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This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled

Faculty Unions: Their Inﬂuence on Awdemic Governance

presented by
Linda Seestedt-Stanford

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for the

PhD. degree in Higher, Adult and Lifelong
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2/05 p:/ClRC/Date0ue.indd-p.1

FACULTY UNIONS: THEIR INFLUENCE
ON ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE

By

Linda Seestedt-Stanford

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial ﬁllﬁllment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Higher, Adult and Lifelong Education
Department of Educational Administration

2006

 

 

 

 

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ABSTRACT

FACULTY UNIONS: THEIR INFLUENCE ON
ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE

By
Linda Seestedt-Stanford

Faculty unions have as their primary objective protecting and improving faculty
life. Conversely, a senate, also a coalition comprised primarily of faculty, has as its
charge supporting the goals of the institution through curricular initiatives and other
designated responsibilities. Both the union and the senate represent a faculty voice and
the political interplay between them can impact on institutional decision-making.

Through my research I discovered there is a blurring of lines between the senate
and union’s roles and respons1bilities that causes recurrent confusion as to which group is
accountable for particular issues and actions. Cross-over membership between the senate
and union, the leadership of the union, and the formal and informal inﬂuences that the
union exerts on the senate were other key areas identiﬁed in my research. These issues
shape the relationship between the senate and union, and thus the political environment of
the institution. .

The ﬁndings of this study indicate that although senates are considered the
governance body by which faculty provide input and participate in institutional decision-
making, in reality the faculty union, through its surreptitious activities is very much a part
of the governance of their institutions. The implications of these ﬁndings are signiﬁcant

and suggest a reconsideration of the role of the faculty union in academic governance.

This dissertation is dedicated to my wonderful family.
To my parents,
Hector and Mary Como,
I am so very proud of you!
To my husband, Mark Stanford,
You are my inspiration!
To my Wolverine children, Michael and Ellyn Seestedt,
Go Spartans!
To my sister, Vivian Como and brother, David Como,
Without family we are nothing.
Thank you for helping me realize my dream!

“Ancora imparo”

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Appreciation is extended to Dr. Marilyn Amey, my advisor, for her patient
support these many years. I have learned a great deal ﬁom her. She has been an inspiring
teacher and mentor. I would also like to thank my committee, Dr. Roger Baldwin, Dr.
Marilee Davis and Dr. Kevin Ford for their precious time and kind direction.

In addition to my family, my good ﬁiends, Mary Ellen, Jane, Lynn and Diana
never doubted that I “would make it”. I am blessed to have such caring and loving
ﬁ'iends. They keep me laughing!

I would also like to acknowledge my dear friend Karen Klumpp. I often tell my
own students that the friends you meet in grad school are the ones you keep for a
lifetime. . .Karen will be my ﬁiend until the day I die. We commiserated and celebrated;
we learned and leaned on each other. I also want to thank another MSU classmate, Pam
Eddy, for taking the time to sit and discuss my research and for reviewing my
dissertation. I hold Pam in high regard as a ﬁiend and colleague.

Finally, I want to thank the wonderful people I work with at The Herbert H. and
Grace A. Dow College of Health Professions. I realize there were times during the last
few months when you had to “take over for me”. I thank you for your support, it is

sincerely appreciated.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................ vii
CHAPTER I: THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 1
Introduction 1
Problem Statement 5
Purpose of the Study 8
Deﬁnition of Terms 9
Overview of Dissertation 10
CHAPTER 11: REVIEW OF THE, LITERATURE 12
Introduction 12
The Nature of Academic Senates 13
Functions of Academic Senates 15
Effectiveness of Academic Senates 19
Faculty Collective Bargaining 24
Academic Senates and Unions 28
Theoretical Framework 32
Sum 34
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 38
Introduction 33
Research Site and Participants 39
Procedures and Data Collection 42
Document Review 43
Interviews 44
Data Analysis Procedures 46
Delimitations and Limitations 47
Epoche 48
4 CHAPTER IV: CASE DESCRIPTIONS 50
Introduction 50
Homestead University 50
The Faculty Senate at Homestead 51
The Union at Homestead 53
Currier University 55
The Academic Senate at Currier 55
The Union at Currier 56
Institutional Similarities 57
Summary 59
CHAPTER V: FINDINGS 60
Introduction 60
Pattern One: Union and Senate Purview 63
Senate and Union Roles and Responsﬂailities 63

 

 

 

 

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El

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Power Struggle 71
Pattern Two: Union and Senate Relationships 76
Membership 76
Leadership 83
Inﬂuence 86
Shared Governance 97
CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 101
Introduction 101
Summative Description of Institutions 102
Senate-Union Relationships 105
Inﬂuence 105
Membership 108
Leadership 110
Shared Governance 112
Implications 1 22
Directions for Further Research 126
Conclusion 129
APPENDIX A 130
Consent Form 130
APPENDIX B 131
Interview Questions 131
Bibliography 132

 

 

 

 

 

Figur:

Figure

 

 

 

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Relationship of the administration, senate and union in a dual

track governance model ....................................... 117
Figure 2 Political interplay between senate, union and

Administration ................................................... 1 19

vii

CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM STATEMENT
Introduction

Faculty participation in governance is an integral part of the organizational
structure of institutions of higher education. Keller (2001) deﬁned academic governance
as “the part that teaching scholars play in the administration, control, standards and long-
term management of the institutions at which they work” (p. 304). Faculty and other
institutional stakeholders are delegated authority by the board of trustees to affect
decisions and processes to support the institution (Kaplan, 2004). Governance, along with
administration, management, and leadership is one of the four requirements needed to run
an institution of higher education (Keller, 2001 ).

Lee (1991) expanded on the concept of academic governance by noting that both
formal and informal structures within an organization, and the relationships among and
between groups in the institution, inﬂuence the process, and the outcome of decisions.
Collective bargaining further obscures the multidimensional nature of faculty
governance. Ehrenberg, Klaff, Kezsbom and Nagowski (2004) point out, “No discussion
of governance in higher education would be complete without a consideration of the role
of collective bargaining”(p. 209). Faculty governance is an important part of the shared
governance matrix of an institution, impacting considerably on the dynamics of decision-
making, and strategic change (Kaplan, 2004).

As early as 1920, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)

advocated for shared responsibility among the different constituents of institutional

 

 

 

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government. In 1966, the AAUP, in collaboration with the American Council on
Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges,
formulated a statement regarding the roles and responsibilities of institutional
government, focusing primarily on the governing board, president and the faculty
(AAUP, Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, 1999). This statement
provided a framework for collaborative decision-making and supported the ideal of
shared governance. Of signiﬁcant importance was the role of faculty in this process.

The AAUP document advocated for the faculty to have primary responsibility for
“curriculum, subject matter, and methods of instruction, research, faculty state and those
aspects of student life which relate to the educational process” (AAUP, 1999, p.5).
Governance models evolved rapidly in the 1960s and early 19703 as a result of this
policy, and were supported by an environment of rapid, sustained grth in higher
education (Benjamin, Carroll, Jacobi, Krop, & Shires, 1993).

Organizational structures for faculty involvement in institutional decision-making
are varied by institution and campus (Lee, 1991). Faculty governance was noted to occur
at two levels, in the department or college, and at the institutional level through an
elected group of faculty representatives in a senate (Duderstadt, 2004). Faculty or
academic senates became the most common type of governance in institutions of higher
education, existing in one form or another on over 90% of 4-year colleges and
universities (Gilrnour, 1991). An academic senate (also known as faculty senates or
councils), as deﬁned by the Report of the American Association of Higher Education
Task Force on Faculty Representation and Negotiations, is a “formal, representative

governance structure at the institutional level that may include only faculty (a “pure”

senate) or that, in addition to a faculty majority, may include representatives of other
campus constituencies, such as administrators, academic staff members and/or students (a
“mixed” senate)” (American Association of Higher Education, 1967, p. 34).
Responsibilities of senates may range from curricular oversight to creating policies
regarding student advising. The level of authority in decision-making may also differ
across institutions with some senates making policy decisions, while others provide
formal recommendations to the administration (Gilmour, 1991).

As these faculty governance systems evolved so too did collective bargaining. In
1965 there were virtually no unionized institutions (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975). In
1972, the AAUP decided to pursue collective bargaining and establish more faculty
unions (Keller, 2001). By the mid 1970’s, one-eighth of the 3038 colleges and
universities in the country had collective bargaining and today that number has increased
to 1007 (Hermassi & Graﬁ 1993) representing over 35% of full-time faculty in the United
States (Douglas & Or, 1990).

Unionization of college and university faculty has in essence contradicted the
concept of collegiality, a tradition espoused as a key component of academic life and a
necessary element in shared governance. Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) pointed out that
collective bargaining assumes there is conﬂict between the employees and the employer
and may undermine the “central ideals of academic professionalism” (p. 3) producing
adversarial rather than collaborative decision making practices. They further observe that
collective bargaining is more consistent with the political and bureaucratic than collegial
concepts of governance. Millett (1980) in his book, Management, Governance and

Leadership, mentioned collective bargaining only in the author’s notes. In his view

 

 

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unionization was destructive to collegial relationships and thus the academic community
and enterprise.

Baldridge and Kemerer (1976) in a seminal study conducted between 1971 and
1974 raised important questions regarding the relationship between senates and unions
and the inﬂuence of unions on shared governance processes. Called the Stanford Project
in Academic Governance (SPAG), this investigation is the only one to date that has
looked at the impact of faculty collective bargaining on governance and decision making
in higher education. A number of salient conclusions were presented by the authors
regarding unions and academic senates. First, the weaknesses of senates appeared to be a
factor in promoting unionization. Second, co-existing senates and unions appeared to take
responsibility for different issues with unions addressing economic issues and work
conditions and senates dealing with curriculum, degree requirements, and admissions.
This split of responsibilities is termed dual track functions. Joint responsibilities covered
personnel issues such as hiring, promotion, and tenure. Third, the “dual track”
responsibilities described above did not seem to remain stable. Unions appeared to be
expanding their inﬂuence into traditional senate responsibilities. The last important
concern from this study dealt with the future viability of senates in the face of union

challenges, administrative leadership, conﬂicts of interest and legal contexts.

Problem Statement

Unions have the potential to be strong coalitions that can increase the power and
inﬂuence of faculty and affect institutional policy and thus the goals of the institution
especially in difﬁcult economic times. Protecting and improving faculty life is the key
mission tied to collective bargaining. Conversely, a senate is also a coalition of faculty,
who have as their responsibility to support the mission and vision of the institution
through curricular initiatives, degree requirements, admissions, and other designated
senate responsibilities that may vary by institution. Although a separation of power
between a senate and labor organization is conceivable, and assumes two mutually
exclusive areas of inﬂuence, these “dual track” processes are highly questionable in
application especially when examined ﬁom a political ﬁamework.

The political model, as described by Baldridge (1971) supports the view that
within organizations are various coalitions and these coalitions are in conﬂict with each
other for power. The group with the most power will ultimately make the decisions and
inﬂuence outcomes in an organization, often making choices that may not be optimal for
achieving an organizational objective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974). Rosovsky (1990)
pointed out that “governance concerns power: who is in charge; who makes decisions;
who has a voice, and how loud that voice is” (p. 261).

Baldridge and Kemerer (1976) cautioned that there is a creeping expansion of
union inﬂuence and that faculty unions have “undercut” the authority of senates,
suggesting that what was once under the purview of senates is now a union responsrbility.

Shuster (1989) encouraged administrators to accept that faculty “simply wear two

different hats, one when they are bargaining collectively and another when engaged in
self-governance and shared governance in the institution” (p. 114).

The interplay between the union and the senate has created a signiﬁcantly
challenging and tenuous environment in higher education. Kemerer and Baldridge (1975)
pointed out that collective bargaining practices could pose a threat to the concept of
shared governance. Unions hold the interests of their membership as their foremost
guiding principle, whereas, senates are concerned with promoting and supporting the
academy. This arrangement creates challenges to unionized institutions, especially in
ﬁscally difficult times (Woznizk, 2003) when programmatic decisions are intricately tied
to the economic conditions of the institution. Keller (2001) refers to this new atmosphere
as a “structural fault in academic organizational life” (p. 313) and describes faculty as
demanding a full partnership in the institution to which they are attached but at the same
time wanting to maintain an entrepreneurial agenda, independent oversight of their
courses, load and time commitments and little accountability. As Keller (2001) pointed
out, “Clearly, the governance of American colleges and universities is varied, oﬂen
fractious and fundamentally impaired” (p. 314).

The AAUP, however, presents a contrary view and supports unionization as a
means for achieving shared governance (Ramo, 1998). The AAUP Policy Documents and
Reports (1995), known as the Redbook, provides principles to guide the faculty’s role in
shared governance. In this report, collective bargaining is supported as the process to

“clarify, strengthen, and protect a sound structure for shared governance” (Ramo, 1998,

p. 52). Clearly there are divergent opinions regarding collective bargaining and its
inﬂuence on faculty involvement in governance. This may, in good measure, be a
reﬂection of the lack of relevant research in this area.

Empirical studies regarding senates and the impact of collective bargaining on
their function and effectiveness are noticeably limited and very dated. With no
differentiation between union and non-unionized environments senates have been
represented as ineffective, weak, unrepresentative, unresponsive and inept (Birnbaum,
1991; Miller, 1998). Faculty, as well as administrators appear dissatisﬁed with the
productivity of senates and participation in them is often viewed by faculty as time
consuming, confusing, and unrewarding (Hamilton, 2000; Mason, 1972). Administrators
complain that many decisions are made through inaction (Miller, 1998) and that senates
operating under a consensus model, although supportive to collegial relationships, restrict
the institution ﬁ'om responding quickly to important campus decisions (Gerber, 1997;
Miller, 1998). The research consistently points out the inefficiency of senates and
questions their viability without regard to the unionization issue.

Baldridge and Kemerer (1977) hesitated to predict the long-term impact that
unionization would have on traditional faculty senates based on the SPAG study
however, their conclusion suggested that faculty governance structures are fragile and “if
not protected and supported, they will be destroyed by the political winds sweeping the
campus” (Baldridge & Kemerer, 1977, p. 347). It has been over thirty years since the
SPAG study was completed. To date, there have been no follow—up studies that have
looked at the inﬂuence of unions on faculty senates. However, the tension between

faculty unions and senates continues to be an issue as pointed out by a recent National

Education Association publication (2003) that posed the question, “Is there an inherent
conﬂict between faculty unions and faculty senates?” (p. 11). Responses to this question
suggest that there is diversity in faculty perceptions related to union and senate functions
and relationships. The inﬂuence of the faculty union on the academic senate, both

institutional coalitions that are faculty based, is an area of research yet to be determined.

Purpose of the Study

The faculty union is one of many interest groups on a college campus. Operating
within a political framework, it is theorized that unions exert inﬂuence on institutions to
support their own interests and values. A senate is a governance body within an
institution that determines academic policies, as well as other issues pertaining to
academic life. Both the union and senate represent a faculty voice. Thus, unions may
sway academic senate policies and processes in order to control the working conditions
of faculty. Current research that is speciﬁc to the inﬂuence of unions on senates is
signiﬁcantly limited. Research in this area is necessary because this relationship may
speak to a possible redeﬁnition of shared governance to include the faculty union as a
major decision-maker in institutions of higher education.

The purpose of this study was to develop a deeper understanding of the
relationship between faculty unions and academic senates by examining relationship
structures, membership, and responsibilities. The primary question driving this study
was: how do faculty unions inﬂuence senates? A qualitative design using a case study
approach was utilized to discern both the informal and formal inﬂuences that faculty

unions have on academic senates as well as the impact of that inﬂuence on decision-

making. Answering this research question has provided current information on the status

of governance in colleges and universities.

Deﬁnition of Terms

The term governance in this study refers to the role faculty play in the
administration, control, standards and long-term management of the institution they work
in (Keller, 2001). Governance, along with administration, management and leadership is
one of the four requirements needed to run an institution of higher education (Keller).

Academic governance is multidimensional in nature (Lee, 1991) and is often
demonstrated through both departmental councils as well as institution wide senates
(Duderstadt, 2004). For the purpose of this study, a mtg will be deﬁned as an
institutional governance body of elected faculty representatives, and possibly other
institutional stakeholders (administrators, students, staff). These groups are often referred
to as either “academic” or “facultY’ senates in the literature. There is no distinction in this
study between the term faculty and academic senate.

The senate, as a governance body of the faculty, is one of many groups that can be
represented in a shared governance model ﬂared governance is deﬁned as a system,
composed of structures and processes, through which faculty, administration and other
campus stakeholders make collective decisions that, impact the institution (Association of
Governing Boards, 1996; Eckel, 2000; Lee, 1991). It is important to note that faculty and
administrators have varied understandings of decision-making in shared governance.

According to Tierney and Minor (2003) some deﬁne shared governance as ﬁilly

collaborative, while others felt it was a consultative process or distributed decision-
making.

The term dual track functions refer to the speciﬁc responsibilities assigned to the
senate and union. The term infers there is a clear demarcation between union and senate
roles in regard to institutional and faculty objectives, with the union dealing with faculty
economic issues, while the senate oversees academic and institutional concerns. This
term implies that the union is not a part of the governance of the institution since the
separation of functions supports the limitation of the union in management decisions.

Conversely dual track governance, acknowledges that faculty collective
bargaining is a part of the governance of an institution. Although the assumption remains,
as with dual track functions, that there are two mutually exclusive areas of inﬂuence for
senates and unions, according to Lee (1982), both the senate and the union would share

governance authority and responsibility.

Overview of Dissertation

The following chapter provides a comprehensive look at senates. Discussion
centers on the nature, functions, and effectiveness of this governance body. A review of
the relevant literature related to collective bargaining in higher education, and
information regarding the relationship between academic senates and unions is also
provided. In Chapter 111, an account of the research methodology and data analysis
procedures in this study are presented, followed by a description of the two case sites in

Chapter IV. The results of this study are presented in Chapter V. A discussion of those

10

results and their implications as well as directions for future research follows in Chapter

VI. Appendices contain the interview questions and consent form

11

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

Faculty or academic senates are generally considered the organizational structures
through which faculty exercise their role in institutional governance. They are “unique
reﬂections of institutional history, values and accidental interactions” (Birnbaum, 1992,
p. 178). They are an accepted and integral part of higher education administration and
reﬂect the culture of the institution. College and university governance structures were
organized within the framework of academic freedom to insure the blending of
professional and managerial considerations into decisions affecting teaching and learning
(Ramo, 1997). Hamilton (2000) pointed out that “shared governance is a necessary
condition for higher education’s mission of creating and disseminating knowledge,
academic freedom and peer review” (p. 16).

Faculty unions are also considered to be an important part of the landscape of
higher education. Collective bargaining, however, is a relative newcomer to colleges and
universities with the ﬁrst unions emerging 30 years ago, long after faculty governance
systems were in place. Various reasons exist for why faculty sought collective
bargaining. The primary explanation evident in the literature relates to the perceived
ineffectiveness of faculty senates and the ineffectual power of those bodies. According to
Polishook and Neilsen (1989) “. . .faculties have sought collective bargaining contracts as
a means of strengthening and supplementing their governance rights in order to

counterbalance the encroachment of increasing managerial prerogative” (p. 148). The

12

faculty union and the faculty senate are inarguably linked through contract issues related
to all faculty personnel issues from workload to program elimination. Thus, with faculty
active in both union and senate processes are there cross inﬂuences that occur that impact
on governance?

The ﬁrst three sections of this literature review will discuss the structure,
ﬁmctions and effectiveness of senates. The fourth part provides a discussion of faculty
collective bargaining, and the last part of the literature review looks at the relationship

between faculty unions and academic senates.

The Nature of Academic Senates

The literature provides a glimpse of academic senates over a twenty-ﬁve year
period. What is notably consistent is the presence of these shared governance structures
on almost every campus in the United States. Gilmour (1991) was the ﬁrst to
comprehensively study the structure of academic senates and found that 91 % of 402
institutions queried had some form of participative governance that included faculty. Data
ﬁom this study suggested that community colleges and four-year institutions with less
than 2000 students were less likely to participate in this type of representative structure,
whereas, 98% of institutions with 10,000 or more students had a shared governance
system. A more recent survey of academic senates done in 2003 by the Center for Higher
Education Policy Analysis (CHEPA), (Tierney & Minor, 2003) supported Gilmour’s data
and reported that 87 % of the 763 institutions sampled had some type of faculty senate
with doctoral and master’s institutions showing higher percentages, 93% and 90%

respectively, than baccalaureate colleges, 82%.

13

 

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The 2001 Survey of Higher Education Governance (Kaplan, 2004) examined
faculty governance at public and private institutions and found that on private campuses
faculty inﬂuence is less structured than at public institutions. A variety of governance
models were noted that included institution-wide faculty senates having just faculty as
members (58%) to institution-wide academic senates that elected senators from among
the administration, faculty, students and staff (1 6.2%). Academic senates composed of
faculty, staff and students were observed more often in public institutions.

