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DO LOW STATUS GROUP MEMBERS’ IMPLICIT TEHROESI
MODERATE COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND BEHAVIORAL
REACTIONS DURING INTERGROUP INTERACTIONS?

presented by

NAO HAGIWARA

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DO LOW STATUS GROUP MEMBERS’ IMPLICIT THEORIES MODERATE
COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS DURING
INTERGROUP INTERACTIONS?

By

Nao Hagiwara

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
For the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Psychology

2006

ABSTRACT
DO LOW STATUS GROUP MEMBERS’ IMPLICIT THEORIES MODERATE
COGNITIVE, AF FECTIVE, AND BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS DURING
INTERGROUP INTERACTIONS?
By Nao Hagiwara
Individuals vary in their approaches to intergroup interactions when expecting
prejudice. Some engage in compensation, whereas others engage in
withdrawal/avoidance. This study examined whether implicit theories about human
attributes would explain this variability in responses. Seventy-three African Americans,
who completed the Implicit Person Theory measure and whose prejudice expectations
were manipulated, interacted with same-sex European Americans. The results suggest
that implicit theories did not differentially inﬂuence behavior, although incremental
theorists felt less authentic during the interaction compared to entity theorists.
Furthermore, contrary to the hypotheses, when expecting prejudice, incremental theorists
expected more negative interactions compared to entity theorists. When expecting
egalitarianism, entity theorists were liked more and induced more positive reactions from
their partner compared to incremental theorists, indicating that entity theorists
approached the interaction particularly positively. Overall, there was relatively little
evidence that low status group members’ implicit theories affect how they approach

intergroup interactions.

I would like to dedicate this to my family.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my committee members, Cheryl R. Kaiser, Deborah Kashy,
Joseph Cesario, and Nobert L. Karr for their time and thoughtful comments on my
master’s project. I would like to especially acknowledge the patience and support that
Deborah Kashy provided me throughout. She has offered much guidance not only in
statistics but also in life when I was going through a major life transition. Also, I want to
acknowledge Cheryl R. Kaiser who has continuously encouraged me to think about my

theories in a coherent manner, design my research more rigorously, and present it clearly.

I must thank my family for their support, especially my husband Brian L.
Livingston, who has given me constant support and companionship, and my parents
Junichi and Mari Hagiwara, for believing in me. I am grateful for the kindness and

understanding of my parents-in-law, Lee and Betty Livingston.

I owe thanks to my undergraduate research assistants in the Self and Social
Perception Laboratory who helped in recruiting potential participants and in collecting
data: Julianne Bender, Lindsay Brown, Lori Hale, Kathy Ong, Brett Pearce, Kristina
Ranoso, Mindy Weinbaum, and Nicole Wightman. I also want to thank the other graduate
students in the Social/Personality interest group for their support. I would like to
especially acknowledge Joan Poulsen and Kimdy Le, for Sharing their experience in

writing a thesis and for giving me great advice.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................. vii
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................. x
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1
Prejudice Expectations Lead to Intergroup Avoidance or Unconstructive
Intergroup Interactions ..................................................................... 2
Prejudice Expectations and Approach Behavior ....................................... 6
Implicit Theories about Human Attributes and Person Perception .................. 9
Moderating Role of Implicit Theories 14
High Statue Group Members’ Responses” 16
Compensatory Behaviors and Resource DepletIOn... l7
HYPOTHESES ................................................................................................................ 20
PILOT STUDIES ............................................................................................................. 22
Pilot Study 1 ......................................................................................................... 22
Pilot Study 2 ......................................................................................................... 23
PRESENT STUDY .......................................................................................................... 27
Overview .............................................................................................................. 27
METHOD ........................................................................................................................ 28
Participants ........................................................................................................... 28
Procedure ............................................................................................................. 28
Measures .............................................................................................................. 34
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS .......................................................................................... 43
Suspicion Check ................................................................................................... 45
Analysis Plan ....................................................................................................... 47
Manipulation Check ............................................................................................. 48
Preinteraction Expectations and Assumptions about Their Partner ..................... 51
Behaviors during the Interaction .......................................................................... 53
Emotions Experienced during the Interaction ...................................................... 54
Feelings of Authenticity and Self-Esteem during the Interaction ........................ 54
Liking and Enjoyment .......................................................................................... 55
Observed behaviors during the Interaction .......................................................... 56
European American Participants’ Emotions during the Interaction .................... 57
European American Participants’ Liking of Their Partner and Enjoyment of the
Interaction ............................................................................................................ 59
Cognitive Resource Depletion ............................................................................. 6O

DISCUSION .................................................................................................................... 62

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ............................................................. 69
CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................. 74
FOOTNOTES .................................................................................................................. 75
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................. 81
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 1 8O

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Frequency and Percentage for Each Scale Point of the Feeling Thermometer
Assessing Evaluations of African Americans ................................................................... 81

Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean Differences of All Measured Variables
across the Entire Sample of146 Participants .................................................................. 82

Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean Differences of All Measured Variables
by Experimental Condition and Race .............................................................................. 83

Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean Differences of Behavioral Measures
across the Entire Sample of146 Participants .................................................................. 84

Table 5. Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean Differences of All Behavioral Measures
by Experimental Condition and Race .............................................................................. 85

Table 6. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum Scores, and Maximum Scores of Stroop
Interference Score for the Entire Sample of I45 Participants ......................................... 86

Table 7. Correlations among Variables Measured during Prescreening for All
Participants ...................................................................................................................... 87

Table 8. Correlations among Self-Report Measures for All Participants ....................... 88

Table 9. Correlations among Self-Report Measures for African American Participants in
the Prejudice Condition ................................................................................................... 90

Table 10. Correlations among Self-Report Measures for African American Participants
in the Egalitarian Condition ............................................................................................ 91

Table 11. Correlations among Self-Report Measures for African American Participants
in the No Information Condition ...................................................................................... 92

Table 12. Correlations among Self-Report Measures for European American Participants
in the Prejudice Condition ............................................................................................... 93

Table 13. Correlations among Self-Report Measures for European American Participants
in the Egalitarian Condition ............................................................................................ 94

Table 14. Correlations among Self-Report Measures for European American Participants
in the No Information Condition ...................................................................................... 95

Table 15. Correlations among Behavioral Measuresfor All Participants ...................... 96

vii

Table 16. Correlations among Behavioral Measures for African American Participants in
the Prejudice Condition ................................................................................................... 97

Table 17. Correlations among Behavioral Measures for African American Participants in
the Egalitarian Condition ................................................................................................ 98

Table 18. Correlations among Behavioral Measures for African American Participants in
the No Information Condition .......................................................................................... 99

Table 19. Correlations among Behavioral Measures for European American Participants
in the Prejudice Condition ............................................................................................. 100

Table 20. Correlations among Behavioral Measures for European American Participants
in the Egalitarian Condition .......................................................................................... 101

Table 21. Correlations among Behavioral Measures for European American Participants
in the No Information Condition .................................................................................... 102

Table 22. Ejfects of Prejudice Expectation Manipulations on African American
Participants ’ Perception of Their Partner as either a Racist or an Egalitarian ........... 103

Table 23. Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Preinteraction
Expectations ................................................................................................................... 1 04

Table 24. Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Behaviors during
the Interaction ................................................................................................................ 105

Table 25. Eﬂects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Emotions during the
Interaction ...................................................................................................................... 1 06

Table 26. Eﬂects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Feelings of
Authenticity and Self-Esteem during the Interaction ..................................................... 107

Table 27. Eﬂects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on One ’s Own Liking of T heir
Partner and Enjoyment of the Interaction and Perceptions of Their Partner '3 Liking and
Enjoyment ........................................................................................................................ l 08

Table 28. Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Observed Behaviors
during the Interaction for African American Participants ............................................ 109

Table 29. Eﬂects of African American Participants ’ Prejudice Expectations and Implicit
Theories on European American Participants ’ Emotions during the Interaction ......... 1 10

Table 30. Effects of African American Participants ' Prejudice Expectations and Implicit

Theories on European American Participants ’ Liking of Their Partner and Enjoyment of the
Interaction ....................................................................................................................... 1 l 1

viii

Table 31. Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Availability of African
American Participants’ Cognitive Resources ...................................................................... 1 12

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. African American Participants ' Preinteraction Expectations — Self .............. 113
Figure 2. African American Participants ’ Preinteraction Expectations - Partner ......... 114
Figure 3. African American Participants ’ Feelings of Authenticity .............................. 115

Figure 4. European American Participants ' Positive Mood during the Interaction ...... l 16
Figure 5. European American Participants ’ Liking of Their Partner ........................... l 17

Figure 6. European American Participants ' Enjoyment of the Interaction ................... 1 l8

Do Low Status Group Members’ Implicit Theories Moderate Cognitive, Affective, and

Behavioral Reactions during Intergroup Interactions?

In contemporary North America, interactions between individuals from different
social backgrounds occur regularly in everyday life contexts such as schools, workplaces,
neighborhoods, or grocery stores. These intergroup interactions often take place between
members of groups that differ in social status (e. g., between men and women, or between
African Americans and European Americans). Social psychologists have recently started
to systematically examine the role of low status group members in intergroup interactions
(Crocker & Major, 1989; Shelton, 2000; Shelton & Richeson, 2006b; Swim & Stangor,
1998). An important area that has generated considerable theoretical and empirical work
is the effects of low status group members’ prejudice expectations on intergroup
interactions (Mendoza-Demon, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002; Miller,
Rothblum, F elicio, & Brand, 1995; Pinel, 1999; 2002; Shelton & Richeson, 2006b;
Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005; Swim & Hyers, 1999).

Recent research provides evidence that members of low status groups vary in their
beliefs and feelings about prejudice, as well as how they respond in situations where they
might face discrimination (see Major & O’Brien, 2005; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002;
Miller & Kaiser, 2001; Pinel, 1999; Shelton & Richeson, 2006b for reviews). For
example, some people try to avoid intergroup interaction when they expect to face
prejudice (Hyers & Swim, 1998; Mendoza-Demon et al., 2002; Shelton & Richeson,
2006a; Swim & Hyers, 1999), whereas other people try to be sociable and liked by their
partners in those situations (Miller et al., 1995; Shelton et al., 2005). This variability in

responses to prejudice and expectations of prejudice can have important implications for

intergroup relationships (Pinel, 2002; Shelton, 2003; Shelton et al., 2005), and therefore
identiﬁcation of moderating factors that explain response variability is an important
direction for researchers to pursue.

One factor that may affect how people respond when they expect to encounter
prejudice during an interaction is the degree to which they believe that they can impact
the quality of an interaction with their partner. That is, some individuals may think that
their interaction partner’s prejudicial views are malleable and not necessarily predictive
of negative interactions, whereas others may think that prejudicial views are immutable
and inevitably lead to negative interactions. Dweck and her colleagues (Dweck, 1999;
Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a) have suggested that a person’s implicit theories about the
stability of human attributes impact how the person understands and reacts to other
people. The present study examined the effects of expectations of prejudice and tested
the notion that an individual’s implicit theories about human attributes moderate their
behaviors. More specifically, the present study examined how low status group
members’ implicit theories about human attributes would differentially shape affective,
cognitive, and behavioral outcomes during intergroup interactions.

Prejudice Expectations Lead to Intergroup Avoidance or Unconstructive Intergroup
Interactions

A majority of research on low status group members’ responses to prejudice
demonstrates that expecting to be the target of prejudice results in efforts to avoid
intergroup interactions (Cohen & Swim, 1995; Hyers & Swim, 1998; Mendoza-Demon et
al., 2002; Pinel, 1999; 2002; Shelton & Richeson, 2006a; Swim & Hyers, 1999). For

instance, Swim and Hyers (1999) found that women tend to withdraw from social

interactions with men who express sexism. In this study, female participants interacted in
a group discussion with other students (who were actually confederates). During the task,
one male confederate made either three sexist remarks or equally offensive non-sexist
remarks, and the researchers then observed how the women reacted to the man who made
these remarks. Although virtually all of the women reported that the sexist remarks were
indeed offensive (this was assessed in self-reports after the interaction was completed),
only 16 percent of the women verbally approached the man about his remarks. The most
common reaction (55 percent) was ignoring the comments altogether. These results
illustrate that, when they are faced with prejudice, low status group members often turn
away from or avoid the problem and the riskiness of confrontation.

In another study, Shelton and Richeson (2006a) asked ethnic minority participants
about the quantity and quality of their interactions with a close, same-sex White friend.
Speciﬁcally, participants were asked to answer questions about how much contact they
had with their friend, how the quality of the interaction with their friend was compared to
their other friendships, and how comfortable they were discussing personal information
including race-related information with their White friend. They found that the more
ethnic minorities expected Whites to be prejudiced, the less contact they had with their
White friends, the less positively they described their contact with their White friends,
and the less comfortable they felt when they interacted with White friends. Again, this
study suggests that expecting to be the target of prejudice is associated with efforts to
avoid or disengage from intergroup interactions for low status group members.

Mendoza-Demon et a1. (2002) also examined how prejudice expectations can lead

to disengagement among African American college students who attended a

predominantly White university. In their study, Mendoza-Demon et a1. (2002)
longitudinally examined whether African American students’ prejudice expectations were
related to their experiences at the university. They found that the more African American
students expected to be the target of racism at the beginning of an academic year, the
more discomfort they experienced during the college transition and the more they
avoided contexts and activities that were designed to address academic problems and
questions (e.g., meetings with professors and teaching assistants). Thus, this study, once
again, demonstrates that low status group members are apt to avoid interactions and
contexts where they might face prejudice.

In Pinel’s study (1999, Study 6), female participants who were high or low in
stigma consciousness (the expectations that one will be the target of prejudice; high
stigma consciousness is associated with more prejudice expectations) were told that they
would be competing against either a man or a woman in a J eopardy-like game and asked
to rate the extent to which they liked the possible Jeopardy topics and the extent to which
they would like to be quizzed on each topic. Pinel (1999, Study 6) found that women
high in stigma consciousness rated stereotypically male topics (e. g., automobile names,
the military) less favorably and avoided them more when they believed that they would
be competing against a male student than when they believed that they would be
competing against a female student. On the other hand, the sex of their competitor did
not have effects on the preference of women with low stigma consciousness. Although
women high in stigma consciousness are not avoiding the interaction per se in this case,

these ﬁndings suggest that they did try to prevent being stereotyped by changing the

interaction context (by choosing “safe” topics for them and avoiding speciﬁc interaction
context) when there is a potential risk of being the target of prejudice.

However, individuals are not always able to avoid or withdraw from interactions
with prejudiced others or to choose interaction contexts. Sometimes they must engage in
these situations, even when they might have preferred to avoid the situation. Some
research suggests that interactions such as these are likely to go poorly. For example,
Pinel (2002) examined the effects of stigma consciousness on low status group members’
actual behavior when they were unable to avoid an intergroup interaction with high status
group members. In this study, female participants, who were either high or low in stigma
consciousness, were paired with a male participant for a joint task in which they needed
to decide which of several applicants should be awarded a journalism prize. Before they
started the actual task, the female participants were informed that their male partner was
either sexist, non-sexist, or were given no information about their partner’s gender
attitudes. Next, both the women and their male partners provided written decisions about
the applicant whom they believed should receive the prize, and they then evaluated each
other’s decision. Pine] (2002) found that women who were high in stigma consciousness
expected interactions with a sexist man to go poorly and reacted more negatively toward
the men (when evaluating the men’s decisions). More speciﬁcally, women high in
stigma consciousness who believed their partner to be sexist rated the quality of a
decision essay more negatively and disagreed with the decision, compared to women low
in stigma consciousness or women high in stigma consciousness who did not believe
their partner to be sexist. Women’s negative behaviors toward their male partner in turn

led the male partner to react negatively towards them, which conﬁrmed their beliefs that

their male interaction partner was sexist. This did not occur in situations where high
stigma conscious females did not expect to face prejudice (their interaction partner was
either a neutral or a liberal man). Additionally, although low stigma conscious female
participants also showed negative reactions towards their sexist partner, their negative
behavior was not strong enough to induce negative reactions from their male partner
toward them. Taken together, a number of studies suggest that low status group
members’ prejudice expectations can be detrimental for successful intergroup interactions.
Prejudice Expectations and Approach Behavior

Despite accumulating evidence that prejudice expectations have negative
consequences for intergroup interactions, this is not always the case. A smaller body of
recent research has shown that sometimes low status group members who expect to be
the target of prejudice actually approach intergroup interactions and try to facilitate
interactions with those who might be prejudiced toward their group by using socially
skillful behaviors (Miller & Kaiser, 2001; Miller & Myers, 1998; Kaiser, & Miller, 2001;
Miller et al., 1995; Shelton etal., 2005). For example, Miller et al. (1995) had obese and
non-obese women converse with a partner by telephone. Of importance, the women were
told that they were either visible or non-visible to their partner (when in reality they all
were visible to their partner). After the interaction, the partners were asked to rate the
women’s social skills. They found that obese women who thought their partner could see
them (and thus might have expected to be the target of weight prejudice) actually
received better ratings on their social skills than obese women who thought their partner
could not see them (and thus could not have been the target of weight prejudice). This

pattern was not observed for non-obese women. Miller et al. (1995) argue that this

indicates that obese women who thought their weight might have caused problems used
compensatory strategies (i.e., behaved in a more socially skilled manner) to prevent
weight prejudice during the interaction.

Recent research by Shelton et al. (2005) found similar effects among ethnic
minorities. In their ﬁrst study, they had ethnic minority students complete the Stigma
Consciousness Scale-Race, (which assesses ethnic minorities’ concerns with how much
they expect to be stereotyped based on their ethnicity) during the ﬁrst week of the
academic year. Next, participants completed a daily questionnaire for 15 days regarding
the dynamics of their interactions with their White or ethnic minority roommates (the
roommates had been randomly assigned), including questions about self-disclosure and
authenticity. Shelton et al. (2005) argued that self-disclosure is indicative of
compensatory behavior for interactions with potentially prejudiced individuals because
this behavior has been found to facilitate smooth interactions with others (Fehr, 2002;
Laurenceau, Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998; Reis & Shaver, 1988). Furthermore,
selective self-disclosure aimed at preventing prejudice might result in the feeling that one
is engaging in self-monitoring and hence being less authentic. Indeed, Shelton et al.
(2005) found that ethnic minorities who expected to be the target of prejudice used more
self-disclosure and felt less authentic during their interactions with their White
roommates, but not with their ethnic minority roommates, indicating that ethnic
minorities behaved in a more socially constructive manner towards their White
roommates when they were concerned about being the targets of prejudice.

Shelton et a1. (2005, Study 2) replicated these ﬁndings in a laboratory setting

where they manipulated ethnic minority participants’ prejudice expectations. They made

prejudice expectancies salient for a half of the ethnic minority participants by having
them read a newspaper article describing the prevalence of prejudice and discrimination
against ethnic minority populations. The other half of the participants read a control
article describing the prevalence of prejudice and discrimination against the elderly.
After reading the articles, participants interacted with a same-sex White participant for 10
minutes and then completed questionnaires including measures of self-disclosure and
feelings of authenticity. They found that ethnic minority participants who were primed
with prejudice against ethnic minorities reported that they were more engaged and less
authentic during the interaction, compared to those participants who were primed with
prejudice against the elderly. This was also conﬁrmed by videotaped verbal and
nonverbal behaviors. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that low status group
members sometimes behave particularly positively when they expect to be the target of
prejudice. These positive, or compensatory behaviors, might occur because low status
group members are attempting to achieve desired interpersonal outcomes (e. g., being
liked, having a smooth interaction) despite prejudice. Compensation might also be aimed
at preventing others from using stereotypes or perhaps even at reducing the other
person’s prejudice.

Research on targets’ responses to prejudice expectancies clearly sends mixed
messages about how low status group members behave when they expect to face
prejudice, with some studies showing avoidance/disinterested behaviors and others
showing approach/constructive behaviors. How might we reconcile these divergent
behaviors observed in the literature? The present study argues that implicit theories

about human attributes provide one way to answer this question.

Implicit Theories about Human Attributes and Person Perception

Implicit theories about human attributes refer to frameworks that people use to
interpret and evaluate their social world (Dweck, 1999; Dweck et al., 1995a; Hong,
Coleman, Wong, Chiu, Hansen, Lee, et al., 2004). People’s implicit theories about
human attributes guide them in understanding and reacting to other people and thus are
important contributors to person perception and social interactions (Dweck et al., 1995a;
Hong et al., 2004). There are two general types of implicit theories about human
attributes: an entity theory and an incremental theory. People who endorse an entity
theory tend to believe that personal attributes are ﬁxed and that people’s characteristics
are static, stable, and hard to change (Chui, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck eta1., 1995a;
Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001; Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 2005). On the other
hand, people who endorse an incremental theory tend to believe that personal attributes
are malleable and that people’s characteristics are dynamic, somewhat unstable, and
amenable to change (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy et al., 2001; Plaks et al.,
2005). Moreover, whereas entity theorists tend to believe that people can be understood
by their stable attributes and traits, incremental theorists tend to believe that people can
best be understood by the interaction of traits and social contexts, such as needs, goals,
intentions, emotional states, and prior behaviors (Dweck et al., 1995a; Chiu et al., 1997;
Levy, Stoessner, & Dweck, 1998; Levy et al., 2001). For instance, entity theorists may
blame levels of intelligence when individuals receive bad grades, whereas incremental
theorists may take into account strategies used or environmental factors (e.g., loud noise,
high temperature, or bad lighting) that might have caused individuals to receive bad

grades (Dweck et al., 1995a).

Considerable theoretical and empirical research demonstrates that entity and
incremental theorists experience different affective, cognitive, and behavioral
consequences during interpersonal interactions. Compared to incremental theorists,
entity theorists encode incoming person information in a more evaluative manner, and
when evaluating others, they invest more meaning in traits, evaluate whether traits are
positive or negative, and make judgments of others who display those traits based on the
valence (either positive or negative) attached to the traits (Chiu et al., 1997; Karafantis &
Levy, 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998). Thus, entity theorists attach more
meaning to others’ positive and negative characteristics than do incremental theorists
(Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998). On the other hand,
incremental theorists rely less on traits and seek to understand people in terms of context-
sensitive terms (Levy et al., 1998; Levy et al., 2001). Therefore, to one who holds an
entity theory, understanding human actions and outcomes involves diagnosing the actor’s
traits, whereas for one who holds an incremental theory, the actor’s overall character is
not as important as social forces (Dweck et al., 1995a).

For instance, in one study (Levy & Dweck , 1999, Study 2), children were
exposed to information about students at another school who were portrayed as either
positive or negative. The students from a “positive” school were described with six nice
behaviors (e.g., “One kid returned the money she saw a classmate drop on the ﬂoor.”)
and three neutral behaviors (e.g., “One kid took a pen out of the front pocket of his
knapsack,”), while the students from a “negative” school were described with six mean
behaviors (e.g., “One kid would not take turns playing the video game with a classmate”)

and three neutral behaviors. Levy and Dweck (1999) found that relative to children who

10

endorsed an incremental theory, children who endorsed an entity theory exhibited more
favorable overall assessments of individual students they had read about belonging to the
“positive” school and more negative assessments of individual students belonging to the
“negative” school. Thus, these ﬁndings demonstrate that entity and incremental theorists
differentially rely on trait evaluations in forming judgments of others.

Similarly, accumulating evidence indicates that entity and incremental theorists’
differential reliance on the importance of traits is associated with stereotyping-related
person perception processes (Hong et al., 2004; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995b; Levy &
Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 2001; Levy et al., 1998; Plaks et al., 2005; Plaks, Stroessner,
Dweck, & Sherman, 2001). For instance, in Levy et al.’s study (1998, Study 1), college
students were asked to list all the stereotypes (positive, negative, neutral) they knew
about several ethnic groups and then to evaluate how true they personally thought each
one was. They found that although both entity and incremental theorists generated the
same number of stereotypes and agreed on the evaluative connotations of those
stereotypes, entity theorists more strongly believed that all of the stereotypes (especially
negative and positive stereotypes) reﬂect real group differences among those ethnic
groups than did incremental theorists.

