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
SEPARATISM IN DECLINE:
HOW POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT HAS MODERATED THE
EVANGELICAL RIGHT

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**SEPARATISM IN DECLINE:
HOW POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT HAS MODERATED THE EVANGELICAL
RIGHT**

By

Robert G. Moore

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
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ABSTRACT

SEPARATISM IN DECLINE: HOW POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT HAS MODERATED THE EVANGELICAL RIGHT

By

Robert G. Moore

Despite the numerous studies exploring the effects of evangelical political participation on American politics, few examine the reciprocal relationship of participation's effects on evangelicals. This study seeks to remedy this inattentiveness by exploring the influence of increased political activism on American Evangelicals. It measures changes for Evangelicals in both voting and campaign participation from 1976-2000, and explores changes in issue accessibility for Evangelicals as well as Non-Evangelicals. It delves into longitudinal changes in political, moral and tolerance attitudes for Evangelicals, and evaluates the influence of participation on those attitudes. Finally, an internal movement, new paradigm churches, is evaluated for its contribution to political participation and attitude shifts.

A comparison of trends between 1976 and 2000 reveals evangelical and secular social issue access is increasing at a rate significantly above the remaining general population. An analysis of social issue attitudes discloses that Evangelicals and Seculars who more readily access social issues have more extreme views on these issues than other Evangelicals and Seculars. Research also shows a reciprocal relationship between the access of social and economic issues, and political participation for Evangelicals.

This study confirms evidence of generational and period effects that suggest permanent increases in evangelical political participation and a moderating of evangelical attitudes in a liberal direction. Lastly, this dissertation demonstrates that new paradigm

church influences, as an internal movement, are found to increase political participation and tolerance

For Marcia, Stephen, Ethan Luke and Drew

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is concerned broadly with how American Evangelical political participation is changing over time and how, as a consequence, participation is changing Evangelicals' political thought. Changes in participation are theorized to affect how individuals organize their political sophistication/political thinking. If Evangelical political participation rose over the past two decades, as many sources assume, it becomes a longitudinal laboratory in which theories about participation and political sophistication are tested. Political participation, political knowledge and the structure of political thought all influence one another. If one changes, repercussions should involve the other two. A change increases the possibility of Evangelicals shifting in their placement across the spectrum of all three of these variables. While perhaps not fitting the traditional definition of becoming more "politically sophisticated", it is none the less just as interesting if they are shifting while Non-Evangelicals are not.¹

On the other hand, change arising from participation is not just limited to political thought. Changing political participation requires new cues to motivate change and to offset previous cues for avoiding participation. The receptiveness to cues may not be uniform across the Evangelical tradition, and the effects may be more profound for some segment of Evangelicals than for others. Furthermore, just as religious traditions are not static institutions immune from outside influences; they are also not immune to internal change. Understanding Evangelical political participation requires investigating internal changes that Evangelicals have undergone over the past two decades. While the

¹ The best known hierarchy of political sophistication is the levels of conceptualization (Campbell et al. 1960). A thorough review of political sophistication is included in Chapter 4.

Evangelical tradition is not sufficiently monolithic to undergo the type of change Vatican II produced in the Roman Catholic Church, internal movements focusing on church growth (particularly because of the entrepreneurial style of many Evangelical churches) are widely disseminated within the tradition. One church growth movement in particular, new paradigm churches, is evaluated for its effect on participation.

In 1979, Rev. Jerry Falwell founded the Moral Majority (the best known of the many Evangelical interest and social movement groups that arose in this decade) in an effort to bring about increased political activism among Evangelical Christians. Falwell, at the founding of Moral Majority, addressed three areas of work for the new organization: registration, information and mobilization of evangelicals². The subfield of religion and politics was rejuvenated by this latest turn in Evangelical political involvement. Much effort in political science has gone into measuring differences between Evangelical and Non-Evangelical attitudes, evaluating Evangelical effects on the Republican Party coalition, examining churches as political communities, theorizing about an ongoing or impending culture war and assessing the effects of religious attendance and religious beliefs on political behavior and political attitudes.³

Previous research on Evangelical influence points to the electoral process and resulting changes in evangelical voting patterns and partisanship. Notions of Evangelical change have been limited to vague unmeasured assumptions about increases in sophistication or shifts in political thought among evangelicals. These assumptions are based on anecdotal evidence and the increase in the sophistication of interest groups such as the Christian Coalition in the early 1990s. Despite assumptions of increased

² Thomas and Dobson, 1999

³ See Leege 2003 for an overview of the subfield.

participation, there is no study that measures aggregate shifts in Evangelical political issue accessibility or their political thought.

In the following chapters I attempt to explore this knowledge gap by measuring how Evangelicals are changing in accessibility and thought. I measure participation across religious traditions to see if Evangelicals have increased their participation. I consider if and how Evangelical issue accessibility/political sophistication have changed including looking at the trends in Evangelical political issue access. I assess if there is a unique relationship between political participation, political information and political issue access for Evangelicals. I also examine period and cohort effects to determine who is being affected by changing participation within the Evangelical tradition. Finally, I see if internal Evangelical alterations have contributed to the shifts in participation.

The following three chapters review the current literature and lay out the theoretical basis for my research. Chapter 2 reviews measurement schemes for defining Evangelicals, and then, historically traces their attitudes toward political participation. It also focuses on models of political participation and their inclusion or failure to include religion. Chapter 3 highlights the internal consequences of increased participation apart from political sophistication. It looks at the potential influence of secularization, the culture war and new paradigm churches. Chapter 4 traces the development of various measurements of political sophistication and defines the rationale for the measurement used in this dissertation. It also summarizes the theories surrounding a reciprocal relationship between sophistication and participation.

Chapter 5 investigates the historical trends of voting and campaign participation for Evangelicals and their relationship to sophistication. Using national election studies

from 1976-2000, I focus on how changes in political sophistication and issue accessibility, affect political participation. In addition, Chapter 5 demonstrates how political participation is interacting with changes in accessibility. The chapter examines the reciprocal relationship between various forms of participation and issue accessibility as well as their relationships to political knowledge. By examining differing forms of participation, I determine whether or not reciprocity is limited by the intensity of participation.

Chapter 6 considers how increasing participation affects younger cohorts of Evangelicals. Building on Zaller's (1992) conclusion that older respondents will exhibit greater partisan resistance to new patterns of participation, I evaluate voting and campaign participation by period effects and birth cohorts to see if younger cohorts present a unique response. Then I evaluate how this new participation may be shaping the political and moral attitudes of these younger cohorts.

Chapter 7 steps away from the Evangelical versus Non-Evangelical comparisons and focuses solely on Christian traditions (Evangelical, Mainline, Black and Catholic). New paradigm church influences in these traditions are measured using the combined 1998 General Social Survey and National Congregation Study. I evaluate whether new paradigm church influences explain participation and tolerance changes in these traditions. The final chapter outlines my conclusions and directions for future research.

By focusing on Evangelicals over time, I propose to confirm supposed increases in Evangelical participation and consider the prospects for future participation. In reaffirming the reciprocal relationship between participation and political thought, I show how both the scope and limitations of these reciprocal relationships are based on the type

of participation. I add to the understanding of political sophistication by showing that religious identities have distinct effects on the reciprocal process of participation and sophistication.

I also test the necessary inclusion of political information in Neuman's (1986) spiral of increasing sophistication. Neuman theorizes that political interest from one's environment increases participation, which then changes or raises the level of sophistication. I provide a test of the effect of political information on changes in participation and sophistication/issue accessibility.

Finally, I consider whether internal movements in religious traditions are of sufficient interest in their effect on political attitudes. When considering religious traditions as political effectors and effectees over several decades, their internal inalterability cannot be assumed. There may be a place in political science such as there is in the sociology of religion for observing religious change in an effort to better understand its effect on politics.

CHAPTER II

EVANGELICALS AND SEPARATISM IN DECLINE

The involvement of the Evangelical tradition in the American political scene has received profuse attention since the rise of the Moral Majority in the late 1970s and the establishment of numerous successor groups to the now defunct Jerry Falwell creation. After twenty years of involvement, it is now not only possible to evaluate the effect of Evangelicals on parties, policy and politicians, but it is also possible to consider the changes within Evangelicals as a result of their political involvement. The effect of their own participation on Evangelicals is potentially more profound than their participation's influence on current politics. While Evangelicals new found political participation has been highly visible, these shifts in Evangelical political behavior may have weakened some of the basic beliefs and practices once unique to this group. The move toward becoming politically active could ultimately lead to the assimilation of Evangelicals into the mainstream political culture.

As this movement takes on new roles of citizenship and political participation, it experiences a change in the cues given by Evangelical elites. The message shifts from one of separatism to one of involvement. This shift to activism was initially ignited by the candidacy of Jimmy Carter, the first self-avowed Evangelical to run for the presidency since William Jennings Bryan. The subsequent mutual embrace of Evangelicals and the Republican Party reinforces the shift. At the same time, conservative denominations are being shaped by new internal religious trends. These trends seek to reduce sectarianism and change the stance of these historically closed groups to one of increased openness to

the culture. In this chapter, I define how to measure Evangelicals, examine their tradition of separatism, and survey the limited research focusing on changing rates of Evangelical political participation.

2.1 Defining Evangelicals

American Protestantism holds within itself three major religious traditions, Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants and Evangelical Protestants. Combined, they represent over half of the American population with Evangelicals representing the largest subgroup. Evangelical identifiers constitute approximately one quarter of all Americans.

Previous studies of American Evangelicals break down into two groups: those focused on the Evangelical tradition and those examining Evangelical social movements. Studies focusing on social movements identify their target as the Christian Right (also referred to as the New Christian Right or the Religious Right). This research attempts to measure political mobilization of Evangelicals as well as other conservative Christians. These inquiries focus on organizations (the Christian Coalition, Religious Roundtable and Family Research Council); leaders (Gary Bauer, Ralph Reed, Pat Robertson and James Dobson) and their efforts to recruit and mobilize activists for a conservative political agenda.⁴ These organizations tend to attract activists from several religious traditions including Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics, and to some extent, Black Protestants. However, they fail to encompass any tradition in its entirety. Hood and Smith (2002) show the Religious Right as a religiopolitical movement crosscutting major American religious traditions but not encompassing any one tradition.

⁴ For an overview of these organizations, see Guth, Green, Kellstedt and Smidt 1996; Moen 1992 and Wilcox 2000. For more detailed studies see Conover 1983; Green, Guth and Hill 1993; Guth 1996; and Guth and Green 1990; Shupe and Stacey 1983; Wilcox 1986, 1988.

More importantly, for this study, they reveal that Religious Right identification fails to significantly explain political behavior. They go so far as to suggest that the various measurements of the Religious or Christian Right are so divergent and elusive that they resemble a “snipe hunt” or a search for a mythical creature that no one ever bags. In part, the Religious Right is difficult to identify because Evangelicals possess internal divisions and mistrust that keep many of these organizations from becoming synonymous with the entirety of the Evangelical tradition; although, they remain influential in the tradition. They function as catalysts helping to explain shifts in Evangelical participation,⁵ as a segment of the tradition, rather than the whole. Measurements and analysis of these social movement groups reveal that they do not represent the whole of Evangelical mobilization, participation or attitude measurements.

This study focuses on Evangelicals as a religious tradition rather than a single segment of a social movement. Penning and Smidt define a religious tradition as “a characteristic way of interpreting and responding to the world”, (2003, p. 13) while Kellstedt et al. defines it as “a group of religious communities that share a set of beliefs that generates a distinct worldview” (1996, 176). This is not to assume that all Evangelical identifiers are identical in their views, but rather, in the aggregate, Evangelicals will respond and act in a similar fashion.

Defining Evangelicals is simplified by focusing on the religious tradition rather than their social movements. While they overlap, and in some isolated cases the social movements may be encapsulated as segments of the tradition⁶, the movements represent

⁵ For example, the Christian Coalition claimed to have distributed 40 million voter guides in Evangelical churches in 1998 election cycle (Wilcox 2000).

⁶ For example, the Influence of Concerned Women for America appears to be limited to Fundamentalists within the Evangelical tradition (Jorstad 1993).

monolithic crusades seeking to influence a more diverse Evangelical tradition (Penning and Smidt 2003). The Evangelical tradition is much broader than any single social movement. The Evangelical tradition embraces a wide diversity of denominations and theology representing charismatics and fundamentalists: Calvinists and Arminians, and Baptists and Pentecostals, to name a few. Within the Evangelical tradition, these differences appear as yawning chasms of demarcation; while to the outside observer, the differences blur into a common heritage and a common identity. A survey of definitions for Evangelicals demonstrates the common elements of this tradition.

“people professing confidence in the Bible and preoccupied with the message of God’s salvation of sinners through the death of Jesus Christ” (Marsden 1980, 3)

“evangelicalism represents the school of Protestant Christianity that emphasizes personal salvation through Jesus Christ and regards the Bible as the final authority concerning all matters of faith and practice.” (Penning and Smidt 2002, 13)

“a desire to communicate the biblical message of salvation and to convert others to Christianity, a strong belief in the Bible as a unique touchstone for determining matters of truth and practice, an active commitment to some branch of the institutional church, and a desire to integrate all of one’s activities and thoughts as consistently as possible around one’s religious convictions.” (Wuthnow 1989, 166)

“(1) the belief that the Bible is the inerrant Word of God, (2) the belief in the divinity of Christ and (3) the belief in the efficacy of Christ’s life, death and physical resurrection for the salvation of the human soul” (Hunter, 1983 7).

Personal salvation, a literal view of the Bible and an emphasis on Evangelism combine to form the common elements that unite these internal divisions into a single tradition.

2.2 Measuring Evangelicals

Over the past two decades segments within political science and sociology have debated how best to measure Evangelicals. Recently, the subfield of religion and politics finally appears to have settled on a common measurement. The initial debate within the religion and politics field focused on whether beliefs, belonging or behaving served best as the primary measurements for religious studies.⁷

The shortcomings of each of these measurements are exacerbated by the use of survey data. Most surveys exclude questions of religious behavior. As a result, using survey data required choosing between group definitions drawn from theological distinctions (Smidt, 1988), or using a denominational affiliation, or some form of self-identification (Jelen, 1989a; Wilcox, 1987). However, using theological distinctions for defining Evangelicals is elusive because of the lack of diversity in survey questions. For example, questions from the American National Election Study concerning the bible and church attendance are not sufficient to distinguish between Mainline Protestants and Evangelicals (Jelen, Wilcox and Smidt, 1990; Wilcox, 1986). Many Mainline Protestants will have high attendance and traditional views of the Bible without embracing the need to be born again to a personal relationship with Christ. In addition, despite acknowledging orthodox views of scripture, their faith and practice will also be defined by greater reliance on reason, experience and contemporary thought than that of Evangelicals (Campbell 2003; Kellstedt and Green 1993).

⁴ Beliefs work best for those faiths that define themselves through the use of doctrinal beliefs as the boundary for inclusion (such as pietistic groups). Belonging measurements focus on attendance, participation in ritual, and daily exercises of personal devotions. However, most surveys do not provide sufficient information for this type of measurement. The defacto standard has become belonging as reported by the respondent's self identification. See Wald et al. 1988 for a more in depth discussion of belief, behavior and belonging.

Self-identification by survey respondents appears to solve the problem of using theological definitions or denominational affiliation. However, Jelen reports that when given the opportunity to choose between the labels of Fundamentalist, Evangelical, Charismatic and Pentecostal, there are large percentages of overlap between the categories as respondents choose more than one option. He finds that 71.2% of all persons who consider themselves Fundamentalists, also consider themselves Evangelicals. Similarly, 49.2% of the Evangelicals designate themselves as Fundamentalists. In addition, while most Fundamentalists would consider Charismatics to be an anathema, 62.9% of Charismatics labeled themselves as Fundamentalists and 69.3% said they were Evangelical (1993, 183-185). Jelen also notes that significant numbers of respondents from Mainline and Catholic denominations in the same way report themselves as also being Evangelical or Fundamentalist.

Using denominational affiliations could potentially result in a sound measurement of Evangelicals. Denominational affiliation has been faulted, though, for assuming a uniformity of belief and practice within the churches (Wilcox, 1986). Kellstedt and Green (1993) and Kellstedt et al. (1996) address this problem and have found solid evidence that denominational distinctions remain strong even when controlling for demographics. They conclude that careful examination of denominational beliefs and ethos allows for the combination of similar denominations into unified religious traditions. Based on this research, the most commonly accepted strategy for measuring religious affiliation is to reduce the wide variety of denominations into a smaller number of religious traditions (Campbell 2003; Kellstedt 1989; Kellstedt et al. 1996; Wald and Smidt 1993). Steensland et al.'s (2000) classification system for religious traditions has rapidly become the

defacto standard within the subfield. Steensland et al reduces denominations into traditions of Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant⁸, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Secular (those with no religious tradition, or an ill-defined, [e.g. “protestant”] tradition without a minimal religious commitment), Nontraditional Liberal, Non-Traditional Conservative, and Other (a catchall for religious groups such as Greek Orthodox). Because of the small percentage of respondents falling into the last three categories (3-4% combined) they are often reduced to a single category of “Other”.

Some have tried to find variance within denominational affiliation by using a measurement of religious commitment. Kohut, Green, Keeter and Toth (2000) grouped respondents with low levels of religious commitment (worship attendance, private prayer and religious salience) with respondents with no religious affiliation. They found that those with low religious commitment, regardless of denominational affiliation, held similar political attitudes, political affiliations and political activities to those that they defined as “secularists”. This matches Lenski’s prior conclusion that “those who are more active in a group usually conform to the norms of the group more faithfully than do marginal and peripheral members” (1963, 23). Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt and Green (2003), using proprietary data, also sought to create a tri-fold measurement (traditionalist, centrist and modernist) within each major religious tradition through the use of a variety of theological questions and numerous measurements of religious practices. These attempts at greater specificity within religious traditions have not survived efforts to export them

⁸ Placement of African Americans in this classification is divided between those who put them in any tradition based on reported denominational affiliation and those who relegate them to the Black Protestant category regardless of denomination. Campbell points out that this is a minor difference as “almost all blacks who affiliate with a church belong to one of seven predominately black denominations” (6). Many studies exclude blacks from the Evangelical traditions as black Evangelicals, while theologically similar to Evangelicals, tended to be more liberal on social domains such as law and order and national defense, and have held distinct positions on party id and voting patterns (Kellstedt, 1989; Cook and Wilcox, 1990).

to time series datasets such as the General Social Survey and the National Election Studies. Most national surveys lack sufficient depth of theological questions and religious practices to create such a tri-fold measurement. In addition, even with proprietary studies using 3000 or more respondents, the Evangelical modernist category has suffered a small N problem, and efforts to use this tri-fold measurement are declining.⁹

2.3 Evangelical Separatism and Political Participation

Historically many Evangelical denominations within the Evangelical tradition have held to views of separation from modern culture, limiting their political and cultural involvement. The call to “keep oneself unstained by the world” in some denominations refers to a watchful attitude against secularization; while in others, it results in drastic lifestyle choices involving a near total withdrawal from modern culture (Lenski, 1961; Martin 1996; Whiteman 1990). While not uniform in strength or definition across all Evangelical denominations, this separatism includes varying levels of the rejection of ecumenicalism, of civic involvement, of political activism and of basic citizenship. Historically, this separatism was enhanced by the rise of the Fundamentalist movement. According to the historian George Marsden, the marks of Fundamentalism include “separatism, insistence on strict doctrinal purity, and incivility towards persons with other beliefs” (1991, 23). This movement has an effect on American denominations in three forms: it results in fundamentalist denominations emphasizing separatism even from other Evangelicals; it introduces fundamentalist influences into denominations (pietist, holiness and Pentecostal denominations) that were not strict fundamentalists; and lastly, it produces fundamentalist identifiers in mainstream churches who, despite their beliefs,

⁹ Personal conversation with Lyman Kellstedt, September 4, 2004

behaviorally give up on both the impetuous to battle modernity and the effort to embrace separatism (Marsden 1980, 195).

The resulting effect of fundamentalism across denominations is a conservative spectrum of separation. At one end, it is populated by denominations emphasizing a faith that requires limiting their contact with the greater society. This extreme position not only advocates little cultural involvement, but also eschews the basic roles of citizenship. This view is balanced at the opposite end of the spectrum by Evangelical denominations that encourage cultural and political interaction, while emphasizing the importance of a distinct morality and worldview. Along this spectrum fall various other conservative denominations emphasizing to a greater or lesser degree the need for community activism and political involvement (Lienesch 1993; Smith 1998; Thomas and Dobson 1999). Green (2000) shows two intermediate steps between extremes on the separation spectrum in terms of political involvement and citizenship. One step reluctantly advocates limited duties of citizenship (such as voting) and approaches political activities with skepticism. A second intermediate step takes a more expansive view of citizenship but is also dubious about involvement in politics. This spectrum matches the common assumption that most Evangelical groups have some aspect of separatism in relation to political activities (Campbell 2003).

Historically, this separatism wanes and increases with variance in the participation cues from both Evangelical leaders, and the increase or decrease of mobilizing resources from Evangelical social movement organizations, and/or Evangelical political organizations. A flurry of such involvement and increased activism surrounds Prohibition in the 1920s and the anti-communist crusades of the 1950s and

early 1960s. These are bracketed by periods of withdrawal as the participation cues decline and the movement experiences repudiation of its positions and politicians.¹⁰

This separatism came under fire in the late 1970s from a surprising source - the Reverend Jerry Falwell. Falwell, a lifelong fundamentalist, reversed his aversion to political activism, and in 1979, founded the Moral Majority based on the political goals of “recruitment”, “information” and “mobilization” of Evangelicals (Wilcox 2000). Similar groups including Christian Voice and Religious Roundtable were also founded during this time period. These groups delivered the first wave of new cues that oriented Evangelicals from political inactivity to political participation. Also, this time period experienced the election of the first avowed “Evangelical” President, Jimmy Carter in 1976. Following his election, Carter called for Evangelicals to leave their separatism and reengage in the political process (Wilcox 2000). While there is little evidence that Evangelical participation increased with the 1976 election (Perkins, Fairchild and Havens 1983), pundits and reporters give credit for the Reagan victory in 1980 to resurgent Evangelical voters (Moen; Wilcox 2000).

Regenerus, Sikkink and Smith (1999), also demonstrate the effectiveness of these new participation cues on Evangelicals. Even when breaking down the Evangelical tradition into separate components of Evangelicals, Fundamentalists and Charismatics, they find that these religious identities (along with practicing Catholics) are the only

¹⁰ The “Scopes Monkey Trial” in 1925 was a public humiliation of both Fundamentalism and its most public leader, William Jennings Bryan. The trial, along with the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, led to a retreat by conservative Christians that kept them out of public view until the late 1970’s (Simpson 1983). There is, however, a period of less noticed mobilization for the Evangelical Right in the 1950s and early 1960s as some ER groups aligned themselves with Senator Joseph McCarthy against communism. This period of activism was limited in its scope within the ER and failed to attract attention outside the ER. It declined in size and influence after the crushing defeat of its favored candidate for president, Barry Goldwater in 1964 (Wilcox 1992). Hunter (1987) agrees with the patterns of decline and also defines each of these time periods of involvement (1920s, 1950s-1960s, 1980s) as three distinct waves of political activism.

identities relying on conservative Christian leaders or political organizations for assistance in voting decisions. As the new cues become more entrenched within the Evangelical tradition, along with new patterns of participation, most research continues to center on the influence of Evangelicals on the political process. The effects of political participation on Evangelicals remain the untold story of this time period. Much of this untold story reflects a lack of interest in religion on the part of political participation models.

2.4 The Socioeconomic Model

In political science, three overlapping and complementary models provide the foundation for explaining political participation. The basic model of participation in political science is the “standard socioeconomic model”. It focuses on political participation arising from individuals’ socioeconomic status (SES) mediated through their civic attitudes. Verba and Nie (1972) show that higher levels of income, education and social status increase respondents’ free time, money and skills, which in turn, increases campaign activity, voting, communal activity and particularized contact. According to Verba and Nie, these latter four forms of political participation are not a unitary concept, but rather four distinct modes of participation. Socioeconomic status alone does not increase participation, but rather works through the intervening effect of efficacy, interest in politics, a sense of civic duty and levels of political information. Social environment also figures into the standard model as individuals with higher SES,

in contrast to lower SES respondents, live and work in social environments that increase civic skills, reinforce civic attitudes and encourage participation.¹¹

2.5 Civic Volunteer Model

Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995; Also Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001) build on the SES model with their Civic Volunteerism Model. By over-sampling political and civic activists, they elaborate on the SES model and find participation influenced by three factors: the resources to participate; psychological engagement; and “recruitment networks” that encourage and equip citizens to participate. Verba, Schlozman and Brady place more emphasis than Verba and Nie on

¹¹ Other researchers have built upon and reinforced the dominance of the SES model. Acock and Scott (1980) found that social class affected attitudes towards political participation and higher social class resulted in more highly visible political participation (voting, working for a candidate, wearing a political button) versus low visibility activities (watching or listening to political programs, reading about the election). Multiple studies using a variety of forms of participation have confirmed the conclusion that higher levels of education are more likely to result in greater levels of participation while lower levels of education are not. While not as robust a finding, higher income over lower income also increases participation (Bennett 1995, Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Conway 2000; Dalton 2002; Kenny 1992; Leighley 1990; Verba, Burns and Schlozman 1997; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). While the original SES model did not include age, increasing age has also been found to boost levels of participation; though, there appears to be some drop off among the elderly for more active forms of participation (Jankowski and Strate 1995; Jennings, 1979; Jennings and Markus 1988; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Jankowski and Strate also confirmed Verba and Nie’s distinction between voting participation and campaign participation as separate modes of participation, and demonstrated that the structure of participation is stable across cohorts, periods and age groups. Strate et al. also conclude that civic competence (knowledge and habits of political knowledge acquisition), community attachment, church attendance, government responsiveness and party attachment also mediate age effects. They conclude that increases in each of these variables contribute to rising participation as individuals age.

Other factors found to increase participation include marriage, media usage, race, and sex (Bennett 1995; Eveland and Scheufele 2000; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Leighley 1991; McLeod and McDonald 1985; Scheufele and Nisbet 2002; Stoker and Jennings 1995; Verba and Nie 1972). However, these predictors vary in their significance and magnitude depending on the mode of participation being measured (Bennett 1975, Dalton 1988; Eveland and Scheufele 2000; Leighley 1991, Neuman 1986). In particular, these social status and civic orientations are least compelling for voter turnout. Regardless of the model used, significant influences on political participation are attributed to gender and race. For most modes of participation, aside from voting, women demonstrate lower levels of involvement (Conway 1991; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Women, though, have reversed a historical trend of lower rates of voting (Conway 2001). Blacks are less likely to vote than whites though the differences in rates of registration and voting have declined over the past forty years. Still when education and region are controlled for, Blacks of similar SES status still vote at lower levels than whites (Abramson and Claggett 1984).

the social environment as a part of adult socialization/experiences which shape the skills that citizens use in the civic and political realm. They find that these skills increased by the job environment, family structure, church involvement and organizational participation. In addition, the social networks within these environments become recruiting grounds for activity (See also Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999). They determine from this model that disparities in availability of political resources explain different rates of political participation among Blacks, Latinos and Whites (Verba et al 1993). Verba, Schlozman and Brady conclude that the effect of activity in non-political organizations, such as volunteer groups and the workplace, is similar between all organization types. This has come under scrutiny as Ayala (2000) finds that activism in volunteer organizations has a positive affect on political participation, while workplace activities, which are more coercive in nature, have a diminished effect on participation.

2.6 Mobilization Model

The Mobilization Model focuses on the opportunities and cues provided for political activism by the respondent's environment. Mobilization serves as a substitute for resources or civic orientations as an instrument of intervention between political participation and socioeconomic status. Higher SES provides more opportunities for participation through direct mobilization sponsored by political leaders and political parties and indirect mobilization arising from social networks (Leighley 1996, 2001; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

Direct mobilization also results from both, close competitive elections, and higher campaign spending (Cox and Munger 1989; Gilliam 1985; Patterson and Caldiera 1983),

as well as party, candidate or group contact (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Rosenstone, Hansen, Freedman and Grabarek 1993). Rosenstone and Hansen find that direct mobilization involves the distribution of free information about issues and candidates. It also includes the reduction of costs for participation through: offers of free childcare to permit attendance at meetings; transportation to the polls; distribution of absentee ballots and voter registration forms; and providing suggested text for letters to representatives and media outlets.

Rosenstone and Hansen conclude that indirect mobilization relies upon the social obligations found between friends, families and social group members. Calls for participation, from informal contact, draw upon the individuals' sense of commitment to those persons with whom they most identify.

Cutting across each of these models is a similar view of the influence of volunteer organizations in increasing political activity. As previously discussed, Verba, Schlozman and Brady conclude that involvement in church and volunteer organizations provides a training ground for participation skills and increases the likelihood of recruitment. Verba and Nie also find that involvement in volunteer organizations increases political participation. Those volunteer organizations, with clearly expressed political goals, providing opportunities for political dialogue, are the most effective in promoting participation. Rosenstone and Hansen reach a similar view of voluntary organizations. They conclude that involvement in such organizations "makes people susceptible to mobilization" (87). Together, these participation models lay the theoretical foundations for subsequent work concerning the influence of religious involvement on participation.

2.7 Participation and Religion

Despite these participation models, much of the research on political participation and religion suffers from both a lack of attentiveness and a dearth of specificity concerning religious traditions. Verba and Nie give little focus to religious affiliation in their SES model, except to note slight differences in types of participation between Protestants (higher) and Catholics (lower). They also evaluate the influences of church related groups, such as Bible studies and women's auxiliary groups, and uncover that they encourage community activism while providing little forum for political discussion.

Secret, Johnson and Forrest (1990), using the SES model, conclude that religiosity, as measured by attendance, and intensity of religious attendance increases voting participation, regardless of race. They also find non-traditional political activities such as labor strikes, civil rights, and war protests are unaffected by religiosity.

Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) look at religious involvement serving as an environment for gaining skills for civic and political participation. They discover that Protestants have greater opportunities for church participation and acquisition of skills than Catholics, while the exposure of both groups to political messages within their denominations is equal. In support of numerous other studies, they also find that church attendance, in general, increases the likelihood of voting, but not more demanding forms of political participation (See Calhoun-Brown 1996; Harris 1994; McKenzie 2001). However, like Verba and Nie they provide little differentiation in their religious categories except for the broad groupings of Protestant and Catholic. Rosenstone and Hansen also acknowledge that church attendance has a large, positive effect on voter

turnout, but a very minor effect on campaign participation. They, nonetheless, repeatedly fail to examine the influence of religious traditions in their models.

Fortunately, several studies have gone beyond the work of the foundational models to broaden the understanding of religion and participation. Scheufele et al. (2003) find three dimensions to the influence of religion on participation. In keeping with previously discussed models of participation, they show a positive effect of both increased church based cues and political discussion on mobilizing attendees. This mobilization, for obvious reasons, is also a function of attendance increasing accessibility to the cues and discussion. Scheufele et al. find doctrinal commitment or doctrinal conservatism indirectly reduces participation, as those with the highest conservative religious beliefs are less likely to read the newspaper, have lower levels of political knowledge, and hold lower views of their own political efficacy. Scheufele et al. also demonstrate that a significant distinction within Protestant Christianity is affecting participation. Exposure in church to political cues and the frequency of political discussions is lower for Mainline Protestants than for Evangelical Protestants. While doctrinal commitment lowers participation in most denominations, for Evangelicals, it results in a “likely self selection process” that places them in churches with greater cues and discussion and hence greater participation (316).

An examination of increasing participation, arising from civil skills gained in churches, reaches a different conclusion from Verba, Schlozman and Brady. Djupe and Grant (2001) show that church-gained civic skills for regular attendees fail to increase political participation. They do conclude that religious traditions result in different levels of participation, which mimics Beyerlein and Chaves (2003) results. Djupe and Grant

have additionally found: participation increases when a fellow religionist recruits respondents for political activities; when religious leaders hold political meetings in the church; and when the partisanship and political norms of the church are clearly perceived by the respondent. Lastly, participation increases when respondents perceive their political activism as closely tied to their church activism. In effect, those persons who see their religious and political goals as synonymous increase their participation in both realms.

2.8 Evangelicals and Participation

The emergence of Evangelicals as a political force does much to refocus the various political participation models on the importance of religion. Few studies, though, examine aggregate change in participation over time with the exception of those studies examining shifts in party vote¹². As Guth et al. note “one area that has remained relatively neglected in this resurgent interest in the politics of religion has been the study of political participation” (2000, 1). Much of the prior research targets results from individual election cycles. For the most part, these studies focus on voting choice (which candidate/party) as well as party identification and ideology, rather than the choice to vote. These studies almost exclusively focus on Evangelicals and the Republican Party. The 1992 Presidential election reveals an increasing willingness on the part of

¹² Manza and Brooks (1997) argue that that conservative Protestants are long-term GOP voters in presidential elections from 1960-1992. They also find no evidence of increased mobilization on the part of conservative Protestants. Manza and Brooks divide the Protestant population into three categories, theologically liberal, theologically moderate and theologically conservative. Layman (1997), using the more common dichotomous conservative versus non-conservative measurement, for evaluating elections from 1980 to 1994, concludes that conservative denominations have become more Republican, and that religious commitment has increased GOP voting.

Evangelicals to vote for George Bush, particularly those for whom social issues are an important influence on their vote (Kellstedt et al b. 1996). Layman and Carmines (1997) show that religious traditionalism increases the probability of voting Republican, identifying with the Republican party, and holding a conservative ideology. Layman (2001) finds high orthodoxy (or religious traditionalism) and high religious commitment increases the likelihood of voting Republican in Presidential elections from 1980-1996 (See also Kellstedt and Green 1993; Kellstedt et al a. 1996; Kohut et al 2000; Mockabee 2002). Other studies spotlight the influence of Evangelicals/Christian Right on the GOP at the state level (Green, Rozell and Wilcox 2000, 2003).

Given the popular assumption of increases in Evangelical participation, it is surprising to find how few studies examine historical voting and campaign participation trends. In part, the studies are few because much of the focus is on the Christian Right or Religious Right rather than the Evangelical Tradition. The earliest efforts at evaluating Christian Right mobilization focus on social group memberships, finances and voter registration drives (Jorstad 1987; Liebman and Wuthnow 1983). When the focus shifts to voting or campaign activity, the results are meager. Smidt (1987) for example, finds a drop in Evangelical voting from 1980-1984 with one exception; he finds evidence that young Evangelicals (ages 17-34) are increasing their voting participation and their identification with the GOP, compared to non-Evangelicals of the same age in both elections. Wilcox (1992) finds hints that Moral Majority supporters are voting at higher rates than predicted in 1980 when controlling for demographics, but he finds no such change in 1984. Another study finds Evangelical voting in congressional elections falls slightly between 1994 and 1998 (Kohut et al 2000). Wald, Kellstedt and Legee (1993)

conclude that when demographic and political variables are controlled for, being a part of the Evangelical tradition increases the likelihood of voting but does not affect campaign activity. This is the only religious tradition they find to significantly affect voting or participation. In one of the few studies to examine participation beyond voting, Guth et al (2003) (using the Third National Survey of Religion and Politics) find that conservative Evangelicals are the only religious movement to significantly increase political activism. Unfortunately, the scale used for political activism in this study must be viewed with caution, as respondents are asked to recall their activism for a four year (1996-2000) time period. In addition, campaign participation is combined with protest activities, as well as contact with public officials, to form the scale suggesting a mixing of dimensions of participation and causal factors.

The Republican Party is also shown to benefit from Evangelical participation. Analysis of national convention delegates finds the percentage of GOP delegates identifying themselves as “Evangelicals” increases from 10% in 1972 to 17% in 1992 while Evangelical identifiers among Democrats hold steady at 6%. Evangelical growth among GOP delegates is exclusively found among Evangelicals with regular church attendance while the percentage of non-regular attending Evangelicals remains static (Layman 1999). Curiously, what remains unmeasured is the common assumption about increases in Evangelical participation.

Another unmeasured assumption associated with participation is a change in Evangelical sophistication and political thought. As participation increases, Evangelicals are viewed as becoming more politically sophisticated. Changes in Evangelical rights organizations, their agendas, and their levels of support, document this change in

sophistication in the 1990s. Evangelicals widen their agenda from moral issues to using “the language of liberalism” and focus on “rights, equality and opportunity” (Moen 1994 352). They also achieve greater financial stability, broaden their internally acceptable range of theological positions, move away from Capital Hill lobbying to the grassroots focus of the early 1980s, and experience an increase in new organizations, as well as a revitalizing of older groups. (Moen 1992; Moen 1994; Wilcox, Jelen, and Linzey 1995; Moen 1996; Rozell and Wilcox 1996; Wilcox, DeBell, and Sigelman 1999; Jelen 2000). Evangelical insiders encouraging Evangelical leaders to communicate in language applicable to the larger public, in an effort to distinguish between cultural pluralism and cultural relativism, and to learn civility in public discourse (Cromartie 2001), further reinforce this assumption of sophistication.

While these perceptions of sophistication do not match the measurements used in political science, the discussion adds to the (largely unexplored) questions of how evangelical participation has changed, what is the effect of that participation within the Evangelical tradition and how has it made Evangelicals more politically sophisticated. These two gaps, unmeasured changes in participation and the effects of those changes, provide the impetus for this study. To lay the foundation for how increased participation within the Evangelical tradition is affecting the tradition, I turn in the next two chapters to how participation influences religious traditions and how participation changes measurements of political sophistication.

CHAPTER III

WHY CHANGING PARTICIPATION MODIFIES EVANGELICALS

The increasing participation of Evangelicals is occurring across time and with crosscutting influences that may aid the changing influence of the participation or negate its affect. The openness of Evangelicals to political influences raises the possibility that political and societal influences will change the Evangelical tradition by increasing secularization, and by facilitating the adoption of democratic ideals such as tolerance. At the same time, conservative, religious motives for participation (including the culture war motif) may lend a counterbalance to the expected moderation of Evangelicals and cancel out some of the expected liberalizing changes. Simultaneously, changes within the Evangelical tradition, while not a consequence of political participation, have the potential to influence the tradition in a manner similar to the increased political involvement.

3.1 Secularization

Modernization/Secularization theory has predicted the decline of religion in industrial and postindustrial society for over a century. The forces of modernity combine to undermine the importance and influence of religion. Increasing rationalism, as measured by increases in education, technology, and science, weakens the trust of the masses in religion. A commitment to cultural diversity, arising from increased mobility and the decline of traditional communities, as well as economic growth with its rejection of religious separatism are additionally theorized to hasten the decline. In addition, liberal

democracy contributes to the process with its separation of church and state. By focusing on harmony over religious orthodoxy, in conjunction with an emphasis on relativism, liberal democracy undermines religion's claims of authoritative truth. (See Weber 1948, 1976; Wilson 1966; Martin 1978; Bruce 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Bruce paints the results of this decline in very broad strokes. He states that secularization will result in:

(a) The declining importance of religion for the non-roles and institutions such as those of the state and economy; (b) a declining of the social standing of religious institutions and (c) a decline in the extent in which people engage in religious practices and display beliefs of a religious kind, and conduct other aspects of their lives in a manner informed by such beliefs (Bruce 2002, 3).

Some argue that secularization is failing to live up to its predictions, and the United States, along with Iran, Ireland and Poland are often cited as the prime cases for rejection of the theory (See Berger 1999; Hadden 1987; Stark and Finke 2000; Martin 1999; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Wallis and Bruce 1991). Many of these researchers conclude that resurgent American and third-world Evangelicalism, and spreading Islamic fundamentalism represent a defeat of secularization and call into question the underlying theory. Martin, in particular, sees these movements as an adaptation (especially by Evangelicals) to successfully create a political space as “influential commentators within a pluralistic society” (1999, p. 48). This political space then becomes a buffer zone around the Evangelical sub-culture. Martin, however, fails to analyze the possible consequences of this new political interaction on the subculture. He ignores the long-term influences of modernization resulting in this shift from separatism to activism. Proponents of secularization argue that these resurgent movements are reactions to the failure of separatism to isolate them from the modern world. These growing religious

movements are viewed as perhaps final (ultimately unsuccessful?) efforts by adherents to defend their religious faith and way of life.

Rodney Stark and others use Rational Choice Theory to promote the most serious alternative theory to secularization. Stark and Bainbridge (1987) contend that a cycle of secularization, revival, and religious innovation best explain the pattern of religious influence. Older religious organizations tend to make accommodations with the secular culture. New sects, in reaction to the secular drift, adopt a traditional view of the supernatural and, as a result, reject accommodation. As the sects gain popularity and power in society, they begin the same drift toward accommodation and secularization. Stark and Bainbridge believe that over centuries, and even millennium, entire religious traditions may fall into disrepute from accommodation and be replaced by entirely new traditions. This view does not see secularization as resulting in a decline of religion, but rather a cyclical replacement of religious groups with new sects and new traditions. The key argument against this view is that the cycle is limited primarily to the United States (an admitted outlier in most measurements of religiosity and secularization). These cycles of replacement may slow but not ultimately negate the secularization trend.

In addition, supporters of secularization argue that the theory is being applied too rigidly. Bruce contends that secularization is not a universal law, but rather an observation of patterns in Western Europe. Norris and Inglehart view secularization as “a tendency, not an iron law” (p. 5). They readily accept the United States as an outlier among postindustrial nations (along with Ireland and Italy) for not showing all of the expected affects of secularization. They do, though, marshal evidence to show some effects of secularization in the United States, pointing to rising percentages of seculars

(no religious affiliation) in the United States, and providing support for Himmelfarb's (1999) assertion that there are two distinct cultures in America.¹³ Bruce also gathers evidence to show that the United States is not the outlier that others suppose. He focuses on the declining popularity of Mainline Protestants and waning traditional morality among conservative churches as evidence of secularization.

3.2 What are the Political Effects of Secularization?

Religious subgroups use separatism to isolate themselves from the affects of secularization. The subgroup socializes its youth into its tenets and beliefs while using the freedoms of the political system to avoid direct confrontation with the worldview of the culture. Penning and Smidt point out that this strategy runs the risk of marginalizing the subgroup, as its views are excluded from political and social discourse. Should the subgroup choose to reject separatism, it is forced to confront diversity as a cultural and political norm. Ultimately, claims to exclusive "truth" within the subgroup are weakened by pressures to privatize religious beliefs. Furthermore, these claims are undermined by exposure to competing values, beliefs and religious views; although, the rejection of separatism does not necessarily result in adaptation to the culture. Berger indicates that a "religious revolution" resulting in the hegemony of a mandated, state-sponsored religion is also a possible replacement for separatism. Realistically, this approach has few chances of success in liberal democracies valuing multiculturalism and plurality (Berger 1999, p. 3-4).

¹³ One culture is nationalistic, puritanical, religious, and family oriented. The other is self-indulgent, secular, tolerant and multicultural (Himmelfarb 1999).

Evangelical rejection of separatism raises the question; in the political realm how will this increased secularization pressure affect Evangelicals? Secularization theory posits many consequences of increased secularization: eroding religious habits accompanied by an increase in seculars, increasing moderation (liberalization) in social and political attitudes (assumed to accompany a decline in the authority of religious leaders), and gains in tolerance.

3.2.1 Eroding Religious Habits and Increasing Numbers of Seculars

An increasingly secular society will result in a decline of religious enthusiasm and participation. Norris and Inglehart maintain that, “Religious habits will erode and the public will become indifferent to spiritual appeals” (7). They find evidence of this theory in Woodberry et al.’s flawed hypothesis that unchanging levels of church attendance over the past 40 years are a reflection of increasing social desirability. Woodberry et al. argue that attendance has in fact dropped, and that their analysis of true attendance rates shows a 40% over-report for current weekly religious attendance. Woodberry et al. assume, however, that other historic attendance reports are more accurate. They fail to adequately address the issue of why social desirability would inflate current attendance figures, but not those figures from four decades prior.

Beyond the religious attendance figures, there is some evidence of a decline in religious salience. Wuthnow (1989) states that religious indicators (participation, belief in God, belief in the afterlife) are as strong today as they were forty years ago. In contradiction to his own conclusion, Wuthnow (1988) finds evidence that Bible literalism is weakening, as is the belief in hell. Applying these results to Evangelicals is difficult, as

in the analysis of attendance, and in the analysis of religious indicators, none of the studies break down the decline by religious tradition.

Furthermore, the percentage of Seculars in the United States has doubled over the past decade, but the decline is not uniform across traditions. And, while the percentage of Seculars increased over the past twenty years, it appears to be exclusively a shift from Mainline Protestants into the Secular category. Evangelicals, Black Protestants and Catholics have maintained their share of their population (even with population growth) while Mainline denominations have lost both membership and attendance (Hout and Fischer 2002). It is also important to note that while Seculars represent the segment of the population who became indifferent to established religious traditions, that does not mean they fit a model of scientific rationalism. Martin's discussion of secularization and declining religion in Great Britain is tempered by the comment that, "the decline of religion was not followed by rationality but by subterranean theologies and nonrational sentiments and superstitions" (Martin 2000, 35). Seculars may still view themselves as religious or spiritual; still, their behavior includes little evidence of religious belonging or devotional practice, and it has no connection with established religious traditions.

