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THE TRANSGRESSION, REVERSE PREFAVOR, AND CONCESSION
COMPLIANCE GAINING STRATEGIES IN EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS

By

Colin Richard Baker

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Communication

2007

ABSTRACT

THE TRANSGRESSION, REVERSE PREFAVOR, AND CONCESSION
COMPLIANCE GAIN ING STRATEGIES IN EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS

By
Colin Richard Baker

This study presents and tests two new compliance gaining strategies: the reverse
prefavor and the transgression, steeped in the family of compliance strategies utilizing the
concession and based on the norm of reciprocity. The reverse prefavor is a strategy first
requiring compliance agents to gain compliance on a small initial request and then offers
a concession on a product or service framed as a repayment for the prior compliance
target’s help. The transgression is similar; however, it is based on the concession as an
apology rather than as reward. Also tested was an expectation of compensation induction.
An experimental survey methodology was utilized, which allowed for the measurement
of motivations to comply with the initial request and other variables expected to mediate
the relationship between the strategies and compliance. Results indicate that several
variables had significant relationships (viewing the concession as a reward, viewing the
concession as apology, and empathy) with compliance. Sympathy and anticipation of

compensation were found to have mediated relationships with target compliance.

Copyright by
Colin Richard Baker
2007

For Tiffany.
For whom I have no egoistic motivations.
And for whom I strive to anticipate every want,
and when I fail,
she need not employ complex compliance strategies,
but merely a direct request.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As I reflect on the process of writing a dissertation and those who helped me to
complete the document, it has become apparent that this project was merely one of many
important experiences culminating in my view of the world and in my abilities as a
scholar. In this regard, there are many people who I wish to acknowledge, and weighing
their contribution is a chore that at this point I am unwilling to undertake. So I recognize
them in no particular order.

My advisor, Dr. William A. Donohue, demonstrated a level of flexibility and
encouragement which, in my experience, is rare among distinguished faculty. My
conversations with him regarding behavior, cognition, and the interactive nature of
communication have led to significant reflection regarding the nature of human
communication inquiry. He was also a champion for me to the end and without his
encouragement I may still be writing.

Dr. Franklin J. Boster served on committees for both my master’s and doctoral
degrees. I am hard pressed to think of anyone who has contributed more to my
educational experiences, perhaps reflected most in my dissertation topic. He has been my
instructor for numerous classes and instructor of record where I was teaching assistant,
collaborated with me on both ad hoc and formal research projects, endured many
committee meetings and read many manuscripts, and provided me with numerous
memorable instances of mentorship. I am troubled that my recognition of his efforts and
influence here is likely to be the only formal recognition that he will receive. Truly, more

is deserved.

My outside committee member, Dr. Jennifer Butler-Ellis has been extremely
helpful to me as a role model and in giving valuable advice. She has always been tactful,
yet honest and this approach enabled me to make informed decisions even if I didn’t
always make the best ones. I would encourage those who follow me to listen to her more
than 1. She also gave valuable comments on my dissertation that resulted in a much more
polished and well developed product in theoretical and methodological terms.

I had the opportunity to observe Dr. Hee Sun Park begin her employment at
Michigan State University and develop into an amazingly productive scholar. She has
demonstrated the direct correlation between hard work and success and that learning is
not complete when classes are. She has also been very supportive and encouraging of me
throughout the process of writing my dissertation and during graduate school in general.

I also wish to acknowledge the influence of Dr. Vernon D. Miller who taught how
to write and to carefully consider the power of words. In my time as graduate student
Marge Barkman was a friend, surrogate mother, and helpful staff member all in equal
measure. Without her patient persistence I would certainly have some outstanding
requirement. Dr. Mathew Seeger, my current department chair demonstrated a level of
patience and support throughout the dissertation process that was instrumental in my
success.

There are others who, without their help, I would have not been able to complete
this project. Michael R. Krofi aided me in correcting several technical issues, and Dr.
Patric Spence and Dr. Kenneth Lachlan helped me in acquiring subjects. Tiffany Baker,
my loving wife, has acted as editor on this and every other manuscript I have written.

Without their help I would still be typing computer code, recruiting subjects and editing.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ x
CHAPTER I ........................................................................................................................ 1
Norm of reciprocity ............................................................................................................. 5
Norm of Reciprocity as Social Influence ........................................................................ 8
Giving and Receiving Favors ....................................................................................... l l
Concession as Reward: The Reverse Prefavor ............................................................. 15
Concession as Apology: The Transgression ................................................................. 17
Test of the Model ........................................................................................................... 23
Alternative Responses to the Compliance Request ....................................................... 25
CHAPTER II ..................................................................................................................... 27
METHOD ......................................................................................................................... 27
Design ........................................................................................................................... 27
Participants ................................................................................................................... 27
Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 28
Scenario Inductions ...................................................................................................... 3O
Instrumentation ............................................................................................................. 34
CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................... 39
RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 39
Motivations ................................................................................................................... 48
Tests of the Proposed Models ....................................................................................... 50
CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................... 59
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 59
Viewing concession as reward and apology ................................................................. 60
Implications for the norm of reciprocity and mutual concessions ................................ 61
Initial non-compliers ..................................................................................................... 66
Limitations and future research .................................................................................... 68
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 81
Appendix A ....................................................................................................................... 71
Motivation to gain rewards scale .................................................................................. 71
Appendix B ....................................................................................................................... 72
Motivation to avoid punishment scale .......................................................................... 72
Appendix C ....................................................................................................................... 73

vii

Empathy scale ............................................................................................................... 73

Appendix D ....................................................................................................................... 74
Sympathy scale ............................................................................................................. 74
Appendix E ....................................................................................................................... 75
Reward seeking scale .................................................................................................... 75
Appendix F ........................................................................................................................ 76
Rectification seeking scale ............................................................................................ 76
Appendix G ....................................................................................................................... 77
Concession viewed as reward scale .............................................................................. 77
Appendix H ....................................................................................................................... 78
Concession viewed as apology scale ............................................................................ 78
Appendix I ........................................................................................................................ 79
Distress scale ................................................................................................................. 79
Appendix J ........................................................................................................................ 80
Compliance Items ......................................................................................................... 80

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Study design and number of subjects per condition. .......................................... 27

Table 2. Mean, standard deviations, medians and percent of subjects complying with
target request as measured by number of tickets purchased. .................................... 40

Table 3. Mean, standard deviations, and medians of subjects complying with target
request as measured by Likert compliance scale. ..................................................... 41

Table 4. Descriptives for motivations to help by condition. ............................................ 49

Table 5. Motivation to avoid material punishments: Correlations, corrected correlations
and path coefficients. ................................................................................................ 51

Table 6. Motivation to gain material rewards-Likert measure of compliance: Correlations,
corrected correlations and path coefficients. ............................................................ 52

Table 7. Motivation to gain material rewards-dichotomous measure of compliance:
Correlations, corrected correlations and path coefficients. ....................................... 53

Table 8. Motivation to gain material rewards-Likert measure of compliance, for
anticipation of compensation conditions only: Correlations, corrected correlations
and path coefficients. ................................................................................................ 54

Table 9. Results for predicted null model of the effect of motivation to reduce negative
affect and altruistic helping on compliance: Correlations, corrected correlations and
path coefficients. ....................................................................................................... 56

Table 10. Results for the revised model of the effect of altruistic helping on compliance:
Correlations, corrected correlations and path coefficients ........................................ 57

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure I. Heuristic Model of the effect of the Transgression and Reverse Prefavor
compliance strategies and their relationship with compliance. ................................ 22

Figure 2. Predicted mediation model of motivation to avoid material punishments-
compliance relationship. ........................................................................................... 23

Figure 3. Predicted mediation model of motivation to gain material rewards-compliance
relationship ................................................................................................................ 24

Figure 4. Predicted null model of the effect of motivation to reduce negative affect and
altruistic helping on compliance. .............................................................................. 24

Figure 5. Proposed model results of motivation to avoid material punishments-
compliance relationship. ........................................................................................... 51

Figure 6. Proposed model results of motivation to gain material rewards-Likert measure
of compliance relationship. ....................................................................................... 53

Figure 7. Proposed model results of motivation to gain material rewards-dichotomous
measure of compliance relationship .......................................................................... 53

Figure 8. Model results of anticipation of compensation motivation to gain material
rewards-Likert measure of compliance relationship. ................................................ 54

Figure 9. Results for predicted null model of the effect of motivation to reduce negative
affect and altruistic helping on compliance .............................................................. 56

Figure 10. Results for the revised model of the effect of altruistic helping on compliance
................................................................................................................................... 58

CHAPTER I

The Norm of Reciprocity is ofien proposed to be the underlying mechanism for
the effectiveness of several compliance gaining strategies such as the unsolicited prefavor
(i.e., Boster, Rodriguez, Cruz, & Marshall, 1995; Regan, 1971), door-in-the-face strategy
(Cialdini et al., 1975) and that’s-not-all technique, (Cialdini, 2004). It takes the general
form of reciprocal concessions where a compliance target feels a normative obligation to
reciprocate the goodwill concessions of a compliance agent with a concession of their
own, thereby eliciting higher rates of compliance. For example, door-in-the-face is a
strategy where a compliance agent retreats from an extreme request likely to be rejected
to the more conservative target request (Cialdini et al., 1975). Salespeople often use the
operating mechanisms of this principle by offering a sale on certain items such as, “I
want to sell a car to you today, so I will knock off $200 dollars.” Because the salesperson
makes a concession, the compliance target is believed to feel obligated to also make a
concession, and may purchase an item that he/she did not particularly want or pay more
for the item than desired. As articulated by Cialdini (2001), the norm of reciprocity is a
particularly powerful mechanism in social influence strategies because it allows the
influencer to choose both the favor (or concession) and the way in which the favor is
repaid. Gouldner (1960) views the norm of reciprocity process as a universal (though not
situationally invariable) tendency to accept favors, to give favors, and to return favors.

The norm of reciprocity has been shown to have great effects on the positive
reciprocation of favors (i.e., Regan, 1971) and the negative reciprocation of
transgressions (i.e., Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & Rohdieck, 2004). In general, the

obligation explanation for the utility of reciprocal concessions addresses just one of these

three features of the norm of reciprocity as detailed by Gouldner — the obligation to
return favors. Surprisingly, little attention has been given to other pertinent issues
described by the norm of reciprocity, namely, the propensity to give favors, and the
compulsion to accept favors within the compliance gaining literature.

An important presumption for the effectiveness of reciprocal concessions as a
compliance strategy is that the target must view the behaviors enacted by the compliance
agent as a legitimate concession (Cialdini, 1975). According to Cialdini (2002) the
authenticity of the concession is not merely a function of the target’s perception of the
concession’s cost but also the target’s beliefs regarding the compliance agent’s motives.
Consumers are becoming much more savvy to the strategies used to gain their
compliance and are cued especially in sales situations where defensive mechanisms are
activated (Cialdini, 1975). By introducing a plausible explanation for the sale or
concession, a compliance seeker may reduce the possibility that defensive mechanisms
are engaged and capitalize on the norm of reciprocity functions of the obligation to give
favors and accept favors.

The central focus of this research is to investigate the utility of reciprocal
concessions in strategies that will increase the likelihood of compliance with a request.
The newly developed strategies presented attempt to deactivate the defensive
mechanisms by invoking the functions of the norm of reciprocity. The general form of
the typical reciprocal concessions message is “I did this for you now you should do this
for me in repayment.” Yet to be investigated, however, is whether this works in the
opposite direction. That is, “You did this for me now you should let me do this for you in

repayment.” The enactment of a service by the target can be made in several different

contexts. Two contexts are proposed here: one in which the helping behavior is other-
oriented (the reverse prefavor), where a target may make a decision on whether to engage
in helping behavior intended to bring relief to the compliance agent; the other is ego-
oriented (the transgression) where compliance targets are all but required to help the
other because, by not doing so, they hurt themselves. These strategies are then followed
by a concessionary compliance message framed as repayment for the compliance target’s
prior act of kindness.

This research has both theoretical and practical value. Exploring all facets of the
norm of reciprocity will help us to gain a more complete understanding of human
behavior. Specifically, one’s obligations to accept favors and to give favors have not been
addressed directly in the compliance gaining literature. Additionally, some researchers
have questioned the utility of the obligation explanation articulated by the norm of
reciprocity to explain the effect of a concession on compliance. The development of
alternative uses of obligation as an explanation for compliance may help to uncover
intricacies in its use as an explanatory mechanism or may provide more evidence
suggesting further explication of alternative causal explanations. Practical implications of
this research are also significant. The identification of a set of influence strategies that
further expand the repertoire of tools available to a person is particularly important in
settings where behavior is governed largely by exchange. Such relationships exist in
organizations, sales situations, and the interactions of strangers (Clark, 1981; Clark &
Mills, 1979; Mills & Clark, 1982). As Regan (1971) notes, “[there are] many situations
where we want compliance or assistance from another person, but either do not have or

choose not to use the resources which would put a large amount of pressure on him”

(p.627). This seems particularly important when future interaction is anticipated or
desired.

In terms of organizational research, this program of study is particularly relevant.
Exchange relationships within organizations can be identified at the dyadic, group and
organizational levels. According to Organ (1988) perceptions of fairness may lead
someone to view their relationship with the organization as one of social exchange rather
than strictly economic exchange. This shift can bring about extra role behaviors
(organizational citizenship behaviors) that may be directed toward a specific person, the
work group, or the organization (Moonnan, 1991). Alternatively, organizational
citizenship behaviors may be enacted in response to competitive work environments and
lead to the expectation by peers and supervisors that an employee continue enacting these
extra role behaviors (VanDyne & Ellis, 2004). As such, feelings of under compensation
in the exchange relationship can eventually lead to a state of psychological reactance.
Additionally, individuals may have psychological contracts within organizations that are
contractually grounded obligations based on exchange. Psychological contracts are
typically thought to be between the organization and individual members (Morrison &
Robinson, 1997) and are determined by beliefs about the reciprocal obligations between
the parties. Much of the work on psychological contracts has emphasized the negative
emotional (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994; Tumley & F eldman, 1999) and behavioral
(Robinson, 1996) ramifications of psychological contract breach; however, more recent
work has begun to imply outcomes when an employee is overcompensated by the

organization and the reciprocal benefits the organization may invoke (Ellis, 2007).

