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1007

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dissertation entitled

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF ‘SUCCESS’: AN
ANALYSIS OF FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT REGIMES
ON LAKE MALAWI

presented by

AARON J. M. RUSSELL

has been accepted towards fulfillment
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DOCTORATE degree in FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE

 

 

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UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF “SUCCESS”: AN ANALYSIS OF
FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT REGIMES ON LAKE MALAWI.

Aaron J.M.‘ Russell

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Fisheries and Wildlife

2007

ABSTRACT

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF “SUCCESS”: AN ANALYSIS OF
FISHERIES CO—MANAGEMENT REGIMES ON LAKE MALAWI.

By
Aaron J .M. Russell

Having developed from a condition of resource abundance and low capital
investment, few artisanal fisheries in Malawi were traditionally subject to any form of
access-limitation. Since the 1930’s, however, increased catch efficiency due to the new
fishing methods, gears, and materials, combined with more recent trends of deteriorating
spawning grounds and population growth, to cause the depletion of many fish stocks. For
decades, the depletion of Lake Malawi’s fish stocks, and the apparent disinterest among
fishers to take action, was blamed on population grth and poverty, a classic example of
the “tragedy" of open-access regimes.

Based on two years of ethnographic fieldwork, I present several case studies that
challenge the assumptions that fisherfolk are unwilling or unable to effectively participate
in fisheries co-management. Rather, the govemment’s and donor agencies’ formalized
blue-print approach to the establishment of co-management institutions (known as
“Beach Village Committees” or BVCs) failed to recognize the need for the informal
consensus-building processes by which institutions gain local legitimacy. Instead of
enlisting the support of the chiefs (who act as the primary community arbiters, mediators,
and custodians of cultural norms), due to their perceived autocracy and corruptibility, the

chiefs were largely excluded from the process.

I analyzed these case studies using an “organizational learning” framework, and
differentiated between the outcomes of BVC empowerment (as envisioned by the
government), and BVC conservation effectiveness. In most cases where BVCs tried to
enact conservation regulations without the visible support of the chiefs, they have been
confronted by significant resistance among stakeholders. In contrast, I present several
case studies in which the active support of chiefs has enabled BVCs to achieve significant
conservation outcomes due to the broad base of community support.

My analysis of organizational learning for empowerment and conservation
outcomes in historical and present-day fisheries management settings in Malawi suggests
that formal institutional design bench-marks are unreliable predictors of conservation
success and institutional legitimacy. Instead, the extent to which stakeholders accept and
support conservation regulations must be recognized as a reflection of the extent to which
co-management leaders are empowered by the community.

I propose an “adaptive organizational learning” fiamework that explores the
sources of resistance that have undermined the empowerment of fisheries co-management
institutions in Malawi. By anticipating these forms of ignorance and resistance to _
institutional and behavioral change, resource management agencies and NGOs may be
better able to support the development of the stakeholder awareness, capacity,
motivation, and legitimacy that is needed to bring about the institutionalization of

sustainable fishing practices.

DEDICATION

Voor mijn familie, een bron van liefde, vriendschap, inspiratie, steun, gezelligheid, en
veel gelach.

Genk ich haag van och,
Want ge zijt sjoen en goet,
As ich o-ch nie haa,

Dan gonk ich doet.

J. v. M.

-iv-

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost I would like to thank my major professor, Tracy Dobson, for encouraging me to embark
on this research, and the endless support that she has provided throughout the study, research and writing
process. I would also like to thank my committee members: Anne Ferguson, Geoff Habron, John Kerr,
John Wilson, and Kevin Ford for their support.

I could not have embarked on these studies without the financial support that I have received from a wide
range of sources: Title VI Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowships from the Afiican Studies
Center, and the Center for Advanced Study of International Development/W omen and International
Development; Walker Hill International Pre-dissertation Travel Grant, Fulbright IIE Dissertation Research
Fellowship, Michigan State University Graduate Research Incentive Fellowship; and Graduate
Assistantships fi'om the Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, and PROM/SE Program at Michigan State
University.

I would like to thank the Centre for Social Research in Zomba for hosting me, and our many colleagues in
Malawi for their support of this research. In particular, I would like to thank Mr. Yotam Msuku for his
invaluable assistance and companionship throughout the course of this research. We also would like to
thank the many fisheries stakeholders for their insights, tolerance, good humor and fiiendship.

Finally, I would like to thank my father and fiancé, for their tireless support throughout the writing process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Acronyms

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: A Short History of Development and Fisheries
Management Paradigms in Malawi

0 Introduction to the political nature of development, fisheries and
‘communities
0 Pro-colonial Fishing Institutions and Practices

0 Social and Economic Change for the Northern Lakeshore peoples
during proto-/early colonialism (1890-1910’s)

o The First Major integration of Lake Malawi’s Fishing Economy into
the Colonial Economy (1910-1930)

0 The Impacts of Afi'ica’s Eden-like representation in European
imaginations

o The First Colonial Fishing Regulations and a Growing
Entrepreneurial Class Cause the Decline of the Chiefs (1930-1950)

0 Growth of Non-African commercial fishing industries (1930-1960)

0 The Rise of Scientific management, African entrepreneurs, and the
first enclosures of the Africans’ fisheries (1940-60)

0 Slow growth of Northern Fisheries and Northern Emigration to
Southern Lakeshore (1950-60s)

0 Independence, governmental centralization, and reassessment of the
Fisheries Department (1963-1975)

0 Growing conflicts between government and fishers leads to declining
legitimacy of the government and fish stock collapse (1975-1993)

0 Democracy bring pressure for participatory management but
autocratic tendencies linger to produce a mixed bag of fisheries co-
management regimes (1993-2005)

0 Lake Malombe Participatory Fisheries Management Program
(PFMP)

 

10

10
13

23

25

30

33
38

41

53

58

63

79

84

 

 

 

o Mbenji Island Traditional Fisheries Management

0 Lake Chiuta Fisheries Association

0 Lake Chilwa and Mpoto Lagoon Fisheries Association
0 Chieftains establish BVCs at Chia Lagoon

o The “Village Trusts” of Lake Malawi National Park

0 Ongoing conflicts in the Bua River Fishery

o PFMP in Southern L. Malawi meets with distrust, and the North is
left to itself (1998-2005)

Malawi’s Current Array of Fisheries Management Regimes

o Malawi’s Fisheries Co—management Policies and Targets for the
Future

Chapter 3: Research Methods

0 Selection of Research Sites

0 Ethnographic Research Methods (observation, participant observation,
semi-structured interviews, life histories)

0 Discussion of individual research methods
0 Data Analysis
0 Context-specific research challenges and caveats

o Impacts of Researcher identity and the Research Process

Chapter 4: Case Studies of Emergent Community-Based Fisheries Regimes

Northern Karonga District

0 Since Independence

Case Study 1: Traditional River Fisheries Management in the North
Rukuru River

0 Upper Vyelo
0 Lower Vyelo
o A Spiritual Institution
0 Social and Ecological Threats
Other examples of poorly-documented weir fishing institutions
0 Lufilya Vyelo
o Dwangwa River Area Biius
Case Study 2: The self-starters of the Far North: Yiwemi BVC
o The Yiwemi Fishery

-vii-

92
94
98
102
104
109

112
116

122

129
129

133

138
153
155
159

166
166
167

168

168
170
174
176
179
179
180
181
181

0 Establishing a Fishery Committee 183

o BVC loss of motivation 185

o Fishery declines spur BVC Revival 186

o Pivotal Role of the Chief 188

0 Need for Livelihood Diversification 192

0 Start of the Yiwemi Co-op 193

o Other examples of self-starter communities in the North 196
o Songwe 196

o Mwenibabu 197

0 Northern Nkhotakota District 199
0 Case Study 3: Crisis transformation - Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary 203
o Fishers as Squatters 203

0 New government-new company 204

0 Creation of the DFS. 207

o Divisions between fishers 208

o The Bountiful Sanctuary 209

0 Arrival of the lemu fishers 21 1

0 New Uncertainties 213

0 Case Study 4: Kambindigu Lagoon Closed Season 216
0 Crisis in the Lagoon 216

0 Establishing the Closed Season 217

0 Early Successes in the Lagoon 218

0 First Divisions — Livelihoods and Leadership 219

o Conflicts in the Lagoon 225

o Conflicts between chiefs and BVCs 227

o Conflicts over leadership of the KFA 230

0 Growing institutional maturation 233

Chapter 5: Understanding the Nature of Institutional Change in Fisheries

C°~management 237
' Theoretical Frameworks 239
o Co—management and CBNRM 239
o Socio-Ecological Resilience and Uncertainty 250

0 Organizational Learning 255

- viii -

O

The Use of Organizational Learning to Analyze Emergent Co-management
Institutions

Analysis of Case Studies

0

O

O

O

The Self-starters of the Far North - Yiwemi BVC and Co-op (Case Study 2)
Crisis Transformation - Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary (Case Study 3)
Kambindingu Lagoon Closed Season (Case Study 4)

Traditional River Fisheries Management in the North Rukuru River (Case
Study 1)

Common Elements in the Organizational Learning Process

Chapter 6: Conclusion

0

O O O O O O

Rethinking links between Empowerment and Conservation

An exploration of resistance to empowerment and conservation
The Adaptive Organizational Learning Process

Recognition of the Crisis

Finding Willing and Able Leaders

Supporting New Institutions

The Need for Organizational Learning Among all Stakeholders at all
Institutional Levels

In Closing

Appendices

Appendix A - Primary fishing gears and targeted fish species in each
Case Study

Appendix B - Case Studies Data Coding Table

Appendix C - List of Data Sources; Case Study 1: North Rukuru River
Fishery

Appendix D - List of Data Sources; Case Study 2: Yiwemi BVC

Appendix E - List of Data Sources; Case Study 2: Supporting Data for
Yiwemi BVC

Appendix F - List of Data Sources; Case Studies 3 & 4: Dwangwa Fish
Sanctuary and Kambindingu Fisheries Association

Literature Cited

 

259

263
263
270
274

281

284

297
297
302
304
305
306
308

311

314

318
318

320
324

325
327

329

332

LIST OF TABLES

mic—Tune.

Table 2-1. The cost of fishing gears, common household items, and hut tax in 1939, and
their equivalent values in 2005 GB Pounds and 2006 US Dollars.

Table 2-2. Tonnage of Fish Landed in Post-Independent Malawi's Water bodies (from
F AO/UN 1966)

Table 2-3. Malawi Fisheries Department sources of funding, 1966-1988 (Jones, Akester
et a1. 1990).

Table 2-4. Nkhotakota primary fishing gears used, primary species caught for each gear,
1 980-89 (T weddle, Seymour et a1. 1990).

Table 2-5. Karonga primary fishing gears used, primary species caught for each gear,
1 980-89 (T weddle, Seymour et a1. 1990).

Table 2-6. Mean costs, earnings and profits for key fishing gears used in Lake Malawi
(priced in Malawi Kwacha) (from Mdaihli and Donda (1992).

Table 2-7. Lake Chilwa and Mpoto Lagoon Fishing Association regulation and their
rationales.

Table 2-8. Ranking of Fisheries Department research proposals for 2000-2001 (Banda,
Chisambo et al. 2000).

Table 3-1. Numbers of observations and interviews (individual and group) conducted
per case study.

Table 3-2. Numbers and distributions of household surveys.
Table 3-3. Emergent Themes in Malawian fisheries co—management case studies.

Table 4-1. Yiwemi household livelihood strategies and residency profiles.

62

76

77

79

100

128

141

149
155
182

LIST OF FIGURES

M

Figure 1-1. Trends of Fish Catches and Fisher Participation in Malawi’s key
Traditional Fisheries (Bulirani, Banda et a1. 1999).

Figure 1-2. Map of Malawi, showing dissertation case study locations
Figure 2-1. Trends of stakeholder roles in fishing institutions on Lake Malawi.
Figure 2-2. Lake Malawi’s major tributaries with documented fish weirs.
Figure 2-3. Luweya River Dipnet Fishing Institution

Figure 2-4. Early Non-Afiican Fishery Catch levels in Lake Malawi.

Figure 2-5. Explanation of the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY).

Figure 2-6. Decline of the Chambo fishery in Lake Malombe (Tweddle, Alimoso
et a1. 1994).

Figure 2-7. Tonnage of Fish Caught by Selected Fisheries in Malawi (1980-89),
with particular note of Nkhotakota and Karonga Districts.

Figure 2-8. December 15, 2000 Malawi News Article describing use of force
against Mangochi Fishers. ‘

Figure 2-9. The Continuum of present and past fisheries management regimes in
Malawi, and their epistemological and technical origins.

Figure 2-10. NARMAP Research Programme, 1999 (W eyl 1999).
Figure 3-1. Map of Malawi, showing dissertation case study locations.

Figure 3-2. Key elements that contribute to credibility and transferability of
ethnographic research (Guba 1981).

Figures 3-3 and 3-4. Community mapping and seasonality charts.
Figure 4-1. Diagram of the lower vyelos on the N. Rukuru River.

Figure 4.2- Civil disobedience over witchcraft accusations enforces
accountability of chiefs.

Figure 4-3. A brief introduction to the Lemu (also known as Chikwesakwesa).
Figure 4-4. Map of the Kambindingu Fisheries Association.

Figure 4-5. KFA Household Residency Origins and Visit Durations.

Figure 4-6. KFA Household Livelihood Strategies.

Figure 5-1. Co-management Continuum.

Figme 5-2. Critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons
(Agrawal 2002).

Fight-e 5-3. Repeated learning cycles in Yiwemi.

-xi-

12
18
23
4O

73

78

115

118

127
132

137

144
173

191

212
220
221
221
244

246

267

 

 

Figure 5-4. Model of F irst-order Empowerment Learning.

Figure 5-5. Second order empowerment learning in the Dwangwa Fish
Sanctuary.

Figure 5-6. Conflicted Learning Interests in the Kambindingu Fisheries
Association Case Study

Figure 5-7. Unresolved Second order Empowerment Learning cycle.

Figure 5-8. Model of external capacity flows between Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary
and Kambindingu Fishery Association.

Figure 6-1. A Model of Organizational Learning for Conservation

Figure 6-2. Potential sources of empowerment failures, and support for adaptive
learning

Figure 6-3. Continuum of Fisheries Management Institutions in Malawi and their
Corresponding Continua of Epistemologies and Methodologies.

Images in this dissertation are presented in color.

.xii.

268

273

279

280

292

299

305

315

 

TABLE OF ACRONYMS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FXDMADE Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
”ETRP British Irrigated Rice Project
BOMA British Overseas Management Administration, Colloquial Term for District
Capitals (Malawi)
BVC Beach Village Committee
CAMPF IRE Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CBNRM Cormnunity-Based Natural Resource Management
CLWMP Chia Lagoon Watershed Management Project
COMPASS Community Partnerships for Sustainable Resource Management in Malawi
DAN IDA Danish Government's Foreign Aid Service
DFO District Fisheries Officer (Malawi)
DFS Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary
DNPW Department of National Parks and Wildlife (Malawi)
DoF Department of Fisheries (Malawi)
ELDP Evangelical Lutheran Development Program
KAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FD Fisheries Department (Malawi)
GBP British Pounds Sterling
EEF World Bank Global Environmental Facility
TFTC Department of Game, Fish and Tsetse Control (Malawi)
TTZ Gesellschafi fiir Technische Zusarmnenarbeit (German Foreign Technical
Assistance Agency)
EVE Group Village Headman
IGA Income Generating Activity
W International Monetary Fund
”\CA Japanese Aid Agency
K Kwacha (Malawian Monetary Unit) (US$1.00 roughly equivalent to K105 -
125 between 2003-2005)
m Kambindingu Fisheries Association
LIl{DP Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project
FIEFAD Malawi-German Fisheries and Aquaculture Project

 

 

- xiii -

 

 

 

Malawi Development Corporation

 

MALDECO
MCP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Malawi Congress Party
VSY Maximum Sustainable Yield
WARMAP National Aquatic Resource Management Pro gramme
NGO Non-Govemmental Organization
NP National Park
NRM Natural Resource Management
ODA British Overseas Development Administration
PF NIP Participatory Fisheries Management Programs
PIVIF Police Mobile Force (Malawi Police Force)
RENAMO Mozambican Counter-Revolutionary Army
SES Socio-Economic System
TA Traditional Authority
UN United Nations
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VH Village Headman
WESM Wildlife and Environmental Society of Malawi
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature

 

- xiv-

 

Chapter 1

“While I have been observing fishing activities along the open
lakeshore, I have not had as much opportunity to observe them in the
lagoon due to the fact that these activities are illegal during the closed
season, and as they therefore take place at under the cover of darkness.
An opportunity to participate in a lagoon patrol enables me to improve my
understanding both of the poachers and the enforcers of this fishery
regime.

We leave Ngala at around 7:30 pm, rowing in silence and in
unison so as not to give anyone any warning of our arrival. Two hours
later we enter the estuary, rowing as quietly as possible. There might be
fishermen nearby and we can hear people in their homes on Bana Island
as we pass. We also pass several hippos that snort and grunt but remain
submerged.

Throughout the evening we surprise a number of poachers and
confiscate their nets and catches. Eventually, we come upon another net
that is stretched across the shallows and heavily entangled in the reeds.
As we try to untangle it, the guys hear and see other boats in the Bana
swamp area to the South. We race of across the lagoon with the engine
roaring and come close on the heels of two canoes paddling furiously to
escape us. We pull up in front of them and turn our attention to one of the
canoes where two boys are seated. As we are confiscating their night ’s
catch, the second canoe tries to escape. The weeds are too dense here for
us to use the motor, so we race after them, paddling hard. We are very
close, less than 5 yards from their canoe, but a narrow gap in the reeds
that leads to Lake Malawi saves them, while our large boat gets stuck in
the thick reeds.

This shallow area, with its thick reeds and abundance of aquatic
vegetation, is prime hippo habitat. All the noise of the engine and the
paddling has awakened many of these sleeping beasts, and all around us
the darkness is filled with loud grunts and snorts as we paddle along the
edge of the lagoon. One hippo gives us a bump from below and several
others follow us as we paddle away, grunting their displeasure.

Its 3:30 in the morning by the time we return home and, though my
arms are tired from rowing for hours, the evening ’3 real victim is my rear
end, sore and aching from hours perched on the side of the boat! We
confiscated 7 nets tonight and the bottom of the boat is full of fish. ”

[Excerpt from notes on a fishing patrol in the Kambindingu Lagoon -
2003-11-04]

Lake Malawi contains an estimated 500-1000 fish species, including a
large number of species in the Cichlid family found nowhere else, making it the
most bio-diverse fresh water body in the world. In stark contrast with this
ecological bounty, the nation of Malawi, which dominates the fishing pressure on
Lake Malawi], is currently ranked as one of the poorest countries in Southern
Africa2 (UNDP 2005) in which an estimated 480,000-1,400,000 people are
infected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic (UNAIDS 2006). The importance of the
fishing industry to the current and future health of the nation can readily be

realized by consideration of the following:

1) Whereas annual per capita fish consumption was at one time estimated to
constitute around 70% of all animal protein consumed by Malawians nation-wide
(Bland and Donda 1994), due to population growth the annual per capita
availability of fish has declined from an estimated at12.9 kg in1976 to just 3.6 kg
in 2001 (FAO 2005).3 While this decrease alarming for all Malawians, it is of
particular concern for people living with HIV/AIDS who require up to 50% more

protein than others (Mumba and Jose 2005).

2) Due to the unpredictability of rainfall during the last 5-6 years, successful
agriculture has increasingly depended on larger capital inputs (i.e., fertilizer and

labor). As fishing households are known to have comparatively larger incomes

 

 

1 Lake Malawi forms a significant portion of the Malawi’s Eastern border with Tanzania and Mozambique,
Where the lake is known as Lake Nyassa and Niassa, respectively. However, due to geography, much of
C.Mozambican and Tanzanian shorelines are characterized by steep mountains and narrow littoral zones,
‘18 much of the Malawian lakeshore is easily accessible and reaps the benefits from the biological
Bro‘hlctivity occurring in its wide littoral zones.
Thu-e is a variety of indices that the UN and World Bank use to rank nations; the Human Development
Ends-7c ranks Malawi as 165'” out of 173 ranked nations.
8 amount is well below the 13-15 kg per capita supply recommended by World Health Organization

-2-

and amounts of assets than purely farming households (Allison and Mvula 2002),

they are better able to afford capital inputs for agriculture.

3) In a national population of ~12 million people, fishing provides a primary or
secondary source of livelihood for an estimated 350,000 fisherfolk (including
fishing gear owners, crew members, and fish traders) (FAO 2005) and a vital
economic support for as many as 1,000,000 people along the Malawian shore

alone (Malawi 1999).

Over the course of the past century, these factors have contributed to the over-
fishing of many fish stocks as increasing numbers of people enter the fishing industry.
Figure 1-1, shows the overall catch trends in Malawi’s three most significant lakes (Lakes

Malawi, Malombe and Chiuta). While Lake Malombe’s valuable chambo (Oreochromys
Spp.) fishery collapsed during the early 1990s due to over-fishing, Lake Chilwa’s
fisheries are vulnerable to cyclical droughts which dry out this lake ahnost completely.
Lake Malawi’s fisheries show an apparent continued increase, however there are clear
Signs that the commercial chambo fishery is under threat as growing proportions of
Catches are made up of juvenile fish. Meanwhile, numbers of fishing gear owners,

fishing assistants, gears, and vessels continue to increase.

 

 

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i i
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‘ r
3 :5:
t .t;
i ii;

W ._
.1"

_ L.Malawi L.Malombe

 

- - 1. - - Gear Owners —-— Fishing As

Figure 1-1. Trends of Fish Catches and Fisher Participation in Malawi’s key
Traditional Fisheries (Bulirani, Banda et a1. 1999).

A common representation of natural resource degradation is that of the neo-
Malthusian “cycle of poverty”, in which over-population is seen as both the causes and
rmults of natural resource scarcity and poverty (Homer-Dixon 1999; Hartmann 2001).
Indeed, this scenario was famously misrepresented by Hardin (1968) as “The Tragedy of
the Commons”, in which individualistic economic motivations led a population of poor
English peasants to overstock, and thereby degrade their communally owned pasture.
What Hardin omitted fi'om his model where the institutional changes that led to this

event: the peasants only overgrazed the commons after their other pasturelands were

¥—

4 Ne0-1VIalthusians as defined by Homer-Dixon (1999) “claim that finite natural resources place strict limits
on the growth of human population and consumption; if these limits are exceeded, poverty and social
, ea:kdown result.” While Homer-Dixon claims that he is not a Neo-Malthusian and recognizes that
munitions] change can produce environmental improvements, as Hartmann (2001) explains, “population
9mm is probably the single largest causal factor of environmental scarcity in both his [Homer-Dixon’s]
p""llem’s model and case studies.”

alienated by the local nobility. Similarly, in order to understand the reasons for over-

fishing in Malawi, we need to appreciate the impact of the large-scale institutional
changes that have shaped and limited fishers’ abilities to establish sustainable indigenous
fisheries management institutions. In the case of this, the most densely populated and
most rural population in Southern Africa (UNDP 2005; UNPP 2005), institutional
changes imposed first by the colonial economy and government, and later by a 30-year

dictatorship, severely undermined the local institutions that might have addressed over-

fishing trendss.

Despite the newly-democratic government’s attempts to introduce a “Participatory

Fisheries Management” regime for Malawi’s fisheries since the mid-19903, most
fisheries scientists and managers are skeptical of local communities’ capacities to
implement and enforce fishing regulations. However, as I conducted my pre-dissertation
fieldwork in 2001, I found that this generalization was inaccurate, and largely based on
the predominance of management and science effort that had been expended in the
Southern end of Lake Malawi. In contrast, I found that several communities in the less-
studied Central and Northern lakeshore regions were creating (or had created) locale-
Speci fic fishing institutions to address both the declines in fish stocks as well as the social
and economic problems that over-fishing produces. The excerpt that started this chapter
hi8111 i ghts the enforcement being carried out by one such group of communities who have
collaborated to establish the Kambindingu Fisheries Association.

A large number of factors that influence the emergence of community-based

n"“t‘L‘lI‘al resources management (CBNRM) regimes have been described by authors such

 

\\
S
I <>pu1ation Density = 109 pop/10112; % rural population = 86.7%.

-5-

¥
_‘—

as Ostrom (1990), Baland and Platteau (1996), Wade (1989), and Agrawal et a1. (2001).
However, most of these case studies were of highly homogeneous, bounded communities
that do not resemble the mobile, unbounded fish and fisherfolk communities of Lake
Malawi. In the case of the Kambindingu Fisheries Association, these communities are
made up of three major ethnic groups which use a variety of different fishing gears, many
of whom are temporary residents who target a variety of migratory and local fish stocks.
Despite all of these ‘challenges’, or perhaps because of them, this group of communities
is presently serving as an example of how communities around Lake Malawi could
manage their fisheries. My observations during pre-dissertation research guided my

initial framing of my research questions and aim:

0 Question 1: Why do some of Lake Malawi’s fisherfolk display a disinclination to
conserve the breeding stocks necessary for their fishing livelihoods when others are
adopting drastic self-imposed fishing restrictions to ensure the long-term

sustainability of their fish stocks?

0 Question 2: To what extent are these divergent institutional scenarios reflections of

unique local cultural and socio-economic contexts?

‘ Question 3: How have external factors like the historical regulatory vs. advisory
roles played by the Malawian Fisheries Department (FD) in Lake Malawi’s fishing

communities affected local attitudes toward fish stocks?

' Question 4: Considering the locale-specific ecological characteristics of
c<>Inmunities’ targeted fish-stocks, how do these affect the ability and/or willingness

0 f communities to accept specific resource conservation measures?

 

0 Overall Goal: Looking at these factors and others, my research aim is to describe the
facilitating contexts that can be provided to make stakeholder participation in

Malawian fisheries management socially and ecologically sustainable.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Figure 1-2. Map of Malawi, showing dissertation case study locations
My four case study sites are shown in Figure 1-2. These case studies differ widely

in terms of the roles played by different stakeholders as well as the types of regulations

that they have established. While constitutions, membership lists, and regulations may
give us an idea of how the leadership of these institutions or other interested parties
would like to represent themselves, these institutions are in fact highly relational, and are
cOl'lStantly being socially redefined by their members as depending on how they address a
Vari ety of social and ecological challenges. I, therefore, used ethnographic research

metl'lods over the course of nearly two years spent living in these communities, to study

 

how their institutions were created, how they are defined by their membership, how they
operate, and what challenges they face.

Ethnographic research is inherently exploratory, and is hypothesis-creating
research rather than hypothesis testing in nature. This dissertation is, therefore, organized

in a somewhat different fashion from many in a quantitatively-oriented natural resource

management department. A brief overview of the dissertation will help to prepare the
reader.

0 Chapter 1: Introduction

0 Chapter 2: A History of Lake Malawi’s Fisheries — In this chapter I first integrate a
history of Malawi’s fisheries with that of Malawi’s economic and political
development from pre-colonialism through colonialism to the 30-year post-
independence dictatorship. Then, I present an overview of the variety of documented

local fisheries management regimes that exist in Malawi today, most of which have

arisen since the start of multi-party democracy in 1993.

Chapter 3: Research Methods — Here I start by describing my selection of research
sites, the ethnographic research approach, and the value of the individual types of
data collected (interviews, participant observation, participatory rural appraisal,
archive and secondary documentation, household surveys, and participation in
Workshops and conferences). Additionally, I discuss the ways in which these are
Used in ethnographic research to achieve credibility, and how the data was analyzed.
Finally, I discuss some of the caveats in my research, relating to: the difficulty of
delineating and defining “community”, and the impact of my identity and that of my

primary research assistant on the research process and outcomes.

-8-

¥
_~——

 

0 Chapter 4: Presentation of Case Studies — The four case studies of community-

based fisheries management institutions are presented here.

0 Chapter 5: Analysis of Case Studies — I first introduce the theories of organizational
learning and ecological systems theory, and offer a framework for analyzing the
emergence and development of institutions related to natural resources management.
The above-mentioned case studies are then analyzed through this framework and I
explore key themes that unify the Malawian fisheries co-management case study

successes and failures.

0 Chapter 6: Conclusions - I offer suggestions as to how governments, NGOs,
communities, chiefs and donor agencies might achieve better results in their attempts
to introduce and support community-based natural resource management regimes by

adopting an adaptive organizational learning approach.

Chapter 2

A History of Development and Fisheries Management
Paradigms in Malawi

Introduction to the political nature of development, fisheries and ‘communities’

Over the course of the past century, fisheries management in Malawi has
undergone a series of changes as local, national, and international stakeholders have
gained and lost influence over national and local-level fishing governance institutions.
Early fishing institutions were less well documented than those which have been recently
established. However, written historical descriptions, oral accounts of the past by the
elderly, and the extent to which they continue to be practiced today allow us a certain
insight to their function in the past. Furthermore, the changing roles played by the three
main ‘actors’ (fishing community members, chiefs, government) in fisheries management
has also been a reflection of the prevailing spiritual values, national governance regimes,
and scientific paradigms of their times, some of which were imposed by, or borrowed

fiom the West.

As is illustrated by Figure 2-1, pre-colonial fishing activities were primarily
regulated by chiefs and fishing community members themselves. Over time, however,
first the community members, and then the colonial government gained, and lost,
influence as national policies, economy, fisher population, and fish stock abundances
evolved. Most recently, the government started a process of devolution of fisheries

management to community-based stakeholder committees. As the specific contexts of

-10-

local fish stocks and the socio-economic trends in different communities vary, so too has
the role of the traditional leaders varied. In some communities, traditional chiefs are the
driving force behind community mobilization around the needs of the fishery, while other
traditional leaders have failed to respond to their communities’ needs and are being

bypassed by emergent fishery stakeholder groups.

The evolving roles of different stakeholders in the management of local fisheries
reflected changes in local political and economic dynamics. Early political governance
and economic wealth tended to be dominated by local chiefs, whose roles as spiritual
leaders and primary intermediaries between communities and the outside world allowed
them to control many aspects of life in their communities, including that of larger-scale
fishing activities. With the establishment of the British colonial government, and the
imposition of hut taxes and peace in the territory, large numbers of men were led to seek
jobs inside the Nyasaland economy, and later in the larger Southern Afiican economy.
Although the chiefs benefited as well, the wealth and technologies that these people
brought back to their communities allowed many community members to exploit fish
stocks with greater efficiency than ever before(Withers 1952; McCracken 1987).
Combined with the growing transportation infrastructure within the country, many people
were therefore able to supply new markets with dried fish, and consequently diminished
the economic primacy of the chiefs (N yasaland 1932; McCracken 1987; Haraldsdéttir

2002).

-11-

 

Prc-colonial Colonial l-Pm Democrag Future
{-18805) (1891-1963) (me-93) Q993-2005)

Chiefs fix ' -

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

\
Government Wk

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Community J x xx’x

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 2-1. Trends of stakeholder roles in fishing institutions on Lake Malawi.
Overall, the colonial government avoided regulating the fishery, with the
exception of protecting African fishers from European competition. Additionally,
through the development of national transportation infrastructure, and by introducing
industrially-manufactured fishing materials (nets, floats, boats), it actively supported the
growth of the entrepreneurial African fishers. Gradually, however, the fish stocks started
showing signs of becoming over-fished, leading the post-independence dictatorship to
impose an increasingly centralized ‘scientific’ fisheries management (Chirwa 1996; Hara
2001). This management regime failed to ensure the sustainability of the fish stocks, and
most recently, the trends seem to be coming fiill-circle as community- and chief-led
fishing institutions are showing us possible avenues for the (re)creation of stewardship
ethics and sustainable fishing institutions by fishers. While the dominant fisheries
management regimes of different periods of history displaced prior institutions in many
parts of Malawi, examples of all of these institutions have persevered over time, and

modern-day fisheries management in Malawi can be seen as a patchwork of institutional

-12-

arrangements that reflect the full array of fisheries management paradigms. In the
remainder of this chapter, I provide a history of the development of fishing technologies
and institutions in Malawi over time, interspersed with a discussion of the (largely)
Western ecological and governance paradigms that guided Malawi’s various

governments’ attempts to imposed fisheries management regimes.

Pre-colonial Fishing Institutions and Practices

“Traditional” fishing methods varied in terms of their technologies; however, they
can be roughly grouped and discussed on the basis of the numbers of people who
participated in their construction and operation, and who had access to the catches.
Small-scale technologies such as spears (vyomba), fishing hooks (mbeja), reed traps
(mono), gillnets (machela/chilepa), and a variety of dip net forms (njero/pyassa/khombe)
were constructed, owned and operated by individual fishermen (or sometimes the owner
accompanied by an assistant) for use in rivers, streams, and the lakeshore (Livingstone
and Livingstone 1865; Bertram, Borley et a1. 1942; Hoole 1955; Mzumara 1967;
Mandala 1990 ).6 Although individual fishermen would regulme give tribute (in the form
of fish) to a chief, the fishermen had few limits on the types of fish that they could catch,
and had sole ownership of the fish caught in their fishing gear (Bertram, Borley et a1.

1942 ; Wilson 1951 ; Mandala 1990; Chirwa 1997). 7

 

6 A. Russell — Karonga District - Interviews with chiefs - 2004-03-10, 2004-04-08, 2004-04-12, 2005-03-
20.

7 Note: An exception in the case of some areas where specific species of fish may have been deemed to
belong to the chief, such as the catfish called mlamba (Clarias gariepinus) and the 11mg fish, locally called
dowe (Protopterus annectens brieni) in the Lower Shire River Mandala, E. C. (1990). Work and Control in
a Peasant Economy: A His_tory of fie Lower Tchiri Valley in Malawi 1859-1960. Madison, Wisconsin,
University of Wisconsin Press.-p.39.

 

-13-

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A separate group of fishing technologies involved communal or group-
construction, ownership and regulation of larger-scale fishing technologies, including
beach seines (mkwawo/khoka wa pansi) used on the lakeshore, and plant-based poisons
(mkhondo/katupi) and fishing weirs (vyelo/biiu) used in rivers. As these large-scale
fishing techniques required a coordinated investment of labor from a large number of
community-members to succeed, and as their use prohibited any other harvests of a local
fish stock, various levels of Chieftain-based regulations became institutionalized
(Munthali 1994).8 Geoffrey Wilson described a similar basis for the creation of land-

based rules of tenure:

“Not all these uses of land give rise to laws, moral rules or conventions,
but only those uses which tend to lead men into conflict with one another
or into mutual embarrassment. The only reasons for the existence of rules
of land tenure are firstly to prevent, as far as possible, such conflicts and
embarrassments from arising, and secondly, to facilitate their resolution
when aroused. " (Wilson 1938 )

The most commonly used group-fishing methods and their regulatory institutions
warrant further explanation as many of these methods and institutions continue to exist
along-side new technologies and institutions today. Additionally, they may provide
insights into the forms of traditional institutions that must be considered when creating

new fishing institutions at local levels.

Beach seines were traditionally made from natural Poulzolzia hypoleuca fibres

(known locally by diverse names: chopwa, bwazi, thingo, mulusa, lukayo, gavi, khonje)

 

8 In a speech given by the late Excellency- for-Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, he supported
the claim that in traditional Malawian societies, rivers, like wells and forests, were common goods, to
which no one could be refused access. This would support the establishment of the institutions aimed at
ensuring equitous access to river fisheries (such as the communal fishing weirs and uses of poisons), and if
extended to the lakeshore, the use of beach seines. Banda, H. K. (1977). Address by His Excellency the
Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, to gp_e_r_1 the Advisogy Board Meeting of the Commonwealth
Youth Develgpment Centre for Africa, Kwacha International Conference Centre, Blantyre, Malawi,
Department of Information, Government of Malawi.

-14-

and might require up to a year to construct (Livingstone and Livingstone 1865; Hoole
1955; Kamanga 1974; Nsiku 2001).9 The seines were taken far out into the lake by
canoe, and then hauled in to shore, a process that took between 1-2 hours, and which
required the collaborative effort of a large number of men (depending on the size of the
seine, between 12 and 20). Those people who contributed their labor received a portion of
the fish caught (Withers 1952; Hoole 1955). Additionally, in the case of beach seines
owned by village chiefs (as many of them were), all members of that chief’ s extended
family could expect to receive a portion of the fish caught. Apart from claims to the fish
catches themselves, many portions of the shoreline had few natural beaches which were
well-suited for the use of beach seines, and a large amount of labor was invested (under
direction of the chief) in clearing the lake-bed of obstructions (drift wood, tree stumps)
that might damage the seines. '0 Where these beaches were limited, some chiefs, such as
Native Authority Maganga in Salirna District, allocated the use rights to specific beaches
to beach seine owners (Withers 1952). At other beaches, any community members could
use the seining sites freely, however, visiting beach seine owners had to obtain
permission to use the beach and usually (though not always) this involved giving a tribute
of fish to the local chief (van Velsen 1964 ).11 Additionally, in order to maintain a
positive relationship with communities, most visiting beach seine owners traveled with
fewer men than needed to haul the seines, allowing local men to earn a portion of the fish

caught in exchange for their labor contribution (Withers 1952; van Velsen 1964 ).12 The

 

9 A. Russell — Karonga District - Interviews with a TA - 2004—04-12; A. Russell —Nkhotakota District -
Interview with a fisher - 2004-02-27; see Hoole (1955) for a detailed explanation of how these natural
fibres are used to make nets.

1° A. Russell -Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief- 200405-03;

-15-

opportunity to contribute labor in beach seining was also a valuable opportunity for
inland communities to earn and buy fish for sale in their communities, especially during
the dry season, when men’s’ labor was not required for farming (Withers 1952; Williams

1969; White 1987 ).

The application of poison to the upstream portions of rivers was another
communal fishing practice organized by the chiefs (Wilson 1951 ; Charsley 1969 ).13 The
poison (called mkhondo, katupe, dama, ndulusya) was derived from the leaves, seeds or
tubers of a variety of plants, including: T ephrosia nyasae, T. vogelii, T. zombensis,
Mundulea seicea, Lasiosiphon kraussianus, Cobretum temifolium and Mucuna sp., some
of which were cultivated for this purpose while some were also planted as hedges (Hoole
1955; Busse 1995 ). These poisons, when applied in rivers or wetlands turned the water a
bright green color, and stupefied all fish in the body of water, making them float to the
surface in a stunned though not dead condition (Bertram, Borley et a1. 1942; Busse
1995).14 The fish were then easily speared, netted and trapped by the men and women
who waited downstream (Wilson 1951). This form of fishing was generally regulated by
the chiefs, and but was infiequently used as the chiefs were well aware that the poisons
killed all adult and juvenile fish in the body of water (Wilson 1951 ; Charsley 1969 ).
Due to the need to apply these poisons in high concentrations, and contrary to subsequent
colonial perceptions of these as a hazard to migratory fish populations, these poisons
were mainly used following the end of the rainy season, when river flow had decreased
substantially or in dried riverbeds that left isolated stretches of water (Bertram, Borley et

a1. 1942; Busse 1995 ; Chirwa 1996).

 

‘3 A. Russell —Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief - 2005-03-20
‘4 A. Russell -Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief- 2002-07-15

-16-

The use of fishing weirs has been documented along many major African river
systems, including: the Zambezi (Scudder 1960), Lake Victoria’s Nyanza District
(Fosbrooke 1934; Whitehead 1958), and the Zambian Barotse Floodplain (Bell-Cross
1971) and Bangweulu Swamp (Brelsford 1946). In the case of Lake Malawi, they have
been documented on most major and minor rivers that flow into the lake, including:
Lufirio, Mbaka, Mbasi, Kiwira, Songwe, Rufilya, N. Rukuru, Luweya, Limphasa,
Banga, Dwambazi, Luluzi, Kamparara, Dwangwa, Bua, Kaombe, Lintippe, Lilongwe,

Bwanje, Luangwa, and Lunyo (Figure 2—2, below).

Additionally, fishing weirs were constructed in the smaller Lake Chilwa, and
across the mouth of the single outlet of Lake Malawi, the Shire River. David Livingstone
was the first European to record the use of these fishing weirs at the mouths of rivers

feeding into Lake Malawi:

“Abundance of excellent fish is found in the lake, and nearly all were new
to us. The mpasa, or sanjika ...was running up the rivers to spawn, like
our salmon at home: the largest we saw was over two feet in length; it is a
splendid fish, and the best we have ever eaten in Africa. They were
ascending the rivers in August and September, and furnished active and
profitable employment to many fishermen, who did not mind their being
out of season. Weirs were constructed full of sluices, in each of which was
set a large basket-trap, through whose single tortuous opening the fish
once in has but small chance of escape. A short distance below the weir,
nets are stretched across from bank to bank, so that it seemed a marvel
how the most sagacious sanjika could get up at all without being taken. ”
(Livingstone and Livingstone 1865)

-17-

 

 

 

fun" "u. MIIO Lemu—d;
Klwlra ..-. ...... ‘~~ ~. . Brown circles denote
'\ documented fishing
5 - ~. weirs
R ulllya ‘ ~. A Red triangle denotes
5 fishing institution
N. Rulam ‘ based on dip nets
I Green square denotes
active mpasa 8:
"0“” Rumphl sanjika fisheries but
.f no documented use of
3 fishing weirs
S. W : I
Umpliasa 7.". ‘
8: Balsa ‘.

gl-

_§
'ou
K.

'.§.- no-"

     

Lunyo

 

 

Luangwa

Shire (outflow)

Map adapted from African Lakes and River Research Group, U. of Waterloo website:
http://www.scienceuwaterloo.ca/departments/biologv/rcscarcll/uwacg/african lakes/Malawilltml.

Figure 2-2. Lake Malawi’s major tributaries with documented fish weirs. 1’

 

 

 

‘5 Documentation of the Tanzanian river fishing weirs Lufirio: van Hekken, P. M. (1986). Leven en
Werken in een Nyakyusa Dorp (Life and Work in a Nyakyusa village). Pam of Social Sciences. Utrecht,
Rijksrmiversiteit te Utrecht: 436. Busse, J. (1995). Die NM : Wirtschafl und Gesellschaft. Muenster,
LIT Verlag.; Mbaka: Bertram, C. K. R, H. J. H. Borley, et a1. (1942). 3.613211 on the fish and fisheries of
m London, Crown Agents for the Colonies. Charsley, S. R (1969). The Princes of NM.
Nairobi, Kenya, Published for the Makerere Institute of Social Research by the East African Publishing
House. Busse, J. (1995). Di; mm : Wm’ haft lmd 931mm. Muenster, LIT Verlag, Mbasi: Ibid.,

-13-

 

In Malawi these fishing weirs are called “biiu” or “vyelo”, which differ

significantly their style of construction and how they capture fish. However, both forms

 

Klwira: Charsley, S. R. (1969). The Princes ofNyakmsa. Nairobi, Kenya, Published for the Makerere
Institute of Social Research by the East African Publishing House. Busse, J. (1995). Die Ny_akflsa :
Wirtschafi und Gesellschafi. Muenster, LIT Verlag.. Documentation for Malawian river fishing weirs:
Songwe (which is shared with Tanzania): Ibid., Rufilya: A. Russell — Karonga District - Interviews with
a chief - 2004-03-10, 2004-05-31; A. Russell —Nkhotakota District - Interview with a fisher - 2005-02-01,
N. Rukuru: Lowe, R H. (1948). “Notes on the Ecology of Lake Nyasa Fish.” Nflsaland Journal 1(1): 39-
50., Luweya: Hoole, M. C. (1955). “Notes on Fishing and Allied Industries as Practised amongst the
Tonga of the West Nyasa District [1934].” Ibid. 8: 25-38. Jackson, P. B. N., T. D. Iles, et a1. (1963). Rgpgrt
on the Survey of Northern Lake Nyafl, 1954-55. Zomba, Malawi, Nyasaland Government Printer.
Nangoma, D. and S. Nyirenda (1991). Ndyaka Fishing Village, Northern Region. Lilongwe, Malawi,
Bunda College of Agriculture, Limphasa: Borley, H. J. H. (1962). Annual Report of the Department of
Game, Fish and Tsetse Control. Zomba, Nyasaland, Ministry of Natural Resources and Surveys,
Nyasaland: 52. Jackson, P. B. N., T. D. Iles, et al. (1963). Report on the Survey of Northern Lake Ny_asa,
1954-55. Zomba, Malawi, Nyasaland Government Printer., Banga: Ibid., Dwambazi: Hoole, M. C. (1955).
“Notes on Fishing and Allied Industries as Practised amongst the Tonga of the West Nyasa District
[1934].” Nflsaland Journal 8(1): 25-38. A. Russell —Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief - 2005-
03-20, Luluzi: A. Russell —Nkhotakota District - Interview with fishers - 2005-03-06, Kamparara: A.
Russell —Nkhotakota District - Interview with chiefs - 2005-05-03, 2004-07-03, 2005-03-02, Dwangwa: A.
Russell —Nkhotakota District - Interview with chiefs - 2005-05-03, 2005-03-02, Bua: Tweddle, D. (1980).
The Importance of Long-term Dita Collection on River Fisheries, with Particular Reference to the Cyprinid
saridium Microl is, Gunther, 1894) Fiiheries of the Aflluegt Rivers of La_ke Malgvyiy Seminar on
River Basin Management and Development, Blantyre, Malawi, CIF A. A. Russell —Nkhotakota District -
Interview with a chief - 2002—07-15, A. Russell —Nkhotakota District — Fishing observation - 2002-07-15),
Kaombe: Bertram, C. K. R., H. J. H. Borley, et a1. (1942). Rgport on the fish and fisheries of Lake Ny_asa.
London, Crown Agents for the Colonies. Berry, V. and C. Petty, Eds. (1992). The Nyasaland survey pamrs
1938-1943 : aggiculture, food and health. London, Academy Books Ltd., Lintippe: Bertram, C. K. R, H. J.
H. Borley, et a1. (1942). Rgport on the fish and fisheries of Lake Nflsa. London, Crown Agents for the
Colonies. Tweddle, D. (1980). The Importance of Long-term Data Collectiop on River Fisheries, with
Particular Reference to the Cyprinid 1staridium Microlgpis, Gunther, 1894) Fisheries of the Affluent
Rivers of Lake Malawi. Seminar on River Basin Management and Development, Blantyre, Malawi, CIFA.
Msosa, W. (1999). Fishery Culture and Origins of the Ethnicity-Tonga People of Lake Malawi. Ancient
Lakes: Their Cultural and Biologigll Divers_ity. H. Kawanabe, G. W. Coulter and A. C. Roosevelt.
Belgium, Kenobi Productions: 271-280., Lilongwe: Lowe, R. H. (1952). Report on the Tilapia and other
fish and fisheries of Lake Nyasa 1945-47., Fishery Publications of the Colonial Office: l—126., Bwanje:
Tweddle, D. (1980). The Importance of Long-term Data Collection on River Fisheries, with Particular
Reference to the Cyprinid lgpsaridium Microlgpis, Gunther, 1894) Fisheries of the Affluegt Rivers of Lake

Malawi. Seminar on River Basin Management and Development, Blantyre, Malawi, CIFA. Namagonya, S.
S. R. and N. Zamadenga (1992). Msaka Fishing Camp, Chimphamba Village (Mangochi), Southern
Region. Lilongwe, Malawi, Bunda College of Agriculture, Luangwa: Bertram, C. K R., H. J. H. Borley,
et a1. (1942). Rgport on the fish and fisheries of Lake Nflsa. London, Crown Agents for the Colonies, and
Lunyo: Ibid. Fishing weirs around Lake Chilwa were documented by Mzumara (1967), and sources for the
fishing weirs at the mouth of the Shire River were presented by McCracken (1987). The S. Rukuru River:
was also recorded as having significant mpasa or sanjika fisheries, however although there is a good
probability that weirs may have been used in this river at some point, neither their construction nor any
institutionalization of the fishery harvest has been documented. Tweddle, D. (1980). The Importance of
L_g_ng—term Dgt_a Collection on River Fisheries with Particular Reference to fly Cyprinid (Opsaridium
Microlgpis, Gunther, 1894) Fisheries of thy: Afilugnt Rivers of La_ke Mala_wL Seminar on River Basin
Management and Development, Blantyre, Malawi, CIF A.

 

 

 

-19-

of fishing weir involve the construction of large bamboo/reed barriers which are anchored
to the river bottom by poles driven into the river-bed, and which span the entire breadth
of the river. A number of gaps are left along the weir, into which different forms of reed
basket-like entrapment devices are placed aimed at capturing the fish swimming
upstream (on their way to the spawning beds) or downstream (after having spawned). For
further explanation see footnote.16 Due to the expected amount of water flow in the larger
rivers, these barriers are usually constructed toward the end of the rainy season, after

which the barriers are less likely to be washed away.

The common characteristic that motivated the evolution of such elaborate fishing
technologies, was the passage of the potamodromous (fish that migrate from lakes to
spawn in streams and rivers) mpasa (Opsaridium microlepis), sanjika/mperere
(Opsaridium microcephalus) and ntchila/ningwe (Labeo mesops). Though the timing of
their passage varies greatly between watersheds, they tend to coincide with the peak of
the rainy season (generally between November and May).17 A number of other fish that

may be caught include: the Tilapiid chambo (Oreochromys spp), and a number of Clariid

 

'6 Biiu is the general term for the fishing weirs constructed in the central region, and consist of a reed/log
barrier with a series of gaps into which fishing traps (called mono, pl. miono) are placed. Fish enter,
following the river currents that are funneled through the traps and are unable to exit. These traps can range
from 300m-2 meters in height, and must have to be removed regularly from the barrier to remove the fish
caught. When used in swamps or lake, they may contain bait in the form of a maize or cassava meal
porridge called nsima or kondowole, respectively. Vyelo is the name of the fishing weir used in the Ngonde-
spealdng part of Karonga. The vyelo is made up a series of boat-like capture devices, called chelo (pl.
vyelo). As with the biiu, the river flow is funneled through the individual chelo, and the fish enters an
enclosure from which it cannot exit except to jump out. In the process of jumping out, the fish land in a
large boat-like reed basin, and the fishermen can remove them from the basin without having to remove the
chelo itself.

'7 The earliest recorded spawning runs in the Lake Malawi watershed occur in the Luweya River, where
they may start as early as mid-August, in the height of the dry season. Hoole, M. C. (1955). “Notes on
Fishing and Allied Industries as Practised amongst the Tonga of the West Nyasa District [1934].”
leand Journal 8(1): 25-38.

Jackson, P. B. N., T. D. Iles, et a1. (1963). Report on the Survey of Northern Lake Nyasa, 1954-55. Zomba,
Malawi, Nyasaland Government Printer. In the past, depending on the rainfall patterns, informants tell me
that the spawning runs in the N. Rukuru River extended from the rainy season until as far as August (2004-
04—07-N.Rukuru-Kambitoto Fishers, 2004-06-02-N.Rukuru-Vyelo Observation).

-20-

catfishes, including kadyakolo/mpusi/kuyu (Barbus ewystomus), ngumbo/chikas/chimwe
(Barbusjohnstonii), tamba (Barbus litamba), and mlamba (Clarias gariepinus) (Hoole
1955; Jackson, Iles et a1. 1963; Tweddle, Seymour et al 1990).18 The construction of
smaller fishing weirs and strings of traps across estuaries and streams or in the lake itself
were also widespread practices, and were used throughout the year (Bertram et al., 1942;

Lowe, 1948b; Hoole, 1955; Jackson et al., 1963; Mandala, 1990).

Aside from the months when fishing weirs were in use, the rivers were open to all
forms of fishing by both men and women. However, once the weirs were constructed
each year, the exploitation of these spawning runs was strictly controlled by local chiefs
and all other fishing in the rivers was banned.” Furthermore, there was a strict hierarchy
to the positioning of peoples’ fishing traps along this barrier with the best slots (generally
those near the banks) allocated to the chiefs, their advisers and relatives. In the case of
smaller fishing weirs in the lake or smaller streams and estuaries, these were constructed
by a few (or single) individuals who retained exclusive rights to their harvests
(Livingstone & Livingstone, 1865; Berry & Petty, 1992).20 The design and institutions
surrounding these fishing weirs are elaborated upon in the case study of the North Rukuru
River in Chapter 4 that functioned in many ways identical to the fishing weirs described

here.

 

‘8 A. Russell —Nkhotakota District - Interview with fishers - 2005-03-06, 2005-03-07, A. Russell —
Nkhotakota District — Fishing Observation - 2002-07-15.

19 A. Russell —Karonga District - Interview with a chief - 2004—05-3 1, A. Russell —Karonga District -
Interview with fishers 2004-04-07.

2° These included two smaller rivers north of Dwangwa: the Kamparara River which flows into the Unaka
Lagoon, and the Luluzi River. The biiu across the Kamparara was divided between chiefs Mwamdimba
and Kamkhondo, and has long since been discontinued (A Russell —Nkhotakota District - Interviews with
chiefs - 2005-05-03, 2004—07-03, 2005-03-02). The Luluzi River biiu continues to be constructed by a
group of 5 older men, independent of any chiefs’ regulation (A. Russell —Nkhotakota District - Interview
with fishers - 2005-03-06). Also see Jackson’s discussion of the Limpasa and Banga Rivers near Nkhata
Bay. Jackson, P. B. N., T. D. Iles, et a1. (1963). Rmrt on the Survey of Northern Lake Nflsa, 1954-55.
Zomba, Malawi, Nyasaland Government Printer.

-21-

Overall, traditional modes of fishing seem not to have been regulated unless they
required a coordination of labor or if they had the potential to monopolize the harvest of
local fish catches to the detriment of other fishers’ needs. In these cases, the chiefs’ who
allocated usufi'uct rights (i.e. use rights) to the land to individual families, extended their
mandate to regulate (and in some cases exclusive of) the use of key sections of rivers and
shorelines for fishing (Hoole, 1955; van Velsen, 1964, 281-282; Mandala, 1990, 105;
Livingstone & Livingstone, 1865). As many of these rivers form a natural jurisdictional
boundary between chiefs’ territories, they frequently required the sharing of fishing weirs
between two communities. Along other rivers, the great demand for access to fish stocks
by surrounding communities has led to the creation of filrther institutional arrangements
to establish equity among communities (discussed in Chapter Four). Beyond their roles
as temporal rulers of the land, chiefs, whose positions were attained through their warrior
and leadership abilities, gained influence through their roles as mediators with the spirit
world and were seen as influential on environmental phenomena such as size of fish
catches, availability of rainfall, safety from crocodile and snake bites, etc (Charsley,
1969, 66-67 ; Mandala, 1990, 39 ; Busse, 1995, 281-282; Kalinga, 1974, 99; G. Wilson,
1939, 74; White, 1987, 164 ).2122 An interesting adaptation of the traditional fishing
rights in the Luweya River has resulted in the recent establishment of a similar system of

fishing rights at the Luweya River mouth (see Figure 2-3).

 

2' A. Russell —Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief - 2004-05-03; A. Russell —Nkhotakota District -
Fish Trading Observation - 2005-03-01.

22 However, Willis’s study of the reproduction of history and tradition by elders and chiefs also indicates
that chiefs’ spiritual powers over fertility and bounty always entailed a certain amount of contestation by
other men, and cannot ever have been seen as absolute. Willis, J. (2001). “'Beer Used to Belong to Older
Men': Drink and Authority among the Nyakyusa of Tanzania.” Africa 71(3): 373-390.

 

-22-

 

Luweya River Dipnet Fishing Institution

In the Luweya River, in addition to the construction of at least 2 fishing weirs, a
restriction of access to migrating fish has been imposed by VH Ngombo’s
chiefiaincy where the river is forced through a narrow canyon at Chiwandama
Falls ( as is indicated by the red triangle in Figure 2-2, above) (van Velsen,
1964; Hoole, 1955). In this case control over the fishery has been exerted
through the chiefiain’s claim to ownership over rights to use a number of small
rock ledges (measuring only a few square inches in size), known as vuu, from
which fishermen are able to catch the migrating fish using dip-nets (van Velsen,
1964; Hoole, 1955). There are a total of 10 vuu over the falls, and the best are
claimed by VH Ngombo, however he has allowed a few other chiefs and
individuals to fish the vuu in return for portions of their catches or various forms
of allegiance (van Velsen, 1964; Hoole, 195 5). In this case, the general
population is fiee to fish in other parts of the river (Hoole, 1955).

In an interesting parallel, gillnet fishers who specialize in catching sanjika at the
river mouth of the Luweya River, established a similar system of exclusive
ownership to specific fishing locations in the 1970-803 (Nangoma, 1991).

 

 

 

Figure 2-3. Luweya River Dipnet Fishing Institution

Social and Economic Change for the Northern Lakeshore Peoples during Proto-

lEarly Colonialism (1890-1910’s)

Even before Great Britain officially colonized the Nyasaland Protectorate in 1891,
interactions between lakeshore communities and foreign missionaries and businesses
were transforming the fishing economy. The successfiil rebellion by the lakeshore Tonga
fi'om their enslavement by the Ngoni in 1877, enabled lakeshore communities to leave the
protection of their fortified stockades (called linga), and settle along the central lakeshore
(van Velsen, 1964, 17). Similarly, the Henga (a subgroup of the Tumbuka people)
rebelled against the Ngoni in 1879 and settled in the extreme northern lakeshore of
Nyasaland (Karonga District). This region also rapidly came under the administrative
and economic control of the British administration and traders once the Swahili traders

who posed a challenge to British rule and trade were beaten in a battle in 1894 (Kalinga

-23-

1974 ). Following these events, British missionaries established a number of schools and
missions in the “Tongaland” lakeshore (present-day Nkhata Bay District) and Karonga
District, enabling people fiom these areas to rapidly gain a dominant presence in labor,
clerical, and military jobs for the colonial administration and foreign-owned commercial

sectors (Kalinga, 1974, 134; van Velsen, 1959; McCracken, 1977, 2002)

In addition to these voluntary interactions between colonialists and the Malawian
population, the colonial administration started to influence local communities in a more
profound way with the 1889 introduction of a hut tax (Sanderson 1961; White 1987 ).
Required to pay these taxes in cash, large numbers of men were forced to migrate to the
European-owned coffee plantations in southern Nyasaland in order to raise the firnds
needed (White, 1987, 86 ; Ng'ong'ola, 1990;. However, this policy failed to attract
sufficient, and well-tirned labor to the plantations as most Afiicans chose to contribute
the minimum amount of labor necessary for earning their hut tax money, and did so
during the dry season when their own farming activities didn’t require their attention
(White, 1987, 86 ; Mandala, 1990, 103 ). To address the problem of southern
Malawians’ unwillingness to spend long periods of time away from home, the plantation
owners successfully attracted laborers from northern Nyasaland. These northemers
(including the Tonga, Tumbuka, Ngoni), who lacked opportunities for earning cash in the
North to pay their hut taxes, proved ideal workers for the southern plantations as they
were willing to spend extended periods of time away fiom home. However, the poor
labor conditions in Nyasaland’s plantations rapidly led growing numbers of Malawians to
seek jobs in the better paid mining and service sectors outside Malawi, in particular: in

the Rhodesias (today, Zimbabwe and Zambia), South Afiica, the Belgian Congo,

-24-

Mozambique, and Tanzania, (McCracken, 1977; Mandala, 1990, 115 ;Ng'ong'ola, 1990;
McCracken, 2002; Coleman, 1974; G. Wilson, 1939, 70. Among Nyasaland’s migrant
workers, much as was the case within Nyasaland itself, the more educated northern ethnic
groups (Tonga, Tumbuka, Ngoni, and Ngonde) quickly gained access to better paid jobs

than did Nyasaland’s other migrant workers (McCracken, 1977; White, 1987, 87 ;

The First Major integration of Lake Malawi’s Fishing Economy into the Colonial

Economy (1910-1930)

The first major period of change to the fishing economy of Lake Malawi occurred
during and following World War I, a decade of extreme environmental shocks and
economic opportunities in the Southern Nyasaland region. A precursor to the ensuing
transformations was the 1908-09 establishment of a roads network connecting nascent
areas of economic and population growth in the plantation (Mulanje, Tyolo),
administrative (Zomba) and commercial (Blantyre, Lirnbe) centres of southern Malawi
(Perry 1969). While the majority of fish demand for these areas had previously been
supplied by traders fiom nearby Lake Chilwa, this shallow lake dried up alrno st
completely during 1913-15 and 1920-2 (Lancaster 1979). The arrival of large numbers of
British and South Afiican troops in Zomba and Blantyre during WW I, which coincided
with episodes of fish scarcity in Lake Chilwa, were key factors that prompted larger scale

investments in fishing and fish trading in Lake Malawi (McCracken 1987).

Chief Mwamadi Matewere at Fort Johnston (today, Mangochi) was foremost in
taking advantage of this sudden demand for fish. In 1917 he constructed a fishing weir

across the entire mouth of the Shire river (the outlet of Lake Malawi, which first flows

-25-

into Lake Malombe, and then continues south to join the Zambezi River), and large
numbers of fish traders started to make (on foot or by bicycle) the 80-120 mile trip
between the southern tip of Lake Malawi and the various markets in the southern
highlands cities (McCracken 1987). The post-war period, however, was a tumultuous
time when many southern Nyasaland Afiicans were forced to relocate their homes, and
adjust livelihood strategies to support themselves and to earn the money needed to pay
their hut taxes. The 1918 global Spanish flu epidemic was followed months later by a
small-pox epidemic, extreme flooding of low-lying areas in 1918-19, and then two years
of extreme drought, resulting in the catastrophic famine of 1921-22 (Mandala, 1990, 110
;. At Lake Malombe, cotton and crop fields which had been cultivated in the dry Lake
Malombe basin were then inundated in the mid-1920’s by a period of high rainfall
leading to an influx of people into the growing fishing and fish trading sector
(McCracken 1987). These pressures created cash shortages among the African
population, forcing many to work in plantations to earn the money needed to pay hut
taxes (N yasaland 1923). Nevertheless, the colonial government noted Afiicans’

disinclination to work in the plantation sectors:

“[77hose natives who can be induced to grow economic corps for
themselves chiefly belong to the class that would otherwise be content to
lead an undisturbed village life, with few needs and but little compulsion
to seek employment with Europeans in order to satisfy those needs. "
(Nyasaland 1923)

, and their (particularly among those in the Central and Northern regions)

preference for migrating abroad:

“The natives of the Central and Northern Provinces appear loath to work
for European estates, and apparently rely on remittances from friends and
relatives in Rhodesia or on their own savings to provide money for their
taxes and modest domestic needs. [Uhe European planting community is
becoming increasingly alive to the fact that, if they are to continue to

-26-

obtain an adequate supply of plantation labour, the conditions under

which labourers are engaged and employed must be very carefully

considered (N yasaland 1923)

In 1930 the colonial government provided a first estimate of the importance of the
fish trading industry at over 10,000 people (N yasaland 1930), and in one Southern district
it was noted that up to half of the Afiican male population was engaged in some aspect of
the fish trade (N yasaland 1931). The importance of the fishing industry for Afiicans’
need to raise hut tax funds was also illustrated during that year when the revenue raised in
taxes was significantly impacted by an extended cold season that delayed the
commencement of the African fishing season (N yasaland 1930). Additionally, a basic
road network continued to be improved and expanded throughout much of the Nyasaland
protectorate including connecting the main trunk road fiom southern Malawi through to
Karonga in the North, and construction of feeder roads to lakeshore areas: Ekwendeni-
Nkhata Bay-Chinteche, Kasungu-Nkhotakota, Dowa-Salima (N yasaland 1930). These
infrastructural improvements facilitated the growth of bicycle- and truck-transport during
the 19208, connecting the more isolated regions of the country to the regional and
southern trade centers, and enabling the growth of the entrepreneurial fish trading class as
far North as Nkhotakota (though due to the tremendous flooding of the Bua and
Dwambazi Rivers, the northern part of the Nkhotakota District, where 2 of my case

studies are located, remained isolated) (Nyasaland 1923; Nyasaland 1930; Perry 1969;

McCracken 1987).

Although the immigration of men due to the colonial hut tax drastically changed
the demographic makeup of lakeshore communities, the early colonial administration

largely left the management of the fishing industry to itself. As quoted by McCracken,

-27-

the colonial sentiment toward the Afiican fishing industry was summed up by the British

Museum Nyasa Expedition leader, Dr. Cuthbert Christie,

“no interference, ofi‘icial or otherwise, could be of any benefit to the

native, who makes his own string, his nets and his canoes and his basket

traps... [and who] puts out his nets when the Lake allows him to do so. ”

(McCracken 1987)

Therefore, the only regulations that limited fishing effort would have been those
imposed by individual chiefs (such as those regulating access to communal fishing
resources: access to seining beaches, fishing weirs, and the use of poisons in rivers)
(Withers 1952; Chirwa 1996). In fact, not only were the chiefs the only regulatory force
in fishing, as has been documented by Chirwa (1996), many chiefs in the south

manipulated social relationships in their communities, making use of free labor to accrue

great wealth with the growth of the fish markets.

Whereas the southern lakeshore is relatively shallow and highly productive, a
significant portion of the northern lakeshore is characterized by steep cliffs and a narrow
littoral zone, meaning that the productivity of the northern waters was much less than that
in the South (Lowe 1948). This made northern fishermen more dependent on the deep-
water and migratory river fish stocks; however, this early colonial period saw great
technological and fishing method innovation with the introduction of the usikite and
chilimira open water seines. In particular, these communities were able to better exploit

the pelagic utaka (Haplochromis spp.) and usipa (Engraulicypris sardella) fish stocks.

The chilimira was introduced to the northern Likoma and Chizirnulo islands by

Arab traders in the 1870’s, and was brought to today’s Nkhata Bay District around the

-23-

turn of the century (Jackson, Iles et a1. 1963; McCracken 1987).23 Although utaka had
previously been caught near shore with beach seines, the chilimira allowed lakeshore
communities to target the small utaka in the open waters, where they quickly learned to
associate the presence of utaka shoals with the submerged rock formations known as
virundu (sing. chirundu).24 Several factors make this a challenging fishing method: the
fishermen have to coordinate the activities of 8-9 crew members in 2 canoes, the boat
captain has to be able to locate a chirundu that may be far out in the lake (up to a mile
fiom shore) and too deep to see (generally between 10-20m, but sometimes up to 40m
deep), they require a good understanding of the underwater “mweza” currents that are
crucial for a successful net deployment, and at night, they need a “siginala” (signalrnan)
who can locate shoals in the dark and coordinate the ascent of the net while luring the
fish into the net with his light flare (Jackson, Iles et a1. 1963; Kamanga 1974;
Haraldsdottir 2002).” Given the difficulty of finding these underwater rock formations as
well as the detailed local knowledge necessary for effectively fishing each individual
chirundu, the virundu in some areas were recognized as the private fishing grounds of the
fishing crew that discovered it (van Velsen 1964 ). Where no ownership is claimed,
competition from non-local fishers is still unlikely as lacking the detailed knowledge of
the local fishing grounds a fisherman risks snagging (and losing) his fishing gear on the
underwater mount (Jackson, Iles et a1. 1963). Subsequently, imported mosquito nets were

also incorporated into the chilimira, and when used at night with light attraction (a

‘

:A Russell- Karonga District— Interview with a chief- 2004- 04-08.

However, when used at night, a third canoe bears a flare to lure the fish into the middle of the net right as
5:16 net is being drawn to the surface.