Likewise, people who endorse an entity theory not only ﬁnd stereotypes more
meaningful, but they also more readily use these expectancies when evaluating others
(Hong et al., 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999). Levy and Dweck (1999, Study 2) found in
their study that, when children were asked to judge an unknown student from a
“negative” school, those who were entity theorists expected the unknown student to be

relatively “mean” and “bad,” whereas children who were incremental theorists showed

11

neutral feelings towards the unknown student. Therefore, it is suggested that the
impression that entity theorists formed of a group of students characterized by mostly
negative behaviors was extended to the entire school, even to students who were not
described in the original experimental stimuli. Additionally, Hong et a1. (2004, Study 1)
found that residents of Hong Kong who endorsed an entity theory tended to attribute
more negative behaviors to residents of Mainland China than to other residents of Hong
Kong (50.0% and 24.5%, respectively), compared to those who endorsed an incremental
theory (41.0% and 29.0%, respectively), suggesting that entity theorists tend to expect
more stereotype-based behaviors from residents of Mainland Chinese‘. Taken together, it
appears that entity theorists ﬁnd stereotypes useful and meaningful when they try to
understand and evaluate people; thus, they readily use more stereotypes in person
perception.

These differences between entity and incremental theorists’ evaluations of others
are apt to inﬂuence their behavior during interactions and lead entity and incremental
theorists to approach social interactions with different types of strategies. Because entity
theorists are more likely than incremental theorists to form trait judgments and view these
traits as especially meaningful, they should exhibit more positive responses to people
with positive traits and more negative responses to people with negative traits (Karafantis
& Levy, 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 2001; Levy et al., 1998). Speciﬁcally,
once entity theorists have judged someone as possessing a negative trait, they may
withdraw from interactions with that person altogether. Altematively, if they do approach
such interactions, they may do so in a disinterested way because they believe that there is

nothing they can do to change that person or make the situation more positive (Dweck et

12

al., 1995a; Karafantis & Levy, 2004). In contrast, incremental theorists may be more
willing to approach interactions with people who possess negative traits in a constructive
manner, relative to entity theorists, because they believe that people can change through
effort and learning and that their partner’s negative characteristics are not inevitably
going to ruin the interaction (Dweck et al., 1995a; Karafantis & Levy, 2004). Indeed,
empirical evidence supports these claims.

For instance, Levy and Dweck (1999, Study 1) had children learn about students
at an unfamiliar school who had a reputation for undesirable behavior and then respond to
questionnaires which included questions about their willingness to socialize with those
students. Results suggested that even though both entity and incremental theorists did not
want to socialize much with students with negative traits, children who endorsed an entity
theory were much less willing to interact with them, compared to those who endorsed an
incremental theory. These results support the argument that entity theorists tend to avoid
or withdraw from interactions with a person whom they believe possesses negative traits,
while incremental theorists are less eager to avoid such a person.

In a separate study, Levy and her associate examined whether entity theorists and
incremental theorists actually show different behavioral patterns during intergroup
interactions. For instance, in their ﬁrst study, Karafantis and Levy (2004) had elementary
school children complete a questionnaire packet which consisted of measures of their
attitudes toward homeless children, of past volunteerism, and of their implicit theories.

In addition, in their second study, they assessed children’s actual volunteer behavior
toward UNICEF-funded children as well as their attitudes towards that group. In both

studies, Karafantis and Levy (2004) found that children who endorsed an entity theory

13

showed less positive attitudes toward and were less willing to volunteer to work with
members of devalued social groups (i.e., homeless people and UNICEF-funded children)
relative to children who endorsed an incremental theory. These results suggest that
believing that traits are static and difﬁcult to change makes volunteering to work with
members of devalued groups seem of limited value, because it implies that these
individuals are unlikely to experience improvements in their condition. In contrast,
children who endorsed an incremental theory reported more liking towards and desire for
more social contact with these disadvantaged social groups. Furthermore, they engaged
in more actual volunteer activities aimed at improving the group’s condition. These
results suggest that believing in the malleability of human attributes contributes towards a
proactive approach toward solving social problems.

As these studies demonstrate, implicit theories about human attributes can play an
important role in understanding people’s reactions to other people of the same social
status and in high status group members’ reactions to members of low status groups. The
present study argues that implicit theories about human attributes should also affect low
status group members’ perspectives toward high status group members. The critical
question here is whether low status group members’ implicit theories about human
attributes moderate how they approach the intergroup interactions when they expect to
face prejudice.

Moderating Role of Implicit Theories

By integrating theory and research on implicit theories and responses to prejudice,

the present study argues that implicit theories will inﬂuence how low status group

members interpret and evaluate the implications of high status group mernbers’

l4

intergroup attitudes, which in turn might induce different behavioral strategies during
intergroup interactions. Speciﬁcally, because entity theorists believe that human traits
are ﬁxed and particularly meaningful in understanding people, they might interpret high
status group members’ intergroup attitudes as having especially important implications
for the quality of intergroup interactions. That is, they may perceive prejudiced people as
possessing a negative belief system that is ﬁxed and cannot be changed, and they may be
apt to expect negative intergroup experiences with those people. Thus, when an
interaction with a prejudiced person becomes imminent, entity theorists may believe that
attempting to engage in compensatory behaviors during the interaction is of limited utility,
and these individuals might be apt to avoid such interactions altogether, or they may
engage in the interaction in a disinterested manner. In contrast, when entity theorists
interact with high status group members who hold positive, egalitarian intergroup
attitudes, they may be especially likely to engage in approach behaviors because they
may perceive egalitarian people as possessing a ﬁxed positive belief system. Therefore,
they may perceive the high status group members’ egalitarian attitudes as indicative of
positive, successful interaction.

On the other hand, because incremental theorists believe that people’s attitudes
are malleable and can be changed, they might be less apt to view high status group
members’ intergroup attitudes as indicative of the subsequent nature of intergroup
interactions. That is, incremental theorists might perceive prejudiced people as possessing
a negative belief system that is more malleable and not necessarily predictive of negative
intergroup behaviors. Furthermore, incremental theorists might believe that by

approaching interactions with prejudiced people in a constructive, positive manner, they

15

may be able to change the negative attitudes of high status group members or at least
prevent the interaction from becoming problematic. Indeed, Shelton et al. (2005) argue
that, in order to approach intergroup interactions in a constructive manner, the targets of
prejudice must be motivated to engage in compensatory strategies and believe that using
these strategies will result in the desired outcomes-~both of which are characteristics of
individuals who endorse an incremental theory (Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy et al.,
2001). When interacting with egalitarian high status group members, incremental
theorists will likely feel positive about the potential for a positive relationship and tend to
approach the interaction. However, this behavior should be less pronounced among
incremental theorists relative to entity theorists, because incremental theorists place less
meaning on egalitarian attitudes in predicting the success of the interaction.
High Status Group Members ’Responses

Would the manner in which entity and incremental theorists approach intergroup
interactions also inﬂuence the high status partners with whom they interact? Indeed, low
status group members’ behaviors do convey meaningful information during intergroup
interactions and the more positively ethnic minorities behave, the more smoothly the
interaction should go (Shelton & Richeson, 2006b; Shelton et al., 2005; Pinel, 2002).
As Merton (1948) ﬁrst argued, when people act on their expectations about others, these
others oftentimes end up conﬁrming the expectations (Curtis & Miller, 1986; Fazio,
Effrein, & Falender, 1981; Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998; Ickes, Patterson,
Rajecki, & Tanford, 1982). Thus, high status group members should react positively
towards their interaction partners when their low status group partners engage in

compensatory strategies, and this process should lead to constructive, positive intergroup

l6

interactions. On the other hand, high status group members should react negatively when
their low status group partners disengage from, avoid, or otherwise behave unfavorably,
and this process should lead to unconstructive and negative interactions. Indeed, Shelton
et al. (2005) found that European American participants who interacted with ethnic
minority participants who expected to face prejudice (and subsequently engaged in
compensatory strategies during the intergroup interaction) reported that they liked their
minority interaction partners better, experienced less negative affect, and enjoyed the
interaction more than European American participants who interacted with ethnic
minority participants not primed with prejudice expectations. Additionally, Pinel (2002)
found that women who reacted in an offensive manner towards sexist men experienced
reciprocal offensive behavior in return from these men. Thus, the target’s expectations
about their partners’ attitudes might play an important role in understanding how their
partners behave during intergroup interactions.
Compensatory Behaviors and Resource Depletion

The literature on resource depletion models of executive function suggests that
engaging in one task that requires self-regulation temporarily impairs people’s capacity to
engage in another task because executive function is thought to be a limited resource
(Engle, Conway, Tuholski, & Shisler, 1995; Hartley & Adams, 1974; Muraven &
Baumeister, 2000; Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Because compensatory strategies require
more behavioral control and self-regulation than avoidance or disengagement (Miller &
Myers, 1998), it is suggested that engaging in compensatory behaviors would impair
people’s capacity to perform another task that also requires cognitive resources. Indeed,

previous research examining people’s cognitive outcomes after interracial interactions

17

found that increasing the self-regulatory demands of an interracial interaction led to
greater interference on a Stroop task; a task that is known to require executive function
(Richeson & Trawalter, 2005; Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Richeson, Trawalter, &
Shelton, 2005).

For example, Richeson and Shelton (2003) had European American participants
with either higher or lower levels of racial prejudice interact with European American or
African American partners before they completed a color-naming Stroop test. They
found that high-prejudiced European American participants who interacted with an
Aﬁican American confederate (and thus had to engage in self-regulatory effort to behave
non-prejudicially) had impaired performance on the Stroop task compared to both high-
prejudiced European American who interacted with a European American confederate
and low-prejudiced European Americans (who presumable did not need to engage in as
much self-regulation) who interacted with either an African American or European
American partner (see also Richeson and Trawalter (2005) for conceptual replications of
this effect with a manipulation of self-regulatory demands during intergroup interactions).

These ﬁndings were further supported by a study which examined the impact of
interracial contact on executive function using fMRI technology (Richeson, Baird,
Gordon, Heartherton, Wyland, Trawalter et al., 2003). They presented unfamiliar
Aﬁican American male faces to European American participants and assessed activity in
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which has been found to be a critical brain region for
executive control (Cohen, Botvinick, & Carter, 2000; Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994;
Kane & Engle, 2002; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Smith & J onides, 1999). Richeson et al.

(2003) found that racial bias measured with the IAT predicted activity in the right

18

dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in response to the faces, such that the more European
American participants displayed racial bias, the more activity was found in the critical
brain region for executive control. In addition, they found that activity in the right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was correlated with Stroop interference that was assessed
after an actual interracial interaction in a separate session. In sum, these studies suggest
that tasks that require self-regulation (e. g., compensatory behaviors) lead to cognitive
depletion. Because low status group members who endorse an incremental theory might
be more willing to engage in compensatory strategies when they expect to face prejudice,

they should also show cognitive depletion after intergroup interactions.

19

Hypotheses

Drawing on the research described above, it was hypothesized that members of
socially devalued groups who endorse an incremental theory would attempt to
compensate when they expect to interact with a prejudiced partner. That is, they would
approach the interaction by displaying more positive affective and behavioral reactions
towards their partner relative to members of devalued groups who endorse an entity
theory. As a consequence, partners who interact with an incremental theorist should
experience less negative affect, enjoy the interaction more, and like their partner more
relative to those who interact with an entity theorist.

On the other hand, when individuals expect to interact with an egalitarian partner,
members of socially devalued social groups who endorse an entity theory might more
readily approach the interaction compared to members of socially devalued social groups
who endorse an incremental theory. For example entity theorists may approach the
interaction with more positive affective and behavioral reactions toward their partner.
This should occur because entity theorists are apt to see their partner’s egalitarian
attitudes as a more meaningful sign that they will react favorably during the interaction.
As a consequence, partners who interact with an entity theorist should experience less
negative affect, enjoy the interaction more, and like their partner more compared to the
egalitarian individual who interacts with an incremental theorist.

When low status group members do not have any expectation about their
interaction partner’s attitudes towards their social group, both entity and incremental
theorists should display similarly neutral or slightly positive behaviors towards their

partner. This should occur because when individuals do not have information about their

20

partners, they usually try to make a good ﬁrst impression. In fact, Snyder and Haugen
(1995) suggest that a desire to get along with one’s interaction partner is one primary
motivation that may be engaged in getting-acquainted situations. They argue that when
people are in the initial interaction phase, they try to ensure smooth and coordinated
interactions with their partners.

The present study also looked at cognitive consequences of intergroup
interactions for low status group members. It was hypothesized that incremental
theorists who interacted with a prejudiced high status group partners would have less
cognitive capacity after the interactions than entity theorists, because the former group
should engage in compensatory behaviors that require more self-regulation, thus more
cognitive resources and energy. On the other hand, entity theorists who interact with
egalitarian high status group partners should not experience cognitive depletion, because
they do not have to “compensate” for their stereotypes but simply need to create positive

impressions (thus requiring less self-regulation).

21

Pilot Studies

Two pilot studies were conducted to ensure that the manipulation of prejudice
expectations (i.e., whether their European American partner would be either prejudiced
toward African Americans or egalitarian) used in the experiment would be believable to
African American students and effectively inﬂuence their expectations about their
interaction partner. In addition, these pilot studies were used to ensure that African
American students’ implicit theories about human attributes would not moderate the
effect of the manipulation of prejudice expectations. In other words, the pilot studies
examined whether entity and incremental theorists would similarly interpret the
manipulation.
Pilot Study 1

Pilot Study 1 sought to examine what college-age individuals’ racial attitudes are
like on average and was used to determine scores used for prejudice manipulation. White
participants (N = 225, age M = 19.21, SD = 1.36 years old, Women = 76.6 %) were asked
to complete a measure of racial attitudes toward African Americans (i.e., the Feeling
Thermometer) over the Internet, which was imbedded among other social categories,
such as White Americans, teachers, and Christians. More speciﬁcally, participants were
asked to rate their feelings towards each social group on a scale from 0 to 100, where the
lower numbers represent the colder or less favorable feelings and the higher numbers
represent the warmer or more favorable feelings toward that group.

Frequency results for African American targets are presented in Table 1. On
average people expressed fairly favorable feelings toward African Americans (M = 71.79,

SD = 21.21), which is consistent with the previous ﬁndings that European Americans are

22

well aware of the social norm that discourages people from expressing racial prejudice
(Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002) and that they sometimes show positive bias
‘ toward African Americans when responding to self-report measures of racial attitudes
(Harber, 1998). Because the majority of people expressed favorable attitudes toward
Aﬁican Americans, an individual may need to score extremely high on the feeling
thermometer scale to be considered as “an egalitarian.” In contrast, because only 9.8 %
of the participants responded with scores of 40 or less, an individual may not need to
score extremely low on the scale to be considered as “prejudiced.” Indeed, very low
scores on the scale might not be believable for the average person.
Pilot Study 2

Pilot Study 2 was conducted to examine whether a score of 40 and a score of 90
would effectively manipulate African Americans’ perceptions of European Americans as
prejudiced or egalitarian, respectively. This study also examined whether individuals’
implicit theories would moderate the effect of the manipulation of the European
American student’s racial attitudes. Only Aﬁican American students were recruited to
participate in this study (N = 88, Women = 77.3%). Participants were asked to complete
a measure of implicit theories about human attributes ﬁrst. They were then asked to
imagine that a European American MSU student was asked to rate his/her feelings
toward Aﬁican Americans and scored either 40, 70, or 90 on the feeling thermometer
scale. A feeling thermometer score of 40 was chosen to indicate prejudiced attitudes
because a prior preliminary study suggested that a score of 30 might be unbelievably low
to European Americans and Pilot Study 1 suggested that that most individuals who

expressed unfavorable attitudes toward Aﬁican Americans scored 40 on the feeling

23

thermometer scale (10 out of 16). The score of 70 was added to examine whether scores
of 40 and 90 were signiﬁcantly different from “the average” attitudes toward Aﬁican
Americans and were therefore “more prejudiced” or “more egalitarian” than the average,
neutral score (i.e., neither prejudiced nor egalitarian). The score of 70 was chosen as a
neutral score instead of a score of 60 because it was the actual average score and because
it is more convincing that a score of 90 actually indicates egalitarian attitudes if it is
different from 70 (which itself seems fairly high) than a score of 60 (which is close to the
midpoint of the feeling thermometer scale). The order of these three conditions were
counterbalanced, so that some participants were asked to rate the student who scored 90
on the feeling thermometer scale ﬁrst, some participants were asked to rate the student
who scored 70 on the scale ﬁrst, and the rest of the participants were asked to rate the
student who scored 40 on the scale ﬁrst (see Appendix A for the actual survey).

A mixed-design ANOVA using a Geisser-Greenhouse correction was conducted
with the European American student’s racial attitudes as a within-subject factor, and the
presentation order of racial attitudes and centered Implicit Theories as between-subjects
factors. The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of the manipulation of the
European American student’s racial attitudes, F(2,186) = 72.92, MSE = 1.94, p < .001.
A paired samples t-test revealed that the student who scored 40 was perceived as more
prejudiced (M = 1.86, SD = 1.40), on a scale ranging from 0 (Very Prejudiced) to 6 (Very
Egalitarian), than the student who scored 70 (M = 3.13, SD = 1.10), t(96) = 7.57, p < .001 ,
and that the student who scored 90 was perceived as more egalitarian (M = 4.02, SD =
1.27) than the student who scored 70, t(96) = 9.68, p < .001. The main effect of Implicit

Theory, F (1,93) = .85, MSE = 1.50, p = .36, and the main effect of presentation order,

24

F(1,93) = 1.12, MSE = 1.50, p = .33, were not signiﬁcant. Although there was no
interaction between the prejudice manipulation and implicit theories, F (2,1 86) = .07,
MSE = 1.94, p = .90, there was a signiﬁcant interaction between the prejudice
manipulation and the order, F (4,1 86) = 2.80, MSE = 1.94, p < .05, indicating that the
participants’ perceptions of the target student’s racial attitudes differed depending on the
order of the presentation.

In order to further examine the effect of the order of the presentation, a one-way
ANOVA with a Tukey HSD post hoc test was conducted. The results showed that
participants perceived the student who scored 40 as more prejudiced when they rated the
student after rating the student who scored 90 (M = 1.28, SD = 1.22), compared to when
they rated the student before rating the student who scored 90 (M = 2.19, SD = 1.58).
However, it is important to note that each condition showed the same pattern, such that
score 90 was always perceived as more egalitarian than score 70, which was always
perceived as more egalitarian than score 40.

Next, believability of the European American student’s racial attitudes was
examined. A mixed-design ANOVA with a Geisser-Greenhouse correction revealed no
main effects for the prejudice manipulation, F (2,1 82) = 1.80, MSE = 2.21, p = .17,
Implicit Theory, F (1,91) =.67, MSE = 4.38, p = .42, or presentation order, F(2,91) = .68,
MSE = 4.3 8, p = .51. The results also showed neither an interaction between prejudice
manipulation and implicit theories, F(2,182) = .78, MSE = 2.21, p = .45, nor an
interaction between prejudice manipulation and the order of presentation F(4,182) = 1.40,
MSE = 2.21, p = .24. Taken together, the results suggest that the manipulation of the

European American student’s racial attitudes works as intended and that implicit theories

25

do not moderate the effect of the manipulation. Although there was an order effect on the
perception of the European American student’s racial attitudes, because the order of three
conditions was not fully counterbalanced (i.e., there were only three different orders
instead of all six possible orders; 40-90-70, 70-40-90, or 90-70-40) and each condition
showed the same pattern (i.e., score 90 was always perceived as more egalitarian than
score 70, and score 70 was always perceived as more egalitarian than score 40), the
actual experiment used a score of 40 and a score of 90 as indications of prejudiced

attitudes and egalitarian attitudes respectively.

26

Present Study

Overview

The primary goal of this study was to examine how Aﬁican American participants
react to interracial interactions when expecting to be the target of prejudice and whether
Aﬁican American participants’ implicit theories about human attributes moderate the
effects of prejudice expectations on their feelings and behaviors during the interracial
interaction. In this study, same-sex African American and European American
participants, who had completed a measure of implicit theories before reporting to the
laboratory session, were paired and asked to interact for 10 minutes. Before the
interaction, African American participants were provided with false information about
their partner’s racial attitudes. One third of the participants were given information that
was designed to lead them to believe that their European American partner was
prejudiced against African Americans. Another third of the participants were provided
with information designed to lead them to believe that their partner held egalitarian
attitudes. Participants in a control group were not provided with information about their
partner’s racial attitudes. The 10 minute interaction was video-taped, and afterwards
participants completed a series of questionnaires conceming the interaction and their
interaction partner. Finally, participants separately completed a Stroop task, which was

used to measure cognitive resources left after the interracial interaction.

27

Method
Participants

Seventy-three Aﬁican American (Age M = 19.31, SD = 1.29 years old with
missing data for two participants, Women = 68.5%), and 73 European American students
(Age M = 18.89, SD = .91 years old with three missing data, Women = 68.5%)
participated in the study. Two of the African American participants identiﬁed themselves
as multiracial/other. In addition, one person in the European American group identiﬁed
herself as Latino American, one participant identiﬁed herself as Native American, one
participant identiﬁed himself as multiracial/other, and one participant identiﬁed herself as
an international student. All participants were recruited from the Psychology Subject
Pool and the larger campus community to participate in this studyz.

Procedure

At least one day prior to participating in the study, all participants completed the
Implicit Person Theories Measure (Chiu et al., 1997), the Self-Esteem Measure
(Rosenberg, 1979), and mood measures as a part of an online prescreening session3’ 4‘ 5.
This study was a between-subjects design, involving one factor with three levels (African
Americans’ expectations of European Americans’ racial attitudes: racist, no information,
egalitarian) and one continuous factor (African Americans’ implicit theories).

One Aﬁican American and two European American participants, who were same-
sex, were recruited for each session. Experimenters, who were blind to experimental
condition, called potential participants who were listed on the Psychology Subject Pool
Website or who expressed interest in the study earlier in the semester", brieﬂy explained

the study, and asked whether they were interested in signing up for a session. When

28

participants agreed to sign up for a session on the phone, and after experimenter
conﬁrmed participants’ race and gender, experimenters organized laboratory sessions
such that one Aﬁican American and two European American same-sex students were
placed in one session. At the end of the phone conversation with participants,
experimenters instructed them to complete the online questionnaires (see Appendix B)
before they came to a laboratory session.

Two European American participants were recruited for one session because it is
harder to recruit Aﬁican American participants than European American participants and
because it made it possible to have a session even when one of the two signed-up
European American participants did not show up to a laboratory session. When all
participants showed up for a session, one European American participant was randomly
chosen to participate in this study and the other European American participant was
asked to participate in an unrelated study which was being conducted simultaneously in
the Self and Social Perception Laboratory. When the Aﬁican American participant did
not show up to the session, both European American participants were asked to
participate in the other, unrelated study.

Participants reported to the laboratory for a study purportedly addressing “serial
cognition,” which was the same cover story used in Shelton et al.’s study (2005).
Participants were individually seated in a private cubicle equipped with a computer.
Following the procedures used in Shelton et al. (2005), participants were told that the
study focused on the inﬂuence of one cognitive task on a subsequent cognitive task when
there is a delay between the two. Furthermore, the experimenter explained that it was

critical to have about a 15-minute delay between the two tasks, so participants would be

29

participating in another study ostensibly conducted by another graduate student that
would examine psychology of impression formation. Participants learned that they
would be interacting with another participant, who was also participating in the “serial
cognition” study, for about ten minutes. Participants were told that their job was to
provide their impressions of the interaction partner and about aspects of the interaction
more generally. To make the cover story more believable, participants received a new
consent form for the “second study.”

After participants completed the ﬁrst cognitive task (actually a ﬁller task) which
involved reading and summarizing a short newspaper article about tortoises, another
experimenter appeared and explained that the second study would focus on examining
how people usually interact with another person under limited time. The experimenter
told only African American participants that we were also interested in whether having
information about one’s partner inﬂuences the interaction. All African American
participants were told that they were randomly assigned to receive information about
their interaction partner. In contrast, European American participants were simply told
that the study examined how people interact with another person, and none of the
European American participants were told that experimenters were interested in the
effects of information at all.