Non-academic employees participation in university governance appears to have
decreased since the 1970s when 50% of institutions had students on their governance
board and almost one-third had staff involved (Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker & Riley, 1978).
The decreasing role of non-academic personnel in academic senates may be related to a
changing focus ﬁ'om the 1960s and 1970s when solidarity and community were
considered vital components in higher education (Gilmour, 1991). Stakeholders such as
student services personnel, non-academic staff; students, non tenure-eligible, part time
and adjunct faculty are not consistently represented in current academic senate structures
and are often not regarded as part of the academic community (Sanders, 1973). This
suggests that faculty control has increased relative to other institutional stakeholders.
Henkin and Persson (1992) sampled 1000 tenured and tenure track faculty at three public
institutions in the same state regarding non-academic staff participation in governance
issues. Results indicated support for non-academic staff to participate in governance
processes related to ﬁnancial and personnel affairs, and to a lesser extent, institutional
matters. Minor support was noted for involvement in the student affairs area, and a

negatively skewed perception of non-academic personnel participation in academic

14

affairs. The Henkin and Persson (1992) study conﬁrmed faculty opinion and perceptions
that they are the “gatekeepers” and control access to the processes of shared governance.
Senate membership has evolved at many institutions to include older faculty who
are delegated authority by the majority of the faculty members who gravitate toward
research and other scholarly endeavors and have no interest in participating in a
governance role (Mason, 1972; Tierney, 1999). Younger members of the faculty may
actually be discouraged to join academic senates for fear it will detract ﬁom their
teaching and research (Floyd, 1985). Women also tend to be under represented in
academic senates. Twale and Shannon (1996) looked at gender differences among faculty
in campus governance and found that men in academic senates tended to be older,
tenured, and hold the rank of professor, while women were younger, and more likely to

be at the non-tenured assistant professor rank.

Functions of Academic Senates

Function more that structure is asserted to be the key to the impact of senates on
institutional governance (Minor, 2003). Not only is there variety in the structure of these
institutional bodies, but also in the speciﬁc purposes or roles they serve. Yet, there are
very few studies that actually speak to the ﬁmction of senates in governance. Mortimer
and McConnell (1978) distinguished three degrees of senate authority: legislative,
advisory, and forensic. The legislative ﬁmctions include such matters as curriculum and
student affairs as well as responsibility for appointing committees that deal with
“clarifying, interpreting, and publishing senate rules and procedures” (Mortimer &

McConnell, 1978, p. 28). The advisory ﬁrnctions of academic senates may include

15

personnel matters, budget, university calendar, and planning. Creating an environment for
discussion and providing administration with key concerns faculty may have regarding
institutional issues describes the forensic function of an academic senate.

Consistent with Mortimer and McConnell’s assessment, it appears that the key
purpose of an academic senate is to oversee instructional issues. The AAUP (1999)
advocated for the faculty to have primary responsibility for control of the curriculum. In
addition to establishing new degree requirements, developing courses to satisfy those
requirements and deﬁning course objectives and content, faculty should be involved in
instructional procedures and evaluation of students’ learning achievements (AAUP, 1999;
Baldridge & Kemerer, 1976). A more recent investigation and analysis of faculty senates
done by CHEPA (Tierney & Minor, 2003) conﬁrmed that undergraduate curriculum
development was the primary area faculty felt they inﬂuenced, followed by standards for
evaluating teaching, and the assessment of the quality of academic pro gram. Only 60% of
the faculty at baccalaureate institutions in the survey felt the venue for participation in
these activities rested entirely with the faculty senate. Academic departments, standing,
and ad hoc committees were noted to be more important than senates as a means of
faculty participation.

Faculty status is a secondary area of institutional decision-making in which
senates appear to have inﬂuence. The senate is viewed as the primary facilitator of
faculty rights (Miller, 1999). This includes assisting in recruiting new faculty members,
setting faculty performance standards, participating within their disciplines in peer review
on matters of tenure, promotion and dismissal, and sitting on committees to hear faculty

grievances (AAUP, 1999; Tierney & Minor, 2003). In addition to the responsibilities

16

 

 

 

 

 

delineated above, the role of faculty senates in the selection and evaluation of
administrators (Strohrn, 1980) and input into institutional planning are also perceived to
be important functions.

The senate also fulﬁlls ceremonial and social functions. Senates operate on
regular schedules, involve the same core of individuals, and ﬁrnction with rules. These
rituals provide members with a sense of belonging and for some may be enjoyed purely
as a pastime. Social interactions, discussion of key institutional issues, and gossip
intermingle to produce a forum for faculty involvement (Birnbaum, 1991).

Most of what was reported in the 2001 Survey on Higher Education Governance
(Kaplan, 2004) described the structure, formal roles and decision-making areas in current
college and university governance systems. The key ﬁnding in this study related to a
comparison of answers of a matched set of institutions to ﬁfteen questions concerning
faculty participation originally a part of a similar survey conducted by the AAUP in
1970. These decision-making categories basically delineated the functions of shared
governance. Results indicated that faculty participation had increased over the past thirty
years in all ﬁfteen decision-making categories evaluated. Faculty control and authority
grew most signiﬁcantly in the area of faculty status, setting the size of disciplines,
appointment of academic deans and department heads and deciding on the authority and
membership of faculty governance agencies. Faculty inﬂuence remained consistent and
high in the areas of academic operation, planning and policy over the thirty-year time
span. As a result of this comparison, Kaplan concluded that faculty appeared to have a

healthy, valued and signiﬁcant role in governance at many institutions.

17

In an effort to more clearly delineate the ﬁmctions of academic senates, Minor
(2003) developed a conceptual framework in which to view senates. The four models
proposed by Minor are a result of a national survey of 150 doctoral institutions, 302
master’s institutions and 311 baccalaureate institutions. The sample represented
approximately 55% of all institutions within each Carnegie classiﬁcation (Carnegie
Classiﬁcation of Higher Education Institutions, 2000) and was consistent with the
public/private ratio in each institutional sector. A 35 item Web-based survey was
developed and ﬁve individuals from each institution, including the chief academic
officer, faculty senate president and three department chairs, were asked to complete it.
Using an analysis of variance, Minor identiﬁed the ﬁve strongest predictors of senate
effectiveness and from those factors developed the four models presented below.

A faculty senate acting in a traditional manner would “function primarily to
preserve and represent the interest of the faculty during decision-making processes”
(Minor, 2003, p. 964). The traditional senate has decision-making authority over areas
deemed to be in the faculty domain, such as curriculum, program requirements and
faculty tenure and promotion. In all other areas, they provide recommendations to the
administration. Generally, a traditional senate is not viewed as an integrated partner in
institutional governance, but rather representative of the interests of faculty.

The inﬂuential model of a senate exercises decision-making authority in the same
areas as the traditional senate, but also has inﬂuence on some nonacademic issues such as
budget, athletics, and development. The inﬂuential senate, according to Minor, “is

assertive and takes initiative on issues that extend beyond faculty matters to those that

18

concern the entire institution” (2003, p. 964). This senate has the ability to create change
and is an integrated governing body of the institution.

Minor (2003) described the third type of senate as dormant. These senates are
inactive and largely ceremonial in function. Dormant senates do not play a role in
decision-making, but do ﬁrlﬁll other latent functions that are important for faculty. The
last type of senate described by Minor is called the cultural senate. In this structure,
decision-making is inﬂuenced by changing cultural dynamics that are not controlled by
the formal structure of the senate, but rather by informal processes such as deals,

personalities, or social interactions/connections.

Effectiveness of Academic Senates

Despite the extensive rhetoric supporting the concept of academic senates as
essential to the functioning of higher education there is little empirical evidence that
documents what constitutes effective shared governance systems. The Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Report (1983) pointed out that there is a
lack of consistency in perceived objectives between the agenda of faculty senates and the
problems confronted by many institutions. This mismatch impacts on the perceived
effectiveness of shared governance and on institutional mission.

Lee (1991) noted that faculty as well as administrators are dissatisﬁed with their
involvement in academic governance. The CHEPA Study (Tierney & Minor, 2003)
conﬁrmed Lee’s earlier conclusion. In this study, faculty reported dissatisfaction with

faculty senates with 22 percent of respondents noting that the senate was not an important

19

governing body and 43 percent of institutions surveyed reporting that involvement in the
senate was not highly valued.

In a case study of governance systems at eight institutions, Lee (1991) concluded
that three related factors contributed to the perceived effectiveness of an academic senate:
structure, the cultural context in which the governance system operated and the
interaction between the faculty governance structure and the administration. The
structures of senates having a large number of non-faculty members were viewed as
being less effective than those senates having faculty dominated or all faculty
membership. Further, the larger the size of the senate the less perceived efficiency was
noted by respondents in this study. In addition, an executive committee of the senate was
deemed preferable to administrators handling issues of setting agendas and organizing
committees.

Cultural issues of particular institutions were also seen as signiﬁcantly impacting
on the efﬁciency of the shared governance structure. The governance history of an
institution, faculty attitudes toward the senate, and the quality of faculty who choose to
participate were all elements that appeared to inﬂuence a senate’s effectiveness (Lee,
1991 ). Faculty participation was strongly linked to perceived legitimacy of decision-
making (Minor, 2003; Mortimer, Gunne & Leslie 1976) and thus a perception of senate
effectiveness.

The third element of academic senates that Lee (1991) found important to
perceived effectiveness was the attitude of the president and/or provost toward the

governance system. At institutions where academic senates were viewed as effective,

20

there was a “routinized, formal relationship between faculty governance leaders and
administration” (p. 46).

Minor (2003) researched existing concepts of effective faculty participation in
governance and found it difficult to identify criteria that spoke to effective senates
because of the variability of models and subjective interpretations of the term “effective.”
He concluded, “the question of how to deﬁne an effective senate remains inadequately
addressed” (p. 962). In an attempt to identify what constitutes a perception of an effective
senate Minor surveyed more that 3500 participants from 763 institutions. Information
was gathered on various structural, cultural, and functional aspects of senates. Minor
identiﬁed fourteen criteria subjects perceived were related to senate effectiveness. Using
three regression models he attempted to predict which of these variables predicted senate
effectiveness. In the ﬁrst model, Minor looked at cultural measures such as trust,
communication, interest in the senate, involvement in the senate and the importance of
shared governance in the institution, as predictors of effectiveness. The second model
measured faculty participation in decision-making pertaining to departmental,
administrative and ad hoc committees. The third model considered areas of faculty
inﬂuence such as educational policies, curriculum, promotion and tenure, selection and
evaluation of president and provost, strategic and budget priorities. Minor found that the
ﬁve strongest predictors of senate effectiveness in his study across the three models were
(a) high levels of faculty involvement in the senate, (b) high levels of faculty interest in
senate activity, (0) faculty inﬂuence over tenure and promotion issues, ((1) signiﬁcant
inﬂuence in the selection of the provost and president, and (e) inﬂuence in setting

strategic and budget priorities.

21

In an extensive review of academic governance, Baldridge and Kemerer (1976)
and Baldridge (1982) concluded that except for a small number of institutions with
successful shared governance models in place, academic senates were not effective. They
asserted that the weakness of senates was a major inﬂuence in bringing about collective
bargaining. Operating on delegated authority from the governing board or president and
depending on institutional appropriations and staffing makes it difﬁcult for senates to
advance independent agendas as well as implement decisions that lack administrative
support.

Birnbaum (1991) presented further information regarding the manifest functions
of academic senates, suggesting that those functions are not being adequately performed.
Using the three traditional models of the university as a bureaucracy, a political system
and a collegium, he asserted that academic senates have a range of activities and
outcomes as a part of their functions. However, the extent to which academic senates
have been a useful mechanism for faculty participation and inﬂuence suggests that their
manifest functions are not being ﬁrlﬁlled. Birnbaum (1991) posited that academic senates
have survived in spite of their inadequacies because they ﬁrlﬁll other latent ﬁrnctions
such as symbolic importance, status provider, decision ambiguity, attention cue,
personnel screening, organizational conservator, ritual and pastime observer, and
scapegoat.

Academic senates survive because they are generally accepted as an essential
characteristic of mainstream colleges and universities (Birnbaum, 1991). Senates
maintain the concept of shared governance, which is widely supported by administrators,

faculty and senate leaders (Tierney & Minor, 2003). However, as pointed out through the

22

CHEPA Study (Tierney & Minor), there are disparate deﬁnitions of the concept of
“shared governance.” It is those multiple interpretations of shared governance and who
retains decision-making authority that make it difﬁcult to deﬁne effectiveness (Minor,
2004). Forty-seven percent of the respondents in the CHEPA study deﬁned shared
governance as a ﬁrlly collaborative decision-making model. A consultative decision-
making model where faculty opinion and advice is sought but decision-making is
controlled by administration was described by 27% of the constituents poled as a
deﬁnition of shared governance. Twenty-six percent of respondents interpreted shared
governance as a distributed decision-making model where different groups make
decisions on particular issues.

The timing of decisions through an academic senate process has been identiﬁed as
a concern by a number of authors (Birnbaum, 1991; Gerber, 1997 ; Miller, 1998; Tierney,
1999) and suggests that academic senates are slow to make decisions and take action on
issues. This indecisiveness may be a latent function of the senate and makes it possible
for many problems referred to it to resolve over time with no intervention (Birnbaum,
1991). Senates also ﬁrnction to provide information to administrators regarding the
importance of particular items, establishing a system of prioritization (Birnbaum, 1991).

The research reviewed on academic senate ﬁrnction and effectiveness is deﬁcient
in deﬁning what factors affect the role of senates in the governance of institutions
(Minor, 2003). The literature that is available is dated, deals primarily with senate
structure, lacks conceptual or theoretical ﬁameworks when discussing senate
effectiveness and provides little or no information on the impact of collective bargaining

on this governance organization. Minor (2003) calls for more research on senates,

23

stating, ”To a large extent, senates remain understudied” (p. 975). More speciﬁcally,
Minor encourages additional research that looks at the “known challenges that impede

senate effectiveness” (p. 975).

Faculty Collective Bargaining

A recurring theme in the recent literature reviewed is a question regarding the
inﬂuence of unions on shared governance (Ehrenberg, Klaff, Kezsbom, & Nagowski,
2004; Kaplan, 2004). The history of collective bargaining in institutions of higher
education is a recent one but may represent one of the most signiﬁcant changes in the
landscape of American higher education (Birnbaum & Inman, 1984). This alteration in
the way some universities and colleges “conduct business” requires a basic understanding
of the history of unionization and what precipitated the advent of collective bargaining on
college campuses.

The Stanford Project on Academic Governance (1973) looked at the reasons why
collective bargaining entered traditional colleges and universities. What the study found
was that wages, beneﬁts and job security ranked as the most important causes for
unionization by all respondents. But another factor that may have contributed to the
increase in unions at some institutions was the role of the faculty senate. Baldridge and
Kemerer (1974) presented a number of case studies and offered different views of the
role of academic senates in the unionization of college campuses. In some cases the
authors indicated that weak academic senates were responsible for the appearance of a
union, in other institutions unions and senates were initiated at the same time, and yet in

other cases strong senates with established directives were maintained while unions were

24

started to deal with the economic issues of the faculty. This diversity speaks to the impact
of institutional culture and history on the governance patterns of colleges. and
universities. What is clear from the literature is that unions emerged because faculty were
faced with issues that compromised their professionalism, power, and economic base
(Raelin, 1989) and that these issues were directly related to governance.

The ﬁrst collective bargaining agreements in higher education institutions were
reached in the late 19605 (Cameron, 1982). Legislative actions that followed in the 19703
enabled the increase of unions or labor organizations for public employees. The option to
unionize is largely a public sector phenomenon with about 38 percent of ﬁrll time faculty
in public colleges and universities covered by collective bargaining agreements versus 6
percent in the private sector (Ehrenberg et al., 2004). Faculty in private institutions were
restricted from forming labor organizations as a result of a Supreme Court decision made
in 1980 (National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) versus Yeshiva). The Court ruled that
faculty were considered managers and thus ineligible to bargain collectively with
universities (Ali & Karim, 1992). In addition to differences by control, faculty
involvement in unions appears to differ by type of institution with two-year colleges,
which are typically public, unionized at a higher percentage (40%) than Liberal Arts I
institutions, which are typically private (3%) (Ehrenberg et al).

Unions represent in a formal manner the entire faculty at an institution, which is a
signiﬁcant departure from the traditional individualistic practices that are a part of
academia (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975). Charles Rehmus (1973) deﬁned three essential
conditions necessary in a union: (a) the assumption of conﬂict between the employee and

employer; (b) the acknowledgement by the employee group that the union is their

25

exclusive representative to administration; and (c) the fair representation of all
employees. By focusing on the “whole” in contrast to the “individual”, unions promote
standardization and uniformity, principles not consistent with the values of individual
achievement and responsibility usually associated with faculty professionalism (Raelin,
1989)

In addition to the concern regarding the erosion of faculty pro fessionalism, the
introduction of unions to the academy appears to have impacted institutional
relationships, authority structures, and communication patterns (Birnbaum & Inman,
1984). Birnbaum and lnman point out through their review of the literature that collective
bargaining has been viewed as eroding academic values, altering institutional missions
and goals and making institutional change and innovation difﬁcult. In addition, they
noted tlmt as organizational effectiveness decreases, collegial practices are threatened and
disagreements appear to intensify in unionized institutions especially during difﬁcult
economic times.

Currently, there are three major national organizations that represent college and
university faculty. They are the American Association of University Professors (AAUP),
the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), and the National Education Association
(N EA). Each of these organizations presents slightly different philosophies in their
approach to representing faculty.

The AAUP, established in 1913, is considered by many to be the leading faculty
organization. This association is responsible for publishing numerous policy statements
and reports that are widely accepted and provide a basis for faculty and administration

relations at many institutions (Garbarino, 1975). The AAUP was slower than other

26

organizations to become a bargaining agent. Since the mid 19703, however, the AAUP
has identiﬁed more than 70 chapters and affiliates and serves as the faculty collective
bargaining representative, primarily in public institutions (AAUP, 2004). The AAUP
views collective bargaining as an “effective instrument” for protecting academic
freedom, resolving grievances, promoting the economic well being of faculty, and
advancing the interests of higher education (AAUP, 2004).

The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) is considered the “pioneer of
unionism” representing teachers since 1916 (Garbarino, 1975, p. 92). The AFT is the
largest higher education union in the country, bargaining for over 130,000 faculty,
professional staff, and graduate student employees (AFT, 2004). Gabarino describes the
AFT as “the most militant, more continuously indignant, more ideological, more issue-
oriented, more committed to support for groups on the ﬁinges of the professorate. . .and
more committed to joint action with non-teacher union groups” (p. 94). The mission of
the AFT higher education department is “to help. . .afﬁliates and their members prosper in
the face of political, economic and technological forces challenging the most basic
assumptions about the union’s role on campus” (Iggy/WWW.aft.ogﬂr_igher_ed/about.htm.
2004, 111).

The National Education Association (N EA), the largest college and university
faculty and staff organization in the United States, represents approximately 115,000
higher education personnel (N EA, 2004). The NBA began as a professional association in
1870 and in the 19603 evolved into a labor organization (Garbarino, 1975). The NEA’s
mission is to “fulfill the promise of a democratic society... promote the cause of quality

public education and advance the profession of education; expand the rights and further

27

the interest of educational employees; and advocate human, civil and economic rights for
all” (http://www.nea.orgjaboutnea.ht_n;l_ 2004, 113).

These three national unions all have, as a part of their mission statement or
embedded in the objectives of their organization, a commitment to furthering or
strengthening shared governance through the efforts of the union. How the unions do this
is not entirely clear in the literature. It may be that diverse philosophy and manner in
which bargaining agents direct and support collective bargaining at individual institutions
inﬂuences the union’s impact on governance, for example. It could be many other factors
as well. Regardless, given their stated missions and objectives, it is apparent that unions

consider shared governance something they can inﬂuence.

Academic Senates and Unions

Although the literature speaks to the diversity, basic functions and effectiveness
of academic senates, it is far more limited, almost non-existent, in its current discussion
regarding the relationship between faculty unions and academic senates. The Stanford
Project on Academic Governance (SPAG) completed in 1974 is the only comprehensive
research effort that looked at faculty unionization and its impact on governance and
decision-making in higher education (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975). The authors sought
“to alert those in higher education to the relationships and intersections between the
union movement and the governance of higher education...” (Kemerer & Baldridge,
1975, p. ix,) and concluded from their study that “We really do not have enough
experience to predict with great accuracy the long-term impact that unionization would

have on traditional faculty senates” (p. 346).

