sup> Haller, I, 354.

<sup>22</sup> Von Schubert, Christlichen Kirche, p. 253. This fear motivated papal policy in steering a middle course between Greek and Lombard: "L'incorporation du siège de Rome à ce royaume Lombard eût été de toute évidence une catastrophe pour le successeur de Saint Pierre, à une époque où son autorité oecuménique était encore très sérieusement mise en cause par les prétentions du patriarche de Constantinople, qu'é poulait solidement l'empereur, dont il était le collaborateur direct", Louis Halphen, Charlemagne et l'empire carolingien (Paris, 1947), p. 16.

until he controlled them could he rule securely and concentrate on expansion. Eventually he was able to force the obedience of the dukes, but this success prompted the popes to seek alliance with the restless elements of the kingdom to derail Luitprand's policy.<sup>23</sup> However, fortune favored Luitprand; Leo III's policies and the papal opposition to them gave Luitprand the opportunity he needed. Siding first with the one and then with the other, he used their animosity to make some gains in territory and improve his position.

Hence, by the beginning of the eighth century the elements of a three-way conflict in central Italy were already well developed. The tense situation thus established lacked only the action of Leo III in 726 to precipitate the Roman revolution of the eighth century.

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<sup>23</sup> H. Fabst, "Geschichte des langobardischen Herzogtums", FDE, II, (1862), 474-476. It seemed, immediately after his accession, that he had forgotten the dukes; he ignored their insults and omissions and behaved as though neither Benevento nor Spoleto really belonged to the kingdom. He waited nine years for the right moment and when it came he acted with such cleverness that the question never became one of open war. See pp. 475ff. for the details. Further information on the history of Italy under the Lombards may be obtained from the following works: Carlo G. Mor, L'eta feudale, 2 vols. (Milan, 1952-53), G. Pochettino, I Longobardi nell'Italia meridionale (Caserta, 1930), and Luigi Salvatorelli, L'Italia medioevale: dalle invasioni barbariche agli inizi del secolo XI (Milan, 1938).

CHAPTER III  
THE ICONOCLASTIC DISPUTE  
AND THE END OF  
BYZANTINE DOMINION IN LATIN ITALY

Beginning in the early eighth century each of the three protagonists in the developing struggle for central Italy came under the leadership of a strong hand. As King Luitprand, Pope Gregory II and Emperor Leo III took control of their respective offices a new and more violent phase of the struggle was opened. The Roman revolution of the eighth century had begun.

Leo III, Emperor of Byzantium, was the first of a long series of military adventurers from the Armenian frontier to seize the throne of Byzantium. On Leo's accession Italy was the only remaining holding of the empire in the West; the empire had become a Hellenic-orientalized state and Leo's reign and that of his son, Constantine V, began a period of reorganization of the empire around that fact.<sup>1</sup> The reign of Leo III was remarkable for many reasons, not least of which was that the policies which he pursued provoked the separatist revolution in Italy which led to the events of 754.

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<sup>1</sup> Bréhier, I, 74-88.

The severity of the disputes brought about by Leo were aggravated by the fact that the pope of the time, Gregory II, was a man who was certainly as strong willed as Leo. The story of the conflict of wills of these two men is without doubt one of the most interesting stories in papal history. Indeed, it is not idly claimed that the process of papal liberation began under Gregory II.<sup>2</sup>

By the time of Gregory II's accession as pontiff the work of the popes as secular lords in Rome had caused the borders between ecclesiastical and political affairs to become blurred to the point that, in the minds of the papal curia and the people, St. Peter seemed to have replaced caesar as head of the state.<sup>3</sup> Gregory held a relatively independent position which allowed him, as leader of the Latin Italians, to maintain a position in opposition to both the Lombards and the Greeks.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Ullmann, Papal Government, p. 45.

<sup>3</sup> Haller, I, 356. In fact, though documentary evidence of direct papal rule in Rome does not appear until Zachary's pontificate, a survey of the pontificate of Gregory II leads one to the conclusion that he governed Rome. He may still have governed in the emperor's name, but govern he did. Until the end of Gregory II's life, when the Exarch Eutychius appeared in Rome, there was no power in Rome to govern the pope or force him to do Leo's bidding. One can only conclude that whatever administration existed was firmly in Gregory's hands. This is probably true of the duchy at large.

<sup>4</sup> Erich Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttum von den Anfängen bis zur Höhe der Weltherrschaft, 2 Ede. (Tübingen, 1933), II, 645.



In 726 Leo, pressed for money to carry out reform in the empire, doubled the indiction, or fiscal year, thereby doubling the taxes for 726. The church was at the time the most wealthy single land-holder in imperial Italy and, as the burden of the increased taxation would therefore cost the church a great deal, Gregory II, in his capacity as lord and protector of the patrimonies of the church, protested the tax and refused to pay. Indeed, the church's burden of the tax was so large that the papal biographer saw the doubled indiction as directed primarily against the church.<sup>5</sup> The papal opposition against the taxes was so pleasing to the Italian people that Gregory was seen as in support of a 'national' revolution.<sup>6</sup> The imperial response to the pontiff's refusal to obey in the tax dispute was the epitome of ineptness; Leo ordered the death of the offending cleric.<sup>7</sup> How-

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<sup>5</sup> Vita Gregorii II, in Liber Pontificalis, éd. par L. Duchesne, BEAR, 2<sup>e</sup> ser., 3 tomes (Paris, 1886), I, 403: "...eo quod census in provincia ponere praepediebat et suis opibus ecclesias denudare...."

<sup>6</sup> Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums, II, 645-646. The term 'national' is used to denote the Latin Italians of central Italy and originates with Caspar.

<sup>7</sup> Vita Gregorii II, pp. 403-404. Several attempts were made. The first plot was one involving, according to Duchesne (Liber Pontificalis, I, 412n.), "...deux officiers supérieurs de l'armée et par un dignitaire ecclésiastique; le gouverneur de Rome s'abstient de la favoriser ostensiblement". The officers seem to have been the Duke Basil and the Chartularius Jordannes while the ecclesiastic was the Subdeacon John Lurion. The plan was approved by the Spatharius Marinus (the governor) sent by Leo to Rome to rule the duchy. Marinus was not a prominent character in future events, perhaps he was withdrawn. Though this plan failed it provided the tone for Leo's dealings with Gregory in the future.

ever, popular feeling was so strongly anti-imperial that the people, aided by Lombard arms, rose up and were able to prevent the execution of the emperor's order.<sup>8</sup>

The situation was further complicated by the fact that, in the same year, Leo had taken a most unpopular step: the prohibition of the use of icons within the empire, which caused general unrest in the East as well as in the West.<sup>9</sup> Realizing the weight of Roman opinion in ecclesiastical affairs and determined to get Gregory's approval, Leo offered Gregory a proposition: either he expressed his approval of the iconoclastic decree, in which case he should have the emperor's gratitude (it being implied that the matter of resistance to taxes would be forgotten), or not, in which case Leo would depose him.<sup>10</sup> The pope refused to comply, as did Germanus, the Patriarch of Constantinople, who was later deposed by Leo to be replaced by a man more amenable to Leo's will.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Vita Gregorii II, p. 404. John Lurion and Jordannes were killed and Basil was forced into a monastery. Cf. Fauli Historia Langobardorum, VI, 49, MGH, SS. rer. Lang. (Hannover, 1878), p. 181.

<sup>9</sup> Nicephorus Breviarum Historicum, FS, C, 963c.

<sup>10</sup> Vita Gregorii II, p. 404: "Et si adquiesceret pontifex, gratiam imperatoris haberet; si et hoc fieri praepediret, a suo gradu decederet."

<sup>11</sup> Hefele-Leclercq, III, 11, 676. A Roman council in 727 apparently condemned the doctrine but no precise canons survive. Cf. Nicephorus Breviarum Historicum, p. 966a.

At this juncture it is interesting to note that Gregory apparently did not consider himself in full rebellion against the empire. Luitprand, King of the Lombards, seeing the chaos in imperial Italy, judged the time fair for increasing his conquests from the empire and attacked Byzantine holdings, probably in Venice and the Pentapolis, while a revolt also broke out in the same areas.<sup>12</sup> In response to this Gregory wrote to the authorities concerned admonishing them to remain loyal to the emperor and the empire, and to aid the Exarch.<sup>13</sup> Thus we see that Gregory II held a seemingly ambivalent attitude vis-à-vis Leo III. On the one hand he protested his loyalty to the empire and exerted himself, where possible, to prevent the diminution of imperial territory in

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<sup>12</sup> Vita Gregorii II, p. 404: "Igitur permoti omnes Pentapolenses atque Venetiarum exercita contra imperatoris iussionem restiterunt...."

<sup>13</sup> Johannis Diaconi Chronicon Venetum, MGH, SS, VII, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hannover, 1846), p. 12. Epistolae Langobardicae Collectae, Ep. XI (Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2177), MGH, Epp., III, ed. W. Gundlach (Berlin, 1892), p. 702: "Quia peccato faciente Ravennantium civitas, quae caput extat omnium, ab nec dicenda gente Longobardorum capta est, et filius noster eximius dominus exarchus apud Venecias, ut cognovimus, moratur, debeat nobilitas tua ei adhereret cum eo nostra vice pariter decertare, ut ad pristinum statum sanctae rei publicae et imperiali servitio dominorum filiorumque nostrorum Leonis et Constantini magnorum imperatorum ipsa revocetur Ravennantium civitas, ut zelo et amore sanctae fidei nostrae in statu rei publicae et imperiali servicio firmi persistere Domino cooperante valeamus". Letter XI was to Duke Ursus of Venice. Letter XII (Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2178), p. 702, was the same letter addressed to the Patriarch of Grado. Vita Gregorii II, p. 404: "...numquam se in eiusdem pontificis condescendere necem, sed pro eius magis defensione viriliter decertarent...." The papal biographer also notes that Rome's love and faith for the empire continued unabated, p. 407: "...in fide persisterent rogabat, sed ne desisterent ab amore vel fide Romani imperii ammonerat."

Italy. On the other he protested against Leo's policies in the most vigorous language.

At this point it may be of interest to take note of the two famous letters sent to Leo III by Gregory II concerning Leo's religious views.<sup>14</sup> The language of the letters was strong and the theme of them was that the emperor ought to cease promoting heresy and interfering in religious affairs. First the emperor was chided rather roughly by Pope Gregory as being more ignorant than a child in the matter of the deference due to icons.<sup>15</sup> Then the pope lectured the emperor on political and ecclesiastical behaviour and theory. He insisted that the popes derived their power and authority from St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles,<sup>16</sup> and admonished Leo that

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<sup>14</sup> Sancti Gregorii II Romani Pontificis Epistolae, Epp. XII-XIII (Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2180, 2182), PL, LXXXIX, 511-524. These letters have been the subject of great controversy. Many doubt their authenticity. Hodgkin, whose views are typical of this group, feels that the true copies do not now exist, Hodgkin, VI, 505. Erich Caspar has investigated the problem of these letters and rejects the notion that they are spurious; see Erich Caspar, "Papst Gregor II und der Bilderstreit", ZKG, LII, (1933), 29-31 et passim.

<sup>15</sup> Gregorii II Epistolae, Ep. XII (Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2180), p. 516: "Averte cogitationes tuas malas, te obtestor; et libera animam tuam a scandalis et execrationibus quibus ab universo mundo incesseris, quandoquidem vel a puerulis parvis illuderis. Obito scholas eorum qui elementis imbuuntur, et dic: Ego sum eversor et persecutor imaginum, et confestim tabellas suas in caput tuum projicient, quodque a sapientibus minime doceri potuisti, ab insipientibus edocebere."

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. "Voluimus et nos, utpote qui facultatem et potestatem atque auctoritatem a sancto Petro principe apostolorum habemus, tibi poenam irrogare...."

dogma was not the business of emperors, just as civil affairs were not the business of churchmen.<sup>17</sup> He further informed the emperor that because of his ecclesiastical policy he had himself damned himself.<sup>18</sup> Thinking, no doubt, of the imperially inspired attempts on his life he wrote to Leo that if Leo continued to insult him and attempted to harm him he would not argue but would merely leave Rome and travel the short distance to Campania, and then the emperor might just as well "chase the wind".<sup>19</sup> For the pope had no need to fear a power which could not rule Italy and could only make Rome dangerous for him because Rome was on the sea, and thus vulnerable to the Greek fleet,<sup>20</sup> particularly when the whole

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 518: "Scis, imperator, sanctae Ecclesiae dogmata non imperatorum esse, sed pontificum, quae tuto debent dogmatizari. Idcirco Ecclesiis praepositi sunt pontifices a reipublicae negotiis abstinentes; et imperatores ergo similiter ab ecclesiasticis abstineant, et quae sibi commissa sunt capessant. Consilium autem Christi amantium imperatorum et piorum pontificum virtus est una, quando cum pace atque charitate res administrantur. Scripsisti ut concilium universale coereretur, et nobis inutilis ea res visa est." On this point Gregory was obviously stretching it a bit; he had great interest and activity in civil affairs.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 516: "...facultatem et potestatem atque auctoritatem a sancto Petro principe apostolorum habemus, tibi poenam irrogare; sed quoniam in te ipsum execrationem ingressisti, tibi habeto illam cum consiliariis tuis, quos complecteris."

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 519: "quod si nobis insolenter insultes, et minas intentes, non est nobis necesse tecum in certamen descendere; ad quatuor et viginti stadia secedet in regionem Campaniae Romanus pontifex; tum tu vade, ventos persequere."

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 520: "Scis Romam ulcisci imperium tuum non posse, nisi forte solam urbem propter adjacens illi mare ac navigia; ut enim ante diximus, si ad quatuor et viginti stadia Rome fuerit egressus papa, nihil tuas minas extimescit."

West looked to the vicar of St. Peter, whom they venerated as a god on earth.<sup>21</sup> He warned Leo that if he sent arms to enforce his iconoclastic views in the West blood would flow of which Leo alone would be guilty.<sup>22</sup>

Leo's response to this heady barrage of advice and criticism from Gregory was to claim to be both pope and caesar.<sup>23</sup> To this Gregory replied that Leo's imperial predecessors did not try to act in such a fashion but co-operated with the popes and respected the church.<sup>24</sup> Here again Gregory is obviously ignoring the recent past in order to get across a clear theoretical position on the relationship of the two powers in the state. Then he again admonished Leo that dogma was a concern for popes, not emperors, since emperors, unlike churchmen, did not have the sensus (mind) of Christ and that Leo should leave the church to its own business and the

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid. "...Occidens universus ad humilitatem nostram convertit oculos, ac licet tales non simus nos, illi tamen magnopere nobis confidunt, et in eum, cujus denuntias te imaginem eversurum atque deleturum, sancti scilicet Petri, quem omnia Occidentis regna velut deum terrestrem habent."

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. "Totus Occidens sancto principi apostolorum fide fructus offert. Quod si quospiam ad evertendam imaginem miseris sancti Petri, vide, protestamur tibi, innocentes sumus a sanguine quem fusuri sunt; verum incervices tuas et in caput tuum ista recident."

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., Ep. XIII (Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2182), p. 521: "Imperator sum et sacerdos."

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

pope would leave the state to its own affairs.<sup>25</sup>

Though they reveal Gregory as a man who no longer took much account of Greek power in Italy,<sup>26</sup> these letters indicate that he still thought in terms of a church within the empire, inasmuch as their theoretical basis was the Gelasian doctrine of the separation of powers within the state.

Despite the admonitory tone of these letters Gregory's lecturing failed to impress Leo or make his spirit quail, and the conflict in Italy continued apace. Duke Exhilaratus, one of the local magnates, made an attempt to hold Campania against the adherents of Rome and to persuade the populace to kill the pope and to follow Leo's orders, but his activities were stopped by the Romans.<sup>27</sup> A similar aristocratic opposition by the Duke Peter was again met by the Romans who blinded him, while in Ravenna the Exarch Paul, who himself

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 522: "Audi humilitatem nostram, imperator; cessa, et sanctam Ecclesiam sequere, prout invenisti atque accepisti; non sunt imperatorum dogmata, sed pontificum, quoniam Christi sensum nos habemus."

<sup>26</sup> Gustav Krüger, Das Papsttum, seine Idee und ihre Träger, 2. Aufl. (Tübingen, 1932), p. 24.

<sup>27</sup> Vita Gregorii II, p. 405: "Ipsis diebus Exhilaratus dux, deceptus diabolica instigatione, cum filio suo Hadriano, Campanie partes tenuit, seducens populum ut oboedirent imperatori et occiderent pontificem". They were killed by the Romans. Cf. Duchesne, Liber Pontificalis, I, 413n: "Hadriano filio Exhilarati, qui praestito sacramento in apostolica confessione Epiphaniam diaconam illicito ausu in uxorem habet, anathema sit." Apparently, then, Exhilaratus and Hadrian had old grievances against Pope Gregory II to revenge. Cf. Bréhier et Aigrain, p. 414.

had made several attempts on the life of the pope which were foiled by the Lombards and Romans,<sup>28</sup> was killed in a riot between adherents of the two parties.<sup>29</sup> A new exarch soon arrived with orders to kill the pope and again the Romans and the Lombards defended the pope, following which Eutychius, the new exarch, was excommunicated.<sup>30</sup>

Eutychius, however, being perhaps the most able Greek representative yet sent, perceived the inherent danger to Greek power in Italy of a Lombard-papal coalition. Playing on the desire of Luitprand to control Rome, Eutychius approached him with a proposition. The papal biographer tells that he entered into a conspiracy with Luitprand and that an agreement was made between them by which their combined forces would seek two goals: first, the submission of the Lombard duchies in the south of Italy which were allied to the pope, and second, the reduction of Rome to obedience to the empire.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Vita Gregorii II, p. 404.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 405: "Igitur dissensione missa in partibus Ravennae, alii consentientes pravitati imperatoris, alii cum pontifice et fidelibus tenentes, inter eos contentione mota, Paulum patricium occiderunt."

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 405-406. Eutychius tried to induce some Romans to kill the pope and the 'optimates' of Rome.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 407: "Eo vero tempore, saepius dicti Eutychius patricius et Luitprandus rex inierunt consilium nefas ut congregata exercita rex subiceret duces Spolitinum et Beneventanum, exarchus Romam...."



When the combined Lombard and imperial forces drew up before Rome, Gregory was able to persuade Luitprand to draw back from attacking, and Luitprand in turn used his good offices to bring Gregory and the exarch together.<sup>32</sup> The attempt was successful and peace under the exarch's presence in Rome was maintained for a time. Indeed, the peace seemed so complete that when a rebellion in Tuscany threatened to raise an anti-caesar in Italy, Gregory gave his blessing to the exarch's efforts to suppress it.<sup>33</sup>

Thus we see that the two fold aspect of Gregory II's policy seems reinforced. He had been looked upon as the leader of an Italian revolution and as having secret ambitions for the territorial aggrandizement of the Roman church in Italy. Yet throughout the proceedings he professed his loy-

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 403: "Ad quem egressus pontifex eique praesentatus potuit regis mollire animos commotione pia, ita ut se prosterneret eius pedibus et promitteret nulli inferre lesionem. Atque sic ad tantam eum conpunctionem piis monitis flexus est ut quae fuerat indutus exueret et ante corpus apostoli poneret, mantum, armilatusiam, balteum, spatam atque ensem deauratos, necnon coronam auream et crucem argenteam. Post oratione facta obsecravit pontificem ut memoratum exarchum ad pacis concordiam suscipere dignaretur: quod et factum est. Et sic recessit, rege declinante a malis quibus inerat consiliis cum exarcho."

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. The people raised an emperor named Petasius, who subsequently called himself Tiberius, and wanted to lead him as emperor to Constantinople and enthrone him there. "Exarchus vero haec audiens turbatus est. Quem sanctissimus papa confortans, cum eum proceres ecclesiae mittens atque exercitus, profecti sunt." Though it is worth noting as suggested by Ludo Moritz Hartmann that the reason for Gregory's assistance to the exarch may have been motivated by a desire to avoid having a local caesar to play second fiddle to, (Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Byzantinischen Verwaltung in Italien (New York, n.d.), p. 23) it more likely that he hesitated to support an overt act of treason.

alty to the empire in word, and finally in deed. How is one to explain him?<sup>34</sup> Judging from the ideology implicit in his letters one finds *oneself* constrained to agree with Henri Hubert that Gregory's task was to avoid obeying a heretical emperor without open treason.<sup>35</sup> Assuming, then, that Gregory's ultimate loyalty to the empire remained untarnished, one finds *oneself* confronted by an obvious question. Consider the trials and tribulations undergone by the papacy from the sixth through the eighth centuries, and the increased difficulties in the eighth century, all caused by willful, heretical emperors who accomplished nothing in the way of defending Italy or the church. In such a situation what hold could the empire, now no longer Roman in any way, have on the loyalty or imagination of a man like Gregory II? Some argue that Gregory did not wish total rebellion as the power most likely to profit was the Lombard,<sup>36</sup> an argument to which

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<sup>34</sup> Some, most notably C. Bayet, argue that secession from the empire was never considered by Gregory II and that he only opposed iconoclasm, "Remarques sur le caractère et les conséquences du voyage d'Étienne III en France", RH, XX, (1882), 90. On the other hand, Erich Caspar supposes that Gregory had planned secession but found his plans ruined by the foreboding presence of the exarch in Rome toward the end, which killed Rome as a center of revolution, Geschichte des Papsttums, II, 662. However, in ZKE, LII, (1933), 68-70 Caspar argues that Gregory had had no secession idea. It ought to be noted that Eutychius drops out of the main affairs after this and was no longer prominent.

<sup>35</sup> Henri Hubert, "Étude sur la formation des états de l'église", RH, LXIX, (1899), 12.

<sup>36</sup> William Barry, The Papal Monarchy from Saint Gregory the Great to Boniface VIII (London, 1902), p. 71.

some weight need be given. Others, who indeed ought to know better, argue that he maintained his allegiance because he still needed imperial protection from the Lombards.<sup>37</sup> But one can scarcely assent to this inasmuch as since Gregory I's time the popes had provided their own best defense against the Lombards. The simplest and most reasonable answer is that while the empire might be plagued by bad or heretical emperors, who might be rebuked or deposed, it yet remained the Roman Empire -- the respublica Romanorum of the Christian people -- and it is to this idea that the papacy clings and is faithful throughout the eighth century and beyond. Even when the possibility of remaining under the theoretical tutelage of Byzantium can no longer be admitted, the idea of and loyalty to the republic of the Romans and the Christian people remains. The key to papal behaviour in this period and the next is the developing concept that the lordship or principatus of the republic is transferable. It does not essentially adhere to Byzantium but to Rome. It can be taken away from the Greeks and held in Rome by the pope, or it can be given to another. Only when this is kept in mind may eighth century papal history be made intelligible!

In 731 the indomitable Gregory II, by natural causes, went the way Leo III was unable to send him by force. He was succeeded by a third Gregory. Gregory III seemed by nature a less argumentative man and one more interested in the spirit

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<sup>37</sup> George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, tr. by Joan Hussey (New Brunswick, 1957), p. 145.

than in worldly matters. This has prompted some to view his election in 731 as a blow to the idea of national revolution against the Greeks and a loss of control by the diaconal circle in the curia.<sup>38</sup> But such did not prove to be so in fact; for Gregory III followed his predecessor's lead in protesting iconoclasm. Soon after his election Gregory sent a letter requesting restoration of images by Leo, but Leo prevented it from arriving.<sup>39</sup> This blunder on Leo's part made certain that his experiences with Gregory II would be repeated -- Leo's action was in practice a complete diplomatic break.<sup>40</sup> As an answer to Leo's provocation Gregory held a Roman synod which formally excommunicated all iconoclasts.<sup>41</sup> Leo himself was declared excommunicate and deposed,

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<sup>38</sup> Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums, II, 664.

<sup>39</sup> Vita Gregorii III, in Liber Pontificalis, I, 415-416. A priest named George was sent with the first letter, but fear of the emperor caused him to return without delivering the letter. After being reprimanded he was sent out again with the letter, but this time he was arrested by an imperial official and sent to Sicily where he was detained in exile for one year.

<sup>40</sup> Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums, II, 664: "Das war der diplomatische Bruch in aller Form."

<sup>41</sup> Vita Gregorii III, p. 416: "...adversus eandem venerationem sacrarum imaginum...depositer atque destructor et profanator vel blasphemus extiterit, sit extorris a corpore et sanguine domini nostri Iesu Christi vel totius ecclesiae unitate atque conpage."

but again Leo detained the legate sent by the pope.<sup>42</sup> Unable to gain his way by persuasion and learning nothing by the past, Leo sent an army to attack Gregory, but the armies of Ravenna and Venice resisted.<sup>43</sup> Impotent now to get back at Gregory by any other means, Leo deprived the See of Rome of those ecclesiastical provinces subordinate to Rome which were still under effective imperial control (South Italy and the Balkans), and assigned them to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This formal act of Leo's marked the severance of effective political ties between Rome and Byzantium, for when Leo took this step he put the papacy wholly outside the empire. The lands of the Patriarchate of Constantinople came to coincide with the real limes of the empire at last.<sup>44</sup> The empire was finally a fully Byzantine state.

Hence it must be concluded that despite papal theoretical interest in the concept of empire, by the end of the 730's Greek power in central Italy was dead. We must disagree with those who argue a surviving connection of the

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<sup>42</sup> Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium, Cronaca E, a. 732, RIC, XVIII, 398. Cf. Joannis Zonarae Annales, XV, 4, PG, CXXXIV, 1323. Vasiliev, I, 259, regards this as the point of papal independence: "Following this step [the council of 731] middle Italy detached itself from the Byzantine Empire and became completely controlled by papal and western European interests. Southern Italy still remained under Byzantine sway." It is clear that he regarded Leo's action of 731 as recognition of the loss of central Italy. Concerning the detention of the papal legate see Vita Gregorii III, pp. 416-417.

<sup>43</sup> Andreae Danduli Chronica, VII, 3, p. 113.

<sup>44</sup> Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, p. 146.

papacy with the Greeks in Gregory III's time.<sup>45</sup> For by Gregory III's death the embryo of the future Roman state in central Italy, the Duchy of Rome, was firmly ruled by the pope, who may even have coined his own money.<sup>46</sup> Gregory was by any measure more powerful in Italy than the emperor, and he was the last pope to bother being confirmed in his election by imperial officials.<sup>47</sup>

Seeing the condition of papal-imperial affairs under Gregory and keeping in mind his much-discussed call for aid to the Franks in 739 it is no surprise that many writers in later ages considered him to have broken with the empire.<sup>48</sup> However, it

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<sup>45</sup> Bayet, RH, XX, (1882), 90-91. Hubert, RE, LXIX, (1899), 25-26. Hubert claims that the Duke of Rome was still an imperial magistrate. This cannot be accepted. If it were so, then the empire would have been able to control Gregory, but as can be seen, there was no power in Rome other than Gregory's and no one to stand effectively in his way.

<sup>46</sup> The coinage of money by Gregory III has been suggested by Horace K. Mann, The Lives of the popes in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (London, 1925), I, ii, 276-277. The suggestion is also supported by Luigi Pizzamiglio, Studi storici intorno ad alcune prime monete papali (Roma, 1876), pp. 23-26. It is unfortunate that more complete information is not available on this matter. If the truth of this suggestion could be demonstrated it would go far to reveal the total degree of papal governance in Rome.

<sup>47</sup> Bréhier et Aigrain, p. 416.

<sup>48</sup> The first suggestion of this appears in Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 22, ed. B. Krusch, MGH, SS. rer. Mer., (Hannover, 1888), II, 179: "...eo pacto patrato, ut a partibus imperatoris recederet et Romano consulto praefato principe Carlo sanciret." Some later writers supposed the secession to have occurred before 739; for example, Cronica Pontificum et Imperatorum Tiburtina, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH, SS., (Berlin, 1903), XXXI, 251: "...et fecit recedere totam Ytaliā a potestate Leonis Augusti heresiarche ...et ipsum imperatorem excommunicavit et regno privavit." See also Martini Oppaviensis Chronicon, ed. L. Welland, MGH,

might be more to the point to observe that in Gregory III's time the term res publica ceases to refer to the Greek empire at large and becomes fixed as a reference to Latin Italy.<sup>49</sup>

By 739, then, the Roman pontiffs and the Italy they led stood outside the penumbra of Greek rule and the so-called Byzantine Empire. Latin Italy stood, in effect, alone with the pope at its head. The Romans had disowned the Greek basileus and he had disowned them -- but in the eyes of the Romans the res publica Romanorum continued to exist in Italy.

In the succeeding pontificate the papacy maintained its independence and expanded its role in the affairs of Latin Italy. While it may be true that Pope Zachary, Gregory III's successor, was more interested in religion than politics and that in his pontificate the Roman party of clerics slipped into the background, one cannot assent to the assertion that

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SS, (Hannover, 1872), XXII, 425: "Hic Gregorius cum Leonem imperatorem de depositione ymaginum Christi et sanctorum incorrigibilem vidisset, Romanam et Ytaliā et Hesperiam totā ab eius iure discedere fecit....". Cf. Romualdi Salernitani Chronicon, a. 739, RIS, VII, 1, 140.

<sup>49</sup> Hubert, RE, LXIX, (1899), 30. It ought to be pointed out that while one agrees with Hubert on this point he is contradicting an earlier statement of his own in this same article; see p. 34, note 45. It ought to be noted that in his approach to Charles Martel Gregory III made no reference to the empire but to the defense of the "...ecclesiam Dei et peculiarem populum....", Codex Carolinus, ed. by W. Gundlach, Ep. I (Ob nimium dolorem -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2250), MGH, Epp. (Hannover, 1892), III, 477. See also Ibid., Ep. II (Nimiam fluctuamur -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2252), pp. 477-479. Because of the necessity of revising the chronology of some of the letters of the Codex Carolinus it is necessary to be able to positively identify each letter to avoid confusion. Therefore, each citation from the Codex will include the number of the letter in the edition cited, the incipit, the Jaffé-Wattenbach register number and, when applicable, a revised number.

Zachary lacked the Roman touch in Italian politics.<sup>50</sup> The situation during his pontificate simply happened to be an entirely different one.

Though Zachary, like his predecessors, wrote to the new emperor, Constantine V, asking him to restore images, the struggle over iconoclasm had ended in Italy. A stalemate had been reached. Relations between Rome and Constantinople became more peaceful because they no longer were of capital importance to either party: the Greeks were simply no longer a power to be reckoned with in Italy<sup>51</sup> and the history of Zachary's period shows that he pretty well reckoned without them.

To begin with Zachary ruled without Greek approval; he made no request for confirmation of his election.<sup>52</sup> He was

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<sup>50</sup> Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums, II, 735.

<sup>51</sup> The reign of Constantine V was marked with endless discord. Soon after his father's death in 741 his brother-in-law, Artabazus, revolted and usurped the throne. Constantine won in 743, Hiephorus Breviarum Historicum, pp. 966c-970a. Artabazus seems to have been the champion of iconoclasm and after his demise the persecutions went on, Ibid., 970c-971c. In addition dangers from external enemies, the Bulgars and the Arabs, threatened the empire and took most of Constantine's time. The Bulgars posed a major threat and Constantine spent a significant portion of his reign fighting them. The net result was that Constantine paid less attention to Italy than any basileus before him, Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, p. 151.

<sup>52</sup> Hubert, RH, (1899), 31, asserts that confirmation was obtained from the duke. But he cites no source and one suspects that his reasoning is that if the pope did not get it from the exarch or emperor he must have gotten it from the duke. Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums, II, 738, suggests that papal letters to Constantine contained a request, but this is dubious. See Ottorino Bertolini, "I rapporti di Zaccaria con Constantino V e con Artavasdo", ASBSP, Ser. 3, IX (1955), 21. He neither asked, got, nor needed confirmation; cf. Hartmann, Untersuchungen, p. 25.



the power in Rome and the duchy and the duke were subordinate to him.<sup>53</sup> Zachary, like Gregory III, may even have coined money for circulation in Rome or the duchy.<sup>54</sup> He also engaged in diplomacy and entered into international agreements with the Lombards in a manner befitting a sovereign lord, and evidence indicates that his claims of lost ducal land from Luitprand were made as sovereign lord and rightful owner of the land in question.<sup>55</sup>

Zachary's adept management of affairs shows through in his policy toward the Lombards. For both Gregory II and Gregory III sided with Luitprand's enemies at every possible moment, and, by using the hostility of the king and the dukes, or of the Greeks to the Lombards, they maintained their pos-

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<sup>53</sup> Vita Zachariis, in Liber Pontificalis, I, 429. When Zachary went to negotiate with the Lombards he "...relicta Romana urbe iamdicto Stephano patricio et duci ad gubernandum...." Msgr. Duchesne notes that "On voit par cette phrase que la duc de Rome était, eu ce temps-là, subordonné de fait au pape", Liber Pontificalis, I, 437n.

<sup>54</sup> Pizzamiglio, pp. 26-27.

