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METAHISTORY AND MEMORY: MAKING/REMAKING THE KNOWLEDGE OF
HIROSHIMA'S ATOMIC BOMBING

By

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ABSTRACT

METAHISTORY AND MEMORY: MAKING/REMAKING THE KNOWLEDGE OF
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This study is about history and its knowledge. The transition from *History* to

histories challenges the total objectivity assumed in historical study. It is obsolete to

assume that there is a transcendently universal historical explanation of past events. Past

reality is not a singular, but to affirm the multiplicity of past realities is not the same as

affirming that history has diverse knowledge.

This study acknowledges the diversity of historical explanations as the present

reality. Then, it is the purpose of this study to seek knowledge in history that

encompasses the diverse historical explanations. This study stresses that the purpose of

historical study is not only constructing historical explanations but also constructing

knowledge. Knowledge in history is the mechanism to build a comprehensible

understanding of diverse historical explanations. This knowledge has been particularly

important ever since the plurality of historical explanations became irrefutable reality.

Many years have passed since History became histories. The plurality of historical

explanations has become irrefutable reality, but it is now posing different problems that

cannot be resolved by the existing notion of history and its knowledge. Different

historical explanations coexist on the basis of ignoring, avoiding, and localizing

themselves from other conflicting historical explanations. Even worse, different historical

explanations seek coexistence through domination, active suppression, and ignoring other

explanations of history.

This study argues that knowledge of history is fluid: history's knowledge is ceaselessly made and remade in light of what becomes known after the event's occurrence. Fluidity, like melody, needs to be studied differently from how we study the past substances. Past substances are like musical note that can be substantiated but they themselves are not melody. The plurality of historical explanations, this study argues, provides the source for our historical inquiry into how we have understood the past differently in different moments of the past. This study thus explores how Hiroshima's atomic bombing has been shaped and reshaped as *ahistorically* significant past event in Japan to present the fluid reality of history's knowledge.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation was drafted mostly in coffee shops in many different corners of the world. I like to set myself on a chair just to melt in the environment. I become a part of the picture. I then look at the people trespassing the environment. I am there but I am not there at all. If no one makes an active recognition of my being there, does it really matter whether I exist there physically or not? I exist only when someone recognizes my existence. If no one recognizes me, I became an invisible man.

To make an acknowledgement is thus an important exercise. It is human practice to keep other human beings exist in our environment. Thence, I wish to make my acknowledgements to even a waiter of a coffee shop where I wrote substantial part of this study. I am thankful to her for letting me stay many hours with just a few dollar amount of coffee. I must have been a bad customer though I have been a loyal customer.

It is perhaps customary to express here one's appreciation to one's advisor, committee members, family members and friends. However, I fear I may come short of expressing either beautifully or fairly the acknowledgements that they deserve. Beautiful acknowledgments, I fear, sin by excluding the true merit of people who deserve acknowledgements, as genuine gratitude is sacrificed in favor of esthetics. The acknowledgements that are fair in expressing genuine gratitude are often simply boring and tedious. The balance, indeed, is the key.

I acknowledge here everyone, while I send my special acknowledgements to those whom I have much to owe. I know the people who should be noted here understand their names, thoughts, languages, and emotions are in every page of this study. They also

know that their names, thoughts, languages and emotions will be in everything I do in my future.

It is my strong wish to list everyone's name here. However, writing their names is not at all an adequate way to acknowledge their significance and contributions. This is only a beginning. I have much more to do to truly acknowledge those important to me in the future in a much more meaningful way than their names being noted in here.

<div style="text-align: center;">Makito Yurita</div>

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Chapter 1

Three Stories:
Problems and Questions on History and Historical Consciousness

All conflicts are, whether direct or indirect, based on past realities. Past realities, however, do not necessarily generate a common understanding of what happened in the past, and they have formed different understandings in the present. If we understand history as the discipline we use to build understanding of what happened in the past, we can perhaps say that history has been one of the primary causes of generating conflicts in the present. Yet, persisting historical controversies and their intensity also and ironically prove our strong faith in history's possibility to resolve conflicts through legitimizing present conditions and bringing justice to the present. It is, on this ground, meaningful to consider history's responsibility to the present. The purpose of this study is to inquire what the responsibilities of history to the present are when we practice history to understand the past. Or perhaps it is better to say that it is the purpose of this study to inquire what history needs to be in order to be responsible to do what it is believed to do. Therefore, this study begins its inquiry by asking an old yet longstanding question: what is history?

What Is History?

This question about history poses two different problems: *what* we understand happened in the past and *how*, using the discipline of history, we understand what happened in the past. These two issues (or questions) are closely related to each other,

and they perhaps seem the same at a glance. Yet, the first question addresses the

formation of our consciousness about what happened in the past, and the second is about

the academic practice of history as a discipline.

It is perhaps needless to state that history is not a product of nature. History is,

instead, the product of human activities in a society, and thus it is a socially constructed

product. In this respect, it is safe to affirm that the *raison d'être* of history is never

independent from a society and the constituent elements of a society. History has a

particular function in a society in which history is shaped and practiced. In other words,

we shape and practice history because it has a function necessary for the construction and

maintenance of our social organisms.

The practice of history would cease when (and if) history failed to offer what is

needed in society and/or when (and if) society itself has ceased to exist. In this respect,

when we ask how we have practiced history or how we should be practicing history, we

have to discuss the question in the context of a society in which the practice is (or is

going to be) exercised. Inquiring into the principle of practicing history is concurrent with

an inquiry into the limitations of the practice. The substance of this inquiry is not about

building unviolable understandings of what happened in the past. Instead, inquiring about

history in the context of society would lead us to consider what the ideal practice of a

particular history is in relation to a particular society.

It is perhaps useful to note in passing that Hayden White brought an eloquent

discussion on the link between history and present society in his most famous work:

Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe.[1] However, this

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[1] Hayden V. White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore and London: JHU Press, 1973), 8.

study, while it takes a similar approach to challenge history and historiography, is different in critical part from White's argument on history. This study, in fact, aims to undo part (not the whole) of what White's concept of history as narrative has brought to history and the knowledge in history. In this respect, it is useful to briefly touch White's argument before moving this chapter's discussion forward.

The work of history, White argues, is a verbal structure built in a form of a narrative prose discourse. Historians build a narrative prose discourse to provide a model that explains the past structures and processes to the present. Historians make history by arranging past events in a particular order, answering questions about the past, sorting what past events to be included/excluded, and emphasizing certain past events while subordinating other events. Every historical explanation, therefore, has a particular discourse style that gives a structure when historians write history. White then proposes four modes of explanation, each of which has four categorical types (Table 1:1).

Table 1:1. Hayden White's Modes and Types of Historical Explanation

	Modes of Historical Explanation			
	Emplotment	Argument	Ideological Implication	Poetic Structure
Types of Historical Explanation	Romantic	Formist	Anarchist	Synecdoche
	Tragic	Mechanistic	Radical	Metaphor
	Comic	Organicist	Conservative	Metonymy
	Satirical	Contextualist	Liberal	Irony

Through exploring historiography and history writings of the nineteenth century, White brings forward a radical critique of the consciousness of historians by stressing

that history writings are fundamentally a narrative prose discourse—literary artifact. This study is generally in agreement with White when troubling the notion of truth and objectivity that have long been separated (and often elevated) the work of historian— historical narrative—from other stories and narratives. White, when arguing historical explanation is fundamentally a verbal narrative, removed the assumed distinction between history and literary artifact. Through characterization of history as narrative, White offers what seemed to be an exit to the scholarship of history, which was thought to lack any real possibility to build the knowledge that is definitive. However, the exit was not real, and it merely permits history to stand as a discipline without a method to build the knowledge that can respond to diversifying historical narratives of past events.

White's concept of history as narrative has gained significant recognition, and it still offers a constructive lens to historiography. However, there have been many historians who are strongly critical of White. There are formal criticisms that challenge those four modes of historical explanations or how White identified the structural framework of historical explanations. More notable criticisms challenge the concept of history as narrative. In *Postmodernism and History*, for example, Willie Thompson critically remarked that the concept is a "theology with no foundation," and White's argument has its foundation and use in the "nausea of the 1968 hangover."[2] There are also critiques holding White responsible for history's losing its disciplinary emphasis on the search for truth as the primary task of historians.[3]

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[2] Willie Thompson, *Postmodernism and History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 29-30.

[3] Carlo Ginzburg, *History, Rhetoric and Proof* (Hanover NH: University Press of New England, 1999).

This study however challenges both White's argument and the arguments against White. In order to challenge history and historiography themselves, this study, as White argues, pushes a radical critique on historical methodology and historians' consciousness in the study of history. However, this study is critical to White when the concept of history as narrative has very little (if any) to offer history and historians to substantiate the knowledge. Today, the concept of history as narrative has turned into a conceptual explanation for the phenomena of endlessly diversifying historical explanations. However, White's concept provides no solution to the contemporary problems that are generated from the plurality of historical explanations. Present reality does not permit us to simply embrace or accept the plurality of historical explanations or understanding the link between history and a society. In order to seek peaceful coexistence of diverse historical explanations in a society, history must seek the knowledge that is transcendently true in the plurality of historical explanations.

Society in and for which we practice history is globalizing. Technological advancements have given us more tools and easy access to those tools for constructing what Benedict Anderson calls an imagined community. Anderson argues that an imagined community is a product of a shared sense of common experiences through media technology to link people who are far apart from each other.[4] Today, not only media but also transportation technology and the knowledge of natural science have fostered global experiences through economic exchanges, political actions, cultural movements, and so on. Even natural disasters and outbreaks of epidemics are not isolated

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[4] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

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events in local regions, as the recent example of the SIRS virus and so many other similar events prove.[5]

To contextualize what was said about history and before moving to a more detailed engagement about it in the following chapter, I present three personal stories to frame the question of history and historical consciousness. Through these stories, I wish to highlight problems and questions to be engaged in the following chapters of this dissertation.

Iolanda's Question

In 2003, I visited my wife's family in Romania. We took a short trip out of Bucharest, and visited Sinaia, a mountain resort village north of Bucharest. Romania, since the revolution of 1989, has adopted the model of the free market economy. There were signs of struggles in forming a new social order in place of the old one.

In Sinaia, my wife and I met a girl named Iolanda. Iolanda was eight years old, and she came to us to beg for money. Many times we had seen children asking for money on streets, in parks, and sometimes at cafés. We had talked several times about what we should do for those children begging for money. We had saved just enough from our graduate assistant salaries to visit my wife's aging parents in Romania. While we had enough to visit Romania, we did not have enough money to spend any extra on ourselves. We had agreed to give something, but we did not want to do so out of sympathy or pity. We also did not want to be the kind of tourists whose passing sympathy and giving

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[5] This study will discuss the impacts of globalization on increasing chances of the present controversies across different historical explanations in Chapter 2.

encouraged the practice of begging in Romania. Though it was not a well-crafted thought, we decided to ask the people who begged for money whether they wished to work for the amount for which they asked. Iolanda came shortly after we crafted the idea. We were caught unprepared to put our idea into a practice. Yet, we asked her if she wanted to work for us. Iolanda said yes, but we had no idea what we should ask her to do. So, we talked: a conversation that lasted more than four hours.

Iolanda was Roma—of group some call Gypsies, some of whom traditionally live off begging on the streets. They have often been called the nation-less people. Iolanda was a very articulate girl with many interesting stories to share. From her stories, we learned that she was living with her family and she takes the train to Sinaia to beg money from the townspeople. Iolanda made money to support her family, and thus she had never been to any school.

During the course of our long conversation, Iolanda asked what we do for a living. We said that we are students. My wife has an advanced degree in mathematics and was in a doctorate program in mathematics education. Iolanda understood what my wife was doing, and she told us that she learned literacy through reading the labels on consumer products, and she encountered mathematics (calculation) by counting money she earned from begging. Then she asked what I was doing. Having no better words, I said "history." What followed was an unexpected question: "what is history?"

If we had not already talked with Iolanda for several hours before this unexpected question, I would have explained in the same way I would talk to a little child. Yet, when she asked the question, she had already shown us the depth of her observation of life that

perhaps had come from the way she grew up. Hence, her question struck me. How should I speak about history to a child who is not like a child and who has never been to school?

Iolanda understood that history is about the past, yet she had trouble understanding what there is to study about the past. Iolanda's understanding of the past came from her experiences. From her parents and grandparents, she also knew what happened before her birth. Mythology also contributed to her knowledge about what happened in the distant past. Iolanda's understanding of the past was constituted from her and her family's experiential knowledge and from culturally shared myths. Ian Barbour argues that myths are useful fictions that are neither true nor false, but that have important social functions. Myths are, Barbour argues, the system of stories that helps people map out their experiences in the present, and that they enable a people's integration into a community with its collective memories and aspirations.[6]

In this respect, Iolanda constitutes her knowledge about the past from two sources: from what has been remembered of her and her family's experiences, and from what has been narrated as the stories about the past—much like those stories in the Grimm Brothers' Fairy Tales. The past beyond her and her family's experiential knowledge, in other words, lies in mythology. For Iolanda, knowing what happened in the past beyond her private circle would offer little or no substance to understand her present conditions and her environment.

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[6] Ian G. Barbour, *Myths, Models, and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 5.

