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The Impact of World War II on the Stalinist Home Front:

Magnitogorsk, 1941-1953

presented by

Joon-Seo Song

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6I07 p:/C|RC/DaIeDue.indd-p.1

 

THE LEGACY OF WORLD WAR II ON THE STALINIST HOME FRONT:
MAGNITOGORSK, l 94 1 -1 953

By

Joon-Seo Song

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

2007

ABSTRACT

The Impact of World War II on the Stalinist Home Front:
Magnitogorsk, 1941-1953

By

Joon-Seo Song

This dissertation investigates the impact of the Second World War on
Magnitogorsk, a defense industrial center in the Urals, and its people. Drawing on
interviews and sources located in Magnitogorsk and Cheliabinsk archives, this study
explores the city authorities’ strategies to overcome social, economic, and political
problems created by the war, and the ways in which the urban inhabitants responded to
governmental policies, by investigating three important aspects of postwar daily life:
living conditions, labor, and social security. By examining the experiences of
Magnitogorsk, the study aims to illustrate that the home-front region had its own unique
war legacy and distinctive identity because Soviet war experiences and their impacts
were not homogenous, but varied across the region. Wartime experiences in the home
front, including hard labor and Magnitogorsk’s propagandized portrayal as a key arsenal
for victory, enhanced regional identity based on a sense of entitlement among urban
inhabitants. Unlike the increased significance of wartime exploits in postwar daily life
within frontline and occupied regions, the inhabitants of Magnitogorsk defined their own
participation and success in the war not in terms of heroic feats in battle, but in terms of
the productivity and labor that supported the Soviet war effort. My analyses of
Magnitogorsk authorities’ strategies of distribution, productivity, and welfare reveal

previously neglected characteristics of postwar Stalinism. Unlike previous scholarship,

which views coercion and exclusion as the postwar Stalinist government’s main tool vis-
aevis society, this study demonstrates that inclusion and concession were essential
components of the Stalinist strategies by investigating authorities’ initiations of need-
based distribution of food and consumer goods and a humanitarian and paternalistic spirit
imbedded in their welfare practices. The findings further suggest that the postwar Stalin
era was not an apogee of the Stalinist rule, implemented with a firmly established set of
tenets, policies, and practices. Rather, postwar Stalinism was fluid, in constant flux, and
even contradictory as the leadership rehabilitated and redefined prewar Soviet values and

practices and eventually established new ones.

Copyright by
JOONSEO SONG
2007

For my parents, Jung-hyun Song and Myung-soon Lee

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been finished without valuable support from
many important people. First of all, I thank my advisor, Dr. Lewis H. Siegelbaum. His
insightful advice, support, and patience were essential for my dissertation research and
writing. My committee members, Drs. Elvira Wilbur, Leslie Moch, Keely Stauter-
Halsted, and John Beck, gave thoughtful feedback on the points that I would not have
otherwise considered. Dr. Wilbur and Kees Boterbloem read and gave valuable feedback
on a preliminary version of a chapter which was later integrated into each chapter of my
dissertation. Crucial comments and questions from Jeffry Jones, Christopher Burton,
Greta Bucher, Donald Filtzer, and Sheila Fitzpatrick at the Midwest Russian History
Workshop and national conventions of AAASS helped me rethink some issues that I had
overlooked. Numerous discussions with colleagues enabled me to elaborate many
unclear ideas. For this, I am indebted particularly to Steven Tuckey, Anastasia Gridasova,
and Lauren Mason at Michigan State University, Victoria Shkurkina at Tomsk State
University, and Christina Yu at the University of Notre Dame. Steven Tuckey deserves
special mention for his sincere and insightful suggestions for my dissertation. Close
reading by my outside reader, Elizabeth Rankin, made my dissertation much more refined.

My research trips could not have been more productive thanks to the funding (the
Research Enhancement Award) from the MSU Graduate School and History Department
and help from many warm-hearted people in Russia. In Magnitogorsk, Prof. Mikhail
Abramzon of History at Magnitogorsk State University (MaGU) offered invaluable help,
from the arrangement of accommodations to administrative support during my two

vi

research trips to the steel town. Particularly, his arrangement of meetings with good local
people and of short trips to beautiful lakes, forests, and small towns in the southern Urals
offered refreshment and energy needed for my archival research. Without the timely
guidance of Prof. Marina Potemkina at MaGU, I would not have had a chance to see so
many important archival sources at the Cheliabinsk Oblast State Archive (OGAChO).
She provided answers to my questions from her broad historical knowledge on the war
and postwar Soviet society. The lectures she coordinated at MaGU and a local high
school offered me exciting opportunities to meet local students. Galina Miroenko,
archivist of the Magnitogorsk Archive (AOAM), made my research as comfortable as
possible. The candies and tea that she provided daily during my research in the archive
kept me refreshed and warm enough despite the Ural’s winter weather plummeting to

— 30 F °. Prof. I. F. Galiguzov at the Magnitogorsk Conservatory, Natasha Safina, a
former MaGU student, and Rita Bolkhovskaia, librarian at the Magnitogorsk Steel Works
Library, arranged interviews with local people for me. Inna Rudometova and Alena
Tokmakova, and Prof. Liudmila Kireeva of Art History at MaGU provided me with
priceless opportunities to experience impressive local culture. In Cheliabinsk, Galina
Kibitkina, vice director of the OGAChO, and archival staff members provided
enormously effective support for my archival research. Prof. Gennadii Bragin of the
Cheliabinsk Institute provided a place to stay and essential help for my daily routine.
Thanks to Prof. Bragin and Ms. Kibitkina’s encouragement, I had chances to present
papers on my research topics at local conferences held in Cheliabinsk. Tamara Riberrnan
enthusiastically introduced me to local culture while the Bragin family, Kim Valentina,

Irina Kliucherova, G. Kibitkina, and Dr. Leonid Pinelis of the ChTZ Hospital provided

vii

—+—— ; _..._. MAI..-

 

the warmest of care when I suddenly fell ill for a brief period. In Moscow, in addition to
a pleasant dinner invitation by Dr. Siegelbaum and Moch, my old friends and colleagues
Baik-yong Lee, Won-seek Kim, and Hae-nam Ahn, shared their accommodation, food,
and stories with me.

My enthusiasm for Russian/Soviet history never would have formed without Profs.
Yeon-su Ki and Young-sang Yim, my mentors at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
in Seoul, Korea. Prof. Ki introduced me to Russian history for the first time, while Prof.
Yim extended my research interest by offering me an opportunity to conduct research on
the Korean communities of the Ural region.

Last, but not least, my special thanks go to my family members. Without my wife,
Hyejung Grace Kong’s encouragement, understanding, and insightful guidance, it would
have been impossible for me to start and finish this dissertation. My son, Alexander Min
Song, gave me immense joy and refueled my energy to resume my writing whenever I
grew weary of it. Family-like members of the Grace Community helped me keep
spiritual peace and confidence. Finally, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my
parents, Jung-hyun Song and Myung-soon Lee. Their emotional and financial support for
my education enabled me to remain on track in pursuing a Ph.D. Thus, I dedicate this

dissertation to my parents.

viii

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................... xi
LIST OF MAPS ..................................................................................... xii
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER I
WARTIME MAGNITOGORSK: FORGING THE LEGACIES OF THE WAR .......... 30
Becoming a Mighty Arsenal .............................................................. 33
Prioritizing Magnitogorsk Workers ...................................................... 40
An illusory priority? ................................................................................... 41
Consolidating Privileges and Hierarchy ................................................ 44
Becoming the privileged: enterprise ofi‘icials and technical personnel ...44
The least privileged: young workers ........................................... 48
Magnitogorsk in Flux: Evacuation and Its Impact .................................... 51
Conclusion ................................................................................. 56
CHAPTER II
THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUITON AND SHORTAGE SURVIVAL STRATEGIES
IN MAGNITOGORSK ............................................................................. 59
Continued Symbolic Prioritization of Magnitogorsk ................................. 66
The Reality: Shortages Continued ....................................................... 69
Food ................................................................................. 69
Housing ............................................................................. 74
Consumer goods .................................................................. 76
The Politics of Distribution .............................................................. 83
Hierarchical distribution: its scope and limit ................................. 84
Socialist paternalism ............................................................. 89
Surveillance and paternalistic distribution .................................... 92
Responding to the Shortages: Workers’ Survival Strategies ........................ 94
Increasing sense of entitlement: “because the war is now over... . . . . . ..95
Regional identity and the sense of entitlement ............................... 97
Class identity and the sense of entitlement ................................... 101
Denunciation as a tool for manipulation ..................................... 103
Denunciation and resistance by the least privileged ....................... 111
Conclusion ................................................................................. 1 18

ix

CHAPTER III
THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTIVITY AND MAGNITOGORSK WORKERS’

SURVIVAL STRATEGIES .................................................................... 122
Politics of Productivity in Rhetoric .................................................. 128
Keep the wartime pace ........................................................ 128
Magnitogorsk women’s responsibilities .................................... 130
Love your job ................................................................... 132
Put in order ..................................................................... 133
Politics of Productivity in Reality and Workers’ Survival Strategies ........... 136
Partial “return to normalcy ” ................................................ 136
Abandoning voluntarism, focusing on professionalism ................... I43
Absenteeism and desertion: young workers ’ survival strategies ........ 160
Conclusion ............................................................................... 1 79
CHPATER IV
THE POLITICS OF WELFARE: SECURING SOCIO-POLIITICAL STABILITY
THROUGH HUMANITARIANISM AND PATERNALISM .............................. 182
Motivations of Stalinist Care ............................................................ 188
Veterans as the new poor ....................................................... 191
“Malicious” western impact ................................................. 194
Against “heartless attitudes humanitarianism as a key Soviet value..207
Strategies of Stalinist Care .............................................................. 214
Rules of inclusion ............................................................... 214
Prioritizing war veterans ...................................................... 217
Enhancing social responsibility ............................................... 224
Responding to Stalinist Care ............................................................ 230
Enterprise managers: resistance to decreasing paternalism .............. 230
Expressing gratitude for paternalistic care ................................. 232
Conclusion ............................................................................... 237
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 241
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................ 253

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Wartime rationing of bread (p. 41)
Table 2. The employment rate among eligible evacuees in the Ural region (p. 53)
Table 3. Desertion and absenteeism of MMK workers (p. 161)

Table 4. MMK workers’ absenteeism and desertion by age (Jan. 1946 — Feb of 1947)
(p.163)

Table 5. Causes for 12 MMK workshop workers’ absenteeism (April-July 1952) (p. 169)
Table 6. MMK absentees by age (April — July, 1952) (p. 170)
Table 7. The amount provided for extremely needy families (1948) (rubles) (p. 193)

Table 8. Employment of the invalids in Magnitogorsk (August 21, 1945) (p. 221)

xi

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1. Line of Farthest German Advances, 1941-44 (p. 10)

Map 2. Magnitogorsk, 1939 (p. 32)

xii

Introduction

War and Its Impact on European Society

Total war usually brings an array of changes to societies. The total mobilization
of society and massive social dislocation caused by such warfare undermines existing
social, economic, and political orders. The First World War brought the collapse of old
regimes and old ruling classes in Europe, as in Russia and Germany. After the war,
European governments enfranchised women as a reward for women’s contributions to the
war efforts. The development of welfare systems was another consequence of the war.1
After the end of the Second World War’s fascist regimes and Nazi occupations, a
“powerful shift to the Left” allowed socialists and Communists to earn broad support in
many postwar European societies.2 In particular, people in East Central Europe, formerly
under either Nazi control or local fascist regimes collaborating with the Nazis during the
war, either suffered from or witnessed violence at a close range.3 Through these wartime

experiences, prewar values, norms, and operative definitions of justice and legitimacy

were brought into doubt and often shattered. As a result, after the war “there was more

 

' For example, see Young-Sun Hong, “World War I and the German Welfare State: Gender, Religion, and
the Paradoxes of Modernity,” in Society, Culture, and the State in Germany 1870-1930, ed. Geoff Eley
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 345-69.

2 Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Lefl in Europe, 1850-2000 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), pp. 288-90.

3 Among civilian populations in Nazi-occupied East Central Europe, Serbia and Poland suffered most under
Nazi control during the war because national governmental authorities were not invited to collaborate with
German occupational forces. Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 216. Of course, the extermination of Jews in East Central
Europe—especially Poland where three million Jews perished—comprised some of the worst violence that
the Polish population witnessed—and sometimes tacitly approved through silence, indifference, and
collaboration—during the war. For example, see Michael Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the
Memory of the Holocaust (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997), pp. 28, 30.

1

”4

room for new normative ideas to form the basis for life. Communism was one the new

ideas that pervaded in East Central Europe.5

Postwar changes resulted in the emergence of new systems, but the changes were
often the consequences of the intensification of the social, economic, and political trends
of both prewar and wartime. Tensions among social groups such as the middle class and
working class, which European states assumed had been solved by the establishment of a
united home front during the First World War, did not vanish, but intensified afier the
war and eventually developed into fascism in Germany and Italy.6 Afier the Russian
Civil War (1918-1921), the “strain and decomposition caused by the ordeals of the war”
made officials use administrative and coercive methods extensively because they were

often “the only ones available.”7

As a result, the “bureaucratic and coercive features of
the state” became predominant after the war while the democratic components of the

revolutionary regime created in 1917 (such as trade unions, workers’ committees, and

 

4 Jan Gross, “War as Revolution,” in The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-
1949, ed. Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 24; Eley,
Forging Democracy, p. 298. Italics mine.

5 Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the
Present (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 240-41. Communism was especially appealing to workers and
intellectuals in former Nazi-occupied East Central Europe. Many workers who suffered as forced labor in
Germany during the war turned away from the discredited right-wing parties and moved to the left. But it
should be noted that faith in Communism among East Central Europeans originated not entirely in blind
belief in the “new faith,” i.e., Marxism. In particular, some intellectuals embraced communism because
there were no alternatives in postwar politics, while others did so out of fear, despair, and opportunism.
For the example of the radicalization of Polish workers during the war, see Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding
Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 18-
19. For the complex motivations of Polish intellectuals’ acceptance of the new faith, see Czeslaw Milosz,
The Captive Mind, trans. Jane Zielonko (New York: Vintage Books, 1981).

6 For example, see Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York:
Vintage Books, 1994), pp. 124-26.

7 Moshe Lewin, “The Civil War: Dynamics and Legacy,” in Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil
War: Explorations in Social History, ed. Diane P. Koenker, William G. Rosenberg and Ronald Grigor Suny
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 416-17.

soviets) were weakened.8 The post-World War II nationalization of economies in East
European countries—especially those that were under strong German economic and
political influence before the war—indeed started in 1940 with the German war
mobilization of regional economies, rather than by the Soviet domination of the region in
1945.9 How, then, did World War II affect the Soviet system and society? This
dissertation explores the legacies of the war and their impact on the Stalinist state and
society by focusing on Magnitogorsk, a defense industry center on the home front (Map

1).

Impact of World War II on the Soviet System and Society

The view that looks at World War II as a turning point that brought critical
changes to both the Soviet system and people is relatively new. As Amir Weiner points
out, an indifference or insensitivity to the changes in Soviet policies and society brought
about by the war originated from historians’ understanding of the interwar period as
composed of “formative and enduring moments” for the Soviet Union.10 This
understanding led them to see the postwar Stalin period either as a “continuation or a

temporal disruption of prewar structured policies.”ll

Thus, many scholars have seen the
war simply as a testing period for the Soviet system and institutions, rather than a period

that critically changed the nature of the system and its policies. For example, James

 

3 Lewin, “The Civil War,” pp. 416-17.
9 Gross, “War as Revolution,” p. 21. See also Johnson, Central Europe, pp. 214-16.

'0 Amir Weiner, “The Making of a Dominant Myth: The Second World War and the Construction of
Political Identities within the Soviet Polity,” Russian Review 55 (October 1996): 638.

" lbid. For example, see Susan J. Linz, ed., The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union (Totowa,
N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985).

Millar has described the postwar Stalin era as “a period during which the prewar system
was reestablished in most of its particulars.”12 Noting that wartime labor conscription
continued and the regime itself took “a stance of repressive vigilance in all areas,” just as
during the war, Sheila Fitzpatrick has stressed that it was only during the post-Stalin
years that Soviet society “lurch[ed] forward into the postwar era.” 13 For these scholars, it
was not until 1953, when Stalin died, that key changes occurred in the Soviet system and
policies. It is true that some prewar and wartime practices were reestablished and
continued after the war, but it also should be noted that some new systems and values
began to develop during the postwar Stalin years.

Some scholars have paid attention to subtle but important changes emerging in
postwar Stalinist policy. Analyzing the Soviet novel in the years after the war, Vera
Dunham has argued that the postwar Stalin government largely weakened the pursuit of
revolutionary values as the authorities implicitly sanctioned the pursuit of private
property and material cravings by the managerial-professional “middleclass.”l4 During
the war, Dunham has maintained, the Stalin government had to change its priority from
emphasizing communist ideology to appealing to patriotism, brotherhood, and loyalty in
order to be successfill in its total mobilization of the population.15 Dunham has claimed

that this wartime practice of lessened dependence on ideology continued afier the war,

 

'2 James R. Millar, “Conclusion: Impact and Aftermath of World War II,” in The Impact of World War I]
on the Soviet Union, p. 290.

'3 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Postwar Soviet Society,” in The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union, pp.
151-52.

1’ Vera Dunham, In Stalin 's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction (Durham and London: Duke
University Press, 1976), p. 49.

'5 lbid., p. 7.

when the Stalin government had to find some reliable group that could be utilized for the
reconstruction of a devastated country. Dunham suggests that it was the legacy of the
war (i.e., wartime destruction of the country) that pressured the Stalinist leadership to
enhance its ties with the middle class as a new partner for the government by offering
material incentives and sanctioning their pursuit of non-ideological, material desires. '6 In
this sense, Dunham emphasizes a non-revolutionary “embourgeoisement” of postwar
Stalinist governmental policy.

Like Dunham, Amir Weiner has demonstrated the ways that the wartime
experiences changed the Soviet social order and political system. He argues that the war
resulted in downgrading the significance of social origin, or class, which had been a key
criterion for promotion and repression. Wartime exploits and ethnicity, rather than class,
became the major yardstick used for measuring citizens’ “Sovietness” after the war.'7
Weiner stresses that the postwar authorities universalized the suffering of certain ethnic
groups either deported by the state or suppressed by the Nazis, and denied any ethnically

based hierarchy of martyrdom.18 Instead, the government encouraged an ethnic hierarchy

 

'6 lbid., pp. 12-13, 17.

'7 Amir Weiner, “The Making of a Dominant Myth,” 656-58; idem, Making Sense of War: The Second
World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 54, 377. The Stalin government began to
increasingly use ethnic identity as a measure of Soviet citizens’ political loyalty already in the late 19305.
Ethnicizing the enemy of people resulted in the deportations of ethnic minorities who were suspected as
unreliable people by the Soviet authorities. Terry Martin, The Aflirmative Action Empire: Nations and
Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 26-
27 . See also Amir Weiner, “Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the Soviet
Socio-Ethnic body in the Age of Socialism,” American Historical Review, vol. 104, no. 4 (October 1999),
1 122. F itzpatrick points out that “Soviet patriotism,” a new wartime and postwar propaganda theme largely
based on Russian nationalism, became one of the key decisive factors for postwar Sovietness. Sheila
Fitzpatrick, “Conclusion: Late Stalinism in Historical Perspective,” in Late Stalinist Russia: Society
Between Reconstruction and Reinvention, ed. Juliane Furst (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p.
272.

'8 Amir Weiner, “In the Long Shadow of War: The Second World War and the Soviet and Post-Soviet
World,” Diplomatic History, vol. 25, no. 3 (Summer 2001), 444-45. During the war, the Stalin government
deported to the interior of the Soviet Union certain ethnic groups living in the borderlands who it thought

5

based on contribution to victory, emphasizing the role of the Russians and Ukrainians. '9
Also, like Dunham, Weiner sees the continued retreat from a revolutionary ethos in
postwar Stalinist policy. Weiner views the growth in the significance of ethnically based
criteria, regardless of §ocial origin and political loyalty, as an obvious sign of the
authorities’ abandonment of the socialist revolutionary ideas of social engineering—the
transformation of its population into “New Soviet Man” in line with Soviet socialist
ideology.20 This suggests that after the war the Stalinist government introduced and
developed new notions of what it meant to be Soviet.

Historians have revealed that the war changed not only the nature of Stalinist
policy but also the sociopolitical attitudes of the Soviet people. Wartime experiences
such as heavy sacrifices and contributions to the war effort both on the frontlines and on
the home front transformed the Soviet people into more assertive members of society.
Weiner argues that the Great Patriotic War “forced and inspired individuals” (especially

fiontoviki, or the former front-line soldiers) “to reassert themselves, take up new roles,

 

could become German sympathizers (such as Soviet Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, and
other ethnic groups). See J. Otto Pohl, Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949 (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Pressl999). What scholars have neglected is the deportation of ethnic groups not only from the
European but also from the Far Eastern borderlands. Koreans in Primorsk region who had been able to
avoid the mass deportation of 1937 were deported during World War II to interior areas such as the Ural
region. Irina Kliucherova, whom I interviewed in 2003, was born to a Korean father and a Russian mother
in Kopeisk, a mining town near Cheliabinsk, in 1945. Her father had been deported on August 8, 1943
from Vladivostok to Kopeisk, where her family lived in a special settlement with other deported minorities,
including Volga Germans and Chechens, until the mid-19505. This shows that the Far Eastern Koreans
continued to be suspected of being Japanese spies, and consequently, deported not only before the war, but
also during the war. Interview with Irina Kliucherova, February 26, 2003, Cheliabinsk. See also Joonseo
Song, “Ural jiyeok koreoin communitywa hankukhak yeongu, 1991-2003 [The Expansion of Korean
Communities and the Rise of Korean Studies in the Urals]” Hankuk Siberia yeongu [Siberian Studies] 7
(December 2004): 1-35.

'9 Weiner, Making Sense of War, chapter 4.

2° This point is also implicit in Vera Dunham’s work. For example, see Dunham, In Stalin 's Time, pp. 5,
49.

and make new claims.”2|

Mark Edele supports this view in his study of Soviet veterans
who retained a particularly strong sense of entitlement based on their contribution to
victory in the war.22 This sense of entitlement frequently provoked the people who had
shed blood to express their strong disapproval of a reality that did not meet their
expectations for a better material life.23 Witnessing the gap between the Stalinist
government’s propaganda and real life, some citizens who could not accept the values
and norms propagated by the authorities became outspoken critics.24 A small number of
ideologically conscious youth even organized “anti-Soviet” (from the authorities’ point of
view) societies.25
Certainly, the spectrum of popular political attitudes was complex and
multifaceted.26 Along with the assertiveness, Elena Zubkova points out that an increasing

sense of unity with the government forged in wartime experiences (such as the common

challenge to survive and the national effort to expel the enemy) and growing trust in the

 

2' Weiner, Making Sense of War, p. 7. See also pp. 57-58, 378.

22 Mark Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group, 1945-1955,” Slavic Review, vol. 65, no, 1
(Spring 2006), 132-37; idem, “A Generation of Victors?” Soviet Second World War Veterans from
Demobilization to Organization 1941-1956” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2004).

23 A. A. Danilov and A. V. Pyzhikov, Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy: sssr v pervye poslevoennye gody
(Moskva: Rosspen, 2001), p. 194; Edele, “A Generation of Victors?” pp. 456-57; Jeffrey W. Jones, “In My
Opinion This Is All Fraud!” Concrete, Culture, and Class in the ‘Reconstruction’ of Rostov-on-the-Don,
1943-1948” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2000), pp. 275-77.

24 Elena Zubkova, Russia afier the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957 (Armonk, New
York: ME. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 109-116.

25 Juliane Furst, “Prisoners of the Soviet Selfi—Political Youth Opposition in Late Stalinism,” Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 54, N0. 3 (2002), 368-69. See also Zubkova, Russia after the War, 109-116.

26 Based on their analyses of recently declassified archival materials on the popular mood, historians of the
postwar Stalin era have shown a broad spectrum of political attitudes—including support, apathy, and
opposition—in the Soviet citizen. For example, see Zubkova, Russia after the War; Jones, “In My Opinion
This Is All Fraud!” p. 241; Edele, “A Generation of Victors?” p. 450.

Soviet system were other key components of postwar Soviet citizens’ attitudes.27 But
recent scholarship shows that full support was neither universal nor constant across the
citizenry. Despite Soviet citizens’ conformist attitudes, only a small number of people
were interested in political activities, such as political campaigns, elections, and
discussions of party and governmental decisions, as a result of the postwar material
hardship. The top concerns for many citizens were food and housing shortages, which
sometimes threatened their survival.28 Donald Filtzer also demonstrates in his study that
Soviet workers felt profoundly alienated from the regime and politics due to their
exhaustion and material hardship.29 Filtzer thus views political passivity and
demoralization as the main characteristics of workers’ attitudes during the late Stalin
years.30 Focusing on a younger generation that was not conscripted to the front, Juliane
Furst maintains that “apoliticalness, individualism and self-centredness,” as opposed to
official values and Soviet collectivism, were main components of postwar Soviet youth

identity.“

 

27 For example, see Zubkova, Russia after the War, pp. 25, 32, 74, 77.

2’ Zubkova, Russia after the War, p. 86. Kees Boterbloem, Life and Death under Stalin: Kalinin Province,
1945-1953 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), p. 137. Of course, the
observation of the postwar Soviet people’s apolitical conforrnism is not a new finding. For more on the
Soviet people’s attitudes of pursuit of material values and conformism, see Dunham’s pioneering work, In
Stalin ’s Russia.

29 Donald Filtzer, “The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar Period,
1945-1948,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 6 (1999): 1014, 1031-1032; idem, Soviet Workers and Late
Stalinism: Labour and Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War 11 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), p. 155

3° Filtzer, “The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers,” 1014.
3' Juliane Furst, “The Importance of Being Stylish: Youth, Culture, and Identity in Late Stalinism,” in Late

Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention, ed., Juliane F urst (London and New
York: Routledge, 2006), p. 220.

The Impact of the War on the Home Front

Despite recent scholarship’s stimulating findings about the changes brought by
the war that we saw above, the findings neither provide a complete picture of these
changes nor are they universally applicable to all regions. Lack of sensitivity to the
geographical dimension has hindered a careful consideration of the regional differences
of wartime experience and its effect on daily life and people’s mentality in different
regions. Until recently, studies on postwar Stalinist society heavily focused either on the
front regions32—including regions occupied by the German armies (such as the Ukraine
and Belorussia) and regions near the frontlines (such as Leningrad and Moscow)—or on
general conditions in the country in which regional particularities have been only
superficially described (Map 1).33 To be sure, wartime experiences of collaboration and
partisan movements by the population in the front regions and their impact on the social
and political identity of the people in those regions are interesting and important issues,
as are the experiences of those front regions after the war, when the enthusiasm,

dynamics, and tensions of postwar reconstruction dominated daily life. These studies on

 

32 It should be noted the division of front and home front was not fixed but fluid. For example, Ukraine,
Belorussia, and Kalinin oblast became occupied regions afier starting as front regions at the beginning of
the war; then they were transformed to home-front regions afier the liberation by the Red Army. In this
study, I define “front regions” as regions which either had been battlegrounds, occupied or blockaded by
German (and Japanese in the Far Eastern region) armies or whose populations had been evacuated due to
the immense threat from the enemy armies’ attack as a result of the geographical proximity to the
battlefields. For examples of the recent studies of the front regions, see Boterbloem, Life and Death under
Stalin; Jeffrey W. Jones, “People Without a Definite Occupation: The Illegal Economy and ‘Speculators’ in
Rostov-on-the Don, l943-1948” in Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-1953,
ed., Donald J. Raleigh (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), pp. 236-54; idem, “ ‘Every
Family Has Its Freak’: Perceptions of Collaboration in Occupied Soviet Russia, l943-48,” Slavic Review,
vol. 64, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 747-70; Weiner, Making Sense of War; Karl D. Quall, “Local-Outsider
Negotiations in Postwar Sevastopol’s Reconstruction, 1944-53,” in Provincial Landscapes, pp. 276-98;
Martin Blackwell, “Regime City of the First Category: The Experience of the Return of Soviet Power to
Kyiv, Ukraine, l943-1948,” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 2005); Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of
the Siege of Leningrad, I 941 -l 995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006): chapter 4.

33 For example, Zubkova, Russia after the War.

from regions show how the Stalin government reestablished the Stalinist order after its
collapse and replacement by an alien political ideology (i.e., Nazism) in the liberated

regions.

\ ”36":4“: ‘ . , d if“),
(Rm: " W .Kdmrn Wren-1944!

 

 

 

 

 

 

Map 1. Line of Farthest German Advances, 1941-44
Source: John Barber and Mark Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941-1945: A Social
and Econocmic History of the USSR in World War 11 (London and New York: Longman,
1991), p. 244 *Line is mine.

Regardless of the significance of the front region experiences, it should be noted
that the home-front regions furthest away from the frontlines throughout the war did not

share the same wartime experiences as the front regions in many cases, if at all. The

10

regions in the deep rear of Soviet territory, such as the Urals and Siberia, were never
occupied by the enemy and never experienced ethnic tensions and conflicts caused by
Nazi policies. In this sense, the life-threatening tensions related to ethnicity issues, which
Weiner vividly illustrates through the experiences of an occupied, rural Ukrainian area
(i.e., Vinnytsia oblast), did not exist in the Ural region. Of course, the home-front
regions were not entirely free from ethnic tensions. For example, the Ural region was
inhabited predominantly by Russians,34 and was fraught with tensions between local
people and evacuees due to a wartime influx of ethnic outsiders who were mainly Baltic
people and Jews.35 But, it should be noted that, as Potemkina points out, ethnic tensions
(including anti-Semitism) in the Urals was in many cases a consequence of worsening
material conditions and increasing daily inconvenience caused by the influx of the
evacuees.36 While ethnic antagonism in the home front was a mostly superficial wartime
phenomenon which would weaken after the war with the change of war-created
conditions (such as evacuation), wartime anti-Semitism in the occupied regions was more

sustainable because the hostility did not emerge abruptly during the war, but was deeply

 

3" On the eve of the war (1939), Russians were comprised of 7 1 .54 percent of the entire Ural populations,
followed by Tatars (8.95 percent), Bashkirs (5.96), Udmurt (3.89), Ukrainians (3), Mordvinians (1.53), and
others. M. N. Potemkina, Evakuatsiia v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny na urale: liudi isud ’by
(Magnitogorsk: MaGU, 2002), p. 145.

35 For many local people, the evacuees, especially from the Baltic republics, were a distinctive group in
terms of ethnic background and living standard. Indeed, many evacuees from the Baltic region could not
speak Russian fluently. For those evacuees from the Baltic republics (independent countries until 1939
when annexed by the Soviet Union as a consequence of the Nazi German and Soviet Non-aggression pact)
Russian was still a foreign language. Likewise, for the local people, Baltic languages were foreign. During
the war years, the use of foreign languages in the deep rear could easily be considered as subversive enemy
or spy behavior. For example, an Estonian party cadre, who was evacuated to the Cheliabinsk oblast, was
suspected to be a spy and was interrogated as a result of his correspondence with other evacuees in the
Estonian language. In addition, stunned by the fact that many Estonian evacuees possessed “luxurious”
personal items, such as typewriters, radio sets, and cameras, 3 local party secretary claimed in his letter to
the provincial party office that all these items should be seized. lbid., p. 152. Not only tensions between
evacuees from the Baltic regions and local people, but also the discord between Russian evacuees and local
Tatars and anti-Semitism especially in the rural areas of the Ural region were reported. lbid., pp. 149-50.

3‘ lbid., p. 149.
1 1

rooted in the historical experiences of the region.37 In this light, the home-front
experiences of ethnic tensions were not the same as the experiences that the people in the
occupied front-regions had. The effect of the wartime ethnic tension on postwar daily
life was less dominant in the home-front region, in comparison with the occupied home-
front regions. In the case of Magnitogorsk, there are several plausible reasons that few
cases of anti-Semitism were reported after the war.38 Magnitogorsk, a young industrial
town built during the early 19308, lacked the painful memories of the collectivization—a
process by which many rural people condemned Jews by identifying them with the Soviet
power that forcefully implemented the unpopular collectivization.39 In addition, the

newly created city did not have the longstanding tradition of anti-Semitism frequently

 

’7 Weiner demonstrates that in the western territory of the Soviet Union anti-Semitism can be traced to the
prerevolutionary era. During the First World War, the imperial Russian government (which suspected spy
activities of the Jews) deported a large number of Jews from border regions and combat zones to the
Russian interior. During the Civil War (1918-1921), Jews in the rural areas of the western Ukraine were
portrayed as “arch-enemy” by both the Right and Left, for the former saw them as Communists while the
latter portrayed them as reactionaries. Weiner, Making Sense of War, pp. 220, 272-73. For the nineteenth-
century presence of rural anti-Semitism in the western Ukrainian region (especially Galicia, a part of
Austrian empire at that time), see Keely Stauter-Halsted, The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant
national Identity in Austrian Poland 1848-1914 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp.
133-41. For anti-Semitism during the turn of the 20th century in the east Ukraine (i.e., Donbas region), see
Hiroaki Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, l870s-1990s
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 43-47.

3' The only example of postwar anti-Semitic sentiment in Magnitogorsk that 1 found in the archives are
anti-Semitic messages written on the ballot during the election of the local soviet held in March 1953,
immediately after the unfolding Doctors’ Plot—an alleged conspiracy (which was proved as fabricated
after the death of Stalin) to eliminate Soviet leadership organized by mostly Jewish doctors in early 1953.
Considering the scandalous nature of the incident, it is not surprising to find such messages on the ballots.
It was certainly not a unique phenomenon in Magnitogorsk. For an example of anti-Semitic ballot
messages of the Magnitogorsk election, see OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 17, d. 169, 1. 140 (3/2/1953),
“Inforrnatsiia: o podpisiakh na biulleteniakh kandidatov v deputaty v mestnye sovety deputatov
trudiashchikhsia.” For the examples of the city of Cheliabinsk, see OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 17, d. 169, II.
68-69 (2/22/1953), “Nadpisi, sdelannye na biulleteniakh kandidatov v deputaty mestnykh sovetov goroda
cheliabinska v den’ vyborov-22 fevralia 1953 goda.” It is difficult to know what extent anti-Semitism
pervaded in Magnitogorsk after the war. But it seems less noticeable. T. V. Futman, whose Jewish
husband worked as an engineer for the Magnitogorsk Steel Works, claimed that her husband had no
experiences of anti-Semitism during the postwar Stalin years. Interview with T.V. Futrnan (Magnitogorsk,
January 18, 2003).

39 For example, see Weiner, Making Sense of War, p. 273.

12

found in the ethnically diverse western border lands.40 In general, ethnic issues were
much less common in postwar daily life in the home-front regions.

Indeed, labor for the Soviet war effort, rather than ethnicity, was a large part of
daily life for the majority of the home-front population during the war. As Alexander
Werth describes the daily life “in the distant rear” (i.e., the Ural and Siberia regions), the
suffering from “the most crippling, most heartbreaking wor ” in the painful working and
living conditions workers faced on the home fi'ont was no less severe than the suffering
and risks that front-line soldiers faced.42 This implies that the degree of suffering
experienced by people on the home front were not so different from the struggle that
people on the fi'ontlines or in occupied regions experienced. Thus, for the people on the
home front, labor became the most significant agency that constructed their identities,
while for the people on the front and occupied regions, the major components of their
postwar daily life were the experiences of battleground, struggles for survival from
blockades and ethnic atrocities by occupied forces, or collaboration with such forces.
Since the war experiences of these two regions were not same, I argue that the ways in
which the people in the home-front regions identified themselves cannot be the same as
those in the front regions.

There is a large amount of research on wartime home-front life. Such studies
have a common problem which has only recently begun to be corrected by the more

balanced approaches of recent scholarship. The “traditional” studies on the wartime

 

‘0 Hence, in this dissertation on the case of Magnitogorsk, the issue of ethnicity is discussed sparingly.
This is not because ethnicity is unimportant but because ethnicity-related issues were presented less
prominently in postwar Magnitogorsk (compared with the former occupied regions). Even during the
height of the postwar anti-cosmopolitan campaign, which targeted mainly Jewish intellectuals,
Magnitogorskii rabochii, the major local newspaper, published few articles related to the campaign.

‘2 Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 11941-1945 (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1964), pp. 218-19.
13

home front typically focused on several key factors: the evacuation process, the
mobilization of the labor force and conversion of industry to wartime production, and the
heroic labor of the Soviet people in the factories and on collective farms. 43 The picture
of patriotism and labor heroism that these studies construct in many cases reflected
reality, but it was not a complete picture. The images of patriotic heroic labor were
particularly overgeneralized, while war-related disasters and negative aspects of the war
were downplayed. Recently, some western scholars have attempted to provide more
balanced accounts of wartime life on the home front by examining wartime ordeals faced
by the people on the home front.44 As more sources have become available from the
newly opened former Soviet archives and the publication of personal memoirs and
diaries, the overgeneralized and unnuanced portrayals of the wartime home front have
begun to be superseded as more historians study previously little examined issues, such
as center-periphery relations, ethnic tensions, and the popular mood on the home front,

both in the Russian and non-Russian peripheries.45 Compared to the wartime home front,

 

’3 For example see, V. T. Aniskov, Podvig sovetskogo krest ’ianstvo v velikoi otechestvennoi voine
(Moskva, 1979); A. A. Antufev. Ural ’skaia promyshlennost’ nakaune iv goafv velikoi otechestvennoi voiny
(Ekaterinburg: Ural'skoe otdelenie Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, 1992); G. A Kumanev, ed., Sovetskii tyl v
pervyi period velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (Moskva: Nauka, 1988); A. V. Mitrofanov, ed., Ural-frontu
(Moskva: Ekonomika, 1985); A. F. Vasil’ev. Promyshlennost’ Urala v goay velikoi otechestvennoi voiny,
[941-1945 (Moskva: Izd-vo "Nauka", 1982); Kuznitsa pobedy: podvig tyla v gody velikoi otechestvennoi
voiny. ocherki i vospominaniia (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1980); P.N. Pospelova, ed.,
Sovietskii tyl v velikoi otechestvennoi voine: trudovoipodvig naroda. Vol. 2. (Moskva: Mysl', 1974). For
western historians’ works, see John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin 's War with Germany. Volume
I (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), chapter 6; Sanford R. Lieberman, “The Evacuation of Industry in the
Soviet Union during WWII,” Soviet Studies 35, No. 1 (January 1983): 90-102.

‘4 For example see, Alec Nove, “Soviet Peasantry in World War II,” The Impact of World War 11, ed.
Linz, pp. 77-90; William Moskoff, The Bread of Aflliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World
War 11 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. chapter 4; John Barber & Mark Harrison, The
Soviet Home F ront, [941-1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War 11 (London;
New York: Longrnan, 1991), esp. chapter 9.

’5 For the unharmonious relations between non-Russian evacuees and local, rural populations (mainly
Russian), and anti-Semitism in the Ural region, see Potemkina, Evakuatsiia v gody velikoi otechestvennoi
voiny na urale , chapter 5; Broekmeyer, Stalin, Russians, and Their War, 1941-1945, pp. 253-54. For the

14

the postwar home front has received much less scholarly attention. Although some
scholars examine postwar conditions of the former home-front regions in their national-
level studies, regional particularities have not been sufficiently described.46 To obtain a
complex and complete picture on the nature of postwar Soviet policies and citizens’
attitudes, it is essential to examine the experiences of previously unoccupied home-front

regions.47

Magnitogorsk as a Home-front Town

I chose Magnitogorsk as the site for my case study of an unoccupied home-front
region during the war and postwar years because of its typicality, and also the city’s
particular wartime and postwar experience, which provides both similarities to and
differences from the experiences of the towns in the front region that help us see a more
complete picture of the impact of the war on the postwar Soviet system and society. On
the one hand, Magnitogorsk—a major steel production center located on the southern
slopes of the Urals—was a typical home-front town that shares many war and postwar
experiences with other unoccupied home-front towns. Like many towns and cities in the

rear, Magnitogorsk experienced demographic and social and economic upheaval during

 

wartime entrenchment of interethnic divisions in the non-Russian periphery (e.g., Kazakhstan), the pressure
of Russificiation, and center-periphery relations, see Paula A. Michaels, “Mobilizing Medicine: Medical
Cadres, State Power, and Center-Periphery Relations in Wartime Kazakhstan,” in Provincial Landscapes,
pp. 217-35. For wartime development of assertive attitudes among workers, peasants, and intellectuals in
“unoccupied areas” (including near front regions like Leningrad and Moscow), see Gennadi Bordiugov,
“The Popular Mood in the Unoccupied Soviet Union,” in The People ’s War: Responses to World War II in
the Soviet Union, ed. Robert W. Thurston & Bemd Bonwestsch (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 2000), pp. 54-70.

’6 For example see, Zubkova, Russia after the War; Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism.

’7 Joonseo Song, “Za predelami totalitarizrna: interpretatsiia stalinizrna zapadnymi uchenymi posle ll
mirovoi voiny,” Problemy istorii, filologii, kul 'tury 16, no.2 (2006): 184.

15

the war due to the influx of evacuees, factory workers, and wounded soldiers, as well as
the evacuation of factories, schools, and other institutions.48 Extended work weeks
(frequently described as “heroic labor” in official rhetoric)—-usually seven days a week,
twelve to fifteen hours of work a day—were routine for workers in Magnitogorsk just as
for those in the other home-front towns.49 Daily life in Magnitogorsk after the war was
not so different from other home-front towns (or towns on the front). After the war, the
urban inhabitants suffered from universal shortages of housing, food, and other consumer
goods.50 The MMK (Magnitogorskii metallurgicheskii kombinat: Magnitogorsk Steel
Works), one of the largest steel mills in the world in the early 19403,51 could not avoid
the labor productivity decline and labor discipline problems (mainly absenteeism and
desertion) from which many factories in industrial centers in the country suffered almost

universally. The reintegration of war veterans by arranging jobs for them and providing

 

‘8 Magnitogorsk was one of the industrial centers of the Ural region, which received a total of about
1,620,000 evacuees in 1942. Potemkina, Evakuatsiia v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny na urale, p. 256.
Small rural towns received evacuees and other people from the front areas. More than 30,000 refugees,
evacuees, and wounded from western regions went to Shadrinsk, a kind of “granary of the Urals,” during
the war years. The city’s main industry served the agricultural center, processing agricultural products. It
included grain mills, a slaughterhouse, silos, a sack factory, a repair shop for agricultural machines, and
some small-scale craftsmen. Marius Broekmeyer, Stalin, the Russians, and Their War, [941-1945, trans.
Rosalind Buck (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), pp. 251, 253, 267.

’9 In many cases, extended labor hours at factories were common not only for workers in the industrial
centers of the home front but also for the people in rural towns because many large and small factories were
evacuated to predominantly rural towns. For example, with the outbreak of the war, five different kinds of
factories (including car, textile, fire-fighting equipment, tobacco, and nail factories) with workers and their
family members were evacuated from Ukraine, Moscow, and other regions to Shadrinsk, a small provincial
town situated east of Sverdlovsk, with a total population of about 31,000 on the eve of the war.
Broekmeyer, Stalin, the Russians, and Their War, p. 255; for the prewar (1939) population of Shadrinsk,
see http://wwwpopulstat.info/Europe/russiathtm (Last visited on May 7, 2007).

5° For the general shortages, see Julie Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail
Practices, and Consumption, 1917-1953 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), chapter 7;
Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism; V. F. Zima, Golod v sssr 1946-1947 godov: proiskhozhdeniie i
posledstviia (Moskva: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1996).

5' John Scott, Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia '3 City of Steel (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), p. 258.

16

services for families of disabled and deceased servicean were other urgent tasks that the
authorities of Magnitogorsk—and all industrial towns—had to address after the war
ended.

On the other hand, Magnitogorsk was not an ordinary home-front town. As a
center of heavy industry and particularly the defense industry, the city was singular from
the start. Built as one of the three monumental construction projects of the First F ive-
Year plan in the early 19305,52 Magnitogorsk was designated for privileged status due to
its strategic, economic, and ideological/political significance for the Stalin government.
During the first half of the 1930s the Party put the city on a “special” list and provided
city workers with top priority in rationing.53 Moreover, the construction of the world’s
largest steel plant, as well as the city itself, was touted as a quintessential example of
building socialism and “the socialist city of the future” in Soviet propaganda of the
1930s. It portrayed Magnitogorsk as emblematic of the grand project of the
Enlightenment that reforms old society through new ideology as well as science and
technology.54 From the official point of view, the fundamental social transformation
would bring about the creation of a socialist way of life and a new Soviet man with “a

new set of attitudes” and “new kinds of behavior.”55 Furthermore, even in contemporary

 

’2 The other two projects were the building of the world’s largest hydroelectric plant on the Dnieper River
and the digging of the “White Sea Canal” linking the Baltic and White Seas. Loren R. Graham, The Ghost
of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fate of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1993), p. 50. .

53 N. A. Osokina, “Soviet Workers and Rationing Norms, 1928-1935: Real or Illusory Privileges?” The
Soviet and Post-Soviet Review‘ 19, no. 1-3 (1992): 57-59.

5" Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1995), p. 18.

’5 lbid., pp. 33-34. See also N. Ivanov, “Magnitka—legendarnyi podvig sovetskogo naroda,” Planovoe
Khozaiistvo, no.4 (1979), 41-45.

17

Soviet literature, building the steel mill was described as a grand conquest of Russia’s
historic backwardness, bringing civilization into backward Asia in the Urals.S6

During World War II, as John Scott, a young American who participated in the
building of the MMK, recalled it was indeed “Stalin’s Ural Stronghold,” a vital center of
the defense industry.57 In the early 19405 Scott anticipated that Magnitogorsk would play
a crucial role in the Soviet war effort due to its remoteness from the border.58 Far from
the front lines, the MMK indeed contributed enormously to the Soviet war efforts: half of
all Soviet tanks and one third of shells produced during the war were made with steel
from Magnitogorsk.59 According to R. W. Davies, the Soviet industrial authorities were
well aware of the strategic danger of the concentration of the iron and steel industry near
the southern border in the late 19208. Thus, despite some efficiency problems related to
coal supply due to the city’s location, the Soviet leadership’s decision to build a giant
steel mill behind the Urals was largely based on their explicit concern about the possible

war in the future.60 The strategic significance of the city made it a “privileged” town

 

’6 See Valentine Kataev, Time! Forward (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1961), pp.
11-12.

5’ John Scott, Behind the Urals, p. xxiii.
’8 lbid., p. 257.

59 I. F. Churilin and M. E. Galiguzov, F lagman otechestvennoi industrii: istoriia magnitogorskogo
metallurgicheskogo kombinata imeni V. I. Lenina (Moskva: Mysl’, 1978), p. 92.

6° R. W. Davies, “A Note on Defense Aspects of the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine,” Soviet Studies 26, no. 2
(April 1974): 272-73. Some scholars downplay the Soviet authorities’ concern about strategic location as a
main reason for building a new steel plant in the Ural region. While Loren Graham suggests the richest
iron deposit in the Magnetic Mountain was the main reason, M. Gardner Clark, Alan Abouchar, and
Franklyn D. Holtzman see no indications that strategic considerations influenced the decision to construct
the iron and steel plant in Magnitogorsk and unite the plant with the Kuznetsk Coal Basin, locating near
Novosibirsk. Rather, they claim that the Soviet authorities’ credit to the efficiency of the UK system was
the key reason for the decision on placing the steel plant in Magnitogorsk. See Graham, The Ghost of the
Executed Engineer, pp. 55-56; M. Gardner Clark, The Economics of Soviet Steel (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1956); Franklyn D. Holzrnan, “The Soviet Ural-Kuznetsk Combine: A Study in
Investment Criteria and Industrialization Policies,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 71 (1957): 372-79;

18

again during the war: as in the 19305, the Soviet government placed the city in the “first”
category and gave priority in rationing to workers in major enterprises like MMK and
Magnitostroi, based on the strategic significance of the city as a wartime arsenal. The
MMK also had priority in obtaining various supplies for production. F urthennore, the
city’s contribution to the war effort was widely propagandized to the whole country, as in
Stalin’s thank-you telegrams sent to Magnitka workers and in letters responding to the
city’s role published in the national newspapers during the war. Given the unique
background and character of this city, the question I explore is: How did the typical and
particular wartime experiences of Magnitogorsk affect the postwar socioeconomic
policies, daily life, and sociopolitical attitudes of its urban inhabitants?

To answer this question, I first, examine the Magnitogorsk authorities’ key
policies that directly affected inhabitants’ daily lives and survival during the postwar
hardships (including policies for the distribution of food, housing, and consumer goods,
labor policies to raise productivity, and welfare policy) and the inhabitants’ responses to
those policies (in other words, survival strategies). In doing so, I explore the strategies of
the local authorities to control local populations and vice versa during the period
dominated by shortages, the ways that the authorities implicitly or explicitly redefined
official values, and the perceptions of city inhabitants of official values and the Stalinist
system. By discovering tensions, conflict, and negotiation between the Magnitogorsk
authorities and the city’s inhabitants, I aim to show what it meant to be Soviet after the
war, both for the Soviet authorities and for the Soviet citizens, and the impact of the war

on the nature of postwar Soviet society and Stalinism.

 

Alan Abouchar, “Inefficiency and Reform in the Soviet Economy,” Soviet Studies 25, no. 1 (July 1973):
66-76.

19

Method and Sources

Analysis of both popular and official discourse and rhetoric is an important part of
my study of the postwar experience of Magnitogorsk. Serious interest in language among
scholars of Russian and Soviet history emerged relatively recently compared with other
fields in history.61 It was late in the 1980s and early in the 1990s that historians began to
question the validity of sociological approaches based mainly on the empirical analysis of
material conditions and on the understanding of class as a given, stable, and fixed
category.62 Through discursive investigation (including examination of language,
discourse, and representation of certain social groups), linguistically informed historians
have attempted to show “the ways in which language constructs. . .identities, interests,
intentions, and actions.”63 Being aware of, but not adopting this linguistically informed
analysis, my study will limit itself to showing the ways that workers and other inhabitants

of Magnitogorsk appropriated the language, and represented themselves.

 

6' For pioneering work in other historiographies that have paid attention to language, see Gareth S. Jones,
Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983); Joan Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American
Historical Review 91 (1986): 1053-75.

62 For the questioning of sociological notions of class, see Shelia Fitzpatrick, “New Perspectives on the
Civil War,” in Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War. pp. 3-23; idem, “The Problem of Class
Identity in NEP Society,” in Russia in the Era of NEP: Exploitations in Soviet Society and Culture, ed.,
Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Richard Stites (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1991), pp. 12-33.

63 Donald Reid, “Reflection on Labor History and Language,” in Rethinking Labor History: Essays on
Discourse and Class Analysis, ed., Lenard R. Berlanstein (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 1993), p. 47. For discussions of the progression of western scholars’ approaches to Russian/Soviet
history from social to cultural during the last twenty years, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Ronald Gregory
Suny, “Class Backwards? In Search of the Soviet Working Class,” in Making Workers Soviet: Power,
Class, and Identity, ed., Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Ronald Grigor Suny (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1994), pp. 1-26; Ronald Gregory Suny, “Revision and Retreat in the Historiography of
1917: Social History and Its Crisis,” Russian Review, vol. 53 (April 1994): 165-82; Steve Smith, “Writing
the History of the Russian Revolution after the Fall of Communism,” Europe-Asia Studies 46, no. 4 (1994):
563-78.

20

4'

Sources from newly opened archives, such as svodki (informant reports on
popular sentiments) are essential sources for the analyzing the language of
Magnitogorsk’s people.64 Certainly, this does not mean that I naively take the
information in these sources at face value. As a historian, I am well aware that these
party reports reflect certain perspectives on what happened since the nature of the reports
could change depending on who the compilers were and for what purpose the reports
were prepared.65 The same caution is required in using statistical data. For example, the
numbers of labor discipline violators and participants in socialist competitions did not
always reflect reality. Often, these numbers were intentionally downsized by enterprise
managers who wanted to avoid punishment fi'om above for their inappropriate treatment
of the labor force. To avoid the risk of inappropriate interpretation of these sources as
much as possible, I investigate the sociopolitical and economic context of the sources as I
interpret them. In the same vein, I keep in mind the problems of using interviews as
historical sources. I am cautious not to take interviewees’ accounts as accurate
reflections of reality because remembrance does not always reconstruct what actually
happened.66 I pay more attention to the ways that the interviewees remembered those
difficult postwar days, rather than to whether interviewees’ accounts (or memories) are

accurate. For example, some Soviet citizens who lived through the hard times of the

 

6‘ Most secret reports on popular sentiments in Magnitogorsk are available in the Cheliabinsk Oblast
Archive (OGAChO), especially the Party Archive (the materials from the Party Archive are indicated with
the initial “P” before the file font numbers), rather than the local archive of Magnitogorsk (AOAM). The
reason for this is because during the Soviet period, most sensitive documents were sent to the party archive
in the oblast capital.

6’ See chapter IV of this dissertation (especially the section, “Responding to Stalinist Care”) for the
problems of interpreting archival sources on popular mood.

’6 Of course, this does not mean that all accounts by interviewees are not accurate: in many cases, their
testimony provided information that archival and secondary sources do not tell.

21

postwar Stalin years first recalled the price drops (13 times during five years, from 1946
to 1950’”) as one of the positive memories of the government during those hard years.68
This implies that although the price-drop rate was small, therefore only symbolic, the
psychological impact of governmental decrees on the people (i.e., positive image on the
government) was enormous. In this sense, interviews are a very useful source through
which we can see how former Soviet citizens perceived the Stalinist system.

I pay attention not only to the popular language of social categories, but also to
the official rhetoric presented in central and local newspapers, party journals, and party
meetings. I expect to learn two main things from these offrcial sources: first, the ways
that local authorities attempted to manipulate society (or “enlighten” it, from the social
engineering perspective); second, the influence of the official rhetoric on people in
Magnitogorsk.69 An individual constructs a sense of self in two dimensions:
“categorization of oneself by others and self-identification.”70 These two components
affect each other in the process of identification; thus, as Lewis Siegelbaum argues, “it is

not always possible or even useful to separate state practices from how individuals

identify themselves?" In this light, examining official rhetoric will help us reveal the

 

67 S. Kara-murza, Sovetskaia tsivilizatsiia: ot velikoi pobedy do nashikh dnei. Vol. 2 (Moskva: Algoritrn,
2001), p. 7.

6’ Interview with N. A. Mikheev in Magnitogorsk. January 15, 2003. For another positive response to price
reductions during the postwar Stalin years, see also Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel J. Walkowitz,
Workers of the Donbass Speak: Survival and Identity in the New Ukraine, 1989-1992 (New York: State
University of New York Press, 1995), p. 26.

‘9 Soviet citizens’ “speaking Bolshevik,” using the official language, is a good example of this. See
Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, pp. 218-20.

7° Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Social Identities in the Stalin Era: An Historiographical Overview,” unpublished
paper, (2002), p. 1.

7‘ Ibid.

22

extent to which the values embedded in official rhetoric affected the self-representation
of the inhabitants of Magnitogorsk.

Finally, the investigation of material conditions (e. g., wages, labor hours, and the
distribution and acquisition of food, housing, and consumer goods, etc.), a major subject
of social history, is no less important for my study of how material conditions affected
the city residents’ perception of the Soviet system. Thus, for my research, I apply both

cultural and social history approaches, rather than letting one determine the other.72

Analytical Lenses and Approaches

Not surprisingly, many scholars of Soviet history (including myself) dig through
declassified documents from newly opened archives in great expectation of unearthing
some new and previously unknown facts. Thus, it is true that I scrutinized with great
excitement the archival documents which had the “entirely secret (sov. secretno)” mark
on them or were stamped with the “declassified (rassekrechennyi)” sign. But, as Stephen
Kotkin stresses, in many cases, “perspective, not archives” is what allows historians a
fresh conceptualization of material.73 Agreeing with his emphasis, I also attempt to
conceptualize my arguments in new ways by applying several analytical lenses and
approaches.

I use war and locality as lenses through which to better understand postwar Soviet

society and state policies. First of all, as we have seen in the first part of this

 

72 I am not insensitive to political components embedded in governmental policies although the political
approach is not the main concern of this study. For example, see Chapter IV of this dissertation for an
examination of the political motivation of the postwar paternalistic and humanitarian welfare practices.

73 Stephen Kotkin, “The State—ls It Us? Memoirs, Archives, and Kremlinologists,” Russian Review 61
(January 2002): 37-38.

23

introduction, the experiences of war brought a broad range of changes not only to social,
economic, and political systems, but also to people’s attitudes. To understand the
postwar Soviet system and society, it is essential to examine what the impact and legacies
of the war were. Secondly, locality is another crucial lens that enables us to see regional
particularities. Soviet people’s experiences of the war were not homogeneous, but
differed depending on the regions they lived during the wartime. The particular local
experiences affected each region, creating particular regional identities. The relationship
between the center and each periphery was defined according to the particularity of each
region.74 Considering the increase in the power of local authorities in supplying and
distributing local resources due to the incompetence of the central supply system during
the war, it is important to understand the local experience of the war. The wartime
“freedom” that local authorities enjoyed did not vanish with the end of the war but
continued to affect various dimensions of daily life.75 These regional deviations from

official rule during the war and postwar years suggest how significant the examination of

 

7" For example, see Karl D. Qualls, “Local-Outsider Negotiations in Postwar Sevastopol’s Reconstruction,
1944-53,” in Provincial Landscapes, pp. 276-298; idem, “Accommodation and Agitation in Sevastopol:
Redefining Socialist Space in the Postwar ‘City of Glory’” in Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the
Eastern Bloc, eds. David Crowley and Susan E. Reid (Oxford: Berg, 2002), pp. 23-46; Heather Diane
Dehaan, “From Nizhnii to Gor’kii: The Reconstruction of a Russian Provincial City in the Stalinist 19303,”
(Ph. D. diss., University of Toronto, 2005).

