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This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled

STATE LEGITIMACY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

presented by

JEAN-PHILIPPE N. PELTIER

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for the

PhD. degree in Political Science

 

 

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Date

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STATE LEGITIMACY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

By

Jean-Philippe N. Peltier

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Political Science

2007

ABSTRACT
STATE LEGITIMACY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
By

J can-Philippe Noel Peltier

Legitimacy is a pertinent issue in Africa. Many modern African states are discredited
or have lost legitimacy. Many of Africa’s problems are, at their very core, problems of
political legitimacy. Politically legitimate states are a pre-requisite for security and
stability. Without security and stability, development and basic human needs cannot take
root. Thus for Africa, state legitimacy is of the essence.

There are many competing theories as to what contributes to the political legitimacy of
the state, or to the lack thereof. This dissertation seeks to examine which, if any, source
of legitimacy best explains perceptions of legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa.

In the end, this dissertation makes two important contributions to the literature. First,
the importance of an individual’s ngds state institutions is shown to be an
important source of legitimacy. Whereas a state can use force to ensure compliance, it is
far less costly to engender willing compliance. The evidence suggests that increasing an
individual’s trust {1119.599}??? of coercionwenhances legitimacy. Second, a Malian case
study attests to the importance of joking relationships. J oking relationships are a largely

ignored informal institution that might signiﬁcantly account for variance in levels of

ethnic conﬂict in Africa.

COPYRIGHT by
JEAN-PHILIPPE NOEL PELTIER
2007

Dedicated to my family

Trang, Benjamin and Nicolas

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation could not have been written without the assistance of several
people. First, I would like to thank my dissertation committee of Michael Bratton, Bn'an
Silver, Saundra Schneider, Eric Chang and John Staatz. By constantly challenging me
and being accessible to listen to my ideas, these individuals greatly improved the
dissertation. I would like to thank the Department of Political Science at Michigan State
University for providing an ideal environment in which to attain a quality graduate
education. Several fellow graduate students were invaluable for their advice, criticisms,
and general ﬁ‘iendship. I truly appreciate the contributions of: Wonbin Cho, Daniel C.
Lewis, Frederick S. Wood, Shane Singh, Matthew Kirwin and Virginia Parish-Beard. I
would be remiss in forgetting to thank my wife, Trang, for her strong editorial support.
Finally, I could not have asked for a better mentor than Michael Bratton. His advice,
suggestions, constructive criticisms, support, and patience were invaluable to the
completion of this dissertation. His support throughout my years at Michigan State was

strong and constant, and his professional career is one I can only hope to model.

LIST OF TABLES ........ - - - - - ..... IX

 

 

 

 

I - STATE LEGITIMACY - - - -_ ...... _ 1
WHY THE STATE? ..................................................................................................................................... 2
DEFINING THE STATE ............................................................................................................................... 4
MARX ........................................................................................................................................................ 5

Gramsci ................................................................................................................................................. 7

Poulantzas ............................................................................................................................................. 8
CRITIQUE OF MARXIST STATE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................ 9
WEBER .................................................................................................................................................... 10
AFRICAN ISTS AND THE STATE ................................................................................................................ 14
THE STATE: A SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... 23
LEGITIMACY AS AN IDEA ........................................................................................................................ 24
LEGITIMACY AS BOTH STRUCTURE AND IDEA ....................................................................................... 27
DIMENSIONS OF LEGITIMACY ................................................................................................................ 31

Horizontal Legitimacy ........................................................................................................................ 3 1

Vertical Legitimacy ............................................................................................................................. 32
DISTINGUISHING OBJECTS To WHICH CITIZENS MAY ATTACH LEGITIMACY ..................................... 37
MEASUREMENT ....................................................................................................................................... 39
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................... 39

II — COMPETING SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY - 44
JURIDICAL SOURCES ............................................................................................................................... 45
INTERNAL SOURCES ................................................................................................................................ 47

Social Structure ................................................................................................................................... 49
Ethnic Ties .......................................................................................................................................... 51
Inﬂuence of Institutional Context ........................................................................................................ 53
Performance Evaluations .................................................................................................................... 56
Trust .................................................................................................................................................... 61
THE FULL MODEL ................................................................................................................................... 64
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................... 64

III -TESTING COMPETIN G SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY ------ 70
DATA ....................................................................................................................................................... 70
MEASUREMENT ....................................................................................................................................... 7 1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LEGITIMACY INDEX ....................................................................................... 71
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ...................................................................................................................... 73

Societal Structures .............................................................................................................................. 73
Ethnic Ties .......................................................................................................................................... 75
Note on Dimensions of Ethnicity ......................................................................................................... 77
Institutional Inﬂuences ........................................................................................................................ 7 7
Performance Evaluations .................................................................................................................... 80
Trust .................................................................................................................................................... 84
CONTROL VARIABLES ............................................................................................................................. 87
Model .................................................................................................................................................. 88
RESULTS .................................................................................................................................................. 88
Societal Structures .............................................................................................................................. 88
Ethnic Ties to the President ................................................................................................................ 93
Inﬂuence of Institutional Context ........................................................................................................ 95
Performance Evaluations .................................................................................................................... 98
Trust .................................................................................................................................................. 1 00
POTENTIAL ENBOGENEITY ................................................................................................................... 104
CAVEAT: R SQUAREB ........................................................................................................................... 105
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 106

vi

IV — SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRY CONTEXT - - - 109

 

 

 

 

COUNTRY EFFECTS ............................................................................................................................... l 10
MULTILEVEL MODELING ..................................................................................................................... 1 15
Ethnic Fractionalization ................................................................................................................... I 16
Electoral Rules .................................................................................................................................. I 18
COUNTRY CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES ................................................................................................... 120
MULTILEVEL REML ............................................................................................................................ 121
Results ............................................................................................................................................... 122
Authority Structure ............................................................................................................................ 124
MULTILEVEL: FINAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................... 126
COUNTRY CONTEXT: MALI .................................................................................................................. 126
OLS Mali ........................................................................................................................................... 127
Mode of Livelihood ........................................................................................................................... 128
Ethnic T ies to the President .............................................................................................................. 131
Performance Evaluations .................................................................................................................. I 3 5
Gender .............................................................................................................................................. 13 7
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 139
V - MALI: A CASE STUDY - - - - - 142
CASE STUDIES ....................................................................................................................................... 143
RESEARCH OF INTEREST ...................................................................................................................... I44
SOURCES ................................................................................................................................................ 145
MALI: POLITICAL SETTING .................................................................................................................. 146
From Independence to Democracy ................................................................................................... 14 7
Student Movement ............................................................................................................................. I 5 6
Tamasheqs ........................................................................................................................................ I 60
MALI: CHALLENGES ............................................................................................................................. 165
Cotton ............................................................................................................................................... 1 65
Decentralization ................................................................................................................................ I 6 7
Education .......................................................................................................................................... 1 70
ETHNIC AMBIGUITY .............................................................................................................................. I75
PASTORALIST PUZZLE .......................................................................................................................... I 81
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 189
VI — CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ..... 192
KEY FINDINGS ....................................................................................................................................... 193
Trust .................................................................................................................................................. I93
Cousinage ......................................................................................................................................... 200
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 203
Contribution ...................................................................................................................................... 203
APPENDICES - - - - 207
APPENDIX A ....................................................................................................................................... 208
Societal Structures ............................................................................................................................ 208
Mode of Livelihood ........................................................................................................................... 215
Ethnic Group Sharing ties with Presidency by Country ................................................................... 222
2SLS Test for Endogeneity (Economic Performance) ....................................................................... 224
2SLS test for Endogeneity (Trust) ..................................................................................................... 225
APPENDIX B ....................................................................................................................................... 226
OLS w/ Robust Standard Errors Clustered By Country (14 Countries) ........................................... 226
OLS with Country Dummies ............................................................................................................. 227
Multi-Level REML Model ................................................................................................................. 228
Descriptive Statistics ......................................................................................................................... 229
Mali Legitimacy Index ...................................................................................................................... 230

vii

Mali Economic Performance Index .................................................................................................. 231

Mali Corruption Index ...................................................................................................................... 232
Mali Institutional Trust Index ........................................................................................................... 233
Mali: Full OLS Model ....................................................................................................................... 234
Map of Mali ...................................................................................................................................... 235
REFERENCES - - ..... 236

 

viii

List of Tables

Table 2.1: Diagram of Model.. ......................................................................................... 64
Table 3.1: Legitimacy Index Scree Plot ............................................................................ 73
Table 3.2: Contacting Index Scree Plot .......................................................... 80
Table 3.3: Economic Needs Index Scree Plot ................................................................... 82
Table 3.4: Corruption Index Scree Plot ........................................................... 84
Table 3.5: Individual’s Trust in Institutions Index Scree Plot ................................. 85
Table 3.6: Inter-personal Trust index Scree Plot ................................................ 87
Table 3.7: Legitimacy OLS Model ............................................................... 89

Table 3.8: Difference of Means — Perceptions of Legitimacy by Authority Structure. . ..91

Table 4.1: Legitimacy OLS with Robust Standard Errors and Country Cluster

Model ................................................................................................ 112
Table 4.2: Legitimacy OLS Models Comparison ............................................. 114
Table 4.3: Analysis of Variance (AN OVA) Model ........................................... 115
Table 4.4: Summary Table of Electoral Systems and Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups
in 14 sub-Saharan Aﬁican Countries ............................................................ 121
Table 4.5: Comparison of Individual and Country Level Effects of ANOVA and
Multilevel Model .................................................................................. 122
Table 4.6: Legitimacy OLS and Multilevel Model Comparison ............................. 123
Table 4.7: Legitimacy Multilevel and Mali OLS Model Comparison ..................... 127
Table 4.8: Difference of Means — Contacting Traditional Ruler ............................ 129
Table 4.9: Difference of Means — Contacting Religious Leader ............................ 129
Table 5.1: Malian Perceptions of Legitimacy (Constitution) ................................ 152
Table 5.2: Malian Perceptions of Legitimacy (Police) ........................................ 152
Table 5.3: Malian Perceptions of Legitimacy (Courts) ...................................... 152

ix

Table 5.4: Malian Perceptions of Legitimacy (Tax) ........................................... 153
Table 5.5: Legitimacy Index Mean of 14 sub-Saharan countries ........................... 153
Table 5.6: Bar Chart — Country Variance: Constitution ...................................... 154
Table 5.7: Bar Chart — Country Variance: Courts....................... . . 154
Table 5.8: Bar Chart — Country Variance: Law . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Table 5.9: Bar Chart — Country Variance: Taxes . . . . . .155
Table 5.10: Student Perceptions of Legitimacy (Constitution)................ . ................158
Table 5.11: Student Perceptions of Legitimacy (Police) ...................................... 159
Table 5.12: Student Perceptions of Legitimacy (Courts) ...................................... 159

Table 5.13: Student Perceptions ofLegitimacy (Tax)159

Table 5.14: Tamasheq Perceptions of Legitimacy (Constitution) ........................... 163
Table 5.15: Tamasheq Perceptions of Legitimacy (Police) ................................... 164
Table 5.16: Tamasheq Perceptions of Legitimacy (Courts) .................................. 164
Table 5.17: Tamasheq Perceptions of Legitimacy (Tax) ..................................... 164

I - State Legitimacy
Large parts of Africa are in disarray. Aristide Zolberg noted over three decades ago, “the
most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost
institutionless arena with conﬂict and disorder as its most prominent feature” (1968, 70).
On the surface, little, if anything, appears to have changed. Yet, this statement does not
take into account the great variety of African experience. From a stable Botswana to the
failed state of Somalia, Aﬁica is more than conﬂict and disorder. Whereas many scholars
tend to focus on the exceptional, such as William Reno in his Warlord Politics and the
African State (1998), I am interested in identifying key variable(s) that help explain the
wide variances in the African experiences with political stability.

For a comparativist, the beauty of Aﬁica lies in the continent’s diversity. Aﬁ'ica proper
is comprised of 53 states; 48 of them in sub-Saharan Afn'ca. In these 48 countries, one
can travel from Somalia to Botswana and observe 48 different degrees of state legitimacy
and democracy. This diversity is a gift given to the sub-Saharan Africanist and is rarely
utilized. Too often, the focus resides on the ‘exceptional’ cases. Yet, I would argue that
one might learn more about the exception by studying the whole. This dissertation
examines state legitimacy in Africa and its sources in this broader context.

In this dissertation, factors that contribute to the willingness of Africans to comply
when a state commands their obedience are identiﬁed. It is reasonable to suggest that
political legitimacy is important in explaining the variance in the current African
condition. I follow the path of Pierre Englebert (2000) who convincingly argues that

inherited legitimacy is a strong predictor of development. Further, the legitimacy of the

state is a necessary condition to economic and political development, a condition that
African states share to varying degrees. If we can accept legitimacy as a necessary
condition, then factors contributing to it are crucial towards better understanding African
conditions. For example, Botswana might be consistently stable due to high legitimacy,
whereas nearby Angola, rich in resources, has been a textbook example of Zolberg’s
disorder and conﬂict, accompanied by low state legitimacy.

Before one can start examining contributing factors to legitimacy, it is important, as
Giovanni Sartori (1970) reminds us, to deﬁne our concepts. For meaningful comparison
and discussion, terms must be sufﬁciently precise to ensure the validity of our
measurements. It is important to deﬁne legitimacy: its meaning, dimensions and
referents — and then to operationalize it for purposes of analysis. It is with this in mind
that the inquiry into legitimacy begins. The inquiry begins in an attempt to deﬁne the
state.

Why the State?

In regards to the inquiry into legitimacy, why does the state matter? In 1968, J .P. Nettl
argued that if the state could “be made into an operating variable that points up
signiﬁcant differences and discontinuities between societies, making possible
systematically qualitative or even quantitative distinction, there may be a case for
bringing it back in” (Nettl 1968, 562). Since, there has been a lot of debate as to the
relative autonomy and merit of the state.

There are two basic approaches that attempt to provide theoretical ground for the merit
of the state. The ﬁrst approach can be broadly categorized as subjective in nature

(Mitchell 1991). Such an approach emphasizes the individual, forgoing the

institutionalized structures of the state (Krasner 1978; Nordlinger 1987). Here, it is
argued that institutions vary from state to state and do not, in of themselves, exhibit any
preference. The analysis of the state is reduced to the ambiguous term policy, which is
deﬁned as “the intention and desires of certain state ofﬁcials” (Mitchell 1991, 86). In the
end, this approach tends to “remystify the state concept” (Almond 1987, 476).

The second and more fruitful approach views the state as an actual organization. Theda
Skocpol argues that the state should be treated as an independent determinant of political
outcome (Skocpol 1981, 156). She provides that states have “their own structures and
histories, which in turn have their own impact upon society” (Skocpol 1981, 200).
Surveying recent literature, Skocpol notes the resurgence of research focusing on the
state as an actor (Skocpol 1985). Most importantly, she advocates the pursuit of “further
comparative and historical investigations to develop middle-range generalization about
the roles of states. . .and about the effects of states on political conﬂicts and agendas”
(Skocpol 1985, 28).

For the most part, the debate as to whether the state has an independent impact upon
political phenomenon is settled. As Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda
Skocpol note, “it is fruitful to assume both that states are potentially autonomous and,
conversely, that socioeconomic relations inﬂuence and limit state structures and
activities” (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985, x). The idea that the state can both
facilitate political inquiry and affect political phenomenon is widely accepted (Almond
1988; Bendix et a1. 1992; Mitchell 1991). The real challenge in researching the state, one
Nettl largely ignores (Almond 1988, 856; Nettl 1968), is identifying and deﬁning the

concept in a sufﬁciently precise manner to allow for rigorous scientiﬁc investigation.

Defining the State

As previously discussed, the state is an important unit of analysis. As the state is at the
very center of this inquiry, this “master noun of political discourse” (Geertz 1980, 121)
must be more thoroughly discussed and, if possible, deﬁned. Speciﬁcally, what is the
state? What leads society to accept a state as legitimate? There is no easy deﬁnition.

David Held describes the state as a multi-dimensional phenomenon whose nature varies
across time and space (Held et al. 1983, ix). In the original Encyclopedia of Political
Science, George Sabine notes that the term state “denotes no class of objects that can be
identiﬁed exactly, and for the same reason it signiﬁes no list of attributes which case the
sanction of common usage.”(Sabine 1934, 328) Initially, inquiries on the state were more
philosophical in nature. In 1532, Niccolo Machiavelli (1995) conceptualized the state as a
territorial sovereign government. Since, there has been a long history examining abstract
concepts of the state, man’s relation to the state, justice and equality (Hobbes 1651;
Locke 1690; Mill 1859; Rousseau 1973). It was not until Karl Marx that a more
empirical, or observationally based approach was made in attempts to characterize the
state (Held 1983, 3).

The next few pages are going to examine various scholars and their approach to the
state. As such, I will touch on the classics, such as Karl Marx and Max Weber. The
inﬂuence of Marx and Marxist thinkers such as Gramsci and Poulantzas is examined. It
soon becomes apparent that a Marxist approach is deﬁcient in furthering our inquiry into

state legitimacy. Thus, the focus of this study turns from Marx to Weber. Weber’s

inﬂuence and applicability to Africa is carefully examined through various scholars who
adopt a Weberian perspective in their analysis of the state.

Marx

Commenting on previous thinkers, Marx noted: “[M]an is not an abstract being squatting
outside the world. Man is the human world, the state, the society” (Marx 1970, 131). In
other words, individuals only exist in relation to others and are deﬁned through their
relationships with others. Further, such a relationship can only be “properly explained in
terms of its historically evolving interaction with other social phenomena — a dynamic
and changing process of inextricably related elements” (Held 1983, 24).

Key to Marx’s analysis was the emphasis on class structure in understanding the
relations between people. Focused on the historical process, Marx notes that classes are a
creation of history. Speciﬁcally, Marx argues that early tribal societies were classless
because: “[T]here was no surplus of production and no private property; production was
based upon communal resources and the ﬁ'uits of productive activity were distributed
through the community as a whole” (Held 1983, 24). Simply, class divisions arise when
society generates a surplus of production. Surplus allows for one class of non-producers
to live off the activity of those who produce: the worker.

Subsequently, the fall of feudal society and the rise of a market economy slowly led to
the rise of the modern Western class divisions. Marx and Friedrich Engels (Marx and
Engels 1930) argue that these divisions are based upon one dominant exploitative
relationship between capitalists (those with capital) and those who only have their labor

(e. g. wage-laborers) for sale (Giddens and Held 1982). In capitalist societies', the

 

l “Societies are capitalist to the extent that they can be characterized as dominated by a mode of production

majority of individuals are classiﬁed as workers, or wage-laborers. This relationship
between capital and wage-laborer is at the very core of modern social and political
structure.

Thus far, two key elements of Marxist thought, the importance of class structure and
the relationships between classes, set the stage for Marx’s view of the state. Marxist
thought on the state are best illustrated in his work The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte (Marx 1963). The Eighteenth Brumaire analyzes the rise to power of Louis
Napoleon Bonaparte between 1848 and 1852. In one of his most famous passages, Marx
comments on the French state:

“This executive power, with its enormous bureaucratic and military organization,
with its ingenious state machinery, embracing wide strata, with a host of ofﬁcials
numbering half a million, beside an army of another half million, this appalling
parasitic body which enmeshes the body of French society like a net and chokes
all its pores.” (Marx 1963, 121)
In his analysis, Marx grants the French state some autonomy. This immense set of
institutions can help shape society and even limit the power of the capitalist.
Speciﬁcally, Marx “suggests that the agents of the state do not simply coordinate political
life in the interests of the dominant class of civil society. . .[the state] has the capacity to
promote change, as well as coordinate it” (Held 1983, 27). Nevertheless, Marx’s concept
of the state was primarily that of a conservative force in favor of the status quo enlisting
the support of its information networks and the coercive arm of the military and the

police. Thus, the Marxist concept of the state was that of a superstructure serving the

interest of the dominant class (e. g. the capitalist) at the expense of the worker.

 

which extracts surplus from wage-workers in the form of surplus-value - the value generated by workers in
the productive process over and above their wages, and appropriated by the owners of capital” David Held,
"Introduction: Central Perspective on the Modern State," in States and Societies, ed. David Held, et al.
(New York: New York University Press, 1983).

In sum, it can be argued that there are two strands of Marxist thought regarding the
relation between the classes and the state: 1) the state operates with a certain degree of
autonomy independent of class divisions, and 2) the state acts as a superstructure to serve
the interests of the dominant class (Held 1983, 29). In the former position, the state can
be viewed as a potential arena for struggle in the promotion of democratic change
(Bernstein 1961). The problem with such approach is that Marx did not adequately
develop his theory regarding the mechanisms of the state, such as determining how
bureaucracies work.

It follows that Marx’s conception of the state as a superstructure that serves the interest
of the dominant class is the most widely discussed and developed of the two thoughts.
Marx’s combined writings indicate that the state is central to the control of class divided
societies (Held 1983, 29). Further, many Marxist thinkers focused their analysis on the

many complex and subtle ways dominant classes sustain power.

Gramsci

Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci sought to understand the means by which the capitalist
class maintain power through the state (Gramsci 1975; Gramsci 1971). His ultimate goal
was to uncover the conditions that would ultimately lead to the transformation of the state
by the subordinate class (e. g. the workers) (F ontana 2002, 159).

In his analysis, Gramsci notes that the state is characterized by a hegemonic
equilibrium constituted by a “combination of force and consent which are balanced in
varying proportions, without force prevailing too greatly over consent” (Gramsci 1975,
1638). In other words, the capitalist state maintained control not just through coercion,

but also ideologically through a hegemonic culture that promotes capitalist values.

Perversely, the working class identiﬁed with a hegemonic culture perpetuated by the

capitalists, in turn helping to maintain the status quo of oppression.

Poulantzas

Nicos Poulantzas (1973) also followed Marx’s conception of the state. While Gramsci
sought to understand how the dominant class sustained power through the use of the
state, Poulantzas was interested in exploring the mechanisms of the state. Poulantzas
sought to understand the structural components of the state with the essential proposition
that the state is the unifying element in capitalism. Speciﬁcally, the state must function
to ensure the political organization of the dominant class as competitive pressures
constantly pressured class based organization to fragment. More importantly, the state
must ensure the political disorganization of the working classes which, because of their
overwhelming numbers, can threaten the dominant class (Poulantzas 1973, 287-88).

Poulantzas further argued that the dominant classes, susceptible to fragmentation, need
the state to protect their interests. In order to do this, the state needs to remain relatively
autonomous of class interests in order to avoid appearances of impropriety or favoritism.
Borrowing from Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Poulantzas argued that the state must
not only repress the oppressed but obtain their consent.

Consent was achieved through a divide and conquer strategy. Speciﬁcally, the state
facilitates class alliances to help the dominant group make an alliance with subordinate
groups as a means of garnering consent to rule by the subordinate group (e. g. working
class). Consequently, the dominant class undermines the worker’s ability to effectively
organize by ‘co-opting’ segments of the working population through these alliances. The

resulting fragmentation of society is a deﬁning characteristic of the capitalist state.

Notably, one of the problems with Poulantzas analysis of the state is that he fails to
sufﬁciently deﬁne and differentiate the institutions that comprise the state. Speciﬁcally,
he does not explain how institutions operate, nor does he examine how the varying class
relationships operate (Held 1983, 33). By failing to address the concerns it is hard to
understand exactly how the state is able to facilitate class alliances, fragmenting society
in the process.

Critique of Marxist State Analysis

The Marxist view of the state is difficult to apply analytically. Most notably, Marxist
thought appears to be less concerned with what constitutes a state (e. g. collection of
institutions) than what a state does (e. g. tool of oppression). For a Marxist, the state is, to
varying degrees, the instrument of the dominant class. The nature of the state is the
outcome of existing class struggles.

In the present inquiry on state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Aﬁica there are two particular
problems with the Marxist view of the state (Chabal 1992, 71). First, the post-colonial
state is not the result of a long standing class struggle. Rather, the post-colonial state is
the result of the colonial state and the outcome of the decolonization process. Thus, the
sub-Saharan state cannot simply be conceived in class terms. In Aﬁica, the state was
formed over existing economic structures.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, is the fact that classes in Aﬁica are not easily
identiﬁed. Patrick Chabal and J can-Pascal Daloz comment that “it is difﬁcult to
establish, other than in ideological terms, whether there are in Africa identiﬁable social
classes with discrete and coherent political ambitions” (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 5). It is

challenging to determine whether those elites do in fact constitute a Marxist class as they

do not live off surplus generated by wage-laborers. Commenting on the absence of a
capitalist economy in Africa, Hyden notes that “the assumption that there is a dominant
class in power capable of ensuring the reproduction of capitalism must be seriously
questioned” (Hyden 1983, 60). Thus, given the sub-Saharan context, a Marxist approach.
does not engender useful inquiry into the state, much less state legitimacy.

Weber

The German sociologist and political economist Max Weber provides a much more
useful deﬁnition of the state. Contrary to Marxists, Weber resisted any attempt to label
the state as parasitic and as a direct product of competition between classes (Held 1983,
34). Weber stressed the independence of the state.

Weber utilized the most signiﬁcant deﬁnition of the modern state, emphasizing two
distinct aspects of the state: territoriality and violence (Weber 1978, 904-07). According
to Weber, the modern state is any set of structures that is capable of monopolizing the
legitimate use of coercion within a given territory; it is a state in competition with other
states rather than a class tool. The state safeguards the existing economic order and its
economic interests in relation to other states. The institutions that comprise the state,
most notably the bureaucracy, ﬁnd ultimate sanction in the claim of monopoly of
legitimate coercion. A state is vulnerable to crisis only if the monopoly erodes.

A key term in Weber’s deﬁnition of the state is legitimizing. The term legitimacy is
absolutely essential to Weber’s deﬁnition of the state’s claim to “the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1958, 78). Essentially,

the state operates within a given scope of territory; territory is a key attribute of the state.

10

The state has the sole right of using force within a well-deﬁned geographical limit. More
importantly, the state can only use legitimate force within such territory.

It follows that legitimate force and factors that make the monopoly of coercion non-
legitimate must be examined. An important aspect of legitimacy is “the probability that
certain speciﬁc commands (or all commands) will be obeyed. . .every genuine form of
domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is. . .obedience” (Weber
1978, 212). Thus, at the core of legitimacy is voluntary compliance. Given the
importance of territory, a more complete deﬁnition of legitimacy would be nggtm
compliance of a given group of people living within a speciﬁed territory. The failure of
the state in attaining voluntary compliance results in illegitimacy.

Given the importance of voluntary compliance the next inquiry naturally concerns how
the state garners voluntary compliance. Weber discusses different types of legitimate
authority: charismatic, traditional and rational-legal. The oldest ‘pure type’ of legitimate
authority rests on charismatic grounds. Charismatic authority rests on devotion to the
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person (Weber
1978, 212). These charismatic leaders are endowed with speciﬁcally exceptional powers
or qualities believed by followers to be acquired through supernatural means (e. g. God
given). It is the recognition of these exceptional powers by the charismatic ruler that
results in an individual’s consent to his rule. The consent could evaporate should the
ruler appear to be deserted by his God or lose his powers and cease to beneﬁt his
followers (Weber 1978, 242).

A second type of legitimate authority rests on traditional grounds. Simply, consent to

rule is based “on the established belief in the sanctity or immemorial traditions and the

11

legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority)” (Weber 1978,
215). Traditional leaders acquire consent by virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and
powers (Weber 1978, 226). These rules are based primarily on personal loyalty.
Obedience is given to the person who occupies the relevant position of power.
Traditional authority is largely tied to tradition or custom. Should a leader attempt to
circumscribe such tradition or custom, it is likely that he will lose voluntary compliance
of his subjects.

Finally, legitimate authority can rest on rational-legal grounds. This type of authority
can be referred to as legal authority. Legal authority rests “on a belief in the legality of
enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue
commands (legal authority)” (Weber 1978, 215). At the center of this rational-legal state
is the bureaucracy. Legitimacy is conferred to the state by the people when rules are
followed rationally and in a way that is consistent with legal statute and accepted norms
and procedures.

The next question becomes, from where do these rules derive? Simply, legal authority
is obtained through the various bureaus or institutions that together comprise the state.
Through Weber’s lens, the inner workings of the state can be viewed as a particular order
or conﬁguration of institutions that create, promulgate, and enforce the rules and
procedures of the state. Commenting on the Weberian state, Alfred Stepan notes that the
state is comprised of the “continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive
systems that attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and [the

state] in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as

12

well” (Stepan 1978, xii). As such, there is little doubt state institutions are variably
structured in different countries, but their function remains the same.

In sum, one can conceive of the Weberian state as comprised of two key elements.
First, it is the monopolization of legitimate coercion within a given territory. The state
seeks to monopolize coercion within a given territory through the use of various
institutions exercising a monopoly of authority (e. g. courts), whether autonomously or
through the joint operation of governmental and societal actors (Bendix et al. 1992,
1013). Territory that does not fall under bureaucratic jurisdiction is not considered part
of the state. I

Second, and most importantly, the state is the monopoly of legitimate coercion.
Legitimacy, as deﬁned by Weber, is voluntary~qbedience of the individual to the state.
Historically, such obedience can rest on three pure types of legitimation: charismatic,
traditional, and rational-legal. Legitimacy in the modern state rests primarily in
individual acceptance of rational-legal bureaucratic rules. In other words, the legitimacy
of the modern state relies upon an individuals “belief in the validity of legal statute and
functional ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules" (Weber 1958, 79).

Given a Weberian framework, it is absolutely essential for individuals to consent to the
rule of the state. Theoretically, it is conceivable that in a given state there are two
variants of pure types of legitimation. Thus, consent to rule can be given to the state on

both traditional and rational-legal grounds, or perhaps a mix of charismatic and rational-

legal.

l3

Africanists and the State

Before proceeding ﬁrrther with the discussion on legitimacy, it is important to examine
how Aﬁicanists, whether explicitly or implicitly, deﬁne the state in their inquiry into
political phenomenon. Some Africanists explicitly adopt the notion of a Weberian State.
Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, for instance, “begin by considering the
contemporary concept of state as it is universally used, with its implicit point of reference
in the Western nation-state” (Young and Turner 1985, 7). Others, such as Robert Jackson
and Carl Rosberg are more implicit when referring to the European template in Africa.
Speciﬁcally, they observe the following: “[I]n general, personal regimes may be thought
of as typical of transitional periods, when one institutional order has broken down and
another is yet to replace it” (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 5).

Jackson and Rosberg observe that most modern African states lack meaningﬁrl
empirical presence in many parts of their territory (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). In other
words, the institutional conﬁgurations that comprise the state are, for the most part,
lacking. Jackson and Rosberg acknowledge that African states meet the legal
requirements of statehood as set by the international community; states display all the

/
outward ceremonial juridical attributes. Nevertheless, the authors take their examination
of the state one step further.

Jackson and Rosberg examine whether African states have the necessary institutions to
effectively monopolize the use of coercion within a given territory. This is important for
examining whether institutions that comprise the state exercise effective monopoly of

k.

coercion in sub-Saharan Aﬁica. Here, unlike preceding scholars, they pay attention to

the Weberian deﬁnition of state. The authors conclude that most African states lack the

14

necessary institutional order, thus necessary capacity, to effectively monopolize the
coercion of force over their juridical territories (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 22). Notably,
they are less concerned at this point with legitimacy than a state’s capacity to effectively
monopolize coercion within a given scope of territory.

Conversely, John Lonsdale is less concerned with monopoly of coercion over a given
territory than he is with state legitimacy, or what he refers to as political accountability
(Lonsdale 1986). He posits that “the idea of accountability seems noticeable for its
comparative absence from the ﬁeld of Aﬁican studies. . .because it is a difﬁcult concept to
use” (Lonsdale 1986, 127). Lonsdale notes that historically African leaders have been
unable to rely entirely on force to effectively control their population. A large part of the
Aﬁican experience involves the use of persuasion. Speciﬁcally, big men need to
persuade individuals to act according to their wishes.

Lonsdale points out that a leader is aware that consistent use of power undermines his
rule. As leaders recognize: “[F]orce is external. . .expensive. It generates resistance,
resignation or evasion” (Lonsdale 1986, 134). Conseqtfently, the abuse of power has led
to individuals who “have generally bent all their ingenuity to the evasion of power”
(Lonsdale 1986, 128). Thus, to prevent individuals from ignoring their leaders entirely or
from simply agreeing and proceeding regardless of edict, rulers aspige for legitimacy, or
willing obedience to their rule.

According to Lonsdale, African state building greatly involves the development of
participant political communities, which are communities in which individual actively
participate. In this context, rulers continually struggle to ﬁnd grounds for legitimation of

their rule, and the success in their quest for legitimacy has varied. To this end, Lonsdale

15

argues that legitimacy is too important a concept to simply. discard as difﬁcult to
conceptualize.

Like Lonsdale, Basil Davidson and F. K. Buah observes that Africa has a rich and
varied tradition of legitimate authority and institutional innovation (Davidson and Buah
1977). According to Davidson, one of the central problems with modern Africa is the
underlying illegitimacy of the state. Davidson argues that colonialism intentionally
undermined what Weber would label traditional authority in attempts to thrust Africa into
the modern world. Colonialism taught “that nothing useful could develop without
denying Africa’s past, without a ruthless severing from Africa’s roots and a slavish
acceptance of models drawn from entirely different histories” (Davidson 1992, 42). In
doing so, colonial powers destroyed the very bed on which legitimacy rested.
Consequently, vast numbers of individuals became disconnected from new colonial elites
who have no historical ground of legitimacy in their claim for willing obedience of their
subjects. Thus, for Davidson (1992), as with Lonsdale (1986), legitimacy is at the heart
of his analysis of the state.

Unlike Lonsdale and Davidson, Crawford Young (1994) is less interested in deﬁning or
exploring legitimacy as he is in deﬁning the state. Relying on Kenneth Dyson (1980),
Young identiﬁes two necessary dimensions of the state in his deﬁnition: 1) the state as a
conceptual object identiﬁed through crucial attributes, and 2) the state as an actor grasped
“in terms of a half-dozen behavioral imperatives that guide its action” (Young 1994, 26).

Young focuses his analysis on the imperatives of the state rather than its crucial
attributes (e. g. territory, population). Young argues that the state, as agent, is motivated

by the following six imperatives: hegemony, autonomy, security, legitimacy, revenue,

l6

and accumulation. By hegemony, he refers to the state’s struggle in ensuring the
supremacy of its authority. Autonomy refers to the fact that “no intrusion on the national
domain can be tolerated, nor can another state be permitted to assert its jurisdiction
within state territory” (Young 1994, 36). Security looks primarily at public safety with
the territory while legitimacy involves the “habitual acquiescence in and consent to its
rule” (Young 1994, 37). The revenue imperative is the “history of the evolution of the
state... [as it] enhances the ability of rulers to elaborate the institutions of the state. . .and
to increase the number and variety of collective goods provided through the state” (Levi
1988, 1-2). Finally, accumulation focuses on expanding the state’s economic base, from
which the state derives its revenue (Young 1994, 39).

Young breaks from a more Weberian focus on legitimacy and concentrates on the
accumulation imperative. Young contends that “for the many developing states,
especially the Aﬁican set. . .the current dilemma of polity management in many ways
hinges on the accumulation imperative” (Young 1994, 40). He explains that the primary
weakness of the African state rests on its inability to “foster accumulation through the
state, to ﬁnd domestic private substitutes for the state, or to secure external ﬁnance other
than to facilitate reimbursement of its gigantic debt” (Young 1994, 40). With this
concept of the state in mind, Young delves into his analysis of the African colonial state
vis-a-vis other colonial states (e. g. Vietnam).

In his state analysis on the accumulation imperative, Young notes that these imperatives
always operate in interaction (Young, 1994, 40). This dynamic is problematic as there is
an arguably sequential order to these imperatives. Speciﬁcally, for a state to accumulate

resources it must ﬁrst have the ability to extract revenue. Without revenue, it is unlikely

l7

that a state can sustain the requisite institutions to facilitate accumulation. More
fundamentally, the state must be legitimate in order for it to extract effectively.
Individuals must be willing to give a percentage of their income to the state on some
ground of legitimation.

Young also notes that hegemony is one of the driving imperatives of the state.
According to Young, it is difﬁcult to conceive that a state can achieve a high degree of
hegemony without ﬁrst attaining legitimacy. Speciﬁcally, all “states are continuously
engaged in a struggle to ensure the supremacy of their authority... [and] will not brook
direct affronts from segments of society to their right to rule” (Young 1994, 35).
Accordingly, it appears reasonable to argue that such direct affronts are unlikely to occur
in a legitimate state, one in which individuals willingly acquiesce to the rules of the state.

Ultimately, Young argues that the African state is the product of a colonial legacy that
sought to emphasize coercive and extractive properties in order to satisfy the
accumulation imperative. He believes that the Aﬁican state must be seen as a ﬁ'ee-
standing entity; one in which the “completeness of its domination freed the state from
responsiveness to its subjects to a remarkable degree” (Young 1994, 159). The question
becomes, can such a dominating state, one no longer subject to its population, still be
considered a state? Given the importance of legitimacy, it is unlikely that Weber,
Lonsdale or Davidson would characterize such a set of institutions as a legitimate state.
Further given the decline in revenues and continuing marginalization of Aﬁican states
from the world economy (van de Walle 2001 , 5), it does not appear that such a strategy, if

in fact employed, has been very successful.

18

Mahmood Mamdani furthers the discussion through the examination of the legacy of
the colonial state (Mamdani 1996). Analyzing the impact of colonial rule in Uganda and
South Aﬁica, Mamdani comments that the African colonial experience:

“. . .came to be crystallized in the nature of the state forged through that
encounter. . .it contained a duality: two forms of power under a single
hegemonic authority. . .Civil power claimed to protect rights [in urban
areas], customary power pledged to enforce tradition [in rural areas]”
(Mamdani 1996, 18)
This is how the term J anus-faced or bifurcated state developed. Through Mamdani’s
lens, colonial authority sought to rule Africa more along urban-rural than inter-ethnic
divisions.

In essence, the modern African state rests on two grounds of legitimation. First, the
state is legitimized through traditional grounds in rural areas. Colonial powers, through
indirect rule, would grant historical African chiefs the authority to rule according to
traditional authority. Mamdani notes that “it was about incorporating natives into state-
enforced customary order” (Mamdani 1996, 18). Speciﬁcally, Aﬁican chiefs and leaders
sought to preserve whatever privilege they could by accepting for better or worse
positions offered them within the colonial administration while learning to manipulate it
for their own beneﬁt (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988, 203). Perversely, this very act of
collaborating with colonial authority undermines their traditional legitimacy as the chiefs’
authority no longer depended on willing acceptance from their subjects. Rather, the
chiefs’ power depended heavily on threat of force from an external colonial power
(Coquery—Vidrovitch 1988, 93).

Second, urban authority attempts to rest on rational-legal grounds. Colonial powers

attempted to directly impose rational-legal rules on individuals directly within the sphere

l9

of control (e. g. urban areas). While rural authority aimed to keep power decentralized,
urban authority was organized “around the principle of fusion to ensure a unitary
authority” (Mamdani 1996, 18). Thus, the challenge of the modern state, according to
Mamdani, is discovering a way to bridge this bifurcated power. This is no easy task as
Mamdani argues that strengthening one is likely to weaken the other.

Jeffrey Herbst shifts the focus from colonial legacy to control over deﬁned territory
(Herbst 2000). Immediately, he begins by asserting that “states are long viable if they are
able to control the territory deﬁned by their borders” (Herbst 2000, 3). According to
Herbst, the fundamental problem of the African state today lies in the projection of
authority “over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people”
(Herbst 2000, 11). From his analysis, one can understand how the urban ruler’s inability
to project power outside of the capital led to Mamdani’s bifurcated state. As power
projection is cost prohibitive, it is far more cost efﬁcient to rely on more indirect means
of controlling rural populations (Herbst 2000, 89).2

Herbst, perhaps unintentionally, modiﬁes the Weberian deﬁnition of state in an African
context. The state remains the monopolization of legitimate coercion, but traditional
African states were more concerned with exerting authority over people than territory
(Herbst 2000, 36). From this deﬁnition, it is reasonable to expect that given the African
context, the legitimacy aspect of state deﬁnition gains additional importance.
Speciﬁcally, controlling people, as opposed to land, cannot occur without consent of

those being ruled.

 

2 Notably, there is great variation in the historical African experience. Beyond the Asante T. C. McCaskie,
State and Society in Pre-Colonial Asante, African Studies Series ,' 79. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995)., the historical empires of Ghana, Kongo, Songhau and Kanem-Bornu, just to name
a few, did extend their control over vast amounts of territory - Philip D. Curtin et al., African History, 2nd
ed. (London ; New York: Longman, 1995)., something that Herbst does not address.

20

Herbst also notes that “the combination of large amounts of open land and rain-fed
agriculture meant that, in pro-Colonial Africa, control of territory was often not contested
because it was often easier to escape from rules than to ﬁght them” (Herbst 2000, 39).
Simply, if traditional chiefs extended beyond the bounds of traditional authority, it was
not uncommon for individuals to simply abandon the village or move under the control of
a legitimate chief; the chiefs were thus subject to popular consent (Asiwaju 1976; Skinner
1964). In sum, legitimacy, or an individual’s consent to being ruled, appears to be the
deﬁning attribute of the historical African state.

Catherine Boone ﬁrrther adds to the literature on the state by shedding light on the
complexities of urban-rural relations in Africa (Boone 2003). Speciﬁcally, she examines
strategies available to the center in attempts to govern the periphery. In her analysis,
Boone highlights several key features of rural society that fundamentally shape a state’s
attempt to further project its authority over rural areas. The key features are the
production of cash crops, the existence of a rural social hierarchy, and elite dependence
on the resources of the central state (Boone 2003, 37). For example, if a rural area does
not produce any cash crop the center is likely to forgo attempts at incorporation. If a
rural area produces important cash crops (e. g. cocoa), then the center must determine
whether it must consult with an existing authority or hierarchical structure. Again,
available strategies for incorporating rural segments appear directly tied to those three
structural features of any one given rural area.

