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This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled

INFORMAL MAYORAL INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION

presented by

DANIELLE L. LESUFIE

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for the

Ph.D. degree in Educational Policy

 

 

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INFORMAL MAYORAL INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION
. By

Danielle L. LeSure

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHEOSOPHY
Educational Policy

2008

ABSTRACT
INFORMAL MAYORAL INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION
By
Danielle Lakethia LeSure
Mayoral involvement in city schools has emerged as a significant reform effort among
urban school districts. While much of the focus in educational research and policy has
been on formal involvement that places city schools under mayoral authority, the
overwhelming majority of city districts across the country remain outside of formal
mayoral control. Mayors who do not have formal control over their school districts still
have the potential to influence their education systems. This study examines the potential
that informal mayoral involvement has to build civic capacity for educational reform in
urban districts. Using the case of Denver, the study explores the informal roles that
mayors, such as Denver’s Mayor John Hickenlooper, can play to influence city schools.
The goal of the study is not to measure the educational impact of mayoral involvement
but instead to identify collaborative efforts that mayors can facilitate with civic actors.
The study identifies two central informal roles that mayors can play in city schools,
catalyst and broker. The research traces how the mayor develops different facets of civic
capacity through each role. The study illuminates both the potential and limitations that
informal mayoral involvement in city schools has to build civic capacity for education
reform. In doing so, it extends both the current literature on mayoral engagement in

education and the literature on civic capacity.

Copyright by
DANIELLE LAKETHIA LESURE
2008

DEDICATION

To my parents Douglas Keith and Beulah Heath LeSure for teaching me to never let
anyone else’s limitations be my own. To my family members (including Uncle Johnny
and Aunt Pat), friends, and Grace Unity Fellowship Church for their continued love and

support. Lastly, to my grandmother Ethel LeSure -— you live in me, you live in my words,
I am your dream.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks to my advisor and dissertation chair Dorothea Anagnostopoulos for
her constant guidance throughout my graduate career and for reminding me to “narrow
my focus” and to be patient through this dissertation process. To my former advisor,
David N. Plank, for teaching me that “it all depends” and “it’s all politics.” Through their
support and leadership, I have grown as a scholar in education policy and will be forever
grateful. To committee members Christopher Dunbar, Richard Hula, and Michael Sedlak
for their invaluable participation and feedback. To Fritz Edelstein and the US Conference
of Mayors for giving me the outlet to find, explore, and develop my research interest
through the 2005-2006 PEA Fellowship in Washington, DC. Lastly, to all of my
research participants in Denver, CO — special recognition to Mayor John Hickenlooper,
Mariah Guajardo Lucero, and Maxine Quintanna. Without welcoming me into their city,
this research would not be possible. Thank you for your honesty, compassion, and time —

on and off the record.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 9
CHAPTER 3: METHEDOLOGY ..................................................................................... 25
CHAPTER 4: MAYOR’S OFFICE OF EDUCATION AND CHILDREN ..................... 42
CHAPTER 5: CATALYST .............................................................................................. 59
CHAPTER 6: BROKER ................................................................................................... 86
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY & DISSCUSSION .............................................................. 103
APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................... l 13

APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................. 114
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 121

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3:1: Interview Participants ...................................................................................... 31
Table 3.2: Research Coding Table .................................................................................... 35
Table 3.3: Civic Capacity Coding Table ........................................................................... 37
Table 5.3: The Mayor’s Leadership Team on Early Childhood Education ...................... 80

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1: LOAS Timeline .............................................................................................. 50
Figure 5.1: Pre—school Initiative Timeline ........................................................................ 62
Figure 5.2: Rhetorical Discourse Shift .............................................................................. 68
Figure 6.1: Denver Scholarship Foundation Timeline ...................................................... 88

viii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In education, the role of the mayor has become defined by school district
takeovers and school board control where mayors in cities such as Chicago, Boston, and
New York have secured formal control over the schools in their cities. This formal role of
the mayor is institutionalized through legislation that grants mayors authority to appoint
school board members, define budgets, and/or hire superintendents. Mayoral involvement
is not simply direct control of a school district; it includes relationships and
collaborations with other civic stakeholders, for example, by forming education offices
and reform initiatives. Researchers, such as Kenneth Wong, have found increases in
supplemental services and gains in academic achievement in most districts under formal
mayoral control (Wong & Shen, 2001; Wong & Shen 2003; Wong, Shen,
Anagnostopoulos & Rutledge, 2007). While nearly 3,000,000 students live in cities with
formal mayoral control of their district, more than 50,000,000 do not. This dissertation
will identify alternative forms of mayoral involvement in education through a case study
of Denver’s Mayor John Hickenlooper and his administration. This research explores the
informal role a mayor can take to shape education in his city. In particular, it examines

how such roles can facilitate the development of civic capacity for educational

improvement. A review of the existing work on mayoral involvement indicates that most
literature on mayoral involvement falls into two strands: 1) literature that identifies
typologies of mayoral roles and 2) literature that seeks to measure increases of mayoral
authority and its impact on student outcomes. The current literature identifies specific
factors of mayoral involvement that include the mayor's accountability, vision of
education, political grantmanship, and restoration of public trust. The frameworks now
used to examine mayoral involvement in education are best seen through the works of
Fritz Edelstein, Michael Kirst, and Kenneth Wong and Francis Shen. The existing
literature and frameworks, as presented in Chapter 2, primarily focus on the formal role
of the mayor in improving education in cities through district takeovers. This focus on
formal involvement leaves the informal involvement of the mayor, which may be the
more prominent model, largely unexamined.

A mayor who does not have control of a school district must use informal
mechanisms to engage in efforts to improve education in a city. Informal and indirect
influences include issue campaigns, public appearances and public service
announcements, legislative support, recognition awards, and after school programs.
There is a growing trend of informal mayoral involvement because of the political risks
involved in district takeovers (Edelstein, 2006). This research will extend the current
literature on mayoral involvement by examining how mayors take on informal roles to
build civic capacity for education initiatives. Briefly, civic capacity is the collective effort
of community stakeholders to work collaboratively to address a major issue or concern. It

is important to consider because it provides a framework to examine a mayor’s role in

forming collaborations between stakeholders from across fields to change public policy

or to develop strategies and programs in education reform (Stone, 2001).

Problem Statement

Because there are a limited number of cities where mayors have taken formal
authority over districts and there is a growing desire for mayors to become involved in
education informally, identifying and exploring the multiple roles of mayors in education
reform is vital (Edelstein, 2006). There is a void in the literature on mayoral involvement
in education. Current research focuses on formal mayoral control in which state or city
legislation grants the mayor formal authority over the city’s schools. Thus, rather than
seeking to appoint school board members, the experiences and work of mayors who are
engaged in education through creating after school programs, scholarships, and
partnerships with their school districts go unnoticed. There is a lack of awareness of
mayoral involvement in mid—sized cities. However, in Denver, Colorado, major
developments in education are occurring as a result, in part, of the mayor’s desire to
create programming that complement the efforts of the district in areas such as universal
access to quality pre-school programs. This research explores how a mayor, Denver’s
Mayor John Hickenlooper, uses informal roles to build civic capacity in education by
examining the following questions: what type of informal roles does the mayor play in
city schools and how do these roles contribute to the building of civic capacity for
educational improvement? Through such questions, researchers must begin to understand
the relationships between mayoral influence and civic capacity to thereby address

pressing issues in urban education reform.

Research Methodology Overview

Exploratory research investigates new areas in an effort to fill a void in the
literature through “inductive” or “theory building” approaches (Patton, 2002). Using an
exploratory research approach, I apply three research methods to examine the relationship
between informal roles and civic capacity — observation, interviews, and newspaper
analysis. These methods, more thoroughly explained in Chapter 3, allow me to identify
key educational initiatives and the role of the mayor. It also allows me to examine the
ways in which the mayor defines key educational issues and problems, mobilizes
stakeholders, and facilitates their interactions in all aspects of civic capacity. This
research does not explain casual relationships between mayoral influence and academic
achievement. Civic capacity building in education led by mayors is new to the field and
has been developed within the past 10 years. An understanding of the informal role of
mayors developing civic capacity helps to unravel a story of the potential influence to

education and the challenges inherent in these educational tasks.

Major Findings

With over 550,000 citizens, Denver is challenged with creating an inclusive
environment that supports a rich culture of diversity. Thirty-four percent of the city’s
population is of Latino descent, 10% African American, and 50% White. In terms of age,
24% of Denver’s population are children under 18. Nine percent of the population are
children between the ages of 0-5. Though only 15% of the city’s population lives below

poverty, Denver Public Schools (DPS) are faced with the challenge of meeting the

demands of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) while addressing the needs of its unique
student population. With a K-12 student population of 72,312, 66.8% come from
economically disadvantaged backgrounds, 36.3% are English language learners, and
11.9% are enrolled in special education.l In terms of race, 57.5% of the DPS student
population are Latino, 18.4% African American, and 19.8% White2 (Standard & Poor’s,
2007). While attending to the needs of its 54 schools who fail to meet AYP, the district
faces such challenges as under enrollment and addressing the needs of at—risk students
who are not surviving in traditional school settings. This is reflected in the district’s
dropout rate of 42.6% (School Matters, 2004). During an interview, a leader from the
district reported that DPS is challenged with bridging the cultural gap in order to make
first steps towards academic achievement as reflected through NCLB accountability
measures. Thus, with the challenges of NCLB accountability, new demands in education
set the context for new forms of mayoral involvement in education.

In Denver, the mayor took on the roles of catalyst and broker to build civic
capacity in education. The Mayor’s Office of Education and Children (MOEC) (Chapter
4) was used as a tool to help the mayor build collaboration among city stakeholders
across government, education, business, and non-profit sectors. By creating awareness for
the need to access quality preschools for all Denver families with the assistance of
MOEC, Mayor Hickenlooper used his role as catalyst to garner support for building a
universal Pre-K program in Chapter 5, particularly through the use of his bully pulpit.

Like universal pre-k, the mayor also used an informal role to help build support for the

 

l The percentage of students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds and who are English language
learners are extremely high when compared to state averages of 33.6% and 12.8% (Standard & Poor’s,
2007).

2 The percent of minorities in the district are extremely high when compared to the following state
averages: Latino 25.3%, African American 5.8%, and White 64.5% (Standard & Poor’s, 2005).

5

Denver Scholarship Foundation. Unlike universal pre-k, his interest here was primarily
funding rather than issue definition and took place behind the scenes. Here he
demonstrates a role as broker in Chapter 6. In the final chapter, I present how his roles as
catalyst and broker are shown as approaches to build civic capacity by developing
initiatives outside of the district. These complement its efforts, rather than redefining it as

the case of mayoral control.

Limitations of Study

This study is based on one city, Denver. It would be difficult to generalize to
another city the findings of this study. Denver is unique because the city has the Mayor’s
Office of Education and Children established under the previous administration of then
Mayor Wellington Webb. This office was designed as an entity of city government so
that mayoral involvement in education could be sustained across administrations. Though
housed separately from the mayor’s office, it is under his leadership and Mariah
Guajardo-Lucero’s, the present advisor of education. Without direct control of their
districts, many mayors in small and mid-sized cities lack not only an office such as the
MOEC but also a policy advisor solely dedicated to education. Though likely not
representative, the existence of the MOEC does allow this researcher to examine how
informal mayoral control can become institutionalized, an important question as
educational improvements typically take longer than the electoral cycle. Having an
established office of education in the mayor’s administration may provide one means

through which long—term efforts to improve education may be sustained.

There are other limitations within this study due to the particular research
methods used. Because of the previous position of conducting research in Denver on
mayoral engagement in high school reform for the United States Conference of Mayors
through grants from the Carnegie Foundation of New York and the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, access was limited to city officials, staff, and stakeholders involved in or in
support of the mayor’s efforts in education. It is likely that organizations such as
Students4Justice and Urban League were reluctant or unwilling to participate in this
study for fear of unwanted consequences, such as political risks or misinterpretations. It
was a challenge to separate myself from the US Conference of Mayors and present
myself as “neutral” given the previous research experience in Denver in the summer of
2006. To address this, I refrained from discussing past affiliation with the US Conference
of Mayors. Additionally, I reassured interviewees of their right to anonymity. Given the
pressures of it being a re-election year, 12 of 21 interviewees decided to remain
anonymous, with four having changed their minds in the midst of the interview,
particularly when speaking about the difference between the current and former mayors’
administrations. As a result, I was able to learn of the context and politics behind most of
the mayor’s informal efforts as a catalyst and broker in building civic capacity in

education.

Significance
By examining the case of one mayor, John Hickenlooper, the findings of this
study add to the literature on mayoral roles in education by presenting a study of the

various types of informal roles mayors may enact. Acting as a catalyst and broker,

Hickenlooper used the Mayor’s Office of Education and Children (MOEC) as a tool to
help define his role in education. Under the guidance of the mayor, MOEC establishes
events and task forces that help to bring different stakeholders from across the city to
build programs, such as universal pre-k and DSF. Though the office does not implement
these initiatives, they have a major role in shaping the direction of its development by
building collaborations between stakeholders from different sectors, such as DPS, non-
profit, and business sectors.

MOEC helps to establish the informal role of the mayor in education. However,
the informal relationships that exist between the mayor, his staff, and key stakeholders
remain just as critical. Through further research on the impact of shaping informal
mayoral roles through the use of city agencies, such as MOEC, and informal partnerships
between the mayor and stakeholders, the field can expand its knowledge of mayoral
involvement in education to be inclusive of informal roles, such as catalyst and broker. In
doing so, educational policy scholars can explore beyond the realm of mayoral control
that entails top heavy policy and program development. Thus, it can broaden the field’s

understanding of how mayors can use informal roles to build civic capacity in education.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

When exploring mayoral involvement in education, the current focus of
educational research is often on mayors who have taken over their school districts,
commonly referred to as formal mayoral involvement or mayoral control. This entails the
mayor directly appointing school board members and sometimes also includes hiring the
superintendent. Kenneth Wong and Francis Shen (2001; 2003) are the leading scholars in
the field. Their research on mayoral control finds that increased mayoral control leads to
improved test scores, particularly for the least performing schools, and an increase in
support services provided to students in the district. Their research is important because it
highlights the lack of research on the impact of informal involvement, particularly as it
relates to building civic capacity for education initiatives outside of a school district’s
jurisdiction, such as the universal pre-k and scholarship programs. Though Wong and
Shen show gains in student achievement and supplemental services provided by direct
mayoral control, it begs the question — how can mayors who do not have the power
afforded by formal authority use informal roles to build civic capacity for school
improvement? What are the advantages and disadvantages of informal mayoral

involvement as it relates to student achievement and supplemental services?

Student Achievement
Under mayoral control the greatest gains are shown in low performing districts.

The findings in the study Does School District Takeover Work? Assessing the

Eflectiveness of City and State Takeover as a School Reform Strategy, indicate that
mayoral takeover is linked to increases at elementary grade levels and linked less in the
upper grades as demonstrated in the cases of Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland where
mayors select the school board, superintendent, and control the budget. For example,
Boston’s mayoral control system, begun in 1992, found academic achievement gains in
the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System. Wong and Shen (2003, p. 26-28)
found, for both elementary and high school grades, the lowest performing schools
reduced the number of failing students in reading and math at a faster rate when
compared to other schools in Boston. Between the years 2000 and 2002, for instance, 8%
fewer 4th graders failed in reading district wide and 20% fewer 4th graders in the lowest
performing schools failed in reading.

In 1995 Chicago implemented mayoral control (Levy, 2006). Since then, the city
has experienced gains in achievement under the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) and the
Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (TAP). From 1998 to 2002, the percent of
Chicago’s K-8 grade students at or above national norms on reading and math increased.
Reading scores showed an increase from 37% to 43%, math scores rose from 39% to
47% (Wong and Shen, 2003, p. 26—28). Lowest performing high schools showed rapid
improvements when compared to other schools in the district. From 1996-97 to 1998-99,
performance increased by 7% in math and 5% in English. With an average increase in
math of 9% and 6% in English, the bottom 20% of high schools gained in achievement
here as well.

With mayoral control established in 1998, Cleveland demonstrated trends in

achievement gains. As with Boston and Chicago, Cleveland’s lowest performing

10

elementary schools had larger gains in some grades. For instance, the bottom 20% of
schools gained an 11% increase in the number of students proficient or above in reading
whereas the overall district increase was only 6% (Wong and Shen, 2003, p. 26-28).
Similar to formal control in Boston and Chicago, test scores in Cleveland demonstrated
significant gains in academic achievement in reading and math, particularly for lower
grade levels. Additionally, lowest performing elementary schools showed the most gains
under formal mayoral control. These statistics that reflect improved results in education
lead to important questions: can mayors who have no influence over their districts impact
student achievement; do mayors who use informal approaches to build civic capacity
primarily focus on initiatives outside the scope of the district, such as the after school

program or the universal pre-k program?

Support Services

In mayoral control, mayors often consider the needs of students beyond the
classroom; thus, creating a new vision for education that is inclusive of partners from
across fields. This is reflected in the trend found by Wong and Shen (2003) in increased
allocations to supportive staff in schools under formal mayoral control. Their study
revealed that mayor-appointed school boards are more likely to increase funding to
support services to address health and social problems in schools that affect academic
achievement. For example, under mayoral control inner city districts have implemented
vision testing for elementary students because of a growing concern that students are not
able to follow lessons presented on the board due to vision problems. Through services

such as this, mayoral control embraces a holistic understanding of students in a broader

ll

context. Often, there are budget increases to supportive staff during transition years from
an elected school board to a mayor-appointed board, as demonstrated in Detroit, Chicago,
and DC. (Wong & Shen, 2003). A focus on such support services reflects a different
vision of education that locates it within the city’s broader social and political
environment. Researchers need to ask if mayors using informal approaches to building
civic capacity for education present similar broad visions. If so, what are the educational
impacts of building support services outside of the school district, such as providing
trained paraprofessionals for after school programming, quality preschool services, or

aiding students in the college application and scholarship process?

Typologies of Mayoral Involvement

In Wong and Shen’s (2003) Big City Mayors and School Governance Reform —
The Case of School District Takeover, the authors present two types of mayoral control —
integrated governance and quasi-integrated governance systems. Integrated governance
systems entail mayoral takeover that grants authority over the school budget, school
board, and the vision for the city’s education system. Chicago, Cleveland, and Boston are
examples of this structure, and researchers have found an upward trend in the focus of
these mayors on enhancing management efficiency in city services and in restoring public
confidence in public schools. Mayors in quasi-integrated structures select all or part of
the school board, which then selects the superintendent, as in the case of Baltimore3

(Wong & Shen, 2003).

 

3 Baltimore mayors once appointed all of the district’s school board members but after state aid increased in
1997, the mayor and governor jointly appoint all members from the State Board of Education’s nomination
slate (Kirst, 2002).

12

The formal mayoral involvement described by quasi-integrated structures are
more limited forms of mayoral control because these mayors are not yet trusted with full
functional authority. It does not address the informal role of mayors who have more
influence through civic capacity mechanisms because of relationships with their school
districts or other key education stakeholders. Quasi-integrated structures may be used to
focus more attention on informal engagement, such as building relationships with their
superintendents to develop initiatives that complement rather than clash with the school
district’s efforts. It is important to expand the definition of quasi-integrated structures and
also to identify non-integrated structures to more fully understand informal mayoral roles
in education.

Michael Kirst (2002) and Fritz Edelstein (2006) present both formal and informal
typologies of mayoral involvement in education. Their works were the first to identify
roles and, in making the distinction, increase awareness of informal engagement as well.
Though their policy reports were geared toward government officials and policy
stakeholders interested in mayoral engagement in education, Kirst and Edelstein open the
door for future scholarship that will explore the myriad roles mayors can use to build

civic capacity in education.

Low, Low-Moderate, Moderate, High Mayoral Influence

Kirst’s (2002) Mayoral Influence, New Regimes, and Public School Governance,
offers four levels of mayoral involvement — low, low-moderate, moderate, and high.
Low mayoral involvement in education entails gaining influence over more conservative

school board. Mayors with this level of influence do not elect members to the school

13

board, but they run a slate of candidates and provide resources for campaigns such as in
Los Angeles. This level of involvement also includes cities where mayors have
threatened to take over their school districts and have pulled back after policy was
changed, as was done in Akron. Unlike low mayoral involvement, in low—moderate
involvement mayors appoint less than the majority of their school board members, such
as in Oakland.4

Mayors with moderate levels of involvement have the authority to appoint the
majority, if not all, of the school board members. However, these mayors do not have a
formal role in education because it has been assumed by their school board. Cleveland5 is
a good example. The high mayoral influence derives from the mayor’s ability to appoint
the entire school board and assume a formal and active role in the city’s public education
system, such as in Chicago and Boston. High mayoral influence is supported by the
business community and often opposed by educational organizations. Mayors with this
level of influence serve as the leaders of their cities’ public education systems and are
therefore held to a higher measure of accountability than prior to having formal control
(Kirst, 2002).

