LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: THE HISTORY OF A PURITAN IDEA
Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
BY
L. JOHN VAN, TIL

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ABSTRACT
LIBERTY OF C NSCIENCE: THE HISTORY OF A PURITAN IDEA

By
L. John van Til

Liberty of conscience, a fundamental idea in the American mind
at the time of the Revolution, had its roots deep in the past. That
conscience was at liberty in relation to other men and institutions 5
was set forth in detail by the Elizabethan Puritan theologian William
Perkins. With his declaration that Christ, in the New Testament, has
given a liberty to conscience, he set out to indicate what this declara-
tion meant for his contemporaries. Tb say that conscience was at
liberty, and to say as he did that it was subject to God alone, was
to say that it was sovereign in relation to other men and institutions.
If conscience was sovereign, if conscience was at liberty, the jurisdic-
tion that pertained to institutions such as the state was limited,
distinct, and separate from other institutions. Perkins' view of con-
science as sovereign and at liberty contrasted sharply with that of
Elizabethan governmental officials who assumed that conscience came
within the purview of the authority of the state, or its agent, the
church. Matters of conscience, for them, were viewed as the object
of a policy of toleration.

The difference in attitudes toward conscience evident in the
age of Elizabeth became more pronounced during the era of the early
Stuarts. Sectarian Splinters of the Cambridge Puritan movement grasped

the significance of the idea of conscience and its liberty for their

belief that individuals were free under the New Testament to decide

L. John van Til

how and where they should perform their religious duties. At the same
time James I and Charles I continued to foster a policy of toleration.
As in the case of Elizabeth before them,certain actions based upon
conscience might be tolerated, but the decision as to what fell within
this policy of toleration, they believed, remained in the hands of
governmental officials.

During the early years of the Stuart era, William Ames, a
sometime student in Cambridge, created a system of theology which had
as its normative principle the dialectic method of Peter Ramus. When
Ames applied the dialectic method to the question of conscience, he
locked conscience and its problems to the dialectic method, precluding
the need or possibility of thinking of conscience in terms of liberty
and sovereignty. When Ames' view of conscience was applied in practice
in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, it precipitated a policy of toleration
toward conscientious thoughts and action. This was evident in the
leaders' diSputes with Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson.' Massachusetts
Bay COlony, thus, under its early leaders had the same attitude toward
conscience as did English governmental officials though their position

was based upon the systematic rational of William Ames.

As the Civil War began, liberty of conscience had become a
familiar idea among a wider range of peOple, such as the Divines of
the Westminster Assembly, the Levellers, John Milton, and even Crom-
well himself. These advocated liberty of conscience in the tradition
of William Perkins.

As the Restoration began, many men in Old England continued

to defend the claim of liberty of conscience, but the older concept

L. John van Til

of conscience as an object of governmental authority and power again
came to dominate English society. The conflict between the idea of
toleration and the idea of liberty concerning conscience came to an

end in 1689 as the Act of Tbleration was passed. This act enshrined
the long-held notion that conscience came within the purview of govern-
mental authority, this remaining as offictal policy until the nine-
teenth century.

While liberty and sovereignty of conscience failed in Old
England, it flourished in America from the earliest days of the colonial
period. In addition to persistent individual defenses of liberty of
conscience, as in the case of Roger Williams, liberty of conscience was
provided for in most of the seventeenth-century charters. By the end
of the seventeenth century it became clear that liberty of conscience
and its parallel concept of sphere sovereignty, were emerging as
important elements in the formation of an American political ideology.
During the years after 1689, when John Locke published an important
defense of liberty of conscience and sovereignty, colonial Americans
increasingly drew upon his writings and those of other defenders of
the idea, to argue for individual liberty, and the definition and
separation of institutional Spheres of jurisdiction.

During the Revolution itself liberty of conscience was guaranteed
by the new states in their constitutions. The same guarantee appeared
in the First Amendment. At the same time Sphere sovereignty provided
a foundation on which rested the notion that government was a separate,
distinct, and limited institution.

The history of liberty of conscience to the era of the American

Revolution, and beyond, is the history of a Puritan idea.

LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: THE HISTORY OF A PURITAN IDEA

By

L. John van Til

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1971

Q9 Copyright by
L. JOHN VAN TIL

1971

For

Samuel van Til, father, friend,

and fellow student of history and ideas.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

While a great many peOple have contributed to this study in a
variety of ways, four deserve special thanks, each having helped this
study along in more ways than they will ever know.

Wives usually receive mention last in acknowledgments, but it
is written somewhere that the Last shall be first; and so, first I wish
to thank my wife, Kathryn Anne, for her manifold assistance. Her help
in the final stages as an eXpert editor have contributed greatly toward
making this essay interesting and readable. Over the years, however,
her assistance has exceeded prOportions that can be measured.

Professor Robert E. Wall, Jr., took an interest in this project
when it was little more than a vague idea, encouraging me at each stage
thereafter. His cheerful attitude and perceptive criticisms have
helped much and are appreciated more. From him I learned that scholar-

ship should be fun as well as work.

Robert P. Swierenga, of Kent State University, has been a friend,

and a colleague in other scholarly efforts. His encouragement of and
enthusiasm for this study has sustained me at many points.
Finally, my father has always taken an interest in my work, and

to him this essay is dedicated.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO

mTRODUCTIONO0....OOOOOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOO
Chapter
I. TOLERATION AND LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE IN ELIZABETHAN

II.

III.

IV.

V.

EINGIANDICCOOOOOIOOOOIOOOCOOOOOO

A. The Elizabethan Government and the Problem of
COHSCience o o o o o c o o c o o o e c c o o o o c

B. Elizabethan Puritans and the Problem of Conscience .

C. William Perkins: A Theology of Conscience

TOLERATION AND LIBERTY 0F CONSCIENCE IN OLD ENGLAND:
1600-1611'000000000000.00.000.000.

A. Toleration Under the Early Stuarts:

1600-1640 . . .

B. A Wider .Acceptance of Liberty of Conscience:

1600-1&OOOOOOOIOOOOOOIOO
C. William Ames and the Problem of Conscience
Do Conclusion 0 o o o o o o o o o c c o o o o

CONSCIENCE AND THE BUILDERS OF THE BAY COLONY:

A. Roger Williams . . . . . . . . .

C C
B. The Antinomian Controversy: 1636-1638 . .
I I

Co COHCIUSIOH o o o o o e c o o o c

LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE IN OLD ENGLAND:

1640—1660

1630-16HO

A. Liberty and Sovereignty in the Westminster Assembly .
B. Liberty of Conscience and the Leveller Movement . . .
C. Liberty of Conscience and the Policies of the Pro-

teCtorate o o o o c c o o o o o o o c o o o o o o 0
Do Conclusion 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o c o o c o o o 0

THE FAILURE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE IN RESTORATION

EIqGI-ANDOIOOOOOOOOOOOO00.0.00...

iv

Page

vi

15
23
38
38
u6
58
71
73

77

. 108

111

112

o 125

131

. 137

140

Chapter Page
VI. THE ACCEPTANCE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA:
1630-1770 0 I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O 166

A. Liberty of Conscience in the American Colonies:
1630-1689000...OOIIOOOAOOOOOI0.0167
B. Liberty, Sovereignty, and Revolutionary Ideology:

1689-1770.0.0.0.000000000000000178
VII. LIBERTY 0F CONSCIENCE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION . . . . . 202
A. Liberty and Sovereignty in the Constitutions of the
NewstatesOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOZM
B. Liberty of Conscience and the Declaration of Inde-
Pendence o o o o o o o c c c o o c o c o o o o o o o 212
C. Liberty of Conscience and the Federal Constitution . . 217
VIII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

BIBLIOGRAPHYOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.0.0000000240

S. 2., Dom. Eliz.

Jordan, Tbleration

ABBREVIATIONS

Joseph Stevenson, gt_§l., eds., Calendars gf

 

 

2- 1!.- .12-

91. g. 11.

State Papers, Domestic SeriesS 2f the Reign

gt; Elizabeth (Iondon, 1865 -

 

W. K. Jordan, The Development of Reli ious
Toleration in England , L vols., (Cambridge,

 

1932-19-16)..-

Leslie Stephen, et al., eds., Dictionary of
National Biography, 22 vols., (Tendon, 1882-
19597.

Perry Miller, The New England Mind, 2 vols.,
(Boston, 1961).

 

INTRODUCTION

William Perkins, an Elizabethan Puritan theologian, wrote many
treatises that dealt with the problems of conscience, and much of what
he wrote was an eXplanation of his claim that Christ "hath given a
liberty to conscience" in the New Testament. Two centuries later, as
the United States Congress met for the first time, James Madison argued
that a Bill of Rights was necessary and that it should include pro-
vision for liberty of conscience, "the rights of conscience" being a

subject about "which the peOple of America are most alarmed."

During the two centuries that separated Perkins from Madison
many peOple Spoke of their concern for conscience, including such persons
as James I, Roger Williams, John Milton, Oliver Cromwell, and John Locke.
Many important religious and political documents specifically commented
on conscience also, among them the Westminster Confession of Faith, the
Charters of most seventeenth-century American colonies, and all the new
state constitutions created at the time of the American Revolution.

With regard to the mass of material concerning conscience, the
question arose as to the relationship between the various eXpressions
about conscience. Upon closer examination it became obvious that at-
titudes toward conscience were of two types, each being present from the
time Perkins wrote about conscience in the 1570's. One view saw con-

science as a phenomenon within the purview of state authority. The state,

or its agent, the church, judged whether a particular action based upon
conscience was within the limits of what the state had decided to toler-
ate. In other words, the state established a policy of toleration, and
conscientious actions were eXpected to conform to this policy. A second
view, developed largely by the Puritan Perkins, cLaimed that conscience
owed its allegiance directly to God because God spoke directly to man
through conscience. Conscience was, thus, at liberty in relation to
other men and institutions. As for institutions in this view, each had
its authority also, receiving it from God. Each institution, such as

the church and state, had its distinct sphere of jurisdiction, and within

the sphere it was sovereign.

Viewing the mass of evidence on conscience from the perspective of
these two fundamentally different attitudes toward conscience reveals a
developing pattern of thought. In a broad perSpective it became obvious
that the concern for conscience eXpressed by James Madison at the time
of the American Revolution was part of a tradition of liberty of con-
science that was directly related to the views of William Perkins. The
tradition of liberty of conscience at the time of Madison did not become
established without a struggle, however, a struggle against the continu-
ing view of conscience as a matter for policies of toleration.

The conflict between the notion of toleration of conscience as
Opposed to the idea of liberty of conscience may be conveniently divided
into three phases, each corresponding to the centuries involved. The
first phase involved the emergence of the ideas in conflict: the Age
of Elizabeth. The seventeenth century covers a second phase, one in

which the conflict touches many of the important religious and political

diSputes of the century. During this period the ideas are refined and
sharpened, toleration emerging in England as official policy enshrined
in the Toleration Act of 1689. Liberty of conscience emerges as an
important issue in the Civil War, even attaining official governmental
sanction under Cromwell. More important, however, was the eXport of the
idea to the American colonies where it became part of the organic laws
of most of the colonies. A third phase develOped in the eighteenth
century, one in which Americans steadily broadened their interest in
liberty of conscience until it became an article in all of the new state
constitutions at the time Of the Revolution as well as the basis for the
religion clause of the First Amendment. Liberty of conscience also
informed the more general American notion of liberty that was so evi-

dent in the American Revolution.

Tracing the emergence of liberty of conscience from the days of
William Perkins to the First Amendment has been particularly appealing
for several reasons. First, it provided an Opportunity to Span several
periods that are usually dealt with in truncated fashion. In working
through several of these areas it was necessary to give serious attention
to the question of how the conventionally designated periods are related
to each other. Second, this study has found its appeal in providing
another clue to the problem of the definition of Puritanism. The dif—
ference between the Massachusetts Bay leaders' attitude toward conscience
and that of their brethren in Old England may be helpful in understanding
the genuine peculiarity or originality of the Massachusetts Bay Colony's
eXperiment. Finally, it may be argued that there is a tendency among

moderns to look back only as far as the eighteenth century to find ideas

that inform institutions and climates of Opinion in the present age.
The roots of the claim of liberty of conscience as laid out in this
study show that an understanding of something as important as the First
Amendment requires a deeper look into the past. Disputes concerning
the meaning of the First Amendment continue, and some of them have as
the central issue the question of the meaning of conscientious objection.
Such issues may be better understood in light of the long history of
the idea of conscience and its liberty.

In short, the growth of the idea of liberty of conscience from
the days of William Perkins is a significant chapter in the history of

ideas, one that deserves to be more widely known.

CHAPTER I
TOLERATION AND LIBERTY 0F CONSCIENCE IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND

Conscience was a familiar idea to Englishmen in the Age of Eliza-
beth. In the 1570's, for example, when the government found it necessary
to tighten its control over Catholics, a member of Commons declared that
conscience was "eternal, invisible, and not in the power of the greatest

1 The makers of government policy were not igno-

monarchy in the world."
rant of the role of conscience, for the government stated its purpose
was "not to have peOple molested by any inquisition or examination of
their consciences in the causes of religion."2 At the same time the
English theologian, William Perkins, penned an extended treatise on con-
science: in it he wrote, "God hath now in the New Testament given a

3

liberty to the conscience." The significance of conscience was not
lost on Catholics either. As the Catholic problem continued to plague
the Elizabethan government, Sir John Nevill, a Catholic, suggested that
the needs of all concerned in the diSpute could be resolved by a treaty
that would provide for "a toleration through the realm to live with
safety of conscience."u

All Elizabethans did not, however, use the idea of conscience

in the same way. The examples cited illustrate two different attitudes

 

1William Cobbett, The Parliamentary History g£_England (London,
1806): I: P0 763-

23. 2., Dom. Eliz., LXXI, p. 16.

3William Perkins, Works (London, 1612-1618), I, p. 529.

“E. 2., mm. Eliz., XVIII. p. 28.

toward the function of conscience in the affairs of men. On the one hand,
the government's statement that it did not intend to examine consciences

in matters of religion implied that it had the right to such an examina-
tion if it so desired. Consistent with this position was Sir John Nevill's
statement, for he assumed that "safety of conscience" should be a matter
of government policy, that is, part of a treaty. In contrast to this

view of conscience stands that of the member of Parliament, claiming that
conscience is not in the power of the greatest monarchy. In the same

vein Perkins stated that God, not the crown or government, gave liberty

to conscience.

The difference represented in these two points of view was funda-
mental and irreconcilable. Elizabethan appeals to conscience, with few
exceptions, were associated with the problem of the individual and his
practice of religion. The two points of view noted reveal two different
answers to the question of what the source of authority was in matters
of religion. The government position assumed that exercise of conscience
was a practice to be granted and tolerated by the crown or its agents.

The member of Parliament and the theologian Perkins assumed that an
authority higher than the crown was the source of authority for conscience.
A brief survey of the emergence of these two attitudes will reveal more

fully the difference between them.

A. The Elizabethan Government and the Problem of Conscience

In essence, the Elizabethan governmental attitude toward con-
science was one of toleration, the notion of governmental toleration
being a tradition. That toleration was a familiar idea in English

politics before the accession of Elizabeth is not difficult to demonstrate.

but an appreciation of that tradition depends, in some measure, upon an

understanding of what is meant by the word toleration.

 

Toleration must be distinguished from tolerance. Tolerance means

 

to possess a fair and objective attitude toward those whose Opinions,
practices, race, religion, or nationality differ from one's own; it is

a freedom from bigotry. The key to the meaning of tolerance is its refer-
ence to a cast of mind; thus, £222 or ob'ective, indeed, the phrase "an
Open mind," indicate the root meaning of the word. Though tolerance and

toleration have the same Latin root (tolero), the word toleration has a

 

 

narrower meaning. Most often it refers to legal situations in which a
government allows a practice to continue even though the practice is not

consistent with the established one. Toleration may, thus, be simply a

 

refraining from persecution.
Toleration as descriptive of a governmental policy, according
to one student of the problem, implies a "latent disapproval," a

"limited and conditional freedom," and "an authority which has been

5

and which again may become coercive." From a different angle, "it

implies . . . voluntary inaction on the part of the dominant group."6
The heart of the idea of toleration has been succinctly stated:

. . . [it] may be said to spring from the theory that
the civil power has inalienable and absolute preroga-
tives. The Government thus elevated may allow certain
.pefsons to differ from it in theory and religious
practice.7

 

5Jordan, Toleration, I, p. 17.

6Ibid.

7Ibid.

 

An important point to grasp in comparing tolerance and tolera-
tion is the absence of any sense of objectivity and Open-mindedness in

the meaning of toleration. A government pursues a policy of toleration

 

for reasons of state which are most often eXpedient reasons.8 A second
point that needs to be stressed is the implication in toleration that
the state merely grants as a privilege what it tolerates, a grant that
may be withdrawn.

The notion of toleration as a governmental grant was evident in
early sixteenth-century England. Thomas More in his UtOpia pictured
King UtOpus as following a policy of toleration:

. . . [He gave to every man liberty and choice to

believe w at he would. Saving that he earnestly

and straightly charged them, that no man should

conceive so vile and base an Opinion of the div-

nity of man's nature, as to think that the soul

do die and perish with the body; or that the

world runneth at all adventures, governed by no

divine providence.9
More here assumes that it was the King's prerogative to give what liberty
he wished his subject to have, and, importantly, he told them about two
Opinions he would not tolerate.

More's fictional King was more tolerant than his real one. More
lived and wrote during the reign of Henry VIII, and Henry had something
to say about what he would allow and what would not be tolerated. In
1536 he authorized the publication of "Articles about Religion," which

includes the following description of Henry's view of his prerogatives:

 

8For an excellent study of the development of state policy see

George L. Mosse, The Holy Pretence: §_Study in Christianity and Reason
of State from William Perkins £2_John Winthrop (London, 1957).

9

 

 

 

 

Thomas More, Utopia (Iondon, 1895), p. 529. (Italics mine.)

Amongst other cures committed unto our princely Office

. . . we have always esteemed and thought (as yet we

esteem and think) this to be most chief, most ponderous,

and of most weight, that his {god's} holy word and com-

mandments may sincerely without let or hindrance, be

of our subjects truly believed, and reverently kept and

observed . . . . 0
Assuming as he did that it was a prerogative of his office as king to
care for the religion Of his subjects, Henry went on to say that "unity
and concord in Opinions, namely in such things as doth concern our reli-
gion" should increase. What Henry had to say about how "unity and con-
cord" should be achieved reflects one form that a policy of toleration
can take. In Henry's thinking, religion could be reverently kept and
Observed if "all occasion of dissent and discord touching the same be
repressed, and utterly extinguished."11

More's description of King UtOpus and Henry's "Articles about
Religion" both reflect attitudes toward toleration; both assume that
the King had the authority to care for religious affairs within the
realm. Henry's wish that dissent be repressed appears to be substan-
tially different from UtOpus' two stipulations about death of the soul
and divine providence. That Henry's Articles allowed his subjects less
latitude than UtOpus' stipulations does not materially change the fact
that both policies rested upon the assumption that the King had the
authority to grant toleration in whatever form he desired. TO para-

phrase Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, either policy of toleration would

 

 

be an insult to mankind, for toleration in any form is still toleration.12
10Thomas Burnet, Histogy gf_the Reformation (London, 1865), I,

Po 272.
11Ibid.
12

Jordan, Toleration, I, pp. 17-18 quotes Holmes on toleration.

 

10

Queen Elizabeth was heir to this policy of toleration and she
used it creatively as she consolidated her power after accession. One
innovation made by Elizabeth and her government in the policy of tolera-
tion involved the problem of conscience, but how conscience was tolerated
and what it meant must be seen in light of the terms and conditions that
attended Elizabeth's accession.

The circumstances surrounding her accession were complex; ex-
tant evidence dating from that period is thin, but what the major issues
were may be stated with some confidence.13 For a decade before the
accession of Elizabeth, England was in the process of deciding whether
it would follow the Protestant Reformation or continue a modified
Catholicism. Henry had set the tone for English Reformation along the
lines of a modified Catholicism. Under Edward VI events seemed to move
in the direction Of Genevan Calvinism, but these develOpments suffered
a relapse with the appearance of Mary Tudor. As Elizabeth came to power,
the question as to whether England would follow Rome or Geneva was not
settled. One issue, perhaps the most important one, as Elizabeth came
to power was, therefore, the religious question.

How this question was answered may be seen in what historians
call the Elizabethan Settlement}!+ Usually this phrase refers to a pair
of Parliamentary bills passed during the first months of Elizabeth's
reign, one called the Act of Supremacy, and the other, the Oath of

Allegiance. The Settlement included these measures, but other factors

 

13Although I have relied on Jordan's discussion of Elizabethan
political events, J. E. Neale's study, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments
lgfi9—lE81 (London, l958),1$51more detailed study of the inside workings
of the Elizabethan government. The discussion in this essay of the
Elizabethan Settlement follows Neale's excellent account; hereafter cited
as Neale, Elizabeth.

 

1b'Neale, Elizabeth, Chapter II.

11

were equally important. The bills themselves differed little from

similar ones enacted during the rule of Henry and Edward, the one signif-
icant exception being the fact that Elizabeth was governor of the English
Church instead of "supreme head" as Henry had been.15

Other elements in the Settlement included Elizabeth's decision
and determination that England would be Protestant rather than Catholic,
and the concommitant question Of how English Catholics would be treated.
The Catholic question, more than any other, reveals the way Elizabeth
related the policy Of toleration to the problem of conscience.

In essence, her position was that Catholics who objected to the
legal requirements of the Settlement as injurious to conscience would
be tolerated. That Elizabeth could consent to such a policy was, indeed,
an innovation in light of Henry's desire that "unity and concord" be
achieved through repression Of dissent. Whether Elizabeth had great
personal respect for conscience is not clear from existing records,
but her private views are not important, nor critical, for an under-
standing of how she could tolerate dissenting Catholic consciences.

The practical working out of the Settlement depended upon the
personality and temperament of the Queen.16 She was no zealot relig-
iously, despite the fact that she was determined that England be Pro-
testant; thus, she could entertain reforms suggested by radical Puritans
as well as those proffered by more moderate divines. Radical Puritans
desired the repression of Catholics, and of all evidence of Catholicism
in the English Church, but the maneuverings by the Crown and its advisors

as the Settlement bills were being drafted indicated Elizabeth's distaste

15Ibid., p, 73. See also Jordan, Toleration, I, p. 8“.

16Neale, EliZabeth, pp. 117-121, 160-161, 230, 2&1, 311-312, and
387-92, as well as Chapter I. See also Jordan, Toleration, I, p. 111.

 

 

12

for such measures.17 She was willing to settle for a compromise between
the demands of Puritans and Catholics.

The absence of religious zeal in Elizabeth was undoubtedly re-
lated to her political goals. Apparently she was determined that peace
prevail on the domestic scene. If peace was to be achieved, religious
interests would have to be subordinated to political ends. Accommodation
of conflicting religious claims could be accomplished through tolerationo
The essence of this arrangement has been described by one student of
this period in these words:

The Settlement of Religion was essentially political

and national in character . . o o The doctrine set

forth . . . was, in essence, that conscience was free,

although the public exercise of ané but the established

religion was not to be tolerated.1

The first ten years of Elizabeth's reign appeared to confirm the
wisdom Of tolerating private deviation from public established religion,
for during that time the religious scene was relatively calm.19 By the
end Of the decade, however, the government found itself in the middle
of a crisis, and that crisis revealed the emergence Of conscience as a
significant feature of the policy of toleration.

”As a practical matter private religion was not greatly disturbed
during the first decade even though many Catholics had refused to follow

the legal requirements of the Settlement. By 1570, however, Rome decided

to support actively Jesuit efforts toward conversion of England, and Mary

 

17mm. pp. 51-52.

18Jordan, Toleration, I, p. 85.

 

19Ibid., compare pp. 99-111 with 112—131.

13

Stuart's arrival in England provided a rallying point for any Catholics
who entertained thoughts of returning England to Catholicism.20 If
these factors were not enough to disturb what might be called an equil-
ibrium, Home made matters worse by issuing the Bull Regnans 12 Excelsis
which excommunicated the-Queen and absolved her subjects "from their
oath of allegiance, and every other thing due unto her whatsoever."21
The government had no choice but to scrutinize Catholic activities more
closely.

The manner in which the government proceeded against Catholics
had an important effect upon the role Of conscience in the Elizabethan
mind. Closer government scrutiny of religious practices evoked cries of
persecution of conscience, and claims, like those noted above, that con—
science "was not in the power of the greatest monarchy in the world."22
The government's counter-claim that it had no intention of "molesting
consciences in the cause of religion" could be regarded with cynicism,
but there is ample evidence that it made an effort to avoid afflicting
consciences for religious Opinions. Consistent with the Queen's view
that religion was merely an aSpect of politics, the government attempted
to separate the question of political loyalty from religious Opinion.

This policy was enunciated by Cecil, one of the Queen's leading ministers:

 

201bid., p. 112.

21Ibid., p. 118.

22.512313! p'; 5.

14

There shall be no color or occasion given to shed the
blood of any of her majesty's subjects that shall only
profess devotion in their religion without bending
their labors maliciously to disturb the (common) quiet
Of the realm, and therewith to cause sedition and re-
bellion to occupy the place of peace against it.23

The Queen herself outlined her policy toward the Catholic threat

24

in the document Declaration gf_the Queen's Proceedings. She outlined

 

the causes of the crisis and eSpecially emphasized the element Of foreign
influences. A comparison of government under her direction with that of
her predecessors would indicate, she argued, the benevolent conditions
she had fostered. It was not her intention, she said, to persecute
subjects for "matters of ceremonies," or any other outward functions
of religion, "as long as they shall in their outward conversation show
themselves quiet and comfortable."25 Emphasizing the distinction between
political loyalty and religious Opinion, the Queen asserted that loyal
subjects

shall certainly and quietly have and enjoy the fruits

of our former accustomed favor . c 0 without any moles-

tation to them by any person by way of examination or

inquisition of their secret Opinéons in their 922:

sciences, for matters of faith.2

Elizabethan governmental attitudes toward conscience emerged
in the context of the traditional policy of toleration. Elizabeth's
determination that England be Protestant naturally raised the question

of how to deal with Catholics who could not in good conscience follow

all the legal requirements of the Settlement of Religion. The Queen
23
Jordan, Toleration, I, p. 120.

241bid., p. 121.

251bid., p. 125.

zélhiéy. p. 126. (Italics mine.)

15

and the government were willing to tolerate Catholic Objections to the
Settlement that were rooted in conscience. Even after Catholicism
appeared to present a more severe threat to political stability, the
Queen continued to tolerate tender Catholic consciences, provided,

however, that political loyalty was assured.

B. Elizabethan Puritans and the Problem of Conscience
The government's disposition to tolerate Catholic consciences
as a matter Of political policy had an unexpected side effect, that is,
an increasing number of Protestant dissenters defended their position
in the name of conscience. Though minor dissenting groups were involved
in such appeals, the most significant group was the party known as
Puritans.27
The first puritan, who he was, and the last one, who he will be,
no one knows, for the term prOperly applies to any and all who share a
spirit of piety and concern for purity in the Christian life. Historic
Puritanism, however, as a distinct movement began in the English Church
during the roign of Elizabeth 1.28 It was a movement aimed at improving
the quality of Spiritual life in the English Church, but it was no mys-
29

tical quietism concerned with an elusive and subjective inner life.

 

27See Jordan, Toleration, I, PP. 261-299 for a discussion of
these groups.

28L. J. Trinterud's "The Origins of Puritanism," Church History,
XX (1951), pp. 37-57, is a useful introduction to the problem.

 

 

29Daniel B. Shea, Jr., Spiritual Autobiography in Early America
(Princeton, 1968) may be mentioned as evidence of a new interest in the
problem of Puritan spiritual or inner life. In certain points Norman
Pettit's The Heart Prepared (New Haven, 1966) is also a comment on the
inner life. How Puritan concern for the inner life was related to other
manifestations of the same concern has not been studied, at least I have
not seen such a study. Even a cursory knowledge of Quietism as evidenced
in the works of Miguel de Molinos, for example, would suggest that the
question of the nature of the inner life for the Christian man was a
question common to many, in the sixteenth-and seventeenth-centuries.

(For an introduction to the works of Molinos see J. Bigelow' s Molinos
the Quietist New York, 1882), ' "

 

 

16

Puritan piety involved the question of the inner life, but its standard
was the Bible, and Puritans viewed the Bible as an authoritative and
infallible guide. Conventional English churchmen, without a doubt,

could assent to the same view of the Holy Word, but they were content to
follow tradition and place confidence in conciliar and confessional inter-

30

pretations of what it was that Scriptures meant. These churchmen, thus,
held a view of the Bible that was consistent with the assumption of the
government's role in policing religious practice, including the policy
of toleration.

The supremacy and infallibility of the Scriptures as rule and
guide for the Puritan was linked to another distinctive assumption,
namely, the religious significance of the individual. Emphasis upon
the supremacy of the Bible was inherited from Continental Reformers,
such as Calvin, and from them the English Puritans learned to appreciate

31

the idea of the priesthood of all believers. In this view the individ-
ual was finally responsible for the condition of his soul as it pro-
gressed in the sanctified life. No priest or church or government could
act or believe, or refrain from acting or believing, for him.

The PUritan as a Reformed Christian, as a believer in the
supremacy of the Scriptures, as a believer in the significance of the

individual, was confronted with the question of how it was that he

stood alone before God and His revelation in the Scriptures. His

 

30Neale, Elizabeth, p. 89 ff.

31See my article "The Appeal to Conscience" in Christianit
Today, XIII (May 23, 1969), pp. 6-8, for a brief description of this
point.

 

17

answer was quite simple: God as creator had endowed him with a con-
science and it was through his conscience that he knew how to act or
believe, or how not to act or not to believe.

Puritan theologians developed a description of the morphology
of conscience that was consistent with their general theory of knowledge,
and in due course that argument will be examined,32 but first something
more needs to be said about the Puritan view of conscience during the
first years of the Age of Elizabeth.

Puritanism as a distinct movement began in Cambridge University,
and it is significant, therefore, that Puritans in Cambridge as early as
1564 defended themselves in the name of conscience. Elizabethan govern-
mental policy had established the Ecclesiastical Commission whose purpose

33

was to enforce the Acts of Uniformity. Uniformity called for wearing
of vestments by preachers, a practice that some Cambridgemen had neg-
lected. They were called before the Commission, and there they justi-
fied their failure to wear them in the name of conscience. Wearing
vestments was against their conscience; and "conscience was a tender
thing, that ought not to be touched or angered," they said.34
These Cambridgemen were eSpecially concerned about the question
of vestments because vestments were a matter indifferent. In Speaking

of indifferent matters the Cambridge preachers referred to practices

that had no Scriptural rule. Religious practices that had no definite

 

32See below p. 19 ff., and see also Thomas Wood's English
Casuistical Divinity During the Seventeenth Century(London, 1952),
Chapter II on the "Court of Conscience."

33Jordan, Toleration, I, p. 100, and Neale, EliZabeth, p. 191 ff.

 

34Jordan, Toleration, I, pp. 252-253.

 

18

Scriptural basis were eSpecially important to them because in such things
each person had liberty to suit his own taste, this being the Christian
liberty that St. Paul had so Often talked about.35
The Cambridge preachers argued that they agreed with the teaching
of the English Church in fundamental doctrines, but that vestments were
not a question of fundamentals. In their Puritan view the commission
did not have the authority therefore, to meddle in this question. Their
final appeal before the Commission stated that "they were taught by con-
science, that things in their own nature indifferent do not always seem
indifferent to the Opinions of men, and are changed by times and acci-
dents."36
Some Cambridgemen were disturbed enough to complain to Cecil.
In their protest to him they stated that "slavery of the body is
grievous, but that of the mind, tormented with daily racks of the con-
science, is more sharp than the most exquisite torments."37 One
preacher petitioned the Queen herself on the vestment issue, and his
stand was that "liberty of conscience ought by no means to be restrained."38
Puritan appeals to conscience in the early years of the Elizabethan
Age were tolerated by the government. Lord Burleigh, another of the
Queen's advisors, in commenting on the fact that "good preachers" had

been indicted for "swerving from the letter of the law,‘ suggested to

the Justices of the Peace that they try to relieve the pressure of

 

35For a listing Of St. Paul's references to Christian liberty
see C. A. Pierce, Conscience ip_the New Testament (London, 1958).

36

 

 

Jordan, Toleration, I, p. 253.

 

37Ibid.

381bid.

 

19

indictment against these men.39 Burleigh advised that if they had to
proceed with the cases against the good preachers, the men not be
treated as rogues or papists, rather that much be made of the dif—
ference between the papists "dissenting from us in substance of faith

"40 The

to God and loyalty to our prince, and these other men . . . .
other men, Puritan preachers, he said, make "some conscience in these.
ceremonies, {and} do yet diligently and soundly preach true religion
and Obedience to her majesty.”41

On another occasion when the Church, under the leadership Of
Witgift, sought to suppress disloyal Catholics by tightening the bands
of uniformity, Burleigh came to the aid of two harried Puritan preachers.
Burleigh protested to Witgift that Witgift's techniques were in the
"Romish style" and were used without distinction of person in examining
ministers. Burleigh thought the techniques were so complicated that
"the Inquisition of Spain use not so many questions to comprehend and

#2 He saw no place for such theological formulation

trap their prey."
among "mere ministers," adding that such "does not edify and reform."
In Speaking of the Puritan preachers, Burleigh stated, "I think they
ought not to answer to all these nice points."43

Puritan preachers, thus, defended themselves and their objection

to certain religious practices by appealing to the rights of conscience,

 

39Ibid., p. 178.

LPG—Lid“! PO 1780

4111318., p. 178.

uzIbid., p. 180.

“31bid., p. 180.

20

and these appeals were met with understanding by governmental officials.
The Puritan practice of appealing to the rights of conscience in con-
crete circumstances continued throughout the Age of Elizabeth. Such
appeals to conscience were more than expedient arguments, for conscience
was increasingly understood as an integral part of Puritan theology.

To say that conscience became more of an integral aspect of
Puritan theology requires some evaluation of what Puritan theology was.
Puritanism as a movement and Puritan theology as an eXpression of that
movement in the Age of Elizabeth did not appear as a monolithic, unified
system.41+ This fact would seem to preclude reference to representative
eXpressions of the Puritan mind during this time. Although new socLal
and intellectual movements at times result from the efforts of a single
individual, as in the case of Calvinism, more Often they emerge as the
product of what might be called a composite mind. Professor Haller in
his searching studies of Puritanism has suggested that Elizabethan
Puritanism was in essence the result of this type of phenomenon.u5 He
identified the locus of Puritan thought in Cambridge University among
what he called the Puritan brotherhood. What these men had to say about
particular theological problems may be taken as representative of Puritan
theology.

According to Haller, early Cambridge Puritanism centered around

the leadership of Richard Rogers, Richard Greenham, John Dod, Arthur

 

uaFor a study that suggests an essential unity, see Charles
and Katherine George' s The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation,
1520-16110 (Princeton, 1961).

 

 

+5William Haller, The Rise of Puritanie m (New York, 1958),
pp. 5-6: hereafter cited as Haller, Rise. Perry Miller takes the same
stance in his book The New England Mind, I, in Chapter' 3 III and IV.
Carl Becker in his The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Centupy Philoso-
phers (New Haven, 1932) demonstrated more than any recent historians
the value of the idea of composite thinking, or as he called it,
"Climates of Opinion."

 

 

 

 

21

Hildersam, and Iawrence Chaderton.“6 What these men had to say about
conscience, therefore, is important.

The Cambridge brotherhood's main concern was with the problem
of the quality of spiritual life, with the question of the relationship
between grace and works. As a practical theological issue the brother-
hood saw the problem of grace and works as a question of the relation-
ship between the Old Testament and the New, between the demands of the
Law in the Old and the freedom taught in the New. Characteristically
John Dod wrote about the ten Commandments, stating their sole purpose
to be "to stir us up . . . in conscience."l+7 He viewed the Command-
ments as a "preparation" and not an end in themselves, nor as a "yoke
or bondage."48 Dod's colleague, Richard Rogers, had the same attitude
toward the Law of the Old Testament; he wrote, "law is not preached to
hold men under, with the yoke of fear and bondage . . . but to set more
stores by God's mercy."b'9

It is fair to say that the brotherhood viewed conscience as a
means of grace, as a bridge between the demands of the Old Law and the
freedom taught in the COSpel. As noted, Dod wrote that the purpose of
the Law was to stir men up in conscience; Rogers thought it essential
to "get and keep a good conscience." Hildersam saw conscience as

"a device that either keeps a heart in joy or sorrow, basing his comment

 

46Haller, Rise, Chapter II.

47John Dod, A Plain and Familiar Explanation 2: the Ten Command-
ments (London, 1609), p. 4.

”81mm. p. 5.

ugRichard Rogers, Seven Treatises {Toward} True Happiness (Iondon,
1610), p. 6.

 

 

 

 

22

upon St. Paul's statement, "For our rejoicing is this, the testimony
of a good conscience."50

Another of the brotherhood, Richard Greenham, had more to say
about conscience. As to what it was, he wrote, "Conscience is a sensible
feeling of God's judgments grounded upon the Word, nourished by the con-
sideration of the Last day, stirring up our hearts to the approving of

q

our doings both before God and man.“1 Greenham metaphorically described
the sense of freedom he felt conscience had in these words:

We must not make our conscience like a chesverel

{kid-leather purse}, stretch it too far, or too

narrow, that is, be not too righteous, as the Ana-

baptists, and the Family of love . . . . We must

not let our conscience be looser than the Scripture

be, for then we shall be prOphane. Take heed of

extremes, for virtue is a mean between extremes,

taking something of one, and something of the other:

knowledge of generals and conscience of particulars.
In Greenham's view, conscience was a capacity in man that allowed him
to bridge the gap between moral demands of Scripture and particuLar
actions. Moreover, it had an elasticity and latitude -- not to be
stretched too far, nor too little.

Mention of conscience by early Cambridge Puritans suggests that
it was part of their theological baggage, but not a particularly important
part. For some, it was a means of grace that softened the demands of

Old Testament law. That conscience had latitude and liberty, in their

view, seems evident in the writing of Greenham. These early Cambridge

 

 

50Arthur Hildersam, CVII Lectures 2p_the figurth 9: John
(London, 1642), PP. 396“97o

 

q
’1Richard Greenham, Works (London, 1620), pp. 816-17.

SzIbid.

Puritans did not, as might be suSpected, feel any compulsion to write a
systematic treatise on conscience and its problems. That task was taken

up by a younger member of the brotherhood, William Perkins.

C. William Perkins: A'Pheology of Conscience

William Perkins came to Cambridge University in 1577, and found
the atmosphere there already charged with a zeal aimed at upgrading the
quality of Spiritual life in the English Church and in society. Like
many of his contemporaries, Perkins experienced a dramatic conversion,

53

and thereafter vigorously pursued a life of piety. Perkins was a
gifted preacher and writer, gaining a reputation early in his career.
Though he died in 1602 at the age of forty-four, he left behind three
large tomes of theological tracts and treatises. From the standpoint
of sheer production, Perkins wrote more than any other Elizabethan
Puritan.

Perkins' writings differ in an important way from those of
his contemporaries, for they evidence an intense interest in conscience
not found in the works of his Puritan peers. In fact, it may be argued
that Perkins' emphasis on conscience was the foundation of a new
theology, one that may be labeled a "theology of conscience."5[+ To
suggest that Perkins created a new theology does not mean that standard

Puritan theological doctrines were cast aside. Puritan theological

mainstays, such as the sovereignty of God, justification by faith, and

 

538ee DNB, XLV, pp. 6-9; and J. T. McNeill's "Casuistry in
the Puritan Age,” Religion and Life, XII (l9h3), pp. 76-89.

 

5”See my essay referred to, supra, p. 16. . As far as I know
others have not used this phrase.

25

other traditional Reformed doctrines, were retained by Perkins, but
were viewed in light of their relationship to conscience.

The root of Perkins' theology of conscience was the assumption
that conscience played a vital role in determining the condition of the
soul. Christians have always been interested in, and, indeed, concerned
for, the condition of the soul, but Perkins taught that conscience was
the means or device that allowed Christians to determine with a high
degree of accuracy the condition of the soul. His emphasis on conscience
forced him to define it and describe how it worked. This he did in a
number of treatises on conscience itself and in other works that were
descriptive of how conscience Operated.55 Perkins' basic treatise on
conscience was called the Discourse.56 This work coupled with his
"Cases on Conscience" define conscience and outline the basic types of
problems of conscience. That conscience comprehended the whole of
theological Speculation for Perkins may be appreciated from the fact
that he described the problem of salvation itself as "the case of con-
science, the greatest that ever was."57

Though Perkins' role in the creation of a theology of con-
science needs further notoriety,58 comment here will be restricted to

an examination of his definition of conscience and its affect upon the

Elizabethan interest in liberty of conscience.

 

55For Perkins' works that deal with conscience see bibliog-
graphy below.
56

The Discourse appears in his Works, I, pp. 515-59L.

57Perkins, Works, I, p. 421, "A Case of Conscience, The Greatest
that ever was: how a man may know whether he be the child of God, or not."

58As far as I know the only study of Perkins in the modern period
is Ian Breward's Ph.D. thesis (1963), done in Manchester University. I
have not been able to obtain a c0py of this study, however.

26

Perkins' definition of conscience embraced two important assump-
tions, the authority of Scripture and faculty psychology, and these account
for his unique definition of conscience. Exaggeration of one or the other
of these elements distorts Perkins' definition.

The assumption of Scriptural authority affected Perkins' view
of conscience in two ways. First, Perkins found in the New Testament
eXplicit warrant for the doctrine of conscience. St. Paul was the chief
eXpounder of the idea of conscience, and often mentioned the freedom and
liberty that the Christian had by way of conscience.59 Perkins' theology
of conscience was an elaboration of the Pauline principle. Following
St. Paul, Perkins argued that the Christian conscience was always regu-
Lated normativcly by the Bible, particularly the New Testament. As he
described the duties of conscience and its liberty, thus, he always
did so in light of Biblical teachings. From the standpoint of the
internecine dispute among Elizabethans about the source of authority,
Perkins' theological stance re-enforced the Puritan claim that Biblical
authority transcended that of the state.60

Describing conscience in terms of faculty psychology was a
second important feature of Perkins' theology of conscience. Use of
faculty psychology was, of course, not an innovation on Perkins' part:

rather, it was a conscious imitation of Roman Catholic writers.

