

EQUALITY, RELATIONS, AND AFFECT IN PEDAGOGY:
INSIGHTS FROM RANCIÈRE, LATOUR, AND NON-REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES

By

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ABSTRACT

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This conceptual project theorizes a new approach to pedagogy: pedagogy after the assumption of equality. Included in my reasoning for experimenting with such a theorization is the belief that pedagogy is necessarily relational. Therefore, our assumptions about pedagogy are always imbued with ethical ramifications. This project suggests the ethical value of assuming equality as a starting point in pedagogy in that it acknowledges the relationality at stake in pedagogy; extends who and/or what participates in pedagogical relations; and illustrates how pedagogy includes non-representational relations. Non-emancipatory, non-modern, and non-representational styles of relations in pedagogy make non-pedagogy or non-pedagogical approaches to education possible. Non-pedagogy is theorized in ways commensurate with non-representational theory. It is not to say that representations do not exist, but that there is more going on than is conventionally considered and that “more than” or going beyond conventional pedagogical assumptions needs attending to. Moreover, non-pedagogy, as, theorized here, has never been in need of emancipation. Non-pedagogy has never been modern. Non-pedagogy has never been – and may never be - representable.

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For all of the nieces and nephews who came into my life while I was working on this project.
May you be whatever your heart desires...

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For Brett:

*Can you feel my heartbeat
When I'm close to you?*

*I'll never find another way to say
I love you more each day
It's quite romantic, I know
That's how I wanna feel today
- Tahiti80, Puzzle*

Thank you, and *ti amo anch'io*.

To my family: I count myself lucky every day to have you each in my life. The endless hours of laughter and endless years of support have helped me to make my dreams come true.
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CHAPTER 1

CRITICAL, POST, NON: EXPERIMENTS IN THEORIZING PEDAGOGICAL EQUALITY

Try again. Fail again. Fail better.
- Samuel Beckett¹

My story, then, is not an exercise in representation or a critique of
representation; rather it is a cabinet of curiosities designed to
incite curiosity.
- Kathleen Stewart²

Overview

This project is an attempt to inhabit a tiny little space of pedagogy where none yet existed for me. This crevice can be found in three different equality moves and in the relations, translations, and attention to affect that follow.

This five-chapter dissertation began with the question "What becomes of pedagogy after equality is assumed?" Each of the three theoretical approaches I've selected to integrate in this project contributed in some unique way to a notion of assumed equality in pedagogy. This, in turn, has redistributed ideas of relations. I'm interested in asking what the implications for their theorizing might be for pedagogy, specifically affective relations in pedagogy, after assuming equality.

All three theories make their own version of an "equality turn", as I have come to call it.

¹ Beckett, S. (1987). *Westward ho!* London, John Calder Publishers, 7. Cited in Dewsbury, The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Geography "Performative, Non-Representational, and Affect-Based Research: Seven Injunctions" 2010 London: SAGE Publications.

² Kathleen Stewart, "'Cultural Poesis: The Generativity of Emergent Things,'" In *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. Norman Denzin, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005), 1029.

Rancière does this by asserting equality of intelligence in the student-teacher relation. It implicates “pedagogical method” as we’ve come to know it. Latour puts all human and non-human things on the same ontological footing. NRT puts all things - everything - on the same plane of immanence and calls it material. I integrate aspects of each to examine the assumption of equality, the implications for ethical relations when equality is assumed, and the relevance of this equality turn for pedagogical theorizing.

Through the chapters of this dissertation, I use Rancière, who is already known in the education literature, to establish the notion of assuming equality in pedagogy and the ramifications of that for both pedagogical method and relations in the pedagogical context. Then, in moving to Latour, I review how he makes an equality turn, but I spend the bulk of my energies establishing how Latour then re-assembles relations. I think this is a very significant aspect of Latour’s contribution to theorizing pedagogy after equality, and in a way, one could say that it extends the “relations” part of the argument I open in the Rancière chapter. I then also have to do the work of theorizing its relevancy to pedagogical theory. I’ve called these two contributions “more-than-human” and “translation.” Finally, NRT also makes an equality turn that redistributes relations, and its theorizing of non-representational performance, particularly through the work being done on/with affect, extends pedagogical theorizing experimentally into new and insightful terrain.

Pedagogical Theorizing | Pedagogical Experiments

I love travel writing. It may be my favorite genre, particularly those travel writers who lean heavily on philosophy, anthropology, science, world religions, and poetic means for writing

about and in places. Sometimes it's the place that captures my imagination. Other times, it's the way the writer writes about the space. Sometimes, it's just something altogether different: an affect; a tone; a lingering.

I do most of my writing, however, with either Lord of the Rings or Harry Potter playing in the background. I supposed it's some company along my own epic journey of completing a dissertation and becoming a scholar. Unlike either of these series (and more like travel writing), my work nearly always engages non-fiction material. However, much like Frodo, Bilbo, and Harry, it doesn't matter much how fictional or non-fictional my sources are, the journey with and through them is real in every significant sense. Somehow, the idiosyncracies of their journeys make mine more enjoyable, understandable, and when necessary, more tolerable as well.

Much like Harry, Ron, and Hermione, trying to find and destroy the various hoarcruces Voldemort has left behind, I too must begin this scholarly journey in "the forest of signs"³. There are no maps to show you where I am headed, as I too am taking this journey in order to learn. I want to learn what becomes of pedagogy when equality is presupposed. I want to explore how Rancière, Latour, and Non-Representational Theory - each on their own terms - presuppose equality and consider what use that might have to educational theory.

The territory isn't very familiar. I am very familiar with how pedagogy has been taken up in education, and I am quite familiar at this point with why and how Rancière, Latour, and NRT take up the presupposition of equality. How though might the presupposition of equality, specifically, inform pedagogy? This is my quest.

³ This is Rancière's term. I will discuss this further in chapter two.

Ordinary Pedagogy

Walking is almost an ambulation of the mind.
- Gretel Ehrlich⁴

My husband bought me a new Nano Ipod to help ensure my sanity during the final months of writing my dissertation. On the back, he had engraved “‘Walking is also ... an ambulation of the mind.’ G. Ehrlich”. I prefer this translation – this transformation – of Ehrlich’s original quote, for I cannot imagine ever getting anything accomplished without walking. Walking ensures that my mind ambulates, breathes. If I sit too long, my mind, in very real ways, stops working well. I become stultified. I feel dumb, both dumb of tongue and mind.

For me, walking is a kind of pedagogy. In attending to it, I nourish all the relations coming to bear on my research and writing. But it was like this long before this project. Exercise and being outdoors have always reunited in me a fuller sense of myself.

Walking is ordinary. It puts me in touch with the ordinary. It takes me out of vacuous places I can create in my mind and asks me to connect-the-dots, so to speak. Walking, for me, is only special insofar that it puts me back in contact with all the ordinary things that matter – a sense of wellbeing, health, perspective, nature, friends, family, big thoughts.

I’d like to think that in some ways this project contributes to an ambulation of the mind – a walk that in its attention to the ordinary refreshes and provokes. Much like the pedagogies that occur when we brush our teeth, wash our hands, cook our meals. Pedagogy happens when we kiss our children and tuck them in at night. Pedagogy sits. It waits. It drags out time when

⁴ Gretel Ehrlich, *Islands, the Universe, Home* (New York: Penguin, 1991), 28.

we are waiting for big news or our loved one dies. Pedagogy hurts. It feels. It senses.

Sometimes (oftentimes?) pedagogy is unsayable.

Pedagogy is so ordinary. What is pedagogy? This is an awfully odd question to ask, isn't it? Do we really know? *Can* we really know? Do we really *want* to know...Now *that's* an interesting question.

Lots of people in education seem to have this all figured out, although I remain amused at how often secondary level teachers I work with wrinkle their brow and ask, "What do you mean exactly by *pedagogy*?" I, of course, stumble around with a host of answers coming from a variety of perspectives, all to say, in the end, that *that's* really what I'm asking: "What do we mean by pedagogy?", and "How do we know when we have it?"

I'm sure most find it unsatisfying to hear the possible options, and it certainly isn't changing how they think about what they do everyday as teachers. They teach. Students learn – they hope. They grade. They teach. And the cycle goes on and on. No wonder pedagogical content knowledge came about. How else to even begin to highlight that something unique is happening between teachers and students?

Here's the part though that I've never settled for myself: Is what teachers and students do everyday in classrooms unique? It can, of course, create some very unique and meaningful moments, but I see no reason why similar, everyday pedagogies aren't just as meaningful and ever present. Maybe more so...let's see.

I could analytically lay out for you all of the long litany of definitions of pedagogy over

time⁵. This is an interesting task, for itself, but for reasons different than mine here. What I want to do is read pedagogy affectively. I want to ask why pedagogy, as a term, resonates with me more than teaching and learning does and how it resonates with me differently than pedagogy and content might. I want to ask if there is something substantively different about life if we call something pedagogical, and do we need teachers to permit us to apply this terminology?

I'd like to think that everyone can do, is doing pedagogy all the time. The rocks and trees are pedagogically working on me this morning on the wind beats through the mountain valley and across our long and lean lake. I am absolutely affected by the whitecaps I see on the waves. Is that pedagogy?

Teacher education has kept pedagogy pretty well hermeneutically sealed and shut off from any world outside the teacher-student relationship. Even then, teaching and learning is frequently preferred over pedagogy as means for describing the process between them. Pedagogy is a perfectly wrapped present with a tight little bow, and if one can successfully deliver it (this pedagogy), we teachers tend to think it is akin to receiving just such a pretty little package. It is special, unique, difficult to come by, and very valuable. I want to recover a more

⁵ Some possible and common definitions that come to mind both from North American and continental perspectives include pedagogy and content, pedagogical content knowledge, teaching and learning, critical pedagogy, public pedagogy, open pedagogy, postmodern pedagogy, cultural studies approaches to pedagogy, Bildung, didactics, the Greek pedagogia, Erziehung, educationalisation, and so forth. Sources like the following can provide helpful overviews of how pedagogy has been defined over time, but generally speaking, North American approaches and continental approaches tend to be treated and reviewed separately, as may be logically indicative of the different commitments each tends to build on: Lynn Fendler, "New and Improved Educationalising: Faster, More Powerful, and Longer Lasting," *Ethics and Education* 3, no. 1 (2008): 15-26. Mark K. Smith, "What is pedagogy?," *The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education*, 2012, <http://infed.org/mobi/what-is-pedagogy/>

ordinary sense of pedagogy. A pedagogy that is already, and also, yet to come – pedagogy as something we swim in.

Kathleen Stewart writes in *Ordinary Affects*: “The ordinary is a circuit that’s always tuned in to some little something somewhere.”⁶ “But it’s ordinary affects that give things the quality of a *something* to inhabit and animate.”⁷ I wonder, is it possible to think about pedagogy in the way Stewart thinks about the ordinary, as “a circuit that’s always tuned in to some little something somewhere”? Is it possible to imagine that “it’s [pedagogical] affects that give things the quality of a *something* to inhabit and animate”? Is it possible that pedagogy can be something as common, temporary, and fleeting as affect?

All of this may sound like I am devaluing pedagogy. My aim is actually quite the opposite. In making pedagogy ordinary, do we, I wonder, see its value? In making pedagogy ordinary, do we stop discussing *what it is* and start embracing *all it can be*?

In order to share some of my own experiences with pedagogy, I will situate my perspective among others under consideration here.

My stories of pedagogy start out like so many others’: searching. “Everyone has probably had the experience, at some time or other, of feeling lost, or of not knowing in which way to turn in order to reach a desired destination.”⁸ I never really learned anything without this experience of disorientation. The process of learning this way is in part disorienting because you feel like you are the only one on this “path”; it is disorienting because it seems no

⁶ Kathleen Stewart, *Ordinary Affects* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 12.

⁷ Ibid, 15.

⁸ Tim Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (London: Routledge, 2000), 217. I am borrowing from Ingold here, but clearly, disorientation as a part of meaningful learning has been theorized by many including, Dewey, Bakhtin, Serres, Britzman.

one else has ever walked it in exactly the same way you have; it is disorienting because there is no map. The old axiom, “Where there’s a will, there’s a way” takes on deep resonance in this context.

The Water Lily

My first few years of college were in certain ways like this. Excited to open myself to big change and new opportunities, I still found it surprisingly disorienting to navigate all the variety that college exposed me to. In many ways I had looked forward to, even ached for, the new perspectives and experiences college would provide; it was just that in actually engaging the diversity and challenges available, hard work ensued. Life changing work occurred. I couldn’t, for instance, engage the details of religious diversity - a personal and academic interest of mine - without it making me reconsider, wrestle with, and at times change my own perspectives and commitments. This came at no little discomfort.

As I sorted my way through what felt like a quick-sand of never ending options and questions, I was forced to face questions I hadn’t expected, questions that would open entirely new worlds of possibility. Never have such moments or periods of learning in my life involved an expert pedagogue, or master explicator, to borrow from Rancière. If anything I felt more alone and isolated in these journeys than I thought was healthy. It made me reach out to others asking about their experiences, thoughts, ideas, questions. It made me appreciate my relationship with the *things*, the objects I was learning from and with. School couldn’t even touch the issues I was wrestling. In many ways, it didn’t want to...*it wasn’t what school was there to do*. In the end, I had to “figure it out” for myself. That education, those relations were

mine to engage or ignore.

Choosing to engage eventually led to interesting insights and periodic, small “arrivals” that, to this day, remain with me as some of my most important personal “turns”. One such moment occurred when I was sitting on a dock in a lake/pond that was clearly part of a larger wetland system. It just so happened that I had sought out a quiet place to grab some time alone and away from the hub-bub of the summer camp that I was directing. I was probably between my fourth and fifth years of college. I had chosen to attend a college where those who were religious were enjoying the contemporary fundamentalist movement to its fullest and finding all kinds of personal satisfaction in doing so. For me, fundamentalist religion never resonated well with my much more literary and historical understanding of religion based in my much more liberal experience of growing up Lutheran. This led to my academic study of religion in college, and as you might also imagine, on ongoing negotiation with the varied voices and commitments found in religious theologies and philosophies around the globe.

I share all this to make my point about the water lily I gazed at on that dock. It was stunning, beautiful - just like the imagery so often provoked of singular beauty and enlightenment miraculously coming into existence in an otherwise muddy, decomposing landscape. I wondered for a moment, however, how another worldview might come at this same scene. How else could I “see” the pond lily? I had so happened to also be pursuing a specialization in Environmental Ethics within my Religion degree. How do science, nature, indigenous religions view this pond lily?

It was then I noticed so much more than the lily itself: how it was supported and what made it possible to grow. I wondered what would happen to this system if I picked the water

lily? How would things in that system be affected? Gaia seemed a very intimate notion in that moment, but so did science, ecology, and just plain history and relative context. That flower was supported by a lily pad and connected via its underwater stem to an entire ecosystem required to sustain it and allow such flowering. The flower was surrounded by air and sunlight. It was a hot, humid Michigan summer. Birds and other insects pollinated this area profusely. No one picked or tended these pond lilies. Torrential rains might submerge them. A dry spell might wither them. The area was famous for deep, black, fertile soil - obviously a good match for these plants - and invasive species or not, biodiversity prevailed.

I thought of all the singular imagery lilies already carry in the collective imagination: the lotus flower, the Easter lily. I also saw the naturalist's view on what makes this lily remotely possible. But I think I learned something more that day, and it mattered in the context of my personal searching for how to make sense of life and my myriad of choices within it. That is, I could see just the flowers and appreciate them for their singular beauty, but I could also see those flowers as connected to a whole host of other, equally beautiful and valuable flowerings, so to speak. Indeed, the system taken together to support the opening of a single pond lily is astounding! Why is it that the lily gets celebrated and the system it is part of does not?

This way of re-seeing my physical world in this relational way extended further into my intellectual life. What else, I asked myself, do I see as a singular, floating object of beauty, assigning great symbolic capital to it without considering its relations? The list was long. Foundationalist and, what happened to also often be representationalist, approaches to knowledge were nothing uncommon in my understanding of the world, how it worked, how we make sense of it, as I suspect it is not uncommon for many modern folks. I now wonder if we've

done something to pedagogy that is similar to how I've decontextualized the pond lily from its relations.

Critical-Post-Non

Grad school, it turned out, had similar lessons to teach me. Upon entering the PhD program, I found myself wholly committed to critical pedagogy approaches to literacy. This slowly gave way and was extended by postmodern thought. But it was when I bumped into Latour for the first time, that I knew something significantly different could characterize what I wanted working on me. So, "critical" gave way to "post" gave way to "non", and each challenged me to restore more connections between relations to pedagogy. This now - in the context of this dissertation - has taken multiple musings: the non-emancipatory, non-modern, and non-representational. Non approaches allow me to theorize pedagogy in ways fundamentally different than critical and post approaches. Crucially, they assume equality as a pedagogical starting point, which secondly, allows them to unhook themselves from emancipatory pedagogies (e.g. critical pedagogy), modernism, and representational assumptions. This has provided a whole new kind of critical leverage as I seek to question taken-for-granted notions in education. In a sense, it has allowed me a broader context from which to see what is possible in and for pedagogy and the inseparability of pedagogy from relations.

I initially relied entirely on critical pedagogy approaches to promote equality in my classroom teaching; it directly addressed the inequality, which seemed entirely relevant to my teaching commitments. Freire offered me rich ways to rethink one's own role in promoting

equality; I especially appreciated the proactive strategies that the oppressor and the oppressed could embody towards those ends. When teaching at a local high school, however, I experienced some the same contradictions Ellsworth addresses in “Why Doesn’t This Feel Empowering?”⁹ My students felt like I was preaching to them, and I felt like I had a leash around their necks, and tug as hard as I might, the direction I wanted to go was not necessarily shared by my students. They weren’t necessarily looking for the emancipation critical literacy approaches could offer them. Who was I then, particularly in the guise of equality, to force such a pedagogical experience upon them? The irony cut to the heart of the issue and challenged me to rethink how I might approach pedagogy in a way that promotes equality.

I found Rancière and Non-Representational Theory much later. In fact, while Latour had more successfully opened up viable new options to me for pedagogical theorizing, it wasn’t until I read Rancière and NRT that I began to feel like there’s was any hope for finding language for what Latour made possible. In many ways, this project has been a part of my own personal journey of asking *what else is there in pedagogy*, and *what is next after critical pedagogy and postmodern thought?*

Humanities-Oriented Approaches to Research and Pedagogy

A third anecdote of a pedagogical adventure involves my decision to return to teach and administrate at an international boarding school in Switzerland after my third year of doctoral study. The economy’s bottom dropping out had finally caught up with Teacher Education at MSU, and my husband’s fifth year of doctoral funding was about to be the last. Two properties

⁹ Elizabeth Ellsworth, “Why Doesn’t this Feel Empowering? Working through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy,” *Harvard Educational Review* 59, no. 3 (1989): 297-324.

to pay for and certainly a few more years of doctoral study were ahead for us both. “Shall I”, I asked myself, “return to work in Switzerland or Mason?” I had previous teaching experience at both, but the latter afforded me many more of things I was looking for, including a context that lent itself to my dissertation topic. I knew it would be a place where I’d be immersed in issues of space and place in education; commitments to the humanities; and challenging “cross-over” contexts of discipline, teaching, group travel, homesickness, etc. In my previous experience, this boarding school had certainly blurred the lines of traditional education. Why, I asked, not immerse myself in a pedagogical context like this while I am writing about pedagogy in space/place in my dissertation?

At that early point, I still needed to apply for and pass comps, but the dissertation project was already in my mind’s eye and the data collection for it had already begun. Envisioning a critical qualitative project, I wanted to investigate how six, then, TE 408 students would experience space and place throughout their internship year and into their first year of paid teaching. The six interns I picked were already familiar with the language, as the other section leader of secondary English Education and I had both incorporated curricula into TE 407/8 that asked students to engage issues of space and place and how that might impact their responsiveness to the students they taught.

Little did I know at that time what twists and turns my scholarship would yet take. I probably still do not fully know what the combined effects of simultaneously teaching overseas, serving as a dean of college-prep students, researching preservice interns, and working on my comps have done to my thinking. This, of course, is putting all of the personal experiences aside and limiting my list to professional ones. Indeed, I sit here now in Switzerland, still unable to

know what my life would look like had I not returned, and connected to the school in very different ways, working towards completion of my degree. Life is funny. It wayfares. Paths are rhizomatic and inevitable, but how we travel them, what sense we make of them, and how talk about those paths are important in shaping both how others think about our journey and how we orient ourselves.

Since the time that I arrived in Switzerland, nearly six years have passed, and more than structural adjustments have taken place. My project's conceptual orientation shifted. While still gleaning inspiration from the interview data I gathered with my preservice interns, I decided to use it in service of a humanities-oriented project, an orientation that finally crystallized for me after enrolling in TE 982: Humanities-oriented Research Methods in Education, designed and taught by Dr. Lynn Fendler. This course helped me to see how and why my interests align with humanities methods and articulate some thoughts I had been developing about common assumptions in educational research. You see, for some time, my ability to look critically at education was only coming from social science assumptions, and to the extent that Latour had opened my mind to the theoretical possibilities of a non-modern approach, I had yet to theorize it in pedagogy or my own educational research. While critical pedagogy and postmodernism both greatly influenced me, a non-modern orientation also allowed a humanities-oriented shift in my project, again bringing additional perspectives into view and offering new kinds of critical leverage, but this time with an assumption of equality.

All three of these narrative examples demonstrate ways in which I've come to immerse myself in relations so to enrich pedagogy. They also demonstrate ways in which I needed to assume different kinds of equality in order to engage those relations. In the case of the pond

lily, I had to take the singular, iconic beauty of the flower and place it back in the context which supports it. There I found not only the richness of the context to the lily, but I also found the lily to be that much more beautiful and wonder-provoking. In the context of my own pedagogical theorizing about critical, post, and non commitments, I had to learn to see all actors (students, teachers, human, non-humans) as not just as relative but entirely related to the act(s) of pedagogy¹⁰. Finally, in the case of my move to Switzerland and taking a humanities-oriented educational methods course, I put the relations relevant to these pedagogical experiments on the same plane of immanence with my pedagogical theorizing. This equality move allowed me to treat my pedagogical theories and the actors in those theories equally, experimentally, and as embodied. This culture of equality, embodiment, and experimentality made new insights into pedagogical theorizing possible.

Instead of emancipating myself from relations (e.g. history, people, place) in pedagogical theorizing, I've found that in returning to relations in non-pedagogical¹¹ (a term I will theorize as this project unfolds) ways, I can affirm and verify assumptions of equality.

What Becomes of Pedagogy After Equality is Assumed?

I suppose I could add a fourth story here about my pedagogical experiments, and it is that of how I came upon this project. What ambulations led me to this event?

¹⁰ Latour makes a distinction between absolute relativism, which one might associate with postmodern thought, and relative relativism, which he associates with non-modern approaches. It has informed my thinking on this point.

¹¹ Non-pedagogical is a term that will unfold as I discuss what it might mean to "lead the child" or do pedagogy in ways consistent with these three theoretical approaches. I will also spend some time theorizing it in chapter 5.

This project began with an interest in issues of space and place in pedagogy. I followed six of my preservice teacher candidates out of my TE 408 course and into their internship year experience, discussing with them the impacts that the context of their internship year placement seemed to be having on their thinking about pedagogy. It wasn't, however, until two years later, upon reading through the transcripts yet again, that I noticed a very curious pattern. Never before had I so clearly seen the ubiquity of a pedagogical assumption of inequality. This assumption was not "the fault" of the interns I had recruited for my study. Having taught them and knowing the other courses and teachers they worked with, their assumption that the students they were teaching somehow begin from a place of inequality was to be expected. That's what they had been taught and, perhaps implicitly, expected to enact as a starting assumption of their work with students. It was considered the ethical way of proceeding through pedagogical choices so to achieve greater equality as an outcome of schooling, and these students were absolutely concerned about achieving equality.

I stopped reading and spent a lot of time thinking about the width and breadth of ramifications for such an assumption both in my project and in education. It is, I thought, a question laying at the very foundations of pedagogy.

Six months passed, filled with literature review searches on space and place, and I identified Non-Representational Theory (NRT) as one of the directions and conversations I wanted to entertain in response to this equality question. The question about equality had seemed too big to tackle, and its tendrils reached into coveted spaces of deep ideological contestation. It was all very intriguing and very intimidating at the same time, but NRT, and then Rancière, gave me some hope.

I suppose it won't surprise you that this is what I've ended up inquiring about in this dissertation. What started as a project on space and place in preservice teacher education became another effort of mine to theorize pedagogy, this time how/if presumed equality can exist in pedagogy. This too, it turns out, has implications for theorizing space and place in education as reconfiguring an assumption as basic as equality/inequality "redistributes the sensible", Rancière would say, of what has long been the status quo.

I began by asking how Latour, NRT, and Rancière considered equality as a starting point rather than only an outcome in pedagogy, and then began asking what implications these theoretical contributions have made and can make in pedagogy. Some questions along the way included, Is it possible to assume equality in educational contexts rather than always working towards it? If it is possible to begin educational endeavors from the assumption of equality, why might that/might that not be desirable? What harm might occur when we assume inequality or equality as the starting point for our pedagogies? Whether we assume equality or inequality as a beginning point in our pedagogies, these assumptions have ethical ramifications, which are necessarily relational. I'm particularly interested in how an assumption of equality might impact ethical relations in pedagogical theorizing.

To the extent that it is possible to assume equality from the outset, it would not only be ethically significant for those we teach, it would suggest a path rarely trodden in education even though education seems to be obsessed with issues of equality. In the end, I can see that my question, which arose out of concerns of space and place, indeed has implications for the geography of pedagogy, but this geography extends well past what might be more well-known definitions of geography to unconventional locations of pedagogy - figurative, affective, and

non-representational ones.

Orienting

Taking up humanities-oriented approaches to pedagogy and pedagogical research is one important way I have come to verify equality. The AERA standards document for humanities-oriented research acknowledges the often unseen empirical aspects of educational research: “Humanities-oriented research seeks to examine the role of education in human existence through experience and observation. In pursuit of this general purpose, humanities-oriented research is empirical.”¹² In this spirit, I take up salient moments in my own pedagogical theorizing through which to ask “What else can pedagogy become?” Of all of the pedagogical approaches are available, my goal – and challenge – was to find those that might support theorizing equality from the outset. In all honesty, this was a question I came to after realizing that Jacques Rancière, Bruno Latour, and Non-representational Theory all did something different. Simply realizing this took a good deal of legwork. Once named though¹³, it seemed it had been a project just sitting there waiting for me. I found it ironic that “equality” in “educational research” had found me again. Maybe I had been looking for it, and I didn’t even realize it.

Once named the follow-up task was simpler to identify: What ramifications do such equality moves have for pedagogy? This was a task I had been doing with pedagogical

¹² “Standards for Reporting on Humanities-Oriented Research in AERA Publications: American Educational Research Association,” *Educational Researcher* 38, no. 6 (2009): 482.

¹³ Dr. Fendler was a huge help in this regard as we brainstormed through all various types of framing devices for this project.

theorizing for years. It should, I thought, come pretty easily. Perhaps one of the most striking take aways from this process, however, has been discovering the sheer depth and breadth of which I have found assumptions of inequality in my own pedagogical theorizing. In a very literal way, I have been undoing much of my previous thinking about pedagogy through the writing and research of this project. I will discuss in the conclusion what I'm calling "writing to atrophy". I've needed to write through the release of my own inequality assumptions. This is difficult and strange work that deserves further attention in its own right after this dissertation is complete.

The reason I settled on these three aspects of pedagogical theorizing – equality, relations, and affect – is partly due to the literature I chose to work with (Rancière, Latour, and NRT) and partly due to the gravitational pull of all three of these theoretical approaches. Once in, it became clear that they had more in common than I initially expected, and it has led me to wonder if that isn't because of the assumption of equality each makes at the outset. Again, this will continue to be fodder for future projects (particularly as I seek additional theoretical approaches that assume equality), but I'd like to note here how a humanities-oriented approach to researching equality in pedagogy made this inquiry possible.

The AERA document begins with a survey of the domain, including the purposes, of Humanities-Oriented Research in Education. One such purpose follows:

Woven into the fabric of humanities-oriented research in education, as in humanities-oriented research more generally, are various forms of criticism intended to problematize unrecognized assumptions, implications, and consequences of various kinds of educational practice, policy, and research, as well as to challenge what these approaches take for granted as beyond questioning. In this way, humanities-oriented research in education is often intended to foster dissonance and discomfort with

conventional practice and, in some cases, to suggest alternatives.¹⁴

This section resonates with me on two levels. First, I found in humanities-oriented approaches a freedom that fostered “problematizing unrecognized assumptions”, particularly as pertains to research method and presentation of that method. Secondly, “humanities-oriented research in education is often intended to foster dissonance and discomfort with conventional practice”. If there is anything I feel like my project does for sure, it is this and in two distinct ways. I am fostering discomfort with the assumption of inequality in pedagogical practices practiced by the very people who seem to care the most about inequality, and I’m writing against the grain of social science research so common and ordinary in educational research that I feel like I’m doing something akin to taking away a child’s blanket because they turned an arbitrarily chosen age of 8 (or whatever) as a good time to do so. I constantly find myself re-teaching the reasons and justifications I have for writing against the grain in these ways.

In terms of content, the AERA standards’ document notes that

Humanities-oriented research in education asks questions about how and why education transpires in the way it does, the purposes and interests it may serve (intended or not), and the consequences that result. Topics typically rife with value dimensions – political, ethical, and/or aesthetic – which are often an explicit focus of investigation, critique, and recommendations for improvement.¹⁵

This aspect of humanities-oriented work coincides in equally significant ways as the performative imperative I noted above. Not only does my choice not to reproduce social science assumptions relate to this point, but to explore, for instance, non-representational theories’ contributions to cultural geography as well as education, forces me deep into

¹⁴ Ibid, 482.

¹⁵ Ibid.

contested domains of value as well. Do I, for instance, really find it worthwhile to question the value of schooling altogether? NRT, I believe, prods that question in me. In this way, humanities-oriented approaches don't only invite questioning the value of the content I am researching. They also invite questioning the value of the inquiry itself.

In terms of method,

Humanities-oriented research in education attempts to gain an understanding of the explicit and implicit messages and meanings of education, to point out the tensions and contradictions among them, and to compare and critique them on ethical or other value-oriented grounds. A prominent feature of humanities-oriented research in education is its use of interpretative methods, broadly construed, which investigate the history, meanings, beliefs, values, and discourses that human beings employ in the production of social life.¹⁶

No other feature of humanities-oriented research better addresses my inquiry in to equality.

The interpretative frame through which I've chosen to proceed values my choice to seek out assumptions of equality *as they have been defined by the theoretical approaches I seek to read them through*. Social science approaches would have me bring Rancière, Latour, and Non-representational Theory's definitions of equality into comparison and contrast relative to all of the other approaches available and describe their relative worth. Humanities-oriented approaches, on the other hand, let me identify this as a potential project but to choose a different project as well, namely to seek out how each of these has theorized equality on their own terms and ask what that might mean for theorizing pedagogy after equality. Both of these potential projects seem valuable to me, but humanities-oriented research helps to recognize them as different projects with different interpretative value.