Kirst’s typology of mayoral roles, focuses on mayors who control their school
districts. While low mayoral involvement is more informal, low-moderate involvement

has aspects of both formal and informal modes. Kirst’s model defines mayoral

 

4 In Oakland (CA), under Mayor Jerry Brown, a city charter amendment was approved allowing the mayor
to appoint 3 of 10 school board members in 2000. Though the city council denied the mayor’s original
request to appoint all school board members, it still wanted to guarantee electoral representation (Kirst,
2002).

5 Former Cleveland Mayor Michael White had authority to appoint all members and the district’s chief
executive officer (CEO). He decided to allow the CEO to do what is best in creating, developing, and
implementing a vision for the district. By keeping his position as an official separate from the school
system’s, authority and accountability of the district was more so with the CEO; thus, making her the
public leader for the city’s public education system rather than the mayor.

14

involvement and acknowledges those cities that use takeover as a policy tool to influence
change. His framework, though broad, does introduce the role of informal engagement.
It also points to the need for further investigation into the politics that shape the
involvement by mayors, particularly informal involvement, in education reform.

Total, Partial, Partnership Relationship, and Medium Involvement

In the US Conference of Mayors’ Mayoral Leadership and Involvement in
Education: An Action Guide for Success, Fritz Edelstein (2006) presents four levels of
mayoral involvement: total control, partial control, partnership relationship, and medium
involvement. Mayors with total control have complete influence over the education
budget and select both the school board and superintendent (i.e. Chicago and Boston).
Mayors with partial control, on the other hand, select members for all or part of their
school board and have less control of their budgets because the emphasis on
accountability shifts to the school board and superintendent. In cases of partial control,
mayors sometimes share budget oversight with the city council. Cities that offer
examples of partial control include Providence and Philadelphia (Edelstein, 2006; Kirst,
2002; Edelstein, 2006).

Partnership relationship and medium involvement are represented by mayors with
an informal role in education. Partnership relationship is found in cities, such as Akron
and Miami, where mayors work with their superintendents on key issues and initiatives.
Des Moines and Charlotte are examples of medium involvement where the actions of
mayors are hindered by political dynamics that challenge the development of
relationships with local school officials (Edelstein, 2006). In distinguishing partnership

and medium involvement from partial partnership and total control, Edelstein identified

15

informal mayoral engagement in education and its ability to create collaboration among
stakeholders across a city to create educational opportunities for students. He helped to
create awareness of a mayor’s potential to influence educational developments through
civic capacity building without having to take over a school district.

The existing literature provided by Wong and Shen (2001 ;2003), Kirst (2002),
and Edelstein (2006) presented an overview of the typologies of mayoral engagement in
education. The emphasis on formal authority and takeovers, however, leaves largely
unexarnined the contributions of mayors who use informal means to enhance education in
their cities. Given that informal mayoral involvement is more likely the most common
form of mayoral involvement, it is important to understand the impact of using such roles

in building civic capacity in education.

Informal Mayoral Involvement and Civic Capacity

In Civic Capacity: What, Why, and From Whence, Clarence Stone (2005, 209)
defines civic capacity as “concerted efforts to address major community problems.” He
explained that concerted refers to “special actions” that involve diverse stakeholders
including government, non-profit and community based organizations, and other sectors.
This study identified these special actions as approaches to building civic capacity. A key
assumption of a civic capacity framework is that public policy requires nongovernmental
and governmental actors and agencies to work together (Stone, 2005, 209). Stone
explains, “The character and effectiveness of governmental activity depends substantially
on how it combines with related non-governmental activity” (Stone, 2005, 209). In the

Color of School Reform, Jeffrey Heni g, Richard Hula, Marion Orr, and Desiree

l6

Pedescleaux (1999, 27) define civic capacity as “the ability to draw together and hold
together a viable coalition of public and private stakeholders linked not necessarily by
coincident interests, shared visions, or altruistic motives, but by habits of collaboration, a
requisite level of trust, and a pragmatic orientation toward making things work.” These
authors expand upon Stone’s theory by agreeing that non-govemmental stakeholders are
key to building civic capacity, but only to the extent to which there is trust and an
effective working collaboration. Civic capacity calls for developing and sustaining
political constituencies in order to maintain initiatives in the face of changing political
environments and across mayoral terms (Henig et al., 1999).

As evident from these definitions, coalition building among stakeholders from
multiple governmental and non-governmental sectors is a key component of civic
capacity. Identifying individuals, groups, and institutions that mobilize to address a city’s
educational concerns provides a foundation for exploring how educational problems are
defined and identified through stakeholder interactions. Stone suggests that the extent to
which civic capacity is built depends on the “informal relationships and shared
understanding built over time” (Stone, 2005, p. 27).

Henig et al. (1999) assert that civic capacity is also dependent on political
leadership and the mastery of political skills to shape political perceptions that stimulate
civic mobilization. For instance, as I will show in this dissertation, Denver Mayor John
Hickenlooper produced a public service announcement to gain support for a merit-based
pay teacher initiative led by the local teacher’s union and school district. Hickenlooper is
perceived as a “cheerleader of Denver Public Schools” and played an informal role in

helping to shape education by using his political capital. Because of an overemphasis on

17

school leadership in much of the educational governance literature, the presence of
politics in shaping educational reform it too often overlooked. This is a critical oversight
in the literature on mayoral control. The extent to which civic capacity is maintained is
dependent on how well it adapts to changes in political climates, such as in budget
decreases and changes in political office (Henig et al., 1999; Stone, 2005; Stone, Henig,
Jones, Pierannunzi, 2001). Following from the work of Stone and Henig et al, this study
explored how mid—sized city mayors institutionalized mayoral engagement through the
central mechanisms of the development of civic capacity: civic mobilization, problem

perceptions and definitions, and stakeholder interactions.

Civic Mobilization, Problem Perceptions and Definitions, and Stakeholder Interactions
Civic capacity brings together an assembly of leaders from principal sectors

relating to particular issues in education. This assembly gathers to change public policy,
to create strategies and programs, or to mobilize the community to act in partnerships
(Stone, 2001; Stone, 2005; Stone et al., 2001). Civic capacity is often developed when
there is civic mobilization to decrease or remove policy-making authority. Civic
mobilization is the extent to which stakeholders collaborate to sustain support for school
reform initiatives. Stone (2001; 2005) argues that conducive political environments for
education reform depend on the broad array of policy actors who mobilize the effort,
particularly parents and schools. This research, however, focused on civic mobilization
initiated by the mayor’s office and the role of mayors in building civic mobilization to
shape educational issues. The literature on civic capacity commonly refers to this as issue

definition or problem perception.

18

The literature on civic capacity indicates issues are defined by how educational
concern is perceived or framed by the community of stakeholders. Public issues are
created when the public recognizes that a problem exists, and when stakeholders work
towards presenting the public with plausible resolutions (Stone et al., 2001). Often, the
perception of a problem increases civic mobilization to address educational concerns
(Shipps, 2003). Stone describes a “synergistic” relationship between issue definition and
civic mobilization; correlating problem perception and increased civic mobilization
(Stone et al., 2001; Stone, 2001; 2005). The extent to which a concern is clearly defined
and understood by stakeholders is reflected in the reform’s impact and ability to be

sustained; this is referred to as its civic capacity strength (Stone et al., 2001; Henig et a1.

1999).

Civic Capacity Strengths & Approaches

Stone (2001; 2005; Stone et al., 2001) presents three civic capacity strengths:
weak, moderate, and strong. Cities with weak civic capacity, such as Atlanta, recognize
the extent to which a problem exists, but stakeholders fail to collaborate to address it
because of conflicting priorities and opinions. Those with moderate civic capacity,
however, often have a clear definition or understanding of the educational issue being
addressed but cannot sustain collaboration because of inner conflicts among stakeholders,
especially racial tensions, limiting the initiative’s impact.6 Strong civic capacity entails

having both a clear issue definition and effective stakeholder interaction that sustain

 

6 Though Chicago Mayor Richard Dailey is influential to the city’s public education system through formal
control established in 1995, many administrators and teachers resisted formal control. Additionally, there
were racial divisions over employment which deterred the education reform process because it negatively
impacted cooperation (Stone, 2001; Stone et al., 2001).

19

initiatives through changing political contexts. According to Stone (2001, 2005), cities

with strong civic capacity have the following attributes:

1.

Public Stage — Defines and presents the public issue to be addressed and how a
city plans to do this through building civic capacity

Broad-based Stakeholder Participation — Key stakeholders from different fields
and sectors (i.e. business, parents, educators, government officials, non-profit
leaders) collaborate to address a particular education issue

Ongoing activities to sustain civic capacity — Programs, summits, meetings, or
other methods of collaboration enhance efforts to sustain reform in the face of
unforeseen challenges and to create opportunities for increased engagement by
new stakeholders

Institutionalization — Create a permanent institutional home with a strong
professional staff to sustain efforts that build civic capacity used to reform
schooling

Meaningful Role for Youth — Develop a method to engage students in reforming

their own education (Annenberg Institute, 2006)

These key city attributes determine the extent of institutionalization and sustainability of

reform efforts. Cities with strong civic capacity, such as Denver,7 and their municipal

leaders built a common vision for educational excellence and created collaborative

opportunities that united stakeholders to increase the quality of schools and expanded

services and support for learning and child development (Annenberg Institute, 2006).

 

7 Brown University’s Annenberg Institute identified Akron and Denver as sites with high civic capacity in
addition to Long Beach, Nashville, and New York City (Annenberg Institute, 2006).

20

This research explored the municipal leadership of a mayor with informal involvement in
education in cities identified as having strong civic capacity.

Civic capacity is important to consider when exploring informal mayoral
involvement because it entails bringing stakeholders together across sectors to develop
educational opportunities for students. Understanding how mayors use informal roles to
build civic capacity allows researchers to explore the unique balance in leadership and
partnership. Because many mayors do not have control over their districts, presenting
what different roles they can have in building civic capacity demonstrates alternatives for
engagement that appear “friendly” to districts rather than “threatening,” such as in formal
control. To build civic capacity, mayors may also depend on the use of their bully pulpit
and the opening of policy windows to develop educational opportunities in the city’s
schools. This study contributes to current literature on civic capacity by highlighting how
mayors can build civic capacity through using the bully pulpit and attending to the

opening of policy windows and the work of policy entrepreneurs.

Bully Pulpit

The bully pulpit is a platform used to steer the direction of a policy issue.
Originally coined by Theodore Roosevelt to describe the presidency, its definition now
expands to include other delegates of the executive branch, such as mayors. Roosevelt
believed that holding office called for being a chief activist for the welfare of citizens
(Dorsey, 2002; Jeffers, 1998). A bully pulpit is an address from which a delegate can
shape public opinion (Jeffers, 1998). It is used to steer the direction of policy by exerting

a “strong voice” in the debate through speeches and personal interactions (Dorsey, 2002).

21

Reagan’s administration argued that the bully pulpit is at its best when there is “malice
towards none with charity for all” (Muir, 1992). Moral obligation and use of the bully
pulpit are key in defining the role of a politician and his/her administration’s
contributions. Repetition and reinforcement of American ideals, such as equity and
economic development, are critical when formulating a memorable public philosophy.
Public philosophy is shaped by coupling public presentation with rhetorical voice to build
awareness and support for a policy issue (Muir, 1992).

Public presentation entails the ability to interact with both constituents and
stakeholders through speeches, campaign efforts, meetings, and private interactions.
Rhetorical voice is the tool delegates use to communicate a clear message defining why
constituents and stakeholders should support an initiative. This voice is discovered in the
careful selection of words and phrases used to shape an argument or convey a message,
also referred to as political language. The bully pulpit’s extent of influence reflects that of
its public philosophy, the unique combination of presenting and conveying the message
to attract broad support while promoting American ideals can play a role in a mayor’s
ability to build civic mobilization around an education initiative (Muir, 1992; Dorsey,
2002). Thus, use of the bully pulpit can be a tool for informal mayoral influence.
Attention to the bully pulpit allows this research to add to the current literature on both

civic capacity and mayoral engagement in education.

Policy Windows
In addition to the bully pulpit, this research adds the concept of policy windows to

mayoral involvement and literature on civic capacity. In Agendas, Alternatives, and

22

Public Policies, John Kingdon (1995) explains how there are moments that present
themselves, such as with changes of administration, that push new ideas in policy. He
refers to these moments as policy windows, or more specifically political windows.
Political windows open when new officials take office and develop new agendas. Policy
entrepreneurs take advantage of these political windows by presenting policy solutions to
the new administrations. Policy entrepreneurs are advocates who willingly invest their
resources to promote a policy idea with the anticipation of future gains, such as the
establishment of a program or the gaining of support and resources from the
administration. Through their access to funding, reputation among political officials and
their staff, time, knowledge, and energy, policy entrepreneurs often have expertise in the
field and political connections for their ideas to be heard and considered. Because
windows are only open for a short period for specific initiatives, policy entrepreneurs
must be constantly persistent and willing to meet to discuss their idea and their dedication
to implementation by investing their resources.

According to Kingdon (1995), policy entrepreneurs actually develop their ideas
prior to any opening of policy windows. They continue to shape and reshape ideas to find
ways to best push their initiatives based on three policy streams — politics, policy, and
problems. The stream of politics entails the transitions to new administrations and the rise
of new policy priorities. A policy stream refers to the different ideas to address an issue
that exists among policy officials and policy entrepreneurs. These ideas are pre-existing
solutions available to be applied to problems as they get defined in particular ways at
particular moments in the change of new administrations. Policy streams co-exist with

problem streams. Problem streams are the types of problems that are being discussed.

23

As streams, they exist like policy solutions, as readily available resources to be utilized
by policy entrepreneurs when policy windows open. Policy entrepreneurs often look for
problems to attach their policy ideas (or solutions) to in order to best push them through a
new administration. The coupling of these three streams create opportunities for policy
entrepreneurs to best take advantage of policy windows through issue definition to build
civic mobilization around a specific education initiative. The mayor’s use of his informal
role to help build civic mobilization upon open policy windows is key in understanding

the relationship between mayoral engagement and civic capacity building.

Conclusion

This research sought to build upon the literature presented above to answer the
question of how mayors use informal roles in education to build civic capacity. The plan
was to extend current literature on mayoral engagement by introducing the concept of
informal involvement that suggested for the sake of this study that a mayor does not have
control, nor partial control, of his or her district. In addition to defining additional
mayoral roles, the literature expanded on civic capacity by exploring how mayors use the
bully pulpit to generate civic mobilization for initiatives through issue definition. Finally,
this study explored how the emergence of policy windows and the existence of policy

entrepreneurs can initiate mayoral involvement and the development of civic capacity.

24

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to explore how mayors use informal roles to build
civic capacity in education. The goal is to expand the literature on mayoral involvement
in education by creating awareness of the efforts of mayors who do not have formal
control of their districts. As explored in the previous chapter, most research on mayoral
involvement emphasizes formal roles and its relationship to student achievement. Instead,
this research uses the following questions to focus on exploring informal involvement

and its potential to influence education through civic capacity:

. What type of informal roles do mayors play in relation to education in their cities?
. What policy approaches do mayors use to build civic capacity for an education
initiative?
0 How does the use of these policy approaches in a mayor’s informal role shape
public policy or program development?
The research questions above are significant to explore how mayors use informal
involvement to create educational opportunities. The questions help to identify specific
roles, and the approaches each mayor uses to build civic capacity. Additionally, these
questions allow this study to fill a current void in the literature on mayoral involvement,
which is the informal engagement of mayors used to shape educational opportunities,

particularly outside of district efforts.

25

Denver Case Study

To explore how a mayor can use civic capacity to exercise an informal role in
education, a case study was conducted of Denver Mayor John Hickenlooper and his
Administration using an exploratory research method. Originally, I sought to compare it
with an additional case study of the mayor of Akron, Ohio. However, political tensions
between the mayor and education community in Akron during the time would not allow
for dependable responses. Thus, the focus was chosen for Denver where better
relationships with stakeholders existed because of the previous research experience as
project coordinator for the US Conference of Mayors. Here, research was conducted
during a site visit in January 2006 to examine the role of the mayor in education through
a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. This experience was the pilot study
that helped to shape this dissertation topic and research. Twelve interviews that included
the mayor, superintendent, and other relevant stakeholders, elicited the information that
mayors can use informal roles in education to build civic capacity for initiatives, such as
universal scholarship funding, access to preschool, and after school programming.
Particularly, Denver’s mayor used both his bully pulpit and the Mayor’s Office of
Education and Children as tools for building civic mobilization to push education
initiatives (LeSure, 2006; Annenberg Institute for School Reform, 2006).

Established in 1995 under the Wellington Webb Administration, the Mayor’s
Office for Education and Children (MOEC) has an important role in bringing
stakeholders from different sectors together to collectively develop and implement
initiatives that improve the lives of children. For instance, under the Hickenlooper

Administration, the MOEC administers the Lights On After School (LOAS) initiative,

26

that provides tutoring for elementary and middle school students through a partnership
with the Denver Public Schools Foundation and Mile High United Way. Together, they
raise funds and increase public awareness in support of district-wide after school
programs. Though LOAS was created under the Hickenlooper administration, investing
in after school programming at the mayoral level began with former Mayor Webb’s Club
Denver program that exposed students to careers, such as teaching, archeology, and fire
fighting (LeSure, 2006). The growth of the after school initiative from Club Denver to
LOAS, a more comprehensive after school tutoring opportunity for students across the
city, is one of many reasons for selecting Denver. Through the MOEC, after school
programming is sustained across terms and continues to reshape itself and further develop
amidst new politics and new players. This suggests strong civic capacity in education. Its

influence on mayoral engagement needs to be explored further (LeSure, 2006).

Research Approach

Exploratory research is often referred to as “inductive” or “theory building.” It
investigates new areas of research in an effort to fill a void in the literature, such as
informal mayoral involvement (Patton, 2002). In Qualitative Research and Evaluation
Methods, Michael Patten (2002, 193) states, “In new fields of study where little work has
been done . . . qualitative inquiry is a reasonable beginning point for research . . . .
Exploratory work of this kind is the way that new fields of inquiry are developed,
especially in the policy arena.” Using an exploratory research approach, a case study was
conducted of Denver where Mayor John Hickenlooper used informal means to build civic

capacity for educational improvement using an exploratory research approach.

27

This study uses an exploratory research approach with investigations through
newspaper analysis, site visits, and serni-structured interviews. The data gathered from
these methods are used to explore how a mayor engages in the different dimensions of
civic capacity building in order to construct and maintain a role in the city’s schools and
education. Data analysis allows patterns to emerge that build from limited knowledge of a
mayor’s work and growth to informal mayoral involvement. The exploratory process also
involves continual examination by both confirming and disconfirming evidence (Patton,
2002). Confirming evidence refers to examples that fit already emergent patterns. In
contrast, disconfirming evidence does not fit emergent patterns but serve as a way of
placing boundaries around confirmed findings (Patton, 2002). Both are necessary in
exploratory research because “(there) may be exceptions that prove the rule or . . . that
disconfirrn and alter what appeared to be primary patterns” (Patton, p. 239, 2002).

Finally, the exploratory research approach is used because it is most suited for
underdeveloped areas of research in policy, such as in informal mayoral involvement in
education. An exploratory approach allowed for possible solutions to the questions and
ideas that emerged from relevant stakeholders because of the consistent focus on
looking for, investigating, confirming, and disconfirming instances that shaped emergent

patterns.

Data Collection
In this study three central data collection strategies were used — newspaper
analysis, semi-structured interviews, and site visits. The three strategies allowed for

triangulation of the data to better identify and develop emergent patterns. Triangulation

28

entails the use of multiple data sources to study a single research inquiry, such as the
informal mayoral involvement. The rich combination of data resulted in illuminating
mayoral roles, the context behind, and the perceptions of the mayor’s involvement in
education. It is important to note that the amount of triangulation allowed for this study
was limited because of budget, time, and political constraints which are describe later in

this chapter.

Newspaper Analysis

To begin to understand the pressing issues of education facing the city in this case
study, a newspaper analysis was conducted covering the mayor’s years in office. More
than 120 news articles were found that referenced Mayor Hickenlooper and his efforts in
education from the Denver Post and Rocky Mountain News. A review and analysis of the
articles showed the challenges facing schools, youth, and families as it related to
education in Denver, among them were achievement gaps and low graduation rates
among Latino students. Perceptions of the mayor’s role in education were revealed and
how the role was shaped over time through his agenda and progress towards helping
students and schools. The newspaper analysis was the first phase of data collection
because it set the tone for the investigation and gave leads on who to interview and what
questions to ask regarding specific programs or events. Key initiatives were identified to
focus on when analyzing findings, such as with the DSF and the preschool tax initiative.
Finally, how the mayor used the bully pulpit to define issues and problems, to mobilize

civic engagement in educational issues, and to engage stakeholders was explored.