7’ For example, immediately after the war, a central party journal article expressed strong dissatisfaction
with local newspaper articles which did not strictly follow the center’s guidelines. The party journal
criticized “Ural’skii rabochii” and other local newspaper editors for their negligence of topics on industry
and political issues. “0 nomerakh respublikanskikh, kraevykh i oblastnykh gazet, izdaiushchikhsia na
chetyrekh polosakh, za 5, 12, i 19 avgusta 1945 g.,” Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, no. 17-18 (September 1945):
35-37. Magnitogorskii rabochii, a major newspaper of the city, was no exception. Even though the
presence of abortion in Soviet society had not been recognized in the official mass media since the
prohibition of abortion in 1936, the Magnitogorsk newspaper discussed changes in the city’s abortion rate
during wartime in an article in July 1945. See “Oberechat’ zdorov’e zhenshchiny,” Magnitogorskii
rabochii, 18 July 1945.

24

local practices and experiences is to draw a complete picture of the postwar Soviet
system and society.

In addition to these lenses, 1 apply several key concepts that post-Soviet scholars
have recently developed. First of all, I employ the modernity approach that views the
Soviet system and its modus operandi from the perspective that Soviet society moved
forward in a progressive way as Soviet leadership implemented policies based on the
European Enlightenment ethos. Thus, this approach sees the experiences of the Soviet
Union from the European context by integrating the Soviet case into the general trend of
what was happening in modern Europe.76 The modernity framework is particularly
useful for my study to explain the nature of seemingly mutually contradictory practices
(e.g., surveillance and welfare policies) and the pursuit of social engineering by the
postwar Stalinist government.

Another insight of post-Soviet scholars that I apply to my study is the concept of
subjectivity, i.e., “the capacity to think and act based on a coherent sense of self.”77
Subjectivity is an important framework for the analysis of the ways that people perceived
the Soviet system and identified themselves. Recently, Jochen Hellbeck shows that it
was very difficult for Soviet citizens to avoid using contemporary official language
whether they resisted or expressed their support for official values.78 Applying this

approach, I will analyze the motivations and nature of the Magnitogorsk people’s

 

7‘ For example, see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain; Peter Holquist, “‘Inforrnation Is the Alpha and
Omega of Our Work’: Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context,” Journal of Modern History 69
(September 1997): 415-50; David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, ed. Russian Modernity: Politics,
Knowledge, Practice (London: Macmillan, 2000); David L. Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural
Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003).

77 David L. Hoffmann, Stalinism: The Essential Readings (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), p. 181.

7’ Jochen Hellbeck, “Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi (1931-1939),”
Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 44 (1996): 344-73.

25

sociopolitical attitudes, including: 1) resistance to criticism and denunciation of local
governmental officials and enterprise managers, and 2) acceptance of official values and
expressions of loyalty to the Soviet system. This exploration of subjectivity will provide
an answer to the question of what it meant to be Soviet from two different perspectives:
that of the people and the authorities.

Patemalism—parent- or father-like care by the state for its subjects—is one of the
conceptual paradigms that I employ for my analysis of the nature of postwar distribution
and welfare policies and inhabitants’ responses to them. Scholars of the socialist system
have often applied this concept to define the nature of the broad scheme of Soviet-type
economic, political, and cultural systems and practices.79 These scholars view the role of
the state as the monopoly distributor of virtually everything that citizens needed as the
key feature of socialist paternalism.80 Under these conditions, it is inevitable that citizens
became deeply dependent on the state; accordingly, supplication rather that resistance
was one of the key attitudes of citizens vis-a-vis the state under this system.8| This
paternalism paradigm is particularly useful for the study of the years after the war
because the postwar Stalin era was the period in which many Soviet citizens (such as war
widows, war invalids, and former frontline soldiers seeking job placement) desperately

sought help and care from the state more than ever before. In addition, in the case of an

 

7’ For example see Ferenc Feher, “Patemalism as a Mode of Legitimation in Soviet-Type Societies,” in
Political Legitimation in Communist States, ed. Thomas H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (Oxford: Macmillan,
1982), pp. 64-81; Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller and Gybrgy Markus, Dictatorship over Needs (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1983); Janos Komai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992).

8° For example, see F eher, Heller, and Markus, Dictatorship over Needs, p. 180.

8' Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 226. Furthermore, Siegelbaum elaborates the nature of
paternalism practices of the 19305. He stresses that states’ distribution practices were not operated by fixed,
solid principles; rather they “were in near flux” depending on the state’s capacity and willingness of
distribution. Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “‘Dear Comrade, You Ask What We Need’: Socialist Patemalism and
Soviet Rural ‘Notables’ in the Mid-19305,” Slavic Review 57, no. 1 (1998): 108.

26

industrial town like Magnitogorsk, where a major enterprise (i.e., the factories) of the city
played the role of state-like distributor of food, housing, and consumer goods, the concept
of “enterprise paternalism” in which workers and their family members heavily depended
on the factory managers’ decisions about allocation of resources is helpful to describe the
politics of distribution of the MMK and the dependencies between factory managers and

workers.82

Outline of Dissertation

This dissertation examines the impact of the Second World War on Magnitogorsk,
the strategies with which the Magnitogorsk authorities tried to control postwar daily life
to overcome the legacies of the war, and the ways in which the city’s inhabitants
responded to governmental polices by investigating three important aspects of postwar
daily life in an industrial town—living (or material) conditions, labor, and social
security—from 1941 to 195 3. The year 1941 marked Magnitogorsk’s entry into the war
effort in its role as an “arsenal.” The year 1953 was the end of the era ruled by one leader
(Stalin) with whom the whole country lived during the difficult war and postwar years.84
Moreover, it was the end of the era that nurtured new trends, which were seeds for later
reforms in the Khrushchev era.

This dissertation is comprised of four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one
investigates the impact of World War II on the city’s industry and daily life. The city’s

wartime experiences are crucial to understanding postwar Magnitogorsk because they

 

’2 For enterprise paternalism, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Workers and Industrialization,” in The Cambridge
History of Russia, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 458-61.

’4 In Magnitogorsk, it was not until the early 19505 that signs of improvement in material conditions
(including food and housing) began to appear. See Chapter II of this dissertation.

27

deeply affected postwar governmental policies and the inhabitants’ self-identification.
Following the descriptions of the city’s wartime transformation into a key defense
industry town and the city’s contribution to the war effort, this chapter investigates the
priority and privileges officially given to the city’s labor force and explicit and implicit
hierarchies shaped during the war. The chapter ends by describing the wartime influx of
evacuees to the city and its impact on daily life.

The second chapter looks at the city authorities’ strategies for distribution of
scarce materials and the inhabitants’ responses to shortages and distribution policies.
After the war, Magnitogorsk workers who officially belonged to the “privileged” wartime
rationing category expressed their concern over the transformation of priorities in the
postwar capital investment to the former front regions. Despite continuation of the
symbolic priority of the city after the war, the material conditions in reality remained
harsh, still much like those during the war. The chapter demonstrates the scope and limit
of hierarchical and paternalistic distribution strategies that the local authorities developed
in the face of extreme shortages. Through an examination of the local people’s responses
to hardship (including complaints of shortages and denunciation of local officials), the
chapter reveals how the heroic image of the city constructed in wartime affected its
inhabitants’ attitudes, the ways in which its inhabitants identified themselves, and how
they perceived the Soviet socialist system.

Chapter three depicts the strategies that local authorities and enterprise managers
employed to increase productivity and the ways that Magnitogorsk workers responded to
these labor policies. Examining various types of official discourses to encourage

productivity and the authorities’ strategies (i.e., concessions, leniency, and focus on

28

professionalism), the chapter demonstrates both contradictory, fluid aspects of postwar
labor policy and the restoration of a prewar trend (emphasis on professionalism) as the
main characteristics of postwar Stalinist labor practices. This chapter implies that despite
the hard material conditions, few older workers shared younger workers’ survival
strategies—absenteeism and desertion: workers were not a unified group but divided by a
generation line.

The fourth chapter discusses how the postwar Stalin regime used welfare
practices to achieve its political goal: social and political stability. The chapter examines
how the authorities’ concerns over social insecurity and the growing gap between urban
inhabitants and officials forced the authorities to propagandize humanitarianism as a key
Soviet value. By examining the welfare practices embodied by the rule of inclusion, the
chapter demonstrates the humanitarian and paternalistic nature of postwar welfare
policies. These humanitarian and paternalistic welfare practices allowed many
inhabitants of Magnitogorsk to identify with official ideology and to nurse hopes for a
better future.

By drawing these four chapters together in the concluding chapter, it is my hope
to show to what extent the postwar experiences of Magnitogorsk were typical or
particular and to define the nature of postwar Sovietness and Stalinism in the deep rear

home front.

29

I. Wartime Magnitogorsk: Forging the Legacies of the War

By the outbreak of World War II, Magnitogorsk was merely 11 years old. Founded
in 1929 at the site of an iron-ore deposit, the city began to take shape as the Magnitogorsk
Steel Works (MMK) was constructed during the First Five-Year period (1928/9-32) (Map
2). In 1932 the plant first produced pig iron, and then steel in 1933. The MMK was the
symbol of the Soviet achievement in every sense: it was the world’s largest steel plant,
equipped with the latest technology.1 Magnitogorsk became not only the economical and
technological, but also ideological emblem of a new society that the October Revolution
promised to create. The Stalinist government intended to build Magnitogorsk as a
“socialist city,” whose new environments were supposed to create model Soviet citizens.
The urban inhabitants were expected to be not only industrially but also politically
literate. This meant that they were supposed to understand the political significance of
their work and willingly participate in the grand project of “building socialism.”2

Stephen Kotkin indicates that Magnitogorsk authorities achieved both industrial
and political goals (i.e., creating the “Mecca” of Soviet steel production and new Soviet
men) by developing several strategies. Socialist competition was one of the key tools
that made the city authorities able to achieve these goals. Characterizing shock work as a
socialist attitude to labor, the local authorities extensively propagated socialist

competition as the method of obtaining victory in the battle for higher productivity. This

meant that the local authorities depended heavily on “unsustainable superhuman

 

' John Scott, Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia '5 City of Steel, enlarged edition prepared by
Stephan Kotkin (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. xviii-xix.

2 Stephan Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California,
1995), p. 203.

30

exertions,” rather than on permanent rationalization, to increase productivity.3
Hierarchical distribution of supplies (including food, housing, and consumer goods) was
another strategy that the local authorities employed for the effective mobilization and
control of urban inhabitants. The authorities provided certain privileges and priorities to
favored groups of people (including engineers, Stakhanovite workers, and high-level
police, party, and factory officials) on the basis of profession, skill level, and political
loyalty.4 Along with the hierarchical distribution system, Kotkin values extensive state-
guaranteed welfare benefits (including housing, employment, education, and health care)
provided by city authorities as important criteria that distinguished Magnitogorsk, a
socialist city, from capitalist cities. Through these strategies, according to Kotkin and
John Scott, Magnitogorsk authorities obtained an important political/ideological
achievement: the creation of people who learned the new ways to live under the socialist
systems and participate in “building socialism” with enthusiasm, believing that they were
conducting an unprecedented experiment in human history.6 In this light, prewar
Magnitogorsk was a representation of a “new civilization” that created a new way of life
and new people that differed completely from those in capitalist society. Yet, how did
the war affect the prewar symbol of the socialist city and people? To what extent were

prewar practices, attitudes, and behaviors changed by the war?

 

3 lbid., pp. 204, 493.
‘ lbid., pp. 208-10, 244-46.
5 lbid., p. 220.

6 Scott, pp. 247-48.
3 l

 

 

 

 

 

Map 2. Magnitogorsk, 1939

1.Train station; 2. Cottages of the elite; 3. Miners’ club; 4. Central hotel; 5. Factory administration; 6. Party
committee; 7. NKVD; 8. Central market; 9. Theaters and metalworkers’ club; 10. Hospital barracks; l 1.
Mining and metallurgical institute

A. Grain elevator; B. Fertilizer plant; C. Brick factory; D. Cement factory; E. Lumber yard; F. Central
Electric station; G. Coke ovens; H. Blast furnaces; I. Open-hearth ovens; J. Rolling mills; K. Ore enriching
station; L. Bread factory

Source: Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley:
University of California, 1995).

32

Even though prewar practices discussed above continued to keep their forms
during (and after) the war, their contents did not remain intact. They were altered as the
scope and features of these practices extended (or cut short) and/or enhanced (or
diminished) by the war-created conditions. Like many other cities during the Second
World War, Magnitogorsk, located far from the frontlines deep in the Ural region,
experienced extraordinary social and economic changes during the war. As the
Magnitogorsk Steel Works (MMK)—the largest steel mill in the Soviet Union at the
outbreak of the wad—converted to wartime production and began to produce steel for
tanks and shells, the city became a key location for the defense industry. The workers
and other residents of the city had to adjust not only to the extended work hours but also
to strict war-mandated rationing of food and consumer goods. The “home front” city
became more crowded due to the influx of evacuees along with factories which were
disassembled and moved from regions near the frontlines. These changes brought about
by the war remained after it ended and became the legacies that both Magnitogorsk

authorities and inhabitants had to overcome in the postwar years.8

Becoming a Mighty Arsenal

 

7 Magnitka: kratkii istoricheskii ocherk (Cheliabinsk: quhno-ural’skoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1971), p. 93.
As of June 1941, the MMK had four blast-fumaces, 15 open-hearth fumaces, four coke batteries, and eight
rolling mills.

8 Certainly, the contribution of wartime experiences to the formation of the postwar socio-economic system
is well known. For example see, Jan Gross, “War as Revolution,” in The Establishment of the Communist
Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, ed. by Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1997), pp. 17-40.

33

In July 1941, a month after the German invasion, the State Committee of Defense
decided to construct a tank factory in the city of Cheliabinsk, Ural region,9 and to
produce armor in Magnitogorsk, located about 200 miles southwest of Cheliabinsk.lo
Magnitogorsk suddenly became a center of the defense industry, supplying armor for
Soviet tanks and high-quality steel for shells and other weapons. ” It was one of many
locations in the Ural region that became arsenals for the Soviet Union during World War
11.

Although the Ural region was not the most industrialized region in the Soviet
Union before the war, it experienced great changes upon the outbreak of the war. Before
the war, the European territories of the Soviet Union were responsible for 84 percent of
the gross industrial output of the USSR, while the eastern regions, including the Ural,
West and East Siberia, Central Asia, and Far East regions, were responsible for only 16
percent.’2 Thus, when German armies occupied the western territories of the USSR by
the end of November 1941, the Soviet Union lost 68 percent of its pig iron, 58 percent of
its steel, 60 percent of its aluminum, and 63 percent of all coal production.l3 But, after
the war broke out, new industrial construction on the “deep rear” home front was

extremely rapid. Capital investment in heavy industry directed to the Ural region and

 

9 By 1940, the Ural region included Bashikir ASSR, Kurgan oblast, Molotov oblast. Sverdlovsk oblast,
Udmurt ASSR, Cheliabinsk oblast, and Chkalov oblast.

'0 V. Z. Dymshits, “Magnitostroi,” in Moia Magnitka: kniga eta-kollektivnyi rasskaz magnitogortsev o
doblesti v trude, orabochei slave, o shirote interesov cheloveka, rozhdennogo revoliutsiei, o sovetskom

obraze zhizhi. (Cheliabinsk: quhno-Ural'skoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1979), p. 51.

" Dymshits, “Magnitostroi,” p. 51; P. N. Gubkin, “Stalinskaia magnitka,” in Liudi Stalinskoi Magnitki
(Cheliabinsk: Cheliabinskoe oblastnoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stov, 1952), p. 30

'2 Holland Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 315.

'3 Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991, 3rd edition (Penguin Books, 1992), p. 275.

34

western Siberia skyrocketed from 13 percent in 1940 to almost 40 percent in 1942.14
Consequently, the portion that the east contributed to the gross industrial output grew to
more than half in 1942.15

Among the eastern regions, the Ural region possessed the strongest potential for
wartime development into a key defense industry site. One of the most important reasons
for the region’s rise as a crucial arsenal during the war was its ideal location: the region
was far from the war front.16 In addition, the Ural region was an attractive choice due to
its relatively strong industrial capacity for certain products. The Ural region was ranked
first in the country for non-ferrous metal production, second for the production of smelted
cast-iron, steel, and extraction of oil, third for coal production, and fourth in capacity for
machinery construction.l7 As the largest and most modern steelworks in the Soviet
Union before the war, the MMK produced 10 percent of the Soviet Union’s steel in
1939.18

In addition, the wartime evacuation of industrial enterprises from the front regions
to the Ural region contributed to its growth as an essential wartime industrial site.
Because of the high concentration of Soviet industrial capacity in the western territories

of the country, the Stalin regime had to either destroy the industrial facilities to prevent

 

'4 Susan J. Linz, ed., The Impact of World War 11 on the Soviet Union (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld,
1985), p. 17.

'5 Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy, p. 315.

'6 M. N. Potemkina, “Evakuatsiia naseleniia v ural’skii region,” Ural v strategii vtoroi mirovoi voina
(Ekaterinburg, 2000), p. 157.

'7 lbid. See also A. A. Antufev, Ural ’skaia promyshlennost' nakaune iv goay velikoi otechestvennoi voiny
(Ekaterinburg, Ural’skoe otdelenie rossiiskaia adademiia nauk, 1992), p. 4.

'8 Stephen Kotkin, Steeltown, USSR Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1991), p. xii.

35

9 or evacuate the facilities to the interior to continue

their takeover by the Germans1
producing armor (bronia), i.e., special metal for weapons. Accordingly, on June 24,
1941, two days after the war broke out, the Stalin government formed a Council for
Evacuation under the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR.20 The council was
charged with “the work of re-basing enterprises, collective farms, tractor stations (MTS),
population, produce. . .and with placing all evacuated [objects and individuals]... in new
locations.”21 About 44 percent of all evacuated industrial enterprises (667 out of 1523)
were moved to the Ural region while the others were evacuated to Central Asia,
Kazakhstan, and West Siberia.22 As the German armies began to occupy the western
regions of the USSR, the Ural region became vital to the Soviet defense industry.

The equipment from 42 factory shops had been evacuated to Magnitogorsk by the
end of 1941.23 The first wartime task of the MMK was to reassemble the evacuated parts
of an armor mill (bronevoi stan) from the Ukraine so they could begin producing ironclad
steel within the shortest possible time. In two and half months beginning August 19,

1941, for example, the equipment from Zaporozhstal ’, a steel factory in Zaporozh’e,

located north of the Crimean peninsula, was disassembled, evacuated to MMK, and

 

'9 The Dnepr dam was blown up by the Red Army for this reason. Barber and Harrison. The Soviet Home
Front..., p. 127. Louis Ernst, "Inside a Soviet Industry: An American engineer tells of his eighteen years in
Russia's coke-chemical industry, increasingly centered in Siberia and still lagging behind prewar levels."
Fortune (Oct. 1949), pp. 116-119, 172, 174, 177-78.

2° Sanford R. Lieberman, “Wartime System of Administration and Control,” in The Impact of the World
War 11, p. 67.

2' Lieberman, “Wartime System of Administration and Control” p. 67.
22 Nove, An Economic History. . ., p. 276
23 M. N. Potemkina, “Evakuatsiia i Magnitogorsk,” R01 ’ urala kak arsenala pobedy (Cheliabinsk, 2000),

pp. 198-200; A. G. Degtiarev, Letopis ' gory Magnitnoi i goroda Manitogorska (Magnitogorsk: lzdatel’skii
otdel Magnitogorskogo poligraficheskogo predpriiatiia, 1993), p. 42.

36

quickly reassembled.24 From Moscow, equipment from the Serp i molot (Sickle and
Hammer) factory was evacuated to a Magnitogorsk hardware plant and reestablished in
late 1941.25

The MMK responded promptly to the outbreak of the war. The party organization
of the factory immediately decided to convert steel production from civilian to defense
purposes several hours after the announcement of the war by V. M. Molotov, deputy
chairman of State Council of Defense on June 22, 1941.26 Georgii Bobrov, a chief
foundry worker at the MMK, recalled that at 11 am. on June 23—the day after the
outbreak of the war—he received an order to forge high-quality steel for armor.”
Grigorii I. Nosov, director of the MMK, acknowledged that the factory was not prepared
to produce that kind of steel. Certainly, at that time, nobody in the Magnitogorsk factory
had ever thought that the factory would smelt steel for armor.28 As Nosov recalled in
later years, the MMK had to carry out some unprecedented experiments to smelt metal
and rolling iron for armored steel as quickly as possible as the Wehrmacht advanced into

the Soviet territories with lightening speed.29 By July 23, 1941, one month after the

German invasion, the MMK had begun to forge the first armored plate and started

 

2’ V. S. Bychkov, “Chernaia metallurgiia v sisteme voennoi ekonomiki,” in Sovietskii Tyl v velikoi
otechestvennoi voine: trudovoi podvig naroda. Vol. 2, ed. P.N. Pospelova (Moskva: Mysl', 1974), p. 46.
After the liberation of Zaporozh’e, some of the evacuated equipment was moved back to its original site;
the rest was left in Magnitogorsk and became part of the permanent facilities of MMK.

2’ Bychkov, “Chernaia metallurgiia,” p. 47.

2” Nosov, “Imeni stalina,” in Liudi Stalinskoi Magnitki, p. 61.

’7 lbid.

2‘ lbid., p. 62.

’9 lbid., p. 69.

37

producing the armor for tanks in August.30 By November 1941, Soviet tanks made from
the steel produced in Magnitogorsk fought in the first Soviet counterattack against the
German army in the Moscow suburbs.31

The MMK expanded during the war, not only reassembling factory equipment
evacuated from the front regions, but also by constructing two new blast-furnace shops
(bringing the total to four) and other facilities.32 Despite the construction of a fifth blast
furnace, which began to produce steel in December 1942,33 there was still not sufficient
steel to satisfy the demands of the front. Thus, the Stalin government decided to build
one more furnace,34 and to fast-track it within an extraordinarily short period of time. It
was constructed in only six months, between July and December 1943,35 and produced
1,400 more tons of steel each day, enough to make 340 tanks.36 Consequently, by the end
of the war, the MMK produced 66 percent more metal and twice as much high-grade
steel than it did in the prewar years.37 Magnitogorsk’s contribution to the war effort was

monumental, compared to other steel towns on the home front. In all, half of the tanks

 

3° Degtiarev, Letopis ’ gory Magnitnoi, p. 41; Dymshits, “Magnitostroi,” p. 55.
3' Nosov, “Imeni stalina,” p. 68.

32 lbid., p. 69. As of October 1944, in addition to MMK and Magrritostroi, a construction trust,
Magnitogorsk had three other steel-production-related factories that employed 2,100 workers; six food
processing factories, whose products included flour, bread, dairy products, meat, and nonalcoholic
beverages; and five light-industry factories, including a refrigerator factory and two garment, two shoe, and
11 local handicraft factories. OGAChO, f. R-804, op. 14, d], 11. 17-l7ob (10/ 1944).

’3 Degtiarev, Letopis ', p. 40, 43.

3" V. E. Dymshits, “Bronevoi stan: zapiski stroitelia,” Novyi mir, No. 6 (1985): 186.

3’ Dymshits, “Magnitostroi,” p. 59. The normal construction period was 18 months.

36 V. E. Dymshits, Magnitka v soldatskoi shineli (Moskva: Arkhitektura, 1995), p. 151

37 I. F. Galiguzov and M. E. Churilin. F lagman otechestvennoi industrii: istoriia Magnitogorskogo
metallurgicheskogo kombinata imeni V. 1. Lenina (Moskva: Mysl', 1978), p. 82. Before the war the MMK
produced primarily ordinary-grade steel. The high-grade steel consisted of only 12 percent of the factory’s
total steel production. Magnitka, p. 93.

38

and one-third of the shells produced during the war were made of steel produced by
MMK.38

Accordingly, Magnitogorsk and its inhabitants often received attention from the
Stalin regime, which was keenly aware of the vital role of MMK in the Soviet war effort.
Stalin frequently sent telegrams to the working people of Magnitogorsk that professed his
gratitude for their hard work.39 In one of the telegrams, Stalin told the workers:

The Motherland and our glorious Red Army will never forget the self-sacrificing

work of the people in Magnitogorsk for the endless augmentation of our

producing capacity and endless supply of metal for the defense industry.40
After each of the Soviet Army’s major victories in battles such as Stalingrad and Kursk,
in January and July 1943 respectively, and after the liberation of the Donbass in
September of the same year, Stalin sent similar telegrams of thanks and praise to the
working people of Magnitogorsk. These telegrams were subsequently published in the
central newspaper, Pravda.4| While Magnitogorsk had been widely portrayed as a
symbol of “building socialism” in official propaganda during the prewar years, during the
war years it became a symbol of patriotism and dedication to the Motherland. As we will
see in the next chapter, Magnitogorsk’s contributions to war effort, which were widely
propagandized in the Soviet mass media, instilled in workers and city residents a strong

sense of the entitlement to a better life.

 

3’ Galiguzhov and Churilin, F lagman otechestvennoi industrii, p. 92; Kotkin, Steeltown, xii.
39 Nosov, “lmeni stalina,” p. 70.
‘° lbid.

41 .
Also see Degtlarev.

39

Prioritizing Magnitogorsk Workers

Another component that fed that feeling of entitlement among Magnitogorsk
working people, especially MMK workers and [TR (technical personnel), was the t0p
priority in rationing and other supplies that the government granted them. In order to
mobilize resources for the war effort to the utmost, the Stalin leadership started rationing
a few weeks after the war broke out in Moscow and Leningrad in mid-July 1941.42 In
Magnitogorsk, it started shortly thereafter on September 1, first with foods such as bread,
sugar, and confections, and two months later expanded to other major foods, including
meat, fish, fat, greats (coarse grains), and macaroni."3 As we see from the example of
bread rationing in Table 1, the Stalin government categorized Soviet industry into two
groups for hierarchical rationing. The criterion for the categorization was based on the
extent of each industry’s contribution to the war effort. Workers and technical personnel
working in industries directly engaged in the war (e.g., defense, metallurgy, chemical,
cement, fuel, electrical, transportation, heavy industry and railway construction, and
machine building) belonged to the “first” category, and received more food and
commodities than those who belonged to the “second” category, which was comprised of

industries less critical to the war effort.44 According to this categorization, more than 40

 

’2 Rationing started on July 17 in Moscow and on July 18 in Leningrad in 1941. A. V. Liubimov,
Torgovilia isnabzhenie v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (Moskva: lzdatel’stvo ekonomika, 1968), pp.
21-22.

’3 Rationing had been previously introduced to Magnitogorsk during the industrialization drive of the early
19305. At that time, the Soviet government used four different rationing categories (i.e., special, first,
second, and third), which were based on the regional significance and types of industries. Workers in the
“special” and “first” categories had priority in receiving food. Magnitogorsk workers who were part of a
major construction project during the First Five-Year plan of the early 19305 were on the special list. E. A.
Osokina, “Soviet Workers and Rationing Norms, 1928-1935: Real or Illusory Privilege?” The Soviet and
Post-Soviet Review, Vol. 19, No. 1-3 (1992): 57-58.

’4 Liubimov, Torgovilia isnabzhenie, pp. 15, 28; U. G. Chemiavskii, Voina i prodovol ’stvie: Snabzhenie
gorodskogo naseleniia v velikuiu otechestvennuiu voinu, 1 94 [-1945 gg. (Moskva: Nauka, 1964), p. 74.

4O

percent of the working population of Magnitogorsk belonged to the first category by late

1941.45

Table 1. Wartime rationing of bread

 

Bread
_Grams per person per a day

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lSt Category 2"“Category
Workers 800 600
White-collar employees (sluzhashchie) 500 400
Dependants 400 400
Children (under 12) 400 400

 

Source: Liubimov, T orgovlia i snabzhenie, p. 28.

An illusory priority?

However, the sufficiency of the first-category rationing status which was granted
to many Magnitogorsk workers and white-collar employees should not be exaggerated.
In reality, a shortage of state-supplied food for civilians persisted throughout the war
because the foremost priority was feeding the armed forces.46 Even though the promised
rations were distributed in full, they were often insufficient for typical Soviet families to
live on for the entire month."7 One party report shows that the majority of the workers
who were registered on the MMK supply list were underfed from October to December

1942.48 The Department of Workers’ Supply (ORS) of the MMK could not meet

 

‘5 Magnitostroi was the second largest enterprise in Magnitogorsk, employing 29,000 working people as of
October 1944. OGAChO, f. R-804, op. 14, d. l, 1. 17 (Oct, 1944). “Pasport po cheliabinskoi oblasti.”

’6 Moskoff, The Bread of Affliction ch. 6.

‘7 lbid., p. 151.

4’ GARF, f. 8300, op. 18, d. 12, l. 3 (1/18/1943), “Akt.” About 100,000 of the workers, white-collar
employees, technical intelligentsia of the MMK and their dependants, who made up half of the city’s
population, received supplies from the state. The ORS of the MMK was organized during the war on
March 11, 1942. The city’s 40 stores and 18 cafeterias, which had a total capacity of 4,000 seats, joined the
MMK ORS. As of January 1, 1943, the ORS had expanded and the number of cafeterias increased to 38,

41

workers’ food needs because the ORS was not supplied with the assigned amount of food
by the upper level (i.e., provincial) suppliers. For example, for the first three months of
1943, the government decided to provide the ORS of MMK with 85 percent of the
amount of meat and fish that the Magnitogorsk authorities demanded, 88 percent of fat,
and 82 percent of groats and macaroni from the state-controlled supply lines.
Considering that the assigned amount was the minimum for daily nutrition, any amount
less than the assigned amount would be quite insufficient. However, frequently a much
smaller amount than initially promised by the upper level was provided to the
Magnitogorsk ORS.49 Additionally, with priority given in transportation to soldiers and
war supplies, transport delays exacerbated the shortage in Magnitogorsk of certain foods,
such as grain and sugar, during certain periods.50

The undersupply and delay of food delivery from the central supply system forced
the ORS of MMK to solve the food supply problem by turning to local food sources, such
as factory gardens or subsidiary farms (podsobnoe khoziaistvo) run by the MMK.51 The

local supply was not always stable, however. In Magnitogorsk, even the local supply of

 

with 5450 seats. lbid., 11.1-10b. By 1945, the ORS of the USSR served 48 percent of the civilian
population on centralized ration lists. Chemiavskii, Voina i prodovol ’stvie, p. 100.

’9 For example, the ORS of MMK received only 28 percent of the monthly quota of potatoes from central
supply as of December 1, 1942. GARF, f. 8300, op. 18, d. 12, 1. 50b (1/18/1943). For the sugar and
confection supply, see lbid., l. 2.

5° lbid., 1. 20b. After southern Russia and Ukraine, the main areas that provided sugar and grain, were
occupied by the Germans. The supplies of certain items, such as confections and sugar, were very limited
until the regions were liberated. The mobilization of horses and trucks for military purposes also
contributed to the diminished capacity to bring food to the urban areas. Moskoff, The Bread of A filiction,
pp. 94-95.

5' GARF, f. 8300, op. 18, d. 12, l. 3. During the war, in addition to the centralized supply system there
were supplementary or ‘decentralized’ but official sources of supply, i.e., factory farms (or subsidiary
farms) affiliated with state industrial enterprises. Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade, p. 299. See
also Moskoff, pp. 94. 97.

42

potatoes was consistently inadequate, comprising only 19.6 percent of the amount of
potatoes that were needed in December 1942, for example. With the exception of some
vegetables like cabbage, tomatoes, and cucumbers, local subsidiary farms and other local
sources generally produced only a scanty supply of food.52 Certainly, fruit and dairy
products were considered luxury items during the war. The dairy products that the ORS
provided for the city residents on the supply list were an “almost negligible” amount
compared with personal dietary requirements.”

Despite the priority officially given to many Magnitogorsk workers laboring in
industries closely related to the war effort, the advantage, in many cases, was almost
imperceivable due to the general shortages and supply problems. Moreover, as the war
neared its end, the rationing gap between both the first and second categories as well as
between workers and white-collar employees became narrower and almost disappeared.
After the liberation of the German-occupied regions, the partly restored grain supply
from those regions as well as foreign aid probably contributed to the gradual
improvement in the food supply. By late 1944, more than 60 percent of all Soviet
workers in the second category received the same rations as those in the first category.54
By the same period, rationing for white-collar employees also improved and more than

90 percent of them received the same rations as workers.55 Thus, the priority that many

 

’2 GARF, f. 8300, op. 18, d. 12, 1. 50b.

53 The amount of milk distributed to a worker at a cafeteria for the last three months of 1942 was only 0.5
liters; sour cream, 46 grams; and cottage cheese, 8 grams. At a cafeteria for leading workers the supplies
were only a bit better. They consumed 0.7 liters of milk and 280 grams of sour cream during the same
period. lbid., 11. 5-6.

5’ Chemiavskii, Voina i prodovol ’stvie, p. 74

5’ lbid., p. 84; see also Hessler, A Social History ofSoviet Trade, 298-99

43

Magnitogorsk workers officially earned for their defense work was frequently nominal.
But Magnitogorsk workers knew that shortages were an inevitable result of the war, and
that they had priority (even though in many cases in name only) as workers in enterprises
vital to the war effort. As we will see in the next chapter, along with Moscow’s
continuing interest in Magnitogorsk after the war, the officially-granted priority in
rationing and other supplies fostered a sense of entitlement among many inhabitants of
the city. For many workers the priority in rationing was illusory. Managerial and
technical personnel, however, had chances to obtain advantages through both official and
unofficial supply channels. Even though shortages persisted during the war, there was a
group of people that had privileges. They were the managerial staff and also the

technical staff of the city’s key enterprises.

Consolidating Privileges and Hierarchy

Becoming the privileged: enterprise oflicials and technical personnel

The degree of access to food and consumer goods56 during wartime rationing
serves as a good indicator of the privileged status of certain groups. MMK supply
conditions in 1942, one of the hardest years of the war, demonstrate that the factory
cadres, including high-level officials, factory administrators, and technical personnel, had
more access to supplies than workers. It should be noted that the Stalin government

began to enhance its support for the ITR by the end of the 19305. After experiencing the

 

’6 The shortage of consumer goods was a more serious problem than the food supply. For example, for the
MMK workers 62 percent of stockings, 50 percent of soap, and 33 percent of knitted wear were supplied in
1942. As for winter boots, only 5 percent of the requested amount was guaranteed during the same year.
Under these conditions, the evacuated workers and their families suffered from cold during the winter.
GARF, f. 8300, op. 18, d. 12, 1. 60b.

44

malicious results of the ordinary workers’ reckless speedup storm of the mid-19305,
government authorities and factory management came to rely more on the
professionalism of the technical intelligentsia.

This trend grew during the war years. In the urgency of wartime what was most
frequently required in the industries of the home front was the leadership of the
managerial staff that could transform workers’ patriotism into production. In addition,
the responsibility of local enterprise management in distributing food and other resources
increased during the war. Because the central supply system could not guarantee the
promised amount of supplies, local enterprises had to mobilize local resources to
supplement the shortage. Under these circumstances, the local enterprises exercised a
substantial amount of control over supply and distribution of food and consumer goods.
Technical personnel who could respond quickly to urgent orders and changing plans from
the center were another important group of professionals. As we have seen above, the
MMK had to produce special steel during the early days of the war and the Magnitostroi,
a construction trust, had to build additional production facilities in very short periods of
time throughout the war years. It was technicians and engineers of the MMK who
successfully converted facilities producing ordinary steel for civilian purposes to facilities
that could produce high-quality steel for armor and weapons. Wartime was the period
when technical personnel and factory managerial staff consolidated their status and

privileges vis-a-vis ordinary workers. Although scholars have seen the rise of the

45

technical personnel as a postwar phenomenon,57 the case of Magnitogorsk shows that it
began during the wartime.

One of privileges that MMK factory cadres enjoyed was more access to extra
meals through both official and unofficial channels. Although factory cadres were
entitled to one supplementary meal without ration coupons in factory cafeterias, in reality
this policy was consistently violated. For example, although a limit of 500 free meals per
month was assigned to factory officials during the fourth quarter of 1942, the actual
number was greater.58 In October, 84 more meals were served to them, in November,
113 more, and in December, 94 more.59 In this way, the factory cadres received an
excess of 24.59 tons of coarse grain, 5.42 tons of meat, and 0.57 tons of fats during the
fourth quarter of 1942.60 Factory cadres enjoyed other privileges in rationing by
unofficial routes. Although the Soviet government restricted the distribution of coupons
for extra hot meals to the workers and ITR who did labor-intensive work and exceeded
individual labor requirements, the director of MMK ignored this rule and ordered the
distribution of these coupons to factory officials, including administrators, white-collar
employees, cadres, and ITR, rather than to workers. Accordingly, from October to
December of 1942, in violation of the governmental policy, 6,844 coupons for extra hot
meals were distributed to factory administrative departments and to leading staff

members (rukovodiashchii sostav) of the Industrial Technical College who were working

 

’7 For example, see Vera S. Dunham, In Stalin ’s Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1976); J. Eric Duskin, Stalinist Reconstruction and the Confirmation of a New
Elite, [945-1953 (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

’8 GARF, f. 8300, op. 18, d. 12, 1. 4.

’9 lbid.

6° lbid., 1. 40b.

46

at MMK.“ Moreover, the cadres and ITR of the Open-hearth Furnace No. 2, including
the chief and deputy of the workshop, had additional hot meals everyday for 10
consecutive days with coupons allocated for workshop workers.62 In this workshop, the
coupons were distributed to all ITR regardless of their fulfillment of labor requirements.63
Although Stakhanovites—workers who over-fulfilled their output norms—
remained “privileged” workers in principle, the priorities for them were frequently
undermined by the supplies for factory cadres and technical personnel who obtained
advantages that Stakhanovites did not. Following the governmental decree of October
18, 1942 (“On the encouragement of Stakhanovites by the abolition of egalitarianism
(uravnilovka) in supply”) the MMK director declared that Stakhanovites and their
families would have priority, receiving both ration coupons for produce from subsidiary
farms and consumer services, such as shoe repair and sewing.64 But the director’s order
was not carried out in practice.65 By mid-January 1943 the factory ORS had still not
provided the extra rations. Nor had the consumer services for the Stakhanovites and their
families been organized. Instead, during the same period, available consumer services
had been routed not to the Stakhanovite workers, but to the factory cadres and their
family members."6 Even though some Stakhanovites still received generous rewards for

completion of important work along with technical personnel, the number of the

 

6‘ lbid., 1. 70b.
‘2 lbid.
‘3 lbid., 1. 8.

“ lbid., 11. 7, 70b.
‘5 lbid.
6" lbid., 1. 70b.

47

Stakhanovites receiving the reward was very small. During November and December in
1942 the factory management distributed a total of 1,025 food packages containing the
equivalent of a monthly food ration to the Stakhanovites (and ITR) as the reward for the
completion of the construction of the Furnace No. 5.67 But the number of the recipients

of the generous rewards comprised only about 2 percent of the entire work force of the

MMK.

The least privileged: young workers“

The real victims of the enterprise’s abuse of the rationing system in favor of
cadres became the unskilled, ordinary workers. Although they had legitimate ration
coupons, they could not exchange them for food because there was very
little food left. For example, on November 7, 1942, the factory ORS could not even
provide workers with meat for the most important Soviet holiday of the year, the
anniversary of the October Revolution. In this period, young single workers living in
donnitories who had coupons for groats and fats could not redeem them due to the lack of

those items.69

Indeed, ordinary workers, especially young workers (those under age 20, most of

whom were unskilled single workers living in dormitories), were the most

 

67 Even though it was a period of severe food shortages, those packages included very generous amounts of
food. For the 500 packages distributed in November include two kilograms of meat, one kilogram of dairy
products, and three kilograms of vegetables. Of the 525 packages distributed in December, 99 packages
included two kilograms of meat, four liters of milk, and two packs of cigarettes, and 225 packages
consisted of one kilogram of meat, four liters of milk, and one pack of cigarettes. For the rest of the
packages, the items were similar to those distributed in November. lbid.

6’ In the beginning of the war the number of young workers at MMK was 19 percent, but at the end of the
war, 61 percent. Neustanno dvigat ’sia vpered... : 90 letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia G. I. Nosova
posviashchaetsia (Magnitogorsk: Literatumo-izdatel’skoe agentstvo “TAN”, 1995), p. 77.

‘9 Ibid.

48

underprivileged group. They frequently received barely enough to maintain their daily
nutritional requirements. In late 1942 the food supply for young single workers and trade
school (RU) and factory training school (FZO) students did not improve at all.70
Although supplementary hot cafeteria-meals were guaranteed for these young workers
who overfulfilled their output norms, the factory ORS never provided the food.71

The poor food supply for young workers continued throughout the war years. In a
letter sent to her aunt who was living in a newly liberated city in Northern Caucasus in
early 1945, a seventeen-year-old female metal worker in the Electric repair shop of the
MMK complained of her difficult living conditions.72 She lived with seven other female
workers in a dormitory room and did not have enough soap to wash with, but her diet was
the most serious problem. The workshop cafeteria served meals only once a day, in the
morning. Thus, the female workers could have a meal only once a day whether it was
breakfast, lunch, or dinner.73 After their poor living conditions in the dormitories became
known to city authorities through surveillance by the city’s secret police, the local party
had the factory management provide the young women with food coupons three times a

week.74 Factory cafeterias that were able to serve three meals a day to young workers

living in dormitories were rare during the war period. The single workers living in the

 

7° lbid., 1. 3.

7' lbid., 1. 30b. During this period even schoolchildren registered on the ORS list for the MMK did not
receive sufficient food rations: meat, grains, and fats for preparing the children’s hot luncheon were not
provided.

7’ OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, 1. 96 (4/18/1945), “Dokladnaia zapiska.”
’3 lbid.
7‘ lbid.

49

dormitory of the Kommunist Mining and Ore Equipment Factory, one of the MMK’s
subsidiary factories, were served meals just twice a day in the workshop cafeteria.7S
Compared to factory cadres, young workers had relatively little access to
consumer goods, which were in extremely short supply. An inspection report on the
living conditions of Magnitostroi workers revealed in February 1945 that more technical
personnel and white-collar employees had access to consumer goods (e.g., clothing)
while young workers “very rarely” received them.76 From 1943 to 1944, for example, an
automobile base chief received 16 items, while a former FZO graduate worker received

none at all.77

Lacking consumer goods and food, they would have to buy what they
needed in the market. These conditions could not have been tolerable especially for
young workers whose wages were not high enough to afford market prices. A young
MMK worker, Safronov, complained that his monthly pay envelope was empty after the
deduction of a 600-ruble cash advance that he had received to purchase boots.78

Although MMK workers’ average wages were relatively high compared to those
of other factory workers, not all MMK workers were highly paid. Young unskilled

laborers working in the Blast-fumace workshop of the MMK received comparatively low

wages and were often in debt to the workshops.79 The poorly paid workers often

 

7’ OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, 1. 9 (2/28/1945), “Materialy: proverki sostoianiia obshchestvennogo
pitaniia na magnitogorskom zavode im. gazety kommunist.”

7° lbid., l. 3 (2/25/1945), “Svedeniia: po proverke bytovykh uslovii rabochikh avtobazy tresna “MS.”
7’ lbid.

7' lbid., l. 60 (2/1945), “Dokladnaia.” In some factories in Magnitogorsk the wage gap between workers
and technical personnel was more than double. Some workers received lower wages than white-collar
employees. For example, the Kommunist Factory workers earned an average of 595 rubles a month during
the first half of 1945, while white-collar employees received 610 rubles and ITR, 1,426 rubles. lbid., l. 139
ob (7/1945).

7"11:111., 1. 59.

50

requested large advance payments from their supervisors, which left them without regular
monthly pay for several months. After receiving cash advances, some workers owed
large amounts of money—more than half or even all of their monthly wages to the
factory. According to a factory party committee report of early 1945, Egumov, a worker
whose wage was 612 rubles, received an extra prepayment of 600 rubles and was left
owing 400 rubles. Petrova, a worker whose wage was 500 rubles, also received a
prepayment totaling 800 rubles and was left owing 560 rubles.80 With deductions of 45-
50 percent of their monthly wages, the underpaid workers, mostly young people, would
not receive substantial paychecks for several months.8| Severely underprivileged young
workers emerged as a negative wartime legacy with which enterprise management and

local authorities would have to deal.

Magnitogorsk in Flux: Evacuation and Its Socio-economic Impact

Another wartime legacy that the Magnitogorsk authorities faced after the war was
the enormously increased city population, mainly due to the influx of evacuees. The city
population increased more than 60 percent from the prewar years as it grew from 146,000
in 1940 to 230,000 in June 1945.82 While cities in the front regions were losing

inhabitants to evacuation in the first two years of the war,83 home front cities, such as

 

8° lbid., 1. 60; see also 1. 139.
8' lbid., 1. 60.

’2 AOAM. f. 10, op. l, d. 383, l. 152 (6/21/1945), “Protokol: zasedaniia 44-i sessii magnitogorskogo
gorodskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia.”

’3 For example, Leningrad lost more than 600,000 residents to evacuation by late August 1942. The city
lost similar number of people to death during the war. Edward Bubis and Blair A. Ruble, “The Impact of
WWII on Leningrad,” in Impact of World War 11, ed. Linz, p. 192; Sovetskii tyl, p. 182. Evacuation from

51

Magnitogorsk, experienced rapid population growth during the period. Evacuation to
Magnitogorsk and other cities in the Ural region started immediately after the war broke
out. Both its geographical remoteness from the front and economic potential as a key
industrial base prompted the Stalin government to evacuate three times as many people as
initially planned (or 1.6 million) to the Ural region.84 The first wave of evacuees came to
the Ural region during the first months of the war when German armies reached the
Moscow suburbs in October 1941. A second wave arrived during the fall of 1942 when
the Germans advanced into the southern part of the Soviet Union.85 Although some
published sources estimate that 100,000 people were evacuated to Magnitogorsk during
the war,86 archival sources suggest a smaller number. A Magnitogorsk city soviet report
indicates that the total number of evacuees sent to Magnitogorsk was about 43,000. In
1941 the city received 18,000 evacuees; 15,000 in 1942; and 10,000 in 1943. 87 The total

number of evacuees was comparable to about 30 percent of the city’s prewar

 

Leningrad was prohibited starting Nov. 1. 1942. Potemkina, Evakuatsiia v gody velikoi otechestvennoi
voiny,, pp. 32-33.

8’ Potemkina, “Evakuatsia naseleniia v ural’skii region,” p. 157. According to the initial evacuation plan
established by early July 1941, the number of the people to be evacuated was not to exceed two million. Of
the two million, 440,000 people, who were mostly from Stalingrad oblast, were to be sent to the Ural
region. lbid., p. 156. Ultimately, however, the total population evacuated to the east during 1941-1942 is
estimated to be at least 12 million. Potemkina, Evakuatiia v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, p. 24.
Among them, 1.6 million evacuees were living in the Ural region by early 1942. lbid., p. 256.

'5 Potemkina, “Evakuatsia naseleniia v ural’skii region,” p.157.
’6 Velikaia otechestvennaia voina, [941-1945. Entsiklopediia (1985), p. 425.

'7 AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, l. 175. (5/24/1945) “Protokol: 48-1 sessii Magnitogorskogo gorodskogo
soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia.” The number of evacuees reached a climax in Magnitogorsk in late
1943 and early 1944 and then began to decrease with the beginning of the reevacuation. M. N. Potemkina,
“Politika sovetskogo gosudarstva po organizatsii reevakuatsii naseleniia v 1941-1943 godakh,”
Mezhbuzovskii sbornik nauchnykh trudov: Seriia gumanitarnye i sotsial 'nye nauki (March, 1998): 58.
Thus, by early 1944, only 27,517 evacuees were living in the city. Potemkina, “Evakuatsiia i
Magnitogorsk.” It is unclear when most of the evacuees in Magnitogorsk returned home. But, in the Ural
region only 12,793 evacuees (0.7 percent of the 1.6 million people originally evacuated) remained in early
1948. By then, the reevacuation process in the Ural region was largely concluded. Potemkina, “Politika
sovetskogo gosudarstva,” 61 .

52

population.88 In addition, many evacuated workers who had left family members in the
southern part of the Soviet Union asked them to migrate to Magnitogorsk to reunite their
families. By the end of the war, many of these family members lived in the city.89
Although the evacuation had a positive impact on the economy,90 the negative
impact overshadowed it. The large number of evacuees partly solved the labor shortage
that had existed before the war and had worsened with the conscription of a large number
of the region’s male population.” Many evacuees thus benefited from secure
employment. The employment rate among the evacuees who were eligible to work—
about 54 percent of those relocated to the Ural region—was strikingly high and rapidly

increased over the course of the war (see Table 2).92

Table 2. The employment rate among eligible evacuees in the Ural region

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year Rate (%)
1941-42 65
1943 88
1944 90
1945 93

 

 

 

Source: M. N. Potemkina, “Evakuatsiia naseleniia v ural’skii region,” 158.

 

8’ AOAM, f. 10, op. I, d. 383, l. 175 (5/24/1945), “Protokol: 48-1 sessii magnitogorskogo gorodskogo
soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia.” Many of them were evacuated from the front areas, such as Moscow,
Leningrad, the Baltic region, and the Ukraine.

“9 OGAChO, f. 234, op. 19, d. 78, 1. 125 (5/28/1945), “Dilektoru magnitogorskogo ordena lenina i ordena
trudovogo krasnogo zrramtni metallurgicheskogo kombinata imeni stalina.”.

9° Bubis & Ruble, “The Impact of World War II on Leningrad,” p. 205; Potemkina, Evakuatsiia v gody
velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, pp. 130-132.

9' Potemkina, “Evakuatsiia naseleniia v ural’skii region,” p. 158.

’2 Ibid.

53

However, the city’s growing population during the war exacerbated pressing
housing problems that had persisted during the prewar years.93 Despite the 60 percent
increase in the population during the war period, housing construction in the city virtually
came to a halt because of the priority given to industrial construction.94 Accordingly,
Magnitogorsk workers lived in very uncomfortable conditions during the entire war. For
example, living space in the MMK female workers’ dormitory was only 2.78 square
meters per person.95 While MMK married couples were supposedly allowed at least a
room,96 MMK provided only 39 rooms for 106 newly married young working couples
during the first five months of 1945.97

Overall, under such circumstances, living conditions in the city for evacuees were
terribly challenging. Although some evacuees were allowed to live in apartments, a vast
majority had to live in dormitories or poorly organized and ill-equipped barracks during
the war.98 Local enterprise leaders’ negligence of the needs of evacuated workers made
the evacuees’ housing conditions even worse. During three consecutive years from 1943

to 1945, the People’s Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy (Narodnyi Komissariat

 

9’ The worsening housing conditions not only in Magnitogorsk but also in the Ural region in general were
anticipated. In 1940, the average living space for a person in the Ural region was quite small: 4.9 square
meters. The national urban average was 6.5. A prewar housing shortage persisted throughout the region.
As of March 1, 1942, the living space per person in the cities in Sverdlovsk oblast became even smaller: it
was reduced to only 3.1 sq. meters. Thus, by 1942 cities in the Ural region were full and further settlement
of evacuees could threaten the evacuees’ health due to the spread of epidemics. Potemkina, “Evakuatsiia
naseleniia v ural’skii region,” 159.

9’ lbid. The state budget assigned for housing and communal services during the war time was merely 0.8
billion 1960 rubles, while defense outlays were 58.2 billion rubles. James R. Millar, “Financing the Soviet
Effort in World War 11,” Soviet Studies 32, no. 1 (January 1980): 109.

9’ OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d.79, l. l 12 (6/8/ 1945), “Dokladnaia zapiska.”

9‘ lbid., I. 114.

97111111., 1. 113.

9’ Potemkina, “Evakuirovannoe naselenie v Ural’skii region," p. 159

54

C hernoi Metallurgii SSSR) ordered the directors of the MMK and the Magnitostroi to
build an apartment for the evacuated workers and technical staff of the Kommunist
Factory. But the directors failed to do so until July 1945.99 Subsequently, the housing
conditions for both evacuated workers and the factory’s technical intelligentsia were
similarly discouraging. The head of a factory workshop who had received a medal for his
heroic labor lived in a barrack kitchen of only nine square meters, with four other family
members. ’00 There was no room for furniture, and the entire family had to sleep on the
floor. A chief mechanic, also a medal awardee, and his five family members lived in a
barracks room of only 12 square meters. A worker and his five family members lived in
an even smaller space of 10 square meters. In addition, the barracks were barely fit for
human habitation as they were collapsing and leaking. Ninety percent of 500 evacuated
factory workers and technical personnel lived in these very dilapidated conditions long
afier the evacuation.'01 By the end of the war, the director of the Kommunist Factory
warned in a report that the housing conditions for factory workers “had reached a
catastrophic level causing the labor discipline in the factory to break down.”102 The
housing conditions of workers at the MMK, the city’s major factory, were only slightly

better than those of evacuated workers. By the end of the war, about 20,000 workers

 

99 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, l. 137 (7/ 18/ 1945), “Dokladnaia: po voprosu bytovnogo sosluzhivaniia
trudiashchikhsia zavoda “kommunist” glavrudy NKChM g. Magnitogorsk.”

'°° lbid.
'°' lbid.

"’2 lbid.

55

from the MMK and other city factories were still sleeping in bunk beds in cramped

dormitory quarters. 103

Conclusion

During the war Magnitogorsk emerged as a key industrial city contributing
considerably to the war effort by producing steel for weapons. The strategic significance
of the city was widely propagandized in national newspapers. Stalin’s praises for
Magnitogorsk workers, which were published in the mass media, highlighted the city’s
role in the war effort to the Soviet people. Moreover, a considerable portion of the city
population belonged to the “first” rationing category due to the value of their labor in
wartime defense industries.

Not surprisingly, however, in reality the city’s crucial status for the war effort did
not guarantee satisfactory provisions during the war, because the armed forces had top
priority in receiving supplies. The city authorities frequently failed to provide the
promised amount of goods through the central supply system. Under these
circumstances, the authorities had to turn to local sources, such as subsidiary farms run
by local enterprises, in order to feed local workers and their families. This increased
dependence on local enterprise farms demonstrated the rise of the power and
responsibility of the local enterprise management. Along with increased power in supply
distribution, the increased reliance on technical personnel and enterprise cadres in making

urgent decisions enhanced the status of local enterprise officials and technical

 

'03 AOAM. f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, l. 172 ob. (6/21/1945), “Reshenie: 44-i sessii magnitogorskogo gorodskogo
soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia.”

56

intelligentsia, which had gradually come back since the Great Purges in the late 19305. '04
The enhanced power of factory cadres enabled them privileged access to food and other
supplies.

The advantages gained by the factory cadres and the increased significance of
technical personnel took their toll on workers, however, especially unskilled ones, who
were mostly young and single. Some workers in Magnitogorsk suffering from hard lives
during the war expressed their hardships and grievances in private letters sent to family
members. A report of the city’s secret police organ, which conducted surveillance of
workers’ letters before delivery in late 1944, details the workers’ complaints: “We are

99105

working 12 hours a day. . .I work while starving, and “my patience has reached its

limit.”106 Some workers expressed hopelessness about their life,”)7

and harshly criticized
the bureaucracy.108

As we will see in the next chapter, the contradictory reality of the city’s officially
prioritized status as a key industrial center for the war effort while it lacked supplies and
adequate living conditions affected its inhabitants’ attitudes toward the local authorities.
While the city’s widely advertized contribution to the war effort enhanced inhabitants’
sense of the entitlement to better living conditions after the war, they expressed their

dissatisfaction with local administrative officials and party members who failed to

improve living conditions. The increased significance of the factory cadres’ role in

 

'0‘ For example, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR,
I 935-] 941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 266.

‘°’ OGAChO, f. 9.234. op. 19. d. l. l- 8 ( 1205/1944)-

‘°° lbid., 1. 1 lob.
'°’ Ibid.
‘0‘ lbid., 1. 140b.

57

wartime widened the gap between the cadres and workers, especially young workers, in
receiving incentives through the postwar hierarchical distribution system, and affected
the enterprise management’s strategy of raising productivity after the war. '09

Wartime demographic upheavals also affected daily life in Magnitogorsk in
various ways. Unlike cities in the front regions, the population of Magnitogorsk, hitherto
a hinterland, increased considerably due to the influx of evacuees from the front.
Although no housing was destroyed by battles or bombing, the city residents suffered
continually from housing shortages during the war and the postwar years. Like many

110

other cities, Magnitogorsk also sent men and women to the front during the war; after

the war, the city authorities would have to provide material aid for returned veterans,
including invalids, their family members, and war widows, many of whom were lefi in

111

dire living conditions. In the following chapters, I will examine how these legacies of

the war took their toll on local authorities, factory cadres, workers, and their families.

 

“’9 See Chapter 111 of this dissertation.

