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DO LOW STATUS GROUP MEMBERS' IMPLICIT TEHROESI MODERATE COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS DURING INTERGROUP INTERACTIONS?

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DO LOW STATUS GROUP MEMBERS' IMPLICIT THEORIES MODERATE COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS DURING INTERGROUP INTERACTIONS?

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ABSTRACT

DO LOW STATUS GROUP MEMBERS' IMPLICIT THEORIES MODERATE COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS DURING INTERGROUP INTERACTIONS?

By Nao Hagiwara

Individuals vary in their approaches to intergroup interactions when expecting prejudice. Some engage in compensation, whereas others engage in withdrawal/avoidance. This study examined whether implicit theories about human attributes would explain this variability in responses. Seventy-three African Americans, who completed the Implicit Person Theory measure and whose prejudice expectations were manipulated, interacted with same-sex European Americans. The results suggest that implicit theories did not differentially influence behavior, although incremental theorists felt less authentic during the interaction compared to entity theorists. Furthermore, contrary to the hypotheses, when expecting prejudice, incremental theorists expected more negative interactions compared to entity theorists. When expecting egalitarianism, entity theorists were liked more and induced more positive reactions from their partner compared to incremental theorists, indicating that entity theorists approached the interaction particularly positively. Overall, there was relatively little evidence that low status group members' implicit theories affect how they approach intergroup interactions.

I would like to dedicate this to my family.

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Do Low Status Group Members' Implicit Theories Moderate Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Reactions during Intergroup Interactions?

In contemporary North America, interactions between individuals from different social backgrounds occur regularly in everyday life contexts such as schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, or grocery stores. These intergroup interactions often take place between members of groups that differ in social status (e.g., between men and women, or between African Americans and European Americans). Social psychologists have recently started to systematically examine the role of low status group members in intergroup interactions (Crocker & Major, 1989; Shelton, 2000; Shelton & Richeson, 2006b; Swim & Stangor, 1998). An important area that has generated considerable theoretical and empirical work is the effects of low status group members' prejudice expectations on intergroup interactions (Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002; Miller, Rothblum, Felicio, & Brand, 1995; Pinel, 1999; 2002; Shelton & Richeson, 2006b; Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005; Swim & Hyers, 1999).

Recent research provides evidence that members of low status groups vary in their beliefs and feelings about prejudice, as well as how they respond in situations where they might face discrimination (see Major & O'Brien, 2005; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Miller & Kaiser, 2001; Pinel, 1999; Shelton & Richeson, 2006b for reviews). For example, some people try to avoid intergroup interaction when they expect to face prejudice (Hyers & Swim, 1998; Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002; Shelton & Richeson, 2006a; Swim & Hyers, 1999), whereas other people try to be sociable and liked by their partners in those situations (Miller et al., 1995; Shelton et al., 2005). This variability in responses to prejudice and expectations of prejudice can have important implications for

intergroup relationships (Pinel, 2002; Shelton, 2003; Shelton et al., 2005), and therefore identification of moderating factors that explain response variability is an important direction for researchers to pursue.

One factor that may affect how people respond when they expect to encounter prejudice during an interaction is the degree to which they believe that they can impact the quality of an interaction with their partner. That is, some individuals may think that their interaction partner's prejudicial views are malleable and not necessarily predictive of negative interactions, whereas others may think that prejudicial views are immutable and inevitably lead to negative interactions. Dweck and her colleagues (Dweck, 1999; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a) have suggested that a person's implicit theories about the stability of human attributes impact how the person understands and reacts to other people. The present study examined the effects of expectations of prejudice and tested the notion that an individual's implicit theories about human attributes moderate their behaviors. More specifically, the present study examined how low status group members' implicit theories about human attributes would differentially shape affective, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes during intergroup interactions.

Prejudice Expectations Lead to Intergroup Avoidance or Unconstructive Intergroup Interactions

A majority of research on low status group members' responses to prejudice demonstrates that expecting to be the target of prejudice results in efforts to avoid intergroup interactions (Cohen & Swim, 1995; Hyers & Swim, 1998; Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002; Pinel, 1999; 2002; Shelton & Richeson, 2006a; Swim & Hyers, 1999). For instance, Swim and Hyers (1999) found that women tend to withdraw from social

interactions with men who express sexism. In this study, female participants interacted in a group discussion with other students (who were actually confederates). During the task, one male confederate made either three sexist remarks or equally offensive non-sexist remarks, and the researchers then observed how the women reacted to the man who made these remarks. Although virtually all of the women reported that the sexist remarks were indeed offensive (this was assessed in self-reports after the interaction was completed), only 16 percent of the women verbally approached the man about his remarks. The most common reaction (55 percent) was ignoring the comments altogether. These results illustrate that, when they are faced with prejudice, low status group members often turn away from or avoid the problem and the riskiness of confrontation.

In another study, Shelton and Richeson (2006a) asked ethnic minority participants about the quantity and quality of their interactions with a close, same-sex White friend. Specifically, participants were asked to answer questions about how much contact they had with their friend, how the quality of the interaction with their friend was compared to their other friendships, and how comfortable they were discussing personal information including race-related information with their White friend. They found that the more ethnic minorities expected Whites to be prejudiced, the less contact they had with their White friends, the less positively they described their contact with their White friends, and the less comfortable they felt when they interacted with White friends. Again, this study suggests that expecting to be the target of prejudice is associated with efforts to avoid or disengage from intergroup interactions for low status group members.

Mendoza-Denton et al. (2002) also examined how prejudice expectations can lead to disengagement among African American college students who attended a

predominantly White university. In their study, Mendoza-Denton et al. (2002) longitudinally examined whether African American students' prejudice expectations were related to their experiences at the university. They found that the more African American students expected to be the target of racism at the beginning of an academic year, the more discomfort they experienced during the college transition and the more they avoided contexts and activities that were designed to address academic problems and questions (e.g., meetings with professors and teaching assistants). Thus, this study, once again, demonstrates that low status group members are apt to avoid interactions and contexts where they might face prejudice.

In Pinel's study (1999, Study 6), female participants who were high or low in stigma consciousness (the expectations that one will be the target of prejudice; high stigma consciousness is associated with more prejudice expectations) were told that they would be competing against either a man or a woman in a Jeopardy-like game and asked to rate the extent to which they liked the possible Jeopardy topics and the extent to which they would like to be quizzed on each topic. Pinel (1999, Study 6) found that women high in stigma consciousness rated stereotypically male topics (e.g., automobile names, the military) less favorably and avoided them more when they believed that they would be competing against a male student than when they believed that they would be competing against a female student. On the other hand, the sex of their competitor did not have effects on the preference of women with low stigma consciousness. Although women high in stigma consciousness are not avoiding the interaction per se in this case, these findings suggest that they did try to prevent being stereotyped by changing the

interaction context (by choosing "safe" topics for them and avoiding specific interaction context) when there is a potential risk of being the target of prejudice.

However, individuals are not always able to avoid or withdraw from interactions with prejudiced others or to choose interaction contexts. Sometimes they must engage in these situations, even when they might have preferred to avoid the situation. Some research suggests that interactions such as these are likely to go poorly. For example, Pinel (2002) examined the effects of stigma consciousness on low status group members' actual behavior when they were unable to avoid an intergroup interaction with high status group members. In this study, female participants, who were either high or low in stigma consciousness, were paired with a male participant for a joint task in which they needed to decide which of several applicants should be awarded a journalism prize. Before they started the actual task, the female participants were informed that their male partner was either sexist, non-sexist, or were given no information about their partner's gender attitudes. Next, both the women and their male partners provided written decisions about the applicant whom they believed should receive the prize, and they then evaluated each other's decision. Pinel (2002) found that women who were high in stigma consciousness expected interactions with a sexist man to go poorly and reacted more negatively toward the men (when evaluating the men's decisions). More specifically, women high in stigma consciousness who believed their partner to be sexist rated the quality of a decision essay more negatively and disagreed with the decision, compared to women low in stigma consciousness or women high in stigma consciousness who did not believe their partner to be sexist. Women's negative behaviors toward their male partner in turn led the male partner to react negatively towards them, which confirmed their beliefs that

their male interaction partner was sexist. This did not occur in situations where high stigma conscious females did not expect to face prejudice (their interaction partner was either a neutral or a liberal man). Additionally, although low stigma conscious female participants also showed negative reactions towards their sexist partner, their negative behavior was not strong enough to induce negative reactions from their male partner toward them. Taken together, a number of studies suggest that low status group members' prejudice expectations can be detrimental for successful intergroup interactions.

Prejudice Expectations and Approach Behavior

Despite accumulating evidence that prejudice expectations have negative consequences for intergroup interactions, this is not always the case. A smaller body of recent research has shown that sometimes low status group members who expect to be the target of prejudice actually approach intergroup interactions and try to facilitate interactions with those who might be prejudiced toward their group by using socially skillful behaviors (Miller & Kaiser, 2001; Miller & Myers, 1998; Kaiser, & Miller, 2001; Miller et al., 1995; Shelton et al., 2005). For example, Miller et al. (1995) had obese and non-obese women converse with a partner by telephone. Of importance, the women were told that they were either visible or non-visible to their partner (when in reality they all were visible to their partner). After the interaction, the partners were asked to rate the women's social skills. They found that obese women who thought their partner could see them (and thus might have expected to be the target of weight prejudice) actually received better ratings on their social skills than obese women who thought their partner could not see them (and thus could not have been the target of weight prejudice). This pattern was not observed for non-obese women. Miller et al. (1995) argue that this

indicates that obese women who thought their weight might have caused problems used compensatory strategies (i.e., behaved in a more socially skilled manner) to prevent weight prejudice during the interaction.

Recent research by Shelton et al. (2005) found similar effects among ethnic minorities. In their first study, they had ethnic minority students complete the Stigma Consciousness Scale-Race, (which assesses ethnic minorities' concerns with how much they expect to be stereotyped based on their ethnicity) during the first week of the academic year. Next, participants completed a daily questionnaire for 15 days regarding the dynamics of their interactions with their White or ethnic minority roommates (the roommates had been randomly assigned), including questions about self-disclosure and authenticity. Shelton et al. (2005) argued that self-disclosure is indicative of compensatory behavior for interactions with potentially prejudiced individuals because this behavior has been found to facilitate smooth interactions with others (Fehr, 2002; Laurenceau, Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998; Reis & Shaver, 1988). Furthermore, selective self-disclosure aimed at preventing prejudice might result in the feeling that one is engaging in self-monitoring and hence being less authentic. Indeed, Shelton et al. (2005) found that ethnic minorities who expected to be the target of prejudice used more self-disclosure and felt less authentic during their interactions with their White roommates, but not with their ethnic minority roommates, indicating that ethnic minorities behaved in a more socially constructive manner towards their White roommates when they were concerned about being the targets of prejudice.

Shelton et al. (2005, Study 2) replicated these findings in a laboratory setting where they manipulated ethnic minority participants' prejudice expectations. They made

prejudice expectancies salient for a half of the ethnic minority participants by having them read a newspaper article describing the prevalence of prejudice and discrimination against ethnic minority populations. The other half of the participants read a control article describing the prevalence of prejudice and discrimination against the elderly. After reading the articles, participants interacted with a same-sex White participant for 10 minutes and then completed questionnaires including measures of self-disclosure and feelings of authenticity. They found that ethnic minority participants who were primed with prejudice against ethnic minorities reported that they were more engaged and less authentic during the interaction, compared to those participants who were primed with prejudice against the elderly. This was also confirmed by videotaped verbal and nonverbal behaviors. Taken together, these findings suggest that low status group members sometimes behave particularly positively when they expect to be the target of prejudice. These positive, or compensatory behaviors, might occur because low status group members are attempting to achieve desired interpersonal outcomes (e.g., being liked, having a smooth interaction) despite prejudice. Compensation might also be aimed at preventing others from using stereotypes or perhaps even at reducing the other person's prejudice.

Research on targets' responses to prejudice expectancies clearly sends mixed messages about how low status group members behave when they expect to face prejudice, with some studies showing avoidance/disinterested behaviors and others showing approach/constructive behaviors. How might we reconcile these divergent behaviors observed in the literature? The present study argues that implicit theories about human attributes provide one way to answer this question.

Implicit Theories about Human Attributes and Person Perception

Implicit theories about human attributes refer to frameworks that people use to interpret and evaluate their social world (Dweck, 1999; Dweck et al., 1995a; Hong, Coleman, Wong, Chiu, Hansen, Lee, et al., 2004). People's implicit theories about human attributes guide them in understanding and reacting to other people and thus are important contributors to person perception and social interactions (Dweck et al., 1995a; Hong et al., 2004). There are two general types of implicit theories about human attributes: an entity theory and an incremental theory. People who endorse an entity theory tend to believe that personal attributes are fixed and that people's characteristics are static, stable, and hard to change (Chui, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001; Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 2005). On the other hand, people who endorse an incremental theory tend to believe that personal attributes are malleable and that people's characteristics are dynamic, somewhat unstable, and amenable to change (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy et al., 2001; Plaks et al., 2005). Moreover, whereas entity theorists tend to believe that people can be understood by their stable attributes and traits, incremental theorists tend to believe that people can best be understood by the interaction of traits and social contexts, such as needs, goals, intentions, emotional states, and prior behaviors (Dweck et al., 1995a; Chiu et al., 1997; Levy, Stoessner, & Dweck, 1998; Levy et al., 2001). For instance, entity theorists may blame levels of intelligence when individuals receive bad grades, whereas incremental theorists may take into account strategies used or environmental factors (e.g., loud noise, high temperature, or bad lighting) that might have caused individuals to receive bad grades (Dweck et al., 1995a).

Considerable theoretical and empirical research demonstrates that entity and incremental theorists experience different affective, cognitive, and behavioral consequences during interpersonal interactions. Compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists encode incoming person information in a more evaluative manner, and when evaluating others, they invest more meaning in traits, evaluate whether traits are positive or negative, and make judgments of others who display those traits based on the valence (either positive or negative) attached to the traits (Chiu et al., 1997; Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998). Thus, entity theorists attach more meaning to others' positive and negative characteristics than do incremental theorists (Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998). On the other hand, incremental theorists rely less on traits and seek to understand people in terms of context-sensitive terms (Levy et al., 1998; Levy et al., 2001). Therefore, to one who holds an entity theory, understanding human actions and outcomes involves diagnosing the actor's traits, whereas for one who holds an incremental theory, the actor's overall character is not as important as social forces (Dweck et al., 1995a).

For instance, in one study (Levy & Dweck , 1999, Study 2), children were exposed to information about students at another school who were portrayed as either positive or negative. The students from a "positive" school were described with six nice behaviors (e.g., "One kid returned the money she saw a classmate drop on the floor.") and three neutral behaviors (e.g., "One kid took a pen out of the front pocket of his knapsack,"), while the students from a "negative" school were described with six mean behaviors (e.g., "One kid would not take turns playing the video game with a classmate.") and three neutral behaviors. Levy and Dweck (1999) found that relative to children who

endorsed an incremental theory, children who endorsed an entity theory exhibited more favorable overall assessments of individual students they had read about belonging to the "positive" school and more negative assessments of individual students belonging to the "negative" school. Thus, these findings demonstrate that entity and incremental theorists differentially rely on trait evaluations in forming judgments of others.

Similarly, accumulating evidence indicates that entity and incremental theorists' differential reliance on the importance of traits is associated with stereotyping-related person perception processes (Hong et al., 2004; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995b; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 2001; Levy et al., 1998; Plaks et al., 2005; Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, & Sherman, 2001). For instance, in Levy et al.'s study (1998, Study 1), college students were asked to list all the stereotypes (positive, negative, neutral) they knew about several ethnic groups and then to evaluate how true they personally thought each one was. They found that although both entity and incremental theorists generated the same number of stereotypes and agreed on the evaluative connotations of those stereotypes, entity theorists more strongly believed that all of the stereotypes (especially negative and positive stereotypes) reflect real group differences among those ethnic groups than did incremental theorists.

Likewise, people who endorse an entity theory not only find stereotypes more meaningful, but they also more readily use these expectancies when evaluating others (Hong et al., 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999). Levy and Dweck (1999, Study 2) found in their study that, when children were asked to judge an unknown student from a "negative" school, those who were entity theorists expected the unknown student to be relatively "mean" and "bad," whereas children who were incremental theorists showed

neutral feelings towards the unknown student. Therefore, it is suggested that the impression that entity theorists formed of a group of students characterized by mostly negative behaviors was extended to the entire school, even to students who were not described in the original experimental stimuli. Additionally, Hong et al. (2004, Study 1) found that residents of Hong Kong who endorsed an entity theory tended to attribute more negative behaviors to residents of Mainland China than to other residents of Hong Kong (50.0% and 24.5%, respectively), compared to those who endorsed an incremental theory (41.0% and 29.0%, respectively), suggesting that entity theorists tend to expect more stereotype-based behaviors from residents of Mainland Chinese[1]. Taken together, it appears that entity theorists find stereotypes useful and meaningful when they try to understand and evaluate people; thus, they readily use more stereotypes in person perception.

These differences between entity and incremental theorists' evaluations of others are apt to influence their behavior during interactions and lead entity and incremental theorists to approach social interactions with different types of strategies. Because entity theorists are more likely than incremental theorists to form trait judgments and view these traits as especially meaningful, they should exhibit more positive responses to people with positive traits and more negative responses to people with negative traits (Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 2001; Levy et al., 1998). Specifically, once entity theorists have judged someone as possessing a negative trait, they may withdraw from interactions with that person altogether. Alternatively, if they do approach such interactions, they may do so in a disinterested way because they believe that there is nothing they can do to change that person or make the situation more positive (Dweck et

al., 1995a; Karafantis & Levy, 2004). In contrast, incremental theorists may be more willing to approach interactions with people who possess negative traits in a constructive manner, relative to entity theorists, because they believe that people can change through effort and learning and that their partner's negative characteristics are not inevitably going to ruin the interaction (Dweck et al., 1995a; Karafantis & Levy, 2004). Indeed, empirical evidence supports these claims.

For instance, Levy and Dweck (1999, Study 1) had children learn about students at an unfamiliar school who had a reputation for undesirable behavior and then respond to questionnaires which included questions about their willingness to socialize with those students. Results suggested that even though both entity and incremental theorists did not want to socialize much with students with negative traits, children who endorsed an entity theory were much less willing to interact with them, compared to those who endorsed an incremental theory. These results support the argument that entity theorists tend to avoid or withdraw from interactions with a person whom they believe possesses negative traits, while incremental theorists are less eager to avoid such a person.

In a separate study, Levy and her associate examined whether entity theorists and incremental theorists actually show different behavioral patterns during intergroup interactions. For instance, in their first study, Karafantis and Levy (2004) had elementary school children complete a questionnaire packet which consisted of measures of their attitudes toward homeless children, of past volunteerism, and of their implicit theories. In addition, in their second study, they assessed children's actual volunteer behavior toward UNICEF-funded children as well as their attitudes towards that group. In both studies, Karafantis and Levy (2004) found that children who endorsed an entity theory

showed less positive attitudes toward and were less willing to volunteer to work with members of devalued social groups (i.e., homeless people and UNICEF-funded children) relative to children who endorsed an incremental theory. These results suggest that believing that traits are static and difficult to change makes volunteering to work with members of devalued groups seem of limited value, because it implies that these individuals are unlikely to experience improvements in their condition. In contrast, children who endorsed an incremental theory reported more liking towards and desire for more social contact with these disadvantaged social groups. Furthermore, they engaged in more actual volunteer activities aimed at improving the group's condition. These results suggest that believing in the malleability of human attributes contributes towards a proactive approach toward solving social problems.

As these studies demonstrate, implicit theories about human attributes can play an important role in understanding people's reactions to other people of the same social status and in high status group members' reactions to members of low status groups. The present study argues that implicit theories about human attributes should also affect low status group members' perspectives toward high status group members. The critical question here is whether low status group members' implicit theories about human attributes moderate how they approach the intergroup interactions when they expect to face prejudice.

Moderating Role of Implicit Theories

By integrating theory and research on implicit theories and responses to prejudice, the present study argues that implicit theories will influence how low status group members interpret and evaluate the implications of high status group members'

intergroup attitudes, which in turn might induce different behavioral strategies during intergroup interactions. Specifically, because entity theorists believe that human traits are fixed and particularly meaningful in understanding people, they might interpret high status group members' intergroup attitudes as having especially important implications for the quality of intergroup interactions. That is, they may perceive prejudiced people as possessing a negative belief system that is fixed and cannot be changed, and they may be apt to expect negative intergroup experiences with those people. Thus, when an interaction with a prejudiced person becomes imminent, entity theorists may believe that attempting to engage in compensatory behaviors during the interaction is of limited utility, and these individuals might be apt to avoid such interactions altogether, or they may engage in the interaction in a disinterested manner. In contrast, when entity theorists interact with high status group members who hold positive, egalitarian intergroup attitudes, they may be especially likely to engage in approach behaviors because they may perceive egalitarian people as possessing a fixed positive belief system. Therefore, they may perceive the high status group members' egalitarian attitudes as indicative of positive, successful interaction.

On the other hand, because incremental theorists believe that people's attitudes are malleable and can be changed, they might be less apt to view high status group members' intergroup attitudes as indicative of the subsequent nature of intergroup interactions. That is, incremental theorists might perceive prejudiced people as possessing a negative belief system that is more malleable and not necessarily predictive of negative intergroup behaviors. Furthermore, incremental theorists might believe that by approaching interactions with prejudiced people in a constructive, positive manner, they

may be able to change the negative attitudes of high status group members or at least prevent the interaction from becoming problematic. Indeed, Shelton et al. (2005) argue that, in order to approach intergroup interactions in a constructive manner, the targets of prejudice must be motivated to engage in compensatory strategies and believe that using these strategies will result in the desired outcomes--both of which are characteristics of individuals who endorse an incremental theory (Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy et al., 2001). When interacting with egalitarian high status group members, incremental theorists will likely feel positive about the potential for a positive relationship and tend to approach the interaction. However, this behavior should be less pronounced among incremental theorists relative to entity theorists, because incremental theorists place less meaning on egalitarian attitudes in predicting the success of the interaction.

High Status Group Members' Responses

Would the manner in which entity and incremental theorists approach intergroup interactions also influence the high status partners with whom they interact? Indeed, low status group members' behaviors do convey meaningful information during intergroup interactions and the more positively ethnic minorities behave, the more smoothly the interaction should go (Shelton & Richeson, 2006b; Shelton et al., 2005; Pinel, 2002). As Merton (1948) first argued, when people act on their expectations about others, these others oftentimes end up confirming the expectations (Curtis & Miller, 1986; Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981; Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998; Ickes, Patterson, Rajecki, & Tanford, 1982). Thus, high status group members should react positively towards their interaction partners when their low status group partners engage in compensatory strategies, and this process should lead to constructive, positive intergroup

interactions. On the other hand, high status group members should react negatively when their low status group partners disengage from, avoid, or otherwise behave unfavorably, and this process should lead to unconstructive and negative interactions. Indeed, Shelton et al. (2005) found that European American participants who interacted with ethnic minority participants who expected to face prejudice (and subsequently engaged in compensatory strategies during the intergroup interaction) reported that they liked their minority interaction partners better, experienced less negative affect, and enjoyed the interaction more than European American participants who interacted with ethnic minority participants not primed with prejudice expectations. Additionally, Pinel (2002) found that women who reacted in an offensive manner towards sexist men experienced reciprocal offensive behavior in return from these men. Thus, the target's expectations about their partners' attitudes might play an important role in understanding how their partners behave during intergroup interactions.

Compensatory Behaviors and Resource Depletion

The literature on resource depletion models of executive function suggests that engaging in one task that requires self-regulation temporarily impairs people's capacity to engage in another task because executive function is thought to be a limited resource (Engle, Conway, Tuholski, & Shisler, 1995; Hartley & Adams, 1974; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Because compensatory strategies require more behavioral control and self-regulation than avoidance or disengagement (Miller & Myers, 1998), it is suggested that engaging in compensatory behaviors would impair people's capacity to perform another task that also requires cognitive resources. Indeed, previous research examining people's cognitive outcomes after interracial interactions

found that increasing the self-regulatory demands of an interracial interaction led to greater interference on a Stroop task; a task that is known to require executive function (Richeson & Trawalter, 2005; Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Richeson, Trawalter, & Shelton, 2005).

