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Faculty Unions: Their Influence on Academic Governance

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FACULTY UNIONS: THEIR INFLUENCE ON ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE

By

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ABSTRACT

FACULTY UNIONS: THEIR INFLUENCE ON ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE

By

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Faculty unions have as their primary objective protecting and improving faculty life. Conversely, a senate, also a coalition comprised primarily of faculty, has as its charge supporting the goals of the institution through curricular initiatives and other designated responsibilities. Both the union and the senate represent a faculty voice and the political interplay between them can impact on institutional decision-making.

Through my research I discovered there is a blurring of lines between the senate and union's roles and responsibilities that causes recurrent confusion as to which group is accountable for particular issues and actions. Cross-over membership between the senate and union, the leadership of the union, and the formal and informal influences that the union exerts on the senate were other key areas identified in my research. These issues shape the relationship between the senate and union, and thus the political environment of the institution.

The findings of this study indicate that although senates are considered the governance body by which faculty provide input and participate in institutional decision-making, in reality the faculty union, through its surreptitious activities is very much a part of the governance of their institutions. The implications of these findings are significant and suggest a reconsideration of the role of the faculty union in academic governance.

This dissertation is dedicated to my wonderful family.
To my parents,
Hector and Mary Como,
I am so very proud of you!
To my husband, Mark Stanford,
You are my inspiration!
To my Wolverine children, Michael and Ellyn Seestedt,
Go Spartans!
To my sister, Vivian Como and brother, David Como,
Without family we are nothing.
Thank you for helping me realize my dream!

"Ancora imparo"

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM STATEMENT

Introduction

Faculty participation in governance is an integral part of the organizational structure of institutions of higher education. Keller (2001) defined academic governance as "the part that teaching scholars play in the administration, control, standards and long-term management of the institutions at which they work" (p. 304). Faculty and other institutional stakeholders are delegated authority by the board of trustees to affect decisions and processes to support the institution (Kaplan, 2004). Governance, along with administration, management, and leadership is one of the four requirements needed to run an institution of higher education (Keller, 2001).

Lee (1991) expanded on the concept of academic governance by noting that both formal and informal structures within an organization, and the relationships among and between groups in the institution, influence the process, and the outcome of decisions. Collective bargaining further obscures the multidimensional nature of faculty governance. Ehrenberg, Klaff, Kezsbom and Nagowski (2004) point out, "No discussion of governance in higher education would be complete without a consideration of the role of collective bargaining"(p. 209). Faculty governance is an important part of the shared governance matrix of an institution, impacting considerably on the dynamics of decision-making, and strategic change (Kaplan, 2004).

As early as 1920, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) advocated for shared responsibility among the different constituents of institutional

government. In 1966, the AAUP, in collaboration with the American Council on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, formulated a statement regarding the roles and responsibilities of institutional government, focusing primarily on the governing board, president and the faculty (AAUP, Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, 1999). This statement provided a framework for collaborative decision-making and supported the ideal of shared governance. Of significant importance was the role of faculty in this process.

The AAUP document advocated for the faculty to have primary responsibility for "curriculum, subject matter, and methods of instruction, research, faculty state and those aspects of student life which relate to the educational process" (AAUP, 1999, p.5). Governance models evolved rapidly in the 1960s and early 1970s as a result of this policy, and were supported by an environment of rapid, sustained growth in higher education (Benjamin, Carroll, Jacobi, Krop, & Shires, 1993).

Organizational structures for faculty involvement in institutional decision-making are varied by institution and campus (Lee, 1991). Faculty governance was noted to occur at two levels, in the department or college, and at the institutional level through an elected group of faculty representatives in a senate (Duderstadt, 2004). Faculty or academic senates became the most common type of governance in institutions of higher education, existing in one form or another on over 90% of 4-year colleges and universities (Gilmour, 1991). An academic senate (also known as faculty senates or councils), as defined by the Report of the American Association of Higher Education Task Force on Faculty Representation and Negotiations, is a "formal, representative governance structure at the institutional level that may include only faculty (a "pure"

senate) or that, in addition to a faculty majority, may include representatives of other campus constituencies, such as administrators, academic staff members and/or students (a "mixed" senate)" (American Association of Higher Education, 1967, p. 34). Responsibilities of senates may range from curricular oversight to creating policies regarding student advising. The level of authority in decision-making may also differ across institutions with some senates making policy decisions, while others provide formal recommendations to the administration (Gilmour, 1991).

As these faculty governance systems evolved so too did collective bargaining. In 1965 there were virtually no unionized institutions (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975). In 1972, the AAUP decided to pursue collective bargaining and establish more faculty unions (Keller, 2001). By the mid 1970's, one-eighth of the 3038 colleges and universities in the country had collective bargaining and today that number has increased to 1007 (Hermassi & Graf, 1993) representing over 35% of full-time faculty in the United States (Douglas & Or, 1990).

Unionization of college and university faculty has in essence contradicted the concept of collegiality, a tradition espoused as a key component of academic life and a necessary element in shared governance. Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) pointed out that collective bargaining assumes there is conflict between the employees and the employer and may undermine the "central ideals of academic professionalism" (p. 3) producing adversarial rather than collaborative decision making practices. They further observe that collective bargaining is more consistent with the political and bureaucratic than collegial concepts of governance. Millett (1980) in his book, *Management, Governance and Leadership,* mentioned collective bargaining only in the author's notes. In his view

unionization was destructive to collegial relationships and thus the academic community and enterprise.

Baldridge and Kemerer (1976) in a seminal study conducted between 1971 and 1974 raised important questions regarding the relationship between senates and unions and the influence of unions on shared governance processes. Called the Stanford Project in Academic Governance (SPAG), this investigation is the only one to date that has looked at the impact of faculty collective bargaining on governance and decision making in higher education. A number of salient conclusions were presented by the authors regarding unions and academic senates. First, the weaknesses of senates appeared to be a factor in promoting unionization. Second, co-existing senates and unions appeared to take responsibility for different issues with unions addressing economic issues and work conditions and senates dealing with curriculum, degree requirements, and admissions. This split of responsibilities is termed dual track functions. Joint responsibilities covered personnel issues such as hiring, promotion, and tenure. Third, the "dual track" responsibilities described above did not seem to remain stable. Unions appeared to be expanding their influence into traditional senate responsibilities. The last important concern from this study dealt with the future viability of senates in the face of union challenges, administrative leadership, conflicts of interest and legal contexts.

Problem Statement

Unions have the potential to be strong coalitions that can increase the power and influence of faculty and affect institutional policy and thus the goals of the institution especially in difficult economic times. Protecting and improving faculty life is the key mission tied to collective bargaining. Conversely, a senate is also a coalition of faculty, who have as their responsibility to support the mission and vision of the institution through curricular initiatives, degree requirements, admissions, and other designated senate responsibilities that may vary by institution. Although a separation of power between a senate and labor organization is conceivable, and assumes two mutually exclusive areas of influence, these "dual track" processes are highly questionable in application especially when examined from a political framework.

The political model, as described by Baldridge (1971) supports the view that within organizations are various coalitions and these coalitions are in conflict with each other for power. The group with the most power will ultimately make the decisions and influence outcomes in an organization, often making choices that may not be optimal for achieving an organizational objective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974). Rosovsky (1990) pointed out that "governance concerns power: who is in charge; who makes decisions; who has a voice, and how loud that voice is" (p. 261).

Baldridge and Kemerer (1976) cautioned that there is a creeping expansion of union influence and that faculty unions have "undercut" the authority of senates, suggesting that what was once under the purview of senates is now a union responsibility. Shuster (1989) encouraged administrators to accept that faculty "simply wear two

different hats, one when they are bargaining collectively and another when engaged in self-governance and shared governance in the institution" (p. 114).

The interplay between the union and the senate has created a significantly challenging and tenuous environment in higher education. Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) pointed out that collective bargaining practices could pose a threat to the concept of shared governance. Unions hold the interests of their membership as their foremost guiding principle, whereas, senates are concerned with promoting and supporting the academy. This arrangement creates challenges to unionized institutions, especially in fiscally difficult times (Woznizk, 2003) when programmatic decisions are intricately tied to the economic conditions of the institution. Keller (2001) refers to this new atmosphere as a "structural fault in academic organizational life" (p. 313) and describes faculty as demanding a full partnership in the institution to which they are attached but at the same time wanting to maintain an entrepreneurial agenda, independent oversight of their courses, load and time commitments and little accountability. As Keller (2001) pointed out, "Clearly, the governance of American colleges and universities is varied, often fractious and fundamentally impaired" (p. 314).

The AAUP, however, presents a contrary view and supports unionization as a means for achieving shared governance (Ramo, 1998). The AAUP Policy Documents and Reports (1995), known as the *Redbook*, provides principles to guide the faculty's role in shared governance. In this report, collective bargaining is supported as the process to "clarify, strengthen, and protect a sound structure for shared governance" (Ramo, 1998,

p. 52). Clearly there are divergent opinions regarding collective bargaining and its influence on faculty involvement in governance. This may, in good measure, be a reflection of the lack of relevant research in this area.

Empirical studies regarding senates and the impact of collective bargaining on their function and effectiveness are noticeably limited and very dated. With no differentiation between union and non-unionized environments senates have been represented as ineffective, weak, unrepresentative, unresponsive and inept (Birnbaum, 1991; Miller, 1998). Faculty, as well as administrators appear dissatisfied with the productivity of senates and participation in them is often viewed by faculty as time consuming, confusing, and unrewarding (Hamilton, 2000; Mason, 1972). Administrators complain that many decisions are made through inaction (Miller, 1998) and that senates operating under a consensus model, although supportive to collegial relationships, restrict the institution from responding quickly to important campus decisions (Gerber, 1997; Miller, 1998). The research consistently points out the inefficiency of senates and questions their viability without regard to the unionization issue.

Baldridge and Kemerer (1977) hesitated to predict the long-term impact that unionization would have on traditional faculty senates based on the SPAG study however, their conclusion suggested that faculty governance structures are fragile and "if not protected and supported, they will be destroyed by the political winds sweeping the campus" (Baldridge & Kemerer, 1977, p. 347). It has been over thirty years since the SPAG study was completed. To date, there have been no follow-up studies that have looked at the influence of unions on faculty senates. However, the tension between faculty unions and senates continues to be an issue as pointed out by a recent National

Education Association publication (2003) that posed the question, "Is there an inherent conflict between faculty unions and faculty senates?" (p. 11). Responses to this question suggest that there is diversity in faculty perceptions related to union and senate functions and relationships. The influence of the faculty union on the academic senate, both institutional coalitions that are faculty based, is an area of research yet to be determined.

Purpose of the Study

The faculty union is one of many interest groups on a college campus. Operating within a political framework, it is theorized that unions exert influence on institutions to support their own interests and values. A senate is a governance body within an institution that determines academic policies, as well as other issues pertaining to academic life. Both the union and senate represent a faculty voice. Thus, unions may sway academic senate policies and processes in order to control the working conditions of faculty. Current research that is specific to the influence of unions on senates is significantly limited. Research in this area is necessary because this relationship may speak to a possible redefinition of shared governance to include the faculty union as a major decision-maker in institutions of higher education.

The purpose of this study was to develop a deeper understanding of the relationship between faculty unions and academic senates by examining relationship structures, membership, and responsibilities. The primary question driving this study was: how do faculty unions influence senates? A qualitative design using a case study approach was utilized to discern both the informal and formal influences that faculty unions have on academic senates as well as the impact of that influence on decision-

making. Answering this research question has provided current information on the status of governance in colleges and universities.

Definition of Terms

The term governance in this study refers to the role faculty play in the administration, control, standards and long-term management of the institution they work in (Keller, 2001). Governance, along with administration, management and leadership is one of the four requirements needed to run an institution of higher education (Keller).

Academic governance is multidimensional in nature (Lee, 1991) and is often demonstrated through both departmental councils as well as institution wide senates (Duderstadt, 2004). For the purpose of this study, a senate will be defined as an institutional governance body of elected faculty representatives, and possibly other institutional stakeholders (administrators, students, staff). These groups are often referred to as either "academic" or "faculty" senates in the literature. There is no distinction in this study between the term faculty and academic senate.

The senate, as a governance body of the faculty, is one of many groups that can be represented in a shared governance model. Shared governance is defined as a system, composed of structures and processes, through which faculty, administration and other campus stakeholders make collective decisions that, impact the institution (Association of Governing Boards, 1996; Eckel, 2000; Lee, 1991). It is important to note that faculty and administrators have varied understandings of decision-making in shared governance. According to Tierney and Minor (2003) some define shared governance as fully

collaborative, while others felt it was a consultative process or distributed decision-making.

The term dual track functions refer to the specific responsibilities assigned to the senate and union. The term infers there is a clear demarcation between union and senate roles in regard to institutional and faculty objectives, with the union dealing with faculty economic issues, while the senate oversees academic and institutional concerns. This term implies that the union is not a part of the governance of the institution since the separation of functions supports the limitation of the union in management decisions.

Conversely dual track governance, acknowledges that faculty collective bargaining is a part of the governance of an institution. Although the assumption remains, as with dual track functions, that there are two mutually exclusive areas of influence for senates and unions, according to Lee (1982), both the senate and the union would share governance authority and responsibility.

Overview of Dissertation

The following chapter provides a comprehensive look at senates. Discussion centers on the nature, functions, and effectiveness of this governance body. A review of the relevant literature related to collective bargaining in higher education, and information regarding the relationship between academic senates and unions is also provided. In Chapter III, an account of the research methodology and data analysis procedures in this study are presented, followed by a description of the two case sites in Chapter IV. The results of this study are presented in Chapter V. A discussion of those

results and their implications as well as directions for future research follows in Chapter VI. Appendices contain the interview questions and consent form.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

Faculty or academic senates are generally considered the organizational structures through which faculty exercise their role in institutional governance. They are "unique reflections of institutional history, values and accidental interactions" (Birnbaum, 1992, p. 178). They are an accepted and integral part of higher education administration and reflect the culture of the institution. College and university governance structures were organized within the framework of academic freedom to insure the blending of professional and managerial considerations into decisions affecting teaching and learning (Ramo, 1997). Hamilton (2000) pointed out that "shared governance is a necessary condition for higher education's mission of creating and disseminating knowledge, academic freedom and peer review" (p. 16).

Faculty unions are also considered to be an important part of the landscape of higher education. Collective bargaining, however, is a relative newcomer to colleges and universities with the first unions emerging 30 years ago, long after faculty governance systems were in place. Various reasons exist for why faculty sought collective bargaining. The primary explanation evident in the literature relates to the perceived ineffectiveness of faculty senates and the ineffectual power of those bodies. According to Polishook and Neilsen (1989) "...faculties have sought collective bargaining contracts as a means of strengthening and supplementing their governance rights in order to counterbalance the encroachment of increasing managerial prerogative" (p. 148). The

faculty union and the faculty senate are inarguably linked through contract issues related to all faculty personnel issues from workload to program elimination. Thus, with faculty active in both union and senate processes are there cross influences that occur that impact on governance?

The first three sections of this literature review will discuss the structure, functions and effectiveness of senates. The fourth part provides a discussion of faculty collective bargaining, and the last part of the literature review looks at the relationship between faculty unions and academic senates.

The Nature of Academic Senates

The literature provides a glimpse of academic senates over a twenty-five year period. What is notably consistent is the presence of these shared governance structures on almost every campus in the United States. Gilmour (1991) was the first to comprehensively study the structure of academic senates and found that 91 % of 402 institutions queried had some form of participative governance that included faculty. Data from this study suggested that community colleges and four-year institutions with less than 2000 students were less likely to participate in this type of representative structure, whereas, 98% of institutions with 10,000 or more students had a shared governance system. A more recent survey of academic senates done in 2003 by the Center for Higher Education Policy Analysis (CHEPA), (Tierney & Minor, 2003) supported Gilmour's data and reported that 87 % of the 763 institutions sampled had some type of faculty senate with doctoral and master's institutions showing higher percentages, 93% and 90% respectively, than baccalaureate colleges, 82%.

The 2001 Survey of Higher Education Governance (Kaplan, 2004) examined faculty governance at public and private institutions and found that on private campuses faculty influence is less structured than at public institutions. A variety of governance models were noted that included institution-wide faculty senates having just faculty as members (58%) to institution-wide academic senates that elected senators from among the administration, faculty, students and staff (16.2%). Academic senates composed of faculty, staff and students were observed more often in public institutions.

Non-academic employees participation in university governance appears to have decreased since the 1970s when 50% of institutions had students on their governance board and almost one-third had staff involved (Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker & Riley, 1978). The decreasing role of non-academic personnel in academic senates may be related to a changing focus from the 1960s and 1970s when solidarity and community were considered vital components in higher education (Gilmour, 1991). Stakeholders such as student services personnel, non-academic staff, students, non tenure-eligible, part time and adjunct faculty are not consistently represented in current academic senate structures and are often not regarded as part of the academic community (Sanders, 1973). This suggests that faculty control has increased relative to other institutional stakeholders. Henkin and Persson (1992) sampled 1000 tenured and tenure track faculty at three public institutions in the same state regarding non-academic staff participation in governance issues. Results indicated support for non-academic staff to participate in governance processes related to financial and personnel affairs, and to a lesser extent, institutional matters. Minor support was noted for involvement in the student affairs area, and a negatively skewed perception of non-academic personnel participation in academic

affairs. The Henkin and Persson (1992) study confirmed faculty opinion and perceptions that they are the "gatekeepers" and control access to the processes of shared governance.

Senate membership has evolved at many institutions to include older faculty who are delegated authority by the majority of the faculty members who gravitate toward research and other scholarly endeavors and have no interest in participating in a governance role (Mason, 1972; Tierney, 1999). Younger members of the faculty may actually be discouraged to join academic senates for fear it will detract from their teaching and research (Floyd, 1985). Women also tend to be under represented in academic senates. Twale and Shannon (1996) looked at gender differences among faculty in campus governance and found that men in academic senates tended to be older, tenured, and hold the rank of professor, while women were younger, and more likely to be at the non-tenured assistant professor rank.

Functions of Academic Senates

Function more that structure is asserted to be the key to the impact of senates on institutional governance (Minor, 2003). Not only is there variety in the structure of these institutional bodies, but also in the specific purposes or roles they serve. Yet, there are very few studies that actually speak to the function of senates in governance. Mortimer and McConnell (1978) distinguished three degrees of senate authority: legislative, advisory, and forensic. The legislative functions include such matters as curriculum and student affairs as well as responsibility for appointing committees that deal with "clarifying, interpreting, and publishing senate rules and procedures" (Mortimer & McConnell, 1978, p. 28). The advisory functions of academic senates may include

personnel matters, budget, university calendar, and planning. Creating an environment for discussion and providing administration with key concerns faculty may have regarding institutional issues describes the forensic function of an academic senate.