"0 A total of 32,000 people, or more than 20 percent of city population, were conscripted into the army and
sent to the front. About 10,000, or one-third, were killed. lunost’ Magnitka, p. 120

111 See Chapter IV of this dissertation.

58

II. The Politics of Distribution and Shortage Survival Strategies in
Magnitogorsk

Recent studies on daily life in the postwar Stalin years show that scarcity was a
universal problem throughout the Soviet Union, regardless of whether one lived in a
former front region or in a key industrial town on the “home front.”' Some regional
studies focusing on the former front/liberated regions destroyed and occupied by the
German armies during the war, such as Kalinin province and Rostov-on-the Don, also
demonstrate that postwar scarcity prevailed in the daily life of these regions, even though
they were identified as a priority for the government and received relatively large
amounts of government investment.2 Primarily the shortages in the former front regions
were due to the focus of investment on reconstruction of infrastructure and heavy
industry, which affected daily living conditions less than light industry.3

While scholars have paid much attention to the center-region relationship in

decision-making on economic policies and their implementation,4 regional practices of

 

' For example, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Postwar Soviet Society: The 'Retum to Nonnalcy,‘ 1945-1953," in
The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union, ed. by Susan Linz (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman &
Allanheld, 1985), pp. 129-156; Elena Zubkova, Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and
Disappointments, [945-1957 (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers
and Late Stalinism; idem, "The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar
Period, 1945-1948," Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 51, no. 6 (1999), pp. 1013-1038; Julie Hessler, A Social
History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, [917-1953 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), chapter 7.

2 Kees Boterbloem. Life and Death under Stalin: Kalinin Province, [945-1953 (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), pp. 181-182; Jeffrey W. Jones, “People Without a Definite
Occupation,” in Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-53, ed. by Donald J.
Raleigh (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), p. 237.

3 During [945-1950 nearly 88 percent of economic investments were concentrated on producer goods (e.g.,
raw materials for heavy industry), while only about 12 percent were focused on food and consumer goods.
Alec Nove, An Economic History of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991, 3rd edition (London and New York:
Penguin Books, 1992), p. 297.

‘ For example, see Timothy Dunmore, The Stalinist Command Economy: The Soviet State Apparatus and
Economic Policy, [945-1953 (Macmillan Press LTD, 1980); James Harris, “Resisting the Plan in the Urals,

59

distribution and perceptions and attitudes toward those practices during the postwar
Stalin years have not been investigated thoroughly. Few scholars have fully examined
the postwar living conditions within key industrial cities of the former home-front region.
Moreover, few scholars have shed light on working peoples’ postwar socio-political
attitudes from the home-front perspective, which would draw on the particular home-
front wartime experience. Studies on the impact of wartime experiences on socio-
political attitudes and the self-identification of the Soviet people tend to focus heavily on
either the former front or occupied regions5 or on particular groups, such as war
veterans.6 However, the experiences of the former battleground regions cannot
appropriately explain the impact of the wartime experience on the attitudes of those in the
“deep rear,” which was never touched by a single battle during the war. For the workers
in the hinterland, memories of the war would be related to their labor in the factories,
rather than heroic exploits in (or the terror of) battle and experiences with Nazi
collaborators or partisans during the occupation and liberation. How, then, did the local
authorities manage distribution of supplies, which were in extreme shortage? How did
the working people of Magnitogorsk, a key industrial center of the wartime home front,

respond to the postwar hardship that plagued daily life?

 

1928-1956: Or, Why Regional Officials Needed ‘Wreckers’ and ‘Saboteurs’,” in Contending with
Stalinism: Soviet Power & Popular Resistance in the 1930s, ed. by Lynne Viola (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2002), pp. 201-228.

5 For example, see Amir Weiner. Making Sense of War : The Second World War and the Fate of the
Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001 ); Karl D. Qualls, “Local-Outsider
Negotiations in Postwar Sevastopol’s Reconstruction, 1944-1953,” in Provincial Landscapes; Jones,
“People Without a Definite Occupation,” in Provincial Landscapes.

6 For example, see Mark Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group, 1945-1955,” Slavic Review,
Vol.65, No. 1 (2006): 111-37.

60

To answer this question, I first will examine the living conditions of the city of
Magnitogorsk, such as supplies of food and consumer goods and housing conditions. I
will pay particular attention to the gap between the reality of supply conditions in
Magnitogorsk and the supply that the industrial workers should have received based on
official policy.7 Then, I will investigate the scope and politics of distribution—the Soviet
regime’s utilization of shortage to achieve its economic and political goals, such as
political loyalty and mobilization of the labor force for extraordinary output—and the
ways in which the policy was implemented by the local authorities.8 My investigation of
the distribution mechanism will enable me to explore to what extent the limits of the
centralized supply undermined or enhanced the role of the state as paternalistic provider
and how the local authorities came to utilize shortages as a tool to manipulate the labor

force.9

Employing a modernity approach, I will also examine how two modern practices,
welfare and surveillance, intersected during the postwar Stalinist era and how both
practices were used as a tool for cultivating a better society by refashioning populations,
which was the goal of social engineering by the Soviet government.10 Recently,

historians have seen the practice of Soviet welfare policy in the broader context of

 

7 Elena Osokina’s concept of “illusory privilege,” which she used for her study on rationing during the
19303, will be useful for in this case. Osokina, Our Daily Bread, p. 88-94.

8 Stephen Kotkin and Lewis Siegelbaum show that scarcity was not a weakness of the Soviet system, but
the regime utilized it to achieve economic and political goals such as increasing labor productivity, political
loyalty, and controlling local officials. Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 246; Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “‘Dear Comrade, You
Asked What We Need’: Socialist Patemalism and Soviet Rural ‘Notables’ in the Mid-19305,” Slavic
Review, vol. 57, no.1 (Spring 1998): 107-132; Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov, Stalinism As A Way
of Life: A Narrative in Documents (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000).

9 See chapter IV “Politics of Welfare,” below, for a detailed discussion of this role of the state.

'° Peter Holquist, “‘lnformation Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work’: Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-
European Context,” Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69 (September 1997): 417, 425.

61

modernity.ll Welfare policy was a crucial aspect of both population management and
state intervention into society, modern political practices that developed during the 19th
and 20'h centuries of industrialization and urbanization.12 According to Peter Holquist’s
insightful hypothesis, state surveillance—one of the essential modes of Soviet power—is,
like welfare policy, a sign of modernity because the state used surveillance as a
population management practice for accumulating information on popular attitudes in
order to better act upon the population.13 In this light, Holquist views both practices—
i.e., welfare and surveillance—as not mutually exclusive practices of modernity. His
argument is useful to understand the more complex nature of the Stalin government’s
strategy of control over society. In this chapter, I will attempt to elaborate Holquist’s
thesis by showing that the postwar Stalin leadership used surveillance to implement
paternalistic welfare practices and, consequently, to enhance the positive images of the
state as a caring father among its subjects.l4

To analyze the Magnitogorsk people’s response to the hardships, I will examine
the rhetoric displayed in their main survival strategies for coping with the shortages, such
as claiming entitlement to a better life, denunciation, and resistance. By examining these
strategies that the city’s inhabitants employed to cope with the hardships, I will explore

the ways that language was able to shape the thought and behavior of the people, and the

 

” For example, see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University
of California, 1995); David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, eds. Russian Modernity (New York: St.
Martin’s Press Inc., 2000).

'2 Hoffmann and Kotsonis, eds., Russian Modernity, pp. 250-256.

'3 Peter Holquist, “What’s so Revolutionary about the Russian Revolution? State Practices and the New-
Style Politics, 1914-21,” in Russian Modernity, ed. by Hoffmann and Kotsonis, pp. 87-114.

'4 In this light, I do not agree with Katherine Verdery, who sees the surveillance and paternalistic
redistribution of the Soviet socialist system as unrelated and mutually exclusive practices. See Katherine
Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996),
pp. 24-26.

62

ways in which the inhabitants of this model city identified themselves. ‘5 Employing class
and regional identities as analytic tools, I will show how the working people of
Magnitogorsk used class to justify their demand for better treatment from the state. Here,
Sheila Fitzpatrick’s approach, which uses class as an “ascribed” characteristic (rather
than as a socioeconomic attribute) whose key function is to define an individual’s rights,
privileges, and obligations vis-a-vis the state, will be useful.’6 In the same vein, I will
also employ E. P. Thompson’s understanding of class or class consciousness not as a
given, inherent, or fixed attribute of an individual, but as something that has to be
formed, and thus, can be taken up, cast off, or hidden.17 For the analysis of regional
identity, I will consider Benedict Anderson’s concept of the “imagined community” and
Sheila F itzpatrick’s “Potemkin Village—[the] state’s idealized representation of the rural
life.”'8 She defined Potemkinism as a “Stalinist discourse in which shortcomings and
contradictions of the present were overlooked.” In the discourse, the world was
portrayed “not as it was but as it was becoming” by focusing only on positive and bright
sides of the world. Applying these concepts, I will examine how the portrayal of the city
in official rhetoric as a model Soviet city during the war and after created a sense of

regional identity that was shared by the working people of Magnitogorsk. In addition, I

 

'5 As examples of analysis of the language of the Soviet subject and its role in self-identification, see Sheila
Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 19305, Slavic Review,
vol. 55, no.1 (Spring 1996): 78-105; Siegelbaum, “Dear Comrade, You Asked What We Need...”

'6 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Ascribing Class: The Construction of Social Identity in Soviet Russia,” Journal of
Modern History, vol. 65, no. 4, (1993): 745-770; Fitzpatrick, ed., Stalinism: New Directions (London and
New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 16.

‘7 E. P. Thompson, The Making ofthe English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 9-13.
See also Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Ronald Grigor Suny, “Class Backwards? In Search of the Soviet
Working Class,” in Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class and Identity, ed. by Siegelbaum and Suny
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 1-26.

‘8 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin ’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after
Collectivization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 16.

63

focus on the way in which its particular regional wartime experience (i.e., hard labor at
factories on the home front) shaped a unique regional identity among the Magnitogorsk
workers. 1 will also examine the integration of these regional and class identities.19
Finally, I will examine the workers’ rhetoric presented in their denunciations of local
officials, too. Focusing on one of the key functions of denunciation—manipulation of the
state in order to “provoke a state response from which the denouncer would derive some
specific benefit or satisfaction,”20 I will explore the way in which the working people of
Magnitogorsk attempted to protect their interests during shortages and the way in which
they perceived the Soviet socialist system.

Resistance is another analytic tool that I employ to investigate how Magnitogorsk
workers perceived the Soviet system. Recent studies show that resistance is not a
universal or monolithic act, but encompasses a wide range of acts, behaviors, and
attitudes.21 While Magnitogorsk workers employed active forms of resistance, such as
refiising work for which they could get little reward, they also used “subaltem strategies”

to manipulate both the local authorities and the state.22 But it should be noted that acts of

resistance were not always anti-governmental; sometimes the aims of resistance were

 

'9 Elena larskaia-Smirova and Pavel Romanov provide a good example of the presentation of a regional
identity, which was combined with class identity, among the workers who had labored at plants in the
home-front regions, such as Samara and Samara province, during World War 11. Elena larskaia-Smimova
and Pavel Romanov, “At the Margins of Memory: Provincial Identity and Soviet Power in Oral Histories,
1940-53,” in Provincial Landscapes, pp. 302-303, 318.

2° Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Signals from Below: Soviet Letters of Denunciation of the 19305," Journal of
Modern History (1996), p. 863. For the regime-centered approach, denunciation was a means of monitoring
public opinion (i.e., a surveillance function) and a state control mechanism over local party officials and
bureaucrats.

2' Lynn Viola, ed., Contending with Stalinism: Soviet Power & Popular Resistance in the I 93 0s (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press), pp. 2-3, 18-20; James C. Scott, “Everyday Forms of Resistance,” in
Everyday F arms of Peasant Resistance, ed. Forrest D. Colbum (Armon, New York and London: ME.
Sharpe, Inc., 1989).

22 Fitzpatrick, Stalin ’s Peasants, p. 10.

64

 

limited to the local environment.23 By the same token, denunciation can be understood as
an expression of frustration and anger by people who believed that the original cause of
Soviet Communism was betrayed by the wrongdoing of governmental and party officials.
Using these analytic tools, I will eventually explore the ways in which the workers of
Magnitogorsk perceived “Sovietness,” as well as the ways in which their identities were
carved out during the hardships of the postwar years.

Responding to extreme shortages, Magnitogorsk authorities continued to use the
hierarchical distribution system, giving priority to the city’s steel and construction
enterprises. Although the priority that people laboring in the city’s key factories had
remained frequently in name only due to the shortages, the authorities maintained the
system by refining gradations in the hierarchy. Along with the hierarchical distribution, a
limited form of welfare-style allocation balanced the postwar distribution system in the
city. A strong sense of entitlement to a better life, shaped by the Magnitogorsk workers’
contribution to the Soviet victory, became the basis of local people’s denunciations of the
local authorities and of their hope for a better future. Thus, the rhetoric presented in their
denunciations and resistance behaviors was not always motivated by anti-Soviet or anti-

govemmental sentiment. In many cases, those acts and their accompanying rhetoric were

 

23 In that case, resistance by locals is understood simply as localized discontent over economic issues.
Thus, the locals’ resistance hardly contains political refusal of the central authorities. See Vladimir A.
Kozlov, E. McClarn and MacKinnon, Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-
Stalin years (Armonk, N.Y.: ME. Sharpe, 2002); Jeffrey Rossman, “A Workers’ Strike in Stalin’s Russia:
The Vichuga Uprising of April 1932," in Contending with Stalinism: Soviet Power & Popular Resistance in
the I 930s, ed. by Lynne Viola (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 81. Although some
scholars (e.g., James Scott and Elena Osokina) see desertion or involvement of illegal economic activities,
such as speculation, as passive forms of resistance, as Siegelbaum and Viola correctly point out it is very
difficult to determine whether those behaviors really came out of resistance motivation due to their multi-
dimensional nature. Thus, investigating contexts and motivations is crucial to understand the nature of
action, rather than determining categorically subalterns’ acts as resistance using a single definition of
resistance. See Scott, “Everyday Forms of Resistance”; Elena Osokina, "Economic Disobedience under
Stalin," in Contending with Stalinism, pp. 170-200; Siegelbaum and Sokolov, Stalinism As A Way of Life,
pp. 12-14; Lynne Viola, "Popular Resistance in the Stalinist 19305," in Contending with Stalinism, ed. by
Lynne Viola (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 24, 43.

65

a reflection of their strong desire to correct “immoral” practices of the Soviet socialist

system.

Continued Symbolic Prioritization of Magnitogorsk
In December 1945 one worker expressed his concerns at a trade union meeting of
the Magnitogorsk Steel Works (MMK):
It was an open secret that during the war Magnitogorsk had received key attention
from the Central Committee of the [Communist] party and our government.
Thus, Magnitogorsk was supplied not only with raw materials for our factory in
the first place, but I have to say that providing foodstuffs for Magnitogorsk was
also a top priority.24
Assuming a shift of the party and government’s attention to the regions liberated from
Nazi German rule after World War II ended, the same worker urged the Department of
Workers’ Supply (ORS) to “enhance considerably the provisions from the subsidiary
economy for the working class of our factory.”25
Judging from the postwar distribution of governmental resources, this MMK
worker’s concerns about decreasing support in material supplies for Magnitogorsk was
not groundless. After a governmental decree titled “Regarding urgent measures for the
reconstruction of the economy in the areas liberated from German occupation” was
issued in August 1943, after the Donbass region was liberated by the Red Army, the

Soviet government began to concentrate its resources on the reconstruction of the

European part of the Soviet Union rather than on those regions east of the Urals and

 

2’ AOAM, f. 118, op. l, d. 174, ll. 26-26ob (12/29/1945) “Stenograficheskii otchet: 8-i obshchzavodskoi
profsoiuzrroi konferentsii chlenov soiuza metallurgov.”

25 Ibid. Emphasis added by author.
66

Siberia.“ The resources were redistributed in favor of the liberated regions where the
majority of the infrastructure damage was located. For example, in 1944 the Soviet
Union’s total investment in the liberated regions increased 2.5 times compared to the
previous year: these areas were consuming 41.6 percent of the USSR’s total investment,
compared to only 16.3 percent in 1943.27

However, the status of Magnitogorsk during the postwar reconstruction era was
rather special and contradictory. Although Magnitogorsk, located “behind” the Urals,
belonged to a less favored region in terms of postwar reconstruction investment, the city,
the largest steel producer in the Soviet Union, remained strategically and economically
significant after the war. Though the war had ended, the Stalin regime decided to give
top priority to the restoration of heavy industry.28 Although Magnitogorsk was not in the
liberated region of the Soviet Union, as in the war years the city continued to receive
official attention during the postwar-reconstruction era due to its role in steel production.
Reminding the Soviet people of the significance of metal in the production of arms and
factory machines during the war in his well-known speech published in Pravda in

February 1946, Stalin requested an increase in steel production for the first postwar Five-

 

26 Timothy Dunmore, The Stalinist Command Economy: The Soviet State Apparatus and Economic Policy
[945-53 (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980), p. 37. The Ural region received 10.4
percent of USSR capital investment funds during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950). It was a six
percent drop from wartime. lbid., p. 70; Holland Hunter, “Successful Spatial Management,” in The Impact
of World War II on the Soviet Union, ed. Susan Linz (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985),
p. 57; Susan J. Linz, “World War II and Soviet Economic Growth, 1940-1953,” in The Impact of World
War II on the Soviet Union, p. 18.

27 Dunmore, The Stalinist Command Economy, p. 37.

2’ Linz, “World War II and Soviet Economic Growth,” p. 17. One example that shows Stalin’s preference
for military/heavy industry production over consumer production is his demands in the 1949 annual plan.
He ordered an increase in aluminum production for aviation while ordering a decrease in civilian output.
Aleksei Tikhonov and Paul R. Gregory, "Stalin's Last Plan," in Behind the Facade of Stalin 's Command
Economy, ed. by Paul Gregory (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), pp. 174-175.

67

Year Plan (1946-1950).29 In 1949, under the slogan, “Metal is people’s welfare,” an
editorial in Pravda urged an increase in steel production to meet the country’s economic
demands.30 Another article in Izvestiia in August 1951 urged the collection of scrap
metal, to include even abandoned German tanks in the forest.31 Along with articles on
the high demand for steel, central newspapers portrayed Magnitogorsk workers as role
models for steel production. For example, Pravda and Izvestiia increased—and perhaps
exaggerated—Magnitogorsk’s reputation by reporting stories about socialist competition
among the workers of MMK and the steadily increasing steel production of MMK,"2 and
by publishing Magnitogorsk workers’ letters to Stalin about their over-fulfillment of steel
production in 1948 and their future production plan for 1949.33 Also, the significant
contribution of Magnitogorsk steel to the construction of high-rises in Moscow and
administration buildings in liberated regions such as Smolensk was widely propagandized
in national publications.34 The presentation of Magnitogorsk and its workers as key steel
producers continued in the official rhetoric throughout the postwar reconstruction era.
The official rhetoric propagandized Magnitogorsk as the “Mecca” of steel production for

the Motherland. For the workers, this was an “imagined community”35 that provided and

 

’9 Pravda, 10 February 1946.

3" Pravda, 11 January 1949.

3' Izvestiia, 22 August 1951.

32 Pravda, 31 January 1952.

’3 Pravda 25 February 1949, Pravda 1 March 1949.

3‘ Liudi Stalinskoi Magnitki (Cheliabinsk: Cheliabinskoe oblastnoe gosugarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1952), p.
45. See also M. Shaginian. Po dorogam Piatiletki (Moskva: lzdatl‘stvo BTsSPS(vsesoiuznyi tsentral'nyi
sovet professional'nykh soiuzov) Profizdat, 1947).

35 This notion of “imagined community” is taken from Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1991). Anderson

68

shaped regional identity based on strong self-esteem and entitlement to better living

conditions as the reward for heroic wartime labor.

The Reality: Shortages Continued

Shortage was not a new phenomenon for the city’s inhabitants. During the prewar
and war years it was a problem that the urban populations had to face in every aspect of
daily life. Even though Magnitogorsk received continuing attention from Moscow after
the war ended due to its role as the country’s largest producer of steel for the postwar
reconstruction, material supplies for daily life in Magnitogorsk changed little compared
to those of the war years, at least during the first four or five years afier the war.
Shortage was the inevitable result of the Stalin government’s concentration of support for
heavy industry at the expense of light industry. Thus, as in the war years, shortages

dominated daily life in Magnitogorsk at least until the late 19403.

Food

A late 1945 report by Nesterov, vice director of the MMK ORS implies that
Magnitogorsk retained its privileged status in the food supply system. The report shows
that the amount of food for Magnitogorsk did not decrease, but increased even after
reconstruction started in the liberated western region of the Soviet Union. The increasing
food supply implies that Magnitogorsk, as one of the strategic industrial centers of the
USSR, received priority regardless of its reduction in geographical priority to a former

home-front region.

 

effectively argues that print or printed language helped people to imagine a large community that they
could never have seen or met during their lifetime.

69

According to the report, the total supply quota of public catering increased by
seven percent.36 As a result, 8,000 more people, totaling 102,000, about half of the city’s
population, received food through the ORS during 1945.37 In fact, the ORS supplied
three times more food than in 1944.38 Starting in October of 1945, 1,100 single MMK
workers living in dormitories who had previously received only two meals a day began
receiving three meals per day.39 MMK workers received 8 more kilograms of fish and
meat in December 1945 than in earlier months.40 The MMK ORS also provided the
workers with bread tickets that allowed them 100 additional grams of bread in late
1945.41 A February 1946 report by the factory cadre department indicates that from
December 1 about 40 percent of the whole factory labor force (workers, ITR, and white-

collar employees) began to receive an increased daily bread ration: 14,529 people’s

 

36 It is unclear whether this increase was due to increased supply fi'om the central supply system or to an
increase by local suppliers. If the former was the case, it would be evidence of the postwar leadership’s
determination to restore heavy industry, indicating that the Stalin regime did not forget the heavy-industry
town in the home-front region even as it began to concentrate its investment in the liberated part of the
USSR. There is also the possibility that both were the case. Indeed, archival sources show that during
1945 production of agricultural products such as potatoes, pigs, and milk from the MMK subsidiary farms
increased. For example, as of December 1945, the MMK farms had 20 percent more pigs (1,030) than the
given quota. AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, l. 19 (12/1945). “Otchetnyi doklad: orabote OPS”a
magnitogorskogo metallurgicheskogo kombinata imeni stalina, 2a 1945 god”; lbid., 1. 260b.
“Stenograficheskii otchet: 8-i obshchezavodskoi profsoiuznoi konferentsii chlenov soiuza metallurgov.”
(12/29/1945).

3’ lbid., 1. 13.

3“ lbid., 11. 14-15, 17-18; AOAM, r. 118, op. 1, d. 184, 11. 3-8 (3/24/1948), “Doklad: o rabote komissii po
rabochemu snabzheniiu zavkoma metallurgov magnitogorskogo metkombinata na profsoiuznoi konferentsii
ot 24-go mama 1948g.”; AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 289, l. 150 (10/9/1950), “Protokol no. 5: obshchego
sobraniia chlenov profsoiuza rabotrrikov predpriiatii ORS”a magnitogorskogo metallurgicheskogo
kombinata sostoiavsheesia 9 oktiabria 1950 goda.”

39 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, l. 161 (10/10/1945) “dokladnaia zapiska: po vypolneniu postanovleniia
biuro chliabinskogo obkoma VKP(b) 0t 10 senyiabria 1945 g. ‘o zhalobakh rabochikh I sluzhashchikh
predpriiatii g.g. cheliabinska, magnitogorska, I miassa na plokhoe obskuzhivanie ikh material’no-bytovykh
nuzhd.”’

40AOAM,f. 118,op.l,d.174,11. 17-18.

4' AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, 1. 320b. It is unclear how long this increased ration continued though.

70

rations increased from 700 to 800 grams of bread; 7,400 people, from 500 to 600 grams;
and 1,156 people, from 450 to 500 grains.42

However, the increased amount of food that the ORS cadres quoted did not
necessarily mean that it was sufficient to satisfy the workers of Magnitogorsk. The
increase was an improvement over the level of the wartime food supply, which was
frequently far below even the officially assigned minimum amount to live on. Thus, the
increase from the wartime level did not necessarily mean a return to prewar peacetime
supply conditions. In fact, it was still below the full supply level for the city’s workers
and their dependents. As Vice Director Nesterov admitted, the government could not
guarantee the full quota for certain food items.43 Indeed, MMK workers were receiving
less bread than the designated amount in late 1945. An MMK worker complained in a
trade union meeting held in December 1945 that inadequate supplies of bread frequently
forced workers to labor for 12-hour work days without enough food to sustain them.44

Distribution problems caused by a lack of workers and vehicles for food
transportation and delivery frequently prevented adequate implementation of state-
controlled distribution systems and worsened daily shortages of food. A report by an
ORS employee at a trade union meeting in 1950 indicated that the lack of transportation

led to a great amount of produce being lefi to rot in the warehouse, while the stores did

 

‘2 In addition, 1,156 workers’ rations increased from 450 to 500 grams, while the rations for the children of
MMK employees increased from 300 to 400 grams. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, 1. 3000b.
(2/29/1946) “Izvtneniia v oblasti truda 1 2a rabotnoi platy, proishedshie na magnitogorskom
metallurgicheskom komvinate posle okonchaniia velikoi otechestvennoi vony.”

’3 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, 1.39. For example, about 83 percent of the bread-supply quota was
fulfilled.

“ lbid., 1. 33.

71

not receive their designated quota.45 Lack of workers in the ORS also reduced its ability
to transport supplies to Magnitogorsk. One manager at a trade union meeting suggested
that the ORS faced a serious problem due to this reason. While during the war many
people joined the department, no matter how hard the work was, to get free soup or tea as
they worked in cafeterias, few people wanted to work as ORS employees in public
cafeterias after the war.46 Certainly, the low wages of the ORS led its employees to leave
for better-paying factory jobs.47 In late 1945, the labor shortage caused delivery
problems. The ORS supplied only one-fourth of the fish quota (15 tons out of 60)
because they lacked 40 workers to go to Kustanisk oblast to get and transport fish to
Magnitogorsk.48 Some stores in the suburbs of the city also often faced serious problems;
they did not receive bread from the bread factory for five days. In mid-1946, workers
often found no bread in either cafeterias or stores for several days while most bread was
left in the bread factories probably due to a lack of delivery laborers or vehicles.49 Also,
the delivery time was often delayed. Store No.51 had not received bread on time for an

entire month. At times, an insufficient amount of bread was delivered. For example, in

 

‘5 AOAM, r. 113, op. 1, d. 239, 1. 154.

4‘ AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, 1. 32.

‘7 As an MMK worker, he or she could receive five to six times more wages. For example, while a female
factory worker at MMK earned an average of 500-600 rubles per month in 1945, a waitress or dishwasher
earned only 107-150 rubles per month. lbid., 1. 37.

‘8 lbid., ll. 36ob-37. Light industrial enterprises and the countryside particularly suffered from labor
shortages afier the war. In 1946, the city meat factory even illegally utilized POW patients from the city’s
Spem'al hospital for POWs. As a compensation for “lending” the POWs, the hospital management received
4.000 rubles from the meat factory. Also, one state farm illegally employed 25 POWs from the hospital.
The collective farm provided 18 tons of hay in return. AOAM, f. 160, op. 3, d. 6, 1. 4.

49 Magnitogorskii rabochii, 11 June, 1946. For bread supply problems, see also Magnitogorskii rabochii,
3, 9 August 1946. An MMK worker also complained at a trade union meeting in December 1945 that a
store on the outskirts of the city did not receive bread for five days. AOAM, f. 118, op. l, d. 174, I. 33.

72

mid October 1948 1,400 kg—200 kg less than quota—were delivered to store No.34. 50
In late 1945, 700 MMK workers did not get bread on time in their factory cafeterias.S '

After rationing was abolished in December 1947 there was no immediate sign of
improvement. Despite the status of Magnitogorsk as one of the nation’s crucial industrial
centers, increases in the food supply appeared later, coming first to most other parts of
the Soviet Union. Whereas some historians view 1948 as a national turning point when
the food supply began to improve,52 for Magnitogorsk this did not happen until the early
19503, when some signs of improvement and stability in the food supply finally
materialized. Thus, it appears that when rationing was abolished, the “privileged” status
of Magnitogorsk workers was severely undermined.

In 1948, after the end of rationing, the poor local harvest of potatoes—frequently
referred to as “second bread” for their substitute role in the diet—resulted in even more
serious food shortages.53 In many cafeterias that year only one type of dish per meal was
served on most days.54 Not only were fresh vegetables and fish almost unavailable in the

cafeterias,55 but bread supplies in the stores remained unstable afier rationing ended.56

 

5° OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22, d. 73, l. 15 (12/9/1948) (12/9/‘1948) “O sostoianii torgovli v gorode za 9
mesiatsev 1948 goda i o perspektivakh ee razvitiia.”

5' AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, 1. 37.

52 F iltzer, “The Standard of Living...,” p. 103 I; Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade, p.297. However,
F iltzer correctly points out that there were some exceptions. Based on archival sources, he reminds us that
the food shortages continued to be felt in some industrial centers in the peripheral regions like Sverdlovsk
even after 1948.

’3 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22, d. 73, 1. 18. The phrase, potato as the “second bread” came fi'om my
interview with Saldaev, a former MMK worker, Magnitogorsk, July 2001.

5‘ OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22, d. 73, ll. 14, 17.
’5 lbid.

’6 AOAM, f. 118, op. l, d. 225, 1. 50. (10/9/1943)
73

And the shortages continued. In 1949 the city’s inhabitants occasionally found no meat,

fresh seafood, fresh vegetables, salt, or sugar in the groceries.57

Housing
The capacity of the local authorities to distribute housing space was limited due to
worsened housing shortages during the postwar years. By the end of the war, the city’s
population had increased about 60 percent from prewar levels as a result of the influx of
evacuees during the war. Accordingly, the city’s inhabitants were forced into much
smaller living spaces. According to a city soviet report in June 1945, the average living
space per a resident was only 2.83 square meters,58 which was even less than the 3.89
square meters per person in 1935.59 Thus, it was not uncommon for four adults—a
worker, his two adult children, and his mother, for example—to live in one room. Even
the “Red Corners” in the barracks, which were an almost sacred place for political
education and propaganda, were used for accommodation.60

As of June 1945, 70 percent of the living space of the city was comprised of

substandard “temporary” accommodations such as barracks and mud huts.61 The

 

’7 AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 415, 11. 96-97 (3/23/ 1950) “Reshenie: Magnitogorskogo gorodskogo soveta
deputatov trudiashchikhsiia. O rabote ispolkoma gorodskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia 23 1949
goda.”

5’ OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, 1. 137 (7/18/1945)“Dok1adnaia: po voprosu bytovogo sosluzhivaniia
trudiashchikhsia zavoda ‘kommunist’ glavrudy NKChM g. magnitogorsk.”

59 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, p. 161.

6° AOAM. f. 118, op. 1, d. 200, 1. 53 (1/17/1948) “Otchetnyi doklad: profsoiuznoi organizatsii ZhDT
MMK.” This was a good example of how the extreme shortage during and after the war in Magnitogorsk
housing undermined its function of introducing the inhabitants to and educating them about the new Soviet

culture. For the ideological function of Soviet housing, see Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, pp. 180-182, 193-
197.

74

proportion of “temporary” housing had increased from the prewar years; in 1938 it had
been 64.4 percent.62 It seems likely that the city administration could not meet the
demands of the unexpected increase in the population during the war. As a result, the
shortage of housing (both permanent and temporary) worsened by the time the war
ended. By late 1946, over 130,000 people, more than half of the entire city’s population,
were still living in barracks built in the early 19303, which were now dilapidated. In fact,
about 70 percent of all barracks in the city had been built during 1931 and 1932 and were
in “absolutely worthless” condition.63 Indeed, in 1938 the director of Everyday Life
Administration (KBU: kulturno-bytovoe upravlenie) anticipated the life expectancy of the
wooden barracks as seven or eight years at best because they were built quickly and
improperly in the early 19303.64 Afier the war, therefore, they needed to be torn down
and replaced with new buildings. As of 1952 a number of city residents, however, were
still residing in collapsing barracks.65 In the late 19403 and early 19503, 72 families of
MMK workers were still living in mud huts after 10 years,66 while a worker in the

railway transport workshop who had seven family members lived in an 11-square-meter

 

6' AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, cl. 383, l. 172 ob. Reshenie: 44-i sessii magnitogorskogo gorodskogo soveta
deputatov trudiashchikhsia. 21-go iiunia 1945 g. 0 realizatsii postanovleniia SNK SSSR ot 11N-1945 g.
“ob uluchshenii zhilishchnogo khoziaistva I kul’tumo-bytovogo obsluzhivaniia naseleniia gor.
Magnitogorska.” Compared to January 1935, the proportion of the “temporary” accommodation was as
much as 84 percent. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, p. 161.

62 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, p. 162.

’3 AOAM, f. 10, op. l, d. 383, 1. 1760b “Protokol: 43 sessii magnitogorskogo gorodskogo soveta deputatov
trudiashchikhsia. 24 maia 1945.”

6‘ Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, p. 169.

”5 AOAM. f. 10, op. l, d. 442, (1952). Director of MMK ordered to remove the dilapidated barracks by
Jan. 1, 1953.

6" AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 246, 1. 770b (1/1950).
75

room.67 One MMK worker was forced to live with his seven children in a shabby 16-
square-meter room.68
These examples show that housing shortages were indeed a serious problem, not
only in the former frontline regions where much housing was destroyed during the war,69
but also in Magnitogorsk, a hinterland city which had not been bombed or destroyed in
fighting. Notwithstanding, the inhabitants faced a housing shortage similar to that
experienced by those who lived in the former warzones. A governmental decree, “On
improvement of the housing economy and cultural and welfare facilities of residents of
Magnitogorsk,” issued only two days after the war ended (May 11, 1945) by the Council
of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) of the USSR, shows how the housing conditions in
the city had become an urgent problem.70 At the same time, this decree also
demonstrates the regime’s recognition of the city’s significance. Even though
Magnitogorsk was not in a destroyed region, which generally received priority from the

central government, the city’s housing shortage drew immediate attention from the

central authorities.

Consumer goods

Saldaev, a former MMK worker, pointed out that “Fall was a season of theft?“

The lack of winter overcoats in postwar Magnitogorsk created a situation in which some

 

‘7 AOAM, r. 113, op. 1, d.249, 1.45 (2/23/1950).
6“ OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 17, d. 9, l. 101 (1 1/1952).

’9 See, for example, Boterbloem, Life and Death under Stalin, pp. 181-182; Jones, “People Without a
Definite Occupation,” p. 237.

7° AOAM. f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, 1. 159 (6/21/1945).

76

people robbed others of coats on the street. During fall and winter thieves frequently
threatened passersby with knives to get their coats and other clothing.72 Former
Magnitogorsk worker Emereev also recalled that even male workers walked together
when they went home after work since many robberies of coats happened on the street
afler the special amnesty following the war.73 In addition, the Komsomol (party youth
organization) secretary in Open-Fumace Workshop No.3 at MMK stated at a trade union
meeting in 1954: “People don’t hang out because of their fear that they could be
undressed on the street.”74 Winter became an especially challenging season for many
workers in Magnitogorsk.

One article in Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, the major party journal, indicated that the
party recognized that the production of consumer goods was one of the most urgent
agenda items after the war ended.75 Likewise, recognizing the seriousness of winter
clothing and shoe shortages, an MMK report emphasized that the local factory had to

boost its production of shoes and underwear since these were the “minimum” demand of

 

7’ Interview with Vladimir lvanovich Saldaev, MMK library, Magnitogorsk, July 6, 2001.

72 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. l, l. 1430b (1 1/30/1945) “Informatsionnoe obshchenie: o povedenii
repatriirovannykh grazhdan, prozhivaiushchikh no terriotorii g. Magnitogorska.”

73 Interview with Emereev. MMK Library, Magnitogorsk, July 6, 2001. Immediately after the war ended
the Stalin government released more than 620,000 prisoners—many of those were petty offenders and
inmates sentenced under Stalin’s draconian wartime decrees—according to the July 7 1945 decree, “On
Amnesty in Connection with the Victory over Hitler’s Germany”). Golfo Alexopoulos, “Amnesty 1945:
The Revolving Door of Stalin’s Gulag,” Slavic Review, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Summer 2005): 274-306; here 277,
279. A December 1945 report by the secret police indicates that many Soviet POWs sent to Magnitogorsk
also joined gangs and robbed people on the street. Robbing and killing of passers-by by these gangs
frequently occurred. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 1, 11. 150-51 (12/31/1945)“1nformatsionnoe
soobshchenie: ob otritsatel’nom povedenii repatriirovannykh grazhdan, prozhivaiushchikh na territorii g.
Magn itogorska.”

7‘ AOAM, f. 118, op.1, d. 536, 1. 620b (12/21-22/1954) “Stenogramma XIV zavodskoi profsoiuznoi
kon ferentsii MMK.”

75 O. Kozlova, “Zametki o rabote raikoma v novykh usloviiakh,” Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo (July 1945): 8.

77

the workers.76 In reality, however, the overall supply of consumer goods did not improve
quickly. The regime’s strong preference for heavy and defense industries after the war
worsened the scarcity. Ironically, however, the supply of consumer goods for MMK
workers showed rapid improvement in 1945, as did the supply of food. For example, as
of December 1, 1945 MMK received 47 percent more consumer goods from the central
government compared with the previous year.77 This allowed MMK to store a
considerable amount of goods for distribution.78 But, again, as with food, the increased
rate was an improvement from the extreme shortage of wartime and was still not enough
to satisfy the workers’ needs. In some sense, with the exception of the famine years
(1946-47), the scarcity of consumer goods was more severe than that of food during the
postwar Stalin years.79
Consequently, until the early 19503, most of the city’s inhabitants had to live
through great hardship caused by the lack of consumer goods. For example, during the
first eight months of 1945, MMK workers received only 15 percent of the minimum
quota for cotton cloth and 10 percent for wool and silk. The cotton amounted to only one

cut of cloth for every seven workers.80 In addition, MMK workers did not receive even a

 

7'6 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, 1. 3430b (1946) “P0 obespecheniiu provtovarami.”

77 AOAM, f. 118, op. l, d. 174, 1. 150b (12/1945) “Otchetnyi doklad: o rabote ORS’a magnitogorskogo
metallurgicheskogo kombinata imeni stalina, za 1945 god.”

’8 Ibid.

79 The local authorities made desperate efforts to secure enough clothing for the city. When the city
delegates failed to receive a promise for a supply of garments from Cheliabinsk, (the capital city of the

Cheliabinsk oblast where Magnitogorsk belongs) they did not give up. Rather, they tried to get a signed
receipt from the center, i.e., the People’s Commissariat of Light Industry and Textile Industries, to

guarantee the next clothing supply. lbid., 1. l6 ob (12/1945).

”0 OG-AChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, l. 1610b (10/10/1945). The minimum amount of clothing for the city’s
1nhab1tants were 6,500 men’s winter coats and 3,350 women’s; 5,000 men’s suits and 2,000 women’s

dresses, lbid., 1.1620b.
78

minimum amount of clothing. Although Magnitogorsk had two garment factories that
had enough capacity to produce and repair clothing for the whole city’s population, the
factories did not even meet the needs of the MMK workers.81 Because the garment
factories were fully occupied with orders from the defense industry even after the war,
they could not provide clothing for civilians.82 For example, in September 1945 an order
of 10,000 overcoats for MK workers was held up because the factory was busy with
producing military supplies.83 This clothing shortage continued for several years
following the war. In November 1947, Samarin, a veteran and inspector in the
Magnitogorsk branch of the Ministry of Government Control, complained in a letter to a
senior inspector that since he was demobilized in July 1946 he had worn only his one
military uniform because he could not get any civilian clothing.84 And the shortage did
not simply affect adults. In 1948, one fifth of the children in a kindergarten still did not
have winter coats.85
In addition, an extreme shortage of underwear which had prevailed during the war

continued afterwards. During the war, the ORS distributed underwear to a very limited
group of workers, such as newly mobilized teenage workers from the factory training

school (FZO) and trade school (RU) and the graduates of these schools.86 Because only

 

8' The city did not have any garment factories before the war; by the end of the war it had two, both
evacuated to Magnitogorsk during the war. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 20, d. 63, 1.1.

‘2 OGAChO, f. 9234, op. 19, d. 79, l. 162.

‘3 lbid.

3" OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22, d. 1, 11. 121-1210b (11/26/47) “Ot kontrolera ministerstva gosudarstvennogo
kontrolia soiuza ssr za raskhodovaniev i sokhrannost’iu khleboproduktov na magnitogorskoi realizatsionnoi
baze ‘vostokzagotzemo’ Samarina Vasiliia Gerasirnovicha.” MMK did not have any sewing factories or

clothing repair workshops. AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, 1.27 (12/29/1945).

’5 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22, d. 72, 1. 2 (1948).

79

50-70 percent of the planned quota of manufactured consumer goods—cg, cotton
thread, woolen and linen cloth—was provided, the shortage of underwear was
inevitable.87 Still by the end of 1945, 60,000 sets of men’s underwear and 20,000 sets of
women’s underwear were urgently needed.88 In 1946 most single workers living in
dormitories had only one pair of underwear, while some workers had none at all.89

Along with clothing, the state-controlled supply system of Magnitogorsk failed to
guarantee even the minimum quota of shoes. The shoe supply for MMK workers was
also extremely low. Although planned shoe production in Magnitogorsk was supposed to
double by late 1945 compared to 1944, the actual production was still far behind.90 The
local shoe factories were held back by lack of enough leather and subsidiary instruments
to make shoes.91 Under these conditions, in 1947 a shop manager of shoe factory No. 2
literally “ran around from morning to evening” to obtain necessary tools from his fiiends
and other people with whom he had blat (i.e., pull or clout).92

Consequently, the availability of shoes in Magnitogorsk was very limited. In late

1945 only seven pairs of men’s shoes were available for 1,020 workers.93 While the ORS

was able to find supplies of woolen cloth from both Moscow and Cheliabinsk, the oblast

 

’6 OGAChO, f. 12234, op. 19, d. 79, l. 1620b .

’7 OGAChO, f. 9.234, op. 19, d. 78, l. 343 (1946). “P0 obespecheniiu promtovarami.”
3‘ OGAChO, f. 9234, op. 19, d. 79, 1. 1620b.

‘9 OGAChO, f. 13234, op. 19, d. 78, I. 343.

”AOAM, f. 118, op. 1,d. 174,1. 16.

9' lbid.

’2 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 60, l. 8 (4/19/1947) “Stenogramma: aktiva rabotnikov legkoi
promyshlenosti g. Magnitka.”

9’ OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, I. 1610b.

80

capital, shoes were supplied mostly fiom local factories. Unfortunately, however,
because light industry in Magnitogorsk was very underdeveloped, it was impossible for
the ORS to meet the shoe needs of MMK workers.94 An amazingly small number of
shoes—only 0.17 pairs per MMK worker—were available during the first eight months
of 1945. This was far below the “minimum” quota of shoes (two pairs of shoes per
year).95 Consequently, in late 1945 7,500 pairs of men’s shoes and 4,500 pairs of
women’s shoes were urgently needed for MMK workers.96 In addition, of the 27,000
children of MMK workers and employees, only about 23 percent received shoes. 97
Moreover, shoe sizes were limited locally: only three sizes of women’s shoes were
available and smaller sizes were not available at all. Since local factories did not provide
men’s and children’s shoes at all, these shoes were supplied from Sverdlovsk.98
Undoubtedly, the lack of both warm shoes and clothing, which were essential
items for the severe winter weather in the Ural region, made the workers’ daily lives
more challenging. During the cold winter days of 1946, some female MMK workers had
to go to work with thin stockings and worn slippers because they did not have winter
shoes and socks.99 In early 1946 one female worker in the MMK furnace shop had not
gone to work for an extended period because she did not have an overcoat. Likewise, a

group of metal workers in the MMK Railroad Transportation Department (ZhDT) who

 

9‘ AOAM, f. 113, op. 1,d. 174,11. 150b-16.

9’ OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, 6. 79, l. 1616b.

9“ lbid., 1. 1620b.

9" lbid.

98A()Al\ll,f.118,0p.1,d.174,1.16.

9" OGAChO, f. 9234, op. 19, 6. 78, 1. 34301) (1946)
81

lived in dormitory No. 84 were absent from work for more than a week because they
lacked adequate winter clothing and shoes.100 Also, almost all graduates of F 20 no
longer had felt-lined boots because the school collected the boots from them as they
graduated. Thus, they went to work in wom-out leather or tarpaulin shoes. What’s more,
factory shops could not provide work clothes for new workers.101
Kitchenware was also one of the items least supplied by the state-controlled
supply system. Ironically, the local metal commodity factory of Magnitogorsk, the “city
of metal,” did not benefit from the city’s reputation. During the immediate postwar
years, production of kitchenware, including metal plates and spoons, buckets, and pans.
was far below the necessary amount. Thus, cafeteria managers had to struggle to patch
caldrons and secure plates.l02 According to a newspaper report in June 1946, one

cafeteria had only 20 spoons for 600 people.103

The article satirized, “Consider yourself
lucky if you get your meal with a spoon.”104 Magnitogorsk cafeterias also suffered from
a cup shortage and cafeteria managers had to find creative ways to serve tea. In late 1945
the manager of Cafeteria No. 10, which had only 10 cups overall, tried to serve tea using
plates, but he had to abandon his plan due to the lack of the plates.105 Cafeteria No. 7,

serving exclusively workers from the MMK Railroad Transportation Department,

reported that workers drank tea from dishes. Likewise, in a Magnitostroi cafeteria, tea

 

'°° Ibid.
'0' lbid.
“’2 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, I. 32.
'03 Magnitogorskii Rabochii, 11 June, 1946. “Kogda net zaboty 0 liudiakh”
'04 lbid.
'°5 AOAM, f. 118, op. l, d. 174, l. 32.
82

[08

was served in one-liter bowls made from aluminum and enamel due to the lack of cups. '06
Despite the extreme shortage, kitchenware production in the city hardly increased. A
1948 party report indicates that only 2.8 percent of the spoon production plan—a

“shameful number for the city [of stee1]”—was fulfilled'07

The Politics of Distribution

Whereas shortages caused great inconvenience to the local population, the Soviet
state used them as leverage to achieve political and economic goals. The state-controlled
supply system made society dependent on the state and was thus capable of being
manipulated. Given the extreme shortages, hierarchical distribution was one of the key
strategies that the Magnitogorsk authorities used for the effective mobilization of the
labor force. But, even though hierarchical, merit-based distribution was the dominant
practice, it was not the complete picture. Welfare-style (or need-based) distribution was
another important strategy that the local party employed to provide aid for the least
privileged in society. As we will see below, the hierarchical distribution in Magnitogorsk
reflected the postwar trend that valued professionalism and technology, '08 while

paternalistic distribution represented one of the governmental strategies to maintain

 

"’6 OGAChO, r. P-234, op. 22, 6. 73, l. 17.
'07 lbid., l. 5. In addition, workers had their meals on dirty tables covered with grease. Because of the lack
of tablecloths, cafeteria tables were left uncovered and remained greasy and dirty. AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d.
184. 1. 50b (3/24/1948) “Doklad: o rabote komissii po rabochemu cnabzheniiu zavkoma metallurgov
magn itogorskogo metkombinata na profsoiuznoi konferentsii ot 24-go marta 1948g.” Sometimes, workers
had to wait an hour in the cafeteria, losing work hours because of the lack of tables and chairs in the
cafeteria. Magnitogorskii Rabochii, 11 June, 1946.

See chapter 111 for details on the trend.

83

socio-political stability by reducing the possibility of an “explosion” of the least

privileged groups in the hierarchical distribution system.

Hierarchical distribution: its scope and limits

As in the war years, the distribution system after the war gave higher priority to
workers in large, key enterprises in heavy industry than to workers in small, light
industrial enterprises. '09 Accordingly, MMK workers belonged to the top tier of the
hierarchal distribution system that supplied housing, food, and other services.“0
Magnitostroi construction workers were next down the ladder, although they were often
on the same rung with MMK workers due to their involvement in the construction of
MMK facilities. Generally speaking, industrial workers from big enterprises like MMK,
Magnitostroi, and other metal production—related factories that were affiliated to an
governmental industrial ministry, such as the People’s Commissariat of Ferrous
Metallurgy (NKChM), were privileged in rationing over workers laboring in small local
enterprises and cooperatives of light industry which were not affiliated with the state

organization.1 11 Under these circumstances, the Magnitogorsk authorities gave priority in

housing repair services—which were among the most urgent and frequent requests from

 

'09 Julie Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade, p. 299.

”0 Former inhabitants of Magnitogorsk whom I interviewed confirmed this: they recalled that if one of
their family members worked at the MMK the family had a better chance to have access to certain kinds of
“privileges.” Interview with Nikolai Aleksandrovich Mikheev, lia Fedorovna Aleksandrovna, and Taisiia
Vasil’evna Futrnan. Magnitogorsk, January 15, 2003.

“' OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 11, 6. 189, 1. 6. As ofJanuary 1945, a total of 70,612 people—or 46,702
DCOple from MMK, 20,087 people from Magnitostroi, and 3,823 people from four other small factories,
including the Metal Wire and Net, Furnace Equipment, Metal Devices, and Calibrate factories—were
Working in enterprises affiliated with the NKChM. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, l. l. “pravka: o
sostave rabochikh i sluzhashchikh na predpriiatiiakh narkomchrrneta goroda magnitogorska.” (1/1/1945).
Based on this figure, we can assume that about 30 percent of the entire city population (230,000 in early
June 1945) worked in the big enterprises affiliated to the NKChM. For the city’s population by early June,
see AOAM. f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, 1. 152 (6/21/1945); I. 1760b (5/24/1945).

84

city inhabitants—to the MMK and Magnitostroi workers over workers in so-called
“subsidiary industries,” or light industry. ' '2

MMK and Magnitostroi workers also received priority in food rations. The
hierarchical gap in rationing appeared more clearly during the postwar famine years,
which were the most difficult postwar years. Although Magnitogorsk did not experience
the worst famine due to a better local food supply compared with other regions of the
country, the gap in the city between workers in key enterprises and people who either
worked in less significant enterprises or who lost their ability to work widened a great
deal. This increased gap between the two groups was a reflection of the Stalin
government’s rationing policy during the famine years. With the emergence of famine,
the Politburo issued a September 27, 1946 order to remove from the rationing system
27.5 million people who were mostly (23.6 million) rural. Over 3.4 million from urban
population (mostly workers’ dependents) and about half a million residents in state-rim
homes for children, the elderly, and disabled were also removed from the rationing

113 The Magnitogorsk party secretary’s report in August 1947 indicates that many

system.
workers of both local enterprises (which were not affiliated with the national industrial
organizations) and light industry cooperatives did not receive food ration cards during the

period.114 The report also indicates that war invalids, pensioners, and invalid workers

(working in light industry) who had the right to receive the ration cards did not even get

 

”2 AOAM, f. 10, op. 1,6. 383, 1. 176.

"3 Filtzer, “The Standard of living,” 1022. Prior to September 27, 1946 the rationing system had provided
for 87.5 million people, more than half of the population. The total consisted of three groups of people: 1)
an urban contingent of 58.6 million; 2) a rural contingent of 27.6 million; and 3) those in “institutions under
state supply”—-children’s and infants’ homes and homes for the disabled and elderly, who totaled 1.3

llnillion. Of the 87.5 million people, 30 percent were workers and technical personnel (ITR). lbid., 1020-
021.

114

OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 11, d. 189, l. 7.
85

food stamps. No food stamps were available for people who had lost their ability to
work, such as sick workers, young and old dependents, and the disabled residing in the
city’s Kirov district where most of city’s light industry enterprises and cooperatives were
located. Despite their appeal to a local hospital for food stamps, they were refused.”5
For the people belonging to this category this was almost a death sentence during the
famine years. Frustrated by the refusal, they implored, “Should we die now? What are
we supposed to do?”l ‘6

However, it should be noted that the hierarchical distribution system could not be
adequately implemented due to lack of resources. Thus, the state’s role of incentive
provider based on hierarchy was sometimes considerably undermined. In this sense, the
hierarchical distribution system was sometimes more symbolic than realist. Indeed, it
was quite challenging for the local authorities to maintain the hierarchical allotment of
living space considering the extreme shortage of housing. Although even skilled workers
and factory cadres from major MMK workshops such as the Coke-Chemical shop had to
live in collapsing barracks or temporary housing by the end of the war,117 their situations
did not change immediately. In 1947, Stakhanovites and many MMK factory cadres
whom the government regarded as deserving of better housing had to live in housing
which was little different fi'om that of ordinary workers: half-destroyed and broken-

downed barracks or temporary housing.”8 For example, a Stakhanovite hammerer in a

 

“5 lb id.

”6 lbid. The exclusion of these groups of people was largely limited to the most difficult postwar years, the
famine years of 1946-1947. It should be noted, however, that as we will see in the chapter IV, the postwar
Stalin government did not abandon these underprivileged groups for good.

117

OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, 1. 125 (5/28/1945) “Direktoru magnitogoskogo ordena lenina i ordena
trudovogo krasnogo znameni metallurgicheskogo kombinata imeni stalina.”.

86

subsidiary workshop (the Cast-Iron Foundry Workshop) of the MMK, complained in late
1947,

During the war years my comrades and I fulfilled the norm by 318 percent. Now,

I have already fulfilled the yearly norm. But, factory cadres’ (rukovoditelei)

relationship with these people is extremely bad. No support at all. I have already

lived in a collapsing apartment for a long time; but despite my rquests, no one

has showed any help. Even repair servrce has not been provrded.
Frequently, even engineers’ families had to live in dormitories because they could not get
apartments.120 Conditions for them were not like in the mid-l930s, when the average
living space for engineers and technical personnel with family members was more than
two times larger (6.26 square meters).121 The “Big Deal” between the “middleclass” and
the postwar Stalin regime, which provided privileges for the technical intelligentsia in
exchange for political loyalty,122 did not always function in Magnitogorsk during the
postwar shortages. Eventually, the city party secretary became well aware that without
improvement in housing both for the technical intelligentsia and workers, mobilizing
labor power would become impossible.123

Under this circumstance, the MMK management had to do its best to maintain the

hierarchy by developing a more refined way of allotment. Management assigned

apartments to workers based on the “significance” of their respective workshops. Thus,

 

”8 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 11, d. 189, 1. s; Magnitogorskii rabochii, 11 June, 1946.

”9 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 518, l. 9. (IO/1947) “o politicheskikh nastroeniiakh trudizshchikhsia v
gorodakh cheliabinskogo oblasti.”

'2" OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, l. 1250b.
'2' Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, pp. 161-162-

:22 Vera S. Dunham, In Stalin 's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1976).

'23 OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 19, d. 73, l. 1250b.
87

workers of key workshops, such as the Blast Furnace and Open-hearth Furnace
Workshops, had priority in receiving housing allotment over the workers of the relatively
less important shops, such as the Boiler Repair Workshop. Consequently, workers in the

latter type of workshop received less habitable living space. '24

As the example of a
Stakhanovite worker above shows, during the most extreme housing shortage, factory
management did not give priority to workers who labored as non-professionals in low-
priority workshops no matter how much they over-fulfilled their output norms.
Providing the workers of key workshops with increased priority was one of the factory
management’s strategies to prevent possible labor turnover in crucial shops within the
Steel Works.

Still, young, unskilled workers usually had much less chance of receiving priority
even if they worked in major workshops. Although teenage workers in the labor reserve
vocational training schools were allocated a relatively high food ration (700 grams of
bread per day),125 they suffered more than adult and skilled workers. Because workers
living in the dormitories were not allowed to have individual garden plots to cultivate,'26
the only source of food for them was food that they could obtain from rations with their
food stamps. For those young workers, the famine years of 1946-1947 were an especially
difficult time. In 1946, the food supply for 14- to l8-year-old workers living in a shoe

127

factory dormitory was cut back. Their new diet was very poor: only two kinds of

dishes were provided and only two meals per day in the factory cafeterias.128

 

‘24 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 502, 1. 49 (1954)
125 Filtzer, “The Standard Of Living” p. 1021

'26 OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 19, d. 79, 1. 113 ob (6/8/1945) “Dokladnaia zapiska: po obskedovaniiu bytovykh
uslovii molodezhi tsekhov: marten No. 3 i parovozo-remontnogo depo metallurgicheskogo kombinata.”

88

As examined earlier, the hierarchical system was the dominant distribution
strategy that the postwar Stalin government used to maximize its economic goal of
reconstructing heavy industry by giving it top priority at the expense of light industry.
Giving priority to heavy industry was not a new strategy; it had certainly been done in the
19303. However, the hierarchical distribution was refined and enhanced after the war,
focusing on importance of work type rather than on the fulfillment of output norms, as
had previously been the case.‘29 It should be noted that the hierarchical system was not a

complete picture of the postwar Stalinist distribution system.

Socialist paternalism

Along with the hierarchical distribution system, the Stalinist government
implemented a welfare-style distribution system through which the state provided
material aid for a select group of people who were in extreme need. This system had its
own merits from the viewpoint of the political leadership. Ironically, the extreme
postwar shortages made it relatively easier for the state to enhance its paternalistic image
than to provide care for its citizens. Welfare-style distribution based on need contains the
political and ideological intentions of the postwar Stalin government while hierarchical

distribution based on the significance of industry and work types reflects the

 

'27 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 88, l. 122 (May 1946) “Dokladnaia: po materialam upravleniia
ministerstva bnutrennikh del po cheliabinskoi oblasti ‘o nedostatkakh v vospitatel’noi rabote, bytjvykh
usloviiakh i okhrane truda podrostkov, rabotaiushchikh na magnitororskoi obuvnoi fabrike No. l, v
tsekhakh magnitogorskogo metallurgicheskogo kombinata i predpriiatiiakh tresta ‘magnitostroi.”’

