This is to certify that the thesis entitled GROUP SIZE AND COM'RIBUTIOI‘B TO COLLECTIVE ACTION: A TEST OF MANCUR OLSON, JR'S THEORY ON ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, INC. presented by Harriet Evelyn Tillock has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for PhD degree in $001010” Kg»; W aw Major professor Denton E. Morrison Date MW— 0-7639 nil-come In} HMS & 50'3' p. . ’5'“ 3m" INC." LIBRARY amozns mmmr. Inclin- a4." “Ji- ABSTRACT GROUP SIZE AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE ACTION: A TEST OF MANCUR OLSON, JR'S THEORY ON ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, INC. BY Harriet Evelyn Tillock This study tests Mancur Olson Jr's theory that member motiva- tions to contribute in collective action settings differ according to group size. The central notion of the theory is that incentives to contribute in large groups depend heavily upon the receipt of private goods available only to contributors but, in small groups, contributions are motivated primarily by a desire to achieve some larger public good. Olson's group size and public or private goods incentive con— cepts are operationalized and general hypotheses generated from them. Public and private goods incentives are refined, a contribu- tion index is constructed, and indices to measure the value of the incentives are developed. More specific hypotheses are generated relative to these concepts. The hypotheses are tested on Zero Population Growth, Inc., a social movement organization arising from the more general environ- mental movement. Data for testing are derived from responses to Harriet Evelyn Tillock questionnaires mailed to a national stratified (disproportionate) random sample of members of this organization. Comparisons of the mean value of incentives between small and large groups constitute the tests of the hypotheses. Results support Olson's theory in less than half the tests; therefore, his theory is not supported by this study. Results also indicate that public and private goods incentives are inextricably mixed in social movement organizations and possess a "moral" component which itself may be a primary incentive for contributing to collective action. It is concluded that the rela- tive value of the public good seems to transcend group size and immediate, personal "gain" components of Olson's theory. Further research is suggested to answer some of the questions raised by this study, including whether or not the relative value of the public good is the driving force behind contributions to collective action in social movements. GROUP SIZE AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE ACTION: A TEST OF MANCUR OLSON, JR'S THEORY ON ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, INC. BY Harriet Evelyn Tillock A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology 1976 © Copyright by HARRIET EVELYN TILLOCK 1976 DEDICATION To the memory of my mother Harriet Long Fleck who taught me to seek the answers to my questions. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A study like this would be impossible without the assistance of many people, and it is to those who have made this research possible that I now give a very special tribute. Robert A. Tillock DDS, my husband, whose continued support and encouragement sustained me throughout. Denton E. Morrison PhD, my chairman, whose ideas meshed with mine to focus on the original problem and whose critical guidance and insistence upon clarity kept the entire study in focus. Denton E. Morrison PhD, Stan Kaplowitz PhD, Barrie Thorne PhD, and James E. Zuiches PhD, members of my committee whose interest and assistance aided immeasurably in the completion of this research. Santo F. Camillari PhD, for advice on the quantitative analysis to be used in the study. Members and staff of the Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, for assistance at all stages of the research, and for provision of computer services needed for data analysis. Linda Buttel for invaluable aid in producing the data analysis needed for the study. Robert Dennis, Adam McLane, Larry Mires, John Tanton MD, and the other staff members and directors of Zero Population Growth, Inc., for their assistance at all stages of the research. iii Larry Barnett PhD, for making the results of earlier surveys available to me and for the advice and suggestions he freely offered. Robert S. P. Yien PhD, Chairman, Department of Sociology, Saginaw Valley State College, for his unfailing support and aid. Administration, Faculty and Staff of Saginaw Valley State College for their assistance and encouragement. Gary Shepherd PhD, for his invaluable aid in editing. Janice Fuller and Joyce Wixson for their careful typing. Special appreciation for financial assistance to Michigan State University College of Social Science for the Biomedical Science Support Grant, Michigan State University Faculty Women's Association for the Research Grant, and Saginaw Valley State College Professional Practices Committee for the Professional Growth and Development Grant. The members of Zero Population Growth, Inc., who took time to fill out and return the survey questionnaires, and without whose assistance this study would have been impossible. All the members of my family and Him Whose aid assures SUCCESS . iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RELEVANT LITEMTURE O O O C O O O C O O O O O 0 INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. . . SELECTING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. . . . . . The Olson Model of Collective Action. Usefulness of Olson's Theory for Purposes of This Study. . . . . . THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION USED AS DATA SOURCE FOR TESTING OLSON'S MODEL. . . REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE. . . . . . . . General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Voluntary Organizations in General. . Social Movements, Social Movement Organizations, and Incentives . . . Voluntary Organizations . . . . . . . Decision Making Relevant to Contri— butions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Incentives and Incentive Systems. . . 2 ELABORATING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MANCUR OLSON JR'S MODEL OF COLLECTIVE ACTION . . . . . . . AN OVERVIEW OF THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL . . . . . . . . . Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . Assumptions of Olson's Model. . . . . Some General Propositions . . . . . . POINTS OF CRITICISM. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 DATA AND METHODS O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O 0 THE TEST POPULATION: ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, INC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organization Characteristics: Zero Population Growth, Inc. . . . . . . Public and Private Goods. . . . . . . SAMPLE DESIGN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DATA GATHERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Procedure . . . . . . . . . Questionnaire Construction. . . . . . Page NH \IO‘O‘U'I to N0 14 16 19 19 21 21 24 25 28 31 31 31 33 37 39 39 4O Chapter Page 4 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND HYPOTHESES. . . . . . . . 44 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 OPERATIONALIZING GROUP SIZE. . . . . . . . . . 45 OPERATIONALIZING THE CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND SOCIAL INCENTIVES. . . . . . . . 50 Statement of Size-Incentive Hypotheses. 51 Problems in Operationalizing the Incentive Concepts. . . . . . . . . . 51 Operationalizing the Incentive Concepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 REFINING THE CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOODS INCENTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Personal and General Public Goods Utility Incentives. . . . . . . . . . 55 Contingency and Contributory Efficacy Incentives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Private Goods Incentives. . . . . . . . 61 CONTRIBUTIONS AND GAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Gain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Public to Private Goods Ratios. . . . . 66 Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 5 FINDINGS SURVEYED CHARACTERISTICS OF ZPG: AN OVER- VIEW OF THE ENTIRE SAMPLE. . . . . . . . . 68 PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND SOCIAL PRESSURE INCEN- TIVES: TESTING THE ORIGINAL OLSON HYPOTHESES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 TESTING THE "REFINED" HYPOTHESES ON PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND SOCIAL PRESSURE INCENTIVES . . . 76 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GROUP SIZE AND PUBLIC GOODS INCENTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Gain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Ratio of Public to Private Goods Incentive Values. . . . . . . . . . . 84 Overall Summary of Findings . . . . . . 86 ELABORATION AND DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS . . 88 Summary by Group Size Operationali- zations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Magnitudes of Incentives and Magni- tudes of Differences. . . . . . . . . 92 The Value of Information Incentives: Private and Public Aspects. . . . . . 95 Public Goods Incentives: Personal and General Utility . . . . . . . . . 98 Implications for Collective Action in Social Movements . . . . . . . . . 101 vi Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS GENERAL OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTED RESEARCH CONC LUS ION I O O C O C C O O O C O APPENDICES A ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, INC. . . . . . . B QUESTIONNAIRE, LETTERS, RAW RESULTS . . . C DETAILED TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . D RESPONSES TO OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS . . . . REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Page 105 106 110 111 117 130 135 152 Table 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.12 LIST OF TABLES SAMPLING DESIGN AND ZPG MEMBERSHIP BY GROUP CATEGORY ' AUGUST ' 1975 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O STATEMENTS USED TO OPERATIONALIZE INCENTIVES. . . . . CONTRIBUTIONS INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REASONS FOR BELONGING T0 ZPG. . . . . . . . . . . . INCENTIVE VALUES FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE . . . . . . . RANKING OF OPEN-ENDED RESPONSE CATEGORIES TO THE QUESTION: "WHAT DO YOU PERSONALLY GAIN FROM MEMBERSHIP IN ZPG? .' O C O O O O O O O O O C C O O O . SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO OPEN-ENDED QUESTION "WHAT GAIN?" BY GROUP SIZE OPERATIONALIZATIONS. . . . SUMMARY OF TESTS OF OLSON HYPOTHESES: INCENTIVE TYPES BY GROUP SIZE OPERATIONALIZATIONS . . . . . . . INDEX VALUE OF INCENTIVES BY GROUP SIZE . . . . . . . RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDICES OF PUBLIC GOODS INCENTIVES BY GROUP SIZE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . INDIVIDUAL GAIN BY GROUP SIZE . . . . . . . . . . . . SUMMARY OF SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESES . . . . . . . . . . SUMMARY OF SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESES BY GROUP SIZE OPEMTIONALIZATIONS O O O O C C C C O I O I O O C O O DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT OF HYPOTHESES BY GROUP SIZE. . INCENTIVE VALUES BY GROUP SIZE OPERATIONALIZATIONS. . NUMBER OF MEMBERS BY STATE AND ACTIVE CHAPTER SIZE IN STATE 0 O O C O O C O O O O O I O O O O O O 0 "WHAT DO YOU PERSONALLY GAIN FROM MEMBERSHIP IN ZPG?" DETAILED O O C O O O O O O C C O O O O O O O O O O 0 viii Page 34 54 64 7O 72 73 75 77 80 83 85 87 89 93 94 114 130 131 Table Page C.3 DETAILED.......................133 C O 4 TABLE SUMMARY 0 O O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1 34 ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RELEVANT LITERATURE INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM A persistent problem for all voluntary organizations is to induce member contributions. The strategies employed by voluntary organizations to obtain contributions vary greatly, as does the degree of success which these strategies produce. In every case, however, the one problem remains central to all voluntary organiza- tions: how to provide people with some "good" that is sufficient to elicit and maintain contributions. This general problem becomes even more difficult to resolve within that class of voluntary organizations grouped under the rubric of "social movements." The peculiar difficulty for social movements is that the ultimate goals of many social movement organizations go beyond the mere satisfac- tion of member needs to the larger realm of ”public good"; i.e., to provide some presumed benefit for people in general, not just for contributing members of the movement. This general problem of producing incentives for member contri- butions in voluntary organizations, particularly in social movements which seek "public goods", will constitute the major focus of my study. In this initial chapter I will attempt to clarify what I view as the central issues related to generating collective action, 2 or member contributions, by (1) identifying and summarizing a theoretical framework which appears to be most useful in dealing with the problem, (2) reviewing those studies in the general literature which have the greatest relevance for both various aspects of the problem and the theory I have chosen to apply to the problem, and (3) briefly summarizing the specific social move- ment organization which will serve as the data source for testing hypotheses derived from the theory. SELECTING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The Olson Model of Collective Action Among the many explanations for collective action that have been offered, perhaps the most cogent and explicit (but relatively untested) is the rational, economic model developed by Mancur Olson Jr in The Logic of Collective Action (1971a).1 Olson's model is intended as an alternative to traditional "interest group theory", i.e., the commonsense idea that people act collectively when it is in their common interest to do so. Instead, Olson focuses upon specific group incentives for action. Olson's major hypothesis is that member motivations to contribute in collective action settings differ according to group size. In "large groups", according to Olson, contributions depend heavily upon the receipt of private goods available only to contributors. In "small groups", however, 1Olson's model is mostly elaborated with regard to collective action in the economic sphere. However, Olson does intend his model to be interpreted as a general one, and thus it should be applicable to any case of collective action. 3 contributions are motivated primarily by a desire to achieve some larger public good. By definition, "public goods" are available to every member of the group whether or not that individual has made a contribution. Obviously costs are involved in production of that "good." Olson is convinced that shares received by contributors are larger and costs are less in small groups. The reverse is true in large groups, since organization is required for production in larger groups and marginal organizational costs raise the total cost per share. In addition, shares tend to be smaller in large groups. So, according to Olson, only in small groups are the costs low enough and shares received large enough to provide sufficient incentive to contribute. In large groups, "private goods" (available only to contributors) must be provided as supplements to the "public good” in order to provide incentives for member contributions to collective action. Usefulness of Olson's Theory for Purposes of This Study Olson's theory attempts to explain why it is that individuals so often fail to act collectively, even when it would be in their own best interests to do so. Olson's approach should be especially useful in examining behavior in social movements, because social movements generally arise from large groups sharing a common interest. As Olson points out, few, if any, large "latent" interest groups do actually act collectively as traditional "interest group" theorists would suggest. Thus, if Olson's theory 4 can produce empirical support, it might help explain why social movement type interest groups often do not act collectively.2 The theory should also help integrate other concepts and studies related to social movements. For instance, the growth and decline cycle in social movement organizations has often been noted. Various explanations for this cycle have been proposed, including positing relationships between the organization and the larger society or its institutions, intra-organizational processes such as goal displacement or oligarchy, membership characteristics, etc. What has received less attention is the basis of membership support of a social movement organization, especially during a period of leveling or decline. In contrast to other theories, Olson might argue that fluctuations in the types of incentives to contribute and/or in the size of the groups would influence the direction of the observed cyclic changes. Thus, relative to the basic membership support for organizations, Olson's model has potential for expanding explanations of the cyclic nature of social movement organizations.3 Olson's theory might suggest reasons why participation in voluntary associations is not extensivepas is generally assumed. Studies indicate that less than half of the population belong to 2The general notion that group size determines certain behaviors has long been a widely held tenet in social science, but the effect of group size on incentives in collective action has not been treated directly. Empirical support of Olson's theory would provide guidelines for inducing more frequent collective action, especially for groups like the "silent majority" whose interests are presumably not now being considered. 3This matter will not be considered directly in this study. 5 any group designated as voluntary (including unions and churches), and only 20 percent of these people are actively involved (Sills, 1968:365). No really adequate explanations have been offered for this low rate of participation. Olson does offer an explanation for differential participation in any collective action: i.e., incentives are dependent on group size, and decisions are made on the basis of individual maximization of profit. Assuming (as Olson does) that adequate resources are available for contribu- tions, differential participation in social movements could be explained on the basis that social movement organizations must .generally provide ”private" incentives since they are large groups, and these incentives have differential value as incentives to individuals. THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION USED AS DATA SOURCE FOR TESTING OLSON'S MODEL The social movement organization that I have chosen as a test of Olson's model is Zero Population Growth, Inc. (hereafter desig- nated as ZPG)--a currently on-going group that has emerged out of the more general "environmental movement." The environmental movement bloomed in the late sixties, peaked about 1970-1971, and since then has receded somewhat in visibility in American society (Hornback, 1974). ZPG itself was incorporated in 1968, reached a peak membership of 37,000 in 1971, then stabilized at its present membership of about 12,000. Thus, ZPG clearly represents a social movement organization undergoing the growth and decline cycle referred to above. 6 ZPG consists of autonomous chapters of various sizes chartered by the national organization. Chapters may have local goals dif- ferent from, or supplementary to, those of the national organization. Members may belong to local chapters or affiliate only with the national group. Variations in chapter size, and in local or national affiliation, suggest representations of the small and large group divisions needed to test Olson's model. An additional important advantage of studying an organization comprised of different size subégroups is the ability to control for the possibility that dif- ferences in organizational goals might influence incentives, and so not provide a clear test of the effect of group size upon those incentives to contribute to collective action. More specific details concerning ZPG and the methods employed to collect data for testing Olson's model will be discussed in Chapter 3. Meanwhile, it should now be helpful to further elaborate the main issues this study is concerned with by briefly reviewing some of the literature that already exists that is directly relevant for incentives and/or contributions in voluntary organizations generally and social movement organizations particularly. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE General The intent of the following literature review is to bring together those empirical studies and theoretical ideas that have some implication for the Olson incentive-contribution model of collective action (i.e., incentives to contribute differ by group size). Much of this literature does not approach the clarity of 7 the concepts and hypotheses developed by Olson. Nevertheless, these studies do produce enough conceptual overlap to accomplish at least two things: one, to establish that Olson's model is in fact applicable to some of the central issues and ideas that must be dealt with in the study of social movements; and two, to provide clues for the possible elaboration of Olson's model. Voluntary Organizations in General Collective action within a voluntary organizational framework has been of deep interest to social scientists in all disciplines for many years, and there exists a voluminous literature on the subject.4 The limited intention of my review here will be to consider only literature that has some bearing upon incentives to contribute to collection action—-the basic element of Olson's model and the focus of the present study. In the social sciences, general usage of the term "voluntary associations" refers to a structured, formally organized, relatively permanent grouping to which people belong by choice. For example, voluntary organizations are usually considered to be non-profit and not connected with a government. In addition, voluntary organiza- tions generally have a formal structure with offices filled in a specified manner, by-laws or constitutions, scheduled meetings, and 4For extensive reviews of this literature see: Constance Smith and Anne Freedman, VOluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972) and the two volumes edited by David Horton Smith, voluntary Action Research: 1972 and VOluntary Action Research: 1973 (Lexington, Mass.: D. W. Heath and Company, 1972 and 1973). 