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ACCOUNTABILITY TN A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT:
A STUDTY OF A VILLAGE IN BANGLADESH

_\__‘

By

Keiko Mizoe

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

2007

ABSTRACT

ACCOUNTABILITY IN A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: A STUDTY
OF A VILLAGE IN BANGLADESH

By

Keiko Mizoe
In international development, donor organizations ofien establish community-based
organizations (CBOs) when they implement community development projects. As these
CBOs are expected to work as intermediaries between residents and donor organizations,
questions of accountability often arise within these linkages. This study examines how
various actors within a community development project are held accountable, and hold
others accountable, for project activities in one small village in Bangladesh. The study
found that while the CBO enjoyed the authority to manage resources, it also faced
pressure from the donor organization and from residents for ensuring the project’s success.
These structures thus enabled the CBO to take an active role in project implementation.
Accountability within the CBO was well-established, due to the joint responsibility of the
members. On the contrary, downward accountability from the CBO to residents seemed to
be weaker than that of upward accountability from the CBO toward the donor

organization.

Copy right by
KEIKO MIZOE
2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURE .................................................................................... v

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1

INF ORMATION-SHARING AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN COMMUNITY

DEVELOPMENT .................................................................................... 3
DATA AND METHOD ........................................................................... 12
Field Survey Site ............................................................................... 12
Project ............................................................................................ 14
Methods ........................................................................................ 18
RESULTS ........................................................................................... 20
Accountability between the VC and the project ........................................... 20
Accountability between the VC and the residents ......................................... 24
Accountability between the VC members ................................................... 28
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 32
APPENDICES .................................................................................... 35
Appendix A. Map of Meherpur ............................................................... 35
Appendix B. Survey questionnaire ............. . ............................................ 36
REFERENCES .................................................................................... 40

iv

LIST OF FIGURE

Figure 1. The project organization chart of PRDP-2 .......................................... 16

Introduction

Community development is often thought of as a local approach to
problem-solving on issues ranging from sanitation to value-added processes for small
farmers (Craig, 1998). In international development, poverty alleviation has been a
central issue in community development since the 19903, and projects in this area are
expected to improve the lives of poor people by involving them in the processes of
problem-solving.

In these types of projects, community-based organizations (CBOs) play an
important role. Donor organizationsl usually establish CBOs in communities to engage
project activities. CBOs are expected to act as an intermediate between residents and
donor organizations, and organize residents for project activities. CBOs are also expected
to carry out community development activities after projects have been terminated. The
underlying concern of this research is how these structures constrain and enable various
actors in the communities where projects are being developed, maintained, and
challenged (Giddens, 1984).

Encouraging sustainability at a local level is an important requirement for CBOs,

 

1 In some international development projects, a donor organization sometimes only
provides the funds for a project, and contracts a project implementing body such as a
NGO or a consultant, to lead the actual implementation of the project. In this case, the
NGO or consultant may establish a CBO. However, in this paper I use the phrase “donor
organization” to signify a project implementing body in general.

1

and research suggests that sustainable and self-reliant CBOs have strong leadership, and
were transparent in infonnation-sharing and decision-making (Datta, 2005). These aspects
can increase residents’ reliance on CBOs, which is one of the factors needed to encourage
residents to participate in the project. Since residents’ active participation in activities is a
crucial part of community development projects, information-sharing between CBOs and
residents and transparency in decision-making are required.

Once a linkage has been made between a CBO, a community and a donor
organization, questions of accountability often arise, as people seek answers for various
events and activities which take place within the project. The concept of accountability
has gained prominence in the context of the provision of community and social services
since the mid 19803, with calls for people or organizations to be accountable for their
actions (Walker, 2002). In community development projects, it is often difficult to discern
who is accountable for What activities, as boundaries for each actor (donor organizations,
CBOs and residents) in the projects are often blurred. Donor organizations usually decide
on the basic framework of projects, and provide financial support. CBOs work closely
with these donor organizations, and are expected to know residents’ needs and opinions
about project activities, and organize activities in the community, while residents are

expected to participate. However, who is accountable for a specific matter is often unclear,

since responsibility and authority of each actor is often intertwined. For example, who is
accountable if residents’ needs are not reflected in the project: CBOs or the donor
organizations? Similarly, if residents do not accomplish their duty, is that the fault of the
residents for lack of effort, €803 for failing to provide adequate guidance, or the donor
organizations who did not provide enough resources?

This paper will focus on the ways in which various actors and groups in one
village in Bangladesh define the ways in which accountability and responsibility are
developed, maintained, and challenged within a development project. In addition, it will
also be important to investigate how the various structures formed around a project
constrain and enable the various actors involved. I turn now to a discussion of
accountability as it relates to a community development project.

Information-sharing and accountability in community development
Community development has gained particular attention with the emergence of
participatory methods since the 19803 in various developing countries (Kumar, 2005).
CBOs are often established in community development projects in order to facilitate
participation among residents. While this is to be commended, the numerous agencies
involved in these kinds of projects often have different ideas of how to go about

generating and implementing projects. For example, donor organizations anticipate

sustainable management, and NGOs expect to balance equity and development. Within

these project, the authority to manage resources typically arises at the local level

(Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). The use of resources at the local level, in turn, leads to

potential conflict between those in charge of the resources (CBOs) and those expecting to

see results from the project (residents and donor organizations). If and when something

fails to meet these expectations, concerns with accountability often come into play.

