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STATE LEGITIMACY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

By

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ABSTRACT

STATE LEGITIMACY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

By

Jean-Philippe Nöel Peltier

Legitimacy is a pertinent issue in Africa. Many modern African states are discredited or have lost legitimacy. Many of Africa's problems are, at their very core, problems of political legitimacy. Politically legitimate states are a pre-requisite for security and stability. Without security and stability, development and basic human needs cannot take root. Thus for Africa, state legitimacy is of the essence.

There are many competing theories as to what contributes to the political legitimacy of the state, or to the lack thereof. This dissertation seeks to examine which, if any, source of legitimacy best explains perceptions of legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa.

In the end, this dissertation makes two important contributions to the literature. First, the importance of an individual's trust towards state institutions is shown to be an important source of legitimacy. Whereas a state can use force to ensure compliance, it is far less costly to engender willing compliance. The evidence suggests that increasing an individual's trust in institutions of coercion enhances legitimacy. Second, a Malian case study attests to the importance of joking relationships. Joking relationships are a largely ignored informal institution that might significantly account for variance in levels of ethnic conflict in Africa.

Dedicated to my family

Trang, Benjamin and Nicolas

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I - State Legitimacy

Large parts of Africa are in disarray. Aristide Zolberg noted over three decades ago, "the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent feature" (1968, 70). On the surface, little, if anything, appears to have changed. Yet, this statement does not take into account the great variety of African experience. From a stable Botswana to the failed state of Somalia, Africa is more than conflict and disorder. Whereas many scholars tend to focus on the exceptional, such as William Reno in his *Warlord Politics and the African State* (1998), I am interested in identifying key variable(s) that help explain the wide variances in the African experiences with political stability.

For a comparativist, the beauty of Africa lies in the continent's diversity. Africa proper is comprised of 53 states; 48 of them in sub-Saharan Africa. In these 48 countries, one can travel from Somalia to Botswana and observe 48 different degrees of state legitimacy and democracy. This diversity is a gift given to the sub-Saharan Africanist and is rarely utilized. Too often, the focus resides on the 'exceptional' cases. Yet, I would argue that one might learn more about the exception by studying the whole. This dissertation examines state legitimacy in Africa and its sources in this broader context.

In this dissertation, factors that contribute to the willingness of Africans to comply when a state commands their obedience are identified. It is reasonable to suggest that political legitimacy is important in explaining the variance in the current African condition. I follow the path of Pierre Englebert (2000) who convincingly argues that inherited legitimacy is a strong predictor of development. Further, the legitimacy of the

state is a necessary condition to economic and political development, a condition that African states share to varying degrees. If we can accept legitimacy as a necessary condition, then factors contributing to it are crucial towards better understanding African conditions. For example, Botswana might be consistently stable due to high legitimacy, whereas nearby Angola, rich in resources, has been a textbook example of Zolberg's disorder and conflict, accompanied by low state legitimacy.

Before one can start examining contributing factors to legitimacy, it is important, as Giovanni Sartori (1970) reminds us, to define our concepts. For meaningful comparison and discussion, terms must be sufficiently precise to ensure the validity of our measurements. It is important to define legitimacy: its meaning, dimensions and referents – and then to operationalize it for purposes of analysis. It is with this in mind that the inquiry into legitimacy begins. The inquiry begins in an attempt to define the state.

Why the State?

In regards to the inquiry into legitimacy, why does the state matter? In 1968, J.P. Nettl argued that if the state could "be made into an operating variable that points up significant differences and discontinuities between societies, making possible systematically qualitative or even quantitative distinction, there may be a case for bringing it back in" (Nettl 1968, 562). Since, there has been a lot of debate as to the relative autonomy and merit of the state.

There are two basic approaches that attempt to provide theoretical ground for the merit of the state. The first approach can be broadly categorized as subjective in nature (Mitchell 1991). Such an approach emphasizes the individual, forgoing the

institutionalized structures of the state (Krasner 1978; Nordlinger 1987). Here, it is argued that institutions vary from state to state and do not, in of themselves, exhibit any preference. The analysis of the state is reduced to the ambiguous term *policy*, which is defined as "the intention and desires of certain state officials" (Mitchell 1991, 86). In the end, this approach tends to "remystify the state concept" (Almond 1987, 476).

The second and more fruitful approach views the state as an actual organization. Theda Skocpol argues that the state should be treated as an independent determinant of political outcome (Skocpol 1981, 156). She provides that states have "their own structures and histories, which in turn have their own impact upon society" (Skocpol 1981, 200). Surveying recent literature, Skocpol notes the resurgence of research focusing on the state as an actor (Skocpol 1985). Most importantly, she advocates the pursuit of "further comparative and historical investigations to develop middle-range generalization about the roles of states…and about the effects of states on political conflicts and agendas" (Skocpol 1985, 28).

For the most part, the debate as to whether the state has an independent impact upon political phenomenon is settled. As Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol note, "it is fruitful to assume *both* that states are potentially autonomous and, conversely, that socioeconomic relations influence and limit state structures and activities" (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985, x). The idea that the state can both facilitate political inquiry and affect political phenomenon is widely accepted (Almond 1988; Bendix *et al.* 1992; Mitchell 1991). The real challenge in researching the state, one Nettl largely ignores (Almond 1988, 856; Nettl 1968), is identifying and defining the concept in a sufficiently precise manner to allow for rigorous scientific investigation.

Defining the State

As previously discussed, the state is an important unit of analysis. As the state is at the very center of this inquiry, this "master noun of political discourse" (Geertz 1980, 121) must be more thoroughly discussed and, if possible, defined. Specifically, what is the state? What leads society to accept a state as legitimate? There is no easy definition.

David Held describes the state as a multi-dimensional phenomenon whose nature varies across time and space (Held *et al.* 1983, ix). In the original *Encyclopedia of Political Science*, George Sabine notes that the term state "denotes no class of objects that can be identified exactly, and for the same reason it signifies no list of attributes which ease the sanction of common usage."(Sabine 1934, 328) Initially, inquiries on the state were more philosophical in nature. In 1532, Niccolò Machiavelli (1995) conceptualized the state as a territorial sovereign government. Since, there has been a long history examining abstract concepts of the state, man's relation to the state, justice and equality (Hobbes 1651; Locke 1690; Mill 1859; Rousseau 1973). It was not until Karl Marx that a more empirical, or observationally based approach was made in attempts to characterize the state (Held 1983, 3).

The next few pages are going to examine various scholars and their approach to the state. As such, I will touch on the classics, such as Karl Marx and Max Weber. The influence of Marx and Marxist thinkers such as Gramsci and Poulantzas is examined. It soon becomes apparent that a Marxist approach is deficient in furthering our inquiry into state legitimacy. Thus, the focus of this study turns from Marx to Weber. Weber's

influence and applicability to Africa is carefully examined through various scholars who adopt a Weberian perspective in their analysis of the state.

Marx

Commenting on previous thinkers, Marx noted: "[M]an is not an abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the human world, the state, the society" (Marx 1970, 131). In other words, individuals only exist in relation to others and are defined through their relationships with others. Further, such a relationship can only be "properly explained in terms of its historically evolving interaction with other social phenomena – a dynamic and changing process of inextricably related elements" (Held 1983, 24).

Key to Marx's analysis was the emphasis on class structure in understanding the relations between people. Focused on the historical process, Marx notes that classes are a creation of history. Specifically, Marx argues that early tribal societies were classless because: "[T]here was no surplus of production and no private property; production was based upon communal resources and the fruits of productive activity were distributed through the community as a whole" (Held 1983, 24). Simply, class divisions arise when society generates a surplus of production. Surplus allows for one class of non-producers to live off the activity of those who produce: the worker.

Subsequently, the fall of feudal society and the rise of a market economy slowly led to the rise of the modern Western class divisions. Marx and Friedrich Engels (Marx and Engels 1930) argue that these divisions are based upon one dominant exploitative relationship between capitalists (those with capital) and those who only have their labor (e.g. wage-laborers) for sale (Giddens and Held 1982). In capitalist societies[1], the

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[1] "Societies are capitalist to the extent that they can be characterized as dominated by a mode of production

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majority of individuals are classified as workers, or wage-laborers. This relationship between capital and wage-laborer is at the very core of modern social and political structure.

Thus far, two key elements of Marxist thought, the importance of class structure and the relationships between classes, set the stage for Marx's view of the state. Marxist thought on the state are best illustrated in his work *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Marx 1963). *The Eighteenth Brumaire* analyzes the rise to power of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte between 1848 and 1852. In one of his most famous passages, Marx comments on the French state:

> "This executive power, with its enormous bureaucratic and military organization, with its ingenious state machinery, embracing wide strata, with a host of officials numbering half a million, beside an army of another half million, this appalling parasitic body which enmeshes the body of French society like a net and chokes all its pores." (Marx 1963, 121)

In his analysis, Marx grants the French state some autonomy. This immense set of institutions can help shape society and even limit the power of the capitalist. Specifically, Marx "suggests that the agents of the state do not simply coordinate political life in the interests of the dominant class of civil society...[the state] has the capacity to promote change, as well as coordinate it" (Held 1983, 27). Nevertheless, Marx's concept of the state was primarily that of a conservative force in favor of the status quo enlisting the support of its information networks and the coercive arm of the military and the police. Thus, the Marxist concept of the state was that of a superstructure serving the interest of the dominant class (e.g. the capitalist) at the expense of the worker.

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which extracts surplus from wage-workers in the form of surplus-value – the value generated by workers in the productive process over and above their wages, and appropriated by the owners of capital" David Held, "Introduction: Central Perspective on the Modern State," in *States and Societies*, ed. David Held, et al. (New York: New York University Press, 1983).

In sum, it can be argued that there are two strands of Marxist thought regarding the relation between the classes and the state: 1) the state operates with a certain degree of autonomy independent of class divisions, and 2) the state acts as a superstructure to serve the interests of the dominant class (Held 1983, 29). In the former position, the state can be viewed as a potential arena for struggle in the promotion of democratic change (Bernstein 1961). The problem with such approach is that Marx did not adequately develop his theory regarding the mechanisms of the state, such as determining how bureaucracies work.

It follows that Marx's conception of the state as a superstructure that serves the interest of the dominant class is the most widely discussed and developed of the two thoughts. Marx's combined writings indicate that the state is central to the control of class divided societies (Held 1983, 29). Further, many Marxist thinkers focused their analysis on the many complex and subtle ways dominant classes sustain power.

Gramsci

Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci sought to understand the means by which the capitalist class maintain power through the state (Gramsci 1975; Gramsci 1971). His ultimate goal was to uncover the conditions that would ultimately lead to the transformation of the state by the subordinate class (e.g. the workers) (Fontana 2002, 159).

In his analysis, Gramsci notes that the state is characterized by a hegemonic equilibrium constituted by a "combination of force and consent which are balanced in varying proportions, without force prevailing too greatly over consent" (Gramsci 1975, 1638). In other words, the capitalist state maintained control not just through coercion, but also ideologically through a hegemonic culture that promotes capitalist values.

Perversely, the working class identified with a hegemonic culture perpetuated by the capitalists, in turn helping to maintain the status quo of oppression.

Poulantzas

Nicos Poulantzas (1973) also followed Marx's conception of the state. While Gramsci sought to understand how the dominant class sustained power through the use of the state, Poulantzas was interested in exploring the mechanisms of the state. Poulantzas sought to understand the structural components of the state with the essential proposition that the state is the unifying element in capitalism. Specifically, the state must function to ensure the political organization of the dominant class as competitive pressures constantly pressured class based organization to fragment. More importantly, the state must ensure the political disorganization of the working classes which, because of their overwhelming numbers, can threaten the dominant class (Poulantzas 1973, 287-88).

Poulantzas further argued that the dominant classes, susceptible to fragmentation, need the state to protect their interests. In order to do this, the state needs to remain relatively autonomous of class interests in order to avoid appearances of impropriety or favoritism. Borrowing from Gramsci's notion of hegemony, Poulantzas argued that the state must not only repress the oppressed but obtain their consent.

Consent was achieved through a divide and conquer strategy. Specifically, the state facilitates class alliances to help the dominant group make an alliance with subordinate groups as a means of garnering consent to rule by the subordinate group (e.g. working class). Consequently, the dominant class undermines the worker's ability to effectively organize by 'co-opting' segments of the working population through these alliances. The resulting fragmentation of society is a defining characteristic of the capitalist state.

Notably, one of the problems with Poulantzas analysis of the state is that he fails to sufficiently define and differentiate the institutions that comprise the state. Specifically, he does not explain how institutions operate, nor does he examine how the varying class relationships operate (Held 1983, 33). By failing to address the concerns it is hard to understand exactly how the state is able to facilitate class alliances, fragmenting society in the process.

Critique of Marxist State Analysis

The Marxist view of the state is difficult to apply analytically. Most notably, Marxist thought appears to be less concerned with what constitutes a state (e.g. collection of institutions) than what a state does (e.g. tool of oppression). For a Marxist, the state is, to varying degrees, the instrument of the dominant class. The nature of the state is the outcome of existing class struggles.

In the present inquiry on state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa there are two particular problems with the Marxist view of the state (Chabal 1992, 71). First, the post-colonial state is not the result of a long standing class struggle. Rather, the post-colonial state is the result of the colonial state and the outcome of the decolonization process. Thus, the sub-Saharan state cannot simply be conceived in class terms. In Africa, the state was formed over existing economic structures.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, is the fact that classes in Africa are not easily identified. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz comment that "it is difficult to establish, other than in ideological terms, whether there are in Africa identifiable social classes with discrete and coherent political ambitions" (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 5). It is challenging to determine whether those elites do in fact constitute a *Marxist* class as they

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do not live off surplus generated by wage-laborers. Commenting on the absence of a capitalist economy in Africa, Hyden notes that "the assumption that there is a dominant class in power capable of ensuring the reproduction of capitalism must be seriously questioned" (Hyden 1983, 60). Thus, given the sub-Saharan context, a Marxist approach does not engender useful inquiry into the state, much less state legitimacy.

Weber

The German sociologist and political economist Max Weber provides a much more useful definition of the state. Contrary to Marxists, Weber resisted any attempt to label the state as parasitic and as a direct product of competition between classes (Held 1983, 34). Weber stressed the independence of the state.

Weber utilized the most significant definition of the modern state, emphasizing two distinct aspects of the state: territoriality and violence (Weber 1978, 904-07). According to Weber, the modern state is any set of structures that is capable of monopolizing the legitimate use of coercion within a given territory; it is a state in competition with other states rather than a class tool. The state safeguards the existing economic order and its economic interests in relation to other states. The institutions that comprise the state, most notably the bureaucracy, find ultimate sanction in the claim of monopoly of legitimate coercion. A state is vulnerable to crisis only if the monopoly erodes.

A key term in Weber's definition of the state is *legitimizing*. The term *legitimacy* is absolutely essential to Weber's definition of the state's claim to "the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory" (Weber 1958, 78). Essentially, the state operates within a given scope of territory; territory is a key attribute of the state.

The state has the sole right of using force within a well-defined geographical limit. More importantly, the state can only use *legitimate* force within such territory.

It follows that legitimate force and factors that make the monopoly of coercion non-legitimate must be examined. An important aspect of legitimacy is "the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed...every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is...obedience" (Weber 1978, 212). Thus, at the core of legitimacy is voluntary compliance. Given the importance of territory, a more complete definition of legitimacy would be voluntary compliance of a given group of people living within a specified territory. The failure of the state in attaining voluntary compliance results in illegitimacy.

Given the importance of voluntary compliance the next inquiry naturally concerns how the state garners voluntary compliance. Weber discusses different types of legitimate authority: charismatic, traditional and rational-legal. The oldest 'pure type' of legitimate authority rests on charismatic grounds. Charismatic authority rests on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person (Weber 1978, 212). These charismatic leaders are endowed with specifically exceptional powers or qualities believed by followers to be acquired through supernatural means (e.g. God given). It is the recognition of these exceptional powers by the charismatic ruler that results in an individual's consent to his rule. The consent could evaporate should the ruler appear to be deserted by his God or lose his powers and cease to benefit his followers (Weber 1978, 242).

A second type of legitimate authority rests on traditional grounds. Simply, consent to rule is based "on the established belief in the sanctity or immemorial traditions and the

legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority)" (Weber 1978, 215). Traditional leaders acquire consent by virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and powers (Weber 1978, 226). These rules are based primarily on personal loyalty. Obedience is given to the person who occupies the relevant position of power. Traditional authority is largely tied to tradition or custom. Should a leader attempt to circumscribe such tradition or custom, it is likely that he will lose voluntary compliance of his subjects.

Finally, legitimate authority can rest on rational-legal grounds. This type of authority can be referred to as legal authority. Legal authority rests "on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)" (Weber 1978, 215). At the center of this rational-legal state is the bureaucracy. Legitimacy is conferred to the state by the people when rules are followed rationally and in a way that is consistent with legal statute and accepted norms and procedures.

The next question becomes, from where do these rules derive? Simply, legal authority is obtained through the various bureaus or institutions that together comprise the state. Through Weber's lens, the inner workings of the state can be viewed as a particular order or configuration of institutions that create, promulgate, and enforce the rules and procedures of the state. Commenting on the Weberian state, Alfred Stepan notes that the state is comprised of the "continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and [the state] in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as

well" (Stepan 1978, xii). As such, there is little doubt state institutions are variably structured in different countries, but their function remains the same.

In sum, one can conceive of the Weberian state as comprised of two key elements. First, it is the monopolization of legitimate coercion within a given *territory*. The state seeks to monopolize coercion within a given territory through the use of various institutions exercising a monopoly of authority (e.g. courts), whether autonomously or through the joint operation of governmental and societal actors (Bendix *et al.* 1992, 1013). Territory that does not fall under bureaucratic jurisdiction is not considered part of the state.

Second, and most importantly, the state is the monopoly of *legitimate* coercion. Legitimacy, as defined by Weber, is voluntary obedience of the individual to the state. Historically, such obedience can rest on three pure types of legitimation: charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal. Legitimacy in the modern state rests primarily in individual acceptance of rational-legal bureaucratic rules. In other words, the legitimacy of the modern state relies upon an individuals "belief in the validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' based on rationally created *rules*" (Weber 1958, 79).

Given a Weberian framework, it is absolutely essential for individuals to consent to the rule of the state. Theoretically, it is conceivable that in a given state there are two variants of pure types of legitimation. Thus, consent to rule can be given to the state on both traditional and rational-legal grounds, or perhaps a mix of charismatic and rational-legal.

Africanists and the State

Before proceeding further with the discussion on legitimacy, it is important to examine how Africanists, whether explicitly or implicitly, define the state in their inquiry into political phenomenon. Some Africanists explicitly adopt the notion of a Weberian State. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, for instance, "begin by considering the contemporary concept of state as it is universally used, with its implicit point of reference in the Western nation-state" (Young and Turner 1985, 7). Others, such as Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg are more implicit when referring to the European template in Africa. Specifically, they observe the following: "[I]n general, personal regimes may be thought of as typical of transitional periods, when one institutional order has broken down and another is yet to replace it" (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 5).

Jackson and Rosberg observe that most modern African states lack meaningful empirical presence in many parts of their territory (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). In other words, the institutional configurations that comprise the state are, for the most part, lacking. Jackson and Rosberg acknowledge that African states meet the legal requirements of statehood as set by the international community; states display all the outward ceremonial juridical attributes. Nevertheless, the authors take their examination of the state one step further.

Jackson and Rosberg examine whether African states have the necessary institutions to effectively monopolize the use of coercion within a given territory. This is important for examining whether institutions that comprise the state exercise effective monopoly of coercion in sub-Saharan Africa. Here, unlike preceding scholars, they pay attention to the Weberian definition of state. The authors conclude that most African states lack the

necessary institutional order, thus necessary capacity, to effectively monopolize the coercion of force over their juridical territories (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 22). Notably, they are less concerned at this point with legitimacy than a state's capacity to effectively monopolize coercion within a given scope of territory.

Conversely, John Lonsdale is less concerned with monopoly of coercion over a given territory than he is with state legitimacy, or what he refers to as political accountability (Lonsdale 1986). He posits that "the idea of accountability seems noticeable for its comparative absence from the field of African studies...because it is a difficult concept to use" (Lonsdale 1986, 127). Lonsdale notes that historically African leaders have been unable to rely entirely on force to effectively control their population. A large part of the African experience involves the use of persuasion. Specifically, big men need to persuade individuals to act according to their wishes.

Lonsdale points out that a leader is aware that consistent use of power undermines his rule. As leaders recognize: "[F]orce is external...expensive. It generates resistance, resignation or evasion" (Lonsdale 1986, 134). Consequently, the abuse of power has led to individuals who "have generally bent all their ingenuity to the evasion of power" (Lonsdale 1986, 128). Thus, to prevent individuals from ignoring their leaders entirely or from simply agreeing and proceeding regardless of edict, rulers aspire for legitimacy, or willing obedience to their rule.

According to Lonsdale, African state building greatly involves the development of participant political communities, which are communities in which individual actively participate. In this context, rulers continually struggle to find grounds for legitimation of their rule, and the success in their quest for legitimacy has varied. To this end, Lonsdale

argues that legitimacy is too important a concept to simply discard as difficult to conceptualize.

Like Lonsdale, Basil Davidson and F. K. Buah observes that Africa has a rich and varied tradition of legitimate authority and institutional innovation (Davidson and Buah 1977). According to Davidson, one of the central problems with modern Africa is the underlying illegitimacy of the state. Davidson argues that colonialism intentionally undermined what Weber would label traditional authority in attempts to thrust Africa into the modern world. Colonialism taught "that nothing useful could develop without denying Africa's past, without a ruthless severing from Africa's roots and a slavish acceptance of models drawn from entirely different histories" (Davidson 1992, 42). In doing so, colonial powers destroyed the very bed on which legitimacy rested. Consequently, vast numbers of individuals became disconnected from new colonial elites who have no historical ground of legitimacy in their claim for willing obedience of their subjects. Thus, for Davidson (1992), as with Lonsdale (1986), legitimacy is at the heart of his analysis of the state.

Unlike Lonsdale and Davidson, Crawford Young (1994) is less interested in defining or exploring legitimacy as he is in defining the state. Relying on Kenneth Dyson (1980), Young identifies two necessary dimensions of the state in his definition: 1) the state as a conceptual object identified through crucial attributes, and 2) the state as an actor grasped "in terms of a half-dozen behavioral imperatives that guide its action" (Young 1994, 26).

Young focuses his analysis on the imperatives of the state rather than its crucial attributes (e.g. territory, population). Young argues that the state, as agent, is motivated by the following six imperatives: hegemony, autonomy, security, legitimacy, revenue,

and accumulation. By hegemony, he refers to the state's struggle in ensuring the supremacy of its authority. Autonomy refers to the fact that "no intrusion on the national domain can be tolerated, nor can another state be permitted to assert its jurisdiction within state territory" (Young 1994, 36). Security looks primarily at public safety with the territory while legitimacy involves the "habitual acquiescence in and consent to its rule" (Young 1994, 37). The revenue imperative is the "history of the evolution of the state… [as it] enhances the ability of rulers to elaborate the institutions of the state…and to increase the number and variety of collective goods provided through the state" (Levi 1988, 1-2). Finally, accumulation focuses on expanding the state's economic base, from which the state derives its revenue (Young 1994, 39).

Young breaks from a more Weberian focus on legitimacy and concentrates on the accumulation imperative. Young contends that "for the many developing states, especially the African set…the current dilemma of polity management in many ways hinges on the accumulation imperative" (Young 1994, 40). He explains that the primary weakness of the African state rests on its inability to "foster accumulation through the state, to find domestic private substitutes for the state, or to secure external finance other than to facilitate reimbursement of its gigantic debt" (Young 1994, 40). With this concept of the state in mind, Young delves into his analysis of the African colonial state vis-à-vis other colonial states (e.g. Vietnam).

In his state analysis on the accumulation imperative, Young notes that these imperatives always operate in interaction (Young, 1994, 40). This dynamic is problematic as there is an arguably sequential order to these imperatives. Specifically, for a state to accumulate resources it must first have the ability to extract revenue. Without revenue, it is unlikely

that a state can sustain the requisite institutions to facilitate accumulation. More fundamentally, the state must be legitimate in order for it to extract effectively. Individuals must be willing to give a percentage of their income to the state on some ground of legitimation.

Young also notes that hegemony is one of the driving imperatives of the state. According to Young, it is difficult to conceive that a state can achieve a high degree of hegemony without first attaining legitimacy. Specifically, all "states are continuously engaged in a struggle to ensure the supremacy of their authority... [and] will not brook direct affronts from segments of society to their right to rule" (Young 1994, 35). Accordingly, it appears reasonable to argue that such direct affronts are unlikely to occur in a legitimate state, one in which individuals willingly acquiesce to the rules of the state.

Ultimately, Young argues that the African state is the product of a colonial legacy that sought to emphasize coercive and extractive properties in order to satisfy the accumulation imperative. He believes that the African state must be seen as a free-standing entity; one in which the "completeness of its domination freed the state from responsiveness to its subjects to a remarkable degree" (Young 1994, 159). The question becomes, can such a dominating state, one no longer subject to its population, still be considered a state? Given the importance of legitimacy, it is unlikely that Weber, Lonsdale or Davidson would characterize such a set of institutions as a *legitimate* state. Further given the decline in revenues and continuing marginalization of African states from the world economy (van de Walle 2001, 5), it does not appear that such a strategy, if in fact employed, has been very successful.

Mahmood Mamdani furthers the discussion through the examination of the legacy of

the colonial state (Mamdani 1996). Analyzing the impact of colonial rule in Uganda and

South Africa, Mamdani comments that the African colonial experience:

> "...came to be crystallized in the nature of the state forged through that
> encounter...it contained a duality: two forms of power under a single
> hegemonic authority...Civil power claimed to protect rights [in urban
> areas], customary power pledged to enforce tradition [in rural areas]"
> (Mamdani 1996, 18)

This is how the term Janus-faced or bifurcated state developed. Through Mamdani's

lens, colonial authority sought to rule Africa more along urban-rural than inter-ethnic

divisions.

In essence, the modern African state rests on two grounds of legitimation. First, the

state is legitimized through traditional grounds in rural areas. Colonial powers, through

indirect rule, would grant historical African chiefs the authority to rule according to

traditional authority. Mamdani notes that "it was about incorporating natives into state-

enforced customary order" (Mamdani 1996, 18). Specifically, African chiefs and leaders

sought to preserve whatever privilege they could by accepting for better or worse

positions offered them within the colonial administration while learning to manipulate it

for their own benefit (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988, 203). Perversely, this very act of

collaborating with colonial authority undermines their traditional legitimacy as the chiefs'

authority no longer depended on willing acceptance from their subjects. Rather, the

chiefs' power depended heavily on threat of force from an external colonial power

(Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988, 93).

Second, urban authority attempts to rest on rational-legal grounds. Colonial powers

attempted to directly impose rational-legal rules on individuals directly within the sphere

of control (e.g. urban areas). While rural authority aimed to keep power decentralized, urban authority was organized "around the principle of fusion to ensure a unitary authority" (Mamdani 1996, 18). Thus, the challenge of the modern state, according to Mamdani, is discovering a way to bridge this bifurcated power. This is no easy task as Mamdani argues that strengthening one is likely to weaken the other.

Jeffrey Herbst shifts the focus from colonial legacy to control over defined territory (Herbst 2000). Immediately, he begins by asserting that "states are long viable if they are able to control the territory defined by their borders" (Herbst 2000, 3). According to Herbst, the fundamental problem of the African state today lies in the projection of authority "over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people" (Herbst 2000, 11). From his analysis, one can understand how the urban ruler's inability to project power outside of the capital led to Mamdani's bifurcated state. As power projection is cost prohibitive, it is far more cost efficient to rely on more indirect means of controlling rural populations (Herbst 2000, 89).[2]

Herbst, perhaps unintentionally, modifies the Weberian definition of state in an African context. The state remains the monopolization of legitimate coercion, but traditional African states were more concerned with exerting authority over people than territory (Herbst 2000, 36). From this definition, it is reasonable to expect that given the African context, the *legitimacy* aspect of state definition gains additional importance. Specifically, controlling people, as opposed to land, cannot occur without consent of those being ruled.

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[2] Notably, there is great variation in the historical African experience. Beyond the Asante T. C. McCaskie, *State and Society in Pre-Colonial Asante, African Studies Series ; 79.* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995)., the historical empires of Ghana, Kongo, Songhau and Kanem-Bornu, just to name a few, did extend their control over vast amounts of territory - Philip D. Curtin et al., *African History,* 2nd ed. (London ; New York: Longman, 1995)., something that Herbst does not address.

Herbst also notes that "the combination of large amounts of open land and rain-fed agriculture meant that, in pre-Colonial Africa, control of territory was often not contested because it was often easier to escape from rules than to fight them" (Herbst 2000, 39). Simply, if traditional chiefs extended beyond the bounds of traditional authority, it was not uncommon for individuals to simply abandon the village or move under the control of a legitimate chief; the chiefs were thus subject to popular consent (Asiwaju 1976; Skinner 1964). In sum, legitimacy, or an individual's consent to being ruled, appears to be the defining attribute of the historical African state.

Catherine Boone further adds to the literature on the state by shedding light on the complexities of urban-rural relations in Africa (Boone 2003). Specifically, she examines strategies available to the center in attempts to govern the periphery. In her analysis, Boone highlights several key features of rural society that fundamentally shape a state's attempt to further project its authority over rural areas. The key features are the production of cash crops, the existence of a rural social hierarchy, and elite dependence on the resources of the central state (Boone 2003, 37). For example, if a rural area does not produce any cash crop the center is likely to forgo attempts at incorporation. If a rural area produces important cash crops (e.g. cocoa), then the center must determine whether it must consult with an existing authority or hierarchical structure. Again, available strategies for incorporating rural segments appear directly tied to those three structural features of any one given rural area.

Relevant to the present discussion on the definition of the state, Evans Lieberman examines one particularly coercive instrument of the state: taxation (Lieberman 2003). Taxation is such an integral part of coercion that Douglass North narrows Weber's

definition, noting that the state is "an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax constituents" (North 1981, 21). Accordingly, state boundaries end where the state can no longer tax its constituents.

Taxation is one of the most visible and immediately felt consequences of a state's ability to effectively coerce its population. According to Lieberman, the "power of the states to tax varies widely across countries" (Lieberman 2003, 6). In his study, Lieberman seeks to understand the varying ways individuals respond to a state's attempt at taxation. He observes in some states, individuals appear to spend a lot of time filling out requisite paper work and maintaining records of their tax filings.

In other states, attempts at taxation seem to fall on deaf ears. Importantly, Lieberman suggests that "the inability of a state to generate significant revenues through taxation is often a precursor to state failure or even collapse" (Lieberman 2003, 6). Specifically, Lieberman illustrates how different institutional configurations affect a state's ability to collect tax payments. Although particularly concerned as to the conditions under which the country's elites avoid paying taxes, Lieberman notes that more regional (e.g. federal) institutional arrangements are overall likely to lead to a more adversarial tax state, one in which the state finds collecting tax payments difficult. Specifically, regional allegiances act as obstacles to a sense of greater national unity. In Weberian terms, the legitimacy of the state is fragmented. Individual consent to the state is stronger towards regional institutional authority than it is to central institutional authority.

Ultimately, Lieberman illustrates that the state is not fully autonomous because "it is subject to serious political and economic constraints" (Lieberman 2003, 40). It cannot

simply act on its own. The health of the state, regardless of its grounds of legitimation, depends primarily on its varying degree of legitimacy. The more individuals willingly consent to the rules (e.g. request for tax payments) of the state, the more effectively the state can monopolize coercion over a given territory. Coercion without consent is likely to be expensive and "relatively ineffective in the wake of extensive avoidance and evasion schemes" (Lieberman 2003, 40).

The State: A Summary

It is clear that the state is an important variable when inquiring into political phenomenon and Africa is no exception. William Munro notes that "the state is pivotal to the political future of African countries…some institutional form and organization exists which calls itself, and is recognized as, the state" (Munro 1996, 113). The state is the dominant structure on the continent and as such, it cannot be ignored (Englebert 2000). As discussed earlier, the state is the monopoly of *legitimate* coercion within a given *territory*. The foregoing summary review of some of the literature clearly indicates that there cannot be a state without legitimacy. Legitimacy might reside or be found in different grounds of legitimation, but in a continent where control of people is at a premium (Herbst 2000), consent to rule is a pre-requisite.

The modern state bases its legitimacy on rational-legal rules. Thus, it is important to examine whether individuals consent to or abide by rules issued through the various institutions that comprise the modern state. A state's attempt to monopolize coercion is found in the set of institutions that lay claim to command over any given territory (e.g. the police, the courts and the military). The extent to which these institutions can effectively monopolize coercion is directly related to their legitimacy, or the individual's

willingness to obey. Thus it stands to reason that understanding what, if any, source helps facilitate such willingness to obey is important in the context of helping the state to solidify and eventually expand its monopoly of *legitimate* coercion to the periphery, with hopes of extending control over all its people. However, as seen in the following section, legitimacy constitutes more than the amalgamation of institutions that comprise the state. Legitimacy can also be thought of as an idea.

Legitimacy as an Idea

Legitimacy is a normative concept. David Easton argues that when basic political attachment to the state becomes deeply rooted or institutionalized, the system is accepted as legitimate by the population (Easton 1957, 399). This attachment is based on the 'system' meeting the population's demands. Easton does not provide any testable theory, but his conceptual scheme does make us think about how the state responds to the demands of the people. His insight points to the state's need to generate and maintain a sufficient degree of support[3] in order to remain legitimate.

Symbols are an effective means of generating sufficient support. Robert Jackman views legitimacy as a phenomenon generated by regimes through the ideological appeals of symbols; appeals designed to engender consent among the governed (Jackman 1993, 97). The link between state and citizenry is at the very heart of the idea of legitimacy. Successful states are able to convince the citizenry that it is the rightful authority. Many scholars have pointed toward the central necessity of legitimacy as an idea.

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[3] Easton (1975) differentiates between specific and diffuse support. Diffuse support tends to be more durable than specific support. Specific support is directed towards political authorities and authoritative institutions (1975, 439).

Young (1994) talks about the state as an idea. The state is the "ensemble of affective orientations, images, and expectations imprinted on the mind of its subjects" (Young 1994, 33). He refers to Murray Edelman (1988; 1964), who views the state as involving a political performance to hide the inequalities and exploitation that the state reinforces through its structures. From there, Young refers to the imperatives of the state, that set of determinants that guide state actions: hegemony, autonomy, security, legitimacy, revenue and accumulation (Young 1994, 34).

As discussed earlier, the legitimacy imperative is a component of the idea of a state (Young 1994, 37). Young suggests that Weber places legitimacy at the core of the notion of state by noting, "absent this property, the state is in a condition of extreme vulnerability" (Young 1994, 37). As valuable as the state's ability to coerce might be, it is often in short supply and tends to undermine the state with over usage. According to Young, the state must seek to invest its structures, or institutions, with legitimacy through habitual consent to its rule. This idea of legitimacy is consistent with Michael Schatzberg's argument that legitimacy in Africa rests on the normative idea that government stands in the same relationship to its citizens that a father does to his children (2001). The father/child idea is a theme that seeks to invest legitimacy into the structures of the state while minimizing the use of coercion.

Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar further the idea of the state's prominent role in state legitimacy (2004). They view the use of the spiritual realm as an important force in legitimizing the state. This link between state legitimacy and the spiritual realm is bi-directional (Ellis and Haar 2004, Chapter 5). The spiritual realm can serve to legitimize the state. Conversely, an illegitimate state attempting to garner legitimacy through the

spiritual realm risks de-legitimizing the spiritual realm in the process. Ellis and ter Haar's emphasis on legitimacy as an idea illustrates the importance of this concept.

Moreover, the concept of legitimacy as an idea is important in the context of scarcity. African state bureaucratic structures are often very limited in capacity, in turn diminishing their ability to effectively coerce the population. As an example, Peter Evans examines the bureaucracy of Zaire (1995). Every indicator of bureaucratic capacity suggests the set of Zairian institutions are limited in their ability to coerce the population. Those institutions lack trained technocrats following standardized procedures whose positions are not based on the whims of immediate supervisors. In effect, the public administration in Zaire is thoroughly neopatrimonial, with every indicator of bureaucratization (e.g. specialization, technocrats with regularly observed procedures, etc...) at an extremely low level (Joseph 1999, 68).

Evans further examines Zaire's infrastructure capacity. Here, it is apparent that the Zairian administration is largely unable to penetrate society and implement its decisions. Regions act autonomously of the center, ignoring rules or edicts that are of little to no relevance to them (Callaghy 1984). Evans concludes that the state directed its energies to preventing the emergence of social groups that might have an interest in its transformation. However, if the state lacks the capacity to implement its program or the bureaucratic capacity to formulate it in the first place, this claim is empirically implausible. Many African states are simply too limited in their capacity to rely on their structures.

A prime example of such limited capacity is Uganda under President Milton Obote (Obote). Though coercive tactics might have been appealing to Obote in dealing with the

Buganda[4], he lacked the military capacity to control society (Rothchild 1986, 82). Through what Rothchild terms a process of hegemonic exchange, Obote resorted to dealing with the village ambassadors who each jockeyed for their own interests (Rothchild 1986, 77). Obote was not the exception to the rule. Bargaining skills became a necessity of African regimes because of their inability to impose terms over semi-autonomous peripheral authority (Rothchild 1986, 83).