Relevant to the present discussion on the deﬁnition of the state, Evans Lieberman
examines one particularly coercive instrument of the state: taxation (Lieberman 2003).

Taxation is such an integral part of coercion that Douglass North narrows Weber’s

21

deﬁnition, noting that the state is “an organization with a comparative advantage in
violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its
power to tax constituents” (North 1981, 21). Accordingly, state boundaries end where
the state can no longer tax its constituents.

Taxation is one of the most visible and immediately felt consequences of a state’s
ability to effectively coerce its population. According to Lieberman, the “power of the
states to tax varies widely across countries” (Lieberman 2003, 6). In his study,
Lieberman seeks to understand the varying ways individuals respond to a state’s attempt
at taxation. He observes in some states, individuals appear to spend a lot of time ﬁlling
out requisite paper work and maintaining records of their tax ﬁlings.

In other states, attempts at taxation seem to fall on deaf ears. Irnportantly, Lieberman
suggests that “the inability of a state to generate signiﬁcant revenues through taxation is
often a precursor to state failure or even collapse” (Lieberman 2003, 6). Speciﬁcally,
Lieberman illustrates how different institutional conﬁgurations affect a state’s ability to
collect tax payments. Although particularly concerned as to the conditions under which
the country’s elites avoid paying taxes, Lieberman notes that more regional (e. g. federal)
institutional arrangements are overall likely to lead to a more adversarial tax state, one in
which the state ﬁnds collecting tax payments difﬁcult. Speciﬁcally, regional allegiances
act as obstacles to a sense of greater national unity. In Weberian terms, the legitimacy of
the state is ﬁagmented. Individual consent to the state is stronger towards regional
institutional authority than it is to central institutional authority.

Ultimately, Lieberman illustrates that the state is not fully autonomous because “it is

subject to serious political and economic constraints” (Lieberman 2003, 40). It cannot

22

simply act on its own. The health of the state, regardless of its grounds of legitimation,
depends primarily on its varying degree of legitimacy. The more individuals willingly
consent to the rules (e. g. request for tax payments) of the state, the more effectively the
state can monopolize coercion over a given territory. Coercion without consent is likely
to be expensive and “relatively ineffective in the wake of extensive avoidance and
evasion schemes” (Lieberman 2003, 40).

The State: A Summary '

It is clear that the state is an important variable when inquiring into political phenomenon
and Aﬁica is no exception. William Munro notes that “the state is pivotal to the political
future of African countries. . .some institutional form and organization exists which calls
itself, and is recognized as, the state” (Munro 1996, 113). The state is the dominant
structure on the continent and as such, it cannot be ignored (Englebert 2000). As
discussed earlier, the state is the monopoly of legitimate coercion within a given
territory. The foregoing summary review of some of the literature clearly indicates that
there cannot be a state without legitimacy. Legitimacy might reside or be found in
different grounds of legitimation, but in a continent where control of people is at a
premium (Herbst 2000), consent to rule is a pre-requisite.

The modern state bases its legitimacy on rational-legal rules. Thus, it is important to
examine whether individuals consent to or abide by rules issued through the various
institutions that comprise the modern state. A state’s attempt to monopolize coercion is
found in the set of institutions that lay claim to command over any given territory (e. g.
the police, the courts and the military). The extent to which these institutions can

effectively monopolize coercion is directly related to their legitimacy, or the individual’s

23

willingness to obey. Thus it stands to reason that understanding what, if any, source
helps facilitate such willingness to obey is important in the context of helping the state to
solidify and eventually expand its monopoly of legitimate coercion to the periphery, with
hopes of extending control over all its people. However, as seen in the following section,
legitimacy constitutes more than the amalgamation of institutions that comprise the state.
Legitimacy can also be thought of as an idea.

Legitimacy as an Idea

Legitimacy is a normative concept. David Easton argues that when basic political
attachment to the state becomes deeply rooted or institutionalized, the system is accepted
as legitimate by the population (Easton 1957, 399). This attachment is based on the
‘system’ meeting the population’s demands. Easton does not provide any testable theory,
but his conceptual scheme does make us think about how the state responds to the
demands of the people. His insight points to the state’s need to generate and maintain a
sufﬁcient degree of support3 in order to remain legitimate.

Symbols are an effective means of generating sufﬁcient support. Robert J ackrnan
views legitimacy as a phenomenon generated by regimes through the ideological appeals
of symbols; appeals designed to engender consent among the governed (J ackrnan 1993,
97). The link between state and citizenry is at the very heart of the idea of legitimacy.
Successful states are able to convince the citizenry that it is the rightﬁrl authority. Many

scholars have pointed toward the central necessity of legitimacy as an idea.

 

3 Easton (1975) differentiates between speciﬁc and diffuse support Diffuse support tends to be more
durable than speciﬁc support. Speciﬁc support is directed towards political authorities and authoritative
institutions (1975, 439).

24

Young (1994) talks about the state as an idea. The state is the “ensemble of affective
orientations, images, and expectations imprinted on the mind of its subjects” (Young
1994, 33). He refers to Murray Edelman (1988; 1964), who views the state as involving
a political performance to hide the inequalities and exploitation that the state reinforces
through its structures. From there, Young refers to the imperatives of the state, that set of
determinants that guide state actions: hegemony, autonomy, security, legitimacy, revenue
and accumulation (Young 1994, 34).

As discussed earlier, the legitimacy imperative is a component of the idea of a state
(Young 1994, 37). Young suggests that Weber places legitimacy at the core of the notion
of state by noting, “absent this property, the state is in a condition of extreme
vulnerability” (Young 1994, 37). As valuable as the state’s ability to coerce might be, it
is often in short supply and tends to undermine the state with over usage. According to
Young, the state must seek to invest its structures, or institutions, with legitimacy through
habitual consent to its rule. This idea of legitimacy is consistent with Michael
Schatzberg’s argument that legitimacy in Africa rests on the normative idea that
government stands in the same relationship to its citizens that a father does to his children
(2001). The father/child idea is a theme that seeks to invest legitimacy into the structures
of the state while minimizing the use of coercion.

Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar further the idea of the state’s prominent role in state
legitimacy (2004). They view the use of the spiritual realm as an important force in
legitirnizing the state. This link between state legitimacy and the spiritual realm is bi-
directional (Ellis and Haar 2004, Chapter 5). The spiritual realm can serve to legitimize

the state. Conversely, an illegitimate state attempting to garner legitimacy through the

25

spiritual realm risks de-legitimizing the spiritual realm in the process. Ellis and ter
Haar’s emphasis on legitimacy as an idea illustrates the importance of this concept.
Moreover, the concept of legitimacy as an idea is important in the context of scarcity.
African state bureaucratic structures are often very limited in capacity, in turn
diminishing their ability to effectively coerce the population. As an example, Peter
Evans examines the bureaucracy of Zaire (1995). Every indicator of bureaucratic
capacity suggests the set of Zairian institutions are limited in their ability to coerce the
population. Those institutions lack trained technocrats following standardized procedures
whose positions are not based on the whims of immediate supervisors. In effect, the
public administration in Zaire is thoroughly neopatrimonial, with every indicator of
bureaucratization (e. g. specialization, technocrats with regulme observed procedures,

etc...) at an extremely low level (Joseph 1999, 68).

Evans further examines Zaire’s infrastructure capacity. Here, it is apparent that the
Zairian administration is largely unable to penetrate society and implement its decisions.
Regions act autonomously of the center, ignoring rules or edicts that are of little to no
relevance to them (Callaghy 1984). Evans concludes that the state directed its energies to
preventing the emergence of social groups that might have an interest in its
transformation. However, if the state lacks the capacity to implement its program or the
bureaucratic capacity to formulate it in the ﬁrst place, this claim is empirically
implausible. Many African states are simply too limited in their capacity to rely on their

structures.

A prime example of such limited capacity is Uganda under President Milton Obote

(Obote). Though coercive tactics might have been appealing to Obote in dealing with the

26

Buganda", he lacked the military capacity to control society (Rothchild 1986, 82).
Through what Rotlrchild terms a process of hegemonic exchange, Obote resorted to
dealing with the village ambassadors who each jockeyed for their own interests
(Rothchild 1986, 77). Obote was not the exception to the rule. Bargaining skills became a
necessity of African regimes because of their inability to impose terms over semi-

autonomous peripheral authority (Rothchild 1986, 83).

Thus, given the states’ weak institutional capacity, it behooves any state to increase its
legitimacy without the actual use of coercion. Creating the idea of legitimacy becomes of
marked importance, one not lost among African leaders. The idea of the state “allows its
institutions to penetrate the conscience of its citizens and to provide the frame in which
they represent themselves as citizens in a political community” (Englebert 2000, 74).

\ a“.
Legitimacy as both Structure and Idea

Thus, a state possesses a twofold nature: ﬁrst as an idea and second as a set of concrete
structures that monopolize legitimate violence over a given territory. For a state to be
legitimate it must be the sole instrument of coercion or violence within a given territory
and, critically, its citizens must accept it as an idea. The monopolization of coercion
alone is insufﬁcient in providing a state with legitimacy.v To be ﬁrlly legitimate, a state
must earn acceptance from its people.

William Reno (1998) illustrates an illegitimate Liberia under former President Charles
Taylor (Taylor). Taylor arguably monopolized coercion over a deﬁned territory but was

not interested in creating the idea of legitimacy through obtaining people’s acceptance of

 

4 Obote was the leader of Uganda in the late 705 and in the early 80s following Idi Amin. The Buganda are
a storied historical Kingdom within Uganda.

27

his rule. Realizing in part that the accumulation of legitimacy is time consuming given
the costs and potential beneﬁts, it appears that Taylor most likely decided against
investing in the idea of legitimacy in order to attain his goal.

Further, Goran Hyden describes the African state as a balloon “suspended in ‘mid-air’
over society and is not an integral mechanism of the day-to-day productive activities of
society” (Hyden 1983, 7). Such a state leaves individuals with little option but to
disengage. Based on this balloon analogy, a state seeking legitimacy wants to be
grounded and connected to those it seeks to rule. On the other hand, Taylor was content
in allowing his particular set of institutions to ﬂoat above society, like a balloon,
completely disconnected from society at large. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that
leadership, whether charismatic, traditional or bureaucratic, must spend resources in
maintaining the idea of legitimacy through its various institutions.

One must remember a few things when discussing legitimacy. Legitimacy is not an all-
or-nothing proposition (J ackman 1993, 108). All states employ violence on their citizens
to various degrees. The less extreme form of coercion might include state’s restrictions
on certain political activities (e. g. limiting the route of a Klu Klux Klan demonstration).
III some cases, state coercion can extend to the banning of political parties. J ackman
notes that states can increase the severity of ofﬁcial coercion through one of two ways: 1)
instead of employing tactics sporadically, states may begin to apply these more
systematically and continuously, and 2) the state may begin inﬂicting higher levels of
physical harm towards those challenging its claims of legitimate coercion (J ackrnan 1993,

110). Among the most extreme forms of use of state coercion might include the

widespread political executions of individuals who dissent with the state, or employment

28

of the use of deadly (e. g. military) force to enforce bans on public demonstration (e. g.
1989 Chinese repression of a series of demonstrations at Tiananmen square using
People’s Liberation Army (Murray 1990)).

Furthermore, few states can be considered completely legitimate. All states must
“strive instead for a working consensus on procedures, a consensus they seek to engender
among politically relevant groups” (J ackrnan 1993, 108). Thus, legitimacy is often a
matter of degrees. Not all states are able to garner equal amounts of willing compliance
from their population. On one extreme end, compliance is less a matter of choice than a
matter of life in North Korea (Garrett and Glaser 1995; Oh and Hassig 2003). In this
example, failing to comply with the state is likely to result in loss of life. As such, it is
likely that such an oppressive state that relies on a fraction of its population enjoys low
levels of legitimacy, or willing consent to its rule.

With respect to the United States, it is reasonable to argue that the majority of the
population consents to the various rules and regulations of the state. The September 11th
terrorist attacks (Schmemann 2001) on the United States resulted in long security lines at
airports to which individuals willingly subjugate themselves. This is a visible example of
tacit consent to the rules of the state. Yet, one cannot ignore the possibility that domestic
disturbances may arise as a result of established rules such as the Los Angeles Riots of
1992 (Wood 2002). Here, a riot erupted in Los Angeles after one segment of the
population perceived the illegitimate use of force by the police department. Such riots
and the necessary [excessive] force needed to restore peace under the circumstances

demonstrate that, to some degree, the state can generate opposition to rules that are not

fully accepted, or legitimated, by a certain segment of its population at any point in time.

29

It is counter-productive to view illegitimacy as an absolute value. J ackman
convincingly argues that “it is more useful to conceive of legitimacy in continuous
terms...” (1993, 108). Each state gains and loses legitimacy. Eventually, there is a point
in which insufﬁcient legitimacy remains and the state collapses. Such a collapse results
in a failed state, one that is unable to monopolize the legitimate coercion of force over a
given territory.

Somalia is an illustration of such a failed state. Speciﬁcally, no one set of institutions
legitimately monopolizes coercion over the defrned territory of Somalia. Rather, Somalia
is characterized by clan-based violence (Adam 1995). As such, there are competing clan
based warlord factions that mights, or might not, seek to monopolize coercion over a
given territory (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 16). The question then becomes, how do
apparently illegitimate states survive? The answer might simply be that legitimacy exists
though it is likely to be found outside formal state institutions

As previously discussed, it is important to note that legitimacy can rest on other than
rational-legal grounds (Weber 1958, 78-79). Rational-legal grounds of legitimation deal
essentially with formal rules. Yet, it is quite possible that legitimacy can be found in
informal political institutions (Helrnke and Levitsky 2004). Because informal institutions
are not always apparent, they are typically ignored altogether or spoken of only in general
terms. Informal institutions provide a sense of stability — equilibrium — that are lacking
with formal institutions (Hyden 2006). For example, an informal, as opposed to formal

(e. g. voting) means of political participation might be found in kinship associations or

 

5 Somaliland, in NW Somalia, is an example of a territory in which clans have set aside differences and
begun to establish a set of institutions that legitimately control the monopoly of force over a given territory
(Somaliland) Patrick Gilkes, "Brieﬁng: Somalia," African A ﬂairs 98, no. 393 (1999).

30

other traditional political units (Chazan 1982, 173). These groups have in common “an
adherence to patterns of authority established by traditional or revised custom, a
commitment to a primordial tie — be it ethnic, cultural or geographic -— and some
perception of a commonality of goals and interests” (Chazan 1982, 174). In Weberian
terms, the rules of these formal institutions are widely accepted, or legitimated, based on
traditional grounds or “the established belief in the sanctity or immemorial traditions and
the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority)” (Weber
1978, 215). Next, it is important to review the dimensions of legitimacy.

Dimensions of Legitimacy

For purposes of this inquiry, previous discussion results in the following deﬁnition of
legitimacy: an individual ’s willing consent to the rules of the state. Thus, a legitimate
state is one in which its constituents willingly obey its mandates. A state expressing
higher levels of legitimacy, one that garners willing obedience from the majority of its
population, relies less on coercion and enjoys more willing compliance on the part of its
people. Yet, the concept of legitimacy is not one-dimensional. One can conceive of two
dimensions of legitimacy: vertical and horizontal. Although this inquiry focuses

primarily on the vertical dimension of legitimacy, it is important that both be understood.

Horizontal Legitimacy

According to Englebert, horizontal legitimacy refers to whether the people who live
within a given territory consider themselves part of a community (Englebert 2000). In
Africa, this can be problematic as most states inherited their borders with little concern
for established communities. Such problem of “congruence, or horizontal legitimacy,

comes from the fact that Aﬁican societies were often politically deﬁned before the

31

creation of the colonial state and that these existing politics. . .did not usually provide the
social foundation for modern independent African states” (Englebert 2000, 85).

As a result of the colonialization process, these communities were Imited under a new
state. These new states did not necessarily share a common identity or view themselves
as part of an overarching community. The greater the number of pre-existing
communities, the less agreement one can “expect to ﬁnd as to what constitutes a
community that lies at the foundation of the state, thus the less horizontally legitimate the
current state” (Englebert 2000, 88).

Jackson and Rosberg focused on horizontal legitimacy in their discussion on the
salience of divided communities whose members resided in two or more countries
(Jackson and Rosberg 1982). They note that “[o]nly rarely did a colonial territory reﬂect
the shape and identity of preexisting African socio-political boundary...” (Jackson and
Rosberg 1982, 14). William Miles refers to the divided communities Jackson and
Rosberg discussed. Speciﬁcally, Miles described how the colonial boundaries in the
Sahel divided the Hausa people between the states of Niger and Nigeria (Miles 1994).
Miles observed that such a division “had a deep impact on each side of the border”

(V illalaon 1998, 24). It is thus reasonable to argue that one such impact is the effect of a

divided community on horizontal legitimacy.

Vertical Legitimacy

Whereas a truly legitimate state will enjoy both horizontal and vertical legitimacy, this
inquiry focuses on vertical legitimacy. Vertical legitimacy generally refers to the
people’s acknowledgment of a state’s right to rule. J ackrnan suggests that a state “is thus

legitimate to the extent that it can induce a measure of compliance ﬁ'om most people

32

without resort to the use of physical force” (1993, 98). As such, vertical legitimacy is the
degree of citizens’ acceptance of the political order given the known or feasible
alternatives (J ackman 1993, 99). The question becomes, do Africans willingly grant the
right to rule to the modern state or do they look elsewhere?

A cursory look into pre-colonial Aﬁica will quickly show that modern political
structures of power bear little resemblance to pre-colonial ones. Basil Davidson clearly
explains how independence did not result in a return to historicity (Davidson 1992).
According to Davidson, independence represented a marked change of political authority
as the new Aﬁican elites acquired the structures of colonial power. Further, Bertrand
Badie goes to great length discussing how imported colonial state structures lost “their
function, that is, their effectiveness and their power...” (Badie 2000, 131).

New Aﬁican elites chose to forgo their pre-colonial institutional past, indeed often tried
to repress it. Elliot Skinner does a wonderful job illustrating this point when discussing
the new elites of Upper Volta who sought to repress and de—legitimize true historical
authority represented by the traditional leader, the Mogho Naba (Skinner 1964). This
rejection of the past served to severely strain the links between state and citizen.

For the most part, the modern state experiment failed to connect with the citizen. One
possible explanation might be that the peasants never participated in the process of state
creation. Harrington Moore (1966, 480) argues that peasants supply the dynamite to
bring down the old state, necessary for reconstruction of the new. If that is the case, this
political process rarely, if ever, took place in Aﬁica.

Some exceptions might be considered, such as the guerilla movements against white

settlerstates. After the Rhodesian parliament issued a Unilateral Declaration of

33

Independence assuring minority white rule in 1965, guerrillas belonging to the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU) began rebelling against the state (Lan 1985, 3). Such
rebellion arguably involves a case where rural peasants sought to bring dynamite to the
existing state and create a new institutional order. Yet, most guerrilla movements since
independence6 appear less concerned with abolishing the state — particular conﬁguration
of institutions that legitimately monopolize coercion over a given territory — than
replacing one regime, or set of rules, with another (Clapharn 1998, 4).

Besides lack of involvement in the process of state creation, other reasons might
explain why the modern state in Aﬁica occasionally fails to connect with its population.
According to Tilly, European state formation involved competition between states (Tilly
1975). Yet, the European process Tilly deﬁned was an endogenous one, while the
Aﬁican process of state making during independence was highly exogenous, or
externally imposed by colonial powers. Hendrik Spruyt posits that as states modernize,
they destroy competing structures (Spruyt 1994, 155). This process occurs mainly
through what he terms Darwinian selection by war (ld.). Essentially, stronger competing
structures dominate those less able to defend themselves. This process rarely occurred in
post-colonial Africa.

Barrington Moore describes the process of modernization as a revolutionary break with
the past (Moore 1966). Moore mainly focuses on economic classes and their interaction
with each other and the state. He concludes that there are three roads to modernization:

l) bourgeois revolution (e. g. France), 2) by way of authoritarian regime that promotes the

 

6 One notable exception has been Eritrea. Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia following a thirty-
year war which lasted from 1961 to 1991 (http://wwwbritannica.com/eb/article-37674/Eritrea) last
accessed 26 Feb 2007.

34

interests of the landlords and industrialists (e. g. Germany), and 3) a peasant revolution
that destroys the landlords, and then leads to a Communist dictatorship (e. g. China)
(F errria 1972, 22). In each case, a radically new set of institutional structures emerged.

Given the Aﬁican context, such roads to modernization are unlikely. First, as
previously discussed, there is little evidence of class structure in Africa (Chabal and
Daloz 1999, 5). Second, Africa has a relatively weak history of land owning elites.
Historically, along with the lack of privatization, there was a relatively equal distribution
of land. Land distribution was aimed at preventing its accumulation in the hands of a few
privileged individuals (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988, 117-20). Given the lack of class
structure and privatization of land, it is unlikely that Africa could follow any of the roads
of modernization Moore described. Consequently, Moore’s notion of state building is
inappropriate in Africa.

Moreover, Tilly and Spruyt’s ideas on state formation are highly endogenous in nature.
As states competed against one another, the process of modernization took place
internally. That is to say, as internal capacity increased, states grew more competitive
and successfully expanded outward. Conversely, the modern Aﬁican state is one of
foreign imposition, comprised of “exogenous institutions, superimposed over preexisting
political structures and inherited by domestic but westemized elites at independence
(Whitaker 1991; Badie 1992; Davidson 1992; Young 1994)” (Englebert 2000, 74). In the
example of the Mogho Naba, the competition was between traditional authority and new
elites whose power derived from the colonial process and the support of foreign states.
To ensure victory of the chosen elites in Upper Volta, the French military aided the new

president in his attempt to repress traditional authority.

35

The African state is the product of foreign powers, abandoned at independence, in turn
adopted by new elites as a means of controlling distinct communities in newly juridically
deﬁned territories. Essentially, the issue of vertical legitimacy becomes “a problem of
clashing and mismatched institutions, contested sovereignty, and disputed allegiance”
(Englebert 2000, 79).

It is thus vertical structural congruence or the compatibility between state structures and
the preferences of citizens that is the focus of this inquiry. Speciﬁcally, are individuals
willing to accept the rule and authority of the state? A state can continually coerce to the
extent of its capacity, but it is not until that people view it as legitimate, that is, accept its
authority, that it can begin a developmental process.

Furthermore, it is possible that, if the modern state fails to deliver sufﬁcient levels of
security (through the monopoly of coercion), then‘individuals will turn to traditional or
alternative structures of authority. This does not necessarily mean that all individuals
want to revert to historical institutions of power. This is simply to say that unless the
state connects vertically with the people, it will continue to whither until it becomes little
more than a private good 'at the hands of a few elites. Alternatively, a state lacking
vertical structural congruence might wither to the point of collapse as people simply start
ignoring it completely.

Finally, Max Weber observes that legitimacy can develop over time through what he
terms customs. Weber deﬁnes custom to mean “a typically uniform activity which is
kept on the beaten track simply because men are ‘accustomed’ to it and persist [through
time] in it by unreﬂective imitation” (Weber 1978, 319). The longer the state survives,

the more chances it has to prove itself, develop, and gain the consent of its people to rule

36

them. As such, the modern state is but decades old, while more traditional structures are
centuries old. It is important to note that Europe took centuries to modernize whereas
African states have enjoyed less than 50 years of independence. Nevertheless,
understanding that one cannot resurrect the past or necessarily desire the past, it remains
to be seen how structural congruence can be developed between states and citizens in the
African context.

Distinguishing Objects to which Citizens may Attach Legitimacy

As previously discussed, the state is both an idea about legitimate authority and a set of
concrete structures that legitimately monopolize the use of force. Pippa Nonis considers
mass political support multi-dimensional in nature (1999). She refers to Easton (1965;
1975) who “distinguishes between support for the community, the regime and the
authorities” (Norris 1999, 9). Norris suggests that these distinctions provide an essential
starting point. This is important to consider when discussing legitimacy.

Legitimacy attaches to any one of four levels: the state, the regime, the government and
its leaders. The citizens might view one level as more legitimate than another, but it is
important to understand what is being measured. For example, Bratton et al. (2000)
mention that the Tuareg minority accepted the legitimacy of the Malian state, less so the
military than other institutions. In their attempt to distinguish among state institutions,
they are able to measure perceptions of legitimacy as they relate to the state and its
institutions as opposed to any one leader or the current regime. In order to ensure
precision, it is important to examine the different levels to which legitimacy can attach

itself.

37

As previously discussed, the state can be thought of as a skeleton, a set of formal
institutions that outlasts the ebb and ﬂow of political regimes. It is the particular set of
institutions that claim the monopoly of legitimate coercion over a given territory.
Whether or not it succeeds is an empirical question, thereby allowing the researcher to
distinguish between strong and weak states. Although states do disappear through
conquest, violence or disintegration, they are generally permanent entities (Young 1994).
The state is comprised of the structures that permit the regime to operate accordingly.

The regime is the set of rules that dictates who can participate and how participation
takes place. Given this deﬁnition, one can conceive of a regime transition as “a shift
from one set of political procedures to another, from an old pattern of rule to a new one”
(Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 10). Regime capacity and legitimacy are directly
related to state legitimacy and capacity. Without legitimate institutions, both as an idea
and as structure, the regime cannot effectively operate. The regime develops its own
logic, “whose ultimate aim is the reproduction over time of its particular conﬁguration of
institutional arrangements and dominant ideas” (Young 1994, 41). Within any given
regime, a government exists.

Government refers to the set of ofﬁce holders who compete for and hold ofﬁce for a
limited time period deﬁned in the rules of the political game. They are the group of
people who make decisions in the name of the state. In a democracy, governments come
and go, but the rules, or the regime, remain constant. .

The government itself is comprised of leaders. These individuals compose the

government but can come and go without government change. The leaders change more

38

frequently than either regime or government and provide much of the daily dynamic of
any given state.

Legitimacy can attach to the state, the regime, the government, or the leaders.
Nevertheless, the focus of this dissertation is on state legitimacy. As such, it will remain
focused on measurements and contributors of state legitimacy at the state level. The
rationale is, none of the other three referents of legitimacy can effectively operate over
time without a legitimate state. In other words, “the interests of regime and state become,
under conditions of prolonged stability, indistinguishable...” (Young 1994, 41).

Measurement

Given the above discussion, this research endeavor examines sources that contribute to
state legitimacy within the Aﬁican context. Before discussing those sources, concepts
and terms must be deﬁned to ensure that subsequent measurements accurately reﬂect the
concepts. As such, this effort seeks to measure vertical state legitimacy while focusing
on the structures of the state that monopolize coercion. Consistent with previous
discussions, the focus is on the state’s ability to induce compliance without resorting to
force - taxation is an example. Critical to compliance is the individual citizen.
Ultimately, the argument proposed is that a state is legitimate to the extent it can garner
willing individual compliance to its rule without resorting to the use of force.

Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation is to examine how people view institutions of coercion,
whether they willingly obey these political institutions. Coercion is one element, but
another factor is people’s acceptance of a state’s attempts or right of coercion. This

becomes the heart of legitimacy or, a state’s ability to govern without resorting to the use

39

of force. As such, do individuals within any given Aﬁican state trust the institutions of
coercion? Do they believe that they should pay their taxes? Do courts have the right to
pass abiding rulings? Do people willingly acquiesce and accept the state’s right to rule
them? These are all questions that attempt to measure the legitimacy of the state. Thus,
this dissertation proceeds as follows.

To measure legitimacy, data is obtained from Afrobarometer Round 37. This is a
comprehensive public attitude survey covering 25,000 respondents over 18 Aﬁican I
countries. The sample employed a multi-stage, area, cluster method with randomization
at all stages to ensure a representative sample. Every adult across the 18 countries had an
equal chance of selection. As a representative sample, it is important to note that the
survey population closely matches the distribution of subgroups within the national
population in key respects such as gender, age and residential location (urban or rural).

Before using the data in attempts to test varying levels of state legitimacy, it is
important to consider potential sources of state legitimacy. Chapter 2 examines
competing sources of legitimacy, speciﬁcally, the literature on societal structures, ethnic
ties, institutional inﬂuences, performance evaluations and trust. The discussion will
generate testable hypotheses. Further, this chapter will help in the development of
indicators to test competing theories.

Chapter 3 uses the available Afrobarometer data in an attempt to empirically test which,
if any, source of legitimacy discussed in the previous chapter has the most affect on

varying perceptions of state legitimacy. Speciﬁcally, Afrobarometer Round 3 data is

 

7 More information on the Afrobarometer survey and its methodology can be located at:
htttgﬂwww.gfrobarometerorg/survevs.htrnl . Notably, Afrobarometer Round 2 data is being excluded as it
did not collect information on individual respondent’s ethnicity, an important potential contributing factor
to varying perceptions of legitimacy (see Chapter 2).

4O

used to determine which theory best explains variance in the perception of state
legitimacy across sub-Saharan Aﬁican states. Knowing which source(s) best explains
legitimacy increases understanding of the Aﬁican state.

It is also important to consider how context might affect legitimacy. Chapter 4 argues
that context matters. Whereas it is important to generalize and compare across countries
(Przeworski and Teune 1970, 4), it is important to remember that context might affect
this research’s ﬁndings. It is likely that country speciﬁc variables, such as particular set
of institutional arrangements or varying levels of ethnic ﬁagmentation, affect empirical
ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, sources of legitimacy that were initially important in explaining
varying levels of perception of legitimacy might, once country particularities are
accounted for, cease to be signiﬁcant. Inversely, previously insigniﬁcant sources of
legitimacy might prove signiﬁcant. Consequently, it is important to look at methods that
take these country effects into account.

Additionally, taking countries into account exposes an outlier. As shown later, the
extent to which competing sources of legitimacy in Mali differs in one very interesting
way. Speciﬁcally, Mali is the only country in which sharing ethnicity with the president
has a statistically signiﬁcant and negative relationship to legitimacy; an individual who
shares ethnicity with the president is less likely to view the state as legitimate. Thus, in
this chapter, the empirical ﬁndings ﬁ'om the Mali model will be discussed. This in turn
will lead to a case study of Mali.

Chapter 5 takes a case study approach in examining Mali. Single case studies have
comparative merit, either as hypothesis generating or deviant case studies (Lijphart

1971). In this case, Mali serves as a deviant case study. Speciﬁcally, Mali is the only

41

state in the database in which sharing ethnicity with the president decreases overall
perceptions of legitimacy. Further, a single-country study can be useful to comparative
inquiry if concepts gathered are applicable to other cases (Landman 2003, 34).

Ultimately, this case study uncovers and facilitates the understanding of a potentially
very important informal institution: cousinage. An understanding of cousinage is likely
to help develop broad comparative theory. Speciﬁcally, cousinage can help explain
variance in levels of conﬂict in ethnically diverse societies. In the end, this “thick
description” (Geertz 1973) provides necessary insight to explain potential differences
between the cross-national and Mali-speciﬁc model tested in previous chapters. As
mentioned earlier, it is likely that there are differences in the relative importance of
sources of legitimacy from the cross-national model to the Mali-speciﬁc model. This
Malian ﬁeld research allows informed discussion over these differences and why these
may not be as unexpected as initially thought.

Chapter 6 will conclude the study by examining the contributions of this dissertation
which are the importance of an individual’s trust in the institutions of the state and the
informal institution of cousinage. The ﬁrst contribution involves showing that an
individual’s trust in the institutions of the state has the most affect on state legitimacy.
Speciﬁcally, the more an individual trusts the institutions of the state, the more the
individual is likely to consent to the rules of the state. Given an individual’s trust in
institutions is vital to legitimacy, possible means of increasing trust in institutions will be
discussed. In order to help the state garner legitimacy, it is important to talk about
various mechanisms that might inspire an individual to trust in a state’s institutions and

consequent policy implications.

42

Besides the importance of an individual’s trust in the institutions of the state, there is
another important contribution to this dissertation known as cousinage in Mali.
Cousinage is an informal institution anthropologists refer to as joking relationships.

J oking relationships are considered a traditional, time immemorial, means of mitigating
conﬂict within and between various ethnic groups. J oking relationships can be found in
several continents around the globe such as Africa and Latin America. The importance
of joking relationships, from a comparativist perspective, is the potential of such
interactions to help explain the wide variance in ethnic conﬂict. It has been noted that
given the large number of ethnic groups in Africa, the continent should experience more
ethnic based conﬂict than observed (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Perhaps joking
relationships, utilized as an informal means of mitigating inter and intra-ethnic conﬂict,
can explain lower levels of ethnic conﬂict than some might predict.

Obtaining sub-Saharan Africa data is difﬁcult. Nevertheless, with data from such
sources as the Afrobarometer project, there is enough information to begin systematic
empirical analysis. As such, this dissertation uses available data in hopes of better
understanding the roots of legitimacy in sub-Saharan Aﬁica. Such cross-national
comparison of available data examining the contributors to legitimacy is among the ﬁrst
of its kind. Accordingly, this dissertation stands to make a credible addition to existing
literature in exploring sources of legitimacy while uncovering informal institutions that

can potentially explain varying levels of ethnic conﬂict.

43

ll - Competing Sources of Legitimacy

The last chapter deﬁned legitimacy as an individual’s willing compliance to mandates of
the state. As previously discussed, legitimacy is a pertinent issue in Africa. A state
lacking legitimacy might soon ﬁnd its authority challenged or usurped by a more
legitimate set of institutions. For example, Mbuji-Mayi, the city that serves as the capital
of the south-central East—Kasai district of Congo, has effectively become “a center of
autonomous development efforts and separatist tendencies” (Reno 1998, 175). Such
localized acts of independence do not facilitate a state’s attempt to monopolize legitimate
coercion over its given territory.

Many of Africa’s political problems are, at their very core, problems of state legitimacy.
Legitimate states are a prerequisite for security and stability. Without security and
stability, development and basic human needs cannot take root. Thus for Aﬁica, state
legitimacy is of the essence.

Legitimacy requires individuals to believe that the state is right and appropriate for their
society with no realistic alternative (Diamond 1999, 65; Lipset 1960, 64). This chapter
seeks to gain a better understanding of what affects varying perceptions of state
legitimacy. Speciﬁcally, this involves examining sources that contribute to sub-Saharan
Aﬁicans’ voluntary compliance with state mandates and reasons why they believe the
state and state institutions deserve their compliance.

If one source can be established as more important than another, scholars can begin
concentrating their analytical tools on aspects of legitimacy that matter. The literature
speaks of two broad categories of sources of legitimacy: external and internal. The

primary source of external legitimacy is juridical. J uridical legitimacy deals with laws,

44

foreign imposed state constitutions (Badie 2000, 146-56) and the legal recognition of the
state by the international community (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Legitimacy is
ultimately an internal manner. For a state to be considered legitimate, it must have the
willing obedience of the individuals living within its boundaries. As such, internal
factors are those that, in one way or another, serve to connect the state to the citizen.

Juridical Sources

Here, two juridical sources of legitimacy are examined: the international community and
the state’s constitution. There is little doubt that modern states in Africa beneﬁt directly
from the international community, mainly in the form of aid. Furthermore, as Jackson
and Rosberg (1982) presciently indicate, the international community plays an
instrumental role in granting legitimacy to the state and ensuring its survival through
guarantee of borders and access to international monetary institutions. Nevertheless,
legitimacy as deﬁned is mainly an internal matter. It is about individuals granting state
structures the right to rule them and the right to monopolize such coercion. As such, it is
not the international community’s function to decide for the individuals.

Without downplaying its signiﬁcance, the international community simply cannot grant
legitimacy to the state on behalf of the people it is attempting to govern. Out of respect
for those who must live under the rule of personal dictators whose accountability remains

primarily tied to foreign political and economic constraints (Jackson and Rosberg 1982,

27), this inquiry does not consider the international community a source of legitimacy.

45

National Constitution

Another juridical contributor to legitimacy is the national constitution, or the basic
principles and laws of the state. Constitutions are an important juridical contributor to
legitimacy. There is an important difference in legitimacy based on degree of individual
contribution or participation in the constitutional making process. The lowest degree of
individual contribution is that of a foreign imposed constitution (Badie 2000, 146) while
the highest degree of contribution derives from a constitution which citizens give to
themselves.

A good example of the latter is the 1996 constitution in Uganda. The individual
grassroots involvement in Uganda’s constitutional design might explain why 72% of
Ugandans are generally satisﬁed with their democratic regime (Bratton, Mattes and
Gyimah-Boadi 2005, 82). Yet, even including individual participation in the constitution
making process does not necessarily lead to increased legitimacy. In her study of
Uganda, Devra Coren Moehler notes that “the inclusion of participation may have helped
pro-government leaders to convince citizens that the process was fair and the constitution
legitimate, but it did not prevent opposition leaders from convincing their followers
otherwise” (Moehler 2006, 35). While examining the involvement of individuals in
constitution-making is fruitful in terms of understanding sources of legitimacy, this
discussion focuses on empirical state rather than constitutional legitimacy. As such, the
effects, if any, of individual involvement with constitution-making should be reﬂected in
the individual’s perception of state legitimacy.

Juridical sources of legitimacy are important. Nevertheless, leery of too much

conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970), this discussion aims to keep the concept of

46

legitimacy narrowly deﬁned to ensure the best possible measurements. Accordingly,
with an understanding that juridical contributors are a factor, theoretical insight is limited
to internal contributors of legitimacy.

Internal Sources

This section begins by examining ﬁve possible internal sources of legitimacy: social
struCture, ethnicity, institutional inﬂuences, performance evaluations and trust. In the
next chapter, data is used to test these competing sources empirically and determine
whether or not any merits further discussion. If any contributors are found to be lacking,
scholars can then proceed to an alternative source.

First, what are social structures? Social structures are often viewed as ﬁxed and
immutable. Yet, Aﬁica is constantly undergoing change. There is no reason to believe
that societal structures would remain isolated from the process of change. Here, the focus
will be on three social structures: authority structures, mode of livelihood and urbanism.
Speciﬁcally, this discussion will cover whether any of these three affect perceptions of
legitimacy, if rural pastoralists are more likely to comply with the demands of the chief
than that of the state, and relevant ﬁndings from the literature.

Ethnicity can be seen as a cultural value. In this context, ethnicity refers “to subjective
perception of common origins, historical memories, ties and aspirations. . .Ethnicity, or a
sense of peoplehood, has its foundations in combined remembrances of past experience
and in common inspirations, values, norms, and expectations” (Chazan et al. 1999, 108).

These deeply embedded [cultural] values are likely to affect perceptions of legitimacy.

Speciﬁcally, individuals who share ethnicity with those in control of the state are more

47

likely to feel a natural link to the state. Consequently, sharing ethnicity is likely to affect
perceptions of state legitimacy.

Institutional inﬂuences are another potential source of legitimacy. Institutions are
essentially the structures of the state. These structures in turn establish the rules of the
game in a society “or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction” (North 1990, 3). Institutions involve either formal (e. g. judicial code)
or informal (e. g. convention and norms) constraints. This inquiry focuses primarily on
formal institutions. Such institutions consist of formal rules that, in turn, “provide signals
to individuals about the rewards and punishments to be expected from various courses of
actions” (Bratton et al. 2005, 39). Thus, it is important to examine how different
institutional rules affect an individual’s perception of state legitimacy.

Citizen evaluations of the performance of the state are another source of legitimacy
worth investigating. There is little the individual can do to affect state performance. Yet,
positive performance might result in a more legitimate view of the state from individuals.
After all, if the state is able to supply basic necessities (e. g. jobs), it is possible that
sustained performance leads to increased state legitimacy as individuals directly beneﬁt
from it.

Finally, the potential effects of an individual’s level of trust in the set of institutions that
comprise the state cannot be omitted from the inquiry. An individual’s trust can be
measured along two dimensions: institutional and inter-personal. As earlier deﬁned,
legitimacy focuses on the relationship between an individual and the state. Consequently,

inter-personal trust is expected to be a less important source of legitimacy than an

48

individual’s trust in institutions. Thus, the level of an individual’s trust in institutions of
coercion is of particular interest.

Mandates of the state are often promulgated and enforced by institutions of coercion:
police, courts and the military. An argument can be made that a citizen’s trust in
institutions of coercion is an important step towards state legitimacy. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the military or the police can physically coerce individuals into
compliance but, force is expensive and generates resistance, resignation or evasion
(Lonsdale 1986, 134). Further, crucial to the earlier deﬁnition of legitimacy is the
voluntary nature of compliance. It is sensible to argue that voluntary action is more
likely if an individual trusts state institutions.

The second dimension of trust is inter-personal. It is important to remember that
legitimacy as earlier deﬁned looks at the relationship between the state and the
individual. There is no theoretical reason to think that levels inter-personal trust,
operating horizontally from one individual to another, affects state legitimacy, operating
vertically between an individual and the state.

In sum, there are various contributing sources that might potentially explain variance in
levels of state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Aﬁica. As always with social reality, it is likely
that legitimacy is the result of more than one factor. Nevertheless, it is important to take

some time to explore these theories a little more fully.

Social Structure

First, traditional authority structures might contribute to legitimacy. Meyer Fortes and
EB. Evans-Pritchard (1967) are an important source in understanding the variety of

Aﬁican authority structures. Africa spanned the gamut from the very hierarchical to the

49

near-anarchical. In their book, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard argue that colonialism more
completely absorbed acephalous societies than hierarchical ones. Hierarchical societies
“have centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions. . .and
status correspond to the distribution of power and authority” (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard
1967, 5). Acephalous societies, on the other hand, lack all such organization and exhibit
no sharp division in rank, status or wealth (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967, 5).

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard suggest that at independence, acephalous societies had
nothing to fall back upon and more successﬁrlly incorporated into the modern state.
Conversely, hierarchical societies were more likely to fall back upon traditional structures
of authority (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967, 12). These traditional structures, in Run,
act against the state and provide an alternative source of legitimacy. If so, one might also
examine whether the modern state can harness this traditional authority and use it to its
advantage. One example is Botswana’s successful incorporation of the Kgotla, or village
council that allows for open discussion and criticism of the state, into the modern state
(Parson, Crowder and Parsons 1990). Based on the available information, it is reasonable
to think that people in acephalous societies, having been more ﬁrlly and successfully
integrated into the new state, view the state as more legitimate.

