n-D’I‘ ' :u ‘3‘ - .0 u o C v< ' .IS (‘ ‘ . ' '6‘-.. .. D ‘ . u ‘ a "‘ p- ‘ ”I : ‘ " ~35." "‘0. N .F "‘ . \ n ".. ‘1' b 6 H22- '.. .,. _ ‘ ‘ ‘ .‘:’J. ‘0': S u u" ._ . .: a"\.:. O'.’; h -5. “’6‘ . .‘ I. ‘r. P;- .I‘ ‘ vvflt..r ' - -:-"fl. '- nu... . . :3 .’ . 0 .ie 56: “E ipi‘ '1 ABSTRACT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND ITS FORMER COLONIES IN AFRICA, THE CARIBBEAN, AND THE PACIFIC—- AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF CERTAIN EMERSONIAN EXCHANGE-THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS By Nerner Dietrich von der Ohe This study deals with the outcomes of exchange among developing and developed countries. Two interrelated groups of indicators are used for the independent (exchange) variables. The first group deals with market transactions, including directional trade matrices tracing the flow of goods and services and measures derived and constructed from this data base, e.g., for measurement of the concepts of exchange inequality and dependence upon exchange partners. The second group might be termed non-market transactions or, in the words of Horvath (l974), "net one-way resource flows." I am referring to foreign aid, of which multilateral aid is a special form. Such aid might be viewed as a temporary bandage on the wounds caused in part by the effects of market transaction losses. ';-."-P C.- ... - ..- .. ... r y . O ‘ . .‘. U Aux P: c‘ .\v Q 1 .x- «i- .Q .‘ .u. . ~ 65 ... 2 “o P. f .: .. C. ... - o u 4,. . u r an» F. .: .uu « cu. F. O h 0) -~\ PM ... o o 0 s .s. O b k ab ... ... ... . . . y . p o . . : .9. o u D n.» .\- O I v. a u: ... . . ... ... .. “I .... on . a. uu ..h. o a b.‘ I ~. .o , u a. , . ... Werner Dietrich von der Ohe These independent variables represent exchanges in the con- text of international relations, on what has been metaphorically called the "macro" level. That is, such ”micro" concepts as senti- ments and attraction are systematically excluded from the analysis in the normative context of international relations. The intention of this study is to explore the feasibility of utilizing exchange-theoretical propositions of Richard Emerson as an analysis guide within this "macro" context. The major dependent variable, the outcomes or "balancing effectiveness" results of exchanges between nations, is measured by the growth or decline rates of l9 indicators of a country's develop- ment. An attempt is made to determine the extent to which these effectiveness measures correlate with, or are affected by, factors that are not indigenous but operate only in the presence of external exchanges. The empirical setting of the study is the group of 44 developing countries that are currently negotiating or renegotiating about conditions under which future aid and trade exchanges should take place between themselves and the enlarged European Communities. This seems an appropriate time to explore, via the use of data from published sources, how these countries have fared historically in 49 their exchanges with the EC since its founding. The notion of how 49During the time span under study--l958 through l972--Denmark, Ireland, and Great Britain were not yet EC members and were not grouped witm the other EC nations for analysis purposes. I“ '50 II. . ..D" o ... o ‘ V. \‘ v a too... ' ‘1! H t! " F’o—n .. a - - gr' 4 ‘00-. I. .. ~ .‘ u - ; u -- -.., ‘ " c " “-v . '. "r a . ' .. "-:"-‘ a “-' I ..'.~ . . .‘ ‘-' - . n _ . .. "‘ .'\:. :7... u. _- a .' ‘ 'P‘. . I ‘ . .t. _ : 2.: .5 v ~ h ’;' ’. ’ ".A O' . u _‘ a it: . ' ...va ‘ ‘ ‘0‘. s. ”c . .DI . A' P o a. " ‘~’ r“ V n *D- . . . :. .r A: ": . 0 . . ‘ " V .v‘ " ..- v 'o u " w .2". ... E' . . . NEE-hi "C' H‘r' q’i‘ ;'.A '~ .t I-.. "Ur. tr;-‘ .4" . L « ' ... . _ ‘A 5 "tr '- rs ‘ W C. . G 's tc he. . Werner Dietrich von der Ohe countries have "fared" as a consequence of their market and non-market exchange transactions with the EC, refers to their progress with respect to the l9 developmental effectiveness indicators. Results of the research provide limited support for the contention that the magnitude of the initial exchange gap_affects the subsequent developmental progress of the “underdog" partner (hypotheses l and 2). The major finding is that the magnitude of a developing country's exchange gap with abroad (its overall trade balance) appears far less consequential for its development than the magnitude of its exchange gap vis-a-vis the European Communities. To have a smaller positive or a negative trade balance with the EC is associated with lower growth rates. For example, the effectiveness outcome indicator of dependence upon one export item during one time period shows a correlation of .85 with a developing country's trade balance with the EC but only a correlation of .22 with its overall balance of trade. ' With respect to the measures of dependence (hypotheses 3A and 38), mixed results are obtained. When dependence is operational- ized in terms of a country's internal economy (lack of export diversi- fication, i.e., dependence upon one export commodity) growth rates of higher education indicators show strong correlations in the predicted direction. When dependence is operationalized in external terms (dependence upon trading partners, i.e., number of countries account- ing for 50 per cent of total exports and imports). these correlations are moderate to weak in the opposite direction. This inconsistent o . ‘00 10-;p‘c'0a . - otv. 0- cu. o’ l‘ o ”x: :"r " ...... “D... V I -v _ I a Inn. on 0;. H‘ '2. . . p.v.- a... g) bl d§v ":Acp.I-A'S 3‘- 0. '0 v ..--4 CI.- “ ‘ '., " ~00 "r' ‘ or. § ...... .v ..:9: :u‘ - ‘A ‘& ... u . . l_. ‘1 .~ . . . L'P‘ o4 . _ h a 3 ‘9- '.~ ' U U-.E‘t II - . . h '- .:\ m r'C‘--‘S I v ‘8 -. "a I ' .P I n ‘ " d ." r 4" . ' J '3 V :. .... ". F'\ "l PP. _ v :5 ‘ E S :F .... . .. .- ... ' a ‘ ~ g " e... .r“. . U ’ ‘0‘, : "z-u - J "In. .1... ‘z- ..' -‘ :u I 1" .‘v- :e "' s» I Werner Dietrich von der Ohe pattern of results raises validity questions regarding the operation- alization of dependence. For example, diversification of an economy may not be a sign of weakened but of strengthened dependence if either exhausted supplies of natural resources or significant price cuts on the world market call for such shifts. Predictions about non-market transactions (hypotheses 3B and 3C) receive little consistent support. The expectation that multilateral aid would be more beneficial to developing countries than bilateral aid--even when the effect of total amount of aid receipts was removed-~is not supported. It is suggested that the critical underlying variable is not the multilaterality/bilaterality of aid-giving channels per se but the independence of authority to allocate aid, e.g., independence from pressures to distribute aid in accordance with the self-interests of donor governments. Some- what more support is found for the prediction that a large initial exchange gap with the EC will serve to depress the amount of aid received from non-EC sources. -1. '3 --- "- 0" '. .l '- .-. - 0- ' o O a - O A o: .- -‘C T) w THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND ITS FORMER COLONIES IN AFRICA, THE CARIBBEAN, AND THE PACIFIC-- AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF CERTAIN EMERSONIAN EXCHANGE-THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS BY Werner Dietrich von der Ohe A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology I975 ® Copyright by Werner Dietrich von der Ohe T975 Dedicated to my mother and to Erich and Renate Schmaus ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Since an adequate acknowledgment of all persons that have contributed to the completion of this thesis would call for a bio- graphical chapter of its own, and since the ways in which these individuals have helped me range from emotional support after a frustrating data run to the pinpointing of "cloudy" conceptual links-- both equally welcome at the right time-~I will avoid "rank-ordering" these persons and, instead, will list them alphabetically. However, I should mention that I feel grateful to some of them for having demonstrated to me that to be a guiding teacher and a friend is not only compatible, but complementary. J. Artis P. Marcus B. Anderson C. Mundt E. Benson T. Nichol S. Camilleri H. Perlstadt M. Cook A. Radtke B. Finifter B. Thorne J. Gullahorn C. Vanderpool M. Lovall Thank you. I would like to add acknowledgments in a different category that are no less important. Financial assistance for carrying out this “I ‘5 '0- .. o -- 'Q‘ ". ' c-l' .. O C p. I a ' u vy-u ..'. . ‘ I .. o . . n ‘. ... . v [V r '. Io. ‘ o o ‘ . 'A" 0‘ a "- « . I I . ‘ . ‘I-an. . ‘ - -~... . .. . I n‘p' a . V O .3" .- ..' -_. research came from Philip Marcus, the Department of Sociology, and the Center for International Studies and Programs at Michigan State University (Ford Foundation grants 7l-3669 and 7l-368l). In addi- tion, I am most grateful for the Fulbright Fellowship and the Fulbright Travel Grant that made my graduate training in the United States possible. Finally, I want to thank Mrs. Elayne Ballance for having been a most helpful and competent typist. iv .. n "O TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ........................ LIST OF FIGURES ....................... Chapter I. INTRODUCTION .................... II. ELABORATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....... Introductory Comments ............... The Theoretical Framework--An Overview ...... Conceptual Elaboration of Three Hypotheses . . . First Hypothesis ................ Second Hypothesis ............... Third Hypothesis ................ Balancing Effectiveness Outcomes: The Main Dependent Variable .......... Concluding Remarks ................ III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................. Sampling Procedures . ............... Data Collection .................. An Overview . . . .............. Procedure of Data Gathering and Processing ............... Completeness and Reliability of Data ...... Data Analysis ................... IV. PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ....... Hypothesis l: Inequality of exchange with the "old" EC in relation to effectiveness outcomes .................... Hypothesis 2: Overall inequality of exchange in relation to effectiveness outcomes ..... Page vii 43 Chapter Hypothesis 3A: Dependence upon one export item in relation to effectiveness outcomes . . . Hypothesis 3B: Dependence upon exchange partners in relation to effectiveness outcomes ................... Hypothesis 3C: Inequality of exchange with the “old“ EC in relation to amount of aid from non-EC ............... Hypothesis 30: Multilaterality of aid in relation to effectiveness outcomes ...... V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION ......... Possible Criticism of the Data Base ....... Summary of the Study .............. Conclusion ................... BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................ APPENDICES A. A COMPILATION OF CONSTRUCTED INDICATORS AND THE DIRECTIONAL TRADE MATRIX .......... B. CONCEPTUAL AND STATISTICAL MEASUREMENT ISSUES AND SOURCES ............... C. A COMPILATION OF ALL CORRELATIONS AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS THAT WERE COMPUTED FOR THE TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES ............ vi Page 71 100 187 ..., ... c\- \v Table 10. ll. 12. LIST OF TABLES Page Distribution of positions within the Commission of the EC, by line and staff departments according to hierarchy of position. "A" positions are those of higher-level pro- fessionals and administrators ....... Number of complete (non-missing) observations on 72 indicators out of a total of 44 possible observations .......... Hypothesis l: Inter-country effectiveness-- selected findings from Tables C.l to C.4 . Hypothesis l: Intra-country effectiveness-- selected findings from Tables C.l to C.4 . Hypothesis 2: Inter-country effectiveness-— selected findings from Tables C.5 and C.6 Hypothesis 2: Intra-country effectiveness-- selected findings from Tables C.5 and C.6 Hypothesis 3A: Inter-country effectiveness-- selected findings from Tables C.7 and C.8 Hypothesis 3A: Intra-country effectiveness-- selected findings from Tables C.7 and C.8 Hypothesis 33: Inter-country effectiveness-- selected findings from Tables C.9 and C.lZ Hypothesis BB: Intra-country effectiveness-- selected findings from Tables C.9 to C.l2 Hypothesis 3C: Amount of aid from non-EC-- selected findings from Tables C.l3 to C.l6 . . . Hypothesis 3D: Inter-country effectiveness-- selected findings from Tables C.l7 and C.l8 vii ..... 18 ..... Bl Table Page l3. Hypothesis 3D: Intra-country effectiveness-- selected findings from Tables C.l7 and C.l8 . . . . 91 A-l. Inequality of overall trade position: total imports as a per cent of total exports over time ..................... 105 A-2. Dependence upon one export commodity over time: per cent of total exports accounted for by that commodity which was.the largest export item at Time0 ................... 107 A-3.l. Directional balance of trade matrix--the evolution of trade among 44 developing countries and l2 developed countries over time (Timeo) ...... . .......... A-3.2. Directional balance of trade matrix-~the evolution of trade among 44 developing countries and l2 developed countries over time (Time]) . . . . ............. I23 109 A-3.3. Directional balance of trade matrix-~the evolution of trade among 44 developing countries and l2 developed countries over time (Timez) . . . . . . . . . . ....... I37 A-4. Balance of trade with groups of countries, in thousand U.S. dollars at current market prices, over time ...... . . . . ....... 151 A-S. Number of trading partners (countries) accounting for fifty per cent of a developing country's imports and exports, over time . . . . . . ..... . . . . . l63 A-6. Susceptability to external influence: over time . . . . . . . ........ . ..... l65 C-l. Hypothesis l.A: Inequality of exchange--raw balance of trade of 44 developing countries with the "old" EC at Time , as related to indicators of effectivenegs outcomes at Time1 and Time2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 viii Table C-2. Page Hypothesis l.B: Inequality of exchange-—raw balance of trade of 44 developing countries with the "old'l EC at Time , as related to indicators of effectiveness outcomes at Time2 . ..... . ................ 191 Hypothesis l.C: Inequality of exchange--per capita balance of trade of 44 developing countries with the l'old'I EC at Time , as related to indicators of effectiven ss outcomes at Time1 and Time2 ........... Hypothesis l.D: Inequality of exchange--per capita balance of trade of 44 developing countries with the "old” EC countries at Time , as related to indicators of effeltiveness outcomes at Time2 .......... 197 Hypothesis 2.A: Inequality of exchange—-overall balance of trade of 44 developing countries with the rest of the world at Time , as related to indicators of effectiveNess out- comes at Time1 and Time2 ............. Hypothesis 2.B: Inequality of exchange-- overall balance of trade of 44 developing countries with the rest of the world at Time , as related to indicators of effeltiveness outcomes at Time2 . . . . ...... 203 Hypothesis 3A.l: Dependence upon one export item-- percentage of total exports of 44 developing countries which is accounted for by the largest export commodity at Time , as related to indicators of effectiveness 0 tcomes at Time1 and Time2 . . . . . . . . . ......... 205 193 199 Hypothesis 3.A-2: Dependence upon one export item-- percentage of total exports of 44 developing countries which is accounted for by the largest export commodity at Time , as related to indicators of effectiveness outcomes at 209 ix Table Page C-9. Hypothesis 3.B-l: Dependence upon exchange partners--number of countries accounting for 50 per cent of.a country's exports at T , in.relation to effectiveness outc mes at T] and T2 ............... C-lO. Hypothesis 33.2: Dependence upon exchange partners-- number of countries accounting for 50 per cent of a country's exports at T , in relation to effectiveness outcome indicdtors at T2 ...... 215 C-ll. Hypothesis 38-3: Dependence upon exchange partners-- number of countries accounting for 50 per cent of a country's imports at T0 in relation to effectiveness outcomes at T1 and T2 . . . ..... 217 C-lZ. Hypothesis 3B-4. Number of countries accounting for 50 per cent of a developing country's. total imports at Time , in relation to effectiveness outcome indicators at Time 211 2 ..... 221 C-l3. Hypothesis 3C.l: Inequality of exchange--raw balance of trade of a country with "old" EC countries at T , in relation to amount of foreign aid regeived from alternative (non-EC) sources at T] and T2 ........... 223 C-l4. Hypothesis 3C-2: Inequality of exchange--raw balance of trade of a country with "old“ EC countries at T , in relation to amount of foreign aid reteived from alternative (non-EC) sources ................. 224 C-l5. Hypothesis 3C-3: Inequality of exchange--per capita balance of trade of a country with "old" EC countries at T , in relation to amount of foreign aid rgceived from alternative (non-EC) sources at T1 and T2 ..... 225 C-l6. Hypothesis 3C-4: Inequality of exchange--per capita balance of trade of a country with "old" EC countries at T , in relation to amount of foreign aid rAceived from alternative (non-EC) sources at T2 ........ 226 Table Page C-l7. Hypothesis BD-l: Percentage of a country's foreign aid receipts which are from multilateral (rather than bilateral) sources at T , in relation to effective- ness outcome? at T1 and T2 ............ 227 C-l8. Hypothesis 3D-2: Percentage of a country's foreign aid receipts which are from multilateral (rather than bilateral) sources at Time . in relation to effective- ness outcomes iAdicators at Time2 ........ 23l xi Figure LIST OF FIGURES Geographical location of the 44 developing countries included in this study . . . . Emerson's fifth theorem .......... Overview of the organizations and countries which are participating in the current negotiations between Europe and certain developing countries . . ........ Relationship between exchange inequality and effective balancing operations predicted by Hypothesis 1 ............ Overview of the general hypotheses . . . . Illustration of the theoretical model of which this study tests one part . . . . Truncated time-series model ........ Balancing effectiveness outcomes-~A guide for the interpretation of l9 indicators xii o o o o q o Page 17 21 4O 45 47 59 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This study focuses upon several exchange-theoretical pro- positions-—developed primarily from the analysis of relationships between individual persons--and attempts to test them at the higher aggregate level of the relationships between developing and developed nations. The specific theoretical emphasis of this analysis is the notion of balancing operations, i.e., reactions to inequity1 and balancing outcomes. I will use Emerson's exchange theory (l962, 1964, l972a, l972b) as a conceptual guideline but will take up his early suggestion (l962: Bln) to elaborate conceptual tools for explaining power-dependence relations at aggregate levels different from that of interpersonal relations, e.g., between organizations, cities, states, and—-in the present study--even between countries. Any reduction in inequality between exchange partners may be due to factors that operate only in the presence of exchange, to factors completely outside of any exchange, or to some combination 1I will not draw a distinction between inequity and inequal- ity. While I realize that equitable social relations may or may not also be equal, the notion of fairness and the "weighting" inherent in equity ideas were not measured in my research. ...-Jo.- thereof. This research focuses only on the first of these. In it, I attempt to identify those sets of circumstances or factors con- tingent upon exchange which buttress or hamper balancing operations and balancing effectiveness outcomes, i.e., which facilitate or hinder improvement in the position of that exchange partner who is at a disadvantage. The outcomes of balancing operations between nations can- not be adequately detected by standard synchronic analyses. A certain time-span must elapse before, for example, any improvement in a developing country's cost of living could possibly take place. To handle this problem, I have attached to each hypothesis a dia- chronic frame. The empirical setting for my study, in a sense, is Brussels. At the time of this writing, Brussels was the center of extended trade and aid negotiations between the European Communities (EC) and their former colonial territories in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. To be more precise, my empirical focus is the ongoing re- lationships of the EC with this set of 44 developing countries, 25 of whom had ties with Great Britain and only became eligible to negotiate with the EC after Britain joined in l973. Figure l illus- trates graphically the ties which the EC has maintained with its former colonies.2 2Certain organizational and trade/aid ties of the EC with l9 newly independent African countries are described in a previous report, completed after my first visit to Brussels in December of l973 (von der Ohe, l974). «.1- .. ::.t...:.x . . \. x ) b ... ...I. ... . .. o..- ‘a. .u ...vut _. ... ..I ...-. 2 . 3 col (4 1-iQ‘U ...... no u ‘n: k -...I.o..“.ucl ‘! s...‘ ‘h'I O DIE-...... . ‘ ! o~iJ.i.L .-.... .-- . I .. . I . AI .. \ . . . .1- A n - .avzum mrsu cF uwvzpocw mowgucaou mcwao—m>mu Lacy-huge» ecu mo coppmuop paupgamgmooo .F mgsmwm .E-XEUUJ-oiiaitis r | NZ _ DAB’ then A--less dependent of the two-~has more power; A will and must use his/her power and to use it means to lessen (loose) the power advantage over time. Several implications of this hypothesized dynamic process will be subjected to empirical test. The theorem in question can be restated as follows: (Emerson, 1972b: 67): . O . ‘I '0” C '0 .. v c - 0. ' n: z . U I a .. _ . .. O ..-. . . . i . .... > . I. I A“ . u I,. . - v. . . 'd._ . “- . Q . _ ‘- .l ‘. - ' ~' ‘ C O ,.. ~ '1 Q C r.‘ 1' in-a ".I - ._- '-D - I. I s '3' P ‘I a nu. \ Rho V. v I p" I H .- b ,f‘tr C . 12 In any exchange relationship A;B: If DA upon B > DB upon A at T0 (base period) eithe DA upon 8 decreases across at T1 (period of then continuous balancing 0r DB upon A increases transactions operations) until DA upon B = DB upon A; i.e., until at T2 (outcome balance is period) reached Where D = dependence A & B = actors T = points in time X Figure 2. Emerson's fifth theorem. One problem in designing such tests stems from Emerson's failure to sufficiently specify either the temperal sequences or the span(s) of time. One might ask whether Emerson's theorem isn't essen- tially unfalsifiable and thus theoretically and empirically empty; if it is not supported in some test, it can always be claimed that the predicted balancing operation has not had enough time to occur (or that it already occurred some time ago, after which other events intervened). As is characteristic of much of sociology, the concept of time is not treated as problematic. After all, the span between T0 and T1 and between T1 and T2 in Figure 2 could refer to minutes or decades. Furthermore, the predicted balancing operations which either party could and/or would undertake presume that A and/or B (a) - - ' oa- . a ,I 'I I . ' ‘ . - . .4 4...”, 0,. v J a n v . no .. -. D ... .' I - ... ' r. I. \ ,. ‘ ' . ,‘ .‘ ‘ I' . " n 0... .7. . "I. . 'n u o. . "o. C ... h '- o .- o 7"» un- , . _I u, . . .. ' n ' O 5 '~ - s .'I ‘0‘ .. -~ . -- I ". u F . y . I I"' 5 . . . .1 p- u ‘ .p u b . .,. . .... ‘ I u c .. Irv, - .."_ . § 0. I u .- ~ v .P s ' I . C in I. u - 9. .I. -5 u_‘ u .. I ‘ . ‘ I h up 13 6 the base period as being unbalanced; (b) dislike imbalance; "perceive" and (c) are sufficiently willing ang_able to work toward balance. Aside from the thorny theoretical and empirical questions about exact; .ly_what constitutes balanced or imbalanced social relations, one should also keep in mind that balance does not necessarily imply equality. This point is clouded in Emerson's work. His early translation of the power vocabulary into dependency terms does not solve the con- ceptual riddle that links equity, equality, power, and dependency. I hope that my study may make some contribution to this problem by elaborating and testing whether unequal (i.e., not necessarily in- equitable) social relations do in fact give rise to "effective” balancing operations. Unlike Emerson, I do not assume that there will be a necessary tendency to close the gap when a situation of inequality between exchange partners exists. If taken seriously, Gouldner's argument that "power arrangements [may] constrain the continuance of [reciprocating] services" (l960: 164) almost requires that one not make such an assumption. Unequal exchange situations also may be a very acceptable state of affairs—-to either side of the equation. However, all of this does not mean that balancing operations in 6Caution should be used with respect to the metaphoric use of sensatory and cognitive terms which I occasionally apply in describ— ing A and 8's interaction. The terms stem from the original develop- ment of the theorem with the study of interpersonal relations in mind. I do not assume that my aggregate "actors" possess all of these human traits, nor do I seek to find theoretical equivalents for every human trait at the level of international exchange. . st: {4' I ~ inf - o o ' 1 N -oo. . . — ' IOO‘ 14 Emerson's sense (1972b: 66f) are not operating as well. It is only that I assume that the arrival of balance is problematic,7 unlike Emerson who sees as problematic the ”survival" of imbalance (op. ci ., p. 67). In concluding this overview, the four types of possible balancing operations specified by Emerson (1962, 1964, 1972) should be given attention. Given any unbalanced social relation, where A is more powerful (i.e., less dependent) than B, then: (a) Actor A may increase the value (valuation) of what B has to offer; (b) Actor B may search for alternative supplies of valued exchange commodities; (c) Actor B may form a coalition with others, not necessarily to obtain supplies of valued commodities via that coalition but perhaps to prevent A from get- ting from others what it now gets from B; (d) Actor B may depreciate the value (valuation) of what A has to offer. Any of these four strategies will move the relationship to- ward greater equality between A and B, i.e., toward a more balanced state.8 7For one thing, balancing operations may after all be anti- cipated by either side of the equation, thus dampening the full use of power across continuous transactions by the more powerful partner. 8It would be interesting to think about a set of scope con- ditions which would allow the assignment of certain probabilities that each of the four balancing strategies would occur. I6 I u o 15 It is important to note that Actor B appears to have more options than Actor A. While the above set should not be construed as being exhaustive, a certain imbalance of options becomes plausible. This is particularly so if one also assumes that altruism (option A) is less likely to be used than some of the other options listed. One final point should be raised, namely that the above balancing operations should ngt_be considered as alternative strate- gies; in fact, any combination of them seems possible. It would be rather naive to assume that any balancing operation is a discrete step where, for example, A stands by with its hands tied and quietly waits while B forms a coalition against A's own future options. A careful analysis of the dynamics of balancing operations may conclude that the notion of balance itself is almost incidental; it is the continuous push and pull around balance that is of theoretical and empirical interest. Conceptual Elaboration of Three Hypotheses These theoretically interesting balancing operations are often very difficult to identify or test outside of the laboratory. Just as chess players may identify their partner's conceptual strate- gies by inferring them from the observed outcomes--single moves or sequences of moves--so also are balancing operations most easily in- ferrable from intermediate observable moves. I will take this approach in my three hypotheses. 