Romzek and Dubnick (1987) suggest that in the public sector, there are four

types of accountability systems: bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political.

Bureaucratic accountability is broadly used for managing public agencies. Two

characteristics of the bureaucratic system are an organized and legitimate relationship

between a superior and subordinate involving close supervision and/or clearly stated rules

and regulations. As Weber (2003) pointed out, bureaucratic organizations are

hierarchically arranged, and each lower office is under the control and supervision of a

higher. Legal accountability is based on relationships between members of the

organization and a controlling party outside the agency that asserts formal contractual

obligations or imposes legal sanctions. Professional accountability is brought about in

tasks that deal with technically difficult and complex issues. Within these various

complicated and specialized cultures, which are increasing in modern society,

bureaucratic administrations are able to dominate discourse and actions through increases

in knowledge and expertise (Weber, 2003 ), creating solutions or strategies that fit the

goals of the organization. Nonprofessional superiors must trust expert officials and give

sufficient discretion to get the job done, whereas expert officials are expected to be

accountable for their solutions. The relationships under political accountability resemble

those between a representative and his/her constituents. Public officials are expected to

reflect public interest in their tasks (Grant & Keohane, 2005). While public officials who

deal with clients (citizens) face direct demands to improve their services, the relationship

is often such that citizens are latently controlled by these officials (Lipsky, 2003).

Accountability implies that some actors have the right to hold a group, or an

organization, to be answerable for its activities (Ackennan, 2004), or whether

responsibilities have been fulfilled (Grant & Keohane, 2005). In short, accountability “is

a method of keeping the public informed and the powerful in check” (Mulgan, 2003, p. 1),

and involves an exchange of information. In addition, accountability is accompanied with

enforcement of sanctions against accounting actors and/or rectification by compensating

the victims if they determine that these responsibilities are not fulfilled (Ackerman, 2004;

Grant & Keohane, 2005; Mulgan, 2003).

Since accountability implies external examination from others, it is relational

(Brown & Fox, 1998) and directional (Wenar, 2006). Accountability defines the
relationships between actors by identifying who can call whom to account, and who has
the obligation of explanation and rectification by defining the lines and directions of
accountability. The distribution of power is also defined in this sense (Kelby, 2006). The
relationship between the account-holder and those who are accountable is unequal and an
actor who is held accountable has distinguishable powers. Mulgan (2003, p. 11) stresses
that account-holders must recognize that they have a moral authority to call for accounts,
“without some recognition of such authority, accountability becomes mere
grace—and-favour reporting or informing.”

Accountability is also directional with accounts flowing dynamically in
hierarchical chains of control. Upward accountability indicates that those in the lower
tiers are accountable to those in the upper tiers for fulfilling their obligations. For instance,
in a hierarchical organization, whether it is public or private, individuals are upwardly
accountable to their superiors above them. Similarly, downward accountability can take
place in situations where those in higher positions are expected to protect those below
them. In the case of police officers, this group is accountable directly to the public for
their exercise of power, and the public are located below the police in regard to the power

exercised in maintaining public order. Accountability also flows horizontally. This implies

accountability between two authorities having similar status, for instance, two
departments in the same government. Some individuals or organizations may take the role
of both who must give accounts for their actions and expect accounts from others
(Mulgan, 2003).

These flows of accountability become even more complex within the area of
international development, where there are often a number of intermediate institutions,
such as the governments of rich countries, those of poor countries, international financial
institutions, and aid NGOs (Wenar, 2006). This group of institutions in the development
effort often involves different nationalities and organizational backgrounds such as public,
private, and non-profit. These institutions form a chain of command in order to reach the
people in need. They should be accountable either to the individuals who are the intended
beneficiaries of the development projects, or the rich individuals who provide the money
in the forms of taxes or donations.

There are several mechanisms of accountability such as financial and/or
performance reports, audits, direct public access, and media attention. In international
development efforts, implementers of projects such as aid NGOs, are often required to be
accountable to donors or funders especially on financial and performance issues.

Accountability mechanisms are mainly exerted in the forms of accounts and performance

reports and/or audits. While this is often relatively clear, the accountability of

implementers to beneficiaries of the project is obscure with no clear requirement of

needing to be accountable. However, implementers often incorporate accountability

mechanisms into their activities, such as meetings with beneficiaries to discuss project

activities (Kelby, 2006).

Kelby (2006) indicates that downward accountability can be effective in

empowerment of the poor. Empowerment is defined here as an expansion of choice,

influence, and action by marginalized people (Giddens, 1984). These individuals can

obtain information through accountability processes, and if they judge that those in

positions of influence have not fulfilled their responsibility, they can call for rectification

(Jenkins & Goetz, 1999). Through these processes, marginalized people can stake a claim

for their issues and exercise a degree of power. However, downward accountability

implies relative powerlessness of the account-holders (Mulgan, 2003), and the

marginalized people in developing countries are often too poor to exercise power to

sanction anyone (Wenar, 2006). Furthermore, there might not be many beneficiaries who

acknowledge a call to be accountable.