Moreover, Ho (2005) suggested that positional peers’ and friends’ perceptions of
psychological contract fulfillment influence our own views of fulfillment.

Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) also noted that the relationships between superiors
and subordinates are inherently exchange based until (if) relationships are developed.
This suggests that traditional strategies by leaders (managers) of social influence and
legitimated power must be utilized until a more transactional (communal) relationship is
developed. Similarly, work on team-member exchange (Seers, Petty, & Cashman, 1995)
has identified relational quality among peers as producing and reproducing the context in
which the task and social aspects of work take place. They also suggest that it is the
reciprocally exchanged behaviors between the team and the individual that reinforce both
the member’s role and the identity of a group as a team. In both team-member exchange
and leader-member exchange, “the reciprocity must be analyzed in terms of the resources
each party may bring to bear on the exchange process,” (Seers, et al., p. 21) and thus, the
acceptance, giving, and returning of resources is critical in role management, role
negotiation and relationship development within organizations. In sum, relationships
within organizations require that, until transactive (communal) relationships are
developed, organizational members rely primarily on exchange to negotiate
organizational life. As such, social influence strategies that rely on exchange may be
productive in gaining desired outcomes.

Norm of reciprocity

Gouldner (1960) suggested that the norm of reciprocity, in its universal form,

makes two interrelated, minimal demands: 1) people should help those who have helped

them, and 2) people should not injure those who help them (p.171). The identification

and elucidation of the norm of reciprocity grew out of the fimctionalist perspective of
sociology. Functional theory is concerned with the problems of how individual actors are
prepared by socialization to play a role in social systems. The functional theory, first
developed by Durkheim, and more recently Parsons, has at a minimum three main
concepts. First, society is viewed as a collection of interdependent parts with a tendency
toward equilibrium. Second, there exist functional requirements that must be met in a
society to ensure its survival. And third, functional phenomena are seen to exist because
they serve a function (this assumption was questioned by Gouldner). Accordingly,
functionalists view persons as having expectations of others’ actions and reactions to
their own behaviors, and these expectations are derived from accepted norms and values
of society. Social norms are generally accepted and agreed upon, and as the behaviors are
repeated, these expectations are accepted as roles.

While Gouldner was not the first to notice the norm, he was the first to present a
definition for the norm and describe it in detail rather than limiting himself to a
discussion of the frequency of its existence (e.g., Thumwald, 1932) or its importance in
holding together the fabric of mankind (e.g., Simmel, 1950). Gouldner credits such issues
to his contemporaries, such as Becker (1956) who referred to man as Homo reciprocus,
and to his predecessors like Hobhouse (1906) who, according to Gouldner, stated that
“Reciprocity... is the vital principle of society,” and Thumwald (1932) who indicated
that the “principle of reciprocity pervades every relation of primitive life.” This
statement perhaps foreshadowed work to be conducted 40 years later in research of
evolutionary biology (Trivers, 1971), which contends that reciprocal tendencies are

hardwired into our brains through natural selection for altruistic and reciprocal behaviors.

The writings of Gouldner, Homans, Thaibaut and Kelly, and Blau are generally
credited with a shifi in thinking from a functional perspective to a social exchange
approach to understanding human relationships. The norm of reciprocity, as described by
Gouldner (1960) and his contemporaries, suggests that the norm functions to stabilize
societies. It does so because one who receives a favor is obliged to repay the favor, and
while they are in debt, they are morally obliged to not harm the favor giver. The norm,
however, does not suggest that favors will be reciprocated in a value-for-value sense, but
rather without strict measure. From a societal stability standpoint, this serves to make the
fulfillment of debts somewhat fluid and unknown to the parties and therefore creates
stability. It would be foolish to bring harm to someone owing us a debt, and if we owe,
we are morally bound to not harm those who have provided favors. To the extent that we
are unsure whether a favor has been paid or repaid, we will not harm. By not following
the norm and therefore not repaying favors, the taker may invite social sanctions from the
favor giver and observers of the interaction by way of ostrication from the system. As ‘
described by Gouldner, the norm of reciprocity functions across social classes and
thereby functions to stabilize society by reducing the proclivity of those with higher
social status from taking advantage of those with less power. The norm is flexible in
terms of the timing of the repayment of favors and the extent to which people are
expected to reciprocate based on their access to resources, societal position, and lot in
life. In sum, because of a variety of social functions, the norm of reciprocity as proposed
by sociologists is a moral norm obligating the recipient to return a favor previously given.

In recognition of the ubiquitous nature of the norm of reciprocity and the power with

which it governs human behavior during social interaction, it has been a pervasively
utilized strategy of social influence (Cialdini, 2001).
Norm of Reciprocity as Social Influence

Cialdini (2001) described the norm of reciprocity as a form of influence jujitsu.
His metaphor of click then whirr further illustrates his belief that the norm of reciprocity
is an ingrained mechanical rule of human behavior. When we are afforded a favor, it is in
many ways unconscionable that we refuse to reciprocate. Using the rule as an influence
strategy allows one actor to both decide the favor and also the form of the repayment
(Cialdini, 2001). Indeed, the norm of reciprocity and its reciprocal concessions
counterpart have been proposed to be the underlying mechanism in the effectiveness of
some of our best documented influence strategies, such as the unsolicited favor and the
door-in-the-face strategy. According to Cialdini, the reciprocation rule functions to
instigate mutual concessions in two ways. First, it obliges a favor recipient to respond in
kind and second, because of this requirement, “people are freed to make the initial
concession and thereby to begin the beneficial process of exchange” (p. 37). He based
these conclusions on the notion that during social interaction, participants often begin
with positions that are unacceptable to one another and that for common goals to be met,
compromise must be achieved (Cialdini, 1975). In order for someone to retreat from an
opening position, an “implicit prescription” of mutual concessions is essential. Without
this rule guiding behaviors, attempts at compromise would not be initiated and the
interaction would not continue. His argument includes evidence from the negotiation
literature, which finds that subjects increase their rates of concessions as their opponent’s

concessions increase (Chertkoff & Conley, 1967; Benton, Kelly & Liebling, 1972;

Komorita & Brenner, 1968), that extreme unmoving positions are met by subjects’
refusal to move from their own positions (Benton, et al., 1972), and that even fair and
equitable initial offers are refused by subjects when confederates would not move from
them (Komorita & Brenner, 1968). These arguments taken together suggest that the
retreat from an extreme position to a more moderate position may induce a target to move
from their own initial position of refusal to one of compliance. While meta-analysis has
largely confirmed the effectiveness of the rej ection-then-retreat compliance strategy
(Dillard, Hunter, & Burgoon, 1984; Fern, Monroe, & Avila, 1986; O'Keefe, 1998), others
have suggested that this effect can be explained by guilt (O’Keefe & Figge’, 1999), the
prosocialness of the organization, single or multiple requestors, and magnitude of the
concession (Dillard, 1991; Dillard, et al., 1984; O'Keefe & F igge', 1997).. More recently,
Hale and Laliker (1999) argued against these criticisms of the mutual concessions
explanation. In a direct test of mutual concessions and what they termed the social
responsibility explanation, Turner, Tamborini, Limon, and Zuckerman-Hyman (2007)
found support for mutual concessions particularly among strangers. Dillard (1991)
estimated that the mean effect size (r) for the door-in-the-face ranged from .15 to .25 in
previous meta-analysis. Thus, the DITF strategy provides a favorable comparison
strategy for new influence strategies of this ilk.

Obligation is a powerful motivator. As such, it has often been used as an
explanation for the effect of an unsolicited favor to remit compliance. One such study
frequently cited was conducted by Regan (1971), who sought to understand whether the
effectiveness of a prefavor on compliance was because of obligation or whether it could

be attributed to increased liking for the favor doer. Regan recognized that by giving a

favor, both things may occur simultaneously. Regan conducted the experiment in a lab
setting where the participant received a soda in the favor conditions and where liking (or
more precisely, disliking) was independently manipulated. The dependent variable of
compliance was measured by the number of raffle tickets subsequently purchased by the
subject from the confederate. According to Regan, the results of the study indicated that
subjects in the favor condition purchased significantly more tickets than those in other
conditions. Interestingly, liking was not correlated with the number of tickets sold in the
favor condition, but liking was correlated with the number of tickets sold in the no favor
and control conditions. This suggests, according to the author, a qualified conclusion that
liking may be irrelevant when a favor is given prior to a request. The author concluded
that by providing a target with an unsolicited favor, a compliance agent could increase
compliance with a subsequent request, and the effect was at least in part due to felt
obligation as would be predicted by the mechanisms operating in the norm of reciprocity.

Similar conclusions were drawn by Cialdini (2001) in his report of a field study in
which he observed the persuasive strategies of the Hare Krishna religious sect. These
enterprising influencers would give a flower to someone walking by and then ask for a
donation to their cause. Cialdini estimated that in this way, the organization was able to
increase donations substantially because of the reciprocation rule. Many passersby would
avoid the Krishnas by walking well out of their way, but even in these cases, the
Krishnas’ tactics were often successful in obtaining a donation. Cialdini concluded that
by first doing us a favor, strange, disliked or unwelcome others can enhance the

likelihood that we will comply with their request. Also interesting here is that targets are

10

often aware of the expectations that accompany the receipt of a gift and may actively
avoid entering into exchange relationships with others.

The target of an unsolicited favor does not actively seek to enter into an exchange
relationship with a favor giver but rather is forced into a debt. Targets may attempt to
avoid entering into the exchange by refusing the favor at the outset of the interaction
while others may diminish the value of the favor. Cialdini (2001) suggested that targets
may reframe the favor as the social influence strategy that it is, and thereby attain
freedom from feelings of obligation. Other research suggests that when we receive an
unsolicited favor we may engage in psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966). When we
believe our freedoms are limited by, perhaps, our emotions of obligation or indebtedness
as a consequence of accepting a prior favor, we may respond by directly opposing the
agent’s request and thereby regaining our freedom to choose. Combined, these issues
indicate several active and passive defenses that may be exhibited by a compliance target.
In order to improve on the concession as a compliance strategy it may be beneficial to
attempt to increase the occurrence in which targets enter freely into a mutual exchange, to
reduce the proclivity of a compliance target to foresee the subsequent compliance
message, and to accentuate the exchange nature of the relationship. Many of these issues
are difficult to overcome using the unsolicited favor strategy and other mutual
concessions-based strategies; however, many of these practical problems are eliminated
with a sequential strategy that calls for the target to make the first concession.

Giving and Receiving Favors
An alternative approach that capitalizes on other aspects of Gouldner’s (1960)

ideas may focus not only on our dutiful obligation to repay debts, but also to give and

11

receive favors. By exploring these additional aspects of the norm of reciprocity, we will
gain valuable insight regarding the utility of the norm of reciprocity to explain findings
and make predictions in social influence contexts.

According to Goffman (1971), the ritual of a favor exchange is an episode that
“asks license of a potentially offended person to engage in what could be considered a
violation of his rights at the same time (the receiver) exposes himself to denial and
rejection” (p.114). Asking for a favor places the receiver in a position of vulnerability and
it is the role of the receiver to express gratitude (Flynn, 2003). This is accomplished by
emphasizing politeness in the favor request, through the use of nonverbal cues such as
smiling, and by thanking the favor giver. These behaviors and feelings are markedly
different than those of the giver. Goffman (1955) explained that instead of reacting with
annoyance and frustration, the giver is obligated to reestablish social order in the
relationship and to “save” the potentially embarrassing situation. According to Flynn
(2003) this is accomplished by offering compliance without observable hesitation,
refraining from reminding the receiver of the favor, and by making statements that
diminish the worth of the favor.

Besides the enactment of specific roles during the giving and receiving episode,
other research has addressed the reasons why someone might engage in performing
favors. Baston and Shaw (1991) summarized several decades of literature on this topic by
proposing that there are perhaps both egoistic and altruistic motives for giving aid. The
corresponding internal responses to seeing someone in need of aid will instigate distinct
motivational states, and the decision to help is based on a relative benefit/cost calculation

by weighing the cost of helping versus the benefit (either self-or other-oriented) of

12

helping the needy individual. Their research suggests that there are two broad forms of
egoistic motivations: arousal reducing egoistic motivations and reward
seeking/punishment avoiding egoistic motivations.

First the egoistic motivations to seek rewards and avoid punishments will be
considered. Rewards and punishments as expected by a potential helper may be material,
social, or internal. Rewards may be material, as in being paid (Fischer, 1963), or
anticipated reciprocal favors (Baston & Shaw, 1991). Rewards may be externally
oriented, as in gaining social approval (Bauman, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 1981), praise
(Batson and Flory, 1990; Bendapudi, Singh, & Bendapudi, 1996), power and reputation
(Brunero, 2002), and avoiding censure (Reis & Gruzen, 1976). Or they may be internally
oriented rewards such as avoidance of guilt, avoidance of painful memories, the
attainment of warm fuzzy feelings (Brunero, 2002), and avoiding pain of guilty feelings
(Sober & Wilson, 1989). If the situational markers provide expectations of rewards for
helping and/or punishments for not helping in the situation, this may cue egoistic
motivations to gain these rewards or avoid these punishments. The form of the reward
may be explicitly stated, or merely suggestive that a reciprocal favor should be performed
to repay the receiver’s debt. Baston and Shaw further suggested that a benefit analysis is
then computed by the observer where the expected benefit of helping, and thereby
reducing their negative affective state, is compared to the expected cost of helping,
having another help, or escaping from the situation. Finally, the behavioral response will
be to act to gain an expected reward or avoid a foreseeable punishment or to not act —

whichever is most positively valenced in the relative benefit analysis.