8 criteria for membership (Smith and Freedman, 1972: viii-ix; Harp, 1973: 4). Traditional "interest group" theory tends to assume that forma- tion of a voluntary organization occurs only to further the collective interests of its members. However, it is clear that many interest groups may function not only in ways beneficial to individual members, but also in ways beneficial to society in general. Thus, incentives for participation in such groups must be "public" as well as "private.” For instance, Smith and Freedman (1972: 33-85), in their review of the literature on voluntary organizations, emphasize a number of functions and dysfunctions of interest groups in a democratic society: some of these can be implicitly viewed as underlying the bases of incentives. The most relevant of these "functional" incentives include the following: (1) Interest groups prevent the arbitrary exercise of power by governments and/or elitist groups; i.e., they counteract the concentration of power described by Michel's "Iron Law of Oligarchy." (2) Groups provide a framework for expressing an individual's interests so that interests are not only articulated and considered, but also so that antagonistic interests can be negotiated and controlled in an orderly manner which will not disrupt the society. (3) Whenever the need arises, interest groups can function as special pressure groups to influence the democratic process. Sills (1968) agrees with Olson that individuals generally do not spontaneously join together to advance their interests, but once they have been encouraged to join a voluntary organization, individuals do benefit from the manifest functions of the 9 organization as expressed in its program. The program may be designed to satisfy interests ranging from sociability to political action. Voluntary organizations may act independently to further members' interests or may seek to influence decisions and actions of policy-making bodies. Since the general public is less likely to belong to such organizations than are socio-economically more advantaged people, the latter are more likely to have their interests represented. Although these groups may be less successful than economic or governmental agencies in articulating members' interests, their costs to the individual tend to be relatively sma11,and they may represent the only avenue open to individuals in expressing their concern over some issue (see warner, 1973). Social Movements, Social Movement OrganiZations, and Incentives Interest groups and voluntary organizations not only respond to change, but of course social movements may initiate change. In this area of the literature, "interest" in the movement is often treated as if it automatically implies membership in an organization. This, of course, need not always be the case. Many persons may have an interest in a particular movement and may even occasionally engage in activity related to the movement "cause" and yet never actually join a formal organization requiring contributions or dues. The environmental movement provides a good case in point: many people were interested in the environmental cause to the extent of joining in "Earth Day" activities or using phosphate-free soaps, but never had strong enough incentives to join environmental movement 10 organizations. Indeed, this provides a classic example in support of Olson, since the benefits of a less polluted environment do not depend upon the contribution of a particular individual. In short, interest does not always mean incentive to contribute. Nevertheless, private interests within social movements should still be taken into account, because they undoubtedly constitute some portion of the total motivation for individual contributions to collective action. According to Milgrim and Toch (1969: 584-585), articulation of the feelings, concerns and hopes of individuals (especial1yiifthe movement offers an opportunity to solve perceived problems) is more important to social movement participants than size or organization. Various psychological factors and "need states”, especially the need to affiliate and/or the intrinsic value of membership in a group, may provide incentives to partici- pants (Birney, 1968: 519; Berkowicz, 1969: 62-64). Killian (1964) provides a contrast to the emphasis on individual psychological factors with his argument that participants in move- ments are heterogeneous in: (1) their interpretation of the move- ment and its values: (2) their participation in movement activities; and (3) their commitment, which ranges from dedication to passive support. This heterogeneity of members makes it more fruitful to study the interaction in the social movement or its organizations than individual psychological factors. Much of the social movement literature assumes that the major incentive for membership is based on the professed goals of the social movement organization (hereafter SMO). However, some studies have shown that,although members subscribe to organizational goals, 11 they often join and/or participate for a variety of non-organizational reasons (Moore, 1961: Minnis, 1952). One particularly good example of this point is provided by Jacoby and Babchuk (1963), who found that while members joined an organization for its specific goal of providing a service or producing a product, many members then remained in the organization because of the activities which they found to be individually gratifying. Although not specifically related to participants in social movements, relevant here is Smith and Reddy's (1973: 169-237) extensive review of the literature related to the impact of volun- tary organizations upon the participant. These authors noted that different types of organizations had different effects upon par- ticipants, but concluded that all effects were probably mediated by prior individual experiences or other influences not directly related to the organization. Particularly interesting for present purposes were the following observations: (1) Voluntary organiza- tions are less able to gain membership cooperation because they are generally less important to the individual than family and/or economic involvement. (2) Members' individual levels of involvement and levels of rewards in voluntary organizations vary greatly. Thus, in any one group, impact is directly related to levels of participation and perceived rewards. (3) Some research evidence indicates that individual feelings of happiness or satisfaction are enhanced by participation in volunteer activity.5 (4) In externally 5Phillips (1967) reports a similar finding. Persons engaged in activity from which they are free to withdraw tend to have more positive than negative emotions,and the former are related to participation. 12 focused, instrumental organizations, impact on the individual tended to decrease willingness to volunteer in all settings, but increase incentives to engage in activities of great personal interest. The foregoing discussion indicates that incentives per se have not been treated very precisely in the literature. In general, the articulation of members' interests is implied as incentive to join voluntary organizations, and certain rewards (or impacts) received as a result of membership provide incentives to continue membership. As should become more apparent in Chapter 2, Olson's clear emphasis upon specific incentives offers potential for better understanding collective behavior in SMO's. Voluntary Organizations Certain aspects of organizations affect incentives, and there- fore it is appropriate to look more closely at what the literature has to say about some of these factors. Organizations are often typed by the principal activity of the group, i.e., such functions as sociability or production of goods and services (Warriner and Prather, 1965). Organizational goals are the basis of the often-used typology developed by Gordon and Babchuk (1965). In this typology the authors used (1) "expressive" to mean provision of activities gratifying to members, (2) "instru- mental" to illustrate organizations providing specific goals, and (3) "instrumental-expressive", the latter combined the other two, Since its activities are gratifying to the partiCipants but also are means to external ends. 13 Social movement organizations differ from other organizations in several ways according to Zald and Ash (1966). Typically,SMO's have goals aimed at changing the society. Purposive (goal directed) incentive structures dominate, although solidary (social activities) incentives may provide a secondary role in the incentive system. Because of the primacy of the purposive incentives, SMO's often have difficulty maintaining member commitment and participation, given the demands of family and occupational roles of members. Most SMO's are "inclusive" since they must rely on a large base of potential support from persons whose goals harmonize with those of the SMO. In "inclusive" organizations members need not be deeply committed; they need only provide general support in most cases and therefore may not have a strong incentive to remain in and/or support the organization under changing conditions. For this reason "inclusive" SMO's must provide incentives to retain member contributions and, in fact, the incentives available to the members may be one of the critical factors in the change and/or survival of the SMO. Social movement organizations can also be characterized by the correspondence between the components of the organization. SMO's generally fit into either "congruent“ or "non-congruent" types. Congruent SMO's are typified either by expressive goals with exclusive membership or instrumental goals with inclusive member- ship. Within congruent instrumental-inclusive SMO's, the organiza- tion provides more incentives for goal directed activities than for interpersonal or'social activities. This type of organization must also be able to provide some form of incentive alternative for 14 members in order to retain their membership in the face of poten- tial competition from other sources, especially other SMO's. Decision Making Relevant to Contributions As has been noted previously, individuals do not always join SMO's; rather, each person goes through a decision-making process before contributing to collective action. That literature relevant to such decision-making is now presented. Hirschman (1971) analyzes political processes in organizations, utilizing economic concepts as analytic tools. Hirschman compares options that are available to consumers of goods regardless of whether the goods are produced in market or non-market situations. One option is to "exit" from the organization when the good deteriorates or the price of obtaining it rises. Exit in the deterioration situa- tion occurs first for those with the most surplus or interest. Exit in the rising cost condition occurs first for those with the least surplus or interest. Exit may be difficult or undersirable under certain conditions, and then "voice" (influencing organizational activities) is utilized in an attempt to improve the product. The latter is applicable to the special case in which the group product is a public good which cannot be avoided by member or non-member. Under these conditions, since leaving the group will deteriorate the public good further, the member will remain in the hope of influenc- ing, by voice, the quality of the good he must accept regardless of its quality. Finally, according to Hirschman, loyalty also exists as a factor in determining exit, since it encourages both a demand for voice and retention of membership beyond the point where these 15 would normally be exchanged for exit. It would follow from Hirschman's formulation that desire, or ability, to influence the quality of the good produced may be part of the incentive which influences the decision to Contribute. Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young (1971) addressed the problem of individual decision-making as it relates to contributions in producing a common good unobtainable by individual action. They suggest that members often pool their contributions and hire a "political entrepreneur" to assist in providing the common good. The entrepre- neur need not necessarily be interested personally in the production of the good, but he does provide the leadership and organization that are often necessary to produce the good. According to this model, an individual assesses the probability that the good will be provided if he contributes. If his contribution will make no dif- ference in the outcome, he will not act. However, if the political entrepreneur can persuade the individual that (a) his contribution will help assure the supply or the quality of the good, (b) his contribution will be pooled with others so that all share in costs, and (c) others will act if he does, then the member may decide to contribute. Decisions between preferred alternatives are made on the basis of expected value to the individual in his unique situa- tion and also on the subjective probability that the outcome will, in fact, be as expected. This model includes the concept that the value of the good differs for each member of the group. That is, given that there is some organization and sharing of costs, members decide on contribUtions,run:on the basis of the size of the share they will receive, but on how much personal benefit will be 16 realized from that share and/or the probability that the good will be supplied without a contribution. Although the value of the share is emphasized, the model recognizes that benefits may be greater in small groups because of other factors, such as direct interaction with others. However, there is still not explicit expectation that group size per se determines either individual actions or the probability that the good will be provided. Coleman (1966) discusses the problems with rational decision- making in situations where (1) perfect consensus does not exist, (2) where there may not be benefit of equal value to each partici- pant in an exchange, and (3) where participation of all members is required if the benefit is to be gained. Consensus can be inferred through the operations of such devices or mechanisms as majority or plurality rule in which participants agree to abide by the rule of the majority. When benefits are of unequal value to partici- pants, individuals will generally attempt to obtain that which is of highest personal value. Coleman's final point is that individuals who disagree with a group decision will decide whether to agree or not on the basis of the relative costs and benefits of consent vs. refusal to consent to the action. Incentives and Incentive Systems Gamson (1975) indicates that neither personal decisions nor interactional factors alone are sufficient explanations for contri- butions to collective action. According to Gamson, SMO's success or failure is related to multiple factors such as strategies employed by leaders, organizational structure, and the ability to create l7 loyalty and demand self-sacrifice of the members. However, success is also highly influenced by the ability of the group to offer some form of selective incentives to members and, thus, SMO's without resources for selective incentives may not be able to survive (Gamson, 1975: 142). Clark and Wilson (1961) relate incentive systems within organi- zations to a number of factors, including the type of organization, processes within the organization, changes in resources available for incentive purposes, relationships with other organizations, and changes in personal motives within the society.- Although resources are usually scarce in SMO's, executives may alter incentives in response to changes in motivations of individual or collective contributors. Incentives for contributions are considered to be the satisfaction of individual motives, especially self-preservation or self-gratification. Clark and Wilson define categories of incentives as follows: (1) Material, or tangible, rewards: usually either money or objects that are exchangeable for money; are often related to organizational goals. (2) Solidarity: intangible and usually not exchangeable for money but include rewards obtained from socialization, identi- fication with the group, status, etc. These incentives are usually independent of organizational goals. (3) Purposive: intangible, but based on the goals of the organization which are of value to contributors; usually related to issues, not specific objects, and most often are difficult to define and/or achieve. Organizations may utilize more than one incentive system, but usually one system is dominant. The dominant system affects l8 intra-organizational processes and behavior. Purposive organizations have the most problems since their goal is usually more generalized, and means for obtaining the goal can become more salient than the often ill-defined goal itself. Emphasis in purposive groups tends to be on services such as providing information, doing research, and promoting the organization in public relations. Since indi- viduals in American society seem more willing to contribute in response to material or solidarity incentives rather than purposive incentives, these alternative incentives often evolve in purposive type organizations. It is obvious from this brief review of the literature that incentives play a vital role in encouraging contributions to col- lective action in social movements,but that the incentive-contribution problem lacks precise formulation. Given this general imprecision, it seems clear that Olson's model of collective action provides a potentially important theoretical tool for more closely examining contribution incentives--or their lack--in social movements. While the literature is not always unanimous in its empirical support of Olson's contentions, there exists enough general agreement on important issues to warrant serious consideration and testing of his model. And it is precisely the virtue of Olson's model that it is clearly enough articulated to permit empirical testing. This introductory chapter has only provided a cursory outline of the major theoretical elements which make up this model. The task of Chapter 2, therefore, will be to detail the specific concepts and assumptions that constitute Olson's theory so that test hypotheses can be developed and analyzed in terms of the data gathered on ZPG. CHAPTER 2 ELABORATING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MANCUR OLSON JR'S MODEL OF COLLECTIVE ACTION Mancur Olson Jr's ideas concerning the "logic of collective action” constitute an unusually articulate and provocative theoreti- cal model for examining member participation in voluntary organiza- tions. The major intent of the preceding chapter was to indicate, in a general way, how this model might be usefully applied to the analysis of social movements. The intent of this chapter will be to specify the major points of Olson's model, including definitions of his key concepts, summaries of his basic assumptions, and state- ments of his general hypotheses. AN OVERVIEW.OF.THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION MODEL Olson begins his argument by noting that production of a collec- tive good is problematic even when it is in the best interests of individuals to help provide the good through their contributions. The problem lies in the fact that all goods cost something to pro- duce, and rational individuals will seek the greatest possible benefit at the least possible cost. Since, by definition, a collective good is equally shared among all members of the group (and with non-members in the case of public goods), any given member is entitled to a share of the good. 0n the other hand, an individual 19 20 member may be unwilling to take the responsibility of bearing a share of the costs. In Olson's theory the size of the group is crucial in determin- ing the general willingness of group members to share costs. For instance, in small groups the share of the collective good each member receives may be large enough so that individuals are willing to help bear the costs, in fact in some cases to bear the entire cost of production, if the good would not otherwise be available. However, in large groups, each member usually receives a smaller share of the collective good. In addition, costs will include marginal organizational costs, since organization is increasingly required for production of a good in increasingly larger groups. In short, as groups become larger, the share of the collective good will become smaller, the cost greater, and hence individual members will be less willing to make contributions. Thus, the consequence of increasing organizational size, according to Olson, is that large groups will rarely operate only on the basis of collective goods incentives. Where large groups do exist, they are usually either "by-products” of institutional structures which can force members to share the costs, and/or the large groups offer some private good available only to contributors. In short, therefore, large groups will generally be less likely to produce a collective good than small groups. In addition, large groups will produce collective goods only if coercion and/or selective incentives are provided as supplementary inducements for sharing costs among members. 