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.100 y

This is to certify that the
thesis entitled

THE EFFECT THE INTELLIGENCE TOOLBOX TRAINING
PROGRAM HAS ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY'S ABILITY TO DEVELOP OR RE-
ENGINEER AN INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY AND THE EFFECT
AGENCY SIZE HAS ON THE ADEQUACY OF AN AGENCY’S
INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY

presented by

Jeremy Gibson Carter

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for the

MS. degree in Criminal Justice

 

 

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5/ 8/55

Date

 

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2/05 p:lC|RC/DaleDue.indd-p.1

THE EFFECT THE INTELLIGENCE TOOLBOX TRAINING PROGRAM HAS ON
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY’S ABILITY TO
DEVELOP OR RE-ENGINEER AN INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY AND THE EFFECT
AGENCY SIZE HAS ON THE ADEQUACY OF AN AGENCY’S INTELLIGENCE
CAPACITY

By

Jeremy Gibson Carter

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
School of Criminal Justice

2006

ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT THE INTELLIGENCE TOOLBOX TRAINING PROGRAM HAS ON
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY’S ABILITY To
DEVELOP OR RE-ENGINEER AN INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY AND THE EFFECT
AGENCY SIZE HAS ON THE ADEQUACY OF AN AGENCY’S INTELLIGENCE
CAPACITY
By

Jeremy Gibson Carter

The purpose of this research study is to determine the effectiveness that the
Intelligence Toolbox training program has in regard to helping state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies to develop or re-engineer an intelligence capacity that is not only
operational, but is consistent with federal regulations and policies. Also, the need exists
to assess the impact agency size and population of the agency’s responsibility has on the
adequacy of a law enforcement agency’s intelligence capacity. It has been made apparent
by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the President
of the United States, and law enforcement administrators on all levels that the initiative
for intelligence capacities is present, however, the knowledge and resources are not.

With this in mind, Dr. David L. Carter and Michigan State University were awarded a
three million dollar competitive training grant from the Ofﬁce of Grants & Training
division of the Department of Homeland Security to develop and deliver a training course
to provide the tools and resources necessary to help guide state, local, and tribal agencies
into the intelligence arena. The researcher hypothesizes that the results of this study will
Show that the knowledge, resources, and networking participants have gained at the
Intelligence Toolbox training program will result in a positive relationship with an

agency’s ability to develop or re-engineer an intelligence capacity.

€0pyright by
JEREMY GIBSON CARTER
2006

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This paper is dedicated to my family and those closest to me. I’d like to thank Dr.
Charles Corley and Dr. Vincent Hoffman for their investment of time and effort to be
members of my committee. A very Special thanks go to Dr. Edmund McGarrell who not
only served as the Chairman of my committee, but who was an invaluable resource which
I constantly tapped for information

To my ﬁiend Michael Borgert who gave support and motivation when I couldn’t
ﬁnd it myself, and for always reminding me of how “not fun” I was during the process of
this paper; I thank you. The duties required of me by the Intelligence Program often took
a backseat while writing this paper and it was Erin Mead and Christopher Michelsen who
picked up where I was slacking. I might have acted like I didn’t notice, but I did and you
are both greatly appreciated. I’ll never forget Hal Wilson, a man who would always
lighten the mood around the ofﬁce, keep things in perspective, and be there for me when
I felt the need to vent.

Finally, thanks to those who are the most important to me. My mother Karen for
putting up with the tests I provided her as a child, my sisters Hilary and Lauren for just
putting up with me in general, and especially my father David who was there to guide me
through the trials and tribulations of not only my Master’s degree, but through life in

general; none of this would have been possible without you.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1
Purpose of the Study ............................................................................................. 2
Delirnitations ......................................................................................................... 3
Basic Assumptions .................................................................................................. 4
CHAPTER 11: REVIEW OF LITERATURE ..................................................................... 5
The Inﬂuence of History ....................................................................................... 5
Lessons Learned from history .............................................................................. 9
The Need for the Intelligence Program ................................................................. 16
The Lack of Information Sharing: Systematic and Human ................................... 18
Recommendations for Improved Information Sharing ......................................... 20
Initiatives for Information Sharing ........................................................................ 28
Challenges Facing State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement ............................. 29
Civil Rights Issues ................................................................................................. 30
Upholding Civil Rights ......................................................................................... 35
Summary: Intelligence “Quick Start Toolbox” Program ...................................... 37
CHAPTER III: DATA AND METHODS ....................................................................... 42
Data ....................................................................................................................... 42
Methods .................................................................................................. ' ............... 4 5
Dependent Variables ............................................................................................. 46
Independent Variables ........................................................................................... 46
Research Questions ............................................................................................... 46
CHAPTER IV: RESULTS ............................................................................................... 48
Univariate Statistics ............................................................................................... 48
Bivariate Statistics ................................................................................................. 50
Research Question One: Intelligence Capacity Before and
After Training ....................................................................................................... 50
Research Question Two: Intelligence Capacity and Modiﬁcations
After Training ....................................................................................................... 52
Research Question Three: Agency Size and Adequacy of Intelligence
Capacity ................................................................................................................ 54
Research Question Four: Agency Population and Adequacy of
Intelligence Capacity ........................................................................................... 55
Ordinal Measures of Intelligence Program’s Effectiveness .................................. 57
Improved Information Sharing .............................................................................. 59
CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION .......................................................................................... 61
Summary of the Results ........................................................................................ 62
Limitations of the Study ........................................................................................ 65

Implications from the Study .................................................................................. 66

The Need to Acknowledge Intelligence Analysts as Professionals ...................... 67
Academic Advantages of the Intelligence Program .............................................. 69
APPENDD( A ................................................................................................................... 71
Operational Deﬁnitions ......................................................................................... 71
APPENDIX B ................................................................................................................... 79
Tool of Measurement: Intelligence Survey ........................................................... 79
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 84

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Summary of Factor Analysis .....................................................
Table 2: Dependent Variables Used for Analyses ......................................
Table 3: Independent Variables Used for Analyses ....................................
Table 4: Univariate Analysis for Nominal Level Variables ...........................

Table 5: Univariate Analysis for Ordinal Level Variables .............................

Table 6: Relationship Between Agency With No Intelligence Capacity
Before Training and Either Having an Intelligence Capacity or Developing

an Intelligence Capacity Aﬁer Training ..................................................

Table 7: Relationship Between an Agency’s Intelligence Capacity Before
Attending the Training and If the Same Agency Made Any Modiﬁcations

to the Existing Intelligence Capacity ....................................................

Table 8: Relationship Between the Size of an Agency and the Adequacy

of It’s Intelligence Capacity ...............................................................

Table 9: Relationship Between the Size of the Population an Agency is

Responsible for and the Adequacy of the Agency’s Intelligence Capacity. . . . . . .

Table 10: Relationship Between the Size of an Agency and the Agency’s

Opinion That the Intelligence Program Helped Their Intelligence Capacity. . . . . . . .

Table 11: Relationship Between the Size of an Agency and their Ofﬁcers’
Opinions That the Resources Obtained at the Intelligence Program Assisted

Their Intelligence Capacity ................................................................

Table 12: Relationship Between Agencies Sharing Information
With Federal Agencies Before Training and Agencies Sharing Information

With Federal Agencies Aﬁer Training ...................................................

vii

...... 45

....... 46

....... 46

........ 49

...... 50

....... 51

....... 53

....... 55

56

58

....... 58

....... 6O

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

In this post September 11th era, the roles and responsibilities of state, local and
tribal law enforcement (SLTLE) have become more important than ever. Along with
trying to meet these new responsibilities, SLTLE agencies ﬁnd themselves dealing with
new challenges and addressing new needs for their agencies. One of the greatest
responsibilities being placed on SLTLE agencies is the requirement for an effective and
efﬁcient intelligence capacity to be incorporated within their agency. Within the arena of
law enforcement, intelligence can be deﬁned as the end product of an analytic process
which provides an integrated perspective to disparate information about crime, crime
trends, crime and security threats, and conditions associated with criminality
(Counterterrorism, 2004). In an effort to help these agencies meet their needs, Michigan
State University was awarded a competitive training grant by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Grants & Training to develop and deliver an
“Intelligence Toolbox Training Program” to be offered to SLTLE agencies. The intent of
this program1 is to provide a training program for SLTLE personnel that will give them
the knowledge and tools to develop a law enforcement intelligence capacity in their
agency as guided by the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) and in
accordance to constitutional guarantees. An intelligence capacity can be deﬁned as the
capability of a law enforcement agency to gather, retain, and disseminate criminal
intelligence.

The intent of this research study is to determine the effectiveness that the

Intelligence Toolbox training program has on the ability for state, local and tribal law

 

' The Principal Investigator is Dr. David L. Carter, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University

enforcement agencies to develop or re-engineer their intelligence capacity as well as to
assess the impact of agency size on an intelligence capacity. A more focused and driven
effort shall be put forth in an effort to bring agencies, of all sizes, to a common level of
standards and practices for law enforcement intelligence. A similar yet more enforcing
effort would be the recommendations outlined by the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in 1971, which presented a set of standards and
recommendations for law enforcement that was driven by intelligence (National Advisory
Commission, 1971). The author will argue that the Intelligence Toolbox training
program has provided SLTLE agencies with the tools and knowledge that will aid their

ability to develop or re-engineer their intelligence capacities.

Purpose of the Study

The need for SLTLE agencies to have an effective intelligence capacity within
their agency has stemmed from the intense criticism brought about from the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States when they concluded that the
attacks of September 11th could have possibly been avoided if the intelligence community
had been able to “connect the dots”. The federal government decided that this problem
could be addressed by demanding that every law enforcement agency, regardless of size,
would have to have an intelligence capacity. This idea, along with the guidelines to carry
out the idea, is outlined in the NCISP. However, SLTLE agencies are still approaching
hurdles that they must overcome in order to meet these new demands.

It is the intent of the Intelligence Toolbox training program to aid SLTLE

agencies in their effort to overcome these hurdles. The ﬁndings of this study are

important to the initiative of the Intelligence Toolbox program. The training program
exists for one reason: to help SLTLE develop or re—engineer their intelligence function.

If the training program is not achieving its purpose, then adjustments must be made to the

prom-

Delimitations

This research study is limited by the following factors:

1. The agencies that participate in the Intelligence Toolbox training program are
self-selected which means they might not be representative of all agencies at
their government level.

2. The attendees of the Intelligence Toolbox training program all had different
levels of knowledge and experience related to law enforcement intelligence
prior to attending the training. This being an antecedent variable may cause
the results to be skewed.

3. External factors unrelated to the Intelligence Toolbox training program may
inﬂuence the development of re-engineering of an agency’s intelligence
capacity (i.e. Funding, chief’s decisions, politics).

4. If an individual who attended the Intelligence Toolbox training program had
participated in a similar training program prior to attending the Intelligence
Toolbox training program, the study would be unable to distinguish which

training had effects on the participant’s perceptions.

Basic Assumptions
This research study was conducted assuming the following factors to be true:
1. All of the individuals responding to the survey will answer the questions
truthfully and accurately.
2. All of the individuals responding to the survey attended the Intelligence

Toolbox training program.

CHAPTER H: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The Inﬂuence of History

Controversies have surrounded the use of law enforcement intelligence because of
instances in the past where the police have kept ﬁles on citizens who were exercising
their constitutional rights, not committing crimes. This, of course, is in contradiction to
the US. Constitution and violates our fundamental precepts of justice and faimess in a
democratic society. Unfortunately, the line is not clear with respect to the types of
information the police can collect and maintain. Early law enforcement intelligence
units, notably going back to the 19203, borrowed an old method from the military known
as the “dossier system”. Essentially, intelligence ﬁles were nothing more than dossiers,
ﬁles with a collection of diverse raw information, about people who were thought to be
criminals, thought to be involved with criminals, or persons who were thought to be a
threat to safety and order within a community. Bootleggers during Prohibition and many
of the high proﬁle criminals of the early 20th Century - Bonnie and Clyde, the Barker
Gang, Machine Gun Kelly, and Al Capone were the typical kinds of persons of whom
police agencies kept dossiers. This method of intelligence was not widely used until a
new threat emerged in the form of Communism (Carter, 2004).

In 193 7, Representative Martin Dies (D-Texas) became the ﬁrst Chairman of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities. Dies, a supporter of the Ku Klux Klan,
fueled the ﬁre of concern about Communism in the United States, including labeling
people as Communists, which often resulted in their loss of jobs and general

displacement from society (Carter, 2004, p. 22). Concern about Communists was

pervasive, but increased signiﬁcantly in 1950 by Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-
Wisconsin) who was using this national concern as the foundation for his re-election to
the Senate. McCarthy rallied against the American Communist Party and called for
expulsion ﬁom government, education, and the entertainment industry for anyone who
was an avowed Communist or Communist sympathizer. Due to fear of the Soviet Union
among the American public, this war on Communism resonated well. Responding to
expressions of public and governmental concern, local police began creating intelligence
dossiers on persons who were “suspected Communists” and “Communist sympathizers”;
these became known as “Red Files”. Thus, police agencies were keeping records about
people who were expressing political beliefs and people who were known to sympathize
with these individuals. The fact that these people were exercising their Constitutional
rights and had not committed crimes was not considered an issue because it was felt that
the presence of and support for Communism within the country was a threat to the
national security of the United States.

The dossier system had become an accepted tool for law enforcement
intelligence; hence when new over-arching challenges emerged, it was natural for the
police to rely on this well-established mechanism for keeping information. In the 19603
law enforcement met two challenges where intelligence dossiers appeared to be an
important tool: the Civil Rights Movement and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement (Best,
1996). In both cases, participants appeared to be “on the ﬁinge” of mainstream society.
They were vocal in their views and both their exhortations and actions appeared to many
people as being “nu-American”. This was aggravated by other social trends: World War

11 “baby boomers” were in their teens and twenties and were exploring their own newly

deﬁned world of “sex, drugs, and rock n’ roll”, contributing to the stereotype of the “pot-
smoking hippies” (Intelligence Program Pre-Training Reading, 2005).

There was an overlap between these social movements, which were viewed by
many as being conspiratorial. Moreover, the rapidly changing values stratiﬁed in large
part along generational and racial lines, created a sense of instability that appeared
threatening. Rather than being culturally instable, as we have learned on hindsight, it was
simply social evolution. Because of the dissonance in the 19605 and the conclusion that
many of the activists and protestors “might” commit crimes or “might” be threats to our
national security, police agencies began developing dossiers on these individuals, “just in
case” (Carter, 2004). The dossier information was typically not related to speciﬁc crimes,
rather, it was kept as a contingency should the information be needed in an investigation
or prosecution. There was additional concern about the dossier system during this time
because of the activist nature of the US. Supreme Court during the era of Chief Justice
Earl Warren (1953-1969).

It was rationalized that such activities were warranted on the grounds of a
“compelling state interest”. However, this argument did not meet political or
Constitutional scrutiny. This was particularly true given the activist nature of many of the
liberal decisions of the Warren Court were met with disfavor in the often expressed belief
that the Court’s decisions2 were “handcuffrng the police” (Carter, 2004, p. 24). With
regard to the current discussion, perhaps most important issue was that the Warren Court

led a generation of judicial activism and expanded interpretations of the Constitution.