13

Considered next are egoistic and altruistic emotional responses to viewing
someone in need. Arousal reducing egoistic motivations are based on an observer’s
internal vicarious emotional response (i.e., empathy) of personal distress (Hoffman,
1981). Hence, by viewing a person in need of help, an observer may feel distress and is
motivated to reduce this negative affective state. In this way, empathy is differentiated
from sympathy. Sympathy refers to the heightened awareness of the suffering of another
person as something to be alleviated (Wispé, 1986). Feeling sympathy for someone
constitutes an altruistic motivation to have their affliction reduced (Eisenberg, 1991).
When feeling sympathy, a person feels for another and when feeling empathy, a person
feels with another (Wispé, 1986). These differences are critical in the motivations for
which we help another. In one case (empathy), we seek to reduce our own negative affect
and in sympathy, we altruistically seek to relieve the negative state of the other. By
feeling with someone it is therefore possible to have a vicarious emotional response to
their pain and pleasures. These motivations are then evaluated similarly to the
motivations to gain rewards/avoid punishments. That is, the costs of helping are
compared to the benefit of helping to gain an expected reward and the appropriate
behavioral response (to help or not) is enacted.

Because the propensity to act altruistically and/or the ability to experience a
vicarious emotional response (i.e., empathy) are based on idiosyncratic internal
differences among people, these may be somewhat difficult for an influence agent to
invoke. An influence agent may, however, quite easily adjust an influence target’s

perceptions of their expectations for rewards and their expectations for punishment by

14

providing messages or drawing attention to situational markers that indicate the potential
rewards/punishments for complying or not complying.
Concession as Reward: The Reverse Prefavor

When these principles are applied to the realm of social influence, an influence
agent may be able to capitalize on a favor owed to another. In the reverse prefavor
compliance strategy a compliance agent sets up a situation where they are in distress and
ask for assistance from the target. Subsequently, the compliance agent will offer them a
concession on a good or service by either sweetening the deal with the that’s-not-all
concession strategy or by reducing the price with a door-in-the-face-strategy. In either
case the concession target request is delivered as a “special opportunity” and repayment
for the earlier favor. By framing the concession as a repayment for the prior favor, the
repayment of the prior favor becomes the salient aspect in the exchange rather than
trigger defensive mechanisms often associated with a concession strategy. Additionally,
if a compliance agent can induce a compliance target to provide them with a small initial
favor, the target may be obligated to accept repayment for that favor. The general form of
the reverse prefavor sequential influence strategy is for a compliance agent to illicit a
paltry favor from a potential consumer followed by a repayment of the favor in the form
of a “concession” or “special opportunity” (i.e., sale or discount on goods) which is the
target request.

H1: A reverse prefavor compliance strategy will be associated with higher rates of

compliance on a target request than a direct request or concession strategy

alone.

15

A target may provide help because they see the potential for certain rewards such
as praise, karma, or a fixture favor as a result for helping, or they may wish to avoid some
punishment such as social sanctions for not helping. They also may feel empathy with the
compliance agent and have an egoistic drive to reduce this negative state. Or, they may
feel sympathy for the compliance agent and act altruistically to relieve the suffering of
the compliance agent. Because several motivations could drive a target to comply with
the initial request, it is expected that there will be relatively high rates of initial request
compliance. Being driven to comply with a request based on altruistic or empathic
motivations may be counter productive for a compliance agent utilizing this sequential
strategy because the target may obtain relief or well being by complying with the initial
request. Therefore, when targets help because of the egoistic motive to relieve their
empathic state or when acting altruistically, there is no need to repay the help they
offered. Because the strategy relies on compliance with the first request to set up the
subsequent return favor compliance message, it may be most productive to solicit
compliance with the initial small request by activating egoistic motivations of expecting
rewards as opposed to sympathy/empathy. If a target helps on an initial small request
based on motivations to gain a reward, we might expect that they will have high rates of
compliance with a concession that satisfies these expected outcomes. Therefore, the rates
of compliance with the target concession request is proposed to be a function of the
motivations by which a compliance target provides aid on the initial request. If the
motivation is reward-focused, the compliance agent will be able to capitalize on the favor
owed (see Table 1 for visual explanation of research design). If someone seeking help

provides a message indicating that the potential helper can expect repayment, they may

16

be able to induce a motivation to help based on the expectation of rewards. It is expected
that due to this increased motivation to gain rewards, repayment may be more easily
provided in the form of a concession. In conditions where an expectation of reward
message is not provided, help may be more readily given based on empathy/sympathy
and thus repayment is unexpected and unnecessary.

H2: A reverse prefavor compliance strategy will be more effective when paired
with a message indicating an expectation of reward than when no message
indicating expectation of reward is presented.

The intent of the reverse prefavor strategy is to provide a logical explanation for a
concession, thereby reducing activated defensive mechanisms and increasing rates of
compliance. Because of our normative obligations to give and receive favors, it is
expected that compliance targets will allow the favor to be repaid in the form of a
concession. Asking for help in the initial reverse prefavor request is likely to elicit
emotional and motivational reactions in the target that may affect the likelihood of
subsequent compliance. The strategy is expected to be most successful when egoistic
motivations of gaining rewards and/or avoiding punishments for not helping are
activated. An alternative strategy that more directly triggers egoistic motivations of
gaining rewards or reducing punishments is the transgression.

Concession as Apolog): The Transgression

Transgressions are those acts that wrong or morally offend another or inflict
psychological or physical pain or injury (Worthington & Wade, 1999). In the
transgression compliance strategy, a'compliance agent commits a seemingly

unintentional action or inaction that has negative consequences for both the compliance

l7

agent and target. The compliance agent subsequently requests aid from the compliance
target in order to remedy the situation, and the compliance target is compelled to help
because, if they do not, they are also injured by the action/inaction of the compliance
agent. Committing a transgression against a target will instigate the egoistic motivation of
reducing punishments; as such, the target is expected to help in an effort of self-
preservation. By limiting the compliance target’s freedom to choose alternative actions, it
is expected that the target will frequently agree to the initial small request. However,
because they do not freely choose to do so, they are not acting in an altruistic or
sympathetic manner. Therefore, the minor favor they provided is an act of exchange and
the view of the target is that their exchange partner is obligated to repay the favor.
Transgressions are objectively wrong or injurious and are particularly destructive when
they are repeated, heavily charged with negative emotion, severe, and unaccompanied by
transgressor guilt or apology (Worthington & Wade, 1999). If the inequity is not
recognized and acted upon by the offender, this may result in negative reciprocation to be
performed by the person who was slighted. Ultimately, this may perpetuate a continued
process of negative actions by both parties until the situation spirals out of control
(Anderson & Pearson, 1999). However, if the offender attempts to repair the relationship,
the banned individual may allow equity to be restored in the relationship and thereby
avoid the possibility of a negative behavior spiral.

According to F rantz and Bennigson (2005), apologies are our most basic and
pervasive conflict resolution technique. With an apology, a transgressor confesses
culpability but concurrently demonstrates that he/she may be worthy of a second chance.

McCullough et a1. (1998) observed that when victims received an apology, they had

18

greater feelings of closeness with the offender, greater empathy for an offender, and
behaved with less avoidance and revenge. Similarly, Ohbuchi, Kameda and Agarie
(1989) determined that victims were less angry, had lower levels of aggression, and had a
better impression of a transgressor when they received an apology.

Apologies can come in several forms. Scher and Barley (1997) found that offers
of reparation, expressions of responsibility, and promises of forbearance were web] in
the effectiveness of an apology. Goffman (1971) mentions corrective action as an
element of an apology; however, Benoit (1995) submits that offenders may take
corrective action without admitting culpability or apologizing. According to Benoit, a
transgressor may take corrective relationship repairing action when they pledge or
provide reparation for the injury, take steps to prevent recurrence of the offensive act or
both. It has also been suggested that when transgressors provide compensation for a
misdeed, they present amends to the victim in order to soothe the victirn’s ill feelings
(Schonback, 1980). Restitution may be in the form of goods, services, or monetary
reimbursement and may therefore reduce the negative feelings of the offense (Benoit,
1995)

Ultimately, a transgressor is required to make amends for their offensive actions.
They may do this through an apologetic message that emphasizes their culpability or
through reparative action. In the case of the transgression compliance strategy, the
compliance agent would use the discount on the sale of an item (concession) as a
reparative action. The compliance target must now make a decision to either accept or
reject the compliance agent’s “attempt” to repair the relationship, whereby acceptance of

the concession would presumably lead to increased relational harmony. Rejection, a form

19

of punishment, would lead to further relational discord. Rejecting another’s attempts to
rectify an inequitable relationship, in effect to fail to accept repayment for a prior help
violates our most basic norms (Gouldner, 1960). In this way, the act of concession
simultaneously repays the help given to the compliance agent and rectifies the prior harm
exacted upon the target. Because the concession is the form of apology and not paired
with a verbal admission of culpability, if the target rejects the offer of concession they
receive neither the benefit of repayment nor the contentment of rectification. For these
reasons, targets are apt to accept the concession as apology and comply with the request.

H3: A transgression compliance strategy will be associated with higher rates of

compliance on a target request than a direct request or concession strategy
alone.

In addition to the transgression, motivating compliance targets to comply so that
they may minimize their punishment for not aiding, a compliance agent may
simultaneously provide indication that they will reward the target in the future for their
help. This has the added benefit of inducing the egoistic motivation to gain expected
rewards in addition to the already present egoistic motivation to avoid punishments.

H4: A transgression compliance strategy will be more effective when paired with

a message indicating an expectation of reward than when no message
indicating expectation of reward is presented.

The transgression compliance strategy is expected to activate the egoistic
motivation to avoid punishments. By providing targets with a message indicating that the
favor will be repaid to them by the agent, it is expected that an additional egoistic

motivation will be generated: the motivation to gain rewards. Additionally, it has been

20

suggested that the transgression compliance strategy provides mechanisms that will
enhance the effectiveness of the concession compliance strategy, and as such, is expected
to outperform the concession and direct request as strategies to gain compliance.

Presently, it is unclear whether a reverse prefavor or a transgression will be more
effective in obtaining compliance on a target request. The reverse prefavor is expected to
motivate someone by way of avoiding punishments and gaining rewards; however,
without a specific induction where a compliance agent suggests that they will earn
rewards for helping it is unclear whether unspecific internal (i.e., wellbeing) and external
(e. g. social approval) rewards and internal (i.e., guilt) and external (i.e., social sanctions)
punishments for helping will be enough to induce compliance. However if the norm of
reciprocity fiinction to receive favors is present, compliance targets will be compelled to
accept the repayment of their prior favor regardless of whether they view it as a good
deal. The transgression is proposed to invoke a strong motivation to avoid punishments,
which is expected to lead to feelings that relationship repair is owed and will view the
concession as the apology that they seek, to which they will comply at high rates. The
possibility does exist, however, that the initial small favor in the transgression will be
agreed to at a high rate, but that because of psychological reactance or other factors
stimulating relationship withdrawal, targets will not comply with the target concession
request. Because of these myriad factors it is difficult to know whether the reverse
prefavor or the transgression will be more effective in inducing compliance with the
target request. Therefore a research question is posed:

RQl: Is a reverse prefavor or a transgression compliance strategy more effective

in obtaining compliance with a target request?

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22

Test of the Model

While the primary focus of this research is to better understand the ability to
influence using strategies that improve the concession, it also allows us to explore the
psychological mechanisms involved in compliance with the transgression and reverse
prefavor compliance strategies. The heuristic model of the proposed process is presented
in Figure 1.

Based on this model, several, more parsimonious models may be gleaned that
directly test the veracity of the proposed processes. Figure 2 is a test of the avoiding
punishments process identified to be instigated most directly by the transgression
compliance strategy. Recall that someone will engage in helping behaviors if they are
driven to avoid punishments. This is predicted to lead to rectification seeking, that is,
seeking relationship repair and apology from the transgressor. If the concession message
is presented correctly it may be perceived to be an apology by the helper. In order to
receive the apology, show acceptance for the apology, and gain compensation for the

transgression, a person is presumed to comply with the concession target request.

 

 

 

 

 

 

. . . . Compliance
Avord + Rectification + Concessron + w/ concession
Material =9 Seeking :> Viewed as =9 target request
Punishments Apology

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 2. Predicted mediation model of motivation to avoid material punishments-
compliance relationship.

The gaining rewards model presented in Figure 3 is expected to be triggered most

directly by the presentation of an anticipation of rewards message whereby someone

23

seeking help may indicate that they will repay any assistance given. By presenting such a
message, someone seeking help may stimulate the egoistic motivation to gain rewards.
This in turn causes them to engage in reward seeking behaviors after they help the needy
individual. If the concession request is presented as a reward for the earlier good deed,

then it is expected that compliance with the request will increase.

 

 

 

 

 

 

G . M t . l + R d + C _ + Compliance

am a ena ewar oncessron w/ concession

Rewards ‘=={> Seeking i=9 Viewed as ‘=i> target request
Reward

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 3. Predicted mediation model of motivation to gain material rewards-compliance
relationship.