21 SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL As I have previously indicated, one of the virtues of Olson's model is its explicitly defined conceptual structure. Now that a general overview of this model has been presented, it will be helpful to summarize the more exact meanings that Olson gives to his key concepts. Definition of Terms A. GROUP: "A number of individuals with a common interest" (Olson, 1971a: 8). This does not imply a group in the sociological sense of being organized in some way, only that a potential for organization exists on the basis of a common substantive interest in a collective good. B. CONTRIBUTION: An individual resource provided for the group to assist collective action. As we have seen, contribution is always problematic to Olson. C. GOOD: That which has value, especially as an incentive for contributions; an objective or desire held in common with all others in the group. n. PUBLICJ comop, OR COLLECTIVE GOOD: ". . .any good such that, if any person X1 in a group x ,...,xi,...,xn consumes it, it 1 cannot feasibly be withheld fromithe others in that group" (Olson, 1971a: 14) . In other words, a public, coulnon, or collective good is such that each member of the designated group receives a share: no group member may be denied a share regardless of the contribution 22 that member may or may not have made. (Since "public goods" are the focus of the present study, I will hereafter not use the terms "common" or "collective" good.) E. PRIVATE OR "SELECTIVE" GOODS: Goods such that individual shares are "selectively" available only to contributors; i.e., provision.of the goods is selective between contributors and non- contributors. For example, most professional societies provide a specialized journal ”free" to members, but charge high subscrip- tion rates for the journal to non-members. F. UTILITY: The pr0perty of a good which makes it of value, 1 . . . .or worth something, to an individual or group. Utility applies to all types of goods, intangible as well as tangible, and public as well as private. G. GROUP RESOURCES: The pool of contributions available to the group to further collective action: "surplus resources" are those available to the individual to be used for contributions to the group. 1Olson concedes that the utility of a particular good may vary between individuals, but he does not deal with the possibility of individual variation in utility over time. In addition, theo- retically, utility could also be negative, but Olson implies only positive utility in his discussion. Negative utility would not act as an incentive to contribute to the group, which is the sense Olson uses. It may be implied that negative utility might act as a posi- tive incentive to contribute to some other group that was acting to prevent the production of the good in question. 23 H. COLLECTIVE ACTION: Combining member contributions and other resources to produce a public good. The antithesis to indi- vidual action. I. PERCEPTIBILITY: The effect a contribution will have upon collective good production as interpreted by individuals. Specifi- cally, Olson designates contributions as having a "perceptible" influence when persons believe the public good will be produced with the aid of their individual contribution and, conversely, that the good will not be produced without that contribution. Olson's notion of perceptibility is similar to the concept of "efficacy", which will be refined and developed more precisely in this study (see Chapter 4, "Operational Definitions and Hypotheses"). J. NOTICEABILITY: That condition in which the actions of any one individual are known to others in the group. K. GROUP SIZE: An implied continuum from small to large, with differentiation between various group sizes made on the basis of the following criteria: (1) SMALL or "PRIVILEGED" GROUP: "...a group such that each of its members, or at least some of them, has an incentive to see that the collective good is provided, even if he has to bear the full burden of providing it himself" (Olson, 1971a: 50). (2) INTERMEDIATE GROUP: "...A group in which no single member gets a share of the benefit sufficient to give him an incentive to provide the good himself, but which does not have so many members that no one member will notice whether any other member 24 is or is not helping to provide the collective good. ...no collective good may ever be obtained without some group coordination or organization" (Olson, 1971a: 50). (3) LARGE or "LATENT" GROUP: "...is distinguished by the fact that, if one member does or does not help provide the collective good, no other one member will be significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to react....an individual in a latent group cannot make a noticeable contribu- tion to any group effort, and since no one in the group will react if he makes no contribution, he has no incentive to contribute" (Olson, 1971a: 50).2 L. RATIONALITY: Decision-making determined on the basis of maximizing individual benefits and minimizing individual costs. M. SELF-INTEREST: Acting "rationally" to maximize individual benefit, or welfare, without consideration for the interests of others. Assumptions of Olson's Model Any conceptual model ultimately relies upon, and is constrained by, a number of empirical conditions and logical (but untested) suppositions holding true. An additional attraction of Olson's formulation is that it makes explicit this assumptive base. ,The major assumptions of the model are as follows: 1. A public good is considered to have a ”nonexcludable” property, since if one persOn consumes it, it cannot be withheld from others. 2A "latent group" is the subject of this study, and clearly meets the criteria presented here. 25 2. "Jointness of supply" for a public good is not a necessary con- dition but may exist, meaning that if one person obtains the good, it can easily be supplied to others as well and in some cases (i.e., with pure public goods) additional consumption does not diminish the supply. 3. What is considered a public good by one group may not be con- sidered a "good" by others in the society.3 4. Perfect consensus exists in the group with regard to goals and means. 5. Each individual in the group may assign the public good a dif- ferent utility. This differential utility is related to the proportion of the individual's invested resources and/or desire for more of the good. 6. All individuals act in a rational and self-interested manner. 7. Individuals have personal resources available for use and/or investment. Some General Propositions Olson's model produces general propositions by relating the following variables: (1) size of the group, including both number of persons plus the value of the public good to each member, (2) rate or level of the public good obtained, (3) the fraction or share of the group good available to each member, (4) individual 3This assumption will fit my own test of a social movement organization. The ”orbital" model developed by Morrison and Hornback (Hornback, 1974) shows that most public goods associated with social movements have both proponents and opponents, and among proponents especially, the strength of the support varies from strong to weak. As we will see, this is also true of ZPG members. 26 advantage based on gain minus costs, and (5) individual decisions based upon personal advantage gained from contributions. Upon examining the interrelationships among these factors, Olson con- cludes that collective action will occur: "...only when the benefits to the group from having the collective good exceeds the total cost by more than it exceeds the gain to one or more individuals in the group" (Olson, 1971a: 34). It now becomes more apparent why size assumes such an important role in Olson's model. Large groups, for instance, are unlikely to engage in collective action because total costs tend to be high while shares tend to be small. In contrast, collective action is more likely to occur in small groups where individual shares are relatively large.4 However, no matter how great the utility associated with a larger share, it will not act as an incentive for contributions unless the individual also perceives his contribution as perceptibly affecting the possible production of the good. The perceptibility factor also interacts with group size. According to Olson, the probability that a group will act without special inducements, such as coercion and/or private goods incentives, ”...depends on whether the individual actions of any one or more members in a group are noticeable to any other individuals in the group. This is most obviously, but 4According to Olson, in groups where members have unequal interest in the good, collective action is also probable: ”...for the greater the interest in the collective good of any single member, the greater the likelihood that the member will get such a signifi- cant proportion of the total benefit from the collective good that he will gain from seeing that the good is provided" (Olson, 1971a: 34). 27 not exclusively, a function of the number in the group... since the larger the group, the less the likelihood that the contribution of any one will be perceptible" (Olson, 19713: 45). If individuals believe their contribution is not perceptible, and therefore will not make a difference in the outcome, they are not likely to contribute unless they can be coerced or are offered private goods incentives. In some cases, persons may receive satis- faction from contributing per se, whether or not their action is noticeable. In such cases, satisfaction gained from the contribu- tion may be seen as a private or non-collective good, available only to some members of the group. In those groups where actions are perceptible and noticed by others in the group, a social incentive may operate. This social incentive is in the form of pressure from others in the group to insure that all members bear their share of the costs. The social pressure incentive is separate from the goods incentives and may .operate as the sole incentive. On the other hand, in a large group, where a contribution makes no perceptible effect upon the outcome and the costs are relatively high, private or selective goods are required as incentives. These private goods are available only to contributors and, when added to the benefit obtained from the public good, may produce a total gain greater than the costs required of individuals. Where we find a large group that does not provide positive inducements in the form of private goods, the group is often the institutional "by-product" of a larger organization which has the power to coerce contributions. For example, the political action group of a union is supported by 28 a portion of union dues which must be paid by all members regardless of their interest in the political action. In essence, then, large groups engage in collective action only when they can coerce contri- butions and/or provide private incentives available only to contributors. To summarize: Olson's general hypothesis is that in small groups, public good incentives will predominate. In large groups, private goods incentives are necessary to supplement whatever public good incentives may be operating. Simply stated, incentives differ according to group size. In Olson's own words: "In any event, size is one of the determining factors in deciding whether or not it is possible that the volun- tary, rational pursuit of individual interest will bring forth group-oriented behavior" (Olson, 1971a: 52). Olson's general model does not offer specific hypotheses for empirical testing, nor does it provide specific operational defini- tions. Thus, specific hypotheses to be tested in this study must be derived in the process of Operationalizing the model. However, two points should be made here that suggest weaknesses in Olson's theory and anticipate some of my own definitional developments in Chapter 4. POINTS OF CRITICISM First, while I agree with Olson that many "interest groups" do not, in fact, act collectively in their own best interests, I do not agree that the only reason is lack of proper incentives, especially in the case of social movements. The orbital model developed by Morrison and Hornback (1975) suggests (as does Olson) that a public good is not desired by all: rather, its utility ranges 29 from positive to negative. Of individuals who do desire the good, only those for whom the good's utility is great would be likely to contribute to a SMO. Individuals with lesser utility for the public good will only contribute sympathy or support for it. For example, in the environmental movement, persons may support the movement by attending a meeting or using only biodegradable products when it is convenient to do so. However, since individuals can also receive the public good without cost to themselves, they may not always actually contribute to a SMO. The reason for not contributing is not lack of proper incentives as Olson would argue: rather, according to the orbital model, it is lack of strength of incentive (the utility of the good is not great enough).5 Therefore, in a given circumstance, only a subset of the "interest group" is likely to contribute to any SMO. The second point of criticism comes from my belief that neither the strength of the incentive nor private goods incentives are the only factors involved in decisions to contribute. Olson's argument for the use of private goods incentives in large groups has some validity for SMO's (Gamson, 1975: 55-71). However, any particular SMO exists in an environment which may provide alternate organizations whose structure and/or incentive systems may better serve the interest of any particular individual.6 The SMO itself may have a 5For further discussion of the orbital model, see Hornback and Morrison (1975). 6See the earlier discussion of these factors in Chapter 1 and further elaboration of the concepts in Zald and Ash (1966) and Hirschman (1970). 30 history, an oligarchical power group, use of particular means, or some other feature which would negatively influence the decision to contribute.7 In addition to organizational factors, members of an "interest group" may not know that a SMO exists to serve their interest, personal resources of time or money may be insufficient to permit contributions, and/or other matters (such as family affairs or writing dissertations) may be more salient at the present time. Therefore, many factors enter into a decision to contribute to collective action, not just the profit maximizing incentive Olson presents. Although it is not feasible to test these concepts in this study, it is important to recognize their existence and be aware that "contributors" are those who have some strong incentive to go along with their ability to contribute to the SMO. 7ZPG advocates and supports rights to abortion and unrestricted access to birth control information as means to population control. These means are not acceptable to many in the society who are interested in controlling population growth. Also, I spoke at length with a former ZPG chapter chairman who stated that he dropped his membership after a power struggle which resulted in "shabby treatment" of the deposed leaders he favored. He still actively supports population control by giving speeches and contributing to another SMO which "provides better information on population problems." Thus, the organization itself as well as goods incen- tives affected his failure to continue contributing to ZPG. CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODS THE TEST POPULATION: ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, INC. There exists a large number of voluntary organizations and social movement groups that might potentially be studied as cases for testing Olson's model of collective action. The particular group chosen for this purpose in the present study, however, seemed especially well suited, given the conceptual and methodological issues involved. The intent of this chapter, then, will be to elaborate those characteristics of Zero Population Growth, Inc., which make it a useful organization to study in Olson's theoretical context, as well as to summarize the sampling procedures and other methods used in actually gathering data on this group. Organization Characteristics: Zero Population Growth, Inc. ZPG is a voluntary organization that seeks population control through political action at local, state, and national levels. ZPG literature lists a variety of organizational goals such as assuring availability of birth control methods for all who wish to practice birth control methods for all who wish to practice birth control, repeal of all pro-natalist measures (i.e., income tax deductions for each child), complete equality between the sexes, implementation of 31 32 land-use planning, and more stringent control of migration. Stra- tegies used to achieve these goals include political lobbying, lawsuits, and educational campaigns which are designed to encourage informed political action on the part of the general public as well as political representatives. According to ZPG financial reports, support for the organiza- tion is about equally divided between membership dues and additional monetary contributions. Annual dues range from $8.00 for student membership and $15.00 for general membership to $1,000.00 for life membership. Contributions are often listed as membership types. For instance, a contribution of $1,000.00 or more results in a ”lifetime" membership status. Those listed as members receive publications from the organization and are automatically placed on the rolls of a local chapter if one is near. ZPG chapters are formed by application to the national head- quarters in Washington, D.C., and approval is virtually automatic so long as at least ten members are in the group applying for the charter. Chapters exist so long as there is any chapter ”activity” (i.e., meetings held). Each chapter receives a portion of its members' national dues to use for local activities, as well as aid and advice from the national office upon request. However, the national office has no power at the local level, and each chapter chooses its own officers, establishes its own by-laws, and regu- lates its own dues, policies, and activities. Barnett (1971, 1974) did two excellent surveys of ZPG members during 1970 and 1971 which provide useful compositional data on the general organization. These surveys revealed that ZPG members were 33 better educated and had higher incomes and higher status occupations than the general population of that time. Almost half of the members were students (predominantly college level), less than one percent were minority group members, 43 percent belonged to some other environmental organization, and between five and ten percent were considered active in chapters. These characteristics fit the general profile of environmental movement adherents found by Hornback (1974). Chapters vary in size from under ten to over 700 members and therefore provide a range of group sizes suitable for testing Olson's model of collective action.1 About one-third of the members listed by the national organizations do not appear on local chapter rolls. Presumably, then, this segment would only have those incentives derived from the larger national group. The only specific responsi- bilities that non-officer members have is yearly payment of national dues. Thus, member contributions are primarily a matter of indi- vidual volition. Informal organization pressures for membership renewal undoubtedly do exist but these, of course, are not defined in the organization policies.2 Public and Private Goods Population control (specifically reaching zero population growth in the United States) is the general public good, and the utility of that good provides the incentive for individuals to 1See Table 3.1 for distribution by size. 2See Appendix A for more detail on ZPG as an organization. I34 .uuonses Hespa>aoca no uceoucm N.m mucomoumou seesaw CC. .poamsen uo: one: use .uouecmwnoo succeed HecOAuec Osbouuvouecoauoo 0:02. C .msmaea>aucu an can: mmacmuensoa SHcOIIeue: pennants won one: moaumunfla no occaumuacumuo menuo me 0H0: nmanmuvnaoa we Amom.-v seem“: one mmasmuonfive deuce. n.5m u . ooa - a man u z coauauom sauce ...mom I z cognac» sauce pan mm ewm.ua maeuoa mannuonso: an an new masseuse o>auuuca - sauce MI ml mmm omen mouse 0 N cow mmHAvmm «Home: mm mu «av mmv Haoam use» ecu o>auo¢cn v.0m om mn.ON mu eel: II NNov muwummnu ca uoz auonfiut m.mm @NH o.mm va o.mn mmd mo.ov omu mow v0 wwwo nuaumunu o>wu0< I «duoa h.NH av o.MH we «.oa @v mm.nH Om om Nfl mahm Oman comma m.nH mv o.ma mv n.ma nv mm.nH om mm AN mmmfl mmHAvmm Tampa: m.mn mv o.nH mv H.NH on mm.ma 0m mm mm vooH mmv Madam mueu ecu w>auo< camaem z onEsm . 