Thus, given the states' weak institutional capacity, it behooves any state to increase its legitimacy without the actual use of coercion. Creating the idea of legitimacy becomes of marked importance, one not lost among African leaders. The idea of the state "allows its institutions to penetrate the conscience of its citizens and to provide the frame in which they represent themselves as citizens in a political community" (Englebert 2000, 74).

Legitimacy as both Structure and Idea

Thus, a state possesses a twofold nature: first as an idea and second as a set of concrete structures that monopolize legitimate violence over a given territory. For a state to be legitimate it must be the sole instrument of coercion or violence within a given territory and, *critically*, its citizens must accept it as an idea. The monopolization of coercion alone is insufficient in providing a state with legitimacy. To be fully legitimate, a state must earn acceptance from its people.

William Reno (1998) illustrates an illegitimate Liberia under former President Charles Taylor (Taylor). Taylor arguably monopolized coercion over a defined territory but was not interested in creating the idea of legitimacy through obtaining people's acceptance of

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[4] Obote was the leader of Uganda in the late 70s and in the early 80s following Idi Amin. The Buganda are a storied historical Kingdom within Uganda.

his rule. Realizing in part that the accumulation of legitimacy is time consuming given the costs and potential benefits, it appears that Taylor most likely decided against investing in the idea of legitimacy in order to attain his goal.

Further, Goran Hyden describes the African state as a balloon "suspended in 'mid-air' over society and is not an integral mechanism of the day-to-day productive activities of society" (Hyden 1983, 7). Such a state leaves individuals with little option but to disengage. Based on this balloon analogy, a state seeking legitimacy wants to be grounded and connected to those it seeks to rule. On the other hand, Taylor was content in allowing his particular set of institutions to float above society, like a balloon, completely disconnected from society at large. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that leadership, whether charismatic, traditional or bureaucratic, must spend resources in maintaining the idea of legitimacy through its various institutions.

One must remember a few things when discussing legitimacy. Legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing proposition (Jackman 1993, 108). All states employ violence on their citizens to various degrees. The less extreme form of coercion might include state's restrictions on certain political activities (e.g. limiting the route of a Klu Klux Klan demonstration). In some cases, state coercion can extend to the banning of political parties. Jackman notes that states can increase the severity of official coercion through one of two ways: 1) instead of employing tactics sporadically, states may begin to apply these more systematically and continuously, and 2) the state may begin inflicting higher levels of physical harm towards those challenging its claims of legitimate coercion (Jackman 1993, 110). Among the most extreme forms of use of state coercion might include the widespread political executions of individuals who dissent with the state, or employment

of the use of deadly (e.g. military) force to enforce bans on public demonstration (e.g. 1989 Chinese repression of a series of demonstrations at Tiananmen square using People's Liberation Army (Murray 1990)).

Furthermore, few states can be considered completely legitimate. All states must "strive instead for a working consensus on procedures, a consensus they seek to engender among politically relevant groups" (Jackman 1993, 108). Thus, legitimacy is often a matter of degrees. Not all states are able to garner equal amounts of willing compliance from their population. On one extreme end, compliance is less a matter of choice than a matter of life in North Korea (Garrett and Glaser 1995; Oh and Hassig 2003). In this example, failing to comply with the state is likely to result in loss of life. As such, it is likely that such an oppressive state that relies on a fraction of its population enjoys low levels of legitimacy, or willing consent to its rule.

With respect to the United States, it is reasonable to argue that the majority of the population consents to the various rules and regulations of the state. The September 11th terrorist attacks (Schmemann 2001) on the United States resulted in long security lines at airports to which individuals willingly subjugate themselves. This is a visible example of tacit consent to the rules of the state. Yet, one cannot ignore the possibility that domestic disturbances may arise as a result of established rules such as the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 (Wood 2002). Here, a riot erupted in Los Angeles after one segment of the population perceived the illegitimate use of force by the police department. Such riots and the necessary [excessive] force needed to restore peace under the circumstances demonstrate that, to some degree, the state can generate opposition to rules that are not fully accepted, or legitimated, by a certain segment of its population at any point in time.

It is counter-productive to view illegitimacy as an absolute value. Jackman convincingly argues that "it is more useful to conceive of legitimacy in continuous terms..." (1993, 108). Each state gains and loses legitimacy. Eventually, there is a point in which insufficient legitimacy remains and the state collapses. Such a collapse results in a failed state, one that is unable to monopolize the legitimate coercion of force over a given territory.

Somalia is an illustration of such a failed state. Specifically, no one set of institutions legitimately monopolizes coercion over the defined territory of Somalia. Rather, Somalia is characterized by clan-based violence (Adam 1995). As such, there are competing clan based warlord factions that might[5], or might not, seek to monopolize coercion over a given territory (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 16). The question then becomes, how do apparently illegitimate states survive? The answer might simply be that legitimacy exists though it is likely to be found outside formal state institutions

As previously discussed, it is important to note that legitimacy can rest on other than rational-legal grounds (Weber 1958, 78-79). Rational-legal grounds of legitimation deal essentially with formal rules. Yet, it is quite possible that legitimacy can be found in informal political institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Because informal institutions are not always apparent, they are typically ignored altogether or spoken of only in general terms. Informal institutions provide a sense of stability – equilibrium – that are lacking with formal institutions (Hyden 2006). For example, an informal, as opposed to formal (e.g. voting) means of political participation might be found in kinship associations or

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[5] Somaliland, in NW Somalia, is an example of a territory in which clans have set aside differences and begun to establish a set of institutions that legitimately control the monopoly of force over a given territory (Somaliland) Patrick Gilkes, "Briefing: Somalia," *African Affairs* 98, no. 393 (1999).

other traditional political units (Chazan 1982, 173). These groups have in common "an adherence to patterns of authority established by traditional or revised custom, a commitment to a primordial tie – be it ethnic, cultural or geographic – and some perception of a commonality of goals and interests" (Chazan 1982, 174). In Weberian terms, the rules of these formal institutions are widely accepted, or legitimated, based on traditional grounds or "the established belief in the sanctity or immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority)" (Weber 1978, 215). Next, it is important to review the dimensions of legitimacy.

Dimensions of Legitimacy

For purposes of this inquiry, previous discussion results in the following definition of legitimacy: *an individual's willing consent to the rules of the state.* Thus, a legitimate state is one in which its constituents willingly obey its mandates. A state expressing higher levels of legitimacy, one that garners willing obedience from the majority of its population, relies less on coercion and enjoys more willing compliance on the part of its people. Yet, the concept of legitimacy is not one-dimensional. One can conceive of two dimensions of legitimacy: vertical and horizontal. Although this inquiry focuses primarily on the vertical dimension of legitimacy, it is important that both be understood.

Horizontal Legitimacy

According to Englebert, horizontal legitimacy refers to whether the people who live within a given territory consider themselves part of a community (Englebert 2000). In Africa, this can be problematic as most states inherited their borders with little concern for established communities. Such problem of "congruence, or horizontal legitimacy, comes from the fact that African societies were often politically defined before the

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creation of the colonial state and that these existing politics...did not usually provide the social foundation for modern independent African states" (Englebert 2000, 85).

As a result of the colonialization process, these communities were united under a new state. These new states did not necessarily share a common identity or view themselves as part of an overarching community. The greater the number of pre-existing communities, the less agreement one can "expect to find as to what constitutes a community that lies at the foundation of the state, thus the less horizontally legitimate the current state" (Englebert 2000, 88).

Jackson and Rosberg focused on horizontal legitimacy in their discussion on the salience of divided communities whose members resided in two or more countries (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). They note that "[o]nly rarely did a colonial territory reflect the shape and identity of preexisting African socio-political boundary..." (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 14). William Miles refers to the divided communities Jackson and Rosberg discussed. Specifically, Miles described how the colonial boundaries in the Sahel divided the Hausa people between the states of Niger and Nigeria (Miles 1994). Miles observed that such a division "had a deep impact on each side of the border" (Villalâon 1998, 24). It is thus reasonable to argue that one such impact is the effect of a divided community on horizontal legitimacy.

Vertical Legitimacy

Whereas a truly legitimate state will enjoy both horizontal and vertical legitimacy, this inquiry focuses on vertical legitimacy. Vertical legitimacy generally refers to the people's acknowledgment of a state's right to rule. Jackman suggests that a state "is thus legitimate to the extent that it can induce a measure of compliance from most people

without resort to the use of physical force" (1993, 98). As such, vertical legitimacy is the degree of citizens' acceptance of the political order given the known or feasible alternatives (Jackman 1993, 99). The question becomes, do Africans willingly grant the right to rule to the modern state or do they look elsewhere?

A cursory look into pre-colonial Africa will quickly show that modern political structures of power bear little resemblance to pre-colonial ones. Basil Davidson clearly explains how independence did not result in a return to historicity (Davidson 1992). According to Davidson, independence represented a marked change of political authority as the new African elites acquired the structures of colonial power. Further, Bertrand Badie goes to great length discussing how imported colonial state structures lost "their function, that is, their effectiveness and their power..." (Badie 2000, 131).

New African elites chose to forgo their pre-colonial institutional past, indeed often tried to repress it. Elliot Skinner does a wonderful job illustrating this point when discussing the new elites of Upper Volta who sought to repress and de-legitimize true historical authority represented by the traditional leader, the Mogho Naba (Skinner 1964). This rejection of the past served to severely strain the links between state and citizen.

For the most part, the modern state experiment failed to connect with the citizen. One possible explanation might be that the peasants never participated in the process of state creation. Barrington Moore (1966, 480) argues that peasants supply the dynamite to bring down the old state, necessary for reconstruction of the new. If that is the case, this political process rarely, if ever, took place in Africa.

Some exceptions might be considered, such as the guerilla movements against white settler states. After the Rhodesian parliament issued a Unilateral Declaration of

Independence assuring minority white rule in 1965, guerrillas belonging to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) began rebelling against the state (Lan 1985, 3). Such rebellion arguably involves a case where rural peasants sought to bring dynamite to the existing state and create a new institutional order. Yet, most guerrilla movements since independence[6] appear less concerned with abolishing the state – particular configuration of institutions that legitimately monopolize coercion over a given territory – than replacing one regime, or set of rules, with another (Clapham 1998, 4).

Besides lack of involvement in the process of state creation, other reasons might explain why the modern state in Africa occasionally fails to connect with its population. According to Tilly, European state formation involved competition between states (Tilly 1975). Yet, the European process Tilly defined was an endogenous one, while the African process of state making during independence was highly exogenous, or externally imposed by colonial powers. Hendrik Spruyt posits that as states modernize, they destroy competing structures (Spruyt 1994, 155). This process occurs mainly through what he terms Darwinian selection by war (Id.). Essentially, stronger competing structures dominate those less able to defend themselves. This process rarely occurred in post-colonial Africa.

Barrington Moore describes the process of modernization as a revolutionary break with the past (Moore 1966). Moore mainly focuses on economic classes and their interaction with each other and the state. He concludes that there are three roads to modernization: 1) bourgeois revolution (e.g. France), 2) by way of authoritarian regime that promotes the

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[6] One notable exception has been Eritrea. Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia following a thirty-year war which lasted from 1961 to 1991 (http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-37674/Eritrea) last accessed 26 Feb 2007.

interests of the landlords and industrialists (e.g. Germany), and 3) a peasant revolution that destroys the landlords, and then leads to a Communist dictatorship (e.g. China) (Femia 1972, 22). In each case, a radically new set of institutional structures emerged.

Given the African context, such roads to modernization are unlikely. First, as previously discussed, there is little evidence of class structure in Africa (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 5). Second, Africa has a relatively weak history of land owning elites. Historically, along with the lack of privatization, there was a relatively equal distribution of land. Land distribution was aimed at preventing its accumulation in the hands of a few privileged individuals (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988, 117-20). Given the lack of class structure and privatization of land, it is unlikely that Africa could follow any of the roads of modernization Moore described. Consequently, Moore's notion of state building is inappropriate in Africa.

Moreover, Tilly and Spruyt's ideas on state formation are highly endogenous in nature. As states competed against one another, the process of modernization took place internally. That is to say, as internal capacity increased, states grew more competitive and successfully expanded outward. Conversely, the modern African state is one of foreign imposition, comprised of "exogenous institutions, superimposed over preexisting political structures and inherited by domestic but westernized elites at independence (Whitaker 1991; Badie 1992; Davidson 1992; Young 1994)" (Englebert 2000, 74). In the example of the Mogho Naba, the competition was between traditional authority and new elites whose power derived from the colonial process and the support of foreign states. To ensure victory of the chosen elites in Upper Volta, the French military aided the new president in his attempt to repress traditional authority.

The African state is the product of foreign powers, abandoned at independence, in turn adopted by new elites as a means of controlling distinct communities in newly juridically defined territories. Essentially, the issue of vertical legitimacy becomes "a problem of clashing and mismatched institutions, contested sovereignty, and disputed allegiance" (Englebert 2000, 79).

It is thus vertical structural congruence or the compatibility between state structures and the preferences of citizens that is the focus of this inquiry. Specifically, are individuals willing to accept the rule and authority of the state? A state can continually coerce to the extent of its capacity, but it is not until that people view it as legitimate, that is, accept its authority, that it can begin a developmental process.

Furthermore, it is possible that, if the modern state fails to deliver sufficient levels of security (through the monopoly of coercion), then individuals will turn to traditional or alternative structures of authority. This does not necessarily mean that all individuals want to revert to historical institutions of power. This is simply to say that unless the state connects vertically with the people, it will continue to whither until it becomes little more than a private good at the hands of a few elites. Alternatively, a state lacking vertical structural congruence might wither to the point of collapse as people simply start ignoring it completely.

Finally, Max Weber observes that legitimacy can develop over time through what he terms customs. Weber defines custom to mean "a typically uniform activity which is kept on the beaten track simply because men are 'accustomed' to it and persist [through time] in it by unreflective imitation" (Weber 1978, 319). The longer the state survives, the more chances it has to prove itself, develop, and gain the consent of its people to rule

them. As such, the modern state is but decades old, while more traditional structures are centuries old. It is important to note that Europe took centuries to modernize whereas African states have enjoyed less than 50 years of independence. Nevertheless, understanding that one cannot resurrect the past or necessarily desire the past, it remains to be seen how structural congruence can be developed between states and citizens in the African context.

Distinguishing Objects to which Citizens may Attach Legitimacy

As previously discussed, the state is both an idea about legitimate authority and a set of concrete structures that legitimately monopolize the use of force. Pippa Norris considers mass political support multi-dimensional in nature (1999). She refers to Easton (1965; 1975) who "distinguishes between support for the community, the regime and the authorities" (Norris 1999, 9). Norris suggests that these distinctions provide an essential starting point. This is important to consider when discussing legitimacy.

Legitimacy attaches to any one of four levels: the state, the regime, the government and its leaders. The citizens might view one level as more legitimate than another, but it is important to understand what is being measured. For example, Bratton et al. (2000) mention that the Tuareg minority accepted the legitimacy of the Malian state, less so the military than other institutions. In their attempt to distinguish among state institutions, they are able to measure perceptions of legitimacy as they relate to the state and its institutions as opposed to any one leader or the current regime. In order to ensure precision, it is important to examine the different levels to which legitimacy can attach itself.

As previously discussed, the state can be thought of as a skeleton, a set of formal institutions that outlasts the ebb and flow of political regimes. It is the particular set of institutions that claim the monopoly of legitimate coercion over a given territory. Whether or not it succeeds is an empirical question, thereby allowing the researcher to distinguish between strong and weak states. Although states do disappear through conquest, violence or disintegration, they are generally permanent entities (Young 1994). The state is comprised of the structures that permit the regime to operate accordingly.

The regime is the set of rules that dictates who can participate and how participation takes place. Given this definition, one can conceive of a regime transition as "a shift from one set of political procedures to another, from an old pattern of rule to a new one" (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 10). Regime capacity and legitimacy are directly related to state legitimacy and capacity. Without legitimate institutions, both as an idea and as structure, the regime cannot effectively operate. The regime develops its own logic, "whose ultimate aim is the reproduction over time of its particular configuration of institutional arrangements and dominant ideas" (Young 1994, 41). Within any given regime, a government exists.

Government refers to the set of office holders who compete for and hold office for a limited time period defined in the rules of the political game. They are the group of people who make decisions in the name of the state. In a democracy, governments come and go, but the rules, or the regime, remain constant.

The government itself is comprised of leaders. These individuals compose the government but can come and go without government change. The leaders change more

frequently than either regime or government and provide much of the daily dynamic of any given state.

Legitimacy can attach to the state, the regime, the government, or the leaders. Nevertheless, the focus of this dissertation is on state legitimacy. As such, it will remain focused on measurements and contributors of state legitimacy at the state level. The rationale is, none of the other three referents of legitimacy can effectively operate over time without a legitimate state. In other words, "the interests of regime and state become, under conditions of prolonged stability, indistinguishable..." (Young 1994, 41).

Measurement

Given the above discussion, this research endeavor examines sources that contribute to state legitimacy within the African context. Before discussing those sources, concepts and terms must be defined to ensure that subsequent measurements accurately reflect the concepts. As such, this effort seeks to measure vertical state legitimacy while focusing on the structures of the state that monopolize coercion. Consistent with previous discussions, the focus is on the state's ability to induce compliance without resorting to force – taxation is an example. Critical to compliance is the individual citizen. Ultimately, the argument proposed is that a state is legitimate to the extent it can garner willing individual compliance to its rule without resorting to the use of force.

Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation is to examine how people view institutions of coercion, whether they *willingly* obey these political institutions. Coercion is one element, but another factor is people's acceptance of a state's attempts or right of coercion. This becomes the heart of legitimacy or, a state's ability to govern without resorting to the use

of force. As such, do individuals within any given African state trust the institutions of coercion? Do they believe that they should pay their taxes? Do courts have the right to pass abiding rulings? Do people willingly acquiesce and accept the state's right to rule them? These are all questions that attempt to measure the legitimacy of the state. Thus, this dissertation proceeds as follows.

To measure legitimacy, data is obtained from Afrobarometer Round 3[7]. This is a comprehensive public attitude survey covering 25,000 respondents over 18 African countries. The sample employed a multi-stage, area, cluster method with randomization at all stages to ensure a representative sample. Every adult across the 18 countries had an equal chance of selection. As a representative sample, it is important to note that the survey population closely matches the distribution of subgroups within the national population in key respects such as gender, age and residential location (urban or rural).

Before using the data in attempts to test varying levels of state legitimacy, it is important to consider potential sources of state legitimacy. Chapter 2 examines competing sources of legitimacy, specifically, the literature on societal structures, ethnic ties, institutional influences, performance evaluations and trust. The discussion will generate testable hypotheses. Further, this chapter will help in the development of indicators to test competing theories.

Chapter 3 uses the available Afrobarometer data in an attempt to empirically test which, if any, source of legitimacy discussed in the previous chapter has the most affect on varying perceptions of state legitimacy. Specifically, Afrobarometer Round 3 data is

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[7] More information on the Afrobarometer survey and its methodology can be located at: http://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys.html . Notably, Afrobarometer Round 2 data is being excluded as it did not collect information on individual respondent's ethnicity, an important potential contributing factor to varying perceptions of legitimacy (see Chapter 2).

used to determine which theory best explains variance in the perception of state legitimacy across sub-Saharan African states. Knowing which source(s) best explains legitimacy increases understanding of the African state.

It is also important to consider how context might affect legitimacy. Chapter 4 argues that context matters. Whereas it is important to generalize and compare across countries (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 4), it is important to remember that context might affect this research's findings. It is likely that country specific variables, such as particular set of institutional arrangements or varying levels of ethnic fragmentation, affect empirical findings. Specifically, sources of legitimacy that were initially important in explaining varying levels of perception of legitimacy might, once country particularities are accounted for, cease to be significant. Inversely, previously insignificant sources of legitimacy might prove significant. Consequently, it is important to look at methods that take these country effects into account.

Additionally, taking countries into account exposes an outlier. As shown later, the extent to which competing sources of legitimacy in Mali differs in one very interesting way. Specifically, Mali is the only country in which sharing ethnicity with the president has a statistically significant and negative relationship to legitimacy; an individual who shares ethnicity with the president is less likely to view the state as legitimate. Thus, in this chapter, the empirical findings from the Mali model will be discussed. This in turn will lead to a case study of Mali.

Chapter 5 takes a case study approach in examining Mali. Single case studies have comparative merit, either as hypothesis generating or deviant case studies (Lijphart 1971). In this case, Mali serves as a deviant case study. Specifically, Mali is the only

state in the database in which sharing ethnicity with the president decreases overall perceptions of legitimacy. Further, a single-country study can be useful to comparative inquiry if concepts gathered are applicable to other cases (Landman 2003, 34).

Ultimately, this case study uncovers and facilitates the understanding of a potentially very important informal institution: cousinage. An understanding of cousinage is likely to help develop broad comparative theory. Specifically, cousinage can help explain variance in levels of conflict in ethnically diverse societies. In the end, this "thick description" (Geertz 1973) provides necessary insight to explain potential differences between the cross-national and Mali-specific model tested in previous chapters. As mentioned earlier, it is likely that there are differences in the relative importance of sources of legitimacy from the cross-national model to the Mali-specific model. This Malian field research allows informed discussion over these differences and why these may not be as unexpected as initially thought.

Chapter 6 will conclude the study by examining the contributions of this dissertation which are the importance of an individual's trust in the institutions of the state and the informal institution of cousinage. The first contribution involves showing that an individual's trust in the institutions of the state has the most affect on state legitimacy. Specifically, the more an individual trusts the institutions of the state, the more the individual is likely to consent to the rules of the state. Given an individual's trust in institutions is vital to legitimacy, possible means of increasing trust in institutions will be discussed. In order to help the state garner legitimacy, it is important to talk about various mechanisms that might inspire an individual to trust in a state's institutions and consequent policy implications.

Besides the importance of an individual's trust in the institutions of the state, there is another important contribution to this dissertation known as cousinage in Mali. Cousinage is an informal institution anthropologists refer to as joking relationships. Joking relationships are considered a traditional, time immemorial, means of mitigating conflict within and between various ethnic groups. Joking relationships can be found in several continents around the globe such as Africa and Latin America. The importance of joking relationships, from a comparativist perspective, is the potential of such interactions to help explain the wide variance in ethnic conflict. It has been noted that given the large number of ethnic groups in Africa, the continent should experience more ethnic based conflict than observed (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Perhaps joking relationships, utilized as an informal means of mitigating inter and intra-ethnic conflict, can explain lower levels of ethnic conflict than some might predict.

Obtaining sub-Saharan Africa data is difficult. Nevertheless, with data from such sources as the Afrobarometer project, there is enough information to begin systematic empirical analysis. As such, this dissertation uses available data in hopes of better understanding the roots of legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa. Such cross-national comparison of available data examining the contributors to legitimacy is among the first of its kind. Accordingly, this dissertation stands to make a credible addition to existing literature in exploring sources of legitimacy while uncovering informal institutions that can potentially explain varying levels of ethnic conflict.

II – Competing Sources of Legitimacy

The last chapter defined legitimacy as an individual's willing compliance to mandates of the state. As previously discussed, legitimacy is a pertinent issue in Africa. A state lacking legitimacy might soon find its authority challenged or usurped by a more legitimate set of institutions. For example, Mbuji-Mayi, the city that serves as the capital of the south-central East-Kasai district of Congo, has effectively become "a center of autonomous development efforts and separatist tendencies" (Reno 1998, 175). Such localized acts of independence do not facilitate a state's attempt to monopolize legitimate coercion over its given territory.

Many of Africa's political problems are, at their very core, problems of state legitimacy. Legitimate states are a prerequisite for security and stability. Without security and stability, development and basic human needs cannot take root. Thus for Africa, state legitimacy is of the essence.

Legitimacy requires individuals to believe that the state is right and appropriate for their society with no realistic alternative (Diamond 1999, 65; Lipset 1960, 64). This chapter seeks to gain a better understanding of what affects varying perceptions of state legitimacy. Specifically, this involves examining sources that contribute to sub-Saharan Africans' voluntary compliance with state mandates and reasons why they believe the state and state institutions deserve their compliance.

If one source can be established as more important than another, scholars can begin concentrating their analytical tools on aspects of legitimacy that matter. The literature speaks of two broad categories of sources of legitimacy: external and internal. The primary source of external legitimacy is juridical. Juridical legitimacy deals with laws,

foreign imposed state constitutions (Badie 2000, 146-56) and the legal recognition of the state by the international community (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Legitimacy is ultimately an internal manner. For a state to be considered legitimate, it must have the willing obedience of the individuals living within its boundaries. As such, internal factors are those that, in one way or another, serve to connect the state to the citizen.

Juridical Sources

Here, two juridical sources of legitimacy are examined: the international community and the state's constitution. There is little doubt that modern states in Africa benefit directly from the international community, mainly in the form of aid. Furthermore, as Jackson and Rosberg (1982) presciently indicate, the international community plays an instrumental role in granting legitimacy to the state and ensuring its survival through guarantee of borders and access to international monetary institutions. Nevertheless, legitimacy as defined is mainly an internal matter. It is about individuals granting state structures the right to rule them and the right to monopolize such coercion. As such, it is not the international community's function to decide for the individuals.

Without downplaying its significance, the international community simply cannot grant legitimacy to the state on behalf of the people it is attempting to govern. Out of respect for those who must live under the rule of personal dictators whose accountability remains primarily tied to foreign political and economic constraints (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 27), this inquiry does not consider the international community a source of legitimacy.

National Constitution

Another juridical contributor to legitimacy is the national constitution, or the basic principles and laws of the state. Constitutions are an important juridical contributor to legitimacy. There is an important difference in legitimacy based on degree of individual contribution or participation in the constitutional making process. The lowest degree of individual contribution is that of a foreign imposed constitution (Badie 2000, 146) while the highest degree of contribution derives from a constitution which citizens give to themselves.

A good example of the latter is the 1996 constitution in Uganda. The individual grassroots involvement in Uganda's constitutional design might explain why 72% of Ugandans are generally satisfied with their democratic regime (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, 82). Yet, even including individual participation in the constitution making process does not necessarily lead to increased legitimacy. In her study of Uganda, Devra Coren Moehler notes that "the inclusion of participation may have helped pro-government leaders to convince citizens that the process was fair and the constitution legitimate, but it did not prevent opposition leaders from convincing their followers otherwise" (Moehler 2006, 35). While examining the involvement of individuals in constitution-making is fruitful in terms of understanding sources of legitimacy, this discussion focuses on empirical state rather than constitutional legitimacy. As such, the effects, if any, of individual involvement with constitution-making should be reflected in the individual's perception of state legitimacy.

Juridical sources of legitimacy are important. Nevertheless, leery of too much conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970), this discussion aims to keep the concept of

legitimacy narrowly defined to ensure the best possible measurements. Accordingly, with an understanding that juridical contributors are a factor, theoretical insight is limited to internal contributors of legitimacy.

Internal Sources

This section begins by examining five possible internal sources of legitimacy: social structure, ethnicity, institutional influences, performance evaluations and trust. In the next chapter, data is used to test these competing sources empirically and determine whether or not any merits further discussion. If any contributors are found to be lacking, scholars can then proceed to an alternative source.

First, what are social structures? Social structures are often viewed as fixed and immutable. Yet, Africa is constantly undergoing change. There is no reason to believe that societal structures would remain isolated from the process of change. Here, the focus will be on three social structures: authority structures, mode of livelihood and urbanism. Specifically, this discussion will cover whether any of these three affect perceptions of legitimacy, if rural pastoralists are more likely to comply with the demands of the chief than that of the state, and relevant findings from the literature.

Ethnicity can be seen as a cultural value. In this context, ethnicity refers "to subjective perception of common origins, historical memories, ties and aspirations...Ethnicity, or a sense of peoplehood, has its foundations in combined remembrances of past experience and in common inspirations, values, norms, and expectations" (Chazan *et al.* 1999, 108). These deeply embedded [cultural] values are likely to affect perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, individuals who share ethnicity with those in control of the state are more

likely to feel a natural link to the state. Consequently, sharing ethnicity is likely to affect perceptions of state legitimacy.

Institutional influences are another potential source of legitimacy. Institutions are essentially the structures of the state. These structures in turn establish the rules of the game in a society "or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North 1990, 3). Institutions involve either formal (e.g. judicial code) or informal (e.g. convention and norms) constraints. This inquiry focuses primarily on formal institutions. Such institutions consist of formal rules that, in turn, "provide signals to individuals about the rewards and punishments to be expected from various courses of actions" (Bratton *et al.* 2005, 39). Thus, it is important to examine how different institutional rules affect an individual's perception of state legitimacy.

Citizen evaluations of the performance of the state are another source of legitimacy worth investigating. There is little the individual can do to affect state performance. Yet, positive performance might result in a more legitimate view of the state from individuals. After all, if the state is able to supply basic necessities (e.g. jobs), it is possible that sustained performance leads to increased state legitimacy as individuals directly benefit from it.

Finally, the potential effects of an individual's level of trust in the set of institutions that comprise the state cannot be omitted from the inquiry. An individual's trust can be measured along two dimensions: institutional and inter-personal. As earlier defined, legitimacy focuses on the relationship between an individual and the state. Consequently, inter-personal trust is expected to be a less important source of legitimacy than an

individual's trust in institutions. Thus, the level of an individual's trust in institutions of coercion is of particular interest.

Mandates of the state are often promulgated and enforced by institutions of coercion: police, courts and the military. An argument can be made that a citizen's trust in institutions of coercion is an important step towards state legitimacy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the military or the police can physically coerce individuals into compliance but, force is expensive and generates resistance, resignation or evasion (Lonsdale 1986, 134). Further, crucial to the earlier definition of legitimacy is the *voluntary* nature of compliance. It is sensible to argue that voluntary action is more likely if an individual trusts state institutions.

The second dimension of trust is inter-personal. It is important to remember that legitimacy as earlier defined looks at the relationship between the state and the individual. There is no theoretical reason to think that levels inter-personal trust, operating horizontally from one individual to another, affects state legitimacy, operating vertically between an individual and the state.

In sum, there are various contributing sources that might potentially explain variance in levels of state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa. As always with social reality, it is likely that legitimacy is the result of more than one factor. Nevertheless, it is important to take some time to explore these theories a little more fully.

Social Structure

First, traditional authority structures might contribute to legitimacy. Meyer Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1967) are an important source in understanding the variety of African authority structures. Africa spanned the gamut from the very hierarchical to the

near-anarchical. In their book, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard argue that colonialism more completely absorbed acephalous societies than hierarchical ones. Hierarchical societies "have centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions...and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority" (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967, 5). Acephalous societies, on the other hand, lack all such organization and exhibit no sharp division in rank, status or wealth (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967, 5).

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard suggest that at independence, acephalous societies had nothing to fall back upon and more successfully incorporated into the modern state. Conversely, hierarchical societies were more likely to fall back upon traditional structures of authority (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967, 12). These traditional structures, in turn, act against the state and provide an alternative source of legitimacy. If so, one might also examine whether the modern state can harness this traditional authority and use it to its advantage. One example is Botswana's successful incorporation of the Kgotla, or village council that allows for open discussion and criticism of the state, into the modern state (Parson, Crowder and Parsons 1990). Based on the available information, it is reasonable to think that people in acephalous societies, having been more fully and successfully integrated into the new state, view the state as more legitimate.

> *Hypothesis 1*: Acephalous societies are more likely than hierarchical ones to view the state as legitimate.

Second, mode of livelihood might affect legitimacy. Here, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard differentiate between pastoralist and agriculturalist societies with what they refer to as modes of livelihood (1967, 8). They argue that mode of livelihood is related to ecological conditions and strongly influences social organizations, to include political systems. If they are correct, it would be logical to argue that modes of livelihood,

whether agricultural or pastoral, contribute either positively if agriculturalist, or negatively if pastoralist, towards legitimacy. Since pastoralist societies are traditionally more mobile and less likely to recognize borders (Curtin et al. 1995), it is reasonable to posit that agriculturalist societies are more likely than pastoralist ones to view the state as legitimate.

> *Hypothesis 2*: Agriculturalists are more likely than pastoralists to view the state as legitimate.

Finally, it is important to examine potential differences among urban-rural lines. It is often taken for granted that urbanization results in profound disruption of African traditional life (Abate 1978; Bratton *et al.* 2005, 167; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1991; Gugler and Flanagan 1978). Robert Bates (2005) shows that developmental ideas and reforms were usually skewed to benefit the urban elites, often at the expense of the rural constituencies. It is not unreasonable to believe that location will affect perceptions of legitimacy. Yet, it must be noted that urban elites are often the most critical of the state. Thus, it could very well be that urban individuals see the state as less legitimate.

> *Hypothesis 3*: Rural individuals are more likely than urban ones to view the state as legitimate.

Ethnic Ties

To understand the importance of ethnic ties, it is necessary to include an overview of relevant scholars' claims about the modern African state. Jean-François Bayart (1993) delves beneath the hollow state and bureaucracy in an attempt to understand how African societies function. Bayart criticizes western scholars for including Africa in a wholly universal approach, forgetting the historical and cultural richness of African societies (Bayart 1993, 5).

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Bayart further argues that the African state is based on networks that lead to societal stratification based on access to the state. The strategy of the heads of these networks is to capture and accumulate as much wealth as possible for redistribution to enlarge their networks. "[I]n other words, the social struggles which make up the quest for hegemony and the production of the state bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in which all actors – rich and poor – participate in the world of networks" (Bayart 1993, 235). This is a major step forward, in that Bayart identifies the centrality of patron-client networks in African society and in its links to the state. There is little doubt that neopatrimonialism and associated patronage retains a strong hold on African politics (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, Ch. 2; Gyimah-Boadi 2004). Frances Hagopian (1996) reminds us that patronage networks are not necessarily unique to Africa. Nevertheless, they must be taken into account when exploring the roots of legitimacy.

In their discussion of neo-patrimonialism, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997) build upon past work (Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Roth 1968; Theobald 1982)[1] and further refine the model of social networks in Africa. In their book, they discuss the personalistic nature of patrimonial regimes. These regimes have three central features. First, the personalistic nature is embodied in the President, the head patron from which the networks extend. Second, it is a regime characterized by clientelism. Presidents rely on awards of personal favors; in the modern context, this often translates into distribution of state resources through contracts, licenses or projects. In return, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions to the head patron (Bratton and Van de Walle

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[1] It is interesting to note that Roth's (1968) discussion on personal rulership distinguishes between two types of patrimonial rule. The first involves the historical survival of patrimonial rule. The second is "personal rulership on the bases of loyalties that do not require any belief in the rule's unique personal qualification, but are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards" (1968, 196). Given Africa's previously discussed historical break with the past, the second type prevails.

1997, 65). Finally, the line between the public and private sector are blurred. There is little distinction between private and public coffers (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 67).

Given the multi-ethnic composition of many African states, ethnicity plays a potentially important role in a neo-patrimonial state. Neo-patrimonial networks care primarily for the clients. It is likely that those who share common bonds, or ethnicity, (Chazan *et al.* 1999, 108) with the president stand to benefit more than others. If not more, at least they will be the first to benefit from the largesse of the state. It stands to reason that individuals who share ethnic ties with the president – or head patron - should be among the last cut off from scarce resources in times of economic crisis. Further, it has been noted that belonging to the wrong ethnic group might decrease an individual's economic opportunities (Posner 2005, 95). Therefore, it is important for an ethnic group to ensure representation in the patronage network, with the ultimate goal of capturing the presidency. From this analysis, it is reasonable to posit that individuals who share ethnicity with the president are more likely than those cut off from access to resources to view the state as more legitimate. Ethnicity acts as a positive source of legitimacy.

> *Hypothesis 4*: Individuals who share ethnicity with the President are more likely to view the state as more legitimate.

Influence of Institutional Context

The discussion turns its attention towards institutional context as a source of legitimacy. Specifically, the inquiry seeks to understand perceptions of legitimacy individuals express towards the state within the broader institutional context. It can be argued that certain institutions serve to link the individual to the state. For example, Russell Dalton (Dalton 1996) stresses the role of parties as a critical linkage mechanism between state and society (Norris 1999, 23). Parties are organizations that serve to connect the

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individual to the state through organizational affiliation. Party membership can affect perceptions of state legitimacy (Linz and Stepan 1996, 8).

Huntington argues that in areas where institutions are weak or non-existent, the role of the party, as an organization, is the only long-run alternative as it, in effect, becomes the source of legitimacy and authority (Huntington 1965, 424). Further, well organized parties have been shown to increase overall voter participation of their members (Diamond 1999, 143). As such, it is important to explore the role of the party and its effect on perceptions of legitimacy.

Based on the literature, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a member of a political party is more likely to view the state as legitimate. Further, individuals who belong to the party in power should be more likely to view the state as legitimate. Simply, if individuals believe that the institutional context allows their preferred party to win, they are more likely to view the state as legitimate (Cho and Bratton 2006, 736). Christopher Anderson and Christine Guillory have shown that winners express higher levels of satisfaction than losers (Anderson and Guillory 1997). It is reasonable to expect that these feelings will only be amplified in Africa's winner take all political environment. Specifically, if an individual is not a member of the ruling party, s/he is likely to have much less access to the state.

> *Hypothesis 5*: Individuals who belong to the *winning* party are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

Second, the institutional context can "influence attitudes when citizens take part in *formal participatory procedures*" (Bratton *et al.* 2005, 40). Institutional context can serve to routinize behavior, such as voting. State sanctioned procedures that allow an

individual to vote – national ID card, registration, queuing at a polling station – seek to routinize individual levels of participation.