Hypothesis 1 : Acephalous societies are more likely than hierarchical ones to view
the state as legitimate.

Second, mode of livelihood might affect legitimacy. Here, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard
differentiate between pastoralist and agriculturalist societies with what they refer to as
modes of livelihood (1967, 8). They argue that mode of livelihood is related to
ecological conditions and strongly inﬂuences social organizations, to include political

systems. If they are correct, it would be logical to argue that modes of livelihood,

50

whether agricultural or pastoral, contribute either positively if agriculturalist, or
negatively if pastoralist, towards legitimacy. Since pastoralist societies are traditionally
more mobile and less likely to recognize borders (Curtin et al. 1995), it is reasonable to
posit that agriculturalist societies are more likely than pastoralist ones to view the state as
legitimate.

Hypothesis 2: Agriculturalists are more likely than pastoralists to view the state as
legitimate.

Finally, it is important to examine potential differences among urban-rural lines. It is
often taken for granted that urbanization results in profound disruption of African
traditional life (Abate 1978; Bratton et al. 2005, 167; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1991; Gugler
and Flanagan 1978). Robert Bates (2005) shows that developmental ideas and reforms
were usually skewed to beneﬁt the urban elites, often at the expense of the rural
constituencies. It is not unreasonable to believe that location will affect perceptions of
legitimacy. Yet, it must be noted that urban elites are often the most critical of the state.
Thus, it could very well be that urban individuals see the state as less legitimate.

Hypothesis 3: Rural individuals are more likely than urban ones to view the state
as legitimate.

Ethnic Ties

To understand the importance of ethnic ties, it is necessary to include an overview of
relevant scholars’ claims about the modern African state. J can-Francois Bayart (1993)
delves beneath the hollow state and bureaucracy in an attempt to understand how African
societies function. Bayart criticizes western scholars for including Aﬁica in a wholly
universal approach, forgetting the historical and cultural richness of African societies

(Bayart 1993, 5).

51

Bayart further argues that the Aﬁican state is based on networks that lead to societal
stratiﬁcation based on access to the state. The strategy of the heads of these networks is
to capture and accumulate as much wealth as possible for redistribution to enlarge their
networks. “[I]n other words, the social struggles which make up the quest for hegemony
and the production of the state bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in which all actors
— rich and poor - participate in the world of networks” (Bayart 1993, 235). This is a
major step forward, in that Bayart identiﬁes the centrality of patron-client networks in
African society and in its links to the state. There is little doubt that neopatrimonialism
and associated patronage retains a strong hold on African politics (Bratton and Van de
Walle 1997, Ch. 2; Gyimah-Boadi 2004). Frances Hagopian (1996) reminds us that
patronage networks are not necessarily unique to Africa. Nevertheless, they must be
taken into account when exploring the roots of legitimacy.

In their discussion of neo-patrimonialism, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle
(1997) build upon past work (Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Roth 1968; Theobald 1982)1
and further reﬁne the model of social networks in Africa. In their book, they discuss the
personalistic nature of patrimonial regimes. These regimes have three central features.
First, the personalistic nature is embodied in the President, the head patron from which
the networks extend. Second, it is a regime characterized by clientelism. Presidents rely
on awards of personal favors; in the modern context, this often translates into distribution
of state resources through contracts, licenses or projects. In return, clients mobilize

political support and refer all decisions to the head patron (Bratton and Van de Walle

 

I It is interesting to note that Roth’s (1968) discussion on personal rulership distinguishes between two
types of patrimonial rule. The ﬁrst involves the historical survival of patrimonial rule. The second is
“personal rulership on the bases of loyalties that do not require any belief in the rule’s unique personal
qualiﬁcation, but are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards” ( 1968, 196). Given Africa’s
previously discussed historical break with the past, the second type prevails.

52

1997, 65). Finally, the line between the public and private sector are blurred. There is
little distinction between private and public coffers (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 67).

Given the multi-ethnic composition of many African states, ethnicity plays a potentially
important role in a neo-patrimonial state. Neo-patrimonial networks care primarily for
the clients. It is likely that those who share common bonds, or ethnicity, (Chazan et al.
1999, 108) with the president stand to beneﬁt more than others. If not more, at least they
will be the ﬁrst to beneﬁt from the largesse of the state. It stands to reason that
individuals who share ethnic ties with the president — or head patron - should be among
the last cut off from scarce resources in times of economic crisis. Further, it has been
noted that belonging to the wrong ethnic group might decrease an individual’s economic
opportunities (Posner 2005, 95). Therefore, it is important for an ethnic group to ensure
representation in the patronage network, with the ultimate goal of capturing the
presidency. From this analysis, it is reasonable to posit that individuals who share
ethnicity with the president are more likely than those out off from access to resources to
view the state as more legitimate. Ethnicity acts as a positive source of legitimacy.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals who share ethnicity with the President are more likely
to view the state as more legitimate.

Inﬂuence of Institutional Context

The discussion turns its attention towards institutional context as a source of legitimacy.
Speciﬁcally, the inquiry seeks to understand perceptions of legitimacy individuals
express towards the state within the broader institutional context. It can be argued that
certain institutions serve to link the individual to the state. For example, Russell Dalton
(Dalton 1996) stresses the role of parties as a critical linkage mechanism between state

and society (Nonis 1999, 23). Parties are organizations that serve to connect the

53

individual to the state through organizational afﬁliation. Party membership can affect
perceptions of state legitimacy (Linz and Stepan 1996, 8).

Huntington argues that in areas where institutions are weak or non-existent, the role of
the party, as an organization, is the only long-run altemative as it, in effect, becomes the
source of legitimacy and authority (Huntington 1965, 424). Further, well organized
parties have been shown to increase overall voter participation of their members
(Diamond 1999, 143). As such, it is important to explore the role of the party and its
effect on perceptions of legitimacy.

Based on the literature, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a member of a political party
is more likely to view the state as legitimate. Further, individuals who belong to the party
in power should be more likely to view the state as legitimate. Simply, if individuals
believe that the institutional context allows their preferred party to win, they are more
likely to view the state as legitimate (Cho and Bratton 2006, 736). Christopher Anderson
and Christine Guillory have shown that winners express higher levels of satisfaction than
losers (Anderson and Guillory 1997). It is reasonable to expect that these feelings will
only be ampliﬁed in Aﬁica’s winner take all political environment. Speciﬁcally, if an
individual is not a member of the ruling party, s/he is likely to have much less access to
the state.

Hypothesis 5: Individuals who belong to the winning party are more likely to view
the state as legitimate.

Second, the institutional context can “inﬂuence attitudes when citizens take part in
formal participatory procedures” (Bratton et al. 2005, 40). Institutional context can

serve to routinize behavior, such as voting. State sanctioned procedures that allow an

54

individual to vote — national ID card, registration, queuing at a polling station - seek to
routinize individual levels of participation.

Legitimacy can be expressed in routine behavior such as voting. Voting promotes what
Dankwart Rustow refers to as “habituation” (Rustow 1970). Speciﬁcally, voting is a
form of routine behavior that can increase perceptions of legitimacy (Diamond 1999, 65).
Habituation leads to an internalization of the rules of the game of the state. It is
reasonable to argue that an individual who votes exhibits aspects of routinized behavior
that suggest increased acceptance of the state. In the end, an individual who votes is
acting in an entirely voluntarily manner within the existing institutional context. Thus, it
is reasonable to hypothesize that individuals who vote are more likely to view the state as
legitimate.

Hypothesis 6: Individuals who vote are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

Finally, our discussion must consider what Bratton et al. refer to as contacting (2005,
264). Contacting refers to the fact that “citizens also take individual initiatives, for
example, by contacting public ofﬁcials or other inﬂuential leaders” (Bratton et a1. 2005,
~ 150). As discussed above, neo-patrimonial networks play an important role in sub-
Saharan Aﬁica. Further, neo-patrimonial networks emphasize the informal. One of the
distinguishing features of such networks is the blurring of the line between the public and
private sector (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 67). In such a context, personal
relationships matter. Further, Bratton et al. note that informal contacts are central to
Aﬁican constructs of political participation (Bratton et al. 2005, 264). Thus, it is

important to examine whether or not individuals contact state ofﬁcials.

55

Contacting occurs at different levels. An individual can contact a local hereditary ruler,
local government councilor or might choose to contact his national representative.
Contacting, especially the choice of contact, is pertinent to the discussion since
legitimacy as previously deﬁned involves the relationship between the individual and the
state.

The primary interest becomes whether an individual contacts a member of the state
apparatus, not whether an individual contacts a local hereditary or religious leader. It is
sensible to argue that an individual who contacts state ofﬁcials is more likely to view the
state as legitimate. Speciﬁcally, that individual is involved in building a personal
relationship with an ofﬁcial of the state, thus feeling closer to the state in the process.

Hypothesis 7: Individuals who contact state ofﬁcials are more likely to view the
state as legitimate.

Performance Evaluations

Citizen evaluations of the performance of the state are another potential source of
legitimacy that merit consideration. Thinking in terms of Easton (Easton 1965; Easton
1975) performance evaluations can be linked to speciﬁc support; they reﬂect individual
judgments about political phenomena (Dalton 1999). The uniqueness of speciﬁc support
“lies in its relationships to the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain
from the perceived outputs and performance of political authorities” (Easton 197 5 , 437).
It is directed towards political institutions and varies base on an individual’s perceived
beneﬁts or satisfaction (Easton 1975, 439).

Robert Bates (Bates 2005; Bates 1976) reminds us that people are self-interested actors
and are more likely to support a state that best serves their interest. If the state fails to

meet people’s needs, the latter might withdraw their support and seek alternatives. Thus,

56

an individual’s support for the state might be described as conditional upon the state’s
delivery of developmental needs; developmental needs ranging anywhere ﬁ'om job
creation to health care. This calculated self-interest resonates well with Aﬁica’s “politics
of the belly” (Bayart 1993) in which the power of the ruler depends on his ability to feed
his followers or, as the case might be, to provide for their self-interested needs.

When referring to delivery of development, it is important to remember that there are
two distinct baskets of developmental goods: economic and political (Bratton et al. 2005,
223). Traditionally, the focus is on economic goods. Such theory has its roots in
modernization theory (Lipset 1960; O'Donnell 1973, 4). Simply, modernization theory
argues that rising living standards, growth of private ownership and the urban middle
classes and improved education leads to greater overall support for the state (Evans and
Whiteﬁeld 1995, 485). Since, scholars have argued that ﬂuctuations in support for the
state are likely a reﬂection on the state’s ability to administer the economy (Nonis 1999,
218)

Michael Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegrnaier (2000) persuasively argue that economic
perceptions account for much of the variance in the voter’s support of the state . It is
clear that delivery of economic goods, economic performance and ensuing economic
perceptions matter to varying degrees (Anderson 1995; Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg 1993;
Weatherford 1984; Weatherford 1992). Regarding sub-Saharan Aﬁ'ica, Bates (2005)
notes that the issue that most frequently drives African city dwellers to militant action is
the erosion of their purchasing power, clearly an economic concern. Bates points out that

Africans “demand larger incomes and higher standards of living” (Bates 2005, 11).

57

Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that positive economic evaluations positively affect
perceptions of state legitimacy.

Hypothesis 8: Positive evaluations of a state’s delivery of economic goods will
increase positive perceptions of legitimacy.

There are reasons to believe that economic performance evaluations might not be as
important as originally considered. Development does not comprise solely of economic
goods. In fact, some suggest that economic performance evaluations play only a minor
role in an individual’s evaluation of the state (McAllister 1999). Beyond economic
considerations, there is evidence that individuals also evaluate the state on moral notions
of right and wrong, and the need for self-respect (Anderson 1990, 80). In evaluating the
state, there is reason to believe that individuals are as likely to consider notions of justice
and fairness alongside more immediate economic concerns (Bratton et a1. 2005, 43).

This leads to the discussion of political goods. Simply stated, (an individual’s
evaluation of the state might have more to do with the provision of accountability than a
state’s ability to create jobs. By political goods, one is referring to such goods as civil
liberties, freedom of speech and free and fair election. This might be of particular
importance in an African context that places “special emphasis on distributive goals and
egalitarian outcomes” (Bratton et al. 2005, 223).

In an inﬂuential article, Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whiteﬁeld (1995) argue that
political goods appear to have greater impact than economic considerations on an
individual’s evaluation of the state. As such, it can be argued that one should be less
concerned with the delivery of economic growth than the provision of free and fair
elections and accountability. Supporting Evans and Whiteﬁeld (1995), numerous studies

have since consistently found political evaluations to have stronger positive impact than

58

- economic evaluations (Diamond 1999; Gibson 1996; Norris 1999; Rose, Mishler and
Haerpfer 1998). Thus, it is important to examine the effects of civil liberties such as free
speech and whether the and fair elections matter.

Another political good worth considering are popular perceptions of corruption
(Mishler and Rose 2001). As Bratton and Lewis note, a “highly valued political good for
ordinary Aﬁicans. . .is clean, transparent government, free of corruption” (Bratton and
Lewis 2005, 7). Given the eroding effects of corruption (Chang and Chu 2006), it is not
unreasonable to think that high levels of perceived corruption will decrease overall
perceptions of legitimacy. Thus, heeding Rose et al.’s warning, it is important to avoid
the mistake of believing that all evaluations derive ﬁ'om economic conditions (Rose et al.
1998, 157). Accordingly, it is reasonable to argue that a state’s ability to deliver political
goods will positively inﬂuence individual perceptions of legitimacy.

Hypothesis 9: Positive evaluations of a state’s delivery of political goods will
increase individual perceptions of legitimacy.

Delivery of development, economic or political in nature, is likely to affect perceptions
of legitimacy. Of the two, economics goods (e. g. jobs, income) are less within the
control of the state than political goods. Simply, economic goods are largely tied to a
state’s economic performance. Economic performance, in turn, is a long-term project
that politicians are unlikely to immediately affect. It is no secret that Africa lags behind
the rest of the world in terms of economic development. The World Trade Organization
trade statistics show Africa accounting for 3.1% of world trade in 1990, decreasing to

2.3% in 20002. Once South Aﬁica (.7%) is accounted for in the statistics, it is clear that

 

2 World Trade Organization Trading Statistics 2004 http://www.wto.or2/english/res e/statiLe/statis e.htm

59

African economic performance has not improved over the years. Consequently, the state
might ﬁnd it easier to deliver political goods.

Given a minimum degree of political order, delivery of political goods are fairly easy.
Bratton et al. note: “[T]the authorities can provide civil liberties and electoral rights
virtually at the stroke of a pen, achieving immediate and broad beneﬁt at low economic
costs” (Bratton et al. 2005, 42). Yet, neither economic nor political goods are possible
without stability.

The state can provide neither economic nor political development without a certain
degree of stability. Political order is a prime political good as “other desirable political
goods become possible (only) when a reasonable measure of security has been sustained”
(Rotberg 2004, 3). It is a necessary condition for ﬁ'uitful economic and political
participation (Rotberg 2004). The institutions that comprise the state in Sierra Leone,
hindered by lack of political order, ﬁnd it difﬁcult to operate and provide political
beneﬁts to its citizens (Reno 1998, Ch. 4). On the other hand, in states where political
order is apparent, full economic and political participation becomes possible. Once basic
security is provided, the state can then begin ensuring the delivery of political and
economic goods.

In sum, given the fact that individuals judge the state by practical tests of self-interests,
state legitimacy is likely to be affected by whether it can deliver economic or political
goods. Whereas some stress the importance of economic goods (Przeworski 1991), it is
clear that political goods have the potential to strongly affect an individual’s evaluation
of the state. A state that is able to provide civil liberties is likely to have more positive

evaluations. In the end, it appears that legitimacy is unlikely if states cannot succeed in

60

demonstrating their capacity to deal with major economic and social problems and
deliver the political ﬁeedom, fairness, transparency and order their citizens expect

(Diamond 1999, 217).

Trust

Given the context of this discussion, trust can be thought of as an individual's belief that
the state will not knowingly or willingly harm him (Newton 1999, 170). Any discussion
of trust must immediately reference its two dimensions: institutional and inter-personal.
Of the two, an individual’s trust in state institutions is most pertinent to this investigation.
Institutional trust operates vertically, from individual to institution. Along with
associational membership, inter-personal trust can be used as a partial proxy for social
capital (Bratton et al. 2005, 193; Norris 1999, 169) and operates horizontally: trust
amongst individuals. As this dissertation’s deﬁnition of legitimacy relies on the vertical
connection between individual and state, it is theoretically sensible to focus on an
individual’s trust in institutions. Nevertheless, one cannot omit from the discussion the
potential importance of inter-personal trust.

Interest in inter-personal trust is evident in the literature on political culture (Abrarnson
and Inglehart 1995; Granato, Inglehart and Leblang 1996; Inglehart 2000). It helps to
take the time to examine one of the more recent and inﬂuential scholar’s perspective on
the importance of trust. Robert Putnam’s (1993) Making Democracy Work is a seminal
work stressing the importance of inter-personal trust. Through a series of personal
interviews, surveys, case studies and some statistical analysis, Putnam compares six
Italian regional governments. Putnam argues that social context and history profoundly

conditions the effectiveness of institutions (Putnam 1993, 177). In his ﬁnal analysis,

61

Putnam argues that a tradition of inter-personal trust facilitates civic engagement which
in turn results in greater effectiveness of governance. Thus, building social capital3 is
critical.

In Bowling Alone (Putnam 1995), Putnam adopts the same framework and discusses
the political consequences of the decline of social capital in the United States over the
last two decades. Beginning with a look at the trend in declining votes, Putnam
concludes that individuals are increasingly socially isolated from each other and broader
parts of community life (J ackrnan and Miller 1998, 50). Along these lines, Francis
Fukuyarna (1995) argues that “spontaneous sociability”, or trust, is a key ingredient in
generating economic growth. He notes that social trust conditions a society’s ability to
compete in global markets. According to Fukuyama, societies with low levels of trust are
at a disadvantage because those are less effective in developing complex social
institutions. In conclusion, it would be safe to hypothesize that increased levels of inter-
personal trust should positively affect state legitimacy. Yet, inter-personal trust operates
on a horizontal level because it involves the interaction between individuals, not between
individual and state. Consequently, one should not expect levels of inter-personal trust to
impact state legitimacy.

Hypothesis 10: Variance in inter-personal trust does not signiﬁcantly affect
perceptions of legitimacy.

The discussion now turns to an individual’s trust in political institutions. Institutional
theories emphasize that trust is an individual’s rational response to the performance of

institutions (J ackrnan and Miller 1998, 56; North 1990). Further, institutional theories

 

3 Per Putnam, social capital “refers to the features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks
that can improve the efﬁciency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” Robert D. Putnam, Robert
Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) 167.

62

hold that the choice of institutional design has real consequences for government
performance and thus, for public trust in institutions (Mishler and Rose 2001). It follows
that an individual’s trust in political institutions is likely to affect levels of state
legitimacy.

State legitimacy, as earlier deﬁned, relies on voluntary compliance to state mandates.
State mandates are likely to be promulgated through coercive institutions. Speciﬁcally,
the state is likely to promulgate and enforce its mandates through courts, the police and
the military. These are very important institutions to the state’s function. Given the
importance of institutions in shaping individual perceptions, it is reasonable to argue that
higher levels of trust in these coercive institutions facilitate state legitimacy. It is also
arguable that the more an individual trusts the courts, the more likely that individual is to
a) turn to the courts and b) voluntarily comply with court orders. Likewise, the more an
individual trusts the police, the more likely that individual is going to a) listen to the
police and b) cooperate with the police when approached.

Finally, institutional trust operates along the same dimension as legitimacy as
previously deﬁned; institutional trust operates vertically. Thus, it is theoretically
reasonable to argue that increased levels of institutional trust leads to increased state
legitimacy. As individuals develop trust in state institutions, they are more likely to abide
by the state’s established rules of the game. Therefore, an individual’s trust in
institutions is likely to be an important source of state legitimacy.

Hypothesis 11: Increased institutional trust leads to increased state legitimacy.

63

The Full Model

Now that I have taken a look at the competing theories, it is important to see how these
theoretically ﬁt together. The above-mentioned theories can be integrated into hi gher—
level categories: interest based, trust and identity based. As Table 2.1 shows, the

respective theories align under one of the three categories.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Legitimacy
i
3
Interest Based Trust Identity Based
~Performanoe ~|ndividual's Trust in Ethnic Ties
Evaluations _. Institutions .—
oEconomlc ~Sodetal Structures
Political -lnter-personal Trust -Authority
Mode of
-lnstitutional Context Livelihood
~Vote
~Winning Party
Contact

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 2.1: Diagram of Model

As the table illustrates, the theoretical arguments made in this chapter suggest that all
three broad based categories directly affect an individual’s perception of legitimacy. Yet,
the political world is complex and highly endogenous. I argue and attempt to support
through statistical analysis in this dissertation, an individual’s trust in institutions affects
or helps predict variance in perceived levels of state legitimacy.

However, I acknowledge that the relationship between an individual’s trust in
institutions and perceptions of legitimacy may be reciprocal. As the feedback arrow in

Table 2.1 indicates, I believe that a certain amount of endogeneity exists. Speciﬁcally,

64

perceptions of state are likely to impact an individual’s trust in institutions. Thus, the
reciprocal relationship is more of a feedback loop than bi-directional in nature. This is a
direct acknowledgment of the complexities of political reality.

Further, both interest and identity based variables appear to affect levels of trust. In the
end, this dissertation seeks to move forward through an attempt to untangle the various
factors that help explain the variance in levels of perceptions of state legitimacy.
Recognizing that no model can fully account for the highly endogenous nature of the
world, this dissertation strives to argue, in a theoretically sound and consistent manner,
how interest, identity and trust based variables help account for perceptions of state
legitimacy in sub-Saharan Aﬁica.

Conclusion

The inquiry at hand is intended to increase understanding of state legitimacy in sub-
Saharan Africa. This chapter reviewed some of the literature concerning ﬁve competing
sources of legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, legitimacy is a pertinent issue in Aﬁica.
Unfortunately, legitimacy is a complex concept to adequately capture fully (Weatherford
1992). Nevertheless, in Chapter 1, a narrow deﬁnition of legitimacy was developed: an
individual’s willing obedience to mandates of the state.

This chapter discussed potential sources of legitimacy: social structures, ethnicity,
institutional context, performance evaluations and an individual’s trust in political
institutions. As discussed, there are good theoretical reasons as to why each source
should contribute to perceptions of state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Aﬁica.

Given the current understanding of Africa, it is likely that some sources of legitimacy

will matter more than others. Two sources of legitimacy merit discussion: ethnicity and

65

an individual’s trust in institutions. The importance of personal relationships and
loyalties in a neo-patrimonial state (Jackson and Rosberg 1984; Roth 1968) make these
two potential sources stand out. In the ﬁrst case, ethnicity is expected to matter but for
reasons that actually undermine wider state legitimacy. Common inspirations, values,
norms, and expectations appear likely to form a strong bond between individuals. In a
context of relative scarcity, it is not unreasonable to believe that people will fall back
upon such ethnic bonds in hopes of obtaining access to state resources. Of course, this
can only happen if your people are in charge of the state apparatus.

However, strong ethnic loyalties risk undermining overall state legitimacy. If a state’s
Big Man relies exclusively on his own ethnic group for support, he will likely alienate
individuals from other ethnic groups. This is especially problematic if the Big Man
comes from a relatively small ethnic group. Speciﬁcally, if the majority of the population
is excluded from access to the state it is unlikely that they will, over time, willingly obey
its mandates.

Notably, even in cases where a president can rely on fairly large support of the
population, legitimacy can be tenuous. In such cases, if a small but important segment of
the population is continually excluded, a state is likely to experience loss in legitimacy.
Further, if any minority is actively discriminated against or if individuals belonging to a
particular community feel endangered by the state, then it is likely that the state will
experience issues with legitimacy, or willing compliance. This was arguably the case in
Rwanda in 1994 in which an ethnic minority rebelled in response to state sponsored

genocide (Prunier 1995; Prunier 1998)

66

Second, an individual’s trust in institutions is expected to matter. Reﬂecting on the
Africanist literature on the state in Chapter 1, the modern African state is, by and large, a
product of colonialism. The state is comprised of institutional structures that have little
relevant historical ties to the people over whom they are trying to monopolize the
legitimate control of force. Trust must be earned. Historically, the relationship between
state and citizen is one that has evolved over long periods of time (Tilly 1975). Further,
trust cannot be coerced. Speciﬁcally, a set of structures cannot ask an individual to trust
them at gunpoint; that is akin to a mugger asking a person to trust him while he takes
his/her wallet. 1

Using the previous analogy, it is reasonable to argue that many Aﬁican states act like a
mugger. Speciﬁcally, it asks compliance to an edict with gun in hand. In Tanzania, the
failed collectivization policy of Ujamaa of the late 19603 (Hyden 1980, 97) was enforced,
in some part, by the military. In this instance, military troops rounded up segments of the
rural population and placed them in a collective farm in support of President Julius
Nyerere’s rural development policies. It is reasonable argue that such action, early in the
life of that Aﬁica state, does little to build collective trust in the state. This is especially
true if the individual is asked to give with no perceived beneﬁt.

In the end, trust involves a relationship. It is likely that developing a relationship is
easier with a childhood ﬁiend than with a stranger one ﬁrst meets as an adult. As such, it
is likely easier for an individual to trust familiar institutions than one that s/he has little
relation to on the onset. Further, such trust is likely to be further complicated if a new set

of institutions, unable to garner willing compliance due to lack of trust, resorts to use of

67

violence. It follows that in the mugger analogy that it is inconceivable that an individual
would ever trust someone he ﬁrst met while being mugged in an alley.

In sum, there is numerous literature directly or indirectly examining competing sources
of legitimacy. Yet, there has been little direct research on these competing sources which
is partly a result of the difﬁculty of deﬁning legitimacy and partly due to lack of
availability of good data. Consequently, there are serious impediments when analyzing
and discussing legitimacy.

The ﬁrst is the simple fact that legitimacy is not easily deﬁnable (Weatherford 1992).
It is evident from the discussion in the previous chapter that legitimacy is a multi-
dimensional and multi-layered concept. Advancement will not occur by simply stating
that the concept is beyond deﬁnition. Thus, it is important to take the concept and
develop a theoretically plausible deﬁnition. It is unlikely that any one deﬁnition will
please all involved. Nevertheless, with a working deﬁnition available, scholars can
proceed in attempts at better understanding what most contributes to legitimacy. This
leads to the second problem.

Relevant data is not always readily available. Nowhere does this hold truer than in
Africa. Although Africa’s comparative advantages to the study lies in the continent’s
variance, good scientiﬁc data is scarce. Fortunately, the Aﬁ‘obarometer4 project has
been collecting and storing scientiﬁc survey data in over a dozen sub-Saharan African
countries since 1999. As such data becomes available, it is imperative that African
scholars begin referencing it to conﬁrm or disprove the myriad of theories that have

developed over the last three to four decades. Africanists are entering a time when the

 

4

 

www.Afrobgometer.org

68

data is increasingly becoming available and simply theorizing is insufﬁcient without
some systematic and empirical analysis. It is with that in mind that the next chapter is
devoted to testing competing sources of legitimacy in sub-Saharan Aﬁica. It is hopeful
that the data will lend better insight as to which, if any, source of legitimacy most matters

within the sub-Saharan African context.

69

III -Testing Competing Sources of Legitimacy

The previous chapter reviewed the relevant literature that suggests the roots of legitimacy
might have several sources. This chapter investigates which, if any, of these competing
sources best facilitates comprehension of varying perceptions of legitimacy in sub-
Saharan Aﬁica. Thus far, the theories compose the following model:
Legitimacy = f (Societal Structures + Ethnicity +
Institutional Performance + Performance Evaluations +
Trust)
This chapter sets to determine if any of these theories best accounts for legitimacy as
initially deﬁned, speciﬁcally, legitimacy as voluntary compliance to mandates of the
state. Before proceeding, it is necessary to operationalize all concepts as measurable
indicators and to identify the data that will be used to measure them.

Data

Data for this study derives entirely from Afrobarometer Round 3. The Afrobarometer is
a series of random national surveys. It is the product of an independent, nonpartisan
research project that measures public opinion in 18 African countries‘. The
Afrobarometer’s primary aim is to produce scientiﬁcally available data on public opinion
in sub-Saharan Aﬁica. Thus, the unit of analysis is the individual with an n of 25,397 in
round 3 surveys conducted circa 2005.

The Afrobarometer survey is very comprehensive and includes well over 100 questions.

These questions cover everything from support to democracy to governance issues such

 

I As will be explained later in the chapter, Zimbabwe, Cape Verde were dropped from analysis.

70

as trust in public institutions. The Afrobarometer data set is the only one that permits an
investigation across such a large number of sub-Saharan African countries.

Measurement

With respect to measurement, Leslie Kish (1959) offers instrumental advice.
Speciﬁcally, it is important to think about the different kinds of variables in the analysis:
explanatory and controlled. Explanatory variables are the objects of the research. “[t]hey
are the variables among which the research wishes to ﬁnd and to measure some speciﬁed
relationships” (Kish 1959, 329). In this case, they include the dependent variable,
legitimacy, and the independent variables, those representing the possible sources of
legitimacy (e. g. social structures). Yet, along with these explanatory variables, it is
important to control for extraneous variables; variables likely to affect the dependent
variable. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to account for all variables to the extent that
they are supported by theory. Against this backdrop, variables for this study are
described in the following section.

Dependent Variable: Legitimacy Index

Chapter I argued that a state is legitimate to the extent it can garner willing individual
compliance to its rule without resorting to force. Now that the concept of legitimacy is
deﬁned, it is important to devise an adequate operational measurement. The
Aﬁobarometer survey asks whether or not individuals agree with the following four
relevant statements:

. Our constitution expresses the values and hopes (of people in this country)

. The police always have the right to make people obey the law

. The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by
. The tax department has the right to make people pay taxes

71

US:

$86

[fit

[CSt'

SL‘

 

The answer choices range from strongly disagree to strongly agree on a ﬁve point scale
with the middle value (3) neither agreeing nor disagreeing. It is reasonable to suggest
that all four questions target willing individuals' compliance to the state. In fact, these
questions were used in Aﬁ'obarometer Round 2 compendium of comparative results as
separate items in attempts to assess state legitimacy (Bratton et al. 2004). Subsequently, I
use these four questions to create a legitimacy index representing the dependent variable.

Before creating the index, it is important to conduct an explanatory factor analysis to
see whether it is justiﬁed. In this context, the analysis will examine whether or not it is
reasonable to conclude that legitimacy is a factor underlying the four items. In survey
research, designing a question that completely captures a concept is a daunting task. To
alleviate this, it is beneﬁcial to utilize several questions to capture a concept. Using
factor analysis, it is possible to determine whether it is statistically reasonable to argue
that there is an underlying factor that helps explain common variance between the
statements (Lattin et al. 2003, 127-28).

Conducting a principal factor analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that there is an
underlying factor in the four questions used to create the legitimacy index. After
graphing a scree plot (Table 3.1), the ‘elbow’ is clearly evident. The elbow is a graphic
representation of an underlying factor that explains common variance. Speciﬁcally, the
factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.34), which explains 52
percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .69) is acceptable

(n= 16,764)2. A factor score can be used to create an index.

 

2 As will soon be discussed, this seemingly low it is largely the result of four countries (Cape Verde,
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Lesotho) being dropped ﬁom analysis. This, along with missing data results in
an n that is far smaller than the initial n of over 25,000.

72

 

Eigenvalues
.5 1 1 .5
A 1

0
r

 

 

 

—1

I l T
1 2 3 4
Number

Table 3.1

Rather than use a factor score, it is theoretically acceptable to construct a summated
index. A summated index facilitates interpretation of the results and is easier to grasp
conceptually. The most straightforward way to design this index is to create a summated
rating scale from the responses to the four statements. The summated index then takes
the sum of the responses to the statements divided by the number of statements. In this
case, a score of 1 indicates that the respondent strongly disagrees, while a score of 5
indicates that the respondent strongly agrees.

Independent Variables

The predictor variables in this study are as follows:

Societal Structures

As discussed in the previous chapter, relevant theories concern both a) pre-colonial
authority structures and b) mode of livelihood. First, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1967)
posited that people in acephalous societal structures are more likely than hierarchical
ones to view the modern state as legitimate. To test this, individual respondents were

coded along authority structure and mode of livelihood. First, individuals were coded as

73

either a member of a historically acephalous society (Authority = O) or as a member of a
historically hierarchical society (Authority = l). Fortunately, Afrobarometer Round 3
speciﬁcally asked the respondent to which tribe, ethnic or cultural group s/he belongs.
Once the ethnic group is known, it is relatively easy to research whether the group is
historically acephalous (i.e. Igbo) or hierarchical (i.e. Barnbara)’.

Notably, as Cape Verde was uninhabited prior to the Portugueses’ arrival in 1456
(Curtin et al. 1995, 156) individuals were not coded. This effectively dropped the
country and its 1,256 respondents. Also, due to the current political climate in Zimbabwe
at the time of the interviews, Zimbabwe and its 1,048 respondents were eliminated as the
survey did not collect information on ethnicity.

Second, a variable to code mode of livelihood was generated. Initially, there appeared
to be a problem with equating ethnicity to mode of livelihood. Speciﬁcally, because one
ethnic group is historically comprised of agriculturalists, the same might not hold true in
a modern urban setting. Mode of livelihood is apt to change over time (Crummey and
Stewart 1981). Given the Aﬁican context, it is then reasonable to argue that the rural
population is largely tied to historical modes of livelihood. Thus, only rural pastoralists
were coded as ‘1’ (Mode of Livelihood = l)4. This is consistent with the earlier
supposition that pastoralist societies, historically engaged in greater conﬂict with the

state, perceive the state as less legitimate than their agriculturalist counterparts.

 

3 Sources used for coding were the online Encyclopedia Britannica (www.britannica.com) along with the
Ethnologuc project (http://www.ethnologue.com/).

" Ibid

74

Ethnic Ties

The previous chapter examined the importance of personal relationships in sub-Saharan
Aﬁica. A neopatrimonial society is expressed through multi-layered client-patron
relationships. In a multi-ethnic society, one of the easiest ways to establish patronage is
through recourse to ethnicity. Speciﬁcally, individuals sharing the same ethnicity are
more likely to help one another as they are seen as helping ‘one of their own’.

It is conceivable that an individual who shares ethnicity with the head patron, the
president, is more likely to have access, be it direct or indirect, to state resources. If not
immediate access, that individual is likely to be more optimistic than an outsider of
eventual access to the head patron. Given the context of scarcity, belonging to the wrong
ethnic group might actually decrease an individual’s economic opportunities (Posner
2005, 95). In Slll'n, personal relationships matter and sharing ethnicity with the president
is likely to positively affect perceptions of legitimacy.

It is also plausible that individuals who share ethnicity with the president are more
likely than their outsider counterparts to perceive the state as legitimate. To test this
hypothesis, it was important to code the ethnicity of each country’s president at the time
the Afrobarometer Round 3 survey was administereds. Second, an Afrobarometer
question was used to determine whether the individual respondent shared ethnicity with
the president. Speciﬁcally, the question asked the respondent to which clan, ethnic or
tribal group s/he belongs. Finally, respondents who shared ethnicity with the president
were coded ‘1’ and all others ‘0’. This information allows inquiry into the affect of

sharing ethnicity with the president on perceptions of legitimacy.

 

5 Sources included Afrobarometer project contributors and BBC Country Reports
l[mp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/coungy proﬁles/defaultstm ).

75

When examining ethnicity, most countries presented minimal challenges in coding
respondents’ ethnic ties to the president. There were two exceptions: Botswana and
Lesotho. Speciﬁcally, both countries are portrayed as ethnically homogenous. First,
Botswana is regarded to be mostly Tswana, with the exception of the San Bushmen, and
other regional ethnic groups that crossed the border6 or were incorporated into the post-
colonial border. Yet, when surveyed, Afrobarometer respondents in Botswana provided
20 different clan identities. Interestingly enough, many ethnic groups in Botswana have
“become so incorporated as to be almost indistinguishable from the Tswana” (Britannica
2006). Using information from the University of Botswana History Department,
individuals from the eight traditional major tribes were coded as ‘1’ (Bennett 2006). The
rest were coded as ‘0’. Similar problems arose when surveying Lesotho.

Lesotho is widely regarded as ethnically homogenous. In fact, 99.7% of the population
is classiﬁed as Sotho (CIA 2006). Sothos distinguish themselves primarily through clan
lineages. When asked, respondents identiﬁed with 24 clans or Sotho lineages. In
Lesotho, it appears that “internally, divisions among different chiefdoms—and within the
royal lineage itself—[have] political signiﬁcance, but externally the sense of Sotho
nationhood and cultural unity remains strong” (Britannica 2006). Like Botswana, it
appears that most Sothos share ethnic ties with the current prime minister. Yet, whereas
there is some variance in Botswana, all Sotho respondents were coded 1. As this is
bound to affect the salience of ethnicity in the analysis, Lesotho and its 1,161 respondents

were dropped.

 

6 Herero’s were driven out of Namibia by the Germans during the suppression of the rebellion (1903-7)
Curtin et al., Aﬁ'ican History 429.

76

Note on Dimensions of Ethnicity

Thus far, Afrobarometer respondents’ ethnic self-identiﬁcation was used to create three
new variables: societal structure, mode of livelihood and ties to the president.
Collinearity is a concern. The ﬁnal model tested for collinearity. The Variance Inﬂation
Factor (V IF) scores were low, and collinearity did not appear to be a problem. Further,
the collinearity between the three variables was low. The subsequent variables were not

generated from ethnic self-identiﬁcation.

Institutional Inﬂuences

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study focuses on two aspects of institutional
inﬂuences on perceptions of legitimacy: political parties and voting. Institutions affect
levels of participation. As Bratton et al. note, participation is “governed by formal rules
and [is] channeled through formal organizations” (Bratton et al. 2005, 261). First, in a
context of weak or non-existent institutions, political parties become an important source
of legitimacy and authority (Huntington 1965). Individuals who join parties actively
contest legitimate control of the state. Party members out of power might be unhappy
with the current government, or those people who. make decisions in the name of the
state. Yet, they likely accept the formal institutions that comprise the state. Members of
a political party are competing within the regime established by the state.

As discussed in the previous chapter, African politics is a winner takes all environment.
Being associated with the party out of power is likely to cut off most avenues of access to
the state. Consequently, more important than simply being a member of a party is

whether an individual is a member of the party currently in power. Fortunately,

77

Afrobarometer asked for an individual’s party afﬁliation. Thus, individuals were coded
as 1 if they belonged to their respective state’s party in power; all others were coded as 0.
Second, political participation, as expressed through voting, is examined. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, legitimation must be evident and routinized in
behavior (Diamond 1999, 65). Voting promotes what Dankwart Rustow refers to as
“habituation” (1970). According to Rustow, habituation leads to an internalization of the
rules of the game of the state. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that an individual who
votes is more likely to have internalized the rules of the game through habituation.
Consequently, the act of voting should positively affect perceptions of legitimacy. The
following Afrobarometer questions observe voting behavior:
. With regard to the most recent, 2002 national elections, which statement is true
for you?
0 You voted in the elections
You decided not to vote
You could not ﬁnd the polling station
You were prevented from voting
You did not have time to vote

Did not vote for some other reason
You were not registered

OOOOOO

Since all but one option deals with why an individual did not vote, a variable was
generated that simply coded individuals if they voted. It is important to note that people
tended to exaggerate their participation levels. Speciﬁcally, more people reported voting
than reﬂected in actual voter turnout numbers. Just to get a sense of the numbers, 74
percent of all Afrobarometer round 3 respondents stated that they voted in the most recent

election. Looking at actual turnout in the 18 countries, the average turnout rate was

78

roughly 65 percent7. Mozambique has one of the largest overstatements of voter turnout
in the most recent national election; a little more than 80 percent of Afrobarometer
respondents in Mozambique state they voted while ofﬁcial turnout for the 2004
presidential election is listed at 36.4 percent. Then there is the case of Ghana, with a little
over 87 percent of Afrobarometer respondents stating they voted in the most recent
national elections with ofﬁcial turnout for the 2004 presidential election reported to be
85.1 percent. Thus, there is some variation between ofﬁcial as opposed to stated turnout.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect individuals who vote, or claimed to have voted, to
perceive the state as more legitimate.

Next, it was determined whether respondents take time to contact state ofﬁcials. This
form of political participation simply involves contact with leaders between elections
(Bratton et a1. 2005, 264). As mentioned in the previous chapter, I hypothesize that
individuals who take time to contact state ofﬁcials are more likely to view the state as
legitimate as they are presumably trying to inﬂuence the outcome by working within the
system. The Afrobarometer questions used here are as follows:

. During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons
about some important problem or to give them your views?
0 A member of parliament
0 An ofﬁcial of a government ministry
o A political party ofﬁcial
Before creating a summated index scale, a principal factor analysis was run to test
whether it was reasonable to conclude that there is an underlying factor that explains the

common variance. After graphing the Eigen values (Table 3.2), the ‘elbow’ is clearly

evident.

 

7 Electoral turnout information used to get 18 country average information is found online at the African
Elections Database (http://africanelections.tripod.coml).

79

 

Eigenvalues
5 1 1 .5

O
1

 

 

 

1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Number
Table 3.2

This elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that explains common
variance. Speciﬁcally, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue
= 1.15) explaining 62 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s
Alpha = .69) is acceptable (n= 19,826). A factor score can be used to create an index.

As mentioned earlier, it is theoretically acceptable to construct a summated index. Thus,

an index with a scale from 0 (never) to 3 (often) was created.

Performance Evaluations

As stated earlier, performance evaluations refer to the “delivery” of development. As
discussed in the previous chapter, performance evaluations fall into two baskets of goods:
economic and political. Ever since Seymour Lipset’s Political Man (1960) there has
been a lot of debate on the role of economic development (Linz and Stepan 1996). In the
end, there is strong evidence that perception of economic performance accounts for much
of the variance in the citizens’ support of the state (Lewis-Beck and Stegrnaier 2000).