A final reason I have found humanities-oriented approaches invaluable in this project

¹⁶ Ibid.

relates to my performative role in researching equality. In researching theoretical approaches that assume equality, it was helpful to have a research approach that allowed me to be experimental in ways I could not be with social science research requirements. Humanities-oriented approaches to research also allow me to not reproduce various aspects of social science commitments¹⁷ that can be associated with assumptions of inequality. I'm just beginning to be able to articulate to a fuller extent what humanities-oriented approaches to research support, and it certainly includes the performative imperative of assuming equality. Social science approaches to "writing up the research" always had me stuck in an apologetic mode while humanities-oriented approaches support performing anew and beyond what seemed taken for granted.

Other than Rancière, the two scholars writing within educational theory that I've drawn the most inspiration from in this project include Dr. Lynn Fendler and Dr. Gert Biesta. Writing with humanities-oriented research approaches as well continental perspectives on educational issues, has come with no less that a lot of support from both of these educational scholars. Living "on the continent" while writing this has absolutely aided in my immersion, but I have Dr. Fendler and Dr. Biesta to thank for continually offering me ways of thinking and being in my Rancièrian "forest of signs" that opened up my thinking, always challenging me to be more generous with myself that I might otherwise be.

Taking Up Equality | Relations | Affect

My three theoretical approaches all speak across and to the themes of equality,

¹⁷ Latour's work comes to mind here, but all three of my theoretical approaches critique social science assumptions.

relations, and affect. Equality is assumed differently in each theoretical approach, which then redistributes relations in pedagogical theorizing. I use these equality turns and their coinciding redistributed relations to theorize pedagogy after equality. Rancière helps me to extend the discussion of what becomes possible in pedagogy when equality of intelligence is assumed. I use Latour's theorization of non-modern relations to further extend what might be possible for pedagogy after equality, and finally, NRT's theorization of affect provides us with insights for non-representational approaches for affective relations in pedagogy. While these three theorists all contribute across the themes of equality, relations, and affect, I highlight one theoretical approach in each thematic section/chapter for the purposes of, first, highlighting a significant aspect of each theory's contribution to this project and, secondly, going in depth about the theme of equality, relations, and affect.

Foreshadowing the content of chapters 2, 3, and 4

While the assumption of inequality is ubiquitous in pedagogical theory, everyone seems interested in pointing out inequality for the purpose of bringing equality into existence. I, too, am on the side of equality. In my own experiments with pedagogical theorizing, though, I have had to circulate through a number of philosophical orientations in order to find theoretical approaches that might support such assumptions. Indeed, assuming equality does not seem to be on equal offer! I've decided to narrow my inquiry to three theoretical approaches that assume equality (only one of which explicitly addresses pedagogy) and to bring those approaches into conversation with three parallel examples of assumed inequality from educational literature. At stake is the ethics of relations.

Chapter Two: Non-Emancipatory Equality and Insights from Jacques Rancière

Freirian critical pedagogies take an emancipatory approach to relations in pedagogy that assumes inequality. This, according to Rancière, stultifies. I claim that Rancière's approach can be considered non-emancipatory in that it acknowledges that all persons are equally intelligent. Freirian critical pedagogies require the psychological defining of "the child" as well as dependence upon "those who know" to be emancipated. The oppressed - in this case, students - must rely on the oppressor - their teachers - to emancipate them. Emancipation is framed as something to be achieved through pedagogy, and the "method" used to emancipate "the child" infers that students are not intelligent enough or intelligent in the ways required to realize their own equality.

In contrast, Rancière's equality of intelligence or equality of capacity can be assumed. In this way, children are capable of learning without an explicator in much the same way that children learn to talk without a master or method. Taught by no one, but simply by making their way through the "forest of signs", comparing and contrasting - keeping and discarding - various relations in the world, human animals assert themselves in ways no one else can do for them. In this way, a person is political and non-representable rather than psychologically-determined¹⁸. To assume equality negates the need for emancipation. Non-emancipatory approaches to pedagogy call attention to the need to acknowledge one's equality simply by verifying it through assertion. Rancière calls this affirmation of equality "dissensus".

¹⁸ One obvious way pedagogy has been informed by psychology can be found in its anthropomorphism.

Chapter Three: Non-Modern Translations and Insights from Bruno Latour

Drawing from examples of how relations have been theorized in pedagogy, I explore the ways in which inequality is reproduced through the reliance on human and human systems as intermediators. The Modern Constitution, characterized in dichotomizing and decontextualizing, maintains these intermediators by drawing upon correspondence as a pedagogical model.

Latour's Non-Modern Constitution, on the other hand, holds to Latour's principle of irreducibility and translation to characterize the vast variety of ways human and non-human things come into relation and how that relation always betrays correspondence. In placing all human and non-human things on the same ontological footing, Latour re-assembles the social after the Nature/Culture divide, rendering correspondence impossible.

Chapter Four: Non-Representational Affect and Insights from Non-representational Theory

A third example of assumed inequality in pedagogy can be found in representational assumptions about dispositions. I look at the ways representational assumptions about dispositions can fix and disembody. One site wherein Non-representational Theory challenges representational assumptions is through its theorizing of affect. I turn to non-representational theories, which assume equality by putting all things on the same plane of immanence and calling it material, through four creative thought experiments. These use vocal performance as a metaphor to explore affective attunements as non-representational embodiment and a way to experiment with experience in pedagogy.

Conclusion

[T]eaching is not a matter of following recipes but ultimately requires teachers who are able to make wise situated judgments about what is educationally desirable.
- Gert Biesta¹⁹

A shortage of pedagogical prescriptions is certainly not the problem in pedagogical theorizing. We have more answers for what to do in education than have proven useful. One direction I am sure to head is in one that takes pedagogy on a retreat.

While retreating typically invokes the kind of remove one might expect when leaving civilization behind to return to the woods, the wilderness, the “essence of natural man”, this is exactly what William Cronon takes issue with when he asks that the people-ing of wilderness - acknowledging human history as a part of natural history - be included in our consideration of wilderness places²⁰. This “rewilding”²¹ is an attempt to recognize human history as part and parcel of nature’s history. Nature is, after all, a place that includes human beings, even though modernity has worked hard to hold them apart.

Pedagogy needs some rewilding too. So long associated with prescriptions to fix what ails both schooling and the students within its grips, much pedagogical theory has served to alienate. I wonder if the presupposition of equality might be one such intervention educationists can perform to avoid the ceaseless return to deficit thinking in educational contexts. Biesta puts it this way: “we do not need a pedagogy of cause and effect, a pedagogy

¹⁹ Gert Biesta, *The Beautiful Risk of Education* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2014), 140.

²⁰ William, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature*, ed. by William Cronon (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995): 69-90.

²¹ Cronon borrows and builds on this term from James W. Feldman, *A Storied Wilderness: Rewilding the Apostle Islands* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011).

that just aims to generate pre-specified “learning outcomes.” We rather need a pedagogy of the *event*”²².

For Biesta, the instrumentalization of education (often times captured in the word “effectiveness”) denotes a losing track of the values and purposes of education more generally. In other words, he asks what education is *good* for. In order to move away from what he terms the “learnification” of education, Biesta suggests we attend to “three different but overlapping domains ... of qualification, socialization, and subjectification”²³ to redefine the purposes of education in a way that acknowledges that “education always involves a risk”²⁴, or as he terms it, “the weakness of education”²⁵. Learnification limits education to an economic transaction²⁶, and Biesta seeks to “reclaim – or rather reinvent – a language of education that can serve as an alternative for the language of learning.”²⁷ While I do so to different ends, my goal is related. I turn to humanities-oriented approaches to pedagogy and pedagogical research²⁸ as a way of constituting pedagogy after three different and related assumptions of equality. Indeed, I plan to try and rewild a notion of pedagogy where equality is assumed and relations - affective and otherwise - can, therefore, be restored to pedagogy.

I reconfigure the order in which equality and pedagogy more typically relate: that is to

²² Biesta, *The Beautiful Risk of Education*, 140.

²³ Gert Biesta, *Good Education in an Age of Measurement: Ethics, Politics, Democracy* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2010), 14.

²⁴ Biesta, *The Beautiful Risk of Education*, 1,

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Gert Biesta, *Beyond Learning: Democratic Education for a Human Future* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006), 19. Biesta outlines the various aspects by which education becomes an economic transaction on pages 19-24.

²⁷ Biesta, *Beyond Learning: Democratic Education for a Human Future*, 24.

²⁸ I’m pointing back to the Humanities-Oriented Standards referenced previously.

say, I start by sharing the ways in which Rancière, Latour, and NRT establish equality in their contexts and the move to discuss the implications this has for relations in their work. Finally, I demonstrate how - when equality is presumed and relations change - pedagogy is restored.

The path of this pedagogy will be more like the paths of herbs and tubors than the genealogical tree so deeply “rooted” in our thinking about knowledge and education. A path more rhizomatic, like the lily I mentioned, and more wayfaring than mapped²⁹.

²⁹ Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill*, 242. I will take this distinction up further in the conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

NON-EMANCIPATORY EQUALITY: INSIGHTS FROM JACQUES RANCIÈRE

Discovering Inequality in Critical Pedagogy

Reasoned progression of knowledge is an
indefinitely reproduced mutilation.
Rancière - ³⁰

I found critical pedagogy shortly before coming to MSU's PhD program. I had been teaching English in a local high school with a colleague who later also became a colleague in MSU's CITE program. Together, we read Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Still to this day, I remember my deep relief and awe in reading a theorist who demonstrated such great humility while simultaneously offering a "way out" of omnipresent inequities. As an English teacher, Freire may have resonated with me even more deeply since it explicitly engaged issues of literacy. I even used the work as a focus text in a culminating project for a year-long course I was enrolled in: "Critical Issues in Language Teaching". Simply, Freire captured the essence of both what was important in English teaching and the teaching of English teaching methods. In critical pedagogy, I saw the promise of anti-authoritarian pedagogies that could result in greater social equity and in educational goals sought by English Language Arts departments. It was win-win, a great coup d'état of social and educational goals met through one, humble pedagogical approach. To be sure, Freire was my gateway to critical theory much as organized religion was a gateway to a meaningful spiritual life. I still harbor great appreciation for the role both play in

³⁰ Jacques Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

my life, however, at some point I had to go cold turkey on the fundamentalist approaches I found in each and surrender to the uncertainty of other possibilities.

I began experimenting with critical pedagogy in my own teaching of English and theorizing what it would mean to teach preservice teachers using such a method as I entered the PhD program. I grounded qualitative research projects in the premises of Freirian critical pedagogies (my departmental comprehensive exam), and I further investigated the issues of “critical literacy” (as the field of English Education had come to call Freirian critical pedagogies in context of English Education) in secondary English classrooms. However, as all of this was unfolding, I continued to learn about additional philosophical approaches to theorizing pedagogy. I read Foucault, Latour, and loads of media and cultural studies projects with a decidedly philosophical tone coming out of Anthropology, as many critical pedagogical theorists and English Education critical pedagogical theorists were making a move to the postmodern. This “post turn” allowed theorists to continue working on the assumptions of critical pedagogy but in broader contexts, across more texts, and with different foundational assumptions. Indeed, “all the world became a text” in this postmodern intervention into English Education.

I can’t point to one moment in time when I began to move away from critical pedagogy, but as I continued to experiment with critical pedagogy and learn about additional critical philosophical possibilities, my gaze widened and my questions deepened. I began to see examples of Latour’s circulating reference³¹ coinciding with Foucaultian genealogies. In this light, Freirian critical pedagogy began to appear somewhat absolutist and dichotomous, the divisions between oppressed and oppressor, rich and poor, haves and have nots, literate and

³¹ Bruno Latour, *Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 24-79.

illiterate oversimplified.³²

I want to discuss two ways in which I came to find inequality in critical pedagogy. First, I work with Bingham and Biesta's argument that the figure of the child in critical pedagogy is determined by developmental psychology. Freire's emancipatory pedagogy is also developmental in that it relies on developmental stages through which a student (and teacher) must progress in order to realize the students' equality. Second, I draw from Cornelissen to demonstrate how the model of facilitator coincides with critical pedagogy's reliance on developmental growth. Both analyses, Bingham & Biesta's figure of the child and Cornelissen's figure of the teacher as facilitator, point to inextricably linked assumptions in my experiments with critical pedagogy that started from an assumption of inequality.

The best language I had found for a critical pedagogue mirrored the purposes of facilitation. The "facilitator" role coincided for me with much work I had done outside of formal education, and neither included nor excluded the ability for teachers or students to have expertise. In the facilitator model, students and teachers worked together - and sometimes through and even in spite of - expertise. It had been a very powerful metaphor as I sought a way out of common authoritarian roles of a pedagogue. The idea, even at that time, that students and teachers could work as equals in the process of learning compelled me. This idea of facilitation, however, still assumed that the students needed facilitation in order to acquire

³² Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). Tsing's *Friction* remains one the most influential texts for me in terms of demonstrating conflicting roles the same actors can play in furthering or facilitating cultural (or in this case, ecological) change. The binaries of good and bad break down quickly when the unintended consequences of otherwise "good" intentions contribute to the problems described in this text.

certain knowledge. It was not until I began this project that I could see why these two issues continued to dissatisfy me in my work with critical pedagogy.

My experiments as a teacher with facilitation, including critical pedagogy, were meant to be interventions on the reproduction of inequality in education. However, they never yielded the full results I sought. My work with critical pedagogy was a logical outgrowth of my interest in facilitation, particularly as a way to extend my work as a facilitator into issues of social inequity. Rancière's work and those writing about his work (in this case, Bingham and Biesta as well as Cornelissen) have helped me to narrate my dissatisfaction with critical pedagogy as an intervention into the reproduction of inequality. Biesta and Bingham help me locate my dissatisfaction with critical pedagogy in the assumptions it makes about the figure of child. Cornelissen helps me to see how my teaching with critical pedagogy was an act of facilitation. Taken together, they help to bring Rancière's intervention into greater relief.

Critical Pedagogy's Figure of the Child

Bingham and Biesta point out that Rancière's work can easily be conflated with the goals of Freirian critical pedagogies: "Rancière's work and Freire's appear at first glance to have some things in common. Indeed, it might seem that Freire's depiction of the banking method is a true gloss on Rancière's account of the stultifying pedagogue."³³ Freire suggests the problem-posing approach as an alternative to the banking method, outlining a pedagogical process for achieving equality through the pedagogical relation. Freire's problem-posing "method yields at

³³ Charles Bingham and Gert Biesta, *Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, Emancipation* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 67.

least five oppressive pedagogical operations”³⁴, according to Biesta and Bingham. In short, Bingham and Biesta might agree that Rancière and Freire would both find the banking method problematic. Even Freire’s solution of problem-posing, however, would be seen by Rancière as reproducing an assumption of inequality.

Bingham and Biesta demonstrate how this problem-posing method facilitates the stultification of the child, highlighting Freire and Rancière’s different assumptions on this point:

In Freire’s work, the psychological oppression of the student is answered by the liberating practice of the problem-posing educator. This is exactly the point where Rancière’s figure of the child is completely at odds with Freire’s. For Rancière, the task is not to restore psychological order to the stultified child. Instead, the task is to assume that the child is already equal to another. It is to assume that the child has already been political. It is to assume that the child has already undergone the most difficult of apprenticeships.³⁵

Bingham and Biesta help us identify that this whole business of assuming equality from the outset in pedagogy might rest on one’s conception of the figure of the child and whether or not a child needs to be facilitated. Rancière’s interventions, on the other hand, conceive of the figure of the child differently from the outset.

Rather than needing to help to develop into a person that can see themselves as equals, Rancière argues in favor of equality on the basis of the fact that students already speak:

“Equality is established on an assumption about what it means for a child to learn his or her mother tongue.”³⁶ In learning a mother tongue, what he calls “‘the most difficult’ apprenticeship of all”³⁷, students teach themselves to associate arbitrary signs and meanings,

³⁴ Ibid, 64.

³⁵ Ibid, 71.

³⁶ Ibid, 53.

³⁷ Ibid, 57.

asserting themselves anew into the arbitrary process of speech. In that they do this, students/children are political (in Rancière's sense of the term, redistributing what might have come previously through their speech enactments. Using language to assert oneself in politics "is a performative enactment that creates an understanding - and an understanding of understanding"³⁸. A master is not needed to learn a mother tongue. The child, of course, interacts with multiple people, adults and other children, but none of these serves as the final facilitator in a child's ability to speak:

The psychological [figure of the] child [in Freire] does not speak because it has already been decided *for* the child how and when he or she will speak. It has already been decided by the selection of a particular method that will bring him or her to speech. In Freire's case, it is the problem-posing method. [...] Psychology explains. It explains because it is part of the explanatory order. It explains how human beings, and in this particular case, how the child, is an ordered form, a form that can and must be brought to speech in an orderly way. [paragraph] But language has an arbitrariness that will not be ordered. [...] When one inserts oneself into language from noise, there is an arbitrariness that cannot be anticipated beforehand. This arbitrariness cannot be prepared for. [...] Rancière reminds us that children already speak. They already speak politics.³⁹

From Rancière's perspective, Freire's model requires the oppressed student to rely upon a master explicator - a master facilitator, as I am about to show - to free students from oppression. Rancière's primary point is that this approach to emancipation reproduces inequality in that it begins with an assumption of inequality in order to work towards equality. In other words, the assumption is one of inequality from the outset and in trying to reduce that inequity (between the oppressed and oppressor, for instance, or the facilitator and facilitated) infinitely reproduces that same assumption of inequality. Rancière's rhetorical question is "How can we ever expect to achieve equality when we act on an assumption of inequality?" By

³⁸ Ibid, 62.

³⁹ Ibid, 70.

beginning with the assumption of inequality, we continue to bring inequality into presence, and we fail to bring equality into presence.

Rancière's remedy, as Bingham and Biesta so nicely illustrate, is to see teachers and students, adults and children, as always already equal, in that learning how to speak one's mother tongue, for instance, the child already participates in and, therefore, influences the world and one's relations within it. The child, in this perspective, is not treated as though s/he is in need of emancipating, and s/he certainly does not need a master explicator or facilitator to reveal the truth of things, as the child has already demonstrated the ability to engage the "forest of signs"⁴⁰ for him or herself, mediator to mediator. For Rancière, emancipation is always already⁴¹ there for all of us; all we have to do is to acknowledge it. The equality of intelligence need only be acknowledged - anyone can be reminded of it when faced with pressures of being assumed unequal.

Critical Pedagogy's Figure of the Teacher

Critical pedagogy was a way for me to facilitate students' learning in a non-authoritative way. What critical pedagogy offered me that other pedagogical models did not was the explicit focus on facilitating equity. While I had experimented with multiple facilitation models for/in

⁴⁰ Jacques Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2009), 10-11.

⁴¹ Avner Segall, "Revisiting Pedagogical Content Knowledge: The Pedagogy of Content/The Content of Pedagogy," *Teaching and Teacher Education* 20 (2004). I can't help but think of Segall's article. His discussion of pedagogy and content's inseparability and the always already pedagogical characteristics of content and content-full characteristics of pedagogy are relevant here in that the figure of the child as political here recognizes both the knowledge and the process that the student has undertaken as one and the same. The relation constitutes pedagogy and demonstrates an equality of intellectual capacity to make meaning.

education, none extended the opportunity for my efforts to have far-reaching social implications. Critical pedagogy was very enticing to me in this way.

Cornelissen's⁴² demonstration of how facilitation acts as a form of explication and a mechanism of inequality, even though it is a response in critique of "more traditional" forms of pedagogy, helps me to understand another reason why seeing myself as a critical pedagogue never satisfied my hopes for theorizing equality in pedagogy.

Rancière critiques explication as the primary method that assumes inequality in pedagogy. Cornelissen addresses how the modern role of facilitator compares with other models of explication, focusing in part on the ineffectiveness of teaching for equality with both "traditional" and facilitation models. Cornelissen points to two specific forms in which Rancière believes we can commonly find explication: the master explicator and Socratic maiëutics⁴³. She, then, extends the discussion to include the currently popular model of teacher as facilitator or guide as a third example of explication and, therefore, stultification in pedagogy:

The facilitator is a 'guide on the side' rather than a 'sage on the stage' (King, 1993). His/her 'purpose is not to transfer knowledge but to create environments and experiences that bring students to discover and construct knowledge for themselves, to make students members of communities of learners that make discoveries and solve problems' (Barr & Tagg, 1995, p. 15). The aim is to create a series of 'ever more powerful learning environments' (ibid, p. 15).⁴⁴

While Cornelissen does not discuss critical pedagogy, this statement captures how critical pedagogy worked for me; it was meant to provide the learner with a method that facilitates a lifting of the veil, a liberation from oppression. On the other side awaited emancipation and

⁴² Goele Cornelissen, "The Public Role of Teaching," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 42, nos. 5-6 (2010).

⁴³ Ibid, 526-528.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 530.

enlightenment. Unlike the pedagogical models that Rancière refers to as the master explicator and Socratic explicator (Cornelissen aligns these with the “sage on the stage” model), the critical pedagogue can also explicate through facilitation or the “guide on the side” model⁴⁵.

Cornelissen goes on to show how the differences between Jacotot and the facilitator [critical pedagogue] “are situated at their starting point”⁴⁶, which resonates with what we’ve just learned from Biesta & Bingham:

The permanent focus on the measurement of each students’ individual learning needs, however, assumes a permanent inequality at the level of each student’s learning capacity, which is assumed to be affected by a number of factors, such as for example interest, readiness level, learning style, gender, culture, and so on. [...] the facilitator seems to replace the assumption of inequality at the level of knowledge with the assumption of inequality at the level of the capacity to learn. In that regard, students are no longer equally different from teachers, but each student has his/her own place and differs from every other student, including the teacher.⁴⁷

Cornelissen turns our attention instead to the will, specifically “only the greater or lesser energy communicated to the intelligence by the will”⁴⁸, and

⁴⁵ Ibid, 529-531.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 531.

⁴⁷ Ibid. This isn’t unlike the way Bruno Latour critiques postmodernism in Chapter One of *Pandora’s Hope*, “‘Do You Believe in Reality?’ News from the Trenches of the Science Wars” (p. 7), where he depicts the problem of modernism not only being that the mind is separated from the body and the world and put in a vat, but that we furthered that complication to no more a productive end when we put everyone’s mind in a different vat separate from everything else including other brains! In this case, we have not only assumptions of inequality, but we also have exponentially multiplied into oblivion assumptions of inequality. Latour asks what good this does us (it is one of his central purposes in re-assembling the nature and culture dichotomy), and it serves also as relevant imagery in the case of Rancière and Cornelissen’s models of explication and, therefore, assumed inequality in pedagogy. To get to the point, simply changing the way we explicate does not prevent us from assuming inequality, and it may be just this that education, when it comes to reproducing inequality in pedagogy, is most guilty of.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 532.

that, for the attentive master, as opposed to the master explicator and the Socratic master, the taught material no longer appears as an object of knowledge, nor as a resources for competence development, but as a thing in common and that his/her relation towards students is not directed at knowledge transmission or competence acquirement, but at supporting attention and the demand of speech.⁴⁹

For me, critical pedagogy and facilitation were intertwined and, in terms of emancipation, equally stultifying. In turning to Rancière's assertion that equality can be assumed from the outset in pedagogy, I could leave the model of critical pedagogy behind and seek new interventions on equality in pedagogy.

Becoming⁵⁰ Non-Emancipatory

Now, I turn to explore the implications of Rancière's beginning from a place of equality. I will depart from critical pedagogy's assumptions about the figure of the child and the method of facilitation to differentiate it from a teacher as an *ignorant schoolmaster* and a student as an *emancipated spectator*, both of whom attend to *a thing in common*. Bingham and Biesta put it this way:

For Freire, then, it is only natural that there is a pedagogy of the oppressed - that there is a particular method - by which the oppressed can arrive at emancipation. For, there can be no such method because the child is already assumed to be an equal being, a being who is already political, a being whose only method is established only by being un-established. The child's method is an arbitrary method. It is the arbitrary method of language that will not follow a social or psychological logic. It is a method saying, doing and feeling. The child does not need, in fact cannot possibly use, the master's method in order to become emancipated. The child already speaks. That is the child's method. The child needs no knowledge from the master to speak again.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Biesta, *Beyond Learning: Democratic Education for a Human Future*. This language is inspired in part by Biesta's "coming into presence". Chapter 2, "Coming into Presence: Education after the Death of the Subject", brings this concept, for Biesta, into presence.

⁵¹ Bingham and Biesta, *Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, Emancipation*, 72.

According to Rancière, the logic of explication is the logic of inequality. The logic of Rancière's starting from the assumption of equality acknowledges the always already emancipated person. So to distinguish from emancipatory pedagogies like Freire's (an explication-based logic that starts from an assumption of inequality), I'm calling Rancière's intervention on pedagogy "non-emancipatory". Non-emancipatory assumptions acknowledge a student's equality from the outset; there is no logic toward the ends of achieving emancipation. It does not explicate.

Rancière's interventions help me to see how the explication-based model stultifies what is possible pedagogically when it hampers one's ability to go about the work of reading the forest of signs. Each must make their orbit⁵², Rancière argues, and each person is equally capable of reading the forest of signs and making a response whereas in the explication model of social logic, the "progressive model", schools reproduce inequality between teachers and students so to secure the continuance of a profession. Rather, Rancière talks about an assumed equality of intelligence in the pedagogical relation. That is, each person is able to connect their own dots and "do pedagogy" relative to their own experiments in the world: "In fact, this idiom [can] only be read by those who would translate it on the basis of their own intellectual adventure."⁵³ In this instance, we see how pedagogy happens relative to relations.

Rancière has been clear about not wanting his "interventions on" pedagogy called "theory"⁵⁴. I, too, then will refer to them as interventions. Such interventions are typically the

⁵² Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*, 59.

⁵³ Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, 21.

⁵⁴ Bingham and Biesta, *Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, Emancipation*, 63-64.

place in a social science research article where one is supposed to talk about how what one has learned can be generalized across schooling and pedagogy. Rancière's non-emancipatory interventions on pedagogy explicitly deconstruct this. It would be a performative contradiction for me act as if Rancière's non-emancipatory interventions could be generalizable in the same way progressive pedagogy generalizes pedagogies and pedagogical outcomes across normalized student populations. Rather, he keeps the logic of schooling and the logic of a non-emancipatory approach distinct from one another. In order to ask *what if* an assumption of equality, neither the pedagogical logic of explication nor the social logic found in schools and schooling that accompanies the logic of explication provide suitable insight.

When Rancière's assumption of equality redistributes what is sensible about "the social", I claim that Rancière negates the need for emancipation in asking *what if* equality is assumed from the outset in pedagogical relations and introduce the term "non-emancipatory". When pedagogy begins from an assumption of equality, pedagogy (and any method previously associated with pedagogy) becomes non-emancipatory. Like non-representational theory⁵⁵, I am not suggesting non-emancipatory is synonymous with anti-emancipatory. Indeed, Rancière uses the term emancipatory. My purposes here are to demonstrate the ways in which pedagogy after equality is assumed goes beyond the ways in which emancipatory pedagogy is

⁵⁵ Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison, "The Promise of Non-Representational Theories," in *Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography*, ed. Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 15. Marcus A. Doel, "Representation and Difference," in *Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography*, ed. Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 117-120. Hayden Lorimer, "Cultural Geography: The Busyness of Being 'More-Than-Representational'," *Progress in Human Geography* 29, no. 1 (2005): 84.

commonly construed.⁵⁶

A non-emancipatory approach to pedagogy means attending to a thing in common. This means attending to those relations that comprise the thing in common as well as that support our attention to it. The teacher's role in attending to a thing in common is three-fold: to invite, to ask, to verify. The student's role in attending to a thing in common includes acting upon his or her equality, continuing to speak, and continuing to search.

Rancière calls this dissensus, as the performance of equality redistributes what is otherwise considered sensible in the pedagogical act. Because non-emancipatory pedagogies enact dissensus, they dis-position. It dis-positions the teacher-student relation as well as humans' relations with things⁵⁷. In this way, the dis-positioning that beginning from equality conjures is an act of dissensus.

Pedagogy before Rancière's equality of intelligence is a behavior, method, mechanism, explanation, formula, consensus. More descriptors could be added to this list. After Rancière's equality of intelligence, pedagogy becomes relational, more uncertain, and potentially materially new. This involves searching, verifying, idiosyncracies, and dissensus, to name a few related descriptors. Such "polemical interventions"⁵⁸ return us to a question posed in the Introduction chapter of this project: Is pedagogy a term we should hold on to? Can we even continue to use a term commensurate with "leading the child" after we've begun from an

⁵⁶ I do something similar with non-modern pedagogical relations in Chapter 3 and non-representational modes of affect in performance in Chapter 4.

⁵⁷ This, too, I want to explore further in Latour's contribution of the "more-than-human" in Chapter 3.

⁵⁸ Jacques Rancière, "A Few Remarks on the Method of Jacques Rancière," *Parallax* 15, no. 3 (2009): 116. This quotation is also part of discussion noted previously in Bingham and Biesta, *Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, Emancipation*, 63-64.

assumption of equality?

A Thing in Common

The “third thing held in common” plays a vital role in Rancière’s theorization of equality as it is presumed in the pedagogical relation:

In the logic of emancipation, between the ignorant schoolmaster and the emancipated novice there is always a third thing - a book or some other piece of writing - alien to both and to which they can refer to verify in common what the pupil has seen, what she says about it and what she thinks of it. The same applies to performance. It is not the transmission of the artist’s knowledge or inspiration to the spectator. It is the third thing that is owned by no one, whose meaning is owned by no one, but which subsists between them, excluding any uniform transmission, any identity of cause and effect.⁵⁹

I love how this quote focuses our attention not only on where the third thing in common is, but also that it belongs to no one. This quote reaffirms an assumption of equality in that no one party can transmit some pre-determined meaning to another party when attending to a third thing in common. Indeed, there is a type of surrender to 1) the relation that makes the third thing possible, 2) an uncertainty that comes from entering into a process of pedagogy rather than transmission or explication, and 3) the newness that this coming into relation with uncertainty may create.

Relational

In redistributing the social logic, and hence pedagogical logic, Rancière reconfigures⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, 14-15. This concept, I will argue in Chapter 3, shares much in common with Latour’s object-oriented philosophy, as described by Graham Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics* (Melbourne: re.press, 2009).

⁶⁰ Rancière would say it “redistributes the sensible”.

what we have commonly thought of as the role of a teacher. A method carefully transmitted by explanation might teach someone something, but from a concern of equality perspective, Rancière posits that this explication only serves to stultify, further reproducing inequality. Does this mean that teachers, even experts for that matter, no longer have a role? What is a teacher *to do* with a classroom full of emancipated spectators? What is a teacher *to do* with a classroom full of children who already undertook the most difficult of apprenticeships and on his/her own? What is a teacher *to do* with groups of always already intelligent students? In other words, what becomes of pedagogy?

