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LIBRARY
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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled

PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN
EASTERN COSTA RICAN WATERSHEDS:
INSTITUTIONS, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

AND DEMAND

presented by

Daniel Vicente Ortega-Pacheco

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for the

M. S. degree in Agricultural Economics

 

 

 

 

”OZ/L

Major Professor’s Signature

12/12/2007

 

Date

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PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN EASTERN COSTA RICAN
WATERSHEDS: INSTITUTIONS, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND DEMAND

BY

Daniel Vicente Ortega-Pacheco

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTERS IN SCIENCE

Department of Agricultural Economics

2007

ABSTRACT

PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN EASTERN COSTA RICAN
WATERSHEDS: LOCAL MARKETS INSTITUTIONS, PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION AND DEMAND

By

Daniel Vicente Ortega-Pacheco

Proper management of watersheds is essential for the protection of natural
resources, the environment, ecosystems and the socio-economic health of regions. The
present work examines the viability of using local payments for watershed services as an
incentive-based instrument for protecting and managing drinking water sources in eastern
Costa Rica. Specifically, this thesis addresses the need for analyses of institutional impact
of Payment for Environmental Services (PES) programs, as well as the need for empirical
research on demand for and public participation in PBS programs. Research methods
include an institutional analysis of local-scale PES, household surveys, and econometric
analysis of households’ willingness to participate in PBS governance and to pay for PBS
programs. The household survey was implemented in July 2006 using face-to-face
interviews that achieved an 84% response rate. The empirical results indicate that there is
significant demand for the proposed PES program across all income segments of the
communities studied. The results also identify factors within households that are related
to individual’s willingness to participate in program administration and willingness to
finance payments to protect local drinking water sources in surrounding micro-
watersheds. Knowledge gained from this study can aid decision-makers in developing

watershed-scale, community—based and institutionally-sound PES programs.

DEDICATION

Ad maiorem dei gloriam

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To my family, my loving fiance'e Paula, and those close friends who supported
this effort.

To whom I am much in debt for his continuous guidance, support and
understanding, Frank Lupi, my major professor. To my guidance committee, Professors
Michael Kaplowitz and A. Allan Schmid for their collegiality and for their patient,
thoughtful review of several iterations of this work.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the generous support of EARTH University,
Costa Rica; Michigan State University — WATER Project; and the Elton R. Smith
Endowment in Food and Agricultural Policy at Michigan State University. I also thank
Professors Sandra Batie and Erick Crawford as well as Oscar Arreola and Delanie Kellon

for their contributions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ VII
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... VIII
INTRODUCTION..- - - - - -- -- - _ l
ESSAY 1:

PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES AND OTHER
INSTITUTIONS FOR PROTECTING DRINKING WATER IN EASTERN

 

 

COSTA RICA .......... _ - __ - -_ - - - -- . ............. - .3
1.1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 3
1.2. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS/SITUATION-STRUCTURE-
PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK ....................................................................... 6
1.3. THE SITUATION .................................................................................................. 7
1.3.1. Case Study Communities ........................................................................ 8
1.3.2. Rural Drinking Water Service ............................................................... 11
1.3.3. Interdependencies ................................................................................. 13
1.4. STRUCTURE ....................................................................................................... 14
1.4.1. Local Payment for Environmental Services [PES] ............................... 16
1.4.2. New National Water Tax ...................................................................... 17
1.5. PERFORMANCE ................................................................................................ 18
1.5.1. Performance Predictions ....................................................................... 19
1.5.2. Performance Discussion ........................................................................ 20
1.6. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 27
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 29
ESSAY 2:
PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGEMENT OF
PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES. - - - 33
2.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 33
2.1.1. Watershed protection and management ................................................ 33
2.1.2. Water quality and management in Costa Rica ...................................... 35
2.1.3. Costa Rica’s System of Payment for Watershed Services .................... 36
2.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................................... 37
2.2.1. Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) ............ 37
2.2.2. Determinants of Participation ............................................................... 38
2.3. STUDY SITE, SURVEY, DATA, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS ................. 40
2.3.1. Study Site .............................................................................................. 4O

2.3.2. Survey Methods .................................................................................... 42

 

 

 

 

2.3.3. Summary Statistics ................................................................................ 43
2.4. PARTICIPATION MODEL ................................................................................. 45
2.4.1. Model estimation and results ................................................................ 48
2.4.2. Marginal Effects .................................................................................... 50
2.5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ............................................ 51
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 54
ESSAY 3
PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: ESTIMATING
DEMAND WITHIN A TROPICAL WATERSHED ...... - - - - - - -59
3.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 59
3.1.1. Costa Rican Watersheds’ Threats ......................................................... 59
3.1.2. Financing Conservation & Payment for Environmental Services
(PES) ..................................................................................................... 60
3.1.3. PES: harnessing demand ....................................................................... 62
3.2. WATERSHED SERVICES DEMAND ............................................................... 64
3.2.1. Understanding the science of watershed services ................................. 65
3.2.2. Nonmarket environmental services values & PES ............................... 66
3.2.3. Measuring nonmarket values: The Contingent Valuation Method
(CVM) .................................................................................................. 68
3.2.4. CVM: Design Considerations ............................................................... 69
3.3. STUDY SITE, SURVEY, DATA, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS ................. 71
3.3.1. Study Site .............................................................................................. 71
3.3.2. Survey Methods .................................................................................... 73
3.3.3. Summary Statistics ................................................................................ 74
3.4. CVM MODEL ...................................................................................................... 74
3.4.1. Variables & Hypothesis ........................................................................ 75
3.4.2. Model significance, parameters estimates and computed marginal
effects .................................................................................................... 76
3.4.3. Analysis of Willingness To Pay [WTP] ................................................ 77
3.5. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................. 80
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 82
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS -- - -- - - - ...... - 88
APPENDICES-.-.. -- ......... - - - -- ......... 92
APPENDIX A. CAIRO-FRANCIA & MILANO COMMUNITIES. ........................... 94
APPENDIX B. NON-RESPONSE-APPOINTMENT SHEET ..................................... 96
APPENDIX C. DISPOSITION CODE SHEET ............................................................ 98
APPENDIX D. WATERSHED MAP ......................................................................... 100
APPENDIX E. HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE ENGLISH/SPANISH
VERSION ........................................................................................................... 102

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Characteristics of two rural communities’ water service system in Eastern
Costa Rica ........................................................................................................... 10

Table 1.2. Institutional Characteristics of Two Policy Instruments (Alternative Structures)15

Table 1.3. Estimated revenues (millions of colones per month) from National Water Tax

and Local PBS programs in Case Study Sites (IUSD = 510 colones). .............. 23
Table 2.1. Reported communities’ aqueducts ...................................................................... 42
Table 2.2 Variables definitions and descriptive statistics .................................................... 45

Table 2.3. Variables’ hypothesized effects on participation based on previous research
studies ................................................................................................................. 47

Table 2.4. Household Participation First Stage Model Estimated Results (PREVOTE) ..... 48

Table 2.5. Household Participation Second Stage Model Estimated Results ...................... 49
Table 3.1. Characteristics of the Two Community Aqueducts ............................................ 72
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics for the variables (N=286) ................................................. 74
Table 3.3. Single probit model estimates and statistics ....................................................... 77

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Reventazon River Watershed and Eastern Costa Rican Case Study Sites. ......... 8
Figure 3.1. Mean WTP and Probability of Yes Vote at Different Monthly Income Levels 78
Figure A. 1. Close up to Cairo-Francia & Milano communities .......................................... 94

Figure D. I. Watershed Map of Survey. ............................................................................. 100

viii

INTRODUCTION

Policy instruments can be designed to modify the incentives faced by resource
managers in a way that encourages sustainable management and conservation. Incentive-
based instruments such as programs for Payment for Environmental Services [PES] are
one case of conservation policy. This thesis work presents a systematic analysis of the
viability for using local PES program in eastern Costa Rican watersheds. For so doing,
we will look closely to local institutions, public participation and demand.

The literature has identified several critical elements that need to be addressed with
regard to PBS program (see FAO 2004; Pagiola, Bishop, and Landell-Mills 2002; Pagiola
2006; Postel and Thompson 2005). In particular, investigators working on various types
of conservation policies have stressed the need for empirical research on the potential for
ecosystem-based, collective and locally-financed institutional arrangements such as PES
programs (see Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Pagiola 2002; Postel and Thompson 2005; 2005;
Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2002). Watershed-based PES programs are an alternative policy
tool offering a promising means for addressing resource use conflicts in eastern Costa
Rican watersheds and for securing the provision of drinking water. Knowledge generated
from this study provides insights into stakeholders’ willingness to support participatory,
self-financing and institutionally sound watershed management in Costa Rica and
elsewhere.

The goal of this thesis is to investigate local institutions, public participation and
demand for PBS programs to protected drinking water sources in eastern Costa Rican

watersheds. The three main objectives are as follows:

I. To examine the institutional impact of watershed—based, collective, and
locally-financed PES programs, through the lens of the institutional
economics Situation, Structure and Performance [SSP] Framework

11. To identify, through statistical analysis, the factors influencing participation
in community-based management of PBS

111. To identify and quantify, using the Contingent Valuation [CV] Method, the
demand for a local PES watershed protection program of the Costa Rican

communities of Cairo-Francia and Milano.

To accomplish these objectives, this thesis presents three essays analyzing local
institutions, public participation and demand, if any, for a program to protect headwaters
and their associated ecosystem services. The discussion throughout this text considers
land uses taking place under private ownership and water delivered downstream from
these land uses via community-owned and administered rural water aqueducts.

Essay 1 discusses alternative institutional structures for provision of drinking water in
eastern Costa Rica. Essay 2 analyzes certain respondents’ characteristics affecting
willingness to participate in the administration of a local PES program to protect drinking
water sources. A contingent valuation exercise is presented in Essay 3, along with
estimation of willingness to pay for the PES program. Conclusions and a summary make
up the ending of this thesis. Finally, the appendix contains copies of the survey
questionnaire in English and Spanish, other reference material used during the survey

implementation, and diagrams and maps of the study’s watersheds.

ESSAY 1:
PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS
FOR PROTECTING DRINKING WATER IN EASTERN COSTA RICA

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Communities across the globe increasingly confront environmental and natural
resource management decisions that require expenditures to protect and conserve
ecosystems. These decisions typically require consideration of bio—physical, political,
economic, and other factors. Institutional economic thinking and analyses provide a
framework for assessing and understanding the relative benefits of alternative institutions
for managing environmental and natural resources. Using an institutional economic
analysis, this chapter provides an evaluation of two alternative policy instruments - a
local payment for environmental services scheme and a national watershed conservation
tax - for protecting drinking water in eastern Costa Rica.

Costa Rica has abundant natural resources (Auty 2001). However, Costa Rica
continues to face high rates of deforestation (Chomitz et al. 1998; FONAFIFO 2000;
World Bank 2000), land cover change for agriculture and pasture, and adverse impacts to
Costa Rica’s water services (Kaimowitz 2000; Kaimowitz 2004). Threats to Costa Rica’s
potable water sector include: urban development; inadequate water supply system
maintenance; high treatment costs due to surface water pollution; lack of rural water
quality monitoring; nitrate contamination; and the absence of watershed and aquifer
protection (Espinoza et al. 2003; Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2002). However, groundwater

sources (including natural springs) in many places in Costa Rica are of high quality and

do not require much, if any, treatment and represent an “important source of potable and
industrial water” (Calvo, 1990).

Because of its location in the tropics, Costa Rica does not typically face water
quantity shortages. However, as already mentioned, water quality and distribution
problems do pose challenges to Costa Rica’s communities and local governments. Water
quality scarcity in Costa Rica has also been attributed to uneven water service
distribution and deficient water treatment (Calvo 1990). For example, in 2005 only 82%
of the Costa Rican population had access to a drinking water supply system and
approximately 30% of the water provided by Costa Rican municipalities and
communities failed to fully meet international standards of quality (Astorga 2005). The
vast majority of the Costa Rican population (80%) gets drinking water from rural
aqueduct systems where it has been reported that about half of those drinking water
supplies fail to meet international health standards (Espinoza et al. 2003). This situation
in Costa Rica may worsen in light of growing drinking water demands (FAO 2000) and
increasing financial constraints in the municipal water sectors (see Astorga 2005; AyA
and OPS/OMS 2002; Espinoza et al. 2003).

In response to these and other threats, Costa Rica has created environmental policies
aimed at managing natural resource use, conflicts, and degradation in watersheds and
other ecosystems. These policies range from stringent regulations (e.g., prohibitions) to
incentive-based institutions (e.g., payment for carbon sequestration schemes). However,
these policies have been implemented mostly at a national level in a top-down fashion
(see Steinberg 2001; Steinberg 2003). Until recently, there have been few attempts to

include local communities in conservation decisions (Silva 2003; Steinberg 2003). One

key exception has been in the area of Costa Rica’s water law which has moved towards
mandating: a) strong focus on the watershed as the unit of management, and b) active
community involvement in decisionmaking (see Astorga 2005; MINAE 2005).

Increasing concern in Costa Rica for the social and environmental costs of ecosystem
harm from unregulated watershed activity prompted policymakers to consider watershed-
based and community-oriented regulation and laws. However, successful ecosystem
management for protecting, maintaining, and restoring ecosystem services requires
planning that recognizes ecosystem, temporal and social dynamics (Cumming et al.
2006). Furthermore, local community support appears to be a requisite and key element
for sustainable development outcomes (Sathaye et al. 2007). As a result, there are
questions about the appropriateness and effectiveness of Costa Rica’s watershed
protection scheme. This chapter uses an institutional economic framework to evaluate
alternative policy instruments for the protection of drinking water sources for two rural

communities in eastern Costa Rica.

To organize our analysis, we use the Situation, Structure and Performance (SSP)
framework first articulated by Schmid in 1978 (Schmid 1987). Doing so allows us to
specify relationships, describe the attributes of the goods and services that create human
independencies (situation), explore the characteristics of the alternative institutional
arrangements (structures), and evaluate the alternatives’ relative efficacy (performance)
(see also Boerrke 2001). After discussing elements of the institutional economics
approach and the SPP framework, the chapter focuses on the case study of protecting

drinking water sources in eastern Costa Rica. We describe two communities in eastern

Costa Rica and their drinking water systems, the situation. Next, we present and describe
alternative institutional programs for protecting the headwaters (sources) of these
communities’ drinking water, the structure. The chapter then lays out a series of
predictions concerning the operation for the alternative structures in the two
communities, the performance. These predications will be evaluated using evidence from
field research, previous experience, and other data. The chapter concludes by identifying

key lessons for policy makers and possible avenues for future research.

1.2. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS/SITUATION-STRUCTURE-
PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK

Institutions structure incentives, shape people’s beliefs and preferences, and introduce
predictability to human interaction (Schmid 2004). As such, human institutions (i.e.,
ways of organizing activities) may affect the resilience of the environment and
environmental services (Dietz et al. 2003), and they may contribute to biodiversity loss
(Barbier et al. 1994; Wells 1998). Institutions and resource protection may be evaluated
and compared in contexts that take account of institutional performance and relationships
(Wells 1998). Focusing on institutions can help policymakers evaluate alternative
arrangements for natural resource protection and facilitate community participation in
natural resource management (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Local payments for the
provision of environmental services (PBS) and a new nationwide ecosystem protection
tax are examples of two institutional arrangements that may help achieve water source
protection goals in eastern Costa Rica. This chapter uses institutional impact analysis to
evaluate the potential of a local payment for environmental services scheme and a

national watershed protection tax.

The Situation, Structure and Performance (SSP) framework (Schmid 1987) allows for
an analytical institutional impact assessment. That is, it provides an organizing
framework for predicting and comparing alternative institutions in terms of substantive
performance measures (e.g., economic outcomes and distributions). The SSP framework
may help answer questions about who is impacted and how they are impacted. Starting
with the observation of “variables” in their context (i.e., the situation), which are taken
as given, interdependencies arising from characteristics of the “good” and actors involved
in “transactions” are identified. These transactions, the interplay of individuals and their
contexts including ever-present costs, are the unit of observation. Institutional impact
analysis of an established situation (e.g., the provision of drinking water) under the SSP
framework allows for comparing institutional alternatives (i.e., structures) that may
control and impact interdependencies related to the good(s) and individuals. That is, by
holding the “situation” constant, alternative “structures” may be evaluated in order to
predict relative “performance.” Performance, in this context, is a relative measure
associated with a given set of social goals (e.g., efficiency, equity). Predicted
performance may be based on notions of social goals (benefits) based upon theory, data
collected from interested parties, or lessons learned from cases with similar situations and
structures. Evaluating presumed or actual performance allows for the articulation of
conclusions and/or insights concerning the alternative structures’ likelihood of achieving

targeted social goals.

1.3. THE SITUATION

The case study examines land use and watershed protection as they relate to the

provision of drinking water in two sets of neighboring rural communities in eastern Costa

Rica. Like many rural areas in Costa Rica and elsewhere in Latin America, these areas
face growing resource development conflicts and environmental degradation. In addition
to supporting the production of market goods (e.g., agricultural commodities and timber),
rural land use change may also result in unintended environmental effects (e.g., alteration
in hydrological cycle, erosion) with potentially adverse impacts on the provision of
environmental services (e.g., drinking water). As a result, national governments and local

communities are considering alternatives approaches to water source protection.

' .._- 7, . ;. ..._..
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Figure 1.1. Reventazon River Watershed and Eastern Costa Rican Case Study Sites.

1.3.1. Case Study Communities

This case study focuses on six communities in Siquirres (canton), Limon (province) in
eastern Costa Rica--Milano, Cairo-Francia, Herediana, La Florida, La Alegria, and
Portén Iberia. The six communities are about 65 miles from the capital city, San José in
the Atlantic coastal plain. The case study communities are in the Reventazén River

watershed - the largest watershed in eastern Costa Rica (see Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1).

The Reventazon watershed has among the highest rates of forest fragmentation in Costa
Rica with less than half of forest cover intact. As a result, adverse water quality and
quantity impacts are to be expected (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2002). Tributaries and
subwatersheds of the Reventazon supply drinking water to local communities in the
eastern slope including the study sites. This region supports large-scale banana and
pineapple production/processing activities as well as other agricultural practices.
Concerns have been raised in eastern Costa Rica about possible risks to people from
agricultural practices especially pesticide contamination in surface waters (Castillo et al.
2005) with special concern in those areas with crops such as banana (Ballestero and
Reyes 2006) and pineapple (Castillo et al. 1997).

Given their geographical distribution and organizational characteristics, the case
study communities were grouped together into two clusters. Each cluster shares
subwatersheds and drinking water sources, faces similar land tenure and use, and uses
similar water distribution systems. Therefore, we will refer to the “South watershed”
(case 1) as the cluster of the communities of La Alegria, Portén Iberia, La Florida, and
Herediana and to the “North watershed” (case 2) as the cluster of the communities of
Milano and Cairo-Francia (see Table 1.1). These clusters of communities get their
household drinking water using rural aqueduct systems that collect potable water from
upstream water sources (i.e., springs) and distribute the drinking water via a collectively
operated system of pipes and storage tanks. The two clusters of communities have

approximately 4,500 households serviced by their rural aqueduct systems.

Table 1.1. Characteristics of two rural communities’ water service system in

Eastern Costa Rica

 

Characteristics

Case 1: South watershed

Case 2: North watershed

 

Village names

Water aqueduct
committee

Water spring
location

Dinking water
distribution

Aqueduct

Water users’
income sources

Principle
land uses

Water supply
Land owners

La Alegria, Portén Iberia, La Florida, and
Herediana

ASADA of La Herediana
0 Executive board of members elected
by the community.
0 Hired manager administers the water
service system.

0 Within a small area (<2 hectares)
owned by the community
0 Located at Turrialba Volcano’s
hillsides
o Surrounded by many different land
uses.
Joint service for all villages and their
neighborhoods in region.

0 Extends from communities ‘near’
source to other communities within 4-
5 miles range

0 Slope differential of about 140 m.

May not be directly linked to agricultural
activities in land nearby the water
sources

Forests and agriculture

Many owners live in the area:

0 Occupy small/medium parcels near
water sources.

0 Have some semi-intensive agriculture
or forestry activities

0 For some, there may be ambiguity in
the land owner of record

Some owners do not live in area and:

0 Own relatively large parcels for part-
time residences/ranches and large-
scale forest plantations

Cairo-Francia and Milano

Two independent CAARS
- Board of directors elected by the
community
0 Head of the board volunteers to
manage water service system.

0 Two springs at the east margin of San
Jose — Limon highway.
0 One spring in forest owned by a
company with tax-free status
0 One spring in farm adjacent to large
scale pineapple operation.
Independent service systems. One for
each village-Cairo—Francia & Milano.

0 Independent aqueducts are no longer
than 3-4 miles
0 Slope differential of < 17 m

Mostly linked to agricultural and
processing activities in land nearby the
water sources

Factor-intensive and large scale
pineapple production and u‘opical fruit
processing

Most owners

0 Live outside the area

0 Own large parcels

0 Have factor-intensive pineapple
plantations presumably vertically
integrated to a fruit processor/exporter
of banana, pineapple and mango
products

 

10

As Table 1.1 illustrates, the two clusters of communities share many characteristics
but have some noteworthy differences. The South watershed has a rural aqueduct system
that is managed by a full-time manager employed by the ASADA, has its water sources
surrounded by a large number of land owners and land uses, and operates an aqueduct
system over a large, steep area in multiple communities. In contrast, the North watershed
manages its rural aqueducts systems with volunteers, has its water sources near the
highway on large agricultural (monoculture) landowners’ parcels, and operates separate
smaller and less steep aqueduct systems. In both clusters, North and South, available
household data suggest that the average monthly household income appears to be on par
with the national average household income (i.e., 140,000 colones) and slightly lower
than household incomes in urbanized and metropolitan areas of Costa Rica’s Central

Valley.