2 season 2 mamadm 2 sz sz .2. huomousu «0 a to a no a mo o assuage muooouno munmuonaoz oocusuom poemsom oocusuwm oeHmHMm nououco ca Hence mustang unease: nuoumesu ZUHmmo NAAZflm emHmmmmmxmx DAN mhma .BmDUD< >m00fl9<0 ADOKU an memmmmrmZ DAN 02¢ ZUHme OZHAmxdm H.n ”dude 35 contribute to ZPG. Specific means used to accomplish population control have included abortion reform, land-use planning or zoning law enforcement, and stricter control of both legal and illegal immigration. Private goods available only to members or contributors are importantly based on providing specialized information. This includes (1) information concerning proposed or pending political action on population related matters, (2) specific information and/or suggestions for individual actions such as writing letters to legislators, and (3) general and up-to-date information on popu- lation growth and/or related matters. Other important (albeit less concrete) incentives would be opportunities for interaction with others who share common interest in population control and who thus provide support for one's own views. ZPG chapters seek local public goods such as securing passage of laws to prevent sale or development of public lands such as beaches or picnic grounds. They provide private goods such as local newsletters and special activities such as informational meetings. Thus, each chapter has local public and private goods incentives that are usually congruent in general with those offered by the national organization. Specifically, however, the public and private goods incentives offered by local chapters are often designed to meet the particular needs of a specific area and are somewhat distinct from goods offered at the national level. Thus, each chapter can, to some extent, be considered as a separate group with its own unique incentive as well as incentives which supplement the national ones. 36 The demographic characteristics of ZPG members and the type of public good they profess clearly place ZPG among those major social movement organizations which emerged to constitute the recent environmental movement. ZPG provides some of the important con- ditions needed to test Olson's theory of collective action. These conditions are briefly summarized below. As a whole, the organization represents the mobilization of members of a large, ”latent" group with a common interest in a public good: that of reaching zero population growth in the United States. This public good is much more specific than those sought by many other social movement organizations. This fact should make it easier to develop operational definitions of public goods incentives to be employed in testing Olson's model. The specific ZPG goal of reaching zero population growth in the United States is useful for testing Olson's model in another way. Many people believe that zero population growth has been reached in the United States as a result of the birth rate reaching replacement level. This belief might lead both actual and poten- tial ZPG members to conclude that contributions are no longer necessary to achieve the avowed public good. However, sinze ZPG continues to function as an organization, there is a basis for thinking that private incentives must be present for ZPG members. This notion is also implied in the fact that ZPG has experienced a growth, decline, and stability membership cycle that is typically 37 assumed in the organizational literature to be associated with goal displacement and the emergence of private goods incentives.3 To summarize: ZPG offers a number of characteristics that are important for testing Olson's theory. These include: (1) volun- tary collective action toward production of a public good, (2) pro- vision of private goods to contributors, (3) explicitly defined goals, (4) variation in group size by chapters, and (5) specific local goals for individual chapters. SAMPLE DESIGN The sampling procedures used in this study were designed to facilitate testing of Olson's hypothesis that group size determines the kinds of contribution incentives that will emerge in collective action groups. Actually, Olson does not operationally define group size in his model. But the definition of size arrived at for purposes of this study (see Chapter 4 for details) dictated that a dispropor- tionate,stratified,random sampling design be employed. In particu- lar, it was necessary to achieve adequate subsamples from small, medium and large local chapters, as well as from members affiliated only with the national organization. Further, since organizational leaders are, in a sense, always involved in ”smaller" groups than members (e.g., the leadership ”elite”) or may have different types of incentives related to leadership status, comparable samples of. 3Zald and Ash (1966) and 81113 (1968), among others, discuss this point. The Appendix has a graphic representation of the cycle in ZPG. 38 both leaders and members in the various local chapter size groups were obtained. Membership in local chapters of ZPG is assigned by zip code number of the member in question. It should be noted that members may theoretically belong to a chapter, but choose not to contribute local dues or participate in local activities.4 Nevertheless, for sampling purposes, persons assigned to local chapters by zip code were considered as chapter members in this study.5 Table 3.1 gives the patterns of ZPG membership by group size and summarizes the basic sampling design. The system used in sampling members from groups was to draw every second leader from all groups, every let member of small groups, every 37th member of middle groups, every 74th member of large groups, and every 53rd member of those not affiliated. This procedure produced 50 members and 48 leaders from each chapter size plus 75 non-affiliated members. The sample size was designed to be large enough to permit comparisons between the groups. 4Results of the survey indicated that only about half of the respondents with a local chapter nearby considered themselves members of that chapter, and that only about one-third of the chapter members were active. The inactive chapter members, as well as those indi- viduals who did not consider themselves local members, are presumably members of only the large, national group. 5Information supplied by ZPG's national office provided information on leaders, chapter affiliation, and active chapters which were invaluable aids in sampling. Special appreciation is due to Larry Mires, ZPG National Chapter Chairman, for indicating leaders and active chapters on the printouts, and to Adam McLane, ZPG Business Manager, for arranging the printing of the current month's membership list by local chapter number where applicable. Both gentlemen greatly simplified the sampling process by providing this aid. I should also like to express my appreciation to all the ZPG officers and members who aided this research, without whose full cooperation this study would not have been possible. 39 DATA GATHERING General Procedure Data for this study were collected by means of a questionnaire mailed to the previously described sample of ZPG members. The wide geographic dispersion of the members plus limited funds dictated the use of this method even though it is generally not considered as satisfactory a method as the use of personal interviews. However, several features of the present study somewhat ameliorate this problem and are discussed below. Moser (1969: 179) has suggested that higher response rates can be achieved on mail surveys in which the potential respondents are well educated, interested in the subject matter, and have respect for the organization backing the survey. All of these criteria appear to have been met in the present study. For instance, it is known from earlier studies (Barnett, 1974; Hornback, 1974) that ZPG members, like most environmentalists, are better educated than average citizens. The simple fact of membership in ZPG implies interest in the subject matter on the part of respondents. Finally, my own status as a researcher representing a respected organization was enhanced by the use of the Michigan State University letterhead for the covering letter. In addition, permission to do the study had been obtained from national ZPG headquarters and was so indi- cated in the covering letter (see Appendix B). Two prior mail surveys of ZPG conducted by Barnett (1974: 2) had achieved 87 percent and 73 percent response rates, respectively. These are unusually high response rates for surveys of this sort and 40 provided a reasonable expectation for satisfactory response to mailed questionnaires in my own study.6 As shown in Table 3.1, this expectation was more than adequately borne out. Completion rate of questionnaires was 88.6 percent, while usable responses represented 87.5 percent of the sample. Questionnaire Construction The questionnaire was developed according to criteria sug- gested by Moser (1969: 210-245) and Dillman et a1. (1974: 746). Thus, questions were designed to be as simple, specific and unambigu- ous as possible. Opinion questions provided a range of responses which allowed respondents to express both the intensity of their opinion and also to rank issues from most important to least important. Some open-ended questions were also provided in an attempt to tap opinions and concerns not dealt with explicitly in the fixed-response questionnaire items. Since one important aspect of the research concerned variation in local chapters, the first questionnaire items focused on respondents' knowledge of their omnchapters and degree of involve- ment in local chapter activities. Appearing next were questions related to individual contributions and the incentives presumably responsible for contributions. Opinions on selected matters related to population control were elicited in the third set of questions, while the final portion of the questionnaire dealt with personal 6Dillman suggested that a 75 percent response rate for mailed questionnaires was possible under some conditions (Dillman et al., 1974: 747). 41 and demographic questions. A complete copy of the questionnaire may be found in Appendix B. Order of the questions was designed with several purposes in mind. For instance, it was hoped that an initial focus on local chapter involvement would provide a mental set for respondents which would encourage consideration of local issues, and thus indicate incentives at that level. On the other hand, opinion questions were primarily related to national issues in order to provide data on incentives related to goods at the national (or "latent” group) level. Personal and demographic questions were saved until last, since these kinds of items are typically the ones with the highest potential for discouraging complete and accurate responses. At the same time, personal and demographic questions also tend to require the least amount of consideration to answer, thus allowing the respondent to complete the questionnaire with but little addi- tional effort. The first three sections of the questionnaire were designed specifically for this study, although some ideas were incorporated from earlier ZPG surveys and also from suggestions made by the ZPG national office. The last section of the questionnaire utilized demographic categories designed to be comparable with Barnett's data so that some characteristics of the members could be compared 7 over time. 7Demography is one of my deep interests and, although com- parison of ZPG members then and now is not a purpose of this study, it will provide data for further investigation. 42 The overall length of the questionnaire ranged from 58 questions for ZPG members who were not involved in a local chapter to 79 questions for those members who were involved in local chapters. This constitutes a relatively small number of questions for surveys of this type (Moser, 1969), but brevity was sought in order to encourage both a higher total response rate and more complete answers. Pre-testing of the questionnaire elicited positive reac- tions to its length and format. Hence, only slight modifications of the questionnaire were deemed necessary for the final version. The final form of the questionnaire was subjected to a photo- reduction process and multilithed in a four-page booklet. A cover letter was designed to emphasize the importance of a response from each member sampled, provide assurances of confidentiality of responses, summarize the purposes of the study, and stress national ZPG's approval of the study. The letter concluded by providing the respondent with an oppor- tunity to express non-interest in participating in the study (only two respondents actually expressed such a desire). Respondents who did wish to participate were also provided an option to receive or not receive a summary of results from the study. The cover letter was typed on an automatic machine which produced copies that had the appearance of a personally hand-typed letter. Each letter was then hand signed in ink to complete personalization.8 The cover letter, questionnaires (coded to indicate group size and respondent's name) and stamped return envelopes were mailed in 8 Copies of the cover letters may be found in Appendix B. 43 offic1al Michigan State University envelopes bearing hand-typed addresses. Brightly colored commemorative stamps were used on the envelopes to attract attention and complete the process of personali- zation. A second letter was sent to those who did not respond within three weeks, repeating again the same personalized approach.9 The above procedures resulted in an original 84 percent response rate in one month. Monetary and time restrictions pre- vented any follow-up after the second mailing. The end of the sixth week after the original mailing was chosen as completion date for data collection. Only one additional response was received after this cut-off date. As noted earlier, the total response rate of 87.5 percent exceeded expectations and thus provided post hoc support for the choice of data gathering. 91 would like to express deep appreciation to Dr. Denton Morrison for his aid in developing the questionnaire and special thanks to my husband, Dr. Robert Tillock, for his advice and sug- gestions concerning length, form and personalization of the mailing plus his aid in preparing the material for mailing. CHAPTER 4 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND HYPOTHESES INTRODUCTION Since Olson bases his theory more on the use of illustrative examples and logic than empirical testing, considerable attention must be given to the development of operationally defined concepts and specific research hypotheses. It is true that some research has already examined the effect of group size and/or incentives on the outcome of collective actions (Britt and Galle, 1974: Gamson, 1975, Chapter 5). However, no research has been designed specifically to test Olson's theory in a natural setting.1 This chapter, therefore, will be primarily concerned with the task of translating Olson's ideas into empiri- cally measurable variables. I shall attempt to adhere as closely as possible to Olson's intended conceptual meaning in this opera- tionalization process and to explain the rationale I have used in 1Olson specifically tests only his observation that "larger members" of the group (especially those with greater resources and/or desire for the good) tend to provide a disproportionately larger share of the costs of the good than do the "smaller members” of the group--what Olson terms "exploitation of the great by the small" (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966: 266-279). For further examples of the theory, see Olson (1971b) and Zeckhauser (1970). 44 45 arriving at each definition.2 In general, my procedure will be to present a concept taken from Olson's model, then outline some of the problems I experienced in translating the concept into empirical terms and, finally, state the specific operational definitions and hypotheses arrived at for purposes of this study, along with their rationale. OPERATIONALIZING GROUP SIZE The concept of group size is crucial to Olson's model, but he provides little direction for operationally defining size as a variable. Notions of numerical difference appear in Olson's discus- sion, but he is never precisely clear about what he means by a ”small" number. In one instance he describes "action-taking" small groups as being somewhere around five or six members, citing small- group research for the choice (Olson, 1971a: 144-145).3 In general, Olson appears to categorize a group as being small if it numbers less than fifty members. For purposes of sampling in the present study, therefore, chapter memberships of fifty or less were regarded 2The specific operationalization of Olson's concepts developed from involvement in discussions relative to a paper by Dr. Denton Morrison: ”A Test of Mancur Olson Jr.'s Theory of Collective Action Against an Alternative on Social Movement Organization Participants" (Research Proposal to the National Science Foundation, May, 1975). 3The size dimension has been widely used in organizational research, but is not a simple variable, and the same ambiguity about precise definitions of size differences exists in much other litera- ture quite apart from Olson. See Lyman W. Porter, Edward W. Lawler, J. Richard Hackman, Behavior in Organizations (New York: McGraw- Hill Book Company, 1975: 248-249). 46 as approximating Olson's meaning of "small group." "Large" chapters in this study were defined as those in excess of 150 members. Beyond the need for establishing rough sampling criteria, however, a more precise definition of small vs. large group size remains problematic. My approach to this problem was not wholly to arrive at some arbitrary numerical cutoff point. Instead, by making use of two additional ideas taken from Olson's model, I was able to arrive at four different, but possible, definitions of size. The utility of developing multiple definitions of Olson's key variable is that it should permit greater flexibility in analyz- ing the data as well as greater specificity in testing Olson's model. That is, it will be theoretically useful to know if Olson's contentions concerning the effect of group size on collective action hold true across all definitions of size or only for spe- cific definitions. The two concepts that I used to develop additional definitions of group size were Olson's notions of perceptibility and noticeability. According to Olson, both the number of actual contributors (noticea- bility) and the individual's belief about the number of potential contributors (perceptibility) combine in different ways to produce different incentives for contributions.4 These combinations resulted in the following operational definitions of group size for analyzing ZPG chapters: 4Members originally sampled as belonging to small or large chapters did not, in general, consider themselves members of the chapter and/or never attended meetings. Thus, sampling designa- tions of size were not used. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION 1: 47 SMALL GROUP: Those members who consistently believe that the number of persons who support zero population growth is small at both local and national levels. LARGE GROUP: Those members who consistently believe that the number of persons who support zero population growth is large at both local and national levels. Rationale for this definition is based on the argument that individual contributions should be both perceptible and noticeable if the number of supporters of zero population growth is perceived to be small. Conversely, contributions should be less perceptible and less noticeable if support for zero population growth is per- ceived to be large. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION 2: SMALL GROUP: Chapter members who believe the local chapter size as less than 55 members. LARGE GROUP: Chapter members who believe the local chapter size as more than 150 members. This definition was used to account for perceived size along the numerical lines implied by Olson. It is assumed that a person's perception of the number of potential contributors (i.e., those giving utility to the public good) as large or as small would, to some extent, be dependent upon the number of persons actually 48 5 observed as contributors. Gamson (1975) has operationalized size in a similar way, but he compared different organizations of varying sizes. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION 3: SMALL GROUP: zpc members who belong to ’ any local chapter. LARGE GROUP: ZPG members who do not belong to a local chapter. (This also includes those who do not know of a local chapter near, or have dropped membership in the local chapter.) This definition seems plausible since meetings of most local chapters are so poorly attended that all persons who actually view themselves as belonging to a local chapter should tend to perceive the poten- tial, latent group as numerically small.6 They should also tend to believe that their contributions are commensurately more perceptible 5One question concerning perceived size Of their chapter was asked Of ZPG members in this study. Of the members who responded: 39% believed the chapter was small (under 50), 30% as medium (51- 149), 31% as large (over 150). Only chapter leaders were relatively accurate in their judgment; members' perceptions of size were accurate in less than 1/3 Of the cases. 6A question was asked of chapter members concerning estimated number of persons who usually attend meetings. Of those who responded to this question, 39% indicated 9 or fewer members attended, 27% indicated attendance at 10-30 members, 2% indicated over 30 persons in attendance, and 32% did not attend meetings themselves. Thus, chapter members in general could be considered as members of small groups since the great bulk of interaction appears to occur in groups of less than 50 members. Further justi- fication for this assertion comes from Bales' definition of a small group as "...any number Of persons engaged in interaction with one another...in which each member receives some impression or percep- tion Of each member..." (Bales, 1950: 33). 49 and noticeable. On the other hand, ZPG members who do not belong to a local chapter can only be aware Of the large numerical size of the national group, and therefore be more likely to view their contributions as less noticeable and less perceptible. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION 4: SMALL GROUP: ZPG members who currently hold an Office at the local and/or national level. LARGE GROUP: ZPG members who do not presently hold Office at any level. The rationale for this operationalization is simply that leaders invariably are involved in the smaller, "inner circle” of the group. Leaders also should exhibit higher public goods incentives, regardless Of the number Of actual or potential contributors. The leaders Of large groups are, after all, according to Olson, pro- viding the members with private goods so that their dues can be used to create public goods.7 7Conventional sociological theory provides an alternative perspective by suggesting that the power, prestige and prerequisites of leadership are themselves private goods and provide strong incen- tives for aspiring to leadership roles, particularly as organizations undergo "institutionalization" (Michels, 1962: Zald and Ash, 1966). However, given the average SES of ZPG members and the age Of the organization, Olson's notion appears to be more viable for analyzing leadership incentives in ZPG; i.e., we should expect ZPG leaders to exhibit higher public goods incentives than ZPG non-leaders. 