 

2 Among the most common cited are Miranda v. Arizona, police must advise arrestees of their Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights prior to a custodial interrogation; Mapp v. Ohio, applying the exclusionary rule to
the states; Gideon v. Wainwright, the right to applied council; and Escobedo v. Illinois, the right to counsel
when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory (Carter, 2004).

Moreover, it symbolically motivated activist attorneys ﬁ'om the 19603 to tr}I new
strategies for the protection of Constitutional rights (Carter, 2004). Among the most
successful was reliance on a little-used provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
codiﬁed as Title 42 of the US. Code, Section 1983, Civil Action for Deprivation of Civil
Rights. Commonly referred to as “1983 suits”, this provision essentially provides that
anyone who, under color of state or local law, causes a person to be deprived of rights
guaranteed by the US. Constitution or federal law, is liable.

The initial lawsuits focused on whether a city, police department, and ofﬁcers
could be sued for depriving a person of their Constitutional rights, and the Supreme Court
held that they could. A signiﬁcant aspect of the case was that the police could be sued if
there was "misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law" (Monroe v. Pope,
1961). This opened the proverbial ﬂoodgates for lawsuits against the police (and
correctional institutions) (Carter, 2004).

These initial lawsuits also focused on various patterns of police misconduct, such
as excessive force and due process violations (Carter, 2004). The reach of lawsuits
against the police grew more broadly with decisions holding that the police chain of
command could be held vicariously liable for the actions of those under their authority.
Moving into the late 19603 and early 19703, this movement of lawsuits reached toward
law enforcement intelligence units. It was increasingly discovered that police agencies
were keeping intelligence ﬁles on people for whom there was no evidence of criminality.
The practice of keeping intelligence dossiers on a contingency basis was found to be

improper, serving no compelling state interest and depriving those citizens of their

constitutional rights (Carter, 2004). As a result, the courts repeatedly ordered intelligence
ﬁles to be purged ﬁom police records and in many cases police agencies had to pay
damage awards to plaintiffs. The decisions also permitted citizens to gain access to their
own records. Many activists publicized their intelligence ﬁles as a badge of honor, often
to the embarrassment of the police. Law enforcement intelligence operations were
signiﬁcantly cut back or eliminated as a result of the embarrassment and costs associated

with these lost lawsuits (Carter, 2004).

Lessons Learned From History

The lessons learned from this era suggest caution in the development of
intelligence ﬁles. Information must be collected, maintained, and disseminated in a
manner that is consistent with legal and ethical standards. This lesson is reinforced by
the ﬁndings of the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Government
Operations (U .S. Senate Select Committee, 1976), the so-called Church Commission,
which held extensive hearings on domestic intelligence, most notable of these hearings is
the F BI’s COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence Program) which spanned the years of
1959-1971 (the last portion of the Hoover Era). The Senate committee concluded that
domestic intelligence activity has threatened and undermined the Constitutional rights of
Americans to free speech, association, and privacy (US Senate Select Committee, 1976).

It has done so primarily because the Constitutional system for checking abuse of
power has not been applied. COINTELPRO was designed to monitor, investigate, and
apprehend, or in some cases neutralize, persons identiﬁed as foreign agents, international

criminals, and in many cases, political dissidents. Although covert operations have been

employed throughout FBI history, the formalized character of COINTELPRO’S
operations in the years of its existence was directed at espionage activities, mostly ﬁom
the Soviet Bloc (Carter, 2004, p. 26). However, the program also generally targeted
radical organizations and people, notably thoSe related to the American Communist Party
(generally in the 19503) and eventually the Civil Rights movement and Vietnam War
protestors (19603 and 19703).

There were unquestioned abuses of authority by COINTELPRO and the operation
clearly violated the rights of many US. citizens. The Church Commission further found
that the F BI’s activities of the time included a wide range of tactics targeted at citizens
based largely on the citizens’ expressions of political ideology (U .S. Senate Selection
Committee, 1976). While COINTELPRO is typically the focal point of criticism during
this era, the hearings identiﬁed abuses in other elements of government - most notably
domestic spying by the CIA. A facet often overlooked, however, was the “spirit of the
times” in the US. That is, many of the questions and fears expressed by the FBI and CIA
were reﬂected in the attitudes of “middle America” who did not understand “what was
going on” with regard to the demonstrations, protests, and cultural upheaval (U .S. Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976). This is not a defense for the
FBI and CIA; rather it is a commentary on American society during this period. Both
“middle America” and the intelligence community have evolved, gaining greater respect
for diverse opinions and citizens’ rights.

Lessons learned from this period are important as we address the fears and
uncertainty associated with terrorism today. Having suffered a setback ﬁom the lawsuits

of the era and the fallout ﬁom the Church Commission’s ﬁndings, which radically

10

changed attitudes about domestic intelligence gathering, intelligence units in many police
agencies were small operations, if they existed at all, and largely concerned with
processing requests related to criminal histories of people. The most active intelligence
initiatives typically dealt with organized crime, but these were often limited (Johnson,
1985).

Moving into the 19803 a new challenge would prompt the re-emergence of
intelligence units: multi-national drug cartels and money laundering. Illegal drugs
ﬂooded the streets of America, hitting an apex in the 19803 (Carter, 2004). They were
being produced by international drug cartels in Colombia, Mexico, Southeast Asia, and
the Caribbean. These organizations were massive, reaching into virtually every
community in America and generating billions of dollars in the underground economy,
much of which was leaving the United States. Recognizing the complexity of
investigating and prosecuting these multi-jurisdictional criminal enterprises, police
agencies began developing multi-jurisdictional drug task forces and rebuilding their
intelligence units to feed information into the task forces for more effective investigations
(Carter, 2004, p. 31).

Beyond these developments, a new factor was added. Due to the impact of drugs
on American society and the vast underground economy being fueled by drug trafﬁcking,
in 1986 President Reagan issued a National Security Decision Directive (N SDD)
declaring drugs to be a national security threat. This was a signiﬁcant action because now
the intelligence community, all federal intelligence agencies including the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (N SA), and the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA), would have responsibilities for identifying and eradicating

11

drugs at their source (outside of the United States) and interdicting shipments of drugs
coming into the US. Moreover, this heightened the responsibility of federal law
enforcement organizations, notably the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to perform work that was both in the domestic law
enforcement arena and the global national security arena.

In pursuing the “war on drugs”, the US. Department of Justice created the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), which were located around
the United States and included members from federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies. Much like the initiative outlined by the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Justice, this task force has the same responsibility as local agencies, and
were given in order to combat the emergence of organized crime cartels (President’s
Commission, 1967). This brought about the necessity for information sharing at all
levels of government. The prospect of cross-jurisdictional intelligence sharing became
somewhat problematic since state and local ofﬁcers who were members of the OCDETF
task forces would have access to classiﬁed national security information (Carter, 2004).
The need to share this information was further complicated, not only because it was
classiﬁed, but also because constitutional protections did not apply to the gathering of
information for national security purposes. Important questions arose:

- Could national security information be shared with state and local law

enforcement ofﬁcers (Carter, 2004)?

- What if that information was shared and domestic law enforcement action was

taken (i.e., an arrest and search) based on that information which was gathered in

a manner not meeting constitutional standards, would the evidence be excluded

from trial (Carter, 2004)?

0 If the case went forward, what would be the result if the defendant wanted to be

faced by his/her accuser who was either an undercover intelligence agent or a
criminal informant ﬂour a drug cartel (Carter, 2004)?

12

Unknowingly, similar questions would arise two decades later as a result of
terrorism. There are two important points to note for the current discussion: First, the
“war on drugs” stimulated the redevelopment of law enforcement intelligence units at all
levels of government. This time, there was a greater emphasis on analysis of information,
not just gathering it, as well as a signiﬁcant emphasis on ensuring the Civil Rights of
citizens remained intact. Second, for the ﬁrst time there was a signiﬁcant relationship
between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with respect to conducting
joint investigations and sharing intelligence. While some complications existed, both
logistically and legally, new avenues were being explored both in intelligence and in joint
law enforcement initiatives. Crime experiences of the 19903 brought new challenges to
the revitalized intelligence efforts of the previous decade.

Driven by rapidly developing technology, easier global communications and
travel, and proﬁts made and divested ﬁom the drug trade, international organized crime
exploded into diverse new areas. Computer crime, more aggressive terrorism, and all
forms of entrepreneurial crime emerged. As in the case of international drug trafﬁcking,
these crimes involved complex criminal organizations, were transnational in nature, and
were well-ﬁnanced. Consequently, intelligence activities were expanding into more
diverse areas requiring new substantive knowledge about crimes and criminals as well as
new skills for information gathering and evidence collection. Once again, the need for
critical analysis and sharing of that information was essential. Law enforcement
intelligence was expanding further.

During this era, the quality of analysis was signiﬁcantly increasing and there was

greater care taken to ensure Civil Rights were protected, and yet problems still remained.

13

Intelligence was routinely shared among those working on task forces representing
different law enforcement agencies. However, intelligence sharing in many other venues
was much less forthcoming. Federal agencies, most notably the FBI, developed a
reputation for collecting information from state and local police, but not reciprocating.
FBI officials responded by saying that much of their information was either classiﬁed or
of a national security nature, hence it could not be shared. In other cases, there was poor
intelligence sharing between federal agencies. Despite the arguments of conspiracy
theorists, the lack of shared intelligence stems ﬁom several points:

° Computerized information systems that are outdated and incompatible thereby

reducing the ability to effectively share electronic information.

- A lack of comprehensive policies and procedures controlling effective

information sharing.

- A lack of coordination between agencies — and sometimes within agencies — to

communicate about common investigations.

- Inconsistent face-to-face communications which permit the establishment

of relationships for joint operations.

0 Concerns by agencies for the validity and reliability of information on which
analyses are based as well as an overall concern about the accuracy of analytic

faglycerrstsdrrnel simply “not getting around to sharing” the intelligence (Carter, 2004).

This lack of sharing would come back to haunt the intelligence community of the
20003, the decade of terrorism. Once again, law enforcement would ﬁnd itself entwined
in national security. While there had been terror attacks on the United States and US.
interests3, including the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the
character and magnitude of the September 11th attacks was the most horrendous the
world had seen. Having the attack occur on US. soil elevated the passion of the nation to

respond at an even higher level. Many concerns were raised about the US. intelligence

community, mainly, “Why didn’t the intelligence community ‘connect the dots’ and take

14

action to prevent the attacks?” In this case, “Connecting the dots” refers to effecting
information gathering, sharing and analysis.

The attacks spurred passage of the anti-terrorism USA PATRIOT Act, which
includes a greater intelligence capacity and joint efforts with state and local law
enforcement agencies to keep our homeland secure through preventing terrorism and
identifying and apprehending potential terrorists (Steel, 1999). The Homeland Security
Act, also stimulated by 9/11, created the Department of Homeland Security which has as
one of its four major divisions Information Analysis and Inﬁastructure Protection, which
ﬁrnctions with a signiﬁcant emphasis on intelligence.

Police agencies at all levels of government have been urged to develop their local
intelligence capacity and share information, particularly through the Joint Terrorism Task
Forces. Federal funds have also been made available to develop intelligence expertise at
state and local levels. However, it is not without its critics. There are concerns among
civil rights activists that the “Red Files” will once again emerge in police department
records, only this time directed toward terror suspects. Indeed, the example often cited
occurred shortly after the 9/11 attacks when the FBI questioned middle-eastern males in
the US. on nonimmigrant visas. One of the questions on a standard list used was, “Do
you sympathize with the hijackers (Colb, 2001)?” Critics argue that this rings back to the
19503 when people were asked if they were Communist syrnpathizers. “What is the

difference?” they ask.4

 

3See: Federal Bureau of Investigation. (1999). Thirty Years of Terrorism in the United States. Washington,
DC: FBI.

‘ The legal difference is that the immigrants were detained on civil grounds related to their visa and that the
questioning was “voluntary”. Critics argue that these reasons were a charade for the true intent of the
questioning. On the matter of being voluntary, consider the language of the US. Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona 38 US 436 (1966) in referring to the psychological coercion associated with the police-
dominated atmosphere.

15

Similarly, the new legislation broadens aspects of intelligence operations through
the implementation of roving wiretaps, monitoring of e-mail and Internet activity,
execution of secret search warrants, information sharing between different levels of
government, all which many fear would dilute Civil Rights. In an analysis of the USA
PATRIOT Act, the Electronic Frontier Foundation observed that the legislation:

“. . .directly breaks down many of the barriers that had previously prevented

sharing of foreign and domestic surveillance information. It also adds a new

category of information that may be shared, called Foreign Intelligence

Information. But there is no provision for the intelligence agencies or domestic

law enforcement to report to Congress about how much and what type of

information sharing is actually done under this new law. Without this information,

Congress will be unable to rationally decide whether the wall between domestic

and international surveillance built after the scandals of the McCarthy and civil

rights eras should remain torn down or be rebuilt” (Electronic Frontier

Foundation, 2006)

Beyond the issue of protecting citizens Civil Rights, state and local law enforcement must
maintain the pragmatic concern of their liability. Section 1983 lawsuits do not apply to
Federal authorities who also have additional protections when actions are taken under

their role of national security, as opposed to a law enforcement role. State and local law

enforcement personnel have no such protections (Carter, 2004).

The Need for the Intelligence Toolbox Program

The driving force behind the post-September 11th intelligence era are the
recommendations set forth by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, or as it is more commonly known, the 9/11 Commission. The ten
members of this independent, bipartisan commission established in 2002 under the
signature of President George W. Bush found, in short, that there was a signiﬁcant lack of

information sharing and cooperation amongst agencies within the intelligence

16

community. Of course the commission was called in order to respond to questions
arising ﬁom the attacks of 9/ 11 and their conclusions are primarily focused at the federal
level. However, the implications of the commission not only built the foundation for a
more effective intelligence community, but began to spawn a whole new cadre of issues
and implications that would affect the intelligence functions at the state, local, and tribal
levels. Along with the 9/11 Commission addressing the need for state, local and tribal
agencies to be a part of the intelligence community, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) reinforced this message within the mission statement ﬁ'om their Chief
Intelligence Ofﬁcer Charles Allen. Within this mission statement, Allen pointed out that
the goal of DHS’ intelligence ﬁrnction is to provide accurate and actionable intelligence
related information ﬁom all components of the intelligence community, including state,
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies (Allen, 2006).

The commission identiﬁed the need to restructure the intelligence community as
stemming from six problems that became apparent before and after September 11‘”. As
stated in the 9/11 Commission Report in the “How to Do It?” section, the six problems
are:

0 Structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work. National
intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of the home
agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of integrated, all-source
analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to “connect the
dots”. No one component holds all the relevant information (9/11
Commission Report, 200, p. 408-410).

0 Lack of common standards and practices across the foreign—domestic
divide. The leaderships of the intelligence community should be able to
pool information gathered overseas with information gathered in the
United States, hold the work - wherever it’s done - to a common standard
of quality in how it is collected, processed, reported, shared, and analyzed.

A common set of personnel standards for intelligence can create a group
of professionals better able to operate in joint activities, transcending their

17

own service-speciﬁc mind-sets (9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 408-
410).