1.3.2. Rural Drinking Water Service

As mentioned, the North and South watersheds each operate their own collective rural
aqueduct systems. Local administration and financing of such drinking water systems is
common in rural Costa Rica. Community members actively engage in their drinking
water system activities for their mutual benefit. Such activities include water aqueduct
construction, setting local policies, volunteering on community committees/boards,
voting in local elections, helping to collect water use payments from neighbors, etc.
There are community-elected executive boards of the Water Aqueduct Committees
(CAARS, a Spanish acronym) or Water Aqueduct Associations (ASADAS, a Spanish
acronym). CAARS/ASADAS are in regular contact with the Costa Rican National

Aqueducts and Sewage Agency (AyA), Public Utilities Regulating Authority (ARESEP),

ll

and units of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) (e.g., National Forestry
Financing Fund (FONAFIFO)). These agencies help with technical and environmental
issues, regulatory considerations, and sometimes assessments of financial impacts of
policy changes. CAARS/ASADAS were initially organized during the construction phase
of the rural aqueduct systems to administer, operate and maintain the drinking water
supply (Espinoza et al. 2003). The principle difference between ASADAS and CAARS is
that the former have been authorized by AyA using service distribution agreements.

In our two clusters of communities, ASADAS managers or CAARS presidents are
involved in the day-to-day operations of the drinking water system, and they work closely
with field assistants. In the case of ASADA in the South watershed, the elected
community water board hired a full-time water service administrator. In the CAARS in
the North watershed, the community elects a community water board and expects the
president of that board to manage their water system. In both instances, field assistants
perform the maintenance tasks on the aqueduct systems as well as implement water
service disconnections (cut-offs) (e.g., for payment failure) and (re)connections of water
service. The ASADAS and CAARS also perform monitoring and administrative
activities, including water bill collection.

Revenue from the water bills are the primary funding source for supporting the
operation and maintenance of the local drinking water aqueduct systems. The households
in the study area that receive drinking water from the aqueduct systems are charged a
fixed or preset monthly water bill ( z 1000 colones / USDS 2 per month ) and their
consumption is not metered. These fees are reported to be much less than those fees

charges to urban water users. Some community members are selected based on their

12

social standing in the community and recruited and trained to collect the monthly water

charges from their neighbors.

1.3.3. Interdependencies

Three main interdependencies seem to arise from characteristics of drinking water and
the actors involved in drinking water transactions in eastern Costa Rica: 1) potential
incompatible use of the land adversely impacting water quality, 2) pricing issues
associated with the provision of potable water where the marginal cost of additional users
in the system may be very low, and 3) lack of information concerning transaction costs.
A complete articulation of the incompatible use of the land in the watershed is outside the
scope of this chapter. However, the incompatible or alternative use of lands at the
headwaters or sources of the clusters’ drinking water systems will be addressed. Suffice
to say, the interdependencies that arise from the incompatible land uses are linked to
questions of factor ownership. Solutions to the issue of incompatible use of the land, once
factor ownership is given, would depend essentially on whether the continued or
proposed use of the land adds more to the landowners’ income than it subtracts from the
water users’. Consequently, landowners may be willing to receive payments to
discontinue a particular land use or adopt certain practices to protect water sources and
secure the provision of the service.

Second, while drinking water is not a nonrival good (e.g., household A cannot drink
the water consumed by household B), once an aqueduct system is built, assuming
adequate water supplies, the marginal cost of adding an additional user to the system is
virtually zero. There is also a certain degree of jointness of consumption of water quality

(i.e., in an aqueduct system everyone must use some given quality). Constructing an

13

aqueduct and altering the quality of water at an aqueduct source are both characterized by
having potentially large fixed costs and almost no marginal costs for adding another user.
Hence, the pricing for drinking water must address sharing the relatively large fixed costs
associated with the construction and management of the drinking water system across
water users.

Thirdly, incomplete information about the protection of drinking water quality may
complicate increased provision of drinking water supplies as well as affect transaction
costs. Although it is possible for rural Water Aqueduct Committees to monitor the
outcomes of their water service by analyzing water quality through laboratory tests,
determining and monitoring the upstream land use activities that will deliver potable
water of desired quality is more complicated. This is particularly true given the lack of
scientific and technical information on how best to provide, protect, and augment sources
of drinking water (Pagiola et al. 2002b). Potential water service suppliers may not know
what specific activities should be implemented or changed in order to reach certain level
of provision of quality or quantity of drinking water. All of these add to the uncertainties
and transaction costs associated with any arrangements between Water Aqueduct

Committees and land holders at aqueduct headwaters.

1.4. STRUCTURE

Our case study focuses on two institutional arrangements that have the potential to
promote protection of drinking water in rural communities in eastern Costa Rica: a new

national water tax and a local payment for environmental services (PES) program. Table

14

1.2 outlines some elements of these two institutional arrangements, the two alternative

SITUCIUI'CS.

Table 1.2. Institutional Characteristics of Two Policy Instruments (Alternative

 

New National Water Tax

 

Structures)
Characteristics Payment for Environmental Services
Instrument Type Contractual agreements
-payments for land use restriction
Enabling Forestry Law 7575.
institution (Republica de Costa Rica 1996)

Administration
Activities

Environmental
Fee

Water Bills

Funds distribution

Implementation

0 Communities manage water system
0 Community members participate

Local coordination of guidelines,
procedures, data, fee collection, payments
to landowners, and monitoring

Payments to landowners for protecting

drinking water source

0 share costs among water users

0 differentiate the amount to be paid
across users

Contractual agreements in locale
0 Payment in addition to regular water
charges

An environmental fee collected locally
is paid to local households protecting
water source

0 Funds protect the originating micro-
watersheds. Small portion for
administration costs

Landowner transfer land use rights to

CAARS/ASADAS.

I CAARS/ASADAS oversight

o FONAFIFO-MINAE to ensure
protection activities and AyA-
ARESEP to ensure water billing
structure is appropriate

15

Regulation
-annual fee added to water bill

Executive Decree No. 32868. (Republica
de Costa Rica 2006)

0 Communities manage water system

0 Community members participate

National collection of annual tax.

National agency responsible for

implementing, monitoring and

evaluating.

Water tax with 50% allocated to water

use and 50% water source protection.

0 shared across national water users

0 'fees depends on water source and type
of end use

0 National tax added to water bill
0 Communities with a PBS program pay
only the water use part of tax

Water source protection fees (5 0% of tax)

divided:

0 50% to a national strategy for
integrated water resource mgmt.

o 25% to the National System of
Conservation Areas (SINAC)

0 25% to the National Fund for Forest
Investments (FONAFIFO)

o FONAFIFO’s share goes back to
communities for local programs to
protect areas of water recharge.

FONAFIFO funds finance protection of

drinking water sources

0 CAARS/ASADAS implement water
tax

0 AyA reports outcomes

1.4.1. Local Payment for Environmental Services [PES]

Local PBS may be thought of as voluntary contractual agreements taking place
between multiple ecosystem service beneficiaries or users (e.g., local water users) and a
number of providers of the those ecosystem services (e.g., landowners in/around drinking
water sources). The agreements typically require a third-party to facilitate and implement
the transaction such as a local agent (e.g., aqueduct managers such as
CAARS/ASADAS). PES programs provide a mechanism so that land owners who
voluntarily agree to apply and follow specified pro-environmental conservation practices
on their lands (e.g., sustainable forest management, preservation, reforestation, etc.),
which provide a stock and flow of ecosystem services to others (beneficiaries), receive
cash payments from the service beneficiaries for some period of time (e.g., five year
term). The terms of this arrangement are typically recorded in a contract which may be of
fixed duration, renewable, or permanent.

Costa Rica has experience with a national systems of PES including an approach of
direct payments to land users for land use decisions resulting in the provision of
environmental services (Chomitz et al. 1998; FAO 2004; Salzman 2005; World Bank
2000). Costa Rica’s national system of environmental service payments (Pagos por
Servicios Ambientales, PSA) was designed for landowners to receive direct
compensation for land use decisions that provide four types of environmental services: 1)
mitigation of greenhouse gases, 2) provision of hydrological services, 3) biodiversity
conservation, and 4) provision of scenic beauty for ecotourism (Pagiola et al. 2002a).
While the PSA is national in scope, only a very small portion of eligible landholders have
participated in the PSA (Pagiola 2002, Pagiola et al. 2005). There is one reported PES

program in Costa Rica that appears to have a local focus, the Procuencas program.

16

Procuencas operates in Heredia province with the help of large agencies (e.g., national
electric company) and provides incentives to upstream landowners to maintain and
improve forest ecosystems (Castro 2001; Redondo-Brenes and Welsh 2006). A local PES
program for protecting the headwaters (source) of rural aqueduct drinking water systems
would require that users of the communities’ water system come together to administer a
system so that they can make institutional arrangements to pool their funds to provide
incentives to landowners in their watershed’s headwater region to implement pro-

environmental land use practices.

1.4.2. New National Water Tax

Under Costa Rica’s “old” national PES program, a five percent tax on gasoline and
private sector contributions were used to make payments to landowners in watersheds
producing hydroelectricity for planting and maintaining trees (Redondo-Brenes and
Welsh 2006). As mentioned above, this system has not resulted in widespread adoption
or success. In response, a new national water regulation scheme has been adopted by
Costa Rica that mandates a (tax) payment from each water user in addition to normal
water service fees (Republica de Costa Rica 2006). Although this new national water tax
will be enforced nationwide, by law the local water service providers (e.g., CAARS,
ASADAS) are responsible for its implementation at the community level and for
transferring monthly water tax revenues to the Department of Water at the Ministry of
Environment and Energy (MINAE).

The new water tax will be implemented gradually over a seven year period. The first
year, there will be a 10% payment of the total tax amount. After that, MINAE will

increase the tax an additional 15% each year to reach 100% of the total tax by the seventh

17

year. However, no more than 25% of these water tax revenues will be directly transferred
back to the originating communities. This tax is structured so that half of the tax is for
water use and the other half of the tax is for resource conservation. So, half of the water
tax funds will be directed to support the implementation of a national strategy for
integrated water resources management. The national integrated water resources
management strategy includes research and development, as well as capacity building to
promote conservation, restoration, protection and sustainable management of watersheds
and water resources. The other half of the water tax revenues will be distributed between
two national agencies - the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC) and the
National Fund for Forest Investments (FONAFIFO). Those FONAFIFO funds are the
funds targeted for return to the originating communities for local watershed protection. It
is important to point out that communities participating in PES programs may apply to
FONAFIFO to be relieved of paying that part of the new water tax related to water

resource management.

1.5. PERFORMANCE

We now consider the characteristics of the alternative institutional arrangements, the
two structures for protecting drinking water sources in our case study, and make some
preliminary predictions about their likely performance. We then go on to discuss in more
depth the expected relative performance of these structures in light of the two case study
communities. We evaluate potential strengths and weakness of the alternative programs
in the study area using some Costa Rican household data, estimates reported in the

literature, and household survey data.

18

1.5.1. Performance Predictions

Many communities in rural eastern Costa Rica may be able to collectively protect the
sources of their drinking water by implementing local PES programs. That is, potential
PES revenue in these communities may be large enough to compensate landowners of
headwater areas for implementing conservation activities. For example, a household PES
survey (Ortega-Pacheco 2007) in eastern Costa Rica revealed sufficient willingness to
fund headwater protection for adequate payments to landowners in the headwater area so
that those landowners might change detrimental land use practices in/around drinking
water sources.

Furthermore, local PES programs appear to involve relatively low additional financial
costs to communities already monitoring and enforcement activities related to drinking
water provision. Any additional PES program monitoring and enforcement activities
would likely be subsidized by relatively small changes to community participation
already taking place as part of the communities’ local water aqueduct system. Likewise,
given the existing fee collection infrastructure, adding a PES fee to current water billing
practices does not seem to present administrative difficulties and would allow members
of communities to share the fixed costs of service provision among all households. A
potential obstacle to local PES approaches may be the transaction costs associated with
identifying and implementing those alternative land use and watershed service protection
practices in the headwater areas that will result in water quality improvements in
particular watersheds and aqueducts.

Alternatively, revenues generated from the new water tax may fall short of allowing
communities in rural eastern Costa Rica to adequately protect their drinking water

sources. The new water tax revenues that may eventually flow to communities, which

19

amount to the 25% of the tax revenues that go to F ONAFIF 0, may simply be too little
and too late to enable rural communities to purchase headwater lands and/or make
sufficiently large payments to headwater landowners in exchange for the adoption of
water protection and conservation practices. Nevertheless, the new water tax is currently
the national regulatory instrument for generating and accumulating revenues for the
eventual purchase of land for conservation and watershed protection purposes.
Complicating matters, these new taxes are being phased-in gradually forestalling the
possibility of immediate implementation of conservation efforts in the study sites using
water tax revenues.

The new national water tax will likely involve increased costs associated with
implementation, monitoring and enforcement activities relative to those associated with
local PES programs. For one, the national system may have less potential for using and
relying upon local volunteers. There will also be increased costs associated with the
coordination of activities and information at national and local levels as well as between
national and local authorities. Recall also that the water tax pricing structure requires all
water users to share in the fixed costs of the national service programs and only returns to

the communities up to 25% of their water taxes.

1.5.2. Performance Discussion

Local PES Program Potential
Local PES programs may be viable options for protecting drinking water sources in

communities where potential revenues from downstream beneficiaries are large enough

20

to adequately entice landowners on or around water sources to agree to limit their
activities to benign or pro-environmental activities on or near water sources. Previous
studies in Costa Rica suggest that forests that are on soils suited for agriculture can be
protected and maintained as forests by using conservation incentives of about $120 per ha
per year (Bouman et al. 1998; Nieuwenhuyse et al. 2000). Those studies, however, do not
fully compare to our case study areas where large-scale pineapple production and
processing play a larger role.

In our case study areas, pineapple production as well as banana production are
major land uses. For one of our case study sites in the North watershed, a drinking water
source for the community’s aqueduct is surrounded by pineapple production. Estimates of
the revenues and opportunity costs for pineapple production in Costa Rica are uncertain
(Haggar et al. 2003) and vary widely (Vega and Vega, 2002). However, pineapple
growing land is generally associated with large relative rental rates and revenues as
compared to similar land in our case study area (Vega and Vega, 2002). Our field
experience suggests that large-scale pineapple producers face relatively large opportunity
costs for changing land use/production practices (i.e., taking land out of production). The
principle land uses and types of landowners in the South watershed differ from those in
the North watershed. In the South, the drinking water sources are on small collectively
owned plots or a small landowner’s parcel and they are surrounded by a relatively large
number of small landowners engaged in a range of agricultural and other practices. As
mentioned, in the North watershed, the drinking water sources are on land owned and
operated by large landowners engaged in large-scale agricultural production (e.g.,

pineapple producers).

21

Analytical estimates based on national and field research data appear to support the
notion that revenues generated in a local PES program may be substantial enough to
compensate landowners for pro-environmental behavior (see Table 1.3). However, in the
North watershed, the local PES revenues may not be great enough given the relatively
larger opportunity costs of the larger-scale land owners (e.g., pineapple producers) and
the relatively small number of downstream water users. Also in the North, downstream
drinking water users are likely employed by upstream pineapple producers so that
changes to pineapple producer’s land use/production practices are likely to impact local
employees’ income and ability to finance headwater protection schemes. Similarly, the
transaction costs in the South watershed are not likely zero. Landowners in and around
the drinking water source in the South watershed have reported some ambiguity in land
ownership records raising the potential for land tenure issues (uncertainty) which might
make entering into enforceable conservation agreements less likely to occur. However,
local PES schemes seem capable generating sufficient revenues for some communities to
financially support local drinking water source protection activities. Local PES
approaches in rural areas may be able to have their monitoring and enforcing activities
subsidized through ongoing community participation (e.g. volunteer time) in local
aqueduct systems. That is, CAARS/ASADAS personnel, in addition to local aqueduct
duties, may also help monitor the PES program including monitoring targeted quality

levels (e.g., collecting samples at final distribution points that can be tested).

22

Table 1.3. Estimated revenues (millions of colones per month) from National Water

Tax and Local PES programs in Case Study Sites (1USD = 510 colones).

 

 

C C 'ti H h Id Water Tax Total Water Local PES :3: Local
ases ommunl es ouse o s Revenues" Tax Revenues“ Revenues“ R
evenues

North Milano 344 0.005 0.014 0.69 2.00
watershed ca“? 656 0.009 1.31

ch13

Herediana 1596 0.023 3.91
32:21:5th La Florida 996 0.014 0.050 1.99 7.06

La Alegria 524 0.007 1.05

Porton Iberia 416 0.006 0.83

 

"‘ Estimated tax revenues correspond to 25% of the total water tax, the share of the tax that is slated to be
transferred back to the communities. Estimates are based on 2002 national estimates of water consumption
(0.54 Km3/year), population (3,925,330), average number of household members in study site (3 persons),
and a per unit water use tax specified in the regulation (0.82 colones per m3 of water).

** Local PES estimates are based on amounts that local households’ water users in Cairo-Francia and
Milano indicated that they would be willing to pay per month to protect their water sources - about 2,000
colones (Ortega-Pacheco, 2007).

Water Tax Potential

The analyses seem to show that the new water tax revenues will not be large enough
in the rural communities in our case study area to fund the purchase of land for
conservation purposes nor enough to entice upstream landowners to modify their land use
practices in and around headwater areas (see Table 1.3). In the South watershed, possible
land tenure uncertainty along with the relatively large number of different owners makes
the possibility of purchasing the necessary headwater lands less likely given the revenue
potential of the water tax. In the North watershed with its larger-scale agriculture and
fewer land owners, the water tax would seem less likely to generate sufficient revenue to
allow the communities to purchase land for drinking water sources protection. As Table

1.3 illustrates, our estimates of the new water tax revenues in our study area indicates that

23

communities would have to amass their water tax conservation fund revenues from the
tax for several years before accumulating enough to potentially purchase headwater
lands. Unfortunately, that would leave these drinking water sources unprotected, possibly
irrevocably, during the interim. Moreover, the tax mechanism of having water tax
protection funds collected locally, transferred to national accounts, and eventually
transferred back to the community in part (maximum 25%) adds further lags and costs to
undertaking designed to protect the areas’ drinking water sources.

Relative to the alternatives, the new national water tax may also increase costs,
relative to the alternatives, associated with implementing, monitoring, and enforcing
drinking water source protection activities because, all else equal, the water tax program
requires the coordination of national agencies and the various local community
ASADAS/CAARS. If the national water tax has to be implemented at the local level by
CAARS/ASADAS, some monitoring and enforcing costs can be also subsidized through
community participation (e.g. volunteer time). However, the coordination costs of
monitoring and enforcing activities may be higher under the water tax because national
agencies would have to be involved in the collection and sharing of the revenue. In fact,
the coordination involved with the national tax scheme not only adds one more layer of
administrative tasks and associated costs but also introduces more costs given that
national authorities will have to somehow control and monitor the activities of local

agencies.

24

Joint Use of Local PES and Water Tax

Given the reality of the new water tax, consideration of the potential implementation
of local PES in conjunction with the tax is in order. From the perspective of the
communities in our case study, local PES programs seem to be a good source of
financing local drinking water protection efforts. The current water use fees paid by the
communities in our case study area are lower than water fees in Costa Rica’s urban areas
(Ortega-Pacheco 2007). The addition of the new water tax, especially if all or a portion of
the environmental stewardship component returns to the community, is not a significant
increase. Previous work shows that these local environmental service beneficiaries are
willing to pay substantially more than their current water use fee to protect their drinking
water sources. However, local PES may not work and may not be feasible in other areas.
The new water tax may be implementable nation wide but it may not generate sufficient
revenues to adequately protect rural drinking water sources such as those in the case
study communities. Given situational specific characteristics of the actors involved (e.g.,
size of pOtential providers and type of land uses), local PES program may be more viable
in some communities than in others (e.g., it is more likely to take place in our South
watershed rather than North watershed).

Our case study shows that in eastern Costa Rica formal (i.e., legal framework) and
informal institutions (i.e., communities’ habits, customs and social norms) may enable
community-level implementation of both policy instruments-a national water tax and a
local PES scheme. We see potential for a mixed strategy combining the implementation

of a) the national water tax, and b) local PES programs in those communities in such

25

places as our South watershed where both seem viable and reasonable approaches for
protection drinking water sources
For such a mixed policy strategy to work, the regulatory framework should be

modified to:
a) Allow local communities to use water tax revenues not only to purchase land
but also to implement local PES programs enabling periodic payments to
landowners engaged in appropriate drinking water protection activities;
b) Allow CAARS/ASADAS to keep “their” portion of water tax’s revenues in
their communities instead using the more costly procedure of transferring funds to
national accounts and then back to communities or in the alternative be allowed to
collect larger PES payments from users and be excused from some of the national
water tax; and
c) Provide F ONAF IF O/DW-MINAE/AyA-ARESEP oversight of
CAARS/ASADAS responsible for collecting and administering funds for
protection activities. This oversight should help ensure that collection of water
bills is appropriate, that monitoring and enforcement is undertaken and that costs

are subsidized through community participation (e.g. volunteer time).

In addition, the data from our case study area clearly suggests that the tax rates of the
national water tax fall far short of realistic costs of water source protection in rural areas.
The water tax fees likely need to be modified at a national level to increase the amount of
revenues that can be generated for expenditure especially in rural communities. Although

current fees may allow large urban areas with their many water users to protect their

26

water sources, our case study indicates that small rural communities would not generate
sufficient revenues to do 50. Our own field experience indicates that in rural areas,
communities are acutely aware of the various environmental threats to their water
sources, and to protect water sources they would be willing to pay monthly water fees

that are significantly higher than the water tax currently enforced by law.