Legitimacy can be expressed in routine behavior such as voting. Voting promotes what Dankwart Rustow refers to as "habituation" (Rustow 1970). Specifically, voting is a form of routine behavior that can increase perceptions of legitimacy (Diamond 1999, 65). Habituation leads to an internalization of the rules of the game of the state. It is reasonable to argue that an individual who votes exhibits aspects of routinized behavior that suggest increased acceptance of the state. In the end, an individual who votes is acting in an entirely voluntarily manner within the existing institutional context. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize that individuals who vote are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

Hypothesis 6: Individuals who vote are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

Finally, our discussion must consider what Bratton et al. refer to as *contacting* (2005, 264). Contacting refers to the fact that "citizens also take individual initiatives, for example, by contacting public officials or other influential leaders" (Bratton *et al.* 2005, 150). As discussed above, neo-patrimonial networks play an important role in sub-Saharan Africa. Further, neo-patrimonial networks emphasize the informal. One of the distinguishing features of such networks is the blurring of the line between the public and private sector (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 67). In such a context, personal relationships matter. Further, Bratton et al. note that informal contacts are central to African constructs of political participation (Bratton et al. 2005, 264). Thus, it is important to examine whether or not individuals contact state officials.

Contacting occurs at different levels. An individual can contact a local hereditary ruler, local government councilor or might choose to contact his national representative. Contacting, especially the choice of contact, is pertinent to the discussion since legitimacy as previously defined involves the relationship between the individual and the state.

The primary interest becomes whether an individual contacts a member of the state apparatus, not whether an individual contacts a local hereditary or religious leader. It is sensible to argue that an individual who contacts state officials is more likely to view the state as legitimate. Specifically, that individual is involved in building a personal relationship with an official of the state, thus feeling closer to the state in the process.

> *Hypothesis 7*: Individuals who contact state officials are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

Performance Evaluations

Citizen evaluations of the performance of the state are another potential source of legitimacy that merit consideration. Thinking in terms of Easton (Easton 1965; Easton 1975) performance evaluations can be linked to specific support; they reflect individual judgments about political phenomena (Dalton 1999). The uniqueness of specific support "lies in its relationships to the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of political authorities" (Easton 1975, 437). It is directed towards political institutions and varies base on an individual's perceived benefits or satisfaction (Easton 1975, 439).

Robert Bates (Bates 2005; Bates 1976) reminds us that people are self-interested actors and are more likely to support a state that best serves their interest. If the state fails to meet people's needs, the latter might withdraw their support and seek alternatives. Thus,

an individual's support for the state might be described as conditional upon the state's delivery of developmental needs; developmental needs ranging anywhere from job creation to health care. This calculated self-interest resonates well with Africa's "politics of the belly" (Bayart 1993) in which the power of the ruler depends on his ability to feed his followers or, as the case might be, to provide for their self-interested needs.

When referring to delivery of development, it is important to remember that there are two distinct baskets of developmental goods: economic and political (Bratton et al. 2005, 223). Traditionally, the focus is on economic goods. Such theory has its roots in modernization theory (Lipset 1960; O'Donnell 1973, 4). Simply, modernization theory argues that rising living standards, growth of private ownership and the urban middle classes and improved education leads to greater overall support for the state (Evans and Whitefield 1995, 485). Since, scholars have argued that fluctuations in support for the state are likely a reflection on the state's ability to administer the economy (Norris 1999, 218).

Michael Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier (2000) persuasively argue that economic perceptions account for much of the variance in the voter's support of the state . It is clear that delivery of economic goods, economic performance and ensuing economic perceptions matter to varying degrees (Anderson 1995; Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg 1993; Weatherford 1984; Weatherford 1992). Regarding sub-Saharan Africa, Bates (2005) notes that the issue that most frequently drives African city dwellers to militant action is the erosion of their purchasing power, clearly an economic concern. Bates points out that Africans "demand larger incomes and higher standards of living" (Bates 2005, 11).

Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that positive economic evaluations positively affect perceptions of state legitimacy.

> *Hypothesis 8*: Positive evaluations of a state's delivery of economic goods will increase positive perceptions of legitimacy.

There are reasons to believe that economic performance evaluations might not be as important as originally considered. Development does not comprise solely of economic goods. In fact, some suggest that economic performance evaluations play only a minor role in an individual's evaluation of the state (McAllister 1999). Beyond economic considerations, there is evidence that individuals also evaluate the state on moral notions of right and wrong, and the need for self-respect (Anderson 1990, 80). In evaluating the state, there is reason to believe that individuals are as likely to consider notions of justice and fairness alongside more immediate economic concerns (Bratton et al. 2005, 43).

This leads to the discussion of political goods. Simply stated, an individual's evaluation of the state might have more to do with the provision of accountability than a state's ability to create jobs. By political goods, one is referring to such goods as civil liberties, freedom of speech and free and fair election. This might be of particular importance in an African context that places "special emphasis on distributive goals and egalitarian outcomes" (Bratton et al. 2005, 223).

In an influential article, Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield (1995) argue that political goods appear to have greater impact than economic considerations on an individual's evaluation of the state. As such, it can be argued that one should be less concerned with the delivery of economic growth than the provision of free and fair elections and accountability. Supporting Evans and Whitefield (1995), numerous studies have since consistently found political evaluations to have stronger positive impact than

economic evaluations (Diamond 1999; Gibson 1996; Norris 1999; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998). Thus, it is important to examine the effects of civil liberties such as free speech and whether free and fair elections matter.

Another political good worth considering are popular perceptions of corruption (Mishler and Rose 2001). As Bratton and Lewis note, a "highly valued political good for ordinary Africans...is clean, transparent government, free of corruption" (Bratton and Lewis 2005, 7). Given the eroding effects of corruption (Chang and Chu 2006), it is not unreasonable to think that high levels of perceived corruption will decrease overall perceptions of legitimacy. Thus, heeding Rose et al.'s warning, it is important to avoid the mistake of believing that all evaluations derive from economic conditions (Rose et al. 1998, 157). Accordingly, it is reasonable to argue that a state's ability to deliver political goods will positively influence individual perceptions of legitimacy.

> *Hypothesis 9*: Positive evaluations of a state's delivery of political goods will increase individual perceptions of legitimacy.

Delivery of development, economic or political in nature, is likely to affect perceptions of legitimacy. Of the two, economics goods (e.g. jobs, income) are less within the control of the state than political goods. Simply, economic goods are largely tied to a state's economic performance. Economic performance, in turn, is a long-term project that politicians are unlikely to immediately affect. It is no secret that Africa lags behind the rest of the world in terms of economic development. The World Trade Organization trade statistics show Africa accounting for 3.1% of world trade in 1990, decreasing to 2.3% in 2000[2]. Once South Africa (.7%) is accounted for in the statistics, it is clear that

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[2] World Trade Organization Trading Statistics 2004 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm

African economic performance has not improved over the years. Consequently, the state might find it easier to deliver political goods.

Given a minimum degree of political order, delivery of political goods are fairly easy. Bratton et al. note: "[T]the authorities can provide civil liberties and electoral rights virtually at the stroke of a pen, achieving immediate and broad benefit at low economic costs" (Bratton et al. 2005, 42). Yet, neither economic nor political goods are possible without stability.

The state can provide neither economic nor political development without a certain degree of stability. Political order is a prime political good as "other desirable political goods become possible (only) when a reasonable measure of security has been sustained" (Rotberg 2004, 3). It is a necessary condition for fruitful economic and political participation (Rotberg 2004). The institutions that comprise the state in Sierra Leone, hindered by lack of political order, find it difficult to operate and provide political benefits to its citizens (Reno 1998, Ch. 4). On the other hand, in states where political order is apparent, full economic and political participation becomes possible. Once basic security is provided, the state can then begin ensuring the delivery of political and economic goods.

In sum, given the fact that individuals judge the state by practical tests of self-interests, state legitimacy is likely to be affected by whether it can deliver economic or political goods. Whereas some stress the importance of economic goods (Przeworski 1991), it is clear that political goods have the potential to strongly affect an individual's evaluation of the state. A state that is able to provide civil liberties is likely to have more positive evaluations. In the end, it appears that legitimacy is unlikely if states cannot succeed in

demonstrating their capacity to deal with major economic and social problems and deliver the political freedom, fairness, transparency and order their citizens expect (Diamond 1999, 217).

Trust

Given the context of this discussion, trust can be thought of as an individual's belief that the state will not knowingly or willingly harm him (Newton 1999, 170). Any discussion of trust must immediately reference its two dimensions: institutional and inter-personal. Of the two, an individual's trust in state institutions is most pertinent to this investigation. Institutional trust operates vertically, from individual to institution. Along with associational membership, inter-personal trust can be used as a partial proxy for social capital (Bratton et al. 2005, 193; Norris 1999, 169) and operates horizontally: trust amongst individuals. As this dissertation's definition of legitimacy relies on the vertical connection between individual and state, it is theoretically sensible to focus on an individual's trust in institutions. Nevertheless, one cannot omit from the discussion the potential importance of inter-personal trust.

Interest in inter-personal trust is evident in the literature on political culture (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Granato, Inglehart and Leblang 1996; Inglehart 2000). It helps to take the time to examine one of the more recent and influential scholar's perspective on the importance of trust. Robert Putnam's (1993) *Making Democracy Work* is a seminal work stressing the importance of inter-personal trust. Through a series of personal interviews, surveys, case studies and some statistical analysis, Putnam compares six Italian regional governments. Putnam argues that social context and history profoundly conditions the effectiveness of institutions (Putnam 1993, 177). In his final analysis,

Putnam argues that a tradition of inter-personal trust facilitates civic engagement which in turn results in greater effectiveness of governance. Thus, building social capital[3] is critical.

In *Bowling Alone* (Putnam 1995), Putnam adopts the same framework and discusses the political consequences of the decline of social capital in the United States over the last two decades. Beginning with a look at the trend in declining votes, Putnam concludes that individuals are increasingly socially isolated from each other and broader parts of community life (Jackman and Miller 1998, 50). Along these lines, Francis Fukuyama (1995) argues that "spontaneous sociability", or trust, is a key ingredient in generating economic growth. He notes that social trust conditions a society's ability to compete in global markets. According to Fukuyama, societies with low levels of trust are at a disadvantage because those are less effective in developing complex social institutions. In conclusion, it would be safe to hypothesize that increased levels of inter-personal trust should positively affect state legitimacy. Yet, inter-personal trust operates on a horizontal level because it involves the interaction between individuals, not between individual and state. Consequently, one should not expect levels of inter-personal trust to impact state legitimacy.

> *Hypothesis 10*: Variance in inter-personal trust does not significantly affect perceptions of legitimacy.

The discussion now turns to an individual's trust in political institutions. Institutional theories emphasize that trust is an individual's rational response to the performance of institutions (Jackman and Miller 1998, 56; North 1990). Further, institutional theories

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[3] Per Putnam, social capital "refers to the features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) 167.

hold that the choice of institutional design has real consequences for government performance and thus, for public trust in institutions (Mishler and Rose 2001). It follows that an individual's trust in political institutions is likely to affect levels of state legitimacy.

State legitimacy, as earlier defined, relies on voluntary compliance to state mandates. State mandates are likely to be promulgated through coercive institutions. Specifically, the state is likely to promulgate and enforce its mandates through courts, the police and the military. These are very important institutions to the state's function. Given the importance of institutions in shaping individual perceptions, it is reasonable to argue that higher levels of trust in these coercive institutions facilitate state legitimacy. It is also arguable that the more an individual trusts the courts, the more likely that individual is to a) turn to the courts and b) voluntarily comply with court orders. Likewise, the more an individual trusts the police, the more likely that individual is going to a) listen to the police and b) cooperate with the police when approached.

Finally, institutional trust operates along the same dimension as legitimacy as previously defined; institutional trust operates vertically. Thus, it is theoretically reasonable to argue that increased levels of institutional trust leads to increased state legitimacy. As individuals develop trust in state institutions, they are more likely to abide by the state's established rules of the game. Therefore, an individual's trust in institutions is likely to be an important source of state legitimacy.

Hypothesis 11: Increased institutional trust leads to increased state legitimacy.

The Full Model

Now that I have taken a look at the competing theories, it is important to see how these theoretically fit together. The above-mentioned theories can be integrated into higher-level categories: interest based, trust and identity based. As Table 2.1 shows, the respective theories align under one of the three categories.

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                    ┌──────────────────────┐
                    │     Legitimacy       │
                    │                      │
                    └──────────────────────┘
                       ↗        ↑↓        ↖
                              Feedback

┌────────────────────┐  ┌────────────────────┐  ┌────────────────────┐
│  Interest Based    │  │      Trust         │  │  Identity Based    │
│                    │  │                    │  │                    │
│ •Performance       │  │ •Individual's Trust in │ •Ethnic Ties      │
│ Evaluations        │→ │ Institutions       │← │                    │
│    •Economic       │  │                    │  │ •Societal Structures│
│    •Political      │  │ •Inter-personal Trust│ │    •Authority      │
│                    │  │                    │  │    •Mode of        │
│ •Institutional Context│ │                  │  │    Livelihood      │
│    •Vote           │  │                    │  │                    │
│    •Winning Party  │  │                    │  │                    │
│    •Contact        │  │                    │  │                    │
└────────────────────┘  └────────────────────┘  └────────────────────┘
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
Table 2.1: Diagram of Model

As the table illustrates, the theoretical arguments made in this chapter suggest that all three broad based categories directly affect an individual's perception of legitimacy. Yet, the political world is complex and highly endogenous. I argue and attempt to support through statistical analysis in this dissertation, an individual's trust in institutions affects or helps predict variance in perceived levels of state legitimacy.

However, I acknowledge that the relationship between an individual's trust in institutions and perceptions of legitimacy may be reciprocal. As the feedback arrow in Table 2.1 indicates, I believe that a certain amount of endogeneity exists. Specifically,

perceptions of state are likely to impact an individual's trust in institutions. Thus, the reciprocal relationship is more of a feedback loop than bi-directional in nature. This is a direct acknowledgment of the complexities of political reality.

Further, both interest and identity based variables appear to affect levels of trust. In the end, this dissertation seeks to move forward through an attempt to untangle the various factors that help explain the variance in levels of perceptions of state legitimacy. Recognizing that no model can fully account for the highly endogenous nature of the world, this dissertation strives to argue, in a theoretically sound and consistent manner, how interest, identity and trust based variables help account for perceptions of state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa.

Conclusion

The inquiry at hand is intended to increase understanding of state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter reviewed some of the literature concerning five competing sources of legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, legitimacy is a pertinent issue in Africa. Unfortunately, legitimacy is a complex concept to adequately capture fully (Weatherford 1992). Nevertheless, in Chapter 1, a narrow definition of legitimacy was developed: an individual's willing obedience to mandates of the state.

This chapter discussed potential sources of legitimacy: social structures, ethnicity, institutional context, performance evaluations and an individual's trust in political institutions. As discussed, there are good theoretical reasons as to why each source should contribute to perceptions of state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa.

Given the current understanding of Africa, it is likely that some sources of legitimacy will matter more than others. Two sources of legitimacy merit discussion: ethnicity and

an individual's trust in institutions. The importance of personal relationships and loyalties in a neo-patrimonial state (Jackson and Rosberg 1984; Roth 1968) make these two potential sources stand out. In the first case, ethnicity is expected to matter but for reasons that actually undermine wider state legitimacy. Common inspirations, values, norms, and expectations appear likely to form a strong bond between individuals. In a context of relative scarcity, it is not unreasonable to believe that people will fall back upon such ethnic bonds in hopes of obtaining access to state resources. Of course, this can only happen if *your* people are in charge of the state apparatus.

However, strong ethnic loyalties risk undermining overall state legitimacy. If a state's Big Man relies exclusively on his own ethnic group for support, he will likely alienate individuals from other ethnic groups. This is especially problematic if the Big Man comes from a relatively small ethnic group. Specifically, if the majority of the population is excluded from access to the state it is unlikely that they will, over time, willingly obey its mandates.

Notably, even in cases where a president can rely on fairly large support of the population, legitimacy can be tenuous. In such cases, if a small but important segment of the population is continually excluded, a state is likely to experience loss in legitimacy. Further, if any minority is actively discriminated against or if individuals belonging to a particular community feel endangered by the state, then it is likely that the state will experience issues with legitimacy, or willing compliance. This was arguably the case in Rwanda in 1994 in which an ethnic minority rebelled in response to state sponsored genocide (Prunier 1995; Prunier 1998)

Second, an individual's trust in institutions is expected to matter. Reflecting on the Africanist literature on the state in Chapter 1, the modern African state is, by and large, a product of colonialism. The state is comprised of institutional structures that have little relevant historical ties to the people over whom they are trying to monopolize the *legitimate* control of force. Trust must be earned. Historically, the relationship between state and citizen is one that has evolved over long periods of time (Tilly 1975). Further, trust cannot be coerced. Specifically, a set of structures cannot ask an individual to trust them at gunpoint; that is akin to a mugger asking a person to trust him while he takes his/her wallet.

Using the previous analogy, it is reasonable to argue that many African states act like a mugger. Specifically, it asks compliance to an edict with gun in hand. In Tanzania, the failed collectivization policy of Ujamaa of the late 1960s (Hyden 1980, 97) was enforced, in some part, by the military. In this instance, military troops rounded up segments of the rural population and placed them in a collective farm in support of President Julius Nyerere's rural development policies. It is reasonable argue that such action, early in the life of that Africa state, does little to build collective trust in the state. This is especially true if the individual is asked to give with no perceived benefit.

In the end, trust involves a relationship. It is likely that developing a relationship is easier with a childhood friend than with a stranger one first meets as an adult. As such, it is likely easier for an individual to trust familiar institutions than one that s/he has little relation to on the onset. Further, such trust is likely to be further complicated if a new set of institutions, unable to garner willing compliance due to lack of trust, resorts to use of

violence. It follows that in the mugger analogy that it is inconceivable that an individual would ever trust someone he first met while being mugged in an alley.

In sum, there is numerous literature directly or indirectly examining competing sources of legitimacy. Yet, there has been little direct research on these competing sources which is partly a result of the difficulty of defining legitimacy and partly due to lack of availability of good data. Consequently, there are serious impediments when analyzing and discussing legitimacy.

The first is the simple fact that legitimacy is not easily definable (Weatherford 1992). It is evident from the discussion in the previous chapter that legitimacy is a multi-dimensional and multi-layered concept. Advancement will not occur by simply stating that the concept is beyond definition. Thus, it is important to take the concept and develop a theoretically plausible definition. It is unlikely that any one definition will please all involved. Nevertheless, with a working definition available, scholars can proceed in attempts at better understanding what most contributes to legitimacy. This leads to the second problem.

Relevant data is not always readily available. Nowhere does this hold truer than in Africa. Although Africa's comparative advantages to the study lies in the continent's variance, good scientific data is scarce. Fortunately, the Afrobarometer[4] project has been collecting and storing scientific survey data in over a dozen sub-Saharan African countries since 1999. As such data becomes available, it is imperative that African scholars begin referencing it to confirm or disprove the myriad of theories that have developed over the last three to four decades. Africanists are entering a time when the

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[4] www.Afrobarometer.org

data is increasingly becoming available and simply theorizing is insufficient without some systematic and empirical analysis. It is with that in mind that the next chapter is devoted to testing competing sources of legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa. It is hopeful that the data will lend better insight as to which, if any, source of legitimacy most matters within the sub-Saharan African context.

III -Testing Competing Sources of Legitimacy

The previous chapter reviewed the relevant literature that suggests the roots of legitimacy might have several sources. This chapter investigates which, if any, of these competing sources best facilitates comprehension of varying perceptions of legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus far, the theories compose the following model:

> Legitimacy = f (Societal Structures + Ethnicity +
>
> Institutional Performance + Performance Evaluations +
>
> Trust)

This chapter sets to determine if any of these theories best accounts for legitimacy as initially defined, specifically, legitimacy as voluntary compliance to mandates of the state. Before proceeding, it is necessary to operationalize all concepts as measurable indicators and to identify the data that will be used to measure them.

Data

Data for this study derives entirely from Afrobarometer Round 3. The Afrobarometer is a series of random national surveys. It is the product of an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures public opinion in 18 African countries[1]. The Afrobarometer's primary aim is to produce scientifically available data on public opinion in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the unit of analysis is the individual with an n of 25,397 in round 3 surveys conducted circa 2005.

The Afrobarometer survey is very comprehensive and includes well over 100 questions. These questions cover everything from support to democracy to governance issues such

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[1] As will be explained later in the chapter, Zimbabwe, Cape Verde were dropped from analysis.

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as trust in public institutions. The Afrobarometer data set is the only one that permits an investigation across such a large number of sub-Saharan African countries.

Measurement

With respect to measurement, Leslie Kish (1959) offers instrumental advice. Specifically, it is important to think about the different kinds of variables in the analysis: explanatory and controlled. Explanatory variables are the objects of the research. "[t]hey are the variables among which the research wishes to find and to measure some specified relationships" (Kish 1959, 329). In this case, they include the dependent variable, legitimacy, and the independent variables, those representing the possible sources of legitimacy (e.g. social structures). Yet, along with these explanatory variables, it is important to control for extraneous variables; variables likely to affect the dependent variable. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to account for all variables to the extent that they are supported by theory. Against this backdrop, variables for this study are described in the following section.

Dependent Variable: Legitimacy Index

Chapter 1 argued that a state is legitimate to the extent it can garner willing individual compliance to its rule without resorting to force. Now that the concept of legitimacy is defined, it is important to devise an adequate operational measurement. The Afrobarometer survey asks whether or not individuals agree with the following four relevant statements:

- Our constitution expresses the values and hopes (of people in this country)
- The police always have the right to make people obey the law
- The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by
- The tax department has the right to make people pay taxes

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The answer choices range from strongly disagree to strongly agree on a five point scale with the middle value (3) neither agreeing nor disagreeing. It is reasonable to suggest that all four questions target *willing* individuals' compliance to the state. In fact, these questions were used in Afrobarometer Round 2 compendium of comparative results as separate items in attempts to assess state legitimacy (Bratton et al. 2004). Subsequently, I use these four questions to create a legitimacy index representing the dependent variable.

Before creating the index, it is important to conduct an explanatory factor analysis to see whether it is justified. In this context, the analysis will examine whether or not it is reasonable to conclude that legitimacy is a factor underlying the four items. In survey research, designing a question that completely captures a concept is a daunting task. To alleviate this, it is beneficial to utilize several questions to capture a concept. Using factor analysis, it is possible to determine whether it is statistically reasonable to argue that there is an underlying factor that helps explain common variance between the statements (Lattin et al. 2003, 127-28).

Conducting a principal factor analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that there is an underlying factor in the four questions used to create the legitimacy index. After graphing a scree plot (Table 3.1), the 'elbow' is clearly evident. The elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that explains common variance. Specifically, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.34), which explains 52 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .69) is acceptable (n= 16,764)[2]. A factor score can be used to create an index.

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[2] As will soon be discussed, this seemingly low n is largely the result of four countries (Cape Verde, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Lesotho) being dropped from analysis. This, along with missing data results in an n that is far smaller than the initial n of over 25,000.

Table 3.1

Rather than use a factor score, it is theoretically acceptable to construct a summated index. A summated index facilitates interpretation of the results and is easier to grasp conceptually. The most straightforward way to design this index is to create a summated rating scale from the responses to the four statements. The summated index then takes the sum of the responses to the statements divided by the number of statements. In this case, a score of 1 indicates that the respondent strongly disagrees, while a score of 5 indicates that the respondent strongly agrees.

Independent Variables

The predictor variables in this study are as follows:

Societal Structures

As discussed in the previous chapter, relevant theories concern both a) pre-colonial authority structures and b) mode of livelihood. First, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1967) posited that people in acephalous societal structures are more likely than hierarchical ones to view the modern state as legitimate. To test this, individual respondents were coded along authority structure and mode of livelihood. First, individuals were coded as

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either a member of a historically acephalous society (Authority = 0) or as a member of a historically hierarchical society (Authority = 1). Fortunately, Afrobarometer Round 3 specifically asked the respondent to which tribe, ethnic or cultural group s/he belongs. Once the ethnic group is known, it is relatively easy to research whether the group is historically acephalous (i.e. Igbo) or hierarchical (i.e. Bambara)[3].

Notably, as Cape Verde was uninhabited prior to the Portugueses' arrival in 1456 (Curtin et al. 1995, 156) individuals were not coded. This effectively dropped the country and its 1,256 respondents. Also, due to the current political climate in Zimbabwe at the time of the interviews, Zimbabwe and its 1,048 respondents were eliminated as the survey did not collect information on ethnicity.

Second, a variable to code mode of livelihood was generated. Initially, there appeared to be a problem with equating ethnicity to mode of livelihood. Specifically, because one ethnic group is historically comprised of agriculturalists, the same might not hold true in a modern urban setting. Mode of livelihood is apt to change over time (Crummey and Stewart 1981). Given the African context, it is then reasonable to argue that the rural population is largely tied to historical modes of livelihood. Thus, only rural pastoralists were coded as '1' (Mode of Livelihood = 1)[4]. This is consistent with the earlier supposition that pastoralist societies, historically engaged in greater conflict with the state, perceive the state as less legitimate than their agriculturalist counterparts.

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[3] Sources used for coding were the online Encyclopedia Britannica (www.britannica.com) along with the Ethnologue project (http://www.ethnologue.com/).

[4] Ibid

Ethnic Ties

The previous chapter examined the importance of personal relationships in sub-Saharan Africa. A neopatrimonial society is expressed through multi-layered client-patron relationships. In a multi-ethnic society, one of the easiest ways to establish patronage is through recourse to ethnicity. Specifically, individuals sharing the same ethnicity are more likely to help one another as they are seen as helping 'one of their own'.

It is conceivable that an individual who shares ethnicity with the head patron, the president, is more likely to have access, be it direct or indirect, to state resources. If not immediate access, that individual is likely to be more optimistic than an outsider of eventual access to the head patron. Given the context of scarcity, belonging to the wrong ethnic group might actually decrease an individual's economic opportunities (Posner 2005, 95). In sum, personal relationships matter and sharing ethnicity with the president is likely to positively affect perceptions of legitimacy.

It is also plausible that individuals who share ethnicity with the president are more likely than their outsider counterparts to perceive the state as legitimate. To test this hypothesis, it was important to code the ethnicity of each country's president at the time the Afrobarometer Round 3 survey was administered[5]. Second, an Afrobarometer question was used to determine whether the individual respondent shared ethnicity with the president. Specifically, the question asked the respondent to which clan, ethnic or tribal group s/he belongs. Finally, respondents who shared ethnicity with the president were coded '1' and all others '0'. This information allows inquiry into the affect of sharing ethnicity with the president on perceptions of legitimacy.

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[5] Sources included Afrobarometer project contributors and BBC Country Reports (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/country_profiles/default.stm).

When examining ethnicity, most countries presented minimal challenges in coding respondents' ethnic ties to the president. There were two exceptions: Botswana and Lesotho. Specifically, both countries are portrayed as ethnically homogenous. First, Botswana is regarded to be mostly Tswana, with the exception of the San Bushmen, and other regional ethnic groups that crossed the border[6] or were incorporated into the post-colonial border. Yet, when surveyed, Afrobarometer respondents in Botswana provided 20 different clan identities. Interestingly enough, many ethnic groups in Botswana have "become so incorporated as to be almost indistinguishable from the Tswana" (Britannica 2006). Using information from the University of Botswana History Department, individuals from the eight traditional major tribes were coded as '1' (Bennett 2006). The rest were coded as '0'. Similar problems arose when surveying Lesotho.

Lesotho is widely regarded as ethnically homogenous. In fact, 99.7% of the population is classified as Sotho (CIA 2006). Sothos distinguish themselves primarily through clan lineages. When asked, respondents identified with 24 clans or Sotho lineages. In Lesotho, it appears that "internally, divisions among different chiefdoms—and within the royal lineage itself—[have] political significance, but externally the sense of Sotho nationhood and cultural unity remains strong" (Britannica 2006). Like Botswana, it appears that most Sothos share ethnic ties with the current prime minister. Yet, whereas there is some variance in Botswana, all Sotho respondents were coded 1. As this is bound to affect the salience of ethnicity in the analysis, Lesotho and its 1,161 respondents were dropped.

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[6] Herero's were driven out of Namibia by the Germans during the suppression of the rebellion (1903-7) Curtin et al., *African History* 429.

Note on Dimensions of Ethnicity

Thus far, Afrobarometer respondents' ethnic self-identification was used to create three new variables: societal structure, mode of livelihood and ties to the president. Collinearity is a concern. The final model tested for collinearity. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores were low, and collinearity did not appear to be a problem. Further, the collinearity between the three variables was low. The subsequent variables were not generated from ethnic self-identification.

Institutional Influences

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study focuses on two aspects of institutional influences on perceptions of legitimacy: political parties and voting. Institutions affect levels of participation. As Bratton et al. note, participation is "governed by formal rules and [is] channeled through formal organizations" (Bratton *et al.* 2005, 261). First, in a context of weak or non-existent institutions, political parties become an important source of legitimacy and authority (Huntington 1965). Individuals who join parties actively contest legitimate control of the state. Party members out of power might be unhappy with the current government, or those people who make decisions in the name of the state. Yet, they likely accept the formal institutions that comprise the state. Members of a political party are competing within the regime established by the state.

As discussed in the previous chapter, African politics is a winner takes all environment. Being associated with the party out of power is likely to cut off most avenues of access to the state. Consequently, more important than simply being a member of a party is whether an individual is a member of the party currently in power. Fortunately,

Afrobarometer asked for an individual's party affiliation. Thus, individuals were coded

as 1 if they belonged to their respective state's party in power; all others were coded as 0.

Second, political participation, as expressed through voting, is examined. As

mentioned in the previous chapter, legitimation must be evident and routinized in

behavior (Diamond 1999, 65). Voting promotes what Dankwart Rustow refers to as

"habituation" (1970). According to Rustow, habituation leads to an internalization of the

rules of the game of the state. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that an individual who

votes is more likely to have internalized the rules of the game through habituation.

Consequently, the act of voting should positively affect perceptions of legitimacy. The

following Afrobarometer questions observe voting behavior:

- With regard to the most recent, 2002 national elections, which statement is true for you?
    - You voted in the elections
    - You decided not to vote
    - You could not find the polling station
    - You were prevented from voting
    - You did not have time to vote
    - Did not vote for some other reason
    - You were not registered

Since all but one option deals with why an individual did not vote, a variable was

generated that simply coded individuals if they voted. It is important to note that people

tended to exaggerate their participation levels. Specifically, more people reported voting

than reflected in actual voter turnout numbers. Just to get a sense of the numbers, 74

percent of all Afrobarometer round 3 respondents stated that they voted in the most recent

election. Looking at actual turnout in the 18 countries, the average turnout rate was

roughly 65 percent[7]. Mozambique has one of the largest overstatements of voter turnout

in the most recent national election; a little more than 80 percent of Afrobarometer

respondents in Mozambique state they voted while official turnout for the 2004

presidential election is listed at 36.4 percent. Then there is the case of Ghana, with a little

over 87 percent of Afrobarometer respondents stating they voted in the most recent

national elections with official turnout for the 2004 presidential election reported to be

85.1 percent. Thus, there is some variation between official as opposed to stated turnout.

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect individuals who vote, or claimed to have voted, to

perceive the state as more legitimate.

   Next, it was determined whether respondents take time to contact state officials. This

form of political participation simply involves contact with leaders between elections

(Bratton et al. 2005, 264). As mentioned in the previous chapter, I hypothesize that

individuals who take time to contact state officials are more likely to view the state as

legitimate as they are presumably trying to influence the outcome by working within the

system. The Afrobarometer questions used here are as follows:

- During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons
  about some important problem or to give them your views?
    o A member of parliament
    o An official of a government ministry
    o A political party official

Before creating a summated index scale, a principal factor analysis was run to test

whether it was reasonable to conclude that there is an underlying factor that explains the

common variance. After graphing the Eigen values (Table 3.2), the 'elbow' is clearly

evident.

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[7] Electoral turnout information used to get 18 country average information is found online at the African
Elections Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/).

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
Table 3.2

This elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that explains common variance. Specifically, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.15) explaining 62 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .69) is acceptable (n= 19,826). A factor score can be used to create an index. As mentioned earlier, it is theoretically acceptable to construct a summated index. Thus, an index with a scale from 0 (never) to 3 (often) was created.

Performance Evaluations

As stated earlier, performance evaluations refer to the "delivery" of development. As discussed in the previous chapter, performance evaluations fall into two baskets of goods: economic and political. Ever since Seymour Lipset's *Political Man* (1960) there has been a lot of debate on the role of economic development (Linz and Stepan 1996). In the end, there is strong evidence that perception of economic performance accounts for much of the variance in the citizens' support of the state (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Specifically, positive economic performance is linked to positive levels of support for the

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state. Thus, it is important to gauge overall perceptions of economic performance. To begin the inquiry, the following three questions were used:

- In general, how would you describe the present economic conditions of the country?
- Looking back, how do you rate the economic condition of the country compared to twelve months ago?
- Looking ahead, do you expect the economic conditions in this country in twelve months time to be better or worse?

There are good theoretical reasons to keep these variables independent and not create a summated index (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Specifically, prospective voters and retrospective voters tend to differ in opinion and socio-economic backgrounds (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992). One must remember that a political evaluation of government[8] performance concerning the economy also deals with more specific and immediate needs.

Along with general evaluative perceptions, it is important to gauge if an individual is satisfied with more proximate concerns that include jobs, food prices and overall economic equality (Bratton et al. 2005, 42-43). To account for these more immediate needs, Afrobarometer asks the following questions:

- How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?
  - o Managing the economy
  - o Creating jobs
  - o Keeping prices stable
  - o Narrowing gaps between rich and poor

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[8] Based on discussion in Chapter 1, government refers to the set of office holders who compete for and hold office for a limited time period defined in the rules of the political game. They are the group of people who make decisions in the name of the state. Thus, government is being used as a proxy for evaluations of the state. It is reasonable to argue that if a government is able to satisfy the citizens' economic and public needs, those same citizens become satisfied with the state or set of formal institutions in which the office-holders operate.

Running a principal factor analysis gives confidence that there is an underlying factor to these questions. After graphing the scree plot, the 'elbow' is clearly evident (Table 3.3 below). This elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that explains common variance. Specifically, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.90), which explains 63 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .80) is acceptable (n= 17,961).

Table 3.3

A factor score can be used to create an index. Yet, as previously discussed, it is theoretically possible to create a summated index. Thus, a summated index was created. It has the additional benefit of being easier to interpret and is conceptually less complicated than a factor score.

The second basket of evaluation performance involves political goods. The earlier discussion in Chapter 2 reminds us that not all evaluative performances are economically based. In fact, economic experiences might have less of an impact on state support than the delivery of political goods. Numerous studies have pointed to the stronger positive impact of political goods. Specifically, providing freedom of speech and free and fair elections involves little economic costs to the state. This is not to say that such political

goods do not come with the possibility of high political costs (e.g. removal from office).

Nevertheless, if a state is truly concerned about legitimacy, deliveries of these types of

political goods are likely to increase overall perceptions of legitimacy. Afrobarometer

questions used were:

- In this country, how often do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?
- On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?

It is reasonable to expect that those who think the state allows for freedom of expression

and promote free and fair elections will tend to be more positive in their evaluations of

the state. Thus, delivery of these political goods is expected to have a positive effect on

perceptions of state legitimacy.

As discussed earlier, there is one more political good to consider: corruption.

Specifically, a high perception of state corruption is likely to negatively affect an

individual's perception of legitimacy. Popular perceptions of corruption are an important

dimension of political goods (Bratton and Lewis 2005). To account for these popular

perceptions of corruption, Afrobarometer asks the following questions:

- How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?
  - The Prime Minister and Officials in his Office
  - Members of Parliament
  - Elected Village Development Councilors
  - National Government Officials
  - Local Government Officials
  - Police
  - Tax Officials
  - Judges and Magistrates

Running a principal factor analysis gives confidence that there is an underlying factor

to these questions. After graphing the scree plot, the 'elbow' is clearly evident (Table 3.4

below). This elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that explains common variance. Specifically, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 5.35), which explains 62 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .91) is acceptable (n= 18,573). For the sake of simplicity, a summated index was used when running the model.

Table 3.4

Trust

Trust can be said to have two dimensions: trust in institutions and inter-personal trust. The former operates vertically – individual to state – while the latter operates horizontally – individual to individual. Consistent with the definition of legitimacy as voluntary compliance to mandates of the state without the use of coercion operates along a vertical dimension, it is reasonable to expect an individual's trust in institutions to play a role in perceptions of legitimacy. As discussed in the previous chapter, institutional theories emphasize that trust is an individual's rational response to the performance of institutions (North 1990). If the set of institutions that comprise the state operate effectively, it is

likely that this will generate increased trust and consolidate legitimacy. Further, as mandates of the state are primarily disseminated and enforced through coercive institutions, it is likely that increased trust in coercive institutions of the state leads to increased levels of state legitimacy. Questions from Afrobarometer used to determine levels of trust in institutions are as follows[9]:

- How much do you trust the military, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?
- How much do you trust the police, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?
- How much do you trust courts of law, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

Running a principal factor analysis gives confidence that there is an underlying factor to these questions. After graphing the Eigen values, the 'elbow' is clearly evident (Table 3.5)

Table 3.5

This elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that explains common variance. Specifically, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue

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[9] Unfortunately for this inquiry, although Afrobarometer respondents were asked whether the tax department had the right to make people pay their taxes, they were not asked whether they trusted the tax department.