<sup>55</sup> Vita Zachariis, p. 426: "...ab eodem rege abstulte sunt a ducatu Romano civitates IIII....quattuor civitates qui pro eo perierant...." Luitprand promised to return (reddere) the cities. Zachary was "...vere pastor populi sibi a Deo credit....", and in a political way as the context implies, Ibid., p. 427. The four cities were "...per donationis reconcessit....", Ibid. In making peace Zachary discussed the borders of the duchy as "...per circuitum finium reipublicae ....", Ibid. When he went to Ravenna to aid the exarch, who was utterly dependent on such aid, he made no mention of the emperor. The land was given back to Ravenna "...ad partem reipublicae restituit....", (Ibid.) and Zachary was the obvious protector of it. The lands were restored to Zachary without any mention being made of the emperor. Cf. F. J. Foakes-Jackson, "The Papacy, to Charles the Great", CML, II, xxii, 695.

ition -- however weak it was. Under Pope Zachary a new policy was begun and carried out with ability. By abandoning both the Greeks and the Lombard dukes, and acting in the name of the duchy he removed those alliances which had made his predecessors the enemies of the king, and he achieved peace.

Zachary's path was even more successful with Luitprand's successor, Ratchis. Ratchis was an orthodox believer who had, in addition, strong Roman sympathies which alienated his following; he was married to a Roman and his policies were strongly influenced by Rome.<sup>56</sup> About 749 Ratchis, following Luitprand's unity policy, attacked Perugia and the Pentapolis. Being asked to cease by Zachary he did so and, according to the chronicler, entered a monastery in a fit of piety.<sup>57</sup> But the chronicler does not tell all the story; the Lombard nobles, incensed at Ratchis' action deposed him, forced him to retire to the religious life, and made his brother, Aistulf, king.<sup>58</sup> Aistulf was much more indisposed to let Rome interfere with his plans, and one wonders whether Zachary would have been able to achieve an accommodation with him had he lived.

The events of the period extending from the conquest of Justinian to the death of Pope Zachary in 752 demonstrated the inability, on both the theoretical and practical planes,

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<sup>56</sup> Oelsner, p. 116.

<sup>57</sup> Chronicon Salernitanum, cap. 1, ed. G. F. Pertz, MGH, SS, III (Hannover, 1839), p. 471.

<sup>58</sup> Ludo Moritz Hartmann, "Italy under the Lombards", CMI, II, vii, 215.

of the papacy to remain within the theocracy of the oriental empire of Byzantium. The deterioration of imperial political control over Italy, the opposition of Constantinople and Rome over various religious issues and the byzantinization and contraction of the empire meant that the peaceful co-existence of Rome with New Rome had become impossible. The claims of the newly byzantinized empire to rule in Roman Italy were decidedly anachronistic. In addition the development of the papacy in Rome and in regard of the West brought it to a point at which the prospects of inclusion in the empire were undesirable. By the time of Gregory II the papacy had become the real secular government of Rome and was beginning to develop its jurisdictional and dogmatic primacy in the north of Europe. The iconoclastic dispute sharpened the antagonisms between Rome and the emperor and precipitated an anti-imperial reaction in central Italy of which the papacy was the natural head. Thus, while in theory Gregory II held to the idea of the co-extension of the empire and the church, and spoke in Gelasian terms of the church within the empire, he also expressed the new position of the pope. He drew attention to the fruits of the missionary labor of St. Boniface and spoke of making a trip to these newly converted lands. At the same time he noted that caesar had no real control over him. Thus while implicitly acknowledging the empire, Gregory II also drew attention to the real state of affairs -- a papacy outside the empire. But though this was so, it was so in a qualified sense. The Byzantine Empire did not have power in Italy, but Italy was part of the Roman

Empire. The Roman Empire was the republic of the Romans and it inhered essentially in Rome. The principatus of the republic was associated with Rome, not Constantinople.<sup>59</sup> It was of this empire and this republic that Gregory II and his followers were conscious. When by 731 the Byzantine Empire no longer ruled in Rome the republic was still part of the political vocabulary of the papacy. The popes were independent sovereign rulers, but as such they considered themselves members of a republic -- a republic which had nothing to do with Byzantium. Under Stephen II this republic was more clearly defined. By 755 Stephen II was speaking and thinking in terms of a Roman republic which was the same as the church of God.<sup>60</sup> According to Walter Ullmann, the republic of the Romans had a two-fold significance. The Romans were first of all the people in Italy immediately subject to Rome and secondly, the Christian people who followed Roman orthodoxy.<sup>61</sup> Both of these ideas as to the meaning of the word "Roman" are of acute importance in what follows.

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<sup>59</sup> Alfred Lombard, Constantin V, Empereur des Romains, Vol. XVI of BFL-Paris (Paris, 1902), p. 65.

<sup>60</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. VI (Dum regni vestri -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2322), p. 489: "...beato Petro sanctaeque Dei ecclesiae, rei publice Romanorum,...." It may also be argued that as St. Peter and the pope may be viewed as having replaced Jupiter Maximus and Caesar as master of Rome and vicar, sancta Dei ecclesiae rei publice is identical with respublica sanctae Dei ecclesiae, Franz Kampers, "Roma aeterna und Sancta Dei ecclesia rei publicae Romanorum", HJb, XLIV, (1924), 240-243.

<sup>61</sup> Ullmann, Growth of Papal Government, pp. 61-63.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE FRANCO-PAPAL ALLIANCE AND THE TREATIES OF 755 AND 756

In a situation in which the papacy wished to avoid being subjected to Lombard control, and in which no aid could be expected from the Greeks, even if wanted -- only one alternative existed: an approach to an outside power.

Gregory III had seen this clearly and in 739 he sent embassies to Charles Martel offering him the Roman consulate if he would aid Gregory against the Lombards.<sup>1</sup> It is doubtful if Martel did very much to aid the pope<sup>2</sup> for he certainly

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<sup>1</sup> Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 22, pp. 178-179. Erich Caspar, Pippin und die römische Kirche (Berlin, 1914), p. 4, points out that the initiative in approaching Martel may have lain with the Roman magnates. The offer of the office was supposed to place him in the position of those previous high military officials who had born it. However that may be, we must disagree with Caspar on two points: first, that the offer did not mean separation of Italy and Byzantium. They were already separate, and one must conclude with A. Gasquet ("Le royaume Lombard; ses relations avec l'empire Grec et avec la France", RH, XXXIII (1887), 79) that Gregory III would not want Martel in alliance with the empire. Second, Caspar's assertion that the arrangement placed Rome in Martel's mundeburdium, p. 8. Such an assertion takes no account of either the sources or the thought of the pope. Cf. Codex Carolinus, Epp. I (Ob nimium dolorem -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2250) et II (Nimia fluctuamur -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2252), pp. 476-479.

<sup>2</sup> In the Divisio Regnorum of 806 (Capitulare 45, MGH, LL: Sectio II, I, 129) Charlemagne noted that his grandfather had

did not send an army. Though Franco-Lombard relations had been rather complicated and often stormy during the Merovingian period due to Frankish interests in southern Gaul and Bavaria, to which northern Italy was in some ways an important adjunct, and because of Lombard contacts with and interest in Bavaria, Charles Martel and Luitprand were far too close for Martel to go to war. Luitprand had continued the Lombard policy of close connections with Bavaria and had been closely involved in Bavarian problems but seems to have come at last to some sort of settlement there recognizing Martel's interests.<sup>3</sup> Both rulers apparently desired to avoid conflict. The two kingdoms were the first in the Germanic world, each with special problems and obvious spheres of interest, and they seem to have chosen to co-operate rather than oppose each other. In 737 Martel was being closely pressed in his war with the Saracens. In that situation he asked for and received aid from Luitprand.<sup>4</sup> By that time a near alliance between the two powers seemed to be in effect

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undertaken to protect the papacy: "...ut ipsi tres fratres curam et defensionem ecclesiae Sancti Petri suscipiant simul, sicut quondam ab avo nostro Karolo...." If this is to be taken in any way seriously it can only mean that diplomatic pressure may have been placed on Luitprand by Charles Martel, (Robert Holtzmann, Die Italienpolitik der Merowinger und des Königs Pippin, 2. Aufl. (Darmstadt, 1962), p.36). In Ep. II (Nimia fluctuamur -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2252), of the Codex Carolinus Pope Gregory III warned Martel "Non credas fili, falsidicis suggestionibus ac suasionibus eorundem regum.", p. 478.

<sup>3</sup> Pauli Historia Langobardorum, VI, 53-54, p. 183.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., VI, 54, p. 183.

and confirmed through the symbolic adoption of Martel's son Pepin by the Lombard.<sup>5</sup>

Despite these close relations under Martel and Luitprand time brought the Franks ever more closely under the influence of Rome. This was done chiefly through the work of the saintly Boniface, papal-sponsored missionary in the east Frankish lands,<sup>6</sup> and after 742 the reformer of the church in the main

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., VI, 53, p. 183.

<sup>6</sup> The conversion of the east Germanic tribes was a matter which interested the Arnulfings very much in that it was considered that the advance of Christianity in these regions would solidify their control over them. From the moment in 690 when St. Willibrord sought out Pepin of Heristal's active support the Anglo-Saxon missions were to be bound up unmistakably and intimately with the politics and successes of the Arnulfing house. In addition a first bond had been created between the Arnulfings and Rome in as much as these Anglo-Saxon monks were most insistent on that point above all. Boniface was the chief agent of papal interest in the north in these years and when Gregory II spoke of going north to Leo III he undoubtedly had in mind reaping the benefit of Boniface's labors: "Nuper siquidem ab interiori Occidente preces illius quem septetum appellant accepimus, qui vultum expetit nostrum Dei gratia, ut ad impartendum ei sanctum baptismum illuc proficiscamur, ac ne socordiae negligentiaeque nostrae ratio nobis reddenda sit, ad iter nos accingimus", Gregorii II Epistolae, Ep. XII (Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2180), pp. 520-521. And again: "Habeto partem cum illis: nos, prout ante scripsimus tibi, viam ingredimur Dei benignitate in extremas Occidentis regiones versus illos qui sanctam baptismum efflagitant. Cum enim illus episcopus misissem, et sanctae Ecclesiae nostrae clericos, nondum adducti sunt ut capita sua inclinarent et baptizarentur eorum principes, quod exoptent, ut eorum sim susceptor, Hac de causa nos ad viam Dei benignitate accingimus, ne forte damnationis et incuriae nostrae rationem reddamus", Ibid., Ep. XII (Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2182), p. 524. Boniface had created by the time of Pope Zachary a large, Rome-oriented and Rome-organized church in the heartland of Germany and he had made the pope head of a large and thriving church in the north. It is worth noting Boniface's oath as bishop in 723 -- it is one of direct obedience to the pope but makes no reference to the emperor -- the new province in the north was to be attached to Rome but not to the empire. It thus tended to put the papacy more effectively out of the empire. S. Bonifatii et Lulli Epistolae, ed. E. Dümmler, Ep. XVI, MGH, Epp., III (Berlin, 1892), pp. 265-266.

Frankish kingdom.<sup>7</sup> At the same time Pope Zachary, being faced with Aistulf's intransigence, revived the policy of approach to the Franks. It is even suggested by some that by 747 Pepin and Zachary had reached an understanding.<sup>8</sup> At any rate, about 750 Pepin sent two high officers, the Archbishop of Wurzburg and the royal chaplain, to Zachary to ask whether he who did not have power should still be called king.<sup>9</sup> Zachary returned the right answer and in late 751 Pepin was crowned by Boniface, the papal legate.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> At Charles Martel's death the realm of the Franks was divided between Pepin and Carlomann. Carlomann's interest in church affairs meant an improvement in Boniface's relations with the state. Carlomann realized that the best interest of the realm required religious reform and called Boniface in to accomplish the job. The Anglo-Saxon idea of the theocratic nature of kingship and the Christian vocation of monarchy proved a useful tool for the Arnulfing house in Francia, but it also proved a snare to bring the Franks into St. Peter's service. The end result was the creation of a church with strong Roman ties.

<sup>8</sup> Wilhelm Gundlach, Die Entstehung des Kirchenstaats und der curiale Begriff Res publica Romanorum (Breslau, 1899), pp. 71ff. Though at first Zachary had by intervening in Bavaria in 742 damaged his position (Annales Mettenses, a. 743, rec. B. de Simson, MGH, SS. rer. Germ., X (Hannover, 1905), pp. 34-35), he was able with Boniface's help and Pepin's desire to maintain relations, to salvage it. By 745 the process of rapprochement with Pepin had already begun. In 745 Zachary wrote to him and his brother that if they obeyed Boniface "...nulla gens ante vestrum conspectum stabit, sed corrurent ante faciem vestram omnes paganae gentes, et eritis victores ...." (Bonifatii Epistolae, Ep. LXI, p. 326).

<sup>9</sup> Annales Regni Francorum, a. 749, rec. F. Kurze, MGH, SS. rer. Germ., VI (Hannover, 1895), p. 8. It is interesting to note as G. L. Burr suggests that the question asked of Zachary had a significance in terms of the papal-Byzantine position in Italy, "The Carolingian Revolution and Frankish Intervention in Italy", CMH, II, xviii, 577.

<sup>10</sup> Annales Einhardi, a. 750, rec. F. Kurze, MGH, SS. rer. Germ., VI (Hannover, 1895), pp. 9-10. On the dates involved see T. Sickel, "Über die Epoche der Regierung Pippins", FDL,



Pope Zachary died in 752 and was succeeded by one of the champions of the revolutionary party among the curia, Stephen II. Stephen, with his ambitious concept of the papacy, was unable to deal peacefully with Aistulf. He attempted initially to pursue a policy along the lines set by his predecessor, but in the face of Aistulf's ambition to unite Italy under the Iron Crown that policy did not succeed. Immediately after Aistulf came to power he had been able to obtain several civitates supposedly subject to the exarchate.<sup>11</sup> At about the same time he was able to take advantage of dynastic difficulties in Benevento and Spoleto to consolidate his power there.<sup>12</sup> Finally Ravenna fell to Aistulf in 751 and Rome appeared to be surrounded. With Aistulf in control of the Exarchate of Ravenna and the duchies to the south, the free enclave of Rome seemed to be the logical next objective. Free now to operate directly against Rome Aistulf

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IV, (1864), 439-453, passim. Hodgkin, VII, 127, suggests that in 751 Boniface had notified the pope that he was sending Lul with a secret and that the secret was a sounding out of the pope before the Frankish legates arrived: "Habet enim secreta quaedam mea, quae soli pietati vestrae profiteri debet...." (Bonifatii Epistolae, Ep. LXXXVI, p. 368).

<sup>11</sup> Chronicon Salernitanum, cap. 2, pp. 471-472. Comachio Ferrara and Istria were the areas in question. The chronicler suggests that this was possible through the treason of the exarch, Eutychius, but no definite information allows that to be corroborated. "Per idem tempus Euthicius Romanorum patricius se Aystulfo tradidit, simulque Comiaculum atque Ferrariam seu et Istriam pugnando optinuit...."

<sup>12</sup> Ottorino Bertolini, "Il primo 'periurium' di Astolfo", ST, CXXV, (1946), 160-161.

began a 'great persecution' in and around Rome.<sup>13</sup> Cleaving still to Zachary's policy of diplomacy and accommodation Pope Stephen sent his brother, Paul the Deacon, and Ambrose the Primicerius to deal with Aistulf; a truce of forty years was made, but from the papal point of view it was broken by the Lombard within four months.<sup>14</sup> Clearly the pope intended that the truce meant a peace between an independent and sovereign Rome and Aistulf. But Aistulf viewed the measure as implying that Rome fell under a protectorate exercised by himself; he claimed jurisdiction over Rome and gave notice of his intent to levy a census of one gold solidus per annum on the inhabitants.<sup>15</sup> A Lombard hegemony being incompatible with Stephen's

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<sup>13</sup> Vita Stephani II, in Liber Pontificalis, I, 441: "Inter haec vero dum magna persecutio a Langobardorum rege Aistulfo in hac Romana urbe vel subiacentibus ei civitatibus extitisset et vehemens eiusdem regis sevitia immineret...."

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. "...illico isdem beatissimus papa, tertio apostolatus ordinationis suae mense, disponens suum germanum, sanctissimum scilicet Paulum diaconum, atque Ambrosium primicerium, plurimus cum muneribus ad eundem Langobardorum Aistulfum regem ob pacis ordinandum atque confirmandum foedera misit. Qui praelati viri ad eum coniungentes, inperitis muneribus, quasi facilius eadem pro re apud eum inpetrantes, in quadraginta annorum spatia pacti foedus cum eo confirmaverunt. At vero isdem protervus Langobardorum rex, antiqui hostis invasus versutia, ipsa foedera pacis post poene IIII menses; in perlurii incidens reatu, disruptit...."

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. "...ipsa foedera pacis post poene IIII menses; in perlurii incidens reatu, disruptit; multas iamfatto sanctissimo viro vel cuncto populo Romano ingerens contumelias, varias illi minas dirigens. Cupiens quippe, Deo sibi contrario, cunctam hanc provinciam invadere, honerosum tributum huius Romane urbis inhabitantibus adhibere nitebatur; per unumquemque scilicet caput singulos auri solidos annue auferre iniabat et sui iurisdictione civitatem hanc Romanam vel subiacentes ei castra subdere indignanter asserebat." Cf. Pauli Historia Langobardorum Continuatio Tertia, cap. 23, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH, SS. rer. Lang. (Hannover, 1878), p. 208. It has been asserted that the tribute thus claimed

concept of his office within the Roman state and the theory of the ecclesiastical republic, it was not desirable for Stephen to concur. In response he sent the abbots of the monasteries of SS. Vincent and Benedict to treat with Aistulf, but Aistulf turned them away without seeing them.<sup>16</sup>

Oblivious to reality, Emperor Constantine V regarded Pope Stephen as his subject and, soon after Aistulf's refusal to negotiate, the Silentarius John arrived in Rome with imperial instructions to Stephen to assist in dealing with Aistulf and with an absurd order commanding Aistulf to restore the land he had taken.<sup>17</sup> This move by the emperor pre-

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by Aistulf was that normally paid by Rome to Byzantium; if true, the implication is clear. See A. Gasquet, L'empire byzantin et la monarchie franque (Paris, 1888), p. 235. Hartmann, Geschichte Italiens, II, ii, 176-177, suggests that Aistulf was not claiming a direct power over Rome, but a hegemony exercised as a foederate of the Greeks. It is probably the case that though Aistulf was not hostile to Rome or the pope, he was intent that his hegemony in Italy as conqueror of the empire should be recognized. He would insist on such recognition from Rome just as he would from his duchies.

<sup>16</sup> Vita Stephani II, pp. 441-442: "Cernens vero isdem sanctissimus papa valide praefati regis perniciose imminere sevitia, magnopere ad se accersitis venerabilium monasteriorum sanctorum Vincentii et Benedicti religiosi abbatibus, sua vice eidem crudelissimo misit regi, obnix per eos postulans pacis foedera et quietum utrarumque partium populi Dei obtinere confirmandam. Quos nempe suscipiens, omnino contemptui habens, eorum spreuit monita et ad suae animae detrimentum sine effectu causae confusos ad propria absoluit monasteria, obtestans eos minime ad praefatum sanctissimum papa declinari."

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 442: "...coniunxit Roma Iohannis, imperialis silentarius, deferens eidem sanctissimo pontifici iussionem, simulque et aliam ad nomen praedicti regis impii detulit adorationis adnexa verba iussionem, reipublicae loca diabolico ab eo usurpata ingenio proprio restitueret dominico."

sented Stephen with an opportunity to demonstrate for the last time the inability of the Greeks to do anything in Italy. Thus he co-operated for a time to give a justification for a final turning away from the Greeks. When he finally approached Pepin it was assuredly not on the emperor's behalf. Hence, Stephen packed John off to Ravenna accompanied by his brother Paul to interview Aistulf, but Aistulf put them off by promising to send a legation to Constantinople.<sup>18</sup> Having accomplished nothing John left to return to Constantinople. He was accompanied by a papal legation sent to request imperial aid of a more substantial sort to end the harassment by the Lombards and liberate Italy.<sup>19</sup> Expecting no aid and not being disappointed in his expectation Stephen sent off an appeal to Pepin by way of a frankish pilgrim.<sup>20</sup> Pepin sent Abbot Droctegang of Jumièges to Stephen, inviting him

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid. "Quem videlicet imperialem missum confestim sepefatus sanctissimus papa, cum suo germano praedicto sanctissimo Paulo diacono, ad eundem misit nequissimum Aistulfum Ravennam. Quibus susceptis, cum inani absoluit responso, adherens eidem imperiali misso quendam proprie gentis nefarium virum, diabolicis inbutum consiliis, ad regiam properandum urbem."

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. "...misit regiam urbem suos missos et apostolicos affatos cum imperiale praefato misso, deprecans imperialem clementiam ut iuxta quod ei sepius exercitandis has Italiae in partes scripserat, modis omnibus adveniret et de iniquitatis filii morsibus Romanam hanc urbem vel cunctam Italianam provinciam liberaret."

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 444: "...cernens prasertim et ab imperiale potentia nullum esse subveniendi auxilium; tunc quemadmodum praedecessores eius...Carolo...direxerunt, petentes sibi subveniri propter oppressiones ac invasiones...clam per quendam peregrinum suas misit litteras Pippino...."

to come to Francia, but Stephen sent him back with letters for Pepin and for the Frankish nobles.<sup>21</sup> Following that exchange of letters Pepin sent more missi repeating his invitation to visit Francia.<sup>22</sup> Meanwhile Aistulf had occupied Cevano and the Silentarius John returned with the imperial response to Stephen's appeal; Stephen was instructed to accompany John to Pavia to support John's demands for the return of the exarchate.<sup>23</sup> While such an absurd measure demonstrated both Constantine's complete lack of understanding of Italian conditions and a flippant disregard for Rome, Pope Stephen acceded to the request to demonstrate for the last time the futility of the papacy's adhesion to the empire. He sent missi to request a safe conduct to Pavia. They returned to Rome at about the same time as the two highly distinguished Frankish missi, Chrodegang and Autcharius, arrived to take Stephen to Francia.<sup>24</sup> The Frankish missi help-

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<sup>21</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. IV (Presens Droctegangus -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2312), et V (Laeta gaudet -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2313), pp. 487-488.

<sup>22</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 444.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 444-445: "Cumque a Langobardis...Ciccanense castellum...usurparet, illico a regia urbe coniunxit sepefatus Iohannis...cum missis ipsius sanctissimi pontificis, deferens secum et quem deportaverant iniqui Langobardorum regis missum, simul et iussionem imperialem in qui inerat insertum ad Langobardorum regem eundem...papam esse properaturum, ob recipiendum Ravennantium urbem et civitates..."

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 445: "...direxit ad eundem blasphemum regem suum missum pro sua et qui cum eo ituri erant indemnitate; ipsoque reverso, extemplo et missi iamfati Pippini...coniunxerunt, id est Rodigangus episcopus et Autcharius dux, quatenus praedictum...papam, iuxta quod petendo miserat, ad suum Francie regem deducerunt...."

ed Stephen to retake Cecano and then accompanied him to Pavia.<sup>25</sup> Stephen left Rome on the fourteenth of October, 753, amid the lamentations of his people. Autcharius had gone ahead to announce the pope in Pavia.<sup>26</sup> Aistulf sent missi to meet the papal party outside Pavia and to tell the pope that he would not hear of any talk about the restitution of lands.<sup>27</sup> Determined not to be intimidated, Stephen confronted Aistulf and demanded the return of various civitates, his demands being seconded by the imperial missi, but to no success.<sup>28</sup> The negotiations obviously being in vain the Franks intervened and asked Aistulf if he would permit the pope to go to Francia without opposition, to which Aistulf responded by asking the pope if this were his wish, obviously trying to intimidate him and bring division between Stephen and the Franks. But Stephen stood firm and said he

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<sup>25</sup> Chronicon Salernitanum, cap. 3, p. 472.

<sup>26</sup> Vita Stephani II, pp. 445-446: "...egressus est ab hac Romana urbe ad beatum Petrum apostolum, XIIII die octobris mensis....Itaque unus ex eisdem Francorum missis, scilicet Autcharius dux, quantotius praecedens, Ticino eum pre-stolatus est."

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 446: "...direxit ad eum sepefatus Aistolfus ...missos suos, obtestans eum nulla penitus ratione audere verbum illi dicere petendi Ravennantium civitatem et exarchatum ei pertinentum, vel de reliquis republicae locis...."

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. "Coniungente vero eo Papiam in civitatem et praedicto nefando regi praesentato...eum petit ut dominicas quas abstulerat redderet oves et propria propriis restitueret. Sed nullo modo apud eum inpetrare valuit. Nam et imperialis missus et ille simili modo petit...et nihil obtinere potuit."

was determined to go.<sup>29</sup> Aistulf flew into a great rage "grinding his teeth like a lion", but could do nothing overt to prevent the trip without provoking Pepin's immediate anger, and on the fifteenth of November, 753, Stephen left Pavia heading north.<sup>30</sup>

Leaving Pavia in haste lest Aistulf repent of his decision and send riders after them, the papal party pressed on and crossed the Alps, finally arriving at St. Moritz where they met Fulrad and Duke Rothard who were to escort them the rest of the way.<sup>31</sup> When Pepin received the news that Stephen's party had crossed the mountain barrier he sent a party with his son Charles to conduct Stephen to him at Pontion.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 446: "Praedicti vero Francorum missi imminabant fortiter apud eundem Aistulfum ut praefatum...papam Franciam pergere relaxaret. Ad haec convocans iamdictum beatissimum virum interrogavit si eius Franciam properandi esset voluntas. Quod videlicet ille nequaquam siluit, sed suam illi propalavit voluntatem....Allo vero die praesente Rodigango...interrogavit...si velle haberet Franciam ambulandi. Et ita affatus est: 'Quod si tua est voluntas me relaxandi, mea omnino est ambulandi'".

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 446-447: "...unde et leo dentibus fremebat ....XV die novembris mensis...a civitate Papia movens suum Franciam profectus est iter."

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 447.

<sup>32</sup> Annales Mettenses, a. 753, p. 44: "Quod cum nuntiatum Pippino fuisset, magno repletus est gaudio, filiumque suum primogenitum Carolum obviam ei ire precepit, ipsumque cum honore ad presentiam eius in villa quae dicitur Pons-Hugonis adducere iussit."

When they were three miles from Ponthion on the sixth of January, 754, Pepin advanced himself to meet the pope. The papal biographer states that Pepin dismounted, prostrated himself and performed the officium stratoris as they entered Ponthion amid hymns of praise.<sup>33</sup>

On the next day the negotiations were opened with the pope requesting a treaty of alliance by which Pepin would promise to champion the cause of St. Peter and the republic.<sup>34</sup> Pepin swore his oath to restore the exarchate and the rights of Peter to the republic as soon as he held his placitum.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 447: "...ad fere trium milium spatium, descendens de equo suo, cum magna humilitate terrae prostratus, una cum sua coniuge, filiis et optimatibus, eundem sanctissimum papam suscepit; cui et vice stratoris usque in aliquantum locum iuxta eius sellarem properavit. Tunc praedictus almificus vir cum omnibus suis extensa voce gloriam et incessabiles laudes omnipotenti Deo referens, cum hymnis et canticis spiritalibus usque ad praefatum palatium pariter cum iamdicto rege omnes profecti sunt...."

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 447-448: "...beatissimus papa praefatum christianissimum regem lacrimabiliter deprecatus est ut per pacis foedera causam beati Petri et reipublice Romanorum disponeret." Several of the Frankish sources note that the pope prostrated himself before Pepin when he requested aid as a suppliant, cf. Chronicon Moissiacense, MGH, SS, I, ed. G.H. Pertz (Hannover, 1826), p. 293: "Sequenti die una cum clero suo aspersus cinere et indutus cilicio in terram prostratus, per misericordiam Dei omnipotentis et merita beatorum apostolorum Petri et Pauli Pippinum regem obsecrans, ut se et populum Romanum de manu Longobardorum...servitis liberaret." See also Annales Mettenses, a. 753, p. 45: "Nec antea a terra surgere voluit, quam sibi predictus rex Pippinus cum filiis suis et optimatibus Francorum manum porrigerent et ipsum pro indicio suffragii futuri et liberationis de terra levaret...."

<sup>35</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 448: "Qui de presenti iureiurando eundem beatissimum papam satisfecit omnibus eius mandatis et ammonitionibus sese totis nisibus oboedire, et ut illi placitum fuerit exarchatum Ravennae et reipublice iura seu loca reddere modis omnibus." For an attempt to reconstruct the specific terms of this oath see Percy Ernst Schramm, "Das Versprechen Pippins und Karls des Grossen für die römischen Kirche", ZSSRk, LVIII, (1938), 180-217.



His anxiety quelled for the nonce and looking forward to the satisfaction of his needs, the pope then spent the remainder of the winter in the cloister of St. Denis near Paris and in the spring he recrowned Pepin as king,<sup>36</sup> and made him patricius Romanorum.<sup>37</sup>

At this point the narrative becomes confused; neither the Liber Pontificalis nor the Frankish chronicles are clear concerning the sequence of events and speak of placita at both Quierzy and Berny-Rivière. Considering the events involved, difficulties of travel, and so forth, it is probable that the chronology given by Levillain is close to reality: in the spring of 754 a placitum was held, following which negotiations with Aistulf commenced and in the spring of 755 the placitum was held, the host summoned and the war commenced.<sup>38</sup> Whether the placitum met at Quierzy in 754 and Berny-

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<sup>36</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 448.

<sup>37</sup> Clausula de Pippini in Francorum Regem Consecratione, RHGF, V, 9-10: "Nam ipse praedictus domnus florentissimus Pippinus, rex pius, per auctoritatem et imperium sanctae recordationis domni Zachariae Papae, et unctionem sancti christi, per manus beatorum Sacerdotum Galliarum, et electionem omnium Franchorum, tribus annis antea in regni solio sublimatus est. Postea per manus ejusdem Stephani Pontificis die uno in beatorum praedictorum Martyrum Dionysii, Rustici et Eleutherii Ecclesia...in Regem et Patricium, una cum praedictis filiis Carolo et Carolomanno in nomine sanctae Trinitatis unctus et benedictus est." Though there was once some question as to the authenticity of this document, by most modern accounts it is to be accepted and it in no way is out of the context of the events involved: Leon Levillain, "De l'authenticité de la Clausula de Unctione Pippini", BEC, LXXXVIII, (1927), passim, and Ernst Schulz, "Die Clausula de Pippino keine Fälschung", Hvjs, XXIII, (1925-27), 446ff.

<sup>38</sup> Leon Levillain, "L'avènement de la dynastie carolingienne et les origines de l'état pontifical", BEC, XCIV, (1933), 294.

Rivière in 755 or vice-versa in unknown.

The placitum of 754 was probably the scene of a good deal of discussion; there seems to have been some opposition among the Frankish aristocracy to opening hostilities with the Lombards.<sup>39</sup> Before his trip to Francia Pope Stephen, apparently knowing of this attitude, had written an exhortatory letter to "Omnibus Ducibus Gentis Francorum", urging his case.<sup>40</sup> Whether the opposition spoken of by Einhard represented an organized faction or not is difficult to tell, but it received reinforcement from another quarter; Pepin's monk-brother Carlomann. Aistulf seems to have taken advantage of Carlomann's hostility to Pepin to get him to go to Francia to try to block the alliance and the war.<sup>41</sup> Pepin had usurped the patrimony of Carlomann's sons and Carlomann may have been involved in intrigue against him, or at least in touch with elements hostile to Pepin, even while a monk in Italy. According to Einhard Carlomann received many visits

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<sup>39</sup> Einhardi Vita Karoli Imperatoris, cap. 6, MGH, SS, II, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hannover, 1829), p. 446: "...cum magna difficultate susceptum est, quia quidem e primoribus Francorum cum quibus consultare solebat, adeo voluntati eius venisi sunt, ut, se regem deserturos domumque redituros, libera voce proclamarent...."

<sup>40</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. V (Laeta gaudet -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2313), p. 488: "...idcirco obsecramus atque coniuramus vestram sapientissimam caritatem per Deum et per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum et diem futuri examinis, in quo omnes pro nostris facinoribus erimus reddituri rationem ante tribunal aeterni iudicis, ut nulla interponatur occasio, ut non sitis adiutores ab obtinendum filium nostrum a Deo servatum, Pippinum, excellentissimum regem, pro perficienda utilitate fautoris vestri, beati apostolorum principis Petri...."

<sup>41</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 448.

from Frankish pilgrims while at Mt. Soracte, which raises the question of whether he might not have been in contact with the opposition to Pepin.<sup>42</sup> Apparently Pepin was able to make his views prevail at the placitum of 754 and the promises made to Stephen were given official sanction. Thereupon activity to redeem them was now begun.