'23 lbid.; OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22. d. 1, 1. 1210b.

'29 See the next chapter for analogous characteristics in the politics of productivity.

89

government’s economic strategy and its focus on labor effectiveness and professionalism
vis-a-vis voluntarism.130
The way that the local authorities distributed “American gifts”——small packages
which included several items of clothing (e. g., trousers, shirts, and sweaters) or socks,
stockings, and shoes, '3 1 all provided by the United States through the United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) program—exemplifies this welfare-

132 The distribution strategies reflected the regime’s desperate efforts to

style distribution.
keep “socialist paternalism” working by maximizing its distributive power not only to
enhance material dependency,I33 but also to attain more political legitimacy among its
subjects. Archival sources show that during 1945 all MMK working people (workers,
ITR, and white-collar employees) had the chance to receive American gift items several
times, regardless of the significance of the workshops to which workers belonged or
workers’ skill levels.‘34 For example, during the first six months of the year 2,374 MMK
workers from the Open-Hearth Furnace No. 3 Workshop and the Locomotive Repair
Shop received 2,112 items.135 In April 1945, 1,186 items were distributed to the labor

force of the MMK mechanical workshop, consisting of 1,382 people (including 1,186

 

'30 See the next chapter for more examples of the Stalin government’s emphasis on professionalism.
‘3' OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 19, (1. 79,1. 113. These gifts were provided from 1944 to 1946/47. 0.

'32 For the nature of the Soviet Union as a welfare-state, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism:
Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the I930s (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), p. 227. Official discourse frequently titled “People are the most valuable asset of Soviet society”
appearing in local newspapers in Magnitogorsk is a good example of the postwar regime’s intentions as far
as its welfare policy was concerned.

'33 Siegelbaum, Stalinism as A Way of Life, p. 422.

'3‘ For example, 181,457 American gift items were distributed to all MMK working people during eight
months of 1945, OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, ll. 162, 113. This was about four times the total number
of MMK workers, which was 46,702 as of January 1945. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, l. l.

'35 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, 1. 113 (6/8/1945).

90

workers, 115 ITR, 37 white-collar employees, 14 apprentices, and 27 students from the
RU). Of the gift items, about 30 percent were distributed to the least privileged groups of
workers, such as young and single workers living in dormitories, the families of
servicemen, and disabled veterans.136 By early 1946, the main recipients of the American
gifts were eventually expanded from MMK workers themselves to their family members
who were servicemen, demobilized, and disabled of categories I-II.I37 The expansion of
the scope of recipients shows that, along with hierarchical distribution, the active form of
welfare-style distribution—one implemented before supplicants asked the state for what
they needed—was one of the major characteristics of the postwar distribution strategy.
Although a party report asserted that because the gifts were “small items” and
used ones, which did not last long, they only temporarily alleviated the clothing
shortage,I38 for the Stalin government, the American gifts were some of the few
consumer goods that the state was able to provide through the centralized supply system.
In this light, the distribution of the American gifts had political implications. The local

authorities distributed those gifis at Red Comers in dormitories and factories under the

 

'36 lbid., 1. 130 ob (5/19/1945) “Akt: sostavken nastoiashchii akt v gom, who mnoiu Mininym V. A. po
porucheniiu magnitogorskogo gorodskogo komiteta VKP(b) proizvedena proverka sistemy ucheta I
vydachi promtovamykh talonov i amreikanskikh podarkov po osnonnomu mekhanicheskomu tsekhu
MMK.”

'37 AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 402, l. 192 (3/25/ 1946) “Reshenie no. 78. Ispolnitel’nogo komiteta
Magnitogorskogo gorodoskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia: ob organizatsii komissii po
raspredelenie i vydache amerikaniskikh podarkov.” Category 111 included the disabled who were healthy
and could do relatively hard labor; category 11, those who were paralyzed but could do light labor; and
category 1, those who were in poor health and could work only sitting, or could not work at all. Interview
with lurii Georgievich Funk, a former doctor (born in 1911 in Ekaterinburg and moved to Magnitogorsk in
1950). Magnitogorsk, July 4, 2001.

'33 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 95, 1. 113; OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, 1. 162 (10/10/1945). A
woman whom I met in Magnitogorsk remembered packages of American gifts that her father brought
home. In most cases, according to her, they were “just small items like socks or stockings.”

91

supervision of workshop foremen. '39

In addition to being convenient, distributing the
gifis at Red Corners could give the impression to recipients that the gifts from America
were a reward for the Soviet Union’s success in defending Europe and other parts of the
world from the Fascist threat. Thus, although those gifis came from the United States, it
appeared to the people of Magnitogorsk that it was the Stalin regime that made these gifts

possible. Moreover, distributing the gifis at Red Corners also convinced many workers

of the socialist state’s paternalistic role of providing help for its subjects in need.

Surveillance and paternalistic distribution

Surveillance was one of the ways that the local authorities used to select
exemplary groups of people to whom they provided welfare-style paternalistic aid.140
This strategy, employing two modern forms of governmental intervention into society—
i.e., surveillance and welfare—that developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries'“
aimed to prevent the development of everyday complaints into anti-governmental
behaviors. By the end of the war, the Magnitogorsk branch of the People’s Commissariat
of State Security (N KGB: Narodnyi komissariat gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti) collected
workers’ complaints about their living conditions through surveillance of the workers’
outgoing telegrams to their family members or relatives. After the NKGB registered all
complaints about poor food, low wages, and difficult living conditions that appeared in

those telegrams, the city party arranged relevant help for workers in extreme need. For

 

'39 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, 1. 130 ob.
"° OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 20, d. 1, 1. 3 (1946). “Dokladnaia zapiska.”

141 David Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, eds., Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practice, pp. 250-
51; Hoffmann, ed., Stalinism: The Essential Readings, p. 130. See also Holquist, “Information is the
Alpha and Omega’.”

92

example, in April 1945, afier a district party secretly reviewed the letter of a 17-year-old
female orphan worker to her aunt detailing her difficult living conditions, she and her
seven other orphan roommates received American gifts.142 Likewise, in accord with the
December 26, 1945 decision of the Central Committee of the Party, the Magnitogorsk
city party fi'equently inspected the material and living conditions of MMK and
Magnitostroi workers in detail, and selected a target group who were deserving of
material support regardless of their levels of productivity.

The postwar Stalin government used surveillance not only for the purpose of
collecting information about popular moods, but also for controlling it. '43 By providing
instant material help to the neediest people as revealed through surveillance of their
telegrams, the government could mitigate the resentment or negative sentiments of those
citizens toward the Soviet leadership and system. In doing so, the leadership could also
spread among the citizens in other parts of the country, as well as among the colleagues
in their community, “positive” public opinions on the father-like role of the state and the
positive side of the socialist welfare system in the industrial center, which was
propagandized nationwide as a symbol of building socialism and a new Soviet city and
lifestyle. The surveillance that the Magnitogorsk authorities used as a means of creating
a favorable mood for the government implies that surveillance was not a passive form of
political practice limited to the gathering of information on popular moods, but an active

political practice of the state to achieve its political goals. [44

 

”2 OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 19, d. 79, 1. 96 (4/18/1945)“I(ok1adnaia zapiska.”
"3 Holquist. “Information is the Alpha and Omega,” 417-419.

"4 lbid., 417-19, 449.

93

Responding to the Shortages: Magnitogorsk Workers’ Survival Strategies

The postwar scarcity of food, consumer goods, and housing was not new to the
people of Magnitogorsk. Since the construction of the city in the late 19203 and early
19305, shortages were a part of the inhabitants’ daily lives.I45 However, the gulf between
the postwar reality and the expectations for better living conditions that the inhabitants
who had survived the hard times of both intensive labor and shortages during the war
made Magnitogorsk workers feel more disappointed than people in other regions. Thus,
the ORS vice director’s report on the increase in the food supply for the MMK that we
saw earlier in this chapter did not get any positive reactions from MMK workers.
Responding to his report, workers instantly shouted in anger:

We don’t need all the numbers. We can get them from newspapers! Tell us

directly how the ORS will improve the food conditions in the cafeterias and

stores, especially the quality of our diets in the cafeterias.”6

Workers would not accept the report since they did not see any improvement in
the food supply in their daily lives. How can we understand the workers’ reaction?
There are several possible explanations for why workers did not see any improvement. It
is not an easy task to prove that the ORS cadre’s report on increased supply was false;
there is no clear reason to disbelieve the numbers in his report. In addition to the
insufficient food provisions, discussed earlier in this chapter, postwar psychology—such
as expectations of better conditions in food supply “because the war is now over” and a

sense of entitlement to a better life as a reward for their contribution to the Soviet victory

 

”5 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain.

”6 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, 1.23.

94

through hard wartime labor—can be considered the most likely reasons. MMK workers
may have shown more positive reactions to an ORS report regarding the increasing food
supply, like that of December 1945, had it been issued during the war. A difference of
several months in this case is the difference between the war and the postwar era, and the
workers’ denunciations need to be considered in this context. The Magnitogorsk
workers’ language reflects three major sources of the working people’s denunciations:
first, their expectations for changes after the war; second, their identification of
themselves as “labor heroes”; and third, their sense of entitlement to a better life based on
strong regional and class identities, and their strong belief in the socialist system.
Although the party requested the Soviet people’s patience with difficult material
conditions during the immediate postwar years by warning that the conditions would not
be improved rapidly in a brief period,'47 the working people of Magnitogorsk did not
endure these hardships silently. Rather, they claimed the entitlement to a better life,
denounced factory management, “self-interested” local officials, and party members, and

even displayed resistance to social norms.

Increasing sense of entitlement: “because the war is now over... ”

The inhabitants of Magnitogorsk, like other people in other parts of the Soviet
Union, did not doubt that things should change because the war ended. Thus, “because
the war is now ended” became a fiequent and dominant rhetorical phrase used by the
workers in demanding better living conditions and more provisions. One worker

claimed, “The war is now ended. In the peaceful conditions, the ORS must work for the

 

”7 Kozlova, “Zametki o rabote raikoma v novykh usloviiakh,” 10-
95

realization of consumer goods.”148 Additionally, after criticizing the unsanitary or
“uncultured” practices at stores and the irregular serving of breakfast at factory cafeterias,
Volkov, a MMK worker in the F inc-Wire Workshop, voiced his complaints at a trade
union meeting of metallurgists in December 1945. He strongly exhorted the vice-director
of the ORS “to inform the managers of the cafeterias of the fact that the war ended, and
that the working class should be served better.”149 Efanov, another worker, also
emphasized the need for postwar improvements:
Time passes and changes... while if there was only one request for ORS during
the war, now, when our Fatherland’s war is finished with victory, the demands for
the ORS would be different. The fundamental duty of the party and government
for the next Five-Year Plan is the improvement of the cultural and daily life of the

working class. Thus, the ORS should play a key role in the decision making

regarding the improvement of the daily living conditions of the working class. '50

Workers even claimed that the taste of cafeteria food should be improved “because the
war was over.” Complaining about an unqualified cook who provided tasteless dishes,
another worker firmly maintained that “the war is over; so the environment of the
cafeteria should be fundamentally changed.”151 The rhetoric of “because the war ended”
became a powerful tool in the negotiation for improved supplies for daily life.

The catchphrase, “because the war ended” was frequently associated with the
demand for “cultured” life. Workers who still. had to have their meals in unbearable
conditions in cafeterias exploded with their complaints. At a trade union meeting in

October 1948, one worker asserted,

 

"8 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, 1. 27.
"91bid, 11. 280b—29. Italics mine.
'5°1bid., 1. 26. Italics mine.

'5' lbid., 1. 24 ob.

96

Wartime passed; it is now not appropriate to serve meals on rusty plates without
forks and cups. We need to apply proper culture in this matter.1 2

One inspector who examined the conditions of the cafeteria was also appalled: “How
long should we eat at the cafeteria like this? It’s already time to switch to more cultured
service for workers?”53 In addition, describing the “uncultured” practices that he
witnessed at a store, one MMK worker stressed that the conditions had to be improved as
the war ended. He described the scene at the store as follows:
At Store No.1 some ladies had a quarrel with a store employee as they asked him
to remove fish heads and tails from the counter and sell tea and omelets more
culturally. The employee had not cleaned the scale dish afier weighing the fish
and then weighed the tea and omelets together with remnants of fish skin. Then,
the employee put them together into the customers’ baskets. . . .Of course, this
uncultured treatment caused anger.154
In Magnitogorsk, the longing for “culturedness,” which had been widely propagated as a
means of modernizing or civilizing the backward practices in Soviet trade during the
prewar years'55 and largely forgotten during the wartime, re-emerged not only “from

above,” but this time also “from below,” or from workers, who had a strong sense of

entitlement to a better life as the war ended.

Regional identity and the sense of entitlement and

 

"2 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 225, 1. 51 (10/9/1948).
"3 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 184,1. 50b.
'54 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, 1. 280b-29. Emphasis added by author.

'55 For example see, Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 225-233; Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Becoming Cultured: Socialist
Realism and the Representation of Privilege and Taste,” in Soviet Society and Culture: Essays in Honor of
Vera S. Dunham, ed. Terry L. Thompson and Richard Sheldon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1988); Julie
Hessler, “Cultured Trade: The Stalinist Turn Towards Consumerism,” in Stalinism: New Direction, ed.
Sheila Fitzpatrick (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 182-209.

97

The feeling of postwar entitlement among the workers of Magnitogorsk was
another factor that motivated inhabitants’ complaints about the poor living conditions and
their denunciations of local officials and party members. This was a particular factor of
the postwar attitude brought about by the heroic role of the home front. The
Magnitogorsk workers realized the significance of their wartime labor to the Soviet
victory. For example, in early 1945, the Stalin regime awarded MMK and Magnitostroi
the nation’s highest honors: the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner of
Labor. At the end of 1945, more than 2,000 MMK workers received medals and honors
from the Soviet government, while medals for Heroic Labor during the War were granted
to 30,000 MMK workers.156 A regional pride shaped by heroic wartime labor and the
prizes they received became leverage the workers could use to justify their demands for
better treatment. '57

The strategic and economic significance of the city presented in the official
rhetoric during and after the war also helped the working people of Magnitogorsk justify
their entitlement or their requests for better treatment. In fact, the propagandized
representations of Magnitogorsk as a “Potemkin Village” in national newspapers and
books158 created an “imagined community” the inhabitants of Magnitogorsk believed in
and internalized. For example, Rodinov, a mechanic in an MMK furnace workshop who
was fi'ustrated by the unavailability of fruit in the city after finding only 60 raspberries at

a local market in 1946, complained that “compared to Magnitogorsk workers’ high level

 

'56 A. G. Degtiarev. Letopis' gory magnitnoi i goroda magnitogorska (Magnitogorsk: lzdatel'skii otdel
Magnitogorskogo poligraficheskogo predpriiatiia, 1993), pp. 46-48.

'57 On the sense of entitlement among the state farmworkers during the 19305, see Siegelbaum, “Dear

Comrade, You Asked What We Need.”’

'58 Marietta Shaginian, Po dorogam Piatiletki.: Izdatl'stvo BTsSPS(vsesoiuznyi tsentral'nyi sovet
professional'nykh soiuzov). PROF IZDAT, 1947.

98

of productivity in steel production, the fruit supply enormously lags behind.”'59 Workers
became aware of the discrepancy between their perceived contribution to the nation’s
economy and their living conditions. Complaining about the poor harvest of potatoes and
their high prices, one worker claimed at a factory party meeting of the MMK in 1953 that
the ORS should have done “everything” in order to secure the potato, vegetable, and fruit
supplies for the “metal workers in Magnitogorsk, [which was] such an important
industrial center.”I60 Babichenko, a worker in an MMK flattening mill workshop, also
asserted that the ORS should guarantee that “the workers of the world ’s largest steel mill
could order garments at a tailor shop with the material that the workers wanted.”'6'

One episode shows that not only workers themselves but also non-workers
utilized the publicly well-known images of the inhabitants of Magnitogorsk as citizens of
a heroic city to negotiate for better treatment from the government. In October 1948
E.K., a high-ranking editorial staff member at Magnitogorskii metal], the MMK factory
newspaper, who was frustrated with the scarcity of food and consumer goods, attempted
to agitate MMK workers into signing a collective letter to Stalin. To convince the
workers, he spread the rumor that 1,200 MMK workers had already signed the letter. '62
According to a local security department report, some of his colleagues, including two

party members, a representative of the MMK trade union, and the head of the planning

 

'59 OGAChO, f. P-234, op.20, d.2, 1.15 (Dec 22. 1946) Fruit that was mostly supplied fi'om the collective
farms of Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan was truly a luxury food for the inhabitants of Magnitogorsk, not only
because it was very expensive, but also because it rarely appeared in the local market.

"’° OGAChO, f. P-779, op. 1, d. 1191, 1. 6 (1 1/16-17/1953) “Obshchego smennogopartiinogo sobraniia
Magnitogorskogo metallurgicheskogo zavoda, ot 16-17 noiabria 1953 g.”

'6' lbid., l. 4. Emphasis added by author.

'62 OGAChO, f. 9.234. op. 23, d. 15, 11. 39-91 (lO/25/l948); OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 23, d. 1.1, 11. 68-73
(1/13/1949).

99

department of the MMK, were also involved in this bold plot.163 The rhetoric used in the
letter implies that the inhabitants of Magnitogorsk understood that the government was
aware of their contributions to the war effort, which had been lauded by the central
newspapers. One worker recalled the text of the letter as follows:

Dear Comrade Stalin:

We raise this issue because the food supply in this country is considerably
improved. Our colleagues who have had vacations in various cities saw a good
harvest and the populations of those cities were fully supplied. Stores everywhere
in the southern and central parts of Russia and in Moscow were overfull. In
Magnitogorsk, we receive neither sugar, groats, nor flour. Many of us have not
received even once a kilogram of groats since the food supply reform. We
Magnitogorsk people have worked selflessly for the welfare of the Motherland.
We became famous during the war and postwar years, but the supplies in the city
have become worse than those in other cities. During the war we were supplied
well, and the director of the complex [MMK] himself well realized this problem.
He even put menus on the tables in cafeterias. He knew what they served and
took away cooks who made substandard food. But, after the abolition of
rationing, Magnitogorsk was very badly supplied and local organizations have not
paid the necessary attention to this problem. Among us, we have many
outstanding people who deserve good supplies and good bread without waiting in
long queues. We request your help for improvement of supplies for the workers
(rabochee snabzhenie) of Magnitka. '64

Moreover, comparing the material conditions of Magnitogorsk with other cities in
the Soviet Union, E.K. and his colleagues also expressed their anger about the poor
supply conditions in the wartime heroic city. Although we do not clearly know the
accuracy of their description of food supply conditions in the other parts of Russian

Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the relatively rich supply in the southern part

of the RFSFR was not a totally inaccurate observation. Filtzer and Hessler show that the

 

'63 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 23, d. 15, l. 89.

"’4 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 23, d. 11, l. 71. Magnitka is a nickname of Magnitogorsk. During the period of
the Famine, many workers in Cheliabinsk oblast wanted to escape the cities, which were in poor material
condition, and move to central and southern regions of the Soviet Union where they believed that the
conditions were better. OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 11, d. 189, l. 35. “Organizatsionno-instruktorskii otdel
Cheliabinskogo obkoma VKP(b) Inforrnatsionnaia svodka.” (8/11/1947).

100

Soviet food supply gradually improved beginning in 1948.165 Also, the argument in the
letter about better food supplies in Moscow and other regions is quite reasonable, since
the postwar Stalin regime made the restoration of those newly liberated regions a top
priority.166 Likewise, complaining that the bread supply in Magnitogorsk was stable
only one or two days a week, one worker questioned why Magnitogorsk had a shortage,
while other cities did not.167 Certainly, the inhabitants were upset with the instability of
the food supply that Magnitogorsk, the showcase city, had to face. A regional or local
identity shaped out of a strong pride for the city and their wartime contribution enhanced

their disappointment and grievances about the food shortage.

Class identity and the sense of entitlement

One construction within the historical documents worthy of attention is the
workers’ frequent use of the term “workers” or “working class.” As we see above and in
the first part of this chapter, MMK workers frequently used the term “working class” in
their addresses at the factory meetings about what they needed. The term “class” was not
one that appeared or was discussed only during political education sessions; workers used
it in their daily lives. “Class” was a part of a common vocabulary.

The strong presence of class identity among the working people in Magnitogorsk

can be easily understood, considering one of the key sources for its justification came

 

'65 Hessler, A Social History ofSoviet Trade, p. 297; Filtzer, “Standard of Living,” 1031.

'66 According to Hessler, since the abolition of the rationing in December 1947, central planners largely
supported a policy of “preferential provisionment” in which Moscow was mostly cared for while regional
towns were hardly given any priority. Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade, pp. 309, 317-18. Also,
the reconstruction of cities such as Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Kiev, which were either destroyed or
occupied by the German armies during the war, was important for the Stalin regime for propaganda

purposes.
'67 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 225, 1. 50 (10/9/1948).
101

from the workers’ labor in producing steel. Thus, workers made demands in the name of
“workers” or the “working class.” As we saw in the case of the letter to Stalin prepared
by a newspaper editor and his colleagues, even intellectuals spoke in the name of the
workers from such a well-known industrial town to appeal for material support from the
government. For example, their discussion about whose name they would use to sign the
letter indicates that class played a large part in defining the local people’s identity. After
the group discussed whether they should use the term “workers” or the name of a party
organization (such as the trade union), they finally decided to sign in the name of the
“workers (rabochie).” They understood that workers, especially MMK workers, were the
core of the city’s identity and believed that complaints fiom workers were more likely to
capture Stalin’s attention.

The fact that workers and other social groups used the rhetoric of working class
implied, on the one hand, that they “played” or “spoke Bolshevik” with one of the entities
of socialist ideology to justify their demands. On the other hand, it also means that the
inhabitants of Magnitogorsk intemalized the key values of Soviet ideology in which
workers were the most crucial social group within society. For these reasons, the
working people of Magnitogorsk developed strong voices as the “workers” or the
“working class.” Although Amir Weiner and Vera Dunham suggest that during the
postwar years the class concept was overshadowed either by the memories of the battle
against the Nazis168 or “embourgeoisement” values,I69 class remained a prominent

element which shaped the identities of the workers in Magnitogorsk. Unlike those from

 

'68 Amir Weiner. Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

'69 Dunham, In Stalin 's Time.

102

the former occupied regions of the Ukraine, which Weiner examines in his study, the
inhabitants of Magnitogorsk, a former wartime industrial center in the “deep rear,”
defined their own participation and success in the war not in terms of battlefield exploits,
but in terms of the workers’ productivity and labor that supported the Soviet war effort.'70
The people on the wartime home front had different legacies of the war than those who
had lived in the battleground regions during the war. The “middleclass values,” or
“embourgeoisment” of Soviet values, which Dunham defines as craving and pursuing
material incentives and consumption, also appeared among the workers; but only through
class were the workers of Magnitogorsk able to consider them. In addition,
Magnitogorsk workers’ uses of “working class” rhetoric for demanding better treatment
from the government based on their wartime heroic labor shows that the workers
perceived class not in terms of Marxist class, which is constructed in the relationship of
other social groups in society, but in terms of the relationship with the state. This means
that MMK workers perceived class as an “ascribed characteristic” whose primary

function was to define an individual’s rights, privileges, and obligations vis-a-vis the

state,”' rather than as a socio-economic attribute.

Denunciation as a tool for manipulation

 

'70 We saw earlier that a Stakhanovite worker of the MMK justified his entitlement to better housing based
on his overfulfillment of output norms during the war. Surely, this trend is not limited only to
Magnitogorsk workers, but can be applied to other workers who labored on the home front during the war.
For example, a worker laboring in the defense industry in Cheliabinsk justified his entitlement to receiving
adequate work equipment by claiming “During the war 1 produced 7,000 plavok. . . .. I worked hard during
the whole years of war. (My two sons were at the front.) But now 1 cannot work. Give me rubber boot.
Mittens and apron.” OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 146, l. 32. “Informasiia: o nastroeniiakh rudiashchikhsla
goroda cheliabinska v sviazi s polnoi pobedoi nad Germaniei” (5/17/1945). Also, see lbid., l. 37.

'7' Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Ascribing Class: The Construction of Social Identity in Soviet Russia,” Journal of
Modern History, Vol. 65, No. 4 (December 1993): 745-770.

103

Denunciation was another strategy that Magnitogorsk workers employed to cope
with the postwar shortages. MMK workers’ denunciations of self—interested officials
represented the workers’ desperate efforts to pressure those “immoral” (i.e., “un-
socialist” or “un-soviet”) officials to maintain a “moral (i.e., “socialist” or “soviet”)
economy.”'72 This did not necessarily mean that the workers opposed the Soviet system
itself. Rather, their critiques are evidence of heavy industry workers’ belief in the
system; in many cases the working people criticized those who operated the system
wrongly, rather than the system itself. In this sense, denunciation of factory management
and the local authorities can be seen as Magnitogorsk workers’ manipulative intentions
(rather than simply opposition to the Soviet system itself) of provoking certain
corrections of the “wrong” policies either of the factory management or the authorities. ”3

Likewise, we can see the demands of the working people of Magnitogorsk for
ORS reforms and criticism of the wrongdoings of local party members and officials as
workers’ strong desire to restore a healthy social and economic system, one which
harkened back to the idealized prewar years. 174 Recognizing the government’s effort to

help the Soviet people, some workers attributed the shortage problems in the city to local

officials. Some MMK workers reminded the factory management of the government’s

 

172 The concept of “moral economy” embraces ideas of “egalitarianism, social justice, and basic collective
rights.” Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945-I950 (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 6. For the examples of workers’ demands for “moral economy” see
Polish workers’ accusations of speculation in lbid., pp. 191-195. For the articulation of the concept of
“moral economy,” see E. P. Thompson, Customs in Common (London: The Merlin Press, 1991).

173 Another function of denunciation, understood from the regime-centered or top-down approach, is as a
state-control mechanism over local officials and a means of surveillance or monitoring public opinion.
Sheila Fitzpatrick. "Signals from Below: Soviet Letters of Denunciation of the 19305," Journal of Modern
History, Vol. 68 (December, 1996): 831-866.

m Saldaev, a former MMK worker whom I interviewed, recalled that the 19305 were better than the
postwar years. He claimed, “People in Magnitogorsk lived better in the 19505 than in the 19405. But,
compared to the 19305, the living conditions of the 19505 were still far less.” MMK Library,
Magnitogorsk, July 6 2001.

104

good intentions to improve material conditions. At a trade union meeting in 1946
workers claimed,

We have government decisions and an order from the People’s Commissariat of

Ferrous Metallurgy about not only rehabilitation of consumer goods production,

but further expansion of the production! '75
Other MMK workers expressed the view that the party and government took care of the
Soviet people very well, but the ORS did not do so.176 Pointing out that not a single party
member and no Komsomol were working in Store No.19, a worker asked (when no party
members were present), “How could the store employees know of the party’s
decisions?”'77 The workers criticized local party members who did not carry out party
policy, which they believed was set up by the government to take care of the Soviet
people. From these examples, one can see the Magnitogorsk workers’ belief in the
government, and their hopes for more strict control over trade by the state. ”8 Although
there was some criticism of the government and its policies, many complaints, like those
above, were limited to economic or daily life issues; only rarely did a complaint expand
from an economic to a political issue. The workers’ intentions were politically “healthy”
ones in nature. ”9

Workers’ criticism of speculation indicates that some workers in Magnitogorsk

very much supported the state-controlled trade and distribution system and requested that

 

”5 AOAM, f. 10, op. l, d. 402, l. 160 (3/ 13/ 1946) “Reshenie No. 63. Ispolnitel’nogo komiteta
magnitogorskogo gorodskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia 0t 13 marta 1946 g.”

"6 OGAChO, f. P-779, op. l, d. 1191, l. 4 (1 1/16-17/1953) “Obshchego...”; also, lbid., I. 5.

”7 lbid., 1.6.

‘7‘ lbid., 1.4.

"9 For other examples of the struggle to correct the deviation from the orthodox socialist system based on

Leninism, see Zubkova, Russia after the War, chapter 11; Juliane Furst, "Prisoners of the Soviet Self?—
Political Youth Opposition in Late Stalinism," Europe-Asia Studies 54, no. 3 (2002): 353-37 5.

105

the local authorities enhance governmental control over trade and distribution. As in
other cities in the Soviet Union during the period of material shortages, illegal
speculation was widely practiced in Magnitogorsk. Workers in garment and other
factories made products with factory materials and then sold them in local markets at
speculation prices.180 Likewise, furniture factory workers made beds secretly during

working hours with the purpose of selling them in the market, even in the presence of

181

factory shop managers. The local government eventually launched a “battle against

handicraftsmen” in 1955 to prevent widespread speculative practices, such as making
beds with governmental material and selling them on the black market. Additionally,
dating back to the war period during which the secondary market rose and the control of
authorities over un-socialist practices loosened, MMK workers strongly blamed ORS
personnel for corruption and irresponsibility and demanded the postwar reform of the
ORS in order to weaken the black market. '82 Complaining about high prices, which were
seven times higher than normal, and that they had to pay for fish that speculators caught
in “their” ponds, workers demanded the reform of the ORS.183 They felt awkward about
the state’s loss of control over state property and its planned economy. They asked,

“Why does the ORS allow the secondary economy? Why doesn’t the ORS rlm kolkhozes

 

‘3“ OGAChO, f. P-779, op. 1, d. 1191, 1.2(11/16-17/1953). see also 1. 3, 4, 5, 12.

'3' AOAM, f. 10, op. 11, d. 118, l. 25 (4/9/1955).

"2 AOAM, f. 118, op. l, d. 174, ll. 28, 32. Fourteen hundred employees worked in the ORS of the MMK.
lbid., 1.21. However, the conditions were not improved quickly. By the early 19505, there was still a
serious shortage in public catering and workers were still complaining about shortages in MMK’s ORS
commerce. AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 442, 11. 247-48 (1/8- 7/16/1952) “Punkt No. 239. O sostoianii
rassmotreniia zhalob trudiashchikhsia v torgovoi seti ORSa metallurgicheskogo kombinata.”

"‘3 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, (1. 174,1. 35.

106

(collective farms) and cooperatives?”I84 Some angry workers asked for reform in the
ORS so that people would buy food at its stores, rather than from the speculators in the
local market'” For the workers who considered themselves victims of un-socialist trade
practices such as speculation, it was unbearable, especially during a time of material
hardship. Moreover, although many inhabitants longed for the abolition of rationing,
there was a large group of people who wanted the authorities to keep rationing for a
while, until the state could achieve a stable bread supply. These people were very much
concerned about a hike in bread price in stores after the abolition of rationing.186 This
shows that there were people who relied deeply on the paternalistic role of the state.
“Speaking Bolshevik,” some MMK workers criticized the ORS cadres at a party
conference. Claming that “we all know what soviet trade means in our daily life and
what place it takes in the construction of the communist society,” Iakovlev, a railway
transportation shop worker, chastised the ORS officials as “those who lacked Bolshevik
enthusiasm, which is required in every field of work.”187 The urban inhabitants’
denunciations of the local party members and officials who either ignored speculation or
participated in the illegal, immoral, and un-soviet trade show that Magnitogorsk workers
intended to manipulate the state to enhance state (or “socialist”) control over speculation
and protecting workers’ own interests. '88 Considering the contemporary rhetoric over

“building communist society” during the postwar years, however, this implies that the

 

"‘4 lbid., 1. 340b.
"5 lbid., 1.35.
"‘6 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 518, 11.67.

"‘7 OGAChO, 1‘. 9-779, op. 1, d. 1191, 1.2. Italics mine.

"’8 For an example of Russian peasants’ strategies of manipulation, see Fitzpatrick, Stalin ’s Peasants,
pp.13-16.

107

workers subconsciously internalized the official rhetoric and used it for manipulating the
authorities.

The MMK workers considered not only speculation, but also blat (pull or clout)
as an unhealthy practice that overpowered Soviet trade and should be eradicated.
Antonov, a worker in the MMK motor depot, expressed strong resentment against a store
manager who was a party member and always inebriated, whom the worker believed sold
items by blat. Antonov claimed, “1 don’t know who coined it, but there is a saying: ‘blat
is above the Sovnarkom (Council of People’s Commissars).’189 Indeed, things are just
like that.” Exposing the store manager’s name, the worker stressed that “one cannot find
a word for explaining the conditions of the store. The store is a personal patrimony;
there’s no governmental control there.” Antonov asserted that every transaction in that
store was done “through a back door. Currently nothing goes through the front door.”
The worker added that “the manager is a party member and his assistant is a party
member, too.” He continually asserted that the corrupt store manager should be punished
because he drank with “our” money and deceived the government. Additionally, the
worker criticized the loosened attitudes of the trade union inspectors as too tolerant
toward such illegal/un-Soviet behaviors. The worker strongly requested more strict
control or inspection by the party and government of the disordered practices. As well, a
steam engine machinist at the railway transportation department who was selected as a
public inspector claimed that the party, trade union, and public’s control over the work of

the ORS should be strengthened. '90

 

‘89 OGAChO, f. 9-779, op. 1, d. 1191, 11. 100b-11.

'90 lbid., l. 4. See also 1.6 for the request to enhance the power of the public inspector.

108

Housing-related issues became a frequent subject of working people’s criticism of

factory management. 19‘

Many workers asked when temporary housing, such as mud huts
and barracks, would be replaced,192 and complained of prolonged housing repair work. '93
In addition, others directly wrote their request, “give me housing,” on ballots during
elections.194 Some examples of their denunciations show that both those who were in the
lower gradations of the hierarchical living space distribution system and those who
received no designated housing privileges criticized the factory leadership with the
intention of provoking them to correct the problems that the workers faced. Fal’kovskii,

head of the boiler repair workshop at the MMK, protested the inadequacy of the factory

policy of housing allocation for workers. He claimed, in 1954, that housing should be

 

'9' The slow improvement of housing remained as one of the most persistent issues in the daily life of the
city’s inhabitants until the late 19405 and even early 19505. OGAChO. f. P-288, op. 17, d. 169, l. 117
(2/9/1953) “Informatsiia No. 4: Magnitogorskogo gorkoma KPSS ‘o khode podgotovki k vybjram v
mestnye sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia po gorodu magnitgorsku.” ; AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 211, l. 16
(1/20/1949) “Protokol No.4: sobraniia chlenov profsoiuza 3-1 brigady martenovskogo tsekha No. 1 ot
27/Xll-48g.”; AOAM, f. 1 l8, op. l, d. 289, l. 24. “Protokol No.1 1: obshchego sobraniia chlenov profsoiuza
martenovskogo tsekha No. 3 ot ll oktiabria 1950g.” During the period, the majority of the complaint
letters sent by inhabitants to the local party and government organizations were regarding housing. For
example, 43 percent (213 out of 53 1) of the complaint letters that the city soviet received in 1949, and
about 40 percent (322 out of 765) that the Magnitogorsk Communist Party received during the first ten
months of 1952 were complaints about the provision of living space or housing repair. OGAChO, f. P-288,
op. 17, d. 9, l. 97 (1952). “Dokladnaia zapiska: o rabote Magnitogorskogo gorkoma partii s pis’mami i
zhalobami trudiashchikhsia”; AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 415, 1.88 (1950). Likewise, among the complaint
letters that the editorial department of Magnitogorskii rabochii received during June 1953 from city
residents many were about poor housing conditions. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 33, d. 129, l. 126 (1953).

‘92 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 17, d. 169, l. 128; OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 17, d. 175, 1. 7o; AOAM, f. 118, op.
l,d.2ll, 1.16; AOAM, f. 118, op. 1,d. 289, l. 24.

'93 For example, in a 1949 MMK factory meeting, workers complained of prolonged repair periods, which
were lasting five months. During the period several families had to live separately in several apartments
and “many families settled down in the corridors with their children, cats, and their things for up to three
months until the workers of the Municipal Economy Administration (U KKh: upravalenie kommunalnogo
khoziaistva) finished the repair work.” AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 215 (2/16/1949). “Stenogramma:
obshchezavodskoi konferentsii po voprosu: itogi vypolneniia kollektivnogo dogovora za 1948 g. na MMK
imeni Stalina.” KBU was reorganized into UKKh in late 1938.

‘94 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 17, d. 169, l. 67.

109

provided not “by the rank” of workshops but “by their need.” Because of this imbalanced
allotment of housing, some workers in the more important workshops were able to
expand their living spaces, while workers in the low-ranked workshop had to live with
roommates in apartments or dormitory rooms. Indeed, for F al’kovskii, the imbalanced
distribution of housing was not based on Soviet or communist ideology, in which goods
should be distributed “as they are needed.” In addition, in 1945, describing the housing
conditions for the workers from the city’s non-maj or factories, such as the meat factory,
as quite “disgusting,” a district leader criticized the existing policy of allotment of city
funds for housing repair, which was devised to provide MMK and Magnitostroi workers
with priority as incentives. '95 He requested that the policy be reformed to provide
immediate housing repair for workers in light industry.

Sometimes, denunciation of factory management came out of a formerly
privileged group of workers such as the Stakhanovites, who resented the illusoriness of
their privileges, in this case for housing. An MMK Stakhanovite worker warned that the
relationship between workers and the factory leadership had become worse than ever
before due to the lack of support for the Stakhanovites who had been living in dilapidated
housing for a long period.'96

In sum, the working people of Magnitogorsk appropriated the language of official
ideology and requested correction of policies which, they believed, were not operating in
the socialist or Soviet way. Using the official language which they internalized, they
attempted to manipulate the authorities and factory management into doing something

about or changing inadequate or “immoral” practices. Certainly, speculation was not a

 

‘95 AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, l. 176.
'96 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 11, d. 189, l. 7.
1 10

way of daily life that many Soviet people simply accepted and participated in without any
uncomfortable feelings. For many MMK workers, who officially deserved a certain
priority in supply and incentives, speculation was a criminal act which ruined healthy
socialist trade. They believed that if the Soviet system functioned as it should the system

would guarantee their privileges.

Denunciation and resistance by the least privileged

Strong criticism of the Soviet government and its policies frequently erupted,
especially during the most difficult years of the postwar famine, among the “least
privileged” inhabitants of the city. Archival sources suggest that much strong criticism
was expressed among workers in light industry. According to the August 1947 party
report from the Kirov district, the location of many light industry factories, workshops,
and local cooperatives, many residents often expressed their frustrations with government
policies. They asked, “What have we come to? Is our government really so poor that it
cannot guarantee food stamps?”197 At one political education meeting, a firefighter
blamed the government, asking,

How can one explain that the USSR made a commitment to supply bread to

foreign governments even though [the bread supply] is not enough for its own

people?

Unlike the MMK workers’ criticism of the ORS, in their criticism of the local
officials and government, terms like “working class” or “workers” were rarely used in the

denunciations by light industry workers. This suggests that those who worked in light

industry largely lacked the same sense of entitlement that MMK workers had. In their

 

'97 lbid.
‘98 lbid.
1 1 1

rhetoric, a traditional “us” and “them” dichotomy, (rather than class identity) which
“subaltem” subjects employed to distinguish themselves from those with power and
privileges, was more dominant.‘99 The less prominent presentation of class
consciousness among light industry workers in Magnitogorsk implies that class was not a
fixed or inherent attitude of an individual, but was one of the entities that competed with
other elements to comprise an individual worker’s identity.

The worsening of food and consumer goods supplies surely helped to undermine
the inhabitants’ trust in the party members and the party as a whole. As we have seen
above, the final decision by a group of local elites to send their letter to Stalin, rather than
the party’s Central Committee or any government organizations, reflects the
Magnitogorsk people’s increasing distrust of the party and the central authorities during
the postwar hard times. Likewise, the local residents’ criticism of party members
increased. For example, in 1947, one worker, who had lived in the German-occupied
Rostov oblast for two years, asserted that material conditions in the region were not bad
at all compared to current-day Magnitogorsk. Criticizing party members as thieves, the
worker claimed, “That’s why our lives are so difficult now.”200 One party candidate also
criticized the party members as people who “try to defend just their own interests,” while
ignoring speculators who disrupted the normal distribution of food and consumer goods

201

by stealing and reselling them on the black market. According to a city party secretary

report, a group of people accused “all communists,” including some local leaders, of

 

'99 The “us vs. them” dichotomy among the Soviet people, which Sarah Davies used in her analysis of the
social identity of the Soviet people in the 19305, is also a useful analytic tool to examine the social identity
of the postwar years. Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda And Dissent,
[934-194] (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapter 8.

2°° OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 11, d. 189, l. 8.

’°‘ lbid., 1.9.

112

abusing their positions, ignoring their duties, and engaging in immoral behavior.202 A
manager of a nursery even prevented her employees who were party members from
attending a party meeting, claiming that party members were “swindlers with no
conscience,” and that they did nothing but chat at meetings.203 Some workers criticized
the government’s food aid program for foreign countries while it failed to satisfy food
supplies for Soviet workers.204 The svodki report of August 1947 indicates that some
poorly paid employees expressed even so-called “anti-soviet pronouncements
(antisovetskie vyskazyvaniia).” A head accountant criticized at a grocery shop, “As long
as the Soviet regime controls [the country], no order (poriadki) will exist.”205
Despite people’s strong criticism of the government and the Communist Party, it
should be noted that Stalin was not generally perceived of as belonging to “them.”
Rather, Stalin, like a good tsar in the eyes of Russian peasants, belonged to “us” for the
people of Magnitogorsk.206 “Na'l've monarchism” remained intact among Magnitogorsk
workers throughout the war, and, in some sense, was enhanced after the Soviet victory in

the war as a result of governmental propaganda on Stalin’s role in the war. A dependent

of one worker, who did not receive any food stamps, expressed disbelief in a “rule like

 

20’ lbid.
2‘” lbid.

2“ lbid., l. 32; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 518, 1. 8. During the years of 19415-1947, the Stalin government
provided 2.5 million tons of grain not only to Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria, Romania, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, but also Western Europe, including France. V. F. Zima, Golod v SSSR
I 946-1 947 godov: proiskhozhdenie posledstviia (Moskva: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1996), p. 149.

’°’ OGAChO, r. P-288, op. 11, d. 189, 1. 34 (8/11/1947) “Organizatsionno-instruktorskii otdel
cheliabinskogo obkoma VKP (b) inforrnatsionnaia svodka. O politicheskikh nastroeniiakh trudiashchikhsia
v gorodakh cheliabinskoi oblasti”; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 518, 11. 8-9.

206 For the Russian people’s traditional faith in the tsar as the benefactor of the narod, see Daniel Field,
Rebels in the Name of the Tsar (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1976), p. 5. This traditional faith continued during
the Soviet period. For labor-camp prisoners’ faith in Stain see Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag.
Archipelago (1973). See also Zubkova, Russia After the War, p. 46.

113

this,” saying, “I would receive food stamps if only I could reach Comrade Stalin.”207 One
worker, who joined the Communist Party in 1925 and worked at a calibration factory,
declared in 1947, “No one does anything except sitting and cheating Comrade Stalin. I
defended the Revolution; but now I live in very difficult conditions. I do not need to say
any more?”08 Moreover, many positive notes on Stalin written anonymously by voters
on ballot sheets during the elections for the representatives for the local soviet
demonstrate the Magnitogorsk people’s sincere trust in Stalin. In addition, as we have
seen in the case of the MMK factory newspaper editor’s letter, the city elites chose Stalin
to ask for help instead of government or party organizations. Magnitogorsk workers’
loyalty and trust toward Stalin illustrates one of the reasons for the regime’s relative
success in maintaining socio-political stability during the postwar hardships.

Some of the most poorly paid and least privileged workers and employees went
further. Many workers from Garment and Shoe Factory No.2 manifested obvious protest
against working on the subsidiary factory farm. The reason they gave for refusing to
work was that they could not expect any rewards. In particular, during 1946-1947, they

did not receive any vegetables or milk.209 Although it is unclear whether the workers

 

20’ OGAChO, f. P-288, op.11, d. 189, l. 7.

2°“ lbid., 1.8.

209 lbid., l. 6 (8/4/1947). Milk, like fruit and fish, was almost a luxury food for the inhabitants of
Magnitogorsk during the postwar years. In mid-1946 Magnitogorsk received only half of the milk quota
for the city through the state-supply system, while the other half was supplied from local farms. The milk
supply from the local milk factory depended on about 8,800 individual households which owned about
9,000 cows. But, the milk production from the local households was far less than the required amount due
to the insufficient supply of feed. To increase milk procurement from local households, the local party
eventually assigned one party activist per 10-15 cow owners to persuade more cow owners to join the local
milk supply system. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 20, d. 11, 11. 22-22 ob (“O khode vypolneniia postanovleniia
Soveta ministrov i TsK VKP (b) op 19/111- ob obiazatel’nykh postavkakh moloka khoziastvami zhitelei
gorodov i rabochikh poselkov.” 5/31/1946) In 1952, the city administration ordered a count of the number
of livestock that individuals owned for the purpose of more accurate allotment of milk from local cow
owners and to prevent their speculation of milk at the local market. AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 442, l. 232.

114

who refused to follow the order were punished, their protest certainly implies that
workers were not always obedient. In the years of the famine, the Communist party
members were no exception; they expressed their strong discontent openly and refused to
sacrifice themselves for work for which they could not get any rewards. Sorokin, a light
industry worker and party member who was not able to receive adequate food through
rationing in 1946, refused to go to work for two weeks, choosing instead to take care of
his children while his wife worked on a local collective farm to get bread and vegetables
for the family. He notified the secretary of the local party that he would not work in a -
“subsidiary industry” despite being threatened with arrest and execution. He declared,
“Working in a subsidiary industry or being imprisoned is all the same.”210 In addition,
some workers and employees refused to carry out their assigned duty as a means of
protest. Ofien, they were poorly paid workers whose subsistence was threatened during
the postwar food shortage and those who had family members affected by the new
rationing law, which removed the right to receive food stamps due to their age (either too
young or old to work) and/or disability. They expressed their resentrnents toward local
officials and party members in various ways. For example, in 1947 one bookkeeper
refused to participate in mandatory Sunday work, declaring that one could not work with
only a 300-gram bread ration.“ Some poorly paid workers whose subsistence was

threatened declined to buy government bonds; instead, they chose to buy potatoes for

 

2'0 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 11, d. 189, 1. 6.
2” lbid., 1.8.
115

seeding.”2 One man even tore down portraits of party and governmental leaders in a
local club during preparation for the election of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.”3

To be sure, many workers in light industry and poorly-paid employees were
antagonistic towards the hierarchical distribution system in which they were fixed at the
lower grades. As we saw above, some inhabitants, especially those who were the least
privileged, expressed anti—Soviet or anti-govemmental sentiment. There is no doubt that
city inhabitants’ denunciations and anti-govemmental sentiments would reach a climax
during the famine years when some groups of inhabitants were excluded from rationing
and their living conditions worsened.

However, the anti-soviet governmental sentiments and behavior among local
people should not be over-generalized or exaggerated. In fact, we do not know exactly to
what extent this anti-govemmental sentiment was a matter of isolated cases or
widespread among the city’s inhabitants. While some people were impatient about
suffering a hard life, others were surprisingly optimistic even during the difficult years.
An Aeration Workshop of the Cheliabinsk Factory worker claimed,

Now people live with difficulty. After 'such a war and bad harvest, this is

absolutely not surprising. Things will not stay like this forever. If we were able

to get through the war and to dispel the Germans, we will overcome all the current
difficulties. Workers from my workshop are expecting a better life.“4

 

212 lbid., ll. 56. Some workers even took their own lives; a metal worker from the MMK Mechanical
Workshop left a suicide note that read “life is too hard: I don’t see anything good in this life.” lbid., l. 6.

2” lbid., 1. 34; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 518, 11. 8-9. He was convicted of this act and sentenced to three
years in prison.

2" OGAChO, f. P-288, op. l 1, d. 189, l. 30. The same svodki report describing the “anti-Soviet” behavior
discussed earlier also indicates, “Many people [of the cities of Cheliabinsk oblast] believe that after the
harvest, already in the autumn of this year [1947] the domestic situation is getting better, and they will live
better (legche).” lbid., l. 31.

116

The war did not have only a negative impact on the Soviet people. Wartime experiences
of survival and, above all, the Soviet victory enabled them to have a surprising level of
endurance and patience, as well as confidence in their ability to overcome difficulties in
daily life.”5 War changed the Soviet people: it made them more resilient than ever. It is
also worth keeping in mind that, as Vladimir Kozlov and Jeffrey Rossman point out, the
Soviet people’s denunciations and resistance was limited, in many cases, to regional or

economic issues rather than extended to political issues.216

In Magnitogorsk, resistance
was not always anti-Soviet or anti-govemmental, but it did many times indicate desire for
reform. It should be also noted that while there were some inhabitants who refused to
carry out duties assigned by the authorities, such as working on factory farms, as we see
above, there were also others who carried out the same work faithfully. According to the
svodki report of October 1947, workers and white-collar employees of the shoe and
garment factories of Magnitogorsk provided a great deal of help in weeding for the
subsidiary farm by willingly organizing voskresniki (voluntary workers) on Sunday.
According to the report, one group of voskresniki, weeding 1.5 hectars of sowing area,
did not want to go home until all group members finished their work in the late

217

evening. Moreover, people’s attitudes were not fixed, but changed as economic

conditions changed and as time passed.”8 Even though historians noticed that the Soviet

 

2'5 For similar view, see Zubkova, Russia Afier the War, pp. 97-98.

2'6 Kozlov, Mass Uprising in the USSR; Jeffrey J. Rossman, “A Workers’ Strike in Stalin’s Russia: The
Vichuga Uprising of April 1932,” in Contending with Stalinism, pp. 44-83.

"7 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 11, d. 189, 1. 31.
2'8 For the fluidity and multiplicity of identities of the Soviet people see Karen Petrone, Life Has Become

More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 2000), pp. 4-5.

117

people’s living conditions improved as material supplies became more stable in the late
19405, they have not paid much attention to how these changes affected people’s
behavior. As we will see in the next chapters, by the late 19405 and early 19505 there
were clear signs of improvement in living conditions including food supplies and

housing.

Conclusion

As material conditions did not improve immediately after the war, the Magnitogorsk
authorities had not only to maintain but also to refine the hierarchical distribution system
exercised during the war in a more nuanced and limited way. Although there were times
when the system was severely stressed, in most cases the local authorities—working
within the supply limits—struggled to retain the hierarchy in distribution to support
skilled workers and technical personnel, especially those working in major workshops of
key industries. As a result, factory cadres and skilled workers in the steel industry had
top priority for receiving food and consumer goods, as well as housing repair and
allotment. On the other hand, workers in light industry in the city were less privileged,
and had no priority compared to the steel workers.

The limited capacity of the centralized supply system during the shortages did not
necessarily imply the weakening of socialist paternalism. Along with hierarchical
distribution, the local authorities maintained welfare-style distribution—distribution not
by ranks or incentives, but by need. To be sure, the welfare-style distribution, like the
hierarchical distribution, was implemented on a very limited scale due to the scarcity of

resources. However, the authorities were active in seeking out and providing recipients

118

with welfare benefits. They monitored public opinion about daily life and carefully
selected the recipients for material aid before the prospective recipient asked the
authorities. Although we do not know exactly how many inhabitants benefited from this
selection, in most cases, the recipients of the benefits were from the least privileged
groups of inhabitants, such as the poorly paid, young people, single workers living in
dormitories, the disabled, the demobilized, and families of deceased soldiers.219 Even
though the authorities implemented the welfare-style distribution in a very limited way, it
grew during the postwar years as a relatively “new” practice for two main reasons: In the
first place, the authorities initiated the search for the beneficiaries rather than waiting
until a request was received “from below”; in the second place, the benefits were not only
based on incentives and rewards for certain kinds of achievements, but also provided as a
type of need-based aid. But this active form of welfare-style aid was not devoid of
political intention. To be sure, the local authorities were limited in the amount of
available supplies they could provide. But the authorities desperately wanted to show
that the state was concerned and doing its best to take care of the groups most affected by
the shortages. The welfare-style distribution was one of the strategies that the authorities
employed to suppress high labor-turnover rates among young, unskilled, and poorly paid
workers. In a broader context, demonstrating such a paternalistic role of the state can be
understood as a political strategy for maintaining social stability and securing political
support “from below.” On the one hand, the postwar shortages surely made playing a
paternalistic role difficult for the regime; ironically, on the other hand, it was a relatively
easy period to demonstrate paternalism simply by implementing an active, pre-emptive

policy of resource allocation.

 

2'9 For a detailed discussion of the welfare practices, see chapter IV.

119

The strategies that Magnitogorsk workers used to cope with the shortages reveal
that the wartime regional experiences heavily affected their attitudes and self-
identification. First, unlike the increased significance of wartime exploits in postwar

daily life in the former occupied regions, such as Ukraine,220

class played a crucial part in
the identification of self among the working people in a home-front industrial center. In
the hinterland, which had not been involved in any battle during the war, more than one
third of the city’s population were workers in heavy industry and were praised as models
of heroic labor during the war. Thus, here, class, rather than war-related activities, was
far more important in determining the identity of the city’s inhabitants. Second,
Magnitogorsk workers’ wartime labor and its contribution to the Soviet war effort, which
was propagandized in official rhetoric, enhanced a general sense of entitlement among
the city’s inhabitants. Common wartime experiences based on geographical location
(battlefield vs. home front and/or occupied vs. unoccupied) strongly affected the
enhancement of homogenous regional identity?”
Magnitogorsk workers’ enhanced sense of entitlement and class identity, as well
as their criticism of the local authorities’ poor control over the state-controlled economy,
proved that Magnitogorsk workers, especially those such as steel factory workers who
were “privileged,” maintained their belief in the Soviet system during the extreme
shortages. Their criticism was also a sign of their heavy dependency on the state. Their

99222

class rhetoric can be considered “speaking Bolshevik” or “worming one’s way to gain

some advantages from the state; but, surely the criticism and even “resistance” were signs

 

22° Weiner, Making Sense of War.
22' For the Ukrainian case, see Weiner, Making Sense of War, p. 60.

222 Siegelbaum and Sokolov, Stalinism as a Way of Life, p. 424
120

that many Magnitogorsk workers living in a city portrayed as a “Potemkin village” did
not abandon their hope for a better future, but kept making every effort to discipline the
state into upholding its socialist policies. This implies that, contrary to what some
historians have observed, workers neither lost working-class consciousness nor became

demoralized due to the shortages.223

 

223 For example, see F iltzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, pp. 75-76.

121

III. The Politics of Productivity and Magnitogorsk Workers’ Survival
Strategies

By the end of the war, the problem of raising labor productivity that began to fall
appeared to be one of the key issues of Magnitogorsk authorities and the factory
management of the Magnitogorsk Steel Works (MMK). Responding to the problem, in
September 1945 the city party committee (gorkom) convened to discuss the ways to boost
productivity. At the meeting, one local party official confessed, “I have to say directly
that, in our province, the labor productivity of a worker still lags far behind that of an
American worker.”l In fact, the productivity of MMK began to fall from 1944 and
continually remained under 1940 level for several years.2 As an example, the report
indicated that during 1944, the cast iron production of the MMK Blast-Furnace
Workshop was 203,000 tons short, while during the first seven months of 1945 the
workshop fulfilled its monthly goal of production only twice, in April and J uly.3 The low
productivity of MMK workshops became a serious issue for the local party and enterprise
managers as the demand for metal increased for the postwar reconstruction. In his
famous address of February 1946 that indicated publicly the Soviet government’s focus

on the restoration of heavy industries, Stalin announced that the Party had a long-term

 

' OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 18, l. 113 (9/4/1945). “Orukovodstve partiinykh organizatsii
sotsialisticheskim sorevnovaniem.”

2 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 34, d. 111, l. 88 (7/1954). OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 18, I. 86. “O
rokovodstve partiinykh organizatsii sotsialistichskim sorevnovaniem.”

3 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 18, 1. 87. (9/4/1945) “0 rukovodstve partiinykh organizatsii
sotsialisticheskim sorevnovaniem (doklad na gorodskom sobranii partaktiva 4 sentiabria 1945).”
According to the report there was plenty of room to increase the production. As an example the report
pointed out the fact that even workshops that over-fulfilled their production norm during 1945, such as the
Open-hearth furnace workshop, did not fully utilized the resources they had. lbid., l. 89.

122

plan to increase the capacity of Soviet industry to three times more than prewar levels.
To fulfill the goal, Stalin emphasized,

Our industry will need to be able to produce annually 50 million tons of cast iron

and 60 million tons of steel. . .Only under this condition can we consider that our

Motherland will be guaranteed against any accidents. For this, three, if not more,

new Five-Year plans will be needed.4
The pressure to increase productivity certainly was enhanced for the local party and
factory managers after Stalin provided concrete figures on the amount of iron and steel
needed for the postwar Five-Year plans. How, then, did the local authorities and factory
managers mobilize workers? To what extent were the strategies that Magnitogorsk
factory managers used for raising productivity similar or/and different compared with the
prewar practices? How did workers respond to postwar working conditions?