3.2.2 Political and Moral Consequences

Norris and Inglehart argue that secularization results in a decline of the preeminence of church leaders. With this decline comes a reduction of influence over the moral and political issues of the day. They identify possible changes as occurring in attitudes toward divorce, abortion, homosexuality, cultural change in general, and equality for women. Chaves (1994) takes a slightly different tack in arguing that secularization should be viewed, not necessarily as a reduction in religion itself, but as a

decline in religious authority; the religious beliefs of individuals can remain unaffected. Meanwhile, the ability to mobilize and institutionalize those beliefs into social and political action will decline as religious authority declines. While Norris and Inglehart center their discussion on the waning influence to affect attitudinal shifts among identifiers, Chaves focuses on the influence to mobilize them. In support of Norris and Inglehart, Bruce (2002) points to some evidence of secularization in moral standards with the increasing acceptance of divorce among Evangelicals.

Hunter also finds evidence of secularization. He uses a terminology of separatism and moderation (as a substitute for “secularization”) to describe ongoing changes among Evangelicals. He points out that “separatism and moderation are in some ways different words for sectarian divisiveness and accommodation” (Hunter 1987, 195). Hunter makes the important point (also iterated here) that some would interpret these terms as negative assessments; when for the social scientist, they are merely the best value-neutral lexis available. He believes that Evangelicals have taken both tacks (separatism and moderation) simultaneously to confront a loss of protestant hegemony in the United States. Despite the historical separatism, Hunter argues that the boundaries between Evangelicals and the greater American community have become blurred. While not settling for a simplistic definition that Evangelicals are becoming more liberal (though his conclusions support this thesis), he argues that Evangelicals have broadened their definitions for faith, belief and behavior to encompass previously rejected liberal positions. This broadening occurs by adding to rather than rejecting more conservative positions. Moderation, according to Hunter, is the acceptability of liberal positions as valid expressions of orthodoxy without rejecting more conservative views. Hunter’s

definition of moderation also includes increasing tolerance and tolerability or “alignment to the normative codes of civility” (47). For Hunter, moderation would involve following a liberal path in political, moral and/or social attitudes, as well as increasing tolerance for out-groups. Hunter’s theorized tolerance, though, would have to overcome Jelen (1991) and Wilcox’s (1992) findings that Christian Right supporters are motivated by negative attitudes toward communists, gays and lesbians, feminists, and the American Civil Liberties Union. These negative motives for participation may undermine the expected moderating influence of participation.

Penning and Smidt (2002) reexamine Hunter’s conclusions with a new survey of Evangelical college students, and argue that secularization is minimal for Evangelical students. They find little evidence that Evangelical students are less orthodox than previous generations. Aside from women’s roles and support for an equal rights amendment, Penning and Smidt find no change on moral issues from Hunter’s study. They also find no shift in overall tolerance levels for these students (158). It should be noted that both studies (Penning and Smidt, and Hunter) show strong secularizing changes in comparison to the data collected in 1962. Evangelical attitudes have been static since Hunter’s 1982 study, but there is no evidence to support that they reversed a significant secular leap that took place in the 1960s. These results are applicable to only a small portion of the American populous as both Hunter, and Penning and Smidt’s studies observe a very small and unique portion of the Evangelical community. For example, Penning and Smidt discover no change among Evangelical students in their attitudes toward divorce, despite the Evangelical divorce rate now rivaling that of the rest of the population. The theorized effects of secularization are for the entire religious tradition,

not just students whose commitment and background include a specialized Evangelical college influence. Secularization as theorized by Martin, Bruce and others is an aggregate process found among average Evangelical identifiers rather than among its elites.

3.2.3 Increasing Tolerance

Tolerance is also one of the theorized byproducts of secularization and liberal democracy. Tolerance weakens religion, as claims to exclusive possession of the truth are counterbalanced by the need to tolerate other viewpoints in the political arena. Strong adherence to subculture boundaries allows a religious tradition to exclude, or at least minimize, the influence of alternative viewpoints and beliefs. Diversity is neither valued nor encouraged. This lack of diversity is demonstrated in Evangelical attitudes.

Evangelicals have selective tendencies toward greater intolerance than do other Americans (e.g. Davis and Robinson 1996; Jelen and Wilcox 1990). While Evangelicals are not more racist in their attitudes toward Blacks, Asians, Catholics, Hispanics or immigrants (Guth et al. 1996; Smith 1998), they hold less tolerant views of Moslems, homosexuals, atheists, feminists, communists, racists and militarists (Jelen and Wilcox 1990; Tamney and Johnson 1997; Smith 1996). Race is not the focus of Evangelical intolerance; but alternatively, other religions (including a lack of religion), divergent moral positions (homosexuality) and what could be termed as a broader category of isms, feminism, racism and communism, are instead their targets.

As the barriers decline, (in this case through increased political activism) political cooperation requires tolerance of previously rejected religious, ethical and moral views. This cooperation is viewed as “cognitive contamination” as worldviews, ethics, and

lifestyles collide through political interaction (Berger 1992). Accommodation and compromise then follow as individuals embrace a rapidly expanding acceptance of relativism (Berger; Hunter 1991; Penning and Smidt). As Bruce succinctly points out, it is difficult for a fundamentalist to rail against “anti-Christ Roman Catholics” on Sunday, and then cooperate with Catholic representatives at a moral/political coalition meeting on Monday (Bruce 29).

While not addressing secularization theory, Warren (2001) presents the (unmeasured) theory that some groups do not facilitate this increase in tolerance as participation increases. Although his argument is applied to the Christian Right as a social movement rather than to Evangelicals as a tradition, he does raise concerns that the monolithic nature of the Christian Right (and its cues to the Evangelical tradition) do not result in conflict and contamination from other views. He sees the Christian Right increasing political participation and possibly increasing political skills, but not cultivating civility or tolerance. This view, though, is conditioned on the premise that Christian Right political participation is limited solely to involvement in Christian Right groups. This is a premise, given the alignment and participation of Evangelicals with the Republican Party that seems dubious. Prior work focusing on the influence of participation does show evidence of participation increasing the norm of tolerance. Political elites and activists acquire a commitment to democratic norms through the act of participation. Participation then teaches citizens about politics and increasing attention to public issues. This process includes learning the “rules of the game” such as adopting the norms of compromise and negotiation, and demonstrating increasing tolerance for outgroups (Cook and Morgan 1971; Freie 1997; Lane 1959; Nagel 1987). Increased

exposure to the norms of civil liberties, and the desire to effectively participate in the democratic arena increases the motivation to accept the norms. However, this participation/political socialization process is tempered by the ideology of its participants. Conservatives are less supportive of civil liberty norms for all groups regardless of their ideological bent (Sniderman et al. 1989, 1991; Sullivan et al. 1993). The implications of this last finding for conservative Evangelicals are clear. Their increased political involvement (and cultural contamination) should result in a pattern of increasing tolerance for “out” groups, though the conservative ideology of Evangelicals may temper the increase.

Several of these consequences of secularization are applicable to this study as a result of the increased political participation of Evangelicals. In particular, renewed Evangelical participation raises the possibility of increasing moderation in social and political attitudes, and increasing tolerance from learning the “rules of the game”. The difficulty with all the measurements of secularization is that there is nothing to suggest that all indices decline at the same rate, or that the decline is evenly spread across political or social characteristics and attitudes. Some behaviors and attitudes may be more resistant to secularization influences and may have a greater lag time for the influence of secularization to appear. However, the shift in Evangelical political participation, and the resulting decline in separatism, leaves open the possibility of a more rapid secularization occurring over the past two decades.

3.3 Fighting the Culture War

The “culture war” may be another influence tempering the secularization of Evangelicals. James Davison Hunter and Robert Wuthnow conclude that the American electorate is increasingly divided in a culture war fought by orthodox and progressives who hold divergent views of the education, morality, law, education, family, media and politics (Hunter 1991, Wuthnow 1988).

Wuthnow sees the cultural war as an inter- and intra-denominational struggle. He perceives the first divide as existing between Evangelicals and liberal religious/secularists. The second divide exists within most of the larger established denominations, as Lutherans, Presbyterians, Methodists and Roman Catholics split somewhat equally between religious conservatives and religious liberals. Curiously, Wuthnow also includes Baptists in this divided group even though conservative Southern Baptists effectively marginalized more moderate Baptists in a series of internal denominational maneuvers in the 1970s and 1980s. Wuthnow also makes the mistake of lumping northern, mainline Baptist denominations with Evangelical Baptists.

Unlike Wuthnow, Hunter views the culture war as solely an intra-denominational conflict. He divides the participants in the war into “orthodox”, who hold traditional religious beliefs and a commitment to transcendent truth, and “progressives”, who have little or no religious commitment and a relativistic view of morality and truth. These two camps are seen as crosscutting all religious traditions. Layman’s (2001) exploration of these intra- and inter-denominational differences finds evidence for both. He concludes that the most committed and orthodox within each religious tradition are more conservative on social and political issues than their less committed and less orthodox

members. At the same time, inter-denominational differences are evident as all Seculars and all Jews are more liberal than the least committed and least orthodox of any Christian tradition. Also, both high and low commitment/orthodox Evangelicals are more conservative than their respective high or low Mainline Protestant, Catholic or Black Protestant counterparts. Low Evangelicals are more culturally and morally liberal than high Evangelicals, but they are still more conservative than are low Christians of any other tradition. It is important to note that this finding does not provide evidence of a broadening cultural divide with increasing numbers enlisting on each side. Other researchers while exploring this thesis find limited evidence of a deep division between traditionalists and modernists (Bolce and De Maio 1999; Davis and Robinson 1996; Green, Guth, Smidt and Kellstedt 1996).

Others have suggested that this orthodox/progressive division only exists among religious and secular elites, and activists (Layman and Carmines 1997). A growing body of research has called this concept into question, or has attempted to modify its scope (Evans 1997; Miller and Hoffman 1999; Williams 1997). DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson (1996), in particular, conclude that there is little evidence of increasing polarization on social issues. Fiorina (2004) marshals evidence to show that the culture war is an artifact of political party polarization. He maintains that the polarized alternatives presented by the Republican and Democratic parties create the appearance of a polarized electorate, as they are forced to choose between two extremes. Fiorina sees the culture war as an elite conflict, comprising perhaps ten percent of the population.

Regardless of its veracity, usage of the culture war concept has become common in Evangelical circles. It is used as a rallying cry and an organizing principle behind the

push for a conservative social agenda. The culture war, in effect, flavors the participation cues and provides much of the focus for the ideological direction that this increased political participation should take. Since the messages of the culture war are attacks on secularization, the political participation fueled by this perceived conflict may serve to negate the secularizing influences of participating.

3.4 New Paradigm Churches

The influences on American Evangelicals over the past two decades are not limited to external social and political forces. Evangelical Christianity is also influenced, during this time of increased political involvement, by new sects that reverse the expected pattern of cultural accommodation for new sects. Niebuhr (1962) traces the evolution of newly formed sects from their inception to their accepted status as denominations. New religious sects originate with the goal of purifying either a denomination or the entire religious tradition. These radical sects are marked by high commitment and high separatism. Successive generations begin a pattern of declining commitment. This decline is often accompanied by a rising socio-economic status fueled by religious-based industriousness and piety. Internal pressures for cultural acceptance result in a rejection of separatism, and the sect transforms into a denomination that rejects claims of exclusive doctrinal truth (See also Michels 1962; Troeltsch 1992). For Evangelicals, new influential sects reversed this pattern by beginning with a rejection of exclusivity and separatism, which is followed by a call for the Evangelical tradition to increase its cultural acceptance.

A phenomenon called the “Jesus Movement” in the early 1970s opened conservative Christians (after a great deal of initial resistance) to rock music and counterculture attitudes, as waves of young people entering conservative churches brought their own distinctive culture with them. Interestingly, at the height of this movement, one of its critics suggested that it was ripe for political absorption by the conservative right (Nolan 1971). The Jesus Movement functioned as a harbinger of changes by remolding established churches within the Evangelical Tradition. It also spawned four new sects/denominations (Calvary Chapel, Gospel Outreach, Hope Chapel and the Association of Vineyard Churches), which continue to be on the forefront of social activism among conservative denominations (Miller 1997). These groups are known for their rapid growth (Perrin, Kennedy and Miller 1997). Despite being relatively small denominations, eighteen Calvary Chapels and five Vineyards are classified as “megachurches” with weekly attendance of 2000 or more (Hartford Institute 2004). One of the marks of these denominations is a lack of antagonism toward the surrounding culture (Di Sabitino 1999; Miller 1997; Shipley 1996; 1998). For example, these denominations have readily embraced what is termed “post-feminist” ideology, where gender equality is assumed as the norm of family and public life (Shipley 1998; Stacey 1990).

Another new movement within Evangelical Christianity, having a similar embrace of the surrounding culture but not arising from the Jesus Movement, is the “seeker church” movement. With some 9500 affiliated churches in the Willow Creek Association¹⁴, this movement is typified by the 20,000 member Willow Creek Community Church in Chicago that began in 1975 (Hybels 1995; Shipley 1998).

¹⁴ Willow Creek Association. http://www.willowcreek.com/wca_info/, September 1, 2003.

Additionally comprising this movement is Rick Warren's equally large Saddleback Valley Community Church. Kellstedt and Green (2003) also classify this movement among new paradigm churches. These churches encourage an increasing involvement in social issues including racial equality, the environment and care for the poor and homeless.

All of these new groups, while beginning in the 1970s, came to prominence among Evangelicals in the 1980s, and their increase in size has been dramatic. At just three decades old, New Paradigm membership in 2000 made up 6 percent of the adult American population (Kellstedt and Green 2003). These denominations and movements are viewed by sociologist Donald Miller as "new paradigm churches", which are infiltrating the practices and attitudes of more established segments of several religious traditions including Evangelical, Mainline and Roman Catholic.¹⁵ Miller describes new paradigm church characteristics as:

- “1. they were started after the mid-1960's
2. the majority of the congregation born after 1945
3. seminary training of clergy is optional
4. worship is contemporary
5. lay leadership is highly valued
6. they have extensive small group ministries
7. clergy and congregants usually dress informally
8. tolerance of different personal styles is prized
9. pastors tend to be understated, humble and self-revealing
10. bodily, rather than merely cognitive, participation in worship is the norm
11. the “gifts of the Holy Spirit” are affirmed
12. Bible-centered teaching predominated over topical sermonizing” (Miller 1997, p. 20)

¹⁵ The author, firsthand, observed the cross-denominational interest in these paradigm churches first, through attending, along with 5000 people, a Vineyard Conference (sponsored by a Roman Catholic Church) held on the campus of the University of Michigan (October 1985), and second, through attending, with several hundred pastors, a church growth conference featuring Rick Warren (seeker church movement) at Fuller Theological Seminary (November 1986).

New paradigm churches take the initial stance of embracing the world around them while still holding to Evangelical theology. Shipley writes of one paradigm denomination:

“...Vineyard is liberal on some social issues and conservative on others, but its disposition toward alternative moralities is consistently marked by tolerance . . . its churches remain doctrinally conservative and thus represent an innovative form of born-again Christianity that weds traditional theology and contemporary culture: members celebrate a personal relationship with Jesus Christ and talk on cellular phones; they believe in miracles and value modern science; they interpret scripture literally and shop at the Gap; they are committed to evangelizing and yet show remarkable tolerance for cultural diversity” (Shipley, 107).

These new paradigm churches are also known for operating food banks, collecting clothing for distribution, providing free or low cost healthcare and operating gang and prison programs (Miller 1997). Many of these churches hold liberal views on racial and class issues and strive (with very limited success) for racially mixed congregations and leadership (Shipley)¹⁶. Kennedy finds that paradigm churches exhibit higher levels of tolerance and greater support for the civil liberties of religious opponents as compared to other Evangelicals (Kennedy cited in Shipley 1992). They (for churches in the 1980s and 1990s) pioneered the use of technology in their services through state of the art sound systems, video projection, multimedia with computer graphics, and electronic instrumentation in their worship bands, as well as effective use of church websites, email and database systems. In addition to contemporary worship, many new paradigm

¹⁶ Miller's congregational surveys found that Vineyard, Calvary Chapel and Hope Chapel congregations averaged 2% Black attendees and 1% or less for Blacks in leadership. Hispanics (13%) and Asians (7%) were more highly represented than Blacks in these congregations, but leadership percentages were still lower (Hispanic 3.5% and Asian 1%). Wolfe (2003) does find evidence that new paradigm churches are effective in building churches among the Hispanic community.

churches include drama and performances by contemporary dance troupes in their services (Hybels and Hybels 1995; Shipley; Miller 1997; Nathan 1995)

New paradigm influence in established Evangelical churches is seen in: the adoption of contemporary worship styles¹⁷, the use of technology, increased informality in dress and décor, establishment of weekly support/12-step groups and home fellowship groups, increased ministry by the laity with a focus on using spiritual gifts, expanding levels of community involvement, concern about racial issues, and positive attitudes toward the surrounding culture¹⁸ (Miller 1997, 2000; Price 2002; Shipley; Wolfe 2003). The Church Growth Movement, which has spawned a plethora of books and conferences for church leaders on how to “grow” a larger church, has been heavily influenced by new paradigm churches. C. Peter Wagner, the “guru” of church growth, frequently invited Bill Hybels, Rick Warren and John Wimber (founder of the Vineyard) to speak at his conferences. Many of Wagner’s principles of church growth are drawn from “successful” paradigm churches (Jorstad 1993; Wagner 1984, 1987, 1994).

These new paradigm churches have not been limited in their influence on Evangelical churches. Many of the more conservative renewal movements within mainline denominations have turned to new paradigm churches as models for change

¹⁷ For example, Vineyard Music International, an offshoot of the Association of Vineyard Churches, specializes in producing recordings, sheet music, and accompaniment tapes of contemporary worship music (all written and recorded by local Vineyard church “worship” or rock bands). Since its founding in 1984, it has grown to become the second largest publisher of sacred music in the world. Similarly, Maranatha Music arising from the Calvary Chapel churches has grown to become a leader in worship music. In 2002, the two companies (publishing music from approximately 1000 member churches) combined to provide over twenty five percent of all the contemporary worship music used worldwide (Integrity 2002).

¹⁸ Bill Hybel, pastor of Willow Creek Church writes, “Everything from the music to the printed program is designed specifically for unchurched people...and because we are trying to reach a different generation, we’ve used cutting-edge communication methods; contemporary Christian music, drama, multimedia, video and dance.” (Hybel and Hybel, p. 173-174). Vineyard values include, “We value being CULTURE CURRENT. We aim to develop an atmosphere of ease, and to speak, act, and dress in ways in which our culture can respond positively. For example, we reflect this value through worship music that is of a popular style.”(The Vineyard USA 2004).

(Kellstedt and Green 2003; Miller 2000). While the precise level of influence is difficult to measure, one study of United Methodist clergy found that 31% supported the ideals of a United Methodist Evangelical Renewal Group (Good News) and 16% supported the ideals of the Willow Creek Association (McKinney and Finke 2002). Many mainline churches have adopted contemporary worship styles or have added alternative worship services to their schedules. In addition, many of these churches have added small group ministries, including support groups, to their weekly schedule (Miller 1997). There is a lack of evidence as to how new paradigm churches have influenced Black Protestant denominations or Roman Catholic Churches. It is possible since these churches have arisen within a predominately white Evangelical protestant tradition that they have influenced predominately a white Protestant audience. However, Miller has expanded his study of new paradigm churches to congregations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. He finds many of the new paradigm attributes have been incorporated into the most rapidly growing churches in these regions. The other unifying factor to these Asian, African and Latin American churches is that they emphasize the gifts of the Holy Spirit in a Pentecostal or Charismatic manner (Miller 2003). While no research in the United States has measured new paradigm influence among Black congregations, there has been a documented increase of Pentecostal and Charismatic practices among American Black congregations, suggesting a possible new paradigm influence on them (Jorstad 1993).

3.5. Which Influences?

We are then left with decidedly mixed influences to potentially moderate Evangelical attitudes. Increased political participation raises the possibility of moderation

occurring over the past two decades. Secularization theory suggests that such moderation may have begun with changes in political participation. This moderation may also have been aided by the stimulus of the new paradigm church movement. However, the culture war ethos and the very nature of the cues leading to participation represent forces moving in the opposite direction. As a result, for those issues most emphasized by the new political cues, an ideological stalemate seems most likely. For those issues not given a conservative emphasis within the Evangelical tradition, they, perhaps, hold the most promise for finding patterns of attitude moderation and increased tolerance.

CHAPTER IV

THE ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL THINKING

The concept of “political sophistication” has come to dominate the search for how to organize the political thinking of the electorate. This overly broad, and at times not easily defined category, has become the catchall for a myriad of structures all proposing to capture the underlying cognitive forms that guide the political thought of the American public. It is also somewhat of a misnomer to label all efforts at measuring organization as “political sophistication”, as researchers themselves have used a wide variety of terms including; “political information”, “political expertise”, “political complexity”, “schemata” and “levels of conceptualization” to describe various aspects of these cognitive structures. Neuman (1986) notes:

“The political sophistication of the citizenry is the central issue in theories of mass politics and democracy . . . The issue was once listed as one of the central foci of political behavior research . . . Later it was listed as one of the five central concerns in the field . . . The sophistication issue has also been labeled as the central unifying conception to emerge from early voting studies . . . Yet the research tradition yields no agreed-upon definition or approach to measurement (191).”

However, from simple additive measurements of political information to more complex searches for an underlying continuum(s) of ideology, political sophistication has become the expansive rubric that ties these concepts and terms together.

This chapter examines the development of the concept of political sophistication from its origins in *The American Voter* to current controversial usages such as schemata. It highlights differences and similarities in the concept across various subgroups in the discipline of political science, and lays the groundwork for measuring the political sophistication of American Evangelicals.

4.1 Levels of Conceptualization

Measuring changes in political thinking is dependent on identifying an underlying structure to respondents' thought processes. Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse (1964) were the first to seek such a structure across the electorate:

“We are interested in the presence or absence of certain abstractions that have to do with ideology; but we are also interested in the degree to which an individual's political world is differentiated, and, most important, in the nature of the degree of “connectedness” between the elements that are successfully discriminated. In short, we are interested in the structure of thought that the individual applies to politics; and this interest forces us to deal in typologies and qualitative differences (1960, 221–22).”

While not explicitly using the term “political sophistication,” their structure or political conceptualization provides the underpinnings for the evaluation of political thinking and continues to influence the discussion of sophistication. In theorizing about this conceptualization, Campbell et al. concludes, “there must be surrogates for ideology that bring large aggregates to act as though propelled by ideological concerns” (217). Based on the responses to National Election Study open-ended questions concerning the likes and dislikes about the parties and their presidential candidates, they conclude that there are four categories of these surrogates. They classify these substitutes in a descending order from highest level to lowest by measuring both the “remoteness in content” and the distance from their ideal of ideological sophistication. As these categories descend away from the ideal, even logical constraint decreases in the individual's belief system. For individuals “the range of relevant belief systems becomes narrower and narrower” as they use fewer and fewer amounts of specific and organized information (Converse, 213). Not only during this descent is there a decline from

ideological concepts, but the objects in the belief system are reallocated from these abstract ideological concepts to familiar social groups or leaders, or even descend to “objects of immediate experience as family, job or immediate associates” (Converse, 1964, 213-15).

The first level of conceptualization is *ideology and near-ideology*, which classifies people by their reliance on abstract concepts, such as liberalism or conservatism, and a broad underlying dimension for making political judgments. The respondents are then able to apply these concepts to specific positions on public policy issues. While this underlying dimension does not have to fit a liberal-conservative dichotomy, there must be some sense of a continuum upon which political objects shift (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964).

The next level is *group benefits*, which involves evaluating parties and candidates, in terms of the positive or negative consequences of their election on a group within the population. These individuals, according to Campbell et al. (1960, 219-220), may be using an “ideology by proxy” by following the cues given by an ideological leadership.

The third level, *nature of the times*, involves references to broad social conditions, or isolated and specific issues, without the benefit of the ideological considerations of the first two categories. Individuals credit or blame one of the parties for a social or economic state, or express their displeasure or agreement with a specific stance or program.

The last or bottom level of conceptualization is called an *absence of issue content*. In this category, there is little discrimination between the parties, and candidates tend to be evaluated on personal characteristics. Varieties of individual stances populate this

level, including blind party allegiance, rejection of parties, and difficulty in following politics. Regardless of the grouping, the result according to Converse is they have “no shred of policy significance whatsoever” (1964, 217).

Converse seeks to reinforce the levels of conceptualization in his original 1964 work by demonstrating the connection between: higher levels of conceptualization and education; conceptualization and participation; conceptualization and political knowledge; and conceptualization and elites. The connection between education and stratification of the electorate, however, is shown to be weaker than Converse initially posited (Converse 2000). In addition, Jacoby (1988) finds the levels are not merely a “surrogate for the same type of political sophistication that is tapped by education or by other means of cognitive ability”. Converse expands the levels of conceptualization to include the concept of a belief system which is “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form or constraint or functional interdependence” (207). For Converse, constraint is the ability to predict individuals’ attitudes based on the initial or prior knowledge of another of the individual’s attitudes. This constraint can be based on “pure logic”, or an underlying psychological attachment to a general idea that “serves as a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs” (210). The constraint can also be based on affiliation with “particular niches in the social structure” (211), which occur through affiliation with the niche and/or the presentation of the group’s attitudes and beliefs as a coherent whole.

Converse examines sophistication in terms of both constraint and in active use of a liberal to conservative ideology. Converse reinforces the conclusions of Campbell et al. that sophistication-based use of ideological comments in National Election Study open-

ended questions, accurate placement of major political parties on the same scale, and passable definitions of conservative and liberal, all relate to both higher levels of political activism and higher levels of education. His analysis of constraint shows that much of the American public exhibits little constraint among issue attitudes. When examining correlations among issue attitudes, he concludes that most of the public demonstrates little structure to their belief systems. Both of these measurements of sophistication, the use of ideology (and the accompanying levels of conceptualization) and constraint, to varying degrees, continue to influence the examination of sophistication.

However, the idea of sophistication as ideology, or levels of conceptualization, has come under fire by researchers. Some find fault with the validity of the political conceptualization as measured by Campbell et al. (1960), Converse (1964), Nie, Verba and Petrocik¹⁹ and others. Smith (1980), in evaluating Nie et al.'s results, finds high levels of individual movement between the levels. He concludes that the levels of conceptualization are not measuring stable levels of sophistication, but rather, are measuring the short-term impact of the rhetoric of political dialogue. Nie et al. faults this conclusion and speculates that Smith's usage of a different coding scheme may result in the differing conclusions. Abramson (1981) also questions Smith's results and suggests that the measurements are unreliable, but that the underlying concept of political conceptualization is stable. Cassel (1984), after evaluating Smith and Nie et al., concludes that the levels of conceptualization are reliable, valid and stable. Additional research expands on the concept of political conceptualization, and in the process, provides validation for the original work. An analysis of cognitive structures finds that

¹⁹ Nie Verba and Petrocik use the master codes rather than the original respondent's comments to produce an expanded version of the levels of conceptualization. They expand the levels to seven categories but still maintain a hierarchical structure with Ideologues ranked highest and Apolitical lowest.

ideologues have high salience to the liberal-conservative continuum, while individuals at lower levels of conceptualization do not use well-defined cognitive structures or the liberal-conservative continuum (Jacoby 1986). A liberal-conservative dimension is operational for a portion of the public with higher levels of education, but for many people, ideological identification functions at the level of providing cues for voting or choosing candidates (Jacoby 1991). Additional works have also helped to reestablish the validity of the levels of political conceptualization (Carmines and Stimson 1982; Hanger and Pierce 1982; Knight 1985; Luskin 1987, Wyckoff 1987; Feldman 1988).

Further research builds, to a lesser extent, upon the idea of sophistication as the levels of conceptualization and, to a greater extent, upon Converse's idea of constraint indicating sophistication. These measurements often include the new element of political knowledge. Neuman's evaluation (1986) finds that sophistication includes three related dimensions: political salience (including political interest, involvement, and attentiveness to political news), political conceptualization (both integration by the levels of conceptualization and differentiation), and political knowledge (based on measurements of political factual items). Neuman's view of political sophistication draws upon the variables most commonly used for political sophistication, and its various other manifestations, such as political awareness, political expertise, cognitive sophistication, political involvement and political interest. Luskin (1990), though, faults Neuman for an overly broad concept that mixes interest and attentiveness with sophistication. At the same time, Luskin (1987) also tries to measure sophistication with a combined measurement of the levels of conceptualization and an eleven-point political information scale. Krosnick (1990) and Zaller (1990) both refine sophistication as "political

expertise” with a focus on how respondents organize knowledge. Zaller measures expertise using media exposure, political awareness, levels of participation and placement of groups and candidates on a seven-point ideological scale. Luskin also faults Zaller as he “commingles sophistication, which is what he really seems to have in mind, with education, political interest, media use, and political participation” (2002, 235).

As can be seen from these later works on political sophistication, researchers have begun to redefine the concept, at a minimum, to include an element of stored information. The amount of correct information stored is viewed as important, or more important, than the organization of that information. With the work of Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), and building on Zaller (1992), political knowledge is beginning to replace cognitive structure as the preferred measurement.²⁰ This, in no small part, is related to the success of increasing levels of political knowledge as predictors of cognitive organization. This research, however, does not have to be an either/or proposition. Apart from levels of political information there is still much to be learned from the cognitive structure of respondents. This is not to ignore the argument that political knowledge is the single best indicator of political sophistication. However, seeking to measure changes in evangelical thinking may require that the categories be more nuanced than the categories of *The American Voter* (1960), more reliable than those of *The Unchanging American Vote* (1976), and broader than political knowledge.

4.2 Schema and Sophistication

An additional effort to measure the organization of sophistication/political thinking from political psychology involves how people organize their thoughts into enduring broad categories or schema. These schemata are persistently available and

²⁰ See also McGraw and Pinney; Smith 1989; Mondak 1999, 2001; Price 1999; Luskin 2002)

represent “long-term individual differences in perceptual readiness” (Bargh and Pratto 1986). Building upon the Information Processing Theory, researchers have concluded that “one of the indisputable findings on long term memory is that information is not stored in a random fashion but is organized meaningfully in packets of semantic associations.” (Lodge and McGraw in Lodge et al. 1991, 1358).

Schema build on Converse’s view of constraint as cognitive organization (Jackson and Marcus 1975; Fiske and Kinder 1981). These categories or schemata provide an overarching structure or mental scaffolding through which new information is given attention, processed and stored. This information processing depends on the ready access of the structures for evaluation of new information. Schema, in effect, serve as mental shortcuts for organizing the world around oneself (Lau, et al. 1991). For citizens these shortcuts provide a “formula for comprehending patterns of political events” (Hamill et al. 1985, 853).

Schemata can be determined by questioning, which reveals the structure in use through the persistent or chronic accessing of similar responses. The accessibility of a schema reveals the organizing principle(s) around which the individual is organizing their political beliefs. Such main beliefs may take the form of party or issue categories including economic concerns, or a more value driven schema like individuality, liberty or equality (Conover and Feldman 1984). Some persons in the political realm are aschematic while others utilize multiple schemata.

The accessibility of a schema also refers to the order in which a schema is checked in response to information or a request for information. Highly accessible schema are checked before less accessible ones and, if an appropriate fit is found for the

information or request, the less accessible schema are not used (Axelrod 1973). The accessibility of schemata also fits with the general theory of attitude accessibility. As Miller and Peterson write, “accessibility is the most ubiquitous measurement of attitude strength in political science” (2004, 853). When asked to express a political attitude, people quickly search their memory for the most accessible considerations, whose accessibility is increased by the recency of use (Feldman 1995; Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992). The same principle applies to schema as it also depends on frequency and the recency of prior activation (Fazio 1989). The accessibility of schemata are also influenced by priming and saliency (Axelrod 1973; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Lau 1986, 1989). Cues in the respondents’ environment and priming from media sources increase the ease of retrieval of political attitudes and political information.

This accessibility does not preclude some citizens from using multiple schema and readily switching from one schema to another with identical levels of access in the hierarchy. A political schema is also not a necessity. Some people are aschematic and demonstrate no organizing principle to their political thinking.

Schemata are viewed as being stable and resistant to change. The economy that schemata provide make individuals less likely to change their schemata formulation in response to limited disparate information. When change does occur, it tends to be slow and incremental. Change can occur in terms of rejection or modification of previously formatted schema or in the restructuring of the hierarchy.

Mayer and Bower (1986) show that schemata can form from experience. Fiske and Taylor (1991) also reveal that individuals can develop a schema “from abstract communications of the schema’s general characteristics” (p 147). This suggests that,

apart from political knowledge, individuals lacking a schema for a particular political concept will use their own experience or environment to develop one.

4.3 Criticisms of Schemata and the Resulting Chronicity Measurement

Not all political scientists view schemata as a positive development. Kuklinski, Luskin and Bolland (1991) argue that schemata proponents have not demonstrated the interrelationship between the components of schemata. They argue that proponents have not produced experimental evidence for the connections between mental operations and affect, that they have used overly expansive and ill defined concepts, and they merely have adopted a new name for old practices. While even proponents of schemata agree with many of the criticisms²¹, opponents have also affirmed the validity of schemata or issue accessibility as a valid measurement of political sophistication. Luskin finds Hamill and Lodge(1986) and Hamill, Lodge and Blake's (1985) schematic analysis of sophistication similar to his own analysis. He concludes that their schema usage is "almost a doppelganger" for segments of his own analysis and states that "the development of different political schemata should be highly intercorrelated and highly correlated with sophistication as a whole" (Luskin 1990, 353).

Lau's work on schemata is especially appealing to this dissertation's focus on political sophistication. It has the primary advantage of providing a measurement of accessibility. It also provides a flexible nonhierarchical set of categories for evaluation. It has the advantage of proven reliability and validity (Lau 1986, 1989; Erber and Lau

²¹ While acknowledging the validity of various critiques of schemata, Lau and Redlawski (2001) argue that using party and ideology as schema has an established validity.

1990), and the added advantage of being redefined as a chronicity or a measurement of the chronic accessibility of each schema by the respondents. Lau's chronicity measurement does not propose to reveal the schematic structure of respondents, but instead reveals how individuals consistently think (and chronically access) in terms of one or more of the categories in the schemata.²²

4.4 Participation, Sophistication, Information and Reciprocal Relationships

Looking at changes in sophistication necessitates looking at the reciprocal relationship between sophistication, political knowledge and political participation. Campbell et al. (1960) theorizes that political involvement and education will increase levels of conceptualization and knowledge, though others find a weaker than expected correlation between education and conceptualization (Hagner and Pierce 1982; Jacoby 1988, 1991). Neuman (1986) and Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) both demonstrate and support the connection between participation, political knowledge and levels of conceptualization. Neuman acknowledges that "political sophistication is a stable and fundamental variable with considerable inertia" but he concludes that political sophistication can be acquired through an upward spiral process over time, involving interest (from a supportive, stimulating and active political environment) and propagating knowledge which in turn increases interest (128-129). Neuman also posits that education (formal and informal) and having a higher level of income are important in changing conceptualization as well as participation in groups (which increases salience but not the levels of conceptualization).

²² Even schema critics, Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland accept that chronic accessibility is "worth distinguishing as a separate target" (1351).

Delli Carpini and Keeter show that political participation and political knowledge influence each other reciprocally (See also Bennett 1994, 1995; Tan 1980). Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) conclude that when one's environment encourages political engagement, those individuals are most likely to search for information. Berggren (2001) also finds that individuals who are limited in their SES and educational resources benefit disproportionately from free information provided by political groups, and that the relationship between SES and sophistication weakens in that setting.

Bennett (1975) argues that the type of political activity exhibited is crucial to determining shifts in political cognitive complexity. He theorizes that the activity will promote change when: 1) it places the participant in direct conflict with the beliefs of others, 2) when the stakes in the conflict were tangible benefits, and 3) when the activity required the participant's individual initiative and autonomous input. Bennett argues that voting is the political activity least likely to bring one into direct conflict with the beliefs of others, thus not initiating change. Leighley's (1991) examination, based on Bennett's assertions, confirms that shifts in conceptualization resulted in shifts in participation and vice versa.

The conclusion is that regardless of the type of measurement used for political sophistication, a reciprocal relationship exists between participation and political thinking. To accurately account for one will require controlling for the other.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND ISSUE ACCESSIBILITY AMONG EVANGELICALS

Has an emphasis on increased political involvement changed how Evangelicals organize their political thinking? If Evangelicals have increased their political participation beginning with cue changes at the beginning of the 1980s, did this initiate the theorized “spiral” relationship between participation and levels of political sophistication? This chapter examines rates of Evangelical participation, and Evangelical changes in political issue accessibility over time. Finally, this chapter evaluates the reciprocal relationship between participation, political information and political sophistication (as measured by accessibility) as a consequence of increases in Evangelical political participation. It also provides an examination of the “culture war” motif as a factor in the shifts in Evangelical issue accessibility. It begins with a brief discussion tying together the theoretical background for the study by drawing from examinations of Evangelical political participation, measurements of political sophistication, and the intertwined effects of political participation and political sophistication.

5.1 Theoretical Background

Several key questions regarding Evangelicals are 1) over time, by what process is stable political conceptualization changing for the Evangelical population, and 2) how should those changes be measured?, Education, changes in participation, participation producing conflict over beliefs, and cues from one’s environment have all been theorized or shown to affect political sophistication, regardless of the definition of political sophistication (See Chapter 3). Neuman’s (1986) and Delli Carpini and Keeter’s (1996)

work have demonstrated the connection between participation, political knowledge and levels of conceptualization. Also, a similar relationship has been found among education and income and levels of conceptualization (Campbell et al 1960; Hagner and Pierce 1982; Jacoby 1988, 1991). As previously mentioned, Leighley's (1991) examination of changes in conceptualization results in shifts in participation and vice versa. However, Leighley's study is limited to the differentiation and integration of The American Voter's four levels of conceptualization. Though building on Bennett's (1976) arguments on the criteria needed for cognitive change, she never explicitly tests for a reciprocal relationship for Bennett's assertion that voting would be the political activity least likely to change political conceptualization.

There is little evidence to suggest that Evangelicals have undergone a major shift in education levels or an increase in income over the past twenty-five years.¹ This leaves the process of changing Evangelical political sophistication to the creation of a supportive political environment within the Evangelical milieu, thus changing patterns of participation and affecting concepts. As earlier examined, internal cue shifts changed from nonparticipation to participation, because Christian Right political and social organizations provided information, training and encouragement for participation. This would theoretically trigger the reciprocal relationship of increased political participation, increased political information and shifts in political sophistication.

For the purposes of this paper, shifts in sophistication will be measured using a chronicity structure. The most venerable measure of political cognition from *The American Voter* would require using levels of conceptualization that have fallen into

¹ One of the distinctions of Evangelicals is that their rates of college attendance and attaining a high school diploma are lower than the general population (Ammerman, 1982; Kellstedt and Smidt, 1991).

disuse in political science. The levels are also limited essentially to three types of response content and one lack of content, which could severely limit the ability to measure change. Particularly if the expected changes in political conceptualization do not fit or are buried within the categories of the levels of conceptualization, the levels of conceptualization would be ineffective. Lau (1986) also points out that the levels of conceptualization are ordered from highest to lowest in terms of sophistication while measurements of accessibility do try to make value judgments between categories or assume a highest to lowest order. Though schemata usage has waned in political science, Lau's chronicity has been shown to be a valid and reliable means of showing the chronic accessibility of political constructs (Erber and Lau 1990; DeSart 1995; Lau 1986, 1989). An expansion of this chronicity can provide the means for measuring political sophistication for both Evangelicals and non-evangelicals.

While Lau initially refers to chronicities as "schemata" in his earlier publications, for the sake of continuity with Lau's later work, I use the term chronicity to refer to his political construct. Lau argues that individual political chronicities "facilitate the processing, storage and later recall" of information about politicians and political events (1986, 196). To measure these chronicities, he employs a "cue-free recall" using the sixteen open-ended likes-and-dislikes questions from the American National Election Studies (ANES) (1989). The responses given to these open-ended questions partially represent an underlying cognitive structure or chronicity. Lau admits that they also partially represent recent random exposure to political stimulus such as a news program or conversation with a friend. However, he does perform a number of tests of consistency and reliability to demonstrate the validity of the underlying cognitive structure (discussed

below). Lau categorizes the responses into four chronicities: issues, group relations, party identification and candidate personal factors, although he also suggests that several of the chronicities could be further divided into smaller subgroups. By weighting the responses in the order that they are recalled, he shows which chronicity is most accessible and “therefore the most indicative of [chronicity] content” for each respondent (1986, 101).²

Lau measures these chronicities using ANES panel study data from election years 1956–1960 and also 1972–1976. To assess the stability of the chronicities, he uses a LISREL analysis to evaluate the stability correlations of the later election year’s chronicities being determined by the earlier year’s chronicities. The positive and highly statistically significant scores led Lau to conclude that the chronicities are reasonably stable over time.

Lau then constructs ten validity criteria including knowledge of the candidate, opinions on foreign and domestic policy issues, strength of party ID and reactions of the Kennedy-Nixon debates. Again, using LISREL, Lau correlates these validity criteria with the sixteen scores (four for each chronicity) generated in the measurement of the chronicity (see footnote 1). All of the validity paths were significant ($p < .01$). Lau demonstrates that the chronicities are generally stable using two different panel studies,

² Lau illustrates this process: “Consider a respondent in 1960 who says she likes Kennedy because (1) he is a Democrat, (2) he proposed tax cuts and (3) he wants to help the poor. She dislikes Kennedy, on the other hand, because (1) he is Catholic and she doesn’t want him to take orders from the Pope. The first “like” response falls into the party category, the second like falls into the issues category and the third like and single “dislike” are both group responses. The first like and the single dislike responses each receive a weight of 3, the second like receives a weight of 2 and the third like receives a weight of 1. This respondent would then have a score of .333 [$3/(6+3)$] for the party category, .222 [$2/(6+3)$] for the issues category, .444 for the groups category [$(1+3)/(6+3)$] and 0 for the candidate category [$0/(6+3)$]. Comparable measures would be constructed from the like and dislike questions about Nixon, the Democratic party and the Republican Party. Hence every respondent receives 16 such scores, one for each of the four political information categories for each of the four attitude object [chronicities]” (Lau 1989, 10). The actual method of scoring as adapted from Lau is found on pages 70–71.

and four different presidential candidates. This stability reveals strong substantiation for the chronicities existing as an underlying structure (1989).

Lau also makes a comparison of the chronicity scheme with the levels of conceptualization from *The American Voter* (Campbell et al, 1960). He argues that the chronicity “capture[s] the same sense as levels of conceptualization or belief systems” (Lau 1986, 112). The “sameness” for both belief systems and Lau’s chronicity is represented in a similar management of new information which provides cognitive economy for making sense of the political world. As a result for this study, political sophistication will be measured using a chronicity measure which reveals the primary issue accessed by each respondent.

5.2 Hypotheses

Evangelical interest and social movement groups in the 1980s and 1990s pushed to the forefront a collection of primarily social issues. The issues being addressed included opposition to abortion, outcomes-based education, and sex education; defense of traditional family values accompanied by a focus on traditional women’s roles; support for decency in media; and rejection of gay lifestyles and homosexual civil rights. The 1990s saw a broadening of this agenda particularly by the Christian Coalition, to include health care and economic issues such as tax policy. During this time period Evangelicals expressed views that were distinctive from the general public on political issues including affirmative action, defense spending, environmental issues, abortion, premarital sex, extra-marital sex, homosexuality and feminism (Curry-Roper 1990; Guth et al 1996; Wilcox 1987, Smidt et al 2003).

This chorus of social concerns is also reinforced in the early 1990s by the emergence of the “Culture War” theme. This motif has become common in Evangelical circles and was the organizing theme of the 1992 Republican National Convention. Hunter’s *culture war* term is thought to have been the inspiration for Patrick Buchanan’s similarly themed convention address. That same election cycle is viewed as having firmly established Evangelicals as a part of the Republican coalition (Kellstedt et al 1994). While the culture is a broadly quoted concept positing a sharp conflict between traditionalists and progressives, there exists little empirical evidence for this division. Increased polarization has not been found within the American public or by Evangelicals or Seculars as a group. However, using a chronicity measurement and dividing religious traditions into those accessing and not accessing social issues provides an alternative means of measuring the culture war. The war may not be fought by broad religious/social groups but by segments within those groups for whom social issues have a heightened primacy.