In community development projects in developing countries, a CBO is often

made for facilitating communication between the residents of the community and the

project. There are a variety of activities that CBOs are engaged in, depending on goals
and strategies of the project. However, the essential tasks of €303 to facilitate
community participation are to take the role of informing fellow residents about the
project, and to coordinate activities in the community. They are also expected to tell the
project officers of the needs and/or opinions of residents. Therefore, CBOs are embedded
between projects and beneficiaries in the chain of command. This chain of command
forms a particular structure (and ofien unique), which will become constraining in some
situations and for some individuals while enabling others to exercise control over the
situation (Giddens, 1984). For residents, CBOs can be a connection with outside
resources, whereas residents need to pass through CBOs to obtain local resources. For
CBOs, they are ensured the access of outside resources; however, they are obliged to act
as representatives of the residents, and typically expected to use the outside resources in a
responsible manner. This points to an interface between agency and structure, as there are
rules that need to be followed, but within each project there are opportunities for
creativity and uniqueness brought into play by the individuals and organizations involved
(Sewell, 1992). This creativity, however, can lead to the principal-agent problem in the
sense that the agent, such as a CBO, uses the project for its own purposes, either by

changing the goals of the project, altering rules, or using the resources for purposes other

than the project intent (Worsham & Gatrell, 2005).

There are three paths of accountability in this case; between donor organizations

and CBOs, C805 and residents, and residents and donor organizations. Walker (2002)

suggests the necessity of three contracts corresponding to these three paths of

accountability for clarifying obligations, authority, and responsibility. However, these

contracts can lead to speculation as to which form of accountability is most important and

whether each type of accountability is compatible. In addition, in reality, it is less

common in community development to make these three kinds of contracts, especially in

a formal way such as written agreements or spelling out the process in a formal meeting.

Considering the four types of accountability systems in the public sector, we

can construct a typology as follows: accountability between donor organizations and

CBOs can be legal, since CBOs are independent organizations from donor organizations.

However, if donor organizations incorporate CBOs into their organizations by paying

rewards, the relationships can be bureaucratic, since donor organizations could supervise

CBOs as insiders. The relationships between CBOs and residents should be political,

since CBOs are required to represent residents’ interests. Accountability between donor

organizations and residents is also political; however, it is less clear than that of CBOs

and residents. If the donor organizations’ aim is to improve economic situations and/or

10

the quality of life in a community, they represent a public benefit, which means that they

should represent residents.

Accountability mechanisms can empower residents in community development

projects through information-sharing and delivering opinions. However, one study shows

that the majority of 15 Indian NGOs that worked with women’s self-help groups thought

strengthening downward accountability, which involved providing information and

opportunities for rectification to those women’s group, would weaken their control over

the programs (Kelby, 2006). This can lead to no clear requirement for accountability

between donor organizations (or project implementing bodies) and residents. In addition,

accountability mechanisms between donor organizations and CBOs, and CBOs and

residents are, for the most part, determined by the project rules, which donor

organizations usually establish. The extent that accountability mechanisms work in

community development projects depends on the project designs and strategies that are

created by donor organizations. After all, donor organizations could balance

empowerment processes and their control, along with the projects’ strategies.

This complexity of the real and perceived flows of accountability will be

examined in one particular community project in Bangladesh. Considering the relative

powerlessness of residents, it is predicted that CBOs are more likely to strive to be

11

accountable upwardly (to the donor organization) than downwardly (to residents). I also
hypothesize that residents will hold the CBO to be accountable for their actions, since it is
CBOs that interact with residents. To provide a better understanding of this specific
development project, I turn to a discussion of the site and the ways in which data on the
project were collected.
Data and methods

Field survey site

I spent one month (from the end of July to the end of August of 2006) in a small
village in the Meherpur District (which is inside the Khulna Division) of Bangladesh.
This area is located in the western part of the country, near India (see Appendix A for a
map of the area). Bangladesh is one of the least developed countries (The UN Office of
the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing
Countries and the Small Island Developing States, n.d.) with a national GDP per capita of
$363 US (18,269 taka). GDP per capita was even lower in the Meherpur district ($335
US) in 2000 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2005). The national adult literacy rates
(ages 15 and older) for women is 33.1% and for men 51.7% (United Nations
Development Programme, 2006), although younger people are being provided with

greater access to education. The state religion is Islam, with nearly 90% of the population

12

reporting that they are Muslim. Bangladesh has hosted various development projects
over the past few decades, ranging from medicine (Ahmed, Adams, Chowdhury, &
Bhuiya, 2000) to agriculture and industrial development (Abedin, 2000).

The government structure of Bangladesh consists of four layers beyond the
national government: Divisions, Districts, Upazilas, and Unions. There are six divisions
in the country, while the Upazilas can be considered analogous to US counties, and
Unions to US townships.

In Bangladesh, villages are located under Unions. A key person in a village is
called “matabbor”. Matabbors are men and typically over 40 years old. There are
matabbors for para (geographical division within a village), shomaji (religious affiliation),
and village levels. They are not elected officials and there is no clear leader among a
group of matabbors in a village. Traditionally, they collectively govern villages, solving
troubles between residents and arranging public activities (Kaida, 2003).