For example, Richeson and Shelton (2003) had European American participants with either higher or lower levels of racial prejudice interact with European American or African American partners before they completed a color-naming Stroop test. They found that high-prejudiced European American participants who interacted with an African American confederate (and thus had to engage in self-regulatory effort to behave non-prejudicially) had impaired performance on the Stroop task compared to both high-prejudiced European American who interacted with a European American confederate and low-prejudiced European Americans (who presumable did not need to engage in as much self-regulation) who interacted with either an African American or European American partner (see also Richeson and Trawalter (2005) for conceptual replications of this effect with a manipulation of self-regulatory demands during intergroup interactions).

These findings were further supported by a study which examined the impact of interracial contact on executive function using fMRI technology (Richeson, Baird, Gordon, Heartherton, Wyland, Trawalter et al., 2003). They presented unfamiliar African American male faces to European American participants and assessed activity in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which has been found to be a critical brain region for executive control (Cohen, Botvinick, & Carter, 2000; Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Kane & Engle, 2002; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Smith & Jonides, 1999). Richeson et al. (2003) found that racial bias measured with the IAT predicted activity in the right

dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in response to the faces, such that the more European American participants displayed racial bias, the more activity was found in the critical brain region for executive control. In addition, they found that activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was correlated with Stroop interference that was assessed after an actual interracial interaction in a separate session. In sum, these studies suggest that tasks that require self-regulation (e.g., compensatory behaviors) lead to cognitive depletion. Because low status group members who endorse an incremental theory might be more willing to engage in compensatory strategies when they expect to face prejudice, they should also show cognitive depletion after intergroup interactions.

Hypotheses

Drawing on the research described above, it was hypothesized that members of socially devalued groups who endorse an incremental theory would attempt to compensate when they expect to interact with a prejudiced partner. That is, they would approach the interaction by displaying more positive affective and behavioral reactions towards their partner relative to members of devalued groups who endorse an entity theory. As a consequence, partners who interact with an incremental theorist should experience less negative affect, enjoy the interaction more, and like their partner more relative to those who interact with an entity theorist.

On the other hand, when individuals expect to interact with an egalitarian partner, members of socially devalued social groups who endorse an entity theory might more readily approach the interaction compared to members of socially devalued social groups who endorse an incremental theory. For example entity theorists may approach the interaction with more positive affective and behavioral reactions toward their partner. This should occur because entity theorists are apt to see their partner's egalitarian attitudes as a more meaningful sign that they will react favorably during the interaction. As a consequence, partners who interact with an entity theorist should experience less negative affect, enjoy the interaction more, and like their partner more compared to the egalitarian individual who interacts with an incremental theorist.

When low status group members do not have any expectation about their interaction partner's attitudes towards their social group, both entity and incremental theorists should display similarly neutral or slightly positive behaviors towards their partner. This should occur because when individuals do not have information about their

partners, they usually try to make a good first impression. In fact, Snyder and Haugen (1995) suggest that a desire to get along with one's interaction partner is one primary motivation that may be engaged in getting-acquainted situations. They argue that when people are in the initial interaction phase, they try to ensure smooth and coordinated interactions with their partners.

The present study also looked at cognitive consequences of intergroup interactions for low status group members. It was hypothesized that incremental theorists who interacted with a prejudiced high status group partners would have less cognitive capacity after the interactions than entity theorists, because the former group should engage in compensatory behaviors that require more self-regulation, thus more cognitive resources and energy. On the other hand, entity theorists who interact with egalitarian high status group partners should not experience cognitive depletion, because they do not have to "compensate" for their stereotypes but simply need to create positive impressions (thus requiring less self-regulation).

Pilot Studies

Two pilot studies were conducted to ensure that the manipulation of prejudice expectations (i.e., whether their European American partner would be either prejudiced toward African Americans or egalitarian) used in the experiment would be believable to African American students and effectively influence their expectations about their interaction partner. In addition, these pilot studies were used to ensure that African American students' implicit theories about human attributes would not moderate the effect of the manipulation of prejudice expectations. In other words, the pilot studies examined whether entity and incremental theorists would similarly interpret the manipulation.

Pilot Study 1

Pilot Study 1 sought to examine what college-age individuals' racial attitudes are like on average and was used to determine scores used for prejudice manipulation. White participants (N = 225, age M = 19.21, SD = 1.36 years old, Women = 76.6 %) were asked to complete a measure of racial attitudes toward African Americans (i.e., the Feeling Thermometer) over the Internet, which was imbedded among other social categories, such as White Americans, teachers, and Christians. More specifically, participants were asked to rate their feelings towards each social group on a scale from 0 to 100, where the lower numbers represent the colder or less favorable feelings and the higher numbers represent the warmer or more favorable feelings toward that group.

Frequency results for African American targets are presented in Table 1. On average people expressed fairly favorable feelings toward African Americans (M = 71.79, SD = 21.21), which is consistent with the previous findings that European Americans are

well aware of the social norm that discourages people from expressing racial prejudice (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002) and that they sometimes show positive bias toward African Americans when responding to self-report measures of racial attitudes (Harber, 1998). Because the majority of people expressed favorable attitudes toward African Americans, an individual may need to score extremely high on the feeling thermometer scale to be considered as "an egalitarian." In contrast, because only 9.8 % of the participants responded with scores of 40 or less, an individual may not need to score extremely low on the scale to be considered as "prejudiced." Indeed, very low scores on the scale might not be believable for the average person.

Pilot Study 2

Pilot Study 2 was conducted to examine whether a score of 40 and a score of 90 would effectively manipulate African Americans' perceptions of European Americans as prejudiced or egalitarian, respectively. This study also examined whether individuals' implicit theories would moderate the effect of the manipulation of the European American student's racial attitudes. Only African American students were recruited to participate in this study ($N = 88$, Women = 77.3%). Participants were asked to complete a measure of implicit theories about human attributes first. They were then asked to imagine that a European American MSU student was asked to rate his/her feelings toward African Americans and scored either 40, 70, or 90 on the feeling thermometer scale. A feeling thermometer score of 40 was chosen to indicate prejudiced attitudes because a prior preliminary study suggested that a score of 30 might be unbelievably low to European Americans and Pilot Study 1 suggested that that most individuals who expressed unfavorable attitudes toward African Americans scored 40 on the feeling

thermometer scale (10 out of 16). The score of 70 was added to examine whether scores of 40 and 90 were significantly different from "the average" attitudes toward African Americans and were therefore "more prejudiced" or "more egalitarian" than the average, neutral score (i.e., neither prejudiced nor egalitarian). The score of 70 was chosen as a neutral score instead of a score of 60 because it was the actual average score and because it is more convincing that a score of 90 actually indicates egalitarian attitudes if it is different from 70 (which itself seems fairly high) than a score of 60 (which is close to the midpoint of the feeling thermometer scale). The order of these three conditions were counterbalanced, so that some participants were asked to rate the student who scored 90 on the feeling thermometer scale first, some participants were asked to rate the student who scored 70 on the scale first, and the rest of the participants were asked to rate the student who scored 40 on the scale first (see Appendix A for the actual survey).

A mixed-design ANOVA using a Geisser-Greenhouse correction was conducted with the European American student's racial attitudes as a within-subject factor, and the presentation order of racial attitudes and centered Implicit Theories as between-subjects factors. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of the manipulation of the European American student's racial attitudes, $F(2,186) = 72.92$, $MSE = 1.94$, $p < .001$. A paired samples t-test revealed that the student who scored 40 was perceived as more prejudiced ($M = 1.86$, $SD = 1.40$), on a scale ranging from 0 (Very Prejudiced) to 6 (Very Egalitarian), than the student who scored 70 ($M = 3.13$, $SD = 1.10$), $t(96) = 7.57$, $p < .001$, and that the student who scored 90 was perceived as more egalitarian ($M = 4.02$, $SD = 1.27$) than the student who scored 70, $t(96) = 9.68$, $p < .001$. The main effect of Implicit Theory, $F(1,93) = .85$, $MSE = 1.50$, $p = .36$, and the main effect of presentation order,

$F(1,93) = 1.12$, $MSE = 1.50$, $p = .33$, were not significant. Although there was no interaction between the prejudice manipulation and implicit theories, $F(2,186) = .07$, $MSE = 1.94$, $p = .90$, there was a significant interaction between the prejudice manipulation and the order, $F(4,186) = 2.80$, $MSE = 1.94$, $p < .05$, indicating that the participants' perceptions of the target student's racial attitudes differed depending on the order of the presentation.

In order to further examine the effect of the order of the presentation, a one-way ANOVA with a Tukey HSD post hoc test was conducted. The results showed that participants perceived the student who scored 40 as more prejudiced when they rated the student after rating the student who scored 90 ($M = 1.28$, $SD = 1.22$), compared to when they rated the student before rating the student who scored 90 ($M = 2.19$, $SD = 1.58$). However, it is important to note that each condition showed the same pattern, such that score 90 was always perceived as more egalitarian than score 70, which was always perceived as more egalitarian than score 40.

Next, believability of the European American student's racial attitudes was examined. A mixed-design ANOVA with a Geisser-Greenhouse correction revealed no main effects for the prejudice manipulation, $F(2,182) = 1.80$, $MSE = 2.21$, $p = .17$, Implicit Theory, $F(1,91) = .67$, $MSE = 4.38$, $p = .42$, or presentation order, $F(2,91) = .68$, $MSE = 4.38$, $p = .51$. The results also showed neither an interaction between prejudice manipulation and implicit theories, $F(2,182) = .78$, $MSE = 2.21$, $p = .45$, nor an interaction between prejudice manipulation and the order of presentation $F(4,182) = 1.40$, $MSE = 2.21$, $p = .24$. Taken together, the results suggest that the manipulation of the European American student's racial attitudes works as intended and that implicit theories

do not moderate the effect of the manipulation. Although there was an order effect on the perception of the European American student's racial attitudes, because the order of three conditions was not fully counterbalanced (i.e., there were only three different orders instead of all six possible orders; 40-90-70, 70-40-90, or 90-70-40) and each condition showed the same pattern (i.e., score 90 was always perceived as more egalitarian than score 70, and score 70 was always perceived as more egalitarian than score 40), the actual experiment used a score of 40 and a score of 90 as indications of prejudiced attitudes and egalitarian attitudes respectively.

Present Study

Overview

The primary goal of this study was to examine how African American participants react to interracial interactions when expecting to be the target of prejudice and whether African American participants' implicit theories about human attributes moderate the effects of prejudice expectations on their feelings and behaviors during the interracial interaction. In this study, same-sex African American and European American participants, who had completed a measure of implicit theories before reporting to the laboratory session, were paired and asked to interact for 10 minutes. Before the interaction, African American participants were provided with false information about their partner's racial attitudes. One third of the participants were given information that was designed to lead them to believe that their European American partner was prejudiced against African Americans. Another third of the participants were provided with information designed to lead them to believe that their partner held egalitarian attitudes. Participants in a control group were not provided with information about their partner's racial attitudes. The 10 minute interaction was video-taped, and afterwards participants completed a series of questionnaires concerning the interaction and their interaction partner. Finally, participants separately completed a Stroop task, which was used to measure cognitive resources left after the interracial interaction.

Method

Participants

Seventy-three African American (Age M = 19.31, SD = 1.29 years old with missing data for two participants, Women = 68.5%), and 73 European American students (Age M = 18.89, SD = .91 years old with three missing data, Women = 68.5%) participated in the study. Two of the African American participants identified themselves as multiracial/other. In addition, one person in the European American group identified herself as Latino American, one participant identified herself as Native American, one participant identified himself as multiracial/other, and one participant identified herself as an international student. All participants were recruited from the Psychology Subject Pool and the larger campus community to participate in this study[2].

Procedure

At least one day prior to participating in the study, all participants completed the Implicit Person Theories Measure (Chiu et al., 1997), the Self-Esteem Measure (Rosenberg, 1979), and mood measures as a part of an online prescreening session[3, 4, 5]. This study was a between-subjects design, involving one factor with three levels (African Americans' expectations of European Americans' racial attitudes: racist, no information, egalitarian) and one continuous factor (African Americans' implicit theories).

One African American and two European American participants, who were same-sex, were recruited for each session. Experimenters, who were blind to experimental condition, called potential participants who were listed on the Psychology Subject Pool Website or who expressed interest in the study earlier in the semester[6], briefly explained the study, and asked whether they were interested in signing up for a session. When

participants agreed to sign up for a session on the phone, and after experimenter confirmed participants' race and gender, experimenters organized laboratory sessions such that one African American and two European American same-sex students were placed in one session. At the end of the phone conversation with participants, experimenters instructed them to complete the online questionnaires (see Appendix B) before they came to a laboratory session.

Two European American participants were recruited for one session because it is harder to recruit African American participants than European American participants and because it made it possible to have a session even when one of the two signed-up European American participants did not show up to a laboratory session. When all participants showed up for a session, one European American participant was randomly chosen to participate in this study and the other European American participant was asked to participate in an unrelated study which was being conducted simultaneously in the Self and Social Perception Laboratory. When the African American participant did not show up to the session, both European American participants were asked to participate in the other, unrelated study.

Participants reported to the laboratory for a study purportedly addressing "serial cognition," which was the same cover story used in Shelton et al.'s study (2005). Participants were individually seated in a private cubicle equipped with a computer. Following the procedures used in Shelton et al. (2005), participants were told that the study focused on the influence of one cognitive task on a subsequent cognitive task when there is a delay between the two. Furthermore, the experimenter explained that it was critical to have about a 15-minute delay between the two tasks, so participants would be

participating in another study ostensibly conducted by another graduate student that would examine psychology of impression formation. Participants learned that they would be interacting with another participant, who was also participating in the "serial cognition" study, for about ten minutes. Participants were told that their job was to provide their impressions of the interaction partner and about aspects of the interaction more generally. To make the cover story more believable, participants received a new consent form for the "second study."

After participants completed the first cognitive task (actually a filler task) which involved reading and summarizing a short newspaper article about tortoises, another experimenter appeared and explained that the second study would focus on examining how people usually interact with another person under limited time. The experimenter told only African American participants that we were also interested in whether having information about one's partner influences the interaction. All African American participants were told that they were randomly assigned to receive information about their interaction partner. In contrast, European American participants were simply told that the study examined how people interact with another person, and none of the European American participants were told that experimenters were interested in the effects of information at all.

In actuality, unbeknownst to the participants, the European Americans' personal information was replaced with one of three versions of a manipulation intended to convey either racist attitudes, egalitarian attitudes, or no information about their racial attitudes. The experimenter delivered one of the three versions of the "European American students' attitudes" to their African American partner (see Appendix C). All African

American participants learned that their interaction partner was a same-sex European American student. In the racist condition, European American participants' attitude survey indicated a "cold" score (i.e., 40) on feeling thermometers about African Americans, indicating that they feel unfavorable toward African Americans. In the egalitarian condition, European American participants' attitude survey indicated "warm" scores (i.e., 90) on the feeling thermometer, indicating that they possess favorable attitudes toward African Americans. In the no information condition, African American participants did not receive racial attitude information so that they had no prior expectations about their partners' level of prejudice. In order to avoid making the study's purpose obvious, racial attitudes toward African Americans were imbedded among other social attitudes items (i.e., White Americans, lawyers, doctors, and teachers)[7]. Also, the prejudice manipulation was imbedded among other filler measures, which were filled out in a constant manner presumably completed by their partner (i.e., self-esteem, mood).[8]

After African American participants reviewed their interaction partner's personal information, all participants completed a short survey regarding their willingness and desire to interact with their partner. At this time, European American participants had no knowledge about their interaction partner. After completing the survey, the experimenter explained to African American participants that it is important that they do not mention anything they have reviewed in the personal information packet, because their partner does not know that they received this information (African American participants were told that the information had been collected from the online prescreening session).

Next, African American participants were led to a cubicle where their European American interaction partner was waiting. When they entered the cubicle, African

American participants were told that the experimenter "forgot" to put a chair in the cubicle and were asked to pull up a chair (that was located in the hallway by the cubicle door) and to have a seat. The distance between two participants was measured[9] after the entire session was over as indicative of nonverbal behavioral reactions towards the partner (Breckler, 1984; Tobiasen & Allen, 1983). All participants were informed that the cubicle was equipped with a microphone and video cameras and that the experimental session would be videotaped so that we could analyze the nature of the interaction later in detail. The video cameras were adjusted before each interaction began to keep images constant (direct shot from the front) across participants. All participants were told that they should get to know one another during the next ten minutes and that they would answer a few questions about the interaction and their partner after the interaction. The experimenter left the room for ten minutes.

After 10 minutes, the experimenter returned to the cubicle, stopped the interaction, and separated the participants by taking the African American participant back to the original cubicle. Then both African American and European American participants were asked to complete a brief questionnaire assessing a number of dependent variables. These dependent variables included the degree to which they felt/believed they had engaged in socially skillful behaviors (as indicators of compensation), their efforts to change their partner's beliefs about themselves, emotions, feelings of authenticity, their self-esteem during the interaction, how much they liked their interaction partner and enjoyed the interaction. Participants also rated how much they felt that their partner like them and how much their partner enjoyed the interaction. These measures are included in Appendices D and E.

After completing the post-interaction questionnaire, all participants were asked to complete the second cognitive task (the Stroop task) which was aimed at examining cognitive depletion after the intergroup interaction. Following the exact procedure employed in Richeson et al.'s study (2005), the experimenter explained that participants were to report the color of various stimuli that would appear on the computer as quickly as they could by pressing the appropriate keys on the key board (the keys were color-coded). On each trial, the word "blue," "green," "red," or "yellow" or a row of four X's appeared on the screen in one of the four colors. On compatible trials, participants color-named the string of X's or a color name that appeared in the same color as its semantic meaning. On incompatible trials, a color name appeared in a color other than its semantic meaning (e.g., "blue" appearing in red type). The difference in color-naming latencies associated with incompatible trials and control trials formed an index of Stroop interference, and the higher the index, the more cognitive depletion.

At the end of the study, African American participants completed manipulation checks which asked them to indicate their partner's racial attitudes toward African Americans before, during, and after the interaction, to assess whether they correctly noticed the European American partners' racial attitudes before the interaction. All participants were also asked to complete a suspicion check sheet. After completing the suspicion check sheet, African American and European American participants were separately probed for their suspicion about the true nature of the study by different experimenters using the Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer (1998) procedure. Experimenters were trained to probe for participants' suspicion using written responses and conversations. First, experimenters were instructed to ask participants whether they have

questions regarding the study and whether the instructions were perfectly clear. Experimenters then asked participants if they noticed something odd or unusual in the study. As experimenters and participants engaged in conversation for a while, experimenters asked participants what they thought the purpose of the study was and when that thought had occurred. Experimenters were instructed to judge whether participants knew the true purpose of the study based on these conversations and written responses.

Once experimenters made a judgment as to how close participants' suspicions were to the actual purpose of the study, both African American and European American participants were brought to one cubicle and underwent a debriefing process together (Aronson et al., 1998). During the debriefing process, the experimenter explained why they manipulated European American participants' racial attitudes and made sure that participants understood that these racial attitudes were false. At the end of debriefing, the participants' rights to deny releasing their video recorded interactions were explained and participants were asked to sign a video release form if they agreed[10]. After the thorough debriefing, participants were thanked and excused.

Measures

Implicit Theories about Human Attributes. Implicit theories about human attributes were assessed at least one day prior to the laboratory session during an online prescreening session with Chiu et al.'s (1997) eight-item Implicit Person Theory scale. Sample items include: "The kind of person someone is is something very basic about them and it can't be changed very much" (reversed), "People can always substantially change the kind of person they are," and "All people can change even their most basic

qualities." Items were rated on a 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) scale (α = .86). Higher scores indicate incremental theorists in this study. Unless otherwise noted, participants made their ratings for all dependent measures collected during the laboratory session on this 0-6 scale.

Preinteraction Expectations - Self. Expectations for the interaction immediately prior to the actual interaction were assessed using 5 items. Example items are: "I think I will enjoy interacting with my partner," "I would prefer to work with a different partner" (reversed), and "I am excited about the interaction with my partner." Higher scores represent more positive expectations about the subsequent interracial interaction (α = .81).

Preinteraction Expectations – Partner. What participants thought their partners would expect for the interaction prior to the actual interaction was assessed using the following two items: "I think my partner will enjoy interacting with me" and "I think my partner will be excited about interacting with me" (α = .85).

Physical Distance. Physical distance between participants and their partner was used to assess participants' nonverbal reaction towards their partner. It was measured as the distance between the two chairs during the interaction. Higher scores indicate more distance between the two, suggesting participants' discomfort about interacting with their partner. Distance was measured in inches.

Socially Skillful Behaviors. Participants completed 12 items regarding how much they engaged in several socially skillful behaviors as indicative of compensatory behaviors. More specifically, the measure assessed the extent to which participants behaved in a socially skilled manner, self-disclosed, and intensely engaged in the interaction. Sample items are: "I tried to act socially skillful," "I revealed a lot about

myself to my partner," and "During the interaction, I frequently elaborated on my thoughts about the topics" (α = .78). Higher scores indicate that participants engaged in more socially skilled behaviors.

Changing Attitudes. Participants' efforts to change their partner's attitudes toward them were assessed with the following two items: "I tried to change my partner's beliefs about me" and "I tried to change my partner's assumptions about who I am" (α = .81). Higher scores indicate greater effort.

Emotions. Participants indicated the extent to which they experienced a variety of emotions during the interaction (as well as during the prescreening session) by responding to 12 items. An exploratory principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation revealed three factors. Using this solution, the emotion items were grouped into Anxiety, Anger and Depression, and Positive Affect factors. The anxiety factor consisted of five items: anxious, calm (reversed), nervous, relaxed (reversed), and uneasy, such that higher scores indicate participants felt more anxiety related negative affect (α = .84 for the laboratory session and .83 for the prescreening session). Five items were combined to assess the extent to which participants felt anger and depression related negative emotions: angry, sad, blue, threatened, and irritated (α = .79 for the laboratory session and .80 for the prescreening session), with higher scores indicated that they felt angrier or depressed.[11] Finally, Positive Affect was assessed using two items (i.e., confident and happy) during the interaction (α = .65) and prescreening session (α = .64). Higher scores indicate that participants experienced more positive affect.

Authenticity. The extent to which participants felt that they were being authentic during the interaction was assessed with the two-item Shelton et al.'s Authenticity scale

(Shelton et al., 2005). The two items were: "I had to change myself to fit in with my partner" (reversed) and "It was easy to express my true attitudes and feelings" ($\alpha = .61$). These two items were combined to create a feeling of authenticity composite scale, such that higher scores indicate that participants felt more authentic during the interaction.

Self-Esteem. Levels of self-esteem after the interaction as well as during the prescreening session were assessed with the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1979) phrased with regard to feelings at the present moment. Example items are: "Right now, I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others," "Right now, I am inclined to think I am a failure" (reversed), and "Right now, I am satisfied with myself" ($\alpha = .89$ and .97, respectively). Higher scores represent high self-esteem.

Liking. Participants' liking of their partner was assessed using three items: "I liked my partner," "I would enjoy interacting with my partner again in the future," and "My partner was a nice person" ($\alpha = .85$). Higher scores represent that participants liked their partner during the interaction.

Enjoyment. Three items were used to assess the extent to which participants enjoyed the interaction with their partner: "I enjoyed getting to know my partner," "I enjoyed the interaction with my partner," and "I had a good time during the interaction." The enjoyment composite score was created such that higher scores indicate more enjoyment ($\alpha = .92$).