This experience struck me as a historian.[7] The question—what is history—asks more than what history is as a disciplinary practice. It also asks what is the functional role of history: What does history do to the present and perhaps for the future? If history's substance were to give an account of the whole past (this in itself is an overly ambitious claim of history), the absolute product of history would have to be the same as to gather all accounts of the past. However, procuring the whole account of the past is insufficient as history's product. Building a chronicle, no matter how complete a chronicle might be, is not the goal of doing history. From this viewpoint, one might say that myths and epics have better functions than history on grounds of their potential to transfer meanings from the past to explain the present. History is not about giving complete accounts of the past even though this is an important process in doing history.[8]

In fact, providing Iolanda with a historian's account of the past would not do anything to her present reality. Some may argue that accounts about the past would help her understand her current conditions as a historical construction. However, we must understand that past accounts themselves do not carry meanings of their own. The accounts have to be elaborated and explained for certain purposes. Iolanda's question about history pushed me to think about the nature of historical explanation. How historical explanation differs from myths and their explanations of the past is not a trivial question. It is generally understood that historians should construct a historical explanation that is fair to the past. However, when the question—what is history?—came

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[7] Though I have employed interdisciplinary approach in many of my studies, I have primarily trained as a historian in Japan, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania.

[8] Arthur C. Danto argues similarly on this point when differentiating substantive and analytical philosophy of history in Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

from Iolanda, it made me think that it is perhaps equally or more important for historians to inquire into how their historical explanation can be fair (or bring fairness) to present reality.

Historical Explanation and Its Violence

It is quite interesting to grow up as an outsider in a society. I grew up in Japan and Hong Kong, and I received most of my education there. But I also had a part of my college education, including graduate level training, in the United States. Learning history in different places has given me a particular understanding because I have encountered historical explanations of the past in very differing circumstances of the present. Learning history in a classroom was not so much of a problem. However, I have experienced historical explanations that generated difficulties in my everyday social environment.

One incident happened when I was 11 years old. There was an intense dispute in China over Japanese junior high school history textbooks. The dispute came from an erroneous report of one Japanese newspaper that said the Japanese textbooks changed their language to legitimize Japan's wartime aggression in East Asia.[9] I saw demonstrations and protests on the streets in Hong Kong about these Japanese history

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[9] See the front-page report on *Asahi Shinbun* on June 26, 1982. The headline says, "Textbooks to bring back the pre-war (Japan)." In this article, the newspaper criticized the Ministry of Education's certification of the textbooks by reporting that the Ministry has changed the textbook language from "invasion" to "military advancement" or simply "advancement". This report has ignited into international disputes, particularly between China and Japan over how history textbooks should represent Japan's wartime aggression. However, there was no case of such certification, and Asahi Shinbun later admitted the report was erroneous. For further information, see: Masami Kataoka, *Asahi shinbun no "sengo" sekinin* (Tokyo: Tentensha, 1998), and Shoichi Watanabe, *Banken kyoni hoeru* (Tokyo: Tokuma, 1997).

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textbooks, and it was quite frightening to see a growing hostility toward Japan and the

Japanese.[10] One day, I went to a store to buy groceries—an errand practiced almost daily.

There, the storekeeper threw dirty water on me from his spit vase. We knew each other

because my parents often sent me there to get things missing in the refrigerator. It was

quite a shock when the storekeeper threw dirty water on me. From his hostile words

thrown at me, I understood that it was because I am Japanese and I was a convenient

target for his protest against the Japanese textbook representation of history.

The people protesting in the street did not know what really was written in the

Japanese history textbooks about Japan's wartime aggression as most of them, I am

assuming here with certainty from my experience, have not seen the Japanese textbooks

in question (and most people in Hong Kong do not read Japanese). The people acted on

the grounds of the erroneous report, and I became a target of their action. I eventually

learned that I was not the only one who had experienced similar incidents: some of my

Japanese classmates had experienced similar harassment.

Instead of getting angry, we accepted the hostility and felt bad or even guilty

about being Japanese. In the school for Japanese students (Japanese school), we had

learned the history of Japan's aggression in East Asia. In museums and libraries, we had

seen images and read literature about Japanese aggression during the war. Movies and

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[10] Hong Kong had been under British colony, and there was no significant hostility toward Japan when compared to the Mainland China in which there was a history curriculum in schools highlighting the Japanese invasion. In history curriculum, the construction of the People's Republic of China is framed as a result of systematic and united efforts of the Chinese people against the Japanese invasion. While in Hong Kong, the school curriculum for history had been divided into two frames: ancient history and modern history. In ancient history, history is taught in Cantonese language to build Chinese identity while the modern history is taught in English without touching in details about the issues that may undermine the legitimacy of British colonial ruling of Hong Kong. For details about this division, see Flora Kan and Edward Vickers, "One Hong Kong, Two Histories; 'History' and 'Chinese History' in the Hong Kong School Curriculum," *Comparative Education* 38, no. 1 (Feb 2002), 73-89.

television dramas from Hollywood and mainland China frequently depicted the Japanese as villains torturing and violating the locals during the war. In the Japanese school, we also had a special history lesson about the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong. It is quite interesting to recall the lesson not because we had learned the history of the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong in a Japanese school. It is interesting because we learned the history written from the perspective of the British, which was also a colonial power in Hong Kong. I remember learning how the British had *heroically* defended Hong Kong from the Japanese aggression, and we got upset when learning that the Japanese army seized the Peninsula Hotel to set up its headquarters. The Peninsula was one of Hong Kong's most prestigious hotels and its colonial style architecture, symbolizing the colonial order, made it a historic landmark of Hong Kong.

I remember that, as children, we had somehow accepted the hostility against us as Japanese. In the neighborhood, being Japanese meant being automatically assigned the status of villain amongst the other children playing in the park. Some local people— Cantonese—even instructed their children not to play with the Japanese children. Interestingly, history education had given us an acceptance of this unfair condition while it had given others legitimacy for their violent actions. This is a case in which the past worked to obscure the present communication about the past, and history functioned as a medium to communicate about the past to encourage a lack of (or avoiding of) communication in the present.

Historical explanation could serve as a medium that encourages not only miscommunication but also violence between different social groups who had had conflicts in the past. Historical explanations have given an understanding of a past in

which Japanese aggression resulted in the deaths of many people in East Asia. In this sense, we can perhaps say that, in the aforementioned case, *the meaning of history* is to identify and understand past reality in which there were Japanese aggressions in East Asia. However, from what I have narrated here, I argue that it is perhaps necessary to consider the meaning in history in order to critically inquire into the legitimacy of historical explanation and its *effects* in the present. "To demand the meaning of an event", Arthur C. Danto argues, "is to be prepared to accept some context within which the event is considered significant."[11] In this respect, if we were to uncritically assume the meaning of history without critically inquiring into the meaning in history, we would miss an opportunity to understand how a particular past event became the subject of historical inquiry in our present.

In fact, we can say with fair certainty that no event constitutes its historical significance at the moment it was happening. It is faulty to assume that we can write historically about an event at the time of its occurrence. Past events become the subject of historical inquiry only with the knowledge we have attained after the occurrence of the events. In consequence, we have limited understanding of the significance of the events outside of the contexts that make the event significant for historical inquiry. In this respect, it is perhaps worthwhile to consciously investigate the contexts from which we assign historical significance to past events. Inquiring into the meaning in history,

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[11] Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 13.

therefore, would lead us to make a systematic examination of the historical development of the contextual conditions that are generating historical explanations.[12]

The Past in the Present

The diversity of historical explanations often comes with a surprise. The current globalization and increasing human mobility make it more frequent than ever for us to encounter historical explanations that have notable differences from the one familiar to us. When I was teaching a university course on the subject of the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima, one student said in the class that the Japanese deserved the bomb because they caused the war through a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. Though I have heard the analogy before, it was shocking to hear that analogy repeated in the classroom. I understood that the student had a strong faith in the analogy, so much so that he recited it in the classroom taught by a Japanese instructor. There was a time students used the word "Japs" to castigate the Pearl Harbor attack and other violence brought by the Japanese during the war. The students were often apologetic for using the word Japs when they were reminded that I am Japanese, but it is always a shock to find out there is a historical explanation legitimizing their castigation of the Japanese with disgust even sixty years after the war's end.

Right after the 9-11 attacks, there was a frequent use of the Pearl Harbor analogy in the media and the public sphere of the United States. There were newspaper articles,

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[12] The process through which the past event gains its historical significance is discussed in Chapter 4 and 5 by illuminating how the atomic bombing of Hiroshima became historically significant event in Hiroshima and in Japan.

periodicals and television broadcasts portraying the terrorist attacks as the second Pearl

Harbor, the new day of infamy, and other similar phrases to align the terrorist attacks to

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. At Michigan State University, there were

several meetings to discuss the 9-11 attacks. I had expressed my concerns about the

problem of using the Pearl Harbor analogy to speak about acts of terrorism. Even though

the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor ended up being a sneak attack, many documents

have revealed that it was intended to be a surprise attack instead.[13] Furthermore, the Pearl

Harbor attack was a strategic attack against military targets, and thus it was

fundamentally different from the terrorists who targeted their attack indiscriminately

against civilian population.

I was however shocked when I was confronted by a professor. He violently

opposed my request for reflection on the Pearl Harbor analogy in connection to the

terrorist attacks. He stressed the legitimacy and accuracy of the Pearl Harbor analogy to

describe the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Similar incidents happened throughout the nation at

the time when the emotional response had silenced criticisms against any challenges to

emotionally charged reactions to the terrorist attacks.[14] Yet, in the public media, the Pearl

Harbor analogy continued. For example, Henry Kissinger stated on CNN: "the people

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[13] Sneak attack and surprise attack are different more than the difference in wording. Sneak attack refers the military attack without an official declaration of war. However, surprise attack is military attack done after war's declaration.

[14] There were some protests and challenges to initial reactions to the 9-11 attacks. Alexander Francis Boyle, a professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law, was quoted in an article, "The Next Casualty: Bill of Rights?" in *Los Angeles Times* (September 13, 2001) to say: "According to the facts in the public record so far, this [9-11 attacks] was not an act of war and NATO Article 5 does not apply. President Bush has automatically escalated this national tragedy into something it is not in order to justify a massive military attack abroad and an apparent crackdown on civil liberties at home."

who did it [9-11 attacks] must have the same end as the people who attacked Pearl Harbor."[15]

The Pearl Harbor analogy is problematic not necessarily because it wrongfully framed Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The fundamental problem of the analogy, in the context of the United States, was to me that it ignored completely the analogy's frightening connotations. For example, two months after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States government forced the relocation of the people and the citizens of Japanese ancestry into internment camps. In fact, there were discussions about the mass internment of Muslim population in the United States soon after the 9-11 attacks.[16] Moreover, the War in the Pacific had caused massive civilian casualties, and John W. Dower characterized the war as the war without mercy.[17] The seriousness of the idea in bringing the terrorist "the same end as the people who attacked Pearl Harbor" is evident when considering the series of events that occurred in the Second World War. These incidents, however, reminded me of two other unpleasant experiences built upon historical explanations about the past war.

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[15] CNN Henry Kissinger, interview on 11 September 2001.

[16] There are multitudes of examples to show that there had been discussions to introduce mass Muslim internment to protect the United States from terrorist attacks. These responses were quite strong immediately after the terrorist attacks, and it still occasionally surfaces today. In response to such emotionally charged reactions, Electric Shadows for ITVS Interactive launched a website to explore "what it means to be an American with the face of the enemy." ("Stories from the Aftermath of Infamy, online: http://www.itvs.org/facetoface/intro.html (accessed May 11, 2008). Furthermore, there are list of discussions and reports that parallels between the US internment of the Japanese Americans in 1949 and the arguments surrounding on the Muslim internment in post-9-11. See, Discover Nikkei at http://www.discovernikkei.org/wiki/index.php/Japanese-American_and_Arab-American_Parallelsin (accessed, May 31, 2008).

[17] John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986).

The first experience came when I lived in Hawaii. I had lived there for three years. Every time someone visited me from outside of Hawaii, he/she asked me to take them to the Arizona Memorial. The Arizona Memorial is built on top of the USS Arizona that was sunk by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Visitors, therefore, have to take a boat to get to the actual memorial site. Before taking the boat, all visitors have to watch a half-hour film. The film depicts the Pearl Harbor attack as a *sneak* attack—instead of a surprise attack—of the Japanese. It was difficult to repeatedly watch the film portraying my nation's past act as a sneak attack, but the most difficult experience came when the lights were turned back on after the film had ended. Nearly always, I saw some visitors crying at the end of the film, and I felt their eyes stabbing my skin. There were times someone said in disgust the word "Japs." I looked down and felt guilty about my being there as a Japanese, yet I felt I was being unjustly castigated by the past.

The second experience came when I was spending my summer at my grandfather's. In the attic, I found my grandfather's military record during the Second Word War. I have always assumed that he had been in the war, but my grandparents never said anything about their wartime experiences. Hence, finding his military record was somewhat of a shock. Yet, what was more surprising was my response to finding the record. Immediately, I compared his military record to what I had learned about the Japanese military's actions during the war. From the record, I found out he was in Qintao City, China for about a half-year during the time the Qintao region had no major military operation. I remember having experienced a sense of relief: my grandfather was less likely to have taken part in the military and other violence of which the Japanese Army has been accused. I wonder why I felt relieved, and I could not find any good reason

other than the idea that it confirmed my *privilege* to castigate the past acts of the nation without a worry of putting dirt on my grandparents. I had learned the historical explanation castigating the nation's past war. However, when I learned that my grandfather had taken a role in the past, I wanted to confirm whether he could be excluded from my castigation of the past.

These two experiences expose how we comprehend historical explanation about the past in the present. At the Arizona Memorial, the visitors receive a version of historical explanation that is automatically and uncritically excluding Japanese and their historical explanation. The substantiality of one historical explanation is constructed through exclusion of those historical explanations that pose contrary views of the past. Similarly, my grandparents kept their silence in postwar Japan where the dominant historical explanation excluded the people who had taken a part in the nation's war.[18] These experiences suggest the difficulty in challenging and/or contradicting historical explanations that have gained notable popularity in present society. In fact, there are many similar examples where historical inquiry, no matter how rigorous the historian's practice may be, has not been successful in reconstructing what has already been a dominant historical explanation in the present society.