In actuality, unbeknownst to the participants, the European Americans’ personal
information was replaced with one of three versions of a manipulation intended to convey
either racist attitudes, egalitarian attitudes, or no information about their racial attitudes.
The experimenter delivered one of the three versions of the “European American

students’ attitudes” to their Aﬁican American partner (see Appendix C). All African

30

American participants learned that their interaction partner was a same-sex European
American student. In the racist condition, European American participants’ attitude
survey indicated a “cold” score (i.e., 40) on feeling thermometers about African
Americans, indicating that they feel unfavorable toward Aﬁican Americans. In the
egalitarian condition, European American participants’ attitude survey indicated “warm”
scores (i.e., 90) on the feeling thermometer, indicating that they possess favorable
attitudes toward African Americans. In the no information condition, African American
participants did not receive racial attitude information so that they had no prior
expectations about their partners’ level of prejudice. In order to avoid making the study’s
purpose obvious, racial attitudes toward African Americans were imbedded among other
social attitudes items (i.e., White Americans, lawyers, doctors, and teachers)7. Also, the
prejudice manipulation was imbedded among other ﬁller measures, which were ﬁlled out
in a constant manner presumably completed by their partner (i.e., self-esteem, mood).8

Alter African American participants reviewed their interaction partner’s personal
information, all participants completed a short survey regarding their willingness and
desire to interact with their partner. At this time, European American participants had no
knowledge about their interaction partner. After completing the survey, the experimenter
explained to African American participants that it is important that they do not mention
anything they have reviewed in the personal information packet, because their partner
does not know that they received this information (African American participants were
told that the information had been collected from the online prescreening session).

Next, Aﬁican American participants were led to a cubicle where their European

American interaction partner was waiting. When they entered the cubicle, African

31

American participants were told that the experimenter “forgot” to put a chair in the
cubicle and were asked to pull up a chair (that was located in the hallway by the cubicle
door) and to have a seat. The distance between two participants was measured9 after the
entire session was over as indicative of nonverbal behavioral reactions towards the
partner (Breckler, 1984; Tobiasen & Allen, 1983). All participants were informed that
the cubicle was equipped with a microphone and video cameras and that the experimental
session would be videotaped so that we could analyze the nature of the interaction later in
detail. The video cameras were adjusted before each interaction began to keep images
constant (direct shot from the front) across participants. All participants were told that
they should get to know one another during the next ten minutes and that they would
answer a few questions about the interaction and their partner after the interaction. The
experimenter left the room for ten minutes.

After 10 minutes, the experimenter returned to the cubicle, stopped the interaction,
and separated the participants by taking the African American participant back to the
original cubicle. Then both African American and European American participants were
asked to complete a brief questionnaire assessing a number of dependent variables.

These dependent variables included the degree to which they felt/believed they had
engaged in socially skillful behaviors (as indicators of compensation), their efforts to
change their partner’s beliefs about themselves, emotions, feelings of authenticity, their
self-esteem during the interaction, how much they liked their interaction partner and
enjoyed the interaction. Participants also rated how much they felt that their partner like
them and how much their partner enjoyed the interaction. These measures are included

in Appendices D and E.

32

After completing the post-interaction questionnaire, all participants were asked to
complete the second cognitive task (the Stroop task) which was aimed at examining
cognitive depletion after the intergroup interaction. Following the exact procedure
employed in Richeson et al.’s study (2005), the experimenter explained that participants
were to report the color of various stimuli that would appear on the computer as quickly
as they could by pressing the appropriate keys on the key board (the keys were color-
coded). On each trial, the word “blue,” “green,” “red,” or “yellow” or a row of four X’s
appeared on the screen in one of the four colors. On compatible trials, participants color-
named the string of X’s or a color name that appeared in the same color as its semantic
meaning. On incompatible trials, a color name appeared in a color other than its semantic
meaning (e.g., “blue” appearing in red type). The difference in color-naming latencies
associated with incompatible trials and control trials formed an index of Stroop
interference, and the higher the index, the more cognitive depletion.

At the end of the study, Aﬁican American participants completed manipulation
checks which asked them to indicate their partner’s racial attitudes toward African
Americans before, during, and after the interaction, to assess whether they correctly
noticed the European American partners’ racial attitudes before the interaction. All
participants were also asked to complete a suspicion check sheet. After completing the
suspicion check sheet, Aﬁican American and European American participants were
separately probed for their suspicion about the true nature of the study by different
experimenters using the Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer (1998) procedure. Experimenters
were trained to probe for participants’ suspicion using written responses and

conversations. First, experimenters were instructed to ask participants whether they have

33

questions regarding the study and whether the instructions were perfectly clear.
Experimenters then asked participants if they noticed something odd or unusual in the
study. As experimenters and participants engaged in conversation for a while,
experimenters asked participants what they thought the purpose of the study was and
when that thought had occurred. Experimenters were instructed to judge whether
participants knew the true purpose of the study based on these conversations and written
responses.

Once experimenters made a judgment as to how close participants’ suspicions
were to the actual purpose of the study, both Aﬁican American and European American
participants were brought to one cubicle and underwent a debrieﬁng process together
(Aronson et al., 1998). During the debrieﬁng process, the experimenter explained why
they manipulated European American participants’ racial attitudes and made sure that
participants understood that these racial attitudes were false. At the end of debrieﬁng, the
participants’ rights to deny releasing their video recorded interactions were explained and
participants were asked to sign a video release form if they agreed”). After the thorough
debrieﬁng, participants were thanked and excused.

Measures

Implicit Theories about Human Attributes. Implicit theories about human
attributes were assessed at least one day prior to the laboratory session during an online
prescreening session with Chiu et al.’s (1997) eight-item lrnplicit Person Theory scale.
Sample items include: “The kind of person someone is is something very basic about
them and it can’t be changed very much” (reversed), “People can always substantially

change the kind of person they are,” and “All people can change even their most basic

34

qualities.” Items were rated on a 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) scale (a

= .86). Higher scores indicate incremental theorists in this study. Unless otherwise noted,
participants made their ratings for all dependent measures collected during the laboratory
session on this 0-6 scale.

Preinteraction Expectations — Self Expectations for the interaction immediately
prior to the actual interaction were assessed using 5 items. Example items are: “I think I
will enjoy interacting with my partner,” “I would prefer to work with a different partner”
(reversed), and “I am excited about the interaction with my partner.” Higher scores
represent more positive expectations about the subsequent interracial interaction ((1 = .81).

Preinteraction Expectations — Partner. What participants thought their partners
would expect for the interaction prior to the actual interaction was assessed using the
following two items: “I think my partner will enjoy interacting with me” and “I think my
partner will be excited about interacting with me” (a = .85).

Physical Distance. Physical distance between participants and their partner was
used to assess participants’ nonverbal reaction towards their partner. It was measured as
the distance between the two chairs during the interaction. Higher scores indicate more
distance between the two, suggesting participants’ discomfort about interacting with their
partner. Distance was measured in inches.

Socially Skillful Behaviors. Participants completed 12 items regarding how much
they engaged in several socially skillﬁrl behaviors as indicative of compensatory
behaviors. More speciﬁcally, the measure assessed the extent to which participants
behaved in a socially skilled manner, self-disclosed, and intensely engaged in the

interaction. Sample items are: “I tried to act socially skillful,” “1 revealed a lot about

35

myself to my partner,” and “During the interaction, I frequently elaborated on my
thoughts about the topics” (or = .78). Higher scores indicate that participants engaged in
more socially skilled behaviors.

Changing Attitudes. Participants’ efforts to change their partner’s attitudes
toward them were assessed with the following two items: “I tried to change my partner’s
beliefs about me” and “I tried to change my partner’s assumptions about who I am” (a
= .81). Higher scores indicate greater effort.

Emotions. Participants indicated the extent to which they experienced a variety
of emotions during the interaction (as well as during the prescreening session) by
responding to 12 items. An exploratory principal components factor analysis with a
varimax rotation revealed three factors. Using this solution, the emotion items were
grouped into Anxiety, Anger and Depression, and Positive Affect factors. The anxiety
factor consisted of ﬁve items: anxious, calm (reversed), nervous, relaxed (reversed), and
uneasy, such that higher scores indicate participants felt more anxiety related negative
affect (a = .84 for the laboratory session and .83 for the prescreening session). Five items
were combined to assess the extent to which participants felt anger and depression related
negative emotions: angry, sad, blue, threatened, and irritated (a = .79 for the laboratory
session and .80 for the prescreening session), with higher scores indicated that they felt
angrier or depressed.ll Finally, Positive Affect was assessed using two items (i.e.,
conﬁdent and happy) during the interaction ((1 = .65) and prescreening session (a = .64).
Higher scores indicate that participants experienced more positive affect.

Authenticity. The extent to which participants felt that they were being authentic

during the interaction was assessed with the two-item Shelton et al.’s Authenticity scale

36

(Shelton et al., 2005). The two items were: “I had to change myself to ﬁt in with my
partner” (reversed) and “It was easy to express my true attitudes and feelings” (or = .61).
These two items were combined to create a feeling of authenticity composite scale, such
that higher scores indicate that participants felt more authentic during the interaction.

Self-Esteem. Levels of self-esteem after the interaction as well as during the
prescreening session were assessed with the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(Rosenberg, 1979) phrased with regard to feelings at the present moment. Example items
are: “Right now, I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others,”
“Right now, I am inclined to think I am a failure” (reversed), and “Right now, I am
satisﬁed with myself” (a = .89 and .97, respectively). Higher scores represent high self-
esteem.

Liking. Participants’ liking of their partner was assessed using three items: “I
liked my partner,” “I would enjoy interacting with my partner again in the future,” and
“My partner was a nice person” (a = .85). Higher scores represent that participants liked
their partner during the interaction.

Enjoyment. Three items were used to assess the extent to which participants
enjoyed the interaction with their partner: “I enjoyed getting to know my partner,” “I
enjoyed the interaction with my partner,” and “I had a good time during the interaction.”
The enjoyment composite score was created such that higher scores indicate more
enjoyment (a = .92).

Partner ’3 Liking. Participants also reported how much they thought their partner
liked them. Partner’s liking was assessed with three items: “I think my partner liked me,”

“I think my partner would enjoy interacting with me again in the future,” and “I think my

37

partner thought I was a nice person” (a = .90). Higher scores indicate that participants
tended to think that their partner liked them.

Partner '5 enjoyment. Three items were used to assess participants’ thoughts
about how much their partner enjoyed the interaction with them: “I think my partner
enjoyed the interaction with me,” “I think my partner enjoyed getting to know me,” and
“I think my partner had a good time during the interaction” (or = .94). Higher scores
indicate that participants tended to think that their partner enjoyed the interaction.

Manipulation Check (Only for African American Participants). To examine
whether Aﬁican American participants attended to their partner’s racial attitudes before
they engaged in the interaction, only African American participants were asked to rate
how much they thought their partner was prejudiced toward African Americans, held
egalitarian attitudes toward Aﬁican Americans, and was neither a racist nor an egalitarian,
before, during, and after the interaction. Their thoughts about their partner’s racial
attitudes during as well as after the interaction were asked in order to distinguish their
expectations prior to the interaction from their actual perceptions after the interaction as
well as to examine whether Aﬁican American participants’ expectations would change
depending on European American participants’ actual attitudes and behaviors. In
addition, they were also asked to rate how positive their partner was toward African
Americans and European Americans. These two items were added at the end in order to
have multiple items assessing the manipulation. See Appendix G for the manipulation
check sheet.

Suspicion Check. Participants were asked to provide written descriptions of what

they thought the purpose of the study was, at what point during the study that idea had

38

occurred to them, and whether anything about the study seemed unusual or strange and
when they noticed that. See Appendix H for the actual suspicion check sheet
administered to the participants. Stroop Interference Score. Stroop interference
score reﬂects availability of cognitive resources after the interaction and was assessed
with the difference between response latencies (RTs) for the control trials and RTs for the
incongruent trials. In order to calculate the score, ﬁrst, all false responses and Stroop
latencies less than 200 ms were excluded. Mean and standard deviation for each
participant were then computed to identify Stroop latencies greater than 3 standard
deviations above the mean, which were also excluded from the data12 . Next, all the
remaining RTs were log-transformed in order to adjust for the normality assumptions of
the data-analytic procedures. Log-transformed RTs were then averaged according to
type of trial (i.e. control, incongruent). Stroop interference scores were calculated by
subtracting mean transformed RTs for the control trials from mean transformed RTs for
the incongruent trials. In the present sample, Stroop Interference Scores ranged from -
36.09 to 542.03 (M = 139.02, SD = 102.64). Higher scores represent greater Stroop
interference (i.e., less cognitive resources).

Coding of Videotapes. Participants’ videotaped verbal and nonverbal behaviors
during the interaction were assessed after the entire experiment was completed. Both
verbal and nonverbal behaviors were evaluated simultaneously by three independent
coders (two women and one man, who were all European Americans) who were blind to
participants’ experimental condition but knew major research questions and hypotheses
examined in the present study. The order in which participants were evaluated was

varied across coders. The coders were instructed to evaluate participants’ behavior using

39

nonverbal behavioral coding surveys (see Appendix F). The surveys contained the
following measures: stereotype, global positive regard, global responsiveness, self-
disclosure, anxiety, irritability, and sociability (i.e., extraversion). Some of the items for
these measures were directly taken from two previous studies [e.g., Global
Responsiveness items, Global Positive Regard items, and Self-Disclosure items; see
Vorauer & Turpie (2004) and Shelton et al. (2005)]. The goal of these ratings was to
provide an unbiased perspective of participants’ affective and attitudinal reactions
towards the partner (Shelton et al., 2005; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004). The coders were
instructed to rate participants on the above measures not based on speciﬁc behaviors
shown by a person, but based on their impression of the person.

Stereotypical behavior was assessed with one item. The coders rated the extent to
which the participant displayed stereotypical behavior associated with his/her racial
group on a scale of 0 (Not at All) to 6 (Extremely). Higher score indicate that
participants showed more racially stereotypical behaviors during the interaction.
Interrater reliability was -.06.13 Because Interrater reliability was low and negative, the
further analysis did not include this measure.

Global positive regard was assessed with six items (a = .91). The following ﬁve
items were measured on a scale from 0 (Not at All) to 6 (Extremely): “The participant
was interested in his/her partner,” “The participant was interested in getting to know
his/her partner,” “The participant was friendly to his/her partner,” “The participant
appeared to be having fun with his/her partner,” “The participant liked his/her partner.”
The last item asked the coders to rate the extent to which the participant smiled during the

interaction on a scale of 0 (Did not smile at all) to 6 (Smiled a lot). Interrater reliability

4o

was .29. Higher scores indicate that participants showed high levels of global positive
regard toward their partner.

Global responsiveness was assessed with seven items (a = .85). The coders rated
the following ﬁve items on a scale between 0 (Not at All) and 6 (Extremely): “The
participants appeared engaged in the conversation,” “The participant was responsive to
his/her partner,” “The participant was attentive to his/her partner,” “The participant
talked during the interaction,” and “The participant asked his/her questions about
themselves.” The coders also rate the extent to which the participant leaned toward
his/her partner on a scale between 0 (Body leaned away from partner) and 6 (Body leaned
forward toward partner) and what the participant did with his/her arms during the
interaction on a scale between 0 (Arms crossed a lot) and 6 (Arms open and/or inviting).
The average Interrater reliability across these seven items were .32. Higher scores
indicate that participants were more responsive to their partner.

Self-disclosure was assessed with four items. Based on Vorauer and Turpie’s
study (2004), this measure was designed to capture the intimacy of the participant’s
comments and how much the coders learned about the participant based on the
interaction. These four items were: “The participant elaborated on her/his thoughts and
feelings,” “The participant’s comments were intimate/personal,” “The participant self-
disclosed to his/her partner,” and “ I learned about the participant from this interaction”
(or = .87). Higher scores represent more self-disclosure. Because Interrater reliability
was too low and negative (ICC = -. l 9), the variable was not used in the following

analyses.

41

A variety of affect during the interaction was assessed with seven items. An
exploratory principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation revealed two
factors. Using this solution, the emotion items were grouped into Anxiety and Irritability.
The anxiety factor consisted of four items: anxious, comfortable (reversed), nervous, and
uneasy, such that higher scores indicate participants looked more anxious during the
interaction (or = .85). Three items were combined to assess the extent to which
participants appeared irritated: unpleasant, annoyed, and irritated during the interaction (or
= .92), with higher scores indicated that participants looked more irritated. Because
neither measure had good Interrater reliability (ICC = .13 for Anxiety and ICC = -.02 for
Irritability), these affect variables were excluded from the analyses.

Sociability was assessed with four items. The coders rate the following items on a
scale of 0 (Not at All) to 6 (Extremely): “The participant was sociable,” “The participant
tried to spark conversation,” “The participant was authentic during the interaction,” and
“The participant was socially skillful” (a = .94). Higher scores indicate that participants

were more sociable during the interaction. Interrater reliability was .51. '4

42

Analysis and Results

Means and standard deviations of self-report variables for the entire sample and
separately by race and condition are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Independent groups t-
tests indicated that African American and European American participants differed
signiﬁcantly in their anger and self-esteem measures during prescreening, and socially
skillful behaviors, self-esteem, and partner’s liking during the interaction. More
speciﬁcally, European American participants reported more negative emotions associated
with anger and depression compared to African American participants during the
prescreening session. In addition, European American participants had lower self-esteem
relative to African American participants during both the prescreening and the laboratory
sessions, which is consistent with a large number of empirical studies showing that
African Americans tent to have higher self-esteem than European Americans (Gray-Little
& Hafdahl, 2000; Hoelter, 1982; Porter & Washington, 1979; Twenge & Crocker, 2002)
due to self-protection (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991;
Rowley, Sellers, Chavous, & Smith, 1998; Simmons & Rosenberg, 1971), positive racial
identity (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Phinney, Cantu, & Kurtz, 1997; Pope,
2000; Rowley et al., 1998), and cultural differences in the self-concept (Twenge &
Crocker, 2002). During the interaction, European American participants reported
engaging in socially skillﬁrl behaviors more than Aﬁican American participants. Finally,
Aﬁican American participants liked their European American partners somewhat more
than European American participants liked their African American partners.

Tables 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations of behavioral measures for

the entire sample and separately by race and condition. Again, Independent groups t-tests

43

were conducted to examine whether African American and European American
participants differ in those behavioral measures. African American and European
American participants differed in independent observer rated global responsiveness and
self-disclosure. The coders reported that African American participants displayed more
global responsiveness toward their partner relative to European American participants. In
contrast, observer coding suggested that European American participants self-disclosed
more than African American participants. Finally, European American participants were
rated as being somewhat more irritated than were African American participants.

Table 6 presents means, standard deviations, minimum scores, and maximum
scores of both raw and long-transfonned Stroop Interference Scores for the entire sample.
There were no group mean differences on the Stroop task.

An omnibus test was conducted to examine whether the correlations and standard
deviations among the prescreening measures (implicit theories about human attributes,
anxiety, other negative affect, positive affect, and self-esteem) differed for African
American and European American participants. This test yielded a chi-square value of
{(15) = 15.64, p = .41, suggesting that the correlations and standard deviations of these
measures did not differ as a function of race, and so the correlations across the entire
sample are presented in Table 7. Correlations among self-report dependent variables and
among behavioral measures for all participants are provided in Tables 8 and 15,
respectively. In addition, correlations among self-report dependent variables and among
behavioral measures across experimental conditions separately for Aﬁican American and
European American participants are provided in Tables 9 through 14 (self-report

measures) and Tables 16 through Table 21 (behavioral measures).

44

Suspicion Check

Suspicion level was examined based on what participants wrote on an open-ended
suspicion check that asked them to describe their thoughts concerning the purpose of the
study, as well as on conversations exchanged between participants and experimenters
during probing. In the case of African American participants, suspicious participants
were deﬁned as those who were very conﬁdent that one or more of the following were
true: 1) the two studies described as independent studies conducted by different
experimenters were actually part of one big study, 2) the information about their partner
was fake, 3) they were purposely paired with a partner from a different race, and/or 4) the
experimenters were actually observing how they interact with an European American
after learning that he/she was prejudiced toward African Americans. The last criterion is
especially important, because it distinguishes suspicious participants from those
participants who simply stated the purpose of the study was to look at how interracial
interaction went in general. The latter case does not quite get at the true hypotheses of
the study. Therefore, those participants who mentioned race but did not mention beliefs
that the study concerned the inﬂuence of their knowledge about their partner’s racial
attitudes on their reactions were categorized as non-suspicious participants. Notably,
African American participants completed the manipulation check sheet, which asked
about their partner’s racial attitudes, right before they completed the suspicion check
sheet, and so the fact that race played an important role was obvious to many participants.
Four suspicious African American participants (5.5%; one participant was classiﬁed

using both criterion 1 and 4, one participant was classiﬁed as suspicious using criterion 3,

45

and two participants were classiﬁed using criterion 4) were excluded from analyses based
on these criteria.

In the case of EurOpean American participants, those participants who thought
that 1) the two studies described as independent studies conducted by different
experimenters were actually part of one big study and/or that 2) they were purposely
paired with a partner from a different race were excluded from the following analyses.
Again, participants who simply mentioned that the study had something to do with race
were not excluded because the racial nature of the interaction was salient and because this
knowledge provided no insight into the hypotheses about experimental condition or
implicit theories. First, because there are usually fewer African American students
enrolled in any psychology classes compared to European American students, the
probability of participating in a study with an Aﬁican American student is relatively low
and would be salient. Because “race” was very salient during the interaction and because
experimenters asked participants to take their best guesses about the purpose of the study
during a probing session, many participants indeed mentioned “race” either on the
suspicion check sheet or during probing. However, if they could not guess speciﬁc
hypotheses of the study, they were not excluded from analyses. Moreover, for both
Aﬁican American and European American participants, even if they could speculate
about the true purpose of the study, they were not categorized as suspicious participants if
they thought of the purpose after the study (i.e., when they were completing the suspicion
check sheet or during probing). Three suspicious European American participants (4.1%;
all three suspicious participants were classiﬁed using criterion 2) were excluded from

analyses on the basis of these criteria.

46

In addition, there was also one African American participant who told the
experimenter that she did not believe that the experimenter “forgot” to put a chair in
another cubicle and that she thought the experimenter was actually observing how close
she would put the chair to her partner. However, because she did not question any other
aspects of the study, her data were excluded only from analyses of physical distance.
There was also one Aﬁican American participant who stated the exact purpose of the
Stroop task. However, again, because she did not express any suspicion on other aspects
of the study, her data were excluded only from the cognitive resource analyses.

Several other participants were excluded from analyses for reasons other than
suspicion about the study. First, those participants who identiﬁed themselves as
belonging to racial/ethnic groups other than either African American or European
American were excluded from all analyses. More speciﬁcally, two participants who were
recruited as African Americans identiﬁed themselves as multiracial/other. Among
participants who were recruited as European Americans, one participant identiﬁed herself
as Latino American, one participant identiﬁed herself as Native American, one
participant identiﬁed himself as multiracial/other, and one participant identiﬁed herself as
an international student. Second, one African American participant brought her baby to
the laboratory session which resulted in an unusual study context; therefore, she was
excluded from all analyses. Finally, there was a participant who participated in the study
twice. Her data and her partner’s data from the second time were excluded. Taken
together, a total of six Aﬁican American participants (8.5%) and four European
American participants (7.2%) were excluded from the subsequent data analyses15 .