Partner's Liking. Participants also reported how much they thought their partner liked them. Partner's liking was assessed with three items: "I think my partner liked me," "I think my partner would enjoy interacting with me again in the future," and "I think my

partner thought I was a nice person" (α = .90). Higher scores indicate that participants tended to think that their partner liked them.

Partner's enjoyment. Three items were used to assess participants' thoughts about how much their partner enjoyed the interaction with them: "I think my partner enjoyed the interaction with me," "I think my partner enjoyed getting to know me," and "I think my partner had a good time during the interaction" (α = .94). Higher scores indicate that participants tended to think that their partner enjoyed the interaction.

Manipulation Check (Only for African American Participants). To examine whether African American participants attended to their partner's racial attitudes before they engaged in the interaction, only African American participants were asked to rate how much they thought their partner was prejudiced toward African Americans, held egalitarian attitudes toward African Americans, and was neither a racist nor an egalitarian, before, during, and after the interaction. Their thoughts about their partner's racial attitudes during as well as after the interaction were asked in order to distinguish their *expectations* prior to the interaction from their actual *perceptions* after the interaction as well as to examine whether African American participants' expectations would change depending on European American participants' actual attitudes and behaviors. In addition, they were also asked to rate how positive their partner was toward African Americans and European Americans. These two items were added at the end in order to have multiple items assessing the manipulation. See Appendix G for the manipulation check sheet.

Suspicion Check. Participants were asked to provide written descriptions of what they thought the purpose of the study was, at what point during the study that idea had

occurred to them, and whether anything about the study seemed unusual or strange and when they noticed that. See Appendix H for the actual suspicion check sheet administered to the participants. *Stroop Interference Score.* Stroop interference score reflects availability of cognitive resources after the interaction and was assessed with the difference between response latencies (RTs) for the control trials and RTs for the incongruent trials. In order to calculate the score, first, all false responses and Stroop latencies less than 200 ms were excluded. Mean and standard deviation for each participant were then computed to identify Stroop latencies greater than 3 standard deviations above the mean, which were also excluded from the data[12]. Next, all the remaining RTs were log-transformed in order to adjust for the normality assumptions of the data-analytic procedures. Log-transformed RTs were then averaged according to type of trial (i.e. control, incongruent). Stroop interference scores were calculated by subtracting mean transformed RTs for the control trials from mean transformed RTs for the incongruent trials. In the present sample, Stroop Interference Scores ranged from -36.09 to 542.03 (M = 139.02, SD = 102.64). Higher scores represent greater Stroop interference (i.e., less cognitive resources).

Coding of Videotapes. Participants' videotaped verbal and nonverbal behaviors during the interaction were assessed after the entire experiment was completed. Both verbal and nonverbal behaviors were evaluated simultaneously by three independent coders (two women and one man, who were all European Americans) who were blind to participants' experimental condition but knew major research questions and hypotheses examined in the present study. The order in which participants were evaluated was varied across coders. The coders were instructed to evaluate participants' behavior using

nonverbal behavioral coding surveys (see Appendix F). The surveys contained the following measures: stereotype, global positive regard, global responsiveness, self-disclosure, anxiety, irritability, and sociability (i.e., extraversion). Some of the items for these measures were directly taken from two previous studies [e.g., Global Responsiveness items, Global Positive Regard items, and Self-Disclosure items; see Vorauer & Turpie (2004) and Shelton et al. (2005)]. The goal of these ratings was to provide an unbiased perspective of participants' affective and attitudinal reactions towards the partner (Shelton et al., 2005; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004). The coders were instructed to rate participants on the above measures not based on specific behaviors shown by a person, but based on their impression of the person.

Stereotypical behavior was assessed with one item. The coders rated the extent to which the participant displayed stereotypical behavior associated with his/her racial group on a scale of 0 (Not at All) to 6 (Extremely). Higher score indicate that participants showed more racially stereotypical behaviors during the interaction. Interrater reliability was -.06.[13] Because Interrater reliability was low and negative, the further analysis did not include this measure.

Global positive regard was assessed with six items ($\alpha = .91$). The following five items were measured on a scale from 0 (Not at All) to 6 (Extremely): "The participant was interested in his/her partner," "The participant was interested in getting to know his/her partner," "The participant was friendly to his/her partner," "The participant appeared to be having fun with his/her partner," "The participant liked his/her partner." The last item asked the coders to rate the extent to which the participant smiled during the interaction on a scale of 0 (Did not smile at all) to 6 (Smiled a lot). Interrater reliability

was .29. Higher scores indicate that participants showed high levels of global positive regard toward their partner.

Global responsiveness was assessed with seven items (α = .85). The coders rated the following five items on a scale between 0 (Not at All) and 6 (Extremely): "The participants appeared engaged in the conversation," "The participant was responsive to his/her partner," "The participant was attentive to his/her partner," "The participant talked during the interaction," and "The participant asked his/her questions about themselves." The coders also rate the extent to which the participant leaned toward his/her partner on a scale between 0 (Body leaned away from partner) and 6 (Body leaned forward toward partner) and what the participant did with his/her arms during the interaction on a scale between 0 (Arms crossed a lot) and 6 (Arms open and/or inviting). The average Interrater reliability across these seven items were .32. Higher scores indicate that participants were more responsive to their partner.

Self-disclosure was assessed with four items. Based on Vorauer and Turpie's study (2004), this measure was designed to capture the intimacy of the participant's comments and how much the coders learned about the participant based on the interaction. These four items were: "The participant elaborated on her/his thoughts and feelings," "The participant's comments were intimate/personal," "The participant self-disclosed to his/her partner," and " I learned about the participant from this interaction" (α = .87). Higher scores represent more self-disclosure. Because Interrater reliability was too low and negative (ICC = -.19), the variable was not used in the following analyses.

A variety of *affect* during the interaction was assessed with seven items. An exploratory principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation revealed two factors. Using this solution, the emotion items were grouped into Anxiety and Irritability. The anxiety factor consisted of four items: anxious, comfortable (reversed), nervous, and uneasy, such that higher scores indicate participants looked more anxious during the interaction ($\alpha = .85$). Three items were combined to assess the extent to which participants appeared irritated: unpleasant, annoyed, and irritated during the interaction ($\alpha = .92$), with higher scores indicated that participants looked more irritated. Because neither measure had good Interrater reliability (ICC = .13 for Anxiety and ICC = -.02 for Irritability), these affect variables were excluded from the analyses.

Sociability was assessed with four items. The coders rate the following items on a scale of 0 (Not at All) to 6 (Extremely): "The participant was sociable," "The participant tried to spark conversation," "The participant was authentic during the interaction," and "The participant was socially skillful" ($\alpha = .94$). Higher scores indicate that participants were more sociable during the interaction. Interrater reliability was .51. [14]

Analysis and Results

Means and standard deviations of self-report variables for the entire sample and separately by race and condition are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Independent groups t-tests indicated that African American and European American participants differed significantly in their anger and self-esteem measures during prescreening, and socially skillful behaviors, self-esteem, and partner's liking during the interaction. More specifically, European American participants reported more negative emotions associated with anger and depression compared to African American participants during the prescreening session. In addition, European American participants had lower self-esteem relative to African American participants during both the prescreening and the laboratory sessions, which is consistent with a large number of empirical studies showing that African Americans tent to have higher self-esteem than European Americans (Gray-Little & Hafdahl, 2000; Hoelter, 1982; Porter & Washington, 1979; Twenge & Crocker, 2002) due to self-protection (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Rowley, Sellers, Chavous, & Smith, 1998; Simmons & Rosenberg, 1971), positive racial identity (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Phinney, Cantu, & Kurtz, 1997; Pope, 2000; Rowley et al., 1998), and cultural differences in the self-concept (Twenge & Crocker, 2002). During the interaction, European American participants reported engaging in socially skillful behaviors more than African American participants. Finally, African American participants liked their European American partners somewhat more than European American participants liked their African American partners.

Tables 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations of behavioral measures for the entire sample and separately by race and condition. Again, Independent groups t-tests

were conducted to examine whether African American and European American participants differ in those behavioral measures. African American and European American participants differed in independent observer rated global responsiveness and self-disclosure. The coders reported that African American participants displayed more global responsiveness toward their partner relative to European American participants. In contrast, observer coding suggested that European American participants self-disclosed more than African American participants. Finally, European American participants were rated as being somewhat more irritated than were African American participants.

Table 6 presents means, standard deviations, minimum scores, and maximum scores of both raw and long-transformed Stroop Interference Scores for the entire sample. There were no group mean differences on the Stroop task.

An omnibus test was conducted to examine whether the correlations and standard deviations among the prescreening measures (implicit theories about human attributes, anxiety, other negative affect, positive affect, and self-esteem) differed for African American and European American participants. This test yielded a chi-square value of $\chi^2(15) = 15.64, p = .41$, suggesting that the correlations and standard deviations of these measures did not differ as a function of race, and so the correlations across the entire sample are presented in Table 7. Correlations among self-report dependent variables and among behavioral measures for all participants are provided in Tables 8 and 15, respectively. In addition, correlations among self-report dependent variables and among behavioral measures across experimental conditions separately for African American and European American participants are provided in Tables 9 through 14 (self-report measures) and Tables 16 through Table 21 (behavioral measures).

Suspicion Check

Suspicion level was examined based on what participants wrote on an open-ended suspicion check that asked them to describe their thoughts concerning the purpose of the study, as well as on conversations exchanged between participants and experimenters during probing. In the case of African American participants, suspicious participants were defined as those who were very confident that one or more of the following were true: 1) the two studies described as independent studies conducted by different experimenters were actually part of one big study, 2) the information about their partner was fake, 3) they were purposely paired with a partner from a different race, and/or 4) the experimenters were actually observing how *they* interact with an European American after learning that he/she was prejudiced toward African Americans. The last criterion is especially important, because it distinguishes suspicious participants from those participants who simply stated the purpose of the study was to look at how interracial interaction went in general. The latter case does not quite get at the true hypotheses of the study. Therefore, those participants who mentioned race but did not mention beliefs that the study concerned the influence of their knowledge about their partner's racial attitudes on their reactions were categorized as non-suspicious participants. Notably, African American participants completed the manipulation check sheet, which asked about their partner's racial attitudes, right before they completed the suspicion check sheet, and so the fact that race played an important role was obvious to many participants. Four suspicious African American participants (5.5%; one participant was classified using both criterion 1 and 4, one participant was classified as suspicious using criterion 3,

and two participants were classified using criterion 4) were excluded from analyses based on these criteria.

In the case of European American participants, those participants who thought that 1) the two studies described as independent studies conducted by different experimenters were actually part of one big study and/or that 2) they were purposely paired with a partner from a different race were excluded from the following analyses. Again, participants who simply mentioned that the study had something to do with race were not excluded because the racial nature of the interaction was salient and because this knowledge provided no insight into the hypotheses about experimental condition or implicit theories. First, because there are usually fewer African American students enrolled in any psychology classes compared to European American students, the probability of participating in a study with an African American student is relatively low and would be salient. Because "race" was very salient during the interaction and because experimenters asked participants to take their best guesses about the purpose of the study during a probing session, many participants indeed mentioned "race" either on the suspicion check sheet or during probing. However, if they could not guess specific hypotheses of the study, they were not excluded from analyses. Moreover, for both African American and European American participants, even if they could speculate about the true purpose of the study, they were not categorized as suspicious participants if they thought of the purpose after the study (i.e., when they were completing the suspicion check sheet or during probing). Three suspicious European American participants (4.1%; all three suspicious participants were classified using criterion 2) were excluded from analyses on the basis of these criteria.

In addition, there was also one African American participant who told the experimenter that she did not believe that the experimenter "forgot" to put a chair in another cubicle and that she thought the experimenter was actually observing how close she would put the chair to her partner. However, because she did not question any other aspects of the study, her data were excluded only from analyses of physical distance. There was also one African American participant who stated the exact purpose of the Stroop task. However, again, because she did not express any suspicion on other aspects of the study, her data were excluded only from the cognitive resource analyses.

Several other participants were excluded from analyses for reasons other than suspicion about the study. First, those participants who identified themselves as belonging to racial/ethnic groups other than either African American or European American were excluded from all analyses. More specifically, two participants who were recruited as African Americans identified themselves as multiracial/other. Among participants who were recruited as European Americans, one participant identified herself as Latino American, one participant identified herself as Native American, one participant identified himself as multiracial/other, and one participant identified herself as an international student. Second, one African American participant brought her baby to the laboratory session which resulted in an unusual study context; therefore, she was excluded from all analyses. Finally, there was a participant who participated in the study twice. Her data and her partner's data from the second time were excluded. Taken together, a total of six African American participants (8.5%) and four European American participants (7.2%) were excluded from the subsequent data analyses[15].

Analyses Plan

The data were analyzed using hierarchical moderated regression analyses. Because there were three levels of European American's racial attitudes towards African Americans (racist, egalitarian, no information), this variable was represented with two dummy-coded terms. One dummy-coded term represented the Prejudice condition vs. the No Information condition comparison (PvN), and the other represented the Egalitarian condition vs. the No Information condition comparison (EvN). In both dummy codes, the No Information condition was the referent condition and was dummy-coded as 0, and the respective experimental conditions were dummy-coded as 1.[16] The main effect of experimental condition (i.e., European American's racial attitudes) and the main effect of African Americans' implicit theories (grand mean centered) were entered in the first and second steps[17] of the regression, and the two-way interactions between the dummy coded experimental condition variables and implicit theories were entered in the third step. Support for the hypotheses would be evidenced by a significant third step with a Racial Attitudes x Implicit Theories interaction. For Emotions and Self-Esteem measures, the initial responses to those measures during the prescreening session were controlled. In order to account for the preexisting emotions and self-esteem, the main effects of those variables were entered in the first step of the regression. The main effect of experimental condition and the main effect of implicit theories were entered in the second and third steps, and the two-way interactions between the dummy coded experimental condition variables and implicit theories were entered in the fourth step.

Manipulation Check

Table 22 presents the results of the manipulation checks. Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine whether participants perceived their partner to be

prejudiced toward African Americans prior to the interaction. The analyses revealed only a main effect of experimental condition controlling for implicit theories ($\Delta R^2 = .61, p < .001$), and examination of parameter estimates suggests that participants in the Prejudice condition did indeed perceive their partner to be more prejudiced toward African Americans before the interaction ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.57$) compared to participants in the No Information condition ($M = .63$, $SD = .96$). In contrast, participants in the Egalitarian condition ($M = .52$, $SD = 1.12$) and in the No Information condition did not differ in their perceptions of their partner's racial attitudes prior to the interaction. These results suggest that prejudice manipulation successfully influenced the perception of African Americans in the Prejudice condition and that African Americans who do not have prior information about their partner usually assume their partner to non-prejudiced.

Next, participants' perception of their partner as egalitarian prior to the interaction was examined using hierarchical regression analyses. Again, the analyses revealed only a significant main effect of experimental condition controlling for implicit theories ($\Delta R^2 = .21, p = .002$). Parameter estimates indicate that participants in the Prejudice condition were more likely to perceive their partner to be egalitarian ($M = 2.95$, $SD = 1.13$) compared to participants in the No Information condition ($M = .89$, $SD = 1.20$). In addition, participants in the Egalitarian condition perceived their partner to be egalitarian ($M = 1.60$, $SD = 2.06$) slightly more than participants in the No Information condition. These results indicate a failure of the manipulation; however, another manipulation check item asking participants whether their partner expressed *positive attitudes* (instead of using the word "egalitarian") toward African Americans showed that participants in the Egalitarian Condition did indeed perceive their partner to be more positive ($M = 4.96$, SD

= 1.31) than participants in the No Information condition (M = 3.84, SD = 1.57; ΔR^2 = .27, $p < .02$). In addition, participants in the Prejudice condition perceived that their partner was slightly less positive (M = 2.93, SD = 1.59) than participants in the No Information condition. Therefore, egalitarian manipulation was successful, and it is suggested that the word "egalitarian" used in the first manipulation check item might have contributed to the failure to accurately check the participants' perception of their partners as egalitarian.

In addition, a three-factor mixed design ANOVA using a Geisser-Greenhouse correction, with retrospective prejudice expectation at different time points (before, during, after the interaction)[18] as a within-subjects factor and implicit theories and experimental condition as between-subject factors, was conducted to examine whether experimental condition and implicit theories would have differential effects on how African American participants' prejudice expectations may have changed over time following the actual interaction[19]. In other words, by comparing prejudice expectations between three time points, this analysis examined how expectations affected interactions with partners who did not systematically act in prejudiced or egalitarian ways. The test revealed a significant main effect of time, $F(2,138) = 57.59$, $MSE = .62$, $p < .001$, a main effect of experimental condition, $F(2,69) = 17.94$, $MSE = 3.07$, $p < .001$, and a significant interaction between time points and experimental condition, $F(4,138) = 41.70$, $MSE = .62$, $p < .001$ which qualified the two main effects. To further examine the significant interaction, three one-way between-groups ANOVAs with Tukey HSD post hoc tests were conducted looking at the effects of experimental condition on prejudice expectations at the three different time points. Before the interaction, African American participants who were in the Prejudice condition thought that their partner was

significantly more prejudiced (M = 3.89, SD = 1.47) compared to those who were in the Egalitarian condition (M = .50, SD = 1.10) and the No Information condition (M = .63, SD = .96). The difference between the Prejudice condition (M = 1.18, SD = 1.61) and the Egalitarian condition (M = .27, SD = .83) was also significant for ratings of prejudice during the interaction , although there were no differences between the Prejudice condition and the No Information condition (M = .63, SD = .90) or between Egalitarian and No Information. Prejudice expectations after the interaction for participants in the Prejudice condition were even further decreased, such that there was no difference in prejudice expectations among the Prejudice condition (M = .89, SD = 1.34), the Egalitarian condition (M = .23, SD = .71), and the No Information condition (M = .47, SD = .77).

In sum, the results suggest that prejudice expectations of African American participants who thought their partner to be prejudiced toward them changed over time as they interacted with a partner who did not behave in a prejudiced manner, indicating that behavioral evidence counter to expectations can override negative expectations even in a short period of time. In contrast, prejudice expectations of African American participants who did not expect their partner to be prejudiced from the beginning stayed the same, because their expectations and behaviors of their partner were consistent.

Preinteraction Expectations and Assumptions about Their Partner

Table 23 presents the results of the moderated regression analyses predicting the African American participants' preinteraction expectations and assumptions about how their partners would feel about the interaction. Analyses of their preinteraction expectations revealed that the main effect of experimental condition accounted for 14%

of the variance in expectations. As can be seen in the table, the parameter estimates indicate that participants in the Prejudice condition had significantly more negative expectations for the interaction relative to participants in the No Information condition. However, participants in the Egalitarian condition did not differ significantly from those in the No Information condition. Although there was no evidence of an implicit theory main effect, the interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition was significant and explained an additional 9% of the variance in expectations. Examination of the simple slopes for implicit theories at each level of condition indicated that, in the Prejudice condition, implicit theories were significantly negatively related to preinteraction expectations (β = -.60, p = .02), indicating that, counter to hypotheses, incremental theorists tended to expect more negative interactions compared to entity theorists. In contrast, in the Egalitarian condition, the simple slope for implicit theories was positive but nonsignificant (β = .09, p = .63). The simple slope for implicit theories in the No Information condition was also positive but nonsignificant (β = .23, p = .29).

Next, moderating effects of implicit theories on the relationship between prejudice expectations and African American participants' thoughts about what their partners' expectations for the interaction were examined. The analyses reveled that about 11% of variance in partner's preinteraction expectations was explained by the main effect of experimental condition. Participants in the Prejudice condition expected their partner to have less positive expectations compared to participants in the No Information condition, but participants in the Egalitarian condition did not significantly differ from participants in the No Information condition. There was no significant main effect of implicit theories when predicting participants' thoughts about their partners'

preinteraction expectations. The main effect of experimental condition was qualified by an interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition, with the interaction explaining 19% of variance in partner's preinteraction expectations overall. Further examinations of simple slopes in Figure 2 revealed that, in the Prejudice condition, implicit theories and experimental conditions were strongly and negatively related (β = -.76, p = .002). Therefore, incremental theorists thought that their partners would expect more negative interactions with them, relative to entity theorists, in the Prejudice condition. In the Egalitarian condition, implicit theories and experimental condition were strongly and positively related (β = .45, p = .009), suggesting that incremental theorists thought that their partners would expect more positive interaction with them, compared to entity theorists. The simple slope for partner's preinteraction expectations in the No Information was not significant (β = .08, p = .71).

Behaviors during the Interaction

Table 24 presents the regression results for participants' reports on the degree to which they engaged in socially skilled behaviors and made efforts to change their partner's attitudes, as well as the physical distance they chose to sit from their interaction partner. Ratings of socially skillful (i.e., compensatory) behaviors showed a significant main effect of implicit theories, such that incremental theorists were less likely to report engaging in socially skillful behaviors than entity theorists. This main effect explained about 9% of variance. Neither the main effect of experimental condition alone nor the interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition predicted self-reported engagement in socially skilled behaviors.

Participants also reported whether they made efforts to change their partner's attitudes toward them. The analyses revealed a main effect of experimental condition that explained 14% of the variance in efforts to change their partner's attitudes, and the parameter estimates indicate that participants in the Prejudice condition tried to change their partner's attitudes toward them more than did participants in the No Information condition. Neither a main effect of implicit theories nor an interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition was significant.

Physical distance between African American and European American participants were measured as indicative of African American participants' liking toward their partner. Neither of the main effect of experimental condition or implicit theories, nor the interaction between the two was significant.

Emotions Experienced during the Interaction

Table 25 presents the results of moderated regression analyses predicting anxiety, other negative affect, and positive affect during the interaction. In order to account for general levels of emotions participants experienced, preexisting emotions measured during the prescreening session were entered as covariates. Thus, when positive emotions were predicted, pre-test positive emotions were controlled. As it is evident in the table, self-reported emotions were not significantly related to any of the main effects or interactions.

Feelings of Authenticity and Self-Esteem during the Interactions

Table 26 presents the regression results for participants' reports on the degree to which they felt authentic during the interaction and their levels of self-esteem. A hierarchical regression analysis revealed neither a main effect of experimental condition

nor a main effect of implicit theories. However, a significant interaction between implicit theory and condition occurred, and it explained about 12% of variance in feelings of authenticity. As can be seen in Figure 3, examination of the simple slopes for implicit theory at each level of condition indicated that, in the Prejudice condition, participants' implicit theories were strongly and inversely related to their feelings of authenticity (β = -.69, p = .01). Thus, in the Prejudice condition, incremental theorists tended to feel less authentic, relative to entity theorists. On the other hand, the simple slope for implicit theory in the Egalitarian condition was small, positive, and non significant (β = .21, p = .25). For the No Information condition, the simple slope was negative and not significant (β = -.32, p = .17).

In order to examine the moderating effects of implicit theories on the relationships between prejudice expectation and self-esteem, the pre-test level of self-esteem was entered as a covariate in order to account for preexisting levels of self-esteem. Hierarchical regression analyses revealed a significant main effect of initial levels of self-esteem, indicating that preexisting levels of self-esteem accounted for about 44% of the variance in the levels of self-esteem measured after the interaction. Neither the main effect of experimental condition alone, nor the main effect of implicit theories alone predicted self-esteem. Also, the interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition was non-significant.

Liking and Enjoyment

Table 27 presents the effects of prejudice expectations and implicit theories on predicting African American participants' liking toward their European American partner, whether they enjoyed the interaction, and their perceptions of their partner's liking

toward them and enjoyment of the interaction. As can be seen in the table, none of these outcomes can be explained by implicit theories, experimental condition, or the interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition.

Observed Behaviors during the Interaction

Table 28 presents the effects of prejudice expectations and implicit theories on African American participants' observed behaviors during the interaction. Analyses of behaviors associated with Global Positive Regard revealed that the main effect of experimental condition accounted for 7% of the variance in the behaviors. Examination of the parameter estimates indicates that participants in the Prejudice condition expressed significantly more behaviors characterized as global positive regard during the interaction relative to participants in the No Information condition. Likewise, the analysis revealed that participants in the Egalitarian condition also expressed significantly more behaviors characterized as global positive regard, compared to those in the No Information condition. However, neither the main effect of implicit theories nor the interaction between experimental condition and implicit theories was significant.