16 Before presenting the hypotheses, I will discuss the rationale for selecting a social-psychological theorem for a test of exchange relations among 57 nations. Then I will present each hypothesis in turn and conclude by singling out for discussion the overall dependent variable in this study-~effective balancing operations. The first reason for choosing a micro-level9 proposition as a conceptual guideline was the need for a set of testing "lenses" to allow analytical precision while also simplifying the otherwise un- manageable empirical complexity. Figure 3 gives a small example of the sheer complexity of the interconnections existing between the European Communities (EC) and its former colonies, illustrating the setting in which they currently negotiate the conditions of future exchange. One party in these negotiations, the EC as a multilateral group, alone requires enormous numbers of experts and public officials (Table l) just to administer the current exchange. All in all, it is fair to assume that well over 2,000 additional higher-ranking public officials from all involved countries are employed in administering l0 the ongoing exchange, not counting the exchanges with thousands of private trading partners. 9Obviously, I use the terms "micro level" and ”macro level" uncritically. I do not imply that the social sciences are in a posi- tion to subject human actions (individually or in groups) to something like a vertical scale where a higher level "organism" implies virtually all lower level parts. In the context of my study, the terms "micro" and "macro" primarily carry geographical connotations. That the notions of micro and macro levels are not even uniformly agreed upon in a supposedly most-exact social science--economics--can be seen from Bain's (l959) discussion of the concept of market. 10Some theoretical questions regarding the interorganizational component of these exchange links have been raised elsewhere (see von der Ohe and Marcus, 1974). l~l ... ... .1‘ . ......c. ...o- 17 89ng ...... ...... 0 O O O 52:38 .uo.cuc:ou ocvgopu>oa Laomuxagou cc. mavu.caluou cacaogau ego coozuom «so.u~_uomoz covuo¢uouu< as» ucpgso muconoocues< .aco—u-—c~uso ecu pa co.u~suua—_~ .~ osao.u $95 .... ..-... x--. ..--x 3.3. .35.. . .v . . . .v . . I I s I I 5 SEE... - .. -- 338° #3:: ~28.— $.53 (:33: .§0000 (as-mg . 33.580 3233:. ......fiaOOOO / 5 a 52.. 53:5 4! 5255.8..." _ _ _ _ _ _ (ESE _ _ _ _ _ _ 8:23. , 325., ..u 2.3 O O O -.82 e: 92 85st a: 88 6E Essa 3255325.: 52.. .5 23:3 H; o‘omo- . u . ' hr . b C 7'"- . 1 ' I »;..' . . Y" .‘. I . n . '1.-. ‘ .' _ . “ u o ‘n. . I. a ._5 .... ‘ v . '.. " - ,. u... I 1 . Q ‘ -' u D‘- a 1 N I‘- " \ ‘y. u . ..., ' I ..- p u v 5‘. .- o 5 I '5 o~ .- .3 0.0 ... -' . ... w ..‘ s u ‘- I . b u 1 .\‘ ‘9 v u ‘ 1 .3 A 20 My first hypothesis contends that B's chances to narrow the gap are partially accounted for by the gigg_of the initial gap between A and B. I suspect that beginning with a larger amount of inequality suppresses B's chances to move toward balance. That is, 8'5 growth rate relative to his starting position will be suppressed.. If the exchange rate between A and B is such that B is both at a relative disadvantage and dependent upon A--a nontrivial qualifica- tion--then the rate by which B moves towards closing this gap will be even smaller. Translated into the empirical setting of this study, this hypothesis proposes that there is an inverse relationship between B's exchange inequality at T0 and the growth rate of certain development-effectiveness measures between T0 and T]. In like manner, B's inequality at T1 should be inversely related to its growth rate between T1 and T2. Figure 4 illustrates this suspected connection. The time factor is introduced in order to allow some "trigger effect" to operate. Since formation of the European Communities (EC) began in the late 19505, I chose averaged measures for the 1958-1960 span as l3 the base period (To). Only the "old" EC countries, those belonging during the times in question, are considered to be partner "A" for 13Founding ("old") EC members were Belgium, France, WGSt Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. .... . I a ... \ o o n Q n. - Q a Ilv 2l {5 high B's effectiveness measures (outcome of balancing operations at T1 (T2) low . EQUAL UNEQUAL B's Exchange with A at T0 (T1) absolute and per capita balance of trade Where: Exchange Effectiveness in % = (T1 - T0 x 100 T0 T0 = 1958/60 base period T1 = 1962/66 base period T2 = 1958/72 base period Figure 4. Relationship between exchange inequality and effective balancing operations predicted by Hypothesis 1. this and other hypotheses. These countries acted more or less as a unified, joint exchange partner both multilaterally and bilaterally (see von der Ohe, 1974). A list of all countries included in this study can be found in Figure 3. The second and third time periods, T1 and T2. divide the time span from the base period (1960) to the latest year for which data are available (1972) into two six-year periods. Within each 22 time period, averages were computed. This averaging procedure has the advantage of leveling extreme ups and downs that are due to non- exchange related factors; for example, 40 to 70 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product in developing countries is affected by the weather, a bad harvest often depressing GDP for several years (see Papanek et al.I 1973). This hypothesis, then, contends that the larger the exchange inequality at T0 (T1), the lower the growth rate of effectiveness measures at the later time point T1 (T2). But why should the magni- tude of the gap suppress B's (i.e., the 44 developing countries') chances to move towards balance? At least two arguments can support this contention. First, there is the obvious point that high exchange inequality adversely affects a country's debt-servicing ability. As inequality increases, I suspect that debt-servicing increases rela- tive to proceeds from exports. Balancing operations should be negatively affected, at least by the percentage by which interest on the debt compounds. Unlike at the social-psychological level, power and dependence between nations can be "banked." The second argument supporting this hypothesis comes from scholars of the "development of underdevelopment" (see Baran, 1957; Frank, 1967; Vasconi, 1969). In their views, inequality and under- development are not just the early stages in the evolution of modernization. They result not from "indigenous" factors affecting each exchange partner independently but can be attributed to the exchange itself. Griffin illustrates this phenomenon at the inter- regional level. Within Peru, he studied the trade flows between the 23 Sierra and the coastal area. The evidence suggested that "the process of development and underdevelopment are related" (Griffin, 1969) the Sierra would have had higher growth rates of both consumption and savings in the absence of exchange with the coast. In short, the Sierra region "financed" the faster development of the coastal area. However, I am interested here in the influence of external rather than indigenous factors upon the growth rate of development. For that reason, I introduce as a control variable a measure of sus- ceptability to external influence (SEI).14 By "partialling out" this variable's effect on the effectiveness measures, I can have more confidence that any findings are the result of international exchange rather than of intranational exchange or other indigenous factors. If B's SEI is high, I predict that a given degree of inequality will suppress B's success more than if the SEI were low. A relatively isolated country should be less affected by external exchange relations. Susceptability to external influence resembles what Emerson calls "motivational investment" at the intraperson level. Even if the magnitude of exchange remains constant, a smaller investment will “hurt less"--although in this case it is finances rather than feelings which are vulnerable to hurt. To summarize the line of reasoning thus far, the subhypotheses which will be tested are: 14SEI is measured as the ratio of (export proceeds + import FWoceeds + aid receipts + debt service outflows) over Gross Domestic Product. All components are in per-capita form. See Appendix B for a more detailed description. 24 l.A The larger the negative trade balance (exchange inequality) between a developing country and the 01d EC at T , the smaller the growth rate of effectivenegs measuresl5 (outcomes of balancing operations) at T]. 1.8 The larger the negative trade balance between a developing country and the 01d EC at T , the smaller the growth rate of effectivene 5 measures at T2. l.C Same as l.A, but with trade balance measured in per capita form. l.D Same as 1.8, but with trade balance measured in per capita form. Four more subhypotheses, l.E through 1.H, correspond to the above when the influence of susceptability to external influence has been con- trolled for. It is expected that partialing out SEI will reduce the original correlations; that is, SEI and effectiveness growth rates are also expected to be inversely related. Second Hypothesis The first hypothesis was concerned with B's exchange inequality vis-a-vis a certain group of countries (the "old" EC) and treated ex-, change inequality as if it were necessarily identical with dependence. It ignored, for example, the case in which B may have had a considerable trade deficit with the founding members of the EC but a huge trade sur- plus1with other countries, thus having an overall positive balance of trade. Balancing operations such as coalition formation with other 15Appendix B provides a detailed description of the various effectiveness measures. ‘ ' I .r. ... h .u. .v. ... n v a p o v . . t - o. I. u . o u u o - .... f a o t _. o P N? «\o ..¢ .\¢ on. I .r» a q. .- r ~ ~ r U n ‘i . . o u n n u u b . o O . s D ... . v - § - .nn 7 r . . .49 ea. 5 . an. . . . c ... . u. y .5 ... c v p u s . a. . .o . ... n r I ~ 1 a ..u r I ll ¢\‘ I I ex. I I o o u «0‘ II. \ . .0. .a5 . ... . . u . n s o a v .s . . l . . . . . . . . . . . u . "u. . . , .u.. r.. . u. o u . .. .... ... u ... . . .. ... , . . m... p u . bx. on! I. u a \. 25 developing or developed countries will now be considered, and will include all relevant options open to either A or B in the analysis. Like the first hypothesis, this one treats Emerson's conceptual scheme as a general guideline upon which to build. B's dependence upon A in particular will be taken up in the third hypothesis. Here, we examine B's overall exchange position at given base periods and inquire again whether B's degree of inequality hampers or buttresses its chances of effective balancing operations. This has relevance for the concept of dependence (hypothesis 3) in the following way. In the presence of an unequal overall exchange position (inequality with alternative partners to A, as well as with A). the important Emersonian balancing option of coalition formation 16 seems to vanish. B simply would not be in a position to take a strong bargaining position with A if B were an "underdog" relative to other exchange partners as well. Thus, the second hypothesis predicts an inverse relation tmtween B's overall exchange position at T0 (T1) and the growth rates at‘which B was able to move toward increased balance at T1 (T2). As in the first hypothesis, B's susceptability to external influence (SEI) should be taken into account. Specific subhypotheses to be tested are: . 16One important distinction is purposely ignored: the difference between coalitions with alternatives to A (other powerful exchange partners) and with alternatives to B (other underdogs). This paint will be taken up later. ..- .... . vuhl ~ 26 2.A The parger the negative trade balance between a developing country and the rest of the world at T , the smaller the growth rate of effectiveness measures at T]. 2.3 Same as 2.A, but for time periods T1 and T respectively. 2 2.C Same as 2.A, but.with trade balance in per capita form. 2.0 Same as 2.b, but with trade balance in per capita form. 2.E to 2.H correspond to the above hypotheses, with the addition of controls for SEI at the appropriate time period. Third Hypothesis I now turn to a specific analysis of B's dependence and to the reasons why it should be conceptualized as something distinct from exchange inequality. Emerson's translation of Max Weber's power typology into a conceptual language of dependence fails to take into account a crucial element of Weber's analysis--action. Emerson gives the impression that gll_social actions (exchange) between A and B have some balancing consequences--affect the equation of their relative positions--so long as they continue to interact. I would distinguish between those actions which constitute the exchange and those actions which have balancing effects (intentional or otherwise). Although these categories may some- times overlap--exchange actions will sometimes affect the equation--this is not always the case. If one follows Emerson's logic to its reasonable conclusion, all unbalanced situations would tend toward balance and-- C ...9 0" u.- 27 once balanced--the exchange situation would never again become un- balanced, except perhaps by intervention of outside forces. Emerson does not allow for actions which are not equity seeking, i.e., moving toward balance. There are some genuine balanc- ing moves in internation interaction, such as aid programs (conceptu- ally equivalent to Emerson's "status giving") and coalition formation. But there also exist actions like the following. Say that trade relations between developing and developed countries are such that chronically negative trade balances occur for the developing partners, i.e., unequal exchange outcomes. The powerful developed nations then take measures to stimulate an overproduction of agricultural or other raw products, lowering world prices because of oversupply.17 Export proceeds are depressed even further in the developing countries de- pendent upon such products, and their trade balances sink more deeply into the red vis-a-vis the developed nations. This type of action sets the parameters for (unequal) exchange, but is not a balancing operation. And A's power to make B accept lower prices for its ex- ports was not the result of any increased dependence of B. This points to the need for careful analysis of dependence in its own right, not simply as the negative reflection of power or vice-versa. B may be dependent upon A in an exchange relation for a 17In the context of trade, economists have termed this phenomenon "immiserizing growth." It refers to the simultaneous expansion of exports by many countries and a resulting decline in export proceeds because of falling prices. 28 variety of reasons, such as: (a) their exchange relation favors A; (b) B does not have an internally diversified assortment of valued exchange goods (and so is more vulnerable to dropping world market prices); (c) B does not have an externally diversified set of trading partners to whom to go if A's terms are unsatisfactory; (d) B may be either unable or unwilling to participate in a coalition intended to counterbalance A's dominance; (e) B does not develop import substitution programs]8 (import substitution is conceptually equivalent to Emerson's “withdrawal" strategy). Where the first two hypotheses were concerned with what might be called the parameters of dependence, i.e., the circumstances and (Jutcomes of exchange, the third hypothesis will focus upon the ConSequences of dependence itself. This general hypothesis is broken i’TtCJ 'four parts, each assessing different aspects of dependence. HYDOthesis 3A One aspect of dependence is inherent in B's internal economic Slil"U¢::'l:ure, namely the presence or absence of a diversified range of eXPO rt goods. Hypothesis 3A suggests that there is an inverse relation bEtween a country's dependence upon any one exchange (export) commodity and ‘i ts growth rate of balancing effectiveness outcomes. More \ y*\() 18It is interesting to note that the so-called diffusionist BKD“F>‘| -of underdevelopment emerged from within the United Nations suchon-“c Comm1ssmn for Latin America (ECLA). It strongly recommends '1'DPOrt substitution programs. A u. . . 7. " '00 .-T‘ u ' ‘ n . '. . I r I ‘ . .... .r. . '1‘ ., ... . ‘." . A' . '. ' v o . F .. ‘u. . . \ . ... -.'ii 0 1 . C n I I I a ' 'i.» l, "' '9 .. ’n . .... n . . I‘t-f' vi. . .‘u. .'. . ’ ... .. . *u. ‘ . ... ‘ . ‘ r: .‘. ' .. - 5.. ‘ ". -'..‘F. u. ‘ - 3 . 1v L‘~ ... ~ . ._v ‘ .- ‘1 \ ~ .' . . ‘.._ a” ‘ ‘ . ‘- ~. .l’ :3 " --‘ . ._.. , u . 4... . ‘- F ”...: ._‘ u ' ... u: “n I .- .I - ‘. ‘b l. _ ‘A n "v "._ 5’. I . ' u h ‘I . u a '1',~Jf . ,~. A 1’. 5'7 . VFUL 29 specifically, the higher the percentage of total exports accounted for by one comnodity, the lower the effectiveness outcome. In a sense, this hypothesis seems intuitively correct and hence almost trivial. If B is not in a position, for example, to temporarily withhold an exchange item wanted by A because this item is just about 8'5 only source of trade income, B will hardly be able to "motivate" A to pay increased prices (Emerson's "status giving" on A's part, and possibly one consequence of "coalition formation" on 3'5 Part). But certain conditions have to be met before this predicted (Elationship between dependence on one export item and effectiveness can hold. First, B's SEI (susceptability to external influence) ShOUld be high; otherwise B would be in a fairly good position to Withheld an export item, since trade would be a small part of the COUNtr‘y's economy. Second, high dependence on one export commodity bF-‘COmes an asset if and only if B has a controlling share of the "0r": d supply and hence is in a position to set prices. As an official in Brussels told me, Zambia was not really disadvantaged between 1958 and 1 960 because about 90 per cent of its exports were copper; it c0nitur‘o‘lled 20 per cent of total world copper exports and was in a pos‘. t ‘iOn to affect prices. Compare these figures to Mauritius's duri "Q the same period, when 90 per cent of its exports were accounted for by sugar but when it supplied only about 2 per cent 0f world sugar expo hts . HYpothesis 3A, then, predicts an inverse relationship be- weEn a country's dependence upon any one exchange commodity and L 30 balanci n g outcomes: 3A.l The larger the percentage of total exports accounted for by one export commodity (dependence) for a develop- ing country at T , the smaller the growth rate of effectiveness megsures at T]. 3A.2 Same as 3A.l, but for T1 and T2 respectively. In addition, two corresponding subhypotheses (3A.3 and 3A.4) will be tested controlling for Susceptability to External Influence. Because of analysis problems, it was not possible to control for a country's share of the world market in terms of major export at this time. Hypothesis 3B This hypothesis is concerned with the effect of the very number of exchange partners upon balancing effectiveness outcomes. The importance of "numbers" operates in a complex way, in that num- bers can be seen as "surrogate variables" for concepts like exclusive- ness, monopolization, limited competition, etc. In this context, I 5099651: operationalizing dependence in terms of the number of exchange Partner's accounting for 50 per cent of B's (a) exports and (b) imports. The lower that number of exchange partners. the higher B's dependence is assumed to be.19 . . 9The linearity assumption inherent in this operationaliza- tw“ ‘5 Problematic. For reasons both of "economy of scale" and mini- mu‘gbconditions of exchange differentiation, strict linearity is gisably "011 a realistic assumption. However, for the purposes of hypothesis, strict curve-fitting operations seem unnecessary. . a \ \ 4 ‘u o u . . a - In u-ol 0a., ... . ~ p f. ‘I ‘ “ . '9 .. . .. ‘I.~ . n ‘ ‘u 1 DD. 7" b .1. ‘- 31 I suspect that an increase in the number of exchange partners is "beneficial" for balancing effectiveness outcomes. This is con- trary to the notion that a few good friends are better than a hundred acquaintances. But the advantages of a few close trading friends are, I 'think, outweighed by the possibility of "withholding" by A which becomes a great potential threat when B has few others to whom to turn. Also contrary to my hypothesis are the savings attending standardization, e.g., higher maintenance costs if some imported machines require Russian nuts while others need American bolts. Both the standardization and the friendship arguments are assumed to be lflmortant in situations where other things (i.e., dependence) are €9ual. If B divides its total trade equally between A1 and A2, A1 BDd A2 in turn must each do half their trade with B in order for dependence to be equal. Any lop-sidedness in the number of exchange Partners would have a negative effect on the underdog's balancing effectiveness. No prior theoretical reasons can be given regarding therelative importance of exports and imports. Therefore, the hypothesis will be tested separately for each. 38.1 The smaller the number of trading partners accounting for 50 per cent of a country's total exports, the smaller the growth rate of effectiveness measures at T]. 38.2 Same as above, but for T1 and T2 respectively. 38.3 Same as 38.1, but for imports. 38.4 Same as 38.2, but for imports. When the above tests are controlled for SEI (38.5 to 38.8) there will be a total of eight subhypotheses. I' 00-. . o— I- _ _. ..-- . n ' o u... o ..-,-.. '0 . n a. _. . u I- . .. o|~ . I" 32 After a certain exchange inequality between A and B has been created or simply exists, hypotheses 3C and 30 take up the question of foreign aid as a possible balancing move on the part of A. Since this study takes B's point of view, I will not take up here the complex question of "cui bono?"--who really benefits from foreign aid. Rather, Iwill again use Emerson's balancing theorem as an inference guide and examine two different aspects of aid. Hypothesis 3C This hypothesis treats aid as a dependent variable. The lndePendent variable is the same used in hypothesis 1, the exchange Position of 8 relative to the 01d EC countries. How does B's exchange Position with A (the 01d EC) affect the amount of aid20 8 receives fWTmlgflternative trading partners? Theoretically, this is an intriguing PVOPMmisince it assumes a set of conditions worth looking into in theh‘own right. Specifically, it assumes at least that: (a) A's exchanges with B are constantly "watched" by alternatives to A; (b) aid is not just a "status giving" balancing operation at A's disposal but an option also at the disposal of others who exchange or anticipate exchanging with B; 20The amount of aid, of course, could itself be considered as a balancing effectiveness outcome. In that sense, this hypothesis is a special case of hypothesis 1. V L a l U l P 0" ' § l ‘ n' V ..w ~ ‘ ‘ ‘D- I g _ I - v ‘ l ' n u, ‘ 'I . - ‘ o .- ‘ ‘I"‘ Do. .' bar ‘ s. C . . .‘r-- ,.’ . l e " IA _ « ‘nu. ‘A i v.. ‘o u . 'u. ‘I- c "x I p -I i '- o .'-> u 0‘ ..~ 5‘ ~. 'w‘ . '~ .I - .- I. ‘- o ‘5 ‘l .. ‘ o“ _._ — I ‘ . k P . x v ‘... u‘ ' ‘ \ < . I I 33 (c) aid-giving is a potential "coalition formation" balancing move as well, in which an outsider attempts to decrease B's imbalance vis-a-vis A. In this particular hypothesis, I only inquire how the alternatives to A react toward an unequal exchange relation between A and B. An inverse relationship is predicted between the inequality between A and B at some base period and the amount of aid extended to B by'alternatives to A at a later time. To put it another way, thelnore nearly equal 8 is relative to A, the more aid 8 will re- ceive from other nations. 3C.l The larger the negative trade balance (exchange inequality) of a developing country with the 01d EC at T , the smaller the amount of aid per capita receiveg from non-EC nations at T]. 3C.2 Same as above, but at T] and T2 respectively. 3C.3 Same as 3C.l, but with trade balance in per capita form. 3C.4 Same as 3C.2, but with trade balance in per capita form. In on hypotheses, "aid" is measured as the grant-equivalent value of theinansaction. Controls for total amount of aid received from all somtes (3C.5 - 3C.8) and for debt-servicing performance (3C.9 - 3C.12) willbe used. Debt-servicing performance is especially important, not because aid incurs return-obligations but because a good debt-servicing ability is an indication that the country is already in fairly good financial shape. If the motive for aid-gifts were really pure altruism ("status giving"), the countries having the greatest inequality with A and the .n' I_.... .. . . _.~.- 1"...'. I "' gt 1" 34 poorest debt-servicing ability would receive the most aid. I predict that the opposite will happen. The situation is analogous to a "poor risk" shopping around for another insurance company. The worse his or her standing with the present insurance company (in Emerson's terms, the more dependent B is upon A), the harder it is to find an alterna- tive insurance company (exchange partner). Hypothesis 30 The final hypothesis in this study inquires into the condi- tions under which the "poor risk“ will receive assistance from someone. Research on group behavior (e.g.,Kpgan and Wallach, 1967) shows that groups will more often make risky decisions than would members of the same groups as individuals. Along this line of reasoning, aid as an altruistic ("status giving") balancing operation should more likely occur from multilateral than from bilateral (individual country) sources. Multilateral aid should be given for purposes of helping B where the need is greatest, whereas bilateral aid would be given where the giver can expect some benefits for itself. Without being too technical, let me mention two ways in which (bilateral) givers ensure some gains (low risk) for themselves through their aid "gifts." The giving of tied aid is a common practice, requiring that the aid be spent for products from the giving country. Also associated with bilateral aid is the giving of products made by the giver but not the receiver, thus discouraging B's development of competitive products . .a' a". .--”" ... .9 .0“ . u a... 35 A greater part of the aid given by multilateral agencies should be "real aid" than is true of aid given bilaterally. To date, there is no satisfactory formula for computing the actual grant- equivalent amount contained in aid flows (see Horvath, 1974). The crude estimates of grant-equivalent aid which I use are the best avail able but still overestimate the "real aid" from bilateral givers. It should be apparent why aid from multilateral sources (either from the major capitalist givers belonging to the Organization for Economic and Cultural Development (OECD) or from the socialist “ember countries within the United Nations Conference of Trade and DeveloPment(UNCTAD) is predicted to have more beneficial results for B's development than is bilateral aid. For one thing, many aid-giving nations divide their total aid between bilateral and multilateral channels. Those projects which yield no direct return for the giver, SUCh as certain infrastructural investments and some expenditures on healfliand nontechnical education, would be delegated (transferred) to anmltilateral agency. Such an agency is less subject to pressure frominterest groups (i.e., intracountry groups) and also is more prone to absorb the blame for risky decisions. From the point of view of any given 8, this hypothesis pre- dicusa direct relation between the percentage of its total aid receipts frmnnmltilateral sources and its balancing effectiveness outcomes at a later time point. 30.1 The higher the percentage of total aid receipts of a country which are from multilateral sources at T0, the larger the growth rate of effective- ness measures at T]. 36 30.2 Same as above, but for T1 and T2 respectively. As before, all aid is measured as grant-equivalent aid per capita.21 The predicted associations ought to be stronger if one amtrtils for total amount of aid received by B (30.3 - 30.4) and if one partials out the effects of SEI (30.5 - 30.6) and of debt-servicing performance (30.7 - 30.8). Balapcing Effectiveness Outcomes: The Main Dependent Variable The primary dependent variable requires some elaboration at this Point. The label "balancing effectiveness outcomes" is mislead- ing in some ways since I do flpt_measure the relative closure or widening of the exchange gap between developing and developed countries (see e.g., Ward _e_t__a_l_., 1971; Pearson, 1969, etc.). I measure B's Progress in moving in the direction of "development," but I do not meamne A's progress. 