Consistent with Mortimer and McConnell's assessment, it appears that the key purpose of an academic senate is to oversee instructional issues. The AAUP (1999) advocated for the faculty to have primary responsibility for control of the curriculum. In addition to establishing new degree requirements, developing courses to satisfy those requirements and defining course objectives and content, faculty should be involved in instructional procedures and evaluation of students' learning achievements (AAUP, 1999; Baldridge & Kemerer, 1976). A more recent investigation and analysis of faculty senates done by CHEPA (Tierney & Minor, 2003) confirmed that undergraduate curriculum development was the primary area faculty felt they influenced, followed by standards for evaluating teaching, and the assessment of the quality of academic program. Only 60% of the faculty at baccalaureate institutions in the survey felt the venue for participation in these activities rested entirely with the faculty senate. Academic departments, standing, and ad hoc committees were noted to be more important than senates as a means of faculty participation.

Faculty status is a secondary area of institutional decision-making in which senates appear to have influence. The senate is viewed as the primary facilitator of faculty rights (Miller, 1999). This includes assisting in recruiting new faculty members, setting faculty performance standards, participating within their disciplines in peer review on matters of tenure, promotion and dismissal, and sitting on committees to hear faculty grievances (AAUP, 1999; Tierney & Minor, 2003). In addition to the responsibilities

delineated above, the role of faculty senates in the selection and evaluation of administrators (Strohm, 1980) and input into institutional planning are also perceived to be important functions.

The senate also fulfills ceremonial and social functions. Senates operate on regular schedules, involve the same core of individuals, and function with rules. These rituals provide members with a sense of belonging and for some may be enjoyed purely as a pastime. Social interactions, discussion of key institutional issues, and gossip intermingle to produce a forum for faculty involvement (Birnbaum, 1991).

Most of what was reported in the 2001 Survey on Higher Education Governance (Kaplan, 2004) described the structure, formal roles and decision-making areas in current college and university governance systems. The key finding in this study related to a comparison of answers of a matched set of institutions to fifteen questions concerning faculty participation originally a part of a similar survey conducted by the AAUP in 1970. These decision-making categories basically delineated the functions of shared governance. Results indicated that faculty participation had increased over the past thirty years in all fifteen decision-making categories evaluated. Faculty control and authority grew most significantly in the area of faculty status, setting the size of disciplines, appointment of academic deans and department heads and deciding on the authority and membership of faculty governance agencies. Faculty influence remained consistent and high in the areas of academic operation, planning and policy over the thirty-year time span. As a result of this comparison, Kaplan concluded that faculty appeared to have a healthy, valued and significant role in governance at many institutions.

In an effort to more clearly delineate the functions of academic senates, Minor (2003) developed a conceptual framework in which to view senates. The four models proposed by Minor are a result of a national survey of 150 doctoral institutions, 302 master's institutions and 311 baccalaureate institutions. The sample represented approximately 55% of all institutions within each Carnegie classification (Carnegie Classification of Higher Education Institutions, 2000) and was consistent with the public/private ratio in each institutional sector. A 35 item Web-based survey was developed and five individuals from each institution, including the chief academic officer, faculty senate president and three department chairs, were asked to complete it. Using an analysis of variance, Minor identified the five strongest predictors of senate effectiveness and from those factors developed the four models presented below.

A faculty senate acting in a *traditional* manner would "function primarily to preserve and represent the interest of the faculty during decision-making processes" (Minor, 2003, p. 964). The traditional senate has decision-making authority over areas deemed to be in the faculty domain, such as curriculum, program requirements and faculty tenure and promotion. In all other areas, they provide recommendations to the administration. Generally, a traditional senate is not viewed as an integrated partner in institutional governance, but rather representative of the interests of faculty.

The *influential* model of a senate exercises decision-making authority in the same areas as the traditional senate, but also has influence on some nonacademic issues such as budget, athletics, and development. The influential senate, according to Minor, "is assertive and takes initiative on issues that extend beyond faculty matters to those that

concern the entire institution" (2003, p. 964). This senate has the ability to create change and is an integrated governing body of the institution.

Minor (2003) described the third type of senate as *dormant.* These senates are inactive and largely ceremonial in function. Dormant senates do not play a role in decision-making, but do fulfill other latent functions that are important for faculty. The last type of senate described by Minor is called the *cultural* senate. In this structure, decision-making is influenced by changing cultural dynamics that are not controlled by the formal structure of the senate, but rather by informal processes such as deals, personalities, or social interactions/connections.

Effectiveness of Academic Senates

Despite the extensive rhetoric supporting the concept of academic senates as essential to the functioning of higher education there is little empirical evidence that documents what constitutes effective shared governance systems. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Report (1983) pointed out that there is a lack of consistency in perceived objectives between the agenda of faculty senates and the problems confronted by many institutions. This mismatch impacts on the perceived effectiveness of shared governance and on institutional mission.

Lee (1991) noted that faculty as well as administrators are dissatisfied with their involvement in academic governance. The CHEPA Study (Tierney & Minor, 2003) confirmed Lee's earlier conclusion. In this study, faculty reported dissatisfaction with faculty senates with 22 percent of respondents noting that the senate was not an important

governing body and 43 percent of institutions surveyed reporting that involvement in the senate was not highly valued.

In a case study of governance systems at eight institutions, Lee (1991) concluded that three related factors contributed to the perceived effectiveness of an academic senate: structure, the cultural context in which the governance system operated and the interaction between the faculty governance structure and the administration. The structures of senates having a large number of non-faculty members were viewed as being less effective than those senates having faculty dominated or all faculty membership. Further, the larger the size of the senate the less perceived efficiency was noted by respondents in this study. In addition, an executive committee of the senate was deemed preferable to administrators handling issues of setting agendas and organizing committees.

Cultural issues of particular institutions were also seen as significantly impacting on the efficiency of the shared governance structure. The governance history of an institution, faculty attitudes toward the senate, and the quality of faculty who choose to participate were all elements that appeared to influence a senate's effectiveness (Lee, 1991). Faculty participation was strongly linked to perceived legitimacy of decision-making (Minor, 2003; Mortimer, Gunne & Leslie 1976) and thus a perception of senate effectiveness.

The third element of academic senates that Lee (1991) found important to perceived effectiveness was the attitude of the president and/or provost toward the governance system. At institutions where academic senates were viewed as effective,

there was a "routinized, formal relationship between faculty governance leaders and administration" (p. 46).

Minor (2003) researched existing concepts of effective faculty participation in governance and found it difficult to identify criteria that spoke to effective senates because of the variability of models and subjective interpretations of the term "effective." He concluded, "the question of how to define an effective senate remains inadequately addressed" (p. 962). In an attempt to identify what constitutes a *perception* of an effective senate Minor surveyed more that 3500 participants from 763 institutions. Information was gathered on various structural, cultural, and functional aspects of senates. Minor identified fourteen criteria subjects perceived were related to senate effectiveness. Using three regression models he attempted to predict which of these variables predicted senate effectiveness. In the first model, Minor looked at cultural measures such as trust, communication, interest in the senate, involvement in the senate and the importance of shared governance in the institution, as predictors of effectiveness. The second model measured faculty participation in decision-making pertaining to departmental, administrative and ad hoc committees. The third model considered areas of faculty influence such as educational policies, curriculum, promotion and tenure, selection and evaluation of president and provost, strategic and budget priorities. Minor found that the five strongest predictors of senate effectiveness in his study across the three models were (a) high levels of faculty involvement in the senate, (b) high levels of faculty interest in senate activity, (c) faculty influence over tenure and promotion issues, (d) significant influence in the selection of the provost and president, and (e) influence in setting strategic and budget priorities.

In an extensive review of academic governance, Baldridge and Kemerer (1976) and Baldridge (1982) concluded that except for a small number of institutions with successful shared governance models in place, academic senates were not effective. They asserted that the weakness of senates was a major influence in bringing about collective bargaining. Operating on delegated authority from the governing board or president and depending on institutional appropriations and staffing makes it difficult for senates to advance independent agendas as well as implement decisions that lack administrative support.

Birnbaum (1991) presented further information regarding the manifest functions of academic senates, suggesting that those functions are not being adequately performed. Using the three traditional models of the university as a bureaucracy, a political system and a collegium, he asserted that academic senates have a range of activities and outcomes as a part of their functions. However, the extent to which academic senates have been a useful mechanism for faculty participation and influence suggests that their manifest functions are not being fulfilled. Birnbaum (1991) posited that academic senates have survived in spite of their inadequacies because they fulfill other latent functions such as symbolic importance, status provider, decision ambiguity, attention cue, personnel screening, organizational conservator, ritual and pastime observer, and scapegoat.

Academic senates survive because they are generally accepted as an essential characteristic of mainstream colleges and universities (Birnbaum, 1991). Senates maintain the concept of shared governance, which is widely supported by administrators, faculty and senate leaders (Tierney & Minor, 2003). However, as pointed out through the

CHEPA Study (Tierney & Minor), there are disparate definitions of the concept of "shared governance." It is those multiple interpretations of shared governance and who retains decision-making authority that make it difficult to define effectiveness (Minor, 2004). Forty-seven percent of the respondents in the CHEPA study defined shared governance as a fully collaborative decision-making model. A consultative decision-making model where faculty opinion and advice is sought but decision-making is controlled by administration was described by 27% of the constituents poled as a definition of shared governance. Twenty-six percent of respondents interpreted shared governance as a distributed decision-making model where different groups make decisions on particular issues.

The timing of decisions through an academic senate process has been identified as a concern by a number of authors (Birnbaum, 1991; Gerber, 1997; Miller, 1998; Tierney, 1999) and suggests that academic senates are slow to make decisions and take action on issues. This indecisiveness may be a latent function of the senate and makes it possible for many problems referred to it to resolve over time with no intervention (Birnbaum, 1991). Senates also function to provide information to administrators regarding the importance of particular items, establishing a system of prioritization (Birnbaum, 1991).

The research reviewed on academic senate function and effectiveness is deficient in defining what factors affect the role of senates in the governance of institutions (Minor, 2003). The literature that is available is dated, deals primarily with senate structure, lacks conceptual or theoretical frameworks when discussing senate effectiveness and provides little or no information on the impact of collective bargaining on this governance organization. Minor (2003) calls for more research on senates,

stating, "To a large extent, senates remain understudied" (p. 975). More specifically, Minor encourages additional research that looks at the "known challenges that impede senate effectiveness" (p. 975).

Faculty Collective Bargaining

A recurring theme in the recent literature reviewed is a question regarding the influence of unions on shared governance (Ehrenberg, Klaff, Kezsbom, & Nagowski, 2004; Kaplan, 2004). The history of collective bargaining in institutions of higher education is a recent one but may represent one of the most significant changes in the landscape of American higher education (Birnbaum & Inman, 1984). This alteration in the way some universities and colleges "conduct business" requires a basic understanding of the history of unionization and what precipitated the advent of collective bargaining on college campuses.

The Stanford Project on Academic Governance (1973) looked at the reasons why collective bargaining entered traditional colleges and universities. What the study found was that wages, benefits and job security ranked as the most important causes for unionization by all respondents. But another factor that may have contributed to the increase in unions at some institutions was the role of the faculty senate. Baldridge and Kemerer (1974) presented a number of case studies and offered different views of the role of academic senates in the unionization of college campuses. In some cases the authors indicated that weak academic senates were responsible for the appearance of a union, in other institutions unions and senates were initiated at the same time, and yet in other cases strong senates with established directives were maintained while unions were

started to deal with the economic issues of the faculty. This diversity speaks to the impact of institutional culture and history on the governance patterns of colleges and universities. What is clear from the literature is that unions emerged because faculty were faced with issues that compromised their professionalism, power, and economic base (Raelin, 1989) and that these issues were directly related to governance.

The first collective bargaining agreements in higher education institutions were reached in the late 1960s (Cameron, 1982). Legislative actions that followed in the 1970s enabled the increase of unions or labor organizations for public employees. The option to unionize is largely a public sector phenomenon with about 38 percent of full time faculty in public colleges and universities covered by collective bargaining agreements versus 6 percent in the private sector (Ehrenberg et al., 2004). Faculty in private institutions were restricted from forming labor organizations as a result of a Supreme Court decision made in 1980 (National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) versus Yeshiva). The Court ruled that faculty were considered managers and thus ineligible to bargain collectively with universities (Ali & Karim, 1992). In addition to differences by control, faculty involvement in unions appears to differ by type of institution with two-year colleges, which are typically public, unionized at a higher percentage (40%) than Liberal Arts I institutions, which are typically private (3%) (Ehrenberg et al).

Unions represent in a formal manner the entire faculty at an institution, which is a significant departure from the traditional individualistic practices that are a part of academia (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975). Charles Rehmus (1973) defined three essential conditions necessary in a union: (a) the assumption of conflict between the employee and employer; (b) the acknowledgement by the employee group that the union is their

exclusive representative to administration; and (c) the fair representation of all employees. By focusing on the "whole" in contrast to the "individual", unions promote standardization and uniformity, principles not consistent with the values of individual achievement and responsibility usually associated with faculty professionalism (Raelin, 1989).

In addition to the concern regarding the erosion of faculty professionalism, the introduction of unions to the academy appears to have impacted institutional relationships, authority structures, and communication patterns (Birnbaum & Inman, 1984). Birnbaum and Inman point out through their review of the literature that collective bargaining has been viewed as eroding academic values, altering institutional missions and goals and making institutional change and innovation difficult. In addition, they noted that as organizational effectiveness decreases, collegial practices are threatened and disagreements appear to intensify in unionized institutions especially during difficult economic times.

Currently, there are three major national organizations that represent college and university faculty. They are the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), and the National Education Association (NEA). Each of these organizations presents slightly different philosophies in their approach to representing faculty.

The AAUP, established in 1913, is considered by many to be the leading faculty organization. This association is responsible for publishing numerous policy statements and reports that are widely accepted and provide a basis for faculty and administration relations at many institutions (Garbarino, 1975). The AAUP was slower than other

organizations to become a bargaining agent. Since the mid 1970s, however, the AAUP has identified more than 70 chapters and affiliates and serves as the faculty collective bargaining representative, primarily in public institutions (AAUP, 2004). The AAUP views collective bargaining as an "effective instrument" for protecting academic freedom, resolving grievances, promoting the economic well being of faculty, and advancing the interests of higher education (AAUP, 2004).

The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) is considered the "pioneer of unionism" representing teachers since 1916 (Garbarino, 1975, p. 92). The AFT is the largest higher education union in the country, bargaining for over 130,000 faculty, professional staff, and graduate student employees (AFT, 2004). Gabarino describes the AFT as "the most militant, more continuously indignant, more ideological, more issue-oriented, more committed to support for groups on the fringes of the professorate...and more committed to joint action with non-teacher union groups" (p. 94). The mission of the AFT higher education department is "to help...affiliates and their members prosper in the face of political, economic and technological forces challenging the most basic assumptions about the union's role on campus" (http://www.aft.org/higher_ed/about.htm. 2004, ¶1).

The National Education Association (NEA), the largest college and university faculty and staff organization in the United States, represents approximately 115,000 higher education personnel (NEA, 2004). The NEA began as a professional association in 1870 and in the 1960s evolved into a labor organization (Garbarino, 1975). The NEA's mission is to "fulfill the promise of a democratic society... promote the cause of quality public education and advance the profession of education; expand the rights and further

the interest of educational employees; and advocate human, civil and economic rights for all" (http://www.nea.org/aboutnea.html 2004, ¶3).

These three national unions all have, as a part of their mission statement or embedded in the objectives of their organization, a commitment to furthering or strengthening shared governance through the efforts of the union. How the unions do this is not entirely clear in the literature. It may be that diverse philosophy and manner in which bargaining agents direct and support collective bargaining at individual institutions influences the union's impact on governance, for example. It could be many other factors as well. Regardless, given their stated missions and objectives, it is apparent that unions consider shared governance something they can influence.

Academic Senates and Unions

Although the literature speaks to the diversity, basic functions and effectiveness of academic senates, it is far more limited, almost non-existent, in its current discussion regarding the relationship between faculty unions and academic senates. The Stanford Project on Academic Governance (SPAG) completed in 1974 is the only comprehensive research effort that looked at faculty unionization and its impact on governance and decision-making in higher education (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975). The authors sought "to alert those in higher education to the relationships and intersections between the union movement and the governance of higher education..." (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975, p. ix,) and concluded from their study that "We really do not have enough experience to predict with great accuracy the long-term impact that unionization would have on traditional faculty senates" (p. 346).

In the thirty years since the SPAG study, there has been a significant increase in faculty covered by collective bargaining agreements but limited updated information on the impact of unionization on governance. Currently, there are 922 public and 85 private campuses in the United States that have unions, representing over 35 % of full-time faculty in this country (Hemmasi & Graf, 1993). The role of collective bargaining in higher education is likely to increase in the future according to Ehrenberg et al. (2004) who predict increases in private sector faculty labor organizations. Recent discussions with the NLRB regarding the Yeshiva decision may not apply to all private-sector faculty, non faculty and graduate assistant unions. According to The Survey on Higher Education Governance since 1990 "unionization has persisted at a steady but low annual rate" (Kaplan, 2004, p. 177).

In consideration of the SPAG study conclusions and the documented increase in unions, it is interesting to note that very few research articles reviewed on shared governance mention the influence of faculty unionization on academic senates. In an effort to try and understand this relationship, Lee (1982) looked at collective bargaining contracts at 58 institutions to determine if the agreements contained protection for the faculty senate. Results of this contract analysis were used to collect more specific governance information from eight institutions. What Lee found was that although "senate and union responsibilities were carefully delineated and kept separate" (p. 81) union leaders were active in the non union part of institutional governance and therefore could "monitor and influence decisions without appearing to involve the unions as an "external" influence" (p. 81). Lee viewed faculty as "sitting on both ends of the bargaining table" (p. 84) and questioned why "faculty who appear to participate actively

in "managerial" policy-making should be permitted to bargain collectively over terms and conditions of employment" (p. 84). Lee's study, done over twenty years ago, drew into question the influence of unions on the governance of colleges and universities.

No other studies regarding governance were discovered that looked at this issue. Even the collegiate union literature provided no mention of unions and their influence on faculty senates (Hemmasi & Graf, 1993). Ali and Karin (1992) pointed out that most findings about the influence of unionization on academic issues have been casually mentioned in the literature and were related to class size, academic calendar, workload, and class schedules.

The 2001 Survey of Higher Education Governance (Kaplan, 2004), the only comprehensive study done in 30 years that looked at faculty participation in governance provided no information regarding the perceived or direct influence of collective bargaining on institutional decision making. This survey listed every constituent group, including students, who may exercise influence in decision-making but did not list unions. With the exception of providing a percentage of institutions in the study that had unionized faculty (15.9%) the only other mention of unions was in reference to survey results noting that 90% of all unionized institutions allowed union leaders to serve in the senate.