Beginning with the conclusion of the placitum of 754 and continuing throughout the rest of the year Pepin tried to threaten and cajole Aistulf into voluntary compliance with Pope Stephen's wishes.<sup>43</sup> In fact the Frankish missi made the trip to Pavia three times in all, and all in vain.<sup>44</sup> Finally, in the spring of 755 the Heerban was sent out and the invasion was commenced.<sup>45</sup> After a short campaign and feeble resistance Aistulf, besieged in Pavia, surrendered and accept-

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<sup>42</sup> Einhardi Vita Karoli, cap. 2, p. 444. Carl Rodenberg, Pippin, Karlmann und Papst Stephen II (Berlin, 1923), pp. 13-18.

<sup>43</sup> Pepin asked Aistulf to "...partibus Romae hostiliter non ambularet, et superstitiones has impias vel contra legis ordine causas, quod antea Romani numquam fecerant, propter eius petitionem, facere non debeant" (Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 36, p. 183), and "...propter pacis foedera et proprietatis sancte Dei ecclesiae reipublice restituenda iura...." (Vita Stephani II, p. 449). Stephen seems to have wished to settle the affair peacefully if possible (Wilhelm Martens, Die römische Frage unter Pippin und Karl dem Grossen (Stuttgart, 1881), p. 20), and Pepin seems to have been prepared to accede to this and even to buy back what he wanted: "Et hoc tibi Aistulf mandat Pippinus, quod si iustitiam sancto Petro reddere vis, dabit tibi XII milia solidorum" (Annales Mettenses, a. 754, p. 47).

<sup>44</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 449.

<sup>45</sup> Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 37, p. 183

ed terms:<sup>46</sup> Ravenna, the Pentapolis, Narni and Cecano and all that fell into their territories, were restored to the pope. Aistulf paid 30,000 solidi, gave up forty hostages to Pepin,<sup>47</sup> and swore never to leave Frankish leadership (dictione) and never to harm the pope or the republic.<sup>48</sup> After restoring the res sancti Petri Pepin returned to Francia,<sup>49</sup> and left Fulrad in command of a detachment to restore Stephen peacefully to Rome.<sup>50</sup>

Soon after Pepin had left Aistulf broke the treaty and refused to restore the territories in question to Fulrad or

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<sup>46</sup> Pepin had the advantage and could have finished the job, but Stephen apparently wished to avoid the destruction of the Lombard Kingdom and urged him to be merciful, Hartmann, Geschichte Italiens, II, 11, 189.

<sup>47</sup> Annales Mettenses, a. 754, pp. 46-48: "Eis minis Heistulfus perterritus per manus Pentapolim, Narnias et Cecanum et reliqua debita, quae sancto Petro debuerat, missis domni Pippini regis per vadium reddidit et XXX milia solidorum Pippino regi tribuit, spondens se singulis annis in tributum V milia solidorum partibus Francorum se fore redditurum. Haec omnia iureiurando Heistulfus cum suis optimatibus et omnibus nobilibus Langobardorum se adimpleturam esse spondit et pro firmitatis causa dedit regi Pippino de nobilibus Langobardorum XL obsides."

<sup>48</sup> Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 37, p. 184: "Hec cernens Aistulfus rex Langobardorum, quod nullatenus se evadere potuisset, pacem per sacerdotes et optimates Francorum petens, dictiones superdicto rege Pippino faciens, et quicquid contra Romanam ecclesiam vel sedem apostolicam contra legis ordine fecerat, plenissima solutione emendaret ...ut numquam a Francorum ditiones se abstraheret et ulterius ad sedem apostolicam Romanam et rem publicam hostiliter numquam accederet."

<sup>49</sup> Annales Alamannici, a. 753, MGH, SS, I, ed. G.H. Pertz (Hannover, 1826), p. 28: "...receptus res sancti Petri reversus est...."

<sup>50</sup> Annales Einhardi, a. 755, p. 13.

the pope.<sup>51</sup> Fulrad was sent back to Francia to witness that Aistulf was failing to perform his obligations and, worse, that he was raiding against Roman territory.<sup>52</sup> Finally, in the first days of 756 Aistulf besieged and occupied Narni sending Stephen into a paroxysm of fear.<sup>53</sup> Rome was so closely invested that Stephen had to send his missi to Pepin by sea in order to prevent their capture by Aistulf.<sup>54</sup>

In early 756 two missi arrived from Constantinople to see Pepin. Stephen explained that Pepin was on the march but they did not believe him, so he sent them on to Marseilles

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<sup>51</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. VI (Dum regni vestri -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2322), p. 489: "...ecce iam mendatium et iniqua perversitas atque eius periurium declaratum est....nec unius enim palmi terrae spatium beato Petro sanctaeque Dei ecclesiae, rei publice Romanorum, reddere passus est."

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., Ep. VII (Providi et sapientissimi -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2323), pp. 491-492: "Tamen omnia vester consiliarius Fulradus...si Deum pre oculis habent, omnia vobis enarrare possunt: non emin quia iam reddere, ut constituit, propria beati Petri voluit, sed etiam scamaras atque depredationes seu devastationes in civitatibus et locis beati Petri facere sua imperatione nec cessavit nec cessat....Videns namque suam deceptionem iniquus Aistolfus rex, cum suis Deo destructis iudiciis per blandos sermones et suasiones atque sacramenta inluserunt prudentiam vestram; et plus illis falsa dicentibus quam nobis veritatem asserentibus credidistis."

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., Ep. VIII (Quanta luctuosa -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2326), pp. 494-498. To Pepin Stephen cries: "Audi me fili, audi me et subveni nobis. Ecce adest tempus salvandi nos: salva nos, antequam pereamus, christianissime rex." Ibid., Ep. IX (Quanta luctuosa II -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2325), pp. 498-500 was in the same tone as the above. At the same time he sent Ep. X (Ego Petrus -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2327), pp. 501-503, written as though by Peter himself, encouraging, demanding and threatening.

<sup>54</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 452.

accompanied by his representative.<sup>55</sup> Pepin had already crossed the Alps to punish Aistulf when they arrived in Marseilles, and they decided to go on to meet him at Pavia. But first they tried to insure that the papal missus would not follow so that they might have a chance to freely give their master's arguments against the pope.<sup>56</sup>

Meanwhile Pepin had once more easily reduced Aistulf to submission. He took one-third of the Lombard treasure-trove, forced Aistulf to swear obedience to the previous treaty and revived the annual tribute paid to the Franks by the Lombards in old King Guntram's time.<sup>57</sup> Little doubt was left that Aistulf's position was that of a vassal; he placed himself under Pepin's ditio and may have made a formal act of homage.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid. "...coniunxerunt in hac Romana urbe imperiales missi, Georgius scilicet prota a secreta et Iohannis silentiarius, directi ad praedictum Francorum regem. Quos suscipiens iamfatus beatissimus papa eisdem motionem praelati Francorum regis nunciavit. Quod quidem illi dubium abuerunt credendi. Et adherens eis missum apostolice sedis, eos Franciam absolsit."

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. "...haec cognoscentes ipsi imperiales missi, tristes effecti, nitebantur dolore missum apostolice sedis detinere....Itaque unus ex ipsis, Georgius...praecedens apostolice sedis missum, celeriter praenominatum Francorum adsecutus est christianissimum regem."

<sup>57</sup> Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 38, p. 185: "Sacramenta iterum vel obsides donat, ut amplius numquam contra rege Pippino vel proceris Francorum rebellis et contumax esse non debeat; et tribute, quod Langobardi ad rege Francorum a longo tempore dederunt, annis singulis per missos suos desolvere deberent."

<sup>58</sup> This gave Pepin a legal hold over Aistulf to use in exercising his protectorate over Rome, Holtzmann, p. 39.

At about the same time the Greeks arrived from Marseilles and demanded of Pepin that he restore Ravenna and the other civitates or perhaps pay a tribute for them.<sup>59</sup> Pepin replied that he would in no way cause the lands of St. Peter and under the rule of the pope to be alienated therefrom.<sup>60</sup> He had acted on Rome's behalf for love of St. Peter and not for the approbation of any man.<sup>61</sup> In no uncertain language Pepin thus dismissed the claims and demands of the emperor in Italy. There should be no doubt concerning the position of the Greeks. Some have suggested that as late as Stephen's trip to Francia the papacy was still an institution of the empire and the pope a servant of the emperor -- the implication is that Constantine V was deceived by Stephen's subsequent acts. Such a suggestion is in obvious disregard of the previous period and cannot be admitted. Similarly the idea that the voyage to Francia was the first independent act of the pope is absurd. While it may be true that there was some doubt as to

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<sup>59</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 453: "...et nimis eum deprecans atque plura spondens tribui imperialia munera ut Ravennantium urbem vel cetera eiusdem exarcatus civitates et castra imperiali tribuens concederet ditioni."

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. "...asserens isdem Dei cultor mitissimus rex nulla penitus ratione eusdem civitates a potestate beati Petri et iure ecclesie Romanae vel pontifici apostolice sedis quoquo modo alienare...."

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. "...adfirmans sub iuramento quod per nullius hominis favorem sese certamini sepius dedisset, nisi pro amore beati Petri et venia delictorum...." Chronicon Salernitanum, cap. 6, pp. 474-475: "Quomodo alienare talia potero, ut non pro alia re quam pro sancto Petro certamen gessui."

the rights of the Greeks, it is because Constantine V deceived himself. If it took Constantine V till 756 to discover that Pepin was not his ally in Italy, then that must be put down to his ignorance of what had been going on in Italy for the past thirty years. As said before, by the time of Zachary the Greeks no longer counted in Italy. When they tried to make their power felt there after 756 they were definitely counted as enemies. In 757 Stephen II asked Pepin to continue to keep track of events in Italy and particularly to guard against the Greeks so that their malice might not be able to harm the church.<sup>62</sup>

Once more Pepin left Fulrad behind to see that the cities of the republic were surrendered to Roman control. Fulrad went the circuit of every city in the exarchate and the Pentapolis with the representatives of Aistulf to receive the keys of the gates and hostages. The keys were then taken to Rome to the pope.<sup>63</sup> When Fulrad had satisfied himself that the conditions of the treaty were fulfilled he returned to Francia in early 757.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XI (Explere lingua -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2335), p. 506: "...sancta Dei ecclesia...ab eorum pestifera malitia liberetur et secura reddatur atque omnia proprietatis suae percipiat...."

<sup>63</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 454. The cities involved were Ravenna, Arimini, Pensauero, Conca, Fano, Cesina, Sinegaglia, Esis, Forlimpopoli, Forolivii, Sussubio, Monte Feltri, Acerragio, Monte Lucati, Serra, S. Marino, Vobio, Orbino, Callis, Luciolis, Egubio, Comacchio and Narni.

<sup>64</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XI (Explere lingua -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2335), p. 504.



## CHAPTER V

### THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRANCO-PAPAL ALLIANCE AND THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE INVOLVED PARTIES

The course of events discussed in the preceding chapter presents several problems of interpretation. In general previous interpreters have erred for several basic reasons. First, they have failed to correctly assess the position of Stephen II and have therefore suggested interpretations inconsistent and incompatible with that position. Secondly, many interpreters have taken legalistic positions regarding the period by assuming that all events took place in a legal-constitutional context. Third, they have insisted on under-rating the ideals involved in favor of totally Machiavellian explanations.

One of the chief problems in accounting for the papal-Frankish alliance as it was established in 754 lies in discovering the factors which motivated the newly enthroned king to overrule domestic objections in order to aid Stephen in a project in which the expected remuneration would be small. The small gains in spasmodic tribute paid by the wily Aistulf could never have offset the responsibilities contracted by Pepin in 754 and neither can it be supposed that mere gratitude for Zachary's efforts on his behalf in the

matter of the change of dynasties would dictate so momentous an undertaking. Johannes Haller, though perhaps his explanation is too restricted, suggests the best approach; Haller unequivocally asserts that the papal monarchy in central Italy was founded on the religious subjugation of the Franks to Rome and St. Peter.<sup>1</sup> "St. Peter and always again St. Peter ....only at St. Peter's will had Pepin taken up the sword."<sup>2</sup> The king was "...advised and influenced by the greatest spirits of the new reform...."<sup>3</sup> According to Haller the ultimate influence determining Pepin's policy in Italy was the lifetime work of Boniface in the forests of Germany and, even more significantly, in the court of the Franks.

Though some, with Charles Martel in mind, may argue that such piety was not characteristic of the Arnulfings, it need not follow in the case of Pepin. Both Pepin and his brother Carlomann were pious men; they spent the formative years of their youth in the monastery at St. Denis. They were taught by monks in a monkish environment and did not have the purely political outlook of their father.<sup>4</sup> It is

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<sup>1</sup> Johannes Haller, "Die Karolinger und das Papsttum", HZ, CVIII, (1912), 39. See also Theodor Zwölfer, Sankt Peter, Apostelfürst und Himmelspförtner, seine Verehrung bei den Angelsachsen und Franken (Stuttgart, 1929).

<sup>2</sup> Haller, HZ, CVIII, (1912), 57.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>4</sup> Albert Hauck, Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands, 5 Bde., 8. Aufl. (Berlin, 1954), II, 3-4.

obvious from a survey of the material in the early sections of the Codex Carolinus that Stephen's correspondence with Pepin invariably gave heavy stress to the theme of St. Peter, his power, position and office.<sup>5</sup> The probability is very great that Pepin was speaking truly when he told the Greek legation in 756 that he only acted to serve St. Peter.<sup>6</sup>

However, it would be wise to examine the possibility of temporal concerns in seeking Pepin's motivation. It must be recognized that Pepin's domestic enemies, as noted above, had had some contact with Aistulf, and Pepin obviously acted in 755-756 to restore Frankish overlordship in Lombardy.<sup>7</sup> It ought to be remarked that the rapprochement of Aistulf with Pepin's enemies may well have been Aistulf's response to a growing closeness of Pepin and Rome and that Frankish overlordship in Lombardy was proven necessary by Aistulf's perjury.

The major critique of Haller's thesis is that given by Martin Lintzel. Lintzel reasonably notes that Haller asserted that there was no political motivation,<sup>8</sup> but then he dismisses the religious tone as mere rhetoric and asserts that religious devotion was circumscribed by political interest and

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<sup>5</sup> Haller, HZ, CVIII, (1912), 55.

<sup>6</sup> Idem, Das Papsttum, I, 433.

<sup>7</sup> Holtzmann, pp. 37-38.

<sup>8</sup> Martin Lintzel, "Der Codex Carolinus und die Motive von Pippins Italienpolitik", HZ, CLXI, (1940), 35.



that Pepin was too wise to allow religious sentiments to influence politics.<sup>9</sup>

At this point it may be of interest to take into account the religious psychology of the Franks. Nearly one hundred years later, in the reign of Louis the Pious, a poem entitled Heliand (Holy Land) was penned in the cloisters of St. Gall. The poem is a veritable text-book of popular religious thought in the period. In it the material of the Gospels appears in Germanic guise. Christ is a Gefolgsherr -- a leader of a warrior-band; the twelve apostles are his comitatus -- Gefolgsmänner. The Twelve followed Christ in the Germanic tradition of Gefolgstreue and Peter's last-minute apostasy was an example of Herisliz which his later life redeemed. In turn the Franks thought of Peter, princeps apostolorum, as a great chieftain. Pepin considered himself to be a follower of Peter -- he was Peter's Gefolgsmann or Degen. In more familiar parlance Pepin was Peter's vassal. In the more sophisticated thought of ecclesiastical circles the relationship had another aspect -- qualitatively the same. In 751 Pepin had become king merely as the successor of the last Merovingian. But in 754 as a vassus of St. Peter he entered into a new kingship. The papal guarantee of Pepin's line and

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., pp. 36-39. One must view Lintzel's arguments with some scepticism due to the time of his writing; he wrote under Nazi power and his article obviously seeks to give the impression that Pepin was both a Teutonic warrior-hero and a Realpolitiker. In addition, of course, one must note that a religious influence played a part in the political life of the Arnulfings. From the patronage of missionary efforts to the obvious ecclesiological policies of Charlemagne, the influence of Rome is clear.

Pepin's guarantee of Rome's dominion and safety made him a new David to the pope's Samuel.<sup>10</sup> Thus though elements of the old Volkskönigtum were still characteristic of Frankish kingship, it had now become a Christian kingship.<sup>11</sup> The unction of Pepin by St. Boniface and later by Stephen II brought the character of Old Testament kingship to Pepin's rulership and symbolized the union of regnum and sacerdotium.<sup>12</sup> Pepin's kingship became an office in Christian society which, unlike his war-leadership of the Franks, existed independently of his personal qualities.<sup>13</sup>

In its essence, then, one is constrained to argue that the Haller thesis must stand substantiated.

An alliance of pope and Arnulfing was created in Francia in 754. It is not at all so certain what the nature or terms of that alliance were. Much of the uncertainty is created by unfounded interpretations of the meanings to be attached to the acts of both Stephen II and Pepin.

Pepin made Stephen II a promise at Ponthion shortly after the pope's arrival: he promised to protect Stephen and Rome against Aistulf. This is indeed meagre and vague infor-

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<sup>10</sup> Walter Mohr, Studien zur Charakteristik des karolingischen Königtums im 8. Jahrhundert (Saarlouis, 1955), p. 40.

<sup>11</sup> Theodor Schieffer, Winfried-Bonifatius und die christliche Grundlegung Europas (Freiburg, 1954), pp. 260-261.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 259-260.

<sup>13</sup> Theodor Mayer, "Staatsauffassung in der Karolingerzeit", VF, III, (1956), 171.

mation. Did it mean protection of the republic? There is no way of telling. At any rate the Ponthion promise is not important enough to merit the attention others have given it. The main issue is obviously the formal obligations undertaken by Pepin at his coronation and at the placitum of 754; the promise of Ponthion was a mere preliminary -- a first assurance to Stephen. Whatever Pepin did promise at Ponthion does not figure greatly in the papal view of his obligations; Stephen's subsequent pleas for aid were based on the more formal oaths which followed, as is indicated in the inclusion of Pepin's sons in the pope's appeals.<sup>14</sup> The promise of Ponthion did not obligate them, but the joint-unction at St. Denis did.<sup>15</sup>

It is highly probable that the joint-unction of Pepin and his sons at St. Denis was preceded by a formal oath on Pepin's part which was binding on his sons.<sup>16</sup> The probability

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<sup>14</sup> Cf. in the Codex Carolinus, Epp. VI (Dum regni vestri-- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2322) and VII (Providi et sapientissimi -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2323), pp. 448, 491: "Dominis excellentissimus filiis Pippino, regi et nostro spiritali compatri seu Carolo et Carlomanno, idem regibus et utrisque patribus Romanorum,....". Ibid., Ep. IX (Quanta luctuosa II -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2325), p. 498: "Dominis excellentissimus Pippino, Carolo et Carlomanno, tribus regibus et nostris Romanorum patribus...."

<sup>15</sup> Martens, pp. 29, 51-52. "...in S. Dionysius wurden neben Pippin dessen zwei Söhne mitverpflichtet...."

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 23. Cf. Annales Einhardi, a. 754, p. 13: "Stephanus papa, postquam a rege Pippino ecclesiae Romanae defensionis firmitatem accepti, ipsum sacra unctione ad regiae dignitatis honorem consecravat...." Caspar, Pippin und die römische Kirche, p. 40, thinks that it was the unction of the sons that gave Stephen compaternity rights with Pepin. The unction of the sons, he claims, has the same importance that Luitprand's adoption of Pepin in years before.

of an oath and the fact of the implication of the sons are dependent wholly upon the fact that in addition to regal unction the ceremony at St. Denis made Pepin and his young sons patricii Romanorum.

The patriciatus Romanorum given Pepin in 754 is one of those acts around which much of the confusion turns. It has been argued that the patriciate was the old office of the exarch and that it gave Pepin the lordship of Italy.<sup>17</sup> On the contrary, however, no exarch was ever formally titled patricius Romanorum.<sup>18</sup> for the patriciate in Greek official ranking was an honor -- not an office.<sup>19</sup> The fact is, as Martens realized, that a distinction must be made between any Greek patrician and the title given to Pepin; the patricius Romanorum was an invention of Pope Stephen II and had nothing whatever to do with any other office of patrician.<sup>20</sup> In fact there was a close association of the patriciate of Pepin and the new republic of papal conception -- Pepin's title was recognition of his understanding and acceptance of the papal view.<sup>21</sup> There is no need to suppose that Pepin was

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<sup>17</sup> For arguments of this sort see the following sources: Max Heimbucher, Die Papstwahlen unter den Karolingern (Augsburg, 1889), p. 23; Heinrich von Sybel, "Die Schenkung der Karolinger an die Päpste", FZ, XLIV, (1880), 55; and Haller, HZ, CVIII, (1912), 46-47.

<sup>18</sup> Hugo Cohn, Die Stellung der byzantinischen Statthalter in Ober- und Mittelitalien (Berlin, 1889), p. 120.

<sup>19</sup> Hartmann, Untersuchungen, p. 28.

<sup>20</sup> Martens, p. 81.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 84.



tricked by Stephen in 754. The patricius Romanorum held an office within the vague constitutional structure of the new republic. Unfortunately, it was an undefined office. It meant in the future what the positions of the two parties of the alliance were able to make it mean.

At the placitum of 754 another formal oath was taken by Pepin which was essentially unassociated with the patriciate: the more specific obligation of Pepin and the Franks to force Aistulf to disgorge those territories of the republic that he had taken. Since Pepin was effectively obligated by becoming patrician, the obligation imposed on the placitum must have been of another sort. It made Pepin's private promise an obligation of the Frankish people and gave it a basis in public law.<sup>22</sup>

In summarizing the events of 754, then, there are three separate events to sort out and distinguish. First, the preliminary promise by Pepin to protect Stephen. Second, the obligation of the Arnulfing house as patricians and therefore officers of the papal state, to defend the republic. Third, the drawing of the Frankish people into the alliance by a decision of the nation in arms to restore the lost territory to the republic.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> B. Niehues, "Die Schenkungen der Karolinger an die Päpste", HJb, II, (1881), 202. See also L. Saltet, "La lecture d'un texte et la critique contemporaine: les prétendues promesses de Quierzy et de Rome dans le Liber Pontificalis", BLE, (1940), 176-206, (1941), 61-85.

<sup>23</sup> It is not proper to infer a change in papal intent between Ponthion and the placitum of 754, as Mayer does. As has already been argued, the affair at Ponthion was too formless

Having discussed the liabilities incurred by Pepin in 754 and the acts upon which they were based, it would now be proper to discuss the role of Stephen II. Stephen was faced with a situation in 754 in which he had to stave off the Lombards, save the position, real and theoretical, of the republic, and prevent a Greek revival of power. In order to do so he needed outside aid that he could control. He chose the Franks. By making Pepin patrician of the Romans he made his new ally a cog in the still very nebulous constitutional machinery of the republic. One of the factors clouding the understanding of Pepin's role in the republic and the nature of the relationship between Pepin and Stephen II is the impossible suggestion, widely made and based on no evidence, that Stephen II, at Ponthion, had commended himself into Pepin's mundeburdium and had become, in effect, Pepin's vassal. The commendation thesis was first expounded by Wilhelm Gundlach who argued that by this means the intervention in Italy became a matter of Frankish public business and not a private engagement of Pepin.<sup>24</sup> This idea was picked up by several other authorities, of whom the most important was Erich Caspar.<sup>25</sup> The thesis hinges essentially upon three

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and preliminary to count. Cf. Ernst Mayer, "Die Schenkungen Constantins und Pippins", DZK, 3. Folge, XIV, (1904), 38-39. Mayer is one of those who argue that Stephen only wanted his patrimony back at first and that the whole concept of the republic materialized in the spring of 754.

<sup>24</sup> Gundlach, pp. 75ff.

<sup>25</sup> Caspar, Pippin und die römische Kirche, pp. 16-17. Cf. Peter Rassow, "Pippin und Stephan II", ZKG, XXXVI, (1916), 497.

words or phrases which are gleaned from the sources by Caspar: the term defensio taken from the phrase "...non sufferens ad Pippini regis defensionem guerendam veniebat", in the Annales Mettenses;<sup>26</sup> the term commendare taken from the phrase "...omnes causas principis apostolorum in vestris manibus commendavimus...." from a letter of Stephen to Pepin;<sup>27</sup> and the phrase iustitia beati Petri which is to be found in many instances in papal correspondence with Pepin. The fact is that these terms and phrases are taken out of context and invested with a context which is not justified by the meaning of the terms as they appear in the sources. While these phrases might be applicable in feudal terminology, they are also reasonably common enough to appear in other usages. If the Annales Mettenses reports that Stephen came seeking a defender, it does not follow that he commended himself after Germanic law. If Stephen used the verb commendare in his letters, even commendare in manibus, it need not have technical legal meaning. He might also commend his soul into God's hand without entering into a feudal contract after Germanic law. Similarly it is obvious that iustitia has no necessary connection with legal commendation. In order for any of these terms to have the significance that Gurdlach and Caspar attribute to them, there would have to be a ceremony of formal homage with Stephen kneeling, placing his hands in

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<sup>26</sup> a. 753, p. 44.

<sup>27</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. VII (Providi et sapientissimi -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2323), p. 496.

Pepin's and commending himself and swearing fealty to Pepin. That such ceremonies were by this time the usual form in such affairs may be seen from the description of the commendation of Tassilo to Pepin in 757 which may be found in the Annales Regni Francorum.<sup>28</sup> Had Stephen performed such an action we may be sure that the principal Frankish sources would have noted it, but none do.<sup>29</sup> It has also been suggested by the proponents of the commendation thesis that the words amicis amici, inimicis inimici occurring in two of Stephen's letters refer to a Germanic oath form associated with a pledge of fealty. Of the two citations given by Caspar for the phrase, neither occurs in a form in any way recognizable as the Germanic oath formula. It is not reasonable to suppose that a Roman pope, unfamiliar with Germanic law at best, would, or even could, enter into an engagement under that law. In spite of the predilections of German historians, even some of the very best, everything that happened in the Middle Ages did not take place under the auspices of Germanic law. It is one of the premises of this dissertation that many of the events herein discussed took place without any formal legal context

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<sup>28</sup> a. 757, p. 14.

<sup>29</sup> See the description of the arrival of Stephen at Ponthion; Annales Mettenses, a. 753, p. 45; Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 36, p. 183. Cf. the following literature for opposition to the commendation thesis: Heinrich Mitteis, Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt (Weimar, 1958), pp. 75ff; Karl Heldmann, "Kommendation und Königsschutz im Vertrage von Ponthion", MIG, XXXVIII, (1920), passim.

and that the vague and irregular nature of these engagements was one of the sources of future trouble. If Pope Stephen used some of the words used by Germans in their contracts it does not prove that he even understood that they had a technical meaning. The Roman pontiff, princeps of the republic, could not become the subordinate of any mere barbarian kinglet, however orthodox he might be.

Neither any act which Stephen II performed in Francia nor the office of patrician gave Pepin any legal powers over the republic.<sup>30</sup> Pepin was an officer of the republic in virtue of his patriciate. Stephen II held the principatus of the republic and thus Pepin was his subordinate. The powers of the patriciate were essentially undefined -- there was no basis in either customary or statutory law to define them. In fact it happened that increasing papal weakness, in time, gave the patrician an upper hand. But under Stephen II the Pope was obviously the senior partner of the alliance in spite of his lack of power. In other terms Stephen held the auctoritas of the republic of the Christian church and Pepin provided the potestas to support him.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Bernhard Niehues, Geschichte des Verhältnisses zwischen Kaisertum und Papsttum im Mittelalter, 2 Bde., 2. Aufl. (Münster, 1877), I, 487-488, 493.

<sup>31</sup> Ullmann, Growth of Papal Government, pp. 67-72.

Another of the factors responsible for clouding the issue is the discussion carried on about donations.<sup>32</sup> Neither in 754 nor 755-756 did Pepin make a donation to the papacy. The territories in question were claimed by the pope as lands illegally and forcefully usurped by the Lombards from the republic, and which legitimately belonged to the republic. Pepin had no claim on the land. In spite of the fact that several scholars, supposing there to have been a donation, postulate the existence of an Urtext,<sup>33</sup> no such text ever existed. The only possible such text is that of the treaties of 755 and 756, which were Lombard agreements to do certain things, not donations made by Pepin. Nor could the papacy possibly have recognized a situation in which the land in question became Pepin's by right of conquest, later to be given to the pope by donation. For if such were the case, then it legally belonged to Aistulf in the first place. The arrangements made in 755 and 756 were by two tri-partite treaties in which Aistulf promised to restore land to the

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<sup>32</sup> Here again German historians see a latin word used in a casual fashion in a papal letter as being used in the context of German law. Codex Carolinus, Ep. VI (Dum regni vestri -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2322), p. 489: "...pro donationis paginam beati Petri sanctaeque Dei ecclesiae rei publice civitates et loca restituenda confirmastis."

<sup>33</sup> Karl Lamprecht, Die römische Frage von König Pippin bis auf Kaiser Ludwig den Frommen (Leipzig, 1889), p. 78. Vita Stephani II, p. 453: "De quibus omnibus receptis civitatibus donationem in scriptis beato Petro atque sancte Romane ecclesiae vel omnibus in perpetuum pontificibus apostolice sedis emisit possidendas; que et usque actenus in archivo sancte nostrae ecclesiae recondita tenetur."



republic and Pepin guaranteed Aistulf's performance of that obligation. Aistulf promised under oath to restore Ravenna and other cities to the Romans and Pepin took hostages to secure Aistulf's promise.<sup>34</sup>

Exactly what areas were involved in the restitution agreement of 755 and 756 is also the subject of some doubt. Principally this is because the pope claimed a qualitative area rather than a set piece of land -- he claimed all that had been imperial land. Thus we have another source of future conflict -- though Stephen II might be satisfied with the exarchate or the Pentapolis, his successors could claim more.

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 451-453: "...pacem inientes atque in scripto foedera pactum adfirmantes inter Romanos, Francos et Langobardos, et obsides Langobardorum hisdem Francorum rex abstolens, spopondit ipse Aistulfus cum universis suis iudicibus sub terribili et fortissimo sacramento atque in eodem pacti foedere per scriptam paginam adfirmavit se ilico redditurum civitatem Ravennantium cum diversis civitatibus . . . . Et denuo confirmato anteriore pacto qui per elapsam VIII indictionem inter partes provenerat. . . ."



## CHAPTER VI

### THE SITUATION THROUGH 756

The outcome of the restoration of the papacy to the Byzantine penumbra was to demonstrate conclusively that the papacy and the emperors could not exist together within the imperial framework if both were to preserve their theoretical and real positions: the emperors as autocrats of a whole society, including state and church, and the popes as patriarchs of the West and first patriarch of the Church Universal. This at a time when two further developments made the inappropriateness of papal inclusion in the imperial structure obvious: 1) the contraction of the Roman Empire, ruled from the east, into a purely Byzantine state, and 2) the increase in papal contact and control over the ecclesiastical organization of Europe proper. The effect of these developments was to make Greek control over Roman Italy an anachronism and place the popes in a position in which their role as Western Patriarchs demanded withdrawal from Greek sovereignty. The removal of several sees from Roman jurisdiction by Leo III in 731 was a singularly appropriate accommodation of fact and theory, whatever its motivation.

On the other hand, the papacy's theoretical views pre-

vented it from casting aside the idea of Romanitas and the Imperium Romanum. The concept of the respublica Romanorum necessarily remained the basis of papal political thought, however vague in outline or detail such thought might be. Thus, in view of other factors, one is constrained to conclude that gradually the idea that the pope may hold the principatus of the republic captured the imagination of the Roman party of the papal curia. One of the most surprising aspects of the monumental reverse therein implied is the gradual and elusive character of the change. In point of fact we must recognize that Gregory II was master of Rome and probably the Duchy of Rome. The papal state existed de facto by 726. The events of 726-731 confirmed it in its existence as did the events of the pontificate of Gregory III. When Zachary became pope the Greek empire no longer existed in central Italy. Zachary ruled the Duchy of Rome and he appeared to claim a title of sorts as protector of the lands of the republic in the old exarchate. He acted as the sovereign lord of the republic and gathered to himself the perquisites thereof. By this time it is idle to speak of papal loyalty or treason to New Rome. The res publica Romanorum adhered to Rome -- Old Rome -- if its erstwhile masters abandoned it, abused it, or otherwise forfeited it then the master of Old Rome would hold it. Hence the respublica sanctae Dei ecclesiae arose out of the union of the respublica Romanorum and the Roman see. It is necessary to realize that the process was a gradual one, no point being definable as that at which the papacy first thought of its

own sphere of jurisdiction as comprising the republic. Indeed, the development of this idea remains openended, so to speak, even after 756. At no time was a statement as to the nature of this republic or its constitutional structure made by its creators or adherents. On the contrary, it was through the essentially untheoretical records and deeds of the papacy that one must examine the concept.