8 may experience a great deal of growth with- outcflosing its gap with A, if A's growth equals or exceeds that of 13. Since I do focus upon externally caused changes in growth rates 0Vfl"time, and since the relations among nations have been conceptual- izmias exchanges which may be--or may catalyze--balancing operations, it seems appropriate to call the hypothesized results of such exchanges balancing outcomes. lef better grant-equivalent data had been available, there should be no differences between the effectiveness outcomes of the two types of aid--save perhaps some difference in administration costs. 37 "Balancing effectiveness outcomes'l refers to the amount of the variance in intracountry development growth rates that is accounted for by a country's dealings with abroad. For example, one such indicator is the growth rate of caloric food supply per capita. A study about "balancing effectiveness outcomes" would p_o_t_ be concerned with all possible or likely factors influencing that growth rate (e.g., climate, population growth, fatalistic religious belief systems, etc.). It is only concerned with that portion of the growth related to externally induced factors such as imports of fertilizer, training of agronomists funded by foreign aid, foreign construction of hygienic food storage areas, and the like. One could distinguish between factors that operate in the absence of external exchange and factors that are more likely to operate in the presence of such exchange. The overall de- pendent variable in this study focuses upon the latter. 21 A list of the specific indicators of "balancing effective- ness outcomes" follows, in order to give a clearer idea of the content 01' this variable. All are change rates over time. See Appendix B for the specifics of operationalization and sources of data. Direction assumed to Indicator indicate improvement % change over time in: a. Dependence upon one export item Decrease \ fi 21 0 one so . . . . 0 o o .- tion Within a c1ally important indicator, that of income distribu . country's po ulation, was omitted because data were onl awnlable for twelve countaies. y lite Most of the indicators used are standard ones found in the rature on development. 38 Indicator % change over time in: b. Debt-servicing position (ratio of principal service payments over interest pay- ments) International Monetary Fund quota position, in per cent Gross Domestic Product per capita (in constant dollars) Per cent of GDP generated by agriculture Capital formation in per- centage of GDP Per cent of external public debt owed to private credi- tors Per cent of external public debt owed to international organizations Cost of living Percentage of population in primary education Percentage of population in secondary education Percentage of population in tertiary education Electricity consumption per capita Daily caloric food supply Per’capita Increase Increase Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease (smaller Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase Direction assumed to indicate improvement (1’) m increase) 39 Direction assumed to Indicator indicate improvement % change over time in: 0. Percentage of population Increase living in urban areas p. Number of research institu- Increase tions (including universities) per 500,000 persons q. Population size (average Decrease annual growth rate) (smaller increase) r. Number of telephones Increase per 100 persons 5. Military expenditures per _ Decrease capita (in constant dollars) Concluding_Remarks In summary, I would like to provide a diagramatic overview of my hypotheses with respect to (a) what relations among the variables are predicted; (b) which control variables should be taken into account; and (c) which terminological equivalence between Emerson's micro-level and my macro-level concepts is suggested. As was pointed out in the introduction, all independent variables are exogeneous factors, i.e., none would influence B's progress in the absence of international exchange. Since we do know that indigenous variables also play an important role, spectacular correlations should not be expected. However, the search for high correlations is not even the aim of this research. 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UXW :0Q3 UWMLCMDEDQUD hLm ‘7‘. ‘1.. 1’1. 'nl I’lLl..-’ ll 067tid.viv.' vwi 1:. near CHAPTER III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY In this chapter I describe and discuss the procedures for collecting, preparing, transforming, and evaluating the data. A research project may be compared to the making of a movie. In the language of that metaphor, this section deals with the type of camera equipment and film used, the rationale for "shooting" some scenes in natural settings and others in the "studio," the editing and cutting 0f the filmed scenes, and the like. I begin with the choice of "actors" for my drama. Samplipg_Procedures My empirical unit of analysis is the country or nation-state. Those included in this study represent both a sample and universe. They constitute an empirical universe because they include all countries 23 i nvited in 1973 to negotiate with the EC. The theory, however, con- tains no location or time specifications; it applies to _a_ny_ exchange at any time in the past or future, involving either individual persons 0?“ aggregate exchange partners. In theoretical terms, my set of g 23This invitation is contained in Protocol No. 22. See E uropean Conmuni ties , 1973. 42 ‘. .~ - o .‘. -... -o.. l 43 countries comprises but a _s_alnp_l_e_ of the universe to which the theory potentially applies. On the basis of findings about this sample, I cannot state whether exchange inequality, for example, My; leads to certain effectiveness outcomes. My conclusions are descriptive of a particular group of countries at a particular point in time. The design of this study is p-centric, that is, from the point of view of the 44 developing countries that seek an association agreement with the EC. These 44 countries resemble a non-random cluster sample, relatively homogeneous as compared to the developed nations (e.g., with regard to Gross Domestic Product per capita), and sufficiently heterogeneous among themselves to allow the empiri- cal testing of certain propositions. Data Collection l\n Overview My original plan called for a two-stage design in which Published aggregate data were compared with questionnaire responses from two delegates of each country negotiating in Brussels. I wanted to identify and evaluate the impact of certain interorganizational Variables-—such as delegation authority, size of supporting staff, composition of decision-making bodies, and the "profile strength" 01‘ interorganizational units--upon the balancing effectiveness out- comes referred to in the previous chapter. Figure 6 illustrates the overall theoretical model I had hoPGd to test. Values for the organizational variables (see Box III in Figure 6) were to be obtained from these questionnaires, while the ... a. cu. in. ""I. . .- Q a . ‘_ . . o‘ ‘ u _ u e I' '0 . ... .I n ,I. on 0 ...! '\ 'Iv- .. , I. ‘ .' _ it u ”we. r ‘- o I ‘9. ~‘ ‘0 o w 'I . ._' ro. ' 4 o .‘ _. e I'- .5 a... c... 'p. . r. o .1 l . v.‘ I v _\' ~‘ .\ ‘ o ,. .. o v. I ., . u'n - .l ,. ' I _ o ‘ I '1- . '_-, , ‘.L | 'I a P- o. ' I d 44 exchange variables (Box II) were to be operationalized using aggre- gate data. To prepare for questionnaire administration and to collect otherwise unobtainable aggregate data, I visited the Brussels negotiations in December and January of l973/74 and again in June, 1974. A number of events prevented me from testing the entire model (Figure 6) in the present study. These circumstances included the oil crisis which partially crippled the EC as a multilateral entity, the slow progress of the negotiations, the fact that many of my questions touched upon areas under negotiation and proved too sensitive to be asked until negotiations were completed, and the surprisingly open admittance that I--coming from the U.S.-~might be 24 As a result, I separated the testing of the model into spying. two distinct phases, postponing that part dependent upon questionnaire data until a later time. The present study builds extensive empirical groundwork by constructing directional exchange matrices over time (see Table A.3, Appendix A), by collecting information on many social variables. and by testing some exchange-theoretical hypotheses. With this under- pinning, I will be in a good position later to assess the impact of 24"Le fait d'ailleurs que l'initiative de l'enquéte soit américaine a joué un role indéniable dans ce 'sabotage'." This quotation is from a letter addressed to me by Monsieur Doucy, Presi- dent of the Institute for Public Opinion Research of the Free University of Brussels and is dated October 1, 1974. A copy of that letter and of the questionnaires is available upon request. 45 I. BACKGROUND VARIABLES (at Time 1) Including: RESOURCES INDUSTRIALIZATION TECHNOLOGY WELFARE SYSTEM via URBANIZATION assumption L_p CHARTER/IDEOLOGY II. ANTECEDENT VARIABLES DEGREE OF EQUALITY/ INEQUALITY OF EXCHANGE NUMBER OF EXCHANGE PARTNERS NUMBER OF POSSIBLE ALTERNA- via TIVE EXCHANGE PARTNERS hypothesis NUMBER OF EXCHANGE DIMENSIONS III INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INTERORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURAL SETTING (aid & trade organizations) including: COMPLEXITY SIZE COORDINATION OF WORKFLOW (e.g., aid). INTERDEPENDENCE OF WORKFLOW V ia . via hypotheses IV ‘- \l hypotheses EEJHIS STUDY DEPENDENT VARIABLES (at Time 2) EFFECTIVENESS OF AID AND TRADE PROGRAMS DEVELOPMENT (intra-country) CLOSING OF EXCHANGE INEQUALITY (inter-country) W \ FTgure 6. Illustration of the theoretical model of which this study tests one part. 0p: ... 46 interorganizational variables upon balancing effectiveness outcomes. This second test phase, for the reasons mentioned, will have to wait until the political negotiations in Brussels have been completed. Consequently, the data reported here are all aggregate, interval-scale data. Many are from published and unofficial EC and African sources, obtained in Brussels. In addition, I made extensive IJSE of United Nations publications, World Bank periodicals and staff [Dapers, and studies published by the Agency for International Develop- rnent (A.I.D.). A detailed description of how each variable was opera- ‘tionalized and the sources from which data were collected appears in Appendix B. PY‘ocedure of Data Gathering axnd Processing Once I made the decision to select from the overall theoreti- Cal model (Figure 6) the link between exchange and effectiveness out- comes, I designed a time-series model for data gathering. Information For all 44 developing countries, six "old" and three "new" EC nations, and four "alternative" countries (Japan, U.S., U.S.S.R., and P.R. China) was to be collected on all indicators for Sixteen points in time from 1958 to 1972. This time-series model was eventually truncated (see Figure 7) by grouping the Sixteen time points into three spans, referred to in (1962-1966), and T this report as T0 (l958—l960). T (1968-1972)- 1 2 Many data. especially for the newly independent nations, were not available on a yearly basis. Since procedures for estimating the missing N=(A) 44 deve- IOping C0 untries ( b) 13 developed COuntri es 47 EFFECTIVENESS OUTCOMES -INDICATORS- Bahamas France ‘ +—__——‘. I I I I I I I I ‘I" I I I \ \ Guyana - r \ \ Liberia - , , 1 \ \ Netherlands - Tanzania 0 / / Zambia . T0 T1 T2 1958/60 1962/66 1968/72 Figure 7. Truncated Time Series Model. ..-»o; r 9r“ "' .e- v '5‘». U .... .... fl . ....r nE’E C “.F‘ hub-d . . :0; 4:0 "~‘ou-b uh.‘ i ”h 48 chta bebueen census-taking years do not produce reliable data, the original time-series model was modified to one with three time periods. More than three values per country was available for most indicators; in these cases, averages were computed for each time span. Altogether thirty indicators were selected or constructed. If each indicator were counted at each time, there would be a total of 72 indicators for which reasonably complete data were available. (Inadequate data occurred primarily for T0, before many developing countries had adequate statistical services). The primary independent variable-~exchange inequality--was operationalized as a balance of goods and services exchanged over the, i.e., as a balance of trade and not a balance of payments. lTade flows between and among the 44 developing and nine EC countries were analyzed. To account for the notion of alternative exchange partners, four principal non-EC trade and aid partners were added, naking a grand total of 57 countries. Coding forms were designed to record both imports and ex- ports from each country to each other country at eight points in time, NItwo-year intervals from l958 to l972. These eight points were then collapsed, producing averaged values for three time periods. This has the advantage of adjusting for abnormal Short-term situa— tions due to internal factors, such as a crop failure or a civil war. 25 From this data base, I constructed a number of "who-with- Mwmfl matrices for the directional flow of goods and services over ‘_ 25For source references and details of operationalization see Appendix B. A p ' U 0. . .‘. .2 :Ft: "A V' “n. ‘0 .n...‘ “ I . . 5 ‘ 5.... ~. \ ... F‘ . If; .“ H . f F.‘,r '- v .U V‘. ‘l .. ,. h Irm- _\ $9. . ‘F- .. . I-PA“ fl.‘ h 5 49 time bEtween/among the 57 nations. For each time period, this in- cluded matrices of raw exports in thousand dollars, of exports as a percentage of a country's total exports, of raw imports and of im- ports as a percentage of a country's total imports, and a final balance of trade matrix (raw exports minus raw imports). The last matrix for each of these three time periods is found in Tables A.3, Appendix A. These matrices, and derived grouped statistics, repre- sent my efforts to operationalize the independent variable "exchange inequality." The nineteen indicators of the major dependent variable "Effectiveness outcomes" measure different aspects of a country's we] 1”are and development status (see Appendix B for specific opera- tionaT ization procedures). In content they could be likened to the maJOY. departments of any national government. With respect to internal affairs (intra-country effective- ne . . $8) a treasury department handles questions of economic growth, a de partment of social welfare focuses on education and individual we] Fa he, a conmerce department upon corrmunications, a department of def - ense upon military questions, and a housing and urban development depar“'ilment sets policies on urbanization and population growth. For each of these major areas, I have from one to four specific indicators. C) Those indicators dealing with a country's position vis-a-vis tthQ‘r‘ nations (inter-country effectiveness) are of particular interest Q “1% . They ought to be more prone to external exchange influences an d therefore Should exhibit stronger correlations. Among the fifteen .. ‘r‘r‘ I . ‘ c'II- 1 I u ‘ fl _ - 3"' us} a .T "" a... a 7“ . I ‘.‘) )hvv ..‘r “"‘on,. . ‘O .1, rl’ ("TI 50 indicators of intra-country affectiveness, I will pay special atten- tion to the Six which are "future-oriented," directly affecting development in the years to come (capital formation, population QY‘OWth rate, number of research institutions, and enrollments in Primary, secondary, and tertiary education). Each of these measures of effectiveness outcomes will be cons idered on its own merits; no scaling or other data reduction tech n i ques were used . ComeT eteness and Reliability \ $9 ata Most research reports dealing with published (aggregate) data repeat a standard set of cautionary statements. They cite the “”0131 ems of meaning equivalence of concepts across cultures (see Prze‘Norski and Teune, 1973), the unreliability of data collected by new1y established statistical services (see Adelman and Morris, 1967), the Caution necessary in interpreting data about politically sensitive areas (see Cutright, 1965), and so on. I can only add that most of the ‘i‘ hdicators included in this study have been double-checked by C c o o n o a ompabing multiple sources and that few politically senSitive indi- c o o o a atohs were used. Of those particularly senSitive indicators that we . be selected, income distribution had to be omitted because of the pauqi ty of data and military expenditure data was obtained from a 5Q . uhce outside the governments in question, namely the U.S. Arms Con- t. . . ho] and Disarmament Agency. Data on urbanization takes into account ‘1: ,, . he Varying definitions of what is considered "urban, Since each C , . . . Ountry reported statistics according to its own definition. :13: 1' are "ex"; jut-:0 -‘ 9...‘ ,F, " \ui.‘ §\. I .‘5. . ‘0‘ a " l ...,,5"r~ «i. ‘ nil: ‘ "‘:':'- q' .- 'Iu: '4'. 6‘9 C v'.~;_ ". A ‘ >26 3"] 3' a; i.“ ‘- .. 9% 5e ‘ a " A f‘a , in. .. r” - I »S C ‘POQ .I r. ' ' 'f r6 O a ‘J e L : . ’3‘. 9 . “' E: H: e ‘ I ":/3"'S S‘i ., ""I\Jn of I ' "" "diri 'r i 51 In the interest of obtaining comparable and more complete data, indicators of enrollment in primary, secondary, and tertiary education were recomputed from per cent of age group enrolled to per Cent of total population enrolled. Many countries report the absol ute number of students but not the number of persons in various age groups. Taking the number of students as a percentage of total POPU'Iation, although adding a source of error by not accounting for differences in age profiles among countries, proves to be a minor prob] em since only growth rates were taken as dependent variables. Otherwise, standardization procedures such as utilizing Per‘ capita figures and controlling for differential inflation by conve”ting current prices into constant dollars were applied wherever app] ‘3 cable. Table 2 gives an overview of the number of complete, "on‘missing observations for each indicator. Caution will be taken I“ the interpretation of those correlations based on smaller numbers of . . 0bServations. Numbers of observations, out of a pOSSible 44, are no ted as well on each table in which findings are reported. Data Analysis After collecting and processing the data, I took five dis- time t analysis steps in order to test my hypotheses. These included conS 1ar‘uction of (a) trade matrices, (b) several variables, (c) a CDY‘b Q1 ation matrix, and (d) partial correlation matrices. In addi- ti 0 . h ‘ I ascertained (e) Significance levels of the correlations and Par - t1 a1 correlations. a . u 0" h ’ ""0...’ ..| O ' - ." 001‘ ' . . i ‘.._.‘.. ‘. . _ - ' «HO-I'* I . .." 3.: . .‘ “ ... 3‘ ’ a: . I ....I " v I t p I -' 8.? .- I . V“ . . ( ... .5. A; . I l I "' Ji I: I r ‘j:f ... ,A ._‘ v v. :. ., F, a: ‘ o 0". ‘.| c . i -; ;|.A A: ‘ J' - u, ‘* .1 . ’. ' V I" 'TLI‘ . ‘3 “ ‘ I. P‘ Elf . .4 ~ J r ' t "L . . - I‘ :1l: r“ E‘ J -l ”'1' ’;.“ v.“ y . . a ‘t '2;. f I \L §-'. ‘ I H {a , ...: “QP’F . .~ _: s;‘ . 1 i 0.}... f.r Uhi . ¥.| :Po . 52 Table 2. Number of Complete (non-missing) Observations on 72 Indicators Out of a Total of 44 Possible Observations. ‘ Number of Time Non-Missing Indicator Name Period. . Observations Debt Servicing Performance 1 33 2 34 Amount of Aid (Total per Capita) 0 42 1 38 2 42 Percentage of Multilateral Aid 0 43 1 43 Susceptability to External 0 37 Infiuence 1 4l 2 43 Inequality of Trade Position 0 32 1 39 2 39 Number of Countries That Account 0 32 1Dow 50% of a Country's Imports 1 39 2 39 Number of Countries That Account 0 31 for 50% of a Country's Exports 1 39 2 39 Bvt-uiance of Trade with Old EC 0 33 Countries 1 39 2 41 Amount of Aid from Non-EC l 38 2 42 Balance of Trade with Old EC 0 33 Der capita) l 39 2 41 Decrease Over Time of a Country's 0 +1 32 Dependence Upon Any One Export 0 -> 2 32 Item--Decline/Growth Rate in Per 1 +2 34 Cent - i a. I .l I. y _—___—r ......” I--. l ‘4 fl - HID. \- ‘ . D .0" ~'r anar— D 'It! 1.. U ‘ ' I. ' I. I.‘. r \ I- . .. . ' a. - ~ P, n"‘; ' var '. a. D -- u' :0. A. A o .- . J ' s '._.“ _ . I A ‘ n. u. . N'_§ vs I UP. R‘ F v " o. e . ' . H N. F?“ ;1 “a. .. l' " ' r“.. 'i ~ 1 5 V ~ -" . . j!“ a: v . . 5 g.‘ 6. v o H " .F Lr' L ._‘ ’ . 't l . 'I. 1‘ ‘v i L ’ V .. . - A s -" “g I h . ' U1 .p. Lr‘ v- . I .5 ‘ I L ‘d‘ I:' .. .' 'tPt 5‘ ‘._ Ji v F‘. . . .‘V‘ F 1 P ' h u, .. I I in" . 5' I“ . i H. V . o '0‘” y. i .. ' ~' l‘. .-’\ . ‘ H l "ur "u‘ y I 53 Kb] e 2. Continued . Number of Time Non-Missing Indicator Name Period Observations Debt Servicing Performance 1 + 2 33 INF Quota Position 1 + 2 32 GDP Per Capita 0 -> I 40 O + 2 4O 1 + 2 41 Per Cent of GDP That iS Generated O + l 40 by Agriculture 0 + 2 40 1 + 2 41 CaDital Formation O + 1 39 0 -> 2 38 1 + 2 39 Per Cent of External Public Debt i .. 2 21 ed to Private Banks and Other '3'“? vate Creditors Per Cent of External Public Debt 1 + 2 19 0Wed to International Organizations C°St of Living 0 +1 25 O + 2 25 1 + 2 37 :9!“ Cent of Population in O —> 1 39 "‘3 mary Education 0 -> 2 39 1 + 2 43 23" Cent of Population in 0 -> 1 39 e(:ondary Education 0 + 2 38 l + 2 42 :er cent of Population in O + l 23 Ertiary Education 0 + 2 23 I -+ 2 3I Eiectricity Consumption Per Capita O + 1 33 O -> 2 33 I + 2 38 .... .- n .A 0": 54 Tim e 2. Continued. Number of . Time Non-Missing Indicator Name Period Observations Daily Caloric Food Supply 1 —> 2 35 Per Capita Per Cent of Urban Population 1 + 2 39 ngmber of Research Institutions 1 —> 2 34 (‘Including universities) Per 500,000 Population AVerage Annual Population 0 + l 40 G'Y‘Owth Rate 0 + 2 44 I + 2 44 Telephones Per lOO Persons 0 + 1 26 0 + 2 26 I + 2 41 Mi 1 itary Expenditure Per Capita 2 —> 1 34 Decrease Over Time of a Country's 0 + 1 32 I ependence Upon Any One Export 0 + 2 32 tem I + 2 34 \ 55 It proved worthwhile to have confronted considerable technical problems during the construction of the nine 57 X 57 trade inatnices; coding mistakes and source problems (e.g., two sources re- FKthing very different figures) were detected which otherwise would have been almost impossible to find. For example, matrices showing a country's exports to various other countries as a percentage of tcrtal exports included a number of cases where totals considerably exceeded 100 per cent. A detailed comparison of original data sOurces with coded numbers and with other data sources enabled me t0 correct these errors. The construction of variables proved to be straight-forward with one exception. As Table A.5 in Appendix A shows, the values for t‘J‘Ie variable "number of countries accounting for 50 per cent of a c:Ountry's exports (imports)" have remarkably little variation. '1 had made a fiat decision when I set the 50 per cent cutting point 1=0r-that indicator of dependency. As Ray and Singer (1973) observed i'ri a different context, however, the composition of the last 50 per (item is just as important as that of the first 50 per cent. If I “Vfiere to do this again, I would change the computer Scanning program to print out the number of countries accounting for at least §_Q_ per (leent of a country's trade. Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficients26 were 26Since my analysis plan was aimed at determining the ex- tent to which external influences may, over time, account for growth rates of effectiveness indicators for the 44 developing countries as a group and not for each country separately, I decided not to use McGranahan's (1971) "correspondence analysis.‘I If that technique were extended diachronically, however, it seems very useful. 56 computed, yielding a matrix of correlations of each indicator with each other indicator. Whereas many assumptions underlying Pearson's l7--those requiring interval data, independent observations, and reasonably linear relations-- have been met, I have ignored the fact tniat.others may not be met (e.g., normality of distribution). Des- Pite Blalock's (1972: 366-369) warning, I decided that such a pro- cedure was justified because my set of countries does comprise an empirical universe, if not a theoretical one. Also, the error introduced by ignoring the normality assumption for Pearson's /& has been shown to be quite small indeed (see Zeller and Levine, 1974). Tests of the significance of correlations and partial <2- "p‘. ‘ U ‘ -‘ . A on. ' .P- ‘ In. -I'. a ‘ n h" '°' r». at ' n- ... ... '_' a ‘ 0 . “u ‘ 3‘ [I _ I V.."‘ I D. r“ r . ‘J U ‘ - I - ‘ .... ; thICP Iv. .‘ ‘- OI,L':‘ :hft‘r“ I II I... -- ’w CHAPTER IV PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS Findings related to each hypothesis are presented below, but only the major patterns of relationships will be discussed. The complete set of correlations for each hypothesis at each time period is located in Appendix C. Figure 8 provides an overview of the nineteen indicators ()f the dependent variable Effectiveness Outcomes. Findings will be (ardered according to two major categories of effectiveness indica- ‘tors, those dealing directly with a country's relations with the ()utside world (inter-country outcomes) and those dealing with its internal status (intra-country outcomes). Intra-country effective- ness outcomes, in turn, are subdivided into more "future-oriented" «ones--directly affecting future chances for development-—and the ll'Present-oriented" indicators. IIXQothesis l: Inequality of Exchange with the "old" EC in relation to Effectiveness Outcomes I view an exchange eguation between A and B as a catalyst, 'itself empty and "unproductive" but serving to facilitate or hamper B's chances to improve its position vis-a-vis A. In Hypothesis 1, I sLuggested that the magnitude of the initial gap between A and B is 58 59 _lNTER-COUNTRY Dependence upon one export item Debt servicing performance IMF quota position Debt owed to private creditors Debt owed to international organizations _LNTRA-COUNTRY a) Future-oriented 1; Capital formation 3 Research institutions 3; Primary education 3 Secondary education 3) Tertiary education 6) Population growth b) Present-oriented 1) GDP per capita 1) Electricity consumption 2) Agriculture, per cent of GDP 2) Urban population 4) Cost of living index 4; Caloric food supply Telephones 7) Military expenditures WHERE: Economic growth Urbanization Education Individual welfare Communications Population growth Military expenditures \ lfigure 8. Balancing Effectiveness Outcomes--A guide for the interpreta- tion of 19 indicators. 6O inversely related to 3'5 later success in moving toward a more balanced exchange position. That is, if B (a developing country) begins with a very large disadvantage relative to A (the Six "old" EC nations), B's chances of improvement will be hampered. Inequality of Exchange was operationalized as B's balance of trade (exports minus imports) with the "old" EC countries as a group. Both raw and per capita balance figures were utilized. Large inequality is reflected in a very low (i.e., negative) trade balance. With four exceptions (dependence on one export item, cost of living, Population growth, and military expenditures), correlations with 27 Effectiveness Outcome indicators are predicted to be positive. "Tirey will exhibit positive correlations if the hypothesis is supported, Inspection of the data tables (Tables C.l - C.4 in Appendix (3) reveals a pattern of mixed support for this hypothesis. In the discussion of this pattern, one should remember that all dependent (effectiveness) indicators are change or growth rates over time. This diachronic frame permits a possible "trigger effect" to operate, i .e., the effects of a trade deficit or surplus at T0 upon, for ex- ample, education enrollments will not be felt instantaneously but may appear later. With few exceptions, the patterns of relationships were the Same whether the independent variable was measured as a raw or a per \ 27See Appendix B for the "scoring direction" of specific 1 "dicators. Ratios such as debt-servicing performance and the re- Oring of some change rates (per cent of GDP generated by Agriculture 53(: 1: <1 external debt owed to private creditors) can be confusing; there- d9V‘e, I will indicate whether or not correlations are in the expected 1 "ection. ‘Ir 1 61 capita trade balance with the “old" EC. Below I will only cite examples of findings for the per capita indicator. 