The most current information available on academic senates was recently published in *Challenges for Governance: A National Report* by the Center for Higher Education Policy Analysis (CHEPA) (2003). Institutions with and without collective bargaining were sampled on a number of issues. The results of the survey suggested that colleges with unions and those without had very little difference in their responses

regarding faculty influence over personnel policies, trust in the administration, and rating the importance of shared governance. Although individuals were surveyed on a number of other topics including their perceptions of faculty influence with various domains of decision-making, the report did not provide a breakdown of unionized and non-unionized institutions regarding these issues.

A subsequent paper based on the CHEPA survey looked at predictors of senate effectiveness (Minor, 2003). Minor found that high levels of faculty involvement in the senate and influence in decision-making were significant predictors of a senate's effectiveness. Although collective bargaining was not mentioned in this article, Minor suggested that traditional senates, which were the largest percent of the sampled institutions, act as associations that represent the faculty, "rather than integrated partners in campus governance" (p. 974), a concept consistent with the culture of unionization. In a later article on faculty senates, Minor (2004) advocated research on alternative means by which faculty could be involved in campus decision making, one of which was through unions. He asserted that collective bargaining along with other forms of faculty participation might impact the role of senates but "enhance faculty participation by providing an opportunity for involvement or serve as a contending voice that diminishes the effect of a senate" (p. 360). Consistent with this thought, Ehrenberg et al. (2004) encouraged researchers to "investigate the hypothesis that the presence of a faculty union may actually improve the functioning of systems of shared governance, at least with respect to economic issues" (p. 213).

Theoretical Framework

Organizational charts exist at every institution of higher education and typically depict on paper the hierarchical decision making structure of the organization. This rational model of decision-making as described by Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker and Riley, (1977) suggests that decisions are made through a well-defined and systematic process. In addition to these organizational charts, however, many colleges and universities operating under the concept of shared governance often delineate even further the responsibilities for particular decisions to other campus constituents such as the academic senate, senior staff, students, and often the union. Although these lines of responsibility are not captured on the organizational chart, they are a part of the operation of the institution and as Baldridge et al. suggest, institutional structures impact and direct political efforts that are focused on policy decisions. Policy is essential to guiding an institution in setting goals and developing strategies for achieving those objectives. Influencing policy thus becomes critical to supporting the interests of various groups within the institution.

It is this influence that Morgan (1997) describes as the "wheeling and dealing, negotiation and other processes of coalition building and mutual influence that shape so much of organizational life" (p. 160). Morgan proposes that it is the delicate interplay of the relationships between the interests, conflicts, and power in an organization that sets the stage for both visible and obvious political ploys as well as the subtle, behind the scene politics. Scarce resources will exacerbate this political power, and institutional goals and strategies will be set through an ongoing process of negotiation, bargaining and

jockeying for position among key constituents in the organization (Bolman & Deal, 1997).

The fundamental assumption in the political framework is that organizations are comprised of coalitions of interest groups in which decisions are made based upon influence, power and conflict. Morgan (1997) suggests that there are fourteen sources of power within an organization that afford individuals or groups with strategies to support their agendas as well as deal with conflict in the organization. They are: (a) formal authority, (b) control of scarce resources, (c) use of organizational structure, rules, and regulations, (d) control of decision processes, (e) control of knowledge and information, (f) control of boundaries, (g) ability to cope with uncertainty, (h) control of technology, (i) interpersonal alliances, networks and control of the informal organization, (j) control of counter organizations, (k) symbolism and management of meaning, (l) gender and the management of gender relations, (m) structural factors that define the stage of action and (n) the power one already has (p. 171).

In review of these power sources, it is immediately evident that academic senates and faculty unions by nature of their roles and responsibilities, as described earlier, may have significant influence and power in colleges and universities. Senates are assigned authority for curricular, admission and academic policies, while unions have contracted authority for issues regarding faculty job rights and other matters relating to faculty welfare. Unions bargain to increase faculty salaries and benefits thus impacting on the resources of an institution, while senates impact resources of the institution through admission policies, and new program development. Faculty involved in senate and union activities may use rules and regulations to their benefit to slow down the decision-making

processes or exercise influence in the outcomes of decisions that may directly impact faculty. These few examples illustrate some of the many political forms of behaviors that senates and unions may individually demonstrate.

When one considers that unions and senates are both faculty based, the dynamic of influence and power in an institution is compounded. Unions represent a countervailing power, an attempt to act as a check on the management of an institution (Morgan, 1997). Conversely, the administration and the board of trustees delegate the senate's powers. Does the union "check" on the institution extend to influencing academic senate activities and decisions? The political model provides an analytical framework for supporting this research proposal and assists the researcher in understanding the ways in which unions exert their influence on academic senates.

Summary

In summary, the literature over the past 30 years regarding academic senates and collective bargaining has been scarce, conflicted, and sporadic. In the 1970s a major study was undertaken and numerous books, papers and reports were written examining unionization and its impact on institutional governance. The next surge of research did not follow until the 1990s when shared governance structures for faculty participation were investigated. In the latter studies, there was no mention of unionization as a variable in academic senate function and effectiveness. In fact, collective bargaining was hardly mentioned in the governance literature. Almost fifteen years have passed since any significant research on academic senates has been published. The CHEPA (2003) study, as well as Minor's research (2004), constitutes the most current view of academic senate

effectiveness but only includes some mention of collective bargaining in the analysis of data.

The limited research on the impact of faculty unions on governance appears inconsistent with the increase in labor organizations on college campuses and the implied reasons for their growth. The literature is mixed in its assessment of why collective bargaining entered higher education and the role of unions in governance. Raelin (1989) attributes the escalation of collective bargaining to eroding faculty governance systems. Consistent with this theme, Duderstadt (1998) warns that faculty will turn to unionization more often if universities cannot make their governance procedures work more efficiently. Poorly functioning faculty governance systems appear to engender the development of unions. Conversely, others suggest unions have caused "adversarial relationships that strained governance" (Schuster, Smith, Corak, & Yamada, 1994, p. 16) and that "collective bargaining practices...could pose a threat to the concept of "shared governance" (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975, p. 25). Still others purport that collective bargaining acts as a protector of traditional academic governance procedures (Polishook & Nielson, 1989; Ramo, 1998). Schuster (1994) and Miller (1989) point out that unions have not replaced traditional academic senates but that unions often stimulate more effective faculty senates once it becomes clear that the union and the senate serve different but compatible purposes. Richardson (1999) referred to the interplay between institutional governance and unions as cooperative decision-making in academe that is a recognized international standard of practice.

As early as 1975, Gabarino concluded that collective bargaining by faculty labor organizations was a form of university governance, "possibly the form of governance of

the future...it is a new form that is a response to...a failure of the traditional forms of governance to adapt successfully to new problems" (p. 28). In contrast, the Association of Governing Boards through their statement on institutional governance (1999) perceived collective bargaining to be detrimental to the long-term strength of institutions of higher education (Richardson, 1999). All of these views suggest a relationship of influence, albeit divergent, between unions and governance structures, yet few of these statements are supported by any research. With the exception of the SPAG study (1974) and elements of the CHEPA Report (Tierney & Minor, 2003) these views are little more than rhetoric that espouses post hoc theoretical explanations of these observed relationships.

Very few research articles dealing with academic senates or faculty governance mention collective bargaining. By lack of mention, the two appear to be disassociated with each other, yet the facts support their co-existence at hundreds of colleges and universities. Ehrenberg et al. (2004) point out that the influence of faculty unions on shared governance is one question that has yet to be addressed by researchers. Is the scarcity of investigations in this area reflective of the fact that researchers perceive unions and faculty senates to function completely separate with limited influence on each other? Or, perhaps academic senates and unions once perceived as having "dual track" functions have blurred the lines of responsibility sufficiently so that both are now a part of institutional governance.

What is suggested by the current literature is a "gentle" implication that faculty unions may actually be a part of the governance structure of institutions, providing faculty with an alternative means of participation in addition to the academic senate.

Examining the influence of faculty unions on academic senates provides additional insight into the governance of institutions with collective bargaining.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The primary research question for this study asked: How do faculty unions influence academic senates? By identifying the formal and informal influences that faculty unions have on senates this study allows for a deeper understanding of the relationship of these two groups. An informal observation of academic senate activities have spurred this researcher's interest in this area and have prompted me to seek additional information on the influence of faculty unions on academic senates. Further, the dearth of information in the literature regarding this relationship provides limited explication.

This study used qualitative inquiry as its primary research methodology. Previous research on senates and unions has not employed a qualitative approach. The primary research style used in past studies has been survey based, providing quantitative descriptions of senate size, structure, functions, and judgments of effectiveness. Information relative to the relationship between the senate and union has not been explored. The qualitative paradigm was selected because it focuses on understanding the meanings embedded in people's experiences (Merriam, 1998). This type of inquiry is particularly appropriate for a study of this nature because it allows for the exploration of the informants' perceptions, experiences, and opinions (Miles & Huberman, 1994) regarding academic senates and the influence of unions on them. Qualitative methodology can enhance the understanding of the relationship, both formal and

informal, between senates and unions by delving in to the complexities and processes related to this association (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Through this approach, it is anticipated that new information can be obtained that will be relevant to the governance of institutions.

Understanding the relationship between faculty unions and senates requires gathering information and perceptions from a cross-section of institutional players who are familiar and interact daily with both the academic senate and faculty union. The following section includes a discussion of site and participant selection, the choice of data gathering methods, and data analysis procedures.

Research Site and Participants

Purposeful sampling (Patton, 1990) was used to identify two institutions for this study. Purposeful sampling allowed the researcher to identify a small number of participants "who provide representative pictures or aspects of information or knowledge distributed within the study population" (Kuzel, 1992, p. 79). Purposeful sampling is based on the premise that the researcher "wants to discover, understand and gain insight and therefore must select a sample from which the most can be learned" (Merriam, 1998, p. 61).

The criteria that guided the site selection in this study centered on identifying public, four-year institutions within the same state that have the same Carnegie Classification and union bargaining agent as well as a senate. Identifying universities with these specific criteria provided the examiner with similar sites that could provide information-rich data in regard to the relationship between senates and unions. By

designating the above criteria, variability was minimized in regard to the impact of the size and mission of the institution, source of funding, and bargaining agent.

In order to select the sites for this investigation, higher education institutions having faculty collective bargaining in a midwestern state were initially identified. Of the 15 unionized four-year institutions listed, all non-public colleges and universities were eliminated. The nine remaining institutions were classified according to their faculty union bargaining agent. An Internet search was conducted of those universities to identify if they had a faculty or academic senate and to obtain their Carnegie Classification. Four institutions were initially identified, providing two matched pairs. Each pair had the same bargaining agent, Carnegie Classification and a senate. These institutions met the criteria for inclusion in this study, however after additional investigation it was noted that one of the paired institutions was in an "unstable" situation in regard to a presidential search and recent administrative and union turmoil. Studying that institution may not have provided a "normalized" view of senate and union relationships centered on answering the question, how do faculty unions influence academic senates? The other paired institutions were selected.

Pseudonyms have been assigned to the institutions identified for inclusion in this study to protect confidentiality. Homestead University and Currier University were selected as the research sites for this study. Both institutions have the same Carnegie Classification, Doctoral/Research Universities – Extensive. The Carnegie Classification (2005) recognizes all colleges and universities in the United States that are degree granting and accredited by an agency recognized by the Department of Education. A Doctoral/Research – Extensive classification describes an institution that has a number of

bachelor level programs and is committed to graduate education. According to the Carnegie Foundation (2005) these institutions award five or more doctoral degrees per year across at least fifteen disciplines. Using the Carnegie Classification provided the examiner with a method that allowed for some consistency in comparison between institutions since the classification system takes into account numerous demographic and academic characteristics of the institution.

The research institutions also had the same representative for faculty collective bargaining, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). General information regarding the AAUP is provided in Chapter II and the history of the AAUP specific to the subject institutions is discussed in Chapter IV, Case Descriptions. Finally, the site institutions had a faculty or academic senate, which at these universities was a mixed senate, including both faculty and administrators.

Participants identified for interview at each of the two institutions were selected based on the assumption they were well suited to speak to the issues under analysis. The selection of the individuals used in this research allowed for union and non-unionized individuals to be a part of this study and represented both faculty and non-faculty views. The examiner, following a thorough review of senate membership lists, senate minutes, union newsletters, union and senate committee/council listings, and personal contacts with colleagues, identified participants for inclusion in this study. The final participants included six individuals at each institution knowledgeable of both academic senate and union activities. These included the chair/president of the academic senate, the president/chair of the faculty union/association, two senior administrators involved in senate/union activities and two regular faculty members who were a part of the faculty

senate. At Homestead University eight individuals were interviewed. Two individuals from this group were eliminated from the study because they could not provide rich narrative or refused to answer the questions presented by the examiner. One of the eliminated participants was a faculty member, and the other, an administrator. All six participants initially selected at Currier were interviewed.

Subjects at both institutions appeared to have a history of involvement in governance activities. The individuals selected for interview, demonstrated knowledge of institutional history, the academic senate, the bargaining contract, and current union issues. The participants from Homestead University consisted of 4 female and 2 males who reported working for that university an average of 17 years (median 17 years), and a range of 9-28 years of employment. Similarly, Currier University participants also noted a long tenure at that institution, averaging 26 years with a range of 4 to 46 years of employment (median 31 years). Four male and 2 female subjects were interviewed at Currier.

Procedures and Data Collection

A case study approach was employed in this study. Using this strategy provided the researcher with a comprehensive picture of unions and senates at two institutions of higher education. The case study approach allowed for "immersion in the setting" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 61) and focused on the groups involved. The case study approach, although exploratory in nature, was conducted within a prescribed framework (Peterson & Spencer, 2002). Data collection involved a combination of methods including historical and document review, and interviews with institutional

representatives. Gathering data from a number of sources assured that variations would be observed as well as corroboration provided of the perceptions of those interviewed (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). These strategies were used to obtain a comprehensive, detailed account of various institutional issues related to the research question.

Document Review

The intent of the document review was twofold. One, it allowed the researcher to gather information relative to the history and context of the union and senate within the specific institution. Examination of relevant documents allowed for "an unobtrusive method, rich in portraying the values and beliefs of participants in the setting" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 116). Secondly, the document review was used to supplement interviews and assist the researcher in reconstructing specific incidents or actions reported by subjects. The document review provided for a deeper understanding of participant narratives. Although most of the documents were examined prior to the interviews, specific institutional, senate and union documents were added and reviewed through out this study based on the input and/or recommendation of subjects. Documents that were reviewed included the following:

1. Current collective bargaining agreements
2. Union constitutions and bylaws
3. Senate constitutions and bylaws
4. Senate memorandums of understanding/action
5. Senate and union membership and committee/council lists
6. Senate minutes for the 2004-2005 academic year

7. Union newsletters for the 2004-2005 academic year
8. Institutional policies
9. Institutional history documents

Documents were obtained through the Internet, requested directly from participants, or acquired by the examiner through the senate or union office. The intent of the document analysis was not to quantify information, but rather to "document and understand the communication of meaning, as well as to verify theoretical relationships" (Merriam, 1998, p. 123). The information obtained from the document review was used to supplement the findings of this study.

Interviews

Phenomenological interviewing was the primary data collection technique in this study. The purpose of phenomenological interviewing is "to describe the meaning of a concept or phenomenon that several individuals share" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 112). The assumption related to this style of interviewing is that shared experiences have meaning and structure and can be described in a narrative form. According to Seidman (1998), the basis of interviewing "is an interest in understanding the experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience" (p.3).

Direct contact via e-mail was made with selected participants by the examiner to set interview dates. All participants were sent the approved consent form prior to the interview date. A signed consent form was verified and on file before the actual interview began. Confidentiality of subjects was maintained. Names of participants were

not disclosed to other participants in the study or other individuals at the research sites. Participants were asked if they had any questions prior to the start of the actual interview. They were advised that the audio recorders could be paused or turned off at any time during the interview at their request.

The interviews in this study entailed face-to-face individually scheduled meetings with designated institutional, senate or union representatives. Interviews were done in the person's office, or a preferred meeting place designated by the individual. Interviews ranged from 37 to 70 minutes with the average interview lasting 53 minutes. All interviews were audio tape-recorded with the written permission of the subject using a digital recording device and associated directional microphone, as well as a traditional analog recorder for back-up capability. Appendix A contains a copy of the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (UCRIS) consent form from this study.

Interviews at each institution were captured during the summer months commencing after spring semester and concluding before the beginning of fall classes. This timing allowed interviewees to reflect on senate and union activities from the past academic year and provided a period of time during which there were no active senate or union activities in process. The examiner spent three days at each institution. Interviews at Homestead University were completed before those at Currier University were scheduled.

A semi-structured open-ended interview protocol was used to guide the data collection process. Merriam (1998) describes this type of interview as a "mix of more and less-structured questions" (p. 73). Although specific information was desired of each

participant, constituting the structured part of the interview, the majority of the interview was guided by a list of questions that were not presented in any particular order but rather flowed and related to the respondent's narrative (Merriam).

The interview protocol consisted of seven questions (Appendix B) with each followed by one or more probes. The questions were developed based on a modification of Seidman's (1998) three in-depth interview series. Although three separate interviews were not done with subjects, the structure of the questions developed remained consistent with a phenomenological based interviewing approach. Questions allowed participants to reconstruct and reflect upon their experiences with academic senates and unions. Probing past and present experiences related to academic senates and unions allowed the examiner to explore participants' responses and then build upon those responses to examine the individual's essential experience with the relationship between these two entities. According to Seidman, "The combination of exploring the past to clarify the events that led participants to where they are now, and describing the concrete details of their present experience, establishes conditions for reflecting upon what they are now doing in their lives" (p. 12).

Data Analysis Procedures

Following each visit to the individual research site, the examiner prepared a verbatim transcript of all interviews. To insure confidentiality in the dissemination of findings, individual responses are reported in the aggregate. Pseudonyms have also been assigned to the universities. Thus, a faculty member from the first institution interviewed

would be referred to as Homestead F1. Individuals are not identified by the particular position they hold in the university, further gender has been scrambled.

Data analysis was done using a coding strategy. The interview transcripts were analyzed and collapsed into smaller pieces of data or incidents (Dey, 1999). This process required the careful inspection of the words used by the participants to describe or convey their experiences, understandings, and interpretations. A constant comparative method of data analysis was used to create categories and subcategories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This method allowed for comparison of incidents, remarks, stories, etc. from one set of data with another or within the same set of data (Merriam, 1998). These units of data (incidents) were then sorted into categories or patterns and then themes (Marshall & Rossman, 1989).