Historians of the postwar Stalin years have frequently considered coercion as a
key strategy that the Stalin leadership used for the mobilization of labor power and
increase in productivity. They have stressed that the postwar Stalin leadership
extensively used coercion as a main tool to maintain productivity. In her pioneering
article on the nature of postwar Stalinist society Sheila Fitzpatrick portrayed the labor
policies of the time as mainly based on coercion.5 In his study of the formerly occupied
Kalinin province, Kees Boterbloem characterizes the postwar Stalinist system as

totalitarian. He sees Soviet society as one “driven by coercion” and argues that the Stalin

leadership attempted to control “every aspect of social, intellectual, political, and

 

4 “Rech’ tovarishcha I.V. Stalina,” Pravda, 10 February 1946.

5 Fitzpatrick, “Postwar Soviet Society: The ‘Retum to Norrnalcy’, 1945-1953,” in The Impact of World
War II on the Soviet Union, ed. Susan Linz (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, Publishers, 1985),
pp. 141-44, 150-52.

123

economic life.”6 Similarly, Donald Filtzer emphasizes in his recent study that the
postwar Stalin regime subjugated workers through criminal laws and coercion.7
Adopting a more or less totalitarian view on the Soviet society, Filtzer sees the Soviet
government as a rigid and authoritarian system that suppressed society. He suggests that
“coercion” is a key strategy of the postwar Stalinist leadership to control workers.

Exploitation is another key concept that recent historians frequently use to
describe the labor relations of the postwar Stalin years. Jeffrey Jones, examining
workers’ wages and working conditions in Rostov-on-the-Don—southem Russia’s
industrial center—indicates that the “Soviet state’s centrally-planned wages did not
compensate workers for the full value of their labor.”8 Filtzer reaches a similar
conclusion by stressing that enterprise managers were reluctant to grant “concessions
over earnings and the intensity of labour.”9 Workers’ health is one of the topics that he
employs to substantiate the exploitation thesis. Filtzer shows that not only deteriorated
living and working conditions but also factory managers’ neglect of safety issues badly
affected workers’ health. '0

In terms of workers’ responses to the exploitive working conditions, recent
studies provide more or less contradictory views. Filtzer, focusing on young workers,

who were the least privileged group of working people, stresses that they were largely

 

6 Kees Boterbloem, Life and Death under Stalin: Kalinin Province 1945-I953 (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), pp. 77, 311 (footnote 1).

7 Donald F iltzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System
after World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 203.

3 Jeffrey Jones, “’In my opinion this is all a fraud!’: Concrete, Culture, and Class in the “Reconstruction” of
Rostov-on-the-Don, 1943-1948,” (Ph. D. diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2000), pp. 143-
44.

9 Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Later Stalinism, p. 203.

'° lbid., pp. 100-115.

124

atomized and demoralized. He notes that the passivity and the lack of social and political
integration of these workers was a hardly surprising result of despair and exhaustion
caused by their struggle for survival during the persisting material hardship.ll The
deteriorated living conditions drove many young mobilized workers to desert the
workplace, despite the existence of severe criminal law for the violation of labor
discipline.12 Unlike Filtzer, Jones portrays Soviet workers during postwar years as a
more active social group that tried to negotiate with the factory management for its
interest. Jones shows that a group of workers, especially the demobilized, knew that they
had leverage due to the chronic shortage of workers. For example, using the tight labor
market and propelled by their sense of entitlement, demobilized soldiers demanded from
factory managers the best possible working conditions and positions.13 Moreover, Jones
shows that some workers expressed their discontent and protested against unpopular
policies, such as payment delays, reduced salaries and ration norms. Workers purposely
slowed down their work pace, walked off the job, or stopped work.'4 They did not
remain entirely passive, but interacted with factory officials through everyday forms of
resistance.

Although the recent studies of the postwar Stalin years above describe effectively

the nature of the Stalinist control over workers, labor relations, and workers’ responses to

 

" Donald F iltzer, “The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar Period,
1945-1948,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 6 (1999): 1030-32; idem, Soviet Workers and Late
Stalinism, chapter 4; idem, “Standard of Living Versus Quality of Life: Struggling with the Urban
Environment in Russia during the Early Years of Post-War Reconstruction,” in Late Stalinist Russia:
Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention, ed. Juliane Furst (London and New York: Routledge,
2006), p. 96.

'2 F iltzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, chapter 5.
‘3 Jones, “’In my opinion this is all a fiaud!,’” pp. 114-15.

'4 Jones, “‘In my opinion this is all a fi‘audl,’” pp. 129-30.
125

 

labor policies, the picture they have provided is incomplete. First, archival evidence
shows that coercion was not the only tool that Magnitogorsk enterprise managers and
authorities used to control workers. In Magnitogorsk, the authorities and enterprise
managers reduced the work hours and restored the off-days to those of peacetime
immediately following the war, responding to workers’ requests for the restoration of
peacetime work hours. '5 Secondly, historians’ studies on workers’ responses to labor
policies, as well as living and working conditions, also need a more nuanced view. Since
recent studies on the topic have largely focused on “young workers” (the least privileged
workers) during the 19405 (the hardest years of postwar Stalin period),l6 responses of
other groups of workers during later periods of postwar years have not been fully
examined. In fact, evidence shows that Magnitogorsk workers’ responses to labor
policies began to change in the early 19505 as living conditions had slowly improved by
then.17 Moreover, older and skilled workers had reacted to labor discipline differently
fi'om the young workers. Many older, skilled and more privileged workers cooperated

with the governmental labor policies by demanding the enhancement of labor

 

'5 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, 11. 299-300 (2/19/1946) “lzrneneniia v oblasti truda 1 zarabotnoi platy,
proisshedshie na magnitogorskom metallurgicheskom kombinate posle okonchania velikoi otechestvennoi
voiny.”

'6 For example, see F iltzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism. In most cases, there is no clear age
definition for “young workers” in Soviet documents of the postwar Stain years. But, “young workers”
frequently means juvenile workers registered at the vocational schools (FZO and RU), young graduates
from those schools, or workers aged either under 25 (or under 20). See for example, see OGAChO, f. 234.
op. 21, d. 55, l. 28. (“Spravka: o sostoianii trudovoi distsipliny na osnovnykh predpriiatiiakh goroda
magnitogorska.” 10/18/1947). It was in 1956 that the Soviet government extended special privileges of
juvenile workers. Since May of the year, work hours for workers age 16-18 were shortened to six-hours
with extra piecework pay to make up any loss in earnings. In addition they received one month vacation
once a year. Alec Nove, “Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State?,” in Soviet Society: A Book of Readings, ed.
Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 506.

'7 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 321.1. 38 (9/9/1955).
126

discipline.‘8 Thirdly, and more importantly, although historians have examined how the
“Big Deal” (i.e., postwar Stalin regime’s support for the so-called “middle class,”
managerial and technical personnel, by providing privileges in exchange for the groups’
political loyalty”) affected the technical intelligentsia, the beneficiary of the deal,20 few
studies have examined how the “Big deal” was presented on workshop floors and in the
party’s and enterprise management’s politics of productivity. Therefore, the key
questions I will investigate in this chapter will be: To what extent was coercion used as a
major tool in manipulating workers? How did the Big Deal affect workers who were
largely excluded from the deal, and the politics of productivity?

Integrating and extending recent studies of postwar labor history, I will examine
these questions by analyzing the ways in which the Magnitogorsk authorities and
enterprise managers attempted to improve the productivity of labor. First, through the
examination of official rhetoric used for raising productivity, I will identify the main
obstacles the Magnitogorsk authorities faced and explore the regime’s changing strategies
to increase productivity. Secondly, I will examine the nature of the strategies practiced
on the shop floor by analyzing the most frequently discussed issues among the local party,

enterprise management, and workers: restoration of peacetime working conditions, wages,
intensity of labor, and labor discipline. Thirdly, I will analyze the “survival strategies,”
or the ways in which Magnitogorsk workers responded to labor policies. In doing so, I

will explore the nature of the strategies that the local authorities employed to manipulate

 

'8 For example, see AOAM, f. 118, op. l, d. 321, 11. 56-59.

'9 The concept of and the term “Big Deal” were coined by Vera Dunham in her work In Stalin’s Time:
Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1976).

20 For example, see J. Eric Duskin, Stalinist Reconstruction and the Confirmation of a New Elite (New
York: Palgrave, 2001).

127

workers and the tactics that workers used in responding to the authorities’ productivity

measures.
The case study of Magnitogorsk shows that the shop floor during the postwar
years was frequently left in disorder and inefficiency due to the conflicts created by the
legacies of the war and the effect of the new postwar Big Deal. The direction of the Big
Deal, which valued more than ever technical personnel, with the emphasis on technology,
professionalization, and rationalization over physical efforts, brought the decline of
socialist competition based on voluntarism. This direction resulted in marginalization of
young workers in workshops. Although young workers, the least privileged ones,
responded to the marginalization by violations of labor discipline, more skilled and older
workers displayed more cooperative attitudes toward official values as living conditions
improved in the early 19505. The authorities and factory officials did not always respond

with coercion to workers’ requests and violations; concession and leniency was an

important part of their responses to workers.

Politics of Productivity in Rhetoric

Keep the wartime pace

Even after the war ended, the pressure for steel production that the local party of
Magnitogorsk received from Moscow continued. A central party report stressed in
August 1945 that ferrous and non-ferrous metal, along with coal and oil products, energy
and railway transportation equipment, should be urgently sent to some “liberated” regions
where reconstruction had started even before the war had ended.21 An article in a central

party journal, Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, reminded party members in August 1945 that not

 

2' “Pered novoi piatiletkoi’,” Partiinoe stroitel 'stvo, no. 16 (August 1945): 5.

128

only reaching the prewar level of production, but considerably surpassing it was a main
goal of the first postwar F ive-Year plan.22 Another article in the journal stressed in
November 1945 that “the liquidation of the impending danger after the war does not
mean the automatic lay-off.”23 The message of the party journal articles for
Magnitogorsk, the country’s center of steel production, was clear: providing steel for
reconstruction of the liberated regions was to continue at a wartime pace.

Under this circumstance, the falling production of the MMK by the end of the war
certainly became an enormous burden for local party and factory managers. The
emotional fluctuations among evacuated and mobilized workers (which we will see in the
next sections in detail) was another postwar phenomenon that made the local party and

factory officials more concerned about the negative impact on labor productivity. The
local party eventually launched a campaign to urge workers to maintain the wartime pace.
Official rhetoric presented in the local newspapers reflect the local authorities’ struggle to
prevent workers’ relaxation afier the war. “Tireless work for their own country” became
one of the major slogans for the young Soviet workers that the local authorities targeted
during the postwar reconstruction period.24 To ensure that Stakhanovites and technical
personnel realized that the end of the war did not decrease the demand for steel, another
article defined “better people” in the factories as those who worked with full potential, as

during wartime.25 Also, only within few weeks afier the end of the war, an editorial of

 

22 lbid., 7. For detailed goals of the plan, see “Piatiletnii plan vosstanovleniia i razvitiia narodnogo
khoziaistva SSSR na 1946-1950 gg.: Doklad predsedatelia Gosplana SSSR N.A. Voznesenskogo,”
Partiinoe stroitel 'stvo, no. 5-6 (1946 March): 17-18.

2’ “Podgotovka k vyboram v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR i massovo-politicheskaia rabota partorganizatsii,”
Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, no. 21-22 (November 1945): 15.

2’ Magnitogorskii rabochii, 16 June 1945.

129

Magnitogorskii rabochii reminded the people of Magnitogorsk, “Complacency and
placidity are alien because the Bolshevik’s law is continual forward activity.”26 As for
the local authorities, the postwar period was not supposed to be a relaxed one. Even
though the intensity of “wartime pace” rhetoric lessened upon reaching the end of the
19405, the time pressures continued. As the first postwar F ive-Year plan (the fourth
Five-Year plan overall) proceeded, slogans like “Let’s accomplish the Fourth F ive-Year
Plan in three and half years” often appeared in the local party meetings by the end of
1948 and early 1949.27 This was a reflection of the official rhetoric of the central party,
“Do not spare yourselves in accomplishing Stalin’s postwar Five-Year Plan, but over-
firlfill it.”28 But, the question was to what extent the workers and factory cadres

internalized the official rhetoric and applied it to the production process.

Responsibilities of Magnitogorsk women
Women could not be left in steel production for the postwar reconstruction. But,
for Magnitogorsk women, their postwar responsibility was more complicated. They had
to work hard in factories (at least until they were replaced by returning veterans), give
birth to more children, reject abortions, and commit themselves to raising children. The
authorities sought to manipulate women in Magnitogorsk by portraying certain images of

females in the local newspapers. One of the female images frequently presented in the

 

25 “Dlia rastsveta sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 26 May 1945.

2’ “Vyshe uroven’ partiino-organizatsionnoi raboty,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 26 May 1945.

2’ OGAChO, r. P-288, op. 13, d. 252, 1. 7 (1/21/1949) “dokladnaia zapiska: o razvertyvanii
sotsialisticheskogo sorevnovaniia i agitatsionnoi robote v 6 i ll tsekhakh zavoda imeni S. Odzhonikidz.”;

OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 23, d. 1, 1. 5 (2/22/1949).

2‘ “Slovo vozhdia o russkom narode,” Pravda, 24 May 1950.
130

local newspaper was a “manly” woman who does men’s work.29 A July 1945 issue of
Magnitogorskii rabochii introduced a female worker’s story of how she volunteered for
work in a foundry in the MMK, a place largely dominated by men. On a day in July, this
woman, Diachenko, visited a shop manager and told him, “I want to learn how to found
steel for the faster reconstruction of the country’s economy.”30 The workshop manger
complied with her request and assigned her as an assistant to an experienced male
founder. The article portrays her as a worker who conscientiously manages her
responsibilities, quoting her mentor’s words that “afier a year, she will be a founder.”3 I
The article indicates that the Magnitogorsk authorities hoped women would continue to

play a role of “superwoman,” as they had during the war period. The authorities

 

29 It should be noted that the masculine image of women portrayed in local newspapers was only one of
multiple images created by the local authorities. In other newspaper articles encouraging city inhabitants to
participate in the cleanliness campaign, women were frequently portrayed in traditional women’s roles, i.e.,
taking charge of domestic work, in this case, cleaning. See “Blagoustroim nash gorod!” Magnitogorskii
rabochii, 16 August 1946 and “Blagoustroim rodnoi gorod!” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 16 June 1948. The
governmental utilization of the image (and body) of women for state policies and political purposes is an
important part of gender politics conducted not only by the Soviet government, but by other modern
European governments. For example, afier the immense loss of male lives in World War 1, the German
government “nationalized” women’s reproductive work by emphasizing biological reproductive work as a
“national duty.” Elisabeth Domansky, “Militarization and Reproduction in World War 1 Germany,” in
Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870-1930, ed. Geoff Eley (Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press, 1996), p. 436. For an example of the utilization of the image of women for political
purposes by the Communist Parties in Europe, see Eric D. Weitz, “The Heroic Man and the Ever-Changing
Woman: Gender and Politics in European Communism, 1917-1950,” in Gender and Class in Modern
Europe, ed. Laura L. Frader and Sonya 0. Rose (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp.
311-52. The case of the Italian Communist Party’s manipulation of women’s images after World War 11 is
particularly telling. In its party newspaper, the PCI portrayed women as active participants in the
antifascist struggle immediately after World War 11. But as the party sought to compromise with more
conservative forces in society (notably the middle class with its strong Catholic identity), the party adopted
a more conventional image of women (i.e., the Madonna-like mother) in the newspaper. lbid., pp. 345-49.
These examples of the utilization of the image of women by the state and Communist parties suggest that
domesticity and reproduction could hardly be conceptualized as a private sphere because domestic virtues
were mobilized for serving the priorities of the state and political parities. For the prewar Soviet practices
of blurring the division of private and public spheres, see Rebecca Balrnas Neary, “Domestic Life and the
Activist Wife in the 19305 Soviet Union,” in Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia, ed.
Lewis H. Siegelbaum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 107-22.

3° “Zhenshchina-podruchnyi stalevara,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 24 July 1945.
3' Ibid.

131

expected Magnitogorsk women to be good workers, as well as good mothers raising their
children well, who contributed to the reconstruction of the economy and to the state’s

pro-natal policy.32

Love your job
After the war ended, violations of labor discipline, especially by young workers,

considerably increased. Accordingly, desertion and enhancement of labor discipline
appeared as key topics discussed at the MMK trade union meetings during the 19405.33
In 1945, some newspaper articles suggested even the necessity of an “iron rule”
(zheleznyi distsiplin) that hopefully would suppress violations of labor discipline,
including tardiness and absence to make workers fulfill their production quotas.34 Under
this circumstance, placing emphasis on people’s “love for their job” became another key
aspect of officialrhetoric of the local authorities. The goal was clear: to raise worker
productivity by curtailing workers’ illegal labor turnover. One article of Magnitogorskii

rabochii introduced the work experience of Karpov, a machinist at a mine at Mt.

 

32 Considering the tremendous human loss during the war and the need for labor power in the postwar
reconstruction, the multiple demands placed on women are not a surprise. Emphasizing that children are
one of the most valuable assets of the state, a local newspaper article exclaimed that the Soviet mothers
deserved honor and respect. It also reported with a positive tone that 400 more babies were born during the
first six months of 1945 compared to the same period of the previous year. (“Zabota o materi i rebenke,”
Magnitogorskii rabochii, 13 July 1945). Another newspaper article also welcomed the increased birth rate
in Magnitogorsk and the decline of the abortion rate in 1945. After the abortion rate in Magnitogorsk
reached its peak and the birth rate dropped during the war, especially in 1943, the birth rate rose again and
abortion rate began to drop. “Oberechat’ zdorov’e zhenshchiny,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 18 July 1945.

’3 AOAM, r. 118, op. 1, d. 211, l. 16(12/27/1948) “Protokol No.4: sobraniia chlenov profsoiuza 3-1 brigady
magtenovskogo tsekha No. 1 0t 27/XII-48.” During the postwar years, desertion was a widespread
phenomenon in major industrial areas and construction sites of the Soviet Union, especially in the Donbass
area of Ukraine, the coal fields of the Moscow basin, and the metallurgical centers of the Urals and
Western Siberia. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, p. 169; Zubkova, Russia after the War, pp.
103-104.

3" “V svete novykh zadach,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 16 May 1945.
132

Magnitka, whose comments reversed Stalin’s famous declaration of 1935 which related
the improvement of “life” to that of work.35 Karpov asserted, “If you love your work
place, it pays you. Work goes well, you feel good ...you become happy.”36 Another
article praised young Komsomols who expressed joy, claiming “We love our work!”37
Furthermore, one newspaper article stressed that one needed to love one’s own work,
understanding that love for their own work would benefit all of the people.38 By
depicting workers with cheerful and optimistic attitudes towards their labor, official

rhetoric constructed a behavioral model for the young workers in Magnitogorsk to follow.

Put in order

During the immediate postwar years, one of the most frequently discussed
productivity-related issues in Magnitogorsk newspapers was putting-in-order, or
cleanliness (blagoustroistvo). Local newspaper articles emphasized that during the
period of peaceful development one should pay special attention to the inculcation of
culture at production sites and putting-in-order in factories.39 In another newspaper
article, the local authorities criticized in a severe tone many party and administrative
leaders as having little concern about the effect of the disordered environment on

production. The article reported that the officials’ indifference to putting-in—order meant

 

’5 Stalin proclaimed in his speech at the All-Union conference of Stakhanovites in 1935, “Life has
improved, comrades. Life has become more joyous. And when life is joyous, work goes well. ” Lewis H.

Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, I 935-194] (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 212-213.

36 “Liubiat svoiu professiiu,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 5 June 1945.
37 “Liubim svoiu professiiu,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 30 June 1945.
3’ “Moral’nyi oblik sovetskogo cheloveka,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 31 July 1945.

39 See “Za chistotu i kul’turu na proizvodstv,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 10 June 1945; “la chistote..,”
Magnitogorskii rabochii, 15 June 1946.

133

they left trash heaps everywhere, and that they became accustomed to the trash and were
not fighting this “evil.””’0 Indicating that the disorder in the shops often delayed work, the
article pointed to an iron foundry shop where remnants of production created a trash heap,
and to a blooming mill where large amounts of iron scum were spilt and forged, and to a
rolling mill that turned into litter.41 The general conditions of the MMK were rather
serious: Vast areas were filled with scrap-iron litter, old structures, and trash”; many
railways and roads in the factory were blocked by scrap-iron.43 The article indicates that
the effort of Grigorii Nosov, the director of the MMK, to establish an orderly worksite
was not very successful. In April 1945 he issued an order to create yards around the
shops in the hopes that they would quickly eliminate the problematic spaces covered with
the heaps of trash and metal scraps. But, only 150 out of 500 MMK workshops created
yards alter a month had passed.44 Stressing that the battle for cleanliness was not a
campaign, but “daily conduct,” the article concludes that because liquidating the bad
habit would not be easy, one should use coercive measures as well as education, which

would destroy the bad habit.45

 

40 «la chistotu...,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 18 May 1945.
’1 lbid.
42 “la chistotu-u” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 10 June 1945.

’3 “Za chistotu...,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 18 May 1945. Such disorder in factory workshops was not
unusual in other factories of heavy industry in the country. F iltzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, 211.

‘4 “Za chistotu..,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 18 May 1945.

’5 lbid. The director’s effort continued in later years. In his 1948 June 27 address on cleanliness of
workplace and production culture, Nosov stressed that the blagoustroistvo was essential in reducing flaw
(defect) to minimum level, while increasing utilization of resource at maximum level. “Neustanno

dvigat ’sia vpered: 901etiiu so dnia rozhdeniia G. I. Nosova posviashchaetsia (Magnitogorsk: Literatumo-
izdatel’skoe Agentstvo “TAN”, 1995), p. 102.

134

The cleanliness rhetoric implies that rhetoric demanding workers’ full physical
devotion (such as restless labor and keeping wartime pace) was not the complete picture
of the strategy that the local authorities utilized to raise productivity. In this light, the
official rhetoric on productivity represents its contradiction between two different
strategies, i.e., wartime speedup and prewar (late 19305) practice focusing on quality of
labor. It is true that during the war factory management gave the production of steel a
priority over cleaning up. But the fanatical speedup drives and extreme years of tension
and pressures ended after the war; and the party and factory managers began to pay more
attention to efficiency rather than pushing workers to the limit to increase the
productivity of the factory. The local party certainly realized that the emphasis on
restless labor had its limit in increasing the productivity of workers although the party
thrust forth the keep-wartime-pace rhetoric to prevent relaxing the mood of workers after
the war. The campaign, frequently called the “battle for restoring order,” represents the
postwar regime’s desperate attempt to overcome the wartime legacy that threatened
efficiency and productivity in production lines.

In this light, the campaign signifies the shift fiom the wartime strategy:
restoration of prewar (especially the late 19305) strategy,46 which emphasized
rationalization and labor quality, rather than work speed and quantity.47 In fact, the
newspaper article above pointed out that the urgency of order in workplaces had already

been addressed in the 1939 Party Congress. The article noted that Malenkov stressed in

 

’6 Indeed, the cleanliness campaign was not a creation of the 19305. Rather, it was a part of the “civilizing
process” that started in the name of kul ’turnost’ as early as the 18805 and 18905 and continued into the
Soviet era. David L. Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1971-194]
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 16-26.

’7 For the change of the politics of productivity of the late 19305, which represented by the decline of
Stakhanovism, see Siegelbaum, Stakhanovisrn and the Politics of Productivity, chapter 7.

135

the meeting the restoration of order and culture in workplaces as “one of the simplest,
most elementary, but most urgent issues that we cannot postpone for any reason because,
without elementary culture, we could never achieve our further goal, industrial
development.”48 Decline of socialist competition—a form of challenge between factories,
shops, brigades, or individual workers used by the Stalin regime for raising
productivity’g—in Magnitogorsk factory workshops after the war, which we will see next

section, is an example of the return to the prewar politics of productivity.

Politics of Productivity in Reality and Workers’ Survival Strategies
Partial “return to normalcy ”

Not surprisingly, the most frequently asked questions from workers in the Ural
region immediately following the war were about the restoration of peacetime working
conditions, including the eight-hour work day, off-days, and the prewar norm of labor
legislation.50 Immediately after the announcement of the Soviet Victory on May 9, 1945,
workers from the Kirov Tank Factory in Cheliabinsk asked,

While extension of labor up to 11 hours a day was indicated in the governmental

decree, there was no mention about off days. The war is now ended, which

means, [they] need to restore fully the off-duty days.5 ' When will we restart the

eight-hour work day? Comrade Stalin declared a transfer to a peaceful
construction. Thus, now, fewer tanks are needed.52

 

’8 “Za chistotu. . .,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 18 May 1945.

’9 Challenges were also made of the plan in the form of a counterplan, or a proposal to accomplish more in
less time. Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 204.

5° OGAChO. F. P-288, op. 9, d. 146, 11. 16-20 “Partiinogo komiteta kirovskogo zavoda: O nastroeniiakh
trudiashchikhsia zavoda v sviazi c voprosom o vykhodnykh dniakh,” (5/14/1945); lbid., l. 23, O
nekotorykh nastroeniiakh trudiashchikhsia zavoda, sviazannykh s okonchaniem voiny” (5/15/1945); lbid.,
11. 31-37, “lnformatsiia: partiinogo komiteta Kirovskogo zavoda. O nekotorykh nastroeniiakh
trudiashchikhsia zavoda, sviazannykh s okonchaniem voiny” (5/17/1945).

5' OGAChO. f. P-288, op. 9, d. 146, 1. 17.

136

After the victory announcement, workers’ violations of labor discipline suddenly
increased. One party report noted that during the several days following the end of the
war some factory workers left workshops after only eight-hours of work. Even
exemplary Communist workers came to work four hours late.53 Some workers claimed
that they might not come to work on the first Sunday following the war. Insisting that no
one would judge them, they refused to admit that their absence would be a violation of
labor discipline.54 Certainly, the lack of coherence and confusion about the day-off
policy during the first several weeks after the war caused more complaints from workers.
After hearing on the radio on May 12 that the city of Cheliabinsk would observe a
holiday on May 13, many factory workers asked at the party meeting that day,
“Tomorrow all of the city will have a holiday; only we should work. . .administrative
employees (sluzhashchie) and factory officials will not work. Why should we work?”55
As in other regions of the Soviet Union, by the end of the war, Ural region workers’
impatience reached its peak.

The authorities responded relatively quickly to workers’ complaints by making a
concession. Immediately following the war the local party eased some previously
tightened rules. In Magnitogorsk, throughout the second half of 1945, extra work hours
that had been set up during the war were reduced according to the government decree of

June 30, 1945.56 The decree also allowed workers to have regular (scheduled) vacation

 

’2 lbid, 1.23.

’3 lbid.

’4 OGAChO. f. P-288, op. 9, d. 146, 11. 17-18

’5 lbid., I. 18 .

137

days. Accordingly, about 64 percent (or 20,989) of all MMK workers received the right
to have vacation that year.’7 In addition, by a decree on November 5, 1945, the MMK
director prohibited compulsory overtime work in the factory, with the exception of some
workshops, such as the railroad transportation workshop, which had considerable
incomplete work. As a result, overtime work further declined to merely 0.6 percent (or
42,000 man-hours) by December, which was 13 times less than that of 1944.58 In the
factory after the war, overtime work was organized only in extremely urgent cases, such
as for eliminating defects and for substitution of workers who did not appear at work.”
By late 1945, the number of days MMK workers spent working on off-days decreased by
more than 90 percent (from 13,352 to 911 days), compared to those in March of the same
year.60 This means that within several months after the war, the overtime work was
considerably decreased in the MMK. This shows that responsiveness and flexibility were
clearly a part of the local authorities’ labor practices immediately after the war ended.
Certainly, the authorities exercised a “return to normalcy (or return to prewar

conditions),” in terms of work hours.61

 

56 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, 11. 299-300. (2/19/1946). “Izrneneniia v oblasti truda i zarabotnoi platy,

proisshestvit na Magnitogorskom metallurgicheskom kombinate posle okonchanii velikoi otechestvennoi
voiny.”

’7 lbid., l. 2990b.

5’ OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, l. 299. More than half of overtime work in December was done in a
small number of workshops, such as the railway transportation workshop.

’9 lbid.
6° lbid.

6' It should be noted that some harsh Soviet labor-related law codes created during the war were eased
during the postwar years. For example, the 26 December 1941 Edict, by which deserters in the defense
industry would be sent to labor camps for five to eight years, was aborted by a governmental decree of 7
March 1947. Absenteeism defined as a crime by a decree of 26 June 1940 was also decriminalized by the
edict of 14 July 1951. OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 11, d. 261, 1. 47 (4/19/1947). See also F iltzer, Soviet
Workers and Late Stalinism, p. 164.

138

Although some officials warned workers not to slacken the wartime labor pace
following the war, the authorities did not pressure the workers. The local authorities
made a partial concession by restoring prewar work hours. The harsh labor discipline
law remained, but the Magnitogorsk authorities did make concessions to workers. Yet, if
workers of Magnitogorsk, Cheliabinsk, and other regions had remained silent waiting for
changes of the wartime labor policies, even the partial “return to normalcy” would have
been achieved only much later. Instead, they spoke up: some workers, including
mobilized and evacuated ones from distant regions, “threatened” factory officials that
they would not to come to work and/or would return home by foot; some of them did not
think their act was illegal; others even wrote collective letters to Stalin to report “bad”
local officials. Certainly the sense of entitlement based on their wartime labor partially
enabled them to act in such a bold manner. Not all workers remained passive and
alienated.

The authorities’ relatively quick responses to workers’ requests were not repeated
in the cases of evacuees and mobilized workers. As we saw in the previous chapter, one
element that made the wartime homefront different was the influx of evacuees and
mobilized workers to the industrial facilities.62 Cheliabinsk province was not an
exception. The announcement of the end of the war instantly stirred the mood of
evacuees and mobilized workers who lived with a “suitcase mentality (chemodannoe
nastroenie)” throughout the war years. Many evacuees in Magnitogorsk and Cheliabinsk

expected that they could return home in a month or less,63 and began to ask questions

 

62 For example, 96 percent of factory No. 174 workers in Omsk, Siberia, consisted of evacuated and
mobilized persons from Leningrad. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 117, d. 530, l. 37.

139

about their return. For example, mobilized workers in the Sergo Ordzhonikidze factory
in Cheliabinsk asked party activists, “When will mobilized workers be released from the
factory?” and “When will workers from Central Asian republics be released from the

factory?”64

According to surveillance by the Magnitogorsk branch of the War
Censorship Board of over 210 mobilized workers’ outgoing letters for twenty days
following May 9, most mobilized workers were eager to return home immediately.
Voitenko noted in his letter to his family, “The war is over; God would give a decree on
demobilization that would send us home. We have waited only for this moment. I don’t
want to stay here.”65 Shlovskii expressed, “I cannot wait until a decree on our return is
declared. We all agreed that we would stay here about a month at maximum. . .” Some
workers said “[We] cannot wait. We want to return home now by foot.”66
Suitcase mind was especially strong among evacuees.“ Many evacuees visited
local party organizations, including the trade union and Komsomol, to request their return
home.68 Evacuees from Leningrad and Khar’kov submitted to workshop heads their

requests for vacations or dispatches to those two cities.69 When the demobilization of

evacuated workers was not announced immediately after the war, they began to blame the

 

63 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 1,1. 115 (5/1945). (5/31/45). “lnforrnationnoe soobshchenie: o nezhelanii
mobilizovannykh rabochikh zaniatykh v promyshlennosti g. Magrritogorska ostatsiia na postoiannuiu
rabotu v Magnitogorske.”

‘4 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 146, 1. 63.

65 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19. d. l, l. 114. A worker figured out the number of the mobilized labor army
workers in the city as “(many) thousands.”

6‘ lbid., 11. 114, 115.

‘7 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, l. 58; OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 146, ll. 80, 88. “o nastroeniiakh
trudiashchikhsia zavoda v sviazi s ukazom prezidiuma verkhovnogo soveta SSSR ot 7N ll-s.g.” (7/16/45).

6’ Potemkina, “Evakuirovannoe naselenie...,” p. 159
“9 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, 1. 58.
140

local administrations for misguiding Stalin. Some evacuees in Cheliabinsk decided to
write letters to ask help directly from Stalin.70 On May 12, 1945, 150 evacuated workers
from Leningrad (including party members) in the Kirov factory of Cheliabinsk sent a
collective letter to Stalin to appeal for their return." In the letter, they also indicated how
poorly they lived in the local town as evacuees.72 Housing was the most serious problem
for many evacuees who frequently lived in much worse conditions than local residents.
With the end of the war, the evacuees began to receive pressure from the local
householders with whom they shared apartments.73 The extremely limited and crowded
living space for evacuees enhanced their longing for their return home. An evacuated
worker at Kirov factory in Cheliabinsk cursed the government in an anonymous letter
sent to the factory’s trade union. He claimed,
I have lived in a dog-like condition that you created for us. It’s not bearable
anymore. The authorities have robbed our pockets for four years and filled their
own; You, with the party men, resign from your positions. We want to know
when we can return to Leningrad?
Some workers in Cheliabinsk complained that their situation was even worse than for

prisoners who were set free by the July 7, 1945, decree of “Amnesty according to the

victory in war.”75 Some evacuated workers believed that they also would be allowed to

 

7° OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 146, l. 37: see also OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, l. 58.

7' OGAChO. f. P-288, op. 9, d. 146, 11. 21-24: OGAChO. f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, 11. 58-59 (8/6/1945).

’2 OGAChO. f. P-288, op. 9, d. 146, I. 22.

7’ Potemkina, “Evakuirovannoe naselenie...,” 159

7‘ OGAChO. P-288, op. 9, d. 146, 11. 88-89. (7/24/1945)

7’ lbid., 11. 80-82 (7/16/1945). Evacuated workers from Leningrad and wounded veterans working in the
Kirov factory in Cheliabinsk strongly complained about the amnesty which set free military deserters.

They were deeply disappointed and resented the absurdity of evacuated workers not allowed to return home
while convicts were released and returned home. A Leningrad evacuee and communist criticized the

141

return home. Other evacuated workers from Leningrad, including party members, in the
Kirov factory claimed that they would go to Leningrad on foot if they were not allowed

1.76

to return by August Evacuated workers from Leningrad said,

You do not release us although military trains departed to Leningrad every month.
Evacuees from Khar’kov were sent to Leningrad almost by force. But, we were
not allowed to go.77
Sheremetov, an evacuated worker, underscored the point:
In the workshop many evacuees’ petitions about their leave for Leningrad are
accumulating. But the workshop management does not consider these petitions;
So, evacuated workers have been just waiting for the factory director’s return
from Moscow, expecting that he would bring with him an answer to our
petitions.78
Despite these fierce requests from evacuees, it was impossible for the local
authorities and enterprise managers to send them home immediately after the war. Local
factories wanted to keep those workers, especially those who were qualified, for as long
as possible. The authorities banned willful re-evacuation since they were afraid of social
disorder that could be caused by transportation overload and labor instability in

enterprises due to sudden vacancies. Thus, the local authorities dragged out the re-

evacuation process.79

 

decree by claiming that “the conditions of the released convicts according to the July 7 decree of 1945 were
better than us because they could now return home while we can’t.” lbid., l. 80.

’6 lbid., 11. 88-89.

7’ lbid., 1. 88.

7’ lbid.

79 A total of 12,480 evacuated people were living in Magnitogorsk as of Jan. 1946. Among them, 3,610
were left the city by the end of 1946. In 1947 an additional 1,275 people left either for their former

residence or unknown places, while 7,595 people still remained in the city. OGAChO, f. R-1142, op. 1, d.
l94,11,1, 11.

142

Abandoning voluntarism, focusing on professionalism
A) Abandoning socialist competition in Magnitogorsk

Socialist competition was rejuvenated briefly in the early years of the war by the
Stalin government; but competition began to lose its momentum again by the end of the
war. Although the local party tried to emphasize the significance of competition, the
factory officials and the technical personnel in Magnitogorsk depended much less on
competition as a tool for raising productivity.80 In May of 1942, Stalin encouraged
socialist competition at the All-Union level under the famous slogan, “All for the
front!”81 A party report from September 1945 indicated that socialist competition and the
Stakhanovite movement at the All-Union level had raised labor productivity in Soviet
industry as a whole by 40 percent in only two years (1942-1944), while a higher increase
of productivity was achieved in defense industries.82 Likewise, the labor productivity of
MMK workers increased by an average of 19.2 percent during this period.83 Certainly,
patriotism and the urgency of war conditions were the main sources for MMK workers’
hard work during the competitions.84 However, the productivity of the MMK did not
increase continually throughout the war; afier 1944 the productivity of the MMK fell

continually for the next two years. The productivity of the MMK in 1946 had not

 

3° The decline of the significance of socialist competition in production was not simply regional, but a
nationwide phenomenon. Many factory cadres and party officials in Soviet industries did not consider
socialist competition a key strategy for raising productivity during the period. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and
Late Stalinism; Duskin, Stalinist Reconstruction and the Confirmation of a New Elite.

8' OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 18, I. 71, “0 rukovodstve partiinykh organizatsii sotsialisticheskim
sorevnovaniem” (9/4/ 1 945).

‘2 lbid.

’3 lbid. During the war, the MMK won 64 first place awards in the competition, 40 second place, and 14
third place awards.

34 Duskin also shares a similar view. See p. 101.

143

recovered to prewar levels: it was only 96 percent of 1940 productivity.85 This implies
that the productivity of the MMK, which reached about 119 percent of 1940 levels in
early 1944, declined almost 25 percent during the period of 1944-46. It was only in 1947
when the productivity of the MMK began to surpass 1940 levels.86

In many cases, socialist competition was carried out in a “formalistic” way in the
city’s many enterprises including the MMK and the Magnitostroi.87 There are some
possible reasons for this trend. Certainly, enterprise management’s skepticism about its
effectiveness contributed to the decline of using competition as a main tool to increase
productivity.88 In some sense, workshop superintendents’ fear of the revival of an anti-
engineer atmosphere after the war that was prevalent during the 193 Os might have been
anther reason why the managerial staff put aside socialist competition and became
unsupportive of leading workers, such as Stakhanovites.89 In addition to the skepticism
and fear of the factory cadres, archival evidence indicates that the mood of relief from
wartime pressure was another important cause in making factory officials indifferent
toward socialist competition. After the war, a mood of relaxation prevailed not only in
workers but also in factory cadres, a situation which hindered, at least temporarily, the

ability of factory management in Magnitogorsk to organize socialist competition in a

 

3’ OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 34, d. 111, 1. 88 (7/1954). “Dokladnye zapiski o rabote metallurgichskogo
kombinata i ego tsekhov za pervoe polgodie.”

’6 lbid.

‘7 OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 19, d. 18, l. 86.

88 Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, pp. 232-33.

’9 Duskin, Stalinist Reconstruction and the Confirmation of a New Elite, 112. As the Stakhanovism
campaign reached its height at the end of the 1930s, the campaign threatened the technical intelligentsia’s

positions by blaming foremen and engineers for their uncooperative attitudes for setting new production
records by over-fulfilling their norms.

144

systematic way. Not only workers but factory managers themselves were among the
exhausted by the end of the pressing war years. For example, a party report criticized the
MMK factory officials for relaxing for a while after the end of the war, which
accordingly left the workshops in disorder. The report revealed that “after the total
engagement for the honor of the victory,” the management of the Blast furnace workshop
neither provided a specified plan for each furnace nor set up a demonstration board
showing workers’ daily achievements of plans at the workshop.90

Consequently, the factory management’s indifference to competition resulted in
the formalistic implementation of competition in workplaces. A September 1945 party
report revealed that only general statements (e. g., “Accomplish the production plan by
100%!”) appeared in the socialist competition contracts without mentioning any specific
instructions indicating workers’ responsibility for saving materials, product quality
improvements, and labor productivity increases.” Due to the factory officials’ poor
organization of the competition, many MMK and Magnitostroi workers were ignorant
about their counterparts in the competition, their responsibilities, the ways that they had
to work for the competition, and their target production quotas.92 Even the party and
trade union organizations did not provide any practical help in a timely manner for the
competition participants, and accordingly, failed to prevent workers from lagging behind

in the competition.93

 

9" OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 19, d. 18, 1. 87.

9' lbid., 1. 101.

92 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 211, 1. 27. “Protokol: profsoiuznogo sobraniia rabochikh 2-1 brigady
martenovskogo tsekh No. 3 ct 29 dekabria 1948 goda.” ; OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 18, 11. 87, 105-106.

’3 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 18, 1. 106.
145

MMK factory officials and party organizations often neglected their
responsibilities of directing socialist competition and organizing propaganda work.
Bolotskii, an ofiicial of the Open-hearth furnace No. 3 workshop committee, was not
even aware of how many workers participated in the competition in his workshop since
no individual labor responsibility was set-up during several months following the end of
the war.94 In the F irebrick workshop, a bundle of socialist competition contracts in honor
of victory in the war were just left on a workshop committee official’s desk without any
action for several months.95 Korda, a workshop committee official, did not organize
socialist competition because it would take a great deal of time and typing. Since no
competitions were organized in this workshop, Stakhanovites and shock-workers were
personally determined by the workshop head, rather than by the results of the competition
and involvement of the party and trade union organizations.96 Factory party
organizations, such as the workshop committees (tsekhovoi komitet) and factory
committees (zavodskoi komitet) paid “very little attention” to the implementation of
socialist competition.97 For example, discussion of the problems in conducting socialist
competition occurred only once in the factory party member meetings and conferences
throughout 1944. The issue had not been discussed at all as of September 1945.98
Likewise, during the same period, no meetings of dvukhsotnikie—workers who fulfilled

their output quotas by 200 percent—and of Stakhanovite and shock-workers were held in

 

9‘ Ibid., 1.93.
9’ Ibid., 1. 95.

96 Ibid. It should be noted that the workshop surpassed its output goal for more than one and one-half
years.

9’ Ibid., 1. 103. (9/4/1945).
9‘ Ibid., 1. 91.
146

the MMK.99 Moreover, winners of the socialist competitions during a six month period
in 1945 (February to August) did not receive their certificates of merit that the factory
party committee should have provided due to administrative delays alter the war

ended. ‘00 Workshop party organizations did not supervise the workshop committee’s

activities for socialist competition.101

The factory party officials’ indifference to
competition continued to the late 19408. A party report of April 1948 indicated that
although 10,000, or about half of the Magnitostroi workers, were young workers, the
enterprise Komsomol committee did not know the numbers of Komsomol participants in
the competition, nor the numbers of shock-workers and Stakhanovites. '02

Factory party organizations’ negligence of appropriate training and education for
the mobilized workers (especially those who were former collective farm peasants from
Central Asia and did not fully master Russian) frequently caused problems in the
implementation of socialist competition. During and after the war the Soviet government
mobilized many workers to industrial enterprises in the Ural regions in the name of a
“labor army” from the countryside all over the region, including Kazakhstan and Central
Asia. Although Mikheev pointed out, “Central Asian workers who could not speak

"03 those mobilized

Russian labored in the places where they did not need to speak,’
former peasants still needed educational and training programs to carry out socialist

competition. A local newspaper article from September 1946 titled “Competition is

 

99 Ibid., 1. 107
'°° Ibid.
‘0' Ibid.. 1.91.

“’2 OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 22, d. 52, 1. 640b. (4/9/1948).

'°3 Interview with Nikolai A. Mikheev. Jan. 15" 2003, Magnitogorsk.

147

missing” revealed that the lack of special attention from the party and trade union
organization regarding Uzbek brigades of Magnitostroi caused a serious problem: those
workers did not know how they competed or even what socialist competition was. '04 The
article pointed out that the party and trade union organizations should have explained at
least the key points of how socialist competition worked to these brigades through
political education. As a result of the workers’ ignorance of the rules of competition, an
Uzbek digger brigade took an hour-long rest, which they called a “smoking-break,”
sitting in a pit during competition.105
Propaganda work for the competition was often abandoned in the factory
workshops in Magnitogorsk. A party report pointed out that displays of slogans in the
factory were concentrated not in the workshops, but in the offices. In the Blast furnace
shop, a red banner, a sign of the workshop’s engagement in socialist competition that
should have been displayed at the workshops during the competitions, was not displayed;
yet, no workshop officials were criticized for their negligencem In the Open-hearth
furnace workshop, not a single banner of slogans indicating the start of the socialist

competition was displayed until four months passed following the warm Additionally,

the representative of the Firebrick workshop committee did not even realize that the

 

'0‘ “Sorevnovanie otsutstvuet,” Magnitostroi, 7 September 1946.

'05 lbid. To be sure, not all Central Asian workers were ignorant either of the competition or of Russian.
Some of them working in the MMK overfulfilled their output norm in the competitions. Magnitogorskii
rabochii reported in 1945 that during the war some Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and Kazakhs achieved 130-140
percent of their norms; and 18 Kazakhs and Uzbeks received medals and orders of the Soviet Union while
31 workers from Central Asia received badges for their excellent and self-sacrificing work during the war.
Furthermore, indicating that those workers worked hard to accomplish their duties to destroy the enemy,
the article stated that the best workers among them eventually joined the party. “V druzhnoi sem’e,”
Magnitogorskii rabochii, 21 October 1945.

'°° OGAChO, f. p. 234, op. 19, d. 18, 11. 88—89.

'°"1bid., 11. 93, 98.

148

workshop’s red banner had been missing for one year. '08

Another sign of the neglect of
the competition by the party organization and factory cadres was the absence of the
“board of honor,” a record board showing the competition participants’ accomplishments
of production goals for the purpose of publicly comparing the output of individual
workers. During the 193 Os, the board of honor was used aggressively in the construction
areas and workshops of Magnitogorsk, but after the war a majority of factory workshops
in Magnitogorsk did not have any “boards of honor.”'09 In addition, the workshop party
committee did not prepare the “express papers” (gazety-molnii), which listed the names
of socialist competition participants and pace-makers. By September 1945, in the Open-
hearth furnace workshop No. 3, no “express paper” was available, even though

competition had started four months earlier.110 During the immediate months after the

war, few communists in the factory were interested in organizing competition.

B) Workers’ indifference to socialist competition
Socialist competition was unpopular not only among factory officials, but among
ordinary workers. Although the high number of worker participants in competition might
lead us to believe that competition was quite popular among workers, we need to keep in
mind some pitfalls in the statistics and that the numbers do not always represent reality.
In fact, the shop heads frequently covered for the lack of participants in socialist

competition by inflating the numbers, rather than persuading workers to participate. The

 

'°‘ Ibid., 1. 95.

'09 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 18, l. 107. For an example of using a board of honor in Magnitogorsk
during the 19305, see Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, p. 205.

"° OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 18, 1.93.

149

fabrication of numbers, of course, was not a new postwar practice; it was one of the “old”
tricks conducted by party and factory committee organizations under the pressure of
implementing party resolutions during the early 19305, when socialist competition was
first introduced. ' ” One party report shows that in many cases, the number of workers
involved in the competition was exaggerated. Although about 84 percent of workers (492
out of 583) of the Open-hearth furnace workshop were registered as participants in
socialist competition, the number of participants did not reflect reality.”2 For example,
in that number were included administrative workers who did not participate.l '3
Likewise, the total number of participants in socialist competition in the MMK
was not very reliable. The MMK trade union estimated that 86-90 percent of the factory
workers, and up to 60-65 percent of administrative workers, were involved in competition
by September 1945.114 During the first seven months of 1945, 158 workers were
registered as Stakhanovites and 864 workers as shock-workers. Thus, by August 1, the
total number of Stakhanovites in the MMK increased to 11,445 and shock workers
increased to 10,307, which totaled half of the entire MMK worker population.“5
However, Rumiantseva, the vice president of the trade union, pointed out that the figures

were biased. She claimed that the figure did not reflect real conditions in the workplaces

 

111 For the examples of the old tricks, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Socialist Competition and Socialist
Construction in the USSR: The Experience of the First Five-Year Plan 0928-1932),” Thesis Eleven, 1982,
p. 61; See also Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of Modern
Soviet Production Relations, I 928-1 94 l (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1986), pp. 76-77.

”2 OGAChO, f. p. 234, op. 19, d. 13, 11. 89—90.

”3 lbid.

”4 Ibid., 1. 98.

“5 Ibid.

150

since “shock workers” were not created in many workshops.l '6 The problem of inflated
figures occurred because many workshops provided “absolutely ungrounded figures.”
For example, Riaskin, the MMK Coke-chemical workshop head provided an inflated

number of workshop workers.l '7

In early 1948 the workshop committee of the
Magnitostroi Cement factory escalated the number of competition participants by
counting prisoners of war, who technically should not have been considered
participants. I '8 In this light, the fact that half of the entire MMK workers (or 19,000)
were Stakhanovites and shock workers in late 19491 '9 has a likelihood of exaggeration.
Another pitfall that we need to be aware of regarding the total number of
participants is the proportion of workers who signed the competition contract on the
individual level. While many participants signed the competition contract only on the
collective level as a formal ritual in workshops, only a small number of them signed
individually and received individual output norms for the fulfillment of the competition.
This reluctance of workers was based on the wage reduction that they would get when

they failed to over-achieve individual output norms that appeared in the agreement.120 By

signing only for the collective agreement, workers might have avoided their individual

 

”6 Ibid.
”7 Ibid., 11. 98-99

”8 The POWs consisted of almost half of the total participants, or 65 out of 143 workers. OGAChO, f. P-
234, op. 22, d. 52, 1. 630b.

”9 Galiguzov and Churilin, F lagrnan otechstvennoi industrii, p. 1 14. In early 1947 there were 40,595
Stakhanovites and shock workers among the entire MMK workforce representing about 52 percent (or 27
percent for the former and 26 percent for the latter). AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 215, 1. 4 ob (2/ 1 6/ 1949);
AOAM, f. 99, op. 10, d. 465, l. 9-100b (3/1/1947). In fact inflation of the number of Stakhanovites
occurred already before the war. For example, in July 1940—50% of all industrial workers were
Stakhanovites. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics, p. 147.

'20 For workers’ resistance to wage reduction clauses in the competition agreement during the early 19305
see Siegelbaum, “Socialist Competition and Socialist Construction,” 61.

151

responsibility and punishment (i.e., wage reduction) for their failure to fulfill normsm

For example, according to a September 1945 report, among the 840 workers of the Lepse
factory who registered as participants in the competition, only half set up their individual
production goals. Likewise, although 784 out of 800 workers were registered as
competition participants in the “Kommunist” factory, only 142 workers signed their
individual production goal. In the Metal manufacturing factory, only 21 percent of
workers (226 out of 1,060) set up their goal for the competition.122 According to
Romashenko, a party representative of the MMK Foundry workshop committee, although
44 brigades (consisting of 850 workers) signed up in 1945 for the socialist competition in
a collective way, not a single worker signed for the individual level of competition.123 In
early 1948, only six percent (36 workers out of 592) of the MMK Concrete (betonitovy)
factory workers participated in the competition. Moreover, only 8 percent of workers (12
out of 143) had individual contracts for the competition.‘24

In addition to the possible danger of wage reduction, unimpressive material
incentives for the competition winners limited workers’ enthusiasm for competition. The
local factory officials knew well that mobilization efforts with little financial and material
rewards would not work. Khravyshev, one MMK workshop head, claimed in 1945, “The

competition would not happen as long as wages are not increased.”125 As we will see in

 

'2' Siegelbaum, “Socialist Competition and Socialist Construction,” 59. If workers failed to fulfill their
output norms a deduction from their wages was made. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, p. 204 (quote from
John Scott, Behind the Urals, p. 72); see also Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization, p. 232.
"2 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 18, 1. 99 (1945).

"3 Ibid., 1. 96 (9/4/1945).

'24 OGAChO, f. P—234, op. 22, d. 52, 1. 630b (4/9/1948).

"5 OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 19, d. 18, 1. 96.

152

the following section, workers’ low wages, rather than their lack of ideological awareness
that the local party authorities frequently claimed, was the main reason that the socialist
competition campaign failed to motivate workers. The factory managers’ wage strategy
(hierarchical wages based on type of work, rather than on the extent of norm fulfillment),
failed to encourage many workers to have an interest in socialist competition. Based on
this trend, workers in major workshops received more wages than those who worked in
subsidiary workshops. Also, Stakhanovites laboring in light industry had more limited
access to material privileges compared to those working in the city’s steel industry. This
indicated that after the war, labor mobilization relied less on workers’ voluntarism, which
depended more on workers’ enthusiasm and physical devotion, than on the quality of

labor.

C) Postwar hierarchical wage system
It is well known that Stalinist industrial mangers used wages as a prevalent tool
for managerial authorities to control workers.126 But, it should be noted that its effect on
raising labor productivity was certainly very limited especially during the immediate
postwar years in the sense that the average wages of workers were quite low, and that few
financial incentives were available for the workers who over-fulfilled their production
quotas. On one hand, even though factory managers knew wage increase was essential to

raise productivity, it was hardly possible to increase wages due to financial strains during

 

‘26 See Duskin, Stalinist Reconstruction, p. 123; Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, p. 233.

153

the period.127 On the other hand, the factory managers did not take measures for workers
receiving low wages, who were mostly young workers, due to the managers’ indifference

to those unskilled labor forces.128

This attitude of factory management was deeply rooted
in wartime practices, mobilizing workers through a half-forced mobilization. Although,
as we will see in the following section, many poorly-paid young workers ran away from
the workshops, the factory managers did not take any aggressive measures to raise those
workers’ wages because “such young recruits were expendable.”129 Under these
circumstances, low average wages of workers was unavoidable throughout the 19403.
More importantly the enterprise managements’ indifference to increasing wages for
unskilled young workers reflects the return of the late 19305’ strategy of productivity,
giving priority to skilled professionals over unskilled workers’ physical work.

According to a secret report investigating the average wages of 30,000 workers of

heavy and defense industries in Cheliabinsk oblast, during 1945 wages did not decrease

but either remained same or even increased compared to 1940. '30 However, this did not

 

127 Zubkova, Russia after the war, p. 141 . Wage determination and norm-setting were areas of
contestation between the regime, workers, and industrial managers. F iltzer, Soviet Workers and Late
Stalinism, p. 233.

"8 Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, p. 234. See also OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22, d. 75, 1. 51
“Dokladnaia: o proizvodstvennom ispol’zovanii vypusknikov RU shk. FZO v treste ‘Magnitostroi.”
(12/1947). Despite the abnormally low wages that the young graduates of the F20 and RU of the
Magnitostroi received in 1947, enterprise managers took no measures to return their wages to the average
level

'29 Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, p. 234. A Cheliabinsk party report and other evidence
support this view. The report determined the wartime practice of labor force utilization as one of the main
reasons that enterprise managers provided wages below minimum level. During the war the local
enterprises used young recruits temporarily paid by a piece-work (part time work) system. The enterprise
managers transferred those workers from one place to another as part time workers, rather than assigning
them full time positions based on their specialty. OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, ll. 88, 95 (“O
razmerakh zarabotnoi platy, poluchaemoi na ruki rabochimi predpriiatii cheliabinskoi oblasti”). 1n the
case of Magnitostroi, as of January 1, 1948, 3,341 workers, one fourth of the entire workers of the trust,
were employed as temporary workers. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 55, 1. 86.

154

mean that their wages were sufficient. In 1945, the average living cost for a single
worker in Cheliabinsk oblast was 250 rubles a month. This cost includes expenses for
two or three cafeteria meals a day, dormitory, working clothes, repairs of clothing and
shoes, laundry, baths, and haircuts. This cost does not include any fees for cultural life,
such as new shoes and clothing, cigarettes, tickets for theater, movies, and membership

dues for any social organizations.” 1

The amount of money that single workers spent per
month for cultural and social activities was no less than 150 rubles. Thus, single workers
needed at least 400 rubles a month for their basic consumption plus cultural life.
However, many workers’ take-home wages remained frequently at the minimum
level for bare survival in 1945 since deductions also increased during the war. The wages
that the workers received in their hands after deductions were in many cases insufficient
for the costs of a normal diet, clothing, and dwelling due to the more than a 30 percent
deduction for taxes, including income, governmental bonds, war-taxesI32 and additional

deductions for breakage of instruments, and weddings.133

The report of 1945 shows that
out of 213,000 workers at six factories in Cheliabinsk oblast, 47 percent received less

than 400 rubles per month after deductions. In addition, one fourth of all workers came

 

'30 The investigated subjects included 30,000 workers from Kirov Tank factory, Defense factory No. 701,
Zinc factory, Mine combine of Cheliabinsk coal, Ferro-alloy factory, Ammunition factory No. 78, and
Defense factory No. 541, Ural automobile factory, and Cheliabinsk Metal Works. OGAChO, f. P-288, op.
9, d. 124, 1. 88.

'3‘ OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, 11. 88-89.

‘32 Although real wages increased after the abolition of war-taxes, consisting of approximately 10 percent
(or, on average, 75-80 rubles) of workers’ wages, in late 1945, as we will see below, many MMK workers,
especially poorly-paid young unskilled workers who graduated from F Z0 and RU, remained in similar
conditions to workers in other heavy and defense industries in the province. This persisted until the late
1940s. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, 11. 299-300 (2/ 19/ 1946).

'33 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, ll. 88, 92. F iltzer shows that sometimes factory management’s

arbitrary and abusive deduction of excessive amounts from workers’ wages for minor damages to
equipment contributed to workers’ low wages. F iltzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, p. 241.