These experiences presented above suggest that historical explanations often provide legitimacy to the political deliberations and identities of the present. In this respect, we can understand that ongoing historical controversies around the world are not necessarily limited to the disputes over the differences in the meaning of history. Instead, the disputes are also about how we construe meaning in history in the present. It is not in

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[18] See the discussion in chapter 3 on historical explanation dominant in the public sphere and its causing violence to the people who have experienced the past.

question whether the past is the subject of history. However, the above stories suggest an idea that historical explanation is the subject of the present, and it is an important medium for inquiring into the impacts of the past and past events in the present.

History of Historical Explanations

The three stories pose questions about history and its functions in situating our consciousness of the present and its historical conditions. Iolanda's story poses a question about history's responsibility to/in the present beyond the disciplinary practice of history. The question troubles the assumed substantiality of history. The methodological inquiry of history is doubtlessly important in doing history as a discipline, yet the explanation generated from methodological inquiry would provide no answer that is sufficient to Iolanda. History is not limited to a disciplinary language, but provides both responses to and causal explanations for the present conflicts in a society. In this respect, the question on history's function in the present and its historical conditions is an important question today. This question, however, cannot be answered through the methodological inquiries of history alone.

Two other stories exemplify the impacts of historical explanations in the present. The first shows how we rationalize our present actions and conditions on grounds of the historical explanation that is dominant in our present social space. Furthermore, this story exemplifies the case in which a historical explanation of wartime violence became a medium to excuse the imputative punishments of the present on grounds of what happened in the past. Then, the last story introduces the case in which historical

explanations fix conditions in our understanding of what happened in the past. These stories highlight two cases in which historical explanations that are dominant in a society authenticate both the silencing and ignoring of other voices that may pose contrary or different explanations of what happened in the past. Moreover, the stories illustrate the case in which historical explanations have authenticated the present to make judgments on past events and the people who took part in them. The story exposes the reality in which the people who have experienced the past cannot speak safely about their direct experience about the past when it is contrary or challenging to the way the events are situated in a historical explanation.

The stories exemplify that historical explanations have substantial impacts on how we understand and/or rationalize present conditions as historically situated reality. Furthermore, historical explanations also provide us the platform on which we build reasons for and acceptance of our actions in the present. In this respect, it is perhaps necessary to differentiate history and historical explanation. History is a disciplinary practice of inquiring into the past and the products generated from this practice. Historical explanation, while it is also history's product, is the medium through which we understand and rationalize both past and present conditions. The substantial difference between history and historical explanation is that the latter can be the subject of historical inquiry. It is possible to inquire into the development of disciplinary practices and methods of historical inquiry—what some call historiography—but it is not the same as practicing historical inquiry. History is a discipline using particular methods to inquire into the past. Historical explanations can be seen as the reflections of how the present makes a sense of what happened in the past. Therefore, different historical explanations

are reflecting the diverse notions and ways the present relates to the past. More notable is that historical explanations freeze the ways people made sense of their present through what happened in the past. In this respect, we can inquire diverse ways people constructed an understanding of their historical conditions in the past through inquiring into past historical explanations as the subject of history.

This study will make an interdisciplinary approach to explore the history of historical explanations in order to investigate the contexts in which past events became the subject of historical explanations. The point to observe here is that this study makes a claim that no event is historically significant itself, because the historical significance of an event cannot be identified in the moment of its occurrence. It is perhaps needless to explicate the logics of this statement, but it can be represented through identifying the logical fallacy in a conventional saying—if I had known this would happen, I would have never done it. This statement is a logical fallacy because, if I had known what would happen in the future, there was no way to prevent it from happening.[19] Historical significance of an event, similarly, is given when the event became significant in the future of the time the event had occurred. In this respect, we can perhaps say that no event is *historically* significant in itself, and thus historical significance of past events is contextually defined. The contexts framing past events to make historical explanations are the product outside of the past. Therefore, it is the non-historical signifiers, contextualizing past events to construct a historical explanation in the present, that define historical significance of what happened in the past.

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[19] This is, in fact, a part of the questions posed by Aristotle. Further discussion on this point, see Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 9-11.

Exploring the history of historical explanation is important when understanding what makes particular past events into history's subject. Through understanding the driving force and the process in constructing historically significant meaning from the chaotic past, we are able to understand the roles of historical explanations beyond the disciplinary discourse of history. In the face of rapidly emerging and intensifying historical controversies in both domestic and international contexts, it is particularly important to identify the limitation of the disciplinary practice of history to resolve the conflicts in understanding and/or representing what happened in the past. In this respect, this study aims to differentiate history—history as a discipline—from historical explanation, which is history in sociopolitical contexts of its present. It is this study's argument that conscious differentiation of history from historical explanation would offer a new approach to substantiate historical knowledge and to offer dialogical resolution to ongoing historical controversies in the world.

Subject of Inquiry and Clarifications

In order to inquire into the history of historical explanation, it is necessary to investigate particular events in the past that are represented in the study of history and that are widely known as historically significant events in the past. This study therefore, explore the history of historical explanations about war violence, namely Hiroshima's atomic bombing. The choice of Hiroshima's atomic bombing is two fold: first, my being Japanese allows easier access to resources written in Japanese, and second is that this event and its significance are recognized around the world. Perhaps, it is fair to note that I

initially avoided Hiroshima for this study. When a Japanese person speaks about

Hiroshima, it often invites a defensive audience. A Japanese who speaks about Hiroshima

must be biased by his sentimental connection with the nation's past.[20] We all have

sentimental or emotional connection with particular past events when we study them.

However, this connection often becomes the very reason we invalidate historical

explanations. If I wish to overcome this dilemma, I should use a past event with which I

have close sentimental and emotional connection. Hence, this study employs Hiroshima's

atomic bombing and other war tragedies Japan had experienced in the Second World War

as the field.

For the purpose of this study, it is critical to have access to the resources written

in Japanese. This study will investigate how particular past events are thought historically

significant to build a historical explanation in a particular society. For this purpose, it is

important to be able to access newspapers, personal memoir and other media to explore

how the events were thought of at selected moments since the event occurred.

It is also important to note that there are diverse historical explanations of the

atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The Smithsonian's planned exhibition of Enola Gay, for

example, brought intense controversy in 1994 over how a public museum should

represent the past.[21] Furthermore, the 9-11 terrorist attacks created a fury in Japan when

the U.S. media described the place where the World Trade Center used to be as Ground

Zero, which has been the phrase used to symbolize the epicenter of the atomic explosion

in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 1995, the U.S. Postal Service's issuing of a postal stamp

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[20] I discuss this point in details in Chapter 3.

[21] For further discussion on Enola Gay controversy, see Martin Harwit, *An Exhibition Denied; Lobbying the History of Enola Gay* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1996).

featuring the atomic cloud with a caption, "Atomic bombs hasten the end of war, August 1945," caused an international dispute between Japan and the United States over how the atomic bombings of Japan is remembered. Similar controversies repeatedly surface between the two countries even today: such as National Atomic Museum in Albuquerque's selling A-bomb accessories, repeated references of atomic bombing when U.S. politicians spoke of the war against terrorism, newspaper columnists writing to justify the use of bomb as saving both Japanese and American lives, and so on. These incidents prove there are substantially different historical understandings about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and thus it is meaningful to explore how Japan has shaped its historical explanations about the bomb.[22]

Before introducing the chapter composition of this study, it is perhaps useful to clarify what this study is not. At a glance, chapters in this study seem to discuss various acts of wartime violence and their representations in history. It is important to note that it is not the purpose of this study to bring such discussions on what past events and/or how the past *ought* to be represented in history. I must admit, however, that at times I had difficulties, as a Japanese, in refraining from a sense of duty for bringing certain events forward to call wider attention to particular incidents that happened in Hiroshima after the atomic bombing. I have relatives in Hiroshima, and I lived there when I was very small child. Therefore, during my investigation of the sociopolitical contexts behind the public commemoration of Hiroshima's atomic bombing, it infuriated me as an individual

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[22] It would be most interesting to explore how the United States shaped its historical explanation of the bomb, and compare it with the Japanese counterpart. However, such investigation would easily double the length of this study, and it would distort the central purpose of this study: that is, to investigate the history of historical explanation for the purpose of presenting the possibility to substantiate historical knowledge and to offer dialogical resolution to ongoing historical controversies.

person to face the fact that the U.S. enforcement of the censorship in Japan about the

radiation impacts of the bomb caused the delay in providing help for the survivors not

days or months, but years after Japan's surrender to the Allied nations.[23] It made me

upset to encounter the information that, when the U.S. military forces collected data to

study the bomb's impacts on human populations in postwar Hiroshima, the survivors

were treated as specimens. Many survivors recall that they wrote their name in the form

where the caption was read *specimen* in place of *name*.[24] Then, it made me excited when

learning that Japan's antiwar movement during the Vietnam War helped American

soldiers who deserted the war to escape to Europe.[25]

It is indeed important work for history to bring those events and occurrences to

light as *the facts of the past*. Many historians, in fact, have already done and are doing

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[23] This study briefly discusses about the U.S. enforcement of censorship in Chapter 4, but the discussion is limited to introduce the sociopolitical background in which Hiroshima's survivors exercise their commemorating of the atomic bomb and its victims. For detailed discussion on the U.S. enforcement of postwar censorship in Japan, see Glenn D. Hook, "Roots of Nuclearism: Censorship and Reportage of Atomic Damage and Casualties in Hiroshima and Nagasaki," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 23, no. 1 (1991), Kiyoko Horiba, *Hyogen to ken'etsu: Nihonjin wa do taioshita ka* (Tokyo: Asahi Sensho, 1995).

[24] November 1946, the Presidential Order issued by Harry Truman had launched the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the name of providing help to the bomb's casualties. However, survivors' testimonies and the archival documents of the U.S. (declassified in 1980s) proved that ABCC did not have any intention or legislative means to provide medical treatment to the survivors in Japan. The booklet introducing ABCC to the bomb's survivors, however, clearly stated throughout the booklet that ABCC had medical doctors and staff to providing free medical help. The booklet was published by ABCC on July 5,1949, under the title in Japanese and English, "What is ABCC?", and it is available in the ABCC Collection at John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center in Houston Academy of Medicine, Texas Medical Center Library, Houston, Texas.

For further details about the ABCC, see the following studies and publications: Hiroko Takahashi, *Huinsareta Hiroshima/Nagasaki: Bei kakujikken to minkan bouei keikaku* (Tokyo: Gaihusha, 2008), Hiroshi Ueno, *Hiroshima sanpo* (Tokyo: Chobunsha, 1997), The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb, "*Genbakuhigai no inpei (sono* 2): *Marmot atsukai ni sareta hibakusha*," *Hankaku zemi 27* (March 18, 2007), http://www10.plala.or.jp/antiatom//jp/Rcrd/Basics/jsawa-27.htm (accessed March 30, 2008).

[25] There are some but not many studies on this historical event. However, there is a collected work of writings and memoirs of those who involved in the project to assist American war deserters in Japan. See, Shigeru Sekitani and Yoshie Sakamoto, eds., *Tonarini dassohei ga ita jidai: JATEC, aru shimin undo no kiroku* (Tokyo: Shiso no kagakusha, 1998).

much to introduce their findings of history. However, the knowledge about the past within the disciplinary circle of history has been very slow in making changes in dominant historical explanations. In his popular book, *Lies My Teacher Told Me*, James W. Loewen challenges the ways history has been taught in American classrooms as, "Feel-good history for affluent white males (that) inevitably amounts to feel-bad history for everyone else."[26] Loewen's identification of problems in history education in American schools is perhaps useful when thinking of why disciplinary history has not been successful in making changes to a dominant historical explanation with the new *findings* or *facts* of what happened in the past. Therefore, this study aims at no historical inquiry of presenting the facts about Hiroshima's atomic bombing and other war violence in the Second World War. Let us count on other historians to do that work. By the same token, it is not the purpose of this study to offer better historical explanation through challenging the existing explanations of the past. Let us also count on other historians and history educators to do that work. Instead, this study aims to explore an interdisciplinary approach to the history of historical explanations in order to bring a new perspective to understand history's subjects and the roles assigned to the past in the present.

Chapter Composition

This chapter has given a general introduction to the underlining argument of this study, and there are six chapters to follow. Each chapter is, of course, linked to each other throughout the study. However, I will also make each chapter stand independently.

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[26] James W. Loewen, *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong* (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 301.

Readers can start reading this study from the chapter that is the closest to their interests. It is my conscious decision to organize this study in such a format because this study aims to approach diverse audience: historians, history educators, politicians and the general public.

For historians, it is recommended to read first the discussion on historiography in the next chapter. Historians who are sympathetic to the Japanese discourse about what happened in Hiroshima are advised to go to chapter 4, 5, and 3. Then move to chapter 6 and 7. Historians who are more critical of the Japanese discourse about what happened in Hiroshima are encouraged to go to chapter 3, and progress to chapter 4, 5, and then 6 and 7. For history teachers and the practitioners of public history, it is recommended to go chapter 3, and then jump to chapter 6 and 7. For politicians and the general public, it is strongly recommended to read chapter 3, 6 and 7. This is how I designed this study, but this is not intended to bind anyone from approaching this study any way they wish.

It is now perhaps useful to briefly introduce here the discussion of each chapter. The following chapter (chapter 2) introduces historiography and its discussions about the scholarship of history and its construction of knowledge. The chapter argues for an idea that the knowledge of history is fluid entity—it is definitive as an existence but it is incorporeal as an entity that is always becoming. Historical knowledge is historically constructed knowledge as a result of historians' studying the past. The knowledge of history that is fluid (the fluid knowledge) is the knowledge that is transcendently true across the diverse historical explanations of the same past. In other words, the fluid knowledge is *the* knowledge in history as opposed to historical knowledge that is conditioned by the contexts of cultural, political, social, and even methodological

variations of conditions. Through exploring historiography—the philosophy of history, chapter two illustrate what makes history deficient in substantiating its knowledge. In the chapter's conclusion, I propose how history can move beyond its conceptual deficiencies.