It has also been proposed that the observation of a needy person in the reverse
prefavor strategy may produce feelings of empathy and/or feelings of sympathy in the
observer (see Figure 4). These emotions are expected to be positively related to helping

in the initial small request for aid. By aiding the person in distress it is expected that the

 

 

 

" Rectification Concession
Empathy =0 Seeking =9 Viewed as
Apology

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Compliance
Likert -
Measure
-- Reward Concession
Sympathy =9 Seeking =1) Viewed as
Reward

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 4. Predicted null model of the effect of motivation to reduce negative affect and
altruistic helping on compliance.

24

vicarious negative affect of empathy and the feelings of sympathy will be neutralized.
Because helping behaviors have neutralized these affective responses, repayment will be
unnecessary and therefore the concession will be irrelevant and unrelated to compliance.
Alternative Responses to the Compliance Request

While the arguments for the processes by which the presented inductions will
affect compliance have been discussed in some detail, this is the first known research to
present such strategies, to test their effectiveness, and to observe the intervening
processes. This being the case, it is prudent to explore alternative processes that may help
to explain the effectiveness of the reverse prefavor and the transgression compliance
strategies. One such issue is related to the concessionary compliance message. The
general form of the concession compliance message in this context, “You did this for me
now you should let me do this for you in repayment” has been proposed to aid in
compliance because the concession will be viewed as both an apology and a reward.
There is the possibility, however, that the message could be perceived to indicate ones’
high level of obligation toward the favor doer. This perception of obligation may be
viewed as a secondary circumstance of personal distress in the agent and, particularly
because the target’s prior action of help caused the distress, they may be driven to help
relieve it. The most cognitively accessible form of relief in this context would be to
comply with the concession. This may be principally true with persons prone to feeling
empathy and/or sympathy. However, viewing the agent in their obligatory state may also
trigger compliance because of the motivation to gain rewards such as social

approval/feelings of good will or to minimize punishments such as social censure (see

25

Figure 5). Therefore, while the motivations to help with the initial small request are
predicted to be most important in the path from helping to compliance, a secondary
motivation to help relieve a person’s distress, the negative affect state of obligation, may
be present. The impact of perceived distress on compliance will also be investigated.

RQ2: Is distress related to compliance?

26

CHAPTER 11
METHOD
Design
To test the hypotheses, this study utilized a 2 (reverse pre-favor, transgression) X
2 (expectation for compensation, no expectation for compensation) independent groups
factorial design with two offset comparison groups (concession and direct request),
resulting in six independent samples (see Table 1). Experimental conditions were
manipulated by providing subjects with messages intended to induce each of the

conditions.

Table 1: Study design and number of subjects per condition.

Reverse

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pre-favor Transgression
Anticipation of N = 124 N = 100
Compensation (19.5%) (17.5%)
No
. . . N = 110 N = 112
AntICIpatIon of o 0
Compensation (21'8 /°) “9'6 A)
Concession N = 63
Control (1 1.10%)
Direct N = 60
Request 0
Control “0'5 A)

 

 

 

Participants

Participants consisted of 577 undergraduate students from three campuses who
participated in the study in exchange for course credit. One campus was a large
Midwestern university (N = 277, 48.0%), another was a small Midwestern Christian
college (N = 39, 6.76%) and the last was a large private Eastern college (N = 261 ,

45.2%). Seven of the surveys returned were removed from analysis due to incomplete

27

responses, resulting in 570 participant responses used in analysis. Subjects’ ages ranged
from 17 to 35 years of age with a mean of 19.63 (SD = 1.49) years. Most of the
participants were Freshman (N = 168, 29.6%), Sophomore (N = 136, 23.9%) or Junior (N
= 166, 29.2%) standing with fewer college Seniors (N = 96, 17.3) participating in the
study. Participants were also more often female (N = 348, 61.5%) than male (N = 218,
38.5%). The ethnicity of respondents was mostly White (N = 426, 74.7%), followed by
Black (N = 52, 9.1%), Hispanic/Latino (N = 34, 6.0%), Asian-American (N = 30, 5.3%),
Asian (N = 10, 1.8%), Native American (N = 1, 0.2%) and other (N = 13, 2.3%).
Procedure

The study was conducted through the use of an experimental survey
methodology where each participant is presented with a scenario in which each of the
variables (RPF/I‘ransgression and anticipation/no anticipation of compensation) is
manipulated. Students were recruited to participate in the survey by either an
announcement given in class by the researcher or by a representative at the school
sending out an email to prospective subjects. Students were directed to a website where
they read the informed consent sheet and were given instructions. Participants then
proceeded to the survey by way of a random link generator, which randomly assigned
each participant to a condition. The random assignment to conditions resulted in
approximately an even number of participants in each of the four experimental conditions
(see Table 1). Because of the need for precise estimates for variables in the experimental
groups, the algorithm used to randomly assign favored control experimental conditions
was a rate of 2: l , resulting in the control conditions having approximately one half the

number of subjects as any experimental condition. Experimental conditions consisted of

28

an initial favor request scenario and items measuring their motivation to help (gain
rewards, avoid punishments, empathy, sympathy), reward seeking, and rectification
seeking. The initial compliance item was counter balanced among experimental
conditions to either precede or follow these measures. This was done to ensure that items
measuring motivation did not affect respondents’ endorsement of the initial compliance
measure, however temporally the decision to comply would follow the motivations to
comply. Subjects were then presented with a continuation of the first scenario where they
were asked to comply with the concession request presented as repayment for the
subjects’ prior help. After this second scenario, subjects reported their view on whether
the concession was an appropriate way to repay/apologize, the perceived amount of
distress in their classmate and final compliance. Again, the final compliance items were
counterbalanced and presented either just after the second scenario induction or after the
items measuring concession as reward, concession as apology, and distress. If, however,
a respondent reported that they would not help on the initial request, they were presented
with a scenario that offered them a concession but did not present it as repayment for the
prior favor. These subjects did not receive items measuring their view of the concession
as reward, concession as apology, or other’s distress.

The counterbalancing of items resulted in a survey design where approximately
one-quarter of those assigned to experimental conditions were presented with both the
initial compliance item and target compliance item immediately after the scenario
inductions. Another one-quarter of participants received both compliance items after the
measures of other relevant variables. One-quarter of subjects received the initial

compliance item immediately afier the initial request, and the target request measure was

29

after scale measures of concession as reward/apology, and distress. The final quarter of
participants received the initial request afier the motivation to help items and the target
request immediately after the target request induction. In all, this resulted in four
differently ordered surveys for each of the four experimental conditions. Those assigned
to the control conditions (direct request control or concession request control) were
presented with a scenario similar in content to the experimental conditions, however they
were not asked for an initial small request and only completed the measure of target
compliance. All participants also reported demographic information.
Scenario Inductions

The scenarios are representative of situations in which students may find
themselves while enacting their role as a student. The general premise of the reverse
prefavor/transgression scenario is that a fellow student asks the subject immediately prior
to an exam if they have an extra blue book exam booklet that they might have to take the
exam. The scenario indicates that the subject does have an extra exam booklet and must
decide whether to provide a favor to their classmate in the form of sharing their exam
booklet. The scenario continues to the following week, where the participant is presented
with a concession (target request) to purchase raffle tickets. The following reverse
prefavor and transgression scenario was presented to participants:

It is nearing the middle of the semester and you have two classes that

both meet on Tuesday and Thursday. Unfortunately for you, both of your

classes have an exam scheduled on the same day. Luckily, you have about

two hours between classes to decompress. At your first exam of the day,

you arrive about five minutes before class and are waiting for class to

begin. As with most students in large lectures, you typically sit in about

the same place every class period but rarely talk to many other students.

You do, however, notice the familiar faces of people with whom you have

not often talked previously. One of your classmates, who you know to be
fairly intelligent, sits in their usual place two seats down from you and

30

appears to be a bit flustered. This classmate turns to you and asks, “You

wouldn’t happen to have an extra blue book exam booklet would you? I

don’t have one.”

You recall that the professor had mentioned that he “had gotten out

of the business of carrying extra blue books long ago.” You do happen to

have two blue books but only because you need the other one for your

next exam later in the afiernoon. If you give this person your exam booklet

you will have to walk about five minutes out of your way to get another

one before your next class. However, you estimate that you will have

about two hours to get to your next class and it is a nice day.

Reverse Pre-Favor/Transgression. In the reverse prefavor conditions presented
above, a compliance agent presents a situation that indicates that they are in distress. If
the compliance agent decides to help their classmate, helping behavior will cost the
compliance target minimally and these helping behaviors are directed at aiding their
classmate. In transgression conditions, a compliance agent presents a situation that
indicates that by their action or inaction they are in distress and because of their behavior
or misbehavior their target has also been harmed. The compliance target may provide a
help that aids both the compliance agent and himself. In this case, the transgression will
be induced by adding the following statement to the general reverse prefavor scenario:
“Your professor has mentioned that they will assign partners for this exam based roughly
on where people sit. Before you can respond to the request for a blue book, your
professor comes by and assigns you to work with this classmate. You will be without a
partner on the exam if your classmate doesn ’t have a blue book ” By adding these
statements to the scenario, the agent’s action of forgetting their blue book is now a
transgression against the target.

Anticipation of Compensation. Conditions receiving an expectation of

compensation message are expected to result in an increased egoistic motivation to obtain

31

rewards. In effect, this ensures that the relationship is transactive in nature and cues the
target to look for their reward. The expectation of compensation message is, “I will figure
out a way to repay you” and will be delivered at the end of the second paragraph. The no
anticipation of compensation message conditions will not receive this message.

Direct Request/Concession Scenario. The direct request and concession strategies
are comparison groups to which the newly developed strategies of the reverse prefavor
and transgression will be compared. The direct request and compliance scenarios will be
similar in content to the reverse prefavor and concession scenarios; however, they will
not provide a request for help or a situation that requires help. The scenario utilized in
both the direct request and concession scenario are presented below.

It is nearing the middle of the semester and you have two classes that both meet

on Tuesday and Thursday. Unfortunately for you, both of your classes have an

exam scheduled on the same day. Luckily, you have about two hours between
classes in order to decompress. At your first exam of the day you arrive about five
minutes before class and are waiting for class to begin. As with most students in
large lectures, you typically sit in about the same place every class period but
rarely talk to too many other students. You do, however, notice the familiar faces
of people you have not often talked to previously. One of your classmates sits in
their usual place two seats down from you and appears to be a bit flustered. This
classmate strikes up a conversation with you about how he got stuck at work later

than expected and almost did not have time to pick up a blue book exam booklet
for use on the exam.

Compliance Request. A concession compliance request will be provided in the
transgression, reverse prefavor, and concession control conditions; whereas a direct
request for the more moderate price will be used in the direct request condition. Previous
research has suggested that the concession as a strategy is more effective when

compliance agents represent a pro-social organization or organization that the target likes.

Therefore the compliance agent will represent the seemingly beneficial organization “old

32

high school.” Previous research has effectively used the sale of raffle tickets as a measure
of compliance. Other benefits to the use of raffle tickets include the presumption that no
one already has raffle tickets from the agents’ old high school, and it allows for the
measure to be continuous. While some people may simply not ever purchase raffle
tickets, there is no reason to expect that this artifact would have a significant effect on
outcomes due to the random assignment of subjects to conditions. The general form of
the concession compliance request is presented below.

The next week you attend class as usual. After class, this same classmate

says to you, “I am selling raffle tickets to raise money for my old high

school, where the prizes include an Ipod Video, gift certificates to the

book store, and some other cool stuff. [Insert compliance message here]

You don’t have to pay me now. Can I put you down for some? You can

buy as many as you want at this price, I can get more.” Your classmate

seems really sincere that this is a good deal.
At the beginning of the quoted message the compliance agent, in the reverse prefavor and
transgression conditions, will deliver the additional message, “You really saved me last
week. I have been thinking about a good way to pay you back for helping me out with that
blue book and I think I have come up with something that you will really like.” This is
intended to suggest that the deal they are about to present is repayment/rectification for
the prior favor or transgression. Additionally, the reverse prefavor/transgression
conditions will receive the message, “We usually sell the tickets for $2 each, and they let
us keep half as an incentive to sell them, but I would like to repay you by selling them to
you for only $1 each.” The concession control condition receives the message, “We
usually sell the tickets for $2 each, and they let us keep half as an incentive to sell them,

but I can sell them to you for only $1 each.” Whereas the direct request control receives

the message, “I can sell them to you for only $1 each.”

33

Instrumentation

Motivation to gain rewards. We may help someone in distress because of our
motivation to gain rewards, to avoid punishments, to reduce the negative vicarious
emotion of empathy, or because of an altruistic response to viewing others’ suffering.
Each of these will be measured as induction checks of the transgression, reverse prefavor,
and anticipation of reward inductions. Rewards for helping behaviors can come in
various forms: material rewards, external rewards, and internal rewards. Someone who
helps because of the motivation to gain material rewards seeks to earn payment for their
good deed or gain other anticipated reciprocal favors. This motivation is expected to
increase in conditions where participants receive an “anticipation of rewards” induction.
The motivation to gain material rewards was measured with seven Likert-type items (see
Appendix A). Items included, “By helping now, I will gain in the end,” and the reverse
coded item, “If I help I do not expect repayment in this situation.” Item response options
range from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” and higher scores indicate a
motivation to gain material rewards. All subsequent items were measured similarly
except where indicated otherwise. The mean of the measure was moderate (M = 3.24, SD
= 1.14), and standardized item alpha was sufficient (a = .80). The motivation to seek
external rewards was measured with four items including, “People will like me more if I
help my classmate,” and “If I help in this situation people will think I am a good person.”
The mean for this scale was moderate (M = 3.97, SD = 1.20), and standardized item
alpha was sufficient (or = .87). The motivation to gain internal rewards was measured

with four items including, “1 would get warm fuzzy feelings if I helped,” and “I helped

34

because it feels good to do so.” The mean was moderately high (M = 5.03, SD = 1.13),
and standardized item alpha was (a = .85).