Existing chronicities are brought to the forefront by salient elements in the respondent’s environment. Previous research has shown that the candidate like-and-dislike questions in the ANES contribute to the emergence of the candidate chronicity but that this emergence is also stimulated by more distant elements such as coverage of the candidates by the news media (Miller et al. 1986). It raises the issue as to what would activate or reinforce the social issues chronicity? The increased information and new set of cues being released into the Evangelical world increase the possibility of a restructuring of the accessibility of political chronicity for some Evangelicals. This occurs as the content of the messages underlying these new cues is primarily concerned

with social issues. An increased emphasis on economic issues, as facilitated by the Christian Coalition and adoption of Republican economic views also leave open the possibility that a reciprocal relationship may exist between accessibility of economic issues and political participation.

The trend of salience of social issues would not be limited to merely Evangelicals. Increased media attention to crime, racial tensions, gay rights and abortion protests across the 1980s and 1990s also heightens the likelihood of social issues' accessibility being reinforced across the entire population. As social issues are diffused by increased media perhaps as a result of Evangelical political activity, by activities from counter-interest groups such as People for the American Way and by the adoption of these issues by political parties, they are no longer just the domain of Evangelicals. However, Evangelical and Non-Evangelical issue accessibility is being stimulated by other actors in the media/political realm. However, if Evangelicals are responding to heightened cues distinct to their congregations and are recipients of messages unique to their Christian media sources, they should show increasing saliency for social issues at a rate higher than the Non-Evangelical population.

The following hypotheses and their corollaries are suggested by this analysis, previous research and common sense:

H1. Increased emphasis on social issues in the American political arena will result in a similar increase in accessibility of social issues for the entire population.

C1. Evangelical social issue access will increase at a higher rate than social issue access for the Non-Evangelical population as Evangelical interest groups, churches and social movements increase the salience for social issues. Access of economic issues for the same reasons will also increase more for Evangelicals.

C2. In keeping with the theorized culture war, Seculars will also show a similar pattern of increased social issue access above and beyond that of the Non-Evangelical population.

H2. Also in keeping with the culture war theory, Evangelicals and Seculars primarily accessing social issues will hold extreme positions on social issues when compared to the rest of their respective religious categories.

H3. The explanations for social issue usage will vary between Evangelicals and other religious groups as religious participation and religious orthodoxy affect Evangelical access while political information and education will have an across-the-board influence for all religious groups.


H4. A positive reciprocal relation will exist for Evangelicals for political participation, political information and their usage of the social issue chronicity. The same reciprocal relationship will also exist for political participation, political information and their usage of the economy chronicity.

H5. In keeping with previous participation research, political participation will show a reciprocal relationship with issue access while voting will not.

5.3 Data

Data for this study are taken from the 1976–2000 American National Elections Study conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan (Sapiro et al. 2002). As the primary focus of the accessibility measurement used in this study is the open-ended questions used in Presidential election years, the data for off-year congressional elections are excluded from the study. The cumulative file yields 13,909 respondents for the years in question and is treated as a pooled cross-sectional analysis.

Figure 5.1. American Religious Traditions over Time.



Source: 1976–2000 ANES

Using multiple years of the ANES provides its own set of difficulties as others have examined and debated (Abramson 1990; Miller 1990). Despite the goal of providing over-time comparisons covering the 24 years under consideration, changes in ANES question wording and usage present several serious obstacles to pooling the data for this study. In particular, the ANES dropped the Bible attitudes question from the 1976 study and changed the format of the question from four possible responses to three beginning in 1992. The 1976–1988 Bible question was recoded to provide compatibility with the later question format. The Two-Stage Auxiliary Instrumental Variables (2SAIV) method of “estimating across datasets” was used to extract the missing Bible question from the 1980

data set for use with the 1976 respondents.³ The NES also changed the wording and provided a necessary expansion of denominational codes in 1990 necessitating the matching of the two differing lists to provide continuity (See Appendix A for coding).⁴

Figure 5.1 shows the breakdown of religious groupings found in the ANES, 1976-2000. Evangelicals, Black Protestants and Catholics show a stable pattern over time while Mainline Protestants declined and Seculars increased. While most of these categories are self-evident, “Seculars” refer to those persons expressing no religious affiliation and the “Other” category is a catchall for small religious traditions such as Eastern Orthodox, non-traditional conservative denominations such as Jehovah Witnesses and non-traditional liberal denominations such as Christian Scientists.

5.4 Evangelical Political Participation


As an entry point for this examination, I evaluate the historical patterns of participation for Evangelicals as compared to other religious groups. These patterns are evaluated using voter response and participation on a six-point campaign-participation scale. Respondents received a score from 1 (no participation) to 6 (participation in all

³ 2SAIV extracts a variable from an auxiliary data set and regresses the variable using a set of explanatory variables in the auxiliary dataset. The parameter estimated from this first stage estimation is then used with the same explanatory variables in the primary data set to create an “instrumental variable”. The IV is used as a proxy for the missing variable. A key assumption of this method is that both the auxiliary and primary dataset are sampled from the same population. The auxiliary model for the missing bible variable is: Bible = .849 + religious tradition * (.098) + church attendance * (.003) + education * (.045) + race * (-.215) + south * (-.053) + abortion * (.197) + campaign interest * (.038) + women’s equality * (-.049) + age * (.003) + politics complicated * (.032). All included variables were significant at .05 level or higher.

⁴ The inclusion of more specific denominations in 1990 allows for more clarity in deciding if a respondent belongs in the Evangelical or Mainline categories. This may be reflected in a decrease in Mainline percentages in 1992 and a slight increase in the Evangelical category. However, when using a similar coding scheme in the General Social Survey (which did not change its denominational wording or coding in 1992) and comparing years, 1984-2000, the Mainline category for the NES and GSS correlate at .91 ($p < .001$). A similar concern over inflation of the Secular category beginning in 1992 with the use of new filter questions for denominational affiliation arrives at a similar conclusion. Both the NES and GSS show a rise in the percentages of Seculars from 1984-2000 (NES: 11.2%-17.1%, GSS: 9.9%-17.6%) and the two are correlated at .78 ($p < .01$).

activities) for influencing others votes, attending political meetings, working for a party or candidate, displaying a button/sticker or making a campaign contribution. Figure 5.2 shows the initial influence of separatism and the effect of changes in cues.

Figure 5.2. Evangelicals and Rates of Political Participation, 1976–2000.



Source: 1976-2000 ANES

A difference of means test (Table 5.1) for political participation between Evangelicals, Seculars and the remaining Non-Evangelicals shows that Evangelicals were significantly lower in their levels of participation in 1976, 1984 and 1988. There were no significant differences for the 1980, 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections. The changes in participation in 1980 and 1992 may point to two watershed years. The 1980 election was the first election to combine both a “born again” candidate in incumbent Jimmy Carter (to whom Evangelicals delivered a majority of their votes) and the influence of the fledgling

Moral Majority. Evangelicals appeared to have responded to the single-year dynamics of the 1980 election with increased involvement, but returned to their lower involvement in the 1984 election. The 1992 election with the GOP's emphasis on culture war solidified new patterns of Evangelical participation, as Evangelicals matched Non-Evangelicals in their political involvement in the two subsequent elections.

Table 5.1. Comparing Evangelical Participation with Seculars and General Population in Political Participation: Difference of Means.¹

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	ANOVA <i>F</i>
1976				7.79***
Evangelicals	1.57 ^a	.82	544	
Seculars	1.73	1.06	215	
General Population	1.76	1.02	1643	
1980				1.48
Evangelicals	1.59	.85	292	
Seculars	1.52	.82	163	
General Population	1.65	.97	953	
1984				3.98*
Evangelicals	1.50 ^a	.78	413	
Seculars	1.65	1.00	210	
General Population	1.64	.98	1319	
1988				5.63**
Evangelicals	1.44 ^a	.76	386	
Seculars	1.51	.87	196	
General Population	1.62	.99	1193	
1992				.50
Evangelicals	1.70	.93	526	
Seculars	1.63	.88	400	
General Population	1.67	1.02	1330	
1996				3.29*
Evangelicals	1.55	.75	171	
Seculars	1.37 ^b	.66	128	
General Population	1.59	.96	447	
2000				2.11
Evangelicals	1.66	.88	344	
Seculars	1.53	.83	281	
General Population	1.65	.94	930	

Source: 1976-2000 ANES

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

^a Evangelical mean significantly different from General Population, $p < .05$.


^b Secular mean significantly different from General Population, $p < .05$

¹ ANOVA analysis between the five largest religious groups, Evangelicals, Seculars, Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants, and Roman Catholics produced similar results except that no significant difference was shown between Evangelicals and Black Protestants (with the exclusion of Evangelicals being significantly higher in 1992). Roman Catholics and Mainline Protestants showed the same significant differences with Evangelicals as the General Population.

Voter participation does not reveal an increase for Evangelicals in the same time period. The bias created by over-reporting (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Anderson and Silver 1986; Burden 2000 and Teixeira 1992) is not an obstacle to an obstacle to comparing groups.⁵ Despite the bias, over reported voting has been found to “closely parallel” (Abramson and Aldrich, 503) official turnout statistics (also see Teixeira 1987; for an opposing view see Burden 2000). Voter turnout was measured using nonvalidated responses for 1976–2000. As Figure 5.3 shows, Evangelicals, Seculars and Black Protestants remain below other traditions in their self-reported voting. However, beginning in 1992, Evangelicals appear to have surpassed or matched voter turnout for Seculars and Blacks.

⁵ For example Anderson and Silver found that despite the tendency to overreport voting there was no significant difference in rates of overreporting between Blacks and whites.

Figure 5.3. Religious Traditions and Vote Participation, 1976–2000.



Source: 1976–2000 ANES

5.5 Chronicity

To measure accessibility of political constructs, Lau’s formulation of political chronicities was used with one important exception. The issues category was expanded to include three areas: Economy, Social and Foreign issues. Though not measuring them himself, Lau (1989) suggests that the issue category could be expanded into categories of foreign policy, economy, racial and social issues.⁶ As Evangelical information and cues have centered on social issues, a broad issue category would fail to capture the expected nuances of change centering on social concerns. These chronicities are based on the

⁶An initial coding added a fourth issue category, Racial Issues. However, this chronicity failed to gain over 1% of the respondents in most of the election years in question and was dropped. Racial responses were then included in the Social Issue category.

candidate and party open-ended comments from the ANES presidential election year studies from 1976–2000. The chronicities as adapted use a four-step process that weights the responses both by the order in which they are recalled and by the number of responses in order to control for verbosity:

1. The open-ended responses using the ANES master codes were categorized according to one of the six types of political information: Candidates, Parties, Groups, Economy Issues, Social Issues and Foreign Policy. Depending on the year of the ANES study, each respondent could volunteer up to three (in 1972) or five (all other years) likes and dislikes for the Democratic and Republican Presidential Candidate and a similar number of likes and dislikes for each respective political party. Following Lau's example, only the first three responses were coded. The fourth and fifth responses were excluded because the numbers of responses were few, and because this also allows for the future addition of the 1972 ANES which only asked for three responses. Appendix B contains the topical categories and a listing of the master codes used within each chronicity.
2. Each response is weighted in the reverse order of which it was recalled. A first response would receive a 3, a second response would be weighted 2 and a third response was given a 1.
3. The sum of the weighted responses for each set of like and dislike questions is divided by the weighted scores of the total number of answers given to the set of likes and dislikes. This produces 24 scores between one and zero, six scores for each chronicity drawn from each set of like-dislike questions.

4. The six matching chronicity scores were then added together to produce a single score ranging from zero to six for each chronicity (e.g., all economic issue scores from the Democratic Presidential Candidate likes and dislikes, the Republican Presidential Candidate likes and dislikes and each respective party's likes and dislikes would be added for a single economic score). Each respondent was then coded according to his/her highest chronicity category.

The following example illustrates this scoring procedure. A respondent in 1984 likes Mondale because (1) he is experienced, (2) he has a progressive view of public morality, and (3) he supports labor unions. The respondent dislikes Mondale because (1) he is too well educated. The first "like" falls into the candidate category, the second is found in the social issue category and the third is in the group category. The first "dislike" falls into the candidate category. The first like and dislike responses receive a weight of 3, the second responses receive a weight of 2 and the third responses a weight of 1. Each category total (candidates=6, social issues=2 and groups=1) is then divided by the total weighting of all responses to control for verbosity. In this case that total would be 9 [3 + 2 + 1 (from the likes) + 3 (from the dislikes)]. The respondent would then have a score of .667 [$6/(3+2+1+3)$] for the candidate category, .222 [$2/(3+2+1+3)$] for the social issue category and .111 [$1/(3+2+1+3)$] for the group category. The other three categories (Foreign Policy, Economy Issues and Parties) are scored a zero. This results in six chronicity scores (one for each category) derived from the Mondale likes and dislikes. Similar measurements are computed for the likes and dislikes about Reagan, the Democratic party and the Republican Party. This results in each respondent having 24 scores, six for each chronicity category from both of the candidates and both parties. The

final step is to add the six scores for each chronicity category and to classify the respondents based on their highest score.

5.6 Measuring the Chronicity

The chronicities or the categories of issue accessibility show a wide variation in size. The Candidate chronicity is used at a rate over ten percentage points (27.5% - 16.9%) higher than the next largest chronicity, Economy. This is in keeping with previous work showing that candidate question format and media coverage explain why the Candidate chronicity is the largest category of response for these questions. Nonschematic or No Content respondents who give no responses to any of the eight open-ended questions make up nearly one in every ten citizens. This statistic is matched by multiple chronicity individuals who make up 10.3% of the electorate⁷ For this last group, two or more of the chronicity scores tied for the most frequently accessed category.


Figure 5.4 shows the stability or lack thereof for each chronicity over time for Evangelicals, Seculars and Non-Evangelicals. For the sake of simplicity, graphic representations of the chronicities exclude the No Content and Multiple chronicity respondents.⁸ The Candidate chronicity shows the most volatility while Economy, Groups, Parties and No Content are fairly consistent as a percentage of the population. For the combined population, three chronicities exhibit a linear pattern over time. Usage of the Foreign Policy chronicity is declining over time ($\beta = -.34$, $p < .05$, $R^2 = .52$);. The Social Issues chronicity shows consistent linear growth ($\beta = .37$, $p < .000$, $R^2 = .95$) for the

⁷ Analysis of the multiple schemata groups revealed no pattern to the multiple schemata accessed. See Appendix C for the complete analysis.

⁸ The No Content chronicity is stable over time at approximately 10% of the population while the Multiple Chronicity shows a decline over time (Multiple Chronicity, $\beta = -.07$, $p < .05$, $R^2 = .59$).

entire population. The Social Issues chronicity line matches the expectation of hypothesis one that the access of social issues as the primary principle for organizing one's political world has increased.

Figure 5.4. Combined Tables of Evangelical, Secular and Non-Evangelical Chronicities over Time: 1976–2000.



Source: 1976–2000 ANES

Next, I turn to comparing these chronicities between Evangelicals, Seculars and remaining Non-Evangelicals. I use Taylor's (1980) four theories for evaluating trends between groups to search for significant differences these three religious traditions.⁹

⁹ To evaluate trends between groups over time there must be underlying theories against which the trends can be compared. D. Garth Taylor argues that "an array of possible theories can be used to describe a set of data and the ultimate theoretical conclusion depends on the most parsimonious statistical model which can be used to describe the data" (1980 87). Taylor suggests four possible theories with seven possible outcomes which can be used for comparing two groups.

5.7 Evidence of a (Limited) Culture War

An analysis of the accessibility or Chronicity trends between Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals found the No Difference theory fits most categories. [See Appendix D discussion of Taylor's trend analysis and for complete analysis of all trend lines] There was no difference (analysis not shown) between the two groups on Candidates, Economy, Foreign Policy and No Content. There was, however, a constant difference (analysis not shown) over time for the Multiple and Group chronicities with Evangelicals averaging 1.7 percentage points more per election year in the Multiple category and 2.2 percentage points less in the Group chronicity.


Theory 1: No Change. This theory predicts that the changes observed between survey years are merely random fluctuations and that the percentage of change in each year is actually zero.

Theory 2: Enduring Differences. This theory would predict that the differences in conceptualization are constant. While the difference between the groups is nonzero the differences are enduring and the correlations between the groups remain the same from survey year to survey year.

Theory 3: Linear Patterns. This theory predicts that the changes in chronicity usage between groups are occurring with a high degree of regularity. The end result is that the differences can be best modeled by a linear pattern which shows an increasing or decreasing difference.

Theory 4: Social Catastrophic. This theory predicts changes in conceptualization that are erratic perhaps as the result of sudden occurrences in the political world. This last theory in effect becomes a catchall for data, while not specifying what model type might fit the data.

Table 5.2. Trend Analysis: Evangelicals, Seculars and Non-Evangelicals' Use of Social Issue Chronicity, 1976–2000.



Trend Line: Evangelical Versus Non-Evangelical

<i>Category difference (Base=Non- Evangelicals)</i>	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Decision</i>
Evangelicals	1) no difference	d=0	16.29	6	<.05	reject
	2) constant difference	d= -1.86	15.04	5	<.05	reject
	3) linear	d= -.69 + -.289	13.62	4	<.05	reject
	4) linear component		1.42	1	>.05	significant

Trend Line: Evangelical Versus Secular

<i>Category difference (Base=Secular)</i>	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Decision</i>
Evangelicals	1) no difference	d=0	7.61	7	>.05	accept

The comparison of Evangelicals with the Non-Evangelical population (excluding Seculars) on social issues provides support for the corollary that Evangelicals would increase their accessibility of social issues over that of Non-Evangelicals. Table 5.2 shows that the theories of “no difference” and “constant difference” between the two groups are rejected. The linear theory is also rejected, but the analysis of the significance of the linear component reveals that the trend between Evangelical and Non-Evangelicals contains a substantial linear factor or a linear segment. Social issues moved to the forefront of both group’s political thought. However, during a segment of the time period, Evangelicals increased their usage at a linear rate that exceeded the usage by Non-Evangelicals.


5.8 Extremes in Attitudes

Both Hunter and Wuthnow agree that the culture war cuts across religious traditions with each tradition experiencing conflict between internal factions of conservatives and liberals. Wuthnow, also, sees the divide between two specific groups at the extremes of the religious spectrum: Evangelical Christians and Secularists with religious liberals. As these two groups are more homogeneous in their beliefs, Evangelicals and Seculars experience far less internal division on their cultural attitudes, and are therefore more reliably conservative (Evangelicals) and liberal (Seculars).

In keeping with Wuthnow’s view of Mainline Protestants, Black Protestant, and Catholic social issue respondents will also be divided between conservative and liberal views. In the aggregate these traditions would appear more moderate as the internal extremes cancel each other out. Respondents giving primacy to Social Issues in these

traditions represent both conservative and liberal opinions and as a result they would be expected to average out each other.

Figure 5.5. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Aid to Blacks.




Source: 1976–2000 ANES

This would suggest a lack of a regular or distinct pattern between social issue and non-social issue adherents for Mainline and Black Protestants and Roman Catholics.

There is, however, reason to believe that Mainline Protestants and Catholics accessing Social Issues should move in a liberal direction as compared to Mainline Protestants and Catholics who are accessing other chronicities. While Wuthnow is correct about the conservative-liberal tensions within denominations, orthodox or conservative believers within Mainline Protestants have historically (for the twentieth century) been a minority. Despite recent gains (McKinney and Finke 2002; Smidt et al 2003), they still represent


the smaller group. Additionally Roman Catholics, even among the traditionalists, have been more socially liberal (Kellstedt et al 1996; Layman 2001; Welch and Leege 1991). The most inconsistent pattern could then be expected from Black Protestants as they demonstrate more conservative views on moral issues and more liberal views on social issues.

Figure 5.6. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Assistance to Blacks.



Source: 1984–2000 ANES

Figure 5.7. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Black Thermometer.




Source: 1980-1988 ANES

This would suggest that on cultural issues there exists a spectrum of religious traditions, with Evangelicals and Seculars anchoring the respective conservative and liberal ends and other more evenly divided religious traditions existing in between. When respondents who primarily access social issues are added to the spectrum and broken down by tradition, social issue Evangelical and Seculars should be more extreme than the remainder of Evangelicals and Seculars. Social issue respondents from other traditions will fall near the rest of their respective tradition but to the liberal side.

The following analysis looks at whether those with heightened accessibility of social issues within the Evangelical and Secular traditions also express extreme social


issue positions. To test the distribution, thirteen measurements of affinity or political attitudes are examined.

Figure 5.8. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Gays in the Military.



Source: 1992–2000 ANES

Figure 5.9. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Gay Adoption.




Source: 1992–2000 ANES

Attitudinal responses were coded so that higher scores represented the conservative position and lower scores represented the liberal one. Affinity to groups, as measured by feelings thermometers, retained their normal coding with higher scores expressing greater attraction. Figures 5.5 – 5.17 present the means for attitudes and measures of affinity covering race, homosexuality, women’s roles, abortion, changing morals and lifestyles, and the environment for the five largest religious traditions.¹⁰ ANOVA means tests matching these Figures are found in Appendix E.


¹⁰ Jews and Social Issue Jews were excluded from the analysis because social issue Jew cells numbered less than 10 for many questions.

Figure 5.10. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Women's Roles.



Source: 1976–2000 ANES


Figure 5.11. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Women's Libber's Thermometer.



Source: 1976–2000 ANES


As expected, social issue Evangelicals are consistently the most conservative, except for race issues. Of thirteen attitudes or thermometers (excluding race), social issue Evangelicals have the most conservative mean on ten measurements. They hold conservative views both toward government aid to Blacks and in their affinity on the Black thermometer, but they did not hold the most extreme conservative positions among the groups measured. They are also virtually tied for the most conservative position (.01 difference) with other Evangelicals in their opposition to gay adoption and support of traditional values in society.

Figure 5.12. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Abortionist Thermometer.



Source: 1976–2000 ANES


Figure 5.13. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Abortion Rights.



Source: 1980–2000 ANES


A similar pattern held true for social issue Seculars. Excluding race measurements, social issue Seculars hold the most liberal position on ten of thirteen measurements. Social issue Seculars are the most supportive toward abortion rights, abortionists and spending on the environment and environmental activists. On race social issues, Seculars maintain a liberal position but are surpassed by different categories of Black Protestants, Mainline Protestants and Catholics.

Figure 5.14. Religious Groups and Social Issue Religious Groups, and Tolerance of Differing Moral Standards.



Source: 1988-2000 ANES


Figure 5:15 Religious Groups and Social Issue Religious Groups, and Adjusting Views of New Moral Behavior.



Source: 1988-2000 ANES


The remaining religious traditions scored as expected. Mainline Protestants and Catholics tended to score near, but on the conservative side of, the population mean for most measurements. Mainline Protestants and Catholics giving primary access to the social issue chronicity were on the liberal side of the population mean. Social issue Black Protestants have mixed responses. As compared to Black Protestants, they were more conservative on abortion, more liberal on women’s roles, and mixed on gay rights, race issues, and values and morals.

Figure 5.16. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and the Environmental Spending.



Source: 1984–2000 ANES

Figure 5.17. Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Environmentalist Thermometer.



Next I turn to the query of the existence of a reciprocal relationship between new patterns of Evangelical participation and the cognitive structure of their political thinking. I examine shifts in issue accessibility for the major religious traditions and the relationship of the shift with campaign participation and/or voting.

5.9 Methodology: 2SCML and 2SPLS


To explore how participation affects the chronicity type used by Evangelicals and to explore the reciprocal relationship between the two, a variety of two-stage estimation models are used to control for endogeneity. Figure 5.18 shows a simplified model of the expected reciprocal relationship. The two-stage conditional maximum likelihood

(2SCML)¹¹ estimation is used for two-stage estimation of the political participation scale and chronicity type. 2SCML uses a binary choice-dependent variable and a continuous independent variable. The first-stage reduced-form equation contains variables which are excluded from the second-stage probit estimation. The OLS coefficients from the first stage are used to estimate the reduced-form equations for inclusion in the probit analysis. The residuals for each reduced-form equation are also included in the second stage as additional variables. The results provide unbiased coefficient estimates and more accurate standard errors than other two-stage probit estimators (Alvarez 1994; Alvarez and Glasgow 2000). The variables included in the model were suggested from previous examinations of predictors of political participation (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Leighley 1991; Verba and Nie 1972) and political knowledge (Bennett 1995; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991, 1993, 1996). While a scale of political knowledge would be preferable to an observation of political knowledge, inconsistency of ANES questions makes that impossibility for the time period in question. Therefore, the political information variable is the reviewer's evaluation of the respondent's political knowledge.¹² A reduced-form equation for political participation and its residuals was computed along with a reduced-form equation for political information and its residuals. The first-stage OLS estimations for the 2SCML are in Appendix G.

¹¹ Rivers and Vuong (1988) provide a technical introduction to this procedure. See Alvarez and Glasgow (2000) for an additional description and comparison of 2SCML with two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS).

¹² Luskin (1987) has demonstrated that the reviewer's evaluations are a valid substitute for a political knowledge scale.

Figure 5.18. Representation of Simplified Chronicity-Participation Model.



Two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS) is used for the examination of voting and chronicity. 2SPLS differs from 2SCML in that it allows for both the dependent and endogenous independent variables to be binary. Unlike 2SCML, no error terms are included as variables in the second stage from the first-stage estimation. Like the 2SCML, 2SPLS coefficients are shown to be unbiased but the 2SCML produces more accurate standard errors. A first-stage reduced-form equation was estimated for both voting and political information. The variables used were drawn primarily from previous analyses by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), and Verba and Nie. The first-stage probit estimations for the 2SPLS are also included in Appendix G.

The first-stage equations suggest a possible positive reciprocal relationship between campaign participation and the Social Issues chronicity, and campaign

participation and the Economy chronicity. The equations also show a negative relationship with the No Content chronicity for Evangelicals. The same relationship is missing for political information (with the exception of No Content) in both the 2SCML and 2SPLS models, while voting is unaffected by chronicity type.

The independent variable for the political participation model is the aforementioned six-point political participation scale. The variables included in the model were suggested from previous examinations of predictors of political participation and conceptualization (Bennett 1975; Leighley 1991; Luskin 1990; Neuman 1981, 1986). Demographic variables (see Appendix F for descriptions of variables) include education, income, gender, marital status, age (derivative and squared to control for a possible curvilinear relationship between age and chronicity type), intelligence, urbanism of residence, urbanism of upbringing, and living in the South.

Political variables include level of campaign interest, respondent interest in who wins the election, reduced-form political participation and reduced-form political information. Party identification was measured as a quadratic regression with both a seven-point scale for party identification and the square of the scale included. This controls for the parabolic shape of the relationship of strength of party identification to the dependent variable. This controls for the likelihood that not only is the direction of party id from Democrat to Republican correlated with the dependent variable but also that strength of partisanship regardless of party may also be correlated with the dependent variable. Religious variables include attitude toward the Bible, church attendance, and dummy variables for religious traditions (excluding Other). Interaction terms in the model include religious traditions and attendance, religious traditions and Bible attitudes,

religious traditions and political participation, and religious traditions and political information. Also, interaction terms for Evangelical education levels and income levels are included.

As a control for serial correlation, dummy variables for each election year were included in the models. As even a “failure to answer the open-ended questions” provides an accessibility category, all 13,909 respondents were used in the chronicity dependent variable. However, the N for the Chronicity-Participation Models is reduced to 11,999 in the second stage of the model by the inclusion of the residuals variable from the first stage of the model. Of the 13,909 respondents, 11,889 gave usable responses for voter turnout, which were then used as a dependent variable for the Chronicity-Voting Models. Missing data in independent variables are set to the mean in the case of continuous variables and to the mode for dichotomous variables. A model was run for each of the eight chronicities: Social Issues, Foreign Policy, Groups, Parties, Economy, Candidates, Multiple, and No Content.

5.10 Results

A total of sixteen models were run, eight searching for a reciprocal relationship between political participation and chronicity access, and eight looking for a similar relationship between voting and chronicity access. As only three models show a possibility of a reciprocal relationship, only those three models are presented in this chapter. The remaining models are found in Appendix H, though they are discussed in passing in the chapter. Models include marginal effects, which were measured by holding other dependent variables at their mean or mode. As anticipated, the social issue chronicity (Table 5.3) and economic chronicity (Table 5.4) demonstrated a positive

relationship between political participation and accessing the chronicity.

Table 5.3. Social Issue Chronicity, Participation and Information: 2SCML Results.

Variables in Model	Social Issues	S. E.	Marginal Effects¹
Demographics			
Education	-.549**	(.054)	-.05
Income	-.207**	(.029)	-.02
Gender	.722**	(.053)	.07
Married	.072	(.044)	.01
Intelligence	.001	(.036)	-.00
Age	-.012	(.007)	-.00
Age Squared	-.000	(.000)	-.00
Urban	-.057*	(.029)	-.01
Where Grew Up	.072	(.046)	.01
Political South	-.031	(.045)	-.00
Political Variables			
Party Identification	.335**	(.052)	.03
Party Identification Squared	-.042**	(.006)	-.03
Campaign Interest	-.582**	(.050)	-.05
Care Who Wins	-.239**	(.053)	-.02
Political Participation	-.404	(.432)	-.05
Participation Residual	-.010	(.022)	-.00
Political Information	1.697**	(.303)	.17
Information Residual	.001	(.028)	.00
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	.086	(.139)	.01
Church Attendance	-.066	(.066)	-.00
Evangelical	-.618	(.574)	-.04
Mainline Protestant	-.333	(.573)	-.00
Catholic	-.670	(.577)	-.05
Black Evangelical	-.606	(.662)	-.04
Secular	-.197	(.547)	-.01
Jew	-.400	(1.027)	-.03
Election Year			

Table 5.3 (cont'd).

1980	.418**	(.096)	.04
1984	.648**	(.088)	.06
1988	.853**	(.088)	.08
1992	.599**	(.092)	.05
1996	.905**	(.105)	.08
2000	.967**	(.090)	.09
Interaction Terms			
Evangelical x Education	.005	(.081)	.00
Evangelical x Income	-.003	(.051)	.00
Evangelical x Political Participation	.821*	(.482)	.08
Mainline x Political Participation	-.170	(.467)	-.02
Black Protestant x Political Participation	-.681	(.562)	-.06
Catholic x Political Participation	-.040	(.470)	-.01
Secular x Political Participation	.031	(.493)	-.01
Jewish x Political Participation	.124	(.729)	.02
Evangelical x Political Information	-.278	(.314)	-.03
Mainline x Political Information	.160	(.290)	.02
Black Protestant x Political Information	.549	(.343)	.05
Catholic x Political Information	.142	(.290)	.02
Secular x Political Information	.004	(.304)	.01
Jewish x Political Information	-.056	(.445)	-.01
Evangelical x Attendance	.158*	(.074)	.01
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	.093	(.075)	.00
Black Protestant x Attendance	.050	(.091)	.00
Catholic x Attendance	.065	(.074)	.00
Jewish x Attendance	.126	(.148)	.01
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	-.106	(.159)	-.01
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.091	(.155)	-.01
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.183	(.188)	-.02
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	-.016	(.157)	-.00
Secular x Bible Attitudes	.053	(.154)	.00
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	.101	(.252)	.01

Table 5.3 (cont'd).

Constant	-4.364**	(.597)
Observations	11,999	
χ^2 Statistic	730.22***	
Pseudo R ²	.12	

Note: * $p < .10$, one-tail test; ** $p < .05$, two-tail test; ***; $p < .01$, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood model (Rivers and Vuong 1988).

¹ Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Reviewing the Social Issue model first, a one-unit increase in Evangelical participation increases the likelihood of using the Social Issue chronicity by 8%. While church attendance is not significant for any other religious tradition in this model, Evangelical church attendance increases the likelihood of accessing Social Issues. The coefficient for Evangelical Bible attitudes is not significant. Beliefs about the Bible are not motivating Evangelicals to increase the usage of social issues in the organization of their political world. In one of the surprises of this study, Bible attitudes have no effect on any of the chronicities regardless of religious tradition. For all respondents, rising education and income decrease the likelihood of accessing social issues first. Also women, persons living in rural areas, moderate party identifiers and independents are more likely to access Social Issues over other categories of political thought.

Figure 5.19 shows differences in probabilities for Evangelicals, Seculars and other religious traditions as political participation rises. While controlling for the other variables in the model, Evangelicals and Seculars double the likelihood of accessing social issues from the lowest level of participation to the highest. All other religious traditions increase their probability at most by two tenths of a percent when moving from the lowest to highest participation levels. Just as the overall trend of social issue

chronicity use showed Evangelicals and Seculars as distinct in their increasing usage, so they also are unique in how political participation increases their access of social issues. Figure 5.21 shows the influence of political information on the likelihood of using the social issues chronicity. Again, Seculars and Evangelicals show a similar trend as they decline in chronicity use as political information increases. For Blacks, Mainlines and Catholics, the trends also decline and the three trend lines are virtually identical.

Figure 5.19. Increasing Political Participation and the Probability of Accessing the Social Issue Chronicity by Religious Tradition.





Figure 5.20 reveals the influence of church attendance on the usage of the social issue chronicity. While the effect of attendance on other Christian traditions is nearly non-existent, rising attendance has a strong influence on the probability of accessing

social issues.

Figure 5.20. Increasing Religious Attendance and the Probability of Accessing the Social Issue Chronicity by Religious Tradition.



A similar positive relationship exists between the Economy chronicity and political participation (Table 5.4). Both increasing education and perceptions of intelligence decrease the usage of this chronicity. Female respondents, rising urban influence and middle age increase the likelihood of using it. Both campaign and political interest variables decrease the likelihood of using the Economy chronicity. Like the Social Issue chronicity, strong party identification decreases its usage, while weak and independent identification increases it. A unit increase in Evangelical political participation raises the probability of using the economy chronicity by 42%. Neither Evangelical church attendance nor Bible attitudes are affecting this chronicity choice.

Figure 5.21. Increasing Political Information and the Probability of Accessing the Social Issue Chronicity by Religious Tradition.




Table 5.4. Economy Chronicity, Participation and Information: 2SCML Results.

Variables in Model	Economy	S. E.	Marginal Effects ¹
Demographics			
Education	-.717**	(.039)	-.17
Income	-.231**	(.021)	-.05
Gender	.375**	(.037)	.09
Married	.006	(.033)	.00
Intelligence	-.059*	(.027)	-.01
Age	.016**	(.005)	.00
Age Squared	-.000**	(.000)	-.00
Urban	.041*	(.021)	.01
Where Grew Up	-.034	(.034)	.01
Political South	.008	(.034)	.00
Political Variables			
Party Identification	.152**	(.038)	.03
Party Identification Squared	-.013**	(.005)	-.03

Table 5.4 (cont'd).

Campaign Interest	-.411**	(.035)	-.10
Care Who Wins	-.174**	(.038)	-.05
Political Participation	-2.113**	(.358)	-.51
Participation Residual	-.027	(.016)	-.01
Political Information	2.661**	(.232)	.63
Information Residual	-.014	(.020)	-.00
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.173	(.113)	-.04
Church Attendance	-.014	(.052)	-.00
Evangelical	-.865	(.462)	-.16
Mainline Protestant	-.715	(.451)	-.13
Catholic	.269	(.450)	.07
Black Evangelical	.743	(.484)	.24
Secular	.135	(.445)	.03
Jew	-.754	(.916)	-.14
Election Year			
1980	-.259**	(.057)	-.06
1984	.206**	(.049)	.05
1988	-.077	(.053)	-.02
1992	-.298**	(.056)	-.07
1996	-.050	(.070)	-.02
2000	-.201**	(.058)	-.05
Interaction Terms			
Evangelical x Education	-.123*	(.062)	-.03
Evangelical x Income	-.033	(.039)	-.01
Evangelical x Political Participation	1.696**	(.397)	.42
Mainline Protestant x Political Participation	.425	(.378)	.12
Black Protestant x Political Participation	.714	(.417)	.19
Catholic x Political Participation	.427	(.381)	.10
Secular x Political Participation	.221	(.413)	.05
Jewish x Political Participation	.316	(.613)	.06
Evangelical x Political Information	-.509*	(.245)	-.13
Mainline Protestant x Political Information	-.104	(.223)	-.03

Table 5.4 (cont'd).

Black Protestant x Political Information	-.595*	(.244)	-.15
Catholic x Political Information	-.337	(.223)	-.08
Secular x Political Information	-.203	(.240)	-.05
Jewish x Political Information	-.172	(.364)	-.03
Evangelical x Attendance	-.003	(.058)	-.00
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	.020	(.057)	.00
Black Protestant x Attendance	.045	(.065)	.01
Catholic x Attendance	.006	(.057)	-.00
Jewish x Attendance	-.036	(.129)	.00
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	.097	(.128)	.03
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.198	(.122)	.05
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.061	(.138)	.02
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	.096	(.123)	.02
Secular x Bible Attitudes	.121	(.125)	.03
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	.351	(.215)	.09
Constant	-3.063**	(.470)	
Observations	11999		
χ^2 Statistic	1159.78***		
Pseudo R ²	.10		

Note: *p<.10, one-tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***; p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood model (Rivers and Vuong 1988).

¹ Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Figures 5.22 and 5.23 show that political participation and political information act in a similar manner for Evangelicals on the Economy chronicity as the variables did on the Social Issue chronicity. Rising participation sharply raises the probability of using this chronicity while rising political information decreases it.

Figure 5.22. Increasing Political Participation and the Probability of Accessing the Economy Chronicity by Religious Tradition.





Figure 5.23. Increasing Political Information and the Probability of Accessing the Economy Chronicity by Religious Tradition.



The No Content chronicity presents an unexpected but theoretically sound result for political information and political participation, decreasing the usage of this chronicity (which is, in effect, an empty-response category). Table 5.5 does not include the coefficients or interaction terms for political information in the model with the political information variables. Political information approaches being the perfect predictor for No Content as increased political information decreases the likelihood of its usage. This result is a model with an inflated pseudo-R2 of .93 and with nearly 55% of the cases perfectly predicted.¹³ Therefore, the present model only includes the political participation variables. As expected, increased participation reduces the probability of falling into this category by 14%. There is no significant relationship between Evangelical participation and this category of non-response but, surprisingly, increased

¹³ Stata Help, <http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/logitcd.html>. Accessed 6/11/2004.

participation in several religious traditions — Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, Catholic and Secular — increases the probability of giving no response.

Table 5.5. No Content Chronicity, Participation and Information: 2SCML Results.

Variables in Model	No Content	S. E.	Marginal Effects ¹
Demographics			
Education	-.084**	(.037)	.01
Income	.012	(.025)	.00
Gender	.114***	(.043)	.01
Married	-.017	(.044)	-.00
Intelligence	.267***	(.033)	.02
Age	-.019***	(.006)	-.00
Age Squared	.000*	(.000)	.00
Urban	.044	(.028)	.00
Where Grew Up	.102**	(.045)	.01
Political South	.123***	(.046)	.01
Political Variables			
Party Identification	-.868***	(.055)	-.03
Party Identification Squared	-.107***	(.051)	-.04
Campaign Interest	-.131***	(.039)	-.01
Care Who Wins	-.348***	(.046)	-.03
Political Participation	-1.877***	(.334)	-.14
Participation Residual	-.145***	(.035)	-.01
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.111	(.151)	-.01
Church Attendance	.011	(.056)	.00
Evangelical	-.597	(.585)	-.04
Mainline Protestant	-1.552***	(.569)	-.12
Catholic	-.796	(.570)	-.06
Black Evangelical	-1.359**	(.615)	-.10
Secular	-1.458***	(.524)	-.11
Jew	.764	(1.950)	.06
Election Years			
1980	-.058	(.074)	-.00
1984	.011	(.068)	.00
1988	.115	(.068)	.01
1992	-.033	(.072)	-.00

Table 5.5 (cont'd).

1996	.060	(.095)	.00
2000	.089	(.079)	.01
Interaction Terms			
Evangelical x Education	.082	(.069)	.01
Evangelical x Income	.069	(.050)	.01
Evangelical x Political Participation	.057	(.372)	.00
Mainline Protestant x Political Participation	1.015***	(.349)	.08
Black Protestant x Political Participation	.773**	(.375)	.06
Catholic x Political Participation	.762**	(.350)	.06
Secular x Political Participation	.784**	(.363)	.06
Jewish x Political Participation	.261	(.924)	.02
Evangelical x Attendance	-.004	(.063)	-.00
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	-.019	(.064)	-.00
Black Protestant x Attendance	.052	(.074)	.00
Catholic x Attendance	-.039	(.064)	-.00
Jewish x Attendance	.113	(.218)	.01
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	.011	(.172)	.00
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.092	(.164)	.00
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.089	(.179)	.01
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	-.069	(.164)	-.01
Secular x Bible Attitudes	.177	(.166)	.01
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	-.782	(.492)	-.06
Constant	2.565***	(.578)	
Observations	12084		
χ^2 Statistic	1936.61***		
Pseudo R ²	.27		

Note: *p<.10, one-tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood model (Rivers and Vuong 1988).

¹ Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Bennett's hypothesis, that voting does not affect political cognition, is not supported by the first stage of the voting models (Appendix H). The relationship,

however, is not reciprocal as the chronicity type does not influence the likelihood of voting. However, voting, particularly for Evangelicals, does affect the likelihood of using specific chronicities. When looking at the significant marginal effects, Evangelicals who vote decrease the probability of using the candidate (-15%), groups (-9%), and Social Issues chronicities (-6%) and increase the likelihood of using the foreign policy chronicity (3%). Unexpectedly, voting and campaign participation affect the Social Issue chronicity in opposite directions. Campaign participation increases social issue usage and voting decreases it. For the voting model as with the participation model the No Content chronicity has to be treated as a distinct model with the exclusion of political information. For Catholics, Mainlines and Evangelicals, voting increases (2%, 3%, 4%, respectively) the probability of falling into this chronicity.

5.11 Conclusions

This study shows full or partial support for all five hypotheses and their corollaries. As hypothesized, accessing social issues as an organizing concept has increased for Evangelicals and Seculars at a rate above the remainder of the population. Social issue access has also increased for the rest of the population at a lower level. Evangelicals and Seculars using this chronicity represent opposite extremes on social issues and affinity toward groups. Also, theorized increases in participation by Evangelicals show reciprocal relationships with the social issue and economy chronicities.

The Social Issue model presents a picture of Evangelicals who attend church reciprocally increasing their political participation and their access of the social issues. Unlike Neuman's hypothesized spiral though, the increased focus on social issues is not

being fueled by nor resulting in increases in political information. There are also unanswered questions about using political information as a surrogate for political sophistication. A serious disconnect between political information and political sophistication is suggested when access of a cognitive structure such as the chronicities and participation could both increase without an increase in political knowledge. This appears to be an issue for future research.

CHAPTER VI

PARTICIPATION AND EVANGELICAL MODERATION

The act of political participation not only influences the political process, it influences the participant. Aggregate changes in rates of Evangelicals' participation can result in aggregate changes in political attitudes. The very salience of motives (defense of traditional values and a Culture War dichotomy) which encourages participation or lack of salience and accompanying inactivity can help to shape the direction of attitude shifts.

There may also be unintended consequences of new participation. These attitude shifts are not necessarily uniform across the Evangelical movement, but instead may be more profound for younger birth cohorts. Declining separatism and secularization are theorized to work hand in hand in reshaping Evangelical political participants. If younger cohorts are most influenced by the new calls to participate, these new cues encouraging participation may be shaping the future of the Evangelical in unexpected ways (at least from the Evangelical perspective). Current political battles over divisions in social and political issues may result in a future where Evangelical moderation has reduced the differences in attitudes between Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals.

This chapter focuses on first, cohort and period changes for Evangelical campaign and voter participation, and second, on cohort, period and participation effects on Evangelical political and moral attitudes. The chapter covers a breadth of models and attitudes and falls within the category of "mid-range studies" that "evaluate changes across a range of phenomena" (Smith 1990, 480).

6.1 Defining Moderation

What is meant by moderation of Evangelical views? As was demonstrated in Chapter five, analysis of attitude means has shown a consistent conservative position on moral, social and political attitudes for Evangelicals. Previous examinations of moderation among Evangelicals have suggested that moderation would take the form of moving away from conservative views (Hunter 1987; Penning and Smidt 2003). This definition of moderation also fits the expectations of proponents of secularization theory.

Prior studies and theories suggest that a liberalizing inclination among Evangelicals would resist the overall trend of the time period under consideration. National trends for this time period in question (1976–2000) do not suggest an overall liberalizing of the American population. Smith provided an overview of trends on social, economic and governmental attitudes. He examined 455 survey trends consisting of 419 attitudes from 1945 to 1987. Smith concluded that Americans generally moved in a liberal¹ direction, but that the movement was not consistent across all topics. The strongest liberal changes were for individual freedoms such as feminism, abortion rights, and race/ethnicity. The most conservative trends involved crime and increasing support for social control. Economic issues had mixed trends. This liberal direction accelerates until 1974 and then liberal and conservative trends balance out one another. The liberal movement levels off in the 1980s but still remains above the pre-1974 levels. Smith points out that the leveling of the liberal trend movement is not associated with the

¹ Smith cross-tabulated GSS issue questions with self-placement on a seven-point liberal/conservative scale, presidential vote choice in 1972 and 1984 and three other indicators of liberal/conservative placement to determine the liberal and conservative direction for each issue. Issues were also defined on a liberal/conservative spectrum by the positions taken by liberal groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union or the Americans for Democratic Action and conservative groups such as the American Conservative Union (Smith 1990, 482).