”.A Russell —Nkhotakota District— Fishing Observations- 2004-05-02, 2004- 05- 11.

-29-

practice called kauni fishing), the chilimira became ideally suited for the smaller usipa as

well (Bertram, Borley et al. 1942).26

The highly effective, though less complex usikite seine was developed as northern
migrant workers’ brought/sent back mosquito nets to their lakeshore communities (Hoole
1955). These light, fine-meshed nets were ideally used when the mweza currents drove
the usipa into relatively shallow waters (less than 5 meters), allowed 2 men to encircle or
swim through usipa shoals with their net spanned (Hoole 1955; Jackson, Iles et a1. 1963).
As with the chilimira net, this technique was frequently used at night in combination with
light flares, enabling the fishermen to lure the usipa into the shallows where they could

more easily be caught by the divers (Kamanga 1974).

The Impacts of Africa’s Eden-like Representation in European imaginations

During the 19th and early the 20th Centuries, European knowledge of Afiica and
Afiicans was dominated by explorers’ accounts of mythical peoples, customs, and
wilderness. These images evolved into two parallel yet contradictory streams of thought,
one seeing Afiicans as “noble savages” living in Utopist harmony with nature, while the
other saw the Afiican landscape and its inhabitants as being in need of European
civilization, development and conversion (Adams and McShane 1992). This dichotomy
reflected the contemporary opposition between US preservationists, like Henry David

Thoreau and John Muir who wanted to preserve wilderness, and a utilitarian view of

‘

26 A. Russell —Nkhotakota District — Interview with fishers - 2002-07-12, 2003-1 l-Ol-Ngala-KPhiri; A.
Russell —Nkhotakota District - Enforcement observation - 2003-11-04.

-30-

nature represented by Gifford Pinchot, the first Director of the US Forest Service.27 A
key point of ignorance (or racism) that underscored both views of Africa was a failure to
recognize that the mid 19th Century Afiican landscapes’ were not in any way ‘natural’,
rather they were nature’s response to the decimation and displacement Afiicans due to
the slave trade, internal strife and the introduction of European diseases (White 1987 ;

Mandala 1990; Adams and McShane 1992; Morris 1996).

One of the most noteworthy explorers in the context of opening southern Afiica to
Europeans was the first European to traverse the Afiican continent, David Livingstone,
whose trip to Lake Malawi in 1856 gave us our first extensive description of the Lake
Malawi region and its people.28 Explorers’ descriptions were invariably intended to
appeal to their European audiences and financial patrons, and therefore frequently
misrepresented Afiica in order to attract further financial support and common acclaim.
Livingstone’s depictions of Afiica, its inhabitants and the potential for British
colonialism to thrive there, as described in his published accounts, consequently differed
diametrically fi'om those in his private journals. Livingstone’s public Afiica was a
paradise: accessible through navigable rivers, the land was fertile and produced foods in
excess, the population were carefree and overwhelmingly fiiendly tribes; however, in his
private Afiica, there were dysentery, a lack of food, hostile tribes, fiequent malarial

attacks, and rather than being heroic quasi-Christians, he despised his Kololo guides who

 

27 The origins for this dichotomy are traced to similar dichotomies in the Bible, Roman society, and the
middle age story of Beowulf. Adams, J. S. and T. O. McShane (1992). The Myth of Wild Afiica:
Conservation without Illusm New York, W.W.Norton & Company.

28 However, despite his claims of being the first to actually visit Lake Malawi, a number of earlier
Portuguese visitors provided us with short descriptions based on third-hand accounts or short visits to the
region: Gaspar Bocarro (1616), Luis Mariano (1627), Francisco Lacerda (1798), two pombieros or half-
castes who are not named (1802), Candido de Costa Cardosa (1848). In particular, Livingstone benefited
fi'om a sketched map given to him by Mr. de Costa Cardosa, though Livingstone would later deny meeting
him. Ransford, O. (1966). Livingstone's Lake : the Drag: of Nyasa. London, England, John Murray.

-31-

murdered and pillaged as they traveled and who sold members of their own clan into

slavery (Ransford, 1966, 75-78 ; Adams & McShane, 1992, 14-17 ).

This representation of a bountifiil, Eden-like Africa under siege from the (truly)
rapacious Arab slave traders was first taken up as a call to arms by a number of religious
societies, and later by the British government, who sent missions to the area that would
become Nyasaland (now Malawi) (White, 1987). Nevertheless, reflecting the ecological
utilitarian-preservationist divide, even Livingstone was conflicted over the benefits of
colonialism and Western commerce, on one hand seeing it as a means to convert the
people to Christianity and protect them from the slave trade, and on the other hand,
recognizing that this would require the subordination of Afiicans to an external

govemment’s rule which could only engender their hatred (Adams & McShane, 1992).

Early colonialist attitudes toward nature have been explored extensively by
Morris (1996) and Adams and McShane (1992). As many of the colonial plantation
owners, missionaries, and administrators were avid hunters, the early game regulations
were designed primarily to establish exclusively European hunting reserves reminiscent
of aristocratic privileges in Europe. Reflecting this paradigm, all traditional hunting
methods used by Africans (nets, traps, snares, poisons, pitfalls, the use of fire and dogs)
were labeled as “irrational, cruel and destructive”, and banned.29 In addition, the
establishment of a gun taxes effectively barred any Afiicans from legally owning guns.
These hunting reserves were not, however, intended for conservation reasons. Rather,

they were intended to provide habitat for large ungulates so that they could be hunted by

 

29 The negative attitudes towards many of these hunting techniques were based on Europeans’ exclusive
htmting society’s views of the hunting methods used by ‘poachers’ in Europe.

-32-

Europeans while not being destructive in surrounding communities’ agricultural lands.

Indeed, outside the reserves, there was no protection of these ‘game species’.30

In relation to ‘game’ species, therefore, many colonialists regarded Africans as
needing civilization. As was seen in the previous section, however, fisheries were treated
differently during the early colonial years, with Africans being described in benign terms
(i.e., the “noble savage” image). This would only change in specific cases (to be
discussed) where the use of traditional fishing weirs and poisons were considered

irrational and destructive.

The First Colonial Fishing Regulations and a Growing Entrepreneurial Class Cause

the Decline of the Chiefs (1930-1950)

Although the colonial government had seen no need to regulate the fishing
industry during the first decades of its administration, growing concerns over the
declining authority of chiefs, conflicts between European and Afiican fishermen (see next
section), deforestation and the perceived unsustainable and unsporting traditional fishing
practices led the government to impose certain restrictions in 1930’s (Chirwa, 1996). A
glimpse of the general social context is provided by one District Commissioner’s
observation that fully one-half of the adult population in his district was “engaged in
work connected with the fishing industry and that its value to the District [was] not less

than £1,200 per annum.” (Nyasaland, 1931a)

 

3° As described by Morris (1996) in Nyasaland’s 1897 game schedule, ‘game’ referred specifically to:
elephant, blue wildebeest, rhinoceros, zebra, buflalo, eland, warthog, bushpig, and roughly 19 species of
antelopes. Carnivores and other smaller mammals were not considered game, however, and could be killed
by anyone. The exact membership in the ‘game’ category would change somewhat in subsequent game
schedules.

-33-

One event that prompted the change from a previously hands-off policy was the
decreasing water levels in Lake Malawi between 1930-35 that enabled fishermen (both
Afiican and European) to construct a multitude of fishing weirs across the outlet of Lake
Malawi into the Shire River. The competition over positioning of fishing weirs at the
river mouth became a source of conflict between Afiican chiefs and Europeans, leading
the government to introduce regulations limiting this fishery. Chirwa (1996) and Msosa
(1999) claim that the government lacked a scientific basis for judging fishing weirs as
unsustainable, and regard these colonial regulations as based on a Eurocentric distaste for
large-scale communal Afiican fishing methods. They argue that traditional fishing weir
traps allowed fish fly to pass through weirs unharmed, capturing only the adult fish, and
that in times of high rains, water flow in most rivers would wash away the traps or
prevent their construction, allowing some adults to pass en route to their breeding
grounds. While this argument may hold merit in relation to the construction of fishing
weirs to capture potamodromous fish like mpasa and sanjika in the rivers that flow into
Lake Malawi, the particular low-water flow conditions at the Shire River mouth during
1930-33 may have warranted the regulations passed as the weirs could intercept most of

the chambo that migrated to Lake Malombe to breed.

The application of fishing weir regulations to the other river fisheries around Lake
Malawi, and the bans on the use of fishing poisons may, indeed, have been influenced by
Eurocentric values, which Chirwa (1996) quotes in regard to this practice as,
“destructive, primitive, unprofessional and unsporting”, and were judged as a threat to
fish stock recruitment (Chirwa, 1996). The sport-fishing values of mpasa and sanjika

most certainly raised their profiles in the colonial government’s policies, which did not

-34-

appreciate that Afiican uses of fishing poisons and weirs had been sustainable in the past
due to the constraints posed by the rivers themselves. As discussed above, the fishing
weirs could only be constructed when river levels are low enough, allowing some adults
to pass when they flood, and fish fi'y were able to pass through the fishing weirs
unimpeded. Similarly, the use of poisons was generally regulated by chiefs for infrequent
use in isolated riverbed pools, slow-moving water bodies, and smaller streams, where
they were effective only in high doses (Chirwa, 1996; Msosa, 1999). Nevertheless, these
practices were all banned due to a colonial dislike that may well be traced to the

Eurocentric hunting values discussed above.

These fishing practices were therefore the first to be regulated in the Nyasaland
Protectorate with the creation of Fishing Rules in the Game Ordinance of 1930 (for
fishing weirs) and the Game Ordinance of 1937 (for fishing poisons). In accordance with
these rules, any weirs constructed across the entire width of a river, and within 2 miles of
the river mouth, had to leave a gap in the barrier at least 5% the width of the river to
allow some proportion of the fish to pass (Nyasaland, 1931b). Regarding the use of
fishing poisons, these were banned altogether (Nyasaland, 1937b). In addition to these
regulations, concerns over logging of certain tree species in order to supply canoes led
the colonial government to set quotas on the number of trees that could be felled for the
construction of canoes and required the payment of a royalty to the chief on whose land

the trees stood (Nyasaland, 1937a; Njaidi, 1995).

While conservation was a primary concern in passing these regulations, they took
on an entirely new aspect with the formal implementation of “Indirect Rule” through the

“Native Treasuries” and “Native Courts Ordinances” in 1933 (Mandala, 1990, 204 ;

-35-

Chirwa, 1996; M. M. Hara, 2001, 72). Whereas many chiefs’ roles as intermediaries
with the spirit world had historically given them a popular mandate to govern their areas,
the gradual Christianization and capital accumulation of the Nyasaland population had
diminished their authority (Mandala 1990 ; Willis 2001). Through indirect rule,
however, chiefs found an alternative source of authority as they were officially
empowered to hear local legal cases and maintain a treasury, were required to establish a
quota system for canoe trees harvested, and retained a portion of but tax and canoe
royalties collected in their jurisdictions. (Woods 1990; Willis 2001) Many chiefs,
therefore, embraced the new- found powers and sources of wealth that the colonial
government’s indirect rule policy gave them (N yasaland, 1934, 1949a; Woods, 1990;

Willis, 2001)?’1

However, the unpopular nature of the tree tax and numerous other conservation
regulations32 meant that many village chiefs who supported the governments’ regulations
(which were a new source of power and wealth) faced a severe erosion of their
communities’ trust and cooperation (Nyasaland 1949; Chirwa 1996; Allison, Mvula et al.

2002).33 In addition to being resented as an impediment to the fishing industry, the quotas

 

31In fact, in many cases, Willis argues that our modem-day conceptions of pre-colonial Chieftain powers are
a figment of on-going chiefs and elders’ re-creations of history and tradition as they struggle to gain access
to resources by reenacting ‘traditional’ values that validate their spiritual roles. In some cases, weak
chiefiaincies therefore gained a great amount of influence over local communities with the spread of
indirect rule (Willis, 2001). Similarly, in southern Malawi, many chiefs who claim a Chieftain lineage
actually gained their chiefiaincies through their collaborative roles as civil servants in the colonial
administration or the hated plantation foremen called ‘capitaos’ (Woods, 1990).

32 In particular, farming regulations aimed at decreasing soil erosion were resented for the harsh
punishments that could include hard labor, fines and prison terms (Thomas, 197 5; Njaidi, 1995). The
cruelty of the regulations was described by Malawi’s first president, H.K. Banda: “If a person did not grow
maize according to the regulations of the Department of Agriculture, if he did not plant his maize in ridges,
he was sent to prison for six or nine months. Not only that. His maize was uprooted. The result was that the
man served a term of imprisonment for six to nine months and when he came back, he found his wife and
children starving.” (H. K. Banda, 1976)

33 This is strongly supported in a speech given by President H. K. Banda, stating that in traditional
Malawian society, forests were common property goods, to which no one could be refilsed access or

-35-

and taxes on trees limited peoples’ access to construction timbers for housing, and even
some chiefs argued against this regulation (N jaidi, 1995; Chirwa, 1996). In some cases
therefore, chiefs withheld their active support for these regulations. Additionally, the
understaffed colonial game wardens were frequently willing collaborators with
‘poachers’, and therefore most conservation regulations were regularly ignored or
circumvented during the 1930-40$ (Wilson 1951 ;Hoole 1955; Njaidi 1995; Chirwa
1996). However, oral history evidence suggests that some chiefs in Karonga had become
aware of the need to limit the use of poisons by the 19503, and restricted them to use in

smaller bounded wetlands, riverbed pools and river side-channels.34

The lack of a highly productive littoral zone along the northern and central
lakeshore meant that these areas were more dependent on the river fisheries and off-shore
chilimira fishery than the southern lakeshore. Consequently, any restrictions on
construction of weirs, use of poisons, and harvesting of trees for canoes which were
crucial for both chilimira fishing and transportation, had greater impacts on northern
livelihoods than those in the South (Bertram et al., 1942).” Although the lack of
personnel to enforce these unpopular regulations enabled much illegal felling, the quotas
forced some in the Northern Districts to travel as far as Tanganyika to purchase trees or
canoes (Hoole, 1955; Chirwa, 1996). During this period, the colonial administration did

note the increasing return of northemers who proceeded to invest large amounts of

 

charged for the rights to harvest timber (H. K. Banda, 1977b). See below for discussion of how these
resentments were used by the post-independence government to centralize all power under the presidency,
stripping the chiefs of any independence.

3‘ A. Russell — Karonga District - Interviews with chiefs - 2004-03-10, 2004-04-19.

35 Due to the topography of the lakeshore in the North, many areas are dificult to access other than by
canoes. Additionally, whereas beach seining (the dominant large-scale fishing technique used in the
southern lakeshore) only requires the use of 1 canoe, chilimira fishing (very commonly used in the North)
requires the use of 2 when used during the day, or 3 canoes when used at night (the third being used to
carry the flare that lures fish into the net).

-37-

money from their migrant labor into a variety of trades, which for the Tonga, in
particular, cannot but have included significant investments in fishing gears (and the

purchase of canoes in Tanganyika, as mentioned above) (Nyasaland, 193 0).

Growth of Non-African Commercial Fishing Industries (1930-1960).

With the rapid growth of markets for fish in the southern highlands and the
improved transportation infrastructure allowing more rapid truck transfers of fish to
markets, a number of European settlers embraced the new investment opportunities in
Lake Malawi’s fisheries (Williams, 1969). The first European fishing investments took
place in 1930 at the outlet of Lake Malawi into the Shire River (near Fort Johnston, now
Mangochi), where first a Mr. Liegl, and then the Greek Yiannakis brothers copied the
Afiican fishing methods and constructed their own fishing weirs right on the upstream
side of those owned by Chief Mwamadi Matewere and Chief Mponda, respectively
(McCracken, 1987; Chirwa, 1996). Needless to say, these events created animosity
between the Afiican and European fishing crews, and following a fight between Leigl
and Matewere’s men, the government passed Lake Malawi’s first fishing regulations, the
Fishing Rules of 1930. These regulations banned non-Afiicans from fishing within 2
miles of the river mouth, banned all uses of poisons, and required that all fishing weirs be
constructed with a gap in the middle to allow some fish to pass through (McCracken,

1987; Chirwa, 1996).

The Yiannakis brothers were not deterred, however, and leased several plots of
lakeshore land near Chipoka (12 miles North of Fort Johnston), where they started fishing

with imported beach seine nets in 1934, and added small scale trawling to their repertoire

-33-

in 1938 (McCracken, 1987; Chirwa, 1996). Additionally, they had purchased four trucks
which they used to transport fiesh fish to Zomba and Blantyre, and from 1938 they used
these to export dried fish to plantations in Southern Rhodesia (today, Zimbabwe)
(Bertram et al., 1942). The successes of the Yiannakis Brothers stimulated a large number
of other Europeans and Asians to invest in both the fishing and trading businesses,
though the Yiannakis remained the only year-round fishing operation up to 1940
(McCracken, 1987; Chirwa, 1996). Beach seine fishing for chambo was the most
important fishery for these companies; however, ring nets contributed some chambo, and
gillnets contributed mostly “ntchila” (Labeo mesops).36 (Lowe 1952) The sharp growth
of the non-African commercial fisheries in their early years, in particular during World
War 11, (Figure 2-4, below) was due to a steady increase in fishing effort.37 However, due
to poor enforcement of record-keeping standards prior to 1946, Lowe (1952) judged the
number of fish caught in 1946 to be significantly lower than that in 1944, raising
concerns that the fishery was being exploited beyond a the level of maximum sustainable
yield (MSY). This conclusion was reinforced by the declines in the proportions of inshore
chambo species (Tshirana, T.saka, quuamipinnis), and increased catches of the open-

water T. Iidole and juvenile chambo (Lowe, 1952).

 

3° lO-20% of beach seine catches were composed of other species (primarily catfish: Bagrus spp. Clarias

s p.) , although these, along with long line catches were generally not recorded.

3 Data from the early non-Afiican fisheries sector is scanty with a gap for 1940—41, and this graph must be
considered an underestimate of fish caught. Figures for 1937-1939 are from Bertram et a1. (1942), 1942-
1946 are fi'om Lowe (1952). Note: While Bertram et al.’s figures reflect those presented by Chirwa (1987),
Lowe (1952) and Williams’s (1968) inexplicably show lower catch data for the Yiannakis operations
between 1937-1939 (29, 203, and 271 short tons respectively).

-39-

 

 

I Trataris & Matsicas

Osman
I Tylor
I Yiannakis

  

Figure 24. Early Non-African Fishery Catch levels in Lake Malawi.
In comparison with the colonial government’s supportive attitude towards Anglo-
Saxon planters, the non-Anglo-Saxon, non-Protestant, non-English-speaking Greek
fishers were seen unfavorably, and in most conflicts with African fishers, the colonial
government sided with the Afiicans (McCracken, 1987). In addition to ethnic bias, this
policy trend was partially motivated by the role that the fishery played in providing
lakeshore Afiicans with a source to earn their hut tax revenues. However, the
relationship between Greek and African fishers was not a simple one of colonialist
capitalists threatening small-scale African fishers’ livelihoods. In fact, as will be
discussed further in the next section, many African chiefs had entered into exclusive
trading relationships with European and Asian fish traders, denying local fish traders
access to fish for local sale. In contrast, the non-African fishers supported the small-scale
local fish traders by selling a portion of the fish to traders at their depot as well as selling

fish fi'om their trucks at stops along the main road (McCracken, 1987; Chirwa, 1996).

-40-

McCracken (1987) provides a compelling discussion of why the Greek fishers’
exports of fish reinforced the colonial government’s unsympathetic attitude towards
them. The 1938-1943 Nyasaland Nutritional Survey pressured the government to ensure
the availability of cheap fish within the colony due to its importance as a source of
protein in a country that was lacking in other meat. In particular, EurOpean plantation
owners, who were being forced to improve labor conditions, also wanted to secure cheap
sources of fish to feed their laborers and pressured the government to take action against
the export of fish (Chirwa 1996; Allison, Mvula et a1. 2002). Chirwa (1996) also noted
that there was great pressure fiom Afiican politicians and chiefs, who had vested interests
in fishing, to reduce the influence of the Greek fishers for personal economic reasons.
The government finally imposed a ban on fish exports following the 1949 famine,
however, a distrustful relationship remained between the government and the Yiannakis
Bros, leading some to call for the removal of the firm from the fishing industry
altogether. Regardless of the govemment’s disapproval, Yiannakis Bros. remained the
dominant commercial fishing operation in Malawi in the 19503, during which time a

significant proportion if its fishing activities was conducted with motorized trawlers

(McCracken, 1987).

The Rise of Scientific management, African entrepreneurs, and the First Enclosures

of the Africans’ Fisheries (1940-60)

The lack of a comprehensive research and management program for Lake
Malawi’s fisheries had largely been due to the low economic importance of the fishing

economy as compared with exported cash crops such as cotton, tobacco and tea

.4].

(McCracken, 1987). During the late 1930s-SOS, however, a number of research programs
embarked on a series of studies that documented the ecological, social, and technological
characteristics of fishing industries in Lake Malawi, and thereby set the scene for an era

of “scientific” fisheries management regulations:
0 Nyasaland Nutrition Survey, 1938-1943 (Berry and Petty 1992);

0 Report on the Fish and Fisheries of Lake Nyasa, 1939 (Bertram, Borley et a1.

1942»

0 Report on the Tilapia and Other Fish and Fisheries of Lake Nyasa, 1945-1947

(Lowe 1952);

0 Report on the Survey of Northern Lake Nyasa, 1954—1955 (Jackson, Iles et al.

1963)

The Nutrition Survey, though interrupted by the Second World War, included the
brief survey of the biology of Lake Malawi’s fish stocks, and the technologies and
techniques used by natives in Nkhotakota District to catch, process, and cook the fish
(Berry & Petty, 1992). In conjunction with the Nutrition survey team, Bertram et al.
carried out an exhaustive survey of Lake Malawi’s fish stocks and fishing industries, and
concluded that the fish stocks of Lake Malawi were under-exploited. Furthermore, they
recommended that the expansion of both European and Afiican fishing industries be
encouraged, though in reference to the chambo (Oreochromys spp.) dominated European
fishing industries, they suggested that no more than a three-fold expansion by the

European-owned fishing industry should be permitted (Bertram et al., 1942). Jackson et

-42-

al.’s research was the first in-depth study of the biota and fishing technologies in the

northern portion of the Lake.

Lowe’s research on the chambo fishery was the first attempt to systematically
apply Western fisheries management approaches to Lake Malawi. Indeed, less than a
decade after the Bertram et al.(1942) report, Lowe’s research showed that the outer limit
of expansion in the non-Afiican fishery (as stipulated by Bertram et a1.) had already been
surpassed (Nyasaland, 1946; Lowe, 1952). Though she had no data for the African
fishery, the limited catch data from the ‘European’ fishery which was available (Figure 2-
4, above), suggested that the MSY for the most important chambo fish stocks in the south
east arm of Lake Malawi had been exceeded and that the current harvests were catching a
significant proportion of juveniles (see Figure 2-5, below for discussion of MSY)

(Nyasaland, 1948; Lowe, 1952).

-43-

 

 

MSY-Maximum

/ Sustainable Yield
Total MScY — Maximum Social

Revenue Yield

Fishing Cost or Revenue

MEY - Maximum
Economic Yield

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fishing Effort

The of Maximum Sustainable Yield arkiu 197

This theory postulates a maximum number of fish that can be extracted annually without
threatening the sustainability of the stocks (MSY). Alternate optimal rates of extraction are
MEY and MScY, which are the rates of extraction that ensure a maximum economic yield,
and a user defined maximum socially desirable yield, respectively. Though valid in
conceptual terms, the application of this model for most fisheries management has been
widely criticized for a number of reasons, among which:

0 Given that most fisheries are multi-specific in nature, MSY disregards the effects of
inter-specific trophic relationships which may lead to the extinction less productive
species or sub-populations;

0 Management at MSY can cause qualitative changes in the fish stocks that reduce
resilience to stochastic shocks, and between different species.

 

 

 

 

Figure 2-5. Explanation of the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY).

Lowe therefore, called for a comprehensive fisheries management policy that
primarily aimed “to establish a rational fishery so that the optimum yield of T ilapia may
be cropped tfiom Lake Nyasa each year over an indefinable period.” Her management

recommendations entailed (Lowe, 1948a, 1952):

A. Interventions in the commercial (European-owned) chambofishery
1. Minimum mesh size restrictions should be raised from two inches to four
inches diagonal stretch.
2. Curtailing Commercial fishing effort in the Lake:
0 Commercial fishing in the southeast arm should be brought down to
the levels recorded in 1946.
o No filrther permits should be given for commercial fishing, although
one permit might be feasible in the Domira Bay Area.

-44-

0 Commercial fishing will achieve the greatest sustainability if it were
nationalized and run as a public utility company.
3. A closed season for chambo fishing in the southern portion of the southeast
arm of Lake Malawi during December.
B. Interventions in the traditional (African-owned) fisheries
1. Minimum mesh size regulations for chambo gears at four inches diagonal
stretch.
2. Protection of the fish breeding (spawning and brooding) grounds. Two
approaches could be used;
0 prohibiting fishing in certain areas, either altogether or in the breeding
season
a prohibiting fishing altogether in the breeding seasons through
introduction of closed season
3. Exploration of alternate fisheries (ntchila, catfish, mpasa, utaka).
4. Kambuzz' seines should be banned altogether once alternate fisheries are
developed
5. Fishing weir regulation maintaining a 5% gap in the middle should be
enforced, and may need to be wider in certain locations.
C Possession of juvenile chambo: Killing or being in possession of juvenile
chambo, called kasawala (measured at less than 6 inches) should be
forbidden and any found in traders’ possession should be confiscated.

As the conclusions from Lowe’s report became known, there was increasing
pressure on the government to address the seemingly imminent threat to the fishery. At
the same time African nationalist politicians, who had their own investments in the
fishing industry were increasing their pressure on the government to limit the activities of
the European-owned fishing industries, and they gained a victory when the 1949 famine
provided them with a humanitarian excuse to ban the European-owned fishing industry’s
exports to Southern Rhodesia (McCracken, 1987; Chirwa, 1996). The Officer-in-Charge
of the Department of Game, Fish and Tsetse Control (GFTC), Mr. John Borley indicated
the govemment’s inclination to preferentially allow African fishery expansion rather than
that of the European-owned fishery in Lowe’s 10 January, 1948 “Memorandum on the

Possible Expansion of the Lake Nyasa Fish Industry”, stating:

-45-

“Left to themselves I do not believe that the African fishermen would over-

fish for they tend to decrease their eflort with decreasing abundance,

whereas non-nativefishermen, bound by capital investments, tend to

increase the scale of [their] activities in order to ofifset the drop in catch

per unit eflort. ”

Mr. Borley also showed his awareness of the political repercussions that might
arise out of enforcing controls on the Afiican fishermen, who would see any limits on
their activities as providing for the European fishery’s needs (Lowe, 1948a). To address
these issues, the Dept of GFT C had been established in 1945 and the first Fisheries
Ordinance was passed in 1949 (N yasaland, 1949b; Mzumara, 1978). Reflecting Mr.
Borley’s leanings (above), in addition to reiterating the previous years’ fishing rules, the
Fishing Ordinance followed Lowe’s suggestions and required the registration of all
fishing gears, and set minimum mesh size limits and a closed season explicitly targeted
toward protecting the breeding chambo (N yasaland, 1948, 1949a; Lowe, 1952).

However, given the anti-colonialist political atmosphere, little effort was made to enforce

these regulations against the Afiican fishermen.

While the Dept. of GFT C tried to limit the growth of the European fishery at the
southern end of the lake, it was greatly encouraged by the growth of the numbers of
Afiican businessmen who were returning from long stays in South Africa and the
Rhodesias to invest in the fishing economy throughout southern Nyasaland (Tew 1950;
Agnew and Chipeta 1979; Mandala 1990; Berry and Petty 1992; Hara and Jul-Larsen
2003). To encourage growth in this sector, the Dept. of OPT C carried out a number of
activities: training workshops for fishermen in an array of subjects from accounting to
fisheries regulations, provided loans for the purchase of fishing gear, subsidized a highly

prized plank-boat construction yard, coordinated the sale of imported fishing twines and

-46-

baked clay weights, experimented with various fishing gears in an effort to improve
existing fishing methods, and carried out a crocodile extermination program (Nyasaland,
1949a, 1952; Borley, 1954, 1955, 1960, 1962). The availability of nylon fishing nets was
further boosted in 1949 by the Dept. of GFTC’s subsidized establishment of the
Nyasaland Fisheries Company, which started to manufacture nylon fishing nets within

the protectorate (Chirwa, 1996).

This growing group of “big fishermen”38 did, however, pose certain threats to the
colonial government’s control over the rural population. Having accrued their wealth
fi'om overseas labor rather than through local patronage networks, these entrepreneurs’
social and economic ties to “outside” areas diminished the dominant role played by their
local chiefs (Wilson 1939; Williams 1969; McCracken 1987; Chirwa 1996). Although it
must be considered an underestimate, in 1962, the government recorded just over one
hundred such full-time commercial fishermen in the southern part of Lake Malawi, Lake
Malombe, and the Upper Shire River, who were catching roughly 1/3 of the total amount
of fish landed by Afiican fishers (Borley, 1962).39 To illustrate the significance of the
amount of capital that these businessmen raised (mostly through their labor abroad) and
invested in fishing gears, the purchase prices of these fishing gears are presented below in

approximate present-day values, and are compared with a number of other items that the

 

38 Label first used by Pauline Phipps to describe those fishermen around Lake Chilwa who claimed to earn
more than £l/day (today £9.47=$l7.370flicer, L. H. (2004). "What Is Its Relative Value in UK Pounds?",
Economic History Services), roughly 15% of those fishers interviewed in her survey. Phipps, P. (1973).
The 'Big’ Fishermen of Lake Chilwa: a preliminary study in entrepreneurism in rural Malawi. Land and
labour in Rural Malawi. M. E. Page. East Lansing, Michigan, Afiican Studies Center, Michigan State
University: 39-48.

39 Big fishermen’s estimated catch of 1,400 tons of fish in 1962 compared with an estimate of 3,000 tons
caught by all other “subsistence” and “semi-subsistence” fishers estimated at “many hundreds”. Hara
(2003) provides a detailed description of the emergence of this group of entreprereurs around Lake
Malombe, who he calls the “Lords of Malombe”.

-47-

1939 Nyasaland Nutrition Survey found to be common in a lakeshore community in

Nkhotakota District (Table 2-1, below).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cost in 1939 (in Equivalent cost in Equivalent cost in
Pounds, shillings, 2005 (in GB Pounds) 2005 (in US Dollars) E
pence ) D
Fis ° Gears
Canoe £10-15 £412-6l9 $748-l,124
Chizimirapurse seine E £6 £248 $450
Beach Seine - Large meshed £3 £124 $225
600 ft. "2
Beach Seine - Small meshed £1, 105 £62 $113
150 a. 1'2
GillneTI'A £1, 10s £62 $113
Mosquito Net (usikite) 2 5s £10 $18
FishingTrap 2' A 2d — ls, 6d £343. 10 $62-$63
Other costs of Living
House (brick)7' A £10 — 35 £412-1,445 $748-2,624
House (wattle & daub) Z A 63 - £1 £12-41 $22-74
Bicycle 2 £2, lOs — £6, 10s £lO3-268 $187-305
Bed sleeping mat (mkeka) 2 6s — 10s £12-21 $22-38
Hoe 2 ls, 3d — 2s £2.58-4. 13 $4.68-7.50
Domestic Fowl 2- C 4d — 6d £.79-1 $1 .43-1 .82
Hut tax 2’ 8 63 £12 $22
Notes:

1 — Source: Report on the Fish and Fisheries of Lake Nyasa, 1939 (Bertram et al., 1942).
2 - Source: Nyasaland Nutrition Survey, 1938-1943 (Berry & Petty, 1992).
A - These prices reflect purchase prices, however, gillnets, traps, and houses are usually not purchased,
rather they are home made. In the case of brick houses, the bricks may be purchased. Natural construction
materials and food were also exchanged for each other through barter, or in exchange for labor (Berry &

Petty, 1992).

B — The hut tax took roughly 2-3 months to earn through labor in plantations (Berry & Petty, 1992).
C — This is only form of livestock recorded in the study. Most cattle and goats were owned by inland
communities (Berry & Petty, 1992).

D — Calculation of 2005 British Pound values were made using the converter created by Officer (Officer,

2004). All values over £10 (in 2005 valuation) were rounded off to the nearest GBP.

E — US Dollar values were converted from the estimated 2005 British Pound values using: 2006 XE.com
www.xe.com). All values over £10 (in 2005 valuation) were rounded off to the nearest US$.

 

 

 

Table 2-1. The cost of fishing gears, common household items, and hut tax in 1939,
and their equivalent values in 2005 GB Pounds and 2006 US Dollars.

The second point of significance comes from the comparison between the amount
of money invested in fishing gears (mostly through funds remitted from abroad) and the

cost of the colonial hut tax, which illustrates the exploitative nature of the colonial

-43-

plantation economy.40 Rather than sell their labor at the cheap price dictated by the
colonialists, large numbers of Africans also entered the fish trading industry to earn the
required amount of money for the hut tax (Vaughan 1982). This required greater
investments in effort and time but allowed them the independence that laboring on an

estate did not (McCracken 1987).

In addition to the grth of a “big fishermen” class, Williams (1969) identified a
class of “entrepreneurial traders” that had emerged during the l950-60’s. Similarly, these
were men who had worked in the civil service or abroad and invested their savings in
bicycles or trucks for the transport of fish from the lakeshore to markets. By 1962, Hara
(2003) reports that there were an estimated 400 such fish traders who bought fish from
Lake Malombe alone. The minimum starting capital was generally around £20 and they
could earn up to 150% profit over the purchase price of the fresh fish when they were
retailed at the inland markets (Williams, 1969).41 In addition to the entrepreneurial

traders, there was a large class of small-scale seasonal or occasional traders who were

 

4° The main avenue for Afiican’s seeking to earn their hut tax within the protectorate (particularly for those
in the underdeveloped North) was to migrate to the plantations where they could earn their hut tax in
exchange for 2-3 months of labor (Berry & Petty, 1992). The exploitative conditions that Afiican laborers
faced in plantations must be seen in context. The colonial government saw African agricultural practices as
backward and was trying to force Afi'ican’s to contribute their labor for the growth of European-run
plantations which it saw as the future of the colony’s economy. These plantations, however, were also
forced to compete against other, better situated colonies, as described by Walker (2004): “landlocked and
lacking the transportation, infrastructure, and commercial opportunities available in neighboring countries,
Nyasaland’s European-owned estates struggled financially throughout the period of colonial rule despite
enormous advantages conferred upon them by the colonial government.”

‘1 However, there are several steps to this process and specific costs and uncertainties associated with each
step: (a) buying the fish at the beach: requires good relationships with local fishing crews in order to get
preferential access when fish are scarce or to get fish at cheaper rates; (b) drying the fish: this is particularly
risky in the rainy season as fish may spoil if not dried quickly, also the trader must guard the fish against
theft or predation, (c) transporting the fish to market: requires knowing the demand at specific markets and
having reliable transportation to those markets; (e) retailing the fish at market: sometimes fish are sold
wholesale to retailers or by the trader’s assistant, requiring trustworthy relationships with retailers and
assistants, good locations in the market. Williams (1969) found that while some traders perform the entire
series of steps themselves, others concentrated on either steps (a+b) or (c+d). In steps (a+b) there is the
opportunity cost of time spent at the beach which could be spent otherwise, although a (c+d) trader may be
forced to wait for fish if their (a+b) trading contacts are unable to deliver on time, in which case the (c+d)
trader’s information regarding the demand and retail prices in the markets may become obsolete.

-49-

primarily responsible for bringing fish to the smaller inland village markets.42 Much as
with the “big fishermen”, the relationships between traders and chiefs also became
strained. Many chiefs who were involved in the fishing industry themselves chose to sell
their entire catches to European and Indian-owned fish transport companies rather than in
small quantities to local traders, whereas the foreign-owned commercial fishermen
maintained good relations with these local traders by selling to them along the road

(Nyasaland, 1932; McCracken, 1987).

Due to the govermnent’s concern over the decreasing influence of the lakeshore
chiefs over the class of entrepreneurs and due to the govemment’s poor record in
enforcing its regulations on the Afiican fishermen, the government passed the 1955
‘Native Authority Ordinance Act. Through this act, the government required all
fishermen to purchase fishing licenses fiom lakeshore chiefs (at prices that the
government established), chiefs could establish rules to limit access to local fisheries as
they saw fit, and chiefs had the right to impose price controls over fish sales (McCracken,
1987; Chirwa, 1996; M. M. Hara, 2001). Given the chiefs vested interests in the fishing
economy and their existing unpopularity for acting as representatives of the government
in the collection of hut and canoe taxes, these regulations resulted in increased animosity

toward chiefs among fishers and traders (Chirwa 1996; Allison, Mvula et al. 2002).

In the end, because of a governmental policy intended to increase the influence of
chiefs amid an atmosphere of growing anti-colonialism, most fisherfolk resisted,
undermined, or ignored the chiefs’ rulings, resulting in the chiefs’ increased

marginalization. Recognizing the impossibility of enforcing this regulation, the

 

‘2 Some businessmen had also purchased a number of bicycles, renting these to those traders who had not
yet accumulated the required amount of capital to purchase their own (Nyasaland, 1946).

-50-

Provincial Commissioner for Northern Nyasaland, recommended that the Act not be
implemented at all (McCracken, 1987). Furthermore, anti- government feeling grew to
such a degree that fewer and fewer Africans showed themselves willing to be associated
with any “government” activity despite any scientific claims of livelihood benefits that
mi t have been certain to accrue to them, including participating in fishermen’s training
sessions, or support of electric fences aimed at decreasing elephant raids on their own

crops (Borley, 1960; Ng'ong'ola, 1990; Njaidi, 1995; M. M. Hara, 2001).”

Although the creation of Wildlife Reserves had relatively little impact on the
northern lakeshore fisheries in general, the case of the Nkhotakota Wildlife Reserve is an
exception that deserves mention for having created a similarly reversed effect to its
intent. This large area of remote land (then, 880 1011.2), which was home to some of the
largest elephant populations in the central region, was gazetted as a Forest Reserve in
1933 (Hayes, 1972; Morris, 1996). However, the main role of the Department of Game,
Fish and Tsetse Control at that time was to control the amount of harm caused by wildlife
on the agricultural fields of Afiicans rather than conservation, and little enforcement of
the reserve rules against hunting and fishing was carried out (Borley 1954; Morris 1996;
Monis 1997). The reserve was subsequently enlarged to 1802 km.2 to establish a more
significant buffer zone between farming and wildlife lands, undoubtedly forcing some
unknown number of Africans to move out of these areas (Borley, 1954; Mkanda, 1991).

In addition to its bounty of wildlife, the Reserve is bisected by the Bua River which hosts

 

‘3 For a discussion of similar anti-colonial sentiment targeted at the agricultural extension services, see:.
Thomas, S. (1975). “Economic developments in Malawi since independence.” Journgl of Southern African
Studies 2(1): 30—51.

Mandala, E. C. (1990). Work and Control in a Peasant Economy: A History of the Lower Tchiri Valley in
Lalawi, 1859-1960. Madison, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press.

Ng'ong'ola, C. (1990). “The State, Settlers, and Indigenes in the Evolution of Land Law and Policy in
Colonial Malawi.” International Journal of Afiicgnilistorical Studies 23(1): 27-58.

-51-

one of the largest mpasa and sanjika spawning populations in the entire Lake Malawi
basin. While the human population was small and dispersed, oral sources indicate that the
Bua River, which passes through the Wildlife Reserve had previously been subdivided
between different chiefs who each constructed fishing weirs along the course of the river
(consistent with traditional river fisheries management practices on the Dwangwa, N.
Rukuru and Lufilya Rivers). A local chief explains how the creation of the Wildlife
Reserve in 1959 led to the decline of sustainable fishing practices along the river and an
increase in the use of poisons as displaced communities adopted fishing methods that

allowed them to catch fish more quickly in their clandestine night-tirne poaching

activities.44

“Since then, people started to fish there at night using katupi maison).
This activity also destroyed the fish eggs, and led to decreases on the
numbers of fish in the lake. Sometimes, so much poison was used, that it
killed fish all the way down to the lake. They do this despite knowing the
eflect on fish populations because they no longer have their own portions
of the river in which they can fish without katupi (rather through the
construction of fishing weirs). In the past, the communities used to divide
the river into separate fishing areas and take care of the fish stocks,
harvesting them selectively. After they were moved out of the reserve,
though, there was no more conservation of the fish stocks as all the people
were forced to fish a smaller stretch of the river. ” 45

 

4" Although Nkhotakota Forest Reserve was officially gazetted (established) in 1933, there was little
enforcement of wildlife reserve regulations during the first decades of their creation (Borley, 1962; Hayes,
1972; Morris, 1996). Conservation measures were tightened in the 1950-603, following passage of the 1953
“Game Ordinance”, which de-listed a number of reserves, so that enforcement would be able to concentrate
on the four largest reserves (one of which was Nkhotakota Wildlife Reserve) (Hayes, 1972; Morris, 1997).
This would explain the chiefs identification of the late 19503 as marking the enclosure of the Nkhotakota
Wildlife Reserve, which was when Njaidi also idertified an increased enforcement of conservation
regulations throughout the protectorate (N jaidi, 1995). Nevertheless, it is significant to note that despite the
widespread poaching, wildlife populations in the Nkhotakota Reserve remained at stable or increased
during the 1950-603 (Borley, 1955, 1962).

‘5 A. Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2002-07-15; The overuse of poisons that
killed all fish, right down to the lake may be a concern about regular fishing practices as poisons are
known to be used by at least 26% of fishermen (Tweddle, 2000).

-52-

It is ironic that the colonial establishment of this Wildlife Reserve to exclude all
traditional natural resource harvesting resulted in threatening the sustainability of the
fishery by displacing all river fishing activities to the remaining 15km stretch of river
between the Reserve and Lake Malawi. Rather than creating an area protected from
unsustainable fishing practices (such as the use of poisons) (T weddle 1985) many
fishermen have instead chosen to continue fishing the upper reaches of the river (within
the Reserve) illegally, and due to their need to do so clandestinely, they have been forced

to use the harmful fishing poisons that can provide them with a quick harvest."’6

Slow Growth of Northern Fisheries and Northern Emigration to Southern

Lakeshore (l950-603).

While the high productivity of the shallow southern lakeshore coupled with its
proximity to markets led to the early commercialization of the fishery during the 1920-
303 (including the development of a mechanized trawler fishery), the transformation of
the northern and central Lake Malawi markets was much slower. In these regions, towns
(and markets for fish) and the roads infrastructure grew more slowly, and the widespread
adoption of nylon fishing nets did not occur until well after World War 11 (Perry, 1969;
McCracken, 1987; Chirwa, 1996).47 The consequent avoidance by truck transport
businesses of areas away from the main roads, meant that the fish trade in these areas
remained the domain of local traders who peddled (by bicycle) fresh fish in small markets

near the shore, and dried fish in the more inland villages of the Vipya Mountain range

 

‘6 A. Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with FD stafl' 2002-07-15; A Russell — Nkhotakota District
— Interview with a chief— 2002-07-15.
‘7 A. Russell —Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs 2004-03-10, 2004-04-08.

-53-

that parallels the lakeshore (Williams, 1969). One noteworthy exception in the North,
was the N. Rukuru River weir fishery from which some mpasa were traded as far as
Mbeya in Tanganyika (roughly 125km on modern roads, at least 150km back then)
(Bertram et al., 1942). An additional difference between the accessible southern and the
remote central and northern lakeshore regions was that fish trading had become a full-
time occupation for many in the South, whereas it was a strictly seasonal activity in the
North, with most men returning to their villages during the rainy season to help with
farming (Williams 1969; Mandala 1990 ; Chirwa 1996). This meant that whereas the
prices for fish had declined to rival those of meat in the southern highlands in the 19303,
fish remained a rare luxury for most of central and northern Malawi inland communities,

at most eaten once or twice a month (Nyasaland, 1933; Berry & Petty, 1992).

Seeing the bounty of fish and the demand for fish markets in the South, the
Tonga, Tumbuka, Ngonde who returned fi'om their dominant positions within the
colonial and migrant labor-force used their capital earnings to move to the southern parts
of Lake Malawi, and established large settlements on the Nankhumba Peninsula that
divides the southern end of the lakeshore (McCracken, 1987; Munthali, 1994;
Haraldsdéttir, 2002, 65). Whereas in most of southern and central Nyasaland less than
20%, and fiequently less than 10% of the adult male population migrated to work outside
the protectorate, these proportions were far greater in the North. In 193 7, the Ngonde of
northern Karonga district had exported an estimated 25% of its male population to work
in Tanganyika, the Tumbuka regions (Mzimba, Kasungu, South Karonga) exported over

40% of their male population, and the Tonga homeland, Nkhata Bay District, sent over

-54-

60% to work abroad (G. Wilson, 1939, 11 ;Tew, 1950).48 These figures were reflected
again in 1945, when only 5% of southern, and 11% of central Nyasaland’s male Afiican
populations were estimated to be working abroad, and 22% of the northern male
population was working abroad, with, again, Nkhata Bay District at the forefiont, sending
60% of their male population (Lovett, 1997).49 The migrants from Nkhata Bay were also
noted to be among the least likely to forsake their home communities, and their
remittances were seen as the primary source of economic prosperity in the district (Tew,
1950). To give an impression of the scale and importance of remittances in the national
economy, remittances fiom abroad in 1960 were roughly 2 million British Pounds (GBP),
while all agricultural exports brought in roughly GBP 11 million, and the Afiican
subsistence agriculture economy was estimated at GBP 15 million (Tew, 1950; Agnew &

Chipeta, 1979).

Due to the accumulation of capital fiom high participation in the labor markets
abroad, these northemers who immigrated to the South were able to set themselves up in
business more effectively than many other local residents, and they invested much of this
in purchases of fishing gears (beach seines, gillnets and chilimira nets) and modes of
transporting fish to markets (trucks and bicycles) (Withers, 1952; McCracken, 1987;
Haraldsdottir, 2002). Combined with their financial backing, their introduction of the

chilimira to the rest of the lakeshore enabled them to succeed in communities that up

 

‘8 Karonga sent a relatively smaller proportion abroad than the other northern Nyasaland Protectorate
districts, as a fair proportion were able to earn money by the sale of cotton, coffee, rice, beans, maize and
beeswax. Additionally, of those that went abroad to work, flieir absences were much shorter (than those of
many other Nyasaland residents), as most migrated to the nearby Lupa Gold Fields in Tanganyika, and
therefore tended to spend 34 months away from home. This was also a prime market for the sale of their
produce (G. Wilson, 1939; Tew, 1950).

9 In a similar pattern to that seen in 1937, by 1950, the percentage of Ngonde migrating to work abroad
was half that of the Tumbuka, at 11.6% (Tew, 1950).

-55-

until then depended entirely on the less effective beach seines to target the off-shore
utaka (Haplochromys flock) and usipa shoals (McCracken, 1987). Furthermore, the
chambo (Oreochromys spp.) of the southern Lakeshore were mostly destined for sale in
the larger cities or exported to southern Rhodesia (today, Zimbabwe), and were thus too
expensive for rural villagers in addition to being more difficult to dry for transport by
small-scale fish traders. In contrast, the small utaka and usipa were easy to dry and were
cheap enough for rural and poorer Afiicans to purchase, meaning that the growing rural
fish trade proved an ideal economic niche that the chilimira fishers were able to quickly

dominate (Haraldsdottir 2002 ).

While the early chilimira fishing efforts around the southern lakeshore in the
19503 were mobile operations, the irmnigration of large family-groups commenced
around 1960.50 Initially, these immigrants’ ability to mobilize greater amounts of labor
and capital for fishing, and their disruption of the local economy resulted in a variety of
conflicts with local community leaders (Borley, 1960, 1962; Munthali, 1994; M. M.
Hara, 2001).51 These tensions came to a head in 1960, when a year of poor utaka fishing
in Nkhata Bay may have led to large immigration to the southern lakeshore. As Hara
(2001) explains, though sparked by a conflict over a local fisher’s failure to pay for a
chilimira net that he had purchased from a Tonga fisherman, this conflict had its origins
in the economic threat that the chilimira fishermen posed to local fishing livelihoods. As

a result, the chief banned the Tongas from his community, and from fishing around the

 

5° The Joint Fisheries Research Organization “Report on the Survey of Northern Lake Nyasa 1954.55” and
the Dept. of Game, Fish and Tsetse Control Annual Reports of 1954-62 identified a number of islands and
locations highly suited for chilimira fishing at Chia Lagoon, in the South-East arm, and around the rocky
islands at the tip of the Nankhumba peninsula, but indicated that chilimira nets were only used sporadically
there (Borley, 1954, 1955, 1960, 1962; Jackson et al., 1963).

5‘ Borley (1960), Munthali (1994), A. Russell -Mangochi District — Interviews with FD staff- 2002-06-09,
2002-06-1 1.

-56-

islands offshore from his village. This eviction had the short-term effect of closing the
local chilimira fishery, and most Tonga’s returned briefly to Nkhata Bay. However, the
Tonga, followed by Tumbuka, and Ngonde succeeded in establishing their families in
several communities around the Nankumba Peninsula, an area that would be incorporated
into Lake Malawi National Park in 1980 (Borley, 1962; Jackson et al., 1963; Grenfell,

1993; M. M. Hara, 2001).52

A final factor that contributed to the success of the northern irnmigrant’s
businesses was their lack of access to farm land in the South, which made them entirely
dependent on fishing-related businesses for a livelihood, and they gained widespread
recognition for their passion for fishing (Haraldsdottir, 2002).53 This fieed northern
immigrant women from their traditional agricultural roles (though this inability to
produce their own staple food is also seen by some as a permanent threat to their
livelihoods, see Haraldsdottir (2002), and they became involved in fish trading. Their
relationships with the main fishers (i.e., their relatives) then allowed them to establish a
trading niche for themselves as they out-competed many non-northern traders, especially

in the sale of dried usipa (McCracken, 1987; Haraldsdottir, 2002).

 

52 Chanbe was settled by Chewas and grew to a large settlement after the creation of the Livingstonia
Mission nearby in 1875, and has the smallest proportion of northern immigrants (mostly Tumbuka) due to
the conflict in the 19603. Msaka/Chimphamba was also settled by Chewa, but by 1993, Tonga settlers
outnumbered the Chewa indigenes. Mvunguti was settled by a usipa fisherman fiom Karonga in 1960, and
most of the population is Nkhonde originating fiom Karonga. Zambo was settled by northemers in the
1960’s. Chidzale was settled by northemers in the 19703 (Grenfell, 1993).

‘3 A. Russell —Mangochi District — Interviews with PD stair- 2002-06-09, 2002-0e11, A. Russell —
Mangochi District — Fishing Observations 2002-06-08; A. Russell —Mangochi District - Interview with a
chief.

-57-

Independence, Governmental Centralization, and Reassessment of the Fisheries

Department (1963-1975)

The end of colonialism brought a new government. However due to the great
amount of popular antagonism that the independence struggle had aroused against the
colonial extension services and the chiefs, the new president, Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda,
found that he had inherited a demoralized civil service, and a rural population that
resisted most interference with their livelihood activities (Thomas, 1975). Doing little to
address conservation for the first decade and a half of single-party rule, the government
instead focused its attention on balancing its budget through growth in the plantation
agriculture sector (J. Kydd & R. Christiansen, 1982). Primarily dependent on exports
from European owned plantations (of coffee, tea and burley tobacco), the government
nationalized a number of these plantations (many of which subsequently were at least
partially owned by President Banda and senior members of his government) and oriented
the national economy in support of t(his) sector. In maintaining a healthy GDP grth
rate of 5.5% between 1964-1977, however, the govemment increasingly marginalized,
suppressed, and impoverished the nation’s smallholder farmers in a number of ways
(Thomas, 1975; J. G. Kydd & R. Christiansen, 1982; Harrigan, 2003) (Allison, Mvula et

al. 2002):

“The bias in favor of estates at the expense of smallholders took many
forms: customary land was annexed for the estate sector; smallholders
were legally forbidden from growing certain high value crops reserved for
estates such as burley tobacco, tea and sugar; finance was siphoned from
the smallholder sub-sector by the monopolistic state marketing board
ADMARC with most of the resulting profits channeled into estates; and
smallholders were relied upon to provide a marketable surplus of the
staple food crop maize to feed estate and urban workers. ” (Kydd and
Christiansen 1982)

-53-

This income did enable the government to embark on large scale infrastructure
development throughout the country, developments that would prove particularly
important to the growth of the northern and central lakeshore economies. Until the end of
the 19603, the central-northern lakeshore region had been a backwater in the nation’s
development as no bridges spanned the great Bua and Dwambazi Rivers to connect this
portion of the lakeshore to outside markets. Similarly, the northern Karonga shoreline did
not have a road connecting it to Karonga, Mzuzu, and Tanzanian markets. Both of these
areas were therefore transformed radically by the completion of a tarred lakeshore roads
that connected the central lakeshore to markets in Mzuzu (to the North), and Nkhotakota,
Salima, Lilongwe, and Blantyre (to the South), and the northern Karonga lakeshore with
Karonga town and the towns of Kyela and Mbeya in Tanzania (Perry, 1969; Thomas,
1975; H. K Banda, 1978).54 Within the Fisheries Department itself, much effort was
made during the 19603 in the construction of feeder roads to important fishing beaches,

and the introduction of fish smoking kilns (FAO/UN, 1966).

Following the end of colonialism in 1963, a UNDP consultant, H.L.F. Renson
was invited to assist the new government “in the planning of fisheries development and in
the organization of efficient fishery services in Malawi” (FAO/UN, 1966).” An
immediate result of this assistance was a reorganization of the Ministry of Natural

Resources in 1965 when the Fisheries Department was placed under the Secretary for

 

5‘ Note, however, that the major bridges across the Bua and Dwambazi Rivers have been periodically swept
away, limiting the growth of the Northern Nkhotakota, and Southern Nkhata Bay Districts in particular.
While these two rivers now have large new bridges (the Dwambazi as late as 2001), numerous smaller
bridges continue to be washed every year. Also, parts of the lakeshore road were not surfaced with tarmac
until the 19903.

55 The colonial Dept of Game, Fish and Tsetse Control ceased to exist in 1963. Tsetse Control, Fisheries
management and commercial crocodile hunting were transferred to Dept. of Agriculture, while Game
control and trout fishing came under the Dept of Forestry (Borley, 1962).

-59-

 

Dept. of Veterinary Services, except for the tasks of fish culture extension which had
been conducted by agricultural extension officers and which remained in the Dept. of

Agriculture.

At this point, Renson also compiled a cumulative estimate of the total tonnage of

fish being harvested from all of Malawi’s water-bodies (Table 2-2, below).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Water Body Smific Lake Malawi Fisheries Fish Harvested (in Tons)
Lower Shire River A 2000
Lake Chilwa 9800
Lake Chiuta 200
Lake Malombe + Upper
Shire River 1700
Lake Malawi Southeast arm - Industrial 2200

Southeast arm - Afiican 1,800

Southwest arm - Industrial (negfigible)

Southwest arm - African 1700

Domira Bay + Salima 400

Nkota Kota + Chia Lagoon 500

North (incl. Nkata Bay and Likoma) 500
Sub-Total Tonnage 7100 7100
Total Tonnage 20800

 

 

 

 

A — Tonnage is based on dried/smoked fish that are exported by railway to the Shire Highlands and
Rhodesia only. The large quantities of fish sold by local fish traders had not been recorded at the time.
1F AO/UN 1966; Mandala 1990)

 

 

Table 2-2. Tonnage of Fish Landed in Post-Independent Malawi's Water bodies
(from FAO/UN 1966)

Renson found that the fisheries management recommendations made by Lowe
(1952) and Bertram et al. (1962) had been poorly implemented (FAO/UN, 1966). In
particular, he noted the inconsistent and selective enforcement of regulations between
“commercial” (read primarily European) ring-net fishermen and “traditional” (read
Afiican) gillnet/ seine fishermen. While some effort was made to enforce minimum mesh
size limits and closed season regulations designed to protect breeding chambo on

commercial fishermen (however ineffectively), these regulations were not enforced

-60-

against the traditional fishery which targeted the same chambo fish stocks with their

gillnet and beach seine (F AO/UN , 1966).

One area in which Renson identified potential for growth was the commercial
chambo fishery in Lake Malawi, which he estimated could be expanded to roughly 3000
tons of fish per year (FAD/UN, 1966). Given that the Greek-owned Malachias Company
had discontinued its commercial rirrg-net fishery in 1964, Renson therefore suggested that
the government parastatal Malawi Development Corporation (MALDECO) enter into
fishing by taking over the Malachias fishing license. Other suggestions included:
rewriting the fisheries legislation, formal training and better supervision for field staff,
improvement and consistency in the recording of fish catch and sales data, improvement
of fish processing and market facilities, and the continued improvement of access roads

to key fishing beaches towards the South of Lake Malawi.

Although Renson suggested that fisheries assistants be hired from fishing
communities, he failed to emphasize the need for training of Malawians to take over the
senior positions then held by expatriates. Consequently, as the British Overseas
Development Administration (ODA) and other donor agencies contributed the majority
of the new Fisheries Department’s funding during the first 15 years of independence, they
were able to exert great influence in how the department was to develop (Table 2-3,

below).

-61-

 

Malawi Fisheries Department funding sources 1966-1988
(source Jones, 1990)

 

 

 

 

  

 

1400f“ ~ ., -- ,, - -- - ,, - -
53 1200
02
g; 1000—
..
5 g 800 , lOther Donors
to" DODAFundi
g; 600- . n9.
:3 ,,,,, IMalaWIanFundlng
mi “”7:
0.
<o « e N a
056° so" i“ '5 <\ 0 0 1b 35°
N . seie‘e‘eteies‘fe‘ei

Year

 

 

 

Table 2-3. Malawi Fisheries Department Sources of Funding, 1966-1988 (Jones,
Akester et al. 1990).

In 1974, the Malawian Government’s new-found concern about over-exploitation
of the fisheries was reflected in the preamble to the new Fisheries Act (Malawi 1974)

which stated:

"An Act to provide for the regulation and control of fishing, and of the
purchase, sale, marketing, processing, import and export of fish, to
provide for the conservation of fish and further to provide for matters
incidental to and connected with the foregoing. "

The new Fisheries Act was particularly aimed at introducing regulation of the
increasingly capitalized chambo fishery in Lake Malombe and southern Lake Malawi,
and included a system of regulations for both the “traditional” and “commercial

fisheries.56 The commercial trawlers were banned from fishing in the narrow southern-

 

“ It should be noted that these labels are used here more for ease of distinguishing the highly mechanized
fishing fleets (that had previously been predominantly owned by Europeans, but in which a number of
African businessmen and ex-Fisheries Department personnel had also invested) fi'om the more “traditional”
gillnets, beach seines, hooks, traps that had generally been used by Africans. The distinction is useful
primarily to highlight the change in policy between the colonial and independent governments, as the
colonialists had not enforced regulations on the “traditional” fishery. Though understandable in view of the

-62-

most portion of Lake Malawi where chambo passed on their way to breeding grounds in
shallow Lake Malombe, and for similar reasons in respect to Lake Malawi chambo
breeding grounds, all commercial trawl and ring net fishers were banned from fishing
within 1 nautical mile (1.85 Km) of shore.57 Furthermore, all “commercial” and
“traditional” fishing gears received specifications as to their legal dimensions, mesh
sizes, conditions of operation, and minimum take able fish lengths were established (see
appendix A-copy/reproduce schedules).58 Finally, a Nov.1-Dec.31 closed season was
established for all ring net and beach seine in Lakes Malawi and Malombe, and for the
beach seines operated in the Upper Shire River (which connects Lakes Malawi and
Malombe), this “closed season” extended from Nov.1-Mar.31.59 All of these regulations
were circumvented regularly, however the closed season for beach seines would prove to

be the most contentious (see below).

Growing Conflicts between Government and Fishers Leads to Declining Legitimacy

of the Government and Fish Stock Collapse (1975-1993)

The president of the newly independent nation of Malawi faced a variety of
threats to his personal power and the nation’s economic independence from many

segments of society. However, two groups received particular attention from him as he

 

colonial Dept. of GFTC’s lack of staff and the strong anti-colonial, anti-conservation sentiment among
rural Malawians, this distinction had been identified as particularly counter-productive for regulation of the
chambo fishery as 90% of chambo landed is caught in the ‘traditional’ fishery (FAQ/UN, 1966). The 1974
Fisheries Act attempted to rectify this situation.

‘7 Under subsidiary legislation to the 1974 Fisheries Act: “Fisheries (Prohibited Methods of Fishing)
Order” and “Fisheries (Commercial Fishing) Regulations”, respectively.

58 Trawl nets, ring nets, chilimira covered by Fifth Schedule; Beach seines covered by Seventh Schedule;
Gillnets covered by Eight Schedule; Minimum take able fish lengths covered by Ninth Schedule. Malawi,
G. o. (1974). Fisheries Act: 53.

59 Closed season for Ring nets covered by Fifth Schedule; closed season for Beach seines covered by
Seventh Schedule (Malawi, 1974).

-63-

consolidated his power: the civil service that was dominated by northern ethnic groups
(i.e., Tonga, Tumbuka and Ngonde), and the chiefs. These groups were easy targets for a
president looking to diffuse the hatred of necessary conservation regulations as these
groups had been the ones who implemented the harsh colonial conservation regulations,
and indeed were accused by the president of having made the regulations more difficult

to live under than necessary:

“When we were under the colonial rule, under the British, you, my
people, were kept down. It was not so much because of the British district
commissioner, but even worse, your own Africans - police oflicers,
policemen, African clerks, and worst still, chiefs...To please the district
commissioner, African clerks, African policemen, messengers and chiefs
were more cruel to their people than the district commissioner himself. ”
(Banda 1977)

Additionally, either due to his genuine beliefs or due to the pragmatic
conservation needs facing his country, the president tried to reverse the great tide of
sentiment that had been built up against the colonial extension services by rewriting the
Afiicans’ experiences of the colonial administrations’ conservation policies. Rather than
acknowledging pre-independence Malawians’ resistance to conservation regulations as
due to resentment of the regulations themselves, be claimed that popular resentment had
been primarily due to the harshness of the penalties that were imposed by the extension
services and the laziness of the (Afiican) civil servants (Thomas, 1975). Furthermore, he
claimed that he had been able to reverse peoples’ resistance to conservation regulations

by the strength of his arguments and his benevolent policies:

“I alone could control my people, could stop them from breaking the
law... When I took over the Ministry I told my people that I would send no
one to prison for not planting maize in ridges. But I said, “I want you, my
people, to plant your maize in ridges. I repeat, 1 will not send any one of
you to prison. But if you do not plant your maize according to the

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regulations of the Department of Agriculture it will not be I, Kamuzu, as
Minister of Agriculture who will punish you. I will do nothing. It will be
the soil that will punish you. The soil will not give you good yields. My

people listened to me. Very soon they saw the sense of it. ” (Banda 1977)

Unfortunately, this positive version of post-independence Malawians’ perceptions
of the governmental extension services was an illusion. While the estate-based economy
had experienced exceptionally high levels of growth during the first decade after
independence, the small scale farming sector had stagnated (Allison, Mvula et al. 2002;
Chinsinga 2002). An increasing rural poverty deepened further when a combination of
internal and external economic shocks forced the nation to enter into the International
Monetary Funds (IMP) Structural Adjustment Programs and make further cutbacks in
social spending (J. Kydd & R. Christiansen, 1982; Ihonvbere, 1997).60 The subsequent
diversion of resources to the estate agriculture sector amidst the stagnation of small-hold
farming left an agricultural extension services demoralized by a lack of resources, staff
and political will to see conservation regulations enforced (Thomas, 1975). Though the
commercial fisheries never held the kind of importance for the government that the estate
agriculture sector did, the Fisheries Department faced similar challenges to its
enforcement of regulations against the subsistence and semi-commercial fishers. Allison
(2002) describes how revenue from fishing licenses declined despite growth in fishers
due to a shortage of FD operating fimds needed for FD staff to visit beaches to collect
funds. During the 1970-80’3 the focus of donor agency assistance was in increasing fisher

efficiency through the transfer of technology (Allison, Mvula et al. 2002). However, the

 

6° Some of the key factors were: 1978-79 shock to oil prices, a drought during the 1980-81 growing season,
increased international interest rates, closure of the primary export route for Malawian agricultural goods
due to civil war in Mozambique, the added burden of an influx of Mozambican refugees, and declining
levels of development aid. Chinsinga, B. (2002). The Politics of Poverty Alleviation in Malawi: a Critical
Review. A Democracy of Ch_ameleons: Politics grid Culture in the New Mam H. Englund Blantyre,
Malawi, Christian Literature Association in Malawi (CLAIM/MABUKU): 25-42.

-65-

new ice plants and trawler engines quickly became unusable due to a lack of spare parts
and increasing firel prices, and a centralized fish landing center at Lifuwu (in the South
West Arm of Lake Malawi) was unusable by trawlers due its highly exposed position

(Watson 1987; Allison, Mvula et al. 2002).

While concern over anti-colonial sentiment had kept the colonial fisheries
authorities from implementing limits on Afiicans’ fishing efforts, the independent
government which claimed a mandate fi'om the people could no longer allow its
regulations to be ignored. The most unpopular regulation was the imposition of a closed
season on beach seine fishing during the time when adult fish migrated to shallow waters
and lagoons to breed. By this time, Lake Malombe and the southeast arm of Lake Malawi
had become the primary fisheries supplying the demand of the cities and plantations, and
had attracted much capital investment in the form of plank boats, improved nylon fishing
nets, and outboard boat engines. However, within the context of a highly autocratic
government, relatively little effort was made to sensitize fishers to the justification, and
indeed, the existence of the fishing regulations, in advance of commencing enforcement
activities, as highlighted by the Chairman of the Mwachikumba Beach Village

Committee (Donda, 2000b):

“By mid 1970s, DoF [Department of Fisheries] started to tell people not
to catch juvenile chambo, and I remember in 1974, about 3 or 4 chambo
seine nets were confiscated from this beach for catching juvenile chambo.
The Fisheries Department came with their [italics are from the source]
regulations and asked people not to catch juvenile chambo. We viewed
DoF people as policemen because they never talked to us or explained
why catching juvenile fish was bad. As a result, we only stopped fishing
when they were around and resumed fishing when they were gone,
because we know they would go back to Mangochi where they were
resident and we could continue fishing without any problems. ”

-66-

An excellent detailed review of the growing animosity and violence between
fishers and the Fisheries Department is given by Hara (2001) a brief summary of which I
will present here. Following the passage of the 1974 Fisheries Act, fishing during the
closed season (which was a widespread phenomenon) was punished first with fines, and
then as fines were proving unsuccessful deterrents, by harsher measures such as jail
sentences and the burning of confiscated fishing nets.61 Over time, however, the fishers
increasingly resisted the Fisheries Department personnel, and by the mid-19803, the
fishers, supported by traders and crew members increasingly threatened enforcement
patrols with bodily harm This growing threat led the Fisheries Department to request the
assistance of the police force in conducting patrols. However, reports quoted by Hara

(2001) reflect the government’s increasing inability to enforce the regulations:

0 “On 22/11/86 at Mpondas beach, the inspection team which included
the Oflicer-in-Charge of police for Mangochi District, had to abort an
operation aimed at seizing fishing gear being operated illegally during the
closed season after being challenged by fisherfolk armed with knives,
sticks and oars. The Police Ofi‘icer-in-Charge ordered the team to abort
the operation and withdraw after realising that the team was ill-prepared
and ill-equipped to deal with the potentially explosive situation.