1.6. CONCLUSION

It appears that for the case of eastern Costa Rica with rural communities that rely on
local, self-financed aqueduct systems, the new national water tax scheme may fail to
provide adequate funds at the right time to help them protect their current sources of
drinking water. This may not be true for the urban areas of Costa Rica that have
reasonably functioning municipal potable water services. In the rural aqueduct setting,
the purchase of land around watersheds headwaters as well as the provision of incentives
to surrounding landowners to adopt pro-environmental land use practices may represent
the least cost, most beneficial approach to providing long-term drinking water protection.
While it appears that local PES schemes may be both viable and effective in the rural
settings of our case study, the implementation of the new national water tax adds a layer
of bureaucracy and potential funding that may be beneficial.

Ideally, the water tax rates (and reimbursement rates to communities) might be
adjusted to more equitably share infrastructure, maintenance, and enforcement costs.
Additionally, there should be some allocation of national water tax funds to the
generation and dissemination of knowledge and information on approaches to improve

watershed services and protection of drinking water supplies. Increased effectiveness of

27

any of the policy instruments would benefit from improved technical information about
the protection and “production” of drinking water. Our case study indicates that with
better information, monitoring and enforcing tasks could be locally tailored to report
performance outcomes of watershed protection efforts.

Finally, future research exploring the cost-effectiveness of incentive-based
conservation policies should account for so-called land market feedback effects that
could result from payments or land purchases. Market feedbacks will arise due to any
change in supply and demand for land. The local PES approach and the water tax
approaches add to demand for certain types of land (e.g., headwater areas of watersheds)
by introducing periodic payments or direct purchases. In addition, setting aside land for
conservation as is currently mandated by the water tax regulation may also increase the
price of remaining lands or displace development toward more ecologically valuable
lands (Arrnsworth et al. 2006; Wu 2000). Such land market feedbacks due to the
implementation of institutional arrangements result in changes to future costs and threats
(Naidoo et al. 2006). A better understanding of these dynamic effects on performance of
incentive-based institutional structures may warrant further examination in the Costa

Rican context.

28

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Watersheds: Institutions, Public Participation and Demand," Masters Thesis,
Michigan State University, East Lansing.

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Services: Market-based Mechanisms for Conservation and Development, Earthscan,
London.

Pagiola, S., Landell-Mills, N., and Bishop, J. (2002b). "Making Market-base Mechanisms
Work for Forests and People." In Selling forest environmental services: Market-based
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Mills, eds., Earthscan, London.

Redondo-Brenes, A., and Welsh, K. (2006). "Payment for hydrological environmental
services in Costa Rica: The Procuencas case study." Tropical Resources Bulletin, 24,
19-25.

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No.14585 Asamblea Legislativa - Comisién Permanente Especial del Ambiente.

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Republica de Costa Rica. (2007). "Tarifas vigentes de los Acueductos Comunales."
Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Publicos (ARESEP).

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York University Law Review, 80(3), 870-961.

Sanchez-Azofeifa, G. A., Harriss, R. C., Storrier, A. L., and de Camino-Beck, T. (2002).
"Water Resources and Regional Land Cover Change in Costa Rica: Impacts and
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Winkler, H. (2007). Sustainable Development and Mitigation. Cambridge University
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Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82(4), 979-992.

32

ESSAY 2:
PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGEMENT OF PAYMENT
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

2.1. INTRODUCTION

2.1.1. Watershed protection and management

Water resources conservation and management occupy an increasingly important
place in the international development agenda because of the growing pressures on
important ecosystems and those relying on the associated ecosystem services
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). It has been asserted that new conservation
and development efforts should be better tailored and more responsive to site-specific
ecological and socio-economic conditions for effective and sustainable preservation and
management of threatened natural habitats (Bawa et al. 2004; Ferraro 2001; Ferraro and
Kiss 2002). There is a growing consensus that local management is essential for
addressing site-specific complexities that externally imposed management systems would
likely fail to appreciate (Kerr 2002, p. 1388). One promising approach for rural
communities to manage their natural resources is through local, collective management
systems (Baland and Platteau 1996). Participation of local beneficiaries (i.e. community-
based management) in natural resources management has received increasing support in
the literature because of the potential for such an approach to achieve environmental and
natural resource goals (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). At the same time, multilateral
agencies like the World Bank and countries such as Costa Rica, have been increasingly
their support of ecosystem and incentive-based approaches for watershed management

(Pagiola et al. 2005). Payment for environmental services (PES) programming is an

33

incentive-based mechanism that has been used in efforts to protect watersheds and
watershed services such as water quality (FAO 2004; Herrador and Dimas 2000; Pagiola
2002; Postel and Thompson 2005).

One area that lends itself to both local community participation and incentive-based
approaches is watershed management (Kerr 2002). Improved management of watersheds,
especially those that support highly valuable hydrological services such as water quality
and quantity, might be advanced by identifying and understanding the factors influencing
local beneficiaries’ willingness to participate in such protection and management
programs. Despite the interest in local management approaches as well as the use of
incentive mechanisms to finance conservation of natural resources, the literature in both
fields has not adequately explored the factors influencing local resource beneficiaries’
willingness to participate in such programs (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Baland and
Platteau 1996; Engel et al. 2005; F A0 2004; Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Herrador and Dimas
2000; Pagiola et al. 2005; Postel and Thompson 2005; Redondo-Brenes and Welsh 2006;
Sarin 1996; Shackleton et al. 2002). Using data collected with household surveys, this
paper examines the economic and household factors associated with respondents’
willingness to participate in community-based management of a potential PES program
for protecting and managing hydrological services of subwatersheds in Eastern Costa
Rica.

This paper proceeds by describing current water quality and deforestation issues in
Costa Rica and Costa Rica’s efforts and experiences with water resources management
and payments for watershed services. Then, this paper briefly reviews some literature on

community-based natural resource management and factors influencing public

34

participation. The paper next describes the research site (six communities in eastern
Costa Rica) and the survey methods for collecting the data from the six communities
where the communities’ previous experience with locally-financed and administered
drinking water aqueduct systems suggest that collective, local management of PES may
be feasible. An empirical model of participation in local management of PES programs is

then developed presented before research results are presented and discussed.

2.1.2. Water quality and management in Costa Rica

1n Costa Rica, water quality scarcity has been attributed to uneven distribution of drinking
water relative to demand and to deficient water treatment (Calvo 1990). In 2005, only 82% of
the Costa Rican population had access to a drinking water supply system, and 30% of the
water provided by municipalities and communities was not potable based on international
standards (Astorga 2005). Given its location in the tropics, water quantity per se is not
presently an issue for Costa Rica. Costa Rica receives 170 km3 of water via precipitation
each year and has 0.54 km3 of average drinking water demand (Espinoza et al. 2003).
However, the local scarcity of water of potable quality is a problem that may increase in the
near future because of expected growth in demand estimated at about 45% for the period
2000-2025 (FAO 2000), and severe financial constraints facing the national water agency
may face (Astorga 2005; AyA and OPS/OMS 2002; Espinoza et al. 2003).

While there are some uncertainties linking land-use changes and watershed services, the
adverse impact of tropical deforestation on water quality sources seems clear (Bruijnzeel
2004). Costa Rica’s rate of deforestation between 1986 and 1992 was about 4% per year, and
is expected to continue in the country’s unprotected remaining forest cover (Sanchez-

Azofeifa et al. 2001). In the absence of proper watershed management, uncontrolled

35

deforestation will most likely adversely impact the future availability of potable water in
Costa Rica.

Recently, Costa Rica adopted a policy change to shift towards a more integrated and
watershed-oriented management approach toward its water resources. Two core changes in
Costa Rica’s water policy are: 1) the use of watersheds as the resource management planning
units, and 2) the mandatory incorporation of local resource beneficiaries in key roles in
watershed management and conservation (Astorga 2005, p. 4; MINAE 2005). Costa Rica’s
water policy change may be thought of as a shift towards a more sustainable management
strategy for the conservation of water sources (e.g., de Sherbinin et al. 1996; e.g., Postel et al.

1996).

2.1.3. Costa Rica’s System of Payment for Watershed Services

Throughout the Americas, watershed-based payment for environmental services [PES]
programs have been explored as means for promoting residents’ conservation and
development of hydrological services (e.g., Echavarria 2002; FAO 2004; Postel and
Thompson 2005; Southgate et al. 2005). In PES programs for watershed protection, upstream
land users (e.g., farmers) are paid by downstream water users for adopting land use practices
(e.g., forest land uses) that limit deforestation, erosion, and flooding risks (Wunder 2006). In
the case of Costa Rica, the country’s PES experience has been largely limited to a national
level approach that, among other conservation goals, has focused on protecting upstream
forests in large watershed that typically provide hydroelectricity (Pagiola 2002; Pagiola
2006)

Under the current national PES scheme in Costa Rica, water conservation payments are

contracted via ad-hoc voluntary agreements between single dominant water users (e.g.,

36

hydroelectric companies) and a semi-autonomous state forestry agency (FONAF IF 0).
FONAF IF 0 administers the contracts and financial operation of the national PES program.
In addition, there is at least one “local’ PES program in Costa Rica in the province of
Heredia-the Procuencas program (Castro 2001; Montagnini et a1. 2005; Pagiola 2006). Local
management with participation of community members and independence from F ONAF IFO
is considered a reason behind the success of the Procuencas program (Redondo-Brenes and
Welsh 2006).

Given the potential that community participation and PBS programs together may offer
communities improved tools to address the water resource management, this paper considers
community-based management approaches and tries to understand determinants of public
participation in environmental governance in order to identify those factors most likely to

positively affect local involvement in watershed management.

2.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.2.1. Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM)

Participatory approaches devolve decision-making rights, benefits, and responsibilities
to local populations (World Bank 2000). Public participation has been recognized, within
the context of natural resources management, as an effective means for giving local
populations a voice in the use of and access to resources, thereby helping with the
development of appropriate institutions for sustainable management (Beierle and Cayford
2002). The literature suggests that community-based approaches receive special attention
when the resource problems require solutions that: i) concern the management of local
resources; and ii) demand action at the community level (e.g., Agrawal and Gupta 2005;

Engel et al. 2005; e.g., Shackleton et al. 2002). If such resource management regimes are

37

based on local context and support of local participatory governance structures, they are
more likely to enhance system performance (Ostrom 1992).

According to Agrawal and Gupta (2005), some of the earliest research on participation
focused on individuals’ propensity to participate in political activities. Studies of
participation in natural resource management have built upon previous work by
incorporating equity and distributional concerns (Agarwal 2001; Weinberger and Jutting
2001). To a large extent, previous examinations of individuals’ participation in
community-based management have been limited to decisions concerning common
property resources management (e.g., Agrawal and Gupta 2005; e.g., Baland and Platteau
1996; Engel et al. 2005; Sarin 1996; Shackleton et al. 2002). The area of understanding
participation of local beneficiaries in community-based management of PES programs for
protecting and managing tropical watersheds and their related environmental services has

not been previously reported.

2.2.2. Determinants of Participation

Previous research into public participation in governance has asserted that participatory
governance processes may be successful if users see net potential gains of taking part in
decision-making activities (Ostrom 1990). Therefore, we will considerer households’
opportunity costs associated with participation in the study’s proffered participatory
management scheme. Participation takes time, so it is natural to consider labor availability
within households. For instance, since the size of a household may serve as an indicator of
labor availability as well as potential side-benefits to be derived from resources (Naik 1997),
the influence of a households’ size should be considered. Moreover, studies of participatory

development suggest that women may be less likely to participate in environmental decision-

38

making where male dominated social structures are in place (Agarwal 2001). So, gender may
be a key variable worth investigating.

The literature also suggests that households’ benefits from participation in collective
governance processes may come from: i) influencing decisions in its favor given their
dependence on the resource, and, ii) the ability to influence decisions when participating
(Behera and Engel 2005). In line with this literature, some studies in participation of
watershed management have found that most people only participate on personally critical
issues (Irvin and Stansbury 2004) such as a dependency on the subject matter resources (e.g.,
access to drinking water). Therefore, we expect that households with a critical dependence of
watershed services and those that perceive decision-making benefits from participating in the
process will positively influence their willingness to participate. In terms of the ability of the
households to influence decisions when participating, learning from past experiences in
decisionmaking such as voting in local elections seems to play an important role. For
instances, mental reinforcements from previous experiences in decision making are often
found to be central in determining beliefs regarding the value of taking part in a particular
planning process (Tuler et al. 2002). This literature suggests that unless there is a strong
feeling among the participants that they can not influence decisions based on previous
experiences, individuals are likely to participate (Halvorsen 2006).

Likewise, households’ trust in current administrative structures and its positive effect on
participation have been highlighted in the literature (Smith and McDonough 2001a).
Therefore, we expect that communities with watershed administrations perceived as
trustworthy to positively influence local beneficiaries willingness to participate (Webler and

Tuler 2001). The participation literature has also examined the role of household heads’

39

demographic characteristics (e.g., income — education level, and age) on their decision to
participate. Studies of participation in natural resource management have found that higher
income community members (often more educated) may be more likely to influence
decisions compared to those belonging to marginalized segments of the population (Lise
2000; McComas 2001). Traditional power structures seem to dominate community decision-
making and, thus, higher income or education may be a proxy for greater bargaining power
and, hence, ability to influence decisions (Engel et al. 2005). The role of age as a proxy for
experience is more ambiguous (Zbinden and Lee 2005) since reluctance of individuals to
engage in new activities may increase with age.

To implement our participation study, the abovementioned determinants will be examined
in the context of an existing drinking water distribution system and a proposed watershed
management approach in eastern Costa Rica. In the following section we present general
information about the research site and research methods. We also present research findings

and a discussion of the results.

2.3. STUDY SITE, SURVEY, DATA, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

2.3.1. Study Site

The setting of the reported research is in Siquirres canton, eastern Costa Rican’s humid
tropics. The study area is located within the Reventazén River macro-watershed (about 65
miles from the capital city, San Jose'). A river with the same name is the primary river in the
region with its tributaries supplying water to local communities. The Destierro, Cairo, Peje,
Vueltas and Germania Rivers, all tributaries of the Reventazén, constitute five micro-
watersheds in which intensive systems of banana and pineapple production for export are the

major land use.

40

This study collected information in six different communities in the Reventazon
watershed. These communities have prior experience with locally-financed and administered
drinking water systems (i.e., aqueducts). The six rural aqueducts in this study provide water
to approximately 4,500 households distributed among several communities within five of the
six districts within the Siquirres canton (See Table 2.1). Because the water in the local river is
too polluted for drinking, water is collected via aqueducts to the natural springs at the
headwaters of the Destierro, Cairo, Peje, Vueltas and Germania Rivers. The rural aqueducts
are administrated by community-based committees called “Asociaciones Administradoras de
Acueductos y Alcantarillados” (ASADAS) or “Comite’s Administradores de Acueductos
Rurales” (CAARS). These associations/committees were organized at the time that
construction of the drinking water supply systems took place to administer, operate and
maintain the drinking water supply systems (Espinoza et al. 2003).

The six reported rural communities’ micro-watersheds are of interest because they face
growing resource development conflicts and degradation issues. There is increasing demand
for water in the lower reaches of these watersheds because of the proliferation of agricultural
production and processing, particularly pineapple and banana crops. At the upper reaches of
these watersheds, increased deforestation threatens the quality of the water sources. The
threats to water sources coupled with current environmental concerns has driven local
agencies’ to consider alternative and participatory approaches to water source management

including local, collective protection of watersheds.

41

Table 2.1. Reported communities’ aqueducts

 

 

Micro- Altitud Community Type of Neighborhoods 5:333:33 Interviews
watershed (m) Aqueduct Operator Served Serviced Collected
Rio Destierro 79-62 Milano CARRS Milano 344 136
“mpg?” 3’ 88-71 Cairo-Francia CARRS Cairo y Francia 656 164
Herediana, Alto
Herediana, La
Rm welt?" 213- 98 Herediana ASADA Esmela'da’ 1596 399
y Gennama Germania, Alto
Germania, El
Ceibo
La Florida,
Rio Peje 201 -l60 La Florida CARRS Calle Fum‘es’ 996 249
El Cruce,
Barrio Nuevo
La Alegria ASADA La Alegria 524 131
Rios Peje y
345-175 .
Vueltas Portén Iberia CARRS Fina???“ 416 104

 

2.3.2. Survey Methods

This research results are based on data collected use a face-to-face household survey.
The survey was designed to determine households’ willingness to participate in a local
committee for administering a possible payment for environmental services [PES]
program for protecting their drinking water sources. The program would help change
land uses in the study areas’ headwaters to protect water quality, quantity and reliability.
Using an iterative design approach, the household survey was pretested and refined to
assure respondents’ understanding of the policy context, trade-offs, and elicitation
method (Kaplowitz et al. 2004). The survey provided background information to the

respondents about the communities’ water supply aqueducts and land use issues within

42

the watershed, and it also made clear that management programs may require
participation of members of the community to help administer operations. The survey
questionnaire collected data on respondents’ socio-economic characteristics, water-
related perceptions, and governance attitudes. Specifically, the questionnaire asked if
respondents would participate in a local committee administering a PES program to
protect their current drinking water sources.

The in-person interviews were implemented during a 31-day period in July 2006 in six
Costa Rica communities that rely upon the local watershed for drinking water. The
research target population were male or female heads of household (18 years of age or
older) that receive their water from a community-owned rural aqueduct. Satellite
photographs were used to divide the target watershed communities into clusters. Clusters
were then randomly selected to determine the households to be interviewed. If a head of
household was not available during a first attempt to conduct an interview, that house
was revisited up to two additional times. A total of 1182 completed interviews were
obtained. Adopting AAPOR’s (2006) standards for survey and public opinion research,
our study has a minimum response rate (RRI) of 84% and a 96% minimum cooperation

rate (COOPI).

2.3.3. Summary Statistics

Key summary statistics from the survey are presented in Table 2.2. We found that, on
average, the ratio of adults (:18 years old) to children (<18 years old) living within
households was less than 2:1. As a result, we estimated slightly less than 4 members per
household in the study area. Heads of household were 73% female; have lived in the

community no longer than 11 years; and 73% have less than a primary school education

43

level. Average household monthly income was estimated to be about 140,000 colones (1 US
dollar = 510 colones). Incomes were obtained directly from respondents and, if respondents
refused to provide an open-ended response, income was estimated using mid points values
from follow-up income-range questions.

Respondent’s water-related behaviors revealed that water use within the studied
communities is entirely aimed for domestic purposes. On average, 50 % of the respondents
perceived water service as having “Good Pressure” (i.e., equivalent to a 2) using a I to 5
scale with 1 being Extremely Good Pressure and 5 being Extremely Poor Pressure. In
addition, we found that 60% of respondents reported have voluntarily participated in
community activities such as voting, and 61 % trust the current water service administration.
We also found that approximately 50% of respondents indicate a willingness to participate in

the Aqueduct Committee that administers the PES program.

44

Table 2.2 Variables definitions and descriptive statistics

 

 

Variable Description Measurement Mean ES; Min Max
Dummy (=1 forl l
part1c1 ating 1n oca

PARTICIPATION committee to administer 1 or 0 0.475 0.499 0 1
PES program)

PREVOTE Dummy I: 1 I" V013 1“ 1 or 0 0 512 0 500 0 1
previous elections) ' '
Natural 10 of the - -

YEARS number 0 years living P213233? 2.431 1.076 0 4.431
in the community
Number of adults and

SIZE children living within Integer 3.902 1.81 1 l 15
household
Ratio ofadults 218 - -

RATIO years old) to children stigvlferrgal 1.708 1.147 0 8
(<18 years old)

INCOME Monthly income 10,000 colones 14.271 14.444 0.7 200
Dummy (= 1 for female

GENDER household head) I or 0 0.716 0.451 0 l
Dummy (= 1 for level of

EDUCATION education less than 1 or 0 0.730 0.444 0 1
primary)
Ecale l-Sl, 1&3?

xtreme y

PRESSAT Pressure and 5 being 1,2,3,4,5 2.364 1.133 1 5
Extremely Poor Pressure
Dummy (=1 for trust in

TRUST current aqueduct 1 or 0 0.668 0.471 0 1
management)
Predicted probability of . -

PREVOTE-hat votin , an Instrumental Pfi‘fifeg" 0.497 0.115 0.07 0.761

Vari le

 

2.4. PARTICIPATION MODEL

Let us assume that households’ decisions are consistent with maximization of an

underlying preference function. Therefore, a household’s choice to participate in the local

committee for administering the water service PES program depends on the expected

benefits. However, willingness to participate may vary from one household to another as they

are not equally endowed (Engel et al. 2005).

We model a two-stage individual household (1) decision to participate in community-

based management of PES (y) as a binary outcome dependent on a set of household’s socio-

45

economic factors (2,) and household’s previous voting in community elections (g;). The
reasons for including the various elements of Z,- and g,- draw from the literature on

participation in environmental governance. Likewise, we hypothesize that the effect of (g) is
endogenous since it may be affected by some of the same household and individual
characteristics influencing the participation decision (yr). Methodologically, we test for this

endogeneity, and we solve this problem by applying a two-stage probit instrumental variable
method (Gujarati 2003; Wooldridge 2001).
Taking into account the binary nature of our dependent variable, we derive the following

probit specification for the probability of outcome y,- as given by:
PrO’i =1) =¢(161Wi +162Fi +1631? +164Hi +fl57l +fl6§il (1)

where, (I) is the cumulative density function for the standard normal distribution, and Pr(y.=1)

represents the probability that household i is willing to participate in the local committee to
administer the PES program. W,-, F ,-, Li, H, , and T,- represent the following household and

individual characteristics: income, natural log of years living in the community, water

pressure satisfaction, household size, and trust in current aqueduct management, respectively.

g, is the predicted probability of voting in past community elections resulting from the

estimation of the following probit specification:

Pr(gi =1): (D(alVVi +aZSi +a3Ei +a4Fi +a5Ri) (2)

where, Pr(g,=1) indicates the probability of household i voting in local elections, and, W,- , S,-
E,-, F1, and R, represent household and individual characteristics, income, gender, education,

natural log of years living in the community, and household ratio, respectively (see Table 3).