Divided management of national intelligence capabilities. While the CIA
was one “centr ”to our national intelligence capabilities, following the
end of the Cold War it has been less able to inﬂuence the use of the
nation’s imagery and signals intelligence capabilities in three national
agencies housed within the Department of Defense: the National Security
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National
Reconnaissance Ofﬁce (9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 408-410).
Weak capacity to set priorities and move resources. The agencies are
mainly organized around what they collect or the way they collect it. But
the priorities for collection are national. As the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) makes hard choices about moving resources, he or she
must have the power to reach across agencies and reallocate effort (9/11
Commission Report, 2004, p. 408-410).

Too many jobs. The DCI has at least three jobs. He or she is expected to
run a particular agency, the CIA. He or she is expected to manage the
loose confederation of agencies that is the intelligence community. He or
she is expected to be the analyst in chief for the government, sifting
evidence and directly brieﬁng the President as his principle intelligence
adviser. No recent DCI has been able to do all three effectively. Usually
what loses out is the management of the intelligence community, a
difﬁcult task even in the best case because the DCI’S current authorities
are weak. With so much to do, the DCI often has not used the authority he
or she has (9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 408-410).

Too complex and secret. Over the decades, the agencies and the rules
surrounding the intelligence community have accumulated to a depth that
practically deﬁes public comprehension. The amount of money and even
the most basic information regarding the intelligence community,
including most of its key components, is shrouded from public view (9/11
Commission Report, 2004, p. 408-410).

Addressing these six problems has not only generated a more sufﬁcient and effective

intelligence community, but it has also brought these same issues into view for law

enforcement administrators across the country.

The Lack of Information Sharing: systematic and Human

While the previously mentioned problems were just scraping the surface of issues

facing the intelligence community, the author believes that there is no greater challenge

18

than the actual resistance to sharing information, which can be attributed to two factors;
human and systematic. The same assessment is illustrated in the 9/11 Commission
Report. This lack of information sharing is perhaps the most signiﬁcant problem facing
state, local, and tribal agencies. The humanistic factors can vary as widely as the
agencies themselves. Due to the standard rule of meeting the “need to know” threshold
of sharing information, agencies ﬁnd themselves debating amongst one another if the
information is actually pertinent to the situation. It is important for an agency to establish
the need for the information to help aid the protection ﬁom a potential threat to the
community in that the agency serves.

Other humanistic problems arise within this realm of information sharing. Often
times federal agencies will not share information with a state, local, or tribal agency due
to either a lack of trust with the particular agency or because the information is classiﬁed.
An example of the lack of trust with an agency is the unwillingness of the FBI to share
information with the Detroit Metro Police Department because of a long history of
corruption within the agency. Classiﬁcation of information still proves to be a
tremendous hurdle for state, local, and tribal agencies. With the FBI and other federal
intelligence agencies classifying information as either secret or top secret, they eliminate
the possibility for the vast majority of intelligence ofﬁcers to access the information due
to their lack of security clearances.

The systematic factors causing problems in the information sharing arena are
centered on the type of sharing system capabilities an agency has. The two information
sharing systems that are most widely used are the Regional Information Sharing System

(RISS) and the FBI’S Law Enforcement Online (LEO). RISS provides secure

l9

connectivity and electronic access to law enforcement sensitive information, encrypted e-
mail, electronic collaboration, and databases of criminal intelligence information. Using
a secure network, law enforcement professionals can access data remotely, twenty four
hours a day, seven days a week. RISS has been in place for over a decade and has been
linked with the FBI LEO system since September 2002. This system also provides a
visual illustration of the information using i2 Analyst’s Notebook to those who access it.
The visualization of this type of information often times makes it easier to identify trends
or patterns with the information as opposed to reading the information ﬁom a written text
source. LEO is a national interactive computer communications system and information
service, an Intranet exclusively for the law enforcement community. It can be accessed
by any pro-approved employee of a duly constituted local, state, or federal law
enforcement agency, or approved member of an authorized law enforcement special
interest group. In order to be approved for access, a registrant must ﬁll out an application
and submit it to the FBI’s LEO division. Once approved, the user will be granted a
usemame and password to access the system. LEO is intended to provide a state-of-the-
art communication mechanism to link all levels of law enforcement throughout the

United States.

Recommendations for Improved Information Sharing

The eagerness of law enforcement decision-makers, while helpful, is not enough
to transfer the initiative of developing an intelligence capacity into an actual functioning
intelligence capacity. The 9/11 Commission and the NCISP identify recommendations

that provide guidance for those who are responsible for developing or re-engineering an

20

agency’s intelligence capacity. The recommendations that the author feels are the most
signiﬁcant to state, local, and tribal agencies are illustrated in this portion of the paper.

The 9/11 Commission discusses multiple recommendations for law enforcement
agencies to follow in an effort to increase information sharing. One recommendation is
that information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better
balance between security and shared knowledge (9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 417).
The implication of this recommendation is that all intelligence, regardless of where it is
collected, stored or disseminated, will meet the same quality standards. The highest
quality pertains to the information being in the most shareable, useful, and efﬁcient form
possible. This quality standard will ensure maximum use of the information by the
maximum number of recipients. The ﬁnal recommendation of the report is that the
President should lead a government-wide effort to bring the major national security
institutions into the information revolution. He/ she should coordinate the resolution of
the legal, policy and technical issues across agencies to create a “trusted-information
network” (9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 418).

In essence, this recommendation asserts that no one agency can accomplish this
alone and decision makers are under constant scrutiny to update information systems,
provide accurate intelligence, and subscribe to standardized concepts of information
sharing. The FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies are just a small ﬁaction of
the intelligence community in the United States, a community comprised mainly of state,
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. The networks designed for sharing
information, and the work of the FBI through Joint Terrorism Task Forces, should build

reciprocal relationships in which state, local, and tribal agents understand what

21

information they are looking for and, in return, receive some of the information being
developed about what is happening, or may happen, in their communities (9/11
Commission Report, 2004, p. 427).

Recommendations, regulations, and guidelines are the essential tools in regards to
developing or re-engineering an intelligence capacity. The NCISP outlines the guidelines
and procedures necessary for an agency, regardless of size, to develop an intelligence
capacity. This capacity will be an effective law enforcement tool while adhering to the
civil liberties and rights to privacy of the American people. The guidelines of the plan
focus primarily on the ability of the intelligence capacity to operate efﬁciently and
legally. It stipulates that an agency must have an individual that is the point of contact for
that agency’s intelligence unit. This individual, or individuals, is responsible for
communicating, sharing, and collecting information from other points of contact. In
essence, this is the backbone to a properly functioning intelligence capacity. Without
communication amongst identiﬁed members of a specialized intelligence unit, the sharing
of information would be impossible.

It is imperative that an agency follow the NCISP guidelines for information
retention, review, dissemination, and purging as outlined in 28 Code of Federal
Regulation Part 23. An agency must adhere to this code of federal regulation as it is that
custodian of criminal intelligence. An agency’s record system must be 28 CFR Part 23
compliant in order to operate not only efﬁciently, but more important, legally. Following
strictly to these guidelines will provide agency immunity to any civil suits that could be
brought against them from members of society for invasion of their civil liberties and

rights to privacy. Another important aspect of the NCISP is the training standards that

22

must be met by all individuals having intelligence related responsibilities. The standards
outlined in the plan are the minimum requirements that must be met in order to be
compliant. The requirements include training missions, objectives, the number of
training hours, and the ﬁ'equency of training. ‘

Within the NCISP are thirty recommendations that are put forth for police chief
executives to take into consideration when implementing or re-engineering their agency’s
intelligence capacity. Of these thirty recommendations presented, six apply directly to
the purpose of the Intelligence Toolbox training program, as well as the being the
fundamental building blocks for a successful intelligence capacity. Recommendation one
of the NCISP states that:

In order to attain the goals outlined in this Plan, law enforcement agencies,
regardless of size, shall adopt the minimum standards for intelligence policing and
utilization and/or management of an intelligence function as contained in the National
Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. The standards focus on the intelligence process and
include elements such as mission of the function, management and supervision, personnel
selection, training, security, privacy rights, development and dissemination of
intelligence products and accountability measures (N CISP, 2003, p. 8-9).

The agency chief executive ofﬁcer and the manager of intelligence functions

should:

0 Seek ways to enhance intelligence sharing efforts and foster information
sharing by participating in task forces and state, regional and federal
information sharing initiatives (N CISP, 2003, p. 8-9).

0 Implement a mission statement for the intelligence process within the
agency (NCISP, 2003, p. 8-9).

0 Deﬁne management and supervision for the function (N CISP, 2003, p. 8-
9).

23

0 Select qualiﬁed personnel for assignment to the function (N CISP, 2003, p.
8-9).

0 Ensure that standards are developed concerning background investigations
of staff/system users to ensure security (of the system, facilities, etc.) and
access to the system/network (NCISP, 2003, p. 8-9).

0 Ensure that individuals’ privacy and constitutional rights are considered at
all times (NCISP, 2003, p. 8-9).

0 Support the development of sound, professional analytic products (N CISP,
2003, p. 8-9).

0 Implement a method! system for dissemination of information to
appropriate components/entities (NCISP, 2003, p. 8-9).

0 Implement policies and procedures manual. The intent of the manual is to
establish, in writing, agency accountability for the intelligence function.
The manual should include policies and procedures covering all aspects of
the intelligence process (N CISP, 2003, p. 8-9).

0 Implement an appropriate audit or review process to ensure compliance
with policies and procedures (N CISP, 2003, p. 8-9).
0 Promote a policy of openness when communicating with the public and all
interested parties regarding the criminal intelligence process, when it does
not affect the security and integrity of the process (N CISP, 2003, p. 8-9).
This recommendation puts in place the foundation for implementing an agency’s
intelligence process. The MSU Intelligence Program is designed with these factors in
place within the curriculum to provide answers to those individuals who attend the
training and are responsible for either developing or re-engineering their agency’s
intelligence capacity. These factors produce hurdles that agencies will face in order to
have NCISP compliant intelligence function.

The sixth recommendation on the list asserts a reminder that the intelligence
capacity within an agency must uphold an individual’s civil rights. The recommendation
states that “All parties involved with implementing and promoting the National Criminal
Intelligence Sharing Plan should take steps to ensure that the law enforcement
community protects individuals’ privacy and constitutional rights within the intelligence

process” (NCISP, 2003, p. 10). It is important that law enforcement ofﬁcers understand

what types of information they can gather in regards to people on whom they collect

24

information and the locations ﬁom which they are collecting information. Agencies must
establish a criminal predicate in order to justify the collection of information.

Criminal predicate is established when information exists which establishes
sufﬁcient facts to give a trained law enforcement or criminal investigative agency ofﬁcer,
investigator, or employee the appropriate basis to believe that there is a reasonable
possibility that an individual or organization is involved in a deﬁnable criminal activity
or enterprise. In an inter-jurisdictional intelligence system, the project is responsible for
establishing the existence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity either through
examination of supporting information submitted by a participating agency or by
delegation of this responsibility to a properly trained participating agency which is
subject to routine inspection and audit procedures established by the project (Carter,
2004, p. 252). It is imperative for law enforcement agencies to establish the criminal
predicate of an individual not only to provide more effective information in the effort to
combat crime, but also to ensure that the civil liberty and privacy issues of the individuals
are upheld.

The importance of upholding individuals’ civil rights is once again stressed in the
ninth recommendation within the NCISP. This recommendation asserts that “In order to
ensure that the collection/submission, access, storage, and dissemination of criminal
intelligence information conforms to the privacy and constitutional rights of individuals,
groups and organizations, law enforcement agencies shall adopt, at a minimum, the
standards required by the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies federal
regulation (28 CFR Part 23), regardless of whether or not an intelligence system is

federally funded” (NCISP, 2003, p. 11). As illustrated within the 28 CFR Part 23, a

25

project shall not collect or maintain criminal intelligence information about the political,
religious or social views, associations, or activities or any individual or any group,
association, corporation, business, partnership, or other organization unless such
information directly related to criminal conduct or activity and there is reasonable
suspicion that the subject of the information is or may be involved in criminal conduct or
activity (Carter, 2004, p. 252).

The NCISP addresses the needs for a minimum standard of training to be
maintained by law enforcement agencies developing or re-engineering their intelligence
capacity. The Intelligence Toolbox is just one of a few intelligence training programs
available for law enforcement. The eighteenth recommendation of the NCISP
speciﬁcally indicates that training is necessary at all levels of law enforcement so that
those individuals who are involved with the intelligence ﬁmction are not only up to date
with the latest standards and issues, but are also provided accreditation in order to have
the adequate ability to perform their tasks. This recommendation asserts, “Training
should be provided to all levels of law enforcement personnel involved in the criminal
intelligence process. The training standards, as contained within the National Criminal
Intelligence Sharing Plan, shall be considered the minimum training standards for all
affected personnel. Additionally, recipients of criminal intelligence training, as
recommended in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, should be recognized
and awarded certiﬁcates for successful completion of training” (NCISP, 2003, p. 12).

The twentieth and twenty-ﬁrst recommendations illustrate implementation issues
and their relevance to the information provided by the Intelligence Program. These

recommendations address the need for law enforcement agencies to have access to record

26

management systems in which information can be stored and shared with other agencies.
The twentieth recommendation asserts that “In order to support agency tactical,
operational, and strategic needs, law enforcement agencies are encouraged to consider an
automated, incident-based criminal records tracking capability, in addition to traditional
case management and intelligence systems. These systems should be Web-based and
conﬁgured to meet the internal reporting and record-keeping needs of the component, in
order to facilitate the exportation of desired data elements — without the need for
duplicate data entry or reporting — to relevant statewide and federal criminal information
programs” (NCISP, 2003, p. 12-13). The twenty-ﬁrst recommendation builds upon the
preceding recommendation in which speciﬁc systems are identiﬁed that law enforcement
agencies should be implementing in their intelligence function.

This twenty-ﬁrst recommendation says that “The Regional Information Sharing
System (RISS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Law Enforcement Online
(LEO) systems, which interconnected September 1, 2002, as a virtual single system, shall
provide the initial sensitive but unclassiﬁed secure communications backbone for
implementation of a nationwide criminal intelligence sharing capability. This nationwide
sensitive but unclassiﬁed communications backbone shall support fully functional,
bidirectional information sharing capabilities that maximize the reuse of existing local,
state, tribal, regional, and federal inﬁ'astructure investments (Bureau of Justice
Assistance, 1998).

Further conﬁguration of the nationwide sensitive but unclassiﬁed communications
capability will continue to evolve in conjunction with industry and the development of

additional standards, and the connections of other existing sensitive but unclassiﬁed

27

networks” (NCISP, 2003, p. 13). During the Intelligence Toolbox course the participants
receive an entire section of training that lasts approximately an hour and a half that
focuses on these types of intelligence related resources. As an addition to the information
the participants receive from the instructors, members ﬁ‘om the RISS.net and LEO are
invited to the training sessions to speak ﬁrst hand with the participants as well as
assisting them in gaining access to the systems.

Recommendations for improved intelligence functions have also been offered
from the academic community. Elaine Kamarck, a member of the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University, wrote several recommendations for
transfonning the intelligence community. Of the recommendations Kamarck offers, her
ﬁrst two present the most effective in terms of law enforcement intelligence. Her ﬁrst
recommendation states that there is a need for a national intelligence university
(Kamarck, 2005). This institution would provide for a continuous education within the
intelligence arena as well as reinforcing the same methods for a more consistent
intelligence function. The second recommendation asserts that the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) should focus on the gathering of secrets and developing intelligence that
creates a clear picture of the information (Kamarck, 2005). While the author does not
agree with Kamarck’s terminology in regards to “secrets” being gathered, the right idea is

embedded within the recommendation.