In chapters three to six, I investigate the representations of Hiroshima's atomic bombing in different contexts and/or in different moments in postwar Japan. Chapter three investigates the process through which personal memories become publicly available resources to construct an understanding of what happened in the past. By differentiating memories from testimonies, the chapter illuminates a complex process in constructing testimonies, which allows a person's private experiences to be used publicly. The chapter then identifies the violence that occurs when testimonies are used outside of their intended context to construct a historical explanation. Chapter four shifts our perspective of inquiry from private construction of testimony to public practice of commemorating the atomic bombing, particularly in Hiroshima. The chapter's main focus is to illustrate the process through which the atomic bombing became the subject to be commemorated in Hiroshima. The bomb brought the city enormous tragedy and painful memory, and there had been conscious efforts to *actively forget* many wartime atrocities and tragedies, which include the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The chapter thus investigates the driving discourse that made Hiroshima actively commemorate the bombing despite the painful memory it wrought to the survivors. Chapter five investigates the process through which Hiroshima's atomic bombing became a nationally shared experience. Not all wartime events became the subject of commemoration in the postwar Japan, even though there were many events that claimed a larger number of casualties. Instead of assuming the historical significance of Hiroshima's atomic bombing

as inevitable, chapters four and five together make a genealogical inquiry into how the atomic bombing has become a collectively shared experience in the postwar public sphere of Japan.

Chapter six shifts the discussion to contemporary constructions of the historical significance and the meanings about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. There are diverse historical explanations of the atomic bombing. Therefore, there is a question as to how we should define what to be represented and what meanings to be authenticated as the knowledge that can stand substantial in respect to the plurality of historical explanations. The chapter investigates Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bombing, the newest and first national memorial museum built inside the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, to inquire how the museum tries to substantiate its exhibition in response to the diverse understandings and representations of the atomic bombing in the public sphere. Through using the museum visitor notebooks, the chapter inquires about the museum as a model case to seek the knowledge in history that is incorporeal and ceaselessly transforming.

The final chapter, chapter seven, concludes with a proposition that history's knowledge is an entity while it is also an incorporeal entity that is ceaselessly changing. Taking upon the notion of fluid knowledge generated in the previous chapter, this chapter pushes forward an argument to propose a different kind of knowledge to history and its knowledge construction. This chapter proposes history of historical explanation as an additional method to push the notion of knowledge that is incorporeal not in place of but in addition to already existing historical knowledge.

Again, this study does not intend to make additional historical explanations about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. This study does not intend to challenge preexisting historical explanations or choose any particular historical explanations. It is also not the intention of this study to introduce a mechanism to bring hierarchy to diverse historical explanations. This study, instead, merely proposes a new kind of knowledge for history. However, it is my firm argument that this attempt to propose a new kind of knowledge will introduce additional horizons to the scholarship of history and its knowledge construction.

Chapter 2

History and Historical Controversy

> There have been, and perhaps there still are, parts of science which have not passed beyond the mere making of observations, the collecting of specimens, and the like. Ordinary history might be just such a science.
>
> —Arthur C. Danto[1]

Historical Revisionism and Revising History

Historical controversy often invites challenges and criticisms to those attempting to rewrite or revise current and presiding historical explanation(s). However, it is important to call our attention to the fact that history is never exempt from revisions. If we accept the generalization that history is about the past, we have to also accept the reality that we would not have known the historical significance of past events at the time the events were still in progress. For instance, the historical significance of the 9-11 attacks is better known today—in terms of the events complexity in history—than in the moment immediately after the terrorists crashed the airplanes. We understand the significance of the attacks in history in the light of many events that followed after the attacks.

In this respect, while the *facts about the past* may be fixed, the *meanings of the past* are never fixed so long as the future is unknown. In other words, all historical explanations are open to revisions in light of everything that could not have been known at the time the events occurred in the past. Therefore, the knowledge of history we have

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[1] Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 4.

today is also open to revision because we have no definitive knowledge about what will happen in our future.[2] Explanations of the past that refuse to be revised are not history. Instead, they would merely be myths or epics that are history-like but not history.

The fiftieth anniversary of the Second World War invited many historical controversies across the nation-states that had violent encounters in the past. These controversies made us aware that we lack a system to separate historical revisionism from an honest process in the scholarship of history—the act of revising existing historical explanation of the past. The problem is not that we cannot intellectually understand the difference between historical revisionism and the revision of historical explanations. Rather, the problem that needs to be highlighted here is that we, including historians, often use historical revisionism as a convenient label to rule out any *undesirable* challenges to the presiding (or dominant) explanations of the past.

Furthermore, when there is an instance of historical controversy, both historians and non-historians frequently cite *the historical facts* to introduce hierarchy into the plurality of historical explanations. Emphasizing historical facts to authenticate historical explanation is a rational practice of history. However, it is only useful when we need to differentiate historical explanations from fiction, myths and epics. In fact, when we emphasize historical facts, we assume those facts as the knowledge with which we can define the authenticity and hierarchy of historical explanations. Knowledge is equated to

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[2] The relationship between our inability to know about the future and the present limitation in constructing definitive historical knowledge is the application of an Aristotelian dilemma, as well as the application of the notion of regret. If we know what will happen in the future, we cannot do anything today to change the future. If we can do something to prevent something from happening in the future, we will not be able to know the future. Consequently, we can identify the meaninglessness of regret if we take it literally. If we had known something would happen in the future, we still would not be able to do anything to avoid something from happening in the future. See Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, for further discussion on this point.

a material property that can be owned, accumulated, and exchanged to construct

historical explanations. In current historical controversies, for example, we often discover

history seeking a political mediation in place of historical inquiry to resolve conflicts

between different historical explanations of the past.[3] The plurality of historical

explanations, therefore, remains the field in which political conflicts are waged to secure

the property value of one's own historical explanation against the historical explanations

of others.

The purpose of this study is to inquire into history that constructs the knowledge

to permit and promote the peaceful coexistence of diverse histories and the values

embedded in them. Therefore, let us start this study with a premise that the plurality of

historical explanation is the present reality. This study thus does not aim at adding

another discussion merely to confirm the importance of or the problems with the plurality

of historical explanations. To take the plurality of historical explanations as reality, this

study argues that history constructs knowledge that is infinite. More precisely, history

constructs the knowledge that is comprised of incorporeal entities which are "neither

agents nor patients, but results of actions and passions"[4] in our practice of inquiring into

the past. This chapter challenges the current practice of history that uncritically positions

its knowledge as physically attributed properties. For the purpose of a peaceful and

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[3] This chapter will discuss this point with actual examples of historical controversies. However, for the examples of politically resolved historical controversies, we can recall the controversy of the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum and its planned exhibition of the Enola Gay in 1994-1995. This controversy was met by a political resolution in 1995 with the Smithsonian's cancellation of the original exhibition plan and the firing of Martin Harwit, then director of the National Air and Space Museum. However, the controversy resurfaced around the same issue when the museum relocated the exhibition in 2003. This event shows that the political resolution of historical controversy did not provide resolution to the issues that are historically controversial.

[4] Gilles Deleuze, "Second Series of Paradoxes of Surface Effects," in *The Logic of Sense*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 4-5.

historical mediation of differentiating and conflicting historical explanations, this chapter

explores historiography to identify the problems in physically attributing knowledge in

history. I will then conclude the chapter's discussion with a proposition for history to

introduce consciousness of a kind of knowledge that is logically and dialectically

attributed.

What Is History?

This question has itself a long history, and troubled historians and philosophers of

history. The origin of the scholarship of history is said to have begun when Herodotus

wrote *The History*. Before Herodotus, there was no history other than chronicles and

epics to preserve knowledge of the past.[5] On the occasion of writing about Xerxes'

expedition against the Greeks in the early fifth century B.C., Herodotus made an attempt

to inscribe knowledge of the past in a form of *historiai*—an enterprise described in the

opening of *The History*:

> I, Herodotus of Halicarnassus, am here setting forth my history [*historiai*],
> that time may not draw the color from what man has brought into being,
> nor those great and wonderful deeds, manifested by both Greeks and
> barbarians, fail of their report, and, together with all this, the reason why
> they fought one another.[6]

Historiai is the Greek plural of *historia*, and it refers to the knowledge attained through

research and investigation. Herodotus made a clear distinction that *The History* is neither

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[5] This statement only refers to the European world. In Asia and South Asia, the scholarship of
history or history-like practice developed somewhat differently from European space of thought. This
chapter will briefly touch on this point later.

[6] Herodotus, *The Famous History of Herodotus* (New York: AMS Press, 1965). Parenthesis mine.

a chronicle—a simple record of the past events—nor epics—stories that mystify the past by indifferently prescribing facts and fictions.

Most notably, Herodotus approached the past as a philosophical problem with which one could procure knowledge about human behavior—specifically, why people fought one another. *Historiai* takes the past not merely as an object to be preserved but also as the subject of analysis with which people in the present seek meanings. Drawing from Herodotus onwards, history canonically is different from chronicles or epics on two accounts. First, history regards understanding the past as a philosophical problem: that is, the study of history is meant to interpret what happened in the past. Interpretation is, therefore, a necessary practice of history to procure the explanations of why and how something has happened in the past, and *its meanings in the present*. Second, history works within the *changes* that happened in the past. Historians are in the present. Historians investigate the *changes* in an event between two temporal endpoints of time in order to establish a causal relationship around the changes that took place in the past. These two points suggest that history is different from searching the chronically kept facts of the past. In fact, as the word *historiai*—the plural form of *historia*—suggests, the plurality of historical explanations was a reality even when Herodotus wrote *The History* in fifth century B.C.

Recent transition from *History* to *histories* symbolically suggests that knowledge in history is indeed fluid. This transition is an active and progressive recognition of the plurality of historical explanations, and it has introduced diverse perspectives to the reading of what happened in the past. However, it is important that the diverse perspectives brought active recognition of the plurality of historical explanations (and the

plurality of historical knowledge also), not the plurality of knowledge in history. The plural reality of history is conceptually problematic if we fail to make a clear distinction between the product of historical explanations (or historical knowledge) and knowledge in history. If we uncritically accept the idea that the plurality of historical explanations comes with the plurality of knowledge in history, it would likely lead history to altogether abandon its project for constructing its knowledge.

For instance, in *Re-thinking History*, Keith Jenkins characterizes history as a discipline that is "epistemologically fragile."[7] Jenkins argues, that past facts and truths are impossible to reach from the present, and thus what we deal with in history is not the past itself but the historian's perception of past occurrences. Therefore, every historian will reach different conclusions about the past so long as they do not hold the same perspective when studying the past. Jenkin's argument can bring forward the notion of knowledge in history that is much like a construction through patchwork—we get the picture of the whole past through the accumulation of the whole range of different readings of past events. This chapter stresses repeatedly that the accumulation of whole accounts of the past would make a good chronicle at best, but that it will never be anything like history. Jenkins is correct to differentiate history from the past itself. Yet, because history makes interpretive approaches to the past, Jenkins's argument is conceptually problematic when he stresses that different readings of the past would eventually bring us to a better understanding of what happened in the past.

If we make a collage of diverse historical explanations to understand the whole past, we then need a perspective that encompasses the whole perspectives of the past.

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[7] Keith Jenkins, *Re-thinking History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991).

This means that we need to have the ultimate perspective that is omniscient and that is also free of historical time. If we are unable to attain such an ultimate perspective to make a collage of diverse historical explanations, we are then required to wait for the absolute end of history to begin building the collage. This chapter noted a little earlier that historical significance of past events is not inherent to the past events themselves. Historical significance of past events is conditional to the present contexts that provide explanation to the past, and thus historical knowledge is always open for reinterpretation in light of everything that has happened after the events that *became* the subject of history. Therefore, until we come to the moment after which absolutely nothing will occur any more—the endpoint of history, we cannot build a collage to understand the whole past. However, such a moment is the end of our existence, and history, as well as everything else, would not have any meaning after such moment. We can also understand that accumulating the whole range of perspectives and experiences of the past does not provide us an absolute and unified historical explanation about the past. Instead, the accumulation of diverse perspectives and experiences of the past would merely give us a chronicle of different perspectives in the past.

There is an assumption of materialism when we authenticate our historical explanations, and the current historiography seems to place heavy emphasis on materialistic faith when defining the nature of knowledge for history. On one hand, the plurality of historical explanations is current reality. On the other hand, there is a strong emphasis on accumulation of accounts and/or perspectives of the whole past. It is the argument of this chapter that it is neither possible nor desirable to continue insisting upon a materialistic emphasis on the knowledge for history, because this limits the scholarship

of history to the pursuit of endless accumulation of the whole past. The accumulation of the whole past is both empirically and theoretically endless, and thus if we assume having an absolute historical explanation at the end of accumulation, history *cannot* construe its knowledge so long as we practice history.[8]

Let us then examine past historiography to identify what has been held as the definitive factors construing the knowledge in the scholarship of history. Inquiring into historiography is necessary in order to move the scholarship of history "beyond the mere making of observations, the collecting of specimens, and the like."[9]

Materialism and Knowledge in History

Enlightenment marked the pivotal point by bringing the pursuit of knowledge about the past to the office of historians. Authoritative interpretation of past events was in the hands of theologians before the Enlightenment. Reading past events was identical to the act of understanding divine intention in the West. The work of history was to give legitimacy to each successor of the governing power in East Asia where it was thought the governing power was entrusted to each dynasty from the Heaven.[10] In other words,

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[8] Refer back the quote of Arthur C. Danto cited at the very beginning of this chapter. Danto also criticizes history as being a part of science that has done nothing but accumulate past accounts without really constructing anything to be called historical knowledge. See Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*.