= 1.55), which explains 70 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .79) is acceptable (n= 18,302). Again, for the sake of simplicity, a summated index was used when running the model.

Attention now turns to the horizontal dimension of trust: inter-personal trust. Inter-personal trust, due to the fact that it operates along horizontal lines, is theoretically unlikely to have an affect on perceptions of legitimacy. Yet, some theorize that that "spontaneous sociability", or trust, is a key ingredient in generating economic growth (Fukuyama 1995). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that in facilitating economic growth, inter-personal trust might help explain perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, if earlier discussions on the impact of positive economic performance are accurate, this suggests that inter-personal trust, a theoretical component of economic performance, affects perceptions of legitimacy. In sum, it is important to control for this theoretically important variable. Questions from Afrobarometer used to gauge levels of trust were:

- Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?
- How much do you trust each of your neighbors?
- How much do you trust people from other ethnic groups?

It might appear puzzling why the question regarding neighbor was included in our examination of *inter*-personal trust. Within a sub-Saharan context, one's neighbors are often related either by family or through ethnic ties. Also, ethnic groups unite in urban settings and live in the same neighborhoods. However, one can never truly account for one's neighbor's ethnic background, especially in urban settings. Thus, it is an appropriate question to include in the index of inter-personal trust. A factor analysis is necessary to ensure that there is an underlying explanatory factor that explains common variance.

Running a principal factor analysis inspires confidence that there is an underlying factor to these questions. After graphing the Eigen values, the 'elbow' is evident (Table 3.6 see below). The elbow is a graphic representation of an underlying factor that explains common variance. Specifically, the factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.07), which explains 58 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .63) is acceptable (n= 19,175). Again, for the sake of simplicity, the model uses a summated index score in lieu of a factor score.

Table 3.6

Control Variables

Finally, the following usual demographic variables were controlled in this study: age, gender and educational levels. Whereas it is possible that such demographic factors will affect perceptions of legitimacy, they are not theoretical *sources* of legitimacy. In the end, it is important to include control variables at the individual level (Anderson and Mendes 2006, 101). Including these variables avoids drawing faulty inferences due to spuriousness that can result from omitting relevant variables (Stipak and Hensler 1982).

Model

What matters most in terms of helping us understand perceptions of legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa? Table 3.7 (next page) increases understanding of the various factors that explain the differences in levels of perceptions of legitimacy. Notably, all entries with missing answers or those which the respondent did not know or left unanswered were coded as missing. In Tanzania, the questions were asked but too many were missing responses or individuals answered "I do not know". As a result, Tanzania dropped out of the model completely for lack of respondents. Thus, once all variables were appropriately coded and an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) model was run, it ran with 13,994 respondents in 14^{10} sub-Saharan African states.

Results

Examining the model (Table 3.7), it is time to analyze the results. Because the data are a large-N public opinion survey, only findings of 0.05 level or greater are considered significant.

Societal Structures

First, it appears that the initial hypothesis by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967) regarding authority structure matters but in an unexpected way. Specifically, the authors suggest hierarchical societies are less likely to view the modern state as legitimate. The model suggests that individuals linked to hierarchical societies are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

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[10] As previously discussed, Cape Verde (historical) , Tanzania (high case of missing data), Zimbabwe (political climate) and Lesotho (Ethnicity) were dropped from the analysis.

Perceptions of State Legitimacy	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>|t|	Standardized Coef.
Societal Structure				
Authority Structure	0.058	0.013	0.000	0.036
1 = Hierarchical: 0 = Acephalous				
Mode of Livelihood	-0.005	0.034	0.882	-0.001
1= Pastoralist : 0 = Agriculturalist				
Ethnic Ties to the President	-0.019	0.015	0.204	-0.011
1 = ethnic ties to Pres: 0 = no ethnic ties to Pres				
Institutional Influences				
Member of Winning Party	0.074	0.014	0.000	0.045
1 = Yes: 0 = No				
Did you vote?	0.039	0.016	0.017	0.020
1= Yes: 0 = No				
Contact Index	0.007	0.013	0.566	0.005
3 = Often: 2 = Sometimes: 1 = On Occasion: 0 = Never				
Performance Evaluations				
Current as Compared to 12 months ago	-0.013	0.007	0.058	-0.018
1= Much Worse: 2 = Worse: 3 =same: 4= Better: 5 = Much Better				
Current Economic Performance	0.009	0.006	0.133	0.015
1 = Very Bad: 2 = Fairly Bad: 3 = Neither Good or Bad: 4 = Fairly Good: 5 = Very Good				
12 Month Projected Economic Performance	0.056	0.006	0.000	0.081
1= Much Worse: 2 = Worse: 3 =same: 4= Better: 5 = Much Better				
Delivery of Economic Goods Index	0.093	0.011	0.000	0.082
1= Very Badly: 2 = Fairly Badly: 3 = Fairly Well: 4 = Very Well				
Free and Fair Elections?	-0.029	0.007	0.000	-0.040
1 = completely free and fair: 2 = free and fair, but with minor problems: 3: free and fair, with major problems: 4= Not free and fair				
Careful about what you say?	-0.002	0.006	0.754	-0.003
0 = Never:1 = Rarely: 2 = Often: 3 = Always				
Perceptions of Corruption	-0.007	0.010	0.479	-0.006
0 = None: 1 =Some: 2 = Most: 3 = All				
Trust				
Institutional Trust Index	0.153	0.008	0.000	0.174
0 = Not at all: 1 = Just a little: 2 = Somewhat: 3 = A lot				
Inter-Personal Trust Index	0.022	0.011	0.045	0.018
0 = Not at all: 1 = Just a little: 2 = I trust them Somewhat: 3 = I trust them a lot				
Control Variables				
Urban-Rural	0.018	0.014	0.213	0.011
1 = Urban: 2 = Rural				
Age	0.000	0.001	0.877	0.001
Gender	0.008	0.013	0.542	0.005
1 = Male: 2 = Female				
Education	0.015	0.004	0.000	0.037

Adjusted R^2 = 0.0804   (n = 13,994)

Table 3. 7

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard note that colonial powers often used existing authority structures to administer via indirect rule (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967, 15). Indirect rule relied on the historical ruler to enforce colonial rules on his subjects on behalf of colonial authority. The historical chief was unlikely to fully support the colonial power for risk of losing his own traditional base of legitimacy. Further, by allowing the historical chief to control his population through historical means, the colonial state did little to impose its own authority structure upon the population in rural areas.

Mamdani points out that this division of rule can result in different authority structures whose legitimation rests on traditional, as opposed to rational-legal, grounds (Mamdani 1996). Further, as Mamdani points out, rural authority never really connected with the state and is, to varying degrees, autonomous from the rational legal state. If this is true, why would individuals in traditionally hierarchical societies view the state as more legitimate?

There is a possible explanation to this contrarian finding. Thinking of Mamdani's (1996) analysis, if individuals from historically hierarchical societies are effectively controlled by traditionally legitimate authority that they equate to the state, then it stands to reason that they would view the state as more legitimate. If the modern state continues to impose its rule over segments of the population through historical chains of command, then it is possible that individuals who fall under such historical authority structures will view the state as more legitimate. For this line of argument to stand, the data would have to show that rural individuals who are historically associated with hierarchical societal structures are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

Rural Groups	Mean	Std. Err.
Acephalous	3.648674	0.011889
Hierarchical	3.743788	0.009449
Difference of Means	-0.09511	0.015009

Statistically Significant at the .000 level

Table 3.8

As table 3.8 (above) shows, among rural groups, hierarchical societies are slightly, but significantly, more likely than acephalous ones to view the state as legitimate. There is no significant difference between urban respondents. The data does support the previous hypothesis. Specifically, remembering previous discussion on Mamdani, state legitimacy in rural areas rests on traditional grounds through existing hierarchical structures. Thus, it is theoretically possible that perceptions of legitimacy of rural respondents in traditionally hierarchical societies are, on average, higher than their acephalous counterpart.

Second, it appears that mode of livelihood does not appear to play a role in perceptions of legitimacy. Yet, it is important to remember that mode of livelihood is fluid in nature. In this case, mode of livelihood can be considered one component of mode of production: relation to production. A mode of production is comprised of two components: forces of production (e.g. labor, technology) and relations of production (Klein 1985, 9). Fortes and Evans-Pritchard focused on the second component, relation of production (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967). Specifically, they investigated how surplus was produced and extracted, either via agriculture or the raising and herding of livestock.

It appears almost inevitable that both forces of production and relations of production change over time. With the end of trans-Saharan trade and need for trade routes,

pastoralist societies began to settle down (Curtin et al. 1995). As they settled, their relation of production likely changed and more closely matched that of agriculturalists. Further, it is reasonable to argue that urbanization and modernization have greatly changed the forces of production, bringing about specialization and technological advances. This complicates the rather simplistic sorting of an ethnic group's mode of livelihood as either pastoral or agricultural.

Even in pre-colonial times, it was evident that there was a great variance within modes of livelihood (Crummey and Stewart 1981, 30). It is reasonable to argue that along with advances in technology, former pastoralists and agriculturalists have changed their mode of livelihood by becoming skilled laborers, artisans, or assuming other quite distinct modes of production. Classifying individuals along modes of livelihood can be highly artificial (Klein 1985, 12). Thus, it does not come as a great surprise that the available data does not support Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967) hypotheses.

Accordingly, history and the literature suggest that both hierarchical structures and modes of livelihood are likely to change over time. Neither are static concepts. While these labels might facilitate academic classification, it is unlikely that they fully capture the complexities and realities of sub-Saharan societies. In might very well be that in a given state, a pastoral society is more likely to perceive the state as legitimate. If so, it is also likely that there are other factors at work other than simply historical mode of livelihood. The available data suggests that such broad classifications do not help explain variance in perceptions of legitimacy.

Ethnic Ties to the President

Perhaps one of the most surprising results is the apparent insignificance of sharing ethnicity with the president. In the previous chapter, the very personal nature of African politics was apparent. Further, in a post-colonial state where competition for scarce resources is intense, ethnicity is a fundamental 'circle of trust' within which individuals operate (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 27). Taken together, it is reasonable to argue that individuals sharing ethnicity with the President are more likely to believe, justifiably or not, that they have greater access to the distribution of favors and material benefits. Yet, the data does not support the original hypothesis that individuals sharing ethnicity with the president are more likely to perceive the state as legitimate. In fact, there does not appear to be any statistically significant relationship.

To make sense of this particular lack of significance, it helps to think about the nature and purpose of client-patron networks. The strategy of the heads of these networks is to capture and accumulate as much wealth as possible in order to redistribute to enlarge their networks or, "in other words, the social struggles which make up the quest for hegemony and the production of the state bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in which all actors – rich and poor – participate in the world of networks" (Bayart 1993, 235). The most successful patron is likely to be the one who most successfully enlarges his network. In a context of multi-ethnic societies, this means that a patron likely has to reach beyond his/her own 'circle of trust'.

Some of Africa's most successful presidents were patrons who successfully enlarged their networks to include most relevant members of society. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the president and long lived big man of Côte d'Ivoire, ensured wide ethnic representation

among his cabinet ministers. Jomo Kenyatta was another president who enlarged his networks through careful inclusion of a variety of ethnic groups into key state positions. Such ethnic inclusion by both Kenyatta and Houphouët-Boigny "assured some minimal participation in the governing process… [that] encourages bargaining by prominent [ethnic] representatives over major issues within the key centers of power, thereby promoting collaboration rather than group competition"(Chazan *et al.* 1999, 116). Thus, it is possible that the majority of ethnic groups feel as though they have sufficient access to the state. Whereas an individual who shares ethnicity with the president might feel s/he has greater access, another might feel s/he has equal access if an ethnic representative was given the ministry of finance. In other words, even though both individuals might have unequal access, they have access nonetheless due to shared ethnicity. In turn, neither is likely to perceive the state as more legitimate than the other.

There is another factor for consideration. Afrobarometer tends to include more stable sub-Saharan countries. In their quest to enlarge their networks, presidents often form widely acceptable and fairly stable multi-ethnic coalitions. It is reasonable to expect that ethnic ties in other less stable countries remain salient partly due to the head patron's, or president's, inability to create inclusive networks. One such example might be Liberia under President Samuel Doe. Specifically, critics of Doe noted that he appointed a largely disproportionate number of fellow ethnic Krahns to positions of power (Reno 1998, 81). Krahns comprise less than four percent of Liberia's population. It is likely that ethnic competition in such an exclusive state is more salient. Consequently, sharing ethnicity with Doe means more to an individual in Liberia than it means to an individual sharing ethnicity with the president in a more ethnically inclusive society (e.g. a Kenyan

during the time of Kenyatta). Perhaps it was Doe's inability to include a sufficient minimal number of Liberian ethnic groups that facilitated his demise in 1990. This argument is consistent with the idea that political instability reflects a more fundamental country characteristic: ethnic division (Easterly and Levine 1997, 1213). In the end, it is sensible to argue that more stable countries, such as the ones represented in the Afrobarometer survey network, have been able to manage their ethnic divisions. But without data on these types of countries, it is difficult to confirm these arguments.

In sum, the lack of significance in the relationship between presidents and individuals who share their ethnicity does not mean that ethnicity itself is not salient. The data simply suggests that in multi-ethnic societies, patron-client networks rely on fairly large networks. In the quest for hegemony of the state, the patron develops personal relationships with individuals that most facilitate his quest. In a multi-ethnic state, not all necessary clients within the network are likely to share ethnicity. This results in more ethnic groups successfully included in the network of distribution of state resources. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that as long as an individual has access, s/he is likely to perceive the state as legitimate.

Influence of Institutional Context

The discussion in the previous chapter suggested institutional context is likely to affect perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, institutions that permit individuals to contest the legitimate right to control the state affect perceptions of legitimacy: political parties, elections (Linz and Stepan 1996, 8).

Two of the three variables related to institutional context appear to be significant. First, individuals who associate themselves with the party in power appear more likely to view

the state as legitimate. This is consistent with the literature. The party plays an important role in facilitating stability (Huntington 1965, 425). In sub-Saharan Africa, institutions are notably weak (Chabal and Daloz 1999). It is exactly in such a context that institutions play a vital role (Huntington 1968, 90-91). Specifically, the party can be a primary institutional source of legitimacy and authority due to lack of strong alternatives. Parties act as source of legitimacy as they are the institutional embodiment of the popular will (Huntington 1968, 91). Through the organization, political parties seek to increase participation.

Parties allow individuals to participate in the functions of the state and compete for the legitimate right to control the state. Such active participation in the state is likely to positively affect perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, an individual who identifies with a party or is actively involved in a party is directly involved in an institution that helps comprise the state. That individual is, in effect, an integral part in the function of the state. If functioning properly, the party embodies the popular will while shaping the state in the process. It is thus reasonable to argue that a state shaped by the will of the people is more likely to be perceived as legitimate as it reflects, in varying degrees, the will of each individual involved in a political party.

This is not to say that African political parties do not suffer from difficulties or weaknesses. Levels of institutionalization in African parties tend to be lower than in other regions of the world (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001). In most cases, a single dominant party prevails while many smaller less capable parties tend to dissolve as quickly as they were formed (van de Walle 2003). Another problem tends to be the excessive personalization of political parties (Ihonvbere 1996, 356).

It is these very weaknesses of the African party that enhance the importance of being part of the winning party. Specifically, being a member of a political party is of very little use if the party is not in power, and more importantly, if the party is not headed by the president. Minor parties have little role and little capacity to distribute scarce resources. Consequently, being part of the party is not as important as being a member of the party in power whose ties to the president all but guarantees access to state resources.

However, a broad base of state legitimation is not necessarily ensured if the only reason an individual feels that the state is more legitimate is because he is associated with the party in power. Specifically, if the ruling party is not inclusive in nature, it is reasonable to expect it to be a poor source of legitimacy partly because a non-inclusive party, by its very nature excludes significant segments of the population. Thus it is important that a party in power remains inclusive, and even better, each party can credibly compete for power as the parties mature and institutionalize. There is reason to believe that this is taking place as studies have shown that party institutionalization in longer standing African democracies is higher and that their capacity is greater than more emergent democracies (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001).

Second, it appears that voting positively affects perceptions of legitimacy. This does not come as much of a surprise. It appears that such routine behaviors as voting does in fact increase overall perceptions of legitimacy (Diamond 1999, 65). Voting appears to promote habituation, in turn leading to an internalization of the rules of the game of the state (Rustow 1970). Thus, as expected, voting appears to positively affect perceptions of state legitimacy. Yet, it is important to remember that not everyone who reported voting actually voted. Moreover, not everyone who voted did so willingly. Some may have

been intimidated into doing so, thus undermining their perception of the legitimacy of the process.

Performance Evaluations

As explained in the previous chapter, performance evaluations deal with the delivery of goods: economic and public. One of the first requirements for the delivery of goods is a modicum of stability. Every country included in the analysis indicated sufficient levels of stability to deliver both economic and political goods. It appears that in general, such practical tests of personal and collective self-interests affect perceptions of legitimacy.

First, the data appears to support the literature suggesting that state economic performance matters. Although the state might have the most difficulty delivering economic matters, it cannot ignore its economic performance. The data suggests that individuals are concerned with such economic matters as job creation and management of the economy. The data supports the literature (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000) in so far as it appears that economic perceptions help explain some of the variances in the voters' perceptions of state legitimacy.

There is an interesting finding. Specifically, current economic performance of the state does not seem to affect perceptions of legitimacy. This suggests that individuals understand that much of present economic performances are, to varying degrees, affected by the international community (Brown 1995). Yet, the delivery of economic goods index is statistically significant and comprised of questions evaluating present economic performance of the state[11] (e.g. do you think the state is doing a good job creating jobs?).

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[11] Of note, statistical test indicate that there is no significant collinearity and that the two variables are not significantly correlated.

Why would one set of present concerns matter while the other, present economic performance of the state, appears to be non-significant? Remembering previous discussion in Chapter 2, this makes sense. Specifically, individuals are self-interested actors who are more likely to support a state that best serves their interest (Bates 1976). It is thus reasonable that to argue that they are less concerned with the daily macro management of the economy largely out of their control than whether they have a job and can adequately provide for their family. Both are present concerns, but the latter is much more immediate in nature. Again, given Africa's "politics of the belly" (Bayart 1993) in which the power of the ruler depends on his ability to feed his followers, this finding should not be surprising. In other terms, why should an individual listen to a state that cannot provide him a job?

Second, in support of the literature, the data suggests that the delivery of political goods matters. However, it appears that economic performance evaluations matter more than political performance evaluations when looking at the standardized coefficients. Further, it does not appear that two of the three indicators of political performance evaluation, freedom of speech and corruption, affect perceptions of legitimacy. This does not support Evans and Whitefield's (1995) argument that economic experiences may have less effect than political ones on an individual's support of the state. It could be that the economic situation in sub-Saharan Africa warrants more overall attention than political matters. It is thus reasonable to argue that providing income for individuals to help support their family is more important than the right to free speech.

Additionally, political goods such as free and fair elections do not come without rather large economic costs. Providing free and fair elections strongly and positively affects

perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, states that allow for completely fair and free

elections increase overall positive perceptions of legitimacy. Yet, the costs associated

with free and fair elections can be staggering for developing countries. The 1997

elections in Mali cost over $30 million (News 2002). This further suggests that although

individuals might value political goods over economic performance, delivery of said

goods is made much more difficult should economic performance falter.

In sum, it appears that both economic and political performance evaluations matter. Of

the two, the data suggests that economic performance evaluations are more important. It

is important to remember that certain political goods require economic resources. Given

the rather somber economic conditions[12], it is not surprising that performance evaluations

focus somewhat more on economic rather than political concerns.

Trust

The data suggests that an individual's trust in institutions matters. Of all factors

considered, an individual's trust in the institutions of the state appears to have the most

significant effect on perceptions of legitimacy[13]. Further, when examining standardized

coefficients, this variable showed the strongest overall impact on perceptions of

legitimacy thus far.

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[12] The average GNI per capita in the 15 Afrobarometer countries is $822. GNI per capita defined: "Gross national income (GNI) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by mid-year population. GNI per capita in US dollars is converted using the World Bank Atlas method." (http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/stats_popup1.html - accessed 9 October 2006)

[13] The importance of an individual's trust in institutions raises endogeneity concerns. This particular concern is addressed later in the chapter.

It is important to remember that the legitimacy index is theoretically rooted in voluntary compliance to the mandates of the state. State mandates are often promulgated and enforced through the courts, the police and at times, the military. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that in order for an individual to think that the police have a right to enforce the law s/he must first trust the police as an institution. One can comply out of fear, but it appears that true legitimacy rests on trust.

There are some interesting long-term implications to this finding. If states want to increase their legitimacy, as measured by voluntary compliance, then foreign donors and other interested parties might consider helping states develop ethnically diverse and professional police, courts and national military. Thus, it is important to think about the importance of an individual's trust in institutions.

The importance of an individual's trust in state institutions might be illustrated by briefly examining ethnic relations between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. There is debate as to the pre-colonial relationship between Hutus and Tutsis[14] and the effect of Belgian colonial power on the relationship. Regardless, it is pretty clear that by the time of independence there was strong Hutu resentment towards the minority Tutsi population (Uvin 1999). Upon independence, Hutus gained control of the state and the military apparatus. Hutu resentment was made apparent in the Tutsi genocides of the early 1960s, killing somewhere between 140,000 and 250,000 Tutsis (Uvin 1999, 256).

In April 1994, political events resulted in a Hutu led genocide of over half a million comprised mostly of Tutsi men, women and children. The presidential guard and Hutu militias primarily conducted this genocide (Uvin 1999, 261). Later that year, the Tutsi

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[14] Rwanda is divided roughly 90 percent Hutu and 10 percent Tutsi Encyclopoedia Britannica, *Rwanda* (2006 [cited 2 October 2006]); available from http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-214507/Rwanda.

led Rwandan Patriotic Front overthrew the primarily Hutu government and took control of the state apparatus.

Today, a primarily Tutsi government controls the state in Rwanda. Due to past use of the military against them, the Tutsi government quickly assumed leadership and control of the army. The Hutus, aware of the genocidal history, are justifiably concerned about the current Tutsi dominance of the military. Given the history of the military as a means of advancing ethnic genocidal plans (Prunier 1998), it is not unreasonable to argue that there is an underlying lack of trust in the military by the ethnic group that is out of power (Reed 1998).

It is clear that reconciling these two ethnicities requires more than trust in the military. Yet, if overall trust in the military can be increased, it stands to reason that individuals from both camps might rest easier. Alleviating fears of impending genocide can only serve to increase long term state stability and legitimacy. Policies that seek to a) professionalize the military (e.g. employing professional soldiers who defend the constitution rather than an individual or set of individuals) and b) ensure broad ethnic representation at all levels of the military can only help modern day Rwanda. Of course, Rwanda is an extreme example. Yet, it is not too hard to see how misuse and abuse of the military can lead to deep insecurities that serves to greatly undermine overall state legitimacy.

In sum, it is imperative that states help foster trust between individuals and its main mechanisms of enforcement. There is no doubt that a state can garner compliance to rules and regulations through the brute use of force, but individuals are more likely to comply if they trust those institutions in the first place. Additionally, legitimacy, as

previously defined, is voluntary compliance *without* the use of force. An individual's trust in institutions appears to be very important for the legitimacy of sub-Saharan African states. Programs that foster the professional (e.g. bureaucratic) state institutions might be an efficacious means of increasing legitimacy.

Second, contrary to expectations, the data suggests that inter-personal trust matters for perceptions of legitimacy. Yet, inter-personal trust is not nearly as significant and does not have as strong an impact as an individual's trust in institutions on perceptions of state legitimacy. Notably, although inter-personal trust has a statistically significant and positive effect on legitimacy, the data suggest that its effect is rather small – standardized coefficient = 0.018.

Nevertheless, it is possible that such inter-personal trust facilitates the development of complex institutions (Fukuyama 1995). In turn, these complex institutions facilitate overall economic performance of the state, enhancing overall perceptions of legitimacy in the process. Legitimacy, as previously defined, operates vertically. As discussed in the last chapter, inter-personal trust is a horizontal concept. As such, it is theoretically reasonable that although inter-personal trust positively affects perceptions of legitimacy, its effect is mostly indirect in nature.

Relying on the literature focusing on inter-personal trust (Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart 2000; Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000), it is plausible that inter-personal trust increases overall perceptions of legitimacy by allowing for more complex and effective state institutions that can, in turn, provide higher levels of economic and political performance. Putnam notes that complex institutions have the added complication of monitoring inter-personal behavior (Putnam *et al.* 1993, 164). Specifically, how can any one individual in

a society trust another to keep his word, or fulfill the terms of a given contract? As Thomas Hobbes (1651) notes, the state can enforce a contract. Yet, Gambetta points out those societies "which rely heavily on the use of force are likely to be less efficient, more costly, and more unpleasant than those where trust is maintained by other means" (Gambetta 1988, 221). Societies that exhibit higher levels of inter-personal trust are less likely to rely on the use of force, thus more likely to run efficiently and at lower costs.

Hence, it appears that both an individual's trust in institutions and inter-personal trust matter to varying degrees. Of the two, as theory would indicate, an individual's trust in institutions is more important and has a greater overall effect on perceptions of state legitimacy.

Potential Endogeneity

It is important to address the issues of potential endogeneity. As stated in the first chapter, Englebert's (2000) study posited that increased levels of legitimacy results in increased economic performance. However, this research project predicts that positive economic conditions lead to increased state legitimacy. Thus, there is a potential endogeneity problem.

To address this problem, one can run an instrumental variable (2SLS) regression[15]. The results suggest that the original Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model does not have an endogeneity problem. Consequently, it is reasonable to run a regular regression with perceptions of state legitimacy as the dependent variable. Notably, this runs counter to Englebert's expectations.

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[15] See Appendix A for model and statistical tests.

There is another issue of potential endogeneity. Specifically, an individual's trust in institutions appears to be the most consistent and statistically significant – when looking at standardized coefficients – variable in explaining variances in perceptions of legitimacy. This appears to hold true when the model was run across all Afrobarometer countries, in turn raising a question of endogeneity. Running a 2SLS regression[16], it appears that the OLS model does not have an endogeneity problem in terms of an individual's trust in institutions. Once again, the results suggest that it is reasonable to run a regular regression with perceptions of state legitimacy as the dependent variable.

It is important to note that these tests are not entirely conclusive. Specifically, it is very likely, as discussed in the previous chapter that some endogeneity exists. Given the complexities of the political world I fully acknowledge the likely reciprocal relationship between an individual's trust in institutions and legitimacy. Yet, as previously argued, the direction is primarily an individual's trust in institutions leading to variance in perceptions of legitimacy, not the other way. These statistical tests allow me to proceed with some level of confidence.

Caveat: R Squared

Here, the low levels of explained variance in the model are addressed. Specifically, the model, with an R^2 of 0.0804, explains very little, a little less than 10 percent, of the variance. Yet, William Berry and Stanley Feldman caution that "researchers should be careful to recognize the limitations of R^2 as a measure of goodness of fit" (Berry and Feldman 1985, 15). Simply stated, one must be cautious about placing too much importance on attempts in maximizing the R^2 (Hanushek and Jackson 1977; King 1986).

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[16] Ibid

On the extreme end, Christopher Achen states that the R^2 "measures nothing of serious importance" (Achen 1982, 61). Nevertheless, one should not dismiss a model simply based on a low R^2.

In the model, statistical significance is as theory predicts. Yet, these findings are presented with caution. The amount of explained variance (R^2= 0.0804) is low, even for public opinion data. The model does not capture over 90 percent of what explains perceptions of legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the underlying theory is solid and there are good reasons to believe that what the model is showing is instructive. This is an initial attempt at systematically and quantitatively studying perceptions of legitimacy as earlier defined in sub-Saharan states. There are no other studies like it. This research is an important step in laying the necessary groundwork for future research. Further, this research facilitates the discussion on the development of functional indicators of legitimacy.

Conclusion

This chapter set to test competing sources of legitimacy in hopes of better explaining the roots of state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa. The data appears to indicate that legitimacy rests on various theoretical foundations. Two general findings follow:

First, legitimacy rests on a combination of factors. It does not appear that legitimacy is simply a function of X. Several theoretical indicators proved to be significant. Further, one must remember that this model does not take into account the wide variations within each of the 15 countries. Thus, it is important to examine how these indicators differ for any one given country. This will lend needed context to the findings. More importantly,

the study of variations within a country provides a deeper understanding of the role these various indicators play in relation to legitimacy.

Second, the only consistently significant indicator across each country was an individual's trust in institutions. This suggests that trust is at the very core of legitimacy. Here, trust was measured with respect to the courts, the military and the police. Additional research is necessary to examine how the use of these coercive institutions affects levels of trust. Specifically, one would not expect the issuance of a traffic citation to decrease levels of trust in the police, but might expect the use of tear gas during an initially peaceful demonstration to decrease levels of trust. Thus, future research must address and categorize various courses of action available to these institutions of interests to measure any effect those might have on perceptions of legitimacy. Further, this data will allow for possible development of policy prescriptions to help states increase their overall legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens.

Accordingly, this chapter sets the groundwork for future research on state legitimacy in Africa. It helps focus future efforts in areas that are most likely to be fruitful. The one area that stands out is an individual's trust in institutions. Consequently, future research will be devoted to better understanding and explaining how institutional trust works in affecting perceptions of legitimacy. If an individual's trust in institutions is at the very core of legitimacy, it stands to reason that there is a need to reflect on policies and mechanisms that might facilitate the increase of trust in those institutions of interests. This is something that I will further address in the last chapter of this dissertation.

Before stating that an individual's trust in institutions has the strongest effect on perceptions of legitimacy, there is one control that needs to be further examined.

Specifically, it is important to remember that the data used in this analysis is collected from 14 different countries. It is quite possible that these findings are affected by individual countries. Specifically, the model as defined is underspecified, or affected by specification error (Anderson and Mendes 2006). By omitting country variables, relevant variables that impact the findings might have been omitted (Gujarati 1994, 510). Specifically, part of the country effect is being absorbed by other variables, in turn introducing bias in coefficients (Fox 1997, 127). Thus, the next chapter will attempt to account for country specific factors that might affect general findings.

IV – sub-Saharan Country Context

This chapter seeks to account for whether country specific context affects the model used in the previous chapter, specifically, if individual level-factors such as perceptions of legitimacy are influenced by contextual factors such as countries. It will be determined whether individuals sampled from the same context, c, share common influences. As Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones note, "the observations in context [c] are not truly independent; they are *clustered* and duplicate one another to some extent" (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220). In other words, the more individuals share common experiences within a given context, the more likely they are to be similar (Kreft and Leeuw 1998, 9).

To explore whether country influences affect individual perceptions, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part covers whether countries affect the model used in the previous chapter. Specifically, robust standard errors and country dummies will help determine whether contextual factors matter.

Upon determining that context affects the model, the second part consists of a Multilevel Residual Maximum Likelihood (REML) regression to analyze the Afrobarometer data. Before running the model and discussing the results, two specific contextual factors within countries that might affect individual perceptions will be examined: ethnic fractionalization and electoral institutions. Variables will then be generated to account for these country specific factors to be used in the REML regression.

In the final part of this chapter, the original OLS regression will be run in one country, Mali, to further illustrate that context matters. When examining the model in each

country, Mali stood out. Specifically, Mali was the only country in which sharing ethnic ties with the president affected perceptions of legitimacy in an unpredictable manner. Interestingly, there was a negative relationship; sharing ethnic ties with the president lowered perceptions of legitimacy in a statistically significant way. This is a counter-intuitive finding that initially appears to contradict the literature. In the end, this model will point to the importance of understanding the context of any given country that is being observed.

Country Effects

As mentioned earlier, it is possible that context is affecting individual perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, if country factors affect individual attitudes it is likely that the responses are not independently and identically distributed (Zorn 2006, 329). Gary King notes that this breaks an important but often unstated assumption in many statistical analyses, that of *exchangeability* (King 2001, 498). Exchangeability "means that after taking into account the explanatory variables, one should not expect to be able to predict or explain [the dependent variable] any better by knowing the names of the [countries]… (exchangeability is what enables us to use many observations to reduce our uncertainty in making a small number of inferences; it is the assumption that area studies scholars are implicitly critiquing when they point out the uniqueness of each individual case)" (King 2001, 498).

In data in which individual observations are clustered or grouped, as in the cross-national data used in the previous chapter, it is unreasonable to expect individual observations to be independent and identically distributed, in turn breaking the exchangeability assumption of the data. To attempt to correct the violation of the

exchangeability assumption in the presence of clustering, one can begin by applying robust standard errors. Specifically, the researcher can run a regression using robust standard errors while clustering the data by country. This allows correction for the non-exchangeability of data, even when the precise nature of the dependence is unknown (Zorn 2006, 329).

The most important aspect of running a regression using robust standard errors is the choice of the dimension on which to cluster the data (Zorn 2006, 338). In this case, the most likely reason for non-exchangeability is the fact that individual responses are collected by country. Specifically, responses from individuals from any one country are unlikely to be independent and identically distributed. To test whether any given country affects individual responses, the coefficient from the original OLS were compared with the OLS w/ robust standard errors clustered by country – only statistically significant coefficients[1] are presented.

As seen in Table 4.1 (below), clustering data by country changes the statistical significance of the coefficients. Most notably, four of the coefficients that were significant in the original OLS regression lose their statistical significance: authority structure, act of voting, inter-personal trust and free and fair elections. This suggests that the original OLS regression might have violated the exchangeability assumption (King 2001). Specifically, there is some clustering among respondents; individual responses might not be independent and identically distributed.

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[1] The full model of the standard OLS regression can be found in Chapter 3. The full model of the OLS with Robust Standard Errors clustered by country can be found in Appendix B

Perceptions of State Legitimacy	OLS (Individual Level Only)	OLS (Robust Std. Errors)
Constant	2.923***	2.923***
	(0.061)	(0.100)
Authority Structure	0.058***	0.058
	(0.013)	(0.048)
Member of Winning Party	0.074***	0.074**
	(0.014)	(0.023)
Did you Vote?	0.039*	0.039
	(0.016)	(0.022)
Projected Economic Performance	0.056***	0.056***
	(0.006)	(0.012)
Economic Performance Index	0.093***	0.093***
	(0.011)	(0.022)
Free and Fair Elections?	-0.029***	-0.029
	(0.007)	(0.016)
Individual's Trust in Institutions	0.153***	0.153***
	(0.008)	(0.023)
Inter-Personal Trust Index	0.022*	0.022
	(0.011)	(0.020)
Education	0.015***	0.015*
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Adjusted R square	0.080	0.082

Table 4.1[2]

One of the most common ways in dealing with clustering is simply to absorb contextual or subgroup differences through a series of dummy variables (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220). In such a case, one should include as many dummy variables as there are clusters or subgroups. Dummy variables have two distinctive advantages: 1) they absorb the unique variation among the subgroups and 2) they can be implemented easily within a standard OLS framework (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220). In this case, the original OLS regression pooled data from 14 sub-Saharan African countries. Thus, dummy

[2] ***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05

variables were created for the 14 countries in the original cross-national sample and another OLS was run.

The results can be seen in Table 4.2 (below). As is clearly evident, taking country context into consideration significantly affects the findings of the original OLS model run in the previous chapter. Note that adding the country dummy increases the overall adjusted R^2 and helps explain more of the variance in perceptions of legitimacy.

Perceptions of State Legitimacy	OLS (Individual Level Only)	OLS (w/ Robust S.E)	OLS (w/ Country Dummies)
Constant	2.923***	2.923***	2.978***
	(0.061)	(0.100)	(0.068)
Authority Structure	0.058***	0.058	0.004
	(0.013)	(0.048)	(0.017)
Member of Winning Party	0.074***	0.074**	0.049***
	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.015)
Did you Vote?	0.039*	0.039	0.021
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.016)
Projected Economic Performance	0.056***	0.056***	0.051***
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.006)
Delivery of Economic Goods Index	0.093***	0.093***	0.075***
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.011)
Free and Fair Elections?	-0.029***	-0.029	-0.038***
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.007)
Corruption	-0.007	-0.007	-0.037***
	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.011)
Individual's Trust in Institutions	0.153***	0.153***	0.169***
	(0.008)	(0.023	(0.009)
Inter-Personal Trust Index	0.022*	0.022	0.024*
	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.011)
Urban Rural	0.018	0.018	0.043**
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.014)
Education	0.015***	0.015*	0.011**
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Benin			0.101
			0.042
Botswana			-0.062
			0.039
Ghana			0.327***
			0.040
Kenya			-0.109**
			0.038
Madagascar			-0.122**
			0.039

(continued)

Malawi			-0.218***
			0.042
Mali			-0.050
			0.040
Mozambique			-0.015
			0.043
Namibia			0.042
			0.039
Nigeria			0.177***
			0.032
Senegal			0.022
			0.042
South Africa			0.072*
			0.035
Uganda			0.220***
			0.034
Adjusted R square	0.080	0.082	0.106

Table 4.2[3]

Further, accounting for countries produces the suddenly high statistical significance of perceptions of corruptions in explaining the variances in perceptions of state legitimacy. Yet, before looking into the significance, or lack thereof, of each independent variable, a critical weakness of the dummy approach must be noted. Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones comment that "[d]ummy variables are only indicators of sub-group differences; they do not explain why the regression regimes for the subgroups are different" (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220). Simply, dummy variables contain no information. They merely suggest that context matters without identifying the characteristic in each country that specifically affects individual perceptions of legitimacy.