Initiatives for Information Sharing
The Intelligence Toolbox training program not only provides aid to state, local

and tribal law enforcement (SLTLE) agencies in their effort to develop or re-engineer an

28

intelligence capacity, but to bring them up to speed on the contemporary initiatives facing

the intelligence community. Carter (2004) asserts that such initiatives are:

Development of the FBI Intelligence Program with its new emphasis on
intelligence requirements, new intelligence products and creation of the
Field Intelligence Group in every FBI ﬁeld ofﬁce as the primary
intelligence contact point among state, local and tribal law enforcement
and the FBI (Carter, 2004, p. x).

Development of the new FBI counterterrorism initiatives and programs
(Carter, 2004, p. x).

New intelligence products from the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) as well ass a substantive input role of raw information into the
DHS intelligence cycle by state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies
(Carter, 2004, p. x).

Expansion and articulation of the Intelligence-Led Policing concept.
Implementation of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan
(Carter, 2004, p. x).

Creation of a wide variety of initiatives and standards as a result of the
Global Intelligence Working Group of the Global Justice Information
Sharing Initiative (Carter, 2004, p. x).

Renewed vigor toward the adoption of 28 CFR Part 23, Guidelines for
Criminal Intelligence Records Systems, by law enforcement agencies that
are not required to adhere to the regulation (Carter, 2004, p. x).

Secure connections for e-mail exchange, access to advisories, reports, and
information exchange, as well as integration and streamlining the use of
Law Enforcement Online, Regional Information Sharing Systems’
RISS.net, and creation of the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange
(Carter, 2004, p. x).

New operational exceptions and training opportunities for intelligence
analysts, law enforcement executives, managers and line ofﬁcers (Carter,
2004, p. x).

Challenges Facing State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement

In this post September 11th contemporary intelligence era, many changes face law

enforcement administrators. With the increase of responsibility handed down by the

federal government comes a variety of challenges and issues that must be addressed and

adhered to at the same time. Carter (2004) illustrates that the following are just a few of

the new challenges facing SLTLE agencies:

29

Recognize that every law enforcement agency — regardless of size - has a
stake in this global law enforcement intelligence initiative and, as such,
must develop some form of an intelligence capacity in order to be an
effective consumer of intelligence products (Carter, 2004, p. xi).

Develop a culture of collection among ofﬁcers to most effectively gather
information for use in the intelligence cycle (Carter, 2004, p. xi).
Operationally integrate Intelligence-Led Policing into the police
organization (Carter, 2004, p. xi).

Recognize that increased information sharing at and between law
enforcement at all levels of government requires new commitments by law
enforcement executives and managers (Carter, 2004, p. xi).

Increase information sharing, as appropriate, with the broader public
safety and private security sectors (Carter, 2004, p. xi).

Protect data and records along with rigid accountability of the intelligence
function (Carter, 2004, p. xi).

Keep law enforcement intelligence and national security intelligence
separate, particularly with respect to state and local ofﬁcers on Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (Carter, 2004, p. xi).

Broader scrutiny of intelligence records and practices by civil rights
groups (Carter, 2004, p. xi).

Routinely use intelligence to make better tactical and strategic decisions
(Carter, 2004, p. xi).

Increase regionalization in all aspects of the intelligence function as an
ongoing initiative of law enforcement agencies at all levels of government
(Carter, 2004, p. xi).

Ensure that non-law enforcement government officials and the community
understand what law enforcement intelligence is and the importance of
their role in the intelligence function (Carter, 2004, p. xi).

Civil Rights Issues

Perhaps the most difﬁcult challenge facing SLTLE agencies with regards to

having an intelligence capacity is the potential for legal ramiﬁcations that can arise ﬁ'om

the misuse of power or information that is collected. Civil rights is a matter that law

enforcement agencies must take into consideration when developing policies for their

intelligence capacities. A reality that law enforcement must face on matters related to

law enforcement intelligence is a discussion of citizens’ civil rights. Different groups of

citizens, some more vocal than others, have expressed concerns at the national level

30

concerning the USA PATRIOT Act and at the local level concerning the types of
personal information that are being collected and retained in ﬁles at the local law
enforcement agency (Herman, 2002).

As part of a public education effort, law enforcement ofﬁcers should be informed
about civil rights issues and the agency’s policies and responses to those issues. Among
the more common concerns expressed are the types of records a law enforcement agency
can keep on citizens; whether a citizen may see the information, if any, is being kept
about him or her; the types of electronic surveillance that may be used; whether the FBI
can view library records and monitor both email and Internet sites visited; and the
intelligence process in general (Martens, 1987). While a law enforcement ofﬁcer may
not be able to answer all citizens’ questions, providing some information is more useful
than not responding at all. Similarly, line ofﬁcers must have a broad understanding of the
criminal intelligence ﬁle guidelines (28 CF R Part 23) as well as an understanding of how
civil rights litigation, most speciﬁcally 42 U.S.C. 1983, Civil Action for Violation of
Civil Rights, applies to law enforcement intelligence activities.

The protection of individuals’ privacy and constitutional rights is an obligation of
government ofﬁcials and is crucial to the long-tenn success of criminal intelligence
sharing. Protecting the privacy and constitutional rights of individuals, while at the same
time providing for homeland security and public safety, will require a commitment ﬁ'om
everyone in the system, ﬁ'om line officers to top management (Carter, 2004).
Constitutional rights refer to those rights that an individual derives ﬁom the Constitution
of the United States. Constitutional rights are the strongest protection from improper

government conduct against an individual. Unlike other legal rights, constitutional rights

31

cannot be changed by a statute. They can only be altered by amending the Constitution
(Chang, 2001).

The term civil liberties refers to fundamental individual rights such as ﬁeedom of
speech, press or religion, due process of law, and other limitations on the power of the
government to restrain or dictate the actions of individuals. They are the freedoms that
are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, the ﬁrst ten Amendments, to the Constitution of the
United States. Civil liberties offer protection to individuals ﬁ'om improper government
action and arbitrary governmental interference in relation to the speciﬁc ﬁ‘eedoms
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. The term civil rights is used to imply that the state has a
role in ensuring all citizens have equal protection under the law and equal opportunity to
exercise the privileges of citizenship regardless of race, religion, sex, or other
characteristics unrelated to the worth of the individual. Civil rights are, therefore,
obligations imposed upon government to promote equality (Chang, 2001). More
speciﬁcally, they are the rights to personal liberty guaranteed to all United States citizens
by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and by acts of Congress. Generally, the
term civil rights involves positive government action, while the term civil liberties
involves restrictions on government.

The term privacy refers to individuals’ interests in preventing the inappropriate
collection, use, and release of personally identiﬁable information (Carter, 2004). Privacy
interests include privacy of personal behavior, privacy of personal communications, and
privacy of personal data The US. Constitution does not explicitly use the word privacy,
but several of its provisions protect different aspects of this fundamental right. Although

explicit federal constitutional right to an individual’s privacy does not exist, privacy

32

rights have been articulated in limited contexts by the US. Supreme Court. Privacy
protections are numerous and include protection from unnecessary or unauthorized
collection of personal information (e. g., eavesdropping), public disclosure of private
facts, and shame or humiliation caused by release of personal information (Harris, 2001).

The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan supports policies that will protect
privacy and constitutional rights while not hindering the intelligence process. When
agencies are reviewing or formulating their policies, it may be helpful to view the
intelligence process as a series of discretionary decisions. At each step, a decision must
be made, usually involving a choice ﬁ'om among several possible alternatives. Consider,
for example, how a criminal intelligence unit might respond to an unsolicited, anonymous
tip alleging that a particular individual is engaged in criminal activity (Kris, 2002).
Should the unit query various police records systems in an effort to learn more about the
“suspect”? Should they query commercial or other public record databases? Should they
conduct surveillance of the “suspect”? Or should they disseminate the information to
other law enforcement agencies in an effort to learn more about the person? What kinds
of additional records are created when these actions are taken (Klockars, 2000)?

And then, after those actions are taken, additional decisions must be made
regarding what information and how much, if any, to store about the “suspect” in the
criminal intelligence ﬁles. Violations of privacy and constitutional rights may potentially
occur when choices are selected from these various alternatives. In order to be effective,
a policy that addresses the protection of individual privacy and constitutional rights

should attempt to eliminate the unnecessary discretion in the decision-making process,

33

guide the necessary discretion, and continually audit the process to ensure conformance
to policy goals (Reporter’s Committee, 2002).

It is imperative that a privacy policy have legitimacy, therefore, when an agency
is developing a new policy or reviewing existing ones, interested parties and competing
viewpoints should be represented. Legitimate parties include not only a wide selection of
law enforcement agencies but also representatives ﬁom privacy and constitutional rights
advocacy groups. Input ﬁom all interested parties is a vital step towards establishing
legitimacy of the policy and achieving its widespread acceptance. It is also essential that
the parameters of a privacy policy be clearly deﬁned. This includes, for example,
identifying the particular aspects of the intelligence process to which it applies, as well as
deﬁning the scope and meaning of the phrase “individuals’ privacy and constitutional
ri ts” (Lynch, 2002). The extent to which information and activities that have been held
to be private or constitutionally protected under the law is, in all likelihood, much
narrower than what the general public believes to be private and protected. This
phenomenon must be understood and acknowledged when developing and conducting
outreach in regards to these issues.

It is impossible for a policy to conceive of every imaginable situation or set of
circumstances. An agency’s privacy policy should acknowledge and address important
issues that currently are not included in some existing criminal intelligence policies. For
example, the policy should acknowledge the existence of information that is received or
possessed by law enforcement agencies that does not rise to the level of “reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity” (i.e., the criminal predicate) and provide guidance on how

to process that information. Often this information, of the type that would be contained in

34

a “temporary” or “working” ﬁle, is received unsolicited by law enforcement agencies and
cannot simply be dismissed (Commission on Accreditation, 1998) .

Finally, an agency’s privacy policy should identify the decision points within the
intelligence process and provide appropriate guidance and structure for each point. This
should be the heart of the policy - to map out clearly, for law enforcement personnel, the
parameters of the decisions they must make throughout the intelligence process, educate
them on permissible options, and provide guidance on appropriate choices. For example,
the policy should stress the need for and importance of planning and direction (the ﬁrst
stage of the intelligence process) (Carter, 2004). Although it is only one phase of the
intelligence cycle, planning and direction guides the overall activities of the criminal
intelligence function. Some of the most egregious violations of sound criminal
intelligence practice can be prevented by developing a clear statement of the mission and
goals of the criminal intelligence unit (usually in terms of crimes it seeks to prevent or
investigate), establishing clear policies and procedures, appropriately tasking personnel
and performing ongoing checks to ensure that the criminal intelligence function is being

carried out in accordance with this guidance (Carter, 2004).

Upholding Civil Rights

A law enforcement agency can prevent the depravation of an individual’s rights
by adhering to the 28 CFR Part 23 guidelines. The focal points of Civil Rights concerns
about law enforcement intelligence rests on how law enforcement agencies collect, retain,
and disseminate information about individuals. As a result, this federal guideline has

become a very important issue permeating virtually every aspect of law enforcement

35

intelligence. This federal regulation speciﬁcally applies to state and local law
enforcement agencies that manage a multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence system that
was funded by the federal government. Hence, it does not apply to every law
enforcement agency that has an intelligence capacity. In light of the estimated 18,000
agencies in the US. the regulation only applies to a comparatively small number (Carter,
2004). Despite this fact, the regulation has become the de facto guideline for most
agencies. Indeed, the NCISP recommends that every agency develop intelligence records
system polices that are 28 CFR Part 23 compliant. As discussed earlier:
Recommendation 9: In order to ensure that the collection/submission, access,
storage and dissemination of criminal intelligence information conforms to the
privacy and constitutional rights of individuals, groups and organizations, law
enforcement agencies shall adopt, at a minimum, the standards required by the
Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies federal regulation (28 CF R Part
23), regardless of whether or not an intelligence system is federally funded.
(NCISP, 2003, p. 28)
This is a signiﬁcant development because the adoption has become a national standard
that is endorsed by the major professional law enforcement associations, the Attorney
General, Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the FBI. The federal
regulation does not actually prescribe policy, but establishes guidelines for intelligence
records systems for which policy should be consistent. In order to maximize the
consistency of law enforcement agency policies on intelligence records, the Law
Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) prepared model policies, entitled “Criminal

Intelligence File Guidelines” that are comprehensive and have withstood the test of court

scrutiny.

36

Summary: Intelligence “Quick Start Toolbox ” Program
The purpose of the Intelligence Toolbox training program is to provide

state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies with the tools and information necessary
to aid the development or re-engineering of an intelligence capacity. This training
program is funded by the Office of Grants & Training within the Department of
Homeland Security. The program is developed and presented by the School of Criminal
Justice at Michigan State University in partnership with the Intelligence Directorate of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Intelligence Division of the Drug
Enforcement Administrations

The training sessions for this program are held in various cities across the country
that have high concentrations of law enforcement agencies in the surrounding area. This
is to ensure and allow for the largest number of agencies possible to attend the training.
The program provides two nights of accommodations while attending the training, under
the provisions that they are not a federal employee, and that they travel 45 miles or more
to the training site. Most agencies lack the appropriate funds to attend the training. The
Intelligence Program allows for many agencies to attend training in their area at virtually
no cost to the agency. All of the individuals attending the entire program earn 20 training
hours that they can apply to their annual training requirements. Participants may receive

an additional four training hours for completing and submitting a post-training exercise

 

5 The principal investigator of the project is Dr. David L. Carter. Dr. Carter authored the grant that was
awarded to provide this training program, developed a large amount of the curriculum, and is the author of
the main textbook for the program, the Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local and Tribal
Law Enforcement. The other staff members for the program include the director of the School of Criminal
Justice, Dr. Edmund McGarrell; the director of the Regional Community Policing Institute at Wichita State
University, Dr. Andra Bannister; a Senior Intelligence Instructor for the Drug Enforcement Administration,
Hal Wilson; a retired special agent from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Merle Manzi; a
criminal justice research specialist, Natalie Hipple and three program specialists; Jeremy Carter, Erin
Mead, and Christopher Michelsen.

37

which consists of submitting a report to the Intelligence Program’s ofﬁce describing a
proposed plan to implement a change to develop or re-engineer their agency’s
intelligence capacity. In order to receive the training hours, the participants are required
to sign-in four different times throughout the training to provide an accurate account of
their attendance.

Each participant receives a student handbook which contains all of the slides and
information presented during the lecture with room throughout to supplement with their
own notes. In addition to the training content, the student handbook contains a list with
all of the major acronyms used by the government and law enforcement as well as a
glossary of commonly used terms within the intelligence arena. Also, the participants
receive a compact disc containing over four hundred intelligence-related resources
comprised of websites and documents and laminated “quick guides” that help the
participants identify the most common terms in the intelligence arena as well as the
collection of information for use of intelligence.