50 OPERATIONALIZING THE CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND SOCIAL INCENTIVES Overview Of the Incentive Concepts Olson argues that only in small groups is a share of the public good alone a sufficient incentive to contribute to collective action. Olson defines the public good incentive only in terms of the size or utility (value to the individual) of the share to which the individual is entitled relative to the cost Of that share. Only in small groups is the cost low enough and the share of the public good large enough for a contribution to be profitable to the indi- vidual, i.e., to provide an incentive for contribution. (Olson believes that in large groups marginal organizational costs increase the total cost Of producing the public good and, generally, the share is smaller. Therefore, the public good incentive is not sufficient to induce contributions in large groups: private goods must be made available to contributors as an additional incentive feature Of large groups. These private goods may be special or exclusive information, social activities, some special privilege or consideration, etc. However, in all cases, the private goods are available only to contributors. The final incentive in Olson's model is the social pressure placed on contributors by other members Of the group. Olson simply refers to this as "social incentive." However, I will use the term "social pressure incentive“, since this better connotes the negative sanctions implied in Olson's concept and also allows designation Of social activities as a distinct, positive, private incentive. Social pressure incentives are especially prominent in small groups where 51 contributions are both perceptible and noticeable and members are constantly acting to insure that all other members contribute to the costs involved in producing their share Of the public good. Statement of Size-Incentive Hypotheses Given the preceding discussion and rationale, it is now possible to more succinctly state Olson's concepts in the form Of explicit hypotheses. These hypotheses are as follows: OLSON HYPOTHESISI: Public goods incentives are higher in small than in large groups. OLSON HYPOTHESISZ: Private goods incentives are lower in small than in large groups. OLSON HYPOTHESIS3: Social pressure incentives are higher in small than in large groups. Problems in Operationalizing the Incentive Concepts Operationalizing these three incentive concepts is somewhat difficult in the research area Of social movements. Definitional problems are perhaps greatest for the concept Of public goods incentives. As noted in Chapter 1, SMO's are likely to be inclusive organizations with diffuse and/or generalized goals which are designed to satisfy the diverse interests Of a large group of potential members. Diffuse or generalized goals are, Of course, difficult to define in specific terms. ZPG is a case in point. It would appear from the name of the organization that ”zero popu- lation growth” is literally the public good. ZPG does include in its stated goals such additional things as total equality between 52 women and men, stricter control of migration, etc. Obviously, each of these, or other goals discussed previously, could attract members whose primary interest might not be zero population growth itself. However, careful reading of ZPG literature on organizational activi- ties indicates that the end product Of all the various ZPG goals is to control population growth (mainly concentrating on the United States): i.e., immigration control, birth control, etc., are simply different means for achieving the same general end. Therefore, I have chosen the term "population control” to indicate the general public good incentive to contribute to ZPG. If "population control" is to be considered a good, then another problem of definition arises concerning the concept Of pro- ducing a "share" of such a good. It is virtually impossible to conceive Of population control as something divisible into "shares”, just as it would be very difficult to determine when "population control" has actually been achieved.8 In dealing with this problem, I adopted Olson's idea that the utility Of the public good helped determine its incentive value. Thus, the relative value placed by the individual on the public good was considered as representative of the utility value of that good as an incentive to contribute to ZPG: i.e., the higher the relative value of "population control", the greater the incentive value of that particular public good. 8The "achievement of zero population growth" publicized in the general media was, in fact, only a temporary condition when fertility was at replacement level. Anyone knowledgeable in demography knows population control involves many factors in addi- tion to the rate Of natural increase. 53 Definitions of private goods and social pressure incentives followed Olson's concepts as closely as possible. The only real difficulty was in determining how ”information" could be defined as a private good as Olson suggests, since much of the information available to ZPG members is also made public as part of the process of educating the public on population problems. However, since ZPG members receive population information much sooner than anyone else, and this information also frequently includes specific details not usually appearing in the mass media, I decided to consider information as a private good incentive. Other private good incentives were also borrowed from Olson, including social activities, sharing common interests, etc. My treatment of social pressure incentives was drawn directly from Olson's concepts; i.e., members may be pressured by others in the group to contribute. Operationalizing the Incentive Concepts All three types Of incentives (public goods, private goods and social pressure incentives) were measured by Obtaining responses to statements designed to elicit the value of these incentives to each individual. Table 4.1 indicates which statements were used to identify each type Of incentive. Highest values were determined by the response categories of "A crucially important reason for my ‘membership" or "Strongly agree.” REFINING THE CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOODS INCENTIVES Now that Olson's "basic" hypotheses have been stated, and the conceptual elements Of these hypotheses have been operationalized, .Hc used .0 coHumoso moueOHocH (to ..O.H. euuo ecu HO ucosooeHm ouHeccoHumosv ecu neueowocH usesoueuu ecu mcHsOHHou Hones: one C 5‘! auto. .ua moons uoc on: nocoHuu >5 «H can no senses a on uoc oHsos H Annoy .chmuooeos as omeusouco e6 cu unduuomEH one on: OHmoom mmsHezuozH mmowmmmo uaHoom AZImv .uH uuommsu onoom HeHucosHucH one eHnsomooHsocx aces oocHu can HO uuem 0 mchn hence H Axum. .mHaom muH cuHHoeoooe u.:meoo can HH co>e,.uoosee was a mcHon uo uso uoH u use oHsos H .Him. .oou as some o>on H mucoucoo any soon uaoouo H Hone. .mcHueHssHuu HHHoquOHHousH nmcHueos can ocean obs: H Arno. .coHueuHceouo ecu :H uoHuH>Huoe an mango H Hana. ..ousoo uceuuomiH as no undo e mcHon exHH H AHuo. .couoHHco ace on: ocH>ec uO: HO .sHHaeu oHo e ocH>ec uoc uou euHooHome Ou e>ec u.coo H when: moose a n.uH Hero. .coHuuuHcoouo emu cu zuws ousHooone H OHQOOQ ecu mango HHHecOuuom H Heuov .useHooum oeuoHeu one sOHueHsuom co weakened HHos ea umoox can Ho nomads e osHom .muo. .omN Baku o>Heuou H soHueluOHcH ecu scum soul :Hem >HHoQOouom H mmsHezmozH oncomimmmwmmm Haney .uuommso >5 usocuuz uHeom uuH cones oHsos uH ucosocu H uH can cH ochuenaufl as mono oHso: H Auto. .uHeoo uuH e>eHcos ou msHom NH uH HH cOHuonHuucoo m! coco: coaueuwcsmuo och Amuov .ocH .omu Ho uuomoon O>Huoe cecu O>HuecuouHe Hecuo o: no>eoH mEOHooum :oHueHsmom cuHs cueocoo moon 4 .O-o. .auooo on» sewerage mucouonaus can no auauocon one Rance .Heoo uecu us oosHe uHOHHO use uuomasn Ou huu H uecu ucuuuomsH On ow susoum cOHusHsmom unannoum Hanoi .noueu cu30uo cH coHuosceu e scum HHHe:Oouom uHuocoo ou venue uoc can H «H can Ou mcoHoo uoc oHsos H Hmuov .uH some uHuecoo HHHscoouom HHH: H .oHeoo auu wo>oHsue 0mm HH Auiov .cu30um coHueHsmom Sn vocouueusu one OHHH a! no success ucmuuomaa oaom mflbHBZHUZH D000 UHAmDm .mmoHezmozH wNHuaoneammwo Os ammo mezmzmesem H.v mamas 55 the next task is to elaborate on Olson's original ideas so that they become more tractable for testing in the present study. In particular, the following section will deal with considerations necessary for applying Olson's theory to a social movement organiza- tion such as ZPG. Several of these considerations came to my attention only after the original proposal and data gathering for this study had been completed. Given these new ideas, I was led to develop a new set Of hypotheses and empirically measurable concepts that hopefully will Offer a more precise test Of Olson's model. Personal and General Public Goods Utility Incentives Social movement goods are not only generalized, but they are also more involved with the deeply held value systems of individuals than in the economic frame Of reference employed by Olson. For instance, in the environmental movement such central values as the "quality of life"-and actual survival Of life on Earth are of vital importance to movement members. Since ZPG members have higher educa- tion and incomes than the average person, they would be more likely to have a global perspective which would convince them of the necessity for controlling population grOwth to avoid potentially disastrous reduction of both the ”quality of life" and the chances Of preserving the life-support systems of the environment (Barnett, 1974; Meadows, 1972). This perspective strongly affects their incentives to contribute for public goods. Olson's model implies situations where receipt of the public good is possible in a relatively short time. But in social movements, the accomplishment of the public good is not generally expected 56 immediately. For instance, environmental movement adherents believe that collective action is essential for both short term individual and long term social survival. In ZPG (and, indeed, in many if not most SMO's) the public good incentive involves more than personal gain, even delayed personal gain. It also involves a sense of responsibility to society and to future generations. This is not identical with the "moral code” aspect cited by Olson (1971a, ff.17, p. 61) as a private incentive; i.e., the relief of a sense Of guilt or the obtaining of a "good feeling” from making a contribution to collective action seeking goods one thinks are "good" or ”right.” Rather, it is the more complex and subtle notion that Obtaining a personal share of a public good is inextricably linked with the more general creation Of that good in the society. Or, as Hirschman (1970: pp. 101-105, 116) has put it, to not create a public good is to create a public evil from which no exit (no individual alternative) exists. Some research (Kelley and Grzelak, 1974) does indicate that, in general, Olson is correct: persons do make decisions in favor Of personal over group interest in the majority of cases. However, those with more information and/or understanding of the situation tend to favor collective over indi- vidual benefits. In view of the fact that ZPG members often do not expect an immediate share of the public good, it seemed increasingly necessary to me to refine the public good incentive concept to include con- sideration Of the "personal” benefit or utility and the "general” utility of the good for the society. Given this refinement, it no longer appears irrational (as Olson believes) for persons to 57 contribute to collective action without expectation of a specific, immediate return (i.e., the incentive Olson assumes to drive col- lective action). In other words, persons with high "general" public good incentives act collectively partly from the hope that they will receive some Of the public good, but also because they have come to believe that the creation Of the public good is in the best interests of both themselves and the society at large. Morrison (1975) has termed such an incentive "reform utility"; i.e., utility that perfectly blends personal and social interests. Contingency and Contributory Efficacy Incentives Olson implies that individuals will either do without the good or obtain it for themselves without collective action if collective action is too costly, or if a contribution has no perceptible effect on the outcome. Thus, a more or less "strict" interpretation Of Olson would involve the individual's belief that creation of the public good is contingent on his/her contribution: i.e., the effect Of a contribution is strongly perceptible. On the other hand, it is clear that contributions are Often not viewed as strictly neces- sary to create the public good but are sought and given simply to ”help" the cause by making the public good more probable. In the case of "contributory efficacy", then, the contribution is only weakly perceptible. Given these refined notions Of the public goods incentives, it is now possible to produce four different forms Of public goods incentives. These are: 58 1. PUBLIC GOOD PERSONAL UTILITY INCENTIVE: The incentive is derived from the personal benefit expected from the public good (or the utility of the public good to the individual). This incentive is measured by responses to the following statements: - Some important aspects Of my life are threatened by population growth. - If ZPG achieves its goals, I will personally benefit from it. - I would not belong to ZPG if I did not stand to benefit personally from a reduction in growth rates. 2. PUBLIC GOOD GENERAL UTILITY INCENTIVE: The incentive is derived from the general belief that the public good has such high utility value for the society that the indi- vidual has the responsibility Of providing it for the group as well as for him/herself personally. This incentive is measured by responses to the following statements: - Stopping population growth is so important that I try to support any effort aimed at that goal. - The benefits Of ZPG membership outweigh the costs. - A deep concern with population problems leaves no other alternative than active support Of ZPG, Inc. 3. PUBLIC GOOD CONTINGENCY EFFICACY INCENTIVE: This incentive is derived from the belief that individual support is needed to produce the good since each contribution will make a strongly perceptible difference in the outcome. 59 This incentive is measured by responses to the following statements: - The organization needs my contribution if it is going to achieve its goals. - I would drop my membership in ZPG if I thought it would reach its goals without my support. 4. PUBLIC GOOD CONTRIBUTORY EFFICACY INCENTIVE: This incentive is derived from the belief that a contribution will help to produce the public good, but the production Of the good is not perceived as contingent on the individual's contribution. This incentive is measured by responses to the following statement: - My contribution is helping to influence action on population control. Having differentiated the concept Of public good into four dimensions, it is now also possible to elaborate the original public good hypothesis (see p. 51). This set Of new hypotheses is based on a "strict" interpretation Of Olson's theory; i.e., each of the public good dimensions should have greater incentive value in small groups compared to large groups. Thus, the new hypotheses are: REFINED HYPOTHESISI: Public Good Personal Utility Incentives are greater in small than in large groups. REFINED HYPOTHESISZ: Public Good General Utility Incentives are greater in small than in large groups. 60 REFINED HYPOTHESISB: Public Good Contingency Efficacy Incentives are greater in small than in large groups. REFINED HYPOTHESIS4: Public Good Contributory Efficacy Incentives are greater in small than in large groups. Now, a "less stringent" interpretation of Olson's theory would seem to suggest that the positive difference between small and large groups should be greater for personal utility incentives than for general utility incentives. The same should be true for contingency efficacy incentives as compared with contributory efficacy incentives. Additionally, if Olson's model is correct, the considerations involving differences in behavior between economic and social movement groups (discussed above) suggest that personal utility should be higher than general utility for the whole, undif- ferentiated sample. In a similar way, higher contingency efficacy than contributory efficacy incentives for the whole sample would also support Olson's model. Explicitly stated, the hypotheses are as follows: REFINED HYPOTHESISS: The positive difference between small and large groups is greater for personal utility than for general utility. REFINED HYPOTHESIS6: The positive difference between small and large groups is greater for contingency than for contributory efficacy incentives. 61 REFINED HYPOTHESIS : Public Good Personal Utility Incentives are 7 higher than Public Good General Utility Incentives for the sample as a whole. REFINED HYPOTHESIS : Public Good Contingency Efficacy Incentives 8 are higher than Contributory Efficacy Incentives for the sample as a whole. Private Goods Incentives In order to study differences in incentive value of different types Of private goods, I arrived at the following categories as useful distinctions: 1. PRIVATE GOODS INFORMATION INCENTIVES: These act as incentives for all contributors, making specialized types Of information more easily available to contributors than to non-contributors. This incentive was measured by responses to the following statements: - I personally gain much from the information I receive from ZPG. - Being a member of ZPG keeps me well informed on popu- lation and related problems. PRIVATE GOODS INTERACTION INCENTIVES: These act as incentives primarily for active members who gain from activities and/or interaction goods not available to non-contributors. This incentive is measured by responses to the following statements: - I personally enjoy the people I associate with in the organization. - It's a group where I don't have to apologize for not having a big family, or not having had any children. 62 3. PRIVATE GOODS OTHER INCENTIVES: These incentive goods are available only to contributors and depend upon individual situa- tions and/or attitudes. In some cases, these incentives may be mixed public and private goods, but any good not purely a public good is to be considered a private good. This incentive is measured by responses to the following statements: I like being a part of an important cause. I enjoy my activities in the organization. I have found ZPG meetings intellectually stimulating. I profit from the contact I have made in ZPG. I would get a lot out Of being a ZPG member, even if ZPG doesn't accomplish its goals. I enjoy being a part Of ZPG since many knowledgeable and influential people support it. The refined hypotheses that follow adhere to a ”strict" inter- pretation Of Olson's theory: i.e., each of the private goods should have greater incentive value in large groups, and smaller incentives in small groups. The new hypotheses are: REFINED HYPOTHESIS : Private Goods InfOrmation Incentives are 9 lower in small than in large groups. REFINED HYPOTHESIS : Private Goods Interaction Incentives are 10 lower in small than in large groups. REFINED HYPOTHESIS : Other Private Goods Incentives are lower in 11 small than in large groups. 63 CONTRIBUTIONS AND GAIN In this study, a ”contribution" to ZPG is simply defined as payment of membership dues. Thus, in much Of the analysis that follows, the contributions Of ZPG members are assumed to be constant while the aim is to determine if incentives for contributions vary between large and small groups according to the Olson model. How- ever, it should be noted that contributions in SMO's are made in a variety of ways that supplement the primarily monetary form Olson implicitly assumes in his economic model. In a SMO, for instance, personal contributions to activities and roles are both essential for organizational survival, in addi- tion to money contributions. Activities include writing letters, giving talks, attending meetings, and other such actions which will aid the "cause.” Roles are Of many types, but leadership roles are especially important in "task-oriented” groups such as SMO's. Con- sequently, leadership was the only role I chose to operationalize in the present study. ”Leader” could mean occupying an Office or directing activities in the group, or both. For present purposes it was operationalized to mean ”holding an office.” Total contribution to ZPG was then based on a "contribution index" designed to measure individual inputs of money, activity, and/or role involvement. This index is summarized in Table 4.2. It should be noted here that the contribution index will be used only to attempt to operationalize and test Olson's concepts of larger contributions in small groups and to roughly approximate his concept Of "gain" as operationalized below. Actual contributions are difficult to determine as they may depend upon personal resources 64 TABLE 4.2 CONTRIBUTIONS INDEX INDEX STANDARD- INDICATOR VALUE*** SCALE IZED RANGE Membership Type l-4* 3.1-12.5 Dues - Amount paid per year $ 8.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 15.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 22.50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 30.00 or more . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Other Monetary Contributions in Addition to Dues 0-3 0 - 9.4 At local level . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 At national level**. . . . . . . . . . . 2 Activities 0-9 0 -28.l Write letters in behalf Of ZPG At local level . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 At national level. . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Give speeches, serve on panel discussions, attend hearings, etc. At local level . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 At national level. . . . . . . . . . . . 2 WOrk for candidates, referenda, favorable to ZPG policies (political work) At local level . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 At national level. . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Roles - present leader status 0-16 0 -50 “cal Office held 0 O O O I O I O O O O O O 8 National Office held . . . . . . . . . . . 8 TOTALS 1-32 3.1-100 Possible range Of contributions 1-32 (standardized 3.1-100) * Cannot be less than one, since all respondents were dues- paying members. ** Contributions at the national level, with the exception of Office holders, were considered as requiring more effort, thus a larger contribution than that at the local level. Some cases included both local and national contributions. ** *Index value was determined by responses on questionnaires with the exception Of membership type, which was coded from membership lists used for sampling. For computation and comparison purposes, the index was standardized on a 0-100 scale by computing the percent: i.e., "l" is 3.1% of 32. 65 Of time and money rather than the desire to contribute. Therefore, contributions will be considered as equal for all tests of hypotheses presented to this point. In addition, the contribution and "gain" indices cannot be used for "hold Office/not hold Office" and ”chapter member/not chapter member” categories,since by definition the small group in each case makes a higher contribution. The con- tribution index will be used to test the following hypothesis: REFINED HYPOTHESIS Contributions will be greater in small groups 12‘ than in large groups.9 Qaip_ The contribution index was also used in conjunction with the Olson Public Good Index10 to derive a measure of "gain" for each respondent in an attempt to roughly operationalize Olson's notion of "group gain”: i.e., the relationship between total costs and benefits for all the members Of the group (Olson, 1971a: 33-34). TO determine the "gain”, each respondent's individual gain was com- puted as a ratio Of the Public Good Index to the contribution index: i.e., ”gain" is what each person gains or benefits in the public good in relation to the "cost" of that individual's contribution. 