 

598cc my article cited, Supra, p. 16.
0
. 6 infra : pp. 30.3u for a further discussion of this point
in terms of sphere sovereignty.
61

See Thomas Wood's English Casuistical Divinity (London, 1952),
Chapter I, for a discussion of how Puritans used faculty psychology.

 

27

According to faculty psychology, conscience was part of the understanding,
understanding being one of two parts of the soul, the will being the
other. Conscience was linked to the understanding because its Operation
involved reason; reason was an essential factor in understanding. Perkins
illustrated his contention that conscience was part of the understanding
by using the homely example of the "wagoner and the wagon." As the
wagoner guides the wagon, so, too, reason and conscience in the under-
standing guide man. Will, by contras., only has the power to choose
or refuse some course of action; it can give no direction.62
Perkins made a further division, separating understanding into
the theoretical and practical. Theoretical understanding judges truth
and falsehood, but only in contemplative way. Practical understanding,
on the other hand, judges particular actions, determining whether they
are good or bad. Conscience, Perkins concluded, was part of the prac-
tical understanding, for its business was to judge Specific actions.63
Further distinctions had to be made, according to Perkins, for
conscience was not mere knowledge. If it were mere knowledge, it would
be capable of being extinguished, and that is not possible, says Perkins.
Conscience is a natural power, that is, a function of understanding,
not a product of understanding as mere knowledge is. Perkins' claim

that conscience was a natural power was based upon his own experience:

he could in no way make conscience go away. This view also had support

 

—— .—

62Perkins, Works, I, pp. 515-516.

63Ihid.

28’

in St. Paul's letter to the Romans, wherein Paul taught that conscience
might be perverted, but was always there as a testimony of God's law.64

Perkins' definition of conscience in terms of faculty psychology
is not easy to comprehend, but his discussion of the purpose of conscience
helps to bridge the gap between faculty psychology and the modern mind.
Conscience, says Perkins, judges the actions of the person in whom it
resides, giving approbation or condemnation.65 Conscience funCtions only
in relation to actions of the self of which it is a part, and thus,
cannot judge actions of other persons. That sense of right or wrong
that one can have about the actions of others is for Perkins mere knowl-
edge.66

An essential feature of conscience in Perkins' view is its
testimonial character. By testimonial, Perkins means conscience's
ability to speak to the rest of the self; herein he describes what
others call "the voice of conscience."67 Conscience testifies or wit-
nesSes to the rest of the self not only, but also to God. That conscience
stands to witness to the self and to God is a fundamental point in
Perkins' view. Conscience was placed in man by God, says Perkins, so
that man would have a way to know whether his actions were consistent
with God's moral law, or against it. In Perkins' words,

Conscience is of a Divine nature, and is a thing placed of

God in the middle between Him and man, as an arbitrator to

give sentence6 and to pronounce either with man or against
man unto God.

 

6”See J. N. Sevenster's Paul and Seneca (Leiden, 1961), pp. 8&-
102, for a discussion of Paul's view of conscience.

 

c;
“Perkins, Works, I, p. 517.
66Ibid.

7This phrase is assumed to be a modern commonplace.

68Perkins, Works, I, p. 517.

Perkins would admit that conscience had some sort of a priori
sense of right and wrong, but that was not the source of information
for a Christian conscience; the Christian informed his conscience by
looking into the Bible, particularly at the moral law.69 The moral law
for Perkins was, however, more than the decalogue of the Old Testament;

70

it embraced the moral law taught in the New Testament as well. How
one applied the moral law was illustrated in his practical divinity or
cases of conscience.

Two general characteristics of practical divinity help to keep
it in perspective, help to define it for the modern mind. For Perkins,
the sense of the moral law as taught in the Old Testament was always
tempered by that freedom the Christian had in Christ. As a matter of
fact, one may test the emphasis that a given Puritan placed on con-
science by noting the weight that he gave to the New Testament over
the Old. As will be evident, some Puritans stressed the Old to such
an extent that they saw no particular value in the concept of conscience.71
A second characteristic of practical divinity evident in Perkins and later
Puritans was the disposition to align problems of conscience according
to Christ's summary of the law. Thus, problems of conscience were one

of three basic kinds; those between self and God, those between self

and another person, or those involving only the self.72 Within each

 

691bid., p. 518.
7OIbid.
7iinfra,ipp. 82-84.

72Perkins, Works, I, p. 518.

30

of these general catagories there was a place for every conceivable
kind of problem, and they were organized by Perkins with an admirable
display of logic.

The comprehensive nature of the general schema permitted, indeed,
challenged, the commentator on practical divinity to write on every type
of human relationship, including relationships between the Church, State,
and individuals. This class of problems appears to have been of Special
interest to Perkins, at least he deals with them at length and with force

73

and conviction. In the introduction to comments on the Church and
State, Perkins states the reason for treating the subject thoroughly,
the belief that the Church of Rome had for so long distorted the role of
conscience in the affairs of men. In his words,

I will stand a while to examine and confute the Opinion,

that the very pillars of the pOpish church at this day

maintain; namely, that civil and ecclesiastical juris-

diction have a coactive power in the conscience, and

that the laws made thereby do as truly and prOperly

bind as the. Speak to mortal and venial sin, as God's

law itself.
Perkins' concern for the practices of the Roman Church stems from the
fact that, in his view, it had made great inroads on the liberty of
conscience that naturally falls to the Christian man. It is important
to note that he points out the two areas in which he feels Roman practice
to have been detrimental, namely, in the Church and in the State.

Concerning the Church, Perkins says all those practices in

the Roman tradition that do not have Scriptural warrant are an

 

73Ibid., pp. 525-530.

1
7L1Iéflp: P- 529. (Italics mine.)

31

.r

unnecessary and unlawful intrusion upon the freedom and liberty of con-

L’
7) In good Puritan style Perkins

science taught in the New Testament.
listed fourteen errors by way of illustration of his argument, refuting
each in turn. One may serve adequately as an example. The fifth chapter
of Galatians reads in part, "Stand ye in the liberty wherewith Christ
hath freed you, and be not entangled with the yoke of bondage."76 The
meaning of this is clear to Perkins:

God hath now in the new testament given a liberty to

the conscience, whereby it is freed from all laws of

his own whatsoever, excepting such laws and doctrines

as are necessary to salvation.
Perkins quotes an unnamed Roman author who states that this passage in-
tends only to free men from the bondage of sin, from the curse of the
moral law, and not from the laws of any superiors. Refuting this argument
Perkins states,

I answer again, that it is absurd to think that God gives

us liberty in conscience from any of his own laws, and

yet will have our consciences still remain in subjection

to the laws of sinful men.78

This comment by Perkins not only re-enforces his claim that
man has liberty in the COSpel, but significantly it suggests that man
is not under any laws of other men. He is not, of course, preaching
anarchy; rather he is emphasizing the fact that all laws come from God.
This argument, found elsewhere in his writings, conflicts sharply with

the assumption, noted earlier, of Elizabethan governmental officials,

that the state had inherent power and authority. Christian men obey

 

r;
7’Ibid., p. 525.

76Galatians 5 :1.

77Perkins, Works, I, p. 529.

78Ibid., p. 530.

32

the state because obedience is required of them in the New Testament,
not because of any inherent authority in the state, according to Perkins.79
How it was that men obeyed the state, Perkins outlined in the same dis-
cussion of Roman errors.

Home erred in teaching total subjection to civil authority as
it did in teaching unscriptural obedience to the Church. Thereafter
Perkins outlined the manner in which one ought to relate to the state.80
Some positive civil laws must be obeyed because they simply repeat moral
laws of God, such as a law against murder. A second class of positive
laws derive from the power that God has given to the magistrate for
maintaining peace and the common good. These laws are called "wholesome

laws" by Perkins,81 but he does not intend this to be an open-ended

category, or a carte blanche to magistrates. They consist of matters

 

that are "indifferent," that is, matters that are not expressly commanded
by God, and matters that do not fall within the bounds of liberty of con-
science, such as paying taxes.82

Perkins mentions a third and rather interesting class of laws
in civil matters; he calls them "penal." By this he means laws that
are geared to regulation of such practices as commerce, or laws that
are not clear in their intent, or Laws that are not eXpressly commands.
In all such matters, states Perkins, man is at liberty to do what he

83

pleases as long as he is willing to suffer the punishment if charged.

 

79Ibid.

8OIbid.

81Ibid.

82Ibid.

83Ibid.

33

Clearly in civil affairs, Perkins is not one of those who teaches that
a law is a law, and therefore, must be obeyed in every and all circum-
stances.

Perkins' description of how the individual relates to the power
of the state was not only unconventional in terms of the prevailing
views in Elizabethan society, it had revolutionary implications. It
may be granted that in Operation Perkins' Christian man obeyed most of
the laws that others obeyed; he did not murder, nor did he steal. The
critical and fundamental difference between Perkins' view and that of
others focused in a small area, but that did not diminish the significance
of the fact that Perkins' system rested upon a different concept of power
and authority.

Perkins' system may best be described as Sphere sovereignty, a
phrase sometimes used to describe Calvin's view of institutions.8u The
phrase posits the assumption that all institutions have as their source
of authority the Creation ordinances of God. Each institution was
created for a purpose, and therefore, was given certain powers and a
Specific jurisdiction. What these features were could be known by an
examination of the order implicit in the Creation, and by written
revelation in the Bible.85 Basic institutions included family, church,
state, and industry, each standing Side by Side under the all-encom-
passing sovereignty of God. Without man, of course, none of these
institutions existed; hence, the idea results that institutions exist

to serve man° Man, too, relates directly and primarily to God. This

 

Herman Dooyeweerd, é New Critique 2£_Theoretical Thought
(Philadelphia, 1958), IV, p. 221.

 

 

85J. M. Spier, §p_lntroduction :2 Christian Philos0phy (Philadelphia,
199a), p. 31.

 

 

34

is what Perkins had in mind when he objected to the Roman view that civil
and ecclesiastical jurisdictions have a coactive power in the conscience,
and that laws made by these institutions had an effect equal to "God's
law itself." In Sphere sovereignty and in Perkins' view, man obeys the
state, or church, because he has a divine injunction to obey in those
cases in which the state or church has jurisdiction. That he obeys the
law of the state is coincidental to the fact that he is obeying God first.

Only when Perkins' view Of authority is appreciated for its
radical departure from prevailing views, can his comments on the indi-
vidual's Opposition to the laws of the state be graSped. Maladminis-
tration by lesser magistrates did not appear to pose a serious problem
for Perkins; it may be surmised that he advocated redress by appeal to
a higher magistrate.86 If the state overbreached its authority in funda-
mental questions, such as in matters Of religion, Perkins' Christian man
had to be civilly disobedient:

If it should fall out that men's laws be made of things

evil, and forbidden by God, then there is no bond of con-

science at all: but contriwise men are bound in con-

science not to Obey. 7
That men are bound in certain instances not to Obey governmental demands
was no Perkinsian whim, it striking the same cord that appears in Calvin.
Calvin's language is a bit stronger: he argues that rather than obey a
law that is contrary to God's moral law, the Christian subject ought
rather to "Spit in the face of the magistrate."88 The point is the same,

however, for both teach that man owes obedience to God first.

 

86Perkins, Works, I, p. 530.

87Ibid.

88John Calvin. Institutes (Philadelphia, 1960), II, p. 1519,

no 511".

35

Perkins' contribution to the develOpment Of an understanding
of liberty Of conscience was monumental though his contribution has
not been fully appreciated. Perhaps his most significant achievement
was a systematic definition of what conscience was in the Christian and
Reformed perspective. His view of conscience as a reliable and reason-
able device standing as an authoritative witness to man and God pervaded
Reformed thinking for the following two centuries.89 Important, tOO,
was his systematic description Of how conscience worked with regard to
Specific problems, such as church-state relations.

Liberty of conscience was a fundamental aSpect of Perkins' whole
concept Of conscience, and it was used in several ways. His statement
that "God hath now in the new testament given a liberty to the conscience"
reflects his general view of liberty of conscience. This statement does
not imply license or anarchy, nor does it suggest that man is a totally
free and autonomous Spirit. The Christian man is bound to Obey Scrip-
tural injunctions, and what these were Perkins outlined in his practical
divinity. Concerning religion, the Christian was bound to Obey the basic
doctrines Of salvation. In Perkins' view the Apostles Creed would pro-
bably be an adequate summary though the Bible was the final test Of what
was essential.

Perkins' description of how the Christian ought to relate to
the state shows another aSpect Of his view Of liberty of conscience.

As in religion, certain basic duties were encumbent if some semblance

 

89The problem Of the demise of this view will be discussed in
the concluding chapter Of this essay.

36

of order was to be maintained, but Perkins would not allow all laws in

the name of order. Iaws aimed at regulation of commerce, for example,

did not bind the conscience. In such matters, thus, man had liberty of
conscience to pursue his own goalso I

More serious, however, was the question of laws that conflicted
with the moral laws of God. In such cases the Christian's liberty of
conscience was not circumscribed by the demands of the state. This
point is best understood in terms of the idea of sphere sovereignty.
The church, the state, and man have their areas of duty and authority,
but the source of authority in each case is not in one for the other;
rather all have their authority first of all from God. The implications
of this view for liberty of conscience suggest that man is at liberty
in relation to the other Spheres, submitting to them only as there is
Scriptural warrant. For Perkins, then, the assumption is that man has
liberty of conscience in relation to the state except in those matters
in which he is bound by Scripture to obey.

In summary, William Perkins was an important figure in the
develOpment of the concept of liberty of conscience, and for several
reasons. His systematic definition of conscience in terms of Scripture
and faculty psychology was normative for generations to come. In
addition, his definition of conscience within this framework provided
a working definition of what that liberty was that "God hath now in
the new testament given" to conscience. No doubt Perkins' Christian
man had many duties to the church, state, and other men; but beginning
as he does with the view that the New Testament Christian has liberty
of conscience, his position differs radically from that of Queen Elizabeth

and her government.

37

As the age of Elizabeth came to a close, it was clear that two
distinct attitudes toward conscience had deveIOped. One, fostered by
governmental officials and others who supported traditional patterns of
English thought, viewed conscience as a practice within the purview of
governmental authority. In terms of sphere sovereignty this meant the
government assumed that all matters of conscience came within its juris-
diction. While the government assumed full jurisdiction over individual
consciences, there were always matters of conscience that it could concede
to its subjects. Those matters it chose to concede constituted its
policy of toleration. A second attitude toward conscience develOped
in the Puritan community, its chief Spokesman being William Perkins.

It poSited conscience as a faculty of man that transcended all other
forms of authority. Conscience stood above the authority of men and
institutions because it was immediately subject to God. While conscience
was bound in certain cases, it was bound only in those instances clearly
Spelled out in God's Word. In terms of Sphere sovereignty, conscience
stood apart from the jurisdictions of the state and church. In other
words, the conscience of the individual was at liberty, was a Sphere

by itself.

These two views -- toleration and liberty of conscience -- con-
tinued in Old England as the seventeenth century opened. During the
first four decades they were more frequently a factor in political and

religious affairs.

CHAPTER II
TOLERATION AND LIBERTY 0F CONSCIENCE IN OLD ENGLAND: 1600-1640

The division among Elizabethans as to the role of conscience in
the affairs of men continued during the period 1600-1640, becoming a more
prominent element in political and religious disputes. An appreciation
of the significance of the continued division among Englishmen on the
question of conscience requires an understanding of governmental policy
concerning toleration, and a sense of the range and variety of pe0ple
who came to embrace the idea of liberty of conscience during this period.
One additional factor contributed to the division among Englishmen during
this period, it being the doctrine of conscience enunciated by William
Amos. Ames deserves special consideration in this period because of

the influence he had upon subsequent developments in America.

A. Tbleration Under the Early Stuarts: 1600-16n0.

As the seventeenth century Opened, the reign of Elizabeth came
to a close. The great Queen had presided over the laying of the founda-
tion of Protestant England. An important feature of her domestic policy
was its stance toward dissenters. She had demonstrated that a steady
policy of toleration was a practical way to handle the tender consciences
of her subjects. What the fortunes of this policy would be in the future
depended in a large measure upon the character of her successors, the
first being James I.

38

39

James was, in some ways, an unusual king, for he was a man of
erudition, and a man with a facile pen. Before acceding to the English
throne in the spring of 1603, James had written a number of treatises
on government. In one of them he complained about the treatment accorded
the Puritan preacher Cartwright, the latter’having been imprisoned. Such
treatment was a great slander, he wrote, considering "the great duty
which we owe to such as are afflicted for their conscience in that pro-
fession.” On another occasion he said that he had no quarrel with earn-
est men who disagreed with the Church in matters of form or ceremony.1
James preferred that his subjects ”content themselves soberly and quietly
with their own Opinions, not resisting to the authority, nor breaking the

law Of the country.”2

The last part of the statement was of course the
nub of the matter. What James thought of disturbers of the peace and
those who were not content to live quietly was evident in hierpinion
of the Dutch Arminians. Tb him they were ”pestilent heretics,” people
”who dare take upon them that licentious liberty, to fetch again from
hell the ancient heresies long since condemned."3

The contrast between James' Opinion of Cartwright and his des-
cription of the Dutch Arminians indicates an ambivalence in his thinking
on the problem of toleration. He could appear noble and generous; at
other times he sounded repressive. Throughout his career'as King of
England he vacillsted from the one stance to the other, depending upon

the nature of the immediate circumstances. One student of this period

 

1c. H. McIlwain, ed., 1:32 Political Works 2; James _r (Cambridge,
“353.. 1918). P. 7.8.

ZIbid.

3Ibid.

40

captured the essence of James' position when he wrote:

James always exPressed himself freely and enthusiastically

in his written works and was invariably indignant when

glaring discrepancies were pointed out between his theory

and practice as King Of England.“

James' noble rhetoric, written or spoken, did not alter the fact
that his basic position on toleration was no different from that of
Elisabeth. Like the great Queen he could order the execution of heretics,
and do so as a matter of policy: yet he could press for a greater tolera-
tion of lay-Catholics. No doubt his temper was inclined toward less
repressive measures, for he could say that no one ever became a Christian
by coercion.5 Retention of power, even the throne itself, however. dic-
tated a less compassionate course on occasion.

In general, James' policy of toleration was moderate, but his
disposition toward leniency in dealing with lay-Catholics was to have a
profound effect on the fate of toleration under his son and successor
Charles I. During the first decade of his reign James spoke of his
affection for loyal "spiritual Catholics", "spiritual" meaning laymen
who were not associated with Jesuit plots to re-convert England.6 This
stance raised the ire of Protestants who always feared Rome and its real
or imagined designs. James backed away from his embrace of lay-Catholics,
but the need of» a marriage partnerfor his son brought the Catholic pro-

blem to the fore again.7

 

“Jordan. Toleration, II, p. 32.

5McIlwain, James I, p. 322.
6Jordan, Toleration, II. 1). 9+.

7Ibid., p. 90 ff.

41

The number of potential brides was limited; usually the possibil-
ities were Catholic. As plans for Charles' future, thus, were made, they
involved negotiations with a Catholic monarch. As early as lélh serious
discussions began with Spain in an attempt to procure a mate for Charles.8
In this, and in subsequent negotiations with Franceg, the role of English
Catholics seemed always to be an issue. Spain and France wanted to con-
clude a treaty which eXpressly stated that the rights of English Catholics
would be protected. While there are many interesting facets to these
negotiations, the most important in terms of the problem of toleration
was the impact that these negotiations had on the English domestic scene.10

While James apparently wanted nothing more than a bride for his
son, a substantial segment Of English society believed that a Catholic
princess, if not the treaty that would bring her to England, threatened
Protestantism. Suspicion of the implications of a marriage treaty created
a fissure between the more militant protestants and traditional churchmen,
a develOpment that was to polarize religious factions.

Charles' actions upon accession in 1625 seemed to many Protestant
members of Parliament a confirmation of their suSpicion. Although there
had been numerous factions within the English Church since the days of
Elizabeth, the stance had been distinctly Reformed. Now, with the
blessing of Charles, ene of the minor factions was coming to dominate the
shape of Church policy. "Angle-Catholic" best describes this group and

its most famous spokesman, William Laud.11

 

81bid., p. 169 ff.

91bid.

1°Ib1d.

111bid., p. 132.

u2

Tomes have been written on the theology and policies of this
party and most of it has been written from a partisan point of view.
While laud retained doctrines that were within the broad Spectrum of
Protestant thought, he favomd policies that seemed to foster a closer
association with Rome. Iaud favored, for example, a streamlining of
the chain of authority in the Church with the Convocation at the top
having final authority. laud and his supporters warmly supported Charles
and he did not appear to discourage them, leading some to suppose that
Charles actively supported Iaud's program. As for dissenters, laud
encouraged a repressive policy toward them.12

Opposition to laud and Anglo-Catholicism appeared early in
Charles' reign and it continued until the beginning of the Civil War.

In fact, a central theme in English political and religious history from
1625 to the Civil War was the conflict between Charles and the Anglo-
Catholic party, and Parliament under the leadership of Reformed Pro-
testants.

The rise of Anglo-Catholic ism under Charles altered the policy
of toleration created by Elizabeth and followed, more or less, by
James I. Earlier the success of the policy had depended upon its
rather even application to both Catholic and Protestant dissenters.

Now, however, it seemed to Protestants that the government and leading
Church Officials were disposed to treat Catholics warmly. This fear
was not without foundation as the activities of Charles and William
laud testify.

12"nitrite Ashley, Great Britain 32 1688 (Ann Arbor, 1961),
PP. 3319332e

“3

The more repressive attitude on the part of the Crown was linked
to two persistent problems that Charles inherited, a tradition of parli-
mentary Opposition to court policy, and a tangle of foreign affairs.13
From the days of Elizabeth there had been a grewing boldness on the part
of Parliament when it came to the examination of government policies,
the threat of the purse often held as club to enforce parliamentary
will. A shy man, and unpolitique, Charles was irritated when his re-
quests for funds were denied or given only token support. The question.
of war'and its prosecution accented the need for funds, and the question
of the meaning Of the War and its attendant alliances provoked sus-
picion among many in Parliament. In short. Charles' relationship to
Parliament was uncomfortable at least, and, in the long run, proved
unworkable.1u

The suSpicion and hostility in Parliament that was linked to
Charles' inability to present his programs for war was fueled further
by the steady rise of William.laud and like-minded Churchmen. Not only
was laud favored by Charles, the Catholic Queen's friends seemed to
gain in influence and power. Sympathy for Home, both in the person of
the Queen and in the High Church views of land, ran as an undercurrent
in the continuing debates between Charles and Parliament. I

In the context of suspicion and hostility, and with sympathy
for Home as an undercurrent, more repressive measures on the part of
the government were inevitable. Parliamentary leaders did not fail
to notice the advance of harsher measures, and they indicated where it

was they thought it would lead.

 

13.1mm. 1». 322.

.IuIbid.

O :3 {do}

’44

In the early days of Charles' first Parliament a demte commenced
concerning the provisions of the marriage treaty. is Some members charged
that Charles had broken the promises of his father, James, in that he
accorded Special privileges to Jesuits. Vigorous measures were demanded
against Jesuits. Next, Parliament turned to an examination of a recently
published book, i lo; g5 g9; g._n_ 991; 93239, written by Richard Hontague.16
This book was attacked because it was alleged to have dishonored the late
King James and to have treated the rights of Parliament with contempt.
More to the point was Montague's contention that the Puritans were worse
than papists, fighting words to be sure. The Commons voted to send
Montague to prison and a committee was appointed to take up the matter
with the King. The committee was informed that the King desired Monta-
gue tO be set free. Shortly thereafter Montague was appointed Royal
Chaplain. 17

Following this incident, one in which Parliament felt itself
again circumvented, Parliamentary rhetoric became more vitrolic. Charles
attempted to stem the flow of criticism by issuing a proclamation against
religious dispute and by pleading for peace and unity, but his efforts

18

were of no avail. Parliament attacked lord Buckingham, a long-time

royal confidant, and protested against ”the daily growth and spread of
the faction of Animianism," which they regarded as ”but a cunning way
to bring in papery."19 By ”Arminianism" Parliament meant the views of

land and his party. One member spoke of laud and his program as one in
15Jordan. Toleration. II, p. 117 ff.

16Ibid.

171nm.

181nm.

19John Rushworth. Historical Collectiopg (London, 1659-1701).
I, pp. 6on-605.

45

which ”new paintings are laid on the old face of the whore Babylon
{homo}. to make her show more lovely. and to draw so many suitors to

”20

her. More specifically. the Commons had a duty:

0 e e to look into the very belly and bowels of the

Trojan horse, to see if there be not men in it ready

to Open the gates to Homish tyranny. and Spanish 21

monarchy; for an Arminian is the Spawn of the papist.

The consensus of Parliament by 1629 was that Charles and the
Anglo-Catholic party would return the English Church to Home. With this
view in mind. and coupled with the fact that larger'numbers of dissenters
were harassed and imprisoned. Parliament had solid ground on which to
contend that Englishmen were becoming the victims of a tyranny unknown
since the days of Henry VIII.

The significance of the policy of toleration under’the early
Stuarts. particularly under Charles, is not so much that it continued
a policy begun by Elizabeth; rather. it is in the fact that the policy
became more repressive. As the government narrowed the limits of what
it would allow in its policy of toleration. it drove more people into
the camp of those who sought reform. of those who found in the idea of
liberty of conscience an argument for freedom. The steady growth of
affection for the cause of liberty of conscience apparently evaded
,the perception of Iand.and King Charles. for as the shrewd Venetian
ambassador observed:

The King. seeing this poison spreading. tries to keep

it far from his heart and to pull out its roots. but

the more he ctries to extripate them the stronger they
become.22

 

2?;22199 P0 6H5.

21Ihid.

22Jordan. Toleration. II. p. 162.

#6

In 1629 Charles dissolved Parliament and ruled without Parlia-
mentary advice for more than a decade. The policy of toleration on
the part of the government was enforced fitfully during the period
1629-1640. but the accession of William land to the Archbishopric of
Canterbury strengthened.laud's position to vex more vigorously dissenters

and to imprison them.23

B. A Hider Acceptance of Liberty of Conscience: 1600-1640

Appeals to conscience grew at a rapid rate under the early
Stuarts. such appeals emerging in virtually every segment of English
society. To bring the range of opinions on conscience within managable
limits. and to account for the extraordinary interest in the notion of
conscience. it will be useful to examine the variety of persons and
groups in terms of two main categories. One category encompasses those
persons that have been traditionally considered sectarian: while the
other includes such persons as remained members. usually clergymen. of
the English Church. The former category is composed of persons who were
outspoken advocates of liberty of conscience: while the latter includes
persons who aided the cause of liberty of conscience through the advocacy

of complementary ideas and programs.

Historically much has been made of the differences between
sectarian groups that emerged during the reign of Elizabeth and under
the early Stuarts. Although students of the period cannot often agree

on the unique features of particudar’groups. they are sure that evident

23mm. . pp. 138-142.

1+7

differences are important. For example. among historians of Puritanism
much energy has been spent in an attempt to determine how followers of
John Robinson at Plymouth Colony differed from the builders of the Bay
Colony of Massachusetts?!+ were the Plymouth [peOple separatists? Here
the Massachusetts Bay colonists separatists? mually important to
students of this problem is the question as to the source of the idea
of separatism.

Such arguments have tended to isolate the question of church
polity-separate or congregational churches versus an established church-
from other problems. The result has been that leaders of such groups
have usually been viewed from the perspective of polity. Valuable
though such a concern is. it has tended to obscure other questions
about the thinking of these gnoups and their leaders. In a broad per-
spective it may be that the separatist tendencies of Robinson and
others were more significant than any other aspects of their thought.

It is a matter of judgment. but that issue should not be normative for
what these men said about other issues.

with these observations in mind. it will be easier to appreciate
the place of so-called separatists and congregationalists in the contest
for liberty of conscience during the early Stuart era. Of course others
have noted the fact that these groups spoke of liberty of conscience.
but their pleas for liberty of conscience have been viewed as a function
of their tendency toward separatism. William Bradshaw. John Smyth.
Francis Johnson. and John Robinson haste all be extolled as leaders of

separatism. as fathers of congregationalism or as founders of the

 

245mm 8. Morgan. Visible Saints: _Thg History 2;: a Puritan
Idea (Ithaca. 1963). is a standard interpretation.

 

48

Baptist movement. Hhat has not been emphasized is the fact that these
men were all part of the Cambridge community during the days of the
Brotherhood. during the days of William Perkins. Concern for conscience
and its liberty among these men is more likely a product of their con-
sorting with other Puritans. such as Perkins. than their own creation
in their struggles toward a separatist polity. Another feature of
their thinking supports this notion. that being the fact that each of
them consistently argued for sphere sovereignty. for the created aué
tonomy of religious life.

The linking of conscience to sphere sovereignty occurred often
in the writings of men like John Smyth. Smyth wrote that the prince
must "leave Christian religion free to every man's conscience." The
prince's power'and authority allowed him to ”handle only civil trans-
gressions. injuries. and wrongs of man against man. in murder. adultery.
theft. etc. for Christ only is the King and lawgiver of the Church and
conscience."25

John Robinson. famous as the father of the Pilgrim settlement
in America. held the same view of civil power and conscience. despite
the fact that he wrote several tracts against other views held by Smyth
and his followers. The value of Robinson's conviction lay in the even
tempered mood in which he eXpressed himself. Robinson wrote that the
prince may constrain men toward outward acts. ”but cf religious actions
the proper end is not civil societyf” that only comes "by faith. and

"26

devotion in the heart of the doors. Again. he wrote. the civil

 

25John Smyth. Confession.g§_Faith (Icndon. 1611). Art. lxxxvi.-

26John Robinson. Works (London. 1851). I. p. l+1.

49

government has ”no power against the laws. doctrine. and religion of
Christ.“ God did not give authority over conscience to any man. wrote
Robinson. for he kept that power in his own hands. so that he alone might
bring them to a knowledge of faith.” ‘

Other leaders of the movements spawned by Cambridge Puritans
were also vigorous in their defense of liberty of conscience. Thomas
Helwys. leader of a splinter group from Smyth's congregation. wrote
lucidly on the question in 1611-12. The record is not clear whether
Helwys attended Cambridge. but he expressed the Perkinsian view of the
duties and powers of the magistrate as they relate to conscience and
in terms that betray a familiarity with treatises on the subject. Helwys.
in preparing to return to England from Holland. wrote A Declaration g;

M 2; 35.11.39. Peo 1e. Remainigg at Amsterdam _i_n_ Holland.28

Conscious
of James' (I) interest in control of dissent. Helwys stated clearly what
his group believed. and why. ”Magistracy is a holy ordinance of God.“

he wrote. and every person ought to be subject to it ”not for fear only.
but for conscience sake.” Kings were set up by God to punish wrongdoing.
and hence. it is “a fearful sin to speak evil of them that are in dignity.
and to despise government.“ Christians should pay taxes. hold office.
and support lawful government. Government should not be-obeyed. however.
if it commanded evil actions. for the children of God are not bound “of

“Nuance to obey in any thins that is unholy and not good. "29

 

”mm.

28mm Helwys. A Declaration g Faith (London. 1611). Art. xxiv.

29Thomas Helwys in Advertisement. 2;; Admonition Unto _thg 933-
M211. (10mm 1611 . P- 5 -

50

A year later Helwys wrote A M Declaration g_f_‘ the hysteg
g: IniguitzBo in which he had more to say on the same subject. Boldly.
he wrote to James that he was “a mortal man." and. thus. had "no power
over ye immortal souls of his subjects. to make laws and ordinances for
them. and to set spiritual lords over them.” Hellys sensed the logic of
his argument and added that if the ruler had authority to make spiritual
laws. "he is an imnortal God. and not a mortal man." Helwys'prescription
to remedy the evils of the church was for James to withdraw his support
from it. Emphasizing again his belief in sphere sovereignty. Helwys
wrote that the Kingdom of God is not of this world. and ”with this kingb
dom. our lord the king games} hath nothing to do.” ‘Ihe king was. thus.
a layman in the church like other non.31

In.his comments on Queen Mary. Helwys pointed out another flaw
in James' assumption that he had power to grant what toleration.he wished
in matters of conscience. James. the defender of Protestantism. would
not concede that Mary had had authority to persecute her Protestant
subjects. Helwys saw the logical impasse when he wrote:

As Queen Hary by her sword of justice had no power over

her subjects' conscience . e e neither hath our Lord.the

king by that sword of justice power over his subjects'

consciences: for'all earthly powers are one and the

same in their several dominions.32

James could not escape the conclusion that if his power was legitimate.
so it was with Mary.

 

3OIhomas Hel
.. . m. A $123. were _of __the _an ten of Iniguity
(Iondon. .1612). Po 37o

Bllbid.

321bid.. p. 41.

51

Of course. Helwys was politique enough to suggest that it was
not James' fault that the whole matter had been confused. the blame
lying with the bishops and others who sought power.33 Helwys' declara-
tion was an eloquent statement of the practical implications of the
doctrine of liberty of conscience. one that represented an increasingly
popular stance.

Two years after Helwys' second Declaration. another important
tract appeared on the subject of liberty of conscience. It was entitled

Religious Peace: 93. _A: Plea for Liberty 9: Conscience. written by

 

leonard Busher. Not much is known about Busher. but the tract was
widely circulated during the first half of the seventeenth century.31+
Busher's argument follows the pattern set out in Helwys' works. and
thus. need not be reviewed in detail here. In the heat of the Civil
war the tract was reprinted with an introduction addressed to Presby-
terians.35 One example of Busher's view of conscience stands out from
the rest. In a paraphrase of the Golden Rule he wrote:

As the king would not have his subjects take away his

life. because he is contrary to them in religion; so

let not the king take away the subjects' lives. because

they are contrary to the king in religion. And as you

would not that men should force you to a religion against

your consciences. so do not you force men to a religion
against their consciences.3

 

 

 

33Ib1d.

3“E. B. Underhill ed.. Tracts gn_ldberty 2§_Conscience and
Persecution (London. l8b65. p. l ff.

35Ib1d.

36

leonard Busher Religious Peace: 93. A Plea for Liberty 935;
Conscience (Iondon. lélhs. p. 68.

52

Assertions of liberty of conscience in the first decades of
the seventeenth century were not confined to well-known leaders of
sectarian splinters of the Cambridge Puritan movement. Thomas Palmer.
high sheriff of Kent. wrote in 1606 "that no man hath power of religion
. . . the liberty whereof resteth in the hands of God only. to dispose
of.“ In his view. conscience could not be compelled. and the prudent
state would respect this fact.37 Henry Jacob. regarded by some as the
founder of Congregationalism. spoke often of the liberty of conscience.
Like Perkins. he wrote. ”He are clearly commanded to obey Cod rather than
man." and what God commanded was known by conscience.38 Jacob. thus.
pleaded his case for congregational.autonomy upon the grounds of cone
science. As he did so. he astutely reminded James I of his statements
about the consciences of Catholics:

You have signified that you intend no persecution against

them for conscience cause. and that you never laid any

thing to the charge of any for cause of conscience. This

giveth us to have great hepe and confidence. and to com-

fort ourselves upon the same. your royal word.39

Appreciation of the significance of conscience for Protestant
Christians grew even faster'as the policy of moderate toleration gave
way to the repressive attitude of Hilliam.1aud. John Canne wrote in
1636 that the Ehtablished Church was not constituted by or for the
Saints. rather it was by “profane people. even mockers and contemners

of religion." This false Church had left no liberty to any man. whether
eavedor damned on the contrary. it ”compelled and forced all in the

 

‘___ wi—

ggihomas Palmer.‘A5,Essaz‘g§_thg_heans £93;32_Make‘ggr,Travels
(London. 1606)} p. 110.

. 38Henry Jacob. A Confession ;a_r_1_d_ fitestation (Amsterdam. 1612).
Art. xxv111. '

39mm" but before text of Confession. po ”'7-

W

53

name and power of the Antichrist’s successors . . . conscience or no
sense ience . .50
From the foregoing it is clear that many persons regarded as
sectarians actively defended the idea of liberty of conscience. and
often they did so in a way that betrayed a debt to the view developed
by .Hilliam Perkins. In addition to these. concern for conscience appeared
among a number of persons who remained active members of the mglish Church.
often being themselves clergyman.
From the point of view of the development of the idea of liberty
of conscience as stated by William Perkins. the views that will be ex-
amined here appear at first to be unrelated. 'Ihe views of these church-
men. however. contributed to the acceptance of the idea of liberty of
conscience in two ways. First. some of them spoke tacitly of conscience
as having certain rights though their view does not seem to be rooted
in the works of Hilliam Perkins. or other Cahbridgo Puritans. Others
did not speak of conscience or its rights. but they did insist that
the areas where the Church could enforce its views were very limited.
In short. the cause of conscience and its liberty under the early Stuarts
was aided by the views of some Churchmen. views that complemented the
claim for liberty of conscience.
A number of important Churchmen expressed their belief that the
fundamentals of Christianity were limited in number and that only these
should be the concern of the Church as it sought to keep itself pure.

'lho obvious conclusion is that men were at liberty to believe as they

 

“oJohn Canne. A £159; £93 Ah_e_ lgLorant (London. 1636). p. 9.

P0 15.

54

saw fit on other issues. In 1615. for example. BishOp Jegon of Norwich
wrote to his superior and asked for permission to prosecute a parishioner.
William Sayer. for heresy. After examining the evidence Bishop Abbot
wrote back that Sayer had only confused a medley of Separatist. Baptist.
and Bamwist doctrines. Significantly he added. "It will never be
assented to. that he should burn as a heretic. unless he deny something
expressly contained in the three creeds or in the four first general
councils."l"1

In the same vein another church-an wrote. '"Ihe only fundamental
truth in religion is this: that Jesus Christ the son of God. who took
our nature from the virgin Mary. is our only and all sufficient savior. ”1+2
Richard Bernard. the author. said further that all who accept this are
in the way of salvation. All other teachings of the Church are of
secondary importance. he added. and tend only to illustrate the one
basic truth.

John Donne. more famous as poet than priest. came to the same
conclusion. 'ihe churches are “virtual beams of one sun." he wrote. No
one church had a monopoly: thus. ”nothing hinders our own salvation more.
than to deny salvation. to all but ourselvesfl Donne's disposition
toward toleration was linked to his belief that men come by their reli-
gion more by birth. education. and accident than by intellectual dis-
cernment. Religious truth was difficult to obtain. a point he made in

one of his poems:

 

“1.10““. “lention' II. p. 35.

anichard Bernard. Christian Advertisements ABA Councils
Peace (Iondon. 1608). p. 17 . If

I?»

 

55

On.a huge hill./Cragged and steep. Truth stands. and

he that will/reach her. about must. and about must

gag/And what the hills suddennes resists. win so:

Yet strive so. that before age. deaths twilightd

'Ihy soul rest. for none can work in that night.

BishoP Joseph Hall treated the problem more fully and made a
further distinction between attitudes toward the fundamentals. Only
those who err in the plain language of the Apostles' Creed may be con-
sidered heretical. a narrower criterion than Bishop Abbot. Heresy con-
sidered dangerous by him. consisted of two types. that which was passively
and privately held. and that which was actively held and prepagated.
The former was a spiritual sin and had to be dealt with by purely
spiritml means. The activist who propaated his views had to be per-
suaded of his error: that failing. Hall believed that the activist would
run afoul of the state and in due course be punished for civil disturbances.
For Hall the spirit of man was subject only to God. "Princes and churches
may make laws for the outward man. but they can no more bind the heart
than they can make it.“ wrote Hall. in a.passage reminiscent of William
Perkins.“

‘momas Fuller. the seventeen-century church historian. wrote
that the Christian does not believe in “forcing others to his own Opinion."
but leaves every man to his own libertyf's John Randall argued that
”Christ would not be defended by the sword: spiritual power betakes it-
self to better weapons. to spiritual and heavenly weapons." For him.

law and force could not impinge upon faith and conscience.“6 writing

 

“3Quoted in Jordan. Toleration. II. p. no.
Lu.

 

Joseph Hall. Works (London. 1863). VI. p. 6+9.

66 “Salons Fuller. 132.9. Holy 229. Profane State (London. 1831).
Po e

45

John mndall. Remy-nine Lectures _o_x_1_ _t_h_e_ Church (London. 1636).
II. Po 91o

56

in 1630. John Bury spoke his mind on the question of physical force in
spiritual affairs when he asked. “Did you ever know any souls converted.
any man cured. with such gall and vinegar?”7 In the same spirit Thomas
Adams stated that ”there is nothing so voluntary as religion: faith comes
by persuasion. not by compulsion." He continued. “Fire and fagot are
powerless to give him faith."l‘8 '
Consistent with these arguments was Bishop Downame's observation
that “the conscience of a Christian is exempted from human power. and
cannot be bound but where God doth bind it. "“9 Downame's observation
echoes the view of William Perkins. but it is also consistent with the
views of his fellow churchmen. For example. he assumes. as do they.

that the fundamentals of faith are few. and like them. he assumes that

man is bound to observe them.

'Ihe question arises as to how to relate the views of the Church-
men to the general themes of toleration and liberty of conscience.
Within the group of churchmen discussed it would be possible to dis-
tinguish a variety of views. Downame's position. for example. appears
to be no different from some of the sectarians noted earlier. On the
other hand. BishOp Abbot. in judging the case sent to him from Norwich.
assumed. that denial of certain creeds was mounds for prosecution. The
factor that distinguishes the views of men like Downame from that of

Perkins is the question of sphere sovereignty. Failure to posit the

 

*—

”John Bury. 3313 Moderate Christian (London. 1631). p. 11.

usihomas Adams. Works (London. 1629). p. 559.

“9ceorge Downame. _11:_e_ Christians Freedom (London. 1635).
p. 102. 10“ ff.

57

authority of conscience in terms that showed a commitment to authority
as transcending institutions is the difference between the view of a
Downame and Perkins. 'me view of a Bishop Abbot is clearly a position
of toleration. his view being the name as that expressed often among
Elizabethan governmental and church officials.

The views of the Churchnen. from Bishop Abbot to Bish0p Downame.
are all eXpress ions of toleration. but they represent an important posi-
tion in the development of toleration-aunder the early Stuarts. Their
views are not consistent with the tone and flavor of a Hilliam laud.
especially those. such as Joseph Hall and Downame. who were active
during the years when Iaud came to power. It nay be conjectured that
these men represent a view of toleration that was more consistent with
that devised under Elizabeth and followed. nore or less. by Janes I.