0 On 26/11/86 at the same Mpondas beach, physical violence erupted
and on the same day at Nasa, a policeman was seriously wounded when
fisherfolk attacked the team in order to snatch back their confiscated nets.

0 0n 23rd November 1988 the team, which included three policemen
including the Oflicer-in-Charge, went back to Mponda and Malunda
beaches. At Malunda they found 10 beach seines in operation, with more
than 5 00 fisherfolk in attendance. 0n attempting to seize the nets, the team
was attacked by the fisherfolk. Not even a warning shot in the air by the
Oflicer-in-Charge could deter the fishermen.

0 During the second week of December 1988, the team, which included
police ofi‘icers, went on patrol to Mpondas and Malunda beaches again.

 

6' For any person found fishing with illegal gear or during the closed season, the 1974 Fisheries Act
provided for punishments of K100 fines or imprisonment for 6 months (Cap.66:05:53) , and any fish,
fishing gears, poisons, boats, engines or vehicles associated with the offence were forfeited without
compensation (Cap.66:05:54) (Malawi, 1974).

-67-

An attempt was made again to confiscate the nets found in

operation. The fishermen openly challenged the team to dare confiscate

the nets. Meanwhile they continued with their operations as if the

inspection team was not even there. Out-numbered and ill equipped, the

team withdrew to the station without doing anything again. ”

Faced with this escalation of violence, and their impotence to stem the illegal
activities of determined fishermen, the Fisheries Department then engaged the assistance
of the riot control unit of the Malawi Police Force, the Police Mobile Force (PMF).
However, on the first occasion in which the PMF was involved, their zeal to suppress the
resistance led them to beat up all the people that they found on the beach, regardless of
their role as fisher, trader or bystander. A number of people were arrested and many
fishing gears and boats were confiscated. Unfortunately, the PMF readiness to use force
only led to increasingly violent resistance by the fisherfolk themselves, which came to a
climax when Fisheries Department and PMF officers tried to confiscate fishing nets fi'om
Mbaluku beach on Jan. 1 8, 1989. On this day, fishermen attacked the government
personnel with stones, oars and knives, leading to the serious wounding of two police

officers and one fisheries department inspector, and the police were only able to extricate

themselves from the confi'ontation by firing warning shots from a machine gun.

In addition to the direct conflicts that occurred over fishing practices, the
government came into conflict with fishing communities over the alienation of lakeshore
property. During the autocratic years of the Banda era, large amounts of communally
owned or used lakeshore were alienated by the government for the promotion of tourism
and agricultural development (Derman & Ferguson, 1995). This ranged from the lease of
small and large lakeshore plots of land for the construction of vacation cottages and

tourist hotels, to the large swathes of land for the establishment of Lake Malawi National

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Park (1980) in Southern Lake Malawi, Vipya paper mill (early l9703)62, and the
Dwangwa Sugarcane Estate (1976).63 Although the conditions of these fishing
communities’ relocations or the limitations placed on their livelihoods varied, and while
“compensation” was paid in some cases, Derman and Ferguson described these
dispossessions as human rights violations because of the powerlessness of these
lakeshore communities to resist the government’s alienation of customary land and the
massive disruptions of the social and economic fabric that this entailed (Derman &
Ferguson, 1995). Furthermore, in the case of the largest areas of alienated land, President
Banda’s personal business empire, Press Holding Company, was a dominant stakeholder
in the planned business ventures, thereby providing these businesses with the fill] support
of the government (Ferguson, Derman et al. 1993; Derman and Ferguson 1995; Posner
1995; Ihonvbere 1997). The relationships between the fishing communities and Lake
Malawi National Park and the Dwangwa Sugarcane Estate management would be

difficult for decades to come, and are discussed below, and in Chapter Four, respectively.

In addition, the FD and the President themselves became among the most blatant
power brokers in fisheries. As described by Watson (1987), Ferguson and Derman
(1991; 2000) and Allison (2002), the operational costs for the FD’s scientific trawling

activities were dependent on income raised by the FD in the sale of collected fish, an

 

62 This project took place at the base of the Vipya Platteau between Bandawe and Chiteche, in Southern
Nkhata Bay District. Though this program was designed during colonialism, the relocations of fishing
communities took place in the 19703, during the Banda regime. In the end, the project was not completed.
63 The site of this sugar cane estate, which plays a significant role in two case studies discussed in the next
chapter, was first developed in 1970 as the British Irrigated Rice Project (BIRP). However, despite the
success of the rice growing project, Banda’s government then decided instead to allocate the land to the
growing of sugar cane (Gosnell, 2004). The Lonrho company, which had successfirlly established the
SUCOMA estate in 1964 at Ntchalo (in Chikwawa District) and maintained a close relationship with the
government, was invited to establish another estate at Dwangwa (Amer & Hutcheson, 1967; Ihonvbere,
1997; Gosnell, 2004). The estate was established in 1973, and the first sugar was produced in 1979
(Gosnell, 2004).

-69-

arrangement which placed the government in direct competition with fisherfo 1k, the
stakeholders on whose behalf they were supposed to work. Despite the concerns over
this conflict of interest raised by Watson (1987), the Icelandic Aid Agency (ICEIDA)
donated another research vessel to the FD in 1993 (named the Ndunduma), which is the
second most powerful fishing vessel on the lake, and which continues to pay for
operational costs from fish sales (Allison, Mvula et al. 2002). Similarly, following the
nationalization of the Greek-owned commercial fishing fleet, the para-statal Malawi
Development Corporation (MALDECO), a subsidiary of the President’s Press Holding
Company, became the single-largest fishing interest on Lake Malawi (Watson 1987;

Ferguson and Derman 1991; Ferguson and Derman 2000).

After the Mbaluku-debacle, the services of the PMF were no longer used by the
Fisheries Department, and a brief exploration of the various factors that contributed to the
FD’s failure to implement their policies should be discussed. The escalation in the
resistance by fisherfolk must be partially recognized as a symptom of a groundswell in
the general population’s disillusionment with the government’s authoritarian and corrupt
policies. During this period, an elite clique within the ruling political party (Malawi
Congress Party or MCP) 64 dominated all aspects of government (Ihonvbere 1997)
(Posner 1995), whose governance was described by Ihonvbere (1997) as “characterized
by ‘top-down’ flow to policy directives and government decrees... [that were] largely

‘irrelevant’ to the needs of the people”. In relation to the management of the fisheries,

 

6‘ The Malawi Congress Party was Life President H. K. Banda’s ruling political party, the only legal
political party in existence during the 30 years of his dictatorship. Until the end of the cold war and the
apartheid regime in South Africa, most western governments refrained from criticizing the “corrupt and
highly repressive [Banda govemment’s] bribery, intimidation, election malpractices, and suffocation of
civil society, as Banda legitimized the South African Apartheid government as well as providing support to
the brutal RENAMO [a counter-revolutionary army renowned fot its atrocities] forces in Mozambique
(Posner, 1995; Ihonvbere, 1997).

-70-

therefore, a significant number of MCP members who had invested heavily the fishing
and fish trading industries were able to actively undermine the fishing regulations for
their own benefit (M. M. Hara, 2001). Through the authority of their MCP party
memberships, these local politicians took over (or at least shared) many of the
arbitration/mediation roles traditionally held by the chiefs, establishing their own systems
of patronage within the communities, and undermining the authority of the chiefs
(Nangoma & Nyirenda, 1991; Chagunda & Sibale, 1992; Mwandira & Samikwa, 1992;
Narnagonya & Zamadenga, 1992; R. H. V. Bell & Donda, 1993; Lowore & Wilson,
2000; J. Wilson, 2006). Similarly, whereas the government had made brutally effective
use of the Malawi Young Pioneer movement (a militaristic youth movement) in enforcing
government regulations throughout the country, Hara (2001) speculated that their absence
in the fishing conflicts was due to their own participation in the fishing industry and their
desire to avoid repercussions fiom relatives and political party leaders.65 Overall, it was
recognized that due to their inability to enforce regulations, the Fisheries Department’s
“tacit acceptance of this flouting of the regulations damage[d] the image and the authority

of the Department of Fisheries” (FAO, 1993).

Beyond the national political scene, however, there were grave oversights on the
part of the ODA, which had contributed much to the operational funding and guidance of

the Fisheries Department. The ODA’s own assessment concluded that, while

 

6’ The role of the Malawi Young Pioneers in creating a culture of governmental repression has been
described by several authors, a few quotes of which I provide here: “In Banda’s Malawi, the Malawi Young
Pioneers and the MCP Youth League had the notorious task of safeguarding discipline and obedience, often
resorting to physical violence if there was any reason to suspect dissidence” (Englund, 2002); “Invented
dissidents continued to be unnecessarily arrested, tied up hand and foot, blind-folded, beaten, shoved into
sacks and dropped in the Shire River for the crocodiles. . . [T]he Young Pioneers, who were said to have
been training with RENAMO [the Mozambican counter-revolutionary army] at one time, formed a major
component of his intelligence system with their own spies, agents and informers who reported to him [the
President] directly" (Mapanje, 2002). See also Posner (Posner, 1995).

-71-

“[ODA funding] has had a durable impact on the Department ’3 capacity
to manage the country ’s fisheries resources, it has also encouraged the
Department (along with other donors) to undertake expenditure which

was neither financially nor economically justifiable. ” (Jones, Akester et
al. 1990)

In many cases, this meant that while positions were firnded, the operational costs were
not, leaving many staff members both idle and fi'ustrated. Additionally, rather than
assisting with the transfer of skills and training of Malawians during the 1960-703, the
ODA support had primarily attempted to continue providing a firnctioning fisheries
department to the newly independent nation, meaning that mo st of the senior positions
continued to be held, and fishery research focus continued to be determined by

expatriates (Mzumara, 1978; Jones et al., 1990).

In addition to these operational challenges, which were not addressed by the
ODA, its bio-centric research and technocratic management approach had left the
Fisheries Department staff well-versed in ecology but entirely untrained in the social or
administrative sciences (Jones, Akester et al. 1990; Ferguson, Derman et al. 1993). As of
1990, the ODA report concluded that “hardly anything appears to be known about socio-
economic factors — e. g. incomes earned, patterns of ownership, alternative income
sources, and constraints on activity” in the Afiican fishery (Jones, Akester et al. 1990).
As the chambo stocks in Lake Malombe and the southern Lake Malawi showed
increasing signs of over-exploitation in the late 1980’s, the value of social data remained
under-appreciated by the foreign fisheries scientist community, and the donor agency-
funded ‘Chambo Fishery Management Project’ maintained a largely bio-centric research
agenda which also saw the wealthiest (and politically aligned) fishing entrepreneurs, who

fished for chambo as their main stakeholders (FAO, 1993; Ferguson et al., 1993). Little

-72-

research was done to investigate the fishing communities’ perspectives regarding the
fishery, and the government failed to recognize that the wealthy chambo seine fishers

were a source of local conflict and inequity (Ferguson et al., 1993).66

In a poignant intersection between declining governmental legitimacy and over-
exploited fish stocks, 1993 saw the collapse of both the chambo stocks of Lake Malombe

(Figure 2-6, below) and the national single-party government.

 

14000 ]
12000 C] Others _ _ —-
... 10000 El Kambu21
5 1‘ l Chambo _
8000 _ — _
g 6000 —
I-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4000
2000
8 88

0
19138833288883

Year

 

 

 

Figure 2-6. Decline of the Chambo fishery in Lake Malombe (Tweddle, Alimoso et
aL 1994).

In the more remote and relatively less commercialized fisheries of the central and
northern Lakeshore, and other remote locations (such as Lake Chiuta) the Fisheries

Department did not establish a permanent presence until the late 1970-803.67 Therefore,

 

66 The problems related to the chambo fishery, and the donor agencies and Fisheries Departments’ lack of
appreciation for the kambuzi fishery are discussed in the following case study, Lake Malombe.

6 In Lake Chiuta, the first data recorders arrived in the mid 1970’s, and the first extension staff arrived in
the mid-19803 (Donda, 2000b). In the Central Lakeshore districts of Salima and Nkhotakota fisheries
recorders staff arrived in 1974 and 1977, respectively, while they arrived in Karonga in 1978 (Tweddle,
1980). Although the Northern lakeshore is less productive than the South, this low investment in the North

-73-

precise data on the numbers and types of fishing gears used around the time of
independence in these regions is unavailable. The only reference point that we have
regarding the fishing economy of the North before Malawi’s independence comes fiom
the Jackson et al.’s survey in 1955. This survey showed that although nylon netting had
first become available in the late 19403, and while it was becoming widely adopted along
the southern lakeshore by gill-netters, gillnets were “not an important fishing method in
use at the time” among the fishers of the North (Jackson et al., 1963). In Jackson et al.’s
(1963) research on the potential for expansion of the gillnet fishery, they determined that
surface gillnetting near shore and in open water would not contribute very much to the
local populations, but that an as-yet unexploited deepwater gillnet (as there is a relatively
narrow shallow zone in the North) fishery for catfish (esp. B. meridionalis, Bathyclarias
spp., and Mormyrus longirostris) could be developed. The most active fisheries that they
observed were: trap/scoop net fishery for migratory fish in rivers, chilimira fishery for
utaka, and beach seine fishing for usipa and utaka where appropriate open sandy beaches
were available. Additionally, Eccles (1960)described an active long line fishery for
Rhampochromys spp. (known locally as ncheni) and Diplotaxodon spp. (known locally as

masuhungu).

The Fisheries Department’s commencement of recording fishing data in the North
in the late 19703 provides our next impression of the characteristics of these fisheries.
However, due to a combination of factors, the data collected cannot be judged highly

reliable until the late 19803, therefore, one should limit their use to the broadest possible

 

may also have been connected with the Banda regime’s overall anti-Northern Northern policies (Posner,
1995).

-74-

level by presenting the 1980-1990 data in an aggregate manner.68 The data presented here
refers specifically to the two northern districts where this thesis’s case studies are found:

Nkhotakota and Karonga (Tables 2-4 and 2-5, below).

In both Nkhotakota and Karonga, the single most productive fishing gear during
the 19803 continued to be the chilimira, with its main target species, the utaka. However,
this predominance was less in Karonga, reflecting the greater opportunities for gillnet
fishing over Karonga’s wider coastal shelf. Additionally, the fishermen of Karonga were
making greater use of small-meshed gillnets, shown by the larger presence of utaka and
chisawasawa ill their catches, whereas Nkhotakota fishermen’s catches were dominated
by the larger chambo (47%) and catfishes. The mosquito nets and kambuzi seines played
smaller roles in both districts, although during the mid-1980’s mosquito nets in
Nkhotakota were increasingly being used to line chilimira nets and beach seines. The
ambiguity of how to classify these combinations of gears seems to have led the data
recorders to count all nets lined with mosquito netting as mosquito nets, whereas this had
been used exclusively to denote the small mosquito nets that were used by divers to catch
usipa before 1982. Therefore, while 665 tons of fish were enumerated as being caught by
“mosquito nets” in 1988, the number tons caught by classical mosquito nets probably
didn’t rise far above 40 (Tweddle, Alimoso et al., 1990). A similar decline was seen in
Karonga’s utaka catches during these years, however the presence of chisawasawa,

kambuzi and usipa may be due, rather, to the absence of virundu in the north of Karonga,

 

68 During 1986-88, a lack of supervision of field staff in Karonga led to suspected underestimations of the
number of fishing gears used. When a thorough count was carried out in 1989, therefore, a false, sharp rise
in fishing gears was noted (Tweddle, Seymour et al., 1990). Similarly, some of the data in Nkhotakota are
suspected to have been falsified during this same period of time (Tweddle, Alimoso, & Sodzapanja, 1990).
The isolation of these fishing beaches and the diflicultly of timing recording visit with actual fishing events
was seen as a particular challenge to the collection of fishing data.

-75-

and where fishing over the coastal shelf may catch a wider variety of species (Tweddle,
Seymour et al., 1990). Longline fisheries were dominated by the catfishes and some
potamodromous fish when they are in the lake. Data on traps and hand line fisheries are
inherently underestimated as the fishermen will generally not bring their catches to the
major fishing docks, yet they are probably the most common fishing gear found. Catches
from traps were dominated in both districts by chambo and other tilapiid fishes. In both
Karonga and Nkhotakota, handline catches were dominated by the larger predatory fish:
Ntcheni (Rampochromys spp.), mpasa and sanjika, although catfish also were caught. In

the Chia Lagoon, in Nkhotakota, scoop net fishing remains an important fishing gear that

targets primarily ntcheni.

While estimates of fish catches and gear ownership are problematic given the
caveats noted above, for the purposes of illustrating the scale of the fishery, I have

presented the highest estimates of gear ownership and fish catches for each district below,

which in most cases coincided with the end of the decade.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chilimira Gilluet Mosquito Nets Kambuzi Seine Lorgline
Max. # of Ears 352 2,257 37 147 313
Max. Annual Catch 5,389 1,222 1,192 1,036 252
(tons)
% of Overall Catch 56% 23% 6% 9% 4%
.: Utaka 92% * *
‘3' Chambo 47% *
U Kampango 18% “
g Mlamba 10% ......
‘2 r Kambuzi ***
e\ - o is
Usrpa 2 /o
i Mpasa/Sanjika *** *
Ncheni *
* and **"‘ are used to indicate those fish species of minor and major importance, respectively,
where they were not enumerate separately or where catches were small overall.

 

Table 2-4. Nkhotakota primary fishing gears used, primary species caught for each
gear, 1980-89 (Tweddle, Seymour et al. 1990).

-76-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chilimira Gillnet Mosquito Kambuzi Longline
Nets Seine

Max. # of ggrs 149 1,694 40 68 206
Max. Annual Catcthons) 678 556 40A 81 47
"/o of Overall Catch 47% 34% 11% 4% 3%
5 Utaka 74% 10% * *
.: Chambo 24% *
«at Kampcmgo 20% 18%
‘2' Mlamba 6% 80%
{2- Kambuzi 7% * ***
°\° a Usipa 7% 93% *

aghisawasawa 7% 5% *

 

***

 

M asa/Sanjika
Nchila

 

 

1%

 

 

 

 

 

* and *** are used to indicate those fish species of minor and major importance, respectively, where
they were not enumerate separately or where catches were small overall.

A Although mosquito nets were enumerated as having caught 665 tons of fish in 1987, this figure
would be misleading, and therefore I show a more likely maximum catch of 40 tons (see discussion above)

 

Table 2-5. Karonga primary fishing gears used, primary species caught for each
gear, 1980-89 (T weddle, Seymour et al. 1990).

To illustrate the relative importance of these two districts’ fisheries Figure 2-7

presents the estimated catches for these districts along side those of the overall Lake

Malawi traditional fishery, the Lake Malawi commercial fishery, and the Lake Malombe

fishery. 69

 

69 Source data for Lake Malawi traditional, Lake Malawi commercial and Lake Malombe fisheries
Anonymous (1999). Fish Stocks and Fisheries of Malawian Waters Resource Report 1999, Fisheries
Department, Government of Malawi; Nkhotakota fisheries Tweddle, D., S. B. Alimoso, et al. (1990).
Analysis of catch and effort data for the fisheries of the Nkhotakota area: Lake Malawi, 1976-89. Monkey

Bay, Malawi, Fisheries Research Unit; Karonga fisheries.

-77-

 

   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 

—Lake Malawi-
Traditional
- - - -N<hotakota

 

 

Karonga

 

 

— Lake Nalaw i-
Corrmercial
------ Lake Nalorrbe

 

  

 

Figure 2-7. Tonnage of Fish Caught by Selected Fisheries in Malawi (1980-89), with
particular note of Nkhotakota and Karonga Districts.

As can be seen, during this decade the Nkhotakota fishery roughly doubled in size
and came to rival the Lake Malombe fishery and the Lake Malawi commercial fishery in
yields. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons for the Fisheries Department’s early
neglect of the Central and Northern lakeshore fisheries. These areas were the under-
populated regions of the country characterized by a poor infrastructure of feeder roads to
major fishing beaches. However, as has been noted by Ferguson and Derman (1993) and
Hara (2001), the Fisheries Department’s almost myopic focus on the chambo fishery,
which is the most prized (for both its commercial and culinary values) by the expatriate
and national elite as well as by the export market, cannot fail to be mentioned.
Consequently, although the tonnage landed by the Nkhotakota utaka fishery rivaled the
chambo catches of the commercial and the Lake Malombe fisheries, its much lower
(economic and culinary) value cannot but have contributed to the government’s valuation

of these fisheries. The end result was that the Fisheries Department focused the

-73-

preponderance of its meager resources on the closely juxtaposed southern Lake Malawi
and Lake Malombe fisheries sectors which predominantly produced chambo. As
discussed above, the exact rises and falls in the data during this decade should be
interpreted with caution. Qualitatively however, the overall grth in the Lake Malawi
traditional fisheries has been attributed in particular to the expansion of the chilimira
fisheries (i.e. utaka) in southern Lake Malawi (Olaf L.F. Weyl, Banda, Manase, Namoto,
& Mwenekibombwe, 2001; Manase, Mwenekibombwe, Namoto, & Mponda, 2002). The
growth in the chilimira fishery makes sense given that chilimira fishing was the most
profitable investment after the declining chambo stocks had made investment in chambo

seines increasingly uncertain (Table 2-6, below) (Mdaihli & Donda, 1992).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chilimira Gillnets Chambo Seine Kambuzi Seine
Investment (b_oats and nets) 3,960 4,700 10,700 10,700
Annual Fixed Costs (boat
maintenance, depreciation) 550 570 1,170 1,170
Annual Variable Costs (net
maintenance, crew earnings, misc.
costs) Lain hm 2.5m am
Total Annual Cost 7,750 1,870 10,670 4,070
E ' gs 10.000 £400 19,000 4,100
Net Profit 2,250 530 8,330 30

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 2-6. Mean costs, earnings and profits for key fishing gears used in Lake
Malawi (priced in Malawi Kwacha) (from Mdaihli and Donda (1992).

Democracy brings pressure for participatory management but autocratic tendencies

linger to produce a mixed bag of fisheries co-management regimes (1993-2005)

The first multi-party elections were held in 1994, a precursor to a bewildering
wave of new development and governance paradigms that were to sweep across the

nation. The donor agencies pushed their agendas of greater economic and political

-79-

liberalizationm, and the “new” political leadership seemed to embrace these concepts and
all the “paraphernalia of democracy” associated with this change.71 However, while
some elements of the government apparatus and modus operandi changed, the autocratic
tendencies that had molded all of its institutions and leaders for the previous 33 years
would not disappear overnight (Englund, 2002). Indeed, most of the “new” senior
leadership and opposition party leader had worked in senior positions under President
Banda, and subsequently reinvented their histories to sell their democratic values to the

donor community (Ihonvbere, 1997; Mapanje, 2002).

Simultaneously, the withdrawal of much foreign assistance to the government’s
budget was forcing the leadership to accept the inevitability of over-fished stocks unless
they adopted a radical new “participatory fisheries management” regime that was
achieving scientific acclaim (Mkanda, 1991; R. H. V. Bell & Donda, 1993; Ferguson et
al., 1993; Martin, 1993). However, as with the national leadership, while the Fisheries
Department adopted the language and paraphernalia of participatory fisheries
management, its operations would in fact continue to be highly-hierarchical and political,
which would undermine extension workers’ initiatives to facilitate participatory fisheries

management (Donda, 2000a; M. M. Hara, 2001). Similarly, while some within the

 

7° Although Western governments had not voiced much criticism to the Banda regime’s brutality and
corruption while Malawi proved useful in supporting the South Afiican Apartheid regime in combating the
rise of Marxist governments throughout Southern Africa (esp. in Mozambique), these positions changed
following the end of the cold war and the demise of the South Afiican Apartheid regime (Ihonvbere, 1997).
Soon, western governments (including the UK, USA, Norway, and the European Community) and the
World Bank, started cutting (or threatening to cut) aid funding in protest of the human rights conditions in
Malawi (Derman & Ferguson, 1995). In the case of the US, this threat was communicated dming a personal
visit by Vice-President Quayle to Malawi in 1992 (Ihonvbere, 1997). These threats were highly effective in
pressuring government to hold the 1993 referendum on multi-party elections as the Malawian economy
which was already in a state of crisis, was highly dependent on foreign aid to fund its programs (Derman &
Ferguson, 1995; Ihonvbere, 1997).

7‘ A phrase coined by Englund (2002) which include: “multipartyism, regular Parliamentary and
Presidential elections, new constitutions, freedom of expression, a non-governmental sector.”

-30-

international development community would promote participatory fisheries
management, these agencies’ and NGOs’ short-term project orientation and bio-centric
research perspective would actually undermine the creation of an effective long-term
national fisheries management policy. A brief history of the grth of “participatory
fisheries management programs” (PFMP) in Malawi, which started at Lake Malombe,
and which was then extended to incorporate an array of different fisheries, will allow us
to appreciate the institutional innovations presented by the case studies to be discussed in

the next chapter.

As the chambo stocks in Lake Malombe and the South East Arm of Lake Malawi
showed increasing signs of over-exploitation, donor agencies funded the Chambo Fishery
Management Project aimed primarily at collecting further biological and taxonomic data
on the chambo fishery (and to a much lesser extent a few other fisheries) (FAO 1993).
Reflecting this uncritically chambo-biased management perspective, little research was
done to investigate the fishing communities’ perspectives regarding the fishery, and
rather than recognizing the chambo seine fishers as being a source of local conflict and
inequity, these were seen as the primary stakeholders to be protected from other fishers
who simply failed to appreciate the need for sustainable fisheries management.72
Consequently, the management options that the FAO research consortium provided to the
Fisheries Department reflected this bias and did not take into account the needs and value

ofthe kambuzi fishery (FAo, 1993):

A. There is effectively no management action and the fishery is allowed to
continue with the poorly enforced regulations that are currently in place.
Fishing effort is not assumed to increase further.

 

72 The problems related to the chambo fishery, and the donor agencies and Fisheries Departments’ lack of
appreciation for the kambuzi fishery are discussed at length in the Lake Malambe case study below.

-31-

B. Management actions are focused on the restoration of the chambo stocks but
with the maintenance of fishing with gillnets and chambo seines. All gear that
is not selective for the larger sizes of chambo, i.e. kambuzi and nkhacha
seines, will be banned. The current effort of the gears targeted on chambo will
be maintained.

C. Management actions are focused on the restoration of the chambo stocks as in
B above. However, in order to compensate the owners of banned gear,
additional gillnets will be allowed to enter the fishery.

D. Management aims to allow the recovery of the chambo stocks while
maintaining and protecting a kambuzi fishery. The use of both nkhacha and
kambuzi nets continues to be allowed but with the mesh size regulated to a
minimum of 25mm. This mesh size will be selective for larger sizes of fish.

B. As in D, the management option will allow the recovery of the chambo stocks
and maintain and protect the kambuzi fishery. Kambuzi seines will be
completely banned and the owners of the banned gear will be compensated by
allowing them to convert to nkhacha nets.

Following the crash of the chambo fishery in Lake Malombe in 1993, the
Fisheries Department and donor agencies alike recognized the inability of the
government to control fishing effort through the centralized fisheries management regime
(FAO, 1993). However the management recommendations provided by the Chambo
Fisheries Management Project which depended on either limiting access to the fishery,
banning certain fishing gears altogether, or enforcing fishing gear mesh sizes were
regarded by senior Department of Fisheries staff as “politically unpalatable and
practically unenforceable” (M. M. Hara, 2001). As a result of the govemment’s
recognition that it lacked the local legitimacy and capacity to enforce such regulations, an
ad-hoc committee was formed to design an alternative management strategy, resulting in
the Artisanal Fisheries Management Plan 1992 (Ferguson, Derman et al. 1993; Gaiger
1994). This plan introduced the idea of a “participatory approach to management”, and

was guided by consultants, Richard Bell and Steve Donda.

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Richard Bell was one of the primary advocates for participatory natural resources
management in Malawi. He was a biologist who had helped to establish the unorthodox
Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP) in Zambia which integrated
rural development with conservation in and around a park that had previously been a
conflict-ridden poaching haven (Adams & McShane, 1992; Morris, 1996). In his book
chapter, entitled, “Conservation with a Human Face”, Bell (1987) argued that the
seemingly inherent conflict between conservation and rural Africans’ interests, which
legitimized the militarization of natural resources management enforcement, could
actually be managed if the rural peoples’ interests were addressed directly. Whereas the
scientific community and foreign conservationists hailed the genetic and aesthetic values
of unique fish and wildlife species, the local communities’ livelihoods depended to a
certain degree on these resources, but these needs were generally not addressed by natural
resource management agencies whose goals were based on protectionist mission
statements defined by conservation science. With high relevance for a Malawi Fisheries
Department that lacked legitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders or the resources to

enforce its regulations, Bell argued that,

“However well intentioned, plans imposed from above are liable to
generate social conflicts or to contain technical errors, [meaning that for
best results] input from all parties involved [read in this context, the
fishing communities] must be incorporated into land-use plans. ” (Bell
1987)

In addition to the LIRDP program in Zambia which combined development and

conservation programs”, the Zimbabwean CAMPFIRE program provided further

 

73 Building on the success of the LIRDP program in the Luangwa Valley, the Zambian government
instituted the ADMADE (Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas) program in
game reserves across the country. Through this program, a portion of the wildlife hunting safari revenues

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encouragement as they were controlling poaching of wildlife by giving communities
actual ownership (and monetary returns) over their wildlife resources (Murphree, 1993).74
The grong popularity of (and financial support for) participatory resource management
approaches among development professionals (Bland 1992; De Gabriel 1998) had led the
Fisheries Department to commission a study by Bell and Donda evaluating the costs and
benefits associated with different management approaches for Lake Malombe:
centralized management, community-based management, and co-management (R. H. V.
Bell & Donda, 1993). As the government lacked the resources to enforce the first option,
and as the communities lacked the capacity to take over the management of the fishery in
its entirety, the Fisheries Department elected to attempt a fisheries co-management
regime in collaboration with fishing community stakeholder committees. Additionally, in
order to establish a legal basis for participatory fisheries management, the Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act of 1997 was greatly amended based on a consultancy

by Tracy Dobson (Dobson, 1996).

Lake Malombe Participatory Fisheries Management Program (PFMP)

With the collaboration of the GTZ75, and the assistance of the UNDP/FAG, World

Bank, and ODA, the Malawi-German Fisheries and Aquaculture Project (MAGFAD)

 

are allocated to local community development programs, and in its first three years resulted in up to ten-
fold decreases in poaching in some parks. Adams, J. S. and T. O. McShane (1992). The Myth of Wild
Afiica: Conservation without 111% New York, W.W.Norton & Company.

74 “Under Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
(CAMPFIRE), [first established in 1989] people living in communal lands are given legal rights and
technical support to sustainably manage their natural resources. Once they have a management plan
approved, communities are able to harvest wildlife and use its profits for rural development, while also
contributing to environmental conservation” Association, C. (1998). CAMPFIRE Fact Sheet. Harare,
Zimbabwe, Afiican Resources Trust.

7’ GTZ-Gesellschafi fir Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Foreign Technical Assistance Agency).

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commenced with a pilot co-management program, the “Lake Malombe and Upper Shire

River PFMP76” where, it was hoped community collaboration would bring about a

recovery of the depleted chambo stocks (Bland 1992; Wilson 1993; Scholz, Njaya et al.

1998; Ferguson and Derman 2000). If this pilot program proved successful, the Fisheries

Department intended to expand co-management to the South East Arm of Lake Malawi,

and then on to the rest of Lake Malawi (R. H. V. Bell & Donda, 1993; Dawson, 1997 ; M.

M. Hara, 2001). Seven areas of management intervention were stipulated in the Bell and

Donda report (R. H. V. Bell & Donda, 1993):

Community participation — Fishing community stakeholders would be organized
at the community level in “Beach Village Committees” (BVCs), and in a
Fisheries Association that encompassed representatives from all BVCs around
Lake Malombe. Each BVC membership is 10-14 fishery stakeholders, elected by
their community to participate on behalf of the community in conservation and
management of the fishery. Village headmen act as ex-officio members, and BVC

members are paid for their services in the form sitting allowances.

Revision of fisheries legislation and policy 77— Specific gear restrictions stipulated
in the 1993 Fisheries Act were revised to give the BVCs a legal personality,
empowering them to “participate on behalf of the fishing communities in

conservation and management of the fisheries”.

Research and monitoring — Continued monitoring of the Lake Malombe and

Upper Shire River aquatic ecology and continued data collection to inform

 

7° PFMP-Participatory Fisheries Managemmt Programme.
77 Incorporated into the 1997 Fisheries Conservation and Management Act.

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extension messages. Additionally, it called for socio-economic studies to provide
insight into the emergence of resource access rights to enable the Fisheries

Department to intervene if adjustments in the PFMP program are needed.

0 Public Relations and Extension — To establish dialogue with fishing communities
that will result in the formation of functional BVCs, to promote dialogue between
BVCs and the Fisheries Department, and to facilitate the identification of fishing
community problems, formulation of solutions, monitoring of the implementation

of solutions by communities.
0 Licensing -— Required of all gear owners.

0 Gear compensation and income generating activities (IGAs) — The cheapest way
to promote the use of legal fishing gear was determined to be the government
purchase of legal fishing gears for these fishermen. Loans were also to be given to

fishermen and women’s groups.

0 Law enforcement - Law enforcement remained the job of the Fisheries

Department.

What should be noted, however, is that this program started before any successful
fisheries co-management regimes in Afiica had been documented, and therefore, the
Fisheries Department and its donor agency collaborators were attempting to design a
management regime with only a rough theoretical fi'amework to go by. A number of

studies have assessed the successes and failures of the fisheries co-management regime

around Lake Malombe:

~86-

Dawson, K A. (1997). Applying Cooperative Management in Small-Scale
Fisheries: the Cases of Lakes Malombe and Chiuta, Malawi. Department of

Fisheries and Wildlife. East Lansing, Michigan, Michigan State University: 53.

De Gabriel, J. (1998). Evaluation of the Participatory Fisheries Management
Programme for Lake Malombe and the Upper Shire. Malawi, Consultancy on

behalf of Malawi Fisheries Department: 32.

Donda, S. (2000). Theoretical Advancement and Institutional Analysis of
Fisheries Co-management in Malawi: Experiences from Lake Malombe and
Chiuta. Institute for Fisheries Management and Coastal Community Development

(IFM). Aalborg, Denmark, Aalborg University: 329.

Hara, M. M., Donda, S. J., & Njaya, F. J. (2002). Lessons fiom Malawi's
Experience with Fisheries Co-Management Initiatives. In K. Geheb & M.-T.
Sarch (Eds), Africa 's Inland F isheries: The Management Challenge (pp. 31-48).

Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers.

Unless otherwise indicated, I will be making use of these primary sources to

summarize the following key issues that have proved most vexing to the PFMP.

Disjunctions between government and stakeholders’ goals. First and most significantly,

the pre-irnplementation assessment of the potential for co-management at Lake Malombe

had highlighted a difference in priorities between the donors and the Fisheries

Department on one hand, and the fishing communities on the other: While the

government and donors were preoccupied with recovery of the chambo stocks, fishing

communities preferred not to make the sacrifices needed to enable chambo recover, as

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they prioritized encouraging an active kambuzifishery (R. H. V. Bell & Donda, 1993;
Ferguson et al., 1993). 78 Although the average pro fit for an individual kambuzi seine
owner was much lower than that of a chambo seine owner, this difference in equity
outcomes actually made a dominant chambo fishery less appealing to the average fishery
stakeholder (Quart, 1993). As can be seen in Table 2-6, above, investment in kambuzi
seines cost less than half that of chambo seines, and the profits were more equitably
distributed among gear owner and crew, whereas chambo seine owners earned much
greater profits than their crews (Mdaihli & Donda, 1992). Furthermore, the high prices
that chambo fetched among the country’s urban elites meant that they were too expensive
for most fishery stakeholders to afford (R. H. V. Bell & Donda, 1993; Ferguson et al.,
1993).79 Therefore, while wealthy chambo seine owners, many of whom did not live
locally or depend on fisheries as a livelihood (rather investing in it as a business venture),
profited fi'om local crews’ labors, the crews (who depended on the fishing for a
livelihood and source of food) could not afford to eat chambo themselves, and were less
able to save the capital needed to purchase a fishing gear of their own. Consequently, the
“co-operation” between governmental and fishing stakeholder in the Lake Malombe
PFMP started with the government imposing a set of goals upon the fishing communities
which were against the communities’ values of social equity and livelihood security. In

2003, the government tried to claim that Lake Malombe fishers’ prioritized restoration of

 

78 Note the growth of the “kambuzi” fishery as the fishery grew over-capitalized, and which then replaced
the chambo fishery almost entirely. Consequently, beach seines were modified from 76-90mm mesh
“chambo seines” to few-25mm mesh “kambuzi seines” and “nkhacha open water seines” that target the
kambuzi fishery (a poorly defined group of species, dominated by Lethrinops spp.) FAO (1993). Fisheries
management in the south-east arm of Lake Malawi, the Upper Shire River and Lake Malombe, with
particular reference to the fisheries on chambo (Oreochromis spp.). Rome, GOM/FAO/UNDP Chambo
Fisheries Research Project: 113p..

’9 The smaller kambuzi are much less highly prized (sold in 1993 at MK 0.60/kg) than chambo (sold in
1993 at MK 2.40/kg) (Mdaihli & Donda, 1992).

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the chambo fishery over that of the kambuzi fishery (Malawi, 2003); however, these
findings were called into question by the Fisheries Departments’ own senior scientists,
Drs. Steve Donda and Moses Banda, who determined that the research to support this had

been poorly done and based on a biased selection of communities. 80

Unrepresentative/undemocratic BVCsg Some of the BVC elections were open and
democratic, while some BVCs were simply established by chiefly fiat. Even where the
elections were democratic, the chiefs and FD Extension workers screened the candidates
to ensure that they were types of people who they felt comfortable in working with or
whom they felt should be in the BVCs. Membership in such a committee was understood
to be a highly political issue, as monetary and social benefits accrued to such members.
Consequently, while some BVCS were constituted of a mixture of gear
owners/crew/comm unity leaders, many tended to lack any crew member representation,
and in some, fishers constituted a minority altogether (i.e. the members were
businessmen or farmers)! Women (who had a stake a fish traders and processors) tended

to be excluded altogether.

Conflicts between chiefs and BVCs.81 In some cases, the BVCs were dominated by
chiefs. However, in other cases, the BVCs represented a threat to the authority and

incomes of the chiefs, and were therefore resented and undermined by chiefs.

 

8° 2003-09-17-Zomba - COMPASS Workshop Observation.

8‘ As the traditional arbiters in village conflicts, chiefs were able to assess fines on community members
and keep the money or goods (sometime fines were paid in the form of livestock or fitmiture) collected for
personal use. As the BVCs were now assigned the roles of assessing and collecting fishing-related fines,
chiefs lost out financially and in terms of personal prestige.

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Poor Sense of Stewardship/Ownership. 82 B VCs generally regarded their roles as
replacing that of the government after (they perceived) the laziness and ineffectiveness
of the Department of Fisheries had resulted in the collapse of the chambo stocks.
Therefore, they expected to be paid in return for their activities within the BVCs, and the
opportunity to earn from participation is a significant reason for why the selection of
BVC membership was a highly politicized activity. The most common reason for
participation in a BVC was the anticipated financial benefits.83 The high level of
involvement of (European) donor agency personnel may also have diminished the sense

of local ownership over the resource.

Poor Effectiveness as Conduits of Extension Messages. It was generally found that the
BVCs did little to share the extension information that they received with their
communities. Many BVC members were also unclear as to the reasons why the BVCs
had been established and what their roles were supposed to be. This was partly due to the

high level of membership turnover, and a lack of contact with FD Extension officers.

Lack of Trust in the FD. Although the MAGFAD leadership initially had supported
funding the replacement of, or providing compensation for illegal fishing gears, a change
in project leadership reversed this position (Pohlvogt & Walter, 1995), and indeed

claimed that no commitment for the provision of loans for gear replacement had ever

 

82 Illustrated by De Gabriel’s (1998) nuanced description of the Malawian concept, Tangatha:
Traditionally, thangata was an accepted annual contribution of labor by community members in a chief’s
fields for which the chief would supply the workers with maize beer. This arrangement was legitimized by
significant spiritual underpinnings, that related to the chief’s role as supplier of fertility. This arrangement
also served to maintain the chief’s economic dominance and social prestige. However, in the modern era,
thangata became associated with the exploitative European-owned plantations where people were forced to
labor in poor conditions for little pay. BVC members saw their task as being akin to the latter form of
thangata as they saw this as being properly the job of the Department of Fisheries, which having failed in
its duties was foisting the task upon the communities.

83 In particular, payment for any activity that they carried out on the BVC behalf, participation in training
workshops where they would be paid daily allowances, and access to loans (see below).

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been made (U. F. Scholz et al., 1998). Nevertheless, as fishers had accepted the new
fishing gear restrictions on the assumption that they would receive new fishing gears
or loans to purchase these (though it should be noted that they did not all intend to
discard their old gears), when the donor agencies and FD determined that they would
be unable to sponsor the loan program, much trust that had been established between

the FD and fishers was lost.

Poor FD commitment to participatory management, Although the FD and donor
agencies spoke in the language of participation, the fishing communities generally felt
that the FD rarely responded to their concerns (as seen in the points mentioned above).
Furthermore, FD Extension officers did not interact with communities in transparent
or democratic manners as they (and the chiefs) selected many of the BVC members as
well as the recipients for loans. However, this lack of democratic values in the field staff
must be seen as modeled on the hierarchical bureaucracy in which they worked, and the
FD’s short-term program goals that defined the field staffs’ interactions with the BVCs.
These symptoms are linked to the fact that the move to co-management was primarily
motivated by the department’s inability to manage the declining stocks rather than their
conviction in the participatory process. Additionally, a GTZ 1995-96 evaluation of the
MAGFAD program reflects a certain amount of donor skepticism of the participatory
management paradigm, which it saw as having been imposed on the Fisheries
Department by the consultants, Bell and Donda (Pohlvogt & Walter, 1995)“. Similarly,

the FAO’s reservations regarding the community-based management approach are seen

 

8’ This observation is further supported by observations that the FAO lacked confidence in the community-
based approach, leading to a Allison et al. (2002)

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as having contributed to the half-hearted and top-down approach to community-based

management initially attempted in Malawi (Allison, Mvula et al. 2002).

Since its inception in 1994, the Lake Malombe PFMP has struggled to achieve
local legitimacy and ownership, and has not resulted in a recovery of the chambo stocks
(Donda, 2000a). The BVCs formed a Fisheries Association, but most of the donor agency
expertise and funding for loans and micro-loans programs ended in the late 1990’s,
cutting short almost all of these livelihood diversification initiatives (M. Hara, Donda, &
Njaya, 1999). Additionally, GTZ ended its support of the program in 2002, which has
undoubtedly had a negative impact on extension efforts. Nevertheless, despite the lack of
strong governance structures for this lake, Lake Malombe’s fisheries have remained
relatively stable, ranging between 3000-4000 tons caught per year (mostly kambuzi)
during the 1994-2001 period (M. C. Banda et al., 2002). Consequently, unless the local
communities genuinely want to support the recovery of the chambo fishery (outlined in
Banda et al. 2002), and can bear the financial burden associated with the necessary
regulations, it might behoove the govermnent to accept this state of affairs and focus their
extension and enforcement efforts on optimizing the communities’ management and

harvest of the kambuzi fish stocks (Ferguson et al., 1993).

Mbenji Island Traditional Fisheries Management (primary sources (Scholz, Njaya et

a1. 1998; Scholz and Chirnatiro 2004))

Mbenji Island lies off shore of Nema Village (north of Senga Bay) in Salima
District, and plays host to a thriving utaka fishery (Copadichromys spp.). In contrast with

the traditional river fisheries which date at least to the early 1900’s, the fishery of Mbenj i

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Island is a unique case in Malawi as it only became a Chieftain-regulated fishery as late as
the 19503, demonstrating the influence that some chiefs maintained despite colonialism
and dictatorship. Presumably due to the growth in the numbers of imported beach seines
during the 19508, chief (now sub-TA) Msosa established a fisheries regime to ensure both
the sustainability of the fishery and, as well as minimizing conflicts between fishers. The
first goal was accomplished by setting a closed season from December-March/April
(during which time no one was allowed to live on the island), and banning the use of
particularly harmful fishing methods, such as using beach seines lined with mosquito
netting or light attraction associated with night-time chilimira fishing. Social harmony

was enforced by banning alcohol, marijuana, gambling and women [sic] on the island.

Traditional beliefs maintain that contravention of the regulations will anger the
ancestral spirits who determine the bounty of fish around the island, and at the opening
ceremony for the fishery, Chief Msosa makes a sacrifice to these spirits in order to
provide for good fish harvests. The opening day of fishing season is one of great
spectacle, with the sacrificial ceremony, dancing, and speeches. Enforcement of the
regulations is carried out by Chief Msosa and his council of elders and fishermen. This
fishery and regime have endured has endured through several chiefiaincy successions,
and the FD has made much propaganda (through speeches and radio interviews with
Chief Msosa as well as by inviting chiefs fiom around the country to visit the Island on
the day of the opening ceremony) of it to encourage other traditional leaders to take a
greater stewardship role over their local fisheries. This would prove to be an inspiration
for TA Kanyenda in Nkhotakota, as will be seen in the case studies presented in Chapter

4. However the future success of this program has been called into question due to the

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corrupting influence of the increased financial incentives in the form of sitting allowances
and invitations to participate in workshops (including the invitation to Chief Msosa to
attend a conference in Japan) that NGOs and the FD are providing in order to share the

credit for this unique program.85

Lake Chiuta Fisheries Association

Whereas Lake Malombe was an entirely government/donor agency-driven co-
management program, the Lake Chiuta Fisheries Association was entirely initiated by the
fishing communities themselves, and represents a scenario in which the communities
have a high sense of ownership and stewardship over the resource. Additionally, while
Bell (1987) and Murphree (1993) may have been the most significant scientific
influences who recognized the potential for rural stakeholders to participate in resource
management, and while Mbenji Island shows the potential of chiefs to impose fishing
regulations on their subjects, Lake Chiuta was the first proof that Malawian societal
norms could be compatible with a community-based resources management ethic that did

not depend on the traditional roles of the chiefs.86

Lake Chiuta is located in a remote part of southern Malawi, and until the late
19803 the only institution regulating fishing in this lake was based on a traditional belief
that spirits inhabiting the island, Phiri la Mtsatsi, would abduct any fisherman found

fishing around the island, in effect, creating a fish sanctuary (Donda 2000). The

 

85 A. Russell —Mangochi District - Interview with FD staff.

86 Indeed as this case study illustrates, chiefs have fiequently chosen to accept bribes rather than act for the
greater welfare of their communities. Therefore, despite the success of the Mbenji Island fishing regime,
whole-sale reliance on chiefs to establish sustainable and equitable fishing institutions is unlikely to
produce the desired effect.

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conditions that had protected this fishery from being commercialized changed in the late
19803, when a road was constructed to the lake that linked this fishery to more distant
markets (J. Wilson, 2004). The first new entrants to the fishery, beach seine fishers fiom
Lake Chilwa, were tolerated by local fishers. However, a large influx of nkhacha seine
fishers who arrived later caused the l990-91 collapse of the chambo” fishery upon which
the local communities depended (Dawson, 1997). The nkhacha presented a number of
problems to the local gillnet chambo fishers: whereas gillnets had caught chambo
selectively, the nkhacha is a fine-meshed open-water seine that caught immature fish of
all species, and its dragging action on the lake bottom caused the destruction of chambo
breeding grounds and made the lake water too turbid for domestic uses. Additionally, the
nkhacha fishers sold their catches at cheaper prices than the locals, thereby undercutting

local incomes (Dawson, 1997; Donda, 2000b).

These threats to local livelihoods, living standards, food sources and ecology
came to a head with the collapse of the chambo fishery, and the local fishers called a
meeting of all fishers demanding that the nkhacha fishers increase the mesh sizes of their
nets, or face eviction. However, when they asked their local chiefs to evict the nkhacha
fishers in September 1992, they found their concerns ignored as the nkhacha fishers had
established a fund with which they bribed the local chiefs and MCP party members to
allow them to continue their fishing activities (J. Wilson, 2004).88 When asked to
intervene on their behalf, the local FD representative could not as he lacked any legal

basis for evicting the outsiders, however, through meetings with the FD staff and later

 

87 Note, in Lake Chiuta, the “chambo” fishery difi‘ers from that in Lakes Malawi and Malombe, and refers
specifically to 0. shiranus (known locally as makumba) and Tilapia rendalii (known locally as chilunguni).
8 They also reported this situation to the responsible District Commissioner, Traditional Authority, and
District Fisheries Ofiicer, but no action was taken (J. Wilson, 2004).

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exposure to the governmental radio fisheries extension program, “Usodzi Wa Lero”89,

they learned of the newly established Lake Malombe PF MP program. The fishers
established BVCs around their own lake, and called for a general meeting May 17th 1995
with all the local chiefs, FD officers, members of Parliament, and Police chiefs. At this
meeting it was agreed that the nkhacha and beach seines would be banned fiom the lake
and minimum mesh sizes were established for gillnets (Dawson, 1997; Donda, 2000b).
However, 200-3 00 of the nkhacha fishers refused to accept these regulations, and the
BVCs forced these fishers to leave by burning down the straw houses inhabited by the

nkhacha owners on May 19-20, 1995 (Dawson, 1997; Donda, 2000b; J. Wilson, 2004).

In 1996, the FD integrated the Chiuta fishers into the PF MP scheme in order to
increase the transparency within, and legal backing for, the workings of the Lake Chiuta
Fisheries Association (Donda, 2000b). BVCs were thereby empowered to formulate and
enforce their own fishing regulations, and the FD acts primarily in an advisory role to the
BVCs. Significantly, the seven village chiefs who had shown their lack of ethics and
leadership in accepting bribes from the nkhacha fishers were omitted from the regime
altogether, while the two who had supported the local fishers (and who were fishermen
themselves) were included as non-voting members (N jaya, Donda, & Hara, 1999; Donda,
2000b). Donda also found that in contrast with the Lake Malombe BVC members, the
Lake Chiuta BVC members were primarily motivated to join the BVCs in order to protect

their fisheries and for the social distinction that this role provides them within the

 

89 Usodzi Wa Lero translates to “Modern Fishing”, and is a weekly lS-minute radio program targeted at
disseminating fisheries-related information to fishing communities. This was initiated by the MAGFAD
project, sponsored by GTZ, and was first aired on the most popular government-run radio station, MBC 1,
on July 20, 1995 (Mueller & Saukani, 2002).

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community (Donda, 2000b).90 In addition to their effectiveness at enforcing fisheries
regulations, the Lake Chiuta BVCs were instrumental in collaborating with the

government in the FD’s annual fisheries frame survey (N jaya 2002).

By 1998, the chambo stocks had recovered to their former levels, and following a
study tour of the Lake Kariba (in Zambia) co-management regime, the Fisheries
Association has continued to refine its regulations and in order to improve enforcement it
has subdivided the Lake Chiuta Fisheries Association into two Area Fisheries
Association (J. Wilson, 2004). As Lake Chiuta lies partly within Mozambique, an
ongoing challenge to the fisheries regime comes fiom nkhacha fishers from the
Mozambican shore (N jaya et al., 1999; Donda, 2000a; Mozambique, 2005).91 Following
the failure of informal discussions between the stakeholders on either side of the border
to establish a unified position on nkhacha fishing, in 2005, the Lake Chiuta Fisheries
Association confiscated a number nkhacha seines from fishermen who had crossed over
fiom the Mozambican shore.92 The tensions between chiefs and fishers also flared up in
2005, when a chief was physically accosted by Fisheries Association members for having
accepted further bribes from Lake Chilwa beach seine owners who attempted, again, to

gain access to this fishery. 93

The Lake Chiuta Fisheries Association faced a severe challenge to its authority in

mid-2006 when the local Traditional Authority, TA Kawinga, denied their right to

 

90 Indeed, as a matte of policy, no sitting allowances have ever been given to the BVCs or Association at
Lake Chiuta (John Wilson, 2002, Pers. Comm.)

9‘ Note, however, that these may not necessarily be Mozambicans. After being chased away, several
Malawian nkhacha fishers settled on fire Mozambican shore (J. Wilson, 2004).

92 2006-08-16 — personal communication - John Wilson; Note, also that not all poaching is conducted by
Mozambique-based fishers. Radio Mozambique (2005) aired a report in which illegal fishing and felling of
trees by Malawians was cited as a particular concern along the Mozambican shores of Lakes Chiuta,
Chilwa and Amaramba (Mozambique, 2005).

93 John Wilson, 2006, Pers. Comm.

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enforce fisheries regulations altogether and overtmned the fines that a BVC had levied
against two migrant beach seine owners. 94 This ruling must be considered suspect as the
TA has been accused by fishers of having accepted bribes fiom Lake Chilwa fishers;
however, it does illustrate the current statutory weakness of BVCs in Malawi.95 Indeed,
while the 1999 Fisheries Conservation and Management Act calls for the official
registration of all BVCs and Fisheries Associations, until this simple process is
completed by the Fisheries Department, BVCs and Fisheries Associations will not have
any legal backing for their enforcement of laws. In order to prevent corrupt officials or
chiefs from severely undermining the legitimacy of the most successfirl example of
fisheries co-management in Malawi, the Fisheries Department has to act quickly to
provide these BVCs (and others around the country) with a legal mandate (Hara, Donda
et al. 2002). The unresolved tensions between TAs/chiefs and the BVCs, and the BVCs’
lack of legal standing have been pinpointed as the primary sources of instability in the
Lake Chiuta fishery co-management regime, and it remains to be seen how the recent
changes to the judicial system that have curtailed TAs’ and chiefs’ powers will affect

their future support for the BVCs’ activities (Hara, Donda et al. 2002).

Lake Chilwa and Mpoto Lagoon Fisheries Association

Lake Chilwa is a large shallow lake (roughly 700 km2 and 2-3m deep) in Southern
Malawi that forms part of the national border with Mozambique. Given its size, it is also

one of the most productive fisheries in Afiica, producing up to 25,000 tons of fish in a

 

9‘ John Wilson, 2006, Pers. Comm.
9’ John Wilson, 2006, Pers. Comm.

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good year (Nyasulu, Namoto et al. 2001; Wilson 2004). Due to its shallowness, however,
this lake has dried out almost completely seven times during the last century (Lancaster,
1979; U. P. Scholz et al., 1998).96 During these periods of drought, fish stocks have found
refilge in isolated pools in the rivers that flow into the lake, making them particularly
vulnerable to capture by fishers (J. Wilson, 2004). Because of concerns over the
sustainability of fish stocks during the most recent recession of the lake, in 1995, the
Fisheries Department and Traditional Authorities around Lake Chilwa decided to
implement a co-management regime to limit the exploitation of fish stocks in these

refugia (U. P. Scholz et al., 1998; Njaya, 2001; J. Wilson, 2004).

In 1995, a number of River Village Committees were established along all major
in-flowing rivers to regulate fishing in river-bed pools, in particular to stop the use of
small-meshed nets and plant-derived poisons (U. F. Scholz et al., 1998; J. Wilson, 2004).
Following the re—flooding of the lake, the River Village Committees program was
expanded to the entire Lake Chilwa and the closely associated Mpoto Lagoon shorelines,
leading to the creation of over 50 BVCs, established to regulate an array of other fishing
practices (U. F. Scholz et al., 1998; J. Wilson, 2004). The full list of regulations and their
associated rationales as described by Njaya, (2001) and Nyirenda (2001)are shown in

Table 2-7, below.

In spite of the above actions, the Lake Chilwa and Mpoto Lagoon BVCs and
Fisheries Association have suffered from some of the same sources of illegitimacy as the
co-management regime on Lake Malombe. In this case, the BVCs were largely made up

of chiefs and their appointees, most of who were not actual fisherfolk, did not live near

 

9‘ Significant recessions or complete droughts were recorded in: 1900, 1913-16, 1920-22, 1934, 1954,
1960-61, 1966-68, 1973 and 1995.

-99-

the lakeshore, and had little direct knowledge of the fishery (J. Wilson, 2004, 2006).

Excluding most primary stakeholders, the BVC regulations were established by the

Fisheries Department and chiefs during the course of three meetings sponsored by the

GTZ-MAGFAD program. (Wilson 2004; Wilson 2006)The primary sources of conflict

have been the regulations that sought to establish control over the large numbers of

fishers who operate from floating reed islands (regulations 9,11,13), the 6-month closed

season on beach seine fishing (regulation 1), and the use of poisons in river bed pools as

this is a traditional fishing method used by women (regulation 5) (U. F. Scholz et al.,

1998; J. Wilson, 2006).

 

Regrhtions

Rationales

 

1) Closed Season for beach seines in L. Chilwa
and Mpoto lagoon, Nov. l-Apr.30

Protect spawning stocks and reduce fishing effort

 

2) Closed Season in rivers, May-Sept.

Protect spawning stocks

 

3) Ban use of Nkhacha open water seines

Prevent habitat destruction and remove competition
with existing beach seines owners

 

4) Release of any juvenile (kasawala) fish
captured

Protect juvehiles. Large fish fetch better
prices

 

5) Ban use of poisonous plant substances
(katupe)

Prevent indiscriminate capture of fish

 

6) Minimum mesh size on gillnets and beach
seines

Protect juveniles. Large fish fetch better
prices

 

7) Ban construction of fishing weirs (biiu) in
rivers during L. Chilwa closed season

Protect spawning stocks

 

8) Ban use of scoop nets (pyassa) for tilapia

Unknown

 

9) Fishingallowed only during the day

Ease monitoring of landed fish by BVC

 

10) Poachers or thieves to be banished

Control of theft and ensure compliance to regulations

 

11) Fish traders should not purchase fish on the
water or floating islands (zimbowera)

Ease monitoring of landed fish by BVC

 

12) Prohibit division of catches between crew
members and net owners

Unknown

 

l3) Require fisher registration with BVCs and
pay governmmtal fishing license

Regulate effort, control movement of fishers, control
of theft of gear, and provide revenue for the
government and community

 

14) Traditional leaders and BVCs should be
respected

 

 

Promote regulation compliance

 

Table 2-7. Lake Chilwa and Mpoto Lagoon Fishing Association regulation and their

rationales.

-100-

 

Following the decline of MAGFAD and DAN IDA97 support for Fisheries
Department extension programs in the late 1990’s, the Fisheries Department gained the
support of the USAID-firnded COMPASS program. COMPASS supported the Lake
Chilwa and Mpoto Lagoon Fisheries Association by sponsoring a series of workshops
aimed at giving the existing regulations official governmental sanction, and provided the
Association with a patrol-boat to enforce its regulations (CONfl’ASS, 2002a, 2003,
2004). Despite the government and NGO-attempts to give this Fisheries Association a
legal identity, however, its lack of popular mandate and transparency, as well as its
exclusion of women remains problematic. Furthermore, Chilirna et al. (2001) have noted
that membership in the variety of development committees in this area is dominated by a
select group of community members who tend to be motivated by individual economic

interests.

As the fisherfolk see the financial benefits (in terms of fines levied and invitations
to attend workshops) accrue to BVC and Fisheries Association members (Wilson 2006),
the motivations of the chiefs and Fisheries Department for the establishment of such an
extensive system of BVCs may be seen with some skepticism. Additionally, the value of
the establishment of such an extensive and socially disruptive formal management regime
must be questioned altogether due to biologists’ long-standing recognition of this lake’s
fish stock’s ability to rebound from natural refugia in swamps, pools, and upstream
tributaries (Furse, Morgan et al. 1979; Allison and Mvula 2002; Jul-Larsen, Kolding et a1.
2003; Wilson 2004). While conclusions regarding these the effectiveness of the Lake

Chilwa BVCs in management must be suspended, they are reported to have been

 

97 DANIDA - the Danish Government’s foreign aid agency.

-lOl-

effective collaborators in generating the conducting the FD’s annual fisheries frame

survey (N jaya 2002).

Chieftains establish BVCs at Chia Lagoon

Chia Lagoon (in southern Nkhotakota District) is separated from Lake Malawi by
a strip of land 1-2 km wide, and is connected to the lake by a single river outlet. This
picturesque lagoon and its bountiful fishery were first described by David Livingstone,
and is one of the most productive fisheries in the district (Livingstone & Livingstone,
1865). Although Hara (2001) has documented the existence of some informal regulations
that limited fishing in the lagoon, these do not seem to have prevented the over
exploitation of local fish stocks. In 1996, long-term declines in chambo stocks led local
chiefs to approach the FD for help in establishing new regulations to protect the fish
stocks.98 Upon the FD’s suggestion, all 23 chiefs and two Traditional Authorities from
the communities surrounding the lagoon visited Mbenji Island to learn from Chief
Msosa’s fishing regime.99 Having decided to establish a similar closed season in the
lagoon oriented around the chambo fishery, in 1997, the chiefs established BVCs in all
communities, to “act as the eyes of chiefs”. Following a public meeting with all
stakeholders, apparently everyone accepted the establishment of a closed season in the

lagoon between Dec. 1- March 31. The first few years of closed season enforcement

 

93 A. Russell - Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief - 2002-07-15.
99 .
Ibid.

-102-

brought about a recovery of the chambo stocks; however, community support for the

closed season subsequently declined. 100

In 1999, the FD attempted to revitalize the regime by bringing all the BVCs
together under a single “Beach Management Group”, however Seymour (2005) attributed
the lack of BVC success since then to the self-seeking behavior of the chiefs: “. . .fines
accrued to the [chiefs] rather than the BVC,. . .rule-breaking committed or condoned by
some [chiefs] themselves”. (Seymour 2005)Additionally, high levels of community
dependence on the FD to enforce fishing regulations in the lagoon, and the FD lack of
resources to do so have been cited as problems by both the communities and FD (M. M.
Hara, 2001; Seymour, 2005).101 These conditions have subsequently enabled a growing
nkhacha fishery to displace the kambuzi seine fishery in this lagoon, resulting in similar
declines to the chambo fishery as when nkhacha fishers arrived at Lakes Chiuta and

Malombe (Seymour, 2005).

In 2005, the renewed state of ecological crisis prompted another round of
discussion mediated by the FD and NGOs,102 resulting in the chiefs’ and fishery
stakeholders’ creation of the Chia Fisheries Association. This Association intends to play
a larger role in overseeing BVC activities, and planned to ban a number of fishing gears,
including the use of all nkhacha nets. However, these regulations will be difficult to
enforce as there are several communities that are entirely dependent on these fishing
gears (Seymour, 2005). The effectiveness of the new Chia Lagoon Fisheries Association

remains to be seen.

 

100 ~
Ibid.
'0' Ibid., A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with PD starr- 2002-07-15.
‘02 Wildlife and Environmental Society of Malawi — Dwangwa Branch; Chia Lagoon Watershed
Management Project (CLWMP).

-103-

The “Village Trusts” of Lake Malawi National Park

In addition to the Fisheries Department’s efforts, the Department of National
Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) has embarked on a participatory fisheries management
regime in Lake Malawi National Park, located at the tip of the Nankhumba Peninsula (the
peninsula which separates the South East fiom the South West arm of Lake Malawi).
This peninsula was the site of the first (failed) Livingstonia Mission that was established
in 1875, and which led to rapid population growth in the area (Grenfell, 1993). Although
the primary fishery at Chembe Village (the largest and oldest of the communities in the
park) was originally a beach seine fishery for utaka, this gradually shifted to usipa with
the arrival of northern chilimira fishers who introduced industrially-made fishing nets.
The unique tourism potential of the area was first exploited in 1948 with the construction
of the Cape Maclear Hotel in 1945, and in 1983 a total of 1,308 overnight visitors stayed

in the government-run hotel (Grenfell, 1993).

In 1980, this area was established as the first fieshwater, underwater park in the

world, and was recognized as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1984 (Derman &

103 The primary reason for its establishment was to provide protection

Ferguson, 1995).
within a lOO-meter distance of the shoreline and its 13 islands where a unique diversity of
colorful cichlid fish species live among a patchwork of rocky and sandy lakeshore

habitats. While this 87 km2 area is quite small in comparison with the lake (6400 kmz), it

 

'03 A number of the components of the National Park had previously been gazetted by the colonial and
post-colonial governments as Forest Reserves: the Maleri Islands Forest Reserve and South Nyasa Islands
Forest Reserve (1934), Cape Maclear, Mwenya Nkudzi Hills Forest Reserves (197 3). These were then
consolidated with other areas into a National Park in 1980 under the National Parks Act, (Cap. 66.07),
through the National Park, (Establishment), Order, of 24th November 1980, published as Government
Notice No. 205 of 1980.

-104-

contains firlly half of the 500-1000 fish species estimated to live in Lake Malawi
(Cubberly, 1991). Additionally, in order to protect these habitats fi'om the dangers of
land-based erosion and pollution, the entirety of the watersheds adjacent to the shoreline
was incorporated into a contiguous park. The four pre-existing fishing communitieslo“:
Chimpamba/Msaka, Mvunguti, Zambo, and Chembe (which contains at least half of the
human population in the park), were given permission from President Banda to remain as

enclave villages within the park, however their fishing livelihoods were severely curtailed

by the park’s creation (Grenfell, 1993).105

While conservation was the stated goal of the park creation, towards the end of its
regime, the Banda government recognized the possibility of untold riches if this park
could be developed for high-class tourism. The Malawi Development Corporation,
which was largely owned by President Banda’s Press Corporation, collaborated with a
South Afiican hotel chain to develop a 152-room luxury hotel complex in the Chembe
valley (Grenfell, 1993; Derman & Ferguson, 1995).106 However, emboldened by the
interests that the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the World Bank Global
Environmental Facility (GEF) had in conserving this ecosystem, the Department of
National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) developed a rival plan for small-scale tomism
development in the park (Cubberly, 1991; Derman & Ferguson, 1995). Additionally, the

DNPW, FD and Department of Water published a number of concerns regarding the

 

10’ Although a fifth community, Chidzale, was not included as an ofiicial enclave village in the original
creation of the National Park, no enforcement measures were ever taken to remove this community, and
later management plans include this village as an official enclave village. This is the smallest village, and
was settled by Northaners in the 19703 Grenfell, S. A. (1993). Lake Malawi National Park Management
and Development Plan. Malawi, Department of National Parks and Wildlife.

‘05 Beach seines were forbidden entirely, and the use of chilimira and gillnets was not permitted in the
coastal zone, i.e., some of the most productive areas.

106 This hotel would include a casino, swimming pools, tennis courts, a golf course, and conference
facilities for at least 200 people (Derman & Ferguson, 1995).