Being threatened as an independently sovereign power in 752 and afterwards by the renewed vigour of Lombard policy under Aistulf the papacy needed outside political and military support. Stephen II found it in the Arnulfing dynasty. In 753-754 Stephen II concluded an alliance with Pepin the Short. Traveling to Francia he received three separate assurances. At Ponthion he received a preliminary pledge of aid from Pepin made as an individual. At St. Denis Pepin accepted the office of *patricius Romanorum* and thus became a subordinate of the pope. At the placitum of 754 the Frankish nation in arms made the Ponthion promise a formal undertaking of the nation. At no time did the pope make any concession in the negotiations in Francia in 754. Indeed, he received all the advantages. He acquired, in Pepin as patricius Romanorum, a deputy in his role of princeps of the republic. All the evidence argues that Pepin's motives were principally religious.

Following the events of 754 Pepin made two expeditions under arms to Italy in 755 and 756 to aid the pope. In each

case treaties, not donations, were the result. Two treaties, in 755 and in 756, between the Romans, the Lombards and the Franks, provided that the Lombards should cede certain areas to the Romans and that Pepin would guarantee Lombard performance, as overlord of Lombardy.

By 756, then, conditions stood as follows:

1) Central Italy stood independent as a republic of which the pope was the princeps by virtue of his pontificate, and Greek power in central Italy was dead. This state, it should be noted, was not technically a papal state, but a Roman state ruled by the pope.

2) Pepin, as patrician, served the pope in a virtually undefined capacity. In all probability he was intended to be the pope's military commander. His sons, as patricians, were included in this arrangement.

3) The nature of the claims to territory made by Stephen were also vague. He claimed a qualitative area: Roman Italy as it had been. It would follow that all Italy might thereby be claimed.

4) The vagueness of the situation was both an example and an effect of the openendedness of the concept of the republic. It would be of paramount importance later. This vagueness was the cause of serious and continual uncertainty to both pope and Arnulfing far into the future. In 754-756 the pope and Pepin had operated essentially on a day-by-day basis. At the center of their arrangement stood the pat-



riciate, which in reality would mean what circumstances caused it to mean. Before too very long the patrician proved to be in a superior position -- at least one factor motivating Leo III to make Charlemagne emperor in 800 stemmed from a desire to straighten out the confused constitutional tangle.



PART II  
THE PONTIFICATE OF POPE PAUL I



## CHAPTER VII

### POPE PAUL I

Pope Stephen died on April 26, 757. During the course of his illness he was attended by his brother Paul, the future pope, who ignored attempts of a minor faction to elect an outsider as pope and stayed with the dying Stephen rather than pursue the papal office.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, after Stephen II died Paul was elected and became pope after an interval of thirty-five days.<sup>2</sup>

Paul, like Stephen his brother, had been an orphan of a prominent Roman family and entered the service of the Church at an early age during the pontificate of Gregory II.<sup>3</sup> Paul later made the family mansion in Rome into a monastery which seems to argue that the two brothers had no other kin.<sup>4</sup> Becoming a cleric Paul served in the papal curia, being

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<sup>1</sup> Vita Pauli, in Liber Pontificalis, I, 463.

<sup>2</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 456.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 440, Vita Pauli, p. 463.

<sup>4</sup> Duchesne, Beginnings of the Temporal Sovereignty, p. 42

raised to the diaconate by Pope Zachary.<sup>5</sup> The date at which the brothers became deacons is unknown but as deacons they both served at the Roman Synod of 744.<sup>6</sup> Paul held that office, presumably as one of the seven curial or Cardinal deacons, during his brother's pontificate. As such he was a member of the inner council under his brother and undoubtedly one of the most influential of the servants of the pope. He was, at the demise of his brother, the logical head of the powerful revolutionary party at the center of the curia and the logical successor as supreme pontiff. Hence his election in 757 was easily effected despite the efforts of a rival faction.<sup>7</sup>

Though some scholars see in Paul a colorless character in contrast to his brother,<sup>8</sup> this assessment is incorrect. Paul, like his brother, does not appear to have been unduly devoted to the spiritual life and his pontificate was taken up with the great political issues facing Rome. Paul was one of the papacy's great champions in secular affairs and a true priest-king after the mold of his brother. As a statesman he was ever on the alert for opportunities to pursue Rome's advantage, and his policy pursued that advantage with

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<sup>5</sup> Vita Pauli, p. 463.

<sup>6</sup> Duchesne, Liber Pontificalis, I, 456n.

<sup>7</sup> Vita Pauli, p. 463.

<sup>8</sup> Paul Kehr, "Über die Chronologie der Briefe Papst Pauls I im Codex Carolinus", NKGK-Göttingen, (1896), 104.

a singlemindedness that appears to have been a family characteristic. As a rule Paul was extremely stern. His governance of Rome was draconian in character. He ruled by the civil law of old Rome and his courts dispensed many capital sentences.<sup>9</sup> In this respect, though, it is necessary to mention one facet of his character which was both a virtue and a weakness. While being a stern ruler he was subject to fits of compassion in weaker moments. His biographer tells how he would go at nighttime into the prisons and free those who lay under capital sentences<sup>10</sup> and at a mother's plea he even forgave treason against himself.<sup>11</sup> Other than these meagre facts about the man and his character there is no other information available about Paul's life. The official biography included in the Liber Pontificalis is one of the least valuable in terms of the information it contains, either about the man or his pontificate.

Though the pontificate of Paul was a seemingly quiet period the tasks facing him were great. His chief concern was the consolidation of the territorial acquisitions of his brother,<sup>12</sup> and the general basis of his policies towards the Lombards and the Greeks was the same as those of his broth-

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<sup>9</sup> Vita Pauli, p. 463. Cf. Duchesne, Liber Pontificalis, I, 466n. Barry, p. 84.

<sup>10</sup> Vita Pauli, p. 463.

<sup>11</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXIX (no. 37, Eximiae et a Deo -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2356), p. 535.

<sup>12</sup> Emile Amann, L'époque carolingienne, Vol. VI of Histoire de l'église, ed. par A. Fliche et V. Martin (Paris, 1947), p. 19.

er. On the other hand, the Frankish intervention secured by his brother had fundamentally altered the conditions of political life in Italy. Though his goal in respect of Desiderius was to maintain and increase the strength of the republic and secure all advantages possible for it, he had also to become accustomed to the limits of his position and adjust his policies and demands accordingly. In respect of the Franco-papal alliance Paul was responsible for furthering the theoretical development of the role of the patrician in a most important direction. But perhaps the most important task facing Paul, and the one at which he failed, was in the unfulfilled need for reform in the government of the republic, both to organize a government to fit the new dimensions of the state and to accommodate the disenfranchised elements who resented the clerical monopoly of power.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE LOMBARDS AND POPE PAUL: THE ATTAINMENT OF AN EQUILIBRIUM OF POWER IN ITALY

The treaties of 755 and 756 had irrevocably and radically altered the conditions of political life in Italy. The Roman republic under its priest-kings had undergone a profound metamorphosis. The Lombard kingdom, having been confronted with a new factor in Italian politics, to which it could not adjust, had in a short time fallen from its position of master of Italy to become a feudal subordinate of the rising power in the north. Directly following the culmination of this abrupt alteration of the Italian power structure it was not possible for those immediately concerned in the Italian arena, the papacy and the Lombard leadership, to discern the exact nature of their new positions. How much territory and power could be gleaned for St. Peter in the days to come? How abject must the Lombard submission be? How far could the lord of Pavia go in attempting to salvage some remnant of his position? Unsure, expectant and ambitious, the chief protagonists of the struggle felt each other out over a period of years and eventually arrived at

what seemed to be a *modus vivendi*:<sup>1</sup> an equilibrium of their respective powers.

Though the settlement of 756 seemed to have satisfied Pope Stephen's demands, it was unlikely to be considered a final measure by the papacy. As mentioned before, the basic claim of the papacy on behalf of the republic had been a qualitative and ambiguous one: Roman Italy. From the ambitious point of view of the master of the Roman state the settlement of 756 left the borders of the republic in an undesirable state. Many Roman towns in the fringe area were still under Lombard control and various areas seemed necessary to round out the republic as an entity. The areas given to the papacy did not, then, comprise the total area of the exarchate as it had been. It was Ravenna and those areas of the old exarchate which had been conquered by Aistulf which were given to the republic.<sup>2</sup> Areas in the northwest and southeast of the exarchate and the Pentapolis, which Luitprand had taken, remained under Lombard rule.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the theme of the restoration of the plenaria iustitiae of St. Peter and the republic became a primary theme of the period after 756.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hodgkin, VII, 263.

<sup>2</sup> Kehr, pp. 126-27. Cf. Sybel, HZ, XLIV (1880), 58, and Duchesne, Liber Pontificalis, I, 460n.

<sup>3</sup> Kehr, p. 127.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 128-129.

No time was wasted by the curia in taking up the theme of the plenaria iustitiae after the successful conclusion of the operations of 756. All that lacked was the opportunity to assert another claim. While Stephen II still lived that opportunity presented itself in the form of the death of the prodigally unfortunate Aistulf through a hunting accident, followed by a disputed succession which allowed the curia to sell its support to the more likely candidate.

The principal claimant of the woe-beladen Iron Crown was Desiderius, Duke of the Lombards, who had been made commander of the army in Tuscany by Aistulf. Through his office Desiderius commanded a reasonably sufficient military force, though he may have lacked noble supporters in other areas of Lombardy.<sup>5</sup> The chief opponent of Desiderius was the brother of Aistulf, the late-king Ratchis, who for personal and dynastic reasons renounced the monastic life to prevent the throne from falling into Desiderius' hands and who seems to have enjoyed wider support than Desiderius.<sup>6</sup> The undesirability of the continuation of Aistulf's line and policy, and

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<sup>5</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 454: "Tunc Desiderius quidam dux Langobardorum, qui ab eodem nequissimo Aistulfo Tusciae in partes erat directus, audiens praefatum obisse Aistulfum, illico adgregans ipsius Tusciae universum exercitum multitudini, regni Langobardorum arripere misus est fastigium."

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 454-455: "Huius personam dispectui habens Ratchisus, dudum rex et postmodum monachus, germanus praefati Aistulfi, sed et alii plures Langobardorum optimates cum eo, eundem Desiderium spernentes, plura Transalpium vel cetera Langobardorum exercitum multitudinem adgregantes, ad dimicandum contra eum profecti sunt."





the weakness of Desiderius, which would make him likely to be a less pugnacious ruler, rendered him the logical candidate to receive Rome's support. Desiderius' position also made it very likely that he would need outside aid. With the army gathered by Ratchis threatening his candidature, Desiderius appealed to Pope Stephen for aid. He promised to respect the republic and to return to the republic the "cities which remained", i.e., the cities of the exarchate which, being Luitprand's conquests, had remained in Lombard hands in 756.<sup>7</sup>

The negotiations between Desiderius and the pope were carried out by men of the highest position in the curial bureaucracy. Paul the Deacon and Christopher the Primicerius were sent by Pope Stephen to deal with Desiderius, and, finding him most receptive and agreeable, they received from him a promise to restore the cities in question to the republic.<sup>8</sup>

Having once received Desiderius' agreement concerning the cities to be restored, Stephen commenced to act on his

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 455: "Ad haec praefatus Desiderius obnixè praelatum beatissimum pontificem deprecatus est sibi auxilium, quatenus ipse regalem valeret adsumere dignitatem, spondens iureiurando, omnem praelati beatissimi pontificis adimplere voluntatem; insuper et reipublice se redditurum professus est civitates quae remanserant, immo et copia daturus munera."

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. "Tunc isdem praecipuus pater et bonus pastor, inito consilio cum sepefato Fulrado venerabile presbitero et abbate atque consiliario...Pippini...misit suum germanum, Paulum...atque Christoform...una cum praelato Fulrado in partes Tusciae, ad praedictum Desiderium. Cum quo loquentes confestim concriptam paginam terribili iuramento isdem Desiderius conctam professus est superius adnexam sponsionem adimplere."

behalf in the matter of the succession. First, he sent an envoy to the perjured Ratchis to persuade him to desist from unsuitable worldly activities and return to his monastery and the obedience due his abbot and leave the affairs of the world to others.<sup>9</sup> Then Fulrad, and the other Frankish officials left in Rome by Pepin, were sent to Desiderius to receive his assurances in regard of the plenaria iustitiae and to aid him in his candidature, and a Roman army was raised to assist him.<sup>10</sup> In Fulrad's presence Desiderius swore to return Faenza, Imola, Ferrara, Osimo, Ancona, Bologna and Umana with all the lands pertaining to each of them, asking that he be allowed to live in peace with Rome and Pepin.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid. "Haec vero peracta statim suum missum...cum apostolicis exortatoriis litteris praefato Ratchiso vel cuncti genti Langobardorum direxit...."

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. "...properans et praefatus Fulradus venerabilis abbas cum aliquantulis Francis in auxilium ipsius Desiderii, sed et plures exercitus Romanorum, si necessitas exigerit, in eius disposuit occurri adiutorium."

<sup>11</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XI (Explere lingua -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2335), p. 506: "Et in praesentia ipsius Folradi sub iureiurando pollicitus est restituendum beato Petro civitates reliquas: Faventia, Imulas et Ferraria cum eorum finibus, simul etiam et saltora et omnia territoria, nec non et Ausimum, Ancona et Humana civitates cum eorum territoriis; et postmodum per Garrinodum ducem et Crimoaldum nobis reddendum spondit civitatem Bononiam cum finibus suis....". Cf. Vita Stephani II, p. 455: Desiderius "...direxit missum suum praelatus sanctissimus pontifex et abstulit de ipsis civitatibus quas...reddere promiserat...id est Faventias cum castro Tiberiaco seu Cabellum et universum ducatum Ferrariae in integro". Niehues, HJb, II, (1881), 216-217 argues that these cities were included in the treaty of 756 and never turned over by Aistulf. Cf. notes 2 and 3 on page 86. Codex Carolinus, Ep. XI (Explere lingua -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2335), p. 506: "Atque fidelum erga Deo protectum regnum vestrum esse testatus est et petiit nos, quatenus bonitatem tuam deprecemur, ut cum eo et cuncta gente Langobardorum magnam pacis concordiam confirmare iubeas."



By these means then, Desiderius, vir mitissimus, became King of the Lombards in March, 757.<sup>12</sup>

While engaged in this business Stephen was not blind to opportunity in other quarters. Capitalizing on the traditional separatism of the Lombard duchies in the south, he understandably reasoned, would keep Desiderius weak and prevent the strategic encirclement of the republic. Hence, when in the same period the Dukes of Benevento and Spoleto wished to grasp the opportunity afforded them by royal weakness and the disputed succession to escape royal control, Stephen was not slow to act. By agreement between Stephen and the dukes, they appealed through him to Pepin to whom they offered their commendation as vassals.<sup>13</sup> By this device the pope and the dukes hoped to gain independence of central control for the duchies and a further weakening of the Lombard state.

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid. "Nunc autem Dei providentia per manus sui principis apostolorum beati Petri simul et per tuum fortissimum brachium, precurrente industria Deo amabilis viri Fulradi, tui fidelis, nostri dilecti filii, ordinatus est rex super gentem Langobardorum, Desiderius vir mitissimus." For a note as to the date of the event, see p. 506n. It is clear that, considering the vassalage of Aistulf and Desiderius' oath to Fulrad as Pepin's representative, Desiderius was considered by the Franks to have been Pepin's vassal and to have held his throne through Pepin's consent and sufferance. Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 39, p. 186: "Langobardi una cum consensu praedicto rege Pippino et consilio procerum suorum Desiderio in sedem regni instituunt." Cf. Chronicon Moissiacense, p. 295.

<sup>13</sup> Codex Carolinus, sp. XI (Explere lingua -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2335), p. 506: "Et tam ipsi Spoletini quamque etiam Beneventani omnes se commendare per nos a Deo servate excellentiae tuae cupiunt et imminent anhelantius in hoc deprecandum bonitatem tuam." Chronicon Salernitanum, cap. 9, p. 475: "Tantum in initio suo regni Spoletini et Beneventani rebelles fuerunt...."

Having completed what looked to be a very satisfactory piece of business, Pope Stephen II had reason to be in high spirit, for he had secured the borders of the republic and insured the docility of his neighbors.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, Desiderius appeared to be a veritable client-king of the republic.

The affair was not so easily settled to the curia's advantage, however. The expected concessions and advantages did not in fact become reality. The promises made so readily by Desiderius while he was yet only a claimant to the crown seeking aid were not so easily kept by King Desiderius, responsible for the safety, well-being and integrity of his kingdom. The cities he had promised to cede to the republic had been Lombard for fifteen years or more and were not so easily severed from the kingdom. Moreover, too soft an attitude toward Rome had its pitfalls; the recent presence of the ex-king-monk Ratchis recalled to memory the anger of the Lombard aristocracy for one who had held the advantage of the realm lightly. And besides, no self-respecting monarch could be able to ignore such open treason as the southern duchies had

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<sup>14</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XI (*Explere lingua -- Jaffé-Wattenbach*, 2335), p. 505: Pepin was exhorted to continue his good work so that he may insure "...ut civitates reliquas, quae sub unius domini ditione erant connexe atque constitutae, fines, territoria, etiam loca et saltora in integro matri tuae spiritali, sanctae ecclesiae, restituere praecipiat; ut populus Dei, quem a manibus inimicorum redemisti, in magna securitate et delectatione tuo auxilio adiutus vivere valeat. Quoniam et filius noster Deo amabilis Fodradus, fidelis vester, omnia conspiciens satisfactus est, quod nequaquam ipse populus vivere possit extra eorum fines et territoria atque possessiones, absque civitatibus illis, quae semper cum eis sub unius domini ditione erant connexae." He also cautions Pepin to not let himself be deterred by persuasions and promises.

shown. Hence the arrangements made in the spring of 757 did not outlive Pope Stephen by very long and the Lombard reaction to the Roman advances made in 757 was the main theme of the first few years of Paul's rule.

By early 758 it was apparent that Desiderius was not going to effect the promises he had made to the papacy in his time of need.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, Desiderius took positive steps to reduce the Duchies of Spoleto and Benevento to submission and for that purpose made an agreement of mutual aid with the Greek emissary, George, residing in Naples, which in Rome it was feared would indicate imminent invasion of the republic.<sup>16</sup>

Shortly after having subdued the rebellious dukes Desiderius appeared in Rome anxious to prevent the pope from provoking another Frankish expedition to Italy. By threat or persuasion Desiderius prevailed upon Paul to send a letter to Pepin, which may even have been dictated by the Lombard, reporting that Desiderius, excellentissimus filius noster, earnestly desired to make peace and would give Imola to the pope if Pepin would be his friend and ally and return the

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., Ep. XIV (no. 15, Lator praesentium -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2338), p. 512: "Unde certam a Deo protectam eximietatem vestram reddimus, nihil nos usque hactenus recepisse de his, quae per nostros legatos excellentiae vestrae petendo mandavimus. Solite namque perfidi et maligne illi in magna arrogantia cordis permanentes nequaquam inclinantur iustitiam beati Petri restituere. Tamen omnia qualiter acta sunt, referentibus vestris missis agnoscere potestis."

<sup>16</sup> Codicis Carolini Epistolae, Ep. XV (no. 16 -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2339), BRG, ed. F. Jaffé, IV (Berlin, 1867), pp. 74-75. This letter does not appear in Gundlach's edition. Jaffé's edition carries the remnants of the corrupted text.

hostages given by Aistulf in 755 and 756.<sup>17</sup> Desiderius' precautions, however, were insufficient and, unknown to Desiderius, Paul succeeded in sending off a second letter in which he asked Pepin to disregard the previous letter (*Dum tam copiosam*) since it was sent under the eyes of "the most insidious King of the Lombards".<sup>18</sup> Paul then reported the recent events: Spoleto and Benevento, which Paul emphasized were Pepin's vassal states, had been attacked and put to fire and sword.<sup>19</sup> Alboin, Duke of Spoleto, who was St. Peter's and Pepin's man, was captured and the Duke of Benevento

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<sup>17</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XVI (no. 17, *Dum tam copiosam* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2340), p. 513: "Agnoscat siquidem excellentissima bonitas tua, quia coniungens ad limina apostolorum excellentissimus filius noster, Desiderius rex, pacifice atque cum magna humilitate; cum quo salutaria utrarumque parcium locuti sumus. Et pollicitus est nobis restituere civitatem Imulas, ea videlicet ratione, ut nostros ad tuam excellentiam dirigere debeamus missos, et suos hospites quod ibidem a vos habere videtur recipere debeat, et pacem cum eo confirmare studeatis."

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., Ep. XVII (no. 18, *Quotiens perspicua* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2343), p. 517. The previous letter was of no value because of "...imminentibus circumquaque Langobardorum regis insidiis....Pro quo et nunc per praenominatos nostros missos alias vobis litteras misimus -- quasi obtemperantes prefati Desiderii regis voluntati -- suos hospites absolvendum et pacem confirmandum; sed, bone, excellentissime fili et spiritalis compater, ideo istas litteras tali modo exaravimus, ut ipsi nostri missi ad vos Franciam valerent transire, quoniam, si hoc non egissemus, nulla penitus ratione per Langobardorum fines transire valuissent. Sed susceptis ipsis litteris, earum seriem nullo modo perficiatis neque praefatos hospites permittatis parti Langobardorum restituerae."

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 515: "Sicque Spolaetinus et Beneventanus, qui se sub vestra a Deo servata potestate contulerunt ad magnam spretum regni vestri desolavit atque ferro et igne eorundem ducatum, loca et civitates devastavit."

fled.<sup>20</sup> Then Desiderius allied with the Greeks to subdue the Beneventine fugitive in Otranto, following which Desiderius went to Rome.<sup>21</sup>

With this information it is possible to reconstruct the situation to some extent. Desiderius wished to reduce the duchies to obedience. In order to do reach them he had to march across papal territory which he did in the Pentapolis.<sup>22</sup> Unable to finish the task alone after Spoleto had been reduced and the Beneventine had fled, he welcomed an offer of aid from the Greeks. But having accepted their aid and gained his purpose he deserted that alliance. He had nothing further to gain by it and probably also realized the danger of con-

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid. "Et comprehensum Alboinum ducem Spoletinum cum eius satrapibus, qui in fide beati Petri et vestra sacramentum prebuerunt, infixis in eis pessimis vulneribus, in vinculis detinet. Adpropinquante autem eo Benevento, ilico dux Beneventanus fugam arripuit in Otorantinam civitatem." Annales Beneventani, a. 759, (Codex 3), L.H., SS., III, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hannover, 1839), p. 173: "Domnus Arichis dux et primus princeps constituitur in Benevento...." Arichis II was to become a champion of Lombard interests against the papacy after 774; H. Belting, "Studien zur beneventanischen Hof im achte Jahrhundert", DOF, XVI, (1962), 143-145.

<sup>21</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XVII (no. 18, Quotiens perspicua -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2341), p. 515: "Et confestim dirigens Neapolim, isdem Desiderius rex accersivit Georgium imperialem missum....iniens cum eo consilium atque suas imperatori dirigens litteras....Nam et hoc cum eodem Georgio...constituit, ut dromonorum Siciliae stolum in Otorantio civitate dirigatur, ut tam Greci quamque Langobardi ipsam opsidentes comprehendere valeant civitatem; eamque concedat imperatori cum hominibus et facultatibus, quae in ea consistunt; et tantummodo ducem illum atque eius nutritorem Iohannem praedicto regi restituant. Post vero dissolutionem eorundem ducatum coniunxit hic ad nos Romae isdem Langobardorum rex."

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. "...Pentapolensium per civitates transiens... ferro et igne omnia salta et universa, quae ad sumptus hominum pertinent, consumpsit...." Despite this testimony it is not probably that Desiderius merely marched across the land.



tinued co-operation with the Greeks as a provocation against Pepin. Having finished his business in the south, he hurried to Rome to keep his relations with Pepin and the pope from deteriorating completely.

With the action in the south over and no threat to Rome having materialized, there was no need for Frankish intervention. The claim that the duchies belonged to Pepin had been a flimsy one at best. No evidence shows Pepin to have accepted that claim anyway, and hence he did not take steps to protect the duchies or retrieve them.<sup>23</sup> Since Desiderius seems to have dropped the Greek alliance almost before it began, it posed no threat to Rome and did not provoke a Frankish response. Out of this whole exchange, then, the only questions remaining were those of Desiderius' violations of the republic's territory and the failure to restore the plenaria iustitiae as promised. But since the violation probably did not amount to much it was soon forgotten. Thus there is absolutely no ground for assenting to the thesis of Paul Kehr that at the close of 758 Pepin and Desiderius came to a private agreement in which Pepin sacrificed the

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<sup>23</sup> Martens, p. 92: "Da Stephan bald darauf starb, so hatte Pippin um so weniger Veranlassung sich irgendwie in die spoletinischen und beneventanischen Verhältnisse zu mischen; er blieb völlig passiv und liess die Sache auf sich beruhen." The vassalage of the duchies was not existent in fact but merely in the wishes of the papacy and Pepin never had a legal or constitutional connection to the duchies, Ibid., p. 93. Maurice Baumont, "Le pontificat de Paul I<sup>er</sup>", RAE, XLVII (1930), 17: "Paul n'avait pas osé demander formellement au roi franc d'intervenir pour délivrer les duchés du Sud. Il était préoccupé par une question capitale pour l'avenir de l'état romain: les 'restitutions' promises par Didier."

interests of the republic.<sup>24</sup>

Only the question posed by Desiderius' breach of promise to restore the plenaria iustitiae remained, though in spite of that ground of contention no open hostilities broke out in Italy. On the one hand Desiderius did not desire war: he simply refused to redeem his promise. On the other hand Paul could not accomplish anything without Pepin's intervention, which he did not receive.

There does not seem to have been any further action by Desiderius in violation of the rights of the republic, and the continued insistence of the pope on the restitution of the promised cities was soon interrupted by a seemingly more pressing problem. In late 759 or early 760 Pope Paul received news of a projected Greek invasion of which Ravenna and Rome were to be the chief targets. Being unable to deal with the situation alone, he requested of Pepin that Pepin persuade Desiderius to lend his aid in repulsing the invasion.<sup>25</sup> However, as Paul's contacts and relations with Desiderius were not so good as to allow an immediate alliance of the two,

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<sup>24</sup> Kehr, pp. 138-145.

<sup>25</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXX (no. 21, Praecelsae et a Deo I -- Jaffé-Mattenbach, 2357), p. 536: "...iubeas...dirigere Desiderio Langobardorum regi missum, ut, si necessitas fuerit, significatum auxilium nobis pro incursione eorundem inimicorum impertire debeat, precipiens Beneventanis atque Spoletinis seu Tuscanis nobis e vicino consistentibus, ut ipsi nostro occurrant solatio." Ibid., Ep. XXXI (no. 22, Praecelsae et a Deo II -- Jaffé-Mattenbach, 2358), p. 537: "...ut nimis velociter dirigere iubeatis vestram praeceptionem Desiderio regi Langobardorum, ut si necessitas exigerit, auxilium prestare debeat tam Ravennae quamque pentapoleis maritimis civitatibus ad dimicandum contra inimicorum inruptionem."

owing to the unfilled desire of the pope, Paul requested that Pepin send missi in the coming March to negotiate a settlement with Desiderius and arrange a coordinated defense of the republic.<sup>26</sup> Pepin's responded by admonishing Paul that he ought to at least try to accommodate the Lombard, to which Paul replied that he was willing to live in peace with Desiderius if Desiderius, that excellentissimus vir, would reciprocate.<sup>27</sup> Thus a first step was taken toward Paul's renunciation of his claim to the cities promised by Desiderius. The requested Frankish missi arrived and in April, 760, succeeded in negotiating a settlement between Desiderius and Paul by which all the rights of St. Peter were to be returned following the taking of a survey to determine which areas legitimately belonged to the Lombard Kingdom and what the pope might claim.<sup>28</sup> For reasons of a practical nature the

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXX (no. 21, Praecelsae et a Deo I -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2357), p. 536: "Deprecantes et hoc a Deo institutam excellentiam vestram: ut ad nos hoc adveniente Martio mense vestrum dirigere iubeatis missum, qui hic Rome nobis condemorari debeat; et ipse, si necessitas exigerit, apud Desiderium imminere debeat regi pro eodem nobis transmittendo solatio, quia, ut plenissimae satisfacta est vestra excellentia, non ob aliud ipsi nefandissimi nos persequuntur Greci nisi propter sanctam et orthodoxam fidem et venerandorum patrum piam traditionem, quam cupiunt destruere atque conculcare."

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXVIII (no. 23, Dum tanto vestrae -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2369), p. 551: "Quod quidem si ipse excellentissimus vir in vera dilectione et fide, quam vestrae excellentiae et sanctae Dei Romane ecclesiae spopondit, permanserit, utique et nos in caritate firma et stabili pace cum eo permansuri erimus, observantes illud dominice praeceptionis documentum: 'Beati pacifici, quoniam filii Dei vocabuntur'".

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., Ep. XIX (no. 24, Quia excellentia -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2344), pp. 519-520: "...omnes iustitias fautoris ves-

cost of the accommodation to Paul was that Paul gave up -- at Pepin's insistence -- the claim to the plenaria iustitiae originally advanced by Stephen II during the weakness of Desiderius.<sup>29</sup> Desiderius, on the other hand, seems to have given up, or promised to give up, an unidentified area or areas originally ceded to the republic in the treaties with Aistulf in 755 and 756, which had never been surrendered. Thus it appears that the arrangements made in the spring of 757 were considered to be of no standing and Pepin seems to have felt that he was not committed by them. The basis of the agreement of 760 was found in the treaties of 755 and 756 and the grounds for settling the difference of 757-759 went back to the situation as it existed in 757. Hence Desiderius was able to retrieve his promises of 757 and to preserve the situation as of the death of Aistulf. He was able to assert and make good the idea that the treaties of 755 and 756 were the limits to which Rome might expand.

Having succeeded thus far Desiderius seems to have

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tri, beati Petri apostolorum principis -- omni videlicet patrimonia, iura etiam et loca atque fines et territoria diversarum civitatum nostrarum Rei publice Romanorum -- nobis plenissime restituisset. Unde eccae ex parte quidem eisdem iustitiis nobis isdem Langobardorum rex fecisse dinoscitur; et reliquas omnes iustitias se profitetur atque omnino spondet nobis esse factururus.: In this connection an interesting note is found in the Benedicti Chronicon, cap. 21, MGH, SS, III, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hannover, 1839), pp. 706-707, which records an expedition of Pepin during Paul's reign which obviously never occurred. This may refer to diplomatic missions. The chronicle says that Tuscany was given to the pope.

<sup>29</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XIX (no. 24, Quia excellentia -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2344), p. 520.

wished to see how much further he could go. It appears that he was not much inclined to implement the terms of the arrangements of 760, and efforts to secure his action in this regard filled a good part of the remainder of Paul's pontificate. Somewhat later Pepin sent a legation to Italy to verify whether or not the arrangements were being carried out and it would seem that Desiderius was in some way lagging in his efforts in that direction.<sup>30</sup> Eventually, at some time in the period 761-762 Pepin had to intervene again. A Frankish legation arrived in Rome and held an inquiry at which representatives of Desiderius and of the various cities under dispute were present and they tried to obtain a settlement.<sup>31</sup> The main concern was with the borders of the republic; apparently Desiderius failed to respect the rights of various cities ceded to the pope. He used, kept or otherwise violated these rights in the landed areas around them and also refused to cede certain areas claimed by the republic.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXII (no. 28, Ad referendas -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2348), p. 526: "Quia vero innotuistis: ob hoc vos praesentes direxisse missos, ut agnoscere...utrum nobis a parte Langobardorum plenariae facte fuissent iustitiae an non, ipsi omnino cause meritum comperti sunt et callidam versutiam atque solite falsiloquam propositionem eorundem vestrorum nostrorumque emulorum agnoverunt, eisque ad vos revertentibus Deo propitio, vestris propalabunt in auribus."

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXIV (no. 29, Dum tam maxima -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2361), p. 541: "Prelati denique missi vestri in nostri presentia cum Langobardorum missis nec non et Pentapolensium ac singularum nostrarum civitatum hominibus adsistentes, conprobatio coram eis facta est de habitis inter utraque partes aliquibus iustitiis, videlicet de pecuniis inter partes restitutis."

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. "Nam de finibus civitatum nostrarum et patrimoniis beati Petri ab eisdem Langobardis retentis atque in-



At this inquiry it was arranged that Frankish and papal legations, accompanied by the representatives of the civitates, would confer with Desiderius in Pavia and secure his approval of the borders of the republic. Desiderius would be required to confirm the borders in the presence of the legations and, by implication, he would guarantee those borders.<sup>33</sup> The pope, in reviewing these arrangements expressed to Pepin his doubt over Desiderius' will to obey them and there was indeed a failure to secure Desiderius' compliance with those terms. When a legation was sent from Rome to secure the implementation of the terms of the agreement they achieved nothing.<sup>34</sup> Indeed, relations became more strained. Though papal rhetoric may have blown the incidents out of proportion, by 762 or 763 Desiderius was raiding into the territory of the republic<sup>35</sup> and trying to frighten Paul into ceasing his complaints by sending him threatening letters. Being without other recourse in the face of Desiderius' continued refusal to come

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vasis nihil usque hactenus recepimus; etiam ea, quae primitis reddiderant, denuo invaserunt."