In a broad perspective. toleration and liberty of conscience
during the period 1600-1640 were in sharper conflict than they had been
during the Age of Elizabeth. Toleration as a policy became more harsh
and narrow. especially as it was influenced by Bishop laud. At the
same time interest in and concern for liberty of conscience upended.
particularly among splinters of the Cambridge Puritan movement. their
attraction to liberty of conscience was no doubt due to the fact that
liberty of conscience inherently assuned the sovereignty of the individ-
ual. Liberty of conscience. thus. could be a powerful tool in the move
toward sepmtism. Finally. a number of men in the English Church ad-
vocated views that aided the cause of conscience and its liberty. but
these views were not ultimately rooted in the conception of authority
and sovereignty that had been stated by William Perkins.

58

The development of the conflict between the ideas of toleration
and liberty was complicated during the period 1600-1640 by the theologi-
cal creations of a one-time Cambridge Puritan. William Ames. His views
deserve special consideration because of their influence on the problem

of toleration and liberty of conscience in America.

C. Uillian Amos and the Problen of Conscience.
The collective thought of the builders of the Bay Colony has
been described as the ”New England Mind" by Perry Miller. Important
for Miller's schene were its roots in the thinking of a handful of dis-
senters who were either driven out of mgland or chose to leave during
the first decades of the seventeenth century. Miller characterized the
typical thinking of these Puritans as ”orthodoxy.” and found that Hilliam
Ames was the chief architect. Says killer. ”ihe standard textbook sur-
vey of theology used by New England students was Hilliam Ames' Hedulla...o"50
While Killer made a good case for the connection between Ames'
theology and that of early New Englanders. he did not concern himself
with the role of conscience in the thought of either Ames or the Bay

leaders.51

An examination of Ames' writings suggests that conscience
was not only important in his thinking. but vital to his whole scheme
of theology. His view was. moreover. very different from that of

Perkins. and. thus. deserves special attention.

 

5°21 .E. 21. I. r. 48-

51For an excellent discussion of other themes ignored by Miller
see George M. Harsden's "Perry Killer's Rehabilitation of the Puritans:
A Critique.’ Church Histo . xxxrx (March. 1970). p. 92.

59

Ames. born in 1576. brought up in a Puritan environment. came
to Cambridge late in the 1590's. during Perkins' tenure there.52 Un-
doubtedly Ames learned to appreciate the value of and need for practical
divinity from the master hinself. Ames. like Perkins. wrote a treatise
on conscience. complete with a collection of cases of conscience.53

‘lhe similarity between what Perkins and Ames had to say about conscience

all but ended with the word conscience. 'lhe difference between Perkins

 

and Ames has been eXplained in terms of Inckground and temperament. but
the evidence on these points is thin)“

while at Cambridge. though after the death of Perkins (1602).
Ames demonstrated his tendency- toward active non-confornity. a stance
not evident in Perkins.” For example. at the tine of his ordination
he refused to wear the usual garb. his performance. coupled with
others of the same type. undoubtedly lead to his suspension and ex-
pulsion “without degrees taken or in process.“ This non-conformity.
too. probably was the factor that caused him to be passed over as new
lectureships in Canbridge were assigned.

Ames' Cambridge days were over by 1609. and thereafter he began

a new phase of his career. Soon he moved. some say fled. to Holland.

 

52H o Visscher. Uilliam Ames: _l_-I_i_s_ Life and Horks. Douglas
Horton tr.. Cal-bridge. Mass" 1956,. p. 29. This brief item is bound
with two others translated by Horton. It is distributed by the Harvard

Divinity School Library.

53Ibid.. and J. D. anden'. edition of Ames' Harrow of rheolog

(Boston. 1397 pp. 1-3. lists some of the editions of Ann's—sI Etings
en conscience.

5“Hugo Visscher. William Ames: His Life and works. pp. 29-31.

argues for a difference in background and temperament.
55Ibid.

if."
e ‘4

60

As in the case of his stay in Cambridge. little is known of his first
ten years in Holland. In that period. however. he did write intro-
ductions to new editions of several non-conformist tracts. endorsing
the contente.56 He also served as chief adviser to the moderator in
the Synod of Dordt. a tribute to his skill.and knowledge in theology._
Soon after Dordt. in 1620. Ames became rector of the University of
Frakener.57‘

Accession to the rectorship of Frakener began yet another phase
of Ames' career. one. however. that displays more clearly his thinking
and personal involvement in Puritan reform. Ames' relationship to and
influence on the band of men who became leading figures in the founding
of Massachusetts Bay Colony occurred during this period. a point that
has been adequately documented by Perry Miller.58

while at Frakener Ames wrote his two most important books. and
they indicate why it was that Ames' view of conscience differed from
that of Perkins. During the years 1620-22. Ames lectured to the sons
of wealthy Leyden merchants. publishing the substance of these lectures
as Hedulla theologies in 16233 thereafter they appeared in English as
1113 m g; m Divinity. Amesstated in the ”forewarning" that
he intended this work. together with a companion volume. later published
as Conscience. to be a statement of all that was important in theology.59

 

) 56 Perry Miller. Orthodog in Massachusetts 1610-16 50 (Cambridge.
1933 e Po 79e

5711111».- Ames. Harrow _o_i_; naming. J. n. meden. tr.. (Boston.
1968) is the edition_that has been used. hereafter cited.as Ames.
Harrow. See p. 3 ff.. for’a review of Ames' career.

5831111». Orthodo . Chapter v.
59’Ames. Harrow. g. 67. Ames' book Conscience: 3§g_Law or Cases.
3 9

Five Books (London. 16% is a rare item. I have used one that-belongs
to the Westminster Theological Seminary. Phila.. Pa.

61

He intended. he said. that these works would be of use to all. laymen
as well as theological students. To that end he set out the material
in a systematic way. with chapter headings and subheadings. This
technique would make it easy for one not familiarwith theology to
find the topic that concerned him most.60

Ames' use of headings. sub-headings. and sub-sub-headings are
a clue to the difference between his work and that of Perkins. for
these characteristics reflect the application of a new method in
theology. This new stance was already evident in Ames' "forewarning."
where he stated. “I see several points which will be brought against

”61

my well intentioned endeavor. Ames anticipated objections to this

system as not being precise enough: "There will be those who will

desire a more exact use of the art of logic."62

logic! 'lhat was the
root of his new method in theology. '

'Ihis new method. that forced Ames to reject Perkins' view of
conscience. that forced him to defend himself in the introduction to
the m. was an adaptation of the new logic of Peter mus. It was
the process of accomodation and adaptation of the Ranist method to the
problems of Puritan thought and theology that produced in Ames' m
and Conscience a distinctive position. Since there are two factors
involved here. Remus' method and Ames' use of it. they will be discussed

sewntelyg

 

w ——

60Ames. Harrow. p. 67 ff.
611m" p. 69

62mm.

62

Hho bus was and what influence he had are questions that began
to be answered for moderns only in the last decades. Perry Miller tells
us that in his excursions into the European background to American
Puritanism he was struck by the enormous literary. reference to Peter
Mans.63 He pieced together a fragmented sketch of what he saw as
the influence of Rains. including it as an appendix to one of his volumes
on the New England Hind.6l+ There he invited interested scholars to pur-
sue the subject further. A Jesuit. Halter Ong. took up this suggestion
and published the results of his studies in 1958.65 _ what is known of
fianus at this time depends almost entirely on the work of these two men.

has was born in the province of Picardy in France. six miles
from the birthplace of Calvin and six years later than Calvin. in 1515.66
At the age of twenty-one he startled the learned world by naintaining
in ‘zhis Master of Arts thesis at Paris. Whatever has been said from
Aristotle is forged. ”67 From that day until St. Bartholomew's by in
1572 Items wrought a continuous battle against the accepted standards
of intellectual activity. fomenting something akin to an intellectual
revolution.68 All through this period he constantly was in danger
physically. receiving protection now from some patron and again from

some other person of power. lines created such a stir that a royal

63Miller. 1 _E_ )1. 1. Chapter V and Appendix A.

6“Ibid.

65Milton:- Ong. Hams Method g _thg Decay 2;; Dialogue (Cambridge.
”388.. 1958)e

“the sketch of lhmus here is a consolidation of facts mentioned
by either Ong. Miller. or Eusden. His proximity to Calvin's birthplace
was not mentioned by any of them. however.

671155. I. p. 116.

68Ibid.

V "‘
. ‘ a

63

decree banned his writings. and on occasion they were publically burned.
His death was violent. some accounts stating that he was thrown from an
upper-story window. while others claiming he was beheaded and cast into

the river.69

”In the eyes of contemporaries." states Perry Killer.
”he died equally for the cause of logic and of Christ. "7°

"hat this Insist doctrine was that so stirred the minds of non
can only be appreciated by reading a full description as feund in
either Miller or Ong. but the main thrust of his thinking may be stated

in a summary fashion.71

His purpose was to set forth certain key ideas
that would enable men to think easily and correctly. Traditionally

there were three parts to philosophy -- ethics. physics. and dialectic -
the latter. according to limes. was the only one that need be relied on
to assure right thinking. Dialectic could be practiced only after
advancing through the levels of grammar and rhetoric. grammar being

the first level of communication. Rhetoric was more complex than grammar
and was that level of connunication in which men attempted to capture

the variety of language. its subtleties. poetic expression. nuances.

and figures of speech. Dialectic stood at the top level. giving a

sense of order to rhetoric. Distracting ideas and irrelevant ones were
easily discarded as man reasoned his way to the solution of a problem

if dialectic was properly used. Bamus' dialectic was eminently practical.

so it was thought. because it drew its problems from real-life sitmtions.

 

69mm.
7°Ibid.
71li‘msden's summary of Remus is particularly pithy.

6+

Professor Ong tells us that Ranus was influenced by Rudolph
Agricola (ma-1485) in departing from Aristotle. and that from Agricola
1am learned that dialectic consisted of invention and judgment.” It
was in the use of the concept of invention that the unique features of
maism had its roots. 0113 gives the example of man wanting to know if
he is dialectical."3 To obtain an affirmative answer. or a negative
one. Aristotelian categoriesw+ need not be applied. Here was one Of the
enchanting features of the new method. for in Aristotelian terms the
use of categories necessitated knowledge of some other field. one that
might be totally unfamiliar. How did one reach the answer without using
the old systen? ‘Ihe question was composed of two parts - man. the
minor. and dialectical. the major. In some way they could be Joined
if the answer was affirntive. Contrarirwise. if they could not be
Joined. the answer was negtive. In the case at hand. a connection
might be made by ”inventing“ or finding a term that linked man and
dialectic. In Ramism this link was called an “argument” or middle
un35sunnmmutMaunmmuudauuuminweumeu
reflecting. rather than the usual sense of the word my; as it is
used in controversy. Logic in this scheme becomes a search for the

proper link between the major and minor elements in a given question.

72mg, mus nethod. See and compare pp. #245. 92-96. and
182-190e

73Ibldee PPe 182-190e

7b’Discussion of the problem of categories in thought-systems
is a complex matter. An entree to the problem may be made examining
Ihgobert D. Runes' Dictiogg__ of Philosofiiy (Ames. Iowa 1955 . p. #73
w. windelhand. Hieteg__ of Ancient Philosophy {New York. 1957 . pp. 256 ff;
Richard McKeon. The Ba__s___ic Lorine of Aristotle New York. 19% pp. xvi-
xvii and pp. 7-373 and Werner Jaeger. Aristotle (Oxford. 1955;. For the
best and most readable discussion of {this problem see Herman Dooyeweerd.
_A_. New Critgue of Lfieoretical Tho t(Phila.. 1958). II. for specific
reference to Aristotle. see pp. 5 ff.

750ng. Ranus Method. p. 182.

65

The question posed by Ong in the example was resolved by suggesting
that.the argument or middle term is ”rational."76 The factor would
be stated in a simple syllogisn; thus. "Hhatever is rational is dia-
lectical; every man is rational; therefore. nan is dialectical."77
The sinple question in this manner has an.affirmative answer.

The crucial.feature in this system is the matter of finding or
inventing the niddle term. Early. Ranus solved this problem by con-
posing a list of "arguments“ that might be employed; in time he ex.
panded its length.78 Of course. on occasion. it might be necessary
to reach a final conclusion by breaking the original question up into
a series of questions. On the other hand. with some questions the .
argument cane immediately to mind without recourse to a list of topics
or'arguments. Skill in the use of this nethod forced students of Ranus
to create ever larger lists of topics and the result was. as Ong points
out. the formation of the modern encyclopedia.79

Judgment was the second part of Ranus' dialectic. and is
basically an expansion of the process of invention. It involved the
art of separating the major’and ninor parts of the question. This
could be acconplished by induction. a skillful use of topics. or the
employment of religious teachings. The use of judgment in this sense
resulted in those divisions and sub-divisions. and sub-sub-divisions

that mark every Hanistically-influenced work.80

 

761nm.

771'hid.
781nm. . p. 183
79mm.

80Ibidreo Po 202e

66

looking again into Ames' works. one is made aware of the fact
that they bear’a character’and fern markedly Ramist. Ames' practice
of dividing his subject into parts. a practice noted several times
already. is nothing else than the application of Ramus' method. The
result. of course. was that theology -- the study of how to live for
God - divided into "faith" and ”observance.” each in turn being sub-

81

and sub-sub—divided until all possible topics relating to theology

had been included in the scheme.

The subject of conscience82

is another example of how Ames
applied Ramist method to theology. but as will be evident. his use of

it here had far reaching results for the meaning of conscience. He
defined conscience simply as "man's judgment of himself according to
the judgment of God of him. "83 From the point of view of Ramist in-
fluence. however. much more is involved. First. such a brief definition
itself is characteristically Ramist. Any good Bamist could show his
reader how he reached a clear and concise statement. but the contents

of statements were most important. Ames' definition of conscience in 9
this way is the same kind of definition found in the Ong example. “man

8“

is dialectical.“ Such statements could become exceedingly sterile

as educational devices. and they did in time. but to the practicing
Ramist such statements conjured up the whole process that led to the

statement.

81Ames. Harrow. p. 77.

82One could construct a chart of the sub-division of conscience.
the point being that it was treated by Ames as one more part or subject
Of theology.

83Am

 

es. Conscience. Bk 1. p. 1.

8“Compare Ames' Conscience. Bk 1. p. l with Ong. Ramus Method.
PPe 182-183e

67

In the Opening pages of Conscience Ames reviews the history of
definitions of conscience.85 and raises the question whether conscience
belongs to apprehension or to discourse. His answer:

It belongs to judgment discoursing. because it cannot

do its act of accusing. excusing. comforting unless

it be through the means of some third.argument. whose

force appeareth only in a Sylloggzm. by that which is

deduced and concluded out of it.

Recalling that Conscience was a companion to the earlier work Marrow.
it could be concluded that Ames was referring to the same form of argu-
ment he used in the earlier work. That this was his intention emerges
even more clearly in the example he gives in the passage immediately
following the statement just quoted. He says:

The force and nature of conscience therefore is con-

tained in such a syllogism. He that lives in sin.

shall die;/ I live in sing/ Therefore. I shall die.

Here he is saying that conscience by nature eXpresses itself in the
syllogisms he is more precise a few lines down when he states that in
the ”syllogism alone is contained the whole naturo of conscience.”88
In short. conscience was dialectic.

Professor Eusden in his thoughtful introduction to a new trans-
lation of Ames' Harrow has captured the significance of Ames' use of
conscience as dialectic. his observations including useful examples.89
Eusden correctly points out that employment of the dialectic method to

the field of morals through conscience posed the possibility of Ames

 

85Ames. Conscience. Bk 1. pp. 1-8.
86.12.19." p. 3

8222329

88.1119... p. 1+.

89Anes. Harrow. pp. #2 ff.

68

bringing order to the field of moral problems.90 Anes' Conscience
is written with a tone and flavor that suggests he was confident that
he would bring a sense of order to moral problems. Eusden came to the
same conclusion as is evident in several of his consents. The book
Conscience. says Ensden. "is really an attempt to apply the Beans
dialectic to what Ames considers the key problems of social and personal
life." Further. "Ames seldom. however. uses the word dialectic: he
prefers his own word 'conscience' which he views as the dialectical
method in action."91 According to Eusden the ”invention" and “judge
ment” of the dialectic process became operative in conscience. these
describing that ability of moral man to make decisions.” This process
can be readily seen in Ames' discussion of conscience and its problems.
though the special place that Scripture occupied roquirod some adjust-
ments in the scheme of pure dialectic.

The process of ”invention” and “judgment“ in conscience. for
Ames. was different than it had been in pure dialectic. a change that
was tied to the special place the Bible occupied in matters moral.
natural man had a conscience whose dictates were binding; the Bible.
however. placed additional demands upon the conscience.93 In demons
strating how this worked. Amos derived two types of biblical injunc-

tions. both of which he refers to as "law“ or ”light3”9u In the

 

—r

93Asos. Conscience. Bk 1. pp. 5-6.
9“raid.

69

syllogism these correspond to the major proposition. A “law" derived
fros a passage of the decalogue is Just as important for Ames as one
drawn from a whole block of passages. "No murder" is. thus. a binding
"law' as “covenant” obligations are binding. the‘forser. a specific
point in hodus 20. the latter. the ”obvious" rule given in the whole
long story of Abrams. 95

Ames is not particularly concerned about the problems of con-
science that natural man eXperiences. Presumably its operation serves
to convict his of his sin. leaving him in a state of anguish until he
comes to know what the Bible can do to bring him peace. natural man's
conscience will derive a law from nature that will tell him that murder.
for example. is evil.96 ‘

host of Ames' discussion of conscience demonstrates how one
works from the ”law“. whether specific or general. to personal appli-
cation. Typical is the example he gives in the first pages of 923-
science.97 One may ask. “Do I have eternal life?" ‘lhe “light" of
Scripture is ”whoever believes in Christ shall not die. but live.”
The “witness“ is "I believe in Christ.“ The conclusion follows.
”Therefore. I shall not die. but live."98 As in his general theology
Ames uses the Ramist method to arrive at a quick and certain answer.

Ames' identification of conscience as dialectic had profound
implications for the concept of liberty of conscience. It may be

argued that his identification of conscience as dialectic precluded --

 

95Professor maden discusses this problem lucidly. See Ames.
Marrow. p. 44.

96“

es. Conscience. Bk 1. p. 5.

97932.. p. 3.

98h”. Harrow. pp. Min-1&5.

70

if it had foreclosed - the possibility of or need for liberty of
conscience. Recall.again Hanna and his nethod. Ramus' intent was to
establish a more sure guide to intellectual activity. and he found the
answer in dialectic. This was a system that by its character could
potentially arrange all possible problems of thought into a unitary
universe of discourse. Uith the stress on systes and unity in Bamus'
dialectic. identification of conscience as dialectic by Area locked
conscience to a method that by its nature projected an aura of deterb
ninism into the field of moral problems. Stated another way. reliance
upon conscience when it was a comprehensive method eliminated the need
to think in terms of conscience as something that could have liberty.
The sense of determinism evident in Ames' view of conscience
appeared also in the title of his book Conscience. He used the word
35!,in the subtitle in the sense of predictable results.99 It is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that in Ames' view allmoral problems
had predictable answers. that there was a law or rule to cover each
and every case of conscience. All that was necessary was the use of
the dialectic syllogism. that is. conscience. In such a view it is
not necessary to speak of liberty of conscience: indeed. to do so would

appear to be beyond comprehension.

Ases' application of the Bamist method to the definition of
conscience placed him outside of the tradition of Hilliam Perkins.
and the question must be asked as to how he relates to the general

development of the conflict between the idea of toleration and liberty

 

99See J. D. Eusden's consent in Anee. Marrow. p. 8, n. 15.

71

of conscience. From the foregoing it is clear that he did not advocate
liberty of conscience. but a moment's reflection reveals the fact that
he taught a system that placed conscience on the same ground as that
occupied by the idea of toleration. In locking conscience to method.
method became authoritative in the same way that the government was in
its policy of toleration. In terms of sphere sovereignty Ames ' position
is more difficult to characterise. but it is clear that he advocated
a view that stripped the individual of his liberty.

The implications of Ames' system in practice became evident
in the Massachusetts Bay Colony as it faced the problem of dissent.
“me treatsent cf dissenters and the proximity of the spheres of the
state and the church betray a commitment to a system that was funda-

mentally no different from the prevailing system in mgland.

D. Conclusion

During the period 1600-18“) three important develOpments oc-
curred that were to have profound influence upon the conflict between
the ideas of toleration and liberty of conscience in the years ahead.
First. toleration under the early Stuarts continued as a policy. but
during the reign of Charles it became more narrow and repressive.
especially as it was influenced by William laud. Second. the claim of
liberty of conscience was actively advocated by an increasing number
of people. particularly among the leaders of the sectarian splinters
of the Cambridge Puritan movement. 'ihe cause of conscience was also
aided by some Churchmen through their insistence on the validity of

viewing the fundamentals of religion as limited in number. Some of

72

these men even spoke of conscience as having certain rights. but their
view differed from that of Perkins in that they did not base their
conception of conscience upon the idea of sphere sovereignty. Third.
the writings of Uilliam Ames during the period spawned a new view of
conscience. one that was to have profound inplications for the develop-
ment of the conflict between toleration and liberty of conscience in
America. Ames wrote a long treatise about conscience and its problems.
but it did not advocate liberty of conscience. It could not foster
this idea because his notion of conscience was tied to the Ramist .
method of dialectic. the method becoming authoritative for the treat-
ment of the affairs of conscience. Ames' view was. thus. in fact no
different from the advocates of toleration. for the individual in his
system was stripped of his liberty in matters of conscience.

In short. the divisions among Englishmen concerning conscience
that emerged during the age of Elizabeth became more pronounced during
the period léOO-lého. The developments during this period affected
many of the major political and religious disputes in the two decades
following 1640. The attitude of Ames toward conscience. on the other
hand. affected the political.and religious affairs of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony. The place of the Amesian attitude toward conscience in

that colony is a central theme in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III
CONSCIENCE AND IKE BUILDERS OF mm BAY COIDNY: 1630-16Q0

he first colonist came to New England to enjoy liberty of con-
science. or so many have believed. As early as 1730 an essayist in the
American leggy Mercgg could ask. ”Is it not shocking that the sane
people who left their native country to enjoy liberty of conscience
should return persecutors as soon as they were in power?” his question
by the Reverend Josiah Smith was answered in the next breath affimtively.
"Yet this is true of many who went to New England . . . to avoid per-

”1 Smith's view. that the founders of New England came to enjoy

secution.
liberty of conscience. was not an isolated case. for in the next year
the Governor of Massachusetts spoke to the General Court these words.
"One great errand of our fathers hither was to avoid all impositions on

their conscience . . . ."2

his view that the enjoyment of liberty of
conscience was a prime factor in the founding of New mgland has per-
sisted to the present time.3 I

As a matter of fact. the prime motive for the founding of New
England. particularly Massachusetts. was exactly the opposite of that
stated by the Reverend Smith and Governor Belcher. Stated positively.
the purpose of the Bay Colony was to create a society in which there

would be no need or room for liberty of conscience.

 

6 1Quoted in Iawrence Leder. Liberty ;a_r_i_d Authority (Chicago. 1968).
Po 2e
2Ihid.

3Ihid.

73

74

Governor Winthrop in his famous lay-sermon on the Arbella.
while the main body of leaders of the new Bay Colony were in transit.
stated clearly enough what their purpose was. the most quoted lines
of this famous speech comment on their purpose:

. . . To seek out a place of cohabitation and con-

sortship under a due form of government both civil

and ecclesiastical . . . . For we must consider

that we shall be as a city upon a hill. the eyes

of all people are upon us; so if we shall deal

falsely . . . we shall be made a story and a h

by-word of many of God's worthy servants . . . .

It is obvious that WinthrOp was conscious of being involved in
the establishment of a new society. Noteworthy. however. is the fact
that these lines do not state that the new society was intended as a
haven for the religiously persecuted. that men would be at liberty in
the new form of government "both civil and ecclesiastical” to do as
they pleased. Other lines in Winthrop's speech indicate that the purpose
was more nearly the opposite. Speaking of their experiment he said. ”In

such cases as this the care of the public must oversway all private re-

spects. “5

Winthrop's assertion that the new colony was a city upon a hill
and that public interests must over-ride private ones pointed toward the
need for uniformity among the people of the Bay Colony. If they were to
succeed as an example of what a Christian society should be. it was es-
pecially important that there be unanimity among the leaders. and it

was vital. too. that there be unanimity among the general citizenry.6

“Perry Miller and Thomas H. Johnson. eds., 'lhe Puritans:

_A_ Sourcebook g; ‘Iheir Writings (New York. 1938). p.755.
5nmee Po 197e

6Miller. Orthodog. Chapter VI.

75

In this context deviations from an agreed or assuaed orthodoxy were a
critical problem for the young colony.

Hhile there have been some objections to ainor theses in the
writings of Perry Miller on New England Puritanisn. the essential
character of the New England wind he has outlined may be regarded as
correct. including the influence of Nillian Aaes on this pattern of
thought. Noted earlier was the relationship between Ales and the circle
of people that gathered around his in Holland. my of then nigrating
subsequently to New England. ‘Ihis association. coupled with the obser-
vations of Miller as to the influence of Anesian ideas on early New
England. docuaents a close tie between Aaes and the character of what
Killer has called “orthodoxy” in Massachusetts.

In addition to a general acceptance of Aaesian theology in the
Massachusetts my Colony. the colony accepted and practiced Aaes' view
of conscience. Tito episodes in the first decade of this colony's ex-
perience demonstrate the Anesian view of conscience in practice. The
dispute with and treatment of Roger Nilliaas is a clear illustration
of the application of Anes' view. 1n. Antinoaian controversy. partic-
ularly as it affected Anne Hutchinson. is a second ample of the dis-
position of Massachusetts my leaders to rely on the Aaesian view of
conscience as they attenpted to maintain unifornity.

Before turning to a discussion of the practice of Anesian prin-
ciples of conscience in hasachusetts Bay Colony. it will be useful to
review certain peculiarities evident in Anes' position on the problen
of conscience. me single seat isportant feature of the Amesian view
of conscience was the fact that it was tied to the dialectic method.

76

the method acting in an authoritative capacity as problems of conscience
were solved. Use of this sethod elisinated the need to think in terss

of conscience as having liberty. Pros another perspective. Ases taught
that conscience was not so such an internal'function of the self as it
was an exterml process regulated by a rational dialectic sethod. While
Ames hisself did not speak of liberty of conscience. such a concept being
unnecessary in a systes» where all probless of conscience could be out-
lined and solved through the application of sethod. the use of this
phrase appeared asong his followers in Massachusetts my. the use of the
concept was so different. however. that it in fact had no relationship
to the concept as stated by Willias Perkins and others. As will be
evident. liberty of conscience in the Asesian' systes was liberty to
believe orthodoxy. 'niis distinction is isportant because it would be
easy to confuse the views of dues and Perkins anong Nassachusetts my
leaders on the question of conscience. me nub of the difference turns
on the meaning of the phrase ”liberty of conscience.“

'lhe probles of conscience asong Massachusetts by leaders . that
is. the question of whether they followed has or Perkins. has also been
colored by the fact that has has been traditionally associated with
the group of sectarians discussed earlier. While Ases was an outcast
fros the established Church. and. thus. in a sense at least sectarian.
his distinctive theological creations set his apart fros other sectarians.
especially in the utter of conscience. Ases' view of conscience was
such closer to that of traditional churchsen than it was to that of a

Henry Jacobo7

 

2’i’li'EE-IZ'.» 1" 52°

77

To emphasize. Ames. and. thus. “orthodoxy in Massachusetts.“ did
not esbrace liberty of conscience as conceived of by Willias Perkins.
In matters of conscience the only alternative was sose systes of toler-
ation. and Massachusetts Bay leaders hassered out a policy of toleration
as their orthodoxy was challenged during the years following 1630. In
this they were so different than the governsent of mgland. a point
illustrated by Winthrop when he said “the care of the public must over-

sway all private respects.”

A. Roger Willians

Majestic sarble monuments of the heroes of the Calvinistic Re-
formation stand in Geneva. Switzerland. Central in the arrangement are
the greatest heroes. Calvin. Farel. Bess. and Knox. On either side
stand warriors who fought in other nations. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.
Holland's William the Silent. Coligny of France. and Croswell of mgland.
Space provided for an American representative is not filled. as one
night expect. by John Winthrop. John Cotton. or even Jonathan Eduardo.
or a latter day figure such as Charles Hodge. or B. B. Warfield. Such
expectations . however great. suffer disappointment. and even tafflesent.
for in the place provided for the leading figure of American Calviniss
stands none other than Roger Willis-8.8

Whether Roger Williams should be enshrined as the representa-
tive of Aserican Calvinism may be debated. Perry Miller in a colorful

passage has suggested that Winthrop and Cotton have been ”heaving in

 

1,—

81h; Complete W___riti__ng§ ofRo Barge rWilliams (New York. 1963); here-
after cited as Williams. _W_____orks. —'Ihis is a reprint of the Narragansett
edition with a seventh voluse added under the direction of Perry Miller.
“me seventh voluse contains an essay by Miller and a nusber of items
written by Williams that have come to light since the Narraansett
edition was published in the nineteenth century.

78

their graves ever since that sonusent was erected.“9 Willians deserves
to be associated with the cause of liberty. however. whatever his relation-
ship to Calviniss may have been. His disputes with his brethren in New
England indicate his thinking and contribution to the cause of liberty
of conscience.

Erly in this century it was a widely simulated idea that
Williams was the first American desocrat. and an ”irrepressible” one

at that.10

Aserican Liberals. such as Vernon L. Parrington. focused
and fostered this picture of Willians. and their argusent seesed to
carry isport when they contrasted him with what they called the reac-
tionary defenders of Old World politics. such as Winthrop and Cotton.
That such a reading of Williams was the result of wishful thinking. if
not a severe twisting of the facts. has been sore than adequately desen-
strated by sore serious students of the Puritan sind.“ Williams' pro-
ported political views must be sentioned if only to dississ then. for

it is only when one realizes that Williams was not concerned about
political democracy that his true motivation can be understood.

Williams was a religious man. a deeply religious man. and some
sense of this inner drive may be grasped by analyzing two character-
istics evident in his relationship to Massachusetts Bay leaders and
their esperiment. Williass had such to say about particular practices
as they were instituted and carried on in the colonies. his view of thus

being one characteristic feature of his differences with Bay leadership.

 

guides Po 6e

10Samuel H. Brockunier. _‘1113 Irrepgssible Desocrats Roger
Williass (New York. 19%). and Vernon L. Parrington. E3 Colonial
Hind (New York. 1927). p. 62 ff.

“Perry Miller. er Williass: His Contribution 1:3 3.93 Ameri-
can Tradition (New York. 1 2'): comments on this problem. pp. v. 27.
Egg- Md 2;.

79

A second feature of Williaas' relationship involved the for: of argu-
sent that he used in the disputes though it was not consciously identi-
fied as a difference by either party.

‘Ihe Massachusetts Bay Colony was a serious religious experisent.
and its early leaders appreciated serious and earnest young preachers
like Roger Williaas. Soon after his arrival in 1631 Williass was invited
by the Boston Church to officiate in the absence of John Wilson. who had
returned to England. Williams was invited because his arrival was pre-
ceded by reports of his ability as a preacher and Bible scholar. no
saall honor for one twenty-seven years old. 12

To the surprise of the Boston Church. Williams refused to accept
the offer. His reason for declining shows that at an early date Williaas
was determined to pursue the goal of a pure church as he understood it.
He declined the offer because the Boston Church had not renounced its
conunion with the Church of England. something he had done.13

Refusal to officiate in the Boston Church was only the first of
several practical steps taken by Williane as he proceeded down the road
that would lead ultisately to banishsent from the Bay colony. Williams
left Boston and subsequently accepted an invitation from the Sales
Church to be its teacher. Winthrop states in his Journal that the
General Court was concerned that Sales could accept Williaas in light
of his refusal to preach for the Boston church. In the same passage

Winthrop records additional observations which show that Bay leaders

 

12Miller. Roe rWillians. p. 1&3 ff; see also Iarser Ziff. 'Ih___e_
Caree______r; of Joh______r_1_ Cotton 9(Princeton. 1962). p. 85 ff.: hereafter cited as
Ziff. Cotton Caree_______r_.

13Williaas. Works. v11. p. 7.

80

began to sense that this earnest young preacher posed sonething of a
threat to Bay orthodoxy. 'lhe Court wrote to John Endicott. the leading
figure in Salon. and. according to Winthrop. informed bin that the new
teacher had ". . . declared his opinion that the nagistrate night not
punish the breach of the Sabbath. nor any other offense. as it was a
breach of the first table [of the ten comm-onto] .“fl‘

Soon Williams left Salem though it is not clear that his de-
parture had anything to do with the Court's letter to micott. Willians
next appeared in Plynouth. and in tine returned again to Sales where
he lead private neetings for devotion and instruction.15

By the tine Willians had returned to Sales. three years had
passed since he case to New England. and during that tine nany new
pastors and teachers had arrived. anong then John Cotton and Ihonas
Hooker. Willians' strange behavior over the past three years was an
increasing cause for concern anong Nassachusetts Bay leaders; now. with
the help of these new and prestigious divines. an effort would be node
to challenge Willis-s. Before fornal court proceedings against Willians
were instituted. John Cotton had read a tract of Williams on the question
of whether the king had the right to dispense land in the New World.

It was Cotton's opinion that the view of Willians in the tract was not

as bad or dangerous as had been represented by word of south.16

me
particulars of Cotton's view on the land question are not inportant ex-
cept to note the fact that Cotton did not see any imnediate cause for

alarn.

 

1"mid.

1siliff. Cotton Career. 1). 88.

161pm.

81

Not withstanding Cotton. Bay leaders indicted Willians on four
counts and brought his to trial. On the charge involving the question
of the King's right to dispense land in the New World. Willians clained
that the King did not have this right. that the land belonged to the
Indians. A second disputed Willians' clain that noanhristians should
not be required to pray or take an oath. Another'raised the issue dis-
puted upon Willians' arrival. the question of separation fron the Church
of England. 'Ihe final count in the indictnent involved Willians' slain
that civil nagistrates had no power to enforce the first table of the
law. the opinion that the Court had inforned Endicott about when it
invited Willians to be its teacher.” ‘lhe Court was willing to give
Willians a week to prepare a defense of these points. but he denurred
and denanded a debate innediately. Hooker. Winthrop states. was
appointed to debate with Willians: apparently Hooker carried the day.
for Willians was sentenced to banish-eat.18

8 The bill of particulars on which Willians was indicted shows
the areas that Willians believed needed change in the Massachusetts
Bay Colony's experinent. When Willians' suggestions for change are
conpared with the actml progra- of the Colony. it is obvious that fron
the Bay leaders' point of view he was a radical. Of special interest
is the difference on the question of the relationship between church
and state. Willians naintained that the church should be separated
fren civil power. especially concerning those setters that related to
the essence of religion. natters that were covered in.the first table

 

17Willians. Works. v11. pp. 7-8. 8

18
Janos K. Hosner. ed.. Winthrop's Journal (New York. 1908). I.

pp. 162-163; hereafter cited as inthrop. Journal.

82

of the law. Willians' interest in the separation of the spheres of
jurisdiction and responsibility that pertained to the church and state
echoes the position spelled out by William Perkins. While Willians
case to the sane conclusion as Perkins about liberty of conscience and
sphere sovereignty. his argusents on these issues were intinately in-
volved in his distinctive herneneutics.

Herneneutics being the science of interpretation of the Scriptures.’
there was a difference between the heneneutics of hassachusetts Bay
leaders and that of Willians. Perry Miller. in his editorial essay ap—
pended to the collected writings of Roger Willians. draws a sharp dis-
tinction between Willians' herneneutic principles and those of the
Bay's leadership. Miller suggests that Refornation thinkers believed
they had noved beyond the sinple typological position that had cropped
up in the Middle Ages. the leaders of the Bay Colony in Massachusetts
following in their footsteps. in Miller's view. Fron this perspective
Miller saw the obvious enphasis in Willians on the typological hernen-
eutics as a radical departure fron the traditional Refer-ed practice of
a John Cotton. 19

1b anyone familiar with Refer-ed theology Miller's sharp dis-
tinction is readily identified as overdrawn. Students :of Puritanis-
have only recently cone to appreciate the enggeration of Miller's dis-
tinction. A recent study by Jesper Bosenneier of the William-Cotton
controversy takes a step in the right direction toward correcting the

0
sharp difference suggested by Professor Miller.2 Rosenneier. citing

 

19Willians. Works. v11. p. 8. 3.. also the sane view in his
m Willians. p. 37 ff.

2°Jesper Rosenneier. “the Teacher and the Witness: John Cotton
and Roger Williaas.” Willian 592 N31 My. Series 3. XXV (July.
1968). pp. 4084.31.

83

a study by Sacvan Bercovitch on typology.21 concludes that all the Divines
of New England enployed the typological heneneutics. While this con-
clusion helps to correct the interpretation of Miller. it does not
cross the fact that Willians drew upon the typological nethod to argue
for separation of church and state and for liberty of conscience.

In a society that depended upon the Bible as the source of in-
foraation and authority for natters of political and social affairs.
the special enphasis that Willians placed upon the typological hernen-
eutics was nore than a natter of hair-splitting. The weight that a
person‘assigned to the typological argusent could alter profoundly the
conclusions that one reached on virtually every najor Biblical doctrine.
'lhe dispute between Willians and John Cotton. thus. provides a clue to
the difference a stronger enmasis upon typology could nuke regarding
Biblical doctrines.

For convenience it will help to distinguish between the views
of Willians and Massachusetts Bay leaders by enploying ”federalisn"
and “typology” to indicate the respective views of the Colony's leaders
and William. Briefly. "federalisn” describes the system of theology
that cane to full bloon in seventeenth-century New England. a systea
that lays great stress upon the covenant idea. Fron the perspective of
the demte with Roger Williams the covenant idea provided a bridge
between the two testsaents. allowing theologians to draw upon the Old
Testanent for exanples and patterns to a such greater degree than was
custoaary for writers such as Calvin. me devotion to this view in
New mgland. particularly in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. nay be seen

‘1

21Sacvan Bercovitch. ”Why in Puritan New England: 'me
William-Cotton Controversy Reassessed.“ American Quarterly. XIX
(Suiner. 1967). pp. 166-191. ' ""

8“

in the determination of leaders to attempt to create "a due fora of govern-
sent” that was as close to the exasple of Mosaic Israel.as circusstances
would allow. Typological.argunents could still be used in the context

of federalisn. but they were regulated by the overuarching principle of
the covenant.

Typology. as enphasised by Willians on the other hand. saw such
of the Old Testanent as figurative of what was to cone in the New Testa-
sent. Typology called for greater stress upon the New Testasent in the
view of Roger Willis-s. Fron this perspective the politicalpreligious
axis in Israel was supplanted when Christ ushered in a new age. one in
which the real power for the believer was spiritua1.22 Williaas' greater
typological enphasis upon the New Testasent was an isportant factor in
his argusent with the Massachusetts Bay Colony over the questions of
church and state and liberty of conscience.

That liberty of conscience was a central consideration in
Williass' sind. and that Bay leaders had a very definite view on this
question did not eserge until after Willis-s had been banished. and he
and Cotton entered a ”tract-war” on the subject. The extent and scope

of these exchanges may be followed in the collected written works of

 

22The argusents of Rosenneier'and Bercovitch. noted above. raise:
sany questions about the interpretation of Puritanisn. resolution of then
falling outside the scope of this study. Essenneier. for example. sug-
gests that the central issue between Williass and Cotton was a question
of the leaning of the incarnation. and that the typological probles was
a function of this issue. While his point about the place of the incarb
nation in the controversy serves as useful information. his sub-Joining
the typological probles to it is questionable. More inportant. however.
is the fact that his discussion of the place of the incarnation in the
controversy. together with Bercovitch'e point about typology. suggest
that in tine a sajor realign-eat of the interpretation of Puritaniss say
be in order. This direction of Puritan studies seess to be supported
by a growing appreciation of fundanental differences between leading
figures. the difference between Perkins and Ases suggested in this study
being an exasple.

85

Cotton and Williams23 though no systenatic study has yet been focused
on this probles. Unravelling the pattern of correspondence and publi-
cation in an attenpt to determine what stage of argusent occurred at
what point in tine is conplicated by the fact that Williams often in-
cluded the latest word by Cotton in the text of a current argument?“

It is not difficult. however. to isolate clear statenents by
each which indicate their respective views. Iarzer Ziff has shown how
Cotton was introduced to the proqu of liberty of conscience in New
England.25 In 1635, at the sane tine Willians was being tried. Cotton
received a letter fron England asking his opinion on a treatise that
had been enclosed. ‘lhe subject of the treatise was persecution for
cause of conscience. Noting that it was not unusual for a scholar of
Cotton's reputation to be queried in such a latter. Ziff observes the
irony in the situation:

How utterly appropriate it was. he was not fully to

appreciate until sone ten years later. for Roger

Williaas was eventually to create his sasterpiece

not only on that topic but as a refutation of Cotton's

handling of it.26
In his answer to this letter fros Eigland on the subject of persecution
for cause of conscience. Cotton does not see the nain issue as one of
liberty of conscience; that issue he discusses only on the last page
of his answer.

The substance of Cotton's letter is a patient dividing and sub-
dividing of issues. distinguishing between those that are essential to

salvation and those that are not. reniniscent of has. Religious

 

23Williass. Works. contains writings of John Cotton in addition
to those of Willians. Larser Ziff has edited additional works of Cotton
published as John Cotton on the Churches of New England (Canbridge.

1968); hereafter cited as Ziff. Cotton Church.

24

Ibid. 25Zirr. Cotton Career. p. 85 ff. 26

Ibid.' p. 92.

86

practices can be divided in the sane manner. according to Cotton. The
key to his view. however. may be found in his position on how conscience
' is inforsed. ‘ktone point he states. "Let so add this one distinction
sore: When we are persecuted for Conscience sake. it is either for
conscience rightly inforsed. or for erroneous and blind conscience."27
Not withstanding other points Cotton made in this letter. the central
issue was the satter of what he meant by "rightly inforsed.“

Exercising his conception of “rightly inforsed.“ Cotton pro-
ceeds to saintain that no one should be persecuted for standing on his
”rightly informed“ conscience. nor. he adds. should anyone be perb
secuted for an erroneous and blind conscience. Professors of ortho-
doxy. in this view. could not be lawfully persecuted. Speaking of the
erroneous and blind conscience. Cotton said that it needed to be inforsed
rightly. and by that he seant instructed by a wise and orthodox nan
such as hisself. This view allowed Cotton to conclude:

f If such a san after such admonition shall still persist

in the error of his way. and be therefore punished. he

is not persecuted for cause of conscggnce. but for

sinning against his own conscience.