The two-day training program is broken down into seven areas of training and one
breakout group session where the participants work cooperatively with minimal guidance
from the staff. Each session is instructed by the staff member that is the most qualiﬁed to
teach the particular material of the session. The ﬁrst day consists of registering,
introductions, and administrative issues, followed by sessions one through four. The ﬁrst
session is “Law Enforcement Intelligence: An Overview”. In this session the participants
will learn what law enforcement intelligence is and what it is not, the history of

intelligence in our country, the initiatives that have been declared by the federal

38

government, the intelligence process, and the direction in which the intelligence arena is
headed.

The second session is “Community Partnerships”. The purpose of the community
partnerships session is to acknowledge the need for law enforcement agencies to become
involved with their community for the intelligence function to be completely efﬁcient and
effective. Participants learn that the community must be educated on the issues facing
their law enforcement agency, aware of the potential targets within the community,
included in the goals of the law enforcement agency, apprised of any special
considerations within the community (i.e. a large Islamic population) and ﬁnally they
must be able to communicate to the community what it is they can do to help the law
enforcement agency with their intelligence function.

The third session is “Intelligence Products and Resources”. During this session
the participants will begin to understand the meaning and role of intelligence products,
become familiar with different intelligence data networks available for access by state,
local, and tribal law enforcement, develop an understanding of federal intelligence
products most frequently available to SLTLE, and become familiar with different
intelligence resources for SLTLE.

The fourth and ﬁnal session of day one is “Developing a Mission, Objectives and
Management Infrastructure”. Within this session the participants will learn how to
identify the components of an operational intelligence plan, deﬁne a mission, goals and
objectives as they relate to an operational intelligence plan, describe the process utilized
to develop an operational intelligence plan, and identify the individual roles and

responsibilities associated with an agencies intelligence ﬁrnction.

39

The second day of the training includes sessions ﬁve through seven and small
breakout groups that meet later in the afternoon. The ﬁrst part of the day begins with the
ﬁfth session which is “Special Issues for Intelligence Capacity Building”. During this
session the participants will learn the intricacies of developing an intelligence capacity,
understanding critical information management issues for an intelligence records system,
issues of civil rights and privacy, adhering to 28 CFR Part 23, liability and intelligence
records, auditing and intelligence functions, and where to start in regards to handling this
large amount of information in a useful and productive manner.

The sixth session is “Intelligence Led Policing”. Within this session the
participants will place law enforcement intelligence in the broader context of intelligence
led policing and the best practices in law enforcement. Also, they will learn to provide
concrete examples of use of analysis to reduce other forms of crime, understand that law
enforcement intelligence is critical for both community and national security, and view
law enforcement intelligence as the newly evolving era of policing.

The seventh and ﬁnal session of instructor training is “External Funding”. This
session is important to demonstrate to the participants the availability of external
ﬁnancial sources. The session focuses on the role external funding should play in the
intelligence function (i.e. it should supplement, not be the regular budget), where to ﬁnd
these external resources, tips on grant proposal preparation, information on how to
maximize the chance of receiving a grant award and stressing the difficulty of and
amount of work in applying for and receiving a grant.

The ﬁnal piece of the training program is a two hour small group breakout

session. During this period all of the participants will meet in small groups consisting of

40

approximately 12 people. Participants assign themselves to a group topic they feel is best
suited to the needs of their agency. The group topics are: “Developing a Strategic Plan to
Create an Intelligence Capability”, “The Intelligence Function in Small Law Enforcement
Agencies”, “Developing Relationships for Regional Intelligence Operations”, and “Re-
Engineering/Reﬁning an Agency’s Current Intelligence Capability”. The role of the staff
during the small breakout groups is as minimal as possible in order to promote creative
thinking among the group members, yet still be available as resources.

The objective of the small groups is for interaction amongst participants to work
together to identify what things have/have not worked for certain people, what obstacles
some agencies have faced and others have not and so forth. The staff provides insight
when a group is confused, offer ideas to get the group started, and is available to answer
questions when a group has them. The small group session ends with all of the groups
coming together in the main classroom. Each group is allowed approximately ten
minutes to present the issues they discussed and how they would address these issues and
problems. The training session concludes with the staff answering any addition
questions, comments or concerns that the participants may have, and at the conclusion of

this session, each individual is awarded a certiﬁcate of completion.

41

CHAPTER III: DATA AND METHODS

Data

The variables used for this study were gathered using an online-based survey
which was e-mailed to every person who attended the Intelligence Program training
sessions. The survey was open online for participation for 35 days and was responded to
by 175 persons, which is a response rate of 33 percent (n=175/527). There were two
types of variables used in this study. First the dichotomous nominal level variables and
second the ordinal variables, which are made up of scales. There are three scales in this
study. The ﬁrst is a Gallup scale that is used to assess the size of population in the area
that a law enforcement agency has responsibility. The scales are “Central City, 50,000
persons or more”, “Suburbs, 2,500-49,999 persons”, and “Rural, less than 2,499
persons”. The second scale is used to assess the size of the law enforcement agency by
the number of its sworn ofﬁcers. The ranges are “25 or less sworn officers”, “26-100
sworn ofﬁcers”, and “101 or more sworn ofﬁcers”.

It should be recognized for purposes of this study that the variables of agency size
in regard to the number of sworn ofﬁcers employed and the population of the area the
agency is responsible for are closely related. Given this, the results of the third and
fourth research question are likely to be similar. The reason for assessing agency size in
these two different ways is to make sure the study encompasses the entire aspect of
agency size as it relates to the adequacy of the agency’s intelligence capacity. The ﬁnal
scale is a variable called “adequacy”. It is an additive scale variable and it will be

discussed in detail later in this section.

42

The Likert scale variables are produced by a respondent identifying to which
extent he/she agrees to a statement on the survey. There are six of these Likert scale
questions on the survey and the possible responses are “strongly agree”, “agree”,
“disagree”, and “strongly disagree”. Of the six Likert scale questions, only two will be
used for analysis purposes in this study, the extent to which a participant agreed or
disagreed that the Intelligence Program helped their agency develop or re-engineer the
agency’s intelligence capacity and the extent to which a participant agreed or disagreed
that the resources obtained at the Intelligence Program were useful in the development of
re-engineering of the agency’s intelligence capacity. These were chosen to directly
assess the participants’ opinion of the effectiveness of the Intelligence Program.

The adequacy variable is an additive scale produced from a group of nominal
level agency characteristics. For the purpose of this study, adequacy is deﬁned as an
agency’s cumulative level of positive intelligence capacity characteristics. In order to
create this additive scale, factor analysis was used to reduce the number of variables used
to explain the relationship between an agency’s characteristics and the effectiveness of
the Intelligence Program of the agencies in the studyf’ A summary of the key factor
analysis ﬁndings are provided in Table 1.

The variables used to create the adequacy scale were:

1. $31: agency’s intelligence capacity was in place before September 11“,

2. If the agency had intelligence analysts on their staff
3. If the agency had a speciﬁc intelligence records system

 

6 The researcher does acknowledge that there is some dissention about the use of dichotomous nominal
level variables in factor analysis due to the possibility of the analysis yielding uncorrelated factors that
result in a wrongly speciﬁed structure or underlying relationship (Walker, 1999). However, the researcher
feels that the underlying relationships of the variables chosen for the factor analysis to be included in the
additive scale had a pre-existing relationship, which is also illustrated by the reliability alpha score.

43

4. If the agency had policies and procedures for their intelligence capacity in

place

If the agency’s intelligence capacity was compliant with 28 CFR Part 23

If the agency’s intelligence capacity was compliant with the NCISP

If the agency worked with the community in an intelligence related

manner

If the agency worked with the private companies in its area

If the agency had allocated funds speciﬁcally for an intelligence capacity

0. If the agency had been sued for matters relating to intelligence records

systems

11. If the agency had been sharing information with federal agencies before
attending the Raining; and

12. If the agency has been sharing information with federal agencies after
attending the Raining

$9?"

“to!”

The respondents answered either “yes”, “no”, or “don’t know” for all of the
questions discussed above. The responses to these questions were recoded into a score of
one or a score of zero. Those respondents who answered “yes” to the questions were
given a score of one. Those respondents who answered “no” or “don’t know” to the
questions were given a score of zero. The question regarding whether an agency had
been sued for intelligence related records systems was recoded with those who responded
“no” given a score of one and those who responded “yes” or “don’t know” given a score
of zero. This is because that the scores of “one” illusRates a positive characteristic of an
intelligence capacity and not being sued would be the positive aspect.

For each respondent’s answers to the above questions, a total is calculated from
which the “adequacy” variable is derived. The “adequacy” variable is on a scale of zero
to 12. The lowest score possible is zero with a respondent answering “no” to all of the
questions above and “yes” to the being sued question. The highest score possible is
twelve which is achieved by a respondent answering “yes” to all of the questions above
and “no” to the being sued question. As it is illusRated in Table 3, the scores are

categorized as either “low”, “medium”, or “high” scores. All of the agencies receiving a

total score of zero to four are categorized as “low”, a total score of ﬁve to eight is a

“medium” score, and ﬁnally a score of nine to twelve is a “hi ” score.

Table 1: Summary of Factor Analysis

 

 

 

Variable Reliability Alpha Bartlett’s Test of Initial Eigenvalues % of Variance
Sphericity
Adequacy .888 .000 6.49 76.44
Methods

The analyses for this study will be the result of using univariate and bivariate
analysis of the variables previously mentioned. Table 4 provides a summary of the
univariate analysis for the nominal level variables of the study while Table 5 provides the
summary of the univariate analysis of the ordinal level variables.

Once again, the intent of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the
Intelligence Program on state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies’ ability to
develop or re-engineer an intelligence capacity and the effect the agency’s size has on the
adequacy of their intelligence capacity. Four research questions were identiﬁed that will
be the focus of the study. Given the nature of the data, the vast majority being
dichotomous, nominal level variables and the fact that the entire population was
surveyed, cross tabulations and chi square analyses will be employed. The chi square test
is the primary method of establishing a signiﬁcant relationship between two nominal
level variables (Walker, 1999, p. 143). When the chi square value (x’) exceeds the
critical value of signiﬁcance at the designated degrees of freedom for the tabulation, the

relationship is considered signiﬁcant at the designated alpha level.

45

Dependent Variables

There were three dependent variables used in this study, with one of them being

used twice in order to test the hypotheses. Table 2 provides a list of the dependent

variables used for analyses as well as the level of measurement for each variable.

Table 2: Dependent Variables Used for Analyses

 

 

 

 

 

Dependent Variable Level of Measurement

Agency Developed or in the Process of Developing Dichotomous (Y es/No)

an Intelligence Capacity After Attending raining

Agency Modiﬁed Any Aspect of Dichotomous (Y es/No)

Their Intelligence Capacity

After Attending Training

Adequacy of Agency’s Ordinal

Intelligence Capacity Large (Additive score of 9-12)
Medium (Additive score of 5-8)

Small (Additive score of 0-4)
Independent Variable

Table 3: Independent Variables Used for Analyses

 

Independent Variable

Level of Measurement

 

 

Did the Agency Have an Intelligence Capacity Dichotomous (Y es/No)
Before Attending Training
Agency Size Ordinal

Large (101 or more sworn ofﬁcers)
Medium (26-100 sworn oﬂicers)
Small (25 or less sworn ofﬁcers)

 

Agency’s Constituent Population Size

Research Questions

 

Large (50,000 or more persons)
Medium (2,500-49,999 persons)
Small (2,499 or less persons)

1. Is there a signiﬁcant relationship between a law enforcement agency not having an

intelligence capacity prior to attending the Intelligence Toolbox Raining program and the

same agency having either developed an intelligence capacity or being in the process of

developing an intelligence capacity after attending the Intelligence Toolbox Raining

program?

46

2. Is there a signiﬁcant relationship between a law enforcement agency having had an
intelligence capacity in place prior to attending the Intelligence Toolbox Raining program
and the same agency changing and/or modifying their intelligence capacity after
attending the Intelligence Toolbox Raining program?

3. Is there a signiﬁcant relationship between the size of the law enforcement agency and
the adequacy of a law enforcement agency’s intelligence capacity?

4. Is there a signiﬁcant relationship between the population the law enforcement agency

is responsible for and the adequacy of a law enforcement agency’s intelligence capacity?

47

CHAPTER IV: RESULTS

Univariate Statistics

For questions two, four, six and eight on the survey, 54 of the respondents
did not answer the question. This is not counted as a “missing” variable because the
survey insRucted the respondent to skip these questions if they had indicated in the ﬁrst
question that their agency did not have an intelligence capacity. The purpose of this was
to gauge the characteristics of an existing intelligence capacity in order to give a ground
work on which modiﬁcations could occur.

As Table 4 and Table 5 illusRate, the ﬁndings from the items that comprised the
adequacy scale generally indicated a basic intelligence capacity in the agencies attending
the Intelligence Program Raining. For example, 64 percent of the agencies reported
having an intelligence capacity before attending the Raining. This suggested an increase
in the post-9/11 period as only 42 percent of the agencies’ intelligence capacities were in
place before September 11‘“. Over one-half and as many as 80 percent of the agencies
reported having an intelligence records system along with policies, procedures, being 28
CF R Part 23 compliant, being NCISP compliant, and sharing information with federal
agencies before attending the Raining. In conRast, only 11 percent of agencies stated that
they had been sued for intelligence related records system. In terms of the level of the
agency’s adequacy of their intelligence capacity, the responses were evenly distributed
across low, medium, and high categories.

In conRast to the variables related to some intelligence capacities, the variables
indicating a commitment of personnel, relationship with the community or private sector,

and sharing of information were less positive in terms of the development of law

48

enforcement intelligence capacities. For example, although 80 percent of the agencies

reported having intelligence analysts on their staff and sharing information with federal

agencies, less than half reported working with the community in any aspect relating to

intelligence, working with private companies in their area in any aspect relating to

intelligence, and allocating funds speciﬁcally for an intelligence capacity.

Table 4: Univariate Analysis for Nominal Variables (n= 175 )

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Variable Yes No Missipg_
Had Intelligence Capacity Before Attending Training 112 54 9
(64%) (3 1%) (5%)
Modiﬁed Any Aspect of Intelligence Capacity After Attending Training 80 86 9
(46%) 449%) (5)
Had Intelligence Capacity Before September 11, 2001 " 74 37 10
(42%) (21%) (37%)
Have Intelligence Analysts on Staff 78 88 9
(45%) (50%) (5%)
Have Intelligence Records System“ 62 58 1
(51%) (47%) (2%)
Have Intelligence Policies and Procedures‘ 87 33 1
(7 1%) (27%) (2%)
Compliant With 28 CFR Part 23 98 68 9
(56) (39%) (5%L
Compliant With the NCISP‘I 98 23 0
(80%) (20%) (0%)
Developed or Developing Intelligence Capacity After Attending Training 96 71 8
(55%) (41%) (4%L
Worked With the Community 77 87 11
(44%) (49%) (7%)
Worked With Private Companies 67 97 l 1
(38%) (55%) (7%)
Allocated Funds For Intelligence Capacity 76 89 10
(43%) (51%) (6%)
Shared Information With Federal Agencies 142 23 10
Before Training (81%) (13%) (6%)
Shared Information With Federal Agencies 140 21 14
After Training (80%) (12%) (8%)
Agency Has Been Sued for Intelligence Related Records Systems 20 114 9
(l 1%) (65%) (24%)

 

‘These were questions on the survey that participants who indicated they did not have an intelligence
capacity before attending the Intelligence Program were instructed to skip. There were 54 participants who

did not respond to these questions.