46

A consequence of our formulation is that we can distinguish between: a) direct effects of

household and individual socio-economic factors (’6 1"6 2"6 3’fl 4’fl 5) on the decision to

participate in the local committee administering the PES program, and b) indirect effects of

some of the same factors (al,a2,a3,a4,a5) embedded in g,- by estimating (fl6) where

'66 represents the second stage parameter for the effect of the probability of previous voting
in community elections on the decision to participate. The adoption of this model
specification and the estimation of eq. (1) enable us to draw conclusions on total effects and

account for the potential endogeinity of previous voting. The dependent variables in the two
stages are: (1) Previous Voting in Local Elections (g,), a dummy variable taking the value 1,
if the household has voted in local elections, and 0 otherwise, and (2) Participation in the
local committee administering the PES program (12,-), a dummy variable that takes the value 1,

if a household is willing to participate, and 0 otherwise.

Table 2.3. Variables’ hypothesized effects on participation based on previous

research studies

 

 

Variables EElfl'ect Associated Research
YEARS Ft - (Zbinden and Lee 2005, p. 5)
SIZE H ,- + (Naik I997)
RATIO Rt + (Naik 1997)
INCOME W, + (Engel et al. 2005; Lise 2000; McComas 2001)
GENDER S,- - (Agarwal 2001).
EDUCATION E~ _ (Adhikan et al. 2004; Lise 2000; Stem et al. 2003; Verba et
' al. 1993)
PRESSAT Li (Irvin and Stansbury 2004)
TRUST T,- (Smith and McDonough 2001b; Webler and Tuler 2001)
PREVOTE-hat g,- (Halvorsen 2006; Tuler et al. 2002)

 

47

2.4.1. Model estimation and results

For estimating our participation model, an instrumental variable probit model was used for
equations (1) and (2) using the STATA software package. Observations with missing data
were excluded from the estimation. Overall, the chi-squared test of the first and second stage
of the model indicates that the model is highly significant (p<0.000). Key variables in the
model were also significant and of the expected sign. Coefficients, test statistics, robust
standard errors and marginal effects for the participation decision are reported in Tables 2.4

and 2.5.

Table 2.4. Household Participation First Stage Model Estimated Results

(PREVOTE)

 

Coefficients z-vnluesa P-values‘ Marginal Efl'ectsb Means
FIRST STAGE: Participation in Local Elections

INCOME 0.004 (-1.23) 0.219 0.0015 14.268
GENDER -0.285 (-332) 0.001 0.1 132 0.728
EDUCATION 0.031 (0.35) 0.723 0.0124 0.723
YEARS 0.238 (6.55) <0.001 0.0951 2.421
RATIO 0.075 (-2.22) 0.027 0.0300 1.707
Constant 0181 (-119) 0.236

N l 140

LogL -759.700 <0.001

-2ln(Lr/Lu) 59.58

my, =1 I x,) 0.494

 

a. Z-stats and P-values are based on robust standard errors computed using the sandwich estimator.
b. Marginal effect of variable on the probability of yes outcome evaluated at the mean values of the independent
variables as well as at for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

As is shown in Table 2.4, we found with regard to the first stage that GENDER (p=0.001),
YEARS (p<0.001), and RATIO (p<0.05) significantly influence household’s PREVOTE.
For instance, based on our results we could infer that women heads of household with

positive RATIO who have recently moved to the community are significantly less likely to

48

vote in community elections than other community segments. Another insight from the
model’s first stage, although not significant, is the observed negative effect of INCOME and
RATIO on previous voting in local elections. This result indicates that people who have a
higher level of income may face larger opportunity cost of time for participating. This stage
serves as the basis for computing the estimated probabilities for PREVOTE-predicted (i.e.,

the instrumental variable in the second stage).

Table 2.5. Household Participation Second Stage Model Estimated Results

 

Coefficients Z-valuesa P-valullsa Marginal Effectsc Means

 

SECOND STAGE": Participation in local committee for administrating the PWES

PREVOTE- hat 1.832 (9.79) <0.001 0.6396 0.512
INCOME 0.004 (1.95) 0.051 0.0017 14.271
YEARS 0.212 (~6.32) <0.001 0.0846 2.431
SIZE 0.02 (0.96) 0.335 0.0079 3.902
PRESSAT 0.055 (1.77) 0.076 0.0218 2.364
TRUST 0.008 (0.1) 0.922 0.0033 0.6683
Constant 0.718 (3.95) <0.001

N 1043

LogL -1430.3188 <0.001

-2|n(Lr/Lu) 163.85

Wald test of exogeneity chi2 1 1.76 0.001

P(yi=1 1 )9) -0.036

 

a. Z-stats and P-values are based on robust standard errors computed using the sandwich estimator.
b. Values are computed using the Instrumental Variable Probit regression tool in STATA.
c. Marginal effect of variable on the probability of yes outcome evaluated at the mean values of the independent

variables as well as at for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

We found during the second stage model estimation that key variables in the model were
significant (at the 10% level) and of the expected Sign (See Table 2.5) with the exception of
TRUST which was not significant. As expected, PREVOTE-predicted shows a positive
effect (p<0.001) during the second stage on participation. Another insight from the model is

the observed negative effect of YEARS (p<0.001), and positive effect of both INCOME

49

(p<0.l), and PRESSAT (p<0.1). In particular, the model indicates that YEARS has a
significant negative effect on PARTICIPATION. Members who have lived longer in the
community tend to be less likely to participate. The positive effect of INCOME and SIZE
may be attributed to the relationship they have with the degree of participants’ investment in
the outcome of decision-making. For instance, our model suggests that a higher income,
better educated household head with a large size family may be more inclined to participate

in the local committee.

2.4.2. Marginal Effects

The marginal effects are computed and reported in the second-to-last column of Table
2.4. These effects represent the unconditional marginal effects of each variable on the
probability that a respondent would be willing to participate. The marginal effects are
evaluated at the sample means. Another finding from our model is the observed marginal
effect of PREVOTE-predicted. The average probability of previous participation was
estimated to be about 50%. Hence, it is predicted that every percentage point of increased
probability of PREVOTE—predicted increases the likelihood of a person being willing to
participate in the local committee for administrating the PES program by about 0.63
percentage points.

Likewise, the mean perception level of PRESSAT was estimated to be about 2, which
indicates that respondents perceive their current water services as having good pressure. The
marginal effect indicates that a one unit increase in one’s PRESSAT score would increase the
probability of participating in the program by about 2.2 percent points (probability increases
by 0.022 per unit). In other words, a person who perceives the water service pressure as being

Extremely Poor (i.e., level 5) is about 11.0 percentage points more likely to participate than a

50

person who perceives the water service pressure as being Extremely Good. In addition, the
mean YEARS were estimated at about 11, so an additional year of residence decreases the
probability of participating by about 0.7 percentage points. Accounting for the non-linear
effect of this variable, a person with 10 years residing in the community is about 11.5
percentage points more likely to participate than a person with 40 years. The model also
shows that an additional 10,000 colones per month in average INCOME, about 140,000
colones, is predicted to increase the probability of participating by 0.17 percentage points
(probability increases by 0.0017 per colones). Lastly, the average household’s SIZE was
estimated to be about 4 persons. Although the effect was not found to be significantly
different than zero, an additional household member is predicted to increase the probability
that a household head decides to participate by 1 percentages point (probability increases

0.01 per member).

2.5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

It has been increasingly recognized that participatory and ecosystem-based
management approaches might lead to more effective protection of global water supplies.
Consistent with this idea is the possibility of enhancing progress by working with
affected populations within a watershed context, where relationships between forest-use
practices and the condition of water quality can be better recognized and managed. In
Costa Rica, there has been a recent move toward more sustainable and integrated forms
of water resources management jointly with a significant proliferation of ecosystem-
based financial instruments as mechanisms of support for conservation activities. Despite
recent emphasis on these concepts, water quality scarcity, degradation of watershed’s

forest and associated stress on human populations continue. Therefore, our attempt to

51

improve understanding with regard to participation in community-based management of
payment for environmental services programs for protecting watersheds is consistent with
fostering the development of both local management approaches, and with the use of
incentive mechanisms to finance conservation of natural resources.

This study examined households’ willingness to participate using an empirical model
and identified factors that appear to significantly influence the palticipation decision. We
implemented a two-stage instrumental variable probit regression in order to estimate the
relative impOItance of factors influencing household’s potential participation. At the first
stage, we analyzed the determinants influencing decisions to vote in local elections. At
the second stage, we estimated the extent that certain determinants, including voting in
previous elections, have on willingness to participate in local committee to administrate a
PBS program for protecting watersheds. Using this approach, we found that about half of
our sample’s respondents indicated a willingness to participate in the proposed
committee. As hypothesized, voting in past local elections was a crucial determinant, and
the number of years leaving in the community was also relevant. To a lesser extent,
income and satisfaction with regard to current water service pressure were also important
factors determining willingness to participate. In particular, people within our study
communities who have previously voted in local elections, have higher income (often
more educated), have not resided more than 11 years in the community, tend not to have
trust in the current water administration, and feel unsatisfied with their current water
service’s pressure, are more likely to participate than other types of people in the

communities.

52

Two important policy implications from our empirical results can be drawn. First, our
research finds a strong indication of support for local, collective management and
protection of hydrological services in the study areas’ headwaters. The results are
evidence that local participation in community-based management is not an obstacle for
the viability of PBS approaches for protecting and managing tropical watersheds and
associated services. Second, there is potential for transferring our results to similar
settings within Costa Rica where PES programs could benefit from local palticipation.
This may also apply to communities in other countries, where community elections and
provision of drinking water via locally-financed and administered rural aqueducts are

familiar processes to local residents.

53

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58

 

ESSAY 3
PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: ESTIMATING DEMAND
WITHIN A TROPICAL WATERSHED

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Resource use conflicts and degradation problems affecting ecosystems and associated
human populations continue to grow. Tropical deforestation, deployment of advanced
technologies for resource use, and population grth are considered among global factors
threatening ecosystems (Dietz et al. 2003). Moreover, in the international donor community
there has been a shift in general priorities from the environment toward poverty alleviation
strategies resulting in decline in conservation funding from mainstream sources of green aid
(W under 2006). From the early to late 905, the simultaneous drop in bilateral and multilateral
agencies’ forest-sector funding can be estimated to be approximately about 25 and 60%,
respectively (Molnar et al. 2003). In response to these trends, the adoption of approaches to
capture some of the value of natural assets to finance in-situ conservation and management of
watersheds services is increasingly promoted by multilateral agencies like the World Bank
(World Bank 2003) and countries such as Costa Rica (e.g., Castro 2001; Miranda et al.
2007). One such approach, Payment for Environmental Services (PES), is the subject of this

study.

3.1.1. Costa Rican Watersheds’ Threats

Deforestation and water quality scarcity in Costa Rica may be fostering the country’s
interest on alternative approaches to watersheds management. Deforestation and forest
fragmentation in Costa Rica are thought to have implications for the national watershed

systems. Costa Rica’s estimated deforestation rate between 1986 and 1992 remained on

59

the order of 4% per year and is expected to continue to affect the country’s unprotected
remaining forest cover (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2001). Moreover, a recent study reported
that most of the drainage basins in Costa Rica have less than 50% forest cover.
Moreover, forest fragmentation was highest in few noteworthy river basins such as the
Reventazén macro-watershed, which is the major watershed of this study’s concerns
(Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2002).

Water quality scarcity exist in Costa Rica due to uneven water service distribution
relative to demand and deficient water treatments (Calvo 1990). This situation might be
accentuated in the medium term by an expected demand growth that was estimated about
45% for the period 2000-2025 (FAO 2000) and financials constraints that the national
water agency may face if proposed new financing mechanisms are not undertaken (see
Astorga 2005; AyA and OPS/OMS 2002; Espinoza et al. 2003). Although water quantity
has not generally been a problem in many areas of Costa Rica, in 2005 only 82% of the
Costa Rican population had access to the drinking water supply system, and 30% of the

water provided by municipalities and communities was not potable (Astorga 2005).

3.1.2. Financing Conservation & Payment for Environmental Services (PES)

Institutional arrangements involving incentives for locally protecting and managing
watershed services may help address the goal of achieving long-term financing of
conservation activities. Payment for Environmental Services (PES) approaches are one
attempt to use economic incentives to protect natural resources and accommodate agricultural
production, forestry, tourism, and drinking water supply (Wunder 2007). The core of
watershed PES programs are designed to directly compensate resource users upstream for

their natural resource stewardship and the associated ecological services provided to

60

downstream beneficiaries (Wunder 2006). In fact, direct payment approaches such as PES
have been empirically found to be cost-effective means to financially suppOIt conservation
and sustainable ecosystem management (Ferraro and Simpson 2002).

Costa Rica has implemented a well-known system of PES programs focused on
compensating provision of specific forest services such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity
protection, and watershed protection (Republica de Costa Rica 1996). The Costa Rican PES
programs have been designed, implemented, and supported at the national scale with external
financing from such agencies as the World Bank (Pagiola et al. 2005). Like most PES
programs so far, the Costa Rican experience has operated as monopsony (Salzman 2005),
with only one larger buyer (i.e., FONAFIFO governmental agency) for multiple service
provider sellers (Pagiola 2002; Republica de Costa Rica 1996). To increase it effectiveness,
recent assessments of the Costa Rican PES scheme have recommended: a) reducing
transaction costs associated to equity concerns (e.g., minimize contractual stages, and
facilitate access to information among landowners groups, small farmers in particular)
(Zbinden‘and Lee 2005), b) to target payment schemes, on a priority basis, to encourage the
sustainability and recuperation of forest in selected drainage basins; not just in conservation
areas (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2002), and c) to use differentiated payments so as to allow for
differences in both the level of service provision and the opportunity cost of providing
services (Pagiola 2006).

Along these lines then, this paper argues that linking beneficiaries with providers via local
payments for environmental services programs may be a workable alternative to financially
support protection and management of watershed’s hydrological services in Costa Rica.

Local PES programs are thought to enhance progress towards in-Situ conservation by

61

working with affected populations within a watershed context, where relationships between
forest-use practices and the condition of water can be better recognized and managed (F A0
2004). On-going efforts such as the New York City-Catskill PES case (Postel and Thompson
2005) and the Procuencas program in Costa Rica Central Valley (Miranda et al. 2007, p. 17;
Redondo-Brenes and Welsh 2006) provide evidence that successful PES schemes may be
watershed-based, may not require international or national financing, and can result in
economic, environmental and equity gains. Likewise, Costa Rica is a country that may offer
institutional advantages for the viability of direct watershed-based PES programs. For
instance, this country has in place a suppOItive watershed-based and community-oriented
water policy framework (Astorga 2005; MINAE 2005). Additionally, many rural areas of
Costa Rica have prior experience with community-financed and operated aqueduct systems

(Espinoza et al. 2003).

3.1.3. PES: harnessing demand

An interesting feature of most watersheds and their services, however, is that the costs
and benefits of their protection and provision are usually borne by different parties
spatially and temporally separated, situation which may poses challenges in designing
instruments for protecting hydrological services (Postel and Thompson 2005). In the
context of Eastern Costa Rican watersheds, environmental steward land-owners upstream
may provide hydrological services such as water quantity and quality while local rural
aqueducts and their communities’ users downstream benefit from those services without
compensation. Hence, generating information about trade-offs that people are willing to
make across alternative ecological services within the suite of feasible ecological

services, perhaps costly, can serve as a guide to policy development (Heal et al. 2001).

62

Economic valuation has been proposed as one tool for organizing that information in a
way that can help guide decision-making, and, if wielded together with financial
instruments and institutional arrangements that allow individuals to capture the value of
ecosystem assets, it is thought to lead to favorable effects (Daily et al. 2000).

Based on these insights, the use of direct payment approaches to locally provide and
protect watershed environmental services in Eastern Costa Rica makes intuitive economic
and policy sense. Researchers working in PBS programs argue, however, that a better
understanding of demand for the services channeled by PES programs may be one
necessary pre-condition for implementation of PES schemes (FAO 2004) and to
potentially mainstreaming these institutional arrangements in the tropics (Wunder 2007).
In fact, the increased interest in local PES for watershed management has been
accompanied by an increased call for empirical research on the demand for and financial
sustainability of such programs (e.g., Arocena-Francisco 2003; Postel and Thompson
2005)

To address this empirical need, this research examines the viability of using locally-
financed payments to protect watershed services (i.e., PES programming) as an incentive-
based policy instrument for protecting and managing watersheds in eastern Costa Rica.
Using a dichotomous choice Contingent Valuation [CV] survey, this work measures
household’s willingness to pay [WTP] higher water bills for PES program payments to
change land uses to protect water quality, quantity and reliability. Given the wide range
of potentially tradable watershed services and the uncertainties associated to the relation
between land uses and specific service provision, this paper continues in section two by

elaborating on key analytical considerations that will facilitate our analysis (i.e.,

63

determining the specific service to be delivered, who the providers and beneficiaries may
be, and how the service is to be provided). Then, we review the underlying concepts and
premises of the economic approach to understand nonmarket watershed services and its
demand. The next section describes the research site and the method used to collect
household’s data for this nonmarket valuation study in two different Costa Rican
communities, each of which has prior experience with locally-financed and administered
aqueducts. Section four describes and reports findings for the empirical model of demand
for PES programs to protect watershed’s hydrological services, and the paper concludes

with section five.

3.2. WATERSHED SERVICES DEMAND

Environmental issues related to drinking water may be addressed within the context of
watershed management. Hydrologic and ecologic processes are thought to govern the
quality of water resources within the watershed]. Watersheds are a basic hydraulic unitz,
defined as a delineated area with a well-defined topographic boundary and water outlet
(Lal 2000). Within its topographic boundaries, a watershed may comprise a complex set
of land uses (e.g., agriculture, forestry, settlements). The extent of the effect of land uses
such as forests or agriculture on watershed services has been argued to remain imprecise
(Pattanayak 2004). For PES to succeed, understanding the biophysical service delivery
pathway is important to identify which specific landscape management practices need to

be encouraged (e.g., sustainable forest management or conservation agriculture) or,

 

1 . . . . .
A watershed may range In Size or It may be Slmple one w1th a first-order stream, or a complex
conglomerate comprising a network of drainage channels.

64

conversely, those that need to be discouraged by the policy instrument (e.g., deforestation
or factor-intensive agriculture) to secure the provision of the watershed service (Salzman

2005). This task, however, may be a difficult one.

3.2.1. Understanding the science of watershed services

The underlying scientific uncertainty in the link between land uses and watershed
services provision has been seen to pose a great challenge in PES design (Pagiola et al.
2002). Given this uncertainty, researchers working on PES programs argue that what
could be traded trough these contractual schemes is not the desired service itself but a
proxy (e.g., paying for protection in selected areas from which communities derived its
water supply) (Pagiola et al. 2002). Then, the provision of drinking water could involve
trading land uses that are thought to generate the desired watershed service. This study
continues by exploring some of the current literature on issues concerning the
relationship between land use changes and watershed services provision which seem to
have built inroads toward this objective.

There is recent evidence reporting specific linkages between changing land uses and
provision of water quality (Bruijnzeel 2004), which may adequately serve the purpose of
guiding policy analysis. In fact, this proposition has been satisfactorily examined
elsewhere (see Kosoy et a1. 2007). It will suffice to mention that the recent study of
watershed PES schemes in Central America by Kosoy and his colleagues argue that
watershed PES programs are more likely to be effective when they are targeted to address

water quality problems. Kosoy, et al.’s (2007) state that this may be the case because

 

2 . .
Regardless the water sources (e.g., ralnfall, ground water, local surface storage), hydrologlc processes
(e.g., infiltration or run-off) within a watershed are interlinked and can be assessed within its confine.

65

there is less scientific ambiguity concerning the relationship between land use changes
and water quality, and less divergence between public expectations and scientific
evidence on the link between land use and water quality. Building on Johnson and
Baltodano’s (2004) previous study in a Nicaraguan watershed, Kosoy et al. argue that the
local perception that water provision is one of the main forest benefits, and the
conventional wisdom that links larger upstream forest cover to both better downstream
water quality and greater quantity seem to be common notions among rural dwellers in
Central America.

The above information suggests that current empirical and conventional knowledge on
the relation between land uses and water provision may support the viability of direct
watershed-based PES programs. Subsequently, having narrowed down our discussion so
as to identify the specific service to be delivered, who the providers and beneficiaries
may be, and how the service is to be provided, this study proceeds by reviewing the
underlying concepts and premises of the economic approach to conservation relevant to

our valuation exercise.

3.2.2. Nonmarket environmental services values & PES

In addition to generate goods (e.g., agricultural commodities, and timber) different land
uses within a watershed may result in unintended environmental effects (e.g., alteration in
hydrological cycle, erosion) with potential associated consequences in the provision of
environmental services (i.e., drinking water). Conceptually it may be useful to think of these
effects as the basis of a demand function for the continuation and protection of drinking water
sources (i.e., avoidance of environmentally threatening land uses). For example, a

households’ utility can be increased if watershed protection through the implementation of

66

certain land uses reduce the potential risks associated to future access to drinking water.