29

Semi-Structured Interviews

In February—March 2007, 21 interviews with stakeholders in were conducted in
Denver. Semi-structured interviews were the primary source for collecting data because
of the rich detail acquired through conversational exchange. In semi-structured interviews
researchers use a fairly open framework for focused conversation for receiving
information. Often these interviews began with general questions, such as what are the
pressing issues facing students in the city. Later, the interview moved to more in-depth
questions to explore the relationship between the general topics or issues and the theory
being explored, civic capacity.

Though some questions were composed during the interview, pre-written
questions were used from my protocols (See Appendix A). The semi-structured approach
was used to create an interactive interview session that was flexible to further probe for
details and to discuss issues. Responses to questions from my protocols were built
through probing, the interview process was less intrusive and encouraged two-way
communication. This form of communication is used as an extension tool to not only
confirm information but also to allow participants to feel more free to discuss sensitive
issues that presented disconfirrning instances.

Interview participants included Mayor John Hickenlooper and Mariah Guajardo
Lucero, his educational advisor and the director of MOEC. Former Mayor Webb was
interviewed and Carol Boigon, his past education advisor who also served as former
director and is the founder of MOEC. Others who were interviewed were the mayoral
staff working at MOEC, school district leaders, leaders in education (i.e. parent

coalitions, gang interventionist), and education-related stakeholders in the broader

30

business and non-profit community (i.e. oil industry and United Way). See Table 3:1 —
Interview Participants that gives the number of participant types, how the interviews
were conducted, and the number of participants who preferred to maintain anonymity,
particularly because of the current mayoral race at that time or the willingness to be
honest off the record pertaining to the differences in administrations between Webb and
Hickenlooper as it relates to education. Most of the interviews took place face-to-face
during February and March 2007. To become better acquainted myself with the
community of stakeholders involved, Mayor Hickenlooper was observed on a school site
visit to a public elementary school, and his education advisor and staff were observed at a

Youth and Child Friendly City committee planning meeting.

Table 3:1: Interview Participants

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Interviews
Number of 1 - .
Stakeholder T . . . n person Anon mrt
we Partlupants 1" & Follow- Phone y y
Person
uP
Mayors 2 v —-
Educational Policy Advisor to 2 __
Mamr v
MOEC Program Directors 3 v 3
MOEC staff members 2 v
Denver Public Schools 5 v (3) v (2) 2 1
Non-Profit Community or 5 2 i
Education Advocacy Group v (2) v (3)
Business Sector 2 v 2

 

 

 

Respondents were chosen based on their educational involvement in the city,
particularly relating to the MOEC. The MOEC provided other leads that were used when

appropriate to arrange an interview and school site visit with the mayor. They played an

31

integral role, particularly when interviewing Latino stakeholders, when this researcher
was presented as someone interested in urban education issues and the MOEC. The
research material and information as obtained over a ten day period.

Most of the stakeholders interviewed were of Latino descent and appeared to
range in age from 35—60. They had experience with multiple education stakeholders at the
district, city, and foundation level. The goal of this research was to interview respondents
who could speak to the mayor’s engagement in education. Criticism of the mayor’s
engagement was limited and mild both because of his position and because of the
collaborative spirit created among stakeholders through MOEC under the leadership of
Dr. Lucero. She had her bully pulpit and the previous position as director of Assets for
Colorado Youth.

Because the education circle is inclusive of many voices, most people interviewed
had some connection to the MOEC, often stemming from previously established informal
business relationship with Director Lucero. It was challenging to find people who did not
but still played a key role in education. While this factor may appear to be a disadvantage
to this research, it later proved to be influential in shaping understanding of civic capacity
through the semi-structured interviews. Though an outsider to the Denver community of
education stakeholders, this researcher appeared as an insider-affiliate because most
interviews were obtained through contacts from within the MOEC. Helpful in creating
interview opportunities, it may have limited respondents to “politically safe” answers on

occasion.

32

Site Visits

These important site visits were most interested in were those directly reflecting
the mayor’s involvement in education and those that demonstrated the city’s involvement
in building civic capacity in education, as defined by Stone (2001; 2003). Though these
opportunities were limited most were informal and on-the-spot yet informative because
of the disconfirming information presented “off the record.” These informal interviews
during site visits helped to better shape emergent patterns by placing boundaries on
discovered “truths” and seem to identify context why certain patterns exist as they do.
Field visits were important to enhancing my study and increasing my acceptance in the

community of stakeholders.

Data Analysis

Data analysis began with a reduction process where I reviewed and typed notes
from interviews, transcribed the interviews, read the transcripts and tentatively identified
categories of responses. I then tested the tentative categories by classifying responses,
primarily in interview responses at first, and later used final categories to code all
responses and news articles. Lastly, I tallied coded responses and explored trends. Using
the Atlas.ti 5.0 qualitative software package, I was able to run a query displaying
responses and information by category. After testing 2 sets of tentative categories solely
using interview responses, the last test was expanded to include a full newspaper analysis
to help further develop categories.

The newspaper analysis explored Mayor Hickenlooper’s involvement in

education and covered his years in office from 1993, his initial campaign, to the present.

33

Using Lexus Nexus, 127 articles were found featuring the mayor or the Mayor’s Office
of Education and Children and his work with education. Of the articles, 20 were featured
in headline news, 79 in local news, and 14 were editorials. Nine articles found in
headlines related to the Denver Scholarship Foundation (DSF), a scholarship program for
graduates of DPS established through the efforts of the mayor and Tim Marquez, a
business leader in the oil industry. Thirteen articles in local news were associated with
DSF; however, a majority in this section were about the preschool tax initiative passed to
create a sales tax to fund a city-wide universal pre-k program. Other articles made
indirect references to programs or efforts by the mayor’s administration.

After reviewing the newspaper analysis and initial tests of categories to code
responses, responses were coded in three main categories — issue definition, program
specifics, and roles - for the mayor’s direct involvement in universal access to quality
pre-k tax initiative and the Denver Scholarship Foundation (Table 3.2: Research Coding
Table). Issue definition pertained to the way the program originated, how it was
perceived by stakeholders and the local Denver community, and the mayor’s role in
building civic mobilization. Program specifics dealt with the details of the initiative,
concerns raised about it, and the anticipated results; this could include greater access to
higher education. Roles entailed the specific involvement of different stakeholder types,

such as funding an initiative or helping to develop it.

34

Table 3.2: Research Coding Table

 

 

ISSUE PROGRAM
DEFINITION SPECIFICS ROLES
Mayor
5 Preschool MOEC Director
:3 Tax Initiative Origin Details
; MOEC
,_3 Denver Problem Perception Concerns DPS
2 Scholarshi - . - - -
a Foundatioii) Crvrc Mobilization Results Education Leaders
Business Leaders

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

These three major themes emerged from interview responses as related to understanding
how mayors can use civic capacity to develop roles in education. Examples of issue
definition include what inspired the initiative or who originated the idea. For instance, an
education stakeholder from the business sector initiated the idea of the mayor helping to
create universal access to higher what for all DPS graduates after visiting the high school
in the district he graduated from years ago (origin). He felt there seemed to be a lack of
school spirit and interest in pursuing college and scholarship opportunities can change
that, particularly for Latino students (problem perception). The stakeholder suggested
rallying the business community in Denver and asked for the mayor’s help in beginning
to build collaborations to create scholarship opportunities (civic mobilization).

The second theme, program specifics, entails responses that describe program
features of initiatives and their anticipated levels of influence on student development and
learning. Three sub-themes for program specifics were identified — details, concerns, and
results. One participant, for example, spoke on how the stakeholder from the business
community used the mayor to help build a scholarship foundation. When discussing the

eligibility requirements and presenting related materials, they were both coded as in the

35

previous tables. Newspapers and several interviews highlighted particular concerns with
eligibility requirements and program specifics, such as those pertaining to a lack of
funding for students of immigrant families. These references and responses were coded
as concerns. Some articles, print material from the foundation, and interviews mentioned
the impact made in funding higher education for students. These references and responses
were coded as results.

Roles refer to responses that capture how the mayor, MOEC, MOEC director,
DPS, and other relevant stakeholders were directly involved in the development of an
initiative. These included campaigning, implementation, funding, and evaluation. Though
respondents spoke on mayoral involvement in relation to specific initiatives, such as
those highlighted above, they often spoke on the mayor’s engagement and that of MOEC
and stakeholders in a general sense. For instance, a respondent stated, “The mayor’s role
is to assemble community partnerships.” To capture these universal roles, a second set of
thematical coding not dependent upon specific initiatives was developed. They include
those found in the table above; however, they also include relationships between the
mayor, the mayor’s office, the mayor’s education advisor (MOEC director), MOEC,
DPS, and primary stakeholders. In presenting these relationships, respondents explained
how the role of one complemented the other and emphasized how they coexist to develop
a more comprehensive role through their partnership. This is evident in a response from a
stakeholder who was a local leader in parental advocacy. She explained, “See, the
relationship of MOEC and the mayor is as one . . . . When the mayor goes out he asks
about parental involvement . . . MOEC asked us for briefs on parental involvement

beforehand so the mayor can have them to pass out, so the same message gets across.”

36

The results of the questions pertaining to themes of issue definition, program
specifics, and roles for the preschool tax initiative and DSF were reviewed as displayed
in Table 3.3. Data was also explored by civic mobilization, problem perception, and

stakeholder interaction.

Table 3.3: Civic Capacity Coding Table

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Problem Perception

Problem perception entails how an initiative is presented to constituents and key
stakeholders to increase exposure and support for it, particularly after identifying
common objectives among policymakers, such as the mayor, and district and local
education leaders. Problem perception is similar to agenda setting because it includes
campaign efforts to grow awareness of issues related to an initiative. For instance, to push
the preschool tax initiative the Mayor’s Office of Education and Children launched the
Preschool Matters campaign. A columnist of the Denver Post reported that the campaign
“gathered on the steps of the Denver City and County Building with balloons and
children in tow to emphasize its mission” (Merritt, 2006, B5). Here the mayor
emphasized the need for parental choice when he stated, “Education is absolutely the key
to our future - and ensuring that Denver parents have access to quality, affordable

preschool for their children is a critical part of improving our public schools” (Merritt,

37

2006, B5). By making parents the central focus and presenting children in the media
campaign, an image was created of giving parents increased choices in education and of
children more opportunities for learning.

In addition to media campaign, problem perception was also captured in
responses pertaining to the importance of having a particular initiative. For example, the
mayor increased support for the DSF through site visits to local schools. He visited
classrooms, and at the elementary level proclaimed to students that they should attend
college; their city would support them in their efforts. Hickenlooper often stated, “our
city is the only one that will pay for you to graduate from college . . . It does not matter if
your parents cannot afford it or not because its free . . . All you have to do is work a little
harder, read a little more, and play game boy a little less . . .” (LeSure, field observation,
2007). In sum, problem perception entails how an initiative is presented and the reasons
identified for it. The way it is presented often reflects the audience it is most trying to
capture; often in this study it appeared to be parents. By emphasizing choice with
increased financial support for access to preschool and higher education, parents were
drawn in, especially after seeing the image of excitement in the eyes of children. Problem
perception was explored in the analysis because it allowed for exploration of the
Hickenlooper Administration’s involvement in shaping a campaign and efforts for

initiatives to gain support from both constituents and relevant stakeholders.

Civic Mobilization
In addition to problem perception, the mayor plays a key role in civic

mobilization. Problem perception entails issue definition where common objectives are

38

identified by key stakeholders. Civic mobilization, on the other hand, is the pursuit of
those common goals (Stone, et al., 2001). Responses coded under civic mobilization
covered not only how the mayor and his staff got stakeholders engaged in developing and
implementing initiatives, such as the Latino Summit, but also in defining the challenges
in doing so. For instance, when she spoke on the initial efforts of civic mobilization
among city stakeholders in education on addressing Latino student issues through the

summit, the current MOEC director, Mariah Guajardo-Lucero stated,

There was resistance. Again, what is the role of the city government . . . doing the summit
was like peeling the band aide off and exposing the problem and just giving it some air
and yet needing to encourage others that there was promise in advancing this
conversation. It was not an easy task because we needed to engage Latino leaders, who
had their opinions, and city leaders contributing research in this conversation. We
actually had great interest from neighboring districts and had to close off spaces because
they were so hungry for information . . .

Civic mobilization entails how constituents and stakeholders are encouraged to
support or participate in particular initiatives. As reflected in co-occurring codes, it can
include aspects of problem perception, such as how an issue is presented in a media
campaign. It also includes informal campaigning efforts to mobilize the support of key
stakeholders through private meetings with the mayor or his adviser to request specific

resources or services to support such initiatives as the Latino Summit.

Stakeholder Interaction

Stakeholder interaction referred to the participation of key stakeholders in the
development and implementation of an initiative. This code identified collaborators of an
initiative and the means by which they collaborate, and includes task force or focus
groups, among others. It also entails informal relationships through previously developed

business connections or service activities (i.e. advocacy) used to develop an initiative,

39

such as with Lights On After School (LOAS). For example, a key partner in LOAS from
United Way discussed how his informal business relationship with the director of MOEC
led to the city-wide LOAS initiative. He stated, “When Maria became executive director
of the Office for Education and Children, her and I talked, we talked about if the mayor’s
office, representing the city, can be a formal partner with us on after school . . . and the
rest is history.”

Through formal and informal stakeholder interaction, partnerships form to expand
civic capacity building efforts. As it expands, so does Hickenlooper’s role. During
several interviews Hickenlooper and the MOEC were referred to as “the glue” that
brought stakeholders together. In these instances, there were co-occurring codes with

stakeholder interaction and the mayor’s roles.

Mayor’s Role

The final variable explored in this study is the mayor’s role. The research
explored how mayors use informal roles to build civic capacity in education through
initiatives such as the preschool tax initiative and the Denver Scholarship Foundation.
When coding responses, references were sought on mayoral engagement and roles in
either increasing awareness or support for an initiative. The mayor, for example,
proclaimed the following about his role in education, “As Mayor, I serve as a catalyst,
and my role is about leadership, creating a vision for education in addition to being a
support to the district through the bully-pulpit and fundraising efforts across the city.”

Responses to mayoral engagement were both program specific and general. For

the purposes of this analysis, the focus was on responses relating specifically to his

40

involvement in the pre-school tax initiative and DSF. However, the more general
responses are reviewed in the concluding chapter of this study. The analysis format
presented in Table 3.3 was used as a tool for summarizing and examining data for the
coding of field notes, interview responses, and news articles. Information was
summarized by initiatives, preschool tax initiative and DSF. This means enabled a
comparison of responses across different programs using three different research
methods. This level of analysis allowed for cross comparisons between sets of data for
triangulation and allowed a confirmation of details and findings. Findings were reported
in the following chapters after presenting the role of the Mayor’s Office of Education and
Children in Chapter 4, the mayor as a catalyst in universal pre-k in Chapter 5, and as a
broker in the development of DSF in Chapter 6. In these chapters, findings were reflected
in the analysis, and each initiative was used to highlight a different role the mayor may
use to build civic capacity in education. The concluding chapter presented a discussion of
findings and implications for understanding the informal roles mayors can have in

education.

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CHAPTER 4: MAYOR’S OFFICE OF EDUCATION AND CHILDREN

Though my study considers the informal roles mayors can play in building civic
capacity in education in their cities, in Denver understanding these roles requires first
examining the role of the Mayor’s Office of Education and Children (MOEC). The
MOEC plays a vital role in linking the mayor’s office with Denver’s schools. In this
chapter, I explore this role, highlighting, in particular, the MOEC’s relationship to the
Lights On After School (LOAS) program. LOAS is a city-wide comprehensive tutoring
program for Denver Public Schools (DPS) elementary and middle school students. Since
2003, there have been 500 participants. Currently, there are 87 schools participating in
the program. Seventy percent of all elementary and middle schools in DPS offer LOAS
programming. Though most focus on academic development, LOAS programs that
include cultural components (e.g. cooking, dance, and drama), recreational activities (e. g.
sports), and social and youth development (c. g. school-to-career service projects and
leadership).

LOAS has seen positive impacts on student achievement and school attendance
because of its focus on quality tutoring instruction, professional development training,
and evaluation (Lucero, 2007). It grew out of the efforts of Club Denver, an after school
career awareness program developed under the Mayor’s Office of Education (MOEC)
under the former Mayor Wellington Webb’s administration. This chapter first presents
Club Denver in order to begin tracing the development of LOAS through the MOEC. It

then explores how informal stakeholder interactions, particularly between United Way

42

and the MOEC, were key in expanding after school programming when a policy window
presented itself with the election of Mayor John Hickenlooper. Lastly, the research argues
that informal mayoral involvement sets the conditions for policy entrepreneurs to initiate
reform by using MOEC as a tool for building civic capacity. In doing so, this study shows
how Hickenlooper is responsive to other stakeholders and how they cast him as providing
the opening to produce change. Additionally, I present how other civic actors can initiate
informal mayoral involvement to further push an initiative, such as after school

programming.

Mayor’s Office of Education and Children

Under Denver’s former Mayor Wellington Webb, the Mayor’s Office of
Education and Children was established to build better relationships between the school
district and the mayor’s office. Prior to Mayor Webb’s election, there was no relationship
between the city and the Denver Public Schools (DPS) school district. Webb’s desire to
increase his involvement stemmed from his longing to highlight the achievements of
students. He felt that the media focused too much on violence among youth. After
reflecting on his childhood, he realized how instrumental after school programs and

activities were to his success 0V ebb, 2007). He explained,

On the news all you saw were reports of gang issues and high crimes (during my first
term in office) . . . who is highlighting the achievements of those students who may not
be A students but are B and C and good citizens . . . I thought about my childhood and
realized that we had more opportunities (e.g. after school programming) and that’s what
many of our children need...

To begin his education efforts, he created the MOEC in 1995 by first seeking an
education adviser for his administration who would be able to build relationships with the

school district. At the time, Webb had a poor relationship with the superintendent of the

43

school district for reasons that remain off of the record according to three interviews.
Thus, he needed someone who was aware of both the educational needs of Denver’s
children, and also, more importantly, the political sensitivity of the situation. He chose
Carol Boigon as his education adviser because of her experience in local Denver politics
as a former PTA member. During our interview, Boigon admitted her strong pursuit of
the MOEC director position because of her desire to merge the knowledge of education
that she developed as a parent with her desire to pursue a political office on City Council.
She stated,

I had stayed involved with education on the side of my children all these years, through
the PTA, through school volunteer, creating programs but my political friends didn’t
know that side of my life at all and I don’t think any of them really knew I was a teacher.
So, I campaigned for the job because I thought this is a culmination of all the boy skills I
had learned in the political government arena, and all my girl skills as a teacher in tough
neighborhoods. And I wanted to bring them together. I thought this would be the job of
my dreams. So I really went after it. And the message I tried to send through channels to
all the members of the selection board is just don’t dismiss me off hand because you
know me in one arena, there’s another side to me. So I campaigned for the job and
ultimately, be selected me.

Upon being chosen by Webb, she was charged with the task of developing a committee to
create the mission of MOEC in a manner that would include building a relationship with
the school district. After receiving a list of committee members to pursue from Webb,
Boigon built the committee and collectively they defined MOEC’s mission as the
following:

The Mayor’s Office for Education and Children is committed to helping Denver children
grow up with the strengths, knowledge, and skills necessary to become confident and
successful residents. The focus is on the first two decades of life, from infancy to young
adulthood. Established in 1995, the Office advocates for the children, youth, and families
of Denver and serves as the City’s liaison to Denver Public Schools.

Housed in the mayor’s office in City Hall, Boigon developed the Mile High
Scholars program in 1996. Under MOEC, it was the first initiative and first attempt to

connect City Hall with Denver schools. MOEC individually contacted both public and

44

private schools and had them identify students at each grade level who exemplified good
citizenship and academic achievement. Each year, each student’s name appears in the
newspaper and they are presented with a flower, certificate, and tickets to a cultural or
sports event at a citywide function, often held in the city park in downtown Denver.
Parents are invited to attend with their children and students take an individual picture
with the mayor after crossing the stage to receive their certificate; afterwards, they all
enjoy ice cream. One MOEC staff member stated that it resembled a graduation,
explaining:

Students and their families were very proud at the ceremony. It resembled a graduation
ceremony. Students were finally being recognized for something positive - being good
citizens, it wasn’t just about grades Schools could finally determine who THEY
wanted to honor and as a result some students increased their pride and interest in school
. . . during the ceremony more heads were held high that were once low

The Mile High Scholar’s program honored approximately 1,000 students in its
first year. According to staff members I interviewed, the program increased the mayor’s
exposure in education throughout Denver. One staffer explained that the goal was to “get
the mayor out there . . . (the Mile High Scholars Program) was quick, cheap, and dirty.”