28

In the thirty years since the SPAG study, there has been a signiﬁcant increase in
faculty covered by collective bargaining agreements but limited updated information on
the impact of unionization on governance. Currently, there are 922 public and 85 private
campuses in the United States that have unions, representing over 35 % of full-time
faculty in this country (Hemmasi & Graf, 1993). The role of collective bargaining in
higher education is likely to increase in the future according to Ehrenberg et a1. (2004)
who predict increases in private sector faculty labor organizations. Recent discussions
with the NLRB regarding the Yeshiva decision may not apply to all private-sector
faculty, non faculty and graduate assistant unions. According to The Survey on Higher
Education Governance since 1990 “unionization has persisted at a steady but low annual
rate” (Kaplan, 2004, p. 177).

In consideration of the SPAG study conclusions and the documented increase in
unions, it is interesting to note that very few research articles reviewed on shared
governance mention the inﬂuence of faculty unionization on academic senates. In an
effort to try and understand this relationship, Lee (1982) looked at collective bargaining
contracts at 58 institutions to determine if the agreements contained protection for the
faculty senate. Results of this contract analysis were used to collect more speciﬁc
governance information from eight institutions. What Lee found was that although
“senate and union responsibilities were careﬁrlly delineated and kept separate” (p. 81)
union leaders were active in the non union part of institutional governance and therefore
could “monitor and inﬂuence decisions without appearing to involve the unions as an
“external”inﬂuence” (p. 81). Lee viewed faculty as “sitting on both ends of the

bargaining table” (p. 84) and questioned why “faculty who appear to participate actively

29

in “managerial” policy-making should be permitted to bargain collectively over terms
and conditions of employment” (p. 84). Lee’s study, done over twenty years ago, drew
into question the inﬂuence of unions on the governance of colleges and universities.

No other studies regarding governance were discovered that looked at this issue.
Even the collegiate union literature provided no mention of unions and their inﬂuence on
faculty senates (Hemmasi & Graf; 1993). Ali and Karin (1992) pointed out that most
findings about the inﬂuence of unionization on academic issues have been casually
mentioned in the literature and were related to class size, academic calendar, workload,
and class schedules.

The 2001 Survey of Higher Education Governance (Kaplan, 2004), the only
comprehensive study done in 30 years that looked at faculty participation in governance
provided no information regarding the perceived or direct inﬂuence of collective
bargaining on institutional decision making. This survey listed every constituent group,
including students, who may exercise inﬂuence in decision-making but did not list
unions. With the exception of providing a percentage of institutions in the study that had
unionized faculty (15.9%) the only other mention of unions was in reference to survey
results noting that 90% of all unionized institutions allowed union leaders to serve in the
senate.

The most current information available on academic senates was recently
published in Challenges for Governance: A National Report by the Center for Higher
Education Policy Analysis (CHEPA) (2003). Institutions with and without collective
bargaining were sampled on a number of issues. The results of the survey suggested that

colleges with unions and those without had very little difference in their responses

30

regarding faculty inﬂuence over personnel policies, trust in the administration, and rating
the importance of shared governance. Although individuals were surveyed on a number
of other topics including their perceptions of faculty inﬂuence with various domains of
decision-making, the report did not provide a breakdown of unionized and non-unionized
institutions regarding these issues.

A subsequent paper based on the CHEPA survey looked at predictors of senate
effectiveness (Minor, 2003). Minor found that high levels of faculty involvement in the
senate and inﬂuence in decision-making were signiﬁcant predictors of a senate’s
effectiveness. Although collective bargaining was not mentioned in this article, Minor
suggested that traditional senates, which were the largest percent of the sampled
institutions, act as associations that represent the faculty, “rather than integrated partners
in campus governance” (p. 974), a concept consistent with the culture of unionization. In
a later article on faculty senates, Minor (2004) advocated research on alternative means
by which faculty could be involved in campus decision making, one of which was
through unions. He asserted that collective bargaining along with other forms of faculty
participation might impact the role of senates but “enhance faculty participation by
providing an opportunity for involvement or serve as a contending voice that diminishes
the effect of a senate” (p. 360). Consistent with this thought, Ehrenberg et a1. (2004)
encouraged researchers to “investigate the hypothesis that the presence of a faculty union
may actually improve the ﬁrnctioning of systems of shared governance, at least with

respect to economic issues” (p. 213).

31

Theoretical Framework

Organizational charts exist at every institution of higher education and typically
depict on paper the hierarchical decision making structure of the organization. This
rational model of decision-making as described by Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker and Riley,
(1977) suggests that decisions are made through a well-deﬁned and systematic process.
In addition to these organizational charts, however, many colleges and universities
operating under the concept of shared governance often delineate even further the
responsibilities for particular decisions to other campus constituents such as the academic
senate, senior staff; students, and often the union. Although these lines of responsibility
are not captured on the organizational chart, they are a part of the operation of the
institution and as Baldridge et aL suggest, institutional structures impact and direct
political efforts that are focused on policy decisions. Policy is essential to guiding an
institution in setting goals and developing strategies for achieving those objectives.
Inﬂuencing policy thus becomes critical to supporting the interests of various groups
within the institution.

It is this inﬂuence that Morgan (1997) describes as the “wheeling and dealing,
negotiation and other processes of coalition building and mutual inﬂuence that shape so
much of organizational life” (p. 160). Morgan proposes that it is the delicate interplay of
the relationships between the interests, conﬂicts, and power in an organization that sets
the stage for both visible and obvious political ploys as well as the subtle, behind the
scene politics. Scarce resources will exacerbate this political power, and institutional

goals and strategies will be set through an ongoing process of negotiation, bargaining and

32

jockeying for position among key constituents in the organization (Bolman & Deal,
1997)

The fundamental assumption in the political framework is that organizations are
comprised of coalitions of interest groups in which decisions are made based upon
inﬂuence, po’wer and conﬂict. Morgan (1997) suggests that there are fourteen sources of
power within an organization that afford individuals or groups with strategies to support
their agendas as well as deal with conﬂict in the organization. They are: (a) formal
authority, (b) control of scarce resources, (c) use of organizational structure, rules, and
regulations, ((1) control of decision processes, (e) control of knowledge and information,
(f) control of boundaries, (g) ability to cope with uncertainty, (h) control of technology,
(i) interpersonal alliances, networks and control of the informal organization, (j) control
of counter organizations, (k) symbolism and management of meaning, (1) gender and the
management of gender relations, (m) structural factors that deﬁne the stage of action and
(n) the power one already has (p. 171). '

In review of these power sources, it is immediately evident that academic senates
and faculty unions by nature of their roles and responsibilities, as described earlier, may
have signiﬁcant inﬂuence and power in colleges and universities. Senates are assigned
authority for curricular, admission and academic policies, while unions have contracted
authority for issues regarding faculty job rights and other matters relating to faculty
welfare. Unions bargain to increase faculty salaries and beneﬁts thus impacting on the
resources of an institution, while senates impact resources of the institution through
admission policies, and new program development. Faculty involved in senate and union

activities may use rules and regulations to their beneﬁt to slow down the decision-making

33

processes or exercise inﬂuence in the outcomes of decisions that may directly impact
faculty. These few examples illustrate some of the many political forms of behaviors that
senates and unions may individually demonstrate.

When one considers that unions and senates are both faculty based, the dynamic
of inﬂuence and power in an institution is compounded. Unions represent a
countervailing power, an attempt to act as a check on the management of an institution
(Morgan, 1997). Conversely, the administration and the board of trustees delegate the
senate’s powers. Does the union “check” on the institution extend to inﬂuencing
academic senate activities and decisions? The political model provides an analytical
framework for supporting this research proposal and assists the researcher in

understanding the ways in which unions exert their inﬂuence on academic senates.

Summary

In summary, the literature over the past 30 years regarding academic senates and
collective bargaining has been scarce, conﬂicted, and sporadic. In the 19703 a major
study was undertaken and numerous books, papers and reports were written examining
unionization and its impact on institutional governance. The next surge of research did
not follow until the 19903 when shared governance structures for faculty participation
were investigated. In the latter studies, there was no mention of unionization as a variable
in academic senate function and effectiveness. In fact, collective bargaining was hardly
mentioned in the governance literature. Almost ﬁfteen years have passed since any
signiﬁcant research on academic senates has been published. The CHEPA (2003) study,

as well as Minor’s research (2004), constitutes the most current view of academic senate

34

 

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effectiveness but only includes some mention of collective bargaining in the analysis of
data.

The limited research on the impact of faculty unions on governance appears
inconsistent with the increase in labor organizations on college campuses and the implied
reasons for their growth The literature is mixed in its assessment of why collective
bargaining entered higher education and the role of unions in governance. Raelin (1989)
attributes the escalation of collective bargaining to eroding faculty governance systems.
Consistent with this theme, Duderstadt (1998) warns that faculty will turn to unionization
more often if universities cannot make their governance procedures work more
efﬁciently. Poorly functioning faculty governance systems appear to engender the
development of unions. Conversely, others suggest unions have caused “adversarial
relationships that strained governance” (Schuster, Smith, Corak, & Yarnada, 1994, p. 16)
and that “collective bargaining practices. . .could pose a threat to the concept of “shared
governance” (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975, p. 25). Still others purport that collective
bargaining acts as a protector of traditional academic governance procedures (Polishook
& Nielson, 1989; Ramo, 1998). Schuster (1994) and Miller (1989) point out that unions
have not replaced traditional academic senates but that unions often stimulate more
effective faculty senates once it becomes clear that the union and the senate serve
different but corrrpatible purposes. Richardson (1999) referred to the interplay between
institutional governance and unions as cooperative decision-making in academe that is a
recognized international standard of practice.

As early as 1975, Gabarino concluded that collective bargaining by faculty labor

organizations was a form of university governance, “possibly the form of governance of

35

the future. . .it is a new form that is a response to. . .a failure of the traditional forms of
governance to adapt successfully to new problems” (p. 28). In contrast, the Association of
Governing Boards through their statement on institutional governance (1999) perceived
collective bargaining to be detrimental to the long-term strength of institutions of higher
education (Richardson, 1999). All of these views suggest a relationship of inﬂuence,
albeit divergent, between unions and governance structures, yet few of these statements
are supported by any research With the exception of the SPAG study (1974) and
elements of the CHEPA Report (Tierney & Minor, 2003) these views are little more than
rhetoric that espouses post hoc theoretical explanations of these observed relationships.

Very few research articles dealing with academic senates or faculty governance
mention collective bargaining. By lack of mention, the two appear to be disassociated
with each other, yet the facts support their co-existence at hundreds of colleges and
universities. Ehrenberg et a1. (2004) point out that the inﬂuence of faculty unions on
shared governance is one question that has yet to be addressed by researchers. Is the
scarcity of investigations in this area reﬂective of the fact that researchers perceive
unions and faculty senates to function completely separate with limited inﬂuence on each
other? Or, perhaps academic senates and unions once perceived as having “dual track”
functions have blurred the lines of responsibility sufﬁciently so that both are now a part
of institutional governance.

What is suggested by the current literature is a “gentle” implication that faculty
unions may actually be a part of the governance structure of institutions, providing

faculty with an alternative means of participation in addition to the academic senate.

36

Examining the inﬂuence of faculty unions on academic senates provides additional

insight into the governance of institutions with collective bargaining.

37

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The primary research question for this study asked: How do faculty unions
inﬂuence academic senates? By identifying the formal and informal inﬂuences that
faculty unions have on senates this study allows for a deeper understanding of the
relationship of these two groups. An informal observation of academic senate activities
have spurred this researcher’s interest in this area and have prompted me to seek
additional information on the inﬂuence of faculty unions on academic senates. Further,
the dearth of information in the literature regarding this relationship provides limited
explication.

This study used qualitative inquiry as its primary research methodology. Previous
research on senates and unions has not employed a qualitative approach The primary
research style used in past studies has been survey based, providing quantitative
descriptions of senate size, structure, ﬁmctions, and judgments of effectiveness.
Information relative to the relationship between the senate and union has not been
explored. The qualitative paradigm was selected because it focuses on understanding the
meanings embedded in people’s experiences (Merriam, 1998). This type of inquiry is
particularly appropriate for a study of this nature because it allows for the exploration of
the informants’ perceptions, experiences, and opinions (Miles & Huberrnan, 1994)
regarding academic senates and the inﬂuence of unions on them. Qualitative

methodology can enhance the understanding of the relationship, both formal and

38

informal, between senates and unions by delving in to the complexities and processes
related to this association (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Through this approach, it is
anticipated that new information can be obtained that will be relevant to the governance
of institutions.

Understanding the relationship between faculty unions and senates requires
gathering information and perceptions from a cross—section of institutional players who
are familiar and interact daily with both the academic senate and faculty union. The
following section includes a discussion of site and participant selection, the choice of data

gathering methods, and data analysis procedures.

Research Site and Participants

Purposeful sampling (Patton, 1990) was used to identify two institutions for this
study. Purposeful sampling allowed the researcher to identify a small number of
participants “who provide representative pictures or aspects of information or knowledge
distributed within the study population” (Kuzel, 1992, p. 79). Purposeful sampling is
based on the premise that the researcher “wants to discover, understand and gain insight
and therefore must select a sample from which the most can be learned” (Merriam, 1998,
p. 61).

The criteria that guided the site selection in this study centered on identifying
public, four-year institutions within the same state that have the same Carnegie
Classiﬁcation and union bargaining agent as well as a senate. Identifying universities
with these speciﬁc criteria provided the examiner with similar sites that could provide

information-rich data in regard to the relationship between senates and unions. By

39

designating the above criteria, variability was minimized in regard to the impact of the
size and mission of the institution, source of funding, and bargaining agent.

In order to select the sites for this investigation, higher education institutions
having faculty collective bargaining in a midwestem state were initially identiﬁed. Of the
15 unionized four-year institutions listed, all non-public colleges and universities were
eliminated. The nine remaining institutions were classiﬁed according to their faculty
union bargaining agent. An Internet search was conducted of those universities to identify
if they had a faculty or academic senate and to obtain their Carnegie Classiﬁcation. Four
institutions were initially identiﬁed, providing two matched pairs. Each pair had the same
bargaining agent, Carnegie Classiﬁcation and a senate. These institutions met the criteria
for inclusion in this study, however after additional investigation it was noted that one of
the paired institutions was in an “unstable” situation in regard to a presidential search and
recent administrative and union turmoil. Studying that institution may not have provided
a “normalized” view of senate and union relationships centered on answering the
question, how do faculty unions inﬂuence academic senates? The other paired
institutions were selected.

Pseudonyrns have been assigned to the institutions identiﬁed for inclusion in this
study to protect conﬁdentiality. Homestead University and Currier University were
selected as the research sites for this study. Both institutions have the same Carnegie
Classiﬁcation, Doctoral/Research Universities - Extensive. The Carnegie Classiﬁcation
(2005) recognizes all colleges and universities in the United States that are degree
granting and accredited by an agency recognized by the Department of Education. A

Doctoral/Research — Extensive classiﬁcation describes an institution that has a number of

40

bachelor level programs and is committed to graduate education. According to the
Carnegie Foundation (2005) these institutions award ﬁve or more doctoral degrees per
year across at least ﬁfteen disciplines. Using the Carnegie Classiﬁcation provided the
examiner with a method that allowed for some consistency in comparison between
institutions since the classiﬁcation system takes into account numerous demographic and
academic characteristics of the institution.

The research institutions also had the same representative for faculty collective
bargaining, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). General
information regarding the AAUP is provided in Chapter II and the history of the AAUP
speciﬁc to the subject institutions is discussed in Chapter IV, Case Descriptions. Finally,
the site institutions had a faculty or academic senate, which at these universities was a
mixed senate, including both faculty and administrators.

Participants identiﬁed for interview at each of the two institutions were selected
based on the assumption they were well suited to speak to the issues under analysis. The
selection of the individuals used in this research allowed for union and non-unionized
individuals to be a part of this study and represented both faculty and non-faculty views.
The examiner, following a thorough review of senate membership lists, senate minutes,
union newsletters, union and senate committee/council listings, and personal contacts
with colleagues, identiﬁed participants for inclusion in this study. The ﬁnal participants
included six individuals at each institution knowledgeable of both academic senate and
union activities. These included the chair/president of the academic senate, the
president/chair of the faculty union/association, two senior administrators involved in

senate/union activities and two regular faculty members who were a part of the faculty

41

senate. At Homestead University eight individuals were interviewed. Two individuals
from this group were eliminated from the study because they could not provide rich
narrative or reﬁrsed to answer the questions presented by the examiner. One of the
eliminated participants was a faculty member, and the other, an administrator. All six
participants initially selected at Currier were interviewed.

Subjects at both institutions appeared to have a history of involvement in
governance activities. The individuals selected for interview, demonstrated knowledge of
institutional history, the academic senate, the bargaining contract, and current union
issues. The participants ﬁom Homestead University consisted of 4 female and 2 males
who reported working for that university an average of 17 years (median 17 years), and a
range of 9-28 years of employment. Similarly, Currier University participants also noted
a long tenure at that institution, averaging 26 years with a range of 4 to 46 years of
employment (median 31 years). Four male and 2 female subjects were interviewed at

Currier.

Procedures and Data Collection

A case study approach was employed in this study. Using this strategy provided
the researcher with a comprehensive picture of unions and senates at two institutions of
higher education. The case study approach allowed for “immersion in the setting”
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. .61) and focused on the groups involved. The case study
approach, although exploratory in nature, was conducted within a prescribed framework
(Peterson & Spencer, 2002). Data collection involved a combination of methods

including historical and document review, and interviews with institutional

42

representatives. Gathering data from a number of sources assured that variations would
be observed as well as corroboration provided of the perceptions of those interviewed
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). These strategies were used to obtain a comprehensive, detailed

account of various institutional issues related to the research question.

Document Review

The intent of the document review was twofold. One, it allowed the researcher to
gather information relative to the history and context of the union and senate within the
speciﬁc institution. Examination of relevant documents allowed for “an unobtrusive
method, rich in portraying the values and beliefs of participants in the setting” (Marshall
& Rossman, 1999, p. 116). Secondly, the document review was used to supplement
interviews and assist the researcher in reconstructing speciﬁc incidents or actions
reported by subjects. The document review provided for a deeper understanding of
participant narratives. Although most of the documents were examined prior to the
interviews, speciﬁc institutional, senate and union documents were added and reviewed
through out this study based on the input and/or recommendation of subjects. Documents
that were reviewed included the following:

1. Current collective bargaining agreements

2. Union constitutions and bylaws

3. Senate constitutions and bylaws

4. Senate memorandums of understanding/action

5. Senate and union membership and committee/council lists

6. Senate minutes for the 2004-2005 academic year

43

7. Union newsletters for the 2004-2005 academic year
8. Institutional policies

9. Institutional history documents

Documents were obtained through the Internet, requested directly from participants, or
acquired by the examiner through the senate or union office. The intent of the document
analysis was not to quantify information, but rather to “document and understand the
communication of meaning, as well as to verify theoretical relationships” (Merriam,
1998, p. 123). The information obtained from the document review was used to

supplement the ﬁndings of this study.

Interviews

Phenomenological interviewing was the primary data collection technique in this
study. The purpose of phenomenological interviewing is “to describe the meaning of a
concept or phenomenon that several individuals share” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999,
p. 112). The assumption related to this style of interviewing is that shared experiences
have meaning and structure and can be described in a narrative form According to
Seidman (1998), the basis of interviewing “is an interest in understanding the experience
of other people and the meaning they make of that experience” (p.3).

Direct contact via e-mail was made with selected participants by the examiner to
set interview dates. All participants were sent the approved consent form prior to the
interview date. A signed consent form was veriﬁed and on ﬁle before the actual

interview began. Conﬁdentiality of subjects was maintained. Names of participants were

44

not disclosed to other participants in the study or other individuals at the research sites.
Participants were asked if they had any questions prior to the start of the actual interview.
They were advised that the audio recorders could be paused or turned off at any time
during the interview at their request.

The interviews in this study entailed face-to-face individually scheduled meetings
with designated institutional, senate or union representatives. Interviews were done in
the person’s office, or a preferred meeting place designated by the individual. Interviews
ranged from 37 to 70 minutes with the average interview lasting 53 minutes. All
interviews were audio tape-recorded with the written permission of the subject using a
digital recording device and associated directional microphone, as well as a traditional
analog recorder for back-up capability. Appendix A contains a copy of the University
Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (UCRI S) wnsent form ﬁ‘om this
study.

Interviews at each institution were captured during the summer months
commencing after spring semester and concluding before the beginning of fall classes.
This timing allowed interviewees to reﬂect on senate and union activities from the past
academic year and provided a period of time during which there were no active senate or
union activities in process. The examiner spent three days at each institution. Interviews
at Homestead University were completed before those at Currier University were
scheduled.