Given the situation described above, the watershed environmental services of concern
(i.e., provision of drinking water) can be thought as a prime case of goods with nonmarket
values. Nonmarket goods are often times characterized by high transaction costs in the form
of incomplete information about the nature and magnitude of agents utility gains (i.e.,
preferences) (Boggess et al. 1993). In this context, payment for environmental services (PES)
approach is one institutional arrangement that may help to align incentive structures in a way
that shift the extemality problem of protecting those highly valuable watershed land uses
providing ecosystem services. The core idea of PBS is that external beneficiaries of
environmental services make direct contractual quid pro quo payments to local landowners in
return for adopting land and resource uses that secure ecosystem protection (W under 2007).
However, one issue with nonmarket values is how to measure beneficiaries’ willingness to
pay for watershed protection. In a more positive way, this implies a challenging empirical
problem: how to measure utility gains associated with watershed protection and the provision
of drinking water.

Generating information about service value relative to cost of provision, in fact, has been
acknowledge to be important for making good conservations decisions (Stevens 2005). Also,
the literature on nonmarket values suggests that the process of commoditization of nonmarket
services like the provision of drinking water may require necessary preconditions such as
rigorous identification and measurement of demand and assignment of money values with a
particular and precise meaning, that is, to reflect social values (Loomis 2005). This paper
attempts to generate this information in the context of Eastern Costa Rican communities. To

carry out our objective, among the various techniques for estimating environmental

67

nonmarket values this study make use of the stated preference survey approached called the

Contingent Valuation Method (CVM).

3.2.3. Measuring nonmarket values: The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM)

The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a non market valuation technique used to
estimate the benefits derived from environmental amenities (Carson 2000; Carson and
Groves 2007; Chilton and Hutchinson 1999; Cummings et al. 1986a). A CVM survey elicits
an individual’s trade-off through questionnaires. Key elements of the questionnaires involve
a constructed or contingent market featuring the reasons why a payment is needed, the good’s
description, and a careful presentation of the payment vehicle (Zilberman and Marra 1993).

Under a commonly used CV question format, the respondent is offered a binary choice3
between two alternatives (often set in the context of a referendum) (Carson and Groves
2007), one being the status quo policy and the other alternative policy having a cost greater
than maintaining the status quo (Carson 2000). As long as the economic agents being
surveyed believe that their responses might influence policy actions, the standard economic
model suggests that agents should respond to the survey in such a way as to maximize their
expected welfare (Carson and Groves 2007). The referendum model for eliciting economic
values in a contingent valuation framework has had great appeal since popularized by Bishop

and Heberlein’s (1979) and Hanemann (1984). Among its virtues are the apparent incentive

 

3 A single binary discrete choice question, with one of the alternatives typically being the status quo, is one
of the most commonly used preference elicitation formats and has a long history of use in survey research.
Bishop and Heberlein (1979) showed that this format could be used along with a random assignment of
different monetary costs to different respondents, to obtain the empirical distribution of willingness-to-pay
or willingness-to-accept (WTA) values in a given population. Later papers by Hanemann (1984) formally
worked out the utility-theoretic approach from a random utility perspective (McFadden 1974); McConnell
(1990), KristrOm (1997), Haab and McConnell (1997, 1998, 2002) and Hanemann and Kanninen (1999)
have also examined the statistical issues involved in using the binary discrete choice format (Carson and
Groves, 2007).

68

compatibility and informational properties (Carson and Groves 2007). The referendum
approach, in fact, was endorsed by the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation (Haab and
McConnell 1998). Applications are particularly common in environmental valuation (e.g.,
Bateman et al. 2006; Cummings et al. 1986b; Hanemann 1994; Smith 1993) and in
developing countries (see Pearce et al. 2002).

In recent years, the CVM has been used to inform policy makers about individuals’
preferences for the basic infrastructural projects in developing countries such as water supply
and sanitation (e.g., Merrett 2002; Whittington 1998), and surface water improvement (e.g.,
Choe et al. 1996; Desvousges et al. 1983). A recent study in a micro-watershed in the
hillsides of Nicaragua employed the CVM to assess the economic value of improving local
watershed services for rural residents (Johnson and Baltodano 2004). The good being valued
in most of these studies is drinking water and it is usually provided through some type of
water project. We follow that approach here but explicitly include PES payments to local

land holders in the specification of the provision of the good, protection of drinking water.

3.2.4. CVM: Design Considerations

Some methodological issues with CVM stem from the contingent character of the data --
answers to survey questions rather than observations of behavior. As with data from other
types of survey questions, research has shown that the economic values from CVM are
sensitive to the framing of the survey questions (Gregory and McDaniels 1987). Never the
less, there are reasonable grounds in the literature to support the idea that carefully designed
contingent payment situations can approximate actual payment situations with sufficient
accuracy to be a useful component of policy process (Mitchell and Carson 1986). Here we

briefly review some of the design characteristics that have been argued to minimize potential

69

sources of error and biases in CVM surveys (see Carson 2000; Carson and Groves 2007;
Carson 1997; Cummings et al. 1986b; Venkatachalam 2004 for a comprehensive treatment).

The literature recognizes that serious consideration should be given to the incentive and
informational properties of preference questions. This study uses the binary-choice
referendum format because of the desirable incentive properties that have been identified in
the literature (as mentioned above), but also because residents in the study area are familiar
with making decisions in a referendum context. The literature also recommends framing of
the referendum so that willingness to pay is elicited, as opposed to willingness to accept
(Mitchell and Carson 1986). In CVM, respondents must understand the commodity to be
valued, how it will be provided and how it will be paid for (Mitchell and Carson 1986). In
our case respondents have experience and are familiar with acting collectively to finance and
operate community aqueducts for providing drinking water. The payment vehicle, a monthly
charge to the water bill, is also familiar and credible since all of the households currently face
a monthly water bill to pay for the operation and maintenance of the current aqueduct.

Given the qualitative character of CVM, the literature suggests that good CVM should
combine quantitative and qualitative insight if it is to be utilized to its full potential (Chilton
and Hutchinson 1999). Among some qualitative methods potentially contributing to the
content validity of CVM studies, researchers suggest (and this study has accounted for) the
use of focus groups, in-depth interviews, pretests and pilot studies. Some other
recommendations may involve: in-person interviews involving visual materials such as maps
and pictures, high survey response rates to help minimize potential problems with
extrapolating to the population of interest, the employment of professional interviewers, and

the selection of household as the unit of observation if a payment vehicle like utility bills is

70

used (Carson 2000).

We continue by presenting information about our research site and the method used to
collect household’s data for this nonmarket valuation study in two different Costa Rican
communities with prior experience with locally-financed and administered aqueducts. This
information may not only provide insights about forces driving communities’ interest on
alternative approaches to watersheds management, but may also aid to our understanding of

communities’ characteristics associated with demand for drinking water.

3.3. STUDY SITE, SURVEY, DATA, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

3.3.1. Study Site

The research setting is in eastern Costa Rica about 130 Km from the capital city, San
José. The research site is located in the lower basin of the Reventazén watershed. The
Reventazén watershed is the second largest watershed in the country (23000 Km2)
(Espinoza et al. 2003). Its tributaries include the Destierro, Peje and Cairo Rivers, which
make up two subwatersheds supplying water to the research site’s community aqueducts.
Specifically, the communities of Cairo-Francia and Milano rely on the local watershed to
supply drinking water to their aqueducts because the nearby surface water is too polluted
for potable uses. Intensive systems of pineapple and banana production for export are the
largest reported land uses in the area. Other land uses in the area include private forest,
pastures, tourism activities, rural towns, and commercial and industrial facilities.

The communities of Cairo-Francia and Milano were selected for this study because of
their prior experience with community-financed aqueduct systems. Moreover, these

subwatersheds, like many in the area, face potential environmental threats due to

71

increasing deforestation, urban expansion, and proliferation of factor-intensive
agricultural production, especially pineapples. In response to these changes, local
agencies must often consider projects to relocate drinking water sources in order to pipe
in drinking water from alternative drainage basins. The costs associated with moving
drinking water sources mean that in-situ alternatives, such as better protection of
available water sources, merit close attention.

The rural aqueducts in this study provide water to Cairo-Francia and Milano
communities (See Table 1). The water to Cairo-Francia and Milano is transported via two
independent aqueducts, which are administrated by community-based committees called
“Comités Administradores de Acueductos Rurales” (CAARS). These committees were
organized during the construction of the water infrastructure to administer, are financed
by revenues from a set monthly water fee, and operate and maintain the drinking water
supply systems. In fact, approximately, 80% of the Costa Rican population receives
waters from one of 1,572 locally-financed rural aqueducts operated by some form of

CAARS4 (Espinoza et al. 2003).

Table 3.1. Characteristics of the Two Community Aqueducts

 

 

Micro- Elevation Community . Interviews
watershed (m) Aqueduct Estlmated Households per Aqueduct Collected
Rl'o Destierro 79-62 Milano 344 136
Rios Cairo y . .
Peje 88-71 Cairo-FranCIa 656 l 64

 

 

4 CARRS are also called Asociaciones Administradoras de Acueductos Rurales (ASADA). The only
difference between these locally administered organizations is that ASADAS have gained legal
authorization as a service provider from AyA, the Costa Rican National Aqueducts and Sewage Agency.

72

3.3.2. Survey Methods

The research results are based on a nonmarket valuation study of household’s demand
for protecting and maintaining their watershed’s hydrological services using a
community-based PES program. A dichotomous choice contingent valuation [CV] survey
was used to measure household’s willingness to pay higher water bills for PES program
payments to protect their water quality, quantity and reliability. Using an iterative
approach, the CV questionnaire was pretested and refined to appraise scenario
plausibility and respondent’s understanding (Kaplowitz et al. 2004). The survey provided
background information about the aqueduct for the communities’ water supply and land
use issues within the watershed. The CV scenario asked if respondents would vote for the
PES program to protect their drinking water at a specific monthly cost. Respondents were
also instructed that if the majority of the population votes yes the program would go
forward and they would have to pay a monthly fee on the top of current water bill equal
to the cost amount they were presented. The associated fee (i.e. bid) was randomly
presented and followed up by a debriefing question to verify that the good was
understood. The bid amounts were set based on priors from in-depth qualitative research.

The face-to-face interviews were implemented during a 31-day period in July 2006 in
two Costa Rican subwatersheds that rely upon the local watershed for drinking water.
The target population of the research was heads of household (18 years of age or older).
Satellite photographs were used to divide the two target watersheds into clusters. Clusters
were then randomly selected to determine the households to be interviewed. Households
that could not be interviewed on an initial visit were revisited up to two additional times
in an effort to include those households’ responses in the dataset. The survey yielded 300

completed interviews. Based on AAPOR’S (2006) standards for reporting response rates

73

from survey and public opinion research, the present study had 81% and 94% minimum

response (RRI) and cooperation (COOPI) rates, respectively.

3.3.3. Summary Statistics

Key summary statistics from the survey are presented in Table 2. We found that on
average, monthly income was about 135,400 colones. Income values were assessed
directly from respondents or calculated from additional income range type questions, if
income amounts were not directly provided. On average, we found that households
perceived that resource protection in the area was somewhat poor. Most of the
households believed that water sources would be threatened in future, absent an

intervention to protect them.

Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics for the variables (N =286)

 

 

Variable Description Measurement Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Vote Dummy (= 1 for yes vote) I or 0 0.692 0.462 0 1
Monthly Cost ng‘a’" Monthly (305" GM 10,000 colones 0.124 0.075 0.04 0.24
amount)
Income Monthly income 10,000 colones 13.688 11.591 1.70 85.00
Scale 1-5, 1 being Drinking
. water sources Extremely
Current Protection Well Protected and 5 being 1,2,3,4,5 3.811 0.969 1 5
Extremely Poorly Protected
Dummy (=1 for being
Threatened in Future Dnnkmg water ”mes 1 or 0 0.828 0.377 0 1

threaten in future if nothing
else is done to protect them)

3.4. CVM MODEL

Following economic theory, we assume that if a respondent’s true WTP is greater than

the cost (i.e., bid amount), then the respondent is assumed to vote “yes”, and “no”

74

otherwise. WTP Should reflect the benefit that individuals perceived they will receive
from the protection of drinking water sources, and it is the portion of its budget the
individual is willing to forgo investing in alternative uses. Specifically, we assume that
personj will vote for the program (yj = 1) if WTP is greater than the program cost, or will
vote against otherwise (yj = 0). We measure this with error, so we have the standard
statistical model of WTP,- = [3ij + c]- where the latter term, Bij, represents the
parametization of the mean, u for j’s demographic variables, Z]; Consequently, we model

the probability of a yes vote as
Prob (yes vote) = (13((Bij - CJ.)/O') (l)

where, (I) is the cumulative density function for the standard normal distribution, and o is
the common standard deviation of the underlying errors. This specification of the
econometric model allows as to recover estimates of the variance term 0‘ by observing that

the parameter on the cost term will be equal to l/ 6 (Cameron 1988).

3.4.1. Variables & Hypothesis

The dependent variable in our model, Vote for the PES program (yj), is a dummy variable
taking the value 1, if the household votes yes to support PES program and 0 otherwise. Based
on economic theory we expect that PES program monthly cost has a negative effect.
Moreover, we hypothesize that believing that drinking water sources were threatened in
future, absent an intervention to protect them, would have a positive effect on the
household’s WTP higher water bills for PES program payments to change land uses to

pl‘OICCt water sources.

75

3.4.2. Model significance, parameters estimates and computed marginal effects

The probit model estimated household votes for the proposed PES program using data
from the 293 completed questionnaires. Coefficients, test statistics, robust standard errors
and marginal effects for the participation decision are reported in Table 3.3. Overall, the
chi-squared test of the model indicates that it is significant (p<0.000). The key variables
in the model were significant and of the expected sign. For instance, as expected, the
monthly cost of the protection program had a negative effect (p<0.000). Income per
month also had positive effect (p=0.054) on estimated household’s WTP. Another
important contribution of our model is the estimated marginal effect of household beliefs
regarding the potential for water sources to be threatened in future if nothing else is done
to protect them (p=0.038). This effect means that people who believe that their drinking
water sources were threatened in the future if nothing else is done to protect them are
more likely to vote yes to pay for the PES. Results suggest that a higher income
household head who believed that their water sources were threaten in the future absent
any form of intervention may be more inclined to pay for supporting a watershed
protection program.

The marginal effects are the unconditional marginal effects of each variable on the
probability of voting yes to a referendum. The marginal effects evaluated at the sample
means are computed and reported in the second-to-last column of Table 3.3. For instance,
an additional 10,000 colones per month is predicted to raise the likelihood of voting yes
by less the 0.6 percentage points. Another contribution of our model is the estimated
marginal effect of a household’s belief that water sources’ are threatened in future, absent
an intervention to protect them, which increased the probability of their voting yes by

about 16 percentage points.

76

Table 3.3. Single probit model estimates and statistics

 

 

. ' M
Estimatesb Coefficients Z-valuilsa P-valuesa Ragga“ VaIII;
Monthly Cost
-4.976 -4.70 0.000 -1.7033 0.124
(in 10000 colones)
Income
. 1.92 0.054 0.0059 13.689
(in 10000 colones) 0 017
Current Protection 0.041 0.47 0.636 0.0140 3.81 1
Threaten In Future 0.437 2.07 0.038 0.1592 0.829
Constant 0.419 1.15 0.011
N 286
LogL -160.505
-21n(Lr/Lu) 29.1 1 0.000

 

a. Z-stats and P-values are based on robust standard errors computed using the sandwich estimator.
b. Values are computed using the Single Probit regression tool in STATA.

3.4.3. Analysis of Willingness To Pay [WTP]

The results yield an estimated mean WTP for the sample of about 2,300 colones per
month per household. The estimated mean WTP values are about twice the current
average monthly water bills of 1,015 colones. We also found that the estimated WTP is
robust to a wide range of model specifications including the range of demographic
variables collected in the survey. The elicited WTP amounts to support the PES program
are additional fees on top of the current monthly water bill.

There are issues that have been raised in the literature regarding the equity and
distributional effects of PES programs that the research examines (see Grieg-Gran et al.
2005 for an exhaustive discussion; Pagiola et al. 2005; Zbinden and Lee 2005). Among
equity issues associated with provision of drinking water in Eastern Costa Rica we have:

1) issues that can arise among water users willing to pay for the provision of the service

77

given the differences in income level across population (i.e., proxy for distribution of
costs burden), and, 2) issues generated from the transactions between groups of rural
water users relatively poorer and potential landowner service providers such as very large
pineapple and banana producers or processors.

Figure 1 illustrates the effect of household income levels on WTP. It shows the
probability of a yes vote at the 10, 50 and 90th percentiles for income from our sample
data (40,000, 120,000 and 290,000 colones of monthly income, respectively). At these
income levels, mean WTP is estimated as 2,020, 2,300 and 2,885 colones, which roughly

represent 5, 2 and 1% of the corresponding income levels.

1.0 -
0.9 7

0'8 ‘ —10th Percentile A - wrp=2,020
0.7 7 —50th Percentile B - WTP=2.300

—901h Percentile c ' WTP=2-°°5
0.6 -

Prob Yes 0.5 7
0.4 ~ \
0.3 r
0.2 r
0.1 7

0.0 I I I I I
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

Colones per month (In 10,000)

A a c

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 3.1. Mean WTP and Probability of Yes Vote at Different Monthly Income
Levels

First, these results demonstrate that every segment of the population exhibited
significant demand and willingness to finance PES program to protect local water quality.

The results also suggest that households in the lower income level of the population are

78

WTP a higher share of monthly income for protecting their watershed and, therefore,
secure their sources of water services. As a matter of fact, these results indicate that total
household’s expenditure in water would represent less than 8%, which may be an
affordable share of income having in mind the impOItance of water resources for
supporting and maintaining life.

In, addition, another study of Eastern Costa Rican watersheds by Miranda, et al.
(2004), using a multi-criteria analysis and a open-ended question format estimated
individual water users’ WTP an extra water fee to protect water sources. The surveyed
population received water service via rural aqueducts and on average, individuals’ water
bills were about 1,200 colones (Miranda et al. 2004). WTP amounts were estimated about
190 colones per month. Although lower than the findings from our case study, these
figures represent a total of water expenditures equal to 1.6 % of the income.

From this analysis, we could argue that in the context of our communities, water users
indicate substantive willingness to pay for the provision of the service and that imbalance
in distribution of provision costs burden across differing segments of population does not
seem to constitute a barrier to local-scale PES programs to protect water. This may be
particularly true if we also consider that the resulting total water bills under the proposed
PES program with an additional monthly charge equal to the mean WTP would still be
about half the amount of the basic water tariffs imposed by governmental water
authorities in more developed communities near the study site ( z 6,000 colones). Our
results also follow the findings from a recent households-level empirical study by
Mendoza, Cash, and Adamowicz (2007). These researchers examined WTP for improved

water supply services in Queretaro, Mexico and found that residents from informal

79

settlements (i.e., non urbanized areas with very low income levels and lacking private
piped water services), are willing to pay a relatively higher proportion of their income
levels for private- piped water services than residents from regular urbanized
neighborhoods.

An unresolved question is whether PES revenues generated from these WTP amounts
would offset opportunity costs that pineapple or banana producers would face if they
participated in the PES program, and, consequently, changed their agricultural practices
(i.e., reduced inputs, set asides, switching crops). Further analysis of this complexity
would involve better understanding of the supply functions of drinking water services
including the costs to agricultural producers and the degree to which different types of

land use changes improve or protect drinking water services.

3.5. CONCLUSIONS

The potential for PES programs as an in-situ incentive-based policy instrument to
financially support conservation is increasingly of interest among ecologists,
environmental scientists, and policymakers. A better understanding of demand for the
services provided by PES programs may be a key to successful implementation of
locally-financed PES schemes. To address this research need on the demand side of local
PES approaches, we estimated households’ demand for protecting and maintaining their
watershed’s hydrological services by community-based PES programs.

Our research finds a strong indication of support for local, collective protection of
hydrological services in the study areas’ headwaters. Using data from a dichotomous
choice Contingent Valuation [CV] survey, we have empirically analyzed the factors

influencing household’s demand. We also measured household’s willingness to pay

80

higher water bills for PES program payments to change land uses to protect water quality,
quantity and reliability. We found that the WTP is Significantly affected by the program‘s
monthly cost, and households’ income and belief that water sources are threatened in
future, absent an intervention to protect them. The results yield an estimated mean WTP
for the sample of about 2,300 colones per month per household. Moreover, in an attempt
to examine issues regarding the equity and distributional effects on those that would have
to finance a local-scale PES programs, we found that every income segment of the
population exhibited significant demand and willingness to finance the PES program to
protect local water quality.

To sum up, in our case study, local demand is not an obstacle for using locally-
financed PES approaches as a mechanism for the protection of watershed and associated
ecological services. However, it is necessary to acknowledge some of the limitations of
our analysis to assess the viability of PBS approaches in Eastern Costa Rica. First, this
study argues that further research is needed to generate accurate hydrological information
concerning the Specific link between ceitain land uses and the several dimensions
embedded in the provision of drinking water (i.e., quantity, quality, and spatial and
temporal distribution). Second, an exhaustive examination of the supply-side of a
potential trading schemes it is also necessary so as to identify potential matches or
mismatches between water users’ willingness to pay for provision of watershed services
provision and landowners service providers’ willingness to accept that compensation.
Ultimately, we also believe that it is necessary to scrutinize the institutional dimension of
PES programs as a policy instrument that could effectively align incentives to sustainably

finance the provision of environmental services from watersheds.

81

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87

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

PES programs have been increasingly supported by international donors such as
the World Bank, countries like Costa Rica, and many ecologists, environmental
scientists, and policymakers interested in alternative instruments to address watershed
conservation and management. PES programs seem to be relevant in the field of
international development particularly. The lessons learned from this study attempt to
contribute to an understanding of how watershed-based, collective, and locally-financed
PES programs can be used to address resources use conflicts in watersheds. Lessons
pertain to Eastern Costa Rican watersheds yet can be broadly transferable to other

Situations with similar socio-economic and environmental complexities.

