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CRIMINOGENIC VARIATION AMONG GANG AND NON-GANG OFFENDERS

By

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ABSTRACT

CRIMINOGENIC VARIATION AMONG GANG AND NON-GANG OFFENDERS

By

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The purpose of this study was to determine if criminogenic variations could be used to differentiate between gang members, non-gang member who displayed defiant individualistic personality traits and non-gang member who did not display defiant individualistic personality traits. The data were obtained from the Indianapolis Lever-Pulling study conducted under National Institute of Justice grant # 2003-IJ-CX-1038. This study conducted discriminate function analyses of 235 offenders who participated in the Indianapolis study.

Findings revealed that there was no statistical difference in the amount of criminal justice system contact between gang members and non-gang members who displayed defiant individualist traits. This lack of differential response also extended to attitudinal variables in the study. However, the data showed that there was no direct relationship between the number of criminal charges a respondent incurred and the degree of defiant individualism displayed.

This study found that there was no significant difference between the perceptions of non-gang members who displayed defiant individualist personality traits and non-gang members who did not display defiant individualist traits. The study also suggests a positive correlation between the degree of defiant individualism and the amount of post-intervention positive lifestyle change.

Dedicated

To

Kimberly Rosario Perez (ABD)
(1976-2006)

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Chapter I

"Introduction"

Gangs in the United States have become a pervasive criminological threat. Their increase in the latter part of the twentieth century has been one of the more consistent criminological trends identified by researchers. In the past, many criminal justice and judicial practitioners have reported gangs in their respective jurisdictions. Whether these jurisdictional administrators viewed gangs as a serious problem or not, law enforcement officials are becoming more forthright about the growing presence of organized crime.

The greatest increase in gangs occurred between 1980 and 1995. In 1980, there where approximately 286 cities with more than 2,000 gangs and close to 100,000 gang members (Jackson, 1999). In 1995, the gang representation had increased to about 2,000 cities with more than 25,000 gangs and 650,000 members (Jackson, 1999). Results of the 2002, National Youth Gang Survey suggest that this increase continued into the 21st century. In 2002 the number of gangs in the U.S. increased to 21,500 with an active membership of 731,500 gang members (OJJDP, 2004). So consistent was the increase in gangs and crime that the correlation has become almost axiomatic within social science. However, there is a new trend that differs somewhat from the gang trends of the last two decades.

The 2004 National Youth Gang Survey suggests that there was a decline in the number of criminal justice agencies reporting gang problems (Egley Jr. and Ritz, 2006). The 2004 survey results reveal slight increases in active gang

membership (760,000 members of 24,000 gangs in 2,900 jurisdictions) but these increases were not statistically significant (Ibid). Moreover of the 2,900 responding agencies only about 47% said that the gang problem in their jurisdiction was getting worse (Egley Jr. and Ritz, 2006). The data from the 2004 survey appears to suggest that the U.S. gang problem is beginning to dissipate. Victim data supports a similar conclusion.

Based on the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), gang violence declined from 1.1 million violent victimizations in 1994 to only 341,000 in 2003 (Harrel, 2005). During that time, crime victims identified the alleged perpetrators as gang members approximately 12% of the time (Ibid). Perpetrators were identified as gang members in about 10% of robberies and 4% of the rapes (Harrel, 2005). However there are three alternative explanations for these most recent findings. Specifically, the 2004 National Youth Gang Survey findings could have been influenced by criminal justice practitioners becoming more acclimated to gangs and gang-related crime, (2) political intervention in the agencies' responses and or (3) changes within the gang culture itself.

It is important to note that the actual number of gangs and gang members increased only slightly and the perception of gangs as a problem declined. The first alternative explanation for the decline in perception could be that criminal justice officials and practitioners are becoming accustomed to the dynamics of gang-related crime. The discovery of gangs in a jurisdiction is no longer a serious impediment to the daily operations of criminal justice agencies. Criminal justice agencies can take full advantage of a host of gang investigator associations and

Internet based web sites to help address the impending gang phenomena. There is a growing wealth and availability of resources to alleviate the conceptualization of gangs as a serious problem.

Another alternative explanation for the reduction in criminal justice perceptions of gangs as highly problematic could be political influence. In many locations, especially where jurisdiction leaders hold elected office, it is detrimental to an individual's career to appear soft on crime. The appearance of being unable to control crime in the jurisdiction may prompt some agency heads to endorse departmental policies whereby gangs and gang-related issues are not *per se* problematic. Subsequently, lower ranking individuals within the bureaucracy may follow suit in recording and reporting criminal justice information pursuant to perceptions of gang related activities.

The third alternate explanation for the reduction in the perception of the gang phenomenon is that the fundamental nature of gangs could be changing. Over the past two decades, there has been a great deal of sociological change in the U.S. and the world. Criminologists admit that those same forces that impact normative social structures also impact deviant structures. It is a theoretical error to assume that gangs are passive systems that exist only to be acted upon. In reality, gangs react not only to internal group dynamics but also to variations in law enforcement strategies and the social contexts in which they exist. In short, gangs evolve. It is the third alternative explanation that is explored by this study.

The boundaries between gang members and non-gang members are blurring. As the behavior of gang members and individual offenders has become

more parsimonious, so too has their crimes. Due to technological advances such as increased communication and the availability of personal computers, individual offenders have the ability to plan and commit more sophisticated criminal operation without the reliance on a stable criminal organization. The changing mode of production in normative society has not gone unnoticed by deviant members of society. Gangs can take advantage of the same networking models in the commission of crime that legitimate business use to regulate international trade. Formal membership is no longer the salient characteristic of this criminal organization; yet traditional gang analysis relies heavily on membership as a criterion for study inclusion. Due to this evolution in organized crime, the traditional conceptualization of gangs must undergo a fundamental re-conceptualization.

"Problem Statement"

Because of the change in gangs and gang-related dynamics, which is causing gangs and non-gang members to exhibit parsimonious criminal behavior, the differences between gang members and non-gang members must be re-assessed. Without re-examining the differences between gang members and non-gang members it may not be possible to craft effective interventions in addressing organized criminality. Reliance on outdated paradigms threatens to stagnate criminological progress in understanding the correlates of criminal careers, thereby ensuring that no desistance is possible. This fundamental re-conceptualization requires non-traditional methods of measurement and analysis

in order to more accurately examine the variation in criminal behavior across the two groups.

Traditionally, gang studies have relied on the group hazard hypothesis as an underlying assumption for the existence of gangs and gang-related crime. The group hazard hypothesis assumes that deviance is essentially an aggregate concept because groups induce, sustain and permit deviant behavior (Dentler and Erikson, 1959). This underlying assumption has led many researchers to focus on formal membership as a criterion and category with which to correlate crime. However, with the punctuated equilibrium of the gang culture, membership has become more transient. Formal membership is not as necessary and important as it might have once been.

By networking with other criminals to conduct specific criminal operation, individuals are relieved from the burden of maintaining large criminal organizations. Once an operation is completed, all participants are free to go their own way without the fear of betrayal or the burden of organizational maintenance. In considering the evolution of organized crime, it is more accurate to couch the analysis within the context of Organized Defiant Individualism.

Organized Defiant Individualism is a personality trait that is characterized by simultaneously possessing mainstream social values and few resources with which to achieve them (Sanchez-Jankowski, 2003). Defiant Individualism causes people to undertake economic operations that can be either legal or illegal (Ibid). Defiant Individualism also has an underlying dynamic that resists any attempt to stop the Defiant Individualism (Ibid). This new gang conceptualization posits that

the gang is simply a grouping of people who have this personality trait. According to Organized Defiant Individualism, formal membership does not hold the same level of importance as in Group Hazard models. This new conceptualization requires new methods of measuring gang-related crimes.

One method of measuring Defiant Individualism is on a continuum. Several researchers (Yablonsky, 1959; Hagadorn, 1998; Morash, 1983; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte and Weirschen, 1993) have recommended measuring gangs on a continuum. The continuum allows researchers to examine variability more accurately than by using dichotomous measures. On a continuum where gangs are at one extreme and people with no Defiant Individualist characteristics are at the other; it is possible to assess the fact that as an individual moves closer to the gang end of the continuum he or she becomes more committed to the Defiant Individualism personality. Formal membership in the gang is simply the final step in the process. A similar process toward general deviance was described by Thrasher in his pivotal 1927 study of gangs and was reported in Morash (1983). Organized Defiant Individualism does maintain provisions for group deviance but it differs from the Group Hazard Hypothesis in group stability and function.

The Group Hazard Hypothesis suggests that gangs are more or less stable structures in which the membership may be dynamic and constantly changing. Conversely, the Organized Defiant Individualism theory supports the idea that the dynamic nature of the gang and the membership are coterminous dynamics, neither independent nor dependent on the other. The Group Hazard Hypothesis clearly states that groups tend to induce, sustain and permit deviant behavior

(Dentler and Erikson, 1959). Under the Group Hazard framework, the gang functions as a workshop of deviance. It is within the confines of the workshop that individuals discover, participate and receive support for various types of criminal endeavors. The gang under the Organized Defiant Individualism framework is much more akin to a tool; the gang is simply a way to accomplish a goal, deviant or legitimate. Once a new conceptualization is formed, an accompanying measurement model must be developed.

The purpose of the measurement model is to ensure that the analysis is being conducted in a systematic and thorough manner. In examining a phenomenon as diverse as gang crime, it is necessary to examine both gang crime and gang attitudes toward crime. In order to achieve a more thorough assessment of the Organized Defiant Individualism concept primary and secondary criminogenics will be used.

Primary criminogenics are the actual rates of criminal behavior that an individual commits. These measures can include several different offenses and incidents. For example, the number of criminal convictions, the number of drug arrests, the number of property arrests and the number of felony charges are all primary criminogenics because they are either direct criminal behaviors or are the result of direct criminal behavior. Conversely, secondary criminogenics are attitudinal measures. Secondary criminogenics are not necessarily illegal since they are attitude based. Secondary criminogenics such as attitude toward gun use and attitude toward authority may affect how the individual views and interacts with society, but are not direct criminal acts. The attitudes that support illegal

behavior are as important to understanding the new boundaries of gang behavior as the behavior itself.

The study will use data from a sample of probationers which includes gang members, individuals who exhibit Defiant Individualist traits and individuals who display no criminal organizational influence. The fundamental nature of gangs has changed to the degree that traditional conceptualizations and measurements are insufficient to draw a distinction between gang members and non-gang members. Thus it is hypothesized that gang members and non-gang members who display Defiant Individualist characteristics exhibit similar patterns of both criminality and attitudes toward crime. Based on the literature review, the following hypotheses were formulated.

"Study Hypotheses"

H_1: There is no difference in criminal justice contact between gang members and Defiant Individualists that would denote a discriminant function.

H_2: There is a direct relationship between the numbers of criminal charges accumulated and the level of Defiant Individualism.

H_3: There is no difference in the attitude toward gun use between defiant individualists and subjects in the zero-influence group.

H_4: There is an inverse relationship between Defiant Individualism and positive trajectory shifts.

H_5: There is no difference in the perception of gang criminality between gang members and Defiant Individualists.

"Summary"

Despite the slight increase in gang membership reported by some law enforcement agencies, crime victims are reporting relatively low incidents of victimization by gang members. There is also no official data that show gang crime to be decreasing. Official data, as well as gang research, often focuses on membership as an inclusionary criterion. However, as gangs have changed they have removed the necessity of membership.

Gangs are dynamic entities that are evolving in ways that make traditional membership obsolete. This changing gang dynamic can affect research findings in different ways. If official data and research are focusing on gang membership, which is no longer as important to the gang culture as it once was, there might appear to be only a slight increase when past years have shown large increases in gang participation.

Conversely, if gangs are moving away from formal membership, victims may still be preyed upon by individuals who are not actually gang members but who commit gang-related crimes such as home invasions and drug sales. These types of crimes require collusion but not necessarily formal membership. Victims would be in a better position to know whether a perpetrator was in a gang or not. Jurisdictions that fail to report gangs as a problem may do so because gangs have become normalized to the jurisdiction or perhaps the law enforcement officials simply do not recognize the emerging gang structures. The term evolution is somewhat misleading; it would be better to classify the change in gang structure as punctuated equilibrium.

The punctuated equilibrium is an anthropological theory that can best be described as the introduction or expansion of an existing organism beyond the traditional applications. The interesting thing about punctuated equilibrium is that the expansion of the traditional function of some organisms does not make all of the organisms irrelevant. Just because some organisms evolve to more sophisticated functions does not mean that the less sophisticated organisms cease to exist. The changes occurring in the gang culture are characterized by the reduction in reliance on formal membership.

CHAPTER II

"The Logic of Conceptualization"

The systematic study of gangs, like most criminological concepts, varies based upon the conceptualization of the phenomenon. Conceptualization embodies more than a simple definition. Fear of crime, for example, does not exist. Fear of crime has no chemical composition, no color, no size or shape and no atomic mass. Fear of crime exists because individuals agree that it exists. Therefore, conceptualizations of constructs must also contain underlying assumptions about the phenomenon that color both the analysis and interpretation of research findings. Gangs and gang-related crime are also a construct. The relationship between conceptualization and construct can be either inductive or deductive.

A deductive relationship between conceptualization and construct is most commonly found in criminological studies. Deductive models test general theories and apply them to specific groups or behaviors. Conceptualizations of criminological constructs are often formed prior to any empirical tests designed to verify an *a priori* theory. The deductive model is, of course, a valid paradigm and heavily relied upon by social science researches. However, sometimes it is necessary to use an inductive process to inform a conceptualization, such as when phenomena undergo autonomic changes.

The inductive relationship between conceptualization and construct begins with observation of the phenomenon and seeks to move from specific to general statements about the phenomenon. The inductive process can be quite helpful in

re-examining phenomena after or during times of change. One element that makes sociological research challenging is the fact that study subjects are not passive back drops on which social processes are acted out; they can take an active role in the production or reproduction of crime. This ability to be an active participant allows individual the ability to create autonomic change or change that is independent of any structural influence. This type of individually-inspired autonomic change that has blurred the boundaries between gang member and non-gang members. In order to understand how a re-conceptualization of gangs is necessary, one must first understand the societal changes that have produced the need for the conceptual shift.

"Gangs in the Age of Globalization"

Globalization has had a profound effect on contemporary gangs. However, prior to the examination of globalization's effect on gangs, it is necessary to clarify the concepts discussed. As a phenomenon, globalization is often misunderstood and has many different conceptualizations. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis globalization is defined as: *The technologically produced reduction in the spacio-temporal characteristics of civilization; whereby advances in economics, communications and socio-cultural transfers are realized at the individual level.* It is necessary to ensure a thorough conceptual understanding of globalization that goes beyond a simple definition. This definition allows discussion of globalization in terms of both time and space.

One of the most notable outcomes of globalization has been the reduction in time and space. The spacio-temporal reduction is only possible because of how

we as humans conceptualize distance. Distance, or space, is often viewed and discussed in relation to time. When taking a flight from North Carolina to California, we often discuss the trip as a 10-hour flight not as a 3,000-mile journey. Therefore, by simply decreasing the amount of time it takes to move from one place to another, we decrease the space. Geographical distance has not been altered, only our perception of the geographical distance.

This spatial perception is not merely two-dimensional. In his second book on globalization, Friedman (2005) uses the analogy that the world is flat as a method of demonstrating that not only is the perception of space and time changing but also the perception of barriers and walls. Friedman (2005) argues that not only is globalization shrinking the world but that it is leveling the playing field. Under globalization, this perceptual change in space and time is the direct result of technological advances. Globalization can be seen as having two types of advances: first order advances (input) and second order advances (outcome).

Technological advances are first-order advances and are somewhat of a misnomer. The technological advances such as cellular phones, personal computers, high-speed Internet capabilities and long-range super sonic air travel are not actually advances. The technological revolution that has helped spurn globalization is simply an extension of existing products. The extension allows common products to be used in ways other than how they were originally conceived. For example, advanced cellular phones not only can place and receive calls anywhere in the world but they can also check e-mail, take high resolution photographs, play music, surf the Internet and record video. These technological

advances, in turn, provide mechanisms with which to realize economic, socio-cultural transfer and communication advances.

Economic, socio-cultural and communication gains are considered second-order (output) advances and are similar in nature to the technological advances. Second-order advances are also extensions or simplifications of previous processes. International finance and trade had always existed. It is, of course, much easier in a time where most business people can instantaneously access financial records via computer or hand held Blackberry device. There has always been cultural transfer as people have migrated from one part of the world to another. However, the regularity, speed and lower cost of migration add to the relative ease of migration and subsequent cultural transfer. Globalization affects many different aspects of people's lives, including crime.

It seems only logical that a globalization effect would accrue to gangs. Hobbs (2001) crystallizes the issue of globalization's effect on local crime by explaining that the historical backcloth, upon which organized crime is acted out, is in the local working class communities. As local economies are changed by globalization, through fragmentation or de-industrialization, organized crime will also be transformed (Ibid). Globalization has two processes that most impact gang crime at the local level: Democratization and the Network Enterprise.

The concept of Democratization (Friedman, 2000; Giddens, 2003) is an extension of the basic globalization conceptualization. Globalization describes the advances produced by technological innovation, while democratization explains to whom the advances accrue. While Friedman frames his discussion in more

general terms, Giddens (2003) specifically discusses the need for a democratizing of democracy due to the members of society living in the same informational environment as the people in power over them.

The shared informational environment can be seen in the media coverage of war. In contemporary social conflicts, embedded reporters are able to show real-time video of war. Due to advances in satellite communications, the same level of information that government leaders have on battle tactics, causalities and campaign success is also available to citizens. Questionable government conduct is more difficult to keep secret due to the anonymity with which whistle blowers can inform the public through a host of Internet applications. Citizens have direct access to experts from around the world, which allows them to hear independent assessments of governmental policies and are therefore not relegated to accepting the official version of daily events.

Democratization is best conceptualized as: the process of obtaining access to any advantage that was previously unattainable by the populace and once reserved for the state. Under the auspices of globalization, democratization has occurred in many different areas. When citizens have access to news with the same speed as government officials, democratization of information has occurred. In nation-states where the citizens can purchase the same personal computers to organize their work that government agencies use to conduct public planning, democratization of technology has occurred. When citizens can hire a private bodyguard force to provide 24-hour protection just like members of the Secret Service, democratization of security has occurred. Perhaps the three most

influential elements in society that have impacted crime at the local level are the democratization of technology and information as well as the democratization of the mechanisms of war.

Personal computers, cellular phones, 24-hour banking, super sonic international flights and satellite communications have proliferated into the mainstream populace at a rapid rate. As these technological innovations have become common place, it would be only logical for the criminal populace to make use of them as well. Criminals can avoid law enforcement wiretapping by using unlocked Global Systems for Mobile communication (GSM) cell phones and highly encrypted computer software. Criminals have an enhanced ability to flee prosecution with the increase of international travel. Criminals also have the ability to select weapons that are on par with, or superior to, those of many law enforcement agencies. The speed at which modern society adopts new technology is different from past generations.

From the introduction of radio it took 40 years to obtain an audience of 50 million listeners in the United States; whereas the Internet only took 4 years to obtain 50 million users after its introduction (Giddens, 2003). However, technological proliferation is not the only issue in the age of globalization. The nature and extended use of the Internet must be considered. This extended use of the Internet has not gone unnoticed by government officials. In an analogy of the Internet's effect on globalization, a United States Federal Communication Commission advisor likened the Internet to Roman roads (Hardt and Negri, 2000). The information super highway provides ordinary citizens with the ability

to disseminate their ideas, beliefs, movements and cultures much the same way that Roman roads spread Roman ideals.

Society has become so technologically interdependent that an entirely new technology-based paradigm has emerged. The seminal work on the information technology paradigm and network enterprise was written by Manuel Castells, who is consistently sited by many scholars who study globalization and the new technology paradigm (Audirac, 2003; Hobbs, 2001; Parker, 2002; Passas, 2000; Tillman, 2002; Scholte, 2003; Hardt and Negri, 2000, Tomlinson, 2003; Dicken, 2003; Held, 2003 and Goldsmith, 2000).

Castells (2000) discusses the defining characteristics of the new paradigm as an information-technology paradigm. This new paradigm consists of many different compatible technologies found in new gadgets that benefit the user because they are widely available and grow relatively less expensive over time (Ibid). Castells (2000) also asserts that the new information-technology paradigm is the foundation of the network enterprise. By using these new, more versatile electronic tools, criminals can communicate and coordinate crimes more effectively. The added features of ready availability and ever falling cost only hasten and solidify the adoption of the new technology. There are five major components of this information-technology paradigm: information as the raw material, pervasive effect of the new technology, networking logistics, flexibility and convergence of specific technologies into a highly integrated system. These components help develop an understanding of its applications to crime.

The first characteristic of the information technology paradigm is that information is the raw material (Castells, 2000). Within a society where a high degree of reliance is placed on information, criminals are able to develop new endeavors based on the manipulation of information. Unlike situations involving drug deals or stolen property, information-related crimes are not limited by logistics. There need not be a great deal of planning about where to hide stolen identifications or bank accounts. Society is very familiar with the havoc that can be wreaked by corporate espionage. When information is the basic raw material of the new economy, it gives the average criminal the ability to pursue more lucrative crime by becoming an information broker. One example of this information transition occurred with a gang in the southeastern United States.

The organization in question, Blue Gang (A fictitious name due to confidentiality concerns), is an international transplant to a medium sized city in the southeastern United States. Shortly after its migration, gang members begin to sell a formula for making 'black crack'. There are two primary formulas being sold to local drug gangs. The first formula (German) involves lacing the cocaine mixture with pencil lead in order to turn the finished crack cocaine, black. The second formula (Eastern European) uses iodine as an additive while cooking the crack and will also turn the finished product black. The use of the specific chemicals does not change the potency of the cocaine but it does prevent law enforcement test kits from rendering a positive finding. If law enforcement test kits cannot show a substance to be positive, the officer cannot charge the suspect with possession of the illegal substance. Additionally, the officer must also be

able show that the substance had the same appearance of the drug in order to charge the suspect with possession of a counterfeit substance.

Now, while members of the Blue Gang never sold drugs in this specific jurisdiction, they sold the information on better methods of producing drugs to other gangs for profit. Thus, the Blue Gang capitalized on the informational nature of crime to create a new type of market. The sophisticated nature of these crimes is in stark contrast to the traditional conceptualizations of gangs as low-level street criminals. The contemporary gang exercises an amazing amount of agency and sophistication in designing criminal enterprises.

The second characteristic of the new information technology paradigm is the pervasive effect of the new technology (Castells, 2000). Because our society has fully embraced the advances in technology, criminals are better able to uses these technologies in interesting ways. Criminal entities are better able to conduct surveillance on potential targets as well as develop more intricate plans for criminal operations. Computer hackers develop sophisticated programs designed to commit cyber crime and evade law enforcement. In her 1998 study, Shelley states that technology has changed the very nature of crime. One example is the use of the Internet to recruit gang members. A North Carolina gang (name withheld due to confidentiality concerns) has had a recruitment website as far back as 1998.

The third characteristic of the information-technology paradigm is the networking logistic aspect (Castells, 2000). As we will discuss later, criminals are networking with greater frequency than ever before. Cooperation among criminal

entities is very natural due to the fact that they have the common problem of evading law enforcement (McCusker, 2004). One example of the networking capabilities of criminal entities in the technology paradigm occurred in October of 2000; a Sicilian Mafia group in conjunction with 20 other individuals created a digital clone of the Bank of Sicily's online component (McCusker, 2004). The group planned to steal $400 million allotted to the bank by the European Union and very possibly could have succeeded had the plot not been revealed by an informant (Ibid). The real issue was not that the group tried and failed but that they conceived of the plan in the first place (McCusker, 2004).

Next the information-technology paradigm is characterized by flexibility (Castells, 2000). The flexibility of contemporary crime is, to a great deal, beholding to the networking logistic capabilities. Criminal entities now have the ability to pull resources from any part of the planet as needed. An example of this flexibility network logistic dynamic occurred in the southeastern United States. In 1999 there was an ongoing conflict between two Hispanic gangs. A member of the Yellow Gang (A fictitious name for confidentiality concerns) killed a member of the Orange Gang (A fictitious name for confidentiality concerns) at an apartment complex. Members of the Orange Gang shipped the dead body of its member to El Salvador without ever notifying the authorities. The Orange Gang then contracted an assassin from El Salvador to retaliate for the murder.

After killing two members of the Yellow gang, the assassin quickly returned to El Salvador. It was only during the investigation of the second murder that the full scope of the crime was uncovered. The most interesting aspect of this

case was the fact that the people in the apartment complex where the shooting took place spread rumors of the murder but would not openly confirm details of the incident until long after the guilty parties had both fled the country. Thus, this local gang was demonstrating its ability to utilize global networking and resources to carry out sophisticated criminal operation. In addition, we see that the community was co-opted into keeping silent either through fear or overt loyalty to the gang.