Though Webb’s involvement in education gained increased visibility and
recognition, the poor relationship between the district office and mayor still existed. This
poor relationship impacted the city’s ability to engage DPS. For instance, Boigon
explained:

The district initially did not want to participate so our office worked directly with the
schools to get around the issue . . . Mile High Scholars was not about engagement but
rather exposure . . . the goal was to get the mayor’s face out there

During an interview, Boigon also reported that at first MOEC tried to go through
the district to identify students. Because of a lack of trust, DPS feared an increase

in administrative work. By working directly with schools, the mayor’s

45

engagement in education was recognized; however, the need to mend the
relationship between the city and DPS remained ever present.

Following its success garnering visibility for mayoral involvement in education
with the Mile High Scholars, MOEC developed Club Denver. Club Denver was an after
school program to allow middle school students to explore career fields. Club Denver,
unlike Mile High Scholars, brought resources to the district such as funding, curriculum,
training, and staff from city agencies to handle all administrative work. Consequently, the
district collaborated with the MOEC on this initiative and Club Denver opened the first
door to the city collaborating with DPS. Boigon reported that the district was particularly
pleased with the role MOEC had in developing the curriculum with city agencies.
According to an interview with Boigon and two of her former staffers, Club Denver
involved city agencies to develop modules in the following fields: firefighting,
paramedics, teaching, environment, arts, aviation, technology, business, earth keepers
(earth science), and the Platt River club (river preservation). Partnering agencies were
encouraged to collaborate with teachers to implement programs and design experiences
that built from what students learned in their sessions, and over 250 students participated
in 10 Club Denver sites across the city from 1998 to 2002.

Though many recognized the MOEC for both Mile High Scholars and Club
Denver, the mayor’s actual involvement was limited. Boigon explained that the goal
again was not to engage the mayor but to instead give Webb “an automatic win.” For

instance, regarding Club Denver, she stated:

Club Denver, the point of that, I was looking for a quick kill. If you’re in politics, you
know you live in four year cycles, the big systemic things might take too long. You can
start those but to keep community confidence up, you have to have some
accomplishments. And you need them fast. (Boigon)

46

As reflected above, the initiatives driven by MOEC under Boigon’s leadership were
primarily political. They were implemented to garner recognition and support for Webb,
rather than to build civic capacity for educational improvements. Civic capacity entails a
broad set of stakeholders collaborating to develop reform; however, Mile High Scholars
and Club Denver were developed by Boigon, and during interviews, there was no

mention of other stakeholders in shaping the programs other than MOEC staff members.

Hickenlooper’s Election - An Open Window

Winning by over 60,000 votes, Mayor John Hickenlooper’s election created an
opportunity to expand educational programming efforts in the city. Kingdon suggests that
policy entrepreneurs often wait for political opportunities that present the ability to
further push their objectives, such as the growth of after school programming across
DPS. Turnovers in administration, such as that with the election of Mayor Hickenlooper,
open policy windows. Policy entrepreneurs are able to take advantage of these windows
because of their knowledge and experience in building after school programming,
developing political connections with relevant stakeholders, and identifying opportune
moments to create change (Kingdon, 1995). Kingdon (1995, 181) explains, “But
entrepreneurs do more than push, push, and push for their proposals . . . They also lie in
wait — for a window to open.”

The change in administration created the right timing for the informal planning
group of policy entrepreneurs, primarily represented by United Way and the Rose
Community Foundation, who sought expanded after school programming through Lights

On After School (LOAS). In regards to expanding already existent after school efforts, a

47

representative from United Way stated, “with Mariah in office we knew that anything
was possible . . . we felt like now was our greatest opportunity to get the mayor on
board.” An education stakeholder from another local non-profit organization, also a part
of the Latino community, also spoke to this by stating, “With Hickenlooper coming into
office there is a better relationship with DPS and when you factor Mariah into the
equation, it’s as if the stars are aligned . . . if we want real reform in education now is a
better time than any.”

The development of LOAS began in 1995 after the director of United Way in
Denver returned from a meeting with local education stakeholders interested in after

school initiatives. The interviewee from United Way explained,

I would say (LOAS) started about ten years ago. We created a partnership with Denver
Public to create a neighborhood center at Horace Mann Middle School because the
former superintendent was looking for a pilot project at the site for after school
programming. At the same time, DPS was working on a similar project at Smiley Middle
School . . . we decided to take the lead here as well.

The timeline shown in Table 4.1, traces the development of LOAS beginning with the
Horace Mann Neighborhood Center (HMNC) and Smiley Middle School Neighborhood
Center (SMSNC) under the leadership of United Way. Simultaneously, the Rose
Community Foundation (RCF) was also partnering with DPS to support developing
beacon sites8 for middle school community. The interviewee from United Way explained
how this began to expand after school programming across Denver through a merger of

efforts:

The Rose Community Foundation received a grant to create a beacon sites in middle
schools. Sense these projects were being developed at the same time, and I served on the
planning committee for the beacons, as they started we had a close relationship with RCF
and we agreed informally that we did not want to compete against each other for funding.

 

8 A beacon site is a school that opens its doors to the community when school is out of session for
educational programming, such as tutoring, extracurricular activities, and adult education workshops.

48

So that led to the creation of an informal partnership . . . for better or worse we both had a
partnership with a key person in DPS to help bring in students to our programs . . . in all
we had trust where we could do things with a handshake. We could do things and she
could run it up the ladder with the superintendent.

The interviewee went on to explain how the partnerships between DPS and both United
Way and RCF allowed for conversations to emerge between both groups to prevent a
duplication of services in the same areas. They were able to spread their efforts
strategically and share best practices and leads to resources through an “informal
planning group.” Here, the organizations combined their after school efforts by naming
the collection of programs led by both United Way and the RCF Lights On After school
(LOAS). Launched in 2003, LOAS was supported by United Way ($500,000), Lockheed
Martin ($125,000), and the Denver Public Schools Foundation (DPSF) ($250,000). The
contribution given by DPSF was raised by newly elected Mayor John Hickenlooper
during his inauguration ball through ticket sales and fundraising efforts during the event.
Part of the stipulation Hickenlooper gave was that “the money could be spent anyway the
district sees fit.” Because of the influence of top board members from Denver’s United
Way, it was determined that the money would be used for LOAS. These policy
entrepreneurs convinced DPS board members and other leaders in the district to do so

through informal conversations.

49

Figure 4.1: LOAS Timeline

 

Webb Administratibh ‘ ' T ‘ ' HickenldripEFAndmirTisaafion
.1995 - 1327 1 1998 — 2002 2003 L2004 l 2005 L 2006 I 2007j
HMNC Club Denver LOAS

 

SMSNC Evaluation with
scoring rubric
Professional
Development
Rose Searchable
Community database for
Foundation parents to find
after school
programs near
residence

Kingdon explains the important role entrepreneurs have in developing,
identifying, and taking advantage of policy windows through the coupling of political,

policy, and problem streams when he states:

If a policy entrepreneur is attaching a proposal to a change in the political stream, for
example, a problem is also found for which the proposal is a solution, thus linking
problem, policy, and politics without the presence of an entrepreneur, the linking of
the streams may not take place. Good ideas lie fallow for lack of an advocate. Problems
are unsolved for lack of a solution. Political events are not capitalized for lack of
inventive and developed proposals. (Kingdon, 1995)

In this section, I presented how LOAS was established through policy entrepreneurs
taking advantage of a policy window that opened with the change of administration in
Denver. This enabled the entrepreneurs to join existing policy solutions and problems and

push for new initiatives thus creating new types of mayoral involvement in education

through MOEC.

MOEC - The Director Makes a Difference
Though Hickenlooper’s election served to open the policy window, his

appointment of Lucero to direct the MOEC was also critical. Even though Hickenlooper

50

helped to launch LOAS, the informal planning group believed more could be done
through his office to expand their efforts besides inaugural fundraising efforts and
appearances, particularly with the hiring of education adviser Lucero. Upon entering
office in 2003, Mayor John Hickenlooper hired a new director of MOEC, Mariah
Guajardo Lucero, who also served as his education adviser. Unlike Boigon, Lucero came
from a strong education background, particularly centered on advocacy for both Denver
children and Latino families. Unlike Boigon, she was not interested in seeking political
office and instead was recognized in the Latino Community as being an activist for
youth. As the director of Assets for Colorado Youth, she had experience building
comprehensive educational programs that included professional development and
evaluation components. One MOEC staffer who worked for both Boigon and Lucero

explained the difference:

Carol came from a strong political background and she was seeking office. Mariah, on
the other hand, has experience as the director of Assets for Colorado Youth, which says a
lot . . . her focus is definitely on serving Denver’s kids.

During our interview, Lucero talked about her experience in policy and what it meant to

her to be a public policy maker. She stated,

I don’t think good public policy makers can be in this business in order to advance their
circle of friendships, I think you have to be willing to stake everything and that without
integrity, in that informed decision-making, you can be seduced into making policy
decisions for the few as opposed to making public policy decisions for the many.

Her approach to public policy is reflected in her leadership and the direction of MOEC,

particularly through her ability to engage policy entrepreneurs in education reform.
During my interview with United Way, the participant explained how a key

member of their informal planning group, who also served on the school board, noted the

need of the mayor to expand their after school programnring efforts in saying

51

She said to us, until we get the mayor and the superintendent on the same page about the
importance of after school programming, we are not going to take this to scale. Well, 10
and behold, when Mayor Hickenlooper was elected part of his platform was to work
closely with and support Denver Public Schools . . . Mariah was our in to his office
(Rimando, 2008)

The above statement confirms that the policy window opened with the turnover in
administration, particularly because of Hickenlooper’s “very long honeymoon period”
and the hiring of Lucero (Rimando, 2008). Rimando, an executive from United Way,
explained that after Lucero was first hired as director of MOEC, he first had an informal
conversation with her where they explored how to make tutoring available to all students

in Denver. Lucero confirmed this by elaborating,

Because I have worked so long with stakeholders across Denver, I have informal
partnerships . . . this is where some of our strongest education programs begin . . . by
discovering how we can combine our resources, as in the case of Lights on After School .
. . my colleagues in education know that my door is always open to finding new ways to
serve Denver’s children (Lucero, 2007)

Rimando also spoke on this informal relationship and Lucero’s impact on the

development of LOAS:

Maria’s commitment and zeal for children and education, because of her experience,
brought to the table an emphasis and commitment to quality, to evaluation, and to staff
training . . . She is a leader. She is a recognized leader in Latino issues, youth issues, and
she just brings a commitment that you don’t see in too many people. (Rimando, 2007)

Mariah’s contribution to LOAS is noted in interviews with Rimando, Boigon, and MOEC

staffers (former and current). For instance, Rimando explained:

(Mariah) brought those elements to LOAS partnership that have been critical. Staff
training that’s made available to school employees and to staff of youth organizations
around quality after school programming and development aspects . . . The emphasis on
evaluation, as Maria would say, ‘we have to have an evaluation in order to have (LOAS)
paid for in years to come — it’s all about outcomes and results.’ So she talked the partners
into investing money in evaluation and staff training. It’s not to say that we would not
have done this, but she brought that knowledge and pressed. (Rimando, 2007)

In addition to Rimando, Boigon also noted Maria’s efforts in after school programming

by stating, “Mariah really created something completely different from Club Denver, we

52

might be a part of that foundation by beginning those partnerships with the district but
her efforts help to solidify tutoring programs for DPS students across the city.” A former
MOEC staffer similarly mentioned, “MOEC’s LOAS initiative is nothing like Club
Denver, it has more of an academic focus and emphasizes tutoring. The new director
brought that.” A current MOEC staffer who works on MOEC stated, “LOAS is about
partnerships and Mariah’s contribution led to us having evaluation reports that show
results.” For instance, the average school attendance for program participants was greater
than non-participants. An evaluation in 2006 shown that school attendance rates in 2005
were 93% for one-year participants, 92.6% for two-year participants, and 93.7% for
three-year participants. Non-participants of LOAS had an attendance rate of 90.1%
(MOEC, 2005). Similar trends are found in relation to achievement on the Colorado
Statewide Assessment Program (CSAP). In 2005, one-year participants had an average
score of 478 on the math component of the CSAP, two-year participants had an average
score of 493, and three-year participants averaged 515. Those not attending LOAS had an
average CSAP math score of 485. In terms of writing, first year participants had an
average score of 480, two-year participants of 491, and three-year participants of 511.
Those not attending had an average CSAP writing score of 486.

Of the budget of 1.6 million dollars, 52% funds programming at the 87 school
sites through competitive grants. Seven percent of funding goes toward evaluation,
training, and administration. Lucero emphasized the importance of incorporating

professional development during an interview when she stated,

Training of our tutors in after school programming is important because we know that
actual programming impacts academic achievement and that the quality of the staff that
run after school programs . . . we have committed to the training of staff. And our
evaluations are demonstrating positive movement and impact.

53

Under the MOEC, the emphasis of LOAS is one of academic achievement. One staffer
responded, “We are most concerned about student performance. We want what we do in
our after school programs to translate into results on the CSAP.” She then went on to
explain, “Though LOAS grew out of Club Denver, our focus is not the same. Yes, some
of our sites have career or trade focuses, but a majority of what we do is tutor and
guarantee it’s accessible to all DPS students.”
MOEC Approach - Building Collaboration

Though Lucero’s impact on LOAS is recognized, the impact of the mayor is not.
The program is seen as a partnership, and when discussing the role of MOEC, emphasis
on Lucero is ever present, even from the Mayor himself. During an interview,

Hickenlooper stated:

Mariah’s work in after school programming is great! She has really led the efforts in the
partnership with United Way and what (MOEC) has done in making it accessible to all
DPS students across Denver is tremendous . . . the key to my success is hiring diverse
individuals who have been there. They know both the issues and stakeholders to make
real change for our kids. (Hickenlooper, 2007)

In a follow-up interview I asked someone from MOEC, who asked to remain anonymous,

what the mayor’s relationship was to LOAS. She stated,

The mayor really doesn’t have a role in LOAS . . . we use his name. People want to get
involved when they see the mayor’s name or face on something. In that way, he does
have a role and led to success because he attracts both participants and stakeholders . . .
speeches and informal meet and greats letting people know about our programs go far. I
don’t know what to call this but rethinking . . . he does have a role . . . it lies in his ability
to draw people to the table to collaborate.

During an interview, Rimando explained that there is a distinction between the MOEC
and Mayor Hickenlooper. He explained that MOEC is a partner, stating

...what really makes LOAS work is trust. We have a good working relationship that’s not
complicated by numerous memos and contracts of understanding. We check our agendas
at the door and even with the Mayor’s Office involved we are seen as equal partners.

54

Rimando emphasized the importance of this equal partnership because it allows for using
the strengths and resources of an array of institutions, each depending on the other to
accomplish the goals of LOAS. Civic capacity entails broad-based stakeholder
interaction because the extent of its success is dependent on the collaboration of different
voices at the table. Stone explains that including community leaders, like those of the
informal planning group, allows for a sharing of networks and resources, as reflected in
the development of LOAS. Though the mayoral role in education here is minimal, it is
worth exploring his role as reflected through the MOEC.

The MOEC serves as a tool for the mayor to build collaborations and identify
additional resources for programming that compliments the efforts of the school district.
Boigon explained, “MOEC is an implementing arm for the mayor that fights to get things
done by knowing where the pockets of funding are and battling for resources . . . we are a
team of people who fight to get things done.” Boigon explained that the “fight” is an
“inside invisible fight” for the allocation or resources.

However, a staff member working for MOEC under both administrations

disagreed:

Collaboration have always been key in everything we do and our job is to bring people
together to build relationships among stakeholders . . . they begin to see what resources
they have and, when combined, its potential impact . . . MOEC helps to initiate these
networks in building new relations, thus, new programs that complements the district’s
efforts . . . (MOEC is) here to help, not to takeover, that is furthest from our minds.

A key to building collaborations is having an open door. Lucero explained, “I think it
helped that our office is no longer in the mayor’s office at the capital . . . by being here9

people feel like it is easier to come to us and feel less intimidated . . . they know our door

 

9 City Office building blocks away from the capital that houses different city agencies. including MOEC.

55

is always open.” Hickenlooper agrees with this open door approach and prides his
office’s ability to listen to new ideas from stakeholders. During an interview,
Hickenlooper stated, “MOEC is about empowerment . . . empowering stakeholders to
work on behalf of students to produce change. It brings excellence through
collaboration.” He then went on to explain, “The culture of a city is about creating a
culture of empowerment. People have to feel empowered to produce change and MOEC
guides that.” In this way, the mayor uses the MOEC to serve as a facilitator of change by
allowing policy entrepreneurs to introduce new program ideas and help set the

administration’s education agenda, unlike under the Webb administration.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I demonstrated how the election of Mayor Hickenlooper opened
what Kingdon refers to as a policy window that enabled policy entrepreneurs in the city
to strengthen their educational initiatives and to establish new, more productive
relationships with the mayor through his adviser, and appointed MOEC director, Mariah
Guajardo Lucero. The MOEC was, again, central to these efforts. The change in MOEC
leadership, made possible by Hickenlooper’s election, made it possible to forge new
relationships between the mayor, the district, and the broader education policy
entrepreneur community. Thanks to these changes, the MOEC now serves as a site for
policy entrepreneurs within and outside of the mayor’s office to foster and support
mayoral involvement in education.

A representative working for a local parents coalition explained, “MOEC is the

glue that brings people together on key topics in education . . .forcing us to come together

56

as a city, district, and even non-profit organizations to give thought to closing the
achievement gap.” One staffer from the MOEC stated, “DPS cannot do it by themselves .
. . it is our ability to be there and present and helping all communicate a message of
excellence . . . we bring that knowledge, expertise, and some resources that can really
help to make a difference.” Another staffer stated similar affirmations: “(MOEC) is that
connection, that network, that all of those relationships stem from to, in the end, have
positive outcomes for children and their families.”

When asked about the challenges of being the director of MOEC and adviser to
Hickenlooper, Lucero explained her constant struggle with shaping the role of the city in
education:

One of the most pressing questions is what is the role of ‘city government in advancing
education in the city where the school district is entirely separate from the city
government . . . what should be the role, could be the role, and needs to be the role of
city government. Because having said that we are completely autonomous if you will,
education is seen as the number one problem for the city government. When you poll
citizens the number 1 issue that they want the mayor to do something about is to have
great schools and have education be number 1. So the challenge then is, how might a city
define its role in advancing education, recognizing that we don’t hire and fire teachers,
we don’t hire and fire principals, we don’t set curriculum in a classroom. How to define
the role one might have, and so that question has been posed sometimes directly and
indirectly and then our challenge has been to answer that question over and over and over
again . . .

. . . It’s been very organic. I would like to think it’s been self-clothing. So as we see
something starting to work we push that forward. The after school program, I think, that
collaborative with Mile High United Way and Denver Public Schools and the city
government is a great example of self correction . . . in terms of our strength in terms of
partnership, in terms of dollars we are in every middle school and every other elementary
school and it has come from the strength in partnership between these three entities. So,
we went from the city giving $250,000 to leveraging this partnership where this year 1.8
million is going into after school programming. And the quality of the program has been
enhanced, an evaluation now goes along with the program, training is now an integral
part. It’s meant educating principals on what quality after school programming looks like,
why it’s important, and how it can advance academic achievement.

His election, along with the work of MOEC and community groups set the stage

for Mayor Hickenlooper to develop new forms of mayoral involvement in education. I

57

will explore these new roles in the following chapters. A key component of civic
capacity is being able to institutionalize initiatives that can continue to enhance
themselves by adapting to different shifts, such as economic and community concerns.
By exploring Kingdon, we see how programs develop and shape themselves through
shifts in administrations and how new policy windows can create opportunities for policy

entrepreneurs to set the education agenda.

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CHAPTER 5: CATALYST

When asked what his role was in education, specifically as it relates to early
childhood education, Mayor Hickenlooper responded, “My role as mayor is that of a
catalyst . . . it is about leadership, creating a vision for education in addition to being a
support to the district.” In Mayoral Leadership and Involvement in Education, Edelstein
(2006, p. 15) defines the role of catalyst as a mayor “advocate(ing) for change and
improvements in education by speaking out, offering ideas, promoting initiatives, starting
partnerships and challenging the community.” My goal in this chapter is to demonstrate
through my research that in playing the role of catalyst during the development of Issue
1A, a preschool tax initiative, Hickenlooper led efforts in the city’s early education
objectives by framing the policy issue and mobilizing stakeholders through the use of his
bully pulpit.