Institutions

Our case study of alternative institutional structures to secure the provision of
drinking water appears to suggest that for the case of eastern Costa Rica with rural
communities that rely on local, self-financed aqueduct systems, the purchase of land
around watersheds headwaters as well as the provision of incentives to surrounding
landowners to adopt pro-environmental land use practices may represent the least cost,
most beneficial approach to providing long-term drinking water protection. While it
appears that local PES schemes may be both viable and effective in the rural settings of
our case study, the implementation of the new national water tax adds a layer of
bureaucracy and potential funding that may also be beneficial. However, the modest
water tax revenues that could be collected from small, rural watersheds such as our case

study sites appears to be insufficient to meet the water protection needs of these

88

communities. Ideally, the water tax rates (and reimbursement rates to communities)
might be adjusted to more equitably share infrastructure, maintenance, and enforcement
costs. Additionally, there should be some allocation of national water tax funds to the
generation and dissemination of knowledge and information on approaches to improve
watershed services and protection of drinking water supplies. Increased effectiveness of
any of the policy instruments would benefit from improved technical information about
the protection and “production” of drinking water. Our case study indicates that with
better information, monitoring and enforcing tasks could be locally-tailored to report

performance outcomes of watershed protection efforts.

Participation

This study examined households’ willingness to participate in the administration and
governance of a local PES program to protect drinking water. By implementing a two-stage
instrumental variable probit regression, we have estimated the relative importance of factors
influencing household’s potential participation. Two important conclusions from our
empirical results can be drawn. First, our research finds a strong indication of support for
local, collective management and protection of hydrological services in the study areas’
headwaters. The results are evidence that local participation in community-based
management of local-scale PES programs is not an obstacle for the viability of PBS
approaches for protecting and managing tropical watersheds and associated services. Second,
there is potential for transferring our results to similar settings within Costa Rica where
PES programs could benefit from local participation. This may also apply to communities

in other countries, where community elections and provision of drinking water via

89

locally-financed and administered rural aqueducts are familiar processes to local

residents.

Demand

We estimated households’ demand for protecting and maintaining their
watershed’s hydrological services by community-based PES programs. Our research
finds a strong indication of support for local, collective protection of hydrological
services in the study areas’ headwaters. Using data from a dichotomous choice Contingent
Valuation [CV] survey, we have estimated local demand for the PES program and
empirically analyzed the factors influencing household’s demand. That is, we measured
household’s willingness to pay higher water bills to finance PES program payments to
change land uses to protect water quality, quantity and reliability. We found that the WTP
is significantly affected by the program‘s monthly cost, and households’ income and
belief that water sources are threatened in future, absent an intervention to protect them.
The results yield an estimated mean WTP for water protection for the sample of about
2,300 colones per month per household (just under 2% of the average income).
Moreover, in an attempt to examine issues regarding the equity and distributional effects
of PES programs, we found that every income segment of the population exhibited
significant demand and willingness to finance PES program to protect local water quality.
At its core, our study indicates that local demand is not an obstacle for using locally-
financed PES approaches as a mechanism for the protection of watershed and associated

ecological services.

90

Future Research

To fully assess the viability of PES approaches in Eastern Costa Rica, this study
argues that further research is needed to generate accurate hydrological information
concerning the specific link between certain land uses and the several dimensions
embedded in the provision of drinking water (i.e., quantity, quality, and spatial and
temporal distribution). Also, an examination of the supply-side of potential trading
schemes it is also necessary so as to identify potential matches or mismatches between
water users’ willingness to pay for provision of watershed services provision and
landowners service providers’ willingness to accept that compensation. Ultimately, future
research exploring the cost-effectiveness of incentive-based conservation policies should
account for so-called land market feedback effects that could result from payments or
land purchases. Land market feedbacks due to increasing demand as a result of the
implementation of new institutional arrangements may result in changes to future costs
and threats (Naidoo et al. 2006). A better understanding of these dynamic effects on
performance of incentive-based institutional structures to secure the provision of drinking

water sources in watersheds may warrant further examination in the Costa Rican context.

91

APPENDICES

92

APPENDIX A

93

Appendix A. Cairo-Francia & Milano communities.

 

Source: Basic Map of Costa Rica 1:50 000: Sheet # 084 Bonilla #079Guacimo.

Figure A]. Close up to Cairo-Francia & Milano communities

94

APPENDIX B

95

 

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A: OD AU: 9.2.3.5
«cc—com 4747:..- 2.5 N DD San — U: 8.5 even 558%.“. .5. 2.8.3.: $5.393: 2.3825 G—
. 508.1«5h “ Eoz< “EN a E334 gm—
”oEeZ Ill 6:5

 

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seem. . . . : 82d 55...?

96

 

APPENDIX C

97

Appendix C. Disposition Code Sheet

Date: Name:

1.0 Interview
1 .1 lete
1.2 Partial

Non-Interview
2.10 Refusal and break-offs
2.11 Refusals
2.1 1 l Household-level refusal
2.1 12 Known refusal
2.12 Break-off
2.20 Non-contact
2.23 Unable to enter
2.24 No one at residence
2.25 /unavailable
2.30 Other
2.31 Dead
2.32 or
2.33
2.331 Household-level
2.332
2.333 No interviewer available for needed
2.35 Miscellaneous

3.0 Unknown Non-interview
3.10 Unknown if hous unit
3.11 Not attem or worked
3.17 Unable to reach/unsafe area
3.20 Hous unit/Unknown if eli
3.21 No screener
3.90 Other

4.10 Out of

4.50 Not a housin unit
4.51 B
4.52 Institution
4.53

4.60 Vacant unit
4.61 Vacant residences
4.62 Seasonal/Vacation/T residence
4.63 Other

4.70 No eli

4.80 filled

Notes:

 

98

Booklet IDs

 

APPENDIX D

99

$3.5m he as: wean—85$ Ad 0.5!..—

 

 

.
.

 

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bin—ESP.»

 

 

 

9.: egress d 52.2.3.

100

APPENDIX E

101

Appendix E. Household Questionnaire English/Spanish Version

Household Questionnaire-Initial Contact Sheet

 

 

 

 

Name of Interviewer: Date:
Location: Cluster:
Questionnaire ID: Time Start: Time Finish:

 

 

 

[ONLY INTERVIEW HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD OR SPOUSE - 18 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER]l

Hello, my name is . I am working with
researchers at Michigan State University in the US. and EARTH University here in
Guacimo. We would like to talk to you about your water service.

I. Do you have piped water service in this house?
Yes OK, are you one of the heads of the household? [MARK]

Yes Would this be a good time to talk to you about your water
service?

Yes [CONTINUE WITH CONSENT STATEMENT]
No When would be a better time for us to speak?
Yes [TIME: DATE: |
No OK, thank you. Have a good day.

No When can I come back to speak with a head of household?
[TIME: DATE: |

No OK, since we’re only talking with people about their piped water service
we can’t interview you for this study. Thank you for your time. Have a
good day.

Refusal Can you just tell me if you have piped water in this house?

Yes OK, thank you for your time. Have a good day.
No OK, thank you for your time. Have a good day.

 

' Sentences in CAPITAL LETTERS and within brackets [ ] represent hints for the interviewer, Bold
letters indicate interviewer script lines

102

AFTER INITIAL CONTACT—INFORMED CONSENT AND INSTRUMENT

VERBAL INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT

 

 

[REPEAT ONLY IF NEEDED, A RE-VISIT FOR EXAMPLE]

Hello, my name is . As I mentioned, I am working
with researchers at Michigan State University in the US. and EARTH University here in
Guacimo. I would like to ask you some questions to learn from you about how you perceive
your current water service.

 

Before we go further there is some information I’d like to share with you. This
interview should take about 30 minutes. Your participation in this interview is
voluntary. There are no right or wrong answers. You do not have to answer any
questions you do not like and you are free to stop the discussion at anytime without any
problems or worries.

Your identity and responses will be kept confidential and your privacy will be protected
to the maximum extent allowable by law. We will not use your name, only a code
number, to identify you in our questionnaire and in analysis and reports. We will be
careful not to describe you or your activities in ways that would allow someone to guess
your identity and we will keep our data in a secure location.

I would like to accurately record everything you have to say. To help me do so, I will
follow a specially designed survey questionnaire and record your comments in the
spaces provided.

We hope that the information we learn from you and your fellow community members
will help us and our colleagues at EARTH University better understand how we can
help you and the communities in your zone.

Do you have any questions? Yes /
No

[RECORD QUESTIONS RAISED AND REPLY AS TRAINED. REMEMBER TO REFER TO
CONTACT SHEET AND PROVIED RESPONDENT WITH CONTACT SHEET]

If you have questions later on about this study, please contact any of the people on the
project contact information sheet [HAND THEM THE CONTACT INFORMATION SHEET].

If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a study participant, or
are dissatisfied at any time with any aspect of this study, you many contact Peter
Vasilenko, Ph.D., Director of Human Research Protections, Michigan State University.
His information is also on the information sheet.

May we proceed with our interview?
Yes / No

Throughout our discussion, please feel free to ask me any questions you may have.

103

 

SECTION I — Natural Resource Management

[INTERVIEWER] I’d like to start off by asking you about natural resources.

[EMPHASIS]

We use the term “natural resources” in this interview to describe places and things in

the natural environment.

1. OK. Keeping in mind the level of importance or unimportance of Natural
Resources to your family’s well being, please rate the importance or unimportance
of the following natural resources to your family’s well being where the lesser
importance is equal to “Extremely Unimportant” and the grater importance is

equal to “Extremely Important”. Let’s go one by one.

[USING THE FOLLOWING SCALE]
1 = Extremely Unimportant
2 = Somewhat Unimportant
3 = Neither Important nor Unimportant
4 = Somewhat Important
5 = Extremely Important

[MARK ONLY IF THE PERSON EXPRESSES 1T]
DK = Don’t know

So thinking on the forests in the area, would you say that
a. forests are [READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE] for your
family’s well being?

And with respect to rivers crossing throughout the area,
b. would you say that they are [READ EACH ITEM IN
SCALE] for your family’s well-being?

How about water springs in this area, would you say that
c. they are [READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE] for your family’s
well-being?

What would you say about the existence of fish in the
d. area’s rivers? [READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE IF
NECCESARY]

e. Now, how about the presence of wildlife in the area?
[READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE IF NECCESARY]

What would you say about the variety of trees and plants
in the area?

What level of importance would you say that the presence
of birds in the area has for your family’s well being?

ID

104

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

 

 

 

 

2. Now, I’d like you to think about the protection of Natural Resources in this region.
Would you say that the protection of Natural Resources in the area are being
extremely well protected, somewhat well protected, neither well nor poorly
protected, somewhat poorly protected, or extremely poorly protected?

[MARK THE ONE THAT APPLIES]

l = Extremely Well

2 = Well

3 = Neither Well nor Poorly

4 = Poorly

5 = Extremely Poorly

[MARK ONLY IF RESPONDENT EXPRESSES IT]

_ = Don’t Know

105

SECTION II — Piped Water Use

[INTERVIEWER — MAKE A SHORT PAUSE]

3. Water is another Natural Resource. Some characteristics of this area, such as the
slope of the land and rainfall, allow for communities to collect water from sources in
the higher parts of these lands. This situation usually happens in an area called a
watershed. During this interview, a watershed is a portion of land where rainfall
water runs downstream so as to reach one or several creeks, rivers or springs.

a. Have you heard of this definition of watershed before?
Yes
No [REINFORCE THE CONCEPT]

4. We have heard that piped water in this area generally comes from one of several
water springs. Who is your household’s piped water service provider?

[MARK THE ONE THAT APPLIES]

 

b. A y A

c. [WRITE THE NAME OF THE AQUEDUCT]
d. Don’t know

e. Other

 

5. What would you say is the largest quantity of water used for in your household?
3. Domestic Use, meaning for drinking, cooking, showering, and washing clothes.
OR

b. Agricultural uses, meaning irrigation, cleaning hog pits/dairy facilities, and
filling up tilapia ponds

[FILL IN ONLY IF RESPONDENT VOLUNTEERS OTHER INFORMATION]
c. Other

 

106

6. For the purpose of this interview, we are going to talk about three main
characteristics of piped water for human consumption: water pressure, reliability of
the service and water quality.

Let’s think on water pressure as the quantity of water you get from your tap, fully
open, in a given time.

a. Can you give me a short example about it?

[VERIFY THAT THE ANSWER MATCHES THE CONCEPT READ AND
CLARIF Y IF NECESSARY]

b. So, according to this, would you say that the typical pressure of your water
service is [REPLACE WITH EACH OF THE OPTIONS OF THE SCALE]?
[MARK THE INDICATED OPTION — ONLY ONE]

1 = Extremely Good

2 = Good

3 = Neither Good nor Poor
4 = Poor

5 = Extremely Poor

[MARK ONLY IF RESPONDENT EXPRESSES IT]
DK = Don’t Know

7. For our purpose today, water reliability refers to the period of time within which
you received water without interruptions, not including those stoppages of water
service caused by failure to pay the water bill

a. Can you give me a short example about it?

[VERIFY THAT THE ANSWER MATCHES THE CONCEPT READ AND
CLARIFY IF NECESSARY]

b. So, according to this, would you say that the typical reliability of your water
service is [REPLACE WITH EACH OF THE OPTIONS OF THE SCALE]?
[MARK THE INDICATED OPTION — ONLY ONE]

1 = Extremely Good

2 = Good

3 = Neither Good nor Poor
4 = Poor

5 = Extremely Poor

[MARK ONLY IF RESPONDENT EXPRESSES 1T]
DK = Don’t Know

107

c. Would you say that your household has experienced piped water service
interruptions?

YES [CONTINUE TO LITERAL (i)]
NO [CONTINUE TO QUESTION 8]

1. Regarding those water service interruptions that your household has
experienced, let’s think about those instances that occurred within the
last 12 months, let’s say since last July. Of those interruptions, how many

would say lasted
a. Less than a day [GET THE BEST GUESS IN A
NUMBER]
b. More than a day [GET THE BEST GUESS IN A
NUMBER]

ii. During the last 12 months, how long-lasting was the longest water service
interruption that you recall your household has experienced?

[PROBE FOR EXACT AMOUNT OF TIME IN HOURS OR DAYS]
Hours Days

iii. During the longest interruption, what did your family do to obtain household
water?
[MARK THE OPTIONS THAT APPLY TO INDICATED AN SWER(S)]

Waited (did nothing)

Used water that we had stored in containers

Have a reservoir tank

Receive help from relatives

Purchase water in bottles

Purchase water from cistern trucks (stored it in a tank)

We used water from other source (rainfall, river, well, or spring)
We own a water pump to suction water from the pipe grid
Other

=".=‘0.° rm .e-e 9'1»

 

108

8. For this interview, another characteristic of your piped water service that we are
interested in is water quality, which refers to water taste, appearance, and safety.
When we say water safety, we mean whether or not the piped water your receive is
safe for your health and that of your family.

a. Can you give me a short example about it?

[VERIFY THAT THE ANSWER MATCHES THE CONCEPT READ AND
CLARIFY IF NECESSARY]

b. So, according to this, would you say that the typical reliability of your water
service is [REPLACE WITH EACH OF THE OPTIONS OF THE SCALE]?
[MARK THE INDICATED OPTION - ONLY ONE]

1 = Extremely Good

2 = Good

3 = Neither Good nor Poor
4 = Poor

5 = Extremely Poor

[MARK ONLY IF RESPONDENT EXPRESSES IT]
DK = Don’t Know

9. During the last year, do you think your household’s piped water has had any
impact on the health of any member of your family?

a. Yes Can you briefly tell me about the health impact that you associate with
your piped water? [RECORD COMMENTS]

 

b. No

10. Now, thinking on possible alternative sources for your drinking water, do you or
any member of your family buy bottled water to drink at home?
[MARK THE INDICATED OPTION]

a. Yes How many and how often do you buy water containers?
[FILL IN THE TABLE ANSWERS]

 

[SIZE OF [NUMBER [DAY] [WEEK] [MONTH]
CONTAINER] BOUGHT]

 

1 It. Bottle

 

2 1t. Bottle

 

1 Gallon

 

5 Gallon

 

 

 

 

 

 

Other

 

 

b. No

109

[INTERVIEWER: CAREFULLY READ THE ROLE-SCRIPT OF THE WATHERSHED
DIAGRAM LOCATED AT THE END OF THE QUESTIONNARIE]

Experts have studied various activities taking place in surrounding areas of water
springs that may impact the water pressure, reliability of the service and quality of
water in aqueduct systems.

Some of the studied activities that may impact the water sources of aqueduct systems
include:

1) Timber-cutting taking place nearby water springs;

2) Agriculture that use agrochemicals, herbicides and fertilizers,
that may infiltrate into the soil and reach water sources;

3) Livestock, dairy and hog operations generating manure that may
get into waterways; and

4) The development of upper watershed areas for housing or hotels
that may cause timber-cutting, as well as generates wastewater
that may get into soil and reach water sources.

11. Knowing this, what do you think would happen to your water sources, if anything
else besides what is currently done to protect them is done in the future?

[INTERVIEWER: READ LIST AND MARK AS MANY AS APPLY. REMEMBER
TO START READING THE LIST WITH A DIFFERENT ITEM FOR EACH
INTERVIEW. MARK WITH “X” BY THE LETTER OF THE ITEM YOU START
WITH. THEN READ IN ALFABETICAL ORDER FROM THE FIRST ITEM (for
example: 0, d, e, f, g, a, b).]

a. They will remain the same

b. They will dry out

c. They will deliver less quantity of water

(I. AyA or the Local Aqueduct Committee will protected them

[USE ONLY IF THE RESPONDENT EXPRESSES IT]
e. I don’t know
f. Other

 

110

Now, I would like to know if you think that the following activities are an issue now, or
if they will be so in five years, in the area nearby the water spring.

12. Do you think that timber-cutting in the area nearby the water spring is currently a
problem for your water source?
a. Yes No Don’t know

gWhat about in 5 years?
b. Yes No Don’t know

13. Do you think that agriculture in the area nearby the water spring is currently a
problem for water sources of your aqueduct?

a. Yes NO Don’t know

éWhat about in 5 years?
b. Yes No Don’t know

14. Do you think that development of new areas for housing or hotels in the area
nearby the water spring is currently a problem for water sources of your aqueduct?

a. Yes No Don’t know

5What about in 5 years?
b. Yes No Don’t know

111

SECTION III— Program Referendum Section
[INTERVIEWER: READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT CAREFULLY]

We have discussed so far your opinions concerning the drinking water service in this
area. We have also talked about some land uses taking place in areas nearby the water
springs, which may or may not impact current pressure, reliability and quality of
water.

There a various programs that can be put into practice; I would like you to consider
one possible program that could be designed to protect your community’s drinking
water sources for the long term.

Thw program would support the use of a new water spring different from the current
one, and would focus on protecting land encompassing the new water spring. So, that
you as a water user will continue to receive the:

a. Same pressure, reliability and quality of water that you typically received
during the last year.

[ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO TO BE USED ON EVERY OTHER
HOUSEHOLD. MARK X HERE WHEN USED]

 

b. Same pressure and same quality as you have typically received in the last year;
however, reliability will be improved through better aqueduct maintenance so
that you will have half as many interruptions as you have had in the last year.

 

 

 

For this to happen, the program would work with owners of land nearby the water
sources to protect the land, or to practice low or no impact activities. For instances,
land protection will prevent or reduce tree-cutting and impacts associated to
agricultural operations.

The program would be implemented by registering voluntary cooperation agreement
through a contract between the Aqueduct Administration, community’s water users,
and owners of land encompassing the new water spring.

The program to protect water sources will cost money. To finance this program, every
household in your community will be asked to vote for or against the program. If a
majority of the community members vote yes for the program, all water users will help
to finance the cost of the program by paying an additional amount on their monthly
water bill.

It is expected that some people will vote for supporting the program and some will vote
against it. For example, some people might vote against the program because they think
that activities nearby the water spring do not represent a problem for the water sources
integrity; others might vote against it because they can get water from other sources.

112

On the other hand, some people might vote for supporting the program because they
recognize that activities nearby the water spring represent a current or future problem
for the water sources and they believe that a program to protect water sources will
secure the long term provision of water.

Your input is important for the process. We want to know about your opinion if you
were asked to cast your vote for this program to protect water sources.

113

15. Would you vote for or against the program if you would have to pay [SEE COST
COLUMN FOR ALTERNATIVE] colones more on your monthly water bill?

[CLARIFY THAT TO VOTE FOR EQUALS YES AND AGAINST EQUALS NO]
[[IMPORTANT! ALTERNATE INITIAL BIDS IN EVERY INTERVIEW. MARK WITH “X”
BY THE LETTER OF THE ITEM YOU START WITH]

[MARK WITH “X” BY THE INDICATED ANSWER Y = YES OR N = NO]

 

 

 

 

COST
a. 400 Y N
b. 800 Y N
c. 1600 Y N
d. 2400 Y N

 

[PAUSE] [USE THE SAME ESCALE AND INSTRUCCTIONS ABOVE]

[MARK HERE IF YOU READ i6. a.i]

16. a. i) It is not clear what the program cost would be; there are two estimates. If the
program would cost your household [SEE ALTERNATIVE FOR YES/NO IN
COLUM COST] colones more per month, would you vote for or against the
program?