The final characteristic of the new information-technology paradigm is convergence of specific technologies into a highly integrated system (Castells, 2000). This new system, while designed for improved commerce and economic growth, is quickly being embraced by the criminal rank and file. Career criminals are becoming generalists with respect to the types of crime they commit.

The democratization of information is almost synonymous with the technology but has enough variation to merit a separate discussion, albeit brief. The multitude now has access to the same level of information as those in higher levels of government in the traditional nation-state (Giddens, 2003). Criminals are constantly devising new ways to use this access to new information. Identity theft, cyber crimes and a whole host of other fraud-based crimes are on the increase in the United States. The ready availability of the new information on social security numbers, credit scores and even pay stubs enables criminals to commit financial crimes with a level of ease never before seen. Even banks are subject to increasing 'phishing' attacks, which are designed to search for customer financial

information. Perhaps the greatest problem associated with democratization is the democratization of the mechanisms of war.

Weapons, just as anything else, have become comodified under globalization. For the first time in history, the individual has access to not only traditional small arms but also weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear and biological weapons. Weapons of choice include Man-Pad shoulder fired missiles, of which, 4,000 have gone missing from the former Iraqi arsenal (Naim, 2005). The Iraqi loss is small in comparison to the total picture. According to the Small Arms Survey, 100,000 Man-Pads are currently unaccounted for (Ibid).

The survey also revealed that at least 13 non-state groups own these weapons (Naim, 2005). There are indications that these weapons are not mere trophies or objects of discussion; these weapons are being used. In 2002 a Man-Pad missile was fired at an Israeli passenger plane as it departed Mombasa, Kenya (Naim, 2005). The demand for this particular weapon is so high that companies in Pakistan, North Korea, Egypt and Vietnam are now supplying additional groups (Ibid).

Naim (2005) also states that Dr. A.Q. Khan, a nuclear arms dealer, is only one of the ruthless, talented entrepreneurs who sell weapons internationally. The demand for these more powerful weapons has even prompted some traditional corporations to enter the arms trade. Elf, the French state owned oil company, arranged the financial backing for the Lissouba Regime to purchase $61.3 million worth of light weapons from Iran, helicopters from Russia and the services of 40 Russian technicians (Naim, 2005). It is difficult to separate the acquisition of the

weapons from the manner in which they will be used. Democratization has made technology, information and the mechanisms of violence much more readily available to citizens and criminals alike. Many gangs such as Latin kings, Mara Salvatrucha and El Rukins have developed strategic alliances with international non-state groups. These alliances create access to these uncontrolled military weapons. Globalization has also impacted gangs through networked enterprises.

The use of network enterprises is increasing among criminals; however, there is some general confusion about the concept. The confusion associated with the network enterprise often stems from semantics. Criminology first dealt with network enterprises when combating gangs and organized crime. Organizations that are involved in criminal network enterprises are sometimes referred to as swarms, due to their loose organizational dynamics. The swarm organization is formidable because it differs so much from traditional criminal structures.

Unlike Weberian structures, a swarm has no head and its members do not necessarily need high levels of intelligence, it has no identifiable organizational structure and it can form and disperse almost instantly (Hardt and Negri, 2004). It is difficult to use traditional law enforcement tactics when combating organizations that use swarm structures. The formidable power of the swarm can be seen even in nature. For example, although a single termite may not necessarily be intelligent, a swarm of termites is an intelligent system (Hardt and Negri, 2004).

The use of swarm structures becomes a force multiplier for an individual criminal. The greatest threat to any criminal enterprise is the threat of betrayal,

such as the Sicilian Bank Fraud (McCusker, 2004). However, criminals who properly network their crimes can avoid this threat because they effectively have no permanent 'members' by which to be betrayed. The Internet also uses a type of swarm intelligence and is almost impervious to attack from hostile externalities because of its composition of multiple singularities (Hardt and Negri, 2004). This collaboration of singularities is what made the illegal downloading of music so difficult for the record industry to curtail. In Hobbs' discussion of the transition from traditional British criminal 'family firms' to serious crime networks, he provides an excellent assessment of the swarm.

In an environment where traditional neighborhoods have disintegrated and family firms have lost their traditional notions of territory, a serious crime network can operate as fluid and flexible marauders on changing terrain (Hobbs, 2001). Hobbs goes on to classify these coalitions of loosely structure collectives as local social systems that could no longer rely on older forms of territorial dominance seen in the 1950s and 1960s. For the purpose of this response, the swarm concept describes the actors and the network enterprise describes the action.

The network enterprise is best defined as: a type of enterprise in which the system of means is composed of the intersections of segments of autonomous systems of goals; thereby producing components that are paradoxically both dependent and autonomous (Castells, 2000). Areas that result from fragmented working class neighborhoods and local labor markets are seen by some scholars (Hobbs, 2001) as the ideal environment for both legal and illegal opportunities

due to the extra territoriality, support of flexible networks and entrepreneurial orientation. These areas are perfect for network enterprises. The network enterprise is based on two principles: connectedness and consistency, and is deceptively simple when applied to criminal enterprises.

Connectedness is the degree to which the network can facilitate noise-free communication (Castells, 2000). By using swarm structure, a few intelligent criminals can conduct very sophisticated criminal operations provided that they can ensure their networks. With the technological proliferation previously discussed, noise-free communication is more attainable. Criminals are able to seamlessly integrate target acquisition, planning, criminal operation and dispersal as effectively as any banker servicing a client's account.

Consistency is the degree to which there is a shared interest between the network's goals and components (Castells, 2000). Consistency is the true unknown element in examining these new criminal forms. The network enterprise is revealing that the strangest of bed fellows can function well together. There are already allegiances between Mexican and Colombian drug Cartels, between Mexican and Chinese human traffickers and between Colombian and Sicilian drug traffickers (McCusker, 2004). Perhaps the greatest example of consistency within a networked criminal enterprise is the relationship between terrorist groups and American street gangs. One of the better known terrorist-gang allegiance is between Al Qaeda and the Mara Salvatrucha.

The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) is an international gang with deep American roots. This gang came to the attention of Al Qaeda leaders after the

September 11th attacks and was quickly identified as an organization that could facilitate the transport of weapons and humans into the U.S. illegally (Williams, 2005). The networked enterprise so far has been very active. Between 2002 and 2004 thousands of 'Special Interest Aliens' have been smuggled into the U.S. from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Iraq (Williams, 2005). Not only are federal officials aware of this network enterprise, the authorities have renamed one particular crossing point 'Arab Ally' and another outside of Douglas Arizona; 'Arab Road' (Williams, 2005).

It is important to reiterate that the network enterprise is a legitimate feature of our new information economy and is no more criminal than commerce itself. It has, however, been re-invented to serve criminal purposes. These legitimate innovations have produced an enhancement effect on gangs and gang-related crime. There is a general consensus among criminologists (Stern, 2003; Tillman, 2002; Williams, 2005; Clark, 2004; Finckenauer and Veroin, 2001, Baily and Unnithan, 1994; Shelley, 1998; Sornarajah, 2004; Passas, 2000) that globalization has the potential to increase crime both globally and locally.

Local gangs can use the extended capabilities of their cellular phones and laptop computers to more efficiently establish local narcotics rings. Conducting counter surveillance on local law enforcement officials is much easier with cameras that can take 2 mega pixel photos of suspected under cover officers and e-mail them to fellow gang members. Highly motivated individuals can even construct impromptu organizations for certain lucrative criminal operations; then instantaneously disband them at the completion of the enterprise. Globalization

allows the criminal individual to truly function as a criminal mastermind and conduct highly sophisticated crimes at the local level. The result of this increase in networked enterprise and information-technology proliferation is gangs that require different theoretical frameworks with which to study them.

"Gangs as Organized Defiant Individualism"

Due to the changes in contemporary gang dynamics, this study proposes an alternative conceptualization of gangs. Sanchez-Jankowski (2003) conceptualizes gangs as organized defiant individualism. Defiant individualism is a personality trait that is produced when an individual, usually lower income, simultaneously possesses mainstream social values but has few resources with which to achieve them (Sanchez-Jankowski, 2003). Defiant individualism causes people to undertake economic ventures, legal or illegal and has an underlying dynamic that resists any attempt to stop the defiant individualist (Ibid). Sanchez-Jankowski (2003) goes on to say that defiant individualism can be viewed in both working class and poor areas and that almost all gang members have it. He therefore conceptualizes gangs as organized defiant individualism. Some of the more salient features of gangs lend themselves to the organized defiant individualism model.

According to defiant individualism, the manufacture, sale and delivery of illegal drugs is the means by which defiant individualists realize mainstream goals. Within the American society those values tend to be monetary, which creates a nice fit between means and ends. As we see with Levitt and Venkatesh (2000), gang members in the study were driven by the prospects of future

earnings, not necessarily what they were making at the time of the study, therefore, the gang represented a direct benefit to members as Sanchez-Jankowski (2003) claimed. However, this differs from the group hazard hypothesis because the gang is not necessarily creating the illegality; it is simply the matrix in which it is conducted.

Interestingly, rap music is another example of organized defiant individualism. There are many cultural elements of the rap music industry that are shared with the gang culture; however, the production, sale and delivery of Rap music is legal. Most rap musicians construct and maintain large entourages, just like gangs. There are well-publicized violent rivalries between various rap groups and even rappers who live and represent one area of the country or another, just like gangs. Rap musicians even kill one another over seemingly innocuous rivalries, just like gang members. As described by defiant individualism, the product in the rap industry is legal and the participants are going to any means to prevent anyone from stopping the endeavor. Violence, unfortunately, is the most common and reliable means for both gang members and rap musicians to use.

Gang members and rappers invariably use violence as a means of protecting their endeavors, legal or illegal. Violence is simply expedient. It is important to remember that a central element of defiant individualism is the lack of resources to achieve social values. This study asserts that the lack of resources extends not only to social networks or to economics but also to coping mechanisms. For example, territorialism is often used as a variable through which to understand gang-related conflicts. Violent clashes over territory are simply attempts to

protect market share in illegal markets or enterprises such as extortion rackets, burglary, drugs or robbery. Rap musicians resort to violence in much the same way.

When faced with a situation where one rap group insults another, the insult is perceived as causing the receiving group to lose face, which equates to a loss of credibility in the rap music industry. Credibility is a crucial element in the marketing of any rap musician's work. Violence is the rapper's method of protecting his or her enterprise. The reason there is an over representation of gang members in the rap music industry is that gang members already understand the organization of defiant individualism; rap music simply represents a new name to the same game. Using the organized defiant individualist framework has several advantages.

Organized defiant individualism (ODI) allows researchers to examine gang-related crime on a continuum from having no elements of the ODI personality trait to formal membership in a gang. The need for a continuum approach to gang research has been called for by several researchers (Yablonsky, 1959; Hagadorn, 1998; Morash, 1983; Thornberry et al., 1993). Examining gang-related behavior on a continuum can also provide an understanding of the temporal correlates of gang crime.

For example, in the Thornberry et al. (1993) study, the authors examined the crime rates of individuals before, during and after their membership in gangs. Zhang et al. (1999) found that gang membership had only a modest effect on subsequent delinquency but that there was a strong positive correlation between

prior delinquency and gang membership. These findings were somewhat supported by Gordon's (2000) findings that individuals joined gangs over a period of time and not in a spontaneous manner. The continuum approach also provides a method of assessing organized deviance outside the frame of formal membership.

Despite the heavy reliance on formal membership, some researchers admit that formal membership is not necessary for associative deviance (Lerman, 1968; Winfree et al., 1994; Howell, 1994) and that there is sometimes more deviance outside of the gang (Decker and Kempf-Leonard, 1991). There are two studies (Morash, 1983 and Thornberry et al., 1993) that have similarities to this study.

In the 1983 study of gangs, Morash tested the peers' delinquency as a measure of the degree to which peer groups were like gangs. Here, the study uses the innovation of the formal organization as a referent by which to assess other associations. The study was based on the ideas of Fredrick Thrasher, who also conceptualized gangs not as a group hazard but as only one element in the pursuit of a free life (Morash, 1983). The study used several scales designed to assess solidarity, activity orientation and gang-likeness. The peer's gang-likeness was statistically significantly correlated with delinquency but was weak and accounted for less than two percent of the variation in delinquency (Morash, 1983). The current study differs from Morash (1983) in two ways: individual level measures and expanded criminogenic correlates.

The current study examines the gang likeness on an individual scale rather than the Morash (1983) structural measure of peer group likeness to gangs. Due to the disaggregate trends seen in contemporary society, the assessment of defiant

individualism is more accurately measured on an individual level. The second variation between the Morash (1983) study and the current one is the expanded dependent variable. Morash (1983) examined delinquency as a correlate of gang-likeness whereas this study uses both crime rates and attitudinal measures as correlates to gang similarities.

Thornberry et al. (1993) examined the crime rates of individuals before, during and after their membership in gangs. The study also tested two model assumptions of gang membership: the selection model and the social facilitation model. The selection model theorized that gangs simply attracted people who were already deviant and thereby produced higher crime rates. Conversely, the social facilitation model asserted that the social structure of gangs promoted increased deviance in people who were not necessarily deviant prior to joining. Thornberry et al. (1993) found that the selection model was not supported. The relationship between these two diametrically opposed models is similar to the models tested in the current study but there is one primary difference.

Thornberry et al. (1993) focuses on gang membership as a referent category. Thornberry et al. (1993) compares deviancy before, during and after gang membership; this study contrasts deviancy of defiant individualism with that of gang membership. Within the framework of defiant individualism, criminological intervention becomes more difficult.

"Desistance Under Defiant Individualism"

An additional dimension of organized defiant individualism is the problem of desistence. Despite an increasing body of research into gangs and gang-related

deviance, there is a dearth of research into the process of desistance. Typically, gang desistance is seen as a spontaneous occurrence in which individual gang members undergo a miraculous transformation and awake as a member of normative society. Not only are the cases of spontaneous life transformation isolated and anecdotal, they are not replicable. Within the theoretical framework of organized defiant individualism, desistence becomes more difficult.

Gang desistance is a unique phenomenon in that it actually entails not only the desistance of behaviors but also the defection from a culture. The specific act of an individual disassociating with a gang is typically insufficient to promote the type of lifestyle change necessary to insure the continued success of the individual and guard against the possibility of recidivism. With respect to the organized defiant individualism, the individual must defect from the culture that promotes the existence of the gang. Under defiant individualism, gang membership is more representative of a personal pathology than a socially facilitated one and will therefore require a more systematic intervention. It is helpful to examine desistance within the framework of the life course perspective.

Sampson and Laub's life course perspective is arguably the most important criminological theory to emerge in the last few decades. The traditional view of crime posited that there was an inverse relationship between age and crime. As an individual grew older he or she would commit less crime and therefore 'age out' of crime (Siegel, 2004). The life course perspective, in general, posits that the relationship between age and crime is not constant across the life

course due to several factors; two of which are homotypic continuity and heterotypic continuity (Sampson and Laub, 1992).

Homotypic continuity refers to deviant behavior committed early in life that prevents an individual from transitioning from a deviant life trajectory to a normative life trajectory (Sampson and Laub, 1992). For example, a gang member who is convicted of multiple felonies in his or her 20s will find it much more difficult to desist from a deviant lifestyle in his or her 40s. The trajectory shift or transition is blocked by several factors. Rival gang members may seek revenge against the desistor, thereby forcing the person to continue committing acts of violence as a survival mechanism. Fellow gang members may also contribute to the blocked transition by seeking favors of an illegal nature. Normative transitions may also be blocked by members of normative society who refuse to employ the individual because of his or her criminal history. Under these circumstances, the age-crime curve is not consistent, in that the relationship then becomes positive; as the individual increases in age so does the level of deviance.

Heterotypic continuity refers to behaviors that are learned early in the life course, which are not necessarily *mala in se* but that lead to deviant or anti social behaviors later in life (Sampson and Laub, 1992). For example, the gang culture prizes aggression in gang members as a way of dealing with adversity. Through overtly aggressive behavior, gang members gain status and rank within the gang. However, in normative society this type of aggressive posturing is seen as hostile and may block normative transitions.

Heterotypic and homotypic continuity may not be addressed by those with the defiant individualist personality, because they may be less likely to view their behavior as pathological. After all, to these individuals, they are only succeeding the best way they can. Therefore, efforts to promote homotypic and heterotypic discontinuity will probably be less effective on these individuals. Much of the consensus as to the relationship between gangs and crime is the result of the underlying assumption that gangs create a group hazard effect.

"Gangs as a Conceptual Group Hazard"

The group hazard effect is actually the combination of two different concepts: the group hazard hypothesis and the group delinquency hypothesis. Erickson's (1973) group hazard hypothesis states that violating the law in groups is more likely to ensure detection and official reaction than individual crime. The group hazard hypothesis could be attributed simply to the fact that it is more difficult for groups to evade detection than for an individual to escape detection (Erickson, 1973). Erickson's group hazard is an extension of the commonly accepted group delinquency hypothesis, which can be seen in earlier work.

Dentler and Erikson (1959) proposed three propositions that sought to explain the aggregate dynamics of deviance. The first proposition was that groups tended to induce, sustain and permit deviant behavior (Dentler and Erikson, 1959). This first proposition addressed the most salient issue of the gangs by asserting that deviance is a central function of groups. With deviance playing such a pivotal part in the group's dynamics, it seems intuitive that the resulting decades of gang research would rely heavily on the membership as a necessary criterion.

The second proposition states that deviant behavior functions in enduring groups to help maintain equilibrium (Dentler and Erikson, 1959). The equilibrium discussed refers to the gang's ability to maintain its activities, such as robbery or drug sales, at a certain level. The group uses deviance to ensure the organization strengthens or removes weak members (Ibid). This equilibrium creates the ability of the group to realize long-term growth and sustainability. In the early years of the twenty-first century, we see generational gang members and gangs that have existed for decades.

The third proposition stated that groups will resist any trend toward alienation of a member whose behavior deviates from the group standards (Dentler and Erickson, 1959). The authors assert that in situations where groups are faced with a member whose behavior violated the group's standards, group members will put pressure on that member in order to force the member to behave in accordance with the group (Ibid). The rationality of the group is that there is strength in numbers. Strength is diminished when members are alienated or unnecessarily removed from the group. It is therefore important to maintain membership at the highest levels possible. Group hazard and group delinquency combine to produce the group hazard effect. Despite the earlier applications to juvenile crime (Erickson, 1973) the group hazard effect forms the founding assumptions for gang research. This group hazard conceptualization overlooks the fact that gang-related crime is not relegated to juvenile actors and that even when aggregate deviance is initiated during adolescence it may continue into adult hood. The group hazard effect is supported by empirical findings.

As previously, stated there is a great deal of consensus among researchers that gang members participate in crime and deviance at much higher rates than non-gang members. The higher rates of crime cross several different domains including violence, homicide and drug sales. Some researchers (Harper and Robinson, 1999) have even observed higher rates of more general forms of deviance such as sexual activity and substance abuse among juvenile gang members. The relationship between gangs and homicide is, perhaps, the most well documented correlate in gang research.

In a 1994 study, Hutson et al. examined drive-by shootings of juveniles under 18 years of age in the city of Los Angeles. From a sample of 677 incidents recorded by police, the researchers found that 71% of the juveniles injured in drive-by shootings in 1991 were gang members (Hutson et al., 1994). In a similar study, Baily and Unnithan (1994) conducted an analysis of gang homicides in California in order to determine if gang homicides were distinct from other homicides. The larger California study found that gang homicide was distinguishable from other forms of homicide and shared homogenous characteristics (Baily and Unnithan, 1994). These studies are representative of later homicide studies that produced similar findings in other locations including Minneapolis (Kennedy and Braga, 1998), Boston (Braga et al., 1999) and St. Louis (Decker and Curry, 2002). Despite the uniformity in findings, there is at least one study whose findings differ from the consensus.

Brewer et al. (1998) found that gang homicides composed a relatively small percent of the juvenile homicides in the city of Houston between 1990 and 1994.

There is, however, one problem with the data collection methodology which may have produced this anomalous finding. The Houston study collected data from newspaper articles and official Houston Police Department data in order to triangulate the analysis (Brewer et al., 1998). The newspaper article label of whether or not a homicide was gang-related was based on the official investigation.

The Houston Police Department admittedly uses conservative criteria with which to determine if a crime is gang-related or not (Brewer et al., 1998). According to the Houston Police Department, a homicide is not considered gang-related unless it is shown to be committed in furtherance of the gang, or gang motivated (Ibid). This has the effect of reducing the number of gang-related homicides by narrowing the focus on the motive of the crime not the actors in the crime. Other cities use more moderate classification criteria and language. For example, the concept of a gang-related crime versus a gang motivated crime. If either the victim or the suspect is a gang member, that crime is considered gang-related. This concept does not place a high degree of importance on the motive for the crime, due to the fact that it is often difficult to discern the actual motives for crime and individual gang members may commit crime under the color of gang authority for personal gain. The findings supporting the gang-crime link are just as robust when examining other forms of deviance.

Gang members have been linked to the sale of illegal drugs. Maxson (1995) examined the drug sales of gangs in Pasadena, California and Pomona, California and found that there was a substantial gang presence (26.7%) in the distribution of

cocaine in the two cities. The degree of non-cocaine sales by gang members was much smaller (11.5%) and the total incidents of gang member drug sales was much lower than the 90% predictions of local law enforcement officers (Maxson, 1995). The findings were limited, due to many gang members escaping identification by either marginal or transitory gang involvement or simply by not coming to the attention of officers (Ibid). Illegal drugs also act as motivators for gang members to maintain affiliation with the gang.

In a study of drug sales among gang members, Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) found that despite earnings from drug sales being only slightly higher than the legitimate labor market, the future prospects of drug earnings drove the desire for gang membership. Drugs represent a realistic possibility for monetary success. This establishes a stronger bond to the distribution of illegal drugs as a means to advancements. Illegal drug sales is not the only advantage members derive from the gang.

Hagan (1997) argued that delinquent subcultures tend to temporarily insulate members from sources of distress. This insulatory effect helps to create solidarity but it also creates additional problems for desistance. Hagan (1997) describes a 'sleeper effect' whereby the gang member finds it difficult to leave the criminal subculture and pursue a normative life. The prior illegal activities disqualify the gang member from participation in more traditional jobs. This is similar to Sampson and Laub's (1992) concept of homotypic continuity. Hagan calls it the 'sleeper effect' because it does not present itself as a problem until

early mid-life. This interplay between internal gang behavior and external effect is also seen in violent displays.

As far back as 1963, researchers Short and Strodbeck noticed that gang members responded to internal challenges by engaging in more external crime. This external acting out serves to reinforce the sleeper effect. This group bond has manifested itself by many gang members referring to the gang as their family (Ruble and Turner, 2000; Gordon, 2000). Other researchers (Schreck et al, 2004) have found that membership in deviant groups increases the amount of victimization an individual may experience. The aforementioned findings do seem to support the group hazard effect thoroughly. However, there are several methodological issues that may explain the findings in support of the group hazard effect.

The following discussion of methodological specificities is not meant to imply that there are methodological errors in the cited studies. It is possible, however, to detect a cumulative effect which may consistently produce findings that support the group hazard effect. The first methodological element of the studies that supports the group hazard effect is the reliance on membership as a salient criterion.

Many gang researchers (Maxson et al., 1998; Decker and Curry, 2000; Winfree et al., 1994; Ebensen et al., 2001) focus their analyses on formal membership as a correlate of crime. The problem is that formal membership is embraced by individuals who have the strongest commitment to the gang culture. This means that not only are the researchers missing the crime rates of individuals

who may simply be less committed to the gang culture but they are also ensuring that the 'gang' data contains the most serious crimes committed with the most frequency. When comparing these data to individuals who are non-members and have less commitment to the deviant lifestyles, the non-member data will regress toward the mean and produce an automatic statistically significant variation between the two groups. The problem of formal membership is compounded when considering the second methodological specificity of official data.

Official data are notoriously unreliable. One problem that occurs with official data is that officers may inflate gang membership by misidentifying non-gang members simply because they associate with other known members. As is seen from the Maxson (1995) study, official data can also cause a deflation effect. However, misidentification tends to favor inflation of gang membership. Despite criminal justice practitioners being in direct contact with gang members on a daily basis, their encounters with gang members, outside of arrest procedures, is often brief and frustrating. Gang members often adhere to a strict code of silence and resist officers' attempts to learn anything about the organizations. The result is the officer reverting to the *defacto* 'safe' assumption that an individual is a gang member. The third methodological specificity is a culmination of the other two.