Delimitations and Limitations

One of the delimitations of this research design was the selection of only two institutions of higher education and the use of 12 participants in this study. In an attempt to reduce variability the two institutions selected had the same Carnegie Classification and collective bargaining agent, as well as a senate. Within each of those universities six individuals were contacted. The assumption was that these faculty and administrators would have institutional memory and knowledge of academic senate and union issues at their institution and would be able to respond openly and insightfully regarding the relationship of the senate and union at their university.

Purposive sampling was used to identify the institutions as well as the participants in this study. Purposeful sampling decreases the generalizability of the findings. This

study will not be generalizable to all academic institutions having a faculty union and a senate.

Epoche

Consistent with a phenomenological approach and prior to initiating this research, the examiner presents a full description of her experiences related to academic senates and unions. Through this process of self-reflection this researcher hoped to gain clarity from her preconceptions, thus providing a more objective view of the analysis.

For the past thirty years I have worked in a university environment, initially as a non-tenured administrative/professional member in a department, then as an administrator in a college. Although my position supports and interacts with the academic senate on such issues as curriculum and committee nominations, I have never been a member of this group, only an observer. I attend senate meetings occasionally when information relevant to my college is discussed or there are significant issues addressed by this body that impact university policies or processes.

My experiences with the faculty union at my institution are confined to understanding and supporting the faculty contract. I was never a member of the bargaining group. Although I interact on a weekly level with Faculty Personnel Services to clarify workload, salary, hiring, and promotion issues for faculty, and respond to grievances filed by faculty members, I have limited interaction with union officials. I am aware of union activities through colleagues in the institution and recognize that the union at my institution is very vocal and influential on all matters related to faculty.

What prompted my interest in academic senate and union relationships was an observation that faculty union officers on my campus were heavily involved in academic senate activities. These faculty leaders appeared to have a strong and influential voice in both groups. The other issue that I felt was interesting was the apparent confusion that faculty often had regarding which group (union or senate) was responsible for particular issues. It appeared that there was little perceived delineation between the union and the senate by faculty and administrators.

CHAPTER IV

CASE DESCRIPTIONS

Introduction

Two universities within a midwestern state were identified as case study sites to investigate the relationship between senates and unions. Throughout this dissertation pseudonyms are used when referring to those institutions. Homestead University and Currier University are both public, four-year institutions with the same Carnegie Classification, having an academic/faculty senate, and the same collective bargaining agent. A more complete description of each institution follows, and is based on an extensive document review, and supplemented through participant interviews.

Homestead University

Homestead University, located in a midsize town in a primarily rural setting was founded in the early 1900s. It was granted constitutional autonomy with its own Board of Trustees in the early1960s. Homestead is Carnegie classified as a Doctoral/Research Extensive institution, providing undergraduate and graduate instruction as well as significant research activity. Enrollment at this public institution exceeds 25,000 students with nearly 1000 full-time faculty supporting teaching and learning.

The Faculty Senate at Homestead

The senate at Homestead is referred to as a "faculty senate" and was established in the late 1950s. Faculty membership in the senate consists of faculty representatives from individual departments in addition to representatives-at-large voted on by the eligible faculty of the institution. Faculty is broadly defined at Homestead as Board of Trustee appointed personnel with the academic rank of instructor or higher, excluding adjunct faculty.

The collective bargaining contract at this university defines faculty a bit more specifically distinguishing between faculty that are appointed to university positions, adjunct faculty, visiting professors and part-time instructors, and faculty traditionally ranked, which includes faculty ranked as instructor, assistant professor, associate professor or professor. Significant in this contract is the inclusion of employees referred to as faculty specialists. The faculty contract states that persons holding the appointment of faculty specialist shall hold rank and be fully participating members in the academic community. Thus, individuals whose responsibilities may include teaching or non-teaching duties, and activities more commonly associated with administrative rather than faculty positions are represented in this bargaining unit appointment category and are eligible for election to the senate through their academic department, service unit, or the general election of members- at- large.

Officers of the administration are appointed by the president to participate and have all the same rights as faculty with the exception of holding office in the senate. The president and provost of the institution hold ex-officio membership in the senate. Of the eighty-one voting members of the senate, only four are administrative appointees. The

executive board of the senate consists of the officers of the senate, which include the president, vice president, three directors and the immediate past president. The executive board serves as the liaison with the administration. The president of the senate meets monthly with the provost and president of the institution.

The collective bargaining contract altered the definition of faculty at Homestead University three years ago and in doing so also changed the membership of the senate. The faculty senate at Homestead is now a mixture of traditional faculty from academic departments whose primary responsibilities include teaching, research and service as well as faculty specialists whose responsibilities cover a wide range of activities that may include teaching, clinical work, planning, marketing and recruiting and may not be associated with an academic department. This senate would be classified as a mixed senate since it has both faculty and administrators represented. Interestingly, department chairs are considered faculty for the purpose of senate membership but administrators according to the collective bargaining contract.

The faculty senate at Homestead defines as its charge, sharing in the governance of the institution by taking an advisory role on matters of concern to the university. Through a system of councils and committees, the senate has the authority to review, recommend and provide oversight on policy impacting undergraduate, graduate and international programs and curriculum, research and technology initiatives for the university and issues related to campus planning and financial matters. Decisions made however, are subject to the approval of the president of the university.

In matters specific to the welfare of the faculty, the senate constitution states it shall represent the faculty on matters affecting the welfare of the faculty, however, both

the senate constitution and bylaws limit senate involvement to those areas not reserved by the collective bargaining agreement.

The Union at Homestead

In 1975, Homestead faculty organized and selected the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) as their collective bargaining agent. The first contract was ratified in 1976. The union is an agency shop requiring all faculty and "faculty specialists" to pay either dues or service fees to the Chapter. The union serves over 850 faculty members and 85 faculty specialists. The union at Homestead lists as its objectives the following: "to promote and protect academic freedom, faculty governance and tenure; to advance the standards and ideals of the profession; to advocate for the interests of higher education and the faculty, and to promote and protect a healthy work environment."

As noted earlier, the faculty specialist category is new to the institution within the past three years and includes those individuals who may hold rank and or have administrative duties or teaching duties as a part of their position. The change in definition of faculty through the contract has altered the definition of membership of the senate. By contractually expanding the definition of faculty to be inclusive of clinical specialists, lecturers, student recruiters, etc the union may have significantly impacted the make-up of the senate at this institution.

In review of the faculty contract, the only mention of the senate relates to clarification of union rights in relation to senate activities. A specific article in the

contract speaks to the union as the exclusive bargaining agent for the faculty and contractually limits the institution's involvement with senate communications and activities that are within the scope of the collective bargaining contract. Further, in the event of a dispute between the union and the institution as to the "bargainability" of any senate recommendation, a grievance and appeal to the Employment Relations Office of the state can be made. This article clearly designates the senate as a communication conduit, with protection to debate issues and provide advisory input. The contract specifies that neither the institution nor the union should be bound by any discussion or recommendation made by the senate. The intent of the contract article is clear in that it protects the union and insures that the union is the only entity that speaks officially for the faculty.

The union, and the institution, through its contractual relationship with the union, has defined the role and limitations of the senate. Although the overall tenor of this specific article conveys protectionism of the union rather than support of the senate, the article concludes by clearly mandating release time from regular faculty duties for the president of the senate. One could interpret this article to suggest that the union recognizes the role of the senate in providing guidance on issues of teaching and learning and that in that role they need to be protected and supported. In essence, the union is contractually supporting the existence of the senate, a tenet consistent with the AAUP concept of shared governance (AAUP, 1995).

Currier University

Currier University was formed in the early 1930's, uniting into one institution a number of unrelated colleges and schools. In 1959, Currier was formally chartered by its state. Currier is an urban four-year, doctoral degree granting institution, Carnegie classified as Doctoral-Research Extensive and having an enrollment exceeding 30,000 students. Twenty-five hundred full and part time faculty support the teaching and learning on this campus.

The Academic Senate at Currier University

Currier University's senate was established in 1966 and is comprised of faculty, academic staff, and administrators, all nominated through their respective colleges or units. Referred to as an "academic senate," full-time faculty and academic staff from all schools, colleges, and divisions of the university are eligible for membership (consistent with unit size). In addition, six members-at-large are elected from the eligible full-time faculty and academic staff. Department chairs, although faculty members in the academic senate, are outside of the bargaining agreement and considered administrators by the union contract. This model is similar to Homestead's senate make-up. A total of eighty-one individuals are a part of the senate at Currier. The senate has a number of standing committees, all but two of which have a liaison assigned from the administration, union, and student council. Liaisons have voice but no vote, with the exception of student representatives, who have voice and vote.

The president or provost of the university is the chair of the senate and sits on the Executive Committee along with the president of the senate, and seven other senate representatives. The president of the faculty union is the designated union liaison to this committee and is without a vote. The executive committee has the responsibility of organizing all the standing committees annually and appointing chairs. In addition to the Executive Committee, the academic senate has committees that provide advice and assistance to the university administration in regard to curriculum/instruction, budget, elections, support services, faculty and student affairs, and research.

The academic senate at Currier describes its role as having the authority and responsibility for the review of educational policy as it affects the university community. Further, recommendation of policies affecting faculty rights and responsibilities, faculty welfare and generally accepted principles of academic freedom and tenure, except in those matters subject to collective bargaining are also a part of the "powers and duties" of this senate.

The Union at Currier University

In 1972, the AAUP was certified as the collective bargaining agent for the faculty and academic staff at Currier. In 1999, union members voted to jointly affiliate with the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). Only one contract thus far has been negotiated under both AAUP and AFT. The union is inclusive of both faculty and academic staff, representing over 2000 individuals. Within the last three years, Currier has become an

agency shop, requiring all faculty and academic staff members of the association to either pay dues or pay a fair share agency fee to a university scholarship or research fund.

The Currier faculty contract specifies that the union is the "exclusive collective bargaining representative of faculty and academic staff with regard to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." There was limited mention in the union contract regarding the academic senate. The only direct mention of the senate in the contract was in reference to the selection process for university wide committees. Information relative to governance was specific to departmental activities only. A letter of agreement written numerous years ago and included with the contract alluded to "various consultative bodies" within the university that occasionally considered or discussed matters subject to collective bargaining. Both Currier University as well as the union agreed through this addendum that consultative bodies' consideration of matters subject to collective bargaining does not constitute recommendation or advice to the university. Further, both the union and the institution are bound to notify each other and provide information relative to the proposed consideration as well as contact the consultative body and inform them that they cannot recommend or develop policy on matters subject to collective bargaining.

Institutional Similarities

Although the two institutions selected for study have had very different beginnings, there are numerous similarities that surfaced in regard to their union and senate histories. Both institutions initiated a senate approximately at the same time.

Senate membership was inclusive of both faculty and administrators. Later, a union was established at both universities during a period when academic unions were gaining popularity across the country. Both institutions include non-faculty positions referred to as "faculty specialists" or "academic staff" in their unions. Currier University, because of their history, involved academic staff in the union at its inception, whereas Homestead brought in non-faculty teaching and administration positions much later. Additionally, department chairs, although faculty members, are also considered administrators at both institutions and are not covered by the faculty collective bargaining agreement. Homestead University, although represented by the AAUP, has had under consideration the addition of a second bargaining agent, again paralleling Currier University where both the AAUP and AFT have affiliations.

A review of the senate bylaws for each of these institutions suggests further similarities in committee structure and representation. Both senates have 81 members. The area of greatest disparity is in regard to the structure of their senate committees and councils. Notably, all the senate committees at Currier, except one, have both union and administrative liaisons (voice but no vote) assigned to them including the executive board. Union involvement in senate activities is a part of the structure of Currier's senate. Homestead, on the other hand, does not structure committees to include "official" union and administrative involvement, although many union officers are represented as chairs or members of the committees.

An extensive document analysis including review of institutional polices could not identify an institutional statement on shared governance at either university, nor was a shared governance matrix delineating the responsibilities of various processes/functions

to institutional shareholders available. None of the subjects interviewed could identify those documents or provide direction to the researcher on their availability.

Since unionized faculty are a part of both of these institutions it follows that there are union members in the senate. It is noteworthy to mention, however, that at both Homestead and Currier union officers occupy significant roles in senate leadership. At Currier University, two out of eight elected members of the Executive Board of the Senate are also officers in the faculty union. Although the union president at this institution is ex-officio and liaison to the Executive Board of the senate, the union president is also an elected member of the senate through their home department. Similarly, at Homestead, the president of the union and a member of the union executive committee are members of the senate, one chairing a key senate council, and the other vice chair of another senate council. The union president at Homestead is also a past president of the senate. The immediate past president of the senate, a member of the executive board of the senate, is also a member of the executive board of the union.

Summary

These case descriptions provide background information on the history and context of both research sites. Significant in these case analyses are the parallels noted in the development of both the senate and unions at these institutions. Further, the concepts of a mixed senate, a union inclusive of academic staff, and the co-mingling of union officials in key senate committees demonstrates the similarity of these two institutions.

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to develop a better understanding of the relationship between academic senates and unions. The literature is exceptionally limited in information related to the formal and informal influences that occur between these two groups. Through the use of qualitative inquiry, it was my hope that new information regarding how unions influence academic senates would emerge and provide direction for further research as well as support a redefinition of the meaning of shared governance at unionized institutions.

Two distinct patterns evolved from the analysis of the data in regard to the primary research question, how do faculty unions influence academic senates? The first major pattern that emerged was related to union and senate purview. Participants discussed the limits of authority, responsibility, and intention as they pertained to unions and senates at their institutions. This pattern will be addressed in this chapter under the title, "Union and Senate Purview."

The second distinct pattern that emerged was related to the relationship between the senate and union. Comments represent the perceptions and experiences of the participants regarding the senate and union connection at their institution. Membership in the senate and union, leadership of the union, and influence were three themes identified. Within the senate and union relationship pattern, the concept of shared

governance will also be discussed. This pattern will be addressed in this chapter under the title, "Union and Senate Relationships."

To reveal and discuss the data without compromising the identity of the interviewee, an individual identifier was created for each participant. The first character of the pseudonym identifies the institution, individuals from Homestead University are identified with the H designator and a C notation recognizes those from Currier. The second character relates to the position of the individual either as faculty (F), administrator (A), union president (U), or senate president/chair (S). The third character represents an individual identification number assigned to a particular subject and is specific to only faculty and administrators. To illustrate, HF1 refers to a particular Homestead faculty member, CA1 describes a specific Currier administrator and the designator CU identifies the Currier union president.

As the data unfold, it is important to note some general observations that surfaced during interviews. It was interesting to observe how eager faculty were to share observations and perceptions with me regarding their experiences with both the union and senate at their institution. A great deal of this enthusiasm may have been related to the fact that the faculty interviewed were current, active members of the senate at their institution, many of whom had been involved in senate activities for extended periods of time. Further, by nature of the collective bargaining agreement on their campus, these same individuals were covered by the contract and aware of union issues, leadership, and interactions with the senate. Faculty were frank, and open in their responses. They provided a number of examples to support their views on senate and union relationships. Only one of the faculty members interviewed was currently active in both senate and

union activities, acting as a representative of their department on the senate as well as an officer of the union.

Administrators also provided rich, candid dialogue regarding their senate and union. Three out of four of the administrators interviewed were either currently active in their senate or had served on a senate in the past. In addition, all four administrators had extensive experience working with the faculty union at their institution, either through contract negotiations, grievance issues, or day-to-day concerns.

Both administrators and faculty appeared at ease with the questions and with me. However, throughout the interviews it was evident that many of the faculty and administrators were uncertain of the specific roles and responsibilities of the senate and the union as it related to everyday institutional issues. Although faculty and administrators consistently articulated that there were distinct separations between the senate and union, they often appeared puzzled as to which entity, union or senate, should advocate for particular concerns. This confusion was evident in interviews at both institutions.

Unlike the faculty and administrators senate and union presidents, although co-operative, projected a careful and somewhat reserved demeanor in response to the interview questions. They were less candid than faculty and administrators and often requested clarification of the questions. One participant consistently responded to questions posed by asking in a confrontational manner, "What do you mean by that?" These respondents were deliberate and somewhat cautious in their answers, endeavoring to make certain that I knew there was a distinct separation between senate and union activities. One union president had formerly been senate president and both union

presidents currently served in the senate as representatives of their departments. Conversely, senate presidents were not presently involved in union committees or activities.

Pattern One: Union and Senate Purview

The role the senate and union play in the life of a university provides a rich understanding of the history and culture of that institution. Determining which group, the union or senate, is responsible for particular initiatives and issues should be obvious by examining a senate's by-laws, and constitution, as well as reviewing the collective bargaining contract for the faculty union. What emerged, however, from the review of these data, was a perspective that there is a "blurring of lines" between the senate and union's roles and responsibilities causing a recurrent confusion by participants in this study as to what group is accountable for certain issues and actions.

Senate and Union Roles and Responsibilities

Many of the interviewees maintained that the roles and responsibilities of the senate and union at their institution were clearly delineated and that those lines were respected and adhered to. The union focuses on faculty work conditions such as salary, benefits, and promotion and tenure issues, while the senate deliberates on academic issues related to curriculum, assessment, and policies impacting programs. Both union

presidents endeavored in their interviews to maintain a clear separation between union and senate roles. The president of the Currier union noted,

> Academic senate has its role and we have ours. What can I say, it's all spelled out in terms of the contract. They deal, they deal with issues of, they deal with academic issues, they deal with questions of curriculum and questions of general education requirements, questions of whether a college will be dissolved, for example. It goes through the senate, has to get the approval of the senate, it doesn't get our approval, goes to the senate. It's an academic issue.

The union president at Homestead was also clear in defining the role of the senate and the union. When asked to share examples of when the union and senate were jointly involved in decision-making he replied,

> We typically are not involved in joint decision-making. No, and in fact the contract very specifically says that the things that are within the contract that the senate cannot do and all we can do are in the contract. So there is not joint decision making specifically because it is prohibited.

Union presidents attempted to provide a compartmentalized view of senate and union activities strongly suggesting that the separation between these two entities, although clear contractually, is also obvious in practice.

The Homestead senate president agreed with the sentiments expressed above and in reference to respecting each other's turf pointed out,

> And there is a little bit of boiler plate text that the president [of the senate] reads at the beginning of [meetings] that says issues such as salaries,

> benefits, workload, all of these things are the providence of the agreement and cannot be discussed here as such. So we try, sometimes we bend over backwards trying to make sure that we do not impinge on those items that are negotiated and try to keep the separation that way.

Currier's senate president reflected on the fact that the senate is comprised of almost 100% union members, except for a few administrative types. He professed that there is no overlap when it comes to responsibilities, "The union still deals with negotiating contracts and rights and terms of salaries and working conditions but the senate still sticks to the academic issues. So we never really overlap."