Analyses Plan

47

The data were analyzed using hierarchical moderated regression analyses.
Because there were three levels of European American’s racial attitudes towards African
Americans (racist, egalitarian, no information), this variable was represented with two
dummy-coded terms. One dummy-coded term represented the Prejudice condition vs. the
No Information condition comparison (PvN), and the other represented the Egalitarian
condition vs. the No Information condition comparison (EVN). In both dummy codes, the
No Information condition was the referent condition and was dummy-coded as 0, and the
respective experimental conditions were dummy-coded as 1.16 The main effect of
experimental condition (i.e., European American’s racial attitudes) and the main effect of
African Americans’ implicit theories (grand mean centered) were entered in the ﬁrst and
second steps17 of the regression, and the two-way interactions between the dummy coded
experimental condition variables and implicit theories were entered in the third step.
Support for the hypotheses would be evidenced by a signiﬁcant third step with a Racial
Attitudes x Implicit Theories interaction. For Emotions and Self—Esteem measures, the
initial responses to those measures during the prescreening session were controlled. In
order to account for the preexisting emotions and self-esteem, the main effects of those
variables were entered in the ﬁrst step of the regression. The main effect of experimental
condition and the main effect of implicit theories were entered in the second and third
steps, and the two-way interactions between the dummy coded experimental condition
variables and implicit theories were entered in the fourth step.

Manipulation Check
Table 22 presents the results of the manipulation checks. Hierarchical regression

analyses were conducted to examine whether participants perceived their partner to be

48

prejudiced toward African Americans prior to the interaction. The analyses revealed only
a main effect of experimental condition controlling for implicit theories (AR’ = .61, p
< .001), and examination of parameter estimates suggests that participants in the
Prejudice condition did indeed perceive their partner to be more prejudiced toward
Aﬁican Americans before the interaction (M = 3.81, SD = 1.57) compared to participants
in the No Information condition (M = .63, SD = .96). In contrast, participants in the
Egalitarian condition (M = .52, SD = 1.12) and in the No Information condition did not
differ in their perceptions of their partner’s racial attitudes prior to the interaction. These
results suggest that prejudice manipulation successfully inﬂuenced the perception of
Aﬁican Americans in the Prejudice condition and that Aﬁican Americans who do not
have prior information about their partner usually assume their partner to non-prejudiced.
Next, participants’ perception of their partner as egalitarian prior to the interaction
was examined using hierarchical regression analyses. Again, the analyses revealed only a
signiﬁcant main effect of experimental condition controlling for implicit theories (AR?
= .21 , p = .002). Parameter estimates indicate that participants in the Prejudice condition
were more likely to perceive their partner to be egalitarian (M = 2.95, SD = 1.13)
compared to participants in the No Information condition (M = .89, SD = 1.20). In
addition, participants in the Egalitarian condition perceived their partner to be egalitarian
(M = 1.60, SD = 2.06) slightly more than participants in the No Information condition.
These results indicate a failure of the manipulation; however, another manipulation check
item asking participants whether their partner expressed positive attitudes (instead of
using the word “egalitarian”) toward African Americans showed that participants in the

Egalitarian Condition did indeed perceive their partner to be more positive (M = 4.96, SD

49

= 1.31) than participants in the No Information condition (M = 3.84, SD = 1.57; AR’ = .27,
p < .02). In addition, participants in the Prejudice condition perceived that their partner
was slightly less positive (M = 2.93, SD = 1.59) than participants in the No Information
condition. Therefore, egalitarian manipulation was successful, and it is suggested that the
word “egalitarian” used in the ﬁrst manipulation check item might have contributed to
the failure to accurately check the participants’ perception of their partners as egalitarian.
In addition, a three-factor mixed design ANOVA using a Geisser-Greenhouse
correction, with retrospective prejudice expectation at different time points (before,
during, after the interaction)'8 as a within-subjects factor and implicit theories and
experimental condition as between-subj ect factors, was conducted to examine whether
experimental condition and implicit theories would have differential effects on how
African American participants’ prejudice expectations may have changed over time
following the actual interaction"). In other words, by comparing prejudice expectations
between three time points, this analysis examined how expectations affected interactions
with partners who did not systematically act in prejudiced or egalitarian ways. The test
revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of time, F(2,138) = 57.59, MSE = .62, p < .001, a main
effect of experimental condition, F (2,69) = 17.94, MSE = 3.07, p < .001, and a signiﬁcant
interaction between time points and experimental condition, F (4,138) = 41.70, MSE = .62,
p < .001 which qualiﬁed the two main effects. To further examine the signiﬁcant
interaction, three one-way between-groups ANOVAs with Tukey HSD post hoc tests
were conducted looking at the effects of experimental condition on prejudice
expectations at the three different time points. Before the interaction, African American

participants who were in the Prejudice condition thought that their partner was

50

signiﬁcantly more prejudiced (M = 3.89, SD = 1.47) compared to those who were in the
Egalitarian condition (M = .50, SD = 1.10) and the No Information condition (M = .63,
SD = .96). The difference between the Prejudice condition (M = 1.18, SD = 1.61) and the
Egalitarian condition (M = .27, SD = .83) was also signiﬁcant for ratings of prejudice
during the interaction , although there were no differences between the Prejudice
condition and the No Information condition (M = .63, SD = .90) or between Egalitarian
and No Information. Prejudice expectations after the interaction for participants in the
Prejudice condition were even further decreased, such that there was no difference in
prejudice expectations among the Prejudice condition (M = .89, SD = 1.34), the
Egalitarian condition (M = .23, SD = .71), and the No Information condition (M = .47, SD
= .77).

In sum, the results suggest that prejudice expectations of African American
participants who thought their partner to be prejudiced toward them changed over time as
they interacted with a partner who did not behave in a prejudiced manner, indicating that
behavioral evidence counter to expectations can override negative expectations even in a
short period of time. In contrast, prejudice expectations of African American participants
who did not expect their partner to be prejudiced from the beginning stayed the same,
because their expectations and behaviors of their partner were consistent.

Preinteraction Expectations and Assumptions about Their Partner

Table 23 presents the results of the moderated regression analyses predicting the
African American participants’ preinteraction expectations and assumptions about how
their partners would feel about the interaction. Analyses of their preinteraction

expectations revealed that the main effect of experimental condition accounted for 14%

51

of the variance in expectations. As can be seen in the table, the parameter estimates
indicate that participants in the Prejudice condition had signiﬁcantly more negative
expectations for the interaction relative to participants in the No Information condition.
However, participants in the Egalitarian condition did not differ signiﬁcantly from those
in the No Information condition. Although there was no evidence of an implicit theory
main effect, the interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition was
signiﬁcant and explained an additional 9% of the variance in expectations. Examination
of the simple slopes for implicit theories at each level of condition indicated that, in the
Prejudice condition, implicit theories were signiﬁcantly negatively related to
preinteraction expectations (,6 = -.60, p = .02), indicating that, counter to hypotheses,
incremental theorists tended to expect more negative interactions compared to entity
theorists. In contrast, in the Egalitarian condition, the simple slope for implicit theories
was positive but nonsigniﬁcant (ﬂ = .09, p = .63). The simple slope for implicit theories
in the No lnfonnation condition was also positive but nonsigniﬁcant (B = .23, p = .29).
Next, moderating effects of implicit theories on the relationship between
prejudice expectations and African American participants’ thoughts about what their
partners’ expectations for the interaction were examined. The analyses reveled that about
1 1% of variance in partner’s preinteraction expectations was explained by the main effect
of experimental condition. Participants in the Prejudice condition expected their partner
to have less positive expectations compared to participants in the No Information
condition, but participants in the Egalitarian condition did not signiﬁcantly differ from
participants in the No Information condition. There was no signiﬁcant main effect of

implicit theories when predicting participants’ thoughts about their partners’

52

preinteraction expectations. The main effect of experimental condition was qualiﬁed by
an interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition, with the interaction
explaining 19% of variance in partner’s preinteraction expectations overall. Further
examinations of simple slopes in Figure 2 revealed that, in the Prejudice condition,
implicit theories and experimental conditions were strongly and negatively related (B = -
.76, p = .002). Therefore, incremental theorists thought that their partners would expect
more negative interactions with them, relative to entity theorists, in the Prejudice
condition. In the Egalitarian condition, implicit theories and experimental condition were
strongly and positively related (B = .45, p = .009), suggesting that incremental theorists
thought that their partners would expect more positive interaction with them, compared to
entity theorists. The simple slope for partner’s preinteraction expectations in the No
Information was not signiﬁcant (B = .08, p = .71 ).
Behaviors during the Interaction

Table 24 presents the regression results for participants’ reports on the degree to
which they engaged in socially skilled behaviors and made efforts to change their
partner’s attitudes, as well as the physical distance they chose to sit from their interaction
partner. Ratings of socially skillful (i.e., compensatory) behaviors showed a signiﬁcant
main effect of implicit theories, such that incremental theorists were less likely to report
engaging in socially skillful behaviors than entity theorists. This main effect explained
about 9% of variance. Neither the main effect of experimental condition alone nor the
interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition predicted self-reported

engagement in socially skilled behaviors.

53

Participants also reported whether they made efforts to change their partner’s
attitudes toward them. The analyses revealed a main effect of experimental condition
that explained 14% of the variance in efforts to change their partner’s attitudes, and the
parameter estimates indicate that participants in the Prejudice condition tried to change
their partner’s attitudes toward them more than did participants in the No Information
condition. Neither a main effect of implicit theories nor an interaction between implicit
theories and experimental condition was signiﬁcant.

Physical distance between Aﬁican American and European American participants
were measured as indicative of African American participants’ liking toward their partner.
Neither of the main effect of experimental condition or implicit theories, nor the
interaction between the two was signiﬁcant.

Emotions Experienced during the Interaction

Table 25 presents the results of moderated regression analyses predicting anxiety,
other negative affect, and positive affect during the interaction. In order to account for
general levels of emotions participants experienced, preexisting emotions measured
during the prescreening session were entered as covariates. Thus, when positive
emotions were predicted, pre-test positive emotions were controlled. As it is evident in
the table, self-reported emotions were not signiﬁcantly related to any of the main effects
or interactions.

Feelings of A uthenticity and Self-Esteem during the Interactions

Table 26 presents the regression results for participants’ reports on the degree to

which they felt authentic during the interaction and their levels of self-esteem. A

hierarchical regression analysis revealed neither a main effect of experimental condition

54

nor a main effect of implicit theories. However, a signiﬁcant interaction between implicit
theory and condition occurred, and it explained about 12% of variance in feelings of
authenticity. As can be seen in Figure 3, examination of the simple slopes for implicit
theory at each level of condition indicated that, in the Prejudice condition, participants’
implicit theories were strongly and inversely related to their feelings of authenticity (B = -
.69, p = .01). Thus, in the Prejudice condition, incremental theorists tended to feel less
authentic, relative to entity theorists. On the other hand, the simple slope for implicit
theory in the Egalitarian condition was small, positive, and non signiﬁcant (B = .21, p

= .25). For the No Information condition, the simple slope was negative and not
signiﬁcant (B = -.32, p = .17).

In order to examine the moderating effects of implicit theories on the relationships
between prejudice expectation and self-esteem, the pre-test level of self-esteem was
entered as a covariate in order to account for preexisting levels of self-esteem.
Hierarchical regression analyses revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of initial levels of self-
esteem, indicating that preexisting levels of self-esteem accounted for about 44% of the
variance in the levels of self-esteem measured after the interaction. Neither the main
effect of experimental condition alone, nor the main effect of implicit theories alone
predicted self-esteem. Also, the interaction between implicit theories and experimental
condition was non-signiﬁcant.

Liking and Enjoyment

Table 27 presents the effects of prejudice expectations and implicit theories on

predicting Aﬁican American participants’ liking toward their European American partner,

whether they enjoyed the interaction, and their perceptions of their partner’s liking

55

toward them and enjoyment of the interaction. As can be seen in the table, none of these
outcomes can be explained by implicit theories, experimental condition, or the interaction
between implicit theories and experimental condition.
Observed Behaviors during the Interaction

Table 28 presents the effects of prejudice expectations and implicit theories on
African American participants’ observed behaviors during the interaction. Analyses of
behaviors associated with Global Positive Regard revealed that the main effect of
experimental condition accounted for 7% of the variance in the behaviors. Examination
of the parameter estimates indicates that participants in the Prejudice condition expressed
signiﬁcantly more behaviors characterized as global positive regard during the interaction
relative to participants in the No Information condition. Likewise, the analysis revealed
that participants in the Egalitarian condition also expressed signiﬁcantly more behaviors
characterized as global positive regard, compared to those in the No Information
condition. However, neither the main effect of implicit theories nor the interaction
between eXperimental condition and implicit theories was signiﬁcant.

A similar pattem was found with observed behaviors that are characterized as
Global Responsiveness. Ratings of global responsiveness behaviors showed a signiﬁcant
main effect of experimental condition, such that participants both in the Prejudice
condition and in the Egalitarian condition enacted signiﬁcantly more behaviors
characterized as global responsiveness, compared to participants in the No Information
condition. This main effect explained about 8% of variance in responsiveness behaviors.

Neither the main effect of implicit theories alone nor the interaction between implicit

56

theories and experimental condition predicted engagement in behaviors associated with
global responsiveness.

An examination of the effects of prejudice expectations and implicit theories
predicting observed sociability during the interaction revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of
experimental condition, such that participants in the Prejudice condition and the
Egalitarian condition were more sociable than participants in the No Information
condition. Experimental condition accounted for about 4% of the variance in sociability.
The main effect of implicit theories was also marginally signiﬁcant, such that incremental
theorists were somewhat less sociable, compared to entity theorists. The interaction
between the two was not signiﬁcant.

European American Participants ' Emotions during the Interaction

Table 29 presents the effects of African American participants’ prejudice
expectations and implicit theories on their European American partner’s emotions.
Analyses of European American participants’ anxiety during the interaction revealed that
the main effect of preexisting anxiety accounted for 12% of the variance in anxiety.
Neither of the main effect of experimental condition or implicit theories, nor the
interaction between the two was signiﬁcant. Examination of European American
participants’ other negative affect during the interaction also suggests that about 5% the
variance in anger can be explained by the main effect of preexisting anger; however, the
main effect was marginal. Again, the main effect of implicit theories, the main effect of
experimental condition, and the interaction between implicit theories and experimental

condition were not signiﬁcant.

57

Analyses of European American participants’ positive mood revealed that the
main effect of preexisting positive mood accounted for 13% of the variance in positive
mood during the interaction. Although the main effect of experimental condition which
include both comparison between the Prejudice vs. the No Information conditions and
between the Egalitarian and the No Information conditions did not reach statistical
signiﬁcance (AR’ = .06, p = 13.), examination of the coefﬁcients indicates that European
American participants in the Prejudice condition was signiﬁcantly different from those in
the No Information condition, such that European American participants in the Prejudice
condition felt more positive during the interaction, compared to European American
participants in the No Information condition. Also, there were marginal differences
between European American participants in the Egalitarian condition and those in the No
Information condition, such that European American participants in the Egalitarian
condition felt somewhat more positive relative to those in the No Information condition.

In addition, even though interaction between implicit theories and experimental
condition with two comparison terms did not account for a signiﬁcant variance in
European American participants’ positive mood (AR’ = .05, p = .18), the coefﬁcients in
the model suggest that there was a signiﬁcant difference between the Egalitarian
condition and the No Information condition, but not between the Prejudice condition and
the No Information condition. As can be seen in Figure 4, the simple slopes for implicit
theories at each level of condition indicated that, in the Egalitarian condition, the simple
slope for implicit theories was signiﬁcant and negative (B = -.36, p = .04), suggesting that
European American participants whose partner held an incremental theory felt less

positive during the interaction relative to their counterparts whose partner held an entity

58

theory, consistent with hypotheses. In contrast, in the Prejudice condition, the simple
slope for implicit theories was negative but nonsigniﬁcant (B = -.06, p = .80), indicating
that there is not relationship between African American participants’ implicit theories and
European American participants’ positive mood. The simple slope for implicit theories
in the No Information condition was also positive but nonsigniﬁcant (B = .17, p = .47).
European American Participants ' Liking of T heir Partner and Enjoyment of the
Interaction

Table 30 presents the results of regression results for European American
participants’ reports on the degree to which they liked their partner during the interaction
and how much they enjoyed the interaction. A hierarchical regression analysis revealed
neither the main effect of experimental condition nor the main effect of implicit theories
in predicting liking. However, the interaction of experimental condition and African
American participants’ implicit theories was signiﬁcant, and it explained about 8% of
variance in liking (see Figure 5). Examination of the simple slopes for implicit theory at
each level of condition indicated that, in the Egalitarian condition, participants’ liking of
their African American partner was inversely related to implicit theory (B = -.36, p = .04).
Thus, in the Egalitarian condition, European American participants whose partner held an
incremental theory tended to express less liking of their partner compared to European
American participants whose partner held an entity theory. On the other hand, the simple
slope for implicit theory in the Prejudice condition was small, negative, and
nonsigniﬁcant (B = -.13, p = .59). For the No Information condition, the simple slope

was positive and was nonsigniﬁcant (B = .18, p = .46).

59

Next, moderating effects of Aﬁican American participants’ implicit theories on
the relationship between their prejudice expectations and European American
participants’ enjoyment of the interaction were examined. The analyses revealed that
about 8% of variance in enjoyment can be explained by Aﬁican American participants’
implicit theories. However, because the main effect of implicit theories became non-
signiﬁcant when interaction terms were added to the model, the main effect will not be
further examined. There was no signiﬁcant main effect of experimental condition when
predicting European American participants’ enjoyment of the interaction.

Although R2 change was not signiﬁcant (AR) = .06, p = .11), examination of the
parameter estimates indicate that there was a signiﬁcant difference between the
Egalitarian condition and the No Information condition, but not between the Prejudice
condition and the No Information condition. Further examinations of simple slopes in
Figure 6 revealed that, in the Egalitarian condition, implicit theories and enjoyment were
strongly and negatively related (B = -.57, p = .003). Therefore, in the Egalitarian
condition, European American participants whose partner was an incremental theorist
tended to enjoy the interaction less than their counterparts whose partner was an entity
theorist. In the Prejudice condition, African American participants’ implicit theories and
experimental condition were negatively, but sigriﬁcantly related (B = -.14, p = .53). The
simple slope for enjoyment in the No Information was not signiﬁcant (B = .02, p = .94).
Cognitive Resource Depletion

Table 31 presents the results of the moderated regession analyses predicting
availability of Aﬁican American participants’ cognitive resources alter the interaction.

As can be seen in the table, cognitive depletion as measured by errors on the Stroop task,

60

cannot be explained by the main effect of implicit theories, the main effect of
experimental condition, or the interaction between implicit theories and experimental

condition.

6 l

Discussion

Two major research questions were addressed in this thesis. The ﬁrst question
examined how prejudice expectations inﬂuence low status goup members’ responses
during intergoup interactions. The ﬁndings of the present study suggest that African
Americans who expect to face prejudice during interracial interactions are less willing to
interact with their partners and expect less positive interactions compared to African
Americans who expect their interaction partners to be an egalitarian or who have no prior
expectations regarding their interaction partners. Likewise, African Americans who
expect their partner to be prejudiced apparently assume that their partner is less willing to
interact with them. These results indicate that prejudice expectations worsen the
interaction expectations of African Americans. However, there was no evidence that
egalitarian expectations increased interaction expectations. The absence of results
contrasting the Egalitarian condition to the No Information condition may have been a
result of a marnipulation failure, or it may reﬂect the possibility that Aﬁican American
individuals usually expect European American individuals to be non-prejudiced during
interactions (at least within the psychology laboratory context).

Alternatively, it is also possible that Aﬁican Americans believe that egalitarian
attitudes displayed by European Americans are not genuine and are due to self-
presentational concerns. If this is the case, the absence of results contrasting between the
Egalitarian and No Information conditions might be due to African Americans’ mistrust
in European Americans’ egalitarian attitudes. Indeed, Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy
(in press) have shown that, European Americans’ egalitarian attitudes threaten ethnic

minorities who endorse cultural world views that justify the current social hierarchy and

62

their socially devalued status. Therefore, some ethnic minorities are even motivated to
deny European Americans’ egalitarian attitudes in order to protect their cultural world
beliefs. However, pilot study 3 indicated that there was little evidence of differences in
believability of European Americans’ racial attitudes across the experimental conditions,
which suggests that egalitarian attitudes were perceived to be as believable as prejudiced
attitudes. Future research should look at the mechanism underlying the null effects of
egalitarian manipulation.

Even though Aﬁican American participants who expected their partner to be
prejudiced were the least willing to interact with their partner among the three
experimental conditions, their reports of their own behavior indicated that they tried
harder to change their partner’s attitudes toward them than did African Americans who
did not expect their partner to be prejudiced. Past research has shown that engaging in
socially skillful behaviors facilitates positive mood and liking (Fuegen & Brehm, 2004;
Mills, 1966; Yeakley, 1999). Although participants were not directly asked to explain
their motives for enacting more socially skilled behavior, such behavior is consistent with
the construct of compensatory behavior in which individuals actively try to change
another person’s attitudes (Shelton et al., 2005). That is, previous research
operationalizes compensatory behaviors as better social skills and more likeability (Miller
et al., 1995), or more selective self-disclosure (which can include counter-stereotypical
self-presentation; see Kaiser & Miller, 2001; Steele & Aronson, 1995), lower feelings of
authenticity, and more engagement during the interaction (Shelton et al., 2005). In a

sense, any behaviors that are aimed at changing a partner’s negative attitudes to positive

63

or neutral ones, regardless of its effectiveness and results, should be considered as
compensatory behaviors.

This ﬁnding that low status goup members who expected to face prejudice
engaged in more compensatory behaviors compared to their counterparts who did not
expect to face prejudice has interesting implications for previous research that has found
that more prejudiced high status goup members are perceived by low status goup
members to be more friendly than low prejudiced high status goup members (Shelton,
Richeson, Salvatore, & Trawalter, 2005; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004). These two sets of
ﬁndings suggest that low status goup members are more likely to engage in compensatory
behaviors when they interact with low prejudiced high status goup members (who are perceived
to be prejudiced by low status goup members) compared to when they interact with high
prejudiced high status goup members. As a result, low prejudice high status goup members are
more likely to like their low status goup partners who engage in compensation and enjoy the
interaction, compared to high prejudice high status goup members, whose low status partners do
not engage in compensatory behaviors. If this is the case, low status goup members may end up
reinforcing high status goup members’ attitudes toward them.

Although the present study did not ﬁnd the effects of prejudice expectations on
the amount of self-disclosure or intensity of engagement in the interaction unlike
previous studies reported, the present ﬁndings are more consistent with the compensatory
perspective (see Miller et al., 1995; Shelton et al., 2005) than with the avoidance
perspective overall, which argues that low status goup members tend to avoid intergoup
interactions or approach the interactions in a disinterested manner when they expect to

face prejudice (Mendoza-Demon et al., 2002; Pinel, 1999; 2002; Shelton & Richeson,

2006a; Swim & Hyers, 1999).

64

The second research question, which was the major focus of the present study,
examined whether the effects of prejudice expectations on the intergoup interactions
were moderated by an individual differences factor. Drawing upon the literature of
implicit theories about human attributes (Dweck et al., 1995a; Chiu etal., 1997;
Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy et al., 1999; Levy et al., 2001), it was hypothesized that
low status goup members who endorse an incremental theory would attempt to engage in
compensatory behaviors to facilitate positive interactions when they expect to interact
with a prejudiced partner, whereas low status goup members who endorse an entity
theory would approach the interaction in a disinterested manner. In contrast, when they
expect their partner to have an egalitarian orientation, it was hypothesized that entity
theorists would be particularly positive during the interaction compared to incremental
theorists. Furthermore, because low status goup members’ behaviors during the
interaction convey meaningful information to high status goup members (Shelton &
Richeson, 2006b; Shelton etal., 2005; Pinel, 2002), it was argued that high status goup
members’ feelings toward their partner and interaction should correspond to those of
African American participants.

Overall, there was little evidence that low status goup members’ implicit theories
moderate the relationships between prejudice expectations and intergoup interactions,
although there was one ﬁnding that was consistent with the hypotheses. When they
expected to face prejudice, African American incremental theorists reported lower
feelings of authenticity during the interaction, compared to Aﬁican American entity
theorists. However, again, none of the other measures of compensatory behaviors

showed this effect. In addition, there were no interactions between implicit theories and

65

expectations of prejudice on African Americans’ liking of their partners, enjoyment of
the interactions, and observed behaviors. However, contrary to the hypotheses, Aﬁican
American incremental theorists were less willing to interact with their partners and
expected less positive interactions, compared to Aﬁican American entity theorists, when
they expected to be the target of prejudice. Likewise, when they expected to face
prejudice, Aﬁican American incremental theorists assumed that their partner was less
willing to interact with them and less likely to enjoy the interaction, relative to Aﬁican
American entity theorists.