A semi-structured open-ended interview protocol was used to guide the data
collection process. Merriam (1998) describes this type of interview as a “mix of more and

less-structured questions” (p. 73). Although speciﬁc information was desired of each

45

participant, constituting the structured part of the interview, the majority of the interview
was guided by a list of questions that were not presented in any particular order but rather
ﬂowed and related to the respondent’s narrative (Merriam).

The interview protocol consisted of seven questions (Appendix B) with each
followed by one or more probes. The questions were developed based on a modiﬁcation
of Seidman’s (1998) three in-depth interview series. Although three separate interviews
were not done with subjects, the structure of the questions developed remained consistent
with a phenomenological based interviewing approach Questions allowed participants to
reconstruct and reﬂect upon their experiences with academic senates and unions. Probing
past and present experiences related to academic senates and unions allowed the
examiner to explore participants’ responses and then build upon those responses to
examine the individual’s essential experience with the relationship between these two
entities. According to Seidman, “The combination of exploring the past to clarify the
events that led participants to where they are now, and describing the concrete details of
their present experience, establishes conditions for reﬂecting upon what they are now

doing in their lives” (p. 12).

Data Analysis Procedures

Following each visit to the individual research site, the examiner prepared a
verbatim transcript of all interviews. To insure conﬁdentiality in the dissemination of
ﬁndings, individual responses are reported in the aggregate. Pseudonyrns have also been

assigned to the universities. Thus, a faculty member from the ﬁrst institution interviewed

46

would be referred to as Homestead F 1 . Individuals are not identiﬁed by the particular
position they hold in the university, ﬁrrther gender has been scrambled.

Data analysis was done using a coding strategy. The interview transcripts were
analyzed and collapsed into smaller pieces of data or incidents (Dey, 1999). This process
required the careﬁrl inspection of the words used by the participants to describe or convey
their experiences, understandings, and interpretations. A constant comparative method of
data analysis was used to create categories and subcategories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
This method allowed for comparison of incidents, remarks, stories, etc. from one set of
data with another or within the same set of data (Merriam, 1998). These units of data
(incidents) were then sorted into categories or patterns and then themes (Marshall &

Rossman, 1989).

Delimitations and Limitations

One of the delimitations of this research design was the selection of only two
institutions of higher education and the use of 12 participants in this study. In an attempt
to reduce variability the two institutions selected had the same Carnegie Classiﬁcation
and collective bargaining agent, as well as a senate. Within each of those universities six
individuals were contacted. The assumption was that these faculty and administrators
would have institutional memory and knowledge of academic senate and union issues at
their institution and would be able to respond openly and insightftrlly regarding the
relationship of the senate and union at their university.

Purposive sampling was used to identify the institutions as well as the participants

in this study. Purposeful sampling decreases the generalizability of the ﬁndings. This

47

study will not be generalizable to all academic institutions having a faculty union and a

senate.

Epoche

Consistent with a phenomenological approach and prior to initiating this research,
the examiner presents a ﬁrll description of her experiences related to academic senates
and unions. Through this process of self-reﬂection this researcher hoped to gain clarity
from her preconceptions, thus providing a more objective view of the analysis.

For the past thirty years I have worked in a university environment, initially as a
non-tenured administrative/professional member in a department, then as an
administrator in a college. Although my position supports and interacts with the academic
senate on such issues as curriculum and committee nominations, I have never been a
member of this group, only an observer. I attend senate meetings occasionally when
information relevant to my college is discussed or there are signiﬁcant issues addressed
by this body that impact university policies or processes.

My experiences with the faculty union at my institution are conﬁned to
understanding and supporting the faculty contract. I was never a member of the
bargaining group. Although I interact on a weekly level with Faculty Personnel Services
to clarify workload, salary, hiring, and promotion issues for faculty, and respond to
grievances ﬁled by faculty members, I have limited interaction with union ofﬁcials. I am
aware of union activities through colleagues in the institution and recognize that the

union at my institution is very vocal and inﬂuential on all matters related to faculty.

48

What prompted my interest in academic senate and union relationships was an
observation that faculty union ofﬁcers on my campus were heavily involved in academic
senate activities. These faculty leaders appeared to have a strong and inﬂuential voice in
both groups. The other issue that I felt was interesting was the apparent confusion that
faculty often had regarding which group (union or senate) was responsible for particular
issues. It appeared that there was little perceived delineation between the union and the

senate by faculty and administrators.

49

CHAPTER IV
CASE DESCRIPTIONS
Introduction

Two universities within a midwestem state were identiﬁed as case study sites to
investigate the relationship between senates and unions. Throughout this dissertation
pseudonyms are used when referring to those institutions. Homestead University and
Currier University are both public, four-year institutions with the same Carnegie
Classiﬁcation, having an academic/ faculty senate, and the same collective bargaining
agent. A more complete description of each institution follows, and is based on an

extensive document review, and supplemented through participant interviews.

Homestead University

Homestead University, located in a midsize town in a primarily rural setting was
founded in the early 19003. It was granted constitutional autonomy with its own Board of
Trustees in the early1960s. Homestead is Carnegie classiﬁed as a DoctoraVResearch
Extensive institution, providing undergraduate and graduate instruction as well as
signiﬁcant research activity. Enrollment at this public institution exceeds 25,000 students

with nearly 1000 full-t irne faculty supporting teaching and learning.

50

The Faculty Senate at Homestead

The senate at Homestead is referred to as a “faculty senate” and was established
in the late 19503. Faculty membership in the senate consists of faculty representatives
from individual departments in addition to representatives-at-large voted on by the
eligible faculty of the institution. Faculty is broadly deﬁned at Homestead as Board of
Trustee appointed personnel with the academic rank of instructor or higher, excluding
adjunct faculty.

The collective bargaining contract at this university deﬁnes faculty a bit more
speciﬁcally distinguishing between faculty that are appointed to university positions,
adjunct faculty, visiting professors and part-time instructors, and faculty traditionally
ranked, which includes faculty ranked as instructor, assistant professor, associate
professor or professor. Signiﬁcant in this contract is the inclusion of employees referred
to as faculty specialists. The faculty contract states that persons holding the appointment
of faculty specialist shall hold rank and be fully participating members in the academic
community. Thus, individuals whose responsibilities may include teaching or non-
teaching duties, and activities more commonly associated with administrative rather than
faculty positions are represented in this bargaining unit appointment category and are
eligible for election to the senate through their academic department, service unit, or the
general election of members- at- large.

Officers of the administration are appointed by the president to participate and
have all the same rights as faculty with the exception of holding office in the senate. The
president and provost of the institution hold ex-ofﬁcio membership in the senate. Of the

eighty-one voting members of the senate, only four are administrative appointees. The

51

executive board of the senate consists of the ofﬁcers of the senate, which include the
president, vice president, three directors and the immediate past president. The executive
board serves as the liaison with the administration. The president of the senate meets
monthly with the provost and president of the institution.

The collective bargaining contract altered the deﬁnition of faculty at Homestead
University three years ago and in doing so also changed the membership of the senate.
The faculty senate at Homestead is now a mixture of traditional faculty from academic
departments whose primary responsibilities include teaching, research and service as well
as faculty specialists whose responsibilities cover a wide range of activities that may
include teaching, clinical work, planning, marketing and recruiting and may not be
associated with an academic department. This senate would be classiﬁed as a mixed
senate since it has both faculty and administrators represented. Interestingly, department
chairs are considered faculty for the purpose of senate membership but administrators
according to the collective bargaining contract.

The faculty senate at Homestead deﬁnes as its charge, sharing in the governance
of the institution by taking an advisory role on matters of concern to the university.
Through a system of councils and committees, the senate has the authority to review,
recommend and provide oversight on policy impacting undergraduate, graduate and
international programs and curriculum, research and technology initiatives for the
university and issues related to campus planning and ﬁnancial matters. Decisions made
however, are subject to the approval of the president of the university.

In matters speciﬁc to the welfare of the faculty, the senate constitution states it

shall represent the faculty on matters affecting the welfare of the faculty, however, both

52

the senate constitution and bylaws limit senate involvement to those areas not reserved by

the collective bargaining agreement.

The Union at Homestead

In 1975, Homestead faculty organized and selected the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) as their collective bargaining agent. The ﬁrst contract was
ratiﬁed in 1976. The union is an agency shop requiring all faculty and “faculty
specialists” to pay either dues or service fees to the Chapter. The union serves over 850
faculty members and 85 faculty specialists. The union at Homestead lists as its
objectives the following: “to promote and protect academic freedom, faculty governance
and tenure; to advance the standards and ideals of the profession; to advocate for the
interests of higher education and the faculty, and to promote and protect a healthy work
environment.”

As noted earlier, the faculty specialist category is new to the institution within the
past three years and includes those individuals who may hold rank and or have
administrative duties or teaching duties as a part of their position. The change in
deﬁnition of faculty through the contract has altered the deﬁnition of membership of the
senate. By contractually expanding the deﬁnition of faculty to be inclusive of clinical
specialists, lecturers, student recruiters, etc the union may have signiﬁcantly impacted the
make-up of the senate at this institution.

In review of the faculty contract, the only mention of the senate relates to

clariﬁcation of union rights in relation to senate activities. A speciﬁc article in the

53

contract speaks to the union as the exclusive bargaining agent for the faculty and
contractually limits the institution’s involvement with senate communications and
activities that are within the scope of the collective bargaining contract. Further, in the
event of a dispute between the union and the institution as to the “bargainability” of any
senate recommendation, a grievance and appeal to the Employment Relations Office of
the state can be made. This article clearly designates the senate as a communication
conduit, with protection to debate issues and provide advisory input. The contract
speciﬁes that neither the institution nor the union should be bound by any discussion or
recommendation made by the senate. The intent of the contract article is clear in that it
protects the union and insures that the union is the only entity that speaks ofﬁcially for
the faculty.

The union, and the institution, through its contractual relationship with the union,
has deﬁned the role and limitations of the senate. Although the overall tenor of this
speciﬁc article conveys protectionism of the union rather than support of the senate, the
article concludes by clearly mandating release time from regular faculty duties for the
president of the senate. One could interpret this article to suggest that the union
recognizes the role of the senate in providing guidance on issues of teaching and learning
and that in that role they need to be protected and supported. In essence, the union is
contractually supporting the existence of the senate, a tenet consistent with the AAUP

concept of shared governance (AAUP, 1995).

54

Currier University

Currier University was formed in the early 1930’s, uniting into one institution a
number of unrelated colleges and schools. In 1959, Currier was formally chartered by its
state. Currier is an urban four-year, doctoral degree granting institution, Carnegie
classiﬁed as Doctoral-Research Extensive and having an enrollment exceeding 30,000
students. Twenty-ﬁve hundred full and part time faculty support the teaching and

learning on this campus.

The Academic Senate at Currier University

Currier University’s senate was established in 1966 and is comprised of faculty,
academic staff, and administrators, all nominated through their respective colleges or
units. Referred to as an “academic senate,” ﬁrll-time faculty and academic staff from all
schools, colleges, and divisions of the university are eligible for membership (consistent
with unit size). In addition, six members-at-large are elected ﬁ'om the eligible full-time
faculty and academic staff. Department chairs, although faculty members in the academic
senate, are outside of the bargaining agreement and considered administrators by the
union contract. This model is similar to Homestead’s senate make-up. A total of eighty-
one individuals are a part of the senate at Currier. The senate has a number of standing
committees, all but two of which have a liaison assigned from the administration, union,
and student council. Liaisons have voice but no vote, with the exception of student

representatives, who have voice and vote.

55

The president or provost of the university is the chair of the senate and sits on the
Executive Committee along with the president of the senate, and seven other senate
representatives. The president of the faculty union is the designated union liaison to this
committee and is without a vote. The executive committee has the responsibility of
organizing all the standing committees annually and appointing chairs. In addition to the
Executive Committee, the academic senate has committees that provide advice and
assistance to the university administration in regard to curriculum/ instruction, budget,
elections, support services, faculty and student affairs, and research.

The academic senate at Currier describes its role as having the authority and
responsibility for the review of educational policy as it affects the university community.
Further, recommendation of policies affecting faculty rights and responsibilities, faculty
welfare and generally accepted principles of academic freedom and tenure, except in
those matters subject to collective bargaining are also a part of the “powers and duties” of

this senate.

The Union at Currier University

In 1972, the AAUP was certiﬁed as the collective bargaining agent for the faculty
and academic staff at Currier. In 1999, union members voted to jointly afﬁliate with the
American Federation of Teachers (AFT). Only one contract thus far has been negotiated
under both AAUP and AFT. The union is inclusive of both faculty and academic staff,

representing over 2000 individuals. Within the last three years, Currier has become an

56

agency shop, requiring all faculty and academic staff members of the association to either
pay dues or pay a fair share agency fee to a university scholarship or research fund.

The Currier faculty contract speciﬁes that the union is the “exclusive collective
bargaining representative of faculty and academic staff with regard to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.” There was limited mention in the union
contract regarding the academic senate. The only direct mention of the senate in the
contract was in reference to the selection process for university wide committees.
Information relative to governance was speciﬁc to departmental activities only. A letter
of agreement written numerous years ago and included with the contract alluded to
“various consultative bodies” within the university that occasionally considered or
discussed matters subject to collective bargaining. Both Currier University as well as the
union agreed through this addendum that consultative bodies’ consideration of matters
subject to collective bargaining does not constitute recommendation or advice to the
university. Further, both the union and the institution are bound to notify each other and
provide information relative to the pr0posed consideration as well as contact the
consultative body and inform them that they cannot recommend or develop policy on

matters subject to collective bargaining.

Institutional Similarities

Although the two institutions selected for study have had very different

beginnings, there are numerous similarities that surfaced in regard to their union and

senate histories. Both institutions initiated a senate approximately at the same time.

57

Senate membership was inclusive of both faculty and administrators. Later, a union was
established at both universities during a period when academic unions were gaining
popularity across the country. Both institutions include non-faculty positions referred to
as “faculty specialists” or “academic staff” in their unions. Currier University, because
of their history, involved academic staff in the union at its inception, whereas Homestead
brought in non-faculty teaching and administration positions much later. Additionally,
department chairs, although faculty members, are also considered administrators at both
institutions and are not covered by the faculty collective bargaining agreement.
Homestead University, although represented by the AAUP, has had under consideration
the addition of a second bargaining agent, again paralleling Currier University where
both the AAUP and AFT have afﬁliations.

A review of the senate bylaws for each of these institutions suggests further
similarities in committee structure and representation. Both senates have 81 members.
The area of greatest disparity is in regard to the structure of their senate committees and
councils. Notably, all the senate committees at Currier, except one, have both union and
administrative liaisons (voice but no vote) assigned to them including the executive
board. Union involvement in senate activities is a part of the structure of Currier’s senate.
Homestead, on the other hand, does not structure committees to include “ofﬁcial” union
and administrative involvement, although many union officers are represented as chairs
or members of the committees.

An extensive document analysis including review of institutional polices could
not identify an institutional statement on shared governance at either university, nor was a

shared governance matrix delineating the responsibilities of various processes/ﬁrnctions

58

to institutional shareholders available. None of the subjects interviewed could identify
those documents or provide direction to the researcher on their availability.

Since unionized faculty are a part of both of these institutions it follows that there
are union members in the senate. It is noteworthy to mention, however, that at both
Homestead and Currier union officers occupy signiﬁcant roles in senate leadership. At
Currier University, two out of eight elected members of the Executive Board of the
Senate are also ofﬁcers in the faculty union. Although the union president at this
institution is ex-o fﬁcio and liaison to the Executive Board of the senate, the union
president is also an elected member of the senate through their home department.
Similarly, at Homestead, the president of the union and a member of the union executive
committee are members of the senate, one chairing a key senate council, and the other
vice chair of another senate council. The union president at Homestead is also a past
president of the senate. The immediate past president of the senate, a member of the

executive board of the senate, is also a member of the executive board of the union.

Summary

These case descriptions provide background information on the history and
context of both research sites. Signiﬁcant in these case analyses are the parallels noted in
the development of both the senate and unions at these institutions. Further, the concepts
of a mixed senate, a union inclusive of academic staff, and the co-mingling of union

ofﬁcials in key senate committees demonstrates the similarity of these two institutions.

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CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to develop a better understanding of the
relationship between academic senates and unions. The literature is exceptionally limited
in information related to the formal and informal inﬂuences that occur between these two
groups. Through the use of qualitative inquiry, it was my hope that new information
regarding how unions inﬂuence academic senates would emerge and provide direction
for further research as well as support a redeﬁnition of the meaning of shared governance
at unionized institutions.

Two distinct patterns evolved from the analysis of the data in regard to the
primary research question, how do faculty unions inﬂuence academic senates? The ﬁrst
major pattern that emerged was related to union and senate purview. Participants
discussed the limits of authority, responsibility, and intention as they pertained to unions
and senates at their institutions. This pattern will be addressed in this chapter under the
title, “Union and Senate Purview.”

The second distinct pattern that emerged was related to the relationship between
the senate and union. Comments represent the perceptions and experiences of the
participants regarding the senate and union connection at their institution. Membership
in the senate and union, leadership of the union, and inﬂuence were three themes

identiﬁed. Within the senate and union relationship pattern, the concept of shared

60

governance will also be discussed. This pattern will be addressed in this chapter under the
title, “Union and Senate Relationships.”

To reveal and discuss the data without compromising the identity of the
interviewee, an individual identiﬁer was created for each participant. The ﬁrst character
of the pseudonym identiﬁes the institution, individuals from Homestead University are
identiﬁed with the H designator and a C notation recognizes those ﬁ'om Currier. The
second character relates to the position of the individual either as faculty (F),
administrator (A), union president (U), or senate president/chair (S). The third character
represents an individual identiﬁcation number assigned to a particular subject and is
speciﬁc to only faculty and administrators. To illustrate, HF 1 refers to a particular
Homestead faculty member, CA1 describes a speciﬁc Currier administrator and the
designator CU identiﬁes the Currier union president.

As the data unfold, it is important to note some general observations that surfaced
during interviews. It was interesting to observe how eager faculty were to share
observations and perceptions with me regarding their experiences with both the union and
senate at their institution. A great deal of this enthusiasm may have been related to the
fact that the faculty interviewed were current, active members of the senate at their
institution, many of whom had been involved in senate activities for extended periods of
time. Further, by nature of the collective bargaining agreement on their campus, these
same individuals were covered by the contract and aware of union issues, leadership, and
interactions with the senate. Faculty were frank, and open in their responses. They
provided a number of examples to support their views on senate and union relationships.

Only one of the faculty members interviewed was currently active in both senate and

61

union activities, acting as a representative of their department on the senate as well as an
officer of the union.

Administrators also provided rich, candid dialogue regarding their senate and
union. Three out of four of the administrators interviewed were either currently active in
their senate or had served on a senate in the past. In addition, all four administrators had
extensive experience working with the faculty union at their institution, either through
contract negotiations, grievance issues, or day-to-day concerns.

Both administrators and faculty appeared at ease with the questions and with me.
However, throughout the interviews it was evident that many of the faculty and
administrators were uncertain of the speciﬁc roles and responsibilities of the senate and
the union as it related to everyday institutional issues. Although faculty and
administrators consistently articulated that there were distinct separations between the
senate and union, they often appeared puzzled as to which entity, union or senate, should
advocate for particular concerns. This confusion was evident in interviews at both
institutions.

Unlike the faculty and administrators senate and union presidents, although co-
operative, projected a careful and somewhat reserved demeanor in response to the
interview questions. They were less candid than faculty and administrators and often
requested clariﬁcation of the questions. One participant consistently responded to
questions posed by asking in a conﬁontational manner, “What do you mean by that?”
These respondents were deliberate and somewhat cautious in their answers, endeavoring
to make certain that I knew there was a distinct separation between senate and union

activities. One union president had formerly been senate president and both union

62

presidents currently served in the senate as representatives of their departments.
Conversely, senate presidents were not presently involved in union committees or

activities.

Pattern One: Union and Senate Purview

The role the senate and union play in the life of a university provides a rich
understanding of the history and culture of that institution. Determining which group, the
union or senate, is responsible for particular initiatives and issues should be obvious by
examining a senate’s by-laws, and constitution, as well as reviewing the collective
bargaining contract for the faculty union. What emerged, however, from the review of
these data, was a perspective that there is a “blurring of lines” between the senate and
union’s roles and responsibilities causing a recurrent confusion by participants in this

study as to what group is accountable for certain issues and actions.