[9] Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 4.

[10] For another example of history and its development, Hidehiro Okada argues that the civilization of South Asia—India in particular in his discussion—was inherently incapable of having a concept of history. The civilization that emerged in South Asia held the belief of reincarnation. Therefore, Okada argues, the civilization that emerged in South Asia had developed a historical consciousness which situated people to comprehend the present as the result of past life and the cause of future life, at the same time. Okada argues that history, because of its technicality, would never go together with the idea of reincarnation because, while history deals with the world of humans, reincarnation establishes causality

before the modern practice of history, the world was viewed mostly as a reflection of the Higher Intention—whether it was of Heaven, God, or other Divine Power. The knowledge about the past, once generated by the theologians, was definitive and it was hardly open for reinterpretation. In fact, revising that explanation of the past was seen as an act of sacrilegion.

Montesquie (Charles de Secondat) asserted in his *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Rise and Decline* that there was a general principle of mundane rather than occult nature governing the whole rise and decline of monarchies in the past.[11] Montesquie's statement is significant because it marked the beginning of an era when the mode of historical explanation was transferred to the realm of human reality from the realm of supernatural entities. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* of Edward Gibbon and *La Philosophie de L'historie* of Voltaire (François Marie Arouet) also marked the divorce of historical explanation from mysticism, by actively negating forces outside human agencies from interpreting the past events.[12] This is the moment when historical explanations were differentiated from mythologies, and when the meanings of what happened in the past became open to reinterpretation in human circle.

However, the work of history has not been quite as successful at divorcing the transcendental metaphysics from ruling the interpretation of what happened in the past.

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beyond the human world—which includes the world of death, spirits, animals and God. For further discussion, see Hidehiro Okada, *Rekishi towa Nanika* (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2001).

[11] Montesquieu, *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Rise and Decline*, trans. David Lowenthal (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999).

[12] Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (London: Wordsworth Editions, 1998). Francois-Marie Arouet Voltaire, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. Thomas Kiernan (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965).

Martin C. D'Arcy, for example, reasserts forces beyond human agencies when constructing historical explanation in his book, *The Sense of History*:

> It would not do for a student to answer every question in history by saying that it was the finger of God. Not until we have gone as far as most in tidying up mundane events and the human drama are we permitted to bring in wider considerations.[13]

D'Arcy argues here to oppose religion and other supernatural entities in constructing historical explanations. However, he still ends the statement with a highly problematic and anachronistic remark about bringing "in wider considerations" to the office of history. Edward Hallett Carr critically characterized D'Arcy's argument: D'Arcy's argument is "to treat religion like the joker in the pack of cards, to be reserved for really important tricks that cannot be taken in any other way."[14]

It is generally accepted today that bringing back secularism or mysticism to works of history is not just unwise but also distorting of history and its knowledge construction. However, it often goes unnoticed that we are also guilty of uncritically emphasizing various isms—such as nationalism, localism, ethnocentrism, and even multiculturalism—in the same way that religious dogma and supernatural entities are emphasized to authenticate historical explanations. It can be said here that a historical explanation is construed *by something that is not the past itself—non-historical factors*. The scholarship of history, then, cannot authenticate any historical explanations by simply stressing past facts if non-historical factors are making past events into the subject of our historical

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[13] Martin Cyril D'Arcy, *The Sense of History: Secular and Sacred* (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), 164.

[14] Edward Hallett Carr, *What Is History?* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 95.

inquiry. Therefore, treating any historical explanations as the product of materialistic accumulation of past accounts is a false assumption.

The accumulation of raw accounts of past events itself does not construct historical explanations. Instead, historical explanations are made of not only things that happened in the past but also *non-historical factors* that make the past a significant subject for present inquiries. Materialism, assumed when constructing historical explanations, is only accurate when knowledge in history is nothing but a mere representation of the raw account of the past. However, past events cannot be empirically confirmed in the present, and thus we deal with traces of the past. Therefore, treating historical explanations with an assumption of materialism would lead us to deconstruct history as a discipline by situating a false end for the pursuit of the knowledge.

Rationalism and Knowledge in History

Enlightenment removed mysticism, and human rationality has replaced the supernatural entity in the interpretation of past events. Rationalism transformed past events into the subjects of historical inquiry, and historians, instead of theologians, took the office of interpreting the past as reflections of human actions in the schema of rationalism.

Rationalism formed two distinctive approaches when inquiring into the past. In *Narration and Knowledge*, Arthur C. Danto identifies substantive and analytical philosophies of history as two approaches of history to study the past. First, the substantive philosophy of history can be represented as an empirical inquiry into the past

meant to build knowledge of the past. It primarily argues for the methodology of

historical inquiry when it emphasizes knowledge in history as being the product of

accumulating accounts from the past. Hence, Danto argues that the substantive

philosophy of history "is not really connected with philosophy at all, any more than

history itself is."[15] The analytical philosophy of history takes on a theoretical approach to

the past.[16] Consequently, the analytical philosophy of history is itself a philosophy

"applied to the special conceptual problems which arise out of the practice of history *as*

well as out of the substantive philosophy of history."[17] Let us then look closely at each

philosophy of history and the kinds of knowledge produced and/or assumed in each

philosophy of history.

Knowledge in Substantive Philosophy of History

First, Enlightenment and its emphasis on human rationality brought an empirical

approach to inquiry into the past. To uncover *the whole past*, rationalism brought an

empirical approach to the accumulation of *whole accounts of the past* from documents

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[15] Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 1. This chapter will later discuss in detail the substantive philosophy of history.

[16] The analytical philosophy of history is often identified as the speculative philosophy of history in many philosophical study of history. However, this chapter follows Danto to identify certain approach to history as "analytical" rather than "speculative." This chapter will discuss in details about the analytical philosophy of history, but its approach to history is most symbolically marked by its theoretical inquiry to the past. Theory is not a product of speculation. Furthermore, to categorize a particular approach to history as "speculative" could bring a connotation that theoretically constructed history's knowledge is "speculative" product, and thus it is not real. In order to better represent the rationale behind the analytical philosophy of history, and in order to represent the analytical philosophy of history as a fair counterpart of the substantive philosophy of history, this study makes intentional choice not to represent theoretical approach to history as speculative one.

[17] Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 1. Italics mine.

and other traces of past happenings. The historian's work is to rebuild the past in the present through the accumulation of traces of the past; and thus knowledge in history means the same as the past in itself without any adulteration. This approach to the study of history was the product of the nineteenth century, when in Germany history became institutionalized as a disciplinary department of universities. The institutionalization of history came with an emphasis on rigorous objectivity, and Wilhelm Dilthey and other neo-Kantian scholars sought to study the past as an historical science, much like Kant had pursued natural science in the study of nature. Because of its emphasis on past substances—the empirical traces of the past, Danto identifies this approach to history as the substantive philosophy of history, and its emphasis on empirical knowledge of the past is also more commonly identified as Romanticism or Romantic historiography.

In his review of history writings of Romanticism tradition, Lionel Grossman argued that Romanticism sustains the view that history is to subsume and transcend what was constructed from the past.[18] Romantic historiography is contrary to the analytical philosophy of history, and it is critical of teleological readings of the past. Leopold von Ranke, a pivotal historian of Romanticism, challenged a hypothetical goal of history as being necessary for a teleological inquiry into the past. Hypothetical goals would introduce something that is not the past into historical inquiry into the past. Ranke argued, if history permits teleological inquiry into the past, it would assign history "to the office of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of future ages."[19] A

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[18] Lionel Gossman, "History as Decipherment: Romantic Historiography and the Discovery of Other," *New Literary History* 18, no. 1 (Autumn, 1986).

[19] Leopold von Ranke, *The Secret of World History: Selected Writings on the Art and Science of History*, trans. Roger Wines (New York: Fordham University Press, 1981), 21.

historian's work is, instead, to explicate past events without forgeries and the falsifications of subjective adulterations (or interpretations) of the past. The primary work of historians is, therefore, to attain the truth about what the past essentially was (*wie es eigentlich gewesen*).[20]

Romanticism therefore equates knowledge in history with past accounts themselves. Romantic historiography, thus stresses the importance of rigorous criticism of sources as well as the primacy of using primary sources in order to construct historical explanation that is representing the past itself. In this respect, we can argue that Romanticism aims to build historical explanation in two ways: (1) by minimizing subjectivity in the past accounts; and (2) by discovering past accounts that are unavailable today. Romantic historiography is still evident in our present practice of history and history's authenticating knowledge embedded in historical explanations. We can find the tradition of Romanticism when we casually characterize the historian's work as the act of discovering past truth—like archeological findings, and even those fictional explorations of Indiana Jones that are presented partly as an historian's adventurous search for past truths.

In his lecture at Cambridge, Edward Hallett Carr brought a challenge to Romanticism and its emphasis on objectivity of historical knowledge. Romanticism, as the substantive philosophy of history, stressed that historical knowledge should be substantive when history is empirically accumulating nothing but facts about the past. There is, however, a critical assumption in the substantive philosophy of history: that is, it treats past facts "like sense-impressions, that impinge on the observer from outside, and

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[20] Ranke, *The Secret of World History*, 21.

are independent of his consciousness."[21] Carr's challenge is especially noteworthy when it is examined along with the recent emphasis on multiculturalism in the scholarship of history.

The substantive philosophy of history provides rationality to multiculturalism in the study of history. Multiculturalism would bring more empirical accounts to what the past essentially was through *discovery* of other experiences that have long smoldered beneath the dominant experiences of past events. Yet, the substantive philosophy of history pursues the knowledge of history through the attainment of absolute objectivity regarding past accounts without any subjectivity from the present. Historians are required to accumulate past accounts that are free from any contemporary readings and interpretations of *past facts*. However, historians have no definitive means to differentiate the present emphasis on (desire for) multiculturalism from the multicultural realities of the past. Hence, multiculturalism in the study of history necessarily—though we may be reluctant to say it—constructs knowledge of history that is conditioned by cultural, political, ethnic, racial, religious, gender, class, and other constituents of present diversity of perspectives.

The substantive philosophy of history can, therefore, push for the plurality of historical explanations in order to accumulate more accounts of the past. However, the substantive philosophy of history is intolerant to the plurality of historical explanations because it assumes the knowledge in history to be made of transcendental and timeless accounts of the past without any conditions. In other words, knowledge in history is assumed in the substantive philosophy of history is seen as a permanently fixed and non-

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[21] Carr, *What Is History?*, 6.

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conditional entity. It can be said that such knowledge resembles the accounts in a chronicle—a record of everything that happened in the past without any added meanings and interpretations. In this respect, the ultimate goal assumed in the substantive philosophy of history is to construct *the complete chronicle*, indiscriminately recording everything that happened in the past. We can conclude with certainty that the knowledge attributed to the substantive philosophy of history is a fixed property, and thus it cannot coexist with the plurality of historical explanations.

Knowledge in Analytical Philosophy of History

Benedetto Croce, a Hegelian philosopher and historian, argues that all history is ultimately a contemporary history of thoughts. This is because history is inevitably written with the perspectives of the historian's present.[22] Robin G. Collingwood further develops Croce's point when arguing that historians are never able to attain complete knowledge about the past. Historians recognize past facts in relation to documents (texts and traces), and documents preserve only what was subjectively thought to be important at the time they were recorded.[23] Hence, historians always work with limited and subjectively selected accounts of the past when they seek knowledge in history. More recently, Johan Huizinga, a cultural historian, asserts that historical thinking always takes

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[22] Benedetto Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty* (London: George Allen & Urwin, 1941).

[23] Robin G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History: With Lectures 1926-1928*, edited with introduction by Jan van der Dussen (1945, reprt. London: Oxford University Press, 1994).

a teleological path—both implicitly and explicitly—as the concerns and conditions of the present would inevitably drive the historian's motivation for studying the past.[24]

These arguments all suggest that both historians and the historian's subjects—the records of the past—*cannot* be totally objective, and thus the substantive philosophy of history has a philosophical deficiency. The claim to empirical accumulation of objective accounts of the past is, in fact, "an extraordinary boastful claim, and one which a man cannot live up to"[25] when it is literally understood. Even if it is possible to empirically attain totally objective accounts of the past, we can only procure a chronicle instead of history. No historical explanation is a mere collection of records about what happened in the past; instead, it is a deductive description of what happened in the past rather than "a complete and total description of everything that has ever happened."[26]

The analytical philosophy of history, therefore, takes a theoretical approach to the past. The past is the historian's subject in seeking universal and timeless general laws that will be instructive to the present. A. R. J. Turgot and Marquis de Condorcet (Montesquieu), prominent philosophers of history in the era of the Enlightenment, introduced the notion of progress to align past events with what was viewed as the necessary course of progress in human history. In *The Future of Progress in Human Mind*, Montesquieu affirmed that enhancement of the human mind has driven human society toward progress. Taking examples of the betterment of human conditions, such as inventions in preventative medicine and the enhancement of social organization for

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[24] Johan Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought, and Art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth centuries* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954).

[25] Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 131.

[26] Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 1.

controlling environment, and the improvement of dietary practice, Montesquieu argued

that human society has ceaselessly progressed toward a construction of a society that is

free of disease. Montesquieu presumed here that sickness and death are the two

conditions undesirable to all human societies transcendentally throughout time. Through

identifying consistent improvement in human health conditions, he affirmed inductively

that progress is the universal and timeless force that has driven the development of

human history.