It is surprising that entity theorists were more optimistic about the interaction they
were about to engage in compared to incremental theorists, because previous studies have
found that children who hold an entity theory expressed much less willingness to
socialize with students with negative traits compared to children who hold an incremental
theory (Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999). Perhaps the awareness of
African American incremental theorists that they can make the interaction even worse
depending on their performance during the interaction might have made them nervous
and thus lowered expectations about the interaction. It is important to note that
incremental theorists simply believe that people’s characteristics can change (Chiu et al.,
1997; Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy et al., 2001; Plaks et al., 2005). Therefore, holding an
incremental theory does not necessarily mean that they always believe that people can
improve negative characteristics, but it also means that they sometimes believe that
people’s negative characteristics can be further deteriorated. Therefore, in the case of
prejudice expectations, African American incremental theorists may have thought that the

interaction with their partner could go wrong if they behave in a certain way. Entity

66

theorists may not have the same issue, because they may have thought that their behavior,
whether it is positive or negative, would have little impact on the nature of the interaction.
Even though there was one item asking participants whether they were nervous about
interacting with their partner, a one-item self-report measure of mood may not be a good
measure to address this issue. In retrospect, the preinteraction survey should have
included more mood items or, even better, a physiological anxiety measure might have
been administered during the preinteraction survey to assess anxiety immediately prior to
the interaction.

Notably (and consistent with hypotheses), Aﬁican American participants’ implicit
theories predicted European American participants’ experiences during the interaction,
indicating that Aﬁican Americans’ expectations and behaviors play an important role in
contributing to the quality of intergoup interactions. When African American
participants expected to interact with an egalitarian, European American participants felt
better during the interaction, liked their partner more, and enjoyed the interaction more,
when their Aﬁican American partner was an entity theorist compared to when their
partner was an incremental theorist, This was the case even though the self-reported
behaviors indicated that both entity and incremental theorists engaged in socially skillful
behaviors to the same extent. In retrospect, it is possible that more sensitive and
structured behavioral coding procedure might allow detection of actual behavioral
differences between African American incremental and entity theorists. Taken together,
it appears that Aﬁican American participants’ behaviors that were moderated by their
implicit theories about human attributes do inﬂuence the experiences of European

American participants during the interaction to some extent.

67

Finally, the current study failed to ﬁnd the effects of compensatory behaviors on
cognitive depletion. More speciﬁcally, it was hypothesized the because engagement in
compensatory behaviors requires self-regulation and behavioral control, Aﬁican
American incremental theorists (who were predicted to engage in compensatory
behaviors during the interactions) would have less cognitive resources left after the
intergoup interactions , compared to Aﬁican American entity theorists (who are
predicted to approach the interactions in a disinterested manner). Failure to detect these
effects might simply be due to the fact that incremental and entity theorists do not differ
in their behaviors during intergoup interactions, as the current ﬁndings suggest.
However, it is also possible that the null ﬁndings were due to the timing of the Stroop
task. In this study, cognitive depletion was measured at the end of the study rather than
immediately after the intergoup interaction. Previous studies that have examined the
relationship between compensatory behaviors and cognitive depletion had participants
complete the Stroop task right after they engaged in the intergoup interaction (Richeson
& Trawalter, 2005; Richeson et al., 2005; Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Because the main
focus of the present study was to assess low status goup members’ affect and behaviors
during the interaction, the postinteraction survey was administered immediately after the
interaction in order to ensure that participants would still have ﬁesh memory about the
interaction when they were completing the survey. It is plausible that the effect of
intergoup interactions on cognitive resources disappeared by the time participants were

ﬁnished completing the postinteraction survey.

68

Limitations and Future Directions

First, behavioral coding measures used in the present study suffered from low
reliability. Previous research using many of the same measures showed considerably
geater reliability (Shelton et al., 2005; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004), and so it may be that in
the present study more reliable measures might be obtained by providing more structured
instructions to coders (recall that the coders for this study were asked to code their ﬁrst
impressions). It will be important in the future to train coders on what to look for in
order to rate each item, to examine inter-rater reliability as coding progesses, and to
discuss and re-examine instructions and coding procedures if needed (Bartholomew,
Henderson, & Marcia, 2000).

Second, implicit theories about human attributes were assessed with an individual
difference approach. Even though the Implicit Person Theory measure has been found to
have good reliability and discriminant validity (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a), it
is possible that other variables that correlate with implicit theories might explain and/or
complicate the ﬁndings reported in the present study. In fact, measures of Permeability,
Sense of Control, and Optimism which were measured during the prescreening session
were all positively correlated with Implicit Person Theory (r’s = .19, .19, and .15,
respectively; see Appendix A for items). It is conceivable that the inconsistent and
counterintuitive ﬁndings in this research might have been affected by these other
correlates of implicit theories. One way to address this possibility would be to
manipulate individuals’ implicit theories using a priming technique (Chiu et al., 1997;
Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan,1999; Hong et al., 2004; Levy et al., 1998) in order to

examine causal directions.

69

Third, both African Americans and European Americans were naive participants,
because the present study tried to examine the effects of low status goup members’
implicit theories about human attributes in a real interracial interaction. It is possible that
the true racial attitudes of European American participants inﬂuenced how African
American participants behaved and felt during the interaction above and beyond the
effects of implicit theories about human attributes. Such a supposition suggests, however,
that the absence of signiﬁcant ﬁndings implies that the uncontrolled factor of having
naive European American participants increased the noise in the study, thereby reducing
power. In the case of the present failures to ﬁnd signiﬁcant results, the problem was not
so much driven by large error terms, but rather by small (or non-existent) mean or slope
differences. One way to control for individual differences among European Americans is
to use European American confederates, who are trained to act in a neutral manner,
instead of actual, naive participants. Using confederates could allow us to broaden the
scope of the current research questions. For instance, if European American confederates
are trained to behave in a prejudiced manner, the future study could examine how Aﬁican
Americans who differ in their implicit theories respond to partners whose behavior
actually reﬂects their prejudiced (or egalitarian) attitudes.

Among the lessons that can be learned from the present study is the fact that
although previous research has tended to focus on positive aspects of incremental theories
about human attributes (Dweck, 1999; Dweck et al., 1995a; Dweck et al., 1995b; Chiu et
al., 1997; Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998; Levy et al.,
2001 ), holding an incremental theory simply means that individuals tend to believe that

human traits and characteristics are malleable (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a;

70

Levy et al., 2001; Plaks et al., 2005), and therefore traits can change in both positive and
negative directions. Indeed, several implicit theory researchers, such as Levy and Plaks,
have just started to systematically look at these ideas. Future work should also be
mindﬁrl that low status goup members’ prejudice expectations may or may not differ
from simply having negative interaction expectations that are not prejudice-related. It is
important to examine whether prejudice expectations are unique and different from
general negative expectations, because they might potentially have differential impact on
low status goup members’ behavior. For instance, if low status goup members expect
that their partner is simply a jerk, they may tend to avoid interacting with that person
regardless of their implicit theories because changing their unpleasant partner’s attitudes
is not their responsibility. In this case, negative interactions can be completely attributed
to the partner. However, if their partner is a “racist jerk,” the negative interaction might
be due in part to the low status goup members themselves because their social goup
membership causes their partner to act in negative ways (Crocker & Major, 1989; Major
et al., 2003). In this case, low status goup members may try to do something to change
their partner’s perceptions of their social groups. One way to examine this issue is to
directly manipulate low status goup members’ expectations about their upcoming
interactions without manipulating their beliefs about high status goup members’ attitudes.
If manipulating prejudice expectations has different effects on behaviors during the
interaction compared to interaction expectations, the current ﬁndings should be due to
“prejudice expectation,” not general interaction expectations.

Future research might also examine this issue by manipulating low and high status

goup members’ interaction expectations. If low and high status goup members who

71

expect to have negative interactions behave in a similar fashion as low status goup
members’ who expect to face prejudice, the current ﬁndings would need to be interpreted
as more general effects of expecting negative interactions. However, if high status goup
members do not show similar behaviors to low status goup members, then the present
ﬁndings might more clearly establish that low status goup members’ prejudice
expectations have unique effects on the intergoup interactions.

Finally, the present study restricted its focus to implicit theories about human
attributes. The study focused on this construct because it plays an important role in
person perceptions and social interactions. However, it is important to identify other
possible moderating factors, such as prior experience, levels of extraversion, and
signiﬁcance of intergoup interactions, on the relationship between prejudice expectations
and intergoup interactions in the future studies. Also, the future research should
examine the effects of prejudice expectations on intergoup interactions in more
naturalistic situations. In the laboratory settings, everyone is forced into an intergoup
interaction regardless of their desire, whereas individuals have choices in many cases
whether they engage in intergoup interactions or not in everyday lives. Thus, laboratory
settings do not allow us to examine who tends to self-select into intergoup interactions.
For example, Mendoza-Demon et a1. (2002) and Shelton and Richeson (2006b) used
diary methods to examine the relationship between prejudice expectations and real-life
intergoup interactions and indeed found that low status goup members who expected to
face prejudice actually had fewer intergoup interactions compared to their counterparts
who did not expect to face prejudice. When naturalistic settings are used, it is important

for the ﬁrture studies to examine when, who, and under what circumstances low status

72

goup tend to avoid the interaction all together. Indeed, researchers have recently started
to look at individual difference factors such as racial identity, gender, social dominance
beliefs, racial attitudes, prior interracial ﬁiendships, and demogaphic backgounds, that
inﬂuence how low status goup members experience and respond to prejudice and
discrimination, (Levin, van Laar, & Sidanius, 2003; Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair,
2003; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003). Future studies should ﬁrrther
examine other individual difference factors that might inﬂuence whether low status goup
members approach or avoid intergoup interactions. For instance, it is possible that when
the intergoup interactions have signiﬁcant personal meanings and important future
implications for low status goup members (e.g., boss and subordinate relationship,
roommate relationship), low status goup members might be less apt to avoid the
interactions regardless of their individual differences. On the other hand, when there is
no future implication with avoiding intergoup interactions, individual differences among
low status goup members should matter in terms of predicting who will avoid/approach
the intergoup interactions. In sum, in order to fully understand the relationship between
prejudice expectations and intergoup interactions, it is critical for the future research to

identify different moderators and employ different methods.

73

Conclusions

The present study provided relatively little evidence that low status goup
members’ implicit theories about human attributes moderate what they expect about the
intergoup interaction, how they feel during the interaction, and how their partner feels
during the interaction, when they expect to face prejudice. As has been discussed, the
sparse ﬁndings may reﬂect a number of methodological or conceptual issues. Although
implicit theories may not be a key moderator, it is important for researchers to continue
the search for variables that explain when intergoup interactions have positive effects
and when they do not. The present study contributes to a better understanding of the
effects of prejudice expectations on intergoup interaction, by pointing to the beneﬁts and
importance of identifying individual differences factors that further explain who, when,
and under what circumstances individuals were more likely to approach or avoid

intergoup interactions.

74

Footnotes
1. According to Hong et al. (2004), although the vast majority of Hong Kong residents
are ethnic Chinese, Hong Kong people in general view themselves as a part of
economically successfully developed Asia and view residents of Mainland China as a
part of relatively less developed region. As a result, many Hong Kong people have
maligned Mainland Chinese people with negative stereotypes.
2. Because there were not enough African American participants in the Psychology
Subject Pool, some of the Aﬁican American students were recruited from the larger
campus community and offered monetary compensation (i.e., $10). Only African
American and European American participants were recruited for this study.
3. Two European American students did not complete the prescreening questionnaires,
because they were recruited in the Psychology Building during session time as pinch-
hitters when both signed-up European American participants did not show up.
4. Past research (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy et al., 1998) has shown that
implicit theories are independent of several theoretically related constructs [i.e.,
Attributional Complexity (Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986),
Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), Personal Need for Structure (N euberg &
Newsom, 1993), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981), and Conservatism and
Liberalism (Keringer, 1984)].
5. In order to replicate existing ﬁndings and to explore other potentially important
predictors of responses during intergoup interactions, participants also completed a
number of theoretically relevant measures, such as: attitudes towards Aﬁican Americans

and European Americans, optimism, rejection sensitivity, self-esteem, Stigna

75

Consciousness-Race, and ethnic identiﬁcation. These measures were of secondary
interest and are thus not discussed further in this proposal.

6. At the beginning of the semester, experimenters visited dormitories and cafeterias on
MSU campus and brieﬂy explained the nature of the study (i.e., cover story) to Aﬁican
American students and asked if they were interested in being contacted later to schedule a
session appointment. If African American participants expressed interest in the study,
experimenters asked them to ﬁll out a waiting list form and to leave their ﬁrst name,
telephone number, gender, race, and email address.

7. Score 90, 65, 80, 90 were chosen for “White Americans,” “Lawyers,” “Doctors,” and
“Teachers” respectively in the information packet. These scores were based on the actual
average scores collected in a pilot study except score 90 for White Americans. Although
the average score for White Americans were about 81, Score 90 was chosen because
some Aﬁican American participants might feel odd when they see their European
American partner expressed more positive attitudes toward African Americans than
toward one’s own social goup. In order to make it more believable for all Aﬁican
American participants, score 90 was chosen.

8. Scores for Self-Esteem and Mood items were actual average scores obtained from the
data collected in several previous studies.

9. The psychical distance was assessed using closest points on the two chairs.

10. All participants ageed and signed a video release form.

11. Even thought previous research suggests that sad and blue are meaningfully different
from anger related negative emotions (i.e., anger, irritated; see Major et al., 2003; Russel,

1980) and should be included in Positive Affect after being reversed coded (Major,

76

Kaiser, & MaCoy, 2003), the present data suggest that sad and blue better ﬁt to other
negative affect items such as angy, threatened, and irritated than to positive affect items
(i.e., happy, conﬁdent). An inter-item reliability of four items (i.e., happy, conﬁdent, sad
reversed, and blue reversed) was .52. A conﬁrmatory principal components factor
analysis with a varimax rotation reveled that sad and blue (which are loaded on the same
factor) are loaded on a different factor from happy and conﬁdent (which are loaded on
the same factor). Therefore, depression related negative affect items were classiﬁed as
Other Negative Affect in the present study based on the data.

12. The lowest Stroop latency was 298 ms; therefore, there was no observation dropped
due to Stroop latencies less than 200 ms. For African American participants, the number
of total observations was 6911. Among those, 194 observations were deleted due to false
responses. In addition, 91 observations were deleted because Stroop latencies were
geater than 3 standard deviations above means (one observation was deleted from 35
participants, two observations were deleted ﬁ'om nine participants, and three observations
were deleted from three participants.) Therefore, the ﬁnal number of observation
resulted in 6646. For European American participants, the number of total observations
was 6915 and 53 observations were deleted due to false responses. In addition, based on
the criteria for identifying outliers, 91 observations were deleted (one observation was
deleted from 36 participants, two observations were deleted from 21 participants, and
three observations were deleted from four participants). Due to technical failure, one
Aﬁican American participant’s Stroop data were lost during data collection.

13. Interrater reliability among three independent coders for each observed behavioral

measure was calculated using the following Intraclass Correlation (ICC):

77

ICC = MSA — MSsx / MSA + (k-1)MSs..\
14. High Interrater reliability of sociability in addition to low reliability of other
behavioral measures is consistent with ﬁndings of social relations model research that the
only variable that people agee on when rating ﬁrst impressions is extroversion (Kenny,
Albright, Malloy, & Kashy, 1994; Kenny, Homer, Kashy, & Chu, 1992). This might also
explain why Global Positive Regard and Global Responsiveness had some interrater
reliability and why these scales correlated so highly with sociability measure.
15. Although suspicious participants might have systematically differentially inﬂuenced
their partners during the interaction, compared to non-suspicious participants, their
partner’s data were not excluded from the analyses this paper because all the analyses
independently treat African American and European American participants’ data.
16. Tables for the results using different dummy-coding (the Prejudice condition as
reference) were provided in Appendix U.
17. Because Aﬁican American participants’ implicit theories systematically differed
across the three conditions (i.e., there were more entity theorists in the Prejudice
condition compared to the Egalitarian and No Information conditions), test of main
effects of the two variables were conducted by controlling for one another. In order to
test the main effect of implicit theories controlling for the experimental condition, main
effect of experimental condition was entered into Step 1, and main effect of implicit
theories was entered into Step 2. By the same token, in order to test the main effect of
experimental condition controlling for implicit theories, main effect of implicit theories

was entered into Step 1, and main effect of experimental condition was entered into Step

2.

78

18. Prejudice expectations of “Before,” “During,” and “After” the interaction were
measured during the manipulation check.
19. Because egalitarian manipulation check items which assess egalitarian expectations at

different time points were not successful, only prejudice expectations over time were

examined.

79

APPENDICES

80

Table 1. Frequency and Percentage for Each Scale Point of the Feeling Thermometer
Assessing Evaluations of African Americans.

 

 

 

Scale Point Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 2 .9 .9
10 l .4 1.3
20 0 .4 1.3
30 2 .9 2.1
40 18 7.7 9.8
50 48 20.4 30.2
60 13 5.5 35.7
70 29 12.3 48.1
80 47 20.0 68.1
90 39 16.6 84.7
100 36 15.3 100.0
N = 225

81

Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean Differences of A ll Measured Variables
across the Entire Sample of 146 Participants

 

 

 

 

Aﬁican European
Overall American American
__M .312 _M _§1_3 _Il_/! _S_Q t
t1 Implicit Theories 2.97 .99 2.89 1.02 3.04 .95 -.91
t1 Anxiety 1.59 .93 1.46 1.18 1.73 1.23 -1.33
’1 Other Negat‘ve 1.08 1.21 .76 .93 1.42 1.07 -3.97***
Affect
t1 Positive Affect 3.69 1.05 3.60 1.18 3.78 1.11 -.95
t1 Self-Esteem 4.58 1.15 4.84 .86 4.31 .94 3.55***
Preinter Expect - Self 3.87 .89 3.86 1.00 3.85 .77 .30
P’e‘me’ EXP?“ ' 3.30 1.03 3.30 1.25 3.31 .75 -.08
Partner
S°°lany 31‘1““ 4.03 .71 3.90 .76 4.15 .65 -2.12*
Behav.
Changing Attitudes 1.09 1.26 1.22 1.50 .95 .95 1.29
Physical Distance 45.69 1 1.10 45.69 1 1 .10 -- -- --
Anxiety 1.85 1.07 1.89 .89 1.81 1.23 .42
Other Negative Affect .30 .50 .33 .53 .27 .48 .73
Positive Affect 4.29 .92 4.34 .91 4.25 .94 .58
Authenticity 4.99 .96 5.01 .91 4.97 1.02 .30
Liking 5.04 .80 4.99 .82 5.10 .79 -.79
Enjoyment 4.97 .86 4.99 .83 4.95 .89 .32
Self-Esteem 5.12 .73 5.28 .62 4.96 .81 2.70**
Partner's Liking 4.35 .82 4.47 .88 4.24 .75 168+

Partner's Enjoyment 4.23 .91 4.33 .97 4.13 .85 1.33

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05
level, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001.

82

 

 

 

 

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Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean Differences of Behavioral Measures
across the Entire Sample of] 46 Participants

 

Stereotype

Global Positive
Regard

Global
Responsiveness

Self-Disclosure

Anxiety

Irritability

Sociability

 

 

African European

Overall American American
_M :52 ___M _§_12 _M 312
.21 .33 .31 .38 .10 .22
3.58 .67 3.26 .68 3.60 .67
1.73 .97 2.08 .75 1.34 1.04
3.18 .81 3.03 .78 3.33 .81
1.04 .76 1.02 .81 1.06 .72
.53 .62 .45 .53 .61 .69
3.61 1.08 3.59 1.03 3.63 1.14

I

3.98***

-.35

4.70***

-2.27*

-.31

-1 .64+

-.24

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05
level, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001.

84

 

 

 

 

 

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Table 6. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum Scores, and Maximum Scores of Stroop
Interference Score for the Entire Sample of 145 Participants

 

 

M SD Minimum Maximum
Raw Score 139.02 102.64 -36.09 542.03
Log-Transformed Score -- .0974 -.0495 .4962

 

Note. Stroop interference scores were calculated by subtracting mean transformed RTs
for the control trials from mean transformed RTs for the incongruent trials. Higher
scores represent greater Stroop interference (i.e., more cognitive resource depletion).

86

Table 7. Correlations among Variables Measured during Prescreening for All
Participants

 

1 2 3 4
1. t1 Implicit Theories --
2. t1 Anxiety -.01 --
3. t1 Other Negative Affect -.06 .60** --
4. t1 Positive Affect .07 -.40** -.35** --
5. t1 Self-Esteem .09 -.41** -.54** .42**

 

Note. ** indicatesp < .01. N: 146.

87

Table 8. Correlations among Self-Report Measuresfor All Participants

 

1 2 3 4 5 6
l. Preinter Exp.- Self --
2. Preinter Exp.- Partner .70*** --
3. Socially Skillful Beh. .31*** .1 1 --
4. Changing attitudes -.15+ -.06 .04 --
5. Physical Distanceﬁ‘) -.32** -.24* -.10 .03 --
6. Anxiety -.13 -.14+ -.11 .23“ .20+ --
7. Other Neg. Affect -.29*** -.22** -.17* .43*** .00 28*"
8. Positive Affect .41 *** .30*** .43*** -.11 -.21+ -.47***
9. Authenticity .29*** .26** .21** -.37*** -.00 -.38***
10. Self-Esteem .36*** .31*** .18* -.17* -.16 -.37***
11. Liking .39*** .28*** .39*** -.3l*** -.13 -.20*
12. Enjoyment .43*** .28*** .41*** -.26** -.19 -.26**
13. Partner's Liking .45*** .39*** .38*** -.21** -.24* -.32***
14. Partner's Enjoyment .48*** .34*** .39*** -.20* -.22+ -.34"'"‘*

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05
level, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001. N = 146. (T) Because physical
distance was measured for each interaction pair, N = 70.

88

Table 8 cont. Correlations among Self-Report Measuresfor All Participants

 

7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Preinter Exp.- Self
2. Preinter Exp.- Partner
3. Socially Skillful Beh.
4. Changing attitudes
5. Physical Distance“)
6. Anxiety
7. Other Neg. Affect --
8. Positive Affect —.23 ** --
9. Authenticity -.38*** .41*** ~-
10. Self-Esteem -.31*** .43*** .31*** --
11.Liking -.50*** .41*** .54*** .19* --
12.Enjoyment _.45*** 53*” 57*" .26*** 39$“ __
l3.Partner'sLiking -.33*** .57*** .43*** .42*** .65*** .37*** --

14.Partner'sEnjoyment -.30*** .59*** .41*** .41*** .64*** .69*** .93***

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05
level, ** indicates p < .01 , and *** indicates p < .001. N = 146. (T) Because physical
distance was measured for each interaction pair. N = 70.