28 relation- a) Inter-country effectiveness: Significant ships were exhibited for three of the five inter-country indicators but these occurred only with the T0 balance of trade with "old" EC (OEC). These relationships were basically unaffected by partialling out the effects of SEI (susceptability to external influence) and the amount of foreign aid received. The hypothesis is supported with respect to dependence upon one export item. Correlations with balance of trade with OEC at T1 (not shown) are also in the predicted direction, although not statistically Significant. Diversification of one's economy is apparently hampered by having had a large negative trade balance With the DEC. b) Intra-country,effectiveness: Broader support for Hypothesis 1 is found for indicators of internal development, as Shown in Table 3. The T1 trade balance with OEC produces a stronger pattern of support for the hypothesis than does that at T0’ although QUite consistent support is found for both times. The hypothesis receives the most support in the areas of hIgher education (growth in number of research institutions and in \ v 28Correlations are based upon numbers of observations which (any from 19 to 41, the majority of which fall between 32 and 39. “See also Table 2 in the previous chapter). T-tests of Significance, h1ch take this into account, wereperformed. Levels of significance "e indicated as follows: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .005. a H... '.c' - a u .. I u . ... . ’ i 'w. ' u . n t. . n. v,. I , . .. . . ‘0 62 Table 3. Hypothesis l: Inter-Country Effectiveness--Selected Findings from Tables C-l to C-4. Per capita trade balance with OEC at T0 with: _V_— In the Change Rate Predicted Between Times .xé' Direction? Dependence on one 0 +l *** -.78 Yes export l + 2 * -.27 0 + 2 *** -.85 Debt servicing l —> 2 *** -.85 No performance External public debt 1 + 2 * -.3l No owed to international organizations tertiary education enrollmentszg) and communications (number of telephones per lOO persons). The least overall support is found for the period between T1 and T2, when the trade balance values are utilized. It is likely that exchange inequality with DEC has a rather inmediate impact upon certain growth indicators--especi ally Cost of living and capital formation--such that development between T1 and T2 is more affected by the T1 trade balance than by the one at T0. \ 5;. 29At T , partialling out debt servicing position produced 1:1 9nifi cant correlations for tertiary education andelectricityin Che predicted direction and. in the opposite direction, for agri- hulture (T -> T ) and secondary education (T + T ). In general, sovever, the coatrol variables had little imBact apon the relation- hl ps between trade balance with OEC and effectiveness outcomes. () One additional relationship, not in the expected direction, FQCurs when raw rather than per capita trade balance is the indicator (20" the indefident “flab“: military expenditures become signifi- aht at the .05 level. 63 Table 4. Hypothesis lA: Intra-Country Effectiveness--Selected Findings from Tables C-l to C-4. Per capita balance of trade with OEC at T with: D In the Change Rate Predicted Between Times zé’ Direction? _Eyture-oriented indicators: Capital formation 0 + l ** +.39 Yes 1 + 2 -.06 O + 2 ** +.38 Yes Tertiary education 0 + l +.26 l + 2 -.0l + 2 ** +.49 Yes firesent-oriented indicators: Cost of liv1ng 0 + 1 +.l8 l + 2 *** +.92 No 0 + 2 + .24 Telephones O + l +.l6 l + 2 +.l0 O + 2 ** +.37 Yes Per capita balance of trade with DEC at T1 with: Eflgture-oriented indicators: Research institutions l + 2 *** +.47 Yes Population growth l +.2 ** -.39 Yes 0 + 2 ** -.36 Yes .512§§ent—oriented indicators: Telephones 1 + 2 ** +.30 Yes 0 + 2 Agriculture 1 + 2 0 + 2 * +.21 Yes \ «1.... . , , .7 64 In general, a favorable trade balance with the DEC appears to further the development of future-oriented and present-oriented areas in about equal measure. It is perhaps not a startling finding that cost of living rises, rather than declines, as a country's trade position with the DEC improves. Although I had expected an Opposite finding, it is safe to assume that European inflation factors affect a country more strongly if that country is able to import conmodities with a higher "technology content," purchased with export proceeds that are generated through a trade surplus. c) Evaluation of the findings: Referring back to Figure 4 in Chapter II, the relative strength of the association measures is surprising. If one takes into account that more than one-half of the developing countries included in this study are neither colonies of the "old" EC nor had special trade associations with it, then it be- comes plausible to suspect the following: that it is not necessarily historically grown dependence but contemporary trade imbalance with the world's largest trading partner-~the European Communities--that Can affect a country's internal development. Looking at the corre- ] ation over time, it does not seem that this effect weakens up to T2 ( 1 968-1972). That these internal growth rates are related to the presence of exchange rather than being indigenous factors may be inferred from the rather high correlation between trade balance and debt servicing DeY‘formances (A: .85). Although not in the predicted direction, it SeEms clear that the latter indicator--measured as the ratio of princi- pa] service payments over interest payments on external public debt-- u... w. v u.» : o \ 65 point to a characteristic phenomenon of capitalism: As long as interest can be paid, erasing one's debt is not to the advantage of the creditor and--given a certain cost of living rise--not to the debtor either (see Appendix B, 8-9 and 8-10, and Hilferding, l9l0). This line of reasoning seems to be supported by the rather high intercorrelation of debt servicing performance and cost of living (A= .77). H,xgothesis 2: Overall Inequality of Exchange in relation to Effectiveness Outcomes Hypotheses l and 2 both attempt to link inequality of exchange with effectiveness outcomes, i.e., with B's chances to accomplish balancing operations over time. The first hypothesis (jeaalt with B's exchange position in relation to A, whereas this one addresses itself to 3'5 overall position (trade balance) with ‘tlie»rest of the world. This overall balance of trade is measured as the percentage of total exports that are "covered" by a country's ‘tIDtal imports; any value exceeding lOD per cent indicates a negative (IJnequal) trade position. All correlations are predicted to be negative with the exception of dependence upon one export item, C031; of living, population growth, and military expenditures. The first--and surprising-~observation is that the number ()1: significant correlations drops sharply as compared with the re- s“Its obtained in the first hypothesis (see Tables C-5 and C-6 Versus Tables C-l to C-4 in Appendix C). Only nine of the nineteen indicators show a significant correlation at either time period and, ii1t the second time, only four of the nineteen are significant at all. 1:13 is tempting to interpret this crude finding as an indication that 66 having a trade deficit with the EC is much more consequential for a developing country's effectiveness growth rates than having a deficit with alternative trading partners. However, such an interpretation would rest on firmer ground if I had (a) tested this more directly, using trade balance with non-EC countries (overall balance minus balance with the "old" EC) and (b) if the trade balances in the two hypotheses had been measured by identical procedures. A closer inspection of Tables C-5 and C-6 reveals the following specific findings . (a) Inter-comm effectiveness: Only the ratio of principal Service payments over interest payments, my indicator of debt servic- ‘3 ng performance, shows a moderate and significant correlation with the overall trade balance--and not in the direction predicted by the hypothesis, a substantial change from the respective correlation in the former hypothesis (see Table 3:/1 = .85; Table 5: l’- = .29). Wriible 5. Hypothesis 2: Inter-Country Effectiveness--Selected Findings from Tables C-l to C-4. —‘ Overall trade balance at T0 with: In the Change Rate Predicted Between Times Direction? 1 +2 * +.29 No Debt servicing \ Even this relationship holds only at T0 but not at T]. It 1 S of interest that the relation between overall trade position and the percentage of external public debt owed to international organi- zattions changes from an almost significant +.27 at T0 to a slightly 67 negative correlation at T1 which is in the predicted direction. Finally, I should point out that one of the strongest relationships in the first hypothesis, with a country's dependence upon one export item, drops markedly when the independent variable is overall trade balance rather than balance with the DEC. Although the correlations in both instances are in the predicted direction, the T0 values drop from .88 to .l3 between hypotheses l and 2. I suspect that this change in the correlation from hypothesis l to hypothesis 2 is a result of a particular “weakness" of the European Comnunities. The EC is dependent upon imports of raw products, i.e., the export conunodities included in this study (see Appendix B, 8-2), unlike any other major trading power (except Japan). To turn this dependence into a power advantage relative to the developing c=C>untries is perhaps one of the more startling findings and would vI"equire a major refinement of the Emersonian theoretical scheme. For example, one of the “actions" that seems to have no balancing intentions (see p. 26) on the part of "old" EC members 8 ueh as France and "new" EC members such as Great Britain has been 1“We creation and maintenance of currency areas, the Franc zone and the Sterling bloc respectively. To pay for a developing country's export items with these "hard" currencies at a price that tends to be set in the capitals of these currencies is one of the mechanisms for the maintenance of a power advantage.30 \ 3OOne principal weakness of my operationalization of trade 8&1 ance is that these currency factors have not been accounted for. For a discussion of donmarable data were simply not available. ependence through currency ties, see Singer, 1972: 266 ff. ¥ . . c a"; :0 Ar . - .I'V ' . . n I NOIA 2"- - f' I. b"" 6 i . . :Ia ‘ 'O'|1l n o . ,..r I“ z' a ‘ V. b ‘ n A r‘ -b U) i- ll ' .'¢.; ‘P:Q'p;‘ ‘6 0b Jt"filh c. é'Cc'sf:.*e: l'!-.. x ’ ... ‘P‘r Q I . .1. "Elamcns ‘ ., . :"EIE-teq to C'- fi'lthe shcrt n. I I I r".‘ "vi \ ‘. u "I" h u; _ .(:’?\ “Mr 0“, Q; I’rpfl'- -u I bvnb on on, 0"“ f' ‘,.r u 3.3' s s gr' STE: becomes 68 b) Intra-country effectiveness: There are four groups of correlations that should receive attention in this section. First, the relationship of overall trade balance at T0 with capital forma- tion is inconclusive (see Table 6). Capital formation growth between T1) and T1 is significant at the .05 level in the predicted direction but switches in the opposite direction during the following period, again to a significant level. This suggests that the influence of trade deficits at one time period may even stimulate the formation ()1: capital at a later time. Second, the percentage of GDP generated by agriculture-- often considered an important indicator for industrial growth (see Kuznets et al., l955)--shows a significant but contradictory pattern Of correlations with overall balance of trade. Trade balance at T0 ‘3 3 related to change rate in agriculture over the long run (T0 - T2) and in the short run between T0 and T]--both opposite the predicted direction. With trade balance at T], the long-run change in agri- culture becomes significant at the .05 level in the predicted (iirection. Third, there are surprisingly significant correlations in the opposite direction between overall trade balance and military expenditures. It will be recalled that the trade balance with the "01d" EC yielded a significant correlation but in the predicted di rection. Having a good overall trade position seems to allow a developing country to reduce military expenditures, whereas just the t)Dposite seems true if it has a good trade balance with the DEC. 69 'Table 6. Hypothesis 2: Intra-Country Effectiveness-~Selected Findings from Tables C-5 and C-6. ()verall trade balance at T with: .2 O In the Change Rate Predicted Between Times ,4_ Direction? fflgture-oriented indicators: Capital fermation O 2 ** -.38 Yes l + 2 ** +.4l No O-+ 2 ** -.31 Yes Population growth 0 l * +.39 Yes 1 + 2 +.02 O + 2 -.O4 firesent-ori ented indicators: Agriculture 0 + l ** +.32 No l + 2 -.l2 0 + 2 ** +.26 No Urban population 1 + 2 * -.29 Yes Military expenditures 1 + 2 * -.28 No Electricity 0 + l +.OO l + 2 * +.24 No 0 + 2 -.02 Overall trade balance at T1 with: inslture-oriented indicators: Population growth 1 + 2 *** +.50 Yes 0 + 2 *** +.42 Yes .13!:§§ent-oriented indicators: .Agriculture l + 2 +.O6 O + 2 ** -.27 Yes lWilitary expenditures l + 2 ** -.35 No \ 0." . a .' ....- ‘ a 0 ii. w \ v '- II J“, u- - .- u ‘u v ’v ~§ . ~ ‘~ 70 And finally, the highest correlations of all are between overall trade balance at T1 and average annual growth rate of popu- lation.31 The greater one's trade deficit, the higher is the population growth rate in both the short and the longer run (both significant at the .005 level). Again, it is worth pointing out that.this expected relationship holds only with regard to overall trade inequality and not with inequality vis-a-vis the DEC. c) Evaluation of the Findings: In discussing this second hypothesis, I have emphasized the--at times--striking differences t>eetween the measures of exchange inequality in hypothesis l and h.ypothesis 2, with respect to patterns of effectiveness outcomes. A developing country's trade position (with one group of developed <2()untries (the "old" EC) appears more consequential for its develop- 'T1€2nt than does its overall trade position with the world. I found moderate supporting evidence for the hypothesis 11i1at the magnitude of unequal exchange does, in general, have a I“liampering effect on B's attempts to move toward balance. Further- ‘Tlcnre, negative influence is stronger when one important set of "Zlnading partners is analytically separated from the total. To put ‘i‘t:differently, an exchange partner's chances of achieving balance \ 31Controls for SEI at T serve to raise correlations from 1t’1e .lO to the .05 level of signiQicance, in the predicted direction, .4F13r population growth (TO + T2) and also for urban population (T]'+ :2 Use of aid as a control variable at T makes the relation- :irrip with secondary education (I -l') significant at the .10 level, Lrt not in the expected directioR. Pgrtialling out the effect of SE1 1? 'T reveals a correlation with tertiary education (T — T ) which is ES‘Isganicant at the .lO level, in the opposite directioR fro that pre- d‘i cted by the hypothesis. .- .. I III ‘ Jo ,, 'A. A, ' . I I . , 0' U . "P 9': -rr r v i '- . O u- “vac. l f“"" ..n bur! 5' -’ :-.--:u'- -«r0r ff .0. IS r: u e - :g‘." ”'P:p t: g {3? its ;:'s:".ar gfin‘ ;." 1‘" (‘9‘. ... . .) “cui] 1."- \- V .l' 7‘2“”: .. 71 vary not only with the magnitude of the initial exchange gap but al50\uith the constellation of exchange partners. Although I did not directly compare exchange relations of B with different sets of specific partners, it seems that the presence of alternative exchange partners (alternative to the EC) certainly did not decrease B's chances for improving its position. Further research should investigate in greater depth the exact meaning of "constellation of exchange partners." To apply Eknersonian guidelines proves not to be particularly useful in this itmstance, because the analytical restriction to a dyadic relationship W‘i th only peripheral references to constellation-specific actions Estnch as coalition formation ignores, for example, that coalitions rmay promote or present balancing operations. In the present context, 'i‘t.should be explored whether the 44 developing countries will bene- ‘f’it more from entering into an association agreement with the enlarged 53!: than they did when trading with the CEO and with the new EC members Separately. Turning to the presentation and discussion of the next group (Di'hypotheses, I shall now investigate to what extent "internal" and "external" dependence are in fact synonymous with being at a disadvant— Eige in an unequal exchange situation. .EixPothesis 3A: Dependence upon one export item in relation to effectiveness outcomes Arguing against theorists who define power in terms of an a(I'tor's attributes, Emerson instead claims that power and dependence (Dllght to be defined in terms of the relational properties of exchange. t u.- 0-. 72 The present study explores the feasibility of systematically chang- ing the context of Emerson's exchange-theoretical propositions and derived extrapolations thereof. In the context of the exchange be-4 tween and among countries, the concept of "dependence" certainly has a number of very different, if perhaps interrelated, meanings. One meaning of dependence in this setting stems from the developing country's internal economic strucutre; if a very high Percentage of B's bundle of goods-for—exchange is taken up by just one export comnodity, B's vulnerability to shift in the world market Situation should also be high. Hypothesis 3A suggests that B's per- centage of total exports accounted for by one export item is inversely Y‘elated to growth of effectiveness indicators. All correlations with effectiveness indicators are predicted to be negative, again with the exceptions of cost of living, average annual population growth, military expenditures per capita, and dependence upon one export ‘i tem.32 a) Inter-country effectiveness: Neither a country's Inter- national Monetary Fund quota position nor its indebtedness to private Creditors is noticeably correlated with conmodity dependence, nor Were they strongly related to exchange inequality in hypotheses l and 23. Even debt servicing performance, important in previous hypotheses, 32Hence dependence upon one export item, as an independent Variable, was correlated with its own rate of change. There is some question of the conceptual independence of these two variables--although the empirical relationships were not high--and these correlations were eXcluded from the sumnary tables included in the text. 73 exhibited weak and inconclusive results. The remaining two inter- country effectiveness indicators, however, show significant correla- tions. Percentage of external public debt owed to international organizations is highly significant in the expected direction, but only with T0 values of the independent variable (shown in Table 7). Even international organizations seem to favor less-dependent countries, increasingly prefering them over the "dependent" countries (who are presumably more in need of their lower interest rates). When the effect of SEI is partialled out, this correlation approximates ~.48 with comnodity dependence at both T0 and T1 (see Tables C-7 and C~8 in Appendix C). Correlations of dependence upon one export item with its Own change rate (not shown) vary in direction. Commodity dependence at T0 is positively related to its rate of change between T0 and T1 . ”in the expected direction. However, commodity dependence at T1 has the opposite effect on the T0 —> T2 change rate. Both correlations "each the .05 level of significance. The question of debt servicing will be brought up again in the discussion of the succeeding hypotheses. It should be mentioned i n this context, that one of the major international organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) refinances the loans it provides to developing countries, to a large extent with capital which it t)Orrows at the prevailing interest rates from principal money markets ‘3 h the United States and Europe. For example, normal loans from the IMF cost 4.25 per cent in the late l940$ and a little over 8 per cent I Q 6 ...» .. r- o u g P.‘ -. | .rhh \- .. .‘ 5.. 'n". ' .‘I r- ‘" --yu~ P C t“ "‘ l" rr 'w w (‘5 v o v u“,; . .; ‘Z’ifns . 5“"v . ,- -"-‘-"' 7'sr "“'- ur'l 5 ~‘ :".1 g l‘ I .u :A 5.1 p P“... i h; . .. ""arrghnr '5 u..v i: ‘;."V:§‘-A ':"&ut ,rs b) I, : \ ' sill-*1 ) 74 Table 7. Hypothesis 3A: Inter-Country Effectiveness--Selected Findings from Tables C-7 and C-8. Dependence upon one export item at T0 with: In the Change Rate Predicted Between Times /1 Direction? External public debt 1 2 * -.35 Yes owed to international organizations Dependence upon one export item atT1 with: External public debt owed l 2 ** -.46 Yes to international organizations k; iri 1970 (see Dsipov, 1972: 200). Only a relatively small share of the IfflF loans is given at lower interest rates. These latter "soft" loans Eilne administered by a sub-organization of the IMF, the International [)eavelopment Association (IDA). The "old" six member countries of the EElJropean Communities hold a 18.47 per cent share of the voting power 'i vi the IMF, whereas the 44 developing countries included in this study ticald a 7.05 per cent share. The merger of the three "new“ EC members Y“iaised the EC's share to 29.17 per cent. In other words, even the eaakternal public debt repaid by developing countries to international Organizations is really paid back to an organization where no other (3(3untry in the world exceeds the EC with respect to voting power in t:he Executive Directorate. b) Intra-country effectiveness: Virtually all indicators ()1: economic growth (GDP per capita, electricity consumption, and ..uo; ‘Pfl';. or a 1- ‘ni s 4.. . ‘\ — u-r ' C-.- I c ... .. ;r‘ - JU o w. v 75 capital formation) are significantly correlated with a developing country's dependence upon one export commodity (see Table 8). Of these, GDP and capital formation are related in the predicted direction and the results for electricity consumption are inconclu- s ive (when controlled33 for debt servicing performance at T], the correlation becomes significant in the opposite direction). It is worth mentioning that exchange inequality, measured either as overall trade balance or balance with DEC, had no noticeable effect upon gross domestic product. With respect to Emerson's theorum, I suspect that a developing country's chance of closing the GDP gap With exchange partners is related to its having a "balanced" (i.e., diversified) assortment of exchange items and not necessarily to the Size of its initial trade inequality. Neither the measures of individual welfare (cost of living and caloric food supply) nor the urbanization indicator is affected by degree of comnodity dependence. As was the case in the first K 33The several control variables had varied effects upon other relationships with‘effectiveness indicators. Controls for S51 at T reduced correlations found with population growth and aSyr‘icultgre and produced, for primary education (T - T ), a signi- F‘l cance level of .10 in the opposite direction from that predicted. Sierss domestic product, a measure of economic growth, is raised "onna..10 to a .05 level of significance in the expected direction ”'rlen the effect of foreign aid receipts are partialled out. Debt servicing performance as a control variable at T F":‘oduced changes for a number of effectiveness variables. Correla- t:‘Ions which had been in the expected direction were reduced in the (:iises of military expenditures, capital formation (T - T ) and (jfiabt to international organizations (T - T2). TertQary Education (T - T ) increased in significance from a .10 to a .005 level, QIDBositg of the hypothesized direction. 76 Table 8. Hypothesis 3A: Intra-Country Effectiveness-~Selected Findings from Tables C-7 and C-8. Dependence upon one export item at T0 with: In the Change Rate Predicted Between Times zé. Direction? flture-ori ented indicators: Capital formation 0 + l *** -.49 Yes 1 + 2 + 2 *** -.45 Yes Tertiary education 01+ 1 l + 2 ** +.36 No 0 + 2 Research institutions 1 + 2 ** +.35 No Population growth 0 +-l l'+ 2 * -.24 No 0 + 2 * -.28 No Eflcesent-oriented indicators: GDP per capita 0 + 1 1 +~2 * -.27 Yes 0 + 2 Agriculture 0 +>l ** -.31 Yes 1 + 2 04+ 2 * -.27 Yes Telephones 0 + l l +'2 * +.27 No I3ependence upon one export item at T1 with: .Efliture-oriented indicators: Capital formation 1 + 2 0 + 2 * -.26 Yes Tertiary education l-+ 2 ** +.4l No 04+ 2 * +.31 No Research institutions 1 + 2 ** +.30 No .Eiresent-oriented indicators: GDP per capita l + 2 ** -.37 Yes 0 + 2 ** -.32 Yes Agriculture 1-+ 2 0 + 2 ** -.30 Yes Telephones l-+ 2 ** +.31 No 0 + 2 Military expenditures 1 + 2 * +.23 Yes 77 hypothesis, it is higher education rather than primary or secondary education enrollments that is most affected by a country's inter- national exchanges. However, correlations for tertiary education and for number of research institutions per 500,000 population were significant but not in the predicted direction. The same is true of population growth with T measures of commodity dependence and for D the corrmunications indicator (telephones per 100 persons from T1 to T2, with T1 values of commodity dependence. At T], military expendi- tures are significant at the .10 level in the predicted direction. c) Commodity dependence: Evaluation of the findings: It is immaterial to this hypothesis whether the dependence upon one export item, in turn, may have directly resulted from external in- fluences of a prior time. The consequences of a given level of ex- port diversification or non-diversification have been explored. At this point, I am unable to explain why growth in institutions of higher learning is associated with unfavorable commodity dependence situations. This hypothesis, in which an education measure operated in the unexpected direction while GDP per capita correlated according to predictions, may be compared with hypothesis 1; here the reverse situation was observed, where GDP was unrelated to exchange inequality with DEC but tertiary education was significant in the hypothesized direction. Further research should explore whether it is possible to rank-order the effectiveness indicators listed in Figure 8 according to their "degree of vulnerability" to concepts such as dependence and e)tchange inequality. Among the intra-country indicators, it would 78 then be possible to evaluate why a more dependent country has a lower growth rate of GDP and simultaneously a higher growth rate of college graduates. For example, certain "transmission" factors that convert external results into internal consequences such as national elites or military rulers should be included in further research. In the above empirical case, one could explore whether other indicators that are class-dependent (as is tertiary education in developing countries) are more strongly affected by “external" dependencies,34 a finding substantially supported in this study. In the following hypothesis, I shall discuss a second mean- ing of dependence, one more readily connected with notions of relational, “external" dependence. Hypothesis 3B: Dependence upon exchange partners in relation to effectiveness outcomes Emerson's theorem leads one to believe that inequality of exchange is synonymous with power advantage (for the “top dog") and with dependence disadvantage (for the "underdog"); furthermore, the power of A over 8 is, by definition, equal to the dependence of 8 upon A. When Emerson defines power or dependence in a less circular fashion, he talks in terms of "motivational investment" in the inter- rnersonal context. For example, B's dependence upon A is equal to the annunt of 8's motivational investment in reWards mediated by A. The inore he or she values or desires those rewards from A, the more de- Pendent B is. ‘ 34I will return to this weakness of my study in the con- cluding chapter. 