Senate and Union Roles and Responsibilities

Many of the interviewees maintained that the roles and responsibilities of the
senate and union at their institution were clearly delineated and that those lines were
respected and adhered to. The union focuses on faculty work conditions such as salary,
beneﬁts, and promotion and tenure issues, while the senate delrherates on academic

issues related to curriculum, assessment, and policies impacting programs. Both union

63

presidents endeavored in their interviews to maintain a clear separation between union
and senate roles. The president of the Currier union noted,

Academic senate has its role and we have ours. What can I say, it’s all

spelled out in terms of the contract. They deal, they deal with issues of,

they deal with academic issues, they deal with questions of curriculum and

questions of general education requirements, questions of whether a

college will be dissolved, for example. It goes through the senate, has to

get the approval of the senate, it doesn’t get our approval, goes to the

senate. It’s an academic issue.
The union president at Homestead was also clear in deﬁning the role of the senate and the
union. When asked to share examples of when the union and senate were jointly involved
in decision-making he replied,

We typically are not involved in joint decision-making. No, and in fact the

contract very speciﬁcally says that the things that are within the contract

that the senate cannot do and all we can do are in the contract. So there is

not joint decision making speciﬁcally because it is prohibited.
Union presidents attempted to provide a compartmentalized view of senate and
union activities strongly suggesting that the separation between these two entities,
although clear contractually, is also obvious in practice.

The Homestead senate president agreed with the sentiments expressed above and
in reference to respecting each other’s turf pointed out,

And there is a little bit of boiler plate text that the president [of the senate]

reads at the beginning of [meetings] that says issues such as salaries,

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beneﬁts, workload, all of these things are the providence of the agreement

and cannot be discussed here as such. So we try, sometimes we bend over

backwards trying to make sure that we do not impinge on those items that

are negotiated and try to keep the separation that way.

Currier’s senate president reﬂected on the fact that the senate is comprised of almost
100% union members, except for a few administrative types. He professed that there is no
overlap when it comes to responsibilities, “The union still deals with negotiating
contracts and rights and terms of salaries and working conditions but the senate still
sticks to the academic issues. So we never really overlap.”

In contrast to union and senate presidents’ perspectives on the separation between
senate and union roles and responsibilities, faculty and administrators offered a slightly
different view. They were less apt to view the roles and responsibilities of these two
bodies as so compartmentalized and clearly deﬁned. HA1 observed that program review,
athletics, and salaries are areas that are discussed between the senate and union. She
noted,

Issues in athletics get discussed between the two groups. Um, salaries are

always discussed between them, but that’s not done formally, that is done

informally. And a lot of the union officers, not a lot but some of the union

ofﬁcers historically have been on senate councils simultaneously so it’s

pretty hard to separate them always.

This administrator acknowledged the impact of faculty who cut across union and senate
representation making it difﬁcult to discern whether senate or union officials are involved

in the appropriate discussions. By the nature of the make up of these groups, there is no

65

clear demarcation regarding issues and discussions since representing both bodies allows
the latitude to discuss any and all issues that may arise.

Consistent with HA1 ’3 comments, an administrator at Currier shared a similar
situation regarding a workload matter in which the senate attempted to get involved. The
crossover of faculty representation between the union and senate was again at issue in
this incident and muddled in whose domain the topic of workload should reside. CA2
related the following,

But there were some workload issues that they, the senate tried to, to get

heavily involved in. It was basically the same people. You had to ask

which group they were representing that day, whether it was senate or

whether it was the union and if it was the senate you can’t talk about it. If

you are union you can, because we, ﬁom the administrative side, we said

we won’t talk to the academic senate about it because we weren’t allowed

to. That’s a union issue. . .and ah. . .they wanted to talk about it item a

senate viewpoint.

HA1 presented another example of where there has been conﬁrsion on the part of
the union as to its role. She noted “In the current bargaining right now they are trying to
take the authority of the senate and the policy on who gets graduate faculty status and put
it into the contract. That is not going to happen.” She again attributed this situation to the
crossover of faculty sitting on both senate and union committees and councils. The
president of the senate at Homestead elaborated on this situation and indicated that the
union was attempting to view this policy as post tenure review and within their realm as a

work condition. She explained that graduate faculty status had. been a part of institutional

66

policies for many years and had never been viewed within the purview of the union. She
explained,
Well that is hardly post tenure review and it is odd that the union would
think about this now. . .and they have been missing on that issue for thirty
some years. However, I told them I thought the whole thing was ridiculous
to begin with and if he (union president) wanted to join me in supporting
an end to graduate faculty status or linking it to promotion and tenure I
would be happy to take that little battle up in the fall.
This example further demonstrates the conﬁrsion that exists between the senate
and the union regarding designated authority. The union felt the issue was theirs
to address, while the senate, based on institutional history, knew the graduate
faculty issue was within their purview to discuss and recommend changes.
Although this conﬁrsion exists at Homestead between senate and union, HA1 felt
that this was a part of the institutional culture and that faculty and administrators
were aware of and comfortable with the situation. She summarized this by saying,
“So we don’t have any line in the sand kind of thing and that has been going on
here for a long time and we are really pretty comfortable with it.”
A faculty member at Homestead, HFl, attempted to offer an explanation as to
why there is so much confusion regarding senate and union role. She said,
The issues that AAUP is so focused on right now, workload, salary, those
types of things, which is their bailiwick, can’t let that bleed over into the
fundamental notion of academic affairs and shared governance. The

problem is, of course, all of these things bleed over into each other. When

67

you start talking about academic issues you are also talking about

workload right? When you start talking about the vision of the university

you are talking about workload. . .so there are some issues that there are

not a clear demarcation between what’s the AAUP’s responsibility and

what’s the faculty senate’s responsibility.

This faculty member clearly identiﬁed a theme that resonated with numerous
other subjects. It is not only the make up of the union and senate councils and
committees that impact on where issues are addressed, but also the nature of the
issue at hand that creates the conﬁrsion.

Workload was culled out repeatedly as an example of an issue that should, by
contractual consideration, be within the purview of the union since it impacts faculty
work conditions. However, issues of workload are also tied to things like institutional
budget and mission. Workload affects research, advising, and often retention of students,
especially at the graduate level. HF 2 shared a recent academic senate memorandum
related to workload. The senate convened a committee to look at workload, an area that
was clearly identiﬁed as a union issue. The senate crafted a recommendation that was
debated on the senate ﬂoor. The information was then forwarded to both the
administration and the union. HF2 noted that the document “may give them [the union]
more ground to argue that it is a concern with regard to the faculty because it has come
up on several different venues from the faculty senate ﬂoor.” If the authority to address
workload issues with the administration is a part of the role of the union, it begs the
question why the senate was involved in convening a committee and providing

recommendations to the administration regarding faculty workload.

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The senate president at Currier also expressed some confusion regarding whose
responsibility it would be to redeﬁne workload. When asked a question regarding a
workload study, CS noted the following,

I guess he [the provost] would come to the academic senate because that

would not be a union thing. I think he would come to the academic senate

and ask us to look into teaching loads in various departments. I don’t

know, it could be, this might be a crossover between, this might be the one

time when the union might get into it as well as the. . .I would have to talk

to [the union president].

Later in the conversation CS ﬁrmly said, “So, I think it would really fall into the
academic senate and the union should stay out of it.” Conversely, in a similar
conversation with the Currier union president, when the issue of workload was
raised, CU provided an immediate and terse response, “No, its not the senate’s
business, it’s the union’s business. It’s a condition of employment.” These two
faculty leaders at the same institution had different views on whose responsibility
is was to deal with workload issues.

Other issues that should be within the purview of the senate and relate to
academic issues often end up in the union shop or become highly inﬂuenced by the
union. One Currier administrator, CA2, felt that the union claimed many issues regardless
of whether they were truly union issues. A faculty member at Currier, CF2,
acknowledged that faculty often view academic issues as falling into union business.
Another faculty member voiced concern that the senate at Currier focused more on

faculty work conditions than academic issues. CFl declared,

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I would prefer for the senate to be more made up of people who appear

concerned with the academic mission of the university. Although the

union pays that lip service, my impression is that at least the leadership of

the union is primarily oriented to more of the traditional union view of

wages and working conditions and that type of thing. And although the

senate doesn’t exclusively focus on that, the people who run that [the

senate] seem to be fairly heavily concerned with that. They will talk about

academic issues but it comes across as either. . .it’s really working

conditions.

CFl went on to further illustrate the point that the senate carries a union agenda.
He related an incident in which the senate killed an introductory freshman experience
course because non-faculty personnel had historically taught it. This action was within
the authority of the senate because it dealt with an academic issue. His interpretation of
what transpired follows,

And the expressed reason given [for killing the course], I didn’t

understand it, anything that made any sense. I thought it was just pure

union shop mentality of ‘our guys aren’t teaching it so it shouldn’t be

taught’. Yeah, oh yeah, these were senate decisions but the major

spokesmen were people who are deeply embroiled in the, in the union.

All of these narratives speak to a “blurring of lines” in regard to the roles and
responsibilities of the senate and the union. The data show that administrators and faculty
within the same institution are confused about which entity, the senate or the union, is

responsible for particular issues. Senate and union presidents projected that their roles

70

and responsibilities were clearly delineated, whereas faculty and administrators provided
numerous examples of where that was not the case. What was most evident in this theme
was that the two site universities were willing to live with this inconsistency and felt that
it was a part of their institutional culture. To repeat the words of the Homestead
administrator who spoke to the conﬁrsion of responsibilities between the senate and
union, “That has been going on here for a long time and we are really pretty comfortable
with it.” Similarly, an administrator at Currier presented the same point of view and
acknowledged that the confusion of who is responsible for what is something “. . .we’ve

learned to live with it. We manage that pretty well.”

Power Struggle

With both institutions acknowledging blurriness in the roles and responsibilities
of the senate and union, it was interesting to note two separate areas that emerged in the
data analysis, each one speciﬁc to a particular subject institution, which may shed some
light on why this ambiguity occurs. At Homestead University participants perceived a
power struggle between the senate and the union. Interviewees reported an ongoing
tension and confusion about responsibilities between these two groups. The senate at
Homestead had been the only voice of the faculty for almost twenty years and according
to the senate president, it was “the chief body in which all policy was debated, discussed
and formulated” before the union was established. A faculty member, HFl , reﬂecting on
the union/senate tension noted that when the union was initiated it “created and still, that

exists today, a real challenge in deﬁning who is in charge of what.”

71

Commenting on the history of the union at her institution the senate president,
HS, shared this perspective,

I can’t think off hand of a single incident of where the union and the

senate have come together on their own to do anything. And again, what I

can say is that what ever happened back in ’74 [when the union was

organized]. . .and I don’t know. . .I have talked to people, but you know you

can’t feel how people were thinking and living at that time. But whatever

happened, I think, was strong enough and there was some resentment, I

think, by people who were leaders in the senate and didn’t want this new

group coming along and taking away their little bit of power. But I think

the separation then became so strong that it would take a series of crises, I

think, to bring that sort of cooperation.
The president of the union at Homestead also alluded to a “controversy between the
union and the senate” conveying that this was in the past. He did however, point out
“That there are some folks involved in the senate that traditionally did not like the union
because they felt that it was usurping their rights.” Tension between the senate and union
at this institution continues to exist even though almost thirty years have passed. Hard
feelings regarding the union role and the loss of power for the senate have permeated the
culture of this institution. HFl shared a recent incident that demonstrates how the tension
and territoriality referred to above is “alive and well” at Homestead. At a recent senate
meeting the vice president of the union stood up on the senate ﬂoor and said to the

president of the senate,

72

I’m sorry. . .the way you deﬁned the faculty senate role is that the faculty

senate is the advocacy voice for the faculty and I want to articulate that the

faculty union is the advocacy voice for the faculty.’ And I think she was

trying to make a point that these two things, that both of these bodies

could be advocacy bodies. Well, there was some territoriality going on

there.

HF 1 summed up this power struggle at her institution by acknowledging there is an
“ongoing tension. . .because of course, at one time we were just a faculty senate, and then
faculty organized into the union and there were considerable discussions about the
responsibilities of each group.”

The faculty union at Homestead contractually supports the existence of the senate,
but limits the inﬂuence of the senate on institutional or union activities and decisions that
are within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement. The contract is clear in
designating the union as the only group that speaks officially for the faculty and limits the
senate to providing advisory input. This may not have been the case thirty years ago.
Then, the senate was the only “voice of the faculty” and may have been the primary
negotiator with administration on work condition issues as well as academic concerns. As
the senate president put it, “I don’t think, well, I don’t think we will ever get back to a
situation where one body does everything, as had been the case before the union.” From
the document review, as well as faculty/administrator interviews, it is obvious that the
union wants to limit the inﬂuence and authority of the senate at Homestead.

In contrast to Homestead, the union at Currier University was established six

years after the senate. In reviewing the faculty collective bargaining contract at Currier,

73

there is little in the contract that speaks directly to the senate. Information relative to
governance was speciﬁc to departmental activities only. Although there was a lack of
reference to the senate in the contract, there was a strong perception conveyed by many
of the interviewees that the survival of the senate at Currier was entirely attributable to
the union. This particular area of emphasis observed in the data analysis is speciﬁc to
Currier University. Only one administrator at Homestead mentioned that the senate exists
at that institution because it was permitted in the faculty contract. However, at Currier
participants addressed this issue repeatedly. The president of the union pointed out that
“Ah, the senate is enshrined in the Board of Governance statutes which are read into,
which are read by reference into our contract and protect the senate and its role.”
Referring to a number of committees both at the department as well as college and
university level, the union president pointed out that governance structures at Currier “are
guaranteed by the union.” Consistent with this theme, CF2 attributes the union with not
only protecting the senate but also providing it with its power. She notes, “Also the
contract, because it stipulates for a faculty governance, gives a lot of strength to the
senate that the senate would not have.” The president of the senate at this institution also
attributes the union with protecting the senate and observed that,

The union was very clever to protect the rights of the academic senate, so

that there was a right. . .that there should be an academic senate and that

the role of the academic senate was to look at academic governance and

academic issues and educational issues.

This reoccurring area of emphasis may speak to the fact that although the senate

was established at Currier for six years before the faculty union, both the senate and

74

union were in the early stages of development and were not in a position to compete for
power. It also suggests that if the union protects the senate and the senate exists because
of the union, the union may also control it. The union president at Currier speaking to the
relationship between the senate and the union said,

We had that good relationship all down the line. There were tensions

when, ah, when ah, sometimes the leadership of the senate was ah, was ah,

the [former president of the institution named] administration, sometimes

when the leadership of the senate was not as aggressive as some people

thought...

From participant narratives, it would appear that the senate make-up
changed considerably as the union matured. CA2 talked to the examiner about
“active union players” on senate committees. When asked if it has always been
this way, he replied,

This has grown overtime. When the union ﬁrst started. . .which is now 25,

26, 27 years ago, something like that, there was already an academic

senate and at that point it was much more populated by a broad section of

the university. The population of people active in research has been

declining and the, the people who are active in the‘union have become

much more active in the academic senate. So there’s been a coalescence of

the two. That’s occurred over 25 years because ah. . .When the union

became very active and the senate. . .those people just walked with their

feet, as they do in many cases, they said we don’t have time to waste on

this sort of thing because they thought it [the union] had more inﬂuence.

75

 

 

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This “coalescence” of the faculty that CA2 spoke of may be one of the keys to
why there is little tension between the senate and union at Currier.

The history of Currier reveals that the same union activists have been a part of the
institutional landscape of this institution for years. These activists matured in the
institution along with the senate and union .and may have inﬂuenced both entities
considerably. As CA1 noted, the names of some of the same faculty who signed the
original faculty contract over thirty years ago are also on the last few bargaining
agreements. This may also account for the fact that interviewees identify the union
repeatedly as the entity that protects the senate at this institution. This may explain why
there was no evidence of current tension, or a power struggle between the senate and

union at this institution.
Pattern Two: Union and Senate Relationships
The relationship between the union and senate was a second pattern identiﬁed in
the analysis of the data. More speciﬁcally, membership, and union leadership were
important themes that surfaced. These two themes link signiﬁcantly with the last theme
identiﬁed in this pattern, the inﬂuence of the union on the senate.

Membership

The individuals involved in senate and union activities are directly and indirectly

involved in molding the relationship between the two groups, and also inﬂuencing

76

institutional policies and processes. Interviewees ﬁom both universities were consistent
in reporting that people involved in the senate and the union is the same small group of
standard players. It is important to note, however, that throughout the interviews
participants often referred to “union” people involved in senate activities. With the
exclusion of the Homestead senate president noting that the past president of the senate
chose to run for a union executive board position in order to assure himself of “additional
protection in case he had to say some things that were not well thought of . . .that he could
be even more assured his freedom of speech in this academic community would be
protected,” there was not one other mention of “senate” activists being part of union
committees or councils.

Focusing on individual faculty members that are a part of both the senate and the
union at Currier, the president of the union described those individuals who are faculty
leaders in both groups. He observed, “So these people play important roles in leadership
in both.” CFl concurred and noted that the senate and union leadership at his institution
are

Almost 100% overlap both in terms of heads of committees. . .but also in

terms of the people who speak, the people who traditionally speak at the

senate meetings. And my impression is that the peOple who raise the

issues, the people who talk on the issues are primarily the people who are

also long time union activists and serve on the union’s various organizing

committees. So there’s a very high overlap.

Looking at the committee and representative listings of both the union and senate

at the site institutions conﬁrms this view. At Currier University, the union vice president

77

is also the vice president of the senate and at both institutions the past president of the
senate is currently an officer of the union. Union presidents at both institutions are
representatives in their senates. At Currier the union president is the union liaison to the
senate executive board. The president of the union at Homestead is a past president of the
senate. Numerous officers of the union act as representatives ﬁom their departments on
the senate at both institutions.

An administrator at Homestead who was an active member of the senate at one
time agreed with the sentiment voiced by the Currier faculty member above regarding the
overlap of membership in the senate and union and corroborated by saying, “You have
senators who are on the senate exec board who sit on the union exec committee and vice
versa. And you have union parties that sit on various senate councils.” With the
exception of one of the senate presidents, every person interviewed acknowledged that
faculty who are active in the senate also tend to be the ones actively involved in the
union. CA2 summed it up by saying

They are very intertwined. . .so it’s hard to distinguish whom they are

speaking for. In fact, the academic senate policy committee, which is

about 7 or 8 people. . .there are probably, almost all of them are active

union players, whether they are currently on the executive committee of

the union or not, they have been.

The union president of Homestead offered an interesting and positive perspective on the
membership make up of the senate by saying, “I think that some of the collegiality has
happened because there are enough of us that have been involved in both organizations

and I think that helps bring us together.” CFl , however, viewed the “co-mingling” of

78

union activists in the senate as coming together more for union agendas rather than senate
issues. He suggested that the “Senate be more made up of people who appear to be
concerned with the academic mission of the university.” He went on to say, “I think what
is going on is that the senate has taken an action or expressed an opinion, not on
something they shouldn’t be focusing on but for reasons that are all union reasons rather
than academic reasons.” This reﬂection is consistent with the president of the union at
Currier who noted that the leadership is the same in both groups and conﬁrmed CF] ’3
analysis saying, “I think they speak more through the union than the senate.”

From interviewees’ perspective, senate leaders, those that speak up on issues and
lead committees, tend to be the ones actively involved in the union. It appears that the
union at both of these universities has a strong and formal presence in the senate through
elected membership as well as appointed liaisons, and that members often view senate
issues through a union lens. HF 1 summarized this by saying, “And the irony here is that
of course, the key people right now who are vocal in the senate are also people who are
key supporters of the AAUP.”

The analysis of the data suggests that faculty involved in senate and union
activities are the same group of individuals. Another area emerged, however, regarding
membership. Participants consistently noted that representatives to senate and union
positions are those who have a long history at the institution, and are elected over and
over again for positions both in the senate and union. HFl explains, “What I see
happening is the membership of the senate consists primarily of old guard, long time
people who have been around forever.” CF I referred to the union at his institution as “A

bunch of old boys, although its mixed gender, although the idea is the same. It’s the

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people who have been working together for 15, 20, 30 years, and have a series of
ritualistic complaints that they bring up over and over again.” He went on to say,

My impression is that the people who are the activists and spokesmen in

the senate are at least my age or older and have been here most of their

academic careers and have been in the senate and union most of their

academic careers. So it’s almost, it almost feels like, like a tenured

position to be a senator at Currier.

HFl shared this sentiment and pointed out that, “There are too many people in the
union who have been there too long and don’t do their job.” The oligarchy of
each institution appeared to be well represented in both union and senate
activities.

CA1, acknowledging the lack of turnover of faculty in union and senate positions
pointed out that the provost of Currier, prior to her departure to a new university, tactﬁrlly
approached faculty leadership with her concern. CA1 quoted the provost as saying “I
ﬁnd over the years I’ve been here that there has not been a great turnover in who’s been
involved in the policy committee, who’s involved in the senate, in fact who’s involved in
the union. Perhaps you should be thinking about the next generation.” CA1 reported that
union and senate leadership vehemently denied the assertion but “couldn’t name three”
other active new faculty in the union or senate.