89

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95

Table 15. Correlations among Behavioral Measuresfor All Participants

 

l. Stereotype

2. Global Positive Regard

3. Global Responsiveness

4. Self-Disclosure

5. Anxiety

6.hrnabﬂﬁy

7. Sociability

.01

.21*

+04

-.05

.07

-.08

l\)

.55**

.87**

-.57**

.90**

-.7l**

3 4
.49** --
a42** +54**
.54** .85**
+45** =69**

5 6
+62** --
.68** +74**

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05
level, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001. N = 146

96

Table 16. Correlations among Behavioral Measuresfor African American Participants in

the Prejudice Condition

 

1. Stereotype

2. Global Positive Regard

3. Global Responsiveness

4. Self-Disclosure

5. Anxiety

6.hrﬁabﬂﬁy

7. Sociability

.24

.20

.40*

-.21

-.32+

.29

.87***

.83***

-.33+

+72***

.88***

.77***

-.38*

a72***

.88***

-.30

+60***

.84***

5 6
.20 --
-.42* -.71***

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05
level, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001. N = 28

97

Table 17. Correlations among Behavioral Measures for African American Participants in
the Egalitarian Condition

 

1. Stereotype --

2. Global Positive Regard -.26 --

3. Global Responsiveness -.31 .92*** --

4. Self-Disclosure -.11 .80*** .82*** --

5. Anxiety -.10 -.45* -.42* -.65*** --

6. Irritability .13 -.76*** -.69*** -.66*** .53** --

7. Sociability -.02 .92*** .89*** .87*** -.58*** -.84***

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05
level, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001. N = 26

98

Table 18. Correlations among Behavioral Measures for African American Participants in
the No Information Condition

 

1. Stereotype --

2. Global Positive Regard .09 --

3. Global Responsiveness .21 .89*** --

4. Self-Disclosure .20 .81*** .88*** --

5. Anxiety -.05 -.69*** -.63** -.69*** --

6. Irritability -.11 -.79*** -.65** -.75*** .80*** --

7. Sociability .21 .92*** 93*" 92*“ -.69*** _.75***

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05
level, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001. N = 19

99

Table 19. Correlations among Behavioral Measuresfor European American Participants

in the Prejudice Condition

 

1. Stereotype

2. Global Positive Regard

3. Global Responsiveness

4. Self-Disclosure

5. Anxiety

6.hrnabﬂﬁy

7. Sociability

.06

.04

.34+

.12

.07

.09

.91***

.54**

+75***

K89***

.88***

.57***

‘67***

ﬂ82***

.91***

4 5
+40* --
+37* +89***
.53** .88***

+84***

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05

level, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001. N = 28

100

Table 20. Correlations among Behavioral Measures for European American Participants

in the Egalitarian Condition

 

1. Stereotype

2. Global Positive Regard

3. Global Responsiveness

4. Self-Disclosure

5. Anxiety

6. Irritability

7. Sociability

.16

.18

-.10

-.10

-.07

.22

.80***

.46*

-.33+

-.52**

.82***

.35+

-.44*

ﬂ60***

.87***

4 5 6
-.28 --
-.23 .59*** --
.30 -.47* -.61***

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05

level, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001. N = 26

101

Table 21. Correlations among Behavioral Measures for European American Participants
in the No Information Condition

 

1. Stereotype

2. Global Positive Regard

3. Global Responsiveness

4. Self-Disclosure

5. Anxiety

6.hrﬁabﬂﬁy

7. Sociability

-.O7

.03

-.02

-.30

-.23

.23

.87***

.52*

-.63**

-.65**

.8]***

.50*

n72***

a76***

.93***

-.36

.49*

.86***

‘81***

+74***

 

Note. + indicates marginal signiﬁcance at p < .10; * indicates signiﬁcance at the p < .05

level, ** indicateSp < .01, and *** indicateSp < .001. N: 19

102

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103

Table 23. Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Preinteraction

Expectations

 

Predictor

Preinteraction Expectations -

Self

Preinteraction Expectations -

Partner

 

Intercept

Prejudice
vs. No
Information
(PvN)

Egalitarian
vs. No
Information
(EvN)

Implicit
Theories

PvN by
Implicit
Theories

EvN by
Implicit
Theories

ﬂ AR2

B M2

 

4.02

-.91**

.20

.22

-.79*

+14

 

 

+44**

.10

.14**

.23

.00

441*

-.10

.09*

3.33

-1.16**

.28

.10

-1.07**

.47

-.42**

.11

.11*

.08

.00

-.42**

.25

.19**

 

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. AR)
for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for

one another.

104

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106

Table 26. Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Feelings of
Authenticity and Self-Esteem during the Interaction

 

Predictor Authenticity Self-Esteem

 

 

b t? aur b ‘ﬂ szz

 

 

Intercept 4.91 3.03

Initial Self-

__ __ *** ***
Esteem .47 .65

-- .44***

Prejudice vs.
No Info. -.19 -.10 -.18 -.14
(PvN)

Egalitarian
vs. No Info. .20 .11 .03 .02
(EVN) .03 .01

Implicit

Theories -.27 -.32 -.Ol -.02

.02 .01
PVN by
Implicit -.31 -.18 -.15 -.12
Theories

EVN by
Implicit .45+ .35 .00 .00
Theories 19* .01

O .

 

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ARZ
for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for
one another.

107

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110

Table 30. Effects of African American Participants ’ Prejudice Expectations and Implicit

Theories on European American Participants ’ Liking of Their Partner and Enjoyment of the
Interaction

 

Predictor Liking Enjoyment

 

b ﬂ AR“) b ,3 A122

 

 

Intercept 4.92 4.64

Prejudice
vs. No
Information
(PvN)

.20 .12 .36 .19

Egalitarian
vs. No
Information
(EvN)

.24 .15 .45 .24

.01 .02

Implicit

Theories . 14 . 1 8 .02 .02

.04 .08*

PVN by
Implicit -.24 -.17 -.14 -.O9
Theories

EvN by
Implicit -.54* -.46* -.51* -.39*
Theories
.08+ .06

 

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. AR"
for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for
one another.

111

Table 31. Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Availability of African
American Participants ' Cognitive Resources

 

 

 

 

 

Predictor Stroop Interference Score
b 13 AR"

Intercept .18
Prejudice vs. No Information (PvN) -.O3 -.12
Egalitarian vs. No Information (EvN) -.06+ -.29+

.06
Implicit Theories -.02 -.1 6

.03
PVN by Implicit Theories -.O3 -.13
EVN by Implicit Theories .01 -.03

.01

 

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. AR}
for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for
one another.

112

Figure 1. African American Participants ' Preinteraction Expectations - Self

 

 

,B=.O9,p=.63

 

African American Particrpants’
Preinteraction Expectations - Self
b)

1 4 ,B=-.60,p=.02

 

 

-1 SD +1 SD
Implicit Theories

+ The Prejudice Condition
+ The Egalitarian Condition
—0— The No Information Condition

113

Figure 2. African American Participants ' Preinteraction Expectations - Partner

 

 

ﬂ=.08,p= .71

 
   

African American Participants’

Preinteraction Expectations - Partner
U)

[a = -.76, p = .002

 

 

-1 SD +1 SD
Implicit Theories

-+— The Prejudice Condition
—l— The Egalitarian Condition
—0— The No Information Condition

114

Figure 3. African American Participants ’ Feelings of Authenticity

 

 

6‘ I/I
‘ 51 ,B=.21,p=.25
E >.
.9 '8
O .... _
.. e
35‘ 3_ ,6=-.32,p=.17
C 0
o (h
E on
.5
5 Ta 2 -
.0 LL.
cg ,6=-.69,p= .01
1 _ + The Prejudice Condition
—-l— The Egalitarian Condition
+ The No Information Condition
0
Low (-1 SD) High (+1 SD)

Implicit Theories

115

Figure 4. European American Participants ' Positive Mood during the Interaction

= .17, = .47
5* M

4- k ﬂ

 

European American Partrcrpants’
Positive Mood during the Interaction
U)

 

 

,6 = -.O6,p = .80
,8 = -.36,p = .04

2 _

+ The Prejudice Condition
1 I —I— The Egalitarian Condition

+ The No Information Condition
0

Low (-1 SD) High (+ISD)

Implicit Theories

116

Figure 5. European American Participants ' Liking of Their Partner

Mp=46

4 _ ,B=-.13,p=.59

67

European American Participants’
Liking of Their Partner
(4)

 

 

,8 = -.36,p = .04
2 _
+ The Prejudice Condition
1 —I— The Egalitarian Condition
+ The No Information Condition
0
Low (-ISD) High (+1 SD)

Implicit Theories

117

Figure 6. European American Participants ' Enjoyment of the Interaction

6-

 

 

2 ~ 3 = -.57, p = .003

European American Participants’
Enjoyment of the Interactron
DJ

+ The Prejudice Condition
1 r —l— The Egalitarian Condition
—0— The No Information Condition

 

 

Low (-ISD) High (+1SD)
Implicit Theories

118

Appendix A. Pilot Study 2 Materials

For the following questions, please select the number that best represents your beliefs
using the scale provided below.

 

 

 

 

1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree

1. The kind of person someone is is something very basic about them and it can’t
be changed very much.

2. People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can’t
really be changed.

3. Everyone, no matter who they are, can signiﬁcantly change their basic
characteristics.

4. As much as I hate to admit it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. People
can’t really change their deepest attributes.

5. People can always substantially change the kind of person they are.

6. Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to
really change that.

7. No matter what kind of person someone is, they can always change very much.

8. All people can change even their most basic qualities.

Please imagine that a White MSU student was asked to rate his/her feelings about some
of the different groups in the United States, using a scale from O to 100 (see below).
He/she was instructed that the higher the number, the warmer or more favorable he/she
feels toward that group. The lower the number, the colder or less favorable he/she

feels. If he/ she feels neither warm nor cold toward them, he/she would rate that group
a 50.

The followings are the student’s ratings about some of the different groups.

 

 

40 African Americans
90 European/White Americans

65 Lawyers
80 Doctors
90 Teachers

 

 

9. What do you think of the White MSU student’s attitude towards African Americans?
0 l 2 3 4 5 5
Very Prejudiced Average Very Egalitarian

 

10. Do you think the student is being honest about his/her attitude towards African
Americans?
0 1 2 3 4 6
Very Dishonest Very Honest

£11

119

 

11. Do you think his rating of African Americans is believable?
(,L l 2 3 4 5 6
Very Unbelievable Very Believable

 

Please imagine that another White student rated each group as followed.

 

 

90 African Americans
90 European/White Americans

65 Lawyers
80 Doctors
90 Teachers

 

 

12. What do you think of the White MSU student’s attitude towards African
Americans?

ﬁll

O 1 2 3 4 6
Very Prejudiced Average Very Egalitarian

13. Do you think the student is being honest about his/her attitude towards African
Americans?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Dishonest Very Honest

 

14. Do you think his rating of African Americans is believable?
0 l 2 3 4 6
Very Unbelievable Very Believable

LI!

Please imagine that another White student rated each group as followed.

 

 

70 African Americans
90 European/White Americans

 

 

 

65 Lawyers
80 Doctors
_90_ Teachers
15. What do you think of the White MSU student’s attitude towards African
Americans?
0 l 2 3 4 5 6
Very Prejudiced Average Very Egalitarian

16. Do you think the student is being honest about his/her attitude towards African
Americans?
0 1 2 3 4 6
Very Dishonest Very Honest

ﬁll

120

17. Do you think his rating of African Americans is believable?
O l 2 3 4 6
Very Unbelievable Very Believable

til

18. Please imagine that an average White MSU student was asked to rate his/her
feelings about some of the different groups in the United States, using a scale from O to
100. What do you think this average White MSU student would rate African
Americans on the scale?

0—5— 10—15—20—25—30-—35—40—45—50—55——60—-65—70—75—80—85—90—95— 100

Very Cold Neither Very Warm
Warm Nor Cold
19. Your Gender: Male Female
20. Your Race: African American Asian American
Latino American Native American
White American International Student
Multiracial/Other (Please specify here: )

 

For the following questions, please select the number that best represents your beliefs
using the scale provided below.

 

 

 

 

1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Agree Strongly
Disagree
21. Overall, my racial group membership has very little to do with how I feel
about myself.
22. The racial group I belong to is an important reﬂection of who I am.
23. The racial group I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of
person I am.

24. In general, belonging to my racial group is an important part of my self-image.

121

 

Appendix B. Independent Variables (Online Prescreening Questionnaires)

Instructions: Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of the following
statements is true for you. There are no right or wrong answers for any question

 

 

0 1 2 3 6
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

J>
(I!

 

 

 

Implicit Theories

1. The kind of person someone is is something very basic about them and it can’t be
changed very much.

2. People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can’t really be
changed.

3. Everyone, no matter who they are, can signiﬁcantly change their basic characteristics.
4. As much as I hate to admit it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. People can’t really
change their deepest attributes.

5. People can always substantially change the kind of person they are.

6. Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really
change that.

7. No matter what kind of person someone is, they can always change very much.

8. All people can change even their most basic qualities.

Racial Identity

9. Overall, my racial group membership has very little to do with how I feel about myself.
10. The racial group I belong to is an important reﬂection of who I am.

11. The racial group I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.

122

 

12. In general, belonging to my racial group is an important part of my self-image.
Justice Beliefs

Belief in Just World

12. I feel that the world treats people fairly.

13. I feel that people get what they deserve.

14. I feel that people treat each other fairly in life.

15. I feel that people earn the punishments and rewards they get.

16. I feel that people treat each other with the respect that they deserve.

17. I feel that people get what they are entitled to have.

18. I feel that a person’s efforts are noticed and rewarded.

19. I feel that when people meet with misfortune, they have brought it upon themselves.
Protestant Work Ethic

20. Most people who don’t get ahead should not blame the system: they really have only
themselves to blame.

21. In America, getting ahead doesn’t always depend on hard work.

22. Even if people work hard, they don’t always get ahead.

23. In America, individuals who are strongly motivated to succeed usually get ahead.
Permeability

24. America is an open society where all individuals can achieve higher status.

25. Advancement in American society is possible for all individuals.

26. Individual members of certain groups have difﬁculty achieving higher status.

27 . Individual members of certain groups are often unable to advance in American

society.

123

Legitimacy

28. American is a just society where differences in status between groups reﬂect actual
group differences.

29. Differences in status between groups in American society are fair.

30. Differences in status between groups in American society are the result of injustice.
31. It is unfair that certain groups in America have poorer living conditions than other
groups.

Control

32. I have little control over the things that happen to me.

33. There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have.

34. There is little that I can do to change many of the important things in my life.

35. I oﬁen feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life.

36. Sometimes I feel that I'm being pushed around in life.

37. What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me.

38. I can do just about anything I really set my mind to.

Rosenberg Self-Esteem

39. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.

40. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

41. All in all, I am inclined to think I am a failure.

42. I am able to do things as well as most people.

43. I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.

44. I take a positive attitude toward myself.

45. On the whole, I am satisﬁed with myself.

124

46. I wish I could have more respect for myself.

47. I certainly feel useless at times.

48. At times, I think I am no good at all.

Mood

49. Right now, I feel ANXIOUS.

50. Right now, I feel CALM.

51. Right now, I feel ANGRY.

52. Right now, I feel SAD.

53. Right now, I feel CONFIDENT.

54. Right now, I feel BLUE.

55. Right now, I feel NERVOUS.

56. Right now, I feel RELAXED.

57. Right now, I feel THREATENED.

58. Right now, I feel UNEASY.

59. Right now, I feel HAPPY.

60. Right now, I feel IRRITATED.

Stigma Consciousness (Race)

61. Stereotypes about my racial group have not affected me personally.

62. I never worry that my behaviors will be viewed as stereotypical of my racial group.
63. When interacting with members of other racial groups, I feel like they interpret all my
behaviors in terms of the fact that I’m a member of my racial group.

64. Most members of other racial groups do not judge members of my racial group on the

basis of their race.

125

65. Being a member of my racial group does not inﬂuence how people of other races act
with me.

66. I almost never think about the fact that I am a member of my racial group when I
interact with members of other racial groups.

67. My being a member of my racial group does not inﬂuence how people act with me.
68. Most members of other racial groups have a lot more racist thoughts about my racial
group than they actually express.

69. I often think that members of other racial groups are unfairly accused of being racist
towards my racial group.

70. Most members of other racial groups have a problem viewing my racial group as
equals.

Optimism

71. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.

72. If something can go wrong for me, it will.

73. I'm always optimistic about my future.

74. I hardly ever expect things to go my way.

75. I rarely count on good things happening to me.

76. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad things.

Racial Attitudes/F eelin g Thermometer

These next questions are about your feelings about some of the different groups in the
United States. Please rate the group on a thermometer that runs from zero (0) to one
hundred (100). The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward
that group. The lower the number, the colder or less favorable you feel toward that

group. If you feel neither warm nor cold toward that group, rate it a ﬁfty.

126

 

 

0—5— 10— l 5—20—25—30—35—40—45—50—55—60—65—70—75—80—85—90—95— 100

 

Very Neither Very
Cold Warm Nor Cold Warm
77. African Americans/Blacks

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

85.

86.

87.

88.

Asian Americans

Latino Americans/Hispanics
Native Americans
Whites/European Americans
Teenagers

Muslim Americans
Christians

Lawyers

Doctors

Teachers

Immigrants

Rejection Sensitivity

Please use the FIRST scale for question 1,3,5,7,9, and 11 and the SECOND scale for question

2,4,6,8,lO, and 12 to rate the extent to which each of the following statements is true for you.

There are no right or wrong answers for any question

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 2 3 4 5 6

Very Unconcemed Very Concerned
1 2 3 4 5 6

Very Unlikely Very Likely

 

127

 

 

 

89. Please imagine that you ask someone you don't know well out on a date. How
concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not the person would want to go out
with you? (very unconcemed/very concerned)

90. Please imagine that you ask someone you don't know well out on a date. How much
would you expect that the person would want to go out on a date with you? (very
unlikely/very likely)

91. Please imagine that you go to a party and notice someone on the other side of the
room, and you try to initiate a conversation. How concerned would you be over whether
or not the person would want to talk with you? (very unconcemed/very concerned)

92. Please imagine that you go to a party and notice someone on the other side of the
room, and you try to initiate a conversation. How much would you expect that he/she
would want to talk with you? (very unlikely/very likely)

93. Please imagine that you ask someone in one of your classes to coffee. How concerned
or anxious would you be over whether or not the person would want to go? (very
unconcerned/very concerned)

94. Please imagine that you ask someone in one of your classes to coffee. How much
would you expect that he/she would want to go with you? (very unlikely/very likely)

95. Please imagine that you ask your ﬁ‘iend to go on vacation with you over Spring Break.
How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not your ﬁiend would want to
go with you? (very unconcemed/very concerned)

96. Please imagine that you ask your friend to go on vacation with you over Spring Break.
How much would you expect that he/she would want to go with you? (very unlikely/very

likely)

128

97. Please imagine that you ask a friend if you can borrow something of his/hers. How
concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not your friend would want to loan it
to you? (very unconcerned/very concerned)

98. Please imagine that you ask a ﬁiend if you can borrow something of his/hers. How
much would you expect that he/she would willingly loan it to you? (very unlikely/very
likely)

99. Please imagine that you ask a friend to do you a big favor. How concerned or anxious
would you be over whether or not your friend would want to help you out? (very
unconcemed/very concerned)

100. Please imagine that you ask a friend to do you a big favor. How much would you
expect that he/she would willingly agree to help you out? (very unlikely/very likely)

101. Gender

102. Age

103. Race

104. Identiﬁcation Number (birth month + birth date + the last two digits of phone

number + the initial of ﬁrst name)

129

Appendix C. Manipulation Materials

Below is the information about your interaction partner. Please review it for a few
minutes.

 

Demographic Information

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[ Participant's ID 7 @30891 I
Your gender Male
Your race White

RSE

Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of the following statements
is true for you. There are no right or wrong answers for any question

0 1 2 3 5 6
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

4}

 

I am able to do things as well as most people.

 

 

I wish I could have more respect for myself.
I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.

 

 

 

 

On the whole, I am satisﬁed with myself.

 

 

I take a positive attitude toward myself.

 

 

NU'IO'l-‘N-h

 

 

 

 

I certainly feel useless at times.

 

 

Mood

Please rate your CURRENT mood using the same 0 (strongly disagree) - 6 (strongly
agree) scale provided above.

 

 

_Bight now, I feel CALM.

Right now, I feel ANGRY.
Right now, I feel SAD.

Right now, I feel CONFIDENT.
Right now, I feel BLUE.

Right now, I feel NERVOUS.
RiLht now, I feel RELAXED.
Right now, I feel HAPPY.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

00:440440

 

 

 

 

 

 

130

Below is the information about your interaction partner. Please review it for a few
minutes.

 

Demographic Information

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I Participant's ID I L030891 I
Your gender Female
Your race White

RSE

Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of the following statements
is true for you. There are no right or wrong answers for any question

LII
Ch

0 1 2 3 4
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

 

 

I am able to do things as well as most people.

 

I wish I could have more respect for myself.

 

I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.

 

On the whole, I am satisﬁed with myself.
I take a positive attitude toward myself.

 

 

 

 

 

 

NO’IUT-‘N-h

I certainly feel useless at times.

 

Mood

Please rate your CURRENT mood using the same 0 (strongly disagree) - 6 (strongly
agree) scale provided above.

 

Right now, I feel CALM.

Right now, I feel ANGRY.
Right now, lfeel SAD.

Right now, I feel CONFIDENT.
Right now, lfeel BLUE.

Right now, I feel NERVOUS.
Right now, I feel RELAXED.
Right now, I feel HAPPY.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ism—s—sis—x—sh

 

131

Attitudes/Feeling Thermometer

These next questions are about your feelings about some of the different groups in the
United States. Please rate the group on a thermometer that runs from zero (0) to one
hundred (100). The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward
that group. The lower the number, the colder or less favorable you feel toward that
group. If you feel neither warm nor cold toward that group, rate it a ﬁfty (50).

0—5— 10— 15—20—25—30—35—40—45—50—55—60—65—70—75—80—85—90—95— 100

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Very Neither Very
Cold Warm Nor Cold Warm
African Americans 40
Doctors 80
Lawyers 65
Teachers 90
White Americans 90

 

 

 

 

 

 

132

Attitudes/Feeling Thermometer

These next questions are about your feelings about some of the different groups in the
United States. Please rate the group on a thermometer that runs from zero (0) to one
hundred (100). The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward
that group. The lower the number, the colder or less favorable you feel toward that
group. If you feel neither warm nor cold toward that group, rate it a ﬁfty (50).

0—5— 10— l5—20—25—30—35—40—45—50—55--60—65—70—75—80—85—90—95— 100

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Very Neither Very
Cold Warm Nor Cold Warm
African Americans 90
Doctors 80
Lawyers 65
Teachers 90
White Americans 90

 

 

 

 

 

 

133

Appendix D. Dependent Variables (Self-Report Pretinteraction Questionnaire)

Instructions: For the following questions, please use the scale provided below. Do not

spend too much time on any one question; we are looking for your ﬁrst, natural, “gut”
response.

 

 

 

 

 

0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1. __ I am looking forward to meeting my partner.

2. _ I am nervous about interacting with my partner.

3. __ I think I will enjoy interacting with my partner.

4. __ I would prefer to work with a different partner.

5. __ I am excited about the interaction with my partner.

6. __ I do not want to interact with my partner.

7. __ I think my partner will enjoy interacting with me.

8. _ I think my partner will be excited about interacting with me.

134

 

Appendix E. Dependent Variables (Self-Report Postinteraction Questionnaire)

For the following questions, please use the scale provided below. Do not spend too much
time on any one question; we are looking for your ﬁrst, natural, “gut” response.

 

 

 

 

O 1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
DURING THE INTERACTION:

1. __ Iwas ANXIOUS.

2. __ Iwas CALM.

3. __ Iwas ANGRY.

4. __ Iwas SAD.

5. _ Iwas CONFIDENT.

6. __ Iwas BLUE.

7. _ Iwas NERVOUS.

8. __ Iwas RELAXED.

9. __ I was THREATENED.

10. __ Iwas UNEASY.

11. ________ I was HAPPY.

12. __ Iwas IRRITATED.

l3. __ I had to change myself to ﬁt in with my partner.
14. __ It was easy to express my true attitudes and feelings.
15. __ I tried to get my partner to like me.

16. __ I tried to change my partner’s beliefs about me.
17. __ I tried to make the interaction go smoothly.

I35

 

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

I tried to make the interaction enjoyable for myself.

I tried to make the interaction enjoyable for my partner.

I tried to change my partner’s assumptions about who I am.

I tried to act socially skillful.

I put a lot of effort into making the interaction go well.

I disengaged or withdraw from my partner.

I did not put much effort into making the interaction go well.
I tried to get my partner to understand who I really am.