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp. 541-542: "Unde constitit, ut nostri ac singularum nostrarum civitatum missi ad Desiderium Langobardorum regem cum vestris progredi debeant missis, ut in eorum atque predicti regis praesentia pro eisdem finibus ac patrimonii comprobatio fiat nobisque omnia iuxta pacti seriem restituantur."

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., Ep. XX (no. 32, A Deo institute -- Jaffé-Mattenbach, 2345), p. 521: "Et ecce nostri missi nihil inpetrantes ad nos sine effectu reversi sunt."

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. "Et plures depraedationes ex tunc atque multa et inaudita mala in nostris inmittit finibus. Unde ecce suas confestim direxit litteras, per quas, confidens in sua ferocitate, Deum prae oculis non habens nec beatum principem apostolorum Petrum metuens, comminationes nobis direxit et inania detractionum verba protulit."

to terms Paul once more requested of Pepin that he send his representatives to investigate.<sup>36</sup>

Roman and Frankish attempts to persuade Desiderius to obey the terms of his agreements and follow the dictates of his overlord continued to be unrewarding and the business continued to drag out. As late as 764-765 occasional Lombard raids or other violations of the republic's territory, termed 'devastations' by the pope, continued to take place.<sup>37</sup> Though Pepin continued to send legations to settle this affair they seem not to have achieved anything tangible and to have reported that Desiderius was uncooperative.<sup>38</sup> However, continued Frankish diplomatic pressure eventually bore fruit and by 765 Desiderius seems to have been brought to heel, though no information survives as to the circumstances. In 765 Desiderius appears to have been acting as Pepin's agent in some respects. Furthermore, it was arranged in 765 that Roman and Lombard legations would finally settle the territor-

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 522.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. n. 34, p. 100. Ibid., Ep. XXI (no. 33, Cum maximo -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2347), p. 523: "Etinim, ...dum tantas sedulae ab eisdem Longobardis devastaciones in nostris finibus ac civitatibus facte fuissent et a nobis ex hoc ammonitus fuisset, comminationis suae ad nos direxit litteras, quas neccesitate coacti infra nostris apostolicas litteras hoc preterito anno vestrae excellentiae direximus intuendas."

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 524: "Unde pro vestra amplissima satisfactione adprobationem fecimus in praesentia praedictorum vestrorum fidelium missorum cum iam dictis Langobardorum regis missis; et satisfacti sunt vestri missi, de tantis iniquitatibus et cognoverunt nostram veritatem et eorum mendacium."





ial claims of the republic.<sup>39</sup> Hence, by the end of Paul's pontificate, a *modus vivendi*, though uneasy, had been established in Italy between Rome and Pavia.<sup>40</sup>

The period 757 to 767 in regard of Roman-Lombard relations appears to be a disorderly welter of negotiations and violations of agreements. However, there is a coherent pattern involved which may be unfolded. The major concern of Paul in regard of the Lombards was to follow the ambitious policy of his brother and predecessor and secure additional territories at the expense of the Lombard kingdom. This concern caused him to seek the weakening of the kingdom for the sake of the republic. Being entirely dependent upon the military support of Pepin, Paul was forced to modify his policies and desires to suit those of Pepin. In the period from 757 to 767 Pepin was involved with a series of local conflicts on the borders of his kingdom which demanded his close and constant attention.<sup>41</sup> He could not afford to intervene militarily in Italy in the absence of a most severe crisis.

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, Ep. XXXVII (no. 38, *Votiva cordis* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2364), p. 549: "Cum eodem quippe rege pro iustitiis inter partes perficiendis loquente constitit, ut, nostris eiusque missis per diversas civitates progredientibus, ipse perpetrare fuissent iustitiae. Et ecce...de partibus Beneventanis atque Tuscanensibus et fecimus et ad vicem nostras recepimus; nam et de ducatu Spoletino, nostris vel Langobardorum missis illuc adhuc existentes, ex parte iustitias fecimus ac recepimus; sed et reliquas, quae remanserunt, modis omnibus plenissime inter partes facere student."

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, Ep. XXXVI (no. 39, *Cum regalis* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2363), p. 546. Desiderius was still suspicious of Paul.

<sup>41</sup> *Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes*, cap. 41-54, pp. 186-193.



Frankish efforts on Rome's behalf had to be limited to diplomatic action. Similarly Pepin would not wish to push Desiderius to a point at which hostilities would result and military action would become necessary. Under these conditions it was necessary that the demands of the papacy be limited so that a crisis could be avoided. Paul's task was to accommodate himself to these circumstances and yet achieve as much as possible to secure the position of the republic. By 759 he was brought to understand that Pepin could not intervene militarily and accordingly he pursued a revised policy calculated to avoid war with the Lombard. From 759 to 765 he strove by diplomacy to achieve the fulfillment of the agreements of 756 and the regularization of conditions between Lombardy and Rome. By 765 he had achieved this.

The lack of really adequate sources for Italian history in the period and the prejudicial tone of the Codex Carolinus creates the possibility that one might underestimate Desiderius. A careful assessment of the situation seems to indicate that he was a reasonable and practical monarch. It is reasonably certain that he learned well in the school kept by Pepin, wherein Aistulf had failed. In all the events of 757-767 Desiderius assiduously avoided angering Pepin and provoking the sort of action visited upon Aistulf. He was, first of all, wise enough to avoid any real conspiracy with the Greeks. Moreover, in his wranglings with Paul he never really posed a threat to the republic, Rome or the papacy. That this was so is evident from the letters of the pope himself, for though he spoke of devastations and outrages, they occurred

far away and were largely exaggerated. The relative calmness of the letters does not indicate a real or imminent danger. Recalcitrant though Desiderius was concerning the complete cession to Rome of the areas promised by Aistulf, he finally chose the prudent course and yielded to the persistent diplomatic overtures of Paul and Pepin.

The major problem facing Pepin in regard of Italy in this period was the discharge of his responsibilities towards the pope without becoming involved in further war. Prudence dictated that he ignore the protectorate created for him by the papacy over the southern duchies and that the unfair terms of 757 be allowed to fade away. By diplomacy he achieved in the end what he had sought to achieve: a workable and peaceful situation in Italy and the protection of the interests of Rome which had been guaranteed by treaty in 756.

Hence from the analysis of Roman-Lombard-Frankish affairs in the period 757-767 one must conclude that the pontificate of Paul witnessed the adjustment of all parties to the novel situation established as of 756. Each had to ascertain his position vis-à-vis the other two and probe the possibilities and dangers of the revised political balance of post-756 Italy. By the end of Paul's pontificate this seems to have been peacefully accomplished and a political equilibrium found. Unfortunately it is impossible to ascertain whether this equilibrium would have lasted, for by 768 the effects of the division of power among the Franks and the chaotic affairs of Rome created a new imbalance which embol-

dened Desiderius to test his position once more and press his position further.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE TESTING OF THE POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE STRENGTH OF THE FRANCO-PAPAL ALLIANCE BY THE EMPEROR

The very existence of the term and the concept of the new ecclesiastical republic of the Romans meant the end of Roman allegiance to the Byzantine Empire. But the revolution establishing the new state on Italian soil was a revolution of thoughts rather than of open deeds. No manifesto or declaration accompanied the achievement of Roman independence and though the two tri-partite treaties of 755 and 756 implied the official recognition of the Roman state such a unilateral act had no relevance to imperial law. Hence, it should not be too surprising that the caesar of New Rome misjudged both the nature and degree of the change in the political organization of Italy which culminated in 756. Constantine V was unlikely to view the pope as anything but an impertinent upstart who would need only to be taught a lesson or two. Similarly it is rather unlikely that Constantine understood the nature of the alliance created between Pepin and Rome or the degree to which the altered circumstances of the Lombard kingdom should affect Desiderius' attitude toward Rome. How should he be able to appreciate

the depth of the spiritual commitment of Pepin to the pontiff of Rome? It is only natural that he should discount Pepin's explanation to his emissary in 756 as mere camouflage motivated by lust for slaughter and plunder.

Despite the attitude of the Romans as manifested in the period 730-752, the Byzantine Emperor, oblivious to reality as it then existed in Italy, continued to act as though his relationship with the universal pontiff had remained unchanged. Even as late as 753 he seems to have considered the pope his subject and agent in Italy as the negotiations with Aistulf in 753 indicate. However, even the preoccupied basileus could not fail to perceive the significance of Stephen's actions in Francia, the nature of which was made clear to Constantine in 756. Hence, beginning in 756, a fundamental change occurred in the Byzantine approach to the West. After 756 the papacy was no longer directly approached by the emperor's men. In fact the papacy seems to have dropped completely out of Byzantine policy considerations. Despite these appearances, however, the papacy was the subject of all Greek policies in the west. To punish the pope, re-assert Byzantine control over Rome and the area of central Italy, and deprive Rome of its political and territorial influence must be recognized as the very core and basis of Byzantine aims in the pursuit of its policies in the West. Every diplomatic or military gambit of the basileus directed toward the West during the pontificate of Paul was undoubtedly motivated by these goals. Having by 756 come to realize what had been going on in Rome



and that Byzantium had long ceased to have any influence there, the emperor was forced to attempt to deal directly with the other principals involved. Despite the initial rebuff afforded Byzantine diplomacy in 756 by Pepin this continued to be the policy of the emperor. Taking Pepin's answer to his representative lightly, the basileus endeavored to win Pepin over to serve as a Byzantine agent. If that were not possible he could seek to secure his neutrality or at least to sow doubt and discord within the alliance.

The imperial diplomatic offensive opened in 757 when there occurred an exchange of legations between Pepin and the emperor<sup>1</sup> in which the initiative undoubtedly lay with the emperor. Though the negotiations produced an initial pledge of amity between the two powers, such an undefined and mean-

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<sup>1</sup> Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 40, p. 186: "Dum haec ageretur, rex Pippinus legationem Constantinopolim ad Constantino imperatore pro amicitia causa et salutem patrie sue mittens, similiter et Constantinus imperator legationem praefato rege cum multa munera mittens, et amicitias et fidem per legatos eorum vicinim inter se promittunt." Annales Einhardi, a. 757, p. 15: "Constantinus imperator misit Pippino regi multa munera, inter quae et organum; quae ad eum in Compendia villa pervenerunt, ubi tunc populi sui generalem conventum habuit." It is impossible to assent to the assertion that the initiative in these negotiations is to be attributed to Pepin. Cf. Kehr, p. 111 and Oelsner, p. 290. Pepin had little if anything to gain by these negotiations while the emperor had everything to gain and was in fact merely pursuing the course begun in 756. In fact it appears that Pepin was pressured by the emperor to enter into a marriage alliance with the Byzantines and refused, Codex Carolinus, XLV (no. 47, Dum omnium electorum -- Jaffé-Hattenbach, 2381) p. 562: "Itaque et hoc, peto, at vestri referre studete memoriam: eo quod, dum Constantinus imperator nitebatur persuadere...vestrum genitorem ad accipiendum coniugio filii sui germanam vestram...Ghisylam...neque vos aliae natione licere copulari, sed nec contra voluntatem apostolicae sedis pontificum quoque modo vos audere peragere."

in less part was of dubious worth to Constantine V. Pepin was not hostile to the emperor and had no particular goal in the pursuit of which the empire was of any importance. On the other hand, the implications of alliance with the Greek would place Pepin in violation of his duty in respect of Rome. Hence the negotiations foundered.<sup>2</sup>

Even though the negotiations were unsuccessful and had certainly little importance, Pope Stephen seems to have been alarmed by the possibilities suggested by the mere fact that such negotiations were in progress and by the specter of Franco-Greek cooperation which they afforded, inasmuch as his safety in Italy was totally dependent upon the support and protection of Pepin. For these reasons Stephen took pause to inform Pepin of the heretical views and activities of the Byzantines, to point out the danger the empire offered to orthodoxy and the physical well-being of the church, and to remind Pepin of his obligation to defend Rome therefrom.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, though Byzantine attempts to enlist Pepin's sympathies and support in Italy had never much possibility

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<sup>2</sup> Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 40, p. 186: "Nescio, quo faciente, postea amicitias, quas inter se mutuo promisserant nullatenus sortita est effectum."

<sup>3</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XI (Explere lingua -- Jaffé-Lattenbach, 2335), p. 506: "...ut inspiratus a Deo...ita disporre iubeas de parte Grecorum, ut fides sancta catholica et apostolica per te integra et inconcussa permaneat in eternum et sancta Dei ecclesia, sicut ab aliis, et ab eorum pestifera malitia liberetur et secunda reddatur...." It would not be improbable that the pope's views and words reinforced Pepin's attitude and produced a disinclination on his part to continue to be involved with the emperor.

of success, the empire did pose a very real threat to the security of the papacy and the republic. The possibility of a revival of Byzantine power in Italy loomed as a frightening prospect to the wearer of the Triple Crown. Hence it is important that it be realized that papal invective against the nefandissimi Greci was not mere rhetoric. The iconoclastic struggle and persecutions under Leo III and the accompanying imperial attempts to assassinate Pope Gregory II were not long past. Indeed, Constantine gave evidence of being even more adamant on the matter of enforcing his religious policy on the empire by use of violence than had been his father. In 754 Constantine had affirmed his iconoclastic views and had them legitimized at the Council of Constantinople.<sup>4</sup> Pope Paul's protests against iconoclasm were ignored by the emperor and Constantine was involved in several severe persecutions, particularly against monks.<sup>5</sup> Thus there could be small doubt about the hostility of the basileus to-

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<sup>4</sup> Nicephorus Breviarum Historicum, pp. 974c-975a: "Constantinus ubi semel se ad Ecclesiae contumeliam ac pietatis oppugnationem accinxit, tanquam afflatu impulsuque contrarii spiritus abreptus, coetum episcoporum colligit octo et triginta numero supra trecentos....In eo conciliabulo fidei canonem condiderunt de sacris imaginibus evertendis, cui ab omnibus ipmio consensu ac nefario subscriptam est; eaque religio omnis pueriliter in foro anathemate damnata."

<sup>5</sup> Vita Pauli, p. 464 (Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2365). Theophanis Chronographia, a.m. 6257-6263, IC, CVIII, 879-899. Theophanes' chronology is difficult to unravel and in regard of the West his dating system is complete nonsense. Some feel that he places creation at 5500 B.C., and so compute that his anno mundi 6200 is equal to 700 A.D. Cf. Henri Hubert, "Observations sur la chronologie de Théophane et de quelques lettres des papes", BZ, VI (1897), 505. Hubert puts 750 A.D., as a.m. 6242 in Theophanes.

ward the papacy. Moreover, it was inevitable that the emperor would look upon the whole concept of the republic and the activities of the popes as treason. Should the empire ever retrieve its power in Italy the republic would be destroyed and the pope subject to prosecution under the lex maiestatis.

Circumstances, however, favored the papacy and the confirmation of papal independence; for Greek attempts to regain control in Italy could not be pursued by force of arms. Throughout the period of Pope Paul's pontificate, and even later, a series of major wars waged by the emperor against the Bulgars, interspersed by raids sustained from Arab forces, and internal difficulties over the religious question insured that the Byzantine Empire would be unable to muster up any kind of a sizeable force to send to Italy or devote more than a passing interest to events there.<sup>6</sup> Hence the chief instrument of Byzantine policy in Italy was the attempted subversion of those around the pope.

In the early period of Paul's pontificate the seditious activity of the agents of the basileus was directed primarily at weakening the position of the papacy through subversion of the Lombards on the one hand and of Roman citizens on the other.

The failure of Greek negotiations with Pepin in 757 opened the way for a Byzantine attempt to seduce Desiderius into acting militarily on behalf of the emperor and attacking

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<sup>6</sup> Theophanis Chronographia, a.m. 6254-6267, pp. 871-906. Nicephorus Breviarum Historicum, pp. 975b-986a.

Rome or the republic. Thus, George, the imperial agent, attempted to engage Desiderius in an anti-Roman coalition in 758. Though the coalition did not effect quite what it had been designed to do from the imperial point of view, Pope Paul was undoubtedly correct in assuming that its goal was to secure a Lombard attack on Rome, Ravenna and the Pentapolis.<sup>7</sup> Desiderius, however, was interested only in support for reducing Otranto, where the Duke of Benevento had taken refuge. Inasmuch as Desiderius realized that full cooperation with Constantinople would entail another, possibly final, Frankish invasion of his land and a subsequent end of his rule, this coalition was short-lived, being broken by the withdrawal of the Lombard once he had achieved his object in respect of the rebellious duchies. On the other hand, though the Greeks had spoken of an imperial army to be sent to Italy for an attack on the republic,<sup>8</sup> it is to be doubted that such an army would have materialized. Had George been able to hold the alliance together the republic would have been attacked, but only by Lombard forces. Desiderius undoubt-

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<sup>7</sup> Codicis Carolini Epistolae, Ep. XV (no. 16 -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2339), pp. 74-75.

<sup>8</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XVII (no. 18, Quotiens perspicua -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2341), p. 515: "Cum quo [George] nefariae clam locutus est, iniens cum eo consilium atque suas imperatori dirigens litteras, adhortans eum, ut suos imperiales divigat exercitus in hanc Italiam provinciam. Et ipse Desiderius cum universo Langobardorum populo professus est, Deo sibi contrario, auxilium prelati imperialibus exercitibus impertire, quatenus -- ex una parte ipse imperatoris exercitus et ex alia isdem Desiderius cum universo Langobardorum populo -- utrique imperator, quod Dominus non permittat, adimplere valeat in quodcumque voluerit voluntatem."

edly realized that George's intent was to use Lombard arms to pursue his master's policy in the grand tradition of Byzantine diplomacy, and it may be doubted whether he took the coalition seriously at any time, except as a means of reducing Otranto.

Simultaneously with the attempt to obtain the aid of Desiderius George worked to infiltrate the papal curia itself in hopes of causing unrest, distrust and even revolution in Rome. It has been argued that the disputed election of 757, in which Theophylact the deacon was supported for the papal office by a minority party, represented the conflict of the aims of the curial pro-independence party with an undefined element disposed to return to the pastoral care of the Thirteenth Apostle.<sup>9</sup> Regardless of whether the argument in respect of Theophylact's candidature may be sustained, it is possible that such an imperial party existed in Rome, though its size and composition may never be defined. The momentous step of openly abandoning the allegiance to Byzantium, the presence of men of eastern origin in the curia, and the fact that George enjoyed some success in his efforts are all suggestive of the presence of such a group. It is not possible to discover whether or not George had any part in promoting the candidature of Theophylact in 757, but his work was probably begun soon after that. Given the presence of a willing fifth column within the city, his efforts must have had some effect.

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<sup>9</sup> Diehl, Études sur l'administration, p. 232. Theophylact would have been "...un pontife sûrement dévoué à la cour byzantine, et disposé à remettre aux mains de l'empereur les territoires conquis à l'église par la politique de son prédécesseur."

In 759 Paul reported to Pepin that he had discovered that Marinus, the Cardinal Priest of S. Chrysogonus, had been involved in plotting with the imperial agent and that certain letters from Constantine V were proof thereof.<sup>10</sup> Though Marinus was in Francia, he was there as a papal representative and this raises the question of whether Greek policy after the failure of open negotiations with Pepin in 757 were directed toward a subtle anti-Roman propaganda at Pepin's court of which Marinus was the instrument.

Attempts at sedition in Italy seem to have born no worthwhile fruit. Though we can be certain of none of the details of the affair of Marinus, we may be sure that the detection of his disaffection rendered the plot ineffective and ruined a good deal of George's work.

Finding that the Lombard king had not been really won to the alliance and seeing that George's effectiveness against Rome had been impaired, the emperor adopted a new mode of dealing with Italy. In 759-760 rumors of an impending attack on the maritime cities of the eastward coast of central Italy began to circulate.<sup>11</sup> From the Archbishop of Ravenna, the

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<sup>10</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXV (no. 20, Omnino compertum -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2352), p. 529: "Omnino compertum habet vestra...excellencia, qualiter marinus...iniqua operatione contra sanctam Dei ecclesiam fidemque othodoxam, Deo sibi contrario, cum Georgio quodam imperiale a secretis consilia contra sedis nostrae contraria et vestrae simili modo ingeri cupiens. Quod quidem et isdem imperator vestrae a Deo protecte excellentiae per suas innotuit litteras."

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXX (no. 21, Praecelsae et a Deo I -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2357), p. 536: "...coniunxit ad nos...quod...Greci...super nos et Ravennantium partes intruere cupiunt atque motionem facere."

pope's deputy governor in the east, Paul received two letters, threatening such an invasion: one from the emperor and the other from Roman sympathizers in Venice.<sup>12</sup> By the spring of 760 adequate measures for the defense of the coast had been attained through Roman-Lombard coordination arranged diplomatically by Pepin.<sup>13</sup> The invasion, however, never materialized and it is doubtful that it would have done so even had adequate measures for defense not been taken. Given the embattled condition of the Byzantine Empire in the east it is hardly likely that an army could have been spared for Italy. An invasion of Italy could not, in 760, be made with the same impunity that it could have been made thirty years previously; despite whatever separated Desiderius and the pope the influence of Pepin would have assured Lombard resistance to an imperial army, and in the event of real danger a Frankish force would also have opposed the Greeks. To fight in Italy now would have been to fight the West! The empire simply did not possess the resources to get caught up in such

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXI (no. 22, Praecelsae et a Deo II -- Jaffe-Wattenbach, 2358), p. 537: "...suscepisse nos...syllabas a...Sergio archiepiscopo Ravennate, quas Leo [sic] imperiali eius sanctitati Ravennarum provincia visus est direxisse.... Exemplar denique epistole saecretae, directae a quibusdam fidelibus Veneticis...Sergio archiepiscopo, simul et ex litteris quas isdem sanctissimus vir nobis direxit...."

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXVIII (no. 23, Dum tanto vestrae -- Jaffe-Wattenbach, 2369), p. 551: "...eo quod convenit inter nos et eundem Langobardorum regem, ut pariter nos in Ravennantium urbe praesentare studeamus ad perficiendas quasdam utilitates...sanctae nostrae ecclesiae, et pertractandum pro Grecorum malitia, quid cotidie imminet in ipsam Ravennatem ingredi civitatem."



a business and indeed never would. This being the case the rumors of 759-760 are exposed for what they were -- mere noise. Constantine V was simply attacking Paul's nervous system. Nothing else demonstrates so well the bankruptcy of imperial western policy in the early 760's.

Toward the end of Paul's pontificate a much more carefully considered and much more impressive threat to Paul's security was mounted by the basileus. Paul's greatest strength was the solidity of the alliance between himself and Pepin. That alliance was based essentially on a religious feeling. Had not Pepin himself testified to George that he acted for love of no man, but for St. Peter.<sup>14</sup> If Pepin's regard for St. Peter and Rome's religious position was the basis of the papacy's strength, then the subversion of that regard would be the key to the papacy's vulnerability. The goal of Constantine's new policy then, was the religious disaffection of Pepin. To achieve such a disaffection it was necessary to introduce a ground of dispute between Rome and Pepin. By definition this would be a dogmatic question. Such a question lay easy to hand in iconoclasm. Thus during Paul's pontificate there was considerable Greek effort to enlist Pepin to the cause of iconoclasm. In late 762 or early 763 Paul reported the rumored approach of a legation of six patricians bound

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<sup>14</sup> Vita Stephani II, p. 453.

first for Rome and then for Francia.<sup>15</sup> It has been argued, and the argument is plausible, that this Greek legation marks the opening of the negotiations which culminated in the Synod of Gentilly in 767.<sup>16</sup> Paul recognized the dimensions of the threat posed by these new negotiations and therefore from the first he took part in them, so that when Pepin's response was sent Paul participated in it and in all future dealings on the subject. Thus, in 763 a joint mission was sent to Constantinople by Pepin and Pope Paul in response to Constantine's overture.<sup>17</sup> It is not known exactly what matters were discussed in Constantinople during the time the legations were there. It is to be assumed, however, that iconoclasm was the major subject. The work of the mission in Constantinople appears to have taken considerable time and the mission does not seem to have returned before 765.<sup>18</sup> In order to facilitate

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<sup>15</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XX (no. 32, A Deo institute -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2345), p. 521: "...intimassa nobis...quod sex patricii...in hac Romana urbe absoluti a regia urbe ad nos properantur. Quid eos velle acturos aut pro qua diriguntur causa, rei veritatem ignoramus; hoc tantum nobis nuntiatum est, quod ad nos progredi et vestram...."

<sup>16</sup> Kehr, p. 125: "...dass dieser aber kein feindseliger war, lehrt die ruhige Haltung des Papstes und die weitere Angabe dass diese Byzantiner, wie man melde, nach Rom bestimmt seien um von dort weiter nach dem Frankenreiche zu gehen.... Vielleicht aber war sie die Veranlassung, dass nun ihrerseits König Pippin und Papst Paul Gesandte nach Constantinople sandten."

<sup>17</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXVIII (no. 35, Praemissis nostris -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2355), p. 533.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., Epp. XXIX (no. 37, Eximiae et a Deo -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2356), et XXXVII (no. 38, Votiva cordis -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2364), pp. 534, 549.

the success of negotiations on the religious question Constantine may have begun to attack the credibility of the pope in order to cause Pepin to entertain doubts which might influence him on the main question. Reports reached Pepin's ears that Paul was in some way deceiving him and in 764 Paul protested to Pepin that unidentified parties were lying to Pepin about Paul and maligning him.<sup>19</sup> Similarly the papal charge that 'enemies' were reported operating in Ravenna<sup>20</sup> reflects, perhaps, another sort of imperial sedition. The attempts seem to have been without effect. The returning legations were accompanied by a Greek legation. Pope Paul instructed Pepin to keep both the Greeks and the Romans with him until he was able to gather a synod to hear the arguments and to decide upon them.<sup>21</sup> While the legations waited for the synod to meet the negotiations continued, but the prospects of success for the Greek cause diminished as the Greek negotiators were unable to gain private access to Pepin.<sup>22</sup> The

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, Ep. XXIX (no. 37, *Eximiae et a Deo* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2356), p. 534: "...per vestros vobis fuisse nuntiatum legatos, quod a quibusdam malignis et mendacium proferentibus in istis partibus divulgatum esset, quia si aliqua nobis necessitas eveniret, nullum nobis auxilium prebere valuissetis."

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 535.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, Ep. XXXVII (no. 38, *Votiva cordis* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2364), p. 549: "...eos [Greeks] apud vos esse detentos, interim quod, aggregatis vestris sacerdotibus atque obtimatis...."

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, Ep. XXXVI (no. 39, *Cum regalis* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2363), p. 544: "...eos [Greeks] pro amore...beati Petri nequaquam suscipi aut illis respondi adquiescentes absque nostrorum missuum praesentia...."

arguments were simply made in Pepin's presence so that he acted essentially as an arbiter of orthodoxy. It may be considered a measure of the failure of the Greeks that at this stage of the negotiations they once more resorted to attempting to impeach Paul's credibility by implying that he was a puppet of his primicerius.<sup>23</sup> There is small doubt that by 766 Pepin had come to his decision and that the Greeks had failed.<sup>24</sup> In 767 the formal discussions were heard at the Synod of Gentilly. If the formal acts of the synod were ever published, and we may assume that they were, they have not survived. The only records we possess concerning the synod are several brief descriptions in the Frankish annals. These tell us only that Pepin held a synod at which the questions of icons and the trinity were discussed between the Greeks and the Romans at Gentilly.<sup>25</sup> That the matter finally went against the

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 546: "Nam illud in ipsis suis apicibus adseruit: quod dilectus filius noster, Christophorus primicerius et consiliarius, sine nostra auctoritate, nobis quasi ignorantibus, suggestiones illas, quas sepius ei direximus, fecisset et alias pro aliis eius ac vestris missis relegisset."

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 545: "Direxistis siquidem nobis per eadem vestra scripta significantes, quod nulla suasionem blandimenta vel promissionum copia vos possit avellere ab amore et fidei promissione, quam beato Petro...polliciti estis; sed in ea ipsa vos caritate et sponsionis fide fine tenus fore permansuros."

<sup>25</sup> Annales Einhardi, a. 767, p. 25: "Orta quaestione de sancta trinitate et de sanctorum imaginibus inter orientalem et occidentalem ecclesiam, id est Romanos et Grecos, rex Pippinus conventu in Gentiliaco villa congregato synodum de ipsa quaestione habuit." The discussion seems to have attracted notice from other quarters as well. Late in Paul's period he received a letter which he forwarded to Pepin from Cosmas Patriarch of Alexandria, expressing concern lest oriental heresy endanger orthodoxy. Codex Carolinus, Ep. XL (no. 41, *quia spiritus* -- Jaffe-Wattenbach, 2370), pp. 552-553.

Greeks is evidenced by a last ditch effort to save the day by introducing the ex filioque question to offset Roman victory in the matter of icons.<sup>26</sup>

With the Synod of Gentilly the problems of Paul's relations with the empire ended. All imperial policies seeking Paul's destruction had failed.

Greek power died in central Italy in 730. The pontificate of Paul was merely a confirmation of that fact. The Greeks had lost their position and would never regain it. By the time of Paul the Greeks were looked upon simply as a hostile power and in this the attitude of Paul was no different from that of his predecessor.

Greek policy toward Italy and the papacy was secondary to the main interest of the emperor. No real expenditure of imperial energy or treasure could be made to secure imperial goals and consequently the sort of policy alternatives open in regard of the papacy were limited. In all cases but one the policies of the emperor were unsound. His first approach to Pepin was based on ignorance of the relationship between Paul and Pepin. His attempt to persuade Desiderius to fight for him was not new. In fact, it might be argued that it failed partly because it had been tried too often and consequently Desiderius realized that it was a trick to get him to take the blows for the emperor's profit. Here too it may be argued that a correct evaluation of Desiderius' position would indi-

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<sup>26</sup> Hefele-Leclercq, III, 11, 726.

cate that he could not be used. The only well conceived Greek policy was that of converting Pepin to iconoclasm -- but here too the voice of the papacy in matters of dogma was underestimated in Constantinople.

With respect to Pepin it must be recognized that his interest in the Greeks was slight. His policy toward Italy did not allow alliance with them and their heresy made such an alliance improbable at any rate. He preferred of course to avoid conflict with them but they posed him no threat in any case.

The fear of the Greeks felt in Rome was great, but that threat was overestimated. Paul clearly overestimated them in the period 758-760 and became panicky because of it. However, in the negotiations between 762 and 767 Paul seems to have played a master hand. By insisting upon inclusion in all negotiations and not allowing the Greeks to gain secret access to Pepin he guarded well against defeat. On the other hand, it must be admitted that he had the advantage at all times. He was, so to speak, on home ground, and he had the sympathies of Pepin.

Between 756 and 767 the emperor was brought to a full realization of what had transpired in Italy. He came to understand that the alliance of Rome and Pepin was not a mercenary alliance and he may even have come to understand the Lombard position vis-à-vis the alliance. Greek power over Rome was dead, and now even the Greeks realized it, but not till imperial emissaries saluted Charles as basileus in 812 would they officially acquiesce and recognize reality.

## CHAPTER X

### THE ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION

Pepin had obligated himself to the pope in 754 in more than one way. While he promised in some fashion to subdue Aistulf and accomplish the restoration of the exarchate to Stephen II, he had also accepted the office of patricius Romanorum and had permitted the same title to be imposed upon his sons. The treaties of 755 and 756 did not, then, suffice to quit him of his duties in regard of Rome. As an officer of the Roman state Pepin was permanent protector and agent of the Holy Father and at his death his sons should in their turn perform the office and services of the patriciate. But the office of patrician had never been defined in more than a vague and general way. Such being the case the nature of the office and the extension of its powers and prerogatives should naturally evolve as practice and circumstance should demand. The alliance upon which the patriciate was based was also an undefined one. No instrument of international law establishing and defining the alliance existed and the tripartite treaties of 755 and 756 could only define the alliance in an indirect fashion. Thus, for instance, it was understood that Pepin should stand as guarantor for the Lombard's per-

formance of the terms of the agreements. After the flurry of activity ceased in 756 it was inevitable that the nature of the office and the alliance should be worked out in greater clarity. It is understandable that Paul should have attempted to develop and define the role of Pepin as patricius Romanorum and place the office and the man in a defined position in the hierarchy of Christian society. Likewise it was unavoidable that the nature of Paul's dependence upon Pepin should further define the relative positions of Paul and Pepin. While the working out the nature of the alliance and office was assuredly not complete in 767, the pattern had already begun to be established which led eventually to a complete metamorphosis of the arrangements envisaged by Stephen II, and to the coronation in 800 of Charles the Great.