A similar pattern was found with observed behaviors that are characterized as Global Responsiveness. Ratings of global responsiveness behaviors showed a significant main effect of experimental condition, such that participants both in the Prejudice condition and in the Egalitarian condition enacted significantly more behaviors characterized as global responsiveness, compared to participants in the No Information condition. This main effect explained about 8% of variance in responsiveness behaviors. Neither the main effect of implicit theories alone nor the interaction between implicit

theories and experimental condition predicted engagement in behaviors associated with global responsiveness.

An examination of the effects of prejudice expectations and implicit theories predicting observed sociability during the interaction revealed a significant main effect of experimental condition, such that participants in the Prejudice condition and the Egalitarian condition were more sociable than participants in the No Information condition. Experimental condition accounted for about 4% of the variance in sociability. The main effect of implicit theories was also marginally significant, such that incremental theorists were somewhat less sociable, compared to entity theorists. The interaction between the two was not significant.

European American Participants' Emotions during the Interaction

Table 29 presents the effects of African American participants' prejudice expectations and implicit theories on their European American partner's emotions. Analyses of European American participants' anxiety during the interaction revealed that the main effect of preexisting anxiety accounted for 12% of the variance in anxiety. Neither of the main effect of experimental condition or implicit theories, nor the interaction between the two was significant. Examination of European American participants' other negative affect during the interaction also suggests that about 5% the variance in anger can be explained by the main effect of preexisting anger; however, the main effect was marginal. Again, the main effect of implicit theories, the main effect of experimental condition, and the interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition were not significant.

Analyses of European American participants' positive mood revealed that the main effect of preexisting positive mood accounted for 13% of the variance in positive mood during the interaction. Although the main effect of experimental condition which include both comparison between the Prejudice vs. the No Information conditions and between the Egalitarian and the No Information conditions did not reach statistical significance ($\Delta R^2 = .06, p = 13.$), examination of the coefficients indicates that European American participants in the Prejudice condition was significantly different from those in the No Information condition, such that European American participants in the Prejudice condition felt more positive during the interaction, compared to European American participants in the No Information condition. Also, there were marginal differences between European American participants in the Egalitarian condition and those in the No Information condition, such that European American participants in the Egalitarian condition felt somewhat more positive relative to those in the No Information condition.

In addition, even though interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition with two comparison terms did not account for a significant variance in European American participants' positive mood ($\Delta R^2 = .05, p = .18$), the coefficients in the model suggest that there was a significant difference between the Egalitarian condition and the No Information condition, but not between the Prejudice condition and the No Information condition. As can be seen in Figure 4, the simple slopes for implicit theories at each level of condition indicated that, in the Egalitarian condition, the simple slope for implicit theories was significant and negative ($\beta = -.36, p = .04$), suggesting that European American participants whose partner held an incremental theory felt less positive during the interaction relative to their counterparts whose partner held an entity

theory, consistent with hypotheses. In contrast, in the Prejudice condition, the simple slope for implicit theories was negative but nonsignificant (β = -.06, p = .80), indicating that there is not relationship between African American participants' implicit theories and European American participants' positive mood. The simple slope for implicit theories in the No Information condition was also positive but nonsignificant (β = .17, p = .47).

European American Participants' Liking of Their Partner and Enjoyment of the Interaction

Table 30 presents the results of regression results for European American participants' reports on the degree to which they liked their partner during the interaction and how much they enjoyed the interaction. A hierarchical regression analysis revealed neither the main effect of experimental condition nor the main effect of implicit theories in predicting liking. However, the interaction of experimental condition and African American participants' implicit theories was significant, and it explained about 8% of variance in liking (see Figure 5). Examination of the simple slopes for implicit theory at each level of condition indicated that, in the Egalitarian condition, participants' liking of their African American partner was inversely related to implicit theory (β = -.36, p = .04). Thus, in the Egalitarian condition, European American participants whose partner held an incremental theory tended to express less liking of their partner compared to European American participants whose partner held an entity theory. On the other hand, the simple slope for implicit theory in the Prejudice condition was small, negative, and nonsignificant (β = -.13, p = .59). For the No Information condition, the simple slope was positive and was nonsignificant (β = .18, p = .46).

Next, moderating effects of African American participants' implicit theories on the relationship between their prejudice expectations and European American participants' enjoyment of the interaction were examined. The analyses revealed that about 8% of variance in enjoyment can be explained by African American participants' implicit theories. However, because the main effect of implicit theories became non-significant when interaction terms were added to the model, the main effect will not be further examined. There was no significant main effect of experimental condition when predicting European American participants' enjoyment of the interaction.

Although R^2 *change* was not significant ($\Delta R^2 = .06$, $p = .11$), examination of the parameter estimates indicate that there was a significant difference between the Egalitarian condition and the No Information condition, but not between the Prejudice condition and the No Information condition. Further examinations of simple slopes in Figure 6 revealed that, in the Egalitarian condition, implicit theories and enjoyment were strongly and negatively related ($\beta = -.57$, $p = .003$). Therefore, in the Egalitarian condition, European American participants whose partner was an incremental theorist tended to enjoy the interaction less than their counterparts whose partner was an entity theorist. In the Prejudice condition, African American participants' implicit theories and experimental condition were negatively, but significantly related ($\beta = -.14$, $p = .53$). The simple slope for enjoyment in the No Information was not significant ($\beta = .02$, $p = .94$).

Cognitive Resource Depletion

Table 31 presents the results of the moderated regression analyses predicting availability of African American participants' cognitive resources after the interaction. As can be seen in the table, cognitive depletion as measured by errors on the Stroop task,

cannot be explained by the main effect of implicit theories, the main effect of experimental condition, or the interaction between implicit theories and experimental condition.

Discussion

Two major research questions were addressed in this thesis. The first question examined how prejudice expectations influence low status group members' responses during intergroup interactions. The findings of the present study suggest that African Americans who expect to face prejudice during interracial interactions are less willing to interact with their partners and expect less positive interactions compared to African Americans who expect their interaction partners to be an egalitarian or who have no prior expectations regarding their interaction partners. Likewise, African Americans who expect their partner to be prejudiced apparently assume that their partner is less willing to interact with them. These results indicate that prejudice expectations worsen the interaction expectations of African Americans. However, there was no evidence that egalitarian expectations increased interaction expectations. The absence of results contrasting the Egalitarian condition to the No Information condition may have been a result of a manipulation failure, or it may reflect the possibility that African American individuals usually expect European American individuals to be non-prejudiced during interactions (at least within the psychology laboratory context).

Alternatively, it is also possible that African Americans believe that egalitarian attitudes displayed by European Americans are not genuine and are due to self-presentational concerns. If this is the case, the absence of results contrasting between the Egalitarian and No Information conditions might be due to African Americans' mistrust in European Americans' egalitarian attitudes. Indeed, Major, Kaiser, O'Brien, & McCoy (in press) have shown that, European Americans' egalitarian attitudes threaten ethnic minorities who endorse cultural world views that justify the current social hierarchy and

their socially devalued status. Therefore, some ethnic minorities are even motivated to deny European Americans' egalitarian attitudes in order to protect their cultural world beliefs. However, pilot study 3 indicated that there was little evidence of differences in believability of European Americans' racial attitudes across the experimental conditions, which suggests that egalitarian attitudes were perceived to be as believable as prejudiced attitudes. Future research should look at the mechanism underlying the null effects of egalitarian manipulation.

Even though African American participants who expected their partner to be prejudiced were the least willing to interact with their partner among the three experimental conditions, their reports of their own behavior indicated that they tried harder to change their partner's attitudes toward them than did African Americans who did not expect their partner to be prejudiced. Past research has shown that engaging in socially skillful behaviors facilitates positive mood and liking (Fuegen & Brehm, 2004; Mills, 1966; Yeakley, 1999). Although participants were not directly asked to explain their motives for enacting more socially skilled behavior, such behavior is consistent with the construct of compensatory behavior in which individuals actively try to change another person's attitudes (Shelton et al., 2005). That is, previous research operationalizes compensatory behaviors as better social skills and more likeability (Miller et al., 1995), or more selective self-disclosure (which can include counter-stereotypical self-presentation; see Kaiser & Miller, 2001; Steele & Aronson, 1995), lower feelings of authenticity, and more engagement during the interaction (Shelton et al., 2005). In a sense, any behaviors that are aimed at changing a partner's negative attitudes to positive

or neutral ones, regardless of its effectiveness and results, should be considered as compensatory behaviors.

This finding that low status group members who expected to face prejudice engaged in more compensatory behaviors compared to their counterparts who did not expect to face prejudice has interesting implications for previous research that has found that more prejudiced high status group members are perceived by low status group members to be more friendly than low prejudiced high status group members (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Trawalter, 2005; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004). These two sets of findings suggest that low status group members are more likely to engage in compensatory behaviors when they interact with low prejudiced high status group members (who are perceived to be prejudiced by low status group members) compared to when they interact with high prejudiced high status group members. As a result, low prejudice high status group members are more likely to like their low status group partners who engage in compensation and enjoy the interaction, compared to high prejudice high status group members, whose low status partners do not engage in compensatory behaviors. If this is the case, low status group members may end up reinforcing high status group members' attitudes toward them.

Although the present study did not find the effects of prejudice expectations on the amount of self-disclosure or intensity of engagement in the interaction unlike previous studies reported, the present findings are more consistent with the compensatory perspective (see Miller et al., 1995; Shelton et al., 2005) than with the avoidance perspective overall, which argues that low status group members tend to avoid intergroup interactions or approach the interactions in a disinterested manner when they expect to face prejudice (Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002; Pinel, 1999; 2002; Shelton & Richeson, 2006a; Swim & Hyers, 1999).

The second research question, which was the major focus of the present study, examined whether the effects of prejudice expectations on the intergroup interactions were moderated by an individual differences factor. Drawing upon the literature of implicit theories about human attributes (Dweck et al., 1995a; Chiu et al., 1997; Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy et al., 1999; Levy et al., 2001), it was hypothesized that low status group members who endorse an incremental theory would attempt to engage in compensatory behaviors to facilitate positive interactions when they expect to interact with a prejudiced partner, whereas low status group members who endorse an entity theory would approach the interaction in a disinterested manner. In contrast, when they expect their partner to have an egalitarian orientation, it was hypothesized that entity theorists would be particularly positive during the interaction compared to incremental theorists. Furthermore, because low status group members' behaviors during the interaction convey meaningful information to high status group members (Shelton & Richeson, 2006b; Shelton et al., 2005; Pinel, 2002), it was argued that high status group members' feelings toward their partner and interaction should correspond to those of African American participants.

Overall, there was little evidence that low status group members' implicit theories moderate the relationships between prejudice expectations and intergroup interactions, although there was one finding that was consistent with the hypotheses. When they expected to face prejudice, African American incremental theorists reported lower feelings of authenticity during the interaction, compared to African American entity theorists. However, again, none of the other measures of compensatory behaviors showed this effect. In addition, there were no interactions between implicit theories and

expectations of prejudice on African Americans' liking of their partners, enjoyment of the interactions, and observed behaviors. However, contrary to the hypotheses, African American incremental theorists were less willing to interact with their partners and expected less positive interactions, compared to African American entity theorists, when they expected to be the target of prejudice. Likewise, when they expected to face prejudice, African American incremental theorists assumed that their partner was less willing to interact with them and less likely to enjoy the interaction, relative to African American entity theorists.

It is surprising that entity theorists were more optimistic about the interaction they were about to engage in compared to incremental theorists, because previous studies have found that children who hold an entity theory expressed much less willingness to socialize with students with negative traits compared to children who hold an incremental theory (Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999). Perhaps the awareness of African American incremental theorists that they can make the interaction even worse depending on their performance during the interaction might have made them nervous and thus lowered expectations about the interaction. It is important to note that incremental theorists simply believe that people's characteristics can change (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy et al., 2001; Plaks et al., 2005). Therefore, holding an incremental theory does not necessarily mean that they always believe that people can *improve* negative characteristics, but it also means that they sometimes believe that people's negative characteristics can be further deteriorated. Therefore, in the case of prejudice expectations, African American incremental theorists may have thought that the interaction with their partner could go wrong if they behave in a certain way. Entity

theorists may not have the same issue, because they may have thought that their behavior, whether it is positive or negative, would have little impact on the nature of the interaction. Even though there was one item asking participants whether they were nervous about interacting with their partner, a one-item self-report measure of mood may not be a good measure to address this issue. In retrospect, the preinteraction survey should have included more mood items or, even better, a physiological anxiety measure might have been administered during the preinteraction survey to assess anxiety immediately prior to the interaction.

Notably (and consistent with hypotheses), African American participants' implicit theories predicted European American participants' experiences during the interaction, indicating that African Americans' expectations and behaviors play an important role in contributing to the quality of intergroup interactions. When African American participants expected to interact with an egalitarian, European American participants felt better during the interaction, liked their partner more, and enjoyed the interaction more, when their African American partner was an entity theorist compared to when their partner was an incremental theorist., This was the case even though the self-reported behaviors indicated that both entity and incremental theorists engaged in socially skillful behaviors to the same extent. In retrospect, it is possible that more sensitive and structured behavioral coding procedure might allow detection of actual behavioral differences between African American incremental and entity theorists. Taken together, it appears that African American participants' behaviors that were moderated by their implicit theories about human attributes do influence the experiences of European American participants during the interaction to some extent.

Finally, the current study failed to find the effects of compensatory behaviors on cognitive depletion. More specifically, it was hypothesized the because engagement in compensatory behaviors requires self-regulation and behavioral control, African American incremental theorists (who were predicted to engage in compensatory behaviors during the interactions) would have less cognitive resources left after the intergroup interactions , compared to African American entity theorists (who are predicted to approach the interactions in a disinterested manner). Failure to detect these effects might simply be due to the fact that incremental and entity theorists do not differ in their behaviors during intergroup interactions, as the current findings suggest. However, it is also possible that the null findings were due to the timing of the Stroop task. In this study, cognitive depletion was measured at the end of the study rather than immediately after the intergroup interaction. Previous studies that have examined the relationship between compensatory behaviors and cognitive depletion had participants complete the Stroop task right after they engaged in the intergroup interaction (Richeson & Trawalter, 2005; Richeson et al., 2005; Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Because the main focus of the present study was to assess low status group members' affect and behaviors during the interaction, the postinteraction survey was administered immediately after the interaction in order to ensure that participants would still have fresh memory about the interaction when they were completing the survey. It is plausible that the effect of intergroup interactions on cognitive resources disappeared by the time participants were finished completing the postinteraction survey.

Limitations and Future Directions

First, behavioral coding measures used in the present study suffered from low reliability. Previous research using many of the same measures showed considerably greater reliability (Shelton et al., 2005; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004), and so it may be that in the present study more reliable measures might be obtained by providing more structured instructions to coders (recall that the coders for this study were asked to code their first impressions). It will be important in the future to train coders on what to look for in order to rate each item, to examine inter-rater reliability as coding progresses, and to discuss and re-examine instructions and coding procedures if needed (Bartholomew, Henderson, & Marcia, 2000).

Second, implicit theories about human attributes were assessed with an individual difference approach. Even though the Implicit Person Theory measure has been found to have good reliability and discriminant validity (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a), it is possible that other variables that correlate with implicit theories might explain and/or complicate the findings reported in the present study. In fact, measures of Permeability, Sense of Control, and Optimism which were measured during the prescreening session were all positively correlated with Implicit Person Theory (r's = .19, .19, and .15, respectively; see Appendix A for items). It is conceivable that the inconsistent and counterintuitive findings in this research might have been affected by these other correlates of implicit theories. One way to address this possibility would be to manipulate individuals' implicit theories using a priming technique (Chiu et al., 1997; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan,1999; Hong et al., 2004; Levy et al., 1998) in order to examine causal directions.

Third, both African Americans and European Americans were naïve participants, because the present study tried to examine the effects of low status group members' implicit theories about human attributes in a real interracial interaction. It is possible that the true racial attitudes of European American participants influenced how African American participants behaved and felt during the interaction above and beyond the effects of implicit theories about human attributes. Such a supposition suggests, however, that the absence of significant findings implies that the uncontrolled factor of having naive European American participants increased the noise in the study, thereby reducing power. In the case of the present failures to find significant results, the problem was not so much driven by large error terms, but rather by small (or non-existent) mean or slope differences. One way to control for individual differences among European Americans is to use European American confederates, who are trained to act in a neutral manner, instead of actual, naïve participants. Using confederates could allow us to broaden the scope of the current research questions. For instance, if European American confederates are trained to behave in a prejudiced manner, the future study could examine how African Americans who differ in their implicit theories respond to partners whose behavior actually reflects their prejudiced (or egalitarian) attitudes.

Among the lessons that can be learned from the present study is the fact that although previous research has tended to focus on positive aspects of incremental theories about human attributes (Dweck, 1999; Dweck et al., 1995a; Dweck et al., 1995b; Chiu et al., 1997; Karafantis & Levy, 2004; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998; Levy et al., 2001), holding an incremental theory simply means that individuals tend to believe that human traits and characteristics are malleable (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a;

Levy et al., 2001; Plaks et al., 2005), and therefore traits can change in both positive and negative directions. Indeed, several implicit theory researchers, such as Levy and Plaks, have just started to systematically look at these ideas. Future work should also be mindful that low status group members' prejudice expectations may or may not differ from simply having negative interaction expectations that are not prejudice-related. It is important to examine whether prejudice expectations are unique and different from general negative expectations, because they might potentially have differential impact on low status group members' behavior. For instance, if low status group members expect that their partner is simply a jerk, they may tend to avoid interacting with that person regardless of their implicit theories because changing their unpleasant partner's attitudes is not their responsibility. In this case, negative interactions can be completely attributed to the partner. However, if their partner is a "racist jerk," the negative interaction might be due in part to the low status group members themselves because their social group membership causes their partner to act in negative ways (Crocker & Major, 1989; Major et al., 2003). In this case, low status group members may try to do something to change their partner's perceptions of their social groups. One way to examine this issue is to directly manipulate low status group members' expectations about their upcoming interactions without manipulating their beliefs about high status group members' attitudes. If manipulating prejudice expectations has different effects on behaviors during the interaction compared to interaction expectations, the current findings should be due to "prejudice expectation," not general interaction expectations.

Future research might also examine this issue by manipulating low and high status group members' interaction expectations. If low and high status group members who

expect to have negative interactions behave in a similar fashion as low status group members' who expect to face prejudice, the current findings would need to be interpreted as more general effects of expecting negative interactions. However, if high status group members do not show similar behaviors to low status group members, then the present findings might more clearly establish that low status group members' prejudice expectations have unique effects on the intergroup interactions.

Finally, the present study restricted its focus to implicit theories about human attributes. The study focused on this construct because it plays an important role in person perceptions and social interactions. However, it is important to identify other possible moderating factors, such as prior experience, levels of extraversion, and significance of intergroup interactions, on the relationship between prejudice expectations and intergroup interactions in the future studies. Also, the future research should examine the effects of prejudice expectations on intergroup interactions in more naturalistic situations. In the laboratory settings, everyone is forced into an intergroup interaction regardless of their desire, whereas individuals have choices in many cases whether they engage in intergroup interactions or not in everyday lives. Thus, laboratory settings do not allow us to examine who tends to self-select into intergroup interactions. For example, Mendoza-Denton et al. (2002) and Shelton and Richeson (2006b) used diary methods to examine the relationship between prejudice expectations and real-life intergroup interactions and indeed found that low status group members who expected to face prejudice actually had fewer intergroup interactions compared to their counterparts who did not expect to face prejudice. When naturalistic settings are used, it is important for the future studies to examine when, who, and under what circumstances low status

group tend to avoid the interaction all together. Indeed, researchers have recently started to look at individual difference factors such as racial identity, gender, social dominance beliefs, racial attitudes, prior interracial friendships, and demographic backgrounds, that influence how low status group members experience and respond to prejudice and discrimination, (Levin, van Laar, & Sidanius, 2003; Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2003; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003). Future studies should further examine other individual difference factors that might influence whether low status group members approach or avoid intergroup interactions. For instance, it is possible that when the intergroup interactions have significant personal meanings and important future implications for low status group members (e.g., boss and subordinate relationship, roommate relationship), low status group members might be less apt to avoid the interactions regardless of their individual differences. On the other hand, when there is no future implication with avoiding intergroup interactions, individual differences among low status group members should matter in terms of predicting who will avoid/approach the intergroup interactions. In sum, in order to fully understand the relationship between prejudice expectations and intergroup interactions, it is critical for the future research to identify different moderators and employ different methods.

Conclusions

The present study provided relatively little evidence that low status group members' implicit theories about human attributes moderate what they expect about the intergroup interaction, how they feel during the interaction, and how their partner feels during the interaction, when they expect to face prejudice. As has been discussed, the sparse findings may reflect a number of methodological or conceptual issues. Although implicit theories may not be a key moderator, it is important for researchers to continue the search for variables that explain when intergroup interactions have positive effects and when they do not. The present study contributes to a better understanding of the effects of prejudice expectations on intergroup interaction, by pointing to the benefits and importance of identifying individual differences factors that further explain who, when, and under what circumstances individuals were more likely to approach or avoid intergroup interactions.

Footnotes

1. According to Hong et al. (2004), although the vast majority of Hong Kong residents are ethnic Chinese, Hong Kong people in general view themselves as a part of economically successfully developed Asia and view residents of Mainland China as a part of relatively less developed region. As a result, many Hong Kong people have maligned Mainland Chinese people with negative stereotypes.

2. Because there were not enough African American participants in the Psychology Subject Pool, some of the African American students were recruited from the larger campus community and offered monetary compensation (i.e., $10). Only African American and European American participants were recruited for this study.

3. Two European American students did not complete the prescreening questionnaires, because they were recruited in the Psychology Building during session time as pinch-hitters when both signed-up European American participants did not show up.

4. Past research (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy et al., 1998) has shown that implicit theories are independent of several theoretically related constructs [i.e., Attributional Complexity (Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986), Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), Personal Need for Structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981), and Conservatism and Liberalism (Keringer, 1984)].

5. In order to replicate existing findings and to explore other potentially important predictors of responses during intergroup interactions, participants also completed a number of theoretically relevant measures, such as: attitudes towards African Americans and European Americans, optimism, rejection sensitivity, self-esteem, Stigma

Consciousness-Race, and ethnic identification. These measures were of secondary interest and are thus not discussed further in this proposal.

6. At the beginning of the semester, experimenters visited dormitories and cafeterias on MSU campus and briefly explained the nature of the study (i.e., cover story) to African American students and asked if they were interested in being contacted later to schedule a session appointment. If African American participants expressed interest in the study, experimenters asked them to fill out a waiting list form and to leave their first name, telephone number, gender, race, and email address.

7. Score 90, 65, 80, 90 were chosen for "White Americans," "Lawyers," "Doctors," and "Teachers" respectively in the information packet. These scores were based on the actual average scores collected in a pilot study except score 90 for White Americans. Although the average score for White Americans were about 81, Score 90 was chosen because some African American participants might feel odd when they see their European American partner expressed more positive attitudes toward African Americans than toward one's own social group. In order to make it more believable for all African American participants, score 90 was chosen.

8. Scores for Self-Esteem and Mood items were actual average scores obtained from the data collected in several previous studies.

9. The psychical distance was assessed using closest points on the two chairs.

10. All participants agreed and signed a video release form.

11. Even thought previous research suggests that sad and blue are meaningfully different from anger related negative emotions (i.e., anger, irritated; see Major et al., 2003; Russel, 1980) and should be included in Positive Affect after being reversed coded (Major,

Kaiser, & MaCoy, 2003), the present data suggest that sad and blue better fit to other negative affect items such as angry, threatened, and irritated than to positive affect items (i.e., happy, confident). An inter-item reliability of four items (i.e., happy, confident, sad reversed, and blue reversed) was .52. A confirmatory principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation reveled that sad and blue (which are loaded on the same factor) are loaded on a different factor from happy and confident (which are loaded on the same factor). Therefore, depression related negative affect items were classified as Other Negative Affect in the present study based on the data.