We know already per Cornelissen that such pedagogy would not take on the role of Socratic maieutic, master explicator, or facilitator. Bingham and Biesta also illustrate how the model of a critical pedagogue is emancipatory, therefore reproducing inequality. What is at stake here are the various ways equality can be realized; there is a performative distinction in Freire and Rancière's approaches to pedagogical equality. In Freire's case, a "pedagogy of the oppressed" is offered as means by which to achieve the equality he believes exists. Rancière, on the other hand, does not posit an epistemological reality. Rather he posits, *what if? What if we act as if - proceed as if* - students and teachers have equal intellectual capabilities and turn our pedagogical attention instead to a thing in common (Rancière's terms) or, stated another way, relations (my claim). In this way, Rancière brings the virtual into the present⁶¹ and situates "the truth of an assumption of equality" in its "practical verification"⁶².

Although equity, democracy, and relationship building all seem to be highly valued by many educators, the relations that an attention to a third thing in common necessitates

⁶¹ Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*, xxiii.

⁶² Cornelissen, "The Public Role of Teaching," 531.

challenges the most basic precepts of common pedagogy. It takes the teacher out of the role of expert. It suggests that the curriculum needs to be opened up to possibility rather than standardized and normalized. It specifically challenges explication as a viable pedagogical mode. These are all things that many teachers, administrators, students, and parents see as the basic services schools offer. Indeed, we always seem to be in hot pursuit of how to do just such things bigger, better, and faster⁶³.

One place to look for assumptions about teaching is to look at the behavioral assumptions in “the doing to” of students. When children are seen as already intelligent people, a method for developing their intelligence is not needed. What is needed is a way to re-position or re-locate the teacher relative to the intelligent, speaking student. In other words, rather than superimposing our ideas of what it should mean to teach students, teachers can take their cues from students as people with an equal capacity for intelligence. Together, teacher and student can attend to a thing in common – a thing of intellectual curiosity for them both.

In *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, Rancière employs Jacotot’s unanticipated experiment to demonstrate how a teacher might assume equality in the context of teaching and the material implications this has for relations/pedagogical practices/a thing in common. The teacher’s role in attending to a thing in common is three-fold: to acknowledge, to ask, to verify. The student’s role (as an emancipated spectator) in attending to a thing in common includes acting upon his or her equality in speaking and searching.

When a teacher becomes an ignorant schoolmaster, the teacher comes into relation

⁶³ Fendler, “New and Improved Educationalising: Faster, More Powerful, and Longer Lasting.”

with the student on things in common - something both the teacher and student can investigate. The teacher does not need to have any previous knowledge of this thing. Both teacher and student are in relation to one another relative to their investigation, and they are also focused on the relations comprising whatever they are studying. In other words, pedagogy becomes inseparable from relations. Attentions jointly turn to how things hang together for questions under investigation. In this way, teacher and student are in relation with a thing in common, but they are also in relation with each other about this thing. In other words, the attentions in relation to the thing in common can be seen as relationally constituted.

Pedagogy, in this sense, is thoroughly relational. In fact, it would be impossible for pedagogy, configured in this way, to exist without an attention to relations. Relations comprise the thing(s) in common. Even an ignorant schoolmaster and an emancipated spectator may become part of the way the issue of inquiry relates or holds together.

In Rancière's perspective then, the role of teachers is not eliminated, but it does change that role. The role of a teacher becomes one of training the attention of the student to a thing in common through three actions:

- Acknowledging an equal capacity for intelligence by inviting attention to a thing in common;
- Asking, "What do you see? What do you think about it? What do you make of it?"⁶⁴; and
- Verifying that the student continues searching.

With Freire, we saw how critical pedagogy puts the pedagogue in a position to facilitate a child's development, which can then lead to emancipation. In that model, emancipation comes

⁶⁴ Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*, 23.

into existence through a method of critical pedagogy that begins from an understanding of preexisting inequality and works to overcome it. In Rancière's intervention, equality of intelligence is assumed, and an attention to relations becomes central to both the relationship between student and teacher as well as the inquiry into whatever it is the two are investigating through interrogation and verification.

Assuming equality of intelligence is an ethical starting point in pedagogy because it assumes that pedagogy is relational and, therefore, shifts our attention back to an attendance to those relations. Unlike what is done to the figure of the child in a psychological model, Rancière's assumption of equality shifts pedagogy to a relation between teachers and students, and this relation is one of will to will rather than intelligence to intelligence. In this relationship of will to will, the teacher's and student's roles distill to essential tasks, focusing attention on how things are in relation or hang together. It suffices for the teacher simply to announce the assumed equality - just an acknowledgement of its existence is adequate - and for students to act or not upon that equality⁶⁵.

When pedagogy becomes based on assumption of equality, the roles of the participating actors change; indeed, everyone becomes an actor who can narrate and translate, not just passively receive. The teacher's role becomes one of asking and verifying that the student is searching. Students, in turn, moving in their own orbits around these objects of attention, define their own parabolas to truth⁶⁶. In this way, attention to a thing in common is entirely a relational idea. When things are in relation, it makes attending to a third thing in common possible. As pedagogy becomes necessarily relational, the ethical consequences of in/equality

⁶⁵ Ibid, 18.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 59.

assumptions become more apparent as well. I prefer the ethical implications for relations after equality is assumed.

Pedagogy or “leading the child” becomes “attending to a thing in common”. This is a non-emancipatory pedagogy. Relations shift from instructing a child towards certain ideas or conclusions to investigating a thing in common or as an ignorant schoolmaster with an emancipated spectator in relation to a thing in common. They urge each other on, as an act of will-to-will, with questions that provoke further seeking, furthering the inexplicable role relations play in attending to a thing in common.

Embracing Uncertainty

WILL What do we do now?
HENSLOWE The show must ... you know
WILL Go on.
HENSLOWE Juliet does not come on for
twenty pages. It will be all right.
WILL How will it?
HENSLOWE I don't know. It's a mystery.
- *Shakespeare in Love*⁶⁷

Attending to a thing in common puts teachers and students into a new relation. It follows then that we can also ask to what extent we, as pedagogues, nurture dispositions that encourage the new? Do we nurture dispositions that witness and participate in invention, subjectivity, or only identification? Our current culture of education seems to be heading towards a singular goal of identification, representation, and reproduction. If this begins from an assumption of inequality, we can count on success under such conditions to exponentially

⁶⁷ *Shakespeare in Love*, Film, directed by John Madden (1998; Burbank, CA: Miramax Lionsgate 2011), DVD.

increase that inequality. Lemke shares this provocative perspective:

Children, still relatively unempowered as human beings in our society, still routinely oppressed and abused by adults, are the last remaining category of persons who are still thought to be unable to think and act for themselves. Our modern model of children derives from and reproduces the arguments of older ideological models fashioned to justify the subjugation of women, peasants, workers, and all the other "lesser breeds" of an earlier era. Dressed up in the trappings of developmental psychology in its more romantic forms, this model continues to legitimize efforts to force children to recapitulate the beliefs and values of one or another group of powerful adults.⁶⁸

Assuming equality at the outset of pedagogy is one way out of such reproduction. As teachers, we constantly talk about wanting to inspire our students, but I fear our not only our schools and curricula stultify those ends. Our own assumptions also get in the way. This certainly has been my experience. Assumptions about the figure of the child follow from assumptions about how we should act as teachers, and as Lemke's example above describes, teachers' assumptions about teaching frequently lead to developmental assumptions about children.

If I'm going to suggest that non-emancipatory approaches to pedagogy attend to a thing in common and that we could consider the attention that teacher and student share towards (with?) a third thing in common is an attention to relations, we must accept a certain degree of uncertainty. We don't know ahead of time which relations we might be attending to. Indeed, any set of relations, anything in common is eligible. Perhaps most important to acknowledge is what we don't know yet about the shape those relations may take as we come into relation with other things in relation. For example, the interpretation of a classic text is not fixed when equality is assumed. As teachers and students come into relation with that text (and those who

⁶⁸ J. L. Lemke, "The Coming Paradigm Wars in Education: Curriculum vs. Information Access," (Presentation at the Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference, Brooklyn, NY, March 1994).

have previously interpreted it), new relations – new interpretations – will be formed.⁶⁹ This same thing can happen with any relations – any things held in common between teachers and students.

Rancière states, “There remains a third way that aims not to amplify effects, but to problematize the cause-effect relationship itself and the set of presuppositions that sustain the logic of stultification.”⁷⁰ It is in this sense, too, that “who the student becomes” is full of uncertainty. As teachers attending to a thing in common with our students, we cannot control who our students become. We can only do our best to ethically consider how we are relating to them and others as teachers. It might be seen as a challenge to find ways to accept this aspect of pedagogical relations when attending to a thing in common.

In *The Emancipated Spectator*, Rancière draws examples from the theatre, demonstrating ways in which students can be thought of as non-passive participants in the spectacle of schooling:

We do not have to transform spectators into actors, and ignoramus into scholars. We have to recognize the knowledge at work in the ignoramus and the activity peculiar to the spectator. Every spectator is already an actor in her story; every actor, every man of action, is the spectator of the same story.⁷¹

What if teachers approached students as narrators and translators? It certainly puts the student on equal footing with the teacher, but it also opens the teacher’s role to more uncertainty. We could also say it opens to the students’ role up to more uncertainty as well. The students’ role

⁶⁹ Kati Macaluso, “Literary Interpretation as Poetic Translation: Envisioning a Rancièrian Emancipatory Framework for Literature Instruction,” *Reading Research Quarterly* 50, no. 2 (2014). Macaluso’s exploration of Rancière’s poetic labor of translation discusses this possibility in depth.

⁷⁰ Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, 22.

⁷¹ Ibid, 17.

was never without uncertainty, but in a mode where students are seen as narrators and translators, this dynamic would be explicit from the outset. It would also highlight the relative uncertainty of a teacher's knowledge, for in participating as an ignorant schoolmaster, the teacher too is taken out of his/her safe place as expert and asked to learn alongside the student. Relative to many classroom cultures found today, the uncertainty that these new relations between teacher and student invite significantly increase what is unknown and predetermined about the pedagogical event. We could even say that "...it is a new scene of equality where heterogenous performances are translated into one another."⁷²

Biesta refers to the need for a kind of risk-taking and uncertainty in education as "the beautiful risk" or "the weakness" of education: "how much we value this weakness depends crucially on the extent to which we believe that education is not just about the reproduction of what we already know or of what already exists, but is genuinely interested in the ways in which new beginnings and new beginners can come into the world"⁷³. In that the student is searching (connecting dots in the forest of signs; attending to relations or a thing in common), they are doing pedagogy under the equality of intelligence. The idea of a material thing in common only becomes possible once equality of intelligence - an equal capacity to learn – is recognized. Otherwise, we remain locked in the reproduction of inequality that necessitates teachers *not* sharing pedagogical or curricular goals in common with students.

There is a certain degree of uncertainty that must be accepted when one attends to a thing in common. Assumptions of who a student and a teacher are gets blurred when equality is assumed. In Rancière's description, we see the uncertainty - the risk of education - that

⁷² Ibid, 22.

⁷³ Biesta, *The Beautiful Risk of Education*, 4.

coming into presence entails:

The effect of the idiom cannot be anticipated. It requires spectators who play the role of active interpreters, who develop their own translation in order to appropriate the 'story' and make it their own story. An emancipated community is a community of narrators and translators.⁷⁴

Coming Into Presence

Attending to relations as a thing in common is a very material shift. The redistribution of the sensible, as Rancière states, has "topographical" implications⁷⁵. Freire's model of emancipation keeps a child in a (develop)mental and psychological role that breeds further inequality while Rancière's child "describes [his/her] own parabola around the truth. No two orbits are alike. And this is why the explicators endanger our revolution."⁷⁶ When a child's equality is acknowledged, they are free to participate materially in all the ways available to anybody else⁷⁷. Mental approaches to pedagogy are meant to facilitate the materializing of equality for the student, but end up keeping an irreducible distance⁷⁸ between student and teacher. For this reason, the distance that Rancière speaks of between a teacher and an explicator is material. It is a material, topographical inequality that can never diminish.

Teaching as attention to a thing in common allows for a subjectification, a coming into presence. Rancière distinguishes subjectification from identification in that it is the creation of

⁷⁴ Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, 22.

⁷⁵ Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, trans. with an intro. by Gabriel Rockhill (London: Continuum, 2004), 49-50. Gert Biesta, "A New Logic of Emancipation: The Methodology of Jacques Rancière," *Educational Theory*⁶⁰, no. 1 (2010): 41.

⁷⁶ Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*, 59.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 41.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 5. Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, 10.

something new. It, therefore, divides the sensible. It speaks. It performs its equality.⁷⁹ This subjectification –this coming into presence – characterizes pedagogy after Rancière’s equality of intelligence is assumed. Student, curriculum, and pedagogy all come into presence, dividing the sensible as we know it, as they enact equality. This is what it means to experience pedagogy relationally. It means to have the possibility of coming into presence with various relations and not knowing in advance what that might bring. There is possibility for newness and novelty, even if this means that a person experiences for the first time something others have already “known”. The encounter of this person and that new insight creates a new relation, subjectification, as it materializes.

Biesta’s concept of “coming into presence” can help us imagine a student’s parabola to truth. We can begin to get a sense of what a student’s educational journey might become if we begin from an assumption of equality. A student in Rancière’s forest of arbitrary signs has no map but speaks in any event. A student orients oneself according to an ongoing process of compare and contrast and pattern building. He or she is familiarizing him/herself with landmarks and signposts from previous encounters with signs and signs of signs. Gaining traction in this environment does not necessarily entail “faster, more powerful and longer lasting”⁸⁰ educationalising. Indeed, slow, thoughtful - even intuitive - piecing together of

⁷⁹ Gert Biesta, “Learner, Student, Speaker: What it Matters How We Call Those We Teach,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 42, nos. 5-6 (2010): 547-548. Bingham and Biesta, *Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, Emancipation*, 140-141. These two texts describe refer to Rancière’s subjectification and further theorize this in relation to “coming into presence”. In a sense, Biesta is coming into presence as he brings this further elaborated concept into being.

⁸⁰ Fendler, “New and Improved Educationalising: Faster, More Powerful, and Longer Lasting,” 15.

arbitrary signs may yield fruitful insights.

Since it is not a process of identification, but a process of subjectification, what pedagogy becomes exactly cannot be known in advance, and this coincides with the ideas of translation and interpretation that always involve slippage. Walking into the unknown is necessary if we are to assert our equality - if we are to "speak", as Biesta and Bingham say. The assumption of equality requires that we open ourselves to multiple and diverse interpretations of the world and all of the various relations that have existed, do exist, and can exist. This is just another example of how assuming equality in pedagogy is an act of dissensus. It redistributes the sensible as we currently experience it in/of pedagogy. Making space for [the new, the unknown, the yet to be born] to be brought into being is what we do as teachers and students when we act as if we are emancipated.

Coming into presence as an attendance to relations is also an attendance to the becoming of relations as material in pedagogy. When equality is assumed, the material paths of any person are unavoidably unique (as it is a relating of arbitrary signs) and irreplaceable. One person's material experiments with pedagogy cannot substitute for another's. When we put such diversity and openness to this diversity on equal footing, its implications for materiality are noteworthy in their implication and potentially traceable as an act of description.

Echoing Rancière's notion of dissensus, Cornelissen writes about the "dispossessing" and dis-positioning that occur when teacher and student become "inter-ested" in a thing in common⁸¹. Cornelissen suggests that pedagogy becomes more inter-esting (and perhaps more pleasurable, too) after Rancière's interventions:

⁸¹ Cornelissen, "The Public Role of Teaching," 534-537. Again, I see a similarity here with Latour's concept of "inter-objective". I will discuss this further in Chapter 3.

Rancière tries to give expression to the fact that there is a particular relation between someone who is attentive and the things to which his/her attention is turned, or between the attentive master and the material s/he teaches. For Jacotot, in order to be a thing in common, the taught material no longer appears as an object of knowledge, representing a true meaning, something that remains hidden from the students' gaze. ... Attention opens up the opportunity for things to refer no longer to something else but to appear as such, as mere expression, mere words, attempts to translate thoughts...that ask to be seen/heard. It opens the opportunity to be in the presence of something inter-esting (a thing in common between master and student). And it seems to be precisely this attention for something inter-esting, a thing in common ..., that allows the master to be in a space between the position of the master and the student, a space that doesn't allow the master the comfortable and elevated (social) position of gatekeeper at the door of knowledge or learning to learn, but brings the master out-of-position, in a state of dis-possession.⁸²

In the *Emancipated Spectator*, Rancière states that "This poetic labour of translation is at the heart of all learning. It is at the heart of the emancipatory practice of the ignorant schoolmaster."⁸³ The recognition of what is lost in translation is common to all three theoretical approaches I bring to this study, and it points to one of the reasons why attending to a thing in common is a worthy education goal. Rancière' recognizes that in interpretation⁸⁴ something is lost and gained. The thing is never the same twice, and it certainly does not reside within master explicators:

attention is no longer connected to the master's superior intelligence but to the unconditional work upon the will. [...] the taught material no longer appears as an object of knowledge, [...] but as a thing in common and that his/her relation towards students is not directed at knowledge transmission or competence acquirement, but at supporting attention and the demand of speech.⁸⁵

For it is, as Biesta so carefully distinguishes, students as speakers who are coming into presence

⁸² Ibid, 534.

⁸³ Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, 10.

⁸⁴ Latour uses the word translation to refer to a comparable concept in a comparable way. In Latour's case, he has dismantled any possibility for correspondence to still exist after his equality move. Further connections are made to Non Representational Theory in Chapter 4.

⁸⁵ Cornelissen, "The Public Role of Teaching," 532.

and not just learners⁸⁶.

Non-emancipatory as Characteristic of Non-pedagogy

Biesta summarizes the contradictions found in “old” logics of emancipation⁸⁷:

1. Modern emancipatory pedagogies create a dependency in the very students we want to emancipate.
2. Modern emancipatory pedagogies assume a fundamental inequality between students and teachers that only continues to be reproduced in our efforts to achieve equality.
3. Modern emancipatory pedagogy distrusts those it is saying should be trusted as equals.

This pedagogical logic, Rancière argues, is at the heart of not just critical pedagogies but progressive pedagogies in general, and in this way, we see a pedagogical logic that also operates at a social level⁸⁸. The enlightenment or demystification that Freirian critical pedagogies pursue is unnecessary when equality of intelligence is assumed from the outset. Non-emancipatory assumptions can redistribute the topography of a pedagogical landscape that would make coming into presence possible. I have suggested three characteristics that describe what pedagogy might become after an assumption of equality or “attending to a thing in common”:

⁸⁶ Gert Biesta, “Learner, Student, Speaker: Why it Matters How We Call Those We Teach,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 42, nos. 5-6 (2010). Bingham and Biesta, *Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, Emancipation*, 69-72 and 133-144. There is much more to be said on this topic than can be addressed here. Biesta as well Biesta and Bingham poignantly articulate the ethical implications for considering students as speakers or students as learners.

⁸⁷ Gert Biesta, “A New Logic of Emancipation: The Methodology of Jacques Rancière,” *Educational Theory* 60, no. 1 (2010): 45-46.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 40-41.

1. Pedagogy becomes necessarily relational.
2. Pedagogy embraces uncertainty.
3. Pedagogy can “come into presence” or materialize something new.

As Biesta reminds us, Rancière would proceed to test or verify that equality continues to be assumed and enacted through my speaking and seeking, and in such a way, I perform dissensus, the enactment of equality that makes subjectivity possible.⁸⁹

Rancière’s beginning from an assumption of equality is a turn to thinking about pedagogy as a thing in common. This is a thing in common between all people who choose to think of themselves as persons just like anyone else and not only something between students and teachers. The ideas of the third thing held in common and that no one owns this third thing are made possible after starting from an assumption of equality in pedagogy. It brings the necessity of relations to the forefront in pedagogy, and it requires embracing uncertainty in pedagogy. Thirdly, it makes it possible for newness to materialize.

In critical pedagogy approaches, pedagogy “belongs” to the teacher. The teacher does pedagogy to students so to affect certain outcomes. In non-emancipatory pedagogy, pedagogy becomes attention to a third thing in common that belongs to no one. Nonetheless, all parties attend to it as well as the new third thing that is created in the relations.

We cannot know ahead of time what the outcome of that relation or attending to that relation will be. In attending to a thing common, we nurture a coming into presence, a material shift. It is the birth of something that did not exist previously. It can be seen as ironic that attending to a thing in common seems to require an acknowledgement of what is not yet

⁸⁹ Ibid, 51.

material in order for it to become material. Perhaps this is another way of pointing to the value of thinking relationally in pedagogy. I find this one of the most provocative aspects of pedagogy after equality.

Cornelissen writes about a thing in common as “a particular state of mind, an attitude that needs to be brought forth time and time again.”⁹⁰ Are we as teachers dis-positioned to acknowledge equality as something that already exists? Are we dis-positioned to bring newness – what we cannot already know – into being, *into relation* in pedagogy?

This chapter points to a concept I would like to develop across my project: non-pedagogy. Non-emancipatory pedagogies serve as one characteristic of non-pedagogy. Next, I will explore non-modern [pedagogical] relations, and finally, non-representational affect. While each of these needs to be theorized on its own terms, they also contribute to a growing notion that something other than “pedagogy” as we’ve come to know it might be possible.

⁹⁰ Cornelissen, “The Public Role of Teaching,” 532.

CHAPTER 3

NON-MODERN PEDAGOGICAL RELATIONS AFTER AN ASSUMPTION OF EQUALITY

In the previous chapter, I examined Rancière's assumption of equality of intelligence and asked what becomes possible for pedagogy after that equality is assumed. I found that pedagogy could become "attending to a thing in common". This attending to a thing in common highlights how pedagogy is inherently relational, requires embracing uncertainty in the pedagogical relation, and nurtures coming into presence of what and who we do not already know. In other words, it nurtures the "new" and "not yet imagined".

Now I turn to Latour, who also makes an assumption of equality that has profound implications for relations, but he has not theorized these relations in terms of pedagogy. I seek to find what relevance Latour's social flattening – that is, putting all things on the same ontological footing – might offer the theorizing of pedagogy. I will focus on two of Latour's many contributions in this regard, namely the principle of irreductions and a characterizing of relations as translations.

Introduction

[I]t's a very different type of production of metaphysical questions
when you follow the prey, so to speak, than when you want to
establish the basic furniture of the universe.
- Latour⁹¹

A translation model of truth
renders the correspondence theory impossible.
- Graham Harman⁹²

I am on the scent of what pedagogy might become after Latour's equality move. Can we imagine pedagogy as a non-human event? Can pedagogy also happen between non-living things? Latour challenges us to imagine more-than-human and more-than-human systems of mediation. I find this very relevant to what it might mean to theorize pedagogy after Latour's ontological flattening or - what I will also call - Latour's equality turn. Maybe in doing pedagogy, we need to see more than the human realm. This is a pedagogy that attends to the hybrid, collective, messy, assemblages among living and non-living things in the everyday, ordinary world.

Latour also uses this social flattening as an opportunity to characterize what is inherently relational as translational. Indeed, the implications of this are so profound in Latour's scholarship that I will suggest we move away from the term "relationship" or "relations" and turn toward "translationships" or "translations". Many other poststructural theorists have also

⁹¹ Bruno Latour, Graham Harman, and Peter Erdélyi, *The Prince and the Wolf: Latour and Harman at the LSE* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2011): 45.

⁹² Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics*, 79.

turned to translation as a way of capturing the inevitable change or erasure⁹³ that characterizes revisiting the same but differently. Latour helps me to see how these changes aren't just natural or somehow automatic; illustrating the great labor or sweat that goes into building and maintaining relations as translational makes Latour's scholarship quite useful to theorizing pedagogy.

I need a cartoon, but I can't draw, so I'll have to rely on your imagination: A brain-in-a-vat⁹⁴ sits atop a classroom desk, among many other brains-in-vats on their individual, neatly line-ordered desks, with a sticker displaying its most recent SAT score. The teacher stands afar in the front of the classroom, observing the results of having poured a bit of this or that chemical into each jar. Occasionally moving closer, she pokes the outside of the jar with a stick, like a child visiting an aquarium. No surprise, the brains-in-vats barely respond, if at all. They pulse irregularly, slowing even further as their final lifeblood makes its way through its veins and, as would be expected, peeters out just as quickly as the brain was disconnected from the body.

While perhaps dramatic, grotesque, and even extreme, I love the imagery Latour lends the imagination for modern day pedagogy in his Introduction to *Pandora's Hope*. Characterizing the modern predicament as brain-in-a-vat, his imagery resonates with some of my worst fears about what education can become. Students' minds dichotomized from their bodies and

⁹³ I'm thinking most specifically of Derrida's work here. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

⁹⁴ This imagery comes directly from the opening chapter in Latour, *Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies*, 1-23. Latour uses it to describe how Cartesian assumptions have bifurcated the body and mind and led to the "social", something his work strives to re-assemble.

surrounding environs, and pedagogy, based on this decontextualized mind, reproducing the inequalities that the modern assumptions set up. Pedagogy, itself, gets treated as a behavior, a psychological experiment, a brain-in-a-vat. Needless to say, but important to keep pointing out, this scenario is far from our most ethical response to children's desire to be educated. Really far. I have tried to remediate that by "bringing the real world" into my classrooms and by taking my research of literacy, for instance, out of the classroom, but in these instances, I still often find the mind located somewhere separate from the body and everyday experience.

In chapter two, I referred to the ways pedagogy becomes inherently relational after Rancière's equality of intelligence is assumed. Latour's non-modern relations help me take another step in the process of restoring relations in pedagogy. If Rancière allows us to recover equality in pedagogy, Latour offers some insights into the restorative work that can be done to resuscitate pedagogical relations after equality is assumed. To return to the Latourian imagery, this restoration allows the head to be reconnected to the body. The blood flows again, and the body is able to function rather than dys-function⁹⁵ more fully.

Latour's non-modern theorizing of relations helps me to imagine pedagogical relations not tied to modern commitments or, in other words, characterized by dichotomizing and decontextualizing. With Rancière, we see how facilitators reproduce an assumption of inequality, which Rancière extends to progressive pedagogical logic more generally. With Latour, we see how other human systems of "intermediation" (relationships, language, correspondence) can infer a similar assumption of inequality. I will maintain that, in attempts to force correspondence, modern pedagogy dichotomizes and decontextualizes which, in turn,

⁹⁵ Latour, *Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies*, 1-23. This also expands on connections to Cornelissen's dis-positioning.

obstructs the very relating of pedagogy. Correspondence – a very human invention - stands in the way of relations because it decontextualizes relations, which thereby obstructs pedagogy. Pedagogy after a Latourian equality move assumes an ability on behalf of all actors to translate one another without the need of intermediaries. His re-assembling of the social in these ways constitutes what Latour calls a Non-Modern Constitution.

I actually encountered Latour's scholarship long before Rancière's and NRT's. He helped me to see that inequality can also be assumed not only in modern approaches to pedagogy but also in postmodern ones. In modern and postmodern approaches to pedagogy, we similarly find pedagogy that is dichotomized and decontextualized from its relations. The mind is still disconnected from the body. A "veil" remains to be lifted. In short, there was still a necessity for experts to "empower" or, might we say, "facilitate" the unknowing novice. Much like in the case of critical pedagogy, I continued to desire a pedagogy that recognized students' ability to make sense of experiences, texts, and information on their own, of their own accord. I wanted to find just one philosophical stance that would allow students to be their own pedagogue and one that would acknowledge the pedagogical between non-living things. And, as Rancière submits that the role of teacher can still exist, I wanted to believe that role could exist without it requiring the student to be reliant on a teacher to learn. I had always been searching for a pedagogy of mediators rather than one with gatekeeping intermediaries.

It was Latour's non-Modern Constitution that first sufficed some of the conditions for pedagogy between mediators that I had not found in critical pedagogy or postmodern thought. No dependency is required on certain actors to those deemed more capable, more knowing, or

more legitimate. Rancière and Latour both eliminate the need for any such dependency and in so doing, reconstitute relations in pedagogy.

Postmodern approaches to pedagogical theory co-existed easily with my English and cultural studies sensibilities. Viewing everything as a text and using deconstruction and critique certainly allowed me to comment prolifically on wide varieties of topics, but rarely did it support building or theorizing anything new. It was as if everything was already doomed to deconstruction, which wasn't as inherently problematic for me - in fact, I loved it! - as was the fundamental assumption that theorizing ends in deconstruction. In my pedagogical experiments, this just wasn't the case, and when I first happened upon Latour's work, the non-modern approach refreshed me without promising perfection or fatalism as foregone conclusions.

In my own pedagogical experiments, I had turned to Cultural Studies as an alternative to critical pedagogy for fresh perspectives on equality in theorizing my pedagogy. Cultural Studies allowed me to go more post and less Freire. I loved the "turns" that cultural studies found in Anthropology, including the representational turn in anthropological approaches to media studies. This literature began to speak to issues broader than those I had previously encountered in critical literacy studies. Cultural Studies welcomes the non-human into our theories of relations. It lets things speak; it lets things act. It also allowed for slippage in meaning made between mediators where other models do not. What Cultural Studies had not yet addressed was the Nature/Culture split that it upheld in its theorizing of culture (and

people's) relation to cultural artifacts.⁹⁶ At that point, Cultural Studies had not yet begun responding to Latour's challenges.

Interestingly, Latour's work has been distilled to a proxy similar to postmodernism's "everything is a text". "Everything is relational"⁹⁷ is the reduction Latour claims that Harman makes of his work, and Latour takes exception to it, pointing out the irony of reducing his principle of irreducibility. In fact, Latour states this in at least three different ways in *The Prince and the Wolf*, a transcript of the live ANTHEM discussion between he and Graham Harman, a foremost Latourian scholar. Firstly, Latour states that is "precisely because of the principle of irreduction that translation is so important."⁹⁸ Then, again, Latour clarifies that "for me translation is necessary precisely because of the irreducibility of a singularity."⁹⁹ And, in a third iteration:

It's precisely the very, very powerful point that it's because things are irreducible that the relations have now center stage and that they are costly. And that every single one of them, whatever they do in terms of relations, they cannot escape and empty the powerful singularity.¹⁰⁰

The relations between these two concepts in Latour's work, I will argue, is central to understanding how relations inform pedagogy after equality in a Latourian landscape, removing the necessity for any intermediating or facilitating systems between actors.

⁹⁶ As we will learn in Chapter 4, Cultural Studies has since made an ontological turn in response to the challenge that Latour posed. In this way, Cultural Studies has addressed some of its own theoretical limitations and has now found ways to contribute in what might be considered non-modern modes.

⁹⁷ Latour, Harman, and Erdélyi, *The Prince and the Wolf: Latour and Harman at the LSE*, 43.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 44.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 49.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 63.