Speciﬁcally, positive economic performance is linked to positive levels of support for the

80

state. Thus, it is important to gauge overall perceptions of economic performance. To
begin the inquiry, the following three questions were used:
. In general, how would you describe the present economic conditions of the
country?
. Looking back, how do you rate the economic condition of the country compared
to twelve months ago?
. Looking ahead, do you expect the economic conditions in this country in twelve
months time to be better or worse?
There are good theoretical reasons to keep these variables independent and not create a
summated index (Lewis-Beck and Stegrnaier 2000). Speciﬁcally, prospective voters and
retrospective voters tend to differ in opinion and socio-economic backgrounds
(MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992). One must remember that a political evaluation
of government8 performance concerning the economy also deals with more speciﬁc and
immediate needs.

Along with general evaluative perceptions, it is important to gauge if an individual is
satisﬁed with more proximate concerns that include jobs, food prices and overall
economic equality (Bratton et al. 2005, 42-43). To account for these more immediate
needs, Afrobarometer asks the following questions:

. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the
following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say?
0 Managing the economy
Creating jobs

Keeping prices stable
Narrowing gaps between rich and poor

000

 

8 Based on discussion in Chapter 1, government refers to the set of ofﬁce holders who compete for and
hold ofﬁce for a limited time period deﬁned in the rules of the political game. They are the group of people
who make decisions in the name of the state. Thus, government is being used as a proxy for evaluations of
the state. It is reasonable to argue that if a government is able to satisfy the citizens’ economic and public
needs, those same citizens become satisﬁed with the state or set of formal institutions in which the ofﬁce-
holders operate.

81

Running a principal factor analysis gives conﬁdence that there is an underlying factor
to these questions. After graphing the scree plot, the ‘elbow’ is clearly evident (Table 3.3
below). This elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that explains
common variance. Speciﬁcally, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor
(Eigenvalue = 1.90), which explains 63 percent of the common variance. Index

reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .80) is acceptable (n= 17,961).

 

1.5

Eigenvalues

 

 

 

1 2 3 4
Number
Table 3.3

A factor score can be used to create an index. Yet, as previously discussed, it is
theoretically possible to create a smnmated index. Thus, a summated index was created.
It has the additional beneﬁt of being easier to interpret and is conceptually less
complicated than a factor score.

The second basket of evaluation performance involves political goods. The earlier
discussion in Chapter 2 reminds us that not all evaluative performances are economically
based. In fact, economic experiences might have less of an impact on state support than
the delivery of political goods. Numerous studies have pointed to the stronger positive
impact of political goods. Speciﬁcally, providing ﬁ'eedom of speech and free and fair

elections involves little economic costs to the state. This is not to say that such political

82

goods do not come with the possibility of high political costs (e. g. removal from ofﬁce).
Nevertheless, if a state is truly concerned about legitimacy, deliveries of these types of
political goods are likely to increase overall perceptions of legitimacy. Afrobarometer
questions used were:
. In this country, how often do people have to be careful of what they say about
politics?
. On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national
election?
It is reasonable to expect that those who think the state allows for freedom of expression
and promote ﬁee and fair elections will tend to be more positive in their evaluations of
the state. Thus, delivery of these political goods is expected to have a positive effect on
perceptions of state legitimacy.

As discussed earlier, there is one more political good to consider: corruption.
Speciﬁcally, a high perception of state corruption is likely to negatively affect an
individual’s perception of legitimacy. Popular perceptions of corruption are an important
dimension of political goods (Bratton and Lewis 2005). To account for these popular
perceptions of corruption, Afrobarometer asks the following questions:

. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?
0 The Prime Minister and Ofﬁcials in his Ofﬁce
Members of Parliament
Elected Village Development Councilors
National Government Ofﬁcials
Local Government Ofﬁcials
Police

Tax Ofﬁcials
Judges and Magistrates

OOOOOOO

Running a principal factor analysis gives conﬁdence that there is an underlying factor

to these questions. After graphing the scree plot, the ‘elbow’ is clearly evident (Table 3.4

83

below). This elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that explains
common variance. Speciﬁcally, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor
(Eigenvalue = 5.35), which explains 62 percent of the common variance. Index
reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .91) is acceptable (n= 18,573). For the sake of

simplicity, a summated index was used when running the model.

 

Eigenvalues

N4

 

 

 

“-10
.a
O

I T
O 2 4

Table 3.4

Trust

Trust can be said to have two dimensions: trust in institutions and inter-personal trust.
The former operates vertically — individual to state — while the latter operates horizontally
— individual to individual. Consistent with the deﬁnition of legitimacy as voluntary
compliance to mandates of the state without the use of coercion operates along a vertical
dimension, it is reasonable to expect an individual’s trust in institutions to play a role in
perceptions of legitimacy. As discussed in the previous chapter, institutional theories
emphasize that trust is an individual’s rational response to the performance of institutions

(North 1990). If the set of institutions that comprise the state operate effectively, it is

84

likely that this will generate increased trust and consolidate legitimacy. Further, as
mandates of the state are primarily disseminated and enforced through coercive
institutions, it is likely that increased trust in coercive institutions of the state leads to
increased levels of state legitimacy. Questions from Aﬁobarometer used to determine
levels of trust in institutions are as follows9:

. How much do you trust the military, or haven’t you heard enough about them to

say?

. How much do you trust the police, or haven’t you heard enough about them to
say?

. How much do you trust courts of law, or haven’t you heard enough about them to
say?

Running a principal factor analysis gives conﬁdence that there is an underlying factor to
these questions. After graphing the Ei gen values, the ‘elbow’ is clearly evident (Table

3.5)

 

 

 

 

l 1 Y r I

1 1.5 2 2.5 3

Table 3.5

This elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that explains common

variance. Speciﬁcally, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue

 

9 Unfortunately for this inquiry, although Aﬁ'obarometer respondents were asked whether the tax
department had the right to make people pay their taxes, they were not asked whether they trusted the tax
department.

85

= 1.55), which explains 70 percent of the common variance. Index reliability
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .79) is acceptable (n= 18,302). Again, for the sake of simplicity, a
summated index was used when running the model.

Attention now turns to the horizontal dimension of trust: inter-personal trust. Inter-
personal trust, due to the fact that it operates along horizontal lines, is theoretically
unlikely to have an affect on perceptions of legitimacy. Yet, some theorize that that
“spontaneous sociability”, or trust, is a key ingredient in generating economic growth
(Fukuyama 1995). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that in facilitating economic growth,
inter-personal trust might help explain perceptions of legitimacy. Speciﬁcally, if earlier
discussions on the impact of positive economic performance are accurate, this suggests
that inter-personal trust, a theoretical component of economic performance, affects
perceptions of legitimacy. In sum, it is important to control for this theoretically
important variable. Questions from Afrobarometer used to gauge levels of trust were:

. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
must be very careful in dealing with people?

. How much do you trust each of your neighbors?

. How much do you trust people from other ethnic groups?

It might appear puzzling why the question regarding neighbor was included in our
examination of inter-personal trust. Within a sub-Saharan context, one’s neighbors are
often related either by family or through ethnic ties. Also, ethnic groups unite in urban
settings and live in the same neighborhoods. However, one can never truly account for
one’s neighbor’s ethnic background, especially in urban settings. Thus, it is an
appropriate question to include in the index of inter-personal trust. A factor analysis is

necessary to ensure that there is an underlying explanatory factor that explains common

variance.

86

Running a principal factor analysis inspires conﬁdence that there is an underlying
factor to these questions. After graphing the Ei gen values, the ‘elbow’ is evident (Table
3.6 see below). The elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that
explains common variance. Speciﬁcally, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated
factor (Eigenvalue = 1.07), which explains 58 percent of the common variance. Index
reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .63) is acceptable (n= 19,175). Again, for the sake of

simplicity, the model uses a summated index score in lieu of a factor score.

 

Eigenvalues
.5

0
r

 

 

 

l I l l l
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Number

Table 3.6

Control Variables

Finally, the following usual demographic variables were controlled in this study: age,
gender and educational levels. Whereas it is possible that such demographic factors will
affect perceptions of legitimacy, they are not theoretical sources of legitimacy. In the
end, it is important to include control variables at the individual level (Anderson and
Mendes 2006, 101). Including these variables avoids drawing faulty inferences due to

spuriousness that can result from omitting relevant variables (Stipak and Hensler 1982).

87

Model

What matters most in terms of helping us understand perceptions of legitimacy in sub-
Saharan Aﬁica? Table 3.7 (next page) increases understanding of the various factors that
explain the differences in levels of perceptions of legitimacy. Notably, all entries with
missing answers or those which the respondent did not know or left unanswered were
coded as missing. In Tanzania, the questions were asked but too many were missing
responses or individuals answered “I do not know”. As a result, Tanzania dropped out of
the model completely for lack of respondents. Thus, once all variables were
appropriately coded and an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) model was run, it
ran with 13,994 respondents in 1410 sub-Saharan African states.

Results

Examining the model (Table 3.7), it is time to analyze the results. Because the data are a
large-N public opinion survey, only ﬁndings of 0.05 level or greater are considered

signiﬁcant.

Societal Structures

First, it appears that the initial hypothesis by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (Fortes and
Evans-Pritchard 1967) regarding authority structure matters but in an unexpected way.
Speciﬁcally, the authors suggest hierarchical societies are less likely to view the modern
state as legitimate. The model suggests that individuals linked to hierarchical societies

are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

_

lo As previously discussed, Cape Verde (historical) , Tanzania (high case of missing data), Zimbabwe
(political climate) and Lesotho (Ethnicity) were dropped from the analysis.

88

Std. Standardized
Perceptions of State Leﬂmacy Coef. Err. P>1t| Coef.

Societal Structure

mummy Structure. * 0.058 0.013 0.000 , 0.036.
1 = Hierarchical: 0 = Acephalous
Mode of Livelihood -0.005 0.034 0.882 -0.001
l= Pastoralist : 0 = Agriculturalist
Ethnic Ties to the President -0.019 0.015 0.204 -0.011

1 = ethnic ties to Pres: 0 = no ethnic ties to Pres
Institutional Inﬂuences

MemberofWinning Party. 0.074 0.014 0.000 ‘ 0.045
M ‘,=_Y,°5: 0=Nol . . p _ . .7 ,
;..Did you.vote?. . 0.039 L . _ 0.016 0.017 f 0.020
l= Yes: 0 = No
Contact Index 0.007 0.013 0.566 0.005

3 = Often: 2 = Sometimes: i = On Occasion: 0 = Never

Pgrforggnce Evggatigns

Current as Compared to 12 months ago -0.013 0.007 0.058 -0.018

l= Much Worse: 2 = Worse: 3 =same: 4= Better: 5 = Much Better

Current Economic Performance 0.009 0.006 0.133 0.01 5
‘ l % Very Bad: 2 _= Fairly Bad: 3 = Neither Good or Bad: 4 = Fairly Good: 5 = Very Good . ., ,
if 12 MOllth Projected Economic Performance 0.056 ' 40.006 0.000 0.08.1 I
‘ l= Much Worse: 2 ? Worse: 3 =same: 4= Better: 5 = Much Better _ . . ‘
:Dclivery of, Economic Goods Index . 0.093 0.011 ’ 0:000 . ' 0.082
* 1? Very Badly: 2 = Fairly Badly: 3 = Fairly Well: 4 = Very Well ﬂ ‘_ . 7 7 , 7 . ,
inseam Fair Elections? 0.029" 0.007 ‘ 0.000 0.040 '

l = corrpletely free and fair: 2 = free and fair, butwith minor problems: 3: free and fair, with major problems: 4= Not free
and fair

Careful about what you say? -0.002 0.006 0.754 -0.003
0 = Neverzl = Rarely: 2 = Often: 3 = Always
Perceptions of Corruption -0.007 0.010 0.479 -0.006
0 = None: 1 =Some: 2 = Most: 3 = All
Ingigtional‘l’rust Index , __ _ 0.153 7 0.008 0.000 0.174
0 = Not at all: 1 = Just a little: 2 = Somewhat: 3 = A lot
, Inter-Personal Trust Index 0 0.022 0.011 0.045 0.018
0 = Not at all: 1 = Just a little: 2 = I trust them Somewhat: 3 = I trust them a lot
amt—”1M9!
Urban-Rural 0.018 0.014 0.213 0.011
1 = Urban: 2 = Rural
Age 0.000 0.001 0.877 0.001
Gender 0.008 0.013 0.542 0.005
H1 =Male: 2 = Female _ q .. _ , , , . .. ;
ZEEducation, . . . 0.015 0.004‘ 0.0005 0.037

 

[ Adjusted R2 = 0.0804 (n =13,994) I

Table 3. 7

 

89

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard note that colonial powers often used existing authority
structures to administer via indirect rule (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967, 15). Indirect
rule relied on the historical ruler to enforce colonial rules on his subjects on behalf of
colonial authority. The historical chief was unlikely to fully support the colonial power
for risk of losing his own traditional base of legitimacy. Further, by allowing the
historical chief to control his population through historical means, the colonial state did
little to impose its own authority structure upon the population in rural areas.

Mamdani points out that this division of rule can result in different authority structures
whose legitimation rests on traditional, as opposed to rational-legal, grounds (Mamdani
1996). Further, as Mamdani points out, rural authority never really connected with the
state and is, to varying degrees, autonomous from the rational legal state. If this is true,
why would individuals in traditionally hierarchical societies view the state as more
legitimate?

There is a possible explanation to this contrarian ﬁnding. Thinking of Mamdani’s
(1996) analysis, if individuals ﬁom historically hierarchical societies are effectively
controlled by traditionally legitimate authority that they equate to the state, then it stands
to reason that they would view the state as more legitimate. If the modern state continues
to impose its rule over segments of the population through historical chains of command,
then it is possible that individuals who fall under such historical authority structures will
view the state as more legitimate. For this line of argument to stand, the data would have
to show that rural individuals who are historically associated with hierarchical societal

structures are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

90

Rural Groups Mean Std. Err.

 

Acephalous 3.648674 0.011889
Hierarchical 3.743788 0.009449

Difference of Means -0.09511 0.015009

Statistically Signiﬁcant at the .000 level

As table 3.8 (above) shows, among rural groups, hierarchical societies are slightly, but
signiﬁcantly, more likely than acephalous ones to view the state as legitimate. There is
no signiﬁcant difference between urban respondents. The data does support the previous
hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, remembering previous discussion on Mamdani, state legitimacy
in rural areas rests on traditional grounds through existing hierarchical structures. Thus,
it is theoretically possible that perceptions of legitimacy of rural respondents in
traditionally hierarchical societies are, on average, higher than their acephalous
counterpart.

Second, it appears that mode of livelihood does not appear to play a role in perceptions
of legitimacy. Yet, it is important to remember that mode of livelihood is ﬂuid in nature.
In this case, mode of livelihood can be considered one component of mode of production:
relation to production. A mode of production is comprised of two components: forces of
production (e. g. labor, technology) and relations of production (Klein 1985, 9). Fortes
and Evans-Pritchard focused on the second component, relation of production (Fortes and
Evans-Pritchard 1967). Speciﬁcally, they investigated how surplus was produced and
extracted, either via agriculture or the raising and herding of livestock.

It appears almost inevitable that both forces of production and relations of production

change over time. With the end of trans-Saharan trade and need for trade routes,

91

pastoralist societies began to settle down (Curtin et al. 1995). As they settled, their
relation of production likely changed and more closely matched that of agriculturalists.
Further, it is reasonable to argue that urbanization and modernization have greatly
changed the forces of production, bringing about specialization and technological
advances. This complicates the rather simplistic sorting of an ethnic group’s mode of
livelihood as either pastoral or agricultural.

Even in pre-colonial times, it was evident that there was a great variance within modes
of livelihood (Crummey and Stewart 1981, 30). It is reasonable to argue that along with
advances in technology, former pastoralists and agriculturalists have changed their mode
of livelihood by becoming skilled laborers, artisans, or assuming other quite distinct
modes of production. Classifying individuals along modes of livelihood can be highly
artiﬁcial (Klein 1985, 12). Thus, it does not come as a great surprise that the available
data does not support Fortes and Evans-Pritchard’s (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967)
hypotheses.

Accordingly, history and the literature suggest that both hierarchical structures and
modes of livelihood are likely to change over time. Neither are static concepts. While
these labels might facilitate academic classiﬁcation, it is unlikely that they fully capture
the complexities and realities of sub-Saharan societies. In might very well be that in a
given state, a pastoral society is more likely to perceive the state as legitimate. If so, it is
also likely that there are other factors at work other than simply historical mode of
livelihood. The available data suggests that such broad classiﬁcations do not help explain

variance in perceptions of legitimacy.

92

Ethnic Ties to the President

Perhaps one of the most surprising results is the apparent insigniﬁcance of sharing
ethnicity with the president. In the previous chapter, the very personal nature of Aﬁican
politics was apparent. Further, in a post-colonial state where competition for scarce
resources is intense, ethnicity is a fundamental ‘circle of trust’ within which individuals
operate (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 27). Taken together, it is reasonable to argue that
individuals sharing ethnicity with the President are more likely to believe, justiﬁably or
not, that they have greater access to the distribution of favors and material beneﬁts. Yet,
the data does not support the original hypothesis that individuals sharing ethnicity with
the president are more likely to perceive the state as legitimate. In fact, there does not
appear to be any statistically signiﬁcant relationship.

To make sense of this particular lack of signiﬁcance, it helps to think about the nature
and purpose of client-patron networks. The strategy of the heads of these networks is to
capture and accumulate as much wealth as possible in order to redistribute to enlarge
their networks or, “in other words, the social struggles which make up the quest for
hegemony and the production of the state bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in
which all actors — rich and poor — participate in the world of networks” (Bayart 1993,
235). The most successful patron is likely to be the one who most successfully enlarges
his network. In a context of multi-ethnic societies, this means that a patron likely has to
reach beyond his/her own ‘circle of trust’.

Some of Aﬁica’s most successful presidents were patrons who successfully enlarged
their networks to include most relevant members of society. Félix Houphouét-Boigny,

the president and long lived big man of C6te d’Ivoire, ensured wide ethnic representation

93

among his cabinet ministers. J omo Kenyatta was another president who enlarged his
networks through careful inclusion of a variety of ethnic groups into key state positions.
Such ethnic inclusion by both Kenyatta and Houphouét—Boigny “assured some minimal
participation in the governing process... [that] encourages bargaining by prominent
[ethnic] representatives over major issues within the key centers of power, thereby
promoting collaboration rather than group competition”(Chazan et al. 1999, 116). Thus,
it is possible that the majority of ethnic groups feel as though they have sufﬁcient access
to the state. Whereas an individual who shares ethnicity with the president might feel
s/he has greater access, another might feel s/he has equal access if an ethnic
representative was given the ministry of ﬁnance. In other words, even though both
individuals might have unequal access, they have access nonetheless due to shared
ethnicity. In turn, neither is likely to perceive the state as more legitimate than the other.
There is another factor for consideration. Aﬁ'obarometer tends to include more stable
sub-Saharan countries. In their quest to enlarge their networks, presidents often form
widely acceptable and fairly stable multi-ethnic coalitions. It is reasonable to expect that
ethnic ties in other less stable countries remain salient partly due to the head patron’s, or
president’s, inability to create inclusive networks. One such example might be Liberia
under President Samuel Doe. Speciﬁcally, critics of Doe noted that he appointed a
largely disproportionate number of fellow ethnic Krahns to positions of power (Reno
1998, 81). Krahns comprise less than four percent of Liberia’s population. It is likely
that ethnic competition in such an exclusive state is more salient. Consequently, sharing
ethnicity with Doe means more to an individual in Liberia than it means to an individual

sharing ethnicity with the president in a more ethnically inclusive society (e. g. a Kenyan

94

during the time of Kenyatta). Perhaps it was Doe’s inability to include a sufﬁcient
minimal number of Liberian ethnic groups that facilitated his demise in 1990. This
argument is consistent with the idea that political instability reﬂects a more fundamental
country characteristic: ethnic division (Easterly and Levine 1997, 1213). In the end, it is
sensible to argue that more stable countries, such as the ones represented in the
Afrobarometer survey network, have been able to manage their ethnic divisions. But
without data on these types of countries, it is difﬁcult to conﬁrm these arguments.

In sum, the lack of signiﬁcance in the relationship between presidents and individuals
who share their ethnicity does not mean that ethnicity itself is not salient. The data
simply suggests that in multi-ethnic societies, patron-client networks rely on fairly large
networks. In the quest for hegemony of the state, the patron develops personal
relationships with individuals that most facilitate his quest. In a multi-ethnic state, not all
necessary clients within the network are likely to share ethnicity. This results in more
ethnic groups successfully included in the network of distribution of state resources.
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that as long as an individual has access, s/he is likely

to perceive the state as legitimate.

Inﬂuence of Institutional Context

The discussion in the previous chapter suggested institutional context is likely to affect
perceptions of legitimacy. Speciﬁcally, institutions that permit individuals to contest the
legitimate right to control the state affect perceptions of legitimacy: political parties,
elections (Linz and Stepan 1996, 8).

Two of the three variables related to institutional context appear to be signiﬁcant. First,

individuals who associate themselves with the party in power appear more likely to view

95

the state as legitimate. This is consistent with the literature. The party plays an important
role in facilitating stability (Huntington 1965, 425). In sub-Saharan Africa, institutions
are notably weak (Chabal and Daloz 1999). It is exactly in such a context that
institutions play a vital role (Huntington 1968, 90-91).. Speciﬁcally, the party can be a
primary institutional source of legitimacy and authority due to lack of strong alternatives.
Parties act as source of legitimacy as they are the institutional embodiment of the popular
will (Huntington 1968, 91). Through the organization, political parties seek to increase
participation.

Parties allow individuals to participate in the ﬁrnctions of the state and compete for the
legitimate right to control the state. Such active participation in the state is likely to
positively affect perceptions of legitimacy. Speciﬁcally, an individual who identiﬁes
with a party or is actively involved in a party is directly involved in an institution that
helps comprise the state. That individual is, in effect, an integral part in the function of
the state. If functioning properly, the party embodies the popular will while shaping the
state in the process. It is thus reasonable to argue that a state shaped by the will of the
people is more likely to be perceived as legitimate as it reﬂects, in varying degrees, the
will of each individual involved in a political party.

This is not to say that African political parties do not suffer ﬁ'om difﬁculties or
weaknesses. Levels of institutionalization in African parties tend to be lower than in
other regions of the world (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001). In most cases, a single
dominant party prevails while many smaller less capable parties tend to dissolve as
quickly as they were formed (van de Walle 2003). Another problem tends to be the

excessive personalization of political parties (Ihonvbere 1996, 356).

96

It is these very weaknesses of the African party that enhance the importance of being
part of the winning party. Speciﬁcally, being a member of a political party is of very
little use if the party is not in power, and more importantly, if the party is not headed by
the president. Minor parties have little role and little capacity to distribute scarce
resources. Consequently, being part of the party is not as important as being a member of
the party in power whose ties to the president all but guarantees access to state resources.

However, a broad base of state legitimation is not necessarily ensured if the only reason
an individual feels that the state is more legitimate is because he is associated with the
party in power. Speciﬁcally, if the ruling party is not inclusive in nature, it is reasonable
to expect it to be a poor source of legitimacy partly because a non-inclusive party, by its
very nature excludes signiﬁcant segments of the population. Thus it is important that a
party in power remains inclusive, and even better, each party can credibly compete for
power as the parties mature and institutionalize. There is reason to believe that this is
taking place as studies have shown that party institutionalization in longer standing
Aﬁican democracies is higher and that their capacity is greater than more emergent
democracies (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001).

Second, it appears that voting positively affects perceptions of legitimacy. This does
not come as much of a surprise. It appears that such routine behaviors as voting does in
fact increase overall perceptions of legitimacy (Diamond 1999, 65). Voting appears to
promote habituation, in turn leading to an internalization of the rules of the game of the
state (Rustow 1970). Thus, as expected, voting appears to positively affect perceptions of
state legitimacy. Yet, it is important to remember that not everyone who reported voting

actually voted. Moreover, not everyone who voted did so willingly. Some may have

97

been intimidated into doing so, thus undenrrining their perception of the legitimacy of the

process.

Performance Evaluations

As explained in the previous chapter, performance evaluations deal with the delivery of
goods: economic and public. One of the ﬁrst requirements for the delivery of goods is a
modicum of stability. Every country included in the analysis indicated sufﬁcient levels
of stability to deliver both economic and political goods. It appears that in general, such
practical tests of personal and collective self-interests affect perceptions of legitimacy.

First, the data appears to support the literature suggesting that state economic
performance matters. Although the state might have the most difﬁculty delivering
economic matters, it cannot ignore its economic performance. The data suggests that
individuals are concerned with such economic matters as job creation and management of
the economy. The data supports the literature (Lewis-Beck and Stegrnaier 2000) in so far
as it appears that economic perceptions help explain some of the variances in the voters’
perceptions of state legitimacy.

There is an interesting ﬁnding. Speciﬁcally, current economic performance of the state
does not seem to affect perceptions of legitimacy. This suggests that individuals
understand that much of present economic performances are, to varying degrees, affected
by the international community (Brown 1995). Yet, the delivery of economic goods
index is statistically signiﬁcant and comprised of questions evaluating present economic

performance of the statell (e. g. do you think the state is doing a good job creating jobs?).

 

11 Of note, statistical test indicate that there is no signiﬁcant collinearity and that the two variables are not
signiﬁcantly correlated.

98

Why would one set of present concerns matter while the other, present economic
performance of the state, appears to be non-signiﬁcant? Remembering previous
discussion in Chapter 2, this makes sense. Speciﬁcally, individuals are self-interested
actors who are more likely to support a state that best serves their interest (Bates 1976).
It is thus reasonable that to argue that they are less concerned with the daily macro
management of the economy largely out of their control than whether they have a job and
can adequately provide for their family. Both are present concerns, but the latter is much
more immediate in nature. Again, given Aﬁica’s “politics of the belly” (Bayart 1993) in
which the power of the ruler depends on his ability to feed his followers, this ﬁnding
should not be surprising. In other terms, why should an individual listen to a state that
cannot provide him a job?

Second, in support of the literature, the data suggests that the delivery of political goods
matters. However, it appears that economic performance evaluations matter more than
political performance evaluations when looking at the standardized coefﬁcients. Further,
it does not appear that two of the three indicators of political performance evaluation,
freedom of speech and corruption, affect perceptions of legitimacy. This does not
support Evans and Whiteﬁeld’s (1995) argument that economic experiences may have
less effect than political ones on an individual’s support of the state. It could be that the
economic situation in sub-Saharan Aﬁica warrants more overall attention than political
matters. It is thus reasonable to argue that providing income for individuals to help
support their family is more important than the right to free speech.

Additionally, political goods such as free and fair elections do not come without rather

large economic costs. Providing free and fair elections strongly and positively affects

99

perceptions of legitimacy. Speciﬁcally, states that allow for completely fair and free
elections increase overall positive perceptions of legitimacy. Yet, the costs associated
with ﬁee and fair elections can be staggering for developing countries. The 1997
elections in Mali cost over $30 million (News 2002). This further suggests that although
individuals might value political goods over economic performance, delivery of said
goods is made much more difﬁcult should economic performance falter.

In sum, it appears that both economic and political performance evaluations matter. Of
the two, the data suggests that economic performance evaluations are more important. It
is important to remember that certain political goods require economic resources. Given
the rather somber economic conditions”, it is not surprising that performance evaluations

focus somewhat more on economic rather than political concerns.

Trust

The data suggests that an individual’s trust in institutions matters. Of all factors
considered, an individual’s trust in the institutions of the state appears to have the most
signiﬁcant effect on perceptions of legitimacy”. Further, when examining standardized
coefﬁcients, this variable showed the strongest overall impact on perceptions of

legitimacy thus far.

 

12 The average GNI per capita in the 15 Afrobarometer countries is $822. GNI per capita deﬁned: “Gross
national income (GNI) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of
employees and property income) from abroad. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by mid-year
population. GNI per capita in US dollars is converted using the World Bank Atlas method.”

(hglp://www.uniceforglinfobycountg/stats popupl .html - accessed 9 October 2006)

13 The importance of an individual’s trust in institutions raises endogeneity concerns. This particular
concern is addressed later in the chapter.

100

It is important to remember that the legitimacy index is theoretically rooted in voluntary
compliance to the mandates of the state. State mandates are often promulgated and
enforced through the courts, the police and at times, the military. Thus, it is reasonable to
expect that in order for an individual to think that the police have a right to enforce the
law s/he must ﬁrst trust the police as an institution. One can comply out of fear, but it
appears that true legitimacy rests on trust.

There are some interesting long-term implications to this ﬁnding. If states want to
increase their legitimacy, as measured by voluntary compliance, then foreign donors and
other interested parties might consider helping states develop ethnically diverse and
professional police, courts and national military. Thus, it is important to think about the
importance of an individual’s trust in institutions.

The importance of an individual’s trust in state institutions might be illustrated by
brieﬂy examining ethnic relations between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. There is debate
as to the pre-colonial relationship between Hutus and Tutsis” and the effect of Belgian
colonial power on the relationship. Regardless, it is pretty clear that by the time of
independence there was strong Hutu resentment towards the minority Tutsi population
(Uvin 1999). Upon independence, Hutus gained control of the state and the military
apparatus. Hutu resentment was made apparent in the Tutsi genocides of the early 1960s,
killing somewhere between 140,000 and 250,000 Tutsis (Uvin 1999, 256).

In April 1994, political events resulted in a Hutu led genocide of over half a million
comprised mostly of Tutsi men, women and children. The presidential guard and Hutu

militias primarily conducted this genocide (Uvin 1999, 261). Later that year, the Tutsi

 

M Rwanda is divided roughly 90 percent Hutu and 10 percent Tutsi Encyclopoedia Britannica, Rwanda
(2006 [cited 2 October 2006]); available from http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-214507/Rwanda.

101

led Rwandan Patriotic Front overthrew the primarily Hutu government and took control
of the state apparatus.

Today, a primarily Tutsi government controls the state in Rwanda. Due to past use of
the military against them, the Tutsi government quickly assumed leadership and control
of the army. The Hutus, aware of the genocidal history, are justiﬁably concerned about
the current Tutsi dominance of the military. Given the history of the military as a means
of advancing ethnic genocidal plans (Prunier 1998), it is not unreasonable to argue that
there is an underlying lack of trust in the military by the ethnic group that is out of power
(Reed 1998).

It is clear that reconciling these two ethnicities requires more than trust in the military.
Yet, if overall trust in the military can be increased, it stands to reason that individuals
from both camps might rest easier. Alleviating fears of impending genocide can only
serve to increase long term state stability and legitimacy. Policies that seek to a)
professionalize the military (e. g. employing professional soldiers who defend the
constitution rather than an individual or set of individuals) and b) ensure broad ethnic
representation at all levels of the military can only help modern day Rwanda. Of course,
Rwanda is an extreme example. Yet, it is not too hard to see how misuse and abuse of
the military can lead to deep insecurities that serves to greatly undennine overall state
legitimacy.

In sum, it is imperative that states help foster trust between individuals and its main
mechanisms of enforcement. There is no doubt that a state can garner compliance to
rules and regulations through the brute use of force, but individuals are more likely to

comply if they trust those institutions in the ﬁrst place. Additionally, legitimacy, as

102

previously deﬁned, is voluntary compliance without the use of force. An individual’s
trust in institutions appears to be very important for the legitimacy of sub-Saharan
African states. Programs that foster the professional (e.g. bureaucratic) state institutions
might be an efﬁcacious means of increasing legitimacy.

Second, contrary to expectations, the data suggests that inter-personal trust matters for
perceptions of legitimacy. Yet, inter-personal trust is not nearly as signiﬁcant and does
not have as strong an impact as an individual’s trust in institutions on perceptions of state
legitimacy. Notably, although inter-personal trust has a statistically signiﬁcant and
positive effect on legitimacy, the data suggest that its effect is rather small — standardized
coefﬁcient = 0.018.

Nevertheless, it is possible that such inter-personal trust facilitates the development of
complex institutions (F ukuyama 1995). In turn, these complex institutions facilitate
overall economic performance of the state, enhancing overall perceptions of legitimacy in
the process. Legitimacy, as previously deﬁned, operates vertically. As discussed in the
last chapter, inter-personal trust is a horizontal concept. As such, it is theoretically
reasonable that although inter-personal trust positively affects perceptions of legitimacy,
its effect is mostly indirect in nature.

Relying on the literature focusing on inter-personal trust (Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart
2000; Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000), it is plausible that inter-personal trust increases
overall perceptions of legitimacy by allowing for more complex and effective state
institutions that can, in turn, provide higher levels of economic and political performance.
Putnam notes that complex institutions have the added complication of monitoring inter-

personal behavior (Putnam et al. 1993, 164). Speciﬁcally, how can any one individual in

103

a society trust another to keep his word, or fulﬁll the terms of a given contract? As
Thomas Hobbes (1651) notes, the state can enforce a contract. Yet, Gambetta points out
those societies “which rely heavily on the use of force are likely to be less efﬁcient, more
costly, and more unpleasant than those where trust is maintained by other means”
(Gambetta 1988, 221). Societies that exhibit higher levels of inter-personal trust are less
likely to rely on the use of force, thus more likely to run efﬁciently and at lower costs.

Hence, it appears that both an individual’s trust in institutions and inter-personal trust
matter to varying degrees. Of the two, as theory would indicate, an individual’s trust in
institutions is more important and has a greater overall effect on perceptions of state
legitimacy.

Potential Endogeneity

It is important to address the issues of potential endogeneity. As stated in the ﬁrst
chapter, Englebert’s (2000) study posited that increased levels of legitimacy results in
increased economic performance. However, this research project predicts that positive
economic conditions lead to increased state legitimacy. Thus, there is a potential
endogeneity problem.

To address this problem, one can run an instrumental variable (2SLS) regression”. The
results suggest that the original Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model does not have an
endogeneity problem. Consequently, it is reasonable to run a regular regression with
perceptions of state legitimacy as the dependent variable. Notably, this runs counter to

Englebert’s expectations.

 

‘5 See Appendix A for model and statistical tests.

104

There is another issue of potential endogeneity. Speciﬁcally, an individual’s trust in
institutions appears to be the most consistent and statistically signiﬁcant — when looking
at standardized coefﬁcients — variable in explaining variances in perceptions of
legitimacy. This appears to hold true when the model was run across all Aﬁ'obarometer
countries, in turn raising a question of endogeneity. Running a ZSLS regression”, it
appears that the OLS model does not have an endogeneity problem in terms of an
individual’s trust in institutions. Once again, the results suggest that it is reasonable to
run a regular regression with perceptions of state legitimacy as the dependent variable.

It is important to note that these tests are not entirely conclusive. Speciﬁcally, it is very
likely, as discussed in the previous chapter that some endogeneity exists. Given the
complexities of the political world I fully acknowledge the likely reciprocal relationship
between an individual’s trust in institutions and legitimacy. Yet, as previously argued,
the direction is primarily an individual’s trust in institutions leading to variance in
perceptions of legitimacy, not the other way. These statistical tests allow me to proceed
with some level of conﬁdence.

Caveat: R Squared

Here, the low levels of explained variance in the model are addressed. Speciﬁcally, the
model, with an R2 of 0.0804, explains very little, a little less than 10 percent, of the
variance. Yet, William Berry and Stanley Feldman caution that “researchers should be
careful to recognize the limitations of R2 as a measure of goodness of ﬁt” (Berry and

F eldman 1985, 15). Simply stated, one must be cautious about placing too much

importance on attempts in maximizing the R2 (Hanushek and Jackson 1977; King 1986).

 

‘6 Ibid

105

On the extreme end, Christopher Achen states that the R2 “measures nothing of serious
importance” (Achen 1982, 61). Nevertheless, one should not dismiss a model simply
based on a low R2.

In the model, statistical signiﬁcance is as theory predicts. Yet, these ﬁndings are
presented with caution. The amount of explained variance (R2= 0.0804) is low, even for
public opinion data. The model does not capture over 90 percent of what explains
perceptions of legitimacy in sub-Saharan Aﬁica. Nevertheless, the underlying theory is
solid and there are good reasons to believe that what the model is showing is instructive.
This is an initial attempt at systematically and quantitatively studying perceptions of
legitimacy as earlier deﬁned in sub-Saharan states. There are no other studies like it.
This research is an important step in laying the necessary groundwork for future research.
Further, this research facilitates the discussion on the development of functional
indicators of legitimacy.

Conclusion

This chapter set to test competing sources of legitimacy in hopes of better explaining the
roots of state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa. The data appears to indicate that
legitimacy rests on various theoretical foundations. Two general ﬁndings follow:

First, legitimacy rests on a combination of factors. It does not appear that legitimacy is
simply a function of X. Several theoretical indicators proved to be signiﬁcant. Further,
one must remember that this model does not take into account the wide variations within
each of the 15 countries. Thus, it is important to examine how these indicators differ for

any one given country. This will lend needed context to the ﬁndings. More importantly,

106

the study of variations within a country provides a deeper understanding of the role these
various indicators play in relation to legitimacy.

Second, the only consistently signiﬁcant indicator across each country was an
individual’s trust in institutions. This suggests that trust is at the very core of legitimacy.
Here, trust was measured with respect to the courts, the military and the police.
Additional research is necessary to examine how the use of these coercive institutions
affects levels of trust. Speciﬁcally, one would not expect the issuance of a trafﬁc citation
to decrease levels of trust in the police, but might expect the use of tear gas during an
initially peaceﬁrl demonstration to decrease levels of trust. Thus, future research must
address and categorize various courses of action available to these institutions of interests
to measure any effect those might have on perceptions of legitimacy. Further, this data
will allow for possible development of policy prescriptions to help states increase their
overall legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens.

Accordingly, this chapter sets the groundwork for future research on state legitimacy in
Africa. It helps focus future efforts in areas that are most likely to be ﬁ'uitful. The one
area that stands out is an individual’s trust in institutions. Consequently, future research
will be devoted to better understanding and explaining how institutional trust works in
affecting perceptions of legitimacy. If an individual’s trust in institutions is at the very
core of legitimacy, it stands to reason that there is a need to reﬂect on policies and
mechanisms that might facilitate the increase of trust in those institutions of interests.
This is something that I will further address in the last chapter of this dissertation.

Before stating that an individual’s trust in institutions has the strongest effect on

perceptions of legitimacy, there is one control that needs to be further examined.

107

Speciﬁcally, it is important to remember that the data used in this analysis is collected
from 14 different countries. It is quite possible that these ﬁndings are affected by
individual countries. Speciﬁcally, the model as deﬁned is underspeciﬁed, or affected by
speciﬁcation error (Anderson and Mendes 2006). By omitting country variables, relevant
variables that impact the ﬁndings might have been omitted (Gujarati 1994, 510).
Speciﬁcally, part of the country effect is being absorbed by other variables, in turn
introducing bias in coefﬁcients (Fox 1997, 127). Thus, the next chapter will attempt to

account for country speciﬁc factors that might affect general ﬁndings.

108

IV — sub-Saharan Country Context

This chapter seeks to account for whether country speciﬁc context affects the model used
in the previous chapter, speciﬁcally, if individual level-factors such as perceptions of
legitimacy are inﬂuenced by contextual factors such as countries. It will be determined
whether individuals sampled ﬁ'om the same context, 0, share common inﬂuences. As
Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones note, “the observations in context [c] are
not truly independent; they are clustered and duplicate one another to some extent”
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220). In other words, the more individuals share common
experiences within a given context, the more likely they are to be similar (Kreft and
Leeuw 1998, 9).

To explore whether country inﬂuences affect individual perceptions, this chapter is
divided into three parts. The ﬁrst part covers whether countries affect the model used in
the previous chapter. Speciﬁcally, robust standard errors and country dummies will help
determine whether contextual factors matter.

Upon determining that context affects the model, the second part consists of a
Multilevel Residual Maximum Likelihood (REML) regression to analyze the
Afrobarometer data. Before running the model and discussing the results, two speciﬁc
contextual factors within countries that might affect individual perceptions will be
examined: ethnic fractionalization and electoral institutions. Variables will then be
generated to account for these country speciﬁc factors to be used in the REML
regression.

In the ﬁnal part of this chapter, the original OLS regression will be run in one country,

Mali, to ﬁrrther illustrate that context matters. When examining the model in each

109

country, Mali stood out. Speciﬁcally, Mali was the only country in which sharing ethnic
ties with the president affected perceptions of legitimacy in an unpredictable manner.
Interestingly, there was a negative relationship; sharing ethnic ties with the president
lowered perceptions of legitimacy in a statistically signiﬁcant way. This is a counter-
intuitive ﬁnding that initially appears to contradict the literature. In the end, this model
will point to the importance of understanding the context of any given country that is
being observed.

Country Effects

As mentioned earlier, it is possible that context is affecting individual perceptions of
legitimacy. Speciﬁcally, if country factors affect individual attitudes it is likely that the
responses are not independently and identically distributed (Zorn 2006, 329). Gary King
notes that this breaks an important but often unstated assumption in many statistical
analyses, that of exchangeability (King 2001, 498). Exchangeability “means that after
taking into account the explanatory variables, one should not expect to be able to predict
or explain [the dependent variable] any better by knowing the names of the [countries]...
(exchangeability is what enables us to use many observations to reduce our uncertainty in
making a small number of inferences; it is the assumption that area studies scholars are
implicitly critiquing when they point out the uniqueness of each individual case)” (King
2001,498)

In data in which individual observations are clustered or grouped, as in the cross-
national data used in the previous chapter, it is unreasonable to expect individual
observations to be independent and identically distributed, in turn breaking the

exchangeability assumption of the data. To attempt to correct the violation of the

110

exchangeability assumption in the presence of clustering, one can begin by applying
robust standard errors. Speciﬁcally, the researcher can run a regression using robust
standard errors while clustering the data by country. This allows correction for the non-
exchangeability of data, even when the precise nature of the dependence is unknown
(Zorn 2006, 329).