Matabbors can be problematic as pointed out by governmental field officers and
NGO staff (Ando & Uchida, 2003). According to these sources, matabbors are often the
initial contact when a new project is started, as matabbors are expected to be familiar with
village situations and the needs of residents. It is said that matabbors sometimes take

advantage of information obtained through the government and NGO staff, keeping the

13

project for themselves or close friends and family members. However, these gains can
backfire. If others learn about a matabbor’s abuse of power, villagers and other matabbors
may hold a meeting and take action against the individual. It is said that Bangladeshi
villages have a mechanism that checks matabbors’ behavior through collective action as
long as villagers are able to gain information about the abuse of power (Ando & Uchida,
2003)

Project

Field research was conducted in one of the project sites of the Participatory Rural
Development Project Phase 2 (PRDP-2) by the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(J ICA)2. PRDP-2 has been implemented under the cooperation of the Bangladeshi and
Japanese government since June 2005, following PRDP phase 1 that was implemented
from 2000 to 2004.

The aim of the PRDP-2 is to establish the “link model,” which is the mechanism
that connects residents to governmental services along with the needs in rural area. The
project organization chart of PRDP-2 is shown in figure 1. In the link model, village
committees (VCs) are formed which include men and women, and the Union Coordinate

Committees, which are formed at the Union level. The VCs hold village committee

 

2 JICA is a donor organization as well as a project implementing body, which directly
manages PRDP-2.

14

meetings (VCMs) once a month, where VC members and villagers discuss community

and individual needs. Union Coordinate Committee Meetings (UCCMs) are held once a

month, attended by the VC chairmen and the public service providers including the

governmental field officers and NGOs. In the UCCMs, the VC chairmen present what

they discussed in the VCMs, and the field officers announce their schedule of services in

the area. While the VC chairmen can talk about the schedule of governmental services to

the VC members and villagers in the VCMs, government officers can make a plan of

services according to the information that they obtained in the UCCMs. The link model is

the network that enables residents to voice their concern to the government, and enables

the government to provide their services effectively and efficiently.

15

Figure I . The project organization chart of PRDP-2

 

    

Union

 
 

formation &

  
 

Coordinate

  
 

. Resources
Commrttee

  
    
 

Information &
Resources

PRDP-2 includes small scale infrastructure projects (VC schemes). The VC

Services

 

 

 

 

schemes are intended to facilitate the VCs’ activities for improving quality of life in the
villages, and are planned and implemented by the VCs taking a central role. There are
rules regarding implementation of the VC schemes such as processes of planning and
implementation, and project proposals including the budget. The funding of the VC
schemes is carried by the residents and PRDP-2. The VC schemes are typically surfacing
muddy roads, constructing gutters and toilets, and the renovation of public schools.
Notice boards are utilized in PRDP-2 in order to publicize information on

governmental services and PRDP-2 activities, and are set up in each Union and village. In

rural Bangladesh, information is channeled through personal connections, and people in

power can control information flows. The notice boards can prevent such control and

abuse by providing the general public with current and future news concerning various

aspects of the project and the public services provided by the Bangladesh government.

Although many people are illiterate in these villages, most could obtain the information

by asking those people who can read about the notices (Ando & Uchida, 2003).

In the mid-term evaluation of PRDP phase 1, it was indicated that the link model

provided a tool for accountability and responsibility among Bangladeshi govemment field

officers regarding their services (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2003). These

field officers were expected to announce their schedule of services in the UCCMs, and if

they did not follow through, they may be blamed in the next UCCM. Also, since they

listened to the villagers’ needs, not responding to these needs could lead to being censored.

Unfortunately, I did not ask whether residents would blame field officers for problems

with the project.

The VC of the village I studied was formed in June, 2005, with VCMs being held

once a month after that. Four out of five para matabbors in the village joined in the VC,

and the only village matabbor became the VC chairman (VCC). All four teachers in the

primary school participated in the VC, two being para matabbors. The VC submitted the

17

proposal of the VC scheme in January, 2006. That project, which was to install lavatories
in 144 households, was approved. The construction work had been completed by July,
2006. The notice board was set up one month before my research, providing ample time
for village residents to become familiar with its function.

In this study, the actions of VCs are regarded as proxies for the CBOs taking a
role as intermediary organizations connecting villages with the Bangladeshi government
and the project (PRDP-2).

Methods

The field research site was selected considering three factors: the size of the
community, the location, and the term of the project activities. Communities that have
less than 150 households were precluded, due to an absence of dynamic interactions
between VCs and residents. I also wanted a village which was isolated (located five miles
from a major city) and had been involved in a project for at least one year. The village
chosen had an active VC, it was located five miles away from a major city with no direct
public transportation services to the village, and had 184 households and 720 individuals
(Participatory Rural Development Project Phase 2, 2006).

The research was divided into two parts; a questionnaire survey was given to

residents, and interviews were conducted with the VC members, residents, government

18

officials, NGOs and PRDP-2 staff. Given that I do not speak Bengali, and the residents do
not speak English, I used an interpreter who was Bangladeshi, born and raised in
Meherpur Sador.

Questionnaire survey. The household list of a village survey conducted in 2006
by PRDP-2 was obtained, and 98 randomly selected people (female 51 and male 47)
participated in the survey.3 Questions focused on such aspects of the project as who the
residents thought were responsible if the sanitation project failed, what kinds of
information the residents had, and how they had gained this information. Since
approximately 70% of the residents do not have formal education, the survey was
conducted by both myself (at times) and a translator who spoke the native language, and
was able to take notes and fill out the surveys for illiterate respondents. The questionnaire,
which was approved by Michigan State University Institutional Review Board (IRB), is
attached as Appendix B.