-105-

ecological threats that such a hotel would pose to the delicate mbuna habitats, (Grenfell
1993) although it should be noted that no one protested that building such a hotel would
require most of Chembe village be moved to make room for the planned golf course
(Derman & Ferguson, 1995). While President Banda’s deputy, John Tembo pushed for
the construction of the hotel, the DNPW was able to use the WWF publicity for the
park’s biodiversity to delay the construction of the large hotel until 1993, when Banda’s
government collapsed (Cubberly, 1991; Derman & Ferguson, 1995). In the end, neither

plan went through.

Despite calls during the 19903 from within the DNPW for a more participatory
management approach, this agency’s approach remained one of “fences and fines”,
reflecting the dictatorship’s own approach to governance (Nfltanda, 1991). This top-down
policy in Lake Malawi NP was supported by the WWF whose approach to achieving
conservation goals was the sensitization of fishers rather than empowerment of them
(Cubberly, 1991). The 1993 Lake Malawi National Park Management plan claimed that
fishers were happy to support the non- fishing zones, however, the same document also
recorded 45 poaching-related arrests during the previous year and called for greater
investment in the study of poaching patterns (Grenfell, 1993). In the end, the DNPW’s
inability to control poaching of the fish and woodland resources led the government to
adopt a new participatory form of fisheries management for Lake Malawi NP in 2000

(Abbot & Mace, 1999; R. H. V. Bell & Donda, 2000).

Faced with the example and lessons learned from the Fisheries Department BVC
program in Lake Malombe, Richard Bell and Steve Donda produced a strategic

management plan for Lake Malawi NP that would enable the enclave communities to

-106-

gain economic benefits from the tourism associated with the conservation of the local
resources (R. H. V. Bell & Donda, 2000). Rather than following the co-management
strategy attempted in Lake Malombe, however, Bell and Donda patterned their
management plan for Lake Malawi National Park more closely on the Zimbabwean
CAMPFIRE and Zambian ADMADE community-based natural resource management

approaches. The management strategy for Lake Malawi NP was described as follows:

“The primary economic opportunity is non-consumptive tourism, while
consumptive use of mbuna fish and forest products should be reduced to
sustainable and aesthetically compatible levels and ultimately eliminated.
This can be achieved through the development, in partnership with
adjacent communities, of low volume/high cost/high quality tourism, with
a focus on adventure style activities rather than accommodation.
Concessions for tourist facilities and activities within the National Park
will be leased to the trusts of adjacent villages. ” (Bell and Donda 2000)

In its first years, this program had little success. Lacking a policy regarding the
roles of chiefs, the first Village Trust at Chembe village was quickly dominated by the
chief (GVH Chembe) who appointed all of his relatives as members in a blatant attempt
to gain all benefits from the program.107 Unsurprisingly, due to the lack of community
representation, the Trust’s attempts to limit deforestation of the hillsides met with
widespread community resistance. In addition to resenting the chief’s control over any
benefits that arose fiom the Village Trust program, the wider community feared that the
whole scheme might be a veiled attempt (with the collaboration of the chief) at fiuther
alienation of the lakeshore for tourism purposes from which the community received little
benefit.108 Due to the rising animosity, Traditional Authority Nankhumba called for new

Village Trust elections and gave chief Chembe the position of ex-officio patron. In

 

'07 John Wilson, pers.comm.,.2002
‘08 A. Russell —Mangochi District — Interview with a chief - 2002-06-17.

-lO7-

addition to the problems at Chembe, other chiefs refused to protect the national parks’
forest as they feared that all access to the non-timber products would be denied to them.
The TA also intervened in these cases, explaining the nature and value of the Village
Trust program to the chiefs, and threatened to have them removed fiom their positions if

they did not accept his rulings. 109

In recent years, the “Village Trusts” have received mixed reviews. Chembe
Village is the largest enclave village situated in the most accessible, developed and scenic
portion of the park, and has received the lion-share of external income generating
assistance from NGOs and donor agencies. Additionally, this trust has entered into a
revenue-sharing arrangement with an up-scale adventure kayaking operator, giving this
operator exclusive rights of access to two islands and the surrounding waters.110 This
arrangement has denied other communities’ fishers access to the fishing grounds that
have now come under the exclusive jurisdiction of Chembe Village Trust. In
combination with the skewed distribution of benefits among Village Trusts in favor of
Chembe village, the exclusion of the Msaka fishers from Chembe Trust’s islands, in

particular, has been a source of conflicts and resentment between communities. “1

Aside from those activities that serve their interests, however, Chembe Village
Trust has not been judged to be particularly active in either addressing the deforestation

of the watershed or enforcing restrictions on its own fishing activities (COMPASS,

 

"’9 Ibid.

“0 see Kayak Afiica homepage (www.kaflafrica.net).

m 2002-06-09 — Msaka - Interviews; Msaka community fishers were at a disadvantage in the conflict
because many of them were Tonga fishers who were not regarded as true residents of Msaka. Additionally,
Chief Chimpamba of Msaka Village was subordinate to Chief Chembe, who is a Group Village Headman
over Chief Chimpamba.

-108-

2002b). 1 '2 Nevertheless, the DNPW is reported to have established three Village Trusts to
date, and three further trusts (2 inside the park, and one outside the park) are reported by
the government to be in various stages of creation (N yanyale, 2005). Furthermore, this
report claims that collaboration with the village trusts has resulted in dramatic declines in
illegal fishing and harvesting of woodland resources within the park, although it also
acknowledges that population growth in the park will increase pressure on the resources.
Combating poaching will therefore require more, rather than less, funding of enforcement

efforts despite the collaboration of the Village Trusts.113

Ongoing conflicts in the Bua River Fishery

While the DNPW has experimented with a co-management regime in the Lake
Malawi National Park, the Bua River fishery associated with the Nkhotakota Wildlife
Reserve remains a site of conflict (see discussion above, for description of how this
conflict came into being). This fishery has been regarded with particular importance by
the FD, DNPW, and donor agencies as this is the only major mpasa (Opsaridium
microlepis) and, sanjika (Opsaridium microcephalus) fishery in which a significant
portion of the river is protected fiom harvest and watershed erosion, also providing a
potentially lucrative tourist sport fishery (Tweddle, 1980, 1985; Bank, 1991; Quan, 1993;
Tweddle, 1993, 2000, 2001). The main dilemma for the government has been to ensure
that sufficient fish are able to pass the gauntlet of fishing weirs near the mouth of the Bua

River to successfully spawn in the Wildlife Reserve since the local communities that had

 

"2 John Wilson, pers.comm., 2002.
”3 see also. Rantala, S. (2004). The promise of ecotourism in Lake Malawi National Park. Non-wood
News: Country Compass. T. Etherington. Rome, Italy, FAQ: 3.

-109-

previously fished the Bua River sustainably through an apportioning system are now
forced to fish in the narrow portion of the Bua between the Wildlife Reserve and the
lakeshore. Here, they construct an impassable barrage of fishing weirs near the river
mouth, and the few fish that are able to pass upstream into the reserve are targeted by
poachers who use illegal fish poisons that allow them to catch fish quickly. While local
chiefs deplore the situation, they blame the strong local resistance to national fishing weir
restrictions (requiring that a gap be left in the middle of the weir) on the communities’
lack of access to the portions of the river that pass through the Nkhotakota Wildlife
Reserve, and claim that they could manage fishing activities sustainably if the

government gave them access to this area. 1 14

Although the option of sharing access to the park’s fisheries with communities
was discussed within the government, the critical status of the fish stocks in the mid-
1990’s due to the fishing weirs, poisonings, and the siltation of spawning grounds115
probably led the government to err on the side of caution. Consequently, the government
continued their regular fishing weir destruction campaigns1 ‘6, supported financially and
logistically by the owner of a nearby tourist lodgel '7, Illovo Sugar Cane Company118 and

the Dwangwa Branch of the Wildlife and Environmental Society119 (Tweddle,

2000).Although these actions have been accompanied by “sensitization” activities, the

 

1“ 1995-05-16 - Mpasa Research and Monitoring Programme, 13‘11 to 14'11 May, 1995 from

Fisheries Research Advisor (D. Tweddle) to Directors of PD and DNPW; A. Russell — Nkhotakota District
— Interview with a chief- 2002-07-15.

”5 These conditions are vividly portrayed by the Tweddle’s annual reports: 1994—07-1 3 - Mpasa Research
and Monitoring Programme, 5til to 8‘” May, 1994; 1995-05-16 - Mpasa Research and Monitoring
Programme, 13‘“ to 14th May, 1995.

“6 1996-02-16 — FD-DNPW Weir dismantling trip memo, 2002-01-02-FD-WESM memo.

“7 2002-05-08 — Dwangwa - WESM (Terry Black).

“8 2002-01-02 — FD—Illovo memo; A. Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with FD staff - 2002-07-
15.

“9 1995-07-22-WESM Mpasa survey memo; 1997-08-19 — WESM-FD memo “Nets and Weirs placed
across the mouth of Bua River”; 2002-01-02-FD-WESM memo.

-110-

irreconcilable differences between the community and government positions and the
polarizing nature of the fishing weir busting actions have resulted in severe animosity and
retaliatory actions by local community members against the govemment’s
representatives. '20 The Fisheries Department Research Advisor at the time, Tweddle,
interpreted an extreme poisoning episode in 1993 as having been in retaliation for a
combined Malawi Fisheries Department and Department of National Parks and Wildlife
fishing weir destruction effort that same year.121 In one such retaliation in 1993, fishers
are thought to have dumped some form of chemicals into the river that resulted in the
deaths of all forms of animal life (including crocodiles) along many kilometers of river

(Tweddle, 2001).122

During the late 19903 and early 20005, the Japanese (JICA) and Danish

(DAN IDA) aid agencies, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) filnded a number
of projects aimed at addressing the conservation threats to the Bua fishery and its
watershed. WESM-Dwangwa Branch was involved in the implementation of a number of
these programs, the most tangible result of which has been the creation of three “Natural
Resource Management” (N RM) Committees in the communities near the Bua River
mouth which established a number of conservation regulations and fines in 1999123 :

0 Fishing without a permit — K1000

o Poaching (of any wildlife except elephants) — K5000

o Poaching elephants - K10,000

o Gillnets with mesh smaller than 2 inches —- K2000
o Infi'actions of 1 Dec. — 31 Jan. gillnet closed season — K5000

 

12° A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Fishing Observation - 2002-07-15.

m 1994-07-13 - Mpasa Research and Monitoring Programme, 5“1 to 8th May, 1994.
‘22 1994-07-13 - Mpasa Research and Monitoring Programme, 5‘11 to s‘h May, 1994.
123 A. Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with FD staff - 2002-07-15.

-111-

o Sawing timber without permit — K5000

0 Use of poison — K20,000

0 Use of 2-4 inch mesh gillnets or constructing weirs at Bua river mouth — K10,000

In return for their enforcement of these regulations, a number of small-scale

livelihood diversification programs have been started in these communities. Differing
from lakeshore BVCs and the Lake Malawi NP Village Trusts, however, the NRM
committees at the Bua River Mouth have not gained access to the river fisheries and other
natural resources within the game reserve, or any direct economic benefits from tourism
in exchange for their participation. Consequently, these NRM committees have little
leverage over their communities, and fishing weirs are still being constructed every year.
'24 While fishing weirs primarily caught mpasa and sanjika in the past, the declines in
these species mean that fishers now catch mostly chambo, and some fishers are migrating

elsewhere in search of better fishing grounds. 125

PFMP in Southern Lake Malawi meets with distrust, and the North is left to itself

(1998-2005)

During the early 1990s, while the government embarked on the Lake Malombe
co-management pilot program, it continued its centralized management and extension
approach in the management and research of Lake Malawi’s fisheries. Similarly, until
the late 1990’s, an appreciation for the need for greater research on the social, economic

and political factors that undermined fisheries management in Lake Malombe was

 

”‘ A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with WESM staff- 2004-05-08, A. Russell — Nkhotakota
District - Interview with fisher - 2005-03-17, A. Russell — Nkhotakota District - Fishing Observation -
2002-0745.

‘2’ A Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with fishers - 2005-03-17, 2005-03-17.

-112-

entirely lacking in favor of further studies of ecology, fishing effort, and aquatic nutrient
flows (Quan 1993; Bland and Donda 1994; Hara 2001). Concerns over the threatened
chambo stocks and the steadily growing fishing effort in the South East Arm of Lake
Malawi finally led the government and GTZ to expand the co-management program to
this fishery in 1998 through the GTZ-sponsored NARMAP program (U. F. Scholz et al.,
1998; Hummel, 2000).126 However, the NARMAP program in Lake Malawi faced many
of the same challenges as did the Lake Malombe PF MP regarding both, the roles and

relationships with BVCs, as well as the roles of the FD extension workers.

As had been the case around Lake Malombe, many BVC members were
overwhehningly motivated by the desire to earn sitting allowances in workshops and to
gain access to government loans. Therefore, when the FD stopped holding workshops
and loans were not forthcoming, interest in participation declined sharply (Hummel,
2000). Additionally, FD—fisher collaboration has been hampered by the FD’s close
relationship with the commercial and semi-commercial fishing industries, who the small
scale fishers see as competitors for the fish stocks (Ferguson et al., 1993; Ferguson &
Derman, 2000; Haraldsdéttir, 2002).127 Consequently, when local fishers see the
MALDECO trawlers fishing in prohibited times or areas, or when they claim damage to
their fishing nets from the trawlers, their complaints are not taken seriously by either

MALDECO or the FD (A. Z. Banda, Kwaela, Thinda, Mauwa, & Joshua, 1999;

 

‘26 NARMAP - National Aquatic Resource Management Programme, the GTZ-sponsored program modeled
on the MAGFAD program in Lake Malombe.

127 This fishing fleet had been established by the Greek Yiannakis brothers in the 1930s and was
nationalized within the Malawi Development Corporation (MALDECO) by President Banda in 1967.
MALDECO was then sold to President Banda’s Press Corporation in the early 1990’s, and has continued to
enjoy a close relationship with the FD.

-ll3-

Haraldsdéttir, 2002). Many of these concerns and reasons for fisher distrust were

summarized by a PD study of fisher attitudes:

“The [artisanaljfishers are not inspired to comply with fisheries
management regulations when they see that the trawl fishers can fish
without observing closed season and using small mesh sizes in the cod
ends, when they see that the gears they consider destructive are licensed,
when they suspect that regulation enforcers receive bribes, collude with
“Big" fishers and the illegal gear owners are let free, when they see that
[the] fisheries research vessel fishes in shallow waters and during closed
season. ” (Banda, Kwaela et al. 1999)

Additionally, an examination of FD extension worker surveys highlighted the
poor reliability of extension personnel reports that claimed to have established
firnctioning BVCs throughout their jurisdiction, an observation reflected in the FD’s own
KAP Survey study. 128 The reason for this was supplied by a FD staff member who
speculated that the distribution of fuel allowances according to the number of BVCs that
an extension worker had established, may, lacking proper supervision, have created a

129

perverse incentive to falsify records of BVCs established. This behavior, in turn, must
be partly blamed on the poor supervision and support received by the field staff, who
regularly receive their salaries late, and who having learned their professions in a culture
of autocracy, and were poorly trained in how to facilitate the establishment of
participatory fisheries management (IDA, 1995; Hummel, 2000).'30 These conclusions
were reflected by a NARMAP study which indicated similar shortcomings that limited

the accuracy of PD fisheries catch and effort data collection (O.L.F. Weyl, Manase,

 

'28 A. Russell - Mangochi District — Fishing Observations - 2002-06-10, 2002-06-11 - Observations, A.
Russell —Mangochi District — FD Archive - 2002-06-15.

‘29 A. Russell —Mangochi District — Interview with FD staff- 2002-06-04.

‘3" A. Russell — Mangochi District - Fishing Observations - 2002-06-10, 2002-06-11.

-114-

Namoto, & Banda, July 1999).131 Consequently, participatory fisheries management in

southem Lake Malawi has in most cases been unsuccessful.

The poor legitimacy of the FD in southern Lake Malawi was punctuated in 2000
by a conflict in which the government was forced to call in riot police, a move

reminiscent of the repressive Banda regime (Figure 2-8 below).

 

 

MALAWI NEWS DECEMBEI 1.15.“. —-—LOCAL NE...)

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rnurrnen who in" u Hil'n‘ defying unlu-

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e 2-8: December 15, 2000 Malawi News Article describing use of force against
Mangochi Fishers.

 

 

 

 

In this event, fishers resisted the FD attempts to enforce the Nov.-Dec. closed season
against in-shore fishing gears (i.e., beach seines and gillnets), the fishers refused citing

MALDECO and the Fisheries Department’s own continued fishing activities during the

 

'31 Serious incongruities between the field data collection forms and the realities faced by field enumerators
included: fishing gears don’t always land at a recognized beach, or tend to arrive in large numbers at a time,
making their enumeration very difficult. Additionally, due to the multi-species fishery, most catches are
sold as a mixture of fish species, making any enumeration by species impossible. Overall, many staff feel
under trained and poorly supervised, and admit to falsifying records.

-115-

closed season, In theory, these trawlers are only allowed to function in the deeper waters,
where they would not harvest the chambo that come close to shore to breed during the
closed season. In practice however, these trawlers are known to fish close to shore at
times, and their official catches cannot be taken at face value as they are known to Off-
load fish to traders while out in the lake to avoid being held accountable for catches of
immature chambo, and some collusion with FD enforcement personnel has been
substantiated by Haraldsdottir (2001).132 Therefore, while the then Director of Fisheries,
Sam Mapila, explained that the conflict was due to fishers’ poor understanding of

trawlers’ impacts, their resistance may well have been valid (Chimwaza, 2000).

Throughout the NARMAP program, the central and northern lakeshore districts
received little financial and staff support to implement PFMP in their regions. Ironically,
however, the case studies presented in chapter 4 parallel the case of Lake Chiuta in
illustrating how a lack of financial incentives for BVC creation may have helped several
central and northern lakeshore communities achieve what the southern communities

could not.

Malawi’s Current Array of Fisheries Management Regimes

From the preceding discussion, we see that Malawi’s fisheries are managed
through a variety of different institutions, representing an array of scientific and
governance backgrounds. By analyzing these experiences, their origins, and the
respective roles played by government, chiefs, and communities, we can draw some

conclusions about the factors that have enabled the success or contributed to the failure of

 

132 A. Russell — Mangochi District — Fishing Observations - 2002-06-10, 2002-06-1 l.

-ll6-

different regimes. These regimes are presented in Figure 2-8 below, overlaid on a scale
that represents a continuum (adapted fi'om Pomeroy (1995)) from completely
government-directed regimes (i.e., “fences and fines”) to complete community-based
natural resources management (CBNRM) regimes. “Co-management” is a commonly-
used label by resource managers to denote a resource management regime that lies at the

center of the continuum as describing, and has been defined as:

“a situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, define and
guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management
functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or
set of natural resources. ” (Borrini-Feyerabend, Farvar et al. 2000)

The format of each fishery regime’s box within Figure 2-9, below, indicates its
current status: dashed grey indicates a regime that has been abandoned; solid grey
indicates a current regime that shows signs of weakness; solid black indicates a current

regime that shows promise.

-117-

 

 

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Trends in Development, Fisheries Management, and their Epistemology

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th. vs. Cons. Bio-centric o—o Anthropocentric
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th Methods Technocratic t—r Participatory
Institutions Used National Laws & Regs. —* Community/stakeholder rules
Enforcement Technology t—O Norms + Institutions

(fines + fences) (social contract)

 

 

 

Figure 2-9. The Continuum of present and past fisheries management regimes in
Malawi, and their epistemological and technical origins.

Whether a nation or an individual park selects a fisheries management regime
toward the CBNRM or the governmental end of the continuum depends on the specific
social, economic, political, and ecological context of the resource and its national and
local stakeholders. Indeed, the management needs for a specific area may change over
time, requiring revisions of once-successful NRM regimes. In addition to changes in the
local context, such NRM revision may be prompted by our evolving understanding of

ecological and social processes, realignment of national governments’ goals, or changing

-ll8-

ethical standards regarding the amount of input that local stakeholders should have in

determining NRM regimes.

CBNRM: Chieftain-based fisheries regimes. In Malawi’s early colonial history, the
government imposed few restrictions on fishing activities, leaving the management of
key river and beach seine fisheries up to traditional Chieftain-based institutions, and the
rest of the lake was “open access”. 133 Although one could argue that these river
management institutions represented a traditional centralized control over the resource, I
have placed it under CBNRM due to the fact that traditional chiefs generally did not have
the power to impose regulations on their subjects; rather they maintain their control
through delicate balances of ritualized economic exchanges. With the exception of the
governmental imposition of a gap in fishing weirs, these institutions have not been altered
significantly by national governments, although depletion of fish stocks and siltation of
the rivers (several case studies of which will be discussed in Chapter 4) are threatening to
make these institutions irrelevant. Nevertheless, despite the spread of modernity and
democracy in Malawi, the institution of the traditional authority has remained resilient
and adaptable in some contexts (to be further explored in the chapter 4). Based on an
adaptation of this traditional leadership role, the Mbenji Island fishery has remained a
sustainable fishery, although its dependence on the leadership of an individual leader may
make it less sustainable in the long run. The enforcement of regulations in both cases

range from informal sanctions to formal fines.

 

‘33 Though this is not always considered a form of management, this label refers to the absence of
any regulatory institutions over peoples’ interactions with the fishery. This is a natural condition
for any resource that is considered limitless as there is no sense in owning a resource that is freely
available to all. Open access also has been used to describe a condition when a existing resource
management institution collapses leading all users to pursue individualistic goals of maximizing
personal gain at the cost of the common good (i.e. “Tragedy of the Commons”) (Hardin, 1968).

-119-

“Fines and Fences”: Government-based fisheries regimes. At the other extreme of the
spectrum, the government’s attempts to scientifically manage Lakes Malawi and
Malombe prior to the early 1990’s proved a failed regime, which can be blamed on a
combination of factors. The management paradigm was based on a Western, modernist,
bio-centric paradigm that was focused on maintaining the target of Maximum Sustainable
Yield for chambo in a multi-species fishery, and in the case of Lake Malombe we found
that the users did not even see maintenance of chambo stocks as a priority. This regime
was characterized by a profound under-appreciation for the social and economic contexts,
and attempted to impose its vision by force and intimidation. Similarly, Lake Malawi
National Park was established against the wishes of the local communities, although with
the support of international conservation organizations and researchers who prioritize
bio-centric research and development goals over social ones. Given that the communities
were largely dependent on the local terrestrial and aquatic resources, and as they received
little direct benefit from the tourism that the park attracted, the enforcement of its
regulations would have required a much greater amount of staff and resources. The
government’s management of the commercial fisheries sector in Lake Malawi, however,
has proven reasonably successful due to the limited number of fishing vessels involved
although accusations of government complicity in illegal fishing activities causes
difficulties for the government’s efforts to establish sustainable co-management regimes

with small-scale fishers in southern Lake Malawi.

Government-led Co-management regimes. The stakeholders of the Bua River and Lake
Malombe fisheries have both experienced extensive government repression and

intimidation, and both of their key fisheries can be regarded as highly degraded. In order

-120-

to reverse these trends, the Malawian government has attempted to establish co-
management regimes in both locations with extensive support fiom foreign donor
agencies and NGOs. However, in both cases, the government (or foreign sponsors) set
the management objectives along pre-determined bio-centric rather than stakeholder-
defined lines, and the resultant regimes failed to compensate stakeholders for their
sacrifices. Both of these regimes remain in existence though they do not operate as
intended, and a significant governmental and foreign sponsor revision of established

objectives or the means of achieving them is necessary.

Community-led Co-management. The case of Lake Chiuta reflects some of the case
studies to be discussed in the following chapter, in that it represents a scenario where
local fishing stakeholders have designed new institutions to address local ecological and
livelihood threats with some advice from the government. This institution came about in
spite of the poor leadership provided by local political and traditional leaders, and the
national government’s role has primarily been to act as an advisory resource and external
legitimizing agent for the Lake Chiuta Fisheries Association. Given the grass-roots
support for this regime, and its repeated rejection of corrupt leader’s guidance, this

regime will represents a prime model for other fishing communities in Malawi.

True Co-management: Government and Communities explore the way forward. I have
categorized the Chia Lagoon Fisheries Association, Lake Chilwa Fisheries Association,
as true co-management regimes for the reason that the government and communities are
both quite involved in helping to explore and define new fisheries management regimes.
While these institutions have been informed by western “co-management” models and

supported by foreign donor agencies, the stakeholders seem to have adapted the concept

-121-

to suit their local social context. Chia Lagoon Fisheries Association did not seem very
hopefirl until the recent facilitations conducted by the government and NGO staff enabled
fisher stakeholders to gain a more level footing with their traditional leadership that had
caused previous management attempts to fail. This program is still in its infancy,
however, and real results remain to be seen. The Lake Malawi National Park Village
Trust program has been included in this category as although the objectives and means
for attaining them were defined by the government, the communities have assumed a
significant ownership over the resource base and are benefiting directly fiom the
livelihood diversification projects and tourism concessions in their communities. This
scheme has also been informed by a Western co-management paradigm based on models

that have had some success in other Afiican countries.

Malawi’s Fisheries Co-management Policies and Targets for the Future

Since the year 2000, a large amount of attention and funding has been focused on
better understanding and addressing the challenges that fisheries co-management has
faced in Malawi. Of particular note, the USAID-fimded COMPASS and COMPASS II
projects have played key roles in facilitating these learning processes associated with
community-based natural resources management.134 In order to facilitate this process
among policy makers, resource managers, and scientists, COMPASS has sponsored a
number of workshops and conferences and provided a venue for the dissemination of a
large array of reports from practitioners involved in all aspects of CBNRM in Malawi.

Additionally, they have provided financial support to environmental NGOs and

 

'34 For more information, see the COMPASS homepage, http://www.compass-malawi.com/cvision2.htm.

 

-122 --

community-based organizations throughout the country. With this support, Malawi’s
fisheries management laws and policies have continued to be revised, with increased

prominence being given to the roles and capacities of BVCs to manage local fish stocks.

While the 1997 Fisheries Conservation and Management Act first provided the
Fisheries Department with a manner to delegate some fisheries management roles to local
fisheries committees, the emphasis in this act remained on the centralized government’s

roles in resource protection. With the subsequent passage of the:
0 Fisheries Management and Aquaculture Policy, 1999,
0 National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy, 2002, and
o Chambo Restoration Strategic Plan, 2003,

the government’s emphasis has shifted to poverty alleviation and empowering local
Fisheries Associations' control over local fishing grounds. Particular conservation hope
has been placed in the establishment of local fishing sanctuaries and communities
capacities to limit access to outside fishers, as provided for in Schedule 6 to the 1997
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act.135 Closely associated with this progress
toward devolution of fisheries management roles to communities is the National
government’s decentralization policy that is devolving most government fidnctions and

line ministry direction to District Assemblies (Trick & Manning, 2002).

Despite these significant advances in fisheries co-management policies, “legal
toolboxes”, capacity building of senior government staff and a proliferation of grey

literature describing the reasons for BVC failures and successes, little of this capacity

 

‘35 Schedule 6 was added as an amendment to the Fisheries Act in 2003, and is entitled: “Ministry of Lands
Valuation and Physical Planning Leasehold Permit/Agreement for Exclusive Fishing Rights.”

-123-

building has been focused at the field staff in their remote living and working locations.
Although the District Fisheries Officers are supposed to transfer knowledge gathered at
workshops to their field staff, due to financial constraints and a lack of administrative
oversight, little training is conducted. In their analyses of Malawian government reforms,
several authors have documented the increasing gap between senior management and
junior staff, whose access to workshops, promotions, and job-security is dependent on
patron-client relationships, a situation which has led to widespread misappropriation and

abuse of government resources (Anders, 2002; Chinsinga, 2002; Englund, 2002).

This marginalization of PD field staff was evidenced during a workshop
conducted by me to provide a venue for field staff fiom the northern half of the lakeshore
to share experiences and lessons about co-management inside and outside Malawi
(Russell, 2003).136 Most of the field staff did not possess copies of any regulations, legal
tool-boxes, and guidelines that they are supposed to implement, and in general had a poor
understanding of how their roles were supposed to change in light of the transition from
centralized to community-based fisheries management. Similarly, most BVCs have been
shown to be sorely lacking in literacy, finance, and management training, which can be
attributed to the poorly paid, motivated, trained, and supervised field staff responsible for
this task (A. Z. Banda et al., 1999; Kamperewera & Wilson, 2003; Russell, 2003).
Finally, the roles of the Traditional Authorities in fisheries co-management remains
ambiguous and poorly addressed by the co-management policies, and due to the factors
mentioned above, they receive little sensitization from FD field staff. Nevertheless,

although they hold no official positions in the management of local fish stocks, their

 

‘36 This workshop, sponsored by the US Embassy small-grants program, was organized to provide co-
management training for the lakeshore district field staff in the districts of Karonga, Rumphi, Nkhata Bay,
Likoma Island, and Nkhotakota.

-124-

customary roles as adjudicators and mediators make their support of local BVCs crucial

(M. M. Hara, 2001; Trick & Manning, 2002).

As has been seen in the cases thus far, although the government is paying
extensive lip-service to the notions of decentralization and co-management (thereby
assuring its access to donor funding), a paradigm of centralized management remains
firmly entrenched in the Fisheries Department, a phenomenon reflected in other
government departments (Allison, Mvula et a1. 2002; Englund 2002). As described by
Chinsinga (2002), such hierarchies tend to toward instrumentally participatory programs
(i.e. in which local communities participate in projects that are predefined by the
government) rather than transformational ones (in which the communities’ priorities
define the development projects), thereby diminishing any local empowerment
objectives. Similarly, donor agencies’ support of fisheries co-management has tended to
reinforce this pattern by focusing most of their capacity-building efforts on strengthening
(and enriching) the managerial elite and paying little attention to the needs of the field

staff.

In a similarly disruptive tendency, donor agencies’ frustration with local
governments, and their need to show rapid results, has led to increasing NGO usurpation
of the local governmental roles as conduits for local capacity building. Chinsinga (2005)
has found that while this may result in short-term successes for the NGOs and their target
communities, the long-term effects for the local governments and communities may be
overwhehningly negative. These conclusions have been borne out by the FD field staff 3
experiences, as communities have become accustomed to being paid to participate in

donor agency and NGO programs and are unwilling to participate when external funding

-125-

for the pro gram inevitably ends. In addition to the effect on the sustainability of these
particular pro grams, the widespread provision of incentives (in the forms of sitting
allowances, refreshments, t-shirts, travel to workshops) by any NGO in a region is
diminishing all other government staffer’s abilities to conduct any capacity building at all
due to their inability to offer financial incentives (Russell, 2003). These issues contribute

significantly to low morale and unethical behavior observed on the part of government

field staff.

However, these long-term capacity-building needs are not issues that most donor
agencies, which are driven by short-term project cycles, are willing or able to address,
and therefore, much capacity building tends to reflect a technocratic rather than
humanistic bent as was reflected in the recently discontinued NARMAP research

program (Figure 2-10, below).

-126-

 

 

 

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Figure 2-10. NARMAP Research Programme, 1999 (W eyl 1999).

In a pattern that reflects a past bio-centric research bias, current esearch on the
real on-going “messy” social, cultural, political, and economic issues that are
confounding the FD’s attempts to establish co-management regimes throughout Malawi
were entirely missing in the donor agency research agendas (Ferguson and Derman 1993;

Weyl 1999; Allison and Mvula 2002). Unsurprisingly, this orientation of priorities was

-127-

reflected in the Fisheries Department’s allocation and prioritization of research efforts in
which the entire contribution toward better fisheries management fiom the social and
economic sciences was limited to an economic study that will have little to no impact on

fisheries management itself (see highlighted in Table 2-8 below).

 

Project Title Priority
Biological management parameters for target species in Lake Malawi
Monitoring of catch and effort in artisanal fisheries
Demersal monitoring surveys
Kauni Fishery selectivity survey.
Chilimira fishery selectivity.
Gillnet selectivity surveys.
Handline catch assessment and gear selectivity.
Traditional gear selectivity surveys (Northern Lake Malawi)
A preliminary study of the effectiveness of monofilament gillnets in Lake Malawi
Lake Malombe assessment programmes
Lake Chiuta assessment programmes
Commercial pair trawl selectivity
Trawl net selectivity survey
The economics of processing and distribution of small scale fishing in Lake Malawi
Demersal exploratory surveys
Pelagic exploratory surveys
Limnological Surveys
Aquatic ecology and fisheries of Lake Chikukutu
l= highest priority requiring immediate action for monitoring;
2 = high priority requiring action;
3 = intermediate priority requiring action but can be done ad hoc;
4 = low priority can be done if and when firnds are available.

Table 2-8. Ranking of Fisheries Department research proposals for 2000-2001
(Banda, Chisambo et al. 2000).

 

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The afore— going chapter has attempted to provide the reader with a contextual
history of the ecological, and more relevantly, the “messy” institutional, social, and
economic factors that will help us better understand the conditions under-which the
Malawian Fisheries Department and its fishing communities are attempting to establish
co-management regimes. Despite these challenges, the case studies of successful co-
management regimes presented in chapter 4 will hopefully present the reader with some
lessons that will enhance the chances of success for sustainable fisheries co-management

regimes elsewhere.

-128-

Chapter 3

Research Methods

Selection of Research Sites

The case studies presented in this dissertation were selected during a pre-
dissertation research trip, when which I traveled and interviewed fishers and fisheries
managers along the full length of the Malawian Lake Malawi shoreline between May-
August 2002.137 Until that time, most fisheries research and management efforts on Lake
Malawi had focused on the Southern lakeshore which is characterized by higher
biological productivity and fishing effort, and a closer proximity to Malawi’s major
cities. As a result of these prolonged (though unsuccessful and conflict-ridden)
governmental and donor agency interventions in the south, this area’s fishing
communities showed little initiative to address declines in their local fish stocks.
Additionally, the large variety of research projects that have taken place in this region
since the early 19903 has meant that many community members showed symptoms of
“research fatigue”, and a disinclination to discuss local fishery issues with me when I
attempted to interview them. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, this

phenomenon is certainly due partly to an expectation by local people of being paid for

 

131 Pre-dissertation funding was provided by a Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Summer
Fellowship fiom the Center for the Advanced Study of International Development (CASID) at MSU, and a
Walker-Hill Pre-dissertation Travel Grant awarded by the International Studies and Programs Oflice at
MSU. Dissertation funding was provided by a Fulbright — IIE Dissertation Research Fellowship and a
Research Incentive Fellowship from the Graduate School at MSU.

-129-

any activity that they might do related to fisheries management (including participation in

research), a by-product of poorly-designed fishery development programs in the 19905.

The purpose of my dissertation research was to analyze the facilitative and
limiting factors in fisheries co-management, but my pre-dissertation research showed that
Southern Lake Malawi fishers were largely apathetic to over-fishing and skeptical of
government and donor agency pro grams. In contrast, in parts of the Northern and Central
lakeshore which had received relatively little research or management attention from
fishery researchers, managers and development programs, I found that a number of
corrrrnunities were adopting (or had adopted) novel institutional innovations to address
the ecological, social, and economic threats from over-fishing. Not surprisingly, fishers in
these areas also showed a greater willingness to meet with me and discuss issues relating

to fisheries.

In order to help inform fisheries managers and scientists of the potential for
community-based fisheries on Lake Malawi, I selected a number of case studies that
represent a variety of institutional solutions to over fishing. Key variables in this

selection included:

0 the initiating and supportive roles played by key stakeholders (Traditional
Authorities, village chiefs, private land owners, NGOs, Malawi Fisheries

Department, fishing industry leaders); and

o the forms of regulations established (temporal access restriction, spatial access

restriction, specific gear restrictions, behavioral fishing/associated regulations).

-130-

While each case study’s initial institutional innovation was prompted by different

proximate, i.e., social, economic, or ecological threats, all communities eventually

recognized the need to address the ultimate cause of these threats, over-fishing. Four

case study sites were selected, and are shown in Figure 3-1, below:

Yiwemi BVC in the far North came about primarily due to the local community’s
concerns over fishery related conflicts. In response, the local chief established
fishing regulations and appointed a committee to enforce them. These
experiences have also, subsequently, led to the establishment of a co-operative to

diversify local livelihoods away fiom an over-dependence on fishing.

The North Rukuru River traditional fishery represents a form of access
limitation to the migratory fish stocks in the rivers that has been in place for
almost a century. This management system falls under the control of the

Traditional Authority.

The Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary and Kambindingu Fisheries Association have
come into being following local crises over fish stock declines and threats to
fishers’ access to fishing grounds. In these cases, non-traditional fishing
community leaders (i.e. not the chiefs) with the support of a local NGO and the
government have established fishery-regulation institutions to address the crisis.
Although there is considerable overlap between these two case studies, this was

not the case initially, and has evolved to be so over time.

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Figure 3—1. Map of Malawi, showing dissertation case study locations.

In all but the North Rukuru River fishery, I conducted preliminary interviews
during my pre-dissertation research, and was able therefore to follow stakeholders’
perception of institutional innovations over a period of three years time. The North
Rukuru River fishery was only selected upon the commencement of my dissertation
research (between August 2003 - April 2005), which constitutes the majority of time
spent in Malawi and the majority of data gathered. During most of this time period, I

maintained two permanent and one temporary household in or near the respective fishing

communities in which I was doing my research.

-l32-

 

Ethnographic Research Methods (observation, participant observation, semi-

structured interviews, life histories)

My primary research method was ethnography as this is the only social science
methodology that would allow me to understand how the fishery stakeholders perceived,
created, and adapted to their emergent or dynamically evolving fishing institutions. This
research methodology, which will be discussed more fully below, was pioneered by the
anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski.138 His research may also be considered the first
true study of fishing institutions as his research subject happened to relate to the lives and
culture of fishing communities on the Trobriand Islands in New Guinea during World

War I. The ethnographer and ethnography have been described, respectively, as:

“...examines meanings that have been socially constructed and
consequently accepts that values and views diflerfi‘om place to place and
group to group. There is not one reality out there to be measured; objects
and events are understood by diflerent people diflerently, and those
perceptions are the reality — or realities. [Therefore we] seek thick and
rich descriptions of the cultural and topical arenas they are studying and
try to develop an empathetic understanding of the world of others " (Rubin
and Rubin 1995).

“...an ongoing attempt to place specific encounters, events and
understandings into a fuller, more meaningful context” (Tedlock 2000).

Since Malinowski’s research, fishing communities have enjoyed great popularity
as research subjects by a variety of anthropologists and related scientists who have been
interested in various aspects of fishing community lives (Ex. (L6fgren 1972) (Wadel
1972; Smith 1977; Acheson 1987; Anderson 1987; Carrier 1987; Taylor 1987) (McCay

1984)). However, as Acheson (1981) describes in his study of fisheries anthropology, the

 

”8 Published as: The Trobriand Islands (1915) and Argonauts of the Western flacific (1922).

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single most unifying theme throughout these studies has been the institutional innovation

that arises from a livelihood fi'ought with risk and uncertainty:

“Fishing poses some very unusual constraints and problems. Marine
adaptations are one of the most extreme achieved by man...eaming a
living in this uncertain and risky environment. While fishermen cannot
control the weather and location of fish, they can reduce some of the
uncertainty of fishing by entering into agreements with each other. Some
of these institutions and norms reduce risk by insuring fishermen some
part of the catch or at least a chance to catch fish; others operate to
reduce costs of fishing; and still others to increase revenues from the sale
of fish ” (Acheson 1981).

In contrast with other social science methodologies such as surveys and
experiments, the ethnographic researcher does not remove the data collection from its
natural setting (as with experimental research) and allows greater incorporation of
themes, processes and interpretations as defined by local stakeholders (in contrast with
survey research) (Singleton Jr., Straits et a1. 1993). Instead, the need to understand local
meanings, definitions and categories require that the research be conducted in situ, and
the primary techniques used are qualitative interviews and participant observation.
Therefore, while some might misunderstand the difference between ethnography and
other social science methods by its (largely) qualitative nature and rejection of objectivist
standards, the selection of ethnographic methods is actually driven by the nature of the
specific research aims being pursued. In particular, Weiss (1994) identified a number of
research aims that are ideally suited for an ethnographic research approach:

0 Developing detailed descriptions,
0 Integrating multiple perspectives,
o Describing process,

0 Developing holistic description,

0 Learning how events are interpreted,

0 Bridging intersubjectivities,

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0 Identifying variables and flaming hypotheses for quantitative research.

In addition to, and partly due to their different research aims, the standards of
validity in ethnography differ from those used by quantitative social scientists. Whereas
survey and experimental researchers justify their conclusions through statistical rigor, and
claim to produce objective, generalizeable knowledge, ethnography does not. Rather the
product of ethnography is “a common understanding of local culture” (Bohannan and van
der Elst 1998), that entails several assumptions regarding the nature and purpose of

ethnographic knowledge (Rubin and Rubin 1995):

0 “Successful qualitative interviewing requires an understanding of culture.
Culture aflects what is said and how the interview is heard and understood.

0 Interviewers are not neutral actors, but participants in an interviewing
relationship. Their emotions and cultural understandings have an impact on the
interview.

0 The purpose of qualitative interviewing is to hear and understand what the
interviewers think and to give them public voice. ”

Based on these assumptions, ethnographic research methods approach the
research phenomenon very differently from other social sciences. A key part of
ethnographic research is the requirement that the researcher spend an extended amount of
time in close interaction with people in their everyday lives (Schatzman and Strauss
1973). This process generally requires the ethnographer to learn the local language, and
to use his/her (at times strategic) ignorance of the local cultural context as a learning tool
by which locally taken-for-granted truths can be explored (Spradley 1979; Tedlock
2000). This process is necessary as the ethnographer has to achieve rapport with the
members of their community who will feel most comfortable in their own every-day life

settings (Patton 2002). Additionally, people invariably represent themselves differently in

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different contexts, and the ethnographer must interact with them in a variety of settings
(home, occupational, social, ceremonial) over time if he/ she wants to gain access to their
confidences (Agar 1996). The types of data wllected in ethnographic research, includes
explicit knowledge, that is expressed verbally, as well as tacit knowledge, which must be
inferred from the explicit data and personal observations of peoples’ actions (Spradley

1979)

As mentioned above, ethnographic research is evaluated by different standards
than other social science research approaches. While it is informed by specific theoretical
perspectives, rather than imposing pre-defined categories and definitions upon the
research data, ethnographers tend to use open-ended, qualitative interviews and
participation in the peoples’ every-day lives and “let ideas emerge from the interviews,
from the lives and examples of the interviewees” (Rubin and Rubin 1995). Recognizing
that these understandings are relative, and intimately intertwined with the identity and
theoretical perspective of the researcher, the relevant standards of validity for
ethnographic research are: “credibility” and “completeness” (Rubin and Rubin 1995),
“fairness” (Guba 1981; Lincoln and Guba 2000), and “utility” (Patton 2002).
Consequently, the credibility of ethnographic conclusions stems from the ethno grapher’ s
documentation of primary sources and demonstration of good ethnographic practices,
including: prolonged engagement at a site, persistent observation, peer debriefing,
triangulation, collection of referential adequacy materials, member checks, establishing
structural corroboration or coherence, establishing an “audit trail”, and practicing
reflexivity, descriptions of which are provided in Figure 3-2 from Guba (1981). While

ethnographic research does not claim to be generalizeable, these research conclusions

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may be considered transferable if the “thick description” and “purposeful sampling”

demonstrate the extent to which the source and destination contexts share similar

characteristics (Figure 3-2, below).

 

 

Credibility

“Prolonged engagement at a site, to overcome, so far as possible, distortions
produced by the presence of researchers and to provide researchers the
opportunity to test their own biases and perceptions, as well as those of their
respondents.

Persistent observation, in order to identify pervasive qualities as well as
atypical characteristics.

Peer debriefing, to provide inquirers the opportunity to test their growing
insights and to expose themselves to searching questions.

Triangulation, whereby a variety of data sources, different investigators,
different perspectives (theories), and different methods are pitted against one
another in order to cross-check data and interpretations.

Collection of referential adequacy materials, whereby documents, films,
videotapes, audio recordings, and other “raw” or “slice-of-life” data items are
collected against which findings and interpretations can later be tested.
Member checks, whereby data and interpretations are continuously tested as
they are derived with members of the various audiences and groups from
which data are solicited.

Establish structural corroboration or coherence, that is, testing every datum
and interpretation against all others to be certain that there are no internal
conflicts or contradictions.

Establish an “audit trail” that will make it possible for an external auditor to
examine the processes whereby data were collected and analyzed, and
interpretations were made.

Practice reflexivity, that is, to intentionally reveal to his [or her] audience the
underlying epistemological assumptions which cause him [or her] to formulate
a set of questions in a particular way, and finally to present his [or her]
findings in a particular way.

Transferability

Do theoretical/purposeful sampling, that is, sampling that is not intended to
be representative or typical but that is intended to maximize the range of
information uncovered.

Collect “thick” descriptive data that will permit comparison of this context to
other possible contexts to which transfer might be contemplated”.

 

Figure 3-2. Key elements that contribute to credibility and transferability of
ethnographic research (Guba 1981).

-l37-

 

Discussion of individual research methods

Qualitative interviews and participant observation. Participant observation (PO) and
qualitative interviews are the mainstay of ethnographic research. Rather than being a
specific technique, PO describes the crucial research approach and “state of mind” (Crane
and Angrosino 1992) of the ethnographer as he/she lives and interacts with people in the
community. Its importance as an integral part of conducting effective research is

illustrated by Bohannan and van der Elst (1998):

“ ‘Participant observation ’ means that the ethnographer participates in
the life of the people in order to discover what the right questions are.
Two factors limit participant observation: what those people will put up
with and what the personality of the fieldworker will allow. Only if
ethnographers learn to speak with people in their own language can they
understand the rational reasons people have for doing what they do. ”

Building upon these personal experiences the ethnographer may conduct a variety
of different types of interviews, and in the most general sense these may be described as
‘cultural’ interviews’ and ‘topical interviews’. Cultural interviews, also referred to as
exploratory interviews, are primarily aimed at “learning how people see, understand, and
interpret their world” (Rubin and Rubin 1995), and take more open-ended, unstructured
forms with less guidance provided by the interviewer. I used this form of interview
extensively during my first months of acclimatization in each research case study site in
order to gain a broad understanding of local livelihoods, institutions, ecological trends,
etc (Schensul, Schensul et al. 1999). During these interviews, while I did ask specific
questions to initiate the conversations, the specific topics discussed were frequently
introduced by the interviewee, while I attempted to maintain the conversation by using an

array of different probes (Bernard 1995).

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In contrast, topical interviews tend to be more structured, as the researcher has
defined specific topics of interest and is looking to learn about events and facts (Rubin
and Rubin 1995). I used this form of interview most frequently in order to cross-check
individual peoples’ claims or assertions, to uncover the reasons for inconsistencies
between data sources, and to monitor peoples’ perceptions over time (Maxwell 1996). In
contrast with the unstructured cultural interviews, therefore, I frequently used interview

guides that listed the questions I intended to discuss (Bernard 1995; Chung 2000).

An additional form of interview that falls outside the cultural-topical interview
dichotomy, and which warrants mention, is the ‘life history’ interview. In order to learn
about the history of any community, its past settlement patterns, livelihood practices, and
traditional institutions, I conducted interviews with the local village chiefs and the
Traditional Authority (known as a TA). The reason why mo st historical information
came from the chiefs is that they are the traditional ‘owners’ of the village settlement, and
any community’s history is inextricably intertwined with that chief’s family’s history.
While these interviews were frequently the most lengthy interviews conducted (extending
in one case, to two several hour periods on consecutive days), they also provided me with
an incredibly valuable understanding of how institutions and livelihoods have changed
over time. In addition to their length, these interviews also frequently posed the greatest
logistical difficulties. In order to obtain an interview, I was regularly forced to travel back
and forth several times to the chiefs’ homes as they would often be called away at the last
minute for funerals, illnesses or to settle disputes. Regardless, many interviews that I held
with chiefs were indispensable for my research as they provided me with much-needed

historical and cultural insights into present day events.

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During the course of my field work, I conducted most interviews while interacting
with people in the midst of their (which became part of my) daily activities. Many of
these interviews were initiated during unscheduled encounters: as we passed each other
on a walking path or road, while resting in the shade of a fish drying rack, as fishers
attempted to teach me how to mend fishing nets, or while standing in a group of people
watching the sale of fish on the beach. Altemately, some interviews were planned in
advance, and were conducted after we shared a meal in their (or my) home, or while I

participated in fishing and enforcement activities on shore or in boats out in the lake.

Gaining access to people was rarely difficult as Malawians are generally very
welcoming and social. However, gaining peoples’ confidence required a significant
investment of time and effort over the course of several interactions. Interview subjects
were not selected at random; they were purposefirlly chosen in order to obtain the
opinions and perceptions of a wide variety of community leaders, fishing gear owners,
fishing crew members, fish traders, and non-fishing community members (Miles and
Huberman 1994; Patton 2002). In addition to interviewing fishing community members,
I also maintained close relationships with and interviewed the district and local Fisheries
Department field staff, local environmental and development NGO staff, and local

business owners.

During my pre-dissertation research I made some attempts to record interviews
using a hand-held tape recorder. However, during the dissertation research all interview
and observation data was collected in the form of hand-written field notes and jottings by
my research assistant and me. The primary reason for this was that respondents

frequently became anxious about participating in my research, and even when they did

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not refirse to participate, they were generally very aware of the recording device and were
not relaxed. This anxiety must partly be understood in light of an atmosphere of
suspicion and fear instilled by three decades of autocratic government during which
popular fear fiom spies enabled the government to suppress all dissent. This same
level of anxiety was rarely shown in response to our taking of field notes. Every effort
was then made to transcribe field notes into extended field notes on my laptop computer
as soon as possible (depending on access to electricity), integrating my research
assistants’ observations into single “thick descriptions, or narratives of events, behaviors,

conversations, activities, interpretations and explanations” (Schensul, Schensul et al.

1999)

A complete list of interviews and observation sessions conducted for each case
study is provided in Appendices C-F, in which stakeholder identities are broken down by
occupation and gender. Total numbers of data collections and participants are
summarized in Table 3-1, below. A certain amount of clarification regarding the
numbers is warranted. A significant number of communities in the Kambindingu
Fisheries Association are temporary settlements by definition, and there is a great deal of
movement by fisherfolk between these communities. As a majority of interviewees
showed intimate knowledge of more than one community’s livelihood and institutional
contexts, I have listed the data collections relating to the Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary and
Kambindingu Fisheries Association in one category. While the amount of mobility in
Yiwemi is somewhat less than the KFA, my understanding of the ecological, social and
institutional changes in the area benefited greatly from interviews and observations

conducted in other nearby communities, and these have been presented separately next to

-l4l-

the data collections conducted with Yiwemi’s direct stakeholders. While interviews are
reported in terms of the numbers of interviewees, the larger-scale data collections
(observations and group interviews) are reported in terms of both the numbers of sessions

and participants in these sessions.

 

 

 

 

 

Case Study # of Observations # of # of Group Interviews
(sessions/individuals) Interviewees (sessions/individuals)

N.Rukur'u River Fishery 2/9 19 1/20
Yiwemi BVC (and nearby 4/202 (8/507) 35 (52) 5/89 (5/117)
communities)
Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary, 13/232 1 15 4/93
Kambindingu Fisheries
Association

 

 

 

 

 

Table 3-1. Numbers of observations and interviews (individual and group)
conducted per case study.

Participatmy Rural Appraisal (PRA)/Group Interviews. During the 1960-70’s an array
of rapid appraisal techniques were developed by extension workers and researchers to
quickly assess rural communities’ uses of natural resources, collectively labeled “Rapid
Rural Appraisal” (RRA). This involved meeting with groups of resource stakeholders in
order to quickly elicit large amounts of information regarding the community, its
institutions, and its resources through the use of visual diagrarnming, sorting, and
mapping techniques (Chambers 1981). Though well developed for institutional analyses
of terrestrial resources management, relatively few RRA's have been described in the
scientific literature for fisheries resource management. One exception is the Rapid
Appraisal of Fisheries Management Systems (RAFMS) described by Pido et al. (1997)
which was developed to analyze informal and formal fisheries management institutions in

Philippine and Indonesian fisheries.

Many of these practices came under increasing criticism from applied

anthropologists, and activist participatory researchers inspired by Paulo Freire (1968),

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during the 1980-90s for being entirely driven by, and beneficial to national governments.
Consequently, RRA practitioners increasingly came to appreciate the values of local
forms of knowledge, and the potential for local stakeholders to address local resource
dilemmas (Chambers 1994). These methods which combine elicitation of data with
community mobilization have become known as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA).

As defined by one of its most well-known advocates, Robert Chambers, PRA is "a family
of approaches and methods to enable rural people to share, enhance, and analyze their
knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act" (Chambers 1994). This evolution
has been paralleled by the growth in the numbers of social scientists who use the research
process as an intervention to help communities, organizations, managers, and teachers
address expectation gaps and organizational dilemmas (Chung 2000; Kemmis and

McTaggart 2000).

Although most RRA and PRA activities today share both data collection and
community-emancipatory roles, some of my research activities were more clearly
intended to achieve one or the other of these roles. For example, in the course of my
research, there were a number of times when I felt that I had a poor understanding of the
fishery resource availability or community layout, and I would request that a number of
fishers meet with me to clarify these (i.e., RRA). Additionally, I used a number of
stakeholder meetings that were intended as PRA sessions, but which were poorly
attended, to elicit information regarding the community and fishery primarily for my

benefit. The most common methods that I used were (Figures 3-3 and 3-4, below):
0 community mapping,

0 resource mapping,

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0 resource ranking,
0 resource seasonality charts,

0 historical trend analysis.

 

Figures 3-3 and 3—4. Community mapping and seasonality charts.

Most stakeholder meetings that I requested, however, had the additional goal of
bringing community members together to discuss sources of common dissatisfaction over
the management of the fish stocks, and to the extent that I could, when asked, I offered
them some examples of ways in which neighboring communities were addressing them
(i.e., PRA). By observing the interactions between stakeholders, these PRA sessions
provided me with key insights into the various forms of informal leadership that existed
in the community. In some cases, these leaders also took the initiative to steer the
stakeholders who were present to a consensus on the crucial issues that needed to be

addressed, and at times brought new institutions into being during that very discussion.

Reasons for community members’ poor attendance at meetings included: prior
experiences of having their time wasted by NGOs/ development programs, their

knowledge that I was not offering payments or refreshments to participants, my poor

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timing of meetings, community anger at their chief, and the ever-present funerals that
most community members are expected to attend. The mo st important element seemed to
be whether the village chief and the BVC leaders understood and agreed with what I was
trying to accomplish with the meeting. This generally required that I meet with them
several times, which in itself may have been the best indicators to chiefs’ and
communities’ of how serious my interest was in their communities. During the well-
attended meetings, the discussions were more driven and determined by the participants’
interests, while I (and sometimes, Fisheries Department staff who I had invited) acted as

resources for the communities’ ideas.

In order to ground-truth my assessments of wealth and livelihood security from
the household surveys (discussed below), I also asked village chiefs (or where chiefs
were poorly informed about the fishery, I assembled a number of fishing community
leaders) to rank the surveyed households in terms of their “well-being”. This activity
provided me with several types of valuable information: the parameters by which
community leaders assess well-being, a village chief’s knowledge of his/her community

members, a ground-truthing of my survey’s interpretations of well-being.

During PRA/RRA sessions, the forms of data collected included written
transcripts of discussions, listings of ranked items, and digital pictures of charts and maps
drawn by participants. These data were then elaborated upon in the same way used for
interview and observation transcripts onto my laptop, and digital images were similarly
transferred to my laptop. A complete list of group interviews (PRA/RRA) conducted for

each case study is provided in Appendices C-F, in which stakeholder identities are broken

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down by occupation and gender. Total numbers of data collections and participants are

summarized in Table 3-1, above.

Archival and secondary documentation. Malawi’s written records, which started in the
mid-1800’s have provided me with an invaluable source of information regarding the
historical developments in the fishing economy, as well as the history of the region as a
whole. The first (albeit embellished) written account of life and livelihoods along Lake
Malawi were provided to us by David Livingstone following his 1861 circumnavigation
of the Southern two-thirds of the lake. Following this, the next major sources of
information came from missionary accounts and the British colonial regime which
produced a series of annual reports summarizing social, economic, and political processes

that were considered important in the protectorate.

During the last two decades of colonialism, in regards to fisheries, the amount of
available data was vastly augmented by the Dept. of Game, Fish and Tsetse Fly Control
annual reports and a number of key research reports that studied various aspects of Lake
Malawi’s fisheries. These reports provide us with the first extensive documentation of the
colonial fisheries sector in Lake Malawi, and provide very basic estimates of the
quantities and qualities of the colonial fishing economy. While I am indebted to the work
of several preceding researchers who analyzed much of the colonial documentation
archive, each dissertation seeks to answer slightly different questions, and I therefore

have sought out the original publications wherever possible.

Since the 1980’s, the tmique nature of Lake Malawi’s fish assemblages, and the
growing concern regarding stock depletions spurred growth in both the scope and number

of research papers on Lake Malawi’s fisheries. Additionally, the eventual expansion of

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the post-independence Malawi Fisheries Department to the Central and Northern districts
meant that we have somewhat reliable fishing statistics for the whole lakeshore starting in
the 1980’s. In addition to governmental and research publications, a variety of
unpublished reports, memoranda and communications have provided me with a
documentary history of a number of fisheries-related organizations’ activities during the

last two decades.

As described by Yin (2003), documentary evidence, as with all research, cannot
be regarded as unbiased as it was, “produced for a specific purpose and a specific
audience (other than the case study investigation), and these conditions must be fully
appreciated in interpreting the usefulness and accuracy of the records.” In many cases,
therefore, the “facts” sited in documentary evidence cannot be regarded as objective,
rather as one party’s view of the matter, and reflective of the authors (and their
institutions’) goals and objectives. Regardless, these sources provided me with additional
sources regarding past events and trends, and therefore enabled me to better understand

the sources and motivations of behaviors, attitudes and statements made by people today.

While some of this documentary evidence was collected as photocopies of
original documents, in most cases there was limited access to photocopiers. A useful
alternative was to take pictures of the documents with a digital camera which in most
cases provided reasonable quality reproductions of documents. This also reduced
document-holders’ concerns regarding the potential damage or loss of documents if

removed from their possession.

Household Survey. Based on the information gathered through interview data, there were

strong indications of heterogeneous support for fisheries conservation institutions

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between different communities. Consequently, I conducted a household survey aimed at
constructing simple quantitative socio-economic profiles of each community.
Furthermore, these communities were noted to be significantly different in terms of their
livelihoods. As may be seen in the case studies, certain perceived differences were borne
out in the survey, providing me with insights as to the potential sources of some

communities’ resistance to fishing regulations.

The identification of memberships within communities was fi‘equently
contentious and highly politicized (see discussion below), however, and my use of the
word more accurately is described as a “dock-user group” referring to the primary fishing
dock used by each household. As the sizes of these dock-user groups differed greatly, we
sampled 1/3 of the households in each, a summary of which are shown in Table 3-2. Due
to the unreliability of many chieftains’ household registries (explained below) and the
excessive amount of time needed to map and sample households randomly, a systematic
sampling was conducted of household encountered along a series of transects (usually
village paths or the shoreline itself) (Singleton Jr., Straits et al. 1993). No surveys were
conducted in relation to the N. Rukuru River fishery due to the large number of
communities involved, and the declining relevance of the river fishing weir institutions

overall.

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Case Study Stakeholder groups Dock—user Group # Households
Yiwemi BVC and Co-op Yiwemi 33
Kambimitgu Fisheries Association and Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary
a) Lake-shore Community dock-users 123

N gala l 07
Likuchi 16
b) Lagoon-shore Comm unity dock-users 5 7
Banga 27
Dema 30
c) Barrier Island Comm unity dock-users 52
Chauma 29
Bana l4
Nyavuu 9
d) Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary Comm unity dock-users 73
Matiki 26
Nkhono 47

 

Table 3-2. Numbers and distributions of household surveys.

These surveys were conducted as face-to-face structured interviews by my

research assistants and me, and were conducted with either the male or female head of

household (or both). In many cases, return visits were required in order to meet with

either the male or female head of household. The surveys were translated into the major

local languages: Chichewa and ChiTonga (and a minority of Chitumbuka speakers) in

Nkhotakota District, and Chitumbuka and Kyangonde in Karonga District, and

respondents were interviewed in their preferred language by research assistants who were

fluent in these languages. The interviews took between 30-60 minutes, and all responses

were recorded on the survey forms by the research assistants. These responses were

subsequently reviewed by me and entered into excel spreadsheets, when access to

electricity allowed.

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Participation in national conferences and workshops. In addition to spending extended
amounts of time interacting with people at the local community level, I participated in
three national conferences on fisheries management and natural resources co-
management in Malawi. The discussions held among many of the senior governmental
and NGO decision makers in these forums provided me with much data needed to allow
me to relate the local issues from my case studies to the larger processes and discussions

occurring across Malawi.

Additionally, I conducted a workshop for all Fisheries Department field staff fi'om
the districts of the Northern Half of Lake Malawi’s lakeshore: Karonga, Rumphi, Nkhata
Bay, Likoma Island, and Nkhotakota Districts. ‘39 In this case, my role as organizer
meant that I had more influence on the proceedings, and all field staff were willing to
have me use the information shared in this workshop for my research. I was able to
gather a wealth of information on the fisheries department field staffs’ experiences and
perceptions of community-based fisheries management, and thereby, relate my case study

observations to the prevailing situation throughout these districts (Russell 2003).

The forms of data collected in conferences and workshops include transcripts of
discussions made by me, collection of documents shared, and transcripts of participatory
group discussion sessions held by participants. These were also subsequently transcribed

onto my laptop computer.

Achieving Data Validity: credibility, completeness, fairness, and utility. As can be seen,

in presenting my case studies, my data come from an array of research methods:

 

'39 Malawi Fisheries Department Extension Staff - Training Workshop on Community Based Fisheries
Managemart, December 11-12, 2003, Mzuzu, Malawi. Funding for this workshop was provided through
the United States Embassy small grants program. Proceeding from this workshop were shared with all
participants and Fisheries Department leadership (Russell 2003).

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o Archival and secondary document review,

0 Ethnographic research methods,

0 Participatory Rural Appraisal (PAR/PRA) methods,

0 Socio-economic household survey,

0 Participation in government conferences and workshops.

None of my characterizations and conclusions can ever represent “objective”
truths, because, as described by Guba (1981), “Objectivity assumes a single reality. . .It
assumes that an agent can deal with an objective (or another person) in a non-reactive and
non-interactive way.” Instead, however, by following a majority of the best practices
listed in Figure 3-2, above, I have confidence that my results achieve the validity criteria
mentioned as relevant to qualitative research, above: credibility, completeness, fairness,

and utility.

One practice that has become particularly important among qualitative researchers
attempting to achieve the first three criteria is “data triangulation” (Denzin 1978; Lincoln
and Guba 2000; Patton 2002; Yin 2003) (Jacob 2001; Kelle 2001; Marsland, Wilson et al.
2001) (Maxwell 1996; Chung 2000), alternatively termed as “critical methodological
pluralism” (Murray, Kay et al. 2003) (Patterson and Williams 1998). Rather than basing
my conclusions on any single account, therefore, I verified these with other sources until
I reached a point where I was no longer learning any new material, and inconsistencies
are explained, a stage sometimes referred to as “the saturation point” (Rubin and Rubin
1995; Patton 2002). While I was able to understand the nature of some contradictions

relatively quickly, some of the intra- and inter-community conflicts that held the keys to

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my research conclusions required me to conduct iterative interviews with the same
subjects over a long period of time (part of achieving “structural corroboration”) (Chung
2000). In his book on case study research, Yin (2003) has described this iterative
triangulation as “the development of converging lines of inquiry”, which should be

presented in the form of a documented “chain of evidence”.

In addition to verifying my research conclusions with community members and
local NGO and governmental extension workers (a process known as “member-
checking”) (Maxwell 1996), I also periodically discussed my interpretations with
professional scientists (referred to as “cross-checking”) (Chung 2000): Dr. Sloans
Chimatiro, (now former) Director of the Fisheries Department in Lilongwe, and my
external dissertation committee member, Dr. John Wilson, who is a fisheries management
consultant based in Zomba, Malawi. Occasional consultations were also held with: the
late Dr. Wycliffe Chilowa, former Director of the Centre for Social Research; Dr. Peter
Mvula of the Centre for Social Research; Dr. Wapu Mulwafu of the History Department
at Chancellor College; Messrs. Friday Njaya, Orton Kachinjika, Mackson Nyirenda of the
Fisheries Department; Mrs. Elvira Ganter, Ms. Stephanie Mueller, and Dr. Olaf Weyl of
the GTZ-NARMAP project; and Mr. Mac Mtandizu of the Wildlife and Environmental
Society of Malawi - Dwangwa Branch. Finally, and perhaps most relevantly, I attempted
to maintain regular contact (given the limitations of the communication infrastructure)
with my major adviser, Dr. Tracy Dobson, and for specific advice, I contacted the rest of

my committee.

The last validity criterion, utility, is frequently the most difficult goal for scientists

to accept, given the conventions that attempt to maintain a distance between the

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researcher and the research subjects. Indeed, for a long time, anthropologists were (and in
some texts, still are) warned not to become too comfortable in their adopted communities
by losing their impartial observational status, a phenomenon described as “going native”
(Singleton Jr., Straits et al. 1993). For many qualitative researchers, however, the reverse
has become true, as they have increasingly come to value the utility of the research
process to their subject communities, which is a key principle of the PRA research
method. During the two years that I spent studying and interacting with these
communities, I considered it unethical not to offer my opinions when they were asked
for, in particular relating to how the communities could improve their management of the
fishery. At a minor level of intervention, as a consequence of my interactions with them,
I know that some community members took a more active role in their local fisheries
management institutions. At a more far-reaching level, my PRA meeting resulted in
Yiwenri village leaders starting a livelihood diversification co—operative, and seeing their
determination and interest in the scheme, I brought governmental and NGO field staff to
the community in the hopes of helping the co-operative gain some financial and logistical
support. Similarly, I have attempted to support the government field staff in their
activities by inviting them to community meetings organized by me, and by conducting a

training workshop for their benefit.

Data Analysis

Following my return to East Lansing, all text documents, jpg images and excel
spreadsheets required a lengthy data cleaning process, and with the exception of the

survey results, all data were entered into one of the standard qualitative data analysis

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sofiware packages, ATLAS.ti®. While the software program, does not actually analyze
the data, it helped me to organize it according to assigned codes, enabling me to easily
retrieve all data sources relating to a specific topic or combination of topics. While some
codes were identified by peoples’ reference to particular places, people, and
organizations, others could only be inferred from specific interactions, conversations, or
stories, and were labeled by me (Rubin and Rubin 1995). Additionally, some codes were
universal to all case studies, while others were specific to one or two, depending on the
characteristics of the institutions that existed at each case study. A complete table of

codes, with corresponding definitions is provided in Appendix B.