Relations in Latour's Scholarship: Mediators and Intermediators

Latour associates intermediaries with his Modern Constitution and talks about moving to a model akin to the non-Modern Constitution where there are no intermediaries but only mediators. The messy hybrid collectives of a non-Modern Constitution are made of mediators while transparent intermediaries are what the Modern Constitution created to bring things bifurcated by Cartesian duality back into relation. Latour places all actors on the same ontological footing, and therefore, treats every actor, living and non-living, as a mediator in its own right.

When pedagogy becomes the thing in common between two or more mediating actors in relation (emancipated spectators affecting one another), pedagogy becomes attending to that middle ground of relations as the thing in common. Latour theorizes *who* the possible mediators are that can come into relation as well as *how* these mediators come into relation. In so doing, he tells me a lot about what might be possible for pedagogy after Latour's ontological flattening. In other words, I want to look between, or as Latour would say, I want to explore the vast and frequently overlooked Middle Kingdom – the land of relations¹⁰¹.

By way of bringing these Latourian contributions of irreducibility and translation into presence more fully, I will first turn to two other tightly intertwined concepts that we find in some of the literature in education theorizing relations in pedagogy: dichotomizing and decontextualizing. As we will see, relations is not commonly theorized as a pedagogical approach, but in a few of the instances where it has been, we find the dichotomizing and decontextualizing characteristic of what Latour calls the Modern Constitution. I want to

¹⁰¹ Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. by Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993): 46-48.

demonstrate how these occur and why they can be associated with assumptions of inequality in theorizing pedagogical relations.

Assumptions of Inequality in the Modern Constitution: Intermediaries that Dichotomize and Decontextualize

A Modern Constitution, according to Latour, is marked by assumptions of inequality. Latour addresses at length these assumptions of inequality in his *Reassembling of the Social*¹⁰² and *We Have Never Been Modern*, where he moves from a Nature/Culture or Nature/Social model to one constituted of “a series of negotiations between a motley armada of forces, humans among them, and such a world cannot be divided cleanly between two pre-existent poles called ‘nature’ and ‘society’”¹⁰³. In so doing, he establishes a new landscape of relations that acknowledges the equality of all things as actors whose relations can be characterized by translation rather than correspondence. The terms “dichotomize” and “decontextualize” characterize how I see these assumptions of inequality informing relations in pedagogy. In the Modern Constitution, we see dichotomizing in relations as associated with a human/non-human divide and decontextualizing as associated with the breakdown in relations caused by the invocation of binaries. Teaching for correspondence has been intended to remediate those binaries. The positing of intermediaries plays a crucial role in maintaining that inequality. I find that forcing a pedagogical goal of correspondence obstructs relations in pedagogy even further, rendering pedagogy impossible.

¹⁰² Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005).

¹⁰³ Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics*, 13.

I want to visit a few examples of how relations in pedagogical theory have recently been theorized, identifying assumptions of inequality and how those assumptions impact pedagogical theories of relations. First, let me say that I seek to join these scholars in theorizing relations in pedagogy. This is important and hard work, and while I put a different spin than they do on such efforts, it is because of their pioneering work in the field that I can extend insights into these other arenas.

Although fostering relationships in the context of “community building” in educational settings, for example, is “all the rage”¹⁰⁴ and better, stronger relationships, many believe, will make for better learning, the role of relations in pedagogy has not been deeply theorized. Fendler maps theories of teaching both on and off the grid in her chapter titled “Teaching Theories”¹⁰⁵. In reference to Joyce and Weil’s *Models of Teaching*¹⁰⁶, Fendler finds that the four same families or groupings of models of teaching have existed in each edition since the first in 1972. These four groupings include Social Interaction, Information Processing, Personal, and Behavior Modification. Fendler notes that in 2008 no noticeable allowance has been made for relations in any of the eight editions! She further draws our attention to places where pedagogy has been theorized as relational – in coaching, for instance– where “the relationship itself teaches”¹⁰⁷. This model goes beyond a model where “teachers and students should form

¹⁰⁴ Lynn Fendler, “Others and the Problem of Community,” *Curriculum Inquiry* 36, no. 3 (2006): 7.

¹⁰⁵ Lynn Fendler, “Teaching Theories,” In *Making a Difference in Theory: The Theory Question in Education and the Education Question in Theory*, edited by Gert Biesta, Julie Allan, and Richard Edwards (New York: Routledge, 2013): 180-197.

¹⁰⁶ This text is now in its ninth edition. I will cite the first edition here: Bruce R. Joyce and Marsha Weil, *Models of Teaching*, first ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

¹⁰⁷ Fendler, “Teaching Theories,” 190.

relationships first as a means of facilitating more effective communication later.”¹⁰⁸ The coincidence of the concept of facilitation should not be missed here. As we saw with Rancière - and is true again in this case - an intermediary (in this case, relationships) is set up as the gatekeeper through which mediation must occur. Fendler goes further to offer an illustration of a model of relations in teaching that does not invoke an intermediary: “One way to imagine teaching relations would be to imagine how, without speaking, an animal or child teaches cognitive awareness, emotional sensitivity, and physical skills to adults in relation.”¹⁰⁹ Fendler not only demonstrates in this example how the relationship itself teaches, but she also illustrates that this pedagogical relationship does not necessitate language, another human system we frequently find positioned in the intermediary role.

In a related vein, I turn to a very recent text, *No Education Without Relation*¹¹⁰, wherein Noddings notes in the foreword “that advocates of relational pedagogy do not agree entirely on how to define it.”¹¹¹ Noddings, often times seen as the scholar “who put relational thinking into the mainstream of American educational theory¹” with her ethics of care¹¹² alongside others who have contributed to relational thinking in education - “Martin’s idea of the Schoolhome,

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Charles Bingham and Alexander M. Sidorkin, eds., *No Education Without Relation*, Counterpoints: Studies in the Postmodern Theory of Education, Book 259 (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2004).

¹¹¹ Nel Noddings, foreword to *No Education Without Relation*, eds. Charles Bingham and Alexander M. Sidorkin (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2004): viii.

¹¹² Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

and Carol Gilligan's feminist ethics" and Paolo Freire's critical pedagogy¹¹³ - are all examples of this variety. What I find interesting about this text though is its claim that "[s]chools must focus on human relations and address the core of the problem"¹¹⁴ even though the first "relational proposition" of the manifesto reads, "A relation is more real than the things it brings together. Human beings and non-human things acquire reality only in relations to other beings and things"¹¹⁵. It is in the return to human relation alone that I find limitations, particularly given the equally significant non-human relations that these authors deem as part and parcel of these educational dilemmas.¹¹⁶

The first chapter in Bingham and Sidorkin's edited book is by Biesta, the same scholar I referred to frequently in chapter two and who helped me to see how Freire's model of emancipation posited a dependency of the student on the teacher. Interestingly, in "'Mind the Gap!' Communication and the Educational Relation"¹¹⁷, Biesta theorizes communication as essential in pedagogical relations. He reviews three modes in which communication has been used to theorize pedagogical relations: communication as transmission, communication as

¹¹³ Charles Bingham and Alexander M. Sidorkin, eds., introduction to *No Education Without Relation* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2004): 1-2. Footnote included in original.

¹¹⁴ Bingham and Sidorkin, eds., *No Education Without Relation*, 6.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Worth noting here is an additional article by Alexander Sidorkin, "Toward a Pedagogy of Relation," *Philosophical Studies in Education* 32 (2000): 9-14. He extends the conversation noted here, but also refers to the ways in which both Noddings and Frank Margonis have used the language of "ontologically basic" in referring to relations in educational theory. This almost sounds Latourian, but both, like the other texts discussed here, remain within the human realm. Noddings does the best job, I think, of identifying the non-human horizons for such theorizing, noting too, the need for more work to be done in this regard.

¹¹⁷ Gert J.J. Biesta, "'Mind the Gap!' Communication and the Educational Relation," in *No Education Without Relation*, eds. Charles Bingham and Alexander M. Sidorkin (New York: Peter Lang, 2004).

participation, and communication as performative enunciation. I find the last of these most compelling as it goes beyond a literal definition of language. Biesta suggests “that rather than thinking of communication as a direct relation between teacher and students [which is consistent with my efforts to dispel correspondence in pedagogy], [he] argues that there is a gap between teacher and student. This gap is a necessary condition for communication – and hence education – to take place.”¹¹⁸ The idea of the gap itself resonates with Latourian translation. Indeed, Biesta calls this gap an “*in-between*”¹¹⁹ space and challenges us to consider transformation rather than transmission as inherently characteristic of the gap. He tells us that “what is at stake in the shift from representation to enunciation is that meaning is radically placed *inside* the process of communication”¹²⁰ and borrows from Bhabha’s theorizing of translation. Here’s where I get hung up and tossed back into the Modern Constitution: if “the gap in which education takes place is, after all, ultimately unrepresentable”¹²¹, how does it help us to theorize the mediations (say, between Fendler’s animal or child and an adult) as communicative alone? This seems to be another example of how we frequently put humans or human systems (of language, communication, even representation) in the role of intermediary, thereby reproducing inequality.

Finally, I’ll draw from one last example of a relationally pedagogical approach. Cultural Studies has long offered what it calls a “*relational model*”¹²². Cultural Studies uses regimes of

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 11.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 18.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 19.

¹²¹ Ibid, 21.

¹²² Paul Du Gay et al, *Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman*, 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2013): xiii. Italics in original.

representation, variously defined, to theorize relations in its “circuit of culture”. While committed to a similar sense of slippage in translation as Latour does and theorizing humans as well as non-human things as capable of mediating one another, Cultural Studies had maintained (until recently) a Nature/Culture divide in its efforts to extend sociological contributions of cultural theory, including those applied in educational/pedagogical contexts.

This component of Cultural Studies has come into explicit debate since Latour, Callon and Law¹²³ and others in Science Studies have made what some have called an ontological turn. Cultural Studies had not gone far enough in breaking down the Nature/Culture divide in the past, but I’ve learned in the course of this project that Cultural Studies has since begun grappling with its own ontological turn. *Cultural Studies Review*, a flagship journal in the field, regularly hosts articles by Latour¹²⁴, and the latest (second) edition’s introduction of *Doing Cultural Studies*, speaks directly to the Latourian challenge facing the field: “Latour’s focus on materiality has been seen as a challenge to the cultural turn.”¹²⁵ Addressing this is serving to also address a larger crisis of relevance in Cultural Studies. Attending to messy, hybrid assemblages that do not reproduce the Nature/Culture divide is helping do this in Cultural Studies. I will borrow from one such theorist writing in Cultural Studies, Kathleen Stewart, in the next chapter. She marks for me the possibility within Cultural Studies to move beyond the human system of representation as intermediary.

In the examples above, I point to how theorizing relations in pedagogy is frequently limited to the human sphere, but also how humans and human systems are frequently

¹²³ Du Gay et al, *Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman*, xviii.

¹²⁴ It’s worth noting that Rancière is another common contributor.

¹²⁵ Du Gay et al, *Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman*, xviii.

deployed as facilitators – intermediaries – of pedagogy in a way consistent with the inequalities of Latour's Modern Constitution. The Modern Constitution's assumptions of inequality can be seen in the ways relations are dichotomized and decontextualized. Humans are held separate from non-humans. Human linguistic and communication systems are deemed necessary intermediators through which actors must pass to be in relation. This reproduces the dichotomy between humans and non-humans, and it also posits an inequality between the supposed intermediary and mediator(s). Although translation is noted in the case of cultural studies, correspondence otherwise seems to be the eye of the needle we must always negotiate to enter into relations in the Modern Constitution. Each of these assumptions causes significant problems in pedagogical theorizing because the very relations that constitute what might be considered pedagogical – as in Fendler's example of the girl or animal who teaches emotional sensitivity without speaking - are obstructed. The relations are interrupted – interfered with – by adding lots of qualifiers into the equation. In other words, in dichotomizing the relations between actors, we dis-place the way they relate to one another. When actors are no longer in relation, pedagogy ceases, and where there is no pedagogy occurring, there is nothing in common to attend to.

Latour, moving to a non-modern framework, challenges us to read pedagogy as an already fully-deployed relational event between mediators both human and non-human and in attending to those relations, to describe how change or translation occurs between mediators. Relational models reliant on intermediaries, however, revert to the work of the Modern Constitution, reproducing inequalities that further obstruct relations in pedagogy.

Assumptions of Equality in the Non-Modern Constitution: Irreducible and Translating

Mediators

[N]othing can be reduced to anything else, nothing can be deduced from anything else, everything may be allied to everything else.
- Latour¹²⁶

Latour's contributions of irreducibility and translation re-assemble the site of relations in pedagogy such that equality is assumed from the outset, making them part and parcel of the non-Modern Constitution. All things (human, non-human, living, and non-living) must be considered as actors on their own terms. These mediators are also not reducible to intermediating systems. They may mediate with language or the concept of correspondence, but they are not reducible to them or dependent upon them.

Latour's principles of irreducibility and translation help us imagine more-than-human and more-than-human systems' possibilities for theorizing relations in pedagogy. In Latour's Non-Modern Constitution, dichotomies are replaced by an acknowledgment of the collective, and translation describes the process whereby actors maintain their uniqueness as does the mediating that occurs between them. In the context of pedagogical relations, where translation renders correspondence impossible, translation actually resuscitates the possibility for relations between actors and, therefore, pedagogy. Pedagogy becomes possible again.

¹²⁶ Bruno Latour, *The Pasteurization of France*, trans. by Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988): 163.

This singularity, this irreducibility, highlights the act of translation that occurs between mediators: “for Latour, translation is ubiquitous; any relation is a mediation, never some pristine transmission of data across a noiseless vacuum.”¹²⁷ In other words, translation stipulates non-correspondence between the actors. It assumes that hybrid, messy and collective assemblages¹²⁸ are comprised of mediators in varying ways and that something is always created and something is always lost in the affecting of mediators upon one another. In calling this translation, Latour

“borrows the concept of translation from Michel Serres, who uses it to describe a specific kind of mediation that simultaneously transmits and distorts a signal. Translation involves movement and displacement. It thus creates a pattern of both order and disorder (Brown 2002).”¹²⁹

Latour and others in science studies provide many examples of how things living and non-living hang together as mediators undergoing translation. One of my favorite Latour’s example of the Berliner Key.¹³⁰ Well-known to travellers staying in European hotels, fairly large and clunky keys are now given to guests to ensure that the keys are not lost or forgotten in one’s pocket. My husband and I usually have to concoct some plan for where to store the key and how to remember where we stored it since it would be a ridiculously weighty thing to carry along on any hike. But, European hotel keys weren’t always this way. They’ve undergone a long series of transformations, and rather than being some kind of social phenomena in and of themselves, Latour demonstrates how the Berliner key is made up of “chains which are

¹²⁷ Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics*, 77.

¹²⁸ These descriptors seem very common to me when reading in Science and Technology Studies scholarship inspired by Latour, Callon, and Law.

¹²⁹ Anders Blok and Torben Elgaard Jensen, *Bruno Latour: Hybrid Thoughts in a Hybrid Word* (New York: Routledge, 2011): 37.

¹³⁰ Bruno Latour, “Technology is Society Made Durable,” in *A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology, and Domination*, ed. John Law (New York: Routledge, 1991): 132-61.

associations of human...and non-humans”¹³¹ including “the will of the manager, the hardness of his words [to those losing smaller keys], the multiplicity of signs [reminding guests to leave their key at the front desk], the [growing] weight of his keys”¹³². Taking together, these series of translations between mediators both human and non-human have the effect of what we’ve come to know as the clunky European hotel key.

In the case of Callon’s domesticated scallops¹³³ (considered to be the acting definition of translation in science studies), we learn about the assemblage of at least three actors – scallops, fishermen, and scientist colleagues – and the ways in which these living and non-living things negotiate roles in answering the question: “does *Pecten maximus* anchor?”¹³⁴ Callon’s fascinating story includes a long list of additional actors enrolled in answering this question, including tides, viruses, parasites, displaced fishing lines, depth and material of fishing lines¹³⁵, and in so doing, Callon outlines a “vocabulary of translation”¹³⁶, and I quote these directly:

- “the notion of translation emphasizes the continuity of the displacements and transformations”
- “to translate is to displace”
- “translation is a process before it is a result”

¹³¹ Bruno Latour, “Technology is Society Made Durable,” 110.

¹³² Ibid, 108.

¹³³ Michel Callon, “Some Elements of Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Science and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay,” in *Power, Action, and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?*, ed. John Law (London: Routledge, 1986): 196-223.

¹³⁴ Callon, “Some Elements of Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Science and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay,” 7.

¹³⁵ See pages 10-12 for a full discussion.

¹³⁶ Callon, “Some Elements of Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Science and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay,” 18-19.

- “The repertoire of translation is not only designed to give a symmetrical and tolerant description of a complex process which constantly mixes together a variety of social and natural entities. It also permits an explanation of how a few obtain the right to express and to represent the many silent actors of the social and natural worlds they have mobilized. ”

Here we see how Callon’s iterations of translation highlight the ethical implications of translation among living and non-living things.

John Law provides another unique example of irreducibility and translation in his study, “On the Methods of Long Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation, and the Portuguese Route to India”.¹³⁷ He argues “that it is not possible to understand this expansion unless the technological, the economic, the political, the social, and the natural are all seen as being interrelated.”¹³⁸ And in his accounting for the various mediators in the coinciding acts of translation, even more unlikely actors get enrolled, including “astrolabes and astronomical tables” and “the winds and current that lay between Lisbon and Calicut.”¹³⁹

In attending to the irreducible relations and the ways in which relations are translated in “series of many tiny events in history”¹⁴⁰, these examples illustrate the ways in which Latour (and by extension, science studies) enact an equality assumption paramount to ontological

¹³⁷ John Law, “On the Methods of Long Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation, and the Portuguese Route to India,” in *Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? (Sociological Review Monograph, no. 32)*, ed. John Law (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986): 234-63.

¹³⁸ John Law, “On the Methods of Long Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation, and the Portuguese Route to India,” 2.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Lynn Fendler, (accepted), “How is it Possible to Make a Difference? Agency, Actors, and Affect as Discourses of Change in Education Research,” in *Changes of Discourse and Discourses of Change in Educational Research*, eds. Paul Smeyers and Marc Depaepe (Dordrecht: Springer).

flattening. In re-assembling modern dichotomies (like that of Nature/Culture), we are able to witness relations on the ground, in the making, and in ways that I maintain are quite pedagogically sound:

To eliminate the great divides between science/society, technology/science, macro/micro, economics/research, humans/non-humans, and rational/irrational is not to immerse ourselves in relativism and indifferentiation. Networks are not amorphous. They are highly differentiated, but their differences are fine, circumstantial, and small; thus requiring new tools and concepts. Instead of sinking into relativism, it is relatively easy to float upon it.¹⁴¹

Latour moves away from what he calls “the modern settlement” found in both modern and postmodern modes of theorizing when he theorizes a Non-Modern Constitution. This equality turn makes some things possible for pedagogy that have not been possible in modern and postmodern theory. This equality move radically frees all potential actors from reduction and then characterizes the relations between actors as translation. This makes how I pedagogically mediate curriculum and how I mediate pedagogy both more complicated and infinitely more rich and generative.

As is the case in the touchstone examples I gave in the previous section, Latour’s conceptions of irreducibility and translation are inseparably intertwined such that the language of relations poses some restrictions as well. Re-lation implies a kind of correspondence. I wonder if it wouldn’t be wise for us to keep our relational language for discussing human components of pedagogy and to also augment our possibilities for theorizing messy and hybrid

¹⁴¹ Bruno Latour, “Technology is Society Made Durable,” 160.

assemblages of pedagogical associations with not only the concept of translation but also the term “translationships”. While relations and relationships have proved useful for theorizing human, even linguistic and representational, dimensions of pedagogy, translations or translationships (of which relations are a type) might allow us to also account for the more-than-human, more-than-linguistic, and more-than-representational dimensions of pedagogical relations.

Concept: translationship

(more-than-relational; more-than-human; more-than linguistic; more-than-representation)

Translationships is not intended to replace the "relations" literature that helps us see how pedagogy between people can be and is thoroughly relational. Translationships help us to theorize the role of relationships within yet a broader context (a context that includes everything else). For, pedagogy that is only theorized in terms of humans is impoverished and bound to continue dichotomizing and decontextualizing (i.e. reproducing the inequalities of the Modern Constitution), both in terms of who/what participates in pedagogy and how that pedagogy becomes constituted.

Now, pedagogical relations has been translated to translation’s pedagogy. I will use this term in reference to what Latour makes possible as I continue. Translation’s pedagogy includes human and more-than-human, linguistic and more-than-linguistic, representational and more-than-representational approaches to theorizing associations (what/who) and associating (how) in the non-modern collective.

Translation's Pedagogy

Everything will be absolutely concrete; all objects and all modes of dealing with objects will now be on the same footing.
- Harman¹⁴²

There is nothing special about language that allows it to be distinguished from the rest for any length of time.
- Harman¹⁴³

Pedagogy after Latour's ontological flattening, translation's pedagogy, takes on a more ecological¹⁴⁴ flavor. That is, pedagogy after Latourian equality must equally attend to all human and non-human mediators in relation as well as the way these mediators translate in their affecting. There are no relationships without transformation, even if they initially appear similar. We could, of course, always add more actors into the networks and see how they influence the nodes of confluence among actors affecting one another, but one call I feel issued by Latour's reassembling of the social is to attend to the relations on the ground. One must account for one's own role in attending to those relations, and in attending to the relations in all their variety and ambiguity, we can begin to see pedagogy as an(other) relational event already deployed with all of its own actors. This requires labor, sweat to build, maintain, and investigate. In this way, we see events, concepts, mediators as hybrid assemblages, and we also see pedagogy as the event of attending to these other actor-networks¹⁴⁵ in the context of its

¹⁴² Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics*, 13.

¹⁴³ Latour, *The Pasteurization of France*, 184-5. This is also cited in Harman's discussion: Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics*, 24.

¹⁴⁴ Brett Merritt, "A Study of Understanding: Alchemy, Abstraction, and Circulating Reference in Tertiary Science Education" (PhD Diss, Michigan State University, 2013): 102-108.

¹⁴⁵ Blok and Jensen discuss Latour's networks as consistent with the concept of immanence,

relations and associations. Neither can be accounted for outside of its relations, and for this reason, Latour's ontological flattening is profoundly pedagogical and quite responsibly so.

As noted, the very word "re-lations" itself is resonant of correspondence, and "For Latour, one thing never resembles another in the least, and for this reason correspondence and unveiling are equally fruitless models of truth."¹⁴⁶ Trans-lations is a better word for describing relations in a Latourian landscape, for it accounts both for the variety of actors and characterizes the manner in which mediators become related. To treat pedagogy as correspondence, a dichotomized task that decontextualizes the people-things in relation, may or may not even get us correspondence. Correspondence is hard to promise. Yet, we keep seeking it like addicts. Latour's model of translation as composition provides an alternative to correspondence as both means and end. But, how does pedagogy under such circumstances proceed? Latour suggests that rather stay locked in a posture of critique, we must move to one of creation, or composition.

making it consistent with non-representational theories. See Blok and Jensen, *Bruno Latour: Hybrid Thoughts in a Hybrid Word*, 15 for a fuller discussion as well as commentary on Latour's willingness to ANT.

¹⁴⁶ Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics*, 19.




Figure 1. Composing Non-Pedagogy. Adapted by author from Bruno Latour, "On Technical Mediation—Philosophy, Sociology, Genealogy," *Common Knowledge* 3, no. 2 (1994): 34.

This adaptation of Latour's model illustrates how multiple translations taken together constitute what he calls "composition"¹⁴⁷ and what I am calling "non-pedagogy". In his "An Attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto", Latour disavows the need to look "forward" or "back", but rather looks to what can be assembled or composed. This act of creation, "componere" in French, is an alternative to critique, which for Latour, has run out of steam¹⁴⁸. In the case of my project, the multiple translations of an assumption of equality, we might say, result in a

¹⁴⁷ Bruno Latour, "An Attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto," *New Literary History* 41, no. 3 (2010): 471-490.

¹⁴⁸ Bruno Latour, "Why Has Critique Run out of Steam: From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern," *Critical Inquiry* 30, no. 2 (2004): 225-248.

composition of pedagogy after equality or non-pedagogy. In other cases, composition is the descriptive placeholder for, say, climate change or a certain piece of animal rights' legislation.

The language of "relations" has allowed us to do some robust theorizing of human-to-human connections in pedagogy. Thanks to Latour, we can now also theorize what might be pedagogical about multiple non-human things in association - and more-than-linguistic and more-than-corresponding about those associations. This has serious implications for curriculum, not just pedagogy. For when pedagogy becomes attending to translations among any actors and in more-than-human ways, curriculum must unhinge from what it traditionally has done. Curriculum is not only between teachers and students any longer. Curriculum is not only mediated through human modes of communication and representation. Curriculum, indeed, cannot correspond at all.

Seen this way, translation's pedagogy is an act of creation. Composition in a Latourian sense is even more than a co-production. Rarely are relations only between two things but between many. Hybrid assemblages aren't just inchoate masses; they are only joined in their doing to one another. If Rancière helped me to see pedagogy as inherently relational, Latour helps me those relations as a boiling and turbulent mass of pressure, some times pushing and pulling or leaving the relations altogether. The imagery of the hot molten lava at the center of earth comes to mind. Nothing is fixed or definite. It all continues moving, changing, interchanging, mixing, and convoluting what we just had one second ago and will be gone in the

next. Here we see things similar come to us again differently. Here, we see how attending to a thing in common is messy, complicated, and powerful work¹⁴⁹.

I don't want to address curriculum, generally, in this project. I do think I need to attend here, however, to a "curriculum of pedagogy", commensurate with Latourian equality. Pedagogy changes if we assume a Rancièrian equality or a Latourian equality. Gone are the days of "find some way to connect topic x to the child's life" or "make learning relevant". This approach would align with the blackboxed model of pedagogy, the one where pedagogy sits waiting on a shelf for us to use at will. In a Latourian model, pedagogy is happening all of the time in myriads of different assemblages. We find ourselves in the position of choosing which ongoing acts of pedagogy to attend to and how to account for our attending, for it is quite possible that in attending to things in a pedagogical relation that we enter into that already fully deployed event as well. What follows are four related insights I have gleaned from rethinking a study of pedagogy after Latour's equality move:

- The Location of Pedagogy
- The Study of Pedagogy as Effect
- The Study of Pedagogy as Opening Blackboxes
- Making Pedagogy More Real: Building Allies

¹⁴⁹ The sheer detail required to recount any aspect of Latour's work is further testament to this. There is *always* more detail to go into, but while laborious, it is also extremely generative - a characteristic I think I am going to add to my list of "Pedagogy worth attending to must be...".

The Location of Pedagogy

We've seen how pedagogical relations can be reduced to humans and human systems, treating some things as intermediaries, gatekeepers, in mediation. When we place anything in the intermediary role, we assume an inequality between actors. Latour might also call this an asymmetry (the point of which is his re-assembling of the social) or symmetrical anthropology¹⁵⁰. In any event, *between* is where we must go to locate pedagogy.

I want to emphasize here the very material-relational way in which Latour makes it possible to redistribute pedagogy. Pedagogy is now squarely located between mediators in translation. Pedagogy is not only in the head, and it is not only psychological¹⁵¹. Pedagogy does not only occur in schools or as a part of formal education. The sites of pedagogy are multiple and can be exclusively between non-human actors. Finally, relations are always an act of transformation. Correspondence makes no sense in a Latourian view of the world.

In radically relocating pedagogy in relations or between things in relation, my attention is moved out of a Nature/Culture binary (thus moving pedagogy also out of the head) and out of schooling alone. In the Modern Constitution, pedagogy occurs as a praxis between two poles: Nature/Culture, teaching/learning, content/pedagogy, student/teacher, school/home. Translation's pedagogy is located in the translating. The translating is the pedagogy, and pedagogy is the translating among any mediators. They are co-constituted. The need for correspondence falls away, and for this reason, Latour provides us with a terrific model of contingent foundations. Nothing is relative or certain, but translations are related relative to

¹⁵⁰ Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, 103.

¹⁵¹ For an in-depth analysis of how pedagogy can be moved from the mental to the logistical realms, see Brett Merritt, "A Study of Understanding: Alchemy, Abstraction, and Circulating Reference in Tertiary Science Education".

one another¹⁵². It is at this point that Latour makes possible what has not been as thoroughly possible previously. In the case of pedagogy, Latour makes it possible to unhinge relations from correspondence, allowing what is made or not made in translation be responsible for the success of any given pedagogical composition.

This middle ground of translations becomes my pedagogical powerhouse. It is the thing I attend to when I teach, and it is the place that pedagogy continually returns to. Translations are where everything else begins and transpires. Much like the process of composition in writing, pedagogy is recursive, and we must depart from and return to the same relations in different ways many times for pedagogy as a process of composition to unfold.

I am suggesting, in another sense, that relations are the centerpiece from which pedagogy radiates like a wheel running over the same path but more worn or with increasing speed, each time different although ever so similar. Considering these relations as translational allows me the freedom to attend to uptake¹⁵³ and difference as it comes into presence in various forms. A singer can't control what is going to happen in a performance. You just prepare as well as you can for that event and then attune yourself in the context of the performance to the factors weighing in. I can be similarly flexible when I attend to translations as pedagogy, remembering that without translation there would be no pedagogy at all, but with translations, the opportunities for pedagogy comparatively flourish.

The metaphor of the genealogical tree has long been eschewed in poststructuralist

¹⁵² Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, 111-114.

¹⁵³ Noddings calls this "reciprocity" in Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, 69-73.

circles, where the metaphors of rhizome, nomad, network/meshworks¹⁵⁴, to name just a few, are typically preferred. The point is to get away from the structuralist and foundational styles of theorizing and to find metaphors more poststructural and more appropriate to contingent foundations. I do not intend to invoke this classic tree metaphor, but I would like to revisit and theorize a part of the tree as metaphor, specifically, the trunk.

If we shift our attention from the roots or branches of the tree to the trunk, we can theorize very different relationships. Think, for instance, of the Womping Willow in the Harry Potter series. It is a big, old tree with the girth to prove it. This Womping Willow, in addition to all its magical powers, is insanely strong and flexible. Its trunk bends and twists in a way that only a very limber and strong tree trunk could. Over the years, we imagine the strength it gathers in order to girdle the challenges seen at Hogwarts. This strength has the uncanny ability of making the tree even more flexible.

Vocal performers (and likely any instrumentalist who relies on breath flow) know this phenomenon well. The torso - its many fibers, tissues, and connective materials en suite - supports the breath, the line of which (the “breathline”) is broken as little as possible even though affects like staccato and glissando might hint otherwise. It is the ever-present girdle of the torso that makes such astounding sounds seem effortless and as if the technically daunting musical score was written for beginners. Ask any classically trained vocalist: The breathline is the lifeline of all singers; it is what makes beautiful and technically difficult singing seem

¹⁵⁴ This double delineation is a common demarcation of similarity and difference between Latour’s networks and Ingold’s meshworks. For a lovely discussion of this, see Tim Ingold, “When ANT Meets SPIDER: Social Theory for Arthropods,” in *Material Agency: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Approach*, eds. Carl Knappett and Lambors Malafouris (New York: Spring Science+Business Media, LLC, 2008): 209-215.

effortless. We have the strength and flexibility of our trunks to thank for that, and we work hard – daily - to maintain that strength and flexibility.