I liked my partner.

I would enjoy interacting with my partner again in the future.
My partner is a nice person.

I enjoyed getting to know my partner.

I enjoyed the interaction with my partner.

I had a good time during the interaction.

During the interaction, I frequently elaborated on my thoughts about the topics.
I was very involved during the interaction.

I revealed a lot about myself to my partner.

I think my partner enjoyed the interaction with me.

I think my partner liked me.

I think my partner would enjoy interacting with me again in the future.
I think my partner enjoyed getting to know me.

I think my partner had a good time during the interaction.

I think my partner thinks I am a nice person.

136

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

Right now, I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with
others.

Right now, I feel that l have a number of good qualities.

Right now, I am inclined to think I am a failure.

Right now, I am able to do things as well as most people.

Right now, I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.

Right now, I take a positive attitude toward myself.

Right now, I am satisﬁed with myself.

Right now, I wish I could have more respect for myself.

Right now, I certainly feel useless at times.

Right now, I think I am no good at all.

137

Appendix F. Dependent Variables (Nonverbal and Verbal Behaviors Coding Measures)

Please provide your opinions about the participant using the scale provided below.

 

 

 

0 l 2 3 ------------ 4 5 6
Not at All Extremely

 

 

H

. The participant looked comfortable during the interaction.

N

. The participant was interested in his/her partner.

DJ

. The participant looked anxious during the interaction.

A

. The participant seemed unpleasant during the interaction.

tit

. The participant appeared engaged in the conversation.

O\

. The participant looked angry during the interaction.

\)

. The participant was interested in getting to know his/her partner.

00

. The participant looked nervous during the interaction.

9. The participant was responsive to his/her partner.

10. The participant appeared annoyed during the interaction.

1 1. The participant was sociable.

12. The participant was friendly to his/her partner.

13. The participant was attentive to his/her partner.

14. The participant was irritated during the interaction.

15. The participant appeared to be having fun with his/her partner.
16. The participant was uneasy during the interaction.

17. The participant elaborated on her/his thoughts and feelings.
18. The participant’s comments were intimate/personal.

19. The participant talked during the interaction.

138

 

20. The participant self-disclosed to his/her partner.

21. The participant liked his/her partner.

22. The participant tried to spark conversation.

23. The participant was authentic during the interaction.

24. The participant was socially skillful.

25. The participant asked his/her partner questions about themselves.

26. The participant tried to act in racially non-stereotypic manner during the interaction.
27. The participant displayed stereotypical behavior associated with his/her racial group.
28. The participant tried to dispel negative stereotypes associated with his/her racial
group.

29. I learned about the participant from this interaction.

30. Please rate the extent to which the participant leaned toward his/her partner.

0 1 2 3 ------------ 4 5 6
Body leaned away from partner Body leaned forward toward partner

 

 

31. What did the participant do with his/her arms during the interaction?

0 ------------ 1 2 3 4 5 6
Arms crossed a lot Arms open and/or inviting

 

 

 

 

34. Please rate the extent to which the participant smiled during the interaction.

0 l 2 3 4 5 6
Did not smile at all Smiled a lot

 

 

139

Appendix G. Manipulation Check Sheet (Only for African American Participants)

Please select a number that best represents your feelings about your interaction partner.
Please do not spend too much time on any one question. We are simply interested in
your ﬁrst, natural, “gut” response.

 

 

 

 

O 1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1. BEFORE the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was prejudiced
toward Blacks.

2. BEFORE the interaction, I thought my interaction partner held egalitarian
attitudes toward Blacks.

3. BEFORE the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was neither a racist
nor an egalitarian.

4. DURING the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was prejudiced
toward Blacks.

5. DURING the interaction, I thought my interaction partner held egalitarian
attitudes toward Blacks.

6. DURING the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was neither a racist
nor an egalitarian.

7. AFTER the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was prejudiced toward
Blacks.

8. AFTER the interaction, I thought my interaction partner held egalitarian
attitudes toward Blacks.

9. AFTER the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was neither a racist nor

an egalitarian.

The following two questions are about your partner’s attitudes toward different social
groups. Please respond by using the same scale provided above.

10. According to the information I received before the interaction, my partner
expressed positive attitudes toward Blacks.
11. According to the information I received before the interaction, my partner

expressed positive attitudes toward Whites.

140

 

Appendix H. Suspicion Check Sheet

1. In a sentence or two, please describe your thoughts about the purpose of today’s study.

 

 

 

2. At what point during the study did this idea occur to you?

 

 

3. Did anything about this study seem unusual or strange? At what point in the study did
you notice these things?

 

 

 

4. What is your birth month?

January February March April May
June July August September October
November December

5. What is your birth date (from 1-31)? _ __

6. Think of the 7 digits of your phone number. What are the last two digits of your phone
number? _ __

7. What letter does your ﬁrst name start with (A-Z)?

141

Appendix I. Consent F ormfor the Online Prescreening Questionnaires
Online Questionnaire
Informed Consent Statement

These questionnaires are part of a research study being conducted by Dr. Cheryl Kaiser, a
faculty member in the Department of Psychology. Participation in this study involves
completing several surveys about yourself, including your thoughts, attitudes, and
feelings. It should take approximately 10 minutes to complete these surveys. When you
are done with these surveys, you will sign up for a laboratory session. Your participation
is voluntary and you may choose to withdraw at any point without penalty. In order to
protect your conﬁdentiality, you will provide the following unique number (Birth Month
and date, Last two digits of phone number,

First Initial), rather than your name to identify your data. Furthermore, your privacy will
be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law.

If you have questions about the study, contact Cheryl Kaiser, Ph.D., or Nao Hagiwara, a
graduate student, Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing,
MI 48824, phone: 517-353-5324, e-mail: ssplab@msu.edu. In case you have questions
or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to contact Ashir
Kumar, MD, Michigan State University's Chair of University Committee on Research
Involving Human Subjects by phone: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, email:
<ucrihs@msu.edu>, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. Dr. Kumar
may be contacted anonymously if you wish.

You indicate your voluntary agreement by completing and submitting this questionnaire.

142

Appendix J. Consent Form for the Serial Cognition Study (For Research Credit)

Informed Consent Form -- Serial Cognition

In this serial cognition experiment, we are interested in understanding how performing
one cognitive task inﬂuences performance on a subsequent cognitive task. In this study,
your ﬁrst cognitive task will involve reading and summarizing an article, and the second
cognitive task will involve completing a computerized color-matching task. There will be
a 15-20 minute delay between these tasks, so that we can examine whether delays are
important in understanding the serial cognition process.

The entire study will take about 45 minutes to complete. You will receive 2 research
credits for your participation. Your participation is greatly appreciated, and is voluntary.
Because this is a research study, participation may involve experiences that produce
short-term changes in your thoughts or emotions. If you wish to discontinue your
participation at any time, you have to right to do so without penalty or loss of
compensation. Also, you have the right to request that your responses not be used in the
data analyses.

This experiment is conﬁdential and your consent form will be stored in a separate place
from your responses. In order to protect your conﬁdentiality, the last ﬁve digits of your
PID, rather than your name will identify your data. To help us protect your conﬁdentiality,
please do not write your name or any other identifying information on anything but this
consent form. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law.

At the conclusion of this research the experimenter will provide a thorough explanation
of the study. It is our goal that you learn about the research you participated in today.
Furthermore, the experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you have about the
research.

Cheryl Kaiser, a professor in the Department of Psychology, and Nao Hagiwara, a
graduate student in the Department of Psychology, are conducting this scientiﬁc study. If
you have questions about the study, contact Cheryl Kaiser or Nao Hagiwara, Department
of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-

53 24, e-mail: ssplab@msu.edu. In case you have questions or concerns about your rights
as a research participant, please feel free to contact Peter Vasilenko, Ph.D., Director of
Human Research Protections, (517)355-2180, fax (517)432-4503, e-mail irb@msu.edu,
mail 202 Olds Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1047. Dr.
Vasilenko may be contact anonymously if you wish.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary consent to participate in this research.

 

 

Name (please print) Signature Date

143

Appendix K. Consent Form for the Serial Cognition Study (For Monetary Compensation)

Informed Consent Form -- Serial Cognition

In this serial cognition experiment, we are interested in understanding how performing
one cognitive task inﬂuences performance on a subsequent cognitive task. In this study,
your ﬁrst cognitive task will involve reading and summarizing an article, and the second
cognitive task will involve completing a computerized color-matching task. There will be
a 15-20 minute delay between these tasks, so that we can examine whether delays are
important in understanding the serial cognition process.

The entire study will take about 45 minutes to complete. You will receive $10 for your
participation. Your participation is geatly appreciated, and is voluntary. Because this is a
research study, participation may involve experiences that produce short-term changes in
your thoughts or emotions. If you wish to discontinue your participation at any time, you
have to right to do so without penalty or loss of compensation. Also, you have the right to
request that your responses not be used in the data analyses.

This experiment is conﬁdential and your consent form will be stored in a separate place
from your responses. In order to protect your conﬁdentiality, the last ﬁve digits of your
PID, rather than your name will identify your data. To help us protect your conﬁdentiality,
please do not write your name or any other identifying information on anything but this
consent form. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law.

At the conclusion of this research the experimenter will provide a thorough explanation
of the study. It is our goal that you learn about the research you participated in today.
Furthermore, the experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you have about the
research.

Cheryl Kaiser, a professor in the Department of Psychology, and Nao Hagiwara, a
graduate student in the Department of Psychology, are conducting this scientiﬁc study. If
you have questions about the study, contact Cheryl Kaiser or Nao Hagiwara, Department
of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-
5324, e—mail: ssplab@msu.edu. In case you have questions or concerns about your rights
as a research participant, please feel free to contact Dr. Peter Vasilenko, Michigan State
University's Chair of University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects by
phone: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517)432-4503, email: <ucrihs@msu.edu>, or regular mail:
202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. Dr. Vasilenko may be contact anonymously if
you wish.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary consent to participate in this research.

 

 

Name (please print) Signature Date

144

Appendix L. Consent Form for the Impression Formation Study (For Aﬁican American

Participants)

Informed Consent Form
Impression Formation---“Receiver Condition”

This study examines the psychology of impression formation. In this study, you will be
paired up with another research participant and the two of you will engage in a ten-
minute semi-structured videotaped interpersonal interaction. In order to further
understand the impression formation process, you and your partner will complete two
short surveys regarding the interaction. Additionally, in order to further understand the
impression formation process, one member of the pair will be randomly assigned to have
information that he or she had previously provided on a subject pool online questionnaire
presented to his or her partner. You have been randomly assigned to receive
information from your partner. However, your partner does not know that you will have
access to that he or she previously provided. This informational disclosure will help us
better understand processes that contribute to impression formation. After the study is
completed, trained members of the research team will examine the videotapes, with the
goal of better understanding how people react during brief interpersonal interactions.

This study will take about 15 minutes to complete. Your participation is greatly
appreciated, and is voluntary. If you wish to discontinue your participation at any time,
you have to right to do so without penalty or loss of research credits. Also, you have the
right to request that your questionnaire responses not be used in the data analyses and
that your videotape be destroyed.

This experiment is confidential and your consent form will be stored in a separate place
from your questionnaire. In order to protect your conﬁdentiality, the last five digits of your
PID, rather than your name will identify your data. To help us protect your conﬁdentiality,
please do not write your name, full PID, or any other identifying information on anything
but this consent form. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by
law.

At the conclusion of this study, the experimenter will further explain this study. It is our
goal that you learn about the research study you participated in today. Furthermore, the
experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you have about the research.

Cheryl Kaiser, a faculty member in the Department of Psychology, and her graduate
students are conducting this scientific study. If you have questions about the study,
contact Cheryl Kaiser, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East
Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-8691, e—mail: kaiser06@msu.edu. In case you have
questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to
contact Dr. Peter Vasilenko, Michigan State University's Chair of University Committee
on Research Involving Human Subjects by phone: (517)355-2180, fax: (517)432-4503,
email: <ucrihs@msu.edu>, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. Dr.
Vasilenko may be contact anonymously if you wish.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary consent to participate in this research.

145

 

 

 

Signature Name (Please Print) Date

Please provide your signature below if you agree to let us videotape your interaction
during the experiment.

 

 

 

Signature Name (Please Print) Date

146

Appendix M. Consent Form for the Impression Formation Study (For European

American Participants)

Informed Consent Form
Impression Formation

This study examines the psychology of impression formation. In this study, you will be
paired up with another research participant and the two of you will engage in a ten-
minute semi-structured videotaped interpersonal interaction. Additionally, in order to
further understand the impression formation process, you will complete a short survey
regarding the interaction and your interaction partner. After the study is completed,
trained members of the research team will examine the videotapes, with the goal of
better understanding how people react during brief interpersonal interactions.

This study will take about 15 minutes to complete. Your participation is greatly
appreciated, and is voluntary. If you wish to discontinue your participation at any time,
you have to right to do so without penalty or loss of research credits. Also, you have the
right to request that your questionnaire responses not be used in the data analyses and
that your videotape be destroyed.

This experiment is conﬁdential and your consent form will be stored in a separate place
from your questionnaire. In order to protect your confidentiality, the last ﬁve digits of your
PID, rather than your name will identify your data. To help us protect your conﬁdentiality,
please do not write your name, full PID, or any other identifying information on anything
but this consent form. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by
law.

At the conclusion of this study, the experimenter will further explain this study. It is our
goal that you learn about the research study you participated in today. Furthermore, the
experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you have about the research.

Cheryl Kaiser, a faculty member in the Department of Psychology, and her graduate
students are conducting this scientific study. If you have questions about the study,
contact Cheryl Kaiser, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East
Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-8691, e-mail: kaiser06@msu.edu. In case you have
questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to
contact Dr. Peter Vasilenko, Michigan State University's Chair of University Committee
on Research Involving Human Subjects by phone: (517)355-2180, fax: (517)432-4503,
email: <ucrihs@msu.edu>, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. Dr.
Vasilenko may be contact anonymously if you wish.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary consent to participate in this research.

 

 

 

Signature Name (Please Print) Date

147

Please provide your signature below if you agree to let us videotape your interaction
during the experiment.

 

 

 

Signature Name (Please Print) Date

148

Appendix N. Video Release Form

Video Release Form

Serial Cognition

We would like your permission to have undergraduate research assistants in Dr. Cheryl Kaiser’s
laboratory in the Department of Psychology at Michigan State University watch your videotape.
Your name will not be attached to your videotape, and the research assistants are well-trained in
matters of conﬁdentiality and research ethics. When the research assistants watch the videotapes,
they will be attempting to provide impressions of the mood states experienced by individuals in
these tapes. This type of behavioral coding is very important for scientiﬁc reasons, because it
helps to provide a second type of data that is useful in understanding how people respond in the
experimental situation.

Again, for conﬁdentiality reasons, your video will be identiﬁed by the last ﬁve digits of your PID,
rather than your name and your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law.
Additionally, the experimenter will be happy to answer any additional questions you have about
this procedure. Finally, you are free to decline permission for your videotape to be used in this
coding procedure. If you decline to have your tape analyzed, it will be destroyed immediately.

If you have further questions about the study, contact Cheryl Kaiser, Ph.D., Department of
Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-8691, e-mail:
ssplab@msu.edu. In case you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research
participant, please feel free to contact Dr. Peter Vasilenko, Michigan State University's Chair of
University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects by phone: (517) 355-2180, fax:
(517) 432-4503, email: <ucrihs@msu.edu>, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI
48824. Dr. Vasilenko may be contact anonymously if you wish.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary consent to have your videotape examined by
research assistants in Dr. Cheryl Kaiser’s laboratory.

 

 

 

Signature Name (Please Print) Date

149

Appendix 0. Debriefing Sheet
Debrieﬁng --- Serial Cognition

Thank you for participating in this study. In our laboratory, we are interested in the
psychology of intergroup relations. In this study, we are investigating what happens
when people expect to be the target of prejudice and how this might be inﬂuenced by
people’s beliefs about the stability of human traits. Previous studies have shown that
some people believe human characteristics are ﬁxed and cannot be changed and that
others believe human characteristics are ﬂexible and easy to change. Prior to today’s
session, you have completed a survey on the Psychology Subject Pool Web Page which
measures these beliefs. In this study, we are examining how beliefs about the stability of
human characteristics, especially those endorsed by low status group members, inﬂuence
the manner in which individuals respond during interracial interactions.

In this study, you were told that you were completing two cognitive tasks that were
separated by a delay task (a social interaction). In actuality, all three of these tasks were
part of the same study. Our primary interest concerns the second and third tasks. Half of
you were told that you received information about your partner, and the other half of you
did not get any information. Those who received information about your partner actually
received bogus information. Some of you received information indicating that your
partner held negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities, while other people received
information indicating that your partner held positive attitudes toward minorities, and the
rest of you received no information about your partner’s racial attitudes. However, in
actuality, this information was not provided by your partner at all. Instead, the
experimenter provided you with false information about your partner’s attitudes. We
falsely conveyed racial attitudes in order to manipulate one participant’s expectations of
being the target of prejudice. Thus, participants who were told that their partner is a
racist would be more likely to expect to be the target of prejudice compared to other
people who were either told that their partner is an egalitarian or were not given any
information.

Past research has shown that people who believe that human traits are ﬁxed respond
particularly negatively toward individuals with negative traits and particularly positively
toward individuals with positive traits, compared to people who believe that human traits
are ﬂexible. Thus, our prediction is that people who expect to interact with a racist, and
who also believe that human traits are ﬁxed, will react negatively toward their interaction
partner and approach the interaction in a disinterested manner. In contrast, people who
believe that human traits are ﬂexible might think that even people’s undesirable
characteristics (i.e., racist attitudes) can be improved, and they might try to facilitate the
interaction with a partner who was portrayed as a racist by engaging in socially skillful
behaviors. On the other hand, when expecting to interact with an egalitarian, people who
believe that human traits are ﬁxed might react more positively toward their interaction
partner and approach the interaction in a constructive manner more so than people who
believe that human traits are ﬂexible, because they are more apt to respond particularly

150

positively toward individuals with positive traits (i.e., egalitarian attitudes). Because
individuals’ behavior usually reciprocally inﬂuences each other’s responses in
interactions, it is also predicted that these racial attitude expectations would result in
different experiences and reactions for both partners during the interaction. More
speciﬁcally, if your partner responds negatively toward you, you might respond
negatively in return (and vice versa if your partner responds positively toward you).

In addition, we are also interested in how different reactions to prejudice inﬂuence
people’s cognitive capacity. The past research has shown that when people engage in a
task that requires lots of effort, they have less cognitive resources for subsequent
cognitive tasks. The third computerized task you completed today examines this research
question. Because engaging in socially skillful behaviors requires self-regulation and
effort, we predict that people who believe people’s traits are malleable will perform
particularly poorly on the color-naming computerized task after the interaction with a
racist partner, because those individuals might have put in extra effort to have a smooth
interaction.

We apologize for not disclosing all of the study information to you earlier. If we had told
you about the false racial attitude information, it might have affected the way you
responded, and the data would not have been valid. In social psychological experiments,
we sometimes employ deception when it is necessary to test meaningﬁrl scientiﬁc
questions. That is, though we do not enjoy using deception, we do use it when the
scientiﬁc question we are investigating cannot be answered without it. We believe that
understanding the psychological processes underlying prejudice expectations is one of
those important scientiﬁc inquiries. By understanding questions like this, our research
can help to make signiﬁcant contributions towards important social issues, like prejudice
and discrimination. In other words, by participating in this study, you have made very
important contributions to science. Finally, it is important not to feel duped or tricked by
the deception in this study. We put a great deal of effort into making these deceptions
believable to undergraduates, and we expected that undergraduates would indeed believe
our cover story.

Thank you again for taking part in this study. Your participation is extremely valuable in
helping us make progress in the scientiﬁc study of intergroup relationships. We believe
that it is important to understand why and under what circumstances perceiving prejudice
affects intergroup behavior. The knowledge gained through studies such as this can help
to better understand the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral consequences of perceiving
discrimination. Again, this research mission would not be possible without your
assistance.

151

Finally, you have the right to withdraw your data from this study without incurring any
costs. If you would like to do this, please inform the person conducting the study.
Additionally, if you would like more information about research on discrimination or
have ﬁirther questions about the study, please feel free to contact Dr. Cheryl Kaiser at
Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone:
517-3 53-8691 , e-mail: kaiserc6@msu.edu.

152

Appendix P. Experimenter I ’5 Script (For Serial Cognition)

Set up:

“Serial Cognition” --- 15' and 3rd parts of the study

Experimenter should dress in casual clothing

Attendance Sheet: We will have a Log Sheet with participants’ names; take
attendance before you start the experiment.

Experimental Material: welcome sign on the door, consent forms (2 for each
participant), one-page reading sheet (ﬁller cognitive task), debrieﬁng sheets,
pencils, and watch.

Prior to meeting participants:

Place the welcome sign on the door to 65 and 83. (It is in a black binder like all
other signs.)

Double-check the participants’ information before you greet them.

Place two consent forms for serial cognition and two pencils before participants
come in.

Do not let students start their session early.

Sessions for Aﬁican American students will be scheduled 3 minutes earlier than
those for White students.

African American students will be told to come to Room65 and wait for an
experimenter to pick them up, whereas White students will be told to come to
Room83.

Have participants wait in the hall until session starts. Experimenter 1 greets the
participants at the scheduled time and say “Are you here for the “Serial
Cognition” study? Thanks so much for coming in.” (If Aﬁ‘ican American
students are not present, wait for a few more minutes by telling White students: “I
am currently setting up a room for the session, and it will take a few more
minutes.” If African American students have not shown up by this time, White
students will complete Social Perception)

153

0 Greet a Black student ﬁrst and bring him/her to a cubicle and start giving
instructions.

0 When a black student is signing the consent forms, greet white students (if both
White students show up, you need to randomly assigned one student to “Serial
Cognition” and the other one to “Social Perception”)

0 Bring both White students to the appropriate (separate) cubicle and have the
student who will be completing “Social Perception” wait for you in a room.

0 If a Black participant does not show up, you need to change the room settings
very quickly. If it is a boy’s session, set up 838 for “Social Perception.” If it is a
girl’s session, set up 83C (put two desks together) for “Color Perception.” You

can ask participants wait for a few minutes while you are setting up the room.

[Greet a Black participant in front of Room65]

Are you here for the “Serial Cognition” study? Are you ? Hi, thanks for
coming in today. My name is , and I’m a research assistant working for Dr.
Kaiser, a professor in the MSU Psychology Department. Please follow me now.

[Bring the participant to Room83B].
Please have a seat. If your cell phone is turned on, please turn it off now.

Before we start our study, please read the consent forms on the table. If you agree to
participate, please sign both copies of the consent form. One is for our records and one is
for you to keep. When you are done, please let me know. I will be outside waiting for
you in the hallway. If you do not see me, that means I am helping out another participant
and I will be back momentarily [Close the door and leave the room].

[Go get the other White participants. Greet both White participants in front of
Room83]

Are you both here for the “Serial Cognition” study? Are you and ?
Hi, thanks for coming in today. My name is , and I’m a research assistant
working for Dr. Kaiser, a professor in the MSU Psychology Department. Please follow
me now. [Bring the participant to Room83D; if both White students showed up,
randomly assign one White participant to the “Social Perception” study].

154

[When you pass Room83C, tell the White student who is assigned to “Social
Perception”. . .]

Someone will be with you in a few minutes. Meanwhile, you can start reading the
consent forms on the desk. [Experimenter 2 will give instruction to students in
“Social Perception” study]

[Take the other white student who is assigned to the “Serial Cognition” to Room83D]
Please have a seat. If your cell phone is turned on, please turn it off now.

Before we start our study, please read the consent forms on the table. If you agree to
participate, please sign both copies of the consent form. One is for our records and one is
for you to keep. When you are done, please let me know. I will be outside waiting for
you in the hallway. If you do not see me, that means I am helping out another participant
and I will be back momentarily.

[After you instruct the White student for “Serial Cognition” to read and sign the
consent forms, you go back to the other room and give the Black student further
instructions.]