9This hypothesis will only be tested for "perceived" group size operationalizations since, by definition, the index would have higher values for leaders as compared with individual members, and for chapter members as compared with those not active in chapters. 10The Olson Public Goods Index is the sum of the utility of all the public good indicators. The resultant sum was standardized to 100 to permit comparison with other indices. 66 According to Olson, the mean of the individual ”gain" is greater in small than in large groups. Thus: REFINED HYPOTHESISl3: Individual gain is higher in small than in large groups. Public to Private Goods Ratios Olson's notion Of "gain" is based on public goods only and implies that public goods predominate in small groups, while private goods are relatively more important in large groups. Assuming that each individual's incentives are mixed, a more precise interpreta- tion Of Olson would require examination Of the relationship Of public to private goods for each individual. In order to operationalize this concept, all public and private goods variable sources were standardized to 100, and then the ratios Of public to private goods were determined for each individual. The mean of these ratios for each group then becomes the ratio indicator for that group. Given Olson's notion that private goods have a more prominent part than public goods in larger groups, the hypothesis becomes: REFINED HYPOTHESISI4: The ratio Of public to private goods is higher in small than in large groups. Procedures Analysis of the data generated from the preceding operationali- zation process was carried out in the following way. First, all the independent variables (group size operationalizations) are examined in relation to the individual items used to measure the dependent variables (public and private goods incentives and contributions) 67 for the relevant hypotheses. Then, independent variables are examined in relation to the indexed dependent variables. Following this the ”gain" variable is examined. Finally, the independent variables are examined in relation to the ratios. Results Of the analysis outlined above will be found in the next chapter. CHAPTER 5 FINDINGS In this chapter I first will present the “raw", empirical find- ings of the study: i.e., the numerical results Obtained from testing the hypotheses generated in the preceding chapter. I will also briefly summarize the extent to which each hypothesis appears to be supported by the empirical tests employed. Finally, I will attempt to discuss and interpret more fully the separate data analysis results as an overall set of findings in relationship to Olson's theory. TO achieve greater clarity of presentation, only summaries Of the various test results will be given here: detailed findings are available in Appendix C. SURVEYED CHARACTERISTICS OF ZPG: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ENTIRE SAMPLE]- The main empirical intent Of this chapter is to compare various public and private good indicators for the previously arrived at operationalizations of large and small groups. However, it should be initially useful to characterize some basic findings on the sample as a whole, since ZPG is, overall, a large group, and the findings for the whole sample have a meaningful, if general, bearing 1Specific results for all questions are found in Appendix B. 68 69 on Olson's theory. Once the sample as a whole has been character- ized, I will then present the findings for the small and large group breakdowns. As anticipated, ZPG respondents were found to have substan- tially higher incomes, higher education, and higher status occupations than average for the population of the United States.2 In short, ZPG members appear to conform to the general demographic pattern of environmental movement members (Hornback, 1974). Two-thirds of the respondents have been ZPG members since 1971. Only half of the 67 percent who reported they were near a local chapter also identified themselves as members of that chapter. Two-thirds of all ZPG respondents never attend any meetings. Con- tributions are reported to be primarily in the form of dues, other monetary contributions and "letter writing.” Less than one-fourth of the respondents have ever held an office. And, as is true in most voluntary organizations, the majority apparently is not deeply involved in organizational activities. It is clear that contributions of ZPG members are importantly based on public goods incentives. When asked to ”indicate the one most important and the one least important reason for membership" (Table 5.1), over 87 percent of the respondents chose reasons defined as public goods as the most important basis for their 2In 1974, United States White Population median income was $12,595, ZPG members' was about $20,000; 26* of those over age 25 in the general white population had "some college”, but 46t of ZPG members have some graduate degree; 0.8. White Population has 51% white collar, 49% blue collar occupation, ZPG members report 67% professional or managerial with only 5% clerical, sales, or blue collar. .n~n I z .onsda Haven Gnu co conga concusoonom O 70 m.o .omN Bonn o>Hooon H conunsnoucH can Bonn 2053 undo hHHuconnom H ouo>Hnm m o.H .nuaonm :cHuoHsmom an venousonnu one OHHH as no nuoomnu ucuunomad osOm oHHnam m n.H .Hoom uocu no ooEHu uncuuu use unommsm cu Hnu H nan» ucuunomsn an on zusono coHuaHsmom venomoum UHHnsa H m.H .mHoou nuH aboHnom on mcwoo an UH HH :oHuannusou a! homo: soHuouHcamno 0:9 uHHnsm o m.n .uH Bonn uHuocon aHHecoanom HHH: H .uHaom and ao>uunuu umu HH oHHnnm m o.m .onsuo unannoman :1 no anon a mcHon oxHH H ouq>Hnm c o.m .coHuuuchmno onu an cqu oudwoonuo H on00a 0:» hence hHHocOQnom H ous>Hnm v 0.0 .soHuanwcuuno ecu :4 noHuH>Huoa as aofico H ouo>Hnm n m.Hm .conoHHno use on: ocH>un no: no .HHHsau mHn o ocn>¢z no: new onnmoHoma on o>on u.coo H onus) muono a u.uH ouaaanm ~ n.vm .mncunonsua >2 umansooso as on ucnunomaa one on: 0Hmoom onsnuonm HcHoom H «van 0» CH :oHom nan cameos unnun added I noono xsdz o.o .sonoHnno Has no: ocH>nn no: no .>HHssu qu o o:H>o: no: nOH ouHooHomn on o>~s u.coo H ones: anonm a n.0H ouubnnm m w.o .coHuuandono on» cH noHuH>Huoa as hence H ouo>Hnm m m.o .ouzao accunoman :6 Ho anon c undo: oxHH H oua>Hnm h o.H .omn sanu o>wouon H soHusanou:H ecu sonu coal sHao >Hausonnom H ouabnnm o o.H .uH sonu unaccob K”323,3st HHH3 H .anou uuH uo>oHsoo emu HH UHHnsa o m.~ .mHoom nun o>oHnu¢ cu ocHou mH uH NH coHuannucoo Ha noooc coHucNHcomno one UHHnsm m H.m ounun ouoon .couuun nonuo cocoa no: u unannon nonuo v ~.vH .cusono coHuaHsnom an oocouoonnu ono oHHH as no uuoomau usdunomaH maom oHHnsm n H.Hm .Honucoo coHumusmom co coHuou cocozHucH ou ocmeoz aw coHuannusoo a: OHHnsm N n.5n .Hoom uncu an ocean uncuuo use unomman o» Hnu H umnu usaunomad on n« suaono coHuoHsmom unannoum uHHnsm H coma cu mchcoHom nap economm unnunomsH uuox u noono xcdz udmxdm ddBOP Ndthm<> UHhHUQAm 0000 hO fihfih “24¢ m0 Pzwummn UQN OF UZHOZOAfiG mom mzomdfim H.m manta 71 membership, while less than eight percent chose a public good as the least important reason for membership. Other public and private goods indicators, indices, and ratios clearly indicate that, in general, public good incentives predominate, private good incentives are next in importance, and social pressure incentives are a poor third (Table 5.2). However, the distinct preference for public goods incentives becomes somewhat blurred when answers are considered to the open- ended query, "What do you feel that you personally gain, if any- thing, from membership in ZPG?" Responses to this question which did not clearly fit the structured categories provided in the previous close-ended question were coded as either ”other public" or "other private." In those instances where more than one category applied, both were coded. An answer of ”nothing" was coded as such. Responses to this question seem to indicate that certain private goods incentives actually rank quite comparably to public goods incentives (Table 5.3). For instance, the personal information incentive now ranks as the highest single incentive of all, while enjoyment of activities in the organization and effect associated with being part of an important cause now rank higher than several public good incentive items (see Table 5.1). It should be noted, however, that while ”information” has been treated as a private good in this study, it may also be considered as an aspect of the public good that ZPG is attempting to accomplish. In reality, then, infor- mation is both a private and a public good. The open-ended responses suggest additional ways in which indi- vidual incentives for membership may actually have a decidedly 72 .nNn I I a OHu-fl .9000 0025.:- HluOF 3 uaanflm H38 to..— mmfi a 8.: 3 36 .323? 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PERCENT TYPE OF GOOD TOTAL RANK OR INCENTIVE SPECIFIC VARIABLE SAMPLE 1 Private I personally gain much from the infor- 42.4 mation I receive from ZPG. 2 Public My contribution is helping to influence 33.1 action on population control. 3 Private I enjoy my activities in the 19.8 organization. 4 Public Stopping population growth is so 19.2 important that I try to support any effort aimed at that goal. 5 Private I like being a part of an important 15.5 cause. 6 Private I personally enjoy the people I 8.7 associate with in the organization. 7 Public Some important aspects of my life are 4.0 threatened by population growth. 7 Other Private - Does not fit other private categories 4.3 8 Other Public - Does not fit other public categories 2.5 9 Public The organization needs my contribution 1.9 if it is going to achieve its goals. 10 Public If ZPG achieves its goals, I will 0.9 personally benefit from it. 74 "mixed" quality that interrelates private and public dimensions. When the open-ended responses are coded according to whether they contain indications of private good only, public good only, mixed incentives, or no incentives, the "mixed" category predominates for the sample as a whole, followed by private and then public incentives. The higher percentage of private to public responses does, of course, support the Olson model for the sample as a whole, but the fact that the highest percentage of respondents give mixed incentives sug- gests that most self-expressed incentives do not fall neatly into the Olson categories. A further qualitative notion of the subtle blending of incentives involved can readily be seen in the sample of actual responses to the item given in Appendix D. 0f more spe- cific relevance to the versions of Olson's Hypotheses l and 2 (to be tested below) is the fact that there is no consistent or strong. tendency to predominate in any of my various operational definitions of small group nor, conversely, do private incentives show strong or consistent predominance in any of the large groups. If anything, the differences, when they show any noteworthy magnitude at all, pro- vide support for a reversal of Olson's hypothesis (Table 5.4). PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND SOCIAL PRESSURE INCENTIVES: TESTING THE ORIGINAL OLSON HYPOTHESES The initial tests concern Olson's hypotheses that public goods and social pressure incentives are larger in small than in large groups, while the reverse should be true for private goods incentives. 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Ame. .mm. ...amv “woav noun “onasz oowuuo H0000 oouuq\aacam owuua\HH08m 40009 Uaom uoz 00060! 002 omaA\0mv DAN you 0.3096 \ooCuo 23020 33 36096 cauqz. 0H0: H0000 uoumazo uouuon 00060: o>ofiaon acouaqncou Afloacaucoov m.m Manda 79 as before, any differences between the means of small and large groups in the direction of the hypotheses were considered as con- firmations. The refined measures, which involve indices of the individual variables, produce another set of mixed results (see summary Table 5.6). For public goods incentives, the results are: REFINED HYPOTHESISI: Public good personal utility incentives are greater in small than in large groups. 1 of 4 tests (25%) supported the hypothesis. REFINED HYPOTHESISZ: Public good general utility incentives are greater in small than in large groups. 3 of 4 tests (75%) supported the hypothesis. REFINED HYPOTHESISa: Public good contingency efficacy incentives are greater in small than in large groups. 1 of 4 tests (25%) supported the hypothesis. REFINED HYPOTHESIS4: Public good contributory efficacy incentives are greater in small than in large groups. 1 of 4 tests (25) supported the hypothesis. The Public Good total index (all public goods combined) supported the Olson Hypothesis1 in one of four tests (25%). Of all the tests made on the indices for public goods, 10 of 28 tests (35.7%) sup- ported the hypotheses. 80 madmw wm.wa «om um.mm wom coauaucou unmouom mv NH NH NH NH mumoa mo Honfisz Hmuoa Hm m o a o acoHucauHucoo mo amassz Hopes + + + musmmmum Haaoom wom m + + Hoooo oum>anm acmaov Hmuoa 0000 mum>fium wom m + + Monuo boom oum>wum mom m + + newuomumucn coco mum>fium mom m + + codumsuoucH boom muo>wnm «mm H + “coco uHHnsm comHoo Hmuoa coco oHHnsm mmw H + soaonum coco oHHnsa HHuuo>o «mm a + honOHuum auouanwuucoo 0000 owansm «mm H + honowuum aucomcfiucoo coco owanom mom m + + suHHHuo cooo oHHnsm HHmum>o amp m + + + hudawua kuosou coco oaabdm amm H + suHHHua Hmcomumm coco oHHnsm uuommsm uuommsm “momma uoz HonEmz uoz wuwm «mung mm>aucmocH ucmoumm umnEsz \uwommq \umnso: uwumunu \Hamsm mmsau> mNHm macaw um mm>aazmozH mo moq¢> xmozH m.m wands 81 For Private Goods Incentives the results are: REFINED HYPOTHESIsgz Private goods information incentives are lower in small than in large groups. 2 of 4 tests (50%) supported the hypothesis. REFINED HYPOTHESISIO: Private goods interaction incentives are lower in small than in large groups. 2 of 4 tests (50%) supported the hypothesis. REFINED HYPOTHESISII: Other private goods incentives are lower in small than in large groups. 2 of 4 tests (50%) supported the hypothesis. The Private Goods total index (combining all private goods) supported the Olson Hypothesis in 2 of 4 tests (50%). In all of the tests in 2 Private Goods indices, 8 of 16 (50%) supported the hypotheses. Social pressure incentive indices were tested on Olson Hypothesis3 and 3 of 4 tests (75%) supported this hypothesis. Finally, when all of the tests of Public, Private, and Social Pressure incentives using the indices were taken into account, 21 of 48 tests, or 43.8 percent, provided support for the hypotheses. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GROUP SIZE AND PUBLIC GOODS INCENTIVES The next set of findings to be reported are concerned with the different types of public goods incentives as a test of Olson's notion that personal utility and contributory efficacy should be greater than general utility and contingency efficacy, respectively. 82 The results of the tests are as follows: REFINED HYPOTHESISS: REFINED HYPOTHESIS6: REFINED HYPOTHESIS7: REFINED HYPOTHESISB: The positive difference between small and large groups is greater for personal utility incentives than for general utility incentives. 3 of 4 tests (75%) supported the hypothesis. The positive difference between small and large groups is greater for contingency than for contributory efficacy incentives. 3 of 4 tests (75%) supported the hypothesis. Public good personal utility incentives are higher than public good general utility incentives. No support. Public good contingency efficacy incentives are higher than contributory efficacy incentives. No support. Table 5.7 provides a data summary for test results on the relation- ships between group size and different types of Public Goods Incentives. Contributions According to Olson, contributions are greater in small than in large groups. This hypothesis was tested using only two of the four independent variables. The "member/not member" and "hold office/not 83 o uuommsm oz 0 uuommnu cz vm.om mv.oo mn.~m Hv.mo omuaq mm.mm no.5m wo.vw om.vo HHusm ooamuo 0H0: uOC\onuuo 6H0: >Hucumoum vm.mw mm.Ho no.nm vo.mm owned mv.om mm.hm mv.vm mm.ow HHuSm nonau: u02\uonfiuz mo.mm mm.mm ma.~m am.mo omuoa wo.mm mm.mm mm.~o vm.oo Hausa nu undo noumonu abouaom vh.~m o~.oo Ho.om ha.mo sound ov.mm no.om Nm.~m hv.oo HHcsm aw can new upcomsn o>oHHon aaucounqccoo uuommsm auaoHuum >uooHuum uuomusm auuaaub auaawub Anasao> Kevan. auOuanuucoo kucoocaucou «nuocoo «scanned subducoocu no oaao> oom om» suwucoo accouom 3.3. no nan-.32 deuce v no a v no n munch mmauummmmm no money: Houoa ovauuo one: 902 + oH.~ «v.n o~.~ mv.o \ooHuuo 8H0: sHucououm houmono «coca Manson + mm.o Oh.n + «Q.N Hm.n uO:\u¢uma£o doOOH honfivt omH uo>0\mm oo.v n>.m + mn.o mn.~ nuns: ad undo noumqno aboaaon omuaH\aaqau was new en.n hm.H + Hm.o om.H uuoamsu o>oHHon sHucouoHucou uuommsm no>wucoosu oo>wucoucu uuommam uo>ausoocu uo>wucoocn nosao> snot unsouo xouoHuuu xoaoauuu >UHHHuD xuauwuo Gouda 0:: Hanna cooruom auouanauucou uncoocwucoo Hauocou Hosanuom oocououuao obauqum mNHw mDQxU rm mm>HHZNUZH wOOOO UHamDm m0 mmUHDZH zumzhwm mmHEWZOHE¢Amm h.m flqn<9 84 hold office" categories were not used since leadership and local membership are both coded as contributions. Thus, respondents who are chapter members or hold office would, by definition, have higher contributions. The means of the Contribution Indices for members of tested groups are as follows: Consistent belief support for ZPG is small 24.6 Consistent belief support for ZPG is large 31.9 “Qt supported Believe chapter size is under 55 (small) 37.7 Believe chapter size is over 150 (large) 40.2 not supported Comparison of the above results indicates that: REFINED HYPOTHESISIZ: Contributions will be greater in small than in large groups. Not supported. 9112 For test purposes, gain was determined by the ratio of the indexed values of the public goods to the contributions. The individual gain thus computed serves as an indicator of each person's benefit in relation to the "costs" of his contribution. The tests of gain (see Table 5.8) indicated that: REFINED HYPOTHESISI3: Individual gain is higher in small than in larger groups. 2 of 4 tests (50%) supported the hypothesis. Ratio of Public to Private Goods Incentive Values A final set of tests were carried out to determine whether the ratio of public to private goods is higher in small than in large 85 TABLE 5.8 INDIVIDUAL GAIN BY GROUP SIZE Individual Gain Consistently believe support for ZPG Small 5.71 Large 4.85 Difference .86 Believe chapter size is under 55 Small 3.51 over 150 Large 2.91 Difference .60 Member local chapter/Not member Small 3.75 local chapter Large 8.09 Difference 4.34 Presently hold office/Not hold Small 1.34 office Large 7.24 Difference 5.87 Total number of supportive tests ‘2 Total number of tests 4 Percent confirmed 50% groups, as Olson suggests. The standardized indices for Total Public Goods and for Total Private Goods were used as ratio components. The results are presented below: Believe support for ZPG is small 1.46 Believe support for ZPG is large 1.41 supported Believe chapter size 55 (small) 1.30 Su orted Believe chapter size 150 (large) 1.26 pp Belong local chapter (small) 1.34 Not belong local chapter (large) 1.56 “Ot supported 86 Hold office (small) 1.23 not su orted Not hold office (large) 1.51 pp REFINED HYPOTHESISI4: The ratio of public to private goods is higher in small than in large groups. 50% supported. Overall Summagy of Findings Table 5.9 summarizes results for all of the specific tests of hypotheses. These results clearly show that the general picture is not one of consistent or strong support for Olson's model. Only three of the 17 hypotheses are supported by more than half of the tests. One of these three ”supported" hypotheses (Olson H-3) deals with social pressure, perhaps the least theoretically problematic and crucial component of Olson's theory, since social pressure has been shown to affect behavior in small group research. Another of the clearly supported hypotheses (Refined H-2) deals with the pre- dominance of general utility, a notion that is intended to represent an alternative to or at least a refinement of Olson's strong emphasis on personal utility. Refined hypothesis 5, which attempts to relate the personal and general utility ideas in a way compatible with Olson's thinking, received rather clear support also. However, even these three hypotheses were only supported in roughly 75 percent of the tests, and therefore should not be considered strong enough to carry the burden for Olson's theory. Since three of the remaining hypotheses were not supported at all, and support for all of the hypotheses totaled only 40 percent, it is clear that Olson's theory is not supported in this study. 87 A~.ovv Hem no hm mummmeomwm mo mamas and mo Adfioe Acme e no N .umsouu omuea cH cecu HHeEe aw waned: ea evoou oue>aum ou Uganda «0 oaueu one «we mammxaomrz omznhmm 83 4 mo N .33.; 83H 5 55 39.8 5 3.32 «H flow H3333“ .2 33:9an 82qu 8s ~ uo o .3203 ooueH 5 can... 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H no 0 macaw HHeae I ooHuuo 0H0: >Huconoum Hos H u0 o @5090 emueH I uoumenu HeooH no nomads uoz Hoe H u0 o msoum HHeim I acumeco HeooH Mensa: Hoe H no 0 macaw ooueH I omH um>o Hoe H mo 0 macho HHeam I mm nova: «H «NH» acumezo o>uHHom How H u0 o ooueH Ho. H no 0 HHeIe eH can sow uuomnse o>eMHon >Hucoumanou .no>HucoocH >uHHHus Heuocuo coco oHHnsm :enu noanz one no>HusoueH >uHHHu: Hec0nuom voom oHHnsm . mHmumpoa>I DNZHMMI Home e u0 m anyone HHe Heuoe HooH. H no H ooHuuo vHon u0:\oUHuuo 6H0: >Husomoum HooHV H w0 H noumeno HeuoH menace uoc\uoume:u HeuoH honamt .0. H u0 o OmH uo>0\mm hops: nH ome acumenu o>oHHom Hos H no 0 woueH\HHean «H can you uuoamsu o>oHHon >HucounHmcoo .>oeoHuuo >uouanuucoo uOu sen» aueunmo >ucaocHucou new moueouu nH museum omueH use HHeEe cwabuon oucououqu 0>HuHeoa och HomHmumabmrz ouznhmz Ho. mamwa\9mommbm monB¢NH4¢ZOHa¢mNmo mDQmo wn mummxaonhm H4909 4(809 chscwucoov OH.m Manda 9]. Hm.ovv va no em manomo Add mom 41809 Ho.oHv 0m u0 m ooHuuo vHo: uO:\ooHuuo 0H0: >Hucwmoum Hm.HvH no mo on Noumeno HeuoH uonfiofi u0:\umume£o HeooH woman: Ho.Hmv vb mo mm OmH uo>0\mm some: uH QNHn acumenu o>oHHom Hm.wvv vo no 0m mmueH\HHeEm mH 0mm now uuommsm w>oHHon xHucmumHmcou mmaomw 444 m0 >mHucomoum How H u0 o uuumeno HeooH wensoa uoc\umumenu HeuoH sense: HOOHH H mo H omH uo>0\mm have: nH ouHa woumeso o>oHHam HooHv H no H omueH\HHese aH can now uuommsm «>0 Hon >HucoumHchO .mmsouo moueH cH sec» HHeSm sH umcoH: mH muoom oue>Hum ou oHHnsm no oHueu one "v mHmmermaz omszmm Home e no w museum HHe Mow Heuoa Hoe H u0 o ooHuuo 6H0: uOC\ooHuuo vHog xHucoeoum Hoe H no 0 noumeno HeooH senses uoc\uoume£o HeuoH Manse: HooHL H No H OmH uo>0\mm hops: eH ouHm uoumecu o>oHme HooH. H no H omueH\HHesu uH can now uuommsm «>0 Hon >HucoumHmcou .wasoum mouoH :H can» HHuau cH uonoHn aH cHum HeseH>HcaH “m mHmmmHOa»: omszmm Ho. N u0 o museum HHe now Hence Ho. 