Motivation to avoid punishments. Motivation to avoid punishments also has three
different dimensions. Most important to the study is the propensity to avoid material
punishments because this is proposed to be directly influenced by the transgression
compliance strategy (see Appendix B). This was measured utilizing six items including,
“By providing this favor, I help both my classmate and myself,” and “The actions of my
classmate hurt me if I do not help.” The mean for the scale was moderate (M = 3.42, SD
= 1.13), and alpha was (a = .82). The motivation to avoid external punishments was
measured with four items. Representative items include, “Others would show their
disapproval of my actions if I do not aid my classmate,” and “If I ever needed help,
people would not help me if I do not help my classmate.” This scale yielded a moderate
mean (M = 3.37, SD = 1.07), with an item alpha ((1 = .80). Motivation to avoid internal
punishment was measured with four items, such as “Giving a favor in this situation may
help me to avoid guilty feelings,” and “I would have painful memories of this situation if
I did not help.” The mean for items measuring this variable were moderate (M = 4.30, SD
= 1.17), and the scale items demonstrated an a = .79 level of reliability.

Empathy. Empathy refers to the attempt by one self-aware person to comprehend
nonjudgmentally the positive and negative experiences of another (Wispé, 1986). By
feeling with someone it is possible to have a vicarious emotional response to their pain
and pleasures. For this study, four items were developed that are intended to measure

state empathy (see Appendix C). A prototypical item is “Seeing my classmate in this

35

situation makes me feel distressed.” Means for the empathy measure were moderate (M =
4.04, SD = 1.24), with a standardized item alpha level of .85.

Sympathy. Sympathy refers to the heightened awareness of the suffering of
another person as something to be alleviated. Four items measuring state sympathy were
constructed (see Appendix D). These items were loosely based on the Empathic Concern
measure in Davis’ (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). An exemplar item is “I
have tender, concerned feelings for my classmate.” The mean for the state sympathy
scale was moderate (M = 4.85, SD = .99), and had a moderate alpha level (a = .78)

Reward seeking. Persons who engage in helping behaviors that are motivated by
gaining material rewards are expected to seek those rewards. Four items were designed to
measure the extent to which a person believes they are owed a favor (see Appendix E).
Exemplary items include “My classmate owes me for helping them” and “I will figure
out a way for my classmate to return the favor.” This measure had a moderate mean (M =
3.0, SD = 1.08), and standardized item alpha of a = .82.

Rectification seeking. Those who have been injured by a prior harm are expected
to seek rectification. Four items, designed to measure the extent to which someone feels
that they are owed an apology, have been developed for this study (see Appendix F).
Representative items include “I would appreciate some acknowledgement by my
classmate for the situation I was put in” and a reverse coded item, “There is no need for
my classmate to say they are sorry.” The mean for the scale was moderate (M = 3.74, SD
= 1.09), and alpha level of o. = .67.

Concession viewed as reward. If a concession is viewed as a reward for prior

helping behavior it has been proposed that this will lead to greater compliance with the

36

concession request. Four items were developed for this study to measure whether the
concession is viewed as a reward (see Appendix G). Items include “This was a nice way
to thank me for my prior help” and “My classmate thoughtfully returned my earlier
favor.” The scale had a moderate mean (M = 3.61 , SD = 1.33), and had a standardized
item alpha of .78.

Concession viewed as apology. A concession that is viewed as rectification for a
prior transgression is expected to increase the acceptance of the concession compliance
request. Five items were constructed that are intended to measure a target’s view of the
appropriateness of the concession as an apology (see Appendix H). Example items
include “The deal my classmate gave me was a good way to say ‘sorry’” and “By
offering this deal my classmate was making a request for forgiveness.” The mean for the
scale was moderate (M = 3.75, SD = 1.23), and had an alpha level of a = .74.

Distress. A person’s perceptions of another’s distress triggers motivations to help.
It has been proposed that the perception of the compliance agent in a state of obligation
or indebtedness may be viewed as distressfiil situation. If the target believes the agent to
be in distress, they may help the agent for a variety of reasons not associated with seeking
rewards or rectification. Distress is measured with six items (see appendix 1) including,
“My classmate feels unsettled about owing me a favor” and “By being helped previously,
my classmate believes they are in a bind.” The scale mean was moderate (M = 4.17, SD =
1.01) and had an alpha level of .87.

Compliance. Subjects in the transgression and reverse prefavor conditions will be
asked to report whether they agree to the initial small request for help with one item,

“Would you help your classmate by giving them a blue book.” Subject’s response

37

categories are “yes” [I will give a blue book to my classmate] or “no” [I will not give a
bluebook to my classmate]. It is important to have a clear commitment of compliance
with the initial small request in order for the subsequent target request to have meaning.
If a subject does not commit to helping their classmate they will be asked about their
motivations for helping but will not receive the experimental compliance request, but
rather will receive a compliance request identical to the concession control. Target
request compliance will be measured by the single item, “How many tickets will you buy
from your classmate at $1 each?” and a four item Likert-type scale including items such
as “I would buy several tickets,” and the reverse coded item “There is no way that I
would buy any tickets.” Please see Appendix J for the four scale items. The mean of the
scale was moderate (M = 3.59, SD = 1.09) and the scale showed high reliability (or = .94).
Of the 570 total participants in the study, 252 (44.1%) reported that they would not
purchase any tickets in response to the single item final target request. Other scores on
this measure ranged from 1 to 20 tickets purchased, resulting in a high number of
responses to be deemed as outliers. The distribution of the measure had high skewness
(1.94) and high kurtosis (5.3 8). These indicators suggested that the distribution of the
measure deviated from normality and thus the variable was dichotomized into those that
complied and those that did not comply with the target request. Both indicators of
compliance along with the Likert—type measure of compliance will be used where

appropriate.

38

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Confirmatory factor analysis (Hunter & Gerbing, 1982) was employed to test the
factor measurement model for internal consistency and parallelism for all multi-item
scales. Based on these analyses, three items were removed from the motivation to gain
rewards scale. Two items (“My classmate is unlikely to repay me for the favor I provide,”
and “If I help I believe this classmate will not attempt to help me in return,”) were
removed because of low correlation with other scale items, and one item (“By helping
now, I will gain in the end.”) was removed because of substantial cross loading with
other factors. This resulted in the retaining of five items that measure the motivation to
gain material rewards. Additionally, one item (“I feel required to help my classmate”)
intended to measure motivation to avoid material punishments yielded significant cross
loadings resulting in high residual errors in the test for parallelism. This item was also
removed from fin‘ther analysis resulting in a five-item measure for motivation to avoid
material punishments. High residual errors were also found in the test for heterogeneity
(parallelism) in two items (“The deal I got was because my classmate owed me an
apolog)’;” and “This was an inappropriate way to admit fault”) in the measure of
concession viewed as apology. These items were also removed from further analysis
resulting in a three-item measure for this variable. After removal of these five items, the
data were deemed consistent with the hypothesized factor model based on the small

errors between predicted and observed correlations in tests of parallelism and internal

consistency.

39

Of the 447 participants who were randomly assigned to an experimental
condition, 87.2% (N = 390) reported that they would agree to the initial request while
12.8% (N = 57) refused. The refusals to comply with the initial small request were not
distributed evenly between conditions. As expected, participants exposed to the
transgression compliance strategy (N = 195, 92%) complied at a higher rate [380, 447) =
8.12, p = .004, phi = -.135] with the initial small request than participants in the Reverse

Pre Favor (RPF) (N = 195, 83%) conditions.

Hypothesis one predicted that a reverse prefavor compliance strategy will be
associated with higher rates of compliance on a target request than a direct request or
concession strategy alone. A one-way independent groups ANOVA was conducted
comparing persons who agreed to the initial small request in the reverse prefavor
condition, concession and direct request conditions. As predicted, there were significant

differences among the three groups [F ( 2, 317) = 4.62, p=.01] in the number of tickets

Table 2. Mean, standard deviations, medians and percent of subjects complying with
target request as measured by number of tickets purchased.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reverse .
Pre-f av o r Transgressnon
Anticipation of 1.68 (2.79) 1.49 (2:43)
Compensation Med " 0 Med " 0
39.8% 46.0%
No 1.91 (2.34) 2.34 (3.23)
Anticipation of Med = 0 Med = 1
Compensation 49.9% 55.4%
2.86 (3.66)
Concession Med = 2
Control 73.0%
0...“ 253,52?
Request 76 7%
Control '

 

 

 

40

that they reported they would purchase and significant differences between the three
groups with respect to the Likert-measure of compliance [F ( 2, 317) = 18.64, p<.001].
Unexpectedly, however, the reverse prefavor had the lowest rates of compliance on the
number of tickets purchased measure of compliance (see Table 2) (M=1.79, P(1.40 S p S
2.18) = .95), and the Likert-type measure of compliance (see Table 3) (M=3.20, P(2.95 S
p S 3.44) = .95) when compared to the concession compliance strategy [number of tickets
purchased (M=2.86, P(1.93 S ,u _<_ 3.78) = .95); Likert measure of compliance (M=4.30,
P(3.88 S p S 4.71) = .95)] and the direct request compliance strategy [number of tickets
purchased (M=2.73, P(2. 12 S ,u S 3.35) = .95); Likert measure of compliance (M=4.48,
P(4.06 S p S 4.90) = .95)]. In general these data reveal a pattern where the concession
and DR compliance strategies do not differ and are significantly better at inducing

compliance than the RPF.

Table 3. Mean, standard deviations, and medians of subjects complying with target
request as measured by Likert compliance scale.

Reverse

' n
Pr e-fav or Transgressno

 

Anticipation of 3.01 (1.76) 3.11 (1.68)
Compensation Med = 2.66 Med = 2.75

 

 

 

 

 

No
. . . 3.36 (1.70) 3.36 (1.74)
Antrcrpatlon of _ =
Compensation Med - 3.00 Med 3.50
Concession 4.30 (1.62)
Control Med = 4.75
Direct
4.48 (1.66)
Reques‘ Med = 5.00
Control

 

 

 

41

Interesting, however, are those forty subjects who received a reverse prefavor
induction that did not comply with the initial prefavor request. These subjects received
the standard concession request without the “You really saved me last week I have been
thinking about a good way to pay you back for helping me out with that blue book and I
think I have come up with something that you will really like,” message. Compliance for
these subjects was significantly higher than those indicating that they would comply with
the initial small request in terms of both tickets purchased [M=3.53, P048 5 p S 4.57) =
.95)] and the Likert measure for compliance [M=4.49 P(4.01 S ,u S 4.97) = .95]. When
the continuous dependent variable “tickets purchased” compliance measure is
dichotomized, into those who comply and those who do not comply, a similar pattern
emerges between subjects who complied with the initial request, and subjects who did not
comply with the initial request. A chi square test was employed to test whether
differences in compliance existed between initial compliers, initial non-compliers, direct
request and concession controls. The chi square test indicated that non independence did
exist among the variables [780, 358) = 37.93, p<.001, phi = .33] and visual inspection of
the cell residuals between predicted and expected cell counts indicated that when subjects
agreed to the initial request in the RPF condition, they complied less (44.1%, N = 86)
than when they did not agree to comply with the initial request (80%, N = 32), or when in
direct request (76.7%, N = 46) or concession only (73%, N = 46) control conditions.

When initial compliance is not taken into account, and initial and non-initial
compliers are combined, results indicate similar findings. Specifically, the mean number
of tickets purchased is still lower [M=2.09, P(1.71 S p S 2.46) = .95], though not

significantly lower, than controls. Additionally, the Likert-type measure of compliance

42

(M=3 .42, P(3.19S ,u S 3.64) = .95) remained significantly lower than controls, and
analysis of the dichotomous measure of compliance [380, 358) = 20.29, p<.001,
Cramer’s V = .24] also indicated that the RPF (50.2%) was worse than control conditions
in inducing compliance.

Hypothesis two predicted that the reverse prefavor compliance strategy will be
more effective when paired with a message indicating an anticipation of compensation
than when no message indicating anticipation of compensation is presented. A t-test was
conducted, which compared compliance rates on the tickets purchased indicator between
those who had received the anticipation of compensation message [M=1.68, P(1.14 S p S
2.22) = .95], with those who did not receive the message [ME] .91, P(1.36 S ,u S 2.46) =
.95). The results of the test indicated that there was no difference [t(193) = -.60, p = .55, r
= .04] when subjects received the anticipation of compensation induction compared to
those who did not receive the induction. Similar findings [t(233) = -1.22, p = .23, r = .09]
were observed in the data with the Likert compliance measure between those who had
received the anticipation of compensation induction [M=3.06, P(2.72 S p S 3.40) = .95],
with those who did not receive the message [M=3.36, P(3.01 S p S 3.71) = .95]. Identical
non-significant findings resulted from the chi square test of independence [780, 195) =
1.64, p<.201 , Phi = .09] with the dichotomized dependent measure with 39.8% (n=41) of
subjects in the anticipation condition complying and 48.9% (N = 45) of subjects in the no
anticipation condition complying. Interestingly, while these findings do not show
significant differences, all measures of compliance point to a consistent pattern of less
compliance with the final concession request when subjects are given the anticipation of

compensation induction.