The most obvious contrast between the pontificate of Paul and his brother Stephen II is the absence of Frankish military action in Italy during the pontificate of Paul. To the casual eye this might seem to evidence a cooling off of the alliance and many have taken the military inactivity of Pepin in Italy as a sign of inactivity per se in regard of Italy. Some have even concluded that following his two Italian expeditions Pepin felt a disinclination to exert himself any further on behalf of those tricky priests.<sup>1</sup> To assert such a view, however, would be to reveal a lack of understanding of

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<sup>1</sup> See E. A. Freeman, Western Europe in the Eighth Century and Onward (London, 1904), p. 203, Passow, pp. 499-501 and Rodenberg, p. 105.



the alliance created in 754 and would demonstrate a too casual study of the events of 757-767.

Pope Paul I continued without hesitation the policy of his brother in regard of the Frankish alliance and his correspondence with Pepin demonstrates that neither he nor the Romans had any doubts as to Pepin's obligations under the alliance. The fact of that obligation and the nature of it found frequent mention in Paul's letters to Francia. Pepin was the patricius Romanorum, pledged at the risk of his eternal soul to the defense of the pope, the church and the republic. In nearly every letter Pepin was verbosely reminded of his promise to Pope Stephen II and St. Peter. Paul told Pepin that he intended to remain true to the alliance between them just as his brother had been, until the end, which is to say, Pepin's obligations should not be allowed to lapse.<sup>2</sup>

Pepin was constantly addressed in the most complimentary terms as the most excellent, most Christian, and most powerful king, protected by God. Paul and Pepin were "joined by the bonds of a spiritual union".<sup>3</sup> The penalty for non-performance of his promises was often hinted at to Pepin as Paul

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<sup>2</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XII (no. 12, Cum gravi gemitu -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2336), p. 508: "...pacis foedera, quae praelatus beatissime memoriae dominus et germanus meus, sanctissimus pontifex, vobiscum confirmavit, permanentes et cum nostro populo permanabimus usque in finem."

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., Ep. XIV (no. 15, Lator praesentium -- Jaffe-Wattenbach, 2338), p. 511: "Interea, christianissime, Dei providentia victor rex, gemina festivitatis peregrinus gaudia in eo, quod, optata cordis adepti desideria...in vinculo spiritualis foederis pariter sumus adnexi."

noted that St. Peter, to whom Pepin had made his promises, was the keeper of the keys of heaven. It was this same Peter, Pepin was often reminded, to whom, along with Stephen II, Pepin owed his own crown and royal name.<sup>4</sup> The constant theme of the pope was that Pepin was the defender and helper of the Roman church, that same Roman church which was Pepin's spiritual mother and the chief among all the churches.<sup>5</sup>

The relationship of Pepin and the papacy as originally established under Stephen II in 754 was based on a relatively undefined idea that Pepin was, as patrician, an officer of the church. Under the aegis of Paul I the curial idea of Pepin's role becomes much more well defined and exalted. Through a close study of the correspondence of Paul in the Codex Carolinus it is possible to see that an idea was emerging in the curia of the role of Pepin as defensor ecclesiae. That Pepin got his post by election of the pope and for practical reasons was passed over. Rather Pepin was lauded as the divinely appointed defender and helper of the church.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXI (no. 33, Cum maximo -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2347), p. 523: "Quod quidem nos, dum cor...vestre in manu Dei est et divina benedictione sanctae unctionis gratia per apostolum eius et regni caelorum clavigerum, beatum Petrum, in regem...esse dinosceris unctus,...in ea ipsa caritate et dilectione adque promissione, quam caelestis regni ianitori spondere studuistis, vos firmiter esse permensurum...."

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXVII (no. 3, Votiva cordis -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2364), p. 549: "...sacrosanctae spiritalis matris vestrae...caput omnium ecclesiarum Dei...."

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., Ep. XIII (no. 13, Si interius mente), p. 510: "...post Deum noster...defensor et auxiliator...."

Indeed, God had predestined Pepin from his mother's womb to be both king and defender of the church.<sup>7</sup> It was God who commanded that Pepin rule and who committed the protection of the church to him.<sup>8</sup> By analogy it is inferred that God predestined Pepin and his sons to guard the church just as he sent Moses to the Israelites in the midst of their lamentations and just as he sent Joshua and David to lead his people.<sup>9</sup> The lords of Francia were equated with the 'new Moses'

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., Ep. XVI (no. 17, *Dum tam copiosam* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2340), p. 513: "Etenim,...quoniam Deus omnipotens ex utero matris tuae te predestinatum habens, ideo te benedicens et in regum ungens, defensorem te et liberatorem sanctae suae ecclesiae constituit...."

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXVI (no. 39, *Cum regalis* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2363), p. 544: "...dominus Deus noster, qui vos regnare iussit et sanctam suam ecclesiam ad defendam vobis commisit ...."

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXIII (no. 26, *Olim omnipotens* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2360), pp. 539-540: "Olim omnipotens Deus, cernens populi sui Israelitici lamentationem et impiam ab aegyptiis illis infertam obpressionem, misertus est eis, mittens farulum suum Moysen, per quem, signa et prodigia exercens, eundem suum eripuit populum; et per eum legem illis institutens, ad optatem eos illis perduxit requiem. Cui etiam Iosue, ut praeliaretur bella domini, adnectit atque alios sui divini nominis cultores eis concessit auxiliares. Sed in omnibus illis non ita complacuit eius divina maiestas, sicut in David rege et propheta, testante eodem misericordissimo Deo nostro in id quod ait: 'Inveni David servum meum secundum cor meum, in oleo sancto unxi eum', cui et regnum et semini eius in aeternum gloriose tribuit possidendum. Sic enim, praecellentissimi atque nobilissimi filii, a Deo instituti reges, isdem dominus Deus noster...in utero matris vos sanctificans, ad tam magnum regale provexit culmen,...et oleo sancto vos vestrumque praecellentissimum genitorem unguens celestibus replevit benedictionibus et sanctam suam catholicam et apostolicam ecclesiam atque orthodoxam christianorum fidem vobis commisit exaltandum atque viriliter defendendam." The first words on the theme of Old Testament kingship were put forward by Pope Zachary and Pope Stephen II in a tentative fashion, but the first full development of the idea in its various aspects was due to Paul I.

and the 'new David'.<sup>9</sup> Just as Moses relieved the Israelites of their oppressions, so Pepin the 'new Moses' was inspired by God to relieve the oppression of the church.<sup>10</sup> As God legislated through Moses on Sinai for the redemption of the Hebrews, so God through Pepin redeems the church.<sup>11</sup> As Moses destroyed the abomination and cult of demons, so Pepin repulsed heresy and the authors of impious dogma.<sup>12</sup> The Franks are a holy nation and a royal priesthood.<sup>13</sup> In effect, then,

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXIX (no. 27, Considerantibus nobis -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2368), p. 552: "Novus quippe Moyses novusque David in omnibus operibus suis effectus est christianissimus et a Deo protectus filius et spiritalis compater, dominus Pippinus, Dei nutu victoriosissimus rex, per quem exaltata Deo ecclesia triumphat et fides catholica ab hereticorum telo inlibata consistit."

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., Ep. XLII (no. 40, Dum divina -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2372), p. 554: "Dum divina Scripturarum istoricarum in nostro memoriale revolvimus et diversorum Dei electorum merita perpendimus, et vestra divinae inspirationis studia in nostrae mentis intuitu conferentes, novum te Moysen in his diebus refulsisse, praecellentissimi filii et spiritalis compater, comperimus. Ille quidem, ut Israeliticum populum ex affligentium eveneret obpressionibus, a divina maiestate praecepta suscepti; tu quoque, praecellentissime atque eximiae rex, ad liberandum sanctam universalem catholicam et apostolicam Dei ecclesiam divinitus es inspiratus."

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. "Per illum denique Dominus in monte Sina legis mandata eidem Ebraico populo observanda tradidit et lumine cum claritatis suae inlustravit; per te quoque redemptor noster, Dei hominumque mediator, ecclesiae suae et universo populo Christiano eius pretioso redempto sanguine pacem tribuit et eius fidei orthodoxe perfectam contulit defensionem."

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 555: "...et sicut isdem Moyses legislator abominaciones gentium et culturam demonum exterminavit, ita et tu,...hereticorum schisma et auctores impij dogmatis respuisti."

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXIX (no. 27, Considerantibus nobis -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2368), p. 552: "Et vos quidem, carissimi, 'gens sancta, regale sacerdotium, populus acquisitionis', cui benedixit dominus Deus Israel...."

the Vicar of God on earth, the binder and looser on earth and in heaven, was making this German war-lord his equal and even his superior! As a 'new Moses' and a 'new David' Pepin, too, was God's vicar; he ruled with Paul over the City of God as God's representative. Indeed, while Paul held his post only through mundane election by men, Pepin held his through divine election by God!

As the sons of Pepin were obligated as patricians just as their father and since the future security of the papacy demanded continuation of the alliance after Pepin's death, Paul studiously cultivated his relationship with the family of Pepin, seeking to guarantee the future of the alliance with indissoluble bonds of love and friendship. At Pepin's request he was god-father to Giselle, born to Pepin and Bertrada in 757,<sup>14</sup> and in 759 he requested that he be allowed the honor of baptising another new born member of the royal family, Pepin's namesake.<sup>15</sup> The pope evinced constant solicitude for Bertrada, the 'most excellent and God-fearing daughter and spiritual co-mother' and Pepin's 'most beloved children'. Indeed, he held out to Pepin the hope that his seed should remain till the end of the world as rulers of Francia.<sup>16</sup> This

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., Ep. XIV (no. 15, *Lator praesentium* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2338), p. 511.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., Ep. XVIII (no. 19, *Solet epistularis* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2343), p. 519: "Unde obnixte te petimus, ut a sacratissimo baptismatis lavacro eundem eximium vestrum filium suscipere mereamur...."

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., Ep. XVII (no. 18, *Quotiens perspicua* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2341), p. 517: "Semen vestrum splendissimum usque in finem mundi eodem regni fruatur culmen."

desire to have as close a friendship as possible with the family led the pope to be ever concerned for their welfare. In 763 when a campaign led into Aquitaine by Pepin was endangered by the desertion of Tassilo, Duke of Bavaria, Paul anxiously asked after Pepin's safety, having heard bad news.<sup>17</sup> And when he learned of Pepin's safety he wrote to Pepin of his great joy.<sup>18</sup>

Aside from generalized expressions of the greatness of this family and concern over them Paul desired the continuity of the alliance with the Arnulfing dynasty after Pepin's death. This led Paul to try to cultivate with special care the older sons of Pepin. He clearly viewed Charles and Carlomann as obligated to the church on the same basis as their

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<sup>17</sup> Annales Nettienses, a. 763, p. 52. Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXVII (no. 34, Quotiens fidelium -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2354), p. 531: "Etenim, dum huius evoluti temporis spatio -- quod nos nec vestrae sospitatis relationem meruimus suscipere nec ventus agnoscere, quid erga vos ageretur vel qualiter in itinere quo profecti estis, peregistis, nimis anxietatis fervore desiderii nostri affectio in hoc ipsud addiscendum sedule provocatur, presertim dum et a nostris vestrisque inimicis adversa nobis de ipsis partibus adnuntiantur. Unde desiderium magnum nobis inheret, vestrae sospitatis gaudia addiscere et vestris salutaribus profectibus gratulari et contra inimicorum contritionem agnoscere. Pro quo quaesumus, ut certos nos, sicut desideramus, per vestros nuntios de vestra prosperitate et laetitiae reddere iubeatis quoniam vestra salus nostra est prosperitate et vestra exaltatio nostrum procul dubio est gaudium et immensa securitas."

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXVIII (no. 35, Fraemissis nostris -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2355), p. 532: "...ut noster animus maxima iocunditatis exultet laetitiae; quoniam nimio desiderio fervescimus, vestram sedule addiscere sospitatem et de vestro gaudio exultare; quoniam vestra salus exaltatio est sanctae matris vestrae ecclesiae et prosperitas vestra nostra esse probatur laetitiae." Somewhat later Paul interceded on Tassilo's behalf to try to bring peace between him and Pepin, Ibid., Ep. XXXVI (no. 39, Cum regalis -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2363), pp. 545-546. The attempt failed.

father, and in his letters he always referred to them as patricians of the Romans. On several occasions he addressed letters to the brothers, linking them with their father in praise, complimenting them on their behaviour and praying for their prosperity and aid for the church.<sup>19</sup> Paul was clearly anxious to instill in the minds of these young men a notion of the responsibility of their position and a desire to discharge it with honor and dedication.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., Epp. XXXIII (no. 26, Olim omnipotens -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2360), XXXV (no. 30, Quanto decoris -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2362), XXVI (no. 36, Nissam relationem -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2353), pp. 530-531, 539-540, 543.

<sup>20</sup> Paul's success in this regard was only partial. In 769 there seems to have been some sort of quarrel between the two young kings, Annales Regni Francorum, a. 769, p. 28. In the next year the dowager, Queen Bertrada, went off to Italy to make peace with the Lombards and arranged a marriage alliance with the Lombards for Charles, Annales Einhardi, a. 770, p. 31, cf. Codex Carolinus, Ep. XLV (no. 47, Dum omnium -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2381), pp. 560-563. Then in 771 the papacy underwent a violent revolution and an accommodation with Desiderius was made. It would seem that after the divisio of 768 a Frankish party opposed to Pepin's Italian policy and represented by Queen Bertrada attained an influence over Charles and got him to seek peace with Desiderius, Martin Lintzel, "Karl der Grosse und Karlmann", HZ, CXL (1929), 8-12. Carlomann, however, was opposed to this course and refused to abandon his father's policies, Ibid., p. 12. By 771 Charles, the pope and Desiderius had reached a position of understanding and Carlomann was isolated. This precipitated the murder of Christopher and the Lombard control over Rome was achieved in that year. At this point the alliance seemed wrecked and the Italian situation to have reverted to a more normal situation, but in the same year Carlomann died and Charles usurped his heirs' rights causing them to flee to Desiderius, Annales Regni Francorum, a. 771, p. 32. In 772 the papacy came into strong hands once more and Hadrian I renewed the policy of the alliance. In a stroke the situation as of 767 had been restored. Desiderius had overreached himself by espousing the cause of Carlomann's heirs and the affair of 771 had shown Charles that Desiderius was getting too powerful. If a balance was to be held in Italy the papacy had to be supported. The alliance went back into operation and within two years Desiderius was destroyed.

The work of the church performed by Pepin and expected of Charles and Carlomann was of such importance, and because of this importance so meritorious, that for Pepin there could be no suitable earthly reward -- only God could repay him.<sup>21</sup> His credits were piling up in heaven and a regal crown awaited him.<sup>22</sup> The names of Pepin and his sons would be inscribed with those of David, Solomon and the other saints in the Kingdom of Heaven.<sup>23</sup>

If Paul exalted Pepin and the Arnulfing family he did not lack words of praise for the entire Frankish people. Since the race of the Franks under the Arnulfings fulfilled the commands of God at Paul's behest, they would be rewarded with earthly prowess and dominion, for Pepin would be made the victor over all barbarian nations.<sup>24</sup> God extended his hand

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<sup>21</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXII (no. 28, Ad referendas -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2348), p. 525: "...neque praemiorum huius mundi ad horum remunerationem digna vobis possunt rependi; verumtamen est...Deus, qui iusta caelestis regni gaudia et victoriae triumphum impertire ac retribuere excellentiae vestrae potest."

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., Ep. XLIII (no. 43, Explere verbis -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2373), p. 557: "...tu...de quo iam repositam sibi in celestibus arcibus praemiorum credat consequi remunerationem." Ibid., Ep. XXXI (no. 22, Praecelsae et a Deo II -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2358), p. 537: "...quatenus repositam sibi in caelestibus regni coronam mercedis a domino Deo nostro percipere mereatur." Ibid., Ep. XXXV (no. 30, Quanto decoris -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2362), p. 543: "...sicut in praesenti vita regalem vobis concessit dignitatem, ita quoque et caelestia vobis conferat praemiorum gaudia."

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXIII (no. 26, Olim omnipotens -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2360), p. 540: "...et cum David et Salemane regibus...vestra in caelestibus regnis adscripta sunt nomina." Ibid., Ep. XLIII (no. 43, Explere verbis -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2373), p. 557: "Unde merito,...cum egregio illo ac praecipuo David rege et eximio prophetarum in celestibus regnis participem te esse...."



over Pepin, his family and the whole kingdom of the Franks and he gives them victory and will cause their enemies to fall before them.<sup>25</sup> As spiritual immortality rewards individuals who served God, earthly immortality would accrue to this people and the kingdom of the Franks would be conserved until the end of time.<sup>26</sup>

The policy of maintaining as close a contact with Pepin as possible was also pursued by more tangible methods. Paul maintained constant contact with Pepin through frequent visits of his missi and the maintenance of resident legates in Francia. Wilcharius, Bishop of Nomentum, was sent to Francia in 758 and except for a trip to Rome in 759 he seems to have stayed there until 760. George, Bishop of Ostia, was sent to Francia in 758 and stayed indefinitely. Peter, possibly a Cardinal priest, was sent in 760 and also stayed indefinitely, and it may also be assumed that Marinus was serving as resident legate in Francia.<sup>27</sup>

Other means of cementing affection adopted by Pope Paul

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., Ep. XVII (no. 18, Quotiens perspicua -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2341), p. 516: "...victorem te super omnes barbaras nationes faciat."

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXII (no. 28, Ad referendas -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2348), p. 526: "Deus autem omnipotens de throno suae maiestatis super vos regnumque vestrum atque amantissimam coniugem...vestros quidem carnales natos...nec non et super universum Francorum populum respicere digneretur et sui brachii dexteram super vos extendat atque victorias vobis de caelo concedat omnesque adversarios ante faciem vestram prosternat ...."

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXXVII (no. 38, Votiva cordis -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2364), p. 548.

<sup>27</sup> See Appendix E.

were the ceding of Mt. Soracte to Pepin,<sup>28</sup> the dedication of St. Petronilla's tomb to the Franks,<sup>29</sup> and the gift of relics to Frankish religious houses as a mark of gratitude and friendship.<sup>30</sup> He also dedicated in Rome a church of St. Denis. St. Denis was a church of which "the name evokes an event of capital importance in the history of the eighth century: the journey of Stephen II to Francia".<sup>31</sup> Its dedication was "truly a monument to the alliance" and a "'memorial of the foundation of the young Roman state'".<sup>32</sup> St. Denis was the patron saint of the Franks and the dedication of this church in Rome was thus a mark of honor which is especially meaningful in those circumstances.

The pope thus followed a careful policy of cultivating understanding and friendship with the Franks, by diplomacy, gesture and word. This much is obvious and undeniable. On the other hand, however, some have questioned whether this policy was successful. It has been argued that Pepin knew nothing of Stephen II's plans to create a state and did not expect him to demand what he did and that after 756 Pepin felt that he had been duped by Stephen and had decided to

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXIII (no. 31, *Salubri providentia* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2349), pp. 526-527.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., Ep. XIV (no. 15, *Lator praesentium* -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2338), pp. 511-512.

<sup>30</sup> Annales Fuldenses, a. 765, MGH, SS, I, ed. F. H. Pertz (Hannover, 1826), p. 347.

<sup>31</sup> Baumont, p. 11: "Le nom évoquait l'événement capital dans l'histoire de la papauté du VIII<sup>e</sup> siècle: le voyage d'Etienne II en France."

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. "...vraiment un 'monument de l'alliance'...un 'memorial de la fondation du jeune état romain'".

have nothing more to do with the pope.<sup>33</sup> Nothing could be further from the truth. The state in question was already in existence and Pepin himself became an officer of it. What was demanded of him was what he had promised. As has been argued above, the fact that Pepin made no expeditions to Italy after 756 is not significant in terms of his attitude towards the alliance. While it is true that Pepin made no further expeditions under arms to discipline the Lombards, this was due primarily to several factors quite divorced from any desire on his part to escape from the responsibilities of the alliance.

In the first place Pepin, after 756, may not have had sufficient support from his nobles to continue direct intervention in Italy. Therefore his policy had to be conducted along more cautious lines.<sup>34</sup> Secondly, there was no need to field an army in Italy in the years 757-767 since there was no danger great enough and present enough to warrant it. Desiderius had not opened hostilities against Rome and the Greek threat of invasion was never more than a rumor. Thirdly, he had too many great problems to deal with north of the Alps. In 758 a campaign in Saxony occupied his attention, and from 760 until his death he was engaged in a protracted war with Waifar, Duke of Aquitaine.<sup>35</sup> It is also reported in Lamberti

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<sup>33</sup> Rodenberg, p. 105.

<sup>34</sup> Mohr, Studien, pp. 46-47.

<sup>35</sup> Annales Regni Francorum, a. 758, 760-767, pp. 16, 18-24. Fredezarii Scholastici Continuationes, cap. 41, p. 186.

annales that the Franks suffered a defeat at Heidachaburg at the hands of some unidentified Slavic bands.<sup>36</sup> Under the circumstances Pepin could not and did not need to do more than intervene diplomatically. One ought to realize that if the need had arisen for further armed intervention to stave off an armed enemy before Rome, a Frankish host would have marched through the Alpine passes in short order! In fact such action was never needed and astute diplomacy achieved the ends of the union. Pepin approached the problem after a practical fashion, determined to fulfill his obligations to Paul yet to avoid the necessity of a military confrontation. Hence, he avoided demanding of Desiderius what Desiderius could not give. Hence, he naturally ignored the southern duchies in 758 -- their commendation was of dubious legality and unnecessary to maintain the pope's position. To have pushed the matter might have provoked real war. The fact is that Pepin and Paul enjoyed constant, close, and amicable relations.

Though the legations sent to Italy by Pepin were of short duration, they were numerous and one may be reasonably certain that a Frankish missus was nearly always with the pope. Indeed, one may gain an idea of the high importance attached to the alliance by a survey of the rank of the missi sent to Italy by Pepin -- they were all important personages. Langbard, Rodbert, Felix and Eucbald were all described as inlustri viri. Andreas and Gunderic were described as soller-

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<sup>36</sup> Lamberti Annales, a. 766, HGE, SS, III, ed. by G. F. Pertz (Hannover, 1839), p. 36.

tissimi viri. Vulfard was Abbot of St. Martin's of Tours, Widmar of St. Riquier, Droctegang of Gemeticense and Haribert of Murbacense. Gerbert was simply described as an abbot. Remedius was the Archbishop of Rouen and was the brother of Pepin. Autcharius was a duke and Dodo was a count. Conibert was simply described as a vassal of Pepin and Simeon as a monk. Michad and Immo were unidentified by the pope as to rank and Flaginus was a chaplain.<sup>37</sup>

Hence there is absolutely no ground for the assertion that Pepin avoided his commitment to Rome. Quite the contrary, he took the office of patricius Romanorum seriously and kept his promises to Stephen and St. Peter. The best evidence of this is the total lack of incrimination or threat in the correspondence of the pope. If Pepin had failed or perjured himself we may be sure that Paul would have howled his anger and disappointment and threatened Pepin instead of praising him. Hence, if Paul's letters are to be a guide then it must be concluded that Pepin satisfied Paul on all points and that the alliance was maintained in spirit and deed. Indeed, it would be facetious to assume that a man of Pepin's mold, having promised in the most solemn manner in the presence of the church's chief moral judge to serve St. Peter, would have the temerity to go back on his word, all the while believing, as he would have, that the one he so deceived had the power to damn him eternally!

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<sup>37</sup> See Appendix B.

It has been argued by various scholars that the office of patrician made Pepin the pope's constitutional superior.<sup>38</sup> This argument was previously refuted. It is, however, true that the effects of the events from 755 to 767 were such that by the end of that period the holders of the patriciate had become the masters of the pope and of the alliance. Several factors tended to lead in that direction.

First there was the fact that the papacy needed the Frankish king. The papacy was, in practical terms, the weaker party to the alliance and had to depend upon the protection and aid offered by Pepin. Though there was no constitutional or legal ground for this process, the process is in a sense a classical example of the development of legal dependency. Thus though the argument that Paul's election was conducted under Frankish auspices because Paul was Pepin's subordinate through the alliance of 754<sup>39</sup> has no validity in fact, it is nonetheless necessary to appreciate that difficulties over the election and the partisanship of some Romans for Theophylact meant that Paul needed a Frankish guarantee of his position. Immo, Pepin's missus, provided such a guarantee.<sup>40</sup> Thus the Franks, in effect, took part in the election and as guar-

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<sup>38</sup> See page 67, note 17.

<sup>39</sup> Heimbucher, pp. 42-43.

<sup>40</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XII (Cum gravi gemitu -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2336), p. 508. A curious note on the role of Immo in Rome is provided by the Benedicti Chronicon, cap. 20, p. 706 which speaks of a 759 trip of Pepin to Rome (!) where he aided in Paul's election

antor's of Paul's position acquired a de facto superiority which was not defined de iure. Having once secured the election of Pope Paul Pepin immediately acted to elicit a pledge of loyalty to Paul from the Romans.<sup>41</sup> The mere fact that the Romans attested such a pledge to Pepin indicated the degree to which he was attaining the superior position. Similarly, the external weakness of Paul and the fact that he depended absolutely on the real or implied military support of Pepin emphasized his dependence. The point is that he who must repeatedly ask aid of another is in a position inherently inferior to that of him upon whom he depends.

Second, the theological negotiations of 766-767 with the Greeks served to emphasize Paul's dependence upon Pepin. In these affairs Paul was thrust into the secondary role of waiting upon another's decision! That this should happen to one whose position entails that he claims supreme theological and dogmatic authority is doubly significant. In 766-767 Pepin was the arbiter of dogma. Indeed, he became the judge of the pope.

Third, the theoretical role developed for Pepin by Paul gave Pepin a superior position. According to this theory Pepin was the elect of God, Paul the elect of men. While Paul was the mere temporal vicar of Peter, Pepin was the fellow of Moses, David and Solomon. Indeed, the Franks were the chosen people of the new era and their king was the lord of all

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<sup>41</sup> Lamprecht, pp. 3-4.

Christian society and first among the saved.

The conditions of the alliance of 754 were thus slightly altered. While the pope spared no effort to make the alliance more secure and insure its continuity, he also created a role for the holders of the patriciate which tended to give theoretical basis to the natural course of events by which the patricians became senior partners to the alliance. Hence, by the end of Paul's pontificate the patricians were definitely the pope's mentors and a firm first step had been taken toward the creation of the full-blown ecclesiological role adopted by Charlemagne. The pontificate of Paul, then, is of utmost significance inasmuch as there emerge in 757-767 two facts of singular importance in the series of events and ideas leading to the coronation of Charlemagne in 800: the nascent ecclesiological idea of the role of the Frankish king and the unconstitutional situation by which a mere king became the mentor of the spiritual head of the West and the temporal head of the respublica Romanorum. The one made the coronation of 800 possible, the other made it necessary.



## CHAPTER XI

### THE REPUBLIC

The ecclesiastical republic of the Romans was not established overnight. There was no particular moment one can positively indicate before which there was no republic and after which there was. The idea of the state matured slowly in the curia through several pontificates. Even when the period of priest-kings was begun under Stephen II the idea of the republic was not developed to a point of clear focus, and it has been pointed out above how this open-endedness of the curial idea contributed to the historical context of the pontificate of Paul.

The republic was a vague entity and it did not know itself. Its development had been gradual and vague. Its definition of its rights was ambiguous. Its relationship to its secular protector was undefined, and it had no constitution. The government of the republic had never been consciously established and was not based on a plan of any sort -- it simply grew out of the situation. The papacy had historically exercised great influence on the secular government of Rome and Italy, and after ca. 726 the papal curia simply took over various political tasks. As the pope became more and more the head of the state the curia became the administrative body of

the secular state.<sup>1</sup> But even though a large bureaucracy had been developed, a crucial weakness characterized the govern-

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<sup>1</sup> The twenty-five cardinal priests formed a senate of sorts while the seven cardinal deacons supervised the local government, assisted by fourteen subdeacons, Duchesne, Beginnings of the temporal sovereignty, p. 62. The central administration was carried on by the primicerius and the secundarius as chief secretaries to the pope, finance was handled by the arcarius and sacellarius and justice by the nomenclator, Calisse, p. 119. The proto-scrinarius ran the chancellor's office, probably under the direction of the primicerius, Ibid. The administration of the lands of the pope was under the various regionarii, Ibid. The exercitus Romanus was commanded by the military aristocracy topped by the dukes, but after ca. 750 the office of the chief duke, the Duke of Rome, was dropped and the army came to be directly subject to the direction of the pope, Duchesne, Beginnings of the Temporal sovereignty, pp. 60-62.

One exception to the unified rule of the republic under the pope was that the area around Ravenna was run as a province. The Archbishops of Ravenna had been traditionally jealous of Rome and continually tried to escape its jurisdiction. Under Stephen II the archbishop had tried to provide for the autonomy of his province by cooperation with Aistulf after the exarchate ceased to be. Shortly after Aistulf had been defeated by Pepin and his power within Ravenna broken the citizens of Ravenna revolted against the archbishop, Sergius, and had sent him in chains to Rome to be judged and punished by the pope, De Sancto Sergio, Agnelli Liber Pontificalis Ravennatis, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH, SS. rer. Lang. (Hanover, 1878), p. 379. When Paul became pope he made an effort to solve the problem, though his success was only temporary, by making Sergius his viceroy in Ravenna and the Pentapolis, and though Sergius seems to have achieved considerable autonomy in his area, it remained part of the republic and friction between the two men came to an end. Sergius seems to have carried out Paul's orders, reported to him on conditions and otherwise to have been loyal. This may, however, have been because Paul did not pursue the matter too hard and exercised a nominal control only. Cf. Codex Carolinus, Ep. XIV (no. 15, Lator praesentium -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2338), p. 512 concerning Sergius' release and reinstatement, and also Ep. XLIX (no. 51, Pervenit ad nos -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2408), pp. 568-569 and Agnellus' life of Sergius (pp. 379-381) for the conditions of Sergius' rule in Ravenna under Paul. After Sergius died there was a disputed succession in the pontificate of Stephen III, following which Leo became the legitimate archbishop, Vita Stephani III, in Liber Pontificalis, I, 477-478. Leo pursued a more aggressive policy of autonomy and tried to escape Rome's rule under Hadrian I, Codex Carolinus, Ep. XLIX (no. 51, Pervenit ad nos -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2408), pp. 568-569.

ment: the entire stability of this administration depended upon the pope. His prestige and office alone gave the curia its mandate to govern. In other words, the especial weakness of this government was the relative non-institutionalization of power. Political power attached to the person of the pope and the necessity of an interregnum following the pope's death<sup>2</sup> meant that in a sense there was no source of power since there was no pope. The powers of the interim rulers were derived from service to a pope -- not from a constitutional right. It is during such a period of transition from one pope to another that the system was most vulnerable. It is also the case that under such a system the stability and continuity of the administration depended greatly on the character and personality of the pope.

The powers held by the pope by the time of the pontificate of Paul I were absolute. In Rome and the republic all officers were papal officers, justice was the pope's justice and the army was the pope's army.<sup>3</sup> From this situation emerged the chief danger to the papal regime: the military aristocracy which was in control of the army but which was not included in the power structure. Previously the nobles had been rulers and they had been accustomed to elect the Duke of Rome, the chief civil and military magistrate, from among

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<sup>2</sup> When the pope died the administration fell to the arch-priest, archdeacon and the primicerius, cf. C. Bayet, "Les elections pontificales sous les carolingiennes au VIII et au IX siècle", RH, XXIV (1884), 51-52.

<sup>3</sup> V. Sickel, "Die Verträge der Päpste mit den Karolingern" DZG, XI (1894), 329-330.

their own number. As the duke began to become the pope's subordinate the power of the nobles began to wane. When, after 750, the office of the duke disappeared and administration and all power in the state fell to the servants of the pope, the nobility found itself disenfranchised.<sup>4</sup>

The republic thus found itself beset by a potentially powerful, disgruntled minority, resentful of government by clerics, and this particular weakness was aggravated by another: the existence of conflicting parties within the curia. The dominant and most powerful of these parties was that which carried out the papal revolution -- those of the curia standing for independence and the concept of curial rule. The power of this party was buttressed by support from the majority of the people of Rome and the republic. Alongside it existed a group opposed to moving away from the empire and a party favoring an approach to the Lombards.