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[3] ***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05; Zambia as reference category for country dummies

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Multilevel Modeling

Recent developments in research have resulted in the formulation of multilevel or hierarchical models (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Multilevel models are used for data involving two levels of analysis. These are referred to as level-1 and level-2 with the assumption that level-1 observations are nested in level-2 units. Thus, when applied to research, "level-1 observations may refer to individuals and level-2 units may refer to contextual units, for example countries" (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 221). Data for level-2 units allows us to specify exactly what it is in each country that affects individual perceptions and attitudes.

The first inquiry is whether perceptions of legitimacy vary across the two levels of analysis of interest: individual (level-1) and country (level-2). An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) decomposes the variance in perceptions of legitimacy to show whether any variance across levels is significant, *i.e.* whether country effects affect perceptions of legitimacy in a statistically significant way.

ANOVA

Parameter	Estimate
Fixed Effects	
Constant	3.677*** (.046)
Variance Components	
Country Level	.029* (.012)
Individual Level	.639*** (.006)
-2 x Log Likelihood	- 46808

Table 4.3[4]

[4] ***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05

The ANOVA (Table 4.3, above) shows us that perceptions of legitimacy vary across levels. More importantly, all of the variance components are statistically significant at the .05 level or greater. This suggests that country level variables matter and affect perceptions of legitimacy at the individual level in a statistically significant manner. Ignoring country level "leads the researcher to neglect the clustering of observations...at the national level" (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 230). As determined in an earlier discussion, a simple OLS regression is inappropriate for this data as clustering at the country level is apparent. Further, how country dummy variables can account for country context was observed, but this approach is atheoretical in the sense that the dummy variable does not have any theoretical merit, it simply absorbs context.

To proceed with this multi-level analysis of the data, contextual factors that are likely to affect individual perceptions of legitimacy within any one given country need to be included in this research. Theoretically, there are two factors that I hypothesize affect individual perceptions in any given country: ethnic fractionalization and electoral institutions.

Ethnic Fractionalization

In a 1997 cross-country analysis of Africa, William Easterly and Ross Levine found that ethnic divisions have a statistically negative effect on economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997). Specifically, they state: "High ethnic diversity is closely associated with low schooling, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, and insufficient infrastructure" (Easterly and Levine 1997, 1241). Simply, they argue that moving from a country with a homogenous population to a country with a

heterogeneous one corresponds with a decrease in annual economic growth rates of more than two percent (Posner 2004, 849).

Easterly and Levine's position has been broadly accepted as other scholars have confirmed their findings and many economists now include a measure of ethnic diversity in their cross-national studies (Alesina *et al.* 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Collier and Gunning 1999; Easterly 2001). Whether leading to higher costs associated with rent-seeking among competitive groups (Collier 1998), or the fact that levels of ethnic fractionalization requires more state intervention and regulation (La Porta *et al.* 1999), economists suggest that ethnic diversity negatively impacts economic growth.

Besides the widely accepted economic impact of ethnic diversity, there is some discussion as to the relationship between ethnic diversity and associated levels of ethnic conflict. Karl Deutsch (1961) argues that ethnic diversity strains and destroys the cohesion of states. Along those same lines, scholars have argued that long-standing ethnic differences between groups challenge the stability of the state (Horowitz 1985; Huntington 1996; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Further, scholars argue that ethnic differences are emphasized and crystallized by political entrepreneurs in hopes of reaching their own political or economic end (Anderson 1983).

In his study of the conflict in the Great Lakes Region – Congo-Kinshasa, Rwanda, and Burundi – Crawford Young notes the centrality of ethnicity in explaining the reasons behind the conflict (Young 2006). Specifically, ethnic diversity can lead to inter-state conflict that negatively impacts the state's ability to monopolize legitimate force over its population. Yet, as Fearon and Laitin claim, there is no strong empirical evidence justifying that ethnicity increases the onset of civil violence (Fearon and Laitin 1996).

They argue that economic and geographic variables serve as better predictors of conflict than levels of ethnic diversity.

In sum, the evidence appears to indicate that ethnic diversity has an effect on the state. The empirical evidence suggesting that higher levels of ethnic fragmentation lead to lower levels of economic development appears more convincing than the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on violence. Yet, neither can be dismissed in its entirety as both are likely to have some level of effect on the state's ability to provide security, a prime political good (Rotberg 2004). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the potential economic and social effects of ethnic diversity on the macro (national) level will have some impact on the micro (individual) level (Cho 2006).

Electoral Rules

Another macro level factor likely to influence individual perceptions of state legitimacy is electoral institutions. It is worth remembering that political struggles are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place because institutions shape the goals that political actors pursue, privileging some and disadvantaging others (Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 3). More specifically, Cox notes that the laws and practices regulating electoral competition can affect the behavior of voters in various and sometimes profound ways (Cox 1999, 145). Further, scholars have noted that the choice of electoral rules and regulations can have varying effects on levels of ethnic division and polarization in Africa (Horowitz 1991; LeBas 2006; Reynolds 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998). For example, Donald Horowitz notes that in states in which electoral rules lead to the proliferation of parties, interethnic coalitions may be necessary, in turn mitigating ethnic

tensions (Horowitz 1991, 359). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that different macro-level electoral rules have an effect on micro-level behavior.

At the most basic level, electoral rules can be classified as either majoritarian or proportional in nature (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). Closer examination reveals clear patterns of organization along two broad dimensions: accountability and representativeness.

Lijphart (1999) links majoritarian systems to an emphasis on accountability, while consensual or proportional systems emphasize representativeness. A purely majoritarian system consists of the absolute sovereignty of the majority (Tocqueville 2000, 248). A majoritarian system favors concentrated policy-making power (Powell 2000, 5). The appeal of a majoritarian system lies in the directness and clarity of the connection between voter and elected official. This is in sharp contrast to a more dispersed conception of power whose policy making "must be the outcome of complex bargaining between winners and losers, ins and outs" (Powell 2000: 5). Such dispersion of power makes accountability difficult to pinpoint. Nevertheless, those who favor such dispersed power arrangements, or more proportional institutions, want to incorporate all factions of society to the policy-making arena (Powell 2000, 6).

Without debating the respective merits of any particular electoral system, it is clear that electoral systems are likely to affect individual level perceptions in any given state. The most typical form of majoritarian electoral rules is one in which the candidates receiving the most votes wins the election: first past the post (FPTP). FPTP rules emphasize a clear and direct connection between voter and elected official but are less concerned with minority representation and can be viewed as exclusionary. The other type of electoral

system is commonly referred to as one of proportional representation (PR). PR electoral rules are more inclusive and allow for greater minority viewpoint. Conversely, accountability of elected officials is much more difficult in a system that stresses dispersion of power.

In sum, electoral rules are likely to influence individual level perceptions of legitimacy. There is a lot of debate as to which set of rules is more appropriate for ethnically diverse states such as the ones found in sub-Saharan Africa (Reynolds 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998), specifically because scholars understand the importance of electoral rules in shaping individual behavior. Accordingly, electoral rules are used in this study as a country level variable to help understand how context affects individual perceptions of legitimacy.

Country Contextual Variables

In an earlier discussion, the advantages of a multilevel in cases involving two levels of analysis were addressed. In the original OLS regression, the data was comprised of entirely individual level observations. Using dummy variables to account for country context suggested that context matters. Yet, dummy variables are atheoretical and do little to leverage existing knowledge on how context affects individual level behavior.

Previously, it was shown how two contextual factors – ethnic fractionalization and electoral rules – might affect individual level behavior in any given state. Now, these factors need to be operationalized to generate level-2 variables that can be used in a multilevel model. Two substantively interesting predictors were generated to run a multilevel model. First, the *Politically Relevant Ethnic Group* (PREG) measure developed by Daniel Posner (2004) was incorporated to represent ethnic fractionalization.

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Rather than simply including all ethnic groups in a country regardless of whether they engage in political competition, Posner – as PREG implies – only accounts for politically relevant groups.

Country	PREG	Electoral System [a]
Benin	0.30	List-PR
Botswana	0.00	FPTP
Ghana	0.44	FPTP
Kenya	0.57	FPTP
Madagascar	0.00	MMP
Malawi	0.55	FPTP
Mali	0.13	TRS
Mozambique	0.36	List-PR
Namibia	0.55	List-PR
Nigeria	0.66	FPTP
Senegal	0.14	Parallel-PB
South Africa	0.49	List-PR
Uganda	0.63	FPTP
Zambia	0.71	FPTP
Mean	0.42	

a. Source: International IDEA www.idea.int
Key: FPTP=First Past the Post, MMP = Mixed Member Proportional,
TRS=Two-Round System, PB=Party Block, List PR=List Proportional
Representation

Table 4.4

Second, a country level dummy variable was generated for proportional systems (1 for PR systems; 0 for the others). Table 4.4 (above) gives information on varying levels of ethnic fractionalization and electoral system across the 14 sub-Saharan countries.

Multilevel REML

Now that this study contains two theoretical country-level variables that help explain contextual differences between countries, a multilevel model can be performed. All individual variables used in the original OLS remain as level-1 observations nested in the two newly created Level-2 country level variables.

Results

Before examining the results of the multilevel REML model, it is worth commenting on

the statistical impact of substantive country level variables. First, considering random

effects, the variance components at both levels of analysis remain significant after

controlling for the predictors at these levels (Table 4.5 below). This suggests that country

level variables are important and significantly account for varying levels of individual

perceptions. Rather than including atheoretical dummies that absorbed context, the

multilevel model allows inclusion of substantively interesting predictors.

Perceptions of State Legitimacy	ANOVA	Multilevel
Constant	3.678***	2.918***
	(0.046)	(0.116)
-2 x Log Likelihood	46808	31930
Variance (Country Level Only)	0.029*	0.021*
	(0.012)	(0.010)
Variance (Individual Level)	0.639***	0.566***
	(0.006)	(0.007)
	(0.006)	(0.007)

> Table 4.5[5]

In the end, it is clear that when examining perceptions of legitimacy, country context

must be taken into account. Table 4.6 (below) shows that certain predictors initially

believed to be statistically significant in explaining varying perceptions of state

legitimacy are no longer significant once a multilevel model was used to account for

country level factors.

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[5] ***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05; full model in Appendix B; This table only shows the fixed effects and variance components to compare increase explanatory power over ANOVA. Table 4.6 shows statistically significant independent variables of multilevel model.

Perceptions of State Legitimacy	OLS	Multilevel REML
Constant	2.923***	2.918***
	(0.061)	(0.116)
Authority Structure	0.058***	0.008
	(0.013)	(0.017)
Member of Winning Party	0.074***	0.049***
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Did you Vote?	0.039*	0.021
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Projected Economic Performance	0.056***	0.051***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Delivery of Economic Goods Index	0.093***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Free and Fair Elections?	-0.029***	-0.038***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Corruption	-0.007	-0.036***
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Individual's Trust in Institutions	0.153***	0.169***
	(0.008)	(0.009)
Inter-Personal Trust Index	0.022*	0.023*
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Urban Rural	0.018	0.042**
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education	0.015***	0.011**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Country Level Variables		
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups		0.202
		(0.180)
Electoral System		0.011
		(0.085)

Adjusted R square	0.08	
2 x Log Likelihood		33248
Explained Variance (Country Level Only)		3.58%*
Explained Variance (Individual Level Only)		96.42%***

Table 4.6[6][7]

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[6] ***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05; Table only shows statistically significant independent variables. The full model can be found in Appendix B.

[7] Of note, I looked at the possible interaction effect between the country level predictor PREG and an individual's trust in institutions. Theoretically, it was worth examining whether an individual at a given trust level would have a different effect on perceptions of legitimacy based on levels of ethnic fractionalization. The interaction variable was not statistically significant and was left out of the final model.

It is interesting to note that one factor that was statistically very significant (P=<.001) in the original OLS is no longer statistically significant in the multilevel model. Specifically, it no longer appears that belonging to a historically hierarchical or acephalous society affects individual level perceptions of legitimacy.

Authority Structure

The lack of statistical significance of the authority structure associated with any individual is not as surprising as one might think. First, almost 50 years have passed since colonial powers awarded independence to most of the sub-Saharan African countries. It has been argued that those colonial powers undermined and reconstructed political authority in the third world (Migdal 1988, 64-88). Additionally, new African elites immediately adopted the structures and institutions the colonial powers left behind (Davidson 1972). Africa's new leaders did not foresee the newly independent regimes as anything but within the mold of the European nation-state. Liberation from colonial rule went hand in hand with liberation from traditional structures (Davidson 1992, 74).

Given the historical evidence, it is plausible that pre-colonial structures were irrevocably changed. Regardless of whether an ethnic group was broadly classified as acephalous or hierarchical, the colonial experience likely changed their hierarchical structure.

A good example of an irrevocably changed hierarchy might be the Igbo in Nigeria. The Igbo are considered among the most acephalous of African societies (Curtin et al. 1995, 71). They mobilized to form the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) to represent their interests and compete for the state's control of the state at the national level. Other minority ethnic groups, often considered acephalous, have since

organized to combat real or perceived political repression and socio-economic discrimination (Suberu 2001, 82). The civil war and the rise of ethnically based political parties point to extant authority structures in what have been historically acephalous societies.

Further, it appears that political realities have forced the Igbo to become more hierarchical over time. In an attempt at succession, the predominantly Igbo southeastern provinces of Nigeria launched the Biafran war spanning from July 6, 1967 through January 13, 1970 (Nixon 1972). This civil war for the independence of Biafra as an ethnic (mostly Igbo) state failed (Curtin et al. 1995, 520). Yet, such an effort necessarily required a hierarchical authority structure.

This does not mean that traditional authority structure has necessarily changed at the village level. It does suggest that an authority structure, capable of representing Igbo interests as a whole, successfully imposed or constructed itself over existing institutions. There is anecdotal evidence that these types of post-colonial changes eroded past structures while constructing new channels of authority (Achebe 1966). Specifically, new political elites successfully created hierarchical structures, effectively mobilizing previously acephalous societies to effectively compete for access to state resources.

In sum, it is likely that colonialism irrevocably changed authority structures in sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, it is unlikely that ethnic pre-colonial authority structures can serve to predict perceptions of legitimacy in a post-colonial context. Thus, it does not come as a great surprise that the available data does not support Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967) suggested hypothesis that authority structure would affect perceptions of legitimacy.

Accordingly, history and the literature suggest hierarchical structures, like modes of livelihood, is likely to change over time. It is not a static concept. While these labels might facilitate academic classification, it is unlikely that they fully capture the complexities and realities of sub-Saharan societies.

Multilevel: Final Analysis

Multilevel modeling allows for better statistical analysis of available Afrobarometer data. Multilevel modeling is data and theory intensive (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 234). Given the availability of both data and theory in this study, it is the most appropriate means of analyzing the data. This technique is particularly appropriate for the purpose of inquiry as data clustering is of substantive interest here, namely, observing how country effect can affect individual perceptions of legitimacy.

Multilevel analysis did not significantly change findings previously discussed in Chapter 3. In fact, it has only strengthened the analysis. For example, it is now apparent that an individual's trust in institutions is likely to be one of the most important factors explaining variance in perceptions of legitimacy. This finding remains robust even when country level effects such as ethnic fractionalization and electoral system are accounted for in the analysis.

Country Context: Mali

Understanding that country context matters, it is interesting to examine how one country's context affects individual perceptions of legitimacy. Looking at the model in each country, one country stood out: Mali. Mali was the only country in which sharing ethnic ties with the president was both statistically significant and negative. Specifically,

individuals who share ethnicity with the president are less likely to view the state as

legitimate.

OLS Mali

Perceptions of State Legitimacy	Multilevel	OLS Mali
Constant	2.918***	3.325***
	(0.116)	(0.269)
Mode of Livelihood	0.032	0.357**
	(0.035)	(0.113)
Ethnic Ties to the President	0.009	-0.267**
	(0.016)	(0.102)
Member of Winning Party	0.049***	-0.052
	(0.015)	(0.053)
Current Economic Performance	0.004	0.062**
	(0.006)	(0.023)
Projected Economic Performance	0.051***	0.046
	(0.006)	(0.026)
Delivery of Economic Goods Index	0.076***	0.079
	(0.011)	(0.043)
Free and Fair Elections?	-0.038***	-0.057*
	(0.007)	(0.023)
Corruption	-0.036***	-0.051
	(0.011)	(0.034)
Individual's Trust in Institutions	0.169***	0.130***
	(0.009)	(0.033)
Urban Rural	0.023*	0.040
	(0.011)	(0.062)
Gender	0.002	-0.134*
	(0.013)	(0.053)
Education	0.011**	0.025
	(0.004)	(0.016)

Adjusted R square		.109
-2 x Log Likelihood	33248	
Explained Variance (Country Level Only)	3.58%*	
Explained Variance (Individual Level Only)	96.42%***	

Table 4.7[8]

[8] ***p=<.001, **p=<.01, *p=<.05; Table only shows statistically significant independent variables. The full model can be found in Appendix B.

To more closely examine how context can affect perceptions of legitimacy, the original OLS model was run in Mali[9]. Table 4.7 (above) shows the results of the model in Mali alongside the results of the multilevel model.

As the table illustrates, variables that help understand perceptions of legitimacy change in the Mali context. For example, being a member of the winning political party is not a statistically significant predictor of perceptions of legitimacy in Mali. Thus, it is worth taking a little time to discuss some of the statistically variables of interest in Mali. Two particular independent variables stand out. Specifically, both modes of livelihood and ethnic ties to the president are statistically significant in understanding varying levels of perception of state legitimacy in Mali.

Mode of Livelihood

First, it appears that in Mali, mode of livelihood has a statistically significant effect on perceptions of legitimacy: rural pastoralists are more likely to view the state as legitimate. Remembering previous discussion, the effect of mode of livelihood is surprising. Specifically, societal structures can change quite drastically with time and pastoralism unexpectedly has a very strong and positive effect on perceptions of legitimacy.

Nevertheless, the data suggests that rural pastoralists are more likely to view the state as legitimate. There appears no good theoretical position to explain this pastoralist puzzle. The minimal literature that specifically discusses the potential effects of mode of livelihood would argue the opposite, that pastoralists are less likely to view the state as legitimate (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1967). This might be due to one of two reasons. First, in some cases pastoralists are associated with the ruling class (Fortes and Evans-

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[9] All scales were re-validated to take into account loss of data; all information can be found in Appendix B.

Pritchard 1967, 121). As such, they might be less likely to accept the imposition of a new power structure that undermines their own authority. Second, it is possible that pastoralists are less willing to recognize the state as legitimate since they are traditionally more mobile and less likely to recognize state borders (Curtin *et al.* 1995). Neither theoretical base would suggest that pastoralists are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

Why do rural pastoralists in Mali view the state as more legitimate? It is possible that Malian pastoralists have a better understanding to the claims of the state. The data suggests that Malian pastoralists have a stronger connection to traditional authority. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate that rural pastoralists are nearly 10 percentage points more likely to contact traditional rulers and over 10 percentage points more likely to contact religious leaders.

How often do you contact a traditional ruler?	Rural Pastoralists (n = 152)	Others (n = 1092)
Never	69.08	78.11
Once or more	30.92	21.88

Difference of Means significant at the .05 level

Table 4.8

How often do you contact religious leaders?	Rural Pastoralists (n = 152)	Others (n = 1092)
Never	60.53	73.26
Once or more	39.48	26.74

Difference of Means Significant at the .000 level

Table 4.9

An individual with strong ties to traditional authority might also be more likely to be aware of any conflict between the state and traditional authority structure. Through such exposure to conflict over claims of legitimacy, such individual might be in a position to better understand the state's claim to legitimacy but not necessarily view the state as more legitimate. Thus, the pastoralist puzzle remains unresolved.

As discussed in the previous chapter, it is likely that this increased perception of legitimacy has less to do with mode of livelihood than specific circumstances in Mali. For instance, rural pastoralists might have stronger ties to traditional authority structure. These authority structures are more likely to encounter conflict with the state. Through this process of conflict, individuals with ties to these authority structures might better understand the state's claims. Accordingly, a Malian rural pastoralist might perceive the state as legitimate because s/he relies on traditional authority structure for daily guidance. As the data appears insufficient to flesh out this scenario, another approach might be more beneficial.

One important factor must be discussed. Within Mali, only two groups are coded as pastoralists: Peuhl and Tamasheq. Since the same model includes the "ethnic ties to the president" variable coded as Peuhl, the additional variance explained in the "mode of livelihood" variable is explained by the Tamasheqs. Thus, the real challenge is to explain why the Tamasheq view the sate as more legitimate than the average Malian and the Peuhls view it as less legitimate.

In the end, a case study might be more appropriate to flesh out this pastoralist puzzle. This problem reminds the researcher that survey data are not without limitations. Specifically, these types of data are useful in testing general theories and hypotheses, but

sometimes the resulting numbers defy interpretation. It is at those times that 'thick description' (Geertz 1973) might be most beneficial. Specifically, understanding the context might help the researcher better understand and consequently interpret the data. Accordingly, the next chapter will be a case study of Mali in an attempt to resolve this pastoralist puzzle.

Ethnic Ties to the President

The data suggests another surprising discovery. As discussed earlier, the literature suggests that ethnic ties matter and can affect socio-economic opportunities (Posner 2005). However, the data appears to suggest that sharing ethnic ties with the president significantly decreases overall perceptions of state legitimacy. At first glance, these findings seem to contradict the literature. However, there is a theoretical explanation that illustrates why Malians who share ethnicity with the president have significantly lower perceptions of state legitimacy

The president of Mali is Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT). ATT is a Peuhl. The Peuhls comprise roughly 17 percent of the state's population (CIA 2006). Further, Mali's electoral system is a Two-Round System (TRS). The winning candidate must obtain 50 percent plus one of the votes. If s/he does not have sufficient votes in the first round in a presidential election, a second round is held to determine the winner. One of the principal advantages of the TRS is that it encourages "diverse interest to coalesce behind the successful candidates from the first round in the lead-up to the second round of voting, thus encouraging bargains and trade-offs between parties and candidates" (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005, 53). In the first round, ATT garnered almost 28 percent

of the votes. In the second round, he easily won with over 64 percent of the votes (Database 2002).

It is clear that ATT could not attain office relying solely on roughly 17 percent of the population. In his quest to incorporate diverse interests to ensure a winning coalition, ATT needed the support of other ethnic groups. It is reasonable to suspect that the ethnic Peuhls, knowing that one of their own is in power, might expect more access to resources than ATT is able to deliver to them.

It is interesting to note that during the 2002 election campaign, ATT made very broad national appeals without reference to ethnicity[10]. Further, ATT stressed national unity and formed a cabinet of people from all major parties plus civil society (AC 2003; AC 2002). As such, one possible scenario for the election outcome is as follows. It is possible that ATT knew his own ethnic group was unlikely to vote for another candidate. Meanwhile, he needed the support of other ethnic groups, but no one ethnic group combined with the Peuhl comprised more than 50 percent of the populations. Assuming every Peuhl and Bambara (the largest ethnic group in Mali) voted for ATT, ATT would only garner a little over 40 percent of the votes. It is plausible that the Sonrhaï (roughly 10 percent of the population) were the pivotal swing group that ensured him the necessary votes for office. In that case, it is possible that ATT would ensure a slightly larger proportional access to the one group he needs to remain in power without providing surplus to his own rather secure minority group. This is secure in the sense that ATT knows ethnic Peuhls are unlikely to defect and support another candidate. In

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[10] As will be discussed shortly, *ethnic ambiguity* in Mali helps to partially explain ATT's inability or unwillingness to make ethnic based appeals.

such a scenario, it is arguable that sharing ethnicity with ATT does not necessarily benefit as initially predicted.

Another recently proposed theoretical framework might help explain the negative relationship between shared ethnicity and decreased perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, Kimuli Kasara convincingly argues that individual with co-ethnics in power get taxed more (Kasara 2007). This might suggest that Peuhls are more effectively taxed and resent ATT's ability to extract resources from his own ethnic group. Yet, Kasara's study applies primarily to ethnic groups that produce cash crops. Although, as previously discussed, modes of livelihood are likely to have changed, Peuhls are not generally associated with crop production. Nevertheless, it is plausible that ATT is more effective in taxing his co-ethnics, reducing their perception of state legitimacy.

Further confounding the results might be the issue of ethnic ambiguity. Mali has long been noted for its ethnic fluidity and ambiguity (Amselle 1998; Zolberg 1967). Although dated, Zolberg noted that Mali was led "by men of typically ambiguous ethnic status" (Zolberg 1967, 459). In examining three Malian ethnic groups (Fulani, Malinke and Bambara), Jean-Loup Amselle more recently demonstrated that ethnic identity is fluid, relational and constantly being transformed over time (Amselle 1998, 43).

Accordingly, it appears reasonable that the lack of clear ethnic cleavages in Malian politics (Baldwin 2005, 12) results in neo-patrimonial networks that lack strong ethnic identity. This might seem to contradict earlier discussion that spoke of neopatrimonial networks possessing strong ethnic identities. However, ethnicity is not ambiguous in those cases and can arguably facilitate the formation of patron-client networks. Whereas patrons in other states might purposively target clients who identify with a particular

ethnic group to ensure wide representation, the ethnic fluidity and resultant ambiguity in Mali makes networks based on ethnic representation less reliable. Specifically, the ambiguous nature of ethnicity makes ethnic identification an unreliable gauge of proportional ethnic representation in a patron-client network seeking hegemony.

Thus, it appears that Mali's ethnically ambiguous context might further help explain the data. While the literature suggests that patrons use kinship ties to win electoral support (Widner 1999, 66), the very ambiguity of ethnic identity in Mali brings to question the crucial role ethnicity is often theorized to play in sub-Saharan politics (Bienen and Herbst 1996; Olukoshi 1998).

In sum, ethnic ties to the president are strongly and negatively associated with perceptions of legitimacy in Mali. It is reasonable that the electoral requirements of a Two-Round system along with a certain ethnic ambiguity resulted in dissatisfaction amongst individuals who share ethnicity with ATT. Specifically, if ATT felt he needed support from a specific ethnic group to retain power knowing his own ethnic base of support is secure, it is reasonable to argue that he might secure greater access to others outside of his own ethnic group. This suggests general dissatisfaction amongst ethnic kin who have no other candidate to support and satisfaction among other ethnic groups to whom he reached out.

Further complicating matters is ethnic ambiguity. Specifically, ethnic ambiguity in Mali might result in ATT unintentionally under-representing his own ethnic group relative to size[11]. One way of getting at this might be to look at the names of ATT's

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[11] The problem with ethnic ambiguity is that one cannot know for sure the ethnic composition of cabinet ministers in Mali. As a state department report notes, ATT expanded the size of his cabinet to be a more inclusive State, "Mali," ed. Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor (State, 2005). Along with ATT's unwillingness to make ethnic based appeals, it is almost impossible to find references to a particular

cabinet ministers[12]. If one looks for traditional Peuhl names such as Diallo, Ba, Bari and Cisse (Leisinger and Schmitt 1995), there appears to be none. Although not completely conclusive[13], this points to under-representation of ATT's own ethnic group.

In sum, if ethnic representation is not a criterion in creating neopatrimonial networks, it is quite possible that any one given network unintentionally over- or under-represents any one given ethnic group. Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that individuals from an under-represented ethnic group might feel as though they do not have enough access, resenting the state in the process. It is also arguable that both the TRS and ethnic ambiguity contribute to the Peuhl respondents' negative perceptions of legitimacy.

The next chapter will further explore and explain the nature of ethnic ambiguity in Mali in addition to discussing the pastoralist puzzle. The informal institution of "cousinage" will also be discussed in important relation to this context, specifically, how cousinage contributes to the rather high ambiguity in ethnic relations in Mali.

Performance Evaluations

The data suggests that both economic and political performance evaluations matter. In Mali, there does not appear to be a significant difference in the impact of either potential source of legitimacy. There are strong arguments that favor the significance of political evaluations in explaining support for the state (Evans and Whitefield 1995). Nevertheless, political performance evaluations in Mali do not appear to have stronger

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minister's ethnic background, making an assessment as to ethnic representation very hard to establish.

[12] Names listed at: http://www.exxun.com/acf_chiefsofstate/Mali/jcf_1.html last accessed 1 Feb 2007.

[13] Inconclusive as last name is not a necessarily accurate predictor of ethnicity. The next chapter will discuss some of the name ambiguity and the problem with associating a particular name to any one ethnic group.

impact than economic ones on perceptions of legitimacy. Whereas free and fair elections appear to positively impact perceptions of legitimacy, freedom of speech and corruption show no statistically significant impact. On balance, looking at standardized coefficients[14], it is reasonable to argue that economic performance evaluations appear more significant in understanding perceptions of state legitimacy in Mali.

Mali is a country confronting serious economic challenges. Mali has a GNI[15] per capita of $330 (WorldBank 2006). This is $492 less than the average GNI per capita of the 15 countries in the cross-national model found in Chapter 3. Mali is a landlocked country in which a staggering 70 percent of the population lives on less than one dollar a day (Britannica 2006). Increased fuel prices combined with a 2004 locust invasion led to a huge price increase in staple foods (e.g. rice). The result was an estimated quarter of the population facing food shortages in 2005 (Britannica 2006). The argument can easily be made that individuals living in a country facing such economic obstacles would place priority on economic performance evaluations. Material insecurity in Mali is such that people place less emphasis on non-economic factors.

In sum, the data suggests that both economic and political performance evaluations matter for state legitimacy in Mali. Economic performance arguably has a stronger overall impact on perceptions of state legitimacy given current economic circumstances. Only one political performance evaluation, the holding of free and fair elections,

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[14] Free and Fair Elections Std Coef. = -0.08; Current economic performance Std Coef. = 0.09

[15] UNICEF defines "GNI per capita - Gross national income (GNI) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by mid-year population. GNI per capita in US dollars is converted using the World Bank Atlas method." (http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/stats_popup1.html - accessed 9 October 2006)

positively impacts perceptions of legitimacy. As discussed previously, free and fair

elections require economic resources. Without economic resources, a state is unlikely to

procure the necessary resources to hold free and fair elections. Logically, one precedes

the other. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that given present economic circumstances,

Malians are more focused with economics than overall levels of freedom and

accountability.

Gender

The data suggests Malian women are less likely to perceive the state as legitimate. This

is not a surprising finding. Gender differences are expected to exist in primarily Muslim

countries. Although women in Muslim societies arguably have fewer opportunities to

interact with the state, reality is more complex.

For instance, Islam in Africa differs greatly from Islam in the Mediterranean and

Arabic world. Islamic women in Africa are often granted greater liberties and are rarely

"veiled nor kept in purdah (except in upper-middle-class Hausa families in Kano[16] – and

even these women can still engage in such income-earning activities as cooking food for

sale, spinning, or weaving)" (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988, 108). That said, it is still

plausible that given Africa's patriarchal societies, women face greater challenges in

voicing their messages and interacting with the state. This suggests that women, having

less contact with the state, are less incorporated and less likely to view the state as

legitimate.

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[16] For more information, read Barbara Callaway *Muslim Hausa Women in Nigeria: Tradition and Change* *Barbara Callaway, Muslim Hausa Women in Nigeria: Tradition and Change, 1st ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987).*

Several factors might contribute to overall lower levels of perceived state legitimacy amongst women. First, Mali's TRS is a majoritarian system. Majoritarian systems have been found to discriminate against women, in turn lowering their overall levels of participation (Lindberg 2004). Majoritarian systems are more likely to have clientelistic electoral campaigns which happen to be strongly biased towards male participation, and women are more likely to respond to public rather than clientelistic policy (Wantchekon 2003, 420). Not only are men favored in the formation of patron-client networks, clientelistic politics tend to disregard issues most likely to interest and incorporate women and increase overall levels of participation (e.g. health care and education) (Lindberg 2004, 34; Wantchekon 2003, 421).

Second, the data suggests that women are simply less likely to be interested in politics. In Mali, women were ten percentage points[17] less likely to express some or more interest in politics and the state. This significant gap appears to support the idea "that many Africans continue to see politics as a male sphere of endeavor" (Logan and Bratton 2006). This lack of interest is likely enhanced by African women's lower overall-social economic status and limited educational opportunities that serve to further constrain their access to the state (Foster 1993).

In sum, it is not surprising to find that gender has observable effects on perceptions of state legitimacy. Besides the role of religion, there are other factors that might work alongside gender to help explain variances in perceptions of legitimacy in Mali. Reality is such that complex mixes of several factors (e.g. structural and cultural) are more likely to explain lower levels in women's overall perceptions of legitimacy in Mali.

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[17] Difference of means test significant at the .000 level.

Unfortunately, the aim of this chapter is too limited to untangle the myriad of factors resulting in lower levels of perceived state legitimacy among Malian women. The importance and complexity of these issues warrants a separate study. Realizing that women comprise a little over half of the Malian population (CIA 2006), it might benefit Mali to consider and address the particular challenges and concerns of women in its quest for broad legitimacy.

Conclusion

Generally, it appears that an individual's trust in institutions is at the very heart of legitimacy; the strong and very positive effect of an individual's trust in institutions continues to matter regardless of context. An individual's trust in institutions facilitates individual compliance to the mandates of the state. The military, police and courts are all institutions that act, to varying degrees, as representatives of the state. It stands to reason that as trust in these institutions of coercion increases, so does state legitimacy. Notably, for true legitimacy, trust must be based on repeated interaction over time and not ignorance. It is often noted that poor rural African peasants are more likely to exhibit greater levels of overall institutional trust (Bratton *et al.* 2005, 232). Yet, such trust is not based on first hand knowledge. It stands to reason that true legitimacy requires informed consent based on knowledge. Institutional trust based on ignorance and lack of contact is hollow.

For a state to be considered legitimate, it is important that the institutions which comprise the state are trusted. This reminds one that legitimacy is not something the state can simply acquire or purchase. Legitimacy is freely given by individuals who trust the various institutions that encompass the state. If trust is at the very core of legitimacy, it is

unlikely that any state in sub-Saharan Africa or anywhere else in the world can acquire legitimacy overnight. Rather, trust requires repeated interaction between citizen and state over an indefinite set of time.

Second, it is apparent that context matters. Specifically, country level effects are likely to affect individual perceptions of legitimacy. When looking at cross-national opinion survey, it is important to attempt and account as to why observations might not be completely independent and non-identical and why observations might violate the assumption of exchangeability (King 2001). Country dummies are effective in helping to explain context, but they are atheoretical. A multilevel model allows accounting for country effects in substantive theoretical ways in which country effects affect individual attitudes and opinions. As long as good theory exists and increasingly appropriate indicators are made available (e.g. PREG), country level effects should be included in a multilevel approach.

Third, Mali illustrated how country level effects can influence individual perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, in Mali it appears that along with an individual's trust in institutions, the two most significant predictors of perceptions of state legitimacy were ethnic ties to the president and mode of livelihood. Of the three predictors, possibly the most unexpected find was the statistically significant, strong and negative relationship between ethnic ties to the president and perceptions of legitimacy. Theory simply would not predict that sharing ethnic ties with the presidency results in lower levels of perceived state legitimacy. This is something that the next chapter will explore in greater detail in a case study approach.

Finally, the state is not an abstract concept. People relate to it in concrete ways. The interaction between the institutions that comprise the state and the people the state seeks to govern matters. Legitimacy is not passive. Legitimacy requires the state to actively seek its citizens' acceptance of its rule. While a state can use physical force, coercion and intimidation to enforce its will, this is likely to be an expensive endeavor. Maintaining adequate force (e.g. police, weapons, etc...) requires constant funding whereas legitimacy allows states to garner compliance at minimal costs. In resource scarce states like those in sub-Saharan Africa, it is thus reasonable for a state to actively pursue policies that increase overall legitimacy.

V - Mali: A Case Study

It is important to remember that at its core, politics is about people. Harold Lasswell (1950) defined politics as *Who gets What, When and How*. In the previous chapter, a lot of time was devoted to examining the *how*; this chapter addresses imbalances by focusing a little more on the *who*. This includes a closer examination of people's thoughts and perceptions of legitimacy in Mali. The previous chapter also focused on statistical analysis. This chapter follows more of a case study approach in hopes of shedding light on previous empirical findings.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it seeks to provide a synopsis of the political setting and some of the unique challenges and opportunities facing Mali. Conversations with various national and international heads of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) serve as background information for the latter. These conversations will highlight some of the more pressing needs and shared concerns regarding issues in Mali. These also refer to, either directly or indirectly, the empirical findings of the previous chapter.

Second, this chapter seeks to shed light on two previous empirical findings: a) ethnic ambiguity and b) the pastoralist puzzle. Specifically, characteristics unique to Mali that help explain these findings will be discussed. This chapter will also explore the informal institution of 'cousinage.' In short, cousinage is a very interesting informal relationship between ethnic groups that serves to promote a sense of unity while increasing levels of ethnic ambiguity. Further, this chapter will discuss how specific factors present in Mali help explain the country specific finding that pastoralists are more likely than their counterparts to view the state as more legitimate.

Case Studies

Case studies are not without advantages (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 67), helping us better understand otherwise abstract concepts. Arend Lijphart (1971) refers to six types of case studies: 1) atheoretical, 2) interpretive, 3) hypothesis generating, 4) theory confirming, 5) deviant and 6) theory infirming. The first two serve no theoretical value but might be useful in basic data gathering (Lijphart 1971, 691). Of the six, Lijphart suggests that the two most useful types in terms of contributions to theory are the hypothesis generating and the deviant (i.e. outlier) case studies. These can be useful to comparative inquiry if concepts gathered are applicable to other countries or if they develop concepts applicable to other countries (Landman 2003, 34).