The most important aspect of nmning a regression using robust standard errors is the
choice of the dimension on which to cluster the data (Zorn 2006, 338). In this case, the
most likely reason for non-exchangeability is the fact that individual responses are
collected by country. Speciﬁcally, responses from individuals from any one country are
unlikely to be independent and identically distributed. To test whether any given country
affects individual responses, the coefﬁcient from the original OLS were compared with
the OLS w/ robust standard errors clustered by country — only statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients1 are presented.

As seen in Table 4.1 (below), clustering data by country changes the statistical
signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients. Most notably, four of the coefﬁcients that were
signiﬁcant in the original OLS regression lose their statistical signiﬁcance: authority
structure, act of voting, inter-personal trust and free and fair elections. This suggests that
the original OLS regression might have violated the exchangeability assumption (King
2001). Speciﬁcally, there is some clustering among respondents; individual responses

might not be independent and identically distributed.

 

l The full model of the standard OLS regression can be found in Chapter 3. The full model of the OLS
with Robust Standard Errors clustered by country can be found in Appendix B

111

 

 

 

 

OLS OLS
Perceptions of State Legitimacy (Individual Level Only) (Robust Std. Errors)
Constant 2923*“ 2.923”
(0.061) (0.100)
Authority Structure 0058*“ 0.058. 8
(0.013) (0.048)
Member of Winning Party 0074*“ 0.074"
(0.014) (0.023)
Did you Vote? 0039" 0.039
(0.016) (0.022)
Projected Economic Performance 0056*“ 0056*“
(0.006) (0.012)
Economic Performance Index 0093‘“ 0.093'“
(0.01 1) (0.022)
Free and Fair Elections? -0.029*** -0.029
(0.007) (0.016)
Individual's Trust in Institutions 0153*" 0153*"
(0.008) (0.023)
Inter-Personal Trust Index 0022* 0.022
(0.01 1) (0.020)
Education 0.01 5*“ 0.015"
(0.004) (0.006)
[ Adjusted R square 0.080 0.082 7
I Table 4.12 I

 

One of the most common ways in dealing with clustering is simply to absorb contextual
or subgroup differences through a series of dummy variables (Steenbergen and Jones
2002, 220). In such a case, one should include as many dummy variables as there are
clusters or subgroups. Dummy variables have two distinctive advantages: 1) they absorb
the unique variation among the subgroups and 2) they can be implemented easily within a
standard OLS framework (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220). In this case, the original

OLS regression pooled data ﬁ'om l4 sub-Saharan Aﬁican countries. Thus, dummy

 

2 *”p=<.001, "p=<.01, ‘p=<.05

112

variables were created for the 14 countries in the original cross-national sample and
another OLS was run.

The results can be seen in Table 4.2 (below). As is clearly evident, taking country
context into consideration signiﬁcantly affects the ﬁndings of the original OLS model run
in the previous chapter. Note that adding the country dummy increases the overall

adjusted R2 and helps explain more of the variance in perceptions of legitimacy.

 

OLS OLS OLS
(Individual (w/ Robust (w/ Country
Perceptions of State Legitimacy Level Only) S.E) Dummies)
Constant 2923*" 2923*“ 2978*"
(0.061) (0.100) (0.068)
Authority Structure 0058*" 0.058 0.004
(0.013) (0.048) (0.017)
Member of Winning Party 0074*“ 0.074“ 0049*“
(0.014) (0.023) (0.015)
Did you Vote? 0039* 0.039 0.021
(0.016) (0.022) (0.016)
Projected Economic Performance 0056*“ 0056*" 0051*“
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
Delivery of Economic Goods Index 0093*" 0.093'“ 0075*"
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011)
Free and Fair Elections? -0.029*** -0.029 -0.038***
(0.007) (0.016) (0.007)
Corruption -0.007 -0.007 -0.037***
(0.010) (0.020) (0.01 1)
Individual's Trust in Institutions 0.153*** 0153*" 0.169***
(0.008) (0.023 (0.009)
Inter-Personal Trust Index 0022* 0.022 0.024*
(0.011) (0.020) (0.011)
Urban Rural 0.018 0.018 0.043“
(0.014) (0.026) (0.014)
Education 0015*“ 0.015" 0.01 1**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Benin 0.101
0.042
Botswana -0.062
0.039
Ghana 0.327***
0.040
Kenya 0109"
0.038
Madagascar -0.122**
0.039

113

(continued)

 

Malawi -0.218***
0.042
Mali -0.050
0.040
Mozambique -0.015
0.043
Namibia 0.042
0.039
Nigeria 0.177***
0.032
Senegal 0.022
0.042
South Africa 0072*
0.035
Uganda 0220*"
0.034
Adjusted R square 0.080 0.082 0.106
[ Table 4.23 ]

 

Further, accounting for countries produces the suddenly high statistical signiﬁcance of
perceptions of corruptions in explaining the variances in perceptions of state legitimacy.
Yet, before looking into the signiﬁcance, or lack thereof, of each independent variable, a
critical weakness of the dummy approach must be noted. Marco R. Steenbergen and
Bradford S. Jones comment that “[d]ummy variables are only indicators of sub-group
differences; they do not explain why the regression regimes for the subgroups are
different” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220). Simply, dummy variables contain no
information. They merely suggest that context matters without identifying the
characteristic in each country that speciﬁcally affects individual perceptions of

legitimacy.

 

3 aatp=<.001, “p=<.01, ‘p=<.05; Zambia as reference category for country dummies

114

Multilevel Modeling

Recent developments in research have resulted in the formulation of multilevel or
hierarchical models (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Multilevel models are used for data
involving two levels of analysis. These are referred to as level-1 and level-2 with the
assumption that level-l observations are nested in level-2 units. Thus, when applied to
research, “level-1 observations may refer to individuals and level-2 units may refer to
contextual units, for example countries” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 221). Data for
level-2 units allows us to specify exactly what it is in each country that affects individual
perceptions and attitudes.

The ﬁrst inquiry is whether perceptions of legitimacy vary across the two levels of
analysis of interest: individual (level-l) and country (level-2). An Analysis of Variance
(AN OVA) decomposes the variance in perceptions of legitimacy to show whether any
variance across levels is signiﬁcant, i. e. whether country effects affect perceptions of

legitimacy in a statistically signiﬁcant way.

 

 

ANOVA
Parameter Estimate
Fixed Effects
3677*“
Constant (.046)
Variance Components
.029*

Country Level (.012)

. . 639*“
lndrvrdual Level (.006)
-2 x Log Likelihood . 46808

 

[ Table 4.34 |

 

 

4 ...p=<.001, "p=<.01, *p=<.05

115

The ANOVA (Table 4.3, above) shows us that perceptions of legitimacy vary across
levels. More importantly, all of the variance components are statistically signiﬁcant at
the .05 level or greater. This suggests that country level variables matter and affect
perceptions of legitimacy at the individual level in a statistically signiﬁcant manner.
Ignoring country level “leads the researcher to neglect the clustering of observations. . .at
the national level” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 230). As determined in an earlier
discussion, a simple OLS regression is inappropriate for this data as clustering at the
country level is apparent. Further, how country dummy variables can account for country
context was observed, but this approach is atheoretical in the sense that the dummy
variable does not have any theoretical merit, it simply absorbs context.

To proceed with this multi-level analysis of the data, contextual factors that are likely to
affect individual perceptions of legitimacy within any one given country need to be
included in this research. Theoretically, there are two factors that I hypothesize affect
individual perceptions in any given country: ethnic ﬁactionalization and electoral

institutions.

Ethnic Fractionalizatlon

In a 1997 cross-country analysis of Aﬁica, William Easterly and Ross Levine found that
ethnic divisions have a statistically negative effect on economic growth (Easterly and
Levine 1997). Speciﬁcally, they state: “High ethnic diversity is closely associated with
low schooling, underdeveloped ﬁnancial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets,
and insufﬁcient infrastructure” (Easterly and Levine 1997, 1241). Simply, they argue

that moving from a country with a homogenous population to a country with a

116

heterogeneous one corresponds with a decrease in annual economic growth rates of more
than two percent (Posner 2004, 849).

Easterly and Levine’s position has been broadly accepted as other scholars have
conﬁrmed their ﬁndings and many economists now include a measure of ethnic diversity
in their cross-national studies (Alesina et al. 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Collier
and Gunning 1999; Easterly 2001). Whether leading to higher costs associated with rent-
seeking among competitive groups (Collier 1998), or the fact that levels of ethnic
fractionalization requires more state intervention and regulation (La Porta et al. 1999),
economists suggest that ethnic diversity negatively impacts economic growth.

Besides the widely accepted economic impact of ethnic diversity, there is some
discussion as to the relationship between ethnic diversity and associated levels of ethnic
conﬂict. Karl Deutsch (1961) argues that ethnic diversity strains and destroys the
cohesion of states. Along those same lines, scholars have argued that long-standing
ethnic differences between groups challenge the stability of the state (Horowitz 1985;
Huntington 1996; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Further, scholars argue that ethnic
differences are emphasized and crystallized by political entreprenerus in hopes of
reaching their own political or economic end (Anderson 1983).

In his study of the conﬂict in the Great Lakes Region — Congo-Kinshasa, Rwanda, and
Burundi — Crawford Young notes the centrality of ethnicity in explaining the reasons
behind the conﬂict (Young 2006). Speciﬁcally, ethnic diversity can lead to inter-state
conﬂict that negatively impacts the state’s ability to monopolize legitimate force over its
population. Yet, as F earon and Laitin claim, there is no strong empirical evidence

justifying that ethnicity increases the onset of civil violence (F earon and Laitin 1996).

117

They argue that economic and geographic variables serve as better predictors of conﬂict
than levels of ethnic diversity.

In sum, the evidence appears to indicate that ethnic diversity has an effect on the state.
The empirical evidence suggesting that higher levels of ethnic ﬁagmentation lead to
lower levels of economic development appears more convincing than the impact of ethnic
heterogeneity on violence. Yet, neither can be dismissed in its entirety as both are likely
to have some level of effect on the state’s ability to provide security, a prime political
good (Rotberg 2004). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the potential economic and
social effects of ethnic diversity on the macro (national) level will have some impact on

the micro (individual) level (Cho 2006).

Electoral Rules

Another macro level factor likely to inﬂuence individual perceptions of state legitimacy
is electoral institutions. It is worth remembering that political struggles are mediated by
the institutional setting in which they take place because institutions shape the goals that
political actors pursue, privileging some and disadvantaging others (Thelen & Steinmo
1992: 3). More speciﬁcally, Cox notes that the laws and practices regulating electoral
competition can affect the behavior of voters in various and sometimes profound ways
(Cox 1999, 145). Further, scholars have noted that the choice of electoral rules and
regulations can have varying effects on levels of ethnic division and polarization in
Aﬁica (Horowitz 1991; LeBas 2006; Reynolds 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998). For
example, Donald Horowitz notes that in states in which electoral rules lead to the

proliferation of parties, interethnic coalitions may be necessary, in turn mitigating ethnic

118

tensions (Horowitz 1991, 359). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that different macro-level
electoral rules have an effect on micro-level behavior.

At the most basic level, electoral rules can be classiﬁed as either majoritarian or
proportional in nature (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). Closer examination reveals clear
patterns of organization along two broad dimensions: accountability and
representativeness.

Lijphart (1999) links majoritarian systems to an emphasis on accountability, while
consensual or proportional systems emphasize representativeness. A purely maj oritarian
system consists of the absolute sovereignty of the majority (Tocqueville 2000, 248). A
majoritarian system favors concentrated policy-making power (Powell 2000, 5). The
appeal of a majoritarian system lies in the directness and clarity of the connection
between voter and elected ofﬁcial. This is in sharp contrast to a more dispersed
conception of power whose policy making “must be the outcome of complex bargaining
between winners and losers, ins and outs” (Powell 2000: 5). Such dispersion of power
makes accountability difﬁcult to pinpoint. Nevertheless, those who favor such dispersed
power arrangements, or more proportional institutions, want to incorporate all factions of
society to the policy-making arena (Powell 2000, 6).

Without debating the respective merits of any particular electoral system, it is clear that
electoral systems are likely to affect individual level perceptions in any given state. The
most typical form of majoritarian electoral rules is one in which the candidates receiving
the most votes wins the electioir: ﬁrst past the post (F PTP). FPTP rules emphasize a clear
and direct connection between voter and elected ofﬁcial but are less concerned with

minority representation and can be viewed as exclusionary. The other type of electoral

119

system is commonly referred to as one of proportional representation (PR). PR electoral
rules are more inclusive and allow for greater minority viewpoint. Conversely,
accountability of elected ofﬁcials is much more difﬁcult in a system that stresses
dispersion of power.

In sum, electoral rules are likely to inﬂuence individual level perceptions of legitimacy.
There is a lot of debate as to which set of rules is more appropriate for ethnically diverse
states such as the ones found in sub-Saharan Aﬁica (Reynolds 1999; Sisk and Reynolds
1998), speciﬁcally because scholars understand the importance of electoral rules in
shaping individual behavior. Accordingly, electoral rules are used in this study as a
country level variable to help understand how context affects individual perceptions of
legitimacy.

Country Contextual Variables

In an earlier discussion, the advantages of a multilevel in cases involving two levels of
analysis were addressed. In the original OLS regression, the data was comprised of
entirely individual level observations. Using dummy variables to account for country
context suggested that context matters. Yet, dummy variables are atheoretical and do
little to leverage existing knowledge on how context affects individual level behavior.
Previously, it was shown how two contextual factors — ethnic fractionalization and
electoral rules — might affect individual level behavior in any given state. Now, these
factors need to be operationalized to generate level-2 variables that can be used in a
multilevel model. Two substantively interesting predictors were generated to run a
multilevel model. First, the Politically Relevant Ethnic Group (PREG) measure

developed by Daniel Posner (2004) was incorporated to represent ethnic ﬁ'actionalization.

120

Rather than simply including all ethnic groups in a country regardless of whether they
engage in political competition, Posner — as PREG implies — only accounts for politically

relevant groups.

 

Country PREG Electoral System a
Benin 0.30 List-PR
Botswana 0.00 FPTP
Ghana 0.44 FPTP
Kenya 0.57 FPTP
Madagascar 0.00 MMP
Malawi 0.55 FPTP
Mali 0.13 TRS
Mozambique 0.36 List-PR
Namibia 0.55 List-PR
Nigeria 0.66 F PTP
Senegal 0.14 Parallel-PB
South Africa 0.49 List-PR
Uganda 0.63 FPTP
Zambia 0.71 FPTP
Mean 0.42

a. Source: International IDEA www.idea.int

Key: FPTP=First Past the Post, MMP = Mixed Member Proportional,
TRS=Two-Round System, PB=Party Block, List PR=List Proportional
Representation

 

[ Table 4.4 I

 

Second, a country level dummy variable was generated for proportional systems (1 for
PR systems; 0 for the others). Table 4.4 (above) gives information on varying levels of
ethnic ﬁ'actionalization and electoral system across the 14 sub-Saharan countries.

Multilevel REML

Now that this study contains two theoretical country-level variables that help explain
contextual differences between countries, a multilevel model can be performed. All
individual variables used in the original OLS remain as level-l observations nested in the

two newly created Level-2 country level variables.

121

Results

Before examining the results of the multilevel REML model, it is worth commenting on
the statistical impact of substantive country level variables. First, considering random
effects, the variance components at both levels of analysis remain signiﬁcant after
controlling for the predictors at these levels (Table 4.5 below). This suggests that country
level variables are important and signiﬁcantly account for varying levels of individual
perceptions. Rather than including atheoretical dummies that absorbed context, the

multilevel model allows inclusion of substantively interesting predictors.

 

Perceptions of State
Legitim a ey ANOVA Multilevel
Constant 3678*“ 2.91 8*“
(0.046) (0.116)
-2 x Log Likelihood 46808 31930
Variance (Country Level 0029* 0021*
Only) (0.012) (0.010)
. . . 0.639’“ 0566*“
Varlance (Indlvrdual Level) (0.006) (0.007)
(0.006) (0.007)

 

[ Table 4.55 W

 

In the end, it is clear that when examining perceptions of legitimacy, country context
must be taken into account. Table 4.6 (below) shows that certain predictors initially
believed to be statistically signiﬁcant in explaining varying perceptions of state
legitimacy are no longer signiﬁcant once a multilevel model was used to account for

country level factors.

 

5 "*p=<.001, **p=<.01, ‘p=<.05; full model in Appendix B; This table only shows the ﬁxed effects and
variance components to compare increase explanatory power over ANOVA. Table 4.6 shows statistically
signiﬁcant independent variables of multilevel model.

122

Multilevel

 

 

 

 

Perceptions of State Lglitimacy OLS REML
Constant 2923*" 2.918***
(0.061) (0.116) 1 ,
Authority Structure 0058*“ 0.008
(0.013) (0.017)
Member of Winning Party 0074*“ 0049*"
(0.014) (0.015)
Did you Vote? 0039* 0.021
(0.016) (0.016)
Projected Economic Performance 0.056“ 0051*“
(0.006) (0.006)
Delivery of Economic Goods Index 0093*“ 0.076***
(0.011) (0.011)
Free and Fair Elections? -0.029*** -0.038***
(0.007) (0.007)
Corruption -0.007 0036*?“ .1
(0.010) (0.011)
Individual's Trust in Institutions 0153*” 0169*“
(0.008) (0.009)
Inter-Personal Trust Index 0022* 0.023"
(0.011) (0.011)
Urban Rural 0.018 0.042"
(0.014) (0.014)
Education 0015*" 0.011"
(0.004) (0.004)
Country Level Variables
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups 0.202
(0.180)
Electoral System 0.011
(0.085)
Adjusted R square 0.08
2 x Log Likelihood 33248
Explained Variance (Country Level
Only) 3.58%*
Explained Variance (Individual Level
Ony) 96.42%***

 

 

 

| Table 4.66 7 ]

 

 

6 I"""‘p=<.001, "p=<.01, ‘p=<.05; Table only shows statistically signiﬁcant independent variables. The
frrll model can be found in Appendix B.

7 Of note, I looked at the possible interaction effect between the country level predictor PREG and an
individual’s trust in institutions. Theoretically, it was worth examining whether an individual at a given
trust level would have a different effect on perceptions of legitimacy based on levels of ethnic
fractionalization. The interaction variable was not statistically signiﬁcant and was left out of the ﬁnal
model.

123

It is interesting to note that one factor that was statistically very signiﬁcant (P=<.001)
in the original OLS is no longer statistically signiﬁcant in the multilevel model.
Speciﬁcally, it no longer appears that belonging to a historically hierarchical or

acephalous society affects individual level perceptions of legitimacy.

Authority Structure

The lack of statistical signiﬁcance of the authority structure associated with any
individual is not as surprising as one might think. First, almost 50 years have passed
since colonial powers awarded independence to most of the sub-Saharan Aﬁican
countries. It has been argued that those colonial powers undermined and reconstructed
political authority in the third world (Migdal 1988, 64-88). Additionally, new Aﬁican
elites immediately adopted the structures and institutions the colonial powers left behind
(Davidson 1972). Africa’s new leaders did not foresee the newly independent regimes as
anything but within the mold of the European nation-state. Liberation ﬁom colonial rule
went hand in hand with liberation from traditional structures (Davidson 1992, 74).

Given the historical evidence, it is plausible that pre-colonial structures were
irrevocably changed. Regardless of whether an ethnic group was broadly classiﬁed as
acephalous or hierarchical, the colonial experience likely changed their hierarchical
structure.

A good example of an irrevocably changed hierarchy might be the Igbo in Nigeria.
The Igbo are considered among the most acephalous of African societies (Curtin et al.
1995, 71). They mobilized to form the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens
(N CNC) to represent their interests and compete for the state’s control of the state at the

national level. Other minority ethnic groups, often considered acephalous, have since

124

organized to combat real or perceived political repression and socio-economic
discrimination (Suberu 2001, 82). The civil war and the rise of ethnically based political
parties point to extant authority structures in what have been historically acephalous
societies.

Further, it appears that political realities have forced the Igbo to become more
hierarchical over time. In an attempt at succession, the predominantly Igbo southeastern
provinces of Nigeria launched the Biafran war spanning from July 6, 1967 through
January 13, 1970 (Nixon 1972). This civil war for the independence of Biaﬁ'a as an
ethnic (mostly Igbo) state failed (Curtin et al. 1995, 520). Yet, such an effort necessarily
required a hierarchical authority structure.

This does not mean that traditional authority structure has necessarily changed at the
village level. It does suggest that an authority structure, capable of representing Igbo
interests as a whole, successfully imposed or constructed itself over existing institutions.
There is anecdotal evidence that these types of post-colonial changes eroded past
structures while constructing new channels of authority (Achebe 1966). Speciﬁcally,
new political elites successfully created hierarchical structures, effectively mobilizing
previously acephalous societies to effectively compete for access to state resources.

In sum, it is likely that colonialism irrevocably changed authority structures in sub-
Saharan Aﬁica. Consequently, it is unlikely that ethnic pre-colonial authority structures
can serve to predict perceptions of legitimacy in a post—colonial context. Thus, it does
not come as a great surprise that the available data does not support Fortes and Evans-
Pritchard’s (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967) suggested hypothesis that authority

structure would affect perceptions of legitimacy.

125

Accordingly, history and the literature suggest hierarchical structures, like modes of
livelihood, is likely to change over time. It is not a static concept. While these labels
might facilitate academic classiﬁcation, it is unlikely that they fully capture the
complexities and realities of sub-Saharan societies.

Multilevel: Final Analysis

Multilevel modeling allows for better statistical analysis of available Afrobarometer data.
Multilevel modeling is data and theory intensive (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 234).
Given the availability of both data and theory in this study, it is the most appropriate
means of analyzing the data. This technique is particularly appropriate for the purpose of
inquiry as data clustering is of substantive interest here, namely, observing how country
effect can affect individual perceptions of legitimacy.

Multilevel analysis did not signiﬁcantly change ﬁndings previously discussed in
Chapter 3. In fact, it has only strengthened the analysis. For example, it is now apparent
that an individual’s trust in institutions is likely to be one of the most important factors
explaining variance in perceptions of legitimacy. This ﬁnding remains robust even when
country level effects such as ethnic fractionalization and electoral system are accounted
for in the analysis.

Country Context: Mali

Understanding that country context matters, it is interesting to examine how one
country’s context affects individual perceptions of legitimacy. Looking at the model in
each country, one country stood out: Mali. Mali was the only country in which sharing

ethnic ties with the president was both statistically signiﬁcant and negative. Speciﬁcally,

126

individuals who share ethnicity with the president are less likely to view the state as

 

 

legitimate.
OLS Mali
Perceptions of State Iﬂntimacy Multilevel OLS Mali

Constant 2.91 8*“ 3325*“
(0.1 16) (0.269)

Mode of Livelihood 0.032 0.357“
(0.035) (0.1 13)

Ethnic Ties to the President 0.009 —0.267**
(0.016) (0.102)

Member of Winning Party 0049*“ -0.052
(0.015) (0.053)

Current Economic Performance 0.004 0.062"
(0.006) (0.023)

Projected Economic Performance 0051*" 0.046
(0.006) (0.026)

Delivery of Economic Goods Index 0076*“ 0.079
(0.011) (0.043)

Free and Fair Elections? -0.038*** -0.057*
(0.007) (0.023)

Corruption -0.036*** -0.051
(0.011) (0.034)

Individual's Trust in Institutions 0169*“ 0130*"
(0.009) (0.033)

Urban Rural 0023* 0.040
(0.01 1) (0.062)

Gender 0.002 -0.134*
(0.013) (0.053)

Education 0.01 1** 0.025
(0.004) (0.016)

Adjusted R square .109

-2 x Log Likelihood 33248

Explained Variance (Country Level

Only) 3.58%*

Explained Variance (Individual Level

Only) 96.42%”

 

 

 

I Table 4.78 I

 

8 I"""‘p=<.001, "p=<.01, ‘p=<.05; Table only shows statistically signiﬁcant independent variables. The

frrll model can be found in Appendix B.

127

 

To more closely examine how context can affect perceptions of legitimacy, the original
OLS model was run in Malig. Table 4.7 (above) shows the results of the model in Mali
alongside the results of the multilevel model.

As the table illustrates, variables that help understand perceptions of legitimacy change
in the Mali context. For example, being a member of the winning political party is not a
statistically signiﬁcant predictor of perceptions of legitimacy in Mali. Thus, it is worth
taking a little time to discuss some of the statistically variables of interest in Mali. Two
particular independent variables stand out. Speciﬁcally, both modes of livelihood and
ethnic ties to the president are statistically signiﬁcant in understanding varying levels of

perception of state legitimacy in Mali.

Mode of Livelihood

First, it appears that in Mali, mode of livelihood has a statistically signiﬁcant effect on
perceptions of legitimacy: rural pastoralists are more likely to view the state as legitimate.
Remembering previous discussion, the effect of mode of livelihood is surprising.
Speciﬁcally, societal structures can change quite drastically with time and pastoralism
unexpectedly has a very strong and positive effect on perceptions of legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the data suggests that rural pastoralists are more likely to view the state as
legitimate. There appears no good theoretical position to explain this pastoralist puzzle.
The minimal literature that speciﬁcally discusses the potential effects of mode of
livelihood would argue the opposite, that pastoralists are less likely to view the state as
legitimate (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967). This might be due to one of two reasons.

First, in some cases pastoralists are associated with the ruling class (Fortes and Evans-

 

9 All scales were re-validated to take into account loss of data; all information can be found in Appendix B.

128

Pritchard 1967, 121). As such, they might be less likely to accept the imposition of a new
power structure that undermines their own authority. Second, it is possible that
pastoralists are less willing to recognize the state as legitimate since they are traditionally
more mobile and less likely to recognize state borders (Curtin et al. 1995). Neither
theoretical base would suggest that pastoralists are more likely to view the state as
legitimate.

Why do rural pastoralists in Mali view the state as more legitimate? It is possible that
Malian pastoralists have a better understanding to the claims of the state. The data
suggests that Malian pastoralists have a stronger connection to traditional authority.
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate that rural pastoralists are nearly 10 percentage points more
likely to contact traditional rulers and over 10 percentage points more likely to contact

religious leaders.

 

How often do you Rural

contact a Pastoralists Others
traditional ruler? (n = 152) (n = 1092)
Never 69.08 78.1 1
Once or more 30.92 21.88

 

I Difference of Means siﬂiﬁcant at the .05 level J

 

Table 4.8

How often do you Rural

contact religious Pastoralists Others
leaders? (n = 152) (n = 1092)
Never 60.53 73.26
Once or more 39.48 26.74

 

[Difference of Means Signiﬁcant at the .000 level I

 

129

An individual with strong ties to traditional authority might also be more likely to be
aware of any conﬂict between the state and traditional authority structure. Through such
exposure to conﬂict over claims of legitimacy, such individual might be in a position to
better understand the state’s claim to legitimacy but not necessarily view the state as
more legitimate. Thus, the pastoralist puzzle remains unresolved.

As discussed in the previous chapter, it is likely that this increased perception of
legitimacy has less to do with mode of livelihood than speciﬁc circumstances in Mali.
For instance, rural pastoralists rrright have stronger ties to traditional authority structure.
These authority structures are more likely to encounter conﬂict with the state. Through
this process of conﬂict, individuals with ties to these authority structures might better
understand the state’s claims. Accordingly, a Malian rural pastoralist might perceive the
state as legitimate because s/he relies on traditional authority structure for daily guidance.
As the data appears insufﬁcient to ﬂesh out this scenario, another approach might be
more beneﬁcial.

One important factor must be discussed. Within Mali, only two groups are coded as
pastoralists: Peuhl and Tamasheq. Since the same model includes the “ethnic ties to the
president” variable coded as Peuhl, the additional variance explained in the “mode of
livelihood” variable is explained by the Tamasheqs. Thus, the real challenge is to
explain why the Tamasheq view the sate as more legitimate than the average Malian and
the Peuhls view it as less legitimate.

In the end, a case study might be more appropriate to ﬂesh out this pastoralist puzzle.
This problem reminds the researcher that survey data are not without limitations.

Speciﬁcally, these types of data are useful in testing general theories and hypotheses, but

130

sometimes the resulting numbers defy interpretation. It is at those times that ‘thick
description’ (Geertz 1973) might be most beneﬁcial. Speciﬁcally, understanding the
context might help the researcher better understand and consequently interpret the data.
Accordingly, the next chapter will be a case study of Mali in an attempt to resolve this

pastoralist puzzle.

Ethnic Ties to the President

The data suggests another surprising discovery. As discussed earlier, the literature
suggests that ethnic ties matter and can affect socio-economic opportunities (Posner
2005). However, the data appears to suggest that sharing ethnic ties with the president
signiﬁcantly decreases overall perceptions of state legitimacy. At ﬁrst glance, these
ﬁndings seem to contradict the literature. However, there is a theoretical explanation that
illustrates why Malians who share ethnicity with the president have signiﬁcantly lower
perceptions of state legitimacy

The president of Mali is Amadou Toumani Toure' (ATT). ATT is a Peuhl. The Peuhls
comprise roughly 17 percent of the state’s population (CIA 2006). Further, Mali’s
electoral system is a Two-Round System (TRS). The winning candidate must obtain 50
percent plus one of the votes. If s/he does not have sufﬁcient votes in the ﬁrst round in a
presidential election, a second round is held to determine the winner. One of the
principal advantages of the TRS is that it encourages “diverse interest to coalesce behind
the successful candidates ﬁ'om the ﬁrst round in the lead-up to the second round of
voting, thus encouraging bargains and trade-offs between parties and candidates”

(Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005, 53). In the ﬁrst round, ATT garnered almost 28 percent

131

of the votes. In the second round, he easily won with over 64 percent of the votes
(Database 2002).

It is clear that ATT could not attain ofﬁce relying solely on roughly 17 percent of the

population. In his quest to incorporate diverse interests to ensure a winning coalition,

ATT needed the support of other ethnic groups. It is reasonable to suspect that the ethnic
. Peuhls, knowing that one of their own is in power, might expect more access to resources
than ATT is able to deliver to them.

It is interesting to note that during the 2002 election campaign, ATT made very broad
national appeals without reference to ethnicity"). Further, ATT stressed national unity
and formed a cabinet of people from all major parties plus civil society (AC 2003; AC
2002). As such, one possible scenario for the election outcome is as follows. It is
possible that ATT knew his own ethnic group was unlikely to vote for another candidate.
Meanwhile, he needed the support of other ethnic groups, but no one ethnic group
combined with the Peuhl comprised more than 50 percent of the populations. Assuming
every Peuhl and Barnbara (the largest ethnic group in Mali) voted for ATT, ATT would
only garner a little over 40 percent of the votes. It is plausible that the Sonrha'r' (roughly
10 percent of the population) were the pivotal swing group that ensured him the
necessary votes for ofﬁce. In that case, it is possible that ATT would ensure a slightly
larger proportional access to the one group he needs to remain in power without
providing surplus to his own rather secure minority group. This is secure in the sense

that ATT knows ethnic Peuhls are unlikely to defect and support another candidate. In

 

‘0 As will be discussed shortly, ethnic ambiguity in Mali helps to partially explain ATT’s inability or
unwillingness to make ethnic based appeals.

132

such a scenario, it is arguable that sharing ethnicity with ATT does not necessarily
beneﬁt as initially predicted.

Another recently proposed theoretical framework might help explain the negative
relationship between shared ethnicity and decreased perceptions of legitimacy.
Speciﬁcally, Kimuli Kasara convincingly argues that individual with co-ethnics in power
get taxed more (Kasara 2007). This might suggest that Peuhls are more effectively taxed
and resent 'ATT’s ability to extract resources from his own ethnic group. Yet, Kasara’s
study applies primarily to ethnic groups that produce cash crops. Although, as previously
discussed, modes of livelihood are likely to have changed, Peuhls are not generally
associated with crop production. Nevertheless, it is plausible that ATT is more effective
in taxing his co-ethnics, reducing their perception of state legitimacy.

Further confounding the results might be the issue of ethnic ambiguity. Mali has long
been noted for its ethnic ﬂuidity and ambiguity (Amselle 1998; Zolberg 1967). Although
dated, Zolberg noted that Mali was led “by men of typically ambiguous ethnic status”
(Zolberg 1967, 459). In examining three Malian ethnic groups (Fulani, Malinke and
Barnbara), J ean-Loup Amselle more recently demonstrated that ethnic identity is ﬂuid,
relational and constantly being transformed over time (Amselle 1998, 43).

Accordingly, it appears reasonable that the lack of clear ethnic cleavages in Malian
politics (Baldwin 2005, 12) results in neo-patrimonial networks that lack strong ethnic
identity. This might seem to contradict earlier discussion that spoke of neopatrimonial
networks possessing strong ethnic identities. However, ethnicity is not ambiguous in
those cases and can arguably facilitate the formation of patron-client networks. Whereas

patrons in other states might purposively target clients who identify with a particular

133

ethnic group to ensure wide representation, the ethnic ﬂuidity and resultant ambiguity in
Mali makes networks based on ethnic representation less reliable. Speciﬁcally, the
ambiguous nature of ethnicity makes ethnic identiﬁcation an unreliable gauge of
proportional ethnic representation in a patron-client network seeking hegemony.

Thus, it appears that Mali’s ethnically ambiguous context might further help explain
the data. While the literature suggests that patrons use kinship ties to win electoral
support (Widner 1999, 66), the very ambiguity of ethnic identity in Mali brings to
question the crucial role ethnicity is often theorized to play in sub-Saharan politics
(Bienen and Herbst 1996; Olukoshi 1998).

In sum, ethnic ties to the president are strongly and negatively associated with
perceptions of legitimacy in Mali. It is reasonable that the electoral requirements of a
Two-Round system along with a certain ethnic ambiguity resulted in dissatisfaction
amongst individuals who share ethnicity with ATT. Speciﬁcally, if ATT felt he needed
support ﬁ'om a speciﬁc ethnic group to retain power knowing his own ethnic base of
support is secure, it is reasonable to argue that he might secure greater access to others
outside of his own ethnic group. This suggests general dissatisfaction amongst ethnic kin
who have no other candidate to support and satisfaction among other ethnic groups to
whom he reached out.

Further complicating matters is ethnic ambiguity. Speciﬁcally, ethnic ambiguity in
Mali might result in ATT unintentionally under-representing his own ethnic group

11

relative to size . One way of getting at this might be to look at the names of ATT’s

 

“ The problem with ethnic ambiguity is that one cannot know for sure the ethnic conrposition of cabinet
ministers in Mali. As a state department report notes, ATT expanded the size of his cabinet to be a more
inclusive State, "Mali," ed. Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor (State, 2005). Along with
ATT’s unwillingness to make ethnic based appeals, it is almost impossible to ﬁnd references to a particular

134

cabinet ministers12 . If one looks for traditional Peuhl names such as Diallo, Ba, Bari and
Cisse (Leisinger and Schmitt 1995), there appears to be none. Although not completely
conclusive”, this points to under-representation of ATT’s own ethnic group.

In sum, if ethnic representation is not a criterion in creating neopatrimonial networks, it
is quite possible that any one given network unintentionally over- or under-represents any
one given ethnic group. Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that individuals ﬁ'om an
under-represented ethnic group might feel as though they do not have enough access,
resenting the state in the process. It is also arguable that both the TRS and ethnic
ambiguity contribute to the Peuhl respondents’ negative perceptions of legitimacy.

The next chapter will further explore and explain the nature of ethnic ambiguity in Mali
in addition to discussing the pastoralist puzzle. The informal institution of “cousinage”
will also be discussed in important relation to this context, speciﬁcally, how cousinage

contributes to the rather high ambiguity in ethnic relations in Mali.

Performance Evaluations

The data suggests that both economic and political performance evaluations matter. In
Mali, there does not appear to be a signiﬁcant difference in the impact of either potential
source of legitimacy. There are strong arguments that favor the signiﬁcance of political
evaluations in explaining support for the state (Evans and Whiteﬁeld 1995).

Nevertheless, political performance evaluations in Mali do not appear to have stronger

 

minister’s ethnic background, making an assessment as to ethnic representation very hard to establish.
12 Names listed at: lggpL/lwwwexxuncom/acf chiefsofstate/MaIi/icf l.html last accessed 1 Feb 2007.

‘3 Inconclusive as last name is not a necessarily accurate predictor of ethnicity. The next chapter will
discuss some of the name ambiguity and the problem with associating a particular name to any one ethnic

group.

135

impact than economic ones on perceptions of legitimacy. Whereas free and fair elections
appear to positively impact perceptions of legitimacy, freedom of speech and corruption
show no statistically signiﬁcant impact. On balance, looking at standardized
coefﬁcients”, it is reasonable to argue that economic performance evaluations appear
more signiﬁcant in understanding perceptions of state legitimacy in Mali.

Mali is a country confronting serious economic challenges. Mali has a GNI15 per
capita of $330 (W orldBank 2006). This is $492 less than the average GNI per capita of
the 15 countries in the cross-national model found in Chapter 3. Mali is a landlocked
country in which a staggering 70 percent of the population lives on less than one dollar a
day (Britannica 2006). Increased fuel prices combined with a 2004 locust invasion led to
a huge price increase in staple foods (6. g. rice). The result was an estimated quarter of
the population facing food shortages in 2005 (Britannica 2006). The argument can
easily be made that individuals living in a country facing such economic obstacles would
place priority on economic performance evaluations. Material insecurity in Mali is such
that people place less emphasis on non-economic factors.

In sum, the data suggests that both economic and political performance evaluations
matter for state legitimacy in Mali. Economic performance arguably has a stronger
overall impact on perceptions of state legitimacy given current economic circumstances.

Only one political performance evaluation, the holding of free and fair elections,

 

‘4 Free and Fair Elections Std Coef. = -0.08; Current economic performance Std Coef. = 0.09

'5 UNICEF deﬁnes “GNI per capita - Gross national income (GNT) is the sum of value added by all
resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net
receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI per capita
is gross national income divided by mid-year population. GNI per capita in US dollars is converted using
the World Bank Atlas meth ” (http://www.uniceforg/irﬂivcouptrv/stats mpupl .htrnl - accessed 9
October 2006)

136

positively impacts perceptions of legitimacy. As discussed previously, ﬁ'ee and fair
elections require economic resources. Without economic resources, a state is unlikely to
procure the necessary resources to hold free and fair elections. Logically, one precedes
the other. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that given present economic circumstances,
Malians are more focused with econorrrics than overall levels of ﬁeedom and

accountability.

Gender

The data suggests Malian women are less likely to perceive the state as legitimate. This
is not a surprising ﬁnding. Gender differences are expected to exist in primarily Muslim
countries. Although women in Muslim societies arguably have fewer opportunities to
interact with the state, reality is more complex.

For instance, Islam in Africa differs greatly from Islam in the Mediterranean and
Arabic world. Islamic women in Aﬁica are often granted greater liberties and are rarely
“veiled nor kept in purdah (except in upper-middle-class Hausa families in Kano“.S — and
even these women can still engage in such income-earning activities as cooking food for
sale, spinning, or weaving)” (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988, 108). That said, it is still
plausible that given Aﬁica’s patriarchal societies, women face greater challenges in
voicing their messages and interacting with the state. This suggests that women, having
less contact with the state, are less incorporated and less likely to view the state as

legitimate.

 

‘6 For more information, read Barbara Callaway Muslim Hausa Women in Nigeria: Tradition and Change
Barbara Callaway, Muslim Hausa Women in Nigeria: Tradition and Change, [st ed. (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 198 7).

137

Several factors rrright contribute to overall lower levels of perceived state legitimacy
amongst women. First, Mali’s TRS is a majoritarian system. Majoritarian systems have
been found to discriminate against women, in turn lowering their overall levels of
participation (Lindberg 2004). Majoritarian systems are more likely to have clientelistic
electoral campaigns which happen to be strongly biased towards male participation, and
women are more likely to respond to public rather than clientelistic policy (W antchekon
2003, 420). Not only are men favored in the formation of patron-client networks,
clientelistic politics tend to disregard issues most likely to interest and incorporate
women and increase overall levels of participation (e. g. health care and education)
(Lindberg 2004, 34; Wantchekon 2003, 421).

Second, the data suggests that women are simply less likely to be interested in politics.
In Mali, women were ten percentage points17 less likely to express some or more interest
in politics and the state. This signiﬁcant gap appears to support the idea “that many
Aﬁicans continue to see politics as a male sphere of endeavor” (Logan and Bratton
2006). This lack of interest is likely enhanced by Aﬁican women’s lower overall-social
economic status and limited educational opportunities that serve to ﬁrrther constrain their
access to the state (Foster 1993).

In sum, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that gender has observable effects on perceptions of
state legitimacy. Besides the role of religion, there are other factors that might work
alongside gender to help explain variances in perceptions of legitimacy in Mali. Reality
is such that complex mixes of several factors (e. g. structural and cultural) are more likely

to explain lower levels in women’s overall perceptions of legitimacy in Mali.

 

‘7 Difference of means test signiﬁcant at the .000 level.

138

Unfortunately, the aim of this chapter is too limited to untangle the myriad of factors
resulting in lower levels of perceived state legitimacy among Malian women. The
importance and complexity of these issues warrants a separate study. Realizing that
women comprise a little over half of the Malian population (CIA 2006), it might beneﬁt
Mali to consider and address the particular challenges and concerns of women in its quest
for broad legitimacy.

Conclusion

Generally, it appears that an individual’s trust in institutions is at the very heart of
legitimacy; the strong and very positive effect of an individual’s trust in institutions
continues to matter regardless of context. An individual’s trust in institutions facilitates
individual compliance to the mandates of the state. The military, police and courts are all
institutions that act, to varying degrees, as representatives of the state. It stands to reason
that as trust in these institutions of coercion increases, so does state legitimacy. Notably,
for true legitimacy, trust must be based on repeated interaction over time and not
ignorance. It is often noted that poor rural Aﬁican peasants are more likely to exhibit
greater levels of overall institutional trust (Bratton et al. 2005, 232). Yet, such trust is not
based on ﬁrst hand knowledge. It stands to reason that true legitimacy requires informed
consent based on knowledge. Institutional trust based on ignorance and lack of contact is
hollow.