Reagan administration, but rather it predates Reagan's 1980 victory by six years. Smith found that post-1974 conservative shifts occurred most commonly on the topics of abortion, economic regulation, foreign affairs and religion. A conservative turn was least common for feminism, racial issues, and attitudes toward sex (Smith 1990).

A different perspective in longitudinal studies is taken by Stimson. His theory of public mood "implies that the public sees every public issue through general dispositions" (1999, 20). These general dispositions represent a global policy attitude in which the public over time alternates between a liberal and conservative policy attitude. Stimson argues that changes in public mood result in shifts on current policy within a "zone of acquiescence." This zone is created within the acceptable liberal and conservative boundaries that bracket public preferences. Shifting mood alters the policy choices within the boundaries of what is acceptable without shifting policy too far to the right or left. Stimson pictures the process as a river of time with a course representing the interaction of public mood meandering down the river. The only restraints on the course are the far banks representing extreme liberal and conservative positions. Stimson argues that the moves left are in response to conservative government policies and to the right in response to liberal policies. These shifts in mood took a conservative turn in the 1960s and 1970s before turning liberal in the 1980s and early 1990s and returning to a conservative direction in the middle 1990s. Stimson's measurement of public mood is an aggregate measurement using the entire American population. He does not evaluate or compare the public mood between segments of the population.

At first glance this theory appears to make evaluating Evangelical changes difficult to measure as it confounds a liberal shift in public mood with an expected liberal

or moderating trend for Evangelicals in the 1980s and 1990s. There are several key differences between Stimson's longitudinal study and this chapter. First, three main areas of this chapter's evaluation, moral issues (excluding abortion), gender roles and tolerance are not included in Stimson's public mood studies. Second, Stimson's measurement is based on multiple dimensions combining a large number of attitudes. He acknowledges that pieces (individual attitude questions) "usually—but not always—look much like the whole" (93). Even if a model focusing on a single attitude reveals a trend deviating from the public mood, it neither negates Stimson's theory nor invalidates the individual model. Third, Stimson does argue that for some issues such as abortion, the policy space between the left and right extremes becomes too narrow for any acceptable government action. While the policy position is not static, neither are the boundaries of the acceptable zone. Liberal shifts in Evangelical attitudes in the 1980s and 1990s can be perceived as responses similar to the rest of the population. These responses change current policy choice by shifting the course taken through the acceptable policy space. It is also theoretically possible that Evangelical moderation could shift the acceptable policy space in a leftward direction without affecting the current policy. The models in this chapter are not capable of differentiating between the two possible scenarios. Stimson's public mood, though, would not explain if Evangelical attitudes shift leftward at a greater rate than those of Non-Evangelicals. If Evangelicals are closing the gap between themselves and Non-Evangelicals, it suggests a dynamic at work that is separate from the public mood.

6.2 Hypotheses

There are two possible historical points at which evangelical attitudes begin to be influenced by secularization. This first starts with the 1980 election cycle when Moral

Majority cues increase and are accompanied by a brief surge in Evangelical campaign participation. This election cycle also marks the beginning point for the shift in cues from separatism to participation. This shift remains constant through the end of the twentieth century to the point that only eight percent of Evangelicals espouse a separatist viewpoint in 2000 (Green 2003, 16). However, it should be acknowledged that while cues change in the 1980s, campaign behavior shows no evidence of a permanent shift until the 1992 Presidential election (see Table 5.1). It is only when Evangelicals begin to align themselves with the Republican Party that Evangelical campaign participation shows a permanent increase.

At the same time, competing influences have the potential to negate the supposed moderating influence of modernization and secularization. The agenda of the Republican Party, the Culture War thesis and internal Evangelical cues all influence Evangelicals in a conservative direction. This suggests that the salience of political and social issues should vary among Evangelicals as the content of internal cues varies. Those messages with consistent salience in the 1980s were opposition to abortion, support of school prayer, opposition to gay rights, and opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment (Guth 1983; Jorstad 1987; Hunter 1987; Moen 1992). In the 1990s while abortion² and gay rights remained front and center, the cues from social interest groups shifted to tax policy toward families, a balanced-budget amendment, equal access of school facilities for student religious groups, capital punishment and discrimination against traditional values (Moen 1996; Wilcox 2000).

² There were even minor shifts in abortion stances as some leaders moderated their views from opposition to all abortion to acceptance of abortion in certain cases (e.g. rape, incest, health of the mother) (Moen).

Feminism, subsequently, stands out as one of the issues where mixed messages were given within the Evangelical community. Moen shows that in the 1980s, social issue groups such as Concerned Women for America, which advocated the most extreme rejection of feminism, had a very narrow audience and limited success with its agenda. As a result, intensity of opposition to feminism gave way to a more laissez faire attitude toward feminist beliefs in the 1990s. Also during this time period, several Evangelical denominations including Southern Baptist, Brethren and Christian Reformed also increased or overturned historical opposition to women's ordination. This is matched by New Paradigm churches' openness to women's ordination, to feminist views of women in the workplace, and to gender equality in family roles (Miller 1997).

Evangelicals have demonstrated views distinct from the general public on political issues including affirmative action, defense spending, environmental issues, abortion, premarital sex, extra-marital sex, homosexuality and feminism (Curry-Roper 1990; Guth et al. 1996; Wilcox, Jelen and Leege 1993). New patterns of socialization affecting these views would include differing levels of parental involvement as well as changes in the church environment toward participation. This increases the possibility that moderating changes in attitudes would be most pronounced for younger birth cohorts (Beck and Jennings 1982; Dalton 1980; Jennings and Niemi 1981). New paradigm churches, or those within established denominations affected by paradigm denominations, could also influence this younger group as they have younger attendees than non-paradigm churches.

Less salient issues are most likely to benefit from the moderating influences of political involvement. The effects of secularization would be most effective when

Evangelical political cues fail to provide a clear directional message on what ideological position should be taken on an issue.

Hunter already provides limited support for a cohort change. His 1982–1985 study of Evangelical college and seminary students found a generally conservative trend for political attitudes among this young post-1980 cohort³. They hold conservative views on busing, the death penalty, social welfare, women's roles, abortion and homosexuality. Despite these views, he also finds that this cohort holds liberal views on gun registration, prayer in schools, increased defense spending, nuclear power and a nuclear freeze. Based on Hunter, there is some initial evidence of the liberalizing of younger Evangelical views.

Smidt (1987) also finds that young Evangelicals in the 1984 election increased their political involvement both as compared to older Evangelicals and also in comparison to Non-Evangelicals of similar age. This fits with Zaller's (1992) view of partisan resistance that shows that the new dominant message of electoral involvement would experience more resistance to internalization from older respondents. In Zaller's perspective, the younger respondents would have less predisposition toward separatism. The participation cues of Evangelical organizations should socialize these younger cohorts into higher levels of involvement⁴. Based on this analysis, I hypothesize for Evangelicals:

H1: A period effect of increasing participation for Evangelicals (arising from the effects of new cues for political participation and political attitudes regardless of the theorized cause, modernization, secularization or culture war) will begin with the 1980 election.

³ Hunter found 40% of Evangelical college students and 48% of seminarians identified themselves as conservative. They also were more likely to identify themselves as Republicans (51% and 46%) and Independents (34% and 32%) rather than Democrats (15% and 22%, respectively).

⁴ Abramson points out that "we are likely to find consistent age-group differences only when we begin by examining attitudes that, on theoretical grounds, should be affected either by a person's position in the lifecycle or by some major events that might affect the formative socialization of specific age groups" (1975, 125).

H2: The rise of cues from Evangelical political and social movement groups encouraging political activism in conjunction with other secularizing changes within the Evangelical tradition will result in younger cohorts whose levels of political involvement will rise to match or even exceed that of similarly aged Non-Evangelical cohorts.

H3: Increasing participation will result in a liberal shift on political issues. This shift, though, will be limited to less salient, less controversial issues such as the environment, feminism and race, and will not affect cue issues such as abortion and homosexuality.

C1: Many of these liberalizing effects would be accentuated in the youngest cohorts who have “come of age” during the new cues and were never socialized into the old separatism. These younger cohorts will demonstrate a less traditional stance on political, cultural and moral issues as compared to the older Evangelical cohorts and will close the “gap” on tolerance with Non-Evangelicals.

C2: Liberalizing or moderation will be increased by campaign participation through contact with divergent viewpoints.

H4: Evangelicals will exhibit increased tolerance for out-groups. This increase would be most evident for the out-group of atheists, the group most likely to be viewed as threatening by religious Evangelicals.

C1: Younger Evangelical cohorts will also demonstrate the greatest levels of tolerance for selected out-groups as compared to older Evangelical cohorts and will again close the “gap” with Non-Evangelicals.

6.3 Age-Period-Cohort Models

If moderating or liberalizing changes have begun to occur among Evangelicals, as a result of secularization brought on by a decline in separatism, an analysis of trends across this time period should reveal the shifts. As there is an expectation of both period and generational/cohort effects, this study draws upon the framework of age-period-cohort (APC) analysis.

The difficulty with any APC model is the problem of identification (Fienberg and Mason 1985). The specification of an APC model can lead to a model with perfect multicollinearity, as the cohort is a linear function of age and period (cohort = period –

age). Mason et al (1973) proposed to deal with the problem by omitting an additional period, age or cohort dummy variable. This elimination sets the effects of the two omitted variables as equal and allows for the estimation of age, period and cohort effects. However, the Mason et al approach is only applicable to models that are nonlinear (284 fn). Glenn (2005) shows that this method only works for nonlinear models when the a priori assumptions are exactly correct. Glenn also evaluates other methods for separating age, period and cohort effects and concludes that “A definitive separation of age, period and cohort effects is not just difficult, but impossible” (2005, p. vii; See Wilmoth 1990 for a similar conclusion).⁵ As the period effects of Evangelical participation are hypothesized to be linear, the Mason et al. approach is not applicable to this study.

There remain two options for properly identifying this model. One is the substitution of part of the APC triad with a surrogate that captures a characteristic of the removed periods, ages or cohorts. However, this type of model is not a true APC model and the substituted variable is not likely to capture all of the effects of the missing APC member (Glenn). The second option for identification is to exclude one part of the APC triad. Central to this option is the issue of whether there is any basis for expecting a liberalizing influence from all three parts of the triad, age and periods and cohorts. Also in terms of rates of participation, it must be determined if there is a theoretical basis for expecting Evangelical aging to diminish the separatism which reduces their campaign and voting participation.

Examinations of political attitudes over time have suggested that stability is the norm with change possible at later ages, albeit at a much slower rate than in adolescence

⁵ Abramson (1978) tests generational differences using a method for estimating attitude means with and without cohort replacement. However, Abramson acknowledges that his model overestimates period effects—one of the key phenomena under evaluation here.

(Alwin, Cohen and Newcombe 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Sears and Funk [year]; Zaller 1992; see Krosnik and Alwin 1989 for an opposing view). There is, however, no definitive research showing that aging produces a generally conservative or generally liberal effect. Generational cohorts are found to be more liberal or conservative than prior cohorts (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Smith 2000). As a prime example of this, younger cohorts are found to be more tolerant while age effects are weak (Glenn 1980; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Miller and Sears 1986; Sears 1975; Sullivan, Pearson and Marcus 1982; see Hill 1997 for an opposing view).⁶ As the theorized effect of secularization for moral, social and political issues is a liberal shift, there is no a priori basis for expecting age to increase this liberalization or moderation.

A similar conclusion can be reached for political participation. A dividing of the American electorate into three cohorts (Pre-New Deal, New Deal, Post-New Deal) shows overall voter participation declining as the Post-New Deal replaces the Pre-New Deal. Post-New Deal participation is lower than both preceding cohorts (Miller and Shanks 1996). Aging has a curvilinear effect on voting and participation with middle age providing the highest levels of participation as compared to youth and elderly (Converse and Niemi 1971; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Strate et al. 1989; Verba and Nie). When examining participation there is no a priori basis for assuming that the influence of aging is not uniform for Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals. The aging trend should be identical for both groups while the birth cohort trend is hypothesized to diminish the distance between the younger Evangelical and Non-Evangelical cohorts.

⁶ The sheer number of attitudes being examined in this chapter forestalls the possibility of providing cohort research for each of the political attitudes.

6.4 Data and Coding

Historical trends for Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals are examined using data from the 1972–2000 American National Election Studies (ANES) and the 1974–2002 General Social Survey. While GSS surveys are available for 1972 and 1973, usage of these two years would require dropping the only measurement of political ideology that is not utilized until the 1974 survey. Given the scarcity of political variables in the GSS, these years were dropped to keep the seven-point ideology scale. Religious traditions are again coded based on the Steensland et al codings and divided into six categories (Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, Roman Catholic, Secular and Other [which combines the Steensland et al non-traditional liberals, non-traditional conservatives and others categories]). NES data is used to compare period and cohort trends in campaign and voter participation for Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals. It is also used to compare period, cohort and campaign participation trends in political and moral attitudes for Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals. Based on Chapter Five's results and Bennett's (1975) now-proven hypothesis that voting is not sufficiently interactive to change political thinking, a similar analysis was not performed comparing periods, cohorts, and voting participation trends in political and moral attitudes.

The GSS data does not include a campaign participation measurement. These models are limited to examining period and cohort effects. The GSS is included, though, because of its diversity of moral questions and variety of civil liberty/tolerance questions. While participation effects cannot be shown, period and cohort trends can be compared to NES trends to see if a similar outcome is observed. A lack of continuity in the NES (and to a much lesser extent in the GSS) data severely limits the number of attitudes that can

be examined. Questions asked in 1980 or prior to 1980 were used as dependent variables in the models whenever possible.. In a few instances when Evangelicals have been shown to hold different levels of support for attitudinal questions, recent shorter trends were examined.

Table. 6.1. NES Period and Ten-Year Birth Cohorts (number of Evangelicals in parentheses)

	1903- 1912	1913- 1922	1923- 1932	1933- 1942	1943- 1952	1953- 1962	1963- 1972	1973- 1982	Total
1972	177	200	246	234	308	46	0	0	1,211 (270)
1976	347	404	401	452	717	317	0	0	2,638 (577)
1980	159	229	223	233	355	352	0	0	1,551 (334)
1984	177	274	263	290	507	534	142	0	2,187 (471)
1988	109	211	248	252	430	515	248	0	2,013 (439)
1992	109	227	284	300	424	644	464	31	2,483 (573)
1996	51	122	203	210	273	436	322	96	1,713 (399)
2000	20	82	158	216	331	405	358	228	1,798 (394)
Total	1,149 (240)	1,749 (398)	2,026 (469)	2,187 (526)	3,345 (704)	3,249 (730)	1,534 (314)	355 (77)	15,594 (3331)

Source: National Election Studies 1972–2000

Periods are measured in the NES using Presidential Election years from 1972–2000. Eight birth cohorts, each covering ten years, are coded beginning with 1903–1912 and ending with 1973–1982. An identical coding for birth cohorts is used with the GSS. Respondents with 1983 and 1984 birth years are available in the GSS but they only represent 29 respondents. They are excluded to maintain an identical cohort coding with the NES. GSS education and income variables were recoded to match NES education and income categories. GSS periods represented individual survey years from 1974–2002.

Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the number of respondents in each cohort and period for the NES and GSS. The number of Evangelicals in each cohort and period is found in parentheses following the totals. Evangelicals represent 21%–23% of each category.

Table 6.2. General Social Survey Birth Cohorts (number of Evangelicals in cohort in parentheses)

	1903- 1912	1913- 1922	1923- 1932	1933- 1942	1943- 1952	1953- 1962	1963- 1972	1973- 1982	Total
1974	171	232	249	254	364	89	0	0	1,359 (287)
1975	185	205	242	260	353	138	0	0	1,383 (288)
1976	170	223	211	254	352	162	0	0	1,372 (308)
1977	164	238	251	275	335	192	0	0	1,455 (321)
1978	145	205	202	249	393	244	0	0	1,438 (329)
1980	139	214	213	200	354	285	0	0	1,405 (336)
1982	154	233	271	254	373	457	39	0	1,781 (317)
1983	112	191	225	222	353	403	45	0	1,551 (328)
1984	99	168	196	193	331	367	82	0	1,436 (358)
1985	103	193	217	212	303	366	100	0	1,494 (398)
1986	102	176	179	193	315	368	108	0	1,441 (370)
1987	95	208	207	264	362	439	203	0	1,778 (360)
1988	85	175	179	151	316	341	210	0	1,457 (367)
1989	72	162	177	223	288	371	223	0	1,516 (379)
1990	66	147	161	153	278	344	209	0	1,358 (316)
1991	62	158	169	172	293	374	275	3	1,506 (388)
1993	53	150	162	199	315	381	298	43	1,601 (454)
1994	83	235	297	385	582	740	565	99	2,986 (718)
1996	57	163	248	328	543	687	651	221	2,898 (673)
1998	39	144	268	302	472	654	656	292	2,827 (641)
2000	22	158	226	288	455	653	582	425	2,809 (604)
2002	0	115	239	298	434	545	590	501	2,722 (566)
Total	2,178 (541)	4,093 (998)	4,789 (1,149)	5,329 (1,362)	8,164 (1,865)	8,600 (1,834)	4,836 (1,071)	1,584 (286)	38,573 (9,106)

Source: General Social Survey, 1974-2002.

6.5 Methodology Periods, Cohorts and Changes in ANES Participation

The first two models in this section use ANES data and focus on period and cohort changes in campaign and voter participation. The first dependent variable is a six-

point campaign participation scale where respondents received a score from 1 (no participation) to 6 (participation in all activities) for influencing others votes, attending political meetings, working for a party or candidate, displaying a button/sticker or making a campaign contribution. Following the SES model (Verba and Nie 1972; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), control variables were included for gender, education and income.⁷ Political variables included the respondent's strength of partisanship, the respondent's concern for who wins the election, and if the respondent was contacted by a major party. Additional control variables included religious attendance and dummy variables for Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jews and Seculars (see Appendix I for descriptions of variables). Dummy variables are included for each period and birth cohort. Interaction terms for Evangelical SES and political variables as well as period and cohort variables, are also included. Missing data in independent variables for all models in this chapter are set to the mean in the case of continuous variables and to the mode for dichotomous variables.⁸

6.6 NES Participation Results

Table 6.3 contains the results for the campaign participation OLS model. With exception of the South dummy variable, all of the SES and political variables are significant. Being female is the only SES/political variable that lowers the level of campaign participation. The Evangelical SES and political variable interactions show that the slopes of Evangelical education and partisan strength are lower than that of Non-Evangelicals. Increasing education and partisan strength results in lower levels of

⁷ In keeping with Rosenstone and Hansen's results, an initial model included a married variable, which failed to be significant, so it was dropped.

⁸ Data was also weighted using vcf0009 to produce a nationally representative pooled cross-sectional analysis.

participation as compared to Non-Evangelicals. Most religious identities are not significant with the exception of Black Protestants and Roman Catholics which both lower campaign participation. As previous studies have shown, church attendance raises the level of participation and the effect is higher for Evangelical participants.

Table 6.3. Regression of Periods and Cohorts on Campaign Participation: NES 1972–2000.

Campaign Participation		
Birth Cohorts		
1903-1912	-.04	(.05)
1913-1922	.05	(.04)
1923-1932	.05	(.04)
1933-1942	.03	(.04)
1943-1952	.07	(.04)
1953-1962	.02	(.04)
1963-1972	.05	(.04)
Periods		
1976	.08*	(.03)
1980	-.04	(.04)
1984	-.08	(.04)
1988	-.07*	(.04)
1992	-.11*	(.04)
1996	-.26**	(.04)
2000	-.25**	(.05)
Gender	-.12**	(.02)
Education	.18**	(.01)
Income	.06**	(.01)
South	.02	(.02)
Strength of Partisanship	.12**	(.01)
Care Who Wins	.26**	(.02)
Party Contact	.39**	(.02)
Church Attendance	.02*	(.01)
Evangelical Protestant	-.17	(.15)
Black Protestant	-.12*	(.05)
Mainline Protestant	-.07	(.04)
Roman Catholic	-.10*	(.04)
Jewish	.08	(.08)
Secular	-.07	(.04)
Interaction Terms		
Evangelical X Gender	.05	(.03)
Evangelical X Education	-.07**	(.02)
Evangelical X Income	.02	(.02)
Evangelical X Church Attendance	.03*	(.01)
Evangelical X Strength of Partisanship	-.06**	(.02)
Evangelical X Care Who Wins	.04	(.03)
Evangelical X Party Contact	-.02	(.05)

Table 6.3 (cont'd).

Evangelical X South	-.03	(.04)
Evangelical Birth Cohorts		
1903-1912	-.03	(.09)
1913-1922	-.04	(.08)
1923-1932	.05	(.08)
1933-1942	.07	(.08)
1943-1952	.01	(.08)
1953-1962	.01	(.08)
1963-1972	-.06	(.09)
Evangelical Periods		
1976	.09	(.07)
1980	.23**	(.08)
1984	.11	(.07)
1988	.12*	(.07)
1992	.26**	(.07)
1996	.29**	(.08)
1900	.33**	(.08)
Constant	.33**	(.08)
N	13068	
R ²	.15	

*p<.05 (two tail test), **p<.01 (two tail test)

Notes: Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.


The 1903-1912 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable.

The 1972 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable.

Period, cohort, and education effects on participation are evaluated by graphing their effects while controlling for SES, political, and religious variables. The linear relationship is not only examined, but loess smoothing⁹ is used to check for nonlinear trends for birth cohorts. Where the loess smoothing reveals a significant difference from the linear plot, the loess line is also included in the graph. This is necessary, as I expect the influence of birth cohorts to be nonlinear. As younger Evangelical cohorts are expected to change in relationship to Non-Evangelical younger cohorts, these changes may be limited to the youngest two or three cohorts. The changes may then be masked by an OLS trend.

⁹ Loess or locally weighted regression is used to fit a smooth curve to the points of a data scatterplot. Loess gives more weight to neighboring points near the point whose response is being estimated and less weight to points further away (Cleveland and Devlin 1988; Jacoby 1997).

Figure 6.1. Campaign Participation by Period, Cohort and Evangelical Tradition¹



Note: OLS Data are from Table 6.3.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

Figure 6.1 demonstrates differing period and cohort effects for both Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals. Non-Evangelicals have declined in their campaign involvement over the past three decades, while Evangelicals have increased their participation. The coefficients for Evangelical periods (Table 6.3) uncover the points at which change occurred. The 1980 election saw a one-time jump in participation, but an unbroken trend of significant increase ran from 1988 to 2000. The data suggests that an initial response to new cues in 1980 was followed by a slower acceptance of new patterns of participation. The 1988 election was also a key year for Non-Evangelicals as campaign participation began a significant downward trend that lasted through 2000.

The results of the birth cohort trends are misleading when just the cohort coefficients are examined. None of the dummy cohort variables or interaction terms is significant. The graph of birth cohorts and campaign participation (Figure 6.1) does reveal an interesting trend, showing a closing of the gap between younger Evangelical and Non-Evangelical cohorts. The loess curve reveals that both Evangelical and Non-Evangelicals birth cohort trends fit the lifecycle theory. The oldest and youngest birth cohorts have lower campaign participation than the middle cohorts. The true change in Evangelical birth cohorts is not represented by the trend line but by the distance between matching Evangelical and Non-Evangelical cohorts. Here we see that the four youngest Evangelical cohorts (1943-52, 1953-62, 1963-72 and 1973-1982) have begun to close the gap, and the youngest cohort matches Non-Evangelicals in campaign participation. Younger Evangelical cohorts are now poised to match or exceed campaign participation levels of Non-Evangelicals as they move into their middle ages.

The second model (Table 6.4) performs a similar evaluation of periods, cohorts and voting. The second dependent variable is a measurement of voter participation coded 1 if the respondent voted in the Presidential election and 0 if the respondent did not vote. The logistic regression model uses the same independent SES, religious, period, cohort and interaction variables as the campaign model with a few additions. Again following Verba and Nie (1972) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the model includes strength of partisanship, care who wins, contact by a major party as well as length of residence and closeness of the election.

Table 6.4. Logistic Regression of Periods and Cohorts on Voter Participation: NES 1972–2000.

	Voter Participation
Birth Cohorts	

Table 6.4 (cont'd).

1913-1922	.66**	(.15)
1923-1932	.69**	(.15)
1933-1942	.56**	(.14)
1943-1952	.30*	(.14)
1953-1962	.10	(.13)
1963-1972	-.35**	(.13)
1973-1982	-.56**	(.14)
Periods		
1976	-.30*	(.12)
1980	-.32*	(.13)
1984	-.03	(.12)
1988	-.20	(.12)
1992	.06	(.12)
1996	-.16	(.13)
1900	-.17	(.13)
Gender	-.17**	(.05)
Education	.68**	(.04)
Income	.33**	(.03)
South	-.40**	(.07)
Strength of Partisanship	.85**	(.06)
Care Who Wins	.01**	(.00)
Length of Residence	.21**	(.06)
Closeness of Election	.87**	(.07)
Party Contact	.31**	(.03)
Religious Attendance	.33**	(.03)
Evangelical Protestant	.10	(.53)
Black Protestant	.39**	(.13)
Mainline Protestant	.60**	(.11)
Roman Catholic	.57**	(.11)
Jewish	.85**	(.23)
Secular	.42**	(.12)
Interaction Terms		
Evangelical X Gender	-.15	(.11)
Evangelical X Education	.03	(.08)
Evangelical X Income	.03	(.06)
Evangelical X Religious Attendance	.04	(.04)
Evangelical X Strength of Partisanship	-.02	(.06)
Evangelical X Care Who Wins	.20	(.12)
Length of Residence	-.00*	(.00)
Evangelical X Closeness of Election	-.15	(.13)
Evangelical X Party Contact	.13	(.16)
Evangelical X South	.10	(.12)
Evangelical Birth Cohorts		
1913-1922	.00	(.32)
1923-1932	-.08	(.29)
1933-1942	.00	(.29)
1943-1952	.08	(.28)
1953-1962	-.17	(.27)
1963-1972	-.03	(.27)
1973-1982	.11	(.30)

Table 6.4 (cont'd).

Evangelical Periods

1976	.69**	(.24)
1980	.33	(.26)
1984	-.09	(.23)
1988	-.03	(.24)
1992	.03	(.24)
1996	.15	(.25)
2000	.05	(.26)
Constant	-5.59**	(.38)
N	13,523	
Pseudo R ²	.23	

*p<.05 (two-tail test), **p<.01 (two-tail test)

Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

The 1903-1912 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable.


The 1972 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable.

As in the previous model, all of the political variables are significant, and raise the probability of voting. Being female and from the South both lower that probability.

Religious attendance and all of the religious identities, with the exception of Evangelical Protestants, increase the likelihood of voting.

Figure 6.2 shows differing trends for the probability of voting. While both Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals have increased their likelihood of voting, just as with campaign participation, Evangelicals have narrowed the gap over time. The loess line for birth cohorts and voting shows a curvilinear trend similar to campaign participation. Once again it is the younger Evangelical cohorts that are closing the participation gap with Non-Evangelicals. There is little evidence that 1980 was a crucial year for voting. Increases in Evangelical voting are most pronounced in the 1976 election and are probably associated with the candidacy of Jimmy Carter.

Figure 6.2. Probability of Voting by Period, Cohort and Evangelical Tradition¹



Note: Predicted probability data is from Table 6.4.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Cohorts, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

6.7 NES Political Attitude Results

I next examine NES political attitudes for period, cohort and participation effects on these attitudes. These attitudes cover topics for which Evangelicals have previously shown differing levels of support as compared to Non-Evangelicals. While other variables are included as controls, the discussion of the models will be limited to period, cohort and campaign participation effects. The first two regression models (Table 6.5) look at environmental issues, a topic for which Evangelicals have shown lower levels of support (Guth et al 1996). The dependent variables are environmental spending (coded 1

- Decrease, 2 - Keep the Same, 3 - Increase) and an environmentalist thermometer (0 - Unfavorable to 100 - Favorable). The control variables for these models and all subsequent NES models are gender, education, income, South, party id, dummy variables for religious traditions, church attendance and campaign participation. Evangelical campaign participation and Evangelical church attendance are included as interaction terms. Period, cohort variables, and their interaction terms remain the same as the voting and campaign models.

Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the OLS trend lines for periods, cohorts and participation while controlling for the remaining variables in the models. Contrary to the secularization theory, the period and participation effects have not only widened the gap of environmental support between Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals, but Evangelical support has declined. Meanwhile Non-Evangelical support (with the exception of the period effects in the environmentalist thermometer model) has increased. Only the Evangelical birth cohorts show rising support for younger cohorts, but the rate of increase is still below that of the rest of the population.

Table 6.5. Regression of Periods, Cohorts and Campaign Participation on Environmental Issues: NES 1980–2000.

	Environmental Thermometer ¹		Environmentalist Spending ²	
Cohorts				
1913-1922	.74	(1.56)	-.04	(.04)
1923-1932	.32	(1.49)	-.03	(.04)
1933-1942	1.41	(1.48)	-.05	(.04)
1943-1952	3.00*	(1.41)	-.06	(.04)
1953-1962	3.60*	(1.40)	-.10*	(.04)
1963-1972	3.61*	(1.46)	-.13*	(.04)
1973-1982	4.12*	(1.96)	-.23*	(.05)
Periods				
1988	4.38*	(.81)	-.32*	(.02)
1992	-4.27*	(.80)	-.26*	(.02)
1996	-8.51*	(.85)	-.02	(.02)
2000	-8.22*	(.90)	-.09*	(.02)

Table 6.5 (cont'd).

Gender	3.60*	(.44)	.01	(.01)
Education	1.10*	(.27)	-.04*	(.01)
Income	-.99*	(.23)	.03*	(.01)
South	1.41*	(.57)	.03*	(.01)
Party ID	-1.72*	(.11)	.05*	(.00)
Church Attendance	-.03	(.18)	-.01	(.01)
Evangelical	-8.77*	(3.39)	.29*	(.09)
Black Protestant	-.88	(1.17)	.13*	(.03)
Mainline Protestant	-.99	(.97)	.10*	(.03)
Roman Catholic	1.57	(.97)	.08*	(.03)
Secular	.70	(1.08)	.06*	(.03)
Campaign Participation	.71*	(.25)	.00	(.01)
Interaction Terms				
Evangelical X Campaign Participation	-.02	(.62)	.01	(.02)
Evangelical X Church Attendance	.79*	(.37)	-.03*	(.01)
Evangelical Cohorts				
1913-1922	.57	(3.42)	-.10	(.09)
1923-1932	3.77	(3.26)	-.07	(.08)
1933-1942	-.31	(3.21)	.01	(.08)
1943-1952	.70	(3.07)	-.11	(.08)
1953-1962	2.57	(3.02)	-.06	(.08)
1963-1972	4.70	(3.22)	-.09	(.08)
1973-1982	11.17*	(4.01)	-.05	(.11)
Evangelical Periods				
1988	4.37*	(1.84)	.02	(.05)
1992	1.99	(1.78)	-.02	(.04)
1996	1.12	(1.89)	.09	(.05)
2000	.25	(2.00)	.06	(.05)
Constant	67.69*	(2.21)	1.47*	(.06)
Observations	8062		9578	
R ²	.12		.10	

*p<.05 (two-tail test), **p<.01 (two-tail test)


Notes: Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

The 1903-1912 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable.

¹ The 1980 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable. The question was not asked in 1984.

² The 1984 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable.


Figure 6.3. Environmental Spending by Period, Cohort, Campaign Participation and Evangelical Tradition.¹



Note: OLS data is from Table 6.5.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Cohorts, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

Figure 6.4. Environmentalist Thermometer by Period, Cohort, Campaign Participation and Evangelical Tradition.¹



Note: OLS data is from Table 6.5.
¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

The next set of models (Table 6.6) examines attitudes towards feminism and women’s roles using the feminist thermometer (0 - Unfavorable to 100 - Favorable) and a seven-point women’s roles scale (1- Equal Roles to 7- Traditional Roles). The period, cohort and campaign participation effects (Figure 6.5) reveal conflicting trends for the feminist thermometer. The period trend shows a nearly parallel set of OLS lines for both Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals showing increasing support. Campaign participation, perhaps as a reflection of Republican support for traditional roles, decreases affinity for

feminists. The birth cohort trend, particularly when looking at the loess line, shows a sharp liberalizing trend for the youngest Evangelical cohorts. Support for feminists, regardless of the Evangelical/Non-Evangelical split, is nearly identical for the youngest cohort.

Table 6.6. Regression of Periods, Cohorts and Campaign Participation on Women's Issues: NES 1972-2000.

	Feminist Thermometer ¹		Women's Roles ²	
Cohorts				
1913-1922	.94	(1.19)	-.05	(.09)
1923-1932	1.43	(1.15)	-.15	(.09)
1933-1942	.28	(1.15)	-.43*	(.09)
1943-1952	2.51*	(1.07)	-.63*	(.08)
1953-1962	.76	(1.09)	-.70*	(.08)
1963-1972	3.24*	(1.21)	-.74*	(.09)
1973-1982	7.35*	(1.70)	-.85*	(.13)
Periods				
1972	-8.92*	(1.18)		
1976	-2.46*	(.95)		
1984	3.23*	(.92)		
1988			-.33*	(.05)
1992	6.04*	(.90)	-.57*	(.05)
1996	6.33*	(.94)	-.52*	(.05)
2000	4.82*	(.98)	-.57*	(.07)
Gender	2.93*	(.43)	-.11*	(.03)
Education	1.32*	(.26)	-.38*	(.02)
Income	-.76*	(.22)	-.09*	(.02)
South	1.42*	(.55)	.08	(.04)
Party ID	-2.00*	(.11)	.08*	(.01)
Church Attendance	1.34*	(.18)	-.16*	(.01)
Evangelical	-13.57*	(3.03)	.45*	(.21)
Black Protestant	6.89*	(1.11)	-.02	(.09)
Mainline Protestant	-2.76*	(.90)	-.08	(.07)
Roman Catholic	-.17	(.90)	-.18*	(.07)
Secular	-1.61	(1.00)	-.16*	(.07)
Campaign Participation	1.06*	(.24)	-.05*	(.02)
Interaction Terms				
Evangelical X Campaign Participation	-1.51*	(.64)	.04	(.05)
Evangelical X Church Attendance	1.76*	(.36)	-.10*	(.03)
Evangelical Cohorts				
1913-1922	-1.10	(2.68)	-.06	(.21)
1923-1932	-2.25	(2.52)	.19	(.20)
1933-1942	-2.88	(2.54)	.18	(.20)

Table 6.6 (cont'd).

1943-1952	-3.12	(2.41)	.27	(.19)
1953-1962	-3.23	(2.44)	.29	(.19)
1963-1972	.81	(2.71)	.14	(.21)
1973-1982	4.07	(3.73)	-.10	(.27)
Evangelical Periods				
1976	5.45*	(2.69)		
1980	8.36*	(2.20)		
1984	4.63*	(2.25)		
1988			-.24	(.12)
1992	6.38*	(2.10)	-.29*	(.11)
1996	8.06*	(2.23)	-.19	(.13)
2000	8.72*	(2.26)	-.51*	(.15)
Constant	49.89*	(2.01)	5.02*	(.14)
Observations	10958		13020	
R ²	.16		.16	

*p<.05 (two-tail test), **p<.01 (two-tail test)


Notes: Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

The 1903-1912 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable.

¹The 1972 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable. The question was not asked in 1988.

²The 1980 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable.

Figure 6.5. Feminist Thermometer by Period, Cohort, Campaign Participation and Evangelical Tradition: NES 1972–2000.¹




Note: OLS data is from Table 6.6.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

The same cohort effect (Figure 6.7) is observed in the women's roles scale. While the overall differences are not large, the youngest Evangelical cohorts move in a more liberal direction and the youngest cohort matches the Non-Evangelicals in their support of role equality. The period trend also shows a closing of the gap between the two groups. Unlike the feminist thermometer model, rising campaign participation moves respondents in a liberal direction but does not close the gap with Non-Evangelicals.

Figure 6.6. Women's Roles by Period, Cohort, Campaign Participation and Evangelical Tradition: NES 1972-2000¹



Note: OLS data is from Table 6.6.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

The last NES model looks at abortion support. Table 6.7 and Figure 6.7 show that abortion support has increased for Non-Evangelicals across periods, cohorts and campaign participation. Without examining the cohorts of religious groups, Scott (1998), using the GSS, has found evidence of a liberalizing trend for U.S. cohorts. This analysis of the NES shows a variation on the cohort effect for Evangelicals. The cohort and campaign effects show a slight increase in abortion support, while the period effect shows a slight decline. For Non-Evangelicals all three trends show an increase in support. The anti-abortion focus of the Evangelical tradition appears to have negated much of the influences that raised the level of support for Non-Evangelicals. However, campaign

participation does increase abortion support, showing some evidence of the influence of divergent viewpoints in the political realm.

Table 6.7. Regression of Periods, Cohorts and Campaign Participation on Abortion Support: NES 1972–2000.

	Abortion Support	
Cohorts		
1913-1922	.07	(.05)
1923-1932	.11*	(.05)
1933-1942	.04	(.05)
1943-1952	.12*	(.05)
1953-1962	.24*	(.05)
1963-1972	.20*	(.05)
1973-1982	.02	(.08)
Periods		
1984	.01	(.04)
1988	-.04	(.04)
1992	.13*	(.04)
1996	.04	(.04)
2000	.00	(.04)
Gender	.12*	(.02)
Education	.22*	(.01)
Income	.11*	(.01)
South	-.05*	(.02)
Party ID	-.05*	(.00)
Church Attendance	.22*	(.01)
Evangelical	-.43*	(.12)
Black Protestant	-.25*	(.05)
Mainline Protestant	.02	(.04)
Roman Catholic	-.23*	(.04)
Secular	-.11*	(.04)
Campaign Participation	.03*	(.01)
Interaction Terms		
Evangelical X Campaign Participation	-.02	(.02)
Evangelical X Church Attendance	.06*	(.01)
Evangelical Cohorts		
1913-1922	.11	(.12)
1923-1932	.08	(.11)
1933-1942	.01	(.11)
1943-1952	-.12	(.10)
1953-1962	-.21*	(.10)
1963-1972	-.11	(.11)
1973-1982	.10	(.16)
Evangelical Periods		
1984	-.05	(.08)
1988	.05	(.08)

Table 6.7 (cont'd).

1992	.01	(.08)
1996	-.09	(.08)
2000	.01	(.09)

Constant 1.33* (.09)

Observations 11363

R² .23


*p<.05(two-tail test), **p<.01 (two-tail test)

Notes: Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

The 1903-1912 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable.

The 1980 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable.

Figure 6.7. Abortion Support by Period, Cohort, Campaign Participation and Evangelical Tradition: NES 1980–2000.¹



Note: OLS data is from Table 6.7.

¹ Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

6.8 GSS Moral, Political and Tolerance Attitudes

The final set of models use the General Social Survey to look at moral, political and tolerance questions unavailable in the NES (See Appendix J for variable descriptions). These models do not examine the effects of participation, as the GSS does not contain a set of campaign participation variables similar to the NES. The control variables for these models are similar to the NES models and include gender, education, income, party identification and political ideology. Peculiarities of the state coding in the GSS make using a “south” variable similar to the NES impossible. Religious variables are comprised of dummy variables for religious traditions and church attendance. Evangelical campaign participation and Evangelical church attendance are included as interaction terms. Cohorts are coded the same as the NES using 10-year birth cohorts beginning in 1903 and running through 1982. Periods for the GSS are more numerous as the GSS is conducted nearly every year from 1974 to 1990 and then every two years following. Interaction terms for Evangelical periods and cohorts are included.

The first set of models (Table 6.8) looks for change in the morals of Evangelicals by examining sexual attitudes. Secularization triggered by political participation should result in a closing of the gap between Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals. The trends for periods and cohorts (Figures 6.8 and 6.9) show little support for this hypothesis. While Evangelicals are moving in a more liberal direction concerning homosexuality, the gap between Evangelicals and others has actually widened in both the period effects and cohort effects. Evangelicals are increasing their acceptance of homosexuality at a much slower rate than the rest of the population. Premarital sex reveals a parallel trend between the two groups. Evangelical cohorts, while starting at a lower rate of acceptance, have

increased their approval of premarital sex at rates similar to Non-Evangelical cohorts.

The same result also holds for premarital sex by periods. Both teen sex and extramarital sex show a trend of near agreement on the undesirability of both.

Table 6.8. Regression of Periods and Cohorts on Sexual Attitudes: GSS 1974–2002.

	Homosexuality ¹		Extramarital Sex ¹		Teen Sex ²		Premarital Sex ¹	
Birth Cohorts								
1913-1922	.02	(.04)	.08**	(.02)			.20**	(.04)
1923-1932	.08*	(.04)	.12**	(.02)	.03	(.03)	.32**	(.04)
1933-1942	.11**	(.04)	.21**	(.02)	.11**	(.03)	.57**	(.04)
1943-1952	.34**	(.04)	.24**	(.02)	.17**	(.03)	.80**	(.03)
1953-1962	.28**	(.04)	.15**	(.02)	.27**	(.03)	.88**	(.03)
1963-1972	.39**	(.04)	.07**	(.03)	.40**	(.03)	.86**	(.04)
1973-1982	.63**	(.05)	.09**	(.03)	.49**	(.04)	.90**	(.05)
Periods								
1974	.18**	(.05)	-.03	(.03)			.09	(.05)
1975							.10	(.05)
1976	.11*	(.05)	.06*	(.03)				
1977	.10*	(.05)	.00	(.03)			.19**	(.05)
1978							.18**	(.05)
1982	.00	(.04)	-.05	(.03)			.22**	(.05)
1983	.00	(.00)	.00	(.00)			.25**	(.06)
1984	-.02	(.05)	-.03	(.03)				
1985	-.07	(.05)	-.08**	(.03)			.21**	(.05)
1986					.06	(.04)	.21**	(.05)
1987	-.14**	(.05)	-.09**	(.03)	.00	(.00)		
1988	-.19**	(.05)	-.21**	(.03)	-.01	(.04)	.08	(.06)
1989	-.14**	(.05)	-.18**	(.03)	-.02	(.04)	.06	(.06)
1990	-.15**	(.05)	-.18**	(.03)	.00	(.00)	.11	(.06)
1991	-.10	(.05)	-.14**	(.03)	.03	(.04)	.14*	(.06)
1993	.10	(.05)	-.19**	(.03)	-.04	(.04)	.14*	(.06)
1994	.07	(.04)	-.22**	(.03)	-.05	(.04)	.09	(.05)
1996	.22**	(.05)	-.24**	(.03)	-.06	(.04)	.09	(.05)
1998	.26**	(.05)	-.26**	(.03)	-.19*	(.04)	-.01	(.05)
2000	.21**	(.05)	-.24**	(.03)	-.19*	(.04)	-.10*	(.05)
2002	.28**	(.05)	-.31**	(.03)	-.18*	(.04)	.00	(.00)
Gender	.20**	(.01)	-.07**	(.01)	-.14**	(.01)	-.15**	(.01)
Education	.27**	(.01)	.09**	(.01)	.06**	(.01)	.09**	(.01)
Income	.04**	(.01)	-.01	(.00)	-.02**	(.01)	.03**	(.01)
Ideology	-.16**	(.01)	-.05**	(.00)	-.08**	(.00)	-.12**	(.01)
Party ID	-.15	(.01)	-.00	(.00)	-.00	(.00)	-.01**	(.00)
Religious Attendance	-.09**	(.00)	-.05**	(.00)	-.05**	(.00)	-.15**	(.00)
Evangelical	-.26**	(.10)	-.12	(.06)	-.09	(.08)	-.21	(.11)
Mainline	-.27**	(.03)	-.11**	(.02)	-.04	(.03)	.13**	(.03)
Black	-.50**	(.03)	.05*	(.02)	.01	(.03)	.15**	(.03)
Protestant								
Catholic	-.15**	(.03)	-.04*	(.02)	.00	(.03)	.27**	(.03)

Table 6.8 (cont'd).