However, to conceptually interpret the past is often problematic because the

historian remains "a creature of time, place, circumstance, interests, and culture."[27]

Historians are also the product of history, and thus their understanding of the future is

also the construction of their own historically conditioned perspectives. Taking

Montesquieu's argument, a society without disease as an example—and the goal for

people to enjoy longer life—must have appeared to be a desired goal throughout human

history. However, it is important to note that a disease-free condition and a longer life

expectancy would not necessarily constitute the transcendental and universal factor for

progress in human history. The society without disease could contribute much greater

poverty and war, once that society's population growth reached its saturation point.

Moreover, the increasing needs of one society for sustenance could lead to the seizure of

resources via conquest, seizure and colonization of a neighboring society. Progress in one

society, therefore, could presage a simultaneous regression or decline of another society.

In this respect, conceptually interpreting past events could lead to involuntary distortion

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[27] Charles Beard, "That Noble Dream," *The American Historical Review* 41, No. 1 (1935). Reprinted in Fritz Richard Stern, ed., *The Varieties of History, from Voltaire to the Present* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), 324.

of the knowledge of history by simplifying what really were complex interdependencies of diverse elements and events of the past. Consequently, the analytical philosophy of history is often fallible when historians make convenient appropriation of past events in lieu of depicting a particular vision of the past as the transcendental and universal course of human history.

Nonetheless, the notion of progress is a widely practiced vision in the analytical philosophy of history. Two of the most prominent contemporary examples are articulated in *The End of History and the Last Man*, originally published as an article in *The National Interest* by Francis Fukuyama, and in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* written by Samuel P. Huntington, which may be taken as a counter argument to Fukuyama's theoretical approach to history.[28] Here, let us look closely at Fukuyama's argument in order to exemplify the characteristics and the problems embedded in the analytical philosophy of history and its constructing the knowledge.

In *The End of History and the Last Man*, social philosopher Francis Fukuyama argues that the fall of the Soviet Union would mark the end of history: that is, history as a dialectical sociopolitical struggle would come to an end with the triumphs of Western liberal democracy and free-market economy. Instead of taking history with "a conventional sense as the occurrence of events," Fukuyama presumed history to be "a single, coherent, evolutionary process...most closely associated with G. W. F. Hegel."[29]

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[28] Some, particularly the scholars emphasizing the substantive philosophy of history, may argue that the works of Fukuyama and Huntington are not writings of history. However, they are historical writing of the rationalist tradition because they establish instructive explanations from past events by way of projecting what has been *the rational course of actions* in human history.

[29] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1992), xii. Also see, Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *National Interest* (Summer 1989).

Fukuyama harbors what is remarkably similar to the progressivism vision of history,

which carries the notion that there is a theoretical endpoint to the history of human

evolution. Through applying Hegelian dialectics—the notion that history moves forward

by conflicts and struggles in human society, Fukuyama argues that history is a play with

an apathetic finale that gives itself a triumphant exit from the stage with the victory of

one paradigm (liberal democracy) to end all ideological views.[30] The end of Cold War,

therefore, marks the end of history because it brought "the end point of mankind's

ideological evolution"[31] to form a human government. History, as the study of inquiring

into ideological progress, will cease to continue after the fall of the Soviet Union, and the

end the Cold War.

Expectedly, there were many criticisms of Fukuyama's argument. However, most

of those criticisms have wrongfully presumed Fukuyama's argument. These critiques

have challenged Fukuyama from the standpoint of the substantive philosophy of history,

and they have argued that it is wrong for Fukuyama to presume an end to history.

Speaking from the perspective of the substantive philosophy of history, the end of history

means the end of all happenings, and that there will be nothing worthwhile to record in

human history in the future.[32] *The end* in the analytical philosophy of history is not the

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[30] This view is similar to the way Karl Marx interpreted Hegelian historicism to argue that human history reflects dialectic materialism. Marx thus holds the vision that human experiences of the past are purposefully interpreted progressing toward the condition in which material inequality and its associated problems will be resolved through Bolshevik revolution and other progressive changes.

[31] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 2.

[32] Perhaps it is needless to note here that such criticisms to Fukuyama's theoretical approach to history are misdirected. Fukuyama did not equate the end of history to the end of all happenings in human society because there are numerous contradictions within any given liberal societies still causing domestic (or international) conflicts and struggles. Even between so-called liberal democratic nations conflicts on issues surrounding the national interest, such as related to economics, migration of laborers and resource management, persist. Hence, the end of history does not mean the end of all happenings that construe

same as the empirical end of all happenings. To adequately challenge Fukuyama's argument, we have to examine the framework with which Fukuyama built his explanation of history.

Fukuyama, when he argues the end of history, ignored the possibility that conflicts and struggles within and between liberal democratic societies could still drive human history onward. Fukuyama holds a deterministic view about such possibilities when assuming that the triumph of liberal democracy would end all ideological struggles for the formation of human governance. Fukuyama's deterministic approach to the past is most evident when he writes, "[w]hile they [differences within liberal democratic societies] may constitute a source of conflicts for liberal societies, this conflict does not arise from the fact that the liberalism in question is incomplete."[33] Fukuyama thus offered a teleological explanation of the past to promote his deterministic interpretation of the history; that is, the present is at the endpoint of ideological development for human governance. His theoretical approach to history depicts human history as *a purposeful interplay* of transcendental causes and general laws, and it brings a deterministic lens when interpreting both the past and the future.

From what Fukuyama's deterministic vision of the past has missed, we can illustrate more about possible problems and shortcomings in the analytical philosophy of history. With his teleological interpretation of the past, Fukuyama overlooked possibilities such as (1) currently ongoing conflicts in liberal democratic societies to form a new political ideology other than what we have already known so far, (2) revival of

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history. Fukuyama argues that history as an ideological struggle would end after the triumphs of the liberal democracy as an ultimate form of human governance.

[33] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 20.

other political ideologies that were once defeated, and (3) the conflicts that are actually

the products of liberal principles in liberal democratic societies. Today, we understand

that Fukuyama's teleological explanation of past human development depends largely on

his conviction that liberal democracy is the ultimate form of human governance.

Fukuyama's argument, therefore, is only true within the theoretical framework that was

built to substantiate his vision of liberal democracy.[34] Therefore, Fukuyama's teleological

explanation of the past seems incomplete and naïve to present eyes, and we can perhaps

say that it is an extreme example of what the analytical philosophy of history produces as

the knowledge of history.

However, must all analytical philosophy of history be so naïve and deterministic?

A strong supporter of the progressive view of history, J. E. E. Dalberg-Action, promoted

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[34] It is arguably true that progressivism, as represented in Fukuyama's theory, has its future determined prior to the interpretation of past events. Identifying what brought defeat to fascism at the end of the last world war, for example, Fukuyama remarked that "Japanese fascism (like its German version) was defeated by the force of American arms in the Pacific war, and liberal democracy was imposed on Japan by a victorious United States" (12). Fukuyama argued here that fascism is political ideology that is bound to fail because of its structural deficiency of expansionist ultranationalism, which has brought people into ceaseless conflict with other parts of the world. Therefore, there were many places Fukuyama seemed to have no trouble when explaining past events, even those events highly controvertible.

For example, Fukuyama provides his teleological explanation to the atomic bombings as: "the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed this (fascist) ideology on the level of consciousness as well as materially, and all the proto-fascist movements spawned by Germany and Japan...withered after the war" (54). However, many studies have offered diverse readings of the impacts of the atomic bombings in bringing the war to an end. The nuclear explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which Fukuyama casually characterized as the killers of fascism, have still been the center of ongoing debates to settle their meanings in history. Furthermore, Fukuyama completely ignored the multitudes of debates on what led Japan to accept its defeat in the last world war, as well as what led the people to abandon fascism.

In his Pulitzer Prize and National Book Award winning book *Embracing Defeat*, MIT professor of history John Dower elaborated the importance of complex circumstantial events behind the liberalization that occurred in postwar Japan. The war destructions the Japanese experienced throughout their nation made it difficult for the Japanese people to see themselves solely as the aggressors in the war. The United States led Tokyo Trial, which provided no representation for the Japanese people, further contributed to the Japanese positioning themselves as the victims of the war and ill-fated national government. Throughout the study, Dower argued that liberal ideology was politically and carefully situated as the only course of action to defeated Japan, in order to prevent the growing popularity of communism. Therefore, we can say that Fukuyama's statement that the atomic bombings crushed fascism and brought the triumph of liberal democracy was an overly deterministic and naïve reading of the past.

history as a progressive science in *The Cambridge Modern History*. Dalberg-Acton stressed the *need* for human history to have certain directions: "we are bound to assume, as the scientific hypothesis on which history is to be written, a progress in human affairs."[35] Like Fukuyama, Dalberg-Acton outlined human history as the progress toward liberal society in which "every man shall be protected in doing what he believes to be his duty against the influence of authority, and majorities, custom, and opinion."[36] However the difference lies in Fukuyama holding the notion of liberal progress as *the universal and timeless reality* while Dalberg-Acton argued that the same notion is merely a *scientific hypothesis* (thus it is arguable and requires empirical investigation) for interpreting the past. Withholding a *rigid* presupposition (that is, that liberal democracy is the ultimate form of political ideology in the evolution of human governance), Fukuyama has interpreted past events in the light of a predetermined goal rather than considering of their preceding events.

The analytical philosophy of history and its theoretical analysis of past events would not be able to offer knowledge that encompasses the plurality of historical explanations because it does not have an internal mechanism within the theory to examine the validation of its hypothesis. Because historians make teleological inquiry into past events, the analytical philosophy of history projects a historical explanation that is not historical. Yet, history is different from chronicles, and the purpose of studying history "is not to know about actions as witnesses might, but as historians do, in

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[35] John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Baron et al., *The Cambridge Modern History* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1902-12). Quoted in Carr, *What Is History?*, 147. Emphasis mine.

[36] John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Baron, *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1907), 3.

connection with later events and as parts of temporal wholes."[37] For historians to abandon their teleological inquiry into the past "would be silly, and historically disastrous, as well as unfulfillable."[38] Historians like Fukuyama and Dalberg-Acton have the privilege of knowing what the actors and witnesses of past events could not have known when the events were still ongoing. Hence history and its knowledge are to some degree always signified by something that is teleological and possessing non-historical attributions.

From above examinations of substantive and analytical philosophies of history, we can come to the conclusion that neither approach to history has the means to substantiate knowledge in history by itself. Furthermore, we can also discover that neither approach to history offers the knowledge that enables pluralism of historical explanation. The subject of the substantive philosophy of history is in the past, and thus no historical referent exists outside of historical texts—past traces—themselves. Similarly, the subject of the analytical philosophy of history is timeless and transcendental in force. Thus historical referent exists always outside of history. "At the level of discourse," Roland Barthes argued, "objectivity, the absence of any clues to the narrator, turns out to be a particular form of fiction, the result of which might be called the referential illusion, where the historians try to give the impression that the referent is speaking for itself."[39] To recognize the historian's subjective intervention in the process of constructing historical explanations and historical knowledge embedded in them would foster

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[37] Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 183.

[38] Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 183.

[39] Roland Barthes, "Historical Discourse," in Michael Lane, ed., *Introduction to Structuralism* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), 149.

skepticism to both empirical objectivity of the substantive philosophy of history, and to the theoretical hypothesis of the analytical philosophy of history.

<center>Skepticism to History and Knowledge of History</center>

Long before E. H. Carr delivered his lecture, Friedrich Nietzsche pushed his criticism of the rationalism assumed in history and its knowledge construction. Nietzsche argues that study of history is a means to an end rather than an end in itself.[40] Nietzsche thus introduces relativity of historical knowledge, and his argument highlights the same important challenges to modern historiography and its heavy emphasis on rationality. However, it was natural science that brought more influential criticism to history and that posed skepticism toward knowledge in history that encompasses all diverse historical explanations.

Albert Einstein, for example, transformed the nature of knowledge in natural science with his theory of relativity in 1913. This theory gained widespread recognition immediately after astronomical observation had confirmed Einstein's argument in 1919.[41] Einstein's general theory of relativity highlights that the aspect of things observed is attributed to the position of the observer. This development in natural science then gave theoretical reinforcement to Nietzsche's proposition of the relativity of knowledge in history.

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[40] Friedrich W. Nietzsche, *The Use and Abuse of History*, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957).

[41] Albert Einstein, *Relativity: The Special and the General Theory, a Popular Exposition*, trans. Robert W. Lawson (London: Mathuen, 1954).

The constructive (active) consciousness of the observer's position and its impacts on forming the knowledge of history brought historians a dilemma: The science of history stresses the importance of the objective construction of knowledge about the past, but (1) the subjective nature of the practice of interpretation in an historian's work and (2) historians' inability to physically observe their subject makes objectivity a mirage, if not a luxury. Many historians like Charles Beard were in despair of history's inability to attain a positivistic mode of knowledge about the past. Beard bemoaned that history suffers from a philosophical deficiency because historians have no capacity to objectively observe their subjects. Historians, unlike other scientists—chemists, biologists, geologists, and even sociologists—who can observe their specimens in the fields or laboratories— can neither observe nor reproduce the past in their present.[42] Historians' inability to make physical observation of the past from the perspective of their present invites plain skepticism to history, and doubt of its ever-attaining knowledge that is relevant and significant to all people concerned. Moreover, the inability of historians to observe their subjects has been repeatedly emphasized when negating history as scientific discipline and when promoting history's inclusion in literary genres.

However, Jean François Lyotard offers a lens to scrutinize the frank skepticism of history and its knowledge construction. Lyotard situates relativism not with the knowledge of history itself but with the process of interpreting the past—with interpretation being seen as key to the process of transforming a chronicle into history. Knowledge in the postmodern condition, Lyotard argues, "is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production:

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[42] Beard, "That Noble Dream," 323.

in both cases, the goal is exchange."[43] In a highly technolocized complex society, historical knowledge, too, would not be concrete to all people in all conditions since knowledge carries no transcendental use or value in and of itself. Lyotard thus challenges the rationalism assumed in historiography and its pursuit of positivistic value of knowledge that is universal and transcendentally timeless, with the following three argumentative points: firstly, that there is no transcendental objectivity of knowledge because knowledge is contingent to the state of society. Secondly, that what comes to be knowledge depends on the modes of inquiry, which control our access to its production process. Finally, the value of knowledge is in its use-value, and thus knowledge may resemble a commodity that has no value in itself.