12. The lowest Stroop latency was 298 ms; therefore, there was no observation dropped due to Stroop latencies less than 200 ms. For African American participants, the number of total observations was 6911. Among those, 194 observations were deleted due to false responses. In addition, 91 observations were deleted because Stroop latencies were greater than 3 standard deviations above means (one observation was deleted from 35 participants, two observations were deleted from nine participants, and three observations were deleted from three participants.). Therefore, the final number of observation resulted in 6646. For European American participants, the number of total observations was 6915 and 53 observations were deleted due to false responses. In addition, based on the criteria for identifying outliers, 91 observations were deleted (one observation was deleted from 36 participants, two observations were deleted from 21 participants, and three observations were deleted from four participants). Due to technical failure, one African American participant's Stroop data were lost during data collection.

13. Interrater reliability among three independent coders for each observed behavioral measure was calculated using the following Intraclass Correlation (ICC):

$$ICC = MS_A - MS_{S:A} / MS_A + (k-1)MS_{S:A}$$

14. High Interrater reliability of sociability in addition to low reliability of other behavioral measures is consistent with findings of social relations model research that the only variable that people agree on when rating first impressions is extroversion (Kenny, Albright, Malloy, & Kashy, 1994; Kenny, Horner, Kashy, & Chu, 1992). This might also explain why Global Positive Regard and Global Responsiveness had some interrater reliability and why these scales correlated so highly with sociability measure.

15. Although suspicious participants might have systematically differentially influenced their partners during the interaction, compared to non-suspicious participants, their partner's data were not excluded from the analyses this paper because all the analyses independently treat African American and European American participants' data.

16. Tables for the results using different dummy-coding (the Prejudice condition as reference) were provided in Appendix U.

17. Because African American participants' implicit theories systematically differed across the three conditions (i.e., there were more entity theorists in the Prejudice condition compared to the Egalitarian and No Information conditions), test of main effects of the two variables were conducted by controlling for one another. In order to test the main effect of implicit theories controlling for the experimental condition, main effect of experimental condition was entered into Step 1, and main effect of implicit theories was entered into Step 2. By the same token, in order to test the main effect of experimental condition controlling for implicit theories, main effect of implicit theories was entered into Step 1, and main effect of experimental condition was entered into Step 2.

18. Prejudice expectations of "Before," "During," and "After" the interaction were measured during the manipulation check.

19. Because egalitarian manipulation check items which assess egalitarian expectations at different time points were not successful, only prejudice expectations over time were examined.

APPENDICES

Table 1. *Frequency and Percentage for Each Scale Point of the Feeling Thermometer Assessing Evaluations of African Americans.*

Scale Point	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	2	.9	.9
10	1	.4	1.3
20	0	.4	1.3
30	2	.9	2.1
40	18	7.7	9.8
50	48	20.4	30.2
60	13	5.5	35.7
70	29	12.3	48.1
80	47	20.0	68.1
90	39	16.6	84.7
100	36	15.3	100.0

$N = 225$

Table 2. *Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean Differences of All Measured Variables across the Entire Sample of 146 Participants*

	Overall		African American		European American		
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*
t1 Implicit Theories	2.97	.99	2.89	1.02	3.04	.95	-.91
t1 Anxiety	1.59	.93	1.46	1.18	1.73	1.23	-1.33
t1 Other Negative Affect	1.08	1.21	.76	.93	1.42	1.07	-3.97***
t1 Positive Affect	3.69	1.05	3.60	1.18	3.78	1.11	-.95
t1 Self-Esteem	4.58	1.15	4.84	.86	4.31	.94	3.55***
Preinter Expect - Self	3.87	.89	3.86	1.00	3.85	.77	.30
Preinter Expect - Partner	3.30	1.03	3.30	1.25	3.31	.75	-.08
Socially Skillful Behav.	4.03	.71	3.90	.76	4.15	.65	-2.12*
Changing Attitudes	1.09	1.26	1.22	1.50	.95	.95	1.29
Physical Distance	45.69	11.10	45.69	11.10	--	--	--
Anxiety	1.85	1.07	1.89	.89	1.81	1.23	.42
Other Negative Affect	.30	.50	.33	.53	.27	.48	.73
Positive Affect	4.29	.92	4.34	.91	4.25	.94	.58
Authenticity	4.99	.96	5.01	.91	4.97	1.02	.30
Liking	5.04	.80	4.99	.82	5.10	.79	-.79
Enjoyment	4.97	.86	4.99	.83	4.95	.89	.32
Self-Esteem	5.12	.73	5.28	.62	4.96	.81	2.70**
Partner's Liking	4.35	.82	4.47	.88	4.24	.75	1.68+
Partner's Enjoyment	4.23	.91	4.33	.97	4.13	.85	1.33

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$.

Table 3. *Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean Differences of All Measured Variables by Experimental Condition and Race*

	Prejudice Condition				Egalitarian Condition				No Information Condition			
	African Americans		European Americans		African Americans		European Americans		African Americans		European Americans	
	(*N* =)		(*N* =)		(*N* =)		(*N* =)		(*N* =)		(*N* =)	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Preinter Expect - Self	3.46	1.03	4.00	.87	4.26	.92	3.72	.77	4.05	.80	3.81	.62
Preinter Expect - Partner	2.84	1.47	3.46	.72	3.75	1.07	3.10	.68	3.34	.88	3.37	.85
Socially Skillful Behaviors	3.90	.62	4.29	.69	3.92	.91	4.08	.63	3.88	.76	4.03	.60
Changing Attitudes	1.84	2.03	1.02	.93	.92	1.02	.83	1.10	.72	.61	1.03	.75
Physical Distance	47.27	11.40	--	--	43.08	10.86	--	--	46.97	10.96	--	--
Anxiety	1.87	.89	1.73	1.20	1.74	1.00	1.75	1.25	2.12	.73	2.03	1.31
Other Negative Affect	.46	.68	.24	.50	.18	.33	.32	.43	.35	.46	.26	.53
Positive Affect	4.36	.91	4.50	.94	4.42	.95	4.25	1.00	4.18	.90	3.87	.74
Authenticity	4.96	1.06	5.11	.83	5.17	.82	4.98	1.24	4.87	.78	4.74	.95
Liking	4.77	.87	5.17	.69	5.23	.73	5.09	.84	4.98	.79	5.00	.90
Enjoyment	4.86	.80	5.06	.75	5.14	.85	5.00	.96	4.98	.85	4.70	.97
Self-Esteem	5.32	.57	5.33	.52	5.33	.66	4.76	.98	5.16	.65	4.71	.73
Partner's Liking	4.35	.85	4.44	.80	4.56	.91	4.10	.68	4.51	.92	4.12	.75
Partner's Enjoyment	4.23	.86	4.42	.84	4.41	1.08	3.96	.84	4.30	.99	3.95	.82

Table 4. *Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean Differences of Behavioral Measures across the Entire Sample of 146 Participants*

	Overall		African American		European American		
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*T*
Stereotype	.21	.33	.31	.38	.10	.22	3.98***
Global Positive Regard	3.58	.67	3.26	.68	3.60	.67	-.35
Global Responsiveness	1.73	.97	2.08	.75	1.34	1.04	4.70***
Self-Disclosure	3.18	.81	3.03	.78	3.33	.81	-2.27*
Anxiety	1.04	.76	1.02	.81	1.06	.72	-.31
Irritability	.53	.62	.45	.53	.61	.69	-1.64+
Sociability	3.61	1.08	3.59	1.03	3.63	1.14	-.24

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$.

Table 5. *Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean Differences of All Behavioral Measures by Experimental Condition and Race*

	Prejudice Condition				Egalitarian Condition				No Information Condition			
	African Americans		European Americans		African Americans		European Americans		African Americans		European Americans	
	(*N* =)		(*N* =)		(*N* =)		(*N* =)		(*N* =)		(*N* =)	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Stereotype	.26	.37	.12	.26	.26	.33	.10	.19	.46	.43	.09	.22
Global Positive Regard	3.29	.80	3.48	.98	2.98	.71	3.40	.58	2.71	.76	3.00	.74
Global Responsiveness	3.77	.66	3.72	.66	3.57	.62	3.69	.63	3.25	.68	3.32	.71
Self-Disclosure	2.21	.76	1.49	.90	2.12	.68	1.43	1.33	1.84	.81	1.15	.76
Anxiety	.88	.61	.99	.64	.85	.76	.96	.55	1.46	.98	1.30	.95
Irritability	.32	.41	.57	.68	.41	.53	.50	.59	.68	.63	.84	.82
Sociability	3.88	1.00	3.61	1.16	3.58	1.00	3.86	1.08	3.18	1.04	3.35	1.19

Table 6. *Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum Scores, and Maximum Scores of Stroop Interference Score for the Entire Sample of 145 Participants*

	M	*SD*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
Raw Score	139.02	102.64	-36.09	542.03
Log-Transformed Score	--	.0974	-.0495	.4962

Note. Stroop interference scores were calculated by subtracting mean transformed RTs for the control trials from mean transformed RTs for the incongruent trials. Higher scores represent greater Stroop interference (i.e., more cognitive resource depletion).

Table 7. *Correlations among Variables Measured during Prescreening for All Participants*

	1	2	3	4
1. t1 Implicit Theories	--			
2. t1 Anxiety	-.01	--		
3. t1 Other Negative Affect	-.06	.60**	--	
4. t1 Positive Affect	.07	-.40**	-.35**	--
5. t1 Self-Esteem	.09	-.41**	-.54**	.42**

Note. ** indicates $p < .01$. $N = 146$.

Table 8. *Correlations among Self-Report Measures for All Participants*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Preinter Exp.- Self	--					
2. Preinter Exp.- Partner	.70***	--				
3. Socially Skillful Beh.	.31***	.11	--			
4. Changing attitudes	-.15+	-.06	.04	--		
5. Physical Distance(†)	-.32**	-.24*	-.10	.03	--	
6. Anxiety	-.13	-.14+	-.11	.23**	.20+	--
7. Other Neg. Affect	-.29***	-.22**	-.17*	.43***	.00	.28***
8. Positive Affect	.41***	.30***	.43***	-.11	-.21+	-.47***
9. Authenticity	.29***	.26**	.21**	-.37***	-.00	-.38***
10. Self-Esteem	.36***	.31***	.18*	-.17*	-.16	-.37***
11. Liking	.39***	.28***	.39***	-.31***	-.13	-.20*
12. Enjoyment	.43***	.28***	.41***	-.26**	-.19	-.26**
13. Partner's Liking	.45***	.39***	.38***	-.21**	-.24*	-.32***
14. Partner's Enjoyment	.48***	.34***	.39***	-.20*	-.22+	-.34***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 146$. (†) Because physical distance was measured for each interaction pair, $N = 70$.

Table 8 cont. *Correlations among Self-Report Measures for All Participants*

	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Preinter Exp.- Self							
2. Preinter Exp.- Partner							
3. Socially Skillful Beh.							
4. Changing attitudes							
5. Physical Distance(†)							
6. Anxiety							
7. Other Neg. Affect	--						
8. Positive Affect	-.23**	--					
9. Authenticity	-.38***	.41***	--				
10. Self-Esteem	-.31***	.43***	.31***	--			
11. Liking	-.50***	.41***	.54***	.19*	--		
12. Enjoyment	-.45***	.53***	.57***	.26***	.89***	--	
13. Partner's Liking	-.33***	.57***	.43***	.42***	.65***	.37***	--
14. Partner's Enjoyment	-.30***	.59***	.41***	.41***	.64***	.69***	.93***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 146$. (†) Because physical distance was measured for each interaction pair, $N = 70$.

Table 9. *Correlations among Self-Report Measures for African American Participants in the Prejudice Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Preinter Exp.- Self	--												
2. Preinter Exp.- Partner	.72***	--											
3. Socially Skillful Beh.	.42*	.15	--										
4. Changing attitudes	-.00	.04	.26	--									
5. Physical Distance (†)	-.34+	-.37+	-.20	-.05	--								
6. Anxiety	-.21	-.26	.00	.39*	.48*	--							
7. Other Negative Affect	-.11	-.19	.10	.56**	-.08	.50**	--						
8. Positive Affect	.14	.09	.56**	.11	-.03	-.23	.16	--					
9. Authenticity	.41*	.39*	-.05	-.18	-.05	-.31	-.50**	.01	--				
10. Self-Esteem	.34+	.31	-.02	-.23	-.20	-.55**	-.47*	.05	.47*	--			
11. Liking	.42*	.36+	.21	-.35+	.08	-.27	-.56**	.06	.46*	.16	--		
12. Enjoyment	.39*	.28	.38*	-.21	.05	-.22	-.51**	.14	.39*	.14	.91***	--	
13. Partner's Liking	.39*	.45*	.28	-.27	-.07	-.17	-.24	.21	.25	.22	.56**	.58**	--
14. Partner's Enjoyment	.47*	.37+	.38*	-.28	-.07	-.21	-.22	.25	.24	.18	.61**	.68***	.93***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 28$. (†) $N = 26$ missing data.

Table 10. *Correlations among Self-Report Measures for African American Participants in the Egalitarian Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Preinter Exp.- Self	--												
2. Preinter Exp.- Partner	.59**	--											
3. Socially Skillful Beh.	.07	-.38+	--										
4. Changing attitudes	-.00	-.01	.24	--									
5. Physical Distance (†)	-.36+	-.12	.01	.21	--								
6. Anxiety	-.14	-.18	.16	.34+	-.04	--							
7. Other Negative Affect	-.13	-.13	-.16	.14	-.00	-.11	--						
8. Positive Affect	.72***	.47*	.26	-.09	-.33	-.14	-.31	--					
9. Authenticity	.14	.29	.06	-.37+	-.01	-.06	-.46*	.39*	--				
10. Self-Esteem	.45*	.22	.04	-.38+	-.13	-.35+	-.29	.31	.15	--			
11. Liking	.38+	.12	.28	.15	-.12	.10	-.46*	.64***	.37	.13	--		
12. Enjoyment	.57**	.30	.30	.22	-.27	.17	-.30	.73***	.27	.08	.89***	--	
13. Partner's Liking	.53**	.33+	.17	.02	-.30	-.15	-.26	.79***	.36+	.12	.76***	.80***	--
14. Partner's Enjoyment	.64***	.38+	.19	.01	-.27	-.16	-.26	.82***	.30	.14	.70***	.80***	.96***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 26$. (†) $N = 25$ due to missing data.

Table 11. *Correlations among Self-Report Measures for African American Participants in the No Information Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Preinter Exp.- Self	--												
2. Preinter Exp.- Partner	.57*	--											
3. Socially Skillful Beh.	.50*	.54*	--										
4. Changing attitudes	-.25	-.14	-.35	--									
5. Physical Distance	-.09	.06	-.16	-.15	--								
6. Anxiety	.40	.17	-.09	.34	.09	--							
7. Other Negative Affect	-.57*	-.39+	-.26	.38	.01	-.04	--						
8. Positive Affect	.35	.27	.47*	-.15	-.29	-.35	-.44+	--					
9. Authenticity	.11	.27	.50*	-.55*	.21	-.49*	-.22	.45*	--				
10. Self-Esteem	.34	.56*	.52*	-.47*	-.11	-.19	-.36	.56*	.21	--			
11. Liking	.46*	.42+	.78***	-.51*	-.34	.00	-.44+	.50*	.39+	.54*	--		
12. Enjoyment	.49*	.38	.75***	-.60**	-.34	-.03	-.48*	.40+	.39+	.53*	.95***	--	
13. Partner's Liking	.35	.40+	.84***	-.39+	-.35	-.24	-.30	.62**	.32	.70**	.82***	.78***	--
14. Partner's Enjoyment	.29	.34	.75***	-.45+	-.30	-.36	-.30	.62**	.38	.66**	.78***	.77***	.97***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 19$

Table 12. *Correlations among Self-Report Measures for European American Participants in the Prejudice Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Preinter Exp.- Self	--											
2. Preinter Exp.- Partner	.78***	--										
3. Socially Skillful Beh.	.45*	.46*	--									
4. Changing attitudes	-.12	.11	-.10	--								
5. Anxiety	-.02	-.11	-.29	.07	--							
6. Other Negative Affect	-.39*	-.17	-.19	.34+	.40*	--						
7. Positive Affect	.34+	.36+	.67***	-.24	-.70***	-.44*	--					
8. Authenticity	.26	.08	.35+	-.51**	-.34+	-.42*	.54**	--				
9. Self-Esteem	.04	.08	.33+	-.37+	-.59**	-.46*	.56**	.54**	--			
10. Liking	.25	.04	.38*	-.60**	-.30	-.55**	.50**	.77***	.49**	--		
11. Enjoyment	.31	.10	.41*	-.54**	-.33+	-.57**	.57**	.70***	.47*	.92***	--	
12. Partner's Liking	.50**	.33+	.51**	-.33+	-.60**	-.65***	.78***	.71***	.62***	.61**	.62***	--
13. Partner's Enjoyment	.55**	.32+	.54**	-.25	-.49**	-.60**	.78***	.62***	.45*	.61**	.62***	.89***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 28$

Table 13. *Correlations among Self-Report Measures for European American Participants in the Egalitarian Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Preinter Exp.- Self	--											
2. Preinter Exp.- Partner	.67***	--										
3. Socially Skillful Beh.	.37+	.24	--									
4. Changing attitudes	-.33+	-.14	-.01	--								
5. Anxiety	-.38+	-.41*	-.08	.28	--							
6. Other Negative Affect	-.26	-.09	-.20	.41*	.36+	--						
7. Positive Affect	.82***	.79***	.28	-.50**	-.64***	-.38*	--					
8. Authenticity	.35+	.28	.13	-.80***	-.57**	-.24	.62**	--				
9. Self-Esteem	.60**	.51**	.29	-.22	-.25	-.28	.59**	.24	--			
10. Liking	.36+	.21	.39*	-.31	-.39*	-.41*	.52**	.49**	.08	--		
11. Enjoyment	.45*	.44*	.33+	-.57**	-.62**	-.37+	.73***	.72***	.28	.83***	--	
12. Partner's Liking	.38+	.20	.40*	-.33	-.49*	-.38+	.56**	.53**	.39*	.78***	.71***	--
13. Partner's Enjoyment	.39*	.09	.39*	-.37+	-.46*	-.37+	.48*	.48*	.36+	.75***	.71***	.88***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 26$

Table 14. *Correlations among Self-Report Measures for European American Participants in the No Information Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Preinter Exp.- Self	--											
2. Preinter Exp.- Partner	.72***	--										
3. Socially Skillful Beh.	.27	.14	--									
4. Changing attitudes	-.25	-.21	-.39+	--								
5. Anxiety	-.23	.10	-.39+	.20	--							
6. Other Negative Affect	-.38	-.14	-.51*	.34	.22	--						
7. Positive Affect	.08	.04	.42+	-.27	-.64**	-.29	--					
8. Authenticity	.34	.09	.69***	-.26	-.41+	-.45*	.44+	--				
9. Self-Esteem	.52*	.56*	.18	-.11	-.47*	-.26	.33	.21	--			
10. Liking	.33	.31	.48*	-.23	-.12	-.45+	.35	.83***	.10	--		
11. Enjoyment	.37	.20	.51*	-.12	-.35	-.48*	.46*	.83***	.14	.72***	--	
12. Partner's Liking	.49*	.57**	.38	-.30	-.29	-.21	.38	.55*	.55*	.56*	.55*	--
13. Partner's Enjoyment	.55*	.59**	.28	-.25	-.41+	-.14	.42+	.54*	.70***	.53*	.56*	.93***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 19$

Table 15. *Correlations among Behavioral Measures for All Participants*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Stereotype	--					
2. Global Positive Regard	.01	--				
3. Global Responsiveness	.21*	.55**	--			
4. Self-Disclosure	-.04	.87**	.49**	--		
5. Anxiety	-.05	-.57**	-.42**	-.54**	--	
6. Irritability	.07	.90**	.54**	.85**	-.62**	--
7. Sociability	-.08	-.71**	-.45**	-.69**	.68**	-.74**

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 146$

Table 16. *Correlations among Behavioral Measures for African American Participants in the Prejudice Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Stereotype	--					
2. Global Positive Regard	.24	--				
3. Global Responsiveness	.20	.87***	--			
4. Self-Disclosure	.40*	.83***	.77***	--		
5. Anxiety	-.21	-.33+	-.38*	-.30	--	
6. Irritability	-.32+	-.72***	-.72***	-.60***	.20	--
7. Sociability	.29	.88***	.88***	.84***	-.42*	-.71***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 28$

Table 17. *Correlations among Behavioral Measures for African American Participants in the Egalitarian Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Stereotype	--					
2. Global Positive Regard	-.26	--				
3. Global Responsiveness	-.31	.92***	--			
4. Self-Disclosure	-.11	.80***	.82***	--		
5. Anxiety	-.10	-.45*	-.42*	-.65***	--	
6. Irritability	.13	-.76***	-.69***	-.66***	.53**	--
7. Sociability	-.02	.92***	.89***	.87***	-.58***	-.84***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 26$

Table 18. *Correlations among Behavioral Measures for African American Participants in the No Information Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Stereotype	--					
2. Global Positive Regard	.09	--				
3. Global Responsiveness	.21	.89***	--			
4. Self-Disclosure	.20	.81***	.88***	--		
5. Anxiety	-.05	-.69***	-.63**	-.69***	--	
6. Irritability	-.11	-.79***	-.65**	-.75***	.80***	--
7. Sociability	.21	.92***	.93***	.92***	-.69***	-.75***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 19$

Table 19. *Correlations among Behavioral Measures for European American Participants in the Prejudice Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Stereotype	--					
2. Global Positive Regard	.06	--				
3. Global Responsiveness	.04	.91***	--			
4. Self-Disclosure	.34+	.54**	.57***	--		
5. Anxiety	.12	-.75***	-.67***	-.40*	--	
6. Irritability	.07	-.89***	-.82***	-.37*	-.89***	--
7. Sociability	.09	.88***	.91***	.53**	.88***	-.84***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 28$

Table 20. *Correlations among Behavioral Measures for European American Participants in the Egalitarian Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Stereotype	--					
2. Global Positive Regard	.16	--				
3. Global Responsiveness	.18	.80***	--			
4. Self-Disclosure	-.10	.46*	.35+	--		
5. Anxiety	-.10	-.33+	-.44*	-.28	--	
6. Irritability	-.07	-.52**	-.60***	-.23	.59***	--
7. Sociability	.22	.82***	.87***	.30	-.47*	-.61***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 26$

Table 21. *Correlations among Behavioral Measures for European American Participants in the No Information Condition*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Stereotype	--					
2. Global Positive Regard	-.07	--				
3. Global Responsiveness	.03	.87***	--			
4. Self-Disclosure	-.02	.52*	.50*	--		
5. Anxiety	-.30	-.63**	-.72***	-.49*	--	
6. Irritability	-.23	-.65**	-.76***	-.36	.86***	--
7. Sociability	.23	.81***	.93***	.49*	-.81***	-.74***

Note. + indicates marginal significance at $p < .10$; * indicates significance at the $p < .05$ level, ** indicates $p < .01$, and *** indicates $p < .001$. $N = 19$

Table 22. *Effects of Prejudice Expectation Manipulations on African American Participants' Perception of Their Partner as either a Racist or an Egalitarian*

Predictor	Racist			Egalitarian			Positive toward African American		
	B	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	.65			.89			3.85		
Prejudice vs. No Information (PvN)	3.28***	.79***		2.10***	.53***		-.83+	-.25	
Egalitarian vs. No Information (EvN)	-.07	-.02	.61***	.86	.22	.21**	1.27**	.39**	.27***
Implicit Theories	-.15	-.08	.00	.02	.01	.01	-.04	-.03	.05*
PvN by Implicit Theories	.41	.11		.06	.02		-.41	-.13	
EvN by Implicit Theories	-.06	-.02	.00	-.52	-.19	.02	-.51	-.22	.02