43

Hypothesis three predicted that a transgression compliance strategy will be
associated with higher rates of compliance on a target request than a direct request or
concession strategy alone. A one way independent groups ANOVA was conducted
comparing those who complied with the initial small request in the transgression
condition, with the concession and direct request conditions. First, when considering the
compliance item “How many tickets would you purchase,” there were significant
differences among the three groups [F(2, 317) = 3.15, p=.044, r =.13], with the
transgression having the lowest rates of compliance (M=1.94, P(1.53 S y S 2.35) = .95),
followed by the direct request (M=2.73, P(2.12 S p S 3.3 5) = .95) and the concession
(M=2.86, P(1.93 S ,u S 3.78) = .95). A similar pattern of results was observed in the data
when the Likert type scale of compliance was investigated [F (2, 317) = 17.58, p<.001, r
=.28], with those who indicated that they would comply with the initial request, and were
thus exposed to the entire transgression induction, complying less (M=3.24, P(3.00 S ,u S
3.48) = .95) than either the direct request (M=4.48, P(4.06 S p S 4.90) = .95) or the
concession control groups (M=4.30, P(3.88 S p S 4.72) = .95). Inspection of the
confidence intervals indicates that the direct request and concession controls did not
differ in their levels of compliance; however, subjects in these groups reported that they
would comply at a higher rate than subjects exposed to the transgression compliance
strategy. Similarly, a chi square test for independence revealed significant differences
between the three groups [{(2, 318) = 19.81, p<.001, r = .25] when compared on the
dichotomized measure of compliance. Inspection of the cell residuals between predicted
and expected cell counts indicated that similar levels of compliance were observed in the

concession and direct request control groups but these groups differed from the subjects

44

who agreed to the initial request in the transgression condition. Specifically, subjects in
the transgression condition complied with the final request approximately half of the time
(49.7%, N = 97), and compliance in the concession control (73.0%, N = 46) and direct
request (76.7%, N = 46) was closer to three-quarters of the time.

Those subjects who did not comply with the initial small request in the
transgression conditions reported higher levels of compliance with the final target request
when considering the tickets purchased measure of compliance (Mr—2.56, P(1.22 S ,u S
3.89) = .95), however this was not significantly higher. The Likert measure of
compliance, however, did show that those who would not help on the initial request (M=
4.18, P(3.49 S [u S 4.87) = .95) were significantly more likely to comply with the target
request. Inspection of the mean confidence intervals indicates that these subjects had
similar levels of target compliance as subjects in direct request and concession control
conditions.

When the final target compliance scores of initial compliers and the eighteen non-
compliers are combined, the propensity to purchase tickets (M=-1.99, P(1.59 _<. p _<_ 2.38) =
.95) does not change substantially. Similarly, the Likert measure of target compliance
does not change substantially (M=3.32, P(3.09 S p _<_ 3.55) = .95), nor does its relative
underperformance when compared to direct request or concession compliance strategies.
When the overall scores for the transgression compliance strategy is compared to the
dichotomous measure of target compliance, only 50.9% of subjects complied with the
target request and this remained significantly lower [x2(2, 335) = 18.58, p<.001, r = .24]

than the two control groups.

45

Hypothesis four predicted that the transgression compliance strategy will be more
effective in gaining compliance with a target request when paired with a message
indicating an expectation of reward than when no message indicating expectation of
reward is presented. A t-test was conducted, which compared those who had received the
anticipation of compensation (W156, P(1.08 S ,u S 3.04) = .95), with those who did not
receive the message (M=2.37, P(1.77 S p S 2.04) = .95) in the transgression condition for
the target compliance indicator of tickets purchased. The results of the test indicated that
when subjects in the transgression condition, received an anticipation of compensation
induction they reported that they would purchase fewer tickets [t(204.46) = -2.07, p = .04,
r = .14, equal variances not assumed] compared to those who did not receive the
induction. The Likert type measure of compliance indicated that while subjects’ reports
of compliance were lower in the anticipation condition (M=3.2 l , P(2.89 S ,u S 3.54) =
.95) than in the no anticipation of rewards condition (M=3.42, P(3.10 S p S 3.74) = .95) it
was not significantly lower [t(210) = -.893, p = .37, r = .06]. Finally, a chi square test for
independence was conducted to determine whether a relationship existed between the
anticipation of rewards induction and compliance on the dichotomized measure of target
compliance. Results of the test indicated that while there may have been a tendency for
subjects in the anticipation condition to comply with the target less (46.0%) than those
who did not receive the induction (55.4%) the groups were not significantly different
[{(1, 212) = 1.85, p=.174, phi = .09, one-tailed].

Research question one asked whether a reverse prefavor or a transgression
compliance strategy was most effective in obtaining compliance with a target request. A

two way independent groups ANOVA was conducted to investigate the veracity of a

46

main effect for strategy type (reverse prefavor/transgression) on the tickets purchased
continuous measure of compliance. Consistent with the previously tested relationships in
H2 and H4, the anticipation of rewards induction had no effect on compliance [F (l, 447)
= 2.20, p= .14, n.s., r =.07]. More pertinent to answering the research question proposed,
there was no main effect for strategy type [F (l, 447) = 1.99, p=.66, n.s., r =.02], and the
strategy by anticipation of rewards interaction was also not able to explain variance in
compliance scores [F(1, 447) = .043, p=.84]. In terms of the Likert measure of
compliance, similar results were found. Specifically, the main effect for anticipation was
not found to affect compliance [F(l , 447) = 2.20, p=.l4, n.s., r =.07], the main effect for
strategy was not found to affect compliance [F(1, 447) = .451,p=.50, n.s., r =.03], and
the interaction was not found to affect compliance [F (1, 447) = .043, p=.835]. In addition,
a chi square test was conducted to investigate possible differences in compliance on the
dichotomized measure. The data revealed no difference [780, 477) = .02, p=.88, n.s., phi
= .07] between the transgression and compliance measure. These data suggest that there
was no difference between the transgression and the reverse prefavor compliance
strategies in their ability to induce compliance with a target request.

When initial non compliers are removed from analysis, a main effect for strategy
type (i.e., RPF, Transgression) is not detected [F(], 389) = .17, p=.68, n.s.] and the
strategy by anticipation interaction is also not significant [F(] , 389) = 1.17, p=.28, n.s.]
on the purchase tickets compliance measure. The main effect for anticipation approached
significance [F(1, 389) = 3.61, p=.06, 772 = .009] however the effect was small (see Table

2 for means, medians and standard deviations). Additionally, the Likert scale measure of

compliance revealed no significant differences [F(3, 389) = 1.47, p = .23, n.s., ”p2 =.008]

47

and the results did not show a difference among the four groups [x2(2, 390) = 4.74, p =
.192, r = .09] on the dichotomized compliance measure.

Research question two asked whether distress is related to target compliance.
Distress was unrelated to the three measures of compliance [tickets purchased (r = .03,
p=.51); Likert measure (r = .05, p = .35); dichotomous measure (r = .04, p = .45)].

Distress also did not differ among treatment conditions [F(3, 389) =.51, p=.67, n.s., ”p2 =

.004].
Motivations

Descriptive statistics for all measured motivations to help by condition are
presented in Table 4. The transgression compliance strategy was predicted to be
associated with relatively high rates of the motivation to avoid material punishments. An
independent groups ANOVA was conducted to test for the predicted main effect. As
predicted, the data indicated a significant main effect for compliance strategy [F (3, 445)
= 64.72, p<.001, ”p2 =.13] with subjects in the transgression (M=3.83, P(3.69 S p S 3.97)
= .95) compliance strategy reporting significantly more motivation to avoid material
punishments than subjects in the RPF conditions (M=3.03, P(2.90 S p S 3.17) = .95).
This analysis also revealed a small main effect for anticipation, with subjects who did not
receive an anticipation message (M=3.30, P(3.17 S ,u S 3.44) = .95) more strongly
endorsing the motivation to avoid material punishments [F(l , 443) = 6.79, p=.009, 77,,2
=.02] than those who did receive the anticipation message (M=3.56, P(3 .42 S ,u S 3.70) =

.95). A significant, but small, interaction was also present [F(1, 445) = 6.91, p=.009, 77p2

=.02] with cell means indicating that the transgression x no anticipation condition

produced the highest motivation to avoid material punishments.

48

Table 4. Descriptives for motivations to help by condition.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rewards - Material Reverse PF Transgression
Anticipation 3.38 (1.14) 3.12 (1.14)
No anticipation 3.04 (1.13) 3.38 (1 .13)
Rewards - lntemal
Anticipation 5.11 (1.11) 4.95 (1.19)
No anticipation 5.20 (1.03) 4.84 (1.18)
Rewards - External
Anticipation 3.99 (1.25) 4.01 (1.15)
No anticipation 4.11 (1.18) 3.80 (1.19)
Avoid Punish. - Material
Anticipation 3.03 (.89) 3.57 (1 .19)
No anticipation 3.03 (.90) 4.09 (1.18)
Avoid Punish. - Internal
Anticipation 4.28 (1 .13) 4.35 (1 .15)
No anticipation 4.29 (1.14) 4.29 (1 .13)
Avoid Punish - External
Anticipation 3.39 (1.05) 3.26 (1.08)
No anticipation 3.25 (1.07) 3.56 (1.06)
Empathy
Anticipation 4.03 (1.36) 3.87 (1.32)
No anticipation 4.13 (1.13) 4.13 (1.13)
Sympathy
Anticipation 4.93 (.94) 4.65 (1.12)
No anticipation 4.96 (1.00) 4.81 (.89)

 

 

 

Interesting to note, however, is that even though the results are consistent with what was
expected, the mean amount of endorsement of the variable was at or below the neutral
point on the Likert scale.

Expectation of compensation was expected to increase the motivation to gain
material rewards. Analysis of this expected main effect revealed that no main effect

existed, however a significant interaction effect was present [F (3, 445) = 7.49, p=.006,

”p2 =.02] with inspection of the cell means, revealing that the RPF x anticipation and the

49

transgression x no anticipation conditions performed better than the other cells. However,
the effect size was small.

The reverse pre favor was expected to potentially motivate someone to help
through a variety of different processes including: gaining internal and external rewards,
avoiding internal and external punishments, empathy, and sympathy. In terms of the
motivation to gain internal rewards, a significant but small main effect was found [F(l ,

443) = 5.82, p=.Ol 6, ‘77,} =.01], whereby subjects in the RPF conditions (M=5.16, P(5.01

S p S 5.30) = .95) were motivated by internal rewards at a higher rate than subjects in the
transgression conditions (M=4.90, P(4.75 S p S 5.05) = .95). No significant differences
between conditions were observed for the motivation to gain external rewards, avoid
internal or external punishments or for empathy. A significant main effect for compliance
strategy was found in the measure for sympathy. As expected, subjects in the RPF
conditions (M=4.95, P(4.82 S ,u S 5.07) = .95) reported higher [F(], 446) = 5.35, p=.O2,
"p2 =.01] levels of sympathy for their classmate than subjects in the transgression
conditions (M=4.73, P(4.60 S p S 4.86) = .95).
Tests of the Proposed Models
All correlations were corrected for attenuation due to error of measurement by

using standardized item alpha coefficients for each variable. In the case of the
dichotomized measure of compliance, measurement was assumed to be perfect. The
proposed models were then tested with path coefficients based on the corrected
correlations.

The proposed model for the relationship between avoiding material punishments

and compliance with a concession target request was presented in Figure 2. Afier

50

correcting for attenuation due to measurement error, low correlations, ,6 = .22, (.08 S ,8 S
.36) = .95, between the motivation to avoid material punishment and rectification seeking
and between rectification seeking and the concession viewed as apology variable [fl =
.01, (-.13 S ,B S .15) = .95] were observed (see Table 5). These relationships did not meet
generally accepted levels of significance nor were they substantial. Therefore, it is

concluded that the data do not fit the predicted modelI (see Figure 5).

Table 5. Motivation to avoid material punishments: Correlations, corrected correlations
and path coefficients.

 

 

 

 

 

Motivation
Avoid Rectification Concession Compliance
Material Seeking as Apology - Likert
Punish
Motivation Avoid
Material Punish '22 '17 '08
Rectification ,, _
Seeking .16 .01 .17
Concession as
.13* .01 .52
APO'OQY
Compliance - . ..
Like it .07 -.13 .43

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

’ significant at the p<.05 level (two-tailed)

"‘* significant at the p<.01 level (two-tailed)

Note: Raw correlations are presented in the lower half of the matrix. Correlations corrected for attenuation
due to error of measurement are presented in the top of the matrix, and those in bold are used to
test the model.

 

 

 

 

Avoid 22 Rectification -01 Concession -52 Compliance -
material =9 Seeking =9 Viewed as 1:4) Likert
Punishments Apology

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 5. Proposed model results of motivation to avoid material punishments-
compliance relationship.

The proposed model for testing the utility of gaining material rewards was
presented in Figure 3. It suggests that a person who helps because they are motivated by

gaining some material reward will then engage in reward seeking. Those engaged in

51

reward seeking will then be more apt to view the concession as a reward, which will
subsequently increase compliance.

By inspection of the path coefficients, the expected model did not fit the data due
to a substantial negative relationship (,6 = -.30) observed between reward seeking and the
concession viewed as reward variable. However, the new model was tested for fit for
both the Likert (Figure 6) and dichotomized (Figure 7) measures of compliance. Please
see Table 6 and Table 7 for raw correlations and path coefficients (corrected correlations)
for the Likert and dichotomized measure of compliance, respectively.

First, the model predicting the Likert measure of compliance will be considered.
In examining the fit of the model, the path coefficients reached substantial size. The error

between the predicted and reproduced correlations were low between the motivation to

Table 6. Motivation to gain material rewards-Likert measure of compliance: Correlations,
corrected correlations and path coefficients.

 

 

 

 

 

Motivation Concession
Material Slam? Viewed as (33:22
Rewards 9 Reward
Motivation Gain
Material Rewards '76 "17 "09
Reward Seeking .64“ -.30 -.10
Concession ., .,
Viewed as Reward "14 "24 '76
Compliance - _ c.
leert -.08 .09 .65

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

gain material rewards and concession viewed as a reward (.06). The error between
compliance and reward seeking (.08) was also low; however, the error between
compliance and gaining material rewards (.13), 2 =1 .56, p =.l2 approached significance.