In a circusstantial satter Cotton was willing to allow the erroneous
person lattitude until sore light could be shed on the issue. but this
was not liberty. for the standard of judgnent in that question. as well
in the satter of fundasentals. was orthodoxy.

Cotton's only sention of liberty of conscience occurred at the

end of his letter. and his consent was an answer to setters that the

questioner considered "main objections.” Cotton wrote:

 

27Williass. Works. III. p. be ff.

28Ibid.

87

Finally. you cone to answer some sain objections. as
you call then. which are yet by one. and that one

objecteth nothing against what we hold. It is (say
you) no prejudice to the connonwealth. if liberty of
conscience were suffered to such as fear God indeed

But we readily grant you. liberty of conscience is
to be granted to sen that fear Cod indeed . e e .29

In thesselves. these consents by Cotton do not alter the substance of
what he had already said. nasely. that matters of conscience are bound
to the problen of whether it is rightly inforned. "Liberty of conscience
. . . suffered to such as fear God” was another'way of saying saints
should not be persecuted. saints being sen of orthodoxy.

Cotton's view of conscience stands directly in the tradition
of Willian Anes. The dependence upon the notion of ”rightly inforned"
in Cotton's answer to the problen is nothing sore than an application
of Ases' argusent on the problen of heresy. Anes stipulated in the
fourth book of Conscience the conditions under which one was detersined
to be a heretic:

When the truth is not only nanifestly revealed in

Scripture. but is also sufficiently propounded

e e . unto his. yet doth so adhere to his error.

that he either opposeth hinself to the plain

Scripture. and (sic) [or] will not through the

naughtness of his sind perceive the sense of

it . . . .30
Anes indicates in the ease context that he is willing to give the
wrongly inforned person a chance to be properly inforned. this being
the ease point Cotton sakes concerning ”erroneous“ consciences.

Cotton's letter shows his debt to the view of conscience set

forth by Anes. The technique of dividing the question. while not as

 

29—...Ib1d00 Po 92s

30Anes. Conscience. Bkeh. p. 11.

88

extrese as in acne of Anes' argusents. is the Ranist sethod. More
inportant is his view that conscience had to be rightly inforned. and
that the character of the infornation could be supplied by a systes of
doctrine or one of its spokesnen. There was no roon for the possibil-
ity that the individual had to finally decide what he saw as truth in
the situation. If conscience was dragged into the process of properly
inforsing a person. and the person resisted the infornatien supplied.
the resistance was sin against the individml's conscience. Further.
Cotton appears to be uncomfortable with the idea of liberty of conscience.
Ne acknowledges the idea. but does not conceive of it as a right. He
calls liberty of conscience a grant. and it is none thing that say be
granted only to these who fear God. In other words. Cotton says that

when a nan adheres to orthodoxy. he has liberty of conscience.

To esphasise. Cotton's view of conscience as set forth in this
letter does not evidence any of the spirit suggested in Willian Perkins'
statenent that Christ has given a liberty to conscience in the New Testa-
nent. more is no sense of the spirit of Christian freedos that is the
birth-right of the re-bom Christian. 0n the contrary. Cotton labors
the question of conscience in a tone of one who has to conjure up a
rational for an idea that is foreign to his. Cotton's attitude tonrd
conscience lacked the vigor and vitality evident in Perkins because his
view was based upon that of Willian Anes. because he allowed the pro-
blen of conscience to be dosinated by the dialectic sethod. The dif-
ference between Cotton's essentially Anesian view of conscience and one
that stood in the tradition of Perkins becones clear when it is cospared
with the view of Roger Willians.

89

It was sore than a decade after Cotton penned his letter to the
English inquirer that Roger Willians published his first statesent
on the problen of liberty of conscience. 31 Willians wrote profusely
and in a style that was less than engaging. His writings. too. were
colored by the rapidly changing events of English society. Moreover.
his discussion of New England's Way was a two-fold argusent. the one.
exasining the cause of his banishnent. and the other. investigating per-
secution and liberty of conscience. At tines these two argusents are
related though at nest points they are not.32

Willians' argusents against persecution and for liberty of con-
science were tied to his version of typology. The nest advantageous
use of this device involved the fourth count of the indictnent against
Willians at his trial. that is. the question of whether civil sagistrates
had biblical authority to enforce the first table of the decalogue.
Willians said they did not have this authority. while the my leaders
clained that power for nagistrates. The crux of this dispute involved
a conflict between the answer given in the Old Testanent and that given
in the New. The Bay leaders. of course. cited the exanple of Israel.
bphasizing the typological argusent. Willians argued that Israel's
experience was only a figure and not to be followed. ‘ Willians. however.
did not rest his case on that point. He challenged Cotton to show his
an exasple in the New Testanent that supported their view. Specifically.
he asked to be shown the place in which Christ had connanded his fol-
lowers to either obey nagistrates' injunctions concerning religious

setters. or that they should set up a society in which nagistrates had

 

31m Bloody Tenet was published in 16%.
32Williams. Works. VII. p. 21.

9O

authority in religious affairs}:3 Willians did not rest his case on
the absence of specific New Testasent illustrations of the New Eigland
Way! he argued that in so far as “Christian“ nations and princes had
tried to confound civil and religious affairs. they had been failures.
causing strife and persecutions?“

The obvious sensing of the New Testanent. for Willians. was
that Christ did not intend that sen should be coerced in spiritual
setters. Christ ordained the power of the sword. but it was given to
the mgistrates only to keep peace anong sen’s bodies - to insure their
physical well-being. There was a sword in the spiritual world. but it
was the persuasion of the word.35 Thus. Willians argued for the separa-
tion of church and state.

Willians' view of persecution and liberty of conscience was a
natural corollary to his argument on church and state. Persecution
followed when the state invaded the sphere of spiritual setters. when
sagistrates interfered with a person's exercise of religion. Conscience
was part of this problen in Willians' thinking. as the title of his nest
fasous book. The M 19353... g: Persecution. for the _C_a_u_s_g g_f_ 92n-
science . . "indicateso36

Conscience. wrote Williams. is ”a fixed persuasion in the sind
and heart of nan. which enforceth his to judge (as Paul said of hisself.
a persecutor) and to do so and so. with respect to Cod. his worship.

etc.“37 Willians said little else aboutwhat conscience was. for he

 

33Ibid.. I. p. 112.
3“Ibid” III. p. 181: see also pp. 248-216.
351bid.. III. p. 181. and VII, p. 179.

361b1dg. III, p. 181 ff. 3711316... IV. P. 508.

91

was not concerned with an exact epistenological definition: rather. his
interest centered on how conscience was a basic capacity of san. "a
fixed persuasion . . . that enforceth his to judge.“

Willians did not clais that conscience was without error in
natters of religion.38 In fact. it was precisely because conscience
was so susceptible to error that Willians argued that it sust be left
at liberty in natters of religion. Truth. religious truth. was difficult
to obtain: hence. there was little chance that religious leaders. such
less civil nagistrates. could isolate it. If leaders could not with
such certainty state the truth. there was little chance that institu-
tional religion. or the state. could possess the truth. Forced con-
forsity. Willians concluded. to institutional versions of religion was
likely to be an inposition of error as well as an unwarranted invasion
of the individual's religious responsibility.39

Liberty of conscience for Willians was not based upon an apti-
nistic view of nan's ability: yet he was confident that if son were left
alone to exercise their religious inclination. the ultinate cause of
truth would be served. History denonstrated that when sen fought wars.
the cause usually was based upon religious convictions. In such cases.
according to Willians. it was obvious that nen's bodies could be coerced.
but never their souls.“0 their inner source of religious conviction.
Pursuing this view Willians concluded that the civil state had no right
to interfere with Catholics. Jews. nor even Quakers. for physical punish-

nent of the body could never reach the condition of the soul.‘"1

 

38Edmund S. Morgan. Roger Willians: The Church and the State
(New York. 1967). p. 135.
39mm is the sain thrust of the Bloody Tenet.

uoWillians. Works. VII. P. 179 ff. ullbid" IV. pp. 506-507.

92

The results of civil. or ecclesiastical. force on a person in
natters of conscience were clear to Uillians. and the results were all
bad. Corporal punishnent night "cause nen to play hypocrite. and dis-
senble in their religion. to turn and return with the tide. as all ex-

.42

perience in the nations of the world doth testify now. It was obvious

to Willians that “all false teachers and their followers" contract "a
brawny and steely hardness froa their sufferings for their conscience."lu3
If the victim of force acquiesed and acted against his conscience. it
was weakened. ”since conscience to God violated. proves . . . [to be‘
a drug. loose and unconscionable in all converse with aen."uu

One additional.aspect of Willians' view of conscience in re1a~
tion to the state needs to be sentioned. that is. that the role of the
state was not nerely a negative one. Uillians posed the question.
”what is then the express duty of the civil nagistrate. as to Christ
Jesus. his Gospel and Kingdoa?"n5- The answer turns upon ”two hinges.“
these being observed in the two essential responsibilities of nagistrates:

First. in renoving the civil bars. obstructions.

hinderances. in taking of those yokes. that pinch

the very souls and consciences of aen. such as yet

are the paynents of tithe. and the aaintainance of

ainisters e e e O

Secondly. in a free and absolute pernission of

the consciences of all aen. in what is sorely

spiritual. not the very consciences of Jews.

nor the consciences of the Tarks or Rapists. or
Pagans thenselves excepted.1+

 

“2%.. PO 209. u31b1dgg III. p. 272.
up 45

Ibidgg P. “98. Ibidgg VII, p. 178.
#6

Ibid.

93

A nost succinct statesent of Uillians' whole argusent appears a few
lines following: there he states. ”I plead the conscience of all nen
to be at liberty."u7

From the foregoing it is clear that Hilliams' view of conscience
was radically different fron that of Cotton and Anes. In contrast to
then he posited liberty of conscience as a fundanental right taught by
Christ in the New Testanent. Hillians sensed the relationship between
liberty of conscience and sphere sovereignty. this being evident in his
argunent for>a linitation on the power’and authority that resided in
each of these spheres. When the church or state. or both of then to-
gether. overstepped their bounds. they crushed liberty of conscience.
At the sane tine Willians. like Perkins. recognised the spheres of
church and state to have specific powers and duties. His nain enphasis.
however. was upon those areas where these institutions had overstepped
the linits of their jurisdiction.

In conclusion. concerning Huger Willians and the Massachusetts
Bay Colony. it nay be said that they represented two distinctly dif-
ferent views of the place of conscience in the affairs of non. The
colony's leaders nade it clear fron the beginning that they saw their
experinent as one that rested upon a systen of known and fixed princi-
ples. this position.aptly labeled as “orthodoxy” by Perry Miller. While
the question of conscience does not appear to have been central in the
Colony's dispute with Roger Hilliaas before he was banished. it becane
a central.issue subsequently. John Cotton spoke for the Colony's position

and fron his connents on conscience it is clear that it was an eXpression

 

“7__Ib1d.. p.179.

9”:

of the Anesian view. Cotton did not speak of conscience as sonething
that enjoyed liberty; rather liberty of conscience for his neant liberty
to believe orthodoxy. This view contrasts sharply with that set forth
by Willians after he left the Colony. Hillians argued for liberty cf
conscience in terns of sphere sovereignty. his view being the sane as
that of Uillian Perkins.

'Ihis dispute between Massachusetts Bay Colony leaders and Roger
Hillians was. however. only the first conflict between the idea of
toleration as developed by Anes and the slain of liberty of conscience
in the tradition of Willian Perkins. 'Ihe Antinonian controversy of
1636-1638 also denonstrated the fundanental conflict between the Anesian

view of conscience and that developed by Perkins.

B. lhe Antinonian Controversyz: 1636-1638

he ”nest wild and desperate enthusiasn in the world” was Cov-
ernor Uinthrop's way of describing the Antinonian party that threatened
his Colony in the years 1636-1638..“8 Undoubtedly Hinthmp's remarks
were intended for consunption in Old England though they do evidence
the degree of concern anong leaders of the orthodoxy party in the Has-
sachusetts hy Colony. How Antinonianisn case to be a threat and what
it neant for the problen of toleration and liberty as attitudes toward

conscience is the subject of this section.

‘Ihe threat of Antinonianisn was a different and more difficult
problem for the leaders of Massachusetts Bay Colony than that of Roger
Hillians. The task of bringing Uillians to trial and the sentence of

 

“SQuoted in Ziff. Cotton Career. p. M0.

95

banishnent had been relatively easy. While Willians' subsequent ful-
ninations about life in the Colony and his sharp reaarks about the absence
of liberty of conscience were undoubtedly a source of enbarrassnent for
the leaders. these denunciations had the virtue of coming from outside
the Colony itself. The Antinomian problen. on the other hand. was a
critique fron within. and it enbroiled a large nunber of colonists.“9
Student of early Massachusetts my history differ as to the nean-
ing of the Antinonian controversy. but whatever else was involved. the
question of dissent was proninent. Students of the problen also differ
on the question of whether it was largely a dispute between a handful of
people centered around Anne Hutchinson or of whether it was an issue
that involved the bulk of society. Fron the perspective of the question
of dissent Anne Hutchinson played a leading role. and the developnent
of the controversy nay profitably be traced in terns of her place in it.
While Anne Hutchinson's activities following her arrival in
Massachusetts by in 163“ bear nore directly on her place in the Anti-
nonian controversy. a few observations about her life in Old England
will contribute to an understanding of her views. Born in 1591. she
grew up under the influence of her preacher-father. Though born in
Lincolnshire. she noved with her parents to London. residing there
until she narried Willian Hutchinson. a Lincolnshire nerchant. the
narriage precipitating a return to Lincolnshire in 1612. 'lhe return to
Lincolnshire is inportant because in the sane year a young preacher.
Just graduated fron Canbridge. took a parish in Boston. not far fron

the Hutchinsons: his nane was John Cotton. Soon Cotton gained a

 

l"9‘Ihe events described here are based upon Ziff. Cotton Career.
Chapter IV: lhvid D. Hall. ed.. ‘Ihe Antinomian WlEQE-lgfi
(Middletown. Conn.. 1968). hereafter cited as Hall. A. 9.: and relevant
passages in Winthrop. Journal.

96

reputation as a preacher. and people came from great distances to hear
his preach. including Anne Hutchinson. When Cotton left Boston. Lincoln-
shire. in 1633. Anne Hutchinson was greatly distressed. She had becone
a devotee of Cotton and felt she ”could not rest” until she could again
sit at the feet of her favorite preacher. The record indicates that the
Hutchinsons cane to Boston in New England in 163%. and sons writers have
suggested that they cans to satisfy Anne Hutchinson's desire to again
hear Cotton preach.” No doubt Willian Hutchinson wished to satisfy

this desire of his wife though he could not have overlooked the prospect
of new business opportunities in the rapidly eXpanding colony.

Between the tine of their arrival in 1634 and the outbreak of
the Antinomian controversy in 1636 the Hutchinsons established them-
selves in the Boston community. Willian was active in both business
and politics. while Anne becane involved in a nunber of activities.51
As for church. they attended the one in which John Wilson was preacher
and John Cotton. teacher.

Ihe controversy over Antinonianisn was directly related to the
reaction of Anne Hutchinson to the preaching of Cotton. he sharing the
pulpit with John Wilson. Anne invited people to her hone to discuss
with then what had been said by preacher Cotton. Discussion during the
week of what had been preached on the previous Sunday was not an unusual
practice in the seventeenth century. but in the Hutchinson hone. Anne
expounded vigorously what she conceived to be the essence of Cotton's

views. As more peeple case to these meetings. on occasion as nany as

 

5°He11, .6.- 9.. p. 5.

511bid.

97

sixty. the inevitable occurred: Cotton's preaching was conpared with
that of other preachers in the Bay colony.52
Anne claimed that Cotton preached better doctrine than did the
other preachers in the colony. She pointed out that he stressed “free
grace.“ while the others taught a ”legal schene” of salvation.53 In this
she was consenting on.a central doctrine in Reforned theology. the
doctrine of justification.5u While there was sons roon for differences
of opinion in the interpretation of this doctrine. Anne seesed to sugb
gest that there was. in fact. a great difference between Cotton's view
and that of other preachers. Just exactly what she had in nind. just
exactly what she did say to those in her'hone. becane a central point
of dispute as the controversy developed. The phrase "legal scheme"
of salvation could readily be interpreted as salvation by works. a
view that had been contested by Reforned and other Protestants since
the days of Martin Luther. Historians have had a difficult tine in
attenpting to untangle the variety of statesents and representations
concerning this doctrine in the Antinonian controversy. This difficulty
undoubtedly has its basis in views stated in the controversy. Whatever
it was that Anne said in her hone each week captured the inagination
of nnny peeple. for soon her views were spread.about town.55
The role of Cotton in the controversy is clouded.56 No doubt

there was a difference between what he and others preached. but the

 

52mm. 53mm.

Salt is interesting to note that for Calvin the idea of justi-
fication was relatively sinple. this contrasting tp'the increasingly
conplicated statement of the doctrine anong Puritans. See the subject

in _Thg E3! Schaff-Herzog Encyclongia 2;; Religious Knowledge (Grand
Rapids. 1950’e

553‘119 59 999 P0 7-

56Hall is less synpathetic toward Cotton than Ziff.

98

question as to what he did say was not easily answered. He was asked
to state his view of justification on nunerous occasions by other
preachers. Then he was asked about other questions that were tangents
to this doctrine. Finally. he was asked to write out his views to a
batch of questions. Cotton responded to the private conversations: then
he responded to the request that he write out his views. In each case.
however. as in the fornal public hearing later. Cotton answered in the
only way he knew. as a scholar. His written consents on the questions
subnitted to hin by the other preachers display the learning and tech-
nique of a skilled theologian. Throughout the controversy Cotton
insisted that the differences between his views and those of the other
preachers were not all that had been suggested. Cotton insisted. too.
that Anne Hutchinson's views were not all that bad. until she stated in
her trial. under great pressure. that she had special revelations fron
God.5?

While the central issue in the controversy was Cotton's teachings
and Anne Hutchinson's representations of then. the way Massachusetts Bay
leaders handled Anne Hutchinson and those associated with her. those
identified as Antinonians. is sore significant fron the point of view of
the conflict between the ideas of toleration and liberty of conscience.
A review of the chain of events will reveal that the Massachusetts Bay
systen was based upon a view that included an attitude toward conscience
that was no different fron that held by governnental officials in Old
England.

573311, Ae 2e. Po 7e

.-

99

The first sign that sonething was wrong with the views that
were associated with John Cotton and Anne Hutchinson cans in the spring
of 1636 when Thonas Shepard. a nainstay anong the orthodox ninisteriun.
warned Cotton that strange and erroneous opinions were ennating fren
nenbers of his congregation.58 Shepar'd's turning did not seen to stem
the problen. for in October a coup of ninisters requested a seating
with Cotton. Anne Hutchinson. and her newly arrived brother-in-law.
John Wheelwright.” The obvious purpose was to suppress deviant opinions.
and the focus was on Anne Hutchinson. During the course of this nesting.
Cotton satisfied the other ninisters. stating that "sanctification did

help evidence justification. "60

In other words. works did help evidence
faith, but in what way he did not say.

This occasion appeared to have resulted in a better understanding
between the defenders of orthodoxy and the suspected dissenters. first
this confrontation had resulted in a nesting of the ninds was an illusion.
for within a few weeks the Boston Church. which already had Wilson and
Cotton on its ninisterial staff. proposed to call John Wheelwright.61
WinthrOp suggested that this proposal was an insult to pastor Wilson.
and he viewed it as evidence of how far the infectious opinions of the
Antinonians had progressed. Winthrop recorded in his Jouml that an
open quarrel was averted in the church nesting over this proposal by

his insistence that it was an established custon that such preposals

 

had to be unaninous.62
581nm. 591nm.
601bld.. P. 6. 611b1d.
62

Ibid.

100

Tito nonths later natters were worse. The ninisters net again
with Cotton and Anne Hutchinson. and again his position was not clear.
Anne was nore forward. however. suggesting that nany ninisters taught a
covenant of works.63 In a few weeks the natter erupted in the General
Court when Henry Vane tendered his resignation as Governor. offering as
the reason his belief that God's judgment was about to cone "for these
differences and dissentions."6l+ Vane also clained that he had pressing
business in London. More to the point. however. was the fact that he
was a friend to nany in the party that had forned around Anne Hutchin-
son. Vane changed his nind. or it was changed for his. and he decided
to stay on the Governor's chair. The Court then began to debate the
question of cause for the Colony's troubles.

With Vane still Governor and others on the Court still synpathetic
to the Antinonian's cause. the orthodox party. personified by Winthrop.
was in a difficult position. The breadth of division in the Colony was
evident in the Court itself: it could cone to no resolution as to the
cause of trouble. The Court. thus. adjourned and proclained a fastday.
to be observed in January.“

The events of the fastday served only to deepen the division
in the Colony. especially a sernon preached by John Wheelwrigit.66 He
clarified the position of those who stood with Anne Hutchinson. and in
so doing. the sernon proved to be the turning point in the orthodox
party's canpaign to quench the Antinonians. When the Court net in March.
it began by fining an obscure citizen. Steven Greensnyth. for having

 

631bid.. p. 7. 6“mid.

65Ib1d. 661nm.

101

stated that ”all ninisters did teach a covenant of works.” Cotton and
Wheelwright excepted.67 Clearly Greensnyth had no right to an Opinion
that did not agree with orthodoxy. Having dispatched a minnow. the Court
turned to larger prey and ordered Wheelwrigxt to appear. ‘mey denanded
an eXplanation for his fastday sernon. After some debate the Court
judged hin guilty of ”contenpt and sedition" for having stirred dis-
putes in the colony.68 It was obvious that Wheelwrigxt was condemned
because his Opinion did not agree with orthodoxy.

A ninority on the Court defended Wheelwright's sernon and they
were supported by a Isrty in Boston. The latter presented a petition to
the Court stating that it did not have the rigit to examine Wheelwrigit
on such a question before the Church nade a detemination on the natter.69
Their petition fell on deaf ears.

The nain seat of the Antinomian party was in Boston. the usual
neeting place of the General Court. Sensing the hostility in Boston.
the Court. over the objection of a minority. adjourned the March meeting
of the Court until May. and designated Canbridge as the meeting place.70
Moving the Court to Canbridge was an advantage to the orthodox party.
since the next nesting involved general elections. a chance to depose
Antinonian synpath izerS.

As the Court convened in May. Vane insisted that they take up
the Wheelwright natter due to the petition having been presented on

his behalf. The najority insisted. over Vane's protest. that this

 

67Ziff. Cotton Career. pp. 125-126.
68Hall. _A_. 2,091)- 8.

69For a detailed discussion of the Church's examination of
Mrs. Hutchinson. see Ziff. Cotton Career. p. 143 ff.

”Hall, :5.- _q.. p. 8. Canbridge was at that time known as Newtown.

102

Court was primarily one of election and that was the first order of
business. In the election Winthrop was elected Governor. while Thonas
Dudley becane Deputy Governor. Dudley had even less patience than
Winthrop when it cane to the Antinonians.“

The election demonstrated that the orthodox party had support
outside of Boston. and. thus. was in a position to deal more vigorously
with the cancerous Antinonian problen. Thonas Shepard preached the
election sermon. and in it he reported that the differences between
Cotton and the rest were slight.72 Harmony seesed within reach. but
whatever chance there was for it was washed away by one piece of legis-
lation passed by the Court. It stated:

It is ordered that no town or person shall receive any

stranger. resorting hither with intent to reside in this

jurisdiction. nor shall allow any lot or habitation to

any. or entertain any such above three weeks. except

such person shall have allowance under the hands of

sons one of the council. or of two other nagistrates.

upon pain that every town that shall give or sell any

lot or habitation to any such. not so allowed. shall

forfeit 100 pounds for every offense. and every person

receiving any such. for longer than is here expressed 73

. . . shall forfeit for every offense 40 pounds . . . .

The intent of the Court's order could not be nissed. It now had the
power to decide who should be allowed within the Colony. The effect
of the order was to transfer the power to decide who was fit to live
in the Colony fron the hands of town officials to the General Court.
Heretofore each Church exanined persons who sought to settle near it in

the Colony: each Church decided when it would accept. Now the Court

 

71lbid.

72'Ihonns Shepard was a leading figure in the Massachusetts Bay
Colony. There has been no nodern study of his to ny knowledge. His
writings. available as The Works 9; Thom m (Boston. 1853. re-
printed in New York. 196777. are a classic exanple of the typical “ortho-
dox“ Divine in the early period of Massachusetts Bay history.

”For a discussion of the place of legislation in the Colony. see
Hall. A. 9.. p. 251. 11. ‘+0. The order of the Court appears in Massachu-
Betta Recomg I. p. 196.

103

would decide who was acceptable and whose Opinions were acceptable.
Even a person with a Christian reputation could be refused admission
to the Colony. Winthrop adnitted as such in a letter to Vane. "A nan
that is a true Christian say be denied residence anong us . . . .“7h
In passing this measure the Court had the leans to exclude other
Antinonians. and anyone whose opinions they did not like. If there
had been an illusion or pretense of freedom and liberty of conscience
before in the Colony. it vanished with this order of the Court.
Notwithstanding the fact that the election had turned over the
Court alnost conpletely into the hands of the orthodox party. and that
it had passed an act restricting settlement. the theological issue in
question remained in dispute. Encouraged by the Court. Bay preachers
decided to nest in synod to examine the issues.” They set in August
and listed sole ninety points of doctrine that had cone under fire.
Host of these were dispatched without such debate. Two received special
attention. the pastors concluding that the Antinonians had abused the
"liberty” to question ninisters. and that they had inprOperly held
"private" neetings.76
These conclusions reflect the prevailing attitude anong ortho-
dox preachers in the Bay. Hhen they spoke of abusing "liberty" to
question ninisters. it would appear they neant that one had liberty
to agree with the ninisters. that one did not have liberty to disagree

with then. Their criticisn of "private" neetings appeared to be

 

7uJohn Winthrop. ”A Defense of an Order of the Court Made in
the Year 1637.” Publications 2;,222 Prince Societ . I. p. 82.

7Small. 5, 9.. p. 8. The errors of the Antinonian party are
found in HinthrOp's account. published as (hapter VIII in Hall. A. _C_.

76H3119 _A_o Es Po 80

10%

another way of saying that Bay citizens did not have the right to
asseable and discuss deviant opinions.

The May Court and the August synod consolidated the position
of the orthodox party. each demonstrating that they intended to repress
or exorcise Antinonians. The Novenber~Court confiraed the sense of conp
fidence evident anong the orthodox party. Hethodically the Court
charged numerous citizens with being Antinonians. disenfranchising and
banishing then.77 Others were relieved of their “guns. pistols. swords.
powder. and shot."78 Though some of those sentenced had been involved
in political action. even nob action. lost were guilty of nothing sore
than holding unorthodox opinions.

Step by step the orthodox party was‘able to dissipate the
strength of the Antinonians. and now it was ready to proceed against
Anne Hutchinson. the one they saw as the chief source of the trouble.
Her case presented a special.problen.since she had not been involved in
any of the politics of the controversy. If they were to banish her from
the colony.sone leans had to be devised.

The record of Anne Hutchinson's exaaination before the Court is
pathetic from a legal standpoint.79 The Court had nothing concrete with
which to charge her; thus. the proceeding rambled from one hearsay argu-
sent to another. It was only after long hours of charge and counterb
charge that Anne. in what could only have been an unguarded nonent.

stated that she had.heavenly revelations in the same way that the Old

 

77Ibid. 78Ihid.

79'Dhe text of "The Examination of Mrs. Hutchinson at the Court
at Newtown" may be found in Hall. A. _C_.. Chapter IX. for a discussion
of the legal aspects of the trial, or hearing. see George Lee Haskins.
_Igg _a_._n<_1_ Authority _ig Early Massachusetts (New York. 1960), pp. 929-51.

105

Testament's Daniel did.80 The Court seized upon this point and made
short work of judging her guilty Of heresy. sentencing her to banish-
ment.

The record of Anne's examination is valuable. however. as evi-
dence Of how the orthodox party viewed liberty of conscience. WinthrOp
began the examination by noting that Anne had troubled the peace of the
commonwealth; then he got to the heart of the matter: "You.are known
to be a woman that hath had a great share in the promoting and divulging
Of those Opinions that are causes of this trouble . . . ."81 Like the
others. she was charged with holding Opinions that were not acceptable
in the Bay. Then Winthrop declared.

YOu are . . . nearly joined not only in affinity and

affection with some of those the court had taken notice

of and passed censure upon. but you have spoken diverse

things as we have been informed very prejudicial to the

honor of the churches and ministers thereof. and you have

maintained a meeting and an assembly in your*house that

hath been condemned by the general assembly as a thing

not tolerable nor coggly in the sight of God nor fitting

for your sex . . . .

In WinthrOp's thinking she was guilty by association. He went on to
state that she had been called before the Court so that it could find
out whether she held the same Opinions as those that had been "handled"
already by the Court.

Following WinthIOp's rambling statement as to why she had been
brought before the Court. Anne said. “I an called here to answer before
you but I.hear no things laid to my charge.” Winthrop insisted that he
had stated charges. and she replied. "Name one. Sir." Winthroptasked

whether'he had not named one already. and she asked again what she had

 

80Hall. _A_.- 9... p. 337.

81......“1‘10! Po 3120

821bido

106

done. "You did harbour and countenance those that are parties in this
faction that you have heard of." said Winthrop.83 ”That's a matter of
conscience. Sir.“ replied Anne. ”Your conscience you must keep or it
must be kept for you" was his reply. "Must I not then entertain the
saints because I must keep my conscience?" Anne retorted. Winthrop
replied with an example:

Say that one brother should commit felony or treason

and come to his other brother's house. if he knows

him guilty and conceals him he is guilty of the same.

It is his conscience to entertain him. but if his

conscience comes into act in giving countenance and

entertainment to him that hath broken the law he is

guilty too. SO. if you do countenance those that are

transgressors of the law you are in the same fact.
When asked what law had been broken in her having saints into her house.
Winthrop cited the command to honor father and mother. and by father he
meant fathers of the commonwealth.81+

The brief dispute about the role of conscience is most revealing.
Anne assumed that what went on in her house. and how she related to those
charged with heresy was a question of conscience. In her mind it was a
utter of personal judgment whether she held the same view they did.
It was also a personal matter. a right of conscience. to agree or dis-
agree with them. In this she echoed the view of William Perkins that
God hath in the New Testament given a liberty to conscience.85 She
could agree. too. with Roger Williams when he said. ”I plead the con-

science of all men to be at liberty. ”86

833320 8“rhino. PPO 312-313.

85%: P0 310 86.85.12.119 P0 930

107

Winthrop's terse reply to her claim of liberty of conscience
is but a parafiuase of Ames' view of conscience. "Your conscience you
must keep or it must be kept for you” was another way of saying that her
conscience had to be consistent with orthodoxy or the keepers of ortho-
doxy would Judge to what degree her conscience strayed from truth.
Implied in Winthrop's statement was the idea of the"rightly infoned"
conscience that Ames used in his discussion of heresy. Said Ames.
”When the truth is not only manifestly revealed in Scripture. but is
also sufficiently prepounded" to a person. and the person “doth so
adhere to his error. that he . . . opposeth himself to the plain
Scripture.“ he is guilty of heresy.87 The key to the whole argument
rests on the concept of a ”rightly informed” conscience. the over-
whelming implication being that orthodox leaders were the custodians
Of truth.

late in the trial Anne again spoke Of conscience. As she de-
fended her view of Scripture and how the Holy Spirit worked. she said.
“Now if you condemn me for speaking what in my conscience I know to be

true I must commit myself unto the Lord. ”88

Here. as in the early part
of the trial. she claimed as authority her conscience over against the
views of the state and church. She assumed here as before that con-
science had a liberty that transcends other men and institutions. In
the same passage Anne node the important distinction between power over
the body and power overrthe soul. "You have power over my body but the

Lord Jesus hath power over my body and soul. ”89 The distinction

879239.: Po 87. (Italics mine.)

88H3ne _A_- 209 P- 3370
891nm, p. 338.

108

between power over the body as separate from power over the soul was
typical of those who stood for liberty of conscience. and this dis-
tinction was absent in a view like Winthrop's.

The difference between the concept of conscience evident in
Winthrop»and Anne Hutchinson was fundamental. Anne. in the tradition
of William Perkins. assumed that conscience was sovereign as over*against
other men and institutions. while WinthrOp argued that conscience was
liable to the judgment and subject to the control of some human agency.
This difference is not diluted by the fact that both Of them readily
spoke of conscience. for the evidence suggests that WinthrOp did not
understand Anne's appeal to conscience as sovereign. His reply to one
of her'questions. a reply that gave an example of a felon as coming
under the authority of the state. missed the point she wanted to make.
Winthrop did not see the difference between the authority of the state
reaching to a felony and the authority of the state reaching an opinion
lield for conscience sake. Eyen Ames. the master*architect of the‘system
Of concepts that made up Massachusetts Bay orthodoxy. made a distinction

between treasonous felony and heretical ideas.90

C. Conclusion

The manner’in which Massachusetts Bay Colony leaders handled the
threats posed by Roger Williams and the Antinomians shows clearly that
they did not intend their colony as a haven for the persecuted and
Oppressed. as has sometimes been suggested. On the contrary. Winthrop
indicated that the leadership of the colony intended it to be an example

of what the godly community should be. In his view uniformity was a

 

———————~—v ——

Wmt P0 69e

109

keystone in the structure. The needs of the community and its purpose
took precedence over'all private views. whims. and interests. according
to Winthrop.

The way Williams and the Antinomians were treated also indicated
the frame of reference within which the leaders of the orthodox party
Operated. Perry Miller'and others have argued convincingly that the
basis of orthodoxy in Massachusetts was the theology of William Ames
though Miller did not concern himself with the relationship of Ames'
view of conscience to the thinking of the Colony's leaders. Aware Of
Ames' distinctive view of conscience. one that eliminated the need to
think of conscience in terms of liberty. it becomes obvious that Mas-
sachusetts Bay leaders followed William Ames in the matter of conscience
as they had in other matters. AdOpting the views of Ames on conscience
and applying them in practice meant that the leaders of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony established a policy that was no different_from that which
had existed among English governmental officials for generations. In
the view of the Colony's leaders conscience was something that came
within the purview Of their authority. They would decide what was an
acceptable conscientious practice: they made it clear in the case Of
Roger Williams. and.later in the Antinomian controversy. that there
was little room for deviation from the established orthodoxy. The
attitude of the leaders of Massachusetts Bay had one advantage over
that of English governmental officials] their view was.rooted in a far
more systematic scheme. and thus. was capable of a more easy application.

In terms of sphere sovereignty. the use of the Amesian view of

conscience in Massachusetts Bay led to the same result as had occurred

110

in Old England. The spheres of the church and the state were expanded
at the expense Of individual sovereignty and liberty. This process was
more exaggerated in New England. however. no doubt due to the fact that
the Colony began as a new venture. a venture unencumbered with the
accumulated traditions that restrain an established government. The
harshness of the Massachusetts Bay leaders' attitude. the narrow range
Of dissent that they would allow. was also supported by their belief
that the church and state could be recreated according to the Mosaic
example.

As the decade of the 1630's came to a close. Winthrop and his
friends undoubtedly felt satisfied in the say that they had handled
dissenters. flheir extrication of dissent provided hope that their ex-
periment might yet cucceed. The events of the next decade in Old
England - the Civil War - would illustrate. however. that the attitude
of the Massachusetts Bay leaders toward conscience was not the wave of
the future. as Winthrop thought: rather. it was a mere ripple in the

wave of the past.

CHAPTER IV

LIBERTY 0F CONSCIENCE IN OLD ENGLAND: 16H0-1660

The decades between the convention Of the Long Parliament in
1640 and the Restoration of the Crown in 1660 were crucial in the history
of the conflict between the policy of toleration and the claim of liberty
of conscience. It was the time when the claim Of liberty moved from a
stage Of gestation in English thought to that of birth. a time when it
became a central theme in numerous and powerful factions in politics and
religion. and a time when it boldly challenged the firmly entrenched
doctrine Of governmental toleration. During the brief period of Crom-
well and his friends. governmental toleration gave way to a recognition
of the rights Of conscience and its liberty as the notion reached a broad
popularized level. Though this triumph was brief. English political and
religious thought was never again the same.

In a broad perspective. the significance Of liberty of conscience
in the Civil War era stems from the fact that the social upheaval Of the
period brought into the Open those people and factions in English society
who saw merit in the argument for liberty Of conscience. Though liberty
of conscience was not the central issue in the Civil War. it was a prom-
inent factor because it was embraced by numerous factions and because
it could be used to support a broad range Of programs. For example. as
will be evident. liberty of conscience could be embraced by both presby-
terians and independents though these groups differed sharply on other
issues. As a result of the pOpularization of liberty Of conscience during
the Civil War. the idea became a creed in the years to come. and it could
not be vanquished. not even under the restored monarchy.

111

112

A. Liberty and Sovereignty in the Westminster Assembly

That the idea of liberty Of conscience ended its gestation.
that it came of age in the Civil War. is most Obvious in the West-
minster Assembly. The one problem plaguing Earliament long before it
convened in 1640 had been the Church question. It was natural. there-
:fore. that soon after convening. the long Parliament issued an ordinance

"1 A list of

calling for "an assembly of learned and godly divines.
delegates was drawn up.2 and in time they met at the place from which
the Assembly took its name.

The Parliamentary ordinance calling the Assembly also spelled
out what its task was:

To be consulted with by Parliament. for the settling

Of the government and liturgy of the Church of England.

and for vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of 3

said church from false aspersions and interpretations.
More specifically. the ordinance charged the Assembly with creating a
government for the Church "as may be most agreeable to God's Holy Word.“u
The Westminster Assembly was called. thus. to settle that question that
had for so long remained unresolved in England.

The Assembly gathered in the spring of 1643 and considered the
church question. as well as many other points of doctrine. stating its

conclusions in its Confession Of Faith and in other documents. In the

 

1A. F. Mitchell. Minutes of thg_Sessions g£_the Westminstg;
Assembly 93; Divines (London. 187K}? hereafter cited as Mitchell. Minutes.
The Ordinance calling the Assembly may be found in W. M. Hetherington.
History 2;; 1.1.3 Westminster Assembly 2.11 Divines (Edinburgh, 1856).
pp. 97-99: hereafter cited as Hetherington. Histogy.

2Mitchell. Minutes. pp. lxxxi-lxxxvii.

3Hetherington. Histogy. p. 97.

“Ibid.

113

Confession the Assembly wrote the following comment on conscience.
words that are strikingly similar to those of William Perkins:

God alone is Lord of the conscience. and hath left it

free from the doctrines and commandments of men which

are in any thing contrary to his Word. or beside it.

in matters of faith or worship. So that to believe

such doctrines or obey such commandments out of cone

science is to betray true liberty of conscience; and

the requiring of an implicit faith. and an absolute

and blind obedience. is to destroy liberty of cone

science. and reason also.
The Westminster Assembly. therefore. became the first Reformation council
to make a confessional statement on liberty of conscience. In terms
of the English Reformation. the claim of liberty of conscience. made
so often since the days of William Perkins. now became part of the creedal
baggage of the English Church.6

While it was an achievement for the Assembly to state its belief
in liberty of conscience. the confessional statement alone did not account
for the full significance of the idea in the Assemblyfs work. The state-
ment on conscience in the Confession was. in fact. part of the Assembly's
resolution of the church question. and only as part of that problem can
the Assembly's view of conscience be appreciated.

The church question in the Assembly consisted of two closely
linked parts. one being the church-state dispute. the other.the presbyb

terian-independency dispute. Distinguishing between the two facets of

 

50f the dozens of texts of the Confession. I have used that pub-
lished by the United Presbyterian Church as part of its Book g§_ggnr
fessions (Phil.. 1966): hereafter cited as Confession. The»Confession
begins at page 125; the statement on conscience appears on p. lbl.

6The Confession was technically adopted. but due to the fact
that it occurred during the Civil War. later spokesmen“ for the church
of England may not regard it as ever having been part of Church creeds.

114

the church question is vital because historically they have been con-
fused. In a broad perspective the Assembly's contribution to the
resolution of the first is more important than what it had to say about
the second. Concern here involves the Assembly's answer to the query.
whether or not the church should be separated from the state. This is
always to be separated from the second question. namely whether the in-
stitutional form of the church should be presbyterian.or congregational.7
Contemporaries Spoke of the church-state dispute as the Erastian
controversy. Erastians in the English Civil War era. like the earlier
followers of the sixteenth-century theologian.Thomas Erastus. advocated
a system in which the church was subordinated to the state.8 Of course.
the Elizabethan Church was an arm of the state. but reform-minded pro-
testants usually objected to this arrangement. The label ”Erastian"
in the reforming climate of the Civil War was attached to a party of
protestants who were interested in reform. but not in the separation
of church and state.9 It was a term used with bitter feeling because
it carried with it a feeling of betrayal of the potential of church
reform. Parliament as usurper or successor to royal power predict-
ably lodged.a large contingent of Erastians. They might support a
national presbyterian church. but it would still. in their view. be a

creature of the state.

 

7For a good discussion of this int see C. Gordon Bolam. et al.,
Thg_English‘gresbyterians (Boston. 1968 . p. 73 ff.

8The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia g£_Religious Knowledge (Grand
Rapids. 1950), IV. p. 167.

9Hetherington. Histogz. p. 232 ff.

115

Parliamentary Erastians drew upon the tradition of politics and
the tradition of religion to support their contention that the church
was. or should be. a creature of the state. Parliamentary lawyers.
steeped in the history of Roman law. saw the separated church as a
violation of the time honored maxim imperium _i_n_ in erio. as a republic
within a republic. Others defended the Erastian position by appeal to
the Mosaic example. a view that saw Old Testament practice as normative
for the Christian Church.10

While the Westminster Assembly's members were almost all Opposed
to the Erastian position. four or five of them were Erastians. The
leader of this small band was John Seldon. perhaps the outstanding
Hebrew scholar of the century. The Assembly's protocol called for the
free eXpression of all views;11 hence. Seldon had a chance to present
his arguments as the church question came to debate. Seldon's defense
of a state church was a long and learned oration. Reports of it sug-
gest that it was a model of scholastic learning. a real tribute in a
scholastic age. This event has been preserved in the records of great
orators. but not so much for what Seldon said as for what was said by
another after he sat down. Legend has it that Seldon left his audience
breathless. for no one could possibly refute him. Surprise. amazement.
and then admiration filled the Assembly's chambers asa young scholar
stood. refuting every point made by Seldon. Without notes. without
preparation. the legend claims. George Gillespie vanquished the Erastian

argument of its greatest proponent.12

10mm.