A common characteristic of ethnographic analysis is an iterative analytic process
by which key themes, contradictions, and areas needing further clarification emerge
during the course of the research, thereby informing and shaping subsequent data
collections (Miles and Huberman 1994; Chung 2000). Based on this iterative analysis
conducted in the field, and an inductive analysis of the data set after leaving the field, I
identified a number of emergent themes that seemed to explain the principal similarities
and differences between and within the case studies (N atasi 1999; Patton 2002). These
themes are described in Table 3-3, below. A description of each case study is presented

in Chapter 4.

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Theme

Description

 

Regime in context of

An existing institution is faced with any number of social,

 

 

 

experiment with new
institution

environmental/livelihood economic or ecological threats.

threats

Grassroots awareness of A majority of stakeholders recognize the nature and cause of

livelihood threat the threat, and support the need for institutional change.

Leader/community a) The leadership has (or is able to make use of others’)

capacity experience, education, and intelligence to create appropriate
institutional innovations able to address the perceived
threats.
b) If the existing leadership is unable or willing to address
the threats leading to ecological/livelihood crisis, the
existing leadership may lose institutional legitimacy creating
a limited institutional vacuum.
c) A rival leadership from within the community (champions
of change) may then gain popular support for more dramatic
institutional reform.

Leaders willing to a) The existing leaders or champions decide to establish

institutional innovations.
b) External agencies may need to mediate or support
champions with the logistics of establishing new institutions

 

New regime established
by leadership

 

 

a) The new institution is established by existing or new
leaderships.

b) Where innovation is introduced by champions of change,
old leaderships may attempt to undermine these changes.

 

Table 3-3. Emergent Themes in Malawian fisheries co-management case studies.

Context-specific research challenges and caveats

The problems of delineating ‘Communities’. Before colonialism, communities centered

around strong leaders (chiefs) who could provide their members with protection fiom

slave raids, opportunities to participate in raids of others’ resources, and the strong

support from ancestral spirits that were necessary for fertility, bounty, and health

Following the colonial suppression of slavery and Ngoni raids for cattle and resources

around the turn of the 20th Century, and given the availability of large tracts of

undeveloped land, people left their fortified villages. Since then family groupings

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increasingly spread out in less centralized communities along the lakeshore, and chiefs or
prospective chiefs competed with each other to attract young settlers to their
communities. This process of community dis-aggregation was further motivated by
peoples’ attempts to avoid an array of colonial regulations and taxes. Following the
introduction of “indirect rule” in 1933, however, and in a trend that continues to unfold
today, chiefs increasingly began acting on their own behalf, accruing wealth and prestige

from their positions as the local representatives and officers of the government.

Although chiefs lost much influence to local party politicians during the three
decades of the Banda regime’s dictatorship, they remained important in enforcing laws
and norms and since the introduction of democracy in 1993, village chiefs have
reasserted themselves as primary conduits for local development assistance. Due to a
distrust of central government corruption and nepotism, donor-funded development
projects aligned with the current participatory development paradigm hope for greater
efficiency and transparency by sending development assistance directly to the rural

population and the most local form of government is the village Chieftain.

Consequently, as new development pro grams have been firnded by the
government or donors, each chieftaincy has been assisted in creation of an appropriately
named development committee (water/borehole, micro-loans, health, agriculture,
forestry, wildlife, fisheries), whose members are fiequently appointed by the chiefs and
development workers. The benefits for many committee members (and their chiefs, who
act as patrons or demand some portion of the benefits from the members) may include:
sitting allowances, refreshments, t-shirts, invitations to attend workshops, prestige within

the community, and the power to determine who in the community will gain access to the

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development activity that is planned. Due to common patterns of nepotism by chiefs, the
desire to host development committees and gain access to development fimds has to be

seen a highly influential force behind the current trends of village subdivision.

These factors have serious implications for a researcher’s ability to accurately
enumerate “community" populations as any attempt to do so may be seen by local leaders
as a potential opportunity or threat to their access to donor or governmental development
resources. In the course of conducting my research, I have found government statistics of
population numbers highly suspect, and found that in most communities my attempts to
enumerate households was complicated by several strategic behaviors on the part of

village chiefs:

0 Simple inflation of household numbers: In order to reach the minimum number of
households necessary to be counted as a chiefdom (33 households), chiefs inflate
the numbers of household in their community either by listing short-term migrant
traders as residents or by listing children living with their parents as separate

households.

0 Strategic inflation of household numbers: In order to gain a disproportionate
portion of development assistance for their families and councilors (called
ndunas), the chiefs will frequently inflate the numbers of households in their

communities that are headed by their extended family and councilors.

0 Strategic omission of “non-resident” residents (immigrants): As some
households, who may have lived locally for a number of years, originally came

from other regions or districts, chiefs may not list these households as belonging

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to their communities for fear that immigrants may gain benefits that should

‘rightfirlly’ go to ‘residents’.

0 Omissions due to ignorance: In addition to intentional omission of “immigrants”,
the mobility of fisherfolk means that some chiefs have stopped keeping track of
the migrants who come and go. This may also be due to the decreasing influence
of chiefs over fisherfolk who may simply register their presence with the local

BVC and not pay the traditional visit (and homage) to the local chief.

Household Sampling. These various factors, and the hopefirl expectations raised by my
foreign (and wealthy) identity mean that with a few exceptions, I was unable to depend
on the village chiefs’ lists of households for the purposes of conducting household
surveys (that is if they had one, which not all chiefs did). Consequently, in most
communities, households were selected through a systematic sampling along a series of
walked transects. Where the community was stretched in a long line of homes along the
shoreline, our transect followed a simple straight line along the shore. However, where
the community extended firrther inland fi'om the shore, or where the communities were
subdivided into housing clusters (frequently due to the positions of rice paddies and

rivers or livelihood needs), the community was sampled in a stratified systematic sample.

Comm unity Sampling. Regardless of the accuracy of household numbers in a
community, many community boundaries have little relevance to the stakeholders’ use of
and access to fishery resources. In most cases, more than one community is dependent
on a single shared fishing dock and fishing grounds. A few communities have
recognized the futility of attempting to organize around independent chieflaincies, and

have therefore, created a single BVC that has representatives of more than one

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“community”. However, for the reasons of wanting to assure personal access to any
development benefits, most of the lakeshore is populated by BVCs that are delineated by
chieflaincy boundaries, and the unenforceability of their mandate over neighboring BVCs
means that most of these organizations exist only on paper. Given the interests and
livelihoods that are shared by users of a single fishing dock and resource, and due to the
ambiguous legitimacy of multitude of chieflaincies these days, I have sampled
communities based on the major fishing dock that is closest to, and most used by the
stakeholders (referred to above as “dock-user groups”). In all but one case, I have been
able to assign whole chieftaincies to particular docks, however, in the case of the
chiefiaincy of Likuchi (in the Kambindingu Fisheries Association case study), I have
divided this community according to whether they live near and access the lagoon or the
lake fishery. The lagoon fisherfolk in this case have been assigned to the Dema dock-

user group, while the lakeshore fisherfolk belong to the Likuchi dock.

Impacts of Researcher identity and the Research Process

Any description of my research methods and analysis could not be considered
complete without a discussion of the impact that my identity and research practices had
on my research results. By exploring and recognizing these sources of bias, I am better
able to claim and demonstrate my research goals of fairness discussed above (Patton
2002). This discussion includes: how my identity and that of my research assistants, and
our research activities affected our access to peoples’ confidence, and how the research
process itself affected peoples’ attitudes towards, and success of the fisheries

management regimes that I was studying.

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Impact of my identity. Although I had a girlfiiend back in the US, I appeared to most
Malawians as a 25-28-year old, single, white, wealthy, male student who suddenly
arrived in their community, and whose purpose remained uncertain for many people for
most of the 2 year period spent in the area. Due to cultural norms, as a single male, I had
more limited access to female than male community members.140 However, I may
consider myself lucky that I was studying fishing communities, where the female fish
traders were relatively more relaxed in talking to me than were the women who
permanently lived in my communities. 1‘“ More problematic was the common hope or
expectation that I, as a (wealthy) foreigner, could facilitate peoples’ access to jobs,
funding for loans, and indeed, during most first meetings that I observed with any BVC, I
was asked whether I could provide them with loans, better boats, life-jackets, better
fishing nets, and fishing lanterns. My identity would therefore fi'equently lead fishers and
BVCs to portray themselves in a particularly needy light during my first meetings with
them in the hope that this representation might induce me to provide or direct benefits to
their organization and community. Additionally, whenever I met with BVCs or chiefs, I

9142

would very fi'equently be asked for ‘sopo , a small gift of money, and though I did

bring material forms of ‘sopo’ (packets of sugar, powdered milk, tea, invitations to meals

 

”0 For the reverse situation, of a white female anthropologist’s perspectives on conducting research in a
Malawian fishing village, see Haraldsdottir (2002).

141 Female fish traders face a significant amount of stigma because their mobility away from their
communities (and familial oversight) and their economic and social independence is assumed to be
associated with poor (promiscuous) morals. Haraldsdottir, G. (2002). Cooperation and Conflicting
Interests: An Ethnography of Fishing and Fish Trading on the Shores of Lake Malawi. Dept. of
Anthrgmlogy. Iowa City, Iowa, University of Iowa: 240.

42 ‘Sopo’ is a transliteration of the English word, ‘soap’, and in the past, a wealthy visitor to a home or a
chief would fiequently present their host with a gift in the form of some sugar, salt or soap, items that had
been imported and therefore required cash for purchase. Nowadays, asking for ‘sopo’ is simply a request
for a small sum of money, and has been raised as a significant impediment to fisheries extension workers as
they don’t have firnding to provide such gifts while NGOs usually do.

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at my home) to a few chiefs whom I visited regularly, I generally deflected most of these

requests.

While some community members with whom I had repeated contact gradually
came to understand the reasons for my being there, despite my (and my research
assistant’s) efforts, I know that many people in the community never fully understood
this. Often, first assumptions were that I worked for the Malawian government, and in
some locations a legacy of harsh govermnental conservation enforcement measures
meant that my purposes were initially regarded with suspicion and fear. Once the
communities knew that I was not a governmental representative, people became more
open to my inquiries, however, it must have continued to seem strange that I could afford
to spend such an amount of time living and talking to people with no apparent business

interest of my own.

The simple fact that I spent such an extended amount of time in their
communities, talking to people about fishing, trade, and fishing institutions had a
significant impact on how people interacted with me. On several occasions, my foreign
status and association with specific BVC leaders caused people to form opinions
regarding my purpose before ever having seen me in person, and I fiequently had to
emphasize my impartiality in local politics. In most, but not all cases, I was able to dispel
fishers’ concerns that I might create difficulties for any illegal fishing or business
activities discussed or observed by informing on them to the BVCs or Fisheries
Department. Given the importance that I apparently placed on studying fishing
institutions, BVCs regularly attempted to represent themselves as being more hard-

working than others, and provided me with information about other communities’

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poaching activities and corruption in other communities’ BVCs. Additionally, the
growing rivalries over leadership and the benefits accruing to BVC members required me
to regularly visit all of them, assuring them that I was impartial in local politics, and that I

valued the input of all stakeholders’ in my research.

Nevertheless, in the course of research, discussions went both ways, and when
asked my opinion of how the fishery was being managed, or ways in which they could be
improved, I shared my opinions with them. While I generally tried not to impose my
opinions on how they should pursue fisheries management, I did regularly ask leaders
questions regarding inconsistencies in their statements, or between their statements and
the conclusions made from a host of other data collected. At a most benign level, my
simple presence and moral support as a foreigner loaned these local institutions a certain
amount of visibility and legitimacy that they might not otherwise have had. At its most
impacting, the PRA/PAR group discussions that I called together had the explicit aim of
promoting a discussion about the issues that were challenging stakeholders’ livelihoods.
In these sessions, I again generally did not tell participants what I thought they should do
differently, rather I asked questions regarding how they could see addressing the threats
that they had identified as a group. It was at the end of one such meeting, that one group
asked me whether establishing a fisherfolk co-op might be usefirl in helping them gain
greater returns from fishing capital raised. I subsequently brought the local fisheries
extension worker into the equation, who then introduced the co-op to a local NGO which
has since supported them with a variety of livelihood diversification and village banking
programs. Consequently, in many invisible ways, and some very visible ways, my

research activities must be recognized as having promoted the leadership and

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collaborative capacity building in several communities, and undoubtedly raised the issues
and institutions related to fisheries management to a higher level of visibility in peoples’
accounts than they might otherwise have achieved. This active researcher role is an
integral part of the participatory action research methodology (see above for discussion of

action research, bias and validity).

Impact of my research assistants. Throughout the course of my dissertation research, I
benefited greatly from the cultural and linguistic assistance of a number of short-term
research assistants, Mr. Martin Chidambo, Mr. Tryson Chiwona and Mr. Kondwani Phiri;
and language tutor/translators, Mr. Alick Bwanali and Mrs. Experencia Chisoni.
However, in discussing the impact of my research assistants’ on the research process, I
judge it to have been minor (due simply to their short involvements with the research
project) in comparison to that of my permanent research assistant, Mr. Yotam Msuku. I
had the greatest pleasure to work and live together with Yotam for the duration of my
dissertation research, and in describing his role in the research process, I will discuss both

the linguistic and cultural roles he played.

Having grown up in a mountainous lakeshore region known as Usisya in Nkhata
Bay District, Yotam has grown up speaking a number of languages (chiChewa, ChiTonga,
chiTumbuka and English), all of which were very useful in helping me conduct my
research. As we conducted our interviews, Yotam and I both took field notes that we
later that day recreated into complete transcripts of the key issues discussed. I had
studied the national vernacular, chiChewa, to an advanced level, and generally felt quite
comfortable in conducting interviews on topics with which I was familiar, nevertheless, I

always benefited greatly in my understanding of the details of the dialogue when I was

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accompanied by Yotarn. However, given the migrancy of fisherfolk, many interviews
were conducted in ChiTonga and chiTumbuka, and although I grew to understand the gist
of what was said, my understanding would have been incomplete had I not been
accompanied by Yotam. Only in the last months did I feel comfortable in conducting the
more basic topical interviews in chiTumbuka, in which case I was able to do so by
largely determining the types of vocabulary that would be used. Whenever possible,
however, in order to avoid misunderstandings, I conducted many interviews through

Yotam, in particular the cultural interviews that were less well bounded in terms of topics

to be discussed.

Because of his ability to speak fluently in all but one of the local languages that
we encountered, Yotam was invaluable at helping us gain access to, and rapport with
most parts of the community. In addition to his linguistic skills, Yotam combined many
of the key characteristics that make for successfirl social interactions in Malawi. He is a
very likeable and gregarious young man (in his early 30’s), married with several children,
well-educated (while not all high-school diplomas can be ranked the same, his is well-
deserved), highly religious (and therefore does not drink alcohol), and was accompanied
by a wealthy foreigner. Given my obvious foreign identity (which sometimes caused
alarm, suspicion, or envy), Yotam was generally able to quickly allay any concerns
among fisherfolk by providing quick explanations of our identities and the reasons for

our presence.

In addition to these academic impacts, Yotam’s presence helped me deal with a
variety of awkward situations: drunks, corrupt police, and rowdy children; safety

concerns: spiders, centipedes, scorpions; and the innumerable times that my car broke

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down in remote locations. Finally, at a personal level, Yotam’s companionship and sense

of humor made every part of my research and living experience more rewarding.

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Chapter 4

Case Studies of Emergent Community-Based Fisheries
Regimes

Northern Karonga District

The northern lakeshore of Karonga was historically ruled by a branch of the
Ngonde kingdom that settled this sparsely occupied area after a long period of migration
fiom the North.143 Their arrival in the area was described by TA Kilupula, descendent of

Mwasikawanga:

“They were good warriors and they conquered all local chiefs and became
the owners of the land. Mwaulamba settled in the uplands of Rufilya,
which is a very old river with lots of fish. Mwasikawanga settled in the
middle lands. Mwasikawanga is my great-grand father [ancestor].

Msomba settled along the lake because he liked to fish very much. " ”4

One of the main factors that influenced the location of settlements was access to

fish and drinking water from rivers:

“At that time fish were plenty, in every small river there was fish. That ’s

why people settled along the rivers. Also for access to water as wells were

scarce. ”145

Within the sparsely populated Ngonde kingdom, numerous enclaves of other

ethnic groups were allowed to settle, including Turnbukas (fiom what is now Rumphi

 

"3 A. Russell — Karonga District - Interview with a chief - 2004-04—12.
1:: A Russell — Karonga District - Interview with a chief- 2004-03-10.
Ibid.

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District), Kisi/Swahilis (fi'om what is now Tanzania), and Lambya (from what is now
Chitipa District). One group that will be discussed at greater length is that of the Hengas,
who fled the slave raiding by the Ngoni (descendants of the Zulus) of their ancestral
Henga valley in Rumphi District146 (Young 1970; Kalinga 1974). The Hengas were
granted an independent chieftaincy at Yiwemi in 1898147 (Young 1970; Kalinga 1974),
and this community was recognized by the Scottish missionaries of the 1900’s as

particularly fertile ground for their mission and schools (Kalinga 1985).

Since Independence

The remote North of post-independence Malawi has received relatively little
development fimding partly due to its distance from the main administrative (Lilongwe)
and commercial (Blantyre) capitals. More importantly however, the large numbers of
Northemers that dominated the colonially-derived civil service posed a political threat to
Malawi’s first president, who aimed to subsume all regional languages and identities
under that of his Central Region Chewa identity (Thorold 1995), resulting in a neglect of
investment in the North of roads, infrastructure, and development funding (McCracken
1977; Posner 1995; McCracken 2002). Under-development may, however, also have had
some positive effects. With little governmental interference in local fisheries
management, and little governmental presence in general, some community leaders have
taken more initiative to address social and ecological problems than that seen in other

parts of the Lake Malawi shoreline.

 

”6 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004-03-09, 2004-03-10, 2004-04-08, 2004-05-
31.
”7 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs 2004-03-09, 2004-05-31.

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Case Study 1: Traditional River Fisheries Management in the North

Rukuru River

Upper Vyelom

The North Rukuru River has its headwaters on the Nyika Platteau (elevation
~2300m) and emerges into Lake Malawi a few kilometers north of the Karonga district
capital (also called Karonga) at an altitude of ~500m above sea level. The river and its
tributaries have long been known for their bounty of potamodromous fish species (fish
that migrate from lakes to spawn in streams and rivers), in particular, the mpasa,
sanjika/mperere, mbaghale, ntchila that spawn in the upper reaches of the river. This
area came firmly under the jurisdiction of the Ngonde “Kyungu” (a title, roughly
equivalent to king) Dynasty in the mid-17th Century, when Kiyalawa Kyungu (the 4th
Kyungu) chose a hilltop next to the North Rukuru River as his home.149 Although the
date of the first construction of fishing weirs on the N. Rukuru River is not remembered
by the current leadership, this institution and technology certainly stretches back to the

turn of the 20th Century'”, and according to Msosa (1999) may be several centuries old.

 

”8 Vyelo is the name of the fishing weir used in the Ngonde-speaking part of Karonga. The vyelo is made
up a series of boat-like capture devices, individually called a chelo (pl. vyelo). As with the biiu, the river
flow is funneled through the individual chelo, and the fish enters an enclosure fiom which they cannot exit
except to jump out. In the process of jumping out, fish land in a large boat-like reed basin, and the
fishermen can remove them from the basin without having to remove the chelo itself.
“9 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with chief - 2004-04-12; Although, Monica Wilson (1977)
placed the arrival of the Kyungu as early as the mid 15‘h Century, Kalinga (1974) supports the time line
provided by the current head of the Kyungu family, Mpeta Mwakasungura.

5° A. Russell - Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004.03- 10, 2004-04—08.

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The gauntlet of fishing activities that a migrating fish had to surpass to reach the
upstream spawning grounds in the North Rukuru River was vividly described by Lowe in

1946 (Lowe 1952):

“A mpasa desirous of ascending the North Rukuru River to spawn was

faced with (a) numerous crocodiles lying off the delta of the river; (b) a

number of seines; (c) fishermen with scoop net in each hand chasing

mpasa in the shallow water of the delta, and once in the river proper; (d)

fishermen with large scoop nets fishing from platforms built every 50

yards or so along the banks for several miles of the river; (e) eight

complete barriers of traps spread out over about 13 mi. of river, and (0

fish netting parties, in which all the men of a village were seen to form a

line across the river each with a scoop net in his hand. ”

A number of fishing weirs, known as “vyelos”, used to be built along the course
of the N. Rukuru River. In the upper reaches of the river, and on the Mwesja tributary,
GVH Kalambo, VH Lasha Mwandwanga, and VH Mweneguwe villages are known to
have constructed vyelos in the past. While the Mwenenguwe fishers have stopped
constructing vyelos altogether, Lasha Mwandwanga fishers maintained having
constructed on until 2002, and Kalambo fishers still construct one during those years
when they can gather a sufficient number of fishers who will contribute to its

construction.” 1

The declining incentive for these upper river fishers to build the vyelo
can be attributed to a number of causes that have combined to make the amount of labor
needed for this practice prohibitive in relation to the number of fish that are caught. The
problems most consistently cited by local leaders are deforestation, stream-bed

cultivation and erosion of the river banks. These factors have led to increased siltation

' and meandering of the river and its tributaries, which have led to fish stock declines, and

 

'5‘ A. Russell - Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004.04.12, 2004.04-19, 2004-04-19, 2004-04.
19, A. Russell — Karonga District - Interviews with fishers - 2004-04-22.

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which also makes them ill-suited for the construction of vyelos that work best in a clearly
defined channel. 152 Several of the major tributaries (Mwesja, Nflcungwi, Mupwa), which
used to support vyelo fisheries of their own, have even stopped flowing entirely during
large parts of the year, and are now seasonal rivers prone to flash floods.153 In addition to
these factors, harmfirl fishing practices in the lake and near the river mouth are blamed
for decreasing the numbers of fish that are able to make their way back to the spawning
grounds. In particular, they blame the increased use of small-meshed gillnets in the lake,

and the gauntlet presented by the vyelos and drifting gillnets in the liver.154

Lower Vyelo

The last 10 kilometers of the N. Rukuru River falls under the jurisdiction of TA
Karonga (a subordinate chief to TA Kyungu). Whereas the upper river vyelos were

controlled by individual village chiefs, a potential difficulty arose in the case of the lower

 

”2 A. Russell - Karonga District - Interview with a chief - 2004-04-19, A. Russell - Karonga District —
Interview with a fisher - 2005-02-01.

153 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-04-19 “Nowadays rivers dry out by
August, especially the Mwesia which was perennial. At the source Mwesia has been heavily deforested and
there is much cultivation near the river bed. Gardens and houses are being swept away by floods because
of this... The one cultivating along the river bank gets more yield than the one on the hillside. Even though
part of his yield could be swept away he still has some remaining. People cultivate in river banks
especially due to unpredictable rainfall. ” A. Russell — Karonga District - Interview with a chief - 2004-04-
19 “This river used to have a lot of fish; now they are no longer plenty. Now, the river is very shallow and
almost runs dry from August to November. In those days it was very deep. Since the mid 1970s the water
level has been declining. The community acknowledges this. They even know the reasons why it is getting
shallow. Among other things they say cutting down of trees along the river banks, cultivation and erosion
in the rivers. So the water has no way to percolate into the soil, it just washes away. ”; A. Russell —
Karonga District — Interview with fishers - 2004-04—22 — “In the past the river passed through thick forest,
its banks were lined with trees and reeds, and it didn 't overflow its banks. Now there are no bushes (along
the banks) and people are cultivating there. Now water floods the land ”, A. Russell — Karonga District —
Interview with a chief - 2004-04—19.

“4 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief— 2004-04-19 “There was more fish in the past.
They used to use vyelo and njero. Now they are all made of nylon ...Most people have moved from the
Mwesia to the Rukuru because there are no fish in the Mwesia...Now there are more people. Down at the
lake and at the Rukuru River mouth gillnet fishing is so intensive that very few fish manage to swim up to
here. ”, A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-04-19; A Russell — Karonga District
- Fishing Observation - 2004-03-10.

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river reaches where there were a large number of communities with hereditary rights (as
defined by chieftain lineages) to participate in the construction of vyelos. Although the
exact origin of this technology and institution are not remembered by today’s traditional
leaders, the motivation for the emergence of this institution (according to the current
chiefs) was to provide for equity in access to the fishery for all stakeholders.155 As the
ruler of these areas, TA Karonga has the sole power to permit the construction of the two
vyelos near the river mouth, and each year, three village chiefs from among the two royal
lineages are allowed to participate in the construction of one of the two vyelos, and TA

Karonga’s village may take part every year156:

o Karonga (Mkambara) Lineage: Nzeruzakale, Mwawembe, Kafikisira,
Mwangolera (Mkambara), Mwafiraso, Mwanjawala, Mwaneya, Kambitoto,

Mwanyesha.

o Mwakasungura Lineage: Mwangonde, Mwanyongo, Malema, Mwakawanga,

Mwangolera (Mwakiyure), Mwangwero, Mwakatundu.

The initiative for the construction of the vyelo is taken by the individual chiefs
whose turn has come in a rotation scheme known only by the chiefs themselves. ‘57 The
timing of the vyelo construction is defined by local rainfall patterns which determine the

flow of the river. In order to avoid having the vyelo washed away by flood waters; this is

 

”5 A. Russell — Karonga District - Interview with a chief - 2004~04-12 “Each VH gets the same number of
vyelo. If his community is more populous he has to wait until another VH doesn ’t want use his traps, then
all his vyelo can be given to the W! with more people. The vyelo system is designed to share the fish
equally among all VHS. Those who set their vyelo at the first or upper setting will user the second or lower
setting next time and vice versa. ”

”6 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004-03-10, 2004-04-08, A. Russell — Karonga
District — Interview with fishers - 2004-04-07.

”7 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004.04.12, 2004-04—08, A Russell — Karonga
District - Interview with fishers - 2004-04-07

-171-

generally done toward the end of the rainy season, i.e., April or May. 158 At this time, a
deputation of chiefs and/or their advisors (nduna) from these communities approaches the
TA Karonga for permission to commence construction of the vyelo, and they set a time
and date when the TA (or his nduna) will meet them at the river.159 To signify the start of
vyelo construction, TA Karonga enters the river and during his opening ceremony, he

pounds in the 4-5 poles that will anchor the vyelo to the river bottom.160

The construction of each vyelo, which takes about a week, is a collaborative effort
of the interested community members from the two communities, although the best bank
(in terms of having better fish habitat) is given to the chief with greater seniority. The
timing of the construction of the vyelo nearest to the river mouth is delayed for three
weeks after that of the upper vyelo in order to ensure that a number of fish will have had
time to migrate upstream to be caught in the upper vyelo. Depending on the number of
fishers interested in participating, different sites along the course of the river will be
selected to minimize the amount of construction required. This means that the number of
individual chelos may range between 20 and 40 depending on the number of interested
fishers. "’1 During the time when the vyelo is in operation (generally extending no later
than July-August, depending on water flow), no other fishing is allowed in the river or at

the river mouth. Posts are places along the lakeshore beach, a ‘A mile from the river

 

‘58 Ibid.

‘59 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004-0442, 200405-31.

“5° A Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004.04—12, 200405-31.

16‘ A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief 2004-04-12; A. Russell — Karonga District —
Fishing observation - 2004-06-02.

-l72-

mouth to demarcate the area in which no lake fishers are allowed to fish (Figure 4-1,

below), and the penalty for infractions is the fine of a cow (a value of US$100-150).162

 

Arrangement of Vyelo at North
Rukuru River mouth

~ 1/2mile__y

k /—+\
Moooooooooog::o. Signposts

5 — Vyelo 2
~ 1.5 miles

A

 

V -- Vyelo 1

 

(as sketched by GVH Mwahimba)
Figure 4-1. Diagram of the lower vyelos on the N. Rukuru River.

 

 

 

The only change imposed on this institution by the colonial (and continued by the
post-colonial) government was to claim the middle chelo slot of every vyelo for the

District commissioner, and rather than placing a chelo in this slot, they left this space

163

open to the flow of water. Although this slot is the least lucrative position on the

 

162; A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-05-31“The owner of the vyelo go [down
to the river mouth] and if they find someone fishing there it is an ofiénce and they bring that person to me. ”
Q: Has this happened before or in your time as chief? “Yes, but during my time nobody has paid a cow.
At times, they don ’t even bring to me. If they see that someone has been caught fishing, their relatives may
just go with a cow and give it to the owner of the vyelo, saying, “We don ’t need this to go any farther (i.e.
to the chief). Please take this. ” They eat it right there or If you are lucky you can buy the cow fi'om them
very cheap. ” Q: Does this informally arranged payment happen very frequently to your knowledge?
“It is quite rare. They go fish down there (at the riverrnouth), but they run away when they know they are
coming. At times they leave their fishing nets and they run very fast. The nets are only worth 10 or 20
kwacha, but a cow is very expensive, especially now. It can cost K12-15, 000. A Russell - Karonga
District — Interview with a chief - 2004-04-12.

‘63 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with fishers —;2004-04-22 Q: Did you have any rules
regulating vyelo fishing practices? “There are no existing rules but those fishing down near the Lake
used to leave a gap in the middle of the vyelo to let some fish pass upstream. ” Q: Who made this rule?

-l73-

vyelo, this regulation is recognized by the government and chiefs as a usefirl mechanism
for promoting protecting the interests of the upstream vyelos as this regulation allows
some fish to pass through each vyelo, as well as fostering the fixture fish stocks by

allowing some fish to pass through all vyelos to their spawning grounds.164

A Spiritual Institution

Beyond granting permission for vyelo construction, TA Karonga’s traditional role
has also been a spiritual one. Due to the magical powers imbued by his office, the TA
was considered to have the power to determine the success of fishing by his appeals to his
ancestors who could intercede in the happenings in the material world. While belief in
the magical powers of the TA and other chiefs has diminished over time, the ceremony
that indicates the start of vyelo construction still involves the TA entering the river
bearing a bamboo rod, and saying a prayer in benediction of the vyelo.165 In return for

this paternalistic blessing, the first significant catch of fish (especially mpasa or

 

“The colonial DC made it long time ago. ”; A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004-
04-12, 2004-05-31

'64 A. Russell — Karonga District —— Interview with a chief - 2004—04—12 “The space at the middle of the
river is left free to allow the fish to go through to the upper region of the river. ”; A. Russell — Karonga
District — Interview with FD stafl - 2004-03-05; A. Russell -— Karonga District — Interview with a chief -
2004—04-12; A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with fishers 2004-04-22.

165 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-04-12 “In our culture, we don ’t just go
there to make vyelo in the Rukuru. We first go to Chief Karonga to ask if he will allow us to trap fish in the
Rukuru River. Then he says “Yes, I’m coming. ” April is the month that the villagers do this (asking to go
fishing). “Then on the first day of fishing he (Chief Karonga) goes to the river with a bamboo rod in his
hand, goes into the middle of the Rukuru saying “I allow you to fish in the river that you should catch fish.
God bless you. ”; Then he goes out. After this the people go home to cut trees and reeds for making vyelo.
When they are made, the first catch goes to the Chief before the owners of the vyelo have eaten anything,
no matter how big it is. From the second catch onward (the fish) are theirs. By sending fish to Chief
Karonga, according to our traditional custom is his blessing that allows them to catch a lot of fish. ”; A.
Russell — Karonga District - Interview with a chief - 2004-05-21 “Before we do anything, we have to pray.
After prayers, we start doing the job. “I can ask someone (usually a nduna, or advisor) to pray or I can do
it myself if I know how to pray. You know, not just anyone can say this prayer. There are not many chiefs
here who can do that job. For the North Rukuru river, only Chief Karonga can do the job. Then the job of
the chief or his ndunas is the planting of poles in the river, but the setting of vyelos is their (fishers) job.
We don ’t want our trousers and shirts to be wet. That ’s why we wear a skirt of banana leaves. ”

-174-

kadyakoro) have traditionally also been brought to the chiefs and TA in recognition of

166

their worldly and spiritual powers. The spiritual powers of the chiefs and

consequences for any fishers who failed to recognize this are elaborated by GVH

Nzeruzakalem:

“If they don ’t give fish to a VH or TA, then the fish will never enter their
vyelo. The fish may be in the river but they won ’t be caught. Later they
(the fishers) will realize that VHNzeruzakale came here asking for fish but
we didn ’t give him any, so let ’s go and apologize to him. Then I would go
to the river and stand in the middle where the fish are, and say “I
Nzeruzakale came to this place and I had visitors. I came to you for help
(i. e. a donation of fish) but you didn ’t help me. And now as you ’ve come to
apologize I am allowing that you should catch fish. ” Then I would take
some water into my mouth and spit the water in front of the vyelo, saying
“I ’m VHNzeruzakale, the owner of this river, so let them catch fish. ”
Then I leave and come home. That very same moment, the fish start
entering the vyelo to be caught. After an hour they (the fishers) bring to
me a large amount of fish. ”

The pomp with which the fish are brought to the TA is recounted by TA Karonga,

who would then redistribute the fish among his advisors and relativesl68:

“They can ’t come to me bearing only one or two fish. 1 0-1 5 fish is the
least that they can bring, and it takes three or four men to carry them to
me. They also don ’t carry the fish to me in a sack or covered in any other
way. This shows to everyone that they are bringing fish to the chief! After
they come, I pray for them again and the following day they will catch
more fish than what they brought to me in tribute. ”

This tradition of giving fish in tribute to Ngonde chiefs was reflected in
expectations of hunters to reserve the right tusk of any elephant killed for the chief and in
each village’s obligation to farm plots of land on behalf of the chief (Wilson 1939;

Kalinga 1974). As described by the historian Owen Kalinga:

 

“’6 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004-04-08, 2004-04-12.
'67 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief- 20040412.
'68 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-05-31.

-175-

“T he latter (referring specifically to the TA Kyungu but also true for TA
Karonga) was believed to be the representative of the royal ancestral
spirits and, as such, communicator with the gods. It was, therefore, vital
not to annoy him so as to aflect the environment by causing drought or
disturbing the reproduction of animals. ” ((Kalinga 1974), p.99)

Social and Ecological Threats

During the last few decades the laborious process of constructing fishing weirs is
gradually being abandoned as the catches have declined to a point where the work
involved is not deemed worthwhile. During some years this lack of interest has at times
made it necessary (and possible), for interested fishers from up to four, instead of the
usual two, communities to collaborate in the construction of the lower river vyelos.169
Even then, one 2005 lower river vyelo was made up of only 19 chelos, with several empty

slots to spare in the middle ofthe barrier.”"

The amount of interest in the construction of
vyelos can only be expected to decline further as in that year, the catches were very poor.
The alternative fishing practice preferred by the younger generation in this decade of
decreased livelihood security is to buy ready-made fishing nets which allow them to
rapidly and independently catch fish that they can sell in order to support their families

who face declining agricultural yields. 171 Specifically, the most common form of fishing

 

“’9 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004.04.12, 2004-05-31 — N. Rukuru — TA
Iggronga; A. Russell - Karonga District — Fishing observation - 2004—06-02.

Ibid..
'7‘ A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief- 2004.04.12 “The Rukuru is spoiling the gardens
of the people. Their own gardens. We are telling them don ’t do it [erode the river banks]. They are still
doing it, so the water is coming in spoiling their gardens, spoiling their crops. "; A. Russell - Karonga
District — Interview with a chief - 2004-04-19 “There is a lot of hunger, because the rain has failed. The
fish they catch are now simply being sold in order to buy food (nsima). "; A. Russell — Karonga District -
Interview with fishers - 2004—04-22 “The land has not changed, the soil (amount) is still the same, but
there is no food. In the past we had bumper yields but now they need fertilizer. The soil has lost its
fertility. ”; A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-04-07 “Harvesting is done in
May. But harvests are shrinking due to problems with water. When you were coming here you could see
standing water in the fields. Maize stocks rot and fall down before they mature. Cassava tubers also rot
hence minimizing the harvest... We have some livestock such as draught cattle but only 2 -4. In the past

-l76-

in the river by younger community members is the use of large-meshed (3-4 inch)
drifting gillnets which are walked down the river by an individual fisher. ”2 Additionally,
the vyelo is seen by the younger generation as an old-fashioned technology and
institution, and the older generation are gradually dying and taking the expertise of vyelo

construction with them. 173

While cultural factors and increased fishing pressure in the lake must take part of
the blame for these fish stock declines, a significant factor in many watersheds is erosion
caused by deforestation and poor farming practices. All along the river, the banks have
been so severely eroded by the cutting of reeds and trees that large swathes of land have
been repeatedly flooded. This trend started in the 1970s and, since one very severe flood
in 1979, regular floods have forced many communities to relocate several times.174
Based on the extension messages from a short-lived (1999-2000) DAN IDA watershed
management program, in 2004 Group Village Headman (GVH) Nzeruzakale, whose

jurisdiction includes most of the land and communities that lie furthest downstream, took

 

there were more than there are now but they died of some disease. They would simply lay down and never
rise again, that was the end. ”

”2 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with chiefs - 200403-10; 2004-04-l9a, 2004-04-19b, 2004
04-19c, A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with fishers - 2004-04-07, A. Russell — Karonga District
— Fishing observation - 2004-03-10.

”3 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-04-19 “Previously they used to build vyelo
but now they don 't anymore. Now they 're using nets and sometimes they are using hooks... The people who
knew how to make vyelo have passed away. The young generations are not expertised in using the vyelo
and they feel it is an old [fashioned] style. ”; A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with fishers - 2004-
04-22 “Last year we didn ’t make a vyelo because the old men who used to work together are all dead
These young men refuse. We lost built one in 200 . "

174 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-04-07 — VH [A]’s house is reached
through a network of small paths, many of which are submerged. His present house is not his original
home. On our way to meet with the VB, I commented to our guide about 2 nice houses (made of burnt
bricks with large mango trees in front of them) which now look entirely neglected. Apparently, these are
the two previous homes inhabited by the VH as he has been forced to move twice due to flood waters; A.
Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004—04-19 “The river course has changed every 5-10
years. In 1998, it really did worse things. Most of the gardens along the river went. There were a lot of
bananas along the river but most of them were washed away the same year. ”; A. Russell — Karonga
District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004-03-10a, 2004-03-10b, 2004-04-07, 2004-04-12, 2004-04-19; A.
Russell — Karonga District - Interviews with fishers - 2004-04—07, 2004-04-22.

-177-

the initiative to address the problems of riverbank erosion and flooding. '75 As he
describes in the following quote, he made a ruling forbidding the cutting of reeds and
trees along the river banks and the cultivation on the river banks in all 8 communities that

fall under his jurisdiction,

“Nowadays the river meanders greatly because of people farming right
down to the river banks. The colonial government had delineated 20
yards of non-cultivated river bank, but now all the reeds have been cut. I
have 8 chiefii under me who I have told to plant trees along the river bank
but some have not planted. I have selected a group of monitors to look
along the river to see whether they have planted the trees, stopped farming
and tethering of livestock close to the river. I sat down together with the
chiefs, and agreed to charge K5 00 for a first oflence. If the oflence is
repeated, the chiefs will increase the fine. If he [someone] continues to
disobey the ruling, his farmland will be reallocated to someone who will
obey the rules!. That garden must be snatched from him! GVI-Is
Mweniumba, Mwandwanga, Kalambo and I work together to take care of
our river. VHKambitoto is the most obedient chief: not having breached
the river bank to create more farmland in his area North of the bridge
over the N. Rukuru on the Yiwemi side.”

Although immediate adherence to this ruling has not been overwhelming, one
measure of this new rule’s effect is the fact that at least one village headman further
upstream has heard about GVH Nzeruzakale’s regulations and is interested in introducing

a similar regulation in his region. 176

Although these river fisheries’ harvesting institution
cannot be designated as a conservation institution, it does have the effect of limiting the
amount of fishing effort expended on the vyelos, which historically were found on most
major rivers. It therefore offers a rare example of a traditional institution regulating the

harvesting of fisheries systems for the purpose of sharing the benefits amongst the many

stakeholders who cannot sustainably all build vyelos each year. Although by law, the

 

”5 A. Russell — Karonga District - Interviews with chiefs - 20040419, 200403-10 — N. Rukuru — GVH
Mwahimba.
”6 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief- 20040419.

-l78-

vyelos are supposed to have a gap in the middle to allow some fish to pass through, the
general conditions of poverty in Malawi and the lack of government oversight allows this

rule to be broken without penalties.

Other examples of poorly-documented weir fishing institutions

Lufilya Vyelo "7

In a similar fashion to N. Rukuru River vyelo fishery, the Lufilya river vyelo
fishery was regulated in a manner designed to create equity among villages. From the
upper river reaches, a series of lyelo were constructed by individual chiefs: GVH
Mwawulambo, GVH Manjazi, GVH Mangawera, GVH Mwakasangira, GVH Namitete,
and GVH Msomba. However, at the river mouth, the vyelo was shared between the TA
Kilupula (every year) and two upriver GVHs (whose turn came in a rotation). Over time,
however, GVH Mwawulambo was excluded from this rotation as his personal vyelo
(which was firrthest upriver) was catching a larger number of fish than the intermediate
vyelos. His vyelo was probably also targeting the fish that had already spawned and who

were returning downstream. As was the case in the N. Rukuru, no other fishing was

 

”7 A. Russell — Karonga District - Interview with a chief - 2004-05-31 “There was a monopoly in the
Rufilya Fiver as people around that section had to fish using a Vyelo with mono ’s and not everyone was
allowed to fish there. From the top to the bottom there was: GVHMwawulambo, GVHManjazi, GVH
Mangawera, GVHMwakasangira, GVT-INamitete, and CWT-[Msomba at the mouth. But when you come to
the mouth of the river, they had to share. This year 2 GVH 3 share and next year 2 other GVTIs share, while
the Chief was every year. This was the same with the Songwe and Rukuru Rivers. This went on [until] they
discovered that fish were plentifid at GVHMwawulambo ’s area at the top, and they stopped Mwawulambo
from fishing at the mouth as he had plenty of fish, more than the others...this [ the fishing system] finished
20 years ago, when the rivers became shallower because of sand and branches due to shifiing cultivation.
So people have just left it and [instead] people have started [using] nets. Anybody can fish anywhere. ”,' A.
Russell - Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004—03-10, A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview
with a fisher - 2005-02-01.

-179-

permitted in the Lufilya while the vyelos were in use. However, this institution came to
an end during the 1970’s as the river had become too shallow due to a combination of
erosion (due to poor agricultural praCtices) and the diversion of significant amounts of
water for a large govemment-sponsored rice-scheme. Since then, most fishing of the
river fishery is done with fixed gillnets around the river mouth and with large-meshed

drifting gillnets in the river.

Dwangwa River Area Biiusm

Before the Dwangwa River changed its course in the early 1950’s, it supported a
biiu fishery (see footnote at start of chapter explaining differences between biiu and
vyelo). In this case, each chief along the river (and the Lipachi and Phwazi tributaries)
built his own biiu, and TA Kanyenda (their paramount chief) had his biiu at the mouth of
the river. These biius were built twice a year, once at the start of the rainy season (in
November) to target the fish swimming upstream, and again at the end of the rainy season
(in April) to target the fish as they returned to the lake. The traps in the biiu (called
mono) were placed at different heights, ranging from the river bed to the surface. All
other fishing in the river, except for the use of spears in the pools was forbidden.

Although no gap was left in the biiu, many fish would have been able to pass through

 

”8 A. Russell -Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2004-05-03 “They stopped [building biiu in
Zaro when] the fish stopped migrating up the river. They were making them twice a year, at the start of the
rainfall when the fish swim upwards, and at the end of the rainfall when the fish returned to the lake. ” Q:
Was the river apportioned in any way into territories? “Because there was no gap left [in the middle of
the biiu] the people on both sides of the river shared the weir as a biiu constructed firrther upstream would
have lost out. But when the rains are heavy the Dwangwa River would flood and the fish could manage to
get through as the water swept away the biius. The biiu was shared in the Zaro, but in the Dwangwa River
each chief had his own section of the river. Chief Kanyenda (Simeon) had the lowest biiu at Dwangwa, then
there was Kamkombwa and the other chiefs at their villages. Because the Dwangwa River was very
forcefiil, enough fish were able to overcome the lower biius to be caught in the upper ones. "; A. Russell —
Nkhotakota District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004-07-03, 2005-03-20.

-180-

when the water level in the Dwangwa River rose high enough to wash over the biiu. The
primary fish species targeted by the biiu were the ntchila, mpasa, and sanjika. After the
Dwangwa River was diverted into the muddy Kambindingu Lagoon, however, the

numbers of fish entering the river dwindled quickly and people stopped building biius.

In the smaller Kamparara River which feeds into the Kambindingu Lagoon, GVH
Wakunyanja and VH Mwamdimba shared in the construction of a biiu so as to share the
benefits of the biiu. However, this biiu institution was discontinued with the increased

flooding of the Kambindingu Lagoon.

Case Study 2: The Self-starters of the Far North: Yiwemi BVC

The Yiwemi Fishery

Yiwemi dock is the most accessible fishing port along the main North-South road
that connects the district capital (Karonga BOMA) to the Tanzanian border, and therefore
receives traders from major markets at Karonga BOMA, Pus, Iponga, the border, and
many smaller village markets.179 Some fish are even sold as far away as Chitipa, a
neighboring land-locked district.180 As may be seen from the household survey data
below (Table 4-1), a majority of Yiwemi residents are local in origin, and household

livelihood strategies tend to encompass a variety of activities.

 

”9 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief- 200403-09, A. Russell — Karonga District —
Interview with fish traders - 2002-07-22, 2005-02-05, 2005-02-11.

‘80 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004~03-09; though less than 100 km away, the
poor road conditions may make travel to Chitipa a full day endeavor.

-181-

 

Yiwemi Community Households Surveyed

 

 

 

N = 54
Livelihood Strategies Farming Fishing Trading Artisan Skills
% of Household 96 69 76 48
Median Visitor
Residency Patterns Local Area District National Duration (yrs)
% Origin of Residence 67 4 20 9 4.5

 

 

Table 4-1. Yiwemi household livelihood strategies and residency profiles.

The earliest adoption of nylon netting at Yiwemi was of 4-6 inch mesh gillnets
that mainly targeted potamodromous fish species in the lake and near river mouths:
“mpasa” (Opsaridium microlepis) and “mperere” (Opsaridium microcephalus).181
Earnings from gillnetting subsequently enabled a number of fishermen to purchase the
more expensive but more lucrative beach seines that enabled the harvesting of the
“usipa” (Engraulicypris sardella) shoals up to half a kilometer from the shore. Though
small in size, and less highly valued by consumers, these fish were most easily dried and
transported to inland communities. However, by the 1990’s, the destructiveness of at
least 10 beach seines in operation near this beach were taking a visible toll on the near-
shore ecology. As beach seines drag along the lakebed, they destroy fish breeding habitat
and capture both adult and juvenile fish. The disappearance of juvenile fish was one of
the first issues that led the Yiwemi fishing community to establish rules limiting the use

of beach seines.182 These ecological problems were described by the original Yiwemi

BVC:

“F ishing was difi‘icult. As the lake is common property, fishermen felt that
they had the right to fish in any harmful manner than they pleased.

Some fish species were not supposed to be caught such as kababa, mpasa
juveniles. etc., yet they were being caught with impunity. People were not
observing the closed season from November 1 to December 31, especially

 

m A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-03-09, A Russell — Karonga District -
Interviews with fishers - 2005-02-05, 2005-02-11.
"‘2 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with Old BVC - 2004-06-11.

-l82-

 

beach seine owners. There were more than 10 beach seines here in the
past, because the usipa were abundant and there were good fishing
grounds. ”183

The over-fishing of local fish stocks, combined with fisher population growth and
the decline of the autocratic national government, led to increased conflicts between
fishers. Various symptoms of social friction were also described as key reasons for the
chief’ s decision to establish a BVC. As described by the original Yiwemi Beach Village

Committee:

“People were coming from other communities to steal [fish and gear]
from us.

Women were getting into fights with each other as they competed to buy
fish. Therefore, we co-opted some [of them] into the committee to take
care of and control of others.

The beach was very dirty and covered with bush providing habitat for
insects and mosquitoes which were causing suflering from malaria.

There were no toilets, so people were defecating in the bush, which led to
increased outbreaks of cholera. ”’84

Establishing a Fishery Committee

Due to popular concern over these issues, in 1993 VH Yiwemi established a
“fishery committee” (committee pa nyanja)185, chaired by Mr. Lackwell Mwangalaba

which set rules regulating fisher behavior:

“The FD advised us to ensure the sustainability of their fish stocks and to
observe the closed season (Dec. -Jan. ). The (fishermen) (forbade the use of
beach seines, quarrels, and theft of canoes and nets. ”18

“Some women were appointed to the BVC in order to mediate in conflicts
between traders. ”187

 

'83 Ibid.

"‘4 Ibid.

‘8‘ A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with New BVC- 2002-07-19.

186 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with fishers - 2004-04-22, 2005-02-11.

-183-

The timing of the creation of this committee coincided with the start of the
governmental fisheries co-management scheme in Lake Malombe, but while the local FD
extension workers gave advice and governmental sanction to VH Yiwemi’s committee, it
should be noted that the initiative was led by the fishers themselves (under the leadership
of VH Yiwemi). The first BVC, which operated fiom 1993-1996, was seen as very
successful in ending the theft of fishing gears by collaborating with other intra- and inter-
community institutions for monitoring and enforcement of gear ownership. For all new
gears brought to the community, the BVC required proof of ownership and made
inquiries with neighboring villages to determine whether any gears were missing. As

presented by the original BVC, this system effectively ended theft of nets:

“Theft is now in decline. We work together with our counterparts of
Mwakanyamale and Songwe BVCs and thieves are caught. When we find
nets or canoes we bring them to the chairman who announces it to other
BVCs. Right now we have a very big net ranging from 2 - 7” mesh size.
The owner has not yet been found. ”188

“Theft of nets has ended within the community, and when they were
caught they were taken to the WI and then to the police. ”’89

Additionally, poaching during the closed season (especially by beach seine
owners) was effectively addressed by enlisting the assistance of a community-based

policing committee, and by incorporating some poachers onto the committee:

“When we catch a poacher, the BVC confiscates the nets and donates the
fish to the hospital. We feel that the poaching problem is being taken care
of in this way. Some of the poachers are now on the BVC too. ”190

 

‘87 A. Russell - Karonga District - Interview with Old BVC - 2004-06-11.

‘88 A. Russell — Karonga District - Interview with New BVC - 2004-06.11.

1:: A. Russell — Karonga District - Interview with New BVC -2002-O7-l9.
Ibid.

-184-

“We work together with Community Policing; when we have caught the
oflender/poacher we confiscate his gear and hang it until January when
he has to pay a fine of K5 00. In the beginning there were many fines
given, however, people have learned and don ’t use these gears at that time

anymore. ..191

BVC loss of motivation

After 2 years, the first committee had largely addressed the most pressing fishery
management issues, and lost its zeal. A second BVC was established in 1996, chaired by
Mr. Dowel Chinula. This committee tackled some of the health/social issues that had

been causing concern in the community:

“We cleared the place by slashing the grass and got medicine from the
hospital which we sprayed around this entire place. We also constructed a
pit-latrine. This was done by the second committee which replaced the
first after it failed to execute its duties. ” 192

By 2001, this second cormnittee had also become inactive, however, this is
attributed by the fishers as being due to their reluctance to work without pay. This
“reluctance to work without pay” can be witnessed throughout Malawi, but the reasons
for its existence in the far North of Malawi are somewhat different from those in the
South. In Southern Lake Malawi, the fish stocks are seen by fishers as having been
depleted due to ineffective governmental regulation, and they now see little incentive to
adopt the unpleasant role of enforcer of unpopular fishing regulations. They feel little
responsibility for the conservation of the fishery, and given that they see this as really

being the govemment’s role, they expect payment for their participation193 (Ganter,

 

19' A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with fishers — 20040422, 2005-02-11.
‘92 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with Old BVC -20040e11.
'93 A. Russell — Mangochi District — Interview with fishers - 2002-06.

-185-

Chisambo et al. 2001). In contrast with the southern lakeshore, this isolated portion of
the northern lakeshore has never had very active governmental enforcement of
regulations. Consequently, fishers’ reluctance to work without pay is primarily attributed
by FD administrators and field staff to the rise of NGO/development agency- funded
programs that pay community-members for their participation in community-

development activities.

“Some BVCs were given maize in exchange for work by the District
Assembly, funded for 4 months by the World Food Program. When that
program ended, many people rqfused to work, especially at water hyacinth
removal which is tough work. ” 94

“B VCs and Water Hyacinth Clubs are unmotivated as FD staff do not
provide incentives (payments or refreshment) to committee members.
NGOs have raised community members ’ expectations by giving gifts,
paying for sitting fees, and buying refreshments. ”195

In the case of Yiwemi BVC, the former committee members’ brief participation
in a donor-agency funded work-for-food program is blamed for their subsequent

reluctance to work in fisheries co-management. As expressed by the BVC members:

“Since the WFP ended, the number of volunteers went from about 50 to
20-30 but these are people who see the water hyacinth as a threat to the
industry and fishing in the river mouths and wetlands. ”196

“Work without pay is diflicult, that is why the former BVC was inactive,
but now we have recognized the benefits of working in the BVC. ”’97

Fishery declines spur BVC Revival

By the 1990’s, the character of the fishery at Yiwemi had changed substantially,

both in terms of the fishing gears used as well as the fish species caught. With the decline

 

‘94 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with FD staff -2002—07-l7.

‘95 A. Russell — Karonga District - Fisheries Extension Staff Training Workshop - 2003-12-12.
‘96 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with New BVC - 2002-07-19.

‘97 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with Old BVC - 2004-06-11.

-l86-

in mpasa and mperere catches, gillnetters went increasingly firrther out into the lake in

search of new fish stocks.198

Currently, the main targeted species, masohungu
(Diplotaxodon spp.), is a deep dwelling fish that had previously not been caught by the
fishermen of the near-shore waters.199 Additionally, the prohibition on beach seines led
fishermen to invest in a new fishing technology (chilimira) to target the pelagic usipa
stocks. This purse seine, operated by two canoes is a technological innovation that
originated in the Usisya region of Nkhata Bay District and has become increasingly
popular since the 1990’s. The expansion of this new fishing gear, combined with the
inactivity of the second BVC and the increased impact of visiting fishermen, led to a third
BVC elected in 2001. This committee, chaired by Mr. Charles Kambewa, has been
active in enforcing existing rules and has gone on to create and enforce a number of new

regulations and processes to protect the local social harmony and ecological

sustainability.

Registration of Visiting Fishermen - Visiting fishermen who temporarily
reside on this beach are expected to pay a fee of K300, and have to register
their gillnets with the Fisheries Department. The BVC collects these
registration fees for the FD, which visits regularly to collect the

registration fees from the VH and write out receipts for the fishermen.200

Regulation of Fish Prices - The prices of fish bought at the beach is also

regulated by the BVC. This has two functions. A maximum fish price

 

'98 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-03-09; A Russell - Karonga District —
Interview with fishers - 2005-02-05, 2005-02-11.

'99 A. Russell — Karonga District - Interview with a chief- 200403-09; A. Russell — Karonga District —
Interview with a fisher - 2005-02-05.

20° A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-03-09, A. Russell - Karonga District —
Interview with PD Staff - 2004-03-05.

-187-

protects the majority of traders from any individual trader’s (generally
non-resident traders) attempts to monopolize the market by outbidding the
others. A minimum fish price protects the local fishers from individual
fishermen’s (generally non-resident fishermen) attempts to drive the prices
too low by selling their fish at too low a price. Either of these activities is

punished with fines of K250.201

Bans on River/Wetland fishing — During the closed season or windy
days, fishermen had fiequently fished in the rivers where catches are
plentiful during these times. This rule is intended to protect juveniles and
breeding fish like chambo and mperere. After a brief period where several

people were fined K5000 each, this practice stOpped.202

Bans on Small-meshed Gears Near Shore — Small-meshed traps and
gillnets (below 2V2 inches) have been banned for use near shore to protect

juvenile fiShr eSPCCially for chambo. 203

Pivotal Role of the Chief

Most fishers claim that the BVC is effective at enforcing the conservation rules

that it has set, and they have noted the reappearance of juvenile fish in the in-shore waters

 

20‘ A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with New BVC - 2004-06-22, A. Russell — Karonga District -
Interview with Old BVC - 2004-06-11, A. Russell — Karonga District - Interviews with fish traders - 2005-
02-05, 2005-02-11.

202 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-03-09, A Russell — Karonga District -
Interview with New BVC - 2004-06-11, A. Russell - Karonga District - Interview with Old BVC - 2004-
06-11, A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with fisher - 2005-02-11.

203 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with Old BVC -2002-07-l9, 2004-06-11;. A. Russell —
Karonga District - Interview with a chief - 2004-03-09, A. Russell - Karonga District — Interviews with
fishers - 2005-02-11, 2005-02-11, 2005-02-11.

-l88-

that had been absent during previous years. In contrast with numerous other fishing
communities where fishery regulations and BVCs exist on paper only and are largely
unknown to community members, all traders are aware of the rules set by the BVC on
fish prices, and have made use of the BVC to punish traders who break these rules.204
When people discuss the reasons for the BVC’s effectiveness, they all point to the key
role played by VH (village headman) Yiwemi in ensuring compliance with the BVC’s

rules:

“All the chiefs involved agreed with the concerns raised by fishermen at
the dock and fully support the BVC and its rules. They help to enforce the
rules and punishments. ”205

“The fishermen comply with the FD fishing rules and ban the sale of
undersized fish on the beach. The W1 is an integral part of the BVC rule
enforcement. ”206

“VI-I is the leader of the committee. He has the last word. People obey him
because he is respected as a good ruler. ”207

As can be seen from the above corrnnents, the quality of VH Yiwemi’s rulings is
considered the key to the success of the BVC. Nevertheless, despite the apparently high
level of community support for his governance, this typically humble and under-spoken
chief explains the delicate balance required in governing the fishery. While he sees
himself as being the source of the BVC’s power, he explains the need for having a BVC

as chiefs have been known to abuse the influence of their office:

“The government gave us, the chiefs, power, and people are very obedient.
The Yiwemi BVC enforces the laws concerning fish and fisheries.

 

2°“ A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with New BVC -2004-06-11; A. Russell — Karonga District —
Interview with fisher - 2005-02-11.

205 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with fisher - 2005-02-11.

206 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with fisher - 2005-02-05.

207 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with fisher - 2005-02-11.

-189-

Having a committee is important because sometimes chiefs are corrupt.
No chief sits on this committee, but as chiefs we do need to be kept
informed of that which is happening in the BVC. ”208

A final illustration of how this delicate balance is maintained was provided by our
encounter with the community’s main method of forcing the chief to address his
community’s — civil disobedience. In this case, we had arranged to have a meeting with
the BVCs and credit groups, however we arrive to find a lone VH Yiwemi sitting on a
chair in the clearing under the mango tree where we had expected to find a crowd of
community members. He is a bit embarrassed and explains why no one has shown up.
Apparently, the community members are refusing to take part in any form of community
development activities (these traditionally organized by the chief, and include BVCs,
credit groups, etc.) as long as he doesn’t chase someone suspected of witchcraft out of the

community (see Figure 4-2, below).209

Given that Chief Yiwemi’s BVCs don’t depend on weaponry or technological
advantage to enforce regulations, and in light of the community’s evident ability to
demand accountability of its chief, the success of his BVCs should be recognized as
representing a deeper community consensus regarding the legitimacy of the chief, and the

appropriateness of the BVC regulations.

 

208 A. Russell — Karonga District - Interview with a chief - 2004-03-09.
209 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-06-02.

-190-

 

Civil disobedience over witchcraft accusations forces accountabilm' on chiefs.

The following is summary of VH Yiwemi’s report to his Group Village Headman regarding his
community’s unwillingness to participate in community development work due to a charge of
witchcraft in the community. The labels [A] and [B] refer to two community members.

VH: “[A] was sick for a long time, and despite going to many doctors he never got better. He then
went to a medium where he was told that [B], his neighbor, was bewitching him.

Then on another occasion, [B] ’s cow grazed on [A] ’s rice. [A] got hold of the cow and led it
to my nduna [advisor] with the hope that they would meet with the owner there to discuss the
issue of the cow. But when [B] heard that his cow was tied up at the nduna ’s house, he simply
went, untied it [the cow], and took it to his home.

The nduna called them both to discuss the issue, but they ended up fighting. The people said
that [B] was wrong to take away the cow instead of coming to discuss the issue first with his

fi'iend [A].

Later [B] heard rumors that [A] had called upon a number of people to go and beat him up at
his house. He [B] then came to me to report about the plot that [A] was coming to torch his
house that night .I invited them both to discuss the issue with me, and this is when [A] accused
[B] of bewitching him. [B] denied this and said that they should go to a medium [someone
experience in detecting witchcraft] and that if he really was the witch, then [B] would be
willing to pay [A] a cow in compensation I [VH Yiwemi] wrote a letter instructing them to go
to the medium and they went to three difi'erent mediums who all confirmed that [B] is really a
witch. -

When they came back [B] admitted that he is the person bewitching Patrick. Then the people
said that he should pay [A] the cow and throw away his magical tools before May 12, 2004,
but he has not yet paid. Now all the people from my village have came to me demanding that I
chase him [B] away because he has not met the requirements. When I said that it is
unconstitutional for me to do so, they say we (chiefs) are in league with Chihauli. [In
traditional culture, chiefs are regarded as possessing a certain amount of magical power, and
he is being accused of protecting a fellow witch] They[the community] say that if he [B] stays
in the village, they will not do any development work.

These are the concerns that 1, your son, am bringing to you, my father.

(1‘! 'H: What do the other chiefs say?
I 'H' The chiefs say that chasing somebody away is against the law. It is only acceptable to fine
him and make him dispose of his magical tools.

(i I. '11: What do the elders say
They say he [B] should pay the cow and throw away his magical tools, and if he fails then he
should leave the village.

(I l '1]: 01:, all of you should come here on Friday at 12 noon. Go and call everybody. Everyone
should attend; and we will resolve this issue. ”

[Though they didn’t want to share the details of how the conflict was resolved, the community
members all showed up for the rescheduled meeting a few weeks later]

 

 

 

Figure 4.2- Civil disobedience over witchcraft accusations enforces accountability of
chiefs.

-191-

Need for Livelihood Diversification

Despite these successes, the status of the over-fished stocks continues to be a

topic of concern for the community leadership and fishers alike:

“In the past, fish used to be caught in large numbers during the day. Now
to catch fish, fishermen have to fish at night with lamps. It is not like in
the past. "210

“We have caught a lot of fish over the years. However, in the past we were
catching a lot more than now. ” In particular, the amount of usipa and
masohungu caught by chilimirafishermen has decreased. “People used
to come all the way from Mzuzu [the regional capital, ~3 00 km away] to
buy fish from here, but nowadays we are not seeing them anymore. ’ I I

This dilemma for fishermen who recognize the ecological problems, but who
don’t see a way out of a prisoner’s dilemma212 situation is well characterized by

Mr.Chirambo:

“Mr. Chirambo plans to start a chilimira crew of his own in July and has been
saving for a chilimira net since lastAugust...He says that there were more fish in
the past, but that the species diversity hasn ’t really changed, and sees the
decrease in fish as being due to the increase in fishing gears. He feels that
something should be done to stop the over-fishing and would be willing to stop
fishing altogether and move into business if the B VC established a longer closed
season. However, he doesn ’t think that people will accept a closed season and
there is no value in his sacrificing his livelihood if others don ’t. “People are
diflicult to convince. ” ”2 13

 

210 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004—03-09; also A. Russell — Karonga District
— Interviews with fisher - 2004-04-22, A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with fish trader - 2005-02-

1 l.

2“ Ibid.

212 Very briefly, in a prisoners’ dilemma situation any one fisher may recognize that his fishing activities
contribute to the over-exploitation of the resource but is unwilling to decrease his fishing as he thinks that
others’ will gain the difference, and he will lose out overall. A more extensive description is offered by
Baland and Platteau (1996).

2” A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with fisher 2005-02-05.

-192-

Start of the Yiwemi Co-op

The view that livelihood diversification is necessary to relieve pressure on the
fishery is widely shared throughout the community and leadership.214 One of the results
of this growing concern has been the start of a livelihood diversification co-operative,
known as the Yiwemi Co-op. The initiative for the establishment of this co-op came from
fishermen who had been members of the first BVC, fish traders who had run a women’s

credit group, and VI-I Yiwemi.

A number of these leaders had been trained in how to run a co-op in 1993;
however this scheme failed due to inter-community rivalries with the chief of a
neighboring community. Nevertheless, the members had maintained a latent interest in
establishing a co-op, and my simple encouragement to them in April 2004 prompted them
to re-attempt this project.215 By June, 2004, the Yiwemi Co-op had drawn up a
constitution and had charged significant initial membership fees (K 1,000), however they
had not yet entirely decided how best to invest their efforts, and I gave them some

suggestions:

“Considering the fact that we have been already trained in corporative
society we decided to come up with this one. Every member is supposed to
pay an annual fee of K200. We have 11 members. The money is with the
Treasurer. This will be used for stationery and oflice supplies. Each
person has paid a fund of K1 , 000 as capital for the corp. We are looking
forward to calling upon the committee to come up with its budget

plans... We would like to convince donors to help us with starter capital.

 

2“ A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with fishers - 2004-04-02, 2005-02-05, 2005-02-11 A.
Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with Co—op — 2004-06-11; 2005-02-11; A Russell — Karonga
District — Interview with fish trader - 2005-02-11.

215 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with fishers - 2004-04-22; At the end of this meeting, I
inquire about the idea that one fisher had raised about establishing a CO-Op, and I am told that several
people had received some training in this through an earlier Italian NGO’s rice farming scheme. We
discuss the potential for this expertise to help them better market their fish, and diversify their livelihoods,
and I got the impression that the main person who suggested this idea, supported by the VH have
something in mind.

-l93-

We are just learning from others, if there are some involved in the same
activities they should feel free to come and teach us. "

Asked for my suggestions: “You may want to diversify your livelihoods
from fishery to other livelihood activities; It is wise to keep all your money
in a bank account rather than in someones’ house; Don ’t use the capital
as a loan to members otherwise the society can stop functioning due to a
single default. Instead, lend the profit made from sales. You could also
multiply your money by keeping them on a fixed deposit account for more
than two months. ”

They respond. “Thank you very much for your suggestions. We really
need them. We would also appreciate it if you could try to contact and
convince other well-wishers to train us on how to run our co-op. ”2 16

Seeing their motivation, I introduced the new FD extension worker to the BVC
and Co-op and urged him to support their efforts at conservation and livelihood
diversification.217 The PD extension worker in turn was able to attract the support of the
Evangelical Lutheran Development Pro gram (ELDP) which has helped the Yiwemi Co-

OP grow a diversity of vegetables and raise livestock.218

During its first grong season,
the co-op had mixed agricultural successes and except for the FD and ELDP support,

they received little help from other local government agencies.219 Nevertheless, the

 

2‘6 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with Co-op - 2004-06-11-
2" A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief- 2004—06-02.