For a state to be considered legitimate, it is important that the institutions which
comprise the state are trusted. This reminds one that legitimacy is not something the state
can simply acquire or purchase. Legitimacy is freely given by individuals who trust the

various institutions that encompass the state. If trust is at the very core of legitimacy, it is

139

unlikely that any state in sub-Saharan Africa or anywhere else in the world can acquire
legitimacy overnight. Rather, trust requires repeated interaction between citizen and state
over an indeﬁnite set of time.

Second, it is apparent that context matters. Speciﬁcally, country level effects are likely
to affect individual perceptions of legitimacy. When looking at cross-national opinion
survey, it is important to attempt and account as to why observations might not be
completely independent and non-identical and why observations might violate the
assumption of exchangeability (King 2001). Country dummies are effective in helping to
explain context, but they are atheoretical. A multilevel model allows accounting for
country effects in substantive theoretical ways in which country effects affect individual
attitudes and opinions. As long as good theory exists and increasingly appropriate
indicators are made available (e. g. PREG), country level effects should be included in a
multilevel approach.

Third, Mali illustrated how country level effects can inﬂuence individual perceptions of
legitimacy. Speciﬁcally, in Mali it appears that along with an individual’s trust in
institutions, the two most signiﬁcant predictors of perceptions of state legitimacy were
ethnic ties to the president and mode of livelihood. Of the three predictors, possibly the
most unexpected ﬁnd was the statistically signiﬁcant, strong and negative relationship
between ethnic ties to the president and perceptions of legitimacy. Theory simply would
not predict that sharing ethnic ties with the presidency results in lower levels of perceived
state legitimacy. This is something that the next chapter will explore in greater detail in a

case study approach.

140

Finally, the state is not an abstract concept. People relate to it in concrete ways. The
interaction between the institutions that comprise the state and the people the state seeks
to govern matters. Legitimacy is not passive. Legitimacy requires the state to actively
seek its citizens’ acceptance of its rule. While a state can use physical force, coercion
and intimidation to enforce its will, this is likely to be an expensive endeavor.
Maintaining adequate force (e. g. police, weapons, etc...) requires constant frmding
whereas legitimacy allows states to garner compliance at minimal costs. In resource
scarce states like those in sub-Saharan Aﬁica, it is thus reasonable for a state to actively

pursue policies that increase overall legitimacy.

141

V - Mali: A Case Study

It is important to remember that at its core, politics is about people. Harold Lasswell
(1950) deﬁned politics as Who gets What, When and How. In the previous chapter, a lot
of time was devoted to examining the how; this chapter addresses imbalances by focusing
a little more on the who. This includes a closer examination of people’s thoughts and
perceptions of legitimacy in Mali. The previous chapter also focused on statistical
analysis. This chapter follows more of a case study approach in hopes of shedding light
on previous empirical ﬁndings.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it seeks to provide a synopsis of the
political setting and some of the unique challenges and opportunities facing Mali.
Conversations with various national and international heads of Non-Govemmental
Organizations (NGOs) serve as background information for the latter. These
conversations will highlight some of the more pressing needs and shared concerns
regarding issues in Mali. These also refer to, either directly or indirectly, the empirical
ﬁndings of the previous chapter.

Second, this chapter seeks to shed light on two previous empirical ﬁndings: a) ethnic
ambiguity and b) the pastoralist puzzle. Speciﬁcally, characteristics unique to Mali that
help explain these ﬁndings will be discussed. This chapter will also explore the informal
institution of ‘cousinage.’ In short, cousinage is a very interesting informal relationship
between ethnic groups that serves to promote a sense of unity while increasing levels of
ethnic ambiguity. Further, this chapter will discuss how speciﬁc factors present in Mali
help explain the country speciﬁc ﬁnding that pastoralists are more likely than their

counterparts to view the state as more legitimate.

142

Case Studies

Case studies are not without advantages (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 67), helping us
better understand otherwise abstract concepts. Arend Lijphart (1971) refers to six types
of case studies: 1) atheoretical, 2) interpretive, 3) hypothesis generating, 4) theory
conﬁrming, 5) deviant and 6) theory inﬁrrning. The ﬁrst two serve no theoretical value
but might be useful in basic data gathering (Lijphart 1971, 691). Of the six, Lijphart
suggests that the two most useﬁll types in terms of contributions to theory are the
hypothesis generating and the deviant (i.e. outlier) case studies. These can be useful to
comparative inquiry if concepts gathered are applicable to other countries or if they
develop concepts applicable to other countries (Landman 2003, 34).

Single case studies offer the most descriptive analysis available. Such qualitative
studies are exactly what Clifford Geertz (1973) refers to when he mentions the need for
‘thick description.’ Yet, descriptive richness comes at a price. Speciﬁcally, such
idiographic emphasis falls short of Adam Przeworski and Henry Tune’s (1970)
nomothetic ideal (nomos=law), which recommends looking for underlying laws. It is
unlikely that the comparativist goal of inference and generalizability (Lichbach and
Zuckerrnan 1997) will be met in a single case study. Nevertheless, this case study will
hopeﬁrlly generate some broader testable hypotheses that can be applied in a more
rigorous and systematic manner in future research.

Understanding the inherent limitations of the case study, this research on Mali is
intended to foster development of concepts and theories that can subsequently be applied

to other sub-Saharan countries. The scope of these ﬁndings is limited to Mali.

143

Nevertheless, it is useful to explore some cursory hypotheses to further understand the
different factors that might or might not affect individual perceptions of legitimacy within
the Malian context.

Research of Interest

As mentioned earlier, this chapter seeks to make sense of the empirical ﬁndings in the
previous chapter. Two trends of interest warrant further investigation. First, this chapter
seeks to shed light on ethnic ambiguity in Mali, speciﬁcally the mechanism(s) that might
help explain ethnic ambiguity in Mali. It appears that the media and other information
sources primarily stress the role of ethnicity in sub-Saharan conﬂict. One example is
Darﬁrr, a conﬂict expressed in terms of Arab versus Aﬁican (BBC 2004). Speciﬁcally,
Darfur involves an Arab militia, supported by an Arab controlled state, committing
genocide against black Aﬁicans. Another famous African ethnic conﬂict is the 1994
genocide in Rwanda involving the Hutu killing of Tutsi (BBC 2005). In those countries,
it is clear that ethnic ties matter and can mean the difference between life and death. This
makes Mali even more interesting as it is a sub-Saharan state in which ethnicity is
ambiguous and appears to have low political salience. This begs the question of what
does Mali have that Sudan, Rwanda and other ethnically tense states lack?

Second, empirical evidence suggests the following puzzle: pastoralists are more likely
than agriculturalists to perceive the state as legitimate. Modes of livelihood will be
analyzed to determine why these appear to affect perceptions of legitimacy. It would be
interesting to identify some trait within the pastoralist community that leads towards

increased perceptions of state legitimacy.

144

This pastoralist puzzle is even more interesting given the historical trend which
suggests pastoralists are less likely to willingly accept imposition of a new political order.
In Mali, a pastoralist group called the Tamasheqs (also knows as Tuaregs) provides a
perfect example of this phenomenon. Since the very beginning of Malian independence,
the Tamasheqs were engaged in a bitter civil war with Mali. In 1992, France helped
initiate negotiations that led to the signing of a peace agreement between Mali and its
Tamasheq population (Poulton and ag Youssouf 1998, 135). This agreement called for
decentralization of state power. Given the historical conﬂict between pastoralists and the
state in Aﬁica, it is arguable that pastoralists are less likely than agriculturalists to
perceive the state as legitimate. Accordingly, understanding ethnic ambiguity and the
pastoralist puzzle will greatly enhance our understanding of perceptions of legitimacy in
Mali.

Sources

To better understand the aforementioned issues, ﬁrst hand information was obtained.
First, it is difﬁcult to ascertain context without visiting the country. Consequently, I
spent eleven weeks with a local guide as an assistant performing ﬁeld research in Mali.
Speciﬁcally, a 90 person (n = 90) survey was conducted. Although speciﬁc populations
were targeted, interviews were collected in as systematic and as rigorous an approach
possible. As such, the Aﬁobarometer sampling procedure was heavily relied upon and
adapted to this ﬁeld research’s particular set of circumstances.

In the ﬁrst stage of sampling, primary sampling units were selected purposively
(Barnbaras and Peuhls). Although the nature of the inquiry did not permit an entirely

random sample collection, an element of randomization was injected given the

145

circumstances. To achieve this, the local guide assisted in delineating neighborhoods and
corresponding boundaries. In the case of Bamako, there were six communes with four to
six neighborhoods in each. The focus was on neighborhoods known for their
concentration of Peuhls, who traditionally were pastoralists, and Bambaras, who
traditionally were agriculturalists. A card was then drawn out of a hat to determine by
which direction —North, South, East and West — the neighborhood would be entered.
Starting from a random point, the households were selected utilizing the day code
method]. Once inside a home, an interview respondent was randomly chosen. The
interviews spanned from Bamako to the rural outskirts of Mopti and Djénné (see Map of
Mali — Appendix C).

Second, while in Bamako, meetings were arranged with several leaders of domestic and
international non-govemmental organizations (N GOs) to observe how elite opinions
might differ from or resemble that of the population as a whole. These interviews shed
light on what various NGO umbrella groups thought Mali needed and provided some
insight into the politics of the country. This information, combined with the survey,
enhanced understanding of the empirical ﬁndings from the Round 3 Afrobarometer data.

Mali: Political Setting

Before proceeding with the Mali case study, it is important to provide a little background
on the politics of Mali. Speciﬁcally, this involves a summary of events leading to the

1991 revolution and subsequent rise of the current Malian state.

 

1 Per www.Afrobarometer.org/sampling.html (visited 10 Jul 06) “The day code introduces randomness into
the interval. It is calculated by adding together the numbers in the day of the month as follows. On the 5th,
14th and 23rd of the month the interval would be 5, but on the 6th, 15th and 24th it would be 6. And so on.
On some days (the lst and 10th of the month) the Interviewer moves to the adjacent dwelling structure
(because the sampling interval is 1). On the 29th of the month the Interviewer must leave the widest gap,
selecting only every eleventh house.”

146

From Independence to Democracy

Mali gained independence on September 22, 1960 (Britannica 2006). The ﬁrst Malian
president was Modibo Keita. A trained teacher and outspoken Marxist, Keita soon put
Mali on a socialist path (Martin 1976) and developed close ties with communist
countries. Notably, “[i]n 1961, he received loans and aid from the Soviet Union,

China. . .established a centralized economy, and instituted a one-party state” (Clark 2000,
256). In 1967, Keita launched a Maoist inspired Cultural Revolution. The Cultural
Revolution was a move designed to soothe the radical wing of the regime, “disgruntled at
what they saw as an outright betrayal of the socialist principles” (Martin 1976, 31).
Further, “Red Guards loudly proclaimed their support for Modibo Keita, condemned
enemies of the party who had criticized the President and called for ideological
puriﬁcation of the party. . .”(Martin 1976, 31).

It is important to consider perceptions of legitimacy in relation to Keita’s socialist
policies, speciﬁcally, the legitimacy of Keita’s Cultural Revolution launched in 1967.
Keita largely relied on a group of youth armed with Chinese weaponry known as the
Milice Populaire (M.P.), or popular militia, to impose his socialist policies on the
remainder of the population (Wolpin 1975, 601). The use of militia speaks to the
population’s lack of willingness in acknowledging and obeying the state’s authority,
which in turn speaks to the low degree of legitimacy of the Keita regime.

Further, applying Weber’s grounds of legitimation, Keita lacks both traditional and
rational-legal grounds of legitimation. Speciﬁcally, he cannot lay claim to traditional

authority while instituting western derived communist ideology. Further, his M.P. attests

147

to a lack of consistent application of rational-legal rules. Consequently, all that remains
is charismatic authority.

Remembering previous discussion, charismatic authority rests on devotion to the
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person (Weber
1978, 212). Keita mainly relied on his MP. and a small base of core supporters to
implement his policy objectives as his appeal arguably did not reach beyond these
groups. In turn, it is not surprising that Keita’s radical policies and accompanying
Cultural Revolution led to widespread popular discontent. Further, the MP. was seen by
the military as a direct challenge to its own authority and led to high levels of military
discontent (Wolpin 1975).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, in 1968, Malian Lieutenant Moussa Traore led a military coup
d’état, successfully overthrowing Modibo Keita (AC 1968). The coup was justiﬁed “on
the grounds that Keita’s policies no longer represented the views of most Malians”
(Bingen 2000, 246). Initially, it appeared that most Malians welcomed the change, even
if it meant military rule (Clark 2000, 256; Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 12).

In an effort to improve relations with the West, Traore also distanced himself from
Keita’s communist allies. Among his changes, Traore “modiﬁed some of the centralized
econonric structures. . . joined the CF A ﬁanc zone [that Keita opted out of]. . .[and] headed
the nation’s one legal political party, the Malian People’s Democratic Union (UDPM)”
(Clark 2000, 256). The UDPM was intended to achieve political legitimacy, both
domestically and internationally (Bingen 2000, 247).

As discussed above, internationally, Traore sought to enhance the legitimacy of his

regime by renewing ties to the west. Domestically, the UDPM sought to enhance the

148

legitimacy of the regime through collaboration and cooperation. For example, the Traore
regime created ofﬁcial Tons villageois (translated as your village/villager) in the
countryside, which were modeled on traditional forms of village mutual aid groups
(Bingen 2000, 246).

Despite these efforts, the regime saw clear limits in collaborating and cooperating with
ordinary Malians. Mali’s economic condition continued to be underwhelming, and there
was no improvement in the living standards for most ordinary Malians. In contrast to
such poverty, members of the Traore regime — relatives and associates — accumulated
increasing wealth (Clark 2000, 256). Additionally, the Traore regime permitted no
dissent to its authority. The UDPM “brutally suppressed all political opposition,
particularly among the country’s intellectuals. . .student demonstrations and labor strikes
occurred periodically but were quickly crushed, resulting in school closings, massive
arrests and many deaths” (Bingen 2000; Clark 2000, 256).

Like Keita and his M.P.s, the UDPM was ﬁnding legitimacy an elusive goal. Despite
tolerance of the repressive policies (Clark 2000) by the international community, in
particular the French, the continued domestic demonstrations in face of violent repression
illustrated signiﬁcant problems of voluntary compliance or obedience. As with Modibo
Keita, the Traore regime lacked strong grounds of legitimation such as traditional
authority. Traore’s use of force in attempts to garner compliance likely served to
undermine the initial enthusiasm for its rule.

Traore continued to rule Mali relying heavily on the use of force (Clark 2000). As
previously discussed, a state relying on force is unlikely to be a legitimate one and can be

costly (e. g. loss of lives). An illegitimate state does not enjoy the support of its citizens

149

as seen through inevitable demonstration and unwillingness to comply with the mandates
of the state. The early Malian state was further rendered illegitimate because it lacked
one or more of the three Weberian grounds of legitimation: charismatic, traditional and
rational-legal. Given the relative poverty of Mali combined with the expense of relying
on the use of force, it was unlikely that such a state could survive for relatively long
periods of time under such coercive conditions.

In 1991, the Traore regime succumbed to revolution. Led by students and unions,
“[d]emonstrations and riots occurred in several cities, the most violent erupting in
Bamako on 22 and 23 March” (Clark 2000, 258). The military was sent to the streets and
shot at citizens indiscriminately. In one particular incidence, the military “reportedly
trapped demonstrators and onlookers in a downtown shopping center, blocked the exits,
and then set ﬁre to the place” (Clark 2000, 258).

In the end, it was the military, led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré
(ATT), that arrested Traore. A national conference, lasting several weeks, was convened.
The goal of the conference was to include all segments of Malian society in hopes of
broadening its legitimacy. Theoretically, achieving broad based agreement on a given set
of rules should facilitate willing compliance. Thus, participants to the conference
“included representatives from the transitional government, all opposition and political
groups, and the major trade unions” (Clark 2000, 260). In the end, the conference
adopted a majoritarian electoral system — Two Round Voting System — and elections
were held with 47 political parties receiving approval to participate in the election (Clark

2000,250)

150

On April 5, 1992, President Alpha Oumar Konaré (Alpha) was elected with 69 percent
of the votes. Notably, he ﬁnished “ﬁrst in every region of the country and among
Malians living abroad” (Clark 2000, 260). Inaugurated on June 8, 1992, Alpha began the
daunting task of leading the newly minted Malian democracy. He was re-elected for a
second and ﬁnal term in accordance with the constitution in 1997.

In 2002, Mali experienced altemance from Alpha’s political party, the democratic
alliance of Mali (ADEMA). ADEMA was voted out of power in favor of ATT and a
coalition of former opposition parties united under the umbrella of the Hope 2002
Coalition party. Since the 1991 revolution, isolated incidents of opposition to the new
regime have surfaced. Notwithstanding, it appears that the majority of the Malian
population willingly obeys the state, legitimizing it in the process (Clark 2000).

Notably, unlike previous states and regimes, the newly democratic state of Mali appears
to be making a concerted, and arguably successful, effort at resting its claims of
legitimacy on legal-rational grounds. Signiﬁcantly, it has avoided resorting to the
consistent use of force to enforce its mandates. Further, as will be discussed below, the
state is seeking to incorporate more of its citizens into every day decisions through the
process of decentralization. Throughout this process, the state resorts to rational-legal
rules, one of three grounds of state legitimacy.

To understand state legitimacy in Mali, it is worth examining how Malians perceive the
state. Speciﬁcally, the legitimacy index used in the statistical analysis was comprised of
four questions, which sought to determine whether Malians believe they should listen to
the state. Thus, the index was broken down into its four original dimensions to show the

percentage of respondents who agreed with the four following questions:

151

. Our constitution expresses the values and hopes (of people in this country)
. The police always have the right to make people obey the law
. The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by
. The tax department has the right to make people pay taxes
The tables below show that overall, Mali appears to enjoy a fairly high level of
legitimacy. The majority of Malians are likely to consent to mandates of the state.

Notably, Malians are most likely to agree with the statement that individuals should obey,

or listen to, the law (Table 5.3).

Constitution eyresses values and hopes Percent

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

disagree 25.5
neither agree nor disagree 12.84
agree 61.66
n 1059
I Table 5.1 j
Courts can make binding decisions Percent
disagree 17.1 1
neither agree nor disagree 11.02
agree 71.88
n 1,216
I Table 5.2 J
People must obey the law Percent
disagree 8.94
neither agree nor disagree 6.34
agree 84.73
n 1231
Frable 5.3 I

 

152

People must pay taxes Percent

 

disagree 19.71

neither agree nor disagree 7.11

agree 73.19

n 1223
I Table 5.4 I

 

The foregoing provides a general idea of perceptions of legitimacy in Mali. To get an
idea of where Mali ﬁts in relative to other Aﬁ'obarometer countries, I took the mean of
the legitimacy index used in the previous statistical analyses and sorted them in

descending order. As Table 5.5 shows, Mali stands at the middle of the pack.

 

Rank Legitimacy in: Index Mean
1 Ghana 4.036
2 Uganda 3.906
3 Namibia 3.826
4 Senegal 3.792
5 Mozambique 3.740
6 South Africa 3.737
7 Mali 3.693
8 Botswana 3.666
9 Kenya 3.556
10 Zambia 3.547
1 1 Nigeria 3.536
12 Madagascar 3.51 1
13 Malawi 3.480
14 Benin 3.464

It is also worthwhile to see how each country differs in individual attitudes to the
questions that comprise the index. As a reminder, the four questions that comprise the
legitimacy index are:

. Our constitution expresses the values and hopes (of people in this country)

. The police always have the right to make people obey the law
. The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by

153

. The tax department has the right to make people pay taxes
The answer choices range from strongly disagree to strongly agree on a ﬁve point scale
with the middle value (3) neither agreeing nor disagreeing. The next four tables (Table
5.6-5.9) are bar charts that visually represent the variation in the mean of responses by

country.

 

I
Benln
Botswana s
GI i . arr-(arr ' x e ‘~'.v: “- :4; gurgling .1 ‘- .4 r
Kenya ' ' . ;- = .. V
Madagascar ‘ -' ‘ ”‘r‘i’ie‘igitvlﬁﬁ’ﬁﬂrtrimAssam
. . r'«-.r\v,. 'wrl'a-
Malawr . ' ~ .
Mali . 1 .
I
Mozamblque
Namibia ' ‘ " *5 5 I... .
' r.
ngena
83116981 _ ' " .. iff't .. :..;rt;i‘.*-‘>rr.za~‘3ft-155553.63"?
. . .
South Afrlca > . .
' ' "’52:”.‘77‘7‘3” ‘ ‘Ug‘ﬁjgf 7:1 VA; Lem \, ﬁ-"zn, .f 7.. '_ . 1*" rs emacicgrgﬁgy- 13: '
Wanda ~. It. ‘. . . _. x.. .-.. .. .... -.
O
Zambla

 

 

.-
-l
—l
—I
-1

Table 5.6

 

Benin
Botswana - , . -
Ghana w~ - .. ,
Kenya :v‘\“:;-;** it" Var-Lace:- - I '45:; .3. ._ , , . . . 5%,}:
Madagascar . .. : . .
Malan ‘ 3“? " ‘ J‘Q‘F- . -‘~.'-’ 9".iirlrthig ‘ ‘ ‘1, ;
Mali ' * ‘ 5 . .
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeﬁa ‘ ‘. ‘ . 'V‘V'x‘jtt“ Q‘Q’R‘j-IK:.\f\'.\;),'§‘_‘:\i~‘:.‘ \- (r 4“" 1"“
Senegal '
South Africa rmw~eea .
Uganda
Zambia ' " ' ' ~ \\'.1-li"“’f§ ~ . .

 

 

mean of Courts
Table 5.7

154

 

Benin
Botswana
Ghana
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi

Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Uganda
Zambia

\ c ‘ ~§z«§+‘$'£n.'. , "' -'-

 

 

I

0

—1

l l I

2
mean of Law

 

Benin
Botswana
Ghana
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi

Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Uganda
Zambia

‘~-"fk'-.}"Kf.f-j.“4-.'D- vex . 'hlj}:*' '

 

 

—:

2
mean of Taxes

As can be seen, Mali remains fairly consistently in the middle of the pack. Malians tend

to agree most strongly with the idea that the courts have the right to make decisions that

people always have to abide by and least strongly with the statement that the constitution

expresses their hopes and values.

155

Now that we have a general understanding of Malian politics, it is important to include
in this discussion two groups who have historically revolted or expressed unwillingness
to listen to the state’s mandates despite Mali’s efforts at legitimacy: students and
Tamasheqs. The student movement was instrumental in the toppling of the Traore
regime and the creation of a democratic state (Smith 1997). In fact, students began
protesting in the late 1970s and were often met with violent repression on the part of the
Traore regime (Bingen 2000). The Tamasheqs, on the other hand, have a long history of
resistance against central Malian authority. Arguably, it was not until a more inclusive
[and legitimate] democratic state that over 100 years of Tamasheq rejection of

centralization came to an end (Poulton and Youssouf 1998).

Student Movement

In Mali, students are organized under l’Association des Eléves et Etudiants de Mali
(AEEM). The AEEM is particularly important due to its effectiveness in articulating its
members’ demands. As a result, the group has become an important part of a vibrant
democratic Mali (Smith 1997) and is not a segment of the population any state can afford
to ignore.

In recognition for their role in the toppling of the Traore regime, in March 1991, the
transitional government invited the AEEM to join the National Conference (Nzouankeu
1993). After agreeing to participate in the conference, the AEEM “negotiated and signed
a 'memorandum' with the government specifying twenty-ﬁve demands made by the
students” (Smith 1990, 250). The content of this memorandum included such demands
as an immediate rise in student scholarships, extension of scholarships to high school

level students and various physical and pedagogical improvements to the schools.

156

There was broad agreement amongst the political elite that these demands represented
needed improvements to the Malian educational system. Yet, few of the demands were
actually implemented by the transitional government (Srrrith 1997). Upon his election to
ofﬁce 1992 President Alpha Konaré was faced with the additional burden of ﬁnding
means to ﬁrnd these relatively expensive demands. Negotiations with the AEEM as to
the implementation of these demands continued through 1993.

Tensions arose in March 1993 when AEEM leaders from the Rural Polytechnic
Institute at Katibougou (IPR) decided to riot against the state based on the state’s failure
to meet key demands in the original memorandum. Speciﬁcally, they were upset to
discover that the number of scholarships had not been increased and that their own
scholarships decreased in monetary value (Smith 1997, 250). [PR students reacted by
attacking and igniting ﬁre to administrative buildings.

Many of the student leaders were detained and imprisoned, but most were released with
the exception of the three ring leaders (IPR Three). As a result, the national AEEM
adopted the cause of the [PR students and the [PR Three (Smith 1997, 251). National
class boycotts, sit-ins and demonstrations followed. Alpha could not ignore the
destabilizing effects of the AEEM protests. Eventually, the [PR Three were released,
school expulsions were reversed, and pardons were issued to all students arrested during
the March riots. However, a key student demand, that of increased scholarships,
remained unmet by the state (Smith 1997, 254). This led to internal divisions within the
AEEM and an increased sense amongst students of its inability to effect change (Smith

1997)

157

It appears that the AEEM was its most effective and most vocal in times when its
members likely viewed the state as most illegitimate. During the military dictatorship of
Moussa Traore, students often effectively organized and demonstrated in the streets of
Bamako in face of violent repression. In contrast, the AEEM became less effective in
organizing mass protests based on its leaders’ unwillingness to do so. Further, it appears
that students are recognizing that the current state is listening to their demands and, as
recently as 1997, entered into an agreement committing itself to meeting those demands
(Smith 1997; Smith 2001). Thus, the students now feel as though they have a voice
within the state leading to less dependence on the AEEM. Further, it is likely that they
recognize the economic difﬁculties facing the state further hamper its ability to meet their
demands.

Given the importance of the AEEM’s role and its potential destabilizing effect on the
state, it is worth taking a glance at student perceptions of legitimacy and its implications.
Notably, it does not appear that students are less likely to view the state as more or less

legitimate than other segments of the population (Table 5.5 — 5.8).

Constitution expresses values and hopes % Student % Other

 

disagree , 28.57 12.98

neither agree nor disagree 9.52 12.98

agree 61.91 61.65

h 42 1017
I Table 5.10 I

 

158

Courts make bindinj decisions % Student % Other

 

 

 

 

 

 

disagree 13.05 17.27
neither agree nor disagree 6.52 11.2
agree 80.43 71.54
h 46 1170
[Table 5.11 J
People must obey the law % Student % Other
disagree 4.26 9.12
neither agree nor disagree 6.38 6.33
agree 89.36 84.55
n 47 1 184
[Table 5.12 I
People must pay taxes % Student % Other
disagree 10.64 20.07
neither agree nor disagree 7.4
agree 89.36 72.54
n 47 1176

Difference of Means Statistically Significant at the .01 level

 

[Table 5.13 I

The available data show that students are much more likely - over 15 percentage points —
to think that people should pay their taxes. Perhaps this sentiment arises from the
realization that their requests, especially their call for an increase in scholarships,
necessitate funding. Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the AEEM is
experiencing difﬁculty mobilizing students today because the latter appear to have a
fairly elevated perception of state legitimacy and have no reason to revolt at this point in

time. However, it is conceivable that this segment of the population will be among the

159

ﬁrst to engage in acts of civil disobedience should conditions worsen and undermining

the legitimacy of the state in the process.

Tamasheqs

Like the students, Tarrrasheqs openly resisted state mandates. The Tamasheqs are desert
dwelling inhabitants of the northern desert of Mali and possess a long history of
challenging central state authority. As mentioned earlier, Tamasheq resistance to
centralized rule is not a modern phenomenon. Speciﬁcally, their “rejection of
centralization was already evident in their resistance to the French” (Poulton and
Youssouf 1998, 25).

The Tamasheqs have a long history of violent conﬂict with the French colonial state in
Mali. On January 15, 1894, the Tamasheqs destroyed a French military formation. The
ensuing brutality of French revenge is still discussed amongst Tamasheqs (Poulton and
Youssouf 1998, 25). In 1916, the French struggled to stamp out the armed Tamasheq
resistance that was led by F irhoun Ag Alinsar . The French military killed 750
Tamasheqs; such slaughter is not easily forgotten among the Tamasheqs (Poulton and
Youssouf 1998, 25). Perhaps one of the more graphic French responses to Tamasheq
revolts was the 1954 public parading of the head of Tamasheq leader Alla ag Albacher to
show what happened to those who did not heed the commands of central authority.

Tamasheq resentment against central authority has since built up over the past 100 plus
years (Coulibaly, Drabo and Mohamed 1995), “erupting as intermittent revolts against
central authority” (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 25). Tamasheq revolts did not cease after
Mali attained independence in 1960. In 1963, the forces of Modibo Keita employed

aircraft to bomb Tamasheqs revolting in favor of an independent state, “an idea dating

160

back to a 1957 petition to the French Parliament initiated by the Imam of Timbuktu [a
Tamasheq stronghold]” (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 25). It was not until 1977 that
Moussa Traore released Tamasheqs arrested in 1963-64.

Along with armed conﬂict, the Tamasheq have dealt with blows from nature.
Speciﬁcally, the 1973 drought created misery and exile for thousands of Tamasheqs.
Central authority did not help engender feelings of goodwill as “[i]ntemational aid
destined for the hungry populations of the North was stolen by army colonels to build
luxurious villas in Bamako, knows as ‘the castles of drought’” (Poulton and Youssouf
1998, 26). It is clear that up to this point, Tamasheqs did not view the state, colonial or
independent, as legitimate; they did not willingly obey the mandates of the state.
Second T amasheq Rebellion: The Armed Revolt 1990—1997
A brief look at history dating back to the 19th century shows that Tamasheq concerns
have only been met with violence and attempts at repression. As Poulton and Youssouf
note: “The seeds of revolt, sown by French conquest and by the massacres of 1963-64
under Mali’s First Republic, had time to grow and multiply” (Poulton and Youssouf
1998, 55). Speciﬁcally, “the original grievances of Mali’s [Tamasheqs] in the early
19603 had never completely disappear ” (Keita 1998, 14). “These were rooted in a
[Tamasheq] conviction that the [state] was unresponsive and hostile” (Keita 1998, 14).

In the late 1980s, Tamasheqs began organizing under the umbrella of the Mouvement
Populaire de Liberation de l’Azwad (MPLA). On the night of June 28, 1990, the MPLA
organized and launched a rebellion in Mali (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 55). Initially,
the rebels were able to inﬂict heavy damage to Malian police and military forces.

Further, “[t]hc rebellion compounded the political and economic problems of the state:

161

the regime of Malian President Traore already faced ﬁnancial constraints, and a growing
domestic opposition” (Keita 1998, 15).

Traore realized he needed to attempt to communicate with the rebels. Before the coup
d’etat that removed him ﬁom power in 1992, he was able to reach an internal agreement
- the Accords of Tamanrasset — that partly addressed the most pressing issues of the
Tamasheq rebels. Some of the speciﬁc provisions included the reduction of the Army
presence in the north, especially around Kidal, and disengagement of the Army ﬁom civil
administration (Keita 1998, 16).

Less than a week after being elected Mali’s President, on April 11, 1992, Alpha Konaré
was quick to build upon the Accords of Tamanrasset and upon further consultation,
leaders from all involved communities signed the National Pact (Poulton and Youssouf
1998, 66; Keita 1998). The Accord faced formidable challenges. First, although very
inclusive, it did not obtain unanimous support from the rebel Tamasheq leaders (Poulton
and Youssouf 1998). Perhaps more importantly, the Accords never received sufﬁcient
funding from donors and the international community to tend to returning refugees, fund
the disarmament process and help with the building of a new security force that
integrated former Tamasheq rebels (Poulton and Youssouf 1998).

Given some of the pact’s shortcomings, perhaps it is not surprising that violence erupted
once more in 1994. Throughout the following years, President Konaré took steps to
address Tamasheq concerns. For example, in an effort to change Malian military
perceptions of the Tamasheq, “the Army instituted recurring consultations between senior
military ofﬁcers and [Tamasheq] community leaders” (Keita 1998, 21). Irnportantly, the

international community began funding efforts to the resettlement of refugees, while

162

donors pledged approximately $200 million towards development efforts in the north
(Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 78). In the end, the combined efforts of President Alpha’s
regime and the international community successfully addressed Tamasheq demands
initially iterated in the Accord of Tamanrasset.

On March 27, 1996, as a symbolic end to conﬂict, small arms surrendered by Tamasheq
rebels were consumed by a ﬂame of peace in Timbuktu. This ﬂame “burned itself into
the consciousness of all Africa. . .illuminated the Malian peacekeeping model which is
now cited across the world” (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 79). This act resonates with
the Malian model of peace keeping, one based on community reconciliation, rrrilitary
integration and efforts towards decentralization (more on which is discussed further in
this chapter).

Since it now appears that Tamasheq grievances are being actively addressed, it is worth
comparing Tamasheq perceptions of legitimacy to the rest of the population. With the
exception of whether the constitution expresses the values and hopes of the Tamasheqs,
Tamasheqs are now signiﬁcantly more likely to perceive the state as legitimate (Tables

5.10 — 5.13). This suggests that the peace process that placed dialogue center stage is

 

 

effective.
Constitution expresses values and hopes % Tamasheq % Others
disagree 1 1 .9 18.58
neither agree nor disagree 23.81 12.39
agree 57.15 61.84
n 42 1017
I Table 5.14 I

 

163

Courts make billdil'g decisions % Tamasheq % Others

disagree 8.89 17.42
neither agree nor disagree 17.78 10.76
agree 73.34 71.81
n 45 1171

Difference of Means Statistically Signiﬁcant at the .01 level

 

 

 

I Table 5.15 ]
People must obey the law % Tamasheq % Other
disagree 2.22 9.19
neither agree nor disagree 4.44 6.41
agree 93.33 84.4
n 45 1186

Difference of Means Statistically Signiﬁcant at the .00 level

 

 

 

I Table 5.16 I
People must pay taxes % Tamasheq % Other
disagree 6.66 20.2
neither agree nor disagree 17.78 6.71
agree 75.56 73.09
h 45 1178

Difference of Means Statistically Signiﬁcant at the .01 level

 

I Table 5.17J

In sum, Mali is a democratic state with varying perceptions of legitimacy among its
population. Overall, it appears that the current state is successfully engendering willing

compliance to its mandates. As was discussed, certain segments of the population that

164

have historically been less willing to listen to the state presently appear satisﬁed. This
bodes well for the future of Mali, allowing the current regime time to improve Malian
socio-econonric conditions without having to use scarce resources to combat active
dissent. The next section explores some of the socio-economic challenges facing Mali.

Mali: Challenges

A landlocked country that is mostly covered by desert, Mali is undoubtedly a poor
country facing numerous challenges. I want to focus on three challenges: cotton,

decentralization and education.

Coﬂon

Cotton production remains vital for Maliz. James Tefft notes, “[i]t is no
oversirnpliﬁcation to state as cotton goes, so go the prospects of development in Mali”
(Tefft 2000, 213). To maintain its prominent role in cotton exportation, Mali focuses on
output expansion with little attention to improving productivity. Given Mali’s strong
economic dependence on cotton production, this approach raises three key challenges.

First, there is evidence that current over expansion, decreased use of fallow periods of
the ﬁelds, along with the absence of sufﬁcient fertilization may constrain cotton
production over time (Tefft 2000, 213). Although fertilization is used in the production
of cotton, it is insufﬁcient. Further, fertilizers cannot keep up with the high levels of soil
depletion with researchers noting that “drastic options, such as doubling the application
of fertilizer or manure, or halving erosion losses, even if feasible, would still not be

enough to make up for the calculated deﬁcits” (van der P01 and Traore 1993, 70).

 

2 Cotton accounted for over 70% percent of Mali’s exports in 2003 International Fund for Agricultural
Development, "Statistiques Pour Le Mali," (IFAD, 2007).

165

Second, there are risks associated with agricultural commodity products (Diouf 2004).

Speciﬁcally, the United Nations reports:
“[M]ost agricultural commodities have experienced a downward trend in real
prices, and the long-term forecasts are not encouraging. According to World Bank
estimates for 2015, although real prices of most agricultural commodities are
projected to rise above current levels, they would still remain below their mid-
1990s peaks”(Diouf 2004, 21).
These trends can lead to rising rural unemployment and decline in export earnings, in
turn threatening Mali’s ability to pay for necessary food imports3. Thus, efforts must be
made to improve productivity rather than simply focusing on crop expansion (Tefft 2000,
214)

Finally, the two previous challenges require substantial ﬁnancial resources (Tefft 2000,
214). Besides ﬁnding ways to use cotton proﬁts to increase productivity, frmds are
necessary to “ﬁnance the government’s budget, or for strategic investment in other
sectors of the economy” (Tefft 2000, 214). Considering Mali’s dependence on cotton
export (Agricultural Development 2007), any loss in current production is likely to
adversely affect Malian economic development plans. A loss in cotton proﬁts will
further increase the Malian state’s heavy reliance on foreign aid to ﬁnance its budget and
development programs (Tefft 2000, 234).

Thus, it is not surprising that local NGO leaders interviewed suggested the cotton
industry was facing growing challenges. Besides the ones mentioned above, other
reported obstacles were growing competition from China alongside United States

subsidies of national cotton growers. Supporting these claims, Oxfarn notes that in the

United States, cotton producers are receiving huge subsidies, selling their cotton on

 

3 As of 2005, Mali imports a little over 16% of its food needs. Ibid.

166

world markets below the cost of production, undermining Aﬁican growth potential in the
process (Rusu 2003). This is despite the fact that the real costs of cotton production are
far higher in the United States than anywhere in Aﬁica (Cromwell 2005).

Further, local NGO leaders reported that Mali simply exports cotton as ﬁber and do not
add value to the crop. The latest fact is the most perverse as exported ﬁber returns to
Mali in the form of more expensive ﬁnished products (e. g. cotton shirts). Leaders point
to the importance of adding value to local agricultural products as a way for farmers to
retain a larger share of the proﬁts. This idea is not lost on the European Union who aims
to support sub-Saharan efforts to increase added value of cotton production through
diversiﬁcation and industrial processing (e.g. clothing) (European Community 2004). In
sum, interviewees appeared to agree that given the many challenges of cotton, it might

beneﬁt Mali to begin thinking beyond cotton.

Decentralization

Whereas solutions to Malian political and economic challenges appear to be as diverse as
local and international interests, all individual leaders point to two key themes:
decentralization and education. First, decentralization is at the heart of Malian political
and developmental discussions. Decentralization became important ever since the 1991
revolution that resulted in the rise of Alpha Oumar Konaré (Alpha) as the democratically
elected president of Mali.

During the 1991 National Conference, revolutionary leaders noted that past regimes
were “inefﬁcient, incompetent, and oblivious to the needs of the nation [and] that state
intervention in rural areas had only reinforced central power” (Rawson 2000, 265). The

proposed cure to these ills was the decentralization of the state institutions. In this

167

context, decentralization denotes the devolution of power to local councils, “each with its
separate legal existence and its own budget, and with the authority to allocated resources
and to carry out multiple functions” (Mawhood 1993; Tordoff 1994, 555).
Ofﬁcially, decentralization in Mali is deﬁned as: « comme un systeme d’admirristration
consistant a perrnettre a un collectivité humaine (decentralization territoriale) on a un
service (decentralization technique) de s’auto-administrer sous le contrble de l’Etat, en
les dotant de la personnalité juridique, d’autorités propres et de ressources nécessaires »
(Sall 1993, 16). Alternatively stated, decentralization in Mali is “the emergence of local
government authorities...is the cornerstone of democracy, local development and [a
revolutionary attempt at] the ﬁght against all forms of poverty” (Diarra et al. 2004, 11)4.
As will be discussed below, to date, decentralization in Mali has focused on
decentralization technique (e. g. services), rather than on decentralization territoriale (e. g.
political decentralization).
The big inquiries surrounding decentralization are primarily those questioning the
center’s will:
“Will real authority and adequate resources devolve to new local
authorities? Will Bamako dictate what local authorities may decide, as
traditionally done, or will a new spirit of collaboration and constitutional
participation evolve between the center and localities?” (Rawson 2000,
266)

The answers to these questions are not self-evident. For example, it was not until the

1999 municipal elections — eight years after the 1991 National Conference — that actual

implementation of decentralization as institutional reform began to take place.

 

4 For a comprehensive review of decentralization in Mali, read Diarra et al. Souleymane Diarra et al.,
"Decentralization in Mali: Putting Policy in Action," in Decentralisation and local governance, ed. Thea
Hilhorst and Gerard Baltissen (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 2004)...

(ht_tp://www.snvmali.org[publications/snvangIglis362.pdf).

 

168

Speciﬁcally, locally elected authority “became the relevant legal fonuns for local
development” (Diarra et al. 2004, 11). Yet, this did not occur without the protest of
those very same forces that approved decentralization measures in 1991 (Rawson 2000,
280). Thus it is fair to question whether the political will necessary to devolve authority
is truly present. Nevertheless, there are signs that the ﬁrst local elections are beginning to
break up the center’s hold as national party leaders break away to stand for local elections
(Rawson 2000, 280).

One of the cornerstones of decentralization is the allocation of ﬁxed ﬁnancial funds to
rural communities (Mali 1997). These funds are set aside for spending at the discretion
of local authorities. Central authorities are not permitted usage of the funds.
Nevertheless, this arrangement is intended to provide some ﬁnancial autonomy to the
communes under the assumption that they are more likely to use funds in ways that are
most beneﬁcial to the local community. Further, decentralization Law NS2 96-501,
Article 2, states that local taxes can be ﬁxed and assessed by local authorities (Mali 1997,
75). Most importantly, local taxes are to be used according to local discretion. Unlike
state derived funds, local municipalities appear5 more successful in recovering locally
imposed taxes (Coulibaly and Hilhorst 2004, 15).