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These specific differences also hold true for all of the group size operationalizations. In other words, public and private goods incentives are mixed in their ranking with only certain public goods tending to predominate. These patterns strongly suggest that most ZPG members share common incentives which transcend group size, however group size may be defined. This common ranking pattern, which emerges for all group operationaliza- tions when the magnitudes of the indexed items are compared, is as follows: 1. Contributory efficacy 2. General utility 3. Information 4. Total public goods 5. Personal utility 6. Contingency efficacy, other private, and total private (approximately equal) . Interaction . Social pressure (Dd These results strongly suggest that there exists a commonality of mixed public and private incentives among ZPG members that is both stronger in magnitude and more consistent than the differences predicted by Olson's model on the basis of group size. The fact that "contributory efficacy" and "general utility" rank above the more strictly conceived Olson concepts of "contingency efficacy" and "personal utility" is also evidence that casts some doubt on the power of Olson's theory to explain contributions within ZPG. The Value of Information Incentives: Private and Public Aspects ZPG is a "purposive" social movement organization (see Chapter 1 for discussion of this). The relatively high value placed by members on questionnaire items measuring public goods indicates that, 96 regardless of group size considerations, purposive incentives play a fundamental role in inducing contributions. However, the rela- tively high value given to "information"--which Olson takes to be a private good--also indicates that some private goods are also important incentives in ZPG. In short, as we have already seen, the organization offers a mixture of incentives. This notion of a mixture of private and public incentives is further bolstered when we recall that "information" itself need not always be viewed as strictly a private good in Olson's sense. As noted earlier (Chapter 3), public dissemination of information is one of the organizational means used to achieve the public good. Thus, non-contributors can eventually obtain the same information as contributors. What is unique about information in this case is its relation to the public good; i.e., it cannot be separated from the public good except in the abstract. "Information" is seldom cited as the most important reason for belonging to ZPG when the various incentives are explicitly listed to be ranked by respondents, although it does achieve a relatively high ranking. However, when responses to open-ended questions are analyzed, "information" clearly emerges as a very important incentive. Typical responses to the question, "What do you feel you personally gain, if anything, from membership in ZPG?”, are listed below to illustrate the value placed on information incentives by ZPG members: "Information of population trends, politics, etc." "Detailed facts and information on population issues." 97 ”Up-to-date information on family planning, abortion, population, immigration - facts and legislation.” "Information on an important effort." "Information and a group of people who share some of my socio- political views. Information clearing-house; political info and feedback; direct lobbying action on congress and executive branch: financial and material resource helpful for the chapter." "Great deal of informative material on birth control, population, abortion, immigration, laws and changes. Materials which I really enjoy receiving to keep up on all that is happening in an area that I am interested in and concerned about." "Opportunity to explore local implications of ZPG and to debate issues with other concerned and informed people. Information in publications, notice of timely lobbying issues, from both a feeling of being a good citizen and practicing what I preach." "Since there is no local chapter, I gain much information and emotional support from my national membership. I sometimes feel like a one-woman ZPG chapter here since the information I gain from ZPG and the National Reporter I pass on to organizations and the community in my population lectures, and to the Board of Directors of our Planned Parenthood group. My major personal gain: since I feel so strongly about the human over-population problem in the world today, I feel that ZPG is working hard in the direction of population control and concern for the environment, especially in efforts to influence population legislation." The last two examples of ”information" responses illustrate especially well the mixture and the subtle blending of public and private goods incentives. Members use organizationally provided information, not just as a source of private gain, but also to ”further the cause.” The above sample responses also illustrate the fact that information incentives for ZPG members are inextricably mixed; i.e., there is no way to empirically separate them into pure public or pure private goods incentives. ZPG members may very well get private gains from the information they receive, but they also feel so strongly about population control that they support the organization simply because it provides them with information to 98 use in educating others about the problem. Thus, for many ZPG members, it is not just the information per se but also the poten- tial use of that information which provides the incentive: the private good incentive is enhanced by its potential for aiding in production of the public good. Finally, it should be noted that the information incentive was not found to be either strongly or consistently related to group size considerations. Public Goods Incentives: Personal and General Utility Inspection of the relative value of the strictly public goods incentives again points out the general lack of differences between any operationalizations of group size; i.e., the range of values for the individual items over the eight categories of group size differs no more than five percent (see Table C.6 in Appendix C). Of particular interest here is that Olson's theory leads us to expect that contingency efficacy and personal utility will be the predominant goods incentives in small groups. However, only two of eight tests support the hypotheses that the indices for these incentives will have higher value in small groups. Instead, the highest values, regardless of group size, are achieved by-"con- tributory efficacy” and "general utility" (ranges 88-93 and 82-85, respectively, as compared to 56-62 for contingency efficacy and 64-69 for personal utility: see Table C.6 in Appendix C).5 5The hypotheses involving these concepts (Refined Hypotheses 7 and 8) for the whole sample were the only hypotheses that received 'no support, meaning that in their reverse form they would be sup- ported with total consistency. 99 These results must once more call into question Olson's expec- tation that contributions are contingent on personal gain, at least for members of ZPG. Perhaps in the economic sphere persons do tend to calculate personal "gain” possibilities and then make their contributions contingent on receiving benefits. However, in the type of collective action represented by a social movement organi- zation like ZPG, other considerations appear to take precedence. Such considerations are perhaps best illustrated from the following examples of additional responses to the open-ended question, "What do you personally gain, if anything, from ZPG?" "A sense of contributing to population stabilization awareness." "It's better than doing nothing (and sometimes it's even a tool for doing something)." ”Satisfaction that efforts are being made to control population." "I gained the feeling that at least I am trying - just wish it was more effective." "The knowledge that I'm helping, even if in only a small way." "The inner satisfaction that I am doing something towards population control." "I personally gain nothing but I feel good encouraging a good cause." "It gives me personal satisfaction to practice and work for what I preach." "Nothing directly - only as the world gains." "Personally little or nothing. Giving my offspring a living chance." "I am supporting an activity which will (may) lead to the degree of public awareness that might support a rational population policy - admittedly a dubious proposition." "I'm not trying to gain anything, I'm trying to help do something to solve a serious and largely un-recognized problem. On the local level, the fact that I enjoy working with the other involved chapter members is a fringe benefit. 0n the national level, the only fringe benefit I can think of is the newsletter." 100 As indicated by the typical responses cited above, many ZPG members do not make contributions in order to make personal gain, nor do they make their contributions contingent on delivery of certain goods. Over six percent of the respondents actually felt that they gained absolutely "nothing" personally from their contri- butions (see Table 5.4). What, then, is the incentive for contri- bution? Satisfaction from helping a good cause, doing something about an important problem, and contributing toward the public good without expectation of an immediate or concrete "gain." Members do not in general appear to closely calculate whether their contribution makes a perceptible or noticeable difference; it is only important that a contribution may possibly "help" to make a difference in the outcome. Members are aware that their individual support may not make much of a difference, but they are also aware that the probability of ultimate success hinges upon the cumulation of individual contributions. Two typical responses that exemplify this orientation are: "One more added to the ranks of ZPG and its goals. The knowledge that I'm helping, even in a small way. The wider the supporting membership the more effective the lobbying." Contributory efficacy and general utility incentives (represented by the above two responses) do, in fact, have the highest value for all members of ZPG, again regardless of "group size" definitions. It might be argued that the concept of "general utility" (in contrast with "personal utility") violates the assumptions of Olson's theory by introducing interests that are considerably broader than the "self-interests" assumed by the theory. It might 101 also be argued that "satisfaction of doing something to help a good cause" is a private or, in Olson's terms, a moral incentive.6 Yet, it is clear that, while ZPG members' motives go beyond a narrow definition of self-interest and involve moral incentives, ZPG is not a philanthropic organization, nor do contributions function mainly to relieve guilt or to produce the good feeling that comes from a moral act. Instead, I believe the most out- standing feature of ZPG members' incentives is the way self- interests are inextricably blended and made compatible with interests that go beyond self. In other words, the evidence from this study suggests that not only do ZPG members believe that what they want is morally right for themselves but also that it is morally imperative for society as a whole. This, of course, is the generic hallmark of the ideologies of many, if not all, col- lective action efforts (social movements) that seek public collective goods. Implications for Collective Action in Social Movements It is a fundamental assumption of Olson's theory (as it is for most of economic theory in general) that individuals develop per- sonalized alternatives to goods sought in all collective action efforts. However, as Hirschman (1970) has pointed out, this assump- tion may not be true, for certain kinds of collective action goods, particularly the public variety. It is true, for example, that a 6When open—ended statements of this type were coded both as private and public goods, i.e., "satisfaction" was considered a private component, "help a good cause" was considered a public component, while a coding of "mixed” was assigned in the summary of all items. 102 factory worker or teacher may decide not to contribute to a col- lective action that seeks to achieve higher wages, because that person may think (1) the good will be obtained anyway by virtue of the collective action of others who are perceived as also giving utility to the good, and/or (2) personal, individual efforts to achieve higher wages (perhaps in another plant, by harder work, etc.) involve less cost and/or are less risky than collective action. When a public good is in question, however, especially one that pertains to the whole community or society in general, the kinds of individual alternatives considered above may not exist. In the case of ZPG, a person will soon perceive that there is no way to individually obtain the benefits that zero population growth (or population control) would produce, or to escape, as an indi- vidual, the costs that continued population growth would impose on everyone. Thus, when a public good is not collectively obtained, there exist no individual alternative sources of the good, and the individual must eventually suffer a public "evil." As Hirschman puts it, a "no exit” situation is created: i.e., some people come to feel that they cannot escape the general evil that will befall everyone and therefore have no meaningful alternative but to support collective action aimed at producing the public good, regardless of the likelihood that such collective action will actually produce the desired results. Much of this study's findings tend to be more supportive of Hirschman's more general ideas concerning the basis of collective action than Olson's more specific economic model. ZPG members in 103 general feel that unless some counteractive efforts are made now-- no matter how modest these may be initially--the "public evil" of overpopulation will eventually be forced upon all future members of society. Therefore, ZPG members express considerable willingness to support any effort to control population,regardless of specific personal payoff contingencies. Most ZPG members appear to realize that no collective good can ever be created if each person attempts to be a "free rider.” Contributions without payoff contingencies represent, in economical terms, an "irrational" response. Nevertheless, absence of this type of "irrational" behavior will guarantee the absence of collective action. Thus, given a public good that has high utility for the individual, there is no "logic" in avoiding collective action, even when the group is large. In short, "logic of collective action" may, for members of a social movement, differ from the logic operating in other kinds of groups. "Self-interest" in social movement organizations is not so much related to the amount of "gain" immediately expected as it is to the value placed by individual members on the desired public good. So, in social movements, if a good which can be achieved only by collective action has a high enough value to the individual, then logic would dictate a contribution regardless of perceptibility, noticeability, or group size. In addition, if the good is viewed in general moral terms as well as in terms of "self-interest" (its value to the individual), avoiding a contribution should appear to members as being both illogical and immoral. There seems to be 104 little doubt that ZPG members, in effect, "see around" the logic of collective action, as Gamson (1975) suggests. CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS GENERAL OVERVIEW Olson's theory does not completely lack support in this study, but the support it receives is neither consistent nor strong. The general picture emerging from my findings should certain lead one toward an open-minded scepticism concerning Olson's logic of collective action model, at least insofar as his theory is applied to social movement groups that seek public goods, such as ZPG. Findings of this study which are particularly incompatible with Olson's theory are the weak and inconsistent incentive dif- ferences between large-small group distinctions. Public good incentives of the general utility and contributory efficacy types predominate for ZPG members regardless of group size operationali- zations, instead of the personal utility and contingency efficacy types predicted by Olson's model. "Information" viewed as a private good ranks relatively highly as an incentive for all group size operationalizations. However, closer analysis suggests that information incentives involve a blending of public and private incentives that cannot readily (or realistically) be separated. Similarly, there is a strong "moral" component in ZPG members' incentives, again regardless of group size. But there is little basis for thinking that this represents 105 APPENDICES 106 only a private gain for members, since ZPG members clearly think that what is good for them individually is good for everyone. Overall, then, results of this study suggest that ZPG member contributions are not primarily based on a careful calculation of the size of the specific, immediate, or direct personal ”gain" resulting from contributions made. Instead, the incentive factors that combine to provide the primary genesis of member contributions appear to be the high magnitude of the value ZPG members place on the good they seek, their completely blended perception of the morality for themselves and for society in obtaining this good, and their realization that avoiding a contribution will result in a public evil. High utility for goods, the blending of self and other interests in a moral context, and the perception of no indi- vidual alternatives for the good or for escaping an evil are central ideological features underlying many of the collective action 'efforts that come to be identified as social movements. My analysis indicates that incentives for collective action seeking such ”public" goods are quite different from those which Olson proposes for groups where relatively moderate utility, strict self-interest and indi- vidual alternatives may be assumed. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTED RESEARCH Obviously the present study is far from definitive. Perhaps its main contribution is in gaining some precision on certain worth- while questions about collective action that have developed in the process of translating an explicit but still very general theory like Olson's into a specific research problem. Certainly there is 107 now some basis for the following questions: (1) Are all of the specific hypotheses tested in this study actually implied in Olson's model? (2) Does an organization like ZPG represent an appropriate group for testing Olson's model? (3) Are the specific organiza- tional definitions of group size, public goods, private goods, and social pressure incentives appropriate? Since Olson does not provide specifics on how his theory might be tested, the general strategy I have employed has been to develop a number of hypotheses that seemed to be reasonable while providing different, possible ways of looking at the general notion Olson presents. Similarly, various operationalizations of group size and of public and private goods have been employed simply to cover a greater part of the range of possibilities suggested but not con- cretely outlined by Olson. The fact that none of the hypotheses (at least the more crucial ones on private and public goods incen- tives) receives consistent support in any of the operationaliza- tions does not, of course, ”prove” Olson's theory wrong, but it does suggest that factors operating in the kind of SMO studied here may exceed the power of Olson's model to satisfactorily explain them.1 1Olson clearly favors collective action in the market realm as the most appropriate for showing the validity of his theory, but he does not exclude organizations like ZPG. Since ZPG is a large, latent group that has mobilized, it should show, on the whole, some of the tendencies toward private good predominance, and at least some of the large and small size operationalizations developed within ZPG should show relatively strong consistency with Olson's theory if it is to be regarded as generally valid. It is the case that there are not many private incentives available to ZPG members, but Olson does not imply that a multitude of private incentives need to be offered. 108 It is also true that the private incentives in ZPG are not "pure" in the sense that they are clearly separated from the public goods incentives. Is a good with a "moral” component strictly a private good, or could it actually exist without the public good component? Is Olson's theory only testable on an organization in which public and private goods can be separated empirically and realistically denied to non-contributors? Does such an organiza- tion really exist outside of theory?2 It is suggested strongly by my data and by more careful consideration of Olson's examples that empirically it may be impossible to separate public and private goods incentives. However, more research is required before this question can be clearly answered. These are but a few of the questions raised in this study. Future research designed to test Olson's theory should surely attempt to address these questions more thoroughly. Specifically, further research might fruitfully investigate the following suggestions: 1. Compare separate and distinct small and large organi- zations in instances where both organizations are engaged in collective action toward the production of an identical public (or collective) good. 2For example, Olson cites professional journals as private goods available only to contributors to professional associations. The American Dental Association is a professional organization lobbying for legislation favorable to dentists--but also protective of patients' interests. The ADA Journal provides material strictly related to the practice of dentistry, but also at least 25 percent of the Journal is devoted to articles relative to legislation protective of dentists' interests and also protecting patients from the dangers of treatment by unqualified persons. (Specific examples can be provided upon request.) 