Latour's argument for attending to the overlooked Middle might be similar to this. For, similar to the ways in which giant old trees and well-trained vocalists know, the strength of our pedagogical allies lay in this middle ground, the trunk of pedagogical translations. The strength of allies that are possible to recruit there lend to a pedagogical flexibility notably different from that of pedagogies stemming from foundations (the roots) or structures (branches).

It is this middle ground, this girded trunk that lends strength to pedagogical theorizing. It lends us the possibility to theorize a strong and flexible sense of relations and translations in pedagogy after Latour's assumption of equality. This is not the same as saying that we must build our pedagogy on a strong foundation, but rather it suggests that we can nurture strong and flexible translations as we attend to a thing in common. If we start from the middle - the between - the translation, then we can also trace the rhizomatic ways in which translations occur.

In a very literal way then, Latour attends to things in common. That is to say, he attends to the linkages *between* and the affects or forces bringing those things in and out of association. To borrow from Rancière, translation's pedagogy¹⁵⁵ can be called attending to a thing in common for the following reasons. First, it is based on an assumption of equality that all actors are equally capable of acting and making linkages. Second, these acts of linking - or translation - are relational in so far that they are between actors. This new, third thing that is created is filled with uncertainty and ambiguity, which fourthly, creates opportunities to come into presence

¹⁵⁵ This is my characterization.

with these linkages, putting one's self, of course, into relation with the thing(s) in common we are attending to. It is in this way that we see how dis-locating assumptions of inequality can locate pedagogy as the very linkages and associations that bring those actors into translation in the first place. Defining pedagogy in this way follows Latour's notion that it is helpful to think of what we are describing in translations as an effect rather than a cause. This disrupts what is sensible about pedagogy - something that causes particular outcomes. Latour inverts this relationship with his principle of irreducibility.

The Study of Pedagogy as Effect

Under the precepts of the Modern Constitution, we talk about pedagogy as cause. This is a behavioral model. It is behavioral because it seeks to make pedagogy as an idealized and decontextualized concept as capable of putting teaching and learning (as two other idealized and decontextualized concepts) into relationship. Pedagogical Content Knowledge certainly does this in a more nuanced way. Pedagogical relations, as explored previously, infers that we can make relations that improve pedagogy. Each of these claim that pedagogy causes the relations and effects that it brings into being.

With Latour's flattened ontologies, modern dichotomizing gives way to a symmetrical anthropology¹⁵⁶. This invocation of equality, "the point of the flat ontology, the point of the symmetry between humans and non-humans, is also that actor-network theory presents a way of undoing ontology."¹⁵⁷ Said differently:

¹⁵⁶ See footnote 150.

¹⁵⁷ Here, I am quoting Noortje Marres in Latour, Harman, and Erdélyi, *The Prince and the Wolf: Latour and Harman at the LSE*, 89.

...the fact that in the descriptions of actor-network theory we continuously encounter actant forces, affects, and at one point ANT even stated very clearly that an object is an effect. But if we engage in studying specific objects, we do not find this singularized thing that is well put-together, as an object. We do not find it at the foundation but we find it as an emergent effect. So a star system is an emerging effect; an architectural building is an emerging effect.¹⁵⁸

Pedagogy, too, can be seen as an emerging effect and not “natural” or inevitable in any way.

Pedagogy as effect looks for what is pedagogical between things (in the middle). It seeks to find forces of connectivity and association that hold human, non-human, living, and non-living things in relation. Here, pedagogy is described as something that has happened or is happening in relations, and in that happening, pedagogy becomes. Such effects have the further affects of drawing our attention to the place or location of pedagogy again. We see that pedagogy is not only between but also decidedly not *outside of* or *other than* any given set of relations. In this way, pedagogy is returned to whatever the context is of its relations. Some might say we find pedagogy again in the disciplines, but as Latour and also Popkewitz¹⁵⁹ remind us, relations are always in the process of being translated, even in disciplines. One thing we are left more sure of is that pedagogy didn’t “begin” in education and get applied to the “real world”.

What’s the value-added in thinking about pedagogy as effect? One outcome of defining pedagogical relations in these ways is the ability to see relationships between pedagogy and relations inverted: pedagogy is no longer the cause of relations but the effect of relations. I inverted this relationship in a way that can be seen when we compare “pedagogical relations” to “translation’s pedagogy”. Translation’s pedagogy is an effect of attending to the connections

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, 91.

¹⁵⁹ Thomas S. Popkewitz, “How the Alchemy Makes Inquiry, Evidence, and Exclusion,” *Journal of Teacher Education* 53, no. 3 (May/June 2002): 262-267.

between things. Previous literature on relations in pedagogy assumes that pedagogy causes certain relations. It assumes causes that lead to certain effects. Translation's pedagogy frames pedagogy as an effect that is traceable. Translations are the links that connect things, and pedagogy can be both the relations in translationship and the additional layer of attending to those translations.

Because effects, and not causes, are what we can attend to, our pedagogy need not be additive. It is adequate enough, when mediators are considered always already emancipated, to attend to the linkages between things, asking What do we see?, How do we know?, and What do we make of it? Rancière helps us to identify a thing in common once we've come to think of ourselves as intelligent as anyone else. Latour can help us attend to those things in common.

The Study of Pedagogy as Opening Blackboxes

As discussed previously, educators frequently claim they will use "pedagogy" to "build relations". Latour, meanwhile, would take the concept of pedagogy as an effect of translations, and open it like Pandora's box. In opening "blackboxes", we can describe the relations that result in pedagogy. In a Latourian universe, we only know pedagogy by its relations, however strong or weak, ethical or unethical. Latour's ontological flattening suggests we don't have to build relations as much as attend to them. Pedagogy, in this sense, becomes an attending to effects rather than a cause to produce some behavioral output.

When we place pedagogy in the middle – that is *in the translations between* – actors, we cannot help but to open blackboxes on any number of topics. Actors become fully deployed

events¹⁶⁰. Previously, pedagogy was like any other blackbox “so firmly established that we are able to take its interior for granted. The internal properties of a black box do not count as long as we are concerned only with its input and output.”¹⁶¹ I can’t help but think of how well suited the description of blackboxes are for pedagogy in the Modern Constitution. Conversely, translation’s pedagogy opens blackboxes, inviting uncertainty, even discomfort, back into the relations of pedagogy.

Latour also redistributes the sensible, to use a Rancièrian phrase, when he re-assembles the Modern Constitution. In opening the blackbox of modernity, Latour has provided a rich methodological approach to thick assemblages - or networks - that comprise the translationships that constitute actors. Any actor, as a fully deployed event, can be blackboxed, but this leads to a misunderstanding of both the actor and the network of relations that manifest that actor. Opening blackboxes, therefore, becomes a central to the task of Latourian-inspired pedagogy.

Latour tells us that things that are blackboxed are low-maintenance but not maintenance-free¹⁶². I’m opening up common ways of blackboxing pedagogy (pedagogy as facilitation; pedagogy as emancipation; pedagogy as relational; pedagogy as transferring or transmitting dispositions) in that I am exploring the assumption of inequality in pedagogical relations. To do unpack these blackboxes in pedagogy, a series of translations is under way to re-define pedagogy. I am trying to rally enough actors (and allies) to gain enough strength in

¹⁶⁰ Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics*, 47.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, 33.

¹⁶² Ibid, 55.

negotiation with these other, more common, definitions of pedagogy. This is not low-maintenance; it requires sweat, the effects of which are now traceable.

Making Pedagogy More Real: Building Allies

When we think about pedagogy after Rancière's assumption of equality of intelligence, we find pedagogy to be a thing in common, translating between a teacher and a student, both assumed equally intelligent. After a Latourian flattening, we can theorize those pedagogical relations more thoroughly. Specifically, I can theorize the ways in which pedagogy's relations are not limited to teacher and students as well as how pedagogy's relations after this assumption of equality cannot rely on correspondence theories to explain relations or pedagogy. Harman nicely characterizes the work required in making pedagogical translations: "all relations in the world are of only one kind: trials of strength."¹⁶³ In other words, pedagogical relations and translations always entail work and attending to those will also. We have to do the work required to attend to make the translations and the work required to attend to translationships. In the correspondence model of pedagogy, it is easy enough to avoid the sweat, labor, and responsibility pedagogy entails, or conversely, to overwork a relation in which translation is not being allowed to occur. Either way, very little traction is acquired.

This is not the kind of pedagogy schooling is built for. Increasingly schools are designed for modern, correspondence-oriented treatments of more or less neat and tidy arrangements of digestible material. Still challenging, but utterly "do-able" in the end. Maybe this points to one reason why Rancière maintains that schooling will never be non-emancipatory. If schools

¹⁶³ Ibid, 25.

started from an assumption of equality, it would have to let everything in, in all its disputability and eruptability. Schooling's entire premise is built upon an assumption that some pieces can be put together correctly and that doing so will result in greater equality. In the process of Latourian composition, we have almost a Darwinian sense of actors, all equal in the opportunity to participate, but work must be done to stay in the game. That work might come in the form of physical strength or cleverness or flexibility or endurance, but sweat is always associated with staying in relation in a Latourian model.

"Latour holds that a thing becomes increasingly real *the more* associations it has."¹⁶⁴ An example Latour provides follows: "'A sentence does not hold together because it is true, but *because it holds together* we say that it is 'true''"¹⁶⁵. I particularly like this in light of what I am trying to imagine as an alternative to dichotomized and decontextualized approaches to pedagogy. What appeals to me most is the labor required to build the strength of any pedagogical theory but also the labor required to know that pedagogical approach, including its assumptions, history, and the relations/translations constituting it. When we require the recruitment of allies to make a stronger argument for any pedagogical approach, we also contextualize that approach within its constituent relations. It's not ahistorical, floating, or free. Translation's pedagogy is a historicized pedagogy.

Similarly, "Since actants are always completely deployed in their relations with the world, and the more they are cut off from these relations, the less real they become."¹⁶⁶ This again emphasizes the needs to know who is or isn't being recruited, but also points to how we

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 75.

¹⁶⁵ Latour, *The Pasteurization of France*, 185-6. Harman also cites this quote in Harman, *Prince of Networks*, 22.

¹⁶⁶ Latour, *The Pasteurization of France*, 19.

can weaken or reconstitute relations in pedagogy we deem unsuitable, unethical, ahistoricized, or unsuitable for pedagogical purposes. Of course, we can still choose to build angels or monsters out of the allies we recruit for pedagogy, but what Latour's theory enables us to do better is to see our pedagogy in terms of its relations, in all their ugliness and in all their glory, and of course, contend both with forces we have much or little control over. In a very radical way, Latour makes it entirely feasible – if we are willing to the work - to historicize, contextualize, make more real our relations relative to other relations.

When Latour puts all things, living and non-living, on the same ontological plane, things previously not given the ability to “speak” speak. Even figurative and literal meanings become equally “real”. An example from Harman's text: An “engineer must *negotiate* with the mountain...”¹⁶⁷ Each time I make my great grandmother's strudel, the dough speaks to me. It's viscosity - reliant on so many variables, including the temperature of the room, the surface material I am kneading on, the humidity outside - tells me when it is ready to rest or be stretched. I speak back in part by trying to control certain conditions, but in the end, I'm really just choosing to make the strudel on a day when I know the dough will like the conditions and therefore, cooperate with me!

Latour's non-Modern Constitution challenges us to open our definitions of pedagogical relationships beyond humans and beyond language. In so doing, it becomes possible to imagine pedagogy that honors the interpersonal but does not reduce it to human terms alone. When equality is presumed, a person/student/actor can connect to other pedagogical events. In attendance to these connections, more affect/more pedagogy occurs. Connections can come in

¹⁶⁷ Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics*, 18.

many forms, and they need not be limited/reduced to humans, language, correspondence, or anything other intermediating explanation. Translation augments relations. It puts relations into context with and on the same ontological footing as all other living and non-living things, forcing neither correspondence nor despair.

Non-Modern Translations as a Characteristic of Non-Pedagogy

Pedagogy after ontological equality lets all things (human and non) participate equally as mediators in pedagogy. These relations are characterized as translational. This labor of translation, which necessitates misunderstanding - a betrayal of correspondence - defines pedagogical relations among living and non-living things. Taken together, we can call these ongoing translations part of a broader composition. I am characterizing translation's ongoing process of composition as pedagogical and constituted in the various translations that occur between the messy, hybrid assemblages of living and non-living things.

With Latour, I can see pedagogy as an attending to the connections among any things. It is more than a relation, in the human sense, in the correspondence sense, and without relation, or recognition of that relation, attending to pedagogy as a thing in common is not possible. I have made an effort to equally open pedagogies that humans participate in with non-human things. One implication of this is that pedagogy affects not only people but also any actant in the network. We must, therefore, consider pedagogy's implications for non-human actors as well as human ones.

To be able to attend to relations that network not just humans but anything – living and non-living opens the parameters of pedagogy up in ways that have not historically been

privileged, particularly when we see that one does not need an expert mediator to describe or explain these relations in order to be pedagogical. Pedagogy is also not limited to matters of human interest alone, and it is not limited to human actors. When a wolf is making sense of the caribou migration or a strange human visitor to its territory, it can be read as a pedagogy of relations. When a scientist is studying the relations, the non-human networks that support the life of a certain kind of fish in an ecosystem¹⁶⁸, they are performing a type of pedagogy.

Pedagogy, we find is all around us; it is the everyday activities of things and people being and doing. What the ignorant schoolmaster learns to do is to attend to these things and ask the three questions: What do I see? How do I know? What do I make of it? Teachers can ask questions and verify searching. But this act of pedagogy does not have to be limited to relations between teachers and students. Indeed, students learn things when reading or meeting new people, or watching a movie. Are the relations between a student and a non-living thing, like a book, similar to pedagogical relations between a student and teacher? I maintain that we have to extend the same possibilities for pedagogy between human and non-human actors. Pedagogy is the performance of attending to relations and, in so doing, “attending to a thing in common” becomes an(other) actor in pedagogy. Pedagogy is an actor in pedagogical events. You cannot separate it from the other relations. Attending to a thing in common is full of the content of that pedagogical event, and that pedagogical event is pedagogical, in part, because of the attending to a thing in common that in part constitutes it¹⁶⁹. Ethical pedagogy attends to just such relations and translations.

¹⁶⁸ Callon, “Some Elements of Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Science and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay.”

¹⁶⁹ Segall, “Revisiting Pedagogical Content Knowledge: The Pedagogy of Content/The Content of Pedagogy.” I also exemplified this co-constitution in Chapter 2.

When we are attending to relations, pedagogy - or education - can occur. Pedagogy can occur when relations are acknowledged. When we treat education/pedagogy representationally, we can't take as many relations into account. We, in effect, cut off pedagogy by decontextualizing relations when we make representational assumptions about what otherwise could be seen as a pedagogical actor. What I am proposing as non-pedagogy after a Latourian assumption of equality is a model more consistent with an ecological approach to pedagogy.

Latour's non-modern translations are a way of thinking about pedagogy ecologically, or to borrow from Feldman's notion of rewilding, pedagogy as rewilded. Rewilding is a term used by Feldman to describe the process of re-imagining nature as including humans¹⁷⁰. Its purpose is to dispel the binaries long held about wilderness as separate from humans and humans as separate from Nature. I've found that reworking similar relationships in pedagogy is useful for thinking pedagogy after Latour's assumption of equality. Non-human things need to be seen as every bit a part of human pedagogy as pedagogy needs to be seen as more-than-human. In dispelling these binaries of their decontextualizing powers, pedagogy relative to its relations (or ecological, rewilded pedagogy) is more able to act, to perform, to compose.

Another way to see this process of composition at work is to review the process by which I am composing the term non-pedagogy. We began with the term "pedagogy", and then I ran interference on that term through Rancière's assumption of equality of intelligence. That process then was interfered with by another attempt at asking what becomes of pedagogy after

¹⁷⁰ Feldman, *A Storied Wilderness: Rewilding the Apostle Islands*. Cronon contributes the foreword, "Irrevocable Lessons of Vanishing Fields," which also discussed the concept of rewilding.

equality is assumed. This time it was Latour's assumption of ontological equality. An approach, what I've been calling non-pedagogy, is being written along the way as all these interruptions and relations translate one another. This process gives us a way of thinking about composition as pedagogy differently as well as how non-emancipation, non-correspondence, and (next) non-representation can occur and accrue. In short, Latour provides insights for how to get out of our all-too-human inveiglement.

What's different about Latour's doubly-entwined contributions of irreducibility and translation is the way in which it disallows us to privilege the human, something frequently taken for granted in pedagogical theory. Similarly, other discussions about pedagogy treat language (another human invention) as the intermediary, as if language is needed to properly "fix" or make correspondence possible between human actors in pedagogy. It assumes that language or the proper use of language or the proper understanding of language is required to get the relations "right" or to correspond in pedagogical contexts. These examples demonstrate how an assumption of inequality (the need for facilitators or intermediaries) decontextualizes actors that might otherwise be in relation for the purposes of correspondence. How ironic that decontextualization supports correspondence and, further, that putting things back in relation (i.e. assuming mediators can mediate each other directly) might be characterized by inevitable slippage, translation, or betrayal of any original.

These educational translations provide us with a new way to think about pedagogy, pedagogy after equality. In the most literal of senses, with Rancière and Latour, pedagogy is becoming something that it never has been before.

Just as Latour makes the intimacy between his principle of irreductions and translation so clear, we see a similarly tight relationship between humans and language when it comes to educational discourses on relations in pedagogy. In fact, it only makes sense to rely on a communication model of relationship when humans are the only actors in the relation. When we move to a more-than-human model for tracing connections and associations between any living and non-living actors, we also need to move beyond language as the means for relating. Doing so will require two moves: 1) acknowledging non-language oriented actors like affect to speak and 2) move from a correspondence-based model of relations to a translation-oriented one. In other words, educational relations/hips needs to be augmented by educational translations/ships, where the trans acknowledges the collective of living and non-living things as well as various modes/styles/mediums of connectivity/association.

Non-modern, pedagogical translationships are not meant to replace pedagogical relationships, but includes pedagogical relations as a subset of all the various types of connections and associations at play in pedagogy. Pedagogical relation(s/ships) deal with the human-only components and dynamics of pedagogy. Pedagogical translation(s/ships) widen the scope of pedagogy to include more-than-human actors and more-than-linguistic connections.

I've tried to move pedagogy to multiple sites of relationality, not limiting it to something that must occur between and a student and teacher or in correspondence to something else. It certainly can happen between a teacher and student, but it may occur among a myriad of other configurations as well, including between human and non-human objects or between two or more non-human objects. Latour makes this possible, in fact challenges us to consider how this might be possible for pedagogy (or the pedagogical relation) when he ontologically flattens

everything.

When equality is assumed, the vast Middle Kingdom - the kingdom of relations – becomes visible. Attending to the way things are relating is pedagogy, is attending to a thing in common, is connecting the body to the head again. These relations can be characterized as the sinewy middle, the strong and flexible trunk that supports the ongoing pedagogy of relations. This is sacred ground for pedagogues; it's what makes our curriculum rich, the very thing our attending to a thing in common attends to.

The issue of affect points to exactly why going beyond language is important. Affect is typically unsayable, and acknowledging the more-than-human and more-than-human systems (of language, representation, communication, etc.) in the pedagogical translations heightens the need to attend to affect in educational translationships. Thinking about how to attend to these relations then as pedagogically powerful and what to do with them is where I turn in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

ATTENDING TO AFFECT: INSIGHTS FROM NON-REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY

In non-representational theories, watermelons can also be teachers.
- Fendler¹⁷¹

In the previous two chapters, I attended to what pedagogy becomes after Rancière's assumption of equality of intelligence and to what pedagogy becomes after Latour's ontological flattening. Rancière allowed me to imagine pedagogy as attending to a thing in common, an act that is inherently relational, requires embracing uncertainty in relations, and nurtures a coming into presence of the not yet. With Latour, I theorized relations in non-modern ways so to expand the field of potential mediators and to imagine how non-correspondence (or translation) characterizes pedagogy. Non-representational Theory (NRT) challenges me to imagine what pedagogy might become when we put everything on the same plane of immanence and call it material. In this chapter, representational approaches to pedagogical dispositions becomes non-representational approaches of affective attunement in pedagogy. NRT makes this possible in the way it assumes equality. For this reason, I am able to theorize something like affect as equally viable and relevant in pedagogical theory.

Is affect unsayable? You may find, as do I, irony in my writing about something that frequently is unsayable. Nonetheless, I am a human trying to mediate translations with other humans in this pedagogical event, and non-living actors like affect certainly play a role I want to attend to. For this reason, bringing language to the pedagogical event of discussing something

¹⁷¹ Fendler, "Teaching Theories," 190.

unsayable, allows me to translate a thing in common although incompletely and without the hope of correspondence¹⁷².

In order to write this chapter, I need to write in a different tone. This is a tone of performance, an act of experiment commensurate with the values and assumptions of non-representational theories. When writing non-representationally, one must put all things on the same plane of immanence, which in part means that you'll be reading more about actors, mediators who might not typically make their way into a dissertation or research project and how I am being affected by them and making my own affects in return.¹⁷³

Here, now, I want to attend to affect as a thing in common between multiple actants/mediators in pedagogical events, both human and non-human, and I want to do so in a way that puts affect on the same plane of immanence with all of those other mediators. The strong middle ground that Latour makes possible opens up a multiplicity of lines of flight¹⁷⁴. After Latour's ontological flattening, humans and non-humans can all act equally. They are irreducible to one another, and relations are characterized by translation to such an extent that we might augment our language about relations and relationships to include translations and translationships to account for the more-than-human, more-than-linguistic, and more-than-

¹⁷² Once again, Macaluso's argument about the pedagogy of translation is invoked here. Macaluso, "Literary Interpretation as Poetic Translation: Envisioning a Rancièrian Emancipatory Framework for Literature Instruction."

¹⁷³ Fendler, (accepted), "How is it Possible to Make a Difference? Agency, Actors, and Affect as Discourses of Change in Education Research." This does not mean that NRT encourages navel gazing. Although, it does require that navel gazing be given equal credence in pedagogical events.

¹⁷⁴ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*. In *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Volume 2, trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987): 9-10.

corresponding aspects of how pedagogical actors are linked. Latour invokes affect primarily as a verb while for NRT “affect embodies the full range of semiotic inflections of its various forms: affected, affectation, affectionate, affect/afféct, and affectable.”¹⁷⁵

To treat affect as an emancipated spectator, I need to let it narrate and translate on its own terms in my writing. In this way, I am entering into a translationship with affect, a linking that honors affect’s (as well as my) equality as a material actor. Another way to say this, would be to say that I have to let affect speak to me as I speak to it. As I write this, for instance, I wonder what will ever conspire from this experiment. I look out the window, where spring has sprung, the birds are chirping, and the snow is melting. This is not what I feel like. The weather affects me in a way that is simultaneously inspiring and maddening as I want to feel the same lightness-of-foot the weather seems to be invoking. Nonetheless, I write/I act as if I feel this way, as it feels like the way to get the work done and in-the-spirit-of what I am writing about. Affect, for me, now is full of conundrums. It is acting on me.

Introducing Non-representational Theory (NRT)

NRT has an uncanny way of capturing many aspects of what I’ve already discussed in the previous two chapters and refracting all of that back at me so that I must inescapably consider them again. Indeed, NRT’s relations are thick and flexible,

With roots in the fine and performing arts, solid foundations in human geography, and expansions across cultural studies, the humanities, and the social sciences, non-representational theory is a mosaic of theoretical ideas borrowed from fields as different as performance studies, material culture studies, science and technology studies, contemporary continental philosophy, political ecology, cultural geographies,

¹⁷⁵ Fendler, (accepted), “How is it Possible to Make a Difference? Agency, Actors, and Affect as Discourses of Change in Education Research,” 9.

ecological anthropology, biological philosophy, cultural studies, the sociology of the body and emotions, and the sociology and anthropology of the senses—only to name a few.

Theoretically, nonrepresentational theory stands as a synthesizing effort to amalgamate diverse but interrelated theoretical perspectives such as actor-network theory, biological philosophy, neomaterialism, process philosophy, speculative realism, social ecology, performance theory, post-structuralist feminism, critical theory, post-phenomenology, and pragmatism.¹⁷⁶

A jumping in and revisiting the past as new, the same as difference, is entirely what non-representational theories is up to: “Simplifying to the extreme, the phrase ‘non-representational’ announces the bypassing of the subservient relationship between one medium and another.”¹⁷⁷ This is another way of thinking about Latour’s placing of all things on the same ontological footing, where everything is a mediator in its own right: “Non-representational styles of thought treat everything usually regarded as representational (e.g. words, concepts, ideas, perceptions, and images) as events in their own right.”¹⁷⁸ So, as I began in Chapter three, I will continue to treat the idea of pedagogy itself as another fully deployed event in its own right, performed anew each time invoked.

Latour is one of the bedrocks of NRT; Deleuze is another. In my own reading, I have found Latour most useful in theorizing how NRT can do what it does, and I find Deleuze’s metaphors the most rich for describing what NRT makes possible. I proceed primarily from a Latourian understanding of NRT but one rich with Deleuzian metaphors. Latour himself speaks of the profound influence Deleuze has had upon his work, including his willingness to rename

¹⁷⁶ Phillip Vannini, “Non-Representational Research Methodologies: An Introduction,” in *Non-Representational Methodologies: Re-Envisioning Research (Routledge Advances in Research Methods)* (New York: Routledge, 2015): 3.

¹⁷⁷ Doel, “Representation and Difference,” 120.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

“actor-network” to “actant-rhizome ontology” (although it seemed a bit unwieldy)¹⁷⁹, and NRT scholars regularly draw on both.

Like Latour, “*non-representational theories work with a relational-material or ‘associative’ account of ‘the social’.*”¹⁸⁰ This social is populated by the vast assemblages¹⁸¹

Latour made possible when he re-assembled the Nature/Culture binary in modern thought.

More in the spirit of Deleuze, we find NRT in Latour’s non-modern space

weary of the structuralist heritage of the social sciences and suspicious of all attempts to uncover symbolic meaning where other, more practical forms of meaning or even no meaning at all exist. Relying primarily on performative approaches to relational action and on post-phenomenological and Deleuzian philosophy, non-representational work puts a premium on the corporeal rituals and entanglements embedded in embodied action rather than talk or cognitive attitudes¹⁸².

In part, this is why I see NRT as useful in pedagogical theorizing. To “put a premium on the corporeal rituals and entanglements embedded in embodied action rather than talk or cognitive attitudes” gets to the heart of much of what I think is at stake in pedagogy. The way we talk about dispositions, however, could stand to take more of that spirit on. Already a part of the NCATE standards in 2002, dispositions came back onto the scene in a decided fashion with NCATE’s 2008 standards¹⁸³, and talk about dispositions still seems a bit locked in cognitive attitudes.

¹⁷⁹ See note 144.

¹⁸⁰ Anderson and Harrison, “The Promise of Non-Representational Theories,” 13. Italics in original.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Vannini, “Non-Representational Research Methodologies: An Introduction,” 4.

¹⁸³ National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, “Professional Standards for the Accreditation of Teacher Preparation Institutions” (*National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education*, 2008).

Dis-positioning Dispositions

My goal isn't to dismiss dispositional issues wholesale, or to suggest that "dispositions" themselves are a problem. What I want to draw attention to are some of the limitations that occur when we bring representational assumptions to dispositions. One example of this can be found in calls to teach and instill dispositions that privilege what some might consider professionally appropriate teaching roles over personal dispositional and predispositional traits¹⁸⁴. Harkening back to what Latour's theorizing made clear about correspondence – namely, it's impossibility after equality – I sense a similar tendency in this well-intentioned argument to both dichotomize and decontextualize relations involving dispositions. This concern coincides precisely with NRT's attempt not to reproduce inequality in these two ways:

1. In fixing "desirable" dispositional traits, representational assumptions are made about these traits that ahistoricize and decontextualize those traits from their relations and
2. A classic assumption of inequality materializes when a Cartesian separation of body and mind is upheld in the call for professional role over personal dispositions. Such a disembodiment not only reproduces inequality. It also utterly undermines the performative impetus that putting all things on the same plane of immanence makes possible and generative. The Rancièrian *as if*, however, may be a useful way we can embody large varieties of dispositional thinking in a way consistent with non-representational assumptions. Fendler mixes "the language of non-representational research with the language of Rancière [to] say the emancipated reader read

¹⁸⁴ Margret Buchmann, "Role Over Person: Justifying Teacher Action and Decisions," *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research* 31, no. 1 (1987): 1-21. Claudia Ruitenberg, "The Trouble with Dispositions: A Critical Examination of Personal Beliefs, Professional Commitments and Actual Conduct in Teacher Education," *Ethics and Education* 6, no. 1 (2011): 41-52.

all texts *as if* they were non-representational.”¹⁸⁵ This suggests that *if* we are willing to put all dispositional traits and approaches on the same plane of immanence and *if* we are willing to treat students and student-teachers as emancipated readers, we could proceed both *bodily* and *experimentally* in thinking dispositions. I do not get the sense, however, that this is the kind of performance Buchmann or Ruitenberg are discussing.

Representational assumptions of inequality in teaching dispositions is particularly problematic when the dispositions one aims to teach are those of equality. Called many things (“democracy” and “democratic citizenship” are just two that come to mind), it is nothing short of a performative contradiction to teach equality representationally. Doing so entails an enactment of inequality that points back again to Rancière who helped me understand why explication as method is problematic as well as why modeling that accompanies the pedagogy of dispositions of equality matters. It matters if we teach dispositions of equality in a way that reproduces inequality. It matters that students and student-teachers see equality exemplified or, as Rancière puts it, *verified* in our pedagogical approaches to dispositions.

Fendler takes this issue up in “Lurking, Distilling, Vibrating, Exceeding”¹⁸⁶. She asks: “How do we teach dispositions? In order to talk about reframing how we think about teaching dispositions, I will suggest that we combine a standard theory of educational objectives with a standard theory of pedagogical modes.”¹⁸⁷ She goes on then to overlay the three pedagogical

¹⁸⁵ Fendler, (accepted), “How is it Possible to Make a Difference? Agency, Actors, and Affect as Discourses of Change in Education Research,” 5.