Interview survey. The interview survey was conducted with 19 VC members,
eight external organizations’ officials — two Bangladeshi government field officers

(agriculture and veterinary), four Bangladeshi and Japanese staff of PRDP-2, and two

 

3 Random numbers were used (Beyer, 1968).

19

different NGO4 staff who were engaged in the micro credit projects in the village. There
were twenty VC members in the village: 17 were male, and three female. One of male
members had joined one month before this survey was conducted, as another male
member had to leave the VC to work in a foreign country. This new VC member was
excluded from the data due to his short-term tenure in the VC. In order to give a popular
voice to this aspect of the study, interviews with 10 residents were conducted. A variety of
residents was selected for the interview.5
Results

Accountability between the VC and the project

Accountability between the VC and PRDP-2 tended to be upward, with the
PRDP-2 being the group seeking accounts from the VC. PRDP-2 set the rules of the VC
scheme implementation, setting the tone for what the VC members were to discuss in

terms of what VC scheme the village would propose in the VCM. The VC made the VC

scheme application, and submitted it to the UCCM. The minutes and attendance list of the

 

4 One NGO ran a micro credit project for women, and another a micro credit project for
women and a scholarship program for primary school children. Both NGOs operated the
projects in the village separately from PRDP-2.

Interviewees consisted of a female head of family, a day laborer, a woman who
participated in a micro finance project, a male who was the member of a farmers’
cooperative, a male and a female who joined the primary school committee, a business
person, a wife of a VG member, a matabbor who was not selected as a VC member, and
the chairperson of the women’s association.

20

VCM were attached to the VC scheme application so that PRDP-2 could know whether
the proposal reflected the outcome of the VCM. Once the proposal was tentatively
approved, the Scheme Implementation Team (SIT) was formed, which was composed of
Union Parishad members, VCC, VCS, a few VC members, an official from the local
government engineering department (LGED), and PRDP-2 staff. The VC scheme
guideline set by PRDP-2 provided that the SIT was responsible for implementing the VC
scheme.

If PRDP-2 finds something that is opposed to the set rules, or does not fulfill
necessary procedures, it can stop or force alterations to in the project. PRDP-2 can impose
sanctions if it felt that the actions were vicious by nature. The relationship between the
VC and PRDP-2 could be considered legal, since PRDP-2 is outside the control of the VC,
and held within contractual obligations.

How did both parties perceive accountability in this project? Since responsibility
is “a term of very similar and sometimes overlapping meaning” with accountability
(Mulgan, 2003, p. 15), and accountability might not be a familiar word within the village,
the term “responsibility” was used in the interviews and the survey questionnaire. Three
of the four PRDP-2 staff said that the SIT was responsible if the sanitation project failed,

based on the ways in which the rules of the VC scheme were written. According to the

21

rules, SITs are responsible from the planning to implementation of VC schemes; those
parties which are included in the SIT, such as some VC members, Union Parishad
members, an engineer of LGED, and PRDP-2 staff, have collective responsibility, and the
PRDP-2 staff I interviewed recognized this joint responsibility.

Perceptions of responsibility within this project seemed different from other
similar undertakings. The field officers of the Bangladesh government (agriculture and
veterinary) and the NGO staff admitted that they were entirely responsible for their
services. A field officer said that, “as my department gave me proper facilities, I will be
responsible for it if the service fails.” This statement implies that the field officer was an
active participant, and that residents were only receivers of the service. NGO staff in
charge of micro credit and scholarships stated that “it is out of question that our services
are failed... Because if we see our service may be going to fail, we will find another way
to make it success. Then we make it success. So, we never make our service fail.” This
could indicate a sense of control and knowing what should be done. These individuals
seem to carry all the responsibility for the success of the project or services, relating
residents as simply receivers of this work. In Giddens (1984) terms, this could be a barrier
to information sharing, as these individuals may feel that concerns coming from residents

are misguided or uniformed, looking only to themselves or other experts as being able to

22

gauge the success of the project. This is indicative of the principal-agent problem, as
those within the local bureaucracy could use their position to control resources, while
using the bureaucratic structure as a foil against complaints from residents (Kelman &
Hamilton, 1989).

In terms of this specific sanitation project, half of the VC members thought of
themselves as responsible, though the rules provided that the SIT was responsible. In
addition, all VC members felt that the VC members or VCC and VCS were responsible
for the labor management of the project. Again, the project rules provided that the SIT
was responsible". One PRDP-2 staff also thought that the VC was responsible for labor
management, and another answered that both SIT and the VC were responsible for this
aspect of the project. While PRDP-2 staff members gave some responsibility to the VC,
the VC actively took responsibility. This relationship between the VC (residents) and the
external organization (PRDP-2) was clearly different from that of the field officers and
NGO staff. By being actively engaged in the interpretation of their roles within the project,
VC members were creating and maintaining new structural conditions to help enable the

project to move forward, as well as potentially increasing their own standing within the

 

6 According to the VC scheme guideline, “SIT convener and advisor would jointly take
responsibility of the collection of contribution and the management of labor.” A SIT
convener is the representative from a VC, and A SIT advisor is a Union Parishad member.