The lack of new members participating in the senate and union, and their
longevity in these groups raised an interesting question regarding the value of faculty
service. Some participants in this study projected little regard for those involved in senate

and union activities. One faculty member at Currier, CFl , ventured to guess that union

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and senate activists had been at the institution for a very long time and involved in union
and senate activities for most of their academic career. He noted, “My impression is that
the peOple who are the activists and spokesmen in the senate are at least my age or older,
and have been here most of their academic careers.”

The president of the senate at Homestead, a leader herself in shared governance,
provided this view of union and senate involvement,

Sometimes you get people running for leadership positions in shared

governance who really can’t do much of anything else. They will take

these positions to avoid teaching. They have discovered they don’t much

care for that. It’s a way, really, of rising in the institution on sort of a

parallel track to the more traditional track of teaching and research. I

mean if you cannot establish excellence in either of those ﬁelds you can

step into service, do some things, and then sort of do an end around, if you

will.

A similar sentiment was voiced by CA2 who explained that faculty active in
senate and union activities typically do not represent the majority of faculty in the
institution. He noted those research faculty were on one side, involved in research, active
in graduate programs, supervising doctoral students and “On the other side many of the
activists in the union and academic senate who publish infrequently. The majority of
them don’t have research ﬁrnding so it’s a different mix of. . .different interests.”

Faculty involvement in both senate and union boards and committees often
caused confusion about which group they were representing. Further, because of their

long involvement in both groups, and little turnover they often focused on “historical”

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disputes and past administrative regimes rather than on issues at hand. An administrator
at Orrrier, CA1, observed,

Deﬁnite scars [from problems with past administrations] are not helped by

the fact that there’s no turnover. You look at the people who signed the

ﬁrst contract it’s a little bit ﬁightening how many are still activists. And

you look at the people who signed the last couple of contracts and you

wonder where the new blood is going to come from.

CFl shared a situation that recently occurred at Currier that was related in part to
a presidential administrative action that occurred many years ago. CFl concluded,

So it was quite obvious to everybody that that’s what the real issue was

[problem with previous administration] and that kind of place where I

think there should be more of a disconnect between the union and its

peOple who are still ﬁghting old battles and the senate concerned with

where the university is now opposed to where it was 10 or 15 years ago.

The membership of the senate and union was clearly a topic that subjects felt
knowledgeable about as well as comfortable in expressing their perspective. In summary,
the proﬁle of a faculty member involved in senate and union activities is consistent with
the following; a senior faculty member, tenured and with a rich institutional memory who
is re—elected often, and has a long involvement in senate and union activities. These
individuals focus their academic careers on governance issues and move between the

senate and union as representatives or participate on both bodies at the same time.

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Leadership

A second theme that emerged was related to leadership. Individual leadership
ability was often mentioned in regard to union effectiveness, however, there was not
much discussion directed speciﬁcally to the importance of good senate leadership. What
surfaced consistently in interviews was the relationship between the president of the
senate and the president of the union.

Leadership was culled out as an important variable in affecting change and
supporting faculty and institutional goals. Both senate presidents at the site institutions
spoke to the relationship between the leader of the senate and the union as being
important and inﬂuential. HS elaborated on this relationship and noted that it is not the
position but the individual that “has the capacity and potential to exert a terrible amount
of inﬂuence for bad or for good”. She followed up on this thought by saying,

If a union president and a faculty senate president don’t like each other, if
God forbid, and we all know this happens on campuses, then there is no
relationship what so ever. If they do, then things will happen that wouldn’t
happen otherwise. It’s a dynamic, it’s a synergy that depends more on the
individual in the ofﬁce than the ofﬁce itself.
This reﬂection speaks to the impact of the personal relationship between senate
and union leadership, and the inﬂuence of that relationship on senate and union
activities. The president of the union at Currier shared a similar view when he
said, “and you know he [the president of the senate] is a good ﬁiend of mine and

he and I talk all the time. So its not like we are isolated individuals, we talk about

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issues together, we talk about things that are going on.” CA1, reacting to the
relationship between the president of the union and the president of the senate at
Currier, suggested that the senate president does not do anything without the say
of the union president and this happens because “it’s a personal relationship, I
don’t know if it’s anything else. And the faculty keeps electing the same president
of the senate and the same union president every year. So um. . .it is a relationship
going back a long way.”

Maintaining a positive, ﬁ'iendly relationship was mentioned several times as
important to effective leadership. To get things done, administrators and faculty alike
observed that the senate and union leaders needed to like each other and cooperate. An
administrator at Homestead, reﬂecting on the relationship between the senate and union
and whether there was inﬂuence between the two offered this statement,

Oh, yeah, and when you have the leadership of the senate and the

leadership of the union where they like each other and they are

comfortable working together, it’s pretty close. And when that doesn’t

happen, and when the president of the senate and the president of the

union, when they are not compatible, then you have very little of that

going on. It is really a ﬁrnction of the resonance between the parties. It’s

not a function of policy or protocol. . .it’s whether people respect and want

to work with each other.

Little information was garnered from participants regarding the leadership
abilities of senate presidents, however, there were numerous reﬂections regarding the

importance of good leadership at the union level. Even the senate president at Homestead

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commented on union leadership by addressing whether the union president really
represented his fellow faculty. HS asked,
So, um. . .and there’s also the question of how much time can you buy out
for someone that is in one of these positions and still have them represent
faculty. . .because at some point they become a union ofﬁcial, really, and if
you are not teaching much at all, then your ability to sympathize with the
conditions of your faculty colleagues sort of drifts away. So there are
many good people on the AAUP chapter executive board, but the
leadership has been singularly unfortunate over the last four years or so.
This same sentiment was voiced by a faculty member (HF 1) at Homestead who
also raised the issue of leadership in the union as a concern when she said, “Well,
I think that, again I think that the union used to be a very strong voice. I think,
that it’s a combination of poor leadership in the union, we’ve had a couple years
of it.”

Emphasis on union leadership reinforced the importance of the role of the union
in both these institutions. One administrator at Homestead (HA2) reﬂecting on union
leadership said, “I think they’ve had some good leaders in there and they have had other
leaders that knew how to work the system.” Recalling a former union president and her
excellent relationship with the president of the university, HA2 continued and said “so I

think the faculty got a lot more when he was president because of that relationship.”

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Inﬂuence

Membership, and the leadership of the union, impact on the political environment
of academic institutions as demonstrated by the above data. These two themes are
strongly linked to the current theme of inﬂuence. Inﬂuence implies there is a power or
authority over something or someone that affects the decisions and actions of a particular
group. Oftentimes, that inﬂuence may not be directly observed but may be circuitous or
subtle. Inﬂuence was identiﬁed by subjects in this study, as occurring in two distinct
categories: the union’s affect on senate issues and activities, and the senate’s use of the
union to shape its own agenda.

The senate president of Currier summed up the political involvement of the union
both inside and outside the institution when he explained,

They work very hard to interact with the board of governors. They are

politically involved in the political parties and so they speak on behalf of

the union. They get support for the union ﬁom these legislators. They try

to...they try to get support from the Board of Governors for the union

issues. Very effective, they have been extremely effective, they actually

work, the union people, the president of the union, for example, happens

to be on the academic senate.

The union is viewed by this faculty leader as having a great deal of inﬂuence and
the mention of the president of the union being involved in the academic senate
may speak to the perspective that the senate is a part of the political ‘ﬁvork” of the

union.

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Many of the participants viewed the union as being involved in senate issues and
decisions, both formally and informally. CA1 emphatically commented on this inﬂuence
when he said,

Officially, in what they say there is a senate role and there’s a union role.

Uno fﬁcially, because of the personalities involved the union is very much

involved both behind the scenes, and in that they speak up without saying
they are the union, but everyone knows they are the union at senate
meetings.
The inﬂuence of union activists as members of the senate impacts senate discussion and
decisions. This administrator was clear in conveying there is a strong union voice that
inﬂuences everyday senate activities. CA2, described an incident at Currier involving the
mandated periodic senate review of board policies that raised concern over union
inﬂuence on routine senate responsibilities. Inﬂuence of the union was not overtly
demonstrated in this case but rather was related to the “view” senate members took when
addressing institutional policies. CA2 noted, “The person involved most heavily in this
thing happens to be a major union activist. That he is taking, what I believe, is the union
position in reviewing these documents. . .he wants it the way the union wants it.”
Although a senate committee assigned this individual the task of reviewing policies, it
was suggested that union inﬂuence predominated his assessment.

Participants from both institutions shared examples where the union got directly
involved in senate issues because the senate did not respond the way the union would
have liked. Reﬂecting on an academic integrity case that was overseen by a senate

committee this Homestead administrator, HA2, said,

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What’s happened this year, the union has gotten involved in some of the

cases because when a faculty member brings forward a case of cheating

and the conduct board does not respond the way the faculty union thinks

they should respond, they get involved. So what ends up happening is at

that point you’ve got the professional concerns committee and the faculty

union kind of at an impasse.

He went on ﬁrrther to point out that in this particular case the union president
“Inserted himself into the hearings.” Union inﬂuence, through the intervention of
the union president in this academic committee, was obvious, and according to
HA2, outside the purview of union responsibilities since academic integrity is a
senate issue.

The union president at Currier commenting on the relationship between the senate
and union also carefully suggested that the union intervenes in senate business when it
perceives the senate is not doing what the union would like. CU observed that the
relationship between the senate and union has been a “Good relationship down the line”
and that the only tension that have been observed were,

When the leadership of the senate was ah, was ah. . .sometirnes when the

leadership of the senate was not as aggressive as some people thought,

people on the senate thought it should be in terms of defending faculty

rights.

Tension was evident between the senate and the union because the senate did not

do what the union wanted them to do. Although, CU was speaking about the

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“tension” between the senate and union, be redirected his assessment of who was
unhappy with the leadership of the senate back to the “people on the senate”.

A faculty member at Currier provided another example of union inﬂuence
involving the union president in a senate issue. CF2 observed that before the senate at
Currier had even debated the closing of an academic unit, the union had a pre-agreement
with the administration in hand. Three other respondents at Currier voiced the same
concern regarding this incident. They suggested that the president of the union had
inﬂuenced the provost to dismantle the college as well as exerted “undue” inﬂuence on
the senate as well. CFl offered this perspective, “Where the question sometimes arises is
who started the process for a particular decision. But my impression is that the decision to
take down the [academic unit] was more the union’s or the senate leadership’s idea than
the provost’s.” With the senate leadership highly biased by the union president, as
suggested by other informants at Currier, this interpretation by CFl of the incident is
signiﬁcant of the inﬂuence that may be present at this institution between the senate and
the union.

As noted above, the union president was the major voice, in the view of
administrators and faculty alike, in intervening and inﬂuencing senate activities at
Currier. At both of the institutions studied the union president sits on the executive board
of the senate as liaison to the union. As one faculty member at Homestead (HF2) pointed
out the “exec board of the senate has a representative from the union and the union
president made himself liaison.” Similarly, the union president at Currier appointed
herself as the union liaison. Neither of the senate bylaws of the site institutions calls for

the president of the union to sit on the executive board. The only requirement is that a

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representative of the union be named to this group. Although neither of these liaison
positions at the two institutions has a vote on the executive board of the senate, one
Currier administrator (CA1) pointed out quite emphatically that the president of the
senate is highly inﬂuenced by the union president.

The president of the faculty senate, who will deny this up one side and

down the other, says exactly what the union president tells her to say.

That’s um. . .mincing no words, but I have watched this happen, sitting on

the senate many times and sitting in once and a long while at the policy

committee [executive committee] of the senate.

This same administrator ﬁrrther reﬂected on an incident involving the
evaluation and reappointment of deans. He pointed out that the senate president
and vice president [also a union officer] encouraged the provost to hold off on the
reappointments since she was stepping down and a new Provost was being
appointed. CA1 said, “It was very clear it [the request for delay] came from the
fact that the union president, who was silent during this was worried that the dean
of [particular college] would be reappointed.” In the opinion of this administrator
these senate officers advocated for an action that was clearly the agenda of the
president of the union.

The personal inﬂuence of the union leader on senate agendas and activities is
obvious in the mind of the administrator quoted above. Depending on the union
president’s history at the institution and past interactions with the senate and its leaders,
there may be considerable power to persuade and impact both senate and institutional

agendas and policies. But, it is not just the personal inﬂuence that should be considered,

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but also the delegated inﬂuence. By nature of the senate make-up, and in the case of both
site institutions, the union president, has an important role as part of the executive
committee of the senate. This individual is involved in setting agendas, reviewing
policies and providing feedback to university and senate leaders. The union, at least at the
institutions studied, appears to have a great deal of inﬂuence, both through the personal
interaction of its leader as well as through its delegated relationship with the senate.
Administrators and faculty at both institutions acknowledged that the union

inﬂuences senate issues and activities. Conversely, senate and union presidents were less
willing to speak to this issue on a speciﬁc level. Senate and union presidents articulated
that senate and union roles were distinct but that at times there may be overlap on
particular issues and that inﬂuence runs both ways. The president of the senate at
Homestead pointed out,

The union contract speciﬁcally mentions the senate and states that those

areas in which the senate has competence belong to the senate and so on.

But in a sense I am a member of the union and I am affected by anything

that the union does and I participate in chapter meetings and the union is

affected by anything we [meaning the senate] do.
Although senate and union presidents were hesitant to identify or talk about
union inﬂuence on senate activities, there was not this same level of cautiousness
in regard to issues that ﬂowed from the senate to the union.

There were numerous instances at both institutions where the senate

referred matters to the union for input, approval or consideration for bargaining.

A faculty member at Homestead (HF2) pointed out that “many of the policies

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[regarding graduate faculty status or research misconduct] originate in the
councils [of the senate] but then they are incorporated into the contract”. It would
appear that the senate might be responsible for identifying and studying issues and
then creating recommendations that are sent to the union for action. The union
then works with the administration to make those issues a part of the “work
conditions” of faculty and integrates them into the collective bargaining
agreement.

A Homestead administrator (HA1) referencing policy statements written by the
senate, validated the view of the faculty member above and said,

They [the senate] send them over to the union and say ‘give me your

views on this before we do this with the administration’ and that goes on

vice versa But most of it is the senate going to the union and not the union

going to the senate.
This predominately one-way review and endorsement process speaks to the inﬂuence of
the union. At both institutions the senate is legally restricted ﬁom dealing with faculty
work issues per the collective bargaining agreement. The issues that are forwarded to the
union from the senate are senate issues. Without union approval, it would be unlikely
that these policy statements would ever make it out of “draft” format. A faculty member
conﬁrmed this observation. HFl , referenced the graduate faculty status document that
was viewed by the senate as an academic issue. She explained that it “Wrangled through
the senate and the AAUP also reviewed that. I don’t know if you call that joint decision

making but I know that if the AAUP didn’t like it, it would never go forward.”

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Administrators, as well as faculty perceive that the union has the “ﬁnal word” on
senate and institutional policies that may relate to faculty. The administration and the
senate forward policies and memorandums to the union for review and input, but often
the senate uses the union to also affect their own agenda This inﬂuence is evident in an
example related by a Currier administrator of where the senate attempted to use the union
to affect a change. In this incident the senate disagreed with management on a space
issue. CA2 noted, “The administration views this as the administration’s, a management
issue and the senate went to the union, back and forth to try and get that into the union
court. They wanted it to become a bargainable issue.” Using the union to inﬂuence the
needs of the faculty speaks to the impact that the union has at both site institutions. A
Homestead administrator (HA1) summarized this key message by saying that most of
what happens is “The senate going to the union and not the union going to the senate. It’s
pretty much one direction from the senate to the union”. When asked, “Why do you
think that happens?” HA1 replied, “Because the union doesn’t need the senate but the
senate needs the union.”

These comments reinforce the perspective that the senate needs the union and that
the union is perceived as having more inﬂuence and power in the institution. The
president of the Homestead senate talked about how the senate is viewed by many as
“fairly well irrelevant to where they live”. She went on to comment that pe0ple on
campus do not take the senate seriously and that the senate is no threat to the union. Her
comments reﬂected the fact that the union negotiates salaries, beneﬁts and are the
guardians of the tenure and promotion process and questioned “so um. . .what do we do?

So I think they think the senate is all right as far as it goes but it’s not worth much”. She

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went on to quote John Nance Garner, likening the senate at her institution to his
observation regarding the national vice presidency “As not being worth a warm bucket of
spit.” She concluded by saying, “I won’t say they would go that far but they. . .I just think
they regard it as very insigniﬁcant.”

This same sentiment was expressed by a faculty member at Currier, CF2, who
pointed out that the faculty of the institution have, “No idea or interest at what goes on in
the academic senate.” She suggested that only a major issue would precipitate the senate
to be sought out and related such a recent incident regarding the closing of an academic
unit on her campus. She observed,

So each committee considered that, and then it went to the whole

academic senate for approval, and that’s when we had representatives

ﬁom this unit who are not members of the senate speak, which is the ﬁrst

time in my ﬁve years that has ever happened, where people from outside
who were not administrators will come to address the senate. But this

again, was an event of major signiﬁcance that the academic senate was

even consulted, that people decided to speak to the academic senate

members. Um, otherwise, as I said, people are hardly aware of who serves

on the senate, what the senate is doing, no matter how important.

This faculty member did not feel that the faculty of the institution valued the
senate. She noted that often the faculty view even academic issues as falling into
the purview of the union and that the union acts as a resource for faculty directing
them to the senate with library and research concerns. Although this faculty

member did not feel that the union inﬂuenced the senate, it was apparent from her

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narrative that the union was the primary group that faculty approached with
concerns, regardless of the nature of the issue.

In the eyes of most of the participants interviewed, union involvement in senate
activities is evident, obvious and appears to be an accepted part of the culture of both
institutions. Union insertion into senate issues, whether done independently or through a
direct request of the senate, speaks to the power and authority of the union. The senate
uses the union to affect its own agenda, likewise the union inﬂuence over the senate acts
to control the policies and actions of the institution, to a certain extent. The inﬂuence
appears to be unidirectional, ﬁ'om the union to the senate. Issues discussed were senate
matters not union agenda. Consistent with power and authority, the union appears to act
to “protect” the senate. This protectionism was clearly conveyed by the president of the
Homestead union who, using the analogy of a police ofﬁcer trying to control a situation
noted,

If he has to use force, he has to use force. And that is what I see as the

difference between the two. The one is the persuader [senate] and the

other is the force [union] and what works best is when they work hand in

glove, and if they had the same goals, than I think its, I think we’re

indomitable.

In an earlier discussion with this same individual, a similar theme was observed
when he referred to the senate as a persuasive body and the union as having “the
muscle.”

One other area of inﬂuence also emerged in the analysis, however this was only

applicable to one of the institutions studied. The collaboration of the senate and union

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during “hard times” to work against the administration was a strong theme observed at
Homestead University. Although considered an outlier in the analysis of the data it is
important to note its signiﬁcance in relation to Homestead’s history and current state of
affairs.

Participants from Homestead noted increased interaction and co—operation
between the senate and union, especially during hard times. Working together against the
administration and presenting an allied ﬁ'ont for the greater good of the faculty and
institution was a key message speciﬁc to Homestead University. This theme may have
reﬂected the fact that the faculty union was going into bargaining soon after these
interviews were concluded. HP 2 pointed out, “There have been increased discussions
between the executive board of the union and the executive board of the senate because
of. . .of prospects to downsize.” Working together against the administration to create a
uniﬁed ﬁ'ont was also noted by HA1 who said,

There use to be a great deal of communication between the two groups

laterally and also some occasions of working together retaining a president

or getting rid of a provost. . .they were very much in league as faculty,

major faculty groups together.

A faculty member at Homestead (HFl ), in reference to faculty discontent with the
university president stated ardently, “Things are, I might as well say it, um. . .I think
things are bad enough here that its possible that these two entities [union and senate]
could actually work together to a greater good.” Even the president of the senate at
Homestead suggested collaborating with the union “to take that little battle up this fall”

with the administration on issues related to graduate faculty status.

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Shared Governance

Shared governance is the last theme identiﬁed in the analysis of the data regarding
senate and union relationship. The term shared governance carries with it multiple
deﬁnitions depending on how it is practiced at individual institutions. Generally,
participants took their time reﬂecting on the term “shared governance”. Some asked for
clariﬁcation of the question “deﬁne shared governance at your institution?” A few
participants appeared guarded in their response. Some interviewees viewed the union as
an integral part of shared governance others felt it was not. Most respondents agreed that
faculty needed to be involved in governance and looked to the union to assure these
rights. There was very little consistency between or within institutions as to who the
major players are in that process.