Due to the over-reliance on formal membership in gangs, some researchers (Ebensen et al. 2001; Bjerregaard, 2002; Thornberry et al., 1993) often measure gangs as a dichotomous variable. Despite findings that support the idea that gang members occupy various levels within gangs (Yablonsky, 1959 and Klein, 1971) and that joining gangs is often a gradual process (Gordon, 2000), researchers still

conceptualize the gang as a dichotomous entity positing that an offender is either a member or not a member. The dichotomous measure of gangs is not exhaustive in the face of contemporary gang dynamics.

The group hazard effect and its derivative methodologies require modification when considering the evolving nature of gangs in the twenty-first century. Social context is often overlooked when examining criminological phenomena. However, gangs and gang-related crime are evolving in new directions as a result of the sociological changes. In order to develop a new conceptualization of gangs and gang-related crime, it is necessary to consider the societal shift affecting contemporary gangs.

"Summary"

The need for the re-conceptualization of gangs and gang-related crime is based in the changing nature of society. To a great degree, Dentler and Erikson's (1959) traditional concept of group deviance has been subverted by the advances of a global society. Where Dentler and Erikson (1959) posited the group as the creator and sustainer of deviance, contemporary society reveals that the defiant individualist personality can generate the same reliance on deviance as a method of goal acquisition. The role of deviance maintenance explained by Dentler and Erikson (1959) has now been replaced by culture. The culture associated with defiant individualism serves to insulate its members from conversion to normalcy. Likewise, the traditional risk of detection and apprehension (Erickson, 1973), once associated with the group, has been alleviated by the reliance on formal membership as a criterion for concern.

These substantive changes in the fundamental nature of gangs require researchers and practitioners to revise the methods of studying gangs. It is no longer sufficient to simply focus on membership or other dichotomous characteristics as the standard by which we are guided. Emerging research models must examine a more holistic component of organized crime and organized criminals.

Chapter III

"Methodology"

This study is a discriminate analysis of variations in criminogenics of both gang and non-gang offenders. In designing the study research methods it was important to draw concrete line of demarcation between the primary groups in question. Many of the following analyses are composed of multiple tests. This successive test and refinement method is critical in order to accurately examine the differences between the test groups. As previously stated, the conceptualization of a phenomenon influences the measurement and interpretation of that phenomenon.

Because the fundamental nature of gangs has changed it is necessary to re-examine the differences between gang and non-gang actors. The traditional reliance on membership as a criterion for study dose not serve researchers well when examining the criminal careers of contemporary gangs. This study seeks to examine the criminal behavior and attitudes of gang members, subjects who exhibit defiant individualist traits and subjects who appear to have zero-influence of either the gang culture or defiant individualism.

This study is a quantitative research project which uses secondary analysis of pre-existing data to test the study's hypotheses. This study addresses the problem of the changing nature of gangs and gang-related crime. Gangs in the modern social context have become less characteristic of the traditional 'group hazard' conceptualization and much more representative of an organization of defiant individualists.

Inherent in this shift is the shift in permanence of the group. Contemporary gangs are more likely to exhibit shorter tenures of existence than traditional gangs under the group hazard conceptualization. In addition, modern gangs are more likely to undertake more sophisticated crimes by adopting conventional network enterprise formats. Therefore, the individuals who comprise the membership of the contemporary gang are not bound by formal membership and may repeatedly go through stages of group affiliation and non-affiliation while simultaneously carrying out criminal careers that are as violent as full time gang members. Based on this problem, the following hypotheses were formulated.

Hypothesis one is that there is no difference in criminal justice contact between gang members and defiant individualists. According to the theoretical framework, contemporary gangs are transient aggregates of defiant individualists, therefore, the criminal justice contact of the two groups should be similar. Probationers in the defiant individualist category have the same motive and opportunity to engage in crime as gang members and only lack consistent membership.

The second study hypothesis is that there is a direct relationship between the number of criminal charges accumulated and defiant individualism. According to Sanchez-Jankowski (2003), defiant individualism is a personality type. This presents a greater problem for the field of criminology because personalities are often dynamic. It is possible to exhibit stronger personality traits over time. One of the more problematic elements of the defiant individualist personality is the disintermediation of the law. Defiant individualists pursue personal goals through

any means available, legal or illegal. Crime and the gang are only tools. Over time, the defiant individualist may become more criminally oriented as his or her legitimate opportunities are reduced.

The third hypothesis is that there is no difference in the attitude toward gun use between defiant individualists and respondents who display no organized criminal influence. Theoretically, the defiant individualist should not have a more favorable attitude toward gun use than the probationer with no gang influences, because defiant individualists are not conceptualized as being inherently deviant. Crime to the defiant individualist is simply a tool of personal gain.

The fourth hypothesis is that there is an inverse relationship between defiant individualism and positive trajectory shifts. A defiant individualist should remain unaffected by criminological interventions such as lever-pulling, due to the nature of the criminal behavior being the defiant individualist personality type. Altering an individual's personality requires more in-depth and personalized intervention than is often possible in the criminal justice system.

The final study hypothesis is that there is no difference in the perception of gang criminality between gang members and defiant individualists. Due to the close association of these two groups, the perceptions about gang criminality, should be similar. The defiant individualist's view of gang criminality theoretically, should be more calibrated than that of the probationers who have no gang influence.

This analysis is cross-sectional in nature and is not designed to study longitudinal trends in gang and non-gang offending. Rather, this examination

seeks to explore the criminogenic variation among gang and non-gang offenders post intervention.

The data were collected as part of grant # 2003-IJ-CX-1038 from the National Institute of Justice. The purpose of the grant was to evaluate the Indianapolis Lever Pulling Intervention. The data set includes both interview data and respondents' criminal histories. The study participants were comprised of every felony probationer in the Indianapolis probation system. The probationers had to meet several criteria prior to selection for the study. The probationers had to be actively on probation for a felony offense and that offense had to be specifically a drug offense, violent crime weapon offense or a property offense. A study sample was drawn from consecutive sub samples of 1,000 probationers, which were supplied each month. There were a total of six different pools of probationers. Each of the sample pools was randomly assigned to one of three groups: law enforcement meeting, community meeting or control group.

After the selection and randomization process, the study contained 540 probationers with 180 participants per group. Despite this preliminary study count, the final sample consisted of 235 participants. Ineffective notification, transportation problems and non-compliance with active probation requirements were all reasons for the attenuation of the sample.

The dataset was comprised of 387 data points. Of the total data points, 195 were analyzed. Composite measures were produced from 66 of the data points. Finally, 23 study variables, which best fit the hypotheses, were selected. Nineteen of the study variables were continuous in nature to allow for more sophisticated

analysis. Study variables that were rejected had large proportions of missing data. For example, data on whether the respondent bought a gun under his or her own name had 40% missing data, how often the respondents fired guns had 99.1% missing data and how many times the respondents carried a gun outside of the home had 99.1% missing data.

"Variable Measures"

The dependent variables used in this analysis were divided into two classes: primary and secondary criminogenics. The use of the criminogenic concept supports the idea that there are multiple dimensions to criminal behavior. In attempting to study criminal variation among groups, it is far too simplistic to examine only criminal instances. Primary criminogenics were conceptualized as official counts of a participant's criminal activity. Secondary criminogenics are composite measures that assess the participant's attitudes toward various criminal concepts. This study developed five measures of the participant's criminal activity. Each of these measures was operationalized by using the official counts from the respondent's criminal histories. The criminal activity variables are listed and discussed below.

Number of Arrests. This variable is conceptualized as the actual count of the instances in which the respondent was taken into police custody. This variable was operationalized by using data from the respondents' official criminal histories found in the dataset.

Number of Violent Convictions. This variable is conceptualized as the actual count of criminal convictions the respondent incurred due to violent

incidents such as assault and robbery. This variable was operationalized by using data from the respondents' official criminal histories found in the dataset.

Number of Property Convictions. This variable is conceptualized as the actual count of criminal convictions the respondent incurred due to property-related incidents such as vandalism and burglary. This variable was operationalized by using data from the respondents' official criminal histories found in the dataset.

Number of Times on Probation. This variable is conceptualized as the actual count of the instances in which the respondent was placed on some form of probation as the result of a criminal charge. This variable was operationalized by using data from the respondents' official criminal histories found in the dataset.

Number of Times in the Department of Corrections. This variable is conceptualized as the actual count of the instances the respondent was held in the custody of the department of corrections. This variable was operationalized by using data from the respondents' official criminal histories found in the dataset.

Time in the Department of Corrections. This variable is conceptualized as the actual count of the number of days the respondent spent in the custody of the department of corrections. This variable was operationalized by using data from the respondents' official criminal histories found in the dataset.

Number of Charges. This variable was not considered a measure of the respondent's contact with the criminal justice system because the number of charges a respondent accrues is not necessarily a function of ongoing contact with the criminal justice system. However, the number of convictions and subsequent

times on probation could be considered cumulative functions of the number of times arrested. Conversely, one arrest could result in multiple charges. This variable was conceptualized as the number of charges accumulated by the respondent. Operationalization was achieved by using data from the respondents' official criminal histories. Secondary criminogenics were composite in nature.

Attitude Toward Gun Use. This variable is conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent has a more or less favorable view of using a gun in conflict situations. The scale originally contained 10 items but was reduced to 6 through reliability analysis. The final scale contained the following items: 1) Sometimes situations get worse than they have to because someone pulls a gun, 2) I might ask my friends to leave their guns at home when hanging out together, 3) If you need a gun to fit in with your friends, you're hanging out with the wrong people, 4) If you're planning to go somewhere or do something you'd need a gun for, you're better off just staying home, 5) Carrying a gun is not worth the risk of getting in trouble with the law and 6) It's alright to have a gun to scare somebody or to make sure they don't give you trouble. The items were operationalized as follows: 1= Strongly Agree, 2= Agree, 3= Disagree, 4= Strongly disagree and 5= Don't know. Prior to reliability testing, question 6 was recoded in reverse order to maintain the scale's continuity. This scale produced the lowest reliability coefficient of any in the study (alpha= .578). A factor analysis revealed that all of the items loaded with an Eigen value of at least .443. The range of the scale was from 6, having a less accepting attitude toward gun use, to 24, having the most accepting attitude toward gun use.

Perception of Gang Criminality. This variable is conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent believes criminal behavior to be important to gang members. This variable is a composite measure that contains the following items: 1) How important is murder to gangs, 2) How important is fighting to gangs, 3) How important is shooting to gangs, 4) How important is drug sales to gangs, 5) How important is drug use to gang and 6) How important is protecting turf to gangs. The items were operationalized as follows: 1= not at all important, 2= somewhat important, 3= moderately important, 4= important and 5= very important. The scale produced a reliability coefficient of .845. A factor analysis revealed that all of the items loaded with Eigen values of at least .691. This scale produced a range from 6, having a perception of low criminal importance to gangs, to 30, having a perception of high criminal importance to gangs.

Positive Trajectory Shift. This variable is conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent participated in post intervention, pro-social behavior. The variable is a composite measure that originally contained 10 items. However, after reliability analysis the scale contained the following items: 1) Since the meeting I have gotten a job or job training, 2) Since the meeting I have gone back to school, 3) Since the meeting I have entered treatment, 4) Since the meeting I am going to church, 5) Since the meeting I am attending counseling, 6) Since the meeting I have contacted community leaders and 7) Since the meeting I have contacted community organizations. This variable was operationalized as: 1= True and 0= False. This scale produced a reliability coefficient of .602, which was the second lowest in the study. A factor analysis of the scale revealed that all of the items

loaded with an Eigen value of at least .473. The range of this scale was from 0, making no positive trajectory shift, to 7, making the most positive trajectory shift.

Post Intervention Networking. This variable was conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent contacted community-based supporters. The variable was a composite measure that contained the following 6 items: 1) After the meeting did you talk with family, 2) After the meeting did you talk with spouse, girl/ boyfriend, 3) After the meeting did you talk with friends, 4) After the meeting did you talk with co-workers, 5) After the meeting did you talk with neighbors and 6) After the meeting did you talk with probation officers. This scale was operationalized as: 1= True and 0= False. The scale produced a reliability coefficient of .714. A factor analysis revealed that all the items loaded with an Eigen value of at least .499. This scale had a range of 0, participating in no post-intervention networking, to 6, participating in a high degree of post-intervention networking.

Intervention Recall. This variable was conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent recalled elements of the intervention meeting. This is a composite measure that contained the following items: 1) Remember that law enforcement are cracking down on violent crime, 2) Remember that law enforcement is cracking down on gun crime, 3) Remember that I can go to federal prison for carrying a gun, 4) Remember that probation is watching behavior closely, 5) Remember that law enforcement wants you to make good choices, 6) Remember that community leaders have opportunities for you to get a job, 7) Remember that community leaders are willing to help you in any way they can

and 8) Remember that I should stay out of trouble. These items were operationalized as: 1= True and 0= False. This scale produced a reliability coefficient of .906. A factor analysis revealed that all of the items loaded with an Eigen value of at least .714. This scale produced a range from 0, having no recall of the meeting, to 8, having total recall.

This study uses two independent variables as part of the discriminate analysis. The predominant purpose of these variables is to provide a framework in which to compare outcome variables.

Defiant Individualism Score (DIS). This variable is a composite measure that originally contained 13 items but was reduced to 11 through reliability analysis. The scale is composed of the following items: 1) Have you ever been a member of a gang, 2) Have you ever been a member of a group, 3) Have you ever thought of joining a gang, 4) Have you ever been recruited or pressured to join a gang, 5) Have you ever hung out with gang members, 6) Have you ever drunk alcohol or gotten high with gang members, 7) Have you ever vandalized something with a gang member, 8) Have you ever stolen something with a gang member, 9) Have you ever been attacked in a gang-related incident, 10) Have you ever attacked someone in a gang-related incident and 11) Do you have friends that are gang members. The items on the scale were operationalized as: yes= 1 and no =0. This scale produced a reliability coefficient of .845. A factor analysis revealed that all of the items loaded with an Eigen value of at least .401. The range of the scale was from 0, having no commitment to defiant individualism, to 11, having high commitment to defiant individualism.

Gang Membership. This variable is conceptualized as whether or not the respondent was a member of a gang at the time of the interview. This variable was operationalized as: 1= yes and 0= no.

Category. This variable is used primarily as a grouping variable through which to compare findings. This variable is composed of three categories. Category-1 (zero-influence group) consists of people who scored 0 on the DIS index. Category-2 (defiant individualists) is composed of people who scored from 1-11 on the DIS index. Category-3 (gang members) is composed of people who had missing data for the DIS index. In the original survey, a contingency question asked respondents to verify whether or not they were current gang members. If the respondent replied yes, he or she was instructed to skip the DIS index items. Therefore, the respondents who have missing data for the DIS index comprise category-3, the gang members group. These three groups allow for a comparison of findings between gang members, non-members who display DIS behavior and non-members who have no commitment to defiant individualism.

This study also examined the demographic characteristics of the sample. The following variables were analyzed in order to summarize the sample characteristics. The number of hours worked per week, Total income by legal means, Total income by illegal means, Number of children, Highest grade completed and the Respondent's age were all operationalized by using count data provided.

Gender was operationalized as: 0= female and male= 1. Percent of the time that the respondent was employed was operationalized as: 1= 100% of the time,

2= about 75% of the time, 3= about 50% of the time, 4= about 25% of the time and 5= not employed. Respondent's race was operationalized as: 1= White, 2= Black, 3= Hispanic, 4= Asian, 5= Native American and 6= Other. Respondent's marital status was operationalized as: 1= married, 2=living with partner, 3= Widowed, 4= separated and 5= divorced.

"Statistical Tests"

The following tests will be used to test the study hypotheses.

H_1: There is no difference in criminal justice contact between gang members and defiant individualists which would denote a discriminant function.

This hypothesis will be tested across five variables: number of arrests (formal criminal justice contact), number of convictions for violent offences (propensity), number of convictions for property offenses (propensity), number of times on probation (recidivism) and the length of days in the Department of Corrections (severity). The measurement model will consist of a discriminant function analysis between gang members and defiant individualists for each variable. The model findings will determine whether or not the hypothesis is supported.

H_2: There is a direct relationship between the number of criminal charges accumulated and the level of defiant individualism.

This hypothesis will be tested by computing a Pearson's correlation of the two variables. For the purpose of comparison, an additional point bi-serial correlation between gang membership and number of criminal charges accumulated will also be computed. The amount of attenuation due to dichotomization in the point bi-

serial correlation will be diagnosed and corrected using an extremeness of split formula (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004: 36).

H_3: There is no difference in the attitude toward gun use between defiant individualists and members of the zero-influenced group.

Hypothesis three will be tested using a discriminant function analysis of defiant individualists and zero-influence groups for each dimension. The model findings will determine whether or not the hypothesis is supported.

H_4: There is an inverse relationship between defiant individualism and positive trajectory shifts.

This hypothesis will be tested by computing a Pearson's bi-variate correlation. For the purpose of comparison, an additional point bi-serial correlation between gang membership and positive trajectory shifts will also be computed as needed. The amount of attenuation due to dichotomization in the point bi-serial correlation will be diagnosed and corrected using an extremeness of split formula.

H_5: There is no difference in the perception of gang criminality between gang members and defiant individualists.

Hypothesis five will be tested using a discriminant function analysis between gang members and defiant individualists. The model findings will determine whether or not the hypothesis is supported.

"Summary"

This study is significant to criminology in three ways. This study creates a new framework for measuring emerging organized crime patterns. By identifying and differentiating organized crime that does not have a stable group base,

criminologists can assess the proportionality of new organized crime patterns. If there are significant criminological variations among respondents who exhibit the defiant individualist personality, it may be possible to focus on defiant individualism as an early predictor of an organized criminal lifestyle. This is a vital first step in crafting enforcement strategies that can effectively suppress networked criminal enterprises.

A second contribution of this study is that it provides direction in research. If there is significant correlation between gang-related crime and the defiant individualism personality type, as Sanchez-Jankowski (2003) asserts, research should focus quantitatively on the early identification of personality traits. This study uses a proxy measure of defiant individualism, however, if the study finds a significant correlation between gang-related crime and defiant individualism, additional research should develop specific indices that can assess defiant individualistic traits at the earlier stages of personality development.

The final contribution of this study is that it may help to formulate intervention strategies. For example, if there is a significant correlation between the defiant individualist personality and age, researchers can develop age-graded guidelines for intervention programs. As mentioned above, the early intervention in the formation of the personality type may prove to be a more effective intervention strategy than simple enforcement models.

Chapter IV

"Introduction to Analysis"

This study explores distinctions between individuals who display defiant individualist personality traits and gang members with respect to criminogenic attitude and behavior. The study addresses the problem that the fundamental nature of contemporary gangs and gang-related crime has changed in ways that no longer require reliance on formal membership to support ongoing criminal lifestyles. The theoretical foundation for this study is Sanchez-Jankowski's (2003) concept of organized defiant individualism.

Sanchez-Jankowski (2003) posits that gangs are essentially an aggregation of individuals who exhibit a personality type called defiant individualism. Thus, the gang is an association of organized defiant individualists (Sanchez-Jankowski, 2003). Defiant individualists pursue socially valued goals through any means, legal or illegal, and resist any attempt to stop their goal attainment. Due to a lack of means with which to obtain these goals, defiant individualists often turn to crime. Sanchez-Jankowski (2003) goes on to assert that almost all gang members have defiant individualist personalities. This creates gang members as a referent category against which to compare other groups. However, not all persons who possess defiant individualist traits may belong to gangs. Thus, actual gang membership is not a prerequisite for this personality and it may well be the case that persons with this personality are engaging in systematic, organized criminal behavior without the designated criminal or gang label. From this theoretical foundation, the study proceeds with five hypotheses.

The first hypothesis articulates that there is no difference in criminal justice contact between gang members and defiant individualists that would denote a discriminant function. If Sanchez-Jankowski's assertion, that almost all gang members have defiant individualist personalities, is accurate then there should be similar behavioral expressions found in both groups. Both groups should be seeking mainstream goals but neither group should have adequate means to obtain their goals. Therefore, there should be no discriminant criminal justice contact between gang members and non-gang members who exhibit defiant individualist traits.

The second hypothesis suggests that there is a direct relationship between the number of criminal charges accumulated and the level of defiant individualism. The longer an individual maintains a criminal lifestyle; the individual should logically accumulate more criminal charges.

The third hypothesis asserts that there is no difference in the attitude toward gun use between defiant individualists and subjects in the zero-influence group. Sanchez-Jankowski's (2003) description of individuals with defiant individualist personalities leads one to believe that they may embrace violence simply as a tool through which to obtain or maintain goals. This suggests the possibility of defiant individualists having a very similar view of gun use to that of individuals who have no gang influence. It is possible the guns are viewed as being less important than one might expect.

The fourth hypothesis asserts an inverse relationship between defiant individualism and positive trajectory shifts. As an intervention strategy lever-

pulling is designed to confront habitual offenders about their criminal behavior, which simultaneously presents them with opportunities to transition into more normative behavioral patterns. Sanchez-Jankowski (2003) does not provide an explanation by which the defiant individualist transitions out of the criminal lifestyle and acquires prosocial values. Sanchez-Jankowski suggests that the defiant individualist simply maintains the deviant lifestyle indefinitely. Presumably, this omission can be filled when considering Sampson and Laub's (1992) concept of homotypic continuity and Hagan's (1997) sleeper effect.

Homotypic continuity is the process by which individuals find it difficult to stop participating in deviant behavior due to prior deviant behavior. Hagan (1997) describes the process as the 'sleeper effect' whereby the gang member finds it difficult to leave the criminal subculture and pursue a normative life. Prior illegal activities have disqualified the gang member from participation in more traditional jobs but the gang member does not recognize this as a problem until early mid-life. Based on these interrelated concepts, the defiant individualists and gang members should have similar difficulties transitioning into positive social roles.

Hypothesis five holds that there is no difference in the perception of gang criminality between gang members and defiant individualists. If Sanchez-Jankowski's (2003) assertion that almost all gang members have defiant individualist personalities is accurate, then there should be no discriminant difference between the perception of the importance of criminality between gang

members and defiant individualists due to the similar ideological foundation of each group.

The data used to test these hypotheses is from an evaluation of the lever-pulling program implemented in Indianapolis, Indiana. Lever-pulling is a criminological intervention based on the 'Cease Fire' component of the Boston Gun Project conducted in the 1990s (McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson and Corsaro, 2006). Lever-pulling is a focused deterrence strategy that is based on multiple characteristics of and responses to offending (Ibid, 2006). A multi-agency work group of criminal justice professionals identify and target habitual offenders. These habitual offenders are required to attend notification meetings where they are advised that they will face significant criminal justice sanctions if the offenders do not stop engaging in certain criminal behaviors such as gun violence. During the meetings, offenders are provided with networking opportunities (McGarrell et al., 2006).

The underlying purpose of the Indianapolis lever-pulling project was to reduce homicides. The initial lever-pulling meetings began in 1998 and continued through the summer of 1999 (McGarrell et al., 2006). Indianapolis conducted nine lever-pulling meetings and eight follow up meetings. The treatment groups consisted of 160 probationers and parolees (McGarrell et al., 2006). The total sample was 235, which included the control group.

Despite a small sample size, the data were well suited to this type of analysis. The dataset contains information about individuals who were on active probation in Indianapolis. The dataset contains subjects from each of the

classifications (gang members, defiant individualists and zero-influenced subjects) of offenders the study seeks to examine. The sample is constructed from multiple selections of probationers participating in the lever-pulling program. The sample was matched into three groups: a law enforcement treatment group, a community treatment group and a control group.

The variables selected for the study are divided into two groups: primary criminogenics and secondary criminogenics. Primary criminogenics is conceptualized as variables that directly involve criminal behavior, such as the number of violent arrests or the number of times on probation. Secondary criminogenics are conceptualized as variables that may have an indirect relationship to crime but are not illegal. Variables such as the individual's attitude toward gun use and intervention recall are secondary criminogenics. It is important to examine both types of variables in order to determine if it was possible to differentiate between gang members and non-gang members with defiant individualist personalities.

If primary and secondary criminogenics discriminate between gang members and defiant individualists, this suggests that perhaps primary criminogenics would be adequate in differentiating between the two groups. Additionally, this finding would suggest that formal membership imparts an extra bonding factor that may not be readily identifiable but which allows the researcher to differentiate between gang members and non-members, even if they share the same personality traits. However, a non-significant finding would

suggest that formal membership is less important in understanding sustained deviant lifestyles than once supposed.

This study examines demographic variables as well as continuous and composite measures pursuant to deviant behaviors. The demographic variables are used to contextualize the sample. These include sex, race, age and marital status. There are four employment-related variables in the study. Number of hours worked per week, percent of the time that the respondent was employed, total income by legal means and total income by illegal means are used to better understand what proportion of the respondents were using crime as their primary source of income. Similarly, the number of children and marital status are examined in order to determine if the respondents had any pro-social bonds. Highest grade completed is used to examine the education level of the sample respondents.