79 In doing so, Emerson does precisely what he says should not be done: he defines power and dependence in terms of "actor" attri- butes rather than relational properties. This weakness becomes more apparent when the context is switched to that of international rela- tions, where an equivalent of motivational investment is difficult to pinpoint and one begins to question the usefulness of such a concept.35 At both the interpersonal and the international levels, I would propose a definition of dependence which is non-tautological, relational in nature, and also more amenable to operationalization. B's dependence upon A can be measured as the percentage of 8's total exchange network which is "occupied" by any A. In more general terms, B's overall dependence upon exchange partners decreases as its exchanges are spread more equally among greater numbers of partners. I operationalized this notion of the "distribution" of 8's exchanges as the number of countries accounting for one-half of 8's total imports and of B's total exports. The larger this number of countries, the lower B's dependence. Hypothesis 38 states that B's dependence upon trading part- ners is inversely related to 8'5 chances for moving toward more balanced outcomes. All correlations with effectiveness outcome indi- cators are predicted to be positive, with the usual exceptions of dependence upon one export item, cost of living index, average annual rate of population growth, and military expenditures per capita. 35Its usefulness at the interpersonal level could also be questioned. Any Skinnerian would claim that it is folly to predict behavior from "motivation;" how can one measure motivation except by inferring it from the behavior? 80 a) Inter-country effectiveness: Significant correlations occur for dependence upon trading partners at T 09 not at T].36 A highly significant correlation, not in the expected but surprisingly, direction, appears for number of countries accounting for half of exports with external debt owed to private banks and other private creditors (see Table 9). Apparently private creditors "agree“ that an increase in 8's export buyers is good--for themselves; I had ex- pected that such an increase would put 8 in a position to obtain more favorable sources of loans and that B would, in fact, do so. In the case of exports, the other significant correlations occur with changes in dependence upon one export item. These are opposite the expected direction and serve to emphasize that "internal" and "external" dependence are indeed not synonymous. With respect to imports, “internal" and "external" dependence show highly signi- ficant correlations in the predicted direction but only for changes between T0 and T]. In the following period, the direction is re- versed. The unexpectedly high negative findings between T1 and T2 with respect to both imports and exports, makes one wonder if perhaps something happened between T1 and T2 which allowed a country's dependence upon one export to increase while the number of exchange partners also increased. A check of the historical record indicates that precisely 36The one exception is external debt owed to international organizations when SEI is controlled for at T . This correlation reaches the .10 level of significance in the Opposite direction from that hypothesized, and occurs only with respect to export dependence. A 81 Table 9. Hypothesis 3B: Inter-Country Effectiveness--Selected Findings from Tables 0-9 to C-12. No. of countries accounting for 50 per cent of EXPORTS at T0 with: In the Change Rate Predicted Between Times ./1- Direction? Dependence upon one 0 + 1 export item 1 + 2 *** +.49 No 0 + 2 * +.28 No Debt owed to private 1 + 2 ** -.45 No creditors No. of countries accounting for 50 per cent of IMPORTS at T0 with: Dependence upon one export item 0 + l *** -.46 Yes 1 + 2 * +.27 No 0 + 2 Debt servicing l + 2 *** +.56 Yes during this time span the so—called "Kennedy Round“ of negotiations within the GATT framework took place, resulting in substantial joint reductions of tariff barriers (see Metzger, 1964). The final significant relationship occurs for imports at T0: debt servicing performance supports the hypothesis at a significance level of .005. b) Intra-country effectiveness: Whereas most strong corre- lations with inter-country indicators occurred with T0 values of the independent variable, intra-country indicators were most often signi- ficant for T]. Indicators relating to institutions of higher learning again proved to be I'sensitive" barometers, particularly in relation to the “"‘fl‘l'l 1 . “ 82 number of countries from which 8 imports. In the predicted direction, these correlations reach the .005 level of significance for both en- rollments in tertiary education and number of research institutions per 500,000 persons. Among the remaining indicators, it is perhaps ironic that military expenditures per capita increase with an increase in the number of countries from which imports are obtained. Is a decrease in dependence upon trading partners accompanied by the "necessity" to build up armed forces? The only other indicator which provides important support, with respect to imports at T], is that of tele- phones per 100 persons (T1 - T2). Other scattered correlations exist, but inspection of Tables C-9 to C-12 shows that the more important measure of dependence is the number of countries from which 8 imports. Import correlations were also very much influenced by controls for debt servicing 37 ability, which reflects the fact that imported goods are often purchased on credit. 37The various control variables had negligible effects at T , for exports and imports alike. At T], exports and imports showed deely divergent patterns. ’Number of countries accounting for 50 per cent of imports became significantly related to several variables when the e fect of debt servicing status at T was removed: electri- city and secondary education (TO - T2) became significant at the .05 level in the opposite direction from predictions, tertiary education reached the .10 level in the expected direction, and the highly signi- ficant expected relationship with telephones (T - T ) all but dis- appears. Controls for SEI produce a .10 level 6f si nificance, in the opposite direction, for military expenditures. The striking effect of debt servicing with respect to imports is not found for number of countries accounting for 50 per cent of 83 c) External dependence--evaluation of the findings: In the elaboration of this hypothesis (see Chapter II) I had mentioned that both standardization and friendship arguments could be raised against the plausibility of this operationalization of dependence. Table 10 provides some support for the standardization argument but pply if imports are being considered; the decline rate of agriculture's share of GDP does correlate with having fewer exchange partners from which to purchase industrial equipment. On the other hand, the high correlations found for both imports and exports with the indicators for higher learning seem to weaken the friendship argument considerably. Even the argument that it takes more trained specialists to build up and maintain an exchange network with more countries does not find empirical support; the correlation between the decline rate of agriculture and tertiary education is zero. As was pointed out in Chapter III, I regret having set the arbitrary limit of 50 per cent. For example, at T0, 76.85 per cent of all imports of the Ivory Coast came from one country. At the same time period, 58.50 per cent of all imports of Gabon also came from just one country. Both countries were treated identically in ex orts. Some small impact can be noted: Secondary education (T - i ) reaches the .10 level in the expected direction and electricity c nsumption (T - T ) becomes significant at the .05 level, but in the opposite direct on, SEI at T , again with respect to exports, has a depressing effect upon electricity consumption (T - T ) al- though correlations are still opposite of predictions; military expenditures and secondary education (T - T both reach the .10 level, the former in the opposite direction 8nd the latter in the predicted one. 84 Table 10. Hypothesis 3B: Intra—Country Effectiveness-~Selected Findings from Tables C-9 to C-12. No. of countries accounting for 50 per cent of EXPORTS at T0 with: In the Change Rate Predicted Between Times Direction? Future-oriented indicators: Research institutions 1 + 2 * -.28 No Population growth 0 + l * +.32 No l + 2 0 + 2 No. of countries accounting for 50 per cent of EXPORTS at T1 with: Future-oriented indicators: Tertiary ed0cation l + 2 0 + 2 *** +.68 Yes Present-oriented indicators: Electricity 1 + 2 O +.2 * -.26 No No. of countries accounting for 50 per cent of IMPORTS at T0 with: Future-oriented indicators: Secondary education 0 + l * -.25 No 1 + 2 O + 2 Tertiary education 0 + l l +~2 ** +.36 Yes O-+ 2 Present-oriented indicators: Military expenditures 1 +>2 * +.27 No Agriculture O-+ l l-+ 2 * -.25 No 0 + 2 * -.25 No No of countries accounting for 50 per cent of IMPORTS at T with: ‘l . Eyture-oriented indicators: Research institutions 1 + 2 *** +.62 Yes Present-oriented indicators: Caloric food supply 1 + 2 * +.24 Yes Urban population 1 +-2 * -.21 No Telephones l-+ 2 *** +.47 Yes 0 +2 85 this analysis, although it is obvious that the Ivory Coast is con- siderably more "dependent" upon that one country than is Gabon. Further research should take this into account and delete my arbitrary limits; both exchange inequality and dependence could be much better explored in their interrelationship. Furthermore, the concepts of size and differentiation--imp1icit in the formulation of this hypo- thesis-~should be scrutinized analytically with respect to exchange inequality and dependence. Do independence and differentiation imply each other? In the following, I shall present and discuss to what extent-~in the terminology of economists--non-market transactions are likely to increase independence and decrease unequal exchange. Hypothesis 3C: Inequality of Exchange with the "Old'I EC in Relation to Amount of Aid From Non-EC The final two hypotheses address a question that has been hotly debated among political scientists and other experts on inter- national relations: Is foreign aid really helping the developing countries?38 Mahmet, in discussing the single case of Somalia, describes the tying of aid, concentration of investments in the physi- cal infrastructure to the neglect of the social infrastructure, and the enormous indebtedness to foreign countries. He concludes that "the moral emerging from Somalia's experience with foreign aid is that 38For examples of this debate see: the various contributions contained in Chilcote, 1974; Rosen and Kurth, 1974; Dsipov, 1972; Singer, 1972; Stevenson, 1972; Wittkopf, 1972; Ward, 1971; Dos Santos, 1970; Pearson, 1969; Frank, 1966. 86 aid is far from being an unqualified bonus given by well-wishing donors" (1971:47). One implication of this conclusion is that the most needy countries, being in a poorer position to return benefits to potential donors, will receive the least amount of foreign aid-- either from the EC or from other nations. In Hypothesis 3C, I am specifically interested in the amount of aid 8 receives from alternatives to A (all non-EC countries). The greater B's exchange inequality with A (the I'old“ EC), I predict, the less aid B will receive from alternative exchange partners. As in hypothesis 1, the magnitude of the initial exchange gap should directly affect B's chances for balancing outcomes--in this case by curtailing one of 8's balancing options, that of finding alternative exchange partners. As summarized in Table 11, I found that just the opposite is the case for T].39 The better a developing country's trade posi- tion with the DEC, the lg§§_total aid it received from other nations during the following time period. This relationship becomes weaker when population size is taken into account (by using per capita trade balance figures) but still remains statistically significant. Partialling out the effect of debt servicing status further depresses the correlations, thus lending some support to Dsipov's (1972) contention that the use of the single concept "aid“ to cover both outright gifts and loans is misleading. Adequate measures of the 39At T , only low correlations (between -.11 and -.l4) were found. These, h8wever, are in the predicted direction. 87 "grant-equivalent" value of aid need to be developed before a truly rigorous test of this hypothesis can be made. Table 11. Hypothesis 3C: Amount of Foreign Aid Received From Non- EC Countries--Selected Findings from Tables C-l3 to C-l6 Raw balance of trade with DEC at T1 with: In the Time Predicted Period /4— Direction? Amount of aid from non-EC 2 *** +.48 No Per capita balance of trade with DEC at T1 with: Amount of aid from 2 * +.26 No non-EC Two alternative explanations for the negative findings appear plausible. First, one could presume that non-EC givers of aid are altruistic, seeking out the poorest countries, i.e., those with the largest trade deficits. Second, one could argue that the correlations would switch in the predicted direction if Great Britain, a "new" EC member, were included with the DEC group; after all, about one-half of the 44 developing countries are former British colonies. To have obtained lower correlations when trade balances are transformed into per capita values is consistent with that of an earlier World Bank study, recently confirmed by Wittkopf (1972). Although more Populous countries receive larger absolute amounts of aid, they receive*less aid per capita than do less populous countries. 88 This hypothesis dealt with specific sources of foreign aid, in terms of the donor countries involved. The next and final hypo- thesis takes a different approach to the question of aid. It examines the institutional channels through which aid is given. Any donor country may give aid directly (bilateral aid) and/or indirectly via contributions to international organizations (multilateral aid). Does the institutional form in which aid is given—-bilatera1 versus multi- lateral-—influence the "effectiveness" of a specific amount of aid? Hypothesis 30: Multilaterality of Aid in Relation to Effectiveness Outcomes Using Emerson's fifth theorem as a guideline, this hypothesis predicts that multilateral assistance is more beneficial to 8 than bilateral aid--not necessarily because it has inherent advantages but because it has fewer of the disadvantages which frequently accompany bilateral aid (see, for example, Mehmet's list of disadvantages cited above). Multilateral aid more nearly approximates altruism, or "status giving" in Emerson's terms; as such, it is expected to in- crease B's chances of moving towards balanced outcomes. a) Inter-country,effectiveness: Findings are summarized 40 in Tables 12 and 13. Only negative results were obtained with re- spect to inter-country effectiveness indicators (Table 12). 40At T (not shown), results were not statistically signi- ficant. External debt owed to both private creditors and international organizations had lower correlations (-.12 and -.09 respectively) but were in the same direction as in T]. 89 Table 12. Hypothesis 3D: Inter—Country Effectiveness--Selected Findings from Tables C-17 and C-18. Percentage of aid from multilateral sources at T0 with: In the Change Rate Predicted Between Times ’44 Direction? External debt owed to l +~2 ** -.54 No private creditors External debt owed to l + 2 * -.32 No international organizations The relatively high correlation between multilaterality of aid and the increased rate at which developing countries are in- debted to private creditors should be commented on. When presenting the list of effectiveness indicators on pp. 37-38, I was not sure whether a decrease or an increase in that rate should be assumed to indicate an improvement. After all, one could argue that an increase of private capital inflow reflects the creditor's confidence that a country will develop, at least to the extent that the profit return rate will equal or surpass the return rate in other countries. By the same token, an increase in indebtedness to international organi- zations could be interpreted as a sign that private creditors recall their capital from a country and prefer to spread the risk. If this line of reasoning is sound, then the percentage of multilateral aid is indeed a good indicator for assessing whether or not private creditors, at least, believe that a country is doing well. 90 Although there are certain exceptions, the same general results are found for the indicators of intra-country effectiveness as well (see Table 13). The overall pattern seems to show that re- ceiving assistance from multilateral sources is ppt_an advantage, contrary to my predictions. b) Intra-country effectiveness: The only correlations 4] are with education and the de- that are in the expected direction cline rate at which GDP is accounted for by agriculture. All others seem to lend support to those who maintain that bilateral aid remains a beneficial way of helping B to improve its position. c) Evaluation of the findings: The findings, at best, provide only weak support for the hypothesis that multilateral aid is more beneficial to developing countries than is bilateral aid. For example, no other independent variable in this study showed nearly so strong a correlation with the growth rate of primary education as this one did. Furthermore, the modest correlation between multi- laterality of aid and the indirect indicator for industrialization-- GDP accounted for by agriculture--is identical to the correlation 41The impact of control variables was negligible for T . At T the usual effect of controls was to somewhat reduce correlatigns far indicators listed in Table 13. One exception should be noted, that of SEI which tended to increase relationships (e.g., for agri- culture, secondary education and capital formation (T - T2) which are all opposite the expected direction). Partiallyi out SEI raised correlations to a .10 significance level for telephones (T - T2) in the opposite direction and, along with controls for foreigh aid re- ceived. revealed significant relations with population growth (T1 - T2 and T0 - T2) in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. 91 Table 13. Hypothesis 3D: Intra-Country Effectiveness--Selected Findings from Tables C-17 and C-18. Percentage of aid from multilateral sources at T 0 Wlth: In the Change Rate Predicted Between Times Direction? Future-oriented indicators: Capital formation 0 + l 1 + 2 O + 2 * -.24 No Primary education 0 +~l *** +.43 Yes 1 + 2 0 + 2 *** +.46 Yes Research institutions 1 + 2 * -.26 No Population growth 0 +'l ** +.27 No 1 + 2 0 + 2 Present-oriented indicators: GDP per capita 0 +41 * -.24 No l + 2 0'+ 2 Agriculture 0-+ l ** +.30 Yes 1 + 2 0 +~2 * +.21 Yes Percentage of aid from multilateral sources at T1 with: Future-oriented indicators: Capital formation 1 +'2 * -.26 No 0-+ 2 * -.25 No Secondary education 1 +'2 * -.25 No 0 +~2 * -.27 No Tertiary education 1 +‘2 ** +.44 Yes 0 +>2 Research institutions 1 +'2 * -.24 No Present-oriented indicators: GDPper capita 1 +~2 *** -.53 No 0 +-2 *** -.44 No Agriculture 1 +-2 ** -.29 No 0 +-2 * -.23 No Caloric food supply 1 + 2 * -.24 No 92 that was found between inequality of exchange with the "old'I EC and agriculture. In other words,, whereas a large trade deficit with the EC depresses a developing country's chances to develop industrially, a higher percentage share increases that chance by the same amount. On the other hand, the strong correlation between GDP growth rates and multilaterality of aid in the opposite direction suggests, in addition to the other negative findings, that multilaterality——as measured--is not the h0ped-for midwife for developmental growth. In concluding this chapter, I shall raise the question of how an improved operationalization for multilaterality can be found and what its underlying dimension could be, since multilaterality of aid simply refers to an organizational arrangement for handling non- market transactions. I should have controlled for the relative poverty of the receiving partners. Poorer nations, for whom development is most difficult, may simply receive more multilateral aid or so little bi- lateral aid that what multilateral aid they get comprises a large percentage of their total.42 42Another procedure for determining the effect of the institutional form of aid, independently from the effect of the amount of aid involved, is the following. Instead of using er- centa e of aid from multilateral sources, I could have used the afisolute amount of multilateral aid and then controlled for size of total aid receipts (both bilateral and multilateral). This would help avoid the problem that percentage of multilateral aid apparently is associated with the confounding variable of relative poverty. 93 A second improvement in the operationalization of aid multilaterality could also be made. One should distinguish between multilateral organizations having independent decision making authority and those in which aid allocations are determined accord- ing to self-serving interests of member governments. Almost all multilateral sources considered in this study lack independence to some extent, either from the constraints of interest rates prevail- ing in national money markets (see Dsipov, 1972) or from the willing- ness of developed countries.to supply subscription capital (see my discussion of the voting power arrangements in the IMF, p. 74. The important underlying variable, in other words, may be independence of authority rather than multilaterality/bilaterality per se. If aid from relatively dependent givers (bilateral aid and that from certain multilateral organizations) were compared with aid from the more independent multilateral organizations, the expected results might be found. The concluding chapter which follows will summarize the overall implications of this research project. It begins with a dis- cussion of two possible objections about the data base upon which my findings rest. I then will assess the extent to which Emerson's fifty theorem has proved to be useful as a guideline for analyzing international exchange relationships. CHAPTER V CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION Summary of the Study This study dealt with the outcomes of exchange among developing and developed countries. Two interrelated groups of indicators were used for the independent (exchange) variables. The first group dealt with market transactions, (including directional trade matrices tracing the flow of goods and services and measures derived and constructed from this data base, e.g., for measurement of the concepts of exchange inequality and dependence upon exchange partners. The second group might be termed non-market transactions or, in the words of Horvath (1974), "net one-way resource flows." I am referring to foreign aid, of which multilateral aid is a special form. Such aid might be viewed as a temporary bandage on the wounds caused in part by the effects of market transaction losses. These independent variables represent exchanges in the con- text of international relations, on what has been metaphorically called the "macro" level. That is, such "micro" concepts as senti- ments and attraction are systematically excluded from the analysis in the normative context of international relations. '94 95 The intention of this study was to explore the feasibility of utilizing exchange-theoretical propositions of Richard Emerson as an analysis guide within this "macro" context. The major dependent variable, the outcomes or ”balancing effectiveness" results of exchanges between nations, was measured by the growth or decline rates of 19 indicators of a country's develop- ment. An attempt was made to determine the extent to which these effectiveness measures correlate with, or are affected by, factors that are not indigenous but operate only in the presence of external exchanges. The empirical setting of the study was the group of 44 developing countries that are currently negotiating or renegotiating about conditions under which future aid and trade exchanges should take place between themselves and the enlarged European Communities. This seemed an appropriate time to explore, via the use of data from published sources, how these countries have fared historically in their exchanges with the EC49 since its founding. The notion of how countries have "fared" as a consequence of their market and non-market exchange transactions with the EC, refers to their progress with respect to the 19 developmental effectiveness indicators. Results of the research provide limited support for the contention that the magnitude of the initial exchange gap affects the 49During the time span under study-~1958 through 1972--Denmark, Ireland, and Great Britain were not yet EC members and were not grouped with the other EC nations for analysis purposes. 96 subsequent developmental progress of the "underdog" partner (hypotheses l and 2). The major finding is that the magnitude of a developing country's exchange gap with abroad (its overall trade balance) appears far less consequential for its development than the magnitude of its exchange gap vis-a-vis the European Communities. To have had a smaller positive or a negative trade balance with the EC was associated with lower growth rates. For example, the effectiveness outcome indi- cator of dependence upon one export item during one time period showed a correlation of .85 with a developing country's trade balance with the EC but only a correlation of .22 with its overall balance of trade. With respect to the measures of dependence (hypotheses 3A and 38), mixed results were obtained. When dependence was operational- ized in terms of a country's internal economy (lack of export diversi- fication, i.e., dependence upon one export commodity) growth rates of higher education indicators show strong correlations in the predicted direction. When dependence was operationalized in external terms (dependence upon trading partners, i.e., number of countries account- ing for 50 per cent of total exports and imports), these correlations were moderate to weak in the opposite direction. This inconsistent pattern of results raises validity questions regarding the operationali- zation of dependence. For example, diversification of an economy may not be a sign of weakened but of strengthened dependence if either exhausted supplies of natural resources or significant price cuts on the world market call for such shifts. 97 Predictions about non-market transactions (hypotheses 3B and 36) received little consistent support. The expectation that multilateral aid would be more beneficial to developing countries than bilateral aid--even when the effect of total amount of aid receipts was removed--was not supported. It is suggested that the critical underlying variable is not the multilaterality/bilaterality of aid-giving channels per se but the indgpendence of authority to allocate aid, e.g., independence from pressures to distribute aid in accordance with the self-interests of donor governments. Somewhat more support was found for the prediction that a large initial exchange gap with the EC will serve to depress the amount of aid received from non-EC sources. Discussion The use of Emerson's fifth theorem as a working guide- line--but only as a guideline--proved to be a useful strategy. It is now possible to pinpoint weaknesses in that theorem, which become more readily apparent when trying to apply it in a new context, and potentially to incorporate improvements into the original theory. In particular, it was learned that the magnitude of the initial exchange inequality--not considered by Emerson--does indeed make a difference for balancing operations and should be taken into account. Second, dependence and exchange inequality, 98 although interrelated, should be kept separate analytically. Third, the constellation of exchange partners affects the "dyadic" relation between A and 8, not only with respect to balancing operations but at a more fundamental level--by affecting the parameters under which their exchange takes place. Further research should explore under what circumstances the constellation of exchange partners is a variable in itself. For example, directional dependency may "bind" A and 8 via third partners to the exchange although their direct exchange may be both negligible in terms of magnitude and equal regarding the exchange equation. Such an approach could lead to researchable questions that would investigate how social networks are conceptu- ally equivalent to economic markets. Underlying such an agenda for further research is a problematic assumption, however. I am referring to the adequacy and usefulness of a vertical integration of theoretical work. The application of "level-switching" theoretical ideas in more than a metaphoric or guideline sense seems to be questionable since context-specific parameters may eliminate or even reverse the connections among variables that the context-free theory stipulates. For example, the present study pinpointed the necessity of researching both the interorganizational and the intraorganiza- tional arrangements of the European Communities in their relations 99 with the developing countries. It is not merely the debt servicing performance--a powerful explanatory variable-—but the organizational "referral system" of such a performance that should be studied. Should one attempt, then, to search for conceptual equivalents for these variables at different aggregate levels? Or should these variables be called context-specific parameters? Is it useful at all to make the distinction between context-specific and context- free theories? I hope that the application of alternative theoretical models such as the triadic network model and interorganizational theoretical conceptual schemes to the data base that was con- structed in this study may help in finding answers to these questions. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Adelman, Irma. 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Country TimeO Time1 Time2 Per cent Per Cent Per Cent Bahamas 919.05 2,898.40 462.00 Barbados 187.38 180.69 282.50 Belgium 103.86 105.39 98.91 Botswana .... .... .... Burundi .... 175.00 116.67 Cameroun 82.61 100.00 113.51 C.A.R. 212.50 129.41 114.29 Congo (P.R.) 356.00 161.54 193.48 Ivory Coast 76.09 83.33 79.46 Dahomey 175.00 325.00 209.09 Denmark 114.47 124.09 122.13 Ethiopia 133.33 300.00 140.00 Fiji 128.89 130.28 179.28 France 99.25 107.41 104.77 Gabon 75.27 68.89 95.59 Gambia 108.57 119.59 143.35 W. Germany 87.50 90.49 85.27 Ghana 10.64 125.00 88.37 Guinee 25.00 26.67 46.67 Guyana 123.53 90.80 100.00 Grenada .... .... .... Upper Volta 300.00 266.67 225.00 Ireland 148.94 154.76 138.18 Italy 126.56 117.36 106.13 Jamaica 138.20 121.37 162.94 Kenya 180.00 140.00 144.00 Lesotho *See Appendix B-l for measurement details and sources of data. 106 Table A-l.* Continued. Country Time0 Time1 Time2 Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Liberia 84.31 109.52 71.19 Luxembourg 100.00 100.00 100.00 Madagascar 135.29 146.67 123.81 Malawi .... 158.33 164.29 Mali 200.00 220.00 220.00 Mauritius 129.63 104.12 116.16 Mauritania 1,566.67 66.67 64.79 Netherlands 112.50 119.32 103.32 Niger 66.67 200.00 155.56 Nigeria 123.08 108.33 78.26 Rwanda .... ‘233.33 160.00 W. Somoa 75.00 160.98 2,728.57 Senegal .... 97.96 127.27 Sierra Leone 100.00 119.44 102.38 Somalia .... 130.77 166.67 Soudan 107.14 118.75 100.00 Swaziland .... .... .... Tanzania 50.00 78.95 119.05 Tchad 166.67 142.86 177.78 Togo 250.00 131.58 132.00 Tonga .... .... .... Trinidad & Tobago 984.85 103.34 113.37 Uganda 60.00 62.50 60.71 United Kingdom 118.09 117.02 115.77 Zaire .... 87.50 75.00 Zambia .... 59.38 74.87 United States 75.45 84.72 100.96 P.R. China 100.00 100.00 133.33 U.S.S.R. 103.85 94.59 92.45 Japan 93.02 76.34 90.82 *See Appendix B-l for measurement details and sources of data. 107 Table A-2.* Dependence Upon One Export Commodity Over Time: Per Cent of Total Exports Accounted.For by That Commodity Which Was The Largest Export Item at Timeo. Largest Export Time0 Time1 Time2 Country gommodity (at Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent 1me0) Bahamas .... .... .... .... Barbados Sugar 70.4 56.2 47.4 Botswana Coffee .... .... .... Burundi Coffee .... 77.1 88.4 Cameroun Cocoa Beans 33.9 21.3 25.4 C.A.R. Raw Cotton 44.3 19.3 23.4 Congo (P.R.) Timber Broadleaves 70.9 37.9 40.9 Ivory Coast Coffee 50.1 37.9 30.4 Dahomey Palm oil 18.2 21.4 7.1 Ethiopia Coffee 52.0 65.3 57.5 Fiji Sugar 59.3 63.1 58.0 Gabon Timber Broadleaves 59.3 32.9 26.7 Gambia Groundnuts 77.6 48.1 39.0 Ghana Cocoa Beans 63.3 65.7 57.3 Guinee Coffee 16.5 11.1 9.4 Guyana Sugar 45.3 26.4 30.1 Grenada Cocoa Beans 45.0 21.8 27.9 Upper Volta Raw Cotton 2.0 7.4 21.4 Jamaica Sugar 22.8 19.3 13.6 Kenya Coffee 25.7 27.4 24.0 Lesotho .... .... .... ... Liberia Rubber 47.1 21.5 16.0 Madagascar Coffee 31.9 31.5 30.2 *See Appendix B-2 for measurement details and sources of data. 108 Table A-2.* Continued. 'Largest Export Country Commodity (at Timeo Time] Timez Timeo) Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Malawi .... .... .... Mali Groundnuts 91.1 14.1 9.7 Mauritius Sugar 89.8 90.2 88.9 Mauritania ... .... .... Niger Groundnuts 56.3 49.6 52.3 Nigeria Cocoa Beans 21.7 15.9 20.5 Rwanda Coffee .... 52.5 57.4 W. Somoa Cocoa Beans 29.1 23.7 40.3 Senegal Groundnuts 38.1 28.9 19.5 Sierra Leone Iron Ore 14.5 16.8 13.2 Somalia .... .... .... .... Soudan Raw Cotton 52.3 45.9 57.3 Swaziland .... .... .... Tanzania Sisal 25.3 21.4 10.4 Tchad Raw Cotton 63.5 78.1 78.8 Togo Cocoa Beans 37.3 25.3 29.6 Tonga .... .... .... Trinidad & Tobago Sugar 7.4 5.9 4.9 Uganda Coffee 39.6 47.6 54.0 Zaire Copper 17.7 50.9 65.1 Zambia Copper 94.9 90.2 94.0 *See Appendix B-2 for measurement details and sources of data. IUJ .omp+ . NF... 9 o c o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 “00+ 0 o o o o o o o oooml o o OOFQNI O O NMEOLao ammou .>H Amav omwoo .m.<.o czocmEmo .Lzm ._ow- . .mou.mu .omo.mu .ooo.¢Pu omm.F- 0|- 0 .om¢.mn . ._m+ .o- .ooN.F+ .omN.P+ .¢m_.m+ .oom.wmp+ .mm+ .omv.mm+ .omm.—r .oom.meu .wm—a . .momn mmu+ omo+ .mpom anmfimm moumncmm mesmcmm Lmummmavmz . . owcma_4 . . osaommb . . . mxcmx . . muvamq . . . 5.6”: . . ucmpmcH mpFo> Loan: . . mumcwco . . m:m»zw . . wmcwzw . . . mango acmscmw .3 . . mwnsmw . . . conga . . mocmcu . . . the; . m_qow:um . . xcmscmo . . ameocmo pmmou Aco>H .m.av omcou . . .m.<.u . czocmEmu . . wuczczm . mcmzmuom . . sawmpwm . moumncmm . . mmsmsmm ”saw: mauve; umxcmz acmcczo um mew—Foe .m.= to mucmmzoch :w munch to mucmpam ”to 36w> to peace age 5022 .Aoaewpv .mswh cm>o wwwcpczou umqum>mo m>szh use mmwcpczou mcwaotm>mo czoeuxucoc mcos< munch to cowp:_o>m wshuuxwgpmz munch to wucaemm Facetuumcwo «._.mu< mFQwH .mpmu to oom+ . . . oom.mu . . mmp+. . . . emo.F+ . . mm- . . . . om~.N~u . . mmugzom new mFWmumu acmEmczmmmE . .Om0.m+ . . . . . . . .Oomam+ . . . . . . . .OO¢.O¢I . . . . . . . .oom.mo -c: C) 0N . oe- + o somMQmMPaNnT o o o o o o oogfiNa—u o o . .aow.m+ . . . .omo.~u . . oom.m+ . o oQN—vnT o o o o o o o o o oom¢| o o o o o o o o o oomNamnT o o o o o o o . .NNpaml . . . . . . . o owVVI o o o o o o o o o ommwoFl o o o o ,o,o.,o - .HOO.PI . . . . . . o . .oom.opmu . omn.~ . Let mum xwucmaq< mmmk 0mm.om+ oom.w_+ . . . comma . .m.m.m.: octcu .m .a . . ..<.m.: . . mwnEmN . . . chmN .m:w¥ caste: . . mecca: . . . ommnoh a .cwch . . . omcoh . . . ODOR . . . vocab . .chmNcmh . acmFVNmZm . . cmnzom . . mw_msom meow; accmwm . . Pmmmcwm . mosom .3 . . mucmzm . . mwcmmwz . . . mewz mncmpcmcpmz mwcmpwcsmz . mzvuwczaz O O O PPGZ . .. west—6.)— 111 .mma . .on . . .ome.opu .omm.mu .Pue.m+ .o- . . .oom.mu .omm.mu O . oom.—m_u O O' O 0 I O' I O mpm.mu o o o o o o oomoONl o o o o o o OOMI . . . . . o . Nmmapl . o o a o o MRI - o acmcw 3maecmw .3 ”£323 mauwta mwaEmu conmw umxcmz gcmcczu pm mngFOQ .m.: to ..... NwN.mmn oom.nn on. . . mmm.mu om~.mu ooo.an oom.mu mon.mu on . . com: . cow.F_u meu.mn oom.mm+ Pom.m+ mam: . oom.mmu mom.Pu www.mu oom.mmu oo~.mn mmm.v+ omm.mmu . om~+ . mucwcm hate mucamzozh . om¢.~ mop: . . . Omen—I . . . o: . 0mm: omo.m¢u . . oom.mn . . . emp+ . . . . . on . . . . . . ome.p+ . . oom.em+ . . . oom+ . . . . . ooo.mw+ . . . men . . . . . om+ . . . . . . mo¢+. . . . . . Fol . . . . . oov.¢¢+ awaowgpm xcwE:mo cw munch to mace—mm A ...,o.,o::..,n.l 1:: I}: -.i .\ v~l.V\V .N a .3 1 u .\.\\.\>\ ..)\ v.\ nnnnn \ ,,,,, \h I ....»n... emummmaumz . . «taunt; . . ocpom63 . macmx muwmsmq . s_mss acachH mp~o> Loan: . . mumcmcw . . mcmaao . . ww:_:u . mcmsw acmEme .3 . . mwnEmw . conmo manage ...E . awao_;pm . . xenEch . . 3mEosmo “mmou 3co>H .m.av cacou . . .m.<.o . :zocmEmo . . auczczm . acmzmpom . . Ezwmymm . momentum . . mesmgmm ”to zmw> to Decca use 5022 .vmscwucoo a.F.mu< mpnmp 112 .oom.om+ .omm.mu .omm.¢¢n .oow.m¢ .m+ . . coo.Pmu 0m¢.m¢u omm.von oom.mm—+ oom.pp+ ompu . mnm.m+ omo.¢u ov~.~: FNV.FI mo¢.n+ nmmn . me+ . Nm~.¢u www.mu mpmu . em. 2.” www.ml m.m.m- oom.¢Fn oom.emn omm.an omn.mmp+ om~.mp+ 0mm.¢mu mmpn . oo¢.¢+ owF+ . moo.au mF¢.F+ mpn.m+ mmwn . 0mm.mms com._+ ooo.~+ oom.mm+ oom.mr mom.~- mom.m- .mpmv to mwoczom new m—wmumn “cwsmczmmms Let mnm omm.o+ omp+ . omw.mp+ omm.¢+ oom.m+ omo.m+ oomu . oom.mmpu awn . . oom.~n mm+ . . omo.~+ m-+ . cop- . mo¢+ . mme.3+ a+ . . oo~.mm+ xwvcmaa< mmma . . comma .m.m.m.: mcwzo .m .3 . .<.m.: . m_nEaN . . mcme .GCEX caste: . magma: .ommnoh w .cwch .....MUCOF omoh . . vane» .mwcm~:mF ucmpw~m3m . cauaom . mw—msom meow; accmwm . . ._. _mmmcmm O mosmm .3 . mvcmzm . mmcmmvz . . cmm_z mucmpcmgumz mwcmpwczmz mzwuwgamz C C OPFMZ . «25:»: 113 . .on Oil 0 I on . . oom.m+ oom._+ mom+ . oom.mn mne.mu ooP.~u. oo¢.Nu ¢+ . . 0' O O om: . mmF.o_+ oom.¢q+ NFN+ . om~.am+ nmm.ou omm.mm+ mee.e+ mmm+ . oo_.NF+ o: . . 0' O O .oo_+ . .oom.np+ om~.o+ .ooo.m+ .omo.m+ _ou mxcmx mu_msmw .xsmpm czachH appo> Loan: . on . o: O O I O O O O O O O O I O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O o O O I O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O O I O . OI . . OI . . . . omwapl . . . . . . . . . . on . . . . on . . o: . . . . cow.F+. .oo¢+ . . . oom+ . .Fom.o+ . . . . . . mn+ . . . oom._n .omn._n . . Omonrl . . . . O I I O O 9 .cmcu acmxjw mmcwzw . . Loommmmvmz . . . avenge; . . . ocaommA o o o o whcmx . . . muFmEma o o o o XPQHH ucmpmeH . mupo> Luna: . . . mumcmco . . . . mcmxzw . . . . mmcmzo mcmco . . 3cmacmw .3 . . . . «vague . . . . conmw . vacate . . Pawn quowsum xcmscmo AmEocmo . pmmou 3go>H . 3.x.av omcou . . . .m.<.o czocmsmu muczcsm acmzmpom anmpmm moumncmm .mmsmsmm O 0 0 "new: mauve; “meta: pcwcczu pm mLmFFoo .m.: to mncmmzogh c? munch to mucmpmm ”to zmw>.to bc_oa age soc; .umzcwpcoo k.F.mn< mpamh 114 .omo .m+ oomu oom.m¢+. .oo~.m+ om¢.mm+ .ome.P_+. oom.m+ .oom.m+ .omo.op+ .oow.m+ .oom.NFn .omm.mmm+ .omm.mm+ .omm.mFu .mvm.m+ .oom.mu .mm- . .mmen . .mop.~+ .oom.m+ .Nem.m+ .Fmp.~1 .mpm.mu .me.m+ .mmpu . .omm.w~+ .oml . .mumu to omo.o+ oom.mn omo.mp+ oom.o+ meLzom I w' I . nmm+ use mpwmpaa “cosmczmmms cot mum xwucmga< wows . . . comma . oom._+ . . . .m.m.m.: . . . . . . mc_;u .m.a OWVINL- o o o o o o o o - o swag: . . mnmcmgu . . acmxsw . . mmcwzw . . . mecca 3cmscww .3 . . mPnEmu . . . conaw . . menace . . . wn_c . quowcpm . . xcmE:mo . . waogmo pmmoo 3go>H .m.av omcou . . .m.<.u . czocmsmu . . wucaczm . acmzmpom . . E:_mfimm . mocmacmm . . mesmnmm u;p_z maatta pmxcmz ucmcczu pm mLMFFoo .m.: to mucmmaogh cw munch to mucmme "to 3mw> to ocean age zeta .vmzcwucoo r.p.mn< anMH 116 oom+ . .mamv to ¢+ . . mmULzom use m~wmumu pcmemcammms cot mum - o o o o omNnmmnT .....OOFQNI o o o o o . OanT o o o o o o o OONaNFFI .....MIooo ......meaFLuo xwucwaa< mama :mnmn .m.m.m.: mcwsu .m.a .<.m.= aPQEmN . mg_mN .mcwx nmuwcn omm mecca: 32. a .ctc. . . . mmcop . omoh . vague mwcm~:MF acmFP~mzm cmuzom . mppmeom meow; mcgmtm . . . Fammcmm moeom .3 mucmzm . mwcmmwz . . cmmwz muse—cmcpmz mwcmprsmz . mzwp_c:mz . PPM: _;apaz 117 .oom ooo.F+ mwcm~cmh cmuzom .3 accmwm . o o o o o o o o o o o LGGWQDUUQZ I I O O O O O O O O O O O O MIPLwnIFJ ocuomm4 O O . O . C O O O O O I O C . mhcmx . O U C . . C C C O Q 0 O O “ova—cad . . . . . . DONaml . . . . . >~m#H . . . . . . omm- . . . . . vampmcH . . . . . . mp—o> Ewan: . o- . . . o- . . . . . . mumcocu . o o o o o o o a o o o o . MCMNDG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mmcwzo . . . . . . m—m+ . . . . . . mango . . . . . . OOM.ONI . . hcmEme .3 . . . . . . . . mwnsmu . . . . . . om+ . . . . . . . :onmm . . . o . . Oomaml . . . . mUCMLm ooooooooo._._..a_.m . o o o o o o o o o o o . flPQOFEPm . . . . . . oom+ . . . . . xcmscmo . . . . . . NNFI . . . . . XmEOSwD . o o o o o . o o o o . HmMOU X¥O>H .m.av omcou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .m.<.u I I I I I I I I I I I A . . . . . . mm+ . . . . . czocmEmu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wuczgzm acmzmpom o o o o o o OOOaNIo o o o o EDWmme O O O O I I I monwanm O O O O O O O O O I I I O I mMEmnmm mvcmzm area *2 :pw3 mewca pmxcmz ucmgcau um mcm__oo .m.: to mucmmaozh cw munch to mucmpmm "to 3ww> to ac_oa ace scam .uascwpcou .._.m-< apnea 118 .mumu to mmoczom ucm m__mumu ucmsmcsmmme com mum x_ncmaq< mama Omm+ . . . . Ommamm+ . . OOMI . . . OmmnN . . . . . . . OI . a . . . o . . . . o o CMQMO . . . . . . . oomamk+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . o . . . . . . .m.m.m.3 . . . . . . . OmNaNNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . mcwsu .mom 0mm.mmu . . . oom.mmp+ . . mmm.omu . . oo_.m—u . . . . . . . mam: . . 030+ . . . . . .<.m.: . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . o . . . . . . . . waEMN . . . . . . . OO©.m+ . . . OmNaPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a a NO®+ . . . . . wLwMN omm.w+ . . . . . . . . . . omo._n . . oom.¢Fu . . . . . . . ooo.F+ . e—m+ . . .m2wx cmpwcz OONom+ o o o Facam+ o a o o o a o e o o - o o . o o a o o o o o o o o o MUCMGD . . . . . . . Omoaml . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . . o o . u . . o . . . OmmnOH & .CFLF . . . . . MOCOH . a . . . . . mum! . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . ODOF Now+ o o o . ¢FNI . o o o o o o o o o o u o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o UGEUF mmmIP+ . o . VwfiaVF+ o o o o o o o o o o o e a o c o o o o o o o o o e u a o a o o o .GFCMNCMH . o o o o o a o o o o o o o o o o o o a o o o o o o u o o a o o o o o o o o o - UCQPPNMZW NmNI . o o o mNmaFFI o o o MNNQFI o o o o . o o o o o o a o o o o o o o o o o o o o o CMUDOW o o o o o o o mmmaNl o o o o o o o o o o c o e o o o o o o o o o o o o e o o o o o o o MPFMEOW o u o o o o o MVNQVF+ o o o o o o o o o o o u o o o o o o o o o o o o o o . o u o UCOQJ @Lwam o o o o o o o NON+ o o o o o o o o o a o . o o o o o o o o o NNN+ o o PQF+ o o o o o memcwm . o o o o o o ommap+o o o o o o o . o o o o o o o o o o o o a o o o o o a o o o . MOEOW .3 o c o o o o o o o o o o o o o u o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o a o o o o mvcmzm o¢ml . o o o moNamFl o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o m+ o o o meapl o o . o memsz o o o o o o . OONI o o o o . o o o o o o o o a o o o o o o o o o c o o o . o o o o o o - mewz ommaFl o o mmean . o o mm¢aNlo o . oomIMI o o o o o o o oml o o o o o o o a o MUCMFLQEHmZ o o o o o o o o o o o o o o . o o o o o . o . o o o o a . o o o . QPCMPW&:MZ . o o o o . o mNNaNFI . o o o o o a o o o o o o o o . o o o e o o s . o a . o o o c o mzwflwkzmz a u c c _. s o o c c o o . o e o o o .4 o .3 a .3 c o m N I r. a o o o .... P P Q: I o o o o o a .- u r o c o .. c n c c a q r a u ,. ,. . ., . L .. . ,. .. a .. .. .. r. a u : r. .. 3 PEG F ME 0 O I O I I O O I O I I I I I I I I I O I O I I I I I I O I O 9 O 119 mm: . . . . com: . . . mmmu . . . omm.mmu . . omm.mu . . omm.m_n . . mum.mn .mcsx mamas: mm_+ . mncmm: O O O I I I O I I I I 0 O O O I O I O O I I I O I O I O I O I O I O 0 O O O I O I I O O I I I O O O O O O O O O O . oom+ . . . oom.~- . . on . . . on . . nm+ . . . mo¢+ . on . . . on . . com: . . omwu . mw+ . . . . . . . . . . . . mm—u . om_n . . ome+ .noh w .cwch emcee omop cmzoh A ..\-§\I.\ \s‘\\\ . stko \- -‘.. Lmummmmmmz . . mwcmnwm . . oguommJ . . . macmx . . muwmsmm . . . Npmum . . mam—mcm mu_o>,cmmm: . . mmmcmcw . . mcmxzw . . .mmcwaw . . mcmco 3cmscmu .3 . . mwnsmw . . . coamw . . mucmcu . . . them . meaowcmm . . xcmscmo . . Ameocmo ammou 3co>H .m.av omcom . . .m.<.u . caocmEmu . . wmcacsm . mcmzmpom . . Ezwmpmm . mommncmm . . mmsmcmm ":p_3 mmuvcm pmxcmz ucmccau pm mLmFPoo .m.: to mmcmmzoch cw meme» to mucmme "to 3mv> to mecca age scam .mmzcwucou a_.mu< mpnmh ...>\ 120 .om_.m_+ .oom.mm+ .oow.m+ . .oop.mnm+ .oo¢._-.. .oom.ompu .mme.~+ . .oom.m+ . .o~N+ .omm.m+ . .Noe.m~+ .o_o.m+ .mme.~: . .Nop.om+ .mpon mo mwogzom omw+ . mm- . . ucm mFFmpmu acmemgsmmms Lem mum . . oom.—+ . . oom.N_: omm.mmp+ coo.m+ omN.—P+ chcmaa< mwm¥ . . . . cmamn . . .m.m.m.= . acycu .m.m . . . .<.m.: . . . onEMN o o O o mLmumN .mCPx umpwca . . . steam: ommaoh a .cwgh . . «one» o o o o omog—u . . . toga» . . MP:MNcmH . campwnmzm . . . cmuzom . . . aw_maom mcomA mggmmm . . . memcmm . . . . meson . . . mucmzm . . mwgmmwz o o o o mewz . mucmpgmspoz . mwcmuwgzmz . . mawu_gamz I I I I OFF“: . . . wzmfiuz 121 mam._n . omm.ompu mam.¢Fn oom.¢- . oom._F- oo_.uu . mop+ . . o- . . . oom._u . epo.-- omm.v¢+ mop+ . . om~.m+ . com- . . v_m.m- . omm.mpu N¢—+ . . mmm- . . oom+ . 0mm: . cmmmo oom.F+ mop.m+ oom.~—u omm+ . NF¢.Fu ooo.mn mmm.m+ .Nvo.m+ omm.mu .m.m.m.: oom.n~+ om¢.m+ . O' I I I mmwn . . omm.¢m+ omm.Fm+ ompn . . . oov.o¢+ . mCPcu .m.m . omm.m+ . . ooe.mu . . o- . . . . .nmo- . . . omm.mn . . omm.mnmn . omo.mpu . on . . . . omw.Fu . . mmm.¢m+ . oom.m¢¢u . mmm.mn . . omo.mmmu . omo.pu . wmu.mfl+ . woo.mmn . mam.m_+ . com- . . . moo.m+ . . . om¢.wmu . . omo.¢n . . omm.omu mmpmpm nmywca gnommmmnmz . . . . . . . . . o_gmnw4 . . o- . . . . . ocpommA . . . . . . . . . . mchx . . . . . . . . . muwmsmw . . . . . . . . . . XFM#H . . . . . . . . . ncm_mLH . . . . . . . mu~o> Lana: . . on . . . . . mumcmgw . . . . . . . . . mcmhzo mocwsw . . . . . . . . . . acmzw xzmsgmw .3 . . . . . . . . . m_n5mw . . . . . . . . . . conmo . . . . . . . . . mucmgm oooooooooowflwm . . . . . . . . mwaowzuu . . . . . . . . . meECmo . . . . . . . . . XGEOLMD . . . . . . . Hmmou XEO>H .m.av omcoo . . . . . . . . . .m.<.u czongmu . . . . . . . . . _uc:L=m . . . . . . . . mcmzmgom . . . . . . . . . Ezwmpmm movmngmm . . . . . . . . . mmsmcwm o o o o o o A mwnEmN "saw: mmowga umxgmz pcmggzo um mLmFFOQ .m.: we mucmmzoch cw mumgh mo mucmpwm ”mo 3mw> $0 pave; mgh 50;; .um:=_p=ou *._.m-< m_an 122 oom.m+ oom.o~+ oom.mm_+ om_.—- om_.m¢- wmo.m- oo_.~- m¢+ . . Nam._n «mm.~n mow: . omm.mu Fmpu . me._mn .om—.npu mwo.mu omm.mpu oom+ . omm.mmn ooa.w~n Ex... .mwmu Io mmogzom new m—wmumu acmemgzmmme Low mum xwucmga< mmm* o o coma CPI. o o o o o omwako¢l o o o o o o o o o o o o CflQM—W o o omma0F+ o o o o o OOFGNI o o o o o o o o o o o o omomomo: o o o o u o o o o o o o o o o o o o o “EFF—U oN—om . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<.m.: o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o ”Wag—MN o o o o o o o o o o o coma NNn—I o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 mL .FmN o o omNnNmn—u o o o o 0 com. meI. o I o o I o o o o om: mug umpW—h: o o o o o o o o o mQMQON-T o o o o o o o o o o o o o ”UP—mm: ooooo..-oooOOMQQF-ToooooooooODMflOn—uwoCFLH oooooooooooooooo-MDCOH o o o o o o o o o o o w¢m+ o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o COOP . o o o . o o o o o o OFOI . o o o o o o o o o o o o o UMEUH . o o o o o o o o o . mm0a0+ o o o o g o o o o . o . QWCmNCMH o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o UCfiFPNMZW . . mmwam+ . . . . . RmkaNl . . . . . . . . o . . . . cmflzom o o o o o o o o . O¢Nl . o o o o o o o o o o o . MPFMEOW o o o o o o o o o o 0 VI o o o o o o o o o o o o UCOUI— “LLmFm . . . o o . . o o o . Nmmaml . o o o o o o o o o o . memcwm o o . o o o o o o o o o o o o o MOEOW .3 o o o o o o o . o o o o o . o o o o o o . . o o o o . o MUCMzi . . . . . . . . . . . mfimam+ . . . . . . . . . . . . mwswmwz . . . . . . . . . . . OON+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mewz . . 000nm! . o o o . OOFaQPMI . o o . . o o o . WUCGFLMSHUZ I I I I I I I I I cm. I I I I I I I I I I I I I wwcmp ngmz w o o o o . o o o o . mafiaFl . o . o o o . o o o o WZPHWLDMZ . o . o o o o o o o . o . o o a o . wfiflz . . o o . . . . . . . . . o . . . . u . o . o . . o . . wZMFflZ 123 ‘.....H.a..\ - ‘ oris . . . 9:. . . ...:K.... Ttvs. . . - . - \.:..\.‘L. ‘ «I‘;.-\ s ‘ Kr...‘ .. . . ..\.:..\f~.\~\\.»>\ . ‘ ‘ v ‘ 4«.. ‘ I ‘ I n . ‘ i ~.\\~I.\\ ~~~~~ \.\ o .ONN+ . o o m+ o o o o o o o . NNF+ o o o o o o o o o o mmoopl . o o o o o o o o . o LMUMMQGUQZ o oml o o o o CPI . o o o o o o o o o o o o o . o o o . o WOMQMI . o o o o o o o o o o o - MwLman 0 .0I o o o 0 CI o o o 0 Cl o o Cl 0 o . 0| 0 o o Cl 0 OI . o o OI . o 0 CI o o o o o OSHOWmA o oVFI o o o o o o o o . o o o o o o o o o OOGI . o o o . mNOQMIo o o o o o o o o o o o o o o MXCQ¥ . . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . oomarl. . OON+ . . mmmap+ . . . GUmMEwQ . .oo¢.o~n . mom: . . . mm¢u . oop.mn . Nmo+ . . . . . “mm.mm+ . . . . . . Fm¢+ . . . . . xpmum o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o OOQQOFI o OOOA¢|0 o I o o o v o UCMFQLH o cole o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 CI o o o o o o o o o o o Nmml o o o o o o o o c o o o MHP°> LQQQD o .OI o o o . OI o o 0 OI . o Cl o o 0 Cl o o o OI . CI 0 o o OI o o o OI . o o o o fiUMCflLG o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o - COP! o o OOVQF+ o NN+ o . o . o MCDXJG o om+ o o o o o o o o o o o o o o mvmnqfiu o o o o o o o u u 00”.? o o o o o o o o o o o o o mmcwaw . .¢MFI . . . m+ . . . . . o . o mmN+ . . o . o . . . . . F—Fa¢+. . . . o o . . o o . . . . . mcmsw . .Nmp.m~- . ¢m~.__- . No“- . oo~.w- . ooN.P+ . . . . www.mw_+ . . . . . oom+ . . acmEme .3 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o n o o QwN+ o o o o o o o o o o o o o o ”magma o omNN+ o o o o o o o o o o o o o oQNNI J.o o o o o o o o o Nm+ o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o :OQMG . .oo_.m~_n . oo~.mm+ . mm~.m+ mmm.mpn. oom._+ . . . . mmm.mm+ . oom+ . . nmo._+ . . . mucwsu o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o c o w.wl o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o a o o o o o o o o o o o o o o NemaFl . o o o o o o o o o o o MWQOFSfim o omONoFl o o FOFI o o o o o o . OOF+ o o o o o o u o o o ommomml o o o o o o OON+ o o o o XLMECQD o owNNl o o o OVI . o o o o o o NNI o o o o o o o o o o ©¢NI o o o o o o o o o o o o o o AQECSMQ o o o o o o 00+ o o . mm+ o o mmN+ o o o o o o o o o o PmVI o o o o o o o . o o o . HWGOU XHO>H o omDFI o o o o o o o o o o ¢w+ o . o o . . o o o o wppnm+ o o o o o o . o o o omomv 00:00 0 omml o o o o o o . o o o o o o VFFI o o . o o o o . o o NwNI o o o o o o o o o o o o . . omoH away omcou .m.<.u czongmu vuczgzm .mpom Ezwmpmm moumngmm magmsmm "Luv: mmowgm pmxgmz pcmggau pm mLmPFoo .m.: we mucmmzoch cw mnmgh $0 wocmme "we 3m_> mo “ewe; wsh 50;; Apmewhv .mewh Lm>o mmwguczoo nmgoFm>mo m>~mzh new mmwgpczou mcwgoFm>mo Laomuxpgom acoe< mumgh mo cowpspo>m mghuuxwgumz mcmgh mo mocmme chowpumgwo *om.m-< m_nmp 124 .wmo.vn .oom.mn .oom.v¢ IF©+ I .¢m¢.mu I¢F' I I I I I I I a u o .mpmu we mmogzom new mFPmuou acmemgzmmme m¢¢._N+ . mmm+ . . oom.mm+ . . . mm¢.mn oom.mwp+ oo~.m+ . NNMQN+ o o c o o NFVQWI o o o o c o oom.mmp+ cmm+ . . OON+ o o o o o mmm._ . oom.m . meaF+ o o o o o o O¢N+ o o o o o o o mmpom+ o u o o o o PVWQFI o . o o o . mea¢+ o o o o o o @MNI o o o o o o . ONmaPI o o o o o o NFI o o o o o o o o Nmfil o o o o o o o QPOQO+ o o o o o . WFMI o o o o o o o uwm.m¢mn. omm.p+ . mmNaF+ o o o o o mmOQFI o o o o . . ”GO! 6 a e o o o o Nw+ a a g a o o o . Low mom. coo. oom.mp+ cow. mum Fl mm+ xwucmaa< mmm* . . canoe . m.m.m.: mewsu .m.m . . .<.m.= . . mwaEMN . . . mgva .mcwx umgwca . . mucmm: _+ ommnop a .cwgp . . . munch . . . COOP . . . vase» . mwcm~cmh . vcmprmzm . . cmuzom . . nvpmsom mcomA aggmwm . . memcwm . moEom .3 . . mvcmzm . . mwgmmpz . o o mewz mucmpgmnuwz mwcmpwsamz . mappwgamz . . . w_mz . . 3sz 125 h.......o.\ . . “......_..o‘.._,.. - .~...-. - .0... a n. . ...:0u ‘....- s a».~.~l ‘ .:~.\ ...,s .\.\\ ~.\.\\ ~.ax..s ..\.s\~.\.~.-\w..>\ ..q :. . ... ......u.0~ . 4 . u x .. . o u a w y .,s.\s.L\ s\~..\.\ N+ o o . mmpoNl o u o o o Nwl . 0 vaavql o o o o o o o o o. QmN+ 0 0 o 0 0 o o LMUMMQMfifi: hml . . . Nomaml . . . . . . . . . . mmm.~+ . . . . . . . . . . ommapl . m—l . . . . mwsman OI o o 0 OI . o 0 CI o 0 Cl 0 o 0.OI o o a Cl o o Cl 0 o 0 CI 0 o 0 0| 0 o o o o OSHOWUA mF+ . o o wmmoN+ o o o o o o o o u o FmNnml o o o o o FmN+ o o NNMI 0 o o o n o o 0 o o MXCQM . . . . . OOpaml. . o . . . . . o . . MMNaml . o . . . o o . . . OOOI . . . o . . . . . wawEMQ oom.ou . mom.m~+ . oom.mu cow: . . www.mmu m¢N+ . emw.mp+ mmm.mn . mm¢+ . . . . . hpmuH NONQMI o mmmaNMI 0 o o 0 0 0 o a 0 DQPQmI 0 0 o 0 o 0 0 o o NCOnQI 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0 bcmeLH Kmfior . @Nwl . o o o o . o o o o . wmcampl . o o . o o o o . FN+ . o MMN+ . . MHFO> LGQQ: Cl . 0 0 OI . o . OI . o Cl 0 . o,OI o o 0 Cl 0 0 OI . o o O. o o 0 CI 0 o o o o NUMCNLG o o o o o mmmaFl o o o o o o o o o o MMNI o o o o o o o o o o - cowl o o o o o o o o o MCMXSG ”5+ . . . Nmfiapl . o o . o . . . . . OOM.©I . . . . . . o . . CPI . . N?! o . . . 062mzw . . . . . wpm.m+ . OONI . .le . . NONaml . . . . . . . o . mNN+ . . M#l . . . . . wcwzw omm.m- . . . . . . com- . ~¢0.FP- Nm¢.Fo_+ m_m- . No¢.w+ . ~m~.mom+ mm¢+ . . acmEme .2 mmp+ o . OON+ o o o o o o o o o o PNVI o o o o o o o o 0 u o u o o o o o o o o Mwfismw Km... 0 0 0 FowamnT ,.0.0 0.0.0.0.000 0 0 FNMQOF-T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 omNn—n 0 0 NI? 0 0 0 0 0 0 conmw 00¢.m+ . oo¢.mo_u oom+ . oom.omn . . . . Ppm+ . mom: . . mmm.F¢+ mom.m+ . . . mucmgm . . . . . ®Fm+ . . . . . . . . . . Fpml . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wfiwm o 0 0 o o NNNamI o 0 o o o 0 o o o o mFPnFI o o c o o o o 0 o o F¢NI o o o 0 o o o o MPQCWEUM Nom+ . . mm~._NN- . . . . ¢o¢- . . mmu.~¢- . . . . 590+ . . . . . . . owe- . . . . xgmscmo NF+ . . . ¢MVI . . . . . . NI . . . mpmaml . . . . . . . . . . om+ . . . . . . . . . XQEOSMD ~o+ . . . mmo.o+ . . . . . mmmn . . No¢.mmn . . . . . . . . . omo.F+ . upm+ . . ammou x:o>H ml . . . mMMa¢+ . . . . . . . o . . mmOaQMI . . . . . . . o . ONP+ . . O¢+ . A.M.Qv OmCOU . . . . . memo—l . . . . . . . . . . mwmaml . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .m.<.u mle . . NDNI . . . . . . ©w¢+ . . FNNQGI . . . . . . . . . . Fm! . . ww+ . o . CSOLGEMU . . . . . OmNaFl . . . . . . . . . . mel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . . . . wUCDLDm o o o o o o o u o o o o o o o u o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o . MCMZWHOM nmN+ . . QQN¢NNI . oomn . mp: . . mm¢.mP+ . . . . oom+ . . oom.pmn mm¢.~n . . . Esvmpmm o o o o o o o 0 o g o o . o 00ml 9 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o WOUMQme . . . . . Dom! . . . . . . . . . . . Nmanl . . . . . . . . . . OOmI . . . . o . . . . mmEmcwm mango xxcmsgmo .2 mwnEmw coamw . mucmgu Edam wwmowcpm meE:mo ‘waOSmo ”saw: mmowga umxgmz pcmggzu pm mumppoo .m.: mo mucmmzoch cw mumgk we mucmme "we 3mw> $0 “swam mgh Egg; .umchucou ..N.m-< wpnmp 126 moN.mH mom.m . nom.—+ oom.m~n mmF+ . «mo.mm+ mmm.oou mom.m_+ oov.opu mmv.om_+ mmp.mm+ vom.m+ oom.mn FN¢._+ mmm.mu mom.mn oom.mn mnm.m+ mNN.N+ mnP.Fu Fen . 5mm.¢n me+ . mmm.Fu mmm.¢+ moF.Fn www.mcn mmm.m+ PFN.mu «mm.P- 0mm: . .mumu $0 mmugzom ucm mpwmumv acmsmgammms L03 mum ancmaa< wmm* www.mpu . ooo.m+ mm—.mm+ . . . . oom.mmu . . . oom.m¢m+ . . . Peo.¢m+ . . . . Nmm.m+ . . . . mmm.vm+ . mop.mu mmm.MI . . . . oom.m+ . . . . ”OVA: 0 o o o . N©©.¢I . . . . VNM.FI . . . . mom.m+ . . . . POP-T . c o o o ©N—.¢l . . . . amp.op+ . . . . mF¢I u o o o o Non.o~+ . . . . NNNoml 0 o o o ooo.¢op+ owe: OOOnOFI o o o o GMNaNI o o o . eqpaml o o o . MVN+ . o o o . mmo.m_+ mmm+ . oom.F+ omw.mpn on . . om- . . mop.m+ mm~+ . mom.¢N+ oom.~n ¢mp.m+ oop.op+ mNN+ . Npmu . mmp.om—u ommu . ooo.Pu mm- . . mmm+ . Pom._+ #33: . ewe: . Nmo+ . eFN.m+ m~+ . . mop.no+ cm- . . wrmw . mwN+ . mop+ . om comma .m.m.m.: mcwso .m.a .<.m.: . mwnEMN wLPmN .m:w¥ umpwcs . . . mucmm: @203 a .cwgh mace» o 0 0 o 0 CDC-F umgup . mwcm~cmh ucmpw~mzm . ccuzom mwpmsom meow; mggwwm memcwm moaom .3 . accmza mwgmmwz mewz mucmpgmzpmz . mwcmpwgzmz mzwpwgamz . wpmz $22,. 127 03m- . Nmm+ . new.m+ mxcmx ¢m¢.F+ oom.pn on . . mmm.~+ mem: . o: .cmgw I j I . i. (. I v I I I I I I p I mmmu . oom.Fn mm: mcwxzo o- . . m¢+ . . m- . . —mm.¢u vmm+ . mmcwsm Lmummmmnmz . . memQPA . . onpommA. . . . mzcmg . . wormsmo . . . >._.wu.H . ucmpmgH mu—o> Luna: . . mumcmgu . . mcmzzw . . mmcwsm . . . mango Acmsgmw .3 . . «vague . . . conmw . . mucmgm . . . whwm . mwaowgpm . . xL~Egmo . . ameogmo ummoo 3go>H .m.a omcou . . .m.<.u . czogmsmu . . wuczgzm . mcmzmuom . . Ezwm_mm . moumngmm . . mmsmcmm ":pw3 mmowga pmxgmz ucmggau pm mgmfipoa .m.: mo mucmmzogh cw oumgh mo moan—mm ”mo 3mw> we “:30; mgh 5022 .umzcwucou *.N.mn< mpnwh 128 I I O I * omm.m_+ com- . oom+ . oo¢.m- mPF+ . mom+. . n_¢.m_+ o 0 0 .009’ wmm.¢w+ . . oop.w+ oo¢.mv+ . . ooo.~+ mm~.mn . . com: . mmw.mom+ . moo.mp+ mFma PM... 0 0 0 0 0 GONQON+ 0 0 0 0 0 ooo.mm+ . . mmm._+ 0mm: . . . oom+ . oomn . . . oom.Fn PNMQFnT o o o o o o FNVI . o o o o o . NNFI . o o o o o . AVm¢nN—.