49

Table 5: Univariate Analysis of Ordinal Variables (n= 175)

 

Low Medium High Missing

 

 

 

 

 

 

Agency Size 38 4O 88 9
(22%) (23%) (50%) (5%)

Population of Agency’s Area 7 45 112 11
(4%) (26%) (64%) (6%)

Adequacy _ 60 53 62 0
(34%) (31%) (35%) (0%)

SRongly Agree Disagree Strongly Missing
Agree Disagree

The Resources Gathered at the 72 70 13 l 19

Training Greedy Helped (41%) (40%) (7 %) (1 %L (l 1%)

The Training Program Helped to

Develop or 42 72 32 5 22

Re-engineer Intelligence Capacity (24%) (42%) (L8%) (3%) (13%)

 

Bivariate Statistics

As mentioned previously, the focal point of this study will be the four research
questions related to the impact of the Intelligence Program Raining and the impact of
agency size on the adequacy of an agency’s intelligence capacity. The bivariate analysis
will consist of analyzing each individual research question through the use of chi square

tables and cross-tabulation tables.

Research Question One: Intelligence Capacity Before and Aﬁer Training

The ﬁrst research question asks whether there is a signiﬁcant relationship between
a law enforcement agency not having an intelligence capacity prior to attending the
Intelligence Toolbox Raining program and the same agency having either developed an
intelligence capacity or being in the process of developing an intelligence capacity after
attending the Intelligence Toolbox Raining program. Table 6 provides a summary of the
relationship between an agency not having an intelligence capacity prior to attending the

Intelligence Program and the same agency either having developed or being in the

50

process of developing an intelligence capacity after attending the Raining program by
using cross tabulation and the chi square analysis.

Table 6: Relationship Between an Agency With No Intelligence Capacity Before Training and Either
Having an Intelligence Capacity or Develcmingin Intelligence Capacity After Training

 

 

 

 

 

Developed or Did Not Develop or Not
Developing Developing Intelligence Chi
Intelligence Capacity Capacity After Training Missing Total Square
After Training (x’)
Had Intelligence
Capacity Before 62 50 0 l 12
Training (55%) (45%) (0%) (100%)
Did Not Have 155.23‘
Intelligence 33 21 O 54
Capacity Before (61%) (39%) (0%) (100%)
Training
Missing 1 0 8 9
(1 1%) (0%) (89%) (100%)
Total 96 71 8 175
Q5%) (41%) ﬁ%) (100%)

 

*Signiﬁcant at Alpha .001 with 4 Degrees of Freedom

The cross tabulations in Table 4 illusRate that 61 percent (n=33) of the agencies
that did not have an intelligence capacity before attending the Intelligence Program
Raining had either developed an intelligence capacity or were in the process of
developing an intelligence capacity following the Raining. This compared to 55 percent
(n=62) of the agencies that had an intelligence capacity before the Raining. The high chi
square value well exceeds the critical value for statistical signiﬁcance at the alpha .001
level. The signiﬁcance of the results of this relationship may be magniﬁed due to the fast
turn around time of this study. The respondents had a very limited amount of time to
implement a change within their agency after attending the Raining program. The
participants who had the most time were those who attended the Lansing, MI Raining in
August 2005. The Lansing participants had approximately six months to implement any

changes related to an intelligence capacity.

51

In contrast, the participants who attended the Raining in Columbia, SC had only
approximately two weeks to implement any changes. It follows that if this same study
were to be conducted one year after the ﬁnal Raining program, the number of agencies
that did not have an intelligence capacity before attending the Intelligence Program and
were developing an intelligence capacity after attending would increase. This effect
would be due to the agencies having enough time necessary to start the bureaucratic
process of implementing change within a law enforcement organization.

Other factors, besides time, can be attributed to the lack of change within an
agency. Those are factors such as funding, political views, adminisRators’ views, and a
lack of personnel. Given the time needed to produce organizational change, the result of
this relationship may be even more signiﬁcant. In summary, the research indicates that
there is a signiﬁcant relationship between a law enforcement agency not having an
intelligence capacity before attending the Intelligence Toolbox Raining program and
having developed or being in the process of developing an intelligence capacity after

attending the Intelligence Toolbox Raining.

Research Question Two: Intelligence Capacity and Modiﬁcations After Training

The second research question of the study is whether there is a signiﬁcant
relationship between a law enforcement agency that had an intelligence capacity in place
prior to attending the Intelligence Toolbox Raining program and the same agency
changing and/or modifying their intelligence capacity after attending the Intelligence
Toolbox Raining program. By the operational deﬁnition for this study, modifying is any
change made to existing policies, procedures, records systems, staff assignments, or any

other aspect of an intelligence capacity. Table 7 illusRates the results Rom the cross

52

tabulation and chi square analysis of the relationship between a law enforcement agency
having an intelligence capacity before attending the Raining program and whether that
same agency made any modiﬁcations to its intelligence capacity after attending the
Raining program.

Table 7: Relationship Between an Agency’s Intelligence Capacity Before Attending the Training and If
the Same Aggng Made Any Modiﬁcations to the Existing Intelligence Capacity
Did Make Modiﬁcations Did Not Make Any

 

 

 

 

to the Intelligence Modiﬁcations to the Chi
Capacity After Intelligence Capacity Missing Total Square
Attending Trainigg After Attending Training (x3)
Had Intelligence
Capacity Before 77 35 0 112
TrainipL (69%) (3 1%) (0%) (100%)
Did Not Have
Intelligence 3 51 0 54
Capacity Before (6%) (94%) (0%) (100%) 236.44“
TraininL
Missing 0 0 9 9
(0%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
Total 80 86 9 175
(46%) (49%) (5%) (100%)

 

‘Signiﬁcant at Alpha .001 Level with 4 Degrees of Freedom

Of the 112 agencies that had an intelligence capacity before attending the
Intelligence Program, 77, or 69 percent, had made some type of modiﬁcation to their
intelligence capacity after attending the Intelligence Program Raining. In conRast, and as
would be expected, only six percent of the agencies reporting no intelligence capacity
before the Raining indicated that they made modiﬁcations to their intelligence capacity.
The chi square value for this relationship is statistically signiﬁcant at an alpha level of
.001. It can be inferred that the information, resources, and tools obtained by the
participants at the Raining program have had a signiﬁcantly positive effect on a state,
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies’ intelligence functions. It can be argued that
some degree of organizational change can also affect the results between these two

variables. The amount of change needed to modify an existing function of policing is

53

vastly different than the amount of change involved in implementing an entirely new
aspect of policing, however it can be argued that the relationship would be even sRonger
if the respondents were given more time to implement modiﬁcations. Based on the
statistical results of the chi square analysis, which had a value of 236.44, the research
suggests that there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the law enforcement agencies
who attended the Intelligence Program Raining and the same agencies implementing

some form of modiﬁcation to their existing intelligence capacity.

Research Question Three: Agency Size and Adequacy of Intelligence Capacity

The other aspect of this study is to determine the impact that the size of a law
enforcement agency has on the adequacy of its intelligence capacity. With this in mind,
the third research question of this study is that here is a signiﬁcant relationship between
the size of the law enforcement agency and the adequacy of a law enforcement agency’s
intelligence capacity. The implication of agency size plays a large role in the arena of
law enforcement intelligence due to the ﬁndings of the 9/11 Commission, which were
previously stated. The intent of the Intelligence Program is to bring the necessary
information and tools to the state, local, and tribal levels, regardless of agency size.
Approximately 58 percent of the participants in the Raining program were ﬁ'om agencies
that were comprised of 101 or more sworn ofﬁcers. The remainder of the participants
were evenly distributed among agencies ranging ﬁom 25 or less sworn ofﬁcers and 26-
100 sworn officers. Table 8 provides a summary of the analysis between the relationship

of an agency’s size and the adequacy of its intelligence capacity.

54

Table 8: Relationship Between the Size of an Agency and the Adquacy of It’s Intelhgence Capacity

 

Agency Size
Adequacy of
Intelligence Less than 25 26-100 101 or More Chi
Capacity Sworn Ofﬁcers Sworn Sworn Ofﬁcers Missing Total Square
Ofﬁcers (x’)
High 7 5 50 0 62
(18%) (13%) (57%) (0%) (35%)
Medium 14 12 27 0 53
(3 7%) (30%) (3 1%) (0%) (3 1%)
Low 17 23 1 1 9 60 57.88“
(45%) (57%) (12%) (100%) (34%)
Missing 0 0 0 0 0
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Total 38 4O 88 9 175
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)

 

*Signiﬁcant at the Alpha .001 Level with 9 Degrees of Freedom

Intuitively, a person would assume that the larger the agency, the more likely that
agency is to have a more adequate intelligence capacity. In this case, intuition is correct.
As table 8 illusRates, the more sworn ofﬁcers the agency has, then the agency will have a
more adequate intelligence capacity. For example, over half of the large agencies were
found to have a high level of intelligence capacity adequacy. In comparison, only 18
percent of small agencies have a high level of intelligence capacity adequacy. There is an
even distribution of low adequacy scores to high adequacy scores as the agency sizes go
Rom small to large. The association between the size of an agency and the adequacy of
the agency’s intelligence capacity is signiﬁcant at the alpha .001 level with a chi square
value of 57.88, which indicates a signiﬁcant relationship between agency size and the

adequacy of that agency’s intelligence capacity.

Research Question Four: Agency '3 Population and Adequacy of Intelligence Capacity
The fourth and ﬁnal research question that will be assessed in this study is that

there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the population of persons the law enforcement

55

agency is responsible for and the adequacy of a law enforcement agency’s intelligence
capacity. Once again, it is intuitive to assume that the larger the population a law
enforcement agency is responsible for, the more adequate its intelligence capacity will be.
This assumption is based on the fact that larger agencies often have access to more
resources, whether those resources are personnel, ﬁnancial, or equipment. As it is Rue
with the size of the actual agency, the higher the population of persons that an agency is
responsible for, the more the agency’s intelligence capacity will be adequate.

Approximately 64 percent of the participants responded that they served a
constituency of 50,000 persons or more while approximately 26 percent serve 2,500-
49,999 persons and only about four percent serve less than 2,499 persons. While it is
almost blatantly obvious, it should be noted that there is also a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between an agency’s size and the population of persons it serves. Table 9
provides a summary of the analysis of the relationship between the size of population an
agency is responsible for and the adequacy of the agency’s intelligence capacity.

Table 9: Relationship Between the Size of the Population an Agency is Responsible for and the Adequacy
of the Agency’s Intellijence Capacity
Agency Population Responsrhility Size

Adequacy of
Intelligence Capacity 50,000 or 2,500-49,999 2,499 or Less Chi
More Persons Persons Persons Missing Total Square
0")
High 54 6 0 2 62
(48%) (14%) (0%) (18%) (35%)
Medium 32 18 0 3 53
(29%) (40%) (0%) (27%) (31%)
Low 26 21 7 6 60 34.59"
(23%) (46%) (100%) (55%) (34%)
Missing 0 O 0 0 0
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Total 1 12 45 7 1 l 175
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)

*Signiﬁcant at the .001 Alpha Level at 9 Degrees of Freedom

56

Similar to the agency size variable, when the size of the population that agency is
responsible for is crossed with the adequacy variable, the results indicate that the larger
the population for the agency, then the more likely it is for the agency to have an
adequate intelligence capacity. The agencies having the highest adequacy scores are the
agencies with the larger constituent population. Table 9 shows that 48 percent (n=54) of
the large population agencies had a high adequacy score, another 29 percent (n=32) had a
medium adequacy score, and only 23 percent (n=26) had a low adequacy score. In
comparison, 14 percent (n=6) of the medium agencies had a high adequacy score, another
40 percent (n=—18) had a medium adequacy level, and 46 percent (n=21) had a low
adequacy level. Lastly, there were zero small agencies that had either a high or medium
adequacy level while all seven of the small agencies in the study had a low adequacy
level for their intelligence capacity.

In summary, the more people a law enforcement agency is responsible for, the
more likely the agency’s intelligence capacity will be adequate. The sRength of the
relationship between these variables is indicated with a chi square value of 34.59, which

is signiﬁcant at an alpha level of .001 with nine degrees of freedom.

Ordinal Measures of Intelligence Program '3 Eﬂectiveness

The two previous research questions have illustrated that the size of a law
enforcement agency has an effect on the adequacy, or the effectiveness, of that agency’s
intelligence capacity. With this effect in mind, the intent of the Intelligence Program is to
provide the resources and tools necessary to either develop or re-engineer an intelligence
capacity for those agencies at the state, local, and tribal levels that either do not have an

intelligence capacity or are in need of re-engineering an existing capacity. The aspect of

57

agency size comes to play a role due largely to the lack of resources and, prior to the 9/11
Commission Report, a notion that the smaller agencies need not play that large of role in
the overall scheme of law enforcement intelligence. Table 10 and Table 11 provide
summaries of the relationship between an agency’s size and their opinions on the degree
to which they believe the Intelligence Program helped their intelligence capacity.

Table 10: Relationship Between the Size of an Agency and the Agency’s Opinion That the Intelligence
Program Helped Their Intelligence Capacity

 

Agency Size
Agency’s Opinion That the
Intelligence Program Helped Less than 25 26-100 101 or More Chi
Their Intelligence Capacity Sworn Sworn Sworn Missing Total Square
Ofﬁcer's Officers Ofﬁcers (x’)
Strongly Agree 7 8 27 0 42
(1 8%) (20%) (3 1%) (0%) (24%)
Agree l7 19 37 l 74
(45%) (48%) (42%) (11%) (42%)
Disagree 8 7 l7 0 32
(21%) (18%) (19%) (0%) (18%) 55.10"I
SRongly Disagree 2 l 2 0 5
(5%) (2%) (1%) (0%) (3%)
Missing 4 5 5 8 22
(11%) (12%) (6%) (89%) (13%)
Total 38 40 88 9 175
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)

‘Signiﬁcant at the Alpha .001 Level with 12 Degrees of Freedom

Table I 1: Relationship Between the Size of an Agency and their Oﬁicers’ Opinions That the Resources
Obtained at the Intelligence Pm Assisted Their Intelligence Capacity

 

Agency Size
Agency’s Opinion That the
Resources Obtained at the Less than 25 26-100 101 or More Chi
Intelligence Program Assisted Sworn Sworn Sworn Missing Total Square
Their Intelligence Capacity Ofﬁcers Ofﬁcers Officers (x’)
Strongly Agree 15 15 42 0 72
(39%) (38%) (48%) (0%) (41%)
Agree 15 15 39 l 70
(39%) (38%) (44%) (11%) (40%)
Disagree 3 5 5 0 l3
(8%) (13%) (6%) (0%) (7%) 69.60“
SRongly Disagree 0 l 0 0 l
(0%) (1%) (0%) (0%) (1%)
Missing 5 4 2 8 l9
( 14%) (10%) (2%) (89%) (l 1%)
Total 38 40 88 9 175
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)

1'Signiﬁcant at the Alpha .001 Level with 12 Degrees of Freedom

As the tables illusRate, the majority of participants, regardless of size, felt that the

Intelligence Program had a positive effect on their intelligence capacities. Overall, 116

58

of the 175 participants, or 66 percent (22 missing cases in this variable) either sRongly
agreed or agreed that the program did in fact help their agency’s intelligence capacity
needs. The relationship between an agency’s size and whether the resources obtained
while attending the Intelligence Program assisted their intelligence capacity yielded even
sRonger results. Of the 175 participants, with 19 missing cases, 142 agencies, or 81
percent, regardless of size, either sRongly agreed or agreed that the resources obtained
while attending the Intelligence Program assisted their agency’s intelligence capacity.
Table 11 illusRates that 92 percent of the large agencies, 76 percent of the medium
agencies, and 78 percent of the small agencies responded that the resources obtained

while attending the Intelligence Pro gram greatly helped their intelligence capacity.