111112.. see the oath that was part of the Ordinance. p. 97.

12Ibid.. p. 238 ff.

116

The David and Goliath aspects of this debate undoubtedly grew
up around the story. but it was important because it focused on the
fact that the Parliament and the Assembly held positions that could not
be reconciled. There could be no compromise. either the church was
separate or it was a creature of the state.

The Assembly's view of the church could not be reconciled with
the wishes of Parliament because it was rooted in the idea of sphere
sovereignty. a stance that had profound implications for the problem
of conscience. Concerning the sphere of the church the Assembly wrote.
"There is no other Head of the Church. but the Lord Jesus Christ."13
Of course. the Erastian could agree with this if he added the qualifica-
tion that Christ. as Head of the Church. had delegated.authority to mag-
istrates to care for the Church. That was not. however. what the Assembly
had in mind. for the Divines also stated "that Jesus as King and Head of
His Church hath appointed an ecclesiastical government in His Church in

the hands of Church officers distinct from civil government. The

sphere of the church was not only distinct. it was also limited. a point
the Assembly made when it stated:

Synods and councils are to handle or conclude nothing
but that which is ecclesiastical. and are not to
intermeddle with civil affairs which concern the
commonwealth. unless by way of humble petition in
cases extraordinary: or by way of advice for satis-
faction of conscience. if they be thereunto required
by the civil magistrate.15

 

13Confession.. p. 146.

luflitdlell, Minutes. p. 204'.

15Ccnressicn, p. 150.

117

If the church was a distinct and separate Sphere. it naturally
followed that the civil government was also an ordained entity. The
Assembly affirmed this position in its usual pithy language. Of mag-
istrates. the Divines wrote:

God. the Supreme Lord and King of all the world. hath

ordained civil magistrates to be under’him over the

people. for’his own glory and the public good: and.

to this end. hath armed them with the power of the

sword. for the defense and encouragement of them that

are good and for the punishment of evildoers.1
Stressing the limits of civil sovereignty. the Assembly stated. "The
Civil Magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the
Word and Sacraments. or the power of the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven.”17

The Assembly's comments regarding the proper domains of the church
and of the state seem to suggest that between them was an insurmountable
wall of separation.” Such a view would be a misreading of their intent.
and a view inconsistent with the idea of sphere sovereignty. Institutions.
such as the church and the state. have areas of common interest. and they
have points at which they overlap. Recognizing this feature of sphere
sovereignty. the Assembly spelled out how the church and the state should
bridge their institutional differences. how they should pursue their com-
mon interests. Quoted already was the Assembly's belief that the church
could petition the government in certain ”extraordinary" cases. or in
satisfaction of conscience.19 At the same time the civil magistrate had
the authority. even duty. to call synods if he felt that it would help

keep peace in the church. The magistrate in so doing had no special

 

license. for all.had to be ”according to the mind of God."20
16%.! P0 we 17113111.
18

infra. p.231 discusses 'ttall of separation“ and the First
Amendment. ’

20

19Confession. p. 150. Ibid.. p. 144.

118

In the Assembly's view. God had ordained the state for specific
ends. and he had done the same for the church. Each was a distinct
institution though in certain instances they were bound to help each
other. Such an image of the Assembly's view of society and its insti-
tutions is. however. incomplete. Separation of church and state is only
part of the Assembly's theory of Sphere sovereignty. As heirs of the
English Reformed tradition. the Assembly was bound to relate the soverb
eignty of the institutional church and state to man. to men as individ-

uals.21

As Reformed Christians they knew that man was not made for the
Sabbath. rather the Sabbath for'man. and they knew that man was not made
for the state. rather the state for man. A description of the powers
ordained to the state and to the church would. therefore. be of little
value unless the rights and liberties of the individual were recognized.
In this context the Assembly's statement on conscience is more
than a concession or mere acknowledgement of the role of conscience in
the affairs of men. Conscience functions. rather. as an essential.and
integral part of the Assembly's resolution of the church question. The
doctrine of conscience is but another'way to state the case for the
sovereignty of the individual. and thus. it re-enforces the limits of
power inherent in the church and state. The Assembly's view of con-
science prevents the individual from becoming a victim of double
tyranny. tyranny by the church as well as by the state.
Another look at the Assembly's statement on conscience from

the perspective of sovereignty. will clarify the place of conscience

in the Assembly's resolution of the church question. Liberty of

21For a comment on the individual.and the Reformation's idea
of the priesthood of all believers see my article "The Appeal to Gen-

science.” Christianity Today. XIII (May 23. 1969). p. 5.

119

conscience is a Christian birthright because it is part of “the liberty

"22 a state-

which Christ hath purchased for believers under the gospel.
ment reminiscent of Perkins' contention that "Christ hath in the New
Testament given a liberty to the conscience."23 The rights of conscience
are. thus. of the same order as the powers ordained to the state and

to the church. a point emphasized by the Confession's phrase "God alone
is Lord of the conscience."24

The question immediately arises as to the limits of that liberty
which Christ gave to conscience. The answer. in the Assembly's view.
hinges on the way the ordained powers of the state. the church. and the
individual relate to each other. The simple fact that each of these
factors has inherent. ordained rights. duties. and powers implies
certain limits. for where the powers of one begin. the power of the
others must end. Once this point is understood. it becomes clear that
the question of limits of power and liberty involves a defining of the
liberties and duties that the state. the church. and the individual
possess.

Noted already was the fact that the Assembly saw state sover-
eignty limited to keeping the peace. encouraging good. and punishing
evil-doers. This point was re-enforced in the Confession's claim that
conscience was at liberty in relation to "the doctrines and command-
ments of men which are in any thing contrary to his Word. or beside it."25
Of course. men had to obey doctrines and commandments that were enjoined

by "his Word." This was another way of stating that liberty of conscience

 

22
24

Confession. p. lul. 233u re. p. 31.

Confession. p. 141. 251bid.

120

was not license. that liberty had to be consistent with the other
sovereign Spheres. with the powers of the state and of the church.

In the Assembly's view. the exercise of liberty of conscience
by the individual in relation to the powers of the state and church was
not an Option that one might exercise. but rather a duty. Referring
to the rules of men. the Confession stated. ”So that to believe such
doctrines or obey such commandments out of conscience. is to betray

true liberty of conscience."26

Obeying the whims and wishes of men had
to be distinguished from obeying lawful. that is. Biblical commands.

Officers of the state and the church disrupted the power'and
place of conscience when they demanded obedience in those things that
were not according to the mind of God. in those things that were con-
trary to the Word. or beside. Magistrates and churchmen had to re-
strain their desires and live within their powers because "the requiring
of an implicit faith {by churchmen: and an absolute and blind obedience
[by magistrate; . is to destroy liberty of conscience." and the Con-
fession adds significantly. "reason also.”27

The Assembly. thus. marked off the conscience of man as a
separate sovereign Sphere. and it did so as part of its resolution of
the issue for which it had been convened. Parliament assembled the
Divines. asking them to settle the government and doctrine of the church.
only to have the Divines tell them that the church. the state. and man
were separately ordained creations. Each was independently responsible
to God for the authority and liberty granted to it by Him. The Assembly's

resolution of the church question had a double barrelled effect: on the

 

26Ibid.

27Ibid.

121

one hand. it solved the church question. and. on the other. its con-

clusions were stated in the form of doctrine. In the hands of the Assem-

bly liberty of conscience became an essential doctrine. and at the same

time an

science

writing

science

integral part of its view of the church.

Fbuther evidence of the fact that the idea of liberty of con-
came of age in the Civil War era may be found in the Specific
of the Assembly's Divines. Representative comments on con-
follow:

To do God and ourselves right. it is necessary that we
shouli with our utmost strength maintain the doctrine
and power of that liberty with which Christ hath en-
dowed His_church. without . . . subjecting ourselves
to their \9agistratesfl1 servitude: so as to surrender
either judgment or consciences to be wholly diSposed
according to the Opinions or wills of men . . . .

Thomas Taylor

There is no power on earth. that can prOperly and im-
mediately reach the conscience of men. Conscience is
a thing out of men's jurisdiction. it will neither be
beholden to man for its liberty. nor is it capable of
his restraints. it is out of the reach of all human
power.

Samuel Bolton

There cannot be imagined a higher contempt of God than
for a man to despise the power of his own conscience
which is the highest sovereignty under heaven. as
being God's most immediate deputy for the ordering of
his life and ways.

Robert Saunderson
Conscience is considered by Divines as a principle of
our acting in order that we do what God commanded in
the law and GoSpel.

Samuel Rutherford

122

Conscience is a man's judgment of himself. of his estate
and actions. as they are subjected unto the judgment of
God . . . . Conscience is placed in the middle. under
God and above man.

Henry Wilkinson
Now conscience is the Spring of practice. and the wheel
that must set all the rest going . . o . Conscience is
a noble and divine power planted of God in the soul. working
upon itself by reflection . . . . God hath given it more
force and power to work upon men. than all other agents:
it being internal and domestic. hath the advantage of all
foreign and outward.

Samuel Ward

As in the case of the Confession. these eXpressions28

embody all the
elements essential in Perkins' view of liberty of conscience. including
the sphere sovereignty concept.

Like Roger Williams and others during the early Stuart period.
Assembly Divines often used liberty of conscience as a defense for some
position taken during the Civil War era. Typical of this use of the
idea appears in _An Apologetics} Narration. written in 1643.29 This
brief tract was written by five members of the Westminster.Assembly.
explaining how they practiced religion while in exile. The work is
often cited by students of church history as evidence of a congrega-
tional view of polity. Aside from the polity question the Apologetigal
Narration is of interest because it rests its case upon liberty of con-
science. 1

The authors in introductory remarks stated that they had. on
the average. served ten years in English churches before they resolved
30

to leave. They gave their reason for leaving:

 

28J. M. Kik. Unpublished extracts made in the Dr. Williams
Library. London: on deposit in the library of the Westminster'Theolog-
ical Seminary. Philadelphia. Pa.

29Robert 8. Paul. ed.. _A_n Apologetical Narration (Boston. 1963).

3°Ibid.. p. 2.

123

The sinful evil of those corruptions in the public
worship and government of this Church. which all 31
do now so generally acknowledge and decry . . . .
These corruptions in worship and government. they said. "took hold upon

”32 They were

our consciences long before some other of our brethren.
not being overly scrupulous because the evils of worship and church
government ”have been the common stumbling block and offense of many
thousands of tender consciences."33 Interestingly. they argued that
the offenses mentioned had been afflicting tender consciences "ever
Since the first Reformation of Religion."31+ that is. since the days of
Queen Elizabeth.

Unwilling to submit to the evil practices set down by church
leaders. unable to because these practices were doctrines and command-
ments of men. the authors of the Narration resolved to leave England.
Free of the evil practices of the Church of England. the apologists re-
solved to inquire what church practice ought to be in terms of Apostolic
direction and primitive practice found in the New Testament. While this
task was great. it was not impossible because they were “to be guided by
that light and touch [torchfl , God's Spirit: [it] should by the Word
vouchsafe our consciences. as the needle touched with the loadstone is
in the compass."35 In determining the church government most consistent
with the New Testament the apologists placed conscience in a central

role because. they stated:

 

___——‘.— _—

31Ibid. 32 Ibid.
33Ibid. 3*Ibid.

35%. . p. 3.

12“

We had (of all men) the greatest reason to be true

to our own consciences in what we should embrace.

seeing it was for our consciences that we were

deprived at once of what ever was dear to us.36
Like Perkins. and like the Confession. conscience was normative for them:

Consciences were Esq] possessed with that reverence

and adoration of the fulness of the Scriptures.

that there is therein a complete sufficiency. as to

make the man of God perfect. so also to make the

Churches of God perfect . . . .37

In a word. the authors of the Apologetical Narration presented
their views on polity because they could not remain silent. for silence
would have been a betrayal of "true liberty of conscience." something
they could not do as members of the Westminster Assembly.

From the foregoing it is clear that the Westminster Assembly
contributed to the Spread of the claim of liberty of conscience during
the Civil War era. The Assembly’s Confession shows clearly that the
Divines were committed to the idea of Sphere sovereignty. that it was
part of their view of the liberty that God had givento conscience.
Individual members of the ASsembly also used liberty of conscience in
terms of Sphere sovereignty to defend particular positions they held. an
example being the authors of the Apologetical Narration. Collectively
and individually. the Assembly embraced liberty of conscience in the
way that it had been stated a half-century earlier by William Perkins.

The Divines of the Assembly were not the only ones during the
Civil War who expressed their’adherence to the concept of conscience
and its liberty through sphere sovereignty. for it was also prominent

in the Leveller movement.

 

361blde

37Ibid.. p. 9.

125

B. Liberty of Conscience and the Leveller Movement

The word Leveller. like the word Puritan. was first used in
derision. It came into being after the movement it described.38
Historically the term applied to a faction in the English Civil War
that advocated a series of reforms aimed at SXpanding the rights of all
citizens. As the term suggests. the proposed reforms would equalize
classes and pe0ple. at least they would all be on one level before the
law. This has been described as a democratic movement. as the pre-
cursor to modern democracy. Modern writers have. therefore. extolled
the virtues and programs of the Leveller party.39

Debates about the origin and scOpe of the Leveller movement con-
tinue.,but these debates do not alter the fact that a number of the
party called Levellers played significant roles in the shaping of Civil
War reforms. Like the Westminster Confession. like many of the Assem-
bly's Divines. Levellers posited liberty of conscience as an essential
element in the solution of the acrimonious and factions disputes of the
Civil War. As the foremost student of the Leveller movement. T. C. Pease.
has said. liberty of conscience "was a fundamental article in the creed
of the Levellers.”u0

The Leveller movement was essentially a layman's political
movement: thus. its interest in the rights of conscience adds another
dimension to that theologically oriented one of the Westminster Assembly.

Though a considerable number of Levellers wrote on the place of liberty

 

38W. Haller and G. Davies. eds. The Leveller Tracts 1642-1652
(New York. l9h4). p. l. n. 1.

39Jordan, Toleration. III. p. 154; and William Haller. Libert
and Reformation.ig;thg Puritan Revolution (New York. 1955). pp. 2§E:287.

“0T. C. Pease. Thg_Leveller Movement (Washington. 1916). p. 82.

126

of conscience in the reformation of English society. their thinking may
be sampled by an examination of the writings of three leaders. William
Walwyn. Henry Robinson. and Richard Overton.

Typical of Leveller tracts on liberty of conscience was William
Walwyn's The Compassionate Samaritan. published in 16##. The short
title does not do justice to what Walwyn had in mind. The remainder
of the title reads:

Unbinding the conscience. and pouring oil into the

wounds which have been made upon the separation:

recommending their future welfare to the serious

thoughts. and careful endeavors of all who love

the peace and unity of Commonwealth's men. or

desire the unanimous prosecution of the Common

Enemies. or who follow our Savior's rule. to do

unto there. what they would have others do unto

them.

This. the full title. reveals some important clues to the nature of
Walwyn's thinking. Separatists suffered because their consciences were
restrained. and he wished.that they be loosed. No anarchist. he seeks
the peace and unity of the nation. No secular thinker. he wants men to
follow the rule of Christ.

A look at the content of the document reveals that Walwyn is
trying to define the limits of Christian liberty and liberty of con-
science. Addressing the Commons. whom he saw as the only persons
left "to play the good Samaritan‘spart." Walwyn expressed his belief
that they would consider "the oppressed conscience“ of the separatists

#2

as they continued ”the Reformation so happily begun.” That Walwyn

was attempting to define the limits of liberty appears in his first

 

ulWilliam Walwyn. The Compassionate Samaritan (London. l6h3).
title page.

uzIbid” p. "A” 3.

127

chapter. "Liberty of Conscience Asserted. and the Separatist Vindi-
cated."43 Walwyn had heard about An_Apologetical Narration. he said.

and "did with gladness of heart undertake the reading thereof.“ua His
joy turned to sorrow. however. because the authors claimed liberty of
conscience for themselves. but not for everyone. Walwyn resolved. there-
fore. to set down the reasons why liberty of conscience should not be
limited. why it was a right of the Separatists as well.

His argument has all the marks found in the views of the Assem-
bly's Confession. in the writings of the Divines. and in the Narration.
the only difference being in the wider application of the idea of liberty
Of conscience. Like the apologists of the Narration. Walwyn wrote his
treatise as a matter of conscience. On this he said. ”Me thinks every
man is bound in conscience to Speak and do what he can in behalf of
others."u5 Walwyn wrote on behalf of the Separatists as a matter of
conscience thoughfi "I myself am none."u6 That liberty of conscience
was not license appears in a most succinct statement of his case:

Now because little can be done in their behalf. unless

liberty of conscience be allowed for every man. or sort of

men to worship God in that way. and perform Christ's Ordi-

nances in that manner as Shall appear to them most agree-

able to God's Word. and no man be punished . . . by

authority for his Opinions. unless it be dangerous to

the State . . . every man ought to have liberty of con-

science of what Opinion soever. with the caution above

namedeeoe

Walwyn linked reason to conscience in the same way Perkins and

the Divines of the Assembly. ”Liberty of conscience is to be allowed

every man . . . because of what judgment soever*a man is. he cannot

 

”sis” p. 1. “as.

“SP-LEO, P. 1‘. “6M. 1+7Ibidg. p. 5.

128

choose but be of that judgment-m")+8 Again. ”whatsoever'a man's reason
doth conclude to be true or false. to be agreeable or disagreeable to
God's Hord." the same ”to that man is his Opinion or judgment."1+9
Walwyn did not mean to imply that reason was likely to be correct.
only that it was compelling. As for the rightness of reason he echoed
Roger Williams when he wrote. "No man. nor no sort of men can presume
of an unerring spirit." because of "the uncertainty of knowledge in
his life."50

Like other Perkinsian eXpressions on liberty of conscience.
Halwyn's argument reflects a deep commitment to Biblical principles.
Linking conscience to the well-known phrase of St. Paul that "whatsoever
is not of faith is sin." Halwyn wrote:

The third reason for liberty of conscience is grounded

upon these foundations. that whatsoever is not of faith

is sin . . o to compel me against my conscience. is to

compel me against what I believe to be true. and so

against my faith: now whatsoever is not of faith is

sin; to compel me therefore against my conscience. is

to compel me to do that which is sinful . . . .51
In short. absence of liberty of conscience causes men to sin.

Like Halwyn's work. a second Leveller tract. Henry Robinson's
Liberty 2: Conscience. stated its purpose in the full title:

Liberty of Conscience: or the sole means to obtain

Peace and Truth. Not only reconciling His Majesty

with His subjects. but all Christians. States. and

Princes to one another. with the freest passage for

the Gospel. Very seasonable and necessary in these

distracted times. when most men weary of war. and
cannot find the way to peace. 2

 

_— __._

48Ibid.. p. 6. “91mm, p. 7.
501333.. pp. 10-11. 51ma., p. 43.

52Henry Robinson. Liberty g£_Conscience (London. léhh). title
page.

129

Like Walwyn. he argued that the polarity between the King's party and
Parliament. and other factions disputes could be settled only when all
recognized liberty of conscience.

A third Leveller tract on liberty of conscience was Richard

Overton's The’Arraignment_g£ Hr. Persecution. written in 1645. It was
53

 

a brilliant piece of satire. and thus. difficult to summarize.
Briefly. it consisted of a mock trial. all the elements that troubled
English society being assigned a place in the proceedings. 0n the one
side Overton pLaced all that was evil. rude-multitude. Scotch-govern-
ment. false-prephets. Sir John Presbyter. Pontifical-revenue. and others.
Supporting them as witnesses were Satan. Antichrist. Spanish-Inquisition.
Council of Trent. High Commission. and many more. Together’all these
presented the case for Mr. Persecution. claiming that he had been falsely
charged.

On the other side Overton placed Mr. God's Vengence to serve
as prosecutor. Vengence charging Persecution with crimes against Christian.
Martyr. and Liberty of Conscience. The star witness for the prosecution
was none other than Sovereign Christ. The Opening speech of Sovereign
Christ reflects much about Overton's view of conscience:

Gentlemen. our Lord of Lords. and King of Kings. whose

image and eXpress prerogative I am. hath by the price

of his blood. constituted himself sole Head and King

for ever over the consciences of men . . . .
This is but another way of stating what the Westminster Confession said.
that is. "God alone is Lord of the conscience." That God intended con-

science to be at liberty Overton eXpressed in the next phrases:

 

vi W—wfifi —__

”Richard Overton. The Arraignment _o_i_‘_ _Mg. Persecution (Tendon.
1645). pp. 1~3.

beid. . P. 1+.

130

Therefore he chargeth his Householders. the Kings

of the earth. to let the tares and the Wheat

grow together in the field of he world until the

harvest. the Day of Judgment.

Overton here borrows a favorite parable of advocates of liberty of con-
science. The implication is that the good and bad must exist side by
side until the Lord of conscience comes to judge what men have done
with their liberty.

Having stated the case for liberty of conscience. Sovereign
Christ concludes by charging Persecution with a violation of liberty
of conscience:

Therefore the malefactor. Persecution. in my judgment.

being in his inclinations and actions altogether ad-

verse thereto. is an Arch-traitor to the prerogative

Royal of Jesus Christ over the consciences of men.

and thgrefore lawfully and justly charged with this

bill.5

Following these remarks by Sovereign Christ is a patient re-
hearsal of the many situations in which Persecution violated liberty
Of conscience. Overton's use of satire in The Arraignment g£_Persecu-
tion effectively conveys his belief that persecution can be avoided in
the future if men would only heed the God-ordained right Of liberty of
conscience. a right granted to everyone.

Other Levellers. such as John Lilburne.57 wrote on liberty of
conscience. but their works need not be reviewed here. The items
cited show that liberty of conscience was basic in their thought as
they» contemplated ways to end civil strife. These works also make it

abundantly clear that their view of liberty of conscience was rooted

 

55Ibid. 56Ibid.

57Haller. Liberty and Reformation. p. 256 ff.. provides an
introduction to Lilburne.

131

in the same perSpective found in the Westminster Confession. and among

the Divines. Although a writer. such as William Walwyn. could criticize

 

the Apologetical Narration. his criticism must be understood in terms
of the problem of the limits of liberty. not as a fundamental fissure.
The Leveller view of liberty of conscience. being part of the Perkinsian
tradition. was a powerful argument in their drive to circumscribe royal

sovereignty.

C. Liberty of Conscience and the Policies of the Protectorate

The execution of the King. in 1649. was a decisive event in the
Civil War. From l6h0 until his death any settlement of the issues would
.have had to take into account the King as person and the King as Office.
Some compromise would have to be made on the question of royal versus
Parliamentary power and on the church question. The Westminster Assembly.
its Divines. the Levellers. and others in writing on liberty of conscience
in this period assumed the existence of the monarchy. and projected
liberty of conscience as a right over against it. While the King lived.
while there was the prOSpect of a compromise settlement of the War that
would include a circumscribed monarchy. the claim of liberty of conscience
did not have a bright future.

With the execution of the King in 1649. the political climate
eXperienced a fundamental change. The execution of the King was as
much a death blow to the institution as it was to the person. at least
this was the attitude of those in control of the government. From the
point of view of the conflict between the royal policy of toleration
and the claim of liberty of conscience as a right. the execution Of

the King signaled a new day. Of course. the future Of the claim of

132

liberty of conscience would depend upon the nature of the government
that replaced the monarchy.

Those responsible for the execution of the King had plans for
a republican government.58 and with the execution there was no turning
back from the move toward a republic. Establishment of a republic would
be no easy task. for public Opinion did not favor the idea. nor was
there unanimity among those in a position to bring about the republic.
Continued fighting on the domestic scene coupled with foreign battles
precluded an early consolidation Of republican interests.

By 1651. however. it became clear that Oliver Cromwell was at
the center of power by accident or by design. or. as Cromwell himself
thought. by the Providence of God.59 That Cromwell was the central
figure on the political scene after 1651 did not immediately register
with the members of that remnant of Parliament called the Rump.60 They
argued with him and his advisors for months. blocking his plans and
suggestions until one day in April. 1653. Cromwell took a small guard
with him to the House and physically ejected its members.

In place of the Rump Parliament. Cromwell and the Council of
the Army installed what is known as the Barebones Parliament. a group
of one hundred and forty men selected from a list drawn up by a number
of congregational churches. This Parliament was supposed to legislate
as well as superintend the government. late in 1653 a new constitution

called the Instrument of Government was drawn up: it provided that

 

58Ibid.. p. 328 ff.

59Robert S. Paul. The Lord Protector (London. 1955). Chapter XV;
hereafter cited as Paul. Cromwell.

60Ibid.

133

Cromwell be designated Lord Protector. and that he be assisted by a
Council of State. As Cromwell took Office. the Barebones Parliament
was dissolved. and Cromwell was. to all intents and purposes. the
government of England.61

The ascendence of Cromwell filled the political vacuum created
by the execution of the King.62 but the question of religion. and.
thus. the question of the claim of liberty of conscience remained un-
resolved. What place liberty of conscience would have in the republic
depended to a large degree on Cromwell.

It can be stated categorically that Oliver Cromwell supported
and defended liberty of conscience. that in his view it was an essential
right in the same sense that it was for Perkins. the Divines of the
Assembly. the Levellers. and others during the Civil War period. To
state that Cromwell defended liberty of conscience. however. probably
grates upon the usual historical images of him. for'he is often pictured
as a fanatic dictator. For example. the most recent and perhaps the
definitive collection of Cromwell's papers. collected and edited by
Professor W. C. Abbott in the 1930's and 1940's. pictures Cromwell as
a dictator in the mold of Hitler and other modern autocrats. The clue
to Abbott's image of Cromwell. however. rests in his view of his own
age. in his increasing apprehension about the portents of a Hitler. more
than it does in his analysis of Cromwell as a Christian statesman Of
the seventeenth century. Abbott was not the only modern historian to
deal harshly with Cromwell. but his work re-enforces the negative Opinions
63

of otheIS.

 

61
6

Ashley. Great Britain 33 1688. p. 357 ff.

 

2Paul. Cromwell. p. 275 ff. 63Ibid.. p. 415 ff.

134

That Abbott saw Cromwell as a precursor to the modern dictator.
that Cromwell deserves a better image. are Observations made by a most
perceptive student of Cromwell and the Civil War era. Robert S. Paul.
True though. the fact is that Cromwell led armies and ordered the ex-
ecution of his enemies. that is only part of the story. as Professor
Paul points out in his study The lord Protector.6u A more accurate
picture of Cromwell would stress the fact that he was a man with a
vision. a Christian man with a vision of a Christian Commonwealth.
Cromwell‘s commonwealth included provisions for liberty of conscience.
a stance not likely to be assumed by a Nazi dictator.

Cromwell's defense of liberty of conscience was evident in his
own comments. He. like his contemporaries. was more involved with the
definition of the limits of liberty of conscience than with its roots
or source. As a political leader he was distressed when exercise of
liberty of conscience led to civil disturbances and violence. Cromwell
drew the line when liberty led to violence. but in so doing he agonized
in ambivalence. Professor Paul captured the essence of this problem
when he wrote:

If Cromwell disliked persecuting those from whom he

most of all dissented. he was completely embarrassed

by the measures he was forced to adopt against Fifth

Monarchists and Quakers. for they were men with whom

he had a great deal in common.65
Cromwell. like Monarchists. passionately desired the coming of the
Kingdom of Christ. The Quaker inner light. moreover. was something

Cromwell could understand. Still. wrote Professor Paul.

 

6“Ibid.

651b1d.. p. 328.

135

He could not allow the civil disturbances caused by

George Fox's followers. and between Cromwell's

methods of orderly government and the Fifth Mon-

archists' violent and fanatical ideal ofég godly

oligarchy. there could be no compromise.
In short. Cromwell was a reformer. but he could not tolerate violence.

That Cromwell saw liberty of conscience as a right. but a right
that did not condone violence. may be illustrated by a typical encounter
he had with a group of dissidents. Several persons representing the
congregation of which a certain John Rogers was pastor. came to him
seeking the release of their pastor. He was unjustly detained. they
argued. for he had only suffered for the gospel. "I toll you.” Crone
well replied. "he suffered as a Railer. as a Seducer. and as a busybody
. . . and a stirrer up of Sedition."67 Impatient with the petitioners'
assumption that they had liberty to do and say what they liked. that
there was no limit to liberty. Cromwell thundered. ”Who will hinder
your preaching of the GOSpel - Yea. his {Christ's} Personal Reign. who
will hinder?”68 Then.the petitioners of Roger's congregation raised
the question of liberty of conscience. to which Cromwell retorted:

I tell you there never was such liberty of conscience.

no never such liberty since the days of the Antichrist

as is now - for’may not men preach and pray what they

will?
Significantly. he added. "And have not men their liberty of all Opinions?"69

That liberty of conscience was a basic factor in the policies
Of the Protectorate was evident in other ways. Cromwell's friends and

advisors were known advocates of liberty Of conscience. Always close

 

661bid.

67Quoted in Paul. Cromwell. p. 328.

6?;229. 691bid. (Italics mine.)

136

at hand for consultation were the principal authors of the Applggetical
Narration. Thomas Godwin and Philip Nye. men who stated their case for
70

liberty of conscience in that work and in others. John Owen. foremost
theologian of the Civil War era. was also close to Cromwell. In
addition to a number of tracts on liberty of conscience written after
the Restoration. Owen defended the idea as he authored the Fifteen
Fundamentals gf_Christianity under Cromwell's direction during the early
days of the Protectorate.”

The leveller. John Lilburne. who was also an army officer. re-
ports that liberty of conscience was a topic often discussed among army
men. Apparently most officers saw the limit of liberty in much the same
fashion as he. for he notes that General Ireton's view was an exception.
that "our principal differences lie at his desire in the too strict
restrainingIéflliberty of conscience."72 Lilburne adds.

A long and tedious tug we had with Commissary General

Ireton only. yea sometimes whole nights together.

principally about liberty of conscience . . . and

very angry and lordly in his debates many times he

uas,73

Lilburne's debates with General Ireton not only illustrate that
liberty of conscience was a concern of military men. but it also shows
that for them as for Cromwell and others. the problem of the limits of
liberty was central. It is noteworthy that among Cromwell and others
associated with him that the question of conscience had shifted from

one that defended the basic claim to a question of the limits of liberty.

 

702.281." P- 32“- 71___Ib1_doo pp. 255-57.

721b1d.. p. 172, n. 4. 73Ibid.

137

This was not only a new aspect of the problem. but one that shows the
fundamental right of conscience and its sovereignty had been accepted
as a basic assumption.

In summary. concerning Cromwell and the politics of the Pro-
tectorate it is obvious that Cromwell and many of those closely associated
with him embraced liberty of conscience. Cromwell himself Spoke often
about conscience and its liberty. His confidante. moreover. were often
men associated with the religious independents. and their devotion to
liberty of conscience was well-known. Cromwell touched on a new aspect
of liberty of conscience when he pointed out that this liberty. too.
had its limits. Cromwell's devotion to and advocacy of liberty of con-
science was important because he was a central political figure and for

a time the most powerful man in government.

D. Conclusion

The era of the Civil War was particularly important in the history
of the conflict between the ideas of toleration and liberty of conscience.
The upheaval of the period brought into the Open those peOple and factions
in English society who saw merit in the claim of liberty of conscience.
Earlier in the period. when Parliament called together an assembly of
Divines. the range of support for liberty of conscience became evident.
The Divines. either in assembly or separately in individual writings.
showed how liberty of conscience was a basic idea in their thinking.
Evident among them also was the relationship between liberty of conscience
and Sphere sovereignty. particularly in their conclusions as stated in
their Confession of Faith. Their confession statement that'God alone

is lord of conscience and has set it free from the doctrines and

138

commandments of med”is strikingly similar to various statements on con-
science made by William Perkins. While the Westminster Assembly Spoke

out on the question of conscience and its sovereignty. numerous members

of the Leveller Movement phrased their devotion to liberty of conscience
in a way that betrayed a commitment to the idea as set forth by Perkins.
During the last half of the Civil War era the emergence Of Oliver Crom-
well as the leading political figure greatly aided the cause of conscience
and its liberty. Cromwell made it clear in his statements and in the

men he chose as confidante that he was devoted to liberty of conscience
and that he saw it in the perspective of sphere sovereignty. Cromwell
also pointed out that liberty of conscience had its limits. that it was
not a license for violence. The acceptance of Perkins' view of conscience
by the Westminster Assembly and Cromwellian leaders was particularly
important because it represented the first occasion in which the idea
gained institutional support.

In a broad perspective. the conflict between the ideas of tolera-
tion and liberty of conscience during the Civil War era must be viewed
as a persistent element in the debates about the nature of English
society and what it should be. The range Of peOple and factions that
could find merit in the claim of liberty of conscience has been demon-
strated. A characteristic of revolutionary periods is that factions and
persons may agree on one basic issue only to differ on others. and this
happened often during the Civil War era. The fact remains. however.
that the cause of conscience in terms of sphere sovereignty gained wide
support. Tbleration as an attitude toward conscience had its supporters

during the Civil War era though the shifting sands of uncertainty

139

apparently forced them into prudent silence. The character of the
Restoration. however. is evidence enough of the continuing attitude

toward conscience as a phenomenon that was within the purview of gov-

ernmental and church officials.

CHAPTER V
THE FAILURE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE IN RESTORATION ENGLAND

When Oliver Cromwell died in September. 1658, he was succeeded
by his son Richard. but Richard was neither the soldier nor the "saint"
that his father had been. He was not able to control the army. it
becoming factions as did Republican partisans generally. By summer of
1659 army men were Openly divided. one group being led by General Monck.
Monck was on duty in Scotland. and having declared his support for civil.
rather than military. government. marched on London. Other military
leaders Opposed him. but they found little support among the citizenry.
Monck arrived in London. restored Parliamentary members that had been
excluded in 1648. and persuaded them to make way for a newly elected
Commons. Finally Monck negotiated for the return of Charles II. out-
maneuvering Parliamentary attempts to impose Specific terms upon the
King. Charles arrived in London in May, 1660. welcomed by delirious
crowds.1

The arrival of Charles signaled the end of the Civil War. the
beginning of the Restoration era. and more significantly, the end of
experimentation in England with liberty of conscience as an Option

to the tradition of mere toleration. How it happened that liberty of

conscience did not endure as a matter of policy in England is something

 

1Maurice Ashley, Great Britain _t_9_ 1688 (Ann Arbor. 1961). I
have used this essay as a guide to affairs in England during the Re-
storation. Many other works cited in the notes to this chapter cover
the same events and may be compared with Ashley's views. Hereafter
it will be cited as Ashley. Britain. The material referred to in this
note may be found on p. 368 ff.

 

140

141

requiring explanation. Noteworthy also is the fact that the failure

of liberty of conscience as a policy Option brought about renewed
persecution and. finally. the Toleration Act of 1689. In a broader per-
Spective. Restoration policy concerning the rights of conscience assured
a divergence in attitude between England and her American colonies on
the question of liberty of conscience. The extent and meaning of this
divergence will be evident in subsequent chapters.

The fate of liberty of conscience during the Restoration era
depended upon the character of the settlement that brought Charles II
back to England. For a decade after his father's death. Charles plotted
ways to regain his throne, but he had no money and few friends. There
was irony in the fact that all his plotting failed, only to be supplanted
by an invitation to return. That he was invited to return. however.
colored the nature of the subsequent settlement. As a condition of
his return Charles agreed to publish a declaration from Breda in Holland
stating that he would leave to a future parliament many important de-
cisions of policy and that he would grant liberty to tender consciences.
Charles issued his declaration and it was approved by the "convention"
parliament in April of 1660.2

That provision was made in the declaration for the problem of
tender consciences indicates that government representatives. as well
as Charles, recognized the critical nature of this issue in the public
mind. The fate of liberty of conscience must be assessed in the context

of the main problems that confronted the settlement of a government.

 

21bid.

142

Six problems were of major prOpertion: the future of the army. of
religion. and of finance. the settlement of landed prOperty. and return
to monarchical government. and the punishment of offenders against the
Stuart Kings.3 As for the military. it would have been dangerous to
retain a large standing army that had been so deeply involved in the
Cromwellian Republic. Apart from a unit or two that were retained.
later to be known as the Coldstream Guards. the army was paid off and
disbanded. Any settlement of the prOperty question was bound to create
enemies. Titles to much property had been disturbed by the Civil War.
some parcels had been sequestered while others had been conveyed under
Republican statutes. The settlement restored Crown lands and church
property. Recent studies indicate no revolutionary change in prOperty
ownership resulted from the Civil War. The question of punishment of
anti-royalists was covered by a general pardon excepting a few persons
such as General Harrison and Henry Vane. who were directly involved in
the execution of King Charles I. As for the constitution. statutes
assented to by Charles I. even under pressure. retained their validity.
In general. the status qug_of 1641 was reinstated. Finance was a com-
plex issue. The main point was. however. that Charles II was voted a
revenue of 1.2 million pounds. an amount that in time allowed him to
assume great independence of Parliament}+

In the resolution of these problems the normative principle
was "restoration.3'not revolution. This implied an end to constitutional
experimentation. The settlement sought to bridge the gap between the

earlier monarchy and that of Charles II.

 

3Ibid.

“Ibid.

143

Of the major problems that confronted the settlement of govern-
ment. none was more important for the question of liberty of conscience
than the religious question. This issue cannot. of course. be totally
separated from the others already mentioned. but it may be separated
for more detailed examination.

From the point of view of advocates of liberty of conscience
the religious climate of the Restoration era consisted of two moods:
hope and despair. During the first months it appeared that liberty
of conscience would be part of the religious settlement. Charles
himself declared from Breda "a liberty to tender consciences." This
declaration was approved by the "convention" parliament, the body
negotiating the return of Charles. Many London ministers viewed this
declaration as a signal that they. as Presbyterian ministers. would be
included in a comprehensive church settlement. Some ministers even
discussed the matter with Charles before he left Breda. Soon after
he arrived in London a number of ministers again talked over the church
question with him. distinguishing themselves from others who were dis-
turbers of the peace.5

In subsequent meetings the ministers pointed out Specific evils
that they found in the Church of England as it existed before 1640
and they offered remedies. Many of these. of course. had to do with
practices such as garb to be worn and elements of liturgy. Charles
declared his intention of calling an assembly of divines to settle the

questions before him. After numerous exchanges with dissenting ministers.

 

5The text of the declaration may be found in George Gould.
Documents Relating 32 the Settlement of the Church 2: England Iflliflfl
Agt_gf Uniformity gf'1665 (London. 1865). pp. 1-3. The pagination in
this volume is confusing because the introductory essay on Puritanism.
written by Peter Bayne. is also numbered in Arabic.

 

144

and with bishops as well. he decided that all parties were too conten-
tious to come to any resolution. In place of an assembly he decided
to make his own statement on the religious question. intending it to
serve until the time was appropriate for an assembly. In October.
therefore. he issued a statement on religious policy.6 Among many
other items it called for liberty of conscience. he reminding his
subjects again that this was the stand he had taken in the Breda dec-
laration.

Soon after Charles' declaration on the religious question the
London ministers wrote the King and thanked him for his understanding of
their interests. The mood of optimism continued among them as was evi-
dent in their reply. As for liberty of conscience they wrote.

The liberty of our consciences. and the free exercise

of our ministry in the work of our great Lord and

Master. for the conversion of souls. ought to be.

and are. more dear to us than all the profits and

preferments of this world; and therefore your maj-

esty's tenderness. manifest in these so high con-

cernments. doth wonderfully affect us. and raise

up our hearts to a high pitch of gratitude.

As the new year began. a fanatical group of Fifth Monarchists
staged a four-day uprising in London. precipitating a royal circum-
scription of private meetings. Numerous sects rushed letters to the
King explaining that they. as Quakers. Anabaptists. and Independents
had nothing to do with the radical sectarians. Meanwhile a number of
London Presbyterians mounted a concerted effort toward electing their

representatives to the House in the forthcoming elections. Royalists

 

61bid.. p. 104 ff.

71bid., p. 101 ff.

145

in the government were alarmed. their reaction being a measure of their
sensitivity, their apprehension. Neither the actions of fanatics nor
the election designs of London Presbyterians suggest that the degree of
optimism. so evident during the previous year. was still entertained
by dissenters.

A week after the London elections. however. a warrant was
issued for the long promised assembly of divines. It called for a
meeting in Savoy Palace and named an equal number of divines from each
of the two main divisions within the religious community. Anglicans
and Dissenters.8 The warrant was cordial and bolstered the hepes of
the dissenting community. The key to the success of this conference
however. rested not on what might be determined by it. but rather in
how or by whom it might be approved. The diSputants entered debate
with much energy. as the lengthy assembly documents atest. but it soon
became evident that recrimination was all that could be eXpected from
the conference.

Although the Savoy conference was charged with revising the
Book of Common Prayer. the Convocation was busy with its own revision
even before the Savoy conference ended. It had been evident from the
moment Charles returned that an episc0pal government would prevail.
but that in itself was not necessarily a bar to many Presbyterians.
By the time the Savoy conference ended, it was clear that the form
of episcopal government would be no different from that which had

existed in 1640. The work of Convocation. therefore. in revising

 

81bid., p. 107 ff.

146

Common Prayer went a long way toward creating a uniformity that would
be unacceptable to Presbyterians.9

Cause for optimism, cause for hope that dissenting parties
could or would be included in the religious settlement. vanished by the
summer of 1661. The problem of comprehension within the Church now
became a question of how dissenters would be treated outside of the
Church. The elections of 1661 created a Parliament that was hostile
to Puritans of all types. for it was a Parliament of Anglican and royal-
ist interests.10

The extent of royalist sentiment in the Parliament of 1661.
or Cavalier Parliament. was evident in the measures it passed. The
King was given supreme control over all the armed forces of land and
sea; he was given extraordinary power in a new treason law. Aided by
a new official. the Surveyor of Imprimery. he now had extensive power
over authors and printers. a measure aimed at limiting the ability of
citizens to petition him. Parliament also passed the Corporation Act.
which was designed to limit the membership in corporations to Anglicans

and loyal royalists.11

These measures were followed by the Act of Uniformity.12
It provided that everyone who held any ecclesiastical office prior to
St. Bartholomew's Day. 1662. had to. on that day. read the morning and

evening prayers. and then in public before the congregation declare his

assent to everything contained in and prescribed by the Book of Common

 

9A

10Ibid.