This study examines five primary criminogenic variables. The number of arrests is used to summarize the amount of law enforcement contact. However, since being taken into custody does not automatically equate to criminal charges being brought by an officer due to probable cause constraints, the number of charges is also examined. Criminal convictions represent an additional element to criminal justice contact. Both the number of violent and property convictions are examined as study variables.

It is also important to consider the outcomes of the criminal justice contacts experienced by the study respondents. Number of times on probation and the

length of time in the department of corrections are both examined for this purpose.

The study examines five secondary criminogenic variables also. The attitude toward gun use is a composite measure that has a range from 6, having a less accepting attitude toward gun use, to 24, having the most accepting attitude toward gun use. Attitude toward gun use is a study variable that assesses the anti-social ideology that may influence or correlate to the respondents' primary criminogenic activity. The perception of gang criminality is a study variable that tests the parsimony of criminal ideology between the various study groups. This variable is also a composite measure with a range from 6, having a perception of low importance of crime to gangs, to 30, having a perception of high importance of crime to gangs.

This study also uses three final variables designed to assess the willingness to desist criminal activity: positive trajectory shift, post intervention networking and post intervention recall. Positive trajectory shift is conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent engages in non-deviant behaviors after participating in the lever-pulling intervention. Positive trajectory shift has a range from zero, making no positive trajectory shift, to 7, making the most positive trajectory shift.

Post-intervention networking is conceptualized as the degree to which a respondent engages in normative association after participating in the lever-pulling intervention. Post-intervention networking has a range of 0, participating in no post-intervention networking, to 6, participating in a high degree of post-

intervention networking. Post-intervention recall is conceptualized as the degree or recall the respondent maintains after participating in the lever-pulling intervention. Similarly, intervention recall has a range from 0, having no recall of the meeting, to 8, having total recall.

"Univariate Analysis"

The univariate analysis consists of examining both the demographic variables and study variables, in order to determine the level of normality in the distribution. The univariate analysis also allows any specific trends that might exist in the data to become readily apparent. Generalities and characteristics of the entire sample are presented first, followed by the traits of: the zero-influence group, the defiant individualist group and the gang member group. The zero-influence, defiant individualist and gang member groups are classification groups.

The members of the zero-influence group are respondents who stated that they were not gang members and who did not display any degree of defiant individualist personality traits. The second of the classification groups is the defiant individualist group. The defiant individualists are respondents who are not members of gangs but who display some defiant individualist traits similar to gang members. The gang member group is comprised of respondents who reported being in a gang at the time of the survey.

"Demographics"

The study sample contains a total of 235 subjects. There are 71 subjects in the zero-influence group, 142 in the defiant individualist group and 21 subjects in the gang member group. Overall, the sample is predominantly male (88.1 %,

n=207). This disproportionate male representation is displayed across the various groups. The gang member group consists completely of male participants (100%, n= 21). The largest proportion of female respondents is found in the zero-influence group, which contained 18.1% (n=13). The overrepresentation of males differs from the population parameter of Indianapolis. A full 51.4% (n= 393,114) of the population is female (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).

For a study of this type it is important to understand the demographics of the individuals who make up the sample. A primary concern for American criminologists has always been the racial or ethnic make up of offenders. An analysis of the racial characteristics shows that the sample is predominantly Black (69.8%, n=164). Whites comprise the second largest racial group (24.3%, n= 57) with Hispanic, Native American and other groups representing negligible proportions of the remaining sample. These patterns are visible in the all of the individual groups.

Blacks comprise the largest proportion of the zero-influence group (61.1%, n=44) as well as the defiant individualist group (74.5%, n= 105) and the gang member group (71.4%, n= 15). White respondents retain their position as the second most heavily represented group in the zero-influence classification (33.6%, n=24). Whites are also the second most represented group among the defiant individualist group (20.4%, n=29) and in the gang member group (19%, n= 4). The zero-influence and the defiant individualist groups contain no Native American participants. These findings demonstrate that the two primary racial

groups in the sample are Black and White Americans. The disproportionate representation of Black Americans is consistent with many criminological studies.

From examining the racial representation of the population of Indianapolis, we see that the study sample is disproportionately African-American. African-American comprise 69.8% of the sample but only 25.5% (n= 195,044) of the city's population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). Conversely, Whites are only 24.3% of the sample but are 66.3% (n= 507,520) of the population in Indianapolis (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). In Indianapolis, other racial groups comprise only 5.7% (N= 44,568) of the population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).

This study also examines marital status as a way to assess the respondents' bond to normative society. Marriage is often seen as an indicator of normative stability. Individuals who maintain families are less likely to engage in systematic deviance. By in large, the sample consists of people who have never been married (45.2%, n=103). The second largest marital arrangement (20.6%, n= 47) is held by those participants who were living with partners at the time of the survey. Only 13.6% (n=31) of the sample are married. These findings suggest that the majority of the sample is living under a lesser commitment to a partner. 'Live in' relationships do not carry the same sociological responsibility as a formal marriage; the most salient difference being the lack of legal recognition of the 'live in' relationship.

The zero-influence group also consists of individuals who largely have never been married (47.1%, n= 33). There are, however, an equal number of

married (15.7%, n=11) and divorced respondents (15.7%, n=11). There is a similar proportion of gang members who have never married (47.6%, n=10).

Table-1 Demographic Analysis by Category

		Sample		ZIG		DIG		GMG	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Sex	Male	207	88.1	59	81.9	127	89.4	21	100
	Female	28	11.9	13	18.1	15	10.6	-	-
Race	White	57	24.3	24	33.3	29	20.4	4	19
	Black	164	69.8	44	61.1	105	74.5	15	71.4
	Hispanic	7	3.0	1	1.4	5	3.5	1	4.8
	Native American	1	.4	-	-	-	-	1	4.8
	Other	5	2.1	3	4.2	2	1.4	-	-
Marital	Married	31	13.6	11	15.7	16	11.7	4	19.0
	Liv. w/ Partner	47	20.6	12	17.1	29	21.2	6	28.6
	Widowed	3	1.3	-	-	3	2.2	-	-
	Separated	14	6.1	3	4.3	11	8.0	-	-
	Divorced	30	13.2	11	15.7	18	13.1	1	4.8
	Never Married	103	45.2	33	47.1	60	43.8	10	47.6
Percent of Time Employed	100%	116	49.4	39	54.2	68	47.9	9	42.9
	75%	29	12.3	8	11.1	19	13.4	2	9.5
	50%	31	13.2	10	13.9	19	13.4	2	9.5
	25%	23	9.8	5	6.9	16	11.3	2	9.5
	0%	36	15.3	10	13.9	20	14.1	6	28.6

Note: Table does not reflect missing values.
ZIG= Zero-influenced group
DIG= Defiant individualist group
GMG= Gang member group

In addition to the aforementioned demographics, there are other characteristics of the sample that help to contextualize this study. The effects of age can often create a variable effect in criminological studies. It is important to determine if there are any age-related anomalies in the data that create an intervening effect in the multivariate analyses. The mean age for study participants is 31 years of age with a median age of 30 years (sd= 8.731). The

youngest person in the sample is 17 years old (.4%, n= 1) and the oldest person in the sample is 58 years old (.9%, n=2).

The mean ages of the various group grow increasingly younger as one moves from the zero influenced group (mean= 33.7) to the defiant individualist group (mean= 30.9) and finally the gang member group (mean= 29.5). This younger gang member contingent appears to support the concept that as individuals age they 'age out' of certain types of deviance. The traditional conceptualization of gangs is one of associations of criminal youth. The overall sample, however, is not dissimilar to the population of Indianapolis with respect to age. The median age of residents in Indianapolis was 34.8 years of age (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).

Education is also an important variable for contextualizing a sample within normative social structures. Individuals with high levels of education typically commit fewer criminal offenses and have access to more employment flexibility than those without higher levels of education. Most members of the sample do not have college level education. Findings show that 84.2% (n= 102) of the study participants have 12 years of education or less. Of these 84.2% with less than 12 years of education, 40.6% (n= 51) have only 11 years of education. This suggests that approximately 40 % of the sample did not graduate from high school. Education levels for all three groups are similar to the sample statistics and the means of the other groups. The gang member group (mean= 11.3) has a slightly lower mean level of education than the zero influenced group (mean= 11.6).

Another measure of stability is the number of children. It is presumed, an individual with children is participating in the normal functions of adulthood, which suggests that the person is also not participating in deviant behaviors. However, due to specific social patterns found in some segments of society, this may not be a strong predictive measure. The presence of children does not guarantee that the respondents are the primary care givers of their children.

The number of children each study participant has is also relatively small. The mean number of children that each participant has is 1.8 (sd= 1.735). A full 27.4% (n=64) of the sample reports having no children. Gang members have a slightly higher number of children (mean= 2.4) than either the zero-influence group (mean= 2.0) or the defiant individualist group (mean= 1.7).

"Education and Income"

An individual's employment is an important measure of lifestyle choice. Statistics show that a little less than half (49.4%, n=116) of the sample have been employed 100% of the time in the six months prior to the survey. Only 15.3% (n=36) of the sample have not been employed at all in the six months prior to the survey. Most of the participants from each group have also been employed 100% of the time in the six months prior to the survey.

The zero-influence group has 54.2% (n= 39) of its members who had been employed 100% of the time in the six months prior to the survey. The defiant individualist group has a smaller proportion (47.9%, n= 68) of its members who have been employed 100% of the time in the six months prior to the survey. The

gang member group has the smallest proportion of their respondents working 100% of the time in the six months prior to the survey (42.9%, n= 9) (See Table-1).

The employed participants report wide variations in the number of hours worked per week. At the time of the survey, only 1.2% (n= 2) of the respondents report not working. Participants who work full time, 40 hours, numbered 32.9% (n=54). Interestingly, 38.4% (n= 63) of the sample works more that 40 hours per week. The number of hours worked suggested that the study participants, by in large, are integrated into the community. The zero-influence group (mean= 43.1) has a higher mean number of hours worked per week as compared to the defiant individualist group (mean= 39.5). The gang member group has the lowest number of mean hours worked per week (mean= 35.8).

An assessment of income source provides a way of determining whether or not members of the sample have a substantial reliance on crime as a source of income. Both legal and illegal monthly incomes are examined in order to make a proportional comparison. With respect to income generated by legal endeavors, 14.7% (n=33) of the respondents report having no income despite the mean income for the sample being $1,281 monthly (sd= 1,409). A full 46.9% (n=119) of the sample reports a legal income of less than $1,000 per month. The distribution of income generated from illegal endeavors is negatively skewed due to 92.3% (n= 217) of the respondents receiving no money from illegal means. Over 95% of the sample (95.3%, n=223) earns less than $1,000 monthly from

illegal endeavors. These statistics suggested that the sample is not comprised of career criminals who rely on crime as their primary source of income (See Table-2).

Table-2 Descriptive Means Analysis

	Mean	Median	SD	N
Age	31.6	30.0	8.731	234
Highest Grade Completed	11.5	12.0	1.667	234
Number of Children	1.8	2.0	1.735	234
Total Income- Legal	1,281	1,000	1,409	224
Total Income- Illegal	425	0	5,231	235
Number of Hours Worked Weekly	40.3	40.0	12.888	71

Note: Table does not reflect missing values.

When examining the amount of income from legal sources, it is clear that members of the zero-influence group earn more (mean= $1,491) than either the defiant individualist group (mean= $1,249) or the gang member group (mean= $861). The defiant individualist group, however, have the largest mean amount earned from illegal endeavors (mean= $623). The zero influence group derive the lowest mean amount of money from illegal endeavors (mean= $347). Due to the findings by multiple researchers of higher crime rates among gang members, one might have expected the gang member group to display larger incomes from illegal endeavors but this is not the case (See Table-3).

Table-3 Descriptive Means Analysis by Category

		Mean	Median	SD	N
Age	**ZIG**	33.7	32.0	9.547	71
	DIG	30.9	29.0	8.565	142
	GMG	29.5	29.0	5.937	21
Higher Grade Completed	**ZIG**	11.6	12.0	1.534	72
	DIG	11.5	12.0	1.760	142
	GMG	11.3	11.0	1.496	20
Number of Children	**ZIG**	2.0	2.0	1.816	71
	DIG	1.7	1.0	1.612	142
	GMG	2.4	2.0	2.135	21
Total Income- Legal	**ZIG**	1,491	1,000	1,564	64
	DIG	1,249	1,000	1,362	139
	GMG	861	350	1,137	21
Total Income-Illegal	**ZIG**	347	0	294	72
	DIG	623	0	6,714	142
	GMG	428	0	1,121	21
Number of Hours Worked Weekly	**ZIG**	43.1	42.0	11.240	51
	DIG	39.5	40.0	12.950	101
	GMG	35.8	40.0	17.198	12

Note: Table does not reflect missing values.
ZIG= Zero-influenced group
DIG= Defiant individualist group
GMG= Gang member group

"Criminal Justice System Contact"

Table-4 shows that throughout the examination of self-reported criminal involvement, the gang member group is consistently higher than other groups. For example, the mean number of convictions for violent crimes for the overall sample is .54; however, the mean number of convictions for violent offenses among gang members is .90. This is higher than either the zero-influence group (mean= .36) or the defiant individualist group (mean= .57). A similar pattern is observed in the number of convictions for property offenses, the number of times

on probation and the number of experiences further in the department of corrections (See Table-4). This finding seems to support other studies that draw a distinction between gang and non-gang offenders.

In analyzing the number of arrests, the mean numbers of arrests of the zero-influence group (mean= 8.5) and the defiant individualist group (mean= 8.2) are similar to the overall mean number of arrests (mean= 8.6). However, the gang member group displays a larger number (mean= 11.3) of arrests. A similar pattern is observed upon comparing offense charges. Again, the gang member group displays a larger number of charges (mean= 20.1) than the zero-influence (mean= 13.9) or individualist groups (mean= 13.8).

Table-4 Primary Criminogenic Analysis by Category

		Sample	ZIG	DIG	GMG
Number of Arrests	Mean	8.6	8.5	8.2	11.3
	SD	7.127	6.219	6.778	11.155
Number of Charges	Mean	14.4	13.9	13.8	20.1
	SD	10.864	9.387	9.995	18.086
Number of Convictions-Violent	Mean	.54	.36	.57	.90
	SD	.948	.737	1.034	.889
Number of Convictions-Property	Mean	.77	.67	.78	1.0
	SD	1.334	1.199	1.348	1.673
Times on Probation	Mean	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.5
	SD	1.420	1.346	1.409	1.720
Times in DOC	Mean	1.1	.89	1.2	1.5
	SD	1.095	.897	1.175	.978

Note: Table does not reflect missing values.
ZIG= Zero-influenced group
DIG= Defiant individualist group
GMG= Gang member group

The secondary criminogenics reveal similar variations in the responses of the different group members. When analyzing the respondents' attitude toward

gun use, Table-5 shows that generally the respondents have a less accepting attitude toward gun use (mean= 8.5). The gun use scale ranges from 6, having the least accepting attitude toward gun use, to 24, having the most accepting attitude toward gun use. Both the zero-influence (mean= 8.4) and the defiant individualist (mean= 8.4) groups have slightly lower mean scores on the attitude toward gun use scale. However, the gang member group has a higher than average score (mean= 9.0) (See Table-5).

Interestingly, gang members have a lower perception of the importance of criminality to gang members than the other groups in the study (mean= 22.9). This scale ranges from 6, having a perception of low criminal importance to gangs, to 30 having a perception of high criminal importance to gangs. The overall mean perception is 23.6. Zero-influence group members also report a higher mean score (mean= 24.6) than defiant individualist members (mean= 23.2). Despite the slight variations in this variable, the ratings are toward the higher end of the scale. The sample is fairly unified in its belief that crime is important to gang members.

The amount of positive trajectory shift found in the sample is generally small (mean= 1.7). The amount of positive trajectory shift is measured on a scale of 0, being no positive trajectory shift, to 7, being the most positive trajectory shift. Gang members show the smallest amount of positive trajectory shift after participating in the intervention program (mean= 1.3). Interestingly, the defiant individualist group displays the largest amount of positive trajectory shift (mean= 1.8).

The amount of post intervention networking is measured on a scale which ranges from 0, engaging in no contact with community-based supporters, to 6, engaging in the most contact with community-based supporters possible. The total sample mean networking score is 2.0 which suggests that the sample overall did not engage in a great deal of post intervention networking. The defiant individualist and gang member groups display the same level of networking as the total sample. The zero-influence group, however, is slightly less engaged in networking than the other groups (mean= 1.8).

Post intervention recall of the sample is fairly moderate. The scale used to measure the amount of information recalled from the intervention ranges from 0, having no recall of the intervention topics, to 8, having total recall. The overall sample has a mean recall score of 5.2. The zero-influence group displays the highest recall score (mean= 5.5) while the defiant individualist group (mean= 5.0) and the gang member group (mean= 5.3) have slightly lower scores (See Table-5).

The descriptive statistics of the demographic and study variables show that the three groups are very similar to one another across the response categories such as age, highest grade completed, number of children and the number of hours worked weekly. This high degree of similarity is due to the purpose for which the sample was originally collected. This sample was constructed in order to test the Lever-Pulling intervention. The lever-pulling intervention utilized two treatment groups and one control group. The study participants were randomly placed into the law enforcement treatment group, the community treatment group or the control group. For the purpose of insuring the most statistically valid

evaluation possible, the demographic characteristics of the individuals in the groups were matched.

Table-5 Secondary Criminogenic Analysis by Category

		Sample	ZIG	DIG	GMG
Attitude Toward Gun Use	Mean	8.5	8.4	8.4	9.0
	SD	1.404	2.500	2.323	2.780
Perception of Gang Crime	Mean	23.6	24.6	23.2	22.9
	SD	5.803	5.444	5.878	6.301
Positive Trajectory Shift	Mean	1.7	1.5	1.8	1.3
	SD	1.586	1.254	1.771	1.154
Post Intervention Networking	Mean	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.0
	SD	1.734	1.570	1.826	1.891
Post Intervention Recall	Mean	5.2	5.5	5.0	5.3
	SD	2.940	2.940	2.972	2.86

Note: Table does not reflect missing values.
ZIG= Zero-influenced group
DIG= Defiant individualist group
GMG= Gang member group

"Correlation Analysis"

The next group of statistics is the bivariate correlations. Correlation Tables 6 through 8 establish the general relationship among the study variables. The primary correlation matrices create a baseline of criminogenic behaviors. Successive correlation matrices are computed in order to determine the stability of the correlations across the sample groups and under varying conditions and assist in furthering the goal of determining if the primary or secondary criminogenic variables are suitable as tools with which to differentiate between gang members and non-gang members with defiant individualists' personality traits.

Table-6 shows the relationships among the primary criminogenic variables in the study. Most of the correlations are intuitive in nature. For example, there is a strong, direct correlation between the number of arrests and the number of charges (r= .934, p=.000). This suggests that as the number of arrests increase so does the number of charges that he or she incurs. The number of arrests also is positively correlated with the number of property convictions (r= .519, p=.000) and the number of times on probation (r= .692, p=000). The number of arrests is positively correlated with the number of violent convictions (r=. 204, p=.002) and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .359, p=000). These correlations, while statistically significant, are moderately strong and suggest that as the number of arrests increase so does the number of times the respondent is held within the department of corrections (See Table-6).

Moreover, the number of charges is positively correlated with the number of property convictions (r= .468, p= .000), the number of times on probation (r= .657, p= .000) and the number of times a respondent had been held in the department of corrections (r= 446, p=.000). All of theses relationships are direct, indicating that as the number of charges increases the number of times on probation, the number of property convictions and the number of times in the department of corrections also increases accordingly.

"Criminogenic Patterns"

There are two other primary criminogenic variables that produce statistically significant but weaker correlations. Please note the direct correlations between the number of charges and the number of violent convictions (r= .211,

p=001) and being a gang member (r= .163, p= .012). These statistics suggest that as the number of charges increase so does the number of violent convictions. In addition, being a gang member is positively correlated with having higher numbers of criminal charges.

Violent convictions are positively correlated with four other primary criminogenic variables. Notice the positive, yet moderately weak, relationships between the number of violent convictions and the number of property convictions (r= .198, p= .002), the number of times on probation (r= .230, p= .000) and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .233, p= .000) These relationships suggest that as the number of violent convictions increases so does his or her number of property convictions, times on probation and times in the department of corrections.

The fourth statistically significant correlation involving the number of violent convictions occurs with the defiant individualism score. The defiant individualism score represents the degree to which the respondent displays defiant individualistic traits. There is a positive, moderately weak relationship between these two aforementioned variables (r= .158, p= .020). This suggests that individuals who score higher on the defiant individualism scale also have higher numbers of violent convictions. However, gang membership within itself is not significantly correlated with the number of violent convictions (r= .122, p= .062). Initially, this seems to suggest defiant individualism may be more a predictor of violence than actual gang membership. However, this conclusion cannot be made until the multivariate analyses of these data are complete.

Moreover, the number of property convictions is significantly correlated with the number of times on probation (r= .465, p= .000) and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .490, p= .000). These findings suggest that as the number of property convictions increases so does the number of times on probation and the number of times the respondent is held in the department of corrections. The number of times on probation and the number of times in the department of corrections also show a direct, moderately strong correlation (r= .352, p= .000). A final primary criminogenic variable, times held within the department of corrections, also produces a moderately weak, positive correlation with the defiant individualism score (r= .141, p= .039). This implies that respondents who score higher on the defiant individualism scale also have been in the department of corrections more often (See Table-6).

Table-6 **Bivariate Correlation (Primary Criminogenics)**

	ARR	CHGS	VCON	PCON	PROB	XDOC	DI	GM
ARR	1.00	.934**	.204**	.519**	.692**	.359**	.039	.120
CHGS		1.00	.211**	.468**	.657**	.446**	.036	.163*
VCON			1.00	.198*	.230**	.233**	.158*	.122
PCON				1.00	.465**	.490**	.090	.055
PROB					1.00	.352**	.085	.091
XDOC						1.00	.141*	.120
DI							1.00	a
GM								1.00

ARR= Number of arrests
CHGS= Number of arrest charges
VCON= Number of violent convictions
PCON= Number of property conviction
PROB= Number of times on probation
XDOC= Number of times in DOC
DI= Defiant individualism Score
GM= Gang membership

[a] = Correlation could not be computed due to DI and GM being mutually exclusive variables.

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

Table-7 displays the results of the bivariate correlation among secondary criminogenic variables. It is immediately apparent that the secondary criminogenic variables (e.g. post intervention recall, post intervention networking, attitude toward gun use and gang criminality) are not as consistently nor as strongly correlated with one another as the primary criminogenic variables (i.e. number of arrests, number of criminal charges, number of violent convictions, times in department of corrections and times on probation). In fact, of the five secondary criminogenic variables (attitude toward gun use, perception of gang criminality, positive trajectory shift, post intervention networking and post

intervention recall) and two classification variables (gang membership and defiant individualism score) the correlation matrix produces only two statistically significant relationships.

These relationships include post intervention recall and post intervention networking. There is a strong positive relationship between the amount of post intervention recall and the amount of post intervention networking (r= .508, p= 000). The statistic suggests that respondents who recalled the various components of the lever-pulling presentations contacted more community-based supporters. This also raises the question of program follow-up. It may be necessary to include more follow-up in order to help participants increase their program recall and thereby promote more community-based networking.

There is also a moderately strong positive relationship between the defiant individualism score and the amount of positive trajectory shift (r= .200, p= .003). This finding suggests that respondents who score higher on the defiant individualism scale engage in more post intervention networking. An encouraging explanation for this statistic is that individuals who have maintained deviant lifestyles maybe more likely to transition out of them when presented with interventions such as lever-pulling (See Table-7).

Table-7 **Bivariate Correlation (Secondary Criminogenics)**

	RCLL	PINT	POSS	PGCR	AGUN	GM	DI
RCLL	1.00	.508**	.090	.092	.005	.003	.016
PINT		1.00	.118	.112	-.120	.013	.141
POSS			1.00	-.018	-.073	-.077	.200**
PGCR				1.00	-.087	-.034	-.045
AGUN					1.00	.058	-.076
GM						1.00	[a]
DI							1.00

RCLL= Degree of post intervention recall
PINT= Degree of post intervention networking
POSS= Amount of positive trajectory shift
PGCR= Perception of gang crime
AGUN= Attitude toward gun use
GM= Gang membership
DI= Defiant individualism Score

[a] = Correlation could not be computed due to DI and GM being mutually exclusive variables.