These points reinforce Carr's observation that "the historian, before he begins to write history, is the product of history."[44] The standpoint from which historians interpret past events is itself the projector of their social and historical backgrounds. Therefore, both Lyotard and Carr warn, when relativism is applied to history's constructing of knowledge, relativism will challenge history to stand as a scientific discipline. Relativism ends up supplying a philosophical support to such historiography that treats the past as "a child's box of letters with which we can spell any words we please."[45] Historiography emphasizing the relativistic knowledge offers nothing to the actual problems surrounding the plurality of historical explanations. Relativism, instead, would lead historiography to

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[43] Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brain Massumi, in *Theory and History of Literature, Vol. 10* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 4-5.

[44] Carr, *What Is History?*, 48.

[45] James Anthony Froude, *Short Studies on Great Subjects* (New York: Charles Scribner and Company, 1883), 21. Quoted in Carr, *What Is History?*, 30.

push history forward to a deconstructive end by inviting plain skepticism of the practice of history, and to its ability to construct knowledge.

For example, postmodern challenges to historiography, such as those posed by Keith Jenkins and Frank Ankersmit, promote the notion of *a total relativity* of knowledge in history. Radical emphasis on the postmodern view takes on historiography and argues that the past is simply unknowable, since the present has no way to attain transcendental truth about what the past essentially was.[46] Historians' products are only a matter of present perspectives of what happened in the past, and are perspectives construed from diverse past experiences.[47] These arguments assume the kind of the knowledge pursued in the substantive philosophy of history. In fact, taking on the substantive philosophy of history and its assumption of what construes knowledge in history, the arguments of both Jenkins and Ankersmit are impeccable because historians can only work with their subjects that are in the present, not those in the past. Historians' products can never be representative of what the past essentially was, as their products necessarily embody something that is not the past.[48]

Such argument would only be repeating criticisms to the substantive philosophy of history. Yet, Lyotard and Carr have introduced relativism to inquire into the process of the construction of knowledge in history, instead of merely challenging the substantive philosophy of history. Lyotard thus stresses the relativistic nature of knowledge in history that is in accordance with the use-value, in order to bridge the knowledge of history,

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[46] Frank R. Ankersmit, *Historical Representation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), and Frank R. Ankersmit, "Historiography and Postmodernism," *History and Theory* 28, No. 2 (1989).

[47] Keith Jenkins, *Re-thinking History*.

[48] Refer back to the earlier discussion on the substantive philosophy of history.

assumed in the substantive and the analytical philosophies of history. Similarly, Carr

introduces relativism to highlight that the authenticity of historical explanations is

attributed to the historical conditions from which historians made their interpretation of

the past. Both Lyotard and Carr stress relativism from the standpoint of the analytical

philosophy of history. Thus, they never really deny *the possibilities of objectivity* when

they challenge *the assumption of total objectivity* of rationalist historiography. Carr

elaborates on this point:

> It does not follow that, because a mountain appears to take on different
> shapes from different angles of vision, it has objectively either no shape at
> all or an infinity of shapes. It does not follow that, because interpretation
> plays a necessary part in establishing the facts of history, and because no
> existing interpretation is wholly objective, one interpretation is as good as
> another, and the facts of history are in principle not amenable to objective
> interpretation.[49]

Carr challenges the claim of total objectivity emphasized in the substantive philosophy of

history, but he does not deny objective reality in itself. No historical explanation can

sustain its legitimacy outside of serving discourse that is situating what comes to be

historical knowledge to begin with. In other words, history is *never* independent in itself.

Instead, history is always dependent on the historical conditions under which historical

explanation is formed and circulated to make historical knowledge about the past.

Therefore, "the sensitivity with which he [a historian] recognizes the extent of his

involvement"[50] in the construction, as well as subscription (consumption), of the grand

narrative is indispensable to transcend the socially and historically situated understanding

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[49] Carr, *What Is History?*, 30.

[50] Carr, *What Is History?*, 54.

about the past.[51] Knowledge in history thus is never concrete because the elements of the

past are open to ceaseless interpretation and reinterpretation insofar as there is

multiplicity of discourse in a society. Each discourse is locally and individually situating

interpretation of the past, and thus there is no grand theory that is universally and

timelessly transcending all discourses to define how the past *should* be interpreted.[52] The

historiography with an emphasis on relativism to its process of knowledge construction

promotes history that is found in multiplicities. The multiplicity of historical knowledge

then promotes *History* to be replaced by *histories*. The transition from History to histories

shows that history has abandoned its constructing of the knowledge that encompasses the

multidimensionality of perspectives that are generating diverse meanings of the past.[53]

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[51] Lyotard challenges the analytical philosophy of history because each grand theory proposed in constructing the knowledge in history "has always existed in addition to, and in competition and conflict with, another kind of knowledge." See Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, 7.

[52] This point closely resembles Delleus' argument on fluidity. For more details, see Tetsuya Higaki, *Delleus: Tokenai toi wo ikiru, Series: Tetsugaku no essence* (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 2002).

[53] For instance, the overwhelming majority of Ph.D. dissertations and other publications in the field of history borrow from relativism and its rationale to challenge history's knowledge that is built upon both the substantive and the analytical philosophies of history. History's knowledge pursued in the substantive and the analytical philosophies of history faces a challenge that says it is not being inclusive or conscious of marginalized experiences and voices in history. Oral narratives, popular culture, and various other aspects of human behaviors have thus gained validity as history's artifacts from which historians could furnish more and extensive empirical data and/or perspectives to provide historical explanations alternative or supplementary to already existing historical explanations that are dominant in the public sphere.

Taking an example from Early America, the late twentieth century saw a proliferation of voices that put forth their own explanations that had found no place before in the standing explanation made by the Founding Fathers, and the great Puritan value represented in the metaphor of the City upon the Hill. The experiences of Native Americans, women, Black slaves and others who have long remained invisible in the standing explanation of Early America have now formed the knowledge rationalized through relativistic challenges to rationalist historiography. For the Native American view of early America, see Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Knophf, 1998). For women's experiences in Early America, see, for example, Laurel Ulrich, *A Midwife's Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard, Based on Her Diary, 1785-1812* (New York: Knopf, 1990). For the Early America narrative from the perspectives of slaves, see Peter M. Voelz, *Slaves and Soldier: The Military Impact of Blacks in the Colonial Americas* (New York: Garland, 1993).

Most historians today would agree that history's diverse representation of experiences and voices has brought and will continue to bring us enhanced understanding of the past. Relativism has challenged the assumption of the singularity of historical knowledge, and it has introduced multidimensional interpretations of past events that are construing diverse historical knowledge. It is important to note here that relativism has simultaneously subjected historical explanations to constant reinterpretation. Relativism has instead, given us a way to produce a multiplicity of historical explanations from the same past events, without substantiating the requirement for ensuring how and if we could ever attain coherent understanding of the past and its meanings. Therefore, relativism emphasizes on historiography—not as the product of a relativistic historiography—has made the plurality of historical explanations possible. Yet, we must note that the plurality of historical explanations became possible by forgetting the actual pursuit of knowledge in history that encompasses diverse understandings of the past. If the knowledge of history is attributed to the discourse in which it has use-value, we can theoretically have a kind of knowledge that is forever multiplying. Forever multiplying knowledge, however, would not stand as knowledge when there is no substantive requirement to pursue a coherent end. Forever multiplying knowledge resembles trivia—a set of information bits disconnected from each other—that can be used and exchanged, but hardly producing anything more than being itself a piece of information.[54]

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[54] This trivialization of historical knowledge is vividly and commonly represented in public discussion of historical subjects. For example, history curriculum and textbooks used in public schools often have historical interpretation of the mainstream constituting the central narrative about the past. However, alternative interpretation with multidimensional interests of gender, race, and other minority groups is usually represented in boxes and other specially assigned space that is disconnected from the central narrative of the textbooks and curriculum. Browsing bookstores, the same pattern is evident. The history section is often divided between History and other *hyphenated histories* all independently occupying the shelves subaltern to the section for History.

Relativism has thus questioned the rationalist historiography by highlighting the inherent philosophical and pragmatic limitations: that is, in presupposing historians' ability to (1) have the knowledge of the future to draft a grand theory for deterministically interpreting the past and (2) have access to transcend time and space, to construct the knowledge that is free from all subjectivities. However, relativism lacks the method to *link* diverse positions, each of which builds its own knowledge of history. Hence, relativism ends up reinforcing plain skepticism of the scholarship of history, or it brings back the materialistic notion of historical knowledge by transforming knowledge into trivial property.

It arrives at the point where Danto cynically characterizes how the scholarship of history has turned out to be a discipline that cannot *construct* knowledge, in the opening of *Narration and Knowledge*:

> There have been, and perhaps there still are, parts of science which have not passed beyond the mere making of observations, the collecting of specimens, and the like. Ordinary history might be just such a science.[55]

The plurality of historical explanations became a reality under the relativistic approach to historiography. However, relativism has a philosophical deficiency, in drawing knowledge from forever multiplying historical explanations. Historians are caught between substantive and analytical philosophies of history when searching to build authenticity for each historical explanation. Yet those who employ relativism to explain what the study of history produces—knowledge—need to be aware of the dangerous temptations to permit the plurality of historical explanations by abandoning the pursuit of knowledge that is coherently linked to diverse explanations of the past. If we have no

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[55] Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 4.

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mechanism to identify such temptations, the scholarship of history would definitively be turned into an *ahistorical* discipline, and history becomes a skeleton—what was once a body becomes mere remains of the body.

Knowledge in History Beyond Materialism

Though it may be a little repetitive, it is useful to restate some key points in respect to the contemporary approach to the knowledge in history, before bringing in this chapter's concluding argument. Let us therefore depict history education and its knowledge as practical examples, in order to effectively situate history that is being practiced, in a contemporary context.

History in general is a part of the core curriculum of public schooling in most places around the world. Many scholars agree that history education has substantial impacts on students learning, and it shapes their national identity and ideological affiliations.[56] More precisely, history education has an important role in constructing and preserving the sense of membership in what Benedict Anderson calls *an imagined community*.[57] By promoting a shared understanding of what happened in the past, history

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[56] For example, see: K. Barton, "A Sociocultural Perspective on Children's Understanding of Historical Change: Comparative Findings from Northern Ireland and the United States," *American Educational Research Journal* 38, No. 4 (2001), 881-913; T. Epstein and J. Shilla, "Perspective Matters: The Teaching and Learning National History," *Social Education* 69, No. 4 (2005), 201-204; P. Seixas, *Theorizing Historical Consciousness* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); J. W. Wersch, "Is It Possible to Teach Beliefs, as well as Knowledge about History?" in P. N. Sterns, P. Seixas and S. Wineburg eds., *Knowing, Teaching, Learning History: National and International Perspectives* (New York & London: New York University Press, 2000): 38-50.

[57] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983). A similar argument can be found in Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). Shohat and Stam argue that media shapes our identity in the postmodern era by "experiencing community with people never actually seen, consumers of electronic media can be affected by traditions to which they

education provides people with a sense of belonging to a community. This community, however, is an imagined one, because these people who are geographically so far apart have had no direct physical interaction with each other and yet have come to share a common destiny as if they were in a coherent community. Today, it is commonly received *reality* that the same past events are not necessarily represented in the same way in each country's history textbooks. Furthermore, there are different representations of what happened in the past within a nation, and we have seen such differences causing historical controversy and fueling disharmony between diverse communities within an imagined community.

Taking the historical controversy over the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum exhibition plan for the *Enola Gay*—the first plane that dropped the atomic bomb upon human populations—for example, there were disputes between the United States and Japan over what historical meanings we should draw from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There was also another set of historical controversies within the United States over who should have the right to define the historical meanings to be represented in public institutions. The controversies, however, did not bring about a dispute regarding *the past facts* themselves.[58] Thus, the substantive philosophy of history could offer nothing to resolve the dispute, because both ends of the dispute have no quarrel with the fact that the *Enola Gay* dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

have no ancestral connection", for example. Citation is from page 347 of Shohat and Stam.

[58] This statement, of course, does not include those historical controversies in which there are disputes on positivistic facts construing the difference between historical explanations of what happened in the past. For example, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are past reality, and the fact that they occurred in the past has never really been the subject of controversy. Historical controversy questions the occurrences of the events themselves—such as Holocaust denialists claiming that there was no Auschwitz—is not the subject of this chapter's discussion.

Furthermore, we must note that the controversies did not pose challenges to the fact/possibility that Japan and the United States had differing analytical frameworks when the atomic bombings are examined as the subject of history.

The historical controversies over the Smithsonian's exhibition of the Enola Gay were disputes not of historical knowledge but of the ownership of the right to dictate the defining power of constructing/representing the knowledge, which is to be encompassing diverse historical knowledge generated on the atomic bombing. In other words, this historical controversy was a political dispute over the ownership of history and its construction of knowledge in history. Political controversies regarding history and its knowledge are commonly understood as historical controversy. This vague differentiation between politics and history suggests that each nation-state assumes its dominion of history as a vested right when history education is utilized to construct and/or defend the righteousness of the national identity in the present. When there is a representational difference regarding what happened in the past, it frequently develops into a serious dispute when two or more nation-states have shared the events in which they had engaged with force—such as wars, colonization, annexation, seizure and so on. By the same token, both historians and the public assume their ownership of history and its explanatory function. Taking the Smithsonian controversy as a political dispute not directly related to history or to the fact that it is building the knowledge on the atomic bombing in history, for example, we can understand that the dispute was about defending the right to construct historical meanings to be represented in public museums.