Though the bully pulpit is often used while politicians are in office, my research
has found that it can also be used during election campaigns for popular favorable
candidates. When first running for office in 2003, John Hickenlooper developed an
education platform that centered on providing equal access to quality preschool
programming. After becoming mayor, Hickenlooper further developed his public
philosophy to attract a broader base of support by shifting the central argument away
from equity and towards the ideal of economic development through education. This
chapter highlights this shift as being instrumental to his role as catalyst. Through it he

created a public philosophy to build civic mobilization around early childhood education

59

in Denver. Like his role as liaison and broker, the mayor’s role as a catalyst has led to
building civic capacity for education. In this case, he has done so by relying on his bully
pulpit to direct collaborations and steer change, rather than produce programs. Through
his public presentation and rhetorical voice, the Mayor was able to win support from both
constituents and stakeholders by first establishing the focus of the pre-school program as
one of equity and later shifting this to economic development. This shift, I argue,
allowed the mayor to broaden the base of supporters for his pre-school initiative, a
broadening that was essential as the initiative passed by only 2 percentage points.

To trace the development of this shift, this chapter begins with an overview and
timeline that traces Mayor Hickenlooper’s early education efforts. It then presents how he
developed the role of catalyst through the skillful use of the bully pulpit. My research
examines how Hickenlooper fostered civic mobilization through his ability to frame the
early education initiative through issue definition and public perception. In making the
distinction between the two, the study demonstrates how Hickenlooper shifted from
building awareness and interest in the initiative towards active support for his early
childhood education platform. By managing to both shift and maintain a dual focus on
equity and economic development, Hickenlooper was able to mobilize support for the

pre-school initiative from a wide range of constituents and stakeholders.

Overview & Timeline
The timeline below offers a visual overview of the events that marked the

emergence and development of Mayor Hickenlooper’s preschool initiative.10 As the

 

'0 MOEC staff referred to the mayor’s overall preschool efforts as the “preschool initiative” throughout
their interviews.

60

timeline indicates, events occurring during the Webb Administration’s Kids’ Tax
initiatives were important because they influenced Mayor Hickenlooper’s early education
efforts. In particular, they were ballot initiatives to increase sales tax by 30 cents for
every $100 spent for general education spending. Both requests for a sales tax increase
related to education were overwhelmingly defeated, only getting 20—30% of the vote.
According to interviews, as presented later in the chapter, the ballot initiatives’ efforts
were too broadly defined and they failed to use the mayoral bully pulpit, particularly as it
relates to building a public philosophy.

Hickenlooper initiated the idea of investing in preschool programming upon
campaigning for mayor in 2003. During this time, be promoted the program as an
initiative aimed at addressing issues of equity. More specifically, he argued that the
initiative would provide all children with an equal playing field. Once elected, winning
by 60,000 votes, Mayor Hickenlooper then led efforts to further develop the overall
program vision through the 2004 Mayor’s Preschool Summit: Invest in Success. The
Summit later led to the development of the Mayor’s Leadership Team that was
established to oversee the development of the pre-school initiative.

Throughout this chapter, I explore how Mayor Hickenlooper used these efforts to
build civic mobilization by first gaining the support and resources of stakeholders,
particularly in the business and non-profit communities, who later collaborated to
develop the Preschool Matters Campaign to win the support of a broad base of voters to
pass Issue 1 A, a sales tax increase to develop the Denver Preschool Program (DPP).
Issue 1A passed by 52% of votes in November 2006 and developments are currently

under way for DPP as listed in Figure 5.1.

61

Figure 5.1: Pro-school Initiative Timeline

 

 

 

 

 

 

Webb Administration - ‘ "' intakenlaopéTAdministr‘étion
2000 F 2001 l 2002 2003 L 2004 2005 L 2006 ] 2007
Hickenlooper Mayor’s
Introduced Preschool Mayor
. , Early Summit: Appointed
$39518: $22,638; Education Invest In Presgrgogl‘la‘tters Board (7) and
Platform Success p 9 Advisory
(Equity (Economic Board (25)
Focus) Focus)
Hickenlooper
Voted Into City Council
Office (won Ralfimfi? in Approved
by 60,000 Boards
votes)
Mayor‘s City March 27,
Leadership Council 1st Board
Team Backing Meeting
Articles of
Nov 06 Incorporation
Ballot to set up
1A Nonprofit
Passed filed (being
finalized)
Program
Specifics 8-
Details

In the following section, I present an overview of Issue 1A and DPP.

Issue 1A - Denver Preschool Program

On November 6, 2006, three years into Mayor Hickenlooper’s first term in
office, Denver’s citizens voted in favor of Issue 1A by 52%. Issue 1A was a ballot
initiative to raise the sales tax to 12 cent for every $100 spent. It was meant to develop
and maintain the Denver Preschool Program (DPP), a needs-based universal pre-k
initiative for the city. The goal of DPP is to raise $12 million a year for preschool
education that is expected to reach 1,500 — 2,000 4 year olds each year through tuition
credits, based on financial need; the program also seeks to invest in improvements to

state-licensed preschool programs throughout the city. Thus, DPP desires to increase

62

access to and the quality of preschool programming because, as its motto states, “all kids
deserve an equal start in life.”

To reach the goals of its campaign slogan, the DPP will also cover the costs of
outreach and enrollment to increase awareness of the program and importance of quality
preschool education, particularly to lower income families. The tuition credits granted to
families for their preschool children are dependent on need and the quality of the
preschool they choose. Higher tuition credits will go to students of low income families
enrolling in high quality programs, as determined by the accountability measurements
and procedures to later be designed by the program.

Program specifics related to needs—based disbursements and qualifying
preschool sites are still being determined by a 7 member board and its advisory board of
25 members, both appointed by the Mayor and approved by the City Council. The Board
of Directors includes representation from City Council, the Department of Human
Services, the community, Mile High United Way and other local non-profits, businesses,
and law firms. Former MOEC director Councilwoman Carol Boigon, a member of the
Board, proclaimed during an interview that the Board’s diversity represents a broad
spectrum of voices and interests across the city and that she believes it will attribute to
the program’s future successes.

The Denver Preschool Program will run as a non-profit organization as
developed and maintained by the board. Currently, articles of incorporation have been
filed but are still being finalized. Some, such as city councilman Charlie Brown, believe
that the late start is a setback. Some preschool directors reported that they were not

informed of the prospective program details and are unsure of how to respond to parents

63

inquiring about reimbursements for next fall. Board member Boigon attributes the
apparent lack of development to the fact that “there is so much infrastructure in creating a
nonprofit from scratch" ” (Merritt, 2007). Though the development of DPP is from
“scratch,” there is precedent for using a tax ballot initiative to fund such an education
program. As the timeline above indicates, Issue 1A emerged both in response to the
failed Kids’ Tax and as a part of Hickenlooper’s mayoral campaign. The failure of the
Kids’ Tax was important to shaping how Hickenlooper framed the Pre-school initiative,
both as a mayoral candidate and then while in office according to 7 articles and 10
interviews with stakeholders from MOEC (4), school district (3), and community
advocacy groups and non-profits (3). Given its influence, I briefly describe the Kids’ Tax

initiative and its demise below.

Kids’ Tax

The Kids’ tax was a ballot initiative to increase sales tax by 30 cents for every
$100 spent. Its goal was to raise $30 million a year for education in Denver.
Stakeholders, such as Boigon and MOEC staff who served on both DPP and Kids’ Tax
campaigns, suspect it failed because it was too broad in scope, lacked focus on a specific
education issues and grade levels, and was not supported by then-Mayor Wellington
Webb. When I asked about the Kids’ Tax in an interview, the former mayor admitted that
he was not in favor of it because of its broadness, lack of clarity, and primary political
intent. He believed that both Kids’ Tax issues were proposed primarily to win political

favors for parties interested in pursuing mayoral candidacy upon his leaving.

 

l l Merritt, G. Denver funding for kids delayed voter-backed plan to pay for preschool. (2007, May 23).
The Denver Post, p. A01.

64

Additionally, during the interview, he stated “the voice of the community was not there.”
Here, he was suggesting that when developing Kids’ Tax there were not as many
stakeholders from across different sectors participating in the process as there were for
DPP. Consequently, Kids’ Tax did not have a united front, unlike the later successful
Issue 1A Preschool Matters campaign. Lynea Hansen, spokeswoman for Preschool
Matters, stated, “When you have 35 business and community leaders who came up with
the proposal you are starting from a good place” (Merritt, 07).

In 2006, Issue 1A passed with 52% of the vote. Many attribute this success to the
shift of rhetorical voice from equity and towards economic development. (This will be
discussed further in the section Framing the Policy Issue.) Additionally, the campaign’s
clear message and narrow scope, when compared to the previous efforts of Kids’ Tax was
also noted in both interviews and by local media. Below are excerpts from 3 newspaper

articles specifically referencing these campaign differences:

[Kids’ Tax] in 2000 was the only one of six Denver ballot questions that voters defeated.
Many at that time cited a lack of specifics on the proposal and the $30 million a year
price tag in voting against it. (Merritt, 2006)

This is the third try for a “kids’ tax” initiative this decade. Measures defeated in 2000 and
2001 involved heftier tax and were for a wider variety of children’s programs. (”Yes to
Preschool,” 2006)

[Issue 1A] is much improved over the previous kids’ tax initiatives, which were
perceived as vague. This proposal is targeted specifically for 4 year olds It would

collect $12 million a year, where the previous efforts planned for $30 million. (Plunkett,
2006)

As presented in the examples, constituents value knowing how and at what amount their
tax revenue would be spent on education items. One MOEC staff member responded, “it
is about articulating the argument. I think we have done that successfully and it is

demonstrated in the passing of Issue 1 A. I won’t lie-~campaigning had a lot to do with it

. . . it’s another difference between our efforts and Kids’ Tax.”

65

Again, one of the primary reasons noted for Kids’ Tax failure was lack of
campaigning. Kids’ Tax campaigning fund was less than $100,000. Most of this funding
was spent on print media, such as pamphlets and yard signs. Preschool Matters, on the
other hand, raised over 1.5 million dollars under the direct leadership of Hickenlooper.
Though money was spent on similar print materials as Kids’ Tax, Hickenlooper’s
administration expanded campaign efforts to also use radio and television ads to gain
support for early childhood education. Hickenlooper’s goal was to first increase
awareness of the importance of investing in pre-k, to later win support for Issue 1A used
to develop Denver’s Preschool Program. Uniquely, the awareness and outreach efforts
included research on constituency voting patterns for education, specifically early
education, through polling to gain a sense of what voters would support. Hickenlooper
particularly valued this aspect of the campaign, given the failings of Kids’ Tax. He
pushed for using research-based evidence to ground support efforts and to prove the
significance of early childhood education to address concerns specific to Denver, such as

non-English learners and high school drop-out populations.

Mayoral Role — Catalyst and the Bully Pulpit

By shifting the political discourse’s focus from equity towards economic
investment, Hickenlooper used his bully pulpit as a tool to leverage support for his early
education initiative by touching on the values of stakeholders. Again, the bully pulpit is
the platform which delegates use to convey a message to gain the support of constituents
and key stakeholders. It can be used to both build awareness and political backing by

shaping arguments through rhetoric and presentation. In fact, the extent to which a bully

66

pulpit is effective is dependent upon both (Dorsey, 2002; Jeffers, 1998). Rhetorical voice
is the ability to formulate a memorable public philosophy that is clear, articulate,
reasonable, and justifies the importance of investing in a particular policy issue, such as
early childhood education. Public presentation is the delegate’s ability to interact with
both constituents and stakeholders. It includes personal interactions and meetings and the
ability of a delegate to show him/herself as calm, delightful, amusing through jokes and
personal gladdening anecdotes disciplined by improvisations, understatements, and a
pleasure of serving constituents (Dorsey, 2002; Muir, 1992; Edwards, 2003).

This section explores how Mayor Hickenlooper developed a public philosophy
through the use of the bully pulpit. My research demonstrates how Mayor Hickenlooper’s
ability to carefully frame the policy issue influenced his ability to attract constituent and

stakeholder support.

Framing the Policy Issue - Hickenlooper’s Early Education Platform

Framing the policy issue, also referred to as issue definition or problem
perception in civic capacity literature, is the extent to which a concern is clearly defined
and understood by stakeholders under the influence of a delegate’s political platform. It is
meant to build support for a policy initiative through agenda setting efforts shaped by
speeches, event appearances, and various forms of media campaigns by an administration
(Stone et al., 2001; Henig et al. 1999). In this section, I distinguish between issue
definition and problem perception to show how the Mayor initially pushed the
importance of preschool education through issue definition beginning with his mayoral

campaign. After attracting voters through his education agenda, he later sought to gain

67

the support of key stakeholders needed to build the initiatives through the Mayor’s
Summit and the Mayor’s Leadership Team. Here, the mayor used both to begin building
civic capacity for preschool education by creating a problem perception that would lead

to creating an initiative that voters would support, such as Issue 1A. See Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2: Rhetorical Discourse Shift

 

I Issue Definition Problem Perception l
, Mayor's
Campaign HickenIOOper May orsPre-K Leadership Team; Issue 1 A
Summit. Invest Passed by
for Mayor elected mayor in Success Preschool Matters 527
(2003) (July 2003) Campaign (2004- "
(2004) 200 6) (2006)

In moving from creating awareness of preschool education towards building the
foundation for developing an initiative through problem perception, the mayor took care
to employ both rhetorical voice and public perception. Both of these contributed to his
ability to frame the initiative in ways that allowed him to garner initial support and then

broaden his base to secure the passage of the initiative.

Issue Definition - Equal Access to Preschool

Issue definition entails shaping a policy concern to generate awareness for initial
support among voting constituents and key stakeholders, such as those representing the
Latino community. Mayor Hickenlooper first generated awareness of the importance of

preschool education during his first campaign for mayor in 2003. He defined the issue

68

addressed by the preschool initiative as one of universal access to quality early childhood
education programs for all students. Six out of 30 news articles about Hickenlooper’s
preschool efforts quoted the mayor as promoting the early childhood initiative as an
equity issue during his first two years in office. Two news articles that referred to
Hickenlooper’s education platform called for equity in access to early education. During
his first year in office, prior to the Mayor’s Preschool Summit, there were 2 additional
articles which did the same; many referred to Hickenlooper’s efforts as a call for “a great
start” or that all students deserve to be at the same starting line. Stakeholders mentioned
in the articles were DPS, Deep Rock Water, and the Piton Foundation. In mentioning
these supporters, it shows that they took on the equity discourse. For instance, one article
cited that Hickenlooper and DPS officials agree “that children need to get into school
earlier rather than later” (Hubler, 2004). Another cited Deep Rock Water as partnering
with Hickenlooper to donate a. share of funds from Mile High Water towards Denver’s
preschool initiative (Brainerd, 2004). The Piton Foundation was also cited as a partner
during this phase and that it was to contribute to research efforts of the mayor’s preschool
platform.

Six interviews also confirmed the support of the Piton Foundation, Deep Rock
Water, and DPS during issue definition. These interviews were primarily with
stakeholders in the district and those who participated in the summit or on the leadership
team. For instance, a MOEC staff member working on the preschool matters campaign
stated, “We had the support of the Piton Foundation from the beginning because they too
wanted early childhood education for poor minority children . . . not too many have

access and that is a shared commonality between the mayor and their foundation.”

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Another staff member, who contributed to both the Kids’ Tax and Preschool Matters
campaign, stated, “it was important to get funding early on to show we had support
Deep Rock Water was there to help expand preschool opportunities for more children.” A
stakeholder from the Piton Foundation stated, “When Hickenlooper was elected it was as
if the stars were aligned. Everyone wanted to do something about quality preschools for
all children especially in the Latino Community, our kids deserve it and so do their
teachers.”

Though not apparent in the newspaper analysis, the equity discourse was also
taken up by teachers, the Latino community, Los Padres, a parental advocacy group, and
the MOEC as reflected in interviews. For instance, Guajardo-Lucero proclaimed, “the
Latino community strongly supported the mayor’s call for equal access to quality
preschool programs for all children . . . this includes Los Padres . . . the teacher’s union
and local parental advocacy groups strongly supported our preschool efforts as well . . .
because it’s really about our children, Denver’s future.” During an interview with Los
Padres, one activist stated, “We support the mayor and think he’s great, he is really
turning things around for Latino children with universal pre-k our kids deserve that
same great start.”

Though there was support from education and Latino stakeholders, 2 articles and
2 interviews with MOEC staff referenced the initial opposition from city council
members and a majority of constituents. They did not want an increase in taxes, because
it did not meet their interests because they could either afford preschool or did not have
children. One staff member argued, “Because our efforts were about equal access to

quality preschool programming not everyone was interested because most white

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constituents can afford such programming or no longer had school aged children.”
Another proclaimed, “city council members act on behalf of their constituents . . . there
were areas where their constituents did not see the value in the tax so at that time neither
did they. As a result, we had to change our focus from access to economic gains for the
city.”

By presenting the issue as one of equity, stakeholders wanting to create equal
access to preschool education were supportive. Interviewees explained that the argument
for equity appealed to the educational interests of the Latino community and issues of
equality in education because of Hickenlooper’s push for “equal access.” For instance,
one respondent from the philanthropic sector explained, “We stand by the mayor because
for the first time I can remember someone in office is taking an active stand for Latino
students our kids want to go to college they have dreams too access to quality pre-k
is important to get them there because most come unprepared for school, many starting as
English language learners.”

Four interviewees stated that Hickenlooper was a “hero” to those in the Latino
community who were concerned about education. The interviewees represented Latino
leaders from a parental advocacy group, a Latino community advocacy group, the DPS
school board, and a local high school. My interviews demonstrated that the Latino
community recognized Hickenlooper for raising awareness of the importance of early
childhood education and how “their” children deserve a great start. They described the
disadvantages to students as unpreparedness for school, low academic achievement, and
increases in high school dropouts among Latino and African American students. Their

reasoning paralleled that expressed by the mayor in his interview when he stated, “Access

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to quality preschool is linked to so many things — dropout rates, achievement, school
readiness . . . I have a son preschool age and as a parent myself I want our city to give all

kids a great start because they deserve it and the city deserves to benefit from it as well.”

Problem Definition — From Equity to Economic Development

During an interview with MOEC Director Guajardo—Lucero, she noted that the
challenge for the administration was not winning support from minority constituents but
instead the majority. She explained that as a result of negative or apathetic responses
from majority constituents, the MOEC was challenged with creating the perception of the
problem in broader terms to reach a broader audience. Guajardo-Lucero stated, “The
mayor had the challenge of repackaging the information to appeal to a broader audience
by presenting it in a manner that clearly showed that it affected everyone . . . the state of
the economy.” Interviewees from the MOEC confirmed this, stating that the Mayor’s
Preschool Summit, Invest in Success, marked the rhetorical shift towards grafting an
economic discourse onto the previous discourse of equity. There are 2 articles in 2004-
2005 that represents this shift after the Mayor’s Preschool Summit, particularly due to the
efforts of the Mayor’s Leadership Team, from the Piton Foundation and the Colorado
Children’s Campaign. Alan Gottlieb and Teni Pinney of the Piton Foundation wrote an
article in the Perspective section of the Denver Post in 2004 on early childhood research.
In the article they argued “providing at-risk children with quality early childhood care
and education significantly reduces the achievement gap that otherwise plague them later
in their school careers.” The following findings were based on an analysis of previous

pre-k studies and a comparative study of Denver Public School student performances on

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the Colorado Student Assessment Program (CSAP), between students who participated in
quality preschool and kindergarten programs and those who have not:

0 Low-income children who were in high-quality early childhood care and education from
infancy through age 5 had higher cognitive scores from the toddler years to age 21 than
their peers who were not in high-quality programs and were more likely to attend
college than their peers;

They were less likely to be held back a grade than were their peers;

They were less likely to be arrested as youths than those who did not participate in such
programs;

They had higher earnings than their peers;

They had greater commitment to marriage than their peers;

They had fewer criminal arrests as adults than their peers; and

Mothers whose children participated in high-quality programs achieved higher
educational and employment status than mothers whose children were not in the program.
These results were especially pronounced for teen mothers.

High-quality early childhood care and education programs offer broader societal
advantages as well, the studies show. They provide families with a safe and stimulating
environment for children so that parents can work. (Gottlieb & Pinney, 2004)

The findings above mark the shift from equity discourse and towards economic
advancement; the article shifted the outcome focus away from educational attainment and
towards one of economic advantage by presenting how investing in preschool education
leads to increases in social mobility, particularly for lower income families. One MOEC
staff member stated, “The Piton Foundation’s work was important because it showed the
economic advantage . . . with less crime, safer streets, more graduates, and opportunities
for better jobs this was the research we needed to show that preschool does make a
difference, especially for the health of our economy.” Another MOEC staffer and high
school principal made similar references to preschool’s impact on “Denver’s economic
future” because of reasons similar to those stated in the Piton Foundation’s article.