Community leaders outside of Bamako suggested during the interviews that central
authority may be resisting the complete release of ﬁrnds to local authorities. It is further
noted that local ﬁrnds still derive from the central state account and that the state often
diverts ﬁrnds, short-changing communes in the process (Diarra et a1. 2004, 36). Rawson

notes that in Mali, further constricting communal ﬁduciary rights is the fact that

 

5 This is based on a study focusing on just two Malian conununes.

169

“communal budgets have to be approved by the state delegate” (Rawson 2000, 280). In
essence, power has been transferred to the communes but the necessary resources and
political support is lacking.

During my interviews, the Deutsche Gesellschaﬁ fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ) noted that one way communes have tried to overcome their shortage of funds is
through collaborative efforts to strengthen capacity and deal with common issues. This
complements earlier research that notes: “[W]here a virile system of local self-governing
units exits, substantial efforts and resources are usually mobilized by local people
themselves to complement the efforts of the central government” (Olowu 1989, 205). In
the end, most NGO leaders emphasized the importance of using local communes to

establish long-term developmental change and overall reduction of poverty.

Education

Second, leaders stressed the importance of education. In this ﬁeld study, every NGO
leader discussed the need for individuals to get involved at the local level or, commune.
These leaders appear optimistic that individuals are getting involved, but reported that the
biggest hurdle towards active and meaningful involvement is education. Speciﬁcally, the
extent of decentralization and the speed at which it can be implemented is related to the
availability of trained manpower (Tordoff 1994, 578). Creating local councils is one
thing, but if individuals cannot effectively administer such local structures it decreases
their overall capacity to effect change at the local level.

One NGO leader also referred to the need for emancipation arguing that his
organization’s role is to “educate and awaken” the population. Participation in local

government structures is critical to the success and sustainability of local programs

170

(Olowu 1989, 202). Further complicating matters is the center’s attempt to substantially
circumscribe local participation. This is particularly important given the fact that until
recently, decentralization has focused on administrative (décentralization technique)
rather than political decentralization (décentralization territoriale) (Olowu 1989, 210).
As noted earlier, education is needed for both administrative and political
decentralization.

Education ought to occur at all levels. Many NGOs are focusing on quality primary
education and civic education. One NGO stressed the need for individuals to understand
their role in the state.

Further, NGOs expressed a desire for citizens to understand that local leaders were
accountable to all individuals for their overall leadership and management. Notions of
accountability, although important (Lonsdale 1986), are not something that has come
easily to newly democratic citizens. Speciﬁcally, Aﬁicans “do not appear to frrlly grasp
their political rights as ‘citizens,’ notably to regularly demand accountability from
leaders” (Bratton and Logan 2006, 4). Yet, perhaps Mali stands a better chance than
other countries in this regard. Speciﬁcally, Bratton and Logan “ﬁnd that plurality
systems have a more positive effect than proportional and mixed systems on popular
demands for political accountability “(Bratton and Logan 2006, 13).

As noted in the previous chapter, the Malian electoral system is a two round plurality
system. Thus, one might expect overall levels of popular demands for political
accountability to be greater in Mali than in states with proportional or mixed electoral
systems. Yet, most NGO representatives I interviewed stressed that basic literacy is

required in order for people to effectively participate in their communal councils. They

171

need basic reading and writing skills to understand proceedings and hold their local
leaders accountable. Essentially, literacy empowers people. They point out that it is
difﬁcult for one to hold another accountable if s/he cannot read or understand the
communal councils’ decisions.

Nevertheless, the GTZ reports that only 53 ofthe 703 communal mayors and less than
8% of the mayors retained their jobs — over 90% lost their jobs. This appears to illustrate
that regardless of attained education levels, Malians do appear to hold their local leaders
accountable or at least they appear to be removing unsatisfying leaders. Further, regional
participation appears lively regardless of education levels. In fact, with the exception of
Bamako, communal electoral turnout is signiﬁcantly greater than national electoral
turnout. Regional turnout in the 2004 communal elections was reported in excess of 50
percent with a regional average of 43.1% (Elections 2004). Notwithstanding these
ﬁgures, most NGOs viewed basic literacy as a core competence needed for development
to take root.

However, education involves more than literacy. The Secretariat de Concentration des
Organisations Non Gouvemementales Maliennes (SECO-ONG/Mali) refers to the Malian
brain drain — educated Malians leaving the country for more lucrative employment
opportunities. The term brain drain represents the loss of highly skilled professionals
ﬁrom a source country, such as Mali, to a recipient country (Sako 2002) -— in the Malian
context, most notably France. On more than one occasion, individuals reported that few
local, regional and state civil servants attained necessary educational levels. In particular,
there was a dearth of engineers and people with more technically related degrees

necessary to tackle some of the more technical issues (e. g. power). Part of the problem is

172

Mali’s inability to compensate trained professionals at levels they can ﬁnd elsewhere
(Sako 2002; Sidibe 1995, 21). For example, rural teachers reported: “Our salary is
between 25,000 CFA ($38 per month) for the newly hired teacher and 35,000 CFA ($54
per month) for the two older teachers (the fourth teacher recently quit)” (Marx 2003)“

Thus, it should come as no surprise that many entrepreneurs and NGOs complained that
ﬁnding someone to help build a bridge or dig a well was no easy task as the expertise is
not easily found and, at times, simply does not appear to exist. It was suggested that a lot
of the more educated Malians left the country for overseas jobs. One NGO leader
pointed to the lack of properly trained Malian park rangers and increasingly, mining
engineers. This is particularly signiﬁcant because Mali is conﬁ'onting challenges from
desert encroachment, elephant poaching and an ailing gold exportation industry that is
currently ranked third behind South Aﬁica and Ghana. Further, there was a distinct
feeling that with increased regionalization of West Aﬁica, Malians are losing jobs to their
better educated and more specialized Senegalese neighbors.

One last observation that merits comment is that perhaps decentralization efforts are
beginning to take hold. Speciﬁcally, Malian politics are becoming more regional.
Throughout Mali, it appeared that the leadership lacks vision. Many Malians reported
that the current president, Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT), “est de notre grain.’
Translated, this means “he is one of us.” Initially, this might sound nice in so far as ATT
is widely perceived to be one of the guys. However, this suggests that ATI‘ has a
particular desire to be all things to all people. This amounts to what one interviewee

terms a “false consensus.” In other words, there are few, if any, issues being debated at

 

6 For comparison, an entry level high school teacher in France earns $1,700/month.
(http://fr.gnswers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070l02141 l IOAAOU65B) accessed 14 Feb 07.

173

the national level. Perhaps partly as a result of decentralization and partly due to ATT’s
desire to forgo alienating his constituents, politics in Mali are becoming increasingly
regional. This is further exacerbated by the fact that central authority is slowly losing
grip over the regions.

With decentralization, regional politics is becoming increasingly important (Rawson
2000). The state’s weak national infrastructure along with scant resources only furthers
the need for decentralization (Library of Congress 2005). Regions are seeking innovative
ways of generating revenue and resources. Further, there has been “considerable effort to
involve local populations in delivery of social services” (Rawson 2000, 283). Unable to
rely on central authority and facing an increasingly interested electorate (evidenced by
high turnover after ﬁrst term), regional leaders are beginning to set the tone for political
discussion.

Missing from political discourse is ethnicity. Ethnicity does not appear to play any
meaningful role in Malian politics. This apparent lack of ethnic salience leads some to
observe that:

“[It] is also true that there is a common denominator to all of these [ethnicities], a
denominator strengthened by a long history of cohabitation, conﬂict and
exchanges of al sorts — matrimonial, commercial or simply that of neighbors.
This history has forged what we can call a veritable Malian identity of common
characteristics and values that are internalized and shared” (Konaré 2000, 15).
Perhaps it is unsurprising that in seeking allies, the central state is more concerned about
regional leaders than ethnic leaders. Whilst it might seem that some regions are more
ethnically homogenous than others, ethnicity simply does not appear to play a role in

national politics. Further, none of the national leaders appear to make direct or indirect

calls to any ethnic support base. In the local newspapers, none of the editorials, cartoons

174

or opinion pieces appeals to ethnic ties. Radio programming, often vicious in their
critique of the state and the president, never seem to appeal to ethnic stereotype or
solidarity. In fact, interviewees from various neighborhoods and settings expressed great
confusion as to the actual ethnic background of any given leader. This leads to the next
discussion in this chapter.

Ethnic Ambiguity

In an ethnically charged context, it is reasonable to believe that individuals who share
ethnic ties with the leader are more likely to perceive the state as legitimate. After all, in
a context of scarcity, it seems natural to take care of one’s own people before taking care
of others. The current president of Mali, ATT, is considered a Peuhl. Peuhls comprise
roughly 13 percent of the population. As discussed earlier, it is sensible to expect that
Peuhl respondents would generally be more favorable than the rest of the population in
their perceptions of state legitimacy. Yet, this does not appear to be the case in Mali.

In my interviews, roughly 50 percent of all those interviewed, regardless of ethnic
background, could not correctly identify ATT’s ethnicity. Over 70 percent of rural
Peuhls correctly identiﬁed ATT’s ethnicity. Still, nearly 30 percent of rural Peuhls
reported that they were unsure. But, among urban Peuhls, only a little more than 40
percent of my respondents could correctly identify ATT’s ethnicity. Further, last names
appeared to be unreliable indicators of ethnic heritage which further complicates their
ability to identify ATT’s ethnicity. This data conﬁrms theory that suggests ethnicity
remains more salient in rural areas.

Ambiguity of last names is not Mali-speciﬁc. For example, Keita is a common name

amongst Yoruba, Hausa, and Bambara (Schaffer 2005, 327). Someone with the last

175

name of Chimuka in Zambia cannot be assumed to be a Tonga (Center 1997). ATT’s last
name, Touré, is as likely to be identiﬁed as Bambara as it is to be identiﬁed as Peuhl.
Cissé, a common Malian last name, has little to do with ethnic heritage. In fact, it was
reported that Cissé is a name Islam historically conferred on an individual who has done
great things to promote the faith and this person’s descendants are allowed to keep the
Cissé last name. Notably, Cissé is a very common regional name.

From the interviews, it was clear that ethnicity in Mali is affected by signiﬁcant
ambiguity. Overall, Peuhls appear just as likely as any other ethnic group in Mali to
misidentify ATT’s ethnic heritage. At ﬁrst glance, this ethnic ambiguity is bound to have
an adverse effect on perceptions of state legitimacy but can also build positive
relationships between the groups.

Malians have an informal institution they call “cousinage.” The best translation for
cousinage is a ‘joking relationship.’ As the term implies, joking relationships involves an
ongoing conversation involving a lot of jokes, or poking fun of, between two individuals.
Speciﬁcally, certain last names in Mali are more common than others. Over time, links
were developed between individuals with speciﬁc last names: Sédibé, for example, are
considered cousins, albeit not necessarily related by blood, to individuals with the last
name of Sangaré, Keita are cousins to Coulibaly (Sédibé and Diallo 2006). As soon as
two cousins meet, insults begin to ﬂy. Yet, these cousins are bound by an accepted norm
of reciprocity to help one another in times of need.

A Peuhl travel guide provided example after example of this relationship at work. The

joking began soon after he discovered the last name of our interviewee. Some of the best

176

exchanges came with individuals whose last name was Coulibaly7. Such jocular
exchanges included “you are my slave.” In one instance, the local guide told one of the
interviewees that he had returned to claim his house and that as his slave the interviewee
had to vacate his property. She quickly retorted to the guide that he should go see his
sister. In this case, his sister was her dog tied to a chair in the back of the courtyard.
What appeared to be the most heated conversation quickly turned into boisterous laughter
and back slapping. It was reported that the people joke over slavery as a) it is such a
tough subject and b) historically just about every ethnic group in Mali conquered or was
conquered by another. This informal institution of cousinage is one of the most
interesting ﬁndings from this Mali study.
Interestingly, other entities have noticed the mediating effects of this joking
relationship. The United States State Department, in a 2003 issue of State Magazine
notes the following:
“A unique Malian cultural custom known as “cousinage” provides a basis for
understanding among these ethnic groups. This is a continual, gentle teasing
between families that acknowledges the differences and plays on the Malian sense
of humor, history and hospitality. For example, a member of the Coulibaly family
is jokingly referred to as a “slave” of a Keita (and sometimes vice versa) because
his ancestors are indebted to the Keita’s for saving their lives. This open and
ﬁiendly acknowledgment of differences seems to provide Malians a sense of
conﬁdence in their common nationhood while defying Aﬁican inter-ethnic
stereotypes.” (Hamilton 2003, 13)

This relationship links most ethnic groups and provides effective means of inter-ethnic

trust and communication. Institutions can act as a mechanism to build the trust necessary

for groups to communicate and engender trust (Jackman and Miller, 1998). It is clear

 

7 Notably, while traveling through Mali, I quickly assumed the last name of Coulibaly as the name appears
to have the most links with other ethnic groups. It helped me in my travels and in my attempts to talk to
those whom I carrre across. A countless number of people called me their slave.

177

that this joking relationship plays a major role in the ethnic ambiguity that pervades
Malian politics.

Although not heavily discussed amongst political scientists, joking relationships are a
good example of an informal institution long noted and studied by anthropologists. As
early as the early 1900s, anthropologists have studied the effects of joking relationships
(Radcliffe-Brown 1940). Ofﬁcially deﬁned, a joking relationship “is a relation between
two persons in which one is by custom permitted, and in some instances, required, to
tease or make fun of the other, who in turn is required to take no offence” (Radcliffe-
Brown 1940, 195). These ‘institutionalized’ relationships occur between several
different societal units (6. g. ethnic groups) and categories (6. g. familial) of varying
inclusiveness (Rigby 1968, 133). There are two varieties of joking relationships:
symmetrical and asymmetrical. In a symmetrical relationship, each of the two
participants can tease and make flm of the other. In an asymrnetrical relationship, one
accepts the jibing without retaliating. As the earlier story of the guide illustrated, joking
relationships in Mali are symmetrical in nature. As noted earlier, there is pretence of
hostility in joking relationships but it is built on an underlying ﬁiendliness.

Don Handelrnan and Bruce Kapferer (1972) conducted an interesting comparative
study on joking relationships. In their study, they differentiated between two sets of rules
that govern joking relationships: setting speciﬁc and category routinized. Handelrnan and
Kapferer refer to these sets of rules as joking frames. In setting speciﬁc frames, the
beginning of joking depends largely on “locally derived cues proffered by and to
potential participants” (Handelrnan and Kapferer 1972, 485). Category-routinized joking

frames are anchored in more general social norms and conventions. In contrast to

178

speciﬁc frames, the rules of category routinized frames have time-depth and are
routinized by well established behavioral cues or roles that govern joking. In Mali, it is
evident that joking relationships have category-routinized frames. Joking participants
have well established cues and retorts that appear intimately familiar to all, regardless of
particular ethnic heritage.
Anthropological work suggests that joking relationships are a form of inter-ethnic
alliance or consociation (Radcliffe-Brown 1949; Radcliffe-Brown 1940). Whereas the
[inter-ethnic] type of joking relationships amongst Malian ethnic groups is considered
uncommon (Radcliffe-Brown 1940, 199), these relationships are fairly widespread
(Radcliffe-Brown 1940, 195). The available literature suggests that a variety of joking
relationships exist in other parts of Aﬁica (Brant 1948; Fortes 1949; Freedman 1977;
Labouret 1929; Radcliffe-Brown 1949; Radcliffe-Brown I940; Rigby 1968). For
example, Freedman (1977) refers to the intra-ethnic joking relationship amongst Kigas
living in northern Rwanda and southern Uganda. He notes:
“[Kigas] exchange verbal abuse, hence the abase are joking partners though
joking is here a poor term for the kind of interaction which takes place. The
exchanges are more akin to artful insulting. The Kiga phrase for this artful
insulting is guterana ubuse, which literally means to toss around (beat) ubuse
among each other. . .This kind of behavior includes gutukana. Gutukana is
something which can arouse anger, while one of the unique features of the ubuse
exchange is that it cannot arouse anger. It carmot by deﬁnition.” (Freedman 1977,
158)

It is thus sensible to argue that category routinized joking relationships that occur

between ethnic groups might help explain varying levels of conﬂict in Aﬁica, or why

sub-Saharan Aﬁica has less conﬂict than one might expect given ethnic heterogeneity

(F earon and Laitin 1996).

179

In sum, joking relationships in Mali is integrated into societal fabric. Joking
relationships act as a means of relieving potential conﬂict in situations of structural
ambiguity (Rigby 1968, 133). Some might consider it a form of traditional “conﬂict
medicine” (Konaté 1999; Zartrnan 2000). Another point worth mentioning is that joking
relationships are as likely to mitigate inter-ethnic conﬂict as intra-ethnic caste based
conﬂict (Konaté 1999). Commenting on the beneﬁcial effects of cousinage, Doulaye
Konaté notes: « Au Mali, le [cousinage] agit comme une thérapeutique qui participe
quotidiennement a la regulation sociale » (Konaté 1999). Simply translated, cousinage
helps regulate social pressures on a daily basis.

From this perspective, it is reasonable to view joking relationships as a means of
managing conﬂict. There are suggestions that joking relationships are being threatened
and in some cases rendered obsolete (O'Bannon 2006). In those cases, it is reasonable to
argue that ethnic conﬂict, formerly contained through the frame sets of joking
relationships, are more likely to ﬂare up. Accordingly, these types of informal
institutions could greatly beneﬁt political science research focusing on ethnic conﬂict.
Thanks to anthropologists, a lot of the theoretical groundwork is already in place.

There are two other factors that possibly help account for ethnic ambiguity in Mali:
elite education and civil service policies under the regime of Modibo Keita. First, new
African elites in Francophone Aﬁica attended only a handful of schools (Snyder 1965).
Elites were taken from their village at a young age to attend French colonial schools. It is
possible that these individuals, not having been steeped in their respective ethnic histories
and traditions (Snyder 1965, 10), were less averse to mingling with or perhaps marrying

individuals from other ethnic groups.

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Second and more importantly, Mali’s ﬁrst President, Modibo Keita, instituted a policy
requiring all civil servants to serve in geographic areas away ﬁ'om an individual’s home
of origin (Diarrah 1986). For example, an individual born in Gao (eastern Mali) might
have to serve in Kayes (western Mali). This policy was established with the deliberate
belief that it was necessary to help different ethnic groups become acquainted in attempts
to build a sense of nationhood.

It can be argued that this particular policy was effective in establishing mutual respect
among ethnically diverse elites. Further, there is a signiﬁcant amount of inter-ethnic
marriage in Mali partly as a result of this policy. The fact that these elites have become
acquainted with other ethnicities in a few select schools would only facilitate the process.
The result would be evidenced by the previously mentioned observation that last names
are a poor predictor of ethnicity. From time spent in Mali, an oft repeated joke is if you
want to cheat someone, don ’t inquire too deeply about who the person is, because you
will discover that he is your cousin. Besides cousinage, the policy effects of Mali’s ﬁrst
president likely added to the already existing ethnic ambiguity in Mali.

Pastoralist Puzzle

Next, the inquiry turns to the pastoralist puzzle. As mentioned earlier, the empirical
evidence suggests that, at least in Mali, pastoralists are more likely than agriculturalists to
view the state as legitimate. This suggestion is counter-intuitive in that pastoralists have
traditionally been amongst the most difﬁcult group to assimilate into a state. One such
example is evident with Mali’s long history of civil strife revolving around the Tamasheq

pastoralists in their northern region. Speciﬁcally, the Tamasheqs desired secession from

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the rest of Mali. Yet, it is exactly this kind of heightened contact that might lead to
higher overall perceptions of legitimacy.

It is arguable that heightened contact with the state results in pastoralists becoming
increasingly aware of the state. This greater awareness leads the pastoralists to realize
that the state wants to impose its rule of law on these traditionally autonomous people.
Combined, this heightened contact results in pastoralists viewing the state as ‘more’
legitimate than the rest of their countrymen who appear less concerned about state
encroachment or are less directly affected by the state. Anecdotally, a Peuhl herder who
was interviewed complained that the state laws were unfair towards his community in
certain disputes. For instance, the traditional laws of Sékou Amadou would impose less
punishment than current state laws if a head of cattle veered from the ﬁelds and ate from
a farmer’s ﬁeld. In essence, the herder thought that the state should not import new laws
at the expense of traditional laws.

Given the background, this attitude makes sense. When speaking of traditional laws,
the Peuhls are refening to the Dina Code of Sékou Amadou codiﬁed in 1812 (Hussein,
Sumberg and Seddon 1999). Notably, Sékou Amadou was a Peuhl ﬁom Macina who
defeated the Barnbaras in 1818. Thus, it is not surprising that these laws favor the
pastoralists over the agriculturalists.

As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons pastoralists8 might be more likely to perceive
the state as legitimate is that they have more contact with the state. Because the
Tamasheqs engaged in armed conﬂict with the state, it seems reasonable that such

conﬂict would lead to more contact and a better understanding of the state’s claims of

 

8 For the sake of consistency with the empirical chapters, when referring to pastoralist I am only speaking
of rural pastoralists.

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authority over the Tamasheqs. It logically follows the Tamasheqs would not rebel if they
did not feel the state’s demands were negatively impacting their community.

Firsthand accounts of pastoralists’ contact with the state were obtained during the Mali
ﬁeld study. Rural herders reported they felt the direct impact of state authority whenever
their herds strayed onto an agriculturalist’s farm. Interestingly, the herders’ disdain was
directed at the state rather than the farmer in that the former viewed the state as being
unreasonable and disrespectful of the Dina Code of Sékou Amadou. Nevertheless, time
in Mali did not suggest rural pastoralists had more day to day contact than other Malians
with the state. In fact, nearly half of the interviewees stated that they would like to
approach the state about issues, but few felt comfortable actually expressing their
concerns to the state. It was repeatedly reported that the state nous écoute pas or, the
state does not listen to us. This suggests that more than simple day to day contact with
the state is attributable to why rural pastoralists are more likely to view the state as
legitimate.

Remembering the previous discussion, of the two pastoralist groups, it is the
Tamasheqs who actively sought some form of independence from the state (Seely 2001).
Further, it is reasonable to think that one group enters a period of civil strife when a basic
and fundamental disagreement develops over the laws of or who controls the state.
Speciﬁcally, “[r]esentments about restricted access to political positions and. . .lost
autonomy drive separatist demands and rebellion generally” (Gurr 1993, 188).

It appears the minority group feels, for whatever reason, that the current rules of the state

are unacceptable. It logically follows that in order to reach a level in which one group

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decides to break away or attempts to break away from the state, it must ﬁrst have a ﬁrm
understanding of the [negative] impact of established rules.

Time spent in Mali appears to conﬁrm these thoughts. When talking to Malians, it is
clear that rural pastoralists have had more disagreement with the rules of the state. The
Peuhls are well versed with the Dina Code and thus, more likely to understand when they
diverged with the rules of the current state. Unfortunately, formal interviews with the
Tamasheqs were brief due to secruity concerns. Nevertheless, time spent in Timbuktu, a
Tamasheq dominated city, provided similar insight. Speciﬁcally, the Tamasheqs9 appear
to be generally distrustful of state courts. It was often reported that they have their own
laws that the state should respect. Despite this attitude, as discussed earlier, there
appeared to be a consensus amongst the Tamasheqs that the police had the right to
enforce the laws10 although they might not agree with the laws.

Overall, the Mali ﬁeld study suggests that the people generally take great pride in the
security of Mali. Mali is a virtual sea of tranquility when compared to its regional
neighbors (e. g. Sierra Leone, Cdte D’Ivoire). Yet, as stated earlier, the police have little
presence in rural areas. Further, most of the armed conﬂict occurred in rather remote
regions of Mali (e. g. Timbuktu, Kidal). Interestingly, it was reported that during the
Tamasheq rebellion, the rebels often targeted remote police spots. According to The
Inventory of Conﬂict and Environment at American University in Washington, DC, the

Tamasheqs targeted remote police stations ostensibly because they detained Tamasheq

 

9 Afrobarometer Round 3 data supports this insight. Tamasheqs are more likely to disagree that courts
have the right to make decisions. The difference is statistically signiﬁcant.

‘0 Again, Afrobarometer Round 3 data empirically supports these feelings. The difference between
Tamasheqs and other respondents was statistically signiﬁcant.

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prisoners (Hershkowitz 2005). It is exactly this kind of contact that could increase a
group’s understanding of a state’s claim to power.

Thus far, this inquiry appears to suggest that in examining legitimacy, whether or not
the ethnic group has experienced conﬂict with the state is more important than the mode
of livelihood. Now, it is worth examining whether any one ethnic group is more likely to
turn towards an alternative authority structure away from the state. Given the discussion
thus far, it is reasonable to believe that pastoralists, especially the Tamasheqs, are more
likely to exhibit this practice.

Walking through the streets of Mali, it does not take long to realize the importance of
Islam throughout the country. After all, the state motto, refening to Islam, states: “Un
peuple, Un But, Une Foi,” meaning one people, one goal, one faith. Without any intent
of passing judgment on deeply held faith values, it did not appear that the population was
very devout in practice. For example, an oft heard comment was that the mosques were
empty except for a fashion show on Friday nights. Indeed, it does not take much time in
Mali to notice that trafﬁc and cities quickly came to a complete standstill on Friday
mosque nights in observance of the Islamic holy day. Yet, it appears that Friday
observance is considered more social than religious in nature.

The two areas visited that left a particularly striking mark for its Islamic fervor were
Djénne and Timbuktu. Both towns were historic centers of Peuhl and Tamasheq culture,
respectively. The visits included encounters with a few very pious Malian Muslims in
Djénne, a reputed center of Islamic studies and replete with Irnarns and madrasas —
Islamic schools. While visiting a museum dedicated to the preservation of historic

documents in Timbuktu, one cannot help but be impressed by some of the most beautiﬁrl

185

gold inlaid pages of the Koran ever seen. An article in the Washington Post written by
Alan Hufﬁnan (Huffman 2005) does a wonderful job describing some of the magniﬁcent
documents preserved in Timbuktu.

Despite the occasional secular attitude toward Friday mosque nights, one does get a
sense that religion plays a more prominent role in the everyday of rural inhabitants than
in the lives of urban inhabitants. Based on experiences in Djénne and Timbuktu in
particular, this study allows the hypothesis that religious authority might supplant that of
the state in certain areas. Consequently, it is sensible to expect individuals to have
greater recourse to religious or traditional authority in such rural areas”.

Islamic inﬂuence was much more evident in rural towns with a large population of
traditional pastoralists. Respondents often reported they turned towards religious
authorities as an alternative authority to the state of Mali. It was also believed that this
religious authority derived from God and thus, such authority was less corrupt and more
just. Respondents understood that the state sought to impose its own laws, but considered
those laws corrupt. On more than one occasion, it was reported that the French gave the
current constitution to Malians and did not understand local norms and customs. It
follows that the state should consult the people and re-draw the constitution.

As discussed, the possibility exists that rural pastoralists might have an alternative to
the state in religious and traditional leaders. It appears that in certain areas, religious
authority or traditional leaders might possibly supplant that of the state might. This

permits one to hypothesize that segments of the population still widely accept religious or

 

ll Speciﬁcally, Aﬁ'obarometer Round 3 data supports the intuition. The evidence is that rural pastoralists
are almost twice as likely as the rest of the general population to seek the advice or help of a religious
leader. Yet, when looking at frequency of religious Observances, there is no signiﬁcant difference between
rural pastoralists and the rest of the population.

186

traditional authority, which conceivably will increase the likelihood of ﬁiction between
the state and those individuals. Speciﬁcally, the apparent contrast in norms and law will
heighten an individual’s awareness and understanding of the state’s claim to legitimacy.

Thus far, the attempts in this study to understand the pastoralist puzzle have led to a
revision to the original hypothesis. Previously, it was hypothesized that an ethnic group’s
mode of livelihood affected its perceptions of legitimacy. It now appears that both active
contact with the state and the availability of an alternate authority structure, be it religious
or traditional, appears more important than mode of livelihood. However, this area
merits additional study and is better left to pursue in future research given the limited
scope of this inquiry.

In regards to the Tamasheqs, there is another factor to consider. Speciﬁcally, the data
used for analysis was collected in 2005, after the peace settlement in the north, but in a
period in which there was still some increasing bandin by Tamasheq bands in the north.
Perhaps any Tamasheq asked questions pertaining to willing obedience, or legitimacy,
would see it in his/her self-interest to answer positively to such questions as to whether
the police has the right to enforce the law. If they did not, they could fear being labeled a
bandit or rebel. Or perhaps, as suggested above, they really did buy into the peace
accords and the state’s accommodations to their demands.

In general, it does not seem that mode of livelihood (e.g. pastoralism) alone helps
explain perceptions of legitimacy. So far, the evidence appears to suggest that whether
one has experienced conﬂict with the state is more important than mode of livelihood. If
a group chooses to engage in armed conﬂict, it presumably has a clearer understanding of

the conﬂict’s purpose and its enemy’s disposition. It follows that should the state prevail

187

as it did with the Tamasheqs, its claims to legitimacy are more widely understood and
accepted by those who have agreed to submit to its authority. This, to an extent, implies
that for others, the state’s authority remains more remote and abstract.

Finally, it is worth discussing whether pastoralists have a viable alternative authority to
the state. To examine this, rural pastoralists were asked if they were more likely to
contact religious leaders or traditional leaders to help them resolve their problems. Not
surprisingly, the responses appear to suggest that rural pastoralists generally have more
contact with religious leaders or traditional leaders.

The evidence derived from the Mali ﬁeld study suggests that rural pastoralists, such as
the Tamasheqs, generally resort to an alternative authority structure when they are
unhappy with the state. Thus, it appears conceivable that the Tamasheqs might have a
better understanding of the state’s claim to legitimacy as it stands in direct contrast to an
alternative structure of authority. Such contrast is potentially most pronounced when
traditional laws or customs directly conﬂicts with the state’s rules. This is best illustrated
by an interview with a pastoralist herder who lives on the outskirts of Dj énne.
Speciﬁcally, he indicated he was very upset that the state ruled against him in regards to
an argument he had with an agriculturalist over his cow eating some of a farmer’s
produce. He attempted to rely on the Code of the Dina as an alternative authority source
to resolve the conﬂict, but the state forced him to settle according to modern terms that
favored the agriculturalist. He stated he did not oppose making amends for the action of
his cow, but opined that the old laws were more reasonable and that the state should not

interfere with such traditions. It appears that experiences with such clashes in laws or

188

customs only heighten the individual’s understanding of the state’s claim to coercion.
As the example illustrates, such heightened understanding is not always positive.

Conclusion

This chapter allowed us to take a more in-depth look at Mali. Speciﬁcally, this chapter
shed light on empirical ﬁndings from the empirical model in the previous chapter: a)
ethnic ambiguity and b) the pastoralist puzzle. Mali is undoubtedly a poor country facing
many developmental challenges including, but not limited to, poverty, food security and
education.

Education in Mali presents a multi-level problem. At the very base, it is important that
Mali combats high illiteracy rates. In addition to providing schools, it must provide the
facilities and teachers. It was observed during the ﬁeldwork that more than one village
had schools without teachers. Some villages had schools with teachers, but lacked
supplies. More disconcerting, long term neglect of education in Mali has led to a more
signiﬁcant developmental hurdle. Simply, Mali lacks the domestic technical expertise
(e. g. engineers) to handle both complex developmental issues and more immediate
revenue generating projects (6. g. mine engineer). Even more alarming, Malians are
beginning to resent efforts at regionalization as more qualiﬁed Senegalese are perceived
as taking what are considered to be Malian jobs. It is no exaggeration to declare that
Mali is facing an educational crisis. However, there does not appear to be a short term
solution.

Perhaps the most signiﬁcant ﬁnding from my time in Mali was the surprising effect of
the informal institution of cousinage, or joking relationships. The theoretical possibilities

and potential contribution of these joking relationships to the literature are considerable.

189

Speciﬁcally, joking relationships might provide strong explanatory power in
understanding conﬂicts, or varying levels thereof. The anthropological literature makes it
clear that joking relationships are not an African phenomenon. There is some research
that suggests the civility such relationships promote is threatened as economic crisis and
modern conditions stress the institution. However, it is clear that joking relationships can
still thrive under harsh economic realities such as Mali.

Further, joking relationships may enhance understanding of inter-personal trust. It is
sensible to suggest that the institution of cousinage might help provide incentives for the
formation of trust. Speciﬁcally, cousinage provides an institutional means for dealing
with grievances or disputes among individuals of different ethnic heritages. Not all
joking relationships occur across ethnic groups, but one should expect greater levels of
inter-personal trust in countries with existing inter-ethnic joking relationships.

The second empirical ﬁnding this chapter sought to shed light upon is the pastoralist
puzzle. This involved examining why rural pastoralists would be more likely to perceive
the state as legitimate. Time in Mali suggests the answer to be twofold: increased contact
with the state and availability of an alternate authority structure. Rural pastoralists in
Mali have a history of contact, often violent, with the state. It is clear that the Tamasheqs
have actively sought to establish some autonomy from the Malian state. Further, rural
pastoralists appear more likely to fall back upon traditional or religious authority
structures. Their argument with the state stems, in part, with their resistance to modern
state laws in favor of more traditional laws (6. g. Dina Code). Rural pastoralists

understand the claims of the state and its claim to legitimacy, but ﬁnd traditional legal

190

structures more favorable to their interests. Although rural pastoralists might perceive
the state as legitimate, they do not necessarily prescribe to its laws.

In sum, case studies can be very beneﬁcial and add to general theoretical knowledge. It
is part of the “thick description” that Clifford Geertz (1973) advocates. Case studies
enhance understanding of empirical evidence. At best, researchers can utilize case
studies to generate new hypotheses (Lijphart 1971, 691). With respect to the present case
study, increased knowledge of joking relationships, variants thereof, and longevity
arguably enhances understanding of current research on conﬂict and trust. Sometimes,
case studies serve primarily as deviant case studies. In the previous chapter, the data
presented a pastoralist puzzle. Although time spent in Mali does not lead to a deﬁnitive
answer as to why rural pastoralists are more likely to perceive the state as legitimate, the
case study suggests that mode of livelihood is less signiﬁcant than contact with the state
and availability of alternative authority structures. Here, the case uncovered relevant
additional variables that were not previously considered (Lijphart 1971, 692). This

demonstrates the usefulness of case studies as a tool to facilitate theoretical research.

191

VI — Concluding Thoughts

Aﬁica proper is comprised of 53 states, and 48 of these are located in sub—Saharan
Aﬁica. It does not take much experience with Aﬁica to notice that large parts of the
continent are in disarray. However, a good portion of Aﬁica presents a prettier picture.
While news reports are quick to focus on the tragedy in Sudan, or the failed state of
Somalia, these are but two of 48 sub-Saharan Aﬁican states. Violence in Darfur, Sudan,
is increasingly complicating international aid relief efforts (BBC 2007), while Somali
continues in its struggle to establish a state (BBC 2007). Sudan and Somalia discount the
great variety of Aﬁican experiences, but Africa’s beauty lies in her diversity.

This dissertation examined state legitimacy in Aﬁica. Inﬂuenced by Pierre Englebert
(2000), the purpose of this project was to determine which factor best accounts for
varying perceptions of state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa. First, the most important
task was to operationalize the concept of legitimacy. Before considering contributing
factors, it was important to deﬁne the concept of legitimacy (Sartori 1970) including its
meaning, dimensions and referents. Based on review of some of the literature, the
concept of legitimacy was deﬁned as an individual’s willing compliance to mandates of
the state. The concept is vertical in nature, focused on the relationship between the
individual and the state. Expanding the scope of inquiry, this dissertation focused
primarily on state legitimacy.

In this chapter, I want to focus on two key ﬁndings and the appropriate implications for
each: an individual’s trust in institutions and the informal institutions of joking

relationships. In the case of an individual’s trust in institutions I will consider some of

192

the policy implications. In my discussion of joking relationships, the focus resides more
in terms of current academic considerations and future research implications.

Key Findings

It is important to discuss two critical ﬁndings. First, an individual’s trust in institutions
appears to be the strongest predictor of perceptions of state legitimacy. Speciﬁcally, the
more an individual trusts institutions of coercion, the more likely that individual will
perceive the state as legitimate. The second ﬁnding came from the Mali case study.
Speciﬁcally, time spent in Mali highlighted the importance of the informal institution of
‘cousinage,’ otherwise known as joking relationships. Although this concept is not
foreign to anthropologists, it possesses a lot of theoretical merit for future political

science research. Both of these ﬁndings contribute to existing literature.

Trust

An individual’s trust in institutions is perhaps the most signiﬁcant source of state
legitimacy. It is important to remember that trust is comprised of two dimensions: an
individual’s trust in institutions and inter-personal trust. Of the two, an individual’s trust
has shown to be strongly signiﬁcant in all models. Not only was an individual’s trust in
institutions signiﬁcant in the cross—national models discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, it was
the only consistently strongly signiﬁcant independent variable across each individual
country model. Larry Diamond notes that those who generally trust institutions are much
more likely to support the current state, regardless of its democratic credentials or lack

thereof (Diamond 1999, 206).

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Thoughts and Policy Implications

Given the importance of an individual’s trust in institutions for state legitimacy, it is
important to consider potential sources that affect an individual’s trust in institutions. If
Aﬁica is suffering from a legitimacy crisis that stunts its developmental potential, then
shoring legitimacy is critical. It is important to reﬂect on some ways to help the state
secure greater legitimacy by increasing an individual’s level of trust in the set of
institutions that comprise the state.

First, one might argue that lower levels of trust are associated with high expectations.
Simply, the logic is that “[S]ome expect more from the [state]. . .than is realistic” (Miller
and Listhaug 1999, 216). As the state is unable to deliver expected goods, levels of trust
begin to falter. If that is the case, it might be important to lower actual expectations to
increase trust. This is particularly important in a context of scarcity. For example, the
state might simply not have the resources necessary to provide universal health care or to
provide sufﬁcient schooling to raise levels of illiteracy. Consequently, it does not beneﬁt
the long term legitimacy of state for leaders to promise such desirable goods.

According to David Easton’s (Easton 1957) conceptual schema, expectations are linked
to outcomes. Easton argues that a state can garner support when its outputs meet the
demands of the members of society (Easton 1957, 396). Exaggerated demands are
unlikely to be met. In some cases, the international community effectively constrains
states in Africa from delivering such high demand outputs as social goods (e. g.
Healthcare) (Brown 1995). Aﬁican leaders might have attained power by promising basic
services that a resource scarce state with little international leverage simply cannot

provide. Along those lines, Arthur Miller (1974) argues that when a citizen’s

194

expectations of government performance are unfulﬁlled, growing institutional distrust
ensues (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 204). As disillusionment with the state grows, an
individual’s trust in the state to make adequate provisions begins to falter].

Second, Daniel Katz et al. (1975) found that outcomes inﬂuence an individual’s trust in
institutions, particularly the fairness of outcomes individuals received when making
demands on bureaucrats (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 213). An individual’s trust is highly
conditional on what individuals deem to constitute a fair outcome. Although the present
inquiry does not examine ‘fairness’ of outcomes, it is not unreasonable to argue that a
state which fails to apply a consistent standard to all individuals is likely to be perceived
as unfair.

The rule of law is one of the most visible means to gauge fairness of outcomes. It
arguably beneﬁts the state to apply rules equally to every individual. Personal experience
in Mali suggests that there are multiple sources of laws to which any one individual can
prescribe, especially in rural areas. Thus, there is very little consistency in the
application of the rule of law, and in some cases debate exists over which set of statutes
(e.g. Dina Code of Sékou Amadou as opposed to Malian Constitution) best applies. It is
arguably beneﬁcial for some states to review existing laws and a) purge laws that clearly
do not apply, b) purge laws that are viewed by many as colonial vestiges, and c)
incorporate some traditional laws where appropriate. This process would preserve

increase efﬁciency and eliminate uneven application of the law. It follows that rules that

 

I As a point of caution, from a normative perspective, it is unfair to expect individuals living in a context of
scarcity to want less than what they have and see. It is presumptuous to believe that an individual in rural
Aﬁica is unaware of what s/he is missing. Time spent in rural Mali, among other places, makes it clear that
rural Aﬁicans know that they are economically disadvantaged and have the same desires as any other
individual. Time in Mali and other African states strongly suggests that Aﬁicans are not sheltered from the
effects of growing global consumerism.

195

are widely accepted and evenly applied are likely to increase perceptions of state
legitimacy.

There is also an interesting psychological insight into the effects of outcomes on
individual levels of trust in institutions. Research suggests that perceptions of procedural
injustice negatively affect levels of an individual’s trust in institutions (Tyler, Degoey
and Smith 1996). Such studies “argue that perceptions of procedural injustice actually
have a greater impact on distrust of the government2 than comparisons involving either
the perceived absolute level of government beneﬁts they receive or their feelings of how
fair or unfair they think these beneﬁts are” (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 213). Procedural
justice communicates whether or not the state respects the individuals (Tyler et al. 1996).
Again, this suggests the importance of impartial institutions that are rule-govemed and
not personality-driven.

Finally, the need for rule-govemed institutions is one strong theme that emanates from
a cursory look at some of the relevant literature examining sources of individual trust in
institutions. Speciﬁcally, there appears a need for institutions to adopt more democratic
(i.e. popularly accepted), unbiased procedures that neither advantage nor disadvantage
any one individual. In a lot of ways, there is a need for the depersonalization of the state.
In short, states are likely to beneﬁt from the development of a Weberian bureaucracy
(Weber 1958, 196). Such a bureaucracy is based on “the principle of ﬁxed and ofﬁcial

jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or

 

2 Based on discussions in Chapter 1, government refers to the set of ofﬁce holders who compete for and
hold ofﬁce for a limited time period deﬁned in the rules of the political game. They are the group of people
who rrrake decisions in the name of the state. Thus, government is being used as a proxy for evaluations of
the state. It is reasonable to argue that if a government is able to satisfy the citizens’ economic and public
needs, those citizens are satisﬁed with the state, or set of formal institutions, in which the ofﬁce-holders
operate.