155

to have even less than 250 rubles a month. This meant that they barely managed their
living expenses without enjoying cultural or leisure activities.'34 One worker received
only 177 rubles out of 364 rubles of his monthly wage af’ter deductions of totaling 187
rubles, including 100 rubles for government bonds, while another worker received only
200 rubles out of 1,029 after 829 rubles of deductions.I35 In a worse case, a worker
managed only 70 rubles out of 1,103 rubles of her wages after the deductions of 178
rubles of income tax and 104 rubles of war-tax, 120 of war bonds, and other items.'36 A
60-80 percent deduction rate from wages was not unusual for many workers. These
workers had to borrow from factories and as a result, each month, seven percent of the
workers in the govemment-inspected enterprises owed their employers.'37 In 1948 the
minimum amount of income for an unmarried single worker in Magnitogorsk was 563
rubles per month. This included money for cultural and social activities and various
deductions, including taxes and bonds. '38 Thus, monthly wages below 500 rubles were
categorized as minimum wage. During that year, out of 12,000 Magnitostroi workers,
nearly 46 percent of workers belonged to the minimum wage group. Not surprisingly, the

part-time workers largely occupied the lower wage group. About one fourth of

 

'34 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, 1. 39. In 1946, 35 % Soviet workers received between 301 and 600
rubles a month. Mark Edele, “A ‘Generation of Victors?’ Soviet Second World War Veterans from
Demobilization to Organization 1941-1956,” (Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 2004), p. 368.

”5 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, 11. 88,90.

'36 Ibid., 11. 88, 93. In 1945 the 4th war bonds were issued. It was one of the expenditures that made
workers’ burden heavier. Workers paid the monthly payment for the bonds although they were in dire
financial conditions. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 79, 1. 164; OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 147, l. 11.
“lnformatsiia: ob itogakh realizatsii chetvertogo gosudarstvennogo voennogo zaima po gor.
magnitogorsku” (5/5/1945). It is unclear to what extent signing for war bonds was mandatory. Once
workers signed, a certain amount of money was deducted each month until it reached a promised amount.

'37 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, 11. 88, 92-93.

'33 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 55, l. 87ob.(1/1/1948)
156

Magnitostroi workers were part-time workers. Among them, about 75 percent earned
below minimum wage, while only 35 percent of full-time workers were in this group. '39
What we need to see beneath the superficial wages for systematic understanding
of the authorities’ politics of productivity is wage differentiations among workers.
Historians see that the amount of workers’ wages depended on a variety of components,
such as the significance of industry (i.e., heavy or light industry) in which they worked
and skill levels. '40 The Magnitogorsk case also proves this view. First, compared to the
wages of steel industry workers in Magnitogorsk, wages for the workers of light industry
in the city were much lower. In a city’s shoe factory, the average wages from1945-1946
were only about 300 rubles141 while wages were about 550 rubles for the factory
workers142 and about 740 rubles for MMK workers.143 Likewise, Magnitogorsk workers
in a consumer goods factory received extremely low wages compared to those in the steel
industry. Even a worker who achieved 121 percent of his output norm earned only 131
rubles, while a worker fulfilling his norm by 185 percent received a mere 269 rubles.144
Second, unskilled recruits learning in the RU and FZO particularly were the most
disadvantaged group in terms of wages. According to postwar wage policies, new

recruits who were in their first six-month training periods in the F20 or RU had no right

 

'39 Ibid., 1. 86.
140 For example, see F iltzer, Late Stalinism and Soviet Workers, pp. 234-235.

‘“ OGAChO, f.P-234, op. 19, d. 88, l. 122. (May, 1946). A shoe factory in Magnitogorsk could not secure
enough workers because of low wages. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 20, d. 1, l. 36.

”2 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, 1. 37 (12/29/45) “Stenograficheskii otchet: 8-1 obshchezavodskoi
profsoiuznoi konferentsii chlenov soiuza metallurgov.” The wages of waitresses [laborers in public
catering] was 107-150 rubles. The average wage of workers on the production line of the MKZ was 724
rubles in 1946. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 20, d. l, l. 33 (2/1946).

"3 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 78, 1. 2990b (2/29/1946).

"“ OGAChO, f.P-234, op. 19,d. 88, 1. 122 ob (5/1946).

157

to receive any relief or wages during absences due to sickness.'45 In Cheliabinsk oblast,
many new recruits to the factories for the first time fell into this category. For example,
approximately 30 percent of the workers in the Cheliabinsk Mine enterprise did not

receive any wages for their absences in 1945.146

The plight of these young trainees did
not end with their graduation. During the two to three months of practice after graduating
from the F20, 1,900 young MMK workers received only a part-time salary, which was
less than 350 rubles a month in October 1945.”7 This was even less than half of MMK
workers’ average wages. ”8 It was only by 1950 that most (registered) young MMK
workers (90 percent, or 4,227 out of 4,641) earned above the minimum wage, which was
500 rubles.I49

What historians have paid little attention to in terms of criteria of postwar wage
differentiation is that the wage gap depended on the type of work (i.e., in which

workshops workers labored). While low wages could not play as significant leverage to

boost workers’ productivity, the hierarchical payment system based on types of work

 

'45 OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, 11. 88,93.
”6 Ibid., 11. 88,94.
”7 OGAChO, f.1>-234_. op. 19. d. 79, I. I63 00/10/1945)-

” In late 1945, the average wage of workers of Magnitogorsk Calibrate Factory was 780-800 rubles
(OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 20, d. 1, l. 28. (1946) while female MMK workers earned 500-600 rubles and only
107-150 rubles for female dishwashers or waitresses in cafeterias. AOAM, f. 118, op. l, d. 174, l. 37
(12/29/1945). Teenage workers (under age 17) in garment factory No.1, working as part-time (six hours
per day) workers received only 119 rubles. (1946 May) OGAChO, f . P-234, opl9, d. 88, l. 122 ob (May
1946). These were the most “skilled” workers among them. Fortunately, all of these workers lived with

either their parents or relatives. 1f young workers were in learner status, no deduction was applied. Ibid., 1.
123.

“9 AOAM, f. 99, op. 10, d. 460, 1. 3 (8/29/1950). “.“Akt By 1950 the number of MMK workers who did
part-time work decreased four times compared to that of 1946. This implies that the number of low wage
workers decreased. Galiguzov and Churilin, F lagman otechstvennoi industrii, 1 14. The improvement of
wages was not limited to Magnitogorsk workers, but a nation-wide phenomenon. By 1950 the real wage of
Soviet workers reached an “acceptable” but austere norm, and by 1952 the real wages had risen 25 percent
above that of 1940. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, pp. 42, 237 (note 89).

158

certainly contributed to increasing productivity among workers laboring in major
workshops. This wage determination, based on significance of work rather than
fulfillment of output norms, can be understood as another sign reflecting the decline of
the practice of using voluntarism as a tool for raising labor productivity. This indicates
that under the financial strains, what factory management chose for effective spending of
their budget was not rewarding reckless labor by speedups, but providing more incentives
for more significant work. As in the distribution of food and other supplies such as living
space, the factory management of the MMK enhanced the hierarchical payment system
according to the type of work.

Indeed, MMK workers of the key workshops, such as the Open-hearth shop,
received better payment than those in “subsidiary” shops in the same factory. The
Mechanical workshop was one of those subsidiary shops. Workers in this workshop
received lower rates compared with those in major shops. In addition workers of the
Mechanical workshop were not eligible for “20 percent of the extra money (Uralskaia
20% nadbavka)”—applied to workers in the Ural region due to higher living costs
associated with harsh weather conditions compared to the other regions of the country—
and rewards for meritorious service (vyslugi let). ’50 Eventually, some workshop heads,
including the head of the mechanical workshop, even suggested that the factory
management needed to diminish wage differentiations among MMK workshops. I 5 I As

we will see in the following section, the wage differentiation between so-called “major”

 

'50 Moreover, living space was provided not with a priority, but was available in the second order. AOAM,
f. 118, op. l, d. 321, l. 46. “Materialy: o sostoianii trudovoi distsipliny, tekuchesti rabochei sily za period s
1950 godal za pervoe polugodie 1955 goda na Magnitogorskom metallurgicheskom kombinate.”
(9/9/1955)

'5 ' The major workshops of the MMK include blast-Fumace, open-hearth firmace, and coke-chemical
workshops, while subsidiary workshops include mechanical, boiler repair, repair construction, shaping
foundry, municipal economy, casting workshops. Ibid., 1. 40.

159

and “subsidiary” MMK workshops caused considerable complaints among workers and
shop managers of the latter workshop, and became one of the reasons for the desertion of
subsidiary workshop workers.

The Stalin government’s emphasis on wage differentiation was not a new,
postwar phenomenon. It was in 1932 that Stalin abolished the egalitarian wage system
(uravnilovka), but at that time, the Stalin leadership encouraged the differentiation to
stimulate workers’ voluntarism; after the war, the emphasis on wage differentiation was

used for encouraging professionalism.

Absenteeism and desertion: young workers’ survival strategies

Magnitogorsk workers’ absenteeism and desertion, parts of the violations of labor
discipline, provide a glimpse of how workers responded to local authorities’ “politics of
productivity.” At the same time, the authorities’ reactions to the violations indicate
another good example of the politics of productivity. This is particularly true during the
postwar Stalin years. Until the late 19305 Soviet workers could change jobs as they

'52 Thus, workers

wanted and they received relatively minor, non-judicial sanctions.
frequently used job-changing as a weapon against enterprise managers who provided
poor wages and poor working conditions.'53 But, the punishment was enhanced in June
1940 as unauthorized job-changing and absenteeism were determined as criminal

offences by a labor law. After the war broke out. new harsh punishment was added. On

December 26, 1941, the Stalin government declared workers who left a job in a defense

 

"2 The compulsory conscription of rural teenagers to create a factory labor force was introduced in 1940.
Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, p. 8.

"3 lbid.
1 60

enterprise would go to a labor camp for five to eight years.l54 Despite the harsh
criminalization of absenteeism and desertion, a considerable number of Magnitogorsk
workers took the risk by being absent and quitting their job. In 1946, more than 11
percent of all MMK working people either were absent or had deserted (See Table 3).'55
But, considering the fact that the given total number of MMK employees included the
ITR and administrative employees, workers’ absenteeism and desertion rate was actually
higher than the figures indicate. Moreover, we need to keep in mind the unreliability of
official recorded data on absenteeism. Notoriously lax timekeeping and poor record-
keeping of the factory officials were widespread practices in Soviet enterprises; thus, it is
very plausible that the number of absentees would be, in reality, higher than that in the
table below.156

Table 3. Desertion and absenteeism of MMK workers

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year Absentees Deserters
1945 3739 1779
1946 4095 1818
1947 1342*
1948 825M
1949 434"
1950 1796 648
1951 3542 712
1952 5554 483
1953 4844 365
1954 51 15 414

 

 

 

 

 

*for eight months only (J an-Aug)

“desertion by workers (trainees) from Labor Reserve vocational schools only

Sources: AOAM, f. 99, op. 10, d. 460, l. 1 (August 29, 1950), l. 107 (February 20, 1950).
AOAM, f. 118, op. l, d. 321, l. 38 (September 9, 1955).

 

‘54 lbid., pp. 160-161

'5’ As of September 1, 1946 the total employees including [TR and administrative employees were 50,31 1.
AOAM, £118, op.1, d. 177,1.23.

'56 Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, p. 225.

161

OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, (1. 55,1. 100b, 27-28 (March 1, Oct. 18, 1947)

Absenteeism and desertion under the draconian labor law also imply that they
were an important part of workers’ “survival strategies” although it should be noted that,
as we will see in the following section, these two actions were not always closely related
to the responses to “survive” from hardship. It is true especially for “young workers,”
who were largely unskilled and thus had little access to material incentives, including
food, consumer goods, and housing compared to any other group of workers. This is why
the majority of the absentees and deserters were young workers under the age of 25 (in
many cases teenagers). For example, during 1946 and the first two months of 1947,
about 52 percent of workers were under 20 years of age, and 28 percent were workers
whose age was between 21 and 25 years (See Table 4). Accordingly, a total of 80
percent of absentees were workers under 25 years of age. In the case of desertion, about
70 percent of deserters were young workers under 25 years of age.‘57 The case of the
Magnitostroi, the construction enterprise of the city, shows a similar phenomenon.
During 11 months of 1947 (Jan. to Nov.), 41 percent (1,160 out of 2,824) of the total

deserters from Magnitostroi were young workers who graduated the RU or FZO.”8

 

'57 Among these deserters, RU and F20 graduates comprised about 33 percent, while it was 24 percent for

mobilized workers and 12.7 percent for the repatriated. Female workers comprised about 22.8 percent
overall. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 55, 11. 11, 12.

"3 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22, d. 75, 1.45.
162

Table 4 MMK workers’ absenteeism and desertion by age (Jan. 1946 - Feb of 1947)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Age Absentees Deserters
Under20 2504 (52.3%) 1027 (47.6%)
21-25 2504 (28.3) 499 (23.3)
26-35 1357 (10.4) 305 (14.2)
36-50 500 (8.2) 285 (13.2)
Over 50 37 (0.8) 37 (1.7)
Total 4789 (%) 2153 (%)

 

 

 

 

Source: OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 55, l. 11, 12.

A) Causes for absenteeism and desertion

Poor living conditions and material shortages were the main causes that led
workers in the Ural region to be absent at workplaces and/or to leave workplaces without
permission. "9 In Cheliabinsk province during the immediate postwar years, many
workers and miners who were greatly dissatisfied with the poor material and cultural
conditions chose to escape from their workplaces and to go to central or southern parts of
the Soviet Union, where they believed the conditions were better.‘60 In early 1946, the
Magnitogorsk Office of the Public Prosecutor inspected the material conditions of
workers from 25 enterprises. The result was grim. Some workers could not go to work

161

due to the lack of shoes. The lack of living space and deteriorated housing conditions

due to the lack of housing repair often caused workers’ absences. As we saw in the

 

"9 These two reasons were almost universal reasons for workers’ absenteeism and desertion during the
postwar Stalin years, especially during the 1940s. For example, see Filtzer, “The Standard of Living of
Soviet Industrial Workers,” pp. 1013-1038.

'60 OGAChO, f. P—288, op. 11, d. 189, 11. 35-36 (8/11/1947). Indeed, their belief does not seem to be
groundless. During the first two years after the war Soviet people living in the former German occupied
regions, such as Ukrainian and Caucasus regions, received food and other aid from the United States
through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). The organization was
created in 1943 and ceased its operations in 1947 in Europe.

'6' OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 20, d. 9, 1. 310b. (6/1/1946) “0 rabote organov prokuratury r. magnitogorska po
ukhodami rabochikh l sluzhashchikh s predpriiatii i samovol’nymi ianvaria po 1 iunia 1946 goda.”

163

previous chapter, lack of living space was one of the most serious problems from which
the city residents suffered for a long time after the end of the war.162 Reviewing workers’
labor discipline during the early 19505, Doshchechkin, head of the repair team of the
MMK Rolling workshop, indicated that the lack of living space led many workers to
desert. '63 Reporting that 200 workers in his workshop registered their petitions for
improvement of housing conditions, Shunin, head of MMK Industrial furnace repair
workshop, also stressed that improving living conditions was essential to improving labor
discipline. '64
Wage-related issues, including delayed payments165 and low wages,166 was
another reason for Magnitogorsk workers’ desertion. One aspect that historians have
paid little attention to is the considerable wage differentiation among workers in the same

167

factory as a cause for desertion. The wage gap between light and heavy industry was

not a new fact. ’68

The wage gap among workers in heavy industry according to skill
level has also been reviewed above. What we need to see closely is the wage

differentiation among workers laboring in so-called major and subsidiary workshops.

 

'62 As of mid-1955, 17,300 MMK workers and employees still lived in 355 old, mud-patched barracks built
as temporary housing during 1928-1931. AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 321, 1.42.

“’3 Ibid., 1.45.
"’4 Ibid.

'65 OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 22, d. 75, 1. 45 (12/47).“Dok1adnaia: “o proizvodstvennom ispol’zovanii
vygusknikov RU 1 shk. FZO v treste “Magnitostroi.”

"’6 One cadre of Magnitostroi indicated that during the first seven months of 1947, low wages was one of
the main reasons for young workers’ desertion. According to him, some wages of some Komsomol
workers in the brick works who deserted were only between 200-300 rubles. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d.
47, 1. 15. In 1947, although young Magnitostroi workers who graduated from the RU and F ZO should have
received an average 600 rubles, they only received 280-500 rubles per month. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22,
d. 75,]. 51 (12/1947).

'67 For example, see AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 321, 1. 42. (9/9/1955).

'68 For example, see F iltzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, p. 235.

164

Evidence shows that the sense of relative privation among the poorly paid subsidiary
workshop workers was quite high, and was one of the main reasons leading to their
desertion. ‘69 For example, Doshchechkin pointed out that no reward for “long service”
(za vyslugu let) for his workshop workers was available; and wages for them were low. l 70
He complained about the lower wages that workers of his workshop received despite
their work in hot, harmful, and hard labor conditions. The wide wage gap means that
although during the prewar years ordinary workers had chances to get material and
financial incentives (e. g., by being Stakhanovites), after the war, those incentives were
given to workers less based on output norms through physical labor devotion and more
according to the significance of workshops (or the significance of workshop’s overall
contribution to the factory production).

The absenteeism rate was usually twice or three times higher in those subsidiary
workshops. Gaidukovskii, head of the Mechanical workshop of the MMK, claimed that
the large gap in material conditions among workers in the so-called “major” and
“subsidiary” workshops was the main cause of desertionm For example, in 1954 only
one RU student out of 38 remained in the MMK Mechanical workshop, while the rest of
them abandoned their workplace. Likewise, according to Gaidukovskii, one-third of

workers of the workshops lefi every year.172 Absenteeism (and desertion) rates were

particularly high among the graduates of the F20 and RU who worked in the subsidiary

 

"’9 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 174, 1. 37.

”° AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 321,1144—45.

'7' Ibid., 1. 45

'72 lbid., 1.40. Party members were no exceptions. About 18 percent of all absentees of the MMK were

either party candidates or Komsomols during the period of 1953-54. Young communists, i.e., Komsomols,
comprised most (83.5 percent) of these deserters. Ibid., 1. 41.

165

workshops, including Mechanical, Boiler-repair, Repair and Construction, and Foundry
workshops of the MMK.173 Shunin, head of another subsidiary MMK workshop, the
Industrial—furnace repair workshop, attributed low wages for his workers to absenteeism
and desertion.174 Due to the poor acquisition of the subsidiary workshops, young
graduates of vocational schools who were picked up from distant regions—such as
Belorussia, Western Ukraine, and Northern Ural—did not want to work. They were
intentionally absent in order to be fired, or they simply deserted. '75

The effect of the wartime practices of job assignment and recruitment of labor
force on absenteeism and desertion also requires more attention from historians. During
the war, random assignments to work—by the decisions made in haste without sufficient
consideration about workers’ specialties due to the wartime pressure—to the graduates
from the vocational schools became widespread in Magnitogorsk enterprises.176 This
practice continued for an extended period after the war. As a result, young vocational
school graduates were frequently assigned new work that did not match their specialty
that they learned at the schools. For example, in 1947, young Magnitostroi FZO
graduates trained as metal workers were assigned to a press work which did not require
the techniques and knowledge that they learned as a specialty. Likewise, another
graduate of the F ZO with a specialty of smith was assigned to work making hammers.177

For the same reason, some new Magnitostroi workers who graduated with a machine

 

”3 Ibid., 1.40.
'7‘ Ibid., 1. 45
'7’ Ibid., 1.46.
”6 OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 21. d. 55, 1. 15.
'7" OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22. d. 75, 1. 50.
166

operation specialty from the FZO even forgot their specialty.178 This random assignment
to work among the vocational school graduates resulted in the graduates losing their
passion toward their work and eventually led to their desertion. Unfavorable job
placement was one of the main causes for desertion among those teenage workers.
Another effect of the legacy of the war on desertion was the “suitcase mind” or
homesickness. Most young Magnitogorsk workers recruited into the Labor Reserve
schools by the Ministry of Labor Reserve and mobilized workers recruited through so-
called organized recruitment (orgnabor) came either from the countryside or distant
regions, such as Belorussia, Ukraine, Central Asia, and the northern Urals.I79 These
young workers, who were half forced mobilized and separated from their families, simply
ran away from factories to return home. According to Doshchechkin, the mobilized
workers had no respect for their own work because they were forcefully mobilized.180
Gaidukovskii stresses that because many graduates of the F 20 and RU were mobilized
from distant regions, they did not have any intention to be highly qualified metal workers.
They did not want to work at the factory workshops, but what they did want was to
leave.181 Frequently, they were deliberately absent so that they could be dismissed from

the factory and return to their home towns. "’2

 

”8 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 47, I. 15. Sometimes, due to the unplanned/unsystematic acceptance of
the young graduates of vocational schools, some Magnitostroi workshops had surplus workers; and the
workshop heads had to transfer a group of newly assigned vocational school graduates to other workshops.
OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 22, d. 75, 1.46.

'79 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d., 11.42, 46. This was not a unique situation of Magnitogorsk, but rather universal
phenomenon. See Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism, pp. 15, 245.

"’° lbid., 1.46. At the same time, he blamed the teachers of those schools for their low quality of
instruction.

"" Ibid.

167

Frequent causes for desertion during the 19408 were closely related to either
material problems (including the deteriorated living conditions, low wages, and consumer
goods shortages) or wartime legacies (such as random job assignment and the suitcase
mind). However, what we need to pay attention to are the changes in the main causes for
absenteeism and the age range of the absentees. By the early 19505, the main cause for
absenteeism was neither poor living nor working conditions; rather, it was alcoholism
(See Table 5).183 Also, the main age group of these absentees was no longer the youngest
group under 20 years of age (See Table 6). During the immediate postwar years, this age
group comprised almost 50 percent of all deserters, but, in the early 1950s, the portion of
deserters comprised of workers under 20 years of age had decreased to 25 percent. An
important point, here, is that this change indicates that young workers’ living conditions
and wages improved considerably. In fact, the rise of alcoholism as the biggest cause of
absenteeism implies that alcohol consumption among workers increased; and the
increased alcohol consumption in turn implies that young workers’ wages were relatively
sufficient to buy alcohol frequently. Miasnikov, an MMK worker, insisted in the mid-
19508 that lowering young workers’ wages would contribute to a decrease in their

absenteeism. He claimed that because the F ZO graduates received wages based on the

 

'82 Ibid. In this light, a workshop head suggested that the factory workshops had to recruit only those who
wanted to receive high qualification as metal workers by strict selection fi'om the graduates of the F 20 and
RU. Ibid., 1. 47.

'8’ A worker of the Coke—chemical workshop claimed that most of the absenteeism was a result of drinking.
Sultangareev, working in the Metal construction workshop since his completion of the FZO claimed that
labor discipline was violated mostly by young workers who recently graduated from the FZO drinking in
dormitories. He claimed that “Every off day, whether you wanted or not, you came to drink. Drink led to
violation of labor discipline.” He even suggested that scattered workers in dormitories and resettled them
in an apartment by 2-3 workers nearby family apartments. Surely education for them would be better than
in dorms. Even a head of the Mechanical workshop suggested to organize a communal life of graduates of
the FZO with a pensioners which they had to live a full year. A worker (Pozdeev) stressed that carrying out
a ‘war against alcoholism’ was essential in order to enhance labor discipline. Ibid., 11. 58, 61-62 .

168

rank 4 rate, they came to hate sufficient extra money to buy drinks. '84 Thus, he
suggested that their wages should be limited to no higher than the rank 2-3 rate, which
means 600-650 rubles a month. According to him, the amount of money would still fully
guarantee their lifestyles; but would not be sufficient for purchasing alcohol. In this way,
he maintains that alcohol-related labor discipline [violations would occur less.185 The
considerable decrease of absence rates among teenage workers (in many cases vocational
school graduates) also indicates improvement of their living conditions and wages.
Moreover, changes in causes of absenteeism show that by the early 19505 absenteeism as
workers’ survival strategies, or protests against bad living and working conditions,

stopped fimctioning in many senses.

Table 5. Causes for 12 MMK workshop workers’ absenteeism (April-July 1952)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Causes % out of total Number of
absentees absentees

Drunkenness 25.2 246

Sickness 13.1 128

Oversleeping 1 1.7 1 15

No clear reasons 11.3 111

Did not want to work 7.7 75

Visited home (in collective 7.1 69

farms, state farms, etc.)

Late return from vacation 3.9 38

Lost pass(propusk) 3.5 34

Spent time with relatives 3.2 31

Detained by police 2.6 25

Relatives’ sickness 2.5 24

Others 8.2 81

Total 100.0 977

 

 

 

 

Source: OGAChO, f. p-234, op. 32, d. 97, 11. 19-20 (11/3/1952).

 

‘“ AOAM, f. 118, op. l,d. 321, 1. 61.
'8’ Ibid., 1. 62.
' 169

Table 6. MMK absentees by age (April - July, 1952)

 

 

 

 

 

Age % out of total
absentees (3,054)

Under 20 24.6

20-30 55.8

30-40 11.2

Over 40 8.4

 

 

 

 

Source: OGAChO, f. Po234, op. 32, d. 97, ll. l7-18 (11/3/1952). “0
rezul’tatakh proverki ispolneneiia Ukaza ot 14NlI-51 goda I Postanovleniia
Sovetov Ministrov SSSR or 8NII-1952 goda No. 3072 “O
neulovetvoritel’nom sostoianii trudovoi distsipliny na predpriiatiiakh i
stroikakh” na Magnitogorskom Metallurgicheskom kombinate im.
STALINA.”

B) Enterprise managers’ responses: indifference and leniency
Despite the increasing escape of workers from workplaces in the Magnitogorsk,
few workshop heads established any practical plans to prevent it. They knew one of the
key causes for desertion: poor living and working conditions. But, enterprise
management paid little attention to their workers’ living conditions and daily life.‘86 For
example, few factory managers of Magnitostroi visited the dormitories where most of the
young single workers lived in order to inspect their living conditions and to listen to their

complaints and suggestions.‘87

In December 1947, as a Magnitogorsk party report also
pointed out, “Nobody in the workshop seemed to care about the wrong appointments that
were equivalent to ignoring the specialties of young workers?”88 The enterprise and

factory officials’ indifference to young workers was a nationwide phenomenon during the

 

"6 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 32, d. 11, 11. 910. (1/11/1952). “Protokol no. 49 zasedanie biuro
magnitogorskogo gorkoma VKP(b).”; OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 32, d. 5, l. 115.

"‘7 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 47. l. 15.
"‘8 OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 22, d. 75. l. 50-
170

period. In July 1952, even the Council of Ministers expressed its concern about
increasing absenteeism by criticizing enterprise managers, workshop heads and foremen
for their failure to recognize the seriousness of absenteeism.189
Magnitogorsk enterprise management’s indifference to absenteeism and desertion
of workers has several important implications. First, managers might have given up
taking care of workers suffering from deteriorated living conditions since in many cases
even managers could hardly improve them due to the lack of material and financial
resources. The assertion by Kolobov, the MMK Coke-chemical workshop head in 1952
well represents this limit of workshop or factory-level efforts: “We need to suppose that
absenteeism can be decreased. But, the MMK alone cannot decrease absenteeism and
cannot improve labor discipline.” Rather he suggested that certain decisions should be
made at the oblast, city, and district party levels. Secondly, it is reasonable to assume
that managers did not have much concern about deserters and absentees because they
were mostly young, unskilled and inexperienced workers frequently laboring in less
important positions in subsidiary workshops. On the one hand, this was because it was
relatively easy for factory management to replace the runaway workers through the labor
reserve system. On the other hand, the managers’ indifference toward unskilled workers
paradoxically suggests the increasing significance of the technical intelligentsia and
consolidation of their status during the postwar years. In this light, the indifference
confirms the “Big Deal” thesis, which emphasized the state’s increased support for the

technical personnel by providing material privileges. Thirdly, as we will see in the next

chapter, factory management’s indifference to workers’ hardships and its effect on

 

'89 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 32. d. 5. l. 119-

171

workers’ desertions indicate why the local party needed to take a humanitarian approach
and scold factory officials: to decrease desertion. In this light, the local authorities’
emphasis on humanitarian attitudes toward workers in plight can be understood as a part
of the politics of productivity.

Magnitogorsk enterprise management had somewhat contradictory attitudes
toward absenteeism. Many workshop heads of Magnitogorsk factories loosely controlled
absenteeism. For example, during the first nine months of 1952, MMK workshop heads
did not report their workers’ absence and others accepted workers’ absence excuses such

as oversleeping or moving.190

The punishment for absenteeism was quite lenient. Only
4.6 percent of the absenteeism cases were transferred to the Comrade Court.l91 Searches
for the deserters were not aggressively implemented either. During the first five months
of 1946 in Magnitogorsk ,190 cases of desertion searches were registered as the police
task.192 The police searches were not carried out around clock, but only 2-3 times a
month. The search was not always done neatly. In March 1946, twenty searches that
were not even touched were forwarded from the previous months of January and
February. Among 11 searches that were newly registered during February, only one
search was implemented. This was a typical condition of the rest of the police
departments of the city.‘93

Not only Magnitogorsk factory management and city authorities, but also the

local law officials of the region where the deserters returned were merciful. This attitude

 

"’0 OGAChO, f. 9-234, op. 32, d. 97, 11. 4-5 (1952)

'9' Ibid., 1. 6. Even not all of the registered cases at the Court were reviewed for various reasons, including
expiration by long delay and immunity from jurisdiction. Ibid., 1. 8.

‘92 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 20, d. 9, l. 33.
'93 Ibid.
172

resulted in a relatively low number of convicted deserters despite the large number of
actual deserters. The local authorities in other regions did not cooperate to arrest
deserters and return them to the places they deserted. Likewise, local procurators of the
districts did not establish any means of arresting deserters; furthermore, they showed
indulgence toward the deserters. For example, in 1946 Skorokhoda, a 31-year-old
worker of a storage facility of Magnitostroi, did not return from his February vacation but
stayed working at a “Kanash” state farm at Shentomensk district (raion) of Kuibyshevsk
oblast where his family worked.‘94 Although the management of Magnitostroi requested
the procurator of Shenteminsk raion to arrest the deserter, the cadres of the enterprise
received a letter from the leader of the state farm that requested to keep him working at
their farm. As of June of the same year, Svishcheva, a 19-year-old old female worker of
Magnitostroi did not return from her April vacation. Instead, she was currently working

at a collective farm in Mel’tsansk raion of the Moldovia republic. ‘95

In the letter sent by
the administration of the collective farm to that of the trust, the management indicated
that she would not return to Magnitogorsk and that the farm needed her.

The conflicts between Magnitogorsk enterprises and local prosecutors suggest
that on the one hand, the Stalin government could not implement full control over society
after the war. On the other hand, the contradiction was an example showing that a

regional interest played a key role in securing labor power and the limited central

authorities’ influence on this issue. The latter could not fully penetrate into local regions

 

‘94 lbid., 1. 320b.
'95 lbid.
173

through “total” control.196 This can be understood as a part of the legacy of the war
during which regional officials had a certain level of autonomy. ’97

Moreover, as in the case of local enterprise managers’ indifference toward
workers’ plight, the lenient attitudes also can be understood from several different
aspects. Some historians consider the authorities’ lenient attitudes toward workers’
violations of labor discipline as the regime’s inevitable attempt to hold onto workers due
to the labor shortage.I98 But, it should be noted that in the case of Magnitogorsk, where
similar leniency was exercised by the local authorities and factory officials, the labor
market was not very tight. Indeed, mobilizing new workers was not a very difficult task
for the local authorities since a relatively stable number of workers was supplied through
a half-forced mobilization (conscript) system. ‘99 Then, why did Magnitogorsk officials
maintain lenient attitudes toward workers violating labor discipline? The second
reason—i.e., leniency as an important survival strategy of enterprise management to
avoid pressures both “from above and below”——would more appropriately explain the

reasons for leniency. As we have seen above, during the postwar years, partial

 

'96 Still, it would be not unreasonable to assume that the central government deliberately ignored the
desertion problems if the deserters went (or returned) to the formerly occupied regions which needed rapid
reconstruction.

'97 For example, see James Harris, “Resisting the Plan in the Urals, 1928-1956: Or, Why Regional Officials
Needed ‘Wreckers’ and ‘Saboteurs,”’ in Contending with Stalinism, pp. 201-228.

'9’ For example, see Jones, “’In my opinion this is all a fi'audl,”’ p. 144.

'99 It is highly possible that the labor shortage was more severe in the former front regions which required
more labor power to reconstruct demolished facilities and infrastructures. But, as Filter pointed out and the
case of Magnitogorsk shows, mobilizing a new work force was not a challenging task in general during the
postwar Stalin years since young workers were easily mobilized by further conscription. Filtzer, Soviet
Workers and Late Stalinism, pp. 234, 242. The compulsory draft of young people into labor reserve
schools was introduced in October 1940. It was terminated by a decree of March 18, 1955 and was
replaced by voluntary recruitment. Alec Nove, “Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State?” in Soviet Society: A
Book of Readings, ed. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 506.
During the war, children who had reached the age of 12 were required to work in industry and agriculture.
Bernice Q. Madison, Social Welfare in the Soviet Union (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1968), p. 45.

174

relaxations of wartime labor discipline were carried out by the abolishment of harsh
wartime labor laws. With the relaxations, the Stalin government put pressure on the local
party to improve material conditions of workers with an instruction of immediate

inspection of workers’ living conditions.200

As we will see in the next chapter, in fact,
demanding that local enterprise management 1ncrease care for young workers who were
suffering was one of the main topics frequently appearing in Magnitogorsk newspapers
during the first several years following the war. Under this circumstance, local enterprise
mangers who could not improve workers’ material conditions and received pressure from
the local authorities had to take lenient attitudes toward workers’ absenteeism and
desertion by covering up the cases in order to avoid prosecution for their failing to
provide adequate working and living conditions.201 Finally, we cannot totally dismiss the
possibility of the impact of a humanitarian ethos. We will see in the next chapter that
during this period, hardhearted enterprise and administrative officials were criticized in
severe tones in local mass media that emphasized humanitarianism as a crucial postwar

Soviet value.202

In this light, local enterprise management’s leniency can be viewed as a
result of enterprise managerial staff’s over-compliance with the state policy, rather than

simply as a result from the pressure by economic reasons such as the labor shortage.203

 

2‘” For example see OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 1 1, d. 261, l. 47. (April 1947)

20‘ For example, in 1948, the procurators of the RSFSR brought 817 prosecutions against ‘people in
positions of authority’ for concealing cases and for “provoking violations of labor discipline by failing to
provide adequate working and living conditions,” as well as for absenteeism and desertion. Filtzer, Soviet
Workers and Late Stalinism, 178.

202 See Pravda, Magnitogorskii rabochii. See the chapter 1V (“Politics of Welfare”) for the Stalin
leadership’s use of humanitarian approach to society.

20’ The similar example can be found during the collectivization process and the Great Terror years in the
1930s. Stalin’s Pravda article (March 2, 1930) “Dizziness fi'om Success” indicates that local party
authorities overreacted to the centers’ order of the collectivization. The “mass operation” of the NKVD’s

175

C) Workers divided: demanding the enhancement of punishments
MMK factory officials’ conversations with workers, which were conducted in
early 1955 revealed that unsurprisingly, workers did not share a universal view on
absenteeism and desertion. Tarasov, an MMK mining worker who recently graduated
from the RU and once was absent due to drinking, confessed that he did not like the job
he currently had and worked unpleasantly by force.204 Provishnik, an MMK worker
laboring in the Coke furnace workshop, claimed that the factory should not hold the

workers who did not want to work at the factory.205

Kholod, working in the repair team
of the MMK Rolling workshop, was absent because he was not accepted by the workshop
that he wanted to work in, and stressed that workers should have the right to move freely
to the workplace that they liked to work in.206

More skilled and older workers requested the enhancement of labor discipline.
As absenteeism considerably increased after the decriminalization of absenteeism in July
1951, many older workers requested the enhancement of labor discipline. Some of them
demanded the abolition of the decriminalization decree. For example, Shvetsov, a senior

electrician working 22 years at the MMK, claimed that absentees had to be banned from

working at the MMK for six months before being re-hired.207 Another senior electrician

 

terror against Soviet people in which the NKVD assigned quotas for arrests sometimes provoked local
NKVD officials’ excessive prosecutions.

2‘“ AOAM, f. 118, op. l,d. 321,1. 57.
2‘” Ibid., 1.58.
2“ Ibid., 11. 60-61

20’ Ibid., 1. 60.

176

Griko, working more than 20 years at the MMK Storage assembly workshop, and
Goranskii, with then years of experience in a brigade of the Metal sheet workshop,
insisted that the labor code on decriminalization of absenteeism should be abolished to

208 Griko claimed that the main cause for absenteeism was the

improve labor discipline.
desire for desertion; workers began to be absent because they wanted to abandon their job
at the factory. The next most important cause for absenteeism he believed was
drinking.209 Zykov, a 58-year-old MMK worker, claimed that absentees should be
transferred to low-paid jobs2'0 while Alekseev, a 57-year-old worker, expressed his
belief that it was time to abolish the July 14,1951 law code that decriminalized

absenteeism.” '

In addition, blaming absentees as irresponsible people, Karpov, who
worked 22 years in the factory, supported their punishment. 2'2

Some workers who had experience of absenteeism even claimed that the
contemporary labor law was too weak to prevent or reduce workers’ Violations of labor
discipline. Mar’kov, who was sent to the factory as a soldier and had only two-years of
work experience but received a strict reprimand for his absenteeism, confessed that the

labor discipline law and “all other laws” were too weak. He suggested that the laws

should be stricter.213 He emphasized, in particular, that deliberate absenteeism for the

 

2"" Ibid., 11. 56-57. They also supported for the expansion of middle level officers’ rights to manage short
term vacation for workers and personal day offs, and compensatory day-offs.

2‘” lbid.

2'°1bid., 1. 59

2” Ibid. It was during the Khrushchev years (in 1957) that the Soviet government removed criminal
penalties for desertion (i.e., leaving one’s job without permission). The penalties for worker absenteeism
and desertion were instituted by the decree in 1940. Nove, “Is the Soviet Union...” p. 506.

2" AOAM, r. 118, op. 1, d. 321, 1. 59.

2” Ibid., 1. 57.

177

purpose of desertion should be severely punished.”4 A 27-year-old worker claimed that
the July 1951 code should be abolished soon because “we are not conscious workers.”2'S
Nasonov, a gas worker of the MMK Blast furnace agreed that the labor code of July 14,
1951 should be abolished while enhancing penalties on hooliganism and lovers of
drinking.”6

But, some workers did not believe that enhanced law or punishment could
improve labor discipline. A 29-year-old female worker who indicated that she was at
Comrade Court in 1943 at age 17 for her absenteeism stressed that she would have not
been absent if the management or others had had a conversation with her. At that time
she was very vexed and felt pity. She emphasized that labor discipline would not be
improved by court punishment; rather, “more explanatory work for persuading workers
would be needed.”2'7 Similarly, some workers pointed out that shop heads’ easy permit
on discharge and indifferent attitudes toward workers decisively affected the rise of
absenteeism. An MMK worker blamed shop heads who simply allowed workers to quit
work without trying to persuade them to continue to work in their workshops.“8

Magnitogorsk workers share more identical ideas on labor discipline during the

first five years after the war when most workers suffered from poor living and working

conditions. But, by the early 1950s, when signs of improvement in living conditions

 

2” Ibid.

2" Ibid., 1. 59.
2"]bid., 1. 57
2” Ibid., 1. 59.

2” Ibid., 1. 60. Some factory cadres in the production front suggested that labor discipline problems could
be solved by initiation of interest from the party and city administrators in the questions of workers by
participating in the workers’ meetings. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 32, d. 5, 1. 122 (1952).

178

more vividly appeared, the responses to the re-increased absenteeism, which in many
cases was not caused by material hardship, became much less universal. The generation

gap between young and older workers became more prominent.

Conclusion

Signs of changes in strategies to increase productivity emerged in various spheres
after the war. The official rhetoric on cleanliness appearing in local newspapers was a
reflection of the authorities’ efforts to curtail a wartime legacy that had had a negative
impact on productivity. The authorities well understood that productivity had been often
hindered by unorganized work environments worsened by the wartime priority on hasty
production. Thus, the emphasis on putting-in—order represented the regime’s changing
focus from restless labor with swifi tempo to efficiency. Magnitogorsk factory cadres’
indifference to socialist competition, which encouraged speedup, was the result of this
changing strategy. Workers’ wage determination came to depend more on the
significance of work in production rather than the extent of the achievement of output
quotas. Surely these changes began to appear before the war, but came to be more
consolidated after the war as the regime relied more on professionalization and
rationalization than voluntarism to raise labor productivity. Under this circumstance,
industrial managerial personnel’s indifference to trainees in vocational schools and young
unskilled workers was a very expectable consequence. During the hard times of the
immediate postwar years, enterprise management “abandoned” the relatively easily
replaceable work force. With the decline of voluntarism in production lines, workers

were left with few practical chances to be promoted or to be better paid through

179

governmental supported policies, such as the Stakhanovite movement. Not surprisingly,
young and unskilled workers were the greatest victims of the Big Deal, characterized by
the regime’s preferential treatment of the technical intelligentsia.

Deserting the poor living and working conditions, as well as absenteeism, were
the most frequently used survival strategies that those victims chose. But the
improvement of living conditions by the early 19503 brought changes in workers’
strategies. The desertion rate declined and absenteeism was hardly used as a tool of
protest by Magnitogorsk workers. Absolute wages of young workers increased although
those of young unskilled workers laboring in less significant workshops remained low.
The improved living conditions made the gap between older and younger workers, which
was less visible during postwar 1940s when material hardship universally affected
workers, more pronounced. Older workers did not have sympathy toward young workers
who violated labor discipline, most violations being caused alcoholism by the early
19503. Division along the age line among workers became more prominent.

The authorities and enterprise managerial personnel did not, and in some sense
could not, always respond with antagonism to workers’ survival strategies. Concession
was one of the key features of governmental policies toward workers. Wartime work
hours and work regimes were partly transformed by the conditions of peacetime.
Draconian laws, passed before and during the war against violations of labor discipline,
remained, but they were relaxed step by step throughout the postwar Stalin years.
Enterprise managers who received pressure from the party chose lenient attitudes toward

workers’ survival strategies. Moreover, the unsuccessful pursuit of deserters who hid in

180

their hometowns in the country signifies the conflict inside the Stalinist system. During
the period, the Stalin government could not achieve a “total” control of society.

The next chapter provides another example that coercion was not the only way
that the postwar Stalin government exercised the control over society. The Stalin
government had to take another responsive step toward society, which eventually

contributed to shaping a citizen who internalized official values.

181

IV. Politics of Welfare: Securing Socio-Political Stability through
Humanitarianism and Patemalism

In early August 2004, the Russian Duma (the lower chamber) passed a plan to end
the Soviet-era system of state benefits for the elderly and disabled. The reform replaced
an array of benefits-in-kind with a “small” amount of cash compensation (400 rubles per
month). In designing the new reform, the Putin government aimed to increase
transparency and prohibit abuse of the system through fake IDs. It meant no more
automatic free transport, subsidized medicine, or discounts on utilities bills for millions
of war veterans, invalids, and pensioners.l After approval of the plan, the Russian
government faced angry protests from groups of communists and elders, many of whom
had been relying on the various kinds of welfare benefits to survive. For example, for
invalid pensioner Iskra Myachnina, who received a pension of 50 dollars each month, a
heavy discount (50 percent) on utility bills, and the medical subsidies she was eligible for
because of her status as an invalid, these benefits were a really big help. The new
reforms abolished all these benefits. Iskra believed that she Would get less in cash
payments, and the money would be eroded by inflation.2 Her concern was representative
of the many who felt they were entitled to governmental help in light of their fighting and
laboring for the Motherland during World War 11. They saw the state benefits as a sign
of the state’s respect for their sacrifice; thus, for them, losing automatic benefits was an

“insult.” Emphasizing that the opposition was “as much emotional as economic,” one

 

' Sarah Rainsford, “Welfare bill stirs Russian anger,” BBC News (August 6, 2004)
<http:/x’news.bbc.co.ukr"2:‘liix’europex’3540980.st:m>, last consulted August 29, 2006.

 

2 Ibid.
182

Russian analyst maintained, “For this nation, the role of the state as a father and mother
is of paramount importance.”3

After World War II, the Soviet people desperately sought what Iskra had secured
until recently: paternalistic care from the state. For the Stalinist government, caring for
physically and emotionally wounded subjects was no less urgent and crucial than political
and economic issues. In fact, provision of material and financial support for the needy
was one of the key tasks that the Stalin regime carried out after the war. Despite its
significance, scholars have paid little attention to postwar social welfare practices
because of the limited availability of research sources on the subject and because of the
seemingly unimpressive quality and quantity of the welfare benefits provided by the
Stalin government compared to those provided by western governments, especially the
GI. Bill in the United States,4 and by the Khrushchev leadership in later years. A few
scholars who have studied the Soviet welfare system characterize the postwar Stalin years
as dominated by prewar welfare practices.5 Seeing the Khrushchev era, especially 195 6,

as a turning point in terms of significant improvement in welfare benefits,6 they have

 

3 Ibid. Italics mine.

4 J. Eric Duskin, Stalinist Reconstruction and the Confirmatino of a New Elite, 1945-1953 (New York:
Palgrave, 2000), p. 18. Michael J. Bennett, When Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and the Making of
Modern America (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2000).

5 For example, see Bernice Q. Madison, Social Welfare in the Soviet Union (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1968), pp. 223-24; Gaston V. Rirnlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe,
America, and Russia (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971), 245, 269-280; Alastair McAuley,
Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union: Poverty, Living Standards, and Inequality (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1979), p. 3.

6 Indeed, the Khrushchev government introduced significantly improved welfare policies in 1956. For
example, the increase in old-age and permanent disability pensions raised the average rate of all pensions
by 81 percent. Also, the period of paid maternity leave was extended from 70 to 112 days. In 1956 wage,
working hour, and employment reforms were also launched. Alec Nove, “Is the Soviet Union a Welfare
State?” in Soviet Society: A Book of Reading, eds. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1961), pp. 503-506.

183

suggested that welfare practices during pre- and postwar Stalin years were dominated by
the rule of “exclusion.” By this rule, the Stalin regime either ruled out unproductive
social entities, such as invalids and aged people, or significantly reduced welfare benefits
for the less productive groups and appropriated them as rewards to stimulate workers’
productivity.7 In this sense, scholars have considered the humanitarian value embedded

in Stalinist welfare practices as mere “rhetoric” and “propaganda”8

or as a post-Stalin
phenomenon, appearing in the Khrushchev era.9 Although this productivity-oriented
approach to Stalinist welfare policy explains one aspect of the welfare program, it does
not provide a comprehensive view. Soviet scholars’ evaluation of welfare in the postwar
Stalin years was not so different fi'om that of western scholars. Many Soviet works either
focus on the expansion of welfare benefits during Khrushchev era or keep silent on the
practices of postwar Stalin years.10

Departing from previous scholarship, recent works have enriched our
understanding of Stalinist welfare practice by providing both a new perspective and more
nuanced interpretations based on newly available archival sources. Portraying the prewar
Stalinist welfare program as a modem-state project which aimed to enhance the social

insurance system, Stephen Kotkin has valued the extensiveness of state-guaranteed

welfare benefits (including housing, education, employment, and health care) compared

 

7 See Gaston V. Rimlinger, “The Trade Union in Soviet Social Insurance: Historical Development and
Present Functions,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 14, no. 3 (April 1961), 401, 405; Madison,
Social Welfare in the Soviet Union, p. 57; Dorena Caroli, “Bolshevism, Stalinism, and Social Welfare
(1917-1936),” International Review of Social History, vol. 48 (2003), 51.

8 Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia , p. 254.

9 Madison, Social Welfare in the Soviet Union, pp. 95-96.

'0 For examples, see L. A. Motylev, Gosudarstvennoe strakhovanie v SSSR i problemy ego (Moskva:
lzdatel’stvo Finansy, 1972), pp. 108-9; Sotsial ’noe strakhovanie v SSSR (Moskva: Profizdat, 1973), pp.
62-69.

184

with those provided not only by the pre-revolutionary Russian government, but also by
other modern capitalist countries.11 However, other scholars have paid more attention to
the limits and ineffectiveness of Soviet welfare system.12 For example Mark Edele’s
exhaustive research on the demobilized soldiers of World War H demonstrates that the
Stalin leadership’s concern with political stability was one of the key reasons for giving
the demobilized privileged status.l3 During the immediate postwar years, the
demobilized emerged as the group that received extensive welfare benefits from the
state.14 But Edele emphasizes that welfare benefits for war veterans considerably
diminished after 1947, when the major demobilization process was over and the “threat”
from the demobilized to the Soviet government seemed less realistic.15 Some scholars
have seen the pre-1956 welfare practice as very limited, excluding unproductive

populations such as invalids since welfare was given to the labor force with the intention

 

H See for example, Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1995), pp.18-21.

'2 For example, see Mark Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group, 1945-1955,” Slavic Review
(Spring 2006): 111-37. See also Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the
Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
For medical welfare practices, see Christopher Burton, “Soviet Medical Attestation and the Problem of
Professionalisation under Late Stalinism, 1945-1953,” Europe-Asia Studies (December 2005). Regarding
welfare practices for women, see Greta Bucher, “Struggling to Survive: Soviet Women in the Postwar
Years,” Journal of Women ’5 History (Spring 2000), 137-59. For welfare practices in a former occupied
region, see Jeffi'ey Jones, “‘In my opinion this is all a fraud!’: Concrete, Culture, and Class in the
‘Reconstruction’ of Rostov-on-the-Don, 1943-1948,” Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
(2000), Chapter 2.

'3 Mark Edele, “A Generation of Victors?: Soviet Second World War Veterans from Demobilization to
Organization 1941-1956,” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago (2004), pp. 177-83.

'4 Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group,”124.

'5 Ibid., 125. Not only Edele but many scholars have pointed out that the demobilized veterans who saw
the world outside the USSR during the war were seen as the “potential danger” to the Soviet government.
They were frequently compared as the Decembrists of World War II. E. S. Seniavskaia, F rontovoe
pokolenie, [941—1945; istoriko-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie (Moskva; Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN,
1995); Elena Zubkova, Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions. and Disappointments, 1945-1 95 7 (Armonk,
New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); Edele, “A Generation of Victors?” pp. 178-79.

185

of stimulating productivity. 1" As we have seen in Chapter III, the productivity-oriented
approach was an important characteristic of postwar Stalinist welfare practices. But the
approach explains only one aspect of the system. The motivations of the postwar welfare
policy went beyond the economic concern of raising productivity.

Integrating and extending these recent studies, I will examine the politics of
welfare—the ways that the Stalin government used the welfare system to achieve its
socio-political goal: stability between the state and society. Discourse which appeared in
the official newspapers during the postwar Stalin years indicates that the widening gap
between the officials and ordinary people, as well as the potential threat from veterans
exposed to the western capitalist system, was one of the foremost concerns of the postwar
Soviet government. To what extent did the Stalin government achieve its socio-political
goals through welfare practices?

To analyze the characteristics of postwar welfare policies I first examine the
politics of welfare—the ways in which it provided material and monetary aid to the
people of Magnitogorsk to achieve its socio-political stability—and then explore the
inhabitants’ responses to the welfare policies. I pay special attention to the humanitarian
approach that local authorities employed to narrow the gap between the authorities and
local people which widened during the war as a result of the officials’ bureaucratic
attitudes toward citizens.

Socialist patemalism—a policy or practice of treating or governing people in a

fatherly manner, especially by providing for their needs without giving them rights or

 

’6 For example, see Gaston V. Rimlinger, “The Trade Union in Soviet Social Insurance: Historical
Development and Present Functions,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 14, no. 3 (April 1961), 401,
405; Madison, Social Welfare in the Soviet Union, p. 57; Caroli, “Bolshevism, Stalinism, and Social
Welfare,” 51.

186

responsibilitiesn—is useful for the analysis of postwar Soviet welfare practice. Scholars
of Soviet history have understood paternalism as one of the key modes of operation of the
Soviet socialist system.18 Under this policy, the state is compared to the “father” who
knows its “children” (subjects) best and the images of an omnipresent and omnipotent
state are emphasized. Since the state was supposed to collect the total social product and
make available whatever people needed, socialist paternalism was essentially a reflection
of the state’s “dictatorship over needs.” '9 Consequently, for the Soviet authorities, a
paternalistic welfare practice was a key to legitimate their rule and secure popular
support. Through analysis of the paternalistic aspect of the postwar Soviet welfare
policies I will investigate to what extent the welfare practice contributed to win political
support “from below.”

The scope of my research on social welfare is limited. The field of social welfare
is extensive, including issues of labor, health, education, and many others.20 In this

chapter, focusing on the labor issue, I will examine some of the social security policies

 

'7 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition (Houghton Mifflin
Company, 2000), from <http://dictionary.referenee.com/browse/‘patemalism>, last consulted July 12, 2006.

’8 Ferenc Feher, “Patemalism as a Mode of Legitimation in Soviet-type Societies,” in Political Legitimation
in Communist States, ed. by T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), pp. 64-81;
F erenc Feher, Agnes Heller and Gybrgy Markus, Dictatorship over Needs (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1983), pp. 180-182. In addition to paternalism, they included bureaucracy, police activity, and the penal
code in the modes of the execution of power in the Soviet system. Ibid, p. 174; Jtmos Komai, The Socialist
System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992),
pp. 55-57; Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1996); Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Dear Comrade, You Ask What We Need”:
Socialist Patemalism and Soviet Rural “Notables” in the Mid-1930s,” Slavic Review 57, no. 1 (Spring
1998): 107-32.

’9 Feher, Heller and Markus, Dictatorship, p. 182; also see Verdery, pp. 24-26. While F ehér, Heller and
Markus have employed the paternalism model only for the post-Stalin era in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, Komai and Verdery view paternalism rather as a crucial analytic tool to understand the general
mode of operation of “socialist” political economy.

20 Madison, Social Welfare, p. xviii.

187

(such as employment and material security) mainly aimed, as in other countries after the
war, at war veterans, whose successful reintegration into society was an especially
important task for the Soviet government.

The welfare practices of postwar Magnitogorsk suggest that a humanitarian ethos
embodied by the rule of inclusion—equal treatment for all social groups based on their
need—was a major feature of the postwar Stalinist welfare policy through which the
Stalin regime succeeded in winning popular support and narrowing the gap between
regime and society. The humanitarian and paternalistic welfare system, whatever its
motivations were, allowed many inhabitants of Magnitogorsk to identify with official

ideology and to nurse hOpes for a better future.

Motivations of Stalinist Care

Immediately following the war, Krupitskii, a resident of Moscow, sent a letter—to
either a governmental organization or the editorial office of a central newspaper—in
which he insisted on provision of a pension for families who had had members killed in
the battle for the Motherland.” Welcoming the law on the demobilization and its
increased payment of support for the demobilized, he believed that the “government had
to create such material help (usloviia) for the families of fallen soldiers, as they had lost
their breadwinners.”22 Like other governments and citizens involved in great wars like
World War I and II, the Soviet government and people considered providing war veterans
and the families of servicemen with special care as a logical outcome of their war victory

because of the veterans’ devotion to the state during the war. On July 19, 1945 an

 

2' GARF, r. 8131, op. 22, d. 5,11. 38-39 “Svodka, no. 58.
’2 Ibid.
188

official report of the Magnitogorsk city soviet emphasized: “The historical victory of our
valorous Red Army obligates us to improve the aid we provide to the families of
servicemen?” However, evidence shows that the Stalin government’s motivations for
the aid were not that simple. There were particular social, economic, and political factors
that motivated the Soviet leadership to launch a relatively generous welfare campaign for
the demobilized and the families of servicemen. As far as the economic factor was
concerned, postwar official rhetoric on welfare policies shows that for the Soviet
government the issue of social welfare intersected with the issue of labor productivity.24
An article in the central party journal fi'om August, 1945 indicates that the postwar Stalin
regime understood that “concerns for people’s welfare” (zabota o liudiakh) was an
indispensable condition for raising labor productivity.25 In fact, a local newspaper article
suggested that it was highly probable that bad supply conditions for factory workers
would lead workers to abandon their factories.26 Authorities realized that raising labor
productivity was directly proportional to raising workers’ morale and that by improving
workers’ living and working conditions they could win the support of their workers and
successfully mobilize them on the production lines.

It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which ideology actually constrained the
Stalin government’s welfare policies. The influence of ideology on Soviet policies is, in

many cases, like the chicken and egg dilemma.27 But one thing is clear: the postwar

 

’3 AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, 1. 165 ob. (7/19/1945) “0 meropriiztiizkh po realizatsii zakona o
demobilizatsii 13-ti starshikh vozrastov.”

2" For example, see Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia, p. 256.
25 “Pered novoi piatiletkoi,” Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, no. 16, (August, 1945): 8.

26 “Kogdan-s” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 11 June 1946.

189

Stalinist government attempted to justify the significance of humanitarian attitudes by
linking them to socialist ideology. For example, an article published in a party journal in
August 1945 stressed attitudes, such as “respect for people” (uvazhenie k cheloveku) and
“concerns for people’s welfare,” as one of the key components of socialism.28 However,
it should be noted that the Soviet government’s emphasis on humanitarian attitudes was
forced to some extent by the expectations raised by society and the government’s concern
with political stability. The government knew well that the war had scarred an enormous
number of people physically and mentally. Providing paternal help was not optional, but
a must—releasing hot steam fi'om a valve, as it were. In some sense, one cannot totally
ignore the possibility that the party utilized the humanitarian method to reinforce the
party’s control over local governmental and enterprise officials. As we saw in Chapter II,
the central party could not provide material supplies requested by the regions during the
war years. Local officials had to mobilize food and other resources from locally
available sources, gradually extending their autonomy over the course of the war.
Criticizing officials’ “heartless” minds was a tool the party used to good advantage to
increase the moral image of the state among Soviet citizens while avoiding serious
criticism for their continuing hard lives. In doing so, the Stalin leadership was able to
achieve two goals: maintain support “from below” and check the regional government

and enterprise officials. In the final analysis, it seems more reasonable to see that the

 

27 For the view, emphasizing ideological influence on the Soviet decision making, see David Lane, Soviet
Labour and the Ethic of Communism: Full Employment and the Labour Process in the USSR (Boulder,
Colo.: Westerview, 1987).