The aristocratic opposition to the curia was probably not included in any of these parties. In all likelihood the aristocracy's goal was simply to acquire power in the state -- this was to be achieved by supporting curial opposition to the revolutionaries in hopes of splitting the curia and gaining power. Even during the early years of the revolution elements of the Roman aristocracy supported the Greeks, solely in order to down the pope. Then when the Greek power was finally eclipsed they tried approaching Aistulf, hoping to use

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<sup>4</sup> Amann, p. 33.

a Lombard attack to bring down the dominant circle.<sup>5</sup>

As the alliance of 754 brought so many other basic changes in Italy's political structure, so did it radically effect the alternatives of action open to the Roman aristocracy. The creation of the alliance with the Franks meant the eclipse of aristocratic opportunity for direct action within the state, and the support of the curia by the Franks during the pontificates of Stephen II and Paul I made open opposition too dangerous. But the existence of this alliance, as it altered the conditions of Roman politics, determined the methods of future aristocratic opposition. If the papacy was too strongly supported to permit open aristocratic opposition, the only course open to the aristocracy was to attempt to control part of the curia and perhaps even to control the pope. To elect a pope as a puppet of their party became the aristocratic goal. This was tried for the first time in 757.<sup>6</sup> It has been argued that Theophylact, Paul's rival, was either pro-Greek or pro-Lombard,<sup>7</sup> but in actual fact Theophylact's

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<sup>5</sup> Benedicti Chronicon, cap. 17, p. 703: "Tunc surrexerunt viri Romani scelerati, et intimaverunt Astolfu regi, ut venirent et possiderunt Tuscie finibus et Romanum imperium usurparent." It may be this incident which is meant when a Lombard party is spoken of, cf. Leon Homo, Rome médiévale (Paris, 1956), p. 42.

<sup>6</sup> Vita Pauli, p. 463: "...populus huius Romanæ urbis divisus est; et alii cum Theophylacto archidiacono tenentes in eius domo congregati residebant....plurima pars iudicium et populi cum eo Paul tenentes quam cum predicto Theophylacto ...."

<sup>7</sup> Diehl, l'administration, p. 232. Rudolf Baxmann, Die Politik der Päpste von Gregor I bis Gregor VII, 2 Bde. (Elberfeldt, 1868), I, 251 claims that he was pro-Lombard. The possibility of that is slight, Joseph Langen, Geschichte der römischen Kirche, 4 Bde. (Sonn, 1885), II, 669n.



personal views are less important than the fact he was a possible tool of the aristocracy.<sup>8</sup> Theophylact represented no more than a small portion of either the curia or the public, while on the other hand, the revolutionary party which had brought off the creation of the alliance and the extension of the republic was likely to have enjoyed the majority of confidence and support among both the members of the curia and the non-aristocratic elements of the public. Under honest and open conditions Paul could not lose, and Immo's presence in Rome insured the election against aristocratic violence or corruption.

There has always been some confusion concerning the nature of Paul's governance of the city and the republic. Though there has been some argument that both Stephen and Paul were dominated by Christopher, who served both popes as primicerius,<sup>9</sup> this was not true. The fact that Christopher lost control of the situation in 767 as soon as Paul was dead shows that it was Paul who was the strong hand in the state, not Christopher. Indeed, Paul's rule was a harsh one; he seems to have applied heavy taxation and kept his prisons crowded, ordering many executions.<sup>10</sup> In all probability this harshness was directed chiefly at the main authors of discontent

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<sup>8</sup> Bayet, RE, XXIV (1884), 54, argues that Theophylact was the choice of the clergy, but there is no ground for such an assertion.

<sup>9</sup> E. Mayer, DZK, XIV (1904), 37.

<sup>10</sup> Barry, p. 84. Duchesne, Liber Pontificalis, I, 466n. "Le pape Paul paraît avoir gouverné durement."

-- the lay aristocracy.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand Paul seems to have shown a lack of ability to carry his policy through at critical moments. Thus he punished the treason of Marinus only lightly,<sup>12</sup> and then eventually pardoned him.<sup>13</sup> His biographer notes that he often felt compassion for condemned men and freed them.<sup>14</sup>

Hence it is necessary to conclude that the greatest failure of the pontificate of Pope Paul was the failure to give more concrete form to the constitution of the republic and to find some way of accommodating the aspirations of the aristocratic faction to have power in the state. Through the treaties of 755 and 756 the republic had acquired large tracts of land of value and became correspondingly wealthy and powerful. It would be a most abnormal situation if the lay aristocracy should not desire to share in the management of such a state. It would also be curious if a powerful minority

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<sup>11</sup> Vita Stephani III, p. 475. Pseudo-pope Constantine (the aristocratic usurper) said at his trial that the people made him pope "...propter grabamina ac praeiudicia illa quae Romano populo inesserat domno Paulus papa." Concilium Romanum 769, MGH, LL: Sectio III, I, 1, ed. A. Verminshoff (Hannover, 1896), p. 78: "...multa Paulus papa Romanis intulit praeiudicia, pro quibus conspiciendis me [Constantine] constituerunt pontificem."

<sup>12</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXV (no. 20, Omnino conpertum -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2352), pp. 529-530.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., Ep. XXIX (no. 37, Eximiae et a Deo -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2356), p. 535.

<sup>14</sup> Vita Pauli, p. 463: "Et si pro modico quemquam per iniquos satellites tribulabat, in proximo tamen, pietate motus, consolationis illi inferebat misericordiam...Sed et carceres atque alia claustra per eadem noctium secreta visitabat; et si quos ibidem inveniebat retrusos, a mortis eruens periculo liberos ire relaxabat."



which had once ruled and had then been reduced to a position of political impotence should not wish to regain its position. The monopolization of power in the curia, then, created a tense situation. In such a situation it was foolishness to refuse to allow a share of the power not to fall into noble hands, particularly when the military system of the state depended upon aristocratic leadership. The reaction of Paul to the strong undercurrent of dissent among the lay aristocracy was predictable yet unwise and dangerous. Unrest was met with repression and indifference. Further unrest could only result. Paul's rule was strong enough to contain the unrest, but as his life slipped away the aristocratic reaction began in full force. The responsibility for the chaos of 767-772 must lay with Paul in some sense.

In June, 757, Pope Paul lay under the final illness and the affairs of the curia fell to the care of Christopher the Primicerius. But it appears that with the pope all but dead and expected to be so momentarily, the functioning of the administration could not be taken for granted. A plot had already begun under the leadership of Duke Toto of Nepi to hasten the end and elect as pope Toto's brother Constantine,<sup>15</sup> who, as a candidate of the aristocracy would insure a renewal

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<sup>15</sup> Concilium Romanum, 769, pp. 83-84: "'Contigit per transactam quintam indiccionem mense Iunio die vicesima nona sanctae recordacionis domnum Paulum papam de hac luce divina vocatione fuisse subtractum. Dum vero in eadem decumberet infirmitate, de qua et vitam finivit, illico areptus a diabolo quidam Nempesini oppidi ortus, Toto nomine, cum suis germanis atque aliis nefariis complicibus nitebantur eum interficere ...."

of noble participation in government. Christopher was able to stave off the actual murder of the expiring pope, but could not prevent the election of Constantine immediately following Paul's demise.<sup>16</sup> The repression of the adherents of the old regime began immediately, though Christopher escaped.<sup>17</sup> The nobles seemed then to be the victors; they had control of Rome and the curia and the principal adherents of the old curial party were in flight. But after Constantine had worn

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 84: "...quod mea infelicitas audiens, hoc fieri prohibui et convocato eodem Totone vel reliquis iudicibus in domucellam meam salutaribus eos adgressus sum monitus et validis exortatus sum adiuracionibus a tanto reatus flagicio caveri. Et vix tandem aliquando eorum procacissimum valui flectere mentem, ne in tali tantoque se immiscerent piaculo. Post haec vero affertis in eadem domo pusillitatis meae sacrosanctis Christi quattuor evangeliiis et venerabili chrismate et ceteris Dei mysteriis (sacramentum) mutuo praeuimus, quod nullus extra alium electionem pontificatus egisset, (nisi) eum quem ex (suo) consilio divina providentia tribuisset ex corpore sanctae nostrae ecclesiae, videlicet de sacerdotibus (vel diaconibus) iuxta huius apostolicae sedis traditionem nobis eligeremus antistitem et prestito inter nos eodem (sacramento), eorum credidimus sponsioni, adfirmantes et hoc in eodem sacramenti foedere, ut neminem rusticorum... Romanae urbis subiacencium castrorum in hanc civitatem ingredi permetteremus. Illi vero (adiura)ntes... iudicium, in periurii reatum delapsi sunt et, plurem rusticorum catervam in hanc Romanam intromitten(tes) urbem, (coe)pere cum armis ostiliter cuneos constituere. Et dum haec agerentur, saepefatus dominus Paulus... in iudicio exalavit spiritum, et de praesenti omnes unanimiter properantes in basilica apostolorum in ipso dominico die denuo sacramenta populo preuimus ob conservandas unicuique iustitias. His vero peractis et cunctis propriis domibus revertentibus, repente adgregantes ipsi nefarius Toto vel eius germanus Constantinus universam rusticorum cohortem brachio forti, hisdem Constantinus laicus existens cum armis apostolicam invasit sedem et clericus in eodem patriarchio effectus est."

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 85: "Illi autem concipientes tristitiam cordis mei primitus quidem interficere facientes Gregorium ducem, habitatorem provinciae Campaniae, ob mei interitum et postmodum moliebant et me interficere...." Christopher was allowed to leave Rome with his son, Sergius the secundarius.

the tiara barely a year Christopher succeeded in gaining Lombard support to retake the city, eject Constantine, and elect as pope a docile man of his own choosing.<sup>18</sup> It has been widely felt that the choice fell on Stephen III because he was estimated to be weak and easily controlled. In fact he turned out to be so -- but who would control him? Stephen III soon began to resent being herded by Christopher, who also had the disadvantage of having many and powerful enemies. Coming under the influence of these enemies, Stephen III tossed his erstwhile master to the wolves so that for awhile it seemed that Desiderius had at last won the upper hand.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Vita Stephani III, pp. 469-470. Christopher and Sergius "...adiurantes firmiter Theodidum ducem Spoletinum et eos trans Padum ad Desiderium suum deduxisset...nitentes ob hoc redemptionem sanctae Dei ecclesiae perficere; eosque isdem Spoletinus dux ad suum deportavit regem. Et dum eis obtutibus praesentati fuissent, obnixi eundem regem deprecati sunt eis auxilium tribui ut talis novitatis error ab Ecclesia Dei amputaretur....Dum vero haec auderentur, coniunxerunt interfatus Christophorus et Sergius in civitate Reatinam, absolutia Longobardorum rege. Et praecedentes Sergius et Maldipertus presbiter cum Reatinis et Furconinis atque aliis Langobardis ducatus Spolitini, coniunxerunt subito ac repente in hanc Romanam urbem, XXVIII die Iulii mensis, indictione VI, vespere ....Hoc cerno audiens Toto et Passibus germani fratres, ignorantes ingenium et dolum quod ei proditores inierunt, cucurrerunt ad liquantis ad...portam....(Toto killed)...Passibus vero in Lateranense fugiit...adnuntiis suo germano Constantino quae gesta fuerunt. Hoc vero audito fugiit isdem Constantinus...." After a brief interlude during which Christopher and Sergius foiled a Lombard plot to take advantage of the situation by electing their own pope, Christopher was able to secure the election of Stephen III.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 478-479: "...coniunxit ad beatum Petrum antedictus Desiderius rex cum suo...exercitu....Praefatus siquidem Paulus [Afiarta] et eius nefandissimi sequaces, inito cum praedicto...rege consilio nitebantur populum Romanum contra eos seducere ad insurgendum contra praedictos Christophorum et Sergium, ut eos interficerent." Christopher and Sergius then went to plead with Stephen III to save them but they

Hence the most serious flaw in the republic was that its government simply grew and was not the result of any sort of planning. As the nobles were gradually excluded from government their resentment grew and as resentment grew they were repressed by Paul so that their repression finally ended in the attempted coup d'état of 767, and the consequent weaker-

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were betrayed. In this situation it seems that Desiderius was able to approach Stephen III through Paul Afiarta. Afiarta was Christopher's chief enemy within the curia and a natural ally of Desiderius who had never forgotten how Christopher blocked his election of Philip in 768. The Lombard element within the curia got through to the pope and it was his abandonment of his counselor which allowed him to be killed. Cf. Duchesne, Beginnings of the temporal sovereignty, p. 82. Also see Ottorino Bertolini, "La Caduta del Primicerio Cristoforo", RSCI, I (1947), 364-374, for a study of the opposition of Afiarta and Christopher. According to Bertolini the 768 divisio and the consequent ambiguity of Frankish policy weakened the position of Christopher, p. 368. Afiarta's pro-Lombardism was directed to conform with the new policy laid out by Queen Bertrada with her son Charles in tow, pp. 368-369. This line of reasoning seems to be most acceptable. After the murder of Christopher and Sergius Stephen III wrote a letter to Charles and Bertrada charging that a conspiracy to kill him had been hatched by Carlomann's missus Dodo and Christopher and that Desiderius had come to his aid, Codex Carolinus, Ep. XLVIII (no. 50, Cum magno dolore -- Jaffé-Wattenbach, 2388), p. 566: "...nefandissimus Christophorus et Sergius...consilium inientes cum Dodone, misso germano tuo... nos interficere insideabant. Unde cum eodem Dodone et eius Francis, cum aliquibus eorum nequissimis consentaneis aggregantes exercitum, super nos in Lateranensium...cum armis ingressi sunt, confringentes et ianuas atque omnes cortinas ipsius venerandi patriarchii lanceis perforantes, atque intus in basilicam domni Theodori papae, ubi nullus ausus est aliquando vel etiam cum cultu ingredi, cum loriceis et lanceis, ubi sedebamus, introierunt; sicque ipsi maligni viri insidiabant nos interficere....Et vix per multum ingenium, dum hic apud nos excellentissimus filius noster, Desiderius...." Though this letter is in all probability merely an attempt to cover up what really happened (Louis Halphen, "La papauté et le complot Lombard de 771", RE, CLXXXII (1938), 242-244), it does indicate that Stephen III and Afiarta were trying to accommodate Charles' new policy vis-à-vis Desiderius and that Carlomann, holding out for his father's policy was in the opposition.

ing of the state allowed the troubles of 771 to occur. Nothing seems to have been learned from this for the further reaction within the curia led by Christopher was to further hinder aristocratic participation by restriction of the candidature of papal elections in 769.<sup>20</sup> The nobles had discovered the key to the situation in control of the government through control of the pope. Indeed the struggle to control the pope furnished a backdrop for Roman domestic politics far into the future and the partisan struggles of the Orsini and Colona were pre-figured in 767.

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<sup>20</sup> Concilium Romanum, 769, pp. 86-88.



PART III  
CONCLUSION

## CONCLUSION

The pontificate of Paul I was thus one of superficially modest activity. Following the obviously great changes that occurred during Stephen II's pontificate and being followed by the stormy events of the period 767-772 and the long and eventful pontificate of Hadrian I, the pontificate of Paul I has seemed to be a period quiet and uneventful in the stormy history of the eighth century papacy. No vast armies moved nor did any great upheaval characterize the period 757-767. Thus the period has been passed over as one of slight interest while more exciting periods have claimed historians' attention. Indeed, it seems that the attitude is traditional, for even Paul's contemporaries saw little of interest in the problems he confronted and the events of his rule. Neither Frankish, nor Greek, nor Italian sources of the period pay much attention to Rome or the papacy under Paul. The result of the relative calm of Paul's pontificate has understandably led to a misappraisal of the significance of the period. Paul has been seen as a colorless character not possessed of the energy or statecraft of the great popes who stood on either side of him: Stephen II or Hadrian I.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Kehr, p. 104.



There is some justice in the assertion that the pontificate of Paul was an extension of Stephen II's. The two men were brothers. Paul was naturally one of Stephen's closest counselors and the policies of Stephen II must be considered, in part at least, the creation of Paul. This being the case it is not surprising that the policies adopted by Paul were continuations of the policies of Rome in the period from 752 to 757. Thus in regard of the Lombards Paul desired to secure the extension and consolidation of the power of the republic and assure that the republic could survive as a state alongside the more powerful Lombards. It would not be untrue to say that, as in the case of Stephen II, this was the central goal toward which Paul strove. Similarly Paul, like Stephen, followed a course in regard of the Franks and the Greeks designed to secure that one, overriding goal. The Greeks were enemies. The empire could only be treated as a hostile foreign power. The Franks were allies and Pepin was a protégé. The rapport and alliance made in 754 were the keystones of the existence and the security of the pope's republic. Without Frankish support the republic would cease to exist, or at any rate, would shrink to include only Rome.

On the other hand, Paul did not simply pursue policies laid out for him as though they had become enshrined as dogma through their success with Stephen II. The conditions brought into being by the alliance had not been tested. The ten-year pontificate allowed the working out of the implications of a new situation. Paul's policies were accordingly suited to the

circumstances and changed as he found this or that policy not productive or safe. Hence, when practical considerations necessitated that a rapprochement with the Lombards be sought Paul sought it. He bent his desires to fit the circumstances and by his death had achieved some stability in Italy. The alliance in Paul's hand became transformed and acquired a theoretical expression of great significance.

The republic was not alone in having to come to terms with a new situation. Because the two Italian expeditions of Pepin in 755 and 756 had completely altered the political conditions of Italy, it took some while for the principals involved to alter their attitudes and to adjust themselves to these circumstances. While Paul was forced to become more moderate in his expectations of future gain and had to content himself with only the full implementation of the treaty of 756, Desiderius demonstrated that he fully realized the import of the events of 755 and 756. Though he became un-co-operative at times, he was careful to go only so far, and thus avoided provoking a third Italian expedition. The Greeks had the most difficult time of learning. In 757 the emperor simply did not appreciate the extent or depth of the change. However, by 762 evidence shows that the lesson was at least partially learned. The Greek attempt to persuade Pepin to become an iconoclast demonstrates that the emperor at least understood the significance and nature of the alliance between Rome and Pepin. He yet failed to perceive the role of St. Peter.

The Brecks were not the only ones who underestimated the strength of the alliance of 754 and the role of St. Peter in that alliance. It is foolish to speak of Pepin leaving, ignoring or sabotaging the alliance. Pepin was Peter's man and had pledged his body to Peter's service for the sake of his soul -- he would not be likely to jeopardize his eternality by perjury. The alliance, then, was held by both parties. Pepin made whatever effort he could to carry out the obligations imposed upon him. In the flurry of rumor and supposed danger of the period there were only two areas of activity for Pepin under the alliance. His responsibilities were to secure the implementation of the terms of the treaty of 756 and to resist Greek efforts to seduce him. He did both. In spite of the rumors and agitations of the period 757-767 it is apparent that there was no real danger to Paul's safety. Hence the fact that Pepin sent no army to Italy is neither surprising nor significant.

Paul tended to be too preoccupied with the pursuit of his policy towards the Lombards and with cementing the alliance to pay sufficient attention to what was to become the major problem of Roman political life following his death. The acquisition of supreme power by the papacy, the acquisition of sovereignty by the Roman state and the extension of the territorial possessions of the republic created a political situation of new dimensions and a need for a governmental revision. The papal curia, which had not been a secular government, took over the duties of secular government without

making the constitutional changes necessary, and the most powerful section of the lay aristocracy was excluded from the exercise of political power and influence. The resultant alienation of a major portion of the lay aristocracy produced internal division which, while it was not always obvious in terms of overt acts against the papacy, was a potential threat to the security of the republic. The alliance of 754 sufficed to bridle the activity of the aristocratic faction for a short while, but with the change of rulers in 757 their activity resumed. Though Paul seems to have been unaware of the seriousness of this flaw in the fabric of the state, he does seem to have been aware of the disaffection of the aristocracy and his solution reflects blind reaction rather than policy. For instead of working to adjust the conditions and bases of the Roman political system to accommodate this class he seems to have merely taken punitive measures against it. No such punitive measures short of annihilation of the entire class would have been in any way efficacious and consequently the implicit danger of an alienated aristocracy remained to break forth from time to time.

It is a major thesis of this dissertation that Stephen II did not subordinate the papacy to Pepin in any way in 754. On the contrary, if there was any subordination, it was that of Pepin to the pope. Pepin had made his oath to St. Peter. There is no need to suppose that that oath need have been guaranteed by any act under Frankish or Roman law. It was a religiously sanctioned oath given under formal circumstances. No one would have questioned its validity. Pepin had also



accepted an office which made him the agent of the pope. This too was formally recognized, and there appears that at least in terms of what Pepin had to do for the pope, there was no doubt about what that office entailed. Finally, Pepin was king only because the pope had made him king. Not in the sense that the Archbishop of Rheims or St. Boniface might have made him king by granting him the blessing of the church in his office. The pope had made him king. He had sanctioned the usurpation of the throne by a man who had no titular right to it, and his sanction made it possible for the usurpation to succeed. Hence, in all respects, Pepin was the subordinate of the pope. The fact is however, that Pepin's subordination was one only in theory. In reality, Pepin, over a period of years, achieved supremacy over the pope simply because he had the army which the pope needed and the influence and power to attain for the pope what the pope wanted and felt he needed. This fact alone sufficed to make Pepin the de facto master of Rome had he wanted to be so. In addition the theoretical statements of Pope Paul, which were probably the result of rhetoric rather than rational development, hinted at an idea which would make Pepin and his sons the pope's superiors in theory. Under Charles the Roman patriciate became a political leadership over the West and, at the same time, an ambiguous spiritual leadership over Latin Christianity. Thus the fact is that the papacy gradually was faced with a situation which was the reverse of that which had been intended. The papal reaction was to seek a justifi-

cation of the situation by reverting to the idea of the papacy in the empire. Hence the coronation of 800. This act, that of 800, was made possible only by going back to a previous constitutional situation and negating the ideological significance of the creation of the republic. For the idea of the republic entailed that the pope was the head of the state -- the coronation entailed that an emperor was the head of state. In effect then, Leo III went back and picked up the constitutional structure that had obtained before 726 and in a very real sense Charlemagne was the successor of the Emperor Leo III. Hence, in spite of whatever significance the coronation might have in terms of Frankish history, in terms of papal history the period 726-800 is a unit and the coronation of 800 was the logical culmination of the eighth century. It is superficial to look upon the act of Pope Leo as having been the product of whimsy or of his immediate political problems in 800. Though the conditions of Roman political life in 800 may have been of importance causally in the coronation they are only so as an immediate and apparent cause -- the coronation was the logical culmination of nearly eighty years of Roman political history.

Thus, while it is true that the pontificate of Paul I bridged the gap between Stephen II and Hadrian I and assured the continuity of Stephen II's work, it was much more than a mere continuation of that regime. The accommodation of Paul and Desiderius, the birth of the theocratic role of the patriciate and continued indifference to a crucial socio-political issue

made the pontificate of Paul I an important age in its own right. Instead of merely providing the continuity spoken of this period set new conditions and the study of the period from 767 to 800 necessitates close study and understanding of the reign of the priest-king Paul.



## APPENDICES

APPENDIX A  
THE CHRONOLOGY  
OF THE LETTERS OF POPE PAUL  
IN THE CODEx CAROLINUS\*

The greatest single difficulty in dealing with the pontificate of Pope Paul I in a satisfactory fashion arises from problems connected with thirty-two extant letters attributed to Pope Paul in the Codex Carolinus. Only one is distinctly dated. Of the rest several may be fixed with some certainty through references to events of known date, but the majority, if they are to be fixed chronologically at all, must be fixed through references to other letters, obvious priority or posteriority to other letters, and a certain amount of pure conjecture.

The principal editions of the Codex Carolinus most widely used are those of Caietanus Cenni, Philip Jaffé and Wilhelm Gundlach. Cenni's edition, Monumenta Dominationis Pontificiae, first appeared in 1760 in Rome, though it is now most widely known as it appears in Volume KCVIII of the Patrologiae Lat-

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\*The Codex Carolinus is a collection of letters sent to the Arnulfing rulers of the Frankish kingdom by the Popes Gregory III, Zachary, Stephen II, Paul I, Stephen III, and Hadrian I and the anti-pope Constantine II. The letters were collected together by order of Charlemagne in 791.



ina of J.-P. Migne. The edition of Jaffé appeared in 1867 in his Bibliotheca rerum Germanicarum, IV, and Gundlach's edition, by far the most widely used, appeared in 1892 in Volume III of the Epistolae of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica.

The chronological order of the letters of Paul I has been given differently by each of the editors mentioned, though the order assigned by Jaffé and Gundlach differ only slightly. Following is a table showing the order assigned to the letters by each main editor:

<u>Letter</u>	<u>Gundlach</u> =I	<u>Jaffé</u> =J	<u>Canri</u> =C
Cum gravi gemitu	12	12	12
Si interius mente	13	13	15
Lator praesentium	14	14	13
(missini)	15	15	--
Dum tam copiosam	16	16	17
Quotiens perspicua	17	17	18
Solet epistularis	18	18	21
Quia excellentia	19	19	20
A Deo institute	20	20	38
Cum maximo	21	21	39
Ad referendas	22	22	42
Salubri providentia	23	23	32
Properans ad nos	24	24	16
Omnino conpertum	25	25	19
Nissam relationem	26	26	22
Quotiens fidelium	27	27	24
Praemissis nostris	28	28	23
Eximiae et a Deo	29	29	36
Praecelsae et a Deo I	30	30	25
Praecelsae et a Deo II	31	31	26
Dum illa quae	32	32	27
Olim omnipotens	33	33	28
Dum tam maxima	34	34	29
Quanto decoris	35	35	30
Cum regalis	36	36	37
Votiva cordis	37	37	40
Dum tanto vestrae	38	39	33
Considerantibus nobis	39	38	14
Quia spiritus	40	40	31
Cum caritatis	41	41	35
Dum divina	42	42	41
Explere verbis	43	43	34



None of the above arrangements of these letters is entirely satisfactory.

There is no argument that Cum gravi gemitu (J12, J12, C12) written in April of 757 is the first letter of the Paul series. There are also a few others which may be dated with some accuracy due to references to external events. Lator praesentium (J14, J14, C13) referring to the birth and baptism of Pepin's daughter Giselle, may be fixed in early 758. Solet epistularis (J18, J18, C21), referring to Pepin's son and namesake may be placed in early 759. A reference to a specific date indicates that Quia excellentia (J19, J19, C20) was written in April of 760. Quotiens fidelium (J27, J27, C24), containing a reference to Pepin's Aquitanian campaign of 763, falls late in that year, and Eximiae et a Deo (J29, J29, C36), referring to the severe winter of 763-764 was probably written in 764. Salubri providentia (J23, J23, C32) may be placed in the period 761-762 through reference to the indiction.

In addition some of the letters fall into natural groups, having been sent together or in an obvious sequence. Thus Dum tam copiosam (J16, J16, C17) and Quotiens perspicua (J17, J17, C18) were sent together as their content testified<sup>1</sup> and followed a missing letter of the same series of which Jaffé provides an epitome. Fraecelsae et a Deo I and II (J30-31, J30-31, C25-26) were obviously sent in sequence, and Dum illa quae (J32, J32, C27) and Olim omnipotens (J33, J33, C28) were simultan-

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<sup>1</sup> Codex Carolinus, Ep. XVII (Quotiens perspicua -- Jaffé-Jattenbach, 2341), p. 517.

eous since they were carried by the same missus. Two other letters were simultaneous for the reason that they refer to the return of that same missus, i.e., Dum tam maxima (G34, J34, C29) and Quanto decoris (G35, J35, C30). For similar reasons it is safe to conclude that Missam relationem (G26, J26, C22) and Praemissis nostris (G28, J28, C23) were simultaneous.

It is also obvious that some groups of letters were sequential, though they may have been separated by considerable passage of time. Thus Omnino conpertum (G25, J25, C19) noting Marinus' treason must follow Properans ad nos (G24, J24, C16) promoting him.

Other letters, however, are not at all so easy to place. In 1896 Paul Kehr introduced a rearrangement of the letters based upon the evidence presented by each of the three previous editors and upon Kehr's personal insights and reasonings. The arrangement of the letters offered by Kehr is the best currently available and his arguments are most valuable in respect of those letters which cannot be dated without some difficulty.

Kehr considers first those letters relating to the Greeks. These he divides into three groups.<sup>2</sup> The first group is that of Praecelsae et a Deo I and II and Dum tanto vestrae (G30, 31, 38, J30, 31, 39, C25, 26, 33) which refer to the pope's fear of a Greek invasion.<sup>3</sup> Kehr argues that Dum tanto vestrae was

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<sup>2</sup> Kehr, p. 113.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

sent some time after the former letters.<sup>4</sup> Since the letters in this group indicate Roman-Lombard tension, but not open war, they are considered to be post-758, and because they ask for missi to arrange matters with Desiderius they are considered to precede Quia excellentia (G19, J19, C20), which was written in April, 760.<sup>5</sup> The second group of Greek letters is composed of Dum illa quae, Olim omnipotens and Considerantibus nobis (G32 33, 39, J32, 33, 38, C27, 28, 14), which refer to Paul's joy at being delivered from the evil of Greek invasion.<sup>6</sup> The first two are simultaneous, one addressed to Pepin and the other to his sons, Charles and Carlomann, and both were taken north by Peter the Primus defensor. The theoretical content of Considerantibus nobis is similar to Olim omnipotens, linking them.<sup>7</sup> The whole group obviously follows Quia excellentia. Kehr argues that Si interius mente and Explere verbis (G13, 43, J13, 43, C15, 34) also belong to this group. However, one is constrained to agree with Cenni, Jaffé and Gundlach who argue that Si interius mente is most likely referring to Paul's elevation and therefore falls in early 757, after Cum gravi gemitu. One is also prompted on the basis of internal evidence to doubt whether Explere verbis may be placed in the second group of Greek letters and to

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 114-115

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 116.



agree with Jaffé that the missus Faribert is that mentioned in the Annales Nazariani as having been in Rome in 767.<sup>8</sup> Kehr further isolates a third group of letters: Cum maximo, Votiva cordis and Dum divina (C21, 37, 42, J21, 37, 42, C39, 40, 41) which he argues refer to the pope's reaction to Franco-Greek theological negotiations occurring near the end of Paul's pontificate.<sup>9</sup> References to a papal-Frankish legation to Constantinople allow Cum maximo and Votiva cordis to be placed in sequence and Dum divina may be considered to follow them since it refers to the beginning of the negotiations in Francia occurring in 766-767. On this reckoning Cum regalis (C36, J36, C37) is after Dum divina since it refers to the completion of those negotiations and looks toward the Synod of Gentilly in 767. Kehr further argues that A Deo institute (C20, J20, C38) must also figure in this group since it refers to the arrival of a Greek mission which he feels served as a prelude to these negotiations, and placed A Deo institute in mid-764.<sup>10</sup> Here he is largely correct except that he places A Deo Institute too late -- Eximiae et a Deo (C29, J29, C36) shows that the Franco-papal legates were already in Constantinople and the negotiations already under way in 763.

Of the remaining letters Kehr also handily disposes.

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<sup>8</sup> Annales Nazariani, MSE, SS, I, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hannover, 1826), p. 31. Cf. Jaffé, BRG, IV, 146n.

<sup>9</sup> Kehr, p. 122

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 125.



Properans ad nos (G24, J24, C16), he argues, is early because Pepin's son Pepin, who was born in 759 and died in 762, is not mentioned, and the theme of the letter is not in accord with the general run of letters after 761.<sup>11</sup> As mentioned above, Omnino compertum (G25, J25, C19) follows Properans ad nos and it falls in the period of 758-759 since it refers to the activities of George, the proto a secretis of the emperor in that period. Dum tam copiosam (G16, J16, C17) and Quotiens perspicua (G17, J17, C18) along with the epitome of the missing letter fall into the same period as internal evidence testified. Kehr argues that Ad referendas (G22, J22, C42) and Dum tam maxima (G34, J34, C29) refer to an identical affair with Ad referendas being later and referring to Dum tam maxima.<sup>12</sup> Cum maximo (G21, J21, C39) is placed after Ad referendas and refers to it.<sup>13</sup>

Thus the chronology worked out by Kehr develops as follows:

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Letter</u>	<u>Gundlach</u>
12	757 April	Cum gravi genitu	12
13	758 early	Lator praesentium	14
14	758	Properans ad nos	24
15	758	(Missing)	15
16	758	Dum tam copiosam	16
17	758	Quotiens perspicua	17
18	759 early	Solet epistularis	18
19	759?	Omnino compertum	25
20	759 late?	Fraecelsae et a Deo I	30
21	759 late?	Fraecelsae et a Deo II	31

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 153.