Single case studies offer the most descriptive analysis available. Such qualitative studies are exactly what Clifford Geertz (1973) refers to when he mentions the need for 'thick description.' Yet, descriptive richness comes at a price. Specifically, such idiographic emphasis falls short of Adam Przeworski and Henry Tune's (1970) nomothetic ideal (nomos=law), which recommends looking for underlying laws. It is unlikely that the comparativist goal of *inference* and *generalizability* (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997) will be met in a single case study. Nevertheless, this case study will hopefully generate some broader testable hypotheses that can be applied in a more rigorous and systematic manner in future research.

Understanding the inherent limitations of the case study, this research on Mali is intended to foster development of concepts and theories that can subsequently be applied to other sub-Saharan countries. The scope of these findings is limited to Mali.

Nevertheless, it is useful to explore some cursory hypotheses to further understand the different factors that might or might not affect individual perceptions of legitimacy within the Malian context.

Research of Interest

As mentioned earlier, this chapter seeks to make sense of the empirical findings in the previous chapter. Two trends of interest warrant further investigation. First, this chapter seeks to shed light on ethnic ambiguity in Mali, specifically the mechanism(s) that might help explain ethnic ambiguity in Mali. It appears that the media and other information sources primarily stress the role of ethnicity in sub-Saharan conflict. One example is Darfur, a conflict expressed in terms of Arab versus African (BBC 2004). Specifically, Darfur involves an Arab militia, supported by an Arab controlled state, committing genocide against black Africans. Another famous African ethnic conflict is the 1994 genocide in Rwanda involving the Hutu killing of Tutsi (BBC 2005). In those countries, it is clear that ethnic ties matter and can mean the difference between life and death. This makes Mali even more interesting as it is a sub-Saharan state in which ethnicity is ambiguous and appears to have low political salience. This begs the question of what does Mali have that Sudan, Rwanda and other ethnically tense states lack?

Second, empirical evidence suggests the following puzzle: pastoralists are more likely than agriculturalists to perceive the state as legitimate. Modes of livelihood will be analyzed to determine why these appear to affect perceptions of legitimacy. It would be interesting to identify some trait within the pastoralist community that leads towards increased perceptions of state legitimacy.

This pastoralist puzzle is even more interesting given the historical trend which suggests pastoralists are less likely to willingly accept imposition of a new political order. In Mali, a pastoralist group called the Tamasheqs (also knows as Tuaregs) provides a perfect example of this phenomenon. Since the very beginning of Malian independence, the Tamasheqs were engaged in a bitter civil war with Mali. In 1992, France helped initiate negotiations that led to the signing of a peace agreement between Mali and its Tamasheq population (Poulton and ag Youssouf 1998, 135). This agreement called for decentralization of state power. Given the historical conflict between pastoralists and the state in Africa, it is arguable that pastoralists are less likely than agriculturalists to perceive the state as legitimate. Accordingly, understanding ethnic ambiguity and the pastoralist puzzle will greatly enhance our understanding of perceptions of legitimacy in Mali.

Sources

To better understand the aforementioned issues, first hand information was obtained. First, it is difficult to ascertain context without visiting the country. Consequently, I spent eleven weeks with a local guide as an assistant performing field research in Mali. Specifically, a 90 person (n = 90) survey was conducted. Although specific populations were targeted, interviews were collected in as systematic and as rigorous an approach possible. As such, the Afrobarometer sampling procedure was heavily relied upon and adapted to this field research's particular set of circumstances.

In the first stage of sampling, primary sampling units were selected purposively (Bambaras and Peuhls). Although the nature of the inquiry did not permit an entirely random sample collection, an element of randomization was injected given the

circumstances. To achieve this, the local guide assisted in delineating neighborhoods and corresponding boundaries. In the case of Bamako, there were six communes with four to six neighborhoods in each. The focus was on neighborhoods known for their concentration of Peuhls, who traditionally were pastoralists, and Bambaras, who traditionally were agriculturalists. A card was then drawn out of a hat to determine by which direction –North, South, East and West – the neighborhood would be entered. Starting from a random point, the households were selected utilizing the day code method[1]. Once inside a home, an interview respondent was randomly chosen. The interviews spanned from Bamako to the rural outskirts of Mopti and Djénné (see Map of Mali – Appendix C).

Second, while in Bamako, meetings were arranged with several leaders of domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to observe how elite opinions might differ from or resemble that of the population as a whole. These interviews shed light on what various NGO umbrella groups thought Mali needed and provided some insight into the politics of the country. This information, combined with the survey, enhanced understanding of the empirical findings from the Round 3 Afrobarometer data.

Mali: Political Setting

Before proceeding with the Mali case study, it is important to provide a little background on the politics of Mali. Specifically, this involves a summary of events leading to the 1991 revolution and subsequent rise of the current Malian state.

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[1] Per www.Afrobarometer.org/sampling.html (visited 10 Jul 06) "The day code introduces randomness into the interval. It is calculated by adding together the numbers in the day of the month as follows. On the 5th, 14th and 23rd of the month the interval would be 5, but on the 6th, 15th and 24th it would be 6. And so on. On some days (the 1st and 10th of the month) the Interviewer moves to the adjacent dwelling structure (because the sampling interval is 1). On the 29th of the month the Interviewer must leave the widest gap, selecting only every eleventh house."

From Independence to Democracy

Mali gained independence on September 22, 1960 (Britannica 2006). The first Malian president was Modibo Keita. A trained teacher and outspoken Marxist, Keita soon put Mali on a socialist path (Martin 1976) and developed close ties with communist countries. Notably, "[i]n 1961, he received loans and aid from the Soviet Union, China...established a centralized economy, and instituted a one-party state" (Clark 2000, 256). In 1967, Keita launched a Maoist inspired Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was a move designed to soothe the radical wing of the regime, "disgruntled at what they saw as an outright betrayal of the socialist principles" (Martin 1976, 31). Further, "Red Guards loudly proclaimed their support for Modibo Keita, condemned enemies of the party who had criticized the President and called for ideological purification of the party..."(Martin 1976, 31).

It is important to consider perceptions of legitimacy in relation to Keita's socialist policies, specifically, the legitimacy of Keita's Cultural Revolution launched in 1967. Keita largely relied on a group of youth armed with Chinese weaponry known as the Milice Populaire (M.P.), or popular militia, to impose his socialist policies on the remainder of the population (Wolpin 1975, 601). The use of militia speaks to the population's lack of willingness in acknowledging and obeying the state's authority, which in turn speaks to the low degree of legitimacy of the Keita regime.

Further, applying Weber's grounds of legitimation, Keita lacks both traditional and rational-legal grounds of legitimation. Specifically, he cannot lay claim to traditional authority while instituting western derived communist ideology. Further, his M.P. attests

to a lack of consistent application of rational-legal rules. Consequently, all that remains is charismatic authority.

Remembering previous discussion, charismatic authority rests on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person (Weber 1978, 212). Keita mainly relied on his M.P. and a small base of core supporters to implement his policy objectives as his appeal arguably did not reach beyond these groups. In turn, it is not surprising that Keita's radical policies and accompanying Cultural Revolution led to widespread popular discontent. Further, the M.P. was seen by the military as a direct challenge to its own authority and led to high levels of military discontent (Wolpin 1975).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, in 1968, Malian Lieutenant Moussa Traore led a military coup d'état, successfully overthrowing Modibo Keita (AC 1968). The coup was justified "on the grounds that Keita's policies no longer represented the views of most Malians" (Bingen 2000, 246). Initially, it appeared that most Malians welcomed the change, even if it meant military rule (Clark 2000, 256; Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 12).

In an effort to improve relations with the West, Traore also distanced himself from Keita's communist allies. Among his changes, Traore "modified some of the centralized economic structures...joined the CFA franc zone [that Keita opted out of]...[and] headed the nation's one legal political party, the Malian People's Democratic Union (UDPM)" (Clark 2000, 256). The UDPM was intended to achieve political legitimacy, both domestically and internationally (Bingen 2000, 247).

As discussed above, internationally, Traore sought to enhance the legitimacy of his regime by renewing ties to the west. Domestically, the UDPM sought to enhance the

legitimacy of the regime through collaboration and cooperation. For example, the Traore regime created official *Tons villageois* (translated as your village/villager) in the countryside, which were modeled on traditional forms of village mutual aid groups (Bingen 2000, 246).

Despite these efforts, the regime saw clear limits in collaborating and cooperating with ordinary Malians. Mali's economic condition continued to be underwhelming, and there was no improvement in the living standards for most ordinary Malians. In contrast to such poverty, members of the Traore regime – relatives and associates – accumulated increasing wealth (Clark 2000, 256). Additionally, the Traore regime permitted no dissent to its authority. The UDPM "brutally suppressed all political opposition, particularly among the country's intellectuals...student demonstrations and labor strikes occurred periodically but were quickly crushed, resulting in school closings, massive arrests and many deaths" (Bingen 2000; Clark 2000, 256).

Like Keita and his M.P.s, the UDPM was finding legitimacy an elusive goal. Despite tolerance of the repressive policies (Clark 2000) by the international community, in particular the French, the continued domestic demonstrations in face of violent repression illustrated significant problems of voluntary compliance or obedience. As with Modibo Keita, the Traore regime lacked strong grounds of legitimation such as traditional authority. Traore's use of force in attempts to garner compliance likely served to undermine the initial enthusiasm for its rule.

Traore continued to rule Mali relying heavily on the use of force (Clark 2000). As previously discussed, a state relying on force is unlikely to be a legitimate one and can be costly (e.g. loss of lives). An illegitimate state does not enjoy the support of its citizens

as seen through inevitable demonstration and unwillingness to comply with the mandates of the state. The early Malian state was further rendered illegitimate because it lacked one or more of the three Weberian grounds of legitimation: charismatic, traditional and rational-legal. Given the relative poverty of Mali combined with the expense of relying on the use of force, it was unlikely that such a state could survive for relatively long periods of time under such coercive conditions.

In 1991, the Traore regime succumbed to revolution. Led by students and unions, "[d]emonstrations and riots occurred in several cities, the most violent erupting in Bamako on 22 and 23 March" (Clark 2000, 258). The military was sent to the streets and shot at citizens indiscriminately. In one particular incidence, the military "reportedly trapped demonstrators and onlookers in a downtown shopping center, blocked the exits, and then set fire to the place" (Clark 2000, 258).

In the end, it was the military, led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT), that arrested Traore. A national conference, lasting several weeks, was convened. The goal of the conference was to include all segments of Malian society in hopes of broadening its legitimacy. Theoretically, achieving broad based agreement on a given set of rules should facilitate willing compliance. Thus, participants to the conference "included representatives from the transitional government, all opposition and political groups, and the major trade unions" (Clark 2000, 260). In the end, the conference adopted a majoritarian electoral system – Two Round Voting System – and elections were held with 47 political parties receiving approval to participate in the election (Clark 2000, 260).

On April 5, 1992, President Alpha Oumar Konaré (Alpha) was elected with 69 percent of the votes. Notably, he finished "first in every region of the country and among Malians living abroad" (Clark 2000, 260). Inaugurated on June 8, 1992, Alpha began the daunting task of leading the newly minted Malian democracy. He was re-elected for a second and final term in accordance with the constitution in 1997.

In 2002, Mali experienced alternance from Alpha's political party, the democratic alliance of Mali (ADEMA). ADEMA was voted out of power in favor of ATT and a coalition of former opposition parties united under the umbrella of the Hope 2002 Coalition party. Since the 1991 revolution, isolated incidents of opposition to the new regime have surfaced. Notwithstanding, it appears that the majority of the Malian population willingly obeys the state, legitimizing it in the process (Clark 2000).

Notably, unlike previous states and regimes, the newly democratic state of Mali appears to be making a concerted, and arguably successful, effort at resting its claims of legitimacy on legal-rational grounds. Significantly, it has avoided resorting to the consistent use of force to enforce its mandates. Further, as will be discussed below, the state is seeking to incorporate more of its citizens into every day decisions through the process of decentralization. Throughout this process, the state resorts to rational-legal rules, one of three grounds of state legitimacy.

To understand state legitimacy in Mali, it is worth examining how Malians perceive the state. Specifically, the legitimacy index used in the statistical analysis was comprised of four questions, which sought to determine whether Malians believe they should listen to the state. Thus, the index was broken down into its four original dimensions to show the percentage of respondents who agreed with the four following questions:

- Our constitution expresses the values and hopes (of people in this country)
- The police always have the right to make people obey the law
- The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by
- The tax department has the right to make people pay taxes

The tables below show that overall, Mali appears to enjoy a fairly high level of

legitimacy. The majority of Malians are likely to consent to mandates of the state.

Notably, Malians are most likely to agree with the statement that individuals should obey,

or listen to, the law (Table 5.3).

Constitution expresses values and hopes	Percent
disagree	25.5
neither agree nor disagree	12.84
agree	61.66
n	1059

| Table 5.1 |

Courts can make binding decisions	Percent
disagree	17.11
neither agree nor disagree	11.02
agree	71.88
n	1,216

| Table 5.2 |

People must obey the law	Percent
disagree	8.94
neither agree nor disagree	6.34
agree	84.73
n	1231

| Table 5.3 |

People must pay taxes	Percent
disagree	19.71
neither agree nor disagree	7.11
agree	73.19
n	1223

Table 5.4

The foregoing provides a general idea of perceptions of legitimacy in Mali. To get an idea of where Mali fits in relative to other Afrobarometer countries, I took the mean of the legitimacy index used in the previous statistical analyses and sorted them in descending order. As Table 5.5 shows, Mali stands at the middle of the pack.

Rank	Legitimacy in:	Index Mean
1	Ghana	4.036
2	Uganda	3.906
3	Namibia	3.826
4	Senegal	3.792
5	Mozambique	3.740
6	South Africa	3.737
7	Mali	3.693
8	Botswana	3.666
9	Kenya	3.556
10	Zambia	3.547
11	Nigeria	3.536
12	Madagascar	3.511
13	Malawi	3.480
14	Benin	3.464

Table 5.5

It is also worthwhile to see how each country differs in individual attitudes to the questions that comprise the index. As a reminder, the four questions that comprise the legitimacy index are:

- Our constitution expresses the values and hopes (of people in this country)
- The police always have the right to make people obey the law
- The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by

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- The tax department has the right to make people pay taxes

The answer choices range from strongly disagree to strongly agree on a five point scale with the middle value (3) neither agreeing nor disagreeing. The next four tables (Table 5.6-5.9) are bar charts that visually represent the variation in the mean of responses by country.

Table 5.6

Table 5.7

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
Table 5.8

Table 5.9

As can be seen, Mali remains fairly consistently in the middle of the pack. Malians tend

to agree most strongly with the idea that the courts have the right to make decisions that

people always have to abide by and least strongly with the statement that the constitution

expresses their hopes and values.

Now that we have a general understanding of Malian politics, it is important to include in this discussion two groups who have historically revolted or expressed unwillingness to listen to the state's mandates despite Mali's efforts at legitimacy: students and Tamasheqs. The student movement was instrumental in the toppling of the Traore regime and the creation of a democratic state (Smith 1997). In fact, students began protesting in the late 1970s and were often met with violent repression on the part of the Traore regime (Bingen 2000). The Tamasheqs, on the other hand, have a long history of resistance against central Malian authority. Arguably, it was not until a more inclusive [and legitimate] democratic state that over 100 years of Tamasheq rejection of centralization came to an end (Poulton and Youssouf 1998).

Student Movement

In Mali, students are organized under l'Association des Elèves et Etudiants de Mali (AEEM). The AEEM is particularly important due to its effectiveness in articulating its members' demands. As a result, the group has become an important part of a vibrant democratic Mali (Smith 1997) and is not a segment of the population any state can afford to ignore.

In recognition for their role in the toppling of the Traore regime, in March 1991, the transitional government invited the AEEM to join the National Conference (Nzouankeu 1993). After agreeing to participate in the conference, the AEEM "negotiated and signed a 'memorandum' with the government specifying twenty-five demands made by the students" (Smith 1990, 250). The content of this memorandum included such demands as an immediate rise in student scholarships, extension of scholarships to high school level students and various physical and pedagogical improvements to the schools.

There was broad agreement amongst the political elite that these demands represented needed improvements to the Malian educational system. Yet, few of the demands were actually implemented by the transitional government (Smith 1997). Upon his election to office 1992 President Alpha Konaré was faced with the additional burden of finding means to fund these relatively expensive demands. Negotiations with the AEEM as to the implementation of these demands continued through 1993.

Tensions arose in March 1993 when AEEM leaders from the Rural Polytechnic Institute at Katibougou (IPR) decided to riot against the state based on the state's failure to meet key demands in the original memorandum. Specifically, they were upset to discover that the number of scholarships had not been increased and that their own scholarships decreased in monetary value (Smith 1997, 250). IPR students reacted by attacking and igniting fire to administrative buildings.

Many of the student leaders were detained and imprisoned, but most were released with the exception of the three ring leaders (IPR Three). As a result, the national AEEM adopted the cause of the IPR students and the IPR Three (Smith 1997, 251). National class boycotts, sit-ins and demonstrations followed. Alpha could not ignore the destabilizing effects of the AEEM protests. Eventually, the IPR Three were released, school expulsions were reversed, and pardons were issued to all students arrested during the March riots. However, a key student demand, that of increased scholarships, remained unmet by the state (Smith 1997, 254). This led to internal divisions within the AEEM and an increased sense amongst students of its inability to effect change (Smith 1997).

It appears that the AEEM was its most effective and most vocal in times when its members likely viewed the state as most illegitimate. During the military dictatorship of Moussa Traore, students often effectively organized and demonstrated in the streets of Bamako in face of violent repression. In contrast, the AEEM became less effective in organizing mass protests based on its leaders' unwillingness to do so. Further, it appears that students are recognizing that the current state is listening to their demands and, as recently as 1997, entered into an agreement committing itself to meeting those demands (Smith 1997; Smith 2001). Thus, the students now feel as though they have a voice within the state leading to less dependence on the AEEM. Further, it is likely that they recognize the economic difficulties facing the state further hamper its ability to meet their demands.

Given the importance of the AEEM's role and its potential destabilizing effect on the state, it is worth taking a glance at student perceptions of legitimacy and its implications. Notably, it does not appear that students are less likely to view the state as more or less legitimate than other segments of the population (Table 5.5 – 5.8).

Constitution expresses values and hopes	% Student	% Other
disagree	28..57	12.98
neither agree nor disagree	9.52	12.98
agree	61.91	61.65
n	42	1017

Table 5.10

Courts make binding decisions	% Student	% Other
disagree	13.05	17.27
neither agree nor disagree	6.52	11.2
agree	80.43	71.54
n	46	1170

Table 5.11

People must obey the law	% Student	% Other
disagree	4.26	9.12
neither agree nor disagree	6.38	6.33
agree	89.36	84.55
n	47	1184

Table 5.12

People must pay taxes	% Student	% Other
disagree	10.64	20.07
neither agree nor disagree		7.4
agree	89.36	72.54
n	47	1176

Difference of Means Statistically Significant at the .01 level

Table 5.13

The available data show that students are much more likely – over 15 percentage points – to think that people should pay their taxes. Perhaps this sentiment arises from the realization that their requests, especially their call for an increase in scholarships, necessitate funding. Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the AEEM is experiencing difficulty mobilizing students today because the latter appear to have a fairly elevated perception of state legitimacy and have no reason to revolt at this point in time. However, it is conceivable that this segment of the population will be among the

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first to engage in acts of civil disobedience should conditions worsen and undermining the legitimacy of the state in the process.

Tamasheqs

Like the students, Tamasheqs openly resisted state mandates. The Tamasheqs are desert dwelling inhabitants of the northern desert of Mali and possess a long history of challenging central state authority. As mentioned earlier, Tamasheq resistance to centralized rule is not a modern phenomenon. Specifically, their "rejection of centralization was already evident in their resistance to the French" (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 25).

The Tamasheqs have a long history of violent conflict with the French colonial state in Mali. On January 15, 1894, the Tamasheqs destroyed a French military formation. The ensuing brutality of French revenge is still discussed amongst Tamasheqs (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 25). In 1916, the French struggled to stamp out the armed Tamasheq resistance that was led by Firhoun Ag Alinsar. The French military killed 750 Tamasheqs; such slaughter is not easily forgotten among the Tamasheqs (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 25). Perhaps one of the more graphic French responses to Tamasheq revolts was the 1954 public parading of the head of Tamasheq leader Alla ag Albacher to show what happened to those who did not heed the commands of central authority.

Tamasheq resentment against central authority has since built up over the past 100 plus years (Coulibaly, Drabo and Mohamed 1995), "erupting as intermittent revolts against central authority" (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 25). Tamasheq revolts did not cease after Mali attained independence in 1960. In 1963, the forces of Modibo Keita employed aircraft to bomb Tamasheqs revolting in favor of an independent state, "an idea dating

back to a 1957 petition to the French Parliament initiated by the Imam of Timbuktu [a Tamasheq stronghold]" (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 25). It was not until 1977 that Moussa Traore released Tamasheqs arrested in 1963-64.

Along with armed conflict, the Tamasheq have dealt with blows from nature. Specifically, the 1973 drought created misery and exile for thousands of Tamasheqs. Central authority did not help engender feelings of goodwill as "[i]nternational aid destined for the hungry populations of the North was stolen by army colonels to build luxurious villas in Bamako, knows as 'the castles of drought'" (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 26). It is clear that up to this point, Tamasheqs did not view the state, colonial or independent, as legitimate; they did not willingly obey the mandates of the state.

Second Tamasheq Rebellion: The Armed Revolt 1990-1997

A brief look at history dating back to the 19th century shows that Tamasheq concerns have only been met with violence and attempts at repression. As Poulton and Youssouf note: "The seeds of revolt, sown by French conquest and by the massacres of 1963-64 under Mali's First Republic, had time to grow and multiply" (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 55). Specifically, "the original grievances of Mali's [Tamasheqs] in the early 1960s had never completely disappeared" (Keita 1998, 14). "These were rooted in a [Tamasheq] conviction that the [state] was unresponsive and hostile" (Keita 1998, 14).

In the late 1980s, Tamasheqs began organizing under the umbrella of the *Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Azwad* (MPLA). On the night of June 28, 1990, the MPLA organized and launched a rebellion in Mali (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 55). Initially, the rebels were able to inflict heavy damage to Malian police and military forces. Further, "[t]he rebellion compounded the political and economic problems of the state:

the regime of Malian President Traore already faced financial constraints, and a growing domestic opposition" (Keita 1998, 15).

Traore realized he needed to attempt to communicate with the rebels. Before the coup d'etat that removed him from power in 1992, he was able to reach an internal agreement – the Accords of Tamanrasset – that partly addressed the most pressing issues of the Tamasheq rebels. Some of the specific provisions included the reduction of the Army presence in the north, especially around Kidal, and disengagement of the Army from civil administration (Keita 1998, 16).

Less than a week after being elected Mali's President, on April 11, 1992, Alpha Konaré was quick to build upon the Accords of Tamanrasset and upon further consultation, leaders from all involved communities signed the National Pact (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 66; Keita 1998). The Accord faced formidable challenges. First, although very inclusive, it did not obtain unanimous support from the rebel Tamasheq leaders (Poulton and Youssouf 1998). Perhaps more importantly, the Accords never received sufficient funding from donors and the international community to tend to returning refugees, fund the disarmament process and help with the building of a new security force that integrated former Tamasheq rebels (Poulton and Youssouf 1998).

Given some of the pact's shortcomings, perhaps it is not surprising that violence erupted once more in 1994. Throughout the following years, President Konaré took steps to address Tamasheq concerns. For example, in an effort to change Malian military perceptions of the Tamasheq, "the Army instituted recurring consultations between senior military officers and [Tamasheq] community leaders" (Keita 1998, 21). Importantly, the international community began funding efforts to the resettlement of refugees, while

donors pledged approximately $200 million towards development efforts in the north

(Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 78). In the end, the combined efforts of President Alpha's

regime and the international community successfully addressed Tamasheq demands

initially iterated in the Accord of Tamanrasset.

On March 27, 1996, as a symbolic end to conflict, small arms surrendered by Tamasheq

rebels were consumed by a flame of peace in Timbuktu. This flame "burned itself into

the consciousness of all Africa...illuminated the Malian peacekeeping model which is

now cited across the world" (Poulton and Youssouf 1998, 79). This act resonates with

the Malian model of peace keeping, one based on community reconciliation, military

integration and efforts towards decentralization (more on which is discussed further in

this chapter).

Since it now appears that Tamasheq grievances are being actively addressed, it is worth

comparing Tamasheq perceptions of legitimacy to the rest of the population. With the

exception of whether the constitution expresses the values and hopes of the Tamasheqs,

Tamasheqs are now significantly more likely to perceive the state as legitimate (Tables

5.10 – 5.13). This suggests that the peace process that placed dialogue center stage is

effective.

Constitution expresses values and hopes	% Tamasheq	% Others
disagree	11.9	18.58
neither agree nor disagree	23.81	12.39
agree	57.15	61.84
n	42	1017

Table 5.14

Courts make binding decisions	% Tamasheq	% Others
disagree	8.89	17.42
neither agree nor disagree	17.78	10.76
agree	73.34	71.81
n	45	1171

Difference of Means Statistically Significant at the .01 level

Table 5.15

People must obey the law	% Tamasheq	% Other
disagree	2.22	9.19
neither agree nor disagree	4.44	6.41
agree	93.33	84.4
n	45	1186

Difference of Means Statistically Significant at the .00 level

Table 5.16

People must pay taxes	% Tamasheq	% Other
disagree	6.66	20.2
neither agree nor disagree	17.78	6.71
agree	75.56	73.09
n	45	1178

Difference of Means Statistically Significant at the .01 level

Table 5.17

In sum, Mali is a democratic state with varying perceptions of legitimacy among its population. Overall, it appears that the current state is successfully engendering willing compliance to its mandates. As was discussed, certain segments of the population that

have historically been less willing to listen to the state presently appear satisfied. This bodes well for the future of Mali, allowing the current regime time to improve Malian socio-economic conditions without having to use scarce resources to combat active dissent. The next section explores some of the socio-economic challenges facing Mali.

Mali: Challenges

A landlocked country that is mostly covered by desert, Mali is undoubtedly a poor country facing numerous challenges. I want to focus on three challenges: cotton, decentralization and education.

Cotton

Cotton production remains vital for Mali[2]. James Tefft notes, "[i]t is no oversimplification to state as cotton goes, so go the prospects of development in Mali" (Tefft 2000, 213). To maintain its prominent role in cotton exportation, Mali focuses on output expansion with little attention to improving productivity. Given Mali's strong economic dependence on cotton production, this approach raises three key challenges.

First, there is evidence that current over expansion, decreased use of fallow periods of the fields, along with the absence of sufficient fertilization may constrain cotton production over time (Tefft 2000, 213). Although fertilization is used in the production of cotton, it is insufficient. Further, fertilizers cannot keep up with the high levels of soil depletion with researchers noting that "drastic options, such as doubling the application of fertilizer or manure, or halving erosion losses, even if feasible, would still not be enough to make up for the calculated deficits" (van der Pol and Traore 1993, 70).

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[2] Cotton accounted for over 70% percent of Mali's exports in 2003 International Fund for Agricultural Development, "Statistiques Pour Le Mali," (IFAD, 2007).

Second, there are risks associated with agricultural commodity products (Diouf 2004).

Specifically, the United Nations reports:

> "[M]ost agricultural commodities have experienced a downward trend in real prices, and the long-term forecasts are not encouraging. According to World Bank estimates for 2015, although real prices of most agricultural commodities are projected to rise above current levels, they would still remain below their mid-1990s peaks"(Diouf 2004, 21).

These trends can lead to rising rural unemployment and decline in export earnings, in turn threatening Mali's ability to pay for necessary food imports[3]. Thus, efforts must be made to improve productivity rather than simply focusing on crop expansion (Tefft 2000, 214).

Finally, the two previous challenges require substantial financial resources (Tefft 2000, 214). Besides finding ways to use cotton profits to increase productivity, funds are necessary to "finance the government's budget, or for strategic investment in other sectors of the economy" (Tefft 2000, 214). Considering Mali's dependence on cotton export (Agricultural Development 2007), any loss in current production is likely to adversely affect Malian economic development plans. A loss in cotton profits will further increase the Malian state's heavy reliance on foreign aid to finance its budget and development programs (Tefft 2000, 234).

Thus, it is not surprising that local NGO leaders interviewed suggested the cotton industry was facing growing challenges. Besides the ones mentioned above, other reported obstacles were growing competition from China alongside United States subsidies of national cotton growers. Supporting these claims, Oxfam notes that in the United States, cotton producers are receiving huge subsidies, selling their cotton on

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[3] As of 2005, Mali imports a little over 16% of its food needs. Ibid.

world markets below the cost of production, undermining African growth potential in the process (Rusu 2003). This is despite the fact that the real costs of cotton production are far higher in the United States than anywhere in Africa (Cromwell 2005).

Further, local NGO leaders reported that Mali simply exports cotton as fiber and do not add value to the crop. The latest fact is the most perverse as exported fiber returns to Mali in the form of more expensive finished products (e.g. cotton shirts). Leaders point to the importance of adding value to local agricultural products as a way for farmers to retain a larger share of the profits. This idea is not lost on the European Union who aims to support sub-Saharan efforts to increase added value of cotton production through diversification and industrial processing (e.g. clothing) (European Community 2004). In sum, interviewees appeared to agree that given the many challenges of cotton, it might benefit Mali to begin thinking beyond cotton.

Decentralization

Whereas solutions to Malian political and economic challenges appear to be as diverse as local and international interests, all individual leaders point to two key themes: decentralization and education. First, decentralization is at the heart of Malian political and developmental discussions. Decentralization became important ever since the 1991 revolution that resulted in the rise of Alpha Oumar Konaré (Alpha) as the democratically elected president of Mali.

During the 1991 National Conference, revolutionary leaders noted that past regimes were "inefficient, incompetent, and oblivious to the needs of the nation [and] that state intervention in rural areas had only reinforced central power" (Rawson 2000, 265). The proposed cure to these ills was the decentralization of the state institutions. In this

context, decentralization denotes the devolution of power to local councils, "each with its separate legal existence and its own budget, and with the authority to allocated resources and to carry out multiple functions" (Mawhood 1993; Tordoff 1994, 555).

Officially, decentralization in Mali is defined as: « comme un système d'administration consistant a permettre a un collectivité humaine (décentralization territoriale) ou à un service (décentralization technique) de s'auto-administrer sous le contrôle de l'Etat, en les dotant de la personnalité juridique, d'autorités propres et de ressources nécessaires » (Sall 1993, 16). Alternatively stated, decentralization in Mali is "the emergence of local government authorities...is the cornerstone of democracy, local development and [a revolutionary attempt at] the fight against all forms of poverty" (Diarra et al. 2004, 11)[4]. As will be discussed below, to date, decentralization in Mali has focused on décentralization technique (e.g. services), rather than on décentralization territoriale (e.g. political decentralization).

The big inquiries surrounding decentralization are primarily those questioning the center's will:

> "Will real authority and adequate resources devolve to new local authorities? Will Bamako dictate what local authorities may decide, as traditionally done, or will a new spirit of collaboration and constitutional participation evolve between the center and localities?" (Rawson 2000, 266)

The answers to these questions are not self-evident. For example, it was not until the 1999 municipal elections – eight years after the 1991 National Conference – that actual implementation of decentralization as institutional reform began to take place.

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[4] For a comprehensive review of decentralization in Mali, read Diarra et al. Souleymane Diarra et al., "Decentralization in Mali: Putting Policy in Action," in *Decentralisation and local governance*, ed. Thea Hilhorst and Gerard Baltissen (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 2004)...
(http://www.snvmali.org/publications/snvanglais362.pdf).

Specifically, locally elected authority "became the relevant legal forums for local development" (Diarra et al. 2004, 11). Yet, this did not occur without the protest of those very same forces that *approved* decentralization measures in 1991 (Rawson 2000, 280). Thus it is fair to question whether the political will necessary to devolve authority is truly present. Nevertheless, there are signs that the first local elections are beginning to break up the center's hold as national party leaders break away to stand for local elections (Rawson 2000, 280).

One of the cornerstones of decentralization is the allocation of fixed financial funds to rural communities (Mali 1997). These funds are set aside for spending at the discretion of local authorities. Central authorities are not permitted usage of the funds. Nevertheless, this arrangement is intended to provide some financial autonomy to the communes under the assumption that they are more likely to use funds in ways that are most beneficial to the local community. Further, decentralization Law N° 96-501, Article 2, states that local taxes can be fixed and assessed by local authorities (Mali 1997, 75). Most importantly, local taxes are to be used according to local discretion. Unlike state derived funds, local municipalities appear[5] more successful in recovering locally imposed taxes (Coulibaly and Hilhorst 2004, 15).

Community leaders outside of Bamako suggested during the interviews that central authority may be resisting the complete release of funds to local authorities. It is further noted that local funds still derive from the central state account and that the state often diverts funds, short-changing communes in the process (Diarra et al. 2004, 36). Rawson notes that in Mali, further constricting communal fiduciary rights is the fact that

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[5] This is based on a study focusing on just two Malian communes.

"communal budgets have to be approved by the state delegate" (Rawson 2000, 280). In essence, power has been transferred to the communes but the necessary resources and political support is lacking.

During my interviews, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) noted that one way communes have tried to overcome their shortage of funds is through collaborative efforts to strengthen capacity and deal with common issues. This complements earlier research that notes: "[W]here a virile system of local self-governing units exits, substantial efforts and resources are usually mobilized by local people themselves to complement the efforts of the central government" (Olowu 1989, 205). In the end, most NGO leaders emphasized the importance of using local communes to establish long-term developmental change and overall reduction of poverty.

Education

Second, leaders stressed the importance of education. In this field study, every NGO leader discussed the need for individuals to get involved at the local level or, commune. These leaders appear optimistic that individuals are getting involved, but reported that the biggest hurdle towards active and meaningful involvement is education. Specifically, the extent of decentralization and the speed at which it can be implemented is related to the availability of trained manpower (Tordoff 1994, 578). Creating local councils is one thing, but if individuals cannot effectively administer such local structures it decreases their overall capacity to effect change at the local level.

One NGO leader also referred to the need for emancipation arguing that his organization's role is to "educate and awaken" the population. Participation in local government structures is critical to the success and sustainability of local programs

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(Olowu 1989, 202). Further complicating matters is the center's attempt to substantially circumscribe local participation. This is particularly important given the fact that until recently, decentralization has focused on administrative *(décentralization technique)* rather than political decentralization *(décentralization territoriale)* (Olowu 1989, 210). As noted earlier, education is needed for both administrative and political decentralization.

Education ought to occur at all levels. Many NGOs are focusing on quality primary education and civic education. One NGO stressed the need for individuals to understand their role in the state.

Further, NGOs expressed a desire for citizens to understand that local leaders were accountable to all individuals for their overall leadership and management. Notions of accountability, although important (Lonsdale 1986), are not something that has come easily to newly democratic citizens. Specifically, Africans "do not appear to fully grasp their political rights as 'citizens,' notably to regularly demand accountability from leaders" (Bratton and Logan 2006, 4). Yet, perhaps Mali stands a better chance than other countries in this regard. Specifically, Bratton and Logan "find that plurality systems have a more positive effect than proportional and mixed systems on popular demands for political accountability "(Bratton and Logan 2006, 13).

As noted in the previous chapter, the Malian electoral system is a two round plurality system. Thus, one might expect overall levels of popular demands for political accountability to be greater in Mali than in states with proportional or mixed electoral systems. Yet, most NGO representatives I interviewed stressed that basic literacy is required in order for people to effectively participate in their communal councils. They

need basic reading and writing skills to understand proceedings and hold their local leaders accountable. Essentially, literacy empowers people. They point out that it is difficult for one to hold another accountable if s/he cannot read or understand the communal councils' decisions.

Nevertheless, the GTZ reports that only 53 of the 703 communal mayors and less than 8% of the mayors retained their jobs – over 90% *lost* their jobs. This appears to illustrate that regardless of attained education levels, Malians do appear to hold their local leaders accountable or at least they appear to be removing unsatisfying leaders. Further, regional participation appears lively regardless of education levels. In fact, with the exception of Bamako, communal electoral turnout is significantly greater than national electoral turnout. Regional turnout in the 2004 communal elections was reported in excess of 50 percent with a regional average of 43.1% (Elections 2004). Notwithstanding these figures, most NGOs viewed basic literacy as a core competence needed for development to take root.

However, education involves more than literacy. The Secrétariat de Concentration des Organisations Non Gouvernementales Maliennes (SECO-ONG/Mali) refers to the Malian brain drain – educated Malians leaving the country for more lucrative employment opportunities. The term brain drain represents the loss of highly skilled professionals from a source country, such as Mali, to a recipient country (Sako 2002) – in the Malian context, most notably France. On more than one occasion, individuals reported that few local, regional and state civil servants attained necessary educational levels. In particular, there was a dearth of engineers and people with more technically related degrees necessary to tackle some of the more technical issues (e.g. power). Part of the problem is

Mali's inability to compensate trained professionals at levels they can find elsewhere (Sako 2002; Sidibe 1995, 21). For example, rural teachers reported: "Our salary is between 25,000 CFA ($38 per month) for the newly hired teacher and 35,000 CFA ($54 per month) for the two older teachers (the fourth teacher recently quit)" (Marx 2003)[6].

Thus, it should come as no surprise that many entrepreneurs and NGOs complained that finding someone to help build a bridge or dig a well was no easy task as the expertise is not easily found and, at times, simply does not appear to exist. It was suggested that a lot of the more educated Malians left the country for overseas jobs. One NGO leader pointed to the lack of properly trained Malian park rangers and increasingly, mining engineers. This is particularly significant because Mali is confronting challenges from desert encroachment, elephant poaching and an ailing gold exportation industry that is currently ranked third behind South Africa and Ghana. Further, there was a distinct feeling that with increased regionalization of West Africa, Malians are losing jobs to their better educated and more specialized Senegalese neighbors.