Improved information Sharing with Federal Agencies

While the intent of the Intelligence Program is to provide the knowledge and tools
necessary to develop or re-engineer an intelligence capacity, it is also designed to aid the
improvement of information sharing as a whole. The participants were asked if their
agency was involved or not involved with sharing information with agencies at the
federal level before the Raining, and after the training. As Table 12 illustrates, there were
a total of 23 participants who responded that their agency was not sharing information
with agencies at the federal level before attending the Intelligence Program Raining. A
total of 21 participants indicated that their agency was not sharing information with
agencies at the federal level after attending the Intelligence Program Raining.

Given this information, there is a slight improvement of information sharing. The

difference of two participants indicating their agency is involved with sharing

59

information after attending the Intelligence Program Raining as opposed to not sharing
information with federal agencies before attending the Raining is minimal, it is still an
improvement. However it should be noted that this increase of information sharing could
be attributed to other factors not related to the Intelligence Program such as improved
equipment, new hiring of personnel, or an adminisRator’s decision.

Table 12: Relationship Between Agencies Sharing Information With Federal Agencies Before Training
and Agencies Sharinglnformation With Federal Agencies After TraininL

 

Sharing Information Not Sharing

 

 

 

 

With Federal Information With Chi
Agencies After Federal Agencies Missing Total Square
Training After TraininL (x1)
Sharing Information
With Federal Agencies 137 l 4 142
Before Train'ﬂ (98%) (5%) (29%) (81%)
Not Sharing
Information With 3 20 0 23 262.10*
Federal Agencies (2%) (95%) (0%) (13%)
Before Training
Missing 0 0 10 10
(0%) (0%) (7 1%) (6%)
Total 140 21 14 175
(100%) 4100%) (100%) (100%)

 

‘Signiﬁcant at Alpha .001 Level with 4 Degrees of Freedom

60

CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION

Law enforcement in the United States today is enduring a re-birth of a
conRoversial practice. The use of intelligence in the law enforcement arena practically
vanished after the 19703, leaving a misconception about its use and value. Sadly, events
such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the attacks on the world Rade towers on
September 11‘”, 2001 have demanded the use of intelligence to be a part of law
enforcement in the present and the future. With the emergence of organized crime and
terrorism at all time highs, law enforcement has looked to the use of intelligence in an
attempt to disrupt and intervene in such criminal activity. The essential ingredient to the
success of law enforcement intelligence is the cooperation among agencies at every level,
regardless of size, location, and resources. It was this idea that led Michigan State
University and the Department of Homeland Security, Ofﬁce of Grants & Training to
help “bridge the gap” between law enforcement agencies.

The Intelligence Program is designed to help assist law enforcement agencies at
the state, local, and Ribal levels to either develop an intelligence capacity if they do not
currently have one or re-engineer an existing intelligence capacity to ensure the
effectiveness of that capacity. This research study was designed to assess the
effectiveness of the Intelligence Program and to determine the impact agency size has on
the adequacy of that agency’s intelligence capacity on the most basic level. In this
section the discussion will focus on the ﬁndings of the study, explanations of uncertainty,
the implications of the ﬁndings, ideas for future improvement of the study, and the

advantages that the Intelligence Program provides.

61

As mentioned before, this study provides an assessment of the Intelligence
Program at the most basic level of scientiﬁc analysis. The data gathered by the online
survey yielded a sRaightforward set of data that could only be used in bivariate analysis.
The research can be separated into two different aspects; the effectiveness of the
Intelligence Program and the impact of agency size on the adequacy of the agency’s
intelligence capacity. The aspect that determines the effectiveness of the Intelligence

Program will be addressed ﬁrst.

Summary of the Results

Initially, the data indicate that there is a statistically signiﬁcant level of positive
effect that the Intelligence Program has on state, local, and tribal law enforcement
agencies’ ability to either develop or re-engineer an intelligence capacity. These ﬁndings
are illusRated by the information provided in the analysis section of this paper. The
ﬁndings of this portion of the study also indicate that the agencies that beneﬁted the most
ﬁom the Raining were the large agencies. Table 10 illusRates that a larger percentage of
the participants ﬁ'om large agencies (73 percent sRongly agree or agree) felt that the
Intelligence Program helped them to either develop or re-engineer an intelligence
capacity as opposed to the percentage of smaller agencies (63 percent sRongly agree or
agree). As Table 11 illusRates, a larger percentage of large agencies (81 percent sRongly
agree or agree) responded that they felt the resources obtained while attending the
Intelligence Program assisted them in the development or the re-engineering of their
agency’s intelligence capacity as compared to a smaller percentage of small agencies (78

percent sRongly agree or agree) that felt the same way.

62

Intuitively it would seem that larger agencies would already have knowledge of,
and access to, the types of information and resources the Intelligence Program provides
while most small agencies would not. With this in mind, it would also seem that since
the Intelligence Pro gram was providing the type of information and resources necessary
to enhance an agency’s intelligence capacity, that the small agencies would beneﬁt more
Rom the program. Although the majority of respondents Rom small agencies reported
that the Raining was beneﬁcial, it was a bit lower than for medium agencies. In
considering these results, however, it is important to keep in mind that different factors
besides information and resources are necessary to implement change within an agency.
These factors are the same ones involved with the issues of organizational change. It
may be that the small agencies which attended the Intelligence Program were unable to
have the same levels of success as the larger agencies due to resource restrictions within
their agencies. The types of restrictions that would hinder small agencies attempts at the
development or re-engineering of their intelligence capacities are ﬁnancial and personnel
related. Law enforcement agencies are being asked to either add an additional unit to
their agencies or “remodel” an existing unit without, in most cases, additional funding or
personnel. These types of situations put law enforcement decision makers in difﬁcult
positions where they must decide where resources will be allocated to.

Unfortunately, intelligence capacities are a difficult aspect to implement given
that they require a minimal ﬁnancial and personnel investment. When faced with the
obstacle of taking on such a task, often time’s law enforcement adminisRators are
reluctant to change, especially when faced with the re-allocation of already scarce

resources. As is the case with many small-town police agencies, the person in charge of

63

making decisions has run the agency “his/her way” for years and feels the operational
methods currently in place are working well enough and there is no need for change. The
Intelligence Program attempts to address issues such as these with the different sections
of the Raining program. The sections which speciﬁcally address these issues are the
“external funding” and “special issues” sections.

Within the “external funding” section, the Raining focuses on ways in which law
enforcement agencies can submit a proposal for external funding such as federal grants.
External funding allows for agencies to supplement the development of, or the
improvement of, an intelligence capacity. It is important to note that intelligence
capacities should not be reliant on external funding due to the uncertainty of funds being
awarded. Any external funds should be used on items such as equipment and part time
personnel. The “special issues” section addresses aspects of intelligence capacities such
as records systems and legal ramiﬁcations as related to law enforcement intelligence.
Law enforcement adminisRators must keep this information in mind when deciding when
and how to implement the use of a federally compliant intelligence capacity. In order to
comply with NCISP policies and 28 CFR Part 23, an investment must be made in a
records system that meets such standards. While the issues raised here are not all
encompassing in regard to the reasons agencies do not develop or re-engineer an

intelligence capacity, they tend to be the most signiﬁcant.

Limitations of the Study

Within the arena of social science research, no research design is perfect and this
study is no exception. When attempting to measure the effectiveness of the Intelligence
Program, there are ways for the study to be enhanced. There are two aspects that could
improve the validity of this study. The ﬁrst aspect would include a representative sample
of state, local, and Ribal law enforcement agencies that did not attend the Intelligence
Program Raining. Given that the entire population that was surveyed for this study was
comprised of agencies who had attended the Intelligence Program, it is impossible to
assess the improvements a law enforcement agency that did not attend the Intelligence
Program would make in their efforts to develop or re-engineer an intelligence capacity.

Therefore, this lack of a conRol or comparison group inhibits the study’s ability to
compare the improvements made by agencies who attended the Intelligence Program to
the improvements made by agencies that did not attend the Intelligence Program. For
example, it may be that small agencies beneﬁted the most from the Raining when
compared to small agencies that did not attend the training. Despite these limitations, this
study goes beyond most training program evaluations. Often times participants are asked
to provide feedback immediately after the Raining program convenes. However, given
the design of the study, the participants were asked to provide feedback months following
the Raining session. This time period allowed for the agencies who attended the Raining
to have some time to implement some of the initiatives and tools that were gained as a
result of the Intelligence Program.

The second aspect in which the study could be enhanced is by gathering a sample

of public opinions as they relate to the initiative of the Intelligence Program. As

65

mentioned within the review of literature, the use of intelligence and information sharing
by law enforcement agencies is a conRoversial issue. For example, the people in a
community such as Ann Arbor, Michigan would be more apprehensive to having their
law enforcement agency attending an intelligence Raining program as compared to a city
such as Columbia, South Carolina. The difference between the two cities are the political
views of the community. Ann Arbor has very liberal political views and would more
than likely have members of the community who would be opposed to having law
enforcement intelligence Raining in their community (Carter, 2006, Discussion). On the
other end of the specRurn, Colurnbia’s community consists of largely conservative
political views among the community and would more than likely be welcoming to law

enforcement intelligence Raining in their community.

Implications ﬁom the Study

The results of this study and the Intelligence Program in general, will have a
rippling effect on policy and procedures of law enforcement agencies across the counRy.
In order for law enforcement agencies to effectively and efﬁciently share information
with other agencies, they must have policies and procedures in place to guide the
practices of law enforcement intelligence. Agencies must make sure that their
intelligence capacities are 28 CF R Part 23 compliant. As mentioned previously, the
failure to do so can have signiﬁcantly negative impacts that would cripple most
intelligence capacities. Agencies must also take into consideration the recommendations
outlined within the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. These recommendations

help to ensure the proper use of intelligence functions, ﬁ'om the developmental stage to a

66

fully functioning capacity. Once again, the ﬁnancial aspect possibly plays the largest role
in the intelligence function arena. With the vast majority of law enforcement agencies
already suffocated by decreasing budgets, the notion of implementing a change to the
current policing system, which involves the expenditure of resources, is not an easy issue

for police adminisRators to deal with.

The Need to Acknowledge Intelligence Analysts as Professionals

One of the main objectives of research is to provide current information that will
facilitate future study. An aspect of law enforcement intelligence that will need to be
addressed in the future is the certiﬁcation of intelligence analysts as a professional career.
The Intelligence Program is designed to support the basic intelligence capacity at the
state, local, and tribal levels, however, the next step a law enforcement agency must do is
to develop law enforcement intelligence analysts. There are two reasons for intelligence
analysts to be recognized as professionals. The ﬁrst is that there is a sRong demand for
intelligence analysts within the law enforcement community. Trained and qualiﬁed
analysts do not come directly out of college, on-the-job work experience is necessary in
order for intelligence analysts to fully be able to comprehend the expectations that are
placed on them.

The second reason is that there must be standards by which intelligence analysts
are held is ensure quality intelligence products and similar practices.7 The similar
practices refer to a standardized means of being an intelligence analyst where methods
are consistent across the range of agencies and jurisdictional levels. These types of

consistencies will allow for analysts to coordinate with one another more effectively.

67

Creating a recognized law enforcement intelligence analyst profession would also create
a more atRactive way to recruit new analysts to ﬁll the positions in demand. One aspect
of the intelligence arena that may help law enforcement adminisRators implement an
intelligence capacity is the Ransfonnation of intelligence analysts Rom a “regular job” to
a profession.

During the “Big Bend Intelligence Conference” held in Tallahassee, Florida on
April 12, 2006, Ritchie Martinez spoke about the issue of Ransforming law enforcement
intelligence analysts’ jobs into a recognized profession. Martinez, the prior International
President of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts,
illusRated eight key characteristics that would distinguish an intelligence analyst as a
professional. The eight characteristics were (Martinez, 2006):
Unique knowledge or expertise
Systematic study of a good practice
Vocational Raining
Vocational qualiﬁcations

Certiﬁcation authority

Code of ethics and conduct
Decision-making autonomy
Recognized status and prestige

@NRVPP‘N?‘

These eight characteristics provide a basis of standards by which most professions are
held. Within the arena of law enforcement intelligence these characteristics would create
the effective and efﬁcient profession of a standardized career in law enforcement. The
key characteristics are that intelligence analysts require a unique expertise within their
job description and by receiving vocational Raining (or work experience) that would
allow them to be able to interpret analyzed information and draw a potential conclusion

from that information. The importance of being able to recognize intelligence analysts as

 

7 The NCISP has recognized needs for standards for education and Raining of intelligence analysts.

68

professionals is to further the efﬁciency and effectiveness of the intelligence cycle. A set
of uniﬁed standards by which intelligence is analyzed will help law enforcement

“connect the dots”.

Academic Advantages of the Intelligence Program

The Intelligence Program reaches farther than just the law enforcement
intelligence arena One of the advantages of having the Intelligence Program developed
and delivered by Michigan State University (MSU) is the opportunity for enhancing the
education of those participants who are interested in doing so. During the ﬁrst day of
Raining participants are given the opportunity to engage with resource providers Rom
various agencies, task forces, and organizations. During this time the participants are
able to learn more about the educational programs that MSU has to offer. The programs
that are most commonly discussed are the online master’s degree, the homeland security
certiﬁcate, and the intelligence certiﬁcate.

The program that receives the most attention is the online master’s degree. The
atRactiveness of the program is that it is offered completely online. The ﬂexible
accessibility to the class is designed for law enforcement personnel who often times have
schedules which prohibit them from attending classes as well as being located all over the
United States. In addition to having access to information regarding continued education,
the participants are able to learn about other Raining programs that MSU offers to the law
enforcement community. The Department of Homeland Security has given MSU grants
to develop and deliver programs related to Weapons of Mass DesRuction, Critical
Incident Protocol, and Campus Emergency Response Teams. Additionally, a joint

DHS/EPA Center for Advancing Microbial Risk Assessment is being housed at MSU for

69

the next ﬁve years. During the resources provider session, information on all of the
programs MSU has to offer is available to the participants.

In closing, the Intelligence Program appears to have had an overall positive effect
on the law enforcement intelligence community. The analyses of the data used in this
study have all yielded statistically signiﬁcant results. The Intelligence Program has not
only met the expectations set forth by the Department of Homeland Security, demanded
by law enforcement adminisRators, and required by Michigan State University, but
greatly exceeded those expectations. The advantages of the Intelligence Program are not
only gained by those participants who attend the Raining, but the entire nation. The
knowledge and resources obtained through the attendance of the Intelligence Program are
just one step toward a uniﬁed goal of creating the most effective law enforcement

community possible.