Thank you very much for waiting. You can keep the other copy.

Now, I’ll provide you with some instructions about today’s study. [Talk slowly] In this
study, we’re assessing how performing one cognitive task inﬂuences performance on a
subsequent cognitive task, especially when there is a 15-20 minute delay between the two
tasks. In the ﬁrst task, you will read a brief newspaper article and brieﬂy summarize it.
After a 15-20 minute delay, you will complete a computer task, which is the second
cognitive task. I will give you more details about the second task right before you start
the task.

Do you have any questions at this point? Great. There is one more thing to discuss
before we start the ﬁrst task. Because it is important that we have at least lS-minute
delay between the two tasks, you will also participate in another small study. One of the
undergraduate students in the lab is testing how people form impressions of other people.
When you are done with my ﬁrst part of the study, another experimenter
will explain his/her study in more detail.

 

Now, please complete the ﬁrst task. When you are done, please open the door---so that
the other experimenter (name) will be with you in a few minutes.

[Leave the room and close the door. Go back to 83D and ﬁve the White participant
further instructions]
Thank you very much for waiting. You can keep the other copy.

Now, I’ll provide you with some instructions about today’s study. [Talk slowly] In this

study, we’re assessing how performing one cognitive task inﬂuences performance on a
subsequent cognitive task, especially when there is a 15-20 minute delay between the two

155

tasks. In the ﬁrst task, you will read a brief newspaper article and brieﬂy summarize it.
After a 15-20 minute delay, you will complete a computer task, which is the second
cognitive task. I will give you more details about the second task right before you start
the task.

Do you have any questions at this point? Great. There is one more thing to discuss
before we start the ﬁrst task. Because it is important that we have at least lS-minute
delay between the two tasks, you will also participate in another small study. One of the
undergraduate students in the lab is testing how people form impressions of other people.
When you are done with my ﬁrst part of the study, another experimenter
will explain his/her study in more detail.

 

Now, please complete the ﬁrst task. When you are done, please open the door---so that
the other experimenter (name) will be with you in a few minutes.

 

 

End of the 1" part

* When the experimenter 2 is giving instructions to both participants about the
interaction in 83D, go back to the control room and adjust the camera angle. When
the experimenter 2 leaves the room, hit the “record” button.

Beginning of the 2nd part

 

 

[The Black participant might ﬁnish their survey early than the White student. If
that happens, experimenter 2 will tell the Black student that “
(experimenter 2) will be here in a few minutes.” After the White participant is done
with the second part of the study (interaction), stop by 83D and say...]

I need to give another participant instructions for the next study, and it will take a few
minutes. (Experimenter 2) agreed to help me with giving you instructions. So,
please wait for him/her in this room. Thanks.

[Go back to 83B and start giving instructions to the Black student]

Thank you for waiting. Now, let’s start the second part of my study. First I need to set
up the computer program for you. [Open the MediaLab “Stroop” and proceed to the
ﬁrst page. You cannot type the same ID# to both “Nao’s Thesis” and “Stroop”
programs. So, for this, add “1000” to the original ID#. For example, if the ID# is
“013,” it will be “1013.” If the ID# is “100,” it will be “1100.”]

Ok, it’s all set. Thank you for waiting. [Talk slowly and clearly!! The participants do
not get the written instructions for this task. So, it is important that they
understand your instructions.] In this task, you will report the color of various stimuli
that appear on the computer screen as QUICKLY and ACCURATELY as you can by
pressing the appropriate keys on the key board. Each trial starts with a small black cross
as your visual staring point. After the cross disappears, the word "BLUE," "GREEN,"

156

"RED," or "YELLOW" or a row of four Xs will appear on the screen in one of the four
colors. Your task is to report the COLOR of the word, NOT the meaning of the word.
You do this by using these 4 color keys (point to the keys). During this task, you should
rest your index and middle ﬁngers on the four colored keys.

You will start off with twenty practice trials. Do you have any questions? [Turn on the
desk lamp and turn off the room lights] Please press any key to start the practice trials,
when you are ready. Stay in the room and see if participants understand the task. If
the student is confused, answer questions and correct their behavior.]

[When they are done with the practice trials...] Good. Do you have any questions
about this task? Once you start the actual task, you cannot stop the computer program.
The task will last for about 10 minutes with no breaks. It is very important that you
concentrate on the computer for this period of time, making sure that you focus on the
cross in the center of the screen. The computer will tell you when you are done with the
task. When you are ready for the actual trials, please press any key to start.

[Leave the room and close the door.]
[After participants are done with the computer task, turn on the lights.]

For White participant: Thanks so much for helping out with our study. There is one
more short survey. Please ﬁll this out very quickly [Hand out a suspicion check sheet].
When you are done please open the door and let me know.

[When the student is done] Now, let’s discuss the study [proceed to the proving
procedure].

For Black participant: Thanks so much for helping out with our study. There in one
more short survey for you to complete [Hand out a suspicion check sheet]. When you
are done please open the door and let me know. [When they are done] Thanks.
(Second experimenter) realized that he/she forgot to give you a short survey
to complete. So, could you please ﬁll this out for him/her very quickly? [Hand out a
manipulation check sheet]. Thank you for your cooperation. Now, here is the money
for your participation. Please sign this sheet, which tells us that you have received the
monetary compensation. Now, (the experimenter 2) will discuss the study.
Please wait for her/him in this room. [Take a suspicion sheet with you and hand it to
ExperimenterZ]

 

 

After the session:

Please write down the participant id on the suspicion check sheet.

157

Go back to the other room, measure the distance between two chairs (the closest distance
between the two), and prepare for the next session.

Enter the data into PC.
**Double check should be done by different person that the ﬁrst data-entry person."

158

Appendix Q. Experimenter 2 ’5 Script (For Impression Formation)
“Impression Formation” -- 2"d part of the study

- Experimenter 2 should dress in casual clothing.

0 Experimental Material: consent forms (2 for each participant), pre-interaction
survey, post-interaction survey, manipulation check sheet (only for Aﬁ'ican
American students), suspicion check sheet, video release form, pencils, and watch.

0 The folder with personal information will be numbered. Do not open the folder
and check the condition. Please take an appropriate folder (indicated by a number
on the log sheet) when you bring it to the participant. Also, when you enter the
data on SPSS, please do not check the condition, and simply type numbers.

Prior to meeting participants:
0 Double-check the participants’ information before you greet them.

0 Make sure that you have all the materials.

0 Set up the MediaLab (enter the ID# and condition# and stand by with the ﬁrst
screen) The computer monitor should be turned off, so that participants cannot see
the survey while they are completing the ﬁrst cognitive task.

[Go to 83B and start with a Black student. When participants are done with the
first cognitive task, go into the room and say...]

Are you done with your task now? Great. Hello. I’m . I believe the
other experimenter brieﬂy told you about my study.

 

Before we start the study, I need you to read the consent form and sign it if you agree to
participate. Please sign both copies of the consent form. One is for our records and one
is for your records.

[When a student is done with the consent forms...] Thanks. Please do not forget to
take your copy when you leave.

FOR BLACK STUDENTS: In this study, I am interested in understanding how people
interact with another person and form impressions about that person under limited time.
Therefore, you will interact with another participant, who is also participating in the
“serial cognition” study, for about 10 minutes and your job is to provide your impressions
of your interaction partner and about aspects of the interaction more generally. To help
us get a better sense of how interactions work, your interaction will be videotaped.

159

Please do not worry about the video recording; only the research team will have access to
the videos.

I am also interested in testing whether having information about one’s partner inﬂuences
the interaction. In this study, you were randomly assigned to receive information about
your partner, while your partner will not receive any information about you. We pulled
your partner’s information from some of the online surveys you both completed before
you came to today’s session. We use a variety of online surveys for this study, which
help us get a better sense of how various pieces of information affect social interactions.
So basically, you’ll be going into the study knowing a little about your partner, but your
partner won’t have any information about you.

Now, please start with reviewing your partner information. [Hand them the material in
a folder] I will be back in about 3 minutes to get you set up for the interaction.

[Leave the room and close the door. Go to 83D and repeat the same thing with a
White student. *Instructions are different; BE CAREFUL!!!]

Are you done with your task now? Great. Hello. I’m . I believe the
other experimenter brieﬂy told you about my study.

 

Before we start the study, I need you to read the consent form and sign it if you agree to
participate. Please sign both copies of the consent form. One is for our records and one
is for your records.

[When a student is done with the consent forms...] Thanks. Please do not forget to
take your copy when you leave.

FOR WHITE STUDENTS: In this study, I am interested in understanding how people
interact with another person and form impressions about that person under limited time.
Therefore, you will interact with another participant, who is also participating in the
“serial cognition” study, for about 10 minutes and your job is to provide your impressions
of your interaction partner and about aspects of the interaction more generally. To help
us get a better sense of how interactions work, your interaction will be videotaped. Please
do not worry about the video recording; only the research team will have access to the
videos.

Do you have any questions at this point? First, I would like you to complete a very short
survey assessing how you feel about the interaction that you will have in a few minutes.
When you are done with the survey, the computer will let you know. When you are done,
please just open the door and let me know. If you don’t see me in the hallway, that
means I am currently helping out another participant and I’ll be back momentarily.
[Turn on the PC monitor, leave the room, and close the door.]

[Go back to 83B and give the Black student further instructions.]

160

Great, thanks for looking this information over. Now, before you start interacting with
another participant, I would like you to complete a very short survey assessing how you
feel about the interaction that you will have in a few minutes. [Turn on the PC
monitor.] When you are done with the survey, the computer will let you know. When
you are done, please open the door and let me know. [Leave the room and close the
door.]

[When the White student is done with the survey, have them sit on an appropriate
chair and tell him/her that we are adjusting the cameras and to wait for a few
moments.]

Thank you for completing the survey. Now, please have a seat there [point the chair in
the room] and wait for a few moments. We are adjusting the cameras, and we will bring
your interaction partner as soon as we are ready. [Close the door and leave the room.]

[When a Black student is done with the survey, go into the room and close the door
and give them instructions]. In a moment, I will bring you to the other room where
your interaction partner is waiting. But, I have one more important thing to tell you.
Because your partner does not know that you have received his/her web surveys, it is
very important that you refrain from mentioning anything you reviewed in the personal
information packet. If he/she knew you received some information, we wouldn’t be able
to study the perspective of people going into an interaction without any prior information.
Thanks for helping us out with this part of the study. Now, let’s go to the other room.
Because you will come back to this room after the interaction, you can leave your
belongings here.

[Bring the Black student to the other room. As he/she enters the room, tell them...]
Oh, I’m sorry, I forgot to put your chair in the room. Here you go [hand a chair to the
Black student], please have a seat.

[When the students are set] Ok. Your task is to get to know one another during the
next 10 minutes. After the interaction, you will answer a few questions about the
interaction and your partner. Do you have any questions? Please keep interacting until I
come back and let you know the time is up. [Leave the room and close the door].

*While Experimenter 2 is giving instructions to participants together, Experimenter
1 should try to adjust the camera angles and start recording the interaction as soon
as Experimenter 2 leaves the room.

[Experimenter 2 should go back to 83B and set the MediaLab screen to the
“Welcome Back” page].

***You can take the folder with personal information away while the participants

are interacting, so that the Black participant cannot go back to the information
when they are filling the manipulation check sheet.

161

[Exactly 10 minutes later--use the stop watches]. Ok, time is up. (call a
Black student’s name), can you follow me now? You can leave the chair where it is now.
I will put that back later. I will be right back for you (call a White student’s
name). Please stay where you are and wait for me.

[Bring a Black student back to 83B] Please have a seat and complete this brief
computerized survey about the interaction you just participated in. The computer will let
you know when you are done. Because this survey is the last thing you need to complete
for my study, (experimenter 1) will be with you when you are done. [Leave the
room and close the door.]

[Go back to 83D and give the White student further instructions]

Thanks for waiting . Let me set up the computer ﬁrst [type the password
“done” and proceed to the “Welcome Back” page.] Now, please have a seat here (in
front of the PC). Please complete this brief computerized survey about the interaction
you just participated in. The computer will let you know when you are done. Because
this survey is the last thing you need to complete for my study, (experimenter 1)
will be with you when you are done.

* If the Black participant finishes the survey first, tell the student: “
(experimenter 1) is currently taking care of another participant. Could you wait for
her/him a few more minutes? I will tell her/him that you are waiting for her/him.”

 

[After experimenter I told the White participant that (s)he cannot give him/her
instructions, go to 83D and say....]

The other experimenter (name) is currently giving another participant
instructions, so (s)he asked me to give you an instruction for his/her second task.

[You show the student that you are obviously READING his/her script]

First I need to set up the computer program for you. [Open the MediaLab “Stroop”
and proceed to the first page. You cannot type the same ID# to both “N ao’s Thesis”
and “Stroop” programs. So, for this, add “1000” to the original ID#. For example,
if the ID# is “013,” it will be “1013.” If the ID# is “100,” it will be “1100.”]

Ok, it’s all set. Thank you for waiting. [Talk slowly and clearly!! The participants do
not get the written instructions for this task. So, it is important that they
understand your instructions.] In this task, you will report the color of various stimuli
that appear on the computer screen as QUICKLY and ACCURATELY as you can by
pressing the appropriate keys on the key board. Each trial starts with a small black cross
as your visual staring point. After the cross disappears, the word "BLUE," "GREEN,"
"RED," or "YELLOW" or a row of four Xs will appear on the screen in one of the four
colors. Your task is to report the COLOR of the word, NOT the meaning of the word.
You do this by using these 4 color keys (point to the keys). During this task, you should
rest your index and middle ﬁngers on the four colored keys.

162

You will start off with twenty practice trials. Do you have any questions? [Turn on the
desk lamp and turn off the room lights] Please press any key to start the practice trials,
when you are ready. Stay in the room and see if participants understand the task. If
the student is confused, answer questions and correct their behavior.]

[When they are done with the practice trials...] Good. Do you have any questions
about this task? Once you start the actual task, you cannot stop the computer program.
The task will last for about 10 minutes with no breaks. It is very important that you
concentrate on the computer for this period of time, making sure that you focus on the
cross in the center of the screen. The computer will tell you when you are done with the
task. When you are ready for the actual trials, please press any key to start.

[Leave the room and close the door.]

 

[After the Black student completed the suspicion check sheet and manipulation
check sheet, go back to 83B and proceed to the probing procedure.]

163

Appendix R. Probing Script

[First, take a look at suspicion response and get the feel of participant’s thoughts.
This will be done separately for Black and White students. The experimenter 2 will
be probing with a Black student, and the experimenter 1 will be probing with a
White student at the same time in separate cubicles]

Hi, (participant’s name). Thank you for your cooperation with our studies
again. First of all, do you have any questions before we discuss the study? [If “yes,”
answer them: if “no” go on to the next question]

 

So, what did you think about the today’s studies? Did you enjoy the studies? Were they
interesting to you? [Try to relax them and have participants engage in the
conversation with you]

Were both studies perfectly clear? Were instructions easy to understand and helpful?
Do you have any suggestions for the researchers to improve the studies?
Did you ﬁnd anything unusual or confusing in either study?

(If a participant does not have too much to say, ask him/her about his/her partner--- “How
was the interaction?” “What did you think of your partner?”)

[Look at the suspicion sheets] So, what did you think about the goals of our research? I
noticed that you wrote that you thought the purpose of the study was .
Can you elaborate your thoughts on this? For example, what makes you think this was
the case? What made you think about this? Can you tell me how conﬁdent/certain are
you that this is the case?

 

And, those thoughts occurred to you at/when (check the suspicion
sheets); is that correct?

 

Oh, by the way, have you known or met your partner before?

[The goal here is to get a good idea of how suspicious people were if they reported
an on-track answer. The goal is to politely get a sense of this information without
giving things away. Stick with the cover story unless the participant is right on
track and extremely conﬁdent]

[Continue on debriefing process by saying...] Great, you are on the right track. . .. Now,
I would like to tell you what this study was about. Let’s move to another room, so that I
can explain the study to both you and another participant together. Please take all your
belongings and follow me. [Bring the participant to Room83A. If another
participant is not there, wait for him/her.]

164

 

 

Appendix S. Probing Note for Experimenters

Experimenter’s name:

 

Participant’s ID:
Did the participant seem suspicious? Yes No

If yes, how suspicious was this participant?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A little Suspicious Moderately Suspicious Extremely Suspicious

If yes, when did suspicion begin?

 

 

 

If yes, was the participant entirely certain about deception or was there some doubt?

 

 

 

Please carefully and neatly list the participant’s comments that would be helpful in
assessing his/her level of suspicion.

Would you exclude this participant?
_ No, not suspicious enough.

__ Maybe, hard to tell.
__ Deﬁnitely he/she was right on track.

165

 

 

Appendix T. Debriefing Script

[This process will take place in Room83A. Both Black and White students will be
debriefed together. The main purpose of this process to make sure that they
understand the nature of the study, why we had to use deception, the racial attitudes
are completely fake, so that they do not feel uncomfortable when they leave the
sessions.]

Now, let’s discuss the study. First, please read this debrieﬁng sheet very carefully. It
describes the purpose of the study, our hypotheses, and the nature of the study designs.
After that, we will discuss the study and answer all your questions [Hand out debrieﬁng
sheet.]

[Take time and wait until they are done reading the sheet] Do you have any
questions? Does everything make sense? [Be sure to answer all questions and send
them to Cheryl if they have questions you can’t answer. Make them feel
comfortable, and ensure they are aware of their contributions to science]

So, as you can tell from the debrieﬁng sheet, we are examining what happens during an
interracial interaction when people expect to be the target of prejudice and how this might
be inﬂuenced by people’s beliefs about the stability of human characteristics. Thus, in
order for us to assess your beliefs about the stability of human characteristics, we ﬁrst
asked you to complete an online questionnaire before you came to today’s session. Also,
in order to manipulate your expectations about your interaction partner, especially yours,

(a black student’s name), we gave you false information about ’3 (White
participant’s name) racial attitudes. (White participant’s name) did not
actually complete these measures----we made up his/her responses for the purpose of the
study. Some participants saw that their partner expressed negative attitudes towards
Blacks, some saw that their partner expressed positive attitudes towards Blacks, and some
saw no information at all about their partner’s racial attitudes. Do you remember the
information in the packet that we gave you before the interaction? We came up with
those numbers in order to test our hypotheses in this study. So, do you understand that
these numbers were not ’8 (a white student’s name) responses at all? Good.

Now, (the white student’s name) may be very surprised by the fact that

(the black student’s name) received false information about you. We are very sorry for
deceiving both of you. We needed to use this kind of deception, because it is central to
the scientiﬁc questions guiding this research. Speciﬁcally, we needed to create an
experimental context where one partner did or did not expect to face prejudice. If we told
you the information was fake ahead of time, you probably would have behaved
differently during the study, and we wouldn’t learn that much about the scientiﬁc study
of prejudice. Do you understand why we needed to use deception? [Make sure that they
are ﬁne!!!!! If not, try to go over the procedure again and talk to them very slowly]
We really apologize for misleading you about ’5 (the white participant’s name)
information. In psychology we sometimes use deception when it is necessary for
addressing an important scientiﬁc question. We believe that understanding intergroup

166

interactions is one of those important questions. This is a recent research topic in social
psychology, and your data will be very helpful in addressing important questions about
this phenomenon. In a very real and meaningful way, you have contributed to the
scientiﬁc study of intergroup relations.

Also, it’s really important not to feel duped by this deception [Emphasize this point!!!].
We spent a lot of time ensuring that the procedures would be believable to
undergraduates, and this has been very effective. Do you have any questions about the
deception? Do you understand why we used it? Great. Thank you very much for your
understanding.

[Make sure participant seems comfortable. If he/she expresses concern, go through
the procedures gently again. Let Cheryl or a graduate student know immediately if
a participant is upset.] You can keep the debrieﬁng sheet if you like, but we are happy
to recycle it for the next group of participants if you do not want it.

I have just one more favor to ask: We will be running this study over the course of the
semester, so we would appreciate it if you refrained from talking about the study with
other students. We want to ensure that everyone comes into the study with the exact
same expectations, so this helps us maintain the scientiﬁc credibility of the study. For
example, if you came in with information about the study, it would have inﬂuenced your
answers and our experiment would be invalid. As I said before, we put a lot of time,
money, and effort into this study, so it’s important to make sure that the science is strong.
Also, when you leave the lab, please do not talk about the study, because participants for
the next session might be waiting in front of the room. Thanks.

Now, I will pass out the video release form. Please read it very carefully. It explains
your right for conﬁdentiality. If you agree to give us your permission to include your
videotape in the scientiﬁc analysis of this study, please sign both of the forms; one is for
our records and the other one is for you to take with you.

[When they are done signing the video release forms] Again, thank you so much for
your help with this study and for contributing to the scientiﬁc process. Please let us
know if you have further questions.

[Write the participant’s ID number on suspicion check and manipulation check
sheets. It will be ﬁled in 85.]

At the end of your rotation, make sure that the consent form is filed in appropriate
place in 85 ﬁle cabinet. Assign credits online for participation (for White
participants). Double check that information is completed in log book. Put all
materials away and tidy up. Please be verv careful to lock ang secure all lab rooms
and materials.

NOTE: If the seating debriefing room gets backed-up, you should have the
participants wait in an empty cubicle until the room is free again.

167

***If some participants are very concerned with the false personal information, you
can show the three folders and assure them that we created the information
beforehand. The folders will be in 83A.

168

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169

Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Preinteraction Expectations

 

Predictor

Intercept

Egalitarian
vs.
Prejudice
(EVP)

No Info. vs.

Prejudice

(NvP)

Implicit
Theories

EvP by
Implicit
Theories

NVP by
Implicit
Theories

Preinteraction Expectations -

3.12

l.11***

.91**

-.57*

.65*

.78*

Self
13 AR-’

Preinteraction Expectations -

Partner

 

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AR-

 

 

 

.56***

.43**

.14**

—.60*

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.45*

.44*

.09*

2.17

L44***

1.15**

-.97**

l.54***

1.07**

.54***

.40**

-.76**

.80***

.44**

.ll*

.00

.19**

 

 

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. AR"
for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for
one another.

170

 

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I72

Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Feelings of Authenticity and
Self-Esteem during the Interaction

 

 

 

 

 

 

Predictor Authenticity Self-Esteem
b ,6 AZR b ,8 M2
Intercept 4.72 2.85
Initial Self- __ __ 47*” . 6 5*”
Esteem '
-- .44***

Egal. vs.
Prej. (EvP) .39 .22 .21 .16
No Info. vs.
Prejudice .19 .10 .18 .13
(NVP) .03 .01
Implicit * * -
Theories -.58 -.69 .16 .26

.02 .01
EvP by
Implicit .76** .60** .15 .16
Theories
NVP by
Implicit .31 .19 12 .15 .13
Theories * .01

 

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. AR"

for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for
one another.

173

 

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176

Effects of African American Participants ’ Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories

on European American Participants ’ Liking of Their Partner and Enjoyment of the
Interaction

 

Predictor Liking Enjoyment

 

 

b ,8 AR" b 5 AR‘

 

 

Intercept 5. 1 2 5.01

Egalitarian vs.

Prejudice (EVP) .04 .03 .08 .04
No.1nf9mat‘on VS' -.20 -.11 -.36 -.18
Prejudice (N VP)

.01 .02
Implicit Theories -.10 -.13 -.12 -.14

' .04 .08*

EVP bylmphc“ -.30 -.25 -.37 -.28
Theories
NVP b.3’1mpl‘c‘t .24 .16 .14 .08
Theories

.08+ .06

 

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ARI

for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for
one another.

177

 

Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Availability of African American

Participants ’ Cognitive Resources

 

 

 

 

 

Predictor Stroop Interference Score
b 3 AR‘?

Intercept .15
Egalitarian vs. Prejudice (EVP) -.O4 -.17
No Information vs. Prejudice (NVP) .03 .11

.06
Implicit Theories -.05 -.42

.04
EvP by Implicit Theories .03 .20
NvP by Implicit Theories .03 .14

.01

 

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. AR‘?
for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for

one another.

178

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179

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