One last observation that merits comment is that perhaps decentralization efforts are beginning to take hold. Specifically, Malian politics are becoming more regional. Throughout Mali, it appeared that the leadership lacks vision. Many Malians reported that the current president, Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT), "est de notre grain.' Translated, this means "he is one of us." Initially, this might sound nice in so far as ATT is widely perceived to be one of the guys. However, this suggests that ATT has a particular desire to be all things to all people. This amounts to what one interviewee terms a "false consensus." In other words, there are few, if any, issues being debated at

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[6] For comparison, an entry level high school teacher in France earns $1,700/month. (http://fr.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070102141110AAQU65B) accessed 14 Feb 07.

the national level. Perhaps partly as a result of decentralization and partly due to ATT's desire to forgo alienating his constituents, politics in Mali are becoming increasingly regional. This is further exacerbated by the fact that central authority is slowly losing grip over the regions.

With decentralization, regional politics is becoming increasingly important (Rawson 2000). The state's weak national infrastructure along with scant resources only furthers the need for decentralization (Library of Congress 2005). Regions are seeking innovative ways of generating revenue and resources. Further, there has been "considerable effort to involve local populations in delivery of social services" (Rawson 2000, 283). Unable to rely on central authority and facing an increasingly interested electorate (evidenced by high turnover after first term), regional leaders are beginning to set the tone for political discussion.

Missing from political discourse is ethnicity. Ethnicity does not appear to play any meaningful role in Malian politics. This apparent lack of ethnic salience leads some to observe that:

> "[It] is also true that there is a common denominator to all of these [ethnicities], a denominator strengthened by a long history of cohabitation, conflict and exchanges of al sorts – matrimonial, commercial or simply that of neighbors. This history has forged what we can call a veritable Malian identity of common characteristics and values that are internalized and shared" (Konaré 2000, 15).

Perhaps it is unsurprising that in seeking allies, the central state is more concerned about regional leaders than ethnic leaders. Whilst it might seem that some regions are more ethnically homogenous than others, ethnicity simply does not appear to play a role in national politics. Further, none of the national leaders appear to make direct or indirect calls to any ethnic support base. In the local newspapers, none of the editorials, cartoons

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or opinion pieces appeals to ethnic ties. Radio programming, often vicious in their critique of the state and the president, never seem to appeal to ethnic stereotype or solidarity. In fact, interviewees from various neighborhoods and settings expressed great confusion as to the actual ethnic background of any given leader. This leads to the next discussion in this chapter.

Ethnic Ambiguity

In an ethnically charged context, it is reasonable to believe that individuals who share ethnic ties with the leader are more likely to perceive the state as legitimate. After all, in a context of scarcity, it seems natural to take care of one's own people before taking care of others. The current president of Mali, ATT, is considered a Peuhl. Peuhls comprise roughly 13 percent of the population. As discussed earlier, it is sensible to expect that Peuhl respondents would generally be more favorable than the rest of the population in their perceptions of state legitimacy. Yet, this does not appear to be the case in Mali.

In my interviews, roughly 50 percent of all those interviewed, regardless of ethnic background, could not correctly identify ATT's ethnicity. Over 70 percent of rural Peuhls correctly identified ATT's ethnicity. Still, nearly 30 percent of rural Peuhls reported that they were unsure. But, among urban Peuhls, only a little more than 40 percent of my respondents could correctly identify ATT's ethnicity. Further, last names appeared to be unreliable indicators of ethnic heritage which further complicates their ability to identify ATT's ethnicity. This data confirms theory that suggests ethnicity remains more salient in rural areas.

Ambiguity of last names is not Mali-specific. For example, Keita is a common name amongst Yoruba, Hausa, and Bambara (Schaffer 2005, 327). Someone with the last

name of Chimuka in Zambia cannot be assumed to be a Tonga (Center 1997). ATT's last name, Touré, is as likely to be identified as Bambara as it is to be identified as Peuhl. Cissé, a common Malian last name, has little to do with ethnic heritage. In fact, it was reported that Cissé is a name Islam historically conferred on an individual who has done great things to promote the faith and this person's descendants are allowed to keep the Cissé last name. Notably, Cissé is a very common regional name.

From the interviews, it was clear that ethnicity in Mali is affected by significant ambiguity. Overall, Peuhls appear just as likely as any other ethnic group in Mali to misidentify ATT's ethnic heritage. At first glance, this ethnic ambiguity is bound to have an adverse effect on perceptions of state legitimacy but can also build positive relationships between the groups.

Malians have an informal institution they call "cousinage." The best translation for *cousinage* is a 'joking relationship.' As the term implies, joking relationships involves an ongoing conversation involving a lot of jokes, or poking fun of, between two individuals. Specifically, certain last names in Mali are more common than others. Over time, links were developed between individuals with specific last names: Sédibé, for example, are considered cousins, albeit not necessarily related by blood, to individuals with the last name of Sangaré, Keïta are cousins to Coulibaly (Sédibé and Diallo 2006). As soon as two cousins meet, insults begin to fly. Yet, these cousins are bound by an accepted norm of reciprocity to help one another in times of need.

A Peuhl travel guide provided example after example of this relationship at work. The joking began soon after he discovered the last name of our interviewee. Some of the best

exchanges came with individuals whose last name was Coulibaly[7]. Such jocular exchanges included "you are my slave." In one instance, the local guide told one of the interviewees that he had returned to claim his house and that as his slave the interviewee had to vacate his property. She quickly retorted to the guide that he should go see his sister. In this case, his sister was her dog tied to a chair in the back of the courtyard. What appeared to be the most heated conversation quickly turned into boisterous laughter and back slapping. It was reported that the people joke over slavery as a) it is such a tough subject and b) historically just about every ethnic group in Mali conquered or was conquered by another. This informal institution of cousinage is one of the most interesting findings from this Mali study.

Interestingly, other entities have noticed the mediating effects of this joking relationship. The United States State Department, in a 2003 issue of State Magazine notes the following:

> "A unique Malian cultural custom known as "cousinage" provides a basis for understanding among these ethnic groups. This is a continual, gentle teasing between families that acknowledges the differences and plays on the Malian sense of humor, history and hospitality. For example, a member of the Coulibaly family is jokingly referred to as a "slave" of a Keita (and sometimes vice versa) because his ancestors are indebted to the Keita's for saving their lives. This open and friendly acknowledgment of differences seems to provide Malians a sense of confidence in their common nationhood while defying African inter-ethnic stereotypes." (Hamilton 2003, 13)

This relationship links most ethnic groups and provides effective means of inter-ethnic trust and communication. Institutions can act as a mechanism to build the trust necessary for groups to communicate and engender trust (Jackman and Miller, 1998). It is clear

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[7] Notably, while traveling through Mali, I quickly assumed the last name of Coulibaly as the name appears to have the most links with other ethnic groups. It helped me in my travels and in my attempts to talk to those whom I came across. A countless number of people called me their slave.

that this joking relationship plays a major role in the ethnic ambiguity that pervades Malian politics.

Although not heavily discussed amongst political scientists, joking relationships are a good example of an informal institution long noted and studied by anthropologists. As early as the early 1900s, anthropologists have studied the effects of joking relationships (Radcliffe-Brown 1940). Officially defined, a joking relationship "is a relation between two persons in which one is by custom permitted, and in some instances, required, to tease or make fun of the other, who in turn is required to take no offence" (Radcliffe-Brown 1940, 195). These 'institutionalized' relationships occur between several different societal units (e.g. ethnic groups) and categories (e.g. familial) of varying inclusiveness (Rigby 1968, 133). There are two varieties of joking relationships: symmetrical and asymmetrical. In a symmetrical relationship, each of the two participants can tease and make fun of the other. In an asymmetrical relationship, one accepts the jibing without retaliating. As the earlier story of the guide illustrated, joking relationships in Mali are symmetrical in nature. As noted earlier, there is pretence of hostility in joking relationships but it is built on an underlying friendliness.

Don Handelman and Bruce Kapferer (1972) conducted an interesting comparative study on joking relationships. In their study, they differentiated between two sets of rules that govern joking relationships: setting specific and category routinized. Handelman and Kapferer refer to these sets of rules as joking frames. In setting specific frames, the beginning of joking depends largely on "locally derived cues proffered by and to potential participants" (Handelman and Kapferer 1972, 485). Category-routinized joking frames are anchored in more general social norms and conventions. In contrast to

specific frames, the rules of category routinized frames have time-depth and are routinized by well established behavioral cues or roles that govern joking. In Mali, it is evident that joking relationships have category-routinized frames. Joking participants have well established cues and retorts that appear intimately familiar to all, regardless of particular ethnic heritage.

Anthropological work suggests that joking relationships are a form of inter-ethnic alliance or consociation (Radcliffe-Brown 1949; Radcliffe-Brown 1940). Whereas the [inter-ethnic] type of joking relationships amongst Malian ethnic groups is considered uncommon (Radcliffe-Brown 1940, 199), these relationships are fairly widespread (Radcliffe-Brown 1940, 195). The available literature suggests that a variety of joking relationships exist in other parts of Africa (Brant 1948; Fortes 1949; Freedman 1977; Labouret 1929; Radcliffe-Brown 1949; Radcliffe-Brown 1940; Rigby 1968). For example, Freedman (1977) refers to the intra-ethnic joking relationship amongst Kigas living in northern Rwanda and southern Uganda. He notes:

> "[Kigas] exchange verbal abuse, hence the abase are joking partners though joking is here a poor term for the kind of interaction which takes place. The exchanges are more akin to artful insulting. The Kiga phrase for this artful insulting is *guterana ubuse*, which literally means to toss around (beat) *ubuse* among each other...This kind of behavior includes *gutukana*. *Gutukana* is something which can arouse anger, while one of the unique features of the *ubuse* exchange is that it cannot arouse anger. It cannot by definition." (Freedman 1977, 158)

It is thus sensible to argue that category routinized joking relationships that occur between ethnic groups might help explain varying levels of conflict in Africa, or why sub-Saharan Africa has less conflict than one might expect given ethnic heterogeneity (Fearon and Laitin 1996).

In sum, joking relationships in Mali is integrated into societal fabric. Joking

relationships act as a means of relieving potential conflict in situations of structural

ambiguity (Rigby 1968, 133). Some might consider it a form of traditional "conflict

medicine" (Konaté 1999; Zartman 2000). Another point worth mentioning is that joking

relationships are as likely to mitigate inter-ethnic conflict as intra-ethnic caste based

conflict (Konaté 1999). Commenting on the beneficial effects of cousinage, Doulaye

Konaté notes: « Au Mali, le [cousinage] agit comme une thérapeutique qui participe

quotidiennement à la régulation sociale » (Konaté 1999). Simply translated, cousinage

helps regulate social pressures on a daily basis.

From this perspective, it is reasonable to view joking relationships as a means of

managing conflict. There are suggestions that joking relationships are being threatened

and in some cases rendered obsolete (O'Bannon 2006). In those cases, it is reasonable to

argue that ethnic conflict, formerly contained through the frame sets of joking

relationships, are more likely to flare up. Accordingly, these types of informal

institutions could greatly benefit political science research focusing on ethnic conflict.

Thanks to anthropologists, a lot of the theoretical groundwork is already in place.

There are two other factors that possibly help account for ethnic ambiguity in Mali:

elite education and civil service policies under the regime of Modibo Keita. First, new

African elites in Francophone Africa attended only a handful of schools (Snyder 1965).

Elites were taken from their village at a young age to attend French colonial schools. It is

possible that these individuals, not having been steeped in their respective ethnic histories

and traditions (Snyder 1965, 10), were less averse to mingling with or perhaps marrying

individuals from other ethnic groups.

Second and more importantly, Mali's first President, Modibo Keita, instituted a policy requiring all civil servants to serve in geographic areas away from an individual's home of origin (Diarrah 1986). For example, an individual born in Gao (eastern Mali) might have to serve in Kayes (western Mali). This policy was established with the deliberate belief that it was necessary to help different ethnic groups become acquainted in attempts to build a sense of nationhood.

It can be argued that this particular policy was effective in establishing mutual respect among ethnically diverse elites. Further, there is a significant amount of inter-ethnic marriage in Mali partly as a result of this policy. The fact that these elites have become acquainted with other ethnicities in a few select schools would only facilitate the process. The result would be evidenced by the previously mentioned observation that last names are a poor predictor of ethnicity. From time spent in Mali, an oft repeated joke is *if you want to cheat someone, don't inquire too deeply about who the person is, because you will discover that he is your cousin.* Besides cousinage, the policy effects of Mali's first president likely added to the already existing ethnic ambiguity in Mali.

Pastoralist Puzzle

Next, the inquiry turns to the pastoralist puzzle. As mentioned earlier, the empirical evidence suggests that, at least in Mali, pastoralists are more likely than agriculturalists to view the state as legitimate. This suggestion is counter-intuitive in that pastoralists have traditionally been amongst the most difficult group to assimilate into a state. One such example is evident with Mali's long history of civil strife revolving around the Tamasheq pastoralists in their northern region. Specifically, the Tamasheqs desired secession from

the rest of Mali. Yet, it is exactly this kind of heightened contact that might lead to higher overall perceptions of legitimacy.

It is arguable that heightened contact with the state results in pastoralists becoming increasingly aware of the state. This greater awareness leads the pastoralists to realize that the state wants to impose its rule of law on these traditionally autonomous people. Combined, this heightened contact results in pastoralists viewing the state as 'more' legitimate than the rest of their countrymen who appear less concerned about state encroachment or are less directly affected by the state. Anecdotally, a Peuhl herder who was interviewed complained that the state laws were unfair towards his community in certain disputes. For instance, the traditional laws of Sékou Amadou would impose less punishment than current state laws if a head of cattle veered from the fields and ate from a farmer's field. In essence, the herder thought that the state should not import new laws at the expense of traditional laws.

Given the background, this attitude makes sense. When speaking of traditional laws, the Peuhls are referring to the Dina Code of Sékou Amadou codified in 1812 (Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon 1999). Notably, Sékou Amadou was a Peuhl from Macina who defeated the Bambaras in 1818. Thus, it is not surprising that these laws favor the pastoralists over the agriculturalists.

As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons pastoralists[8] might be more likely to perceive the state as legitimate is that they have more contact with the state. Because the Tamasheqs engaged in armed conflict with the state, it seems reasonable that such conflict would lead to more contact and a better understanding of the state's claims of

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[8] For the sake of consistency with the empirical chapters, when referring to pastoralist I am only speaking of rural pastoralists.

authority over the Tamasheqs. It logically follows the Tamasheqs would not rebel if they did not feel the state's demands were negatively impacting their community.

Firsthand accounts of pastoralists' contact with the state were obtained during the Mali field study. Rural herders reported they felt the direct impact of state authority whenever their herds strayed onto an agriculturalist's farm. Interestingly, the herders' disdain was directed at the state rather than the farmer in that the former viewed the state as being unreasonable and disrespectful of the Dina Code of Sékou Amadou. Nevertheless, time in Mali did not suggest rural pastoralists had more day to day contact than other Malians with the state. In fact, nearly half of the interviewees stated that they would like to approach the state about issues, but few felt comfortable actually expressing their concerns to the state. It was repeatedly reported that the state *nous écoute pas* or, the state *does not listen to us*. This suggests that more than simple day to day contact with the state is attributable to why rural pastoralists are more likely to view the state as legitimate.

Remembering the previous discussion, of the two pastoralist groups, it is the Tamasheqs who actively sought some form of independence from the state (Seely 2001). Further, it is reasonable to think that one group enters a period of civil strife when a basic and fundamental disagreement develops over the laws of or who controls the state. Specifically, "[r]esentments about restricted access to political positions and...lost autonomy drive separatist demands and rebellion generally" (Gurr 1993, 188).
It appears the minority group feels, for whatever reason, that the current rules of the state are unacceptable. It logically follows that in order to reach a level in which one group

decides to break away or attempts to break away from the state, it must first have a firm understanding of the [negative] impact of established rules.

Time spent in Mali appears to confirm these thoughts. When talking to Malians, it is clear that rural pastoralists have had more disagreement with the rules of the state. The Peuhls are well versed with the Dina Code and thus, more likely to understand when they diverged with the rules of the current state. Unfortunately, formal interviews with the Tamasheqs were brief due to security concerns. Nevertheless, time spent in Timbuktu, a Tamasheq dominated city, provided similar insight. Specifically, the Tamasheqs[9] appear to be generally distrustful of state courts. It was often reported that they have their own laws that the state should respect. Despite this attitude, as discussed earlier, there appeared to be a consensus amongst the Tamasheqs that the police had the right to enforce the laws[10] although they might not agree with the laws.

Overall, the Mali field study suggests that the people generally take great pride in the security of Mali. Mali is a virtual sea of tranquility when compared to its regional neighbors (e.g. Sierra Leone, Côte D'Ivoire). Yet, as stated earlier, the police have little presence in rural areas. Further, most of the armed conflict occurred in rather remote regions of Mali (e.g. Timbuktu, Kidal). Interestingly, it was reported that during the Tamasheq rebellion, the rebels often targeted remote police spots. According to The Inventory of Conflict and Environment at American University in Washington, DC, the Tamasheqs targeted remote police stations ostensibly because they detained Tamasheq

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[9] Afrobarometer Round 3 data supports this insight. Tamasheqs are more likely to disagree that courts have the right to make decisions. The difference is statistically significant.

[10] Again, Afrobarometer Round 3 data empirically supports these feelings. The difference between Tamasheqs and other respondents was statistically significant.

prisoners (Hershkowitz 2005). It is exactly this kind of contact that could increase a group's understanding of a state's claim to power.

Thus far, this inquiry appears to suggest that in examining legitimacy, whether or not the ethnic group has experienced conflict with the state is more important than the mode of livelihood. Now, it is worth examining whether any one ethnic group is more likely to turn towards an alternative authority structure away from the state. Given the discussion thus far, it is reasonable to believe that pastoralists, especially the Tamasheqs, are more likely to exhibit this practice.

Walking through the streets of Mali, it does not take long to realize the importance of Islam throughout the country. After all, the state motto, referring to Islam, states: "Un peuple, Un But, Une Foi," meaning one people, one goal, one faith. Without any intent of passing judgment on deeply held faith values, it did not appear that the population was very devout in practice. For example, an oft heard comment was that the mosques were empty except for a fashion show on Friday nights. Indeed, it does not take much time in Mali to notice that traffic and cities quickly came to a complete standstill on Friday mosque nights in observance of the Islamic holy day. Yet, it appears that Friday observance is considered more social than religious in nature.

The two areas visited that left a particularly striking mark for its Islamic fervor were Djénne and Timbuktu. Both towns were historic centers of Peuhl and Tamasheq culture, respectively. The visits included encounters with a few very pious Malian Muslims in Djénne, a reputed center of Islamic studies and replete with Imams and madrasas – Islamic schools. While visiting a museum dedicated to the preservation of historic documents in Timbuktu, one cannot help but be impressed by some of the most beautiful

gold inlaid pages of the Koran ever seen. An article in the Washington Post written by Alan Huffman (Huffman 2005) does a wonderful job describing some of the magnificent documents preserved in Timbuktu.

Despite the occasional secular attitude toward Friday mosque nights, one does get a sense that religion plays a more prominent role in the everyday of rural inhabitants than in the lives of urban inhabitants. Based on experiences in Djénne and Timbuktu in particular, this study allows the hypothesis that religious authority might supplant that of the state in certain areas. Consequently, it is sensible to expect individuals to have greater recourse to religious or traditional authority in such rural areas[11].

Islamic influence was much more evident in rural towns with a large population of traditional pastoralists. Respondents often reported they turned towards religious authorities as an alternative authority to the state of Mali. It was also believed that this religious authority derived from God and thus, such authority was less corrupt and more just. Respondents understood that the state sought to impose its own laws, but considered those laws corrupt. On more than one occasion, it was reported that the French gave the current constitution to Malians and did not understand local norms and customs. It follows that the state should consult the people and re-draw the constitution.

As discussed, the possibility exists that rural pastoralists might have an alternative to the state in religious and traditional leaders. It appears that in certain areas, religious authority or traditional leaders might possibly supplant that of the state might. This permits one to hypothesize that segments of the population still widely accept religious or

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[11] Specifically, Afrobarometer Round 3 data supports the intuition. The evidence is that rural pastoralists are almost twice as likely as the rest of the general population to seek the advice or help of a religious leader. Yet, when looking at frequency of religious observances, there is no significant difference between rural pastoralists and the rest of the population.

traditional authority, which conceivably will increase the likelihood of friction between the state and those individuals. Specifically, the apparent contrast in norms and law will heighten an individual's awareness and understanding of the state's claim to legitimacy.

Thus far, the attempts in this study to understand the pastoralist puzzle have led to a revision to the original hypothesis. Previously, it was hypothesized that an ethnic group's mode of livelihood affected its perceptions of legitimacy. It now appears that both active contact with the state and the availability of an alternate authority structure, be it religious or traditional, appears more important than mode of livelihood. However, this area merits additional study and is better left to pursue in future research given the limited scope of this inquiry.

In regards to the Tamasheqs, there is another factor to consider. Specifically, the data used for analysis was collected in 2005, after the peace settlement in the north, but in a period in which there was still some increasing banditry by Tamasheq bands in the north. Perhaps any Tamasheq asked questions pertaining to willing obedience, or legitimacy, would see it in his/her self-interest to answer positively to such questions as to whether the police has the right to enforce the law. If they did not, they could fear being labeled a bandit or rebel. Or perhaps, as suggested above, they really did buy into the peace accords and the state's accommodations to their demands.

In general, it does not seem that mode of livelihood (e.g. pastoralism) alone helps explain perceptions of legitimacy. So far, the evidence appears to suggest that whether one has experienced conflict with the state is more important than mode of livelihood. If a group chooses to engage in armed conflict, it presumably has a clearer understanding of the conflict's purpose and its enemy's disposition. It follows that should the state prevail

as it did with the Tamasheqs, its claims to legitimacy are more widely understood and accepted by those who have agreed to submit to its authority. This, to an extent, implies that for others, the state's authority remains more remote and abstract.

Finally, it is worth discussing whether pastoralists have a viable alternative authority to the state. To examine this, rural pastoralists were asked if they were more likely to contact religious leaders or traditional leaders to help them resolve their problems. Not surprisingly, the responses appear to suggest that rural pastoralists generally have more contact with religious leaders or traditional leaders.

The evidence derived from the Mali field study suggests that rural pastoralists, such as the Tamasheqs, generally resort to an alternative authority structure when they are unhappy with the state. Thus, it appears conceivable that the Tamasheqs might have a better understanding of the state's claim to legitimacy as it stands in direct contrast to an alternative structure of authority. Such contrast is potentially most pronounced when traditional laws or customs directly conflicts with the state's rules. This is best illustrated by an interview with a pastoralist herder who lives on the outskirts of Djénne. Specifically, he indicated he was very upset that the state ruled against him in regards to an argument he had with an agriculturalist over his cow eating some of a farmer's produce. He attempted to rely on the Code of the Dina as an alternative authority source to resolve the conflict, but the state forced him to settle according to modern terms that favored the agriculturalist. He stated he did not oppose making amends for the action of his cow, but opined that the old laws were more reasonable and that the state should not interfere with such traditions. It appears that experiences with such clashes in laws or

customs only heighten the individual's understanding of the state's claim to coercion. As the example illustrates, such heightened understanding is not always positive.

Conclusion

This chapter allowed us to take a more in-depth look at Mali. Specifically, this chapter shed light on empirical findings from the empirical model in the previous chapter: a) ethnic ambiguity and b) the pastoralist puzzle. Mali is undoubtedly a poor country facing many developmental challenges including, but not limited to, poverty, food security and education.

Education in Mali presents a multi-level problem. At the very base, it is important that Mali combats high illiteracy rates. In addition to providing schools, it must provide the facilities and teachers. It was observed during the fieldwork that more than one village had schools without teachers. Some villages had schools with teachers, but lacked supplies. More disconcerting, long term neglect of education in Mali has led to a more significant developmental hurdle. Simply, Mali lacks the domestic technical expertise (e.g. engineers) to handle both complex developmental issues and more immediate revenue generating projects (e.g. mine engineer). Even more alarming, Malians are beginning to resent efforts at regionalization as more qualified Senegalese are perceived as taking what are considered to be Malian jobs. It is no exaggeration to declare that Mali is facing an educational crisis. However, there does not appear to be a short term solution.

Perhaps the most significant finding from my time in Mali was the surprising effect of the informal institution of cousinage, or joking relationships. The theoretical possibilities and potential contribution of these joking relationships to the literature are considerable.

Specifically, joking relationships might provide strong explanatory power in understanding conflicts, or varying levels thereof. The anthropological literature makes it clear that joking relationships are not an African phenomenon. There is some research that suggests the civility such relationships promote is threatened as economic crisis and modern conditions stress the institution. However, it is clear that joking relationships can still thrive under harsh economic realities such as Mali.

Further, joking relationships may enhance understanding of inter-personal trust. It is sensible to suggest that the institution of cousinage might help provide incentives for the formation of trust. Specifically, cousinage provides an institutional means for dealing with grievances or disputes among individuals of different ethnic heritages. Not all joking relationships occur across ethnic groups, but one should expect greater levels of inter-personal trust in countries with existing inter-ethnic joking relationships.

The second empirical finding this chapter sought to shed light upon is the pastoralist puzzle. This involved examining why rural pastoralists would be more likely to perceive the state as legitimate. Time in Mali suggests the answer to be twofold: increased contact with the state and availability of an alternate authority structure. Rural pastoralists in Mali have a history of contact, often violent, with the state. It is clear that the Tamasheqs have actively sought to establish some autonomy from the Malian state. Further, rural pastoralists appear more likely to fall back upon traditional or religious authority structures. Their argument with the state stems, in part, with their resistance to modern state laws in favor of more traditional laws (e.g. Dina Code). Rural pastoralists understand the claims of the state and its claim to legitimacy, but find traditional legal

structures more favorable to their interests. Although rural pastoralists might perceive the state as legitimate, they do not necessarily prescribe to its laws.

In sum, case studies can be very beneficial and add to general theoretical knowledge. It is part of the "thick description" that Clifford Geertz (1973) advocates. Case studies enhance understanding of empirical evidence. At best, researchers can utilize case studies to generate new hypotheses (Lijphart 1971, 691). With respect to the present case study, increased knowledge of joking relationships, variants thereof, and longevity arguably enhances understanding of current research on conflict and trust. Sometimes, case studies serve primarily as deviant case studies. In the previous chapter, the data presented a pastoralist puzzle. Although time spent in Mali does not lead to a definitive answer as to why rural pastoralists are more likely to perceive the state as legitimate, the case study suggests that mode of livelihood is less significant than contact with the state and availability of alternative authority structures. Here, the case uncovered relevant additional variables that were not previously considered (Lijphart 1971, 692). This demonstrates the usefulness of case studies as a tool to facilitate theoretical research.

VI – Concluding Thoughts

Africa proper is comprised of 53 states, and 48 of these are located in sub-Saharan Africa. It does not take much experience with Africa to notice that large parts of the continent are in disarray. However, a good portion of Africa presents a prettier picture. While news reports are quick to focus on the tragedy in Sudan, or the failed state of Somalia, these are but two of 48 sub-Saharan African states. Violence in Darfur, Sudan, is increasingly complicating international aid relief efforts (BBC 2007), while Somali continues in its struggle to establish a state (BBC 2007). Sudan and Somalia discount the great variety of African experiences, but Africa's beauty lies in her diversity.

This dissertation examined state legitimacy in Africa. Influenced by Pierre Englebert (2000), the purpose of this project was to determine which factor best accounts for varying perceptions of state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa. First, the most important task was to operationalize the concept of legitimacy. Before considering contributing factors, it was important to define the concept of legitimacy (Sartori 1970) including its meaning, dimensions and referents. Based on review of some of the literature, the concept of legitimacy was defined as an individual's willing compliance to mandates of the state. The concept is vertical in nature, focused on the relationship between the individual and the state. Expanding the scope of inquiry, this dissertation focused primarily on state legitimacy.

In this chapter, I want to focus on two key findings and the appropriate implications for each: an individual's trust in institutions and the informal institutions of joking relationships. In the case of an individual's trust in institutions I will consider some of

the policy implications. In my discussion of joking relationships, the focus resides more in terms of current academic considerations and future research implications.

Key Findings

It is important to discuss two critical findings. First, an individual's trust in institutions appears to be the strongest predictor of perceptions of state legitimacy. Specifically, the more an individual trusts institutions of coercion, the more likely that individual will perceive the state as legitimate. The second finding came from the Mali case study. Specifically, time spent in Mali highlighted the importance of the informal institution of 'cousinage,' otherwise known as joking relationships. Although this concept is not foreign to anthropologists, it possesses a lot of theoretical merit for future political science research. Both of these findings contribute to existing literature.

Trust

An individual's trust in institutions is perhaps the most significant source of state legitimacy. It is important to remember that trust is comprised of two dimensions: an individual's trust in institutions and inter-personal trust. Of the two, an individual's trust has shown to be strongly significant in all models. Not only was an individual's trust in institutions significant in the cross-national models discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, it was the only consistently strongly significant independent variable across each individual country model. Larry Diamond notes that those who generally trust institutions are much more likely to support the current state, regardless of its democratic credentials or lack thereof (Diamond 1999, 206).

Thoughts and Policy Implications

Given the importance of an individual's trust in institutions for state legitimacy, it is important to consider potential sources that affect an individual's trust in institutions. If Africa is suffering from a legitimacy crisis that stunts its developmental potential, then shoring legitimacy is critical. It is important to reflect on some ways to help the state secure greater legitimacy by increasing an individual's level of trust in the set of institutions that comprise the state.

First, one might argue that lower levels of trust are associated with high *expectations*. Simply, the logic is that "[S]ome expect more from the [state]...than is realistic" (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 216). As the state is unable to deliver expected goods, levels of trust begin to falter. If that is the case, it might be important to lower actual expectations to increase trust. This is particularly important in a context of scarcity. For example, the state might simply not have the resources necessary to provide universal health care or to provide sufficient schooling to raise levels of illiteracy. Consequently, it does not benefit the long term legitimacy of state for leaders to promise such desirable goods.

According to David Easton's (Easton 1957) conceptual schema, expectations are linked to outcomes. Easton argues that a state can garner support when its outputs meet the demands of the members of society (Easton 1957, 396). Exaggerated demands are unlikely to be met. In some cases, the international community effectively constrains states in Africa from delivering such high demand outputs as social goods (e.g. Healthcare) (Brown 1995). African leaders might have attained power by promising basic services that a resource scarce state with little international leverage simply cannot provide. Along those lines, Arthur Miller (1974) argues that when a citizen's

expectations of government performance are unfulfilled, growing institutional distrust

ensues (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 204). As disillusionment with the state grows, an

individual's trust in the state to make adequate provisions begins to falter[1].

Second, Daniel Katz et al. (1975) found that *outcomes* influence an individual's trust in

institutions, particularly the fairness of outcomes individuals received when making

demands on bureaucrats (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 213). An individual's trust is highly

conditional on what individuals deem to constitute a *fair* outcome. Although the present

inquiry does not examine 'fairness' of outcomes, it is not unreasonable to argue that a

state which fails to apply a consistent standard to all individuals is likely to be perceived

as unfair.

The rule of law is one of the most visible means to gauge fairness of outcomes. It

arguably benefits the state to apply rules equally to every individual. Personal experience

in Mali suggests that there are multiple sources of laws to which any one individual can

prescribe, especially in rural areas. Thus, there is very little consistency in the

application of the rule of law, and in some cases debate exists over which set of statutes

(e.g. Dina Code of Sékou Amadou as opposed to Malian Constitution) best applies. It is

arguably beneficial for some states to review existing laws and a) purge laws that clearly

do not apply, b) purge laws that are viewed by many as colonial vestiges, and c)

incorporate some traditional laws where appropriate. This process would preserve

increase efficiency and eliminate uneven application of the law. It follows that rules that

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[1] As a point of caution, from a normative perspective, it is unfair to expect individuals living in a context of scarcity to want less than what they have and see. It is presumptuous to believe that an individual in rural Africa is unaware of what s/he is missing. Time spent in rural Mali, among other places, makes it clear that rural Africans know that they are economically disadvantaged and have the same desires as any other individual. Time in Mali and other African states strongly suggests that Africans are not sheltered from the effects of growing global consumerism.

are widely accepted and evenly applied are likely to increase perceptions of state legitimacy.

There is also an interesting psychological insight into the effects of outcomes on individual levels of trust in institutions. Research suggests that perceptions of procedural injustice negatively affect levels of an individual's trust in institutions (Tyler, Degoey and Smith 1996). Such studies "argue that perceptions of procedural injustice actually have a greater impact on distrust of the government[2] than comparisons involving either the perceived absolute level of government benefits they receive or their feelings of how fair or unfair they think these benefits are" (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 213). Procedural justice communicates whether or not the state respects the individuals (Tyler et al. 1996). Again, this suggests the importance of impartial institutions that are rule-governed and not personality-driven.

Finally, the need for rule-governed institutions is one strong theme that emanates from a cursory look at some of the relevant literature examining sources of individual trust in institutions. Specifically, there appears a need for institutions to adopt more democratic (i.e. popularly accepted), unbiased procedures that neither advantage nor disadvantage any one individual. In a lot of ways, there is a need for the *depersonalization* of the state. In short, states are likely to benefit from the development of a Weberian bureaucracy (Weber 1958, 196). Such a bureaucracy is based on "the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or

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[2] Based on discussions in Chapter 1, government refers to the set of office holders who compete for and hold office for a limited time period defined in the rules of the political game. They are the group of people who make decisions in the name of the state. Thus, government is being used as a proxy for evaluations of the state. It is reasonable to argue that if a government is able to satisfy the citizens' economic and public needs, those citizens are satisfied with the state, or set of formal institutions, in which the office-holders operate.

administrative regulations" (Weber 1958, 196). If rules are consistent and applied evenly through time, then it is reasonable to argue that individuals are more likely to trust institutions.

One way of facilitating this effect might be through the process of institutionalization. Institutionalization of existing structures is not an easy process. First, even though money is not an absolute pre-requisite, institutions "as a permanent structure is knit to the presupposition of a constant income for maintaining it" (Weber 1958, 208). As discussed earlier, resources are a scarce commodity with different competing interests actively seeking access or control. Further, satisfying demands through appropriate output often suggests that resources should be spent on social needs rather than attempts of bureaucratizing existing institutions.

Second, institutionalization requires the support of educational institutions, especially institutions of higher learning (e.g. universities), to ensure that individuals master adequate levels of education and relevant skill sets to effectively administer bureaucratic institutions (Weber 1958, 240). Due to the educational difficulties existing in Mali and other sub-Saharan states, this is another demanding criterion for institutionalizing the state. Given that only a small percentage of individuals in sub-Saharan Africa have received some sort of post-secondary education or more (Bratton *et al.* 2005, 204), this is no small requirement as resources are very limited.

On a positive note, it appears that increased education spending is popular amongst citizens. However, educational institutions are also desperately in need of bureaucratization as educational institutions suffer from the same shortfalls (e.g. adequately qualified administrators) that other institutions have. These are but two

necessary conditions for successful institutionalization of state structures. Further, certain conditions only serve to complicate a state's efforts towards creating structures that abide by the rule of law[3]. Both the context of scarcity and politics of the belly as expressed through neopatrimonial networks result in institutionalization becoming a formidable challenge to sub-Saharan African states.

Thus, improving levels of an individual's trust (or at least reducing levels of distrust) is part of the challenge of legitimatizing the state (Diamond 1999, 206). There appears to be no easy solution, and scarcity does not facilitate the process. The literature examining an individual's trust in institutions strongly suggests the need for impartial institutions that apply the rule of law equally and evenly across all sections of society. One of the proposed ways, though by no means easy, is for the state to focus its resources on bureaucratizing the state. As discussed earlier, this involves more than awarding titles to individuals and placing them in official positions. Perhaps, given sub-Saharan Africa's long history of military intervention, one of the first institutions states might seek to bureaucratize is the military.

Ghana is an example of a state that has endured great pains to institutionalize, or professionalize its military. One means the state employed was to ensure continual involvement of the military with United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation (Annan 2004). This benefits Ghana because the UN furnishes necessary resources for the bureaucratization process through training and stipends given to each military member deployed on mission. Perhaps one of the most important steps to be taken is putting the military under the control of the legislature. Specifically, many African legislatures do

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[3] For a complete list of bureaucratization requirements, suggest reading *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Gerth and Mills (eds.) (1958).

not control or deal directly with the military. Rather, as in Ghana, the president deals with military budgets and finance, administration and the promotion of higher ranking officers (Addison 2002, 40). Placing the military under effective legislative control might enhance the consistency and fairness of its application while minimizing its use as a potential source of patronage. In the end, it is likely that both continued professionalization through such activities as United Nations deployments and increased oversight of the military increases an individual's trust in the institution while decreasing the likelihood of military intervention in political rivalries amongst elites.

In sum, courses of actions that are likely to positively affect an individual's trust in institutions are managing expectations, fairness of outcomes as expressed through consistent application of the rules and bureaucratization. First, taking a cue from discussion in the previous chapter, perhaps civic education might help reduce unrealistic expectations. Specifically, "injecting civic education content into the school curricula and mass media, content that both informs people about the players and the rules…and reduces unrealistic expectations of what [the state] can deliver" (Mattes and Bratton 2007, 204).