22	760 early	Dum tanto vestrae	38
23	760?	Si interius mente	13
24	760 April	Quia excellentia	19
25	760?	Dum illa quae	32
26	760?	Clim omnipotens	33
27	760?	Considerantibus nobis	39
28	760?	Explere verbis	43
29	760?	Ad referendas	22
30	761?	Dum tam maxima	34
31	761?	Quanto decoris	35
32	762	Salubri providentia	23
33	763	Nissam relationem	26
34	763	Quotiens fidelium	27
35	763-4	Praemissis nostris	28
36	764 early	Eximiae et a Deo	29
37	764 middle	A Deo institute	20
38	765 early	Cum maximo	21
39	765 end	Votiva cordis	37
40	766	Cum regalis	36
41	766-7	Dum divina	42
42	761-7	Quia spiritus	40
43	761-7	Cum caritatis	41

For the most part Kehr's arrangement seems to be the most satisfactory and his arguments are convincing. There are only a few points at which one is prompted to disagree. Si interius mente (G13, J13, C15) placed by Kehr in 760, seems more likely to belong, as Gundlach and Jaffé decided, in early 757 as the second letter of the series. In spite of Kehr's arguments, Si interius mente seems more logically to come in the period immediately following Paul's election and the reference to partisan activity in Rome is very likely that preceeding Paul's election. It also is to be doubted whether Explere verbis may be placed in 760 as Kehr argues. It need not be part of the second group of Greek letters discussed by Kehr and may even be part of the third group. It is also likely that Properans ad nos (G24, J24, C16) precedes Lator praesentium (G14, J14, C13) as it in no wise refers

to the difficulties of 758 with which Lator praesentium and the succeeding letters are concerned. Because both Missam relationem (G26, J26, C22) and Fraemissis nostris (G28, J28, C23) refer to the arrival of the same Frankish mission and both refer to Quotiens fidelium (G27, J27, C24) they are simultaneous. A Deo institute (G20, J20, C38), referring to the six Greek patricians which, as Kehr argues, may very well immediately precede the Franco-papal mission to Constantinople, is placed too late by Kehr. If the Franco-papal mission was in the east in 763 A Deo institute ought to be placed in 762-763, rather than mid-764 and Cum maximo (G21, J21, C39), according to internal evidence, follows it by one year. Quia spiritus (G40, J40, C31) is probably in connection with the Franco-Greek negotiations and may tentatively be dated 766-7.

Thus a final chronology of the letters of Pope Paul will be as follows:

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Letter</u>	<u>Gundlach</u>
12	757 April	Cum gravi gemitu	12
13	757 April-May	Si interius mente	13
14	757-8	Properans ad nos	24
15	758 early	Lator praesentium	14
16	758	(missing)	15
17	758	Dum tam copiosam	16
18	758	Quotiens perspicua	17
19	759 early	Solet epistularis	18
20	759?	Omnino conpertum	25
21	759 late	Fraecelsae et a Deo I	30
22	759 late	Fraecelsae et a Deo II	31
23	759ex-760in	Dum tanto vestrae	38
24	760 April	Quia excellentia	19
25	760?	Dum illa quae	32
26	760?	Olim omnipotens	33
27	760-1	Considerantibus nobis	39
28	760-1	Ad referendas	22
29	761-2	Dum tam maxima	34
30	761-2	Quanto decoris	35
31	9/761-9/762	Salubri providentia	23

32	762-3	A Deo institute	20
33	763-4	Cum maximo	21
34	763 late	Quotiens fidelium	27
35	763-4	Praemissis nostris	28
36	763-4	Nissam relationem	26
37	764	Eximiae et a Deo	29
38	765	Votiva cordis	37
39	766	Cum regalis	36
40	766-7	Dum divina	42
41	766-7	Quia spiritus	40
42	767	Explere verbis	43
43	761-7	Cum caritatis	41

It should also be noticed that accuracy demands that the two letters of the anti-pope Constantine II, Omnino credimus and Dum internae, numbered XCVIII and XCIX by Gundlach ought to be numbered XLIV and XLV. The other letters of Stephen III and Hadrian I have to be renumbered in consequence.

## APPENDIX B

### THE FRANKISH AND ROMAN MISSI

In the course of the formation and development of the Franco-papal alliance the frequent exchange of communication between Pepin and the pope was a most important business. Though the letters of the Codex Carolinus provide us with information concerning some of the affairs dealt with in those communications it certainly was not the full story. It must be supposed that the men who carried these letters were also entrusted with important verbal information. Important functionaries such as bishops, abbots or dukes would not be sent on a journey so long as that between Francia and Rome merely to carry letters. Though we cannot know anything about the verbal communications between Pepin and Paul, a review of the comings and goings of the missi and the identities of these men may give some indication of the magnitude of the affairs at hand and the frequency of Franco-papal contacts.

What follows is a simple list of the various missi arranged in chronological order. Each notation will be followed the the Gundlach edition number of the appropriate letter and the page in that edition where the reference may be found:

- 757: Iumo, Pepin's missus, was in Rome and stayed for Paul's consecration (12; 508).
- 757-8: Langbard, inluster vir, carried a letter to Paul; Marinus, a cardinal priest, was then in Francia (24; 528-529).
- 758: Vulfard, Abbot of St. Martin's of Tours, brought a letter to Paul and Wilcharius, Bishop of Nomentum, was recommended to Pepin (14; 511-512). Holbert, inluster vir, kept by pope in Rome; George, Bishop of Ostia, and Stephen a cardinal priest, sent to Pepin (17; 517).
- 759: George of Ostia to stay with Pepin in Francia (18; 518). Wilcharius still in Francia (25; 530). Felix and Ratbert, virii inlustri, sent to Paul and Wilcharius returned to Rome (30; 536).
- 760: Remedius, Pepin's brother and Archbishop of Rouen, sent to Paul along with Duke Autcharius and Paul's missus, Peter the cardinal priest, was sent to Pepin (19; 519-520). Peter the primus defensor sent to Pepin (32; 538).
- 760-1: Wilcharius again returned to Rome, accompanied by Count Dodo and Michad (22; 525).
- 761-2: Peter the primus defensor returned to Rome with Admar, Abbot of St. Riquier, the Abbot Gerbert and Eucbald, vir inluster (43; 541).
- 762-3: Conibert, a vassal of Pepin, with some message for Paul (20; 522).
- 763-4: Droctegang, Abbot of Gemeticense, and Vulfard were in Rome (28; 532). Andreas and Lunderic, sollertissimi viri, arrived with letters (21; 522). George and Peter are still to remain with Pepin (Ibid.).
- 765: Peter the notarius and John the mansionarius have returned to Rome accompanied by Vulfard. Vulfard was to stay and George and Peter the cardinal priest are to stay with Pepin or return home as Pepin pleases (37; 548-9).
- 766: John the subdeacon, Pampilo the defensor return to Rome with Pepin's missus Flaginus the chaplain. Philip the priest and Ursus the cubicularius were sent to Pepin (36; 544-546).
- 767: Count Dodo and Abbot Heribert sent to Rome (43; 557). John the subdeacon and Peter the primus defensor were sent to Pepin (43; 558).
- 761-7: Remedius and Symeon in Rome (41; 553).

It is obvious that there are many gaps in our information. Many of the letters do not mention who carried them. Many missi are mentioned going in one direction but not in the other and so forth. Still, the information available is enough to show the frequency and importance of Franco-Roman diplomatic exchange.



## APPENDIX C

### THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE FABRICATION OF THE DONATION OF CONSTANTINE

There has been, perhaps, no historical document over which more scholarly dispute has been held than the Donation of Constantine. Since the time when Lorenzo Valla unmasked the document as a forgery scholars have been unable to settle among themselves the question of the date when the document was forged and by whom.

While some scholars hold with the view that it was made in the ninth-century in Francia, the weight of scholarly opinion is such that we may be fairly sure that, whatever its date, the Donation is decidedly not a Frankish, but a Roman, document.<sup>1</sup> It has also been suggested that the donation was originally fabricated before the eighth century and slightly

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<sup>1</sup> Hermann Grauert, "Die konstantinische Schenkung", HJb, IV (1883), 607-608, argues that it was forged for imperial purposes to counter Byzantine claims in the ninth century. Idem., "Zur konstantinischen Schenkung", HJb, V (1884), 117-120. So also does J. P. Kirsch, following the theory first laid down by Grauert: "Die Heimat der konstantinischen Schenkung", RQ, XXIII (1909), 110-114. However, the weight of literature is against this view and its arguments do not compel acceptance, cf. Carlyle, I, 289 and G. Krüger, "Zur Frage nach der Entstehungszeit der konstantinischen Schenkung", ELz, XIV (1889), 430, and E. Loening, "Die Entstehung der konstantinischen Schenkungsurkunde", EZ, LXV (1890), 195-196.



revised for use in the period after 754.<sup>2</sup> However, the document undoubtedly was written after 750, and in connection with the rise and development with the ecclesiastical republic. This is, however, the only area of general agreement, and various arguments exist for attributing the document to the pontificate of this or that pope are abundant.

The major interest in the donation in respect of this dissertation is in regard of the question whether the document originated from the pen of either Stephen II or Paul I, or, indeed, of Christopher.<sup>3</sup> While there is no secure ground for assigning the fabrication of the document to either of these pontificates and denying the possibility that it was made later than 767, it is at least reasonable to attempt to understand the possible circumstances of fabrication in the period 752-767.

According to the donation the papacy, or the vicarate of the Son of God, had great power and was exalted above the empire in honor.<sup>4</sup> The pope had the position of princeps over the whole church and in particular over the patriarchal

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<sup>2</sup> Loening, p. 209, cf. Krüger, p. 431.

<sup>3</sup> Krüger, pp. 459-460, E. Pfeil, Die fränkische und deutsche Romidee des frühen Mittelalters (München, 1929), p. 51, C. B. Coleman, Constantine the Great and Christianity, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. CXLVI (New York, 1914), p. 211, Wilhelm Levison, "Konstantinische Schenkung und Silvester-Legenda", ST, XXXVIII (1924), 159-160. Concerning Christopher see Wolfgang Gericke, "Das Glaubensbekenntnis der 'konstantinischen Schenkung'", ZSSRk, LXXVIII (1961), 68ff.

<sup>4</sup> Exemplar Constituti Domni Constantini Imperatoris, cap. 11, ed. by C.B. Coleman in Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol CXLVI (New York, 1914), p. 233.

sees of the East.<sup>5</sup> As an outward mark of the position of the Roman pontiff Constantine ceded to him the Lateran palace and the right to wear an imperial crown, the purple and other imperial regalia.<sup>6</sup> In accord with this the papal court acquired the same rights as the imperial court.<sup>7</sup> The pope was given

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., cap. 12, p. 233.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., cap. 14, pp. 234-235: "Pro quo concedimus ipsis sanctis apostolis, dominis meis, beatissimis Petro et Paulo et per eos etiam beato Silvestrio patri nostro, summo pontifici et universali urbis Romae papae, et omnibus eius successoribus pontificibus, qui usque in finem mundi in sede beati Petri erant sessuri, atque de presenti contradimus palatium imperii nostri Lateranense, quod omnibus in toto orbe terrarum prefertur atque precellet palatiis, deinde diadema videlicet coronam capitis nostri simulque frigium nec non et superhumeralem, videlicet lorum, qui imperiale circumdare adsolet collum, verum etiam et clamidem purpuream atque tunicam coccineam et omnia imperialia indumenta seu et dignitatem imperialium presidentium equitum, conferentes etiam et imperialia sceptrata, simulque et conta atque signa, banda etiam et diversa ornamenta imperialia et omnem processionem imperialis culminis et gloriam potestatis nostrae."

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., cap. 15, p. 235: "Vivis enim reverentissimis, clericis diversis ordinibus eidem sacrosanctae Romanae ecclesiae servientibus illud culmen, singularitatem, potentiam et precellentiam habere sancimus, cuius amplissimus noster senatus videtur gloria adornari, id est patricios atque consules eticii, nec non et ceteris dignitatibus imperialibus eos promulgantes decorari; et sicut imperialis militia, ita et clerum sacrosanctae Romanae ecclesiae ornari diversis, cubiculariorum nempe et ostiariarum atque omnium excubitorum ornatus, ita et sanctam Romanam ecclesiam decorari volumus; et ut amplissime pontificalis decus prefulgeat, decernimus et hoc, ut clerici eiusdem sanctae Romanae ecclesiae mappulis et lenteaminibus, id est candidissimo colore, eorum decorari equos et ita equitari et sicut noster senatus calicamenta uti cum udonibus, id est candido linteamine inlustrari: ut sicut celestia ita et terrena ad laudem Dei decorentur; pre omnibus autem licentiam tribuentes ipso sanctissimo patri nostro Silvestrio, urbis Romae episcopo et papae, et omnibus, qui post eum in successum et perpetuis temporibus advenerint, beatissimis pontificibus, pro honore et gloria Christi Dei nostri in eadem magna Dei catholica et apostolica ecclesia ex nostra synclitu, quem placatus proprio consilio clericale voluerit et in numero religiosorum clericorum connumerare, nullum ex omnibus presumentum superbe agere."

power over Italy or the West,<sup>8</sup> and Constantine moved his capital to the East to assure that where the celestial principate rested there should be no earthly rival.<sup>9</sup>

The idea that Stephen II was responsible for the forging of the donation is entirely plausible. The most likely context for the fabrication during Stephen II's pontificate is that of his trip to Francia in 753-754. It has been argued that the idea that Aistulf should restore land to the pope or make restitution to Rome can only be explained in terms of reference to the Donation of Constantine.<sup>10</sup> It has also been argued that the officium stratoris performed by Pepin had to have been inspired by that of Constantine. On the other hand, these points need not compel assent. If the officium stratoris in the donation could have inspired Pepin's so could Pepin's have inspired that in the donation.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, unless a copy of the donation were sent ahead to Pepin it is difficult to

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., cap. 17, p. 236: "...omnes Italiae seu occidentaliū regionum provintias, loca et civitates...."

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., cap. 18, p. 236: "Unde congruum prospeximus, nostrum imperium et regni potestatem orientalibus transferri ac transmutari regionibus et in Byzantinae provintia in optimo loco nomini nostro civitatem aedificari et nostrum illic constitui imperium; quoniam, ubi principatus sacerdotum et Christianae religionis caput ab imperatore celeste constitutum est, justum non est, ut illuc imperator terrenus habeat postestaem."

<sup>10</sup> The most modern proponent of this view is Walter Ullmann, Growth of papal government, pp. 58-59. cf. Lot, Ganshof et Pfister, p. 409, Caspar, ZKC, LIV (1935), 145-1458 and Hauck, II, 26.

<sup>11</sup> Elie Griffe, "A propos de la 'Donatio Constantini'", BLE, LVIII (1957), 239.



see how it could have influenced that action. Secondly the theme of restoration and restitution is not dependent upon the donation. The lands in question had been wrested from the republic and were being asked for on behalf of the republic, not on behalf of the successor of St. Sylvester. Thirdly, no indication exists in any source that Stephen used the donation.<sup>12</sup> Hence, while it may have been made at this time, there is no evidence that it was either used or needed.

In regard of the pontificate of Paul I as the period of fabrication there is again one major situation in regard of which the document might have been useful; that of the opposition of the lay aristocracy to curial rule in the city. In this context the material contained in the donation in regard of the imperial prerogatives of the pope and the senatorial rights and position given the Roman clergy acquire particular significance. Here again there are two arguments against this view. First, that there is no evidence that the document was used. Second, that Paul in general seems to have ignored that particular problem anyway. If we assume Christopher to have invented the document it would have been in the context of the same problem, probably in the period 768-769.

While there are possibilities in the period 753-769 there is also no lack of possibilities for later periods, and the evidence is just as good for deciding that it was fabricated by or under Pope Hadrian I, who even seems to have made a

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<sup>12</sup> Colemann, Constantine the Great, p. 212.





veiled reference to it.<sup>13</sup> It is also suggested by some that the donation was a ninth-century affair<sup>14</sup> made in Rome to preserve the rights of the papacy and linked to the 816 coronation of Louis the Pious.<sup>15</sup>

A survey of the problem leads one to the conclusion that the task of assigning a positive date for the fabrication of the Donation of Constantine is one which is difficult if not impossible.

Suffice it to say that many possibilities exist and external sources give no indications which one might consider positive. Internal criticism, heretofore, has also been inconclusive -- witness the confusion of scholarly opinion. Hence though one might wonder what conclusions computer analysis might yield, one suspects that the results might be equally inconclusive. One can only conclude of the donation that it was a product of the Roman chancery in the period 750-850.

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<sup>13</sup> Loening, pp. 219-233. Joseph Langen, "Entstehung und Tendenz der konstantinischen Schenkungsurkunde", HZ, L (1883), 416-435. Mayer, DZK, XIV (1904), 64-67. Baxmann, I, 284, and Martens, pp. 360ff. All of these authorities argue against that idea.

<sup>14</sup> Werner Ohnsorge, Abendland und Byzanz (Bad Komburg, 1963), p. 82. Ohnsorge has also suggested that the donation is connected with Leo III's trip to Francia in 804/5. See, Idem., "Die konstantinische Schenkung, Leo III und die Anfänge der kurialen römischen Kaiseridee", ZSSRg, LXVIII (1951), 89ff. See Ruth Bork, "Zu einer neuen These über die konstantinische Schenkung", Festschrift Adolf Hofmeister (Halle, 1955), pp. 39-56.

<sup>15</sup> Lamprecht, p. 119.



## APPENDIX D

### BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

While the standard corpus of bibliographies of medieval history ought to be familiar to working medievalists, there are always a few little known or specialized bibliographies which are worth looking at. Hence it is wise to begin by checking one or two bibliographies of bibliographies. Among the more well known works of this sort are Theodore Bestermann's A World Bibliography of Bibliographies, 3rd edition, 4 volumes (Geneva, 1955-1956), and Edith M. Coulter's Guide to Historical Bibliographies (Berkeley, 1927). While the latter was issued some time ago there have not been so many new bibliographies in medieval history as to render it exceptionally out of date.

The best readily available, recent, general historical bibliography is the American Historical Association's Guide to Historical Literature (New York, 1961), which is well enough known to be part of any historian's stock-in-trade.

The general historical bibliographies of Europe are most easily classified according to national origin. The best among the German offerings is Dahlmann-Waitz, Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte, 9. Aufl. (Leipzig, 1931). Also of some use



are G. Franz's Bücherkunde zur deutschen Geschichte (München, 1951), and Karl Jacob's Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte im Mittelalter, 6. Aufl., 3 Bde. (Berlin, 1959), both of which have the advantage of being recent. Among French bibliographies it is wise to see August Molinier's Les sources de l'histoire de France des origines aux guerres d'Italie in 6 volumes (Paris, 1901-1906). Finally, in connection with the papacy, it is always best to review one or two Italian bibliographies. Two examples of such bibliographies are Carlo Lozzi's Biblioteca Istorica della antica e nuova Italia in two volumes (Bologna, 1963), and Emilio Calvi's Bibliografia generali di Roma in four volumes (Rome, 1906-1912).

The most valuable category of bibliography is, of course, those dealing with medieval history or related topics. Foremost among these are Louis Faetow's Guide to the Study of Medieval History, in the revised edition (New York, 1931) and August Potthast's Bibliotheca Historica Medii Aevi in two volumes of the second edition reprinted in Graz in 1957. C. Chevalier's Repertoire des sources historiques du moyen age in three volumes (Paris, 1905ff) might also be reviewed along with Shirley Jackson Case's A Bibliographical Guide to the History of Christianity (Chicago, 1931), which does not have too much depth.

Finally, in the matter of periodical material the best work is the annually issued Internationale Bibliographie der Zeitschriftenliteratur published in Leipzig and Osnabruck from 1911 on in two parts, one for German and the other for non-German writings.

While the array of primary source material available to a medievalist may not be so vast as to be overwhelming, it is desirable to have one or two good guides to the sources. The best of these and the easiest to use are the registers of various sorts published for the most part in Germany. Among the most applicable here are Jaffé-Mattenbach's Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Graz, 1956), and Böhmer-Mühlbacher's Die Regesten des Kaiserreiches unter den Karolingern (Innsbruck, 1889). Those interested in more direct information on the Lombard kingdom ought to refer to the Lombarden Regesten published by L. Bethmann and O. Holder-Egger in the Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für Ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde, III (1878), 225-318. Less satisfactory, but also of use are Cardinal Baronius' Annales Ecclesiastici, ed. by A. Theiner in 37 vols. (Brussels, 1864-1883), which includes many long selections from the sources and Ludwig Celsner's Jahrbücher des fränkischen Reiches unter König Pippin (Leipzig, 1871), an exceptionally detailed collection of material which is useful in guiding one to the proper source.

In general concerning primary sources one is cautioned to check through all the great national source collections for here and there information related to the subject at hand may be found. For the most part, however, there are relatively few important primary sources for this topic. The first among these is of course the Codex Carolinus, the two best editions of which are those of Wilhelm Gundlach in the Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae III (Berlin, 1892) and P. Jaffé's

Bibliotheca rerum Germanicarum, IV (Berlin, 1867). The next most valuable source is Louis Duchesne's edition of the Liber Pontificalis in 3 vols. (Paris, 1886). It is also useful to look through the editions of papal letters in the Patrologiae Latina, edited by J.-P. Migne. Thus for instance the Sancti Gregorii II Epistolae in Volume LXXXIX (Paris, 1850) has been of great value in this research. Some specifically Frankish sources of value have been the Annales Regni Francorum, the Annales Einhardi, the Annales Mettenses and the Continuation of Fredegar. The Annales Regni Francorum and the Annales Einhardi were issued together in 1895 in Hannover in the Scriptores rerum Germanicarum series of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica. The Annales Mettenses is available in the same series in a 1905 edition. The continuation of Fredegar (Chronicorum quae dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes) is available in an edition by Bruno Krusch in Volume II of the Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Hannover, 1888). Other sources which have proven to be of use are the Chronicon Salernitanum, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, III (Hannover, 1839), the Concilia aevi Karolini in Volume II of Section III of the Leges of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Hannover, 1896), and the Liber Pontificalis Ecclesiae Ravennatis of Agnellus in the Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Langobardicarum et Italicarum (Hannover, 1878). Agnellus was anti-Roman and inaccurate in places and therefore must be used with caution. It has also been of value to have a look at one or two Greek sources for the period. The most likely are Nicephorus Breviarum His-





toricum, Patrologiae Graecae, C (Paris, 1865) and Theophanis Chronographia, Idem, CVIII (Paris, 1863). One must be careful to note that Theophanes' chronology is generally inaccurate.

For background material one ought to refer to one or all three of the following works on Carolingian history: Louis Halphen's Charlemagne et l'empire carolingien (Paris, 1947), Engelbert Mühlbacher's Deutsche Geschichte unter den Karolingern (Stuttgart, 1959) or A. Kleinclausz, Charlemagne (Paris, 1934). Though the reputation of Halphen's work is highest, Mühlbacher gives a fuller account of the early Carolingian period.

It is more difficult to find really satisfactory work on early Italian history. One of the best, though out of date, is Thomas Hodgkin, Italy and her Invaders, 8 vols. (Oxford, 1892-1899). Another worthwhile work is Ludo Moritz Hartmann's Geschichte Italiens im Mittelalter, 3 Bde. (Gotha, 1900). Other materials available are Gabriel Pepe's Le moyen âge barbare en Italie (Paris, 1956), Pasquale Villari's The Barbarian Invasions of Italy (London, 1902) and Leon Homo's Rome médiévale (Paris, 1956). There is a similar difficulty in finding satisfactory material on Italian law. Carlo Calisse's A history of Italian Law (London, 1928) and Ernst Mayer's Italienische Verfassungsgeschichte, 2 Bde. (Leipzig, 1909) are both useful.

The available literature affording general coverage of Byzantine history is more satisfactory and more plentiful. The two best works are both available in English. These are A. A. Vasiliev's History of the Byzantine Empire, 2nd ed., 2



vols. (Madison, 1961) and George Ostrogorsky's History of the Byzantine State (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1957). Other surveys are Louis Bréhier's Le monde byzantin, 2 tomes (Paris, 1948) and Le monde orientale de 395 à 1081, in the second edition (Paris, 1944) co-authored by Charles Diehl and Georges Marçais.

There is certainly a wide selection of general works on the history of the church and the papacy. L'histoire de l'Église, edited by A. Fliche and V. Martin affords a fine detailed survey. The relevant material may be found in Volume V by Louis Bréhier and René Aigrain (Grégoire le grand, les états barbares et la conquête arabe, Paris, 1947) and Volume VI by Emile Amann (L'époque carolingienne, Paris, 1947). Albert Hauck's Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands, 5 Bde. (Berlin, 1954) and Hans von Schubert's Geschichte der christlichen Kirche im Frühmittelalter (Tübingen, 1921) are the best German works among the multitude of church histories available. Heffele-Leclercq's Histoire des Conciles, 11 tomes (Paris, 1910) is of value, but like Fliche et Martin's work it is mainly a narration based on the sources and is not particularly interpretive. Both these works are primarily valuable as handbooks. There are four commonly available and most excellent treatments of the papacy during this period. The best survey is Erich Caspar's Geschichte des Papsttums von den Anfängen bis zur Höhe der Weltherrschaft, 2 Bde. (Tübingen, 1933). Only the first two volumes were published owing to Caspar's death in 1933. The two volumes only cover the period as far as 750. Also well worth referring to are Louis Duchesne's The Beginning



of the Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes (London, 1903) and Johannes Haller's Das Papsttum, 5 Bde. (Basel, 1951). Walter Ullmann provides a more theoretical approach to the history of the papacy. Though there was some controversy over the Growth of papal Government in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (London, 1965), it is one of the works now becoming standard. Also of use are Bernhard Niehues, Geschichte des Verhältnisses zwischen Kaisertum und Papsttum im Mittelalter, 2 Bde., 2. Aufl. (Münster, 1877), J. Bosselin, The Power of the Pope during the Middle Ages, 2 vols. (London, 1853), Rudolf Baymann, Die Politik der Päpste, 2 Bde. (Elberfeldt, 1868), Joseph Langen, Geschichte der römischen Kirche, 4 Bde. (Bonn, 1885), and William Barry, The Papal Monarchy from Gregory the Great to Boniface the VIII (London, 1902). Gustav Krüger provides a treatment of the ideas and proponents of papal ideology which is short and unencumbered by a narrative: Das Papsttum, Seine Idee und Ihre Träger, 2. Aufl. (Tübingen, 1932).

Finally, among the various sorts of general works one ought to consult would be a good history of medieval political thought. The obvious best would be R. V. and A. J. Carlyle, History of Medieval Political Thought in the West, 6 vols., 5th imp. (New York, 1962).

The most pertinent material for a project such as this is obviously to be found in scholarly monographs and articles. Such studies on more restricted problems afford much additional illumination on the background of Italy before the papal-Frankish alliance. Two articles in the Cambridge Medieval History serve as reasonably good introductions to the problem of the

restoration of the imperial power in Italy: Charles Diehl's "Justinian: the Imperial Restoration in the West", II, i, 1-24, and L. M. Hartmann's "Imperial Italy and Africa: Administration", II, viiia, 222-235. The general condition of pre-iconoclast Byzantium is the subject of George Ostrogorsky's "The Byzantine Empire in the World of the Seventh Century", in the Dumbarton Oaks Papers, XIII (1959), 1-21. Three excellent monographs provide fine scholarly studies of the Byzantine period of power in Italy: Charles Diehl's Études sur l'administration byzantine dans l'exarchate de Ravenne (New York, n.d.), L. M. Hartmann's Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Verwaltung in Italien (New York, n.d.), and Hugo Cohn's Die Stellung der byzantinischen Statthalter in Ober- und Mittelitalien (Berlin, 1889). More specific studies dealing with iconoclasm are also to hand: Charles Diehl's "Leo III and the Isaurian Dynasty", Cambridge Medieval History, IV, i, 1-26, Erich Caspar's "Papst Gregor II und der Bilderstreit", Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LII, (1933), 29-89, Ottorino Bertolini's "I rapporti di Zaccaria con Costantino V e con Artavasto", Archivio della Società Romana di Storia Patria, third series, IX (1955), 1-21, and Alfred Lombard's Constantine V, Empereur des Romains (Bibliothèque de la faculté des lettres de l'université de Paris, XVI ) (Paris, 1902). L. M. Hartmann's "Italy under the Lombards", Cambridge Medieval History, II, vii, 194-221, E. Pabst's "Geschichte des Langobardischen Herzogtums", in Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, II (1862), 405-518, A. Gasquet's "Le royaume lombard; ses relations avec l'empire Grec et avec la France", Revue



Historique, XXXIII (1887), 58-92, and H. Deltin's "Studien zum beneventanischen Hof im achte Jahrhundert", Dumbarton Oaks Papers, XVI (1962), 141-193, all offer material relevant to the papacy's struggles with the Lombards, although the latter deals mainly with the post 774 period.

Material on the development of the idea of the republic of the Romans under the popes is more difficult to find. For the most part one has to search through the letters. However, two works do touch directly on the problem: Franz Kampers' "Roma aeterna und Sancta Dei ecclesia rei publicae Romanorum", Historisches Jahrbuch, XLIV (1924), 240-249, and Wilhelm Gundlach's Die Entstehung des Kirchenstaats und der curiale Begriff Res publica Romanorum (Breslau, 1899). See also Fedor Schneider's Rom und Romgedanke im Mittelalter (Köln, 1959), and E. Pfeil's Die fränkische und deutsche Romidee des frühen Mittelalters (München, 1929).

The literature concerning the Franco-papal alliance is both profuse and of high scholarly quality, though it is generally out of date and greatly in need of revision. Several French studies of the formation of the alliance are available, but in general they are not as significant as the equivalent German works. Among these are C. Bayet's "Remarques sur le caractère et les conséquences du voyage d'Étienne III en France", Revue Historique, XX (1882), 88-105, Henri Fubert's "Étude sur la formation des états de l'église", Idem, LXIX, (1899), 1-40, 241-272 and Leon Levillain's "L'avenement de la dynastie carolingienne et les origines de l'état pontifical", Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes, XCIV (1933), 225-295.



The last is especially useful as a chronological guide. Much more important are four substantial German monographs which among them offer the views which have been generally accepted: Wilhelm Martens' Die römische Frage unter König Pippin und Karl dem Grossen (Stuttgart, 1881), Karl Lamprecht's Die römische Frage von König Pippin bis auf Kaiser Ludwig den Frommen (Leipzig, 1889), Erich Caspar's Pippin und die römischen Kirche (Berlin, 1914), and Caspar's "Das Papsttum unter fränkischer Herrschaft", Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LIV (1935) 132-364. The last two are undoubtedly the most important works in the field. The major flaw of these four works and of most of the literature, is the propagation of old myths about Pepin's donations and Stephen II's commendation. The German writers are in general characterized by a tendency to be too legalistic in their outlook. Also of much use are Robert Holtzmann's excellent little study, Die Italienpolitik der Merowinger und des Königs Pippin (Darmstadt, 1962), and Carl Rodenberg's Pippin, Karlmann und Papst Stephen II (Berlin, 1923). Periodical materials provide a large corpus of literature. Among the best is Johannes Haller's "Die karolinger und das Papsttum", Historische Zeitschrift, CVIII (1921), 38-76 which offers a refreshing understanding of the spiritual context of the alliance. Against Haller's view is Martin Lintzel's "Der Codex Carolinus und die Motive von Pippins Italienpolitik", Historische Zeitschrift, CLXI (1940), 33-41. Lintzel's work suffers from pandering to the Aryan-Teutonic mythology of the Nazi regime. There is also much more material of varying quality. Such for instance as W. Sickel's "Kirchen-

staat und Karolinger", Historische Zeitschrift, LXXIV (1900), 385-409 and "Die Verträge der Päpste mit den Karolingern", Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, XI (1894), 301-351, and XII (1894), 1-43. Peter Basso's "Pippin und Stephan II", Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, XXXVI (1916), 494-502, Ernst Mayer's "Die Schenkungen Constantins und Pippin", Deutsche Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht, 3. Folge, XIV (1904), 1-69 and Heinrich von Sybel's "Die Schenkungen der Karolinger an die Päpste", Historische Zeitschrift, XLIV (1880), 47-85. For an answer to Sybel see B. Niehues' article under the same title in Historisches Jahrbuch, II (1881), 76-99, 201-241. P. E. Schramm's "Das Versprechen Pippins und Karls des Grossen für die römischen Kirche", Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, kanonistische Abteilung, LVIII (1938), 180-217 and Karl Heldmann's "Kommendation und Königsschutz im Verträge von Ponthion", Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, XXXVIII (1920), 541-570 are also interesting.

The material on the pontificate of Paul is both poor and scarce. The only specific study available is Maurice Baumont's "Le pontificat de Paul I<sup>er</sup>", Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire, XLVII (1930), 6-24. Baumont failed to make a serious first-hand study and his work is a scissors and paste effort with little insight. Though Paul Kehr did not undertake a study of the pontificate as such, his "Über die Chronologie der Briefe Papst Pauls I im Codex Carolinus", Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philologisch-historische Klasse, (1896), 103-157, is excellent



in achieving its purpose and even offers some insight into the period.

The best periodical work available on the affairs of Stephen III's pontificate is that of Ottorino Bertolini: "La caduta del primicerio Cristoforo nelle versioni dei contemporanei e le correnti antilongobarde e filolombobarde in Roma alla fine del pontificato di Stefano III", Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia, I (1947), 227-262, 349-378. Also to the point are Martin Lintzel's "Karl der Grosse und Karlmann", Historische Zeitschrift, CXL (1929), 1-22 and Louis Halphen's "La papauté et le complot lombard de 771", Revue Historique, CLXXXII (1938), 238-244.

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