In contrast to union and senate presidents' perspectives on the separation between senate and union roles and responsibilities, faculty and administrators offered a slightly different view. They were less apt to view the roles and responsibilities of these two bodies as so compartmentalized and clearly defined. HA1 observed that program review, athletics, and salaries are areas that are discussed between the senate and union. She noted,

> Issues in athletics get discussed between the two groups. Um, salaries are always discussed between them, but that's not done formally, that is done informally. And a lot of the union officers, not a lot but some of the union officers historically have been on senate councils simultaneously so it's pretty hard to separate them always.

This administrator acknowledged the impact of faculty who cut across union and senate representation making it difficult to discern whether senate or union officials are involved in the appropriate discussions. By the nature of the make up of these groups, there is no

clear demarcation regarding issues and discussions since representing both bodies allows the latitude to discuss any and all issues that may arise.

Consistent with HA1's comments, an administrator at Currier shared a similar situation regarding a workload matter in which the senate attempted to get involved. The crossover of faculty representation between the union and senate was again at issue in this incident and muddled in whose domain the topic of workload should reside. CA2 related the following,

> But there were some workload issues that they, the senate tried to, to get heavily involved in. It was basically the same people. You had to ask which group they were representing that day, whether it was senate or whether it was the union and if it was the senate you can't talk about it. If you are union you can, because we, from the administrative side, we said we won't talk to the academic senate about it because we weren't allowed to. That's a union issue...and ah...they wanted to talk about it from a senate viewpoint.

HA1 presented another example of where there has been confusion on the part of the union as to its role. She noted "In the current bargaining right now they are trying to take the authority of the senate and the policy on who gets graduate faculty status and put it into the contract. That is not going to happen." She again attributed this situation to the crossover of faculty sitting on both senate and union committees and councils. The president of the senate at Homestead elaborated on this situation and indicated that the union was attempting to view this policy as post tenure review and within their realm as a work condition. She explained that graduate faculty status had been a part of institutional

policies for many years and had never been viewed within the purview of the union. She explained,

> Well that is hardly post tenure review and it is odd that the union would think about this now...and they have been missing on that issue for thirty some years. However, I told them I thought the whole thing was ridiculous to begin with and if he (union president) wanted to join me in supporting an end to graduate faculty status or linking it to promotion and tenure I would be happy to take that little battle up in the fall.

This example further demonstrates the confusion that exists between the senate and the union regarding designated authority. The union felt the issue was theirs to address, while the senate, based on institutional history, knew the graduate faculty issue was within their purview to discuss and recommend changes. Although this confusion exists at Homestead between senate and union, HA1 felt that this was a part of the institutional culture and that faculty and administrators were aware of and comfortable with the situation. She summarized this by saying, "So we don't have any line in the sand kind of thing and that has been going on here for a long time and we are really pretty comfortable with it."

A faculty member at Homestead, HF1, attempted to offer an explanation as to why there is so much confusion regarding senate and union role. She said,

> The issues that AAUP is so focused on right now, workload, salary, those types of things, which is their bailiwick, can't let that bleed over into the fundamental notion of academic affairs and shared governance. The problem is, of course, all of these things bleed over into each other. When

> you start talking about academic issues you are also talking about workload right? When you start talking about the vision of the university you are talking about workload...so there are some issues that there are not a clear demarcation between what's the AAUP's responsibility and what's the faculty senate's responsibility.

This faculty member clearly identified a theme that resonated with numerous other subjects. It is not only the make up of the union and senate councils and committees that impact on where issues are addressed, but also the nature of the issue at hand that creates the confusion.

Workload was culled out repeatedly as an example of an issue that should, by contractual consideration, be within the purview of the union since it impacts faculty work conditions. However, issues of workload are also tied to things like institutional budget and mission. Workload affects research, advising, and often retention of students, especially at the graduate level. HF2 shared a recent academic senate memorandum related to workload. The senate convened a committee to look at workload, an area that was clearly identified as a union issue. The senate crafted a recommendation that was debated on the senate floor. The information was then forwarded to both the administration and the union. HF2 noted that the document "may give them [the union] more ground to argue that it is a concern with regard to the faculty because it has come up on several different venues from the faculty senate floor." If the authority to address workload issues with the administration is a part of the role of the union, it begs the question why the senate was involved in convening a committee and providing recommendations to the administration regarding faculty workload.

The senate president at Currier also expressed some confusion regarding whose responsibility it would be to redefine workload. When asked a question regarding a workload study, CS noted the following,

> I guess he [the provost] would come to the academic senate because that would not be a union thing. I think he would come to the academic senate and ask us to look into teaching loads in various departments. I don't know, it could be, this might be a crossover between, this might be the one time when the union might get into it as well as the...I would have to talk to [the union president].

Later in the conversation CS firmly said, "So, I think it would really fall into the academic senate and the union should stay out of it." Conversely, in a similar conversation with the Currier union president, when the issue of workload was raised, CU provided an immediate and terse response, "No, its not the senate's business, it's the union's business. It's a condition of employment." These two faculty leaders at the same institution had different views on whose responsibility is was to deal with workload issues.

Other issues that should be within the purview of the senate and relate to academic issues often end up in the union shop or become highly influenced by the union. One Currier administrator, CA2, felt that the union claimed many issues regardless of whether they were truly union issues. A faculty member at Currier, CF2, acknowledged that faculty often view academic issues as falling into union business. Another faculty member voiced concern that the senate at Currier focused more on faculty work conditions than academic issues. CF1 declared,

> I would prefer for the senate to be more made up of people who appear concerned with the academic mission of the university. Although the union pays that lip service, my impression is that at least the leadership of the union is primarily oriented to more of the traditional union view of wages and working conditions and that type of thing. And although the senate doesn't exclusively focus on that, the people who run that [the senate] seem to be fairly heavily concerned with that. They will talk about academic issues but it comes across as either...it's really working conditions.

CF1 went on to further illustrate the point that the senate carries a union agenda. He related an incident in which the senate killed an introductory freshman experience course because non-faculty personnel had historically taught it. This action was within the authority of the senate because it dealt with an academic issue. His interpretation of what transpired follows,

> And the expressed reason given [for killing the course], I didn't understand it, anything that made any sense. I thought it was just pure union shop mentality of 'our guys aren't teaching it so it shouldn't be taught'. Yeah, oh yeah, these were senate decisions but the major spokesmen were people who are deeply embroiled in the, in the union.

All of these narratives speak to a "blurring of lines" in regard to the roles and responsibilities of the senate and the union. The data show that administrators and faculty within the same institution are confused about which entity, the senate or the union, is responsible for particular issues. Senate and union presidents projected that their roles

and responsibilities were clearly delineated, whereas faculty and administrators provided numerous examples of where that was not the case. What was most evident in this theme was that the two site universities were willing to live with this inconsistency and felt that it was a part of their institutional culture. To repeat the words of the Homestead administrator who spoke to the confusion of responsibilities between the senate and union, "That has been going on here for a long time and we are really pretty comfortable with it." Similarly, an administrator at Currier presented the same point of view and acknowledged that the confusion of who is responsible for what is something "...we've learned to live with it. We manage that pretty well."

Power Struggle

With both institutions acknowledging blurriness in the roles and responsibilities of the senate and union, it was interesting to note two separate areas that emerged in the data analysis, each one specific to a particular subject institution, which may shed some light on why this ambiguity occurs. At Homestead University participants perceived a power struggle between the senate and the union. Interviewees reported an ongoing tension and confusion about responsibilities between these two groups. The senate at Homestead had been the only voice of the faculty for almost twenty years and according to the senate president, it was "the chief body in which all policy was debated, discussed and formulated" before the union was established. A faculty member, HF1, reflecting on the union/senate tension noted that when the union was initiated it "created and still, that exists today, a real challenge in defining who is in charge of what."

Commenting on the history of the union at her institution the senate president, HS, shared this perspective,

> I can't think off hand of a single incident of where the union and the senate have come together on their own to do anything. And again, what I can say is that what ever happened back in '74 [when the union was organized]...and I don't know...I have talked to people, but you know you can't feel how people were thinking and living at that time. But whatever happened, I think, was strong enough and there was some resentment, I think, by people who were leaders in the senate and didn't want this new group coming along and taking away their little bit of power. But I think the separation then became so strong that it would take a series of crises, I think, to bring that sort of cooperation.

The president of the union at Homestead also alluded to a "controversy between the union and the senate" conveying that this was in the past. He did however, point out "That there are some folks involved in the senate that traditionally did not like the union because they felt that it was usurping their rights." Tension between the senate and union at this institution continues to exist even though almost thirty years have passed. Hard feelings regarding the union role and the loss of power for the senate have permeated the culture of this institution. HF1 shared a recent incident that demonstrates how the tension and territoriality referred to above is "alive and well" at Homestead. At a recent senate meeting the vice president of the union stood up on the senate floor and said to the president of the senate,

> I'm sorry...the way you defined the faculty senate role is that the faculty senate is the advocacy voice for the faculty and I want to articulate that the faculty union is the advocacy voice for the faculty.' And I think she was trying to make a point that these two things, that both of these bodies could be advocacy bodies. Well, there was some territoriality going on there.

HF1 summed up this power struggle at her institution by acknowledging there is an "ongoing tension...because of course, at one time we were just a faculty senate, and then faculty organized into the union and there were considerable discussions about the responsibilities of each group."

The faculty union at Homestead contractually supports the existence of the senate, but limits the influence of the senate on institutional or union activities and decisions that are within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement. The contract is clear in designating the union as the only group that speaks officially for the faculty and limits the senate to providing advisory input. This may not have been the case thirty years ago. Then, the senate was the only "voice of the faculty" and may have been the primary negotiator with administration on work condition issues as well as academic concerns. As the senate president put it, " I don't think, well, I don't think we will ever get back to a situation where one body does everything, as had been the case before the union." From the document review, as well as faculty/administrator interviews, it is obvious that the union wants to limit the influence and authority of the senate at Homestead.

In contrast to Homestead, the union at Currier University was established six years after the senate. In reviewing the faculty collective bargaining contract at Currier,

there is little in the contract that speaks directly to the senate. Information relative to governance was specific to departmental activities only. Although there was a lack of reference to the senate in the contract, there was a strong perception conveyed by many of the interviewees that the survival of the senate at Currier was entirely attributable to the union. This particular area of emphasis observed in the data analysis is specific to Currier University. Only one administrator at Homestead mentioned that the senate exists at that institution because it was permitted in the faculty contract. However, at Currier participants addressed this issue repeatedly. The president of the union pointed out that "Ah, the senate is enshrined in the Board of Governance statutes which are read into, which are read by reference into our contract and protect the senate and its role." Referring to a number of committees both at the department as well as college and university level, the union president pointed out that governance structures at Currier "are guaranteed by the union." Consistent with this theme, CF2 attributes the union with not only protecting the senate but also providing it with its power. She notes, "Also the contract, because it stipulates for a faculty governance, gives a lot of strength to the senate that the senate would not have." The president of the senate at this institution also attributes the union with protecting the senate and observed that,

> The union was very clever to protect the rights of the academic senate, so that there was a right...that there should be an academic senate and that the role of the academic senate was to look at academic governance and academic issues and educational issues.

This reoccurring area of emphasis may speak to the fact that although the senate was established at Currier for six years before the faculty union, both the senate and

union were in the early stages of development and were not in a position to compete for power. It also suggests that if the union protects the senate and the senate exists because of the union, the union may also control it. The union president at Currier speaking to the relationship between the senate and the union said,

> We had that good relationship all down the line. There were tensions when, ah, when ah, sometimes the leadership of the senate was ah, was ah, the [former president of the institution named] administration, sometimes when the leadership of the senate was not as aggressive as some people thought...

From participant narratives, it would appear that the senate make-up changed considerably as the union matured. CA2 talked to the examiner about "active union players" on senate committees. When asked if it has always been this way, he replied,

> This has grown over time. When the union first started...which is now 25, 26, 27 years ago, something like that, there was already an academic senate and at that point it was much more populated by a broad section of the university. The population of people active in research has been declining and the, the people who are active in the union have become much more active in the academic senate. So there's been a coalescence of the two. That's occurred over 25 years because ah...When the union became very active and the senate...those people just walked with their feet, as they do in many cases, they said we don't have time to waste on this sort of thing because they thought it [the union] had more influence.

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This "coalescence" of the faculty that CA2 spoke of may be one of the keys to why there is little tension between the senate and union at Currier.

The history of Currier reveals that the same union activists have been a part of the institutional landscape of this institution for years. These activists matured in the institution along with the senate and union and may have influenced both entities considerably. As CA1 noted, the names of some of the same faculty who signed the original faculty contract over thirty years ago are also on the last few bargaining agreements. This may also account for the fact that interviewees identify the union repeatedly as the entity that protects the senate at this institution. This may explain why there was no evidence of current tension, or a power struggle between the senate and union at this institution.

Pattern Two: Union and Senate Relationships

The relationship between the union and senate was a second pattern identified in the analysis of the data. More specifically, membership, and union leadership were important themes that surfaced. These two themes link significantly with the last theme identified in this pattern, the influence of the union on the senate.

Membership

The individuals involved in senate and union activities are directly and indirectly involved in molding the relationship between the two groups, and also influencing

institutional policies and processes. Interviewees from both universities were consistent in reporting that people involved in the senate and the union is the same small group of standard players. It is important to note, however, that throughout the interviews participants often referred to "union" people involved in senate activities. With the exclusion of the Homestead senate president noting that the past president of the senate chose to run for a union executive board position in order to assure himself of "additional protection in case he had to say some things that were not well thought of...that he could be even more assured his freedom of speech in this academic community would be protected," there was not one other mention of "senate" activists being part of union committees or councils.

Focusing on individual faculty members that are a part of both the senate and the union at Currier, the president of the union described those individuals who are faculty leaders in both groups. He observed, "So these people play important roles in leadership in both." CF1 concurred and noted that the senate and union leadership at his institution are

> Almost 100% overlap both in terms of heads of committees...but also in terms of the people who speak, the people who traditionally speak at the senate meetings. And my impression is that the people who raise the issues, the people who talk on the issues are primarily the people who are also long time union activists and serve on the union's various organizing committees. So there's a very high overlap.

Looking at the committee and representative listings of both the union and senate at the site institutions confirms this view. At Currier University, the union vice president

is also the vice president of the senate and at both institutions the past president of the senate is currently an officer of the union. Union presidents at both institutions are representatives in their senates. At Currier the union president is the union liaison to the senate executive board. The president of the union at Homestead is a past president of the senate. Numerous officers of the union act as representatives from their departments on the senate at both institutions.

An administrator at Homestead who was an active member of the senate at one time agreed with the sentiment voiced by the Currier faculty member above regarding the overlap of membership in the senate and union and corroborated by saying, "You have senators who are on the senate exec board who sit on the union exec committee and vice versa. And you have union parties that sit on various senate councils." With the exception of one of the senate presidents, every person interviewed acknowledged that faculty who are active in the senate also tend to be the ones actively involved in the union. CA2 summed it up by saying

> They are very intertwined...so it's hard to distinguish whom they are speaking for. In fact, the academic senate policy committee, which is about 7 or 8 people...there are probably, almost all of them are active union players, whether they are currently on the executive committee of the union or not, they have been.

The union president of Homestead offered an interesting and positive perspective on the membership make up of the senate by saying, "I think that some of the collegiality has happened because there are enough of us that have been involved in both organizations and I think that helps bring us together." CF1, however, viewed the "co-mingling" of

union activists in the senate as coming together more for union agendas rather than senate issues. He suggested that the "Senate be more made up of people who appear to be concerned with the academic mission of the university." He went on to say, "I think what is going on is that the senate has taken an action or expressed an opinion, not on something they shouldn't be focusing on but for reasons that are all union reasons rather than academic reasons." This reflection is consistent with the president of the union at Currier who noted that the leadership is the same in both groups and confirmed CF1's analysis saying, "I think they speak more through the union than the senate."

From interviewees' perspective, senate leaders, those that speak up on issues and lead committees, tend to be the ones actively involved in the union. It appears that the union at both of these universities has a strong and formal presence in the senate through elected membership as well as appointed liaisons, and that members often view senate issues through a union lens. HF1 summarized this by saying, "And the irony here is that of course, the key people right now who are vocal in the senate are also people who are key supporters of the AAUP."

The analysis of the data suggests that faculty involved in senate and union activities are the same group of individuals. Another area emerged, however, regarding membership. Participants consistently noted that representatives to senate and union positions are those who have a long history at the institution, and are elected over and over again for positions both in the senate and union. HF1 explains, "What I see happening is the membership of the senate consists primarily of old guard, long time people who have been around forever." CF1 referred to the union at his institution as "A bunch of old boys, although its mixed gender, although the idea is the same. It's the

people who have been working together for 15, 20, 30 years, and have a series of ritualistic complaints that they bring up over and over again." He went on to say,

> My impression is that the people who are the activists and spokesmen in the senate are at least my age or older and have been here most of their academic careers and have been in the senate and union most of their academic careers. So it's almost, it almost feels like, like a tenured position to be a senator at Currier.

HF1 shared this sentiment and pointed out that, "There are too many people in the union who have been there too long and don't do their job." The oligarchy of each institution appeared to be well represented in both union and senate activities.

CA1, acknowledging the lack of turnover of faculty in union and senate positions pointed out that the provost of Currier, prior to her departure to a new university, tactfully approached faculty leadership with her concern. CA1 quoted the provost as saying "I find over the years I've been here that there has not been a great turnover in who's been involved in the policy committee, who's involved in the senate, in fact who's involved in the union. Perhaps you should be thinking about the next generation." CA1 reported that union and senate leadership vehemently denied the assertion but "couldn't name three" other active new faculty in the union or senate.

The lack of new members participating in the senate and union, and their longevity in these groups raised an interesting question regarding the value of faculty service. Some participants in this study projected little regard for those involved in senate and union activities. One faculty member at Currier, CF1, ventured to guess that union

and senate activists had been at the institution for a very long time and involved in union and senate activities for most of their academic career. He noted, "My impression is that the people who are the activists and spokesmen in the senate are at least my age or older, and have been here most of their academic careers."

The president of the senate at Homestead, a leader herself in shared governance, provided this view of union and senate involvement,

> Sometimes you get people running for leadership positions in shared governance who really can't do much of anything else. They will take these positions to avoid teaching. They have discovered they don't much care for that. It's a way, really, of rising in the institution on sort of a parallel track to the more traditional track of teaching and research. I mean if you cannot establish excellence in either of those fields you can step into service, do some things, and then sort of do an end around, if you will.