+ o o o o o o AVmOnNaT 0 0 0 0 0 o mum.Fn . . com: . VMVaNI . . . . . . ”RN! 0 o . o o . . mmm.~: . . mmw+ . VMN+ . o o o . o . vmm.mp+ . . mmo.mp+ O©O¢©+ o o o o o o ”ON! 0 o . OI . . NNFI . o o o o o . mm¢l . . . u . o . flWh-WI. u u MW®+ . thaNl . . OO@.r+ . . . . . . mm¢.~+ «2..-. .. .. .. .. ... .mpmu we mmULzom Ucm . . oan . . . on . . . . mvu . . . . 93+ . . m_wmpmu acmsmgzmmms Lem mum xwucmaa< mmm« mmm.~+ coo. N- . . . :mama oom.up+. . .m.m.m.: com. wp+ mom. newnu .m.a m+ . . .<.m.: . . . . mwnEmN . mgme F+ .m:_¥ ump_:: . . . . MUCGDD ommnoh w .cvgh . . . . MGCOH ouch . uncop mwcmucwh ucmFPNmzm . . . . cmczom . appmsom . meow; mggmmm . . . Pmmmcmm . . . moeom .3 mucmzm . mwgmmwz . . Lmawz mvcm—gmzpwz mwcmuwgzoz mzvagamz w—flz v3w~m2 .. ..tatul|¢.(.l .. . . . (.’f¥m’( I ‘I . ... .$ LmQQ: 0 OI . o o o OI o o o o OI o o o l o o o Cl 0 o o OI . o 0 CI 0 o 0 CI o o o . MUMCNLG o NmmoFl o o o o o o o o . o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o MCMXSG 0 MMN0F+ 0 0 0 0 o o o o 0 0 0 o 0 00+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 wmcwzw 0 mNMQN+ 0 o o o o o o o 0 o 0 o 0 ONNQNI 0 Fl 0 o o 0 0 o 0 0 m+ 0 o 0 0 0 o o 0 o o MCMSG . oom.mom+ . mom.wn . . m¢m.~+ . mmo.F+ . oo¢+ . . mom.mn . mmm.npu . . . . . AcmEme .3 0 OONI o 0 0 o o 0 o o 0 0 o o o 0 o o o 0 0 0 0 o 0 o o 0 0 o o 0 o MFQEMg 0 mNN+ 0 o 0 mOFnQI 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nw+ 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 o 0 0 o o 0 0 o :onmw 0 OONanI o 0 OOOa©+ o o O®¢am+ o OOan+ 0 00ml 0 o NVNa©m+ 0 coal 0 o o o o o o o mUCMLm 0 omen? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Pfiwm 0 mNOQFI o o 0 o o 0 o o VNF+ o o o o 0 o 0 0 0 0 o o u o o 0 o 0 o o 0 0 o o o o . MFQCPSHM 0 mmemml o o ¢m+ o 0 o mmm+ o o OONI o o mml o o o mmNI o o VMMQQ o 0 o o o o o XLMECQD 0 mom- 0 0 o o o 0 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 o o 0 mF+ 0 o 0 o o 0 0 o 0 XQEOSQQ 0 MVNQMF+ o o NI 0 o o o 0 0 o 0 o mmm+ 0 o o o o o wmml o 0 mFI 0 o o o 0 o o “WQOU >g0>H o mFma¢+ o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 MI 0 o 0 OP+ o o o o o o omomv COCOU . mm: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .m.<.u o GMOQMF+ o o o 0 0 o o 0 o o o o 0 Nm+ o o o 0 o o 0 #oNI o 0 ml 0 o 0 0 o o 0 o CDOLmEMU o mel o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o WUCDLDM I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ”cmzmpom . Nmm.mmm+ . mmmu . . . mom+ . . mmm+ . . oopu . . mmm+ . . mmmu . . . . . . . . Eswmpwm I mmmfiN' I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I mOUQDme I OONQQ' I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I mac—65mm A mucmpgmcpmz mwcmuwgzmz mzvuwgzmz Wsz mzmpmz Lmummmmumz mpgmnFA .omm4 "5pw3 mmUTLm uwxgmz pcmggzu um mngPoo .m.: mo mucmmsogh cw mumgp mo mocmpmm "yo 3mw> $0 “:30; msh Eogu .umacvpcou ..N.m-< «Pam» 130 upm.mm+ 3mm.m+ mmm.m+ emo.mmm+ ONN.mF+ www.mn coo.mvpu N¢m.m+ moo.m~+ mwo._+ menu . mom.m+ nm~.m+ ¢oeu . Fm¢.F+ moo.mn Pc¢+ . «mm- . www.m¢+ mmm- . mo¢.F+ .oo~.Pu Pom: NOOQ... .mpmu $0 mmugaom ucm Nom.— . cop: . . oo—.m mmm+ . . oov+ . . . . . . . . . . . oop+ . NF+ 0 o o o o o o - MOOQF+ oovu . . . NNN+ . . . . . . mmwn . . . . . . ~—+ . . . . . . . . . . . . oo—.F ppm- . mop: . «mo.P+ mmmn . oom.mo+ «mm.¢n www.mu mpwmpmv “swamgzmmme Low mum xwucmaa< mmm* . . . . :mama . . .a.m.m.= . mcwgu .m.¢ . . . .<.m.= awaEmN . mg_mN .mCVX ump_=: . . . .mvcmm: omnnop w .cwxh . . . mace» omoh . vmgoh . . .mwcmucmp . . ucmFP~mzm cmvzom . . . MPFmEom mcom4 mggmwm . . . memcmm . . moeom .3 mucmzm . . . mwgmmwz . . . . mewz . mucmpgmcpmz . mwcmuwgamz . . mawuwgamz rpm: Pkg—m2 I. y h . . m+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . em- . . . . . . . . . . . :mbzom I I can! I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I MI+ I I I I I I I I I I I no“ N QNNNOW I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I mONI I I I I I I I I I I I I I val' I I I I I I I mtomd MLLmINW I I I I I I I I I I I I I Nm F+ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I VKI‘I I I I mmml‘l I I I I I N mmmcmw I O 0 O I I I O I I O I I I I O I I 0 | I I I I I I I O I O I O 0 I Q I O I O I 9 I I I. O O MUONNNOW I)“ o o . . . o . . o . . . . o . - - . . . - - . . u . . - - o - n . . . . . - . - . . o u u - . ..xu.x~.);»x . . n .... . . . fll . . - - C20. - - .n-+ - .. - - - - - - - . - - - - - -- . - - ~V~ ~+ . . . q - fis....~x.\>\ a . \- . . - u ..:..- . n .- .. - . - .- .....t... .... . . - - . :..- -. .. -- . - .- -- ........\. - ...... -. -2..-.. .- .- -- .- :..-:-.- -7.:.. .:>::< . . . . . . . 59+ . . . . . . . . . FmN+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . OF+ . . . . . . . . . LfiUmMGMUGZ . I I I . I mNNI I I.mFF+ I I I . I . . I I . I . I WVI I I I I . I I . I I I MWLWDPJ I I OI I I I 0' I I I I OI . I I OI I . I . OI I . I OI I I I OI I I I OI . I . I I I OSPOWQJ I I ”NOIF+ I FNVIP+ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I oom+ I I ”PI I I I I I I I I I I I I mxcmx I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I MUFMECQ . . coo.mpu . oom.mn . . oom+ . . «mm.m+ . . . . . . . mum+ . . mmm._u . Pvmu . . . . . . xpmuH I I I I I I I I *mmaFI I I I I I . I I I UCQPQLH I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I F¢¢IPI I I I I I I I I I I I I ©N| I I I #Pml I I I mgFo> Luna: I I OI I I I OI I I I I OI I I I OI I I I I OI I I I OI I I I OI I I I OI I I I I I I mumcme . I I . I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I . . I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I “cmxzw ........I...Im_.-..INO¢|.............©—.+...—.|......mm=_.30 . . F+ . . . . . . . . . GNF+ . . NMNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . mmwnMI . Nmml . . . . . . 0:656 . . mmmampl . Nmmap+ . . ONm.©I . OO®.N+ . . mel . . mmmnp . ©0¢quI . wwm+ . . . NCMELOG .3 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I mwnsmw . . . m_:+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33m+ . . . . . . . . . . . gonna . . oom.m- . mme+ . . . omm.m+ . oom.om+ . . . . . . . m_¢+ . . oom.:F- . oom.m- . . . . much. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .._u . . . . . . . MI . . . . . . . . . . wwaowcpm . . . OON+ . . OODI . . . . . . . . . . Nowapl . . . . . . . . . . . . JLGECMQ . . . . . . Om?! . . m¢N+ . . . . . Ewonmo . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dmpl . . Omml . . . . . . . . . . . . . FO—I . . vwmap+ . . #mmou XSO>H . . . . . meI . . . . . . . . . . . . . va+ . . N+ . . . .m.mv ODCOQ . . on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ommn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .m.<.u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fan: . . . . . . . . . . . . . «mm+ . . m+ . . . . . czogwEmu I I I I I I 0 I I OO¢+ I I I I I I I I I I 0 I FUCBLDm I I 0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I mcmzmgom . . mom: . . KmN.mu . . me+ . . oo_.m+ . . N—u . . mm—+ . . oom.mu . mmmu . . . . . E:_m—wm I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I WOUQDme I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I mmemfimm 131 A cmnzom m__msom .4 mggmwm Pmmmcmm .Eom .3 mucmzm mwgmmFZ gm wz H;p_3 mmowgm pmxgmz ucmggzu um mgm__oo .m.: we mucmmaoch cw mumgp Io mocmpmm "we 3mv> Io “CPO. mgh 50.. .umzcwpcou «.N.mn< mfinmk 132 _~¢.¢+ me- . «mm._u ~m_.w+ w¢+ . . mmm.Fm+ Rom.~+ owp+ . N+ . .mpmu Io ¢mo.mu . . com: . . . Pow.¢+ . . pnm.m . . mop: . . . mom: . . . meLDOm va+ . we. m_wmgmu pcmemgsmwme Low mum oo¢.mm+ www.mu mmm.m+ ¢m¢.NN+ on . . mm+ . . mm~.omn mp: . on . . mmpn . mom.p+ m¢m+ wwm+ mpm._+ ancmaa< mam.1 o o o o o CMQMHJ I I I I I I I I .m.m.m.: Mchu .m.m .<.m.= awasmN mgme . .mcwx uwpwcs mncmm: ommaoh a .cwgh . . . . mace» amok . uncoh wwcmN:MH u:w__~m3m cmuzom . ampmeom . meow; aggmwm . Pmmmcmm mosom .3 mucmzm . mwgwmwz . . mewz . . mvcmpgmsumz champwgsmz . . . mzwuwgsmz Ppmz I I I I PEG-um: 133 I m—Iv‘l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I . I I m0-\om Ik I chal I I IKOVAMI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I mMWlmII. I I I I I I I I I NUDNKMRQ I mocfiqmnfiu I 0—7:? I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Dmhnfiu I I NON NI I \IN I I I I I I I I I I mkfkmmmz I we“! I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I mm+ I I I owl I I I I I I I I I I I‘mmxz . m-m.:I NJ&. I mwrCl I I o OQOIR l I I I o I I I QC~ I h I I ma\+ I I - .003- NI I I I I I I I un\un\5.\.5.uz\u.t>\ I I.u-.\..4I _ n I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I.\~\I.I\ I..I\~I.\I\ I ... I I I I I I I - - - - - . \KII ! . - - I . . . - I ..VI.\ I \ II...I,\ FF0+ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I m®P+ I I I I I I I I LCUWQUGUMZ I I I I I I I I I I I I I MPLmnPJ OI. I I I OI I I I I OI I I I I I OI I I OI I I I OI I I I Cl I I I I I OI I I I I OEHOWEJ QGOQmmI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I om¢+ I I I I I I I I I I I mxcmM I I I I I I I I I I I I MUFQEMQ COMQ¢NI I ooml I I I OON+ I I I I I I I I ooml I I NNNI I I ”MNQNI I I I I I I1. I I I XFMHH NomanI I OONI I I I 00—...- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I “mml I I I I I I I I I VCMPWLH I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I MHPO> Swag: OI I I I OI I I I I OI I I I I I 0| 0 I OI I I I OI I I I OI I I I I I OI I I I I MUMCULQ OWPQQI I I I I I I I NOMQFI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ”cmxzw I I I I I I I I I I I F+ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I UQCWSG MOquNI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I mmwnpl I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0:656 omp.owu . mm¢.ms . . cmmn . . . . . . . . oom+ . . omo.~+ . mmm.o— . . . . . . acmEme .2 I I I I I I I I I I o . I I I . I I I I I I I I wwnEmw mwN+ I I I I I I I I I I I I . I I I . I I ©F+ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I . I I I . I I CODMO DONIFNI I NNNI . . I MMOIVI . . I . I I I OOMoml I QmNam+ . mmNIFI . I I I I I o I . GUCWLm I I I I I I I o I I I I I I . I I . . I I . I I I w.wm —m¢.®I . F+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ml . . . . . . . . . . Gwaowsvm mmpakm+ . oom+ . . . vmw+ . . . . . . . . OI . . . OOFI . . OOmI . . . . . . . . . . meEcwD I OONI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I XWEOEMD ¢©¢IN+ . .pF+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NF! . . . N+ . . . m+ . . . . . . . . . Hmmou ASO>H mmoam+ . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .m.mv 00:00 A Omm+ . I . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . I . o . . . I . . . . . I . . . . I I . . . . . .m.<.U mel . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I le . . m¢¢+ . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . CZOLGEMU 00ml . . MONI . I . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . OVFIPI . . . . . . . I . wUCJLsm . . . I . I . . I o . I . . o o . . . . . I . . . I I . I . . . I . . . . . . . . o . . MCGZmHOm mom.Pv+ . omm.~u . . mom: . . . . . . . wmm._n . N¢F+ . . mmm.mn . . . . . . . . . Ezwmpmm I mmwaml I I I I I I I OONQMI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I WOUMDme ©©OQVFI I I I I I I I mmmaPI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I mmenwm .mcwx .2 wccwm: .no# a .cmgh munch ouch no:up mwcm~cmh .Nwzm "cpwz mmuPIa pmxgmz ucmggzo um mgm__oa .m.= Io mncmmaogh cw mung» mo mucmpmm "we 3mw> we pcwoa mgk 20;; .umacwpcou I.N.m-< m_nmp 134 ewm.mm+ mm¢.~m~+ «mm.wm+ mmm.mmm+ mmm.m_F+ vwm.mm+ mm¢.¢mn mm_.Nn mom.m- mow+ . www.mp+ www.mmu Pom.¢u wa.op+ moeu . mp¢+ . emmn . mo¢.e~+ mom: . mmm.~m+ N¢N.FP+ mmo.mm+ mmwa . Nmm+ . 9P0... - BQNQFI OI. . ' wmo.mmu 50¢.NP: wom.mmn oom.v+ . . . oom.mou mmw.v_n moo.nn .... .... .mpwn mo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o o o O O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o o o o o . . . . . . . . . . u .on u u mmULzom oom.~+ omm+ . wwmn . O m+ . . w+- u - £-. u - 00ml ucm m—wmumu acmEmgammmE oo_.m+ com: . . . mmo.mu mom.mn . com- . . . oom' O O O oom.PNn . . o: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mmu. . . . . . . . . . ¢mpn . . . . mmm+ . . mo—+ . . . O O O O O O 0 o O 0 o NOF' o o o O . . . . . Nm+. . . . H u. .. .. a .u ....a ..w r M . - 0 OI- . n 0 0| a u o . . . . . . Om¢+ m m . NNNI . . MMFaNI . o o o o O o I ~ on- o 0 Low m-m xwucmga< mmm* . o o o o . :MQMW . . . . .m.m.m.= . . . newco .m.m . . . . . .<.m.: . . . . . mwnEmN . . . . . . mgme . . .mcwx umgpca o o o . o MUCGD: . ommaoh a .c_gh o o o o o o MOCOP . c o o o o COOP . . . . . . cucuh . . . . mwcmNcmH . . . . vameNmzm . . . . . covaom . . . . . mw_mEom . . meow; aggmwm . . . . . Pmmmcmm . . . . mosom .3 . . . . . mucosa . . . . . memmwz . . . . . . mewz . . . mc:m_gmzpwz . . . mwcmppgamz . . . . mzwppgzmz . . . . . . w_mz . . . . . p3m~mz . . . . . norflgdfl . . . . . . . h (flflw . . . . . Gcnrwba 135 Icqml I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I QMIJQII I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I MUO\\\DW I} HNWMWHII I I II II II I I. I I II II I I. I AI I I I I I Nkmhm‘u I I I I I I I I I I MVN| I I I I I fihskhkt 0mm «OI wm~ ~+ I rx~ ml I I I I NVWIxNI I I OI I I . I I I wNNI I I I I . fixkfltxk IMP?! I I I I I I I I I I I I NVDI~I I I I I mwngul I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Lauxmxz HWCMwnvwlII H II II II VMH~ ImIvPH. II II II AHAICIPI§I I I I «IAIVIOSWIAMI I -\.:.II~ I. I I I I \,.~I,JMIJI\ I I I ..I,I.\I~\I.IN.I.I.I~\N.I>\ III-IIII - I I I I II I I I IIIIIIII I II I I I I ISIAIUIAHIIII. . I -I I I II , I I I I I I I . . I.\I..III..~I\ II.AI.I..\.,.\ IOIIIIIIIOIIIIIIOIIIIIIIOIIIIIOIIIIIIIOIIIIILMUWmmMUMz INQmQONI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I OOGQMI I I I I I I I I I I mmnu I I I I I I MPLOQPI- IOI I I I I I I OI I I I I I OI I I I I I I OI. I I I I OI I I I I I I OI I I I I I I ospome— Ivm®QM—II I I I owl. I I I I I OF—Ia _II I I I I O¢MQmI I I mml I I I I I NQMI I I I I I I thm¥ IOOMQNI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I GUPwEMQ .moPImmI . . . mmmI¢mI . . . con.m+ . . . . mm~.movu . oom.¢NI . . . mmFIIMI . . . . . xpmpm Ioomaml I I I I Nmma MI I I I COP. —.II I I I I Nomuwml I I I I I I I I I I I I I I UCQ—IU.LH Imml I I I I I I I I I I I I mel I I I I I wNwl I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I “U. Fo> LmQQ—I— IOU I I I I I I OI- I I I I I 0' I I I I I I OI I I I I 0.! I I I I I I OI I I I I I I mumcme ImmmaFl I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I OO¢QFI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ”cmxzw I I I I OONIOFI I I I I I I I I I I I OOQINI I I I I I I I I I I mPl I I I I I I mGCPZG INCFIml I I I mwmom+ I I I hmmorl I I I I NwFI©~+ I I OwFI I I I I I m+ I I I I I I I wcmzw .mom.mm+ . . . mmm.mNI . . . mom+ . . . . . oom.mPI . . ooo.wnu . . . MMNINI . . acmEqu .3 IVmOINI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ¢m+ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I wwnEmw IFO—l I I I I I 0+ I I I I I I I I I I I I I Nomam+ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Conww .nomIFI . . . . mom.m¢: . . . mmm.mw+ . . . moOImmmI . oom.¢¢I . . . mMNINNI . . . . wucmgm IOPNIOI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I wfiwm IFNQIQPI I I I 6mm: I I I . PN©.PI I I I I NomImN+ I I I I I I I I I ©N+ I I I I I mwaowcpm .omo.¢mn . . . «mm.ma . . . nom.mn . . . . ooo.mpu . . ooFI . . . . . oom+ . . . . . xgmscwo .mmpl I I . I I I I I . I I I I I I I I I I I epml I I I I I . I I I I I I I I XmEocmo Immmam+ I I I I mNmIN+ I I I moml I I I I I meaom+ I I I I I I I I I I NM! I I I I Hmmou XSO>H Ipwwl I I I I I NMNI I I I I PF+ I I I I I NONINI I I I I I I I I I I mwp+ I I ImImv ODCOQ Iocml I I I I I ON+ I I I I I I I I I I I I I MPOIN+ I I I I I I I I I I MO?! I I I I I ImI Io ucwoa mgh Eogm .umacwpcoo I.N.m-H Amav omcou .m.<.u czongmu wucagzm mcmzmpom Ezwmfimm moumngmm mmsmgmm whtmkk mkamxz . NVW.V+- . . Loommmmumz . . . wwgman ogpomm4 . mxcmx mu_mEmn . »_MHH ucmpmgH mp_o> Lmaas . . . mumcmgw . . . mcwxaw mmcwae . manna . Acmsgmw .3 I I I “PaEmw I I I I conmw . . . mucmgm . . . . ww_m MPQongm . xgmscwo . xmsozmo . pmmoo ago>H .m.mv oncou . . . .m.<.u czogwEmu wccsgsm A . . «cosmaom . . . samemm . . moumngmm . masocmm "saw: mmumga pmxgmz pcmggsu pm mng—oo .m.: we mucmmzoch c? mumgh mo oucm_mm ”we 3mw> $0 “swam mgp 20;; Ammewhv .mewh gm>o mm_gpczoo umqopm>mo m>Pm3H can mmwgpcaou mcwaopm>mo Lsomnxugou mcos< mcmg» yo cowu:_o>m mshuuxwggmz mnmgp we mucmme Fm:o_uumgwo *.m.mn< m—QMH kmaxé HirthNva\r.-UH\Q nuvz . «ssgxfixu \, .s\‘-.\< 3‘» \ \ \.~\-.\a\ 138 .Smu 08 3953 EB mZSmu ucwsmgzmmme .89, mum x.6=m&< mm? mwr. FFF+ mmm N+. . mmm.m+ . . . . comma mmm. OF+ I I I I I I I I I I ImImImI: . mm~.mNI . . new. N- . ooFI . . nmp+ . . .emm.p+ . . . . . a NWNQMFI nOI . u o o a u ' NwwaMI - o . o a n u u o . . . . . . c . c . . n u . . NQMnF+ . . . u . . c . o . mmm. OI . o n . o o . . o . o MCWEU cm.& . ooo.vm- oww. m+ . NoN.m- . mm—.NI . MMN.n—I . . . . new. —¢N+ mmm NF+ . mmm.mm+ . . . .<.m.= . ONFI . MGI . . ~ . . o o . . . . . . . o . NanFl . wmma Ml . . . . o o u . . . GwflEMN . Dml . o . NOV! . . NN¢+ . - MFFI . . Omm+ . ~ ~ . . . ©N¢n FFN+ . . . . . u o o . o . . . wLwMN . mop.vn . . mm¢.~u . #mmI . . NoN.m+ . Nmo.mn . oom.m- . CON. Fmp+. mmN. w+. . oom.np+ . . .mcwx .c: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mn+ . . . . . . . NNNI . . . . . . . . wtcmmb . . ~ . o . u . . u u . . o . . o . . . . . o . . o c . . n o . Nownfil . OFMQO+ . PNM. F+ .DOGDOF & .CFLH - u n o u o u o u u u o n u u o o o o u o ‘ . u o u o o . o u a u o . u o . o a o u o Macon—- . MDMI . . . mm+ . . . . . . . mm+ . . . . . . . . . . . . m—©.F+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . omOH . ©N©.N+ . . NNNufil . omml . . wm¢npl . . . . . . o . . . . OF¢+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UMSUH . . . o . o . . . . . . o o o . . . . ~ . . #NmnN+ . . c . o . ©—C.N+ . . o . n . . u . o . MwCMNCflP . . . o n o . . . o u . o . . o . . - o c o . o . . . a . . . . . o . o . . u . . . . . . . . UCflFwNMZW . ¢¢NI . . . . . . o . u o o o . MCI . . . . o . . . . c . . mFN+. - n o . . o u . n . . . . . CMUJOW . F+ . . . . . - o . . o o . . o . . . . o . . o . o o . . . o #l u o o . . o . n c . o - . - GPFMEOW . mml . o u c . . o . o . u . . . NFFI . o . . . . o . o u . mmo.—I . o o . . . v u . . 0:004 MLmeW . cmN.MI . . NFI . . . . . . . ©¢w+ . . . . . . . . . . . m¢mnml . mp+ . . . . . . . . . . memcmm . . . . o u . . . . o . . - o . . o u . - . . . . . u u u . . mm+ . . . . . . u u . o . u . . MOEOW .3 u n a . . . o u . . . . . . . . . OI . . . OONI . u o . . . - mmfil o . . . . . . . . o . o u . MUCMBZ . mNFn¢+ . . ONman . . . . . . me+ . . . . . . c . . . . 05m.MI . m+ . . . mmm.m~+ . . . wwmerz . 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XFMHH . . ccmpwgm mp_o> Lmaa: . . mumcwgu . . «sumac . . mm:_=w . . . mcmcw managmu .3 . . mwnsmw . . conmw . . mocmgm Pawn . mwao_;pm . . 3Lmscmo . . 3msosmo pmmoo 3go>H .m.mv omcou . . .m.<.o . czogmsmu wuczgzm . mcmzmuom . . Earmme . moumngmm . . magmsmm A ":pwz mmowga umxgmz ucwggsu pm mgmppoo .m.= yo mncmmaoch cw mumgh Io mu=m_mm p: ”we 3mw> we _oa och 50.; .um=:w“=ou ..m.m-< m_nmh 140 . mop.N~I . oom.NvI . mmm.N+ . Nmo.omn . mm+ . . . ¢~N+. . . 3mm.mpu . mNF+ . . m3¢._- 0 C I 0 b 0 0 I 0 O 0 0 0 I I I I I 0 I . mm- . . . owN+ . . mpo.P+. . 2a.? . emo.¢-. . omm.~+ . ¢+ . . 3mm.P+ . mmp.m¢FI mom.—o_u oom.mva moo.mm+ .moo.v- . Noo.¢omu m—m+ . . ._vm.mu . omN.N+ . «mo.—I . .NFm.mI . m¢m._—+ «mm.mI . cum.NI . 3mm.m+ . oow+ . . NNN.NI . oem.—I . oem.pu . mmN.~mm+ Nmm.m+ . mpm.en . NFm.F- . NNF.FI . Q 5:: .V a :1 Scaofip+ c- . . O I I I 0 I I I I I I O I I I 0 I I 0 I 0 0 0 I 0 I I I 0 I I I 0 I I I 9 I 0 I I 9 0 I .emm+ . .P» . . ICI- to o O I 0 0 O I I I O I I I 0 I I I I .mumu Io mmogzom . omm.omu . . oom.mmu . o fimmnpl . o . . mmm.m¢m+ . . . mmp.oo+ . . . . N_m.3+ . . . . mom.m¢_n . om- . . . . OQM.MI o o c o Downml o o u . mmwaml o o . o mw¢aml . o o . mFVI u o o o . NwOI w a o o .mmm.~mu . . . . mmwawl . . . o Pm+ o o o o . o uml o o o o . mmO.MI . . . . mmO.MI . . . . «mm.mmN+. . QGmael . . . ..N¢¢.ml . . . o OQOQVPI o o o o NONI a o o . - .55.?CI . . - a . 6.2.1.. . . . . Ag- . . . AV- . ¢xm.N»I 3cm m_?mpmu pcmEmLammmE ¢mm+. 0 I mmm.N_+. 00F.FI . mmv.F+ . coo.mNI. upm+ . . NI . . . oou.m+ . me+ . . 0 I I o I I I I I I O 0 I 0 I 0 FmN+ 0 I O I I 0 0 9| . . 03¢. r+ oow.Nm+ mw¢.m+ . oom.m+ . ooo.mmu. m©m+ . . omo.ms . «mN.N—NI mom: . . mNP.¢+ . .Nm+ . . .mo- . . .mmmu . .oo¢.P+ . .Nmm.P- . .mvm- . . .mNN.—+ . .NFFI . . Imm+0 I I Imm+I I I .oow.mw+. Imml I I IMNN' I I D¢mm+ I I .mop- . . 30% .U xwucmaa< mmmI . . . :mamo . . . . . .m.m.m.: mcwcu .m.m cow.m+ . . . .<.m.: . . . . . . ownEmN m- . . . . . mLPmN ooo.N+ . Eonmcwx .2: none... MUCMDD . . ommnop w .cwgh . . . . mm:o~ MNFI . . o o 0 COOH . . . . . . . nmcup . . . . . mwcm~cmh . . . . . ucm_w~m3m . . . . . . censom . . . . . . mwpmeom mcow4 mggmwm . . . pmmmcmm . . mosom .3 mucmzm 3mm._+ ~m+ . . . . mwgmm_z Koo.F+ . . . . .mm_z mmo.~+ . mucmpgmspmz . . . . mwcmpwssmz . mzwuwxamz 0—- I I I I. I PF”: 9 c o o o o .PZflsz «Intolaflsluaut' f- I ...!riF/I .’ DUII’ I I f 9, Io .. I I a fa rbflf n4 ...... H- I) nun . . . . . - oxF:%¥ .. . . o . . o 60 (05an O I I I I O O % lung” 0 I O o O CO Maw" . . . I . 141 .mmpu . IN”- I I I I0' I I . . .em~.F_+. o o oONwaFI o 0 .0I o o o o o owFPI o o o . ommpl . o . . .Now.m+ . o o ooomaFFLvo o o omPVnFl o . . .owm._+ . o . omql . o H H .mwm... H H . . mmo.¢+ . o o —.+ o o o mxcmx .Nom.m+ m+ . . mmm.m+ opo._| mmm.on momemn .mpfiaml . . . . . .mmm.o_+ I0' I I .nom.mpu. .mpm.mn .mm~.¢Fn .wmm+ . .o- . . .omw+ . .omp.vu .mmc.¢+ .Nm¢.omfin ._mP._+ .mmmu . .wmm.mo_+ .meu . .mwm.FNu. .me.ma .mmp.mu .m_m.mm+ .FN¢.¢+ .omwn ._mm.©n .mmm.mm+ .Nmm.Pn .mmo.¢mu. .muu. . .o- . . .om_.F+ .m@N.Fn .mmN.PP+. .o- . . .mmo.F+ .oo- . .omu.m+ .moo.¢o+. .vm—+ . .oom._n Imm+ I IP?‘ I ommm.~_+. .Nom+ . .oqm+ . .momu . .wmmn . .mmw.opn .ompu . .mou . NgmpH ucmpmgH 06' I I .omw.Pu .omF.F+ .oom.o_ .moo._u .mo- . .wmm.m+ .vomu . .> mem: .cmgo I I vm+ mm“. ml acmxsw I I I0' I I .oou.mn .mmm.o— .mm—n . . . mmm.¢a . moo.¢+ Pu . . . . mmcwao +I A Lmummmmumz . . mwgmnw4 . . onaommA . . . mxcmx . . mowmsmw . . . XFmHH c:m_mLH mupo> nga: . . mumcmgw . . acmaam . . mmcwaw . mange .xcmEme .3 . . mwaEmm . . . conga . . mucmgm wnwm . owqovspm . . xgmscmo . . xmsozmo ummoo xgo>H .moav omcou . . .m.<.u . csogmamu . . wvczgam . acmZmpom . . E:Wm_mm . moumngmm . a mmsmgmm "cpwz mmUVLQ pmxgmz ucmggsu pm mgmppoo .m.: $0 mucwmzoch cw mumgh mo mocmpmm ”we 3mw> Io “smog mgp 50;; .nmacwpcou ¥.m.mn< anmH 142 .mon.mm+. .oom+ . . .oom.F+ . .mow.m+ . .mmv.mpu. .momn . . .oo~.Fm+. .wmm.upu. .Nmm+ . . .vmm.o_+. .mmm.m¢+. .mmo.mp+. .mwm.m+ .mpmu we mwogsom new .omm.mm+ .mmm.wp+ . .mmN.FP- .mmo.mm+ .mmm._m+ . .moo.mm+ .oom.mp_- .mmo.¢- . . .m¢_+ . . . .me- . . o oquoFl o . .omp.m—u. . m_o.om+. . mmm.mu . . omn.pu . . mmm.¢n . . oop+ . . . one- . . . «Fm.~+ . . mwo.m+ . . um~.mm+. . omm.pp+ . «NP.F- . . mm+ . . . mko.F- . . .®p¢.¢7. . . .nom.cr+. . .OI . . . .mom.Nr|. . .fi_manl .ooo.¢+ . .oom.¢u ovmma¢+ o o o o o Ioom+ I I IOON' I .vmm.m~n. .ooo.m+ IMNN+ I I I I I I oNMI o o o o c o .qmm.mm+. .o- . . Imomn? I I I I I I. .Nmmopl . . . . . .m+ . . . oNNmnF+ o o o o o Iom—u+ I I I I 0 I .mpn . . . . . . I¢m+ I I I I I I .omm+ . . comma—u... o o o o o . . . . . .vmpn . .mom.mp+ . . . .m—_- . . . . . . I I I 0 I QQFaN... .. c a o .@\.l. . . . . . .Ol . c . Owfirflrufil 0 o O o ...ONoPI . o o . m_wmpmu I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I O I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I o I I I I I I I I I I I 0 I I I O pcmsmgzmmma . . mom+ . . . oom.mpu . . OO—an. . . _mm.w+ o o OOOQMIo Lo+ mum xwvcmag< mam.P .nm+ . . . . :mamw . . . . . . ..m.m.m.= m:w;o .m.m .om_.m+ . . . .<.m.: . . . . . . . mwnsmN . mg_mN .mcwx .2 magma: omQQOH w .:_;H . mmcoh ouch . umguh mwcmNcmp acmpw~mzm . . . . . . . cmuzom mwpmeom mcom4 mggmwm . . ~mmmcmm mosom .2 mucmzm . mwgmmwz . . mewz mvcmpgmcumz mwcmp_gzmz . mzwpwgzmz .mpu . . . . . Ppmz . . . . . . . _3m_uz .mm¢.F+ . . .on . . . . . . .mmmn . . . . I I I I ..I I .mu . . . . o I I ‘ I 0 I o o o -v o» -... 3.41;; Cid 4&2 4% (Son)! :2 Ofifioww) 6%Cwi mu «6:54 143 C‘F (fl . 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F... o o o o om—um-T o o o meNl o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o MPLmnFI— oOIooooo IoooQoOIooooolooooOInooOIooooOloooooocflomwl— ._vao—nn—I I o o o I o o o o IMNmo—u+ o o o I I o o I mmNn—u o o o o o o o 0 NM... 0 o o o o mxgmx .npmaml . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mmeEwfi .oo~.¢~-. . . .mm_.mp- . .Nxo._+ . . .oo_- . . . mmo.p- . m.¢.m+ . . oom.o.- . . . »_muH .Omwawml. . . . . . . . . .©N+ . . . . . . . . . ONwapl . . . . . . . mm+ . . . . UcmFmLH .Frporl . . o . . . . . . . o . . o . .Nmfinpl . . . . . . . . . . MHFO> LUQQD .o- . . . . . .o- . . . . o- . . . . .o- . . . . c- . . . o- . . . . o- . . . . . mumcmgw .MON.mI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mcmhzw .mmm- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . w_+ . . . . . . . . . _mm- . . . . . mmcwaw .mmF.NP+ . . . . . o . o . . . . . . .GMNaMI . . OI . . . . . . . . . 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N+ o o o Aomomv ODCOU .mmm- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .m.<.u .Om¢.wm+ . . .OMI . o . . . . . . . .ml . . . . mml . . . m+ . . . . VQI. . . . . CDOLGEMU .o_o- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _u:=L=m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . acmzmpom .oom.¢mq+ . . .mom.m_- . .mmm+ . . . .oom+ . . . 00¢.F- . Nom.¢ . . Nom.FF-. . . sawmpwm m—N.MI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NI . . . . . mOUanmm .mNN.¢I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . Nmmaml . . . mmEmsmm mucmpgmcpmz mwcmpwgamz mawpwgsmz wpmz wzm_mz Lmummmmumz mwgman "saw: mmo_ga umxgmz ucmggzo um mgmppoo .m.= mo mncmmzogk cw mumgp mo mucm_mm ”we zmv> we p:_oa mgh sogm .nm::_p:oo *.m.mu< m—nMH 144 .Nm¢.mmp+ .nmw.w+ .mmn.m+ .mmm.omo. 0mm- 0 .owm.Fu .oom.mmmn .mmn.m+ .omo.Pn .oomn . .mmn.w+ .Fmo.pu .mmm.mu .pmmu . .mwp.mwp+ .mmm.Pn .eom+ . .mmm.Fn .mopn .Pmm+ . .NonNi .mov.cu .o: . . .th.~+ wmwfium- ¢~r.r+ O- . C umm.m+ mmo.~u ompn oop.¢¢ m+ . . me+ . m_u . m~+ . mom+ . ¢Fu . .mpmn $0 moogzom vcm memumu acmemgzmmms L0$ mum Nom.F- . . qmm.m+ . . . . . OOVnml—u o o o o o o o o o o o o o . o o o N©m+ o o o . o . QVGI . o . o e o . . . . o . mmNarl . . . . . mmn.pn . o o . wF+ o o o . . . . . . mmp+ . . . . . . O I O O o O mm~+ O O I I 0 III, I I I ,\I\I.I O >IVI') mom yum emu xwucmag< mwm :mamq m.m.m.: wcwcu .m.m .<.m.: . ovnsmN mgme mcwx .2 . mucmmz . . . .noh w .cvgh coco» . . . 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O MN+ O O O O O O NN+ O O om+ O O O O O ¢m_.m_u . 0 0 O O O O O O O O I ”0' O O O o o o o a o o o o o o OanN+ o o . . . . . . . o: . . mmm+ . . . . . . . . . . . . mo+ . . . . . . mm: . . . ¢m+ . . mom.mn . . mmpu . . . . . . . . . . . mu . . . . . . mom.m_u . . . mwgmm_z mosom .3 aungm . 59?! . - . CQW+ . .MWUWQW~W . . ¢m¢.mm~u . “mm.Pu Fmv.mu . . mmv._+ mewz mbtmkk | I Q | I “\Lmulfiz O I Q | I I melfiz . u - vatfivxk Qtuhuz n o s..\.\~...ux;~s-<< .. n - a.\~\ \\_\\‘~.\p\ . Lmommmmnmz . . . mwgmnPJ . . . osuomm4 . c o . MXCU¥ . . . mowmsmw . . o . NFflHH . . . ucmpmgH . muFo> Lona: . . . mumcmga manage mmcwzw . . . . mcmcu . acmsgmo .3 . . . mwaEmm . . . . conga . . . mucmgm warm . . quowspm . . . meEcmo . . . 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Imports Exports Country T0 T1 T2 T0 T1 T2 Bahamas 0] 01 01 0] 01 01 Barbados O3 03 03 01 02 02 Botswana .. .. .. .. Burundi .. 04 04 .. 13 01 Cameroun 01 01 01 0] 01 02 C.A.R. 01 01 01 01 02 02 Congo (P.R.) 02 01 01 01 O3 04 Ivory Coast 01 01 02 01 02 03 Dahomey 11 01 02 IO 01 02 Ethiopia 04 O4 04 02 02 02 Fiji 05 12 21 02 02 02 Gabon 0] 01 02 02 02 O3 Gambia 02 15 01 02 12 15 Ghana 03 04 O3 02 O3 03 Guinee 01 O3 03 02 06 2] Guyana 02 02 02 02 O4 02 Grenada .. .. .. .. .. .. Upper Volta 01 02 02 01 02 02 Jamaica 02 02 02 02 02 02 Kenya 02 O4 04 03 14 05 Lesotho .. .. .. .. .. .. Liberia 0] 02 04 01 02 03 *See Appendix B-5 for measurement details and sources of data. Table A-5.* Continued. 164 Imports Exports Country T0 T1 T2 T0 T1 T2 Madagascar 01 Ol Ol Ol Ol 02 Malawi .. 04 26 .. 03 02 Mali 03 05 O3 05 04 06 Mauritius 05 09 lo Ol Ol 01 Mauritania 05 Ol 02 04 03 03 Niger 02 Ol 02 Ol Ol Ol Nigeria 02 03 03 02 03 O4 Rwanda .. 03 06 .. 02 02 N. Samoa Ol 10 ll Ol 03 Ol Senegal .. Ol 02 .. Ol Ol Sierra Leone 02 03 04 01 01 Ol Somalia .. 