The Piton Foundation recognized the strength of their research in the campaign
efforts and their role in pushing forward when the authors proclaimed, “Compelling
information is readily available to fuel a powerhouse marketing campaign.” In addition to

their early childhood study, the Piton Foundation conducted a poll to gauge what voters

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would approve of to fund Denver’s universal pre-k efforts. Authors stated, “By a 58% to
40% margin, Denver voters polled said they would support a sales-tax increase of .2
percent to pay for a universal pre-kindergarten program.”

Alan Gottlieb sat on the Mayor’s Leadership Team, and his organization’s efforts,
particularly polling and helping to add an economic focus to equity efforts through
research, were key in developing the Preschool Matters campaign, as of the Colorado
Children’s Campaign (CCC). In a Denver Post article by staff writer Karen Auge in 2005,
the CCC’s president Barbara O’Brien was noted as arguing that because voters were in
favor of supporting the cigarette tax to expand the state health insurance program for
working families, “that leaves early-childhood education as the most pressing need”
(Auge, 2005). MOEC director, Mariah Guajardo Lucero was cited as agreeing with
O’Brien. Though the article did not focus on educational aspects of pre-programming, it
made a connection between early childhood education and health through the results of
CCC’s Colorado Kids Count Survey. O’Brien stated, “When we match up how kids are
sliding in the national rankings and then compare that to (state) budget cuts over the last
few years, I think we get a clear picture that kids have really taken a (health-related) hit.”

The articles above represent the rhetorical shift because they add an economic
aspect to the equity argument as supported by the research on the social mobility
advantages of preschool education, such as reflected in improved health. This was
confirmed in the 4 interviews that showed how stakeholders became engaged in shaping
the campaign’s rhetorical strategy to gain more support, particularly from city council
and the business community, to achieve their goals of making preschool accessible for at-

risk students. For instance, an MOEC staffer explained,

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...there was definitely a shift from an education focus to one on the health of the city and
the Colorado Children’s Campaign and Piton Foundation were key the Annie E. Casey
Foundation contributed research too that helped the Children’s Campaign . . . we needed
to win the support of the business community and city council at that time and research
was key.

Another MOEC staffer referenced the importance of the Mayor’s Leadership team and
explained how they not only developed strategy but also brought key research that further
helped to shape how they framed the Preschool Matters Campaign. The mayor and his
leadership team needed to attract a broader base of supporters, including city council
members and non—minority constituents, particularly those without children. In using
research they showed preschool education’s impact on social mobility, the basis for
presenting an economic platform for supporting Issue 1A through the Preschool Matters

Campaign was established.

Economic Development

In 2005-2006 the Preschool Matters Campaign strongly pushed a discourse for
economic development. There are 3 of 7 articles that highlight the mayor’s efforts as
investing in improving the economic condition of Denver through preschool education,
many of which made quick references to economic advances of the city as found by the
Piton Foundation. None of the articles here go into great detail, they discuss Issue 1A and
how it is necessary to improve the city, as it relates to safety and health, and highlight the
City Council’s approval. One such article by Denver Post writer George Merritt (2006)
quoted Hickenlooper as stating, “Early childhood education’s documented return on
investment shows that this is one of the best investments we can make in Denver’s kids

and Denver’s future.” In the same article, City Council President Michael Hancock and

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Superintendent Michael Bennet are noted for emphasizing how important the preschool
program is as well and that they “will do everything (they) can to pass this in November”
(Merritt, 2006).

Articles similar to that above emphasized the economic advantages of preschool
education while also referencing student equity (i.e. “catching up”). By taking such a
broad approach authors can attempt to solicit more support for Issue 1A. For instance,
one editorial in the Perspective section of Denver Post, from an anonymous writer,
explained

...when Denver children show up for kindergarten, far too many are unprepared and it
can be an uphill struggle to catch up. That’s quite a burden for a 5 year old, and there are
great social and economic costs down the road. The value of preschool education is well
known... (“Yes to Preschool,” 2006)

Later in the editorial, the author urged voters to vote in favor of Issue 1A while
acknowledging that it was not perfect because more work was needed on the actual
details of the program itself, such as spending public dollars on religious based pre-k
education programs. However, the author argued for voters to “take a leap of faith . . .
This program would give a boost to 1,500 to 2,000 Denver children. Expanded preschool
can provide valuable social skills and prepare our children for school years ahead.”

In 4 interviews with MOEC, staff members noted how more constituents and
business community members, such as Tim Marquez, began to support the initiative
because, as Mayor Hickenlooper stated, “it spoke to what matters to them - the economy
. . . Denver’s economic future.” DPS, as reflected in interviews with a district leader and
principal, also took on the discourse for the economic and social advantages of preschool
education. For instance, when asked what are some of the pressing issues facing his

school a high school principal stated, “early childhood education . . . children are not

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coming prepared which makes it difficult to learn this will have great impact on our

society in the future as it relates to dropout rates and crime.”

Building Civic Mobilization - Mayor’s Preschool Summit & Leadership Team

Hickenlooper used his ability to frame the policy issue through issue definition,
problem perception, and use of his bully pulpit. Through successfully framing the
initiative as securing both equity and economic development, Hickenlooper was able to
build civic mobilization by initiating collaborations among stakeholders across the city,
initially through action groups at the Mayor’s Preschool Summit, to give
recommendations on approaches to addressing preschool education.

Clarence Stone (2001; 2005) defines civic mobilization as the extent to which
stakeholders collaborate to sustain support for policy initiatives. He argues that political
environments conducive to developing initiatives depend on the broad array of policy
actors invited to the table to build change. In this section, I explain how the role of
catalyst facilitates the development of civic mobilization. From these action groups, the
Mayor developed a leadership team to build upon the summit recommendations and

create a strategy to develop a sustainable universal preschool program for Denver.

Stakeholder Interaction

Throughout the interviews, district leaders, education stakeholders, and advocates
from the Latino community argued that Hickenlooper’s role in creating awareness in
preschool education was very instrumental to the launching of the initiative. One school
principal stated, “because the mayor was involved, others wanted to get involved too . . .

he has a way of bringing different people to the table.” A respondent from the MOEC

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stated, he just knows how to unite people around the issue.” She went on to explain,
with Guajardo-Lucero during a joint interview, that the Mayor’s Preschool Summit was
used to identify stakeholders and spark interaction among them to produce collaborations

that would lead to the development of a universal pre-k program.

Action Group Recommendations

The Mayor’s Preschool Summit, Invest in Success, launched an effort to prioritize
early childhood education in the city under Hickenlooper’s leadership. He asked
participants to make recommendations to his initiative on early education. Participants
included 300 business and civic leaders and advocates for early childhood education12
who were broken into 4 action teams to make recommendations in the following areas
related to early childhood education programming — economics, parent investment,
policy, and public engagement. The economics group was responsible for developing the
benefits of investing in pre—k for businesses and potential cost savings of early
investments rather than later in student development. Parent investment entailed outreach
efforts creating awareness of the importance of enrolling their students in quality
programs and creating community partnerships between them and their providers. Policy
issues covered systemic approaches to measuring the quality of early childhood
programming through evidence-based research. Lastly, public engagement referred to
how non-profit, government, and business sectors can collaborate to lead public

engagement and awareness efforts in the city’s early childhood education endeavors.

 

'2 Mayor’s Initiative on Early Childhood Education. (2004). Invest in success — Denver Mayor’s Summit
on Early Childhood Education. [Brochure]. Denver, Colorado: Mayor’s Office of Education and Children.

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Through these four action groups, the administration was able to determine what
type of early childhood education reforms stakeholder groups would more likely to
support. In each group, participants used key-pad voting to rank policy and program
questions such as the following:

. What is the most important reason to promote public investment in early

childhood education?

. If additional dollars are sought for early childhood education, what is the best

source?

. What is most important to address the quality of early childhood education?
In terms of the first question above, among all the participants 41% believed that equal
opportunity for all socio-economic backgrounds to have access to quality early childhood
education was the most important reason to promote public investment. For the second
question, 68% of respondents voted that creating new sources of exclusive local funds for
quality pre-k programming was the best source for the mayor to pursue his efforts. Lastly,

53% of participants voted in favor of enhancing training of child care providers to best

address the quality of early childhood education programming.

Leadership Team ’3 Strategy Building

After reviewing participant responses and gauging their interests and investments,
Hickenlooper, through the MOEC, developed the Mayor’s Leadership Team. The team
was comprised of 32 members, mostly from the business sector. Table 5.3 shows that
there were 10 members representing the management and investment sector. One
stakeholder, Pat Grant of the National Western Association specialized in fundraising.
Seven members of the team represented the business industry, particularly as it related to

urban development and housing, oil, and technology. There were 4 members representing

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the media and PR industry, particularly representing television efforts. Four members

were from the education sector, directly servicing kids. This includes Superintendent

Bennet and Qualistar, an early learning program in Denver funded by Catholic

foundations and donations. Of the five non-profit businesses, 3 were education focused —

this includes 1 foundation, the Aurora Education Foundation. Another Foundation,

Adolph Coors Foundation was involved. The Bighorn Center is a public policy institution

established to identify, drive, and advocate for public policies in Colorado’s state and

local government efforts.

Table 5.3: The Mayor’s Leadership Team on Early Childhood Education

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Number of
Stakeholders Stakeholders
Superintendent Michael Bennet, Denver Public Schools;
Education 4 Charles Tafoya, Rocky Mountain SER; Doug Price and Linda
Reily, Qualistar (Early Learning/Catholic)
Law 2 Larry Alter, Senn Visciano Kirschenbaum, PC; Dick
Campbell, Campbell Bohn Killin Brittan and Ray, LLC
Non-profi t (education) 2 Tom Downey, Children’s Museum of Denver; Barbara
O’Brien, Colorado Children’s Campaign
Nogéirczgtogyn' l Rutt Bridges, The Bighorn Center (Public Policy)
Foundation 2 Peter Coors, Adolph Coors Company; Angela Hutton-Howard,
Aurora Education Foundation
Alex Cranberg, Aspect Management Corporation (oil); Patty
Financial Fontneau, IMA Financial Group, Inc; KC Gallagher, Gallagher
Management Enterprises, LLC; Pat Grant, National Western Assocratron;
Investment ’ 10 Rollie Heath, Charlene Hill and George Sparks, NorthStone
Fun draising Group, LLC; Davrd Krkumoto, Denver Management Advrser;
Zachary Neumeyer, Sage Hospitality Resources; Monica
Pleiman, Optimum Management Systems, LLC
Anna Garcia, Anko Metals; Patrick Hamill, Oakwood Homes,
LLC; Ron Montoya, PlastiComm Industries; Mark Smith, East
Business 7 West Partners (Urban Development); Robert Tointon, Phelps-
Tointon, Inc. (Concrete); Ronald Williams and Daniel
Yohannes, The Gary-Williams Company
Leanna Clark, Schenkein Public Relations; Walt DeHaven,
Media/PR 4 Channel 4 KCNC TV News; Tryg Myhren, Myhren Media,

Inc.; Caroline Schomg CableNet Works

 

80

 

With such a wide spectrum of interests represented on the Mayor’s Leadership
Team, stakeholders were able to attend to their primary goals — I) serve as champions for
early childhood education in Denver, 2) forge an action plan for accomplishing the city’s
vision of ensuring quality early care and education is available to all parents, and 3)
garner public support for community action. A press release from the Mayor’s Office of

Education and Children stated the following regarding the team

The Mayor’s Leadership Team will help determine how Denver can provide quality early
education to meet the demand of all its children. Young children are their priority. The
benefit of investing in this age group for the business sector, Denver’s future workforce,
the economy, and the community-at-large is a driving force. National experience
demonstrates that when business, civic, and political leaders support early childhood

education, the future of our children, our community, and our economy is enhanced.
(MOEC, 2005)

After 30 months of effort, the Leadership Team proposed that City Council refer a
question to the November ballot asking Denver voters to raise the sales tax rate .12
percent to fund a high quality, parental choice preschool program for Denver’s four-year-
olds. This, Issue 1A, was backed by the mayor’s office in addition to a united
collaborative front of significant leaders in the city across different fields as represented
in the table above. There were 7 instances in the news paper analysis that referenced the
Mayor’s Leadership team’s efforts, most as it related to fundraising and campaigning.
For instance, Lynea Hansen, who served as spokesperson and campaign treasurer for the
team, was quoted as stating the following on Preschool Matters — “I think how well we
feel has nothing to do with how much money we have raised . . . I think our yard signs
are a good indication of how broad—based our support is -— they are everywhere”
(Plunkett, 2006). The author of that same article stated, “. . .the campaign benefited from a
significant war chest. The Preschool Matters campaign raised more than $1.4 million,

more money than for any other Denver campaign since Hickenlooper ran for office”

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(Plunkett, 2006). Like news articles, interviews cited fundraising and campaigns as vital
to pushing Issue 1A. For instance, one MOEC staffer stated “if it weren’t for our focus on
getting the business community involved coupled with (polling and pre-k) research, I’m

not sure if our efforts would have been successful.” Another staffer emphasized,

...it is important to remember that we raised the most money for this campaign when you
compare it to Kids Tax . . . the mayor was really physical(ly visible) on this campaign
which led to raising over 1.5 million for the media campaign, which included print and
television . . . our team recognized the power of the media and so did the mayor . . . by
having (Hickenlooper) at the forefront of these efforts, through appearances and public
service announcements, we were successful this time.

Interviews with MOEC staffers revealed that the Mayor’s ability to build civic
mobilization and utilize his bully pulpit to gain support from both stakeholders and
constituents were key in passing Issue 1A to develop the Denver Preschool Program.
Again, Issue 1A passed by only by 52%. However, as Guajardo-Lucero suggested, “this
would not have been possible if we did not broaden our policy approach the Preschool
Matters Campaign and the research of the Piton Foundation . . . it showed how preschool

programming affects all citizens of Denver.”

Summary

Again, public presentation is the delegate’s ability to interact with both
constituents and stakeholders. It includes personal interactions, meetings, and the ability
of a delegate to show him/herself as calm, delightful, amusing through jokes and personal
gladdening anecdotes disciplined by improvisations, understatements, and a pleasure of
serving constituents (Dorsey, 2002; Muir, 1992; Edwards, 2003). All of those
interviewed, with the exception of 3, identified Hickenlooper’s personality as being key
in passing the tax initiative to develop Denver’s Preschool Program. Hickenlooper’s

public presentation was critical in building civic mobilization for early childhood

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education efforts. Overall, there were 19 instances of this particularly throughout my
interviews with MOEC staff, DPS leaders, and local Latino community activists. For
instance, one MOEC staff member, who contributed to both Kids’ Tax and Preschools
Matters, claimed, “now [under Hickenlooper] we are able to leverage the fact that we’re
in the mayor’s office . . . we’re able to use that as a leadership position and push in some
ways, push and lead because of his strong platform in early childhood education.” She
explained how his collaborative nature and ability to be down to earth and bring everyone
to the table to produce change were key. She said, “Hickenlooper is a likeable guy and
still in his honeymoon phase as a mayor his ability to bring different people to the
table is key to our success.” Two additional MOEC staff members and a high school
principal spoke to this as well but further explained that Hickenlooper appears to be more
engaged in education more than the previous mayor because of his school site visits.
During these one and a half hour visits, he visits each class in session and often
participates in lessons, including square dancing and rope climbing. These appearances
again demonstrate his ability to get at the local level and “get his hands dirty by seeing
the concerns firsthand” according to an interview with a high school principal. One
interviewee from the non-profit sector argued, “others want to get involved when they see
that he is too . . . this is part of the reason why the preschool efforts worked, because he is

a likeable guy who knows how to bring different stakeholders to the table.”

Conclusion
As catalyst, Mayor Hickenlooper used his bully pulpit to both drive and build

civic capacity for the Denver Preschool Program. Through issue definition and problem

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perception, Hickenlooper first brought awareness of the issue and later focused on
gaining support of key stakeholders, particularly from the business community, to
develop the Mayor’s Leadership Team on early childhood education. This team helped to
reframe the policy issue from one of equal access to quality preschool program to one of
the city’s economic development. Again, the economic focus supported by research on
social mobility through preschool education allowed for more city council members and
constituents initially against funding early childhood education from tax dollars to see the
value in it for them because of this broader approach (which included such reasons as
safer communities, better marriages and workers) helped to attract broader support.

The key distinction between issue definition and problem perception is one
focuses on introducing the policy issue by building awareness and the other specifically
shapes it to attract a target audience necessary to achieve a political means, such as the
development of the Denver Preschool Program through the passing of Issue 1A. For
instance, in issue definition the mayor is cited as predominantly using such terms as “all
kids deserve a great start” or “all kids need to start at the same starting gate.” On the
other hand, problem perception highlights the economic advantages of “investing in
success,” such as attracting more to the district because of safer streets. Current literature
on civic capacity does not make the distinction. It simply defines issue definition as how
the educational concern is perceived or framed by the community of stakeholders. By
highlighting the difference, my research shows the role of the mayor as being critical in
shaping the initial policy issue presented to gain constituency support of key voters, such
as the Latino community. Public issues, on the other hand, are created when the public

recognizes that a problem exists and when stakeholders work towards presenting them

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with plausible resolutions (Stone et al., 2001). This I define as problem perception.
Though the mayor’s role was limited in the problem perception phase, the use of his bully
pulpit to serve the message to the public was still key in the passing of Issue 1A,
particularly as it relates to building civic mobilization. Like Stone’s work, my research
also shows that there is a “synergistic” relationship between issue definition and civic
mobilization; thus, correlating problem perception and increased civic mobilization
(Stone et al., 2001; Stone, 2001; Stone, 2005).

Again, civic mobilization is a key part of civic capacity. It calls for bringing
together an assembly of leaders from principal sectors in order to change public policy, to
create strategies and programs, or to mobilize the community to act in partnerships
(Stone, 2001; Stone, 2005; Stone et al., 2001). Mayor Hickenlooper’s informal mayoral
role as catalyst, like that of his role as broker, focuses on building civic mobilization
through the use of his bully pulpit to attract stakeholders to the table to produce change,
including those from outside the government sector. Non—governmental stakeholders are
key to building civic capacity, but only to the extent to which there is trust and an
effective working collaboration. Hickenlooper and his administration were instrumental
in building this trust and collaboration, particularly through the Preschool Summit and
development of the Mayor’s Leadership Team.

In the next chapter, I explore Mayor Hickenlooper’s role as broker in helping to
develop the Denver Scholarship Foundation. Here, he again uses his bully pulpit to create
collaborations among stakeholders to build civic capacity to build education

programming for Denver students.

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CHAPTER 6: BROKER

In his 2006 “State of City” address Mayor John Hickenlooper stated, “We have
been working to raise private funds to make the universal promise of college access
possible we have met with several presidents of Colorado universities and colleges to
begin building the partnerships that will be vital to (the Denver Scholarship
Foundation’s) success.” Like the role of catalyst, the mayor’s role as broker entails
building partnerships among stakeholders to produce change. It calls for the mayor to
actively facilitate a program’s development, such as that of the Denver Scholarship
Foundation (DSF), by channeling resources and collaboration opportunities. In contrast to
his role as catalyst, as a broker Hickenlooper is more focused on building civic
mobilization around the issue, rather than defining the issue. This chapter uses DSF to
define and explore Hickenlooper’s ability to broker relationships through advocating on
behalf of the program to build civic capacity primarily through civic mobilization efforts.

DSF is the largest privately-funded post-secondary access program for high
school students in the nation. It was co-founded by Mayor Hickenlooper with oilman Tim
Marquez in 2006 to help students overcome the obstacles of entering college and
vocational programming, such as lack of funding or awareness of the variety of
educational opportunities available to them. During an interview, Hickenlooper stated,
“The finish line shouldn’t end with high school graduation. Our administration is
committed to the vision that all Denver graduates should be able to attend college,

regardless of their financial situation.”

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This chapter explores how the mayor uses his role as broker to sustain civic
capacity for on-going programming and the institutionalization of DSF. I first give an
overview of DSF and then present how Hickenlooper brokered resources to support the
initiative. While he was able to mobilize stakeholder support for the DSF, tensions
emerged due to the initiative’s blurring of public concerns and private interests about the
funding of higher education for immigrant students. Informal mayoral control enabled the
mayor to deal with these tensions, without undermining the initiative, by focusing on
campaigning for scholarship funding. Thus, the mayor’s role as broker became more
symbolic over time because of these persistent tensions around immigration and the
refusal of some groups to support the funding of higher education for students of

immigrant families.