Seculars	.04	(.03)	.10*	(.02)	.22*	(.03)	.12**	(.03)
Interaction Terms								
Evangelical X Church Attendance	.01	(.01)	.01*	(.00)	-.00	(.01)	-.04*	(.01)
Evangelical Birth Cohorts								
1913-1922	-.02	(.08)	-.06	(.05)			-.12	(.08)
1923-1932	.00	(.08)	-.08	(.05)	.01	(.06)	.01	(.07)
1933-1942	-.08	(.07)	-.15**	(.05)	-.09	(.06)	-.14*	(.07)
1943-1952	-.29**	(.07)	-.18**	(.05)	-.06	(.05)	-.14*	(.07)
1953-1962	-.22**	(.07)	-.06	(.05)	-.13*	(.05)	-.10	(.07)
1963-1972	-.25**	(.08)	.00	(.05)	-.19**	(.06)	-.06	(.08)
1973-1982	-.26*	(.12)	-.02	(.08)	-.26**	(.08)	-.22	(.12)
Evangelical Periods								
1974	-.21*	(.10)	-.05	(.06)			.22	(.11)
1975							.28*	(.12)
1976	-.17	(.10)	-.11	(.06)				
1977	-.13	(.10)	-.14*	(.06)			.17	(.11)
1978							.11	(.11)
1982	-.05	(.09)	-.07	(.06)			.08	(.11)
1983							.	
1984	-.07	(.10)	-.04	(.06)				
1985	-.11	(.09)	-.01	(.06)			.16	(.11)
1986					.06	(.08)	.17	(.11)
1987	-.01	(.09)	-.05	(.06)	.00	(.00)	.	
1988	.01	(.11)	.05	(.07)	.03	(.08)	.31**	(.12)
1989	.04	(.11)	.02	(.07)	.03	(.08)	.34**	(.12)
1990	-.08	(.11)	-.01	(.07)	.00	(.00)	.26*	(.12)
1991	-.16	(.11)	-.04	(.07)	-.04	(.08)	.18	(.12)
1993	-.07	(.10)	.03	(.07)	.03	(.08)	.08	(.12)
1994	-.12	(.09)	.06	(.06)	.01	(.07)	.19	(.11)
1996	-.28**	(.09)	.07	(.06)	.01	(.07)	.19	(.11)
1998	-.25**	(.09)	.05	(.06)	.14	(.08)	.18	(.11)
2000	-.22*	(.10)	.07	(.06)	.11	(.08)	.28*	(.11)
2002	-.31**	(.12)	.10	(.07)	.10	(.09)	.09	(.13)
Constant	1.66**	(.06)	1.73**	(.04)	1.94*	(.06)	2.98**	(.07)
Observations	23706		24594		14191		23378	
R ²	.25		.11		.15		.31	

*p<.05 (two-tail test), **p<.01 (two-tail test)

Notes: Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

¹ The 1903-1912 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable and the 1972 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable.² The 1985 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable and The 1913-1922 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable.


Figure 6.8. Sexual Morals by Period and Evangelical Tradition: GSS 1974–2002.¹



Note: OLS data is from Table 6.8.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

Figure 6.9. Sexual Morals by Cohort and Evangelical Tradition: GSS 1974–2002.¹



Note: OLS data is from Table 6.8.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

A set of models measuring changes in attitudes toward government spending (Table 6.9) discloses very little difference between groups. Evangelicals are slightly less favorable toward increased spending for foreign aid, education and the environment and slightly more favorable toward military spending than Non-Evangelicals (Figures 6.10 and 6.11). The gap toward the latter three categories appears to be widening across the periods. In keeping with Stimson's public mood, all four measurements do show a liberal trend, but Evangelical change is at a lower rate than Non-Evangelicals. Government spending by cohorts reveals little difference between Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals.

Table 6.9. Regression of Periods and Cohorts on Government Spending: GSS 1974–2002.¹

	Spending on Foreign Aid		Spending on Education		Spending on the Environment		Spending on Military	
Cohorts								
1913-1922	-.01	(.02)	-.12**	(.02)	-.09**	(.02)	-.07**	(.02)
1923-1932	-.06**	(.02)	-.15**	(.02)	-.13**	(.02)	-.08**	(.02)
1933-1942	-.06**	(.02)	-.22**	(.02)	-.22**	(.02)	-.01	(.02)
1943-1952	-.07**	(.02)	-.30**	(.02)	-.34**	(.02)	.07**	(.02)
1953-1962	-.14**	(.02)	-.29**	(.02)	-.38**	(.02)	.10**	(.02)
1963-1972	-.17**	(.02)	-.31**	(.02)	-.41**	(.02)	.15**	(.02)
1973-1982	-.19**	(.03)	-.26**	(.03)	-.46**	(.04)	.21**	(.04)
Periods								
1974	.06*	(.02)	-.03	(.03)	-.24**	(.03)	.67**	(.03)
1975	.03	(.02)	.04	(.03)	-.13**	(.03)	.63**	(.03)
1976	.07**	(.02)	-.02	(.03)	-.18**	(.03)	.51**	(.03)
1977	-.00	(.02)	.05	(.03)	-.04	(.03)	.51**	(.03)
1978	-.02	(.02)	.05	(.03)	-.08**	(.03)	.45**	(.03)
1982	.04	(.02)	-.05*	(.02)	-.04	(.03)	.51**	(.03)
1983	.06**	(.03)	-.10**	(.03)	-.10**	(.03)	.59**	(.03)
1984	.00	(.04)	-.15**	(.04)	-.18**	(.04)	.70**	(.04)
1985	-.08*	(.03)	-.14**	(.03)	-.12**	(.03)	.75**	(.04)
1986	.04	(.03)	-.12**	(.03)	-.19**	(.03)	.72**	(.04)
1987	.01	(.03)	-.10**	(.03)	-.22**	(.04)	.71**	(.04)
1988	.04	(.03)	-.14**	(.03)	-.22**	(.03)	.70**	(.04)
1989	.05	(.03)	-.21**	(.03)	-.29**	(.03)	.69**	(.04)
1990	.01	(.03)	-.23**	(.03)	-.29**	(.03)	.77**	(.04)
1991	.05	(.03)	-.15**	(.03)	-.21**	(.03)	.58**	(.04)
1993	.03	(.03)	-.14**	(.03)	-.06	(.03)	.75**	(.04)
1994	.07**	(.02)	-.17**	(.03)	-.07**	(.03)	.58**	(.03)
1996	.04	(.03)	-.15**	(.03)	-.05	(.03)	.56**	(.03)
1998	-.05	(.03)	-.15**	(.03)	-.07**	(.03)	.53**	(.03)
2000	-.11**	(.03)	-.17**	(.03)	-.05	(.03)	.39**	(.03)
2002	-.00	(.03)	-.19**	(.03)	-.06	(.03)	.26**	(.03)
Gender	-.02*	(.01)	-.07**	(.01)	-.06**	(.01)	.04**	(.01)
Education	-.02**	(.00)	-.03**	(.00)	-.02**	(.01)	.08**	(.01)
Income	.02**	(.00)	-.01*	(.00)	.01*	(.00)	-.00	(.00)
Ideology	.02**	(.00)	.05**	(.00)	.06**	(.00)	-.08**	(.00)
Party ID	-.00	(.00)	.03**	(.00)	.03**	(.00)	-.03**	(.00)
Religious Attendance	-.02**	(.00)	.00	(.00)	.00	(.00)	.00	(.00)
Evangelical	.04	(.05)	.02	(.05)	.03	(.06)	-.18*	(.06)
Mainline Protestant	.08**	(.02)	.09**	(.02)	.05**	(.02)	-.13**	(.02)
Black Protestant	-.00	(.02)	-.09**	(.02)	-.04	(.02)	-.05*	(.02)
Roman Catholic	.07**	(.02)	.08**	(.02)	.02	(.02)	-.08**	(.02)
Secular	.03	(.02)	.10**	(.02)	.02	(.02)	.02	(.02)
Interaction Terms								
Evangelical X Religious Attendance	.01	(.00)	.01	(.00)	.02**	(.00)	-.00	(.00)
Evangelical Cohorts								
1913-1922	-.00	(.04)	.07	(.04)	.02	(.05)	.11*	(.05)
1923-1932	.05	(.04)	-.05	(.04)	.00	(.04)	.09	(.05)

Table 6.9 (cont'd).


1933-1942	.07*	(.04)	.02	(.04)	.06	(.04)	-.01	(.05)
1943-1952	.04	(.04)	-.01	(.04)	.02	(.04)	-.02	(.04)
1953-1962	.01	(.04)	-.05	(.04)	.01	(.04)	.00	(.05)
1963-1972	.04	(.05)	-.06	(.05)	-.00	(.05)	.11	(.06)
1973-1982	-.09	(.07)	-.19*	(.07)	-.03	(.08)	.07	(.08)
Evangelical Periods								
1974	-.03	(.05)	.08	(.06)	.02	(.06)	-.12	(.06)
1975	-.06	(.05)	-.04	(.06)	-.04	(.06)	.00	(.06)
1976	-.05	(.05)	.06	(.06)	.07	(.06)	.01	(.06)
1977	-.05	(.05)	-.05	(.05)	-.08	(.06)	-.11	(.06)
1978	.02	(.05)	-.11*	(.05)	-.08	(.06)	-.14*	(.06)
1982	-.04	(.05)	.02	(.05)	-.04	(.06)	-.14*	(.06)
1983	.03	(.06)	-.03	(.07)	-.08	(.07)	-.22*	(.07)
1984	.05	(.07)	-.04	(.08)	-.10	(.08)	-.12	(.09)
1985	.02	(.06)	.06	(.06)	-.13*	(.07)	.01	(.07)
1986	-.08	(.06)	.07	(.06)	-.01	(.07)	-.01	(.07)
1987	-.01	(.07)	.00	(.07)	-.09	(.08)	-.10	(.08)
1988	-.10	(.06)	.01	(.07)	-.05	(.07)	-.12	(.08)
1989	-.07	(.06)	.10	(.07)	-.09	(.07)	-.00	(.07)
1990	-.09	(.06)	.10	(.07)	-.05	(.07)	-.06	(.08)
1991	.08	(.06)	.05	(.07)	-.10	(.07)	-.11	(.07)
1993	.02	(.06)	.09	(.06)	.00	(.07)	-.10	(.07)
1994	-.04	(.05)	.07	(.05)	-.03	(.06)	-.03	(.06)
1996	.04	(.05)	.15**	(.06)	.06	(.06)	-.11	(.06)
1998	.07	(.05)	.12*	(.06)	-.02	(.06)	-.12	(.06)
2000	.09	(.05)	.12*	(.06)	-.06	(.06)	-.05	(.07)
2002	-.02	(.07)	.22**	(.07)	.08	(.08)	-.01	(.08)
Constant	2.66*	(.03)	1.69*	(.04)	1.69*	(.04)		
Observations	22116		22509		22137		22003	
R ²	.04		.09		.10		.13	

*p<.05 (two-tail test), *p<.01 (two-tail test)

Notes: Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

¹The 1903-1912 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable and the 1980 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable.


Figure 6.10. Government Spending by Period and Evangelical Tradition: GSS 1974–2002.¹



Note: OLS data is from Table 6.9.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

Figure 6.11. Government Spending by Cohort and Evangelical Tradition: GSS 1974–2002.¹



Note: OLS data is from Table 6.9.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

A change in the probability of expressing tolerance is examined in the last three sets of models. The logistic regressions look at support for keeping an out-group book in the library, allowing a speech by an out-group member and keeping a college teacher who is affiliated with an out-group. The first set of models looks at atheists (Table 6.10), the second at homosexuals (Table 6.11) and the third at communists (Table 6.12). All of the dependent variables are coded so that 1 equals tolerant and 0 equals intolerant.

**Table 6.10. Logistic Regression of Periods and Cohorts on Tolerance of Atheists:
GSS 1974–2002.¹**

	Atheist Book		Atheist Speech		Atheist Teacher	
Cohorts						
1913-1922	.28**	(.08)	-.31**	(.08)	-.31*	(.09)
1923-1932	.44**	(.08)	-.63*	(.08)	-.73*	(.08)
1933-1942	.65**	(.08)	-.88*	(.08)	-1.07*	(.08)
1943-1952	1.00**	(.08)	-1.23*	(.08)	-1.51*	(.08)
1953-1962	.91**	(.08)	-1.21*	(.08)	-1.56*	(.08)
1963-1972	.93**	(.09)	-1.12*	(.09)	-1.50*	(.09)
1973-1982	1.12**	(.12)	-1.30**	(.13)	-1.53*	(.12)
Periods						
1974	.00	(.10)	.02	(.10)	.03	(.10)
1976	-.12	(.10)	-.04	(.10)	.17	(.10)
1977	-.06	(.10)	.04	(.10)	.25**	(.10)
1982	-.03	(.10)	.14	(.10)	.07	(.09)
1984	-.05	(.10)	.10	(.11)	.20**	(.10)
1985	-.19	(.10)	.16	(.10)	.20**	(.10)
1987	-.03	(.10)	.07	(.10)	.26**	(.09)
1988	-.09	(.12)	-.14	(.12)	.30**	(.11)
1989	-.00	(.12)	-.03	(.12)	.07	(.11)
1990	.05	(.12)	-.16	(.13)	.07	(.11)
1991	.19	(.12)	-.21	(.13)	.08	(.11)
1993	-.07	(.12)	.11	(.12)	.18	(.11)
1994	-.12	(.10)	.16	(.10)	.33**	(.09)
1996	-.26**	(.10)	.21**	(.10)	.16	(.10)
1998	-.16	(.10)	.04	(.11)	.07	(.10)
2000	-.36**	(.10)	.19	(.10)	.22*	(.10)
2002	-.13	(.12)	.17	(.13)	.15	(.11)
Gender	.00	(.03)	.16*	(.03)	.12**	(.03)
Education	.66**	(.02)	-.61**	(.02)	-.57**	(.02)
Income	.15**	(.01)	-.14**	(.01)	-.07**	(.01)
Ideology	-.11**	(.01)	.08**	(.01)	.14**	(.01)
Party ID	.03**	(.01)	.03*	(.01)	.01	(.01)
Religious Attendance	-.11**	(.01)	.08**	(.01)	.07**	(.01)
Evangelical	-.72**	(.20)	.63**	(.20)	.63**	(.23)
Mainline Protestant	-.34**	(.07)	.35**	(.07)	.29**	(.06)
Black Protestant	-.81**	(.08)	.77**	(.08)	.54**	(.07)
Roman Catholic	-.27**	(.07)	.31**	(.07)	.15*	(.06)
Secular	.19*	(.09)	-.21*	(.09)	-.32**	(.07)
Interaction Terms						
Evangelical X Religious Attendance	-.03*	(.01)	.01	(.01)	.01	(.01)
Evangelical Cohorts						
1913-1922	-.13	(.16)	.24	(.16)	.37	(.20)
1923-1932	-.17	(.16)	.27	(.15)	.45*	(.19)
1933-1942	-.18	(.16)	.23	(.15)	.33	(.18)

Table 6.10 (cont'd).

1943-1952	-.27	(.15)	.25	(.15)	.29	(.18)
1953-1962	-.18	(.15)	.31*	(.15)	.03	(.18)
1963-1972	-.35*	(.17)	.42*	(.17)	.16	(.19)
1973-1982	.00	(.27)	.45	(.26)	.09	(.27)
Evangelical						
Periods						
1974	-.11	(.20)	.20	(.20)	-.10	(.21)
1976	.24	(.20)	.08	(.20)	-.24	(.21)
1977	-.07	(.20)	.04	(.20)	-.12	(.21)
1982	-.37	(.19)	-.10	(.19)	-.04	(.20)
1984	.14	(.20)	-.32	(.20)	-.25	(.20)
1985	-.07	(.19)	-.01	(.19)	-.16	(.20)
1987	.33	(.19)	-.31	(.19)	-.41*	(.19)
1988	.08	(.22)	.12	(.22)	-.16	(.23)
1989	.26	(.22)	-.37	(.22)	-.30	(.22)
1990	-.09	(.23)	.02	(.23)	-.25	(.23)
1991	-.08	(.22)	.35	(.22)	-.18	(.22)
1993	.23	(.21)	-.25	(.22)	-.35	(.21)
1994	.26	(.19)	-.38*	(.19)	-.58**	(.19)
1996	.38*	(.19)	-.45*	(.19)	-.22	(.19)
1998	.33	(.19)	-.16	(.20)	-.41*	(.20)
2000	.57**	(.20)	-.54**	(.20)	-.67**	(.20)
2002	.37	(.24)	-.58*	(.25)	-.57*	(.24)
Constant	-.56**	(.14)	.48**	(.14)	1.29**	(.14)
Observations	24336		24715		24091	
Pseudo- R ²						

*p<.05 (two-tail test), **p<.01 (two-tail test)

Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.


¹ The 1903-1912 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable and the 1980 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable.

All three sets of models show period and cohort increases in tolerance by Evangelicals. As Evangelical belief and fundamentalism have been found to decrease tolerance for out-groups, these trends represents a significant shift for Evangelicals (Filsinger 1976; Laythe, Finkel and Kirkpatrick 1999; Laythe et al 2002; Karpov 2002)¹⁰. An additional study (Wilson 1994) previously found a positive trend for cohorts but did not include religious variables. The period effects, though, for Evangelicals demonstrate

¹⁰ It should be noted that the Laythe, Finkel and Kirkpatrick (1999) and Laythe et al (2002) studies would not pick up a period or cohort effect as each study sampled only college students. The Karpov study uses two survey years of the GSS (1991 and 1998) to examine changes in tolerance. However, Karpov uses the GSS's own coding of fundamentalist, moderate and liberal respondents rather than a more specific measurement of religious traditions.

the largest effect in closing the tolerance gap. All nine period trends (Figures 6.11, 6.13 and 6.15) show Evangelical identifiers increasing their probability of tolerance over time, and with a higher slope of increase than Non-Evangelicals. The cohort trends (Figures 6.12, 6.14 and 6.16) show a decline in the gap between groups but at a lower rate than the period trends.


Figure 6.12. Tolerance of Atheists by Period and Evangelical Tradition: GSS 1974–2002.¹



Note: Predicted probabilities are from Table 6.11.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

Figure 6.13. Tolerance of Atheists by Cohort and Evangelical Tradition: GSS 1974–2002.¹



Note: Predicted probabilities are from Table 6.11.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

Table 6.11. Logistic Regression of Periods and Cohorts on Tolerance of Homosexuals: GSS 1974–2002.¹

	Homosexual Book		Homosexual Speech		Homosexual Teacher	
Cohort						
1913-1922	.39**	(.08)	-.51**	(.08)	-.37**	(.08)
1923-1932	.65**	(.08)	-.68**	(.08)	-.51**	(.08)
1933-1942	.77**	(.08)	-.84**	(.08)	-.81**	(.08)
1943-1952	1.08**	(.07)	-1.05**	(.08)	-1.19**	(.08)
1953-1962	1.08**	(.07)	-1.02**	(.08)	-1.14**	(.08)
1963-1972	1.05**	(.09)	-.93**	(.09)	-1.21**	(.09)
1973-1982	1.50**	(.13)	-1.26**	(.15)	-1.58**	(.14)
Periods						
1974	.05	(.10)	.11	(.11)	.06	(.10)
1976	-.04	(.10)	.19	(.11)	.08	(.10)
1977	.10	(.10)	.11	(.10)	.10	(.10)
1982	-.09	(.09)	.06	(.10)	-.02	(.09)

Table 6.11 (cont'd).

1984	-.05	(.10)	.08	(.11)	-.07	(.10)
1985	-.17	(.10)	.05	(.11)	-.03	(.10)
1987	-.20*	(.10)	.06	(.11)	.13	(.10)
1988	.05	(.12)	-.13	(.13)	.07	(.12)
1989	.04	(.12)	-.33*	(.13)	-.16	(.12)
1990	.08	(.12)	-.34*	(.14)	-.17	(.12)
1991	.41**	(.12)	-.40**	(.14)	-.06	(.12)
1993	.17	(.12)	-.32*	(.13)	-.36**	(.12)
1994	.14	(.10)	-.36**	(.11)	-.33**	(.10)
1996	.06	(.10)	-.34**	(.11)	-.51**	(.11)
1998	.27**	(.10)	-.55**	(.12)	-.56**	(.11)
2000	.16	(.10)	-.31**	(.12)	-.49**	(.11)
2002	.34**	(.13)	-.37**	(.14)	-.55**	(.13)
Gender	.22**	(.03)	-.25**	(.03)	-.32**	(.03)
Education	.62**	(.02)	-.66**	(.02)	-.62**	(.02)
Income	.17*	(.01)	-.18**	(.02)	-.14**	(.01)
Ideology	-.12**	(.01)	.14**	(.01)	.19**	(.01)
Party ID	.01	(.01)	.00	(.00)	-.03**	(.01)
Religious Attendance	-.11**	(.01)	.10**	(.01)	.09**	(.01)
Evangelical	-.69**	(.21)	.73**	(.21)	.91**	(.22)
Mainline Protestant	-.17**	(.07)	.16*	(.08)	.24**	(.07)
Black Protestant	-.43**	(.08)	.35**	(.09)	.30**	(.08)
Roman Catholic	-.02	(.07)	-.09	(.08)	-.10	(.07)
Secular	.08	(.08)	-.15	(.10)	-.07	(.09)
Interaction Terms						
Evangelical X Religious Attendance	-.03*	(.01)	.06**	(.01)	.08**	(.01)
Evangelical Cohorts						
1913-1922	.13	(.18)	-.05	(.17)	-.21	(.19)
1923-1932	-.06	(.17)	-.10	(.17)	-.33	(.19)
1933-1942	.01	(.17)	-.10	(.16)	-.25	(.18)
1943-1952	-.06	(.16)	.04	(.16)	-.18	(.18)
1953-1962	-.05	(.16)	-.10	(.16)	-.44*	(.18)
1963-1972	-.04	(.18)	-.05	(.18)	-.28	(.20)
1973-1982	.10	(.28)	.05	(.29)	-.37	(.30)
Evangelical Periods						
1974	-.16	(.20)	-.16	(.21)	.01	(.21)
1976	.27	(.20)	-.33	(.21)	-.27	(.21)
1977	-.37	(.20)	-.04	(.20)	.22	(.21)
1982	-.11	(.19)	.01	(.20)	.24	(.20)
1984	.15	(.20)	-.48*	(.20)	-.13	(.20)
1985	-.29	(.19)	.05	(.20)	.04	(.20)
1987	.17	(.19)	-.26	(.19)	-.28	(.19)
1988	-.14	(.22)	.06	(.23)	-.04	(.23)
1989	.28	(.22)	-.27	(.23)	-.35	(.22)

Table 6.11 (cont'd).


1990	-.02	(.23)	.14	(.24)	-.03	(.23)
1991	-.22	(.22)	.07	(.23)	-.29	(.22)
1993	.07	(.21)	-.47*	(.23)	-.14	(.22)
1994	.11	(.19)	-.29	(.20)	-.26	(.19)
1996	.16	(.19)	-.40	(.21)	-.23	(.20)
1998	-.16	(.19)	.09	(.21)	-.00	(.20)
2000	.06	(.20)	-.44*	(.21)	-.47*	(.21)
2002	.05	(.24)	-.62*	(.27)	-.47	(.25)
Constant	-1.32**	(.14)	1.04**	(.15)	1.34**	(.14)
Observations	24262		24278		24074	
Pseudo-R ²						

*p<.05 (two-tail test), *p<.01 (two-tail test)

Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

¹The 1903-1912 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable and the 1980 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable.


Figure 6.14. Tolerance of Homosexuals by Period and Evangelical Tradition: GSS 1974–2002.¹



Note: Predicted probabilities are from Table 6.12.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

Figure 6.15. Tolerance of Homosexuals by Cohort and Evangelical Tradition: GSS 1974–2002.¹



Note: Predicted probabilities are from Table 6.12.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

Table 6.12. Logistic Regression of Periods and Cohorts on Tolerance of Communists: GSS 1974–2002.

	Ban Communist Book		Communist Speech		Communist Teacher	
Birth Cohorts						
1913-1922	.29**	(.08)	-.38**	(.08)	.24**	(.08)
1923-1932	.47**	(.08)	-.56**	(.08)	.46**	(.08)
1933-1942	.61**	(.08)	-.71**	(.08)	.66**	(.08)
1943-1952	.88**	(.07)	-.91**	(.07)	1.04**	(.08)
1953-1962	.95**	(.08)	-.94**	(.07)	1.12**	(.08)
1963-1972	.93**	(.09)	-.87**	(.08)	1.22**	(.08)
1973-1982	1.17**	(.12)	-1.03**	(.12)	1.20**	(.11)
Periods						
1974	.28**	(.10)	-.28**	(.10)	.28**	(.10)
1976	.02	(.10)	-.03	(.10)	.14	(.10)
1977	.07	(.10)	-.15	(.10)	.06	(.09)

Table 6.12 (cont'd).

1982	.01	(.10)	-.06	(.09)	.19*	(.09)
1984	-.04	(.10)	-.03	(.10)	.15	(.10)
1985	-.15	(.10)	.05	(.10)	.10	(.10)
1987	-.06	(.10)	.01	(.10)	.10	(.09)
1988	-.10	(.11)	-.15	(.11)	.20	(.11)
1989	-.08	(.12)	-.13	(.11)	.34**	(.11)
1990	.04	(.12)	-.17	(.12)	.28*	(.11)
1991	.27*	(.12)	-.45**	(.12)	.41**	(.11)
1993	.07	(.12)	-.18	(.11)	.44**	(.11)
1994	-.08	(.10)	-.07	(.10)	.21*	(.09)
1996	-.20*	(.10)	.14	(.10)	.25**	(.09)
1998	-.06	(.10)	-.06	(.10)	.27**	(.09)
2000	-.22*	(.10)	.11	(.10)	.18	(.09)
2002	-.13	(.12)	.03	(.12)	.19	(.11)
Gender	-.05	(.03)	.24**	(.03)	-.14**	(.03)
Education	.70**	(.02)	-.69**	(.02)	.49**	(.02)
Income	.15**	(.01)	-.13**	(.01)	.06**	(.01)
Ideology	-.10**	(.01)	.12**	(.01)	-.14**	(.01)
Party ID	.03****	(.01)	.03****	(.01)	.01	(.01)
Religious	-.07**	(.01)	.06**	(.01)	-.04**	(.01)
Attendance						
Evangelical	-.69**	(.21)	.98**	(.21)	-.13	(.21)
Mainline Protestant	-.43**	(.07)	.53**	(.07)	-.33**	(.06)
Black Protestant	-.90**	(.08)	.79**	(.08)	-.42**	(.07)
Roman Catholic	-.42**	(.07)	.47**	(.07)	-.21**	(.06)
Secular	.06	(.09)	-.07	(.08)	.08	(.07)
Interaction Terms						
Evangelical X	-.05**	(.01)	.03**	(.01)	-.03*	(.01)
Religious						
Attendance						
Evangelical Birth						
Cohorts						
1913-1922	-.18	(.17)	.03	(.17)	-.31	(.18)
1923-1932	-.39*	(.16)	.21	(.16)	-.36*	(.17)
1933-1942	-.20	(.16)	.06	(.16)	-.38*	(.17)
1943-1952	-.25	(.15)	.03	(.15)	-.34*	(.16)
1953-1962	-.26	(.15)	.11	(.16)	-.19	(.16)
1963-1972	-.19	(.17)	.08	(.17)	-.28	(.18)
1973-1982	-.09	(.26)	.33	(.25)	-.12	(.26)
Evangelical						
Periods						
1974	-.31	(.20)	.03	(.20)	-.41	(.21)
1976	.24	(.20)	-.11	(.20)	-.06	(.20)
1977	-.22	(.20)	.01	(.20)	-.35	(.20)
1982	-.14	(.19)	.09	(.19)	-.53**	(.20)
1984	.18	(.20)	-.29	(.19)	-.14	(.20)
1985	.09	(.19)	-.15	(.19)	-.40*	(.20)
1987	.35	(.19)	-.19	(.19)	-.24	(.19)
1988	.20	(.22)	.17	(.22)	-.35	(.22)
1989	.42	(.22)	-.48*	(.22)	-.26	(.22)
1990	.21	(.23)	-.35	(.23)	.06	(.22)

Table 6.12 (cont'd).

1991	.03	(.22)	.16	(.22)	-.28	(.22)
1993	.45*	(.22)	-.60**	(.21)	.00	(.21)
1994	.35	(.19)	-.41*	(.18)	.17	(.18)
1996	.43*	(.19)	-.43*	(.19)	.07	(.19)
1998	.31	(.19)	-.24	(.19)	.05	(.19)
2000	.43*	(.20)	-.60**	(.19)	.29	(.19)
2002	.42	(.24)	-.61*	(.24)	.37	(.23)
Constant	-.88**	(.14)	.64**	(.14)	-1.08**	(.13)
Observations	24180		24440		23610	
Pseudo-R ²						


*p<.05(two-tail test), *p<.01 (two-tail test)

Notes: Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

The 1903-1912 cohort is dropped as the baseline variable

¹The 1980 period variable is dropped as the baseline variable.


Figure 6.16. Tolerance of Communists by Period and Evangelical Tradition: GSS 1974-2002.¹



Note: Predicted probabilities are from Table 6.13.

¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

Figure 6.17. Tolerance of Communists by Cohort and Evangelical Tradition: GSS 1974–2002.¹



Note: Predicted probabilities are from Table 6.13.
¹Controlling for Gender, Education, Income, Religious attendance, Strength of partisanship, Care who wins, Party contact and Religious identity.

6.9 Conclusions

Examination of period and cohort trends for campaign participation and voting finds split support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Campaign participation reveals 1980 to be a crucial year that began the Evangelical trend of change, while voting shows no such trend. Younger Evangelical cohorts have increased both their rate of voting and campaign participation to match or exceed younger Non-Evangelical cohorts.

The liberalizing effect of campaign participation receives mixed support as participation increases liberal views of abortion but decreases support for environmental issues and feminism. The “direction” of the participation may be an intervening factor in the effect of participation as increasing GOP identification also reduces support for environmental issues and feminism. Divergent viewpoints from campaign participation only change respondents if they truly are divergent. The period effects also failed to show a consistent liberal trend. The pattern of Evangelical birth cohorts reveals a liberal trend for nearly all of the models, though liberalizing effects on sexual issues are occurring at a much lower rate than for the Non-Evangelical population.

The most dramatic conclusion of the chapter is the increasing support of tolerance for out-groups across Evangelical periods and among younger cohorts. Evangelicals are beginning to approach Non-Evangelicals in their support for civil liberties. This reorientation is not limited to one out-group but is across the board for atheists, homosexuals and communists. As homosexuality is one of the targeted groups of Evangelical political and social movement organizations, this ability to embrace civil liberties while at the same time not increasing acceptance of homosexual morality suggests that a very complicated balancing of moral values and civil norms is taking root in the Evangelical tradition. Evangelicals are increasingly willing to accept the civil liberties’ claims of homosexuals while maintaining their historical views of the morality of homosexuality. The question remains whether they can maintain this balancing act with increased cultural/political involvement.

CHAPTER VII

PARTICIPATION AND NEW PARADIGM CHURCHES

As separatism declined through the end of the twentieth century, there is little doubt that the cues of Evangelical political and social movement organizations facilitated much of the new participation. This decline, though, was not the only internal change that had the potential to affect Evangelical participation and political attitudes. The 1980s brought a dramatic rise in the number of Evangelical political groups and saw more fundamental change in the nature of the Evangelical church. The rise of a broad range of “new paradigm churches” that rejected separatism, not only in politics but on a wide range of cultural fronts (music, dress, technology), became catalysts for change. These new denominations affected more established Evangelical churches by advocating greater acceptance of current cultural norms. This chapter looks into the influence of new paradigm groups within American Christianity and looks for a connection between tolerance, moderation, participation and new paradigm characteristics.

7.1 Overview and Hypothesis

As Evangelicals embrace political participation, an internal movement may help to speed the adoption of this activism. New paradigm churches have been hailed as a “New Reformation,” changing how Evangelicals view and interact with a modern secular culture. As formerly discussed, these churches are more tolerant of anti-religious views, more liberal on race and class issues, more focused on racial equality, more involved in providing social services and more willing to adopt the music, arts, dress and language of the surrounding culture.

The cultural acceptance of these churches raises the possibility that new paradigm attitudes increase political participation. While the evidence of such a pattern is sparse, Willow Creek Association clergy demonstrate high levels of political activism. Over a third (36%) tried to persuade others how to vote, 19 percent gave money to a campaign, 16 percent displayed a campaign sign and 13 percent attended a campaign rally. A majority (56%) urged their congregations to register or vote and 27% publicly supported a candidate (Kellsted and Green 2003). Miller (1997) reports that 49 percent of Calvary Chapel, Vineyard and Hope Chapel attendees often or sometimes try to persuade another how to vote. Over two thirds (68%) believe that it is important to volunteer time and/or give money to political causes.

This new openness to the culture and increasing levels of tolerance also suggests that secularization or political moderation would find a faster reception in new paradigm-influenced churches than in more traditional Evangelical churches. The interaction with divergent viewpoints producing cognitive contamination would appear to be highest for new paradigm attendees within the Evangelical tradition. Based on this analysis, I hypothesize that:

H1: As new paradigm churches encourage involvement in an attendee's culture, increasing new paradigm attributes among Evangelicals will increase political participation.

H2: As new paradigm churches have a greater tolerance for anti-religious persons and organizations, increasing new paradigm attributes among Evangelicals will increase tolerance for Atheists as an out-group.

H3: As new paradigm churches exhibit greater tolerance for moral diversity, increasing new paradigm attributes among Evangelicals will increase political moderation as measured by a liberal direction.

The one caveat to this last hypothesis is that while new paradigm churches express and demonstrate greater tolerance for those not like themselves, new paradigm attendees have been shown to hold traditional Evangelical views on morals. Additionally, they are more politically conservative than Non-Evangelicals (Miller 1997; Shipley). Moral and political tolerance may be a norm for interaction with the culture, but internal tenets for members are traditional Evangelical views. However, these previous studies did not compare new paradigm moral and political views with those of other Evangelicals to see if they significantly differed.

7.2 Data

The National Congregation Study (“NCS”) was conducted in conjunction with the 1998 General Social Survey. GSS respondents (Total N=2862) who attended a religious service at least once a year were asked to identify a specific congregation and its location. The congregations were then contacted and a representative leader was interviewed.

The result is a survey of 1236 congregations who were nominated for the study by GSS respondents. Approximately half of the GSS respondents (N=1476) can be matched to their congregation. The number of congregation attendees being larger than the number of congregations is a result of larger congregations being identified by more than one respondent. The NCS covers facets of church structure, church demographics, theology, worship structure, internal church programs and activities (including political activity), and community involvement. For this study, the congregation questions were matched with the appropriate General Social Survey respondents and their GSS answers.¹

¹ I am deeply indebted to Professor Mark Chaves at the University of Arizona for making the combined GSS-NCS dataset available to me.

7.3 Conflicting Religious Traditions and Congregations

The NCS's administrators produced their own set of denominational codings separate from the GSS responses. These were based on affiliations obtained from the individual congregations. The NCS has its own religious-tradition coding based on its own denominational coding. Neither the NCS denominational coding nor the religious-tradition coding is used in this study.

Several major differences exist between the NCS traditions coding and the Steensland et al. coding used in this and previous chapters. First, the NCS traditions coding divides Black Protestants across all of the Christian traditions including Evangelicals in opposition to the most commonly used classification schemes (Campbell 2003; Kellstedt 1989; Cook and Wilcox 1990). Evangelicals in particular are usually coded as a white tradition. Furthermore, persons who have behaviorally and attitudinally been identified as "Seculars" (low attendance and vague or nonexistent identification of a tradition) by Steensland et al (as well as Kellstedt and Wald 1993; Kellstedt et al 1996; Kohut et al 2000) are included in Evangelical, Mainline, Black and Catholic traditions and the denominational coding by the NCS. This is despite these persons showing that they hold very distinct political, social and moral attitudes and appear to have little identification with a religious tradition. Respondents with the lowest level of attendance (once or twice a year), even when reporting "None" for their General Social Survey religious identification, were asked to name the congregation they attended and were coded into that denomination. For the sake of compatibility with previous chapters and out of conviction about the necessity of coding Seculars and Black Protestants into separate categories, Steensland et al's coding was followed based on the GSS religious

variables. Then, since new paradigm churches are a movement within American Christianity, non-traditional and secular respondents were dropped leaving Evangelicals, Mainline, Blacks and Catholics (N=1298).

In addition, use of actual congregations versus religious self-identification appears to violate assumptions about “belonging” and the influence of group identification. Identification is not necessarily synonymous with the congregation of current attendance. Attendance may be a reflection of a spousal or family choice or even a lack of available choices. Previous research has shown the powerful effect that identification with a label has in creating and maintaining group-based attitudes. This research on social categorization suggests that one’s self-perception as a part of a group is insufficient for respondents to act as a group (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Tajfel 1981, 1982; Turner 1982). As Hogg and Abrams state, “the group is thus within the individual ...” rather than existing as an external interaction (p. 19). This self-identification has increasingly become the de facto standard of politics and religion research (Wald and Martinez 2001).

Two comparisons of GSS identification and NCS congregations appear to support previous work on identification. In both the GSS and the National Congregation Study, respondents are asked to identify their religious preference as Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Other (with DK in NES) or None (only in the GSS). If they respond “Protestant” they are asked what church or denomination (GSS “if any”). I recoded both the GSS religious classifications variable (“relig”) and the National Congregation Study classifications variable (“trad2”) using a very simple three-part identification: Protestant, Catholic and Other.² I then checked the percentage of matching identifications between

² For this analysis, those responding “None” (N=35 dropped) for their GSS religious preference were excluded to maintain continuity between the GSS and NCS. The NCS takes “none” respondents who report

the GSS and NCS by each level of religious attendance. Different answers for their GSS Protestant/Catholic/Other identification and for their NCS Protestant/Catholic/Other affiliation are the case for over one-sixth of the respondents in the database. This response is somewhat mitigated by attendance as 11% differ at the highest level of attendance while 18% differ at the lowest level. It still remains that, of those persons who attend religious services more than weekly, one in nine identify with a tradition that is different from where they attend.

Further examination of religious identity suggests that the most accurate identity is that which respondents report, and not the church they attend. Again, using a simple Protestant, Catholic, and Other triad, I recoded respondents' reported religious preference at the age of 16. This I correlated with both their current GSS and NCS Protestant/Catholic/Other religious preference.³ Table 7.1 shows the results broken down by attendance. At every level of reported religious attendance, with the exception of "nearly every week," the "age 16 preference" is more highly correlated with the GSS current preference than with the congregation the respondents are currently attending. The age-16 current-GSS correlation is also always higher than the correlation between the current GSS identification and the NCS congregation identification. This may be an artifact produced by the respondents' recall of their earlier religious preference or it may show the permanence of early religious identification. It would appear to be a mistake to classify respondents by their NCS denominations if the researcher is looking for the respondents' religious identity. It also produces the curious result that the attributes from

attending a congregation the previous year and places them into Catholic or Protestant denominations based on the church they attended.

³ Again the "none" category was dropped from both the Age-16 and current-GSS preferences (N=79 dropped).

one's current congregation in one religious tradition, and self-identification with a different religious tradition, are working in conjunction for some respondents to affect political attitudes. While beyond the scope of this chapter, this is a question that deserves greater future investigation.

Table 7.1. Religious Identity Correlations for GSS Age Sixteen Preferences, Current GSS Preferences and Current National Congregation Study Preferences.

Religious Attendance	N	Correlations		
		Age 16 - GSS	Age 16 - NCS	GSS - NCS
Once or twice a year	152	.74	.66	.63
Several times a year	211	.83	.62	.60
Once a month	143	.72	.53	.62
2-3 times a month	187	.88	.58	.59
Nearly every week	144	.46	.54	.53
Weekly	388	.70	.53	.65
More than weekly	161	.74	.59	.66
Total	1,461	.60	.50	.57

Note: all correlations are significant at $p < .001$

7.4 The New Paradigm Scale

New paradigm churches through their music, cultural sensitivity and church growth have had an expanding influence on Evangelical Christianity. As examined previously, their influence in established Evangelical churches is seen in adoption of contemporary worship styles, use of the arts in worship, increased informality in dress and decor, increased use of technology, establishment of weekly support/12-step groups and home-fellowship groups, increased ministry by the laity with a focus on using spiritual gifts, changed levels of community involvement, and concern about racial issues. While new paradigm churches also have the characteristic of younger attendees and lower education requirements for clergy, the former is a consequence of new paradigm attributes, and the latter is less likely than other attributes to be exported to or

approved by established Evangelical denominations. It is important to note that none of these groupings of attributes by themselves capture new paradigm influence and by themselves may be more influential in a religious tradition other than the Evangelical tradition. Mainline Protestants have traditionally used more technology and had a higher receptivity to the arts than Evangelicals have but with less participatory worship. Charismatics and Pentecostals (within all four traditions) have had a more expressive worship style without the concerns of community involvement or therapeutic (support group) outreaches.

While there are no explicit new paradigm church questions in the NCS, several church measurements match new paradigm characteristics. I created an additional new paradigm scale using sixteen measurements which combine six smaller categories : *informality* (laughter or applause during worship), *contemporary and participatory worship* (electric guitar, drums, raising hands, jumping, shouting or dancing during worship), *performing arts* (skit or dance performance), *technology* (use of multimedia, a church website or email), *spiritual gifts* (speaking in tongues, groups for practicing spiritual gifts, groups meeting for healing)⁴, and *groups for community involvement* (groups to discuss racial relations, various support groups, groups meeting to assess community needs). This created a scale of new paradigm characteristics (“NPC”) coded from 1 to 17 (1 - no NPC characteristics to 17 - all NPC characteristics).⁵

⁴ An initial scale excluded speaking in tongues as a part of the spiritual gifts dimension. Removal of the tongues variable reduced the alpha reliability to .69. As many new paradigm churches have charismatic or Pentecostal tendencies and this emphasis on the experiential is intermingled with many of their attributes, tongues were included in the scale.

⁵ Even with this many variables the NCS does not measure every new paradigm attribute. The NCS does not measure the percentage of congregants involved in ministry which goes hand in hand with lay ministry in new paradigm churches. A possible surrogate is questions about spiritual gift usage which can provide a rough ministry replacement. Also the breakdown of church groups as recorded by the NCS was problematic. The NCS recorded groups into categories of fellowship-social, religious-spiritual, religious-

Table 7.2 shows the percentage of respondents whose church gave an affirmative response to each variable. While New Paradigm church influence is unmeasured among Black churches, the table shows that Black churches may score high on the paradigm scale because of the traditionally demonstrative worship in their churches and large numbers of Black churches in the 1980s adding charismatic and Pentecostal practices to their churches. Black churches scored the highest percentage of drum and guitar usage and highest in jumping, laughter, applause and speaking in tongues. The possibility exists that the new paradigm scale for Evangelicals, Mainline and Catholics represents an accurate measurement of new paradigm influence (greater cultural accommodation, participation and moderation) while the same scale for Black Protestants may represent a conservative shift arising from traditional Pentecostal influences.

Table 7.2. Percentage of New Paradigm Church Attributes in Each Christian Tradition.

Variables	Evangelical Protestant	Mainline Protestant	Black Protestant	Roman Catholic
Drums used during main service	34%	15%	59%	13%
Electric guitar used during main service	36%	22%	38%	31%
Adults jumped, shouted or danced during main service	14%	3%	57%	2%
Applause during main service	66%	56%	88%	43%
Congregants raised hands during main service	47%	27%	85%	53%
Used overhead projector during main service	29%	12%	14%	3%

education-fellowship, religious-fellowship-social, religious-service-fellowship, religious-devotional-education, homeowners-neighborhood groups, activities in homes, bible-scripture-study-social, and education-social and others. Identifying the type of small groups/home fellowships germane to new paradigm congregations was impossible so this attribute was excluded. Support groups were identifiable despite falling into three categories, substance abuse, divorce and support group unspecified. All substance abuse and divorce respondents with affirmative responses also gave affirmative responses in the unspecified variable so that variable was included.

Table 7.2 (cont'd).

Group met to receive or practice gifts of the spirit in past 12 months	14%	16%	26%	28%
Tongues spoken during worship in past 12 months	19%	6%	45%	20%
Group met for physical healing in past 12 months	36%	47%	37%	50%
Dance performed during worship within last 12 months	25%	30%	42%	29%
Congregation has a website	30%	36%	15%	25%
Congregation uses email	36%	41%	21%	19%
Group met to discuss race relations in past 12 months	15%	27%	30%	20%
Group met to plan or conduct an assessment of community needs in past 12 months	40%	48%	53%	52%
Group met to support people with specific problems	30%	50%	27%	49%
Skit performed during worship within last 12 months	79%	82%	72%	57%
Laughter during main service	82%	86%	77%	58%

Note: N varies between 1286 and 1298 for respective variables.