2‘8 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with PD staff - 2004-11-31 Could you tell me how
Yiwemi Club formed? “They formed on their own initiative, but I organized them. You reminded them [of
the idea to create a co-op] when you came [when I held a meeting with fishers]. I met with the Evangelical
Lutheran Development Program oflicer, Mr. Kawsiwa in May. He thought that fishermen couldn 't do
anything but fishing. [But] they had plowed the land and Mr. Kawsiwa was convinced. He came in July,
saw the place and peoples ’ determination. We had 12 women and 8 men as members. ”

2'9 Ibid., A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with FD staff- 2005-01-29 “At Yiwemi we planted some
trees near the beach to control erosion: l 86 Mtangatanga and 90 Acacia The seedlings came from ELDP.
They were recently given maize seeds, cassava shoots, groundnuts, sorghum. These have all been planted
by now, and this time everyone was given (seeds) individually, to be planted on their own plots of land to
see their performance. The main aim was that they should share seeds once harvested with other
community members. The first crops: beans failed due to some disease and the Agricultural officers would
not help, the maize didn ’t grow well as it was planted late, the vegetables made some profit and they sold
more than K4000 worth, and the tomatoes failed as they were transplanted late. ELDP is concerned that
they may lose momentum, so they want to stimulate them further [by giving them seeds individually].
Agricultural Extension is not interested in getting involved. I visited him 3 times and also his supervisor but
they have no interest in collaboration...they are only interested if there are allowances [per diem
payments]. It is the same with the ward councilors, they are not interested. The goats are doing well

-194-

collaborative commitment shown by the co-op’s members and their willingness to
prioritize the livelihood needs of the member households headed by single women has
convinced ELDP and FD extension workers of Yiwemi Co-op’s potential to make a

community-banking scheme work.

How does ELDS plan to support this club in the future?

“We will work with them up to when our program ends. It seems like with
what we have issued them, we have assisted them. We will continue to help
as long as they are committed. Next year we will give them chickens. They

have also asked us for help with adult literacy and we have told this to the
head ofi‘ice. ”

Could you explain your SA C0 program ?

“We will start a village bank. The club donates money to the bank, which
is loaned out and repaid with interest for depositors ~25-3 0%. We have
started one already at Mlare and will start with meetings here [at Yiwemi]
next week. ELDP provides an ofiice, desks, a safe, watchmen, and a
cashier. We assist the clubs for 2 years, then the group must take over.
ELDP used to give loans as well, however this resulted in a lot of defaults.
Now it will be their [the community ’s] money, and the people themselves
will decide on interest rates and repayment. ” 2

Additionally, as in the case with Yiwemi BVC, although VH Yiwemi is a member
of the Co-op and is not the chairperson, the co-op membership is significantly motivated
through his hardworking example.

Why did you decide to support this group?

“This is because of the cooperation of the farmers including the VH. At
Yiwemi we meet with them 2 times a week but sometimes we have difliculty
to meet as we are funding 22 clubs in the Yiwemi area. "

Who do you feel are the people who really encourage this group?

“VT-I Yiwemi, Chairman Mushani, the Vice-Chairlady, almost everyone.
Anyone who wasn ’t eager was expelled. Recently we expelled 3 members.

 

though there are no new births. Guinea fowl have produced around 40 eggs that have been given to 5
members for hatching. One hen hatched eight eggs, but the other hens were not seated [laying]. It takes a
long time for them to sit. Due to high vegetation the fowl are kept in an enclosure to protect them from
predators, but for this reason they have stopped laying eggs. Now members work individually and meet
every Friday aflernoon at Yiwemi ’s house. ”

220 Ibid.

-l95-

Now there are 12 women and 5 men, including the VH who doesn ’t have a
position. He is just a member. ”

How do you feel about having VHS as chairmen in ELDS clubs?

“In ELDS, the VH is not allowed to be the chairman, but if you have any
problems we go to him. In some clubs the VH is not even a member. ”

Could you give me your appraisal of why VH Yiwemi is helpful in this
club?

“His commitment, ‘t-hl‘r/tti '. He is always in the lead, and he likes to
motivate people. We discourage the VII [in general] from being chairman
of clubs as he can become a dictator. He is just a member. He [referring
specifically to VII Yiwemi] was the one telling people of the goodness of
having a club [co-op] and he was hard working, showing an example to
his people. ”‘72

Other examples of self-starter communities in the North

Songwe222

During the early 19908, fishing communities near the mouth of the Songwe River,

(forming the border between Tanzanian and Malawi), were involved in conflicts with

Tanzanian fishers over placement of fishing nets, and theft of fishing nets and fish. In

1993, GVH Mwenitete established three BVCs to enforce the peaceful co-existence

between fishers from both sides of the border. Having addressed these issues, they now

mame enforce bans on the use of mosquito-netting in chilimira nets, and under-meshed

gillnets (1-1% inch).

 

22‘ A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with ELDP - 2005-01-29.
222 A. Russell - Karonga District — Interview with BVC - 2002-07-18, A. Russell - Karonga District -
Interview with FD stafl - 2002-07-17.

-196-

Mwenibabum

In 1997, due to conflicts on the beach, the FD helped the community create a
BVC. They set fines for theft of fish and nets, banned the barter of fish-for-alcohol on
the beach, mediated in conflicts over net positioning, set fish prices, and required fees
from visiting Tanzanian fishers. The committee became inactive around 2000, and VH
Mwenibabu appointed three separate new two-person committees in 2001, one each to
regulate: Fishers, Foreign Pottery Traders, and Local Traders. Unfortunately, the
infrequency and inconsistency of FD staff visits has hampered the community’s attempts

to improve fishing livelihoods:

“This area is doing very well in fishing but we need help. Sometime before
1999 - 2001 the FD tried to visit us but since 2002 they haven ’t come.
How can we improve our fishing if they don ’t come? At first they said that
we should build a fish kiln which we did but they did not come back to

instruct us how to use it. Now it has been destroyed due to neglect.

Though they [fishers] know that small fish grow into big ones, they still
exploit the juveniles. leat we need is education, as the government did in
the past, teaching us how to take care of our resources. What we need is to
create and raise awareness among community members and school
children about fish so that they can wisely manage the resource. If it is
possible, could you assist us in creating a place where we can keep fish
for community education purposes? We have a good place to create a dam
[fish pond]. We need technical support from you and other well

wishers. The fish are heavily depleted because of ignorance. ”224

These committees were very active in their activities until 2004, when VH

Mwenibabu suddenly passed away. Unfortunately, his successor had not yet been

 

223 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interviews with fishers - 2004-04-20, zooms-03; A. Russell — Karonga
District - Interview with a chief - 2004-03-13; A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with BVC - 2002-
07-20.

224 A. Russell — Karonga District — Interview with a chief - 2004-03-13; also A. Russell — Karonga District
- Interview with FD stafl - 2004-11-31 “They do follow gear meshes but I put the blame on our [the
government ’3] side for not doing any training as there is no resources. Those people are really ready and
willing to learn from us but we don ’t reach them like we are supposed to. It is us who are failing. ”

-l97-

appointed as of March 2005, and the absence of the chiefs support has left the BVC

without a leader. For now the firture of this BVC is uncertain.

-l98-

Northern Nkhotakota District

This stretch of the Lake Malawi lakeshore developed with minimal governmental
interference for many decades due to its relative inaccessibility. Until the late 1960’s, the
torrential floods of the rivers to the North (Dwambazi) and South (Bua River) prevented
the establishment of a permanent transportation infrastructure, and after bridges were
built across these rivers in addition to many smaller rivers, each year sees at least one of
these bridges being swept away. Although the area traditionally falls under a Chewa
chieftaincy (i.e., Traditional Authority Kanyenda), large irnmigrations by Tonga settlers
following the end of the Ngoni raids in the late 18903 have led to the ascendancy of the
Tonga language and ethnicity. Until the mid-1900’s the landscape was largely forested,
with small-scale cassava and maize farming (as staples), and a Chinese-sponsored rice-
farrning scheme in the lakeshore marshlands. This rice- growing scheme ended in the
19603 when the Mauritian-owned sugarcane company, Lonrho, leased the land from the

newly-independent Malawian govermnent and relocated all people living on it.

As in Northern Malawi, prior to the introduction of nylon nets in the 1950’s the
main fishing activities took place in rivers and near-shore waters. River species, such as
mpasa, sanjika, ntchila, mkupi, kadyaokolo, matamba, chikongwe, mbununu, kuyu,
mpondwe, nkongola, were harvested using fishing traps, spears, and poisons, and along
the larger Dwangwa and Kamparara Rivers, local communities under the leadership of
their chiefs (including: GVH Wakunyanja, VH Msisita, and TA Kanyenda) collaborated

in the building of fishing weirs during the early and late rainy seasons (when the fish

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migrate up to, and down from, their spawning grounds, respectively).225 In the lake
fishery, chambo, ntchila and usipa were targeted with small fishing traps and spears, and
small gillnets and beach seines laboriously hand-woven of flax fibres.226 An early
example of the use of such a beach seine by the second chief of Ngala is recalled by the

current chief; GVH Wakunyanja:

“In 1836 when my father [forefather] arrived, he found a beach seine
known as “mkumba nkhondo ” owned by his uncle, Gangala. In the past
these nets were made to target chambo not casawala (juvenile chambo),
they had large mesh size. ”2 7

During the course of the 20th Century, the local fishing economy and the
characteristics of the fishery have changed dramatically with progressive erosion of the
lakeshore. The first significant local changes occurred in the 1920-30’s, when the Bana
Swamps, which had been used for rice farming, became increasingly flooded, and
eventually connected with Lake Malawi through the lam River. These swamps have
gradually were referred to as “Kambindingu” (meaning “to capsize a canoe”) because
people increasingly had to make use of canoes to cross this flooded marsh and drowned

in the lagoon when their canoes capsized. The ecological transition from rice-paddy to

fish-breeding habitat is described by GVH Wakunyanja:

“The fish started to enter into the Kambindingu. My father started to trap
fish with a mono (trap). The fish found habitat in the lagoon and started
to breed in it. Now the lagoon became a fish habitat instead of a rice

 

2” A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with an ex-MP - 2003-11-21, A. Russell — Nkhotakota
District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004-05-03, 2004-07-03, 2005-03-20.

226 A. Russell -— Nkhotakota District — Interview with an exeMP - 2003-11-21, A Russell — Nkhotakota
District — Interviews with chiefs - 2003-12-04, 2004-05-03, 2005-03-17, 2005-03-20; A. Russell —
Nkhotakota District — Interview with fisher - 2004-02-27.

227 A. Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief- 2004-05-03, “mkumba nkhondo ” — literally
“I want a spear/direction”. This may have referred to: simply the forefathers’ hunting activities, the desire
by the fisher to invoke magical spells related to hunting to induce fishing success, or may have reflected a
desire by the owner for people pulling the net to make sure that the net was being pulled straight.

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paddy. Fish started to multiply and they moved freely between the lake
and the lagoon. "228

This gradual erosion of the lakeshore continued throughout the 20m century,
requiring the relocation of several communities along the shore. However, both the
gillnet fishery in the lagoon (for chambo) and the beach seine fishery off the shore of the
adjacent lakeshore grew in productivity and economic importance. Soon after this, as
reported by local elders, the colonial government set a closed season during the fish

breeding season (which coincides with the rainy season):

“On their own they had no significant rules for the fishery. However,
under colonial rule the Fisheries Department established a close season.
Fishers were allowed to fish and camp at the Lake in temporary shelters
from May to September; by October they were supposed to move back to
Dema where they had their permanent houses. ”2

“During this rainy season in the past, nobody lived at Bana or Chauma.
People were living in their villages, Dema, Banga, etc. They would visit
the lakeshore at Bana to see whether the usipa stocks had grown and if so,
they would camp there. People from as far as Nkhata Bay would come
and camp here in the dry season. People were using small canoes to cross
the Kambindingu, going to Bana and the fish would jump from the la oon
into the canoes. Some big, some small. There were that many fish! ”2 0

The next dramatic change to the local ecology and fishery occurred when an
obstruction of the Dwangwa River led to a shift in its course in the early 1950’s, moving

its main inlet into Lake Malawi from between the present-day communities of Matiki and

Nkhono, to the Kambindingu lagoon, which in turn opens out into the lake via 2

 

228 -

Ibid.
229 A. Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief - 2003-12-04.
23° A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2004-05-03.

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estuaries.231 This event, its supernatural cause, and its consequences to the fish stocks are

recounted by GVH Wakunyanja:

“With the death of Simeon Kanyenda (a previous TA) there was a heavy
rain which caused the Dwangwa River to overflow and change its course
toward the Kambindingu. This was in 1951 as I was returning from
Zambia. In the past, like in 1940-50, the river used to have fish like:
mpasa, sanjika, matamba, chikongwe, mbununu, ntchila, kuyu, mpondwe,
nkongola. They were all caught inland in the river. During these months,
from April to May, they were swimming down to the lake. But now all
these fish have stopped going into the river. ”232

With the increasing deforestation of the Dwangwa River watershed, a trend that is
seen throughout the country, siltation of the Kambindingu Lagoon has increasingly
become a concern to local fishermen. They claim that the muddy waters of the lagoon
serve as a deterrent to the potamodromous fish that had previously migrated upstream to
spawn, and the siltation is observed to be burying the chambo nesting grounds in the

lagoon.233

 

23‘ A. Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interviews with chiefs - 2004-05-03, 200543-20.
232 A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2004-05-03.

233 A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a BVC - 2004-02-26- “We do have problems, mostly
because of the change in the course of the Dwangwa river which has buried our fishing grounds and
reduced the size of the lagoon. There is also the problem of pollution (molasses) that is poured into the
river every year by Illovo, which kills both young and old fish. "; A. Russell —- Nkhotakota District -
Interview with a fisher - 2004-02-27 “Fish is not caught as it was before. Now there is no fish. When they
first closed [the lagoon], the most common fish was katungulu (chambojuv) but are not very much now
because of the sand and mud which has buried the lagoon. During 1966 - I 97 9, the lagoon was very deep
but now it is shallow. ”; A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a fisher - 2005-03-01, What is
the effect of the Dwangwa River on fishing? “Bad, because we fail to catch fish. They run away fiom
that filmbi (literally “dust " in the water), because it has a very bad smell. ”; A. Russell — Nkhotakota
District - Interview with a chief - 2005-03-20 “The Dwangwa river is an old river. It had mpasa, sanjika,
nchila, mkupi, kaayaokolo. However, nowadays you rarely find these fish since the river diverted into the
lagoon. The fish used to come straight into the river, but the[ now they don ’t because the] lagoon is
muddy. ” A. Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with a BVC - 2003-11-01.

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Case Study 3: Crisis transformation - Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary

Fishers as Squatters

The Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary is a 12 km stretch of lakeshore centered on the old
Dwangwa River river mouth, adjacent to the sugar cane estate initially leased by the
Lonrho Company. As previously mentioned, the Lonrho sugar cane company and
government had relocated all resident communities from the area in the 1960’s, and
therefore owned the undisputed rights to the land on which it was located. However, the
highly productive fish breeding grounds around the old river mouth estuary still attracted
many fishermen to temporarily settle and fish from the beaches fi'onting the sugarcane
estate’s property. These fishermen’s presence was considered a major source and conduit
for theft of sugarcane and other materials, and presented safety concerns for both
fishermen and company employees.234 The company’s concerns are summarized by one

former Lonrho employee:

“[ The] Relationship wasn ’t all that good due to fear of theft and
encroachment. Also they [fishermen] were bringing in kachasu beer
[home-brewed spirit] and our workers were going down to drink and they
used to get [into] some fights and injuries. "235

During the 1980’s, the Malawian govermnent placed high importance on the
success of export-oriented industries in the country, and therefore, actively supported the
Lunro Company in chasing the fishers away fi'om the beaches. Although these evictions

tended to be non-violent, as fishermen would frequently have fled the scene before

 

23‘ A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a BVC - 2002-07-12; A. Russell — Nkhotakota
District — Interviews with Ilovo staff- 2004-02-23, 2004-02-23, 2004—05-07, 2005-03-04.
2” A. Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with Ilovo stair- 2005-03-04.

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security personnel arrived, descriptions by those on both sides leave little doubt as to the

seriousness of the situation in the late 1980’s. As described by a former Lonrho

employee:

“In 198 7 we had a security department which was in control of the beach.
In fact, they didn ’t allow any fishermen to stay there. All along we have
been chasing them from the beaches, especially the fishermen... Lonrho
was regularly burning huts. Used to go there every day, and burn them
every time... All [enforcement activities were] done by company security,
and sometimes we involved the TA and District Commissioner. ”236

, and by fishers:

“The present residents settled here for fishing. At first there were tense
relations with Illovo [referring to Lonrho] as the company didn 't want
them to settle there fearing sugar cane theft. This animosity was quite
high at times, with the company burning all the huts in Nkhono village in
1997(actually meaning I 98 7) around February after telling the residents
to pack their things and leave. ”237

New government, new company

This confrontational relationship only started to change as the Malawian
govermnent itself became more democratic and concerned with human rights in the early
1990’s, and with the 1997 transfer of the sugar estate to the South African-owned Illovo
company. Coinciding with these transitions, a number of senior staff within Lonrho and
the associated satellite companies established a local branch of the Malawi Wildlife and
Environment Society (WESM). This NGO entered into a memorandum of understanding

with the management of Lonrho in 1995238, and under the chairmanship of Mr. Mac

 

23" Ibid., see also A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with Ilovo staff- 2004-02-23.
237 A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with BVCs - 2002-07-12, 2003-11-19.
238 Documents - 1995 “WESM-Dwasco Affiliation”

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Mtandizu (who was a Senior Field Manager for Lonrho) WESM rapidly became an
intermediary between local fishing communities and Illovo (the new leasers of the sugar

cane estate).239

The key to overcoming the impasse between the fishermen and Illovo was in
WESM’s identification of a mutually-acceptable solution for the stakeholders involved in

the on-going conflict which addressed their main concerns:
0 For the company of Illovo, this meant addressing the theft of sugarcane;

o For WESM and the senior company staff who form the majority of its
membership, this meant making a contribution to the conservation of over-

harvested fish stocks in Lake Malawi;

0 For fishermen this meant securing access to fishing grounds and beaches where

fish could be sold and dried in preparation for transport to inland markets.

WESM therefore suggested the creation of a sanctuary that would ban all fishing
and habitation along a 12 km stretch of the Illovo lakeshore centered on the estuary
formed by the old river mouth of the Dwangwa River. In addition to encouraging fish
reproduction by protecting breeding areas (especially for chambo) from habitat
degradation (from human waste, clearing of brush and destructive beach seines) and
over-fishing, this sanctuary would limit the amount of lakeshore that Illovo would have to

control for sugarcane theft while allowing fishermen to operate from specific beaches

 

”9 A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with Ilovo stati- 2002-07-11 "The sanctuary was
generally a WESM idea, especially the Dwangwa branch, and they encouraged the communities (at
Dwangwa Sanctuary) to do this @articipate). In this process, the FD acted as expert advisors only. The
Dwangwa fish sanctuary was sold to FD and communities by WESM — Dwangwa, and legally supported by
the FD B VCfi'amework. ” ; A. Russell - Nkhotakota District - Interviews with BVCs - 2002-07-11, 2002-
07-12, 2003-11-01.

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without fear of harassment. In late 1999 and early 2000, WESM, FD, and TA Kanyenda
held meetings in the squatter communities ill order to discuss fishermen’s perceptions of
the status and threats to local fish stocks and their acceptance for the establishment of the
suggested sanctuary.240 In addition to having assured access to certain beaches, in the
words of the FD, the fishermen perceived a need to change the ways in which the fish

stocks were being harvested:

“The future posed to be a threat, it was learned from these discussions
that the past fishery was very good, i. e. good catches with assorted
species, low cost and fishermen were few, while the present fishery is very
mechanized, little catches of small fish. T 00 many fishermen and many
undermeshed gears [are being used] to catch the little fish. It was from
these [beginnings] that the participants were considering ways of
reversing the situation. There were many, like banning of undermeshed
gears, increasing the closed season, [but] the closed season was felt to be

a [preferable] alternative to the situation. ”2 41

This plan required squatters to vacate a 12 km stretch of lakeshore, including the
two settlements nearest to the estuary (Mandewu and Chikasowa), in return for receiving
permission to maintain temporary shelters in the three communities at either end of the

sanctuary: Nkhono to the South, and Matiki and Nyavuu to the North.

 

2‘0 A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with BVC - 2002-07-11 “TA Kanyenda held a meeting of
all residents to achieve consensus on the creation of the sanctuary that would require the communities of
Chikasowa and Mandewu to relocate. Chikasowa residents moved here (to Matiki), and the Mandewu
residents moved South to Nkhono”; -; A. Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with BVC - 2003-1 1-
01— How was the sanctuary created? “The initial idea was that of Mac Mtandizu (as WESM chair) and
Mr. Manda (a FD fisheries assistant). They asked fishers where casawala (juvenile chambo) were found in
greatest numbers, and then made an agreement with the people to make that 10km stretch a sanctuary
(agreed May 2001). They also set fines at K500. A. Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with
WESM staff - 2002-07—1 1; Documents - 2000-05—23 “launching of Dwangwa Sanctuary”;

2“ Documents - zooms-23 “Launching of Dwangwa Sanctuary”; A. Russell — Nkhotakota District —
Interviews with BVCs - 2002-07-11, 2002-07-12.

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Creation of the DFS.

Under the patronage of TA Kanyenda, the Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary (DFS) was
officially created on May 19"“, 2000.242 Although there were a few people who had to be
forcibly moved out by the police, the majority of the people and all chiefs supported the
relocations and establishment of the sanctuary.243 In the course of WESM and FD’s
interactions with the fishing communities, a number of leaders (fishing gear owners
rather than VHS) emerged as their main contacts in each community. Most noteworthy of
these is Mr. M. Wotsogola, a chilimira net owner representing the fishers staying at
Nkhono community. These community leaders then formed committees in their
respective communities, and with financial and logistical assistance from Illovo and
WESM, the FD trained the BVCs in Nkhono, Matiki and Nyavuu communities in their

roles as enforcers of the DFS.244

Interestingly, the establishment of the DF S has subsequently been represented by
WESM and FD as revolving primarily around the need for better fisheries conservation,
and not related to a negotiation between fisher’s access to beaches or Illovo’s priority of
controlling sugarcane theft. This is demonstrated in the absence of any mention of these

issues in the objectives of the sanctuary, as recorded by the FD:

“1) To protect the fish from extinction (all species);

2) To strengthen the participatory natural resources management programme
among the fishers, traditional leaders, Fisheries Department, Dwangwa Sugar

 

242 Documents - 2000-05-23 “Launching of Dwangwa Sanctuary”; A. Russell - Nkhotakota District -
Interview with WEM staff - 2002-07-11.

2‘3 A. Russell - Nkhotakota District - Interviews with BVCs - 2002-07-11, 2002-07-12; A Russell —
Nkhotakota District — Interviews with WESM stafl‘ - 2002-07-11, 2004-02—23.

2“ Documents - 2000-05-19- “BVC Training”; Documents - 2000-08-23 “Letter from WESM to Illovo
GM”; Documents - 2000-08-23-“Letter from WESM to IllovoHR”; Documents - 2000-08-26 -“BVC
Training Program”; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with BVC - 2002-07-11.

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Corporation, Ethanol Company, and Wildlife Society of Malawi — Dwangwa
Branch;

3) To empower the fishers to control the fishery resource and to manage it on
their own so that their future generations enjoy the benefits as well;

4) To improve catches in the long run. ”245

Through what Illovo considered to be an informal accommodation on its part, the
fishers were granted access to parts of the Illovo lakeshore (i.e., at Nkhono and Matiki),
and for the first years, all stakeholders were considered to be content with the
arrangement.246 Interestingly, the agreement was made entirely as relating to fisheries

management concerns, leaving Illovo’s right to control access to its lands unchallenged.

Divisions between fishers

Nkhono BVC and Matiki BVC (note the exclusion of Nyavuu BVC, which
quickly became inactive as it is located further from the DFS247) took up their roles as
enforcers of the fishing ban within the DFS, and gained significant recognition for their
activities by catching over 60 poachers during their first year of operation.248 In early
2002, these BVCs were assisted by the FD in applying for a grant from the USAID-
funded COMPASS project for the purchase of a patrol boat equipped with an outboard
engine. As lead organization in the proposal, Nkhono BVC was given ownership (by

COMPASS) over the patrol boat and an initial capital investment of K80,000 for the

 

2‘5 Documents - 2000-05-23 “Launching of Dwangwa Sanctuary”; see also A.Russell - Nkhotakota District
— Interview with WESM stan- 2002-07-11.

2“ A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with WESM staff- 2002-07-11; ARussell — Nkhotakota
District — Interviews with BVCs - 2002-07-11, 2002-07-12.

2“ A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2005-03-19.

2‘8 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with BVCs - 2002-07-11, 2002-07-12; A.Russell —
Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief - 2004-02-23.

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enforcement operations.249 While all BVCS were permitted to use the boat,
unfortunately, the ownership of the patrol boat rapidly became an issue of contention
between Nkhono and Matiki BVCS. As steward of the boat, Nkhono BVC Chairman,
Mr. Wotsogola insisted on having the boat docked at Nkhono, where he could monitor its
use and maintenance, but would allow any BVC to use the boat if they supplied their own
fuel. Meanwhile, Matiki BVC felt that they should have shared ownership of the boat
and resented Mr. Phiri’s use of the boat for personal gain (i.e., in fishing or taxi service)

250, a concern shared by the DPS-patron, TA Kanyenda:

“The Dwangwa sanctuary is working well because the BVCs that we have
there they are working very hard. Though some people are complaining
that the boat, that boy [Wotsogola] is misusing it for personal use, not for
use of the community. ”2 51

Mr. Wotsogola explained that these boat-rentals go to pay for sanctuary patrols and the

maintenance costs of the boat.”2

The Bountiful Sanctuary

Partly due to a feeling of resentment over Nkhono BVC’S ownership of the patrol

boat, Matiki BVC had become largely inactive (and even counteractive) in enforcing the

 

2‘9 Documents - 2002-07-22 “COMPASS boat launching”; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview
with BVC 4004-06-28.

25° A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with BVC -2002-07-11. — “Mr. Wotsogola, who is the
chairman of the Nkhono B VC wants to use the COMPASS boat for his own entrepreneurial activities,
matola (taxi service) and doesn ’t share the boat with Matiki. ” ; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District -
Interview with BVC - 2002-07-12; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2004-02-23.
2“ A.Russell —- Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2004-02-23.

”2 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with BVC - 2002-07-12 “The idea for the boat was the
FD ’s, and the Chair and Treasurer fi'om Nkhono + the Matiki Secretary put together the proposal to
Compass. Nkhono BVC feels that as they did most of the work for the proposal, that they should be able to
base the boat in Nkhono. " He says that he doesn’t think that the Matiki BVC secretary has been very
honest with the Matiki BVC about the boat status (meaning its use as a matola), and explains that “they
have been using the boat as a matola in order to raise money for patrolling filel. The other BVC has the
right to come and use it if they bring filel. ”; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with BVC - 2004-
06-28.

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DFS fishing ban by mid-2002, while Mr. Wotsogola and Nkhono BVC had become the

defacto enforcers of the DFS.253 According to Mr. Wotsogola:

Few people fish in the sanctuary. He estimates a maximum of 1-2
people/night, which he does not consider as having a large effect on the
fishery. During 2001-2003, they carried out 23 patrols, catching 22
people, and raised Kl 1,220 in fines. Individuals in three of these cases
were told to leave the area by the TA as they were repeat offenders.254

After just 2 years of closure, the fish populations in the sanctuary were already
noticed to be recovering in both number and size, seen most notably in increased catches
of chambo at both margins of the sanctuary.255 This success of the DF S at restoring fish
stocks had a large impact on TA Kanyenda and fisher-leaders’ understandings of how to
use BVCS to tackle local problems of over fishing. They soon had another opportunity to

attempt this with the collapse of the fish stocks in the nearby Kambindigu Lagoon.

While the DFS gradually becomes a sub-theme within the emergence of the larger
Kambindingu Fisheries Association (the next case study), I will simply present the
remainder of the unfolding story of the DFS here. Partly as a function of Mr.
Wotsogola’s influential role in the Kambindingu Fisheries Association, and as a
reflection of the BVC’S confidence in their new-found powers, Nkhono BVC was able to
ban the use of a controversial, new form of fishing gear: the lemu or chikwesakwesa (see

description in the box below).

 

2” A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with FD start --2005-03-05 “The people living at Matiki
are very mobile, and the committee members are very busy, so they never meet. They also refilse to deal
with the problem of fishing in the sanctuary as they fear repercussions fiom the accused. Documents -
2000-06-26 “Matiki Poaching Report”;

25‘ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with BVC - 2003-11-01.

25‘ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with BVCS - 2002-07-11, 2002-07-12; A.Russell —
Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief - 2004-02-23.

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Arrival of the lemu fishers

Fishers from Southern Lake Malawi using this new fishing technique settled in
Likuchi, a community to the South okahono, in 1999. These fishers, predominantly of
the Yao ethnic group, are migrating from their home district of Mangochi due to the
depletion of chambo stocks in the Southern end of Lake Malawi. They were able to gain
acceptance from the local chief over the complaints of gillnet fishers by buying him a
lemu net of his own, and by presenting him with tributes (donations of fish) on a regular
basis.256 Following their arrival at Likuchi, these fishermen expanded their fishing
activities to the North, including targeting the untapped bounty of the DF S. A number of
them were caught fishing ill the DFS in 2004 by Nkhono BVC, but they have succeeded
in convincing the VH and BVC Chair at Matiki to allow them to base their on-going
expansion into local waters from Matiki.”7 The scenario by which lemu fishers have
gained access to communities is described by a fi'ustrated BVC leader in a nearby

community:

“Those people, we chased them away, but they came back. In the past
there were none of these fishing gears. Those people don ’t care about
others’ nets, they simply cut them apart. But they have relatives living

 

25“ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with PD staff- 2005-03-05 “Every day ofthe week, each
lemu fisherman bring 2 dozen chambo to the VH, and there are 30 lemu fishing gears. They also bought
him a boat and lemu net when they arrived. Small fishermen cannot get a hearing with the VH. These
fishermen have gone to the police with their complaints of damages to their nets, and the police have
brought the FD into the matter. But the VH says that the FD has no right to chase the lemufishermen
away, and that these fishermen should be the ones to leave. ”; see also A.Russell — Nkhotakota District -
Interview with fisher - 2004-02-24.

2” A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with BVC - 2005-03-16 “Nkhono B VC did patrol that this
year. We can go there once a week, or 2-3 times in a month with the COMPASS boat. In 2004 we found
people fiom Liwaladzi lemu fishing in the sanctuary. Two times they were charged K10, 000, but they have
only paid K6, 000. ”; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with fisher - 2005-03-17 “Three quarters
of us (fishers at Matiki) have gillnets, and these are cut by the lemu fishermen In the past we chased them
[away], but now the chief and the B VC mediate with the lemu fishermen. ”; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District
— Interview with fisher - 2005-03-17; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with FD stafi - 2004-02-
23.

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here and they give a lot of fish to the chiefs, and so it is really dzfiicult to
chase them away or to confiscate their nets. ”258

 

 

A brief description of the Lana [also known as Chikwesakwesa):
Lemu compared with a gillnet:

While the lemu net is basically a very wide, 700-800m long gillnet, its operation differs in a number of
ways. Whereas the classic gillnet is considered a passive capture gear (note the exception of chiombera)
as fish accidentally swim into it and get entangled in the net, the lemu is operated as an active capture
gear. Much as with a purse seine, the lemu is set in a wide circle, and then gradually drawn in, causing
the fish to get captured in the mesh as they try to escape the closing net.

Lemu man-power and technology:

In terms of the man-power and technology used, these techniques differ greatly as well. While a gillnet
is generally set once and retrieved by a single person in a canoe several hours later, the lemu is
repeatedly and continually being set and drawn in by a crew of 4 people in a plank boat. Lemu boats
are shorter, lighter, and have more bowed keels than chilimira plank boats, and do not use engines.

Origin of the names chikwesakwesa and lanu:

A lemu is an car, which is rowed seated backwards as opposed to the paddles used by all other
Malawian fishers; chikwesakwasa literally means: big (chi) pull (kwesa), pull (kwesa)) referring to the
fishing technique.

Lemu as source of conflicts:

Due to the large (3 1/r -4 inch) mesh size used by lemu fishermen (as they target mainly adult chambo),
the FD generally has approved of them. However, gillnet fishers do not, as lemu fishers regularly set
their nets on top of existing gillnets (which cannot be seen at night), and in order to disentangle these
nets, lemu fishers tend to cut the gillnets leading to losses for the gillnet owners. Additionally, due to
these fishers’ non-local ethnicity or residence, and the large incomes earned with this gear cause a
significant amount of jealousy and resentment.

 

Figure 4-3. A brief description of the Lemu (also known as Chikwesakwesa) ”9

Since the creation of the DFS, the bountifirl catches of chambo, mbaba, and
nkututu have attracted large numbers of fishers to trade, fish and settle at Matiki and
Nkhono (including lemu fishermen), and have enabled many to expand their fishing

operations by buying larger fishing gears.260 This economic growth has also spurred

 

25‘ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with BVC - 2004-02-24.

259 Based on Seymour (2005); ARusseIl — Nkhotakota District - Interviews with fishers - 2005-03-05,
2005-03-05, A.Russe11 — Nkhotakota District - Fishing observation - 2005-03-05; A.Russell - Nkhotakota
District — Interview with FD staff - 2005-03-05.

26° A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with fisher - 2005—03-17- The excellent fishing is illustrated
by this gillnet fisherman who started fishing last year when he bought 1,800 meters of 2 V4 inch and 3 V2
inch gillnet. He bought his net with a K6000 loan fiom an NGO-sponsored rotating loan program, known
as a ‘caterpillar’ scheme. Unfortunately, he lost 800 meters of gillnet due to high winds. Nevertheless, due
to the good fishing, he has already been able to repay his loan with 100% interest; Similar stories are told
by other fishersz-ARussell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with fishers - 2005-03-17, 2005-03-17,
2005-03-17, 2005-03-17; 2005-03-16.

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other aspects of community-development, such as the construction of wells and a school
at Nkhono, and the start of an NGO-firnded micro-loans program for female traders at
Matiki.261 The rift between Matiki and Nkhono BVCS has remained, and (possibly) due
to Mr. Wotsogola’s role in the Kambindingu Fishing Association, Matiki BVC has
largely been absent in the development of the Association. Indeed, allowing lemu fishers
to settle at Matiki, has been counterproductive to the aims of both the DFS and the

Association.

New Uncertainties

Since late 2004, however, the status of the DPS has come under threat with the
gradual lessening of Nkhono BVC’S enforcement activities. This trend coincided with

Mr. Wotsogola’s (Chairman of Nkhono BVC) relocation of his residence to Ngala (his

family’s residence) and the natural emigration of fishers from Nkhono community.262

Consequently, poaching has increasedm, which Mr. Wotsogola attributes to:

“As of now we are 4 [committee members] only. We need to take Chrissy
(the Fisheries Department extension worker) to strengthen it (i. e., to
motivate the BVC). They don ’t want to work without pay, there are few
people just working voluntarily. ”264

 

2“ A.Russell - Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief- 2005-03-17 “The problem is [that the]
company wants chase us away. But the fishers are really benefiting fi'om the fishing here, and the women
have received loans. ”,' A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with BVC - 2005-03-16.

2“ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with PD statr- 2005-03-05 “The sanctuary is working very
well, but the B VC is not working now. They are not doing the patrols because the people who were leading
them are no longer living there. Wotsogola moved back to Ngala, and the people don ’t follow the rules any
longer. The patrol boat with the engine is also at Ngala now and people will not patrol without an engine.
A lack of governmental activity is also a problem. ”; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with
BVC - 2005-03-16.

2“ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with BVC - 2003-11-07.

2“ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with BVC - 2005-03-16.

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Additionally, the ambiguous legal status of Matiki’s fishers’ rights to reside on
Illovo’s beaches has started to be a source of uncertainty since a sudden erosion event
flooded most of Matiki beach in the year 2002. While some fishers relocated their
fishing activities to other beaches (such as Nyavuu and Nkhono), the majority remained

in a dense row of pitiful shelters on a narrow band of sand (ranging between 10-40m

265

wide) between the lake and sugarcane fields. This event raised Illovo’s concerns over

their liability for potential accidental injuries and deaths due to the burning of the cane

fields, and has prevented Illovo from being able to erect barriers protecting its fields from

266

erosion. While Illovo wanted the Matiki fishers to move fiom the area, the social and

economic benefits that Matiki residents have reaped from their proximity to both the DFS
and the infrastructure provided by Illovo have made them unwilling to do so:267 These

sentiments are reflected by the following fishers’ testimonies,

“We want to continue fishing as we can earn cash every day, while
farming [you earn] only once [a year]. Fishing is better here than
elsewhere. We don’t want to leave. In January we refused [they rejected
Illovo 's request that they leave), and till now we refuse. They want [us] to
go to Nyavuu. Fishing there is the same as here, but [it is prone] to
flooding, there are crocodiles, no school, no clinics. Now the children go
to school at Matiki, also there is a clinic [both belonging to Illovo]. "26

“We are being chased [away] by Illovo, because they claim that this place
belongs to Illovo. This is the place were we feel our needs are well-met,
therefore it is not good for us to be chased away as we are familiar [used
to] this place. ”269

 

2‘” A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with BVC - 2002-07-11; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —
Interview with fish traders -2003-11-05.

2“ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with BVC - 2003-11-01, 2003-11-19; ARussell —
Nkhotakota District - Interview with fish traders - 2003-11-05-Ngala—Fish Traders; A.Russell - Nkhotakota
District — Interview with Illovo Staff - 2004-02-23.

2‘” A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with Ilovo Staff - 2005-03-04; A.Russell — Nkhotakota
District — Interviews with fishers - 2005-03-17, 2005-03-17, 2005-03-17; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —-
Interview with fish trader - 2005-03-17; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief -2005-03-
17.

2“ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a fisher - 2005-03-17.

2‘9 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a fish trader - 2005-03-17.

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This Situation remained unresolved until late 2005, as although Illovo received
official support from the Ministry of Lands over their rights to the shoreline, Matiki
leaders resisted moving, and instead proposed clearing a new settlement area within the
DFS.27o In late 2005 the communities gave in to the calls by Illovo to relocate, with some
choosing to move to Nyavuu while others have moved to Nkhono village.271 It remains
to be seen how the Matiki BVC leaders redefine their roles and attitudes toward the DFS

now that they have been forced to relocate.

Despite these challenges to the effectiveness of the individual BVCS of the DPS,
the growth in stature and function of the Kambindingu Fisheries Association (as will be
described in the next section) has the potential to overcome the challenges. In brief, as the
DFS is now a sub-component of the larger KFA, Nkhono and Matiki BVCS may feel
pressure to be seen as active partners within the Association (and as enforcers of the
DPS) so as not to lose out in any future benefits that may be reaped by KF A members.
Additionally, the chiefs in Nkhono are highly supportive of the BVC’s enforcement of
the DFS, increasing the likelihood that the BVC will be revitalized by new members.

This is expressed well by VH Chagolombara’s vision for the BVC and its mandate:

“The BVC is good for everyone. The BVC is for youths who should take
care of the fish for everyone. We all depend on fishing here. Without
proper management there would be no fish in the near future. Most of the
community members are uneducated and largely dependent on fishing. In
the past, fishing was subsistence but now it has been commercialized, and
people try to catch a lot of fish for money. Every wise Malawian is proud

 

27° Documents — 2004-10-28 “Letter fi'om Commissiona' for Lands to Dwasco General Manager” ;
A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2005-03-17.

271 John Wilson, pers.commo. 2006; ARussell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with WESM Stafi ~2006—
1 1-14.

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of the lake and its resources. The lake is the lifeblood of the people of
Malawi. ”272

Case Study 4: Kambindigu Lagoon Closed Season

Crisis in the Lagoon

Much as in the over-fishing trends of Lake Malawi as a whole, Unaka Lagoon, as
one of the more productive and convenient fishing grounds, became rapidly over-fished
during the late 1980’s and 19903, resulting in a collapse of the local fish stocks in
2000.273 The cause of the fish stock collapse is uniformly placed on the growth in
numbers of fishing gears, and their increasing targeting of juvenile fish stocks, which to

this fisherman is clearly linked to the need for capital for the purchase of nets:

“Gears made from flax were locally made and anybody could easily make
them, unlike nylon which you can only find in shops and requires money.
In 1966, my grandfather had a beach seine made from flax. He was
catching a lot of fish such as nkhututu, mlamba, ntchira and chambo. He
used to only keep the big ones and threw the juveniles back into the water.
In 1969 nylon nets were introduced. With nylon nets you have to buy them
from the shops and you need money and so you have to sell the juveniles.
In 1971, the ntchila became extinct - that was when chambo started to be
caught in abundance up to I 98 7. ”2 74

The fish stock collapse in 2000 must have been a dramatic event as several
community chiefs independently describe the beach seines filled with snails during that

year:

 

272 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2005-03-17.

”3 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interviews with chiefs - 2004-02-23, 2004-02-26; A.Russell —
Nkhotakota District - Interview with fishers - 2004-02-24, 2004-02-27, A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —
Interview with a BVC - 2004-02-26.

27‘ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a fisher - 2004—02-27.

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“At that time they were only catching small fish together with snails, and
we were unable to separate the snails and fish. ”27

“Now there are fewer fish both in the lake and the lagoon. In the past,
visitors were honored by roasting fish, however this is no longer done due
to the scarcity [and expense] of fish. At one point, the nets were full of
snails, and this made them realize that the fish are depleted. ”276

Establishing the Closed Season

Following TA Kanyenda’s experience with the successful creation of the
Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary, in-which over-fishing was for the first time being dealt with by

the fishing communities themselves, he requested FD and WESM assistance in designing

a similar community-based intervention for the Kambindingu Lagoon.277

“It first came into my mind to create a sanctuary to be able to control
fishing. [We needed an area where] it should not allow anyone [ to do]
any fishing. Having such places [sanctuaries] the fish are well-kept and
everybody should follow good behavior for fishing.

When we were starting, we first organized the people and the BVCS telling
them how it [the fish stocks condition] was then [in the past] and making
them think about how fish is caught now. They themselves discovered the
problem, that we have misused the fish. "278

Due to the serious economic impact of the fish stock collapse in 2000 and the
capacity-building opportunities that WESM and FD had made available in the creation of
the DFS, there was widespread support among fishers to create BVCS as part of the

solution to the over-fishing in the lagoon.279 Initially, the TA and senior chiefs intended

 

2‘” A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief- 2004-02-26.

”6 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2004-07-03.

27’ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with chiefs - 2003-12-04, 2004-02-23, 2004-02-26, 2004-
07-03; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with WESM stafi - 2002-07-11.

27" A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2004—02-23.

”9 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief- 2003-12-04 “The BVCs started in 2000 when
we were called together by the FD. All the chiefs and fishermen, we made our own rules governing the
BVCS. We decided on the dates of opening and closing of the lagoon on our own. "; 2004-02-24-Likuchi-
B.Phiri — “The first year the B VC went to do patrols but now they have lost heart. At first, people were

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for the lagoon to be turned into a sanctuary (similar to the DFS), requiring the relocation
of all communities surrounding the lagoon.280 However, given the significant hardships
that this would cause for the communities, they decided to establish a half-year closed
season for all fishing in the lagoon (Octl-Mar.31), and a ban on small-meshed gillnets

and all beach seines during the open season (i.e. Apr.2-Sept.31).28'

Early Successes in the Lagoon

Large-scale meetings were held by TA Kanyenda and the FD to sensitize all
fishermen to the new regulations in the lagoon, where they achieved widespread support
from fishers and chiefs alike.282 BVCS were then established and trained in August 2000
by WESM and FD (with financial and logistical support fi'om Illovo) in all communities

surrounding the lagoon. 283 In order to coordinate BVC activities, they were collected into

 

happy to close fishing in the lagoon for a short while, but now they think that the government wants to close
it for ever, and they don ’t agree with this. ”; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief -
2004-02-26; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with WESM staff - 2002-07-11.

28° A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2004—02-23; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District
— Interview with Fish Traders - 2004-04-28, A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with a BVC -
2005-03-01.

28' A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with fishers - 2002-07-12; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District
— Interview with a chief - 2004-02-23; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with fish traders - 2004-
04-28; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a BVC - 2005-03-01.

282 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with fishers - 2002-07- 12 “They held a meeting ofaII
fishermen between Matiki and Dwambazi, with transportation provided by the FD and TA Kanyenda, at
which all accepted the closed season. ”; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2004-
02-26 “FD came to the GVHKada telling him the need for establishing fishermen ’5 groups (BVCS) to take
care of the Unaka lagoon. The GVH said that the owner of the land is VHw Vwawa. Therefore they
approached me and together with the fishermen we agreed it would be good for the fish to grow. Because
at that time they were only catching small fish together with snails, and we were unable to separate the
snails and fish. When we had closed (the lagoon) fish started to grow including ‘nyungosale ’
[Oreochromis shiranus] which we could remember having ever seen before ".; A.Russell — Nkhotakota
District — Interviews with chiefs - 2003-12-04, 2004-02-23; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview
with WESM stafi - 2004-02-23; - A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interviews with BVCs - 2004-02-24,
2004-04-28.

233 Documents - 2000-08-23 “Training funding request to 111ch GM”; Documents - 2000-08-26 “BVC
'nummnguemez

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an Association (“Kambindingu Fisheries Association) chaired by GVH Wakunyanja, and

whose membership were the chairmen of all the BVCs around the lagoon and DFS.

Further encouraged by WESM/FD training (again funded by Illovo) in December
of 2000, BVCs were diligent in their enforcement of the regulations during the first

closed seasonm, and this was reflected in recovering fish stocks:

“It was in 2000, the settlement of B VCs. We started working in 2001 on
October I“ which is when the Kambindingu closed season starts. By then
we used our BVCS to protect [enforce the closed season]. After only 2
years we saw that there was many fish in Kambindingu. People saw that
it was good to have laws protecting the fish. ” 285

“These days, fish are found since we forbade the use of beach seines since
year 2000. Since we established the BVCS we started closing the lagoon
for 6 months and when we opened we only allowed gillnets. Right now
there are a lot of fish in the lagoon, up to 200-3 00 chambo in a single

haul ”286

First Divisions —- Livelihoods and Leadership

Although all communities around the lagoon were initially supportive of the
closed season and gear restrictions, underlying divisions between communities emerged

once the fish stocks started to return a year later. A map of the area is given in Figure 4-

4, below.

 

28‘ Documents - 2001-01-04 “BVC Training”; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interviews with chiefs -
2003-12-04.; 2004—02-26; ARussell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with fisher - 2004-02-27; A.Russell
— Nkhotakota District — Interviews with BVCs - 2004-02-24, 2004-02-24.

285 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with BVC - 2004-02-24.

2“ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2004-02-25.

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1

(Map not
to Scale)

Dema

 

M5 Lake-
shore

Likuchi

 

 

 

.\

  
   

Ngala

  
  
 

Dwangwa Fish

Dwasulul
Dwambazi

Lake
Malawi

   

Sanctuary

Old river
mouth

 

Figure 4-4. Map of the Kambindingu Fisheries Association

-220-

 

A number of differences between communities livelihood strategies and residency
patterns illustrated by the household survey data may provide some explanation for these

divisions (Figure 4-5 and 4-6, below).

 

_ Local

— Area

Ustrlct
rational
+Vislt Diration

 

§
§
'\\‘
s
h
s
s
s
s

A

I

I

I n
I if.

I

  

Figure 4-5. KFA Household Residency Origin and Visit Duration.

 

 

-
S
WW

_T
—
r-

fillll
IIIII

7///
I
\\\s.\i\s
VA
I

////A

mm

7%
I
V/////
--

 

Figure 4—6. KFA Household Livelihood Strategies.

-221-

The dock-users located along the lagoon-shore (Dema, Banga, and a part of
Likuchi) are characterized by the highest degrees of local residency and dependence on
farming income of all community-groups. However, most farming income is earned
during April-July, and therefore, closure of the lagoon fishery causes significant hardship
during the time of the year when food stocks and other sources of income are at their
lowest (Jan-March).287 These conununities’ primary source of fish comes from the
lagoon gillnet and beach seine fishery.288 While the lakeshore communities (N gala and
part of Likuchi) similarly participate to a great extent in farming, their much greater
proportion of migrants fiom outside Nkhotakota District reflect the importance of fishing
and trading activities that brought them to Ngala in the first place. The fishing gears used
in these communities are primarily dependent on the fish stocks in Lake Malawi itself,
although a proportion fish in the lagoon as well (using off-shore purse seines and gillnets,

but also near-shore gillnets and beach seines).289

The third main group of “communities”
around the lagoon is that of the growing fishing camps on the marsh/barrier islands
(Chauma, Bana, Nyavuu) which separate the lagoon from Lake Malawi.290 These

communities are composed of a mixture of area, district and national migrant fishers and

 

28’ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a fisher - 2004-02-27 “The main problem here is
poverty and hunger, hence, people still sneak in to fish. Some were raised fishing while others do it due to
their need for money. Others have farmland and its just habit. Some need it for food, some buy fertilizer,
also school children need fees paid Life demands many things, food is a necessity therefore it seems to me
that farming can be the solution. Here, though they say that it is [the] closed season, is just mere words,
women of this society can ’t eat “mayani ” (cassava leaves) as relish. Right now [in February, during the
closed season] people are there in the lagoon fishing. If there was money to buy fertilizer some would not
need to fish. ”

288 A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with a fisher; - 2005-03-01; A.Russell — Nkhotakota
District - Fishing Observation - 2005-03-02; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief -
2005-03-02.

28" A.Russell - Nkhotakota District - Fishing observations - 2004—05-02, 2004—05-02, zooms-05, 2004—
05-11; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District - Interview with a fisher - 2005-03-01.

29°A.Russell - Nkhotakota District - Interviews with chiefs - 2005-03-19, 2005-03-19; A.Russell —
Nkhotakota District - Interview with a fisher - 2005-03-01.

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traders, who have settled here primarily to harvest the bountifiil usipa stocks in Lake
Malawi using beach seines and chilimira purse seines. Additionally, a significant

minority fishes the lagoon using gillnets.291

The fourth category of communities is that
of the two temporary settlements at either end of the Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary (DFS),
whose residents are to a great extent composed of migrant fishers and traders from within
Nkhotakota District. Their relative proximity to their resident homes may also have a

direct influence on their relatively short times of occupancy in these communities and

their abilities to engage almost equally in farming, fishing and business.

The different fishing livelihood strategies employed by these groups of
communities rapidly became a source of disagreement over the KFA regulations in the
lagoon, and some lagoon-shore community fishers called for the reopening of the lagoon
to year-round fishing. However, in addition to reflecting livelihoods differences between
communities’ fishing dependencies in the lagoon or the lake, these disagreements also
reflect a resistance against what might be perceived as jurisdictional encroachment by
GVH Wakunyanja on GVH Wakuntunda communities’ activities. Although the origin of
the closed season lay with TA Kanyenda, GVH Wakuntunda, who represents Dema and
Banga communities, felt that the KFA was biased against his communities by a KFA

leadership which resides in GVH Wakunyanja’s lakeshore communities:
0 The KFA chairman, GVH Wakunyanja, lives at the southern end of Ngala;

o The KFA vice-chairman, Mr. Wotsogola, who is also steward of the Nkhono
BVC patrol boat and the main enforcer of the lagoon closed season, has his

family’s residence at Ngala;

 

29‘ A.Russell -— Nkhotakota District - Interview with a fisher - 2005-03-01.

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o and the KF A secretary, Mr. Boock Phiri (who was chairman of the short-lived

Mpondabwaki BVC) lives in Likuchi.

However, while the leadership is biased toward GVH Wakunyanja’s
communities, GVH Wakuntunda’s claims that his primary criticisms are not about how
the KFA is led, rather, the undue burden that its regulations place on his communities’

livelihoods overall:

“Some fishermen (including him) don ’t accept some rules like the closed
season as it is long, and they consider this rule too tough. Some have left
their homes due to the hardship of this rule causing even further
difiiculties for those family members left behind (due to loss of their
contributions to household labor and income). We have grown tired of
these rules. There is great hunger in the communities. ”2 2

Additionally, while the above arguments would lead one to expect lagoon-shore
fishers to argue for relaxation of the closed season regulation, this is not the case as most
fishers, and the most significant village chief along the lagoon shore, support
enforcement of the closed season despite the hardships caused.293 There is some

resentment in these communities as they claim that the KFA leadership turns a blind eye

 

292 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2003-12-04; see also A.Russell - Nkhotakota
District — Interviews with BVCs - 2003-11-01, 2004-02-24; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview
with a fisher - 2004-02-24.

2” A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2004-02-26 “We alreaofv agree to close [the
lagoon] so we don ’t want to change that, it should continue. Our ancestors used to catch big fish but now
they are all gone and we have never seen some of the species that they ate because we never allowed time
for fish to breed. So for our fitture generation to see what type of fish we were eating, we should continue
to close and open, close and open. ”,'; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a BVC- 2004-02-26
Have there been changes in fish catches over the last years? “There have been changes, as in the past
we were fishing without restraint. Now we have a closed season. Though we face many difi'iculties during
the closed season, when the open season comes the difliculties are past. Fish is caught in abundance. "
What do you do during the closed season? “During the closed season, many of us are idle... [and there]
is a lack of capital for people to invest in other activities. ”,' A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews
with fishers - 2004-02-27; 2005-03-02; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with fisher traders-
2005-03-18, 2005-03-18; ARussell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a BVC - 2004-02-25.

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to poaching by fishers from Likuchi, which is the home of the KF A Secretary.294 This
bias and the harshness of the regulations are raised by GVH Wakuntunda regularly, and
in his inability to end the closed season regulation, he even denies ever having agreed to
it in the first place.295 However, given the broader community’s support for the closed
season regulation, GVH Wakuntunda’s resentment over not being able to exert any
influence on a KFA whose regulations significantly impact local livelihoods must be seen

as a significant motivator for his comments and actions.

Conflicts in the Lagoon

By 2002, most BVCS were becoming discouraged, with a major factor being their
physical and social fear of poachers’ (at times relatives’) reprisals.296 Mr. Wotsogola
(Association Vice Chair, and steward of Nkhono BVC’s patrol boat) who was the main

remaining enforcer of the closed season, describes one of his conflicts while on patrol:

“Enforcing rules is diflicult when people don ’t accept your reasons.
Many people just blame you for being jealous. They say that you don ’t
want them to make any money. ”

 

29‘ A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2004-02-26 “They (local arcs) have stopped
confiscating because of low morale. In the past they did enforce rules. However, fishermen fiom Ngala
[probably referring to Likuchi] come to fish in Unaka during the closed season but they claim that it is
fishermen fi'om our side who do so. A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interview with a BVC ~2005-O3-
06 “A large problem with the Kambindingu Lagoon closed season is that the B VCs members are fishing
there themselves, especially those from Banga, Dema, Likuchi, and Bana. We only realized this when we
attended the Association meeting and met the B VC members who we had seen in the lagoon during the
atrol. ”
€95 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2003-12-04 “Some have left their homes due
to the toughness of this rule causing even further hardship to those family members left behind. At first the
rules worked well, but today many people violate these rules. They go fishing despite the closed season. We
have grown tired of these rules. There is great hunger. ”; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with
a chief - 2004-10-31 Do you think that the closed season can work? “No. I havn ’t been conferred with
at any point regarding the creation of the closed season and the Association is still chaired by GVH
Kamkhondo [despite the initial planned 3 year chairmanship].
29‘ Documents - 2002-02-27- “Association Meeting minutes"; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews
with BVCS - 2003-11-01, ; 2004-02-24, A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Enforcement observation -
2003-l 1-04.

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Wotsogola is concerned about his safety at times. In 2002, he was patrolling
together with Mr. Manda (PD) and 2 policemen, and they were attacked when they tried
to confiscate the poacher’s nets. The police were not prepared to shoot at anyone, so
they, the enforcers, were forced to run away!297 These circumstances meant that the few
who continued to patrol attempted to avoid social sanctions by trading enforcement duties
with distant BVCS, and try to protect themselves by attracting the participation of the

police or by arming themselves with savage-looking weapons.298

The social pressures were fiequently also expressed in less obvious ways, as those
BVC Chairs who were deemed too active in enforcing fishing regulations were removed
or voted out of their positions. In the case of the Banga BVC, the Chairman became the
target of a slander campaign by other BVC members, resulting in his demotion from the
BVC by the local chief. 299 The consequences of this episode were described by one

Banga community member:

“At first the committee was composed both of fishermen and farmers. I
think this design was deliberate so that fishermen wouldn ’t be able to
wield all the power. The first BVC Chair (who was not a fisherman
himselfi had been very effective at catching poachers in the lagoon. But

 

297 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a BVC - 2003-11-01; see also A.Russell — Nkhotakota
District — Interview with a BVC - 2004-02-24.

’93 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with BVCs 2002-07-11, 2003-11-01, Wotsogola is also
concerned due to his awareness of the failure in other areas of the police to protect BVCS. For enforcing
fishing rules a BVC Chair in southern Nkhotakota was attacked by poachers who slashed at his neck with a
panga knife. To date no one had been arrested for the attack nor has any compensation been given to the
disabled BVC Chain; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a BVC - 2004-02-24 “At first we
worked together with the government to carry out patrols but that has ended now. Fisheries Assistant
Manda and two police ofiicers used to accompany us which caused people to fear us. Now Manda has left.
The B VCs and chiefs all have fishing gears so they can ’t confiscate gears from each other and their
relatives. ”

2” A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with BVCS — 2003-11-01, -2004-02-25; A.Russell —
Nkhotakota District — Interview with fish trader - 2004-02-24; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview
with a fisher - 2004-02-27.

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this second BVC is composed of entirely of fishermen, which is why they
fail in their duties. ”300

In addition to their unwillingness to enforce rules against their fiiends and
relatives, many informants describe these BVC members as the primary culprits and

beneficiaries of poaching activities:

“I’Wrat happens is this, if I am a BVC member I will send my crews to fish
in one direction and I will go patrolling in the other direction. Right now
they are not patrolling because it ’s the BVC members who have gears and
who fish in the lagoon. "301

“The BVC members are actually the ones who encourage people to fish
during the closed season in the lagoon. When they find people fishing they
just confiscate a pail of fish and leave them to continue their fishing. "302

Conflicts between chiefs and BVCs

The role of primary interlocutor between outsiders and the community is
traditionally that of the chief, involving his/her receipt of homage and gifts which
reinforces the chiefs’ wealth and influence in the community.303 In many cases, however,
this role has also allowed many chiefs to divert much development assistance to their

fiiends and relatives, as is noted by GVH Wakunyanja himself:

“There is little trust between people here, even with chiefs. An example is
the starter pack in which it is the chief ’s friends and relatives who get the
fertilizer handouts rather than (people who might be more hardworking or
deserving in the community. ”3 4

 

30° A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a fish trader - 2004-02-24.

3‘” A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2004—02-25; see also A.Russell — Nkhotakota
District - Enforcement observation- 2003-11-04.

”2 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a fish trader - 2004-02-24.

”3 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with WESM staff 4004-02-23.

3‘” A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief- 2004-10-31.

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Due to the govemment’s past experience with chiefs that dominate and manipulate
village committees, FD-regulations explicitly excluded chiefs as voting members in
BVCS. Instead the chiefs, who are the primary adjudicators for community conflicts,

were given the roles of ex-oflicio patrons.

The conflicts between BVCS and their respective chiefs arose as the newly-
founded BVCS started to divert the benefits and respect that had traditionally gone to
chiefs. An example relates to the key role of receiving immigrant fishers and traders,
which generally would have entailed gift-giving in homage in return for receiving an
allocated space to build a house. Additionally, in the past chiefs organized the creation of
beach seine fishing grounds through the removal of tree stumps in the water, and
expected payment in return for allowing visiting fishers to use the'beacl'h305 Instead,
many fishers have tended to simply visit the local BVC to have their fishing gears
inspected, and build themselves temporary shelters without visiting the chiefs, a trend
reflected by some chiefs’ ignorance of their fishing residents.306 Furthermore, the chiefs
are losing influence and respect derived fiom their traditional roles as conduits for
development programs and loans, a role that is now also being played by the BVCS.307

Consequently, the chiefs may undermine BVC’s activities out of ignorance or resentment

of the BVCS role:

 

305 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2004—05-03 “A visitor had to register with the
chief before being allowed to fish there. This was because these fishing grounds were under ownership at
that time. The chiefs had full control of them. They had to create the fishing grounds to allow beach
seining to take place. They had to remove many tree stumps from the lake. "

3“ A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interviews with chiefs - 2004-06-28, 2004-07-03.

307 A.Russell - Nkhotakota District - Interview with a BVC - 2003-11-04— Mr. Wotsogola tells me of a
plan to build a fish market on the lake-shore road, which is a few hundred meters from his house, to be
funded by IndeBank. With the help of the Fisheries Department he has also organized a loan from
IndeBank for K1,000,000.; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Inta'view with a chief - 2004-10-31 “B VCs
are the only beneficiaries for the FD mediated loans allowing them to buy boats and nets. ”

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“The VH were quite supporting initially, but because we elected others,
excluding VH, we don ’t know what relationship exists between BVC and
chiefs. It is a question of feeling excluded and a lack of respect. The
small benefits (going to BVCS) are excluding VHS. Sometimes chiefs and
people develop a sense of jealousy because of incentives like workshops or
the boat of Nkhono B VC which don ’t benefit chiefs. When there is a
problem the VH will have one group while the BVC will have another
group and that will have a negative impact on the sanctuaries. In Malawi,
we have some allegiance to VH and they command respect, and if they
make rules most will accept them. Very few will resist. We haven ’t been
able to take advantage of that. As long as we cause a division, disregard
for the policies will be very high. “’08

An example of this undermining of BVC activities occurred when the Ngala BVC
chased away the newly-arrived lemu fishermen whose fishing practices created conflicts
with gillnet owners (see previous section for more info). Though initially successful, the
lemu fishermen were subsequently permitted to settled in Ngala when they appealed

309

directly to the chief, offering him fish in homage. This exact same scenario was

played out by the kandwindwi310 fishers, who were forbidden fiom fishing at Ngala by

 

’08 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with WESM staff- 2004-02-23; see also ARussell —
Nkhotakota District — Interview with a BVC - 2002-07-12, One VH, whose commmrity was relocated out
of the area that is now known as the DFS, is known to have hippo traps near his house and during a tour of
the DFS, and I have seen him deploy his beach seine inside the limits of the sanctuary, much to the
embarrassment of the Nkhono BVC chair. On this occasion, Mr. Wotsogola tells me that those manning
the beach seine will pay a fine, but the net is not confiscated.

309 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with FD stafi - 2004-02-23 “These [ lemu] fishermen come
from Liwaladzi and Matiki. They had attempted to settle and fish here [at Ngala] in the past and were
chased away. However, now they have returned using their kinship with local fishermen as an excuse to be
able to stay here. This is making it difficult to get them to go away. ” ; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District -
Interview with a BVC - 2004-02-24 “Those people, we chased them away, but they came back In the past
there were none of these fishing gears. Those people don ’t care about others ’ nets, they simply cut them
apart. But they have relatives living here and they give a lot of fish to the chiefs, and so it is really difficult
to chase them away or to confiscate their nets. ”; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief -
2004-05-03 “When we had a meeting in 2001, a meeting at the closure of the Kambindingu, fisheries
ofi‘icers from Mangochi warned us not to allow lemu fishers fi'om Mangochi to fish here as they said it was
a bad practice. However, the FD licenses them and they are now fishing everywhere in the lake. When we
challenge them [ lemu fishers] they say that they have licensed their gears, and are therefore registered to
fish anywhere. Now even the BVCs and chiefs don ’t agree on how to protect the lagoon fish. ” ; A.Russell —
Nkhotakota District - Fishing observation - 2004-05-02.

31° This beach seine is named after the most powerfirl a commercial fish trawler used by MALDECO in
Southern Lake Malawi and is pulled in to shore much more quickly than a regular beach seine by men who
energetically ‘walk’ the ropes up the beach rather than rhythmically pulling them in a seated position.
Thereby the net moves through the water more quickly, allowing fewer fish to escape.

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the BVC, but were then permitted to do so by the VH after they presented him with gifts
of fish.3 n In both of these contexts, added confirsion has stemmed from FD statements
that support BVCs’ moves to bar the entrance of these fishing gears that seem to be
contradicted by the FD fishing licenses that the lemu and kandwindwi fishers have paid

for 3'2

Conflicts over leadership of the KFA

In addition to the individual BVCs’ interactions with chiefs, the roles of the GVH
and TA within the Association reflects this same tension between “traditional” and
“modern” forms of community governance. At its inception, TA Kanyenda had named
GVH Wakunyanja as Chairman of the KFA, reflecting his traditional role as mediator in
issues that span more than one village chief’s jurisdiction. However, as Mr. Wotsogola’s
(the KFA Vice-Chairman) increasing leadership in enforcement of the closed season and
sensitization of surrounding communities reflects, his role is easily mistaken by fishers
for that of a KFA chairman.3 ‘3 In addition, a number of factors of convenience make Mr.
Wotsogola a logical and easier intermediary than GVH Wakunyanja: while Mr.

Wotsogola is fluent in English, Chichewa (the national language), and Chitonga (the local

 

3” A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Meeting observation - 2004-11-06, During this meeting, Mr.
Wotsogola states: “Beware of rivalry between B VCs and chiefs. ” “When kandwindwi [fishers] arrived
there was competition between the VHand BVC. B VCs didn 't want the kandwindwis at Ngala, [and were]
supported by the FD which doesn ’t like this gear. But the kandwindwi owners went to the VHS wih [gifts
of] fish], and [they were] allowed to stay. This is the reason why the Association needs a single rule so that
these types can ’t take advantage of rivalries. "

3 ‘2 A.Russell - Nkhotakota District - Meeting observation - 2004-11-06, A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —
Interview with a chief - 2004-05-03.

3'3 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —Interviews with BVCS - 2004-02-24, 2005-03-06; A.Russell -
Nkhotakota District —Interviews with fishers - 2005-03-01, 2005-03-02; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —
Interview with fish trader - 2005-03-07; ARussell - Nkhotakota District — Fishing observation - 2005-03-
06.

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language), GVH Wakunyanja feels most comfortable speaking Chitonga; while Mr.
Wotsogola’s home is close to the main road at Ngala, visiting the GVH’s home requires a
1 hour walk along the beach or a 30 hour wade through marshes and due to the GVH’s
busy schedule, any visitor must make an appointment in advance of any planned meeting;
and whereas a migrant fisher or visitor might expect requests for ‘sopo’3 14 from the GVH,
this would not be expected behavior for Wotsogola. Consequently, Mr. Wotsogola has
become the primary KFA contact for visiting governmental, NGO and research visitors,

and has been invited to attend governmental workshops.315

For these reasons, GVH Wakunyanja has become somewhat resentful of Mr.
Wotsogola’s prominent role in the KFA. As with the conflicts between BVCS and village
chiefs, the GVH has expressed this resentment of the community-leadership of the KFA
by undermining Mr. Wotsogola. Two examples of this resentment are the GVH’s refusal

to attend meetings:

“There are several meetings being conducted by the FD but I have not
been invited to attend as Association Chairman. It is always Wotsogola
going to meetings and speaking on my behalf He then tells me that they
[FD] want to hold a meeting at such a time, but why should I do this?
When they come they go to Wotsogola and not to me. He is trying to get
me out of this seat as he wants to be chairman. "3 16

, and to abandoning Mr. Wotsogola when the time comes to facing the anger of

poachers coming to retrieve their confiscated fishing gears:

 

3” a gift, see footnote 142 for further explanation.