28 “Chelovek-samyi tsennyi kapital sovetskogo obshchestva,” Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, (September, 1945), 4.
This article was republished in Magnitogorskii rabochii, 27 October 1945.

190

humanitarian nature of welfare practice during the postwar Stalin era developed out of

complex motivations.

Veterans as the new poor

During the war, 32,000 people from Magnitogorsk were conscripted to the front,
where about 10,000 of them were killed.29 As the war ended, the demobilized—
including war invalids and the families of fallen soldiers—integrated into postwar society
as a new group. Wounded soldiers were the first to be demobilized, even before the
war’s final days. But mass demobilization started less than two months after the war
ended with the demobilization law of June 23, 1945 and the release of draftees over 40
(or birth years 1893 to 1905).30 As of July 1, 1945 Magnitogorsk had a total of 13,408
demobilized servicemen’s families, including 3,456 families of either servicemen killed
on the fi'ont3 1 or of disabled veterans.32 By July 1945 the number of draftees from

Magnitogorsk alone comprised about 15 percent of the entire city population.33

 

29 Iunost ’ Magnitka (Moskva: Mol. Gvardiia, 1981), p. 120.

3° Edele, “A Generation of Victors?” p. 101. Soldiers above age 51 (birth years 1890 to 1892) were
demobilized during the war.

3' OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, l. 32. (7/1945). “Otchet: o rabote gorodskogo otdela po
gosudarstvennomu obespecheniiu i bytovomu ustroistvu semei voennosluzhashchikh pri magnitogorskom
gorispolkome za pervoe polugodie 1945 goda.”

32 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, l. 1590b. “Dokladnaia zapiska: o vstreche, trudovom I bytovom
ustroistve demobilizovannykh iz krasnoi arrnii, trudovom ustroistve invalidov otechestvennoi voiny I
okazaniia pomoshchi sem’iam pogibshikh voinov po gorodu magnitogorsku” (10/10/1945). Among the
demobilized servicemen’s families, 2,991 families received an average of 779 rubles of financial aid from

the government, while 1,649 families received pensions averaging 1,009 rubles during the first six months
of 1945. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, 1. 320b.

’3 About six months later the number of demobilized soldiers and their families in the city had not increased
but rather decreased, even though the first demobilized wave arrived in Magnitogorsk on July 24
(Magnitogorskii rabochii, July 25, 1945) and the second demobilization finished by the end of 1945 (Edele,
“A ‘Generation of Victors?”’ p. 68). Compared to 1945, the total number of demobilized servicemen’s
families slightly decreased to 12,770 families in January 1946 (OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, l. 46

191

Assuming that the household of each demobilized veteran amounted to at least two or
three people (e. g., veteran him/herself and spouse, veteran and his/her parents, a war
widow and her children), city inhabitants who had at least one demobilized veteran in
their families comprised at least 30 to 45 percent of the entire city population.

Immediately after the war, many veterans and their families emerged as the group
that needed the most urgent material aid. Taisiia V. Futman, a former history professor at
the Teachers College of Magnitogorsk, recalled:

After the war ended, more male students began to appear in classrooms [as

demobilized veterans returned to school]. All the frontoviki (frontline soldiers)

were so poor.”34 They had only one uniform that they wore when they were

demobilized from the Army. They [always] came to class in their military

uniforms and soldier shirts. It was the only clothing they had.35

A report on the work done by the social welfare administration of Magnitogorsk
during 1948 shows that many of the demobilized belonged to the group of “extremely
needy people” (ostranuzhdaiushchiesia) defined as needing urgent material support. The

report (Table 7) shows that more than 80 percent of the total amount of the financial aid

of the group was spent on the families of demobilized veterans.

 

(J an/ 1946). There are several possible reasons to explain the decrease: first, there is a possibility that some
of the demobilized soldiers’ families (including those of fallen soldiers and invalids) who were evacuated
during the war might have returned to their hometowns, while the absolute number of the older members of
the first and second demobilization categories—over 40 years old for the first, over 30 for the second
demobilization——was not very big; second, lack of complete registration for the demobilized veterans can
also be considered as the reason for the lower number of the demobilized families. But it should be noted
that even though the absolute number of the demobilized decreased, their proportion did not since the total
population of the city also decreased after the war as many evacuees left the city. The city population,
which was 230,000 in June 1945, decreased to 185,500 in 1947 (AOAM. f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, l. 152 (June
21, 1945), I. 1760b; OGAChO, f. R-804, op. 14, d. 6, 1. 1 (January 1, 1947). Then it began to increase
again, but it was only by 1951 that the city population recovered to the level of June 1945 (OGAChO, f. R-
804, op.14, d.7, 1.1, 8. “ekonomicheskii passport g. Magnitogorska” (1953)).

34 Interview with Taisiia Vasil’evna Futman (January 15, 2003 Magnitogorsk). Futman (b. 1919), an
evacuee from Leningrad, came to Magnitogorsk in 1944 from Kuibyshev (current-day Samara), the first
town to which she was evacuated.

35 Interview with T. V. Futman. Magnitogorsk, January 18, 2003.
1 92

Table 7. The amount provided for extremely needy families (1948) (rubles)36

 

 

 

 

 

 

Families of the fallen soldiers 103,950
Invalids of the Great Patriotic War 38,175
Families whose breadwinners died 7,550
Families of servicemen 2,600
Invalids of labor 27,756

 

 

 

Source: AOAM, f. 202, op. l, d. 12, l. 9. “Informatsionnyi otchet: o rabote
Magnitogorskogo gorodskogo otdela sotsial’nogo obespecheniia po vypolneniiu plana
prakticheskikh meropriiatoi 2a 1948 god.”
Among the veterans and their families, war widows and war invalids became the groups
most desperately needing material aid. In January 1947, the City Department of People’s
Education (GORONO: Gorodskoi otdel narodnogo obrazovaniia) conducted an
inspection of the poorest group of city residents, many of whom were war widows and
war invalids supporting multi-children families. The purpose of the inspection was to
provide help for children’s education and to discover children who went neither to school
nor to work.37 According to the report, 200 children could not go to school at the
beginning of the academic year due to lack of clothing while another 185 children quit
school for the same reason during the first half of the academic year of 1947-48.38
Consequently, the Magnitogorsk authorities were under great pressure fiom the
demobilized and their families who requested paternalistic support. For example, when
the demobilized failed to receive appropriate and expected help from the state (help
guaranteed by governmental decisions), they petitioned local authorities. In 1945, the

demobilized fi‘om NKVD (Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrenm'kh del: People’s

 

36 In addition to financial support, a total of 14 cows and pigs were distributed to these people. AOAM, f.
202, op. l, (1. 12,1. 9.

’7 OGAChO, f. 9234, op. 21, d. 83, 1. 19 (3/3/47). “Dokladnaia.”
3“ Ibid.
193

Commissariat for Internal Affairs)39 troops sent letters to the authorities that requested a
clear explanation of why the NKVD had not provided aid for them.40 Many family
members of the demobilized actively requested support that they needed. By the end of
the war many wives of the frontoviki were sending letters requesting material support and
repair of their apartments to the local governments, claiming that their husbands would
soon return from the front.4| The demobilized and their families, including those of
fallen soldiers, were the main group for whom the local authorities had to provide
paternalistic help. When this large a proportion of the city population needed help (some
of them desperately) during the hard times of the postwar years, the local authorities
could not ignore them. The veterans and their families deserved governmental support
not only for their wartime sacrifices and service, but also because many of them were

among the poorest people in the city.

“Malicious ” western impact

9942

The authorities’ concern over the formation of “Decembrist, or anti-

govemmental, visions among the demobilized was another important motivation for their

 

39 Renamed MVD (Ministrestvo vnutrenm'kh del: Ministry of Internal Affairs) in March 1946.
4° GARF, f. 8131, op. 22, d. 5, 1. 170 “Svodka, no. 61.”

4' OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 93, l. 198, 383. (1945) “Zaiavleniia i pis’ma semei voenno sluzhashchikh,
invalidov voiny, demobilizovannykh iz annii o pomoshchi i otvety na nikh.” Also see OGAChO, f. P-234,
op. 19, d. 1, 11. 147-148 for servicemen and their families’ strong complaints about living conditions and
apartments. (1 1/9/1945). During 1945, the local party and governmental offices received a total of 3,376
requests for material help (especially clothing and shoes) from the families of demobilized, servicemen and
other needy people. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, 1. 550b.

42 Decembrists were the young Russian military officials who fought during the Napoleonic War (1812-
1815), which is called the Patriotic War by Russian and Soviet historians. Those officials who had been
exposed to the liberal and democratic system of the West during their military actions in France and other
western European countries plotted a revolt against the Russian autocracy under Tsar Alexander I. In
December 1825 those young officials organized a revolt in front of the tsar’s palace in St. Petersburg but
failed. The participants in the revolt were either executed or sent to Siberia.

194

keen efforts to provide material support for the war veterans. Despite the obvious
differences in the historical conditions of Russia’s war against Napoleon (1812-1815) and
World War II, veterans of both wars shared “similar socio-psychological consequences”:
the awakening of a spirit of freedom, the rise of aspirations to a better life as a reward for
their victory, and the birth of progressive political ideas among the intelligentsia.43

In fact, Soviet soldiers during the Great Patriotic War saw that people outside of
the “Workers’ Paradise” lived better. Emereev, a former Great Patriotic War veteran
who marched to the west, recalled, “We realized that people lived better and better as we
moved further and further west.”44 Indeed, the Soviet leadership did not conceal its
anxiety about the possible impact of the better-off and more “civilized” capitalist world
that the frontline soldiers saw in the west.45 In September 1944, an article in Pravda.
shows well the concern. The article warned the Red Army soldiers as follows:

We shall yet pass through many foreign countries. Soldiers! Yours eyes will often

be dazzled; but do not be deceived by these outward signs of their so-called

civilization! Remember, real culture is that which you carry with you.46
As the war ended, the Stalin leadership took seriously the mood of the demobilized as
well as the soldiers who were still in the Red Army waiting to be demobilized. Indeed,

violence and riots by the demobilized soldiers occurred in the course of the chaos of their

returning home during 1945. These incidents made the leadership very uneasy. Archival

 

‘3 Zubkova, Russia after the War, p. 208. note 22. For similar points of view, see Aleksandr Nekrich,

F orsake Fear: Memoirs of an Historian (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991), p. 9; E. S. Seniavskaia, [941-1945
F rontovoe pokoloenie. lstoriko-psiklologicheskoe issledovanie (Moskva: RAN institut Rossiiskoi istorii,
1995), pp. 132-34.

‘4 Interview with Emereev. Magnitogorsk. July 6, 2001.

‘5 Weiner, Making Sense of the War, p. 366.

‘6 Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945 (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 1984), p. 947.
quoted in Weiner, Making Sense of the War, p. 366.

195

sources, such as NKVD chief Beria’s letter to other top members of the uppermost Soviet
leadership (e. g., Molotov, Malenkov, and Bulganin), prove that the Soviet leadership was
concerned about the violence that had recently occurred among the large body of the
demobilized who were still partially armed and many of whom had seen the West.47 As
Mark Edele points out, riots by soldiers were not a new story in Soviet history. Soldiers
played a key role not only in the revolutions of 1917,48 but also in the Kronstadt rebellion
of 1921. While the Kronstadters were the key force of the revolutionary movements that
ended the tsarist regime in 1917, they also were rioters ‘who fought against the
Bolsheviks’ privileges and authority in 1921. From these historical experiences, the
Stalin leadership well realized the potential dangers of soldiers.49 Soviet leaders’ concern
over the uneasiness of returning soldiers was one factor that contributed to the state
organs’ immediate implementation of the demobilization laws. The laws regulated
material and financial aid for the demobilized, including war invalids, family members of
fallen soldiers, and servicemen in general.

What made the Stalin leadership worry was the return not only of frontline
soldiers, but also of repatriated Soviet citizens who had been mobilized as a labor force
from the occupied regions of the Soviet Union to Germany and other European territories
controlled by the Axis powers. These repatriated people provided ordinary Soviet

citizens who had been long disconnected from the outside world with chances to know

 

‘7 GARF f.‘ r-9401, op. 2, d. 104, 11, 283-284. “L. Beria to Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Antonov”
(October 27 1945), ibid, d. 105, 11. 3-4, Nachal’nik upravleniia NKVD Laininskoi oblasti Pavlov to L. P.
Beria (November 10, 1945) [forwarded to Molotov], quoted from Edele, “A ‘Generation of Victors?’” pp.
47-48, 178-79.

‘3 Edele, “A ‘Generation of Victors?”’ p. 179.

‘9 Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Soviet State and Society between Revolutions 1918-1929 (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 77-78.

196

how people lived in different socio-economic and political systems. Indeed, some
repatriates recalled their life in Germany in a very positive way, especially in terms of
material things. According to a July 1945 report to the Soviet Procuracy, young women
who worked in restaurants and cafes enjoyed a certain degree of tolerance from German
employers, dressed well, ate well, and enjoyed the right to unrestricted movement within
the city. They were even able to go to theaters.50 These women brought home many
photos taken in Germany and showed them to their friends and families afier they
returned to the Soviet Union.51 Extolling life in Germany, Austria, Finland, and other
countries, other repatriates spoke favorably of German cities and towns, as well as of
their “culturedness” (kul ’turnost ’) and the “affluence” of peasants. A group repatriated to
the Rosslavl’ district of Smolensk oblast said:
In Germany we lived several times better than here. Peasants in Germany lived
well, just like those who lived in the cities; there were no differences between
cities and the country.52
The West was portrayed in a positive light by those who came in contact with it. One
repatriate claimed,
We had a very good impression of Germany and her system (poriadok). Ordinary
peasants’ houses were well furnished with electric lighting, heating, and beautiful
furniture. [In the Soviet Union] We have hardly seen houses such as those. In
most cases, only intellectuals have them. Germans were very cultured. [S0,]

workigg under the [German] farm-owners was not difficult, and the food was very
good.

 

5° RGASPI, f. 17, op. 117, d. 533, 11. 18-19. “Materialy k protokolu no. 224 zasedanie org biuro TsK
VKP(b): “O khode repatriatsii, ob ustroistve na rabotu repatriirovannykh sovetskikh grazhdanni ob
organizatsii politicheskoi raboty s nimi.” (7/28/1945).
5‘ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 117, d. 533,11. 18-19.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.

1 97

Considering that the repatriated amounted to more than 4.3 million people, it is
very reasonable to assume that the Stalin government had to be sensitive about
“malicious” influences that these large numbers of repatriated people could bring into
Soviet society.54 After the war, the party expressed its concerns with the disorganized
political education of the repatriated in some regions, including Belarus SSR, Ukraine
SSR, and a part of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) that
remained under German occupation during the war.55 In addition, the Central Committee
of the Party ordered the republic-level central committees of the parties in Ukraine,
Belorussia, Moldavia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to deploy agitators who could
politically educate the repatriated in their native language during their journey to home as
well as at border points, including railway stations and sea or river ports. The central
party ordered local party organizations to furnish railway stations through which the
repatriated journeyed home with central and local newspapers, journals, and literary
works, as well as radios. The Central Committee in particular urged the local party
organs to pay special attention to political education in the hometowns of the repatriated.
For example, the Committee ordered both individual and group discussions to be

organized for the repatriated in industrial enterprises and on collective farms.56

 

5‘ According to a party report, the total number of people who were driven off and captured by German
armies during the war was 5,452,343, including 3,455,067 Soviet citizens and 1,997,276 Soviet POWs. Out
of this number, 4,303,403 (including 2,817,383 citizens and 1,486,020 Soviet POWs) were repatriated to
the USSR as of July 20, 1945, while 1,148,940 still remained in the foreign countries where Soviet citizens
labored. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 117, d. 533, l. 84 (7/20/1945). “Doklad: zamestitelia upolnomochennogo
soveta narodnykh komissar’ SSSR po repatriatsii—o khode repatriatsii sovetskikh grazhdan po sostaniia na
20 iiulia 1945.”

’5 “Ob organizatsii politiko-vospitatel’noi raboty s repatriirovannymi sovetskimi grazhdanami,” Partiinoe
stroitel 'stvo, no. 16 (August 1945), p. 39.

56 Ibid., pp. 39-40. Given this circumstance, it is not a surprise that Soviet patriotism was strongly
exhibited in official rhetoric reflecting postwar Soviet values that the “Soviet man” should internalize. For
an example of official rhetoric on “Soviet patriotism” presented in a party journal, see “Vospitanie

198

The Stalin government sent many repatriated and Soviet POWs to the factories in
the Ural and Siberia. Magnitogorsk also received the repatriated in 1945. After the
filtration process by security forces, such as NKGB, NKVD, and SMERSh (Smert’
shpionam or “Death to Spies”),57 the Soviet authorities formed 12 divisions of repatriated
Soviet citizens in the cities of Germany, Poland, and occupied Belorussia; and then sent
them to Magnitogorsk. In this way, a total of 12,280 repatriated citizens arrived in
Magnitogorsk from October to December of 1945. .Upon their arrival, the local security
forces again “filtered” them over the two- to three-month period. Then, the local
authorities arranged employment for the repatriated groups in collaboration with key
enterprises affiliated with the People’s Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy.58 Local
security forces, such as NKGB, kept an eye on these “suspicious” repatriated citizens
through surveillance and sent reports entitled “On negative behaviors of repatriated
citizens residing in Magnitogorsk.”59

In addition to listening to returning veterans and repatriated Soviet citizens,

people living on the homefront throughout the war had another chance to obtain

 

sovetskogo pauiotizma—vazhneishaia zadacha ideologicheskoi raboty,” Bol ’shevik, no. 14 (July 30, 1947),
pp. 1-7.

57 SMERSh was a specialized counter-intelligence division in Soviet troops. One of its wartime duties was
securing the rear area of the Red Army from partisans and spies. Robert Stephan, “Smersh: Soviet Military
Counter-Intelligence during the Second World War,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 22, No. 4
(Oct, 1987): 585.

58 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 20, d. 11, ll. 5-50b (3/3/1946)“Dok1andnaia zapiska: o proizvodstvennom
ispol’zovanii l material’no-bytovom polozhenii repatriirovannykh na predpriiatiiakh goroda.” As of March
1946, 6497 out of the total 12280 repatriated were assigned to MMK, 4,789 were at Magnitostroi, and the
rest were at four other small factories. Ibid., 1. 5.

59 According to a local NKGB chief’s December 1945 report to the city’s party secretary, the War
Censorship department conducted surveillance on 156 outgoing letters written by repatriated citizens from
December 1 to 26. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 1, 11.150-151 (12/31/1945) “lnforrnatsionnoe
soobshchenie: ob otritsatel’nom povedenii repatriirovannykh grazhdan, prozhivaiushchikh na territorii g.
Magnitogorska.”

199

knowledge of the outside world: from enemy (mostly German) POWs. As the Stalin
government sent many enemy POWs to labor camps in the Volga, Ural, and Siberian
regions, local people had frequent opportunities to have contacts with them. A.D. Hans
Schuetz, a German POW who worked in a camp located in Saratov, says in his memoir
that he frequently had conversations with a young Russian guard at the camp. Their main
topics of discussion were the Soviet system’s shortcomings and economic conditions, and
the Soviet people’s poor living conditions.60 According to Schuetz, the young Russian,
called Misha, told him in spring 1948:

Russian people need help from the outside. . .What is needed is a political leader
who will stand up against Stalin and his government.61

Some Soviet citizens working in POW camps had the chance to compare living
conditions in the Soviet Union and the West through frequent and regular contacts with
those foreign POWs."2 It is not difficult assume that these guards who were acquainted
with POWs shared the information they acquired on the “outside world” with their family
members and close friends.

Magnitogorsk was one of the many towns in the Ural region that had POW
camps. As of March 1, 1945, two POW camps in the city contained a total of 3,108
prisoners, mostly German POWs.63 Afier the total number of POWs in the city reached

highest (about 4,500) in 1947, it began to decrease as they returned to their home

 

60 AD. Hans Schuetz, Davai, Davail! Memoir of a German Prisoner of World War II in the Soviet Union
(Jefferson, North Carolina and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1997), p. 137.

6' Schuetz, Davai, Davai, p. 137.

62 For the German POWs it was not difficult to have contact with Soviet people in the area of POW camps
after the war. Schuetz, Davai, Davai!! p. 137.

3”

63 Magnitogorskii rabochii, 15 January 1994. “Vremia vspominat.

200

countries. In late 1948 and early 1949 the number in Magnitogorsk declined to 2,000.64
The local authorities used these enemy POWs as a labor force on construction sites and
state farms until they were repatriated to their home countries by late 1950. In 1946
“Special Hospital” (Spetsgospitalia) No. 5921 for enemy POWs was re-deployed to
Magnitogorsk from the neighboring Bashkir Republic.65 As of August 1946, 400 enemy
POWs were hospitalized in the facility.66 Like healthy enemy POWs laboring at
construction sites and factories in Magnitogorsk, the POW patients also had chances to
have contact with local people as the hospital sent its foreign patients—without
permission from the authorities (UPVI UMVD)——to local state farms (sovkhoz),
collective farms, and the meat factory to collect food and other necessities that the
hospital needed.67 Indeed it was not so difficult for local people to have contact with
these foreign POWs because local authorities’ supervision over them was not particularly
tight.68 Like Shuetz, whom we met above, Kurt Keller, a German POW accommodated
in a camp in Magnitogorsk, developed a fi'iendly relationship with Efim Berliakov, a

local camp guard who provided him with help at his own risk."9 For some local residents,

 

64 V. P. Bakanov, Magnitogorsk: istoricheskii ocherk (Magnitogorsk: PMP <<MiniTip>>, 2001), p. 305.
65 AOAM, f. 160, op. 3, d. 2, 11. 21, 55.

6" AOAM, f. 160, op. 3, d. o, 1. 21.

67 AOAM, f. 160, op. 3, d. 6, 1. 4 (4/23/1948).

68 In a small town, Miass, located north of Magnitogorsk, German POWs were singing German songs on
the street and in local residential areas when they moved from camp to workplaces or vice versa. They
were even treated liberally by the local people at cultural facilities (kul 'turnye uchrezhdeniia) and at other
place in other ways. OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 9, d. 124, 1. 43 (6/6/1946). In fact, some local residents had
compassion toward the enemy POWs.

69 Magnitogorskii rabochii, 2 June 1993. “Cherez vselennuiu.” After Kurt Keller returned to Germany, he
did not give up writing letters to the Soviet government to get permission to visit Magnitogorsk to see
Berliakov. But it was only in spring 1994 that he eventually received permission from the Russian
government. When Keller visited the city, however, he found out that Berliakov had died four years
earlier, in 1989.

201

the foreign POWs were simply a subject for sympathy; but for others they were probably
sources for knowledge with which the locals could compare Soviet conditions with those
of the outside world.

The Voice of America, a radio service broadcasting western propaganda, was for
the people of Magnitogorsk another window on “bourgeois” views of both domestic
conditions and the outside world. The Voice of America began Russian broadcasting on
February 17, 1947. Programming aired two hours daily (one and half hours for the
European part of the Soviet Union and 30 minutes for the Far East region). According to
Voice of America officials, many Soviet citizens in regions from the Urals to the borders
of Poland regularly listened to the radio program.70 Indeed, listening to the Voice of
America (Golos Ameriki) during the postwar Stalin years was neither impossible nor very
difficult, even for the Soviet citizens living in the regions behind the Urals, an area
remote from the western border of the Soviet Union. This was possible because, first, the
establishment of a new broadcast base on the Eastern fi'ont after the war expanded the
listening range of the broadcast; and, second, there was increased access after the war to
foreign radio receivers, whose channels were not blocked by the Soviet authorities.
Some fiontoviki, those who served on the frontlines and entered Western EurOpe
pursuing Nazi armies, attained receivers during their stay in Western Europe and brought
them back to the Soviet Union, either keeping them or selling them at the local market,
probably for food and other commodities, as well as for cash. Nikolai Mikheev recalled
that after the war ended, one could easily purchase foreign radios, such as Philips, at the

local market. He claimed,

 

7° RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 94, 1. 70.
202

In Moscow radio channels were blocked by special devices; but in Magnitogorsk
one could buy foreign radios whose channels were not blocked.71

Although we do not know how many people in the Ural region listened to the
Voice of America, evidence indicates that listening to it was not unusual.72 One former
MMK worker recently testified that he heard of a big, tragic accident73 which occurred in
the MMK on December 5 1947 on the Voice of America two hours after the accident
happened.74 One former MMK worker who listened to the program recalled that the

program stated, “A big accident with a considerable number of victims happened to

 

7' Interview with Nikolai Aleksandrovich Mikheev (b. Aug 30, 1920; former communist party member),
the Palace of Pioneers, Magnitogorsk, January 15, 2003.

72 For example, the wife of a resident of the Lenin district in the city of Cheliabinsk reported that her
husband, a former worker, was discharged from the Ordzhonikidze factory for his violation of labor
discipline in February 1953 after refusing to vote for the election of deputies for the local soviet.
According to his wife, “He is not a Soviet man (sovetskii chelovek). For the whole day he listens to the

‘ Voice of America’ and speaks out about his approval of the American way of life.” OGAChO, f. P-234,
op. 17, d. 178, l. 21 (2/22/53) “0 khode vyborov v mestnye sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia po
Cheliabinskoi oblasti.”

73 Around 7: 30 pm, December 5, 1947 a deadly accident occurred at the Open-hearth Furnace No. l
workshop of the MMK. The sudden rupture of a crane which held a giant bucket filled with melted metal
caused a flood of 1600° C metal fluid on the workshop floor as the bucket fell. Witnesses to the totally
unexpected accident described how workers near the bucket burned literally “like human torches” in the
middle of the metal wave that overran the workers. According to a witness, the workshop was like a hell
where “people are falling into the fire.” According to ofi'rcial documents of the MMK, the death toll from
the tragic accident was 22. But statements from the wimesses of the accident suggest that the death toll
could have been as high as 80. Magnitogorskii rabochii, 15 April, 2000. “Nabat iz 1947-go goda.”
According to Chumakov, one of the reasons for the disagreement over the death toll was because personal
records for the workers mobilized as a “labor army” (trud armiia) and for the convicted who were placed at
the MMK are very difficult to trace. Magnitogorskii rabochii, 17 June, 2000. “So smeny vy vemulis’.” It is
highly possible that NKVD and other government departments like MVD kept the records of the convicted.
Rumors about the accident might have been widely spread among MMK workers and their family members
because many workshop and factory cadres rushed to the scene within 30 minutes after the accident
occurred. Magnitogorskii rabochii, 15 April, 2000.

7‘ Magnitogorskii rabochii, 15 April, 2000. “Nabat iz 1947-go goda.” It is quite curious how the Voice of
America could get accurate information on the accident instantly, if what the former MMK worker testified
was true. Such a quick report of the western broadcast radio program on what happened in the strategically
important “closed” city behind the Urals suggests that there might be an informant(s) working for the West
among MMK employees.

203

Nosov, “the king of metallurgists.”75 Negoda, a former MMK worker, also recalled “my
sisters and I” woke up late at night to listen to the Voice of America after the war.76 In
Cheliabinsk, a woman reported her husband to the local authorities for his listening to the
Voice of America.77 Even a worker complained about why listening to the program was
not allowed, even though Stalin had died.78

Under these circumstances, the Soviet government became more sensitive than
ever before about the “malicious” impact on Soviet citizens and consequent estrangement
of its subjects from the state’s control. Although the party expressed its concerns over
the weak propaganda work for the repatriated in some regions (e.g., Baltic region,
Belarus SSR, Ukraine SSR, and wartime-occupied territories of the RSFSR),79 the party’s
anxiety over the effect of foreign ideas was not limited to those regions. The geographic

isolation of Magnitogorsk as a hinterland behind the Urals did not stop the party’s

 

75 Ibid. According to lvanov, the day after the accident, the factory leadership and the NKVD announced
that an “enemy of the people” had sawed the support beam of the broken crane on which the giant bucket
had hung; and this eventually caused the fall of the giant bucket. The NKVD arrested two workers and
executed them later. Although one cannot know at this point the exact cause of the accident, as Ivanov
implies, it would be more plausible to see the catastrophe as accidental rather than as sabotage by an
“enemy of the people.” According to lvanov, however, one MMK worker raised the question that it was
almost impossible to saw the beam because it was always watched by at least 10 workers in the workshop.
After raising this question, the worker was not seen anymore in the workshop. Magnitogorskii rabochii, 17
June, 2000. It was unclear whether the conclusion of NKVD and factory leadership was true, because since
then the accident was never further discussed, publicly, until the late 19908. This was why Chumakov,
involved in editing work for an encyclopedia on Magnitogorsk, decided to investigate the accident to
satisfy his own curiosity in the late 1990s. He personally heard of the accident first only in 1953 when he
was a student of the Industrial College in Magnitogorsk. Magnitogorskii rabochii, 15 April, 2000. “Nabat
iz 1947-go goda.” Chumakov suggested that fear of the “iron rule” of the postwar Stalin regime might
make people restrain fi'om discussing the accident publicly. Magnitogorskii rabochii, 17 June, 2000.

76 Interview with I. D. Negoda. Magnitogorsk. April 13, 2003.

7’ OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 17, d. 178, 1. 21.

78 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 36, d. 40, 11. 1-7 (4/13/1956).

79 “Ob organizatsii politiko-vospitatel’noi raboty s repatriirovannymi sovetskimi grazhdanami,” Partiinoe
stroitel ’stvo, no. 16 (August 1945): 39. For an exarrrple from the Ukraine, see Amir Weiner, Making Sense
of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001), pp. 377-78.

204

concern about influence from the West. At a Komsomol (Young Communist League)
conference in Magnitogorsk in October 1946, the city Komsomol secretary pointed out
that the lectures for the Komsomol and other youth had special importance because
“bourgeois ideology, which misinterprets the Soviet realities, is penetrating our country
to a large extent.”80 Emphasizing that the party needed to educate youth about the
“Soviet Union, the most democratic system in the world,” the secretary reminded the
local party members that political lectures should be prepared to disclose alien influences
on Soviet youth and be based on the opposition of Soviet ideology to all harmfirl

influences of “bourgeois ideology.”8'

The local party also implemented its propaganda
work by showing western films, displaying the negative aspects (e. g., unemployment,
prostitutes, and hopeless daily life) of western society under the capitalist system. For
example, the local newspaper showed that local theater Magnit screened an Italian movie,
“The Bicycle Thief” in April 1950.82

It would .be wrong, however, to claim that the postwar Stalin leadership just
attempted to conceal or ignore everything about the West. The Stalin government
understood that was impossible, since many Soviet citizens had seen and heard about the

outside world. More importantly, due to its wartime experience the government realized

the necessity of learning some advanced western technology83 and of educating its

 

3° OGAChO, r. P-234, op.20, d.18, 112324 (Oct. 1946).
8‘ Ibid., 1.24.
82 See the theater section in Magnitogorskii rabochii, April 14, 1950.

83 For example, the MMK library staff reminded factory employees in June 1945 that those who needed to
operate and manage complicated and varied equipment in the MMK needed to learn foreign technologies as
well as the technologies developed by Soviet engineers and scientists. For this reason, the MMK
technology library subscribed to about 80 foreign periodicals written in various languages. “15 let nauchno-
tekhnicheskoi biblioteki kombinata,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 22 June 1945. Moreover, the Magnitogorsk

205

citizens about the increasing role of the Soviet Union in international affairs, not only as a
victor of the war but also a new superpower in the development of the Cold War. After
the war, creating the Soviet man who could fit into a global context was an important task
for the Stalin government.84 Ironically, while the authorities worried about the influence
of the outside world on the Soviet people and enhanced propaganda work on Soviet
patriotism, the same authorities encouraged citizens to be more sensitive about

international affairs and expand their interest in them. 85

 

authorities urged students to pay more attention to learning foreign languages and reminded them that they
had the right to choose foreign languages like French, English, and German. “Literaturnyi fakul’tet
Magnitogorskogo pcdinstituta,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 4 July 1945.

8‘ A. A. Danilov and A. B. Pyzhikov, Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy: SSSR v pervye poslevoennye gody
(Moskva: Possiiskaia politicheskaiia entsiklopediia Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy, 2001), 146.

85 For example, a Pravda article stressed that qualified Soviet citizens, therefore, should not forget for
“even a minute” the development of international reactions, which were pregnant with a new war plan
while they were accomplishing peaceful communist construction. “Slovo vozhdia o russkom narode,”
Pravda, 24 May 1950. Likewise, an article in the central party journal reminded party educators that
international conditions should be included in political education for the masses. B. Leibzon, “Sovetskoe
gosudarstvo i politicheskoe vospitanie naroda,” Partiinoe stroitel 'stvo, no. 1 (January 1946): 8. For the
party’s emphasis on follow up international affairs, see 0. Kozlova, “Zametki o rabote raikoma v novykh
usloviiakh” Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, no.13-14 (July 1945): 11. The official rhetoric of Magnitogorsk
authorities also reflects this trend. Pointing out that the “entrance of the Soviet Union into the international
arena” after the war had an “extraordinary significance for all the people of the country,” an editorial of
Magnitogorskii rabochii emphasized that as the Soviet Union had won the war, Soviet people used the
victory not only for themselves but also for helping others in Europe who were engaged in “liberating”
their countries, like Poland and Yugoslavia. The editorial urged the Soviet people to expand their
worldview. “Velikaiia zasluga sovetskogo naroda pered istoriei chelovechestva,” Magnitogorskii rabochii,
5 June 1945. Indeed, the local newspaper kept updated reports on the Pacific War and the Soviet delegates’
meeting with U.S. congressmen in New York while criticizing some local party members who had poor
knowledge of international affairs since they rarely read newspapers. “Massovyi miting v N’iu lorke,”
Magnitogorskii rabochii, 5 June 1945; “Press-konferentsiia po voprosu o sovetskogo-amerikanskikh
otnosheniiakh, ustroeniia gruppoi chlenov kongressa SShA,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 6 June 1945;
“Mnimoe blagopoluchie,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 5 June 1945. A propaganda pamphlet on a
Magnitogorsk worker, published in the early 19505, also emphasized that engineers’ wives were expected
be well informed on the Korean War (1950-53), as well as the winners of “socialist competition.” In this
manner, the local party organs sought to inform local people about those who were fighting for peace
against “Western imperialism” in the Far East during the height of the Cold War. See I. Gorelik, Mikhail
Sinitsyn: Urals Metalworker (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951), p. 21. In some sense,
the Soviet government’s effort to make its people have interest in international affairs through Cold-War
eyes achieved its goal. The authorities saw that the possibility of a new war between the Soviet Union and
the United States—which dominated official rhetoric on international affairs—stimulated the Soviet
people’s interest in international affairs which had developed during the war. A. Leon’tev, “Sovetskii
soiuz——oplot svobody narodov i mira mezhdu narodami,” Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, no. 19 (October 1945): 7.

206

Against “heartless attitudes humanitarianism as a key Soviet value

Humanitarian values were a large factor in the design and implementation of
postwar welfare policies. Indeed, the Stalin government was forced to pay attention to
humanitarianism to mitigate the problems prompted by the war. After total war, like any
other government, the Soviet government realized that caring for its physically and
psychologically exhausted citizens through a humanitarian approach was not only
effective, but also essential to secure social and political stability. However, one of the
biggest obstacles faced by the Stalin government in the implementation of their care was
governmental and enterprise officials’ indifference toward average people—or the
“heartless attitude” (bezdushnoe otnoshenie) frequently described in official rhetoric of
the party—which developed during the pressing days of the war. The Stalin leadership
was keenly aware that the gap between officials and average citizens caused by the
“heartless attitude” was widening and reaching a dangerous level. For the Stalin
government, it was not difficult to find indicators of the seriousness of the widening
fissure between the state and society. For example, immediately after the war, the
editorial offices of central newspapers such as Izvestiia and Pravda received many letters
from demobilized veterans who complained that bureaucratism worsened their housing
problems.86 The veterans were particularly critical of administrative officials’ refusal to
assign them the same housing that they had lived in before they left for the front.87

Despite court decisions restoring their housing rights, many evacuees also complained

 

8" GARF, f. 8131, op. 22, d. 5, l. 170 “Svodka, no. 61. otdela pisem redaktsii “IZVESTII.” It is unclear that
how many letters these editorial offices received from demobilized veterans. In July 1945, however, the
editorial office of Izvestiia received 1,500 letters fi'om Soviet citizens. Of those letters, about one-third
were about housing. Many letters that the offices received during the immediate postwar months were also
related to the demobilization issue. GARF, f. 8131, op. 22, d. 5, 11. 38-39, 89, 90. “Svodka, No. 38-39, 59,
61 otdela pisem redaktsii “IZVESTII.”

87 GARF, r. 8131, op. 22, d. 5, 1. 170.
207

that the court decisions were not implemented due to the indifference of officials. For
example, Zvesdochkin, a former Moscow citizen who returned to the city with his sick
wife from the region he was evacuated, complained that they had not yet received their
room from the organization, despite multiple court orders. He blamed the passivity of the
People’s Commissariat of Justice (NKIu: Narodnyi komissariat Iustitsii).88 Under these
circumstances, the authorities made enormous propaganda efforts to instill in the minds
of the Soviet people, especially officials, the idea, that a humanitarian mindset and
attitudes were crucial to the Soviet people.89

An article published in a party journal in September 1945 and re-published in
Magnitogorskii rabochii emphasized that party organizations should educate cadres to
have respect and concern for ordinary people. Quoting Stalin’s statement that “people
are the most valuable assets” of socialist/ Soviet society, it addressed Stalin’s unease over

some managers’ indifferent attitudes toward the average citizen.90 The Soviet authorities

 

8“ GARF, f. 8131, op. 22, d. 5, 1. 89 “Svodka, no. 59.

89 It should also be noted that the Stalin regime’s emphasis on humanitarian values does not necessarily
mean that state violence disappeared. People continued to be arrested for political crimes although
certainly the number began to decrease after the war. The contradictory features of the Stalinist system can
be understood, as Holquist pointed out, by understanding the humanitarian-spirit-based welfare practices
and the state violence from the perspective of “state intervention to refashion society according to an
idealized vision of the social order.” David L. Hoffmann, ed., Stalinism: The Essential Readings (Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), p. 130. See also Peter Holquist, “State Violence as Technique: The
Logic of Violence in Soviet Totalitarianism,” in Landscaping the Human Garden: T wentieth-Centuty
Population Management in a Comparative Framework, ed. by Amir Weiner (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 2003), pp. 1945. From this point of view, welfare and state violence are different sides
of the same coin.

9° “Chelovek-samyi tsennyi kapital sovetskogo obshchestva,” Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, (September, 1945),
pp. 1-8; it was republished in Magnitogorskii rabochii, 27 October 1945. The statement originated in the
address Stalin delivered to the graduates of the Red Army acaderrries on May 4, 1935. See Pravda, May 5,
1935. This indicates that the authorities’ attention to the value of people did not occur first after the war.
The intentions of the postwar leadership were different, however. As Stalin’s famous phrase of the 19305,
“Cadres decide everything,” indicates, the party’s prewar emphasis on human value focused on the
effective utilization of human resources (especially rniddle-rank personnel, or cadres). But the party’s
postwar emphasis on human values was rooted more in a humanitarian spirit. In the same vein, the postwar
regime implemented practices based on a humanitarian spirit more than ever while the prewar Stalin

208

fi'equently cited the Stalin quotation in official rhetoric in the immediate postwar years to
emphasis the significance of the value of each person. The article reminded readers of
Lenin’s warning about the negative impact of the Civil War on the people’s—especially
bureaucrats’——attitudes:
[While] there is a valuable experience, such as heroism, diligence, and etc., there
is also a bad [one]. The worst elements from the war [experiences] are
bureaucratism and arrogance (chvanstvo).
The article stressed that although leaders often had to overlook dissatisfactory relations
with the people during wartime, such attitudes could not be tolerated any more after the
war.91 Declaring that service was the most important thing making the Soviet system
strong, the article advised that taking care of one’s fellows was the “sacred
responsibility” of Soviet citizens.92 Contrary to what Weiner argues, the Magnitogorsk
case shows that the Soviet government’s attempt at social engineering did not vanish
after the war.93
The authorities’ emphasis on the people inevitably resulted in attacks on
administrative and enterprise officials. Under these circumstances we cannot completely
rule out the possibility that the Stalin leadership, through its criticism of officials,
especially local ones, intended to achieve two political goals: first, reinforcement of the

central control over local officials whose power had increased during the war; second,

diversion of possible antagonism from society against the government to “heartless”

 

government frequently used welfare as rewards for the mobilization of its population. For the
characteristics of welfare practice in the 19305.

9' “Chelovek-samyi tsennyi kapital sovetskogo obshchestva, ” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 27 October 1945.
92 “Chelovek-samyi tsennyi capital. .., ” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 27 October 1945.

93 For examples of postwar Stalin government’s diminished efforts to “nurture” its citizens with Soviet
ideology, see Weiner, Making Sense of War.

209

officials by providing images that the state was on the people’s side. We can find the
intentions of the Stalin leadership in the same party journal article discussed above.
Reminding readers of Stalin’s emphasis on attentiveness (chutkost ’) toward
people’s requests, the article enumerated some examples of factory directors who
violated the eight-hour-workday policy.94 It accused a factory director in Leningrad of
violating workers’ legal rights by expanding labor hours and depriving workers of
vacations and time off and another factory director in the Gorky province of his violation
of the eight-hour work rule.95 Neglecting people’s interests was the main rhetorical line
that the party used in its criticism of these officials. Pointing out that some factory
managers were still abusing workers’ patience and ignoring workers’ rights by exploiting
their wartime labor heroism, the article urged the local party and trade union
organizations to participate actively in the “battle to improve service to the people.” 96
Recognizing that during the war “our people (nash liudi) gave up many things and lived
with hardship and shortages,” an article in a party journal claimed in August 1945, “Now

”97

it is time to do all possible work to improve the living conditions of the people. It also

stressed that addressing the people’s requests for material comforts and cultured living
conditions was a critical responsibility since “the work of the Party is work with the

People (rabota c liud ’mi),”98

 

9‘ lbid. Stalin’s statement originally came from his address at the 15‘h Moscow provincial conference of the
Communist Party in 1927.

95 Ibid.
9" Ibid.
97 “Pered novoi piatiletkoi,” Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, no. 16, (August, 1945), p. 8.

93 Ibid. Also see N. Patolichev, “Bol’she vnimaniia voprosam kul’tury i byta trudiashchikhsia,” Partiinoe
stroitel ’stvo, no. 23-24 (December 1945), pp. 19-22. Patolichev, party secretary of Cheliabinsk province,

210

An editorial in Magnitogorskii rabochii stressed in July 1945 that the model
Soviet man was one of “great humanity (gumannost ’) and generosity (blagorodstvo)’”’9
The editorial also urged Soviet citizens to be concerned about their fellows, develop
compassion, and attend to the inquires of workers, collective farmworkers, and
intellectuals in order to secure normal working and living conditions.'00 Citing Stalin’s
instructions on the necessity of developing attentive and sympathetic relationships with
workers, another newspaper article in the same month criticized hardhearted officials and
enterprise managers and urged the leaders of administrative institutions and enterprises to
handle workers’ complaints with compassion.101
In Magnitogorsk “heartless attitudes” (bezdushnoe otnoshenie) became one of the
most frequently used terms in the local party’s criticism of local officials who did not
provide appropriate material help or job placement for local people, especially
demobilized veterans.102 For example, a July 1945 report of the city’s social welfare
administration criticized Danilenko, director of the municipal industrial complex, for the

“heartless attitude” he displayed in the implementation of material service programs for

the families of servicemen. According to the report, the director shifted the work position

 

stressed in a party journal article that during peacetime party activists needed to “draw twice or three times
more attention” than during wartime to the construction of housing, schools, hospitals, theaters, clubs, and
bathhouses.

99 “Moral’nyi...,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 31 Julyl945. (quoted from Pravda, 30 July 1945)
'00 Ibid.

'0' “Chutko otnosit’sia k zhalovam trudiashchkhsia,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 10 July 1945. Italics are
mine.

'02 For example, see a party report in OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 83, l. 18. (3/3/1947). “Dokladnaia...”
During the immediate postwar years, providing paternalistic care and paying attention to the demobilized
and their families were key topics in both the central party journal and local newspapers. For the example,
see V. Kuznetsov, “Zabota ob udovletvorenii material’no-bytovykh nuzhd rabochikh i sluzhashchikh—
osnovnaia profsoiuzov,” Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, no. 21-22, (November 1945), pp. 19-29; “Bol’she
vnimaniia nuzhdam trudiashchikhsia,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 7 October 1945.

211

of a demobilized veteran’s wife from foreman to rate-setter (regulator) without
considering the difference in wages and the difficult economic condition of the veteran’s
family. As a result, their living conditions worsened “considerably.”103 A city soviet
report highlighted an even worse case in a party meeting on March 7, 1946. Due to the
“rude and bureaucratic attitudes” of Magnitostroi officials, a war veteran working at the
enterprise did not receive any room for seven months, despite the resolution of the
manager (V. E. Dymshits).104 A city war administration report on March 3, 1947 shows
another example of hard-hearted officials. Due to the indifference of the city’s trade
unions and economic organizations, the vice director of the city’s People’s Education
administration failed to obtain any material aid for 185 poor school children who had to
quit school during the first two months of the year due to a lack of clothing and shoes.‘05
Consequently, the war administration report indicates that local authorities had
considerable concerns about many trade union and enterprise leaders’ “heartless
attitudes” toward the demobilized and servicemen. Reminding party members of the city
party’s resolution of February 1946 (“On the provision of help for the families of the
fallen soldiers had been carried out unsatisfactorily”), a district party secretary quoted in
the report suggested “severe punishment of the officials who had heartless attitudes

toward the complaints from the families of the fallen soldiers, servicemen, and

 

"’3 AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, 1. 165.

'04 AOAM, f. 10, op. l. d. 402, l. 1290b (3/7/46) “Reshenie No. 52: ispolnitel’nogo komiteta
magnitogorskogo gorodskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia 0t 7 marta 1946 g.” Subsequently, orders
were given to correct the problems . OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 83, l. 18 (3/3/47).

'05 Out of those students, 42 were from MMK workers’ families, 86 from Magnitostroi families, and 57
from other institutions and enterprises. An additional 200 children had to be absent at the beginning of the
spring semester of 1946 due to the same problem. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 83, l. 19.

212

demobilized.”106 Similarly, proposing severe punishment for a former MMK official
who evicted a fallen soldier’s family from housing, a 1949 city soviet executive
committee (Gorispolkom) report criticized “heartless and thoughtless attitudes toward fair
inquiry of working people” among enterprises officials. ‘07

The Magnitogorsk newspapers’ frequent and detailed coverage of local officials’
bureaucratic attitudes, as well as the local authorities’ strong criticisms of them, indicate
that the authorities took the issue very seriously. A local newspaper article in June 1945
criticized a factory administrator’s heartless attitude toward demobilized veterans.
Kazakov, a recently demobilized veteran working at the Mining Equipment Factory in
Magnitogorsk, had eight family members. Soon after he returned from the front, he
visited the workshop director to request help in getting beds for his family. Although he
received the director’s permission to obtain furniture, a factory accountant denied the
request, telling Kazakov, “You have not worked long enough at this factory to receive
that kind of thing.”108

Another article in Magnitogorskii rabochii sharply criticized the unsympathetic
attitudes of city administrators with several examples.109 Leinik, a worker recently
manied to a city committee employee, appealed to a city administrator to transfer his
wife back to the city from her new workplace 60 km away from Magnitogorsk. Despite

Leinik’s repeated requests to let his wife work in the city, the administrator did not

approve the transfer. Blaming the city administrator for his implacable attitude, the

 

'°° Ibid., 1. 18.

'07 The report charged that he had blatantly done this horrible thing to the family. AOAM, f. 10, op. l, d.
415, 1. 92 ob.

'°8 “Kogda net zaboty o liudiakh,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 11 June 1946.

'°9 “Chutko otnosit’sia k zhalovam trudiashchkhsia,” Magnitogorskii rabochii, 10 July 1945.

213

newspaper article pointed out: “there were many hardhearted administrators around
us.”1 10 In the same vein, the article discussed Leonev, a Magnitostroi worker who had
left his wife and a young son in Omsk province and subsequently received two letters
from an acquaintance: the first informed him that one of his sons, who was twenty years
old, had returned from the front armless; and the second notified him that his wife had
died and that there was no one to look after his young son. 1 ” After Leonev received the
letters, he asked the Magnitostroi cadre department for a work break. Instead of

' providing the break, however, the department requested the prosecutor’s office to
investigate the condition of Leonev’s family and to check out whether what Leonev said
was true. On March 1, 1945 after three months had passed, the prosecutor’s office
confirmed that the Leonov family was in dire straits and requested that the cadre
department give Leonev a work break. Although the department head endorsed Leonev’s
application, he did not provide the break immediately. Highlighting the unfeeling
attitude of the bureaucracy, the article informed readers that Leonev had applied five

times and had been waiting for six months.1 '2

Strategies of Stalinist Care

Rule of inclusion

The authorities’ criticism of “soulless” officials did not end with an urge to

cultivate humanitarian attitudes. One of the dominant features characterizing postwar

 

”0 Ibid.
'” Ibid.
”2 Ibid.
214

welfare practices was the extension of benefits to more recipients. Of course, the practice
of inclusion was not carried out in a “perfect” way: sometimes the principle was
undermined by extreme shortages. During the postwar famine from 1946 to 1947, the
Stalin government excluded invalids and others who did not have labor capacities (elders
and children) from rationing.1 ‘3 But it should be noted that the postwar exclusion was
neither permanent nor regulated by decree. While this group of the population was
excluded from rationing, they were at the same time included in the Stalinist welfare
system. In 1948 local authorities spent more than one third of the financial support
allotted for the city’s neediest people in unproductive groups such as invalids. (Table 1)
Unlike the welfare policy in the prewar years, the postwar policy did not exclude the
weakest groups in society simply because certain groups of people were less productive
or unproductive.114 Rather, it stipulated that war and labor invalids receive food and
other material aid. Of course, inclusion of war invalids on the list of welfare benefits was
not exactly surprising, considering that it was not a unique welfare practice of the Stalin
government but rather taken for granted by then as the indisputable responsibility of
modern states. But the continuing provision of considerable welfare benefits for war
invalids even after 1948—when the government largely diminished welfare benefits for

non-invalid veterans—and expanding the recipients of governmental welfare benefits to

 

”3 Donald Filtzer, “The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar Period,
1945-1948,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 6 (1999), 1022. See also Chapter 11, “Politics of
Distribution,” in this dissertation.

”4 For an example of progressive exclusion and marginalization of the disabled from welfare benefits
during the 19305, see Caroli, “Bolshevism, Stalinism, and Social Welfare,” 45.

215

include labor invalids115 suggest that a big change occurred in Stalinist welfare policies,
compared to the prewar Stalin years.

The rules of inclusion were more elaborated by the provision of welfare benefits
according to need, rather than merit or hierarchy. Special monetary payments
(edinovremennyie pomoshchi)—one-time financial support from the government without
payback obligations—that the authorities provided people facing unexpected difficulties
was one example of need-based aid.116 In Magnitogorsk war widows and the family

members of invalids (although not limited to these subjects)117

were the main recipients
of financial support during the immediate postwar years. The recipients of special
payment were selected as a result of either the local government’s inspection of city
inhabitants or its approval of requests from needy people. In many cases, the city welfare
administration gave out either 100 or 150 rubles. But some recipients received 200-500

rubles, depending on their condition. For example, a widow who needed to pay for her

husband’s funeral received 500 rubles; a sick pensioner received 300 rubles for resort

 

”5 For example, the Magnitogorsk authorities expanded the recipients of the “American gifts” from MMK
workers to the demobilized and invalids by the end of the war. During 1945, a total of 72,420 American
gift items were distributed to families of war veterans, including war invalids (OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19,
d. 92, 1. 50), along with financial and material help including clothing, boots, textiles, bed equipment, stock
(e.g., cows and pigs). OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, l. 159. (“Dokladnaia zapiska: o vstreche, trudovom
i bytovom ustroistve demobilizovannykh iz krasnoi arrnii, trudovom ustroistve invalidov otechestvennoi
voiny i okazaniia pomoshchi sem’iam pogibshikh voinov po gorodu Magnitogorsku.” -10/10/1945). Also
see AOAM, f. 10, op. l. d. 402, l. 129 (3/7/1946). By early 1946, the main recipients of the American gifts
were the demobilized and war invalids. AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 402, l. 192 (3/25/1946) “Reshenie no. 78.
lspolnitel’nogo komiteta Magnitogorskogo gorodoskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia: ob organizatsii
komissii po raspredelenie i vydache amerikaniskikh podarkov.”

”6 Edele shows that the aid system was institutionalized in 1948. Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement
Group,” Slavic Review, (2006): 125. footnote, n. 68. But it seems that some local authorities started the
practice before that. For example, in Magnitogorsk some inhabitants received special financial aid in 1947.
"7 For example, repatriated citizens received special financial support just as war invalids did. AOAM, f.
10, op. 1, d. 409, l. (1947).

216

 

treatment for his illness1 18; and a needy inhabitant received 200 rubles for her purchase of

9
seed potatoes.1|

Prioritizing war veterans

Facing extreme shortage of resources, it was a very challenging task for the
Magnitogorsk authorities to provide aid for those that needed it. In order to provide
welfare benefits for the neediest group in society, the authorities employed several
strategies. One was prioritization of demobilized veterans over non-veteran workers.
Compared to the aid provided to many workers, the financial and material aid provided to
demobilized veterans in Magnitogorsk was considerably more extensive.

The Magnitogorsk authorities’ prioritization of veterans over steelworkers (not
only unskilled but also skilled and sometimes technical staff) is representative of the fact
that for the Stalin government socio-political stability was the most serious issue, at least
during the immediate postwar years. As we saw in a previous chapter, the demand for
steel was most significant for the postwar reconstruction of destroyed regions and the
reinforcement of defense and heavy industries. Under these circumstances, workers in
the steel factories, especially skilled workers and ITR, were the group designated to
receive the most “privileges” in the distribution system. But the priority that these groups
had was taken by demobilized veterans during the immediate postwar years because the
authorities prioritized demobilized veterans over the non-veteran labor force. One can

assume that among the steel factory labor force young workers were the biggest victims

 

”8 AOAM, f. 118, op. 1, d. 187,11. 3435; AOAM, f. 118, op. 1. d. 203,1. 34 (1948-1949); AOAM, r. 10,
op. 1, d. 415, 1. 87 (1950)

“9 AOAM, r. 118, op. 1, d. 187,1. 35 (4/26/1948).
217

of the prioritization. From the authorities’ point of view, compared to demobilized
veterans these young workers lacked the strong group identity which could unite them
into a group resistant of state authority. Despite the great plight of the most
underprivileged workers, therefore, the authorities gave top priority to demobilized
veterans, the potentially “dangerous” group.

Following governmental decisions of June 1945 on regulation of aid for
veterans,120 the Magnitogorsk city soviet decided on July 19 to provide aged (starshikh)
demobilized servicemen121 and all invalids who had worked at enterprises in
Magnitogorsk before the war with material and monetary aid.122 The main welfare
benefits that one factory123 in Magnitogorsk planned to provide for the demobilized and
the families of fallen soldiers in accordance with the decree included the following: 1) job
placement; 2) support for housing (including housing services, such as apartment repair
and loans for the housing construction); 3) material help, including food, fruit seeds,

commodities, firewood,124 and monetary aid; 4) support for children, including the

 

‘20 For the governmental decree see the June 23, 1945 decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on
regulation of aid for veterans and their families. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, l. 97 (8/21/1945).
“Spravka: o vypolniaemoi robote po trodoustroistvu invalidov otechestvennoi voiny po gorodu
magnitogorsku.”

'2' AOAM, r. 10, op. 1, d. 383, 1. 166 (7/19/1945).

122 In Magnitogorsk, as in other local cities, the local social welfare administrations (otdely
sotsobespecheniia) and the government and district party organs (raiispolkom) dealt with veterans’ affairs.
The trade unions of the enterprises were often involved in the distribution of aid. OGAChO, f. P-234, op.
19, d. 92, l. 97 (8/21/1945); AOAM, f. 10, op. l, d. 383, l. 145, 166 (7/19/1945) “Reshenie: 45-isessii
magnitogorskogo gorodskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia. O meropriiatiiakh po realizatsii zakona o
demobilizatsii 13 starshikh vozrastov.”

'23 This is the case of the MKZ factory. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 83, l. 3. (1946) “Meropriiatii na 1947
g. po okazaniu pomoshchi sem’iam voenno-sluzhashchikh, sem’iam pogibshikh na frontakh voinov,
invalidam voiny i truda i demobilizovannym.”