The new paradigm scale was then examined for reliability. The alpha reliability test for the scale is .73 and the exclusion of any of the variables failed to increase the alpha level. Exploratory factor analysis was performed on the data to see if its dimensions matched the categories of the scale (informality, participatory worship, technology, spiritual gifts, performing arts, community involvement groups). The factor analysis was performed using principal component analysis with a varimax rotation. The dimensions were determined by examining the scree plot and the eigenvalues. The exploratory factor analysis found five dimensions to the data rather than six (Table 7.3). Informality did not appear as a separate dimension but instead was split between the participatory worship

and performing arts. Dance performance was also split between performing arts and spiritual gifts. Given charismatic and Pentecostal affinity for banners, flags and dance, this division has a sound theoretical basis (Ward 2003; Webber 1995). For Pentecostal churches, a trained dance performance is still an emotional worship expression tied to the exuberance of the Holy Spirit and spiritual gifts. For less Pentecostal churches, dance performance is tied to an appreciation of the arts.

Table 7.3. Factor Analysis of New Paradigm Church Attributes.¹

Variables	Participatory Worship	Spiritual Gifts	Technology	Community Involvement	Performance
Drums used during main service	.806				
Electric guitar used during main service	.682				
Adults jumped, shouted or danced during main service	.647				
Applause during main service	.617				
Congregants raised hands during main service	.615				
Used overhead projector during main service	.504		.338		
Group met to receive or practice gifts of the spirit in past 12 months		.722			
Tongues spoken during worship in past 12 months	.426	.637			
Group met for physical healing in past 12 months		.556		.357	
Dance performed during worship within last 12 months		.498			.368
Congregation has a website			.793		
Congregation uses email			.731		
Group met to discuss race relations in past 12 months				.717	
Group met to plan /conduct an assessment of community needs in past 12 months				.679	

Table 7.3 (cont'd).

Group met to support people with specific problems				.522	
Skit performed during worship within last 12 months					.796
Laughter during main service					.678
Eigenvalue	2.80	1.77	1.59	1.48	1.35
Percentage of Variance	16.5%	10.4%	9.4%	8.7%	8.0%

¹ All factor loadings above .30 are shown. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

A comparison of the new paradigm scale means by religious tradition (Table 7.4) reveals that the new paradigm levels for Evangelicals and Mainline Protestants are very similar. Black Protestants, perhaps because of their worship styles, score significantly higher than the other two Protestant groups, while Roman Catholics show the lowest average level of new paradigm attributes.

Table 7.4. Anova Test of Means: New Paradigm Scale Means by Religious Tradition.

Religious Tradition	New Paradigm Mean ¹	Standard Deviation	N	ANOVA <i>F</i>
Evangelical	6.39 ^a	3.31	406	21.33***
Mainline	6.09 ^{a, b}	2.86	291	
Black	7.81 ^c	3.02	168	
Catholic	5.68 ^b	2.64	429	

¹ Means with the same subscript are not significantly different from each other ($p < .05$).
*** $p < .001$.

7.5 Methodology: Regression and Logistic Regression

While the N for the four Christian traditions in the NCS is 1298 respondents, many of the dependent variables under consideration were split ballot questions. This resulted in many dependent variables with an approximated N of 800. Control variables

(See Appendix K for descriptions.) include demographics (education, income, gender, age, number of children, marital status, and urban), political variables (party identification or strength of partisanship, and political ideology) and religious variables (religious attendance, and dummy variables for Evangelicals, Mainline and Black; Catholics are the excluded category). Interaction terms take in the new paradigm scale and attendance, new paradigm scale and religious traditions, and religious traditions and attendance.⁶

An initial set of twenty-seven regression and logistic regression models (not shown) using tolerance, political, and moral attitudes plus participation as dependent variables, failed to find any significant effects for Evangelical X paradigm interaction. A second set of models was run with an additional set of interaction variables using a three-way interaction for religious traditions X paradigm scale X church attendance. This tests for a new paradigm influence that is mediated by attendance and tradition. Seven models showed significant effects for Evangelicals with increasing attendance in churches with higher paradigm scores. Five models fall into the category of tolerance, one model is a moral/political attitude and the last model is a measurement of participation.

7.6 Results

Evangelicals with increased attendance interacting with increasing levels of new paradigm characteristics raised their probability of tolerance of atheists, homosexuals and

⁶ For an initial set of models, first order terms, paradigm and attendance, were centered by subtracting the variable mean. This has the advantage of reducing colinearity between the first order terms and interaction terms and it also improves the ability to interpret the first order terms when adding the interaction terms (Aiken and West 1991). Despite reducing the VIF scores, no new variables became significant ($p < .10$, one-tail test) or increased their significance level. Given the ongoing debate that centering produces nearly identical results as non-centered regression and the possibility of systematically biased estimates of the main effects, the models are presented without centered first order terms (Katrachis 1992; Kromrey and Foster-Johnson 1998).

communists in five of nine tolerance models. Models for each of the three out-groups include measuring support for the civil rights of an out-group member as measured by giving a public speech, keeping an out-group-authored book in the library, or allowing an out-group member to teach at the college level.

Table 7.5. Logistic Regression: Paradigm Scales and Tolerance of Atheists


	Atheist Speaker		Atheist Book		Atheist Teacher	
Political Variables						
Party ID	.05	(.05)	.04	(.04)	.07	(.04)
Political Ideology	-.07	(.07)	-.13*	(.07)	-.12*	(.06)
Demographics						
Education	.58***	(.10)	.60***	(.10)	.66***	(.10)
Income	.10	(.09)	.09	(.09)	.05	(.09)
Gender	-.36**	(.18)	.06	(.17)	-.01	(.17)
Age	-.02***	(.01)	-.01***	(.01)	-.04***	(.01)
Children in Home	.00	(.05)	-.01	(.05)	.07	(.06)
Urban	.04	(.03)	.00	(.03)	.04	(.03)
Marital Status	-.02	(.07)	.10	(.07)	-.00	(.06)
Religious Variables						
Religious Attendance	-.19**	(.08)	-.14*	(.08)	-.02	(.07)
Evangelical	-.41*	(.22)	-.67***	(.22)	-.22	(.21)
Mainline	.28	(.25)	-.46**	(.23)	.08	(.22)
Black	-.34	(.30)	-.51+	(.30)	-.50*	(.29)
New Paradigm Scale	.01	(.06)	.04	(.06)	.00	(.05)
Interaction Terms						
Evangelical X Paradigm	-.39*	(.22)	-.59***	(.22)	-.32	(.20)
Mainline X Paradigm	-.48*	(.26)	-.48**	(.24)	-.01	(.21)
Black X Paradigm	-.24	(.32)	.13	(.31)	-.01	(.29)
Paradigm X Attendance	-.02	(.03)	-.02	(.03)	-.01	(.03)
Evangelical X Attendance	.04	(.11)	-.05	(.11)	-.09	(.11)
Mainline X Attendance	.29**	(.13)	.07	(.12)	.20*	(.11)
Black X Attendance	-.02	(.15)	.10	(.15)	-.16	(.15)
Evangelical X Attendance X Paradigm	.08**	(.04)	.09**	(.04)	.06*	(.03)
Mainline X Attendance X Paradigm	.09**	(.05)	.07	(.04)	-.01	(.04)
Black X Attendance X Paradigm	.05	(.05)	-.04	(.05)	.02	(.05)
Constant	.46	(.70)	-.09	(.70)	-.20	(.67)
Observations	851		829		821	
Pseudo-R ²	.14		.13		.15	

Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The Roman Catholic tradition is dropped as the baseline variable.

*p<.10 (one-tail test), **p<.05 (two-tail test), ***p<.01 (two-tail test)

Table 7.5 gives the results for measuring tolerance of atheists, an out-group for which new paradigm churches have already been shown to have increased support for their civil rights. In keeping with research beginning with Stouffer (1954), education increases tolerance in all three atheist models and age decreases tolerance. In support of Kennedy's conclusion about new paradigm churches increasing tolerance for atheists, Evangelicals with higher levels of attendance, and whose congregation has higher new paradigm characteristics, have higher probabilities of tolerance in all three models. As the first set of models finds, significant change in tolerance requires the interaction of attendance with new paradigm levels. Figures 7.1 through 7.3 show a uniform pattern for Evangelical attendance and new paradigm levels. Occasional attendance produces a flat to slight increase in the probability of tolerance, regardless of increasing new paradigm levels. Those with increasing new paradigm levels and little or no attendance drop in their probability of expressing tolerance. The probability of tolerance increases for Evangelicals with increasing attendance and increasing new paradigm levels. The level of new paradigm influence appears to reverse the effects of commitment in an Evangelical congregation. Higher levels of commitment (as measured by attendance) reduce the probability of tolerance in a traditionally Evangelical church, while decreased involvement in the traditional church raises the probability of tolerance. The new cultural ethos produced in a new paradigm church turns this on its head.

Figure 7.1. Probability of Tolerance of an Atheist Speaker by Religious Tradition, New Paradigm Attributes, and Attendance.




Note: Predicted probability data is from Table 7.5.

¹Controlling for Strength of partisanship, Party ID, Gender, Children, Marriage, Education, Income, and Urban.

The most puzzling part of this pattern is that lower attendance at a new paradigm church reduces tolerance, while lower attendance increases tolerance for traditional Evangelical churches. The answer may be in the nature of the new paradigm churches. Many of them are relatively new congregations, or traditional churches that have undergone radical changes in their structure and style. Frequently established churches have undergone significant turmoil with membership loss or even church splits when adopting new paradigm styles. The likely possibility is that infrequent new paradigm

attendees represent evangelicals whose attendance has declined in opposition to the new paradigm influences. While these disgruntled attendees would represent the church stalwarts in traditional Evangelical churches, new paradigm directions (seen as “worldly” compromise) have increased dissatisfaction and reduced attendance, but not affected their “normal” lower tolerance. It becomes a possibility that the two most intolerant Evangelical groups, residing at opposing ends of the scales in Figures 7.1 through 7.3, are in effect drawn from the same Evangelical subgroup.

Figure 7.2. Probability of Tolerance of an Atheist Book by Religious Tradition, New Paradigm Attributes, and Attendance.




Note: Predicted probability data is from Table 7.5.

¹ Controlling for Strength of partisanship, Party ID, Gender, Children, Marriage, Education, Income, and Urban.

A similar pattern also exists for Mainline attendees. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show that paradigm influence increases the tolerance of higher attending Mainline respondents, while Figure 7.3 shows that Mainline new paradigm attributes increase tolerance regardless of attendance levels. Adoption of this new Evangelical style by Roman Catholics appears to move them in a more conservative direction on tolerance. Also in keeping with the possibility of a Pentecostal influence rather than a cultural-embracing influence, high attending Black Protestants either decline or have the lowest increase of tolerance of the three attendance levels. Increased tolerance appears to only occur for new paradigm Evangelicals or Mainline Protestants.

Figure 7.3. Probability of Tolerance of an Atheist Teacher by Religious Tradition, New Paradigm Attributes, and Attendance.



Note: Predicted probability data is from Table 7.5.

¹Controlling for Strength of partisanship, Party ID, Gender, Children, Marriage, Education, Income, and Urban.

While only one of each of the three models for Homosexuals and Communists (Tables 7.6 and 7.7) shows a significant attendance/new paradigm/Evangelical interaction, the configurations remain the same. For Evangelical and Mainline Protestants, increasing exposure to an increasing number of new paradigm attributes raises the probability of supporting civil liberties and tolerance for out-groups activities (Figures 7.4 and 7.5).

Table 7.6. Logistic Regression: Paradigm Scales and Tolerance of Homosexuals.

	Homosexual Speaker		Homosexual Book		Homosexual Teacher	
Political Variables						
Party ID	-.00	(.05)	.07	(.05)	-.02	(.05)
Political Ideology	-.20**	(.08)	-.13+	(.07)	-.11	(.07)
Demographics						
Education	.67***	(.12)	.53***	(.11)	.72***	(.12)
Income	.09	(.11)	.00	(.10)	.09	(.10)
Gender	-.07	(.20)	.09	(.18)	.60***	(.20)
Age	-.02***	(.01)	-.02***	(.01)	-.04***	(.01)
Children in Home	.06	(.06)	-.04	(.06)	.00	(.06)
Urban	.05	(.04)	-.02	(.03)	.01	(.04)
Marital Status	.02	(.08)	.07	(.07)	.03	(.08)
Religious Variables						
Religious Attendance	-.12	(.10)	-.16+	(.09)	-.07	(.09)
Evangelical	.26	(.18)	.26+	(.15)	.34**	(.17)
Mainline	-.68***	(.26)	-1.18***	(.23)	-.83***	(.25)
Black	.45	(.32)	-.39	(.26)	.15	(.31)
Political Variables	-.36	(.36)	-1.03***	(.31)	-.52	(.34)
New Paradigm Scale	.03	(.07)	.03	(.06)	.01	(.07)
Interaction Terms						
Evangelical X Paradigm	-.06	(.26)	-.30	(.23)	-.39	(.24)
Mainline X Paradigm	.11	(.33)	-.42	(.28)	.49	(.32)
Black X Paradigm	1.05**	(.44)	-.05	(.32)	.31	(.37)
Paradigm X Attendance	.02	(.04)	-.02	(.03)	-.03	(.03)
Evangelical X Attendance	-.09	(.13)	-.08	(.12)	-.17	(.12)
Mainline X Attendance	.14	(.16)	-.16	(.13)	-.20	(.15)
Black X Attendance	.22	(.18)	.01	(.16)	.08	(.17)


Table 7.6 (cont'd).

Evangelical X Attendance X Paradigm	.01	(.04)	.05	(.04)	.07*	(.04)
Mainline X Attendance X Paradigm	-.01	(.06)	.06	(.05)	-.05	(.05)
Black X Attendance X Paradigm	-.18**	(.07)	-.00	(.06)	-.06	(.06)
Constant	.81	(.84)	.65	(.75)	-.12	(.80)
Observations	820		807		807	
Pseudo-R ²	.19		.17		.22	

Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The Roman Catholic tradition is dropped as the baseline variable.

*p<.10 (one-tail test), **p<.05 (two-tail test), ***p<.01 (two-tail test)

Figure 7.4. Probability of Tolerance of a Homosexual Teacher by Religious-Tradition New-Paradigm Attributes, and Attendance.



Note: Predicted probability data is from Table 7.6.

¹Controlling for Strength of partisanship, Party ID, Gender, Children, Marriage, Education, Income, and Urban.


Table 7.7. Logistic Regression: Paradigm Scales and Tolerance of Communists.

	Communist Speaker		Communist Book		Communist Teacher	
Political Variables						
Party ID	.08*	(.05)	.15***	(.05)	.01	(.04)
Political Ideology	-.13**	(.07)	-.15**	(.07)	-.06	(.06)
Demographics						
Education	.70***	(.10)	.72***	(.10)	.37***	(.10)
Income	.10	(.09)	.01	(.09)	.02	(.09)
Gender	-.30*	(.17)	-.03	(.17)	.05	(.16)
Age	-.01**	(.01)	-.01	(.01)	-.02***	(.01)
Children in Home	-.03	(.05)	-.02	(.05)	.03	(.05)
Urban	.03	(.03)	-.01	(.03)	.01	(.03)
Marital Status	-.01	(.07)	.07	(.07)	.02	(.06)
Religious Variables						
Religious Attendance	-.11	(.07)	-.13+	(.08)	-.06	(.07)
Church Theology	.17	(.14)	.28+	(.14)	.22*	(.13)
Evangelical	-.34	(.22)	-.58***	(.22)	-.40*	(.21)
Mainline	.23	(.24)	-.32	(.24)	-.32	(.22)
Black	-.21	(.29)	-.54*	(.30)	-.56*	(.29)
New Paradigm Scale	.01	(.05)	-.04	(.06)	-.05	(.05)
Interaction Terms						
Evangelical X Paradigm	-.38*	(.21)	-.28	(.22)	-.15	(.20)
Mainline X Paradigm	-.42*	(.25)	-.44*	(.25)	.14	(.22)
Black X Paradigm	-.13	(.31)	.08	(.31)	-.28	(.30)
Paradigm X Attendance	-.02	(.03)	-.02	(.03)	-.02	(.03)
Evangelical X Attendance	.05	(.11)	.05	(.11)	.10	(.10)
Mainline X Attendance	-.05	(.12)	-.01	(.12)	.06	(.11)
Black X Attendance	-.06	(.15)	-.00	(.15)	-.24	(.15)
Evangelical X Attendance X Paradigm	.06*	(.04)	.05	(.04)	.03	(.03)
Mainline X Attendance X Paradigm	.07*	(.04)	.08*	(.04)	.00	(.04)
Black X Attendance X Paradigm	.04	(.05)	-.01	(.05)	.08	(.05)
Constant	-.75	(.77)	-1.16	(.73)	.21	(.68)
Observations	815		803		785	
Pseudo-R ²	.14		.14		.09	

Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The Roman Catholic tradition is dropped as the baseline variable.

*p<.10 (one-tail test), **p<.05 (two-tail test), ***p<.01 (two-tail test)

Figure 7.5. Probability of Tolerance of a Communist Speaker by Religious-Tradition New-Paradigm Attributes, and Attendance.



Note: Predicted probability data is from Table 7.7.

¹ Controlling for Strength of partisanship, Party ID, Gender, Children, Marriage, Education, Income, and Urban.

The next model looks at the only moral/political attitude beyond tolerance to have a significant Evangelical new paradigm effect. The abortion scale used as the dependent variable was produced from six GSS questions measuring support for abortion under a variety of circumstances. The scale is coded 0 - no support for abortion to 6 - highest support for abortion. The regression model (Table 7.8), using the same control variables as the tolerance model, finds that new paradigm attributes decrease abortion support at nearly every level of attendance for Evangelical, Mainline and Black Protestants. Only

the lowest levels of Evangelical attendees are unchanged by increasing new paradigm levels. Among new paradigm Roman Catholics (Figure 7.6) with high and occasional attendance, a moderation or secularization of abortion attitudes appears to be taking place. For the moment, Evangelical new paradigm churches appear to be maintaining a balancing act of conservative theology with increasing cultural openness. The lack of significance for new paradigm attributes in so many models (not shown) suggests that NP churches are not yet influencing their attendees in a more secular direction for a variety of attitudes. However, with the exception of abortion attitudes, they are not significantly influencing Evangelicals in a conservative direction either. The surprise is that they are not producing moderation, but a conservative shift (at least for abortion) in Mainline and Black traditions.

Table 7.8. Regression: Paradigm Scales and Abortion Support.

	Abortion Scale	
Political Variables		
Party ID	-.09*	(.06)
Political Ideology	-.21**	(.09)
Demographics		
Education	.07	(.14)
Income	-.02	(.13)
Gender	.20	(.24)
Age	.00	(.01)
Children in Home	-.09	(.08)
Urban	.11**	(.04)
Marital Status	.02	(.09)
Religious Variables		
Religious Attendance	-.34***	(.11)
Evangelical	1.31***	(.43)
Mainline	2.60***	(.85)
Black	.24	(.41)
New Paradigm Scale	-.05	(.07)
Interaction Terms		
Evangelical X Paradigm	1.01**	(.45)
Mainline X Paradigm	-.24	(.78)
Black X Paradigm	.38	(.39)


Table 7.8 (cont'd).

Paradigm X Attendance	.07*	(.04)
Evangelical X Attendance	-.19	(.21)
Mainline X Attendance	-.59	(.40)
Black X Attendance	.56***	(.20)
Evangelical X Attendance X Paradigm	-.15**	(.07)
Mainline X Attendance X Paradigm	-.01	(.11)
Black X Attendance X Paradigm	-.07	(.07)
Constant	1.46	(1.02)
Observations	737	
R ²	.19	

Notes: Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The Roman Catholic tradition is dropped as the baseline variable.

*p<.10 (one-tail test), **p<.05 (two-tail test), ***p<.01 (two-tail test)

Figure 7.6. Pro-choice Support by Religious-Tradition New-Paradigm Attributes, and Attendance.



Note: Predicted probability data is from Table 7.8.

¹Controlling for Strength of partisanship, Party ID, Gender, Children, Marriage, Education, Income, and Urban.

The last model looks for a new paradigm effect on political participation in the form of voting. The dependent variable for this model is whether the respondent reported voting in the 1996 Presidential Election. Dependent variables are the same as the tolerance and abortion models with the exception of the addition of a number of congregation-specific political variables. Using the NCS also allows for inclusion of church variables not normally found in political models. As the strictness or theological conservativeness of a church has been shown to affect participation, a liberal to conservative theology variable is included in the voter participation model (Campbell 2000). In addition, the voter participation model includes variables covering candidates speaking to the congregation, voter-guide distribution, opportunities for political activism and groups meeting to discuss politics. As Black Protestants historically have the lowest voting tendency among the religious groups, they are dropped as the comparison category.

As Table 7.9 shows, the model finds significant support for the strict church hypothesis. As a congregation's theology moves from liberal to moderate to conservative, the probability of voting decreases 9%. At the same time, if the perceived political stance of the church is conservative, the probability of voting increases by 11% over a liberal congregation. None of the other congregational political variables are significant. The control variables perform as expected with strength of partisanship, education and income increasing the likelihood voting, being female decreasing the likelihood, and age showing a curvilinear effect of increase then decrease.

Table 7.9. Logistic Regression: Paradigm Scales and Probability of Voting.

	Voted in 96		Marginal Effects
Political Variables			
Strength of Partisanship	.61***	(.08)	.09
Church Political Ideology	.33**	(.15)	.05
Opportunities for Political Activism	-.04	(.17)	-.00
Group to discuss Politics	-.30	(.27)	-.02
Voter Guides Distributed	.09	(.18)	.00
Candidate spoke to congregation	.30	(.34)	.03
Demographics			
Education	.57***	(.10)	.10
Income	.12*	(.08)	.02
Gender	-.27*	(.16)	-.04
Age	.13***	(.03)	.02
Age-squared	-.09***	(.02)	.01
Urban	-.04	(.03)	-.01
Religious Variables			
Church Theology	-.31**	(.15)	-.05
Religious Attendance	.00	(.11)	.00
Evangelical	-.15	(1.05)	-.01
Mainline	.64	(.99)	.09
Catholic	-1.07	(.65)	-.03
New Paradigm Scale	.03	(.06)	.00
Interaction Terms			
Evangelical X Paradigm	-.48**	(.24)	-.08
Mainline X Paradigm	-.28	(.27)	-.03
Catholic X Paradigm	-.25	(.25)	-.06
Paradigm X Attendance	-.04	(.03)	-.01
Evangelical X Attendance	.03	(.13)	.01
Mainline X Attendance	.41***	(.16)	.08
Catholic X Attendance	.12	(.13)	.02
Evangelical X Attendance X Paradigm	.08*	(.04)	.01
Mainline X Attendance X Paradigm	.06	(.05)	.01
Catholic X Attendance X Paradigm	.05	(.04)	.01
Constant	-5.14***	(1.40)	
Observations	1156		
Pseudo-R ²	.21		


Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The Black Protestant tradition is dropped as the baseline variable

*p<.10 (one-tail test), **p<.05 (two-tail test), ***p<.01 (two-tail test)

The interaction of attendance, new paradigm characteristics and being Evangelical is again significant. Evangelicals with high attendance in congregations with high new

paradigm levels slightly increase their probability of voting (Figure 7.7). Other Evangelical levels of attendance dropped in their probability of voting as the new paradigm attributes increased. Increasing attendance in a new paradigm church for the other three traditions decreases the likelihood of voting. Given that new paradigm characteristics are intertwined with Evangelical or conservative theology (having started in the Evangelical tradition), a congregation that is not already Evangelical is often becoming more theologically conservative by adopting this style and message. In effect for Evangelicals, new paradigm increases are a liberalizing influence while for every other tradition new paradigm increases are a conservative shift.

Figure 7.7. Probability of Voting by Religious-Tradition New-Paradigm Attributes, and Attendance.



Note: Predicted probability data is from Table 7.9.

¹Controlling for Strength of partisanship, Party ID, Gender, Children, Marriage, Education, Income, and Urban.

7.7 Conclusions

Under the surface of changing Evangelical political participation has lurked a growing often unnoticed influence among Evangelicals and to a lesser extent Mainline Protestants. The new paradigm movement has begun to transform these two traditions from the inside with increasing participation and tolerance for Evangelicals and increasing tolerance for Mainline Protestants. While both Evangelical and Mainline show some new paradigm effect, why is there a clearer pattern of increased tolerance for Evangelicals than Mainline Protestants? Mainline churches already embrace tolerance at a higher rate than Evangelicals. For Mainliners, adopting new paradigm styles merely moves them along in the same direction they were heading while for Evangelical churches it is a new tack, a change in orientation on tolerance and participation.

Conversely, it is not clear from the data that new paradigm attributes apply to congregations outside of Evangelical and Mainline Protestants. The results show clear changes in Evangelical and Mainline respondents as their attendance and NP attributes increase. The evidence is less clear for Black Protestants and Roman Catholics. What is a scale of new paradigm attributes for Evangelicals and Mainline congregations may be a scale of Pentecostal/charismatic influence for Roman Catholics and Black Protestants. The new paradigm scale carries with it an ethos of openness to the culture, tolerance, and participation while the Pentecostal scale may be closing congregations to the culture. The constant influence of attendance interacting with NP levels suggests that new paradigm

influence requires exposure in order to produce change among respondents. This effect is most evident in new paradigm effects on tolerance.

The results of this model support Djupe and Grant's (2001) finding that religious traditions do not directly promote different levels of participation but rather participation depends on how churches connect their religious practices and their political activism. In this case though, participation is not tied to political events (political speaker, political group) held within the church, but rather, it is a reflection of Evangelicals rejecting the old separatism standard. The mantra of cultural relevance helps new paradigm attendees embrace the civil liberty standards of the greater community, and raises voting participation. Still, the theorized secularization of embracing cultural relevance does not yet appear to be occurring. This is not to suggest that it will not, merely that it bears further watching as new paradigm influence continues to grow.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Evangelical participation has changed and as a result Evangelicals are changing. The campaign participation and voting trends in this study suggest a gradual acceptance of new levels of political participation. The 1992 Presidential election may have been a key election for Evangelical participation in the Republican Party, but it did not trigger changes in Evangelical participation. The mutual embrace of Evangelicals and the GOP must be assumed to have been built upon the foundation of sporadic, yet increasing, Evangelical political activism. Evangelicals have effectively shed all signs of separatism in politics. As a result, the GOP finds a new constituency and Evangelicals find a home in a major party because Evangelicals are both conditioned to participate and are looking for a participatory outlet that signals receptiveness to their concerns. The changes in 1992 are a consequence of trends starting in 1980. This is a tale of a gradual process that covers two decades, involves a reordering of Evangelical political thought, and focuses mostly on changes among younger Evangelicals.

Chapter Five shows that the American electorate underwent a fundamental shift in its political sophistication as measured by issues accessibility. From one percent of the total population in 1976, the accessibility of Social Issues has steadily grown to the point that by the year 2000 it was accessed first by one out of eight Americans. This demonstrates a shift in political thinking country, and also suggests the effectiveness of new cues in restructuring the hierarchy of chronicities for Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals alike. These results also hint at some validity to the culture war motif. The increased political involvement of Evangelicals is a reflection of increased concern about

social issues accompanied to a lesser extent by more participation by Evangelicals using the economic chronicity. A similar shift among Seculars completes the drawing of lines for the cultural conflict. As a result, Evangelicals and Seculars appear to be increasing their access to the Social Issues chronicity in a manner that reflects the culture war expectations of Hunter (1991) and Wuthnow (1998). The lagging increase of the chronicities' usage for the rest of the population reveals the widening influence of this war beyond Evangelicals and Seculars.

Fiorina (2004) may be partially right in his belief that the culture war is being fought by ten percent of the American electorate. However, the trends of increasing numbers of seculars, increasing participation of Evangelicals and growing usage of social issue access imply that the culture war is not yet fully engaged. The conflicts of the past two decades may only be the opening skirmishes of a larger war yet to come. Conversely, it should be acknowledged that Evangelical participation has not exceeded that of other religious traditions to any significant degree. Evangelicals have not become super-participants. The past two decades have merely seen the return of religious conservatives to the political arena. Their participation is only noticeable because of their previous avoidance of the political realm.

The Social Issues chronicity usage also shows the influence of Evangelical church environment as attendance increases its accessibility, while economic chronicity remains unaffected by attendance. Additionally, orthodoxy as measured by views for the Bible fails to be significant for either reciprocal model. The influence of attendance on political sophistication not only reinforces prior conclusions about churches as political

communities, but suggests another area of effect for these communities that deserves greater consideration (Wald, Owen and Hill 1988; Djupe and Grant 2001).

Social Issues is not the only chronicity affecting Evangelical participation. It is possible that the usage of the economic chronicity may also provide good news for the GOP, as a segment of Evangelicals is beginning to reflect traditional Republican emphasis on economic issues. Since orthodoxy and attendance are not affecting the access of economic issues, it suggests that Evangelicals are recipients of economic cues from outside the religious tradition. While this study cannot identify those cues, it suggests that Evangelicals are open to more traditional, political influences such as the media and political parties.

As expected, social issues and the economy cues within the Evangelical community result in a reciprocal relationship between participation and chronicities. The study supports the findings of Leighley (1991), Junn (1991) and Bennett (1975) that participation and political sophistication have a reciprocal relationship. Surprisingly, I do not find support for Delli, Carpini and Keeter (1996), Bennett (1994, 1995) and Tan's (1980) conclusions that changes in sophistication are dependent on shifts in political information. Evangelicals who are shifting their issue accessibility and increasing their participation are not doing so as a result of increases in their levels of political knowledge. There is a curious unexplained disconnect between increased participation, changes in political issue access and increases in political information. Neuman's (1986) spiral based on increasing political information does not appear to have been initiated by the positive Evangelical political atmosphere. The closest explanation for this phenomenon is Breggaren's findings about free information from political groups

weakening the relationship between socio-economic status and sophistication. Perhaps the free information within the Evangelical environment also short-circuits the relationship between sophistication, participation and the seeking of new information. It remains one of the most puzzling findings of this study and one worthy of further inquiry.

The examination of participation and political information shows that they affect Evangelicals in a unique manner. The effects of both in increasing or decreasing chronicity usage are more severe than for other religious traditions. Participation sharply increases social issues and economic chronicities as compared to other traditions, and increasing political information more sharply reduces them (with the exception of Mainlines). While proving that these two variables are unique for Evangelicals in their chronicity usage, it is beyond the scope of this study to suggest an answer as to why they affect Evangelicals differently. What is left is a picture of Evangelicals with increasing participation and shifts in sophistication that are changing without benefit of increasing political information. It is a disturbing picture of an increasingly mobilized portion of the electorate that still chooses to remain ignorant of the realm in which it is participating.

Furthermore, Evangelicals are changing in that they are learning the “rules of the game.” Chapter Six reveals that participation and moderation are increasing among the youngest cohorts. The future of Evangelical participation looks bright based on younger cohort trends. The future of civic norms is positive as younger Evangelicals are demonstrating significant increases in tolerance. The cohort participation trend provides support for Zaller’s (1992) “partisan resistance” that older respondents will be less open to new political messages and are more likely to reject participation.

The liberal trend of these younger cohorts illustrates that studies such as Hunter (1982) and Penning and Smidt (2003), which focus on secularization among Evangelical elites, are failing to grasp what is occurring for the tradition as a whole. Evangelical leaders, trained in the tradition's colleges and seminaries, are holding to traditional beliefs while the non-elites are drifting away from those positions. The future of this tradition is a highly traditional leadership core leading an increasingly secular flock. Secularization is occurring within the Evangelical tradition and political moderation is accompanying it.

This dissertation also brings to light that Evangelicalism, like all religious traditions, is not a static movement. Internal influences can be just as profound as external influences. The new paradigm church movement demonstrates the effects of a growing movement within Evangelicals in both increasing tolerance and increasing participation. It suggests that there is a need in political science for a subfield much like the sociology of religion where religious change is examined and catalogued because of its potential political consequences.

8.1 Future Directions

Among the possible directions for future work is a more comprehensive examination of the Social Issues and Economic chronicity respondents. While in some election years they are a very small N, it may be possible to evaluate these groups by SES and other demographic factors. In addition to political participation, more work is needed to determine the effect that these chronicities may have on shifts in Evangelical voting (party choice, not participation) and party identification as well as efficacy. As Evangelicals are increasing in participation and in learning civic norms, is there a similar

effect on their political efficacy? In particular, the effects of the Social Issues chronicity on party identification may contribute to the literature concerning party realignment around traditional issues. As the Social Issues chronicity shows no sign of abating its linear increase, it deserves further attention in future ANES surveys.

This study also opens an avenue to considering how to define an accurate religious identity. The discord between the GSS codes and NCS codes provides fertile ground for evaluating the influence of one's current congregation versus one's religious identification.

This study shows that religious identities have a significant role in political sophistication, levels of participation and civic norms. It is but the first step of many in evaluating internal changes within religious identities as a result of their interaction in the political realm.

Appendix A

Classifying Religious Traditions

Historically measuring evangelicals involved a debate between using on a theological distinctives (Smidt, 1988) or a denominational affiliation (Wilcox, 1987; Jelen, 1989a). However, most surveys do not include nuanced theological questions that would allow for determining religious traditions. Using denominations has been faulted for assuming a uniformity of belief and practice within the churches and ignores those who attend non-Evangelical churches who may hold similar views (Wilcox, 1986).

Over time the subfield of politics and religion has come to accept the denominational measurements as the defacto standard for evaluation religious traditions in America. Steensland et al.'s (2000) coding for the General Social Survey has also been used with the NES and in a very short time has become the most often referenced standard for denominational classification. It is an adaptation of the Steensland et al. classification that is used in this paper.¹ The codings are:

Chapter 5 and 6 (National Election Study 1972-1988)

1) Respondents were assigned as follows:

Evangelical Protestants: Non-black respondents affiliated with Baptist, Primitive Baptist, Free Will Baptist, Southern Baptist, Pentecostal, Assemblies of God, Church of God, Disciples of Christ, Nazarene, United Missionary, Free Methodist, Protestant Missionary, Church of God in Christ, Plymouth Brethren, Church of Christ, Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventists, Evangelical and Reformed, Reformed, Dutch Reformed, Christian

¹ I am indebted to my instructors and fellow participations at the Pollsters and Parishioners: Seminar on Survey Research and American Religion sponsored by the Henry Institute at Calvin College, 2003 for their input in our cooperative effect in converting the Steensland et al measurement from the GSS to the NES and for the correction of errors (albeit few) and new GSS additions in Steensland et al.'s classifications. Denominations not covered in the Steensland et al. measurement were classified with J. Gordon Melton's Encyclopedia of American Religions (6th edition), Frank S. Mead and Samuel S. Hill's Handbook of Denominations in the United States (9th edition) and when available denominational websites.

Reformed, Missouri Synod Lutheran, Mennonite, Amish, Church of the Brethren and Other Fundamentalists.

Mainline Protestant: Presbyterian, Lutheran, Congregational, United Church of Christ Episcopal, Anglican, Church of England, United Methodist/Methodist/Evangelical United Brethren, Disciples of Christ, Christian and white respondents falling into the Baptist and Southern Baptist categories residing outside the political South.

Black Protestant: African Methodist Episcopal, all black members of Evangelical and Mainline denominations and black respondents falling into the Baptist and Southern Baptist categories, and black respondents, missing their denominational response or refusing to respond, with church attendance more frequent than yearly.

Roman Catholic.

Jewish.

Secular: Agnostic, Atheist

Other: Orthodox, Christian Scientist, Spiritualist, Mormon Latter Day Saints, Unitarian, Jehovah's Witness, Quaker, Unity, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Bahai, Other non-Judeo-Christian religions, Other religions.

1) Respondents with unclear responses are classified based on other characteristics. Those with the high levels of attendance were coded evangelical. Those with low (about once a month or less) or no reported attendance were coded secular.

2) White respondents answering Protestant, Non-denominational or Community church with the high levels of attendance were coded evangelical. Those with low or no reported attendance were coded secular.

3) Black respondents answering Protestant, Non-denominational or Community church with the high levels of attendance were coded black protestant. Those with low or no reported attendance were coded secular.

Chapter 5 and 6 (National Election Study 1992-2000)

1) Respondents were assigned as follows:

Evangelical Protestants: Non-black respondents affiliated with 7th Day Adventist, Fundamentalist Adventists (Worldwide Church of God), Adventist, American Baptist Association, Baptist Bible Fellowship, Baptist Missionary Association of America, Conservative Baptist Association of America, General Association of Regular Baptist Churches (G,A,R,B.), National Association of Free Will Baptists (United Free Will Baptist Church), Primitive Baptists, National Baptist Convention in the U,S,A., United

Free-Will Baptist Church, Reformed Baptist (Calvinist), Southern Baptist Convention, Fundamental Baptist (no denom, ties), Local (independent) Baptist churches with no denominational ties or links to a national fellowship, Baptist , Old Order Amish, Evangelical Covenant Church (not Anabaptist in tradition), Evangelical Free Church (not Anabaptist in tradition), Brethren in Christ, Mennonite Brethren, Brethren , Mennonite Church, Christian and Missionary Alliance (CMA), Church of God (Anderson, IN), Church of the Nazarene, Free Methodist Church, Salvation Army, Wesleyan Church, Church of God of Findlay, OH, Holiness, Church of God, Plymouth Brethren, Independent Fundamental Churches of America, Independent-Fundamentalist , Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod; LC-MS, Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod; WELS, Other Conservative Lutheran, Primitive Methodist, Congregational Methodist (Fundamentalist), Methodist , Assemblies of God, Church of God (Cleveland, TN), Church of God (Huntsville, AL), International Church of the Four Square Gospel, Pentecostal Church of God, Pentecostal Holiness Church, United Pentecostal Church International, Church of God in Christ (incl. NA whether), Church of God in Christ (International), Church of God of the Apostolic Faith, Church of God in Prophecy, Vineyard Fellowship, Open Bible Standard Churches, Full Gospel, Apostolic Pentecostal, Spanish Pentecostal, Pentecostal ; Church of God, Presbyterian Church in American (PCA), Evangelical Presbyterian, Reformed Presbyterian , Christian Reformed Church (inaccurately known as "Dutch Reformed"), Free Hungarian Reformed Church, Christian Churches and Churches of Christ, Churches of Christ; "Church of Christ" , Christian Congregation

Mainline Protestant: Episcopalian; Anglican, Independent Anglican, Episcopalian, United Church of Christ (includes Congregational, Evangelical and Reformed), Congregational Christian, Church of the Brethren, Moravian Church, Quakers (Friends), Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (formerly Lutheran Church in America and The American Lutheran Church); ELCA, Lutheran, United Methodist Church; Evangelical United Brethren, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., Cumberland Presbyterian Church, Presbyterian, Reformed Church in America, Reformed, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) and white respondents falling into the Baptist and Southern Baptist categories residing outside the political South.

Black Protestant: American Baptist Churches U.S.A., Baptist General Conference, National Baptist Convention of America, National Primitive Baptist Convention of the U.S.A., Progressive National Baptist Convention, African Methodist Episcopal Church, African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, all black members of Evangelical and Mainline denominations and black respondents falling into the Baptist and Southern Baptist categories, and black respondents, missing their denominational response or refusing to respond, with church attendance more frequent than yearly.

Roman Catholic.

Jewish. Jewish, no preference, Orthodox, Conservative, Reformed, Jewish other.

Secular: Agnostic, Atheist.

Other: Greek Rite Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Rumanian Orthodox, Serbian Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Georgian Orthodox, Ukranian Orthodox, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim; Mohammedan; Islam, Buddhist, Hindu, Bahai, American Indian Religions (Native American Religions), New Age, Wicca (Wiccan), Pagan, Other non-Christian/non-Jewish, Scientology, Religious/ethical cults More than 1 major religion (e.g., Christian, Jewish, Moslem, etc.), Christian Scientists, Mormons; Latter Day Saints, Spiritualists, Unitarian; Universalist, Jehovah's Witnesses, Unity; Unity Church; Christ Church Unity, Fundamentalist Adventist (Worldwide Church of God), Non-traditional Protestant.

1) Respondents with unclear responses are classified based on other characteristics. Those with the high levels of attendance were coded evangelical. Those with low (about once a month or less) or no reported attendance were coded secular.

2) White respondents answering Protestant, no denomination given, Non-denominational Protestant, Community church, Inter-denominational Protestant, Christian, or "just Christian" with the high levels of attendance were coded evangelical. Those with low or no reported attendance were coded secular.

3) Black respondents answering Protestant, Non-denominational or Community church with the high levels of attendance were coded black protestant. Those with low or no reported attendance were coded secular.

Chapter 6 General Social Survey (1972-2002)

(Using variables DENOM and OTHER)

Evangelical Protestant: American Baptist Association, Baptist, Don't Know Which, Advent Christian, Amish, Apostolic Christian, Apostolic Church, Assembly of God, Bible Missionary, Brethren Church, Brethren, Brethren, Plymouth, Brother of Christ, Calvary Bible, Chapel of Faith, Charismatic, Chinese Gospel Church, Christ Cathedral of Truth, Christ Church Unity, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Christian Calvary Chapel, Christian Catholic, Christian; Central Christian, Christian Reformed, Christ in Christian Union, Christ in God, Churches of God Except with Christ and Holiness, Church of Christ, Church of Christ, Evangelical, Church of Daniel's Band, The Church of God of Prophecy, Church of Prophecy, Church of the First Born, Church of the Living God, Community Church, Covenant, Dutch Reformed, Evangelical Congregational, Evangelical Covenant, Evangelical, Evangelist, Evangelical Free Church, Evangelical Methodist, Evangelical United Brethren, Faith Christian, Faith Gospel Tabernacle, First Christian, Four Square Gospel, Free Methodist, Free Will Baptist, Full Gospel, Grace Brethren, Holiness Church of God, Holiness Nazarene, Holy Roller, Independent, Independent Bible, Bible, Bible Fellowship, Independent Fundamental Church of

America, Laotian Christian, Living Word, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, Macedonia, Mennonite, Mennonite Brethren, Missionary Baptist, Missionary Church, Mission Covenant, Nazarene, New Testament Christian, No Denomination Given or Nondenominational, Open Bible, Other Baptist Churches, Other Fundamentalist, Other Lutheran Churches, Other Methodist Churches, Other Presbyterian Churches, Pentecostal, Pentecostal Assembly of God, Pentecostal Church of God, Pentecostal Holiness, Holiness, Pentecostal, People's Church, Pilgrim Holiness, Primitive Baptist, Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventist, Southern Baptist Convention, Swedish Mission, Triumph Church of God, The Way Ministry, Wesleyan, Wesleyan Methodist-Pilgrim, Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Vineyard Fellowship.

Black Protestant: African Methodist, African Methodist Episcopal Church, African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, American Baptist Association¹, American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A.¹, Apostolic Faith, Baptist, Don't Know Which¹, Christian Tabernacle, Church of God in Christ, Church of God in Christ Holiness, Church of God, Saint & Christ, Disciples of God, Federated Church, Holiness; Church of Holiness, House of Prayer, Methodist, Don't Know Which¹, National Baptist Convention of America, National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc.¹, Other Baptist Churches¹, Other Methodist Churches¹, Missionary Baptist¹, Pentecostal Apostolic, Primitive Baptist, Sanctified, Sanctification, Southern Baptist Convention¹, United Holiness, Witness Holiness, Zion Union, Zion Union Apostolic, and Zion Union Apostolic-Reformed.

Mainline Protestant: American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A., American Lutheran Church, American Reformed, Baptist Northern, Christian Disciples, (Congregationalist, First, Congregationalist), Disciples of Christ, Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran, Evangelical Reformed, First Christian Disciples of Christ, First Church, First Reformed, Friends, Grace Reformed, Hungarian Reformed, Latvian Lutheran, Lutheran Church in America, Lutheran, Don't Know Which, Methodist, Don't Know Which, Moravian, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., Presbyterian, Don't Know Which, Presbyterian, Merged, Quaker, Reformed, Reformed Church of Christ, Reformed United Church of Christ, Schwenkfelder, United Brethren, United Brethren in Christ, United Church of Canada, United Church of Christ, United Church of Christianity, United Methodist Church, United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.,

Other: Christadelphians, Christ Church Unity, Christian Scientist, Church of Jesus Christ of the Restoration, Church Universal and Triumphant, Eden Evangelist, Jehovah's Witnesses, Jesus Latter Day Saints, Latter Day Saints, Latter Day Saints -Mormon, Latter Day Saints -Reorganized, Mind Science, Mormon, New Age Spirituality, New Birth Christian, Religious Science, True Light Church of Christ, Spiritualist, Unitarian, Universalist, United Church, Unity Church, Unity, Worldwide Church of God

Roman Catholic.

Jewish. Jewish, no preference, Orthodox, Conservative, Reformed, Jewish other.

Secular: Agnostic, Atheist.

- 1) Respondents with unclear responses are classified based on other characteristics. Those with the high levels of attendance were coded evangelical. Those with low (about once a month or less) or no reported attendance were coded secular.
- 2) White respondents answering Protestant, Non-denominational or Community church with the high levels of attendance were coded evangelical. Those with low or no reported attendance were coded secular.
- 3) Black respondents answering Protestant, Non-denominational or Community church with the high levels of attendance were coded black protestant. Those with low or no reported attendance were coded secular. Those Black respondents answering “Other <Baptist, Methodist, ect.. or “<Baptist, Methodist, etc.> -Don’t know which” were coded Black Protestant. White respondents were coded Evangelical if “Other Baptist, Other Lutheran, Other Methodist or Other Presbyterian”. White respondents were coded Mainline Protestant if “Baptist -Don’t know which, Lutheran -Don’t know which, Methodist, -Don’t know which or Presbyterian -Don’t know which”.