23

community.

The VC schemes were a precious opportunity for residents to improve their
living environment. Although the VC was not solely responsible for the implementation
of the project, there might be some pressure that the village might not have a VC scheme
in the future if the implementation failed. These structures of responsibility and pressure
could enable the VC to take responsibility actively, which would also lead to constraining
the VC from abusing their power. This is an exemplary example of Giddens’ (1984)
concern with structuration, and how variousnodes within networks reinforce and check
each other in a dialectical manner. According to Giddens, structures provide guidelines
for behaviors, while the behaviors of those within these structures maintain and reinforce
the guidelines. According to some of my observations, VC members, while happy to be in
a position of power, actually felt powerless with regards to some of the procedures
provided by PRDP-2.

Accountability between the VC and the residents

Another important aspect of the accountability within the project was between
the VC and residents. This accountability is downward as the VC was held accountable
by residents for various aspects of the project. PRDP-2 expected the VCS to respond to

residents’ needs and the public interest when they were generating the VC scheme. This

24

means that the VC should be accountable for their decisions and actions to residents.

Even though the proposed project affects the residents’ lives, and it is an
important task for the VC to know which project residents need, none of the VC members
said that they had asked about the residents’ needs. Some of the VC members said that
they would not discuss the VC scheme until it was finalized. This could imply that there
was no chance of rectification by the residents, constraining their actions. Although
residents can attend the VCM when the VC scheme is discussed if they know when it will
be held, there were only a few names of residents on the attendance list for that particular
meeting. This relationship is expected to be “political” within the formal structure of
PRDP-2, as it is expected the VCS would respond to residents’ needs. However, the type
of accountability seemed “professional” in the village; the VC was in a position to know
what was best for the community, and residents needed to follow that decision.

In addition to information pertaining to the project aims, the ways in which it
would be implemented could be important for residents. They are, after all, expected to
bear some cost, and might need to take part in project activities. Most of those who
participated in the sanitation project (97.3%) answered that they knew how much they
should pay for the sanitation before it began. Regarding other information such as what

fund was used for the sanitation project, about 80% of males and 33% of the female

25

respondents answered that they were aware of these plans. Only four (all male) out of 98
(8.5%) survey respondents knew the total budget of the project. This information was
gleaned from either the VC M or through the VCC, not from the announcement board on
which information about the total budget, and how much of the cost each party (J ICA,
residents, etc.) was to bear, was set up in the village for each VC scheme. It should be
noted that this budget was publicized on the board for a few months near the mosque and
the primary school that are located in the central part of the village, so the information
was available. A majority of the respondents (78%), however, said that they were not
interested in this type of information. A resident said “what will we do by knowing that
information?” This could imply that the large picture of the project was out of the
residents’ realm of influence, and their main concern was with their own role and
participation in the project, on which. they seemed to feel they were sufficiently informed.
Also, this residents’ weak interest in knowing information about the project might
indicate the residents’ trust in the VC. If residents were doubtful of abuse of power by the
VC in the sanitation project, they may have been more eager to obtain information about
the project in order to detect the VC’s abuse of power.

Besides the announcement board, a question arose regarding whether the VC

members gave residents enough information about the project. Fifteen of the 16 male VC

26

members said that they told others about the project, which typically meant talking to

friends, relatives and neighbors, and no female members said that they had talked to

others. One VC member said that he gave out information because, “if I tell the villagers

what was talked in the VC meeting, they would try to complete the sanitation

construction,” which was a typical response among VC members. This seems to reflect an

attitude among VC members and providing information to residents in order to make sure

the residents were cooperating with the VC members in the sanitation project. Given their

position between PRDP-2 and residents, this is not surprising, as these individuals have a

vested interest in maintaining a consistent and consensual front within the village.

However, if a project that does not require residents’ contribution such as money and

labor is selected, VC’s motivation to give information to residents might be lower.

An important factor of accountability is that residents recognize their right to call

for an account if something is not to their liking. In order to do this, they should know

who to go to for the account. A majority of respondents (79%) felt that the VC members

were responsible for the project, whereas 9% thought it was the residents that should be

held accountable, 5% said J ICA and 3% looked to the village leader (VCC). To reiterate,

the rule devised by PRDP-2 specifically stated that the SIT was responsible for the project.

Residents could go to the VC members to ask questions, as these individuals could be

27

contacted directly.

Looking more closely at the VC members, half felt that they themselves were
responsible for the project, while four looked to external organizations (e.g., government,
project staff). Three of the 18 said that responsibility was controlled by the VCC and/or
VCS, one said it was the residents, and one answered that both the VC and external
organizations were ultimately accountable. Comparing these findings to those of the
survey in which 79% of the respondents thought that the VC members were responsible,
it can be argued that there was a gap of perceived accountability between the residents
and the VC members. While the VC does not bear all responsibility of the project
according to formal rules, residents tended to see this group in that way. This may be due
to the work that the residents could see in the village, such as collecting money from the
residents and labor management, which was done by the VC.

Accountability between the VC members

While the VC is accountable in both an upward and downward direction in
relation to the sanitation project’s implementation, it has to maintain transparency in
information-sharing and decision-making in order to work in a collaborative manner.
Decision-making about VC activities seemed to concentrate on the VCC and VCS.