[MARK HERE IF YOU READ l6.a.ii]

 

 

16. a. ii) And if the program would cost your household [SEE ALTERNATIVE FOR
YES/NO IN COLUM COST] colones more per month, would you vote for or against
the program?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Says that would vote Says that would vote
for (YES) against (NO)
a. 800 Y N .100 Y N
b. 1600 Y N l 400 Y N
c. 2400 Y N 800 Y N
d. 4000 Y N 1600 Y N

 

 

114

 

[IF RESPONSE WAS A NO —

NO: ASK THE FOLLOWING 16. b) What does the respondent say while
QUESTION] making the decision?
17. Would you vote in favor [MARK ALL THAT APPLY]

to pay any additional a. Says it’s w.

amount per month for b. Says it’s M

this program? c. Says that she/he can’t afford it

(I. Discusses personal expenses.

SI How much would e. Questions benefits for she/he.
that be? f. Questions if project would work.
¢ g. Recognizes that she/he should pay

more but can’t afford it.

No Why? h. Other:

18.

19.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If this program to secure water sources in this area is implemented and secures the
provision of water for the long-term, do you think this program would provide
other benefits?

a. Yes Which ones? ,
[MARQUE LA(S) MAS CERCANA(S) O AGREGUE OTRA]?

1. Protect the rivers’ water quality
ii. Birds protection
iii. Better fishing in the area

iv. Regulate the implementation of environmental-friendly agricultural
practices

v. Minimize water related health risks
vi. Increase job opportunities
vii. Provide improvements to community’s facilities
viii. Improve Aqueduct Management '
ix. Increase reliability of water service
x. Other

 

 

b. No
c. Don’t know

When we talk about long-term, what length of time would you say crosses your
mind?

Years Don’t know

 

115

20. On your opinion, what entity would you say is responsible for protecting the

community’s water sources?
[MARQUE WITH “X” OR ADD IN OTHER AS INDICATED]

AyA

Local Aqueduct
FONAFIFO
MIN AE
Municipality
Don’t know
Other

(PWPP-PP’P’

 

116

SECTION IV —Drinking Water Service Administration
21. With regard to your current water service, do you use water meter?
a. Yes [CONTINUE TO QUESTION 24]
b. No
c. Don’t know
22. Do you pay a set monthly fee for your drinking water service?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t know
23. How much was your water bill last month?
Colones Don’t know [CONTINUE TO QUESTION 27]
24. Does you meter work?
a. Yes
b. No
0. Don’t know

25. How often is the meter read?

a. Once a month

 

b. Other
c. Don’t know
d.

26. Approximately, how much do you pay each month?

Colones Don’t know

117

Now, I would like to discuss with you about the use of water meters

27. Using a scale of l to 5, with “1” being “Strongly Disagree” and “5” being “Strongly
Agree”, please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following
statements concerning water meter usage

[USANDO LA SIGUIENTE ESCALA]
l = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither agree nor disagree
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree

[USE ONLY IF RESPONDENT EXPRESSES IT]
DK = Don’t Know

[INTERVIEWER: READ LIST AND MARK AS MANY AS APPLY. REMEMBER TO
START READING THE LIST WITH A DIFFERENT ITEM FOR EACH INTERVIEW.
MARK WITH “X” BY THE LETTER OF THE ITEM YOU START WITH. THEN READ
IN ALFABETICAL ORDER FROM THE FIRST ITEM (for example: 0, d, e, f, g, a, b).]

“The use of water meter ”

 

Improve billing practices because households only pay for
water they use. Would you say that you [READ EACH ITEM 1 2 3 4 5 DN
IN SCALE] with this statement?

Improve water conservation because households will be more
careful and not waste water. [READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE 1 2 3 4 5 DN
IF NECCESARY]

Improve water service because the Aqueduct Administration
will have more funds to render the service. [READ EACH 1 2 3 4 5 DN
ITEM IN SCALE IF NECCESARY]

118

[USE SAME SCALE AND INSTRUCTIONS AS PREVIOUS]

“A water meter ”.

 

Miscalculates the amount of water households consume.
d. Would you say that you [READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE]
with this statement?

Results in higher monthly payments relative to a set

e. monthly fee, even when water meter is working properly.

[READ EACH ITEM 1N SCALE 1F NECCESARY]

f Require households to pay to install and maintain the
' meter. [READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE IF NECCESARY]

Can be illegally tampered. [READ EACH ITEM IN
3 SCALE IF NECCESARY]

119

DN

DN

DN

DN

28. Researchers in this area have elaborated some suggestions about how to protect
your current drinking water service .

I will read through a list of suggestion first, and, then, please I will ask you to tell us
how important is for you each of this suggestions. Using a scale of 1 to 5, with “1”
being “Extremely Unimportant” and “5” being “Extremely Important”.

[USING THE FOLLOWING SCALE]
1 = Extremely Unimportant
2 = Somewhat Unimportant
3 = Neither Important nor Unimportant
4 = Somewhat Important
5 = Extremely Important

[MARK ONLY IF THE PERSON EXPRESSES IT]
DK = Don’t know

[INTERVIEWER: READ LIST AND MARK AS MANY AS APPLY. REMEMBER TO
START READING THE LIST WITH A DIFFERENT ITEM FOR EACH INTERVIEW.
MARK WITH “X” BY THE LETTER OF THE ITEM YOU START WITH. THEN READ
IN ALFABETICAL ORDER FROM THE FIRST ITEM (for example: c, d, e, f, g, a, b).]

 

a. Provide more information/education to community
members on how to help to protect water sources. Would 1 2 3 4 5 DN
you say that this suggestion is [READ EACH ITEM IN
SCALE]?

b. Improve participation of community’s households in
water conservation. Would you say that this suggestion I 2 3 4 5 DN
is [READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE IF NECCESARY]?

c. Improve community organization, would you say that it
is [READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE IF NECCESARY] that 1 2 3 4 5 DN
this suggestion should be undertaken to protect water
sources in this area?

d. Improve communication and cooperation between the
people in the community and government agencies. 1 2 3 4 5 DN
[READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE IF NECCESARY]

e. Improve system’s maintenance by Aqueduct

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Administration [READ EACH ITEM IN SCALE IF 1 2 3 4 5 DN
NECCESARY]
f. Improve administration by Aqueduct Administration 1 2 3 4 5 UN
LConduct a study to locate an alternative water spring 1 2 3 4 5 DN
h. Protect the land around the water spring 1 2 3 4 5 UN
[USE ONLY IF RESPONDENT EXPRESSES IT]
Other

 

 

 

120

SECTION V— Demographic Information

I have some general questions about you and your family
[INTERVIEWER: CIRCLE RESPONDENT’S GENDER]

 

I Male / Female I

29. What is your age?
30. a. How many persons 18 years or older live in this household?
b. How many persons under 18 years live in this household?

31. How long have you lived in this community?
Years

 

32. Are you planning to leave this community next year? Yes
No

33. What is the highest level of school that you have completed?
[MARK THE OPTION THAT APPLIES]

a. None or some years of primary school e. Some time at university
b. Primary f. Bachelor’s Degree
c. Some years of high school g. Licentiate Degree
d. High School h. Graduate Degree
34. aWhat is your current civil status?
a. Marries [CONTINUE TO QUESTION 35]
b. Civil Union [CONTINUE TO QUESTION 35]
c. Divorced /Separated [CONTINUE TO QUESTION 36]
(1. Single [CONTINUE TO QUESTION 36]
e. Widow [CONTINUE TO QUESTION 36]

35. What is the highest level of school that your spouse has completed?
[MARK THE OPTION THAT APPLIES]

a. None or some years of primary school 6. Some time at university
b. Primary f. Bachelor’s Degree

c. Some years of high school g. Licentiate Degree

d. High School h. Graduate Degree

36. The home that you inhabit is [READ OPTIONS]?

a. Owned
b. Rented

c. Being taken care of
d. Borrowed

121

6. Don’t’ know
f. Other

37. {Do you farm any land? Si No

38. Including all the members in your household, can you tell me approximately
what the total monthly income in your household is?

¢ [REGISTER THE AMOUNT]

 

[IF RESPONDENT REFUSES TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER, ASK THE
FOLLOWING]

a. Can you just tell me if your total household monthly income is less than
150,000 colones?

a) Yes
i. If so, can you tell me if your total household monthly income
is less than 75,000 colones?
01. Yes
02. No
b) No
i. If so, can you tell me if it less than 240,000 colones?
01. Yes
02. No

39. Do you vote in any of the following elections [READ OPTIONS]?
[MARK THE OPTION THAT APPLIES]

a. At a community level, for Development Committee for example Yes No

b. At a local level, for Mayor or Regents for example Yes No

c. At a cantonal level , for Member of Congress for example Yes No

(1. At a national level, for President Yes
No

40. Do you trust your current water service administration to manage the aqueduct?

a. Yes
b. No Briefly, tell me why not?
c. Don’t know Briefly, tell me why?

 

 

41. Programs like the one presented in this interview are likely to require the
participation of community members in a committee.

122

a. Would you be willing to participate in this water aqueduct committee?
Yes No

b. Would any other member in your household older that 18 be willing to
participate? Yes No

[READ QUESTION 42 ONLY IF RESPONDENT SAYS “NO” TO PREVIOUS, IF
NOT F INALIZE THE INTERVIEW]

42. In a short comment, what is the main reason that prevents you from
participating in the Aqueduct Committee?

 

 

 

 

 

Well, that was the last question. Thank you very much for your time.

We really appreciate your willingness to share your opinions about these issues.
Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions or comments in the
future.

Our contact information is on the information sheet we gave you earlier.

FINISHED WITH INTERVIEW

123

SECTION VII - For Interviewer Only

43. Did the person who responded to the questions seem disturbed (e.g., irritated,
nervous) during the interview?

a. Yes
b. No

44. Do you think the respondent made an effort to tell the truth?

a. About their perceptions Yes/No
b. About their income Yes/No
0. About their voting Yes/No

45. In general, how would you rate the overall quality of the interview?

a. Extremely Good

b. Good

c. Neither Good nor Poor
d. Poor

e.

Extremely Poor

If you have any comments you would like to make about the respondent’s answers
to this questionnaire or the questionnaire itself, please record them below.

124

CUESTIONARIO DOMICILIAR - PAGINA DE CONTACTO INICIAL

 

 

Entrevistadora: F echa:
Lugar: Cluster:
ID Cuestionario: Hora Inicio: Hora Finalizado:

 

[SE ENTREVISTA SOLO JEFES DE FAMILIA O CONYUGUES - MAYORES DE 18 ANOS]
Buenos dias, mi nombre es: . Trabajo para un
proyecto de investigacion social de la Universidad Michigan State en Estados Unidos

y la Universidad EARTH de Guacimo. Nos gustaria conversar con usted acerca de
su servicio de agua potable.

I. aRecibe usted agua entubada en esta casa?
Si Gracias. (,Es usted jefe/jefa de familia? [MARCAR]

Si Cree usted que podemos hablar acerca de su servicio de agua
potable en este momento?

Si [CONTINUE CON ACUERDO DE CONFORMIDAD]
No aCree usted que habra un mejor momento para hablar?

Si [HORA: FECHA: |
No Gracias por su tiempo, que tenga un buen dia

No (,Cuando puedo regresar para hablar con uno de los
jefes de la familia?

[HORA: F ECHA: |
No Gracias, pero como solo estamos entrevistando en las casas donde
reciben agua entubada, no hace falta entrevistarlo(a) a usted para este
estudio. Gracias de nuevo por su tiempo. Que pase un buen dia.
Rechazo gPodria solamente decirme Si reciben agua entubada en esta casa?

Si Muchas gracias por su tiempo, que pase buen dia

No Muchas gracias por su tiempo, que pase buen
dia.

125

DESPUES DEL CONTACTO INICIAL — ACUERDO DE CONFORMIDAD Y
CUESTIONARIO

ACUERDO VERBAL DE CONFORMIDAD

 

 

[REPITA SOLO SI ES NECESARIO— EL CASO DE UNA SEGUNDA VlSlTA POR
EJEMPLO]

Como dije antes, mi nombre es: . Trabajo para
un proyecto de investigacién social de la Universidad Michigan State en Estados
Unidos y la Universidad EARTH de Guacimo.

 

Antes de continuar, tengo informacién importante que me gustaria compartir con
usted. La conversacién durara aproximadamente 30 minutos. Su participacién en
esta entrevista es voluntaria. No existen respuestas correctas, ni incorrectas. No
tiene que contestar a ninguna pregunta que no le guste, y tiene la libertad de dejar
la discusién en cualquier momento sin problemas o preocupaciones por haberlo
hecho.

Su identidad y respuestas seran estrictamente confidenciales y su privacidad sera
protegida al maximo, tanto como la ley nos lo permite. No utilizaremos su nombre,
sino un c6digo nume’rico para identificarle en nuestro cuestionario y en los analisis e
informes. Seremos cuidadosos de no describir sus actividades en forma tal que
permita que alguien pueda adivinar su identidad, y mantendremos nuestros datos
siempre en un lugar seguro.

Quiero tomar nota cuidadosamente de todo lo que usted desee decir. Para ayudarme
a hacer esto voy a utilizar este cuestionario.

Esperamos que la informacién que recibamos de su parte y de otros miembros de su
comunidad sirva para entender mejor cOmo nosotros y los colegas en la Universidad
EARTH podemos apoyar a personas como usted y a las comunidades en esta zona.

(,Tiene alguna pregunta? Si
NO

[REGISTRE LAS PREGUNTAS Y RESPONDA DE ACUERDO AL ENTRENAMIENTO.
RECUERDE REFERIRSE A LA HOJA DE CONTACTO Y PROVEERLE AL
ENTREVISTADO UNA COPIA DE LA MISMA.]

Si en el futuro usted tuviera alguna pregunta con respecto a este estudio, por favor
contacte directamente a cualquiera ’de las personas indicadas en esta hoja
[ENTREGAR LA HOJA CON INFORMACION DE CONTACTO].

Si tiene alguna pregunta con respecto a sus derechos como participante de esta
investigacién, o esta descontento en algi'm momento con este estudio, puede
contactar al Dr. Peter Vasilenko, Director de Investigacién que involucra sujetos
humanos. Su informacién de contacto también esta en esta hoja.

126

 

(,Procedemos con la entrevista? Si
No

Durante esta conversacién por favor siéntase libre de hacerme cualquier pregunta
que tuviera.

127

SECCION I - Manejo de Recursos Naturales

[ENTREVISTADORA] Quiero comenzar preguntandole sobre recursos naturales
[ENFASIS] Nosotros usaremos el término “recursos naturales” en esta entrevista

para describir lugares y cosas en la naturaleza.

1. Ahora bien. Pensando en el nivel de importancia de los recursos naturales para
el bienestar de su familia, diga por favor cual es el nivel de importancia que tiene
cada uno, donde lo menos importante es igual a “Sin Importancia” y lo mas

importante es igual a “Muy Importante”. Vamos uno por uno.

[USE LA SIGUIENTE ESCALA]
1 = Sin Importancia
2 = Poco Importante
3 = Ni Importante ni NO Importante (Indiferente)
4 = Importante
5 = Muy Importante

[MARQUE SOLO SI EL ENTREVISTADO LO EXPRESA]
NS = NO SE

Entonces, pensando en los bosques de esta zona, usted
a. diria que los bosques son [LEA CADA OPCION EN LA 1 2 3
ESCALA] para el bienestar de su familia?

Y al respecto de los rios que cruzan la zona, gusted diria
b. que los rios son [LEA CADA OPCION EN LA ESCALA] 1 2 3
para el bienestar de su familia?

Que me dice de las nacientes de agua de'esta zona,
c. (gusted diria que son [LEA CADA OPCION EN LA 1 2 3
ESCALA] para el bienestar de su familia?

(,Y qué me dice de la existencia de peces en los rios de

d‘ esta zona? [LEA LA ESCALA SI ES NECESARIO] ' 2 3
Ahora, acuando hablamos de la existencia de animales

e. de montafla en esta zona? [LEA LA ESCALA SI ES 1 2 3
NECESARIO]

f ;,Y que me dice de la variedad de arboles y plantas en 1 2 3

° esta zona?

g (,Qué importancia le asigna a la presencia de aves en I 2 3

esta zona para el bienestar de su familia?

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

 

ID

 

 

128

 

2. Ahora bien, me gustaria que piense en la proteccién de los recursos naturales en
esta zona. gDiria usted que los recursos naturales de la zona estan siendo muy
bien protegidos; bien protegidos; ni bien ni mal protegidos; mal protegidos; 6
may mal protegidos?

[MARQUE LA OPCION INDICADA]

1 = Muy Bien

2=Bkn

3 = Ni Bien ni Mal (Indiferente)
4 = Mal

5 = Muy Mal

[USE SOLO SI EL ENTREVISTADO LO EXPRESA]

_=NO sé

129

SECCION 11 — Uso de Agua Entubada
[ENTREVISTADORA — HAGA UNA CORTA PAUSA]

3. El agua es un recurso natural. Algunas caracteristicas del terreno en esta zona,
como la pendiente y las lluvias, permiten a las comunidades recolectar agua
desde fuentes. Esta situacién se da en zonas llamadas cuencas. Para esta
entrevista una cuenca es una porcién de la tierra donde el agua de lluvias corre
hacia abajo hasta alcanzar en conjunto una o varias quebradas, rios o nacientes.

a. gHabia escuchado esta definicién de cuenca?
Si
NO [REF UERCE EL CONCEPTO]
4. Hemos oido que el agua entubada en esta zona generalmente proviene de mm o
varios nacientes, (,Digame por favor quién es el encargado de brindar el servicio

de agua para su casa?

[MARQUE LA OPCION INDICADA]

 

a. A y A

b. [ESCRIBA EL NOMBRE DEL ACUEDUCTO]
c. NO sé

d. Otro

 

5. gPara qué utiliza usted la mayor cantidad de agua en su casa?
a. Uso Doméstico , es decir para beber, cocinar, bafiarse o lavar ropa.
O

b. Usos agricolas, es decir para riego, limpieza de chanchera o lecheria, para
llenar piscinas de tilapia, etc.

[ugAR SOLO SI EL ENTREVISTADO VOLUNTARIAMENTE OFRECE OTRA
OPCI N]

c. Otro

 

130

6. Para nuestra conversacién y para fines de esta entrevista vamos a hablar de tres
caracteristicas importantes del agua entubada que se usa para consumo
humano: presi6n del agua, confiabilidad del servicio y calidad del agua.

Entendamos presién como la cantidad de agua que usted recibe con la llave
completamente abierta durante un determinado tiempo.

a. gPuede darme un ejemplo corto al respecto?

[VERIFIQUE QUE LA RESPUESTA COINCIDA CON EL CONCEPTO
LEIDO Y CLARIFIQUE SI ES NECESARIO]

b. De acuerdo a lo anterior gDiria usted que la presidn habitual de su servicio
de agua es [REEMPLACE CON LAS OPCIONES DE LA ESCALA]?
[MARQUE LA OPCION INDICADA — SOLO UNA]

1 = Muy Buena

2 = Buena

3 = Ni Buena Ni Mala (Indiferente)
4 = Mala

5 = Muy Mala

[MARQUE SOLO SI EL ENTREVISTADO LO
EXPRESA]

NS =NO 36'

131

7. Para nuestros fines, confiabilidad del servicio se refiere al tiempo en que usted
recibe el agua sin interrupciones, no tomando en cuenta los cortes por falta de

pago.
a. (,Puede darme un ejemplo corto al respecto?

[VERIFIQUE QUE LA RESPUESTA COINCIDA CON EL CONCEPTO
LEIDO Y CLARIFIQUE SI ES NECESARIO]

b. De acuerdo a lo anterior éDiria usted que la confiabilidad habitual de su
servicio de agua es [REEMPLACE CON LAS OPCIONES DE LA ESCALA]?
[MARQUE LA OPCION INDICADA — SOLO UNA]

l = Muy Buena

2 = Buena

3 = Ni Buena Ni Mala (Indiferente)
4 = Mala

5 = Muy Mala

[MARQUE SOLO SI EL ENTREVISTADO LO
EXPRESA]

NS =NO sé

132

. aDigame por favor si en su casa han experimentado interrupciones en el
servicio de agua entubada?

Si [CONTINUE CON EL LITERAL (i)]
NO [CONTINUE CON LA PREGUNTA 8]

i. Hablando de las interrupciones del servicio de agua que han
experimentado en su casa, pensemos solo en las veces que ha ocurrido
en los ultimos doce meses, digamos que desde julio pasado. (,De esas
interrupciones, cuantas veces han durado?

a. Menos de un dia [OBTENGA LA MEJOR
APROXIMACION
EN NUMERO]
b. Mas de un dia [OBTENGA LA MEJOR
APROXIMACION
EN NUMERO]

ii. En los ultimos doce meses, (,cuanto tiempo dur6 la interrupcién del
servicio mas larga que usted recuerda?

[OBTENGA UNA APROXIMACION EN HORAS O DIAS — LO QUE
APLIQUE]

Horas Dias

iii. Durante esa interrupcién arecuerda usted qué hizo su familia para
obtener agua?

[ENCIERRE LAS OPCIONES QUE APLIQUEN A LA(S)
RESPUESTAS]

Esperamos a que volviera (no hicimos nada)

Usamos agua que guardamos en recipientes

Tenemos un tanque de almacenamiento

Nos ayudaron unos parientes

Compramos agua embotellada

Compramos agua de un camién cistema

Cogimos agua de otro fuente (lluvia, rio, pozo, naciente)
Tenemos una bomba para jalar agua de la tuberia

Otro

r'qu we .0-9 9‘!»

 

133

8. Para fines de esta entrevista otra caracteristica de interés es la calidad del agua,
la cual se refiere a su sabor, apariencia, y seguridad. Cuando decimos seguridad
estamos hablando de que si el agua es 6 no apta para su salud y la de su familia.

a. gPuede darme un ejemplo corto al respecto?