11Ibid.

121bid.3 for text see Gould. Documents. p. 386 ff.

shley. Britain. p. 368 ff.

14?

Prayer. In addition, the Solemn league and Convenant had to be renounced.
Moreover, after that day only those who had received epiSCOpal ordination
in the Church of England could officiate in it. The Act covered tutors
and schoolmasters as well as parish ministers. Innumerable possible
offences were mentioned in the Act, breaches being covered by explicit
penalties.

HOpe of liberty of conscience was utterly and brutally extin-
guished in the Provisions of the Act of Uniformity. at least it was for
dissenting ministers. As St. Bartholomew's Day approached in 1662.
thousands of ministers had to make a decision whether they would abide
by the provisions of the Act. Some two thousand could not. They chose
to be cut off from the Church of England rather than submit to its pro-
visions. This event is known to history as the Great Ejection. Some
ejected ministers found refuge in the homes of wealthy friends: others
turned to different vocations to support themselves and their families:
still others migrated.13

Though the Corporation Act struck at Puritans in business. while
the Act of Uniformity disabled dissenting ministers. little had been
done to curtail the religious privileges of the average citizen. until
the Conventicle Act of 1664.14 This act struck at the mass of dissenting
brethren in the churches. Its main feature provided penalties for anyone
caught at a religious meeting not conducted according to the liturgy of

the Church of England, provided he was at least sixteen years of age.

 

13A. G. Matthews. Calamnyevised (Oxford. 1934). The intro-
duction to this essay gives a full account of the Ejection. It is a
valuable tool for the study of the effect of the Settlement upon dis-
senters, being a modern study of a contemporary review of the problem.

14

 

Ashley. Britain, p. 368 ff.

148

The penalties consisted of fines for the first two offences. thereafter.
seven years in certain American colonies. A year later. in 1665, still
another measure was passed to harass dissenters. it being the Five Mile
Act which prevented ministers and teachers from approaching within five
miles of any place where they had formerly been employed.15

It is important to note that these measures against dissenters
were passed and enforced by Parliament. Civil officers, and on occasion
the militia, were used to enforce them. During the early years of the
Restoration. enforcement was pursued with vigor; in the 1670's and 1680's
they were enforced fitfully. according to the whims of eXpedient govern-
ment officials. Churchmen. of course. had a stake in the program of
harassment of dissenters. but once the latter had been effectively ex-
cluded from the church. Church leaders were free of the disruptive
element.

As for Charles' role in the suppression of dissenters. historians
differ. One view is eXpressed in the following estimate of him:

The King himself was not a fanatic. A dark man with

a large nose. over six feet tall. he had been a good-

looking boy, but had grown into a rather ugly. if

strangely attractive, man. He was a dilettante. in-

clined to be lazy but capable of bursts of energy.

Good-looking women and entertaining rogues gave him

pleasure. but scarcely influenced his policies. If

he had any principles, they weriéto maintain his

throne and his dynasty in tact.
Another historian states, "For these severities. little. if any. blame

can be attached to Charles himself."17 Charles' repeated statement that

 

15$§1§.. and for text see Gould. Documents. p. 488 ff.

16Ashley. Britain. pp. 373-374.

17C. R. Cragg. From Puritanism tg_the Age gf_Reason (Cambridge.
1966) 9 PO 2210

 

149

he believed in liberty of conscience may. of course be viewed cynically.
his statements being eXplained as a matter of expedient policy. A case
might be made. however. for the claim that Charles was forced to acquiesce
in the matter of liberty and toleration if he wished to maintain any
support in Parliament. Charles' attitude toward liberty of conscience
will be examined more fully in the subsequent discussion of the growth

of liberty of conscience in the American Colonies.

The character of the Restoration religious settlement was. thus,
largely the work of the Cavalier Parliament. Before it came to power
in the summer of 1661, advocates of liberty of conscience had reason
to believe that they would enjoy this liberty as a right mandated by
the Restoration government. Their belief was based upon the fact that
the "convention" parliament was conciliatory. and upon the declarations
of the King himself. This hope was short-lived, for soon after it con-
vened. the Cavalier Parliament enacted numerous severe measures. These
measures not only precluded the recognition of the rights of conscience.
they called for a vigorous campaign of repression of dissent. While
some seats of this Parliament were changed through byu-elections. it
remained in tact and in power for nineteen years. The Cavalier Parlia-
ment. thus. dominated the character of the religious climate in England
for the greater part of the Restoration era.

The various measures of Parliament effectively excluded dis-
senters from the Church of England, from corporations. and other
positions of privilege. These measures did not. however, completely
silence the advocacy of liberty of conscience. Throughout the Restora-
tion era in England there were always peOple advocating and defending

the need for liberty of conscience.

150

As the Restoration began, for example. John Milton continued
his defense of liberty, something he had done early in the Civil War.
In 1659 he wrote a tract on the power of government in ecclesiastical
affairs in which he argued vigorously for the cause of sphere sovereignty.
He called upon the whole history of state churches as evidence of the
cause of the problems that plagued England. He stressed the evil of
enslavement of the individual soul by clergy aligned with the power
of the state. Heresy was one of the keys in the chain that bound men's
consciences. Milton could find no clear meaning for this word heresy
in the Greek language from which it came: to him it meant only that
men differed in Opinions. Milton placed conscience in the center of his
argument against heresy:

Seeing . . . that no man. no synod. no session of

men. though called the Church. can judge defini-

tively the sense of scripture to another man's

conscience, which is well known to be a general

maxim of the Protestant religion. it follows

plainly. that he who holds in religion that be-

lief or those Opinions which to his conscience

and utmost understanding appear with most evi-

dence or probability in the scripture. though

to others seem erroneous. can no more be justly

censured. for a heretic than his censures; who

do but the same thing themgelves while they
censure him for so doing.

More positively. he wrote that Protestants "granted rule of every
man's conscience to himself." that is. conscience was at liberty in

19

relation to all other men.

 

18

John Milton. Treatise 2f_Civil Power. Works (London. 1659).
P0 3110

 

1911618.

151

Another example of the defense of liberty of conscience in the
early days of the Restoration was the noted political phiIOSOpher.
James Harrington. Harrington's most famous work Oceana had been
published in 1656 and was dedicated to Oliver-Cromwell.20 This work
outlined in detail many items of government that were to find embodi-
ment in the American system of government. such as. rotation of offices.
secret ballots, and government based upon a written instrument. Oceana
defended religious liberty based upon liberty of conscience. but with
the passing of Cromwell in 1658 and the changing political climate of
1659, Harrington wrote numerous additional tracts on facets of govern-
ment all of which gave a prominent role to liberty of conscience.
Harrington's persistence as a republican and defender of liberty of
conscience led to his imprisonment in 1661.

He defined liberty of conscience as that condition of society
in which "a man according to the dictates of his own conscience may
have the free exercise of his religion" without regard to his place
or station in relation to government.21 He linked liberty of con-
science to civil liberty. "without liberty of conscience. civil liberty
cannot be perfect: and without civil liberty, liberty of conscience

22

cannot be perfect." A good government is one that will create a

climate in which its citizens are able "to make use of their liberty of

23

conscience." Harrington's works. like Milton's.were read and quoted

much in the years of the Restoration and after.

 

20James Harrington. The Commonwealth 2f Oceana (London. 1656).

 

21James Harrington. A System of Politics (London. 1700),
pp. 505-506.
22

James Harrington. Valerius and Publicola (London. 1659), p. 489.

 

23James Harrington. Humble Petition, Works (London. 1659). p. 544.

 

152

Another eloquent and influential defender of liberty of con-
science during the Restoration was John Owen. During the Civil War.
Owen had been friend and confidant of Cromwell, a leading Spokesman
for the so-called independents, and a leader in the Oxford community.
The effect of the Restoration on Owen and his work is interesting be-
cause it is representative of how a limited number of dissenting
ministers handled themselves during the period.a number who were so
well-known and so close to the center of power that they received
Special. though not always kind. treatment.

While at Oxford it had been Owen's habit to preach often in
the village of Stadham, the place of his birth, and as the Restoration
began he went there, heping to be left to his scholarly work. With
the Act of Uniformity and other measures it became necessary for him
to give up preaching to the small congregation in Stadham. Owen
sought an interview with Sir Edward Hyde, the Lord Chancellor. in the
hope of easing the severity of the policies against dissenters. Hyde
insisted that Owen refrain from preaching. but at the same time he
asked Owen to write against Roman Catholicism. Hyde's motives seemed
obvious. He could use the considerable talent of Owen in a most
important area and therein hOpe to divert his attention from the dis-

senting cause.2

 

2“To my knowledge there has not been a modern study of John

Owen. though the works of numerous scholars point to the fact that he
was an important figure in seventeenth-century English life. His
writings were published as Thg_Works 2f John Owen (Edinburgh. 1850-53),
ed.. Wm. H. Goold. and reprinted by the Banner of Truth Trust, London,
beginning in 1965. Various aspects of his career cited in the text
are taken from the one hundred twenty—two page introduction to his
works. hereafter cited as Owen Works. For Owen's relationship to
Hyde see p. lxviii ff. [Yol. {j

153

Owen continued to preach in small secret gatherings, and in time
he began to write the treatise suggested by Sir Edward Hyde. Owen's
target was a work written by the Franciscan John Vincent Cane on the
subject of the differences between Catholics and Protestants. The
thrust of Cane's message was that peace could come among Christians
only at such time as they all joined the Church of Rome though the
message was more subtlely stated. Owen described the author as having
the voice of Jacob and the hands of Esau. Owen's critique ellicited a
rejoinder and that in turn was answered by Owen.25

Owen's refutation of the Franciscan's works received wide
attention. Sir Edward Hyde in an interview with Owen offered the Opinion
that Owen had done more for the cause of Protestantism than any other
man in England, but Hyde could not understand how such a talented man
could be missled by the notion of independency.26 Hyde suggested that
Owen could hold a high office in the Church if he gave up his odd
Opinions about church government. Owen argued that the congregation
was the basic unit described in the New Testament and the pattern fol-
lowed by the early church, but he was not able to gain support for this
view from the Lord Chancellor.

Soon after these exchanges with Hyde, probably in early 1664,
John Owen was invited to serve as pastor in John Cotton's old pulpit
in Boston, New England. What response Owen gave to this invitation is

not entirely clear except that he did not go to New England. One writer

 

251bid., p. lxxix ff.

Zélbid.

15“

has it that he desired to go, but was stOpped by an order of the court.27

Another writer states that he was unwilling to leave the cause of dis-
senters at home, resolving to wait for happier days.28

Owen's activities during the next three years suggest that had
he gone to New England, his auditors there would have been diSpleased
with his view of the dissenting cause. Upon hearing how the New
Englanders treated dissenters, Owen joined other leading dissenters
in EngLand and wrote them a letter of rebuke. It requested the following:

That you will trust God with his truth and ways,

so far as to suspend all rigorous proceedings in

corporeal restraints or punishments on persons

that dissent from you, and practice principles

of their dissent without danger or disturbance to

the civil peace of the place.29
This was written at the same time that Owen was writing a number of
tracts on the subject of liberty, items that would have been distasteful
to New Englanders. One tract was on the "Grounds and Reasons on which
the Protestant Dissenters Desire their Liberty." Another was a "Humble
Plea for Liberty of Conscience."30

Meanwhile the Great Plague, followed in 1666 by the great London
fire, diverted the attention of the government and churchmen; thus, the
lot of dissenters was eased. The fall of Sir Edward Hyde's government
the following year further complicated the religious climate. Some church

leaders, such as BishOp Wilkins of Chester, saw this as an occasion to

enlarge toleration,and thus,quiet the strife that had engulfed society

 

27Ibid.

28Ibid.

29Ibid., p. lxxxvii.

’%
’OIbid.. These items are collected in Volume XIII, beginning on

 

P0 5760

155

for NOSt 0f 'the decade° Though this plan was endorsed by prominent

churchmen, such as Tillotson and Stillingfleet, it was violently Opposed
by others. Supporters of suppression were forced to defend their posi-

tion,and their view appeared in a tract by Samuel Parker.

The dispute among Anglican churchmen is interesting because it
shows support among them for the cause of dissent. More important,
however, is the work written kw Parker, for it stated clearly the
rational with which dissenters,such as Owen,had to contend. Parker's
title-page summed up very adequately what could be found in the text.

The short-title was "Discourse of Etclesiastical Polity, and of the Power

"31

of the Magistrate in Matters of Religion. The longer title included
the following, "the authority of the civil magistrate over the con-
sciences Of subjects in matters of external religion is asserted, the
mischief and inconveniences of toleration are represented, and all
pretences pleaded in favor of liberty of conscience are fully answered."32

John Owen replied in his Truth and Innocence Vindicated. Like
Parker's work, Owen's full title stated the thrust of his purpose;

A Survey of a Discourse Concerning Ecclesiastical

Polity, and the Authority of the Civil Magistrate

Over the Consciences of Subjects in Matters of

Religion.33
This is Owen's most comprehensive work on liberty of conscience, it
covering two hundred pages in fine print. It states clearly and fully

the case for liberty of conscience in terms of Sphere sovereignty, and,

thus, it marks Owen as a leading apologist.

 

31Ibid., JXIII, p. 343, ibre begins Owen's tract against Parker,
including a description of Parker's work.

32Ibid.

33Ibido

156

Since the document is a line by line refutation of Parker's
Discourse, it will suffice to indicate only briefly some Of the main
points made by Owen. He began the essay by pointing out the basic
problem that confronts anyone who decides to enter a debate about
liberty of conscience, namely, that if one really believes that liberty
of conscience is "the direct will and command of God," there is no
point to the debate.34 If the matter is to be debated at all, there-
fore, it can proceed only upon a supposition. In Owen's words, "Among
the many disadvantages which those who plead in any sense for liberty
of conscience are eXposed unto, is not the least that . . . they are
enforced to admit a supposition."35 This was an important point, for
it Opened the door to a more adequate distinction between the question
of the right of liberty of conscience and the question of the limits
of liberty.

Owen immediately reinforced his contention that professors of
liberty of conscience really had nothing to debate by observing that
"men, therefore, in such discourses, Speak not to the nature Of the
things themselves, but to the apprehensions of them" by their Opponents.36
In other words, in the essay he was beginning, he was not questioning
the existence of liberty of conscience, only the manner in which Parker
understood it. Making this distinction, Owen's argument was much more

forceful.

 

34Ibid., p. 345.

35Ibid.

36Ibid°

157

Having stated the grounds on which he intended to stand as he
examined Parker's treatise, Owen went on to review Parker's introduction.
It made bold and raucous claims, said Owen, claims which the text of
the treatise did not support nor prove. As for liberty of conscience,
Parker said that he demonstrated the "inconsistence of liberty Of con-
science with the first and fundamental laws of government."37 Said
Owen of this,

I am content that he please himself with his own

apprehensions, like him who admired at the mar—

velOus feats performed in an empty theatre ...

there is scarce in his whole discourse any one

argument Offered that hath the least seeming

cogency towards such an end.3
Further, said Owen, "whether you take 'liberty of conscience' for
liberty of judgment, which himself confesseth uncontrolable, or liberty
of practice" which he opposes, you will not even find his conclusion,
much less his premise.39

Turning from Parker's form of argument, Owen examined his con-
tention that men could not live peacefully if they enjoyed "the liberty
of their consciences." That they could, was demonstrated in several
states on the Continent, in Owen's view. Finally he mentioned Parker's
position that it was erroneous to believe that "'liberty of conscience
would conduce much to the improvement of trade in the nation.'"uO

Many peOple who were deeply involved in the economic affairs Of the

nation supported the contention that liberty of conscience was helpful

 

37Ibid., p. 366.

38Ibid.

391b1d.

uolbid., p. 367.

158

to trade,said Owen, and he was willing to take their word for it rather
than that of Parker.

In short, Owen's review of Parker's introduction demonstrates
Owen's belief that Parker did not approach the central issue in the
problem, that is, whether liberty of conscience was a right; moreover,
the objections that Parker did in fact raise were on shaky ground.
Owen's review also indicates his own view of liberty of conscience
and something Of the tenacity with which he held it.

The main body of Owen's treatise reflects other' aspects of his
view of liberty of conscience. As for the source of authority for
conscience, "The power Of God over the consciences of men I suppose
is acknowledged by all who own any such thing as conscience, or believe
there is a God over all."u1 More Specifically, there is "government of
the consciences of men . . . and that in subjection to and dependence
on Christ alone." 'Conscience, therefore,

. t.‘ .- is the practical judgment that men make

of themselves and of their actions, or what they are

to do and what they are not to do, what they have

done or what they have omitted, with reference unto

the judgment of God, at present declared in their

own hearts and his word, and to be fully executed

at the last day . . . . ”2

As Owen stressed the positive aSpect of the meaning of liberty
of conscience, he also stated its relationship to the nature and duties

of government. The business of government and its magistrates was

distinct from other aspects of human experience, he Often repeated in

 

ulIbid” p. #40.

“21mm.

159

this treatise. Typically he spoke of magistrates who "kept themselves
to their prOper sphere" as princes who thereby made themselves "dear

to mankind."43

The end Of government was "the preservation of public
peace and tranquillity in the world." God "who is the fountain and orig-
inal of all power hath both assigned its government's prOper end, and
fully suited it to the attainment thereof." The problems that plagued
English society did not stem from anything else than the clamor of
greedy men, said Owen. If they could be silent, "we should quickly
hear the harmonious consenting voice of human nature itself declaring
the just prOportion that is between the grant of power and its end."

These Observations on the SCOpe and purpose of government were
made in an attempt to refute Parker's claim concerning the magistrate
that "'religion is subject of his dominion, as well as all other affairs
of state.'" They show that Owen believed in the integrity of the in-
dividual and in the liberty of his conscience, that this liberty was
part Of a general ordering of creation that included the political state.
The grant of power to the state was for a Specific end, that is, pre-
serving the peace and tranquillity of society. The state had no author-
ity over conscience, and it had no authority over the church. The latter
point Owen Often made in this essay.

Parker's claim that government had authority over religion led
to serious distortions in the affairs of religion, said Owen. Parker's
scheme led to the establishment of the magistrate on an equal footing

with the Lord Of the church. In Owen's words,

 

“3mm. , p. 498.

ualbid.. p. #92.

160

The authority ascribed to the civil magistrate being

as hath been expressed, it will be very hard for any

one to distinguish between it and the sovereignty

that the Lord Christ himself hath in and over the

church; yea, if there be any advantage on either

side, or a comparative preeminence, it will be

found to be cast upon that of the magistrate.
For Owen, the matter of worship, the nature of gathered groups Of
believers, is a matter that is distinct from the affairs of the state,
a matter under the direct authority of Christ.

Owen's Truth and Innocence Vindicated was a smashing success.
It drew from Parker a reply as vindictive as any piece written in that
age of venomous rhetoric. Owen was "the great bell-wether of disturb-
ance and sedition," a person "who would have vied with Mahomet himself
both for boldness and imposture," and "a viper so swollen with venom
that it must either burst or spit its poison." Parker suggested that
his true countrymen could do no better service to it "than by beating
down the interest and reputation of such sons of Belial."46

A measure of Owen's success and a clue to how a dissenter of his
stature was treated during the Restoration may also be found in the affect
that his exchanges with Parker had on other writers. A friend of Milton's,
Andrew Marvell, reviewed Parker's work in his Rehearsal Transposed.
Said Marvell of Parker,

If he chance but to sneeze, he prays that the founda-

tions of the earth be not shaken. Ever since he crept

up to be but the weather-cock Of a steeple, he trembles

and cracks at every puff of wind that blows about him,
as if the Church of England were falling.“7

“51b1d., p. 377.

“61311-510. I, P. lXXXiXo

47Ibid.

161

One student Of Marvell reports that even the royal court joined the
laughter generated by Marvell's witty critique Of Parker and his writ-
ings.

Even after his essay on the power of magistrates Owen continued
to enjoy interviews with the King, always pressing the cause Of dis-
senters. Through the efforts of Sir John Trevor, a principal secretary
of state, Owen was invited to meet with the King and his brother, the
Duke of York, at Turnbridge Wells.“8 Liberty for dissenters was ex-
tensively discussed, and the King expressed his wish that they could be
relieved of their strictures. Subsequent to this meeting Owen met with
the King often in London, and on occasion the King gave Owen money to
help relieve the sufferings of poor dissenters.)+9 These meetings with
the King occurred during the months prior to the Declaration of Indulgence
of 1672 though it is not clear that Owen had any direct influence on the
policy. Owen's efforts did not go unnoticed among his enemies. Said one,

Witness his fishing out the king's counsels, and

inquiring whether things went well to his great

Diana, liberty of conscience? how his majesty

stood affected to it? whether he would connive

at it and the execution of the laws against it?

who were Or could be made his friends at court?

what bills were like to be put to Parliament?50

Owen lived until 1683, dying in August on St. Bartholomew's
Day, the anniversary of the ejection of so many of his dissenting
brethren. Though he continued his public career until his last days,

he spent much of his time writing numerous tracts and treatises. Some

of these were published after his death and among them were several on

 

“81b1d., p. xci.

uglbid.

50Ibid., xcii.

162

liberty of conscience. Owen, thus, continued his defense of liberty of
conscience to the end of his life.

The impact of the work Of men like Owen on behalf of liberty of
conscience during the Restoration is difficult to measure with precision.
Owen's dispute with Parker, his other tracts, and his frequent discussions
with King Charles undoubtedly left their mark. At the same time, it was
Obvious that the character of the religious settlement and the enforce-
ment of it depended upon the whims Of the Cavalier Parliament and the
relationship between it and the Crown.

While it is noteworthy that defenders of liberty of conscience
continued to speak and write deSpite the repressive climate Of the Re-
storation, the value of their work rests also in the fact that it con-
tributed to the solution of the problem of dissent in the Glorious
Revolution. Not that the claim of liberty of conscience triumphed in
the Revolution, rather, it reinforced the movement in favor of a more
liberal toleration of dissent.

The Toleration Act of 1689 embodied the provisions Parliament

51

was willing to extend to dissenters. It was not generous, but it did
give legal standing to a variety of dissenters. The old persecuting
acts were not removed by it; they were merely suSpended in certain

cases. Non-conforming parties could worship in separate places pro-
vided they secured a license for it and left the doors Open when meeting.
The document itself ran to some five thousand words, an indication of

the Spirit in which it was written, an indication of the assumption that

the limits Of toleration must necessarily be defined in great detail.

 

51G. R. Cragg, Puritanism lg the Period 2: the Great Perse-
cution (Cambridge, 1957;, p. 248 ff., for the text of the Act see Gould,
Documents, p. 507 ff.

 

163

This measure helped to stablize the political and religious
climate during the years following the Restoration era, but as one
student of the problem has said, it also helped to relegate dissenters
to the backwaters of English society.52 The measure removed none of
disadvantages that accrued to the non-membersof the Church of England;
as under the Restoration they were almost entirely excluded from posi-
tions of responsibility and trust, and their sons still could not
attend the universities. They might be able to worship God as they
pleased, but it was difficult to serve the king.

In terms of the contest between liberty of conscience and
toleration in England, the Toleration Act ended the diSpute. Liberty
of conscience as a step—child of the Reformation came to life in England
during the Age of Elizabeth under the leadership Of the Cambridge
Puritan Brotherhood. It grew under their care and feeding and became
increasingly a staple in the storehouse of ideas preached during the
first half Of the seventeenth century. As the Civil War began, the
claim for liberty Of conscience nourished so long by so many, came to
the center of the debate on church and state. It even became a basic
prOp in the state governed by Oliver Cromwell. With the coming of the
Restoration the fate of liberty of conscience was not at once clear,
for Charles himself was one of its advocates. Amidst the rapid rise
of Restoration sentiment and under the hand of the Cavalier Parliament
a religious settlement emerged that was hostile to the claim of liberty
of conscience. A few eloquent, and surely courageous, souls continued
to press for liberty of conscience despite the hostile climate of the

Restoration era.

 

521bid., p. 251.

164

AS for toleration, it had always been the policy of English
governments, its roots being somewhere in the deep past. Its Signifi-
cance in England dates from the beginning of the Age of Elizabeth, for
she was the one who held out the prospect of a true reformation of the
English Church. Queen Elizabeth formulated a policy of toleration that
went beyond mere personal whim, and therein set the pattern for her suc-
cessors. She did not, however, elevate her policy to the level of formal
statement or statute. Subsequently the degree of toleration could vary
with the needs and personal wishes of the monarch or his government,
and it did. James I talked Of toleration and even liberty, but behaved
in a ‘vacillating way. Charles I, lead by the designs of BiShOp laud,
tolerated little in the way of dissent. The harshness of his stance
was a contributing factor in the cause of the Civil War. Of course,
there were advocates of toleration in the Civil War, but in this era
they had to compete with the Open claim of liberty of conscience. Since
the return of the monarchy was a conscious attempt to restore the Old
order, toleration was prominent in the settlement, not withstanding
the efforts of Charles himself. The attitude toward dissent on the part
Of the government during the Restoration was as harsh as it had been at
any time in a century.

Theoretically, it could be argued, there was still a chance
that liberty of conscience could supplant mere toleration as the Glorious
Revolution began in 1688. In fact, that was not possible, for the case
for liberty Of conscience had been presented during the Civil War, and
when it was rejected in the first months of the Restoration, it found

new life in the colonies of America. A few advocates of it remained,

165

fewer still were willing to press the claim Of liberty of conscience as
a right in the unhospitable climate of the Restoration. Thus, as the
Revolution came in 1688, the only hOpe for the problem of dissent in
England rested in a formal recognition of a moderate policy of tolera-
tion, and that happened in the Toleration Act of 1689. This measure
regulated the problem of dissent in England until the era of reform

in the 1830's. Advocates of liberty of conscience, therefore, had to

look elsewhere for a climate congenial to their argument.

CHAPTER VI
THE ACCEPTANCE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA: 1630-1770

The conflict between the ideas of toleration and liberty of con-
science in Old England, a conflict that was resolved in the Toleration
Act of 1689, Spilled over into the English colonies in America, but with
a different result. In America the claim of liberty of conscience became
an important element in thought and practice among the earliest settlers,
the idea gaining support until it was set forth as a fundamental principle
in the constitutional fabric of the American Revolution. In short, lib-

erty of conscience triumphed in America, while it failed in England.

In a broad perSpective, the most important phase in the history
of liberty of conscience in America encompasses the two decades (1770-
1790) covering the American Revolution, for during this period the new
states all provided for liberty of conscience in their constitutions,
the same protection appearing in the new Federal Constitution. These
events all appear as a decisive, and even dramatic, move to insure a
guarantee of liberty of conscience in the new nation. They will, thus,

be examined together in the following chapter.

In turning to an examination of the evidence of liberty of con-
science during the period 1630-1770, it is clear that interest in con-
science and its liberty appeared early and spread throughout most of the
colonies by the end of the seventeenth century, Massachusetts Bay Colony
being the major exception. It is also clear that as the seventeenth

century came to a close, liberty of conscience, together with its

166

16?

parallel concept of Sphere sovereignty, was a part of an emerging
American political ideology. From the perspective of the triumph Of
liberty of conscience at the time Of the Revolution, it will be useful
to view the early arrival and Spread of liberty of conscience as one
phase of the develOpment of the idea in America, thereafter examining
the relationship of it to the emerging political ideology. The evidence
also lends itself to this distinction, for during the period 1630-1689
the outstanding expressions of devotion to the cause of conscience and
its liberty appeared in local laws and more importantly, in charters.
Many individuals, of course, Spoke for the cause, too. By the end of
the century, however, eXpressions concerning conscience and sovereignty
were made in the context of political issues, such as the question of
state authority over churches and over individuals.

The discussion of liberty of conscience in pro-Revolutionary
America will, thus, be divided into two phases. First, the period
1630-1689 will be examined with Special attention given to individual
and institutional SXpressions of the idea. Following this, the period
1689-1770 will be surveyed, attention being given to the relationship

between liberty of conscience and the emerging political ideology.

A. Liberty of Conscience in the American Colonies: 1630-1689

An earlier chapter outlined the fate Of liberty of conscience
in the Massachusetts Bay Colony.1 Massachusetts Bay leaders resisted
and denied the claim of liberty of conscience relying on Amesian ortho-

doxy for their arguments. These leaders had been challenged by

 

lsupra, Chapter III.

168

Roger Williams and laten,Anne Hutchinson, both of whom claimed that
conscience was at liberty in relation to other men and institutions.

While the Massachusetts Bay position on liberty of conscience
was reviewed in some detail, little was said about the views of others
outside of that colony. In fact, liberty of conscience Spread rapidly
throughout the other colonies during the years that it was being resisted
in Massachusetts Bay. Winthrop himself was aware of this and recorded
his impression in his Journal for December, 1638. He wrote:

At Providence, also, the devil was not idle. For

whereas, at their first coming thither, Mr. Williams

and the rest did make an order, that no man should be

molested for his conscience . . . . (concerning the

censure of a person for his attitude toward the role

of women in the churches). In conclusion, when they

would have censured Verin, Arnold told them, that it

was against their own order, for Verin did that which

he did out of conscience; and their order was that

no man should be censured for his conscience.é
later he wrote, "Many books [area coming out Of England, some in defense
of anabaptism and other errors, and for liberty of conscience as a
shelter for their toleration."3 In l6h8 WinthrOp reported on the visit
of a pastor, Mr. Haryson, from Virginia, who told him that his congrega-
tion had grown to over one hundred members and that Governor Berkeley
was harassing them. Haryson inquired whether Winthrop thought they
should leave Virginia. He told Winthrop that they could go to the
Bahama Islands where one, William Sayle, planned a colony, having been
granted a charter by Parliament. WinthrOp advised him not to go and

commented on the provisions Of the charter for the Bahamian colony:

 

2Winthrop, Journal, I, p. 28.

31b1d., II, p. 257.

169

The first article was for liberty of conscience, wherein
they provided, that the civil magistrate should not have
cognizance of any matter which concerned religion, but
every man might enjoy his own Opinion or religion, with-
out control or question, (nor was there any word of main-
taining or professing any religion or worship of God at
all) e o e o

Winthrop undoubtedly thought that the devil was at work in the islands
as well as in Providence. Closer to home, during the Dr. Child's affair,
Winthrop noted that in the search of the possessions of Child's asso-
ciates, Bay agents found a petition addressed to Parliament which pleaded
the need for "liberty of conscience, etc. . . . ." in the Bay Colony.5
There were other claims for liberty of conscience in the colonies
in addition to those WinthrOp commented on. The emergence of liberty of
conscience noted by him in Providence in 1638 was confirmed in a planta-
tion agreement written in the summer of l6h0. It said, ”We agree, as
formerly hath been the liberties Of the town, so still, to hold forth
liberty of conscience."6 The document was signed by thirty-nine peeple.
Rufus Jones, noted Quaker historian, rehearsed a diSpute between the
Dutch Governor of New York and the townSpSOple of Flushing, Long Island,
in his study of Quakers in the American colonies. He indicates that

liberty of conscience was central in the diSpute:

The inhabitants of Flushing were profoundly stirred
by this invasion of their liberties. They gathered in a
public meeting, expressed their disapproval of the acts
of persecution, and drew up a remonstrance which was signed
by thirty-one men and sent to the Governor . . . . The
remonstrance declared that the patent, or charter, of their
town 'grants liberty of conscience without modification,'
and that the signers intended to stand by their precious
rights 0 e o 07

1+ ,
Ibid., pp. 251-52. 51bid., p. 307.
6F. N. Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters, and Other Organic laws—(Washington, 19095, VI, pp. 3205-07;
hereafter cited as Thorpe, Constitutions.

7Rufus M. Jones, The Quakers lg the American Colonies (New York,
1966), P. 272.

 

170

The question of the rights Of conscience was basic in the early
settlement of Maryland, also. The Act Concerning Religion of 1649 is
often referred to by students of religious freedom, and it provides:

That no person or persons whatsoever within this province
. . . professing to believe in Jesus Christ, Shall from
henceforth be any ways troubled, molested or discounten-
anced for or in rOSpect of his or her religion nor in the
free exercise thereof . . . nor any way compelled to the
belief or exercise of any other religion against his or
her consent, so as they be not unfaithful to the Lord
PrOprietgry, or molest or conspire against the civil gov-
ernment.

This measure does not, however, state in eXplicit terms that settlers
would enjoy liberty of conscience. That the measure was intended for
that purpose was noted some thirty years later by the son of the Lord
PrOprietor, the Third Lord Baltimore. He said that his father had abso-
lute authority to take with him any who wished to settle in the patent,
but when it came time to go, few would consent unless he made provision
for liberty of conscience:
Many there were of this sort of peOple who declared their
willingness to go and plant in the province SO as they
might be at liberty . . . with their respective judgments
and consciences, without being subject to any penalties
whatever for their so doing, provided the civil peace was
preserved . . . . These were the conditions prOposed by
such as were willing to go and be the first planters of
this province, and without the complying with these con-
ditions, in all probability this province had never been
planted o o o 09
During the Civil war, support of liberty Of conscience emerged
’ in Parliament, and this was a valuable aid to the cause in the colonies.

As early as l6n3 Parliament recognized the rights of conscience as a

central issue that needed reforming. This was evident, for example,

 

:William H. Browne, ed., Archives gf_Ma£yland (Baltimore, 1883),
I, P. 24 0

9Quoted in George Petrie, Church and State in Early Maryland
(Baltimore, 1892), PP. 195‘960

 

171

in the document of December 23, entitled Considerations, which called
for the preservation of the rights of particular congregations.10
Those who could not for conscience sake conform to this and other pro-
visions were free from harassment. At the same time Parliament began

to grant patents with the eXpress provision for liberty of conscience.
Charles M. Andrews, in his exhaustive study of the colonies, mentions
such cases. Writes Andrews,

Some time before l6u5 certain people in Bermuda petitioned

Parliament for the privilege Of religious freedom and in

October, 16W5, the House of Lords ordered that they and

such others as should join them were to enjoy liberty of

their consciences in matters of God's worship without

molestation . . . 0
Another example of this practice is the one already mentioned by Winthr0p,
the one granted to William Sayle.

By the 1650's settlements in Maryland, New York, Providence, the
Bahamas, Bermuda, and perhaps elsewhere, claimed the right of liberty of
conscience as a fundamental article in their form of government. The
rise of Oliver Cromwell did not disturb this pattern, and as the Restor~
ation came, the colonies included many communities that had enjoyed
liberty of conscience for two decades and more.

As the character of the Restoration religious settlement unfolded
in England, undoubtedly many colonials expected a wave of repression to
engulf them. In fact that did not happen. Fitful efforts to force some
of the colonies to conform to the design of parliamentary religious

policy are a matter of record, but these efforts were only part of the

 

10Quoted by c. M. Andrews in The Colonial Period 9;; American
History (New Haven, 193Q, l96b), IV, p. 49b, note.

11

 

Ibid.

172

picture. During the years of the Restoration the most significant de-
velOpment in the area of colonial religious life was the rapid Spread
of the claim for liberty of conscience.

King Charles II aided in the preservation and extension of lib-
erty Of conscience in the colonies. Colonials, like their brethren in
England, read his statement made from Breda in which he affirmed "a
liberty to tender consciences." They also read his statement later that
year when he said his subjects would have "liberty Of tender consciences,
that no man shall be disquieted or called in question for differences of
Opinion in matters of religion, which do not disturb the public peace."
Like dissenters in England, colonials who defended liberty of conscience
had good reason to be encouraged during the months after Charles returned
to England.12

As the policy of Parliament began to unfold in late 1661, however,
the story of liberty Of conscience took a different pattern in the colo-
nies than it did in England. Despite parliamentary measures, such as
the Act of Uniformity, King Charles wrote Governor Berkeley in 1662 the
following message:

Because we are willing to give all possible encourage-

ment to persons Of different persuasion in matters of

religion to transport themselves thither with their

stocks; you are not to suffer any man to be molested

or disquieted in the exercise of his religion, so he

be content with a quiet and peaceable enjoying it,

not giving therein offense or scandal to the govern-

ment.13

In other words, Berkeley was instructed to include liberty Of conscience

as an article of government.

 

12supra, p. 11371.

13Jones, Quakers, p. 272.

173

Following Charles' letter to Berkeleyghis support for the cause
Of liberty of conscience in the colonies continued. The next year he
granted a new charter to Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, and
it included the following provision:

CharlesTheSecond....coco-......
.....OIOOOO0.00000000000000
That our royal will and pleasure is, that no person

within the said colony, at any time hereafter, Shall be

any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called into

question, for any difference in Opinion in any matters of

religion, and do not actually disturb the civil peace of

our said colony: but that all and every person and persons

may . . . at all times hereafter, freely and fully have

and enjoy his and their own judgments and consciences, in

matters of religious concernments4 through the tract of

land hereafter mentioned . . . .

In the same year Charles granted a charter to cover the colony
of Carolina. In it he made an interesting distinction concerning liberty.
After stating that at times people could not conform to the established
church, he gave the patentees "full and free license, liberty and author-
ity" to grant "such indulgencies and diSpensations" to their settlers
as they thought necessary to secure peace and quiet in the colony.15
He did not, thus, require liberty of conscience as a condition of the
charter. Two years later, however, the patentees published the Con-
cessions and Agreements of the Lord Pr0prietors of the Province of
Carolina: it included liberty of conscience as a fundamental right. No
person at any time was to be molested for differences in Opinion and
practice in religion: rather, all persons were to enjoy their liberty
in judgment and conscience. The patentees added to these provisions

the phrase, "custom Of this realm of England to the contrary hereof in

anywise notwithstanding," the phrase suggesting that they were aware

1“Thorpe, Constitutions, VI, p. 3211 ff.

 

1511». id" V. p. 2747.

17L»

that their practice was a departure from practice in England and
elsewhere.16

In 1665, the same year the patentees of Carolina issued their
Concession and Agreements, King Charles issued them a new charter, en-
larging the grant. Carolina's Charter of 1665 contained a verbatim
repetition of the clause on liberty of conscience used in the Rhode
Island charter of 1663.17

The practice of making liberty of conscience a fundamental article
in the patents granted during the first years of the Restoration contin-
ued throughout the rest of the seventeenth century, even in the more com-
plicated transactions dealing with the middle colonies. The New Jerseys
and Pennsylvania all provided for liberty of conscience, and they did
so at every stage of their legal development.

The Jersey colonies began their legal develOpment toward separate
entities in 166M when Charles granted his brother, Duke of York, the
territory encompassing New York and New Jersey. In a few months James
had arranged to convey the New Jersey portion of his grant to two friends,
lord John Berkeley and Sir George Carteret, "in as full and ample manner

as the same is granted to the Duke of York."18

For several decades the
meaning of this phrase was not clear and itclouded the legal development
of New Jersey. Meanwhile, Berkeley and Carteret published Concessions
and Agreements in an effort to attract settlers, the document being simi-
lar to that used by the Carolina settlers. It contained the same clause

used in Carolina and Rhode Island on liberty of conscience.19 As if

16229.0! P0 27570 1711,1110, Po 2771.
18

Ibid., p. 253a. 19Ibid.

175

aware that the title to the territory was in question, the PrOprietors
included an additional provision:

That no pretense may be taken by our heirs or assigns

for or by reason of our right of patronage and power

of advouson, granted by his majesty's Letter's Patents,

unto his Royal Highness James Duke of York, and by his

Royal Highness unto us, thereby to infringe the general
clause of liberty of conscience, aforementioned . . . .

20
From the beginning, thus, the New Jerseys were on the same ground as
Rhode Island and Carolina concerning liberty of conscience.

Soon after the Concessions and Agreement was published, New
Jersey SXperienced a steady influx of settlers, some from New England
who tended to reside in the northern part of the territory, and others,
largely Quakers, who settled in the southern part of New Jersey. While
there were undoubtedly many reasons why these people came into New
Jersey, many of them came because of the assurance provided by the Con-
cession, that they would be able to enjoy liberty of conscience.

New Jersey, however, was to become two separate colonies as a
result of Lord Berkeley's sale of his interest in 167M to two Quakers,
John Fenwick and Edward Byllinge. The separation occurred in 1676 through
conveyance by deed, Carteret becoming sole prOprietor Of what was called
East Jersey and a group of Quakers emerging as co-prOprietors of West
Jersey. The next year the prOprietors of West Jersey issued the Funda-
mental Laws of West Jersey as part of their Concessions and Agreement,
and it provided for liberty of conscience.21

At the time the Concession was issued, a dispute arose between

the claim of the prOprietors and Governor Andros of New York, the latter

 

20Ibid.

21Ibid.

176

claiming that he controlled New Jersey. This precluded the meeting of

a provincial assembly as provided for in the Concession. Such an assembly
met, however, in 1681, and one Of its first items of business was the
enactment of "fundamentals" which were to be inviolable in the province.
This document follows closely the form set down in the Concession of

1677- One student of constitutional history suggests that the laws of
1681 reflect numerous rights which the Whig party in England was strug-

22 As for liberty of conscience, the language of 1681

gling to secure.
guaranteeing it to the inhabitants of West Jersey was much more succinct
than it was in earlier expressions in New Jersey. The document of 1681
read, in Article Ten, "That liberty of conscience in matters of faith
and worship toward God Shall be granted to all people within the Pro-
vince aforesaid, who shall live peaceable and quietly therein . . . ."
East Jersey followed the same pattern two years later.23
The story of William Penn and the founding of the colony named
for his father is one always treated at length in colonial histories,
and religious liberty as a basic motive for the founding of the colony
receives prominent attention. The religious liberty provision in
colonial Pennsylvania was based upon Penn's belief in and devotion to
liberty of conscience. His Frame of Government of 1682, and the re-
vision Of it the next year, evidence this position.2’+ The Pennsylvania
Charter of Privileges of 1701, Penn's final restatement Of the basic

laws, also made provision for liberty of conscience. It is worth noting,

 

22E. P. Tanner, The Province 9; New Jersey, 1664:1738 (New York,
1908), p. 113 ff.

 

23Thorpe, Constitutions, V, p. 2565 ff.