Overview & Timeline

Prior to the development of DSF, in January of 2004, Hickenlooper pledged to
provide free college education to the students of Cole Middle School upon graduating
from a DPS high school. It was included in DPS’s efforts to turn the school around after 3
years of low state test scores (Sherry, 2005). DPS Superintendent Jerry Wartgow and
Mayor Hickenlooper had developed a good working relationship because of the mayor’s
interest in supporting DPS as explored in Chapter 3. Hickenlooper stated the following

about his interest in supporting Cole Middle School

Higher education is important and I believe I began where the need was greatest - Cole
Middle School. The students there needed hope . . . many needed to know that they can
go to college too . . . lack of money will not be an excuse for not being able to pursue that
path . . . as a result many of the students had a new sense of pride . . . their heads were
lifted a bit higher now as they walked through the halls.

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Eleven months after promising over 350 students of Cole Middle School college tuition
assistance, Hickenlooper had raised $900,000 from private funders (Sherry, 2004). The
press noted how his efforts inspired others, such as Republican businessman Alex
Cranberg, to offer a similar opportunity to students at DPS’s Horace Mann Middle
School. Cranberg stated to a reporter, “(Hickenlooper’s efforts in Cole Middle School)
gave me the idea, although it has been rattling around in my head for a while” (Cox,
2004). Hickenlooper announced the Horace Mann tuition guarantee to approximately 500
students alongside Cranberg in May 2004 during a student assembly (Denver Post, 2004).
Approximately, 90% of Horace Mann’s student population are of Latino descent and
qualify for free and reduced lunch. Like Cole, it is also one of the lowest performing

middle schools in the district (Cox, 2004).

Figure 6.1: Denver Scholarship Foundation Timeline

 

 

[ 2004 J 2005 I 2006 ]
Cole Middle School GR ADS ”07m” Meetings DSF
College Scholarships wrth Marquez;

Planning on how to
create universal
scholarship
programming

Horace Mann Middle
School College
Scholarships
With the development of both Horace Mann and Cole middle school tuition
guarantees, Hickenlooper was inspired to make college accessible to all Denver students
graduating from both public and private high schools. Because of his campaign for higher
education funding, be collaborated with the state’s CollegeInvest department to create the
Mile High Graduate Rebate Award for Denver Students (GRADS). CollegeInvest is a

not-for-profit division of the Colorado Department of Higher Education that provides

information, scholarships, saving plans, and loan opportunities for low-income students

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and parents across the state. The GRADS program provides $1,500 student loan
forgiveness for Denver students pursuing higher education and who graduated from the
DPS between 2005 and 2009. In order to receive loan forgiveness upon completing their
higher education degree, students must choose CollegeInvest as their Stafford Loan
lender. Though the Mayor’s Office wrote a press release for the GRADS program,
surprisingly, it was not covered by the Denver Post. Hickenlooper led efforts in providing
middle school students college scholarships upon graduating and loan forgiveness
through CollegeInvest; however, he is mostly acknowledged by both staff and
constituents for his ability to raise funding for all DPS graduates through DSF.

DSF began as the dream of Tim Marquez, a wealthy Latino businessman.
Marquez was raised in Denver and graduated from DPS. As a product of Lincoln High
School, he returned to live in Denver after working in California and wanted to become
engaged in education. While looking for how he could play a role in DPS, he found that
the participation of the business community was lacking. Marquez believed the
participation of businessmen to be very important in education because of his previous
involvement in supporting education initiatives through funding efforts within
Califomia’s business community.

In addition to the business community’s lack of engagement, Marquez also
discovered that the same school pride which propelled him to graduate and become a
business owner in the oil industry was lacking among current Lincoln students. During a
school visit, he saw the desire of many Latino youth to go to college, and he also saw
their lack of knowledge about the process and funding. He then quickly arranged for a

meeting with Mayor Hickenlooper to discuss the void of the collective business

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community and how to create a universal scholarship program for all DPS students.
Hickenlooper stated, “[Marquez] walked in my office and we talked about the missing
voice of the business community . . . upon leaving we came up with ideas on how to get
them involved based on his vision for making college affordable for all DPS graduates.”

To begin, in 2005, the mayor, MOEC, and Marquez drafted a list of prospective
stakeholders, mostly private funders from the business sector, to explore how to fund
their universal scholarship efforts. Major funders often met with the mayor and/or
Marquez through private informal meetings. In these meetings they convinced
stakeholders of the importance of funding the initiative and began raising money. MOEC
would also meet with local politicians and education leaders to gain support for the idea.
At this time, they learned of some of the challenges that might exist in implementation,
such as covering the tuition costs of students who are of immigrant families. (This will be
explored in more detail in the next section).

In 2006, the Denver Scholarship Foundation (DSF) was established to both aid
students in the application process and cover the costs of tuition. Hickenlooper used the
MOEC to build the Board of Directors, which included Tim Marquez and his wife
Bernadette Marquez, who served as Chairman and Treasurer, respectively. The mayor
sits on the board along with DPS Superintendent Michael Bennet, DPS School Board
President Theresa Pena, former president of Colorado State University Albert Yates, and
Colorado Governor Roy Romer. The remaining four Board members are from the
business sector, two of the four work in the clinic health field.

Initial planning meetings were arranged by the MOEC for the board to discuss

how to best structure their efforts, particularly as they relate to eligibility and

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disbursement of funding. Thus, DSF began its first year with three pilot studies in
Abraham Lincoln, Montebello, and South High Schools. During the pilot studies, the
program covered the family contribution portion of students’ tuitions upon receipt of their

financial award letters. To apply, students must have met the following requirements”.

0 Meet DPS enrollment and academic requirements (Classes of 2010 and beyond must
also maintain 2.0 GPA)

0 Graduate from a DPS high school (2007 or later) - students who graduated from any
traditional Denver Public High School in 2007 (not just the three pilot schools) are
eligible and encouraged to apply

0 Enroll at least half-time in a participating Public State Institution within one (1) year
of high school graduation

0 Be eligible to receive Federal Student Aid

0 Apply for financial aid and at least three (3) additional scholarships

- Meet all deadlines

To aid students in achieving post-high school ambitions, DSF also provided
Future Centers and scholarships to DPS graduates planning to attend a state college or
vocational program. Future Centers are school—based guidance counseling centers
focused on educating and advising students on educational programs, application
processes, financial aid, and college life. Currently, there are 9 centers for every DPS
high school. Unlike the Future Centers, the scholarship aspect of the program began as a
pilot study at three DPS high schools — Lincoln, Montebello, and South. Here, they
developed the program to fund the “last dollars” of tuition costs not covered by the
financial aid package (often referred to as the parent contribution). After receiving
feedback from both parents and students, DSF learned that it is best to fund the “first
dollars in” at a flat rate based on a student’s expected family contribution, ranging from

$2,000-$6,000. Parents and students preferred knowing ahead of time, and felt more

 

'3 Retrieved on March 9, 2008 from the Denver Scholarship Website at
http://www.denverscholarship.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=223&srcid=227.

91

comfortable about the transition into higher education. Thus, changes were made
accordingly for the next year of scholarships.

Though there were challenges, DSF assisted 330 eligible DSF scholars with
securing over $1.3 million in additional financial assistance, such as other scholarships
and work study awards. DSF awarded 170 scholarships totaling over $154,000 to
students in their first semester of post-secondary education and expects to pay the same in

the spring semester as well.

Funding Higher Education for Students of Immigrant Families

In addition to “first dollars in,” other concerns were raised by parents and students
of illegal immigrant families. With scholarships averaging $3,000, they could not afford
higher education because their family contribution was much higher given that they were

not allotted financial aid by the government. The Denver Post reported,

From a practical standpoint, giving an illegal immigrant a $3,000 scholarship probably
wouldn’t do much good, given the structure of student aid. Colorado colleges and
universities can accept illegals, but they cannot give them in-state tuition or financial aid.
Citizenship or legal status is required to get federal financial aid. (P1)

With a large illegal immigrant student population in the DPS system, the issue of funding
higher education for this student population received much attention in the press. Of the
21 articles I was able to locate about DSF, 8 explored the challenges students of
immigrant families faced in pursuing scholarships. In the articles, students reported not
knowing there was a scholarship cap when being told that to qualify there must be
financial need, complete federal and state aid forms, and apply for three private
scholarships. Allison Sherry of the Denver Post wrote a story on a senior who was

unaware of this cap and was under the assumption that DSF would cover her family

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contribution portion in full. Because she was an illegal immigrant even the cap of $6,000
would not suffice because her tuition was as high as $25,000. Sherry quoted student
Anahi Gutierrez as saying, “That scholarship was my future, my life.”

As explored in Chapter 3, MOEC director, Lucero, again spoke on her frustrations
of the stereotypical mindsets in the education system, particularly concerning Latino
students, and her personal struggle with getting stakeholders to support the additional

costs of funding higher education for immigrant students

Public Policy being shaped by a stereotypical mind set of what poor families could or
should be . . . Honestly, I think that is what eats at my soul, it cats at my essence, that is

what makes a difficult day for me . . . From white education professionals I heard, “we
can’t get all students college ready here in Denver, because if we do that who’s going to
fix our cars?”

After discovering the concerns of major political stakeholders concerning immigration
and educators concerning college readiness, Marquez, under the guidance of the mayor,
felt it was best to develop DSF as a non-profit organization. During an interview, Lucero
argued that in doing so, Marquez and the mayor were able to get past politics and
political constraints that could hinder progress if it was run through a city government
entity. Lucero stated, “It was easier to address these concerns from a non-profit angle
because most Denver tax payers were not interested in funding education for children of

color, particularly students from immigrant families.”

Public and Private Tensions

Hickenlooper’s early efforts to campaign for scholarship funding for Cole Middle

School students inspired Cranberg’s interest in funding the higher education costs of

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students from Horace Mann Middle School, particularly for students of immigrant

families. The Denver Post reported,

He selected Horace Mann as the beneficiary in consultation with Denver Public Schools
Superintendent Jerry Wartgow. “I told him to pick a school with a large number of
immigrants, where my offer would make an incrementally large difference, “Cranberg
says. “I didn’t want one where everybody would be going to college anyway.” (Cox,
2004)

Though Cranberg was mentioned in the newspaper, his name was not mentioned during
interviews. He was referred to by the mayor as a “private donor,” Additionally, an
MOEC staffer did not acknowledge Cranberg’s contribution, saying instead, “Because of
our private funders, primarily from the private sector, we were able to develop our efforts
in both Cole and Horace Mann Middle Schools.” While Hickenlooper and staffers failed
to identify Cranberg’s direct contribution they frequently and fondly mentioned Marquez.
Both Hickenlooper and MOEC staff labeled him as a “pioneer” for bringing in the
business sector to DPS efforts in higher education.

The overshadowing of Cranberg’s efforts, particularly after his initial investment
in funding the costs of students from illegal immigrant families, highlights the tensions
that can occur between public and private interests given the pressures of addressing
politically intense issues, such as immigration and losing DPS students to charter schools.
Hickenlooper was challenged with navigating through this partnership because of
Cranberg’s reputation for providing DPS students with scholarships to private schools
because they are “often better than public schools.” He did this through his Alliance for
Choice in Education (ACE) which gave over $4.6 million in aid to over 1,000 students

over the past four years (Cox, 2004).

94

In addition to drawing students away from DPS through ACE scholarships,
another possible reason for Hickenlooper to distance himself from Cranberg is because of
Cranberg’s strong Republican affiliation and the possibility that he might run for political
office. The Denver Post explained

While Cranberg has been a major contributor to the Colorado Republican Party and a
champion of school vouchers, an idea embraced by the GOP, he also has given to
Democratic candidates, and he favors relaxed immigration laws — a stance putting him at
odds with some Republican leaders.

Impatient with status quo, Cranberg’s involvement in such high profile issues, plus his
standing as a member of the board of trustees of Metropolitan State College (he was
appointed by Gov. Bill Owens in 2002), might suggest he’s contemplating a run for
office. (Cox, 2004)

Though Cranberg is mentioned in the news as a funder, other stakeholders were
not identified in early efforts to fund higher education for Cole and Horace Mann Middle
School students. It appeared as if Hickenlooper wanted to keep it anonymous. He and his
staff often stated that through “private donations” or “private funders” they were able to
raise money to fund higher education for Denver students. The same is also reflected in
news articles. Though Hickenlooper does not reveal the funders, he is still noted for
building civic mobilization because he raised nearly $1 million thus far for Cole Middle
School students alone. That coupled with Cranberg’s commitment to do the same in
Horace reflects Hickenlooper’s ability to use his role as a mayor to bring others to the
table to build change. Hickenlooper acknowledged his ability to raise private donations
and saw that as a major part of his role, which he referred to as “getting others to invest
their dollars.” Boigon stated that the mayor’s role in education is also one of creating
sustainable change by “assembl(ing) a community of partnerships.” This is demonstrated
by Hickenlooper’s informal mayoral role as a broker, through his contribution to the

development of DSF.

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Mayor’s Role as Broker

With a goal of building a $200 million endowment, DSF’s goal is to support
nearly 6,000 DPS graduates in pursuing higher education. In meeting this, DSF was
heavily dependent on the mayor’s role as broker. Here, Hickenlooper served as a change
agent by brokering relationships among stakeholders, primarily in the business sector, to
gain financial contributions to reach endowment goals. Unlike his role as catalyst,
Hickenlooper was not the initiator of the idea nor did he play a major role in developing
DSF in terms of policies and processes. Instead, his focus was on acquiring the funding
necessary by brokering relationships between relevant stakeholders to have them
contribute the funding necessary to sustain the program. A former city council person,
who now works as a leader in the school district, spoke on Hickenlooper’s role as broker

when she stated the following in response to his efforts in DSF:

Hickenlooper is the cause for creating a collaborative spirit that has grown here in Denver
. . . it manifested through his funding efforts because people no longer want to work in
silos . . . overlapping relationships and leadership created more opportunities and because
of the mayor, it was taken to another level.

During this interview, the district leader stated the mayor’s role is to “rally the
community.” Hickenlooper does this by brokering relationships among stakeholders
through advising policy entrepreneurs, such as Tim Marquez, on how to build civic
capacity for an initiative and sustain it. In using the MOEC as an agent to begin the initial
development and planning, stakeholders are provided the foundation later needed to
institutionalize a program, such as DSF.

This section explores the mayor’s role as broker as it relates to building civic
capacity through civic mobilization. Civic mobilization is the ability to create

partnerships between an assembly of leaders from principal sectors relating to particular

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issues in education being addressed, such as access to higher education. This assembly
gathers to change public policy, to create strategies and programs, and to mobilize the
community to act in partnerships (Stone, 2001; Stone, 2005; Stone et al., 2001).
Hickenlooper played a major role as broker by mobilizing stakeholders to support DSF
through his ability to advise policy entrepreneur Tim Marquez through informal meetings

and school site visits.

Mobilizing Stakeholders

During interviews with MOEC staff, many acknowledged the mayor’s “open door
policy” as being key in the development of DSF. One staffer stated, “If the mayor would
have never let Tim in, in the first place, we would have never gotten to this point — where
every Denver student can now go to college, lack of money is no longer an excuse.”
Lucero also spoke on the mayor’s willingness to engage outside stakeholders by stating,
“(Hickenlooper’s) leadership style allows for collaborations because our door is always
open for great ideas.” Many attributed the mayor’s advisory role in partnering with
Marquez as instrumental because of his ability to introduce him to private donors willing
to fund and collaborate for DSF. Also, the mayor’s willingness to build civic
mobilization by making school appearances and being quoted in the newspaper together.
When speaking of higher education, Hickenlooper, staff, and stakeholders acknowledge
Marquez as being instrumental. The mayor does not steal the spotlight but instead shines

it on Marquez’s efforts. For instance, during the interview with Hickenlooper he stated,

When Tim Marquez and I first met to discuss his vision for funding higher education, the
dream of making funding available for every DPS student had a chance of finally
becoming a reality . . . Together the MOEC and mayor’s role create an engine of effort/
The culture of a city is about creating a culture of empowerment because people have to
feel empowered to create change.

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Another aspect of being a broker, is empowering stakeholders by using the MOEC as an
engine of change. Though Hickenlooper might help to steer the direction through an
advisory role, MOEC is recognized for its role in creating the initial meetings of
development and brainstorming. For instance, Hickenlooper lists stakeholders who might
be interested in supporting higher education funding who he might have informal
conversations or relationships with. After sharing that with Lucero, MOEC will then
contact there the mayor’s leads plus their own leads through staffers within the office. By
doing the initial networking to get stakeholders to the table, MOEC deals with the politics
and nuances to find and create opportunities. Boigon stated, “the role of MOEC is one of
a battle for resources, a team of people who fight to get things done . . . It is an invisible
fight for the allocation of resources . . . we have to understand where the pockets of
money are.” In addition to the invisible fight for the allocation of resources, MOEC was
also referred to by a stakeholder as “the glue that brings people together on a topic . . .
forcing us to come together for a common goal . . . the difference between the past
administration is that now support is in more effective and strategic ways through setting
the stage for continuous partnerships.” This is evident in the MOEC’s role in arranging
meetings for once prospective DSF board members to gather to develop programming,
thus, building civic mobilization around the issue but also sustaining it with these major

players.

School Site Visits
In addition to informal fundraising campaigns and empowering policy
entrepreneurs through the efforts of the MOEC, Hickenlooper also built civic

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mobilization as broker by bridging the gap between the city and the district through
school site visits. Upon running for mayor, he vowed to visit a school in Denver each
week. These weekly visits last for 3-4 hours and often are not covered by the media. It is
a day for school leaders to tell the mayor of their current challenges and he might then
refer people for them to speak with who can help them. It is also a day to visit
classrooms, which he seemed to have enjoyed the most while I shadowed him during a

site visit. Below is a excerpt from my field notes capturing a school site visit:

Among a class of 3rd graders in Fallis Elementary School, he stood tall with his sharp
grey coat and slender physique. With an unpretentious soul, now a minority among
minorities, he acknowledges the true majority. Students of Latino descent, and former
refugee students from countries such as Somalia and Sudan, sit on the floor at the front of
the classroom with their legs crossed and head high looking eagerly towards this kid-
friendly humble spirit. “Why are you visiting our school?,” one Latina girl sincerely
asked in a soft voice. Her eyes were big and brown and in them were a new found pride
that came just by directing the question personally to him. He gleefully responded, “In
the old days, mayors never got involved with schools . . . but when I got elected I said
that I was going to visit every single school in this city to get a sense of how you guys are
doing . . . plus, I love to hang out with kids!” “I do tooll,” eagerly shouted a Latino boy
from the front, recognizing his new found personal connection with the mayor.

...After laughter, came his famous thought provoking speech which he delivers most
frequently during site visits in every classroom he enters, even pre-k. “How many of you
are going to college some day?” Planting the seed early, every child excitedly raised their
hands, with the exception of the Latino boy who earlier found his connection with the
mayor. However, this disconnect was resolved when the mayor instantaneously motioned
and demanded, “Jesus, you put your hand up too!” Jesus responded, “...college is
expensive.” “I got news for you Jesus and all of your class . . . our city is the only one
that will pay for you to graduate from college . . . it does not matter if your parents cannot
afford it or not because its free . . . all you have to do is work a little harder, read a little
more, play game boy a little less . . .” The mayor was then interrupted from across the
other side of his audience by a Latino boy whose voice stood out but face was buried
amongst his colleagues, “Did you say play game boy more?” “No,” laughed the mayor.
“You need to listen a little more.”

Students then asked the mayor questions about college — what is it like, where do you live
while attending, is it fun. After attending to each one, the mayor said, “ College is great
because the people who graduate are funnier, look better, and make $1 million dollars
more than if they just graduated high school.” “Wow, that’s a lot of money,” said Jesus.
The mayor explained, “remember it takes hard work, a little more time on homework, a
little less time on x-box or talking on the phone . . . you need to start right now though
right in this classroom.” The kids nodded in agreement; one even suggested that the
mayor give their class more homework. The spirit of hope beyond what they envision
now planted a dream in them. Each different, each becoming more real. Whether it lasts
for a moment or beyond that moment - I cannot say. However, with all the seeds being
planted, I believe that the efforts are bound to bare some good fruit for this city.