A faculty member at Homestead linked shared governance to the union. HF2
offered that the union not only assured job security to faculty but also shared governance,
and that means, “. . .participation and participation now.” This thought was expanded on
by the president of the union at Currier who offered a perspective on this issue when he
said,

Shared governance is an idea that comes out of the tradition of not having

a union. It comes out of an idea that, that if you go to the national AAUP

you will see this, that they talk constantly about ‘oh, we must have shared

governance pursued’, and its basically a kind of collective begging,

begging the board not to be bad to them, begging the board to abide by the

code, by the set of principles adopted by the AAUP, and most boards have

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adopted those covering tenure and all these other things and so on. But

there is no enforcement mechanism except the courts.

CU went on to summarize that it is the “collective bargaining contract” that protects and
deﬁnes the faculty role in shared governance. “. . .We are protected in the governing of
the institution. The senate and the union have their roles to play and the organization is
run by this interaction between them.” Without the union in place to guarantee, through
legal means, the faculty role in the governance of Currier, CU views shared governance
as having no backbone and reduces it to no more than lip service or as he stated
“collective begging.” By CU’s assessment the union’s role in shared governance is
considerable and critically important to the faculty of the institution.

Conversely, when the senate president at Currier was asked about shared
governance he acknowledged the role of the academic senate and the faculty as a part of
shared governance but adamantly rejected the notion that the union was also a part of it.
He said, “No, no, not at all. No, no, no, the union is really a rigid contractual body. They
deal with contractual issues on a rigid contractual basis”.

What participants appeared to agree on regarding shared governance is that the
administration and faculty constitute the major players. HA2 deﬁned shared governance
“As the administration and the various employee groups, particularly the faculty, working
together to resolve issues.” This administrator hesitated to suggest that the union was a
part of the shared governance of his institution. He offered this example to illustrate why.
The union president was asked by administrators to serve on select committees. Although
the union president accepted and viewed his involvement as a positive part of shared

governance, he ended up resigning because of all the pressure exerted on him by the

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union. According to HA2, the union felt he was “not doing what he needed to do to
represent them when he was serving on these committees” and was getting “too close to
the administration”. HA2 went on to say,

I would still say that the shared governance model, to me, works most

effectively with the faculty senate because we have administrators and

faculty serving together on all those committees, and so they come

together with recommendations and then they work to implement them

together.

Another administrator at Homestead, HA1, concurred and reiterated that shared
governance is, “Between the senate, and the administration, and the faculty. . .the senate
as a representative of the faculty at large.” The union role, according to this
administrator, is a very small and legal role. However, she went on to say, “But the fact
it is in the contract probably gives them some basis for asserting that they are a part of
shared governance.”

Conversely, at the same institution another view of shared governance is noted,
this time from faculty leaders. Both the senate and union president at Homestead had
similar perspectives on the role of the union in shared governance. The union president,
although succinct in his assessment of shared governance, clariﬁed that, “yes” the senate,
union, and management are a part of the governance structure of Homestead. The senate
president used this image to explain shared governance, “We [senate and union] are two
arms, if you will, of shared governance, working conditions and academic policy, and as
long as we make that metaphor have some reality, we are actually connected at some

point, we are in good shape.”

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Faculty at Currier were very clear in designating the administration, union and
senate as the major players in shared governance. In fact, one faculty member, CFl ,
noted that the union at his institution has a “strong part” in governance. Another Currier
faculty reﬂected on shared governance, and her long history at the institution. She
observed that the senate is more involved under the new university president than in past
years. She said the senate is focused on,

Trying to do its role, to look over, to look for the interests of the parties

involved, the students and the faculty and the research interests. So all of

that has taken the senate into a much more active role in governance. So I

think that, that it’s the administration, the union and the academic senate.

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CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

The role faculty play in the governance of an academic institution has been
formally advocated and supported by the academy and higher education associations for
almost a century. Faculty involvement in institutional governance was operationally
deﬁned with the advent of academic or faculty senates in the sixties and seventies. These
senates became the collective voice of faculty in issues regarding curriculum,
instructional methods, student life, and often faculty work conditions (Miller, 1999;
Mortimer & McConnell, 1978; Tierney & Minor, 2003). To ensure faculty involvement
in governance collective bargaining entered higher education. Baldridge and Kemerer
(1976) pointed out that the weakness of senates was a primary factor in promoting
unionization. When faculty are excluded from the governance process unionization is

often a political consequence (Richardson, 1999).

The political model as described by Baldridge (1971) provides a ﬁ'amework ffom
which the data in this study become meaningful. The ﬁrndamental assumption in the
political ﬁamework is that organizations are made up of groups with their own set of
interests that affect decision-making through power and conﬂict. PoWer is expanded
through coalition building and mutual inﬂuence, two factors that Morgan (1997) pointed

out shape organizations.

With the introduction of faculty unions into the mainstream of academia, the

nature of governance changed. Senates co-exist with unions at many institutions today,

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however, the literature is exceptionally limited in addressing the relationship between
these two entities. It is this relationship that is the fundamental inquiry for this research.
Two midwest universities were studied in an attempt to address the question, how do

faculty unions inﬂuence academic senates?

Summative Description of Institutions

The ﬁndings of this study enabled a summative description of the relationship
between the senate and union at the subject institutions. This information is important in

understanding the political atmosphere on each campus.

An administrator, along with the senate president and a faculty member, reﬂecting
on the beginning of the union at their institution, individually stated these exact words
“no institution ever gets a union that doesn’t deserve it”. Unionization at Homestead,
ﬁ'om their view, was a consequence of a poor shared governance model and distrust of
the administration and their willingness to support faculty. As noted in the study ﬁndings,
Homestead’s union was established years after the senate. The senate had been the voice
of the faculty on academic as well as faculty work conditions. What speciﬁc incidents
transpired at Homestead that precipitated the establishment of collective bargaining are
uncertain but what is evident from narratives is that the union was established in reaction
to the administration. Lee (1991) observed similar reactions from the institutions she
studied and said, “. . .old disputes between long gone provosts or presidents and the
faculty had shaped the governance system in ways that even two or more decades could

not change”(p. 45).

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The lack of power the senate had in supporting faculty may have been a key
reason for the creation of the union at Homestead. The senate at Homestead had
represented the faculty for years before the union, and may have been perceived as
effective. With the advent of the union, however, many senate responsibilities may have
shifted to the union. Subjects alluded to a long-standing power struggle and tension
between the union and the senate. In reviewing the collective bargaining agreement at
Homestead it is clear that the union is the designated advocate for the faculty. The
contract speciﬁcally limits the Homestead senate to advisory input only to the institution.
Consistent with issues of cross over membership in the senate and union as well as the
longevity of senate members discussed by study participants, it is entirely feasible that
faculty members who were less than enthusiastic about the union coming to Homestead
thirty years ago may still be “stirring the pot” and continuing to create tension and
discord between the senate and union in regard to roles and responsibilities.

Unlike Homestead, Currier University did not appear to view the advent of the
union as a negative consequence or primarily a response to a failed shared govemance
attempt. There was very little reference to a power struggle or tension between the union
and senate. The union at Currier appeared to evolve as part of the organization of that
institution and may be consistent with the culture, history and location of the university.
Herrnasi and Graf (1993) presented a model for faculty union voting behavior and
suggested that employment conditions and distrust of the administration prompts
unionization. The move to unionization is supported by perceptions of the usefulness of a

union, a liberal socio-political belief system of the faculty, as well as favorable views of

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unions at other institutions or organizations. Currier faculty may have felt that unionizing
was in the best interest of the faculty and consistent with the culture of their institution.

There appears to be a very different view of the union at Currier. The union is
perceived as the ‘protector” of the senate and in the opinion of many of those who
participated in the study; the senate exists because of the union. In contrast to Homestead,
there is little in the Currier collective bargaining agreement that speaks directly to the
senate. Information relative to governance in the contract was speciﬁc to departmental
activities only. Perhaps contract articles limiting authority or deﬁning roles for the senate,
like at Homestead, are absent from the collective bargaining contract of this institution
because there is no threat ﬁ'om the senate or power struggle between the two groups.

The senate and the union began within six years of each other at Currier and may
have included many of the same faculty. If the nature of the faculty leadership and
representation in the senate and the union have been consistent since the inception of the
AAUP at this institution, as suggested by the data, faculty move between the senate and
the union as representatives and leaders, causing a blurring of lines between the two
groups. Further, as pointed out by participants, union activists involved in the senate
monitor and control senate activities as well as promote the union’s agenda through
senate involvement. The lack of a power struggle between the union and the senate at
this institution is further illustrated by the fact that every standing council of the senate
has a union liaison that has voice but no vote.

With the addition of the union at Homestead and Currier, a second voice for the
faculty was recognized. This new voice adds to the political environment of the

institution. Cameron points out that “Adding one more strong interest group to the

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political structure of the institution may complicate the power balance and decision
making processes”(l982, p.8). Although the subjects may have viewed the union
differently at these two institutions, the data identify a number of common themes that

relate to the relationship of the senate and union as well as their roles and responsibilities.

Senate and Union Relationships

Inﬂuence

Inﬂuence was a key theme in the relationship between the senate and the union.
The direction of the inﬂuence appeared to be predominantly from the union to the senate.
At both institutions the union acts to contractually protect faculty governance and assure
faculty voice in institutional decision—making. The power to “protect shared governance”
is negotiated contractually with the administration. The union is the “watchdog” for
faculty governance on these campuses; the senate exists because of the union. The union
takes its charge very seriously as evidenced by the involvement of its leaders in senate
activities at both subject institutions. Corroboration of union involvement in senate issues
and decisions further demonstrates the ﬂow of inﬂuence ﬁom the union to the senate. As
pointed out by Clark (1983),

Conceptual sustenance is found in the growing amount of macro political

analysis that seeks the speciﬁc location of legitimate inﬂuence, approaches

that when combined point to the three faces of power: the power of groups

to prevail in overt conﬂict over explicit issues; the power of groups to

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keep issues off the agendas of action; and the power of groups to shape

conceptions of what can and ought to be done (as noted in Hardy, 1990,

pg.4ll)

Most participants viewed the union as being involved in senate business, both
formally and informally. On a formal level the president of the union at Currier was a
member of the executive board of the senate (non-voting). The recent past president of
the senate at Homestead was on both the executive board of the senate (voting) and the
executive board of the union Through their involvement on these executive boards they
were able to monitor and inﬂuence senate agendas, decisions and issues and interact often
with key administrators on institutional matters. Both union presidents were voting
members of the senate. Being a part of the executive board provided them with advance
information on issues and forthcoming agendas. Perhaps that is why these individuals
were identiﬁed by those interviewed in this study as being outspoken and active
participants in senate meetings. Further, by nature of the fact union officers were active in
the senate at both institutions; they may have felt union protection when expressing
opinions contrary to administrative views.

The inﬂuence of the union on the senate is obvious through the delegated
authority noted above. Participants also cited a number of other incidences of inﬂuence
demonstrated on an informal level. One area where informal inﬂuence was observed was
through the personal power and relationships of the president of the union. The union
president was clearly the major voice in intervening and inﬂuencing senate activities. In
addition to the delegated position on the executive board of the senate, this individual’s

personal and professional relationships with the senate president, provost and other key

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administrators impacted on the union’s inﬂuence over the senate. Numerous vignettes
pointed out the “intervention” of the union president in academic concerns, and the
relationship, whether bad or good, with the senate leadership and its effect on getting
things done.

Participants also pointed out that the senate often used the union to affect their
own agenda especially when the administration did not agree with senate
recommendations. The senate views the union as having more power with the
administration, thus building a coalition with the union supports the senate in achieving
their objectives. This was reinforced by the observation that senate documents go to the
union for review and approval. This speaks to the perceived power of the union even
when issues did not fall within the purview of the collective bargaining agreement.

Viewing senate issues with a union lens was also a concern of many participants
in the study. Evaluating university policies, processes, or approaching a problem from a
union perspective rather than ﬁom an academic vieWpoint is an example of the informal
inﬂuence the union has on the senate and the institution. Subjects voiced concern that the
union philosophy often dominated academic integrity cases, decisions on course
offerings, or institutional policy review, areas that are not typically within the formal
purview of a faculty union. Again, this speaks to the inﬂuence of the union on senate
activities.

Participants in this study repeatedly suggested that faculty were unaware of senate
issues, and that there was a general perception that the senate was not effective or useful.
Although some participants felt the senate represented the voice of the faculty, it was the

union that they actually referred to as the group that gets things done. One faculty

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member who saw the senate as the faculty voice went on to talk about “the faculty taking
back the university” and how that may have to be done on the “picket line” of the union.
This illustrates most poignantly the view of most faculty interviewed that although the
senate may be seen as the voice of the faculty, it is the union that faculty rely on to assure
their rights. The ability to protect the rights of the faculty both for work conditions and
issues related to academic life clearly puts the union in a power position on these two

campuses.

Membership

The make-up of the membership in the senate is a second theme identiﬁed in the
ﬁndings of this study. This theme emerged as the most robust area in the data analysis,
suggesting that particular faculty move between union and senate positions or maintain
leadership representation in both Participants were clear in reporting that the same small
group of standard players was involved in both senate and union activities and that the
senators who were most outspoken and active were union activists. Interestingly,
participants did not report that senate “activists” were a part of union activities but rather
union activists were a part of the senate.

Union activists in the senate tended to approach issues through a union lens, often
making senate issues, union concerns. This crossover of membership caused a blurring of
lines and confusion regarding in whose particular domain issues should be addressed. As
noted earlier, the union was viewed by participants in this study as providing contractual
protection to the senate on governance issues. The leadership overlap between these two

groups may account in part for this perspective (Baldridge & Kemerer, 1976; Lee, 1979).

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Subjects are aware that the union is on guard, monitoring senate activities to ensure and
maintain faculty rights.

There are very few studies that look at membership issues in faculty governance,
especially related to senate and union involvement. However, the ones identiﬁed in the
literature conﬁrm the ﬁndings of the current study. Barbara Lee (1982) reviewed faculty
collective bargaining contracts at ﬁfty-eight colleges and universities. From that sample
she selected eight institutions for in-depth study. Through the case analysis Lee noted that
union leaders were active in the non-union parts of institutional governance and therefore
could surreptitiously inﬂuence institutional decisions.

Having the same faculty involved in both the senate and the union allows the
union to monitor activities for both groups. Further, this coalition building and the mutual
inﬂuence that occurs between the senate and the union increases faculty inﬂuence and
control over institutional processes and decisions. Crossover membership between the
senate and union provides the faculty with an organized, deliberate and powerﬁrl voice in
the institution that does not outwardly appear to have the auspices of union involvement.

In a later longitudinal study, Lee (1991) found that the same faculty were
involved in governance leadership activities year after year. Further, she observed that
faculty and administrators alike questioned the quality of these leaders. The most able of
faculty, those that do research, publish and excel at teaching, are not typically attracted to
governance roles (Duderstadt, 2004; Gilmour, 1991), a theme clearly identiﬁed and
conﬁrmed by the ﬁndings of the present study. Participants in the present study often
portrayed senate and union activists as ineffective researchers and teachers. Their

involvement in governance was suggested as a way to achieve status while avoiding the

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traditional teaching and research norms. Birnbaum (1989) observed that involvement in a
senate offers older and less prestigious faculty a “local means for enhancing their own
importance” (p.430). The literature supports the ﬁndings of this study and suggests that
the pattern of faculty membership in governance has not changed signiﬁcantly over the
years, and may, in part, be related to the value placed on individual faculty involvement
in the governance process.

The results of this investigation are clear in that involvement in union and senate
leadership positions are not highly valued. Conversely, faculty and administrators
acknowledge the need for faculty to be invested in governance. This apparent
contradiction speaks to the lack of a reward system (Gilmour, 1991) for faculty involved
in governance activities as well as the investment of time. These two key issues
discourage younger faculty ﬁom participation. Promotion and tenure requirements
compromise the ability of younger faculty to invest their time and efforts in governance
activities (Floyd, 1985). Thus this small group of individuals, the tenured professors,
those with a history in the institution, seeks out leadership positions in the senate as a
venue for discussion, debate and comradeship. Many of these same people move between
the union and the senate, representing one group at a time or both groups at the same
time. This oligarchy is representative in this study of the membership of the union and

senate in the subject institutions.

Leadership

The relationship between the senate and union president was a central ﬁnding that

also emerged from this study. Subjects verbalized the importance of a positive

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relationship between these two leaders as critical to getting things done. Liking each
other was a prerequisite for getting things done. This coalition building between the
senate and union increases the power and inﬂuence of the faculty in the institution
(Morgan, 1996). It gives the faculty two voices with the administration. Further, the
coalition development results in cooperation between the senate and union on all issues
related to faculty work conditions, as well as academic life, and generally promote the
faculty interests in the institution. This theme intersects with the two previous themes,
membership and inﬂuence. The union president at both Currier and Homestead is seen as
being able to cross over into senate business as routinely as they do with union affairs
since both of these individuals sit on the senate executive committee and are voting

members of the senate.

The degree of personal power that was afforded the position of union president
was evident. Most of the inﬂuence exerted on senate issues and problems came ﬁom the
union president. Unlike the senate president, the union leader has formal authority that is
assigned through the collective bargaining contract. Using the contract as proof of this
authority, the union president can challenge, interfere, and direct issues, even when those
issues are not speciﬁcally within the domain of the union. The union president can bring
up and discuss any issue ﬁ'om work conditions to academic affairs. This places the union
president in a position of power that is legitimized by the faculty and contractually

adhered to by the institution (Morgan, 1996).

Conversely, most senates operate in an advisory capacity to the administration.
Duderstadt (2004) views these senates as “debating societies whose opinions are

invariably taken as advisory by the administration and the governing boar ” (pg. 149).

Ill

Birnbaum points out that senates serve important organizational functions such as
providing an opportunity for faculty to meet, debate, and “engage in acceptable behavior
when faced with ambiguous or uncertain stimuli” (1991, p. 19). There is no contractual
authority assigned to the president of the senate. Much of what happens in a senate is
often based on tradition and rituals. The president of the senate is not allowed to discuss
any issue that is within the providence of the collective bargaining agreement, nor can
administrators address these issues with senate ofﬁcials unless those senate ofﬁcials are

wearing their “union hats” and hold union office.

Shared Governance

The concept of dual track ﬁrnctions, a term deﬁned by Kemerer and Baldridge
(1975) in their seminal study of unions on campus, describes how union and senate
presidents in this study explained their respective roles and responsibilities. They
expressed a compartmentalized view noting distinct separations between issues
appropriate to the senate and union. The union focused primarily on faculty work and

economic conditions, while the senate deliberated on academic issues.

Contrary to the perceptions of the senate and union leadership, the faculty and
administrators in this study did not share this same observation. They noted crossover
membership as a major issue causing a blurring of responsibilities between these two
groups. By the nature of this crossover there is no clear demarcation of issues since

faculty leaders involved in both bodies have the latitude to discuss any and all issues that

112

arise. Further, there are some matters that impact both union and senate such as
workload, university calendar, policies addressing faculty graduate status, to name a few.

This ambiguity fosters further conﬁrsion and a blurring of roles (Duderstadt, 2004).

As early as 1976, Baldridge and Kemerer suggested that there was a breakdown in
dual track bargaining already occurring. In addition to economic conditions, unions were
demanding decision-making rights in areas that were traditionally the jurisdiction of
senates; they were seeking a role in governance. Baldridge and Kemerer asked an
important question, “To what extent are governance rights legitimate union concerns?”
(p.405). It is at this juncture, thirty years later that we address this critical question as it

relates to the last ﬁnding of this study.

Shared governance is deﬁned as a system, composed of structures and processes,
through which faculty, administration and other campus stakeholders make collective
decisions that impact the institution (Association of Governing Boards, 1996; Eckel,
2000; Lee, 1991). Participants in this study lacked a consistent deﬁnition of shared
governance across subjects as well as by institution. It is not surprising to ﬁnd faculty
and administrators relating different conceptions of shared governance. Tierney and
Minor found that “campus constituents often employ multiple deﬁnitions of shared

governance which create varied expectations about decision making” (2003, p.12).

Most subjects focused on the groups involved in shared governance rather than a
deﬁnition of the process. There was general agreement that faculty and administrators
were an important part of shared governance. Some subjects noted that the interaction
between the senate and the administration accounted for shared governance. Others

deﬁned shared governance as involving the administration, the union and the senate.

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Shared governance is all about the interaction of campus constituents in
institutional decision-making and ultimately on the implementation of the choices they
make (Eckel, 2000). Unions, because they represent a coalition of faculty, undoubtedly
impact on the campus environment and institutional decision-making. Interestingly, the
mention of unions as a part of shared governance is strikingly omitted in the literature

(Burgan, 2004; Keller, 2004).

The omission of union involvement in shared governance goes against the trend
of inclusion that has permeated higher education these past years. As Schuster et a1.