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

A bivariate matrix of primary and secondary criminogenics is constructed to examine whether relationships exist between the behavioral and attitudinal measures. Table-8 displays these findings. There are only two statistically significant correlations. Two of the correlations displayed in Table-8 (post intervention recall with post intervention networking and number of times in DOC and number of property convictions) have been previously discussed where it was noted that there is a positive correlation between the level of post intervention recall and the amount of post intervention networking. This suggests that respondents who recalled more components of the lever-pulling intervention went on to take fuller advantage of those networking opportunities. The direct

relationship between number of times in the department of corrections and the number of property convictions displayed in Table-8 further implies that respondents who maintained criminal lifestyles and amassed increasing numbers of property conviction were also held within the department of corrections more.

There is a weak inverse correlation between the number of convictions for property offenses and the amount of post intervention recall (r= -.177, r= 036). This statistic suggests that as the number of convictions for property offenses increase the post intervention recall decreases. This suggests that individuals who maintained criminal lifestyles, as evidenced by increased property convictions, did not retain as much information about the lever-pulling intervention. Perhaps this limited recall was due to a stronger commitment to a deviant lifestyle. In addition to this finding, there is a weak direct relationship between the number of times in the department of corrections and the amount of positive trajectory shift (r= .130, p= .046). This suggests that respondents who have been in the department of corrections more often undertake a more positive post intervention trajectory shift (See Table-8).

Table-8 **Bivariate Correlation (Primary and Secondary Criminogenics)**

	RCLL	PINT	POSS	PGCR	PCON	XDOC
RCLL	1.00	.508**	.090	.092	-.177*	-.124
PINT		1.00	.118	.112	-.057	.082
POSS			1.00	-.018	-.017	.130*
PGCR				1.00	.102	-.050
PCON					1.00	.490**
XDOC						1.00

RCLL= Degree of post intervention recall
PINT= Degree of post intervention networking
POSS= Amount of positive trajectory shift
PGCR= Perception of gang crime
PCON= Number of property conviction
XDOC= Number of times in DOC

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

It is possible that the age of the respondents might play a part in their criminal behavior. Therefore, in addition to the three correlation models reported in Tables 6 through 8, a partial correlation matrix was computed controlling for age. These findings are discussed below and displayed in Tables 9 through 11.

With four exceptions, the correlations between the primary criminogenic variables displayed in Table-6 remain stable while controlling for the effects of age on the sample. The direction, strength and significance of the correlations are unaffected by holding age constant. That is to say that age does not act as an intervening force in the criminogenic dynamics of the sample. The greatest change occurs is the correlation between the number of times on probation and the number of violent convictions. In the base correlation matrix, this relationship

produces a significant relationship (r= .230, p= .000), suggesting that respondents who had more violent convictions also had been placed on probation more. However, when controlling for age the correlation failed to attain statistical significance (r= .128, p= .199). Thus, age impacts the aforementioned relationship denoting that younger offenders are perhaps too young to experience numerous violence convictions and probation.

Another change in the model is seen in the correlation between the defiant individualism score with the number of charges a respondent incurred. Although both correlations fail to attain statistical significance, the base model displays a direct correlation (r= .036, p= .604) while the partial correlation controlling for age produces an inverse relationship (r= -.025, p= .804). This suggests that when the effects of age are constant, the respondent will have fewer criminal charges as the defiant individualism score increases.

The correlation between the number of times in the department of corrections and the defiant individualism score also changes when controlling the effects of age. The base model shows a weak positive relationship between these two variables (r= .141, p= .039). This suggests that respondents who scored higher on the defiant individualism scale were held in the department of corrections more often. However, when controlling for age, the relationship failed to attain statistical significance (r= .108, p= .281). The final change in the primary criminogenic correlation model occurs within the gang member variable. No correlations are able to be computed with the gang member variable when controlling for age (See Table-9). This occurs because age is negatively correlated

with gang membership. When controlling the effect of age, gang membership cannot be computed because of the significant role that age plays on the gang member variable.

The overall impact of age on the primary criminogenic correlations is to neutralize the life course dynamics. The specific life course dynamic in question is the maintenance of a deviant lifestyle. As an individual continues in a criminal trajectory, he or she is more likely to meet and associate with others who maintain a similar lifestyle. Since younger respondents have not lived as long, they may not have maintained criminal lifestyles long enough for these correlation patterns to display themselves with the same level of statistical significance seen in the larger sample. This suggests that the baseline primary criminogenic correlations may only be applicable in designing intervention programs for older offenders. There is also a second effect of age on the statistics. The effect of age also diminishes some statistical correlations in other statistical models.

Tables 9 and 10 show that when controlling for age, bivariate correlation of gang membership can not be computed with either primary or secondary criminogenics. Age is inversely correlated with gang membership. This inverse correlation is supported in the literature as well as the model statistics. The earlier demographic analysis (See Table-3) shows that participants in the gang member group are younger than the participants in the zero-influence group or the defiant individualist group.

Table-9 **Partial Correlation- Controlling for Age (Primary Criminogenics)**

	ARR	CHGS	VCON	PCON	PROB	XDOC	DI	GM
ARR	1.00	.916**	.233*	.557**	.688**	.259**	.008	.
CHGS		1.00	.286**	.547**	.640**	.392**	-.025	.
VCON			1.00	.230*	.128	.366**	.226*	.
PCON				1.00	.558**	.529**	.031	.
PROB					1.00	.256**	.055	.
XDOC						1.00	.108	.
DI							1.00	.
GM								1.00

ARR= Number of arrests
CHGS= Number of arrest charges
VCON= Number of violent convictions
PCON= Number of property conviction
PROB= Number of times on probation
XDOC= Number of times in DOC
DI= Defiant Individualism Score
GM= Gang membership

**P< .01 *P< .05

Table-10 displays the secondary criminogenic partial correlations controlling for age. This model contains only two variations from the base model displayed in Table-7. The first variation occurs in the correlation between the perception of gang criminality and the positive trajectory shift. Despite neither of the correlations attaining significance, the base model displays an inverse correlation (r= -.018, p= .798). This suggests that as the respondent's perception of criminality as being important to gangs increases, their amount of positive trajectory shift decreases. That is to say, respondents who displayed less positive trajectory shifts after participating in the lever-pulling intervention thought that crime was more important to gang members. However, in the partial correlation

model the correlation direction switches (r= .128, p= .201). This suggests that as the respondent's perception of criminality as being important to gangs increases, their amount of positive trajectory shift also increases. That is to say that when controlling the effect of age, respondents who participated in more positive trajectory shifts thought that crime was more important to gangs.

The effect of age on the secondary correlation is similar to the effect on the primary criminogenic correlations. Age neutralizes the maintenance dynamic of life course. Younger respondents may have not had the opportunity to maintain or desist deviant lifestyles according to the same patterns as other members of the sample. Controlling the effect of age on the correlation between perceived gang criminality and positive trajectory shift causes the direction of the correlation to change. The partial correlation suggests that respondents who see criminality as important to gangs also have less positive trajectory shifts.

The only other variation in the partial correlation of secondary criminogenics is the inability to compute correlations with the gang member variable. This occurs because age is negatively correlated with gang membership. When controlling the effect of age, gang membership cannot be computed because of the significant role that age plays on the gang member variable (See Table-10).

Table-10 **Partial Correlation - Controlling for Age (Secondary Criminogenics)**

	RCLL	PINT	POSS	PGCR	AGUN	GM	DI
RCLL	1.00	.558**	.065	.158	.710	.	.034
PINT		1.00	.161	.154	-.042	.	.098
POSS			1.00	.128	-.039	.	.209*
PGCR				1.00	-.049	.	-.041
AGUN					1.00	.	-.073
GM						1.00	[a]
DI							1.00

RCLL= Degree of post intervention recall
PINT= Degree of post intervention networking
POSS= Amount of positive trajectory shift
PGCR= Perception of gang crime
AGUN= Attitude toward gun use
GM= Gang membership
DI= Defiant Individualism Score

[a] = Correlation could not be computed due to DI and GM being mutually exclusive variables.

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

Perhaps the greatest amount of variation between the base correlation matrices and the partial correlations occurs when examining the partial correlation between primary and secondary criminogenics. Table-11 displays the five variations that occur when controlling for age. Immediately notable is the addition of two extra variables, attitude toward gun use and number of times on probation. These additional variables are included in this table because there is a statistically significant relationship that did not exist in any previous model.

There are two correlations that experience a directional change when controlling for age. In the base model, positive trajectory shift produces an inverse correlation with both perception of gang criminality (r= -.018, p= .798) and

number of property convictions (r= -.017, p= .800). However, in the partial correlation matrix, the relationship between positive trajectory shift and perception of gang criminality (r= .128, p= .201), as well as the relationship between positive trajectory shift and number of property convictions (r= .073, p= .463), are both positive. This of course does not change the failure to attain significance. This directional shift, when holding the effects of age constant, suggests that when age is factored out, offenders may engage in more positive trajectory shifts if they perceive crime as being important to gang members and if they have more property convictions. This varied correlation pattern would necessitate different intervention strategies.

In addition to these directional changes of the previous variables, the correlation between positive trajectory shift and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .130, p= .046) loses statistical significance in the partial correlation (r= .179, p= .072). This suggests that when age is held constant the desire of career criminals to change their life trajectory may not be as readily apparent.

Similarly, the positive correlation between the number of property convictions and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .490, p= .000) is no longer significant when controlling for age (r= .108, p= .281). The partial correlation matrix also produces a moderate correlation between the number of times on probation and attitude toward gun use (r= .208, p= .036). This statistic suggests that as the number of times on probation increases the respondent's attitude toward gun use becomes more favorable (See Table-11).

Thus, as age and probationary experiences increase attitudes toward gun use, appears to become more neutralized.

Table-11 Partial Correlation- Controlling for Age (Primary and Secondary Criminogenics)

	RCLL	PINT	POSS	PGCR	PCON	XDOC	AGUN	PROB
RCLL	1.00	.558**	.065	.158	-.289*	-.158	.037	-.142
PINT		1.00	.161	.154	-.083	.068	-.042	.043
POSS			1.00	.128	.073	.179	-.039	.010
PGCR				1.00	.037	-.095	-.049	-.026
PCON					1.00	.108	.072	.558**
XDOC						1.00	.108	.256*
AGUN							1.00	.208*
PROB								1.00

RCLL= Degree of post intervention recall
PINT= Degree of post intervention networking
POSS= Amount of positive trajectory shift
PGCR= Perception of gang crime
PCON= Number of property conviction
XDOC= Number of times in DOC
AGUN= Attitude toward gun use
PROB= Number of times on probation

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

"Zero-Influence Group"

The purpose of computing sub-sample correlations is to identify the primary and secondary criminogenic correlations among specific groups without the affects of other groups confounding the results. The following analyses are replications of the base correlation models stratified by the zero-influence, defiant individualist and gang member groups in the study.

The first group to be examined is the zero-influence group. When examining the primary criminogenic correlations, the number of arrests is strongly correlated with the number of charges incurred by the respondents (r= .907, p= .000). This suggests that as the number of arrests increases so does the number of charges. This finding is intuitive in its nature. The number of arrests was also significantly correlated with the number of property convictions (r= .365, p= .002) and the number of times on probation (r= .644, r= .000). Both of these correlations are direct, which suggests that as the number of arrests increase so does the number of property convictions and the number of times on probation (See Table-12).

Zero-influenced respondents display a strong direct correlation between the number of charges they incurred and the number of times respondents were on probation (r= .612, r= .000). As the number of charges increases so does the number of experiences with probation. Among the zero-influence group, the number of charges is also correlated with the number of property convictions (r= .326, p= .005) and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .259, p= .028). These subsequent correlations are moderately strong and in the same direction as the other primary criminogenic correlations.

The number of times on probation is correlated with both the number of violent convictions (r= .244, p= .039) and the number of property convictions (r= .460, p= .000). The direct nature of these correlations suggests that as the number of property and violent convictions increases so does the number of times on probation. The number of times in the department of corrections is moderately

correlated with the number of property convictions (r= .397, p= .001) and the number of times on probation (r= .333, p= .004). As property convictions and the number of times on probation increases so does the number of times in the department of corrections.

Table-12 Bivariate Correlation - Zero Influence Group (Primary Criminogenics)

	ARR	CHGS	VCON	PCON	PROB	XDOC
ARR	1.00	.907**	.209	.365**	.644**	.227
CHGS		1.00	.170	.326**	.612**	.259*
VCON			1.00	.154	.244*	.189
PCON				1.00	.460**	.397**
PROB					1.00	.333**
XDOC						1.00

ARR= Number of arrests
CHGS= Number of arrest charges
VCON= Number of violent convictions
PCON= Number of property conviction
PROB= Number of times on probation
XDOC= Number of times in DOC

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

An examination of the secondary criminogenics finds that among the zero-influence group, there is only one statistically significant correlation. Specifically, there is a positive, moderate correlation between post intervention recall and the amount of post intervention networking (r= .392, p= .004). This statistic suggests that among respondents of the zero-influence group, post intervention networking increases when respondents retain more information from the program (See Table-13). This correlation suggests that it may be possible to increase the

amount of post intervention networking, simply by improving the participants' recall of program components. Members of the zero-influence group may benefit from the incorporation of mnemonic devices or rhetoric in the lever-pulling curriculum.

Revising the lever-pulling curriculum to include more phrases or slogans that serve as mnemonic devices may increase the recall of the participants. Additionally, the incorporation of some type of follow-up in the program may also serve as an important link between the respondent's recall of the program components and the respondent's networking with community-based supporters. Through a follow-up stage, the program facilitators could remind the participants of various components in the program and help the participants initiate the post intervention contact with community-based supporters.

Table-13 Bivariate Correlation - Zero Influence Group (Secondary Criminogenics)

	RCLL	PINT	POSS	PGCR	AGUN
RCLL	1.00	.392**	-.092	-.079	.082
PINT		1.00	-.049	-.031	-.155
POSS			1.00	-.174	-.162
PGCR				1.00	-.267
AGUN					1.00

RCLL=Degree of post intervention recall
PINT= Degree of post intervention networking
POSS= Amount of positive trajectory shift
PGCR= Perception of crime importance to gang
AGUN= Favorable attitude toward gun use

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

Table-14 displays the results of the primary and secondary criminogenic correlation for the zero-influence group. This specific matrix produces no statistically significant correlations between primary and secondary criminogenic variables. The two correlations displayed in Table-14 are previously discussed. The positive correlation between post intervention recall and the amount of post intervention networking ($r= .392$, $p= .004$) is also displayed in Table-13 where it suggests that among respondents of the zero-influence group, post intervention networking increases when respondents retain more information from the program.

The second correlation that is displayed in Table-14 occurs between the number of times the respondent is held within the department of corrections and the number of property convictions the respondent incurs. The number of times in the department of corrections is positively correlated with the number of property convictions ($r= .397$, $p= .001$); suggesting that as the respondents were convicted of property crimes more often, they were also held within the department of corrections more often.

Table-14 shows that the primary and secondary variables are not significantly correlated with one another among the zero-influence group. The result is that members of the zero-influence group had no interdependence of primary and secondary criminogenic variables. The criminal behaviors exhibited by members of this group were not correlated to any observable non-criminal attitudes.

Table-14 Bivariate Correlation - Zero Influence Group (Primary and Secondary Criminogenics)

	RCLL	PINT	POSS	PGCR	PCON	XDOC
RCLL	1.00	.392**	-.092	-.079	-.245	-.176
PINT		1.00	-.049	-.031	-.085	.063
POSS			1.00	-.174	-.137	.131
PGCR				1.00	-.006	-.086
PCON					1.00	.397**
XDOC						1.00

RCLL=Degree of post intervention recall
PINT= Degree of post intervention networking
POSS= Amount of positive trajectory shift
PGCR= Perception of crime importance to gang
PCON= Number of property convictions
XDOC= Times in department of corrections

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

"Defiant Individualists"

The defiant individualist group was comprised of respondents who reported not having an active membership in a gang at the time of the survey but who exhibited a range of defiant individualistic traits. The bivariate correlations of primary criminogenic variables produced statistically significant relationships among the defiant individualist group. There are strong direct correlations between the number of arrests and the number of charges (r= .931, p= .000), number of arrests and the number of property convictions (r= .524, p= .000) as well as the number of arrests and the number of times on probation (r= .716, p= .000). These statistics suggest that within the defiant individualist group, as the number of arrests increase so does the number of property convictions, charges and number of times on probation.

Respondents' arrests also produces moderate positive correlations with the number of violent convictions (r= .209, p= .012) and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .366, p= .000). Both subsequent correlations are positive, which suggest that as the defiant individualist's numbers of arrests increases so does their numbers of violent convictions and numbers of times in the department of corrections.

The number of violent convictions is moderately correlated with the number of charges (r= .234, p= .005). The direction of the relationship suggests that as the number of charges increases for defiant individualists so does the number of violent convictions. The number of charges produces three additional statistically significant relationships among the defiant individualist sub-sample. The number of charges produces direct correlations with the number of property convictions (r= .463, p= .000), the number of times on probation (r= .658, p= .000) and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .488, p= .000) (See Table-15).

Within the defiant individualist group, the number of violent convictions is significantly correlated with the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .226, p= .007). This suggests that as the number of violent convictions increased so did the number of times in the department of corrections. In addition to this moderate relationship, the number of violent convictions is also correlated to the number of times on probation (r= .209, p= .012) and the number of property convictions (r= .182, p= .031).

The number of property convictions is correlated to both the number of times on probation (r= .439, p= .000) and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .510, p= .000). Both correlations are direct, which suggests that as the number of property convictions increased so did the number of times on probation and the number of times in the department of corrections. As an extension of this, there is a positive correlation between the number of times on probation and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .327, p= .000). Taken as a whole, these positive correlations suggest that as members of the defiant individualist group maintained criminal lifestyles, they increasingly came into contact with various forms of the criminal justice system such as probation and incarceration in the department of corrections.

Table-15 Bivariate Correlation - Defiant Individualist Group (Primary Criminogenics)

	ARR	CHGS	VCON	PCON	PROB	XDOC
ARR	1.00	.931**	.209*	.524**	.716**	.366**
CHGS		1.00	.234**	.463**	.658**	.488**
VCON			1.00	.182*	.209*	.226**
PCON				1.00	.439**	.510**
PROB					1.00	.327**
XDOC						1.00

ARR= Number of arrests
CHGS= Number of arrest charges
VCON= Number of violent convictions
PCON= Number of property conviction
PROB= Number of times on probation
XDOC= Number of times in DOC

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

Table-16 displays the correlations between secondary criminogenic variables among defiant individualists. It is readily apparent that this matrix produced only one statistically significant relationship. There is a strong positive correlation between the amount of post intervention recall, which denotes the number of components the respondent remembers from the lever-pulling intervention and the amount of post intervention networking (r= .576, p= .000), which speaks to the degree to which the respondent made contact with community-based supporters present at the lever-pulling program. This statistic suggests that defiant individualists who recall more elements of the intervention program also engage in more post intervention networking. This finding is similar to the zero-influence group (See Table-16).

Table-16 Bivariate Correlation- Defiant Individualist Group (Secondary Criminogenics)

	RCLL	PINT	POSS	PGCR	AGUN
RCLL	1.00	.576**	.178	.214	-.001
PINT		1.00	.186	.179	-.001
POSS			1.00	.034	-.035
PGCR				1.00	.023
AGUN					1.00

RCLL= Degree of post intervention recall
PINT= Degree of Post intervention networking
POSS= Amount of positive trajectory shift
PGCR= Perception of gang crime
AGUN= Attitude toward gun use

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

The matrix of primary and secondary criminogenic variables only produces two statistically significant correlations for the defiant individualist group. There is an inverse significant correlation between the number of property convictions and the amount of post intervention recall (r= -.232, p= .042). This suggests that people with high numbers of property convictions have lower post intervention recall, which reflects their ability to remember various components of the lever-pulling intervention. This may be due to respondents with high property convictions having stronger commitments to a criminal lifestyle. The high degree of commitment to criminal lifestyles would be antithetical to the pro-social messages and opportunities being offered at the intervention meetings.

Table-17 displays a correlation of primary and secondary criminogenic variables. Due to the table containing both primary and secondary criminogenic variables, some correlations are replicated from Table-15 and 16. For example, the correlation between the degree of post intervention recall and the amount of post intervention networking (r= .576, p= .000), which suggests that as the respondent remembers more components of the lever-pulling intervention, the respondent also contacts more community-based supporters.

Additionally the positive correlations between the number of criminal charges and the number of property convictions (r= .463, p= .000) were replicated. The positive correlation between the number of criminal charges and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .488, p= .000) is also displayed in both Table-17 and Table-15. In addition to these replicated correlations, Table-17 also displays three new correlations.

A positive correlation exists between the number of property offenses and the perception of gang criminality (r= .194, p= .023). This suggests that respondents who have higher property convictions also believe that crime is more important to gangs. It is also possible that these respondents have more violent beliefs about gang behavior. There is a negative correlation between the number of property convictions and the amount of post intervention recall (r= -.232, p= .042). This statistic suggests that respondents who remembered more components of the lever-pulling intervention also had fewer property convictions. This relationship suggests that defiant individualists with fewer property crime convictions may have less commitment to deviant lifestyles and were therefore more responsive to the opportunities presented in the lever-pulling program.

The final correlation displayed in Table-17 was the positive correlation between the number of charges and the amount of positive trajectory shift (r= .174, p= .039). This statistic suggests that defiant individualists who had more criminal charges overall engaged in normative processes more often after participating in the lever-pulling intervention (See Table-17). This finding may speak to the desire of the defiant individualists to desist their criminal life trajectories.

Table-17	Bivariate Correlation - Defiant Individualist Group (Primary and Secondary Criminogenics)						
	RCLL	**PINT**	**POSS**	**PGCR**	**PCON**	**XDOC**	**CHGS**
RCLL	1.00	.576**	.178	.214	-.232*	-.118	-.025
PINT		1.00	.186	.179	-.013	.096	.039
POSS			1.00	.034	.026	.127	.174*
PGCR				1.00	.194*	.019	-.081
PCON					1.00	.510**	.463**
XDOC						1.00	.488**
CHGS							1.00

RCLL= Degree of post intervention recall
PINT= Degree of post intervention networking
POSS= Amount of positive trajectory shift
PGCR= Perception of gang crime
PCON= Number of property conviction
XDOC= Number of times in DOC

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

"Gang Member Group"

Table-18 displays the primary criminogenic correlations within the gang member group. As with the other study groups, there are significant correlations between the number of arrests and the number of property convictions (r= .970, p= .000), the number of times on probation (r= .729, p= .000) and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .605, p= .004). These findings suggest that as the number of arrests increases so does the number of property convictions, the number of times on probation and the number of times in the department of corrections.

The number of property convictions is also correlated with the number of charges incurred (r= .687, p= .001). As the number of property convictions

increases so does the number of overall charges. The number of charges is, in turn, significantly correlated with the number of times on probation (r= .714, p= .000) and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .638, p= .002).

There are two strong correlations between the number of property convictions and the number of times on probation (r= .573, p= .007) and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .580, p= .006). Both of these relationships are significant. As the number of property convictions increases so does the number of times on probation and the number of times in the department of corrections. There is a correlation between the number of times on probation and the number of times in the department of corrections (r= .539, p= .012).

Table-18 Bivariate Correlation - Gang Member Group (Primary Criminogenics)

	ARR	CHGS	VCON	PCON	PROB	XDOC
ARR	1.00	.970**	.134	.729**	.696**	.605**
CHGS		1.00	.113	.687**	.741**	.638**
VCON			1.00	.336	.266	.123
PCON				1.00	.573**	.580**
PROB					1.00	.539*
XDOC						1.00

ARR= Number of arrests
CHGS= Number of arrest charges
VCON= Number of violent convictions
PCON= Number of property conviction
PROB= Number of times on probation
XDOC= Number of times in DOC

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

Secondary criminogenic correlations are displayed in Table-19. This matrix displays only two statistically significant correlations. There is a strong positive correlation between the amount of post intervention networking, reflecting the degree to which the respondent took advantage of community-based contacts presented at the lever-pulling intervention and the amount of post intervention recall, which reflects the number of components the respondents remember from the lever-pulling program ($r = .597$, $p = .038$). As with other groups in the study, as the amount of post intervention recall increases, so does the amount of post intervention networking. This correlation suggests that it may be possible to increase the amount of post intervention networking simply by improving the participants' recall of program components. Members of the zero-influence group may benefit from the incorporation of mnemonic devices or rhetoric in the lever-pulling curriculum.

Revising the lever-pulling curriculum to include more phrases, slogans or even visual components may increase the recall of the participants. Additionally, the incorporation of some type of follow-up in the program may also serve as an important link between the respondent's recall of the program components and the respondent's networking with the community-based supporters. Through a follow-up stage, the program facilitators could remind the participants of various components in the program and help the participants initiate the post intervention contact with community-based supporters.