'24 During late 1945, the city government provided free firewood for all of the 1,580 families of fallen
soldiers living in housing without centralized heating systems, and arranged private lots for vegetables
cultivation. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, ll. 159ob-160. (10/10/1945). “Dokladnaia zapiska: o

218

daycare center enrollment of all needy children of demobilized soldiers;125 and 5)
organization of sponsorship for invalids.126
Several government aid practices (such as housing, food supply, and job
placement) showed the local authorities’ priority for veterans over workers. Considering
the extreme housing shortages and poor housing conditions during the postwar years, the
living space distributed to the families of demobilized servicemen and the housing
renovation services were quite generous privileges that the local authorities provided for
the demobilized, war invalids in particular. A December 1945 report by the city’s war
administration (Voennyi otdel) indicated that during the year the administration “satisfied
most of the complaints” (572 out of 581)—many of which referred to poor housing
conditions—from families of war invalids in Magnitogorsk.127 The city authorities
renovated 2,200 apartments for the frontoviki families; arranged well-fumished

apartments for 392 frontoviki families, including those whose family members had died

on the front.128 For example, the family of a deceased captain and lieutenant colonel

 

vstreche, trudovom i bytovom ustroistve demobilizovannykh iz Krasnoi Armii, trudovom ustroistve
invalidov otechestvennoi voiny i okazaniia pomoshi sem’iam pogibshikh voinov po gorodu
Magnitogorsku.”

'25 Ibid.

'26 It should be noted that the patronage was not only for war invalids but also for workers invalided in
industrial accidents. See section below for details on how the patronage system worked.

'27 These were not the whole number of the complaints that the organizations received. Rather it was the
number of complaints in 1945 that were transferred to the administration from party organizations such as
city committees (gorkom) and oblast committees (obkom), and the editorial office of Magnitogorskii
rabochii. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, l. 45. (December 1945).

'28 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, 1. 50. “Otchet: o rabote gorodskogo otdela po gosobespecheniiu l
vytovomu ustroistvu semei voennoskuzhashchikh pri magnitogorskom gorispolkome za 1945 god.” Most
of returning demobilized veterans had their own apartments, which were renovated by the local
administration. For those who did not have their own apartments, the local authorities provided special
dormitories in the MMK, Magnitostroi, and other enterprises. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, l. 159
(10/10/1945).

219

received one of the best apartments in the city.129 In response to demobilized veterans’
requests for building materials, the city provided roofing material, more than 12,000 red
bricks, cement, and other materials for the renovation of their apartments or/and
construction of housing.130 Thanks to this support from the local war administration, a
total of 45 frontoviki families built new houses during 1945. During 1948, housing
support continued for war invalids, families of the fallen soldiers, and other demobilized
veterans. The city provided a group of city residents who were mostly demobilized
veterans and war widows with 191 apartments, 17 new individual houses, and 863
apartment repair services.'3 1 The authorities distributed new houses mainly to veterans
who had worked at MMK before the war and provided larger houses for war invalids
who had large families. For example, war invalid Alekhin, an MMK worker before the
war who had six family members, received an individual house which cost 27,000 rubles.
Medvedev, a category 11 war invalid who had four family members, received a house
which cost 12,000 rubles.I32

The city gave priority to demobilized veterans in job placement, as well.133
Evidence shows that the employment rate among the demobilized, especially war

invalids, was relatively high in Magnitogorsk. In July 1945, the city of Magnitogorsk

required all enterprises and institutions to provide a list of work for which the

 

‘29 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, 1. 1590b (10/10/1945).
'30 Ibid.

'3' AOAM, r. 202, op.1, d. 12, 1. 9.

'32 Ibid.

'33 Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System

after World War 1] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 30.
220

'34 The local authorities’ persistent efforts contributed

demobilized veterans could apply.
to a considerable increase in employment of the demobilized in the immediate postwar
years. For example, as of August 21, 1945, 1,065 war invalids were registered in

Magnitogorsk; and among them, about 80 percent were either employed or enrolled in

educational programs for future employment (See Table 8).

Table 8. Employment of the invalids in Magnitogorsk (August 21, 1945)

Category of I II III
'nvalidity

 

 

Invalid veterans 20 237 808

 

 

 

 

Employed 86 633
Learning 22 108
Do nothing

 

 

 

 

 

Source: OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92,1. 93 (8/21/1945).

In 1946, the employment rate of invalid veterans (excluding sick ones) increased by 87
percent through the efforts of the local soviet and economic organizations. The
employment rate of invalid groups 11 and III was relatively high (98.5 percent, or 726

135 Many disabled veterans began to work as qualified/skilled workers in

people).
positions such as turner, crane operator, and mechanic. Ninety-nine invalid veterans

worked as technical personnel. In 1950, the Cheliabinsk oblast surpassed its job

placement goals for war invalids and the family members of the demobilized, including

 

'34 AOAM r. 10, op. l,d. 383.1. 167.

'35 Out of 726 invalids, 195 were found jobs at MMK and 110 at Magnitostroi; 86 were enrolled in
educational institutions, 52 in factories, 45 in the cooperatives (artely), and 398 in other working places.
AOAM, f. 10, op. l, d. 402, l. 129 (3/7/1946). “Reshenie No. 52 lspolnitel’nogo komiteta Magnitogorskogo
gorodskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia.”

221

fallen soldiers. During 1950, about 20 percent more people (a total of 800) in the
category were employed than in the initial plan.136 Although a Magnitogorsk party report
indicates that a great deal of work had to be done on the government's plan for the full
employment of war invalids and their family members, another report of January 1952
indicated that the employment rate among category 111 war invalids (94 percent) had
increased by more than 15 percent over that of 1945.137
In addition to priority in job placement, the city soviet provided priority to the
families of demobilized servicemen in daily life services, such as clothing and shoe

repairs, and access to baths and barbershOps.138

Immediately following the war, the
Magnitogorsk authorities ordered all factories and cooperatives to provide immediate
clothing and shoe repair work with top priority for the demobilized veterans and their
family members.139 The city health department immediately organized medical service
teams for demobilized veterans in local hospitals140 and gave war invalids priority to see
doctorsm In addition, the city’s transport department guaranteed free passes for

veterans. 142

 

'36 OGAChO, f. R—948, op. l, d. 222, l. 4. “O rabote po trudovomu ustroistvu l material’nomu bytovomu
obsluzhivanniu pensionerov Chealibinskogo oblasti otdela sotsial’nogo obecpecheniia za 1950 goda.”
(1950)

”7 AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 442, 1. 9. (1/8/1952). “Punkt no. 2. o sostoianii trudovogo ustoristva invalidov
otechestvennoi voiny itruda.”

'38 AOAM f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, 1. 147.
”9 Ibid., 1. 1670b. (7/19/1945), “0 meropriiatiiakh. .
"0 Ibid.
”' AOAM, f. 10, op. 1. d. 383, 1.63.
"2 Ibid., 1. 145.
222

The city government opened a special cafeteria and store for war invalids in 1945.
They received free meals at the cafeteria.143 Some invalids working in small enterprises
that employed up to 20 invalids enjoyed some extra privileges in food supply. For
example, 17 war invalids employed in a metal manufacturing factory received
supplementary food, including 500 ml (about two cups) of milk each day, an enormous
privilege at the time.144

But we need to keep in mind the priority that the city authorities provided to
veterans was not perfect and permanent. Although war invalids had the right to receive
food stamps, they were often illegally excluded from rationing during the postwar famine
years.145 Just as food supply priorities were jeopardized by food shortages, the war
veterans’ (particularly invalids’) priority in job placement faced serious challenges due to
“heartless” enterprise officials who were indifferent to the employment status of war
invalids. For the managers of enterprises, the employment of war invalids required extra
effort and time-consuming work since they had to deal with complicated adjustment of

work process and re-qualification efforts.146 Therefore, despite governmental decrees that

 

"3 OGAChO, r. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, 1. 93; AOAM, r. 10, op. 1. d. 402, 1. 129 (3/7/1946).

'44 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, l. 161. “Dokladnaia zapiska: o vstreche, trudavom i bytovom
ustroistve demovilizovannykh iz Krasnoi annii, trudovom ustroistve invalidov otechestvennoi voiny i
okazaniia pomoshchi sem’iam pogibshikh voinov p0 gorodu Magnitogorsku.” (10/10/1945).
Contemporaries considered the right to receive milk as one of the “privileges” provided to war invalids. A
Cheliabinsk oblast party’s secret report in June 1946 indicated that many people expressed a strong concern
about the milk supply and asked many questions at meetings about whether the privilege (of milk supply
for war invalids) would continue. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 805, l. 30. (6/10/46) “0 nastroeniiakh sredi
rabochikh I skuzhashikh v cviazi o zakonom o postavkakh moloka.”

"5 See Chapter 11, “Politics of Distribution.”

"6 Edele, “A Generation of Victors?” 522.

223

guaranteed jobs for the demobilized, there were local enterprises and factory managers

who did not follow the rules.147

Enhancing social responsibility

Another welfare strategy that the postwar Stalin government employed was the
enhancement of society’s role in providing aid for needy people. Facing a lack of
resources and without the capacity to fully implement its welfare policies, the
government developed this strategy through organization of social guardianship and
patronage. On August 13, 1946 the Soviet Ministry announced a decree which regulated
“the obligation of all leaders of Soviet organizations and enterprises to help welfare
organizations and to improve systematically material and living conditions for the
families of deceased soldiers, invalids, and servicemen.”I48 Indeed, a considerable
portion of the priorities and welfare benefits for demobilized veterans would stop by

1948, when the major demobilization process was over.149 In this light, one can see the

governmental strategy of enhancing society’s role in welfare practices as a state strategy

 

”7 For example, some local enterprise managers neglected to provide vocational education plans for the
employment or promotion of war invalids. AOAM, f. 10, op. 1. d. 402, l. 129. The directors of the MMK
and Magnitostroi personnel departments did not work satisfactorily for the employment of war invalids.
Hence, MMK and Magnitostroi workshops were not concerned about the promotion of war-invalid workers
and did not facilitate work for the disabled with artificial limbs. Ibid., 1. 129 ob. The local enterprise
management’s negligence resulted in a delay in employment for demobilized veterans. By early 1947
many veterans who had returned in the third and fourth demobilization waves the previous year had not
been employed for seven months. By January 1952, the head of the Mining-Ore Administration (GRU)
employed only 53 out of a total of 572 available servicemen’s familes. According to a party report,
specialty education for the family members was not even carried out because the head considered it “minor
work.” As a result, in early March of that year, 446 privates and sergeants and 63 officers still remained
unemployed. But it should be also noted that many of them deliberately avoided working and were
involved in speculation. Some of the demobilized could neither work nor speculate due to their health
problems. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 21, d. 83, 1. 190b (3/3/1947). “Dokladnaia.”

"3 OGAChO, r. P-234, op. 21, d. 83, 1. 180b (3/3/1947). “Dokladnaia.”

”9 Edele, “A Generation of Victors?” p. 178, 183. Edele sees 1947-48 as the watershed in providing
benefits for veterans since later the state almost stopped its support for the program.

224

to shift its responsibility for caring for needy people to society (e. g., enterprises, social
institutions such as schools, and local communities). As we will see below, however, the
case study of Magnitogorsk suggests that, despite the seemingly decreased role of
“father” or “distributor” of the state, the state did not fully abandon its paternalistic role.
Rather, the local authorities continued to display that role to society even after 1948 as
they persistently audited the implementation of welfare practices by local enterprises and
social institutions.

Organization of voluntary aid drives—including “Sunday aid drives”
(Voskresniki), “Saturday aid drives (Subbotniki),” and “Monthly aid drives
(Mesiiachiniki)—for the demobilized and invalids (including those who were injured
from industrial accidents) was one of the tactics that the authorities employed to mobilize
necessary resources at the local level. Already during the second half of 1945 the
Magnitogorsk city administration had organized two “Sunday aid drives.”150 The
collected items and money were handed to the city’s department of social security so that
the department could distribute them to needy demobilized families through factory and
enterprise organizations. As the result of two drives, for example, the Garment Factory
No.1 handed over 25 children’s coats and 20 suits to the city’s Social Security

Department. I 51

In 1946, the Magnitogorsk city government required all organizations in
the city to collect supplementary clothing, money, shoes, rations (food), and firewood for

demobilized soldiers through these aid drives. ‘52 This suggests that after the war, the

 

'50 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19,11. 92, 1. 50.
'5' Ibid., 11.48, 50.

'52 AOAM f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, ll. 1640b, 1670b. It seems that collecting aid materials through the “Sunday
drives” was not satisfactory, though. In early 1946 the city administration set a yearly plan for searching

225

authorities redefined or expanded Soviet volunteer labor, such as subbotniki, to include
the provision of aid for the needy, such as the demobilized and invalids.

By 1948 the local authorities directed local enterprises to organize patronages, or
sponsorships (shefstvo), and a board of guardians (opekunskie sovety) for the more
systematic implementation of aid practices for their needy workers, such as demobilized
veterans (including families of war invalids and fallen soldiers) and invalid workers from
industrial accidents. 153 Like the aid drives, society (in this cases enterprises and other
social institutions like schools) was responsible for the implementation of this welfare
practice while the government supervised and audited their activities. The tasks of the
opekunskie sovety were very extensive. They included the organization of sponsorships
for war and labor invalids and the families of fallen soldiers; the organization of various
forms of aid, such as material and financial support; the arrangement of jobs for invalids’
and fallen soldiers’ family members; and arrangement of educational programs to help

154

them increase their skill level and earn more wages. In fact, the organization of aid

programs for needy workers was not a new practice developed after the war, but existed

155

during the war years. Local enterprises and institutions in Magnitogorsk had taken

 

for additional sources for aid materials for the extremely needy families of fallen soldiers. OGAChO, f. P-
234, op. 19, d. 92, l. 59.

'53 AOAM, f. 202, op. 1, d. 12, 1. 8-9; AOAM, f. 202, op. 1. d. 12, l. 1.
'54 AOAM, r. 202, op. 1, d. 12, 1. 6.

'55 In 1944 organs called “assistance committees” (komitet sodeistviia) were created mainly at the factory
level and run by invalids for invalids. The main function of the committees was facilitating the fulfillment
of aid for war invalids. The committee members were elected in the factories and included members of the
factory labor unions. The committees worked closely with the district welfare administrations, as well as
the factory labor unions. Edele, “A Generation of Victors?” p. 520. But it should be noted that the
committees were not created in every factory and that in some factories the organs sometimes existed in
name only. Moreover, the creation of the committee was more or less a temporary measure to encourage
the care of war invalids. Accordingly, most of them were discontinued once the war was over. The state’s

226

care of the families of the frontoviki during the war by providing not only material but
also “moral” support.156 The local authorities elaborated and developed this wartime
practice of sponsorship in 1948, when the government reduced many parts of the social
welfare benefits for veterans. In January 1948, the city’s social welfare administration
inspectors conducted a complete check on all families of fallen soldiers, war invalids, and
labor invalids in Magnitogorsk. Determining the neediest families in the city through
inspection, the social welfare administration directed local enterprises to organize boards
of guardians and sponsorships for inhabitants in extreme need. As a result, a total of 62
boards of guardians and 290 sponsorships were organized in Magnitogorsk during
1948.157

Many needy Magnitogorsk inhabitants received practical aid through the
opekunskie sovety and shejstvo created in enterprises and other institutions. For example,
the city’s Mining and Metallurgical Institute acted as a patron for a category I war invalid
by providing practical items, such as two outs of wool, 200 kg of potatoes, a one-half-
year-old cow, and 500 rubles of cash.158 The board of guardians of the Calibrating
Factory organized sponsorship for 11 fallen soldiers’ families. The board offered seven
new apartments to the families, arranged for the repair of 28 apartments, and provided a

total of 3,850 rubles of financial support and free passes for children’s camps and rest

 

interest in preventing the organs from developing into invalid interest groups was one of the critical reasons
behind the dissolution of the assistance committees. Ibid., pp. 526-527, 528-530.

'56 Magnitogorskii rabochii, June 17, 1945. By the end of the war, many servicemen, war widows, and war
invalids whose family members received material and monetary support through the patronage
organizations sent letters to the editorial office of the local newspapers, like Magnitogorskii rabochii, to
express their gratitude to local enterprises, institutions, and administration that provided aid during the war.
Ibid.

'57 AOAM, f. 202, op. 1, d. 12, 1. 6.

'53 Ibid.
227

homes. The board also helped 23 people raise their skill levels through the arrangement

of educational programs. 159

The board of guardians in the Magnitostroi Construction
Administration Department No. 10 operated sponsorship for 12 families of the deceased
and war invalids in 1948. These families received a total of 1,650 rubles of special
financial support, repair services for nine apartments, 9.5 tons of coal, and three cubic
meters of firewood through the sponsorship. The sponsorship even organized field
workers to plow land for war-widows’ families who did not have labor available for the
fieldwork.160 The board of guardians of the department arranged job placements for 23
people from deceased soldiers’ families and 19 from war invalids’ families. More
importantly, the board established patronages for the 11 neediest families for whom
employment helped a great deal.161

The board of guardians of the MMK, consisting of 14 members, distributed a total
of 106,390 rubles in grants, and offered apartment repair service for 52 families in
1948.162 The board arranged the distributions of 22 passes for sanatoriums and rest
homes, as well as 252 passes for the Pioneer Camps and sanitary playgrounds.163 Thanks
to the help of the board of guardians, for example, Zakharova, a war widow, received

extensive support including fuel, harvest help, 800 rubles of special financial support,

two passes for the Pioneer Camp for her children, and job placement for her son.164 The

 

'59 Ibid.

“’° AOAM, f. 202, op. 1, d. 12,11. 7-8.

'°' Ibid., 1. 7.
"’2 Ibid., 1. 6.
'63 Ibid., 1. 7.
”’4 Ibid.

228

boards provided Kazkova, another war-widow, with free commodities like plates, a table,
and bed equipment. In 1952 the MMK board provided the families of war and labor
invalids and fallen soldiers with a total of 245,000 rubles of financial support, 79
apartments, and 690 free passes for children (among them, 256 children of war and labor
invalids) to the Pioneer Camp.165 According to a 1951 decree of the city administration
committee (“On the employment and material help for invalid veterans, and invalids of
labor, and families of fallen soldiers of the MMK”), the board of the MMK arranged job
placement for 60 people from deceased soldiers’ families and 32 war invalids in 1952.
The boards worked to increase the labor qualification of 28 people so that they could
make more wages when promoted to new positions at their workplaces.I66
The MMK board of guardians arranged sponsorships at the workshop level. The
chemical-recovery workshop organized sponsorship for four families while the high-

grade rolling (Sortoprokatnyi) workshop sponsored six families.167

The heating system
workshop became the patron for an unemployed war widow who had three children; the
workshop employed her, repaired her apartment, provided 175 kilograms of seed
potatoes, ploughed up 2000 square meters of land without charge, gave out free
authorization for the Pioneer Camp for her children, and bought two tons of fuel and
three tons of hay. The MMK Railroad Department’s Loading Workshop organized

patronage for a category I war-invalid family. Through the sponsorship the workshop

provided the family with an individual house (which costs 12,000 rubles), six tons of coal

 

">5 AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 443, 1. 104 ob. (12/1952)
"’6 Ibid.

”’7 AOAM, r. 202, op. 1, d. 12, 1. 6.

229

and two cubic meters of firewood, 1200 rubles for the farmstead fence, and two sets of
beds. The workshop also provided help for the construction of a kitchen garden and gave
out free passes for the sanatorium and 1000 rubles in special financial support.

Even though it is difficult to know the exact portion of needy inhabitants who
received various forms of aid from the boards of guardians, it is clear that there were
many very needy people who were able to get though their worst times by relying on the
aid. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the authorities’ encouragement of local

enterprises to provide aid did not always lead to satisfactory results.

Responding to Stalinist Care
Enterprise managers: resistance to decreasing paternalism

Not surprisingly, some local enterprise managers refused to provide material help
for their needy employees, most of whom were demobilized veterans, by claiming that
provision of help for needy was the state’s duty, not society’s. Although local enterprise
managers had provided material aid for war widows and families of invalids and
servicemen faced with dire conditions during the war, some local enterprises managers
resisted the local authorities’ orders to provide material support or to employ war invalids
after the war. Local society had endured hardship and provided aid for the needy during
the war but society’s expectation for the state’s paternalistic role reached its height once
the war ended.

In June 1945, after its inspection, the social welfare administration of the Kirov
district of Magnitogorsk ordered Danilenko, director of the Municipal Industrial

Complex, to immediately correct defects in material and daily-life (material ’no-bytovyi)

230

services for the families of demobilized veterans. But instead of carrying out the
necessary improvements, he declared:

Let the party and trade union take care of the issue of securing (providing for) the
families. For me I need to concentrate on carrying out the production plan.16

A report shows that Danilenko was not the only enterprise manager who believed that
helping demobilized veterans was not his or her task but that of the government.
Chudikov, the director of the Meat Factory, firmly believed that taking care of the
families was the work of the community not enterprises. According to a report, the
director “had done nothing” for the workers of demobilized veterans’ families faced with
problems. Although the roofs were leaking and some rooms in their mud houses were
collapsing due to lack of renovation, the director did not provide any repair work for
them.169 Efanov, the representative of the MMK trade union, did not distribute goods
allocated for invalid workers during January and February 1947. Instead, he tried to hand
over those goods to the city’s social welfare department.I70 Although there was no
explanation for the official’s behavior, it seems that he did not want to accept the extra
responsibility, which he believed to be the state’s.

Due to workshop leaders’ indifference, the provision of aid through patronage or
boards of guardianship had not begun in some MMK factory workshops even by the early
1950s. The MMK industrial-fumace repair workshop, the open-hearth furnace
workshop, the rolling-metal workshop and the electricity workshop did not organize

sponsorships. Thus, no one in these workshops was involved in providing aid for the

 

"’8 AOAM, f. 10, op. l, d. 383, l. 165. See also Edele, A Generation of Victors, 375.

'69 AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 383, 1. 165 ob. (7/19/1945); see also OGAChO, r. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, 1. 161
(10/10/1945)

'70 OGAChO, f. 9234, op. 21, d. 83, 1. 180b (3/3/1947) -
231

17' The conditions in Magnitogorsk reflected the general

needy families of the factory.
conditions of the Cheliabinsk oblast. In 1950, about 87 percent of the plans for
organization of patronage (1,224 out of the planned 1,410) were firlfilled in the oblast.I72
Even in workshops where patronages were organized, provision of welfare help for war
and labor invalids was not carried out systematically since the patronage committee and
workshop committee of the labor union often did not know who the needy families were.
Thus, material help was given only to needy workers who reported their conditions to the
workshop.'73 Although some MMK workshops did not react to petitions of invalid
workers for three months, the factory leadership did not take necessary steps to have the
workshop heads and patronage committees provide aid for the invalids.I74 Paradoxically.
this “resistance” of enterprise officials can be seen as proof that the Stalin government
had succeeded in instilling a paternalistic image of the state in Soviet society throughout

7
the prewar and war years.1 5

Expressing gratitude for paternalistic care
Despite the difficulties faced by the Stalin government during the implementation

of the welfare program, it achieved more than its minimal political goals—cg,

 

'7' AOAM, f. 10, op. 1, d. 443, 1. 104 ob. (12/1952) “Punkt No. 436.”

'72 For example, with support from the government, the goals for apartment repair (116 percent or 2,848
apartments), providing apartments (111.8 percent, or 671 apartments), and providing financial help (109
percent or 1,752,815 rubles) were surpassed. OGAChO, f. R-948, op. 1, d. 222, l. 17. (1950).

'73 AOAM, r. 10, op. 1, d. 443, 1. 105. (12/1952).

"4 AOAM, r. 10, op. 1, d. 443, 1. 105. (12/1952).

'75 Some voters reminded the local candidates for the local soviet that caring for invalids, servicemen, and
the fallen soldiers’ families, including their children, was the state’s responsibility. OGAChO, f. P-234, op.
25, d. 68, l. 19, 20. “lnformatsiia: o nadpisiakh na biulleteniakh kandidatov v deputaty verkhovnogo soveta
RSFSR.”

232

preventing serious popular upheavals—through relatively successful operation of the
welfare practices. Even though there were challenging times (especially the postwar
famine years) and groups that criticized the government for its inability to provide
material aid at a satisfactory level, the Magnitogorsk inhabitants who received certain
kinds of benefits from the welfare system expressed their gratitude and support for Stalin
and the Soviet political system. Even though the benefits were not impressive in terms of
quantity and/or quality, the meager benefits seemed generous to recipients living in the
extreme hardship of postwar years, as Osokina correctly pointed out.176 Moreover, it
would be hard to deny the positive impact that the authorities’ humanitarian/patemalistic
criticism of officials’ “heartless attitudes” had on city inhabitants’ perceptions of the
state. The Soviet people’s responses to governmental aid would be psychological to
some extent, rather than solely materialistic.

The city residents’ expressions of gratitude toward Stalin and the Soviet
government reflect the population’s support for the Soviet system. In 1945 a war widow
and mother of four children, Usova, who had suffered from poor living conditions
claimed that “I now live well” after receiving material support from the government.
With war-widow status, she received grain seeds and monetary support. According to a
city soviet report, with the financial support she was able to purchase two goats, “with
which she considerably improved her living conditions.”177 In this situation, the widow
could also make additional income by selling milk or other dairy products from the goats

at the local markets. As we have seen in the earlier part of this chapter, the city

 

'76 Elena Osokina, Our Daily Bread: Socialist Distribution and the Art of Survival in Stlain ’5 Russia, I 92 7-
194] (Armonk, New York: ME. Sharpe, 2001), p. 93.

'77 OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 19, d. 92, 1.47.
233

government provided a total of 14 cows and other cattle (in addition to financial support)
to extremely needy families in Magnitogorsk during 1948.178 For the standard of the
time, having a goat or a cow was a big privilege. Futman, whom I interviewed in
Magnitogorsk, confirms the importance of owing cattle, especially for widows who had
to cultivate the fields by themselves:
After the war we had to reconstruct the economy of the western part of the USSR,
where everything was destroyed. Thus even the cattle were transported from the
eastern region to the west. There were women workers who plowed for
themselves because the number of cattle was small [there]. Young livestock such
as calves, cows, and sheep, were driven [to them]. When the livestock were
distributed to the people [in the western region], they even cried out from joy.I79
Many veterans and their wives sent thank-you letters to newspaper editorial offices,
expressing their gratitude to the local social welfare administration that had taken care of
their families by providing material support during the war years. '80 Senior sergeant
Loktionov stated in his letter to Magnitogorskii rabochii:
The Social Welfare Department of the Ordzhonikidze district and the people of
the motor transport depot of the MMK surrounded my family with care and
attention. . .the Social Welfare Department provided essential help.181

Messages and slogans that voters wrote on their ballots often reflect popular

opinion.'82 Thanks to newly declassified archival documents, we now have access to

 

"8 AOAM, f. 202, op. 1, d. 12, 1. 9. (1948)

”9 Interview with Futman, January 18, 2003. (Magnitogorsk). It is unclear why the authorities did not use
transportation such as trains or trucks. Probably, the lack of transportation forced the authorities to drive
the cattle rather than to load them on the train. Immediately after the war much of the transportation
system was concentrated on the western part of the USSR to transport demobilized soldiers and other
resources from the west to the east. No matter what caused the lack of transportation, certainly, driving
cattle from the eastern region to the western must have been challenging work. Futman explained, “People
discussed how they drive stock for thousands of kilometers. First of all, cattle needed to be fed at some
places so that they did not perish, so people needed to find pasture. Secondly, cattle had to be protected
from wolves and also fi'om thieves. This was a complicated task.”

'80 Magnitogorskii rabochii, June 17, 1945. “obzor pisem: vypolniaiut svoi dolg.”

'8' Ibid.
234

these messages. Although Sarah Davies highlights only hostile messages on the ballot

183

papers from the elections of the 19303, the archival sources that I examined reveal that

many voters wrote patriotic and politically loyal messages and slogans (including praises

for Stalin, the Party, or the government) on their ballots,I84

along with other messages
(including complaints of shortages, denunciation of certain candidates, and requests for
what they needed) during the elections of the postwar Stalin era. Since the adaptation of
the 1936 Constitution, there were a total of seven elections, including three elections for
local soviets (1947-48, 1950, and 1953), two elections for Republic Supreme Soviets
(1947 and 1951), and two elections for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1946 and 1950)
during the postwar Stalin era.‘85 The archival sources that I examined were the reports by
the Magnitogorsk city party apparatus (obkom) on two elections, the Republic Supreme
Soviet election of 1951 and the local soviet election of 1953.

To what extent are the archival materials—party and security organs’ reports
dealing with the public mood—reliable sources reflecting popular sentiments? As

historians have recently alerted us, it is possible that evidence in the reports was

frequently edited.186 Depending on the motivations of the compilers, the features of the

 

'82 Some voters also either wrote messages on the ballot boxes or put small notes (zapiski), such as
petitions, in the ballot boxes during the elections. For example, see OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 17, d. 169, 1.
140; OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 25, d. 68, l. 4. (2/25/1951). “0 nadpisiakh na biulleteniakh kandidatov v
deputaty verkhovnogo soveta RSF SR.”

'83 Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin ’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 112.

'8‘ George Carson also pointed out that the Soviet press reported during the 1950 elections that many voters
wrote patriotic slogans. George Barr Carson, Electoral Practices in the U.S. S. R. (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1955), p. 75. See also Jerome M. Gilison, “Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing
One Percent,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, N0. 3 (September 1968): 815.

'85 Howard R. Swearer, “The Functions of Soviet Local Elections,” Midwest Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 5, No. 2 (May, 1961): 145.

235

reports could differ drastically depending on whether they intended to emphasize the
negative or positive. The secret-police reports by the NKVD usually tended to emphasize
the negative attitudes of the people since the main responsibility of the organ was to
identify those holding hostile views. In contrast, the Party reports usually focused more
on the positive mood of the people since the party officials wanted to demonstrate their

187

propaganda activities functioned effectively. Indeed, the party reports on the ballot

messages included relatively small portions of negative (otritsatel ’ny) sentiments.188
Despite the possibility of this bias, it does not necessarily mean that the messages
themselves are false. Rather, the report would be one of several good sources
demonstrating types of popular mood.
In February 1951, one war invalid of Magnitogorsk wrote a note on her ballot for
the election of the delegates for the Supreme Soviet:
I vote for beloved leader and good comrade Stalin, giving heartfelt thanks and
Bolshevik greetings for the whole care. I, an invalid pensioner, live by his care. I
just hope from my heart that dear Stalin is healthy and lives long, long time.
Pensioner, A. N. Murashkina.189

Similarly, Shteingart also wrote on her ballot, “1, daughter of the Soviet Union, invalid of

Great Patriotic War ....thank you, Stalin (Shteingart Eva Markovna).”190

 

'86 Davies, Popular 0pinion..., p. 13; Zubkova, Russia After the War..., p. 7.

187

Davies, Popular Opinion, p. 14.

'88 The report by the party secretary of the gorkom on the messages written on the ballots of the Supreme
Soviet election held in February 1951 indicated that the proportion of the messages that the party
categorized as “negative messages” was 9 percent (32 out of 357). For the party report on the local soviet
election in February 1953 it was only 4 percent (9 out of 224). OGAChO, f. P-288, op. 17, d. 169, 11. 129-
140 “lnformatsiia: o nadpisiakh na biulletniiakh kandidatov v deputaty v mestnye sovety deputatov
trudiashchikhsia.” (3/2/1953); f.P-234, op. 25, d. 68, 11. 4-27. For the case of Cheliabinsk city see
OGAChO, f. P-288, op.17, d.169, 11. 59-70.

"‘9 OGAChO, f.P-234, op. 25, d. 68,1. 9.

236

Surely, not all needy people in the city received material and moral support from
the local government and enterprises. In comparison with later years, the welfare system
during the period was still underdeveloped. Some people who did not receive sufficient
welfare benefits expressed their complaints on their ballots. For example, a message on a
ballot reads: “Take care of the invalids of the Patriotic War!”191 Another message, which
was probably written by a person who was neither an invalid nor a war veteran, reads: “1
request care for the old who have not any relatives, just like taking care (otmetit ’) of
invalids and the families of the Red Army?”92 In some sense, however, this message
implies that the local government systematically guaranteed a certain level of welfare
benefits for invalids and war veterans, though they might not have been very impressive.

The postwar welfare practices along with the emphasis on the humanitarian spirit
caused those who received welfare benefits to have gratefirl attitudes towards the
government. In this sense, the strategy was successful and allowed the citizens to
maintain positive views of the Stalinist system and the country’s future during the hard

times of the postwar years.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that providing needy people with material help was a
challenging task for the Stalin government during the postwar years when famine and
shortages undermined the state’s capacity for paternal care. No matter how dire the

postwar conditions became for the Soviet government, taking care of its subjects was a

 

'90 Ibid., 1. 24.
'9' Ibid., 1. 19.
'92 Ibid.
237

desperate issue that was closely related to the issue of socio-political stability and the
legitimacy of the Soviet government. After the war the large number of war veterans,
war invalids, and war widows—many of whom needed urgent material help—remained
the social groups that could undermine the stability. To exacerbate the situation from the
party’s point of view, “heartless” officials could be catalysts aggravating exhausted local
people’s resentment against the authorities. Indeed, the party’s criticism of heartless
local officials would enable it to achieve additional political goals: the reinforcement of
the center’s influence on local officials whose autonomous power had increased during
the war and the diversion of people’s complaints to “bad” officials rather than the
governmental system. These postwar conditions forced the local authorities to develop
more humanitarian features in welfare policy (i.e., provision of need-based benefits) than
before. Compared to the prewar Stalin government’s welfare practices, implemented
mainly on the basis of merit (e. g., provision of welfare benefits as incentives to
encourage workers’ labor productivity), the postwar practice was more inclusive and
humanitarian. Seen this light, the postwar Stalin era, rather than the Khrushchev era, was
a turning point in the development of the inclusive nature of Soviet welfare policy.

Given the limited capacity of the government, the Stalin government developed strategies
(such as prioritization of veterans and increasing society’s role in welfare practices) to
gain maximum results for its socio-political goals. Because the welfare benefits were
neither sufficient nor distributed to “all” needy people, some Magnitogorsk people

expressed strong complaints against the authorities and welfare programs.193 Local

 

‘93 For example, some voters’ ballot messages during local elections show their resentment against the
state’s poor welfare policy. While one message reads: “The working class has been poorly taken care of,”
another one reads: “There is no care for invalids of the Patriotic War.” OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 25, d. 68,
11. 26-27.

238

enterprise managers viewed the authorities’ pressure on them to provide aid for needy
employees as shifting the state’s responsibility onto them. But many recipients of need-
based welfare benefits expressed their gratitude to the Stalin government for its paternal
care. This Stalinist care increased people’s trust in the Soviet system.

Moreover, the increased inclusiveness in welfare practice (compared to the
prewar years) was one of the improvements that Magnitogorsk people experienced in
their daily lives. Along with the emergence of other signs of “normalization” in daily life
(e.g., construction of new apartment complexes in the city, price drops, improved food

supplies, and decrease in state terror194

), the postwar Stalinist system of care enabled
local people to internalize official ideology and maintain their belief in the progress of

Soviet society toward communism.‘95 The postwar Stalin government’s skillful and

 

'94 The “warning” of the Cheliabinsk oblast public prosecutor (prokuror) and senior advisor of justice
(starshii sovetnik iustitsii) t0 the Magnitogorsk party secretary symbolically shows the Stalin government’s
effort to decrease unnecessary state violence after the war. In his official letter of September 1950 the
public prosecutor urged the Magnitogorsk party secretary to stop the “vicious practice (porochnaia
praktika) of groundless arrests and bringing innocent citizens to trial which had continued despite repeated
instructions of the Cheliabinsk obkom since March 1948.” OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 24, d. 11, l. 60.
“Sekretariu Magnitogorskogo gorkoma VKP (b), Tob. Gubkinu, P.N.” (9/21/1950). Indeed, this example
represented the postwar trend of decrease in state terror. The number of people convicted for political
crimes which once reached a total of 123,294 in the Soviet Union in 1946 began to decrease throughout the
rest of the postwar Stalin years. Accordingly, the number was only a total of 28,800 (or a 76.6 percent
decrease from 1946) in 1952. The number of people convicted in 1946—the second largest number during
1939-1953—was only 15.5 percent of that in 1937, the peak year of the Great Terror. V. P. Popov,
“Gosudarstvennyi terror v sovetskoi Rossii. 1923-1953 gg.” Otechestvennye arkhivy, No. 2, (1992), 28.

'95 During the Supreme Soviet election of 1951, many voters in Magnitogorsk wrote anonymous messages
on their ballots indicating their belief in the progress. OGAChO, f. P-234, op. 25, d. 68, l. 6. This indicates
that many local inhabitants accepted official ideology and identified themselves with official values. One
can see these messages as simply a superficial form of “speaking Bolshevik”—using official language in
public expressions, without internalization of the official values. But it is unlikely that these messages
were written with the expectation of benefits since they did not contain voters’ names. Moreover, some
conditions suggest that writing such politically loyal messages was a behavior coming out of voters’ sincere
attitudes or beliefs in official values. Under the new Soviet election system (set up in 1936) a certain
degree of devotion or enthusiasm was required to enter messages (whether politically loyal or anti-Soviet,
such as marking opposition to candidates appointed by the party) on the ballots. In order to write these
messages, voters needed to bring their pens and enter screened booths. Carson, Electoral Practices in the
USSR, p. 76. Indeed it was a very cumbersome practice for voters to undertake to “speak Bolshevik,”
though many voters simply received ballots from officials and put them directly in the ballot boxes if they
agreed with the candidate.

239

vigorous utilization of welfare policy and its efforts to portray the government as a moral
polity allowed the people of Magnitogorsk to maintain their trust in the Stalin leadership
and their hopes for the future, despite the shortages and hardships that they faced in their

daily lives.

240

Conclusion

The Magnitogorsk Experience: Both Typical and Unique

Postwar changes in the social, economic, and political landscape of Magnitogorsk
and its inhabitants’ socio—political attitudes were deeply rooted in the city’s wartime
experiences. While some of these experiences were commonly shared by other industrial
towns of the Soviet Union (whether on the front or in home-front regions), other
experiences were particularly limited to the cities like Magnitogorsk, a key industrial
defense center on the home front. The wartime experiences that Magnitogorsk shared
with other industrial towns included, first, the enhanced authority of enterprise
managerial staff, such as technical personnel and enterprise officials. The urgency of
wartime steel production did not allow local authorities and enterprise managers to rely
on workers’ voluntarism; rather, professional knowledge and ability to mobilize available
resources were essential in order to implement orders received “from above” and to make
important decisions. Thus, as the war progressed, the local administrative and enterprise
managers became more authoritarian as their power increased. In the large enterprises,
this resulted in the consolidation of hierarchical distribution and wage systems in which
technical personnel and enterprise officials had official and unofficial privileges vis-a-vis
ordinary workers. Although the significance of technical personnel in workshops
emerged during the 19303 after the decline of authorities’ excessive emphasis on
voluntarism, my case study indicates that it was during the war years (not postwar as

some scholars argue') that the professional groups consolidated their privileges. Second,

 

' For example see Vera Dunham, In Stalin 's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet F ictton (Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 1976); J. Eric Duskin, Stalinist Reconstruction and the Confirmation of a
New Elite, I 945-1953 (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

241

the wartime concentration of power in enterprise and governmental administrative
officials led to an increase in bureaucratism and indifferent attitudes toward average
citizens, frequently described as “heartless attitudes” in postwar official rhetoric. Third,
the war changed not only the attitudes of the officials, but also the attitudes of average
citizens who had sacrificed for the war effort. A sense of entitlement growing out of their
contribution to the victory became a crucial element affecting the local inhabitants’ self-
identification. Thus, a rise in tension between the increasingly authoritarian officials and
average citizens who were becoming increasingly assertive was inevitable by the end of
the war. Diminishing the tension became an urgent task for the local authorities in the
postwar period.

One of Magnitogorsk’s most unique experiences as an industrial defense center
on the home fiont was the city’s role as a key producer’of steel for tanks and shells.
Labor for the war effort became one of the most dominant aspects in daily life in wartime
Magnitogorsk, just as it did in other home-front cities. Although the city’s inhabitants
were able to hear about conditions on the frontlines (including Nazi atrocities,
collaboration with the enemy, and resistance movements) from various sources (such as
the official mass media, evacuees from the front regions, and wounded soldiers evacuated
to the city), the extent of the impact of this information on self-identification was less
than that of labor, a key part of daily life in a wartime home-front city. The particular
status of Magnitogorsk as a wartime “arsenal” and the experience of wartime labor not
only created the city’s myth of the war, which profoundly affected the consolidation of a

regional identity, but also deeply affected the self-identification of the inhabitants of

242

Magnitogorsk. This wartime experience of labor and the myth of the war set the stage for
how the local people “thought, acted, and interacted” after the war.2

Like its legacies from the war, the postwar experiences of Magnitogorsk were
both typical and unique. There are some common features of postwar daily life and labor
that both the former front and home-front regions shared. First of all, in both regions,
material scarcity and consequent hardship dominated daily life.3 Secondly, in terms of
production culture, workshop voluntarism, which resulted in the “abandonment” of
socialist competition, declined on production lines as the focus turned to professionalism
in both former front and home-front regions.4 In addition, like many other local
authorities regardless of whether in the front or home front regions, Magnitogorsk
authorities also had to grapple with a redefinition of “Sovietness” after the war in order to
make the concept appropriate to postwar social, economic, and political circumstances.
The Soviet values presented in official rhetoric in postwar Magnitogorsk reflect the local
(as well as central) authorities’ struggle to overcome the legacies of the war by redefining
what it meant to be Soviet. My case study of Magnitogorsk reveals that one of the
redefined criteria for Sovietness that emerged during the postwar Stalin period is a
humanitarian attitude or compassion for needy people. The Stalinist government’s

emphasis on human values was not a new, postwar phenomenon, but had appeared in the

 

2 Juliane F urst, “Introduction: Late Stalinist Society: History, Policies and People,” in Late Stalinist Russia:
Society Between Reconstruction and Reinvention, ed. Juliane Furst (London and New York: Routledge,
2006), p. 6

3 See Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and Restoration of the Stalinist System
after World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

4 For a national trend of the forrnalistic implementation of socialist competition, see Filtzer, Soviet Workers
and Late Stalinism, pp. 232-33. The postwar trend of the decline of voluntarism caused by the emphasis on
professionalism was vividly demonstrated in Magnitogorsk through distribution policies based on the
significance of work type rather than the fulfillment of output norms.

243

mid-19305. However, this Soviet concept was redefined after the war. While the
emphasis during the 19305 mainly focused on effective utilization of human resources,
the postwar emphasis on human values was rooted in a philanthropic ethos. After total
war, the Stalin leadership was keenly aware that the gap between officials and average
citizens caused by the “heartless attitudes” that had developed during the pressing
moments of the war was widening and reaching a dangerous level. For the Stalin
government, caring for its exhausted citizens through a humanitarian approach was
essential to secure social and political stability. Scolding officials for their indifference
toward needy people’s requests for help, local official rhetoric frequently emphasized that
compassion toward the needy was essential for a model Soviet citizen. The authorities’
redefinition of Sovietness shows that the postwar Stalin leadership had a double burden:
the authorities had to mobilize the labor force for postwar reconstruction while consoling
the psychologically and physically exhausted and wounded population.5 The local
authorities were very concerned about the moods and reactions of people who were
exhausted by wartime labor, had lost family members during the war, became disabled,

or had a chance to see or hear about the living standards of the “outside world.” Thus, on

 

5 A Magnitogorskii rabochii editorial, defining friendship among different nationalities within the Soviet
Union as the “moral responsibility” of the “Soviet man,” also shows the regime’s efforts to overcome one
of the burdens created by the war. See “Moral’nyi oblik sovetskogo cheloveka,” Magnitogorskii rabochii,
31 July 1945. During the war years, various ethnic groups (including Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingush,
Kalmyks, Karachays, Crimean Tatars, and Koreans in the Far East) who were suspected as would-be spies
or collaborators with the enemy were deported as the “enemy within.” After the war, the Stalin
government seemed to emphasize the unity of the peoples of the Soviet Union from its concern over the
possible threat to that unity from the psychologically wounded “enemy inside.” Certainly, there was no
mention about the nationalities that the Stalin regime deported during the war years in the local
Magnitogorsk newspapers. But, describing how workers from Central Asia and Kazakhstan who worked at
construction sites in Magnitogorsk contributed to the war effort against foreign enemies and how the local
authorities took care of these workers who were not fluent in Russian, some local newspaper articles sought
to invoke feelings of “brotherhood” among the people in Magnitogorsk. Sec “V druzhnoi sem’e,”
Magnitogorskii rabochii, 21 October 1945; “Inzhener—stroitel, ”’ Magnitogorskii rabochii, 30 December
1945; “Sorevnovanie otsutstvyet,” Magnitostroi, 7 September 1946.

244

the one hand, the official rhetoric drove workers to keep the wartime work pace; on the
other hand, it chastised the hardhearted attitude of the bureaucrats, emphasizing the
importance of compassion in dealing with the local people who were facing material
hardship.

Some of the Magnitogorsk experiences demonstrate delicate variations between
front and home front regions. First, the case study of Magnitogorsk suggests that the
factory managers’ lenient attitudes toward violations of labor discipline, such as
absenteeism and desertion, were not always a result of the managers trying to keep
workers during an extreme shortage of labor as some studies of the home front show.6 In
Magnitogorsk, the major enterprise managers disciplined workers leniently for violating
labor rules, even though they did not have a serious labor shortage as other home-front
regions did during the postwar years. This suggests that in cases of key industrial towns
on the home front which managed to maintain a relatively stable supply of labor,
managerial leniency can be seen as a result of a local management survival strategy to
avoid prosecution by covering up cases of labor-discipline violations and/or as an effect
of the humanitarian ethos propagandized in official rhetoric. Second, my study indicates
that 1948 was not a national turning point, when signs of improvement in the food supply
began to appear, as some historians argue.7 It was not until the early 1950s in

Magnitogorsk that signs of improvement and stability in the food supply finally

 

6 For example see Jeffrey W. Jones, “In My Opinion This Is All Fraud!” Concrete, Culture, and Class in the
‘Reconstruction’ of Rostov-on—the-Don, 1943-1948” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, 2000), p. 144.

7 See Donald Filtzer, “The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar
Period, 1945-1948,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, N0. 6 (1999), 1031; Julie Hessler, A Social History of
Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices. and Consumption, 19] 7-1953 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2004), p. 297; Furst, “Introduction,” in Late Stalinist Russia, p. 2.

245

materialized.8 This fact shows that the Stalin leadership had readjusted regional priorities
by the end of the war. The former front regions, which suffered enormous damage
during the war, received top priority in supplies afterwards while the industrial centers in
the deep rear home front could not avoid a relative degradation of priority in material
supplies, regardless of their economic and strategic significance. Moreover, when
rationing ended in late 1947, some “privileged” industrial defense centers such as
Magnitogorsk lost their priority supply status (even though in many cases it was illusory
or symbolic).

There are more obvious differences between former front and home-front regions.
Unlike the importance of wartime behaviors, such as battlefield exploits, participation in
the resistance movements, and collaboration with Nazis, in the self-identification of the
people in the former occupied regions,9 the inhabitants of Magnitogorsk defined their
identity not in terms of military exploits or their relationship with the occupying forces,
but in temrs of the productivity and labor that supported the Soviet war effort. The
people on the wartime home front had different legacies of the war from those who lived
on the battleground during the war: for the people in a legendary steel town in the
hinterland, memories of the war were not so much related to the heroism of wartime
battles, but to the heroism of wartime labor. Consequently, my study reveals that class

played a crucial part in self-identification among Magnitogorsk working people

 

8 As we have seen in the chapter 111, changes in the causes for young Magnitogorsk workers’ desertions in
the early 19505 was another indicator that in the city the turning point was not the late 1940s but the early
1950s. While in the 19405 the main cause of violations was poor living conditions (including food,
housing), it was alcoholism in the early 19505.

9 For exarrrple, see Amir Weiner. Making Sense of War: the Second World War and the Fate of the
Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Jeffrey W. Jones, “‘Every Family
Has Its Freak’: Perceptions of Collaboration in Occupied Soviet Russia, 1943-1948,” Slavic Review 64, no.
4 (Winter. 2005): 747-70.

246

(especially those who labored in major heavy industry enterprises). MMK workers
frequently used the term “working class” in their addresses at factory meetings about
what they needed. The term “class” was not one that appeared only during political
education sessions. Workers used it in their daily lives. Magnitogorsk was a “Potemkin
village” which was widely propagandized in national newspapers as a mighty “arsena ”
during the war and the “Mecca” of steel production for postwar reconstruction after the
war. For many inhabitants, whether or not they were workers in the city’s major
enterprises, the city was an “imagined community” that shaped a regional identity based
on strong self-esteem and entitlement as rewards for heroic wartime labor. Although
some studies of occupied front regions and the general atmosphere of postwar society
indicate that the class concept was overshadowed, either by memories of the battle
against the Nazis or by “embourgeoisement” values, class remained a prominent
component which people in Magnitogorsk, an industrial center in the home front,

appropriated as an important agency for self-identification.

Postwar Stalinism

My case study of Magnitogorsk reveals several important features of postwar
Stalinism that current studies have not fully explored yet. Although some recent
scholarship sees exclusion and violence (or coercion) as the postwar Stalinist

government’s main tool vis-a-vis society,10 my study on the welfare practices and labor

 

'0 For example, see Amir Weiner, “Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the
Soviet Socio-Ethnic body in the Age of Socialism,” American Historical Review, (October, 1999), 1114.
The wartime and postwar fate of Koreans, who had been suspected as Japanese spies in the late 19305 and
been deported in 1937 from the Far East to Kazakhstan and Central Asia, provides a good example of the
rule of exclusion that the Stalin leadership implemented through ethnicization of interior enemy. The
Stalin leadership excluded Koreans from conscription for the Second World War. Instead, the authorities
mobilized Koreans in Kazakhstan and Central Asia as “labor-army” for the factories in the Urals and

247

policies in Magnitogorsk suggests that inclusion and concession were also essential parts
of the Stalinist policies. The welfare practices embodied by extending recipients of
welfare benefits (not based on the productivity levels but on the urban inhabitants’ need)
reflect the rule of inclusion which the postwar Stalinist authorities implemented based on
humanitarian and paternalistic ethos. Coercion was not the only tool that the local
authorities used to control the city’s inhabitants. Responding to workers’ complaints on
the continuation of wartime extended working hours after the war, local party and
enterprise managers began to reduce extra work hours less than two months after the war
ended, and prohibited compulsory overtime work at the end of 1945, which resulted in a
considerable reduction of total labor hours in a relatively brief period. In addition,
although harsh labor-related law codes that defined absenteeism as a crime existed
throughout the 1940s, in actuality the enterprise managers and local authorities
maintained lenient attitudes toward absentees and deserters. The repeated warnings of
the Cheliabinsk oblast officials to the Magnitogorsk party secretary to stop the practice of
groundless arrests and trials of “innocent” citizens during the late 1940s and early 19505
symbolically reflect the postwar local authorities’ more humane, or less arbitrary,
approach to society. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the Soviet social
engineering project was not carried out only by violent and exclusive ways as Weiner
showed through the postwar purification drive through ethnicization. Rather, the official

rhetoric presented in the local newspaper (which stressed compassion and

 

Siberia. During the postwar Stalin years, Koreans were neither allowed to move beyond the territory where
they had resided (mainly Kazakhstan and Central Asia) nor to study subjects connected with defense
technology. Of course, this restriction in education was not officially indicated, but tacitly practiced. It
was only after Stalin’s death that those residential and academic restrictions disappeared. Joonseo Song,
“Ural jiyeok koreoin communitywa hankukhak yeongu, 1991-2003 (The Expansion of Korean
Cormnunities and the Rise of Korean Studies in the Urals, l991-2003),” Hankuk Siberia yeongu (Siberian
Studies), Vol. 7 (December 2004).

248

humanitarianism as an important component of Sovitness) indicates that exclusion and
violence were not the only methods that the postwar Stalinist leadership employed to
carry out the social engineering project. Concession and inclusion were one of the main
strategies that the authorities employed during the difficult postwar years.”

Although historians frequently stress the victory of the war as a main source for
increased legitimacy of the postwar Stalinist government, my research indicates that
various signs of inclusion and accommodation (or concession) that the Stalinist
leadership demonstrated through paternalistic and humanitarian policies made many
Magnitogorsk people retain their belief in the Soviet system after the war. In fact,
maintaining a healthy political mood among Soviet citizens was a very challenging task
for the leadership after the war. Stephen Kotkin argues that during the 1930s, the Soviet
socialist system appealed to the Soviet people largely because few could imagine an
alternative system being available to society. 12 During the 1930s, censorship blocked
information on other systems and only a small number of people were able to cross the
sealed borders to see the outside world. This situation dramatically changed after the
war. Many Soviet veterans and citizens had chances to see another way of life in
capitalist countries during the war. Even citizens who did not have such chances still had
opportunities for new knowledge, either from foreign radio programs, which were
increasingly accessible to ordinary Soviet citizens in the deep interior, or through contact

with enemy POWs who were sent to towns throughout the country to alleviate labor

 

” In this light, Nicholas Timasheff’s “Great Retreat” paradigm—which emphasizes the abandonment of the
revolutionary ethos—is inappropriate for defining some features of postwar Stalinism. Nicholas S.
Tirnasheff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia (New York: Dutton,
1946)

'2 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1995), p. 358.

249

shortages. It is difficult to know how many people in Magnitogorsk actually possessed
anti-Soviet sentiments due to their access to information from the outside world. Even
though some people expressed their doubts about the Soviet system—and even anti-
govemmental attitudes—after listening to Voice of America, others simply did not believe
the western propaganda.l3 Even though people in Magnitogorsk suffered from shortages
during the second half of the 1940s, they saw numerous signs that the government was on
their side, including its strong criticism of officials’ heartless attitudes, paternalistic
welfare aid for needy citizens, and a series of price reductions throughout the period.
Beginning in the early 19505, they eventually saw signs of improvement in living
conditions. Although the price reduction rate, the amount of welfare aid, and the speed of
the improvement in living standards were not so “impressive, the government’s gestures
were still sufficient to make many people in Magnitka believe the official ideology about
the progress of Soviet society toward Communism. Under these circumstances, they
were able to nurture an implicit hope for the future.

As we know from the term “High Stalinism,” a traditional approach frequently
views the postwar Stalinist era as an “apogee of Stalin’s power” during which the
Stalinist leadership achieved firm and full control over society.14 But my study suggests
that postwar Stalinism was not a firmly established set of tenets, policies, and practices.
Rather, it was unstable, fluid, and continually in flux. This instability and movement was
unavoidable for the postwar Stalin leadership, which had to overcome the legacies of the

war. The redefinition of the criteria for Sovietness that we saw above and the presence of

 

'3 For example, a former MMK worker’s wife whom I met in Magnitogorsk told me that although she
listened to criticism of Stalin from the Voice of America out of curiosity during the postwar years, she
simply believed that the criticism was wrong.

'4 F urst, “Introduction” in Late Stalinist Russia, p. 1.

250

contradictory signs in governmental policies (e. g., coexistence of inclusive and exclusive
rules) is part of the evidence. The Magnitogorsk authorities’ distribution strategies for
food, housing, and services and their wage scales reveal the contradiction. Even though
the local authorities and enterprise managers consolidated a hierarchical distribution and
wage system and updated it frequently according to the significance of work type, they
also implemented a welfare-style distribution—distribution not by ranks or incentives,
but according to need. A contradiction (i.e., violence vs. concession, or compassion) is
also found in the authorities’ strategies for raising labor productivity. While the
Magnitogorsk authorities encouraged workers to keep up the wartime pace to prevent
workers from becoming too relaxed after the war, the same authorities urged workers to
pay special attention to putting the factories in order. The party certainly realized that the
wartime emphasis on “tireless work” had as its wartime legacy limits to overcome (i.e.,
workshops in disorder) that threatened efficiency and productivity on production lines.
During the immediate postwar years, the Stalinist system was not established on firm
principles; rather it was constantly redefined and reconstructed.

In retrospect, the postwar experiences of Magnitogorsk suggest that postwar
Stalinism reflected rehabilitation and reinvention (or redefinition). The Stalinist
leadership restored prewar practices, then developed further some features of these
practices, and eventually established new ones. The progression includes the authorities’
emphasis on professionalism over voluntarism in labor, the hierarchical distribution and
wage systems, and the enhancement of the rules of inclusion in welfare practices based

on humanitarian and paternalistic values. Due to this reinvention, late Stalinism can be

251

seen as a watershed: not only a continuation of the prewar Stalinist system, but also the

foundation for the deve10pment of the future Soviet system.

252

Bibliography
1. Archival Sources

AOAM (Arkhivnyi otgel administratsii g. Magnitogorsk)

Fond 10 Magnitogorskii gorodskoi sovet

Fond 99 Magnitogorskii Metallurgicheskii Kombinat

Fond 118 Zavodskoi komitet soiuza rabochikh metallurgov Vostoka g.
Magnitogorsk

Fond 160 Spetsgospital’ No. 5921 p0 delarn voennoplennykh i interbirovannykh
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Fond 202 Otdel sotsial’nogo obespecheniia ispolnitel’nogo komiteta Kirovskogo
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RGASPI (Rossiisky gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’noi i politicheskoi istorii)
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Fond R-9401 Narodnyi komissariat vyutrennikh del SSSR (NKVD SSSR)-
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