¹⁸⁶ Lynn Fendler, “Lurking, Distilling, Exceeding, Vibrating,” *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 31 (2012): 315-326.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 320.

modes of “provider, facilitator, and model”¹⁸⁸ with knowledge, skills, and dispositions as we commonly find them in, for example, NCATE’s standards documents. She notes that “[a]lthough there has been more work on dispositions recently, we are still (at least in the US) not very good at defining, teaching, or assessing dispositions as such”¹⁸⁹, and she suggests that theory – and in fact, *models* how theory – might begin to help teacher education reframe how we talk about dispositions. In linking dispositions with the pedagogical mode of modeling, Fendler suggests that “[m]odeling is associated with dispositions. Teachers embody and exemplify respectful relationships, intellectual curiosity, and aesthetic appreciation.”¹⁹⁰

I can’t help but notice how differently the last pedagogical approach to dispositions sounds than the one I find in Sockett’s *Knowledge and Virtue in Teaching and Learning: The Primacy of Dispositions*: “Education’s primary emphasis must be on those moral and intellectual dispositions that characterize the free, autonomous individual in a democratic society, developed through content embedded in official educational standards.”¹⁹¹ We’ve long thought about dispositions representationally, and in dispositions’ reliance on content to correspond with desirable dispositions in Sockett’s comment, I think we see modeling that continues that tradition.

Burbules provides another example of teaching as exemplification through the example of Wittgenstein: “His way of teaching was designed to enable listeners to shift their thinking, to think differently about a problem, which was often in his view the only way to ‘solve’ it. In this

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Hugh Sockett, *Knowledge and Virtue in Teaching and Learning: The Primacy of Dispositions* (New York: Routledge, 2012): xi-xii.

respect, one can teach only as a guide; it is a matter of showing more than saying.”¹⁹² Burbules highlights the important role of *tacit teaching*, especially “at a time when teaching is being governed by an increasingly constrained standardized model of instruction, it seems all the more important to maintain the legitimacy of alternative models of teaching.”¹⁹³ Talking about dispositions as inherently embodied, i.e. modeled, stands in sharp contrast for me to the calls we more frequently see in the culture of learnification.¹⁹⁴

Another way we can see dispositions taken up representationally is in the teaching of dispositions through explication inferred through Sockett’s (just above) reliance on content to teach dispositions. This idea sends me back to Rancière again, whose assumption of equality of intelligence among students and teachers, demonstrated the ways in which explication stultifies pedagogy. To explicate, one must assume that a student (student-teacher may be used interchangeably here) needs something (e.g. knowledge, skills, dispositions) that only an expert can intermediate for them and that this something can be instilled in a student in such a way that it corresponds with what the teacher knows and, in “knowing”, can and should transmit. Obviously, this is not only inconsistent with non-representational theories, but it is also antithetical to both Rancière and Latour’s assumptions of equality.

A final limitation of treating dispositions representationally resides in the inability for re-presenting previous dispositions ever to come into presence as something new. With non-representational assumptions each new performance is deemed new, and in not limiting our dispositional uptake to something previous, we can break out of old patterns and habits. We

¹⁹² Nicholas C. Burbules, “Tacit Teaching,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 40, no. 5 (2008): 667.

¹⁹³ Ibid, 669.

¹⁹⁴ See previous discussion of this topic with Biesta in Chapter 1.

can create experimentally without ever having to leave our bodies behind. This embodied experimentation actually seems to be more in tune with thinking dispositions in any event, and while I understand that the concept of dispositions is generally understood to include the opportunity for habits to change, I have a harder time understanding how this is possible without taking on some aspects of non-representational commitments.

By way of summing up what I've overviewed here, I'll return to my first point: When dispositions are theorized representationally, they are used to fix and disembody subjects from pedagogical objects¹⁹⁵, a vestige of inequality "deregulated"¹⁹⁶, as Fendler calls it, by non-representational theories. To talk about dispositions as something we possess or not and whether we are or are not "aligned to" such representational concepts, standards, or expectations is to work from an assumption of inequality. To think in terms of putting everything on the same plane of immanence, however, can't help but loosen representationalism's hold. I think Fendler says it best in "The Ethics of Materiality: Some Insights from Non-Representational Theory". NRT

seem[s] to have done away with, once and for all, the last vestiges of structuralism in social theory. In non-representational theory there are no longer signs or symbols that represent concepts of realities. Furthermore, non-representational theories also dissolve any Wittgensteinian distinctions between the speakable and unspeakable, and they erase distinctions among pictures, models, displays, or depictions and reality.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ Lynn Fendler, "The Ethics of Materiality: Some Insights from Non-Representational Theory for Educational Research," in *Educational Research: Material Culture and Its Representation*, eds. Paul Smeyers and Marc Depaepe (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014): 118-120.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, 131.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, 117.

In putting “all things on the same epistemological plane”¹⁹⁸, NRT, like Latour and Rancière, claims that expert intermediation is not required for anything to make sense of anything else in its relations. In relation to education, specifically, Fendler adds: “Non-representational theory is described as a critical alternative to two mainstream epistemological positions for research, namely social constructivism and logical empiricism.”¹⁹⁹ So, how else might non-representational theories help me to proceed embodied and experimentally?

NRT has had to enact a similar performance in relation to its name. Indeed, an artifact of the spirit of experimentation in non-representational theorizing can be found in discussion about the name. Anderson and Harrison, in *Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography*, offer the following:

If non-representational theories begin from practices and advocate a relational-materialist analysis of the social, why the name ‘non-representational theory?’ [...] non-representational styles of thinking can by no means be characterised as anti-representation *per se*. Rather what passes for representations are apprehended as performative presentations, not reflections of some *a priori* order waiting to be unveiled, decoded, or revealed.²⁰⁰

This naming of non-representational theory, of course, then leads into a detailed discussion of how NRT theorizes representation:

Non-representational theory takes representation seriously; representation not as a code to be broken or as a illusion to be dispelled rather representations are apprehended as performative in themselves; as doings. The point here is to redirect attention from the posited meaning towards the material compositions and conduct of representations.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 118.

²⁰⁰ Anderson and Harrison, “The Promise of Non-Representational Theories,” 19.

²⁰¹ Ibid, 14-5, quoting John David Dewsbury, Paul Harrison, Mitch Rose, and John Wylie, “Introduction: Enacting Geographies,” *Geoforum* 33 (2002): 438.

As theorists pondered the ramifications of “non”, additional renderings were experimented with in a similar but different spirit. One of my favorites comes from Lorimer:

If a necessary shift beyond bold statements of intent has taken some time, there is now plentiful evidence of ‘more-than-representational’ thinking being put to work, taken places and resurfacing in unexpected forms. These are busy, empirical commitments to doings near-at-hand, in ordinary and professional settings, and through material encounters²⁰².

In this, I certainly see NRT’s Latourian ancestry, and I borrowed from this meaning to coin the work I see Rancière making possible in pedagogy after equality as “non-emancipatory” and again further in introducing the concept of “non-pedagogy”. Now, I want to explore “non” or “more-than” representation’s possibilities for theorizing pedagogical dispositions.

Affective Attunements

The body has to learn to play itself
like a musical instrument
in this world’s compositions.
- Kathleen Stewart²⁰³

I find that one of the best ways to illustrate how NRT’s equality assumption works is to read it through an example. Affect will serve as that example in this chapter. While Latour enables me to see how NRT can materially make the moves and claims that it does, NRT scholars turn to Deleuze, Spinoza, Bergson, and Massumi to theorize affect. McCormack, Dewsbury, Wylie, Harrison, Anderson, Thrift have all capitalized on Deleuzian approaches to theorize affect in its various facets.

²⁰² Lorimer, “Cultural Geography: The Busyness of Being ‘More-Than-Representational’,” 84.

²⁰³ Kathleen Stewart, “Affective Attunements,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 29 (2011): 450.

Non-representational theories' talk about affect can be a useful way to think more-than about dispositions in pedagogy. In remaining embodied and proceeding experimentally, pedagogues (like singers) bring our fullest selves to bear on any pedagogical performance.

Affect is a big and amorphous topic. It includes many lines of flight that I will begin travelling here and have to continue in my scholarship after the dissertation is defended. What Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari, and Massumi have made possible on this topic is much bigger than I would pretend to tackle in one chapter. In fact, I am still learning – learning very much - what it is like to jump into the stream of theorizing affect, riding waves that connect me to pedagogy, and describing eddies that I cannot yet join, as if the force of the stream I am riding is too strong to allow me “out” temporarily. Once in, I’m all in. No turning back.

I find Deleuze and Guattari’s texts, on a whole, relatively difficult to read, but moments in their texts crystallize for me in concise, resonant ways. The chapters in their book, *What Is Philosophy?*, that explore concept, plane of immanence, and affect are just such moments.

Deleuze and Guattari characterize “concepts” as an act of creation that belongs to philosophy. Affect, they pair with percept, as belonging to art. “*Affects*”, they state, “*are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man.*”²⁰⁴ I notice right away the pairing of nonhuman and man, highlighting again the necessity of hybrid assemblages like those Latour re-assembles. But what do affects do? Can they be considered on their own terms? Where is affect? What would it mean, as NRT maintains, to consider affect as material?

Theorizing affect is quite popular at present and has been for some time. One thing many scholars agree on is that affect is different from emotion, although as Fendler notes,

²⁰⁴ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994): 169. Italics in original.

affect has typically been treated as synonymous with emotion in education²⁰⁵. With NRT we can see how the distinctions between emotion and affect have really only developed in the recent years. McCormack draws on Massumi to define affect in ways distinct from emotion like this: “Emotion...works in a largely established field of discursively constituted categories in relation to which the felt intensity of experience is articulated...[while] affect acknowledges the importance to experience of the non-human force of movement and sensation.”²⁰⁶ McCormack has performed such attentions to affective intensities in his recent text, *Refrains for Moving Bodies: Experience and Experiment in Affective Spaces*²⁰⁷, where he uses dance and music to theorize bodily movement.

Another prominent non-representational theorist, Dewsbury, defines affect as “at once an actual phenomenon and a virtual force, a material effect and an immaterial disposition”²⁰⁸. If that’s not more-than enough for you, he sums up affect in this way: “Ultimately affect attends to the fact that a lot of the world is unintelligible. It is then in excess of epistemology and of consciousness, existing as a substrate of potential bodily response, being auto-motive or ontogenetic rather than willed.”²⁰⁹ Fendler plays in delightful ways with different but related notions in her discussion of affect in non-representational theories as “hi-def” and “disabling

²⁰⁵ Fendler, (accepted), “How is it Possible to Make a Difference? Agency, Actors, and Affect as Discourses of Change in Education Research.”

²⁰⁶ Derek P. McCormack, “An Event of Geographical Ethics in Spaces of Affect,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 28, no. 4 (2003): 495.

²⁰⁷ Derek P. McCormack, *Refrains for Moving Bodies: Experience and Experiment in Affective Spaces* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014).

²⁰⁸ John David Dewsbury, “Affect,” in *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, eds. Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2009): 20.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 21.

autopilot”²¹⁰.

To round up this sampling of affect, I’ll point again to McCormack, who states: “affect is by no means confined to or contained by the physical limit of bodies. Affect is instead better conceived of as a distributed and diffuse field of intensities, circulating within but also moving beyond and around bodies.”²¹¹ Unlike the way dispositions are commonly fixed and disembodied, attending to affect non-representationally welcomes a fluidity of movement back into pedagogical thinking, a freedom of body and spirit to explore, try on, and discard various dispositional strands available to any pedagogue. When we treat dispositions representationally, we forego this opportunity of exploration and consideration. We short circuit dispositions’ abilities to work on us. This seems antithetical to our broader pedagogical aims in teacher education, cutting out even the opportunity to do the irreplaceable work of exemplification. We, quite literally, dis-position our bodies, our selves from the potential to model and make modeling part and parcel of what it means to think about and practice becoming a teacher.

With Latour, I learned how pedagogy, constituted of translations among hybrid assemblages, can be theorized in terms of composition. I explored the ramifications for thinking about pedagogy as composition. Now I turn to another type of composition, musical composition, and the composition of a vocal performance in particular, as a thought

²¹⁰ Fendler, (accepted), “How is it Possible to Make a Difference? Agency, Actors, and Affect as Discourses of Change in Education Research.”

²¹¹ McCormack, *Refrains for Moving Bodies: Experience and Experiment in Affective Spaces*, 3.

experiment²¹² on how affect might help me dis-position dispositions' representational hold in pedagogy.

One of the most powerful capacities a vocal performer has at their disposal is the ability to attune to affective components of and in a performance. One can train and train, but the way one attunes to various dynamics in the actual performance determines much of how the performance is taken up by one's audience. Let me share an example.

In my final year of high school, I was competing in the Machtel competition. It may be familiar to you. It takes place each spring at LCC to award high school singers competing at the highest levels of vocal performance in the mid-Michigan area. The competition allowed me to draw on art song, a part of my repertoire I most enjoyed. I also, however, chose songs that challenged me. One, for instance, took me to a note that stretched my mezzo soprano vocal range, and it, of course, ended the entire song and my selection of three for the competition. Mezzos are used to everyone wanting their range to be higher, so I just took this selection made for me by my beloved vocal teacher and decided to do my best with it, come what may.

I prepared in ways similar to any other competition, selecting a song or two that I already knew well and preparing others from scratch. Over the upcoming months I performed the same songs in other competitions thus, theoretically, preparing myself further for future competitions. What is unique to each performance, however, is the utter newness of any single performance. There, in the end, is something you just can't prepare for. The newness of a room, the humidity or dryness of the air that day, your own body's state of hydration and

²¹² Derek P. McCormack, "Thinking in Transition: The Affirmative Refrain of Experience/Experiment," in *Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography*, eds. Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010): 201-220. McCormack, *Refrains for Moving Bodies: Experience and Experiment in Affective Spaces*.

general sense of wellbeing, the faces you've never seen before (or maybe, by surprise, you know well!) looking at you intently from just 5-7 feet away as you sing. All of these things come to weigh on the moment of the performance, and as I learned quickly and well, one's ability to read and respond *in the moment* is a crucial talent to develop as a vocal performer. The songs themselves fall away, in a sense. You've sung them ad nauseum. You know them so well that you dream about them, sing them in the shower, hum them on the bus to school, see the notes in your mind while the English teacher drones on in third hour. Frequently, I still find myself singing these songs now, and I don't even know what I am singing, something from high school, decades and decades in my past.

In the performance, the music and the words are like the air that you breathe. You don't doubt they will be there for you when you need them. What I did focus on in performance was attuning myself to the affective dimensions of the performance. One day, it was unbearably humid. I remember being locked in a room at Olivet College, thinking we might all fall asleep from the heaviness in the air. Should I, I wondered, match the mood of the weather or take it for a foil. I could play up something totally opposite – light, quick, airy. I decided to emphasize each at different times, in bigger ways than I previously with any of the selections, in different songs. First, I leaned heavily into the lovely long drawn out tones of one of my favorite art songs. Without getting too heavy – a temptation always to be avoided in already heavy alto songs – I let the music work on me and my adjudicators like the Delta blues might in August in Alabama. Remembering that the effect could carry over vocally, I would have to mentally make a 180° turn to carry off light and airy, quick and sprightly in the next song. What the heck, I thought. This is the performance; see if you can pull it off. Almost seeing my judges jump out of

their seats, I watched moods lift, fogs of dense humidity clear as I started the second song, as if I was watching the fog clear now over the lake of Lugano after three days of rain. Smiles broke. Eyes glinted. All of this, of course, aided my singing. Light on each note, a smile that opened the space in the roof of my mouth and increased the resonance in my nose as I placed the sound further and further forward in my nasal cavity. It worked. I pulled it off, and the audience loved it. More thankful, in a sense, for a performance that refreshed their day generally than the specificity I had achieved in vocal delivery, we had met one another in that vocal moment. We shared something that emerged – unrehearsed, unpracticed.

I share this example by way of illustrating the spontaneity any vocal performer can choose to embody or not each time she/he performs. It's an affective dimension of performance I've never lost touch with. It, in fact, is an aspect of performance I still regularly draw on. In the first days and weeks of each new school year, I plan for the opening moments of contact with students unknown to me. I imagine standing in the front of the room – visualizing it taking place one hundred different ways, knowing there are just so many dynamics I cannot know in advance. Attuning to affective dimensions of pedagogy comes with the territory of teaching. I can choose to attend to these affective dimensions or not. Many of my colleagues do not. They prepare hermeneutically sealed opening statements and review their syllabi the same way each year regardless of who is in front of them. I guess I have too much a vocal performer in me. I know the pay offs of attending to affect. I know it will make the difference between a well-executed performance and a well-executed performance *people like*.

It's a matter of whether of not my performance has heart, take up²¹³, push back. The more I give, the more I get. I need this as a performer, on the stage or in the classroom – it gives me more to go on. It keeps things flowing. It keeps us in relation.

Back to the Machtel. It's the final night of competition. I've performed my three pieces the night before, and I've advanced to the finals. I've been given feedback on my performance, and tonight I am being judged not only on my ability to perform the same three songs again, but also on my ability to demonstrate uptake on the adjudicators' feedback. Can I, they want to know, show them that I've listened?

Back to the same old routine, I think, as I walked into the glare of the stage lights. My heart is definitely beating faster than usual, and as I turn expecting to see the judges' faces three feet in front of me, I am blinded by the bright spotlights. I can't see anything. Everything is white. I go inside my own mind and body. I can't respond to the audience in front of me – I can't see them! So I imagine them and think about the feedback given me the night before. All of this is running through my head as I sing – seriously, the singing is so rote at this point. I've sung it so many times before that I'm not even thinking about it anymore. However, I know that the big ol' note that I both love and hate waits for me at the end of the performance. I know exactly what the judges want. They've asked for the same thing so many times before: open, smile, forward, float on it. These are the ways we talk about placing our vocal tones in our mouths, head, and body so to acquire the sound we want to reverberate in the room or hall. It's time. Here it comes. I open my mouth and place the note. White lights. White noise.

²¹³ Again, resonating with Noddings' notion of responsiveness and reciprocity in the caring relation.

The typical cheers occur as I go to my seat. The regular congratulations. I have no idea what just happened. I literally couldn't hear what I had just produced. I had no reason to think it wasn't just like any other time I sang that song. Solid, but not the pitch perfect harmonics, creating sound that would echo in people's ears as an after thought. It was, I reassure myself, not a song I would ever have picked for a big competition, but there it is: the piece my vocal teacher wanted me to sing.

One more student, a friend from school and regular winner of competitions, had yet to sing. She typically brought a Broadway-inspired tune to the audience, which they loved and usually were wooed by. I expected that to happen tonight. We didn't typically compete against each other but with each other in high school choir.

She sang beautifully. She picked music directly in her range and repertoire. Solid. I expected her to win.

As the adjudicators called out the winning names, they reached second place. I expected my name to be called...or maybe not. Hearing my friend's name called, my teacher reached over and grabbed my hand. I had won, but needed to wait until I heard my name. My friend looked shocked. She hadn't won. She wasn't very used that. I had. I didn't even know what I had sung. Seriously, all those bright lights and now an equally blinding memory of singing that last note. The judges commented prolifically on the ways I had responded to their feedback, and the last note, they all told me, reflected my willingness to take on a challenge, respond to feedback, and execute perfectly. Shocked, I was thankful. I still wish I could have heard what I actually sang!

This story captures for me experimental embodiment that resulted in affective attunement. I was so fully absorbed and engaged that my whole body was in the performance and in response to the judges I was singing for. It was a performance *for them* after all. I needed them to take it up.²¹⁴ The note I sang was so crisp and clear I couldn't even hear it. I felt it in a sense, but I only have a void in terms of knowing what that last note sounded like. It seemed effortless although I had probably been preparing that song – and that performance – for the last 8 months.

I don't think I'm alone when I say something similar happens in our teaching. We all probably call it different things, but we know when it is or isn't happening and we know we quite typically won't experience the results of our hard work firsthand. Rather, we expect – we hope – it will come back to us in ways and times unexpected. One way NRT has gotten a handle on this excess is through its theorizing of affect. Here, I want to call it affective attunement²¹⁵, and I will use NRT to help me theorize this component of pedagogy after equality. It's not something one can prepare ahead of time, but it is something one can practice and acquire over time. I think Britzman calls it “practice makes practice”²¹⁶.

Blinding White Lights and Affective Attunements

Schooling can be one of the most bankrupt affective experiences. I find little in schools – physically, psychically, aesthetically – particularly attentive to affect. In many ways, schools

²¹⁴ I'm thinking here again of Noddings.

²¹⁵ Stewart, “Affective Attunements,” 445-453. Both Kathleen Stewart and Derek McCormack explore atmospheric attunements. I borrowed from this to create “affective attunements.”

²¹⁶ Deborah Britzman, *Practice Makes Practice* (Albany, New York: New York Press, 2003).

drive affect out, something Thrift noted as “criminal neglect” in the context of cities.²¹⁷ We might even say, to the extent that affect is harnessed in contexts of schooling, it is to neoliberal or capitalistic ends. The latest movements, for instance, to sell privatized schooling is being marketed with great attention to affect and the affective capacities required to garner buy-in to this idealized fantasy. Thrift, too, finds a similar problem in the way cities attend to (or not) their affective dimensions.²¹⁸ Meanwhile, standardized tests and mass data generation – both relatively void of real affective consideration – are sold as epitomizing what school can and should exemplify.

How can we attend to affective attunements in pedagogy when the bright white lights are blinding us? This may be an appropriate description of how many teachers feel these days as I certainly feel it, even from afar, as I watch colleagues, public school districts, and universities negotiate with the blinding bright lights of “standardization” and “accountability”. How can we, I wonder, attend to what really matters – including those affective dimensions of our practice – with these blinding spotlights in our vision? What can we do *in spite of* what is happening around us? Surely these are some of the challenges outlined by Fendler²¹⁹ and that Biesta is responding to in his refutation of learnification.

With non-representational theories, pedagogy can become a process of attending to affective attunements, where I find myself reconnected with my pedagogical breathline and drawing from the pedagogical powerhouse of translations. As I attune, I experiment with various harmonies relative to other actors in pedagogy, including but certainly not limited to

²¹⁷ Nigel Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect* (London: Routledge, 2008): 172.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Fendler, “New and Improved Educationalising: Faster, More Powerful, and Longer Lasting.”

people. Like the process of composition in Chapter 3, where I talked about the value of the middle, the trunk, in vocal performance, to be strong and flexible in one's singing, a strong middle – and strong torso - is invaluable. Similarly in translations, we look to where things come into contact, affecting one another for the force and potential of any pedagogical event. If we stick with the musical metaphor, a vocal performer then uses the strength of their torso to aid in attuning as precisely as possible to the other performer's they are in relation with, i.e. the orchestra, the pianist, the guitar, other singers. The attunement is relative to the others one wants to be in relation to and typically this also means an alignment, an attunement to one another so that an excess, the harmonics, of sound can come and amplify the beauty that is possible when attunement is tight.

As we become more affectively attuned to things around us – how things hang together in relations – we can attend to the pedagogical in ways similar to how a vocal performer attends to one's audience. This means attuning oneself to the people in the room, the humidity that day, the light, the colors, the ambience, the mood, the feelings, attitudes, and personalities of the judges. It means leaning forward into the piano more if sound is dampened. It means closing your eyes, if necessary, to maintain attention to the breathline. In a performance, a vocalist draws on all of his or her powers of affective attunement to bring a performance to the audience. It is the first and last time this particular performance will ever occur, but in another sense, it's just the next performance in a litany of previous and future performances.

As a teacher, I do the same thing. I walk into a class on day one. I've prepared attunement devices, devices that will help me hear, listen, draw out²²⁰ the sensibilities of my

²²⁰ The term *educare* comes to mind here.

students. What piques their interest? What do they have a lot to say about? Who are they? What are their preferences, styles of interaction, moods and soft spots. I spend multiple days doing this, often also through/with curricular touchstones, all to the ends of adding these students into the performance. I need them to perform. I perform so that they can perform. We are in a performance all year long together, and sustaining such a long, drawn out opus is laborious! The real talent, of course, lays in making that labor seem effortless. There are weak spots in our performances, but taken as a whole, most everyone is interested in maintaining a level of quality performance – we all want something to succeed, even we can't agree or don't always know what that performance is. All of this is connected to affective attunement. It's all about finding our places together and alone in the midst of being together²²¹.

I'm looking to develop thick, fibrous connections with my students, but too many, and the field is cluttered, making attunement difficult amidst the cluttered space. Too few of these connections – too few recruited allies – and we don't have the pedagogical staying power to go the duration, and garnering deep, fibrous connections on the fly is rarely as successful as when you've started nurturing them earlier. Like money in a bank account, the well is deeper the longer the money has been accruing interest²²².

In simply attending to the affective dimensions of dispositions *already in play*, we don't make our work easier, but we can position ourselves to make the most of the potential of that pedagogical concept. When we attend to the ordinary, everyday dispositions already in

²²¹ Or, as Rancière might call this, "being apart together." Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, 59.

²²² Please forgive the financial analogy. It seemed the most fitting – something more like a child saving up money in a piggy bank than an economic transaction not unlike those we find in the culture of learnification.

motion, maybe our pedagogy can become more resonant with the potential for new dispositional lines of flight.

Experimenting with Affective Attunements

Thought is placed in action and action is placed in the world.
This is the starting point for all non-representational theories.
- Anderson and Harrison²²³

As I proceed, I'd like invoke some common lines of flight in NRT and then move to theorize some ways of attending to affective attunements as a non-representational way to think dispositions in pedagogy. The common lines of flight in NRT include:

- Becoming Material, Being Embodied
- Not for the Faint of Heart: Performativity in Pedagogy
- Uniqueness and Irreplaceability²²⁴
- Experimenting with Experience, Difference and Repetition

By way of deterritorializing representational assumptions I find in recent calls to attend to dispositions in teacher education, I theorize what a move to affective attunement might look like as an alternative. Lines of flight I want to suggest for attending to affective attunements non-representationally include:

- Attunement
- Sonority
- Timbre

²²³ Anderson and Harrison, "The Promise of Non-Representational Theories," 11.

²²⁴ Fendler, "The Ethics of Materiality: Some Insights from Non-Representational Theory for Educational Research," 127-130.

- Resonance

We will find traces of the lines of flight²²⁵ commonly found in NRT in these performative experiments of affect. I will actively work to fold²²⁶ these characteristics into one another.

Becoming Material, Being Embodied

attune : to cause (a person, company, etc.) to have a better understanding of what is needed or wanted by a particular person or group

- 1: to bring into harmony : tune
- 2: to make aware or responsive²²⁷

What if we thought about pedagogical embodiment as if it were an issue of attunement? In a vocal performance, being affectively attuned is more than being “on pitch”. It’s not always about creating melodious moments. Being affectively attuned might mean recognizing a strong influence (like the weather that day when I was performing at Olivet) and deciding to counter it, antagonize it, or employ it to get somewhere else. In jazz and blues music, vocalists and musicians bend notes so to take sound out of tune as a way of attuning to the style or mood of the composition. Attuning, in other words, can mean bringing mediators in translationships into harmony in unexpected and perhaps unheard of ways. Attunement doesn’t have to mean correspondence or even something comfortable and full of “good

²²⁵ Don Livingston, “Promise for a Post-structural Approach to Curriculum,” *Valdosta State University: College of Education & Human Services*, 2015, <http://coefaculty.valdosta.edu/l schmert/gera/vol3no1/Livingston-publish.pdf> and William M. Reynolds and Julie A. Webber, *Expanding Curriculum Theory: Dis/positions and Lines of Flight* (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2004). Both of these sources theorize lines of flight in curriculum studies. This project seeks to open up lines of flight in pedagogical theory.

²²⁶ Michel Serres theorizes folding in various aspects of his work.

²²⁷ Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “attune,” accessed April 22, 2015, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attune>

feelings”.

We tend to think of “harmony” as a set of notes or sounds melodiously belonging together, but harmony is also achieved by bringing unusual –even unsettled sounds – into relationship. Indeed, attuning can be to atonal ends. Consider Google’s definition of atonal: “not written in any key or more” and “atonal music may be written by obscuring tonal structures or by ignoring conventional harmonies altogether”²²⁸. We like – our ears like – tonal music (think of the C major chord), but I bet we can all imagine some pedagogical moments where we had to attune to atonal translationships in our teaching. I think of moments where I just felt so utterly different from – in age, tastes, experience, goals – the students I was teaching. It was such an uncomfortable place to be pedagogically, and when in such a situation, it seems endlessly challenging to attune to the affective dimensions of relationships when we seem to have so little in common²²⁹. Just like our ears tend to seek resolution in music from atonal sounds to tonal ones, our bodies ache for similar harmony sometimes in teaching relationships. And, maybe sometimes the opposite is true. Sometimes we want to enter dissonance into our pedagogical translationships so to break out a rut or make us uncomfortable with what we’ve taken granted.

Thinking about embodiment as attunement sheds light on the ways teachers and students can be different together without having to “become” someone else.

²²⁸ Google Online, s.v. “atonal,” accessed April 28, 2015, <https://www.google.ch/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=atonal%20definition>

²²⁹ As I write this, I’m made aware of how useful the notion of “attending to a thing in common” may be in those situations *if* I can move past what we already don’t have in common personally to a third thing in common pedagogically.

Not for the Faint of Heart: Performativity in Pedagogy

sonorous

- 1: producing sound (as when struck)
- 2: full or loud in sound <a sonorous voice>
- 3: imposing or impressive in effect or style
- 4: having a high or an indicated degree of sonority²³⁰

Performativity literally grows out of becoming material in a way that experiments with experience. Performance is exhausting. You must reach out, in, over, and under with all of your being. You're simultaneously drawing in and pulling out, attuning and exploding preconceptions. You can always give less, but you get less in return. Your labor truly reaps with what it sows and sometimes more or less depending on the ways in which you brought the variables into relation.

In schools our performativity is stretched out over the course of nine months. We must learn to perform in the various seasons and across the breaks or holidays, plan in such ways as to keep the momentum flowing, the suspense hanging, the resonance deep enough, rich enough to inspire more searching. But this isn't the kind of performance increasingly required of us, and so performing now means performing in spite of the bright lights in our eyes, the deafening clamor of banging pots and pans in our ears as we try to attune to those we are in translation with.

I can't help but think about the "sage on the stage" metaphor when I think of sonority in teaching. It's what so many teachers and students consider the embodiment of "good pedagogy". When thinking experimentally, however, about dispositions as various types of

²³⁰ Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. "sonorous," accessed April 22, 2015, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sonorous>

affective attunements, I get to thinking about Fendler’s pairing of dispositions with the pedagogical mode of exemplification. How sonorous is our modeling? How rich and full-bodied is our modeling?

Typically, we associate loud and booming characteristics in pedagogy with voices and dispositions and modeling with something “soft” and “gentle”. We probably all know the sonority with which “quiet modeling” has spoken to us at some point in our pedagogical lives. This power to teach that dispositions have when exemplified is unmistakable. We can’t always pinpoint what it was about a teacher that made them good, but we know it when we see it. They walk the walk, even if they don’t talk the talk.

This ability for dispositions to be sonorous, I think, seems fairly overlooked in many commonly taught teaching methods. Attuning to such sonority also takes practice and lots of failure. It is maybe a skill we, justifiably, associate with teachers who have been teaching for a long time. It is a skill that can be acquired.