Second, one means of brining greater fairness of outcomes might be through the creation of a constitution that relies heavily on public support. Although public support does not guarantee constitutional legitimacy, it is a step in the right direction (Moehler 2006). Last, one of the most challenging means of improving an individual's trust in institutions is through the process of bureaucratization. Given the complexity of the process and scarcity of resources, perhaps the state can focus on one institution at a time, or as few as possible. I would suggest that states begin by focusing on institutions of

coercion (e.g. military). Such institutions are absolutely critical in ensuring consistency and fairness in application of the law, an important element of individual trust. Now that I have discussed theoretical factors that comprise individual trust and consequent policy implication, it is time to think about the other significant highlight of this dissertation, the informal institution of cousinage.

Cousinage

Although not directly related to legitimacy, the informal institution of cousinage is one of the most interesting findings derived from this inquiry. Specifically, the study of cousinage and its potential at explaining varying levels of ethnic conflict is virtually non-existent in the political-science literature. More importantly, it is likely that joking relationships inoculate states from some of the likely underlying causes of ethnic conflict: competition, fear and ethnic mobilization by political entrepreneurs. Perhaps just as importantly, cousinage might help explain the relative scarcity of ethnic violence.

First, there is strong evidence that competition lies at the heart of ethnic conflict (Bates 1974; Bates 1986; Bonacich 1972; Horowitz 1985, 95-140). In such studies, ethnic *competition* is viewed as a rational response by ethnic groups in the pursuit of scarce benefits. Dalmas Taylor and Beatrice Moriarty (Taylor and Moriarty 1987) find that friendliness between ethnic competitors is heavily dependent upon on the level of competitiveness. The more competitive the relationship, the less friendly one ethnic group is likely to be towards the other.

Second, there are scholars who emphasize the role of political entrepreneurs in harnessing ethnic fears. Specifically, they argue that "ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within [ethnic] groups, build upon these fears of insecurity and

polarize society" (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 41). In a context of scarcity, political entrepreneurs mobilize an ethnic base by alluding to the fact that if they do not win, they will be left out of the process and have no access to state resources. As previously discussed, it can be argued that this fear is realizable and likely to surface at varying levels should any one ethnic group become dominant.

Studies also suggest that ethnic conflict is most likely to occur once the largest ethnic group just achieves dominance (Dion 1997). Robert Jackman's (Jackman 1978) statistical analysis suggests that, among other variables, once an ethnic group surpasses 44 percent of the population, a coup d'état is more likely. Jackman argues that "it is the presence of a numerically dominant ethnic group (rather than cultural heterogeneity) that appears to be the potent destabilizing force" (Jackman 1978, 1276). It is thus plausible that any one dominant group will further raise levels of fear and insecurity on behalf of less dominant groups.

In the end, there appears little doubt that ethnic conflict negatively impacts society. Yet, as much attention as the media gives to ethnic conflict and the resulting instability and insecurity, these are not as prevalent as some might think. In a very interesting study, James Fearon and David Laitin (1996) assert that cooperative relations between ethnic groups is far more common than ethnic violence. Further, actual ethnic conflict in Africa is far below what a reasonable model might project. Given the potential for ethnic violence in Africa, it is in fact relatively rare (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 717). Yet, as Fearon and Latin (1996) observe, most of the news reporting and the academic literature give the exact opposite impression. More importantly the authors argue that informal institutions can help to "cauterize" inter-ethnic conflicts.

Better than cauterizing, joking relationships likely prevent the initial tear. Joking relationships likely diminish the potential for ethnic unrest in any given state. Specifically, joking relationships act, to varying levels, to undermine inter-ethnic competition. These also assuage fears through inter-ethnic cooperation and built-in conflict resolution mechanisms. In some cases, the most robust examples of joking relationships (e.g. Mali) appear to actually undermine the salience of ethnicity by promoting fairly substantial levels of ethnic ambiguity, in turn raising some rather stringent hurdles for a potential political entrepreneur to overcome. In brief, joking relationships likely counter the very factors the literature suggests are at the very center of ethnic conflict and violence.

Focusing on Africa, the study of joking relationships is arguably an important part of understanding ethnic cooperation. As the previous chapters suggested, joking relationships are not Mali-specific. Varying forms of this informal institutional arrangement can be found throughout Africa. It follows that further study of joking relationships in this broader field can strongly and positively contribute to greater understanding of conditions that lead to ethnic conflict or its avoidance.

As a final note, Robert Bates stated that "[e]fforts should be devoted to creating institutional environments which provide incentives so that persons organize coalitions of a different nature when in pursuit of their interests"(Bates 1986, 163). Perhaps such institutions are already in place. If so, these might enhance comprehension of the relative scarcity of ethnic conflict given such potential in sub-Saharan Africa (Fearon and Laitin 1996).

Conclusion

Legitimacy is a pertinent issue in Africa. Many modern African states are discredited or have lost legitimacy. The misery and atrocities born out of illegitimate states are apparent. Further, states that have lost much of their legitimacy go to great lengths to remain in power at the expense of the very people they should be protecting.

Many of Africa's problems are, at its very core, problems of political legitimacy. Politically legitimate states are a pre-requisite for security and stability. Without security and stability, economic and human development, along with basic human needs, cannot take root (Rotberg 2004). Thus for Africa, state legitimacy is of the essence.

Contribution

Englebert notes that leaders of non-legitimate states are limited in the options available to address the many economic and political challenges confronting sub-Saharan Africa (2000, 173). He convincingly argues that legitimate states have increased developmental capacities. Yet, in his macro-level cross-national study, Englebert does not examine the underlying sources of legitimacy.

This dissertation sought to take Englebert's pioneering work one step further. Specifically, it sought to disentangle the potential contributing sources to legitimacy. It did so by approaching legitimacy from the perspective of the individual. It is likely that historical continuity facilitates willing obedience, but it is not a stretch to argue the colonial period in sub-Saharan Africa history ended or otherwise severely altered historical continuity of pre-colonial sub-Saharan institutions. Consequently, true historical continuity is scarce.

Given the present sub-Saharan context and developmental implications of legitimacy, how does one help engender greater levels of legitimacy? This is a question that Englebert (2000) begins to ask without answering. Hopefully, this dissertation helps establish a direction for engendering legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically, provoking insight into the various factors that affect individual perceptions of state legitimacy. If policies that address these factors can be developed, it is reasonable to suggest that these more legitimate states will increase developmental capacities while benefiting its citizens in the process.

Further, this dissertation sought to provide an empirical analysis of competing sources of legitimacy. Given that political legitimacy is important, especially in a developmental context, it is vital that factors that advance legitimacy are understood. These factors include, but are not limited to, those that contribute towards Africans granting the state the right to rule them, or those that lead Africans to believe the state and state institutions deserve their compliance. If some theories can be identified as more valid than others, then existing analytical tools can be applied to only those aspects of legitimacy that matter.

Incorporating data from the Afrobarometer project, this paper argues that an individual's trust in institutions is the most important variable in accounting for varying levels of perceptions of legitimacy. Understanding that an individual's trust is at the heart of state legitimacy can guide future endeavors. As the literature suggests, an individual's trust is itself a combination of varying factors. Future research can focus on these variables to help explain different levels of institutional trust. A better understanding of such factors,

their relative importance and effect on levels of institutional trust is likely to facilitate the development of potential solutions to Africa's legitimacy crisis.

Further, this study hopes to renew interest in an apparently overlooked informal institution. Specifically, this study highlighted the merit of studying how joking relationships can help political scientists better understand varying levels of conflict in ethnically heterogeneous societies. It is likely that such informal institutions attenuate the very factors (e.g. competition) that lead to ethnic conflict and associated developmental problems. The anthropological literature suggests that such informal institutions are not unique to Africa, which greatly enhances the comparative possibilities for future research. Importantly, this dissertation reminds the researcher that focusing on the general, as opposed to the exceptional, is likely to yield greater benefits in one's quest to better understand political events.

Finally, one of the comparative advantages to the study of Africa lies in the continent's variance. To better understand one aspect, one must first have a clear theoretical understanding of the whole picture. Comparison within sub-Saharan Africa was feasible given the potentially vast amount of data from Africa, which has an 'n' of 48 states. Further, the Afrobarometer data made responses from over 20,000 respondents in 18 sub-Saharan countries available for analysis. This was appreciated since data is not easy to collect. As relevant data becomes available, it is imperative that African scholars begin appropriate data analyses to help confirm or disprove the myriad of theories that have developed over the last three to four decades. Just recently, data is becoming increasingly available and simply theorizing is insufficient without some systematic and

empirical analysis. I believe, with help from the availability of quality data, that this

dissertation makes a worthy contribution to existing sub-Saharan African literature.

Appendices

APPENDIX A

Societal Structures

Societal Structure	Freq.	Percent
Acephalous	8,489	42.44
Hierarchical	11,514	57.56
Total	20,003	100

Historically Hierarchical Ethnic Groups by Country – Coded as "1"

Benin	Ethnic Group
	Fon
	Adja
	Bariba
	Dendi
	Yoruba
	Ditamari
	Peulh
	Yoa
	Haoussa
	Ide
	Lamba

Botswana	Ethnic Group
	Mokgatla
	Mokwena
	Mongwato
	Mongwaketse
	Motlokwa
	Morolong
	Molete
	Mmirwa
	Mosobea
	Motawana
	Motalaote
	Monajwa

Ghana	Ethnic Group
	Akan
	Gagomba
	Dagaati

Madagascar	Ethnic Group
	Antakarana
	Antambahoaka
	Antandroy
	Antanosy
	Antefasy
	Antemoro
	Antesaka
	Bara
	Betsileo
	Betsimisaraka
	Bezanozano
	Mahafaly
	Merina
	Sakalava
	Sihanaka
	Tanala
	Tsimihety
	Vezo

Malawi	Ethnic Group
	Ngoni

Mali	Ethnic Group
	Bambara
	Peuhl/Fulfuld
	Senufo
	Mianka
	Mossi
	Sonink
	Malink
	Khasonk
	Arabe
	Maure
	Kakolo
	Samoko
	Sonrha
	Tamasheq
	Dafing
	Bella

Namibia	Ethnic Group
	Oshiwambo
	Setswana

Nigeria	Ethnic Group
	Hausa
	Yoruba
	Ebira
	Fulani
	Kanuri
	Ijaw
	Igala
	Urhobo
	Awori
	Tapa
	Kalabari
	Shuwa-arab
	Qwari

Senegal	Ethnic Group
	Wolof
	Pular
	Mandinka
	Soninke
	Bambara

South Africa	Ethnic Group
	Afrikaans/ afrikaner/ boer
	Shangaan
	Swazi
	Zulu

Uganda	Ethnic Group
	Alur
	Ateso
	Luo
	Lugbara
	Madi
	Muganda
	Musoga
	Muhororo
	Mukonzo
	Munyarwanda
	Munyoro
	Mutooro
	Munyankole

Zambia	Ethnic Group
	Bemba
	Lozi
	Nsenga
	Lunda
	Ngoni

Historically Acephalous Ethnic Groups by Country – Coded as "0"

Benin	Ethnic Group
	Yoruba

Botswana	Ethnic Group
	Moherero
	Mosarwa
	Mokalanga
	Motswapong
	Mokgalagadi
	Moyei
	Mombukushu
	Mokhurutshe
	Mohurutshe

Ghana	Ethnic Group
	Ewe
	Ga/dangbe

Kenya	Ethnic Group
	Kikuyu
	Luo
	Luhya
	Kamba
	Meru
	Kisii
	Kalenjin
	Masaai
	Mijikenda
	Taita
	Somali
	Pokot
	Turkana
	Bajuni
	Kuria
	Embu
	Borana
	Swahili

(continued)

Digo
Giriama
Duruma
Chonyi
Mijikenda
Gunya
Teso
Wanga
Kabarasi
Bukusu
Ombuya
Nyala
Tachoni
Nyore
Maragoli
Marama
Sabaot
Nandi
Kipsigis
Tugen
Keiyo
Burji
Murule
Dagodia
Gari
Mupule
Shabelle
Gabawen
Garmug

Malawi	Ethnic Group
	Tumbuka
	Nkhonde
	Lambya
	Chewa
	Yao
	Lomwe
	Manga'nja
	Sena
	Sukwa
	Senga
	Tonga

Mali	Ethnic Group
	Dogon
	Bobo
	Bozo

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Mozambique	Ethnic Group
	Makua
	Sena
	Ndau
	Nyanja
	Changana
	Chope
	Bitonga
	Makonde
	Chuabo
	Ajua

Namibia	Ethnic Group
	Herero
	Caprivian
	Rukwangali
	Nama
	Damara
	Lozi
	Subia
	Kavango

Nigeria	Ethnic Group
	Igbo
	Yoruba
	Efik
	Isoko
	Ibibio
	Tiv
	Nupe
	Edo
	Idoma
	Itsekiri
	Anang
	Ekoi
	Taroh
	Ogoni
	Sayawa
	Okpella
	Okirika

Senegal	Ethnic Group
	Serer
	Diola
	Manjack
	Bainouk

South Africa	Ethnic Group
	Ndebele

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(continued)

Xhosa
Pedi/spedi/ north sotho
Sesotho/sotho/ south sotho
Setswana/ tswana
Venda

Uganda	Ethnic Group
	Akaramojonj
	Japadhola
	Kakwa
	Kumam
	Mugwere
	Mugishu
	Mufumbira
	Mukiga
	Samia

Zambia	Ethnic Group
	Tonga
	Chewa
	Tumbuka
	Kaonde
	Luvale
	Namwanga
	Mambwe
	Lenje
	Bisa
	Ila
	Lala
	Mbunda
	Senga
	Swahili
	Nyanja
	Chokwe
	Nyika
	Luchazi
	Lamba
	Tabwa
	Kalunda

Mode of Livelihood

Mode of Production	Freq.	Percent
Agriculturalist	19,193	95.95
Pastoralist (Rural)	810	4.05
Total	20,003	100

Historically Pastoral Ethnic Groups by Country – Coded as "1"

Benin	Ethnic Group
	Peulh

Botswana	Ethnic Group
	Moherero

Kenya	Ethnic Group
	Masaai
	Somali
	Turkana
	Murule
	Dagodia
	Gari
	Mupule
	Shabelle
	Gabawen
	Garmug

Madagascar	Ethnic Group
	Antandroy
	Bara
	Mahafaly

Mali	Ethnic Group
	Peuhl/Fulfuld
	Tamasheq

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Mozambique	Ethnic Group
	Makua
	Sena
	Ndau
	Nyanja
	Changana
	Chope
	Bitonga
	Makonde
	Chuabo
	Ajua

Namibia	Ethnic Group
	Herero
	Nama
	Damara

Nigeria	Ethnic Group
	Fulani

Senegal	Ethnic Group
	Pular

Uganda	Ethnic Group
	Akaramojonj
	Japadhola
	Muhororo

Historically Agricultural Ethnic Groups by Country – Coded as "0"

Benin	Ethnic Group
	Fon
	Adja
	Bariba
	Dendi
	Yoruba
	Ditamari
	Yoa
	Haoussa
	Ide
	Lamba

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Botswana	Ethnic Group
	Mokgatla
	Mokwena
	Mongwaketse
	Motlokwa
	Morolong
	Mokalanga
	Molete
	Mmirwa
	Motswapong
	Mosobea
	Motawana
	Moyei
	Mohurutshe
	Mombukushu
	Monajwa
	Mokhurutshe
	Motalaote
	Mongwato
	Mosarwa
	Mokgalagadi

Ghana	Ethnic Group
	Akan
	Ewe
	Ga/Dangbe
	Gagomba
	Dagaati

Kenya	Ethnic Group
	Kikuyu
	Luo
	Luhya
	Kamba
	Meru
	Kisii
	Kalenjin
	Mijikenda
	Taita
	Pokot
	Bajuni
	Kuria
	Embu
	Borana
	Swahili
	Indian
	Digo

(continued)

Giriama
Duruma
Chonyi
Mijikenda
Arab
Gunya
Teso
Wanga
Kabarasi
Bukusu
Ombuya
Nyala
Tachoni
Nyore
Maragoli
Marama
Sabaot
Nandi
Kipsigis
Tugen
Keiyo
Burji

Madagascar	Ethnic Group
	Antakarana
	Antambahoaka
	Antanosy
	Antefasy
	Antemoro
	Antesaka
	Betsileo
	Betsimisaraka
	Bezanozano
	Merina
	Sakalava
	Sihanaka
	Tanala
	Tsimihety
	Vezo

Malawi	Ethnic Group
	Tumbuka
	Nkhonde
	Lambya
	Chewa
	Yao
	Ngoni
	Lomwe
	Manga'nja

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(continued)

Sena
Sukwa
Senga
Tonga

Mali	Ethnic Group
	Bambara
	Senufo
	Mianka
	Mossi
	Sonink
	Malink
	Khasonk
	Dogon
	Bobo
	Bozo
	Arabe
	Maure
	Kakolo
	Samoko
	Sonrha
	Bella
	Dafing

Mozambique	Ethnic Group
	Makua
	Sena
	Ndau
	Nyanja
	Changana
	Chope
	Bitonga
	Makonde
	Chuabo
	Ajua

Namibia	Ethnic Group
	Oshiwambo
	Caprivian
	Rukwangali
	German
	Afrikaaner
	English
	Lozi
	Subia
	Setswana

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(continued)
        Kavango

Nigeria	Ethnic Group
	Hausa
	Igbo
	Yoruba
	Efik
	Ebira
	Isoko
	Ibibio
	Kanuri
	Tiv
	Nupe
	Ijaw
	Edo
	Idoma
	Itsekiri
	Ikwere
	Awori
	Tapa
	Kalabari
	Shuwa-arab
	Gwari
	Anang
	Ekoi
	Ukwani
	Igede
	Ekpeye
	Taroh
	Ogoni
	Sayawa
	Okpella
	Okirika

Senegal	Ethnic Group
	Wolof
	Serer
	Mandinka
	Soninke
	Diola
	Manjack
	Bambara
	Bainouk

South Africa	Ethnic Group
	Afrikaans/ Afrikaner/ Boer
	Ndebele
	Xhosa
	Pedi/Spedi/ North Sotho
	Sesotho/Sotho/ South Sotho
	Setswana/ Tswana
	Shangaan
	Swazi
	Venda
	Zulu

Uganda	Ethnic Group
	Alur
	Ateso
	Kakwa
	Kumam
	Luo
	Lugbara
	Mugwere
	Madi
	Muganda
	Mugishu
	Musoga
	Mufumbira
	Mukiga
	Mukonzo
	Munyarwanda
	Munyoro
	Mutooro
	Munyankole
	Samia

Zambia	Ethnic Group
	Bemba
	Tonga
	Lozi
	Chewa
	Nsenga
	Tumbuka
	Kaonde
	Luvale
	Namwanga

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(continued)

Mambwe
Lenje
Lunda
Ngoni
Bisa
Ila
Lala
Mbunda
Senga
Swahili
Nyanja
Chokwe
Nyika
Luchazi
Lamba
Tabwa
Kalunda

Ethnic Group Sharing ties with Presidency by Country

Ethnic groups coded as sharing ethnicity with the president – coded as '1'

Country	Ethnic Group
Benin	Mariba
Botswana	Mokgatla
	Mokwena
	Mongwato
	Mongwaketse
	Motlokwa
	Morolong
	Molete
	Mmirwa
	Mosobea
	Motawana
	Motalaote
	Monajwa
Ghana	Akan
Kenya	Kikuyu
Madagascar	Merina
Malawi	Chewa

Mali	Peuhl/Fulfuld
Mozambique	Changana
Namibia	Oshiwambo
Nigeria	Yoruba
Senegal	Wolof
South Africa	Xhosa
Uganda	Munyarwanda
Zambia	Bemba

2SLS Test for Endogeneity (Economic Performance)

Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression

Legitimacy	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Economic	0.037	0.019	1.960	0.050	0.000	0.074
Authority Structure	0.003	0.017	0.170	0.863	-0.030	0.036
Mode of Livelihood	0.014	0.033	0.420	0.673	-0.051	0.079
Ethnic Ties to Pres	0.013	0.015	0.870	0.383	-0.016	0.043
Winning Party	0.069	0.014	4.820	0.000	0.041	0.097
Vote	0.029	0.015	1.890	0.059	-0.001	0.059
Contacting Index	-0.002	0.012	-0.120	0.903	-0.026	0.023
Delivery of Econ Goods	0.121	0.012	9.990	0.000	0.098	0.145
Free and Fair Elections	-0.060	0.007	-8.810	0.000	-0.074	-0.047
Freedom of Speech	-0.011	0.006	-1.830	0.067	-0.022	0.001
Inter-Personal Trust	0.051	0.010	4.950	0.000	0.031	0.071
Urban-Rural	0.062	0.014	4.520	0.000	0.035	0.088
Age	0.000	0.000	0.870	0.384	-0.001	0.001
Gender	0.000	0.012	0.030	0.977	-0.024	0.025
Education	0.004	0.004	0.980	0.325	-0.004	0.011
Benin	-0.092	0.039	-2.350	0.019	-0.168	-0.015
Botswana	0.003	0.037	0.070	0.945	-0.071	0.076
Ghana	0.372	0.038	9.850	0.000	0.298	0.446
Kenya	-0.097	0.037	-2.650	0.008	-0.169	-0.025
Madgascar	-0.155	0.038	-4.050	0.000	-0.231	-0.080
Malawi	-0.077	0.038	-2.030	0.042	-0.151	-0.003
Mali	0.038	0.038	1.000	0.318	-0.037	0.113
Mozambque	0.050	0.042	1.200	0.230	-0.032	0.132
Namibia	0.050	0.041	1.230	0.219	-0.030	0.129
Nigeria	0.086	0.032	2.690	0.007	0.023	0.148
Senegal	0.098	0.040	2.440	0.015	0.019	0.177
South Africa	0.057	0.035	1.600	0.109	-0.013	0.126
Uganda	0.242	0.033	7.250	0.000	0.177	0.307
_cons	3.181	0.070	45.490	0.000	3.044	3.318

Sargan Statistic: P-val = .153 (Cannot Reject the Null of Good Instruments)
Hausman Test = .213 (Cannot Reject the Null of No Endogeneity)

Instrumented:	Economic Performance
	hier pas pres wp vote contact eperform fair speech social urbrur
Included instruments:	age gender educ c1 c2 c4 c5 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 c16
	Individual Econ Situation, Gone Without Cash Income, and Job
Excluded instruments:	Opportunities

2SLS test for Endogeneity (Trust)

Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression

Legitimacy	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Individual's Trust in Institutions	0.740	0.927	0.800	0.424	-1.076	2.557
Authority Structure	0.000	0.022	-0.010	0.994	-0.044	0.044
Mode of Livelihood	0.057	0.054	1.070	0.286	-0.048	0.163
Winning Party	0.005	0.079	0.060	0.949	-0.149	0.159
Contacting Index	-0.014	0.025	-0.560	0.572	-0.063	0.035
Past	-0.015	0.012	-1.240	0.214	-0.039	0.009
Present	-0.004	0.017	-0.220	0.826	-0.037	0.029
Future	0.024	0.050	0.480	0.634	-0.073	0.121
Delivery of Econ Goods	-0.012	0.156	-0.080	0.937	-0.318	0.293
Free and Fair Elections	0.011	0.086	0.130	0.899	-0.158	0.180
Freedom of Speech	-0.006	0.007	-0.880	0.379	-0.021	0.008
Inter-Personal Trust	-0.115	0.223	-0.520	0.606	-0.551	0.322
Urban-Rural	0.010	0.062	0.170	0.866	-0.110	0.131
Age	0.000	0.001	0.460	0.646	-0.001	0.002
Gender	0.002	0.015	0.160	0.875	-0.027	0.032
Educ	0.020	0.017	1.150	0.249	-0.014	0.053
Benin	0.099	0.108	0.920	0.360	-0.112	0.310
Botswana	-0.253	0.310	-0.820	0.413	-0.861	0.354
Ghana	0.199	0.213	0.940	0.349	-0.218	0.616
Kenya	-0.100	0.049	-2.020	0.043	-0.196	-0.003
Madagascar	0.056	0.282	0.200	0.843	-0.496	0.608
Malawi	-0.680	0.800	-0.850	0.395	-2.247	0.888
Mali	-0.262	0.309	-0.850	0.396	-0.869	0.344
Mozambique	-0.233	0.353	-0.660	0.509	-0.924	0.458
Namibia	0.013	0.055	0.240	0.812	-0.095	0.121
Nigeria	0.499	0.548	0.910	0.363	-0.576	1.573
Senegal	-0.343	0.558	-0.610	0.539	-1.435	0.750
South Africa	0.117	0.092	1.270	0.204	-0.063	0.297
Uganda	0.097	0.179	0.540	0.590	-0.255	0.448
_cons	2.396	0.866	2.770	0.006	0.698	4.093

Sargan Statistic: P-val = .110 (Cannot Reject the Null of Good Instruments)

Hausman Test = .488 (Cannot Reject the Null of No Endogeneity)

Instrumented:	Individual's Trust in Institutions
	hier pas wp contact past present future eperform fair speech social urbrur age gender educ c1 c2 c4 c5 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11
Included instruments:	c12 c13 c14 c16
Excluded instruments:	Vote and Ethnic Ties to the President

APPENDIX B

OLS w/ Robust Standard Errors Clustered By Country (14 Countries)

Legitimacy	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Authority Structure	0.058	0.048	1.210	0.250	-0.046	0.162
Mode of Livelihood	-0.005	0.061	-0.080	0.935	-0.136	0.126
Ethnic Ties to Pres	-0.019	0.046	-0.410	0.691	-0.119	0.081
Winning Party	0.074	0.023	3.160	0.007	0.023	0.124
Vote	0.039	0.022	1.720	0.109	-0.010	0.087
Contact Index	0.007	0.020	0.370	0.718	-0.035	0.050
Past Econ Performance	-0.013	0.009	-1.480	0.162	-0.031	0.006
Present Econ Performance	0.009	0.018	0.520	0.614	-0.029	0.047
Future Econ Performance	0.056	0.012	4.510	0.001	0.029	0.083
Delivery of Economic Goods	0.093	0.022	4.240	0.001	0.046	0.140
Free and Fair Elections	-0.029	0.016	-1.840	0.089	-0.063	0.005
Freedom of Speech	-0.002	0.016	-0.110	0.911	-0.036	0.033
Corruption Index	-0.007	0.020	-0.360	0.722	-0.051	0.036
Individual's Trust in Institutions Index	0.153	0.023	6.640	0.000	0.103	0.203
Inter-Personal Trust	0.022	0.020	1.070	0.303	-0.022	0.066
Urban/Rural	0.018	0.026	0.680	0.508	-0.038	0.073
Age	0.000	0.001	0.120	0.908	-0.001	0.002
Gender	0.008	0.016	0.510	0.616	-0.026	0.042
Education	0.015	0.006	2.300	0.039	0.001	0.028
_cons	2.923	0.100	29.140	0.000	2.706	3.140

Adj. R^2 = 0.081 (n= 13,994)

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OLS with Country Dummies

Legitimacy	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Authority Structure	0.004	0.017	0.230	0.821	-0.030	0.037
Mode of Livelihood	0.031	0.035	0.900	0.370	-0.037	0.099
Ethnic Ties to Pres	0.010	0.016	0.630	0.531	-0.021	0.041
Winning Party	0.049	0.015	3.310	0.001	0.020	0.078
Vote	0.021	0.016	1.300	0.194	-0.011	0.053
Contact Index	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.997	-0.025	0.025
Past Econ Performance	-0.007	0.007	-1.120	0.264	-0.020	0.006
Present Econ Performance	0.004	0.006	0.650	0.518	-0.008	0.016
Future Econ Performance	0.051	0.006	7.920	0.000	0.038	0.063
Delivery of Economic Goods	0.075	0.011	6.790	0.000	0.054	0.097
Free and Fair Elections	-0.038	0.007	-5.230	0.000	-0.052	-0.023
Freedom of Speech	-0.009	0.006	-1.490	0.137	-0.021	0.003
Corruption Index	-0.037	0.011	-3.460	0.001	-0.057	-0.016
Individual's Trust in Institutions Index	0.169	0.009	19.130	0.000	0.152	0.187
Inter-Personal Trust	0.024	0.011	2.140	0.032	0.002	0.045
Urban/Rural	0.043	0.014	3.020	0.002	0.015	0.071
Age	0.000	0.001	0.880	0.378	-0.001	0.001
Gender	0.002	0.013	0.120	0.902	-0.024	0.027
Education	0.011	0.004	2.910	0.004	0.004	0.019
Benin	0.101	0.042	2.390	0.017	0.018	0.183
Botswana	-0.062	0.039	-1.610	0.108	-0.139	0.014
Ghana	0.327	0.040	8.220	0.000	0.249	0.405
Kenya	-0.109	0.038	-2.890	0.004	-0.184	-0.035
Madagascar	-0.122	0.039	-3.100	0.002	-0.199	-0.045
Malawi	-0.218	0.042	-5.240	0.000	-0.300	-0.137
Mali	-0.050	0.040	-1.270	0.206	-0.128	0.027
Mozambique	-0.015	0.043	-0.340	0.732	-0.099	0.069
Namibia	0.042	0.039	1.100	0.273	-0.034	0.118
Nigeria	0.177	0.032	5.460	0.000	0.114	0.241
Senegal	0.022	0.042	0.530	0.597	-0.061	0.106
South Africa	0.072	0.035	2.070	0.039	0.004	0.139
Uganda	0.220	0.034	6.520	0.000	0.154	0.287
_cons	2.978	0.068	43.830	0.000	2.845	3.112

Adj. R^2 = 0.107 (n = 13,994)

n = 14 Countries, w/ Zambia as reference category

Multi-Level REML Model

Legitimacy	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Authority Structure	.008	.017	0.49	0.624	-.025	.042
Mode of Livelihood	.032	.035	0.91	0.362	-.036	.099
Ethnic Ties to Pres	.009	.016	0.60	0.548	-.021	.040
Winning Party	.049	.015	3.33	0.001	.020	.078
Vote	.021	.016	1.33	0.184	-.010	.053
Contact Index	.000	.013	0.000	0.996	-.025	.025
Past Econ Performance	-.008	.007	-1.16	0.247	-.0207	.005
Present Econ Performance	.004	.006	0.67	0.505	-.008	.016
Future Econ Performance	.0508	.006	7.96	0.000	.038	.063
Delivery of Economic Goods	.076	.011	6.88	0.000	.055	.098
Free and Fair Elections	-.038	.007	-5.30	0.000	-.052	-.024
Freedom of Speech	-.009	.006	-1.41	0.159	-.020	.003
Corruption Index	-.036	.010	-3.93	0.001	-.057	-.015
Individual's Trust in Institutions Index	.169	.009	19.12	0.000	.151	.186
Inter-Personal Trust Index	.023	.011	2.11	0.035	.002	.045
Urban/Rural	.041	.014	2.94	0.003	.014	.070
Age	.000	.000	0.91	0.362	-.000	.001
Gender	.002	.013	0.14	0.892	-.024	.027
Education	.011	.003	2.90	0.004	.004	.019
Political Relevant Ethnic Groups	.202	.180	1.12	0.262	-.151	.555
Electoral Systems	.011	.085	0.13	0.897	-.156	.178
Constant	2.918	.116	25.14	0.000	2.690	3.146

n = 13,994
Wald chi2(21) = 1,049.72
-2 x Log Likelihood = 31930

Country var (cons)	.021	.010			.009	.051
Individual var (residual)	.566	.007			.553	.579

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Legit Index	16764	3.683	0.816	1	5
1 =Strongly Disagree: 2 = Disagree: 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree: 4 = Agree: 5 = Strongly Agree					
Authority Structure	20003	0.576	0.494	0	1
1 = Hierarchical: 0 = Acephalous					
Mode of Livelihood	20003	0.040	0.197	0	1
1= Pastoralist : 0 = Agriculturalist					
Ethnic Ties to President	19553	0.277	0.447	0	1
1 = ethnic ties to Pres: 0 = no ethnic ties to Pres					
Member of Winning Party	20003	0.325	0.469	0	1
1 = Yes: 0 = No					
Did you Vote?	20003	0.746	0.435	0	1
1= Yes: 0 = No					
Contact Index	19826	0.206	0.490	0	3
3 = Often: 2 = Sometimes: 1 = On Occasion: 0 = Never					
Past Econ Perform	19539	2.901	1.107	1	5
1= Much Worse: 2 = Worse: 3 =same: 4= Better: 5 = Much Better					
Present Econ Perform	19582	2.632	1.271	1	5
1 = Very Bad: 2 = Fairly Bad: 3 = Neither Good or Bad: 4 = Fairly Good: 5 = Very Good					
Future Econ Perform	17220	3.396	1.148	1	5
1= Much Worse: 2 = Worse: 3 =same: 4= Better: 5 = Much Better					
Delivery of Economic Goods	17961	2.048	0.717	1	4
1= Very Badly: 2 = Fairly Badly: 3 = Fairly Well: 4 = Very Well					
Free and Fair Elections	18365	2.008	1.080	1	4
1 = completely free and fair: 2 = free and fair, but with minor problems: 3: free and fair, with major problems: 4= Not free and fair					
Careful about what you say?	19094	1.820	1.130	0	3
0 = Never:1 = Rarely: 2 = Often: 3 = Always					
Corruption Index	18573	1.378	0.716	0	3
0 = None: 1 =Some: 2 = Most: 3 = All					
Individual's Trust Index	18302	1.787	0.922	0	3
0 = Not at all: 1 = Just a little: 2 = Somewhat: 3 = A lot					
Social Trust Index	19175	1.102	0.653	0	3
0 = Not at all: 1 = Just a little: 2 = I trust them Somewhat: 3 = I trust them a lot					
Urban/Rural	20003	1.617	0.486	1	2
Age	19765	36.079	14.471	18	130
Gender	20003	1.500	0.500	1	2
Education	19921	3.110	2.058	0	9

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Mali Legitimacy Index

Afrobarometer Questions:

- Q52a: Our constitution expresses the values and hopes (of people in this country)
- Q52b: The police always have the right to make people obey the law
- Q52c: The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by
- Q52d: The Tax department has the right to make people pay taxes

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.06), which explains 46 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .62) is low but permissible (n= 1039).

Scree Plot for Legitimacy Index

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
Mali Economic Performance Index

Afrobarometer Questions:

- Q65: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?
  - o   a: Managing the economy
  - o   b: Creating jobs
  - o   c: Keeping prices stable
 - o   d: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.43), which explains 53 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .70) is acceptable (n= 1103).

Scree Plot for Economic Performance Index

Mali Corruption Index

Afrobarometer Questions:

- Q56 How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?
  - o a: Office of the Presidency
  - o b: Members of Parliament
  - o c: Local Government Councilors
  - o d: National Government Officials
  - o e: Local Government Officials
  - o f: Police
  - o g: Tax Officials
  - o h: Judges and Magistrates

Scree Plot for Corruption Index

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 4.15), which explains 59 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .88) is acceptable (n= 846).

Mali Institutional Trust Index

Afrobarometer Questions:

- Q55g: How much do you trust the military, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?
- Q55h: How much do you trust the police, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?
- Q55i: How much do you trust courts of law, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.26), which explains 54 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .69) is acceptable (n= 1139).


Scree Plot for Institutional Trust Index

Mali: Full OLS Model

Perceptions of State Legitimacy	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Societal Structure					
Authority Structure	-0.108	0.070	-1.540	0.123	-0.051
Mode of Production	0.357	0.113	3.170	0.002	0.160
Ethnic Ties to the President	-0.267	0.102	-2.620	0.009	-0.128
Institutional Influences					
Member of Winning Party?	-0.052	0.053	-0.980	0.326	-0.032
Did you vote?	0.107	0.064	1.690	0.091	0.056
Contacted a Member of Parliament	0.075	0.046	1.640	0.102	0.058
Contacted an official of a government ministry	-0.012	0.063	-0.200	0.843	-0.007
Contacted a political party official	-0.069	0.033	-2.080	0.037	-0.076
Performance Evaluations					
Economic Performance Past 12 Months	-0.032	0.023	-1.400	0.163	-0.047
Current Economic Performance	0.062	0.023	2.630	0.009	0.093
Future Economic Performance	0.046	0.026	1.770	0.077	0.058
Delivery of Economic Goods Index	0.079	0.043	1.840	0.066	0.066
Free and Fair Elections?	-0.057	0.023	-2.450	0.015	-0.084
Careful about what you say?	0.039	0.027	1.440	0.150	0.048
Perceptions of Corruption	-0.051	0.034	-1.490	0.137	-0.052
Trust					
Individual's Trust in Institutions Index	0.130	0.033	3.920	0.000	0.140
Can most people can be trusted?	-0.059	0.058	-1.030	0.305	-0.034
Trust each of your neighbors?	0.020	0.030	0.660	0.512	0.024
Trust people from other ethnic groups?	-0.049	0.027	-1.840	0.067	-0.068
Control Variables					
Urban-Rural	0.040	0.062	0.640	0.523	0.024
Age	-0.001	0.002	-0.880	0.379	-0.031
Gender	-0.134	0.053	-2.560	0.011	-0.090
Education	0.025	0.016	1.540	0.123	0.057
Con	3.325	0.269	12.380	0.000	.

Adj R^2 = 0.109 (n = 900)

Map of Mali

Map obtained from worldatlas.com
(http://worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/bwmaps/mlbw.htm) last accessed 26
Feb 2007

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