196

administrative regulations” (Weber 195 8, 196). If rules are consistent and applied evenly
through time, then it is reasonable to argue that individuals are more likely to trust
institutions.

One way of facilitating this effect might be through the process of institutionalization.
Institutionalization of existing structures is not an easy process. First, even though
money is not an absolute pre-requisite, institutions “as a permanent structure is knit to the
presupposition of a constant income for maintaining it” (Weber 1958, 208). As discussed
earlier, resources are a scarce commodity with different competing interests actively
seeking access or control. Further, satisfying demands through appropriate output often
suggests that resources should be spent on social needs rather than attempts of
bureaucratizing existing: institutions.

Second, institutionalization requires the support of educational institutions, especially
institutions of higher learning (e. g. universities), to ensure that individuals master
adequate levels of education and relevant skill sets to effectively administer bureaucratic
institutions (Weber 1958, 240). Due to the educational difﬁculties existing in Mali and
other sub-Saharan states, this is another demanding criterion for institutionalizing the
state. Given that only a small percentage of individuals in sub-Saharan Aﬁica have
received some sort of post-secondary education or more (Bratton et al. 2005, 204), this is
no small requirement as resources are very limited.

On a positive note, it appears that increased education spending is popular amongst
citizens. However, educational institutions are also desperately in need of
bureaucratization as educational institutions suffer from the same shortfalls (e. g.

adequately qualiﬁed administrators) that other institutions have. These are but two

197

necessary conditions for successful institutionalization of state structures. Further,
certain conditions only serve to complicate a state’s efforts towards creating structures
that abide by the rule of law3. Both the context of scarcity and politics of the belly as
expressed through neopatrimonial networks result in institutionalization becoming a
formidable challenge to sub-Saharan Aﬁican states.

Thus, improving levels of an individual’s trust (or at least reducing levels of distrust) is
part of the challenge of legitimatizing the state (Diamond 1999, 206). There appears to
be no easy solution, and scarcity does not facilitate the process. The literature examining
an individual’s trust in institutions strongly suggests the need for impartial institutions
that apply the rule of law equally and evenly across all sections of society. One of the
proposed ways, though by no means easy, is for the state to focus its resources on
bureaucratizing the state. As discussed earlier, this involves more than awarding titles to
individuals and placing them in ofﬁcial positions. Perhaps, given sub-Saharan Aﬁica’s
long history of military intervention, one of the ﬁrst institutions states might seek to
bureaucratize is the military.

Ghana is an example of a state that has endured great pains to institutionalize, or
professionalize its military. One means the state employed was to ensure continual
involvement of the military with United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation (Arman
2004). This beneﬁts Ghana because the UN furnishes necessary resources for the
bureaucratization process through training and stipends given to each military member
deployed on mission. Perhaps one of the most important steps to be taken is putting the

military under the control of the legislature. Speciﬁcally, many Aﬁican legislatures do

 

3 For a complete list of bureaucratization requirements, suggest reading From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology, Gerth and Mills (eds.) (1958).

198

not control or deal directly with the military. Rather, as in Ghana, the president deals
with military budgets and ﬁnance, administration and the promotion of higher ranking
ofﬁcers (Addison 2002, 40). Placing the rrrilitary under effective legislative control
might enhance the consistency and fairness of its application while minimizing its use as
a potential source of patronage. In the end, it is likely that both continued
professionalization through such activities as United Nations deployments and increased
oversight of the military increases an individual’s trust in the institution while decreasing
the likelihood of military intervention in political rivalries amongst elites.

In sum, courses of actions that are likely to positively affect an individual’s trust in
institutions are managing expectations, fairness of outcomes as expressed through
consistent application of the rules and bureaucratization. First, taking a cue from
discussion in the previous chapter, perhaps civic education might help reduce unrealistic
expectations. Speciﬁcally, “injecting civic education content into the school curricula
and mass media, content that both informs people about the players and the rules. . .and
reduces unrealistic expectations of what [the state] can deliver” (Mattes and Bratton
2007,204)

Second, one means of brining greater fairness of outcomes might be through the
creation of a constitution that relies heavily on public support. Although public support
does not guarantee constitutional legitimacy, it is a step in the right direction (Moehler
2006). Last, one of the most challenging means of improving an individual’s trust in
institutions is through the process of bureaucratization. Given the complexity of the
process and scarcity of resources, perhaps the state can focus on one institution at a time,

or as few as possible. I would suggest that states begin by focusing on institutions of

199

Q

coercion (e. g. military). Such institutions are absolutely critical in ensuring consistency
and fairness in application of the law, an important element of individual trust. Now that
I have discussed theoretical factors that comprise individual trust and consequent policy
implication, it is time to think about the other signiﬁcant highlight of this dissertation, the

informal institution of cousinage.

Cousinage

Although not directly related to legitimacy, the informal institution of cousinage is one of
the most interesting ﬁndings derived from this inquiry. Speciﬁcally, the study of
cousinage and its potential at explaining varying levels of ethnic conﬂict is virtually non-
existent in the political-science literature. More importantly, it is likely that joking
relationships inoculate states from some of the likely underlying causes of ethnic conﬂict:
competition, fear and ethnic mobilization by political entrepreneurs. Perhaps just as
importantly, cousinage might help explain the relative scarcity of ethnic violence.

First, there is strong evidence that competition lies at the heart of ethnic conﬂict (Bates
1974; Bates 1986; Bonacich 1972; Horowitz 1985, 95-140). In such studies, ethnic
competition is viewed as a rational response by ethnic groups in the pursuit of scarce
beneﬁts. Dalrnas Taylor and Beatrice Moriarty (Taylor and Moriarty 1987) ﬁnd that
ﬁiendliness between ethnic competitors is heavily dependent upon on the level of
competitiveness. The more competitive the relationship, the less ﬁiendly one ethnic
group is likely to be towards the other.

Second, there are scholars who emphasize the role of political entrepreneurs in
harnessing ethnic fears. Speciﬁcally, they argue that “ethnic activists and political

entrepreneurs, operating within [ethnic] groups, build upon these fears of insecurity and

200

polarize society” (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 41). In a context of scarcity, political
entrepreneurs mobilize an ethnic base by alluding to the fact that if they do not win, they
will be left out of the process and have no access to state resources. As previously
discussed, it can be argued that this fear is realizable and likely to surface at varying
levels should any one ethnic group become dominant.

Studies also suggest that ethnic conﬂict is most likely to occur once the largest ethnic
group just achieves dominance (Dion 1997). Robert J ackrnan’s (J ackman 1978) statistical
analysis suggests that, among other variables, once an ethnic group surpasses 44 percent
of the population, a coup d’état is more likely. Jackrrran argues that “it is the presence of
a numerically dominant ethnic group (rather than cultural heterogeneity) that appears to
be the potent destabilizing force” (J ackrnan 1978, 1276). It is thus plausible that any one
dominant group will further raise levels of fear and insecurity on behalf of less dominant
groups.

In the end, there appears little doubt that ethnic conﬂict negatively impacts society. Yet,
as much attention as the media gives to ethnic conﬂict and the resulting instability and
insecurity, these are not as prevalent as some might think. In a very interesting study,
James Fearon and David Laitin (1996) assert that cooperative relations between ethnic
groups is far more common than ethnic violence. Further, actual ethnic conﬂict in Aﬁica
is far below what a reasonable model might project. Given the potential for ethnic
violence in Aﬁica, it is in fact relatively rare (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 717). Yet, as
Fearon and Latin (1996) observe, most of the news reporting and the academic literature
give the exact opposite impression. More importantly the authors argue that informal

institutions can help to “cauterize” inter-ethnic conﬂicts.

201

Better than cauterizing, joking relationships likely prevent the initial tear. J oking
relationships likely diminish the potential for ethnic unrest in any given state.
Speciﬁcally, joking relationships act, to varying levels, to undermine inter-ethnic
competition. These also assuage fears through inter-ethnic cooperation and built-in
conﬂict resolution mechanisms. In some cases, the most robust examples of joking
relationships (e. g. Mali) appear to actually undermine the salience of ethnicity by
promoting fairly substantial levels of ethnic ambiguity, in turn raising some rather
stringent hurdles for a potential political entrepreneur to overcome. In brief, joking
relationships likely counter the very factors the literature suggests are at the very center
of ethnic conﬂict and violence.

Focusing on Aﬁica, the study of joking relationships is arguably an important part of
understanding ethnic cooperation. As the previous chapters suggested, joking
relationships are not Mali-speciﬁc. Varying forms of this informal institutional
arrangement can be found throughout Africa. It follows that further study of joking
relationships in this broader ﬁeld can strongly and positively contribute to greater
understanding of conditions that lead to ethnic conﬂict or its avoidance.

As a ﬁnal note, Robert Bates stated that “[e]fforts should be devoted to creating
institutional environments which provide incentives so that persons organize coalitions of
a different nature when in pursuit of their interests”(Bates 1986, 163). Perhaps such
institutions are already in place. If so, these might enhance comprehension of the relative
scarcity of ethnic conﬂict given such potential in sub-Saharan Aﬁica (F earon and Laitin

1996)

202

Conclusion

Legitimacy is a pertinent issue in Africa. Many modern Aﬁican states are discredited or
have lost legitimacy. The misery and atrocities born out of illegitimate states are
apparent. Further, states that have lost much of their legitimacy go to great lengths to
remain in power at the expense of the very people they should be protecting.

Many of Aﬁica’s problems are, at its very core, problems of political legitimacy.
Politically legitimate states are a pre-requisite for security and stability. Without security
and stability, economic and human development, along with basic human needs, cannot

take root (Rotberg 2004). Thus for Aﬁica, state legitimacy is of the essence.

Contribution

Englebert notes that leaders of non-legitimate states are limited in the options available to
address the many economic and political challenges confronting sub-Saharan Aﬁica
(2000, 173). He convincingly argues that legitimate states have increased developmental
capacities. Yet, in his macro-level cross-national study, Englebert does not examine the
underlying sources of legitimacy.

This dissertation sought to take Englebert’s pioneering work one step further.
Speciﬁcally, it sought to disentangle the potential contributing sources to legitimacy. It
did so by approaching legitimacy from the perspective of the individual. It is likely that
historical continuity facilitates willing obedience, but it is not a stretch to argue the
colonial period in sub—Saharan Aﬁica history ended or otherwise severely altered
historical continuity of pre-colonial sub-Saharan institutions. Consequently, true

historical continuity is scarce.

203

Given the present sub-Saharan context and developmental implications of legitimacy,
how does one help engender greater levels of legitimacy? This is a question that
Englebert (2000) begins to ask without answering. Hopefully, this dissertation helps
establish a direction for engendering legitimacy in sub-Saharan Aﬁica, speciﬁcally,
provoking insight into the various factors that affect individual perceptions of state
legitimacy. If policies that address these factors can be developed, it is reasonable to
suggest that these more legitimate states will increase developmental capacities while
beneﬁting its citizens in the process.

Further, this dissertation sought to provide an empirical analysis of competing sources
of legitimacy. Given that political legitimacy is important, especially in a developmental
context, it is vital that factors that advance legitimacy are understood. These factors
include, but are not limited to, those that contribute towards Aﬁicans granting the state
the right to rule them, or those that lead Aﬁicans to believe the state and state institutions
deserve their compliance. If some theories can be identiﬁed as more valid than others,
then existing analytical tools can be applied to only those aspects of legitimacy that
matter.

Incorporating data from the Aﬁobarometer project, this paper argues that an individual’s
trust in institutions is the most important variable in accounting for varying levels of
perceptions of legitimacy. Understanding that an individual’s trust is at the heart of state
legitimacy can guide future endeavors. As the literature suggests, an individual’s trust is
itself a combination of varying factors. Future research can focus on these variables to

help explain different levels of institutional trust. A better understanding of such factors,

204

their relative importance and effect on levels of institutional trust is likely to facilitate the
development of potential solutions to Aﬁica’s legitimacy crisis.

Further, this study hopes to renew interest in an apparently overlooked informal
institution. Speciﬁcally, this study highlighted the merit of studying how joking
relationships can help political scientists better understand varying levels of conﬂict in
ethnically heterogeneous societies. It is likely that such informal institutions attenuate
the very factors (e. g. competition) that lead to ethnic conﬂict and associated
developmental problems. The anthropological literature suggests that such informal
institutions are not unique to Aﬁica, which greatly enhances the comparative possibilities
for future research. Irnportantly, this dissertation reminds the researcher that focusing on
the general, as opposed to the exceptional, is likely to yield greater beneﬁts in one’s quest
to better understand political events.

Finally, one of the comparative advantages to the study of Aﬁica lies in the continent’s
variance. To better understand one aspect, one must ﬁrst have a clear theoretical
understanding of the whole picture. Comparison within sub-Saharan Aﬁica was feasible
given the potentially vast amount of data from Aﬁica, which has an ‘n’ of 48 states.
Further, the Aﬁ'obarometer data made responses from over 20,000 respondents in 18 sub-
Saharan countries available for analysis. This was appreciated since data is not easy to
collect. As relevant data becomes available, it is imperative that Aﬁican scholars begin
appropriate data analyses to help conﬁrm or disprove the myriad of theories that have
developed over the last three to four decades. Just recently, data is becoming

increasingly available and simply theorizing is insufﬁcient without some systematic and

205

empirical analysis. I believe, with help from the availability of quality data, that this

dissertation makes a worthy contribution to existing sub-Saharan African literature.

206

Appendices

207

APPENDIX A

Societal Structures

Societal Structure Freq. Percent

Acephalous 8,489 42.44
Hierarchical 1 1,514 57.56
Total 20,003 1 00

Historically Hierarchical Ethnic Groups by Country — Coded as ”I "

Benin Ethnic Group

Fon
Adja
Bariba
Dendi
Yoruba
Ditamari
Peulh
Yoa
Haoussa
lde
Lamba

Botswana Ethnic Group

Mokgatla
Mokwena
Mongwato
Mongwaketse
Motlokwa
Morolong
Molete
Mmirwa
Mosobea
Motawana
Motalaote
Monajwa

208

Ghana

Madagascar

Malawi

Ethnic Group

Akan
Gagomba
Dagaati

Ethnic Group
Antakarana
Antambahoaka
Antandroy
Antanosy
Antefasy
Antemoro
Antesaka
Bara
Betsileo
Betsimisaraka
Bezanozano
Mahafaly
Merina
Sakalava
Sihanaka
Tanala
Tsimihety
Vezo

Ethnic Group
Ngoni

Ethnic Group

Bambara
PeuhVFulfuld
Senufo
Mianka
Mossi
Sonink
Malink
Khasonk
Arabe
Maure
Kakolo
Samoko
Sonrha
Tamasheq
Daﬁng
Bella

209

Namibia

Nigeria

Senegal

South
Africa

_Uganda

Ethnic Group

Oshiwambo
Setswana

Ethnic Group

Hausa
Yoruba
Ebira
Fulani
Kanuri
Ijaw
lgala
Urhobo
Awori
Tapa
Kalabari
Shuwa-arab
Qwari

Ethnic Group

Wolof
Pular
Mandinka
Soninke
Bambara

Ethnic Group

Afrikaans/ afrikaner/ boer
Shangaan

Swazi

Zulu

Ethnic Group

Alur

Ateso

Luo
Lugbara
Madi
Muganda
Musoga
Muhororo
Mukonzo
Munyarwanda
Munyoro
Mutooro
Munyankole

210

Zambia Ethnic Group

Bemba
Lozi
Nsenga
Lunda
Ngoni

Historically Acephalous Ethnic Groups by Country — Coded as "0”

Benin Ethnic GrouL
Yoruba

Botswana Ethnic Group

Moherero
Mosarwa
Mokalanga
Motswapong
Mokgalagadi
Moyei
Mombukushu
Mokhurutshe
Mohurutshe

Ghana Ethnic Group

Ewe
Galdangbe

Kenya Ethnic Group
Kikuyu
Luo
Luhya
Kamba
Meru
Kisii
Kalenjin
Masaai
Mljikenda
Taita
Somali
Pokot
Turkana
Bajuni
Kuria
Embu
Borana
Swahili

211

(continued)

Malawi

Digo
Giriama
Duruma
Chonyi
Mijikenda
Gunya
Teso
Wanga
Kabarasi
Bukusu
Ombuya
Nyala
Tachoni
Nyore
Maragoli
Marama
Sabaot
Nandi
Kipsigis
Tugen
Keiyo
Burji
Murule
Dagodia
Gari
Mupule
Shabelle
Gabawen
Garrnug

Ethnic Group

Tumbuka
Nkhonde
Lambya
Chewa
Yao
Lomwe
Manga'nja
Sena
Sukwa
Senga
Tonga

Ethnic Group

Dogon
Bobo
Bozo

212

Mozambique

Namibia

Nigeria

Senegal

South Africa

Ethnic Group

Makua
Sena
Ndau
Nyanja
Changana
Chope
Bitonga
Makonde
Chuabo

Ajua

Ethnic Group

Herero
Caprlvian
Rukwangali
Nama
Damara
Lozi

Subia
Kavango

Ethnic Group
Igbo
Yoruba
Eﬁk
lsoko
lbibio
Tiv
Nupe
Edo
Idoma
ltsekiri
Anang
Ekoi
Taroh
Ogoni
Sayawa
Okpella
Oklrika

Ethnic Group

Serer
Diola
Manjack
Bainouk

Ethnic Group
Ndebele

213

(continued)

Uganda

Zambia

Xhosa

Pedi/spedi/ north sotho
Sesotholsotho/ south
sotho

Setswana! tswana
Venda

Ethnic Group

Akaramojonj
Japadhola
Kakwa
Kumam
Mugwere
Mugishu
Mufumbira
Mukiga
Samia

Ethnic Group

Tonga
Chewa
Tumbuka
Kaonde
Luvale
Namwanga
Mambwe
Lenje
Bisa

Ila

Lala
Mbunda
Senga
Swahili
Nyanja
Chokwe
Nyika
Luchazi
Lamba
Tabwa
Kalunda

214

Mode of Livelihood

Mode of Production Freq. Percent

Agriculturalist 19,193 95.95
Pastoralist (Rural) 810 4.05
Total 20,003 1 00

Historically Pastoral Ethnic Groups by Country — Coded as ”1 "

Benin Ethnic Group
Peulh

Botswana Ethnic Group
Moherero

Kenya Ethnic Group
Masaai
Somali
Turkana
Murule
Dagodia
Gari
Mupule
Shabelle
Gabawen
Gannug

Madagascar Ethnic Group

Antandroy
Bara
Mahafaly

Mali Ethnic Group

Peuhl/Fulfuld
Tamasheq

215

Mozamblque Ethnic Group

Makua
Sena
Ndau
Nyanja
Changana
Chope
Bitonga
Makonde
Chuabo

Ajua

Namibia Ethnic Group

Herero
Nama
Damara

Nigeria Ethnic Group
Fulani

Sengal Ethnic Group
Pular

Uganda Ethnic Group

Akaramojonj
Japadhola
Muhororo

Historically Agricultural Ethnic Groups by Country — Coded as “0 ”

Benin Ethnic Group

Fon
Adja
Baﬁba
Dendi
Yoruba
Ditamari
Yoa
Haoussa
Ide
Lamba

216

Botswana

Ghana

Kenya

Ethnic Group

Mokgatla
Mokwena
Mongwaketse
Motlokwa
Morolong
Mokalanga
Molete
Mmirwa
Motswapong
Mosobea
Motawana
Moyei
Mohurutshe
Mombukushu
Monajwa
Mokhurutshe
Motalaote
Mongwato
Mosarwa
Mokgalagadi

Ethnic Group

Akan

Ewe
Ga/Dangbe
Gagomba
Dagaati

Ethnic Group
Kikuyu
Luo
Luhya
Kamba
Meru
Kisii
Kalenjin
Mijikenda
Taita
Pokot
Bajuni
Kuria
Embu
Borana
Swahili
Indian
Digo

217

(continued)

Mada ascar

Malawi

Giriama
Duruma
Chonyi
Mijikenda
Arab
Gunya
Teso
Wanga
Kabarasi
Bukusu
Ombuya
Nyala
Tachoni
Nyore
Maragoli
Marama
Sabaot
Nandi
Kipsigis
Tugen
Keiyo
Burji

Ethnic Group

Antakarana
Antambahoaka
Antanosy
Antefasy
Antemoro
Antesaka
Betsileo
Betsimisaraka
Bezanozano
Merina
Sakalava
Sihanaka
Tanala
Tsimihety
Vezo

Ethnic Group

Tumbuka
Nkhonde
Lambya
Chewa
Yao
Ngoni
Lomwe
Manga'nja

218

(continued)

Mozambique

Namibia

Sena

Sukwa
Senga
Tonga

Ethnic Group

Bambara
Senufo
Mianka
Mossi
Sonink
Malink
Khasonk
Dogon
Bobo
Bozo
Arabe
Maure
Kakolo
Samoko
Sonrha
Bella
Daﬁng

Ethnic Group

Makua
Sena
Ndau
Nyanja
Changana
Chope
Bitonga
Makonde
Chuabo

Ajua

Ethnic Group

Oshiwambo
Caprivian
Rukwangali
German
Afrikaaner
English
Lozi

Subia
Setswana

219

(continued)

Nigeria

Sengal

Kavango

Ethnic Group

Hausa
Igbo
Yoruba
Eﬁk
Ebira
lsoko
lbibio
Kanuri
Tiv
Nupe
Ijaw
Edo
Idoma
ltsekiri
lkwere
Awori
Tapa
Kalabari
Shuwa-arab
Gwari
Anang
Ekoi
Ukwani
Igede
Ekpeye
Taroh
Ogoni
Sayawa
Okpella
Okirika

Ethnic Group

Wolof
Serer
Mandinka
Soninke
Diola
Manjack
Bambara
Bainouk

220

South
Africa

Uganda

Zambia

Ethnic Group

Afrikaans/ Afrikaner/ Boer
Ndebele

Xhosa

PedilSpedi/ North Sotho
Sesotho/Sotho/ South
Sotho

Setswana! Tswana
Shangaan

Swazi

Venda

Zulu

Ethnic Group

Alur

Ateso
Kakwa
Kumam

Luo
Lugbara
Mugwere
Madi
Muganda
Mugishu
Musoga
Mufumbira
Mukiga
Mukonzo
Munyarwanda
Munyoro
Mutooro
Munyankole
Samia

Ethnic Group

Bemba
Tonga

Lozi
Chewa
Nsenga
Tumbuka
Kaonde
Luvale
Namwanga

221

(continued)
Mambwe
Lenje
Lunda
Ngoni
Bisa
Ila
Lala
Mbunda
Senga
Swahili
Nyanja
Chokwe
Nyika
Luchazi
Lamba
Tabwa
Kalunda

Ethnic Group Sharing ties with Presidency by Country

9

Ethnic groups coded as sharing ethnicity with the president — coded as ‘1

Country Ethnlc Group
Benin Mariba

Botswana Mokgatla
Mokwena
Mongwato
Mongwaketse
Motlokwa
Morolong
Molete
Mmirwa
Mosobea
Motawana
Motalaote
Monajwa

Ghana Akan
Kenya Kikuyu
Madagascar Merina

Malawi Chewa

222

Mall
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Uganda

Zambia

Peuhl/Fulfuld
Changana
Oshiwambo
Yoruba

Wolof

Xhosa
Munyarwanda

Bemba

223

ZSLS Test for Endogeneity (Economic Performance)

 

Instrumental variables 2SLS r ression
Legitimacy Coef. Std. Err. z P>Iz| [95% Conf. Interval]

Economic 0.037 0.019 1 .960 0.050 0.000 0.074
Authority Structure 0.003 0.017 0.170 0.863 -0.030 0.036
Mode of Livelihood 0.014 0.033 0.420 0.673 -0.051 0.079
Ethnic Ties to Pres 0.013 0.015 0.870 0.383 —0.016 0.043
Winning Party 0.069 0.014 4.820 0.000 0.041 0.097
Vote 0.029 0.015 1 .890 0.059 -0.001 0.059
Contacting Index -0.002 0.012 -0.120 0.903 -0.026 0.023
Delivery of Econ Goods 0.121 0.012 9.990 0.000 0.098 0.145
Free and Fair Elections -0.060 0.007 -8.810 0.000 -0.074 -0.047
Freedom of Speech -0.011 0.006 -1.830 0.067 -0.022 0.001
Inter-Personal Trust 0.051 0.010 4.950 0.000 0.031 0.071
Urban-Rural 0.062 0.014 4.520 0.000 0.035 0.088
Age 0.000 0.000 0.870 0.384 -0.001 0.001
Gender 0.000 0.012 0.030 0.977 -0.024 0.025
Education 0.004 0.004 0.980 0.325 -0.004 0.01 1
Benin -0.092 0.039 -2.350 0.019 -0.168 -0.015
Botswana 0.003 0.037 0.070 0.945 -0.071 0.076
Ghana 0.372 0.038 9.850 0.000 0.298 0.446
Kenya -0.097 0.037 -2.650 0.008 -0.169 -0.025
Madgascar -0.155 0.038 -4.050 0.000 -0.231 -0.080
Malawi -0.077 0.038 -2.030 0.042 -0.1 51 0003
Mall 0.038 0.038 1.000 0.318 -0.037 0.113
Mozamibque 0.050 0.042 1 .200 0.230 -0.032 0.132
Namibia 0.050 0.041 1.230 0.219 -0.030 0.129
Nigeria 0.086 0.032 2.690 0.007 0.023 0.148
Senegal 0.098 0.040 2.440 0.015 0.019 0.177
South Africa 0.057 0.035 1.600 0.109 -0.013 0.126
Uganda 0.242 0.033 7.250 0.000 0.177 0.307
_cons 3.181 0.070 45.490 0.000 3.044 3.318

Sargan Statistic: P-val = .153 (Cannot Reject the Null of Good Instruments)
Hausman Test = .213 (Cannot Reject the Null of No Endogeneity)

Economic Performance

hier pas pres wp vote contact eperforrn fair speech social urbrur
age gender educ c1 02 c4 c5 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 016
Individual Econ Situation, Gone Without Cash Income, and Job

Opportunities

lnstrgmenteg:
Included insﬂments:
Exgludﬁ instruments:

224

ZSLS test for Endogeneity (Trust)

 

Instrumen I variables 28L r ression
Std. [95% Conf.
Legitimacy Coef. Err. z P>IzI Interval]

Individual's Trust in

Institutions 0.740 0.927 0.800 0.424 -1 .076 2.557
Authority Structure 0.000 0.022 -0.010 0.994 -0.044 0.044
Mode of Livelihood 0.057 0.054 1.070 0.286 -0.048 0.163
Winning Party 0.005 0.079 0.060 0.949 -0.149 0.159
Contacting Index -0.014 0.025 -0.560 0.572 -0.063 0.035
Past 0015 0.012 -1.240 0.214 -0.039 0.009
Present -0.004 0.01 7 —O.220 0.826 -0.037 0.029
Future 0.024 0.050 0.480 0.634 -0.073 0.121
Delivery of Econ Goods -0.012 0.156 -0.080 0.937 -0.318 0.293
Free and Fair Elections 0.011 0.086 0.130 0.899 -0.158 0.180
Freedom of Speech -0.006 0.007 -0.880 0.379 -0.021 0.008
Inter-Personal Trust 01 15 0.223 -0.520 0.606 0551 0.322
Urban-Rural 0.010 0.062 0.170 0.866 -0.110 0.131
Age 0.000 0.001 0.460 0.646 -0.001 0.002
Gender 0.002 0.01 5 0.160 0.875 -0.027 0.032
Educ 0.020 0.017 1.150 0.249 -0.014 0.053
Benin 0.099 0.108 0.920 0.360 -0.112 0.310
Botswana -0.253 0.310 -0.820 0.413 -0.861 0.354
Ghana 0.199 0.213 0.940 0.349 -0.218 0.616
Kenya 0100 0.049 -2.020 0.043 -0.196 -0.003
Madagascar 0.056 0.282 0.200 0.843 -0.496 0.608
Malawi -0.680 0.800 -0.850 0.395 -2.247 0.888
Mall 0262 0.309 -0.850 0.396 -0.869 0.344
Mozambique -0.233 0.353 -0.660 0.509 -0.924 0.458
Namibia 0.013 0.055 0.240 0.812 -0.095 0.121
Nigeria 0.499 0.548 0.910 0.363 -0.576 1.573
Senegal -0.343 0.558 -0.610 0.539 -1 .435 0.750
South Africa 0.117 0.092 1.270 0.204 -0.063 0.297
Uganda 0.097 0.179 0.540 0.590 -0.255 0.448
_cons 2.396 0.866 2.770 0.006 0.698 4.093

Sargan Statistig: P-val = .110 (Cannot Reject the Null of Good

Instruments)

ngsman Test = .488 (Cannot Reject the Null of No Endogeneity)

lnstrumented:

Included instruments:
Excluded instruments:

Individual's Trust in Institutions

hier pas wp contact past present future eperform fair speech
social urbrur age gender educ c1 c2 c4 c5 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11
c12 c13 c14 c16

Vote and Ethnic Ties to the President

225

APPENDIX B

OLS wI Robust Standard Errors Clustered By Country (14 Countries)

 

[95% Cont.
Legitimacy Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| lntervalI

Authority Structure 0.058 0.048 1.210 0.250 -0.046 0.162
Mode of Livelihood -0.005 0.061 -0.080 0.935 -0.136 0.126
Ethnic Ties to Pres 0019 0.046 -0.410 0.691 -0.119 0.081
Winning Party 0.074 0.023 3.160 0.007 0.023 0.124
Vote 0.039 0.022 1.720 0.109 -0.010 0.087
Contact Index 0.007 0.020 0.370 0.718 -0.035 0.050
Past Econ Performance 0013 0.009 -1.480 0.162 -0.031 0.006
Present Econ Performance 0.009 0.018 0.520 0.614 -0.029 0.047
Future Econ Performance 0.056 0.012 4.510 0.001 0.029 0.083
Delivery of Economic Goods 0.093 0.022 4.240 0.001 0.046 0.140
Free and Fair Elections -0.029 0.016 -1.840 0.089 -0.063 0.005
Freedom of Speech -0.002 0.016 -0.110 0.911 —0.036 0.033
Corruption Index -0.007 0.020 -0.360 0.722 -0.051 0.036
Individual’s Trust in

Institutions Index 0.153 0.023 6.640 0.000 0.103 0.203
Inter-Personal Trust 0.022 0.020 1.070 0.303 -0.022 0.066
Urban/Rural 0.018 0.026 0.680 0.508 -0.038 0.073
Age 0.000 0.001 0.120 0.908 -0.001 0.002
Gender 0.008 0.016 0.510 0.616 -0.026 0.042
Education 0.015 0.006 2.300 0.039 0.001 0.028
_cons 2.923 0.100 29.140 0.000 2.706 3.140

 

IAdj. R2 = 0.081 (n= 13,994)

226

OLS with Country Dummies

 

Std.

Legitimacy Coef. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Authority Structure 0.004 0.017 0.230 0.821 -0.030 0.037
Mode of Livelihood 0.031 0.035 0.900 0.370 —0.037 0.099
Ethnic Ties to Pres 0.010 0.016 0.630 0.531 -0.021 0.041
Winning Party 0.049 0.015 3.310 0.001 0.020 0.078
Vote 0.021 0.016 1.300 0.194 -0.011 0.053
Contact Index 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.997 -0.025 0.025
Past Econ Performance 0007 0.007 -1.120 0.264 -0.020 0.006
Present Econ Performance 0.004 0.006 0.650 0.518 -0.008 0.016
Future Econ Performance 0.051 0.006 7.920 0.000 0.038 0.063
Delivery of Economic Goods 0.075 0.011 6.790 0.000 0.054 0.097
Free and Fair Elections 0038 0.007 -5.230 0.000 -0.052 -0.023
Freedom of Speech -0.009 0.006 -1.490 0.137 -0.021 0.003
Corruption Index -0.037 0.011 -3.460 0.001 -0.057 -0.016
Individual’s Trust in
Institutions Index 0.169 0.009 19.130 0.000 0.152 0.187
Inter-Personal Trust 0.024 0.011 2.140 0.032 0.002 0.045
Urban/Rural 0.043 0.014 3.020 0.002 0.015 0.071
Age 0.000 0.001 0.880 0.378 -0.001 0.001
Gender 0.002 0.013 0.120 0.902 -0.024 0.027
Education 0.01 1 0.004 2.910 0.004 0.004 0.019
Benin 0.101 0.042 2.390 0.017 0.018 0.183
Botswana -0.062 0.039 -1.610 0.108 -0.139 0.014
Ghana 0.327 0.040 8.220 0.000 0.249 0.405
Kenya 0109 0.038 -2.890 0.004 0184 -0.035
Madagascar -0.122 0.039 -3.100 0.002 -0.199 -0.045
Malawi -0.218 0.042 -5.240 0.000 -0.300 -0.137
Mall 0050 0.040 -1 .270 0.206 -0.128 0.027
Mozambique -0.015 0.043 -0.340 0.732 —0.099 0.069
Namibia 0.042 0.039 1 .100 0.273 -0.034 0.1 18
Nigeria 0.177 0.032 5.460 0.000 0.1 14 0.241
Senegal 0.022 0.042 0.530 0.597 -0.061 0.106
South Africa 0.072 0.035 2.070 0.039 0.004 0.139
Uganda 0.220 0.034 6.520 0.000 0.154 0.287
_cons 2.978 0.068 43.830 0.000 2.845 3.112

 

IAdj. R2 = 0.107 (n = 13,994) I

 

n = 14 Countries, w/ Zambia as reference category

227

Multi-Level REML Model

 

Std. [95% Conf.

Legitimacy Coef. Err. z P>|zj lntervalL
Authority Structure .008 .017 0.49 0.624 -.025 .042
Mode of Livelihood .032 .035 0.91 0.362 -.036 .099
Ethnic Ties to Pres .009 .016 0.60 0.548 -.021 .040
Winning Party .049 .015 3.33 0.001 .020 .078
Vote .021 .016 1.33 0.184 -.010 .053
Contact Index .000 .013 0.000 0.996 -.025 .025
Past Econ Performance -.008 .007 -1.16 0.247 -.0207 .005
Present Econ Performance .004 .006 0.67 0.505 -.008 .016
Future Econ Performance .0508 .006 7.96 0.000 .038 .063
Delivery of Economic Goods .076 .011 6.88 0.000 .055 .098
Free and Fair Elections -.038 .007 -5.30 0.000 -.052 -.024
Freedom of Speech -.009 .006 -1.41 0.159 -.020 .003
Corruption Index -.036 .010 -3.93 0.001 -.057 -.015
Individual’s Trust in Institutions
Index .169 .009 19.12 0.000 .151 .186
Inter-Personal Trust Index .023 .011 2.11 0.035 .002 .045
Urban/Rural .041 .014 2.94 0.003 .014 .070
Age .000 .000 0.91 0.362 -.000 .001
Gender .002 .01 3 0.14 0.892 -.024 .027
Education .01 1 .003 2.90 0.004 .004 .019
Political Relevant Ethnic Groups .202 .180 1.12 0.262 -.151 .555
Electoral Systems .01 1 .085 0.13 0.897 -.156 .178
Constant 2.918 .116 25.14 0.000 2.690 3.146
n = 13,994
Wald chi2(21) = 1,049.72
-2 x Log Likelihood = 31930
Country var (cons) .021 .010 .009 .051
Individual var (residual) .566 .007 .553 .579

228

Descriptive Statistics

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Legit Index 16764 3.683 0.816 1 5
l =Stgrgly Disggree: 2 = Disgree: 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree: 4 = Agree: 5 = Strongly Agee
Authority Structure 20003 0.576 0.494 0 l
1 = Hierarchical: 0 = Acephalous
Mode of Livelihood 20003 0.040 0.197 0 l
l= Pastoralist : 0 = Agriculturalist
Ethnic Ties to President 19553 0.277 0.447 0 1
l = ethnic ties to Pres: 0 = no ethnic ties to Pres
Member of Winning Party 20003 0.325 0.469 0 1
l = Yes: 0 = No
Did you Vote? 20003 0.746 0.435 0 l
l= Yes: 0 = No
Contact Index 19826 0.206 0.490 0 3
3 = Often: 2 = Sometimes: I = On Occasion: 0 = Never
Past Econ Perform 19539 2.901 1.107 1 5
l= Much Worse: 2 = Worse: 3 =same: 4= Better: 5 = Much Better
Present Econ Perform 19582 2.632 1.271 1 5
l = Very Bad: 2 = Fairly Bad: 3 = Neither Good or Bad: 4 = Fairly Good: 5 = Very Good
Future Econ Perform 17220 3.396 1.148 1 5
1= Much Worse: 2 = Worse: 3 =same: 4= Better: 5 = Much Better
Delivery of Economic Goods 17961 2.048 0.717 1 4
1= Very Badly: 2 = Fairly Badly: 3 = Fairly Well: 4 = Very Well
Free and Fair Elections 18365 2.008 1.080 1 4

l = completely free and fair: 2 = free and fair, but with minor problems: 3: free and fair, with major
problems: 4= Not free and fair

 

 

 

 

Careful about what you say? 19094 1.820 1.130 0 3
0 = Neverzl = Rarely: 2 = Oﬁen: 3 = Always

Corruption Index 18573 1.378 0.716 0 3
0 = None: 1 =Some: 2 = Most: 3 = All

Individual's Trust Index 18302 1.787 0.922 0 3
0 = Not at all: 1 = Just a little: 2 = Somewhat: 3 = A lot

Social Trust Index 19175 1.102 0.653 0 3
0 = Not at all: 1 = Just a little: 2 = I trust them Somewhat: 3 = I trust them a lot

Urban/Rural 20003 1.617 0.486 1 2
Age 19765 36.079 14.471 18 130
Gender 20003 1 .500 0.500 1 2
Education 19921 3.1 10 2.058 0 9

229

Mali Legitimacy Index

Afrobarometer Questions:

Q52a: Our constitution expresses the values and hopes (of people in this country)
Q52b: The police always have the right to make people obey the law

Q52c: The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to
abide by

Q52d: The Tax department has the right to make people pay taxes

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.06), which explains 46
percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .62) is low but
permissible (n= 1039).

 

 

 

 

_1

1 2 3 4
Number

Scree Plot for Legitimacy Index

230

Mall Economic Performance Index

Afrobarometer Questions:

. Q65: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the
following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say?
0 a: Managing the economy
0 b: Creating jobs
0 c: Keeping prices stable
0 d: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.43), which explains 53
percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .70) is acceptable

(n= 1103).

 

1.5

Eigenvalues
.5
1

 

 

 

I

“-4
'h-I

1
Number

Scree Plot for Economic Performance Index

231

Mall Corruption Index

Afrobarometer Questions:

. Q56 How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?
0 a: Ofﬁce of the Presidency
o b: Members of Parliament
0 c: Local Government Councilors
o (1: National Government Ofﬁcials
o e: Local Government Ofﬁcials
o f: Police
0 g: Tax Ofﬁcials
o h: Judges and Magistrates

 

 

 

 

I I I
0 2 4 6 8
Number
Scree Plot for Corruption Index

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 4.15), which explains 59
percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .88) is acceptable
(n= 846).

232

Mali Institutional Trust Index

Afrobarometer Questions:

. Q5 5g: How much do you trust the military, or haven’t you heard enough about

them to say?

. Q55h: How much do you trust the police, or haven’t you heard enough about
them to say?

. Q55i: How much do you trust courts of law, or haven’t you heard enough about
them to say?

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.26), which explains 54
percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .69) is acceptable

(n= 1139).

 

 

 

 

—

T I

1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Number

Scree Plot for Institutional Trust Index

233

Mall: Full OLS Model

 

Std.

Perceptions of State Legitimacy Coef. Err. t P>|t| Beta
Societal Structure
Authority Structure 0108 0.070 -1.540 0.123 -0.051
Mode of Production 0.357 0.1 13 3.170 0.002 0.160
Ethnic Ties to the President 0267 0.102 -2.620 0.009 0128
Institutional Inﬂuences
Member of Winning Party? 0052 0.053 -0.980 0.326 0032
Did you vote? 0.107 0.064 1.690 0.091 0.056
Contacted a Member of Parliament 0.075 0.046 1.640 0.102 0.058
Contacted an ofﬁcial of a government
ministry -0.012 0.063 -0.200 0.843 -0.007
Contacted a political party ofﬁcial 0069 0.033 -2.080 0.037 0076
Performance Evaluations
Economic Performance Past 12 Months -0.032 0.023 -1.400 0.163 0047
Current Economic Performance 0.062 0.023 2.630 0.009 0.093
Future Economic Performance 0.046 0.026 1.770 0.077 0.058
Delivery of Economic Goods Index 0.079 0.043 1.840 0.066 0.066
Free and Fair Elections? 0057 0.023 -2.450 0.015 -0.084
Careful about what you say? 0.039 0.027 1.440 0.150 0.048
Perceptions of Corruption -0.051 0.034 -1.490 0.137 -0.052
Trust
Individual’s Trust in Institutions Index 0.130 0.033 3.920 0.000 0.140
Carl most people can be trusted? -0.059 0.058 -1.030 0.305 -0.034
Trust each of your neighbors? 0.020 0.030 0.660 0.512 0.024
Trust people from other ethnic groups? -0.049 0.027 -1.840 0.067 0.068
Qontrol Variablgg
Urban-Rural 0.040 0.062 0.640 0.523 0.024
Age -0.001 0.002 -0.880 0.379 0031
Gender -0.134 0.053 -2.560 0.01 1 0090
Education 0.025 0.016 1.540 0.123 0.057
Con 3.325 0.269 12.380 0.000

Adj R2 = 0.109 (n = 900)

234

Map of Mali

 

W3 Algeria 300. ml,
300 km

     

Taoude'nnr
O

    

Mauritania

    

Arao.uane

MALI _
Niger
Timbuktu River

 
    

 

woosdewarqderg©

Nloro
6". 5”“

 

Map obtained from worldatlas. com

(13112: //worldatlas. com/webimage/coungs/africa/bwmaps/mlbw. him) last accessed 26

Feb 2007

235

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