03 04 .. 02 22 Soudan O6 06 06 O4 06 05 Swaziland .. .. .. .. .. .. Tanzania 05 05 05 04 05 07 Tchad Ol 01 02 Ol 02 Ol Togo 03 03 03 Ol 02 02 Tonga .. .. .. .. .. .. Trinidad & Tobago 04 l6 l6 O3 03 02 Uganda ll 02 O3 04 07 04 Zaire O4 04 06 02 Zambia 25 39 04 03 *See Appendix B-5 for measurement details and sources of data. 165 Table A-6.* Susceptibility to External Influence: Over Time. Country Time Time o 1 “me-2 Bahamas .... .... 1.45 Barbados 1.45 1.20 1.13 Belgium .64 .69 .81 Botswana .... .42 .34 Burundi .05 .29 .35 Cameroun .54 .45 .49 C.A.R. .50 .44 .42 Congo (P.R.) 1.76 1.75 .78 Ivory Coast .71 .23 .69 Dahomey .53 .33 .46 Denmark .59 .48 .52 Ethiopia .23 .17 .21 Fiji 1.61 1.14 .83 France .24 .20 .26 Gabon 1.14 .79 1.17 Gambia 2.38 4.03 3.58 N. Germany .34 .29 .39 Ghana .35 .35 .36 Guinee .24 .29 .50 Guyana 1.20 1.14 1.10 Grenada .... .45 .... Upper Volta .25 .39 .30 Ireland .61 .57 .33 Italy .24 .24 .33 Jamaica .61 .62 .69 Kenya .63 .54 .48 Lesotho .... .60 .17 Liberia 1.33 1.32 1.43 Luxembourg .53 .61 .80 *See Appendix B-6 for measurement details and sources of data. Table A-6.* Continued. 166 Country Time0 Time1 Time Madagascar .51 .43 .46 Malawi .14 .68 .62 Mali .41 .33 .27 Mauritius .84 .76 .90 Mauritania 1.11 .66 .79 Netherlands .80 .70 .72 Niger 1.60 1.50 .40 Nigeria .53 .36 .42 Rwanda .06 .35 .29 N. Somoa ... ... 7.43 Senegal .14 .48 .47 Sierra Leone .97 .61 .51 Somalia .28 .64 1.02 Soudan .31 .35 .44 Swaziland ... .13 .11 Tanzania .15 .57 .65 Tchad .85 .41 .46 Togo .39 .51 .55 Tonga ... .... .03 Trinidad & Tobago .75 1.27 1.29 Uganda .53 .52 .43 United Kingdom .33 .28 .36 Zaire .10 .42 .76 Zambia .06 1.23 1.01 United States .07 .07 .09 P.R. China ... .... .... U.S.S.R. .09 .11 .11 Japan .18 .17 .20 *See Appendix B-6 for measurement details and sources of data. APPENDIX B CONCEPTUAL AND STATISTICAL MEASUREMENT ISSUES AND SOURCES APPENDIX B CONCEPTUAL AND STATISTICAL MEASUREMENT ISSUES AND SOURCES Details of operationalization and major sources of data for all indicators are included in this appendix. Wherever data were available for more than one year within each time period (1958-1960, 1962-1966, and l968-l972 respectively), one of two pro- cedures was used. An average of the available figures was calcu- lated, in most instances. However, when this procedure seemed inappropriate--e.g., when data were available only for the middle and end of a time period--that figure closest to the "middle year" was used. All raw figures used were converted into U.S. dollars and, where appropriate, "constant dollars" were used in order to eliminate the effect of differential inflation rates among countries. Effectiveness Outcomes indicators (all dependent variables with the exception of Amount of Aid from Non-EC Countries) are change rates. Such rates may be either positive ("growth") or negative ("decline"). Rates for Population Growth and Military Expenditures are annual average changes in per cent. All others were calculated for the present study by taking the difference (change) between two tine periods as a percentage of the base-year value. For example: 167 168 (T2 ' T1) X 100 = per cent change T1 Where not obvious, the direction of scoring (e.g., whether a high value or a low value is assumed to indicate high Effective- ness Outcomes) is indicated. 8.1: Overall balance of trade (independent variable). a) Operationalization: This indicator of inequality of exchange is a country's balance of trade with the rest of the world. The usual method of subtracting imports from exports was not used. In order to focus upon the relationship of imports to exports, the confounding influence of the sheer magnitude of trade was removed by taking imports as a percentage of exports: Total exports Total imports X 100 inequality of trade balance b) Scoring direction: A “good" trade balance will have a value of less than 100 per cent, while a "poor“ balance will ex- ceed 100 per cent. In other words, this indicator is highest when B's (negative) inequality is greatest. c) Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 1965: Vol. 18, No. 12 1973: Vol. 22, No. 12 B.2: Percentage of total exports accounted for by one export commodity (independent variable and--in.the form of a change rate--also a dependent variable) 169 a) Operationalization: This is an indicator of a country's dependence upon one export item. The underlying assumption is that a diversified economy, i.e., one not highly dependent upon one or two export items but having a variety of valued export products, is less vulnerable to the ups and downs of world market prices. From a list of the quantitatively most important exports of developing countries, fourteen export commodities were chosen. These agricultural and metal products are: Copper Palmoil Cocoa Beans Raw Cotton Coffee Tea Timber Broadleaves Sisal Rubber Tin Sugar Iron Ore Groundnuts Manganese Ore Each country's exports of these fourteen commodities at T0 were then scanned by computer, which selected the one commodity accounting for the largest share of total country exports. That commodity was then examined at all time periods and its percentage of total country ex- ports calculated for each time. Assuming an approximately equal country share of world exports for that commodity and no substantial market price cuts, a decrease in that percentage over time is assumed to in- dicate greater diversification of the economy and, hence, decreased dependence upon one export item. Those few countries for which none of the commodities listed was a major export were dropped from the analysis. 170 b) Scoring direction: A higher value is assumed to indi- cate lower dependence on one export item. c) Sources: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, Commodity Trade and Price Trends: 1973 Edition. Report No. EC-166/73. United Nations Statistical Office, World Trade Annual, Vol. I. 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 B.3: Raw directional balance of trade matrix (used to construct independent variables 8.4 and 8.5). a) Operationalization: Unlike the overall trade balance in 8.1, these trade balances were computed by simply subtracting imports from exports. The procedure was more complicated than it sounds, since a total of nine 57 X 57 directional trade matrices \vere involved. For each time period, separate export and import matrices were constructed indicating the flows from each country to each other country. Trade balance matrices were then calculated by computer from the corresponding export and import matrices (see Appendix A.3). Imports and exports were in thousand U.S. dollars at current prices. b) Sources: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade: A 171 Supplement to International Financial Statistics Vol. 1 Vol. 3 Vol. 4 Vol. 6 Vol. 7 United Nations Economic Commission on Africa, UNECA Trade Statistics, Series A. Various years. United Nations Economic Commission for Asia, UNEC-Asia Trade Statistics.l Various years. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, UNECLA Trade Statistics. Various years. 8.4 and 3.5: Raw and per capita balance of trade with “old" EC countries (independent variables). a) Operationalization: From the raw directional balance of trade matrices (B.3), each country's raw balance of trade with the group of six "old" EC countries was obtained by having the computer sum across these six individual balances. Per capita balances were also calculated, as a way of con- ‘trolling for the effect of differential size of developing countries. This was done by dividing the raw balance with the old EC by the average population size of the corresponding time period, with an ad- Justment to convert the result into dollars (rather than thousand dollars). 172 b) Scoring direction: A higher value indicates a more favorable trade situation. c) Sources: For trade statistics, see 8.3. For population statistics used in all per capita calculations: United Nations_Qemographic Yearbook 1959 through 1973 United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1959 through 1973 8.6 and 8.7: Number of countries accounting for 50 per cent of a country's exports and of a country's imports (inde- pendent variables) a) Operationalization: These indicators of a country's dependence upon trading partners are based upon the assumption that dependence is greatest when most trade is concentrated on only one trading partner and is least when trade is evenly spread among a large number of partners. This notion was operationalized as the number of trading partners accounting for 50 per cent of a country's total exports and of its total imports. The cutting point of 50 per cent was an arbitrary one. Construction of these indicators began with the 57 X 57 directional matrices for exports and imports respectively. Each matrix value was multiplied by 1,000 (in order to put the numerator and denominator on a common base), divided by the country's total exports or imports, and the resulting figure multiplied by 100 to obtain a percentage. By this method, six additional matrices were 173 obtained containing directional flows of imports and of exports at each time period as percentages of a country's total imports/exports. Such a matrix shows, for example, what percentage of Ghana's total imports come from each of the 56 other countries. By computer, these percentage export and import matrices were scanned; beginning with the largest percentage and working down, the computer summed the figures until a total of at least 50 per cent of a country's trade was obtained. It then printed out the numbgr_of trading partners required to obtain this total. b) Scoring direction: A higher number is assumed to indicate lg§§§r_dependence upon trading partners. c) Sources: For total import and export figures, see 8.1. For directional import and export figures, see 8.3. 8.8: Susceptability to external influence (control variable) a) Operationalization: Countries are assumed to vary with respect to the relative openness of their economies to outside in- fluence. For example, an isolated village in Lapland which comes in contact with the outside world on two market days a year is analogous to a country with extremely low "openness;" the external contact which does occur is unlikely to have a major influence--for either better or worse--upon the local economy. In my terminology, there is a low "susceptability to external influence" (SEI). At the other ex- treme is the situation where a large part of the economy depends upon trade and other contacts with the outside world. 174 In operationalizing this notion of susceptability or vulnerability, ngt_flows--e.g., exports minus imports-~are inade- quate since they give little indication of the total volume of flows. After all, jobs and profits are generated from both export trade and import trade; for the purpose of assessing impact upon the overall economy, it is appropriate to sum gross exports and gross imports. Inflows of foreign aid (total rather than in grant- equivalent form and including East Bloc aid where known) and out- flows of debt-service payments also have impact upon the economy and should receive consideration. Originally I had also planned to use factor income flows such as receipts or payments of entre- preneurial income, but comparable data was not available for the 44 developing countries. The formula used for computing SEI is: SEI = exports + imports + aid receipts + debt-servicing, Gross National Product All component indicators are in U.S. dollars at current prices. All were also in per capita form, although the same result would have been obtained by using raw figures. Since statistics for the numerator were only available in current prices, the denomi- nator is also at current prices. For countries for which aid and/or debt-servicing statistics were not available, the ratio was computed using only exports and imports. I had thought this indicator to be an original idea. Later, however, I came across two discussions in the literature which 175 recommended the construction of a similar formula (including imports and exports but not aid or debt servicing). See Heintz (1972) and Caporaso (1974). To the best of my knowledge, such an indicator has never before been used in empirical research. b) Scoring direction: A higher value indicates greater susceptability to external influence. c) Sources: For total exports and imports, see 8.1. For foreign aid see: Organization for Economic and Cultural Development, Development Assistance 1968 Review 1971 Review Organization for Economic and Cultural Development, Development Cooperation 1973 Review International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association. P.D. Henderson, "The Distri- ‘bution of Official Development Assistance Commitments by Recipient Countries and by Sources." Economics Department Working Paper No. 92. 1970. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, Part I. 1972. United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1965 1969 1973 b For debt servicing see: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Associa- tion, “External Public Debt; Service Payments and Terms, 1965-1970." Document Report No. EC- 167-71. October 15, 1972. 176 European Communities, Commission, Tropical Africa: Socio-Economic Indicators. DG VIII., No. 557. International Monetary Fund, Balance of Pay- ments Yearbook 1965 through 1973 For GNP see: United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965 through 1971 United Nations Statistical Yearbook. 1970. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, Part I. 1969 1972 13.9 and 8.10: Debt servicinggperformance I (control variable) Debt servicing performance II (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: The principal incentive for the export of capital (i.e., non-soft loans) to developing countries--as bOth Lenin (1917) and executives of Chase Manhattan Bank would agree-- 15 not the country's total amount of indebtedness but its ability to Service or pay back what debts it has. The two indicators included 1'1 this study capture different aspects of that ability. Both were calculated for the present research. The first irldicator is: 05 I = Service payments (on interest and principal) ' New disbursements New disbursements are the amount of new loans taken on dur- ing the time period in question. 177 This first indicator was chosen as a control variable because I suspected that a low ratio, i.e., relatively substantial amounts of new loans contracted, could erase the otherwise negative effects of a large trade deficit. The second indicator was chosen because it became apparent to me that debt-servicing involves large sums of money for many developing countries, money which otherwise could go toward economic and other forms of development. For example, 19 African countries in this study pay an average of 9.6 per cent of their total exports just to service debts (see von der Ohe, 1974: 18). As a dependent variable, an increase in the following ratio is considered to be an improvement: 05 11 = PrinClPal service payments ' Interest payments b) Scoring direction: a high value on either ratio is assumed to indicate a favorable situation. c) Sources: See debt servicing under 8.8. 8.11: Amount of total aid, per capita (control variable) a) Operationalization: Aid figures used were in U.S. dollars and refer to receipts of foreign aid° Total aid inflows and not the grant-equivalent thereof were used. Where available, aid from East Bloc countries was included. b) Sources: See aid statistics under 8.8. 178 8.12: Percentage of aid from multilateral sources (independent variable) a) Operationalization: In most cases this indicator was computed for the present study. The amount of receipts from multi- lateral (international) organizations was divided by total aid receipts (see 8.11) and multiplied by 100 to obtain a percentage. b) Sources: See aid statistics under 8.8. 8.13: Amount of aid from non-EC (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: This figure was calculated using statistics for total aid receipts (not per capita) and for aid receipts from the six "old" EC countries including both bilateral and multi- lateral grants. Total aid minus EC aid = non-EC aid b) Sources: See aid statistics under 8.8. 8.14: IMF Quota position (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: Most developing countries, upon be- coming a member of the International Monetary Fund, begin with quotas which are proportionately equal. Periodically all members have the opportunity to increase their subscription capital. Because the size of the "pot" increases at these times, a country must increase its subscription capital just to maintain the same percentage of the total. A country's quota position is expressed in terms of its per- centage of the total capital underwritten by all member countries. b) Scoring direction: Higher values are assumed to indicate higher (inter-country) Effectiveness Outcomes, since they reflect im- provement in economic position vis-a-vis other nations. 179 c) Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 1962: Vol. 15 1965: V01. 18 1966: Vol. 19 1968: Vol. 21 1973: Vol. 26 International Monetary Fund Annual Report 1971 1972 8.15: GDP_per capita (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: Gross Domestic Product figures in constant dollars were used. Where per capita statistics were not available, these were calculated by dividing GDP by average popula- tion during each time period. b) Sources: United Nations Yearbook of National Account Statistics. 1971. United Nations Commission for Africa, A Surveygof Economic Conditions in Africa, Part I. 1969 1971 8.16: Per cent of GDngenerated by agriculture (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: Origin of Gross Domestic Product is reported according to the percentage contributions of various sectors of the economy. A decrease in the relative contribution of agriculture usually accompanies increased urbanization and increased industrialization. b) Scoring direction: This variable was rescored such that a higher value indicates a decrease in the contribution of agri- culture and, presumably, an increase in Effectiveness Outcomes. 180 c) Sources: United Nations Commission for Africa, A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, Part II. 1970. United Nations Yearbook of National Account Statistics. 71971. 8.17: Capital Formation (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: Expenditure of Gross Domestic Product is reported according to the major uses to which it is put. This variable taps that part not used for consumption but invested for the future. Expressed as a percentage of GDP, this indicator includes both Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Increases in Stocks. Sources using a base of constant market prices had to be supplemented with those using current purchasers' values. This inconsistency appears to create negligible problems, since the aim is to assess the importance of capital formation relative to other expenditures of GDP. b) Scoring direction: Higher values are assumed to indi- cate increases in Effectiveness Outcomes. c) Sources: United Nations Yearbook of National Account Statistics, International Tables. 1971. United Nations Statistical Yearbook. 1973. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, Part II. 1970. 8.18 and 8.19: Percentage of external public debt owed to private creditors and to international organizations (dependent variable)v' a) Operationalization: Public (governmental) debts to organizations and governments in other countries are reported according 181 to type of creditor. I chose for this study the percentage of debt owed to international organizations and to private banks and other private creditors. One could argue about the relative merits of the two types of creditors, from the point of view of the indebted developing country. I would think that loans from international organizations are to be preferred because of their lower interest rates. Those countries heavily indebted to private creditors are often those who cannot obtain more favorable terms elsewhere. b) ’Scoring direction: Higher values for debts to inter- national organizations is assumed to indicate an increase in Effectiveness Outcomes. Debt to private creditors was rescored such that higher values indicate a decrease in such debts and, I suggest, an increase in Effectiveness Outcomes. c) Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, "External Public Debt: Service Payments and Terms, 1965-1970; Projected Service Payments, 1971-1980." Report No. EC-l67-71. October 15, 1972. 8.20: Cost of Living (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: The cost of living index reflects one aspect of individual welfare within a country. The effect of inflation is removed in the calculation. Wherever possible, index figures with a base of 1958 = 100 were used. Different base years had to be used for some countries. Within each country, the same base year was used in all calculations. Because this indicator is a change rate, the error introduced should be minor. b) Sources: 8.21, B.22, and B.23: 182 International Monetary Fund,.International Financial Statistics 1967-68: Supplement 1973 United Nations Statistical Papers "Compendium of Social Statistics 1967" United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1967 1972 1973 Percentage enrolled in primary,_secondary, and tertiary education (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: As discussed in the research methods chapter, these enrollments are expressed as percentages of total population rather than of the appropriate age—group. This was done because age-group statistics are unavailable for many countries. b) Sources: Agency for International Development, Economic Data Book - Africa, 1973. Agency for International Development, Economic Data Book - Latin America. 1970. United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1963 1966 1970 1972 1973 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, A Survey_of Economic Conditions in Africa, Part I. 1971. 8.24: Electricity consumption per capita (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: This indicator reflecting one facet of industrialization is expressed in number of Kilowatt hours per capita. 183 b) Sources: United Nations Statistical Papers, Series J., "world Energy Supplies.11 No. 8 No. 15 No. 16 No. 17 8.25: Daily caloric food supply per capita (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: Food supply is given in number of calories per day eaten by the "average" person in a country. b) Sources: United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, Production Handbook 1962: Vol. 16 1965: Vol. 19 1968: Vol. 22 1971: Vol. 25 1973: Vol. 27 United States Senate, Committee on Agri- , culture and Forestry, World Food Conference 1974: Selected Material for the Use.of the U.S. Congressional Delegation to the World Food Conference. United States Congress, Subcommittee on . Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Food and Pepple, 1961. 8.26: Percentege of urban population (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: This indicator is the percentage of a country's population which resides in what are considered urban areas. The definition of what is "urban“ is set by each country and varies considerably. See my discussion of the merits of this vari- ability in the research methods chapter. b) Sources: United Nations Demogrephic Yearbook 1960 1962 1970 1971 184 Agency for International Development, Economic Data Book - Africa. 1967 1968 1973 Agency for International Development, Economic Data Book - Latin America. Various years. 8.27: Number of research institutions per 500,000 population (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: The number of research institu- tions includes universities having research facilities and/or staff. In order to take into account the differential sizes of developing countries, I converted these figures to institutions per half million people. b) Sources: UNESCO, A Survey_of the Scientific and 1 Technological Potential of African Countries. 1968-69. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, A Surveypof Economic Conditions in Africa, Part I. 1972. 8.28: Population size (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: Unlike most measures of Effective- ness Outcomes, this is an ggflgel_average growth rate in per cent. b) Scoring direction: A higher value--i.e., a large popu- lation growth rate--is assumed to indicate a lower Effectiveness Outcome. I realize that this assumption is open to some question. c) Sources: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Atlas 1970 1973 185 United Nations Statistical Yearbook. 1963. United Nations Demographic Yearbook. 1964. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Tables. 1968.‘ 3.29: 'Telephones per 100 persons (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: This indicator of the development of conununications is expressed in the number of telephones for each 100 Persons. It does not, of course, indicate how widely such tele- phone (connections are distributed throughout the country. b) Sources: International Telecommunications Union, General Telephone Statistics, Various years. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, The World's Telephones. Various years. United Nations Statistical Yearbook. 1971. 3.30: hfilitary expenditurespper capita (dependent variable) a) Operationalization: This is an gflgggl.average growth rate in per cent, based on constant dollars between the years of 1953 and 1972. The allocation of proceeds from trade surpluses or al<1 receipts is of no small interest, because money spent on such thlllgs as the military cannot be used for "productive" purposes. For this reason I included this variable in a study which otherwise systematically excludes variables such as intra-country political Systems (the overwhelming majority of the 44 developing countries are 0" were ruled by military juntas) or political ideologies. It should also be noted that almost all military equipment for developing cOuntries has to be imported, thereby creating a drain on the balance 0f Payments . 186 On the average, developing countries as a group are gradu- ally approaching the world average of military expenditures; in 1972 their average was 5.3 per cent of GNP as compared with the world average of 6 per cent (see p. 1 of the source below). b) Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and.Arms Trade 1963-1973. Pub1. No. 74. U.S. Government Printing Office No. 1975 0-557-372. I 1 APPENDIX C A COMPILATION OF ALL CORRELATIONS AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS THAT WERE COMPUTED FOR THE TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES 187 mcowumNWcmmco chowpmccmpcw op umzo pnmu RN.- mm.. mm.. NN.- Am_ u zv Np + _p u__a=a Facempxm Lo 8:80 282 mcopwuwcu wum>_ca conga new N F mxcmn mpm>vca op umzo pamu e_.+ mm.+ NN.+ m_.+ AFN u zv p + p uppnza _acempxm co 8:80 can mo.+ No.+ No.+ mo.+ Amm u 2v me + _e cowpwmoa egos: 22H AmucwEAma pmmcmpcw Lm>o mpcwexma N _ muw>cwm quwucwca mo owpmcv ww.:rrk ¢w.|¥¥* mw.ux¥¥ vw.lxxr Amm n zv H i H mocmELowLmQ m:wov>xwm unmo mm.-... em.-e.« em.-..v mm.-t.. Amm u zv NH +.op om.-. RN.-. mm.-. mm.-. Aem n zv up + _p sap, mm.-.x. _m.-tss om.-t.. _m.-«.. 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N _ ON + up + NF + ON + “Ne u zv _» + op cowumozum xcmucouom oo.1 mo.1 No.1 No.1 Amm n zv H +. p cw cowpmpaaog No pcwu cm; No.1 mo.- o_.- no.1 Amm 1 zv up 1 OH .1 .1 .1 1 N _ co mo mo 0 Ame 1 zv _p 1 op cowpauzum sgaewca No.1 No.1 mo.1 80.- Amm 1 zv p 1. p :_ cocpa_=aoa co 8:88 282 A~¢1zv A5m1zv Akmuzv Ammuzv Oh um um ”caazgam mmzouhzo mmmzu>Hpuwcam accaau can u2< AHmmv muca=.ccH 82o £323 meat» Scam La; :2 vw< Pmuoh quoh —mccmuxm on No mucm_mm 38m mew» Lm>o wmcmcu No .ps< a Hum xu___nmuqmom=m .mfioguzou “zogng acofipa_mggoo "mom omqqomhzoo .umaecpcou .~.u m_aap 190 .0200000 Pmauw>0000 00 um 000 :00: 0000000 00020 302 200 < x000000< :0 01< «Pack 00m "0002 OF. 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MN.¢¢ fled .. v: Nr 0 Or 9:511:12... he» weed-ICC N_ w. :.., Qemrlni pup—9.. La... r.) Hw'c-L. Typed and Printed in the U.S.A. Professional Thesis Preparation Cliff and Paula Haughey 144 Maplewood Drive " East Lansing, Michigan 48823 , Telephone (517) 337-1527 ~r-mfl t‘r-tr “P" f'fi'F‘fi"f'.v‘"““