What if we spent more time nurturing sonority in dispositional modeling? What types of affective attunements might we need to attend to? To narrow this line of thought even further, what type of affective attunements might model an assumption of equality sonorously? This is an aspect of teacher education that this project points to as next needing to be drawn out²³¹.

If we don’t affectively attune more sonorously with modes of modeling equality, Rancière, Latour, and non-representational theories have helped me to see that the message may not – the embodiment may not – manifest. The imperative consistent with each of these theoretical approaches to assuming equality calls for a performative verification. Modeling

²³¹ There’s that word again: educare.

dispositions of equality as a means of alleviating the reproduction of inequality seems to be my most sonorous option.

Uniqueness and Irreplaceability

timbre: the quality given to a sound by its overtones: as
a : the resonance by which the ear recognizes and identifies a
voiced speech sound
b : the quality of tone distinctive of a particular singing voice or
musical instrument²³²

Fendler uses the terms “uniqueness” and “irreplaceability”²³³ to describe an inescapable aspect of Rancièrian ethics: “Rancièrian ethics of irreplaceability suggests it is a matter of basic human dignity to regard each person as unique and irreplaceable.”²³⁴ This suggests that ethically, if one is to proceed in a Rancièrian assumption of equality, recognizing uniqueness and irreplaceability must be our starting point in pedagogical translationships and a way of proceeding in pedagogy that continues to affectively attune. This is a tricky settlement given pressures to standardize and normalize, even idealize, every aspect – including the people involved! – in today’s pedagogical climate. It is also tricky because we, as teacher educators, might also deem certain dispositions or relationships inappropriate for the educational relationship. How then, do we proceed in both embracing uniqueness and irreplaceability and being ethical?

²³² Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “timbre,” accessed April 22, 2015, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/timbre>

²³³ Fendler, “The Ethics of Materiality: Some Insights from Non-Representational Theory for Educational Research,” 130.

²³⁴ Ibid, 11.

Sometimes I think of the equivalent of uniqueness and irreplaceability in pedagogy as tone quality or timbre in vocal performance. No one can choose their tone quality or change it. You have what you are born with, but you can, of course, choose to develop that tone quality in any way you choose. Improving your pitch can improve tone quality. Strengthening your breath support can round out your tone quality and support pitch. Adding warmth or length or speed to your singing can affect tone quality in ways that provide dimension and texture. But the actual tone of your voice is what it is. Think of Amy Winehouse, Ella Fitzgerald, Ray Charles. All very different voices, and all trained quite independently of one another. Each retains something unique, something irreplaceable that even they must safeguard. Steve Perry and, more recently, John Mayer, know this well, having been treated for vocal nodes (a common callousing of the vocal chords when used in unhealthy ways), which can jeopardize one's whole career in the ways it can change tone quality and the general flexibility of one's voice. Is there something comparable in pedagogy that we seek to preserve, attend to?

I imagine some teachers might refer to this as a personal *style* in teaching. This is a thorny issue for teacher educators, but we can certainly recognize that in this appeal to style there is something ineffable that we each bring to teaching. We, too, have experienced something beyond what we can articulate about the dispositions we bring to pedagogy. Non-representational theories refer to *modes* or *styles* of doing and being. Thrift and Anderson & Harrison develop this in earnest as relates to the naming and "methods" of NRT.²³⁵ How, then, upholding a Rancièrian ethic of uniqueness and irreplaceability, do we ask students/student teachers to engage those dispositions? We all know teachers who use this as a kind of excuse –

²³⁵ Anderson and Harrison, "The Promise of Non-Representational Theories," 1-36 and Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect*, 1-26.

“It’s just my style, the way I do things.” This, I think, is really at the heart of why Ruitenberg suggests that we hold personal pre-dispositions separate from professional roles²³⁶. While we want to acknowledge the ineffable in all teachers’ experimenting with pedagogy, we also want them to try on new performative roles, being thoughtful about why we act the way we do and the ethical implications of those choices.

Invoking the figurative language of timbre helps me figure out how I can participate in this questioning of and experimenting with roles without also having to choose disembodiment. In other words, how can I model experimenting with new pedagogical roles and dispositions without having to ignore or put in the closet my own unique styles, dispositions, temperaments? Rather, like timbre, since some of my pedagogical (pre)dispositions seem at some levels inescapable and significant, how can I find a way to both embrace that and become more malleable? How can I see myself as both immersed and malleable at the same time? This seems like a way to proceed ethically without having to dichotomize kinds of dispositions or disembody what I am sensing, intuiting, or am otherwise drawn out by²³⁷. Just like with timbre, we can proceed as pedagogues by asking what we can do with our dispositions and how we can experiment experience in ways that ethically attend to the many translationships weighing in on our decisions.

²³⁶ See conversation in the beginning of this chapter, “Dis-positioning Dispositions”.

²³⁷ I like how “drawn by” here suggests the term “educare” again. It’s an example of a non-human thing educating me, drawing me out.

Experimenting Experience; Difference and Repetition

resonance

1: the quality of a sound that stays loud, clear, and deep for a long time

2: a quality that makes something personally meaningful or important to someone

3: a sound or vibration produced in one object that is caused by the sound or vibration produced in another²³⁸

My favorite part of non-representational theories has to be the playful notion of repetition and difference. For me, this is where the hope for change and a creative return to the same become possible. Doel puts it this way: “What returns to the event of the world is difference. Non-representational theory attends to this difference.”²³⁹

Some things, of course, we want to stay the same. I find great refreshment in the notion of revisiting the same performed anew. This doesn’t always have to mean enormous change occurs. Latour, Callon, and Law’s examples (in chapter 3) of how small translations accumulate into larger differences underscore this for me. To change doesn’t necessitate a total overhaul, and to stay the same may be temporary enough that holding on to it while we have it – celebrating it – makes it all the more precious.

The notion of resonance, too, is like this, particularly from the perspective of the singer for when a singer finds resonance in their vocal productions, they don’t only enjoy the sounds proliferating around them or in the room. You also feel it profoundly in your body. Resonance is what happened when I was singing that last note in the Machtel competition, and I couldn’t

²³⁸ Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “resonance,” accessed April 22, 2015, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resonance>

²³⁹ Doel, “Representation and Difference,” 121.

hear it. It's as if the affect of the moment was too great for all of my senses to take in at one time so I felt the note rather than hearing it.

Feeling resonance is always more rewarding than hearing it, in my opinion. If you hum to yourself, you notice the buzzing and ringing sensation in your chest, mouth, and maybe even nose. When as a singer you achieve great resonance, you feel that vibration through your entire body. You can also feel faint or dizzy as your head fully resonates with a pitch you are producing. Like many performers can attest, you can also feel the resonance in the room. It's as if the walls and air are all resonating with you. My vocal teacher use to say it was her "natural high". It really is a remarkable feeling of not just being fully immersed but decidedly in contact with other things.

I think this same resonance is possible in pedagogy, particularly if modeling dispositions is the mode we want to pursue. McCormack suggests "think[ing] concepts as performing a kind of work similar to prepositions ... as ways of moving in the midst of things"²⁴⁰ He also proposes "thinking relations in transition. To think relations in transition is to experiment, and to experiment is to provide possibilities for making more of experience."²⁴¹ It might be an interesting thought experiment to think about the relations and translations of equality that I've pursued in this project in such terms. McCormack's language is certainly consistent with the language of hybrid assemblages in translation, keeping aspects of what existed before and losing others in transformation. In a sense, the Rancièrian *as if* experiments with the resonance of just such dynamics as well. Fendler mixes the Rancièrian *as if* with non-representational theories in the context of educational research when she states:

²⁴⁰ McCormack, *Refrains for Moving Bodies: Experience and Experiment in Affective Spaces*, 27.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

Non-representational theories allow analysis and commentary in which all of those factors can be treated *as if* they were relevant and interrelated aspects of materiality. In the process of analysis and communication, I will omit some of those factors, but I can omit them *as if* criteria of ethics, aesthetics, and pedagogy were more important than criteria of ideological conventions, publish-ability, or traditions of coherence.”²⁴²

If I think this in the context of modeling dispositions as pedagogy, I can hardly imagine a wider repertoire or richer context within which to experiment, trying better, and failing harder.²⁴³

Affective Attunements as Characteristic of Non-Pedagogy

Affect is like our human gravitational field, and what we call our freedom are its relational flips. Freedom is not about breaking or escaping constraints. It’s about flipping them over into degrees of freedom. You can’t really escape the constraints.
- Massumi²⁴⁴

We can think of theory as properly educational to the extent that it effectively generates uptake of resonant vibrations that exceed the given.
- Fendler²⁴⁵

I have tried to experimentally embody what non-representational approaches to thinking dispositions in non-pedagogy might look like. Using affective attunements as creative, figurative thought experiments, one might say I am trying to build my ethical muscles²⁴⁶. Mixing

²⁴² Fendler, “The Ethics of Materiality: Some Insights from Non-Representational Theory for Educational Research,” 131.

²⁴³ John David Dewsbury, “Performative, Non-Representational, and Affect-Based Research: Seven Injunctions,” in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Geography*, eds. Dydia DeLyser, Steve Herbert, Stuart Aitken, Mike Crang, and Linda McDowell (London: Sage Publications LTD, 2010): 3.

²⁴⁴ Brian Massumi, “Navigating Movements,” *Brian Massumi* (2002).

²⁴⁵ Fendler, “Lurking, Distilling, Exceeding, Vibrating,” 325.

²⁴⁶ Lynn Fendler, “Figuring Out Ineffable Education,” *Other Education: The Journal of Educational Alternatives* 1, no. 1 (2012): 15.

Fendler's ideas of cultivating ethics in terms of building muscles²⁴⁷ and non-representational assumptions of figurative language, I've used four different metaphors to evoke new ways of thinking dispositional performances. These performances can be read like Fendler's figurative education:

Figurative language does not have a representational function, so it constructs a relationship between the text and the reader that is unlike the relationship constructed in representational language. By analogy, in figurative education, knowledge is not represented by educational practices. Imagining figurative education, we may have to address the disconcerting premise that education stands alone as its own thing, not representing any meaning at all, but rather gesturing in a metaphorical way toward the ineffable.

This performative imperative of the figurative blurs any remaining lines between language, text, reader, researcher – or anything else, for that matter – while

[when] language or research is assumed to be representational, a hierarchy of authority is established in which one or the other ... has more authority than the other; one can determine the other. The epistemological commitments of representational research thereby set up a foundational assumption of inequality in which determinism is inescapable.²⁴⁸

Non-pedagogy, proceeding in a radical spirit of material equality, performs *as if*²⁴⁹ anything is possible and everything is material, narrating and translating all other actors "*as if* they are non-representational" too²⁵⁰. I hope I've captured some of that spirit here.

Moving – Embodied and Experimentally – Beyond Representation

One of the hardest parts of written compositions, for me, is that you typically are not

²⁴⁷ Fendler draws inspiration from Deborah Hawhee, "Bodily Pedagogies: Rhetoric, Athletics, and the Sophists' Three Rs," *College English* 65, no.2 (2002): 142-162.

²⁴⁸ Fendler, "The Ethics of Materiality: Some Insights from Non-Representational Theory for Educational Research," 121-122.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, 11-12.

²⁵⁰ Ibid, 5.

physically present when others translate your composition. You can write it with feedback in mind. You can change aspects of the composition after hearing from others. You can write with expressed purposes put forward for you to attend to, but you can never affectively attend to a written composition (except maybe poetry or speeches) in some of the ways you can in a vocal performance. In other ways, it is similar though. You may only get one or two performances before certain audience members make their final “translation” of your work. Critique is frequently not based on authorial intent or desire. How you attend and how you resonate, however, always matter, no matter what mode of composition you are attending to.

Sometimes to attune, we have to dis-position. This is different from disembodiment. Non-representational assumptions in pedagogy demonstrate that we do not need to dispense with the term “pedagogy”. We can perform pedagogy anew. We can perform pedagogy as “non” or “more-than”. We do not have to limit our pedagogies to re-presentations of past usages of the term. Assuming equality, for any number of the reasons I’ve explored in this project, changes pedagogy. Pedagogy is affected. Its relations translated, and it is capable of mediating in new ways.

A non-representational take on pedagogy, or non-pedagogy, is defined in part by its attention to affective relations. It is inseparable and indistinguishable from them. Those relations, in everyday becoming, constitute ordinary pedagogy, and the result is something temporary, wholly unique, and irreplaceable.

Few attend to ordinary affects better than Kathleen Stewart and Derek McCormack. The detail they have been able to articulate renders the amount of labor undertaken visible. To affectively attend to something in so much fine detail requires painstaking patience and an

infinite number of returns to the same that is always different. NRT helps me see why the return complicates. Latour's notion of translation helps me describe the translation. We return to see what we did before and how it did/did not happen, knowing all along that we are returning to something different. How do we know (a methodological question, in a sense) that what we "see" is what we "saw"? It requires affective attunement, comparing and contrasting with previous encounters, or repeated encounters with the forest of signs (as Rancière might add). Fendler uses the language of vibrating in a way that seems particularly apropos after my metaphor of singing:

The language of *vibrating* gives us alternatives to essentialism (e.g., Platonic forms, Cartesian substances, or reified concepts). Vibrating is dynamic, changing, and relational. It occurs in the gaps between things. It depends on uptake and connections; it is not dependent on generalizability or replicability. Vibration reframes the issue of pedagogy so that teaching is no longer envisioned as a process of unidirectional delivery of authoritative information, but rather of dynamic, democratic, and experiential connections.²⁵¹

Maybe non-representational theory isn't brand new after all, as it seems resonant with both Rancière and Latour's theorizations of translation in relations after pedagogy. Maybe it's just an affectively attuned attention to the everyday, the ordinary. In a very real sense, I am suggesting that attending to affect in pedagogy is to attend – to attune – in this way. We don't necessarily need complicated scaffolds and formulas of pedagogical savvy as much as we need opportunities to run the gamut of affective dimensions always on offer in pedagogical translations.

²⁵¹ Fendler, "Lurking, Distilling, Exceeding, Vibrating," 326.

Not writing from within NRT, Osberg, Biesta, and Cilliers²⁵² make a call to update the epistemology of schooling. They do this through three examples of pedagogy, demonstrating how representational commitments underpin the epistemological assumptions of modern schooling. They make the case that our purposes of schooling need to be altogether revisited if we want to address these assumptions guiding education. Pedagogical interventions alone, they argue, will not address this larger, systemic set of assumptions that they feel needs updating. They recommend complexity theory as a way to update the epistemology of schooling. I've drawn out non-representational approaches in pedagogy to see if it has any resonance. I find it lends something to that effort, namely to revisit pedagogy's assumptions non-representationally.

I've used the terms disagreement, dissensus, dis-position, and redistribute frequently throughout this project. Most of these have been used to disrupt in some way, but dispositions as we see it in education literature, and particularly calls toward greater standardization and accountability, want to stick, fasten, or hold in place both the identifying of desired individual dispositions and the instilling of particular teacher and student behaviors. Doing so is a way of treating dispositions representationally. I wonder if loosening representation's grip on dispositions – embodying and experimenting with dispositions non-representationally - might be a way to attend to dispositions in more rich and nuanced ways. This would, of course, have the effect of also unhinging dichotomous thinking around right/wrong and good/bad dispositions when all possible dispositions and approaches to thinking dispositions are put back

²⁵² Deborah Osberg, Gert Biesta and Paul Cilliers, "From Representation to Emergence: Complexity's Challenge to the Epistemology of Schooling," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 40, no. 1 (2008): 213-227.

into circulation - on the same plane of immanence - thus aiding in our ability to read, decipher, try on, evaluate, discard, and keep any number of dispositions or dispositional modes, styles for more nuanced purposes that the representational approach allows for. One must let go of correspondence in order to proceed thusly.

Attending to affective performances actively dis-integrates representational approaches to theorizing dispositions. As in a vocal performance, dispositions can't be cultivated in spite of one's self. A successful performance requires immersing one's whole self so that becoming malleable to even the tiniest of differences is possible. I've experimented with the figurative language of affective attunements as ways to take up and draw out those tiny differences.

I have characterized aspects of the dispositions discussion as representational because of the aims to standardize and replicate idealized and decontextualized behaviors that may or may not make sense relative to circumstances in which they are to be mobilized. Furthermore, I have pointed to the inadequacy of explication and transmission as a method for teaching democratic dispositions as well as the performative contradiction that we embody if we enact representational assumptions in our pedagogies intended to teach equality. Non-representational approaches, I find, are much better suited for what seem to be the salient issues at stake in calling for a greater attention to dispositions in pedagogy.

As we've seen with each of our previous theorists, when we think about approaching dispositions non-representationally, we must assume from the outset that the dispositions a person/teacher performs will not mirror those we taught them. That is to say that when we assume equality from the outset in pedagogical encounters, we cannot assume to control the outcomes of pedagogy. Can we live with this pedagogical possibility? It doesn't need to be as

frightening as we might initially think, but it is part and parcel of assuming equality as an initial stance in a pedagogical relationship. To that end, I find the possibility of a non-representational pedagogical present the most ethical educational disposition I might muster.

CHAPTER 5
EQUALITY | RELATIONS | AFFECT AFTER EQUALITY,
OR
AN INTRODUCTION TO NON-PEDAGOGIES

This very personal story may only make sense to me.
- Tahiti80²⁵³

I began this project recounting my surprise at the utter lack of assumed equality that I could find in pedagogy once I realized how deeply entrenched were the assumptions of inequality. While it has become the intended aim of many pedagogies to achieve equality, I have striven here to imagine pedagogies that start from an assumption of equality, and in so doing, I've attempted to avoid reproducing inequality.

I endeavored to explore the implications of assumed equality in pedagogy by first finding theoretical approaches that already assume equality. These were Rancière's assumption of an equality of intelligence in the pedagogical relation, Latour's ontological flattening, and non-representational theories' putting of all things on the same plane of immanence and calling it material. While only Rancière has theorized this equality in the context of pedagogy, I have attempted to bring Latour and NRT's equality moves into the arena of pedagogical theorizing.

Rancière does this by asserting equality of intelligence in the student-teacher relation. It implicates pedagogical method. Latour puts all humans and non-human things on the same ontological footing and characterizes their relations as translation. This implicates the concept of pedagogy itself. NRT puts all things on the same plane of immanence and calls it material.

²⁵³ Tahiti80, recorded performance of "Memories of the Past," by Xavier Boyer, Médéric Gontier, Sylvain Marchand, Pedro Resende, Raphaël Léger, Julien Barbagallo, digital recording released in October 2002, on *Wallpaper for the Soul*, Minty Fresh.

I've sought to consider how such equality turns re-distribute relations and the relevance of this for theorizing pedagogy.

As three of my theorists make their own version of an "equality turn", as I have come to call it, perhaps my most important finding is that when equality is assumed, pedagogy becomes possible in ways previously constrained. Before pedagogy was a term lurking²⁵⁴ around what seemed to be clearer conceptions of teaching and learning, pedagogical content knowledge, and schooling. I have found that when equality is assumed, relations are restored. Translation characterizes how things relate without seeking or promising any correspondence. Affective attunements, then, can help me attend to the nuance of translation. Pedagogy now means something it cannot mean in teaching and learning, PCK, or schooling. Pedagogy has been translated.

As relations in pedagogy become reconstituted, I can then again see content rendered pedagogical and pedagogical relations as content-full. It is the assumption of equality that makes this possible in pedagogical relations. Inequality stultifies. It stultifies relations; it stultifies pedagogy. One way to restore, or rewild, pedagogy, then, is to return to the forest of signs, pedagogy's natural habitat, and attend to the relations between things.

The way that each of these theoretical orientations' commitment to equality impacts relations in their context is undeniable. Assuming equality in pedagogical relations is an ethical stance to take in educational endeavors. Assuming equality in pedagogy has ethical, ontological, and epistemological consequences. Generally speaking, we can characterize the kinds of shifts we see in pedagogy after equality as consistent with "non" oriented

²⁵⁴ Echoing Fendler's "Lurking, Distilling, Exceeding, Vibrating" again.

commitments - non-method, non-modern, non-representational.

Talking about pedagogy in such ways moves pedagogy out from under the constraints of psychology and sociology and has clear ties to the development of humanities-oriented pedagogies and educational research that Fendler has brought to my attention. I'm doing more than just offering another way to do pedagogy; I'm offering a new way of doing and thinking pedagogy after equality. I'm contributing to a conception of non-pedagogy in tracing the translations underway here. I've theorized non-pedagogy at least three ways in this project.

These include:

- non-pedagogy as a non-emancipatory attending to a thing in common;
- non-pedagogy as more-than-human and translational; and
- non-pedagogy as attending to affective attunements.

As each translation builds upon and morphs the previous, a growing conception of non-pedagogy is composed. This composition is not completed, but a jumping off point for further inquiry, further translations, and further transformations.

I'm not looking for a final definition of non-pedagogy, but I do like to think we've composed a few evocative characteristics along the way. With Rancière's assumption of equality of intelligence, I learned that pedagogy can still exist as an attending to a thing in common. That thing in common is inherently relational, requires that I embrace uncertainty in my pedagogy, and it can nurture a coming into presence of that which is not yet known. With Latour's ontological flattening, I found pedagogy rewilded with non-human things and translation as characteristic of relations after equality. Finally, with NRT, I became free to attend to the nuance of affect when attending to a thing in common. In placing all things on the

same plane of immanence and calling it material, NRT took what was previously considered immaterial in pedagogy, reconstituted its relations, and now allows me and other pedagogues to attend to affect not only in name, but also in detail.

Maybe rather than attending to pedagogy as in the Greek “leading the child”, pedagogy can become child-like pursuant to the equality moves for pedagogy I’ve composed above. It’s fitting, as an ignorant schoolmaster, myopic ants²⁵⁵, or otherwise. To be child-like assumes equality and, emancipated and capable of attending to the many things we may find we have in common or not with our world, we can play in the affective attunements of composition resonantly and full of anticipation.

I return to non-representational theories, thankful for the notion of “non” it has theorized. Without “non”, I never would have pursued this project, and with “non”, there is always more-than to pursue.

I began this project with a review of Biesta’s critique of learnification. I held out hope that pedagogy, although variously defined and often assuming inequality, still had potential. Non-pedagogy, or what can also be called more-than-pedagogy, may be the name for that pedagogy, however lacking any name might be. It is certainly an alternative to learnification. In holding to the assumptions that everything is already emancipated and capable of mediating and that any actor - any emancipated spectator - can mediate through non-corresponding translation makes attending to the more-than dimensions of experience not only possible but even desirable. Such non-representational approaches to pedagogy can contribute in new ways to Biesta’s framework for purposes of education. Pedagogy can become attending to what isn’t

²⁵⁵ This is a classic Latour reference to how one might proceed “methodologically” in ANT. Pun intended by Latour.

yet known, what can't correspond, what is coming into presence.

Fendler's analogy of "the term "carbon footprint" as it is used in environmental studies" to exceeding in pedagogy is just one example of this. She notes the ways in which environmental scientists have given us terminology that is forward looking, and has exceeded the previous conceptualizations of energy use beyond the fields of economics and engineering. The term "carbon footprint" exceeds the scope of more technical and instrumental definitions, and awakens an ethical realm of implications when we think about and debate energy use.

She then "by imagining the term *pedagogical footprint* and suggesting that educational theory might be exceeding, [is] trying to point to and make explicit the limits of our current educational theorizations as a means of recognizing, identifying, and challenging those limits."²⁵⁶ Non-pedagogies aid us in considering our "pedagogical footprint". They remind us to "tread lightly" and to leave sustainable tracks in our wake - tracks, if possible, that do more good than harm.

Non-Pedagogy as Wayfaring

Maybe another way for me to talk about non-pedagogy is through the use of figurative language once more. Wayfaring is my new favorite way of thinking non-pedagogy. Wayfaring, a notion drawn out by Ingold²⁵⁷, is a metaphor I would like to suggest for pedagogy after equality.

²⁵⁶ Fendler, "Lurking, Distilling, Exceeding, Vibrating," 323.

²⁵⁷ Tim Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History* (London: Routledge, 2007), 72-103. In an earlier text, Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill*, 219-242, Ingold speaks in terms of wayfinding. I find these two terms commensurate for my purposes here. Serres, too, theorizes something very similar in Michel Serres, *Hermes. Literature, Science*

It begins with the ordinariness of pedagogical journeys like those I recounted in the introduction, and it proceeds less as a way to proceed and more a way of proceeding. As Ingold narrates, “For the Inuit, *as soon as a person moves he becomes a line*. [...] The line that goes across, by contrast, is a connector, linking a series of points arrayed in two-dimensional space. In what follows I shall link this difference to one between two modalities of travel that I shall call, respectively, *wayfaring* and *transport*.”²⁵⁸

In what follows, it becomes clear that transport is a representational way of thinking while wayfaring is non-representational. Ingold describes the deep but unmapped resourcefulness of seafarers in contrast to those involved in transportation: “Even seafarers make their way along invisible lines. Ever attentive to wind and weather, to swell and tide, to the flight of birds and host of other signs, the experienced mariner can guide his ship through the deepest of waters without having resort to charts or instruments of any kind.”²⁵⁹ Talk about affective attunements! This type of analogy to wayfaring rather than transport is useful to me as a teacher. Attending to the differences between simple product delivery and orientating among relations in a constantly changing matrix makes for very different pedagogies.

Wayfaring, for me, evokes curiosity of the latter. The notion even challenges me to imagine

and Philosophy, Ed. by J.V. Harari and D. Bell (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1982). Originally published as *Hermès V. Le passage du Nord-Ouest* (Paris: Minuit, 1980). Yusoff’s written a fascinating article on the matter for geographers, making it relevant to my inquiry into New Cultural Geography’s work in non-representational theory as well as the boundary crossing – or blurring – of the social sciences and humanities undertaken in this project. For Yusoff’s article, see Kathryn Yusoff, “Navigating the Northwest Passage,” in *Envisioning Landscapes, Making Words: Geography and the Humanities*, eds. S. Daniels, D. DeLyser, J.N. Entrikin, and D. Richardson (New York and London: Routledge, 2011): 299-310 (uncorrected proof).

²⁵⁸ The distinction is borrowed directly from Ingold (Ibid, 81). I use these now to theorize non-pedagogy, a new territory for both concepts.

²⁵⁹ Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History*, 76.

myself practiced enough to be able to read teaching like a seafarer reads invisible lines.

This idea of the wayfaring line rather than a line of transport has helped me to think not only about the place, goal, or destination I am heading for in pedagogy, but also the process and context in which it plays out. I had to laugh when I read this descriptor of wayfaring in the process of navigating a new job in a new country amid the convoluted trails of grad school and in researching pedagogy after an assumption of equality: “The wayfarer is continually on the move. More strictly, he is his movement. [...] the wayfarer is instantiated in the world as a line of travel.”²⁶⁰

Ingold’s work in *Lines* on the concept of wayfaring seems a fitting metaphor on many levels for this project. Wayfaring also adequately describes my own experiments with pedagogical theorizing as well as the ways in which humanities-oriented approaches to both educational research and pedagogical theorizing are appropriate to this project. It aptly characterizes what it was like trying to answer this question: “What becomes of pedagogy after equality is assumed?”.

Ingold’s notion of wayfaring is a metaphor I would like to suggest for pedagogy after equality, of pedagogy of the ordinary. It shares a spirit with Deleuze’s concepts of nomad and rhizome. His work suggests that we as pedagogues might “flatten” the paths we journey along, and in doing so, to inhabit or “*know as we go*, from place to place”²⁶¹ and “not *before* we go.”²⁶² In resolutely non-representational fashion, wayfaring doesn’t assume anything before setting out, and in this way puts all things – manner, method, location, purpose – on the same

²⁶⁰ Ibid, 75-76.

²⁶¹ Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill*, 229.

²⁶² Ibid, 230.

plane of immanence: “Such ambulatory knowing - or knowledgeable ambulating - cannot be accommodated within the terms of the conventional dichotomy between mapmaking and map-using”²⁶³, and neither can it be accommodated within the terms of the conventional dichotomy between teaching and learning. This is one reason why I find pedagogy as non-pedagogy an educational concept worth holding on to.

Wayfaring is a way of navigating, but importantly, wayfaring is also a process by which I have learned that I can attend to relations in and while navigating. Transport does not account for relations. It is simply a delivery mechanism, often times done in spite of many of the relations at stake. I have argued that this is a less ethical disposition for me to embody.

Wayfaring can assume equality as an initial presumption, which therefore, puts things into relation, and this allows an attendance to affect. This attendance to relations, including affective relations, is what makes pedagogy after equality possible in the first place. It is, in a sense, all about moving alongly and attending to affect therein. Affect, in effect, shows you what to attend to whether that be weather patterns, behavioral patterns, or financial stress. It’s like a compass. Affect tells us about relations, but it is simultaneously pointing at something slippery and hard to pin down.

The concept of non-pedagogy, then, is like concept of lines, and I’m taking pedagogy out for walk²⁶⁴ and wayfaring, alongly²⁶⁵, inhabiting the affect of relations making pedagogy possible, specifically an assumption of equality.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History*, 73 and 76. In both places, Ingold refers to “Klee’s dictum that it is the line itself that ‘goes out for a walk’, citing Paul Klee. *Notebooks*, Vol. 1: *The Thinking Eye*, ed. J. Spiller, trans. R. Manheim (London: Lund Humphries, 1961).

²⁶⁵ Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History*, 77-103.

I did not initially set out to investigate the presupposition of equality. I found it along the way. I found it in my investigations of space and place, which led me to non-representational theory. I didn't initially consider how all three of these theoretical approaches presupposed equality and how that I might ask what becomes of pedagogy when equality is presupposed in these ways.

My experiences following six student-teachers throughout their internship year set me off on quite a journey of wayfaring! They gave me so much to consider. As they sorted through what they thought should be done in various pedagogical moments and weighed that against what they had been told should be done, these interns often found themselves choosing between a wayfaring approach and a mapped approach to pedagogy. Given the various stakeholders in the internship experience, choosing between these options was stressful and anxiety-producing. In fact, I think it constituted one of their greatest stressors throughout the internship, after perhaps lack of sleep and a crazy, full schedule. Pedagogically speaking though, following their gut or following prescriptions highlights a central tension each of these interns struggled with as they thought about who and how they wanted to become as a teacher.

Not their teacher or internship mentor, I was really allowed to simply follow, support, and listen (perhaps we could say "affectively attune") to how these six candidates made sense of an otherwise very messy process. You might say we wayfared together.

Ingold suggests that the difference between a native to an area and a visitor is whether they hold a map "not in the hand but in the head." For this reason, Ingold's description of place and wayfaring seem even more fitting. In ways similar to how Ingold talks about wayfaring, these student teachers learned how to inhabit their experience of becoming a teacher. Entering

strange and new territories that required these interns to draw on the resources that existed and any previous mental maps that might help them navigate the novel situation they found themselves in. How much “direction” they were given really wasn’t initially the point. They needed a chance to acquaint themselves with this new space, explore it, and make attempts at geo-graphing it that would coincide with their experiences and speak to the challenges that they found themselves facing. These are practical verifications of equality I can happily share with not only my preservice teachers, but the secondary level students they (and I) work with as well.