An inverse correlation between the amount of post intervention networking and attitude toward gun use (r= -.610, p= .046) is also shown in Table-18. This suggests that respondents who have more favorable attitudes toward gun use also have less post intervention networking. This statistic is by far the strongest secondary correlation coefficient among the gang member group. This suggests that gang members have a stronger commitment to violence, as evidenced by their more acceptable attitudes toward gun use and therefore engage in less post intervention networking with community-based supporters (See Table-19). Gang members with more favorable attitudes toward gun use are also more likely to have a stronger commitment to the gang culture and less likely to engage in positive transitions.

Table-19 Bivariate Correlation - Gang Member Group (Secondary Criminogenics)

	RCLL	PINT	POSS	PGCR	AGUN
RCLL	1.00	.579*	.182	-.165	-.196
PINT		1.00	.097	.187	-.610*
POSS			1.00	.011	-.167
PGCR				1.00	-.363
AGUN					1.00

RCLL= Post intervention recall
PINT= Post intervention networking
POSS= Positive trajectory shift
PGCR= Perception of gang crime
AGUN= Attitude toward gun use

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

A bivariate correlation matrix of primary and secondary criminogenic variables produces three statistically significant relationships. Note that all three of the variables are related to the attitude toward gun use. First, there is a strong positive correlation between the attitude toward gun use and the number of property convictions (r= .705, p= .002). Moreover, as the number of property convictions increases, the attitude toward gun use becomes more favorable. The only negative gun-related correlation in Table-20 is the relationship between the attitude toward gun use and the amount of post intervention networking (r= -.610, p= .046). Therefore, gang members who have more favorable views of gun use engage in less contact with community-based supporters present at the lever-pulling intervention. This finding suggests that gang members are somewhat resistant to desisting deviant attitudes that may impact their criminal behavior.

The attitude toward gun use is also strongly correlated with the number of arrests (r= .563, p= .023) and the number of charges (r= .549, p= .028). These statistics suggest that as the number of charges and arrests increase, the attitude toward gun use becomes more favorable. Gang members in the study appear to have a much stronger commitment to gun use than either the defiant individualist or zero-influence groups, as evidenced by more variables being significantly correlated with attitudes toward gun use. This favorable attitude toward gun use may explain the traditionally higher rates of violence within the gang sub-culture (See Table-20).

Table-20 Bivariate Correlation - Gang Member Group (Primary and Secondary Criminogenics)

	RCLL	PINT	POSS	PGCR	PCON	ARR	CHGS	AGUN
RCLL	1.00	.579*	.182	-.165	.222	.055	.062	-.196
PINT		1.00	.097	.187	-.194	-.116	-.007	-.610*
POSS			1.00	.011	-.502	.111	.207	-.167
PGCR				1.00	-.136	-.170	-.223	-.363
PCON					1.00	.729**	.687*	.705**
ARR						1.00	.970**	.563*
CHGS							1.00	.549*
AGUN								1.00

RCLL= Degree of post intervention recall
PINT= Degree of post intervention networking
POSS= Amount of positive trajectory shift
PGCR= Perception of gang crime
PCON= Number of property conviction
XDOC= Number of times in DOC

**P< .01 *P ≤ .05

"Discriminant Function Analyses"

The following analyses are designed to determine whether or not primary and secondary criminogenic variables discriminate between various study groups. A discriminant function analysis is a statistic used to test whether or not a group of variables significantly discriminate between two or more groups, thereby producing a latent function. The discriminant function analysis allows the researcher to determine if the overall model discriminates between the various dependent groups as well as which individual component of the model contributes most to the differentiation.

A discriminant analysis model is displayed in Table-21. This model displays a discriminant analysis of secondary criminogenic variables across the zero-influence and defiant individualist groups. The Wilks' Lambda statistic (Λ= .941, p= .311) shows that the secondary criminogenic variables do not discriminate between the zero-influence and the defiant individualist groups. The function of the groups at the centroid (ZI = .337, DI= -.181), show that these two groups were fairly close together. This closeness also denotes no discriminant function (See Table-21).

From the standardized discriminant function coefficients, it is clear that the perception of gang crime [f(x)= .802] and the amount of positive trajectory shift [f(x)= -.688] contribute the most to the secondary criminogenic differences between these two groups. The structure matrix shows that perception of gang crime (r= .678) and positive trajectory shift (r= -.560) also have the strongest correlation to a latent function in this model despite the model not attaining statistical significance.

Interestingly, the weakest predictor of a discriminant function is the attitude toward gun use [f(x)= -.030]. Attitude toward gun use also displays the weakest correlation to the discriminant function (r= -.045). The canonical correlation for Table-21 also shows that there is a weak relationship between the model groups and secondary criminogenics (R_c= .242). This weak canonical correlation shows that secondary criminogenics are not necessarily the best way in which to differentiate defiant individualists from respondents in the zero-influence group.

Table-21 Secondary Criminogenic Discriminant Analysis (Zero-Influence and Defiant Individualists)

		Mean	SD	Dis. f(x) r	Struct. Matrix
Attitude Toward Gun Use	**ZI**	8.3	2.520	-.030	-.045
	DI	8.4	2.349		
Perception of Gang Crime	**ZI**	25.5	4.286	.802	.678
	DI	23.6	5.69		
Post Intervention Networking	**ZI**	1.9	1.558	-.256	-.098
	DI	2.0	1.799		
Positive Trajectory Shift	**ZI**	1.4	1.180	-.688	-.560
	DI	1.8	1.851		
Post Intervention Recall	**ZI**	5.3	3.190	.256	.172
	DI	5.0	2.963		

Wilks' Λ= .941 **Sig.= .311** **R_c= .242**

Centroid Functions (ZI = .337, DI= -.181)

Table-22 displays the results of a discriminate function model of the primary criminogenic variables. The variables are tested between defiant individualist and gang member groups. The significance level of the Wilks' Lambda (p= .283), displayed in Table-22, shows that the model of primary criminogenics does not discriminate between defiant individualists and gang members; hence these data show little difference in the level of criminal justice contact as evidenced by the number of arrests, number of violent convictions, number of property convictions, number of times on probation and the length of time held within the department of corrections.

The Wilks' Lambda ranges from zero to one and functions as an F test of significance. If the model attains statistical significance, then each individual variable is assessed in order to determine which variable differs significantly by group. A Wilks' Lambda of zero (0) is interpreted as the group means differ and the groups are therefore different from one another.

However, a Wilks' Lambda of one (1) suggests that the group means do not differ and the two groups are more similar to one another. The model of primary criminogenics, displayed in Table-21, produces a Wilks' Lambda of .961. The function of the groups at the centroid (DI = -.077, GM= .518) denotes the distance between the two groups. The closer the centroid functions are, the less discrete the two groups. When the centroid functions are close together, this suggests that the model variables do not discriminate between the two groups (See Table-22).

Table-22 also shows the results of the standardized discriminant function coefficients for variables in the model. These coefficients are partial in that they do not show overlapping effects of the other variables in the model. The standardized discriminant coefficients denote the amount of discrimination that each variable lends to the discriminant function. The two variables on which the defiant individualist and gang member groups differ the most are numbers of arrests [f(x)= .715] and number of violent convictions [f(x)= .515]. Therefore, these two variables contribute the most to the ability to differentiate between defiant individualists and gang members; although there is no statistically significant difference.

In discriminant analysis, the discriminant function is a latent variable that is created as a linear function of the independent variables. The structure coefficient denotes the uncontrolled association between the independent variable and the latent function. Table-22 shows that, again, the variable with the greatest correlation to a latent function is the number of arrests (r= .689). Structure coefficients are interpreted like standard correlation coefficients; therefore, it is

important not to confuse them with the model's canonical correlation (R_c). The canonical correlation expresses the relationship between the dependant variable groups and the discriminant function.

An $R_c = 0$ would be interpreted as no relationship between the groups and the discriminant function. Conversely, an $R_c = 1$ would be interpreted as a perfect association between the dependent groups and the latent discriminant function. Table-22 shows that there is a weak relationship between the model groups and primary criminogenics ($R_c = .197$). This weak canonical correlation suggests that perhaps primary criminogenics are not the best way in which to differentiate gang members from defiant individualists.

Table-22 Primary Criminogenic Discriminant Analysis (Defiant Individualists and Gang Members)

		Mean	SD	Dis. f(x) r	Struct. Matrix
Number of Arrests	**DI**	8.2	6.778	.715	.689
	GM	11.3	11.155		
Number of Conviction	**DI**	.5	1.034	.515	.553
Violent	**GM**	.9	.889		
Number of Conviction	**DI**	.7	1.348	-.290	.264
Property	**GM**	1.0	1.673		
Number of Times on	**DI**	2.1	1.409	-.064	.491
Probation	**GM**	2.5	1.720		
Length of Time in DOC	**DI**	3757.5	3419.081	-.557	-.594
(Days)	**GM**	2576.3	2764.157		

Wilks' Λ= .961 **Sig.= .283** **R_c= .197**

Centroid Functions (DI = -.077, GM= .518)

Table-23 shows a discriminant analysis of secondary criminogenic variables across the defiant individualist and gang member groups. The Wilks' Lambda shows that secondary criminogenic variables also do not discriminate between

defiant individualists and gang members (Λ= .956, p= .763). The group functions at the centroid (DI = -.076, GM= .461) are also relatively close and supports the finding of no discriminant function (See Table-23).

From the standardized discriminant function coefficients, we see that attitude toward gun use [f(x)= .861] and positive trajectory shift [f(x)= -.476] are the greatest contributors to differentiation between defiant individualists and gang members. The structure matrix also confirms that attitude toward gun use (r= .851) and positive trajectory shift (r= -.461) have stronger correlations to a latent function than the other variables in the model. The canonical correlation, however, suggests that secondary criminogenics are not the best means with which to differentiate between defiant individualists and gang members.

Table-23 Secondary Criminogenic Discriminant Analysis (Defiant Individualists and Gang Members)

		Mean	SD	Dis. f(x) r	Struct. Matrix
Attitude Toward Gun Use	**DI**	8.4	2.349	.861	.851
	GM	9.5	3.142		
Perception of Gang Crime	**DI**	23.6	5.693	-.010	-.158
	GM	23.1	4.874		
Post Intervention Networking	**DI**	2.0	1.799	.375	.124
	GM	2.1	2.040		
Positive Trajectory Shift	**DI**	1.8	1.851	-.476	-.461
	GM	1.4	1.213		
Post Intervention Recall	**DI**	5.0	2.963	-.115	.001
	GM	5.0	3.015		

Wilks' Λ= .956 **Sig.= .763** **R_c= .186**

Centroid Functions (DI = -.076, GM= .461)

"Summary of Findings"

This study contains several relevant findings with which to better understand the criminogenic differences between gang members, defiant individualists and offenders with no gang influence. The demographic analysis shows that the overall sample contains more blacks than any other racial minority. This representation of black respondents was disproportionate to the representation of blacks in the population of Indianapolis, Indiana.

Males are also over represented in the sample. The general population of Indianapolis is almost evenly distributed between males and females but the sample was heavily male. Additionally, the findings show that a large percentage of the sample is not married. This marriage finding is interesting when considering the age distribution of the sample. The average age of the sample respondent is 31 with a median age of 30.

Respondents in the sample also have relatively moderate education levels. The majority (84.2%) of the sample has 12 years of education or less. While the overall education level is not very high, the employment statistics are high. The sample shows only a small number (1.2%) of respondents as being unemployed at the time of the survey.

An examination of the primary criminogenic variables shows that gang members had consistently higher average offenses than other groups. These higher average offenses can be seen in the number of arrests, the number of charges, the number of violent convictions, the number property convictions, the

number of times on probation and the number of times in the department of corrections.

An analysis of the secondary criminogenics reveals similar patterns to those of the primary criminogenics. The attitude toward gun use shows that the sample was generally less accepting of gun use. However, gang members are more accepting of gun use than other groups in the sample. Interestingly, gang members perceive crime as being less important to gang members than either of the other two groups in the sample.

The amount of positive trajectory shift found in the sample is relatively low. However, members of the defiant individualist group display the most positive trajectory shift. Similarly, the sample shows low levels of post intervention networking. The zero-influence group displays the least post intervention networking among the study groups. Despite displaying the least post intervention networking, the zero-influenced group had the greatest post intervention recall of the three groups.

Among the bivariate correlation, the primary criminogenic variables (number of arrests, the number of charges, the number of violent convictions, the number property convictions, the number of times on probation and the number of times in the department of corrections) produced 18 statistically significant relationships. These primary criminogenic relationships are intuitive in nature such as the statistically significant relationship between the number of arrests and the number of charges incurred. The primary correlation matrix functions as a

baseline model against which to determine any fluctuation across the study groups.

Unlike the primary criminogenic correlation matrix, the secondary criminogenic correlation matrix produced only two statistically significant relationships. A bivariate correlation matrix of both primary and secondary criminogenic variables also shows only two statistically significant relationships.

In addition to univariate, bivariate and multi-variate statistics, this study tests five hypotheses that focus on the variations of both primary and secondary criminogenic factors, which might provide a means by which defiant individualists could be differentiated from gang members and offenders with no gang-related influence. The first study hypothesis is that there is no difference in the criminal justice system contact between gang members and defiant individualists, which would constitute a discriminate function. Based on the preceding analysis this hypothesis is supported (See Table-22).

The second hypothesis is that there is a direct relationship between the number of criminal charges and defiant individualism. Based on the preceding analysis this hypothesis is not supported (See Table-6). The third hypothesis is that there is no difference in the attitude toward gun use between the defiant individualist and the zero-influence group, which could constitute a discriminant function. Based on the preceding analysis this hypothesis is supported (See Table-21).

The fourth hypothesis is that there is an inverse relationship between defiant individualism and the amount of positive trajectory shift. Based on the preceding

analysis, this hypothesis is not supported (See Table-7). The fifth hypothesis is that there is no difference in the perception of gang criminality between gang members and defiant individualists, which could constitute a discriminant function. Based on the preceding analysis this hypothesis is supported (See Table-23). Subsequent explanations as to why the results occurred in this manner are discussed in the concluding chapter.

Chapter V

"Summary of Purpose"

This study addresses the changing nature of gangs in the United States. Despite the slight increase in active gang membership (Eagley and Ritz, 2006), victims reported fewer crimes being perpetrated by gang members (Harrel, 2005). The reduction of reported crimes committed by gang members is dramatic in proportionality. The number of violent victimizations decreased from 1.1 million in 1994 to only 341,000 in 2003 (Harrel, 2005). From 1994-2003, crime victims identified the alleged perpetrators as gang members approximately 12% of the time (Ibid). Perpetrators were identified as gang members in about 10% of robberies and 4% of the rapes (Harrel, 2005).This study posits that this seeming inconsistency can be explained not only by criminal justice practitioners becoming more acclimated to gangs, thereby over identifying perpetrators as gang members, or political intervention in the agencies' responses which re-define who is a gang member but, most importantly, due to the changing nature of gangs.

This study posits that contemporary gangs and gang-related crimes are less driven by formal membership. Thus, inconsistencies in reported gang crime are more attributable to a blurring of boundaries between gang members and non-gang members. This fundamental change in gang structure and purpose requires examination in order to determine if traditional distinctions between the crimes of gang members and non-gang members are still valid.

"Summary of Literature Review"

This study asserts that the contemporary gang transformation diminishes the importance of formal membership and thus requires a re-conceptualization of the gang phenomenon. This evolution of the gang is inspired by a current sociological trend associated with globalization called the networked enterprise. Castells (2000) explains that the networked enterprise creates a system where intersecting segments are both dependent and autonomous at the same time. Under a system of networked enterprises, gangs are becoming organizations with fluctuating memberships and fewer permanent associations. The lack of stable association should not be misconstrued as weak associations.

Not only have some scholars (Hobbs, 2001) begun to study this gang transformation but others (Hardt and Negri, 2004; Castells, 2000) have explained how the general social transformation accrues to the criminal element in society. Still, other researchers (McCusker, 2004; Williams, 2005) have demonstrated increased networking of some well-known gangs. This structural and functional transformation requires a theoretical foundation. As a theoretical foundation, Sanchez-Jankowski (2003) provides an explanation for the re-conceptualization of gangs. Sanchez-Jankowski (2003) posits that gangs have become agglomerations of individuals who exhibit the defiant individualist personality trait.

Individuals who display this personality type seek to attain socially prescribed goals by any means available. This goal-oriented pursuit is somewhat impeded by a lack of resources with which to legally attain the desired outcomes; therefore, the defiant individualist resorts to illegal means (Sanchez-Jankowski,

2003). In addition to the disintermediation of laws and social norms, the defiant individualist is willing to go to any lengths to prevent the disruption of his or her goal pursuit. The inherent resistant qualities of the new paradigm makes intervention efforts that much more difficult. Under this new paradigm, gangs have become groups of organized defiant individualists who come together to undertake criminal enterprises, which are structured as networked enterprises. Hence, the need for formal membership no longer exists, since the association is transient by nature.

Organized defiant individualism is a radical departure from the traditional conceptualization of gangs. Traditionally, gangs have been viewed as socially problematic due to the group hazard effect. There are two different concepts that combine to form the group hazard effect: Dentler and Erikson's (1959) group delinquency hypothesis and Erickson's (1973) group hazard hypothesis. The group hazard hypothesis posits that group deviance is perceived as a greater threat to society and therefore draws more attention from official social control agents (Erickson, 1973-b). The group deviance hypothesis posits that groups tend to induce, sustain and permit deviance (Dentler and Erikson, 1959). Together these two concepts form a group hazard effect which views gangs as workshops of deviance. Conversely, the organized defiant individualism hypothesis views the gang as a tool, rather than the workshop. Gangs, under the defiant individualist conceptualization, also create a problem for individuals seeking desistance from a criminal lifestyle.

Gang desistance entails not only the desistance of behaviors but also the defection from a culture. The specific act of an individual disassociating with a gang is typically insufficient to promote the type of long-term lifestyle change necessary to insure the continued success of the individual and guard against the possibility of recidivism. With respect to the organized defiant individualism, the individual must alter his or her personality traits that promote the existence of the gang. Under the defiant individualism conceptualization, gang membership is more representative of a personal pathology than a socially facilitated pathology. Promoting desistence may be much more difficult for individuals who display a defiant individualist personality type. Understanding contemporary gangs as organized defiant individualism is a stark contrast to the traditional conceptualization.

Traditionally, gangs are conceptualized as a group hazard. The group hazard effect is a combination of two similar but different concepts: the groups hazard hypothesis and the group delinquency hypothesis. Erickson's (1973) group hazard hypothesis states that violating the law in groups is more likely to ensure detection and official reaction than individual crime. The group hazard hypothesis could be attributed simply to the fact that it is more difficult for groups to evade detection than for an individual to escape detection (Erickson, 1973). The group delinquency hypothesis is the second component of the traditional gang conceptualization.

Dentler and Erikson (1959) proposed three propositions that sought to explain the aggregate dynamics of deviance: groups induce and sustain deviance,

deviance maintains group equilibrium and groups resist alienation of a member whose behavior deviates from the group standards. It is clear by the first proposition that deviance is viewed traditionally as a group pathology. Additionally, the group is viewed as serving a maintenance role in deviance as evidenced by the second and third propositions. Taken together, the group hazard hypothesis and the group delinquency hypothesis construct a conceptualization of gangs that places a great deal of focus on the group dynamics. With the alternate conceptualization in place, this study proceeds to determine whether criminal behaviors discriminate between gang members, individuals who display defiant individualist personality traits and individuals with no gang influence.

Based on the literature, this study proposes five hypotheses. Hypothesis one suggests that there is no difference in criminal justice contact between gang members and defiant individualists. Under the traditional group hazard conceptualization, deviance is maintained and promoted through membership in the gang. A large number of studies have shown the statistically significant difference in criminal behaviors between gang members and non-gang members. However, if the organized defiant individualism conceptualization is valid, there should not be any criminological differences between gang members and non-gang members who display defiant individualism.

The second study hypothesis posits that there is a direct relationship between the number of criminal charges accumulated and defiant individualism. Over time, the defiant individualist may become more criminally oriented as his or her legitimate opportunities are reduced even further by early criminal

offenses. The defiant individualist's reliance on criminal pursuits should logically increase as the commitment to the personality type increases.

The third hypothesis holds that there is no difference in the attitude toward gun use between defiant individualists and respondents who display no organized criminal influence. Since it is posited that defiant individualists are not pathological in nature, but rather rational, it should logically follow that their attitude toward gun use is much more utilitarian in nature. Defiant individualists should not have a predisposition toward using guns more than individuals without the defiant individualist personality.

The fourth hypothesis suggests that there is an inverse relationship between defiant individualism and positive trajectory shifts. A defiant individualist should remain unaffected by criminological interventions, such as lever-pulling, due to the nature of the criminal behavior being the defiant individualist personality type. Lever-pulling is a focused deterrence strategy that is based on multiple characteristics of and responses to offending (McGarrell et al., 2006). During the lever-pulling program, a multi-agency work group of criminal justice professionals identify and target habitual offenders who are required to attend notification meetings (Ibid, 2006).

At these meetings, habitual offenders are advised that they will face significant criminal justice sanctions if the offenders do not stop engaging in certain criminal behaviors such as gun violence. During the meeting, offenders are provided with networking opportunities (McGarrell et al., 2006). Lever-pulling attempts to promote criminal desistance in this way. Altering an

individual's personality requires more in-depth and personalized intervention than is often possible in the criminal justice system.

The final study hypothesis is a null hypothesis offering no difference in the perception of gang criminality between gang members and defiant individualists. Due to the close association of these two groups, the perceptions about gang criminality should be similar.

"Summary of Methods"

This study uses secondary data to test these hypotheses. The data are part of a research study funded by grant # 2003-IJ-CX-1038 from the National Institute of Justice. The purpose of the grant is to evaluate the Indianapolis lever pulling intervention. The data set includes both interview data and respondents' criminal histories. The study participants were comprised of every felony probationer in the Indianapolis probation system. The probationers had to meet several criteria prior to selection for the study. The probationers had to be actively on probation for a felony offense and that offense had to be specifically a drug offense, violent crime weapon offense or a property offense. A study sample was drawn from consecutive sub samples of 1,000 probationers which were supplied each month. There were a total of six different pools of probationers. Each of the sample pools was randomly assigned to one of the three groups: law enforcement meeting, community meeting or control group.

After the selection and randomization process, the study contained 540 probationers with 180 participants per group. Despite this preliminary study count, the final sample consisted of 235 participants. Ineffective notification,

transportation problems and non-compliance with active probation requirements were all reasons for the attenuation of the sample.

The dataset is comprised of 387 data points. Of the total data points, 195 were analyzed. Study variables that were rejected had large proportions of missing data. For example, data on whether the respondent bought a gun under his or her own name had 40% missing data, how often the respondents fired guns had 99.1% missing data and how many times the respondents carried a gun outside of the home had 99.1% missing data. Twenty-three study variables which best fit the hypotheses were selected. Nineteen of the study variables were continuous in nature to allow for more sophisticated analysis.

The dependent variables used in this analysis were divided into two classes: primary and secondary criminogenics. Primary criminogenics were conceptualized as official counts of a participant's criminal activity such as number of arrests, number of violent convictions, number of property convictions, number of times on probation, number of times in the department on corrections, number of days in the department of corrections and the number of criminal charges. Operationalization of the primary criminogenics was achieved by using data from the respondents' official criminal histories. In addition to the primary criminogenics, the study also examined secondary criminogenics.

Secondary criminogenics are composite measures that assess the participant's non-criminal attitudes or behaviors toward various concepts. The study uses five secondary criminogenic variables. Attitude toward gun use is conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent has a more of less favorable

view of using a gun in conflict situations. This composite measure contains 6 items. The items are operationalized on a five point Likert scale which produces a range from 6, having a less accepting attitude toward gun use, to 24, having the most accepting attitude toward gun use. This scale produces the lowest reliability coefficient of any in the study (alpha= .578). A factor analysis reveals that all of the items load with an Eigen value of at least .443.

Perception of gang criminality is the next secondary criminogenic variable. This variable is conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent believes criminal behavior is important to gang members. This variable is a composite measure that contains six items which were operationalized on a five-point Likert scale. This scale produced a range from 6, having a perception of low criminal importance to gangs, to 30, having a high perception of criminal importance to gangs. The scale produced a reliability coefficient of .845. A factor analysis revealed that all of the items loaded with Eigen values of at least .691.

Positive trajectory shift is conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent participated in post intervention, pro-social social behavior. The variable is a composite measure that originally contains seven items. This variable was operationalized on a Guttman scale which produced a range from 0, making no positive trajectory shift, to 7, making the most positive trajectory shift. This scale produced a reliability coefficient of .602, which was the second lowest in the study. A factor analysis of the scale revealed that all of the items loaded with an Eigen value of at least .473.