ZQIREQp: PP- 3035-44-

177

not only as a matter of simple evidence, but also because it shows how
liberty of conscience fit into Penn's general philOSOphy Of political
and social institutions:

Because no PeOple can be truly happy, though under the
greatest Enjoyment of Civil Liberties, if abridged of

the Freedom of their Consciences, as to their Religious
Profession and Worship: And Almighty God being the only
Lord of Conscience. Father of Lights and Spirits; and the
Author as well as Object of all divine Knowledge, Faith

and Worship, who only doth enlighten the Minds, and per-
suade and convince the Understandings of People. I do
hereby grant and declare, That no Person or Persons, in-
habiting in this Province or Territories, who shall con-
fess and acknowledge One almighty God, the Creator, Upholder
and Ruler of the World: and profess him or themselves obliged
to live quietly under the Civil Government, shall be in any
Case molested or prejudiced, in his or their Person or Es-
tate, because of his or their conscientious Persuasion or
Practice, nor be compelled to frequent or maintain any
religious Worship, Place or Ministry, contrary to his

or their Mind, or to do or suffer any other Act or Thing,
contrary to their religious Persuasion.

Pennsylvania Operated under this Charter until 1776.

By 1689, or by 1701 if Penn's revised Charter be included, the
rights of conscience were established in the basic laws of most Of the
colonies. These institutional eXpressions of the rights of conscience
were significant, not only for the protection they afforded those who
lived under them during the colonial era, but also because these pro-
visions continued into the eighteenth century until the time when the
new states adopted new constitutions. These provisions provide con-
tinuous testimony to the cause Of conscience and its liberty from the
earliest days Of settlement until the time of the Revolution.

During the period 1630-1689 many individuals also expressed
their devotion to liberty Of conscience. Noted in an earlier chapter
were the views of Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson. The townsmen of

Providence individually Spoke for the cause of liberty of conscience

 

251pm" pp. 3076-81.

178

as they signed their new town charter in 1640. Later, as the Quakers
migrated to the middle colonies, and as they attempted to invade Massa-
chusetts Bay Colony, they argued for liberty Of conscience, a point that
has been documented in great detail by the Quaker historian, Rufus Jones.
Viewing the period 1630-1689 as a whole, it is obvious that lib-
erty of conscience in the American colonies was accepted as a basic
principle of institutional and social life by many peOple, the position
of Massachusetts Bay Colony being an obvious exception. Cognizant of
these develOpments, particularly of the provisions for liberty of con-
science in the Charters and other laws of the colonies, examination of
the problem of liberty of conscience during the period 1689-1770 may be

better understood.

B. Liberty, Sovereignty, and Revolutionary Ideology: 1689-1770

While the Charters and other legal provisions for liberty of
conscience continued throughout the rest of the colonial period, it
became apparent by 1689 that liberty Of conscience was increasingly
important in the formation of an emerging American political ideology.
This develOpment may be seen in two ways: in the day-tO-day discussions
Of interested persons, and in the writings of John Locke, who has long
been recognized as influential in the formation of American political
ideas. To maintain a prOper perSpective on these develOpments it will
be useful to focus on Locke first, thereafter noting the familiarity
with the ideas of liberty and sovereignty as they have been set forth

in this study.

179

Since the publication Of Carl Becker's Declaration gf_Independ-
£232 in 1922, there has been a sustained interest in the role of Locke
in the formation of American Revolutionary ideology.26 Becker laid to
rest the long-standing ideatmmt.Rousseau was the pre-eminent force
behind Revolutionary ideas; and at the same time he raised to Rousseau's
vacant seat the Englishman John Locke. In Speaking of Locke's influence
Becker said, "Jefferson OOpied Locke."27 Subsequently, writers such as
Bernard Bailyn, have modified Becker's view, suggesting that Lockean
ideas came to America earlier, and largely through the writings of English
Opposition authors in the early years Of the eighteenth century.28
Lawrence Leder in his recent study of liberty and authority during the
period 1689-1763, also recognized the influence of Locke. In Speaking
of the approaches to the problem of the origin and purpose of government
set forth by a variety Of colonial writers, he concluded that they
"ensconced Lockean theory firmly in the American mind."29 'Elsewhere
Leder speaks Of "the general enthusiasm for Lockean theory" among colon-
ials.30

Locke, thus, has long been recognized as a potent source of ideas

for the develOpment Of American political ideology, but the question Of

which Lockean ideas were important in America needs to be looked at in

 

26Carl Becker, The Declaration g£_lndependence (New York, 1922).

 

27Ibid.. p. 278.

28Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins 2f the American

Revolution (Cambridge, 1967).

 

29Lawrence Leder, Liberty and Authoripy: Early American Poli-
tipal Ideoloqul689-l763 (Chicago, 1968), p. 39: hereafter cited as
Ieder, Liberty.

BOItfl-dog Po “’2.

180

some detail. Locke has Often been pictured as fostering a natural

rights philosophy, and certain of his writings comment on this problem.31
Locke's Speculative views on the question of the state of nature prior
to the formation of societies has also been pointed out.32 Still other
writers have discussed his view of prOperty and its relationship to
government.33 There can be no doubt about the fact that these ideas
were current in America in the years after 1689; and there can be no
doubt about the fact that, in certain cases, the expressions in America
were gleaned from Locke.

Iocke, however, also had Specific views about liberty of con-
science and Sphere sovereignty though this has not Often been recognized.
What Locke said about these ideas deserves Special attention here because
his comments on them were echoed frequently in American political ideology
in the period after 1689.

Studies by AlanHeimert34 and Staughton Lynd35 both point out
that Iocke's I_._e't_t_e_r_- _o_r_1_ Toleration36 was a pOpular item in eighteenth-
century America, and odd though it may seem at first glance, this letter
is, in fact, a detailed comment on liberty and sovereignty in the tradi-

tion of Perkins and the Westminster Assembly. This essay was written

 

31Staughton Lynd, The Intellectual Origins of American Radical-
ism (New York, 1968), p. 20 ff.: hereafter cited as Lynd, Radicalism.

 

32 Leder, Libert . p. 37 ff.
33Lynd, Radicalism. p. 34 ff.

3“Alan Heimert, Religion and the American Mind: From the Great
Awakening 32 the Revolution (Cambridge, 1966), p. 17.

 

35Lynd, Radicalism. p. 27.

 

36Locke wrote four letters on toleration. The first one written
in 1688-1689. is by far the most famous one, going through dozens of
editions. The title of this letter varies. I have used John Locke,
‘A Letter Concerning Toleration, Patrick Romanell, ed., (New York, 1955);
hereafter cited as Locke, Letter.

181

a few months before its publication in 1689, the same year that the
Toleration Act passed into law. The appearance of Locke's letter and
the Act in the same year are purely a matter of coincidence. Locke's
use of this word in the letter makes it clear that he did not conceive
of it in the same way that it had been used for generations by govern-
mental Officials, the way that it was used in the Act. Locke used the
word toleration in the sense of Christian charity, a point that is
Obvious in the letter itself.

The letter was labeled with the word.toleration for the Simple
reason that someone had written to him to ask what his views were on
the subject, reference to this query being made in the first lines of
the letter.37 But Locke did not stOp with a passing comment on tolera-
tion as Christian charity: he took the occasion to illustrate what it
should be, also giving examples where it was absent. Subsequently he
went on to state his view Of liberty and sovereignty. That he lingered
over the problem of Christian charity is a clue to his view of how it
is that men ought to live together, of what conditions ought to pre-
vail if true liberty and sovereignty are to be possible.

As for Christian charity, he began discussing it with several
illustrations of situations in which it was absent. Said Locke, Christ-
ians may boast of tradition, as the Anglicans did; they may boast of
reforming zeal or Of orthodoxy, as some Puritans did: but these are
not the marks of the Christian or his church. These are marks of "men

striving for power and empire over one another."38 Locke had no

 

37Ibid., p. 13.

38Ibid.

182

objection to tradition EEE.§E’ yet if a man "be destitute Of charity,
meekness, and good will in general toward all mankind, even to those who
are not Christians, he is certainly yet Short of being a true Christian
himself."39 In this Locke sets the tone of what he means by toleration,
and he re-enforces his view by appeal to Scripture: "If the Gospel
and the apostles may be credited, no man can be a Christian without
charity, and without faith which works, not by force, but by love."40

To drive his point home, to make it clear that Christian charity

was "the chief characteristic mark of the true church,"1+1

Iocke gave an
example of a situation in which this Spirit was absent. "Now I appeal '
to the consciences of those who persecute, torment, destroy, and kill
other men upon pretense of religion, whether they do it out of friend-
ship and kindness towards them or no?"l+2 Locke will believe them when
he sees them treating their close friends with the same vigor. Perse-
cutors are lax, says Locke, for they wink at "whoredom, fraud, malice
and such like enormities, which according to the apostle manifestly
relish of heathenism."l+3 These, says Locke,

. . . are certainly more contrary to the glory of God,

to the purity of the church, and to the salvation of

souls, than any conscientious dissent from ecclesiastical

decisions, or separation from public worship, whilst ac-
companied with innocence of life.

 

Persecution of innocent dissent while obvious vices go unchecked is a

way to build a Christian church that to Locke "is altogether incredible."

 

3933.121.- ”OIpid. . p. 11+.
“Ibid. 42Ibid.

qubid. (Italics mine.)

uBIbid.

183

In contrast to this situation, Locke suggests how it is that
church leaders and magistrates should conduct themselves if they have
Christian charity, and follow the rule Of Scripture:

If, like the Captain of our salvation, they sincerely

desired the good Of souls, they would tread in the steps

and follow the perfect example Of that Prince of Peace,

who sent out His soldiers to the subduing of nations,

and gathering them into His Church, not armed with the

sword or other instruments of force, but prepared with

the Gospel of peace and with exemplary holiness of their

conversation. This was His method. 5
Further, Locke notes that the Prince of Peace could have provided that
the Gospel be Spread by force, rather than by persuasion; but if that
had been his intention, "we know very well that it was much more easy
for Him to do it with armies Of heavenly legions than for any son of
the church, however potent."46

Tbleration or Christian charity, for Locke is, thus, the chief
mark of the Christian. It is essential because the spread of the Gospel
and the salvation of souls depends upon it. This stance avoids force
and coercion in dealing with men; instead, it depends upon peace and
kindness, and persuasion by examples of holiness.

Christian charity was not, however, an end in itself for Locke;
rather, it was only one facet of Locke's belief that religion was the
"highest obligation that lies upon mankind."u7 Religion was the word
Locke used to describe how man as creature related to God as Creator:

Every man has an immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness

or misery, whose happiness depends upon his believing and

doing those things in this life which are necessary to the

obtaiging of God's favor, and are prescribed by God to that
end.

 

“5113.19... p. 16. ' ”6112.19.-

“792.251.. P. “6. “813%.

184

Believing that "there is nothing in this world that is of any
consideration in comparison with eternity,“ Iocke went on to say that
"the care of each man's salvation belongs only to himself."49 In this
context Locke's observation that no life lived "against the dictates pf

his ggnscience will ever bring him to the mansions of the blessed"50 is

 

most significant. Stated another way, if a person lives continuously
in violation of his conscience, he is sure to be damned. In this, Locke
places conscience at the center of religion, and, thus, at the center of
a person's life. In another passage of the letter he makes the same
point when he writes that religious Opinions belong "entirely to the
conscience of every particular man, for the conduct of which he is
accountable to God only."51 In other words, echoing the Westminster
Confession, God alone is lord Of the conscience and has made it free
from the doctrines and commandments Of men.
. Since religion is the "highest obligation" that lies on any

man and since the fulfillment of that Obligation is "entirely“ a matter
of conscience for which he is "accountable to God only," Locke appears
to promote the liberty and sovereignty of the individual. AS could be
eXpected, like other advocates of liberty of conscience before him,
Locke identifies other Spheres, particularly those of church and state,
and in the context Of liberty of conscience and Sphere sovereignty,
attempts to define their limits. Wrote locke,

I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish

exactly the business of civil government from that of

[Organized] religion, and to settle the ust bounds
that lie between the one and the other.5

 

49Ibid. _ 5°Ibid., p. 31+. (Italics mine.)

5113111., P0 58. (Italics mine.) 521ocke, Letter, P. 170

185

This was essential:

If this be not done, there can be no end put to the

controversies that will be always arising between those

that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side,

a concernment for the interest of men's souls and, on

the other side, a care for the commonwealth.55

Government is a separate sphere of jurisdiction, and the sc0pe
of its power covers the commonwealth, the latter being "a society of men
constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their
own civil interests." Civil interests consist of "life, liberty, health
. . . and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses,
furniture, and the like.”5u The Magistrate, as a creature of the civil
government, has a duty "by impartial execution of the laws, to secure
unto all the peOple in general, and to every one of his subjects in
particular, the just possession of these things belonging to this life."55
To this end the magistrate is armed.

Locke wants it understood that "the whole jurisdiction of the
magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments," that it does not
involve the salvation Of souls. Care of souls "is not committed unto
him, I say, by God, because it appears not that God has ever given such
authority to one man over another, as to compel anyone to his religion."56
From another angle, Locke argues that religion is a matter of "inward

persuasion of the mind . . . . And such is the nature of the understand-

ing that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward

 

force."57
53Ibid. 5“Ibid.
551bid. 56Ibid., p. 18.

57Ibid.

186

Next Locke discusses the character of the jurisdiction that
fell to organized religion, that is, the church. Unlike many earlier
writers, Locke saw the voluntary character of churches as a significant
aspect, as one that pointed to its limited jurisdiction. In his words,

A church, then, I take to be a voluntary society of men,

joining themselves together of their own accord in order

to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they

judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation

of their souls.58
If anyone Should wonder why it was a voluntary organization, Locke sug-
gested they consider alternative views. For example, if some one was
born into the church, they would hold their faith by tenure, inheriting
it from their parents. To Locke that would be absurd. The hope of
salvation, says Iocke, is the only reason to belong to a church.

The purpose of the church was public worship and the salvation
of souls, and, says Locke, it should be run according to the rules "as
the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in eXpress words,
..59

to be necessary to salvation. If churches conduct themselves in
this manner, Locke has no doubt that they would serve the needs of men.
Churches were after all made for men, not men for the churches. Locke
concludes his discussion of the character of jurisdiction that fell to
churches by stating that "nothing ought nor can be transacted in this
society relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods."6O
To the ears of advocates of much churchly power and authority
Iocke's view of the church as a modest organization with a circumscribed
area Of jurisdiction could be construed as an abdication of reSponsibility
toward society and its morality. Such a conclusion could be made if his

view of conscience was not fully understood and appreciated. The fact

is that his limiting of the power and authority that fell to the government

 

58%., P0 200 59%.. P. 22. 60Ibid., Pp. 22, 23.

187

and churches required a high view of conscience and its liberty. Man
as a religious being might belong to a church, but that did not relieve
him of his responsibility to live according to the dictates of his con-
science. The same was true concerning his membership in a society under
a government.

Conscience was normative for man no matter what institutions
he be associated with, this being clear in Locke's discussion of the
problem of government and morality. Locke recognized the magistrate's
interest in public morality, and that he had authority to enforce it.
This authority was, however, limited to obvious and universally accepted
evils, such as murder. When individual consciences came into conflict
with public morality and the government's interest in it, Locke had no
reservations in stating:

Everyone Should do what he in his conscience is persuaded

to be acceptable to the Almighty, on whose good pleasure

and acceptance their eternal happiness depends. For Ob-

servance is due, in the first place to God, and afterward

to the laws.61
Here Locke brings together a number of points he had made earlier,
namely, that conscience is normative in man's relationship to God, that
the latter is man's highest concern, and that the jurisdiction of the
government is limited.

Locke illustrates this position with two examples, one in which
the magistrate requires a deed that appears to the conscience as unlawful,
and a second in which the magistrate requires something that does not

fall within his jurisdiction. In the first case Locke refers to a situa-

tion in which the person judges something to be unlawful to his conscience,

611bid. ’ P. “'8.

188

such as objection to a given war. Locke felt that in a well run society
such a situation would seldom exist because the magistrate would always
seek the peace and quiet of his subjects. Should it happen, however,
Locke says, "A private person is to abstain from the action that he
judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not

unlawful for him to bear."62

It is worth noting in passing that Locke
suggests that some punishment is unlawful, and ought not to be accepted.

As for the case in which the magistrate requires something not
within his jurisdiction, Locke, says, "men are not in these cases obliged
by that law, against their consciences." If it be objected that the
magistrate believe he is doing good, Locke again Speaks without equiv-
ocation:

The private judgment (as I may call it) of the magistrate

does not give him any new right of imposing laws upon his

subjects which neither was in the constitution of the

government grantgg him nor was ever in the power Of the

peOple to grant.
Again Locke reflects his conception of separate spheres of activity
and how it is that they are related to conscience. Even if the situation
arise in which a conflict between the individual and the government can
not be reconciled, Locke has no doubt that the person should follow his
conscience. Like St. Paul and many later writers, Locke pointed out that
in the end God will judge each and reward each according to his desire
to promote peace and the other Christian virtues. In the meantime, the
individual should care for ”his own soul first, and in the next place

. . . public peace."6u Caring for one's soul required adherence to the

 

6("Ibid.

62Ibid. (Italics mine.) 63Ibid., p. 49.

189

dictates of conscience, for as Locke said earlier, no one could eXpect
to enter the mansions of the blessed without following the rule of
conscience.

Locke concluded his letter with a prayer Or benediction in
which he touched the high points of his argument:

God Almighty grant, I beseech Him, that the gOSpel Of
peace may at length be preached, and that the civil
magistrates, growing more careful to confOrm their
consciences to the law Of God and less solicitous

about the binding of other men's consciences by human
laws, may, like fathers Of their country, direct all
their counsels and endeavors to promote universally

the civil welfare of all their children, except only

of such as are arrogant, ungovernable, and injurious

to their brethren; and that all ecclesiastical men, who
boast themselves to be successors of the apostles, walk-
ing peaceably and modestly in the apostles' steps, with-
out intermeddling with state affairs, may apply themselves
wholly to promote the salvation of souls.65

From the foregoing it is clear that John Locke advocated the
same view of conscience and sovereignty that had been set forth by a
variety of writers since the days of William Perkins. For him con-
science must be at liberty because it is only then that man can care
for the most important business he has in this life, namely, the sal-
vation of his soul. Conscience is normative in defining the Spheres
of authority that fall to government and the church, too, for while
each of these institutions has their lawful duties, it does not extend
to the concerns of conscience of the individual. Finally, Locke's dis-
cussion of liberty and sovereignty in the context of Christian charity
is noteworthy because it reflects his conviction that liberty of con-

science is an idea that ought to be fostered above all by Christians.

 

65Ibid., p. 59.

190

Placing Locke in the tradition of Perkins and other Puritans may
grate on the historical image of Locke that has appeared in many accounts
of the man and his ideas. A comment or two on Locke, the man, therefore,
is, in order. The usual image of Locke pictures him as an urbane gentle-
man on the order of a Ben Franklin. It would be more accurate, however,
to see him as a representative of later English Puritanism, at least
this conclusion may be drawn from a recent study of his letters and
journals, items that have become available only in the last twenty years.66
Locke's continuous association with men like John Owen also suggest that
he was familiar with, and to a degree, a product of the Puritan move-
ment in England. In conclusion concerning Locke, it may be said that
his works yield many new insights when he is read without the tinted
glass of modern secularism.

During the period 1689-1770 the cause Of conscience and its
liberty in America had both a practical and a theoretical foundation.
The Charters and other laws continued in force, and, at the same time,
Locke's views were being circulated. Not everyone read Locke, but as
will be evident, many advocates of liberty and sovereignty either cited
him as their authority or borrowed his words and phrases lg 2233. In
addition to the Charter provisions and the writings of Locke, Americans
during the period drew upon the Westminster Confession and other earlier
expressions on liberty and sovereignty in the tradition of William
Perkins as they defended the rights of the individual and the need for

separation of church and state.

 

66Maurice Cranston, John Locke: ‘5 Biography (New York, 1957).

191

In turning to a discussion of the day-to-day use of the ideas
of liberty and sovereignty during the period 1689-1770, it is apparent
that many American colonials were concerned about the relationship
between individuals and institutions, particularly between individuals
and government. The concept of sphere sovereignty was often employed
in diSputes between advocates of governmental authority and those who
saw its authority as limited. A few of these diSputes may be cited to
demonstrate the manner in which Sphere sovereignty was employed.

A Philadelphia businessman, for example, prOposed the publication
of a newSpaper, and the question of libel at common law had been an
issue that concerned many peOple. From another perSpective, the question
Of the limits of the liberty of the press were in the process of being
defined. The publisher's perSpectus commented on this problem and
assured the public that it did not intend to contribute to "the licen-
tiousness of the press." In this the publisher obviously recognized
that all liberty had limits.67 On the other hand, he made it clear
that governmental authority was bounded within a definable jurisdiction.
In the words of the perspectus:

We are commanded to pay Obedience tO governors, yet not

to all generally, but only to those who use their author-

ity for the punishment Of evildoers and for the praise of

those that do well . . . . Where the end of government

is perverzgd, it is criminal in any man to acquiesce

under it.

In other words, this publisher was stating that the business Of govern-
ment did not extend to his paper, that the government's Sphere of

authority did not encompass regulation of the press. His recognition,

 

67leder, Liberty, p. 30. 68Ibid.

192

however, that the liberty of the press had limits was consistent with
his view of Sphere sovereignty, the question of the limits Of liberty
always being a part of the diSpute when jurisdiction came into conflict.

Thomas Maule's Tribute £2 Caesar, How Paid by the Best Christians,

 

written in 1712, diSplays the same devotion to liberty and sovereignty.
Men gathered themselves into societies, wrote Maule, so "that they might
live safely and enjoy their liberties."69 This liberty could be enjoyed,
however, only when the spheres of government and the church were clearly
marked off and Observed. "Civil societies have their laws proper and
peculiar to themselves, and the churches have their rules of discipline

peculiar to themselves,‘ said Maule. Further, when the civil magistrates

and the church "confound their jurisdictions under the law," confusion

 

and conflicts can be the only result.7O Maule sought to distinguish
exactly the business Of government and of the church, and to borrow the
words of Locke "settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the
other."

Samuel Willard, known to students Of New England for his summary
of Christian doctrine, preached an election sermon in 1694 that reflects
his commitment to sphere sovereignty. Government was ordained by God,
says Willard, "to prevent and cure disorders that are apt to break forth
among the societies of men; and to promote the civil peace and prosperity

71

of such a peOple." For Willard the purpose of government was the same
as stated by Locke, and earlier by the Westminster Divines. "Government

is God's ordinance; and those that are vested with it . . . have their

69Thomas Maule, Tribute tg_Caesar (Philadelphia, 1712), p. 12.
70Ihid. (Italics mine.)

71Leder, Libert , p. to.

193

authority from Him," says Willard. While rulers have their authority
from God, it must be emphasized, according to Willard, that "peOple
are not made for rulers, but rulers for a people."72 In this Willard
reflects a commitment to the conception of sovereignty that has been
outlined in this study.

Another example of devotion to the tradition of liberty and
sovereignty may be found in the writings of John Wise. Man according
to Wise was a "freeborn subject under the crown of heaven," and he
owed "homage to none but God himself." God "provided a rule for men
in all their actions," and it is found "in the soul of man."73 In
other words, God alone is lord of man and has given him a guide within
himself that must be followed in his actions that relate to other men

and institutions.

While some writers during the period 1689-1770 stressed the
concept of Sphere sovereignty, others appealed directly to liberty of
conscience as they defended individual rights over against other men and
institutions. The following examples were drawn from a large number Of
such SXpressions, and an attempt has been made to use examples from
the different colonies over the whole time span being examined.

A Rhode Islander displayed a deft sense of history when he con-
trasted the atmOSphere in early Massachusetts with that of his colony.
People in seventeenth-century Rhode Island, as now, he wrote, enjoyed
"liberty of conscience, which is freedom to worship God in the way we

are persuaded is most agreeable to His will and most acceptable to

 

721bid.

73John Wise, A_Vindication,gf the Government 2f_the New England
Churches (Boston, 1717), pp. 33*38.

 

 

 

194

Him."74 Liberty of conscience is freedom from interference by other men
and institutions. With an eye to developments at the time of the Revolu-
tion his further comment that liberty of conscience "is the only ipdg-
feasible right Of all men,"75 is significant. His use of indefeasible
here is the sense that others, at the time of the Revolution, tried to
convey when they spoke of rights as unalienable. Liberty of conscience
for this writer was a right that could not be trampled upon or taken
away by any person or institution.

Peter Clark, in a Boston election sermon, Speaking on the question
of the relationship between the government and religion, borrowed heavily
from the Westminster Confession. Said Clark of the magistrate:

. . . the] may not use his authority to impose articles

of faith or modes of worship on the consciences of the

subjects, or enforce these by civil penalties; for the

consciences of men are immediately subgect to God, and

acknowledge no superior but Him alone.7
In other words, God alone was lord of the conscience and had set it
free from the authority of men. Clark not only saw conscience as free
from the authority of men, but suggested, as did Locke, that the magis-
trate had a duty to see that liberty of conscience was not violated
by other men and institutions. When liberty of conscience was allowed
to be trampled upon, Clark stated, "the sacred legaments Of society and
government are at once broken and dissolved."77 For Clark liberty of

conscience was the normative factor in the proper Operation of society,

 

7”Rhode Island Gazette, January 11, 1733/34.

7SIbid. (Italics mine.)

76Peter Clark, The Rulers Highest Di nit , and the Peoples
Truest Glory(Boston, 1739), pp. 18-19.

 

77Ibid.

195

for it was the backbone of the concept of Sphere sovereignty, a concept

that posited a limited jurisdiction to the Spheres of church and state.

Charles Chauncy, a leading figure in theological circles, Spoke
of liberty of conscience in terms that echo Locke. Said Chauncy, "The
use of force in matters of religion and conscience is not only contrary
to the example of Christ . . . but to the nature and reason of things."
Force in matters of conscience is "a method altogether unsuited to work
upon the minds of men. For whatever influence it might have upon their
bodies, it can have none upon their souls."78

In Pennsylvania liberty of conscience, provided for in the
Charter, was often used as a defense against government action. During
a period when the Governor, George Thomas, sought to raise money for
the militia, a number of Quakers objected. Thomas found it necessary
to assure these Quakers that he, too, believed in liberty of conscience.
Said Thomas,

Far be it from me to attempt the least invasion of your

charter, or your laws for liberty of conscience, or to

engage any assembly in measures that may introduce per-

secution for conscience sake. I have always been a pro-

fessed advocate for liberty, both civil and religious,

as the only rational foundation of society.79
Thomas here views liberty of conscience as the very foundation of society.
Liberty of conscience is the normative factor in defining the just bounds
that separate the jurisdiction that falls to the government and other

institutions.

78Charles Chauncy, The Only_Compulsion Proper to be Made Use
2£_ig the Affairs g£_Conscience and Beligionfzboston, 17357, p. 9.

79American Weekly Mercury, January 15, l739/h0.

196

Liberty of conscience also played a part in the defense of the
right to private judgment and principles, this being evident in a
Pennsylvania magazine. The writer began by inquiring whether the men
of the Reformation were correct in following their consciences as they
Split from the Church of Rome. If they were right in following their
consciences, and if they were correct in resisting attempts to coerce
them, then "every man, in every age and nation, hath an equal claim to
the same liberty." From this premise the writer went on to say!

Every Christian hath an equal right to the peaceable and

constant possession of his own principles, and ought to

be left by all men, and secured by civil government, in

the full and undisturbed enjoyment of them.

Moreover, he continued,

Every Christian hath a further right, to publish and vindi-

cate by reason and argument his own Opinions; to Speak

freely against all corruption of religion . . . to separate

from such communions and societies of Christians whose

doctrines and worship he cannot in conscience approve of.
Again, as in the examples cited above, the writer here uses the idea of
conscience and its liberty to support his view that men are free from
the intrusions of institutions and other men.

Another writer in Pennsylvania at about the same time wrote an
essay on the right of private judgment, and he links private judgment
to liberty of conscience. As in the case just noted, the actions of
men of the Reformation were cited as justification for the claim that
a Christian Should stand on liberty of conscience. The argument that

the rights of conscience were the basis of the Reformation was emphasized.

Attempts to violate conscience by government or churches or other

 

8OIbid., January 20, 17b3/h4.

197

persons were, said the writer, "unnatural, inhuman, and anti-Christian."
The right of private judgment through conscience was one of those
"sacred and original rights of human nature which the Gospel had revived

81 Further, the rights of conscience were equal in

and re-established."
all men, and each man had to account for his actions through conscience.
For this reason liberty of conscience was an important and vital concern
of society. Finally the writer noted, "A man may alienate his labor,
his estate, and several other branches of his prOperty . . . but he
cannot transfer his right of conscience," and, he adds with a touch of
irony, "unless he could . . . substitute another to be judged for him
at the righteous tribunal of God" in the final Day of Judgment.82

Noteworthy in these remarks is the idea stated two centuries
earlier by William Perkins that liberty of conscience was linked to the
GoSpel, or as in Perkins' words "Christ hath now in the New Testament
given a liberty to conscience."83 Again this writer noted that con-
science and its liberty was something that could not be alienated, or
transferred.

Liberty of conscience was a prominent argument in New York at
the time King's College was being established. Some saw its establish-
ment as a further extension of the Anglican Church and so they resisted
it. One writer likened the occasion to that of French Protestants, and
concluded:

The civil magistrate's power reaches only to the punish-

ing of men for actions detrimental to civil society, not
for Opinions. Whilst men desire only liberty to worship

v—r __—

81Pennsylvania Gazette, January 19, 1747/h8.

82mm.
83

supra. p. 31.

*

198

God according to the dictates of their conscience, and

in all other matters are willing to submit to the known

laws of the land, no prince that values his reputation

. . . will make a new law to entrap sugfl men and bring

them under the denomination of rebels.

Concerned also with the threat associated with the establish-
ment of King's College, another writer pointed out that in England there
were two traditions of religion, one associated with the Church of
England and the other with the Church of Scotland. The point was that
there was no unity in England and that it could not be eXpected in the
colonies. The alternative was liberty, and liberty was an inviolable
right of men. As for the source of liberty in general, it was tied to
liberty of conscience. Liberty of conscience "cannot be transferred;
it claims an entire exemption from human jurisdiction, because its ends,
offices, and interests are superior to all the ends of civil association."85
Significantly the writer adds that if the government tries to usurp this
right, it degenerates into tyranny, and the right of self-defense must
be exercised. In short, liberty of conscience is the basis of other
liberties, and when it is attacked,the solution is self-defense, or
revolution.

By mid-century an essay in a Connecticut paper pointed out that
the colony's college had been founded "upon principles of liberty of
conscience," and it was the same liberty of conscience that dissenters
from the English Church had fought for.86 The point of the essaywwas
summed up in the phrase, "Our forefathers enjoyed liberty of conscience;

shall we give it up?"87

 

8u’NeIwI‘Zgrk Gazette, February 12, 1753.

 

85Occasional Reverberator, October 5, 1753.
86Connecticut Gazette, October 15, 1757.

87Ibid.

199

By 1760 the cause of conscience and its liberty had advanced
throughout the colonies, even in Massachusetts. One advocate argued:

The civil government as they exercise their authority to
rule only in temporary things are the ministers of God,
. . . . God hath not committed to them the government
of his church, or to meddle in cases of conscience.

Another wrote:

The right of private judgment is inalienable - and since

it is essential to true religion that we act from conscience
and a conviction that what we profess and practice is agree-
able to the divine will -- religious liberty ever supposes,
and it is requisite to its being, that the conscience be
left free and that none pretend to an empire over it.89

An election sermon of 1762 by Atmaham Williams summs up the view that
prevailed at the time of the Revolution. Williams said,

Human laws cannot control the mind - the rights of con-

science are unalienable: inseparable from our nature -

they ought not, they cannot possibly be given up to

society. Therefore religion, as it consists in right

sentiments, affections, and behavior towards God - as

it is chiefly internal and private, can be regulated

only by God himself.90
Concluding this point Williams stated that the civil authority had a
right to encourage public worship, but only if it was "consistent with
an entire liberty of conscience."91

During the period 1689-1770 American colonials often drew upon
the idea of conscience and its liberty to defend individual rights
against real or imagined encroachments by the government. Liberty of
conscience could be adapted to the problem of the freedom of the press,
as well as to other areas of individual freedom. In this it contributed

to the growing appreciation of the difference between English governmental

 

88John Bolles, 29 Worship £29 in Spirit, and in Truth, l§_tg_
Worship Him ingrue Liberty'2£_Conscience (Boston, 1736); pp. 60-61.

 

 

 

89Benjamin Stevens, A Sermon Preached at Boston (Boston, 1761), p. 11.

 

90Abraham Williams, A_Sermon.Preached at_Boston (Boston, 1762), p. 10.

 

91Ibid.

200

conceptions of individual rights and a distinctively American one.

AS one writer put it, "Americans reverenced liberty." in the eighteenth
century. Applying this observation to the Revolution, he continued,
"American goals remained unchanged" throughout the century; hence,
"Americans confidently entered the struggle with Britain over the meaning
and extent of liberty."92

Often the question of church and state entered the political
arena during this period, and often colonials argued for their separation
in terms of Sphere sovereignty based upon conscience and its liberty.

On this question, as regarding those that affected the individual more
directly, the colonials quoted, paraphrased, and eluded to earlier ex-
pressions on liberty and sovereignty in the tradition of William Perkins.
Among the more obvious sources for the colonials were the views of

John locks and the Westminster Confession of Faith though some colonials
Spoke as though they had copies of Perkins' treatises on their reference
shelves.

While the range of persons who cited liberty of conscience during
the period 1689-1770 was no doubt greater than it was during the earlier
phases of seventeenth-century colonial experience, the two periods are
integrally related. The review of charter provisions for liberty of
conscience during the various stages of settlement indicates a firm
commitment to the idea. Moreover, individuals during the early period
in most of the colonies frequently expressed their devotion to liberty
of conscience. The charters themselves provided continuity throughout

the period, for they remained in force until superceded by constitutional

 

92Leder, Liberty, pp. 19-20.

201

provisions in the new states. The period 1689-1770 may be distinguished
from the earlier phase in that it eXperienced a quickening of interest
in the argument from conscience for Sphere sovereignty and individual
liberty, this phenomenon contributing to an emerging American political
ideology.

In sum, then, concerning liberty of conscience in colonial
America, it may be said that the idea arrived early and soon became a
basic principle in most of the colonial charters, Massachusetts Bay
Colony being the outstanding exception. Further, by the end of the
seventeenth century, liberty and sovereignty became important elements
in an emerging political ideology. Finally, as the argument from con-
science and its liberty became more popular as an element in political
ideology, it reflected a debt to John Locke, the Westminster Confession,
and others in the tradition of William Perkins. As the Revolution
approached in the 1770's, liberty of conscience was an important princi-
ple, one that Americans were ready and willing to guarantee as they

created their new instruments of government.

CHAPTER VII
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

On August 20, 1789, the House of Representatives voted to approve
the following provision as an amendment to the Constitution, ”Congress
shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise
thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience."1 This provision was
designed to quiet the fears Of many concerning the future Of liberty Of
conscience, fears that emerged as a result of power given to the new
Federal Government by the new Constitution. Many men in the Congress
recognized the need to protect the rights of conscience from an invasion
by the new creature which the Constitution created, but it was James
Madison who Spelled out why it was that this protection was needed.

In the Constitutional Convention and in Congressional debates,
Opponents Of a bill of rights in any form frequently cited the English
Declaration of Rights and the common law as a protection for rights.2
Madison, however, saw this stance as entirely inadequate for the American
situation, particularly as it affected liberty of conscience. When the
argument was raised again in the House debates, Madison pointed out
what he saw as its greatest weakness. As for the English Declaration
of Rights, he said, "The truth is, they have gone no further than to
raise a barrier against the power of the Crown;" thus, "the power of

the Legislature is left altogether indefinite.” Not only that, when

 

1Joseph Gales, Comp., The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress

2; Egg United States (Wash., 183a):’1. p. 766; hereafter cIEad as Gales,
Debates.

 

21bid., p. u36.

202

203

the great rights, "trial by jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of
conscience, come into question in that body," the invasion of them is
resisted by able advocates through appeal to the Magna Carta. But

"the Magna Carta does not contain any one provision for security of
those rights, reSpecting which the peOple of America are most alarmed,"
the chief among these being "the rights of conscience.” Concluding,
Madison said, these "choicest privileges of the peOple," are not only
unprotected by the Magna Carta, they "are unguarded in the British Con-

stitution."3

The House's proposed amendment to the Constitution and Madison's
comments upon it suggest that liberty of conscience was a fundamental
right in the thinking of many of his countrymen. There isvabundant
evidence that liberty Of conscience was a basic element in the climate
of Opinion at the time of the American Revolution.

Traditionally studies of the American Revolutionary period focus
on the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Constitution with
its Amendments: but in examining the place of liberty of conscience in
the era Of the Revolution it will be useful to alter this convention
Slightly. While the Declaration and the Constitution will be examined
in due course, a better perSpective on the development of liberty Of
conscience may be gained through observing a number of state constitutions
first. These constitutions are Often neglected in studies of the period,
but they provide an index Of the pervasiveness, if not pOpularity, of

certain ideas, including liberty of conscience.

 

3Ibid.

204

Once the state constitutions have been examined, attention will

be given to the Declaration and the Constitution. Following a survey Of

all these documents, it will be useful to evaluate the relationship

between liberty of conscience as it appeared in the era of the Revolution

and the questions Of a church establishment in Massachusetts and of the

separationist interpretation as it has appeared in the twentieth century.

A. Liberty and Sovereignty in the Constitutions of the New States

The Continental Congress in May, 1776, circulated a letter to

the states advising them to formulate instruments of government in view

of the fact that a decision had been made to publish a declaration of

independence.“ Pursuant to this advice each of the states created con-

stitutions excepting Rhode ISland and Connecticut, these two choosing

to Operate for a time under their old Charters.5 In creating these new

constitutions each of the states made Specific provision for liberty

of conscience, and they did so in terms of sphere sovereignty.

it will

To facilitate an examination of these constitutional provisions
be useful to quote several of them at length.

SEC. 16. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our
Creator, and the manner Of discharging it, can be directed
only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence:
and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free
exercise of religion, according to the dictates Of con-
science: and that it is the mutual duty of all to prac-
tice Christian fortearance, love, and charity towards each
other.

Virginia, 1776
II. That all men have a natural and unalienable right

to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
their own consciences and understanding: and that no

 

IV: P- 30

1+Journals of_the Continental Congress, 177h-l789 (Wash., 1906),

Ssupra, p. 173 ff.

205

man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any
religious worship, or erect or support any place of
worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or
against, his own free will and consent: Nor can any
man, who acknowledges the being of a God, be justly
deprived or abridged Of any civil right as a citizen,
on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar
mode Of religious worship: And that no authority can
or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power
whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or
in any manner control, the right of conscience in the
free exercise of religious worship.

Pennsylvania, 1776

SECT. 2. That all men have a natural and unalien-
able right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own consciences and understandings;
and that no man ought or of right can be compelled to
attend any religious worship or maintain any ministry
contrary to or against his own free will and consent,
and that no authority can or ought to be vested in,
or assumed by any power whatever that shall in any
case interfere with, or in any manner control the
right Of conscience in the free exercise Of religious
worship.

SECT. 3. That all persons professing the Christian
religion ought forever to enjoy equal rights and privi-'
leges in this state, unless, under colour of religion,
any man disturb the peace, the happiness or safety Of
SOCIétYO

Delaware , 1776

XXXIII. That, as it is the duty of every man to wor-
ship God in such manner as he thinks most acceptable
to him: all persons, professing the Christian reli-
gion, are equally entitled to protection in their
religious liberty: wherefore no person ought by any
law to be molested in his person or estate on account
of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his
religious practice: unless, under colour of religion,
any man shall disturb the good order, peace or safety
of the State, or Shall infringe the laws of morality,
or injure others, in their natural, civil, or reli-
gious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled

to frequent or maintain, or contribute, unless on con-
tract, to maintain any particular'place of worship,
or any particular ministry.

Maryland, 1776

206

XIX. That all men have a natural and unalienable
right to worship Almighty God according to the dic-
tates of their own consciences.

North Carolina, 1776

III. That all men have a natural and unalienable
right to worship ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the
dictates Of their own consciences and understanding,
regulated by the word of GOD; and that no man ought,
or of right can be compelled to attend any religious
worship, or erect, or support any place of worship,
or maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates
of his conscience: nor can any man who professes the
protestant religion, be justly deprived or abridged
Of any civil right, as a citizen, on account of his
religious sentiment, or peculiar mode of religious
worship, and that no authority can, or ought to be
vested in, or assumed by, any power whatsoever, that
shall, in any case, interfere with, or in any manner
control, the rights of conscience, in the free exp
ercise Of religious worship: nevertheless, every
sect or denomination of peOple ought to observe

the Sabbath, or the Lord‘s day, and keep up, and
support, some sort Of religious worShip, which to
them shall seem most agreeable to the revealed will
of GOD.

Vermont, 1777

II. It is the right as well as the duty of all men

in society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to
worship the SUPREME BEING, the great Creator and
Preserver of the universe. And no subject shall be
hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty.
or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and
season most agreeable to the dictates of his own con-
science: or'for his religious profession of sentiments:
provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or ob-
struct others in their religious worship.

Massachusetts, 1780

IV. Among the natural rights, some are in their very
nature unalienable, because no equivalent can be given
or received for them. Of this kind are the RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE.

V. Eyery individual has a natural and unalienable
right to worship GOD according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and reason: and no subject shall

207

be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty
or estate for worshipping GOD, in the manner and season
most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience,
or for his religious profession, sentiments or per-
suasion: provided he doth not disturb the public peace,
or disturb others, in their religious worship.

New Hampshire, 17846
As for the rest of the new states, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina,
and Georgia made similar constitutional provisions.7 The Charters of
Rhode Island and Connecticut, issued in 1662 and 1663 respectively,
included provision for a guarantee of liberty of conscience as has been

noted already.

The sections cited clearly Show a devotion to liberty of con-
science. An examination of these sections, however, from the perspective
of the problem of authority shows more fully the relationship between the
view of conscience expressed in the constitutions and that found in the
tradition Of William PerkinS.

Earlier in this study it has been argued that the advocates of
liberty of conscience in the seventeenth century were devoted to the
belief that God alone is lord of conscience.8 God alone was head of
the Church through Jesus Christ: God was the Chief Magistrate as well.