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By going into schools and visiting them, students, parents, and teachers perceive the
mayor to be a “friend to the district.” Through these visits, he gains visibility and brokers
civic mobilization among constituents who will receive the services. Unfortunately, while
he tells the students to do well because “a rich guy has put in all this money so you can
go to school free” the truth of the matter is over 10% in that school were illegal aliens.
The question now becomes, can that dream still become a reality for them? Thus far, the
answer appears to be no because the cap of $6,000 still exists. When Marquez of DSF is
asked to speak on the matter he suggests, “we are still looking into the issue.” DSF
proclaims to be in private conversations with some of the local Denver schools to offer
financial assistance to immigrant students so that when coupled with its scholarship
contributions they can afford the costs of college. Hickenlooper does not appear to be a
part of these conversations, nor of DSF Board of Directors. I was not aware of his role on
the board during the interviews. Thus, as broker his role evolved to become more
symbolic overtime because of the persistent tensions around immigration and the refusal
of some groups to support the funding of higher education for students of immigrant

families.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Hickenlooper’s role as broker entails building civic mobilization
around higher education funding for Denver students through informal fundraising
campaigns and empowering policy entrepreneurs. As broker, Hickenlooper has raised
funding for Cole and Horace Mann middle school student classes graduating from a DPS

high school up to the class of 2010. Additionally, he co-developed DSF and raised

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millions for covering the costs of the family contribution portion of a student’s financial
aid package through his relationship with Marquez. Though Hickenlooper sits on the
Board of Directors for DSF, his role appears minimal because during interviews the
primary focus was shifted on Marquez’s efforts and the mayor’s efforts were minimized
to campaigning and bringing private stakeholders to the table to collaborate with other
key stakeholders under the guidance of the MOEC. Thus, as broker, Hickenlooper’s role
is more symbolic when compared to that of catalyst because of his advisory role in
building collaborations to generate support. One MOEC staffer attempts to explain this

symbolic role by stating

In what I do, I know that I can start with the mayor. His engagement is besides just
paying attention to the issues . . . I think he is more of a symbol. He can get people to
become engaged and attend meetings just because he’s there. People come because he is
the mayor. But I think engagement is that next step. It’s not only that (speaking as if she
is the mayor) “I think it’s, you know, education so I’m gonna appear here because it’s so
important” it is also,”It’s so important that I am gonna absolutely pull you into what it is
that we’re doing, or what I think is important or what needs to be happening.”

Here, the mayor’s role as broker to build civic mobilization is apparent in his ability to be
a symbol for change. When asking the same interviewee about how the MOEC
complements the efforts of the mayor, she stated “we’re that connection, that network, so
that all of those relationships in the end have positive outcomes for children and families,
such as in the case of our higher education efforts.” Thus, the co-dependency of the
mayor and the MOEC to build change through informal educational engagement
continues to exist, as it did in his role as catalyst. Together, however, their role in
program development is minimal because it focuses on civic mobilization rather than
being engaged in implementation. By maintaining political distance, the mayor is able to
guard himself against certain political risks surrounding use of public funds to educate

students of immigrant families. In the discussion chapter to follow, I explore to what

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extent do the advantages of mayoral separatism impact a mayor’s ability to build civic

capacity through the use of informal roles?

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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY & DISSCUSSION

This research identified the roles mayors can use to build civic capacity in
education. The study explored approaches to building civic capacity in education when
mayors do not have formal authority over their district. Using the case study of Denver’s
Mayor John Hicken100per, it was found that mayors can act as catalysts and brokers to
build civic mobilization for educational changes. A catalyst entails using the bully pulpit
to build civic mobilization around an initiative, such as the universal pre-k, by focusing
on issue definition and problem perception. Unlike the catalyst, Hickenlooper’s role of
broker in the development of the Denver Scholarship Foundation (DSF) did not
concentrate on framing the policy issue. Instead, he played an advisory role here and
placed emphasis on developing relationships with donors behind the scenes to help fund
the initiative. Unlike broker, the role of catalyst entails initiating an idea and advocating
for it by being in the spotlight. By staying in the background as broker, however,
Hickenlooper was able to avoid the politics of funding the high tuition costs of higher
education.

In both his roles as catalyst and broker, Hickenlooper’s use of informal
engagement emphasized his ability to build civic mobilization. The Mayor’s Office of
Education and Children (MOEC) is used by the mayor as a tool to initiate stakeholder
interaction in both universal pre-k and DSF efforts. Like the mayor, MOEC’s efforts are

limited to just the development of these initiatives and not its implementation. The policy

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implication of this though the mayor helps to broaden the vision of education by building
programs that compliment the efforts of the district, such as the quality of pre-k, he is not
held accountable for its success. In terms of accountability, he is recognized for his
contributions to civic mobilization by bringing stakeholders to the table through the use
of the MOEC and the campaigns for funds through his roles as catalyst and broker. This
chapter reflects how these roles add to the literature on mayoral engagement and civic
capacity. Information is presented on the potential impacts of the informal contributions
of mayors without control over their districts; thus, most information is added to the
importance of identifying new mayoral roles beyond formal control and its relationship to

civic capacity, particularly in building civic mobilization.

Mayoral Engagement

As explored in the literature review, current research on mayoral involvement
emphasizes the impact of mayors with formal control of the school districts in their cities.
However, voids are left in the literature on informal mayoral engagement. Typologies
from both Fritz Edelstein (2006) and Michael Kirst (2002) raised awareness of the
different levels of mayoral involvement in education. While presenting the extent to
which mayors are engaged in other roles, they fail to present how mayors are engaged
through informal roles. The distinction between levels and roles are key because one
shows the degree to which mayors are engaged while the other illuminates how mayors
are involved. In knowing how mayors are involved by identifying their roles, researchers
can begin to explore both the potential impact and limitations of informal mayoral

involvement. Current literature on formal mayoral control demonstrates how such

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involvement leads to new vision for schools, political grantmanship, increased
accountability, and restoration of public trust (Wong and Shen 2001; 2003). Drawing on
the research, information is documented to show how informal mayoral involvement in
education leads to similar developments through initiatives that support schools that

remain external from the district.

New Vision of Education

With mayoral control, mayors consider the needs of students beyond the
classroom and thereby create a new vision for education that is inclusive of partners from
across different fields. This is reflected in the trend found by Wong and Shen (2003)
showing increased allocations to supportive staff in schools under formal mayoral
control. Their study reveals that mayor-appointed school boards are more likely to
increase funding to support services to address health and social problems in schools that
affect academic achievement. For example, under mayoral control inner city districts
have implemented vision testing for elementary students because of a growing concern
that students are not able to follow lessons presented on the board due to vision problems.
Through services such as this, mayoral control embraces a holistic understanding of
students in a broader context. Often, there are budget increases to supportive staff during
transition years from an elected school board to a mayor-appointed board, as
demonstrated in Detroit, Chicago, and DC. (Wong & Shen, 2003). A focus on such
support services reflects a different vision of education when it is located within the city’s

broader social and political environment.

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Unlike formal control, this study found mayors using informal roles create a new
vision for education by helping to develop programs that compliment the educational
efforts of the district. Because these mayors do not have control of their district budgets,
they are more limited than mayors with formal influence to increase support services.
Mayors with informal engagement can create new visions in education that are initiative
driven or program oriented based on key educational concerns of their city, their
relationship with district leaders and other relevant stakeholder groups, and current
political climates (Wong & Shen, 2003). In Denver, John Hickenlooper’s election into
office presented opportunities to develop universal after school programming, quality
pre-k services, and access to higher education for DPS students. This broad vision of
universal access to education programs outside of the district’s scope is unique to Denver.
With further implementation, Denver and other mayors with informal mayoral
involvement should continue to be explored in future research to determine the impact on

student achievement.

Political Grantmanship

Political grantmanship entails a mayor’s ability to attract revenues, particularly
federal funding, from outside of the school district (Wong and Shen, 2003). Wong and
Shen (2003) found a positive relationship between mayoral takeover and increases in
federal revenue (i.e., federal grants). Because mayors have the political capital to apply
for and attract investments in the funding of school district programs and a holistic
education perspective, mayoral control allows for increased revenue streams from the

multiple sectors of education, social services, and health (Usdan, 2006). Mayors with

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informal roles in education have the ability to generate revenue (Edelstein, 2006;
Edelstein et al., 2005; LeSure, 2006). Interestingly, this might involve private rather than
public revenues. In Denver, Hickenlooper was able to raise donations for scholarships
from the business community through informal meetings and conversations. Though
Hickenlooper did not use revenue from multiple city agencies, such as in formal mayoral
control, acquiring private funding allowed for the development of higher education
efforts that both developed DSF and paid for the tuition costs of students from two low
performing middle schools graduating from DPS. Because the dollars were from the
private sector, there was greater flexibility in spending. This was particularly important in
relation to the scholarship initiative. Initially, the funding flexibility allowed for the
funding of tuition costs of all students in the targeted schools, including students from
immigrant families. Efforts to generate public funds for these students were met with
anti-immigrant political tensions. Hickenlooper chose to negotiate these political tensions
and limited his involvement by acting as a broker rather than catalyst to develop DSF. In
doing so, the spotlight on the scholarship program was placed on founder Tim Marquez
in the midst of political tensions on immigration. With resources raised to develop
scholarships remaining out of the jurisdiction of the city government, the responsibility of
finding better ways to support students of immigrant families was placed on DSF.
Political grantmanship can be used to resolve political tensions by placing accountability

at the private sector rather than in the public sector.

Accountability

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Though there appears to be the potential for greater flexibility in political
grantmanship through informal mayoral involvement, as in the case of Hickenlooper’s
higher education efforts, there is less accountability than compared to formal control.
With the implementation of mayoral control, accountability for the academic
achievement of students is shifted from the school district to the mayor’s office. Mayors
of integrated governance systems with high influence or total control are more
accountable to their constituents and feel more obligated to address educational issues
(Kirst and Bulkley, 2000; Wong and Shen, 2003). These pressures of being in the
political spotlight result in stringent academic accountability systems, holding students
and schools more accountable to system wide standards. Some argue that there are
disadvantages to such initiatives that place increased pressures on achievement while
others are confident in the effort’s ability to highlight areas of poor performance, once
“swept under the ru g” (Edelstein, 2006; Wong, 2006). Because of this outcome-based
accountability, policies under mayoral control often lead to enhancements in instruction
and curriculums within the district (Wong & Shen, 2003).

A limitation of informal mayoral involvement, however, appears to be the lack of
accountability for district performance. The emphasis is not placed on classroom
instruction, curriculum, or management. Instead, as in the case of Denver, the emphasis is
on bridging the relationship between the city and the district through programs that are
complementary to the school district or that add to it, such as that of creating universal
access to quality pre-k programs to address school readiness. Unlike formal mayoral
roles, informal involvement does not appear to facilitate mayoral engagement with

making improvements within the school district itself or making demands that the district

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improve its performance and student outcomes. Instead, informal mayoral control appears
to facilitate mayoral work to build civic capacity for initiatives outside of the district (i.e.
universal pre-k, access to higher education) or that add onto it (i.e., after school
programming). In serving as a catalyst and broker for initiatives, Hickenlooper is
involved in the initial development, particularly through building civic mobilization. He
is not, however, engaged in discussions of implementation and thus not held accountable
for school improvement outcomes. Thus, mayors who engage in informal involvement

can spend less political capital to restore public trust than do mayors with formal roles.

Restoring Public Trust

Through new visions in education, political grantmanship, and increased
accountability, mayors with formal control of city school districts are restoring public
trust the public education systems in their cities. Wong and Shen (2003) reported survey
results from the National School Boards Foundation that found constituents were half as
likely as school board members to report approval of school services in the areas of
college readiness, school violence, student discipline, and English as a second language
program. This finding supports mayoral control as an education reform strategy because
“mayoral involvement in education represents an institutional effort to fill the confidence
gap by addressing the performance challenge” (Wong & Shen, 2003; p. 13). Mayors with
informal roles have the ability to fill in similar confidence gaps through building civic
capacity around initiatives that remain external to the district to restore trust in the
educational opportunities available in their cities. This is demonstrated in the passing of

the pre-school tax initiative where Hickenlooper was able to increase public trust enough

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to pass an increase in taxes. By narrowing the focus of education initiatives funded
through tax increases and showing its relationship to the economic development of
Denver, Hickenlooper’s use of his role as catalyst reveals a mayor’s ability to build civic

capacity through use of his bully pulpit.

Civic Mobilization -Bully Pulpits and Open Policy Windows

In addition to contributing to the literature on mayoral engagement in education,
this research contributes to current literature on civic capacity by exploring the roles
mayors can use in education. By identifying the roles of catalyst and broker, this research
highlights a key function where mayors can build civic mobilization through the use of
the bully pulpit and open policy windows. Civic mobilization is defined as the extent to
which stakeholders collaborate to sustain support for education initiatives (Stone 2001;
2005). In this research, both the mayor and MOEC were used to build civic mobilization.
The mayor helped to gain the interest of key stakeholders through the use of the bully
pulpit. An example is when Hickenlooper used his status as mayor to promote the
importance of pre-school education and to gain support of stakeholders which later led to
voting in favor of increased taxes to develop DPP. By framing the issue as one of
investing in preschool as a way to invest in Denver’s economic development, the use of
the bully pulpit to attract a broad base of supporters through rhetorical voice was key in
building civic mobilization.

Open policy windows are also important in building civic mobilization, as
demonstrated in the Lights On After School (LOAS) initiative. Here, the mayor’s election

created the opportunity for civic actors outside of the mayor’s office to initiate mayoral

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involvement in educational efforts through the MOEC. The use of the bully pulpit was
not used only by the mayor but by policy entrepreneurs in the city to initiate mayoral
efforts in building civic mobilization to develop initiatives. Further research on the use of
open policy windows in building civic mobilization is needed to expand the literature on
civic capacity and its relationship to informal mayoral engagement, particularly as it
relates to how policy entrepreneurs can initiate the use of the mayor’s bully pulpit to

develop programs.

Conclusion

My research increases awareness about informal mayoral involvement and how it
can be used to build civic capacity in education. Though it is too early to explore its
impact on student achievement, Denver demonstrates it potential through the Lights On
After School (LOAS), universal pre—k, and the DSF. Here, Mayor Hickenlooper’s civic
mobilization efforts are complimented by his ability to use the MOEC as a tool for
initiating stakeholder interaction through summits, task forces, and planning meetings.
Thus, there is a complimentary relationship between the mayor and the MOEC as it
relates to building civic mobilization. In regards to this relationship, Hickenlooper
explained, “Together, the MOEC and the mayor are the engine of effort for expanding
access to early childhood education, higher education, and after school programming.” In
being an engine of effort, the mayor’s use of his informal roles as catalyst and broker,
with the assistance of MOEC, builds civic mobilization to gain support and resources of
stakeholders necessary for the successful development of education programs that

compliment the efforts of the district. Though there are potential impacts associated with

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increased access to universal pre-k and higher education, such as school readiness and a
more educated workforce, there are limitations of informal mayoral involvement due to
lack of accountability because both programs were later institutionalized by creating
separate non-profit organizations. Because the mayor was not involved in its
implementation, it is important to explore civic capacity as it relates to use of the bully
pulpit and open policy windows to build civic mobilization. Though my research is based
on one case study of Denver, it identifies the need to explore if there is a trend among
informal mayoral involvement as it relates to seeking education reform efforts outside of
the district’s efforts. Additionally, future research should investigate the extent to which
informal mayoral involvement can increase academic achievement of low performing
schools when compared to districts under formal mayoral control. Lastly, with such city
offices as the MOEC in both formal and informal systems of mayoral involvement in
education, researchers in the field should explore how cities can institutionalize mayoral

involvement and its impact on building civic capacity in education across mayoral terms.

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APPENDIX

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APPENDIX A

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Informal Mayoral Involvement in Education
Approaches to Building Civic Capacity

MAYOR HICKENLOOPER

What influenced your decision to run for mayor?

What are the three pressing issues your city is currently facing?

In terms of education, what are the three pressing issues facing students in your
city?

Of these issues, do you have a role in addressing them? Explain.

As mayor, what is your relationship with the MOEC?

Because the MOEC was previously established, how has it influenced your
involvement in education? What advantages does it give? What challenges or
limitations does it present?

How has the MOEC evolved because of your leadership and direction? Explain.
How does your vision for the MOEC and role of Denver mayors in education

‘ compare to that of Webb’s? Explain.

10.

11

Give 1-3 word(s) that personify the role(s) of the mayor in shaping Denver
education?

Are there challenges in local politics, media, or stakeholder relationships that
hinder your desired efforts to improve education? Explain.

. Complete the following statement:

“To be the mayor of Denver and engage in education entails . . .”

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Ni—n

Informal Mayoral Involvement in Education
Approaches to Building Civic Capacity

FORMER MAYOR WEBB

What led to the development of MOEC?

. What did you envision as the relationship between the mayor and the MOEC? Do

you see that existing now? Explain why or why not.

When developing the MOEC, what were the local politics like? Did you have
resistance or support? What was the role of the media? Who were the key partners
in the beginning and are they still there (i.e. United Way), why or why not?

How has the MOEC evolved over administrations? If you were an evaluator, what
feedback would you give (i.e. three things it is doing right, three areas of
improvement, and suggestions)?

As mayor, were you ever approached or had an interest in school district takeover
of DPS? Did you pursue it? Why or why not?

Revisit your meeting with Mayor Hickenlooper when turning over the
administration/position. What advice did you give on being involved in education
as the Mayor of Denver?

Give 1-3 word(s) that personify the role(s) of the mayor in shaping Denver
education?

Give 1-3 word(s) that personify the role(s) of MOEC in shaping Denver
education?

What challenges in local politics, media, or stakeholder relationships did you face
that hindered desired efforts to improve education? To what extent did your racial
background play a role, if at all. Did establishing the MOEC help to address these
challenges? Explain.

10. Complete the following statements:

. “To be the mayor of Denver and engage in education entails . .
0 Mayor: “To be a black mayor and engage in education entails . .

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Informal Mayoral Involvement in Education
Approaches to Building Civic Capacity

STAKEHOLDER A

What led to the development of MOEC?

. What is the relationship between the mayor and the MOEC? Explain.

When developing the MOEC, what were the local politics like? Did you have
resistance or support? What was the role of the media? Who were the key partners
in the beginning and are they still there (i.e. United Way), why or why not?
How has the MOEC evolved over administrations? If you were an evaluator, what
feedback would you give (i.e. three things it is doing right, three areas of
improvement, and suggestions)?
Imagine/revisit an initial meeting with Maria when turning over the position of
MOEC director. What advice would/did you give and why?
Give 1-3 word(s) that personify the role(s) of the mayor in shaping Denver
education?
Give 1-3 word(s) that personify the role(s) of MOEC in shaping Denver
education?
What challenges in local politics, media, or stakeholder relationships did
you/MOEC face that risked hindering desired efforts to improve education?
Explain.
Complete the following statements:

. “To be the mayor of Denver and engage in education entails . .

. “To be the director of MOEC entails . . .”

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Informal Mayoral Involvement in Education
Approaches to Building Civic Capacity

STAKEHOLDER B

. How long have you been working with the MOEC? Have you been here during

both the Webb and Hickenlooper administration? What is your position here and
what responsibilities does it entail?

Have you seen your responsibilities/program further develop or change over your
time here? Explain.

. What stakeholder partnerships are vital to your program’s success? What are their

roles, what resources do they bring?

Were there ever any challenges among stakeholders that risked hindering reform
efforts? If so, what were they and how (if) they were addressed? If not, why?
What is the role of the MOEC in education and how does it relate to that of the
mayor’s?

In one word, describe the role of the MOEC.

In one word, describe the role of the mayor in education.

If you worked for both Webb and Hickenlooper describe the differences in their
visions for and approaches to addressing education issues in Denver?

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Informal Mayoral Involvement in Education
Approaches to Building Civic Capacity

STAKEHOLDER C

. What is your organization’s relationship to the MOEC? When did it develop and

how? What does your involvement entail?

Do you have relationships with other stakeholders involved in MOEC efforts or
staff members? If so, to what extent and how did they develop? Did these
relationships shape your engagement in these reform efforts? Explain.

Reflect on your experiences partnering with MOEC. What key factors are
necessary to maintain partnerships and to effectively build future collaborations
with other stakeholders?

Were there ever any challenges that risked hindering reform efforts? If so, what
were they and how they were addressed, if at all? If not, why?

What are the major contributions to education in Denver you are most proud of
through your collaboration with MOEC?

In one word, describe your organization’s partnership role with MOEC.

In one word, describe MOEC’s role in education here in Denver.

What do you perceive is the mayor’s role in education here in Denver? What is
his relationship with MOEC and building/maintaining partnerships?

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Informal Mayoral Involvement in Education
Approaches to Building Civic Capacity

STAKEHOLDER D

. What are the most pressing education issues in Denver? Why do they exist and to

what extent? Which communities are impacted the most?

What efforts are in place to address these issues and by whom/what organization?
Has the mayor or the mayor’s office of education and children been involved in any
of the efforts mentioned? If so, how and to what extent? If not, why in your opinion
(i.e. lack of interest, political consequences)?

If you were mayor for a day, what educational issues would you address (if you
would at all)? Explain. What are some of the challenges you might face in terms of
media, local politics, and available resources?

In one word, what should be the role of a mayor in education? Why?

Does Hickenlooper (or has Webb) capture that role? Mayor’s Office of Education and
Children? Explain

120

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