The fourth secondary criminogenic variable is post intervention networking. This variable was conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent contacted community-based supporters. The variable was a composite measure that contained 6 items operationalized using a Guttman scale, which is composed of dichotomous items. The scale produced a reliability coefficient of .714. A factor analysis revealed that all the items loaded with an Eigen value of at least .499. This scale had a range of 0, participating in no post-intervention networking, to 6, participating in a high degree of post-intervention networking.

The final secondary criminogenic variable is intervention recall. This variable was conceptualized as the degree to which the respondent remembered elements of the intervention meeting. These items were operationalized using a Guttman scale containing eight dichotomous items. This scale produced a range from 0, having no recall of the meetings, to 8, having total recall. This scale produced a reliability coefficient of .906. A factor analysis revealed that all of the items loaded with an Eigen value of at least .714.

This study also uses two classification variables: defiant individualism score and gang membership, which serve as the dependent variables in the analysis. Defiant individualism score (DIS) is a composite variable that is conceptualized as the degree to which an individual displays the defiant individualist personality. The scale is composed of the following items: 1) Have you ever been a member of a gang, 2) Have you ever been a member of a group, 3) Have you ever thought of joining a gang, 4) Have you ever been recruited or pressured to join a gang, 5) Have you ever hung out with gang members, 6) Have

you ever drunk alcohol or gotten high with gang members, 7) Have you ever vandalized something with a gang member, 8) Have you ever stolen something with a gang member, 9) Have you ever been attacked in a gang-related incident, 10) Have you ever attacked someone in a gang-related incident and 11) Do you have friends that are gang members. The items on the scale were operationalized as: yes= 1 and no =0. This scale produced a reliability coefficient of .845. A factor analysis revealed that all of the items loaded with an Eigen value of at least .401. The range of the scale was from 0, having no commitment to defiant individualism, to 11, having high commitment to defiant individualism.

The gang membership variable is conceptualized as whether or not the respondent was a member of a gang at the time of the interview. This variable was operationalized as: 1= yes and 0= no and is mutually exclusive with the defiant individualism score. The study proceeds to examine the data at univariate and multivariate methods including Pearson's Correlation and Discriminant Function Analysis.

A discriminant function analysis is a statistic used to test whether or not a group of variables significantly discriminate between two or more groups, thereby producing a latent function. The discriminant function analysis allows the researcher to determine if the overall model discriminates between the various dependent groups as well as which individual component of the model contributes most to the differentiation. One of the most important statistics in discriminant function analysis is the Wilks' Lambda.

The Wilks' Lambda ranges from zero to one and functions as an F test of significance. If the model attains statistical significance then each individual variable is assessed in order to determine which variable differs significantly by group. A Wilks' Lambda of zero (0) is interpreted as the group means differ and the groups are therefore different from one another. However, a Wilks' Lambda of one (1) suggests that the group means do not differ and the two groups are more similar to one another. Using measures of central tendency, bivariate correlation and discriminant function analysis, this study proceeds with the analysis and hypothesis testing.

"Summary of Findings"

The demographic analysis shows that the overall sample contains more blacks than any other racial minority. This representation of black respondents is disproportionate to the representation of blacks in the population of Indianapolis, Indiana. Males are also over represented in the sample. The general population of Indianapolis is almost evenly distributed between males and females but the sample was heavily male. Despite the average age of the sample respondent being 31 years of age (median age=30 years) a large percentage of the sample is not married.

Respondents in the sample also have relatively moderate education levels. The majority (84.2%) of the sample has 12 years of education or less. Despite the relatively low education level, the employment statistics are high. The sample shows only a small number (1.2%) of respondents as being unemployed at the time of the survey. Additionally, approximately half (n= 49.4%) of the sample

was employed full-time at the time of the survey. The univariate examination also extends to the study variables.

A univariate examination of the primary criminogenic variables shows that gang members had consistently higher average offenses than other groups. These higher average offenses can be seen in the number of arrests, the number of charges, the number of violent convictions, the number property convictions, the number of times on probation and the number of times in the department of corrections. An analysis of the secondary criminogenics reveals similar patterns to those of the primary criminogenics. The attitude toward gun use shows that the sample is generally less accepting of gun use. However, gang members are more accepting of gun use than other groups in the sample. Interestingly, gang members perceive crime as being less important to gang members than either of the other two groups in the sample.

The amount of positive trajectory shift found in the sample is relatively low. Generally, respondents in the sample did not experience a great deal of lifestyle alteration after participating in the lever-pulling program. However, members of the defiant individualist group display the most positive trajectory shift. Similarly, the sample shows low levels of post intervention networking. The respondents generally did not contact community-based supporters very much. The zero-influence group displays the least post intervention networking among the study groups. Despite displaying the least post intervention networking, the zero-influenced group had the greatest post intervention recall of the three groups. The study also includes bivariate correlations designed to determine how intuitive

criminal relationships vary across the zero-influence, defiant individualist and gang members groups.

Among the bivariate correlations, the primary criminogenic variables (the number of arrests, the number of charges, the number of violent convictions, the number property convictions, the number of times on probation and the number of times in the department of corrections) produced 18 statistically significant relationships. These primary criminogenic relationships are intuitive in nature, such as the statistically significant relationship between the number of arrests and the number of charges incurred. As the numbers of arrests increase, so do the number of criminal charges. This correlation displays maintenance of criminal lifestyles.

Unlike the primary criminogenic correlation matrix, the secondary criminogenic correlation matrix is not intuitive. Because the secondary correlation matrices correlated non-criminal attitudes and behaviors, the relationships are not as predictable. The secondary criminogenic matrices show only two statistically significant relationships. There is a positive correlation between the amount of post intervention recall and the amount of post intervention networking. This finding suggests that respondents who remembered more components of the lever-pulling program contacted more community-based supporters. The zero-influence group, the defiant individualist group and the gang member group all had the same positive correlation between the amount of post intervention recall and the amount of post intervention networking. Perhaps the most noticeable

correlations can be seen in the primary and secondary matrix of the gang member group.

The primary and secondary matrix of the gang member group produces four significant gun-related correlations. Attitude toward gun use, which measures whether or not the respondent is more or less favorable of using a gun in conflicts, was not significantly correlated with any other variable in any other groups (zero-influence group or defiant individualist group) other than among the gang member group. First, there is a strong positive correlation between the attitude toward gun use and the number of property convictions ($r = .705$, $p = .002$). As the number of property convictions increases, the attitude toward gun use becomes more favorable.

The attitude toward gun use is also strongly correlated with the number of arrests ($r = .563$, $p = .023$) and the number of charges ($r = .549$, $p = .028$). These statistics suggest that as the number of charges and arrests increase, the attitude toward gun use becomes more favorable. Gang members in the study appear to have a much stronger commitment to gun use than either the defiant individualist or zero-influence groups, as evidenced by more variables being significantly correlated with attitudes toward gun use. This favorable attitude toward gun use may explain the traditionally higher rates of violence within the gang sub-culture. The only negative gun-related correlation is the relationship between the attitude toward gun use and the amount of post intervention networking ($r = -.610$, $p = .046$). Therefore, gang members who have more favorable views of gun use engage in less contact with community-based supporters. This finding suggests

that gang members are somewhat resistant to desisting deviant attitudes that may impact their criminal behavior. In addition to bivariate correlations, this study also uses discriminant function analysis to examine whether or not there are discernable differences between the zero-influence group, the defiant individualist group and the gang member group and test the study hypotheses.

"Discussion of Study Hypotheses"

The first study hypothesis states that there is no difference in the criminal justice system contact between gang members and defiant individualists, which would constitute a discriminate function. Based on the analysis in chapter four, this hypothesis is supported. Table-22 displays the discriminant function analysis of primary criminogenics between gang members and defiant individualists. The model is not statistically significant (Λ= .961, p= .283).

The primary criminogenic model examines five variables that are direct elements of contact with the criminal justice system: number of arrests, number of violent convictions, number of property convictions, number of times on probation and length of time in the department of corrections. It is necessary to include measures from every aspect of the criminal justice system in order to produce an adequate picture of the overall contact with the criminal justice system. The number of arrests assesses the law enforcement or primary contact with the criminal justice system. Number of violent convictions and number of property convictions assesses the variation in the judicial contact between the two groups. The model also includes the number of times on probation and the length

of time in the department of corrections as an assessment of the correctional aspects of the criminal justice system.

If any one of the variables in the primary criminogenic model is found to be significant, the Wilks' Lambda for the entire model will attain statistical significance. The failure of the primary criminogenic model to discriminate between gang members and defiant individualists suggests that these two groups have similar criminal justice contact. As previously discussed in chapter two, it is possible for defiant individualists to be misidentified as gang members, due to their relatively close associations and criminal complacency in gang-related crime.

The second hypothesis states that that there is a direct relationship between the number of criminal charges a respondent incurred and the degree of defiant individualism. Based on the analysis in chapter four, this hypothesis is not supported. Table-6 shows that the relationship between defiant individualism and the number of criminal charges incurred is not statistically significant (r=. 039, p=569). Even when controlling for the effects of age, the relationship fails to attain significance (r= -.025, p= .809).

According to Life Course Theory, these two variables should be directly correlated. Life Course Theory posits that as individuals engage in criminal life styles they find it more difficult to desist criminal activities, due to antisocial decisions and behaviors made earlier in life. This linear function is called Homotypic Continuity (Sampson and Laub, 1992). There is a plausible explanation for this unexpected finding. Game Theory suggests that as an

individual repeatedly engages in any given activity he or she will discover which tactics best provide the desired outcome. As the defiant individualist maintains a criminal lifestyle, he or she may develop better technique for committing crimes or avoiding detection. The defiant individualist may also develop larger more advanced criminal networks with which to better avoid detection.

The third study hypothesis states that there is no difference in the attitude toward gun use between the defiant individualist and the zero-influence group, which could constitute a discriminant function. The analysis in chapter four suggests that this hypothesis is supported. Table-21 shows that there is no secondary criminogenic discriminant function between the zero influence and the defiant individualist group ($\Lambda = .941$, $p = .242$).

This model contains not only a measure of the respondents' attitudes toward gun use but also their perception of gang crime, the respondents post intervention networking, positive trajectory shift and post intervention recall. All of these variables are facets of secondary behaviors that might impact the primary criminal behavior. Respondents post intervention networking, positive trajectory shift and post intervention recall specifically examine whether or not the respondents transitioned toward prosocial activities. The model's failure to attain statistical significance suggests that the both respondents in the zero-influence group and the defiant individualists shared similar attitudes toward gun use and positive transitions.

The fourth study hypothesis states that there is an inverse relationship between defiant individualism and the amount of positive trajectory shift.

Therefore, the study supposes that respondents with higher defiant individualist scores will engage in less pro-social behaviors after participating in the lever-pulling intervention. Based on the preceding analysis, this hypothesis is not supported but the relationship does attain statistical significance. The relationship between the defiant individualism and positive trajectory shift is positively correlated ($r= .200$, $p= .003$). This positive correlation is also stable when controlling for the effects of age ($r= .209$, $p= .035$).

It is possible that individuals who have greater defiant individualistic traits require the prosocial opportunities provided by the lever pulling intervention and take greater advantage of these services. This statistic is compatible with the concept of homotypic continuity. The longer the individual maintains the antisocial lifestyle, the greater the desire may be to make a prosocial transition. This intervention program perhaps may be better suited to people with higher levels of defiant individualism and not as a blanket program for all offenders.

The fifth hypothesis states that there is no difference in the perception of gang criminality between gang members and defiant individualists, which could constitute a discriminant function. Based on the analysis in chapter four this hypothesis is supported. Table-23 shows that the model of secondary criminogenics does not represent a discriminant function between the defiant individualist and gang member groups ($\Lambda= .941$, $p= .242$).

The model in Table-23 is similar to the model in Table-22, in that it not only contains measures of the respondents' attitudes toward gun use but also their perception of gang crime, the respondents post intervention networking as

evidenced by contact with community-based supporters and positive trajectory shift, which entails engaging in more prosocial behaviors and post intervention recall. Respondents' post intervention networking, positive trajectory shift and post intervention recall specifically examined whether or not the respondents transitioned toward prosocial activities. The model's failure to attain statistical significance suggests that the respondents in the defiant individualist group and the gang member group shared similar secondary criminogenic attitudes and behaviors.

"Study Limitations"

Despite generating several supported hypotheses, this study has three limitations that should be addressed in subsequent replications. There are limitations due to sample size, index reliability and the measure of defiant individualism. While these limitations are not serious enough to render the study invalid, the study could produce a more useful replication by strengthening these areas.

The sample size in this study is relatively small (N= 235) compared to many sample sizes in the criminal justice field. This smaller than normal sample size also produces unequal numbers of respondents in the three study groups. It is important to remember that these data are not specifically collected for this study. In order to produce findings that could be generalized to the population at large, the sample size would need to be in the range of 1,000 to 1,500 cases. This would provide an appropriate statistical power for extrapolating the findings to larger

groups. The sample size is not overly problematic, due to the exploratory nature of this study.

There is also a limitation created by two of the secondary criminogenic indices. The scale measuring the respondents' attitudes toward gun use has the lowest reliability coefficient of all the variables in the study (α= .578). It is easy to understand why respondents may have succumbed to the Hawthorne Effect in completing these questions. The Hawthorne Effect occurs when a research participant gives the response he or she thinks the researcher expects based on the knowledge of the research project. Since these study respondents are probationers, it is easy to see how they might have given answers they perceived as the 'right' answer or failed to complete the gun use-related questions altogether.

The second scale that contributes to the limitation was the positive trajectory shift scale, which also produced a relatively low reliability coefficient (α= .602). It is possible that the respondents were suffering from the Hawthorne Effect when completing these questions also. If the respondents who were on probation had not taken full advantage of the opportunities to network in positive ways, it is possible that they may have not answered the questions in this section or answered in sporadic illogical patterns.

The measure of defiant individualism by a proxy scale also contributes to the limitations of the study. The scale which measures defiant individualism is a continuum that assesses closeness to gang members on a number of issues. The logic of the scale is based on the Morash (1983) study in which groups were assessed as more or less 'gang like'. The criminological variations of these groups

are then analyzed in order to determine similarities to gang behavior. The study's defiant individualism scale essentially measures closeness to gangs.

Based on the theoretical assertion by Sanchez-Jankowski (2003), that almost all gang members have defiant individualist personality traits, the defiant individualism index in this study measures closeness to gang members as a proxy for increased defiant individualism. In subsequent studies, researchers would need to develop an individual index that measures defiant individualism as an isolated trait not as a proxy. Perhaps a scale developed around the diagnostic model for Oppositional Defiant Disorder would be more beneficial. Oppositional Defiant Disorder is a mental disorder seen in juveniles and is characterized by rebellion to authority figures in the pursuit of personally valued goals.

"Recommendations"

Based on the preceding study findings and limitations, the following recommendations are presented. First, a replication study is recommended. The support for three of the five study hypotheses (and a fourth statistically significant hypothesis) justifies additional inquiry. This study has demonstrated that neither primary nor secondary criminogenics perform a discriminant function for gang members versus defiant individualists. This inability to distinguish between gang members and non-member defiant individualists suggests that more study is needed to determine what other variables might be used to differentiate between these two classifications of offenders. If it is not possible to differentiate the two groups, subsequent research must measure the groups as similar in sociological

threat. Additionally, if a discourse of differentiation cannot be identified, the reliance on formal membership as an inclusionary criterion should be abandoned.

Additional research is also needed to better understand the characteristics of defiant individualism as it pertains to criminology. There are many questions that this new criminal conceptualization raises. For example, how is the personality developed among criminals, is it more prevalent in any given population, is it debilitating or does it allow its subjects a degree of functionality? Most importantly, can the personality trait be reversed or de-criminalized? All of these questions need to be subjected to scientific rigor. It may be possible to glean information from existing studies in other disciplines that address similar concepts. This study provides a foundation from which to proceed in identifying the salient characteristics of defiant individualism as it pertains to criminology.

Another recommendation is that subsequent studies of defiant individualism develop and use a defiant individualism index. Developing an independent defiant individualism scale provides for much stronger reliability and validity of subsequent studies. Perhaps, the defiant individualism index could be created by a more thorough examination of the oppositional defiant disorder literature. Oppositional defiant disorder is a psychological disorder, diagnosed in children, which has many of the same characteristics as defiant individualism. Although oppositional defiant disorder is most commonly diagnosed in children, the diagnostic tools may help to inform a defiant individualism index, which could be used for adults.

A final recommendation is for a larger sample size in subsequent replications. Future studies should begin with an *a priori* power analysis which is designed to reveal the sample size needed to be able to generalize finding to larger populations.

"Conclusion"

This study shows that the contact with the criminal justice system does not discriminate between gang members and defiant individualists. The gang member versus non-gang member differentiations produced under the group hazard models can be partially diminished by more accurately measuring all groups involved in the emerging structure of the criminal culture. Defiant individualists have the ability to maintain criminal lifestyles just as gang members do without the need or burden of stable gang membership. Despite the criminal activities of people with defiant individualism, there is little that is known about the personality trait.

The study findings demonstrate that the actions of defiant individualists are not always readily predicted. This direct correlation between defiant individualism and positive trajectory shift is somewhat antithetical to an expected outcome. However, the finding suggests that there is hope for this emerging threat. This finding suggests that perhaps we should not scrap the lever pulling intervention strategies just yet. Perhaps, through this exploratory analysis we have discovered that the intervention is useful when properly targeted.

Traditional conceptualizations about gangs and gang-related crime have not kept pace with the criminal world. This study has shown that gang membership

does not necessarily delineate the greater threat and should not be considered the criterion that defines criminal careers. As society in general continues to change and take full advantage of social shifts, so do gangs. It is imperative that criminologists not only adapt to these changes but that we understand and anticipate them. It is the ability to anticipate crime that is the first responsibility of the criminologist.

Attachment

"Code Book"

List of variables on the working file

Name		Position
GROUP	Group	1
	Measurement Level: Scale	
	Value Label	
	1 Law Enforcement	
	2 Community	
	3 Control	
BADD		2
	Measurement Level: Scale	
	Value Label	
	.00 No	
	1.00 Yes	
GENDER		3
	Measurement Level: Scale	
	Value Label	
	.00 Female	
	1.00 Male	
ATTEND		4
	Measurement Level: Scale	
	Value Label	
	.00 No	
	1.00 Yes	
STAADD	Status when getting address	5
	Measurement Level: Scale	
	Value Label	
	1.00 Meeting Date	
	2.00 Discharged	
	3.00 Revoked	
	4.00 Absconded	

5.00 Transfer
6.00 Incarcerated
7.00 TRV

MCJA Interviewed at MCJA **6**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

CHEARD Heard of the LP meetings (control) **7**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Yes
2.00 No

CWHOM Heard of LP meetings from whom? **8**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Friends
2.00 Family
3.00 Probation
4.00 Law Enforcement
5.00 Community Leaders
6.00 Television/Radio

REMEM1 Remember law enforcement cracking down on violent crime **9**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

REMEM2 Remember law enforcement cracking down on gun crime **10**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

REMEM3 Remember can go to federal prison is carry gun 11
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

REMEM4 Remember probation is watching behavior closely 12
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

REMEM5 Remember law enforcement wants to make choices 13
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

REMEM6 Remember community leaders have opportunities for you to get 14
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

REMEM7 Remember community leaders are willing to help you in any way 15
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

REMEM8 Remember should stay out of trouble 16
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

AFT1 After the meeting did you talk with family 17
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

AFT2 After the meeting did you talk with spouse, girl/boy friend 18
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

AFT3 After the meeting did you talk with friends 19
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

AFT4 After the meeting did you talk with coworkers 20
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

AFT5 After the meeting did you talk with neighbors 21
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

AFT6 After the meeting did you talk with probation officers 22
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

SINCE1 Gotten a job or job training **23**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

SINCE2 Gone back to school **24**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

SINCE3 Entered treatment **25**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

SINCE4 Going to church **26**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

SINCE5 Attending counseling **27**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

SINCE6 Missed meetings with probation **28**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 False
1 True

SINCE7 Contacted law enforcement **29**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
0	False
1	True

SINCE8 Contacted community leaders **30**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
0	False
1	True

SINCE9 Contacted community organization **31**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
0	False
1	True

SINCE10 Asked probation officer for help **32**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
0	False
1	True

CHOICES Better choices because I attend the meetings **33**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1	Strongly Agree
2	Agree
3	Disagree
4	Strongly Disagree
5 M	Don't Know

PROMC Promise to crack down on gun crime **34**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

PROMG Promise to send to federal prison **35**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

PROMISE Law enforcements agencies have followed through on their pro **36**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

CLOPP Community leaders were willing to help me find opportunities **37**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

CLPROM Community leaders followed through on their promises — 38

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1	Strongly Agree
2	Agree
3	Disagree
4	Strongly Disagree
5 M	Don't Know

THINK Often think about the meetings — 39

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1	Very Frequently
2	Frequently
3	Somewhat Frequently
4	Not at all

HELP Helpful were the meetings — 40

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1	Very Helpful
2	Helpful
3	Somewhat Helpful
4	Not at all Helpful

CONTINUE Meetings should continue — 41

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1	Strongly Agree
2	Agree
3	Disagree
4	Strongly Disagree
5 M	Don't Know

DISCOUR Discourage people from breaking the law — 42

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1	Strongly Agree
2	Agree
3	Disagree

4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

SCARE Just scare tactics **43**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

TIME Do not have the time or money to follow through **44**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

JOB Can't provide me with a job where I can make money **45**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

WATCH Watching probationers more now than before **46**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

GETOUT Difficult for arresttees to get out of the system 47
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

BREAK Less likely to break the law because of the message 48
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

HEARDO Heard other probationers talk about meetings 49
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

CAREFUL You can get away with a lot of crimes 50
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

PRYING Law enforcement does not have any business prying 51
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree

3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

SERIOUS Law enforcement is serious about responding to crime 52
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Strongly Agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly Disagree
5 M Don't Know

SUCCESS Successful you have been in doing crimes 53
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Very Successful
2 Somewhat Successful
3 Somewhat Unsuccessful
4 Very Unsuccessful

MEETO Often meet probation officer at his office 54
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 Not at all
1 Less than every month
2 Every month or almost every month
3 Every week of almost every week
4 Several times a week
5 Everyday or almost every day

MEETH Probation officer contact you at home 55
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 Not at all
1 Less than every month
2 Every month or almost every month
3 Every week of almost every week
4 Several times a week
5 Everyday or almost every day

MEETW Probatin officer contact you at work **56**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value Label

0 Not at all
1 Less than every month
2 Every month or almost every month
3 Every week of almost every week
4 Several times a week
5 Everyday or almost every day

TELE Probation officer contact you by telephone **57**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value Label

0 Not at all
1 Less than every month
2 Every month or almost every month
3 Every week of almost every week
4 Several times a week
5 Everyday or almost every day

CTREAT Participated in court ordered treatment **58**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value Label

0 Not at all
1 Less than every month
2 Every month or almost every month
3 Every week of almost every week
4 Several times a week
5 Everyday or almost every day

SWEEP How many times contact during a probation sweep **59**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value Label

0 Not at all
1 Less than every month
2 Every month or almost every month
3 Every week of almost every week
4 Several times a week
5 Everyday or almost every day

PCON How many times local police officers contacted you 60
Measurement Level: Scale

FCON How many times federal law enforcement contacted you 61
Measurement Level: Scale

PRCON How many times prosecutors contacted you 62
Measurement Level: Scale

CRCON How many times community representatives contacted you 63
Measurement Level: Scale

CLCON How many times clergy contacted you 64
Measurement Level: Scale

POCON How many times probation contacted you 65
Measurement Level: Scale

CONFRONT Confronting someone on the street with a gun 66
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1	Much more
2	Somewhat more
3	About the same
4	Somewhat less
5	Much less

ARRESTG Someone's risk of being arrestted 67
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1	Much more
2	Somewhat more
3	About the same
4	Somewhat less
5	Much less

GUNPEN Legal penalities for illegally carring a gun 68
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1	Much more
2	Somewhat more

3 About the same
4 Somewhat less
5 Much less

USEGUN Likely is it that you will use a gun 69
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Not at all likely
2 Somewhat unlikely
3 About the same
4 Somewhat likely
5 Very likely

LUSEGUN Likelihood that you will use a gun 70
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Much more
2 Somewhat more
3 About the same
4 Somewhat less
5 Much less

RARREST Risk of being arrested 71
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Much more
2 Somewhat more
3 About the same
4 Somewhat less
5 Much less

RCONVICT Risk of being convicted 72
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1 Much more
2 Somewhat more
3 About the same
4 Somewhat less
5 Much less

RPRISON Risk of going to prison **73**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1	Much more
2	Somewhat more
3	About the same
4	Somewhat less
5	Much less