70

APPENDD( A

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
28 CFR Part 23. The code of Federal Regulation that outlines the operating policies,
based on executive order 12291 , for criminal intelligence systems (Counterterrorism,
2004).
Adequacy. A law enforcement agency’s positive attributes of an intelligence capacity that
allow the intelligence capacity to be the most effective.
Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (A T120. Operated by the Regional Information
Sharing Systems, ATIX is a secure means to disseminate a national security or terrorist
threat information to law enforcement and other ﬁrst responders via the ATIX elecRonic
bulletin board, secure website, and secure e-mail (Counterterrorism, 2004).
Counterintelligence. A National Security intelligence activity that involves blocking or
developing a sRategic response to other groups, governments, or individuals through the
identiﬁcation, neutralization, and manipulation of their intelligence services
(Counterterrorism, 2004).
Criminal History Record Information. Information collected by criminal justice agencies
on individuals consisting of identiﬁable descriptions and notations of arrests, detentions,
indicRnents, information, or other formal criminal charges, and any disposition arising
there ﬁ'om, sentencing, correctional supervision, and/or release. The term does not
include identiﬁcation information such as ﬁngerprint records to the extent that such
information does not indicate involvement of the individual in the criminal justice system

(Counterterrorism, 2004).

71

Criminal Predicate. Information about an individual of their behavior that may only be
collected and stored in law enforcement intelligence records system when there is
reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity and
the information is relevant to that criminalrconduct or activity (Counterterrorism, 2004).
Dissemination (of Intelligence). The process of effectively disRibuting analyzed
intelligence in the most appropriate format to those in need of the information to facilitate
their accomplishment of organized goals (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Field Intelligence Group (FIG). The cenRalized intelligence component in an FBI Field
Ofﬁce that is responsible for the management, execution, and coordination of intelligence
functions within the Field Ofﬁce region (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Fusion Center. An organizational entity that integrates and analyzes intelligence
produced by different organization and submitted to the center in order to produce a
comprehensive intelligence picture of the crime issue (Counterterrorism, 2004).
Information. Pieces of raw, unanalyzed data that identiﬁes persons, evidence, events, or
illusRates processes that indicate the incidence of a criminal event or witnesses or
evidence of a criminal event (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Information System. An organized means, whether manual or elecRonic, or collecting,
processing, storing, and retrieving information on individual entities for purposes of
record and reference (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Information Sharing System. An integrated and secure methodology, whether
computerized or manual, designed to efﬁciently and effectively distribute critical
information about offenders, crimes, and/or events in order to enhance prevention and

apprehension activities by law enforcement (Counterterrorism, 2004).

72

Intelligence (Criminal). The product of the analysis of raw information related to crimes
or crime patterns to ascertain offenders and Rends (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Intelligence Community. Those agencies of the United States Government, including the
military, which have the responsibility of preventing breeches to US. national security
and responding to national security threats (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Intelligence Function. The activity within a law enforcement agency responsible for some
aspect of law enforcement intelligence, whether collection, analysis, and/or dissemination
(Counterterrorism, 2004).

Intelligence-Led Policing. The dynamic use of intelligence to guide operational law
enforcement activities to targets, commodities, or threats for both tactical responses and
sRategic decision-making for resource allocation and/or sRategic responses
(Counterterrorism, 2004).

Intelligence Records (Files). Stored information on the activities and associations of
individuals, organizations, businesses, and groups who are suspected of being or having
been involved in the actual or attempted planning, organizing, ﬁnancing, or commission
of criminal acts; or are suspected of being or having been involved in criminal activities
wit known or suspected rime ﬁgures. (Peterson, Morehouse, and Wright, 2001)
Intelligence Records Guidelines. Derived from the federal regulation 28 CFR. Part 23,
these are guidelines/standards for the development of records management policies and
procedures used by law enforcement agencies that have federally funded multi-

jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems (Counterterrorism, 2004).

73

Intelligence Products. Reports or documents that contain assessments, forecasts,
associations, links, and other outputs from the analytic process that may be disseminated
for use by law enforcement agencies for prevention of crimes, target hardening,
apprehension of offenders, and prosecution (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Joint Regional Information Exchange Systems (JRIES). A subscriber-supported analytical
and resource system for tribal, local, state, and federal law enforcement with an interface
to the Department of Defense which provides secure sensitive but unclassiﬁed real-time
information with databases, e-mail, media studies, threat reporting, analytic tools, and
mapping and imagery tools (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Law Enforcement Intelligence. The end product (output) of an analytical process which
collects and assesses information about crimes and/or criminal enterprises wit the
purpose of making judgments and inferences about community conditions, potential
problems, and criminal activity with the intent to pursue criminal prosecution of project
crime Rends (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Modiﬁ. Any change(s) made to existing policies, procedures, records systems, staff

assignments or any other aspect of an intelligence capacity.

74

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. A formal intelligence sharing initiative,
supported b the US. Department of Justice, Ofﬁce of Justice Programs, that securely
links state, local, tribal and federal law enforcement agencies, facilitating that exchange
of critical intelligence information. The plan contains model policies and standards and
is a blueprint for law enforcement adminisRators to follow when enhancing or building
an intelligence function. It describes a nationwide communications capability that will
link all levels of law enforcement personnel, including ofﬁcers on the sReet, intelligence
analysts, unit commanders and police executives (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Open Source Information (or Intelligence). Individual data, records, reports, and
assessments which may shed light on an investigatory target or event which does not
require any legal process of any type of clandestine collection techniques for a law
enforcement agency to obtain, rather it is obtained through means that meet copyright and
commercial requirements of vendors as well as being Ree of legal restrictions to access
by anyone who seeks that information (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Operational Intelligence. Information is evaluated and systematically organized on an
active or potential target. This process is developmental in nature wherein there are
sufﬁcient articulated reasons to suspect criminal activity. Intelligence activities explore
the basis of those reasons and newly developed information in order to develop a case for
arrest (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Policy. The principles and values that guide the performance of a duty. A policy is not a
statement of what must be done in a particular situation. Rather, it is a statement of
guiding principles that should be followed in activities that are directed toward the

attainment of goals (Counterterrorism, 2004).

75

Privacy (Information). The assurance that legal and Constitutional restrictions on the
collection, maintenance, use and disclosure of personally identiﬁable information will be
adhered to by criminal justice agencies with use of such information to be strictly limited
to circumstances where lawful legal process permits use of the personally identiﬁable
information (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Privacy (Personal). The assurance that legal and Constitutional restrictions on the
collection, maintenance, use and disclosure of behaviors of an individual, including their
communications, associations, and Ransactions, will be adhered to by criminal justice
agencies with use of such information to be sRictly limited to circumstances where lawful
legal process authorizes surveillance and investigation (Counterterrorism, 2004).
Privacy Act. Legislation that allows an individual to review almost all Federal ﬁles (and
state ﬁles under the auspices of the respective state privacy acts) pertaining to
him/herself; places restrictions on the disclosure of personally identiﬁable information;
speciﬁes that there be no secret records systems on individuals and compels the
government to reveal information sources (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Purging (Records). The removal and/or desRuction of records because they are deemed
to be no further value or further access to the records would serve no legitimate
government interest (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Recommendations. Suggestions for actions to be taken based on the ﬁndings of an
analysis (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Records System. A group of records ﬁ'om which information is reRieved by reference to a
name or other personal identiﬁer such as a social security number (Counterterrorism,

2004).

76

Regional Information Sharing System (RISS). RISS projects consist of six regionally
grouped states Rom which state, local and Ribal law enforcement agencies can become
members to share intelligence information and have a clearinghouse for information and
resources for targeted crimes. A member-based intelligence sharing network and
clearinghouse for information and resources for targeted crimes. Tribal, local and state
law enforcement agencies can become members of one of six regional centers
(Counterterrorism, 2004).

Regional Intelligence Center. Multi-jurisdictional centers cooperatively developed within
a logical geographic area that coordinates federal, state, local and Ribal law enforcement
information, with other information sources to Rack and assess criminal and terrorist
threats that are operating in or interacting with the region (Counterterrorism, 2004).
Requirements (Intelligence). The types of intelligence operational law enforcement
elements need Rom the intelligence function within an agency or other intelligence-
producing organizations in order for law enforcement ofﬁcers to maximize protection and
preventive efforts as well as identify and arrest persons who are criminally liable
(Counterterrorism, 2004).

Responsibility. Reﬂects how the authority of a unit or individual is used and determining
if goals have been accomplished and the mission fulﬁlled in a manner that is consistent

with the deﬁned limits of authority (Counterterrorism, 2004).

77

Sensitive But Unclassiﬁed (SBU) Information. Information that has not been classiﬁed by
a federal law enforcement agency that pertain to signiﬁcant law enforcement cases under
investigation and criminal intelligence reports that require dissemination criteria to only
those persons necessary to further the investigation or to prevent a crime or terrorist act
(Counterterrorism, 2004).

Strategic Intelligence. An assessment of targeted crime patterns, crime Rends, criminal
organizations, and/or unlawful commodity Ransactions for purposes of planning,
decision-making and resource allocations; and the focused examination of unique,
pervasive, and/or complex crime problems (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Surveillance. The observation of activities, behaviors, and associations of a target
(individual or group) with the intent to gather incriminating information or “lead”
information which is used for the furtherance of a criminal investigation
(Counterterrorism, 2004).

Tactical Intelligence. Evaluated information on which immediate enforcement actions
can be based; intelligence activity focused speciﬁcally on developing an active case.
Third Agency Rule. An agreement wherein a source agency releases information under
the condition that the receiving agency does not release the information to any other
agency (Counterterrorism, 2004).

Threat Assessment. An assessment of the criminal or terrorist presence within a
jurisdiction integrated with an assessment of potential targets of that presence and a
statement of probability that the criminal or terrorist will commit an unlawful act. The
assessment focuses on the group’s opportunity, capability, and willingness to fulﬁll the

threat (Counterterrorism, 2004).

78

APPENDIX B
Intelligence Toolbox Training Survey
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.
This survey is completely voluntary [on behalf of the participant.

1. Did your agency have an intelligence capacity prior to your attendance of the
Intelligence Toolbox Raining?
[I Yes
[1 N0
[] Don’t know
I"If you answered yes, then go on to questions 2 -— 7
*If you answered no, then go on to question 8
2. Was the intelligence capacity in place before September 11‘“?
[I YES
1] N0
[] Don’t know
3. Do you have intelligence analysts on your staff?
[I Yes
1] N0
[] Don’t know
4. Do you have a dedicated intelligence records unit?
I] Yes
1] N0
[] Don’t know
5. Has any aspect of the intelligence capacity been modiﬁed or changed as
a result of attending the Intelligence Toolbox Raining?
[] YES
[I No
[] Don’t know
6. Do you have separate policies and procedures for an intelligence
capacity
[I Yes
1] N0
[] Don’t Imow
7. Is your intelligence capacity consistent with:
28 CFR Part 23
[I Yes
[I No
[] Don’t know
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP)
[I Yes
[] N0

79

[] Don’t know

8. Have you developed, or are you in the process of developing, an intelligence
capacity since attending the Intelligence Toolbox Raining?

[I Yes

[I No

[] Don’t know

9. Is your agency a member of the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS)?
[I Yes
[I No
[] Don’t know

10. Is anyone in your agency connected to the following information sharing systems:
Regional Information Sharing System Network (RISS.net)
[I Yes
[I No
[] Don’t know

Law Enforcement Online (LEO)
[I Yes
[1 N0
[] Don’t know

Automated Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX)
I] Yes
1] N0
[] Don’t know

Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES)
[] Yes
I] No
[] Don’t know

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)
[I Yes
[I No
[] Don’t know

11. Was your attendance at the Intelligence Toolbox Raining:
Your personal decision
[] Yes
[] No

Your agency’s decision
[] Yes

80

[] No

12. Did you have any intelligence Raining prior to attending the Intelligence Toolbox
Raining?
[] Yes
[] No

*If you answered yes, please indicate which Raining(s) you attended.
State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program (SLATT)
[] Yes
[] No

International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts
[] Yes
[] No

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
[] Yes
[] No
Drug Enforcement AdminisRation Federal Law Enforcement Analyst
Training
[] Yes
[] No
Other
[lYes

Please specify:

 

UN0
13. Did you have any intelligence Raining after attending the Intelligence Toolbox
Raining?
[lYes
UNO
*If you answered yes, please indicate which Raining(s) you attended.
State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program (SLATT)
[1 Yes
UNO
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts
UYm
HNO
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
NY68
UNO
Drug Enforcement AdminisRation Federal Law Enforcement Analyst
Training
[W68
”No
Other

81

[] Yes
Please specify:

 

[l N0
14. The size of your agency is:
[] Less than 25 sworn ofﬁcers
[] 26-100 sworn ofﬁcers
[] 101 or more sworn ofﬁcers
15. Your agency is responsible for an area that is:
[] Urban - 2,500 or more persons
[] Rural — Less then 2,500 persons
[] Suburban - ?
16. Has your agency ever been sued for issues speciﬁcally related to intelligence
records?
1] YES
[1 N0
[] Don’t know

17. Are any members of your agency assigned to:
Joint Terrorism Task Force (J TTF)
[I Yes
I] N0
[] Don’t know

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDEFT)
[I Yes
[] N0
[] Don’t know

State Fusion / Intelligence Center
[I Yes
[I No
[] Don’t know

Regional Fusion / Intelligence Center
I] Yes
[I N0
[] Don’t know

18. Have you worked with the community in any form as related to your intelligence
responsibility?
I] Yes
[I No
[] Don’t know

19. Have you worked with the private companies within your geographical area as
related to your intelligence responsibility?

82

[I Yes
[] No
[] Don’t know

20. Has your agency allocated funds speciﬁcally for an intelligence capacity?
[I Yes
[1 N0
[] Don’t know

21. Would you have attended the Intelligence Toolbox program if the course had a
cost associated with it? *Please note, the course will remain free of charge
regardless of the responses gathered

[] Yes
I] No

22. Was your agency involved with receiving/providing information with federal

agencies prior to attending the Intelligence Toolbox?
I] Yes
I] No

23. Was your agency involved with receiving/providing information with federal

agencies after attending the Intelligence Toolbox?
[] Yes
1] No

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

24. An intelligence capacity is important for your law enforcement agency?
I] Strongly Disagree [1 Disagree []Agree 1] Strongly Agree

25. Your law enforcement agency is aware of threats posed in your region by
terrorists and exRemists?
[] SRongly Disagree [] Disagree []Agree [] SRongly Agree

26. Your law enforcement agency is aware of threats posed in your region by
organized crime?
[] SRongly Disagree [] Disagree []Agree [] SRongly Agree

27. Your agency is well protected Rom civil rights law suits with respect to
intelligence in your records systems?
[] Strongly Disagree [1 Disagree []Agree 1] Strongly Agree

28. The Intelligence Toolbox program helped your agency develop/re-engineer an
intelligence capacity.
[] SRongly Disagree [] Disagree []Agree [] SRongly Agree

29. The resources you received from the Intelligence Toolbox program have assisted
greatly since attending the Raining.
[] SRongly Disagree [] Disagree []Agree [] SRongly Agree

83

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