Lines of Flight

Taken together, equality, relations, and affect now enable me to talk across various themes relevant to theorizing pedagogy, or non-pedagogy.

Equality Assumption

It is beginning from an assumption of equality that pedagogy grows out of the rich and varied contexts of relations and nurturing an attendance to the nuances of affect becomes possible.

Rancière’s assumption of equality in the pedagogical relation makes pedagogy become attending to a thing in common between emancipated spectators. Attending to a thing in common, I argued, is 1) inherently relational, 2) requires that actors embrace uncertainty in the pedagogical relation, and 3) nurtures coming into presence as pedagogical activity.

Latour’s ontological flattening brings the richness of relations into fullest view. His

imperative to attend to and account for any things constituting relations helps me to see the full extent to which pedagogy can attend and in places previously not privileged.

Finally, NRT puts all things on the same plane of immanence and calls it material. In so doing, NRT establishes an equality of materiality across everything. NRT helps us to see that things previously considered irrelevant or immaterial in the pedagogical relation are vital to a pedagogy after equality is assumed.

It is the assumption of equality though, in each of these three theoretical approaches that makes what follows in each possible. Without equality, relations would still be dichotomized and affect's potential considered more or less immaterial.

Actors in performances

When equality has been assumed, Rancière, Latour, and Non-Representational Theory each see participants in pedagogy as actors, mediators in their own right. In treating all things on their own terms, these theoretical approaches radically open the possibilities of what any thing(s) can make possible. This results in a real sense of potential, hope even, for new configurations – new translations – to come into being. It places pedagogy in the context of performance, and this performance of Life (as NRT would term it) is not only a representing of what came previously, but new performances each time with the potential to repeat or not repeat the past. This also celebrates the small changes made from performance to performance, allowing of shades of difference in composition to come into clearer view.

Commitment to the “the thing in common”

With Rancière, we saw an attention to the “thing in common”. With Latour, it is an attention to the objects made out of assemblages in many micro translations. In non-representational theories, everything is made material. Each of these lend to “attending to a thing in common”. Again, this way of thinking about pedagogy only becomes possible because of the equality move each theoretical approach offers. Latour’s actants must be concrete. NRT traces absent things’ materiality as a force to be reckoned with, the affecting to attend to. Rancière brings the performative imperative to bear. While I don’t suspect Latour and NRT would necessarily expect their work to be taken up alongside Rancière’s in the context of pedagogical theorizing, I find it more than coincidental that all three share features relevant to pedagogy on such a refined level. Again, I have to point to the assumptions of equality as the primary impetus on this point, but I the extent to which each theoretical approach also brings our attention to “sticking points” or “rub” between things can’t be overstated.

A material thread

Related to the point above is the aspect of materiality lent to pedagogy after equality in Rancière, Latour, and NRT’s theorizing. In assuming equality, we participate in pedagogy *as if* all relations are materially significant. We may not do so if our pedagogy assumes inequality among its actors or performances. In fact, as I saw, pedagogical relations are decontextualized and, even further, they are immaterialized. I may even go as far as to say that no material pedagogy exists at all if we are not in attendance to relations after equality is assumed. What does this then say about many of our current approaches to pedagogy? If they are not material,

what are they, and what is realistic to expect of them?

The location/dis-location of pedagogy

Pedagogy, in all its relations, gets materially distributed, positioned, mapped, configured anew when equality is assumed from the outset. Relations are in the middle for all three theorists, and this dis-positioning of relations as the cause for more effective pedagogy may be quite new and unfamiliar for most educators. We don't find pedagogy in the head any longer. We don't find pedagogy in psychology or sociology alone. We also don't find pedagogy only in schools. I suspect this relocation of pedagogy might be happily met by most pedagogues; the real difficulty might lie in enacting it. Little of what schooling historically offers us lends itself to non-pedagogical translations. In short, I think it is easier to imagine non-pedagogy than to begin enacting it. I have certainly found that in my writing I am constantly tripping over my own assumptions of inequality. It's a recursive process, assuming equality, and it gets deep down into the bones of how we relate with others and the world on a moment-to-moment basis. Humanities-oriented approaches to pedagogy and pedagogical research have aided me in proceeding experimentally and may be useful to others as well. One nugget of very useful knowledge I have unearthed in this process is the assurance that we are not without any models. Many of these models, however, may need to be brought more fully into pedagogical theorizing.

Pedagogy as Nurturing Dis-positions

So much pedagogy seeks to implant, transmit, or otherwise teach particular

dispositions, skills, and knowledge. Rancière, Latour, and Non-representational Theory reminds me why pedagogy and pedagogical education cannot dispose anyone to pre-determined ends. Where pedagogy exists, there we also find translation, and in its very constitution, translation betrays any efforts to make the end match the means. This challenges us to think anew about what we mean when we call for dispositions to be taught, evaluated, and assessed in teacher education programs. Can we imagine nurturing dispositions that seek to dis-position? We've begun to learn how to do that with knowledge and skills, but little, I have found, has been theorized to this end with dispositions. I wonder if an assumption of equality is necessary to nurturing the disposition to dis-positioning. It certainly seems necessary if we intend to model dis-positioning in ways commensurate with the theoretical approaches I've pursued here.

Translation across all three theorists

The notion of translation is similar among all three theoretical approaches. The non-representational character of "translation" as way/manner in which relations affect one another can be seen in each. Rancière refers to this through his discussion of interpretation. With Latour we find the sociology of translation, and in Non-representational Theory, non-representation itself includes the characteristic of translation. All three of these describe translation in a way that informs the kind of relations (or ways of relating) that I am saying constitute pedagogy after an assumption of equality and that we can attend to if we want to nurture dispositions in pedagogy that assume equality in our relations.

As we have seen, translation goes a long ways toward theorizing pedagogy anew. We can perform pedagogy in ways only imagined or not yet imagined. Part of the point of

translation is that it opens pedagogy to ever new becomings. It also makes possible change. The temporariness of things/actors/networks in translation can be rendered both an advantage and a characteristic to be negotiated.

Disavowal of method

There is an unmistakable intention on Rancière, Latour, and NRT's part to disavow method in any explicative sense. In Rancière, we saw this as he overhauled the entire pedagogical relation, previously reliant on inequality in its impetus. Latour notoriously likens the work of researchers, for instance, to ants. And, in the narrated conversation between himself and a grad student²⁶⁶, Latour eschews the idea of "theoretical framework" and "method", stating instead that the researcher's job is to describe and let those one is researching do the describing. They, in a very literal sense, will show us exactly what we need to see.²⁶⁷ This certainly overturns how most pedagogues have previously thought of pedagogy – what it is, who does it, and where it is located. It puts students in the driver's seat and takes teacher out of the master explicator role. It also overturns how social science frames educational research.

NRT turns to the performative. While there are certainly methods to recount in processes as they become, Method as pre-determined and replicable simply doesn't make sense. If we think of the labor of translation or non-representation as non-method, we see that it is commensurate with Rancière in that it cannot presuppose outcomes and in that there is no

²⁶⁶ Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*, 141-156.

²⁶⁷ Bruno Latour, *Aramis or The Love of Technology*, trans. by Catherine Porter (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996): 10.

room for a stultifying explicator. This is a “method” that can only be traced association by association; orbit by orbit (blending Latour’s and Rancière’s language here). It is a relentless, tireless, material pedagogy of translating (and betraying/misunderstanding) traced networks. What else can more aptly describe the processes of pedagogy? It returns me to what Rancière might mean when he speaks of training our will or attention to a “thing in common”. After equality is assumed, the pedagogical relation certainly surpasses the pedagogical logic of the schoolmaster or any knowing expert. The disavowal of method, I find, is one of the primary moves making equality material. In disavowing method, we verify equality, and all actors’ capacity to bring newness into being.

Pedagogy never was and never can be modern

All three theoretical approaches help us to see that pedagogy was never modern and, hence, can never be. If we are being modern, we are assuming inequality in the pedagogical relation, and as I’ve seen, when inequality is assumed, pedagogy is not possible, at least not to its full potential. I like to use an analogy from my chiropractor to illustrate this. It is less often the case that an impingement on a nerve fully severs the nerves functioning. Rather, its capacity to act fully is compromised. This compromise coincides with some dysfunction, even pain, since the nerve cannot communicate effectively in the ways it is intended for. If, of course, there is no relation any longer between a nerve and its corresponding muscles, tendons, ligaments, neuropathways, we indeed have a problem! The body cannot operate. This often times leads to intensive interventions that might include surgery to restore the nerves ability to function in relation with the body. Similarly, when we decontextualize pedagogy from

its relations by dichotomizing its possibilities and therefore limiting them only to humans, language, and representation, pedagogy can't act. It loses its vitality, its connective power. Indeed, when the relationality necessary to pedagogy is obstructed – a worse case scenario - pedagogy cannot happen at all.

Although Rancière and NRT do not use the terms non-modern, they also do not employ postmodern. This isn't unlike Michel Foucault and other theorists whom have been called postmodern, but nonetheless, avoid the term themselves. I would like to follow-up in future work on the potential for the term non-modern in reference to Rancière and NRT's work. In a sense, I can now say I feel comfortable calling scholarship that assumes equality from the outset non-modern.

Other Emergent Subjects

This section title is meant to evoke the additional becomings that have unfolded for me over various space-times²⁶⁸ in the process of this project.

Pedagogy beyond the classroom

This project has helped me to theorize pedagogy in everyday life more than in a classroom. A classroom after equality is assumed becomes just one more place where everyday pedagogies unfold, in relation, for better or worse. I cannot train teachers any longer without thinking about how we all go about doing everyday affects and affecting. Teaching – and learning to teach – isn't some sacrosanct spot from which those with enough qualifications

²⁶⁸ McCormack, *Refrains for Moving Bodies: Experience and Experiment in Affective Spaces*, 5.

humbly reach out to others thirsting to know something. It's simply coming into contact with fellow human beings or things and attending to the things in common between us, attending to the affecting that brings us into relation. The privilege of teaching is that you get paid to think about this stuff all of the time, as a part of your job, and ideally, it lends to spending more time affectively attuning to nuances than might happen in other pedagogical contexts.

I never cease to be surprised by just how far this principle of equality challenges me. I return to Jacotot's questions over and over again, "What do I see? How do I know? What do I think of it?", and with my students, I ask, "What do we see? How do we know? What do we think of it?". I expect to be immersed in this question for some time to come.

Finding my writing

Brett and I included the image of the Hopi emergence symbol on our wedding program. *Blue Highways*, by William Least-Heat Moon²⁶⁹, is a favorite book for both of us, and this image²⁷⁰ captured the spirit of the way we hoped to proceed in our marriage.

This is the way Least Heat-Moon describes the old symbol: "The key seemed to be emergence. [...] Its lines represent the course a person follows on his "road of life" as he passes through birth, death, rebirth. Human existence is essentially a series of journeys, and the emergence

²⁶⁹ William Least-Heat Moon, *Blue Highways: A Journey into America* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982).

²⁷⁰ The images can easily be found in Least-Heat Moon, *Blue Highways: A Journey into America*, 185, and Frank Waters. *The First Revelation of the Hopi's Historical and Religious Worldview of the Life: Book of the Hopi*. Drawings and Source Material recorded by Oswald. New York: Penguin Books, 1963: 23.

Frank Walters Foundation: "Sheltering the Creative Spirit". Land Trust Letter http://www.frankwaters.org/land_trust_letter.htm

symbol is a kind of map of the wandering soul, an image of a process; but it is also, like most Hopi symbols and ceremonies, a reminder of cosmic patterns that all humans move in.”²⁷¹ Also called a “labyrinth of migration”²⁷², I love how this symbol performs more-than-representation. It certainly captures a sense of circuitous, complicated wandering that clearly has a beginning and end, but no matter how many times or ways you’ve travelled this path, you know the experience is always in excess of what we can know or say about such experiences. Least Heat-Moon puts it this way:

I walked through it to stretch from the long highway. Even though I avoided the shortcut holes broken in the hedges, I still went down the rungs and curves without a single wrong turn. The “right” way was worn so deeply in the earth as to be unmistakable. But without the errors, wrong turns, and blind alleys, without the doubling back and misdirection and fumbling and chance discoveries, there was not one bit of joy in walking the labyrinth. And worse: knowing the way made traveling it perfectly meaningless.”²⁷³

I find real joy in knowing that I remember and rely on previous experiences on such a path without knowing how they will ever end. I knew, for instance, that there would be very familiar signposts in my writing process as I undertook the dissertation. At some point, when I had done enough writing, I began to see similar signs of that process of composition creep up on me again. What is unmistakably new, however, each time I write is when I experience these different landmarks and how I come to articulate what I am learning. Much like in the maze of

²⁷¹ Ibid, 184-5.

²⁷² Ibid, 406.

²⁷³ Ibid, 409-10.

the Hopi symbol, there is a distinct turning around point – a point at which it would seem simple to return to where one has come from. Reliably, however, my perspective always changes just enough to make “knowing” the return path not possible. I see it with new eyes after some point, and as Least Heat-Moon puts it, “knowing the way would make traveling it perfectly meaningless.”

A halfway point of sorts happened for me in this project at the proposal defense. Although much closer to the end of my entire writing process than others’ experience it, I came to a point for the proposal of being able to see the whole project laid out before me. When I “turned back” to walk and write the return portion of my journey, the path was now refracted back on me in a way that brought entirely new things into perspective. I certainly recognized signposts along the way, but until I exit the labyrinth again, I don’t suspect I will ever really know what lies ahead. These layers of pedagogy that I have experienced in the process of writing have certainly become part of what I understand to be proceeding under the assumption of equality. This Hopi emergence symbol is both a representation and more-than-representational in the ways it continues to teach me. Doel states it in this way: “Non-representational theory should not, then, be understood as a refusal of representation *per se*. It is a refusal of representation yoked to the problematic of a repetition of the same.”²⁷⁴

Writing to Atrophy

I’ve been noting throughout the writing of this document how I feel like I need to atrophy everything I previously knew about writing - strip my writing all the way down to the

²⁷⁴ Doel, “Representation and Difference,” 118.

bare conceptual points, and then rebuild new writing muscle memory relevant to the concepts and ideas I'm trying to discuss. It's endlessly aggravating to write this way - and entirely inefficient - but I think it provides another window into what I might say about the writing process in poststructural spaces. I literally feel like I have to write away much of how used to think and write, and when my writing gets simplistic enough to identify the salient, newly-stated concepts, I can start building in refinement again based on the new conceptual insights. I feel like a total jarhead along the way, but I think it's the path needed to get where I'm going, which is reminiscent of what Least Heat Moon says about walking the labyrinth above.

I literally felt like I lost my ability to write beginning in the third year of my doctoral program. Anything I had ever learned that made me feel like a good writer – with the exception maybe of tracking theoretical themes and claims across wide-ranging literature (which, by the way, I still associate more with a reading skill than a writing skill) – disappeared. They disappeared with my fullest turn to poststructuralist commitments. I'm not sure what this means, and it certainly can be described in part as a non-representational experience, for the very idea of having words to explain this would be counterproductive. Fendler points to a similar predicament she and those in her class faced when theorizing Rancière²⁷⁵.

I still don't know what this means for my writing. I write more and more, but the only thing that helps me feel like I'm connected to what I'm writing is to theorize away any correspondence. This both feels the most ethical and accurate way for me to write about my research in such poststructuralist places. I guess you could call my writing blatantly non-pedagogical. Its goal is not to teach, win converts, or even enlighten really. It's to affect in such

²⁷⁵ Fendler, "Figuring Out Ineffable Education," 5-6.

a way as to bring new imaginings into being. I frequently feel like a child at the zoo, pointing to something cool and new and saying, “Look! Did you see what that can do?!”

Jumping in the Stream of Writing

Another way I could characterize writing in the ways required for this project has been like jumping into a quickly running stream. There’s little time to get a sense of what’s further up and down the river, although you sense that your survival may depend on it. You have to jump in to participate, describe, and feel the flow of the conversation – how it affects you. Once in, you gulp big breaths any time your head surfaces (which isn’t necessarily often), and you feel the immensely powerful, swirling strength of the river rush around you, with you. You are the river. You’ve become part of it. You learn how to swim in it, riding waves and resting in eddies. Writing takes on a different tone. At times it’s exhaustion – sheer breathlessness – and at other times it’s peaceful, calm, and contented as a gently rippling stream. It’s all part of the river and your ride in it.

For me, this is an utterly different way of writing and experiencing writing than when I was writing in more social science-oriented modes. I was constantly worried about correspondence and building support for or against my house of cards. In fact, thinking back on it, I usually also felt quite disembodied. My writing became rote and fixated on matching the formulaic structure and tones that seemed to be expected of me. I didn’t find it challenging other than to say it challenged my patience, but then again – let me be honest! – writing usually challenges my patience. I think this is another place where I’d like to learn more about into Lindquist’s pedagogy of patience (see following section).

Hindsight is 20/20.

This project is certainly imperfect, as every project is, and having done it, I can now see more clearly its limitations. I could easily have picked one of these theoretical approaches and asked what becomes of pedagogy after that assumption of equality. Chapter two would be about the equality move. Chapter three would be about the resulting redistribution in relations, and chapter four would be the aesthetic implications (in Rancière's case). A similar, in-depth analysis could also be done with Latour and another with NRT. I don't think I would ever have come to know that though without having first taken on these three theoretical approaches together. Quite frequently – more frequently than I could fully exploit in each chapter – I found one theoretical approach informing the others. Given the scope of addressing all three in one dissertation, I was unable to go into all of the depth each theoretical approach offers; they are each endlessly thought-provoking for me. In fact, it was quite hard to try and restrain myself to the task at hand for (and possible for the scope of) this project. This project, in a sense, secured for me a sense that 1) yes, indeed, pedagogy can exist after an assumption of equality, 2) that theoretical approaches exist that make assumptions of equality available to pedagogy, 3) those diverse theoretical approaches expand the potential for further theorizing of those models but also others. I'm quite anxious to take on each of these in the future.

I also made another choice in this project with advantages and disadvantages. I had my hands full familiarizing myself with the rich and challenging theoretical domain of Rancière, Latour, and NRT, not to mention the narrowing of their massive and growing contributions to the ones' most poignant for this project. While I tied aspects of currently existing literature

within education to each, there remains the challenge of finding more ways to connect this primarily non-schooling oriented scholarship to conversations in education and teacher education. Particularly since my proposal defense, I've been keeping an ear to the ground for salient places of overlap for future work. I would love to have been able to start this project there, but I just simply needed to see what was in front of me with Rancière, Latour, and NRT. This is certainly one way I plan to adjust the articles/chapters as are written here for future publications, but I must say I am indebted to the unique nature of a dissertation for allowing me the space to probe the possibilities that newcomers to educational theorizing might offer and for my committee's support of that work.

Piles on my table; Future tracings

As I sit here, I am keenly aware of the piles of literature not yet tapped and mounting around me. This project has opened so many new trajectories, trajectories that will surely need to be flown, chased, or sipped another time.

Ecological models of pedagogy and pedagogical practices is one horizon I want to escape into. Stengers²⁷⁶ and Connolly²⁷⁷ theorize the political possibilities – and cosmopolitical possibilities - for the more-than-human, and Ingold challenges me to see such seemingly

²⁷⁶ I'm thinking of Isabelle Stengers, *Cosmopolitics I* (Posthumanities, Vol. 9), trans. by Robert Bononno (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) and Isabelle Stengers, *Cosmopolitics II* (Posthumanities, Vol. 10), trans. by Robert Bononno (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) as well as Isabelle Stengers, "Introductory Notes on An Ecology of Practices," *Cultural Studies Review* 11, no. 1 (2005): 183-196.

²⁷⁷ William Connolly. *Pluralism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005).

otherworldly conceptions as just another part of the ordinary, everyday meshwork²⁷⁸ of people and things.

Cronon, Whatmore and Hinchliffe make me want to particularize the rewilded assemblages of humans and things in pedagogy in case-by-case detail. They have each already contributed so much in this regard, but the concept will be new to education. I'd like to bring that conversation more fully into pedagogical theorizing.

Brett Merritt makes me want to trace the non-mental realms of non-pedagogies in secondary English and English language classrooms. Now that I see the relevant connections to be made by Rancière, Latour, and NRT to English studies, it is most intriguing to think about how English scholars have kept those aspects of our pedagogy locked up in the head. I want to find the material tracings, both past and future, that have not yet come into presence in my teaching discipline.

Jory Brass has me quite intrigued by the possibility for posthuman discussions as well as scholars provoking absences²⁷⁹ in teacher education. He shared Snaza et al's recent contribution to the *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, "Toward a Posthuman Education"²⁸⁰. This may be an avenue to continue pushing theorizing about relations past some of the human limitations I note in chapter three.

²⁷⁸ Ingold, "When ANT Meets SPIDER: Social Theory for Arthropods," 212. Ingold offers meshwork as an alternative metaphor to Latour's network.

²⁷⁹ Anne Phelan and Jennifer Sumsion, *Critical Readings in Teacher Education: Provoking Absences*, Bold Visions in Educational Research (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Sense Publishers, 2008).

²⁸⁰ Nathan Snaza, Peter Applebaum, Siân Bayne, Dennis Carlson, Marla Morris, Nikki Rotas, Jennifer Sandlin, Jason Wallin, and John Weaver, "Toward a Posthumanist Education," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* 30, no. 2 (2014): 39-55.

Levinas, who said humanism is not humane enough²⁸¹, is someone I need to read more of.

Grosz, Butler, Phelan all point me to both poststructural feminisms in further theorizing of non-pedagogy as well as “becoming”, and its additional potentials in pedagogical relations.

Ingold, Wylie, Dewsbury, McCormack and a surprising number of others are all walking. They are walking for anthropological, affective, and ordinary, everyday practices of being and knowing. I hadn’t expected walking to figure as prominently as it has in this project. These scholars also note with surprise how overlooked the topic is academically, given how common an activity walking is. This will be one of my first topics of free reading after the dissertation.

I don’t suppose Deleuze will ever be easier to read, but I keep telling myself with every reading that it might. I’ll keep hoping, and I will certainly continue to enjoy his deeply resonant metaphors.

Spinoza’s *Ethics*²⁸², too, is rankling around in my reading room.

The return to Cultural Studies that I make in this project makes me realize what I’ve been missing while I’ve been busy doing other things in the past two years. I’m absolutely mesmerized by the possibilities of non-representational theorizing for a field long holding to be the field that theorizes representation. Kathleen Stewart and others writing within Cultural Studies and NRT are making me hold out hope that Cultural Studies will not only withstand but

²⁸¹ Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981): 128. Also taken up in the theorization of humanism after the subject in Biesta, *Good Education in an Age of Measurement: Ethics, Politics, Democracy*, 78-80.

²⁸² Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics. The Collected Works of Spinoza*, Volume I, trans. and ed. by Edwin Curley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

extend the ontological and epistemological turns I've touched upon in this project. I am beginning to think of Non-representational Theory as a Cultural Studies after Latour. The ontological turn that Latour unfolded brought with it an exponentially wide field of new possibilities all squarely within the interests of Cultural Studies. I need to keep reading to find out what else I've missed in this regard, but also to identify areas of intersection between Cultural Studies, Non-representational Theory, and pedagogy that I can contribute to through future research.

Julie Lindquist has long been theorizing affective dimensions of pedagogy. I am quite eager to learn more about the "pedagogy of patience" coming out of work she and Bump Halbritter are doing. The very notion seems utterly compatible with kind of affective attunements to messy, hybrid assemblages that I try to theorize here as well as what it feels like to write poststructurally.

I now have a new way of thinking and understanding the social justice trend in educational scholarship. Frankly, I need to do some good hard thinking on this topic given its ubiquity in the job market, but also in terms of how assuming equality complicates the huge explosion of work being done in this field. Previously, I always entered this conversation through critical conversations. Now, I'm seeing social justice with new eyes and speaking social justice in a new language. Translation is going to be a very real component in negotiating with this rambunctious concept in educational theorizing.

My eyes have been opened in new ways to educational philosophy. It's as if I now have a purpose for it. Before, so much in educational philosophy just seemed like something other. Now, it transects with what seems important and relevant. I don't really have a way to explain

this; it's just something that happened. I want to know more about Heidegger and phenomenology before NRT. I am fascinated by Whitehead's influence on Latour and many NRT scholars. I want to learn more about philosophy's bounds – its limits – particularly in provoking more curiosities like those NRT provokes.

Michel Serres deserves a whole section to himself. A philosopher, a writer, a troubadour²⁸³, a sailor – Michel Serres seems to be the launching point for so much of the work done by scholars I've referenced in this project. His folds, metaphors, detours, assemblages, fantasies, realities, wordsmithing, intellect, integrity, evocations all intrigue me. He speaks more of pedagogy than Latour or NRT scholars and at least as much as Rancière.

Homage to the Everyday

In a sense, this project pretty well boils down to a praise of the ordinary. For, in attending to the ordinary, we find things are pretty extraordinary. It's hard work to attend to the ordinary. We don't need extra convolutions and intermediaries to negotiate out of our way, along the way. We certainly don't need to posit them for others, as hoops to jump through, when attending to a thing in common is adequate challenge and reward. Does any of this mean that we can't have teachers and students, classrooms and pedagogy? No, but they certainly are distributed differently and equally.

Kathleen Stewart's *Ordinary Affects*²⁸⁴ might lend an affective attunement to everyday pedagogy. Might it be possible that in attending more thought-fully to the ordinary that we find

²⁸³ Michel Serres, *The Troubadour of Knowledge*, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser with William Paulson (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1997).

²⁸⁴ Stewart, "Affective Attunements," 445-453.

our greatest attention to a thing common? In education, we are so busy producing and packaging pedagogy, even making new pedagogies, might we miss out on what is everyday and ordinary about translations?

Surely not boring, if we entertain what Latour has helped me theorize as translation's pedagogy, isn't the constant nuance of change and the challenge to affectively attune to it as a thing in common enough work for pedagogues? Do we somehow lose track of what might be important about pedagogy if we call it ordinary? Might we weaken the value of pedagogues who are working tirelessly to attend to pedagogy in all of its nuance? Might I be undermining my own research in suggesting that there is nothing really "special" about pedagogy? I find locating pedagogy in relations, as translations, and in immaterial places of affect plenty to attend to. In fact, part of the point of being immersed in pedagogy is to explore its full embodiment, something that Rancière, Latour, and NRT all help make more materially available. This is some of the nuance I'd like to hold onto with my "new" concept of non-pedagogy.

We've made pedagogy very extraordinary. We've especially made it hard to participate in everyday ordinary pedagogies by creating tiny, eye-of-the-needle like passage ways for students to enter into kingdoms of further investigation. We've made the evaluation of whether students have attended to our elaborate systems of pedagogy painful and boring, even misdirected, seemingly about something else altogether and nothing about whether clouds carry moisture or how people get fat. How have we managed to make pedagogy so painful?

Pedagogy is made painful when we assume that our students aren't intelligent enough to attend to other instances of pedagogy themselves. We refused them their right to mediate. We've made pedagogy into something that involves separating the domains of things that interact, and therefore decontextualizing relations in such a way that leaves pedagogy lifeless.

Pedagogy doesn't need to be made special, extravagant, detailed, difficult, or exciting. We just need to attend to those being-doings in translation all around us all of the time.

Pedagogy as ordinary treats relations non-representationally, and in this way, aids in the proliferation of possible translations and translating. Ordinary pedagogy recognizes the extra, the excess, the inarticulable, and the ineffable in its consideration of pedagogical relations. Affect is an enduring example of this for me.

Coda

I've always found, near the end of my writing projects, some small surprise waiting for me, some little gift of insight waiting at the end. In this project that insight resides in a return to non-representational possibilities in Cultural Studies and the work of Kathleen Stewart.

I want to include one last glance through Kathleen Stewart as I close:

The stories that make up my story – disparate and arbitrary scenes of impact tracked through bodies, desires, or labors and traced out of the aftermath of a passing surge registered, somehow, in objects, acts, situations, and events – are meant to be taken not as representative examples of forces or conditions but rather as constitutive events and acts in themselves that animate and literally make sense of forces at the point of their affective and material emergence. More directly compelling than ideologies, and more fractious, multiplicitous, and unpredictable than symbolic representations of an abstract structure brought to bear on otherwise lifeless things, they are actual sites where forces have gathered to a point of impact, or flirtations along the outer edges of a phenomenon, or extreme cases that suggest where a trajectory might lead if it were to go unchecked. They are not the kinds of things you can get your hands on or wrap your

mind around, but they are things that have to be literally tracked.²⁸⁵

My intellectual work takes me into nature all of the time. I seek out walks in the woods, hikes in the mountains, sleeping in the mountains, fresh air, the smell of grass, flowers, trees, and views - wonderfully refreshing views of nature. My husband and I mostly hike, snowshoe, and ski our way into and through any natural place we can access. Our routes are at least as wayfaring as my intellectual journeys have been. You can, indeed, retrace your steps when hiking, and it is nearly absurd to see the circuitous routes one takes at times, whether that be on a small scale - over rocks, sticks, and stones through water sodden trails - or on a larger scale - switchbacking up the side of one valley along its entire length only to be able to cross and switchback down in the other direction along the other side. Pedagogy, non-pedagogy, I think, has been a similar experience.

Luther, father of the Protestant Reformation, protested the necessity of going through the Catholic Church to commune with God. He was excommunicated and exiled for those beliefs, although they spread prolifically and now form the basis of Protestant denominations. John Muir, a different kind of figure (although arguably equally religious as well), preached humans ability to commune with God directly in Nature. Nature was God made manifest for Muir. He would climb to the top of giant pines in huge windstorms to experience what the trees experienced in high wind. Seen as a bit of an ecstatic ascetic, Muir enraged those lobbying for unfettered access to what became protected national wildernesses as he

²⁸⁵ Stewart, "Cultural Poesis: The Generativity of Emergent Things," 1028.

evoked in throngs a love and desire to protect wilderness because of what it offers despite humankind's efforts to improve upon it.²⁸⁶

I hope to be a bit of an outlier here too. Educationally speaking, it would seem heresy to suggest that education does not require a teacher. It might seem heresy to suggest that curricular outcomes can't be predetermined. It probably seems heretical to say that education might be more ethical and effective if we gave up pedagogical methods that believe children need adults or that students needs teachers who are expertly trained in their content and methods to transmit the proper purposes, skills, and dispositions necessary to continue building the professionalization of education and schooling. In reviewing the scholarship on offer by three theoretical approaches that assume equality as a precondition, I hope to share a vision for pedagogy after equality, one that can be accessed directly by anyone, anytime, with anything, and in any way that works for them.

I still hold out hope: If pedagogy can be ordinary, maybe equality can be too.

²⁸⁶ Ken Burns, "The Scripture of Nature (1851-1890)," in *The National Parks: America's Best Idea*, Episode 1, television documentary, dir. by Ken Burns (Arlington Country, VA: Public Broadcasting Service, 2009).

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