The overall model fit was adequate [38(3) = 3.99, p=.26].

52

 

 

 

 

. . _ Compliance
Garn Matenal .76 Reward --30 Concessron -76 Likert ,
Rewards 1:) Seeking =9 Viewed as =14 Measure
Reward

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 6. Proposed model results of motivation to gain material rewards-Likert measure
of compliance relationship.

Alternatively, the model (see Figure 7),which included the dichotomized measure
of compliance had lower errors (averaged .07) between predicted and observed
unconstrained correlations and had reasonable effect sizes. Evaluation of the individual
links suggested a much better fit with the model and the overall model was more

consistent with the data [78(3) = 3.57, p=.3 1].

Table 7. Motivation to gain material rewards-dichotomous measure of compliance:
Correlations, corrected correlations and path coefficients.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Motivation Concession
Material 816:3? Viewed as 683%); '
Rewards g Reward ‘
Motivation Gain
Material Rewards '76 "‘17 "09
Reward Seeking .64“ -.30 -.07
Concession .. n
Viewed as Reward "14 "24 '59
Comply - Dichot -.08 -.06 .52“
, Compliance
Gain Material .76 Reward --30 Concessron -59 Dichotomous
Rewards 1:1) Seeking :1) Viewed as 1:1) Measure
Reward

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 7. Proposed model results of motivation to gain material rewards-dichotomous
measure of compliance relationship.

53

The original thought in developing this path model was that an anticipation of
rewards message, “I will figure out a way to repay you” may induce compliance with the
initial small request based on an egoistic motivation to gain material rewards. When the
model is evaluated by considering only those subjects who received the anticipation of
rewards induction, the relationships among the variables become even more substantial
(see Table 8), the errors between predicted and observed unconstrained correlations are
reduced, and the fit of the overall model (see Figure 8) is enhanced considerably [352(3) =

.57, p=.96].

Table 8. Motivation to gain material rewards-Likert measure of compliance, for

anticipation of compensation conditions only: Correlations, corrected correlations and

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

path coefficients.
Motivation Concession
Material Slam? Viewed as 0322:: '
Rewards g Reward
Motivation Gain
Material Rewards '72 "25 "20
Reward Seeking .61“ -.35 -.10
Concession .. ..
Viewed as Reward "14 "28 '79
Compliance - _ .. - c. n
Likert .1 8 .24 .67
. , Compliance
Gain Matenal .72 Reward -.35 Concessron -79 Likert -
Rewards =9 Seeking =9 Viewed as =9 Measure
Reward

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 8. Model results of anticipation of compensation motivation to gain material
rewards-Likert measure of compliance relationship.

54

Taken together, these findings indicate a departure from previous thought on the
progression from the motivation to gain rewards to final compliance. That is, people who
are motivated to help based on the possibility of gaining instrumental rewards are likely
to seek those rewards. Offering a subsequent concession is often not viewed as an
appropriate reward. Because compliance is based to a large extent on the perception that
the concession is a form of reward, compliance is ultimately decreased. This is
particularly relevant to those subjects who are given an anticipation of rewards induction.
These people, while seeking the reward to which they feel entitled, do not see the
concession as an appropriate benefit.

Finally, the last predicted model asserted that the vicarious negative egoistic
response of empathy and the other oriented (altruistic) response of sympathy would be
neutralized by helping on the initial small request. Therefore, subjects who were
motivated by these affective responses were not expected to feel like a return favor was
owed to them (reward seeking), or feel as if they are owed an apology, or relationship
repair (rectification seeking). Because reward seeking and rectification seeking were
predicted to have mediated relationships on compliance through concession as reward
and the concession as apology, respectively, sympathy and empathy were proposed to be
negatively related or unrelated to final compliance. Inspection of the parameter estimates
reveals several unsubstantial relationships in the model. The raw correlations and
parameter estimates are presented in Table 9. As expected, empathy and sympathy
generally produced negative and weak relationships with reward seeking and rectification

seeking and resulted in a poor fit for the overall model [78(3) = 184.62, p<.001].

55

Table 9. Results for predicted null model of the effect of motivation to reduce negative

affect and altruistic helping on compliance: Correlations, corrected correlations and path
coefficients.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 Empathy .66 -.08 .15 .09 .76 .18
2 Sympathy .54“ -.29 -.14 .13 .14 .12
3 5,9391%; -.07 -.23** .65 -.3o -.08 -.10
4 831:0 .11* -.10 .48“ -.21 -.01 —.16
5 affix? .07 .10* -.24** -.15** .75 .76
6 23°32? .06 .11* -.06 .01 .57" .52
7 03:22 ' .16" .10* -.09 -.13* .65“ .43"

 

However, careful inspection of the parameter estimates reveals some interesting
findings. First, while not strong, the path between empathy and rectification seeking is in
the positive direction [,6 = .15, P(-.O7 S ,6 S .37) = .95]. This may indicate a slight

tendency for people who help in order to reduce their egoistic negative emotional state to

 

 

 

 

.15 - - -.01 Concession .52
Rectification ,
Empathy ==> Seeking =9 Viewed as \
Apology

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Compliance
Likert -
Measure

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.76
-.29 Reward -.30 Concession
Sympathy =9 Seeking =9 Viewed as

Reward

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 9. Results for predicted null model of the effect of motivation to reduce negative
affect and altruistic helping on compliance

56

expect some sort of apology. Second, the negatively valenced path between sympathy
and reward seeking was stronger than expected.

Significant errors, small parameters, and an interest in further investigating the
sympathy to reward seeking relationship justified revision of the proposed model.
Therefore, empathy and rectification seeking were removed from the model due to
insignificant relationships with other variables. The concession viewed as reward variable

was also removed because it was now exogenous due to the removal of rectification

Table 10. Results for the revised model of the effect of altruistic helping on compliance:
Correlations, corrected correlations and path coefficients.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reward Concession Compliance
Sympathy Seeking as Reward - Likert
Sympathy -.29 .13 . 12
Reward *1: . -
Seeking -.23 .30 .10
Concession . w:
as Reward .10 —.24 .76
Compliance , n
_ Like rt .10 -.09 .65

 

seeking. What remained was a causal string leading from sympathy to reward seeking to
concession viewed as a reward and finally to compliance.

The parameter estimates of the revised model are sufficiently strong (see Table
10). The errors observed between predicted and observed unconstrained correlations are
low and localized tests of individual links reveal that errors do not deviate significantly
from zero. The overall fit for the model is satisfactory [352(3) = 3.14, p=.3 7]. This
indicates a pattern of relationships between these variables that suggests those who feel

sympathy for someone in need, and are thus motivated to relieve the other’s pain, tend to

57

 

 

 

 

 

 

, Compliance
-.29 Reward --30 Concessron -76 Likert -
Sympathy => Seeking =9 Viewed as =9 Measure
Reward

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 10. Results for the revised model of the effect of altruistic helping on compliance.

engage in less reward seeking. Reward seeking is negatively related to viewing a
concession as a reward. Thus, those seeking to be rewarded for their help do not view the
concession as appropriate while those not seeking rewards for their prior good deed
evaluate the concession more positively. Viewing the concession as a reward ultimately

leads people to take advantage of the reward and therefore comply to a greater extent.

58

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The norm of reciprocity, as described by Gouldner (1960), is proposed to govern
a persons’ tendency to accept favors, to give favors, and to return favors. There is a rich
history of social influence research suggesting the norm of reciprocity, and the mutual
concessions it requires, are effective means of gaining compliance. This study sought to
employ these processes - particularly the nonn’s requirement that people accept returned
favors — in forwarding two new compliance strategies. The reverse prefavor compliance
strategy was expected to increase compliance by motivating internal and external reward
seeking and punishment avoidance. The transgression compliance strategy was expected
to improve compliance based on a person’s desire to avoid instrumental punishments and
then seek rectification for the transgression. It is important to have a large repertoire of
compliance strategies from which to choose when attempting to influence exchange
partners. While many of the relationships that were proposed to exist based on the
relative effectiveness of the strategy manipulation and the anticipation of rewards
manipulation were not found in the data, evidence for several important relationships
were revealed. This chapter will discuss the significant relationships observed, as well as
the proposed relationships that did not meet traditional levels of significance or
meaningful size of effect, and place these in the context of extant research. Limitations

and future research will also be forwarded.

59

 

Viewing concession as reward and apology

The present data indicated that there were substantial positive relationships
between viewing the concession as a reward and compliance, and viewing the concession
as an apology and compliance. These relationships were expected to be high. Because
many subjects did not comply with the final request, however, it may be more accurate to
view the uncovered relationship slightly differently. That is, those who did not view the
concession as a reward or apology did not comply. While this certainly would not be true
in other situations applying the concession as a compliance strategy, because of the
context of the situation and the framing of the request, these relationships seemed to
explain a fair amount of variance in compliance scores.

Reward seeking, on the other hand, was negatively related to viewing the
concession as a reward and rectification seeking was unrelated to viewing the concession
as a punishment. This suggests that when people seek rewards for a prior favor, they have
provided that the concession is not viewed as an appropriate response, or conversely, that
when not seeking rewards they find the concession to be a nice way to thank them. Here,
subjects scored low on both reward seeking and rectification seeking. Originally, it was
thought that a small initial favor request or transgression against a target would induce
compliance in the initial request and thereby allow for the return of the favor or
rectification of the harm done. Small favors and small transgressions may not be the most
effective way of gleaning compliance on the target request. Perhaps a larger initial
request or transgression may provide higher levels of reward seeking/rectification
seeking, and at higher levels of these variables, the view of the concession as

reward/rectification may be reversed. In the present study, with the small favor provided,

60

 

many people did not seek relationship repair. Because of this, when presented with the
concession, they may not have seen the need for it, or perhaps they felt that if they
accepted the concession, they would be overcompensated for such a minor favor
previously provided.

Another important finding was that sympathy was negatively related to reward
seeking. Thus a path from sympathy to reward seeking, to viewing the concession as a
reward, and ultimately to compliance was found to fit the data. Sympathy has been
proposed to be an altruistic motivator (Baston & Shaw, 1991). The relationship between

sympathy and reward seeking provides some evidence for this; however, one might

 

expect that the relationship between these variables is stronger if sympathy is entirely fl
altruistic.

Anticipation of compensation also was found to have an impact on target
compliance particularly in the transgression condition. The effect, however, was small
and in the opposite direction than expected; that is, receiving the anticipation message
diminished compliance with the target request. It is possible that indicating to subjects
that they will be repaid proxied an apology and thereby diminished the need for firrther
relationship repair in the form of a concession. Alternatively, the message may have
indicated that something good was to come from the prior help, and subjects, when faced
with an undesirable repayment, tended to either withdraw from the relationship or wait
for a repayment that was congruent with their expectations.

Implications for the norm of reciprocity and mutual concessions
Several caveats to the norm of reciprocity were first observed by Gouldner (1960)

and, more recently, scholars wishing to invoke the norm to gain compliance with a

.1 l

'"l

request (i.e. Boster et al., 1995) Gouldner suggested that the norm functioned to stabilize
societies by requiring that when a favor was given, a recipient was required to not harm
the favor giver, and that a giver would not harm a recipient. This suggests that it is
perhaps most functional for a lag to exist between the giving of a favor and the repayment
of that favor. In the current study, the compliance strategies called for a favor to be given
to the compliance agent and it was expected that the compliance agent would be able to
capitalize on this favor owed. The data suggest that this form of repayment was not
particularly acceptable to compliance targets. Thus they may anticipate allowing the
favor to be repaid at another time with a repayment deemed to be more acceptable.

Alternatively, mutual concessions are expected to work by first retreating from an
initial extreme position and, because of this concession by the compliance agent, a
compliance target is expected to reciprocate the gesture and thus move from a position of
non compliance to a position of compliance (Cialdini, 1975; Hale & Laliker, 1999;
Turner et al, 2007). The concession, in norm of reciprocity terms, is seen as a favor that
requires repayment. Cialdini, 1975) has argued however that consumers are becoming
much more savvy to this strategy and thus if the concession is not seen as a legitimate
offer of retreat, defensive mechanisms are activated. The strategies in the present research
were developed, in part, to disable these defensive mechanisms by providing a
justification for the concession. It is possible, however, that the act of providing a
concession — moving from an extreme position to a less extreme position — satisfied the
obligation to repay the prior favor given to the compliance agent. This retreat is presumed
to be, at least in part (Cialdini, 2004) viewed as a concession that is subsequently

reciprocated; however, less is known about the verbal retreat and how this by itself might

62

   

 

 

satisfy a debt. In the present research, it was expected that the retreat (concession) would
be viewed as repayment only when the compliance target actually took advantage of the
offer; however, one reason for relatively low levels of compliance may be that the offer
of the concession was viewed as repayment.
Gouldner suggests that by not adhering to the norm of reciprocity a person may
invite social sanctions or ostrication from the system. In this, Gouldner suggests that q
- i
regulation of the system is conducted by those in the system. By being presented with the
reverse prefavor and the transgression inductions, a compliance target is positioned as

one up in the social arrangement. Not allowing repayment of a prior favor is a violation

 

of the norm of reciprocity as it was originally described. It may be that someone in this
one up position feels freer to leave the exchange without guilt. The compliance target
may offend the compliance agent by violating the norm, but if they wish to escape from
the exchange then this is ineffectual. In the scenarios presented there was no indication
that others were observing the interaction, so possible ostrication from the larger system
may also be minimized for this violation. Ultimately violating the norm of reciprocity
may be more serious when one refuses to repay a debt; however, violating the norm by
refusing repayment may be a less serious violation, or at times, may even be expected
(Flynn, 2003).