Appendix B
Chronicities and NES Master Codes

Candidate Qualities

201, 211-214 215-221, 301, 302, 305-320, 401-404, 407, 408, 411-422, 423-426, 431-454, 601-604, 609, 703-710, 719

Parties

101, 102, 111, 112, 121, 122, 131-135, 141, 151, 161-174, 197, 501-520, 531-536, 597, 723, 728

Groups

531-536, 1201-1248, 1297

Social Issues (with topics)

Education

Values and Principles (including religion)

Abortion

Feminism

Health Care

Gun Control

Crime

Drugs

Environment

Homosexuality

Race

809-838, 847-849, 897, 914-925, 945-1045, 949-951, 962-964, 968-990, 991-993, 994-1003, 1013-1024, 1059-1061

Economic (with topics)

Budget and the Economy, Government Reform, Tax Reform, Social Security, Welfare and Poverty, Infrastructure, Jobs, Energy policy

553, 554, 605, 606, 805-808, 841-846, 901-913, 926-944, 952-961, 965-967, 1004-1012, 1025-1058

Foreign Policy (with topics)

Defense, War and peace

1101-1199

Appendix C

Multiple Chronicity Respondents

The multiple chronicity category represents one tenth of the U.S. population which fail to provide a dominant chronicity in their responses to open-ended questions. Theoretically these respondents may be drawing from a chronicity structure that allows equal access to several chronicity, thus resulting in tied scores between two or more chronicity categories. This category may also represent those persons lacking in a political chronicity structure but unlike no issue content respondents they are willing to give random responses which also resulting in tied categories.

Multiple Chronicity respondents were examined with exploratory factor analysis to determine if their chronicity scores demonstrate an underlying structure. Candidate, economy, parties, groups foreign policy and social issues scores were evaluated using principle components analysis and varimax rotation for each election year to search for a structure to the multiple chronicity respondent's responses. The data itself has questionable adequacy for using factor analysis as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic for the individual years ranged from a high of .500 in 2000 to a low of .318 in 1972. All of the years fit Kaiser's category of *unacceptable* for factor analysis (Kaiser quoted in Kim and Meuller 1978, p. 54).

Analysis of the diagonal elements on the anti-image correlation matrix for the KMO individual statistics for each variable found a uniformity of scores that showed that the unsuitability of the data for factor analysis is consistent across the variables and not limited to one or two variables with low individual KMO values. For most years the near linear shape of the plottings complicated analysis of the scree plot to determine the

number of factors. Therefore all eigenvalues above 1.0 were used on the examination. Comparison of rotated components (Table C1) between years failed to reveal a consistent identifiable pattern to the structure of the factors. The factor analysis reveal that the multiple chronicity respondents are truly individualistic in their responses and the category harbors no underlying aggregate structure.

Table C1. Multiple Schema Factor Analysis 1976-2000.¹

<i>Schema</i>	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000
Candidate	.69						
Economy		.70	.77	.35	.71	.50	.56
Party	.62	.86		.69	.81	.87	
Groups	.63		.31			.64	.74
Foreign Policy	.59	.81	.35	.93	.93	.55	.65
Social Issues	.68	.54	.43	.60	.33		.54
Eigenvalue	1.29	1.36	1.25	1.36	1.24	1.35	1.41
% of Variance	21% 20%	23% 22%	21% 20%	23% 21%	21% 21%	22% 20%	24% 20%
KMO Score	.318	.413	.344	.349	.351	.420	.500

¹ All component scores above .3 are shown.

Appendix D: Trend Lines

To evaluate trends between groups over time there must be underlying theories against which the trends can be compared. D. Garth Taylor argues that “an array of possible theories can be used to describe a set of data and the ultimate theoretical conclusion depends on the most parsimonious statistical model which can be used to describe the data” (1980 87). Taylor (Table D1) suggests four possible theories with seven possible outcomes which can be used for comparing two groups.

Theory 1: No Change. This theory predicts that the changes observed between survey years are merely random fluctuations and that the percentage of change in each year is actually zero. Differences in chronicities accessed between Evangelicals and the Nonevangelical according to this theory do not exist.

Theory 2: Enduring Differences. This theory would predict that the differences in conceptualization are constant. While the difference between the groups is nonzero the differences are enduring and the correlations between the groups remain the same from survey year to survey year.

Theory 3: Linear Patterns. This theory predicts that the changes in chronicity usage between groups are occurring with a high degree of regularity. The end result is that the differences can be best modeled by a linear pattern which shows an increasing or decreasing difference.

Theory 4: Social Catastrophic. This theory predicts changes in conceptualization that are erratic perhaps as the result of sudden occurrences in the political world. This last theory in effect becomes a catchall for data, while not specifying what model type might fit the data.

Table D1. Taylor's Decision Sequence for Evaluating Trends in Public Opinion¹


Hypothesis	Decision One	Decision Two	Model Type
No difference	Accept if χ^2 N.S.	→ 1. $d = 0$	
↓ Reject			
Constant value	Accept if χ^2 N.S.	↘ Test reduction χ^2 from No difference model on one df	2. Significant: $d=\text{constant}$ 3. N.S.: $d=\text{constant}$ borderline significant
↓ Reject			
Linear Trend	Accept if χ^2 N.S.	Test reduction χ^2 from Constant difference model on one df	4. Significant: $d=a+b(\text{time})$
↓ Reject		Test reduction χ^2 from Constant difference model on one df	5. N.S.: Borderline linear trend 6. Significant linear component 7. Nonlinear trend
↓			
Explore further nonlinear or multiple linear models			

These theories move from the simplest theory which explains the data to the most complex. The emphasis on parsimony requires moving to a more complex model only when the data cannot be explained by any of the previous simpler models. Each of the

¹ Adapted from Taylor, 1980 p. 94.


first three theories uses a Chi test built around a predicted value of the percentage of change between years on each pairing between religious groups and the population. The *no change* theory posits that the rate of change equals 0 ($d=0$). The *enduring differences* uses the average rate of change over the time period of the trend ($d=\text{average change}$). The *linear patterns* uses a least squares estimate ($d=\text{constant} + bx [\text{time}]$). Three additional theories are also tested by examining the difference between Chi test scores for each model to determine if there is a borderline or significant linear or constant component to the trend. Trend lines for each chronicity were examined between Evangelicals and Nonevangelicals (excluding seculars). Tables 2D-8D show the trend analysis over seven elections from 1976 to 2000. With the exception of Social Issues the chronicities are remarkably similar. Five of the trends (Candidates, Economy, Foreign policy, Parties and No Content) exhibit no difference between Evangelicals and Nonevangelicals while Groups and Multiple chronicities have a constant difference.

Table D2. Trend Analysis Evangelicals and Non-evangelicals in “Foreign Policy Chronicity”: 1976-2000




<i>Category difference</i> (Base=Nonevangelical)						
	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Decision</i>
Evangelicals	1) no difference	d=0	7.96	6	>.05	accept

Table D3. Trend Analysis Evangelicals and Non-evangelicals in “Groups Chronicity”: 1976-2000




<i>Category difference (Base=Nonevangelical)</i>	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Decision</i>
Evangelicals	1) no difference	d=0	19.88	6	<.05	reject
	2) constant difference	d= 2.17	6.10	5	>.05	accept

Table D4. Trend Analysis Evangelicals and Non-evangelicals in “Parties Chronicity”: 1976-2000




<i>Category difference (Base=Nonevangelical)</i>	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Decision</i>
Evangelicals	1) no difference	d=0	8.56	6	>.05	accept

Table D5. Trend Analysis Evangelicals and Non-evangelicals in “Economy Chronicity”: 1976-2000




<i>Category difference (Base=Nonevangelical)</i>	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Decision</i>
Evangelicals	1) no difference	d=0	6.23	6	>.05	accept

Table D6. Trend Analysis Evangelicals and Non-evangelicals in “Candidate Chronicity”: 1976-2000




<i>Category difference (Base=Nonevangelical)</i>	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Decision</i>
Evangelicals	1) no difference	d=0	8.71	6	>.05	accept

Table D7. Trend Analysis Evangelicals and Non-evangelicals in “Multiple Chronicity”: 1976-2000



<i>Category difference (Base=Nonevangelical)</i>	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Decision</i>
Evangelicals	1) no difference	d=0	12.68	6	<.05	reject
	2) constant difference	d=-1.95	7.91	5	>.05	accept

Table D8. Trend Analysis Evangelicals and Non-evangelicals in “No Content Chronicity”: 1976-2000



<i>Category difference (Base=Nonevangelical)</i>	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Model</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Decision</i>
Evangelicals	1) no difference	d=0	6.58	6	>.05	accept

Appendix E
Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Issue Means

Table E1: Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Race.^a

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	ANOVA F
Aid to Blacks				43.41***
Evangelical	5.55 ^a	2.15	2458	
Social Issue Evangelical	5.10 ^{a, b}	1.76	218	
Black Protestant	4.06 ^c	2.72	1453	
Social Issue Black Protestant	4.56 ^c	2.54	135	
Mainline Protestants	5.20 ^{a, b}	2.03	2855	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	4.80 ^b	1.87	167	
Roman Catholic	4.90 ^{a, b}	2.17	2797	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	4.77 ^b	2.04	160	
Secular	4.87 ^{a, b}	2.26	1453	
Social Issue Secular	4.93 ^{a, b}	2.22	135	
<i>Population Mean</i>	<i>5.04</i>	<i>2.23</i>	<i>11426</i>	
Assistance to Blacks				95.59
Evangelicals	2.20 ^a	.77	1567	
Social Issue Evangelicals	2.23 ^{a, b}	.81	188	
Black Protestant	1.38 ^c	.54	750	
Social Issue Black Protestant	1.35 ^c	.56	54	
Mainline Protestants	2.16 ^{a, b}	.66	1681	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	2.19 ^b	.72	142	
Roman Catholic	2.03 ^{a, b}	.74	1800	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	2.02 ^b	.64	132	
Seculars	2.05 ^{a, b}	.75	1008	
Social Issue Seculars	2.02 ^{a, b}	.71	126	
<i>Population Mean</i>	<i>2.04</i>	<i>.75</i>	<i>7448</i>	
Black Thermometer				159.14***
Evangelicals	61.51 ^{a, b}	19.04	2237	
Social Issue Evangelicals	62.35 ^{a, b}	19.90	208	
Black Protestant	84.05 ^c	17.08	997	
Social Issue Black Protestant	82.79 ^c	18.08	53	
Mainline Protestants	59.69 ^a	18.61	2669	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	61.41 ^{a, b}	19.05	168	
Roman Catholic	62.52 ^{a, b}	19.29	2522	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	67.02 ^b	19.48	153	
Secular	61.00 ^a	19.48	1330	

Table E1 (cont'd).

Social Issue Secular	64.69 ^{a, b}	19.83	135
<i>Population Mean</i>	63.62	19.95	11472

^a Means with the same subscript are not significantly different from each other. *** $p < .001$.

Table E2: Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Homosexuality.^a

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	ANOVA <i>F</i>
Gays in the Military				16.59***
Evangelicals	3.16 ^{a, b}	2.19	954	
Social Issue Evangelicals	3.34 ^a	2.21	129	
Black Protestant	2.96 ^{a, b}	2.35	451	
Social Issue Black Protestant	2.35 ^{b, c, d}	2.18	40	
Mainline Protestants	2.50 ^{b, c, d}	2.13	819	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	2.13 ^d	2.00	89	
Roman Catholic	2.39 ^{b, c, d}	2.11	1050	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	1.92 ^d	1.93	96	
Seculars	2.30 ^{c, d}	2.09	750	
Social Issue Seculars	1.76 ^d	1.84	95	
<i>Population Mean</i>	2.62	2.18	4473	
Gay Adoption				19.30***
Evangelicals	4.40 ^a	1.66	807	
Social Issue Evangelicals	4.39 ^a	1.63	110	
Black Protestant	4.35 ^a	2.01	389	
Social Issue Black Protestant	3.91 ^{a, b}	1.96	34	
Mainline Protestants	3.79 ^{a, b}	2.11	681	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	3.24 ^{c, d}	2.35	71	
Roman Catholic	2.76 ^{a, b}	2.21	878	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	3.44 ^b	2.44	82	
Seculars ^f	3.33 ^{c, d}	2.23	629	
Social Issue Seculars	2.58 ^c	2.03	88	
<i>Population Mean</i>	3.86	2.10	3769	
Gay and Lesbian Thermometer				58.69***
Evangelicals	24.85 ^{a, b, c}	25.92	1569	
Social Issue Evangelicals	21.88 ^a	24.59	190	
Black Protestant	38.27 ^{c, d, e}	28.34	678	
Social Issue Black Protestant	30.35 ^{a, b, c}	27.89	49	
Mainline Protestants	33.13 ^{b, c, d}	25.73	1727	

Table E2 (cont'd).

Social Issue Mainline Protestants	39.30 ^{d, e}	26.79	146
Roman Catholic	40.50 ^{d, e}	25.98	1789
Social Issue Roman Catholic	46.41 ^{e, f}	27.58	128
Seculars	42.20 ^e	27.28	1019
Social Issue Seculars	51.00 ^f	27.53	126
<i>Population Mean</i>	35.22	27.27	7421

^aMeans with the same subscript are not different from each other. *** p < .001.

Table E3: Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Women's Issues.^a

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	ANOVA F
Women's Libber Thermometer				66.14***
Evangelicals	51.87 ^{a, b}	24.11	1966	
Social Issue Evangelicals	46.28 ^a	26.05	166	
Black Protestant	70.12 ^d	22.60	814	
Social Issue Black Protestant	76.15 ^d	19.70	45	
Mainline Protestants	54.95 ^{b, c}	21.40	2283	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	60.73 ^c	22.17	129	
Roman Catholic	59.65 ^c	21.00	2255	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	60.19 ^c	22.73	135	
Seculars	60.63 ^c	21.11	1164	
Social Issue Seculars	70.78 ^d	20.91	116	
<i>Population Mean</i>	58.19	22.77	9310	
Women Equal Roles				28.70***
Evangelicals	3.56 ^a	2.50	2395	
Social Issue Evangelicals	3.23 ^{a, b}	2.04	217	
Black Protestant	3.37 ^a	2.70	1097	
Social Issue Black Protestant	3.04 ^{a, b, c}	2.30	57	
Mainline Protestants	3.01 ^{a b, c, d}	2.23	2778	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	2.39 ^{c, d, e}	1.98	168	
Roman Catholic	2.89 ^{a b, c, d}	2.30	2715	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	2.33 ^{d, e}	1.97	161	
Seculars	2.57 ^{b, c, d, e}	2.31	1427	
Social Issue Seculars	2.02 ^e	1.91	134	
<i>Population Mean</i>	3.05	2.38	11149	

^aMeans with the same subscript are not different from each other. *** p < .001.

Table E4: Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and Abortion.^a

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	ANOVA <i>F</i>
Anti-Abortionist Thermometer				19.08***
Evangelicals	55.54 ^{a, b, c}	29.97	692	
Social Issue Evangelicals	66.03 ^a	32.20	71	
Black Protestant	52.55 ^{a, b, c, d}	28.45	291	
Social Issue Black Protestant	64.54 ^{a, b}	22.45	13	
Mainline Protestants	47.79 ^{c, e, f}	26.62	963	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	49.06 ^{b, c, d, e}	26.15	67	
Roman Catholic	56.28 ^{a, b, c}	25.72	817	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	56.05 ^{a, b, c}	32.71	44	
Seculars	38.59 ^{d, f}	26.37	342	
Social Issue Seculars	34.67 ^f	31.06	39	
<i>Population Mean</i>	<i>51.38</i>	<i>28.18</i>	<i>3339</i>	
When Abortion Should Be Allowed				95.22***
Evangelicals	2.51 ^{b, c}	1.03	2192	
Social Issue Evangelicals	2.86 ^a	1.04	233	
Black Protestant	2.36 ^{b, c, d}	1.17	990	
Social Issue Black Protestant	2.56 ^{a, b}	1.18	64	
Mainline Protestants	1.95 ^{c, f}	.98	2350	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	1.76 ^f	.96	174	
Roman Catholic	2.24 ^{c, d, e}	1.08	2429	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	2.19 ^{d, e}	1.09	169	
Seculars	1.71 ^{f, g}	.97	1362	
Social Issue Seculars	1.43 ^g	.80	152	
<i>Population Mean</i>	<i>2.16</i>	<i>1.08</i>	<i>10072</i>	

^aMeans with the same subscript are not different from each other. *** p < .001.

Table E5: Religious Groups and Social Issue Religious Groups, and Values, Morals and Lifestyles.^a

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	ANOVA <i>F</i>
New Lifestyles Breakdown Society				32.96***
Evangelicals	4.16 ^{a, b}	1.19	1263	
Social Issue Evangelicals	4.23 ^a	1.06	163	
Black Protestant	3.84 ^{b, c}	1.46	582	
Social Issue Black Protestant	3.93 ^{a, b, c}	1.29	45	
Mainline Protestants	3.88 ^{a, b, c}	1.17	1283	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	3.59 ^{c, d}	1.32	116	
Roman Catholic	3.79 ^{b, c}	1.24	1405	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	3.62 ^{c, d}	1.19	108	
Seculars	3.36 ^{d, e}	1.44	885	
Social Issue Seculars	3.08 ^e	1.41	113	
<i>Population Mean</i>	3.82	1.17	5903	
Must Change Views of Moral Behavior				28.75***
Evangelicals	3.49 ^{a, b}	1.49	1264	
Social Issue Evangelicals	3.85 ^a	1.46	163	
Black Protestant	2.74 ^c	1.53	582	
Social Issue Black Protestant	3.09 ^{b, c}	1.59	45	
Mainline Protestants	3.15 ^{b, c}	1.40	1283	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	3.12 ^{b, c}	1.42	118	
Roman Catholic	2.97 ^c	1.43	1406	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	3.09 ^{b, c}	1.32	107	
Seculars	2.71 ^c	1.39	887	
Social Issue Seculars	2.78 ^c	1.39	112	
<i>Population Mean</i>	2.78	1.39	5967	
Need for Traditional Values				26.84***
Evangelicals	4.48 ^a	.92	1264	
Social Issue Evangelicals	4.47 ^a	.85	163	
Black Protestant	4.21 ^{a, b, c}	1.32	582	
Social Issue Black Protestant	4.09 ^{b, c}	1.20	45	
Mainline Protestants	4.30 ^{a, b}	.90	1282	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	4.06 ^{b, c}	1.07	118	
Roman Catholic	4.27 ^{a, b}	.99	1406	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	4.06 ^{b, c}	1.05	108	
Seculars	3.92 ^{c, d}	1.20	886	
Social Issue Seculars	3.64 ^d	1.28	113	

Table E5 (cont'd).

<i>Population Mean</i>	4.24	.95	5936	
Tolerant of Differing Morals				27.30***
Evangelicals	2.91 ^b	1.38	1263	
Social Issue Evangelicals	3.37 ^a	1.41	163	
Black Protestant	2.44 ^{d, e}	1.37	582	
Social Issue Black Protestant	2.98 ^{a, b}	1.50	45	
Mainline Protestants	2.66 ^{b, c, d}	1.28	1283	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	2.59 ^{b, c, d, e}	1.16	118	
Roman Catholic	2.47 ^{c, d, e}	1.22	1404	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	2.50 ^{c, d, e}	1.20	107	
Seculars	2.24 ^{d, e}	1.19	886	
Social Issue Seculars	2.18 ^e	1.29	113	
<i>Population Mean</i>	2.59	1.31	5964	

^a Means with the same subscript are not different from each other. *** p < .001.

Table E6: Religious Groups, Social Issue Religious Groups and the Environment.^a

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	ANOVA F
Environmental Spending				16.13***
Evangelicals	1.65 ^{a, b}	.65	1755	
Social Issue Evangelicals	1.72 ^a	.74	214	
Black Protestant	1.49 ^c	.61	820	
Social Issue Black Protestant	1.45 ^{b, c}	.59	60	
Mainline Protestants	1.57 ^{a, b, c}	.61	1869	
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	1.51 ^{b, c}	.58	164	
Roman Catholic	1.50 ^{b, c}	.59	2022	
Social Issue Roman Catholic	1.54 ^{a, b, c}	.61	148	
Seculars	1.47 ^{b, c}	.60	1168	
Social Issue Seculars	1.23 ^d	.47	141	
<i>Population Mean</i>	1.54	.62	8361	
Environmental Thermometer				10.81***
Evangelicals	66.13 ^{a, b}	20.68	1464	
Social Issue Evangelicals	63.54 ^a	21.61	170	
Black Protestant	72.28 ^{b, c, d}	20.28	643	
Social Issue Black Protestant	73.04 ^{c, d}	18.24	45	

Table E6 (cont'd).

Mainline Protestants	67.61 ^{a, b, c}	20.10	1627
Social Issue Mainline Protestants	68.41 ^{a, b, c, d}	21.15	130
Roman Catholic	71.12 ^{b, c, d}	18.98	1660
Social Issue Roman Catholic	67.81 ^{a, b, c}	19.32	119
Seculars	69.80 ^{a, b, c, d}	19.75	4325
Social Issue Seculars	69.51 ^d	19.71	340
<i>Population Mean</i>	<i>68.80</i>	<i>20.38</i>	<i>6973</i>

^a Means with the same subscript are not different from each other. *** p < .001.

Appendix F

Table F1. Variables Used in Chapter Five NES Models and Reduced Form Equations.

Variable	Coding
Political Participation Scale (vcf0723)	1. Lowest level of participation (none) 6. Highest level of participation in campaign activities
Political Information (vcf0050a)	Respondents general level of information about politics and public affairs seemed: 5. Very High 4. Fairly High 3. Average 2. Fairly Low 1. Very Low
Voted (based on vcf702)	1. Voted 0. Did not vote
Chronicity Dummy Variables	Each Chronicity was coded: 1. Chronicity 0. Otherwise
Party Identification (vcf0301)	Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? 1. Strong Democrat 2. Weak Democrat 3. Independent - Democrat 4. Independent - Independent 5. Independent - Republican 6. Weak Republican 7. Strong Republican
Party Identification Squared	
Internal Efficacy (vcf0613 & vcf0614)	Scale created from "People like me don't have any say about what the government does" (0- agree 1-disagree) and "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on" (0- agree 1-disagree). 2. Highest Efficacy 1. 0. Lowest Efficacy

Table F1 (cont'd).

Care who wins (vcf0311)	1. Don't care very much or DK, Pro-Con, Depends, and Other 2. Care a good deal
General Political Interest (vcf0313)	Pay attention to Politics/Public Affiars 1. Hardly at all 2. Only now and then 3. Some of the time 4. Most of the time
Campaign Interest (vcf0310)	1. Not much interested 2. Somewhat interested 3. Very much interested
Party Contact (vcf9030)	Did anyone from one of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the campaign? 1. Yes 0. No
Strength of Partisanship (vcf0305)	1. Independent or Apolitical 2. Leaning Independent 3. Weak Partisan 4. Strong Partisan
TV (vcf0725)	Did the respondent watch TV programs about the campaign? 1. No 2. Yes
Radio (vcf0726)	Did the respondent hear about the campaign on the radio? 1. No 2. Yes
Newspapers (vcf0727)	Did the respondent read about the campaign in newspapers? 1. No 2. Yes
Age (vcf0101)	Respondent age
Education (vcf0110)	1. Grade school or less (0-8 grades) 2. High school (12 grades or fewer, incl. non-college training if applicable) 3. Some College (13 grades or more but no degree; college, no identification of degree status) 4. College or advanced degree

Table F1 (cont'd).

Gender (vcf0104)	1. Male 2. Female
Income (vcf0114)	1. 0 to 16 percentile 2. 17 to 33 percentile 3. 34 to 67 percentile 4. 68 to 95 percentile 5. 96 to 100 percentile
Unemployed (vcf0116)	1. Yes 0. No
Urbanism: Currently live in (vcf0111)	1. Central cities 2. Suburban areas 3. Rural, small towns, outlying and adjacent areas
Where Grew Up (vcf0134)	1. Urban 2. Rural
Church Attendance (vcf0130 & vcf0130a)	5. Every week 4. Almost every week 3. Once or twice a month 2. A few times a year 1. Never
Bible (vcf0845 & vcf0850)	1. The Bible is the actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word 2. The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word 3. The Bible is a book written by men and is not the Word of God
Political South (vcf0113)	1. South 0. Nonsouth
Religious Tradition Dummy Variables	Each tradition was coded: 1. Religious tradition 0. Otherwise

Appendix G
2SCML: First Stage OLS Estimation for Reduced Form Coefficients

Table G1. Campaign Participation: Reduced Form Coefficients for Endogenous Variables

Dependent Variable: Campaign Participation	Chronicity Type in Campaign Participation Reduced Form Models								
	Variables in Model	Social Issues	Foreign Policy	Groups	Parties	Economy	Candidate	Multiple	No Content
Education		.05* (.02)	.05* (.02)	.06* (.02)	.05* (.02)	.05* (.02)	.06* (.02)	.05* (.02)	.05* (.02)
Gender		-.01 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.00 (.03)	-.00 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.00 (.03)
Income		.07** (.02)	.07** (.02)	.07** (.02)	.07** (.02)	.07** (.02)	.07** (.02)	.07** (.02)	.07** (.02)
Occupation		-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)
Campaign Interest		.13*** (.03)	.13*** (.03)	.13*** (.03)	.13*** (.03)	.12*** (.03)	.13*** (.03)	.13*** (.03)	.12*** (.03)
Care Who Wins		.19*** (.04)	.20*** (.04)	.19*** (.04)	.20*** (.04)	.20*** (.04)	.20*** (.04)	.20*** (.04)	.18*** (.04)
Political Interest		.12*** (.02)	.12*** (.02)	.12*** (.02)	.12*** (.02)	.12*** (.02)	.12*** (.02)	.12*** (.02)	.12*** (.02)
Party Contact		-.31*** (.04)	-.31*** (.04)	-.31*** (.04)	-.31*** (.04)	-.32*** (.04)	-.31*** (.04)	-.31*** (.04)	-.31*** (.04)
Internal Efficacy		-.05* (.02)	-.05* (.02)	-.05* (.02)	-.05* (.02)	-.05* (.02)	-.05* (.02)	-.05* (.02)	-.05* (.02)
Chronicity		.12* (.06)	-.02 (.07)	.06 (.05)	-.04 (.06)	.10* (.04)	-.06 (.04)	-.05 (.05)	-.12* (.06)
Non-Evangelical		-.03 (.18)	-.02 (.18)	-.01 (.18)	-.03 (.18)	-.03 (.18)	-.04 (.18)	-.02 (.18)	-.06 (.18)

Table G1 (cont'd).

Interaction Terms									
Non-Evan x Education	.06* (.03)	.05* (.03)	.05* (.03)	.05* (.03)	.05* (.03)	.05* (.03)	.05* (.03)	.05* (.03)	.06* (.03)
Non-Evan x Gender	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.05 (.04)
Non-Evan x Income	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)
<i>Non-Evan x Occupation</i>	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
Non-Evan x Campaign Interest	.10** (.03)	.10** (.03)	.10** (.03)	.10** (.03)	.10** (.03)	.10** (.03)	.10** (.03)	.10** (.03)	.10** (.03)
Non-Evan x Care Who Wins	-.03 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.02 (.04)
<i>Non-Evan x Political Interest</i>	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	.00 (.02)
<i>Non-Evan x Party Contact</i>	-.01 (.05)	-.01 (.05)	-.01 (.05)	-.01 (.05)	-.01 (.05)	-.01 (.05)	-.01 (.05)	-.01 (.05)	-.02 (.05)
<i>Non-Evan x Politics Complicated</i>	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)
Non-Evan x Chronicity	-.07 (.07)	.02 (.08)	-.05 (.06)	.11 (.07)	-.12* (.05)	.06 (.04)	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	.09 (.07)
Constant	1.05*** (.16)	1.04*** (.16)	1.04*** (.16)	1.05*** (.16)	1.05*** (.16)	1.05*** (.16)	1.05*** (.16)	1.05*** (.16)	1.09*** (.16)
Prob. Chronicity=0 and Non-Evan x Chronicity=0	F= 2.99 p=.05	F=0.05 p=.95	F=0.61 p=.55	F=2.80 p=.06	F=2.95 p=.052	F=1.30 p=.27	F=2.98 p=.051	F=2.98 p=.051	F=2.07 p=.12
R ²	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
F-statistic	86.77***	86.56***	86.60***	86.76***	86.77***	86.65***	86.72***	86.72***	86.69***
N	12083	12083	12083	12083	12083	12083	12083	12083	12083

Note: * $p < .05$, two-tail test; **; $p < .01$, two-tail test; *** $p < .001$, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses.) for the equations used to obtain residual terms included in the second stage of the 2SCML. *Italicized* variables are excluded from the Structural Equations. Election year variables to control for serial correlation were included in the model (not shown).

Table G2. Political Information: Reduced Form Coefficients for Endogenous Variables

Dependent Variable: Political Information		Chronicity Type in Campaign Participation Reduced Form Models							
Variables in Model		Social Issues	Foreign Policy	Groups	Parties	Economy	Candidate	Multiple	No Content
Education		.36*** (.02)	.36*** (.02)	.36*** (.02)	.36*** (.02)	.36*** (.02)	.36*** (.02)	.36*** (.02)	.34*** (.02)
Gender		-.29*** (.03)	-.28*** (.03)	-.28*** (.03)	-.29*** (.03)	-.28*** (.03)	-.29*** (.03)	-.29*** (.03)	-.26*** (.03)
Income		.13*** (.02)	.13*** (.02)	.13*** (.02)	.13*** (.02)	.13*** (.02)	.13*** (.02)	.13*** (.02)	.12*** (.02)
Care Who Wins		.19*** (.04)	.19*** (.04)	.19*** (.04)	.19*** (.04)	.19*** (.04)	.19*** (.04)	.19*** (.04)	.14*** (.04)
Campaign Interest		.22*** (.02)	.22*** (.02)	.22*** (.02)	.22*** (.02)	.21*** (.02)	.22*** (.02)	.22*** (.02)	.20*** (.02)
Political Interest		.15*** (.02)	.15*** (.02)	.15*** (.02)	.15*** (.02)	.15*** (.02)	.15*** (.02)	.15*** (.02)	.15*** (.02)
Intensity of Partisanship		.06*** (.02)	.06*** (.02)	.06*** (.02)	.06*** (.02)	.06*** (.02)	.06*** (.02)	.06*** (.02)	.05*** (.02)
Party Contact		-.06 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.06 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.04 (.04)
Radio		.08* (.03)	.09* (.03)	.08* (.03)	.08* (.03)	.08* (.03)	.09* (.03)	.08* (.03)	.08* (.03)
Television		.21*** (.05)	.21*** (.05)	.20*** (.05)	.21*** (.05)	.21*** (.05)	.21*** (.05)	.21*** (.05)	.13* (.05)
Newspaper		.21*** (.04)	.21*** (.04)	.21*** (.04)	.21*** (.04)	.21*** (.04)	.21*** (.04)	.21*** (.04)	.18*** (.04)
Chronicity		.12* (.06)	.06 (.06)	.09 (.05)	-.03 (.06)	.16*** (.04)	.05 (.04)	-.05 (.05)	-.61*** (.05)
Non-Evangelical		.05 (.19)	.06 (.19)	.05 (.19)	.05 (.19)	.04 (.19)	.06 (.19)	.05 (.19)	.00 (.19)

Table G2 (cont'd).

Interaction Terms										
Non-Evan. x Education	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)
Non-Evan. x Gender	.07** (.04)	.08** (.04)	.07* (.04)	.07* (.04)	.08* (.04)	.08* (.04)	.08* (.04)	.08* (.04)	.06 (.04)	.06 (.04)
Non-Evan. x Income	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.02)
Non-Evan. x Care Who Wins	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.00 (.04)	.00 (.04)	.00 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.00 (.04)	.02 (.04)	.02 (.04)
Non-Evan. x Campaign Interest	.06* (.03)	.06* (.03)	.06* (.03)	.07* (.03)	.06* (.03)	.06* (.03)	.06* (.03)	.06* (.03)	.06* (.03)	.06* (.03)
Non-Evan. x Political Interest	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.04 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)
Non-Evan. x Intensity of Partisanship	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)
Non-Evan. x Party Contact	-.03 (.04)	-.03 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.03 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)
Non-Evan. x Radio	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.01 (.04)	-.01 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)
Non-Evan. x Television	-.15* (.06)	-.15* (.06)	-.15* (.06)	-.15* (.06)	-.15* (.06)	-.15* (.06)	-.15* (.06)	-.15* (.06)	-.11 (.06)	-.11 (.06)
Non-Evan. x Newspaper	.02 (.05)	.01 (.05)	.02 (.05)	.02 (.05)	.02 (.05)	.01 (.05)	.01 (.05)	.02 (.05)	.02 (.04)	.02 (.04)
Non-Evan. x Chronicity	-.00 (.07)	.04 (.07)	-.02 (.05)	-.10* (.05)	.07 (.06)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.03 (.05)	.04 (.06)	.04 (.06)
Constant	.05 (.06)	.04 (.06)	.05 (.06)	.05 (.06)	.04 (.06)	.05 (.06)	.05 (.06)	.04 (.06)	.04 (.06)	.04 (.06)
Prob. Chronicity=0 and Non-Evan x Chronicity=0	F= 8.58 p=.0002	F=4.39 p=.01	F=5.63 p=.004	F=0.86 p=.42	F=11.60 p=.0000	F=6.38 p=.002	F=0.73 p=.48	F=243.44 p=.0000		

Table G2 (cont'd).

R ²	.41	.41	.41	.41	.41	.41	.41	.41	.43
F-statistic	260.99***	260.61***	260.72***	260.28***	261.27***	260.79***	260.27**	282.57***	
N	13799	13799	13799	13799	13799	13799	13799	13799	

:: *p<.05, two-tail test; **, p<.01, two-tail test; ***p<.001, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses.)
the equations used to obtain residual terms included in the second stage of the 2SCML. *Italicized* variables are excluded from the Structural Equations.
tion year variables to control for serial correlation were included in the model (not shown).

Table G3. Voting: Reduced Form Coefficients for Endogenous Variables

Variables in Model	Chronicity Type in Voting Reduced Form Models							
	Social Issues	Foreign Policy	Groups	Parties	Economy	Candidate	Multiple	No Content
<i>Education</i>	.26*** (.04)	.26*** (.04)	.25*** (.04)	.26*** (.04)	.26*** (.04)	.26*** (.04)	.26*** (.04)	.25*** (.04)
<i>Income</i>	.18*** (.03)	.18*** (.03)	.18*** (.03)	.18*** (.03)	.18*** (.03)	.18*** (.03)	.18*** (.03)	.18*** (.03)
<i>Age</i>	.06*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)
<i>Age-squared</i>	-.00*** (.00)	-.00*** (.00)	-.00*** (.00)	-.00*** (.00)	-.00*** (.00)	-.00*** (.00)	-.00*** (.00)	-.00*** (.00)
<i>Lived in Home</i>	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
<i>Unemployed</i>	-.09 (.15)	-.09 (.15)	-.09 (.15)	-.09 (.15)	-.10 (.15)	-.09 (.15)	-.09 (.15)	-.09 (.15)
<i>Church Attendance</i>	.11*** (.02)	.11*** (.02)	.11*** (.02)	.11*** (.02)	.11*** (.02)	.11*** (.02)	.11*** (.02)	.11*** (.02)
<i>Close Election</i>	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)
<i>Campaign Interest</i>	.24*** (.04)	.24*** (.04)	.24*** (.04)	.24*** (.04)	.24*** (.04)	.24*** (.04)	.24*** (.04)	.24*** (.04)
<i>Care Who wins</i>	.31*** (.06)	.31*** (.06)	.31*** (.06)	.31*** (.06)	.31*** (.06)	.31*** (.06)	.31*** (.06)	.30*** (.06)
<i>Political Interest</i>	.07* (.03)	.07* (.03)	.07* (.03)	.07* (.03)	.07* (.03)	.07* (.03)	.07* (.03)	.07* (.03)
<i>Strength of Partisanship</i>	.15*** (.03)	.15*** (.03)	.15*** (.03)	.15*** (.03)	.15*** (.03)	.14*** (.03)	.15*** (.03)	.15*** (.03)
<i>Party Contact</i>	-.37*** (.07)	-.37*** (.07)	-.37*** (.07)	-.37*** (.07)	-.37*** (.07)	-.37*** (.07)	-.37*** (.07)	-.37*** (.07)
<i>Internal Efficacy</i>	.00	.00	-.02	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00

Table G3 (cont'd).

Chronicity	(.04) .02 (.11)	(.04) .05 (.11)	(.02) -.01 (.09)	(.04) -.01 (.10)	(.04) .08 (.08)	(.04) -.08 (.06)	(.04) .07 (.08)	(.04) -.08 (.10)
<i>Non-Evangelical</i>	(.37) .59 (.37)	(.37) .60 (.37)	(.36) .65 (.36)	(.37) .59 (.37)	(.37) .58 (.37)	(.37) .55 (.37)	(.37) .61 (.37)	(.37) .67 (.37)
Interaction Terms								
Non-Evan. x Education	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.06 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.06 (.04)
Non-Evan. x Income	.00 (.03)	.00 (.03)	.00 (.03)	.00 (.03)	.01 (.03)	.00 (.03)	.00 (.03)	.00 (.03)
Non-Evan. x Age	-.02* (.01)	-.02* (.01)	-.02* (.01)	-.02* (.01)	-.02* (.01)	-.02* (.01)	-.02* (.01)	-.02* (.01)
Non-Evan. x Age-squared	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)
<i>Non-Evan. x Lived in Home</i>	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)
<i>Non-Evan. x Unemployed</i>	-.09 (.17)	-.09 (.17)	-.09 (.17)	-.09 (.17)	-.08 (.17)	-.09 (.17)	-.09 (.17)	-.08 (.17)
Non-Evan. x Church Attendance	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)
<i>Non-Evan. x Close Election</i>	.15* (.07)	.16* (.07)	.15* (.07)	.16* (.07)	.15* (.07)	.15* (.07)	.16* (.07)	.15* (.07)
Non-Evan. x Campaign Interest	-.06 (.05)	-.06 (.05)	-.06 (.05)	-.06 (.05)	-.06 (.05)	-.06 (.05)	-.06 (.05)	-.07 (.05)
Non-Evan. x Care Who wins	-.04 (.07)	-.04 (.07)	-.04 (.07)	-.04 (.07)	-.04 (.07)	-.04 (.07)	-.04 (.07)	-.05 (.07)
<i>Non-Evan. x Political Interest</i>	.04 (.04)	.04 (.04)	.05 (.04)	.04 (.04)	.04 (.04)	.04 (.04)	.04 (.04)	.04 (.04)

Table G3 (cont'd).

<i>Non-Evan. x Strength of Partisanship</i>	-.04 (.03)	-.04 (.03)	-.04 (.03)	-.04 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.04 (.03)	-.04 (.03)
<i>Non-Evan. x Party Contact</i>	.03 (.08)	.03 (.08)	.03 (.08)	.04 (.08)	.03 (.08)	.03 (.08)	.04 (.08)
<i>Non-Evan. x Internal Efficacy</i>	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.00 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.00 (.04)
<i>Non-Evan. x Chronicity</i>	.10 (.13)	-.08 (.13)	.06 (.10)	-.03 (.11)	.13 (.07)	-.14 (.10)	-.15 (.12)
Constant	-3.64*** (.33)	-3.64*** (.33)	-3.60*** (.32)	-3.64*** (.33)	-3.61*** (.33)	-3.64*** (.33)	-3.58*** (.33)
χ^2 Statistic	2644.94***	2641.70***	2642.32***	2641.48***	2642.37***	2643.78***	2660.15*
Pseudo R ²	.18	.18	.18	.18	.18	.18	.18
N	11889	11889	11889	11889	11889	11889	11889

Note: * $p < .05$, two-tail test; *** $p < .001$, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses.) for the equations used to obtain residual terms included in the second stage of the 2SPLS. *Italicized* variables are excluded from the Structural Equations. Election year variables to control for serial correlation were included in the model (not shown).

Appendix H

Chapter Five 2SCML and 2SPLS Tables

Table H1. Foreign Policy Chronicity, Participation and Information : 2SCML Results

Variables in Model	Foreign Policy	S. E.	Marginal Effects ¹
Demographics			
Education	-.693**	(.057)	-.05
Income	-.262**	(.030)	-.02
Gender	.350**	(.053)	.03
Married	.003	(.046)	-.00
Intelligence	-.032	(.040)	-.00
Age	-.024**	(.007)	-.01
Age Squared	.000	(.000)	.00
Urban	.059*	(.029)	.00
Where Grew Up	-.049	(.048)	-.00
Political South	.069	(.047)	.00
Political Variables			
Party Identification	.278**	(.056)	-.00
Party Identification Squared	-.031**	(.007)	-.01
Campaign Interest	-.515**	(.051)	-.04
Care Who Wins	-.308**	(.052)	-.03
Political Participation	-1.609**	(.550)	-.12
Participation Residual	-.020	(.024)	-.00
Political Information	2.519**	(.355)	.19
Information Residual	-.003	(.030)	.00
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.001	(.163)	-.00
Church Attendance	-.164*	(.078)	-.02
Evangelical	.383	(.661)	.01
Mainline Protestant	.400	(.656)	.00
Catholic	.149	(.661)	-.01
Black Evangelical	-.587	(.769)	-.04
Secular	.534	(.652)	.06
Jew	.056	(1.323)	.01
Election Year			

Table H1 (cont'd).

1980	.613**	(.075)	.08
1984	.593**	(.072)	.07
1988	.479**	(.076)	.05
1992	-.163	(.089)	-.01
1996	-.280*	(.135)	-.02
2000	-.416**	(.110)	-.02
Interaction Terms			
Evangelical x Education	.058	(.084)	.00
Evangelical x Income	.043	(.052)	.00
Evangelical x Political Participation	1.215*	(.596)	.09
Mainline x Political Participation	1.042	(.577)	.09
Black Protestant x Political Participation	-.276	(.705)	-.02
Catholic x Political Participation	.466	(.584)	.04
Secular x Political Participation	.041	(.617)	-.00
Jewish x Political Participation	.622	(.909)	.05
Evangelical x Political Information	-.858*	(.362)	-.06
Mainline x Political Information	-.668*	(.339)	-.06
Black Protestant x Political Information	.282	(.409)	.02
Catholic x Political Information	-.330	(.341)	-.03
Secular x Political Information	-.136	(.360)	-.01
Jewish x Political Information	-.422	(.531)	-.03
Evangelical x Attendance	.129	(.085)	.01
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	.146	(.085)	.02
Black Protestant x Attendance	.051	(.110)	.01
Catholic x Attendance	.126	(.085)	.01
Jewish x Attendance	.157	(.197)	.01
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	.043	(.180)	.00
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.086	(.176)	-.00
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.082	(.219)	-.00
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	-.029	(.179)	.00
Secular x Bible Attitudes	-.098	(.179)	.00
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	-.002	(.306)	-.00

Table H1 (cont'd).

Constant	-3.185**	(.689)
Observations	11999	
χ^2 Statistic	683.96***	
Pseudo R ²	.13	

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***, p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood model (Rivers and Vuong 1988).

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H2. Groups Chronicity, Participation and Information : 2SCML Results

Variables in Model	Groups	S. E.	Marginal Effects ¹
Demographics			
Education	-.630**	(.042)	-.12
Income	-.200**	(.023)	-.04
Gender	.405**	(.041)	.07
Married	.103**	(.036)	.02
Intelligence	.100**	(.030)	.02
Age	.021**	(.005)	.004
Age Squared	-.000**	(.000)	-.00
Urban	-.032	(.022)	-.01
Where Grew Up	.003	(.037)	-.00
Political South	-.203**	(.038)	-.04
Political Variables			
Party Identification	-.019	(.041)	-.08
Party Identification Squared	-.022**	(.005)	.07
Campaign Interest	-.454**	(.038)	-.08
Care Who Wins	-.130**	(.041)	-.03
Political Participation	-1.427**	(.369)	-.25
Participation Residual	-.012	(.018)	-.00
Political Information	2.148**	(.240)	.39
Information Residual	.061**	(.022)	.01
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.140	(.118)	-.04
Church Attendance	.019	(.055)	-.00
Evangelical	-.382	(.474)	-.08

Table H2 (cont'd).