3“ Zomba Workshop; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District -Interview with WESM staff- 2003-12-05-
Dwangwa-T.Black; ARussell — Nkhotakota District —Interviews with chief --02-03, 2004-05-03; A.Russell
- Nkhotakota District —Intervicw with a BVC - 2004-04—28.

31“ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —Interview with a chief 4004.05-03; also A.Russell — Nkhotakota
District -Interviews with BVCs - 2003-12-02, 2004—04-28.

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As recalled by Mr. Wotsogola, “We caught 3 beach seines: one from the
father of Boock (Chairman of Mpondabwaki B VC), one from Dema and
one other one. They were brought to Wakunyanja ’s house, and I was
together with the GVH, Boock and two other people from the Association.
I told them that when the people come to collect the nets, we should all be
there, not just me. When the people went to Wakunyanja ’s, he told them to
go talk to Wotsogola. All of the people from the Association refused to
come when people had to pay fines. They then came here to my house,
many people...they were very serious (angry), especially the father of
Boock. The father told me that I would die if I started to play this game
(imposing this rule). ”

Events such as those described above have made Mr. Wotsogola fearful for his

safety at times, severely shaking his interest in enforcing the closed season regulation in

the lagoon:

“I don 't know what I can do all alone! I hope [think] I will go back to
Nkhono with my boat. Here I can kick the bucket and kiss the ground [die]
if I am alone! ”317

These various divisions had become most destructive in early 2004, leaving many

BVCS unmotivated, easily corruptible, and actively involved in poaching themselves.318

The commonly perceived hypocrisy of some BVC members is well illustrated by GVH
Wakuntunda, who told me about a BVC member who instructed a poacher to go

poaching during the following night in order to pay his fines:

“After they catch someone and confiscate their gears, they charge him a
fine to get his gears back. Some committee members then tell the poacher
that he can raise the cost of the fine in two nights of fishing, and that he
can pay the fine in the form of fish or money! Even now, you can find
some people eating chambo as relish in their homes, while lying that they
are protecting the fish stocks. ”319

 

3 ‘7 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District -Interview with a BVC - 2004-04-28; see also A.Russell - Nkhotakota
District —Interviews with BVCS - 2003-11-05; 2004-02-24.

3'8 A.Russell - Nkhotakota District -Enforcement observation - 2003-11-04; A.Russell — Nkhotakota
District -Interview with a BVC - 2005-03-06.

3'9 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District -Interviews with a chief - 2003-12-04.

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Growing institutional maturation

Despite these internal divisions that at times led one segment of the KFA or
traditional leadership to undermine another, larger institution-building processes and a
diffusion of leadership among BVCS seem to be forcing these opponents to overcome
their divisions. During the course of 2003-04, FD personnel, foreign WESM-personnel320
and the author himself321 contributed greatly to the confidence of KFA and BVC
members through their capacity-building activities and encouragement of both individual
BVCs and the KFA as a whole. These activities, many of which attempted to involve
previously disgruntled leaders, have also had the effect of legitimizing the KFA’s
activities through these leaders’ public statements of support for the closed season
regulations.322 A key element that seemed to further solidify their communities’
following was the BVCs’ prestige and access to training/finding prospects provided by
numerous external agencies (WESM-Dwangwa, Fisheries Department, COMPASS,

Afi'ican Development Bank, IndeBank).

In addition to the effect of the maturation of individual BVCS around the
Kambindingu Lagoon and KFA, these BVCS were aided (and forced) out of their early
2004-inactivity due to the support (and competition) provided by the creation of a

number of new BVCs at Dwasulu, Dwambazi and Nyavuu. Dwasulu and Dwambazi

 

32° A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —Interviews with BVCs - 2003-11-Ol,-2004-04-28; A.Russell —
Nkhotakota District —Meeting observation - 2003-12-03.

32' A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —Interviews with BVCs - 2003-11-01, 2003-11-05; A.Russell —
Nkhotakota District —Enforcement observation - 2003-11-04; A.Russell - Nkhotakota District -Interviews
with chiefs-2003-l2-04, 2004-05-03; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —Meeting observation - 2004-11-06;
A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —Interview with a fish trader - 2005-03-07.

322 A.Russell — Nkhotakota District —Meeting observationz - 2004-11-06, 2005-03-30.

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BVCS were created in 2004 through the encouragement of Mr. Wotsogolam, and Nyavuu
BVC was recreated through a KFA meeting (it had been dormant since its involvement in
the creation of the Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary).324 Two patrols were conducted by
Dwasulu and Dwambazi BVCS ill late 2004 (one with the Nkhono BVC boat, the other
with GVH Wakuntunda’s boat at Dema),325 which due to their distance from the lagoon
may have had the effect of decreasing the association of lagoon enforcement with Mr.
Wotsogola and thereby removing these activities from the scope of the conflicts between
communities and chiefs. Additionally, Nyavuu and Dwasulu BVCS may have challenged
the centrality of the DF S and Kambindingu Lagoon within the KFA when they proposed
the creation of two additional, smaller sanctuaries at Nyavuu estuary and the Luluzi River
estuary, respectively.326 In proposing the creation of these sanctuaries, these BVCS may
have stimulated the original KFA BVCS into overcoming their internal differences lest
their comparative inactivity caused them to lose out in external agencies’ funding/training

to the new BVCS.

For whichever combination of reasons, the KFA seems to have regained
momentum. Following the patrols conducted by Dwambazi and Dwasulu BVCS, Likuchi
and Banga BVCS conducted further patrols of the lagoon.327 Additionally, the KF A
sponsored a meeting in March 2005 (this is of particular significance as until then, all

meetings had been sponsored by WESM) inviting all chiefs and BVC Chairs to resolve

 

323 A.Russell - Nkhotakota District -Meeting observation - 2004-l 1-06; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District -
Interview with a BVC - 2005-03-06; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District -Fishing observation - 2005-03-06.
32‘ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with a BVC -2005-03-01; A.Russell — Nkhotakota District
- Interview with a chief - 2005-03-09.

32‘ A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with BVCs - 2005-03-01, 2005-03-06, 2005-03-16;
A.Russell — Nkhotakota District - Interview with a chief - 2005-03-02.

32‘ A.Russell - Nkhotakota District — Interviews with BVCs -2005-03-01, 2005—03-06; A.Russell —
Nkhotakota District — Interview with a chief - 2005-03-09.

32" A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Interviews with BVCs - 2005-03—16.

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328

the challenges to the enforcement of the closed season in the lagoon During the

course of this meeting, all chiefs and BVC Chairs discussed the reasons why the

Kambindingu Lagoon closed season wasn’t functioning. The key issues raised werem:

o Fines were not high enough to deter poaching, but also may cause undue hardship

due to the difficulty of having to pay in cash;
0 Gear owners were not being penalized when they sent others to fish for them;

0 The difficulty of enforcing the closed season given the large number of people

living right on its shores;

0 There is uncertainty among fishers regarding the start and end dates of the closed

season;

0 The conflicts that have arisen when chiefs permitted the use of fishing gears that

their BVCs forbade.

To address these concerns, the KFA revised the regulations, resulting in

regulations that would make enforcement easier, yet more deterrent for poachers:330

1. Rule: At the start of the closed season, all BVCS required to hold meetings to
notify fishers.

2. Rule: No beach seines will be allowed in the lagoon
o Penalty: Rather than being fined, these will be confiscated for 1 year

3. Rule: No small mesh gillnets, long lines, or pyasa allowed in the lagoon during
closed season.

0 Penalty: Fines will be paid in the form of livestock:
0 3000 yards gillnet - fined 1 goat,
- 300 yards gillnet - fined 1 chicken (10 chickens = 1 goat),

 

Z: A.Russell — Nkhotakota District — Meeting observation - 2005-03-30.

33° Ibid.

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o pyasa, longline - fined 2 chickens,

0 Any gillnet owner who sends others to fish pays 5 chickens in addition to
the fine paid by those actually caught fishing.

. Rule: During the lagoon closed season, all people living in temporary
habitations around the lagoon have to move away from the lagoon edge
settlements.

- Penalty: If they refuse, involve the VH, then the GVH, and then the TA
who may bring in the police.

. Rule: Any newcomer must have their gear assessed by the Association and VH
Rule: Fishing in the Lake Malawi closed season
0 Penalty: Fined K20,000.

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Chapter 5

Understanding the Nature of Institutional Change in

Fisheries Co-management

Having developed from a condition of resource abundance and low capital
investment, few artisanal fisheries in Malawi were traditionally subject to any form of
access-limitation. The key exceptions to this statement occurred where the exploitation
of fish stocks by one group precluded others’ attempts to do the same when using
methods such as fishing weirs, beach seines, and poisons, discussed in Chapter Two. In
addition to being widespread in Afiica, similar systems of traditional access-sharing and
rotational fishing have been documented in a variety of contexts such as the salmon
harvest in the Teelin River in Ireland (Taylor 1987), fishing in the inter-village buffer
zones between Atlantic fishing communities in Bahia, Brazil (Cordell and McKean
1986), and communal fishing territories on Lake Titicaca in Peru (Levieil and Orlove
1990). Otherwise, given the large expanse of Lake Malawi, the small populations of lake
fishers, and their relatively inefficient fishing gears, little concern was given to the active

management of the fishing economy.

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Since the 1930’s, however, the lakeshore and river fishers have increased their
catch efficiency through the adoption of new fishing methods, gears, and materials. This
increasing investment, combined with environmental changes and gradual increases in
fisher populations has led many fish stocks to become locally depleted. The need to
address these trends with a revision of government management paradigms was triggered
in the early 1990’s by the collapse of the highly prized chambo (Oreochromys spp.)
fishery in Lake Malombe, which coincided with the international rise of participatory
natural resource management regimes in the late 19803. Similarly, at the local level in
Malawi, fishers have become increasingly concerned with the depletions of the more
desirable fish species, forcing them to target less desirable fish species and while

expending greater effort in doing so.331

As documented by Hara (2001) and Ganter (2001), most of Lake Malawi’s
fishing communities have taken little initiative to address the increasingly precarious
status of local fish stocks. This has been accompanied by gathering apathy and
frustration among fishery managers at their inability to instill any sense of local
stewardship in the fishing communities. However, in the previous chapter, I presented
several case studies that defy this generalization. These case studies demonstrated how
community willingness to support new local fisheries conservation institutions is
intimately related with broader issues of community empowerment and institutional

legitimacy.

 

33 ' In the both the Dwangwa and Northern Karonga regions large proportions of gillnet fishers have
transitioned fi'om fishing primarily for chambo and potamodromous fish species (mpasa, sanjika, ntchila,
ningwi) to masohungu and bapu, or have invested in chilimara to target utaka, usipa, masohungu, or in
long-line fishing hooks for kampango and mlamba.

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In order to understand the nature of these institutional changes, in this chapter, I
first review the literature on co-management institutions, socio-economic resilience, and
organizational learning, and then analyze the previous case studies using a framework

that integrates these three theories.

Theoretical Frameworks

Co-management and CBNRM

Since the 19703, the inadequacies of the past century’s attempts to impose
scientific management policies on the harvesting of natural resources have become
apparent. National governments, in particular those of developing countries, recognized
that population growth combined with colonial-era policies which took little account of
local stakeholders’ livelihoods needs were increasingly leading to conflict-ridden
relationships between stakeholders and governments, and the uncontrolled exploitation of
natural resources. Indeed, the establishment of many colonial or national regulations
created open-access regimes by undermining or replacing pre-existing community-based
natural resources management (CBNRM) norms and institutions that had maintained
local stakeholder compliance through complex intra-community relationships based on
mutual interdependencies of community members (Ensminger 1996; Jodha 1996; Jentoft
2000). Recognizing the inabilities of these national governments to enforce their
regulations, many scientists turned to the study of persistent CBNRM regimes in order to

better understand the reasons for their successes so that locally-appropriate institutional

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designs might assist or replace the national governments’ institutions in the management

of resource use (i.e. co-management).

From an ethical standpoint, numerous authors have argued for co-management as
a means for reversing colonial enclosures of resources that served the conservation and
aesthetic priorities of expatriate and national elites, but which deprived rural communities
of access to local natural resources. However, the more successful rationale for
proponents of co-management or CBNRM regimes has been that decentralization of
resource management decisions to stakeholder communities could improve stakeholder
compliance with regulations (and thereby achieve conservation goals) due to stakeholder
perceptions of the policies’ legitimacy, transparency, fairness and relevance (Baland and
Platteau 1996). As discussed in Chapter 2, “co-management” is a label that has been used
by different people to describe a variety of different institutional fi'ameworks. One
definition of co-management, that illustrates the breadth of institutions that might be

included in this category, describes it as,

“a situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, define and
guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management
functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or
set of natural resources ” (Borrini-Feyerabend, Farvar et al. 2000).

Essentially, the co-management paradigm arose as an argument against resource
economists’ models that claim resources held in common will inevitably be over-
harvested, and that the solution must be to assign property rights over them to individuals
or to a government (Gordon 1954; Schaefer 1954; Hardin 1968). By the 1970-80’s,

however, a number of social and natural scientists began to criticize the assumptions

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upon which these models were based (Bromley and Cemea 1989; Pinkerton 1989;

Holling 1973; Holling 1978; Netting 1981; Berkes 1987; McCay and Acheson 1987):

0 that individual resource stocks can be managed at what has been labeled the
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) indefinitely, rather than recognizing how

different species interact in unpredictable ways;

0 that each ecosystem is characterized by a linear series of successional stages,
rather than fluctuating between a number of successional climaxes, and that

management for stability may actually induce instability;

0 that an open-access regime (mis-named ‘common property’ by Hardin (1968)) is
the natural result of individualistic resource extraction rumling rampant, rather
than due to erosion of local institutions and practices by incorporation into larger

political and economic systems;

0 that these common-property resources can best be regulated by a distant central
governmental agency that bases its authority on ‘science’, rather than by local
institutions that are directly accountable to, and therefore potentially more

legitimate in the view of resource users.

Recognizing the shortcomings of these assumptions, many scientists became
advocates for regimes that place local institutions in charge of natural resource
management, or on an equal footing with governmental institutions, referred to as
CBNRM and co-management, respectively. Baland and Platteau (1996) conducted a

meta-analysis of resource management regimes, providing us with an overview of the

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particular roles that might optimally make use of the strengths of government-based and

community-based institutions, respectively:

Government Roles:

1.

Process information on village-level resources, and help communities
assess historical trends, potential remedial steps to be taken, and

evaluation of regulatory successes;
Provide economic incentives to induce shifts in the use of resources;

Assist local initiatives by clarifying group territorial rights, providing legal

fi'ameworks; and protecting under-represented sub- groups;
Provide formal conflict-resolution mechanisms;

Provide financial and technical support for costly monitoring and

enforcement activities;

Promote competition among management units, and disseminate

information on best management practices between them

Community Roles:

l.

3.

Devise rules, procedures and sanctions that will gain broad support among
resource users through their understanding of and adaptation to local

ecological, economic, social conditions;

Adjust local rules and procedures to changing circumstances which is

easily done due to ease of communication in smaller communities;

Resolve conflicts through customary conflict resolution mechanisms that

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minimize the incidence of interpersonal conflicts;

4. Organize self-monitoring (enforcement) by users, which is likely to be
significantly less costly than centralized control exercised through formal

administrative channels.

Depending on the specific capacities of the rural stakeholders, governments and
communities might establish an array of different co-management institutional
fiameworks. To better illustrate the variety of forms which co-management may take,
Sen and Nielsen (1996) represent them in the form of a continuum of management
arrangements that they broadly classify into five categories, depending on the

relationships between fisher stakeholders and the government:

0 Instructive: There is only minimal exchange of information between government
and fishers. This type of co-management regime is only different from centralized
management in the sense that the mechanisms exist for dialogue with users, but
the process itself tends to be government informing fishers of the decisions they

plan to make.

0 Consultative: Mechanisms exist for government to consult with fishers but all

decisions are taken by the government.

0 Cogerative: This types of co-management is where government and fishers

cooperate together as equal partners in decision-making.

o AdViSOflI Fishers advise government of decisions to be taken and government

endorses these decisions.

0 Informgtive: Government has delegated authority to make decisions to fisher

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groups who are responsible for informing government of these decisions.

While the authors distinguish between central government management and
“Instructive co-management” at one end of the spectrum, and “Informative co-
management” and CBNRM at the other, for the purposes of my analysis, I have chosen
not to adopt these distinctions as they poorly reflect how fisheries have been managed in
the Malawian context. Rather, most central goverrnnental fishery management has
entailed (either by design or for practicality) a minimum amount of information exchange
and dialogue, at least at the local level. Similarly, most CBNRM regimes today fall
within the national jurisdictions of governments, and absent any other governmental
regulation, these regimes must be seen as enjoying at least tacit recognition by the
government. A pictorial representation of this continuum, adapted from Pomeroy (1995),

is presented in Figure 5-1, below.

 

    

l
L Government based management

 

   

Government. Advises Community Informs

  
    
   

Government
&Communlty
Collaborate

 

 

Figure 5-1. Co-management Continuum.

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In most contexts, national or colonial regulations eroded or destroyed any pre-
existing traditional institutions that had previously managed local access to natural
resources. Consequently, the establishment of effective co-management regimes depends
on the establishment of robust new local institutions to represent and act on behalf of the
local counterparts to the government (Pinkerton 1989). Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990), and
Baland and Platteau (1996) have greatly informed our understanding of the key social,
economic, institutional and ecological characteristics typical of successful CBNRM
regimes. These have been compiled by Agrawal (2002) into a list of “critical enabling

conditions”, reproduced in Figure 5-2, below.

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Critical Engbling Conditions of §Mgbm ' on the Cgmmong
1) Resource system characteristics

(i) Small size
(ii) Well-defined boundaries
(iii) Low levels of mobility
(iv) Possibilities of storage of benefits from the resource
(v) Predictability
2) Group Characteristics
(i) Small size
(ii) Clearly defined boundaries
(iii) Shared norms
(iv) Past successful experiences — social capital
(v) Appropriate leadership - young, familiar with changing external environments, connected to local
traditional elite
(vi) Interdependence among group members
(vii) Heterogeneity of endowments, homogeneity of identities and interests
(viii) Low levels of poverty
(1 and 2) Relationship between resource system characteristics and group characteristics
(i) Overlap between user group residential location and resource location
(ii) High levels of interdependence by group members on resource system
(iii) Fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources
(iv) Low levels of user demand
(v) Gradual change in levels of demand
3) Institutional arrangements
(i) Rules are simple and easy to understand
(ii) Locally devised access and management rules
(iii) Base in enforcement of rules
(iv) Graduated sanctions
(v) Availability of low-cost adjudication
(vi) Accountability of monitors and other oificials to users
(1 and 3) Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements
(i) Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration of resources
4) External environment
(i) Technology:
(a) Low-cost exclusion technology
(b) Time for adaptation to new technologies related to the commons
(ii) Low levels of articulation with external markets
(iii) Gradual change in articulation with external markets
(iv) State:
(a) Central governments should not undermine local authority
(b) Supportive external sanctioning institutions
(c) Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users for conservation activities
(d) Nested levels of appropriate, provision, enforcement, governance.

 

 

 

Figure 5-2. Critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons (Agrawal
2002).

This exhaustive analysis of “enabling conditions” has contributed greatly to our
understanding of the ideal CBNRM regime characteristics. Unfortunately, while some

conditions on this list might be useful for the strengthening of existing filnction CBNRM

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regimes (such as establishing graduated sanctions), many conditions (such as
homogeneity of communities, boundedness of communities and resources, and high
dependencies on resources) are not aspects that governments can influence. In fact, many,
if not most resource depletion scenarios, such as those of Lake Malawi’s fisheries, exist
precisely due to: the decline of physical boundaries, greater mobility of resource users
and heterogeneity of resource user interests, and increasing integration with larger
economies that have raised the demand for fish by distant markets (some of the primary
“critical enabling conditions” listed above). Being rooted in rational choice philosophies,
the “critical enabling conditions also tend to assume that stakeholders have perfect
knowledge of the resource status and the reasons for resource declines, and that resource
users (and managers) base their decisions and actions on simple individualistic economic
evaluations rather than complex calculations based on social formulas of shared

obligation, reciprocity, and equity (Halma and Jentoft 1996; Jentof’t, McCay et al. 1998).

These assumptions have been criticized by a number of authors who argue that
formally-instituted, conservation-goal driven co-management institutions are unlikely to
be effective if they try to replace informally-derived, consensus-based, process-driven
social and cultural institutions that operate to maintain core values such as social
solidarity, harmony, consensus and equity (although they may simultaneously maintain
certain power imbalances and resource inequities) (Korten 1980; Pinkerton 1987; Mosse
1995; Ensminger 1996; Hanna and Jentoft 1996; Jodha 1996; Jentoft, McCay et al. 1998;
Cleaver 2002; Jentofl 2004). In order to achieve this moral legitimacy the formation of
new formal institutions has to allow for a time-consuming and energy-intensive process

of “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver 2002). Through the negotiation of daily interactions

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that are shaped by each individual’s multiple social and livelihood identities and the
influences of historical institutional processes, formal institutions then gradually attain
informal consensus by establishing morally acceptable balances between individuals’ and
communities’ needs (Cleaver 2002; Jentoft 2004). As a result the formal institutions will
become “embedded” within the larger network of overlapping and competing social,
economic, and political institutions, and thereby they will gain moral legitimacy,
relevance, and effectiveness in achieving resource management goals through socially-
appropriate methods of conflict resolution, negotiation, participation and other
mechanisms for collaboration (Agrawal 1999; F olke 2002; Pinkerton 1988; Gronow
1995; Ensminger 1996; Hanna and Jentofi 1996; Jentoit, McCay et al. 1998; Leach,

Mearns et al. 1999; Wilson and Jentofi 1999).

While seeking embeddedness will facilitate co-management institutions’
achieving conservation objectives, an additional objective of co-management has always
been to promote rural empowerment (Cleaver 2002; Jentofl 2005). Co-management
advocates have learned from the failures of the community-development movements
during the 1950-708 in which an acceptance of pre-existing power structures and an
orientation towards centrally-defined blue-print projects resulted in most benefits
accruing to traditional elites, and in projects neglecting the needs of the rural poor
(Korten 1980). Therefore an emphasis has been placed on bringing about the
empowerment of those groups that have traditionally been marginalized in local decision-
making processes relating to the allocation of resources, such as minorities, women, low
castes, and the “poorest of the poor” (Chambers 1984; Mearns 1995; Cleaver 2002;

Nielsen, Degnbol et a1. 2004; Jentoft 2005; Cleaver and Toner 2006). While formal

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institutions may be changed quickly, empowerment of a “community” or stakeholder
group takes time, and is dependent on a combination of external inputs and endogenous
experiences that progressively lead to what Zimmerman (1990) describes as “learned
hopefulness.” As discussed by J entofi (2005), empowerment is “perceived as an enabling
process, in which individuals and communities can take responsibility and act effectively
to safeguard or change their environment”, and is therefore described as being both a

precondition for, and the most important outcome of co-management.

Unfortunately, many resource management agencies have focused on the
improvements in fisheries management that might be achieved through the establishment
of formal co-management institutions without supporting the empowerment of the
fisheries stakeholders involved. This reflects an unwillingness among government
agencies to release control over resource management decision-making to local
stakeholders, and has been motivated by a combination of factors, including: the vested
interests of the government (and powerful elites) in the resource, lack of confidence in
the abilities of local stakeholders to play a meaningfirl and sustainable role (an opinion
that has been shared at times by donor agencies and fisheries scientists), and institutional
disincentives (both from the governmental agencies and donor agencies) to invest
significant amounts of time or energy in what are essentially poorly measurable outcomes
(Holling and Meffe 1996; Nielsen, Degnbol et al. 2004; Jentofi 2005). The result has
frequently been a crisis of legitimacy, in which stakeholders remain skeptical of the
motivations and interests behind co-management institutions, do not consider themselves

as being represented or empowered by these institutions, and therefore withhold their

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moral support for the enforcement of conservation regulations (Ensminger 1996; Jentof’t

2000; Nielsen, Degnbol et al. 2004; Jentofi 2005).

In addition to the question of the role that empowerment plays in co-management,
scientists have increasingly come to appreciate the important roles of environmental and
social change and variability on how institutions develop. Indeed, as identified by Stern

et al. (2001), the key gap in our knowledge of co-management is of,

“the dynamics of resource management institutions, their evolution and
adaptation, the ways in which they respond to problems of decision
making and internal conflict, and the mechanisms that govern change in
the institutions and in how they relate to resources ” (Stern, Dietz et al.

2001).

Socio-Ecological Resilience and Uncertainty

Traditional natural resource management paradigms have hinged upon
assumptions that environmental variability could, and should be controlled in order to
enable humans to maximize their harvests of resources. Since his introduction of the
concepts of adaptive management and ecological resilience in the early 1970s, however,
C.S. Holling (in particular) has radically transformed the ways in which resource
scientists and managers think about resource management and ecosystem variability
(Holling 1973; Holling 197 8). Our current understanding of how variability fimctions to
provide ecological resilience has been summarized into four main points (Holling and

Meffe 1996; Holling and Sanderson 1996):
A. Environmental change is episodic rather than continuous or gradual;

B. The spatial organization of natural systems is patchy rather than uniform, and

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non-linear processes organize the shift from one range of scale to another;

C. Rather than having a single equilibrium state, ecosystems are characterized by

multiple, or are entirely without, equilibria; and

D. On one hand, destabilizing forces are important for maintaining structure and
diversity, while on the other, stabilizing forces are important in maintaining

productivity.

Overall, environmental variability is regarded by Holling and others as crucial
for maintaining an ecosystem’s capacity to absorb sudden shocks, and indeed to use
these shocks for renewal and reorganization of the ecosystem (Folke 2002; Holling
1973; Holling 1978; Berkes and Folke 1998). In contrast, attempts by our resource
management agencies to achieve stability through the maintenance of maximum
sustainable yields make our ecosystems more vulnerable to such shocks, the
consequence being that ecosystems may cross thresholds that will change the
ecosystem’s organization in unexpected ways (Holling 1973; Holling 197 8; Holling
and Sanderson 1996; Berkes and Folke 1998). Some examples of how management
agencies have decreased ecosystem resilience include regimes that: mitigated natural
cycles of floods, droughts, or fire; or induced changes in trophic interactions
(Gunderson, Carpenter et al. 2006). This ironic relationship in which apparently
effective management of an ecosystem may lead to declining ecosystem resilience
due to a gradual loss of awareness and responsiveness to ecological shifts has been
labeled, “the pathology of management” (Holling and Meffe 1996), and is described

as having the following stages:

1. Initial centralized management policies succeed in removing disturbance and

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enhancing growth;

2. Implementing agencies that are initially responsive to ecological, economic and
social forces evolve to a focus on efficiency and self-preservation with

increasingly rigid and myopic goals;

3. Economic sectors that have grown as a result of successful management become
over-capitalized and increasingly dependent on perverse subsidies and the

management agencies’ abilities to maintain control over the ecosystem;

4. The relevant ecosystems gradually lose resilience as they become more
homogeneous, and less spatially variable, while resource users and agencies are

increasingly driven by selfish short-term survival goals;

5. Crisis and vulnerabilities begin to become more likely and evident and the public

begins to lose trust in governance.

The primary examples used by Holling (1998) of this scenario of management
failure include: forest management in New Brunswick; water management in the
Florida Everglades; estuarine management in the Chesapeake Bay; salmon
management and power development on the Columbia River; water quality, fisheries,
and development in the Laurentian Great Lakes and Baltic Sea. Extending far beyond
the simple management of natural resources, in his recent book entitled Collapse:
How societies choose to fail or succeed, Jared Diamond (2005) has associated
resource management pathologies with threats to, or the collapses of, a variety of

historical and current-day societies and nation-states. The main factors (which be

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called “psychological failures”) which he outlined as contributing to failures of these

societies’ decision-making processes were a:

1.

Failure to anticipate a problem before it actually arises due to a lack of prior

remembered experiences or reasoning based on false analogies;

Failure to perceive a problem that emerges as a slow trend but which may be
concealed by wide fluctuations (referred to as “creeping normalcy”), combined

with “landscape amnesia” (forgetting how different the resource looked 50 years

agO);

. Failure to try to solve the problems due to individual stakeholders’ rational

choices to maximize short-term gains at the expense of long-term sustainability
(i.e., tragedy of the commons scenario). In a context of poor enforcement of
regulations, the status-quo may be defended in terms of a core societal value or

simple denial of the problem;

Failure of attempted measures to solve the problem as it may be beyond
stakeholders’ capacities or resources to solve, or the efforts may have been made

too late.

While Diamond’s research focused primarily on the reasons for nations’

failures to make wise resource management decisions and the ways in which this

might be prevented, a number of authors have recognized that these crises may at

times promote forms of institutional innovation. In particular, existing governments’

loss of legitimacy produced by their failures to prevent crises may result in an

institutional vacuum, which may in turn act as a catalyst for organizational learning to

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resolve the crises (Lee 1993; Holling 1996; Berkes and Folke 1998; Holling, Berkes
et al. 1998; Folke 2002; Gunderson 2002). To complement these descriptions of
centralized management failures, as discussed above, numerous studies of small- scale
societies and local resource management institutions (CBNRM) have provided us
with clues about how effective resource management institutions might be designed.
Paralleling the values of diversity within ecosystems, community-based institutions
may be crucially strengthened by various members’ regular contestation of leaders’
powers, thereby legitimizing natural resource institutions within the broader
community (possibly preventing “tragedy of the commons” scenarios) (Holling 1978;
Leach, Mearns et al. 1999). The ability of CBNRM, or any management regime to
avoid or learn fiom crises (both ecological and social) has been linked to their
adaptability and transformability (Holling and Sanderson 1996). As defined by
Walker (2004), these attributes are defined as,

Adaptability - In a SES [Socio-Economic System], adaptability is the collective

capacity of the human actors in the system to manage resilience. Although the

system as a whole self-organizes without intent, the capacities and intent of the

human actors strongly influence the resilience and the trajectory of the SES.

T ransformability - The capacity to create a fundamentally new system when

ecological, economic, or social (including political) conditions make the existing
system untenable.

In order to better understand how organizations and institutions adapt and
transform themselves, I turn to studies of Organizational Learning, upon which many of

the above insights are based.

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Organizational Learning

The concept of “organizational learning” was initially proposed by Argyris and
Schoen (1996) as an explanation for the different ways that industrial organizations
evolve in the face of the changing demands of the internal social and external economic
climates. Crossan et al. (1999) characterize the process of organizational learning as
‘organizational renewal’, requiring “that organizations explore and learn new ways while
concurrently exploiting what they have already learned.” This framework, or similar
learning theories, have been adopted by a number of resource management scientists who
link the abilities of rural stakeholders and governments to achieve sustainable resource
management regimes to their institutions’ abilities to learn fiom social and ecological
threats and opportunities (Schusler and Decker 2003; Gunderson, Carpenter et al. 2006;
Lee 1993; Pinkerton 1994; Holling and Sanderson 1996; Fazey, Fazey et a1. 2005; Folke
2002; Olsson and Folke 2001; Olsson, Folke et al. 2004). The primary catalyst for
organizational learning processes is the anxiety produced by the existing institution’s
failure to provide at the level that was expected, or the awareness of potential gains that
have not been firlly exploited (Argyris and Schiin 1996; Lipshitz and Popper 2002;

Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Ford 2005). As described by Gershenfeld and Ford (2005):

“The identification of disconnects can lead to a dialogue that can lead to
shared knowledge of an issue or sets of issues. This can only occur when
gaps are not avoided, discounted, or feared. As noted by Peter Senge, the
gaps between vision and reality can lead to constructive tensions. These
tensions, if harnessed properly, can facilitate the creative process. ”

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Two distinct, though not mutually exclusive, forms of organizational learning
have been identified by a number of authors: (a) first-order, single-loop, evolutionary, or
social learning during periods of internal and external prosperity and growth, and (b)
second-order, double-loop, transformational, survival, or revolutionary learning during
periods of social or economic turmoil (Greiner 1972; Argyris and Schdn 1996; Coutu
2002; Schusler and Decker 2003). For my analysis, I have adopted the definitions posed

by Argyris and Schdn (1996):

First-order learning — “Incremental change or adaptation carried out to filrther
exploit existing technologies, routines, and processes in ways that don ’t alter
underlying assumptions or values. ”

Second-order learning — “Those sorts of organizational inquiry which resolve
incompatible organizational norms by setting new priorities and weighting of
norms, or by restructuring norms themselves together with associated strategies
and assumptions. "

While the visible events that characterize these two types of learning may be seen
as separated in time (i.e., periods of growth and stability vs. periods of organizational
turmoil and change), both types of learning processes should be seen as existing in an
ever-present state of tension with different types of learning prevailing at different times
and at different levels of the organization. Therefore, while first-order learning processes
operate to exploit the learning gains already made, certain individuals or groups within
the organizations will maintain a sensitivity to threats posed by conditions inside and
outside the organization (Crossan, Lane et al. 1999). When existing institutions fail to
address threats, or at times even cause threats to grow to a level that alarms a significant
number of stakeholders, these individuals or groups have a greater chance of overcoming

the resistance of the leadership in the organization, and may spur an episode of second-

order learning (Argyris and Schiin 1996; Coutu 2002).

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A key to any organization’s survival and prosperity, therefore, is the effective
management of this tension between first order learning which enables the organization
to exploit gains from past learning, and the second-order learning that attempts to affect
change upwards from the individual to the group and organization-levels in response to
external stimuli (Levitt and March 1988; Crossan, Lane et al. 1999). This tension
between first and second-order learning processes has been described by numerous
authors as a cycle, in which organizations first learn to address problems and consolidate
the gains from their lessons learned, and then become inflexible and unresponsive to new
threats, leading to the increased possibilities of new crises arising at which point second-
order learning may lead to a new institutional framework that repeats this cycle (Holling,
1996; Lipshitz et al., 2002; Greiner, 1972; Crossan, Lane et al. 1999; Coutu, 2002). At
the same time, Lipshitz et al. (2002) suggest that cultural norms of transparency,
integrity, issue orientation, inquiry, and accountability may help organizations maintain a
constructive first-order learning process that allows them to balance the characteristics of
internal stability and outward sensitivity. This is supported by Argyris and Schdn (1996),
who argue that in order for workers’ needs to be fulfilled, and therefore to prevent the
rise of dissent and divisions, “organization members must have the motivation, ability,
and opportunity to inquire into resolving the perceived gap on behalf of the organization

[or community]. "

Despite an organization’s best attempts to maintain the cultural norms discussed
above, some forms of institutional change are inevitably called for at times. These
changes inherently cause resistance among those members and external stakeholders who

have benefited from the status-quo power relationships, resource and rewards allocations,

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levels of autonomy, etc. Indeed, organizations are frequently most easily defined by the
processes, rules and hierarchies that seek to provide stability and predictability for its
members and external stakeholders. It is unsurprising, therefore, that resistance to
change in organizations is a phenomenon that is well documented by both social

scientists (Katz and Kahn 1966) and ecologists (Hooley 2005) (Holling and Meffe 1996).

Rather than being surprised by this resistance to change, which has been labeled
“entrenched learning”, many of these sources of resistance could in theory be anticipated
by change agents as a logical product of the institutional changes (Cutcher-Gershenfeld
and Ford 2005). When these sources of resistance are viewed as rational attempts by
members to protect their access to power and resources that they perceive as being
threatened by the introduction of new institutions rather than being discounted as
stakeholders’ old-fashionedness or irrationality, they can be planned for and possibly
avoided altogether. Additionally, entrenched learning may be contributed to by a number
of “psychological failures” (Diamond 2005), discussed above, many of which can also be
addressed in a preemptive manner before the institutional changes are introduced. Failure
to do so may result in a variety of manifestations of entrenched learning: members’
withholding of support, perceived inconsistencies in new institutions, cynicism regarding
institutional effectiveness, or the active undermining of new institutions (Argyris and

Schbn 1996; Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Ford 2005).

Any analysis of organizational learning must also reflect the scale at which such
learning processes occur. In many cases, first order learning occurs as a consolidation of
the existing institutional fiamework, and may occur throughout the organization. In

contrast, second-order learning frequently starts with an individual or a sub- group within

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the organization, and then spreads to other parts of the organization, eventually replacing
previous institutions (Greiner 1972; Argyris and Schdn 1996; Crossan, Lane et al. 1999;
Coutu 2002). Therefore, while the overall organization may undergo second-order
learning processes, some of the constituent sub-groups within it, especially those with
vested interests in maintaining previous institutional infiastructures, may resist these
changes. An awareness of the nested nature of institutions, and the interactions between
institutions at different scales has also been emphasized more recently in the socio-
ecological literature that has labeled these nested systems as “panarchies” (Gunderson,
Carpenter et al. 2006; Holling and Sanderson 1996; Noble 2000; Futemma, de Castro et
al. 2002; Gunderson 2002). Consequently, in order to promote organizational resilience,
which might here be understood as organizational learning, numerous authors have
emphasized the need for the promotion of multiple, overlapping, and redundant
institutions that are more likely to be sensitive to internal and external stimuli at a variety
of institutional, ecological, and temporal levels (Ostrom 1990; Holling and Sanderson
1996; Folke, Berkes et al. 1998; Noble 2000; Olsson and Folke 2001; Folke 2002;

Ostrom 2005).

The Use of Organizational Learning to Analyze Emergent Co-management

Institutions

As these discussions illustrate, natural resource managers and scientists are
becoming more aware of the interrelatedness between ecological and institutional
resilience. We have seen that most organizations strive to maintain a stable set of social

interactions and natural resource allocations, a condition that is promoted by many

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stakeholders during times of seeming growth in earnings and efficiency (i.e., institutional
learning is dominated by first-order learning). However, over time institutions fi'equently
become myopic in their attempts to maintain growth, and unresponsive to the signs of
declining resource resilience, a condition that may lead to an unpredictable resource
collapse or reorganization. At these times of crisis, old institutions may lose popular
support, and create opportunities for the emergence of new ones (i.e., second-order

learning dominates).

In the case of Malawi, despite the erosion of their influence by economic
processes, colonialism, and a 30 year dictatorship, village chiefs and Traditional
Authorities (TAs) have always played a central role in regulating local stakeholders’
access to limited resources and in mediating in disputes within or between communities.
In contrast, President Banda’s dictatorship never achieved local legitimacy in its attempts
to impose fishing regulations, and following the simultaneous failures of centralized
fisheries management in Lake Malombe and the national transition to democracy, donor
agencies pushed an agenda of participatory fisheries management. All assumption in this
movement was that the introduction of democratically elected, representative stakeholder
committees (i.e., BVCS), that did not include an active role for the village chiefs, would
be able to gain the legitimacy and support of fisherfolk necessary to achieve conservation
goals. Another implicit assumption was that chiefs, whose rule was regarded as
autocratic, untransparent and prone to corruption, were not suitable partners or leaders for
the empowerment of fisheries co-management institutions, which was seen as a necessary
precondition for achieving the conservation goals. The case studies of co-management

successes discussed in the previous chapter, viewed within a context of widespread

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indifference to co-management around most of Lake Malawi, call these assumptions into
question. In order to understand the nature of these co-management successes I present
an analysis in which I explore the validity of the assumption that the co-management goal
of empowerment, as imposed by outside agents in Malawi, necessarily supports resource
management agencies’ objectives’ of creating fisheries management institutions that have

the legitimacy and support of local fisherfolk.

Adapting organizational learning theory to aid in analysis of the effectiveness of
the Malawian govermnent’s implementation of fisheries co-management, I separately
examine the previous case studies in terms of their “successes” in achieving both
empowerment and conservation objectives. On one hand, given that the Malawian
government (and its donor agency supporters) regarded chiefs as impediments to co-
management, success might be measured based on the extent to which government-
imposed BVCS supplanted the pre-existing chieflains’ leadership roles in relation to
interactions between and activities of fisherfolk (which includes the roles of arbitration,
mediation, and facilitation of development assistance, and receipt of homage by
immigrant fisherfolk). In this case the organizational learning fiamework would be

described as:

0 First Order Empowerment Learning —Where chiefs are able to address
conservation issues by establishing their own BVCS, or where they are able to
undermine the emergence of independent BVCs; this represents a continuation of

the institutions, norms and values of the chieftaincy.

0 Second Order Empowerment Learning - Where BVCS are successfully

established by the government or fishery stakeholder groups to the exclusion of

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the chiefs, this represents a profound departure from the institutions, norms,

values and practices surrounding the chieflaincy.

On the other hand, the success of fisheries co-management must be measured by
the extent to which local institutions are able to achieve legitimacy, gain acceptance, and
mobilize broadbased support among fisherfolk for their rules and regulations aimed at
changing fishing behavior. Based on this objective, the organizational learning

framework would be applied as follows:

0 First Order Conservation Learning - Those communities that are unwilling or
unable to establish constraints on fishing activities reflect the continuation of first-

order learning processes among stakeholders.

0 Second Order Conservation Learning - Irrespective of whether chiefs or BVCS
are responsible, those communities that effectively establish and gain support for

institutions, values and practices that govern individuals’ fishing behavior.

Set within the context of resource uncertainty, organizational learning effectively
illustrates the unique and shared characteristics that define these case studies’ alternate
institutional innovations, some of which have been more successful than others in leading
to sustainable fisheries management and stakeholder empowerment. While the Yiwemi
case study represents a first-order empowerment learning process, it is also characterized
by second-order conservation learning. Here, the existing chiefiaincy has addressed
ecological threats by establishing a BVC and fishery regulations that have resulted in
changes in fishing methods. In contrast, the Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary case study
represents both second-order empowerment learning and second order conservation

learning, whereby the government has supported the empowerment of fishery

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stakeholders, resulting in conservation outcomes. The Kambindingu Fisheries
Association case study similarly represents an attempt to achieve second-order
empowerment and conservation learning following an ecological crisis. However,
entrenched learning, in the form of first order empowerment learning that arises in
resistance to the second-order empowerment learning, by certain chiefs continues to
threaten the sustainability of both empowerment and conservation outcomes. Finally, the
North Rukuru River fishery represents an illustration of how entrenched learning (in this
case, first order conservation learning in resistance to imposed second order
conservation learning) may successfully resist the imposition of new regulations, while
emphasizing that not all crises are due to empowerment learning failures. I conclude by
extending my analysis of the roles of key variables and main actors that determined the
forms of organizational learning in my case studies to explain the successes or failures in

the other Malawian fisheries co-management regimes discussed in Chapter Two.

Analysis of Case Studies

The Self-starters of the Far North - Yiwemi BVC and Co-op (Case Study 2)

During the late 1980s and early 19908’ Village Headman Yiwemi’s community
perceived a number of growing threats to local fish stocks, livelihoods and security. The
central concern was the visible declines in juvenile fish populations near shore, which
was blamed on the 19803 growth of beach seine fishing, and fishers’ non-observance of

the Lake Malawi closed season. In addition to posing threats to fisher livelihoods, these

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declines in fish catches were also leading to conflicts among (mostly female) fish traders
as they competed to buy scarce fish supplies. In the context of the end of the national
autocratic government, there was also a rise of theft among fishers of fish and nets, which
was blamed on the increasing mobility of fishers. Additional concerns regarded public
health issues near the beach: cholera outbreaks were blamed on poor sanitation due to a
lack of public toilets, and spread of malaria-bearing mosquitoes was blamed on habitat

provided by vegetation that grew on the beach.

First BVC - 1993 — Consequently, the VH Yiwemi decided to establish a
committee of fishing industry leaders and traders (a BVC) that would set regulations to

address each of these threats in the following ways:

0 Beach seines were losing popularity, but were banned anyway. Working with a
community policing committee, the BVC confiscated nets used during the closed
season, returning them at the end of the season in exchange for the payment of

fines. Any confiscated fish were donated to the local hospital;

0 Any fishers appearing with new fishing gears had to show proof of ownership,
and inquiries are made with neighboring communities regarding any gears that

might have been lost or stolen. Thefis are referred to the chief and local police;
0 BVC fish trader members acted as mediators in conflicts between traders.

Second BVC - 1996 — The first BVC had lapsed into inactivity after having
addressed the first three issues, and a second committee was elected by fisherfolk to deal

with the remaining issues.

0 Brush was cleared fi'om the beach;

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o A pit latrine was constructed;

0 Additionally, this BVC became active in removal of invasive aquatic pests (water

hyacinth).

This second BVC took part in the removal of water hyacinths through a District
Assembly-administered, UN-filnded, “Food-for-Work” program that paid contributors of
labor for projects of regional priority with bags of maize. However, when funding for
this program ran out, the loss of financial incentives led to a severe decline in BVC

activities altogether.

Third BVC - 2001 — By 2001 several new issues of concern were raised by the
community regarding interactions with migrant fishers, fish pricing and destructive
fishing practices, leading to the election of a third BVC. In particular, migrant fishers
(many from Tanzania) were seen as having unfair advantages over local fishers as they
had not registered their nets with the govermnent to assure their legality. Additionally,
migrant fishers were undercutting local fishers’ livelihoods by selling locally-caught fish
at prices below those offered by locals, and some outsider traders were able to outbid

locals for fish, thereby depriving them from being able to afford fish.

In addition to these issues relating to equity between locals and migrant
fisherfo lk, there were renewed concerns over the protective measures for juvenile fish
stocks. This time, the growing purse seine industry (which replaced the beach seine as
the most profitable fishing gear investment) was having a deleterious effect on juvenile
fish as fishers targeted river mouths and wetlands during windy days when they couldn’t

fish in deeper waters. Additionally, the mesh sizes of gillnets used in the area had

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declined to a size where fishers using these nets near shore were catching juveniles. The

third BVC addressed these problems as follows:

Migrant fishers were required to register their gillnets with the government;

0 BVCS regulated fish prices, fining any fishers or traders that attempted to

circumvent the rule;

0 Large fines were levied against purse—seine fishers fishing in river mouths or

wetlands;

0 Small mesh gillnets and traps were banned for use near shore.

Fourth BVC and Co-op - 2005 — A new BVC has been elected, primarily to
relieve previous members of duties that seem to have achieved their intended goals.
However, recognizing that fishing livelihoods are declining overall, a number of previous
BVC members and fish traders established Yiwemi Co-operative to diversify livelihoods
away from fishing into collective farming and marketing of produce. They have received
significant encouragement from the local Fisheries Department extension worker and

starter seeds, livestock and capital fiom the Evangelical Lutheran Development Program

(ELDP), a development NGO.

0 During the first growing season, they were reasonably successful in raising a

number of new vegetable crops that were tended by the group as a whole;

0 Similarly, later that year, they worked as a group to breed guinea fowl and goats

loaned to them by the ELDP;

o In 2006, ELDP was so impressed by the dedication of Yiwemi Co-op members,

that it planned to start a village banking scheme there.

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During the last 15 years, Yiwemi community leaders have responded to a number

of trends that were posing threats to local fish stocks, livelihoods, and social harmony

(see Figure 5-3).

 

 

§1993
Theft of nets & fish
Traders” conflicts

 

l
VH created

 

ithaaehatfishragctsi

Model of Learning in Yiwemi

 

 

2001 g
Illegal fishing gears:
Pricing conflicts
Depleted iuvenilgsj

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BVC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1996 . 2005
Poor hygiene Livelihood concerns
and disease My encouragement
v v t
' New BVC New BVC _ Established Yiwemi
Elected ' " Elected Co-op
Capacities
Women’s group leadership
Italian NGO training Support
BVC leaderships FD visits
VH leadership ELDP loans

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 5-3. Repeated learning cycles in Yiwemi.

Although Chief Yiwemi has never occupied any official leadership role in any of

these committees, he is seen by the community as a primary reason for their success as he

is the final arbiter in any community disputes. Similarly, while the chief is a simple

member of the Yiwemi Co-op, his hard-working example is regarded by the extension

workers as the key to the group’s success. This co-op also benefits greatly from

organizational training that several members had received from a failed NGO-sponsored

livelihood diversification program in the early 19903, and the experience that several co-

op members gained from having been on past BVCs and women’s credit groups. A sign

of the successes of the chief and his leaders in establishing support for these institutional

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innovations is the fact that knowledge of, justifications for, and support for, these

institutions was almost universal among interviewed community members.

 

 

Management Regime in Context of
‘ Environmental [Social Variability

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Grassroots “ . New regime established
awareness of 1 Order Leamlng by leadership and
livelihood threat supported by majority
Leader/community Leaders willing to
—g capacity (previous —~o experiment with —
axperienceltraining) new institutions

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 5-4. Model of First-order Empowerment Learning.

Due to the initiative of this chief in establishing a BVC and the successes of “his”
institutions in adapting to new threats and taking advantage of development
opportunities, he has strengthened his influence within his community. Therefore, as
measured by the govemment’s co-management assumptions regarding empowerment, the
fact that the chief maintains such a powerfirl background role in this co-management
scenario means that this case study would reflect first order empowerment learning, with
each episode being construed as a mere refinement of preexisting institutions (see Figure
5-4, above). However, this case study has succeeded overwhelmingly in changing fishing
methods, fisherfolk interactions, social attitudes regarding the sharing of profits hour the
fishery, and while there is still concern regarding the long-term fishery outlook, the
inshore waters have been repopulated with juvenile fish stocks. Therefore Yiwemi BVC

can be said to have achieved second order conservation learning outcomes.

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This case study must be regarded as a rebuttal of the governments’ assumption
that chiefs are necessarily poor facilitators of community empowerment. Rather than
simply being a continuation of pre-existing institutions and norms associated with the
chieflaincy, this chief has helped to create a supportive environment for the growth of a
whole cadre of community leaders, resulting in a community development program that
extends well beyond the immediate arena of fisheries management. Suffice it to say that
this case study would indicate that the government and donor agencies assessments of the
“correct” empowerment process to achieve conservation outcome needs to give greater
recognition to roles that chiefs play in legitimizing new institutions. First of all, the
government and donor agencies need to recognize that effective chiefs are not autocratic
rulers. Indeed the formal powers of the chief are only as significant as his/her ability to
effectively achieve social consensus within his/her community on the relative benefits of
any newly proposed institutions. This was illustrated in a variety of contexts during
colonialism, when chiefs were unable to implement governmental conservation and
fisheries regulations that were primarily seen to benefit the government and the chiefs.
Additionally, in the current case study, the power of the constituents to hold the chief
accountable for his ability to maintain social harmony and welfare was illustrated by the
community’s unwillingness to participate in any community development activity until
the chief dealt with their concerns over witch-craft in the community (see Figure 4-2 in

Chapter 4).

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Crisis Transformation - Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary (Case Study 3)

From the 19703 to the early 19908, fishers had been embroiled in a simmering
conflict with the sugar cane estate over access to fishing beaches along the estate
shoreline, an area that is also a highly productive fish breeding area. Throughout the
years of autocracy, the estate was primarily concerned with limiting potential sources of
theft and conflict with estate workers, and had been supported by the government in
regulme chasing away all squatting fisherfolk from the beaches. This conflict was
exacerbated by increased fishing effort (in particular beach seines) that was causing
declines in fish catch trends in other nearby areas, and which made the bounty of the
estate shoreline all the more appealing to fishers. Then in the 1990’s, the government
transition to democracy and a change of ownership of the sugar cane estate led some
senior company staff members who were involved with WESMm, a local conservation
NGO, to propose a novel solution to the conflict. The main stakeholders involved, and

their respective priorities were:

0 Sugar cane company — to limit fisherfolk presence on boundaries of the estate to

prevent theft and conflicts;

o Fisherfolk — to secure access to beaches along sugar case estate shoreline from
which to conduct fishing and trading operations, protect fish stocks from over-

depletion;
. NGO - to conserve fish stocks; address animosity between estate and fisherfolk;

0 Fisheries Department — to conserve fish stocks, and support fishers in achieving

 

332 Wildlife and Environmental Society of Malawi — Dwangwa Branch

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participatory fishery management institutions.

The solution to their common problem was to establish a 12km sanctuary which
all fisherfolk would vacate, while allowing them to establish two temporary communities,
one at each end of the sanctuary. In each community, a BVC would be established and
trained in fisheries conservation and the Fisheries Department would assist the
communities to successfirlly apply for a grant to buy a motorized patrol boat with which

they would patrol the sanctuary to ensure that no fishing took place there.

A key champion of this transition was Mr. Mac Mtandizu, a senior manager in
Illovo who effectively established the Dwangwa Branch of WESM. Within the fisher
communities, key leadership role were played by fishing industry leaders from the
settlements of Nkhono and Matiki, with the Chairman of Nkhono BVC, Mr. Wotsogola
as the overall leader. Following the establishment of the sanctuary, however, the
significant role played by Mr. Wotsogola created some fiiction with chiefs and Matiki
BVC leaders who resent the personal financial benefits and prestige that he gained in
doing so. The most significant source of friction revolved around Mr.Wotsogola’s
stewardship of a motorized sanctuary patrol boat donated by the COMPASS project.
While this internal struggle led to the Matiki BVC leadership withholding their
enforcement support of the sanctuary, and indeed, harboring of known poachers, Nkhono
BVC, under Mr. Wotsogola’s leadership has been able to keep most poachers away fi'om
the sanctuary simply due to the patrol boat’s advantage of speed over poachers hand-
powered boats. Overall, despite these tensions, the visible wealth that has accrued to

both communities during the last few years as a result of the bountifirl fishing catches

-27l-

around the sanctuary’s margins means that there is widespread support for the

maintenance of the sanctuary.

During 2004-05, two new events have taken place that may have uncertain effects
on the sustainability of the sanctuary. First of all, the tension between Matiki and
Nkhono leaderships has recently diminished as severe erosion of the Matiki beach has
forced its members to relocate to Nkhono and another nearby community (N yavuu). It
remains to be seen to which community the Matiki BVC leadership will relocate and
what role they will play in supporting or resisting Nkhono BVC’s protection of the
sanctuary. At the same time however, Mr. Wotsogola has relocated his primary home to
Ngala village, and is increasingly responsible for enforcing the closed season in the
Kambindingu Lagoon, thereby diminishing his presence in and enforcement of the

sanctuary.

In this case study, the conservation objectives of creating a sanctuary, introducing
fishing regulations in the adjoining lakeshore areas, and bringing about a recovery in fish
stocks have been overwhehningly realized, and one might justifiably judge this case
study to represent second order conservation learning. Additionally, as Nkhono BVCS
has established itself as an effective fisheries management institution independent of any
traditional leadership or the sugar cane company, based on the government and donor
agency framework, we could also describe this case study as a second order
empowerment learning success (see Figure 5-5, below). This conclusion would be
further supported by noting the great wealth that has accumulated to both fisherfolk
communities, and the NGO support that these communities have been able to attract for

micro credit and water borehole programs.

-272-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. ,1 Management Regime in
Ugssstalinable 1 ' — Context of Environmental
' 8' “mmg [Social Variability
l
Environmental/Social
Cfifls
2nd Order Learning New regime established
by champion &
Grassroots awareness of supported by majonty
livelihood threat
Community capacity Champion gains community
(experience/training) support, creates institution

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 5-5. Second order empowerment learning in the Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary.

However, as with the Yiwemi case study, I would argue that this conclusion is
premature. While the Nkhono BVC was reasonably successful in the first years due to its
technological advantage over poachers, its long-term sustainability, given Mr.
Wotsogola’s absence will require the election and empowerment of a new BVC at
Nkhono, possibly giving the former Matiki BVC leaders an opportunity to share this
leadership role. This BVC will also require the presence of the patrol boat to affect the
enforcement of the sanctuary, and it remains to be seen how such a BVC would negotiate
gaining ownership of this boat given the leadership and enforcement roles that Mr.
Wotsogola now plays in the Kambindingu Fisheries Association (partly due to his use of
this same patrol boat for patrols in the Kambindingu Lagoon). Failing this, the
conservation successes could begin to be eroded, and if this resulted in significant
encroachment by fishers along Illovo ’s shoreline, one can easily imagine a scenario in
which Illovo felt a need to revert to its legally-supported basis for ejecting fisherfolk from

the shoreline altogether, thereby nullifying any role played by BVCs.

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Kambindingu Lagoon Closed Season (Case Study 4)

Fishing effort in the Kambindingu Lagoon, a highly productive fish breeding area,
increased sharply in the 1980-90’3, leading to declining fish catches in the late 19908, and
a complete collapse of the fishery in 2000. Due to the Traditional Authority’s
observation of the successful establishment of the Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary (DFS-Case
Study 3) a year earlier, he decided, in consultation with local fisherfolk and chiefs, to
establish a half-year closed season in the lagoon and set restrictions on the types of
fishing gears that could be used in the lagoon (in particular banning the use of beach
seines and small-meshed gillnets that were destructive of juvenile fish stocks). The NGO
that had been pivotal in providing training for BVCs in the DFS provided similar training
for the establishment of elected BVCS in all communities around the lagoon For a year,
the extended closed season was widely supported, and these BVCS became members of a

coordinating body, the Kambindingu Fisheries Association.

However, divisions soon emerged as chiefs in the lagoon-dependent communities
(Dema and Banga) perceived an inequitable distribution of power within the Fisheries
Association in favor of the BVCS, and in favor of those chiefs who lived in communities
with easier access to lakeshore fish stocks (N gala, Likuchi). Additionally, divisions
emerged between individual chiefs and their respective BVCS, as these organizations
became the primary foci of visits by fishers, and NGO and government agency personnel,
through which the BVC members benefited (and chiefs lost) both in terms of prestige and
income. During the following years, these sources of resentment and jealousy gave rise to

a variety of symptoms of entrenched learning. These included withholding support for

-274-

regulation enforcement activities and cynicism over the regulations’ successes, out—right
denials of having ever consented to the establishment of regulations, active poaching
during the closed season using illegal fishing gears, and physical threats against enforcers
of regulations. These conflicts occurred between stakeholders at a variety of levels,

including:

0 Within communities — Membership in, and leadership over, BVCs has become
highly contested as these positions may provide them with prestige and economic
benefits, including paid invitations to attend workshops and training sessions, and

the ability to demand bribes fiom poachers.

o In several communities, different groups have attempted to establish rival BVCs

within a single community in the hopes of attracting benefits to their members.

0 Following his loss in the election of the Banga BVC chairmanship, the rival
candidate resented the Chairman’s enthusiasm for enforcing regulations, and
through a slandering campaign convinced the local chief to remove the BVC
Chairman from his position. Since then this BVC has become known for

corruption and poaching activities.

0 Between chiefs — the group village headman of the lagoon-side communities
resented the awarding of the position of Fisheries Association chairman by the
Traditional Authority to the group village headman of the lakeshore communities,

and this chief feels excluded from the process.

0 Between communities — Community leaders from lakeshore and lagoon shore

communities accuse fishers from the other communities of poaching, and accuse

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their respective counterpart BVCs of selectively enforcing regulations. An
example of this is fishers from Dema who accuse BVCs members fi'om Ngala and
Likuchi of selective enforcement of regulations, while allowing their own fishers

to continue poaching.

0 Between chiefs and BVCs -— Chiefs may feel a loss of influence and income due
to the rise of BVCs and therefore try to undermine their activities. For example,
after Ngala BVC had forbidden the use of two harmful fishing gears that new
arrivals were introducing from southern Malawi, the Ngala village chief granted

the incoming fishers permission to live and fish fiom his community in return for

gifts of fish.

However, some of the most emotional conflicts revolve around the role played by
the vice-Chairman of the Fisheries Association (Mr. Wotsogola), who was also chairman
of Nkhono BVC, and therefore the steward of the motorized patrol boat. In addition to
Mr. Wotsogola’s visible leadership in conducting patrols, for a number of reasons of
convenience discussed in chapter 4, many outsiders direct their requests and visits to Mr.
Wotsogola rather than the GVH (appointed Chairman of the Fisheries Association by the
Traditional Authority). Consequently, Mr. Wotsogola benefits fiom his interactions with
outsiders in a variety of ways, and his prestige has become a self-reinforcing cycle as
other BVC chairmen regularly visit with Mr. Wotsogola in the hope of gaining access to
governmental or NGO-funded community or fisheries development programs. The
GVH’s resentment of Mr. Wotsogola’s growing prestige (probably reinforced by his
visible business acumen) has led the GVH to undermine Mr. Wotsogola’s activities

within the Fisheries Association in a number of ways:

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o In an effort to bridge the conflict between lakeshore and lagoon shore
communities, the FD had organized a meeting of all chiefs and BVCs around the
lagoon. However, because the FD had asked Mr. Wotsogola to invite the GVH
rather than visiting and inviting him personally, the GVH refused to attend the

meeting.

0 More alarmingly, on one occasion, when poachers arrived to claim confiscated
nets, the GVH denied having given his support for the enforcement patrol and
directed the poachers to seek out Mr. Wotsogola at his home, abandoning him to
face their anger alone. In the ensuing confrontation, one of the poachers
threatened to kill Mr. Wotsogola if he insisted on demanding payment of the
stipulated fine, and lacking the support of the GVH or other BVC chairmen, Mr.
Wotsogola was forced to release all fishing gears in exchange for relatively

insignificant fines.

Throughout 2001-2004, the Fisheries Association and its BVCs had mixed
success in enforcing regulations. However, in 2004, the Fisheries Association conducted
a number of sensitization meetings around the lagoon, during which several BVCs held
new elections, and with the encouragement of Mr. Wotsogola, two more distant
communities (Dwasulu and Dwambazi) formed BVCs and joined the Kambindingu
Fisheries Association. A watershed moment occurred when these new BVCs conducted
patrols during the lagoon and lakeshore closed seasons, at which point the communities,
BVCs and chiefs around the lagoon realized that their intransigence would only benefit
the outsider BVCs who pocketed all fines levied during their patrols. Soon after these

patrols were conducted, the KFA held a meeting to which all BVC chairmen and Chiefs

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were invited and at which they resolved many of the sources of conflict and jealousy

between them.

In this case study, I observed a number of different learning processes taking
place at different scales and among different stakeholder groups. At both the community
and Association levels, fishery leaders have attempted to replace the inadequate
leadership of the traditional leaders with stakeholder driven institutions, however, their
levels of success differed greatly. At the community level, most traditional leaders
displayed severe entrenched learning processes as they came to realize the amount of
influence that the BVCs were gaining. Additionally, leaders, chiefs and the Group
Village Headman of the lagoon-shore communities resented the disproportionate
influence and benefits accruing to the lakeshore communities. Finally, the GVH in
charge of the Association has come to resist many of the KFA activities due to the

growing importance of his vice-chairman, Mr. Wotsogola.

The traditional leaders in the KFA have, on the whole, proven highly resistant to
the establishment of empowered and effective BVCs, and this has led to mixed successes
for BVCs in their enforcement of new fishing regulations. The primary motivators of
empowerment learning have been local “champions”, represented by some active BVC
chairmen, and the KFA vice-chairman, Mr. Wotsogola, in particular. These champions
could not, however, have succeeded without the legitimation of WESM, COMPASS333,
and the Fisheries Department, who have sponsored and facilitated a series of workshops
aimed at providing the KFA with a legal constitution. Additionally, some of the

resistance to the KFA ended with the enforcement interventions of two new BVCs’

 

333 Community Partnerships for Sustainable Resource Management in Malawi, and USAID-funded project.

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(Dwasulu, Dwambazi) in 2004, and the planned establishment of sanctuaries by Dwasulu

and Nyavuu BVCs in 2005, both of which may have caused the original KFA BVCs to

put aside some of their internal rivalries for fear of losing NGO/governmental support to

these new BVCs. This complex series of events is illustrated in the Figure 5-6, below.

——-———————-—-———-—n——-———--—-——-————---——-——————-a—-———--—-—-——_————

 

Declining catches in
Kambindingu Lagoon
not addressed by VHs

 

 

 

Conflicted Learning Interests in the Kambindingg Fisherigs
Association Case Study

;O....Cam.fii;.h.§éfi.c0t0u0a0&0coo000.30%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

V
TA Kanyenda sets ‘/2 yr closed
WW

l l l
Kambindingu Lagoon TA Kanyenda’s DFS Experience WESM/FD DFS Experience
Crisis - Fishery Collapse applied to Kambindingu applied to Kambindingu
I . J |

 

 

 

WESM/FD train

 

 

i
DFS champion takes on large
enforcement/leadership role

I
i
Chiefs feel marginalized I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Several BVCs/chiefs
undermine KFA

 

 

i
i

. Kambindingu Fishery Association Created -

 

 

WESM/FD capacity
buildingfor BVC leaders

 

 

 

l

 

 

J}

New BVCS

oCreate sanctuaries

 

 

 

l

 

COMPASS/WESM/FD
supports legal
constitution registration

]

 

 

 

.....OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO ......OOOOOOOOOOOOOO~

:Association undermined from within H Association strengthened from outside:

Figure 5-6. Conflicted Learning Interests in the Kambindingu Fisheries Association

Case Study

In the KFA case study, the existing chiefs at several levels have resisted second-

order empowerment learning processes through their own entrenched learning processes

despite the government and NGO attempts to legitimize the BVCs. Therefore, second-

279 -

order conservation learning similarly remains only partly realized as entrenched learning
by chiefs provides sufficient institutional ambiguity to allow a significant amount of
poaching to occur. It remains to be seen to what degree the activities of the new BVCs
and the revised KFA rules succeed in overcoming the conflicts between chiefs and BVCs,
and between lakeshore and lagoon-shore communities. This will result in either first
order or second order institutional and conservation learning at the KFA level (see Figure

5-7, below).

 

 

Management Regime

Unsuccessful 1st- in Context of 1st-Order or 2nd Order
Order Learning

Environmental [Social

Variability v Prevarls

Ambiguous management until
leadership conflict is resolved

f
l l

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Grassroots Old leadership resists a New regime established
acknowledgement undermines regime by champion

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of livelihood threat
1‘ r

I
L Community “PIC"! Champion gains community
(experience/training) support, creates new institution

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 5-7. Unresolved Second order Empowerment Learning cycle.

A key determinant of whether the KFA (and its incorporated DFS) regulations
become the accepted institutions remains to be seen once the KFA receives its official
governmental charter. Most significantly, the constitution will require BVCs and the
KFA to hold regular elections, and if the representatives chosen reflect a popular desire
for enforcement of the KFA regulations, then some of the leadership rivalries may

disappear (i.e., achieving both second order empowerment learning and second order

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conservation learning). As part of this process, the roles of Mr. Wotsogola, his role as
Nkhono BVC chairman in absentia, and his stewardship of the Nkhono BVC boat need to
be clarified, and made transparent. Overall, a majority of fisherfolk are supportive of
maintaining some form of closed season in the Kambindingu Lagoon, but second order
conservation learning will not be achieved until chiefs, BVCs, and Mr.Wotsogola allow
their roles to be validated by the institutional bricolage needed to bring about institutional

legitimacy and thereby second order empowerment learning.