A similar sentiment was voiced by CA2 who explained that faculty active in senate and union activities typically do not represent the majority of faculty in the institution. He noted those research faculty were on one side, involved in research, active in graduate programs, supervising doctoral students and "On the other side many of the activists in the union and academic senate who publish infrequently. The majority of them don't have research funding so it's a different mix of...different interests."

Faculty involvement in both senate and union boards and committees often caused confusion about which group they were representing. Further, because of their long involvement in both groups, and little turnover they often focused on "historical"

disputes and past administrative regimes rather than on issues at hand. An administrator at Currier, CA1, observed,

> Definite scars [from problems with past administrations] are not helped by the fact that there's no turnover. You look at the people who signed the first contract it's a little bit frightening how many are still activists. And you look at the people who signed the last couple of contracts and you wonder where the new blood is going to come from.

CF1 shared a situation that recently occurred at Currier that was related in part to a presidential administrative action that occurred many years ago. CF1 concluded,

> So it was quite obvious to everybody that that's what the real issue was [problem with previous administration] and that kind of place where I think there should be more of a disconnect between the union and its people who are still fighting old battles and the senate concerned with where the university is now opposed to where it was 10 or 15 years ago.

The membership of the senate and union was clearly a topic that subjects felt knowledgeable about as well as comfortable in expressing their perspective. In summary, the profile of a faculty member involved in senate and union activities is consistent with the following; a senior faculty member, tenured and with a rich institutional memory who is re-elected often, and has a long involvement in senate and union activities. These individuals focus their academic careers on governance issues and move between the senate and union as representatives or participate on both bodies at the same time.

Leadership

A second theme that emerged was related to leadership. Individual leadership ability was often mentioned in regard to union effectiveness, however, there was not much discussion directed specifically to the importance of good senate leadership. What surfaced consistently in interviews was the relationship between the president of the senate and the president of the union.

Leadership was culled out as an important variable in affecting change and supporting faculty and institutional goals. Both senate presidents at the site institutions spoke to the relationship between the leader of the senate and the union as being important and influential. HS elaborated on this relationship and noted that it is not the position but the individual that "has the capacity and potential to exert a terrible amount of influence for bad or for good". She followed up on this thought by saying,

> If a union president and a faculty senate president don't like each other, if God forbid, and we all know this happens on campuses, then there is no relationship what so ever. If they do, then things will happen that wouldn't happen otherwise. It's a dynamic, it's a synergy that depends more on the individual in the office than the office itself.

This reflection speaks to the impact of the personal relationship between senate and union leadership, and the influence of that relationship on senate and union activities. The president of the union at Currier shared a similar view when he said, "and you know he [the president of the senate] is a good friend of mine and he and I talk all the time. So its not like we are isolated individuals, we talk about

issues together, we talk about things that are going on." CA1, reacting to the relationship between the president of the union and the president of the senate at Currier, suggested that the senate president does not do anything without the say of the union president and this happens because "it's a personal relationship, I don't know if it's anything else. And the faculty keeps electing the same president of the senate and the same union president every year. So um...it is a relationship going back a long way."

Maintaining a positive, friendly relationship was mentioned several times as important to effective leadership. To get things done, administrators and faculty alike observed that the senate and union leaders needed to like each other and cooperate. An administrator at Homestead, reflecting on the relationship between the senate and union and whether there was influence between the two offered this statement,

> Oh, yeah, and when you have the leadership of the senate and the leadership of the union where they like each other and they are comfortable working together, it's pretty close. And when that doesn't happen, and when the president of the senate and the president of the union, when they are not compatible, then you have very little of that going on. It is really a function of the resonance between the parties. It's not a function of policy or protocol...it's whether people respect and want to work with each other.

Little information was garnered from participants regarding the leadership abilities of senate presidents, however, there were numerous reflections regarding the importance of good leadership at the union level. Even the senate president at Homestead

commented on union leadership by addressing whether the union president really represented his fellow faculty. HS asked,

> So, um...and there's also the question of how much time can you buy out for someone that is in one of these positions and still have them represent faculty...because at some point they become a union official, really, and if you are not teaching much at all, then your ability to sympathize with the conditions of your faculty colleagues sort of drifts away. So there are many good people on the AAUP chapter executive board, but the leadership has been singularly unfortunate over the last four years or so.

This same sentiment was voiced by a faculty member (HF1) at Homestead who also raised the issue of leadership in the union as a concern when she said, "Well, I think that, again I think that the union used to be a very strong voice. I think, that it's a combination of poor leadership in the union, we've had a couple years of it."

Emphasis on union leadership reinforced the importance of the role of the union in both these institutions. One administrator at Homestead (HA2) reflecting on union leadership said, "I think they've had some good leaders in there and they have had other leaders that knew how to work the system." Recalling a former union president and her excellent relationship with the president of the university, HA2 continued and said "so I think the faculty got a lot more when he was president because of that relationship."

Influence

Membership, and the leadership of the union, impact on the political environment of academic institutions as demonstrated by the above data. These two themes are strongly linked to the current theme of influence. Influence implies there is a power or authority over something or someone that affects the decisions and actions of a particular group. Oftentimes, that influence may not be directly observed but may be circuitous or subtle. Influence was identified by subjects in this study, as occurring in two distinct categories: the union's affect on senate issues and activities, and the senate's use of the union to shape its own agenda.

The senate president of Currier summed up the political involvement of the union both inside and outside the institution when he explained,

> They work very hard to interact with the board of governors. They are politically involved in the political parties and so they speak on behalf of the union. They get support for the union from these legislators. They try to...they try to get support from the Board of Governors for the union issues. Very effective, they have been extremely effective, they actually work, the union people, the president of the union, for example, happens to be on the academic senate.

The union is viewed by this faculty leader as having a great deal of influence and the mention of the president of the union being involved in the academic senate may speak to the perspective that the senate is a part of the political "work" of the union.

Many of the participants viewed the union as being involved in senate issues and decisions, both formally and informally. CA1 emphatically commented on this influence when he said,

> Officially, in what they say there is a senate role and there's a union role. Unofficially, because of the personalities involved the union is very much involved both behind the scenes, and in that they speak up without saying they are the union, but everyone knows they are the union at senate meetings.

The influence of union activists as members of the senate impacts senate discussion and decisions. This administrator was clear in conveying there is a strong union voice that influences everyday senate activities. CA2, described an incident at Currier involving the mandated periodic senate review of board policies that raised concern over union influence on routine senate responsibilities. Influence of the union was not overtly demonstrated in this case but rather was related to the "view" senate members took when addressing institutional policies. CA2 noted, "The person involved most heavily in this thing happens to be a major union activist. That he is taking, what I believe, is the union position in reviewing these documents...he wants it the way the union wants it." Although a senate committee assigned this individual the task of reviewing policies, it was suggested that union influence predominated his assessment.

Participants from both institutions shared examples where the union got directly involved in senate issues because the senate did not respond the way the union would have liked. Reflecting on an academic integrity case that was overseen by a senate committee this Homestead administrator, HA2, said,

> What's happened this year, the union has gotten involved in some of the cases because when a faculty member brings forward a case of cheating and the conduct board does not respond the way the faculty union thinks they should respond, they get involved. So what ends up happening is at that point you've got the professional concerns committee and the faculty union kind of at an impasse.

He went on further to point out that in this particular case the union president "Inserted himself into the hearings." Union influence, through the intervention of the union president in this academic committee, was obvious, and according to HA2, outside the purview of union responsibilities since academic integrity is a senate issue.

The union president at Currier commenting on the relationship between the senate and union also carefully suggested that the union intervenes in senate business when it perceives the senate is not doing what the union would like. CU observed that the relationship between the senate and union has been a "Good relationship down the line" and that the only tension that have been observed were,

> When the leadership of the senate was ah, was ah...sometimes when the leadership of the senate was not as aggressive as some people thought, people on the senate thought it should be in terms of defending faculty rights.

Tension was evident between the senate and the union because the senate did not do what the union wanted them to do. Although, CU was speaking about the

"tension" between the senate and union, he redirected his assessment of who was unhappy with the leadership of the senate back to the "people on the senate".

A faculty member at Currier provided another example of union influence involving the union president in a senate issue. CF2 observed that before the senate at Currier had even debated the closing of an academic unit, the union had a pre-agreement with the administration in hand. Three other respondents at Currier voiced the same concern regarding this incident. They suggested that the president of the union had influenced the provost to dismantle the college as well as exerted "undue" influence on the senate as well. CF1 offered this perspective, "Where the question sometimes arises is who started the process for a particular decision. But my impression is that the decision to take down the [academic unit] was more the union's or the senate leadership's idea than the provost's." With the senate leadership highly biased by the union president, as suggested by other informants at Currier, this interpretation by CF1 of the incident is significant of the influence that may be present at this institution between the senate and the union.

As noted above, the union president was the major voice, in the view of administrators and faculty alike, in intervening and influencing senate activities at Currier. At both of the institutions studied the union president sits on the executive board of the senate as liaison to the union. As one faculty member at Homestead (HF2) pointed out the "exec board of the senate has a representative from the union and the union president made himself liaison." Similarly, the union president at Currier appointed herself as the union liaison. Neither of the senate bylaws of the site institutions calls for the president of the union to sit on the executive board. The only requirement is that a

representative of the union be named to this group. Although neither of these liaison positions at the two institutions has a vote on the executive board of the senate, one Currier administrator (CA1) pointed out quite emphatically that the president of the senate is highly influenced by the union president.

> The president of the faculty senate, who will deny this up one side and down the other, says exactly what the union president tells her to say. That's um...mincing no words, but I have watched this happen, sitting on the senate many times and sitting in once and a long while at the policy committee [executive committee] of the senate.

This same administrator further reflected on an incident involving the evaluation and reappointment of deans. He pointed out that the senate president and vice president [also a union officer] encouraged the provost to hold off on the reappointments since she was stepping down and a new Provost was being appointed. CA1 said, "It was very clear it [the request for delay] came from the fact that the union president, who was silent during this was worried that the dean of [particular college] would be reappointed." In the opinion of this administrator these senate officers advocated for an action that was clearly the agenda of the president of the union.

The personal influence of the union leader on senate agendas and activities is obvious in the mind of the administrator quoted above. Depending on the union president's history at the institution and past interactions with the senate and its leaders, there may be considerable power to persuade and impact both senate and institutional agendas and policies. But, it is not just the personal influence that should be considered,

but also the delegated influence. By nature of the senate make-up, and in the case of both site institutions, the union president, has an important role as part of the executive committee of the senate. This individual is involved in setting agendas, reviewing policies and providing feedback to university and senate leaders. The union, at least at the institutions studied, appears to have a great deal of influence, both through the personal interaction of its leader as well as through its delegated relationship with the senate.

Administrators and faculty at both institutions acknowledged that the union influences senate issues and activities. Conversely, senate and union presidents were less willing to speak to this issue on a specific level. Senate and union presidents articulated that senate and union roles were distinct but that at times there may be overlap on particular issues and that influence runs both ways. The president of the senate at Homestead pointed out,

> The union contract specifically mentions the senate and states that those areas in which the senate has competence belong to the senate and so on. But in a sense I am a member of the union and I am affected by anything that the union does and I participate in chapter meetings and the union is affected by anything we [meaning the senate] do.

Although senate and union presidents were hesitant to identify or talk about union influence on senate activities, there was not this same level of cautiousness in regard to issues that flowed from the senate to the union.

There were numerous instances at both institutions where the senate referred matters to the union for input, approval or consideration for bargaining. A faculty member at Homestead (HF2) pointed out that "many of the policies

[regarding graduate faculty status or research misconduct] originate in the councils [of the senate] but then they are incorporated into the contract". It would appear that the senate might be responsible for identifying and studying issues and then creating recommendations that are sent to the union for action. The union then works with the administration to make those issues a part of the "work conditions" of faculty and integrates them into the collective bargaining agreement.

A Homestead administrator (HA1) referencing policy statements written by the senate, validated the view of the faculty member above and said,

> They [the senate] send them over to the union and say 'give me your views on this before we do this with the administration' and that goes on vice versa. But most of it is the senate going to the union and not the union going to the senate.

This predominately one-way review and endorsement process speaks to the influence of the union. At both institutions the senate is legally restricted from dealing with faculty work issues per the collective bargaining agreement. The issues that are forwarded to the union from the senate are senate issues. Without union approval, it would be unlikely that these policy statements would ever make it out of "draft" format. A faculty member confirmed this observation. HF1, referenced the graduate faculty status document that was viewed by the senate as an academic issue. She explained that it "Wrangled through the senate and the AAUP also reviewed that. I don't know if you call that joint decision making but I know that if the AAUP didn't like it, it would never go forward."

Administrators, as well as faculty perceive that the union has the "final word" on senate and institutional policies that may relate to faculty. The administration and the senate forward policies and memorandums to the union for review and input, but often the senate uses the union to also affect their own agenda. This influence is evident in an example related by a Currier administrator of where the senate attempted to use the union to affect a change. In this incident the senate disagreed with management on a space issue. CA2 noted, "The administration views this as the administration's, a management issue and the senate went to the union, back and forth to try and get that into the union court. They wanted it to become a bargainable issue." Using the union to influence the needs of the faculty speaks to the impact that the union has at both site institutions. A Homestead administrator (HA1) summarized this key message by saying that most of what happens is "The senate going to the union and not the union going to the senate. It's pretty much one direction from the senate to the union". When asked, "Why do you think that happens?" HA1 replied, "Because the union doesn't need the senate but the senate needs the union."

These comments reinforce the perspective that the senate needs the union and that the union is perceived as having more influence and power in the institution. The president of the Homestead senate talked about how the senate is viewed by many as "fairly well irrelevant to where they live". She went on to comment that people on campus do not take the senate seriously and that the senate is no threat to the union. Her comments reflected the fact that the union negotiates salaries, benefits and are the guardians of the tenure and promotion process and questioned "so um...what do we do? So I think they think the senate is all right as far as it goes but it's not worth much". She

went on to quote John Nance Garner, likening the senate at her institution to his observation regarding the national vice presidency "As not being worth a warm bucket of spit." She concluded by saying, "I won't say they would go that far but they...I just think they regard it as very insignificant."

This same sentiment was expressed by a faculty member at Currier, CF2, who pointed out that the faculty of the institution have, "No idea or interest at what goes on in the academic senate." She suggested that only a major issue would precipitate the senate to be sought out and related such a recent incident regarding the closing of an academic unit on her campus. She observed,

> So each committee considered that, and then it went to the whole academic senate for approval, and that's when we had representatives from this unit who are not members of the senate speak, which is the first time in my five years that has ever happened, where people from outside who were not administrators will come to address the senate. But this again, was an event of major significance that the academic senate was even consulted, that people decided to speak to the academic senate members. Um, otherwise, as I said, people are hardly aware of who serves on the senate, what the senate is doing, no matter how important.

This faculty member did not feel that the faculty of the institution valued the senate. She noted that often the faculty view even academic issues as falling into the purview of the union and that the union acts as a resource for faculty directing them to the senate with library and research concerns. Although this faculty member did not feel that the union influenced the senate, it was apparent from her

narrative that the union was the primary group that faculty approached with concerns, regardless of the nature of the issue.

In the eyes of most of the participants interviewed, union involvement in senate activities is evident, obvious and appears to be an accepted part of the culture of both institutions. Union insertion into senate issues, whether done independently or through a direct request of the senate, speaks to the power and authority of the union. The senate uses the union to affect its own agenda, likewise the union influence over the senate acts to control the policies and actions of the institution, to a certain extent. The influence appears to be unidirectional, from the union to the senate. Issues discussed were senate matters not union agenda. Consistent with power and authority, the union appears to act to "protect" the senate. This protectionism was clearly conveyed by the president of the Homestead union who, using the analogy of a police officer trying to control a situation noted,

> If he has to use force, he has to use force. And that is what I see as the difference between the two. The one is the persuader [senate] and the other is the force [union] and what works best is when they work hand in glove, and if they had the same goals, than I think its, I think we're indomitable.

In an earlier discussion with this same individual, a similar theme was observed when he referred to the senate as a persuasive body and the union as having "the muscle."

One other area of influence also emerged in the analysis, however this was only applicable to one of the institutions studied. The collaboration of the senate and union

during "hard times" to work against the administration was a strong theme observed at Homestead University. Although considered an outlier in the analysis of the data it is important to note its significance in relation to Homestead's history and current state of affairs.

Participants from Homestead noted increased interaction and co-operation between the senate and union, especially during hard times. Working together against the administration and presenting an allied front for the greater good of the faculty and institution was a key message specific to Homestead University. This theme may have reflected the fact that the faculty union was going into bargaining soon after these interviews were concluded. HF2 pointed out, "There have been increased discussions between the executive board of the union and the executive board of the senate because of...of prospects to downsize." Working together against the administration to create a unified front was also noted by HA1 who said,

> There use to be a great deal of communication between the two groups laterally and also some occasions of working together retaining a president or getting rid of a provost...they were very much in league as faculty, major faculty groups together.

A faculty member at Homestead (HF1), in reference to faculty discontent with the university president stated ardently, "Things are, I might as well say it, um...I think things are bad enough here that its possible that these two entities [union and senate] could actually work together to a greater good." Even the president of the senate at Homestead suggested collaborating with the union "to take that little battle up this fall" with the administration on issues related to graduate faculty status.

Shared Governance

Shared governance is the last theme identified in the analysis of the data regarding senate and union relationship. The term shared governance carries with it multiple definitions depending on how it is practiced at individual institutions. Generally, participants took their time reflecting on the term "shared governance". Some asked for clarification of the question "define shared governance at your institution?" A few participants appeared guarded in their response. Some interviewees viewed the union as an integral part of shared governance others felt it was not. Most respondents agreed that faculty needed to be involved in governance and looked to the union to assure these rights. There was very little consistency between or within institutions as to who the major players are in that process.

A faculty member at Homestead linked shared governance to the union. HF2 offered that the union not only assured job security to faculty but also shared governance, and that means, "...participation and participation now." This thought was expanded on by the president of the union at Currier who offered a perspective on this issue when he said,

> Shared governance is an idea that comes out of the tradition of not having a union. It comes out of an idea that, that if you go to the national AAUP you will see this, that they talk constantly about 'oh, we must have shared governance pursued', and its basically a kind of collective begging, begging the board not to be bad to them, begging the board to abide by the code, by the set of principles adopted by the AAUP, and most boards have

adopted those covering tenure and all these other things and so on. But there is no enforcement mechanism except the courts.

CU went on to summarize that it is the "collective bargaining contract" that protects and defines the faculty role in shared governance. "...We are protected in the governing of the institution. The senate and the union have their roles to play and the organization is run by this interaction between them." Without the union in place to guarantee, through legal means, the faculty role in the governance of Currier, CU views shared governance as having no backbone and reduces it to no more than lip service or as he stated "collective begging." By CU's assessment the union's role in shared governance is considerable and critically important to the faculty of the institution.