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Table 23. *Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Preinteraction Expectations*

Predictor	Preinteraction Expectations - Self			Preinteraction Expectations - Partner		
	b	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	4.02			3.33		
Prejudice vs. No Information (PvN)	-.91**	-.44**		-1.16**	-.42**	
Egalitarian vs. No Information (EvN)	.20	.10	.14**	.28	.11	.11*
Implicit Theories	.22	.23	.00	.10	.08	.00
PvN by Implicit Theories	-.79*	-.41*		-1.07**	-.42**	
EvN by Implicit Theories	-.14	-.10	.09*	.47	.25	.19**

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Table 24. *Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Behaviors during the Interaction*

Predictor	Socially Skillful Behaviors			Changing Attitudes			Physical Distance		
	b	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2
Intercept	3.92			.71			47.03		
Prejudice vs. No Information (PvN)	-.09	-.06		1.37**	.43**		.59	.02	
Egalitarian vs. No Information (EvN)	.00	.00	.01	.20	.07	.14**	-4.84	-.21	.04
Implicit Theories	-.27	-.38	.09*	.01	.01	.00	-1.39	-.13	.00
PvN by Implicit Theories	.12	.08		.06	.02		1.26	.05	
EvN by Implicit Theories	.03	.02	.00	.10	.04	.00	1.62	.10	.00

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Table 25. *Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Emotions during the Interaction*

Predictor	Anxiety			Other Negative Affect			Positive Mood		
	b	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	1.85			.28			4.01		
Initial Emotions	.15	.21	.04	.11	.19	.02	.05	.06	.00
Prejudice vs. No Information (PvN)	.04	.02		.21	.19		.11	.06	
Egalitarian vs. No Information (EvN)	-.34	-.19	.04	-.17	-.16	.06	.22	.12	.01
Implicit Theories	.25	.29	.05	-.10	-.19	.00	.01	.01	.00
PvN by Implicit Theories	.01	.01		.22	.22		-.09	-.05	
EvN by Implicit Theories	-.09	-.07	.00	.07	.09	.02	.03	.02	.00

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Table 26. *Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Feelings of Authenticity and Self-Esteem during the Interaction*

Predictor	Authenticity			Self-Esteem		
	b	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2
Intercept	4.91			3.03		
Initial Self-Esteem	--	--	--	.47***	.65***	.44***
Prejudice vs. No Info. (PvN)	-.19	-.10		-.18	-.14	
Egalitarian vs. No Info. (EvN)	.20	.11	.03	.03	.02	.01
Implicit Theories	-.27	-.32	.02	-.01	-.02	.01
PvN by Implicit Theories	-.31	-.18		-.15	-.12	
EvN by Implicit Theories	.45+	.35	.12*	.00	.00	.01

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Table 27. *Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on One's Own Liking of Their Partner and Enjoyment of the Interaction and Perceptions of Their Partner's Liking and Enjoyment*

Predictor	Liking			Enjoyment			Partner's Liking			Partner's Enjoyment		
	b	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	4.99			4.99			4.53			4.32		
Prejudice vs. No Info. (PvN)	-.27	-.17		-.16	-.09		-.45	-.24		-.24	-.12	
Egalitarian vs. No Info. (EvN)	.20	.13	.04	.09	.06	.01	.01	.00	.03	.09	.04	.01
Implicit Theories	-.02	-.02	.01	-.02	-.03	.00	-.17	-.20	.02	-.16	-.17	.03
PvN by Implicit Theories	-.33	-.23		-.26	-.17		-.26	-.15		-.23	-.12	
EvN by Implicit Theories	.06	.05	.04	.11	.10	.03	.19	.15	.04	.09	.07	.02

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Table 28. *Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Observed Behaviors during the Interaction for African American Participants*

Predictor	Global Positive Regard			Global Responsiveness			Sociability		
	b	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2
Intercept	2.84			3.30			3.26		
Prejudice vs. No Information (PvN)	.54**	.33**		.44**	.33**		.48*	.22*	
Egalitarian vs. No Information (EvN)	.35*	.21*	.07**	.33*	.24*	.08**	.46*	.21**	.04*
Implicit Theories	-.08	-.09	.00	-.20	-.29	.01	-.38+	-.34+	.01
PvN by Implicit Theories	.07	.05		.11	.10		.31	.16	
EvN by Implicit Theories	.03	.03	.00	.18	.15	.01	.38	.24	.02

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Table 29. *Effects of African American Participants' Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on European American Participants' Emotions during the Interaction*

Predictor	Anxiety			Other Negative Affect			Positive Mood		
	b	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	3.55			.10			4.22		
Initial Emotions	-.43**	-.32**	.12**	.08	.22	.05+	-.29**	-.33**	.13**
Prejudice vs. No Information (PvN)	-.02	-.01		.08	.07		.60*	.31*	
Egalitarian vs. No Information (EvN)	-.27	-.11	.01	.03	.03	.00	.56+	.29+	.06
African American Partner's IT	.11	.09	.02	-.13	-.27	.00	.17	.19	.02
PvN by Implicit Theories	-.25	-.11		.15	.17		-.23	-.13	
EvN by Implicit Theories	.27	.15	.03	.20	.29	.03	-.51+	-.38+	.05

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Table 30. *Effects of African American Participants' Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on European American Participants' Liking of Their Partner and Enjoyment of the Interaction*

Predictor	Liking			Enjoyment		
	b	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2
Intercept	4.92			4.64		
Prejudice vs. No Information (PvN)	.20	.12		.36	.19	
Egalitarian vs. No Information (EvN)	.24	.15	.01	.45	.24	.02
Implicit Theories	.14	.18		.02	.02	
			.04			.08*
PvN by Implicit Theories	-.24	-.17		-.14	-.09	
EvN by Implicit Theories	-.54*	-.46*		-.51*	-.39*	
			.08+			.06

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Table 31. *Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Availability of African American Participants' Cognitive Resources*

Predictor	Stroop Interference Score		
	b	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	.18		
Prejudice vs. No Information (PvN)	-.03	-.12	
Egalitarian vs. No Information (EvN)	-.06+	-.29+	
			.06
Implicit Theories	-.02	-.16	
			.03
PvN by Implicit Theories	-.03	-.13	
EvN by Implicit Theories	.01	-.03	
			.01

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Figure 1. *African American Participants' Preinteraction Expectations - Self*



Figure 2. *African American Participants' Preinteraction Expectations - Partner*



Figure 3. *African American Participants' Feelings of Authenticity*



Figure 4. *European American Participants' Positive Mood during the Interaction*



Figure 5. *European American Participants' Liking of Their Partner*



Figure 6. *European American Participants' Enjoyment of the Interaction*



Appendix A. *Pilot Study 2 Materials*

For the following questions, please select the number that best represents your beliefs using the scale provided below.

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree

1. _____ The kind of person someone is is something very basic about them and it can't be changed very much.
2. _____ People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't really be changed.
3. _____ Everyone, no matter who they are, can significantly change their basic characteristics.
4. _____ As much as I hate to admit it, you can't teach an old dog new tricks. People can't really change their deepest attributes.
5. _____ People can always substantially change the kind of person they are.
6. _____ Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change that.
7. _____ No matter what kind of person someone is, they can always change very much.
8. _____ All people can change even their most basic qualities.

Please imagine that a White MSU student was asked to rate his/her feelings about some of the different groups in the United States, using a scale from 0 to 100 (see below). He/she was instructed that the higher the number, the warmer or more favorable he/she feels toward that group. The lower the number, the colder or less favorable he/she feels. If he/she feels neither warm nor cold toward them, he/she would rate that group a 50.

The followings are the student's ratings about some of the different groups.

40	African Americans
90	European/White Americans
65	Lawyers
80	Doctors
90	Teachers

9. What do you think of the White MSU student's attitude towards **African Americans**?

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6
Very Prejudiced Average Very Egalitarian

10. Do you think the student is being honest about his/her attitude towards African Americans?

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6
Very Dishonest Very Honest

11. Do you think his rating of African Americans is believable?

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6

Very Unbelievable Very Believable

Please imagine that another White student rated each group as followed.

90	African Americans
90	European/White Americans
65	Lawyers
80	Doctors
90	Teachers

12. What do you think of the White MSU student's attitude towards **African Americans**?

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6

Very Prejudiced Average Very Egalitarian

13. Do you think the student is being honest about his/her attitude towards African Americans?

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6

Very Dishonest Very Honest

14. Do you think his rating of African Americans is believable?

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6

Very Unbelievable Very Believable

Please imagine that another White student rated each group as followed.

70	African Americans
90	European/White Americans
65	Lawyers
80	Doctors
90	Teachers

15. What do you think of the White MSU student's attitude towards **African Americans**?

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6

Very Prejudiced Average Very Egalitarian

16. Do you think the student is being honest about his/her attitude towards African Americans?

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6

Very Dishonest Very Honest

17. Do you think his rating of African Americans is believable?

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6
Very Unbelievable Very Believable

18. Please imagine that an average White MSU student was asked to rate his/her feelings about some of the different groups in the United States, using a scale from 0 to 100. What do you think this average White MSU student would rate African Americans on the scale?

0—5—10—15—20—25—30—35—40—45—50—55—60—65—70—75—80—85—90—95—100
Very Cold Neither Warm Nor Cold Very Warm

19. Your Gender: ____ Male _____ Female

20. Your Race: _____ African American _____ Asian American
_____ Latino American _____ Native American
_____ White American _____ International Student
_____ Multiracial/Other (Please specify here: _____)

For the following questions, please select the number that best represents your beliefs using the scale provided below.

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree

21. _____ Overall, my racial group membership has very little to do with how I feel about myself.
22. _____ The racial group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.
23. _____ The racial group I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.
24. _____ In general, belonging to my racial group is an important part of my self-image.

Appendix B. *Independent Variables (Online Prescreening Questionnaires)*

Instructions: Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of the following statements is true for you. There are no right or wrong answers for any question

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

Implicit Theories

1. The kind of person someone is is something very basic about them and it can't be changed very much.

2. People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't really be changed.

3. Everyone, no matter who they are, can significantly change their basic characteristics.

4. As much as I hate to admit it, you can't teach an old dog new tricks. People can't really change their deepest attributes.

5. People can always substantially change the kind of person they are.

6. Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change that.

7. No matter what kind of person someone is, they can always change very much.

8. All people can change even their most basic qualities.

Racial Identity

9. Overall, my racial group membership has very little to do with how I feel about myself.

10. The racial group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.

11. The racial group I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.

12. In general, belonging to my racial group is an important part of my self-image.

Justice Beliefs

Belief in Just World

12. I feel that the world treats people fairly.

13. I feel that people get what they deserve.

14. I feel that people treat each other fairly in life.

15. I feel that people earn the punishments and rewards they get.

16. I feel that people treat each other with the respect that they deserve.

17. I feel that people get what they are entitled to have.

18. I feel that a person's efforts are noticed and rewarded.

19. I feel that when people meet with misfortune, they have brought it upon themselves.

Protestant Work Ethic

20. Most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system: they really have only themselves to blame.

21. In America, getting ahead doesn't always depend on hard work.

22. Even if people work hard, they don't always get ahead.

23. In America, individuals who are strongly motivated to succeed usually get ahead.

Permeability

24. America is an open society where all individuals can achieve higher status.

25. Advancement in American society is possible for all individuals.

26. Individual members of certain groups have difficulty achieving higher status.

27. Individual members of certain groups are often unable to advance in American society.

Legitimacy

28. American is a just society where differences in status between groups reflect actual group differences.

29. Differences in status between groups in American society are fair.

30. Differences in status between groups in American society are the result of injustice.

31. It is unfair that certain groups in America have poorer living conditions than other groups.

Control

32. I have little control over the things that happen to me.

33. There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have.

34. There is little that I can do to change many of the important things in my life.

35. I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life.

36. Sometimes I feel that I'm being pushed around in life.

37. What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me.

38. I can do just about anything I really set my mind to.

Rosenberg Self-Esteem

39. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.

40. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

41. All in all, I am inclined to think I am a failure.

42. I am able to do things as well as most people.

43. I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.

44. I take a positive attitude toward myself.

45. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

46. I wish I could have more respect for myself.

47. I certainly feel useless at times.

48. At times, I think I am no good at all.

Mood

49. Right now, I feel ANXIOUS.

50. Right now, I feel CALM.

51. Right now, I feel ANGRY.

52. Right now, I feel SAD.

53. Right now, I feel CONFIDENT.

54. Right now, I feel BLUE.

55. Right now, I feel NERVOUS.

56. Right now, I feel RELAXED.

57. Right now, I feel THREATENED.

58. Right now, I feel UNEASY.

59. Right now, I feel HAPPY.

60. Right now, I feel IRRITATED.

Stigma Consciousness (Race)

61. Stereotypes about my racial group have not affected me personally.

62. I never worry that my behaviors will be viewed as stereotypical of my racial group.

63. When interacting with members of other racial groups, I feel like they interpret all my behaviors in terms of the fact that I'm a member of my racial group.

64. Most members of other racial groups do not judge members of my racial group on the basis of their race.

65. Being a member of my racial group does not influence how people of other races act with me.

66. I almost never think about the fact that I am a member of my racial group when I interact with members of other racial groups.

67. My being a member of my racial group does not influence how people act with me.

68. Most members of other racial groups have a lot more racist thoughts about my racial group than they actually express.

69. I often think that members of other racial groups are unfairly accused of being racist towards my racial group.

70. Most members of other racial groups have a problem viewing my racial group as equals.

Optimism

71. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.

72. If something can go wrong for me, it will.

73. I'm always optimistic about my future.

74. I hardly ever expect things to go my way.

75. I rarely count on good things happening to me.

76. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad things.

Racial Attitudes/Feeling Thermometer

These next questions are about your feelings about some of the different groups in the United States. Please rate the group on a thermometer that runs from zero (0) to one hundred (100). The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward that group. The lower the number, the colder or less favorable you feel toward that group. If you feel neither warm nor cold toward that group, rate it a fifty.

0—5—10—15—20—25—30—35—40—45—50—55—60—65—70—75—80—85—90—95—100		
Very Cold	Neither Warm Nor Cold	Very Warm

77. African Americans/Blacks

78. Asian Americans

79. Latino Americans/Hispanics

80. Native Americans

81. Whites/European Americans

82. Teenagers

83. Muslim Americans

84. Christians

85. Lawyers

86. Doctors

87. Teachers

88. Immigrants

Rejection Sensitivity

Please use the FIRST scale for question 1,3,5,7,9, and 11 and the SECOND scale for question 2,4,6,8,10, and 12 to rate the extent to which each of the following statements is true for you.

There are no right or wrong answers for any question

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6	
Very Unconcerned	Very Concerned

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6	
Very Unlikely	Very Likely

89. Please imagine that you ask someone you don't know well out on a date. How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not the person would want to go out with you? (very unconcerned/very concerned)

90. Please imagine that you ask someone you don't know well out on a date. How much would you expect that the person would want to go out on a date with you? (very unlikely/very likely)

91. Please imagine that you go to a party and notice someone on the other side of the room, and you try to initiate a conversation. How concerned would you be over whether or not the person would want to talk with you? (very unconcerned/very concerned)

92. Please imagine that you go to a party and notice someone on the other side of the room, and you try to initiate a conversation. How much would you expect that he/she would want to talk with you? (very unlikely/very likely)

93. Please imagine that you ask someone in one of your classes to coffee. How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not the person would want to go? (very unconcerned/very concerned)

94. Please imagine that you ask someone in one of your classes to coffee. How much would you expect that he/she would want to go with you? (very unlikely/very likely)

95. Please imagine that you ask your friend to go on vacation with you over Spring Break. How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not your friend would want to go with you? (very unconcerned/very concerned)

96. Please imagine that you ask your friend to go on vacation with you over Spring Break. How much would you expect that he/she would want to go with you? (very unlikely/very likely)

97. Please imagine that you ask a friend if you can borrow something of his/hers. How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not your friend would want to loan it to you? (very unconcerned/very concerned)

98. Please imagine that you ask a friend if you can borrow something of his/hers. How much would you expect that he/she would willingly loan it to you? (very unlikely/very likely)

99. Please imagine that you ask a friend to do you a big favor. How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not your friend would want to help you out? (very unconcerned/very concerned)

100. Please imagine that you ask a friend to do you a big favor. How much would you expect that he/she would willingly agree to help you out? (very unlikely/very likely)

101. Gender

102. Age

103. Race

104. Identification Number (birth month + birth date + the last two digits of phone number + the initial of first name)

Appendix C. *Manipulation Materials*

Below is the information about your interaction partner. Please review it for a few minutes.

Demographic Information

Participant's ID	030891
Your gender	Male
Your race	White

RSE

Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of the following statements is true for you. There are no right or wrong answers for any question

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

I am able to do things as well as most people.	4
I wish I could have more respect for myself.	2
I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.	1
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.	5
I take a positive attitude toward myself.	5
I certainly feel useless at times.	2

Mood

Please rate your CURRENT mood using the same 0 (strongly disagree) - 6 (strongly agree) scale provided above.

Right now, I feel CALM.	4
Right now, I feel ANGRY.	1
Right now, I feel SAD.	1
Right now, I feel CONFIDENT.	4
Right now, I feel BLUE.	1
Right now, I feel NERVOUS.	1
Right now, I feel RELAXED.	3
Right now, I feel HAPPY.	4

Below is the information about your interaction partner. Please review it for a few minutes.

Demographic Information

Participant's ID	030891
Your gender	Female
Your race	White

RSE

Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of the following statements is true for you. There are no right or wrong answers for any question

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

I am able to do things as well as most people.	4
I wish I could have more respect for myself.	2
I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.	1
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.	5
I take a positive attitude toward myself.	5
I certainly feel useless at times.	2

Mood

Please rate your CURRENT mood using the same 0 (strongly disagree) - 6 (strongly agree) scale provided above.

Right now, I feel CALM.	4
Right now, I feel ANGRY.	1
Right now, I feel SAD.	1
Right now, I feel CONFIDENT.	4
Right now, I feel BLUE.	1
Right now, I feel NERVOUS.	1
Right now, I feel RELAXED.	3
Right now, I feel HAPPY.	4

Attitudes/Feeling Thermometer

These next questions are about your feelings about some of the different groups in the United States. Please rate the group on a thermometer that runs from zero (0) to one hundred (100). The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward that group. The lower the number, the colder or less favorable you feel toward that group. If you feel neither warm nor cold toward that group, rate it a fifty (50).

0—5—10—15—20—25—30—35—40—45—50—55—60—65—70—75—80—85—90—95—100

Very Cold — Neither Warm Nor Cold — Very Warm

African Americans	40
Doctors	80
Lawyers	65
Teachers	90
White Americans	90

Attitudes/Feeling Thermometer

These next questions are about your feelings about some of the different groups in the United States. Please rate the group on a thermometer that runs from zero (0) to one hundred (100). The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward that group. The lower the number, the colder or less favorable you feel toward that group. If you feel neither warm nor cold toward that group, rate it a fifty (50).

0—5—10—15—20—25—30—35—40—45—50—55—60—65—70—75—80—85—90—95—100

Very Cold — Neither Warm Nor Cold — Very Warm

African Americans	90
Doctors	80
Lawyers	65
Teachers	90
White Americans	90

Appendix D. *Dependent Variables (Self-Report Pretinteraction Questionnaire)*

Instructions: For the following questions, please use the scale provided below. Do not spend too much time on any one question; we are looking for your first, natural, "gut" response.

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

1. _____ I am looking forward to meeting my partner.

2. _____ I am nervous about interacting with my partner.

3. _____ I think I will enjoy interacting with my partner.

4. _____ I would prefer to work with a different partner.

5. _____ I am excited about the interaction with my partner.

6. _____ I do not want to interact with my partner.

7. _____ I think my partner will enjoy interacting with me.

8. _____ I think my partner will be excited about interacting with me.

Appendix E. *Dependent Variables (Self-Report Postinteraction Questionnaire)*

For the following questions, please use the scale provided below. Do not spend too much time on any one question; we are looking for your first, natural, "gut" response.

0----------1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

DURING THE INTERACTION:

1. _____ I was ANXIOUS.

2. _____ I was CALM.

3. _____ I was ANGRY.

4. _____ I was SAD.

5. _____ I was CONFIDENT.

6. _____ I was BLUE.

7. _____ I was NERVOUS.

8. _____ I was RELAXED.

9. _____ I was THREATENED.

10. _____ I was UNEASY.

11. _____ I was HAPPY.

12. _____ I was IRRITATED.

13. _____ I had to change myself to fit in with my partner.

14. _____ It was easy to express my true attitudes and feelings.

15. _____ I tried to get my partner to like me.

16. _____ I tried to change my partner's beliefs about me.

17. _____ I tried to make the interaction go smoothly.

18. _____ I tried to make the interaction enjoyable for myself.

19. _____ I tried to make the interaction enjoyable for my partner.

20. _____ I tried to change my partner's assumptions about who I am.

21. _____ I tried to act socially skillful.

22. _____ I put a lot of effort into making the interaction go well.

23. _____ I disengaged or withdraw from my partner.

24. _____ I did not put much effort into making the interaction go well.

25. _____ I tried to get my partner to understand who I really am.

26. _____ I liked my partner.

27. _____ I would enjoy interacting with my partner again in the future.

28. _____ My partner is a nice person.

29. _____ I enjoyed getting to know my partner.

30. _____ I enjoyed the interaction with my partner.

31. _____ I had a good time during the interaction.

32. _____ During the interaction, I frequently elaborated on my thoughts about the topics.

33. _____ I was very involved during the interaction.

34. _____ I revealed a lot about myself to my partner.

35. _____ I think my partner enjoyed the interaction with me.

36. _____ I think my partner liked me.

37. _____ I think my partner would enjoy interacting with me again in the future.

38. _____ I think my partner enjoyed getting to know me.

39. _____ I think my partner had a good time during the interaction.

40. _____ I think my partner thinks I am a nice person.

41. _____ Right now, I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.

42. _____ Right now, I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

43. _____ Right now, I am inclined to think I am a failure.

44. _____ Right now, I am able to do things as well as most people.

45. _____ Right now, I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.

46. _____ Right now, I take a positive attitude toward myself.

47. _____ Right now, I am satisfied with myself.

48. _____ Right now, I wish I could have more respect for myself.

49. _____ Right now, I certainly feel useless at times.

50. _____ Right now, I think I am no good at all.

Appendix F. *Dependent Variables (Nonverbal and Verbal Behaviors Coding Measures)*

Please provide your opinions about the participant using the scale provided below.