(1994) point out,

The call for participation emerges, however, not only out of a political
process in which various groups seek empowerment, but also out of a
deeper understanding of academic culture and what complex
organizations, especially professional organizations, must do to function

effectively (p.17).

The conception of shared governance is one that is ﬂuid, and changes in response to the
environment as well as the mission of the institution (Morphew, 1999). Shared
governance may involve a number of constituents including the faculty senate, the union,

trustees, students, staff and administration of the institution depending on the issue at

hand.

Governance, on the other hand, is speciﬁcally deﬁned as the role faculty play in
the administration, control, standards and long-term management of the institution in
which they work (Keller, 2001). Governance and shared governance carry different

meanings and imply different dynamics. Governance is often demonstrated through an

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institution-wide senate or the faculty council of a department. Faculty governance is a
concept that is highly advocated by faculty and administrators alike as a key element

necessary to the health and efficacy of an academic institution (Tierney & Minor, 2003).

Clarifying the concept of faculty governance was more difficult to discern ﬁ'om
subjects in this study. Some respondents reported that faculty in both the senate and the
union were involved in governance issues. They observed that governance was the
interaction between these two groups, implying that both groups were involved in the
long-term management of their institution. Other subjects rejected the notion that the
union was a part of faculty governance. With faculty involved in union and senate
activities, crossover membership between the two groups and the blurring of
responsibilities, it is understandable that faculty and administrators alike are uncertain of
how to view governance at their institution. The faculty role in academic governance
remains a topic of“. . .controversy, ambiguity and misunderstanding among faculty

themselves, administrators and more recently, state legislators” (Lee, 1979, p.565).

Faculty senates and faculty unions have co-existed at colleges and universities for
decades and purported to operate within the framework of dual track governance, a
practice very difficult to achieve (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975; Schuster et al., 1994).
Figure 1 provides a simple schematic that illustrates the relationship between the
administration, senate and union in a dual track governance model. The administration or
a senate committee initiates a query to the senate regarding an academic issue. An
example may be the closing of an academic department. The senate reviews and
discusses the issue and recommends an action to the administration. The matter is then

forwarded to the union by the administration for review in light of the collective

115

bargaining contract. The union then works with the administration to resolve any
contractual concerns the closing of the unit may have on faculty. In this model, the senate
and the union roles and responsibilities are separate and distinct. The senate debates the
academic issue and advises the administration, while the union looks at the impact of a

potential decision on faculty work conditions.

In the current study this belief, that a separation of roles and responsibilities exists
between the senate and the union, two faculty coalitions, could be the basis for some of
the subjects’ resistance to including unions in a deﬁnition of governance. Promoting the
idea that the senate and union represent the same group of faculty, for a different set of
reasons and under different terms reduces the implication that the union is part of
governance. Thus, the university is not in a conﬂict of interest situation when faculty are
making academic decisions that impact the institution and then separately negotiating
conditions of employment based on those new decisions. Keeping the roles and
responsibilities of the union and senate separate may eliminate legal issues. The US.
Supreme Court’s Yeshiva decision of 1980 limited collective bargaining at private
colleges and universities because the court determined that faculty were considered
managerial employees through their involvement in governance. Numerous unions at
private institutions were decertiﬁed after this ruling, but public institutions continued to

unionize supported by legislation in some states that overruled the Yeshiva decision.

This landmark case brought to the foreﬁ'ont the issue of faculty involvement in
governance and collective bargaining. As noted earlier, governance suggests faculty

investment in the objectives and goals of the institution, whereas collective bargaining is

116

Figure 1

Relationship of the administration, senate and union
in a dual track governance model

 

Administration

 

 

 

 

 

..// \\

Sen Union

 

 

 

 

 

 

117

speciﬁcally focused on faculty work conditions. The union’s involvement in governance
sets up a conﬂict of interest between the faculty and the institution. If the union is in
position to inﬂuence governance decisions those decisions made may support faculty
needs versus institutional welfare. Discussion of class size, workload, closing academic
programs or allocating the institution’s budget may be issues that are a part of governance
that will also impact faculty work conditions. The Association of Governing Boards
(2001) strongly recommended that unions be denied any role in traditional governance

processes.

Promoting dual track functions and advocating loudly that the union is not
involved in governance provides institutions and unions with an argument “on paper” that
there is a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between the union and the senate.
However, the reality of union inﬂuence on senate activities, as born out by the results of
this study, suggest that unions are very much involved in the governance of their
institutions, albeit covertly through their strong voice in the senate, vis-a-vis the
inﬁltration of union activists. Further, union inﬂuence over senate and institutional
processes and policies, and the blurring of union roles and responsibilities with the senate

immerses the union in the management of the institution.

This political interplay between the union and the senate and the union and the
administration, as illustrated in Figure 2, impacts directly on the goals and objectives of
the institution and the welfare of the faculty. Using the same example noted earlier
regarding the closing of an academic unit, the senate would be responsible for discussing
the issue and advising the administration on a proposed action. With union activists

involved in senate leadership, the union would be immediately aware of the issue at hand.

118

Fit-"2

Political interplay between senate, union and administration

 

 

 

 

 

 

In

 

 

 

 

 

 

119

Since the action impacts faculty jobs, union activists in the senate may use their inﬂuence
to affect the direction of the senate decision. In this example the union would be involved
in the academic decision, review of the decision related to the faculty contract and
subsequent interaction with the administration regarding the impact of the decision on

faculty work conditions.

The results of this study are provocative, and suggest reconsideration of
contemporary models of academic governance on unionized campuses. Dual track
governance once thought to succeed (Burgan, 2004; Lee, 1982) may no longer be the
appropriate model of governance in higher education. Overlapping leadership, crossover
membership, and the informal relationships and inﬂuence between the union, senate and
administration suggest that a true separation of roles and responsibilities between the
union and the senate is somewhat dubious. Data suggest that the union plays a role in
inﬂuencing academic policies and processes, often successfully intervening in issues that

are not within their formal purview.

The dual track governance model appears to be fraught with problems. This
research study points out concern by administrators and faculty alike regarding the
ambiguities of the system. Subjects commented repeatedly about the ineffectiveness of
the senate and the strength of the union. Direct and indirect union inﬂuence is
acknowledged in senate and institutional issues. Why then is there resistance to formally
identifying the union as a part of governance? Perhaps it is because unions cannot
bargain governance. Collective bargaining is a political process designed to beneﬁt union
members. Union involvement in the management of an institution places it in a possible

conﬂict of interest position, as well as at odds with the administration. Continuing to

120

promote a perception of separation between union and senate roles and responsibilities
masks the true political nature of this interaction. Under a dual track governance facade
the union can continue to inﬂuence the institution without the outward manifestation of

any managerial involvement.

Perhaps another key to the survival of dual track governance is the fact that
faculty have two groups representing them, the senate and the union. This coalition
development offers a strong strategy for promoting the interests of the faculty within the
organization (Morgan, 1996) without appearing to violate legal issues. The union,
through its inﬂuence and involvement in senate membership and leadership positions,
controls senate activities for self-interest purposes. As long as the union can continue to
manipulate the senate it maintains a very deﬁnitive but surreptitious role in faculty

governance.

Politically, the administration appears to be well aware of what the union is doing
as evidenced by administrators in this study who “have learned to live with this”
situation. Perhaps administrators ﬁnd the union involvement in senate affairs to be a
barometer of sorts. Union reaction to academic issues may provide administrators with
information that may become a part of ﬁrture contract negotiations. Or perhaps,
administrators understand the need for the union to be involved, albeit informally, in the
business of the institution since faculty are the essential employees, overseeing
curriculum and instruction, the university’s major commodities. Additionally, union buy-
in and support on irnportant university issues allows for more timely revision of

processes and policies that impact institutional effectiveness. Hardy (1999) urged

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institutions of higher education to consider involving unions in decision-making. Hardy

stated,

Creating credibility, the use of consultation and legitirnating decisions can
prevent union resistance from occurring. Such strategies are often
associated with political advantage, but they may also be a way of
building consensus and are worthy of examination within the context of

higher education (p. 416).

Viewing academic governance as having components of both the collegial and
political model (Baldridge et al., 1977) may more accurately portray the reality of what is
happening on the two campuses studied. Although the political model appeared to
dominate, the union presidents were an active part of the senate, either through the senate
executive board or major councils. There were no restrictions at either of these
institutions on union leadership involvement in senate activities. This provides some
evidence that a mixed model of decision-making, involving both a political and collegial

framework, may be present at these institutions.

Implications

The ﬁndings of this study indicated that although senates are touted to be the
governance body through which faculty provide input and participate in institutional
decision-making, in reality the faculty union through its surreptitious activities is really

the key voice in governance. Although the union guarantees and protects governance

122

through the collective bargaining contract, its formal involvement in governance is
legally restricted. The power the union gamers, however, because of the dependency of
the senate on the union to “protect” it, increases the union’s potential to inﬂuence,
especially in times of scarce resources. Scarce resources intensify the need to protect
faculty jobs and salaries, and increase the level of political involvement to control

decisions that may be detrimental to the faculty.

A faculty union involved in the management of an institution is considered in
conﬂict of interest since the union deals with the interests of those it represents rather
than the interests of the university. Thus, through crossover membership, leadership
involvement on the senate executive board and its legitimate inﬂuence within the
institution, the union is able to shape and control issues and actions related to both faculty
life and institutional welfare without the formal appearance of being the union. Inﬂuence
and cooptation of the senate puts the union in position to control both institutional
policies that may impact work conditions of faculty and then to negotiate those same

issues on a formal level through collective bargaining.

These ﬁndings have important implications for institutions, especially in light of
the fact that unions are on the increase in higher education (Ehrenberg et al., 2004;
Kaplan, 2004). Colleges and universities concerned with the expansion of faculty union
inﬂuence in the governance of their institution may consider restricting union leaders
ﬁ'om involvement in senate activities. Limiting crossover leadership between the union
and senate may reduce some of the ambiguity regarding roles and responsibilities of these

two faculty groups. Restricting union leaders from having a formal role in senate matters

123

also reduces the communication conduit between the senate and the union and may avert

both formal and informal inﬂuences of the union on the senate.

Recommending a designated hiatus between an individual’s senate and union
leadership position, and working toward term limits for both senate and union leaders
may alter the tendency for the same small group of standard players to be involved in
senate and union activities. These restrictions will need, however, to be implemented
carefully since there is a limited pool of faculty interested or willing to be involved in
governance activities (Duderstadt, 2004). Thus, orienting and mentoring new faculty to
governance opportunities and building faculty reward systems to support that
involvement are essential. Fostering a culture that values governance assures faculty they
will have a continuing voice in institutional decision-making and will be willing to
exercise that voice. It may also provide the institution with a broader cross section of

faculty who are focused on institutional mission and goals.

The ﬁndings of this research suggest that the union is a part of the shared
governance of the institutions studied. Perhaps unionized colleges and universities have
evolved to a point where they are ready to adopt a new model of governance for the 21St
Century. This new model would involve the collaboration of both labor and management
as strategic partners. Saltzman and Grenzke (1999) referred to this as a “new unionism.”
In new unionism, the faculty union gains inﬂuence over issues that previously have been
outside the scope of bargaining. Faculty coalitions within an institution may have
dissimilar goals, but through a collegial model of decision-making, rather than political
activity, these groups build consensus for the common good. Baldridge et a1. (1977)

describe the collegial model of decision-making as a “human relations approach to

124

organization” (p.20) that builds consensus of the academic community through its
involvement. Under this model, the faculty union and senate would no longer be

represented as separate coalitions, but rather as a united faculty.

Mortimer and McConnell (1978) argued that the statement on Academic
Government of College and Universities published by the AAUP in 1966 (AAUP, 1999)
was unrealistic in its delineation of authority for decision-making in higher education,
especially since it did not take into consideration the rise of collective bargaining in
colleges and universities. Academic issues are inextricably linked to ﬁscal concerns and
ﬁscal concerns to faculty work conditions. Mortimer and McConnell (1978) noted, “In
sum, we argue that those concerned with college and university governance should
eschew the search for separate areas of authority and look for ways to enhance joint

involvement” (p. 272).

Political strategies that support self-interests combined with a collegial model
that reﬂects common interests (Baldridge et al., 197 7), may draw the union out of its
surreptitious role as a decision-maker in institutional governance. Thus, the faculty union
would become an active and obvious participant in the governance of the institution.
Mary Burgan (2004) argues that the collective bargaining approach to academic
governance has numerous advantages and that in mature institutions unions play a strong

and positive role in decision-making.

The collective bargaining approach to governance obviously diminishes the role
of the senate, and raises an important issue regarding the value of senates in the
governance of institutions. Birnbaum (1991) talked about the functions of senates,

suggesting that they exist for reasons other than governance, such as ceremonial rituals

125

and providing gathering places for faculty discourse. Perhaps senates continue to exist
because they provide a communication function that supports the faculty, union and the
administration in identifying institutional issues and problems. Or perhaps senates
survive because they are useful to maintaining a facade of shared governance. Referring
issues to a faculty body for deliberation even when that group has little decision-making
authority provides the institution with an avenue to assuage faculty concerns and gives
the appearance of shared decision-making. These issues point to a critical need for
additional research in the area of governance and shared governance, especially in

collective bargaining environments.

Direction for Further Research

The political model as described by Baldridge (1971) provided the theoretical
framework for this study. According to this model, the union and the senate represent two
faculty coalitions that may be in conﬂict with each other and with the institution for
power. The group with the most power will ultimately be a part of the decision-making
process and inﬂuence the outcome of the organization. Through this research it has been
established that unions inﬂuenced senate decisions and thus had power as the major voice
of the faculty in the institutions studied. The predominant model of decision-making in
this study was the political model. What was also evident, however, was some movement
at both institutions to a collegial view of decision-making as demonstrated by union
officers’ involvement in key senate councils including the executive board. Further,

studies employing an ethnographic focus may be useﬁrl in identifying institutions that are

126

evolving to or currently using mixed models of decision-making. Perhaps as unions and
senates mature in their joint relationship with the institution there is less of a focus on
competitive strategies and more on consensus building. Research in this area would help

discover some of the cultural variables that impact such a transition.

Alternatives to the traditional dual track governance model need to be identiﬁed
and researched. Models of governance that reduce ambiguity by advocating for the union
as the only voice of the faculty in both academic and work conditions should be studied.
This type of contracted governance eliminates the need for a senate and relegates issues
of curriculum, program review, and other academic processes to the purview of the
collective bargaining agreement. The union becomes a strategic partner with the
administration, allowing the union to achieve a broader scope of bargaining and thus have
direct inﬂuence in governance. This model already exists at many institutions; however
there is very little research regarding the impact of this governance structure on
institutional decision-making, faculty participation and the political atmosphere of these

universities.

Research needs are also evident and essential in respect to the dual track
governance model. The recent literature is exceptionally limited in the discussion of
crossover membership issues, as well as union involvement in key senate committees.
Identifying institutions that have restricted union ofﬁcer involvement in major senate
committees and have endeavored to maintain a clearer demarcation of union and senate
roles and responsibilities would lend additional perspective on the efficacy of a true dual

track governance model.

127

Examining faculty membership in senates, in both unionized and non-unionized
environments, using a quantitative paradigm may provide more deﬁnitive information
and trends regarding faculty involvement in governance. Queries regarding reward
systems, years of involvement, tenure status of faculty and movement between senate and
union positions will further document and likely support the observation of cross-over

and recurring membership, as well as senior faculty involvement.

Looking at the perceived institutional value of faculty participation in governance
activities may provide insight into union/senate membership patterns. Faculty
participation in governance and leadership is problematic (Duderstadt, 2004) and by
studying faculty investment and involvement in governance activities, at both unionized
and non—unionized institutions, valuable information regarding faculty turnover can be

obtained.

Leadership was a key theme identiﬁed in this study. The leadership of the union
was mentioned numerous times as an important variable in getting things done.
Participants in the study also felt that the relationship between the president of the senate
and the union leader was important to achieving faculty and institutional goals. There was
no information discovered in the literature review that spoke speciﬁcally to faculty
leadership issues. Studying the leadership styles of senate and union leaders in
institutions that have experienced forward movement as evidenced, by a Carnegie
reclassiﬁcation, for example, may provide insight into the signiﬁcance of faculty

leadership in institutional success.

A ﬁnal area that may provide some enlightening information regarding

governance at unionized institutions relates to the collective bargaining agent

128

representing the faculty. Do speciﬁc unions impact differently on governance issues in
colleges and universities? Would faculty represented by the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) have different governance concerns than perhaps a faculty
represented by the National Education Association (NBA)? How inﬂuential are faculty

bargaining agents in regard to governance issues?

Conclusion

The discoveries of this research suggest that faculty unions are very much a part
of the governance of their institutions. Through the union’s strong voice in the senate,
and its inﬂuence over both senate and institutional processes, the union not only impacts
the welfare of the faculty it represents but also inﬂuences the goals and objectives of the
institution. Although senate and union leaders in this study advocated that dual track
governance was the norm, overlapping leadership, crossover membership, the informal
relationships and inﬂuence between the union and the senate, and the union and the
administration suggest otherwise. Through these surreptitious activities, the union was
involved in faculty governance and was also an integral part of the shared governance
matrix of the institutions studied. The implications of these ﬁndings are signiﬁcant and

suggest a reconsideration of the role of the faculty union in academic governance.

129

Appendix A

Consent Form
Title of Project: Academic Senates and Faculty Unions
Investigators: Marilyn Amey, PhD, Linda Seestedt-Stanford ABD
Institutional Afﬁliation: Michigan State University, Department of Education

You are invited to participate in this research study on the relationships between academic senates and faculty unions.
The following information is provided to help you make an informed decision whether or not to participate. If you have
any questions please do not hesitate to ask.

Through this project we hope to gain better insight into the relationship between faculty unions and academic senates.
There is limited research in this area so your support of this project is sincerely appreciated This research is being
conducted in fulﬁllment of a requirement for a graduate degree from Michigan State University. You were selected to
participate in this study because you are either a faculty member or administrator at your university and knowledgeable
of both senate and union activities and processes.

If you decide to participate in this research project I will need approximately 45 minutes of your time to ask you
questions related to the relationship between the senate and faculty union at your institution. I will be tape recording
this interview in order to assure accuracy in the transcription of our conversation. You are ﬂee to ask me to turn off the
tape recorder at any time during our conversation. Tape recordings will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study.
You may change your mind about being in the study and quit after the interview has started

Subject and institution identity will be kept strictly conﬁdential. Pseudonyms will be assigned to each respondent at the
time of transcription. Information obtained ﬁom subjects will be reported in aggregate to assure conﬁdentiality is
maintained. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowable by law.

If you have any questions at this time, please ask them. If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to
contact Dr. Marilyn Amey at 517-432-1056 or at (amcyﬁgmsucdu). If you have any questions or concerns regarding
your rights as a study participant, or are dissatisﬁed at any time with any aspect of this study, you may contact -
anonymously, if you wish - Peter Vasilenko, PhD., Chair of the University Committee on Research Involving Human
Subjects (UCRIHS) by phone: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, by email at: ucrihs@msu.edu, or regular mail: 202
Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. If you have additional questions later I will be happy to answer them.

You will be given a signed and dated copy of this form to keep.

My signature below Indicates that I have voluntarily decided to participate In this research project as a subject
and that you have read and understand the Information provided above.

 

 

Subject’s signature Date

 

Subject’s printed name

In my judgment, the subject ls voluntarily and knowingly giving Informed consent to participate In this research
study.

 

 

lnvestigator’s signature Date
Linda Seestedt-Stanford

989-774-1 850
seestedt@msuedu

130

Appendix B

Date

Participant

 

 

Institution

ﬂ

 

. Tell me about your personal history at the university?

a. Describe the responsibilities of your position.
b. Describe your interactions with the academic senate.
c. Describe your interactions with the union.

Through what processes or groups do faculty voice their concerns?
a. In your opinion which of those processes or groups are most effective and
why?
b. So overall, in your opinion how strong is the faculty voice on this campus?

. What is your view of the faculty union on this campus?

a. How well do you feel they obtain their goals?
b. Can you give me an example?

Describe how you see the relationship between the faculty senate and the faculty
union at this institution.
a. Has it always been this way?
i. What caused it to change or kept it stable?
ii. What do you think about their relationship as you just described it?

Please share with me examples of when the union and senate were jointly
involved in decision-making? (e. g. calendar, workload, program closure)
a. What is an example of an issue (3) that the senate referred to the union?
b. What is an example of an issue (3) that the union referred to the senate?

In what circumstances or around what issues have you observed the faculty union
exerting any inﬂuence on the senate?
a. How did the inﬂuence occur? Can you describe the process or dynamics?
Can you provide me with examples?

Given what you have reconstructed in this interview thus far, how would you
deﬁne shared governance at your institution?
a What role do the unions play in that?

Is there anything else you would like to share regarding senates and unions?

131

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