Conversely, when the senate president at Currier was asked about shared governance he acknowledged the role of the academic senate and the faculty as a part of shared governance but adamantly rejected the notion that the union was also a part of it. He said, "No, no, not at all. No, no, no, the union is really a rigid contractual body. They deal with contractual issues on a rigid contractual basis".

What participants appeared to agree on regarding shared governance is that the administration and faculty constitute the major players. HA2 defined shared governance "As the administration and the various employee groups, particularly the faculty, working together to resolve issues." This administrator hesitated to suggest that the union was a part of the shared governance of his institution. He offered this example to illustrate why. The union president was asked by administrators to serve on select committees. Although the union president accepted and viewed his involvement as a positive part of shared governance, he ended up resigning because of all the pressure exerted on him by the

union. According to HA2, the union felt he was "not doing what he needed to do to represent them when he was serving on these committees" and was getting "too close to the administration". HA2 went on to say,

> I would still say that the shared governance model, to me, works most effectively with the faculty senate because we have administrators and faculty serving together on all those committees, and so they come together with recommendations and then they work to implement them together.

Another administrator at Homestead, HA1, concurred and reiterated that shared governance is, "Between the senate, and the administration, and the faculty...the senate as a representative of the faculty at large." The union role, according to this administrator, is a very small and legal role. However, she went on to say, "But the fact it is in the contract probably gives them some basis for asserting that they are a part of shared governance."

Conversely, at the same institution another view of shared governance is noted, this time from faculty leaders. Both the senate and union president at Homestead had similar perspectives on the role of the union in shared governance. The union president, although succinct in his assessment of shared governance, clarified that, "yes" the senate, union, and management are a part of the governance structure of Homestead. The senate president used this image to explain shared governance, "We [senate and union] are two arms, if you will, of shared governance, working conditions and academic policy, and as long as we make that metaphor have some reality, we are actually connected at some point, we are in good shape."

Faculty at Currier were very clear in designating the administration, union and senate as the major players in shared governance. In fact, one faculty member, CF1, noted that the union at his institution has a "strong part" in governance. Another Currier faculty reflected on shared governance, and her long history at the institution. She observed that the senate is more involved under the new university president than in past years. She said the senate is focused on,

> Trying to do its role, to look over, to look for the interests of the parties involved, the students and the faculty and the research interests. So all of that has taken the senate into a much more active role in governance. So I think that, that it's the administration, the union and the academic senate.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

The role faculty play in the governance of an academic institution has been formally advocated and supported by the academy and higher education associations for almost a century. Faculty involvement in institutional governance was operationally defined with the advent of academic or faculty senates in the sixties and seventies. These senates became the collective voice of faculty in issues regarding curriculum, instructional methods, student life, and often faculty work conditions (Miller, 1999; Mortimer & McConnell, 1978; Tierney & Minor, 2003). To ensure faculty involvement in governance collective bargaining entered higher education. Baldridge and Kemerer (1976) pointed out that the weakness of senates was a primary factor in promoting unionization. When faculty are excluded from the governance process unionization is often a political consequence (Richardson, 1999).

The political model as described by Baldridge (1971) provides a framework from which the data in this study become meaningful. The fundamental assumption in the political framework is that organizations are made up of groups with their own set of interests that affect decision-making through power and conflict. Power is expanded through coalition building and mutual influence, two factors that Morgan (1997) pointed out shape organizations.

With the introduction of faculty unions into the mainstream of academia, the nature of governance changed. Senates co-exist with unions at many institutions today,

however, the literature is exceptionally limited in addressing the relationship between these two entities. It is this relationship that is the fundamental inquiry for this research. Two midwest universities were studied in an attempt to address the question, how do faculty unions influence academic senates?

Summative Description of Institutions

The findings of this study enabled a summative description of the relationship between the senate and union at the subject institutions. This information is important in understanding the political atmosphere on each campus.

An administrator, along with the senate president and a faculty member, reflecting on the beginning of the union at their institution, individually stated these exact words "no institution ever gets a union that doesn't deserve it". Unionization at Homestead, from their view, was a consequence of a poor shared governance model and distrust of the administration and their willingness to support faculty. As noted in the study findings, Homestead's union was established years after the senate. The senate had been the voice of the faculty on academic as well as faculty work conditions. What specific incidents transpired at Homestead that precipitated the establishment of collective bargaining are uncertain but what is evident from narratives is that the union was established in reaction to the administration. Lee (1991) observed similar reactions from the institutions she studied and said, "...old disputes between long gone provosts or presidents and the faculty had shaped the governance system in ways that even two or more decades could not change"(p. 45).

The lack of power the senate had in supporting faculty may have been a key reason for the creation of the union at Homestead. The senate at Homestead had represented the faculty for years before the union, and may have been perceived as effective. With the advent of the union, however, many senate responsibilities may have shifted to the union. Subjects alluded to a long-standing power struggle and tension between the union and the senate. In reviewing the collective bargaining agreement at Homestead it is clear that the union is the designated advocate for the faculty. The contract specifically limits the Homestead senate to advisory input only to the institution. Consistent with issues of cross over membership in the senate and union as well as the longevity of senate members discussed by study participants, it is entirely feasible that faculty members who were less than enthusiastic about the union coming to Homestead thirty years ago may still be "stirring the pot" and continuing to create tension and discord between the senate and union in regard to roles and responsibilities.

Unlike Homestead, Currier University did not appear to view the advent of the union as a negative consequence or primarily a response to a failed shared governance attempt. There was very little reference to a power struggle or tension between the union and senate. The union at Currier appeared to evolve as part of the organization of that institution and may be consistent with the culture, history and location of the university. Hermasi and Graf (1993) presented a model for faculty union voting behavior and suggested that employment conditions and distrust of the administration prompts unionization. The move to unionization is supported by perceptions of the usefulness of a union, a liberal socio-political belief system of the faculty, as well as favorable views of

unions at other institutions or organizations. Currier faculty may have felt that unionizing was in the best interest of the faculty and consistent with the culture of their institution.

There appears to be a very different view of the union at Currier. The union is perceived as the "protector" of the senate and in the opinion of many of those who participated in the study; the senate exists because of the union. In contrast to Homestead, there is little in the Currier collective bargaining agreement that speaks directly to the senate. Information relative to governance in the contract was specific to departmental activities only. Perhaps contract articles limiting authority or defining roles for the senate, like at Homestead, are absent from the collective bargaining contract of this institution because there is no threat from the senate or power struggle between the two groups.

The senate and the union began within six years of each other at Currier and may have included many of the same faculty. If the nature of the faculty leadership and representation in the senate and the union have been consistent since the inception of the AAUP at this institution, as suggested by the data, faculty move between the senate and the union as representatives and leaders, causing a blurring of lines between the two groups. Further, as pointed out by participants, union activists involved in the senate monitor and control senate activities as well as promote the union's agenda through senate involvement. The lack of a power struggle between the union and the senate at this institution is further illustrated by the fact that every standing council of the senate has a union liaison that has voice but no vote.

With the addition of the union at Homestead and Currier, a second voice for the faculty was recognized. This new voice adds to the political environment of the institution. Cameron points out that "Adding one more strong interest group to the

political structure of the institution may complicate the power balance and decision making processes"(1982, p.8). Although the subjects may have viewed the union differently at these two institutions, the data identify a number of common themes that relate to the relationship of the senate and union as well as their roles and responsibilities.

Senate and Union Relationships

Influence

Influence was a key theme in the relationship between the senate and the union. The direction of the influence appeared to be predominantly from the union to the senate. At both institutions the union acts to contractually protect faculty governance and assure faculty voice in institutional decision-making. The power to "protect shared governance" is negotiated contractually with the administration. The union is the "watchdog" for faculty governance on these campuses; the senate exists because of the union. The union takes its charge very seriously as evidenced by the involvement of its leaders in senate activities at both subject institutions. Corroboration of union involvement in senate issues and decisions further demonstrates the flow of influence from the union to the senate. As pointed out by Clark (1983),

> Conceptual sustenance is found in the growing amount of macro political analysis that seeks the specific location of legitimate influence, approaches that when combined point to the three faces of power: the power of groups to prevail in overt conflict over explicit issues; the power of groups to

keep issues off the agendas of action; and the power of groups to shape conceptions of what can and ought to be done (as noted in Hardy, 1990, pg. 411).

Most participants viewed the union as being involved in senate business, both formally and informally. On a formal level the president of the union at Currier was a member of the executive board of the senate (non-voting). The recent past president of the senate at Homestead was on both the executive board of the senate (voting) and the executive board of the union. Through their involvement on these executive boards they were able to monitor and influence senate agendas, decisions and issues and interact often with key administrators on institutional matters. Both union presidents were voting members of the senate. Being a part of the executive board provided them with advance information on issues and forthcoming agendas. Perhaps that is why these individuals were identified by those interviewed in this study as being outspoken and active participants in senate meetings. Further, by nature of the fact union officers were active in the senate at both institutions; they may have felt union protection when expressing opinions contrary to administrative views.

The influence of the union on the senate is obvious through the delegated authority noted above. Participants also cited a number of other incidences of influence demonstrated on an informal level. One area where informal influence was observed was through the personal power and relationships of the president of the union. The union president was clearly the major voice in intervening and influencing senate activities. In addition to the delegated position on the executive board of the senate, this individual's personal and professional relationships with the senate president, provost and other key

administrators impacted on the union's influence over the senate. Numerous vignettes pointed out the "intervention" of the union president in academic concerns, and the relationship, whether bad or good, with the senate leadership and its effect on getting things done.

Participants also pointed out that the senate often used the union to affect their own agenda especially when the administration did not agree with senate recommendations. The senate views the union as having more power with the administration, thus building a coalition with the union supports the senate in achieving their objectives. This was reinforced by the observation that senate documents go to the union for review and approval. This speaks to the perceived power of the union even when issues did not fall within the purview of the collective bargaining agreement.

Viewing senate issues with a union lens was also a concern of many participants in the study. Evaluating university policies, processes, or approaching a problem from a union perspective rather than from an academic viewpoint is an example of the informal influence the union has on the senate and the institution. Subjects voiced concern that the union philosophy often dominated academic integrity cases, decisions on course offerings, or institutional policy review, areas that are not typically within the formal purview of a faculty union. Again, this speaks to the influence of the union on senate activities.

Participants in this study repeatedly suggested that faculty were unaware of senate issues, and that there was a general perception that the senate was not effective or useful. Although some participants felt the senate represented the voice of the faculty, it was the union that they actually referred to as the group that gets things done. One faculty

member who saw the senate as the faculty voice went on to talk about "the faculty taking back the university" and how that may have to be done on the "picket line" of the union. This illustrates most poignantly the view of most faculty interviewed that although the senate may be seen as the voice of the faculty, it is the union that faculty rely on to assure their rights. The ability to protect the rights of the faculty both for work conditions and issues related to academic life clearly puts the union in a power position on these two campuses.

Membership

The make-up of the membership in the senate is a second theme identified in the findings of this study. This theme emerged as the most robust area in the data analysis, suggesting that particular faculty move between union and senate positions or maintain leadership representation in both. Participants were clear in reporting that the same small group of standard players was involved in both senate and union activities and that the senators who were most outspoken and active were union activists. Interestingly, participants did not report that senate "activists" were a part of union activities but rather union activists were a part of the senate.

Union activists in the senate tended to approach issues through a union lens, often making senate issues, union concerns. This crossover of membership caused a blurring of lines and confusion regarding in whose particular domain issues should be addressed. As noted earlier, the union was viewed by participants in this study as providing contractual protection to the senate on governance issues. The leadership overlap between these two groups may account in part for this perspective (Baldridge & Kemerer, 1976; Lee, 1979).

Subjects are aware that the union is on guard, monitoring senate activities to ensure and maintain faculty rights.

There are very few studies that look at membership issues in faculty governance, especially related to senate and union involvement. However, the ones identified in the literature confirm the findings of the current study. Barbara Lee (1982) reviewed faculty collective bargaining contracts at fifty-eight colleges and universities. From that sample she selected eight institutions for in-depth study. Through the case analysis Lee noted that union leaders were active in the non-union parts of institutional governance and therefore could surreptitiously influence institutional decisions.

Having the same faculty involved in both the senate and the union allows the union to monitor activities for both groups. Further, this coalition building and the mutual influence that occurs between the senate and the union increases faculty influence and control over institutional processes and decisions. Crossover membership between the senate and union provides the faculty with an organized, deliberate and powerful voice in the institution that does not outwardly appear to have the auspices of union involvement.

In a later longitudinal study, Lee (1991) found that the same faculty were involved in governance leadership activities year after year. Further, she observed that faculty and administrators alike questioned the quality of these leaders. The most able of faculty, those that do research, publish and excel at teaching, are not typically attracted to governance roles (Duderstadt, 2004; Gilmour, 1991), a theme clearly identified and confirmed by the findings of the present study. Participants in the present study often portrayed senate and union activists as ineffective researchers and teachers. Their involvement in governance was suggested as a way to achieve status while avoiding the

traditional teaching and research norms. Birnbaum (1989) observed that involvement in a senate offers older and less prestigious faculty a "local means for enhancing their own importance" (p.430). The literature supports the findings of this study and suggests that the pattern of faculty membership in governance has not changed significantly over the years, and may, in part, be related to the value placed on individual faculty involvement in the governance process.

The results of this investigation are clear in that involvement in union and senate leadership positions are not highly valued. Conversely, faculty and administrators acknowledge the need for faculty to be invested in governance. This apparent contradiction speaks to the lack of a reward system (Gilmour, 1991) for faculty involved in governance activities as well as the investment of time. These two key issues discourage younger faculty from participation. Promotion and tenure requirements compromise the ability of younger faculty to invest their time and efforts in governance activities (Floyd, 1985). Thus this small group of individuals, the tenured professors, those with a history in the institution, seeks out leadership positions in the senate as a venue for discussion, debate and comradeship. Many of these same people move between the union and the senate, representing one group at a time or both groups at the same time. This oligarchy is representative in this study of the membership of the union and senate in the subject institutions.

Leadership

The relationship between the senate and union president was a central finding that also emerged from this study. Subjects verbalized the importance of a positive

relationship between these two leaders as critical to getting things done. Liking each other was a prerequisite for getting things done. This coalition building between the senate and union increases the power and influence of the faculty in the institution (Morgan, 1996). It gives the faculty two voices with the administration. Further, the coalition development results in cooperation between the senate and union on all issues related to faculty work conditions, as well as academic life, and generally promote the faculty interests in the institution. This theme intersects with the two previous themes, membership and influence. The union president at both Currier and Homestead is seen as being able to cross over into senate business as routinely as they do with union affairs since both of these individuals sit on the senate executive committee and are voting members of the senate.

The degree of personal power that was afforded the position of union president was evident. Most of the influence exerted on senate issues and problems came from the union president. Unlike the senate president, the union leader has formal authority that is assigned through the collective bargaining contract. Using the contract as proof of this authority, the union president can challenge, interfere, and direct issues, even when those issues are not specifically within the domain of the union. The union president can bring up and discuss any issue from work conditions to academic affairs. This places the union president in a position of power that is legitimized by the faculty and contractually adhered to by the institution (Morgan, 1996).

Conversely, most senates operate in an advisory capacity to the administration. Duderstadt (2004) views these senates as "debating societies whose opinions are invariably taken as advisory by the administration and the governing board" (pg. 149).

Birnbaum points out that senates serve important organizational functions such as providing an opportunity for faculty to meet, debate, and "engage in acceptable behavior when faced with ambiguous or uncertain stimuli" (1991, p. 19). There is no contractual authority assigned to the president of the senate. Much of what happens in a senate is often based on tradition and rituals. The president of the senate is not allowed to discuss any issue that is within the providence of the collective bargaining agreement, nor can administrators address these issues with senate officials unless those senate officials are wearing their "union hats" and hold union office.

Shared Governance

The concept of dual track functions, a term defined by Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) in their seminal study of unions on campus, describes how union and senate presidents in this study explained their respective roles and responsibilities. They expressed a compartmentalized view noting distinct separations between issues appropriate to the senate and union. The union focused primarily on faculty work and economic conditions, while the senate deliberated on academic issues.

Contrary to the perceptions of the senate and union leadership, the faculty and administrators in this study did not share this same observation. They noted crossover membership as a major issue causing a blurring of responsibilities between these two groups. By the nature of this crossover there is no clear demarcation of issues since faculty leaders involved in both bodies have the latitude to discuss any and all issues that

arise. Further, there are some matters that impact both union and senate such as workload, university calendar, policies addressing faculty graduate status, to name a few. This ambiguity fosters further confusion and a blurring of roles (Duderstadt, 2004).

As early as 1976, Baldridge and Kemerer suggested that there was a breakdown in dual track bargaining already occurring. In addition to economic conditions, unions were demanding decision-making rights in areas that were traditionally the jurisdiction of senates; they were seeking a role in governance. Baldridge and Kemerer asked an important question, "To what extent are governance rights legitimate union concerns?" (p.405). It is at this juncture, thirty years later that we address this critical question as it relates to the last finding of this study.

Shared governance is defined as a system, composed of structures and processes, through which faculty, administration and other campus stakeholders make collective decisions that impact the institution (Association of Governing Boards, 1996; Eckel, 2000; Lee, 1991). Participants in this study lacked a consistent definition of shared governance across subjects as well as by institution. It is not surprising to find faculty and administrators relating different conceptions of shared governance. Tierney and Minor found that "campus constituents often employ multiple definitions of shared governance which create varied expectations about decision making" (2003, p.12).

Most subjects focused on the groups involved in shared governance rather than a definition of the process. There was general agreement that faculty and administrators were an important part of shared governance. Some subjects noted that the interaction between the senate and the administration accounted for shared governance. Others defined shared governance as involving the administration, the union and the senate.

Shared governance is all about the interaction of campus constituents in institutional decision-making and ultimately on the implementation of the choices they make (Eckel, 2000). Unions, because they represent a coalition of faculty, undoubtedly impact on the campus environment and institutional decision-making. Interestingly, the mention of unions as a part of shared governance is strikingly omitted in the literature (Burgan, 2004; Keller, 2004).

The omission of union involvement in shared governance goes against the trend of inclusion that has permeated higher education these past years. As Schuster et al. (1994) point out,

> The call for participation emerges, however, not only out of a political process in which various groups seek empowerment, but also out of a deeper understanding of academic culture and what complex organizations, especially professional organizations, must do to function effectively (p.17).

The conception of shared governance is one that is fluid, and changes in response to the environment as well as the mission of the institution (Morphew, 1999). Shared governance may involve a number of constituents including the faculty senate, the union, trustees, students, staff and administration of the institution depending on the issue at hand.