The final authority in each Sphere was God, for he was the Creator and

 

6Francis N. Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State Constitutions,

Colonial Charters, and Other Organic laws (Wash.,rl909)?Fhereafter
cited as Thorpe, Constitutions. The sections cited may be found as
follows: Va., VII, pp. 3812-24: Pa., V, pp. 3081-84: Del., II, pp. 695
ff., Md... III, pp. 1686.91: N. (1.. V. pp. 2787-89: Vt.. VI. pp. 34%“23
Mass., III, pp. 1888-93; and N. H., IV, pp. 2h53-57.

71bid., N. Y., v, p. 2637; N. J.. v, p. 2567: s. c., V. p. 2757:
and a... II, P. 773.

8suEE, p, 113 ff.

208

sustainer of all things.

From the point Of view of advocates of liberty Of conscience,
a further consideration was essential. Conscience was finally the
normative factor in determining God's will, even as it affected the
Operation of the state and churches. Of course conscience was en-
lightened by the Bible and eXperience in general, but in the exi-
stential situation it was conscience that determined what it was that
a man must do. The Westminster Confession phrased this view in a
pithy fashion, as has been noted: "God alone is Lord of the conscience,
and has set it free from the doctrines and commandments of men."9
Further, it stated that to Obey such doctrines and commandments in
blind obedience was a betrayal of true liberty of conscience.10 0b-
viously men must obey certain doctrines and commandments, but only when

they were according to the will Of God as determined by conscience.

This stance was termed a "theology of conscience" in an earlier

chapter,11

and that characterization requires further elaboration since
it continued to be a critical feature of the concept of conscience in
the era of the American Revolution. In the twentieth century when a
”death of God" theology can be seriously promoted, when most academic
intellectuals, and political ones for that matter, would be embarrassed

by any reference to theology, mention of a theology of conscience has

little meaning. The phenomenon that "theology of conscience" refers to,

9511213. P. 113.
supra, p. 113.
192.12.: P- 23 ff.

209

however, may be recognized under another label. Religion in its broad
and historic sense comes close to being Synonomous with the word theology
as used until the twentieth century. In each case the word refers to how
it is that man relates to his Creator, or how all aSpects of reality
evident in the creation relate to the Creator.

In the language of Sphere sovereignty, conscience of man is
normative in all Spheres because it is precisely this feature Of man,
as creature, that God placed in a position superior to his other quali-
ties. AS was noted earlier, writers on the subject called conscience
"the principle Of our acting," "the wheel that must set all the rest
going," "a thing out of men's jurisdiction," "the highest sovereignty
under heaven." Further, conscience has "more force and power to work
upon men, than all other agents:” as such "it will neither be beholden
to man for its liberty, nor is it capable of his restraints, it is out

12 With these characteristics in mind

Of the reach of all human power."
it is easier to appreciate the meaning Of Robert Saunderson when he said,
"There cannot be imagined a higher contempt of God than for a man to
despise the power of his own conscience."13 Clearly conscience in this
view is considered normative for life and all conceivable aSpects that

it encompasses. If religion means the stance a person takes in relating
the basic issues of life, to use the broadest conception, the phenomenon
referred to as a "theology Of conscience" is surely a definition of
religion. It is this theology of conscience as a pervasive religious

outlook which came to full fruition in American soil during the eighteenth

century. The logical outgrowth of this religious view of life was manifest

 

12
41.31.31: Pp. 121-122 .

13 upra, Po 121::

U)

m

210

in the new constitutions, in the provisions for liberty of conscience,
and in the general framework of such provisions.

Focusing on the section of the Virginia constitution cited above
for a moment, it is evident that the intent was to link "Creator,"
"religion," and "conscience." Religion is the way that man relates to
his Creator, but this relationship can be cared for only through con-
science. Conscience employs reason and conviction, not force and violence:
hence, conscience as the only way to discharge the duties of man toward
his Creator must be at liberty. Significantly, the Virginia constitution
adds that it is necessary, therefore, to practice "Christian forebearance,
love, and charity towards each other." This provision implies two im-
portant assumptions, first that the whole business of Creator-religion-
conscience is in a Christian context, and that it involves not only a
relationship between one man and his God, but also the relationship of
each man to the next. Conscience is, thus, normative in the broadest
sense of religion.1u

The same characteristics are evident in the other state con-
stitutions. Pennsylvania Speaks positively of the right to worship
"Almighty God" according to conscience. That religion was an inclusive
term, meaning more than mere formal worship, is clear from the phrases
"religious sentiments" and "peculiar mode Of worship,“ they being
viewed as distinguishable but complementary. As if conscious Of the
English practice of tolerating certain acts of conscience, the Pen-
nsylvania constitution also stated that "no authority can or ought to
be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any case

interfere with . . . the rights of conscience."15 These same measures

luThorpe, Constitutions, VII, pp. 3812 3-24.

15’Ibm., v, p. 3081.

211

were stated in the Delaware document.16

Maryland's provisions differed
slightly, chiefly in that it used the word.”religious liberty" in

place of the wordggnscience.17 North Carolina phrased liberty Of
conscience in a Single sentence, using the same words that had appeared
in several other states, namely, "That all men have a natural and un-
alienable right to worship Almightly God according to the dictates

of their own consciences."18 Vermont followed earlier measures, in-
jecting the phrase "regulated by the word Of GOD" as a qualification

19 Massachusetts combined the

of the meaning of the word conscience.
Virginia notion that religion was a duty with that Of other states
which viewed it as a right. The universal character of religion was,
in Massachusetts, acknowledged through reference to God as the Supreme
Being, the Creator and Preserver Of the universe.20
From the perSpective Of the problem of authority, from the perb
Spective of Sphere sovereignty, it is evident from the foregoing that
the state constitutional provisions for liberty of conscience were
cast in the language and context that had been stated for generations
by advocates Of liberty of conscience in the tradition of William
Perkins. When the new state constitutions at the time Of the American
Revolution spoke of liberty Of conscience, they continued a long-standing
tradition, elevating it to the level of a constitutional guarantee.
Looking at the Revolutionary period as a whole, it is important
to appreciate the Significance Of these provisions in the states. They

indicated the range and scope of interest and devotion to the idea of

 

1é2239.. pp. 695 ff, 17Ibid., III, p.11686.
181.1214... V. 1231787. 19mm. v1. 1). am.
20

Ibid., III, p. 1888.

212

liberty Of conscience. When Madison Spoke of a great concern among
Americans as to the fate of the rights of conscience under the new
Federal Government, a point noted at the beginning of this chapter,21

he was aware of the universal provision for liberty of conscience in

the state constitutions. Recognition of the states' support and provision
for liberty of conscience also provides some insight into certain portions
of the Declaration of Independence, a subject on which attention may now

be profitably focused.

B. Liberty of Conscience and the Declaration of Independence
Further light on the place of liberty of conscience in the era

of the American Revolution may be gained by a careful examination of

the Declaration of Independence. ‘ In turning to an examination of the
Declaration, however, it needs to be pointed out that the Revolution
has Often been written about in terms of a conflict between the Declara-
tion and the Federal Constitution. This view suggests that the Declara-
tion is the true symbol of the Revolution, while the Constitution repre-

22 Such a view obscures the

sents a conservative counter-revolution.
fundamental characteristics that these documents have in common: and it
tends to detach them from the constitutions and declarations of the

states.

Much can be learned from viewing all these documents as evidence

Of a general "climate of opinion,“ to borrow Carl Becker's famous phrase.

 

21511213, p.203.
22A convenient summary may be found in R. A. Billington, ed.,
The Reinterpretatign 9; Early American History (San Marina, 1966),
pp. 101 ff., written by Merril Jensen. Jensen's work is a prime ex-
ample of the view commented on in the text, and, thus should be read
in conjunction with Robert Brown's Charles Beard and the Constitution
(New York, 1965). ‘—

213

From this perSpective, the Declaration appeals as a brief statement of
purpose and ideals, much like a church's creedal statement; thus, it may
be taken as a summary of more elaborate views. In light of the fact that
the new states all provided for liberty of conscience, the question may
be asked whether the Declaration said anything about the rights of con-
science. This is a crucial question since the text of the Declaration
does not include the word conscience.

Staughton Lynd's provocative essay on the intellectual origins

of American radicalism has as a central theme the notion that the
23

Declaration assumes the rights of conscience as it argues for liberty.
Lynd focuses on the meaning of the phrase "unalienable right." Tradi-
tionally, says Lynd, this phrase has been interpreted by analogy to
prOperty rights, but "inalienability thus defined did not exclude the

permanent transfer of a right from the original owner to a delegated

24

purchaser.” The logic of the analogy to prOperty rights leads to the

conclusion that liberty, being one of the unalienable rights referred
to in the Declaration, could also be transferred. Says Lynd, this
"was the fatal flaw in the traditional theories of natural rights,"

that is, that an individual could give up his liberty as he could give

up his prOperty.25

Having demonstrated the poverty of reading the phrase "unalien-

able rights" by analogy to prOperty rights, Lynd suggests that the

correct way to understand this phrase is by "analogy to conscience."26

23Staughton Lynd, The Intellectual Origins of American Radical-
ism (New YOrk, 1969), hereafter cited as Lynd, Radicalism.

24%., P0 “’50 2592-99

26Ibid.

 

214

Quoting a mid-eighteenthecentury writer on moral philOSOphy, Lynd
states that the rights of conscience are unalienable because they cannot
be subject to the will of another, the nature of conscience requiring
this characteristic. Summing up he says, "When rights were 'unalien-
able' in this sense, it did not mean that they could not be transferred
without consent [prOperty View}, but that their'nature made them un-
transferable [consc ience] . "27

Lynd recognized that his interpretation was a substantial de-
parture from the traditional view. The problem with the "Becker-Bailyn"
thesis is that it looked only at the "bare surface" of the language,

28 What needed

says Lynd, ignoring the context in which it appeared.
clarification was the "intellectual background," says Lynd, and the back-
ground in Lynd's view was "largely in England." The key figures were

a group of radicals, "associated with non-Anglican (Nonconformist or
Dissenting) Protestant denominations such as the Quakers."29 Their
Significance rests in the fact that they "transferred to secular
political discourse that reliance on the individual conscience of
uneducated men for which they had contended in religion."30 These
Radicals, as Lynd styles them, therein affirmed what they like to call
”'the dignity Of human nature."31 This secularization of the concept

Of conscience took place in the 1770's according to Lynd.

 

271bid.’ PO “'5. 28Ib1d., p. 19.
291bid. 30Ibid.

31Ibid., p. 20.

215

Lynd is undoubtedly correct in seeing the significance of the
concept of conscience in the milieu of the Declaration.of Independence.
He presents a persuasive argument for its appearance among his Radicals
in the 1770's, but the purpose of his study has precluded his seeing
an even greater influence of the idea at the time of the Revolution.
Lynd's mission in his essay was to find respectable roots for the views
he and his associates hold in the twentieth century though he does not

say this in eXplicit terms.32

The significance of conscience for him
was that it "internalized" and "humanized" the standard for rights.33
If he is correct in pointing to an internal standard for rights, then
his contemporaries who lean so heavily on prOperty rights are not in
the true American tradition.

Lynd's characterization of his Radicals cannot be avoided, but
the question remains as to how the rest of society viewed the rights Of
conscience. In looking at the Declaration only for the moment, it
appears that another dimension of the concept of conscience was as
important as the notion that "their nature ‘rights of consciencg made
them untransferable."3u The question of authority is crucial in any
view of conscience: in fact, the claim of conscience is no better than
the authority called upon. Lynd says that his Radicals "secularized"
35

and "humanized" the concept of conscience, and this would seem to
require an appeal to "human rights" as authority in the Declaration.
While many men in the twentieth century might gain an audience by

appealing to ”human rights" as they call for liberty of conscience, such

321222.. p. 3 ff. 33Ibid.. p. 19 ff.

3“Ibid., p. 45. 351bid., p. 19 ff.

216

a view would have been unintelligible to most men of the eighteenth
century. The framers of the Declaration, thus, reached for the best
argument from authority which they knew, one which their audience
understood well. "Men . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights," they said, and to them this was a self-evident
truth.36 In other words, certain rights, like the rights of conscience,
cannot be alienated, 223 because they are "human rights," rather because
they are an endowment from their Creator.

The question of authority in the Declaration's claim that care
tain rights were unalienable is most important, for related to it is
the question of what limits, if any, there are on liberty. If Lynd is
correct in seeing "unalienable rights" as an expression of "human rights,"
then the limits depend upon what one person sees, or a group agree to,
as the limit of liberty. This could lead to totalitarianism if the
"peOple" agreed to that stance through acquiesence or by design. On
the other hand, it could lead to an exaggerated degree of individual
liberty, even to anarchy, if a sufficient number of the American public
agreed that conscience allowed this degree of liberty. Revolution would
be an absolute right for each person if he was persuaded in his conscience
that revolution was the answer to his particular problem. Jefferson and
others recognized revolution as a right, but in that view it depended
upon a substantial segment of the community agreeing to that course of
action. Lynd laments the fact that revolution could occur only when
a "majority" of the people favored it: to him that seemed unfair and

unworkable.37 The only way to avoid totalitarianism and anarchy, and

36The Constitution of the United States 2f America' Egg ihg_
Declaration g£_Indepgndence—(New York; published by Doubleday and Com-
pany, Inc. as a "New, Revised Edition," but without the name of the
editor.

 

37Lynd, Radicalism. P0 550

217

to avoid Lynd's conclusion concerning revolution, is to appreciate

the argument from authority used in the Declaration. That argument is
the same one noted earlier in the State Constitutions, namely, the
argument for conscience and its liberty in the cOntext of Sphere soverb
eignty.

From the perspective of Sphere sovereignty it appears that the
Declaration of Independence was as much of a comment on liberty of con-
science as were the state constitutions. Staughton Lynd's perceptive
analysis of the Declaration shows that the phrase "unalienable rights"
can only make sense in terms of a concept of conscience as the basis
for this phrase. While he failed to appreciate the broad support for
the idea in the period, his conclusion as to the Significance of con-
science for the meaning of the Declaration is a substantial contribution
toward a better understanding of the Declaration. Lynd's focusing on
the phrase ”unalienable rights" as a crucial feature is supported by the
fact that the state constitutions also used the same phrase when Speaking
of conscience and its rights. Further, the argument from authority,
the source of authority appealed to in the Declaration, was the same
one employed in the state constitutions. In sum, then, concerning the
Declaration of Independence, it may be concluded liberty of conscience
was an ideal, and at the same time an assumption implicit in the docu-

ment.

C. Liberty of Conscience and the Federal Constitution

Since the Revolution also brought forth a new Federal Constitu-
tion, it is important to inquire what provision it contained for the
rights of conscience. The emergence of the Federal Constitution in

1787 created a crisis in the minds of many concerning the protection

218

of their rights, rights which were protected in the states. The story
is well-known how the ratification of the Constitution involved heated

debates by its admirers and detractors, and how the question of protec-

38 In fact, two states refused to

39

tion of rights was a central issue.
ratify the Constitution at all until some such provision was made.
Still others ratified it on the condition that protection of rights
would be immediately established.”°

As the first Congress met in 1789, therefore, one of the first
items presented for the agenda was consideration of a way to protect
the rights of citizens. There were differences of Opinion among the
membership as to the import of this issue. Some argued that the people
eXpected them to get on with creating the government that the Constitu-

tion envisioned,“1

but others argued that the Constitution was, in fact,
incomplete without Specific provisions for the rights of the peOple.n2
One argument pointed out that the Preamble to the Constitution stated,
among other things, that it was ordained to "secure the blessings of
liberty," and that this was the only item in the list of stated purposes
that had not been provided for in the text of the document. For this
reason, the document was incomplete.

The great majority of the House agreed that something had to be
done about the question of rights, but it was James Madison who took it
upon himself to assemble a list of the items that the state conventions
and others deemed essential to "secure the blessings of liberty." As he

said, "I shall proceed to bring the amendments before you . . . and

 

38Alfred H. Kelly and W. A. Marbison, The American Constitution

(New York, 1963), pp. 148-160.

39Ibid. “01bid.
41 42

Ibid.. Po “'34 ff. Ibid.

219

advocate them until they shall be finally adOpted or rejected by a
Constitutional majority of this House."’+3 His original list included
some twenty propositions aimed at a variety of grievances.uu When
the smoke cleared and Congress was ready to propose amendments to the
states, twelve remained, ten of which passed into the Constitution.“5

The ten amendments to the Constitution were all part of a Single
item in Madison's original lists]+6 obviously, therefore, his original
prOposals were stated in greater detail. The abbreviation, however, Of
them is an important clue to an understanding of the intent of each
amendment. What turned out to be the First Amendment in the Constitu-
tion was stated in the following manner by Madison:

The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account

of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national

religion be established, nor shall the full and equal

rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pre-

text , infringed.

The peOple shall not be deprived or abridged of their

right to Speak, to write, or to publish their Senti-

ments; and the freedom of press, as one of the great

bulwarks of liberty, Shall be inviolable.

The peOple shall not be restrained from peaceably

assembling and consulting for their common good: nor

from applying to the legislature by petition, o

remonstrances, for redress of their grievances.
Obviously the first paragraph above was shortened to the familiar
phrase, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
reltgion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” EQually
Obvious is the fact that Madison's prOposal concerning "religion" and

the Federal government assumed a relationship between conscience and

religion.

 

_——f

1+3Gales, Debates, p. 424. MIbid" pp. 433-436.

“5Alfred H. Kelly and W. A. Harbison, The American Constitution
(New York, 1963), p. 176.

46 4

Gales, Debates, pp. 434-35. 7Ibid.

220

Further light on what this relationship was may be found in
other parts of the House debates on amendments, particularly, in two
other prOposals by Madison, and in comments on them. In the proposed
amendment concerning the right to keep and bear arms, Madison included
a phrase aimed at preventing the abuse of the rights of conscience in
the case of those who objected to bearing arms. After some discussion
it was decided that conscientious objection to bearing arms was not a
right in the fundamental sense because it could create a Situation in
which no one would bear arms, even if the national safety depended upon
it. In terms of Sphere sovereignty, this was a situation in which the
limits of the liberty due man was determined by the legitimate needs of
the state as it pursued its stated purpose. In other words, liberty of
conscience was limited by the inherent rights and duties of the Sphere
called.§i§£g. The House members were sure that the Government would be
sympathetic to the desires of conscientious objectors, but they made it
clear that objection to bearing arms was not a right of conscience.
Fear that no one would want to bear arms was not based upon a distrust
of Quakers or Mennonites: rather, such fear was based upon the belief
that someday non-Christians, people without a Christian conception of
conscience, would use such a provision as shelter.1+8

Madison also prOposed an amendment protecting liberty of con-
science in the states. It read, "No State shall violate the equal
rights of conscience."l+9 In debate it was argued that this was out of

place because the Federal Government had no authority to alter the

 

481131110. P0 7490

ugIbid" p. 739: approved by “”5“ P‘ 755'

221

state constitutions: such an amendment surely would be such an altera-
tion. Madison, however, conceived this to be the most important amend-
ment in the whole list, his reason being, "If there were any reason to
restrain the Government of the United States frOm infringing upon these
essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured
against State Governments."50 It was at this point that Madison gave
the argument cited in the beginning of this chapter, namely, that pro-
tection for liberty Of conscience was absolutely vital, since it was
unprotected in the British Constitution.51

Viewed together, Madison's three proposals touching on the sub-
ject of conscience present a consistent picture of the place of con-
science in the definition of reli ion, but the comments of other House
members are enlightening, also. Of particular interest was the dis-
cussion on the prOposed wording, namely, "no religion shall be established
by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed," this

52

being offered as a substitute for the longer version. One member
suggested that the clauses of the sentence be tranSposed, so as to
preclude it being read as a discouragement to religion.53 Next it was
suggested that the first clause should read "no religious doctrine
shall be established by law."5n Still another thought that the whole
amendment should be eliminated because the only issue was that con-
cerning "religious establishments," and the Constitution had not dele-

gated any authority whatsoever in this area to Congress.55 Further,

5°Ibid. 51Ibid.
SZIbi-do' Po 7290 SBIbld.

5“Ibid., p. 730. 551bid.

222

Representative Carroll indicated why he thought the amendment should
stand:

As the rights of conscience are, in their nature, Of

peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest

touch Of governmental hand: and as many sects have

concurred in Opinion that they are not well secured

under the present Constitutigg . . . (I am) much in

favor of adOpting the words.
Carroll was sure that this amendment would quiet the public more than
any other amendment he had heard proposed. Significantly, he added
that "he would not contend with gentlemen about the phraseology" be-
cause his object was to secure the substance in such a "manner as to
satisfy the wishes of the honest part of the community."57

Madison again joined the debate and said that he thought the
meaning of the words to be "that Congress should not establish a reli-
gion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor to compell men
to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience."58 Whether
the words were necessary or not, Madison said he did nOt know, but he
was certain ”that they had been required by some of the State Conventions"
because they believed that the Constitution gave the Government power
to make all laws necessary to carry on the Government. The Conventions
saw this as power to "make laws of such a nature as might infringe the
rights of conscience, and establish a national religion." To quiet this
fear on the part of the Conventions and others was the purpose of the
amendment, said Madison.59

Another aspect of the subject was pointed out by Representative

Huntington: he “feared, with the gentleman first up on this subject,

56Ibid. 57Ibid.

581bid. ”Ibid.

223

that the words might be taken in such latitude as to be extremely
hurtful to the cause of religion."60 He understood it in the sense
stated by Madison, he said, but others might put another construction
on it. Huntington illustrated his point with an example. He noted
that some congregations supported their ministers and built their church
buildings by contributions, contrasting this with taxing for this pur-
pose as occurred in some places. Agreements to contribute for these
purposes were written into church by-laws, he said, placing a contractual
obligation upon the contributor. Suppose, he said, that an action were
brought before a Federal Court upon failure of performance in such a
case. Huntington was fearful that the ”no establishment" clause might
be interpreted to mean that the defaulting person could not be compelled
to performance of his obligation. In conclusion, Huntington said that
he hoped the amendment "would be made in such a way as to secure the
rights Of conscience . . . but not to patronise those who professed no
religion at all."61
The result of these discussions was the adaption of the state-
ment "Congress Shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent
the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience."62
Subsequently the Houses's prOposed amendment went to the Senate, and
finally, to the Committee of Conference. The record of the House and
Senate does not Show at what point the above version was changed to read
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment Of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof," this being the form finally

ratified by the stateso63

 

__ ...—— ___—

6°Ibid.. pp. 730-31. élxbid.
62

Ibid., p. 766.

63Constitution and Declaration, Doubleday edition.

224

Obviously the final form submitted to the states did not include

the word conscience, and the records of the Senate and Committee of

 

Conference do not indicate why Specific reference to conscience was not
made, that is, why the version submitted to the states was altered.
At first glance it would appear that this change was of major importance,
but reflection upon the context of the debates and upon the character of
the climate of opinion at the time of the Revolution suggests that the
change was very minor. If the omission of the clause on conscience was
of major importance, if it altered radically the intent of the House
in its earlier draft, then it might be eXpected that, as the final form
came to the House, those who vigorously supported the cause of conscience
would have objected to the omission. No Objections were raised.6n The
omission Of Specific reference to conscience in the final form may be
readily understood, however, by reference to the general climate Of
Opinion of the era. Noted earlier was the fact that the framers of the
state constitutions assumed that religion was inseparable from conscience
and its rights. From this perspective it would make sense to shorten the
prOposed amendment through eliminating redundancies. In other words,
"free exercise of religion" and "the rights of conscience" referred to
the same thing; nothing was lost through striking out one of these two
phrases.

To summarize and emphasize the develOpment Of the place of con-
science in the First Amendment, the main versions of it in the House

debates may be cited again:

 

6+Cales, Dem-teen, pp. 4%, 729. 766. and Ibid.. P. “’7.

225

The civil rights of none Shall be abridged on account
of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor Shall the full and equal
rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pre-
text , infringed .

June 8, 1789

No religion Shall be established by law, nor Shall
the equal rights of conscience be infringed.

AuSuSt 15: 1789
Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe
the rights of conscience.
August 20, 1789
Congress shall make no law reSpecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.
65
September 25, 1789
The absence of the clause containing the word conscience in the version
submitted to the states on September 25, 1789, may be understood when
the word religion is recognized as another way to refer to conscience
and its rights.
Having examined the State Constitutions, the Declaration of
Independence, and the background to the First Amendment in light of
the history of the claim of liberty of conscience, it appears that con-
cern for the rights of conscience at the time of the Revolution was
based upon the belief that conscience was central in man's life. Further,
this view of conscience, rooted in the conception of conscience that
emerged in the seventeenth century, was the prevailing one at the time

of the American Revolution, since universal provision for it was made

in the new instruments of government created during the Revolution.

 

65Ibid.

226

The pervasive character of this view is also evident in the fact that
it appeared in the context of sphere sovereignty, Specifically in the
provision that no authority or power could or ought to be vested in
anyone so as to interfere with the rights of conscience.

Notwithstanding these conclusions, one further question deserves
consideration, that is, how was it that provision could be made for
liberty of conscience and at the same time provision made in some states
for the support of public worship. This is an important consideration
because historians often point out a diSparity between states on this
subject,66 and because it will help toward a better understanding of
the First Amendment.

Much is made of the fact, for example, that Massachusetts is
said to have had a state church until the 1830's, this being contrasted
with the Virginia provision for "dis-establishment" during the Revolution.
The conclusion is usually drawn that Virginia was somehow more enlightened
than Massachusetts. A careful reading of the Massachusetts Constitution
in light of the concept of conscience set forth in this study helps toward
a better understanding of this unique situation. Article I stated that
all men have certain "natural, essential, and unalienable rights," a
statement found in many of the other constitutions.68 Article II provided
for liberty of conscience in the following form:

II. It is the right as well as the duty of all men in

society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the

SUPREME BEING, the great Creator and Preserver Of the uni-

verse. And no subject shall be hurt, molested, or re-

strained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for wore

shipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable
to the dictates of his own conscience: or for his

___._

66Every text examined covering either the Revolutioncurthe period

up to the 1830's follows the notion that a provision like that of Massa-
chusetts, to be examined below, was an "establishment" or state church.
See Kelly and Harbison, The American Constitution, cited above.

672IE29 68Thorpe, anstitutions, III, p. 1888.

67

227

religious profession of sentiments; provided he doth not

disturb the public eace, or obstruct others in their

religious worship.68
Like Article I, this Article differs little from that of other states.

The notion that Massachusetts somehow provided for "an establish-
ment" of religion hinges upon the meaning of Article III.70 It had
several sections, the first of which gave authority to the legislature
to encourage "public worship" because "the happiness of a peOple, and
the good order and preservation of civil government" depends upon religion.
Further, it gave political and religious societies power to arrange for
the support of public worship, and it suggested that citizens be enjoined
to attend public worship. There was no doubt about the fact that this
meant that taxes could be imposed for the support of public worship.
Without reference to the rest of the Article, this arrangement could
be called "an establishment" of religion.

But Article III has more to say. Crucial to the intent of the
above provision for public support was the next phrase "if there be any
on whose instructions they can conscientiousiy_and conveniently attend."71
In other words, the provisions could not violate the previously stated
rights of conscience. Further comment on the provision in question
appeared in the next phrase which said that all political and religious
societies Shall at all times have ”the exclusive right of electing" and
supporting their teachers. As for the money, it was to be used for the
support of whatever "religious sect or denomination" one chose. Finally,
Article III stated that every denomination "shall be equally under the
protection of the law" and that "no subordination of any one sect or de-

nomination to another shall ever be established by law."72

 

693.12- 7°Ibid.
71Ibid. (Italics mine.) 72Ibid.

228

The last sections make it amply clear that the writers of the
Constitution did not intend "an establishment" of religion in Massa-
chusetts. No one denomination was to be exclusively enthroned as the
official church of the state, as in the case of England for example.
The question remains, however, as to the meaning of the earlier pro-
visions of Article III. Encouraging people to attend public worship
and giving authority to the legislature to provide support for such
worship certainly appears to be state establishment of church. It is
precisely at this point that the concept of conscience as outlined in
this essay aids in understanding.

There is no conflict between Article II's provision for liberty
of conscience and Article III'S provision for the support of public
worship when liberty of conscience means liberty to do one's religion,
or the duty he owes his Creator. Article II in fact stated, "It is the
right as well as the duty of all men in society . . . to worship the
Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe:" there-
fore, ”no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained . . . for worb
shipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of
his own conscience."73 This provision could be made along side of one
that talked Of support for public worship, when the latter is recognized
as encourggement of public worship, rather than "an establishment" in
the sense of a state church.

The issue concerning the stance of a state toward "religion"
needs to be understood well. The Massachusetts Constitution's provisions
make sense only when the word religion is understood in the sense that

prevailed in the eighteenth century, namely, as an all inclusive view

 

73Ibid.

229

Of life. This is what the writers of the Massachusetts Constitution
had in mind when they stated that the happiness OfaipeOple and the
74

success of a government depended upon religion. Conscience was the
normative factor in religion, and so it had to be free from all inter-
ference. From this perspective encouragement of religion was natural
and inevitable. Clearly, however, liberty of conscience and encouragement
of religion were very different from the question of an established form
of religion, the latter being expressly prohibited in Massachusetts as

it was in most, if not all, other states. As for the change in the
Massachusetts Constitution in the 1830's concerning religion, it testi-
fies to a sustained desire on the part of that States' citizens to en-
courage religion, not a continuation of a state church as has so Often
been argued.

The distinction between encouragement of religion and establish-
ment of it found in the Massachusetts Constitution provides a further
insight into the meaning of the First Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution. Noted earlier was the fact that during the process of drafting
the First Amendment religion was viewed as being protected through
liberty Of conscience.75 This feature, together with the distinction
made concerning the Massachusetts Constitution, provide the basis for
a full appreciation of the First Amendment.

The familiar form of the First Amendment, finally ratified by
the States in 1791, had three main clauses.76 The first is clear enough,

"Congress shall make no law." The second, "respecting an establishment

 

4 .
7 Ibid.. ¢ .. . ... 75su ra, p. 219 ff.

 

76Constitution and Declaration, Doubleday edition.

230

of religion," has caused some difficulty and confusion among constitu-
tional lawyers. In view of the Massachusetts Constitution's provision,
"no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever
be established by law,"77 it appears that this clause could mean only
one thing, that Congress shall make no law reSpecting a religious establish-
ment, that it shall make no law elevating or subordinating any sect
or denomination, in other words, that it Shall not create a national
religious establishment, or church. This view is fully consistent with
the debates in the House noted earlier, debates on precisely this point.
The third clause, "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" has also
caused some difficulty for constitutional lawyers. As in the case of
the second clause on establishments, this one depends upon the state-
ment, "Congress shall make no law." In addition, the intent of the
words "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof“ refer back to the phrase
"respecting an establishment of religion." Religion is the key word in
each case; hence, the meaning of the third clause is that Congress shall
make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Translated into
the language of conscience, this phrase would read, Congress shall make
no law prohibiting the free exercise of conscience. The equation of
religion and conscience is as crucial as it is legitimate, for it is
only then that the First Amendment provides a framework within which
actions can be judged by a commonly accepted standard.

The First Amendment, like the Massachusetts Constitution, pre-
vented governmental interference in the area of establishments or

churches. In view of the fact that the states encouraged religion,

 

77Thorpe, Constitutions, III, p. 1888.

231

the question arises whether the First Amendment also encouraged reli-
gion. Whether the clause "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"

is read with or without reference to the equation of "religion" and
"conscience," it seems Obvious that the restriction on Congress is an
encouragement of religion. The difference between Massachusetts' strong
encouragement and the First Amendment's mild provision does not alter
the basic stance, for in each case the standard finally rests on the

Operation of conscience.

Appreciation of the place of conscience in the formulation of the
First Amendment requires some adjustments in the currently accepted atti-
tudes toward.the Amendment, particularly in the case of the separation-
ist doctrine. Borrowing from a view stated by Thomas Jefferson in a
letter to the Danbury Baptists' Association, written a decade after the
First Amendment was ratified, the separationist doctrine talks about
"a wall of separation."78 Often the phrase is used in the argument
to eliminate prayers in Congress and the motto "In God we trust" from
coins. When used this way, it is clear that the phrase intends a wall
of separation between the state and religion though at times the word
ghpggh is used when religion is intended.

The separationist doctrine is based upon two erroneous assump-
tions, one touching the intent of Jefferson's phrase, and the other
touching the Amendment's use of the word religion. Jefferson did not
intend to imply a "wall of separation" between religion and the state
when religion is understood to mean any eXpressions or actions that

refer to God, such as the prayers in Congress or the motto on coins.

 

78Leo Pfeffer, Church State and Freedom, "Introduction."

232

Jefferson's letter stated:

Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies

solely between man and his God, that he owes account

to none other for his faith or his worship, that the

legislative powers of government reach actions oniy,

and not Opinions, I contemplate with sovereign rever-

ence that act of the whole American peOple which de-

clared that their legislature should 'make no law

reSpecting an establishment Of religion, or prohib-

iting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a

wall of separation between church and state.
Clearly he believed that the First Amendment placed a wall of separation
between church and state, but he uses the word church in a different
way than he uses the word religion in this letter. Church refers to
"an establishment" of religion, and in this he is consistent with his
contemporaries' use of the word. Religion in the first part is the same
concept used by others at that time: it is the matter which lies be-
tween man and God, and it is beyond the reach of others, whether a matter
Of faith or worship. Jefferson's use of the word religion in this letter
makes even more sense if it is read with an eye to the place of conscience
in the whole affair. In his Notes 22_Virginia Jefferson demonstrated
that he assumed conscience was normative in religion. Speaking of reli-
gion he said, "Our rulers can have no authority over such" because
"the rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not submit."80

When the "wall of separation" is understood as Jefferson used
it, to describe the relationship between the government and religious
churches, it is obvious that the separationist view of religion is
different from that used in the formulation of the First Amendment.

As has been demonstrated, the framers Of the Amendment distinguished

 

79Saul K. Padover, The Complete Jefferson (New York, 1943),
pp. 518-519. (Italics mine.)

 

80Quoted in Jose h L. Blau, Cornerstones of Religious Freedom
_i_p_ America (Boston, 1949 , p. 79.

 

233

between organized religion, or church, and the free exercise of reli-
gion through conscience. If the men of Congress agree for reasons of
conscience that they desire to pray before they commence their business
that would seem to be their privilege in view of the fact that the
First Amendment prohibits interference with the free exercise of reli-
gion through conscience. The idea of a "wall of separation" has
nothing to do with the free exercise of religion through conscience,
either in Jefferson's letter, or in the context in which the First
Amendment was formulated. Contrary to the separationist doctrine, the
First Amendment saw religion as a phenomenon that could not be circum-
scribed in any manner, and this was true because conscience was the
normative factor.

Advocates of the separationist doctrine also point to the com-
ments of Jefferson and Madison on the question of the President pro-
claiming a national Day of Thanksgiving as evidence of the idea of a
wall of separation.81 Madison, after retirement from the Presidency,
stated that he did not think that it was a good practice, implying that
it tended to violate the establishment provision of the First Amendment.
Jefferson's position was the same.82 If such proclamations required
peOple to worship publicly, or to perform any act upon pain of penalty,
then it could be concluded that the free exercise of religion had been
interfered with. Proclamations do not require any performance, much
less upon pain of penalty; rather, they encourage people to care for
their religion through conscience. This encouragement comes from the

desire and free choice of the man who is President, undoubtedly as an

 

81Leo Pfeffer, Church State and Freedom, pp. 117-118.

821bid.

234

act of conscience. He is not required to make such a proclamation; he
may choose to not issue such a proclamation, as Jefferson decided to do.
The views of Jefferson and of Madison in this case are not normative of
the meaning of the First Amendment: they are reactions of individual
persons to the Amendment.

In sum, then, concerning the notion that the First Amendment
intended to establish a "wall of separation," it must be concluded that
such a phrase could only refer to the intent of the first part of the
Amendment, namely, "Congress shall make no law reSpecting an establish-
ment of religion," understanding "an establishment" to mean a national
religious establishment or national church. The second provision pre-
venting the free exercise of religion is, thus, left free to carry the
intent Congress had in mind when it formulated the Amendment, namely,
that everyone, including the President, was free to exercise his religion
through conscience. It would be better, however, to refrain from using
the notion of a wall of separation altogether, especially since the
phrase does not appear in the Amendment, using instead the classic
phrase "an establishment" of religion. The virtue of this phrase lies
in the fact that it serves to remind citizens of the long struggle waged
against established churches. Moreover, it leaves the next phrase of
the Amendment unencumbered, allowing it to serve as an additional re-
minder that the free exercise of religion through conscience is a
peculLarly American right; as Madison said, "one unguarded in the

British Constitution."

235

In conclusion, concerning liberty of conscience in the eighteenth
century, the era of the American Revolution was most important. It was
the time when a fundamental reordering of American society occurred, an
occasion in which liberty of conscience was established in all states
and in the new Federal Constitution. The pervasive provision for liberty
of conscience during the American Revolution was made because the public
in general, and constitution-writers in particular, regarded liberty of
conscience as normative for man in caring for religion, and by religion
they meant the comprehensive manner in which man relates to all reality.
Recognition of conscience as normative in this way also carried a commit-
ment to the idea of Sphere sovereignty,.that is, that various aspects of
life were unique and limited to specific purposes. Most obvious examples
of such Spheres were those of government and organized religion. As the
Revolution came to full fruition with the creation of the Federal Consti-
tution, the commitment to liberty of conscience was embodied in the
structure of the central government through the First Amendment. This
Amendment prevented Congress from creating a national religious estab-
lishment, or church, and it guaranteed the free exercise of religion
as broadly defined, through conscience.

The First Amendment is, thus, a great watershed“ in the history
of the struggle for liberty of conscience, for it was the culmination
of a long battle for the recognition of that idea set forth among Cambridge
Puritans and advanced by an ever-increasing number of people during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the same time, the First Amend-
ment Laid the foundation for an unprecedented degree of freedom through

conscience.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

In a broad perSpective, it may be concluded that the guarantee
of liberty of conscience at the time of the American Revolution, a
guarantee set forth in the newly formed state constitutions and the
First Amendment, was the result of a struggle that had roots deep in
the past.

That conscience was at liberty in relation to other men and
institutions was set forth in detail by the Elizabethan Puritan theolo-
gian William Perkins. With his declaration that Christ, in the New Testa-
ment, has given a liberty to conscience, he set out to indicate what
this declaration meant for his contemporaries. To say that conscience
was at liberty, and to say as he did that it was subject to God alone,
was to say that it was sovereign in relation to other men and institu~
tions. If conscience was sovereign, if conscience was at liberty, the
jurisdiction that pertained to institutions such as the state was
limited, distinct, and separate from other institutions. Perkins' view
of conscience as sovereign and at liberty in relation to other men and
institutions contrasted sharply, even radically, with that of English
governmental officials. The governmental attitude toward conscience
assumed that it came within the purview of the authority of the state,
or its agent, the church. Matters of conscience, for them,were viewed
as the object of a policy of toleration.

The difference in attitudes toward conscience evident in the

age of Elizabeth became more pronounced during the era of the early

236

I,

237

Stuarts. Sectarian splinters of the Cambridge Puritan movement grasped
the significance of the idea of conscience and its liberty for their
belief that individuals were free under the New Testament to decide

how and where they should perform their religiOus duties. At the same
time the governments of James I and Charles I continued to foster the
idea that conscience came within the jurisdiction of governmental author-
ity. As in the case of Elizabeth before them, certain actions based
upon conscience might be tolerated, but the decision as to what fell
within this policy of toleration, they believed, remained in the hands

of governmental officials.

During the early years of the Stuart era, William Ames, a some-
time student in Cambridge, created a system of theology which had as
its normative principle the dialectic method of Peter Ramus. When
Ames applied the dialectic method to the question of conscience, he
locked conscience and its problems to the dialectic method, precluding
the need or possibility of thinking of conscience in terms of liberty
and sovereignty. When Ames' view of conscience was applied in practice
in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, it precipitated a policy of toleration
toward conscientious thoughts and action. This was evident in the dis-
putes which Massachusetts Bay Leaders had with Roger Williams and Anne
Hutchinson. Massachusetts Bay Colony, thus, under its early leaders
had the same attitude toward conscience as did English government
officials though their position was based upon the systematic rational
of William Ames.

As the era of Civil War approached, liberty of conscience had
become a familiar idea among a wide range of people. In the war era

itself, liberty of conscience and sphere sovereignty were defended by

238

the Divines of the Westminster Assembly, individually and collectively
in the Assembly's Confession of Faith. levellers, supporters of Crom-
well, as well as John Milton, Cromwell himself, and others advocated
liberty of conscience in the tradition of William Perkins.

As the Restoration began, many men in Old England continued to
defend the claim of liberty of conscience, but the older concept of
conscience as an object of governmental authority and power again came
to dominate English society. The conflict between the idea of toleration
and the idea of liberty concerning conscience came to an end in 1689 as
the Act of Toleration was passed. This act enshrined the long-held
notion that conscience came within the purview of governmental author-
ity, this remaining as official policy until the nineteenth century.

While liberty and sovereignty of conscience failed in Old England,
it flourished in America from the earliest days of the colonial period.
In addition to persistent individual defenses of liberty of conscience,
as in the case of Roger Williams, liberty of conscience was provided for
in most of the seventeenth-century charters, Massachusetts Bay Colony
being the outstanding exception. By the end of the seventeenth century
it became clear that liberty of conscience, together with its parallel
idea of sphere sovereignty, were emerging as important elements in the
formation of an American political ideology. During the years after
1689, when John Iocke published an important defense of liberty and
sovereignty, colonial Americans increasingly drew upon his writings and
those of other defenders of the idea, such as the Westminster Divines,

to defend the claim of individual liberty. Liberty of conscience was

also used in this period to argue for the separation of institutional

Spheres of jurisdiction.

239

As the Revolution came, Americans had expressed their devotion
to liberty of conscience and Sphere sovereignty in a variety of ways,
in early charters, in individual pleas, and in their emerging political
ideology. During the Revolution itself liberty of conscience was
guaranteed as the new states were formed. Each state in writing a new
constitution provided for liberty of conscience; the same guarantee
appeared in the First Amendment. Sphere sovereignty as an integral
feature of the idea of liberty of conscience was a useful tool at the
time of the Revolution, also, for it supported the belief of many that
government was a separate, distinct, and limited institution. Liberty
of conscience, thus, became a fundamental idea in the American mind.

Liberty of conscience had its roots deep in the past, in the
works of the Puritan, William Perkins. Its history to the era of the

American Revolution, and beyond, is the history of a Puritan idea.

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