Additionally, evidence of the norm of reciprocity has been found to exist among
strangers (exchange relationships) but not friends (communal relationships) (Boster, et a1.
1995). As Cialdini (2001) notes, mutual concessions is a powerful compliance strategy
because a compliance agent can make the initial concession and thereby begin the

process of exchange. The general concession strategy calls for the compliance agent to

63

put themselves in a one-up position in the exchange. This may make the relational
parameters salient to the target, which would indicate that the parties are in an exchange
relationship and that the exchange is presently unequal. The reverse prefavor and the
transgression, by design, however place the compliance agent in a one-down position.
This may specify a different set of relational parameters to the compliance target. The
target may view the willingness of an agent to place themselves in a one down position as
indicating that the agent views the target as a communal relational partner rather than an
exchange partner. Therefore, the exchange of favors may become less based on exchange
and more on altruism. Organizational literature, for example, has noted that trust can
develop quite quickly in certain situations (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998),
which may move a relationship from one grounded in exchange to a communal
relationship. If this is the case, it might explain why compliance in the treatment
conditions was lower than expected. Put simply, given the way the relationship is
redefined the concession and therefore compliance may be unnecessary.
Raw compliance

The raw level of compliance in the experimental conditions appears promising,
with 44.1% of subjects in the RPF conditions reporting that they would comply with the
target request and 49% of subjects reporting that they would comply in the transgression
conditions. The RPF and transgression compliance strategies were predicted to perform
better than control conditions but were found to not be as successful in gaining
compliance. As argued previously, the sequential strategies first require that a compliance
agent perform a transgression against someone or ask them for a prior help and then offer

a concession as repayment or rectification. There are many times, particularly in

64

organizations, when one purposely or inadvertently causes harm or slights another (i.e.
Anderson & Pearson, 1999). These data suggest that when relationships are strained do to
a favor already being owed or a harm previously enacted, it is possible to gain
compliance with a request by presenting it as a concession. It is difficult to know whether
a concession within this context would outperform other strategies; however, nearly 50%
compliance in conditions where the requester has either caused some harm or is already
in debt to the target seems like a successful strategy.

High levels of compliance in the control conditions do not reflect the levels of

compliance in other similar compliance literature using the sale of tickets as a final

 

compliance request. Traditionally, the compliance request of tickets purchased has been
used in studies evaluating the effectiveness of the unsolicited favor. Goie and Boster
(2005) reported subjects in their control conditions as purchasing .68 tickets, while Boster
et al., (1995) reported .69 tickets purchased for strangers and 2.94 for friends in control
conditions. In Goei, et al., (2003) the authors reported control conditions purchased 1.4
tickets, and Regan (1971) reported that subjects purchased .8 tickets from unpleasant
confederates and 1.5 tickets from confederates in control conditions. In this study,
subjects in control conditions reported that they would purchase a mean of 2.86 (mode =
2) tickets in the concession control and 2.73 (mode = 2) tickets in the direct request
control conditions. It is unlikely that these differences are due to drawing from different
populations since many of the subjects in previous studies are from the same
“Midwestern University” as the present study. Hence, it appears that compliance scores

may be unnaturally high in the control conditions. Ultimately it is difficult to know

65

_"~

whether the inflation in compliance scores is limited to the control conditions or if the
levels of compliance across conditions are proportionally increased.

Why the treatment conditions fared worse that control conditions is not entirely
clear. In addition to the issues mentioned above One explanation may be the concession
strategy used. The concession strategy utilized in the study is a variation of the that’s-not-
all (TNA) technique (Burger, 1986). That is, a price is given for the tickets and before the
subject can reply, the deal is improved. Some have argued that the effectiveness of the
strategy is not entirely based on the concession explanation, but rather because the initial
price sets an anchor point of reference for the value of the item (Burger et al, 1999;
Cialdini, 2004). Thus when deciding whether or not to comply, the high anchor point
tends to increase the likelihood that the better deal will seem more attractive, and within
the range of acceptance. The present study expected to increase compliance over the
concession control, in part, by giving a reason for the concession and deactivating
defensive mechanisms. It was expected that if subjects had a valid reason why they, in
particular, were getting a bargain, it would work to increase compliance. If, however, the
anchor point or some other mechanism drives the effect generally, the present scenario
may have worked to draw attention away from this and instead made the irrelevant
relational variables more salient, negating the effectiveness of other, more useful
mechanisms.

Initial non-compliers

Those who did not comply with the initial request complied more with the

subsequent concession compliance message than subjects who complied with the initial

request in both the RPF conditions and transgression conditions. There are several

66

reasons why this may be the case. First, these individuals could be high in equity
sensitivity, described by Husman, Hatfield, and Miles (1987) as entitleds, and seek to be
overcompensated at the expense of others. They may not want to help when they see little
benefit to themselves in doing so as in the initial small request. However, they may be
prone to subsequently view the concession as being a good deal and therefore take
advantage of it.
ran

Another possibility is that, because they denied the person initially, they may feel

that not complying with a request for a second time may be in poor form. Internal and

external motivations for gaining rewards and avoiding punishments may become high

 

1”“

when presented with the second request. Denying someone’s request once may be
justified, however when faced with not helping a second time, it may be inconsistent with
their view of themselves as a helpful person or they may become particularly concerned
that others will view them as unhelpful with repeated denials of aid.

Third, they may have not helped initially because they viewed the compliance
agent negatively due to not being prepared for the exam. It is possible that their view of
the compliance agent changed when they were presented with more information. In this
situation, raising money for their old high school is something a good person would do.
Giving a deal on the tickets is something a good person would do. Hence, some subjects
may be more likely to withhold favors to pe0ple they view negatively, and give favors to
those individuals who they view positively.

Fourth, the process of complying with a concession after an initial rejection does
resemble the door-in-the-face strategy (Cialdini et al., 1975). However, in this case,

instead of the DITF taking the form of rejection-then—retreat it takes the form of rejection-

. z

rejection-then retreat. Perhaps this is too much to bear for even the most stubborn
compliers.

A final reason why final compliance may have been increased in conditions where
subjects did not comply with the initial request may be due to not receiving the message
setting up the concession. These subjects did not receive the additional “You really saved
me last week I have been thinking about a good way to pay you back for helping me out
with that blue book and I think I have come up with something that you will really like. ”
This message was intended to frame the concession as relationship repair for the
treatment conditions. It is possible that it had the unintended consequence of setting
subjects’ reward expectations too high, resulting in a negative reaction when faced with
the concession. Therefore, this message may have reduced compliance in treatment
conditions making it appear that it was initial non-compliers that had increased
compliance.

Limitations and firture research

Future researchers wishing to test the veracity of the RPF and transgression would
do well to first establish its usefulness under several conditions rather than test the many
paths of why it might bring about compliance. One possibility would be to give the
control conditions the entire scenario, including the initial request. This would allow for a
better understanding of different compliance strategies that might work when a
compliance agent already “owes” a favor or an apology. For example, the relative
effectiveness of the direct request and concession could be compared to conditions where
the “here is how I am going to repay you” message is delivered. Alternatively, it was

thought that a verbal thanks (or apology) may reduce the reward seeking/rectification

68

seeking behaviors and subsequent compliance. Given the results of the present study, it
may be beneficial to reduce reward seeking (rectification seeking) in order to increase
compliance. Thus, paired with a verbal thanks or apology, a concession may be more
effective in gaining compliance.

A second limitation to the present study is that the control conditions varied in a
variety of ways other than the delivery of a specific compliance message. Subjects in
control conditions did not complete the items measuring the thirteen other variables.
While attempts were made to keep the scenarios relatively similar in content, the
scenarios were significantly shorter in control groups and were potentially more
cognitively accessible when determining whether they would comply than experimental
groups.

Future research may also seek to better understand the anticipation of
compensation message. In the present study, the anticipation message may have had a
slightly negative relationship with compliance. It appears that subjects did not view the

concession as a reward/apology when they were seeking one. Perhaps an induction that

reduces rather than increases reward/apology seeking may be beneficial. A message such

as, “I cannot see how I could ever repay you but...” may work to increase compliance
with the subsequent request.

The scenarios in the study also included trading favors that are relatively easily
quantifiable in dollar and cents. Future research can determine if subjects pay particular
attention to the monetary value of exchanged favors, and if they do, whether other types
of favor exchange might show higher levels of compliance. This study sought to

determine whether the concession could be framed as an apology or as a reward. The

69

 

apology and the reward may be useful for framing other types of requests. There may be
times when it is unclear to a compliance target what the advantages and disadvantages are
for complying. In these cases, it may be profitable for a compliance agent to frame the
request as a reward. For example, in an organizational setting, someone may wish to get
out of participating in a cross functional team. They may attempt to induce a coworker to
take their place by telling them, “Because I owe you a favor I want you to take my place P
in this prestigious team.” «-
Another limitation of the present research is that the scenario inductions required

subjects to effectively imagine themselves in the situations presented and successfully :

 

perceive the inductions. Some of the measures may be particularly susceptible to this
artifact. For example, the measure of distress was a measure of how distressed the subject
believed the compliance agent to be with regard to owing relationship repair. In order to
respond to items on this scale, a subject must first be able to imagine himself in the
situation, then be able to imagine himself in the position of the compliance agent, and
then imagine what the compliance agent was feeling. That is a lot of imagining. We
might expect that some people would be unable to do this effectively; particularly those
who are low in perspective taking and fantasy (see Davis, 1983). While it is hoped that
the inductions were successful, and perhaps this is evidenced by several observed
significant relationships, clearly a laboratory or field study would allow for the
opportunity for expanded confidence in the data. Moving to a more realistic methodology
where subjects feel the effects of the reverse prefavor and transgression may ultimately

result in findings that deviate from those presented here.

70

"112*”

Appendix A
Motivation to gain rewards scale

Rewards (material)
1. If I help it would be because I expect that the favor I provide to my classmate will
be repaid sometime.
I would be looking for a reward if I were to help. _
This classmate will do something for me because of the favor that I provide.
If I help it would be because if the situation presents itself, my classmate will do
me a favor.
My classmate is unlikely to repay me for the favor I provide. (R)
If I help I do not expect repayment in this situation. (R)
If I help I believe this classmate will not attempt to help me in return. (R)
By helping now, I will gain in the end.

PP!"

.°°.".°‘.V'

Rewards (external)
1. People will like me more if I help my classmate.
2. I believe that people would admire me if I help.
3. If I help in this situation it would increase my reputation.
4. If I help in this situation people will think I am a good person.

Rewards (internal)
1. I would get warm fuzzy feelings if I helped.
2. It would make me feel good to help out my classmate in this situation.
3. I would help in this situation because of the way it makes me feel inside.
4. Helping in this situation would make me feel like I am a nice person.

71

 

Appendix B
Motivation to avoid punishment scale

Punishment (material — no partner)

The actions of my classmate hurt me if I do not help.

I would be harmed if I do not help my classmate.

I feel required to help my classmate.

By providing this favor, I help both my classmate and myself.
If I do not help my classmate I will lose out.

This favor I may provide aids me as much as it aids them.

9999?)!“

Punishment (external)
1. If I ever needed help, people would not help me if I do not help my classmate.
2. My peers would think bad things of me if I do not help.

3. Others would show their disapproval of my actions if I do not aid my classmate.

4. My classmate would not like me if I do not help them.

Punishment (internal)
1. Giving a favor in this situation may help me to avoid guilty feelings.
2. I would feel lousy if I did not help my classmate.
3. I would have painful memories of this situation if I did not help.
4. I would be in the wrong if I did not help here.

72

 

Frm
"

I"

Appendix C

Empathy scale
1. Seeing my classmate in this situation makes me feel distressed.
2. I feel the agony that my classmate is feeling.
3. When I see my classmate in this situation I feel kind of protective toward them.
4. Because this classmate feels worried, I also am feeling worried.

73

 

Appendix D

Sympathy scale
1. I feel sorry for my classmate.
I have tender, concerned feelings for my classmate.
In this situation I don’t have much pity for my classmate. (R)
My classmate has my sympathy.

5‘5”!"

74

 

Appendix E

Reward seeking scale
1. There is no reason for this classmate to return the favor I did for them.(R)
2. My classmate owes me for helping them.
3. My classmate is indebted to me for what I did.
4. I will figure out a way for my classmate to return the favor.

75

 

Appendix F

 

Rectification seeking scale
1. My classmate should apologize for all the trouble they caused.
2. If I were in my classmate’s position I would show remorse for putting me in that
position.
3. There is no need for my classmate to say they are sorry. (R)
4. I would appreciate some acknowledgement by my classmate for the situation I
was put in.

 

76 i

Appendix G

Concession viewed as reward scale
1. This was a nice way to thank me for my prior help.
2. The offer made was not a fair way to pay me back.(R)
3. I liked the creative way that I was rewarded for my earlier assistance.
4. My classmate thoughtfully returned my earlier favor.

77

 

Appendix H

Concession viewed as apology scale

9:599)!“

The deal my classmate gave me was a good way to say “sorry”.

By offering this deal my classmate was making a request for forgiveness.
My classmate regrets having put me out so they made it right the best they could.
The deal I got was because my classmate owed me an apology.
This was an inappropriate way to admit fault. (R)

78

Appendix I

Distress scale
1. My classmate feels unsettled about owing me a favor.
2. By being helped previously my classmate believes they are in a bind.
3. My classmate wants us to be even.
4. This classmate feels distress over needing to repay me.
5. Because I helped my classmate previously, now they feel bad.
6. My classmate feels obligated to me.

79

 

Appendix J

Compliance Items
1. I would buy several tickets.
2. There is no way that I would buy any tickets.(R)
3. In this situation I am likely to purchase some tickets.
4. Purchasing tickets is a good idea at this time.

80

 

r“-

Appendix K

Endnote

 

1 While not predicted, an alternative model where rectification seeking is removed, fits
the data quite well 98(1) = 3.57, p=.3l]

81

 

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