109 Study the process whereby persons are initially recruited into the organization, before organiza- tional socialization has an opportunity to change incentives and make them homogeneous with those of other members. Study collective action over time, since much socio- logical theory (Michels, Zald and Ash, etc.) suggests that private goods become increasingly important over time. Give attention to very precise measures of public and private goods incentives, including the differen- tiation of the personal/general utility and contributory/contingency efficacy distinctions developed here. Research should attempt to determine how different incentives may be empirically separated, and/or blended and ranked, and whether, in fact, distinct public, private, and social pressure incentives may ever be empirically separated in a meaningful way. Research should attempt to determine whether social movement organizations are basically the same or inherently different from other types of collective action organizations. This differentiation would be crucial toanswering questions about incentives to contribute to collective action. If social 110 movement organizations are inherently different from other types of collective action organizations, then it would seem to follow that social movement incentive systems are also inherently different. But this latter proposition is yet another question for research to answer. CONCLUSION In conclusion, then, more questions were raised than answered by this study. Generally speaking, Olson's theory of the logic of collective action does not seem to apply as well to collective action in social movement organizations as it might for organiza- tions implicated in economic considerations. Public and private goods incentives are inextricably mixed in social movements and possess a "moral" component which itself may be a primary incentive for contributing to collective action. The relative value of the public good for ZPG members seems to transcend the group size and immediate, personal "gain" components of Olson's theory. There- fore, further research is suggested to answer some of the questions raised here, including whether or not the relative value of the public good is the driving force behind contributions to collective action in social movements. APPENDIX A ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, INC. ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, INC. Zero Population Growth, Inc., was organized in late 1968 around Paul Ehrlich, who remains to this day as Honorary President. The original group soon became too large to operate as a single unit, so it was divided into local chapters with a national head- quarters opened in Palo Alto, California, near the location of the original group. The organizational structure which developed pro- vides for a 60 member Board of Directors who may be nominated by the general membership but are elected by the existing Board of Directors. Since this Board of Directors meets only twice a year, they choose an Executive Board which meets regularly (usually bi- monthly) and provides policy guidelines for the Executive Director and staff of the National office, whom the Executive Board hires to run the organization. In 1974 the National headquarters moved to washington, D.C., to be closer to other organizations with similar interests and also to facilitate lobbying in Congress. Membership in ZPG is open to anyone and members receive each month the newspaper (The National Reporter) and "Population Politics", a newsletter describing lobbying control so that members may send letters to support the ZPG position on such legislation. In addition, members receive special handouts and reports to sup- plement the information provided in the monthly publications. ZPG headquarters acts as a resource materials center for all members. 111 112 Members are automatically placed on the rolls of a local chapter if one is near, but they need not actively participate or pay dues locally. They are considered members of ZPG so long as they pay dues to the National organization, and this is their only responsibility in the organization. ZPG chapters are formed by application to the National Chapter Chairman, and approval is almost automatic so long as at least ten members are in the group applying for the charter. Chapters exist so long as there is any chapter activity. Each chapter receives a portion of its members' national dues to use for local activities as well as aid and advice from the national office upon request. However, the national office has no power at the local level,and each group has its own by-laws, officers, dues, policies, and activities decided at the local level. Larry Barnett (Barnett, 1971, 1974) did two excellent surveys of ZPG members in 1970 and 1971 which revealed the following characteristics: ZPG members were more likely to be better educated, have higher incomes, and be more active politically than the general population at that time. Almost half were students, primarily at the college level, but even non-students were predominantly youthful (under 40). Members were less likely to be Catholic and few minority group members were represented, but members were more likely to have no religion or be Jewish than the general population. Only about five to ten percent were considered active in chapters, but 43 percent belonged to some other environmental organization. The demographic characteristics did not seem to determine behavior or attitudes among sample members, with the one exception that younger 113 females in the second survey planned families of a size they believed would halt population growth. ZPG members overwhelmingly favored the principle that abortion and vasectomy should be legally available although many did not personally favor either. However, members did not agree that the government should limit family size, and only about half believe in tax changes to penalize larger families. Thus, there was general consensus on the problems related to overpopulation and to the use of political means to solve them, but no general con- sensus concerning individual desire for those public goods. Membership in ZPG is widely dispersed geographically, but at the same time often concentrated in areas of high population density (geographical location of chapters and members is listed below). .coHueHHHuue nouaezo 0: 5H: anon-3E one enouaecu 35.32:. 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The long term survival of the human species is dependent upon the establishment of an equilibrium between human demands and the carrying capacity of nature. The earth and its re- sources of land, air, water, and minerals are finite, and therefore there are limits to the cumula- tive demands which can be placed upon them. In addition, the earth and its resources and the users of those resources comprise a series of intricately complex ecological systems. N o demand or action can be considered in isolation; all things are interconnected. Foremost among the pressures on the boundaries of finity and ecological balance is the strain of a growing human population now numbering in the billions. The number of human beings that the earth can support is a function of the per capita demands of those individuals. It is pre- ferable to support a smaller number of human beings at an equitable and sufficient standard of living than a greater number at a lesser level. Zero Population Growth, Inc. (ZPG) concerns itself primarily with the United States, but these principles are universal. ZPG has adopted a limited number of broad goals to guide its activities: 1. ZPG believes that the present population of the United States exceeds the optimum level for the continued well-being of its citizens. ZPG therefore advocates the achievement, by voluntary means, of an end to US. population growth by 1990, and a reduction in US. popula- tion size thereafter. Among the conditions necessary to achieve this goal, ZPG stresses: freedom of access for every person to all means of voluntary birth control; a major research effort to develop safer and more effective means of birth control; complete equality of opportunity for all women and men; and removal of all legal and societal pro-natalist pressures. The population size should stabilize at a substantially reduced level which will maximize diversity, freedom of choice, and the quality of life for all. , 2. ZPG believes that land is a resource too important to human survival to be subjected to misuse. Ecological land use planning is essential in determining the appropriate patterns of distribu- tion of people on the land, and of migration between states and regions. Thoughtful land use plan- ning at all levels of government is necessary to assure the'long-range stewardship of the land and well-being of mankind. 3. ZPG believes that human activities are causing the rapid depletion of the world’s available stock of mineral resources. Simultaneously those activities are resulting in increased pollution of land, air and water resources. ZPG therefore recommends 1) reduction in the rate of growth and eventual stabilization of United States consumption of non-renewable resources; and 2) rapid stabilization of total national energy consumption at least until environmentally sound sources are developed. ZPG recognizes that none of its goals can be justified unless concurrently with their achieve- ment adequate levels of income, health care, and educational opportunity are assured to all persons. This paper made from 100% post-consumer waste. Questionnaire l SURVEY OF ZPG MEMBERS,1975 Unless otherwise instructed, please circle the number which best represents your response to each question. Example: 1. 2. 3. 4. Are you a ZPG member? 1. CE3§ 2. No when did you originally join ZPG? l. l969 (ZPG founded) 2. l970 (First Earth Day) 3. l97l 4. 1972 (Stockholm Environment Conference) 5. l973 6. l974 (Bucharest Population Conference) 7. l975 Is there a local ZPG chapter near you? I. Yes 2. No 3. Don't Know 00 you belong to the local ZPG chapter? l. Yes 2. No 3. Formerly. now dropped If either of these are marked, skip question 3 and continue with Question ngmbg; 4, plggsg. this question and continue with question number 4 , pl ease. "]If either of these are marked, skip the rest of How often do you attend local ZPG meetings? l. Frequently 2. One or more times per year, but not frequently 3. Not at all How many people do you think belong to your local chapter? (Fill in) How many members usually attend the meetings you attend? I. Less than 10 2. lO-ZO 3. 20-30 4. Over 30 5. I don't attend To the best of y0ur knowledge which of the following have been held by your local ZPG chapter in the last year. and which have you attended? Check if Meetings Check if you have Held attended meetings 1. Informational or program meetings (including those sponsored by ZPG and open to non-members). 2. Primarily social meetings such as picnics, dinners. etc. at which program is not primary. 3. Business or program meetings open only to members. 4. Committee or planning sessions. _ 5. Other. please state Please circle your contributions to and activities in ZPG. A. Dues: 1. Local chapter 2. National 8. Attend meetings: I. Local chapter 2. National C. Write letters or send other information in behalf of ZPG and/or its policies. 1. Local or state issues 2. National issues 0. Give speeches, serve on panel discussions, attend hearings, etc. l. Local or state issues 2. National issues E. Work for candidates, referenda, favorable to ZPG policies. 1. Local or state 2. National F. Make monetary or material resource contributions in addition to dues. 1. Local ZPG 2. National ZPG J 1'7 118 5. Do you presently hold office or have you ever held office in ZPG? A. At present: nggl_level: 1. Yes 2. No National level: I. Yes 2. No B. Formerly: £9511 level: 1. Yes 2. No National level: 1. Yes 2. No 6. why do you belong to ZPG? (Please circle the number which beSt expresses your response to each statement.) A grygjglly_ An impgr- Of some- 0f ver 0f a950- i ortant tant impgr- litt e lutely no reason for reason tance impgr- impor- my member- for my for my tance tance to ship. member- member- to my my member- ship. ship. member- ship. ship. A. My contribution is helping to influence action on population control. l 2 3 4 5 B. I personally gain much from the information I receive from ZPG. l 2 3 4 5 C. Some important aspects of my life are threatened by population growth. l 2 3 4 5 D. I like being a part of an important cause. 1 2 3 4 5 E- If ZPG achieves its goals, I will per- sonally benefit from it. I 2 3 4 5 F. The organization needs my contribution if it is going to achieve its goals. I 2 3 4 5 G. I personally enjoy the people I asso- ciate with in the organization. 1 2 3 4 5 H. I enjoy my activities in the organization. l 2 3 4 5 1. It's a group where I don't have to apo- logize for not having a big family. or not having had any children. I 2 3 4 5 J. People who are important to me encourage my membership. 1 ‘ 2 3 4 5 K. Stopping population growth is so important. that I try to support . ggy_effort aimed at that goal. I 2 3 a 5 L. Other reason, please state I 2 3 4 5 7. From the above list. select the one reason you feel is most important for your membership and the one reason you feel is the least important reason for your membership in ZPG. (Please indicate by writifig in the corresponding letter A - L from the above list.) A. The most important reason 8. The least important reason 8. What do you feel that you personally gain. if anything, from membership in ZPG? A. From Local Chapter? (If no chapter. write None) B. From National? 9. Please circle the number which best represents your response to each statement. 119 ZPG chaptensshould get involved in local growth issues. Parents with three or more natural children should be required to pay tuition if their children attend public schools. The benefits of ZPG membership outweigh the costs. I trust the leaders of ZPG to do something worthwhile with my dues. I would not be a member of ZPG if my friends had not urged me. A deep concern with population problems leaves no other alternative than active support of ZPG. Inc. I have found ZPG meetings intellectually stimulating. I would not belong to ZPG if I did not stand to bene- fit personally from a reduction in growth rates. I profit from the contacts I have made in ZPG. The government should make an intensive effort to apprehend and deport all illegal aliens residing in this country. I would get a lot out of being a ZPG member. even if ZPG doesn't accomplish its goals. The number of persons in this local area who favor zero papulation growth is large. Population education should be mandatory in the public schools. I enjoy being a part of ZPG since many knowledgeable and influential people support it. Being a member of ZPG keeps me well informed on population and related problems. Zero population growth has now been accomplished in the United States. I would drop my membership in ZPG if I thought it would reach it's goals without my support. The number of persons in the U.S. who favor zero population growth is large. I will "stick it out” with ZPG through thick and thin. I may not renew my ZPG membership. The number of foreign-born people entering this country to live should be reduced to equal the number of Americans leaving to live in other nations. 3. Strongly Tend to Neither Tend to Strongly Agree Agree Agree Dis- Disagree nor Dis- agree ggree _l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 S l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4 5 15. 17. 18. 19. 120 4. Are you? 1. Male 2. Female How many natural children (not adopted or stepchildren) do you now have? (fill in) How many adopted children or stepchildren do you now have? (fill in) A. Adopted 8. Stepchildren Your age? (fill in)_____ Hhat is your current marital status? l. Single (never married) 2. Married 3. Separated 4. Divorced 5. Hidowed Please check the highg§£_educational level you have cgmpleted. I. High school graduation or less 2. Some college; or some business, professional. or technical schooling after high school but no Bachelor' 5 Degree 3. College graduation with a Bachelor's Degree 4. Graduate work beyond the Bachelor's Degree but no advanced degree 5. Graduate degree, please state highggt degree obtained Hhat has been your principal occupation in the last year? (circle only one) D. Undergraduate student 1. Graduate Student 2. Houseperson 3. Unemployed 4. Farmer or fann laborer 5. Professional 6. Managerial 7. Clerical or sales worker 8. Blue-collar worker Please circle the category which gives the total before-tax income in 1974 of yourself and (if you are married) your spouse. (response optional)— 1. Under $10,000 2. 310,000-314,999 3. 315,000-319,999 4. 320,000-324,999 5. 325,000-534,999 6. 335,000-544,999 7. 345,000-359,999 8. Over $60,000 Are you a member of any other environmental or conservation organization? (If so. please state name(s);i not, write "none”. ) Please use this space or a separate sheet for any observations. comments or suggestions you have for or about ZPG. Thank you for your cooperation. Please look over the questionnaire to make sure you have not skipped any items. Please return the questionnaire in the enclosed envelope. 121 .oaougce «3.03:. on» 5 93.230333. 05 Educ» made: .83.: >5 v2.3...- uo: 25: so» ous- exdl Ou ouaeccognaav 0:... auto, good as .couu-weaoou was we 50> :55. 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Washington, D.C. 20036 GROWTH (202)785-0100 September 25, 1974 Harriet E. Tillock 2541 N. Mason Street Saginaw, Michigan 48602 Dear Ms. Tillock: ZPG is happy to grant you permission to study the organization, and survey its membership, as part of your Ph.D. thesis research. I am certain that your work will be of substantial benefit to us. Our grant of permission, however, is subject to the following requirements: --that you make clear in all phases of the project that this study is being conducted solely by you in your capacity at Michigan State University, and that it is not an official activity of Zero Popu- lation Growth. --that the final version of the questionnaire to be sent to our members be approved by us. --that you provide to ZPG for review advance copies of any final report or other materials which constitute project findings or conclusions. Enclosed are initial suggestions for revision of Larry Barnett's second questionnaire. we offer them only as suggestions-- as questions which we believe will produce answers which are either more meaningful to you, or useful to you and to ZPG. We do not intend these suggestions to limit you in any way in developing your survey material. Sincerely, Robert T. Dennis Executive Director cc: John Harris John Tanton Enclosures RTD:em 128 MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Department of Sociology East Lansing, Michigan - 48824 We are conducting a study of the members of Zero Population Growth. Inc. You are one of a small but representative sample of the members selected by chance for this study. Since the sample is small, your response is important so that we may get a true picture of ZPG membership. Our aim is to learn about the way you are involved in ZPG, the reasons for your membership, and your views on some important population policy issues. It is hoped that this study will help ZPG become a more effective organization. The study is being conducted with the permission and the cooperation of the national headquarters of ZPG, but is an independent study. The study is made possible through the support of Michigan State University and through the personal resources of the investigators; no financial support is provided by ZPG. We hope you will take a few minutes right now to fill in and return the enclosed questionnaire. Your answers will be handled with the strictest confidentiality. No names or other identifying features of respondents will be revealed in reports of the study. Although statistical analysis of the results will be made available to ZPG, questionnaires and names of respondents will not be provided. This procedure is designed to allow you to answer freely and candidly. It is only if you are completely frank and open in your answers that the study will be useful. Your name and address are coded to the questionnaire identification number so we can maintain our records. We plan to mail you a reminder if we don't receive a response in about two weeks. Please keep in mind that it is important for us to study all types of members: long—term and short—term, deeply involved and less involved, enthusi— astic and less-than-enthusiastic. However, we wish to respect com- pletely your right to privacy and will send you neither a reminder nor another questionnaire if you indicate your desire not to partici- pate on this letter and return it in the envelope enclosed. If you desire a copy of our results, check below and return this with your questionnaire. we appreciate greatly your cooperation in making this study possible. Sincerely, Denton E. Morrison Harriet Tillock Professor Project Coordinator Principal Investigator Instructor, Saginaw Valley College Ph.D. Candidate, MSU I would like a copy of the results of this study. 129 MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Department of Sociology East Lansing, Michigan - 48824 October 6, 1975 MI. P.0. Box 111 Waterloo, NY 13165 Dear Mr. : We hope you received our first letter and questionnaire explaining the study of ZPG members we are conducting. In case you didn't, or in case you misplaced it or set it aside, we're enclosing a copy. We are very pleased with the cooperation from ZPG members we have received in our study, but, as indicated in our original letter, we do need the cooperation of all persons sampled if our results are to be representative of ZPG members. Naturally we recognize that ZPG members are very busy people and that our questionnaire probably can't have high priority in your time schedule. But we would really appreciate it if you could find a few minutes to fill in and return the questionnaire. Thanks, Denton E. Morrison Harriet Tillock Professor Project Coordinator Principal Investigator Instructor, Saginaw Valley College Ph.D. Candidate, MSU P.S. If you have already returned the questionnaire, please disre- gard this letter! APPENDIX C DETAILED TABLES 130 66.6 66.6 66.6 9606606 90: 6026666660 2:»: 06.6 . 06.6 06.6 9606606 6026666660 266: . 66 . 66 . 66 . mm 69669 q<909 6 6 6 69669 66909 6606. M 6606. M .606. 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