Mainline Protestant	-.319	(.464)	-.07
Catholic	-.026	(.461)	-.02
Black Evangelical	.031	(.493)	-.03
Secular	-.248	(.460)	-.05
Jew	.190	(.838)	.04
Election Year			
1980	-.192**	(.060)	-.03
1984	.005	(.054)	.00
1988	.016	(.055)	.00
1992	-.378**	(.062)	-.06
1996	-.190*	(.078)	-.03
2000	-.226**	(.062)	-.03
Interaction Terms			
Evangelical x Education	-.065	(.068)	-.01
Evangelical x Income	-.067	(.043)	-.01
Evangelical x Political Participation	.788	(.418)	.15
Mainline x Political Participation	-.214	(.396)	-.05
Black Protestant x Political Participation	.729	(.422)	.10
Catholic x Political Participation	.107	(.392)	.01
Secular x Political Participation	.678	(.427)	.12
Jewish x Political Participation	.389	(.590)	.04
Evangelical x Political Information	-.256	(.259)	-.06
Mainline x Political Information	.153	(.232)	.02
Black Protestant x Political Information	-.359	(.247)	-.05
Catholic x Political Information	-.098	(.229)	-.02
Secular x Political Information	-.352	(.249)	-.07
Jewish x Political Information	-.408	(.347)	-.07
Evangelical x Attendance	-.048	(.062)	.00
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	-.022	(.062)	.00
Black Protestant x Attendance	-.071	(.067)	-.00
Catholic x Attendance	-.042	(.060)	-.00
Jewish x Attendance	-.037	(.119)	-.00

Table H2 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	.183	(.135)	.05
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.053	(.130)	.02
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.130	(.141)	.04
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	.085	(.129)	.03
Secular x Bible Attitudes	.136	(.133)	.04
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	.245	(.208)	.05
Constant	-2.875**	(.485)	
Observations	11999		
χ^2 Statistic	1285.22***		
Pseudo R ²	.13		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***, p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood model (Rivers and Vuong 1988).

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H3. Parties Chronicity, Participation and Information : 2SCML Results

Variables in Model	Parties	S. E.	Marginal Effects ¹
Demographics			
Education	.163**	(.045)	.02
Income	-.005	(.025)	-.00
Gender	-.187**	(.044)	-.02
Married	-.068	(.039)	-.01
Intelligence	-.067*	(.032)	-.01
Age	-.004	(.006)	-.00
Age Squared	.000	(.000)	.00
Urban	-.012	(.025)	-.00
Where Grew Up	-.008	(.041)	-.00
Political South	-.006	(.040)	-.00
Political Variables			
Party Identification	-.327**	(.045)	.04
Party Identification Squared	.039**	(.006)	.05
Campaign Interest	-.115**	(.042)	-.02
Care Who Wins	.036	(.046)	.01
Political Participation	1.378**	(.441)	.18

Table H3 (cont'd).

Participation Residual	-.001	(.019)	.00
Political Information	-.857**	(.285)	-.11
Information Residual	-.015	(.024)	-.00
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	.367*	(.146)	.05
Church Attendance	-.093	(.066)	-.01
Evangelical	.584	(.556)	.11
Mainline Protestant	.651	(.546)	.10
Catholic	.673	(.548)	.11
Black Evangelical	.357	(.591)	.07
Secular	.358	(.543)	.09
Jew	.548	(.956)	.18
Election Year			
1980	.493**	(.068)	.09
1984	.455**	(.062)	.08
1988	.598**	(.063)	.11
1992	.713**	(.073)	.13
1996	.712**	(.085)	.16
2000	.875**	(.067)	.19
Interaction Terms			
Evangelical x Education	.023	(.072)	.01
Evangelical x Income	-.053	(.046)	-.01
Evangelical x Political Participation	-.048	(.483)	.01
Mainline x Political Participation	1.011*	(.464)	.15
Black Protestant x Political Participation	.907	(.505)	.13
Catholic x Political Participation	.938*	(.467)	.14
Secular x Political Participation	.821	(.499)	.13
Jewish x Political Participation	.600	(.668)	.09
Evangelical x Political Information	.014	(.300)	-.01
Mainline x Political Information	-.517	(.278)	-.07
Black Protestant x Political Information	-.305	(.302)	-.04
Catholic x Political Information	-.467	(.279)	-.07
Secular x Political Information	-.297	(.298)	-.05

Table H3 (cont'd).

Jewish x Political Information	-.070	(.401)	-.01
Evangelical x Attendance	.143*	(.072)	.01
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	.073	(.072)	.01
Black Protestant x Attendance	.036	(.080)	.00
Catholic x Attendance	.079	(.071)	.01
Jewish x Attendance	-.048	(.145)	-.02
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	-.373*	(.162)	-.06
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.320*	(.156)	-.05
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.333	(.171)	-.05
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	-.380*	(.157)	-.05
Secular x Bible Attitudes	-.361*	(.160)	-.05
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	-.541*	(.234)	-.09
Constant	-1.140*	(.565)	
Observations	11999		
χ^2 Statistic	607.53***		
Pseudo R ²	.08		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***; p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood model (Rivers and Vuong 1988).

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H4. Candidate Chronicity, Participation and Information: 2SCML Results

Variables in Model	Candidate	S. E.	Marginal Effects ¹
Demographics			
Education	-.408**	(.035)	-.11
Income	-.149**	(.019)	-.04
Gender	.412**	(.034)	.12
Married	-.068*	(.030)	-.02
Intelligence	.020	(.025)	.00
Age	-.006	(.004)	-.00
Age Squared	.000**	(.000)	.00
Urban	-.005	(.019)	-.00
Where Grew Up	-.075*	(.031)	-.02
Political South	-.036	(.031)	-.01

Table H4 (cont'd).

Political Variables			
Party Identification	.414**	(.035)	-.02
Party Identification Squared	-.044**	(.004)	-.10
Campaign Interest	-.243**	(.032)	-.07
Care Who Wins	-.236**	(.034)	-.08
Political Participation	-.652*	(.316)	-.15
Participation Residual	.007	(.015)	-.00
Political Information	1.606**	(.204)	.45
Information Residual	-.023	(.018)	-.00
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	.038	(.102)	.01
Church Attendance	.030	(.046)	.01
Evangelical	.599	(.412)	.24
Mainline Protestant	.997*	(.404)	.38
Catholic	.555	(.407)	.19
Black Evangelical	.199	(.466)	.10
Secular	.509	(.404)	.16
Jew	1.347	(.744)	.56
Election Year			
1980	-.593**	(.047)	-.15
1984	-.971**	(.046)	-.23
1988	-.730**	(.046)	-.18
1992	-1.029**	(.050)	-.24
1996	-.641**	(.062)	-.16
2000	-.854**	(.051)	-.20
Interaction Terms			
Evangelical x Education	.175**	(.054)	.05
Evangelical x Income	.097**	(.035)	.03
Evangelical x Political Participation	.910**	(.350)	.23
Mainline Protestant x Political Participation	-.633	(.333)	-.23
Black Protestant x Political Participation	-.489	(.403)	-.16
Catholic x Political Participation	-.605	(.336)	-.22
Secular x Political Participation	-.573	(.366)	-.22
Jewish x Political Participation	-.570	(.514)	-.22

Table H4 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Political Information	-.811**	(.216)	-.22
Mainline Protestant x Political Information	.078	(.196)	.04
Black Protestant x Political Information	.057	(.232)	.02
Catholic x Political Information	.179	(.197)	.08
Secular x Political Information	.147	(.214)	.07
Jewish x Political Information	.240	(.301)	.09
Evangelical x Attendance	-.032	(.051)	-.01
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	-.038	(.051)	-.02
Black Protestant x Attendance	-.014	(.064)	-.01
Catholic x Attendance	-.019	(.050)	-.01
Jewish x Attendance	-.138	(.106)	-.05
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	-.001	(.115)	.00
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.008	(.110)	-.00
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.139	(.132)	.04
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	.016	(.111)	.00
Secular x Bible Attitudes	-.012	(.114)	-.01
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	-.370*	(.181)	-.12
Constant	-3.149**	(.423)	
Observations	11999		
χ^2 Statistic	1326.63***		
Pseudo R ²	.09		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***; p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood model (Rivers and Vuong 1988). Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H5. Multiple Chronicity, Participation and Information : 2SCML Results

Variables in Model	Multiple	S. E.	Marginal Effects ¹
Demographics			
Education	-.046	(.042)	-.01
Income	.047*	(.023)	.01
Gender	.073	(.042)	.01
Married	.041	(.036)	.01

Table H5 (cont'd).

Intelligence	.026	(.030)	.00
Age	-.003	(.005)	-.00
Age Squared	.000	(.000)	.00
Urban	.005	(.023)	.00
Where Grew Up	.050	(.037)	.01
Political South	.011	(.038)	.00
Political Variables			
Party Identification	.003	(.043)	.01
Party Identification Squared	.001	(.005)	.00
Campaign Interest	.060	(.038)	.01
Care Who Wins	.167**	(.041)	.03
Political Participation	-1.118**	(.390)	-.19
Participation Residual	-.005	(.020)	-.00
Political Information	.468	(.245)	.07
Information Residual	-.002	(.022)	-.00
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.061	(.123)	-.01
Church Attendance	.055	(.057)	.01
Evangelical	.523	(.468)	.11
Mainline Protestant	.853	(.463)	.21
Catholic	.075	(.465)	.02
Black Evangelical	.051	(.513)	.03
Secular	.488	(.457)	.09
Jew	.453	(1.007)	.13
Election Year			
1980	-.060	(.058)	-.01
1984	-.167**	(.055)	-.03
1988	-.234**	(.057)	-.04
1992	-.364**	(.064)	-.05
1996	-.398**	(.081)	-.05
2000	-.247**	(.063)	-.04
Interaction Terms			
Evangelical x Education	.054	(.064)	.01
Evangelical x Income	-.017	(.041)	-.00

Table H5 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Political Participation	.162	(.431)	.03
Mainline Protestant x Political Participation	-.278	(.417)	-.04
Black Protestant x Political Participation	-.366	(.470)	-.06
Catholic x Political Participation	-.151	(.417)	-.02
Secular x Political Participation	-.202	(.456)	-.04
Jewish x Political Participation	-.588	(.770)	-.09
Evangelical x Political Information	-.268	(.258)	-.04
Mainline Protestant x Political Information	-.118	(.240)	-.02
Black Protestant x Political Information	.122	(.266)	.02
Catholic x Political Information	-.067	(.239)	-.01
Secular x Political Information	-.093	(.259)	-.01
Jewish x Political Information	-.162	(.414)	-.03
Evangelical x Attendance	-.071	(.062)	-.01
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	-.050	(.063)	-.01
Black Protestant x Attendance	-.009	(.072)	-.01
Catholic x Attendance	-.006	(.062)	-.00
Jewish x Attendance	.096	(.141)	.01
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	.114	(.138)	.02
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.009	(.135)	.00
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.108	(.152)	.02
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	.204	(.135)	.03
Secular x Bible Attitudes	.067	(.137)	.01
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	.341	(.258)	.05
Constant	-1.473**	(.484)	
Observations	11999		
χ^2 Statistic	329.93****		
Pseudo R ²	.04		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***, p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood model (Rivers and Vuong 1988).

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H6. Social Issue Chronicity, Voting and Information : 2SPLS Results

Variables in Model	Social Issues	S. E.	Marginal Effects¹
Demographics			
Education	-.470***	(.046)	-.04
Income	-.169***	(.027)	-.02
Gender	.740***	(.048)	.07
Married	.052	(.041)	.00
Intelligence	-.012	(.029)	-.00
Age	-.004	(.007)	-.00
Age Squared	-.000	(.000)	-.00
Urban	-.041	(.027)	-.00
Where Grew Up	.050	(.044)	.00
Political South	-.017	(.042)	-.00
Political Variables			
Party Identification Squared	-.176***	(.060)	-.02
Party Identification	-.207***	(.059)	-.02
Campaign Interest	-.586***	(.046)	-.05
Care Who Wins	-.246***	(.050)	-.02
Voting	-.082	(.179)	-.01
Political Information	1.482***	(.238)	.14
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	.101	(.134)	.01
Church Attendance	-.009	(.054)	-.00
Evangelical	-2.847***	(.981)	-.26
Mainline Protestant	-.197	(.925)	-.03
Catholic	-.611	(.931)	-.06
Black Evangelical	-1.098	(1.052)	-.10
Secular	.455	(.870)	.03
Jew	-.113	(1.376)	-.01
Election Year			
1980	.434***	(.089)	.04
1984	.637***	(.080)	.06
1988	.812***	(.080)	.07
1992	.601***	(.081)	.05
1996	1.081***	(.095)	.10
2000	1.078***	(.082)	.10
Interaction Terms			

Table H6 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Education	-.219***	(.074)	-.02
Evangelical x Income	.006	(.050)	.00
Evangelical x Voting	-.691***	(.201)	-.06
Mainline x Voting	-.012	(.181)	-.00
Black Protestant x Voting	-.154	(.199)	-.01
Catholic x Voting	-.031	(.183)	-.00
Secular x Voting	.122	(.189)	.01
Jewish x Voting	-.052	(.230)	-.00
Evangelical x Political Information	.959***	(.257)	.09
Mainline x Political Information	.072	(.230)	.01
Black Protestant x Political Information	.337	(.261)	.03
Catholic x Political Information	.145	(.231)	.02
Secular x Political Information	-.096	(.235)	-.01
Jewish x Political Information	.169	(.334)	.02
Evangelical x Attendance	.238***	(.064)	.02
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	.025	(.062)	.00
Black Protestant x Attendance	.030	(.080)	.00
Catholic x Attendance	.032	(.062)	.00
Jewish x Attendance	.012	(.114)	.00
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	-.153	(.152)	-.02
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.080	(.149)	-.01
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.189	(.178)	-.02
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	-.038	(.151)	-.01
Secular x Bible Attitudes	.035	(.149)	.00
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	-.148	(.221)	-.01
Constant	-4.454***	(.928)	
N	13909		
χ^2 Statistic	877.43***		
Pseudo R ²	.13		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***; p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-stage probit least squares model.

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H7. Foreign Policy Chronicity, Voting and Information : 2SPLS Results

Variables in Model	Foreign Policy	S. E.	Marginal Effects ¹
Demographics			
Education	-.54***	(.05)	-.04
Income	-.14***	(.03)	-.01
Gender	.27***	(.05)	.02
Married	-.00	(.04)	-.00
Intelligence	-.04	(.03)	-.00
Age	.01	(.01)	.00
Age Squared	-.00***	(.00)	-.00
Urban	.05	(.03)	.00
Where Grew Up	-.00	(.04)	-.00
Political South	.06	(.04)	.00
Political Variables			
Party Identification Squared	.07	(.06)	.01
Party Identification	-.09	(.06)	-.01
Campaign Interest	-.42***	(.05)	-.03
Care Who Wins	-.21***	(.05)	-.02
Voting	-.78***	(.25)	-.06
Political Information	2.27***	(.34)	.18
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.07	(.16)	-.01
Church Attendance	-.03	(.05)	-.00
Evangelical	2.64*	(1.21)	.19
Mainline Protestant	.84	(1.20)	.06
Catholic	1.29	(1.21)	.09
Black Evangelical	-.25	(1.48)	-.03
Secular	1.45	(1.17)	.10
Jew	.51	(2.06)	.03
Election Year			
1980	.67***	(.07)	.05
1984	.63***	(.06)	.05
1988	.46***	(.07)	.04
1992	.03	(.07)	.002
1996	-.17	(.12)	-.02
2000	-.02	(.10)	-.00
Interaction Terms			

Table H7 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Education	-.00	(.08)	-.00
Evangelical x Income	-.04	(.05)	-.00
Evangelical x Voting	.46	(.27)	.03
Mainline x Voting	.02	(.26)	.00
Black Protestant x Voting	.03	(.32)	.00
Catholic x Voting	.23	(.27)	.02
Secular x Voting	.12	(.27)	.01
Jewish x Voting	.16	(.42)	.01
Evangelical x Political Information	-.77*	(.36)	-.05
Mainline x Political Information	-.33	(.34)	-.03
Black Protestant x Political Information	-.02	(.41)	.00
Catholic x Political Information	-.45	(.34)	-.03
Secular x Political Information	-.38	(.36)	-.03
Jewish x Political Information	-.28	(.54)	-.02
Evangelical x Attendance	.03	(.06)	.00
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	.13*	(.06)	.01
Black Protestant x Attendance	.03	(.09)	.00
Catholic x Attendance	.08	(.06)	.01
Jewish x Attendance	.07	(.16)	.01
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	.06	(.17)	.01
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.05	(.17)	-.00
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.02	(.21)	.00
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	.01	(.17)	.00
Secular x Bible Attitudes	-.02	(.17)	.00
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	.05	(.29)	.00
Constant	-6.51***	(1.20)	
N	13909		
χ^2 Statistic	721.16***		
Pseudo R ²	.12		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***, p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-stage probit least squares model.

¹ Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H8. Groups Chronicity, Voting and Information : 2SPLS Results

Variables in Model	Groups	S. E.	Marginal Effects ¹
Demographics			
Education	-.478***	(.036)	-.09
Income	-.155***	(.022)	-.03
Gender	.287***	(.036)	.05
Married	.093***	(.033)	.02
Intelligence	.056*	(.024)	.01
Age	.025***	(.006)	.00
Age Squared	-.000***	(.000)	-.00
Urban	-.041*	(.020)	-.01
Where Grew Up	.019	(.034)	.00
Political South	-.183***	(.035)	-.03
Political Variables			
Party Identification Squared	-.390***	(.056)	-.07
Party Identification	.447***	(.050)	.08
Campaign Interest	-.416***	(.035)	-.08
Care Who Wins	-.115***	(.039)	-.02
Voting	.071	(.169)	.02
Political Information	1.071***	(.223)	.20
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.054	(.108)	-.01
Church Attendance	-.011	(.044)	-.00
Evangelical	-2.211***	(.806)	-.41
Mainline Protestant	-1.052	(.785)	-.18
Catholic	-.223	(.775)	-.04
Black Evangelical	.149	(.844)	.02
Secular	-.448	(.743)	-.09
Jew	-.275	(1.177)	-.06
Election Year			
1980	-.104	(.054)	-.02
1984	.105*	(.048)	.02
1988	.090	(.050)	.02
1992	-.076	(.050)	-.01
1996	-.024	(.070)	-.00
2000	-.005	(.061)	.00
Interaction Terms			

Table H8 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Education	-.201***	(.062)	-.03
Evangelical x Income	-.069	(.041)	-.01
Evangelical x Voting	-.478***	(.185)	-.09
Mainline x Voting	-.208	(.179)	-.04
Black Protestant x Voting	.043	(.191)	.01
Catholic x Voting	-.038	(.177)	-.01
Secular x Voting	-.051	(.183)	-.01
Jewish x Voting	-.106	(.254)	-.03
Evangelical x Political Information	.823***	(.245)	.15
Mainline x Political Information	.289	(.228)	.05
Black Protestant x Political Information	.030	(.242)	.00
Catholic x Political Information	.049	(.225)	.01
Secular x Political Information	.075	(.235)	.01
Jewish x Political Information	-.129	(.326)	-.02
Evangelical x Attendance	.025	(.051)	.00
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	.017	(.051)	.00
Black Protestant x Attendance	-.054	(.058)	-.01
Catholic x Attendance	-.022	(.050)	-.01
Jewish x Attendance	.042	(.094)	.01
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	.070	(.125)	.02
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.042	(.120)	-.00
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.020	(.130)	.01
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	.021	(.119)	.01
Secular x Bible Attitudes	.051	(.124)	.02
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	.246	(.188)	.05
Constant	-2.881***	(.783)	
N	13909		
χ^2 Statistic	1354.16****		
Pseudo R ²	.12		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***; p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-stage probit least squares model.

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H9. Parties Chronicity, Voting and Information : 2SPLS Results

Variables in Model	Parties	S. E.	Marginal Effects ¹
Demographics			
Education	-.148***	(.038)	-.02
Income	-.103***	(.023)	-.02
Gender	.046	(.039)	.01
Married	-.026	(.035)	-.00
Intelligence	-.041	(.025)	-.01
Age	-.014*	(.006)	-.00
Age Squared	.000*	(.000)	.00
Urban	-.030	(.022)	-.01
Where Grew Up	-.044	(.037)	-.01
Political South	-.019	(.036)	-.00
Political Variables			
Party Identification Squared	.155***	(.058)	.02
Party Identification	.223***	(.056)	.03
Campaign Interest	-.163***	(.038)	-.03
Care Who Wins	.029	(.042)	.00
Voting	.340	(.191)	.05
Political Information	.011	(.243)	.01
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	.267*	(.131)	.04
Church Attendance	-.120*	(.048)	-.02
Evangelical	1.070	(.862)	.19
Mainline Protestant	-.696	(.842)	-.11
Catholic	-.402	(.844)	-.04
Black Evangelical	-.370	(.927)	-.03
Secular	-.175	(.799)	-.01
Jew	-1.479	(1.345)	-.22
Election Year			
1980	.215***	(.059)	.03
1984	.239***	(.054)	.04
1988	.363***	(.055)	.06
1992	.075	(.058)	.01
1996	.295***	(.073)	.05
2000	.371***	(.062)	.06
Interaction Terms			

Table H9 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Education	.138*	(.064)	.02
Evangelical x Income	-.005	(.043)	-.00
Evangelical x Voting	.152	(.205)	.03
Mainline x Voting	-.293	(.199)	-.05
Black Protestant x Voting	-.130	(.215)	-.02
Catholic x Voting	-.211	(.199)	-.03
Secular x Voting	-.146	(.203)	-.02
Jewish x Voting	-.506	(.290)	-.08
Evangelical x Political Information	-.362	(.263)	-.06
Mainline x Political Information	.286	(.246)	.05
Black Protestant x Political Information	.290	(.266)	.04
Catholic x Political Information	.201	(.246)	.03
Secular x Political Information	.231	(.253)	.03
Jewish x Political Information	.799*	(.368)	.12
Evangelical x Attendance	.071	(.055)	.01
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	.117*	(.054)	.02
Black Protestant x Attendance	.051	(.065)	.01
Catholic x Attendance	.114*	(.055)	.02
Jewish x Attendance	-.072	(.114)	-.01
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	-.243	(.146)	-.04
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.216	(.141)	-.03
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.219	(.154)	-.04
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	-.260	(.142)	-.04
Secular x Bible Attitudes	-.237	(.145)	-.04
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	-.455*	(.211)	-.07
Constant	-.606	(.843)	
N	13909		
χ^2 Statistic	3575.82****		
Pseudo R ²	.22		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***, p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-stage probit least squares model.

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H10. Economy Chronicity, Voting and Information : 2SPLS Results

Variables in Model	Economy	S. E.	Marginal Effects¹
Demographics			
Education	-.471***	(.033)	-.11
Income	-.137***	(.020)	-.03
Gender	.253***	(.033)	.06
Married	-.011	(.030)	-.00
Intelligence	-.052*	(.022)	-.01
Age	.031***	(.005)	.01
Age Squared	-.000***	(.000)	-.00
Urban	.049***	(.019)	.01
Where Grew Up	-.008	(.032)	-.00
Political South	.023	(.031)	.01
Political Variables			
Party Identification Squared	.218***	(.047)	.06
Party Identification	.020	(.046)	.01
Campaign Interest	-.367***	(.032)	-.09
Care Who Wins	-.135***	(.036)	-.04
Voting	-.226	(.157)	-.06
Political Information	1.465***	(.206)	.36
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.161	(.104)	-.04
Church Attendance	.052	(.041)	.01
Evangelical	-1.460	(.757)	-.33
Mainline Protestant	-.469	(.736)	-.08
Catholic	.276	(.735)	.08
Black Evangelical	.273	(.814)	.06
Secular	-.253	(.702)	-.05
Jew	.647	(1.250)	.16
Election Year			
1980	-.064	(.051)	-.02
1984	.343***	(.044)	.08
1988	.013	(.048)	-.00
1992	.090*	(.045)	.02
1996	.220***	(.062)	.05
2000	.187***	(.056)	.04
Interaction Terms			

Table H10 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Education	-.361***	(.057)	-.09
Evangelical x Income	-.074*	(.037)	-.02
Evangelical x Voting	-.210	(.169)	-.04
Mainline Protestant x Voting	.002	(.164)	.01
Black Protestant x Voting	-.104	(.181)	-.02
Catholic x Voting	-.008	(.164)	.00
Secular x Voting	-.136	(.170)	-.03
Jewish x Voting	.198	(.255)	.05
Evangelical x Political Information	.781***	(.226)	.18
Mainline Protestant x Political Information	.084	(.209)	.01
Black Protestant x Political Information	-.111	(.229)	-.03
Catholic x Political Information	-.090	(.208)	-.03
Secular x Political Information	.063	(.217)	.01
Jewish x Political Information	-.311	(.330)	-.08
Evangelical x Attendance	-.022	(.047)	-.01
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	-.033	(.046)	-.01
Black Protestant x Attendance	.034	(.056)	.01
Catholic x Attendance	-.032	(.046)	-.01
Jewish x Attendance	-.082	(.105)	-.02
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	.063	(.119)	.02
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.169	(.114)	.04
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.067	(.127)	.02
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	.083	(.115)	.02
Secular x Bible Attitudes	.073	(.117)	.02
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	.259	(.191)	.06
Constant	-4.017***	(.738)	
N	13909		
χ^2 Statistic	1079.59***		
Pseudo R ²	.08		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***, p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-stage probit least squares model.

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H11. Candidate Chronicity, Voting and Information : 2SPLS Results

Variables in Model	Candidate	S. E.	Marginal Effects¹
Demographics			
Education	-.234***	(.030)	-.07
Income	-.095***	(.018)	-.03
Gender	.320***	(.030)	.10
Married	-.067*	(.027)	-.02
Intelligence	.018	(.020)	.01
Age	-.005	(.005)	-.00
Age Squared	.000*	(.000)	.00
Urban	.003	(.017)	-.00
Where Grew Up	-.068*	(.029)	-.02
Political South	-.031	(.029)	-.01
Political Variables			
Party Identification Squared	-.009	(.040)	-.00
Party Identification	-.268***	(.039)	-.08
Campaign Interest	-.221***	(.029)	-.07
Care Who Wins	-.270***	(.032)	-.08
Voting	-.033	(.143)	-.00
Political Information	1.043***	(.186)	.32
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.001	(.095)	.01
Church Attendance	.021	(.037)	.01
Evangelical	-1.023	(.682)	-.32
Mainline Protestant	1.294	(.668)	.39
Catholic	.746	(.670)	.21
Black Evangelical	.242	(.804)	.10
Secular	.875	(.639)	.26
Jew	1.396	(1.065)	.45
Election Year			
1980	-.513***	(.042)	-.16
1984	-.898***	(.041)	-.28
1988	-.665***	(.041)	-.21
1992	-.756***	(.041)	-.24
1996	-.447***	(.055)	-.14
2000	-.715***	(.049)	-.22
Interaction Terms			

Table H11 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Education	-.036	(.048)	-.01
Evangelical x Income	.071*	(.032)	.02
Evangelical x Voting	-.466***	(.153)	-.15
Mainline Protestant x Voting	.106	(.149)	.03
Black Protestant x Voting	.066	(.178)	.02
Catholic x Voting	.110	(.150)	.03
Secular x Voting	.127	(.155)	.03
Jewish x Voting	.161	(.224)	.05
Evangelical x Political Information	.270	(.200)	.09
Mainline Protestant x Political Information	-.336	(.188)	-.10
Black Protestant x Political Information	-.177	(.222)	-.05
Catholic x Political Information	-.168	(.188)	-.04
Secular x Political Information	-.243	(.196)	-.06
Jewish x Political Information	-.142	(.285)	-.04
Evangelical x Attendance	.044	(.042)	.01
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	-.047	(.042)	-.02
Black Protestant x Attendance	-.052	(.057)	-.02
Catholic x Attendance	-.050	(.042)	-.02
Jewish x Attendance	-.087	(.084)	-.02
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	.043	(.107)	.01
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.038	(.103)	.01
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.140	(.124)	.03
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	.051	(.105)	.01
Secular x Bible Attitudes	-.004	(.107)	-.01
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	-.258	(.164)	-.09
Constant	-2.064***	(.671)	
N	13909		
χ^2 Statistic	1365.31***		
Pseudo R ²	.08		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***, p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-stage probit least squares model.

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H12. Multiple Chronicity, Voting and Information : 2SPLS Results

Variables in Model	Multiple	S. E.	Marginal Effects¹
Demographics			
Education	-.190***	(.037)	-.03
Income	.071***	(.022)	.01
Gender	.132***	(.037)	.02
Married	.004	(.034)	.00
Intelligence	.045	(.025)	.01
Age	.021***	(.006)	.00
Age Squared	-.000***	(.000)	-.00
Urban	.032	(.021)	.01
Where Grew Up	.057	(.035)	.01
Political South	-.007	(.035)	-.00
Political Variables			
Party Identification Squared	.110*	(.050)	.02
Party Identification	.124***	(.048)	.02
Campaign Interest	-.173***	(.035)	-.03
Care Who Wins	.076	(.039)	.01
Voting	-.854***	(.177)	-.14
Political Information	1.164***	(.226)	.19
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.071	(.117)	-.01
Church Attendance	.176***	(.047)	.03
Evangelical	5.662***	(.837)	.93
Mainline Protestant	1.688*	(.834)	.26
Catholic	-.078	(.838)	-.03
Black Evangelical	.565	(.926)	.07
Secular	.182	(.791)	.02
Jew	.680	(1.448)	.14
Election Year			
1980	.088	(.052)	.02
1984	.069	(.050)	.01
1988	-.011	(.052)	-.00
1992	-.126*	(.051)	-.02
1996	.030	(.075)	.01
2000	.261***	(.061)	.05
Interaction Terms			

Table H12 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Education	.207***	(.059)	.04
Evangelical x Income	-.105***	(.039)	-.02
Evangelical x Voting	1.357***	(.190)	.22
Mainline Protestant x Voting	.222	(.187)	.03
Black Protestant x Voting	.131	(.205)	.02
Catholic x Voting	-.031	(.188)	-.01
Secular x Voting	-.053	(.193)	-.01
Jewish x Voting	-.097	(.309)	-.01
Evangelical x Political Information	-1.648***	(.244)	-.27
Mainline Protestant x Political Information	-.450	(.232)	-.07
Black Protestant x Political Information	-.151	(.254)	-.02
Catholic x Political Information	-.099	(.232)	-.01
Secular x Political Information	-.108	(.240)	-.01
Jewish x Political Information	-.418	(.378)	-.08
Evangelical x Attendance	-.248***	(.053)	-.04
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	-.087	(.053)	-.01
Black Protestant x Attendance	-.049	(.064)	-.01
Catholic x Attendance	.006	(.053)	.00
Jewish x Attendance	.073	(.115)	.01
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	.126	(.131)	.02
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	-.003	(.128)	.00
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.090	(.143)	.02
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	.184	(.129)	.03
Secular x Bible Attitudes	.064	(.131)	.01
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	.197	(.225)	.04
Constant	-5.922***	(.829)	
N	13909		
χ^2 Statistic	230.86****		
Pseudo R ²	.02		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***; p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-stage probit least squares model.

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Table H13. No Content Chronicity, Voting and Information : 2SPLS Results

Variables in Model	No Content	S. E.	Marginal Effects¹
Demographics			
Education	.340***	(.038)	.02
Income	.360***	(.028)	.02
Gender	-.004	(.040)	-.00
Married	-.079	(.042)	-.00
Intelligence	.221***	(.032)	.01
Age	.073***	(.007)	.00
Age Squared	-.001***	(.000)	-.00
Urban	.029	(.027)	.00
Where Grew Up	.101**	(.043)	.01
Political South	.140***	(.043)	.01
Political Variables			
Party Identification Squared	.012	(.054)	.00
Party Identification	-.011	(.051)	-.00
Campaign Interest	.145***	(.036)	.01
Care Who Wins	.016	(.045)	.00
Voting	-2.018***	(.172)	-.13
Religion Variables			
Bible Attitudes	-.039	(.151)	-.00
Church Attendance	.357***	(.058)	.02
Evangelical	3.205***	(.565)	.20
Mainline Protestant	.864	(.526)	.06
Catholic	1.258**	(.527)	.08
Black Evangelical	.450	(.572)	.03
Secular	.262	(.437)	.02
Jew	2.361	(1.345)	.17
Election Years			
1980	.056	(.071)	.00
1984	.300***	(.065)	.02
1988	.191***	(.064)	.01
1992	.018	(.067)	.00
1996	.135	(.091)	.01
2000	1.162***	(.079)	.07
Interaction Terms			
Evangelical x Education	-.298***	(.067)	-.02

Table H13 (cont'd).

Evangelical x Income	-.190***	(.047)	-.01
Evangelical x Voting	.656***	(.179)	.04
Mainline Protestant x Voting	.420**	(.173)	.03
Black Protestant x Voting	.275	(.181)	.02
Catholic x Voting	.354**	(.172)	.02
Secular x Voting	.256	(.176)	.02
Jewish x Voting	-.035	(.444)	.00
Evangelical x Attendance	-.143**	(.064)	-.01
Mainline Protestant x Attendance	-.142**	(.066)	-.01
Black Protestant x Attendance	-.015	(.076)	-.00
Catholic x Attendance	-.147**	(.065)	-.01
Jewish x Attendance	-.033	(.225)	-.01
Evangelical x Bible Attitudes	-.098	(.169)	-.01
Mainline Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.036	(.165)	-.00
Black Protestant x Bible Attitudes	.063	(.179)	.00
Catholic x Bible Attitudes	-.163	(.165)	-.01
Secular x Bible Attitudes	.030	(.167)	.00
Jewish x Bible Attitudes	-1.219**	(.608)	-.08
Constant	-8.976***	(.619)	
N	13909		
χ^2 Statistic	6915.88***		
Pseudo R ²	.80		

Note: * p<.10%, one tail test; **p<.05, two-tail test; ***, p<.01, two-tail test. This table reports unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) from the 2-stage probit least squares model.

¹Marginal effects are calculated at the mean/mode of the independent variables.

Appendix I

Table I1. Variables Used in Chapter Six NES Models.

Variable (NES variable No.)	Coding
Political Participation Scale (vcf0723)	1. Lowest level of participation (none) 6. Highest level of participation in campaign activities
Political Information (vcf0050a)	Respondents general level of information about politics and public affairs seemed: 5. Very High 4. Fairly High 3. Average 2. Fairly Low 1. Very Low
Voted (based on vcf702)	1. Voted 0. Did not vote
Abortion (vcf0838)	There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? 1. Abortion should never be permitted. 2. Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health of the woman is in danger. 3. Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman would have difficulty in caring for the child. 4. Abortion should never be forbidden, since one should not require a woman to have a child she doesn't want.
Environment (vcf9047)	Should federal spending on improving and protecting the environment be increased, decreased or kept about the same? 1. Increased 2. Same 3. Decreased
Environmentalists Thermometer (vcf0229)	1(cold)-97(warm)
Women's Libber's Thermometer (vcf0225)	1(cold)-97(warm)

Table I1 (cont'd).

Women's Roles Scale (vcf0834)	<p>Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that a women's place is in the home.</p> <p>Where would you place yourself on this scale?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Women and men should have an equal role 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Women's place is in the home
Strength of partisanship (vcf0305)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Independent or Apolitical 2. Leaning Independent 3. Weak Partisan 4. Strong Partisan
Length of Residence	
Care who wins (vcf0311)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Don't care very much or DK, Pro-Con, Depends, and Other 2. Care a good deal
Campaign Interest (vcf0310)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not much interested 2. Somewhat interested 3. Very much interested
Party Contact (vcf9030)	<p>Did anyone from one of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the campaign?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 0. No
Strength of Partisanship (vcf0305)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Independent or Apolitical 2. Leaning Independent 3. Weak Partisan 4. Strong Partisan
Closeness of election (vcf0714)	<p>Do you think the presidential race will be close or will one candidate win by quite a bit?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Will win by quite a bit 1. Pro-con, depends 2. Close Race

Table I1 (cont'd).

Length of Residence	Actual years coded 0-90
Education (vcf0110)	1. Grade school or less (0-8 grades) 2. High school (12 grades or fewer, incl. non-college training if applicable) 3. Some College (13 grades or more but no degree; college, no identification of degree status) 4. College or advanced degree
Gender (vcf0104)	1. Male 2. Female
Income (vcf0114)	1. 0 to 16 percentile 2. 17 to 33 percentile 3. 34 to 67 percentile 4. 68 to 95 percentile 5. 96 to 100 percentile
Church Attendance (vcf0130 & vcf0130a)	5. Every week 4. Almost every week 3. Once or twice a month 2. A few times a year 1. Never
Bible (vcf0845 & vcf0850)	1. The Bible is the actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word 2. The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word 3. The Bible is a book written by men and is not the Word of God
Political South (vcf0113)	1. South 0. Nonsouth
Religious Tradition Dummy Variables	Each tradition was coded: 1. Religious tradition 0. Otherwise

Birth Cohorts	1. 1903-1912	7. 1963-1972
	2. 1913-1922	8. 1973-1982
	3. 1923-1932	
	4. 1933-1942	
	5. 1943-1952	
	6. 1953-1962	

Table I1 (cont'd).

Periods	Presidential election years from 1972-2000
	1. 1972
	2. 1976
	3. 1980
	4. 1984
	5. 1988
	6. 1992
	7. 1996
	8. 2000

Appendix J

Table J1. Variables Used in Chapter Six General Social Survey Models.

Variable	Coding
Dependent	
Extramarital Sex	<p>What is your opinion about a married person having sexual relations with someone other than the marriage partner--is it always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Always Wrong 2. Almost Always Wrong 3. Sometimes Wrong 4. Not Wrong
Homosexuality	<p>What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex--do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Always Wrong 2. Almost Always Wrong 3. Sometimes Wrong 4. Not Wrong
Teen Sex	<p>What if they are in their early teens, say 14 to 16 years old? In that case, do you think sex relations before marriage are always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Always Wrong 2. Almost Always Wrong 3. Sometimes Wrong 4. Not Wrong
Premarital Sex	<p>If a man and woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Always Wrong 2. Almost Always Wrong 3. Sometimes Wrong 4. Not Wrong
Government Spending: Foreign Aid	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase 2. Same 3. Decrease
Government Spending: Education	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase 2. Same 3. Decrease

Table J1 (cont'd).

Government Spending: Environmental	1. Increase 2. Same 3. Decrease
Government Spending: Military	1. Increase 2. Same 3. Decrease
Atheist Speaker	<p>There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion...</p> <p>If such a person wanted to make a speech in your (city/town/community) against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not?</p> 1. Yes, Allowed to speak 0. No, not allowed to speak
Atheist Teacher	<p>Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not?</p> 0. Yes, fired 1. Not fire
Atheist Book	<p>If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?</p> 0. Favor 1. Not Favor
Communist Speaker	<p>Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist.</p> <p>Suppose an admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?</p> 1. Yes, Allowed to speak 0. No, not allowed to speak
Communist Teacher	<p>Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not?</p> 0. Yes, fired 1. Not fire
Communist Book	<p>Suppose he wrote a book, which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?</p> 0. Favor 1. Not Favor
Homosexual Speaker	<p>And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual?</p> <p>A. Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?</p> 1. Yes, Allowed to speak 0. No, not allowed to speak

Table J1 (cont'd).

Homosexual Teacher	Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not? 0. Yes, fired 1. Not fire
Homosexual Book	If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not? 0. Favor 1. Not Favor
Independent	
Party Identification	Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent or what? 1. Strong Democrat 4. Independent 7. Strong Republican
Political Ideology	1. Extremely Liberal 2. Liberal 3. Slightly Liberal 4. Moderate 5. Slightly Conservative 6. Conservative 7. Extremely Conservative
Education	1. Grade school or less (0-8 grades) 2. High school (12 grades or fewer, incl. non-college training if applicable) 3. Some College (13 grades or more but no degree; college, no identification of degree status) 4. College or advanced degree
Income	1. 0 to 16 percentile 2. 17 to 33 percentile 3. 34 to 67 percentile 4. 68 to 95 percentile 5. 96 to 100 percentile
Gender	1. Male 2. Female
Age	Actual age, 18-80

Table J1 (cont'd).

Age-squared	Actual age squared * .001
Children in Home	Number of children the respondent has ever had.
Urbanism: Currently live in	Population of Residency 1. Open country 2. 1000-2499 3. 2500-9,999 4. 10,000-49,000 5. Unincorporated area of a Medium Central City 6. Unincorporated of a Large Central City 7. Suburb of a Medium Central City 8. Suburb of a Large Central City 9. Medium Central City 10. Large Central City
Marital Status	1. Not Married 0. Married
Religious Attendance	How often do you attend religious services? 8. More than weekly 7. Every week 6. Almost every week 5. Two to Three times a month 4. Once or less a month 3. Two to three times a year 2. Once a year or less
Religious Tradition Dummy Variables	Each tradition was coded: 1. Religious tradition 0. Otherwise

Appendix K

Table K1. Variables Used in National Congregation –1998 General Social Survey Models.

Variable	Coding
Dependent	
Abortion Support Scale	0. Low 6. High
1996 Presidential Vote	1. Voted 0. No Vote
Atheist Speaker	There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion... If such a person wanted to make a speech in your (city/town/community) against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not? 1. Yes, Allowed to speak 0. No, not allowed to speak
Atheist Teacher	Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not? 0. Yes, fired 1. Not fire
Atheist Book	If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not? 0. Favor 1. Not Favor
Communist Speaker	Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose an admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not? 1. Yes, Allowed to speak 0. No, not allowed to speak
Communist Teacher	Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not? 0. Yes, fired 1. Not fire
Communist Book	Suppose he wrote a book, which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not? 0. Favor 1. Not Favor

Table K1 (cont'd).

Homosexual Speaker	<p>And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual?</p> <p>A. Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?</p> <p>1. Yes, Allowed to speak</p> <p>0. No, not allowed to speak</p>
Homosexual Teacher	<p>Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not?</p> <p>0. Yes, fired</p> <p>1. Not fire</p>
Homosexual Book	<p>If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?</p> <p>0. Favor</p> <p>1. Not Favor</p>
Independent	
Party Identification	<p>Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent or what?</p> <p>1. Strong Democrat</p> <p>4. Independent</p> <p>7. Strong Republican</p>
Strength of Partisanship	<p>1. Independent</p> <p>2. Weak Partisan</p> <p>3. Partisan</p> <p>4. Strong Partisan</p>
Political Ideology	<p>1. Extremely Liberal</p> <p>2. Liberal</p> <p>3. Slightly Liberal</p> <p>4. Moderate</p> <p>5. Slightly Conservative</p> <p>6. Conservative</p> <p>7. Extremely Conservative</p>
Education	<p>1. Grade school or less (0-8 grades)</p> <p>2. High school (12 grades or fewer, incl. non-college training if applicable)</p> <p>3. Some College (13 grades or more but no degree; college, no identification of degree status)</p> <p>4. College or advanced degree</p>
Income	<p>1. 0 to 16 percentile 5. 96 to 100 percentile</p> <p>2. 17 to 33 percentile 4. 68 to 95 percentile</p> <p>3. 34 to 67 percentile</p>

Table K1 (cont'd).

Gender	1. Male 2. Female
Age	Actual age, 18-80
Age-squared	Actual age squared * .001
Children in Home	Number of children the respondent has ever had.
Urbanism: Currently live in	Population of Residency 1. Open country 2. 1000-2499 3. 2500-9,999 4. 10,000-49,000 5. Unincorporated area of a Medium Central City 6. Unincorporated of a Large Central City 7. Suburb of a Medium Central City 8. Suburb of a Large Central City 9. Medium Central City 10. Large Central City
Marital Status	1. Not Married 0. Married
Religious Attendance	How often do you attend religious services? 8. More than weekly 7. Every week 6. Almost every week 5. Two to Three times a month 4. Once or less a month 3. Two to three times a year 2. Once a year or less
Religious Tradition Dummy Variables	Each tradition was coded: 1. Religious tradition 0. Otherwise
Church Theology	Theologically speaking, would your congregation be considered more on the conservative side, more on the liberal side, or right in the middle? 1. More Liberal 2. Right in the Middle 3. More Conservative

Table K1 (cont'd).

Church Ideology	<i>Politically speaking</i> , would your congregation be considered more on the conservative side, more on the liberal side, or right in the middle? 1. More Liberal 2. Right in the Middle 3. More Conservative
Political Activism in Church	Within the past 12 months, have people at worship services been told of opportunities for political activity, including petition campaigns, lobbying, or demonstrating? 1. Yes 2. No
Group to Discuss Politics	Within the past 12 months, have there been any groups or meetings or classes or events specifically focused on discussing politics? 1. Yes 2. No
Voter Guides Distributed	Have voter guides ever been distributed to people through your congregation? 1. Yes 2. No
Candidate Spoke to Congregation	Have any political candidates have spoken to your congregation in the past 12 months 1. Yes 2. No
New Paradigm Scale	New Paradigm Church attributes (1 through 16) 1. Low 16. High

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