Governance, on the other hand, is specifically defined as the role faculty play in the administration, control, standards and long-term management of the institution in which they work (Keller, 2001). Governance and shared governance carry different meanings and imply different dynamics. Governance is often demonstrated through an

institution-wide senate or the faculty council of a department. Faculty governance is a concept that is highly advocated by faculty and administrators alike as a key element necessary to the health and efficacy of an academic institution (Tierney & Minor, 2003).

Clarifying the concept of faculty governance was more difficult to discern from subjects in this study. Some respondents reported that faculty in both the senate and the union were involved in governance issues. They observed that governance was the interaction between these two groups, implying that both groups were involved in the long-term management of their institution. Other subjects rejected the notion that the union was a part of faculty governance. With faculty involved in union and senate activities, crossover membership between the two groups and the blurring of responsibilities, it is understandable that faculty and administrators alike are uncertain of how to view governance at their institution. The faculty role in academic governance remains a topic of "...controversy, ambiguity and misunderstanding among faculty themselves, administrators and more recently, state legislators" (Lee, 1979, p.565).

Faculty senates and faculty unions have co-existed at colleges and universities for decades and purported to operate within the framework of dual track governance, a practice very difficult to achieve (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975; Schuster et al., 1994). Figure 1 provides a simple schematic that illustrates the relationship between the administration, senate and union in a dual track governance model. The administration or a senate committee initiates a query to the senate regarding an academic issue. An example may be the closing of an academic department. The senate reviews and discusses the issue and recommends an action to the administration. The matter is then forwarded to the union by the administration for review in light of the collective

bargaining contract. The union then works with the administration to resolve any contractual concerns the closing of the unit may have on faculty. In this model, the senate and the union roles and responsibilities are separate and distinct. The senate debates the academic issue and advises the administration, while the union looks at the impact of a potential decision on faculty work conditions.

In the current study this belief, that a separation of roles and responsibilities exists between the senate and the union, two faculty coalitions, could be the basis for some of the subjects' resistance to including unions in a definition of governance. Promoting the idea that the senate and union represent the same group of faculty, for a different set of reasons and under different terms reduces the implication that the union is part of governance. Thus, the university is not in a conflict of interest situation when faculty are making academic decisions that impact the institution and then separately negotiating conditions of employment based on those new decisions. Keeping the roles and responsibilities of the union and senate separate may eliminate legal issues. The U.S. Supreme Court's Yeshiva decision of 1980 limited collective bargaining at private colleges and universities because the court determined that faculty were considered managerial employees through their involvement in governance. Numerous unions at private institutions were decertified after this ruling, but public institutions continued to unionize supported by legislation in some states that overruled the Yeshiva decision.

This landmark case brought to the forefront the issue of faculty involvement in governance and collective bargaining. As noted earlier, governance suggests faculty investment in the objectives and goals of the institution, whereas collective bargaining is

Figure 1

Relationship of the administration, senate and union
in a dual track governance model



specifically focused on faculty work conditions. The union's involvement in governance sets up a conflict of interest between the faculty and the institution. If the union is in position to influence governance decisions those decisions made may support faculty needs versus institutional welfare. Discussion of class size, workload, closing academic programs or allocating the institution's budget may be issues that are a part of governance that will also impact faculty work conditions. The Association of Governing Boards (2001) strongly recommended that unions be denied any role in traditional governance processes.

Promoting dual track functions and advocating loudly that the union is not involved in governance provides institutions and unions with an argument "on paper" that there is a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between the union and the senate. However, the reality of union influence on senate activities, as born out by the results of this study, suggest that unions are very much involved in the governance of their institutions, albeit covertly through their strong voice in the senate, vis-à-vis the infiltration of union activists. Further, union influence over senate and institutional processes and policies, and the blurring of union roles and responsibilities with the senate immerses the union in the management of the institution.

This political interplay between the union and the senate and the union and the administration, as illustrated in Figure 2, impacts directly on the goals and objectives of the institution and the welfare of the faculty. Using the same example noted earlier regarding the closing of an academic unit, the senate would be responsible for discussing the issue and advising the administration on a proposed action. With union activists involved in senate leadership, the union would be immediately aware of the issue at hand.

Figure 2

Political interplay between senate, union and administration



Since the action impacts faculty jobs, union activists in the senate may use their influence to affect the direction of the senate decision. In this example the union would be involved in the academic decision, review of the decision related to the faculty contract and subsequent interaction with the administration regarding the impact of the decision on faculty work conditions.

The results of this study are provocative, and suggest reconsideration of contemporary models of academic governance on unionized campuses. Dual track governance once thought to succeed (Burgan, 2004; Lee, 1982) may no longer be the appropriate model of governance in higher education. Overlapping leadership, crossover membership, and the informal relationships and influence between the union, senate and administration suggest that a true separation of roles and responsibilities between the union and the senate is somewhat dubious. Data suggest that the union plays a role in influencing academic policies and processes, often successfully intervening in issues that are not within their formal purview.

The dual track governance model appears to be fraught with problems. This research study points out concern by administrators and faculty alike regarding the ambiguities of the system. Subjects commented repeatedly about the ineffectiveness of the senate and the strength of the union. Direct and indirect union influence is acknowledged in senate and institutional issues. Why then is there resistance to formally identifying the union as a part of governance? Perhaps it is because unions cannot bargain governance. Collective bargaining is a political process designed to benefit union members. Union involvement in the management of an institution places it in a possible conflict of interest position, as well as at odds with the administration. Continuing to

promote a perception of separation between union and senate roles and responsibilities masks the true political nature of this interaction. Under a dual track governance façade the union can continue to influence the institution without the outward manifestation of any managerial involvement.

Perhaps another key to the survival of dual track governance is the fact that faculty have two groups representing them, the senate and the union. This coalition development offers a strong strategy for promoting the interests of the faculty within the organization (Morgan, 1996) without appearing to violate legal issues. The union, through its influence and involvement in senate membership and leadership positions, controls senate activities for self-interest purposes. As long as the union can continue to manipulate the senate it maintains a very definitive but surreptitious role in faculty governance.

Politically, the administration appears to be well aware of what the union is doing as evidenced by administrators in this study who "have learned to live with this" situation. Perhaps administrators find the union involvement in senate affairs to be a barometer of sorts. Union reaction to academic issues may provide administrators with information that may become a part of future contract negotiations. Or perhaps, administrators understand the need for the union to be involved, albeit informally, in the business of the institution since faculty are the essential employees, overseeing curriculum and instruction, the university's major commodities. Additionally, union buy-in and support on important university issues allows for more timely revision of processes and policies that impact institutional effectiveness. Hardy (1999) urged

institutions of higher education to consider involving unions in decision-making. Hardy stated,

> Creating credibility, the use of consultation and legitimating decisions can prevent union resistance from occurring. Such strategies are often associated with political advantage, but they may also be a way of building consensus and are worthy of examination within the context of higher education (p. 416).

Viewing academic governance as having components of both the collegial and political model (Baldridge et al., 1977) may more accurately portray the reality of what is happening on the two campuses studied. Although the political model appeared to dominate, the union presidents were an active part of the senate, either through the senate executive board or major councils. There were no restrictions at either of these institutions on union leadership involvement in senate activities. This provides some evidence that a mixed model of decision-making, involving both a political and collegial framework, may be present at these institutions.

Implications

The findings of this study indicated that although senates are touted to be the governance body through which faculty provide input and participate in institutional decision-making, in reality the faculty union through its surreptitious activities is really the key voice in governance. Although the union guarantees and protects governance

through the collective bargaining contract, its formal involvement in governance is legally restricted. The power the union garners, however, because of the dependency of the senate on the union to "protect" it, increases the union's potential to influence, especially in times of scarce resources. Scarce resources intensify the need to protect faculty jobs and salaries, and increase the level of political involvement to control decisions that may be detrimental to the faculty.

A faculty union involved in the management of an institution is considered in conflict of interest since the union deals with the interests of those it represents rather than the interests of the university. Thus, through crossover membership, leadership involvement on the senate executive board and its legitimate influence within the institution, the union is able to shape and control issues and actions related to both faculty life and institutional welfare without the formal appearance of being the union. Influence and cooptation of the senate puts the union in position to control both institutional policies that may impact work conditions of faculty and then to negotiate those same issues on a formal level through collective bargaining.

These findings have important implications for institutions, especially in light of the fact that unions are on the increase in higher education (Ehrenberg et al., 2004; Kaplan, 2004). Colleges and universities concerned with the expansion of faculty union influence in the governance of their institution may consider restricting union leaders from involvement in senate activities. Limiting crossover leadership between the union and senate may reduce some of the ambiguity regarding roles and responsibilities of these two faculty groups. Restricting union leaders from having a formal role in senate matters

also reduces the communication conduit between the senate and the union and may avert both formal and informal influences of the union on the senate.

Recommending a designated hiatus between an individual's senate and union leadership position, and working toward term limits for both senate and union leaders may alter the tendency for the same small group of standard players to be involved in senate and union activities. These restrictions will need, however, to be implemented carefully since there is a limited pool of faculty interested or willing to be involved in governance activities (Duderstadt, 2004). Thus, orienting and mentoring new faculty to governance opportunities and building faculty reward systems to support that involvement are essential. Fostering a culture that values governance assures faculty they will have a continuing voice in institutional decision-making and will be willing to exercise that voice. It may also provide the institution with a broader cross section of faculty who are focused on institutional mission and goals.

The findings of this research suggest that the union is a part of the shared governance of the institutions studied. Perhaps unionized colleges and universities have evolved to a point where they are ready to adopt a new model of governance for the 21st Century. This new model would involve the collaboration of both labor and management as strategic partners. Saltzman and Grenzke (1999) referred to this as a "new unionism." In new unionism, the faculty union gains influence over issues that previously have been outside the scope of bargaining. Faculty coalitions within an institution may have dissimilar goals, but through a collegial model of decision-making, rather than political activity, these groups build consensus for the common good. Baldridge et al. (1977) describe the collegial model of decision-making as a "human relations approach to

organization" (p.20) that builds consensus of the academic community through its involvement. Under this model, the faculty union and senate would no longer be represented as separate coalitions, but rather as a united faculty.

Mortimer and McConnell (1978) argued that the statement on Academic Government of College and Universities published by the AAUP in 1966 (AAUP, 1999) was unrealistic in its delineation of authority for decision-making in higher education, especially since it did not take into consideration the rise of collective bargaining in colleges and universities. Academic issues are inextricably linked to fiscal concerns and fiscal concerns to faculty work conditions. Mortimer and McConnell (1978) noted, "In sum, we argue that those concerned with college and university governance should eschew the search for separate areas of authority and look for ways to enhance joint involvement" (p. 272).

Political strategies that support self-interests combined with a collegial model that reflects common interests (Baldridge et al., 1977), may draw the union out of its surreptitious role as a decision-maker in institutional governance. Thus, the faculty union would become an active and obvious participant in the governance of the institution. Mary Burgan (2004) argues that the collective bargaining approach to academic governance has numerous advantages and that in mature institutions unions play a strong and positive role in decision-making.

The collective bargaining approach to governance obviously diminishes the role of the senate, and raises an important issue regarding the value of senates in the governance of institutions. Birnbaum (1991) talked about the functions of senates, suggesting that they exist for reasons other than governance, such as ceremonial rituals

and providing gathering places for faculty discourse. Perhaps senates continue to exist because they provide a communication function that supports the faculty, union and the administration in identifying institutional issues and problems. Or perhaps senates survive because they are useful to maintaining a facade of shared governance. Referring issues to a faculty body for deliberation even when that group has little decision-making authority provides the institution with an avenue to assuage faculty concerns and gives the appearance of shared decision-making. These issues point to a critical need for additional research in the area of governance and shared governance, especially in collective bargaining environments.

Direction for Further Research

The political model as described by Baldridge (1971) provided the theoretical framework for this study. According to this model, the union and the senate represent two faculty coalitions that may be in conflict with each other and with the institution for power. The group with the most power will ultimately be a part of the decision-making process and influence the outcome of the organization. Through this research it has been established that unions influenced senate decisions and thus had power as the major voice of the faculty in the institutions studied. The predominant model of decision-making in this study was the political model. What was also evident, however, was some movement at both institutions to a collegial view of decision-making as demonstrated by union officers' involvement in key senate councils including the executive board. Further, studies employing an ethnographic focus may be useful in identifying institutions that are

evolving to or currently using mixed models of decision-making. Perhaps as unions and senates mature in their joint relationship with the institution there is less of a focus on competitive strategies and more on consensus building. Research in this area would help discover some of the cultural variables that impact such a transition.

Alternatives to the traditional dual track governance model need to be identified and researched. Models of governance that reduce ambiguity by advocating for the union as the only voice of the faculty in both academic and work conditions should be studied. This type of contracted governance eliminates the need for a senate and relegates issues of curriculum, program review, and other academic processes to the purview of the collective bargaining agreement. The union becomes a strategic partner with the administration, allowing the union to achieve a broader scope of bargaining and thus have direct influence in governance. This model already exists at many institutions; however there is very little research regarding the impact of this governance structure on institutional decision-making, faculty participation and the political atmosphere of these universities.

Research needs are also evident and essential in respect to the dual track governance model. The recent literature is exceptionally limited in the discussion of crossover membership issues, as well as union involvement in key senate committees. Identifying institutions that have restricted union officer involvement in major senate committees and have endeavored to maintain a clearer demarcation of union and senate roles and responsibilities would lend additional perspective on the efficacy of a true dual track governance model.

Examining faculty membership in senates, in both unionized and non-unionized environments, using a quantitative paradigm may provide more definitive information and trends regarding faculty involvement in governance. Queries regarding reward systems, years of involvement, tenure status of faculty and movement between senate and union positions will further document and likely support the observation of cross-over and recurring membership, as well as senior faculty involvement.

Looking at the perceived institutional value of faculty participation in governance activities may provide insight into union/senate membership patterns. Faculty participation in governance and leadership is problematic (Duderstadt, 2004) and by studying faculty investment and involvement in governance activities, at both unionized and non-unionized institutions, valuable information regarding faculty turnover can be obtained.

Leadership was a key theme identified in this study. The leadership of the union was mentioned numerous times as an important variable in getting things done. Participants in the study also felt that the relationship between the president of the senate and the union leader was important to achieving faculty and institutional goals. There was no information discovered in the literature review that spoke specifically to faculty leadership issues. Studying the leadership styles of senate and union leaders in institutions that have experienced forward movement as evidenced, by a Carnegie reclassification, for example, may provide insight into the significance of faculty leadership in institutional success.

A final area that may provide some enlightening information regarding governance at unionized institutions relates to the collective bargaining agent

representing the faculty. Do specific unions impact differently on governance issues in colleges and universities? Would faculty represented by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) have different governance concerns than perhaps a faculty represented by the National Education Association (NEA)? How influential are faculty bargaining agents in regard to governance issues?

Conclusion

The discoveries of this research suggest that faculty unions are very much a part of the governance of their institutions. Through the union's strong voice in the senate, and its influence over both senate and institutional processes, the union not only impacts the welfare of the faculty it represents but also influences the goals and objectives of the institution. Although senate and union leaders in this study advocated that dual track governance was the norm, overlapping leadership, crossover membership, the informal relationships and influence between the union and the senate, and the union and the administration suggest otherwise. Through these surreptitious activities, the union was involved in faculty governance and was also an integral part of the shared governance matrix of the institutions studied. The implications of these findings are significant and suggest a reconsideration of the role of the faculty union in academic governance.

Appendix A

Consent Form

Title of Project:	Academic Senates and Faculty Unions
Investigators:	Marilyn Amey, Ph.D, Linda Seestedt-Stanford ABD
Institutional Affiliation:	Michigan State University, Department of Education

You are invited to participate in this research study on the relationships between academic senates and faculty unions. The following information is provided to help you make an informed decision whether or not to participate. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to ask.

Through this project we hope to gain better insight into the relationship between faculty unions and academic senates. There is limited research in this area so your support of this project is sincerely appreciated. This research is being conducted in fulfillment of a requirement for a graduate degree from Michigan State University. You were selected to participate in this study because you are either a faculty member or administrator at your university and knowledgeable of both senate and union activities and processes.

If you decide to participate in this research project I will need approximately 45 minutes of your time to ask you questions related to the relationship between the senate and faculty union at your institution. I will be tape recording this interview in order to assure accuracy in the transcription of our conversation. You are free to ask me to turn off the tape recorder at any time during our conversation. Tape recordings will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study. You may change your mind about being in the study and quit after the interview has started.

Subject and institution identity will be kept strictly confidential. Pseudonyms will be assigned to each respondent at the time of transcription. Information obtained from subjects will be reported in aggregate to assure confidentiality is maintained. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowable by law.

If you have any questions at this time, please ask them. If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to contact Dr. Marilyn Amey at 517-432-1056 or at (amey@msu.edu). If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a study participant, or are dissatisfied at any time with any aspect of this study, you may contact - anonymously, if you wish - Peter Vasilenko, Ph.D., Chair of the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (UCRIHS) by phone: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, by email at: ucrihs@msu.edu, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. If you have additional questions later I will be happy to answer them.

You will be given a signed and dated copy of this form to keep.

My signature below indicates that I have voluntarily decided to participate in this research project as a subject and that you have read and understand the information provided above.

_____ _____

Subject's signature Date

_____

Subject's printed name

In my judgment, the subject is voluntarily and knowingly giving informed consent to participate in this research study.

_____ _____

Investigator's signature Date

Linda Seestedt-Stanford
989-774-1850
seestedt@msu.edu

Appendix B

Date_____
Participant _____
Institution_____

1. Tell me about your personal history at the university?
    a. Describe the responsibilities of your position.
    b. Describe your interactions with the academic senate.
    c. Describe your interactions with the union.

2. Through what processes or groups do faculty voice their concerns?
    a. In your opinion which of those processes or groups are most effective and why?
    b. So overall, in your opinion how strong is the faculty voice on this campus?

3. What is your view of the faculty union on this campus?
    a. How well do you feel they obtain their goals?
    b. Can you give me an example?

4. Describe how you see the relationship between the faculty senate and the faculty union at this institution.
    a. Has it always been this way?
        i. What caused it to change or kept it stable?
        ii. What do you think about their relationship as you just described it?

5. Please share with me examples of when the union and senate were jointly involved in decision-making? (e.g. calendar, workload, program closure)
    a. What is an example of an issue (s) that the senate referred to the union?
    b. What is an example of an issue (s) that the union referred to the senate?

6. In what circumstances or around what issues have you observed the faculty union exerting any influence on the senate?
    a. How did the influence occur? Can you describe the process or dynamics? Can you provide me with examples?

7. Given what you have reconstructed in this interview thus far, how would you define shared governance at your institution?
    a. What role do the unions play in that?

8. Is there anything else you would like to share regarding senates and unions?

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