[VERIFIQUE QUE LA RESPUESTA COINCIDA CON EL CONCEPTO
LEIDO Y CLARIFIQUE SI ES NECESARIO]

b. De acuerdo a lo anterior gDiria usted que la calidad habitual de su servicio
de agua es [REEMPLACE CON LAS OPCIONES DE LA ESCALA]?
[MARQUE LA OPCION INDICADA — SOLO UNA]

1 = Muy Buena

2 = Buena

3 = Ni Buena Ni Mala (Indiferente)

4 = Mala

5 = Muy Mala

[MARQUE SOLO SI EL ENTREVISTADO LO
EXPRESA]

NS = No sé

9. Durante e1 ultimo aflo, acree usted que su salud 6 la de alguno de los miembros
de su familia ha sido afectada por el agua que reciben en su casa?

a. Si aCuénteme brevemente que tipo de padecimiento asocia usted al agua
entubada? [REGISTRE LOS COMENTARIOS]

 

b. NO

134

l0. Pensando en fuentes alternativas de agua potable, (,Usted o alguien de su familia

compra agua embotellada para beber en casa?
[MARQUE LA OPCION INDICADA]

a. Si LCuantos envases compran y con qué frecuencia ?
[ESCRIBA LAS RESPUESTAS EN LA TABLA]

 

[TAMANO DE [NUMERO [DIA] [SEMANA] [MES]
ENVASE] COMPRADO]

 

Botella de l litro

 

Botella de 2 litros

 

1 Galén

 

 

 

 

 

 

5 Galones

 

 

b. NO

[ENTREVISTADORAI CUIDADOSAMENTE LEA EL ESCRITO-GUION DEL
DIAGRAMA DE LA CUENCA QUE SE ENCUENTRA AL FINAL DE ESTE
CUESTIONARIO]

Algunas personas expertas han estudiado varias actividades alrededor de la
naciente que pueden tener cierto impacto en la presi6n, la confiabilidad del servicio
y la calidad del agua de un Sistema de acueductos.

De las actividades estudiadas algunas pueden o no tener un impacto sobre las
fuentes de agua de un Sistema de acueductos, tales como:

1) La corta de arboles alrededor de la naciente;

2) Agricultura que usa agroquimicos, con herbicidas y
fertilizantes, que pueden adentrarse en el suelo y llegar a las
fuentes de agua;

3) Ganaderia, lecherias o chancheras que pueden generar bofiiga
que puede llegar a las fuentes de agua; y

4) Las construcciones de casas y hoteles que ocasionan corta de
arboles y generan aguas negras que pueden adentrarse en el
suelo y llegar hasta las fuentes de agua.

135

11. En base a lo anterior, aqué cree usted que sucederia con las fuentes de agua que
abastecen su casa, si nada mas de lo que se hace hoy para protegerlas, se hace en
el futuro?

[ENTREVISTADORAz LEA LA LISTA Y MARQUE LAS QUE APLIQUEN. RECUERDE
LEER LA LISTA COMENZANDO CON UN INCISO DIFERENTE EN CADA
ENTREVISTA. MARQUE CON UNA “X” A LA PAR DE LA LETRA CON QUE
COMENZO A LEER. SIEMPRE LEA EN EL ORDEN LISTADO (EJEMPLO: c, d, e, f, g,

a. b)-]

b. Se secaran
c. Daran menos agua
d. AyA 0 el comité del acueducto local van a protegerlas

a. Se mantendran igual l

[USE SOLO Sl EL ENTREVISTADO LO EXPRESA] "
e. No sé
f. Otro

 

 

136

Me gustaria saber si usted cree que las siguientes actividades son un problema
actual o lo seran dentro de cinco aflos para la zona alrededor de la naciente.

12. (,Cree usted que la corta de arboles alrededor de la naciente es un problema
actual para las fuentes de agua?
a. Si NO NO sé

LY dentro de 5 afios?
b. Si NO NO sé

l3. (,Cree usted que las actividades agricolas alrededor de la naciente son un
problema actual para las fuentes de agua de su acueducto?

a. Si NO NO sé

éY dentro de 5 afios?
b. Si NO NO se'

14. (,Cree usted que la construccién de casas y hoteles alrededor de la naciente son
un problema actual para las fuentes de agua de su acueducto?

a. Si NO NO sé

(,Y dentro de 5 aiios?
b. Si No NO 56

137

SECCION III — Secci6n de Voto por el Programa
[ENTREVISTADORAI CUIDADOSAMENTE LEA EL SIGUIENTE ESCRITO]

Hasta ahora hemos conversado sobre sus opiniones acerca del servicio de agua en
esta zona asi como de los diferentes usos de la tierra alrededor de la naciente, los
cuales pueden 6 no tener un impacto en la presi6n, confiabilidad y calidad del agua.

Hay diversos programas que pueden ponerse en practica, me gustaria que
considerara un posible programa que podria ser disefiado para asegurar las fuentes
de agua de la comunidad en el largo plazo.

El programa apoyaria el uso de una nueva naciente de agua diferente a la actual, y
se enfocaria en proteger la tierra alrededor de esta nueva naciente. De este modo,
usted como usuario seguira recibiendo:

a. La misma presi6n, la misma confiabilidad y calidad de agua que ha
recibido tipicamente durante el afio pasado.

[ESCENARIO ALTERNATIVO, A SER USADO CADA DOS CASAS
MARQUE AQUI CON UNA X CUANDO LO USE |

 

 

b. La misma presi6n y calidad de agua que ha recibido tipicamente durante
el aflo pasado; pero con una confiabilidad mejorada, de modo que usted
solo tenga la mitad de las interrupciones que tuvo durante el aflo pasado,

 

 

b. procurando mejorar el mantenimiento del acueducto.

 

 

Para ello se trabajaria con propietarios alrededor de la fuente de agua para que
protejan la tierra o practiquen actividadesde poco o ningun impacto. Por ejemplo,
la proteccion prevendra o reducira la corta de arboles y los impactos de las
actividades agricolas.

El programa se implementaria mediante un acuerdo voluntario de cooperaci6n
registrado a través de un contrato entre la administracion del acueducto, los
usuarios del agua, y los duefios de tierras alrededor del nuevo naciente.

138

Este programa de proteccién de las fuentes de agua costara dinero. Para financiar el
programa, a cada hogar en su comunidad se le solicitara que vote a favor 0 en
contra del programa. Si la mayoria de los miembros de la comunidad votan a favor,
todos los usuarios ayudaran a financiarlo pagando un monto adicional en su tarifa
mensual del agua.

Se espera que algunos voten a favor y otros en contra del programa. Por ejemplo,
alguna gente podria votar en contra del programa porque piensan que las
actividades alrededor de la naciente no representan ningI’In problema para la
integridad de las fuentes de agua; otros podrian votar en contra porque tienen c6mo
obtener agua de otras fuentes. Por otro lado, alguna gente podria votar a favor del
programa porque reconocen que las actividades alrededor de la naciente podrian
ser un problema actual o a futuro para la integridad de las fuentes de agua y creen
que un programa para proteger las fuentes de agua asegurara la provisi6n de agua
en el largo plazo.

Sus opiniones son importantes para el proceso. Queremos saber su opini6n en el
caso de ser requerido para votar por este programa de protecci6n de fuentes de
agua.

139

 

15. aVotaria usted a favor 0 en contra del programa si tuviera que pagar [VER
ALTERNATIVA EN COLUMNA DE COSTO] colones mas en su recibo mensual
de agua?

[CLARIFICAR QUE A FAVOR ES SI Y EN CONTRA ES NO]

[[IMPORTANTE! ALTERNAR COSTO INICIAL EN CADA NUEVA ENTREVISTA.
MARQUE CON UNA “X” A LA PAR DE LA LETRA CON QUE COMENZO A LEER]
[MARQUE LA ORESPUESTA CON UNA X EN S = SI O N = NO]

 

 

 

 

COSTO
a. 400 S N
b. 800 S N
c. 1600 S N
d. 2400 S N

 

[PAUSA] [USE LA MlSMA ESCALA E INSTRUCCIONES PREVIAS]

[MARQUE SI USO l6.a.i]

I40

16. a. i) No esta claro aun cual seria el costo del programa; existen dos estimados. Si
el programa le costara a su hogar [VER ALTERNATIVA SI /NO EN COLUMNA
DE COSTO] colones mas por mes, votaria a favor 0 en contra del programa?

[MARQUE SI USO l6.a.ii]

 

 

16. a. ii) Y si el programa le costara a su hogar [VER ALTERNATIVA 81 /NO EN
COLUMNA DE COSTO] colones mas por mes, votaria a favor 0 en contra del
programa?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dice que a favor (SI) Dice que en contra (NO)
a. 800 S N 100 S N
b. 1600 S N 400 S N
c. 2400 S N 800 S N
d. 4000 S N 1600 S N
[SI LA RESPUESTA ES NO
— NO, HAGA LA 16. b) gQué dice el entrevistado mientras toma su
SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA:] decisién? [Puede marcar mas de una]

a. Dice que es demasiado caro
l7. Votaria a favor de pagar

cualquier cantidad
adicional cada mes por
este programa?

b. Dice que es demas_iado poco
c. Dice que no puede pagarlo

d. Habla de sus gastos

e. Duda del beneficio para él/ella

 

 

SI Cuanto seria? f. Duda que el proyecto m
¢ g. Reconoce que debe pagar mas pero que no
puede
No Por qué? h. Otro:

 

 

 

 

 

141

 

18. Si este programa que pretende proteger las fuentes de agua de la zona se lleva a
cabo asegurando la provisi6n de agua a largo plazo, 5Cree usted que el
programa proveeria otros beneficios ?

a. Si Cuales? ,
[MARQUE LA(S) MAS CERCANA(S) O AGREGUE OTRA]?

i. ProtecciOn de la calidad del agua del riO
ii. Proteccién para las aves
iii. Mejoramiento de la pesca en la zona

iv. Regular la implementacién de practicas agricolas amigables con el
ambiente

v. Minimizar riesgos de salud relacionados con el agua
vi. Aumentar las oportunidades de trabajo
vii. Mejorar la infraestructura en la comunidad
viii. Mejorar la administracién del acueducto
ix. Aumentar la confiabilidad del servicio

x. Otro

 

b. NO

c. No se’

19. Cuando hablamos de “largo plazo”, adiganos por favor cuanto tiempo viene a
su mente?

Afios NO sé

 

20. Segun su opini6n (,qué entidad es responsable por el cuidado de las fuentes de
agua de la comunidad?
[MARQUE UNA O AGREGUE LO QUE APLIQUE]

a) AyA
b) Acueducto Local
c) FONAFIFO

d) MINAE

e) Municipalidad
t) No sé

g) Otro

 

142

SECCION IV — Administracién del Servicio de Agua Potable

21. Con respecto a su actual servicio de agua éUtiliza medidor?

a. Si [CONTINUE CON LA PREGUNTA 24]
b. NO
c. No sabe

22. (,Paga usted una tarifa mensual fija por su servicio de agua potable?
a. Si L
b. No ,
c. NO sabe '

23. éCual fue el valor de su recibo de agua e1 mes pasado?

 

Colones No sabe [CONTINUE CON LA
PREGUN TA 27]

24. gSabe usted si su medidor funciona?

a. Si
b. NO
c. NO sabe

25. gSabe usted cada cuanto es leido su medidor?

a. Una vez a1 mes
b. Otro
c. NO sabe

 

26. Aproximadamente, acuanto paga usted por mes?

Colones NO sabe

143

Ahora, me gustaria conversar con usted acerca del uso de los medidores de agua

27. Usando una escala de l a 5, donde “1” significa “Muy en Desacuerdo” y “5”
significa “Muy de Acuerdo”, por favor digame cuan de acuerdo o cuan en
desacuerdo esta usted con las siguientes declaraciones relacionadas con el uso de
los medidores de agua.

[USANDO LA SIGUIENTE ESCALA]
1 = Muy en Desacuerdo
2 = En desacuerdo
3 = Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo(1ndiferente)
4 = De acuerdo
5 = Muy de Acuerdo

[MARQUE SOLO SI EL ENTREVISTADO LO MANIFIESTA]
NS = NO sabe

[ENTREVISTADORA: RECUERDE LEER LA LISTA COMENZANDO CON UN
LITERAL DIFERENTE EN CADA ENTREVISTA. MARQUE CON UNA “X” A LA
PAR DEL LITERAL CON EL QUE COMENZO A LEER. SIEMPRE LEA EN EL
ORDEN LISTADO (POR EJEMPLO: C, D, E, F, G, A, B).]

“El uso del medidor .”

Mejora el Sistema de cobro ya que los usuarios

pagan solamente por la cantidad de agua usada. 1 2 3 4 5 NS
Digame por favor si usted esta [LEA CADA

OPCION EN LA ESCALA] con esta declaracion?

Mejora la conservacién del agua puesto que de

esta manera los usuarios tendran mas cuidado de l 2 3 4 5 NS
no desperdiciar el agua. [LEA LA ESCALA SI ES '
NECESARIO]

Mejora el servicio de agua debido a que el
0 Comité del Acueducto tendra mas fondos para 1 2 3 4 5 NS
' brindar el servicio. [LEA LA ESCALA SI ES
NECESARIO]

144

 

[USE LA MISMA ESCALA E INSTRUCCIONES PREVIAS]

“Un medidor ”.

 

Calcula de mala manera la cantidad de agua que
(1 una familia consume. Digame por favor si usted
' esta [LEA CADA OPCION EN LA ESCALA] con

esta declaracién?

Cobra mas caro que lo que se paga en una tarifa
e. mensual fija, aun si el medidor funciona bien. 1
[LEA LA ESCALA SI ES NECESARIO]

Requiere que las familias paguen la instalaci6n y
f. el mantenimiento. [LEA LA ESCALA SI ES 1
NECESARIO]

Puede ser alterado o modificado ilegalmente.
g. [LEA LA ESCALA SI ES NECESARIO]

145

NS

NS

NS

NS

28. Existen algunas sugerencias por parte de expertos en el area acerca de c6mo
proteger su actual servicio de agua.

Permitame leer una lista de sugerencias y por favor digame cuan importante o no es
para usted cada una de ellas, usando una escala de 1 a 5, donde 1 es igual a “Sin
Importancia” y 5 es igual a “Muy Importante”.

[USANDO LA SIGUIENTE ESCALA]
l = Sin Importancia
2 = Poco Importante
3 = Ni Importante ni No Importante(1ndiferente)
4 = Importante
S = Muy Importante

[MARQUE SOLO SI EL ENTREVISTADO LO MANIFIESTA]
NS = NO sabe

[ENTREVISTADORA: RECUERDE LEER LA LISTA COMENZANDO CON UN
LITERAL DIFERENTE EN CADA ENTREVISTA. MARQUE CON UNA “X” A LA
PAR DEL LITERAL CON EL QUE COMENZO A LEER. SIEMPRE LEA EN EL
ORDEN LISTADO (POR EJEMPLO: C, D, E, F, G, A, B).]

 

a. Dar mas informacién y educacion para la gente de
la comunidad sobre como colaborar con la
protecci6n de las fuentes de agua, adiria usted que 1 2 3 4 5 NS
esta sugerencia es [LEA CADA NUMERAL DE LA
ESCALA]?

b. Mejorar la participacién de los hogares de la
comunidad para la conservaci6n del agua, adiria 1 2 3 4 5 NS
usted que esta sugerencia es [LEA LA ESCALA SI
ES NECESARIO] ?

c. Mejorar la organizacion comunal, adiria usted que
esta sugerencia es [LEA LA ESCALA SI ES 1 2 3 4 5 NS
NECESARIO] que se debe hacer para proteger las
fuentes de agua potable en el area?

d. Mejorar la comunicacién y participacién entre la

gente de la
comunidad y las instituciones del gobierno. [USE l 2 3 4 5 NS

LA MISMA
ESCALA E INSTRUCCIONES PREVIAS]

e. Mejorar e1 mantenimiento del Sistema por parte del
Comité del Acueducto. [USE LA MISMA ESCALA 1 2 3 4 5 NS
E INSTRUCCIONES PREVIAS]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

146

[USE LA MISMA ESCALA E INSTRUCCIONES PREVIAS]
[CONTINUE LA LECTURA DE LA SECUENCIA]

 

 

 

f. Mejorar la administracion por parte del Comité del 1 2 3 4 5 NS
Acueducto
g.Llevar a cabo un estudio para localizar una 1 2 3 4 5 NS
naciente alternativa
NS

h.Pro_tegerla tierra alrededor dela naciente 1 2 3 4 5

 

[USE SOLO SI EL ENTREVISTADO PROVEE
INFORMACION DE MANERA VOLUNTARIA]

i. Otro

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

147

 

SECCION V - Informacion Demografica

Tengo algunas preguntas generales acerca de usted y su familia.
[ENTREVISTADORA: MARQUE EL GENERO DEL ENTREVISTADO]

 

I Hombre / Mujer I

 

29. (,Cual es su edad?
30. a. (,Cuantas personas mayores de 18 afios viven en esta casa?
b. gCuantas personas menores de 18 afios viven en esta casa?

31. gCuanto tiempo ha vivido usted en esta comunidad?
Afios

 

32. gTiene usted planeado mudarse de esta comunidad en el siguiente afio? Si
No

33. éCual es el nivel de educacion mas alto que usted complet6?
[ENCIERRE EL LITERAL QUE COINCIDA CON LA RESPUESTA DEL
ENTREVISTADO]

a. Primaria Incompleta 6 Nada
b. Primaria Completa

c. Secundaria Incompleta

d. Secundaria Completa

Universidad Incompleta
Bachillerato Universitario
Licenciatura

Postgrado

P'CPI‘P.“

34. aCual es su estado civil?

Casado [CONTINUE CON LA PREGUNTA 35]
En uni6n libre [CONTINUE CON LA PREGUNTA 35]
DivorciadO/Separado [CONTINUE CON LA PREGUNTA 36]
Soltero [CONTINUE CON LA PREGUNTA 36]
Viudo [CONTINUE CON LA PREGUNTA 36]

{DP-99'!”

35. (,Cual fue el nivel de educaci6n mas alto que su pareja ha completado?
[ENCIERRE EL LITERAL QUE COINCIDA CON LA RESPUESTA DEL
ENTREVISTADO]

Primaria Incompleta 6 Nada
Primaria Completa
Secundaria Incompleta
Secundaria Completa

Universidad Incompleta
Bachillerato Universitario
Licenciatura

Postgrado

P-P .U'P
Erect-w

148

36. (La casa en que usted vive es [LEA LAS OPCIONES]?

a. Propia

b. Alquilada

c. Cuida la propiedad

d. Prestada

e. No sabe

f. Otro

37. (,Se dedica usted a la agricultura? Si NO

 

38. Incluyendo a todos los que viven en su casa, gCual es aproximadamente el
ingreso mensual en su hogar?

¢ [REGISTRE EL MONTO]

 

[8] EL ENTREVISTADO RECHAZA RESPONDER, PREGUNTE LO
SIGUIENTE]

a. gPodria solo decirme si el ingreso total por mes de su casa es menor que
150,000 colones?
a) Si
i. Si es asi, (,puede usted decirme si el ingreso total por mes de
su casa es menor que 75,000 colones?

01. Si
02. NO
b) NO
i. Si es asi, apuede usted decirme si es menor que 240,000
colones?
01. Si
02. No

39. Vota usted en alguna de las siguientes elecciones [LEA LAS OPCIONES]
[MARQUE LA OPCION INDICADA]

a. A nivel comunitario, para Comité de Desarrollo por ejemplo Si NO
b. A nivel local, para Alcalde o Regidor por ejemplo Si No
c. A nivel cantonal, para Diputados por ejemplo Si No
d. A nivel nacional, para Presidente Si NO

40. (,Confia usted en la administracion de su actual servicio de agua para manejar e1
acueducto?

a. Si
b. NO Digame brevemente apor qué?
c. NO Sabe Digame brevemente apor qué?

 

149

41. Programas como el presentado en esta entrevista tienden a requerir la
participacién de los miembros de la comunidad en un comité.

a. (,Estaria Usted dispuesto a participar en este Comité del Acueducto de
Agua?
Si NO

b. (,Estaria algun otro miembro de su hogar mayor de 18 afios dispuesto a
participar?
Si NO

[LEA LA PREGUNTA 42 SOLO SI EL ENTREVISTADO RESPONDE “NO” A LA
PREGUNTA 41, SI RESPONDE SI FINALIZE LA ENTREVISTA]

42. En un comentario muy corto, diganos por favor, écual es la raz6n principal que
evita que Usted participe en el Comité del Acueducto?

 

 

 

 

 

Bueno, esa fue la ultima pregunta. Muchas gracias por su tiempo. De verdad aprecio
mucho su disposici6n de compartir con nosotros sus opiniones sobre estos temas.
Si en el futuro usted tiene preguntas 0 comentarios, por favor no dude en
contactarnos. Nuestra informaci6n de contacto esta en la pagina que le entregamos
al inicio de esta entrevista.

TERMINE LA ENTREVISTA

150

SECCION VI - Para el entrevistador solamente

43. gPiensa Usted que la persona entrevistada se not6 contrariada (ej. irritada, nerviosa,
molesta) durante la entrevista?

a. Si
b. NO

44. éPiensa usted que la persona entrevistada hizo un esfuerzo por responder con la
verdad?

a. Sobre sus percepciones Si NO
b. Sobre sus ingresos Si NO
c. Sobre su votacién Si NO

45. En términos generales, gcémo calificaria la calidad general de la entrevista?

a. Muy Buena

b. Buena

c. Ni Buena ni Mala
d. Mala

e. Muy Mala

Si usted tiene algun comentario que quisiera hacer sobre las respuestas del entrevistado o
sobre el propio cuestionario, por favor registrelo en este espacio.

151

   

IIIIIIIIIIIII