CASE2 **74**

Measurement Level: Scale

GAR Chances of arrest **75**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	No Chance
2.00	Low Chance
3.00	Some Chance
4.00	Good Chance
5.00	High Chance
6.00	Completely Certain

GCON Chances of conviction **76**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	No Chance
2.00	Low Chance
3.00	Some Chance
4.00	Good Chance
5.00	High Chance
6.00	Completely Certain

GPRI Chances of going to prison **77**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	No Chance
2.00	Low Chance
3.00	Some Chance
4.00	Good Chance
5.00	High Chance
6.00	Completely Certain

AGUN Arrest for gun **78**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

ABURG Arrest for burglary **79**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

ATHEFT Arrest for theft **80**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

ASDRUGS Arrest for selling drugs **81**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

APDRUGS Arrest for purchasing drugs **82**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

ACAR Arrest for stealing a car **83**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

ABCHECK Arrest for writing a bad check **84**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

AROB Arrest for robbery **85**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

AASSAULT Arrest for assaulting someone **86**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

ARAPE Arrest for raping someone **87**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

AMURDER Arrest for murdering someone **88**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

PGUN Prison for gun **89**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

PBURG Prison for burglary **90**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

PTHEFT Prison for theft **91**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

PSDRUGS Prison for selling drugs **92**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

PPDRUGS Prison for purchasing drugs **93**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

PSCAR Prison for stealing a car 94
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

PBCHECK Prison for writing a bad check 95
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

PROB Prison for robbery 96
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

PASSAULT Prison for assaulting someone 97
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

PRAPE Prison for raping someone 98

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	No Chance
2.00	Low Chance
3.00	Some Chance
4.00	Good Chance
5.00	High Chance
6.00	Completely Certain

PMURDER Prison for murdering someone 99

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	No Chance
2.00	Low Chance
3.00	Some Chance
4.00	Good Chance
5.00	High Chance
6.00	Completely Certain

SGUN Serious thing for gun 100

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

SBURG Serious thing for burglary 101

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

STHEFT Serious thing for theft **102**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

SSDRUGS Serious thing for selling drugs **103**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

SPDRUGS Serious thing for purchasing drugs **104**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

SSCAR Serious thing for stealing a car **105**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

SBCHECK Serious thing for writing a bad check **106**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

SROB Serious thing for robbery **107**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

SASSAULT Serious thing for assaulting someone **108**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

SRAPE Serious thing for raping someone **109**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

SMURDER Serious thing for murdering someone **110**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Warning
2.00	Arrest
3.00	Fine
4.00	Probation
5.00	Short Prison
6.00	Long Prison

FGUN Federal court for gun **111**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	No Chance
2.00	Low Chance
3.00	Some Chance
4.00	Good Chance
5.00	High Chance
6.00	Completely Certain

FBURG Federal court for burglary **112**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	No Chance
2.00	Low Chance
3.00	Some Chance
4.00	Good Chance
5.00	High Chance
6.00	Completely Certain

FSDRUGS Federal court for selling drugs **113**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	No Chance
2.00	Low Chance
3.00	Some Chance
4.00	Good Chance
5.00	High Chance
6.00	Completely Certain

FPDRUGS Federal court for purchasing drugs **114**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

FROB Federal court for robbery **115**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

FRAPE Federal court for rape **116**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

FMURDER Federal court for murder **117**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Chance
2.00 Low Chance
3.00 Some Chance
4.00 Good Chance
5.00 High Chance
6.00 Completely Certain

FELONGUN Felon legally carry a gun **118**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

FPENGUN Federal penalties for carrying a gun **119**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HARSHER System has the harsher penalties **120**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 State
1.00 Federal

CONPEN Consider the penalties for carrying a gun **121**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Strongly Agree
2.00 Agree
3.00 Disagree
4.00 Strongly Disagree
5.00 M Don't Know

LEARNP Main way you learn about punishmens **122**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Personal experience
2.00 Friends
3.00 People who have in the system
4.00 Television, Radio
5.00 Other advertising, like bus signs, billboards
6.00 Family
7.00 Other

STOPYOU Most important thing that stop you from using a gun 123

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Chances of being arrested
2.00	Chances of going to state prison
3.00	Chances of going to federal prison
4.00	Concerns about your family
5.00	Concerns about your own safety
6.00	How you would be treated in prison

FPENPOS Federal penalty for a felon in possession 124

Measurement Level: Nominal

FPENUSE Federal penalty for using a gun in a crime 129

Measurement Level: Nominal

SPENPOS State penalty for a felon in possession 130

Measurement Level: Nominal

SPENUSE State penalty for a felon in possession 131

Measurement Level: Nominal

CASE3 Case Number 3 132

Measurement Level: Scale

TROUBLE Trouble to get gun 133

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Almost impossible
2.00	Alot of trouble, but you could do it
3.00	Little of no trouble

EASYGUN Easy for felons to get gun 134

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Strongly Agree
2.00	Agree
3.00	Disagree
4.00	Strongly Disagree
5.00 M	Don't Know

GETWORSE Situations get worse pulls gun **135**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Strongly Agree
2.00 Agree
3.00 Disagree
4.00 Strongly Disagree
5.00 M Don't Know

REDUCECO Reduce gun violence in my community **136**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Strongly Agree
2.00 Agree
3.00 Disagree
4.00 Strongly Disagree
5.00 M Don't Know

STAYOUT Nothing you can do to stay out of a gun fight **137**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Strongly Agree
2.00 Agree
3.00 Disagree
4.00 Strongly Disagree
5.00 M Don't Know

OKTOSHT Ok to shoot somebody if they're about to hurt or kill you **138**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Strongly Agree
2.00 Agree
3.00 Disagree
4.00 Strongly Disagree
5.00 M Don't Know

CARGUN Need to carry a gun in my neighborhood **139**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Strongly Agree

2.00 Agree
3.00 Disagree
4.00 Strongly Disagree
5.00 M Don't Know

FRIENDSG Ask my friends to leave their guns at home when we hang out **140**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Strongly Agree
2.00 Agree
3.00 Disagree
4.00 Strongly Disagree
5.00 M Don't Know

HANGING Hanging out with the wrong people **141**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Strongly Agree
2.00 Agree
3.00 Disagree
4.00 Strongly Disagree
5.00 M Don't Know

EDUC Improve my education **142**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Strongly Agree
2.00 Agree
3.00 Disagree
4.00 Strongly Disagree
5.00 M Don't Know

NEEDGUN Need a gun, stay at home **143**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Strongly Agree
2.00 Agree
3.00 Disagree
4.00 Strongly Disagree
5.00 M Don't Know

WORTHRIS Carrying a gun is not worth the risk **144**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Strongly Agree
2.00	Agree
3.00	Disagree
4.00	Strongly Disagree
5.00 M	Don't Know

SCARESOM It alright to have a gun to scare somebody **145**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Strongly Agree
2.00	Agree
3.00	Disagree
4.00	Strongly Disagree
5.00 M	Don't Know

EASYGGUN Easiest way for a convicted felon to get a gun **146**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Have someone else purchase it for him
2.00	Buy froma gun store using a fake identification
3.00	Buy a gun from somebody who sells guns illegally
4.00	Buy one from somebody he knows
5.00	Steal one
6.00	Borrow one from a friend

WHYOWN Why do people own guns in your neighborhood **147**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	For protection
2.00	For respect
3.00	For a job
4.00	For committing crimes
5.00	For sport/hunting

GINHOME Guns in your home **148**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
.00	No

1.00 Yes

GOUTHOME Guns outside the home **149**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HMTGOUT How many times did you have guns outside the home **150**
Measurement Level: Scale

HOGOVT How often did you carry a gun outside the home in the months **151**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Everyday or almost everyday
2.00 Several times a week
3.00 Every week or almost every week
4.00 Less than every week

TIMESG1 How many times per week 1 **152**
Measurement Level: Scale

TIMESG2 How many times per week 2 **153**
Measurement Level: Scale

MONTHG3 How many per month 1 **154**
Measurement Level: Scale

MONTHG4 How many per month 2 **155**
Measurement Level: Scale

FIREGUN How often did you fire gun **156**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 One to five times
3.00 Once/twice month
4.00 Once/twice week
5.00 Almost everyday

THREATEN How often threatened with gun **157**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Never
2.00	One to five times
3.00	Once/twice month
4.00	Once/twice week
5.00	Almost everyday

SHOTAT How often were you shot at with gun **158**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Never
2.00	One to five times
3.00	Once/twice month
4.00	Once/twice week
5.00	Almost everyday

INJURED How many times injured with a gun **159**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Never
2.00	Once
3.00	Twice
4.00	3-5 Times
5.00	More than 5 times

WHENGET When did you get you last gun **160**
Measurement Level: Nominal

KINDGUN What kind of gun was it **161**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Pistol
2.00	Derringer
3.00	Revolver
4.00	Rifle
5.00	Shot gun
6.00	Sawed off shot gun
7.00	Machine gun
8.00	Other type of gun

KINDOTH Other type of gun **162**
Measurement Level: Nominal

LASTGUN Where did you get your last gun **163**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Gun dealer
2.00	Retail or sporting good store
3.00	Pawn shop
4.00	Street dealer
5.00	Friend/girlfriend/family
6.00	Gang member
7.00	Stole it
8.00	Other

LASTOTH Last gun other **164**
Measurement Level: Nominal

PREASON Primary reason you got the gun **165**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	For protection
2.00	For respect
3.00	For work
4.00	As a gift
5.00	For committing crimes
6.00	Other reason

REASOTH Other reason **166**
Measurement Level: Nominal

DIRECT Buy the gun directly **167**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Directly
2.00	Someone bought

RELATION Person in relation to you **168**
Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Girlfriend/boyfriend
2.00	Friend

3.00 Family
4.00 Gang member
5.00 Stranger

OWNNAME Did you buy it under you own name **169**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

PCHECK Did the seller do a police check on you **170**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

SELLFAM Sell to a family member **171**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 False
1.00 True

SELLFRI Sell to a friend **172**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 False
1.00 True

SELLGUND Sell to a gun dealer **173**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 False
1.00 True

PAWN Pawn the gun **174**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 False
1.00 True

TRADEFM Trade it to a family member **175**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
.00	False
1.00	True

TRADEFD Trade it to a friend **176**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
.00	False
1.00	True

TRADEGUN Trade with a gun dealer **177**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
.00	False
1.00	True

GIVEFM Give it to a family member **178**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
.00	False
1.00	True

GIVEFD Give it to a friend **179**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
.00	False
1.00	True

THROW Throw it away **180**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
.00	False
1.00	True

PDRUGS Purchase drugs illegally **181**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HMTPDRUG How many times purchase drugs 182
Measurement Level: Scale

HOPDRUG How often did you do it in a month when purchasing 183
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Everyday or almost everyday
2.00 Several times a week
3.00 Every week or almost every week
4.00 Less than every week

CALCPDRG How many drug using the followups 184
Measurement Level: Scale

PDTDAY1 How many times per day 185
Measurement Level: Scale

PDTWEEK1 How many times per week 1 186
Measurement Level: Scale

PDTWEEK2 How many times per week 2 187
Measurement Level: Scale

PDMONTH3 How many per month 3 188
Measurement Level: Scale

PDMONTH4 How many per month 4 189
Measurement Level: Scale

SDRUGS Sell drugs illegally 190
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HMTSDRUG How many times did you sell drugs 191
Measurement Level: Scale

HOSDRUG How often did you do it in a month when selling 192
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Everyday or almost everyday
2.00 Several times a week
3.00 Every week or almost every week
4.00 Less than every week

CALCSDRG How many times sell drugs using the followups 193
Measurement Level: Scale

SDTDAY1 How many times per day 1 194
Measurement Level: Scale

SDTWEEK1 How many times per week 1 195
Measurement Level: Scale

SDTWEEK2 How many times per week 2 196
Measurement Level: Scale

SDMONTH3 How many per month 3 197
Measurement Level: Scale

SDMONTH4 How many per month 4 198
Measurement Level: Scale

CONSUMEA Consume alcohol 199
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Three or more times a day
2.00 1-2 times a day
3.00 3-4 times a day
4.00 1-2 times a week
5.00 1-2 times a month
6.00 Once a year
7.00 Never
8.00 M Don't know

USEDRUGA Use any type of illegal drug 200
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Three or more times a day
2.00 1-2 times a day

3.00 3-4 times a week
4.00 1-2 times a week
5.00 1-2 times a month
6.00 Once
7.00 Never
8.00 M Don't know

LMARI Marijuana in your life 201
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once
3.00 Once in a while
4.00 Few times a month
5.00 Few times a week

LCOKE Coke in your life 202
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once
3.00 Once in a while
4.00 Few times a month
5.00 Few times a week

LHEROIN Heroin in your life 203
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once
3.00 Once in a while
4.00 Few times a month
5.00 Few times a week

LMETH Meth in your life 204
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once
3.00 Once in a while
4.00 Few times a month
5.00 Few times a week

LACID Acid in your life 205
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once
3.00 Once in a while
4.00 Few times a month
5.00 Few times a week

CASE4 206
Measurement Level: Scale

BURG Commit any burglaries 207
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HMTBURG How many times commit burglaries 208
Measurement Level: Scale

HOBURG How often commit burglaries in months when committing 209
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Everyday or almost everyday
2.00 Several times a week
3.00 Every week or almost every week
4.00 Less than every week

BTIMESD1 Times per day1 burglaries 210
Measurement Level: Scale

BTIMESW1 Times per week1 burglaries 211
Measurement Level: Scale

BTIMESW2 Times per week2 burglaries 212
Measurement Level: Scale

BMONTH3 Times per month3 burglaries 213
Measurement Level: Scale

BMONTH4 Times per month4 burglaries 214
Measurement Level: Scale

THEFT Commit any thefts 215
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HMTTHEFT How many times commit theft 216
Measurement Level: Scale

HOTHEFT How often commit theft in months when committing 217
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Everyday or almost everyday
2.00 Several times a week
3.00 Every week or almost every week
4.00 Less than every week

TTIMESD1 Times per day1 theft 218
Measurement Level: Scale

TTIMESW1 Times per week1 theft 219
Measurement Level: Scale

TTIMESW2 Times per week2 theft 220
Measurement Level: Scale

TMONTH3 Times per month3 theft 221
Measurement Level: Scale

TMONTH4 Times per month4 theft 222
Measurement Level: Scale

CAR Steal any cars 223
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HMTCAR How many times steal cars **224**
Measurement Level: Scale

HOCAR How often steal cars in months when committing **225**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Everyday or almost everyday
2.00 Several times a week
3.00 Every week or almost every week
4.00 Less than every week

CTIMESD1 Times per day1 steal cars **226**
Measurement Level: Scale

CTIMESW1 Times per week1 steal cars **227**
Measurement Level: Scale

CTIMESW2 Times per week2 steal cars **228**
Measurement Level: Scale

CMONTH3 Times per month3 steal cars **229**
Measurement Level: Scale

CMONTH4 Times per month4 steal cars **230**
Measurement Level: Scale

BADCHECK Pass any bad checks **231**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HMTBCHEC How many times pass bad checks **232**
Measurement Level: Scale

HOBCHECK How often pass bad checks in months when committing **233**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Everyday or almost everyday
2.00 Several times a week
3.00 Every week or almost every week
4.00 Less than every week

BCTIMED1 Times per day1 bad check 234
Measurement Level: Scale

BCTIMEW1 Times per week1 bad check 235
Measurement Level: Scale

BCTIMEW2 Times per week2 bad check 236
Measurement Level: Scale

BCMONTH3 Times per month3 bad check 237
Measurement Level: Scale

BCMONTH4 Times per month4 bad check 238
Measurement Level: Scale

BROB Commit any business robberies 239
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HMTBROB How many times commit business robberies 240
Measurement Level: Scale

HOBROB How often commit business robberies when committing 241
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Everyday or almost everyday
2.00 Several times a week
3.00 Every week or almost every week
4.00 Less than every week

BRTIMED1 Times per day1 business robberies 242
Measurement Level: Scale

BRTIMEW1 Times per week1 business robberies 243
Measurement Level: Scale

BRTIMEW2 Times per week2 business robberies 244
Measurement Level: Scale

BRMONTH3 Times per month3 business robberies 245
Measurement Level: Scale

BRMONTH4 Times per month4 business robberies **246**
Measurement Level: Scale

PROBBERY Commit any personal robberies **247**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HMTPROB How many times commit personal robberies **248**
Measurement Level: Scale

HOPROB How often commit personal robberies when committing **249**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Everyday or almost everyday
2.00 Several times a week
3.00 Every week or almost every week
4.00 Less than every week

PRTIMED1 Times per day1 personal robberies **250**
Measurement Level: Scale

PRTIMEW1 Times per week1 personal robberies **251**
Measurement Level: Scale

PRTIMEW2 Times per week2 personal robberies **252**
Measurement Level: Scale

PRMONTH3 Times per month3 personal robberies **253**
Measurement Level: Scale

PRMONTH4 Times per month4 personal robberies **254**
Measurement Level: Scale

FIGHTS Involved in any fights **255**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 One to Five
3.00 Once/Twice Month
4.00 Once/Twice Week

5.00 Almost Everyday

CVICTIM Been a victim of crime **256**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HMTCVIC How many times been a victim of crime **257**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Once
2.00 2-3 Times
3.00 4-6 Times
4.00 More than 6 Times

VICTIMOF Most serious crime that you were a victim of **258**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 I had something stolen from me
2.00 My house was broken into
3.00 My car was stolen
4.00 I was robbed
5.00 I was assaulted
6.00 I was raped
7.00 Other

FFAMVIC Friends/Family been victims of violent crime **259**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

VICHOM Friends/Family been victim of homicide **260**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

GANGS How many gangs **261**
Measurement Level: Scale

GMEMBERS How many gang members **262**
Measurement Level: Scale

DANGER1 Most dangerous gang **263**
Measurement Level: Nominal

DANGER2 Most dangerous gang **264**
Measurement Level: Nominal

GMCGUNS How often do gang members carry guns **265**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Sometimes
3.00 Most of the time
4.00 Always

GANGIMP How extensive is the impact of gangs on neighborhood **266**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 No Effect
10.00 Impacts every aspect

GMURDER How important is murder to gangs **267**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Not at all important
5.00 Very Important

GFIGHT How important is fighting to gangs **268**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Not at all important
5.00 Very Important

GSHOOT How important is shooting to gangs **269**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Not at all important
5.00 Very Important

GDRUGS How important is drug sales to gangs **270**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Not at all important
5.00	Very Important

GDRUGU How important is drug use to gangs **271**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Not at all important
5.00	Very Important

GTURF How important is protecting turf to gangs **272**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Not at all important
5.00	Very Important

REGANG Resist the pressures to get involved in gang activity **273**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Very hard
2.00	Difficult
3.00	Pressures are moderate, most youth resist them
4.00	No pressure

GNEIGH Gangs in your neighborhood **274**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
.00	No
1.00	Yes

HMGNEIGH How many gangs are in your neighborhood **275**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	One or Two
2.00	Three to Five
3.00	Six to Ten
4.00	More than Ten

GMEMBER Are you a member of a gang 276
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

EVERBG Ever been a member of a gang 277
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

MGROUP Member of a group 278
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

EVERMG Ever been a member of a group 279
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

THOUGHT Thought of joining a gang 280
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

RECRUIT Recruited or pressured to join a gang 281
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HUNGOUT Hung out with gang members 282
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HIGHGM Drunk alcohol or gotten high with gang members 283
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

VANDAL Vandalized something with gang members 284
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

STOLEGM Stolen something with gang members 285
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

ATTACKGM Been attacked in a gang related incident 286
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

ATTGRI Attacked someone in a gang related incident 287
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

FGANGM Friends who are gang members 288
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

INTERACT Interact with somebody who is a member of street gang 289

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Never
2.00	Once/Twice Month
3.00	Once/Twice Week
4.00	Everyday

CASE5 290

Measurement Level: Scale

FARREST Old were you when you were first arrested 291

Measurement Level: Scale

HMTARRES How many times arrested in your lifetime 292

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Once
2.00	2-5 Times
3.00	6-10 Times
4.00	11-20 Times
5.00	21-50 Times
6.00	More than 50 Times

HMTARR6 Times arrested in the last six months 293

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
.00	Never
1.00	Once
2.00	2-5 Times
3.00	6-10 Times
4.00	11-20 Times
5.00	21-50 Times
6.00	More than 50 Times

FCONVICT Old were you when you were first convicted of crime 294

Measurement Level: Scale

HMTCONV How many times have you been convicted of a crime **295**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	Once
2.00	2-5 Times
3.00	6-10 Times
4.00	11-20 Times
5.00	More than 20 Times

VCLIFE Violent crimes have you committed in your lifetime **296**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	None
2.00	One
3.00	2-5
4.00	11-20
5.00	21-50
6.00	21-50
7.00	More than 51 Times

NVCLIFE Nonviolent crimes have you committed in your lifetime **297**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
1.00	None
2.00	One
3.00	2-5
4.00	11-20
5.00	21-50
6.00	21-50
7.00	More than 51 Times

PDDRUGSL Purchased drugs in your lifetime **298**

Measurement Level: Scale

Value	Label
.00	Never
1.00	One
2.00	2-5
3.00	6-10
4.00	11-20
5.00	21-50

6.00 More than 50 times

SDRUGSLI Sold drugs in your lifetime 299
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 Never
1.00 One
2.00 2-5
3.00 6-10
4.00 11-20
5.00 21-50
6.00 More than 50 times

MREASON Main reason first got involved in crime 300
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Excitement
2.00 Friends
3.00 Money
4.00 Lost my Temper
5.00 Reputation
6.00 Other

MREASOTH Main reason other 301
Measurement Level: Nominal

LOCKEDUP How long have you been locked up in your lifetime 302
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 0-6 months
2.00 6 months to 1 year
3.00 1 to 2 years
4.00 2-4 years
5.00 4-6 years
6.00 More than 6 years

FELONS How many felonies convicted of 303
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 One
2.00 2-3

3.00 4-6
4.00 7-10
5.00 11-15
6.00 16-25
7.00 More than 25

DATREAT Ever been in alcohol or drug treatment 304
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

FPRISON Family members served time in prison 305
Measurement Level: Scale

FRPRISON Friends have served time in prison 306
Measurement Level: Scale

FRFELONY Friends have felony convictions 307
Measurement Level: Scale

BIRTH What year were you born 308
Measurement Level: Scale

AGE 309
Measurement Level: Scale

SCHOOL High grade of school you completed 310
Measurement Level: Scale

MARRY Have you ever been married 311
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

CMARRY Are you currently 312
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Married
2.00 Living with a partner
3.00 Widowed
4.00 Separated

5.00 Divorced
6.00 Never married

CHILD How many children do you have **313**
Measurement Level: Scale

TINCOME Total income by legal means **314**
Measurement Level: Scale

WASJOB What was your job **315**
Measurement Level: Nominal

TILLINC Total income by illegal means **316**
Measurement Level: Scale

ILLEGAL Main source of illegal income **317**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Selling drugs
2.00 Prostitution/Pimping
3.00 Robbery/Burglary
4.00 Selling Stolen Goods
5.00 Theft
6.00 Other

RACE Race or ethnic background **318**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 White
2.00 Black or African American
3.00 Hispanic
4.00 Asian
5.00 Native American, or
6.00 Other

ROTHER Other Race **319**
Measurement Level: Scale

EMPLOY Are you currently employed **320**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

.00 No
1.00 Yes

HWEEK How many hours do you work in a typical week **321**
Measurement Level: Scale

TEMPLOY What percent of the time were you employed **322**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 100 percent
2.00 About 3/4 of the time
3.00 About 1/2 of the time
4.00 About 1/4 of the time
5.00 I was not employed

GAMBLE Gamble **323**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once/Twice Month
3.00 Once Week
4.00 Everyday

CLUBS Clubs/Bars **324**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once/Twice Month
3.00 Once Week
4.00 Everyday

SPORTS Organized sports **325**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once/Twice Month
3.00 Once Week
4.00 Everyday

MOVIES Go to movies **326**
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once/Twice Month

3.00 Once Week
4.00 Everyday

CHURCH Go to church 327
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once/Twice Month
3.00 Once Week
4.00 Everyday

CEVENT Community event 328
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once/Twice Month
3.00 Once Week
4.00 Everyday

HANGOUT Hang out with friends 329
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

1.00 Never
2.00 Once/Twice Month
3.00 Once Week
4.00 Everyday

FILTER_$ uniquecode ~= code (FILTER) 330
Measurement Level: Scale
Value Label

0 Not Selected
1 Selected

GUNSALL self-report any gun activity 331
Measurement Level: Scale

DRUGSALL Use or Sale of Drugs 332
Measurement Level: Scale

NONVIOAL 333
Measurement Level: Scale

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