0 ---------- 1 ---------- 2 ---------- 3 ---------- 4 ---------- 5 ---------- 6
Not at All Extremely

1. The participant looked comfortable during the interaction.

2. The participant was interested in his/her partner.

3. The participant looked anxious during the interaction.

4. The participant seemed unpleasant during the interaction.

5. The participant appeared engaged in the conversation.

6. The participant looked angry during the interaction.

7. The participant was interested in getting to know his/her partner.

8. The participant looked nervous during the interaction.

9. The participant was responsive to his/her partner.

10. The participant appeared annoyed during the interaction.

11. The participant was sociable.

12. The participant was friendly to his/her partner.

13. The participant was attentive to his/her partner.

14. The participant was irritated during the interaction.

15. The participant appeared to be having fun with his/her partner.

16. The participant was uneasy during the interaction.

17. The participant elaborated on her/his thoughts and feelings.

18. The participant's comments were intimate/personal.

19. The participant talked during the interaction.

20. The participant self-disclosed to his/her partner.

21. The participant liked his/her partner.

22. The participant tried to spark conversation.

23. The participant was authentic during the interaction.

24. The participant was socially skillful.

25. The participant asked his/her partner questions about themselves.

26. The participant tried to act in racially non-stereotypic manner during the interaction.

27. The participant displayed stereotypical behavior associated with his/her racial group.

28. The participant tried to dispel negative stereotypes associated with his/her racial group.

29. I learned about the participant from this interaction.

30. Please rate the extent to which the participant leaned toward his/her partner.

0 ---------- 1 ---------- 2 ---------- 3 ---------- 4 ---------- 5 ---------- 6
Body leaned away from partner Body leaned forward toward partner

31. What did the participant do with his/her arms during the interaction?

0 ---------- 1 ---------- 2 ---------- 3 ---------- 4 ---------- 5 ---------- 6
Arms crossed a lot Arms open and/or inviting

34. Please rate the extent to which the participant smiled during the interaction.

0 ---------- 1 ---------- 2 ---------- 3 ---------- 4 ---------- 5 ---------- 6
Did not smile at all Smiled a lot

Appendix G. *Manipulation Check Sheet (Only for African American Participants)*

Please select a number that best represents your feelings about your interaction partner. Please do not spend too much time on any one question. We are simply interested in your first, natural, "gut" response.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

1. _____ BEFORE the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was prejudiced toward Blacks.
2. _____ BEFORE the interaction, I thought my interaction partner held egalitarian attitudes toward Blacks.
3. _____ BEFORE the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was neither a racist nor an egalitarian.
4. _____ DURING the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was prejudiced toward Blacks.
5. _____ DURING the interaction, I thought my interaction partner held egalitarian attitudes toward Blacks.
6. _____ DURING the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was neither a racist nor an egalitarian.
7. _____ AFTER the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was prejudiced toward Blacks.
8. _____ AFTER the interaction, I thought my interaction partner held egalitarian attitudes toward Blacks.
9. _____ AFTER the interaction, I thought my interaction partner was neither a racist nor an egalitarian.

The following two questions are about your partner's attitudes toward different social groups. Please respond by using the same scale provided above.

10. _____ According to the information I received before the interaction, my partner expressed positive attitudes toward Blacks.
11. _____ According to the information I received before the interaction, my partner expressed positive attitudes toward Whites.

Appendix H. *Suspicion Check Sheet*

1. In a sentence or two, please describe your thoughts about the purpose of today's study.

_____

_____

_____

2. At what point during the study did this idea occur to you?

_____

_____

3. Did anything about this study seem unusual or strange? At what point in the study did you notice these things?

_____

_____

_____

4. What is your birth month?

____ January ____ February ____ March ____ April ____ May

____ June ____ July ____ August ____ September ____ October

____ November ____ December

5. What is your birth date (from 1-31)? ___ ___

6. Think of the 7 digits of your phone number. What are the last two digits of your phone number? ___ ___

7. What letter does your first name start with (A-Z)? _____

Appendix I. *Consent Form for the Online Prescreening Questionnaires*

Online Questionnaire

Informed Consent Statement

These questionnaires are part of a research study being conducted by Dr. Cheryl Kaiser, a faculty member in the Department of Psychology. Participation in this study involves completing several surveys about yourself, including your thoughts, attitudes, and feelings. It should take approximately 10 minutes to complete these surveys. When you are done with these surveys, you will sign up for a laboratory session. Your participation is voluntary and you may choose to withdraw at any point without penalty. In order to protect your confidentiality, you will provide the following unique number (Birth Month and date, Last two digits of phone number,
First Initial), rather than your name to identify your data. Furthermore, your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law.

If you have questions about the study, contact Cheryl Kaiser, Ph.D., or Nao Hagiwara, a graduate student, Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-5324, e-mail: ssplab@msu.edu. In case you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to contact Ashir Kumar, MD, Michigan State University's Chair of University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects by phone: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, email: <ucrihs@msu.edu>, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. Dr. Kumar may be contacted anonymously if you wish.

You indicate your voluntary agreement by completing and submitting this questionnaire.

Appendix J. *Consent Form for the Serial Cognition Study (For Research Credit)*

Informed Consent Form — Serial Cognition

In this serial cognition experiment, we are interested in understanding how performing one cognitive task influences performance on a subsequent cognitive task. In this study, your first cognitive task will involve reading and summarizing an article, and the second cognitive task will involve completing a computerized color-matching task. There will be a 15-20 minute delay between these tasks, so that we can examine whether delays are important in understanding the serial cognition process.

The entire study will take about 45 minutes to complete. You will receive 2 research credits for your participation. Your participation is greatly appreciated, and is voluntary. Because this is a research study, participation may involve experiences that produce short-term changes in your thoughts or emotions. If you wish to discontinue your participation at any time, you have to right to do so without penalty or loss of compensation. Also, you have the right to request that your responses not be used in the data analyses.

This experiment is confidential and your consent form will be stored in a separate place from your responses. In order to protect your confidentiality, the last five digits of your PID, rather than your name will identify your data. To help us protect your confidentiality, please do not write your name or any other identifying information on anything but this consent form. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law.

At the conclusion of this research the experimenter will provide a thorough explanation of the study. It is our goal that you learn about the research you participated in today. Furthermore, the experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you have about the research.

Cheryl Kaiser, a professor in the Department of Psychology, and Nao Hagiwara, a graduate student in the Department of Psychology, are conducting this scientific study. If you have questions about the study, contact Cheryl Kaiser or Nao Hagiwara, Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-5324, e-mail: ssplab@msu.edu. In case you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to contact Peter Vasilenko, Ph.D., Director of Human Research Protections, (517)355-2180, fax (517)432-4503, e-mail irb@msu.edu, mail 202 Olds Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1047. Dr. Vasilenko may be contact anonymously if you wish.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary consent to participate in this research.

_____	_____	_____
Name (please print)	Signature	Date

Appendix K. *Consent Form for the Serial Cognition Study (For Monetary Compensation)*

Informed Consent Form --- Serial Cognition

In this serial cognition experiment, we are interested in understanding how performing one cognitive task influences performance on a subsequent cognitive task. In this study, your first cognitive task will involve reading and summarizing an article, and the second cognitive task will involve completing a computerized color-matching task. There will be a 15-20 minute delay between these tasks, so that we can examine whether delays are important in understanding the serial cognition process.

The entire study will take about 45 minutes to complete. You will receive $10 for your participation. Your participation is greatly appreciated, and is voluntary. Because this is a research study, participation may involve experiences that produce short-term changes in your thoughts or emotions. If you wish to discontinue your participation at any time, you have to right to do so without penalty or loss of compensation. Also, you have the right to request that your responses not be used in the data analyses.

This experiment is confidential and your consent form will be stored in a separate place from your responses. In order to protect your confidentiality, the last five digits of your PID, rather than your name will identify your data. To help us protect your confidentiality, please do not write your name or any other identifying information on anything but this consent form. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law.

At the conclusion of this research the experimenter will provide a thorough explanation of the study. It is our goal that you learn about the research you participated in today. Furthermore, the experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you have about the research.

Cheryl Kaiser, a professor in the Department of Psychology, and Nao Hagiwara, a graduate student in the Department of Psychology, are conducting this scientific study. If you have questions about the study, contact Cheryl Kaiser or Nao Hagiwara, Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-5324, e-mail: ssplab@msu.edu. In case you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to contact Dr. Peter Vasilenko, Michigan State University's Chair of University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects by phone: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, email: <ucrihs@msu.edu>, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. Dr. Vasilenko may be contact anonymously if you wish.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary consent to participate in this research.

_____	_____	_____
Name (please print)	Signature	Date

Appendix L. *Consent Form for the Impression Formation Study (For African American Participants)*

Informed Consent Form

Impression Formation---"Receiver Condition"

This study examines the psychology of impression formation. In this study, you will be paired up with another research participant and the two of you will engage in a ten-minute semi-structured videotaped interpersonal interaction. In order to further understand the impression formation process, you and your partner will complete two short surveys regarding the interaction. Additionally, in order to further understand the impression formation process, one member of the pair will be randomly assigned to have information that he or she had previously provided on a subject pool online questionnaire presented to his or her partner. You have been randomly assigned to receive information from your partner. However, your partner does not know that you will have access to that he or she previously provided. This informational disclosure will help us better understand processes that contribute to impression formation. After the study is completed, trained members of the research team will examine the videotapes, with the goal of better understanding how people react during brief interpersonal interactions.

This study will take about 15 minutes to complete. Your participation is greatly appreciated, and is voluntary. If you wish to discontinue your participation at any time, you have to right to do so without penalty or loss of research credits. Also, you have the right to request that your questionnaire responses not be used in the data analyses and that your videotape be destroyed.

This experiment is confidential and your consent form will be stored in a separate place from your questionnaire. In order to protect your confidentiality, the last five digits of your PID, rather than your name will identify your data. To help us protect your confidentiality, please do not write your name, full PID, or any other identifying information on anything but this consent form. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law.

At the conclusion of this study, the experimenter will further explain this study. It is our goal that you learn about the research study you participated in today. Furthermore, the experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you have about the research.

Cheryl Kaiser, a faculty member in the Department of Psychology, and her graduate students are conducting this scientific study. If you have questions about the study, contact Cheryl Kaiser, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-8691, e-mail: *kaiserc6@msu.edu.* In case you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to contact Dr. Peter Vasilenko, Michigan State University's Chair of University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects by phone: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, email: <ucrihs@msu.edu>, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. Dr. Vasilenko may be contact anonymously if you wish.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary consent to participate in this research.

Signature	Name (Please Print)	Date

Please provide your signature below if you agree to let us videotape your interaction during the experiment.

Signature	Name (Please Print)	Date

Appendix M. *Consent Form for the Impression Formation Study (For European American Participants)*

Informed Consent Form

Impression Formation

This study examines the psychology of impression formation. In this study, you will be paired up with another research participant and the two of you will engage in a ten-minute semi-structured videotaped interpersonal interaction. Additionally, in order to further understand the impression formation process, you will complete a short survey regarding the interaction and your interaction partner. After the study is completed, trained members of the research team will examine the videotapes, with the goal of better understanding how people react during brief interpersonal interactions.

This study will take about 15 minutes to complete. Your participation is greatly appreciated, and is voluntary. If you wish to discontinue your participation at any time, you have to right to do so without penalty or loss of research credits. Also, you have the right to request that your questionnaire responses not be used in the data analyses and that your videotape be destroyed.

This experiment is confidential and your consent form will be stored in a separate place from your questionnaire. In order to protect your confidentiality, the last five digits of your PID, rather than your name will identify your data. To help us protect your confidentiality, please do not write your name, full PID, or any other identifying information on anything but this consent form. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law.

At the conclusion of this study, the experimenter will further explain this study. It is our goal that you learn about the research study you participated in today. Furthermore, the experimenter will be happy to answer any questions you have about the research.

Cheryl Kaiser, a faculty member in the Department of Psychology, and her graduate students are conducting this scientific study. If you have questions about the study, contact Cheryl Kaiser, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-8691, e-mail: *kaiserc6@msu.edu.* In case you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to contact Dr. Peter Vasilenko, Michigan State University's Chair of University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects by phone: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, email: <ucrihs@msu.edu>, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. Dr. Vasilenko may be contact anonymously if you wish.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary consent to participate in this research.

Signature	Name (Please Print)	Date

Please provide your signature below if you agree to let us videotape your interaction during the experiment.

Signature	Name (Please Print)	Date

Appendix N. *Video Release Form*

Video Release Form

Serial Cognition

We would like your permission to have undergraduate research assistants in Dr. Cheryl Kaiser's laboratory in the Department of Psychology at Michigan State University watch your videotape. Your name will not be attached to your videotape, and the research assistants are well-trained in matters of confidentiality and research ethics. When the research assistants watch the videotapes, they will be attempting to provide impressions of the mood states experienced by individuals in these tapes. This type of behavioral coding is very important for scientific reasons, because it helps to provide a second type of data that is useful in understanding how people respond in the experimental situation.

Again, for confidentiality reasons, your video will be identified by the last five digits of your PID, rather than your name and your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowed by law. Additionally, the experimenter will be happy to answer any additional questions you have about this procedure. Finally, you are free to decline permission for your videotape to be used in this coding procedure. If you decline to have your tape analyzed, it will be destroyed immediately.

If you have further questions about the study, contact Cheryl Kaiser, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-8691, e-mail: *ssplab@msu.edu*. In case you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to contact Dr. Peter Vasilenko, Michigan State University's Chair of University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects by phone: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, email: <ucrihs@msu.edu>, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. Dr. Vasilenko may be contact anonymously if you wish.

Your signature below indicates your voluntary consent to have your videotape examined by research assistants in Dr. Cheryl Kaiser's laboratory.

_____	_____	_____
Signature	Name (Please Print)	Date

Appendix O. *Debriefing Sheet*

Debriefing --- Serial Cognition

Thank you for participating in this study. In our laboratory, we are interested in the psychology of intergroup relations. In this study, we are investigating what happens when people expect to be the target of prejudice and how this might be influenced by people's beliefs about the stability of human traits. Previous studies have shown that some people believe human characteristics are fixed and cannot be changed and that others believe human characteristics are flexible and easy to change. Prior to today's session, you have completed a survey on the Psychology Subject Pool Web Page which measures these beliefs. In this study, we are examining how beliefs about the stability of human characteristics, especially those endorsed by low status group members, influence the manner in which individuals respond during interracial interactions.

In this study, you were told that you were completing two cognitive tasks that were separated by a delay task (a social interaction). In actuality, all three of these tasks were part of the same study. Our primary interest concerns the second and third tasks. Half of you were told that you received information about your partner, and the other half of you did not get any information. Those who received information about your partner actually received bogus information. Some of you received information indicating that your partner held negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities, while other people received information indicating that your partner held positive attitudes toward minorities, and the rest of you received no information about your partner's racial attitudes. However, in actuality, this information was not provided by your partner at all. Instead, the experimenter provided you with false information about your partner's attitudes. We falsely conveyed racial attitudes in order to manipulate one participant's expectations of being the target of prejudice. Thus, participants who were told that their partner is a racist would be more likely to expect to be the target of prejudice compared to other people who were either told that their partner is an egalitarian or were not given any information.

Past research has shown that people who believe that human traits are fixed respond particularly negatively toward individuals with negative traits and particularly positively toward individuals with positive traits, compared to people who believe that human traits are flexible. Thus, our prediction is that people who expect to interact with a racist, and who also believe that human traits are fixed, will react negatively toward their interaction partner and approach the interaction in a disinterested manner. In contrast, people who believe that human traits are flexible might think that even people's undesirable characteristics (i.e., racist attitudes) can be improved, and they might try to facilitate the interaction with a partner who was portrayed as a racist by engaging in socially skillful behaviors. On the other hand, when expecting to interact with an egalitarian, people who believe that human traits are fixed might react more positively toward their interaction partner and approach the interaction in a constructive manner more so than people who believe that human traits are flexible, because they are more apt to respond particularly

positively toward individuals with positive traits (i.e., egalitarian attitudes). Because individuals' behavior usually reciprocally influences each other's responses in interactions, it is also predicted that these racial attitude expectations would result in different experiences and reactions for both partners during the interaction. More specifically, if your partner responds negatively toward you, you might respond negatively in return (and vice versa if your partner responds positively toward you).

In addition, we are also interested in how different reactions to prejudice influence people's cognitive capacity. The past research has shown that when people engage in a task that requires lots of effort, they have less cognitive resources for subsequent cognitive tasks. The third computerized task you completed today examines this research question. Because engaging in socially skillful behaviors requires self-regulation and effort, we predict that people who believe people's traits are malleable will perform particularly poorly on the color-naming computerized task after the interaction with a racist partner, because those individuals might have put in extra effort to have a smooth interaction.

We apologize for not disclosing all of the study information to you earlier. If we had told you about the false racial attitude information, it might have affected the way you responded, and the data would not have been valid. In social psychological experiments, we sometimes employ deception when it is necessary to test meaningful scientific questions. That is, though we do not enjoy using deception, we do use it when the scientific question we are investigating cannot be answered without it. We believe that understanding the psychological processes underlying prejudice expectations is one of those important scientific inquiries. By understanding questions like this, our research can help to make significant contributions towards important social issues, like prejudice and discrimination. In other words, by participating in this study, you have made very important contributions to science. Finally, it is important not to feel duped or tricked by the deception in this study. We put a great deal of effort into making these deceptions believable to undergraduates, and we expected that undergraduates would indeed believe our cover story.

Thank you again for taking part in this study. Your participation is extremely valuable in helping us make progress in the scientific study of intergroup relationships. We believe that it is important to understand why and under what circumstances perceiving prejudice affects intergroup behavior. The knowledge gained through studies such as this can help to better understand the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral consequences of perceiving discrimination. Again, this research mission would not be possible without your assistance.

Finally, you have the right to withdraw your data from this study without incurring any costs. If you would like to do this, please inform the person conducting the study. Additionally, if you would like more information about research on discrimination or have further questions about the study, please feel free to contact Dr. Cheryl Kaiser at Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, phone: 517-353-8691, e-mail: kaiserc6@msu.edu.

Appendix P. *Experimenter 1's Script (For Serial Cognition)*

Set up:

"Serial Cognition" --- 1st and 3rd parts of the study

- Experimenter should dress in casual clothing
- Attendance Sheet: We will have a Log Sheet with participants' names; take attendance before you start the experiment.
- Experimental Material: welcome sign on the door, consent forms (2 for each participant), one-page reading sheet (filler cognitive task), debriefing sheets, pencils, and watch.

Prior to meeting participants:

- Place the welcome sign on the door to 65 and 83. (It is in a black binder like all other signs.)
- Double-check the participants' information before you greet them.
- Place two consent forms for serial cognition and two pencils before participants come in.
- Do not let students start their session early.
- Sessions for African American students will be scheduled 3 minutes earlier than those for White students.
- African American students will be told to come to Room65 and wait for an experimenter to pick them up, whereas White students will be told to come to Room83.
- Have participants wait in the hall until session starts. Experimenter 1 greets the participants at the scheduled time and say **"Are you here for the "Serial Cognition" study? Thanks so much for coming in."** (If African American students are not present, wait for a few more minutes by telling White students: "I am currently setting up a room for the session, and it will take a few more minutes." If African American students have not shown up by this time, White students will complete Social Perception)

- Greet a Black student first and bring him/her to a cubicle and start giving instructions.
- When a black student is signing the consent forms, greet white students (if both White students show up, you need to randomly assigned one student to "Serial Cognition" and the other one to "Social Perception")
- Bring both White students to the appropriate (separate) cubicle and have the student who will be completing "Social Perception" wait for you in a room.
- If a Black participant does not show up, you need to change the room settings very quickly. If it is a boy's session, set up 83B for "Social Perception." If it is a girl's session, set up 83C (put two desks together) for "Color Perception." You can ask participants wait for a few minutes while you are setting up the room.

[Greet a Black participant in front of Room65]
Are you here for the "Serial Cognition" study? Are you _____? Hi, thanks for coming in today. My name is _____, and I'm a research assistant working for Dr. Kaiser, a professor in the MSU Psychology Department. Please follow me now.

[Bring the participant to Room83B].
Please have a seat. If your cell phone is turned on, please turn it off now.

Before we start our study, please read the consent forms on the table. If you agree to participate, please sign both copies of the consent form. One is for our records and one is for you to keep. When you are done, please let me know. I will be outside waiting for you in the hallway. If you do not see me, that means I am helping out another participant and I will be back momentarily **[Close the door and leave the room]**.

[Go get the other White participants. Greet both White participants in front of Room83]
Are you both here for the "Serial Cognition" study? Are you _____ and _____? Hi, thanks for coming in today. My name is _____, and I'm a research assistant working for Dr. Kaiser, a professor in the MSU Psychology Department. Please follow me now. **[Bring the participant to Room83D; if both White students showed up, randomly assign one White participant to the "Social Perception" study].**

[When you pass Room83C, tell the White student who is assigned to "Social Perception"...]
Someone will be with you in a few minutes. Meanwhile, you can start reading the consent forms on the desk. **[Experimenter 2 will give instruction to students in "Social Perception" study]**

[Take the other white student who is assigned to the "Serial Cognition" to Room83D]
Please have a seat. If your cell phone is turned on, please turn it off now.

Before we start our study, please read the consent forms on the table. If you agree to participate, please sign both copies of the consent form. One is for our records and one is for you to keep. When you are done, please let me know. I will be outside waiting for you in the hallway. If you do not see me, that means I am helping out another participant and I will be back momentarily.

[After you instruct the White student for "Serial Cognition" to read and sign the consent forms, you go back to the other room and give the Black student further instructions.]
Thank you very much for waiting. You can keep the other copy.

Now, I'll provide you with some instructions about today's study. **[Talk slowly]** In this study, we're assessing how performing one cognitive task influences performance on a subsequent cognitive task, especially when there is a 15-20 minute delay between the two tasks. In the first task, you will read a brief newspaper article and briefly summarize it. After a 15-20 minute delay, you will complete a computer task, which is the second cognitive task. I will give you more details about the second task right before you start the task.

Do you have any questions at this point? Great. There is one more thing to discuss before we start the first task. Because it is important that we have at least 15-minute delay between the two tasks, you will also participate in another small study. One of the undergraduate students in the lab is testing how people form impressions of other people. When you are done with my first part of the study, another experimenter _____ will explain his/her study in more detail.

Now, please complete the first task. When you are done, please open the door---so that the other experimenter _____ (name) will be with you in a few minutes.

[Leave the room and close the door. Go back to 83D and five the White participant further instructions]
Thank you very much for waiting. You can keep the other copy.

Now, I'll provide you with some instructions about today's study. **[Talk slowly]** In this study, we're assessing how performing one cognitive task influences performance on a subsequent cognitive task, especially when there is a 15-20 minute delay between the two

tasks. In the first task, you will read a brief newspaper article and briefly summarize it. After a 15-20 minute delay, you will complete a computer task, which is the second cognitive task. I will give you more details about the second task right before you start the task.
Do you have any questions at this point? Great. There is one more thing to discuss before we start the first task. Because it is important that we have at least 15-minute delay between the two tasks, you will also participate in another small study. One of the undergraduate students in the lab is testing how people form impressions of other people. When you are done with my first part of the study, another experimenter _____ will explain his/her study in more detail.

Now, please complete the first task. When you are done, please open the door---so that the other experimenter _____ (name) will be with you in a few minutes.

---------- **End of the 1st part** ----------

*** When the experimenter 2 is giving instructions to both participants about the interaction in 83D, go back to the control room and adjust the camera angle. When the experimenter 2 leaves the room, hit the "record" button.**

---------- **Beginning of the 2nd part** ----------

[The Black participant might finish their survey early than the White student. If that happens, experimenter 2 will tell the Black student that "_____ (experimenter 2) will be here in a few minutes." After the White participant is done with the second part of the study (interaction), stop by 83D and say...]
I need to give another participant instructions for the next study, and it will take a few minutes. _____ (Experimenter 2) agreed to help me with giving you instructions. So, please wait for him/her in this room. Thanks.

[Go back to 83B and start giving instructions to the Black student]
Thank you for waiting. Now, let's start the second part of my study. First I need to set up the computer program for you. **[Open the MediaLab "Stroop" and proceed to the first page. You cannot type the same ID# to both "Nao's Thesis" and "Stroop" programs. So, for this, add "1000" to the original ID#. For example, if the ID# is "013," it will be "1013." If the ID# is "100," it will be "1100."]**

Ok, it's all set. Thank you for waiting. **[Talk slowly and clearly!! The participants do not get the written instructions for this task. So, it is important that they understand your instructions.]** In this task, you will report the color of various stimuli that appear on the computer screen as QUICKLY and ACCURATELY as you can by pressing the appropriate keys on the key board. Each trial starts with a small black cross as your visual staring point. After the cross disappears, the word "BLUE," "GREEN,"

"RED," or "YELLOW" or a row of four Xs will appear on the screen in one of the four colors. Your task is to report the COLOR of the word, NOT the meaning of the word. You do this by using these 4 color keys (point to the keys). During this task, you should rest your index and middle fingers on the four colored keys.