Traditional River Fisheries Management in the North Rukuru River (Case Study 1)

Given that the establishment of traditional river fishing institutions on the N.
Rukuru River occurred at least 100 years ago, I have no first hand information regarding
the process through which it came about, and rely entirely on stakeholders’ perceptions of
these institutions today. However, the assumption that these fishing institutions were
established to avoid conflicts between the stakeholder communities is plausible,
especially given the historical account of a conflict between chiefs over river fishing
rights along another river. As access to most other resources was established by the
military power and alliances of individual chiefs, this system of shared access might seem
like an example of second-order empowerment learning if it wasn’t for the fact that those
chiefs who today share access rights to the fishing grounds are allied through a common
ancestry. Consequently, this case, reflecting evidence from other river fishing institutions
in Malawi, indicates that access to these river fishing grounds was a simple extension of
chiefs’ political powers, and any sharing which occurred was done in order to cement

local power structures, and amounts to simple first order empowerment learning. From

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the current sources, there is no indication that there was any purposeful conservation
intent in the timing or method of fishing weir construction, and therefore it is a moot
point to discuss conservation organizational learning at the time of the river fishing weir

institution inception.

Since then the only significant changes to these river fishing institutions were the
colonial regulations (subsequently adopted by post-independence governments) which
stipulated that all fishing weirs should leave a 5% gap in the middle of the barriers to
allow a certain proportion of adult fish to pass upstream unharmed. However, since the
colonial period, there is evidence that this regulation never attained the status of accepted
institution and fishing weirs continued to block the entire width of the river in 2005. This
regulation was established as a reflection of colonialists’ Eurocentric distaste for any
form of hunting and fishing that wasn’t “sporting” (i.e., didn’t allow the prey a chance to
evade capture), and an ignorance regarding the actual impact of these fishing weirs
(discussed at length in chapter 2). Realistically, the timing of the construction of these
fishing weirs, which occurs after the end of the main rainy season, should allow enough
adult fish to pass upstream to reproduce, and the reed/bamboo mesh of the weirs should
allow enough offspring to arrive in the lake to repopulate the stock. Given that this
regulation was established based on one colonial officer’s concern for the plight of
chambo migrating from Lake Malawi into the Shire River at a time of low lake levels
(see Chapter 2 for further explanation), this institution made little sense of
potamodromous fish (in particular, mpasa and sanjika) migrations up the North Rukuru
River that did not suffer from low water levels. Therefore, while this regulation may

have been intended to establish a greater conservation awareness and therefore could

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have been regarded as an attempt to bring about second-order conservation learning, it
failed to achieve institutional legitimacy and entrenched first order conservation learning

prevailed.

A more serious disruption to these institutions has evolved since the 19703, in the
form of declining fish stocks, that have made the amount of effort expended on the
construction of fishing weirs unattractive to a younger generation of fishers, and thereby
caused an overall decline in institutional relevance among fishers. Some scientists have
blamed declining potamodromous fish species, such as the mpasa and sanjika, on the
fishing weirs, and have criticized the Traditional Authorities poor observance or
enforcement of the gap-rule. The persistence of the traditional fishing weir institutions
may be regarded as successful entrenched empowerment learning against the

government’s attempted imposition of the gap-rule.

However, while the river fishery does face some pressure from the few remaining
fishing weirs, the primary culprit for fish stock declines is more likely the siltation of fish
spawning beds in the river’s tributaries due to widespread deforestation and erosion of
the watershed. As these activities fall well outside the jurisdiction and influence of the
TA’s authority, the fishing weir institutions cannot reasonably be blamed for the declines
of the fish stocks, and therefore this case study does not imply any conservation learning
conflicts. This case study also illustrates the importance of scale when linking the effects

of organizational learning processes to ecological resilience.

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Common Elements in the Organizational Learning Process

Catalytic uncertainties and crises. In each case study discussed above, as well as in the
contexts of L. Malombe, L. Chiuta, L. Chilwa, Chia Lagoon, Mbenji Island, and Lake
Malawi NP, the threatened disruption of livelihoods and access to particular fish stocks,
or their collapse altogether was a key catalyst in bringing about support for a change in
institutions regulating the fishery. The most obvious form of uncertainty for fishers is
that of declining fish catches, which is generally due to an unsustainable overall growth
in fishing effort and the growth of particularly harmful fishing methods, such as beach
seines (which may be highly disruptive of fish breeding grounds and capture large
numbers of juvenile fish). In almost all such contexts, fishers have called for bans on
specific fishing gears (the use of beach seines in Yiwemi), and in some cases they have
banned fishing altogether in fish breeding areas (DF S) or during fish breeding seasons

(KFA, Mbenji Island).

Aside from declining fish stocks themselves, fishers have also mobilized to resist
the enclosures of fish stocks by such actions as the privatization of lakeshore (DFS), or
the establishment of national parks (Lake Malawi NP, Nkhotakota Wildlife Refuge). In
these particular cases, the resulting institutionalized behaviors were regarded by
authorities as ‘poaching’ or ‘squatting’, although their persistent resistance to imposed
institutions have at times led to revisions of regulations in favor of fishers (through the
establishment of the DF S, and the Lake Malawi NP Village Trusts). Similarly, claims of
ownership over fish stocks led to the same illegal institutionalized behaviors among
fishers when the Banda government tried to enforce fishing regulations. Ironically, since

the start of participatory fisheries management in Malawi, most fishers along Lakes

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Malawi and Malombe have rejected the govemment’s language of shared ownership and
responsibility over the fisheries because the FD extension and chiefs’ efforts to
monopolize the membership and objectives of BVCs exposed the minimal degree of

ownership actually being offered.

At a less obvious level, a number of other factors are contributing to the
uncertainty posed by fish stock declines to stimulate stakeholders’ perceived need to
establish new regulations. These include an awareness of overall environmental
degradation (erosion, soil fertility), perceptions of declining social norms and security,
and the declining abilities of people to maintain standards of living amidst the
unpredictable but growing costs of poor agricultural harvests, family members living with
HIV/AIDS, and the ever-increasing costs of school fees, fuel, and necessities. Therefore,
some fishing communities have taken action, not only against the immediate problems of
declining fish stocks, but also to address social issues of theft (Y iwemi, Mwenibabu),
drunkenness/conflicts (Y iwemi, Mwenibabu, Mbenji Island), and equity among

stakeholders (Y iwemi, Mwenibabu).

Recognizing the need for change. In mo st fishing communities surrounding Lake
Malawi described thus far, traditional chiefs have been unable or unwilling to address the
grth of ecological and social threats associated with fishery declines. In a few cases,
where livelihood or ecological uncertainties developed into crises, this lack of leadership
enabled empowered stakeholder-driven BVCs to take over many roles traditionally
played by chiefs, thereby achieving second order empowerment learning (DFS, KFA,

L.Chiuta, and possibly Chia Lagoon). In the DPS, KFA, and L.Chiuta case studies, this

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empowerment has also resulted in second order conservation learning, although in the
cases of the DFS and KFA, with ongoing questions regarding the long-term sustainability

of both empowerment and conservation learning objectives.

In contrast, several chiefs have recognized the need for new regulations and
institutions to address a variety of social, economic and ecological threats, and their
leadership status has been strengthened by these innovations, i.e., first order
empowerment learning (Y iwemi, Mwenibabu, Songwe, Mbenji Island, and possibly
Chembe Village Trust in Lake Malawi NP and the N.Rukuru River afforestation
initiative). In all of these cases, a variety of social and economic outcomes were gained
for constituent communities, and in the cases of Yiwemi, Mwenibabu and Mbenji Island,
second order conservation learning outcomes were achieved as well. However, the
majority of Malawian fishing communities seem both unwilling to pursue second order
empowerment processes, and unable to achieve second-order conservation learning
outcomes. Both the facilitating factors and resistance to empowerment or conservation

require firrther exploration.

Impacts of the Traditional Leadership While mo st commercially valuable near-shore
fish stocks throughout Malawi are quite obviously under threat, most traditional leaders
have not shown a combined ability and willingness to address this livelihood concern
through the establishment of conservation institutions. Worse still, in all studied contexts
where BVCs have been introduced but are failing to achieve conservation outcomes, one
of the key factors limiting the empowerment process has been the entrenched learning

through action or purposeful inaction of strong institutional rivals (i.e chiefs,

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governmental representatives and political elites). In a variety of ways, they resist
institutional innovations that threaten the status quo distribution of power, incomes, and
resources, or their participation is motivated by self-interest which undermines the
empowerment of the BVCs involved (L. Chiuta, L. Malombe, L. Chilwa, Chia Lagoon,

Lake Malawi NP Village Trusts).

This is even the case where poor traditional leadership has resulted in livelihood
crises that brought about the establishment of BVCs. As the KFA case study illustrates, a
crisis-based institutional vacuum is not a permanent condition, and once the fill] extent of
the threats to preexisting power-brokers, and the exact distribution to resources and
power among the new leadership becomes apparent, internal divisions may quickly
emerge enabling chiefs (or other institutions) that had lost importance to once again gain
support. These divisions may reflect genuine concerns over inequitable distributions of
burdens and benefits (KF A: between the lagoon-shore and lake-shore communities, and
between Mr.Wotsogola and GVH Wakunyanja; DFS: between Nkhono and Matiki
BVCs), but these may also be created and used by rival leaders (KFA: GVH Wakuntunda

against GVH Wakunyanja; Lake Chiuta chiefs against BVCs) for personal gain.

However, in most cases where second order conservation learning has occurred
(with the notable exception of Lake Chiuta) the active support of chiefs has been a key to
success in legitimizing new BVC regulations. In addition, while not recognized by the
dichotomy established by the government co-management program’s assumptions, in
some cases chiefs may be seen as highly empowering influences for fisheries
stakeholders. The Yiwemi case study, in particular, illustrates how the chiefs leadership

has provided legitimacy and support for the training and empowerment of several BVC

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leaderships, which has subsequently given rise to the Yiwemi Co-op. It is less clear to
what extent fisheries stakeholders are genuinely empowered at Songwe, Mwenibabu, and
Mbenji Island, or whether they simply act as appointed representatives of their respective
chiefs. Overall, however, these cases show that chiefs are not inherently inept, corrupt or
always motivated by self interest. They may instead participate in fisheries conservation
institutions for the benefit of their communities and the sustainability of the fish stocks
and may indeed strengthen their positions and influence in their communities due to their
leadership in addressing conservation issues (Y iwemi, Mbenji Island, Songwe and

Mwenibabu).

Regardless, both the positive and negative roles that have been shown to be
played by chiefs in facilitating and limiting empowerment and conservation outcomes
indicate the continued importance of traditional leaders in rural Malawi and the need to
actively engage with them in the establishment and support of BVCs. Recognizing that
BVCs will always have a certain dependence on chiefs as the final local arbiters in
conflicts between fisherfolk, and in the BVCs’ attempts to enforce regulations, these
empowerment conflicts may be lessened or avoided if the chiefs are encouraged to
participate in the discussion of particular regulations, and if the institution of their
traditional office is shown simple respect. However, even where the chiefs do not take
the lead or where they resent the leadership of BVCs (i.e., GVH Wakunyanja in the KFA
case study), a successful approach to maintaining their support (without giving them too
much power) has taken the form of giving them ceremonial titles (such as the “patron”

titles given to chiefs in Lake Malawi NP Village Trusts).

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The Roles of B VCs and Champions. While we have limited data on the specific roles of
non-traditional leaders (champions) in isolation from the activities of their respective
BVCs, there are indications that most BVCs act as support groups for dominant fishing
industry leaders rather than as representatives of a wide range of stakeholder needs. This
is reflected in Donda’s (2000) description of how co-management at L. Chiuta was
initiated by a single fisher in response to the village chief and Traditional Authority’s
unwillingness to address the threats posed by the migrant seine fishers. Similarly, we note
the dominant leadership role played by Mr. Wotsogola in the DFS and KFA case studies.
Beyond the leading roles played by BVC chairmen, however, and despite the fact that
BVCs are made up of 10 individuals, most BVC initiatives in the DPS, KFA and L.
Chiuta have been the result of a maximum of 1-4 individuals’ leadership. In Mwenibabu
BVC, after having initially established a 10 member BVC, during the second iteration,
the chief decided instead to allocate two individuals each to addressing three specific

tasks.

This over-dependence on a single or few individuals to lead all BVC activities has
also resulted in the limited abilities or motivation of these institutions to continue
operations when their leaders are absent (ex. Nkhono BVC, Kalambo BVC in Karonga).
Given that one objective of the establishment of BVCs was to promote stakeholder
empowerment and legitirrrization of local institutions, fisheries co-management regimes
have, therefore, not yet achieved this goal in most documented cases in Malawi. Instead
we must recognize that we may simply be replacing one form of centralized local
institution (the chief) with another (the fishing industry leader). In the case of the DFS

and KFA, many positive results have come from the almost solitary leadership provided

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by Mr. Wotsogola, however, as is the case with chiefs, given an absence of balancing
powers and oversight from their BVCs and communities, even BVC champions may
become vulnerable to weaknesses of corruption and nepotism. This potential for
corruption is heightened by the fact that many BVCs give their constituents few or no
opportunities for input into the crafting of institutions, and show little transparency

regarding the collection and use of money taken in fines.

Capacity-building and Legitimization by External Supporters. In these case studies, a
number of external sources of support have proven extremely valuable to the successes of
new institutions and organizations. In most cases where second order conservation
learning occurred without second order empowerment learning (Y iwemi, Mwenibabu,
Songwe, Mbenji Island, N.Rukuru River afforestation initiative) most of the conservation
learning success was achieved with little contemporary NGO and government support. It
is interesting to note, however, that several of these initiatives had received extension
support from some past, capacity-building or training programs (Y iwemi Coop: Italian
NGO Co-op training in the early 1990’s; Mwenibabu: fisheries extension support for
BVC in late 19908; N.Rukuru Reafforestation: discontinued DANIDA watershed
management program). Additionally, Yiwemi Co-op (at Yiwemi) gained crucial
financial support due to networking opportunities provided first by me, followed by that
of the local Fisheries Department extension worker, who successfully lobbied the ELDP
to extend their loans program (of seeds, livestock, gardening materials, and soon a village

banking infiastructure) to this community.

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With the noteworthy exception of Lake Chiuta, all case studies that achieved both
second order empowerment and conservation learning outcomes were highly dependent
on external support and legitimization. In the DPS case study, the initial motivations for
establishing the sanctuary came through Illovo’s interaction with a national
environmental NGO - WESM (particularly through the leadership of the WESM-
Dwangwa chairman, Mr. Mtandizu), and the fishers’ interactions with WESM and the
local Fisheries Department extension worker. Subsequently, the establishment of the
BVCs was facilitated (logistically and financially) by the Illovo and WESM-funded
training programs, and the FD-supported proposal to the USAID-funded COMPASS
program for a patrol boat. The BVCs likely also benefit fiom the fact that they are the
organizations that brokered the agreement with Illovo allowing fisherfolk to use the
beaches, and as long as WESM and Illovo recognize the BVCs, no other institution has

any comparable claim to legitimacy in these communities.

Based on their experiences in establishing the DFS, WESM (again, headed by Mr.
Mtandizu), FD, and Mr. Wotsogola (from the leadership of the DPS) were able to
promote a similarly novel management institution for the KFA after the lagoon fishery
collapsed. The initiative to establish a half-year closed season in the Kambindingu
Lagoon came from TA Kanyenda, who played a role in building fishers’ consensus for
the establishment of the DF S, and whose customary ownership of the area gives the KFA
legitimacy. Illovo and WESM embraced the notion of helping the communities around
the KFA to improve livelihoods and conserve fish stocks based on their positive
experience with the DFS, and provided initial financial and logistical support for BVC

training activities. The FD provided the nascent KF A and its leaders with official

-29l-

governmental sanction through its public support during stakeholder meetings, its hosting
of BVC leadership educational visits, and the govemment’s impending registration of the
KFA constitution. In a small way, my regular discussions with KFA leaders and
observation of its activities have also tangibly contributed to the KFA leadership’s
legitimacy. These sources of knowledge and leadership transfers from the DFS to the

KFA, and the ongoing support of the KF A are shown in Figure 5-8, below.

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Kambindingu Fishery Association.

Similar support for training and the drawing up of management plans and
constitutions in Lakes Chilwa, Chiuta, and Malombe were provided by the Fisheries
Department. However, this raises the issue of the negative effects that such support can

have on local institutions. In a number of cases (Lake Malombe, southern Lake Malawi,

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Lake Chilwa), the FD and GTZ-sponsored NARMAP program’s “support” of the
formation of BVCs was largely to blame for their failures. In these cases (discussed
extensively in Chapter 2), the politicized allocation of financial incentives provided for
participation in BVCs (or even just the anticipated access to these incentives) severely
undermined these institutions’ abilities to gain legitimacy. Additionally, in their
guidance of the establishment of BVCs and fisheries management plans in these water
bodies, the FD and its donor agency supporters have tended to adopt blue-print
approaches that inadequately address the needs and priorities of local stakeholders, and

that make little real effort to empower them.

In other contexts, while not provided with the intent to undermine, similar
concerns have been raised regarding the long-term sustainability of conservation
outcomes if incentives are provided. Concern has been raised regarding the sustainability
of the second order conservation learning outcomes at Mbenji Island due to the
govermnent’s and NGOs’ provision of lavish financial incentives to this already
successful institution. The negative effect of providing external incentives in such a
context was illustrated in 2000 at Yiwemi, when the second Yiwemi BVC became
dormant after the funding ran out for a short-lived UN Work-for-Food program that had
paid BVC members to remove invasive aquatic plants. The provision of small incentives
for participation by NGOs and donor agency projects (ranging from the small - provision
of food, refreshments, and t-shirts, to the provision of sitting allowances and loans) has
become a significant source of frustration for many FD field staff who report that their

communities have become entirely unwilling to participate in any development or

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resource management activities due to their growing expectation of incentives for which

the govermnent field staff have no budget.

Overview of the Roles of the Fisheries Department. Throughout Malawi the primary
constructive role played by the FD has been to disseminate information to fishing
communities regarding institutional innovations that traditional or BVC leaders might
make to address local threats. They have also provided important capacity building
opportunities by hosting exchange visits and by training BVC members in their tasks.
Additionally, where they have provided legitimacy to BVCs, this may have helped some
BVCs to establish their credibility in the communities, and at times their mediation

between different BVCs has helped local stakeholders to overcome rivalries.

Where co-management has failed most glaringly, a significant contributory factor
has been the FD’s reluctance to place the priorities of the communities over those of the
elites, resulting in their imposition of regulations and frameworks without seeking or
incorporating meaningful dialogue with stakeholders. Inversely, the FD may also have
contributed to entrenched learning among chiefs in other areas due to their neglect of
these important stakeholders in the sensitization and BVC formation process. While
providing public legitimacy to BVCs is important for the operation of these groups, the
FD’s continued legitirnization of a majority of ineffective, undemocratic BVCs around
Lake Malawi may be doing more harm than good. As many of these ineffective BVCs
(that are dominated by the chiefs and elites) occupy the official roles as fisheries
management institutions, it becomes all the more difficult for other stakeholders to

mobilize community support for second-order conservation learning. Additionally, by

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allowing these elites to claim stewardship over the resources despite their own support of
illegal fishing activities, other local stakeholders are shown the limited extent to which

the government is really interested in empowering them

A final crucial role that can only played by the FD is to facilitate the registration
of all Fishing Associations, as is provided for under the 1999 Fisheries Conservation and
Management Regulations. Despite the fact that the legal basis for registration is codified
in law, currently no BVC or Fisheries Association in Malawi has this legal identity,
placing BVCs’ successes at the mercy of the charismatic leadership skills of champions
or chiefs. Without this documentation of their legal basis to enforce fisheries regulations
as well as the supporting materials such as BVCs’ licensing forms, BVCs are at risk of
having their enforcement activities challenged on the water and the in courts. An
additional concern relates to the sustainability of BVCs that may currently be successful
due to the presence of strong leaders, but which lacking a legal framework, may collapse
following a leader’s departure, sickness or death (which are real risks for the DFS,

Mwenibabu BVC, and N.Rukuru River afforestation program).

Overview of the Roles of NGOs. NGOs may play a useful role as long as their efforts are
supportive of the FD field staff and the District Assemblies to whom these staff are
gradually becoming accountable. While some NGOs work in close collaboration with the
FD staff; numerous others work in relative isolation of governmental agencies’
development programs. Many of these NGOs are under pressure to show relatively rapid
successes, for which purpose they fiequently provide small financial incentives in

exchange for communities’ participation. In doing so, however, these NGOs can

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severely undermine FD staffs efforts to mobilize BVCs as they do not have budgets to
pay for the incentives that have become expected by the communities. Similarly, the
laudable desires of NGOs to support, and be associated with, successful fisheries
management regimes through the provision of financial incentives may actually result in
undermining the institutions’ effectiveness. NGOs’ and donor agencies’ support of
governmental agencies may also be harmfiil if they fail to adequately assess the accuracy

of starting premises declared by governmental agencies or local leaders.

Aside from these caveats, NGOs are fi'equently more able to access resources
from donor agencies than are national agencies, and to the extent that they collaborate
closely with the FD staff and District Assemblies, that may significantly contribute to
these agencies’ and BVCs’ achievement of respective goals. Possibly more important
than financial contributions, however, some of the most useful contributions to local

communities’ initiatives have come from training and capacity building by NGOs.

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Chapter 6

Conclusion

Rethinking links between Empowerment and Conservation

From the preceding analysis of case studies, it seems evident that a number of
assumptions in the Malawian government’s program to bring about empowerment and
conservation outcomes are flawed. Some chiefs have shown a capacity to provide
leadership for conservation efforts, exemplified in the Yiwemi case study (and to a
certain degree the Kambindingu Fisheries Association case study), which illustrates how
chiefs can help empower fisheries stakeholders to reverse alarming ecological and social
trends. Additionally, criticisms of susceptibility for autocratic and corrupt behavior,
typically raised of chiefs and national governments, have been seen to develop in

stakeholder committees, even where the BVCs are products of democratic elections.

Until now, empowerment has tended to be measured on the basis of the existence
of specific forms of organizational structures and regulations that stem from donor
agencies’ and governments’ imposed perceptions of what a democratic organization
should look like. However, as Malawi’s past and present conservation programs have

shown, while chiefs may be represented as being all-powerful, they actually have never

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been able to impose conservation regulations on their constituents, and are only able to
operate effectively based on informal consensus-driven legitimacy. I argue instead that
stakeholder empowerment should be measured by the extent to which the community
accepts and supports conservation regulations regardless of the formal institutional form
taken. This deeper definition of empowerment enables us to better account for effective
chiefs’ conservation regulations, and be more critical of BVCs’ claims to legitimacy and

empowerment.

These case studies reflect conclusions by Jentofr (2005) argueing that
empowerment must be seen as a necessary precondition for, as well as an outcome of
effective co-management or CBNRM conservation, and that empowerment of an
organization is both reflective of, and a source for further community empowerment. A
caveat to this statement is that at times of livelihood uncertainty, not all segments of the
population need to be empowered in order to establish effective conservation institutions,
and indeed, attempts to induce radical changes in existing social hierarchies, cultural
values and power dynamics may engender strong forms of resistance (Cleaver 2002).
Instead empowerment of the previously disenfranchised might best be achieved through

incentives once livelihood stability has been reestablished.

Based on these conclusions, I propose a unified model of organizational learning
for co-management success that is measured primarily by the ability of community-based
institutions to achieve conservation outcomes, and that is independent of the specific

form that the conservation institutions take (see Figure 6-1, below).

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Figure 6-1. A Model of Organizational Learning for Conservation

In this model, when key social, economic, or ecological trends present a threat to
a community’s livelihoods and security, the extent to which stakeholders are empowered
(either through chiefs or BVCs) determines whether they are able to: recognize the extent
and causes of the threat, develop new ways of addressing the threat, and achieve broad-
based community support for the new institutions or regulations (i.e., second order
organizational learning). If community leaders and institutions are effective in doing so,
corrections to the threatening trends may be achieved, thereby re-establishing stability of
livelihoods (which in the case of fishing communities, also implies reversing declines in
fish stocks). This would represent second order organizational learning in relation to both

empowerment and conservation.

On the other hand, if community leaders are not sufficiently empowered, they
may fail either to recognize the causes and needs for institutional change, or may to be
unable to implement the needed regulations for a lack of legitimacy or capacity. Thereby
they may allow a continuation or growth of a fishery/ livelihood threats (i.e., first order
organizational learning), eventually leading to some form of ecological and/or livelihood
crisis. Such a crisis may then permit and prompt the rise of a new leadership in the
community (as with the rise of BVCs in Lake Chiuta, the DFS and KFA case studies),
although in some cases this leadership may only emerge with the support of external
agencies. Depending on their empowerment due to their own capabilities and knowledge,
legitimacy granted by the community, and their ability to overcome entrenched learning
by pre-existing leaders and interests, these new institutions and leaders my enable the
community to re-attain livelihood stability (i.e. second order learning). However, in

some cases (what seems to have been the case in most Malawian fishing communities), a

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lack of BVC empowerment, results in an inability to unseat the entrenched learning of the
pre-existing fishery power brokers (including chiefs, government officials, fishing
industry leaders). In this case, first order learning will prevail leading to the perpetuation
of status-quo conservation institutions that are poorly designed and go unobserved, and

the continued decline of fish stocks and livelihood standards.

In addition to assessing the successes or failures of relatively recent institutional
innovations, it is important that we (and more importantly, the FD) recognize the
ongoing, cyclical nature of institutional learning processes. In contexts like the KFA,
where empowerment has taken quite a while to be achieved, WESM and the FD have
recognized the need for their regular support of the capacity-building and legitirnization
process. However, while some co-management regimes may seem to require little direct
involvement fiom national agencies (Lake Chiuta, Yiwemi, Mbenji Island), complacency
by resource management agencies may allow these BVCs and Fisheries Associations to
be undermined by new sources of unanticipated social, economic, political or ecological
uncertainty. Examples of seemingly effective co-management regimes that now require a
firrther FD investment include: Lake Chiuta, where the legitimacy of BVCs is under
threat from chiefs; DFS, where reorganization of BVCs is necessary following the
departure of the primary community leader and the relocation of Matiki community to
Nkhono and Nyavuu communities). Similarly, although the Yiwemi BVC was
functioning quite well, the active support of FD extension enabled it to achieve hitherto
unanticipated goals through the establishment of Yiwemi Co-op. Therefore, in order to
support an institution’s viability overtime, we must actively seek to discover the key

variables and processes that limit the regime’s empowerment learning processes, while

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being careful not to introduce any new limiting factors (such as the introduction of

perverse incentives introduced in the Mbenji Island and Yiwemi BVC cases studies).

An exploration of resistance to empowerment and conservation

By analyzing these case studies through a framework of first-order and second-
order learning rather than simple successes and failures, I have come to a greater
appreciation of the inherent resistance (entrenched learning) that second-order learning
processes may engender if the leadership does not take pre-existing institutions into
account. In the case of the current Malawian fisheries management policies, while BVCs
are being empowered to manage the fish stocks, chiefs have been explicitly excluded as
stakeholders due to the govemment’s past experiences in which chiefs have proven prone
to corruption. However, one must keep in mind that the patterns of governance exhibited
by many of those chiefs were the products of an autocratic govemment’s example of rule
by nepotism, lack of transparency, and corrupt patron-client relationships. And indeed,
much as poorly empowered BVCs have shown similar tendencies toward corruption,
institutions such as Transparency International report that patterns of corruption continue
to pervade the government’s civil service today (Khembo 2005). Therefore, chiefs should
not be singled out for these criticisms. More importantly, by ignoring the variety of
formal and informal community-level institutions that continue to be centered around the
powers of the chiefs, the fisheries policies would seem to be forcing all fishing
communities to embark on second-order learning in direct conflict with the traditional

leadership.

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Instead of setting these forces in opposition to one another, the Fisheries
Department and supporting NGOs should examine the sources of resistance in individual
second-order learning cases and consider adopting an extension approach that bridges the
divide between first-order and second-order learning, thereby engendering less resistance
fiom pre-existing institutions and interests. Whether a regime is introduced through a
successful process of second-order learning or following a crisis that unseats entrenched
first order learning processes, there are a number of common factors that may contribute
to their success or failure. However, there are also many common solutions to helping
them overcome these detractors to successful learning. If sources of ignorance,
dissention, and resentment can be directly addressed, BVCs have a greater chance of
actually receiving the support of traditional leaders, rather than being undermined by
them Indeed, the traditional leaders might even enforce a greater degree of accountability

and transparency in the BVCs themselves (as is the case in Yiwemi BVC).

Corresponding closely to the variety of “psychological failures” that Jared
Diamond (2005) described as contributing to ecological collapse at nation- state levels, a
number of similar reasons have been sited by fishery stakeholders around Lake Malawi to

explain their lack of stewardship initiatives. These factors include:

1. Failure to recognize the long-term declining trends in fish stocks amidst large

short-term fluctuations (creeping normalcy and landscape amnesia).

2. Rejection of the cause-effect relationship between fishing practices and the fish

stock declines,

a. related to spiritual beliefs that fish stock abundance is due to the will of

ancestral spirits or God;

-303-

b. perception that fish stock declines are caused by other influences so that

limits to one’s own fishing would not help (false analogy);

3. Lack of leadership capacity/experience/willingness to create appropriate

regulations,

a. Insufficient knowledge of how alternative institutions might work,
whether they would produce claimed results, and concern over

unpredictable consequences;
b. New institution may be seen as loss of power and income;
c. Cultural values that fisheries should be open to all Malawians.

4. Fear that limits accepted by one’s own community may simply result in better

catches for other communities’ (prisoner’s dilemma) or poachers (free-ridership);

5. Inability of leaders to enforce new institutions due to institutionalized resistance

from fishers or other leaders.

The Adaptive Organizational Learning Process

By overlaying the list of “psychological failures” onto a simplified organizational
learning cycle (see Figure 6-2, below), we may gain a better appreciation for the specific
challenges that resource management agencies and local institutions need to remain
aware of, if they are to empower an adaptive organizational learning process. Based on
my analysis of the Malawi fishery’s co-management case studies, I will discuss the ways
in which each regime has become the victim of these learning failures, and suggest ways

in which governments, communities, chiefs, NGOs, donor agencies, and other

-304-

stakeholders can help to return organizations and leaders to the adaptive organizational

learning cycle.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

,. declnes not
I j ,
Sensitizelmobilize
fisherfolk, leaders
”5. Grassroots New
awareness Adaptive institution ‘
of threat - created ’.
Reject came. ‘I/ “Earn: "9 a.
fake analogy yc 8 W
.‘l ,i orttslders,
‘ Leader/ Leaders willing mama}:
Sensitlze ‘ community ; to experiment ‘
fisherfolk, -“ capacity with institution /
leaders 4 Fear «raider' ‘
:BVC lies-riders,
Lack capacity Create . prisoner's
experience, - - -> training. share dilemma
willirmness OWN

—> Adaptive Ieaming cycle ----- > Feedback to supporting institutions
\—-> Learning failure cause . . . . . .p Capacity building promotes learning

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 6-2. Potential sources of empowerment failures and support for adaptive
learning

Recognition of the Crisis

First and foremost, the introduction of new institutions requires that stakeholders
be aware of the problem and perceive the need (or in the case of new opportunities, the
desire) for new institutions and norms. In the case of the two most significant
unsuccessfirl govemment-initiated regimes (Lake Malombe, Lake Chilwa), the
psychological failures were on the part of the donor agencies and the government, as they

chose to ignore the local and scientific ecological knowledge that fish stock declines were

-305—

more likely affected by water level changes (Lake Chilwa and Lake Malombe) and
fishing pressures outside of their control (Lake Malombe), than over-fishing in these
Lakes themselves. Building on these “false analogies”, the government was unable to
mobilize local stakeholder alarm to match that of the expatriates’ and elites’ regarding the
plight of the chambo (Lake Malombe). Similarly, concern over fishing in river fish
refugia did not warrant expansions of restrictions to the whole Lake (Lake Chilwa). In
both cases, the govemment’s best strategy might be to encourage a thorough
reassessment of the failed institutions by scientists, policy makers, and particularly
stakeholders to determine stakeholder concerns, and invest its limited resources in

helping to address these concerns.

Circumstances will also arise in which local stakeholders are the victims of a
failure to recognize threats, or an unwillingness to acknowledge the causal relationships
between these threats and their own activities. In these cases, which might apply to many
local Malawian fisheries, the government and NGOs should help fishers to recognize the
threats by engaging in extensive sensitization of the fisherfolk and their leaders. The
govermnent is ideally-placed to conduct this form of education as it frequently has the
best information regarding long-term trends that might be obscured by short-term
fluctuations, and can place the conditions of the local fishery within that of the large scale

trends.

Finding Willing and Able Leaders

Secondly, for stakeholders to accept new institutions, they need confidence in

their leadership’s capacities (both technical and moral) to guide institutional change. To

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the extent that existing leaders (in most cases, chiefs) are able and willing, with the
advice and support of the govermnent, NGOs and other community members, to make
such changes, the institutional innovations may not encounter significant resistance

(Y iwemi BVC, Mwenibabu BVC, Songwe BVC). While the above cases required little
government encouragement, in most instances chiefs may need extensive sensitization
regarding the threats, and enlightenment as to the merits, of potential institutional
solutions before they will take any initiative. One tactic might involve playing to their
existing insecurities and frustrations over the declining relevance of the chiefiaincy in an
increasingly unpredictable, mobile, and capitalized Malawi, and offering them an
alternative vision of following in the successful footsteps of such chiefs as sub-TA Msosa
(Mbenji Island), TA Kanyenda (DFS, KFA), VH Yiwemi (Y iwemi BVC and Co-op), VH
Mwenibabu (Mwenibabu BVC), and the late-GVH Nzeruzakale (N. Rukuru River
afforestation effort). The respect that these chiefs have gained in their communities, and
around the country (TAs Mso sa and Kanyenda have been profiled on the national radio)
for their efforts has paid highly-visible dividends in terms of prestige, and in some cases,

more tangible economic benefits.

However, where existing leaders and institutional frameworks are not seen to
reflect the necessary moral standards or technical capacities to introduce change that
works for the benefit of their stakeholders, their institutional innovations may quickly be
undermined by passive or even active stakeholder resistance (Lake Chiuta, Lake
Malombe, Lake Chilwa, Chia Lagoon, Bua River, Lake Malawi NP Village Trusts). If
this is the case, then the government, community, and/or other change agents might help

to resolve this impasse by encouraging a grassroots mobilization around an alternative

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source of leadership within the community (DFS, KF A, Lake Chiuta). In either case, the
government should support the existing or potential leadership with training
opportunities, both in terms of expanding their skills (i.e.. coaching in effective literacy,
numeracy, leadership, ecology, firnctions in a committee) as well as providing them with
experiential learning opportunities by taking them on visits to examine similar initiatives
elsewhere. These proposed institutional innovations must be recognized as largely
foreign to most leaders, and therefore, extensive capacity-building and advice is needed if
the new organizations and leaders are to maintain popular confidence in their abilities and
motivations. Although the Malawian government and certain NGOs have been able to
provide some useful training for BVCs, there is great need for more investment in this
direction. More importantly, the government needs to make greater efforts to be seen as
an honest broker for fishers rather than allowing their training and workshop

opportunities to be bought and sold as political favors to the elites.

Supporting New Institutions

If the existing leadership or the new champions have the mandate (or at least, the
tacit support) of a majority of stakeholders, the challenge for supporting organizations
and NGOs is to help the leaders navigate the various learning failures that may arrest
their success at an early stage. These threats may come fi'om a variety of internal and

external sources, each of which will be explored briefly here.

Some stakeholders question the wisdom of new regulations in view of the burdens
on their livelihoods, and these complaints may be used by disgruntled community leaders

to undermine the legitimacy of the regime (entrenched learning) (KFA, Lake Chiuta).

-308-

The primary reasons for these sources of entrenched learning are the govemment’s and
NGO’s neglect of key leaders (KFA, Lake Chiuta) and stakeholders’ livelihood needs
(Lake Malawi NP, Bua River fishery), or perceived corruption and nepotism on the part
of the new leadership (DF S, KFA). This is one of the primary sources of fiiction
associated with second-order learning processes, and should be addressed in advance by
the government and NGOs as they sensitize the community and bring about the
establishment of new institutions and leaders. Realistically, if the process is transparent
and allows all stakeholders to voice their concerns, no large group of stakeholders should
be neglected as in the manner of the Lake Malawi NP Village Trusts. The Bua River
fishery reflects a similarly limited participation of stakeholders in the setting of goals,
producing a continued conflict-ridden situation. To address these two scenarios, the Dept.
of National Parks and Wildlife has offered Lake Malawi NP stakeholders extensive
incentives for their cooperation, but has not been as generous in the Bua River, meaning
that while Lake Malawi NP Village Trusts seems to be having some success, the Bua

River regime does not.

The PD, NGOs, and BVCs have not adequately addressed the neglect of
disgruntled leaders in Lake Chiuta, and this may continue to cause unpredictable forms of
friction in the firture, as was exhibited most recently in the form of a TA ruling against
the BVCs. In the KFA, the BVC leadership eventually made some efforts to invite
disgruntled chiefs to their discussions, and a number of sources of conflict were resolved
as a consequence. Realistically, bridging divides between stakeholder groups and leaders
should be one of the FD’s and NGO’s primary roles beginning early on in the

sensitization process. These conflicts also speak to a larger need and a task that only the

-309-

government can undertake: only by establishing a legal identity can BVCs withstand
fishers’, chiefs’, and politicians’ challenges to their authority. Consequently, a key role
that the Fisheries Department should spearhead is to assist BVCs and Fisheries
Associations in developing constitutions, and to have their organizations registered with

the national registrar as officially sanctioned enforcers of fisheries regulations.

From these internal divisions, or simply by being given the opportunity to do so,
some fishers may choose to reap benefits from the conservation policies by illegally
harvesting the surplus produced (free-ridership). This has been a challenge to ahnost all
fisheries regimes discussed, including Yiwemi. In each case, the community has had to
invest time and energy in enforcement, and in some cases they were successful in
stemming the poaching quickly by levying large fines (Y iwemi, N.Rukuru River fishery),
or by engaging some of the poachers and giving them enforcement powers against
poachers (Yiwemi). The government has also sourced funding-support from COMPASS
for patrol boats in the DF S and Lake Chilwa cases, and although the DFS boat has been
quite effective in keeping poaching down in the sanctuary, the ownership of the boat has
also become a point of great contention. Enforcement of regulations is one of the least
relished tasks for most BVCs, and while the government has infrequently been able to
conduct some enforcement efforts, these actions have generally not motivated the
existing BVCs to patrol on their own (Chia Lagoon, KFA). Governmental and NGO
financial support of BVC enforcement activities is likely to lead to a greater BVC
dependency on external support; however, donations of materiel (i.e. boats, uniforms, ID
badges, flashlights) may, if done carefirlly, provide some BVCs with the confidence

needed to enforce their rules. Realistically, I would argue that the best support for

-310-

enforcement is through development of greater local legitimacy through improvements in
accountability, transparency, and official status rather than material support. This lack of
legitimacy was illustrated by the govemment’s firtile attempts to stop poaching in Lake
Malawi NP (before the establishment of Village Trusts) despite enjoying technological

advantages over the community members.

Beyond the legitimacy of the local BVC or Fisheries Association, however, many
stakeholders may also be unwilling to follow new regulations if they perceive that a
neighboring community or some other group will simply reap the benefits of their
sacrifices (prisoner’s dilemma). Ideally, BVCs should be grouped into Fisheries
Associations that organize around ecologically significant units (such as the KF A), and
thereby establish a common set of regulations to be respected by all constituent
communities. In some cases, however, Traditional Authority or district boundaries may
bisect these ecosystems (Chia Lagoon, Dwambazi River estuary), in which case the
Fisheries Department, as an organization with a national mandate, is ideally suited to

mediate between stakeholders.

The Need for Organizational Learning Among all Stakeholders at all Institutional

Levels

Related to the various institutional innovations discussed above, these local actors
in the fisheries co-management relationship will need to revise some values and attitudes

that are counterproductive to adaptive organizational learning.

-3ll-

Fishers. Fishers have traditionally seen management of the fishery either
as the job of the government or as the domain of God. They have to take
greater responsibility for the effects of their activities on the sustainability

of fish stocks or lose their livelihoods.

Chiefs. Historically, traditional leaders have depended on their positions
for influence and income. They now have to be helped to embrace new
forms of institutions; otherwise, they risk becoming marginalized

completely by the new BVCs.

Field staff. Historically, fishery extension workers have depended on their
positions to maintain influence over, and receive income (through
contributions and bribes) from fishers. They need to realize that their
futures lie precisely in giving away the power that they have sought to
hold on to. Given that most FD staff positions are in the process of being
devolved to District Assemblies, if they fail to achieve successes in terms
or empowering their local stakeholders, they may lose their jobs

altogether.

Many of the recommendations discussed above have centered on improving the
relationships between relatively local actors: fishers, chiefs, and government extension
staff. However, ultimately, there are a number of national and international organizations
who wield great influence on the determination of national policies and allocation of
resources to the field staff. Therefore, responsibility for fisheries co-management failures

and successes must be taken at all levels.

-312-

Fisheries Department upper management Due to the highly politicized
history of the government civil service, upper managers at the district and
national levels typically spent greater amounts of time seeking invitations
to meetings and workshops than in supporting the field staff in their
unrewarded jobs. This is probably the most significant obstacle to
achieving effective fisheries co-management. Instead, the upper
management needs to give greater financial, administrative, and training
support to field staff; and the measures of managers’ effectiveness and

their rewards should be tied directly to the success of their field staff.

NGOs. As donor agencies have become disillusioned with the corruption
and lack of transparency within governmental civil service, NGOs have
benefited greatly as they are assumed to be better able at delivering quick
results. However, due to their greater access to financial resources, NGOs
have also attracted the best civil servants to work for them, and have been
able to provide incentives to local communities for their participation.
Both of these actions have severely diminished government agencies’
abilities and capacities to address development issues on their own. NGOs
should work more closely with government agencies to ensure that the
agencies benefit from the lessons learned and are better able to retain

expertise.

Donor agencies. These agencies’ project funding has tended to be driven
by expatriate and elites’ bio-centric perceptions that ignored fisherfolk

needs. Additionally, their short funding cycles have reinforced a

-313-

syndrome of dependency in government agencies, and have diverted much
expertise from the government to NGOs. Finally, most funding has gone
to sponsoring endless workshops for NGOs and governmental elites with
little attention or funding given to ensure that this capacity is transferred to
the lower level actors who actually implement the policies. These agencies
need to provide more long-term support for development, with a greater
emphasis on capacity-building and support of the civil service. Rather
than seeking rapid, but too-frequently short-lived successes through
funding of NGOs, donor agencies should help to reform and provide
greater financial support directly to government agencies. A model that
might be followed is that of Mozambique, where all donor agency funding
for agricultural services is invested in a single governmental trust that is
managed and overseen by a board of donor agencies and national agency

representatives.

In Closing

As we look at the various fisheries co-management regimes in Malawi today

(shown in Figure 6-3, below), we note that, with the exception of the management of the

small “commercial fishing” fleet, those regimes that have proven most successful in

achieving stakeholder support and fish stock sustainability (outlined in solid black) tend

to be skewed toward community-driven initiatives. This pattern would seem to lend

support to the concept of co-management in principle. However, the predominance of

less successfirl regimes (outlined in solid grey) and failed regimes (outlined in dashed

-314-

grey) that are skewed toward the government-driven axis indicates that significant
lessons remain to be learned by the Fisheries Department in how to successfully
empower resource stakeholders for the introduction and ongoing support of co-

management regimes.

 

Continuum of Fisheries Management Institutions in Malawi and their
Corresponding Continua of Epistemologies and Methodologies.

 

 
        
   
       
  

 

    
  

   
  
 

    
 

    
  

    
  

 

sis: .... °""”’°°°" N
$223.13" 33:3: w \ ‘
Government Government Community
Informs Consults with Community Advises Autonomy
Community Community Co-management Community (CBNRM)

 

 

 

Trends in Development, Fisheries Management, and their Epistemology

 

th. Paradigm Eurocentric/Modernist t———9 Critical theory/post modern
th. vs. Cons. Bio-centric 4—-—> Anthropocentric
th. Objectives Pie-determined t—t PRA/Freirian determined
th. Methods Technocratic +——+ Participatory
Institutions Used National Laws & Regs. +—* Community/stakeholder rules
Enforcement Technology t—t Norms + Institutions

(fines + fences) (social connect)

 

 

Figure 6-3. Continuum of Fisheries Management Institutions in Malawi and their
Corresponding Continua of Epistemologies and Methodologies.

By providing co-management regimes with a broad array of feed-back capacity-

building mechanisms, we can help them avoid firture crises through an adaptive

-315-

organizational learning process At the inception of any institutional innovation, it must
be assumed that the leadership of local resource management regimes will tend to cater to
a social demand for stability, efficiency and continuity. Therefore, the primary objectives
of national resource management agencies and deve10pment NGOs should be to assist
these local institutions in retaining or achieving an awareness of the larger ecological
trends that they may not (genuinely or choose to) perceive, and to assist these
organizations in adapting their local institutions accordingly. If the challenges, on the
other hand, relate to a perceived institutional lack of capacity, the support should take on
a training and capacity building approach. Finally, in those cases where the threats to
adaptive learning stem from external influences or entrenched learning forces, the
supportive agencies may need to help mediate between stakeholders, and in some cases
exert pressure, provide incentives, help in enforcement, or give greater legal standing to
the new institutions. Part and parcel of an agency’s ability to support local fisheries co-
management regimes, however, lies in its overall legitimacy and rapport with the local
stakeholder groups, meaning that all initiatives have to reflect the needs and priorities of

the stakeholders.

To a significant degree, the examples of successful and unsuccessful fisheries
management regimes discussed in this dissertation reflect the local extension agents’
manner of interaction with their stakeholders. For an agency to succeed in promoting
these types of adaptive learning processes at the local level, its staff must perceive
themselves as sensitizers, facilitators, and advisors for the locally-relevant needs to a
greater degree than as instructors and enforcers of the national conservation plan. While

Malawian resource management agencies are struggling under severe financial

-3l6-

constraints, this is not a sufficient reason for co-management failure. Indeed, many of the
most successfirl fisheries co-management regimes discussed were partly achieved due to
an absence of funding that made a more enforcement-oriented approach prohibitive,
while an availability of firnds and personnel (that were poorly invested) may have
contributed to some regime failures. The challenge, therefore, is for the Fisheries
Department to internalize the concept that achieving success in terms of its conservation
goals depends on its abilities to be successful in supporting local livelihoods in a variety
of ways and to empower its field staff to help individual communities seek locally

appropriate conservation strategies.

-317-

APPENDIX A

Primary fishing gears, targeted fish species in each Case Study.

 

Commun

F ishin Gears

Case Study 1: North Rukuru Traditional River Fishery

Ta etedS .

 

 

N. Rukuru River

Vyelo

Mpasa, mperere, sanjika

 

 

Drifting gillnets

Mpasa, mperere, sanjika

 

Case Study 2: Kaporo BVC and Co-op

 

Kaporo

Chilimira

Stflgu, Masohungu, Kabwiri, usipa, chambo

 

Gillnet

mpasa, nkholokolo, masuhunju, ningwi, sanjika, nkhozola,
mkunguni, batala, Mbuvu, chambo

 

Case Study 3+4) Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary and Kambindingu Fisheries Association

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Liwaladzi Lemu Chambo
Chiombera (Gill) Chambo
Chilimira Usipa , Utaka
Gillnet Utaka, mayera
Nkhono Chilimira Usipa
Gillnet Mabuno, Chambo, ntcheni, mayera
Matiki Lemu Chambo
Gillnet (3 ‘/z) Chambo, mabuno, mbaba
Gillnet (l '/2) Utaka
Nyavuu Gillnet Chambo
Kauni (Chili) Usipa, chambo
Beach Seine Chambo, mlamba
Bana + Chauma Kauni (Chili) Usipa
Beach Seine Usipa
Kambuzi BS Chambo
Gillnet Mabuno/Kampango
Banga + Dema Beach Seine Usipa
Kambuzi BS Chambo
Gillnet Chambo
Likuchi Kambuzi BS Chambo
Gauze Wire BS Usipa
Chilimira Usipa, Chambo
Gillnet Chambo. Mkututu
Ngala Kauni (Chili) Utaka, Usipa
Gillnet Mabuno, mayera, Kampango, Chambo, utaka,
Beach Seine Usipa
Dwasulu Gillnet Utaka, chambo
Beach Seine Chambo
Kauni (Chili) Utaka, Usipa
Kasitu Chikwitu (Chili) Usipa
Beach Seine Usipa
Kambuzi Seine Chambo
Dwambazi Gillnet Mayera, Chambo, Kampango, Mpasa
Chilimira Usipa, Utaka
Beach Seine Utaka

 

 

*Bold gears indicate the most important gears and their main targeted species at each dock

 

 

 

 

-318-

 

Common vernacular (Chewa, Tonga, Tumbuka, Nggnde) and Latin fish nomenclature

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Latin name Common Names Latin name Common Names
nkhozola Labeo cylindricus ningwi
kabwiri Labeo mesops ntchila
mkunguni Lethrinops spp. kambuzi, mayera
Opsaridium
? mabuno, kota microcephalus mperere, sanjika
Bagrus meridionalis Kampango, mbuvu Opsaridium microlepis mpasa
Barbus eurystomus kadyakolo, mpusi, kuyu Oreochromys lidole chambo
ngumbo, chikas,
Barbus johnstonii chimwe Oreochromys saka chambo
Barbus litamba tamba Oreochrowhiranus mkututu
Oreochromys
Clarias gariepinus mlamba squamipinnis chambo
C opadichromis spp. utaka
Copadichromys spp. mbaba Ramphochromis spp. ntcheni, batala, sangu
Diplotaxodon spp. masuhunju Synodontis njassae nkholokolo
Engraulicypris
sardel/a usipa
Fishing Gears Defined
Chilimira (open-water purse Chilimira Refers to daytime fishing (also known as Tolola)
seine)
Kauni Night time fishing with light attraction
Chikwitu '/4 inch mesh (not mosq.) for adult usipa

 

Beach Seines

Beach Seine

Seated, mosquito mesh-lining for usipa

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Kambuzi Seated, l, l ‘/2 inch mesh for chambo

Gauze Wire Seated, wire mesh for usipa

Kandwindwi Walked, for adult and juvenile fish (matemba)
Gillnet Gillnet Passive capture

Chiombera Noise used to scare fish into gillnet

 

-3l9-

 

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51.8050 50880.35 .29 5559-55050 55508 .05 C0 055 28 .5 5520090 5 8090 808800 5 0. 0.5.5.2
.0295 5585 5.2 550— 5055 8 58252500.: 09 2000 55
8093020 805 50550 5 80585 085500559. 5059-55888 5 .5 5520090 5 805 808800 5 02 05.52
.85—05306505258503 .5 050 .5 5090 80880050520090 5 808053 555 5 9 05.52
5:50; 23o agfi
05 58:05 52. .855 a. 5 5 >55558 809808 558800 .3 85550— .5 5520090 5 505 508800 5 8 0.5.52
.552 5520800 55 00.56502 5 00520..
5 8 55890 5.2 000: 05 £80305 5 055 5050.80 5 050500 .558 .5 8052890 5 5090 808800 5 0. 05.52
558.8800 055 .5 5555 085500 5 550m 05 8 085000 0.5 5 059 55 585.5 805 058 808800 85 0. 0.552
558800 05 8 55:02 5 0558 .5 5.02 5 0m: 05 05 505 058 808800 5 0. 05-52
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.w
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80009 05 85 .5555 8595 558800 05 .5 80520090 5 0808800 55.50 555005 55 3 05.52
.509 .5 9559 05 805 5.5 08:00:00 5.50 55.5 58509 552890 5 5090 508800 5 8 0.552

88558
585.905
5.5050
858.305
58806.08
5800-5020

52805”:
5.90050

5005-50800
mam-20050

SES-afiafi
5509-50800

05220-86800

.5 5038-50

052-800
5888-50
5825é8

2052.800
05 9022.800
80 50.,-”.800
09553-800

580-50

-321-

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.m80.._\8_00=.80

888 .8 88288888888 :8 888.80
.8800. 088$ 98988 888980 .8 808820890 888 80808 5. 888980.800
880m 983 .8 80882080 888 808808 =< mm.8o
.908 80808888 88088 .8028 080—9 8 88250.88 08 58 890B 883 088 90893 .899 88 090.9 .8 808808 =< 85.80
88.8888. 88.88
$8800 05 8 838 880—0880. 88800 8093 80 880808 .88 088 85 8000M 900820988
9805 .9039 :09 .880» 8888 80808 8 8088 05 825 808 0203 85 88m 8888 8 80882390 8 808800 88 3 808m
.003 80» 0088.. 08 8 880m 8888 .8 80820090 880888 88 8 808m 302 900,—..209mE
.883 28 8 888 8820802 888 8.8 8 888 88. 38. 88 888.828

899 .8805 8.039 ..0._ .888 main E0808 .8 8080 05 mMOmm—m 08 8 88m 888.8 8 80882890 8 80888 .88 3 808m
@8880 05 8 80>.88 880889008 88800 8093 80 88088 .88 088 85 9805

8.039 :08 .888 8888 88808 .8 8028 05 0088 8888 09 3 808 85 880% 988 .8 8082890 880888 88 8 80.8.8
.000m 80% 0088 888 8009 089 85 880% 988 .8 80882890 8 80888 88 8 808m

.888 08. 8 83.8.8 880908900. 88800 8093 80 880808 >88 088 85 .8805 0.039

08 80.89 :08 .8w 8888 880008 .8 808 05 08.89 8888 09 8 88 85 880% 988 .8 80882890 8 80888 88 08 80.899
@8988 803m 8098 0888 80888 .88 8 88¢

808.00. 888088 888 .888 0.8 .088 88 .0098 05 8 88890 .8 80882890 8 8098 80888 88 08 808m

.8888. 808.88 8003.09 898088908 80 80.88089 8 80882080 8 8808085

8088.9. 888 8098.8 800509 88808890.. 8 8088089 .8 80882890 8 8808085

8098.8 808.88 800509 0898088908 8 88080888 .8 808820090 8 8808088

.8888 088 8890 o>m 800509

808888 888.08 8F .mo>m 888 8088.9. 800509 @0085 0.08. 88 8 888808—08 8 808838 .8 80882080 8 8808088
.8098 888 8890 U>m 800.509 80808089

8888 8S. .mo>m 888 8098.8 8080.80 800509 8805 88— 88 888088908 8 8088088 8 809820890 8 8808088

.8989 98.98.8808

80830 8888888 808 8. 88:08 8:. 888 885 8098 800m 8888 08 093 888.8 .8 80882890 8 8098 80888 88 0. 808d
.8888 88 .8 88888 8 2 888

80830 88 8888 .8 80882890 8 8098 80.888 88 0. 80.8%

.8888 9mm .8 808820090 8 8098 80888 888 0. 8088

809808 B08 8888 .8 80882890 8 8098 80888 88 3 80.8%

880% 3-20988

302 8-89mi
88 8.888

88.888
0820.888
88098.8
8.888.388

mahéfloywuofimm .

miéflumuuofifi
H.U>m.8_0m.890_m

8.0888888
88.8 880.588
88 08.888
8,0 880.888

88... 88.8288
380.8988

-322-

.8888 8.. 8 _ .8. 8.8. _ 8 28.83 a b8 85 888 2 88¢
88888
.8 88.888 05 .3 .5525 8888.8; 05 .8 888% .8 8893 8.84882 05 8.888 85 80888 .98 9 880m

858.888 v.8 .8888 .8858:— 52—8 m: .8883 «.80 Ho 88388 88 8888 .2.
8888.. 8088880 .8888: 8.52 508m 8 .883 8838—5: 88.5 05.8 8.8288 88 83808 =<
.8888 8088.880 .888: .bofim m: .8808 ii E53 05 .8 88288 88 82808 =<
88888 in .85—9»: .588 8: ..was—88 883 8582 .8 8:288 88 .8888 =<
883.85 88 .8888: 82.8 8 88:88 5.88... 886.2 8 88288 88 8:88 5.
.8885 88 .8888: .888 8 88:88 288.08 282 8 88288 c8 888:. .8
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88.8.89 .88: 8.8838 88a 88 18:8 88388 88 8:88 8..

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.8885 8.. .8888: .888 8 8.8.8.8 383: 8 88288 88 888. .2

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8.8.8585 98 £888.»: 508% m: 88.888 833 go 88288 88 8888 .2

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888.88 88 .8883: .58.» 8 588888 882 «8880 .8 88308 v.8 8:88 3.
8885.88 98 68253: 527.: 8: 585888 8988ng swam no 838288 88 8888 .2
88.8.85 88 .8888: .888 8 88:88 882 85 8 88288 88 :88... 3.

.8885 83285. E fin a: 88 8 v8: £258 :55. .AoBsBAxEEoEV 088 889 :88

888208 8a .685 an: 88208 8:. A888 88 83 .85 858 8m 828 88:88. .8 88288 88 82808 =<
82% «EU 8 8: 88888 .8: 88 83mg own: 8.8.88.3 a 8 823 .o_.8803_ 8 883 .8 88288 88 8858 =<
.823 8 8888 mo 8: 05 .8 8:38 88 8888 =<

.8882 88

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85.88: 88
23. Baa—80¢

£0“ hon—05603“
8&3 «.893
88.5-3
88888.8;
8582.3
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282.83
3.82-3
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8583.53.83

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-323-

List of Data Sources

Case Study 1: North Rukuru River Fishery

APPENDIX C

 

NGO/FD

VH/GVH/TA

BVC

Gear owner

Crew member

TI’Iader
Community
member
Observation
Gmup
Discussion

Total Men

Total Women

Total

 

Interviews

 

2004-03-05

y—n

 

2004-03-10

 

2004-03- 10

 

2004-03-10

 

2004-03-13

 

2004-04-07

 

2004-04-07

 

2004-04-12

 

2004-04- 19

 

2004-04-19

 

2004-04-19

 

2004-04-22

 

2004-05-31

 

2004-05-31

H~H~H-~HHH_~

NNNNNNNNNNNNNN

 

Total Stakeholders -
Interviews

N
W

N
‘0

N
\O

 

 

Observations

 

2004-06-02

 

2004~O3-10

Ox

 

Total Stakeholders -
Observation

 

 

Group Discussions

 

2004-04-07

10

10

20

20

 

 

Total Stakeholders -
Group Discussion

 

 

 

 

10

 

10

 

 

 

 

 

20

 

 

20

 

-324-

Interviewees

 

APPENDIX D

List of Data Sources
Case Study 2: Yiwemi BVC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

<2 “ =
E ‘32 g 3‘ 3 8 a E a
Q g a ._ 5g E ‘5 2 3 g
o a 3
8 §a§§§saéaggii
z E m :3 Q [— £3 E 8 O 5 g 3 h L
Interviews
2002-07-17 1 l 1
2002-07-22 2 2 2
2004-03-05 1 1 1
2004-03-09 1 1 1
2004-03-10 1 1 1
2004-04-08 3 3 3
2004-04-12 2 2 2
2004-05-31 1 1 1
2004-06-02 2 2 2
2004-11-31 1 1 1
2005-01-29 1 1 1
2005-01-29 1 l 1
2005-02-05 1 l 1
2005-02-05 1 1 1
2005-02-05 1 1 1
2005-02-11 1 1 1
2005-02-11 1 l l 1
2005-02-11 1 l 1
2005-02-11 1 1 1
2005-02-11 3 3 5 5
2005-02-11 1 l 1
2005-02-11 1 1 1 1
2005-02-11 1 1 1 1
2005-02-11 1 l 1
2005-02-14 1 1 1
2005-02-13 1 1 1
Total Stakeholders - 5 11 2 2 5 10 4 0 0 24 11 35
InwnWmm
Observations
2002-07-22 10 4O 1 20 3O 50
2005-02-05 16 50 1 26 4O 66
2005-02-11 15 70 1 45 4O 85
2005-02-11 5 10 1 1 1
Total Stakeholders - 0 0 0 0 46 160 10 4 0 91 111 202
Observations

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-325-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

< "‘ a
g 'E :3' lg = a a g
o E“ a .9 o 0 g
E3 ‘9 L) B -8 E a 3 = 8 jg 33 '§
§>§8Ee°ee~ °°
Z on Q j; E 0 Q E- i-t H N
Group Discussions
2002-07-19 1 10 10 20 1 31 31
2004-04-22 1 10 20 l 3 l 31
2004-06-11 1 ll 4 6 3 1 8 3 11
2004-06-11 10 1 10 10
2004-06-11 1 5 l 6 6
Total Stakeholders - 0 4 31 24 46 3 5 0 5 86 3 89
Group Discussions

 

-326-

 

APPENDIX E

List of Data Sources
Case Study 2: Supporting Data for Yiwemi BVC

<

otal Men

otal

Interviews
2002-07-17
2004-03-05
2004-03- 10
2004-03-13
2004-04-06
2004-05-31
2004-l 1-31
2004-12-01
2004-12-09
2005-01-29
2005-01-31
2005-01-31
2005-02-01
2005-02-01
2005-02-01
2005-02-01
2005-02-01
2005-02-06
2005-02-06
2005-02-07
2005-02-07
2005-02-07
2005-02-07
2005-02-07
2005-02-07
2005-02-10
2005-02-10
2005-02- 10
2005-02-10
2005-02- 12
2005-02- 12
2005-02- 13
2005-02-13
2005-02- 13
2005-02-13
2005-02- 14

2005-02-14

papay—ny—ap—IO‘y—apng—ny—apdu—ay—on—o

 

1
1
1
1
1
I
1
1
6
1
1
1
1
1
2
5
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I

p—np—tp—np—np—ag—n—ap—ny—Ag—a

-327-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"' s:
<3 ._ g .3. g a a g 3
g E g «E: g ,_ g .g o o §
0 t- .8 t O. m 2 3 '
a“; sfiéeaaflaié
z E m g o [— (3 E 8 o E [3 3 t~ ~.
2005-02-14 1 1 1
2005-02-14 1 l l 1
2005-02-14 1 1 1
2005-02-14 1 1 1 1
Total Stakeholders - 6 12 4 1 7 5 18 0 0 0 42 10 52
Interviews
Observations
2004-12-02 2 l 2 2
2005-02-01 5 10 4O 1 25 30 55
2005-02-06 5 10 20 1 25 10 35
2005-02-07 4 25 20 1 19 3O 49
2005-02-10 4 20 10 l 24 10 34
2005-02-12 16 150 30 l 71 125 196
2005-02-13 5 10 1 8 7 15
2005-02-15 21 75 25 1 61 60 121
Total Stakeholders - 0 0 0 62 40 330 75 8 0 235 272 507
Observations
Group Discussions
2004-06-04 20 15 l 35 35
2004-04-21 1 2 6 l 9 9
2004-06-03 1 14 1 l 15 15
2005-02-10 1 3 2 10 l 4 3 1 20 3 23
2002-07-20 6 15 15 l 35 35
Total Stakeholders - 1 4 11 59 38 4 3 0 5 114 3 11 7
Group Discussions

 

-328-

 

APPENDIX F

List of Data Sources
Case Studies 3 & 4: Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary and Kambindingu Fisheries
Association

 

NGO/FD/Corporate

VH/GVH/TA

BVC

Gear OWIICI'

blew member

Trader

Community

Observation

Group Discussion

Total Men

Total Women

Total Interviewees

 

Interviews

 

2002-07-1 l

g—a

 

2002-07-1 1

 

2002-07- 12

 

2002-07- 12

 

2003-11-01

n—INNn—n

her—band

 

2003-11-01

 

2003-1 1-03

 

2003-1 1-04

 

2003-1 1-05

 

2003-1 1-05

 

2003-1 1 -O7

g—aNg—np—a

 

2003-11-21

 

2003-12-02

N

WNNNNNNNNNQNN

 

2003-12-03

N
N

 

2003-12-04

 

2003-12-05

 

2004-02-13

 

2004-02-23

 

2004-02-23

 

2004-02-24

 

2004-02-25

 

2004-02-25

 

2004-02-25

v—Iu—Ii—r—Io—ns—n—ht—s—Iu—Iw—tu—nNNu-‘u—nu—I-HNO‘H—n

 

2004-02-26

 

2004-02-27

 

2004-04-28

 

2004-04-28

 

2004-04-28

 

200405-02

 

2004-05-03

 

2004-05-03

 

2004-05-07

 

2004-05-08

 

2004-05-10

 

 

2004-06-28

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

n—INn—INn—Ar—tA—aNu—ny—s

 

 

NNNNNNKWNNNNNNNNNNNNN

 

-329-

 

 

NGO/FD/Corporate

BVC

Gear owner

Crew member

Trader

Community

Observation

Group Discussion

Total Women

 

2004-06-28

 

2004-07-03

 

2004-10-31

 

2004-10-31

“ N “ “VH/GVH/TA

 

2005-03-01

 

2005-03-01

 

2005-03-01

 

2005-03-01

 

2005-03-02

 

2005-03-02

 

2005-03-02

 

2005-03-04

 

2005-03-04

 

2005-03-04

 

2005-03-05

 

2005-03-05

 

2005-03-05

r—No—It—to—Nt—n—Nt—nh—u—‘u—nt—‘Nn—Iu—ITotalMcn

 

2005-03-05

 

2005-03-05

 

2005-03-05

 

2005-03-05

 

2005-03-06

 

2005-03-07

 

2005-03-07

 

2005-03-16

 

2005-03-17

 

2005-03-17

p—ng—aNp—n

 

2005-03-17

 

2005-03-17

 

2005-03-17

 

2005-03-17

 

2005-03-17

 

2005-03-17

 

2005-03-17

 

2005-03-17

 

2005-03-17

 

2005-03-18

 

2005-03-18

 

2005-03-19

 

2005-03-19

 

2005-03-20

 

 

2006-08-16

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-330-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

g s
“ = .
:3 < 2;» é a .5 3 a a
a E a a S a '5 § § s
(D L) g i! ‘g E. 5 3‘ '5 3; 'g
g E 5 <3 8 E 8 8 9% £3 [3 5
2006-11-14 1 l 1
2006-11-20 1 1 1
Total Stakeholders 19 18 38 40 15 16 8 0 0 110 5 115
Observations
2003-11-02 1 1 6 1 7 7
2003-11-04 1 1 8 1 10 10
2003-11-19 2 1 2 2
2004-05-02 1 7 1 8 8
2005-03-06 1 3 1 4 4
2005-03-04 3 1 3 3
2005-03-05 2 2 l 2 2 4
2005-03-02 2 20 l l l 1 1 22
2005-03-01 6 50 l 31 25 56
2005-03-01 1 10 50 50 1 61 3O 91
2004-05-11 1 6 1 7 7
2004-05-05 1 10 1 l 1 11
2004-05-02 2 3 3 1 7 7
Total Stakeholders - 0 3 7 23 99 122 0 13 0 164 68 232
Observations
Group Discussions
2004-11-06 4 6 30 1 38 2 40
2004-02-23 2 2 2 1 6 6
2004-02-26 1 l 30 1 29 1 30
2005-03-30 1 6 10 l 17 1 7
Total Stakeholders - 7 15 43 0 30 0 0 0 4 90 3 93
Group Discussions

 

 

-331-

 

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