Concerning the project proposal, there was no one who answered being involved except

28

these individuals. Concerning labor management, one VC member, in addition to the

VCC and VC S, discussed being involved in any way. However, the decision-making

procedures seemed to be transparent within the VC. The VCC talked about the

decision-making procedure of the VC scheme, noting that “first, I and VCS meet and talk

about the project. After we make a decision, I inform the other VC members that we are

going to take this kind of project, so whether you agree with us or not. Then they express

their opinion, and then, we go for it.” All VC members said that all information was

shared among the VC members.

The VCC and VCS also played a major role in project activities; more than 80%

of the residents who participated in the sanitation project said that they obtained the cost

of participation directly from the VCC or VCS. The VC members said that the VCC and

VC S collected money from the residents. When I asked the VCC why other members did

not help him, he answered:

They can not give us a time, they are all busy with their work. They used to say

that “we all give you responsibility to two of you (VCC and VCS), and it is your

duty. We would not have any headache about this. So, do your duty, and we are

not asking you any question for coming situation. We are not going to interrupt

your matters. We just attend the meeting.”

29

This could represent relatively trustful relationships between VCC and VCS, and other

VC members. However, the VCC and VCS consulted with other VC members about their

decision, as mentioned above, pulling down possible barriers to implementation of the

project if something went wrong. It was indicated that the characteristics of the VC might

influence this decision-making procedure and information-sharing. Asked about the

qualifications for becoming a VC member, the VCC answered:

I think there are some qualifications to become a VC member. They must be

literate, should spend their time for community, and should be honest. Another

thing is that they should have money. If a person has these four things, that person

might be a member.

When asked why the VC members have to have money, he answered:

In our village, many people are poor. When we do a project, some villagers are

difficult to pay. In this case, those who have lots of money can give their money

at that time, and we can do the project. We are not going to lose the project. After

the project begins, if those who could not pay are able to pay, they can pay us in a

long term. For this reason, the (VC) members must have money. They can help

other people.

This statement implied that the VC members had joint-responsibility in the financial

30

matter of the sanitation project. The VCC said there were 10 to 15 residents who could

not pay 300 taka by the due date. It may be difficult for a small number of people to bear

the financial burden on behalf of poor people. The VCC and VCS might need the VC

members to take responsibility together by involving them in the decision-making

processes. In doing so, the VCC and VCS could make sure that other members would

cooperate if something happened. This can also be seen as a structural barrier to some

people, as membership into the VC — a committee with at least some power over the

project — would not be open to everyone. White (1992) has argued that such exclusionary

practices typically lead to decisions which are most beneficial to those already in power.

This may lead to the need for VC members to check the decision-making of the VCC and

VCS’s. One of the main concerns is being able to support these decisions, as the whole

VC was regarded as accountable for the project by the residents. These other VC

members could be blamed if the decisions and actions of their leaders failed.

There did seem to be some horizontal accountability between the VCC, VCS,

and other VC members. Decisions within the organization could affect different

individuals who would need the ability to rectify problems when consulted. In this kind of

situation, the idea of joint responsibility among the VC members could be perceived by

residents as promoting transparency in information-sharing and decision-making. These

31

constrained the leading members from abusing their power, as well as the other VC
members from abandoning their responsibilities. The mattabors’ monopoly on
information that has been criticized by governmental field officers and NGO staff was not
seen in this village, which is not surprising given the relative trustworthiness between the
mattabors and residents. It could be said that the transparency of decision-making and
information within the VC was maintained at this point. This could be one major step in
becoming a sustainable CBO.
Conclusion

Development projects within developing countries and villages are meant to
provide new opportunities to residents, and while the intentions of these projects may be
appropriate, things can go wrong. This study shows that when asked about accountability,
members of the project team often felt themselves responsible, though some also felt that
others above and/or below them should share the blame. The upward accountability
mechanisms from the VC to PRDP-2 had been formalized, though this did not stop some
members from looking to others for help. However, this upward accountability could
place constraints on the VC, in that they had to succeed in the sanitation project. There
might also be pressure of residents on the VC to succeed in the sanitation project’s

implementation. These structures enabled the VC to strive to fulfill their duty, and to take

32

responsibility other than that prescribed in the rules such as labor management.

The contrary was found, regarding the relationship between the VC and residents.

While the VC members provided residents with minimum information about the project

implementation, such as the cost for participation, they did not ask residents what project

was needed. As predicted, the downward accountability mechanisms from the VC to

residents seemed to be weaker than the upward one from the VC to PRDP-2.

In addition, none of the VC members said that they involved residents in

decision-making processes. In the framework of PRDP-2, the VC was expected to

represent residents’ needs in the VC scheme, and thus, the accountability mechanisms

between the VC and residents should be “political.” This should be qualified, however, as

survey results and interviews with residents seemed to show that the relationship was

actually closer to a professional mechanism of accountability, in the sense that the VC

perceived themselves as capable of deciding what the village needed. If this was felt to be

problematic, it could be rectified by promoting the residents to attend the VCM in which

selection of the VC scheme was discussed. This could also strengthen the downward

accountability that is required for residents’ empowerment.