You will start off with twenty practice trials. Do you have any questions? **[Turn on the desk lamp and turn off the room lights]** Please press any key to start the practice trials, when you are ready. **Stay in the room and see if participants understand the task. If the student is confused, answer questions and correct their behavior.]**

[When they are done with the practice trials...] Good. Do you have any questions about this task? Once you start the actual task, you cannot stop the computer program. The task will last for about 10 minutes with no breaks. It is very important that you concentrate on the computer for this period of time, making sure that you focus on the cross in the center of the screen. The computer will tell you when you are done with the task. When you are ready for the actual trials, please press any key to start.

[Leave the room and close the door.]

[After participants are done with the computer task, turn on the lights.]

For White participant: Thanks so much for helping out with our study. There is one more short survey. Please fill this out very quickly **[Hand out a suspicion check sheet]**. When you are done please open the door and let me know.
[When the student is done] Now, let's discuss the study **[proceed to the proving procedure]**.

For Black participant: Thanks so much for helping out with our study. There in one more short survey for you to complete **[Hand out a suspicion check sheet]**. When you are done please open the door and let me know. **[When they are done]** Thanks. _____ (Second experimenter) realized that he/she forgot to give you a short survey to complete. So, could you please fill this out for him/her very quickly? **[Hand out a manipulation check sheet]**. Thank you for your cooperation. Now, here is the money for your participation. Please sign this sheet, which tells us that you have received the monetary compensation. Now, _____ (the experimenter 2) will discuss the study. Please wait for her/him in this room. **[Take a suspicion sheet with you and hand it to Experimenter2]**

After the session:

Please write down the participant id on the suspicion check sheet.

Go back to the other room, measure the distance between two chairs (the closest distance between the two), and prepare for the next session.

Enter the data into PC.
Double check should be done by different person that the first data-entry person.

Appendix Q. *Experimenter 2's Script (For Impression Formation)*

"Impression Formation" — 2nd part of the study

- Experimenter 2 should dress in casual clothing.
- Experimental Material: consent forms (2 for each participant), pre-interaction survey, post-interaction survey, manipulation check sheet (only for African American students), suspicion check sheet, video release form, pencils, and watch.
- The folder with personal information will be numbered. Do not open the folder and check the condition. Please take an appropriate folder (indicated by a number on the log sheet) when you bring it to the participant. Also, when you enter the data on SPSS, please do not check the condition, and simply type numbers.

Prior to meeting participants:

- Double-check the participants' information before you greet them.
- Make sure that you have all the materials.
- Set up the MediaLab (enter the ID# and condition# and stand by with the first screen) The computer monitor should be turned off, so that participants cannot see the survey while they are completing the first cognitive task.

[Go to 83B and start with a Black student. When participants are done with the first cognitive task, go into the room and say...]

Are you done with your task now? Great. Hello. I'm _____. I believe the other experimenter briefly told you about my study.

Before we start the study, I need you to read the consent form and sign it if you agree to participate. Please sign both copies of the consent form. One is for our records and one is for your records.

[When a student is done with the consent forms...] Thanks. Please do not forget to take your copy when you leave.

FOR BLACK STUDENTS: In this study, I am interested in understanding how people interact with another person and form impressions about that person under limited time. Therefore, you will interact with another participant, who is also participating in the "serial cognition" study, for about 10 minutes and your job is to provide your impressions of your interaction partner and about aspects of the interaction more generally. To help us get a better sense of how interactions work, your interaction will be videotaped.

Please do not worry about the video recording; only the research team will have access to the videos.

I am also interested in testing whether having information about one's partner influences the interaction. In this study, you were randomly assigned to receive information about your partner, while your partner will not receive any information about you. We pulled your partner's information from some of the online surveys you both completed before you came to today's session. We use a variety of online surveys for this study, which help us get a better sense of how various pieces of information affect social interactions. So basically, you'll be going into the study knowing a little about your partner, but your partner won't have any information about you.

Now, please start with reviewing your partner information. **[Hand them the material in a folder]** I will be back in about 3 minutes to get you set up for the interaction.

[Leave the room and close the door. Go to 83D and repeat the same thing with a White student. *Instructions are different; BE CAREFUL!!!]

Are you done with your task now? Great. Hello. I'm _____. I believe the other experimenter briefly told you about my study.

Before we start the study, I need you to read the consent form and sign it if you agree to participate. Please sign both copies of the consent form. One is for our records and one is for your records.

[When a student is done with the consent forms...] Thanks. Please do not forget to take your copy when you leave.
FOR WHITE STUDENTS: In this study, I am interested in understanding how people interact with another person and form impressions about that person under limited time. Therefore, you will interact with another participant, who is also participating in the "serial cognition" study, for about 10 minutes and your job is to provide your impressions of your interaction partner and about aspects of the interaction more generally. To help us get a better sense of how interactions work, your interaction will be videotaped. Please do not worry about the video recording; only the research team will have access to the videos.

Do you have any questions at this point? First, I would like you to complete a very short survey assessing how you feel about the interaction that you will have in a few minutes. When you are done with the survey, the computer will let you know. When you are done, please just open the door and let me know. If you don't see me in the hallway, that means I am currently helping out another participant and I'll be back momentarily. **[Turn on the PC monitor, leave the room, and close the door.]**

[Go back to 83B and give the Black student further instructions.]

Great, thanks for looking this information over. Now, before you start interacting with another participant, I would like you to complete a very short survey assessing how you feel about the interaction that you will have in a few minutes. **[Turn on the PC monitor.]** When you are done with the survey, the computer will let you know. When you are done, please open the door and let me know. **[Leave the room and close the door.]**

[When the White student is done with the survey, have them sit on an appropriate chair and tell him/her that we are adjusting the cameras and to wait for a few moments.]
Thank you for completing the survey. Now, please have a seat there **[point the chair in the room]** and wait for a few moments. We are adjusting the cameras, and we will bring your interaction partner as soon as we are ready. **[Close the door and leave the room.]**

[When a Black student is done with the survey, go into the room and close the door and give them instructions]. In a moment, I will bring you to the other room where your interaction partner is waiting. But, I have one more important thing to tell you. Because your partner does not know that you have received his/her web surveys, it is very important that you refrain from mentioning anything you reviewed in the personal information packet. If he/she knew you received some information, we wouldn't be able to study the perspective of people going into an interaction without any prior information. Thanks for helping us out with this part of the study. Now, let's go to the other room. Because you will come back to this room after the interaction, you can leave your belongings here.

[Bring the Black student to the other room. As he/she enters the room, tell them...]
Oh, I'm sorry, I forgot to put your chair in the room. Here you go **[hand a chair to the Black student]**, please have a seat.

[When the students are set] Ok. Your task is to get to know one another during the next 10 minutes. After the interaction, you will answer a few questions about the interaction and your partner. Do you have any questions? Please keep interacting until I come back and let you know the time is up. **[Leave the room and close the door].**

***While Experimenter 2 is giving instructions to participants together, Experimenter 1 should try to adjust the camera angles and start recording the interaction as soon as Experimenter 2 leaves the room.**

[Experimenter 2 should go back to 83B and set the MediaLab screen to the "Welcome Back" page].

****You can take the folder with personal information away while the participants are interacting, so that the Black participant cannot go back to the information when they are filling the manipulation check sheet.**

[Exactly 10 minutes later---use the stop watches]. Ok, time is up. _____ (call a Black student's name), can you follow me now? You can leave the chair where it is now. I will put that back later. I will be right back for you _____ (call a White student's name). Please stay where you are and wait for me.

[Bring a Black student back to 83B] Please have a seat and complete this brief computerized survey about the interaction you just participated in. The computer will let you know when you are done. Because this survey is the last thing you need to complete for my study, _____ (experimenter 1) will be with you when you are done. **[Leave the room and close the door.]**

[Go back to 83D and give the White student further instructions]
Thanks for waiting _____. Let me set up the computer first **[type the password "done" and proceed to the "Welcome Back" page.]** Now, please have a seat here (in front of the PC). Please complete this brief computerized survey about the interaction you just participated in. The computer will let you know when you are done. Because this survey is the last thing you need to complete for my study, _____ (experimenter 1) will be with you when you are done.

*** If the Black participant finishes the survey first, tell the student: "_____ (experimenter 1) is currently taking care of another participant. Could you wait for her/him a few more minutes? I will tell her/him that you are waiting for her/him."**

[After experimenter 1 told the White participant that (s)he cannot give him/her instructions, go to 83D and say....]
The other experimenter _____ (name) is currently giving another participant instructions, so (s)he asked me to give you an instruction for his/her second task.

[You show the student that you are obviously READING his/her script]
First I need to set up the computer program for you. **[Open the MediaLab "Stroop" and proceed to the first page. You cannot type the same ID# to both "Nao's Thesis" and "Stroop" programs. So, for this, add "1000" to the original ID#. For example, if the ID# is "013," it will be "1013." If the ID# is "100," it will be "1100."]**

Ok, it's all set. Thank you for waiting. **[Talk slowly and clearly!! The participants do not get the written instructions for this task. So, it is important that they understand your instructions.]** In this task, you will report the color of various stimuli that appear on the computer screen as QUICKLY and ACCURATELY as you can by pressing the appropriate keys on the key board. Each trial starts with a small black cross as your visual staring point. After the cross disappears, the word "BLUE," "GREEN," "RED," or "YELLOW" or a row of four Xs will appear on the screen in one of the four colors. Your task is to report the COLOR of the word, NOT the meaning of the word. You do this by using these 4 color keys (point to the keys). During this task, you should rest your index and middle fingers on the four colored keys.

You will start off with twenty practice trials. Do you have any questions? **[Turn on the desk lamp and turn off the room lights]** Please press any key to start the practice trials, when you are ready. **Stay in the room and see if participants understand the task. If the student is confused, answer questions and correct their behavior.]**

[When they are done with the practice trials...] Good. Do you have any questions about this task? Once you start the actual task, you cannot stop the computer program. The task will last for about 10 minutes with no breaks. It is very important that you concentrate on the computer for this period of time, making sure that you focus on the cross in the center of the screen. The computer will tell you when you are done with the task. When you are ready for the actual trials, please press any key to start.

[Leave the room and close the door.]

[After the Black student completed the suspicion check sheet and manipulation check sheet, go back to 83B and proceed to the probing procedure.]

Appendix R. *Probing Script*

[First, take a look at suspicion response and get the feel of participant's thoughts. This will be done separately for Black and White students. The experimenter 2 will be probing with a Black student, and the experimenter 1 will be probing with a White student at the same time in separate cubicles.]

Hi, _____ (participant's name). Thank you for your cooperation with our studies again. First of all, do you have any questions before we discuss the study? **[If "yes," answer them: if "no" go on to the next question]**

So, what did you think about the today's studies? Did you enjoy the studies? Were they interesting to you? **[Try to relax them and have participants engage in the conversation with you]**

Were both studies perfectly clear? Were instructions easy to understand and helpful?

Do you have any suggestions for the researchers to improve the studies?

Did you find anything unusual or confusing in either study?

(If a participant does not have too much to say, ask him/her about his/her partner--- "How was the interaction?" "What did you think of your partner?")

[Look at the suspicion sheets] So, what did you think about the goals of our research? I noticed that you wrote that you thought the purpose of the study was _____. Can you elaborate your thoughts on this? For example, what makes you think this was the case? What made you think about this? Can you tell me how confident/certain are you that this is the case?

And, those thoughts occurred to you at/when _____ (check the suspicion sheets); is that correct?

Oh, by the way, have you known or met your partner before?

[The goal here is to get a good idea of how suspicious people were if they reported an on-track answer. The goal is to politely get a sense of this information without giving things away. Stick with the cover story unless the participant is right on track and extremely confident.]

[Continue on debriefing process by saying...] Great, you are on the right track.... Now, I would like to tell you what this study was about. Let's move to another room, so that I can explain the study to both you and another participant together. Please take all your belongings and follow me. **[Bring the participant to Room83A. If another participant is not there, wait for him/her.]**

Appendix S. *Probing Note for Experimenters*

Experimenter's name: _____

Participant's ID: _____

Did the participant seem suspicious? ____ Yes ____ No

If yes, how suspicious was this participant?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A little Suspicious Moderately Suspicious Extremely Suspicious

If yes, when did suspicion begin?

_____

_____

_____

If yes, was the participant entirely certain about deception or was there some doubt?

_____

_____

_____

Please carefully and neatly list the participant's comments that would be helpful in assessing his/her level of suspicion.

Would you exclude this participant?

___ No, not suspicious enough.
___ Maybe, hard to tell.
___ Definitely he/she was right on track.

Appendix T. *Debriefing Script*

[This process will take place in Room83A. Both Black and White students will be debriefed together. The main purpose of this process to make sure that they understand the nature of the study, why we had to use deception, the racial attitudes are completely fake, so that they do not feel uncomfortable when they leave the sessions.]

Now, let's discuss the study. First, please read this debriefing sheet very carefully. It describes the purpose of the study, our hypotheses, and the nature of the study designs. After that, we will discuss the study and answer all your questions **[Hand out debriefing sheet.]**

[Take time and wait until they are done reading the sheet] Do you have any questions? Does everything make sense? **[Be sure to answer all questions and send them to Cheryl if they have questions you can't answer. Make them feel comfortable, and ensure they are aware of their contributions to science.]**

So, as you can tell from the debriefing sheet, we are examining what happens during an interracial interaction when people expect to be the target of prejudice and how this might be influenced by people's beliefs about the stability of human characteristics. Thus, in order for us to assess your beliefs about the stability of human characteristics, we first asked you to complete an online questionnaire before you came to today's session. Also, in order to manipulate your expectations about your interaction partner, especially yours, _____ (a black student's name), we gave you false information about _____'s (White participant's name) racial attitudes. _____ (White participant's name) did not actually complete these measures----we made up his/her responses for the purpose of the study. Some participants saw that their partner expressed negative attitudes towards Blacks, some saw that their partner expressed positive attitudes towards Blacks, and some saw no information at all about their partner's racial attitudes. Do you remember the information in the packet that we gave you before the interaction? We came up with those numbers in order to test our hypotheses in this study. So, do you understand that these numbers were not _____'s (a white student's name) responses at all? Good.

Now, _____ (the white student's name) may be very surprised by the fact that _____ (the black student's name) received false information about you. We are very sorry for deceiving both of you. We needed to use this kind of deception, because it is central to the scientific questions guiding this research. Specifically, we needed to create an experimental context where one partner did or did not expect to face prejudice. If we told you the information was fake ahead of time, you probably would have behaved differently during the study, and we wouldn't learn that much about the scientific study of prejudice. Do you understand why we needed to use deception? **[Make sure that they are fine!!!!! If not, try to go over the procedure again and talk to them very slowly]** We really apologize for misleading you about _____'s (the white participant's name) information. In psychology we sometimes use deception when it is necessary for addressing an important scientific question. We believe that understanding intergroup

interactions is one of those important questions. This is a recent research topic in social psychology, and your data will be very helpful in addressing important questions about this phenomenon. In a very real and meaningful way, you have contributed to the scientific study of intergroup relations.
Also, it's really important not to feel duped by this deception **[Emphasize this point!!!]**. We spent a lot of time ensuring that the procedures would be believable to undergraduates, and this has been very effective. Do you have any questions about the deception? Do you understand why we used it? Great. Thank you very much for your understanding.

[Make sure participant seems comfortable. If he/she expresses concern, go through the procedures gently again. Let Cheryl or a graduate student know immediately if a participant is upset.] You can keep the debriefing sheet if you like, but we are happy to recycle it for the next group of participants if you do not want it.

I have just one more favor to ask: We will be running this study over the course of the semester, so we would appreciate it if you refrained from talking about the study with other students. We want to ensure that everyone comes into the study with the exact same expectations, so this helps us maintain the scientific credibility of the study. For example, if you came in with information about the study, it would have influenced your answers and our experiment would be invalid. As I said before, we put a lot of time, money, and effort into this study, so it's important to make sure that the science is strong. Also, when you leave the lab, please do not talk about the study, because participants for the next session might be waiting in front of the room. Thanks.

Now, I will pass out the video release form. Please read it very carefully. It explains your right for confidentiality. If you agree to give us your permission to include your videotape in the scientific analysis of this study, please sign both of the forms; one is for our records and the other one is for you to take with you.

[When they are done signing the video release forms] Again, thank you so much for your help with this study and for contributing to the scientific process. Please let us know if you have further questions.

[Write the participant's ID number on suspicion check and manipulation check sheets. It will be filed in 85.]

At the end of your rotation, make sure that the consent form is filed in appropriate place in 85 file cabinet. Assign credits online for participation (for White participants). Double check that information is completed in log book. Put all materials away and tidy up. Please be very careful to lock and secure all lab rooms and materials.

NOTE: If the seating debriefing room gets backed-up, you should have the participants wait in an empty cubicle until the room is free again.

*****If some participants are very concerned with the false personal information, you can show the three folders and assure them that we created the information beforehand. The folders will be in 83A.**

Appendix U. *Tables with Different Coding: Effects of Prejudice Expectation Manipulations on African American Participants' Perception of Their Partner as either a Racist or an Egalitarian*

Predictor	Racist			Egalitarian			Positive toward African American		
	B	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2
Intercept	3.93			2.99			3.02		
Egalitarian vs. Prejudice (EvP)	-3.35***	-.84***		-1.24*	-.33*		2.10***	.65***	
No Information vs. Prejudice (NvP)	-3.28***	-.77***	.52***	-2.10**	-.51**	.16**	.83+	.24+	.27***
Implicit Theories	.26	.13	.00	.08	.04	.01	-.45	-.29	.05*
EvP by Implicit Theories	-.46	-.16		-.58	-.21		-.10	-.05	
NvP by Implicit Theories	-.41	-.11	.01	-.06	-.02	.02	.41	.14	.02

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Preinteraction Expectations

Predictor	Preinteraction Expectations - Self			Preinteraction Expectations - Partner		
	b	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	3.12			2.17		
Egalitarian vs. Prejudice (EvP)	1.11***	.56***		1.44***	.54***	
No Info. vs. Prejudice (NvP)	.91**	.43**		1.15**	.40**	
			.14**			.11*
Implicit Theories	-.57*	-.60*		-.97**	-.76**	
			.00			.00
EvP by Implicit Theories	.65*	.45*		1.54***	.80***	
NvP by Implicit Theories	.78*	.44*		1.07**	.44**	
			.09*			.19**

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Behaviors during the Interaction

Predictor	Socially Skillful Behaviors			Changing Attitudes			Physical Distance		
	b	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2
Intercept	3.83			2.08			47.76		
Egalitarian vs. Prejudice (EvP)	.10	.06		-1.17*	-.38*		-5.42	-.24	
No Information vs. Prejudice (NvP)	.09	.06		-1.37**	-.42**		-.59	-.02	
			.01			.14**			.04
Implicit Theories	-.15	-.21		.07	.05		-.13	-.01	
			.09*			.00			.00
EvP by Implicit Theories	-.09	-.09		.04	.02		.35	.02	
NvP by Implicit Theories	-.19	-.09		-.06	-.02		-1.26	-.06	
			.00			.00			.00

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Emotions during the Interaction

Predictor	Anxiety			Other Negative Affect			Positive Mood		
	b	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2
Intercept	1.89			.49			4.13		
Initial Emotions	.15	.21	.04	.11	.19	.02	.05	.06	.00
Egalitarian vs. Prejudice (EvP)	-.37	-.21		-.38*	-.35*		.11	.06	
No Information vs. Prejudice (NvP)	-.04	-.02	.04	-.21	-.18	.06	-.11	-.06	.01
Implicit Theories	.26	.30	.05 +	.13	.25	.00	-.08	-.09	.00
EvP by Implicit Theories	-.10	-.08		-.16	-.20		.12	.90	
NvP by Implicit Theories	-.01	-.01	.00	-.22	-.23	.02	.09	.05	.00

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Feelings of Authenticity and Self-Esteem during the Interaction

Predictor	Authenticity			Self-Esteem		
	b	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	4.72			2.85		
Initial Self-Esteem	--	--	--	.47***	.65***	.44***
Egal. vs. Prej. (EvP)	.39	.22		.21	.16	
No Info. vs. Prejudice (NvP)	.19	.10	.03	.18	.13	.01
Implicit Theories	-.58*	-.69*	.02	-.16	-.26	.01
EvP by Implicit Theories	.76**	.60**		.15	.16	
NvP by Implicit Theories	.31	.19	.12*	.15	.13	.01

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on One's Own Liking of Their Partner and Enjoyment of the Interaction and Perceptions of Their Partner's Liking and Enjoyment

Predictor	Liking			Enjoyment			Partner's Liking			Partner's Enjoyment		
	b	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	4.72			4.83			4.10			4.08		
Egal. vs. Prej. (EvP)	.47+	.31+		.25	.15		.45	.25		.33	.16	
No Info. vs. Prej. (NvP)	.27	.16		.16	.09		.45	.23		.24	.11	
			.04			.01			.03			.01
Implicit Theories	-.35+	-.48+		-.27	-.37		-.44+	-.50+		-.39	-.41	
			.01			.00			.02			.03
EvP by Implicit Theories	.39	.35		.38	.32		.46	.35		.33	.23	
NvP by Implicit Theories	.33	.24		.26	.18		.26	.16		.23		
			.04			.03			.04			.02

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Observed Behaviors during the Interaction for African American Participants

Predictor	Global Positive Regard			Global Responsiveness			Sociability		
	b	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2	*b*	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	3.36			3.74			3.85		
Egalitarian vs. Prejudice (EvP)	-.40	-.24		-.17	-.12		-.32	-.15	
No Information vs. Prejudice (NvP)	-.64*	-.37*	.08+	-.46+	-.31+	.06	-.62+	-.28	.05
Implicit Theories	.13	.17	.00	.01	.02	.01	.11	.11	.00
EvP by Implicit Theories	-.17	-.15		-.06	-.06		-.06	-.04	
NvP by Implicit Theories	-.20	-.13	.01	-.20	-.16	.01	-.46	-.24	.03

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Effects of African American Participants' Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on European American Participants' Emotions during the Interaction

Predictor	Anxiety			Other Negative Affect			Positive Mood		
	b	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2
Intercept	3.52			.18			4.82		
Initial Emotions	-.43*	-.32*		.08	.22		-.29**	-.33**	
			.12**			.05+			.13**
Egalitarian vs. Prejudice (EvP)	-.25	-.10		-.05	-.05		-.04	-.02	
No Information vs. Prejudice (NvP)	.02	.01		-.08	-.07		-.60*	-.27*	
			.01			.00			.06
Implicit Theories	-.14	-.11		.02	.05		-.05	-.06	
			.02			.00			.02
EvP by Implicit Theories	.52	.29		.05	.07		-.28	-.21	
NvP by Implicit Theories	.25	.43		-.15	-.14		.22	.11	
			.03			.03			.05

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Effects of African American Participants' Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on European American Participants' Liking of Their Partner and Enjoyment of the Interaction

Predictor	Liking			Enjoyment		
	b	β	ΔR^2	*b*	β	ΔR^2
Intercept	5.12			5.01		
Egalitarian vs. Prejudice (EvP)	.04	.03		.08	.04	
No Information vs. Prejudice (NvP)	-.20	-.11	.01	-.36	-.18	.02
Implicit Theories	-.10	-.13	.04	-.12	-.14	.08*
EvP by Implicit Theories	-.30	-.25		-.37	-.28	
NvP by Implicit Theories	.24	.16	.08+	.14	.08	.06

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

Effects of Prejudice Expectations and Implicit Theories on Availability of African American Participants' Cognitive Resources

Predictor	Stroop Interference Score		
	b	*β*	ΔR^2
Intercept	.15		
Egalitarian vs. Prejudice (EvP)	-.04	-.17	
No Information vs. Prejudice (NvP)	.03	.11	
			.06
Implicit Theories	-.05	-.42	
			.04
EvP by Implicit Theories	.03	.20	
NvP by Implicit Theories	.03	.14	
			.01

Note. Parameter estimates are from the full model including the interaction terms. ΔR^2 for experimental conditions and implicit theories are based on the values controlling for one another.

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