Village residents, as predicted, looked mostly to the VC for responsibility of the

project, whereas some VC members felt other parties, such as the external organizations

33

and residents, were responsible. This difference in expectations of accountability point to

a gap between the residents and the VC members, which could lead to problems if the

project was to fail. Given that at least some VC members thought that the external

organizations were responsible for the project, while the residents saw the VC as

responsible, calls for accountability within the village could bring about conflict as VC

members may refuse to be held accountable (Schonbach, 1990).

The village that I studied, at least at this point, seems to have no major problems,

even though the possibility exists for misunderstandings to emerge. This is based on the

trust I observed within the village toward VC members, which means the problems

pointed to above have not yet arisen. This could be due, at least in part, to good

communication within the village, though not through the formal community-based

channels, such as the notice board. Instead, good communication, in this sense, refers to

informal daily contact between and among residents and VC members. The importance

and role of formal community-based channels of communication needs to be explored

further in future studies that take place in other places that are concerned with questions

of accountability.

34

Appendix A. Map of Meherpur

 

l l
88°40' 88°50' E
KUSHTIA

-- I
J . #61696
‘ if". 5.
(:33 «- =

West Bengal
_ 23. (INDIA)
55' N

     
     
   

23
CHUADANGA 45-

 

  

CHUADANGA

  
  

 

 

 

 

 

_ 23°
35'
MEHERPUR DISTRICT
4 o 4 8 km
88:35‘ 88:45’ \

 

35

Appendix B. Survey questionnaire

10.

ll.

12.

13.

. Are you familiar with the Village Committee? (Yes/No)

If yes, what is the task of the Village Committee?

 

Have you attended the Village Committee Meetings? (Yes/No)

Why or why not?

 

Are you familiar with the Union Coordinating Committee and its meetings?
(Yes/No)

Were you aware of the meeting that focused on selecting the Village Committee
members? (Yes/No)

Did you attend it? (Yes/No)

Do you know what fund was used for the sanitation project? (Yes/No)

If yes, where did the fund come from?

 

If yes, how did you learn about it? (attend the Village Committee Meeting/from the
Village Committee members/from the residents/from the notice board/no
information/others)

If you answered “fiom the Village Committee members” or “from the residents”,
that person is: (the same Gusti member/the same Para member/the Para
Matabbor/the Gram Matabbor). Who is it?

 

Did you join the sanitation project? (Yes/No)

If yes, did you know how much you should pay for the sanitation beforehand?
(Yes/No)

36

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23

24.

25.

If yes, how did you learn about the payment? (attend the Village Committee
Meeting/from the Village Committee members/ from the residents/from the notice
board/no information/others)

If you answered “from the Village Committee members” or “from the residents”,
that person is: (the same Gusti member/the same Para member/the Para
Matabbor/the Gram Matabbor). Who is it?

 

Do you know the total budget of the sanitation project? (Yes/No)

If yes, where did you get that information? (attend the Village Committee Meeting/
from the Village Committee members/ from the residents/ from the notice board/no

information/others)

If you answered “from the Village Committee members” or “fiom the residents”,
that person is: (the same Gusti member/the same Para member/the Para
Matabbor/the Gram Matabbor). Who is it?

 

What information would you like to know about the sanitation project? (the total
budget /the accounts /the work schedule /others I

Do you think you had a chance to give your opinion about what project this village
needed? (Yes/No)

If yes, how? (Directly in the Village Committee meeting/through the Village
Committee members/through the residents/other)

If you answered “through the Village Committee members” or “through the
residents”, that person is: (the same Gusti member/the same Para member/the Para
Matabbor/the Gram Matabbor). Who is it?

 

. Did you notice the notice board? (Yes/No)

Do you know what information is on it? (Yes/No)

Do you know the government services that are offered by the Health Department?

37

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

(Yes/No)?

Have you utilized them? (Yes/No)

 

If yes, how did you know about them?

Do you know the government services that are offered by the Agriculture
Department? (Yes/No)

Have you utilized them? (Yes/No)

If yes, how did you know about them?

 

Do you know the government services that are offered by the Livestock
Department? (Yes/No)

Have you utilized them? (Yes/No)

If yes, how did you know about them?

 

If the sanitation project fails, who is responsible for it? (the village leader/the
Village Committee members/the Scheme Implementation Team (SIT)/all the
residents/the local govemment/JICA/others)

If collecting the sanitation cost from the residents fails, who is responsible for it?
(the village leader/the Village Committee members/ the Scheme Implementation
Team (SIT) /all the residents/the local govemment/JICA/others)

Do you think the Village Committee works for the whole community or only for
certain people? (whole community/only certain people/both/none/don’t know)

Are you satisfied with the Village Committee? (very satisfied/somewhat
satisfied/neither satisfied nor dissatisfied/somewhat dissatisfied/very

dissatisfied/don’t know)

Why or why not?

 

38

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

Do you think this village has changed since the Village Committee was established?
(very changed/somewhat changed/unchanged/don’t know)

If you answered, “very or somewhat changed”, have the changes been positive,
negative, or they don’t really matter? (better/worse/doesn’t matter/don’t know)

Age

Sex (male/female)

Gusti

 

Para

 

How many years of the formal education do you have?

 

What is the main source of your household income?

 

How much is the last year’s annual income?

 

What organizations are you involved with in this village?

 

39

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