Historical controversies, if we exclude those disputes on empirical matters, are disputes over the ownership of history that has been assumed as a vested right. In other

words, the disputes were not over disciplinary matter in building the knowledge in history. I argue in this chapter that knowledge in history is (and has been) assumed to be a physically defined material entity. The practice of history, thus uncritically applies a materialistic assumption to equate historical knowledge—the substances constructing/constructed in historical explanations—with knowledge in history that is encompassing the plurality of historical explanations. History has treated its knowledge as the object for accumulation, exchange, seizure, and control. We can find that historical controversies more often meet political resolutions to balance property ownership than to further history's resolution, by constructing knowledge in history through examining the constituent elements of historical explanations.

There is the difficulty that no one has actual ownership of the past itself. The past is not in the present, and thus there is no physical entity to be claimed for ownership. In this respect, it is everyone's vested right to interpret the past. This is the same as saying that no one has the vested right to claim a definitive interpretation of the past. Today, we seem to have no definitive differentiation between historian's disciplinary product (knowledge in history) and the products of the popularized practice of history (the plurality of historical explanations found in the public sphere). Historians are thus unable to claim any special and/or disciplinary privilege to define their interpretation of the past as the legitimate works of history that is different from the casual interpretation or appropriation of the past in the public sphere. Therefore, if history cannot define knowledge that goes beyond its affirming plurality, history would, at worst, become a mere methodology bereft of knowledge.

Contemporary Takes on Knowledge in History

The correlation between history and politics can perhaps lead to a truism: we have not yet known a common ground to build a history that encompasses all humans. The truism thus promotes the argument that history can never escape from nationalism and other known isms until we build an imagined community that encompasses the whole human population. The truism also brings forward the argument that the past has infinite meanings. History and its constructing of knowledge have to be infinite in order to reflect the complex political, social, and cultural realities of the present. Neither arguments, however, offer any alternative nor do they overcome the condition that prevents history from constructing knowledge. More importantly, neither arguments answer to what the truism originally posed as history's dilemma in constructing its knowledge. Instead, they simply restate the truism not as history's dilemma but as the necessary condition of history to seek knowledge. It is logically false to explain the problems identified in the truism by simple restatement. Therefore, both arguments provide nothing but deconstruction of history's pursuit of knowledge.

If history (and history education) seeks knowledge that goes beyond the ideological framework of the present, it is necessary to authenticate knowledge in history outside of the truism. Today we find two dominant approaches to authenticate knowledge in history that corresponds to the plurality of politically conditioned historical explanations. First, there is a drive toward universalism that validates the knowledge by making it infinitely inclusive of all diverse historical explanations of the past. Then, there is a tendency to localism that authenticates the knowledge by defining it as only existing

within the contained context of each historical explanation. In the following few pages, let us also briefly discuss each approach to history before bringing the chapter to its concluding discussion.

Universalism: Multiculturalism and Knowledge in History

Knowledge in history validated under universalism seeks to be inclusive of all historical explanations. History, as noted earlier, has an important role in installing and maintaining a sense of belonging to an imagined community. In this respect, it is politically critical in liberal democratic nations to shape history (and history education) that is inclusive of all people who constitute the nation. Multiculturalism is one of such discourses with an emphasis on universalism; it provides political rationality for history to pursue knowledge that is universally inclusive of all people in the present public sphere.

Multiculturalism challenges the attempts for constructing a definitive historical explanation to define the knowledge in history. Defining such definitive historical explanation would necessarily introduce the relationship between the core and subaltern discourses constituting historical knowledge. Hence, what has become the core discourse would inevitably monopolize history and its knowledge construction, through selective inclusion and general exclusion of historical explanations of others. Multiculturalism frames knowledge as an inclusive product without a defining core. It should almost indiscriminately embody diverse readings of what happened in the past. The ultimate ownership of knowledge in history, consequently, belongs to no particular institution—

including the office of history. Furthermore, we can also find transnational multiculturalism that aims to build a historical explanation that is inclusive of all human populations beyond nation-state boundaries.

In this respect, multiculturalism *ultimately* seeks the knowledge that is to build an imagined community through implementation of a cosmopolitan identity that is supposedly inclusive of all diverse people and their experiences. Hence, we can argue that knowledge constructed upon a base of multiculturalism is the product of the analytical philosophy of history. Multiculturalism takes a theoretical approach to the past, and it draws meanings from past events to construct cosmopolitan identity. However, as does analytical philosophy of history, multiculturalism has a philosophical deficiency in its own theoretical approach to the past. Knowledge built upon multiculturalism permits plurality of historical explanations and their construction of multiplicity of identities. Multiculturalism, however, could also be antagonistic to those historical explanations that authenticate the knowledge of history through subtraction of and differentiation from the historical explanations of others. In this respect, multiculturalism invalidates its own theoretical approach of inclusiveness by being exclusive of those discourses that are actively excluding other people's discourses.

More serious challenge to the multiculturalism approach of history comes from how multiculturalism validates its construction of knowledge in history. Multiculturalism stresses the inclusiveness of diverse representations of what happened in the past, and thus holds more perspective about past events, and is linked to strengthening the authenticity of the scholarship of history to study the past. History under multiculturalism therefore seeks out the underrepresented voices of the past to make knowledge in history

more inclusive of diverse voices. In this respect, multiculturalism takes a very similar approach to the substantive philosophy of history when validating its approach to constructing knowledge in history. The substantive philosophy of history stresses the empirical accumulation of whole accounts of the past. Multiculturalism challenges the total objectivity assumed in the substantive philosophy of history, but it also stresses a historical explanation that is inclusive of all *perspectives* of the past.

Hence history under the multiculturalism will face the conceptual problem that is similar to that identified in the substantive philosophy of history. The substantive philosophy of history has the conceptual problem that, when it succeeds in accumulating the accounts of the whole past, it would at best construct a complete chronicle—not a history—of the whole past. Similarly, the accumulation of whole perspectives of past events will construct a complete set of *anthologies* about the past. Neither chronicle nor anthologies are the product of history, and thus they are not knowledge in history in themselves. However, we must note that multiculturalism poses another severe philosophical deficiency in its construction of knowledge in history.

Substantive philosophy of history has a theoretical endpoint when accumulating accounts of what happened in the past. However, multiculturalism has no theoretical endpoint to its accumulating perspectives of what happened in the past. It is conceptually problematic to authenticate a historical explanation through what has been accumulated as perspectives of what happened in the past. Perspectives, once accumulated, become a *fixed* property. Therefore, perspectives accumulated to construe history that is inclusive of diverse historical explanations would not be the same as the present perspectives that are ceaselessly changing. In other words, there is an assumption that the present is a fixed

moment of time in which we can locate and accumulate perspectives that are fixed in the present. However, time is an entity that does not have a physical attribution. The present is always coming into being and passing away without their being any definitive entity to be accumulated. Multiculturalism can accumulate what was once the present perspective about what happened in the past, because all present perspectives are ceaselessly becoming ex-present (obsolete) perspectives. In other words, multiculturalism assumes knowledge in history as an imagined product that can be attained, external to the structure of time.

Multiculturalism makes knowledge in history unattainable property. Multiculturalism provides no philosophical means to construct knowledge in history more than what has already been discussed in modern historiography. Instead, it simply provides a similar illusion proposed in the substantive philosophy of history, and it validates the illusion with the analytical philosophy of history. It is false to say that materialistic accumulation of historical explanations will construe ultimate knowledge in history, and it is also false to claim a theoretical framework that can be inclusive of all diverse historical explanations about what happened in the past.

Localism: Narratives and Knowledge in History

Localism provides another approach to history that aims to substantiate the knowledge in history while acknowledging the plurality of historical explanations. E. H. Carr argues that "Knowledge is knowledge for some purpose", and therefore "the validity

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of the knowledge depends on the validity of the purpose."[59] In this respect, the use value

of knowledge in history can be defined similarly by the narrative structure of each

historical explanation. Localism positions knowledge in history as the locally constructed

product; and thus this knowledge is validated within the narrative structure of each

historical explanation.

Many philosophers of history such as Maurice Mandelbaum and Author C. Danto

have argued that historical explanations are fundamentally narratives, and thus the

explanation of history takes on the narrative structure. It is important to note that, when

they argue that historical explanations are fundamentally narratives, it is not the same as

saying that narratives themselves construe knowledge. Narrativism stresses the narrative

structure as constituting historical explanations, and thus it positions past accounts as

merely components that make up historical narratives. Thus, narrativism poses a

challenge to the substantive philosophy of history that assumes that past accounts

themselves are constituent elements of knowledge in history. Instead, past accounts are

only fragments, and they do not make up knowledge by themselves without narrative

structure that provides a structural network in which all past accounts are in

subordination to each other. Narrativism thus stresses the narrative structure as the

necessary medium to construct the knowledge in history.[60]

Perhaps we can recall here the earlier discussion of Aristotle's dilemma. If we

know what is going to happen in the future, we will not be able to prevent the future we

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[59] Carr, *What Is History?*, 31.

[60] It is not only Maurice Mandelbaum and Arthur C. Danto but also many philosophers of history argue the same point since late 1960s to respond to emerging relativistic criticisms to history and history's knowledge. See for example, Maurice Mandelbaum, "A Note on History as Narrative," *History and Theory* 6 (1967), 416-17; and A. R. Louch, "History as Narrative," *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1969), 54-70.

know from happening. Hence, if we claim we can understand the meanings (or significance) of the past event at the time it happened in the past, we need to have complete knowledge of our future that may affect how we assign significance to the past event. History then has no function, since history provides nothing when everything is determined. History, instead, seeks knowledge that is built from what becomes known about events in light of all things we came to know, after the events occurred in the past.[61] Therefore, history's ability to understand the past significance is limited by our inability to access the future, and this limitation becomes a serious constraint for knowledge in history assumed in the analytical philosophy of history.

Narrativism, instead of marking our inability to access the future as a deficiency, stresses limitation as the given condition for history to substantiate its knowledge. No historian can physically observe the past, and no historian has definitive knowledge of the future. Therefore, no historian can provide definitive and timeless interpretation of what has happened in the past. Instead, historians establish narrative structure to provide a causal relationship between the time something has not yet happened and the time something has already happened, When no historian can physically observe the past, the subject of history is not to identify what happened in the past; instead, the subject of history is the *changes* that occurred in the past. Hence, all historical explanations have a particular kind of causal relationship built between two temporal axes of time (Figure 2:1).

Knowledge in history therefore is constituted of two factors: there are past accounts representing traces of what happened in the past, and there is narrative structure

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[61] See an earlier example of the 9-11 terrorist attacks and the events' historical significance.

that brings a causal relationship to past accounts that are themselves fragmented. In this respect, historical knowledge, as well as historical explanations, is open for revision in light of emerging and/or changing perspectives of the present. Furthermore, it is mathematically valid to argue that a historical explanation is infinitely open for revision, because the present is infinitely providing the resources to draft a more complete historical explanation as we move toward the future. We can therefore understand that narrativism explicates the structural mechanism of historical explanation, suggesting that knowledge in history is an infinite entity that has no positivistic attributions, so long as we have no definitive knowledge about the future. Hence, narrativism argues that history needs validate historical explanations in light of two factors construing each explanation. Most importantly, narrative structure of historical explanation is a conceptual mechanism through which we build historical explanations, and it also provides us the perspectives to examine the authenticity of the claims found in diverse historical explanations.

Figure 2:1. The Causal Relationship of Historical Explanations and History-like Explanations

Narrativism, as a conceptual mechanism, is different from localism. Localism approaches knowledge so as to situate the plurality of historical explanations. However, many historians and history educators today recite the narrative structure of historical

explanations to give legitimacy to an historical explanation that is locally contained within a particular context. Localized historical explanation seeks to make whatever has use-value within the localized context into knowledge in history. Yet, making a historical explanation responding only to such localized context isolates such contextually conditioned knowledge from other historical explanations that may pose contrary views of what happened in the past. This isolation of knowledge within a localized context gives the historical explanation a seemingly inviolable position against any challenges. Thus it gives an illusion of timeless and inviolable substantiation of localized knowledge in history.

For example, the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum replaced its original exhibition plan of the Enola Gay with a whitewashed exhibition that introduces the plane as a technological wonder rather than a carrier of weapons of mass destruction. This new exhibition also provides a historical explanation that is construed from both past accounts, and narrative structure, to highlight the technological development of military aircraft in the Second World War. Through keeping the Enola Gay within a localized context of military technology, the exhibit clearly isolates the historical explanation to construct the knowledge that is structured by the official narrative of the museum. Similarly, in Japan, the Association for Advancement of Unbiased View of History argues that history is "the *story* of a people or peoples, from their origins, their adventures, their success and failures."[62] The association stresses history as narratives to justify the history textbook that affirms the national identity as opposed to "the

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[62] The Association for Advancement of Unbiased View of History, *ABC of Modern Japanese History*, online: http://www.jiyuu-shikan.org/ (accessed May 12, 2008).

masochistic view of history" that favors vague transnationalism.[63] Instead of stressing the

narrative structure to make a critical inquiry into each historical explanation, the

association takes a view that stresses narrative as the knowledge of history itself.

In these two examples, narrativism is misappropriated to validate actively

ignoring all other possible historical explanations in the present through localizing one's

focus upon a particular narrative structure and its historical explanation. Narrativism

localizes historical explanations not as its goal but as a method to highlight the narrative

structure of historical explanations. However, when localism misappropriates the

narrative structure to explain the infinite diversities of historical explanations, narrativism

does nothing but resurrect the aforementioned truism in order to provide an explanation

for the problems identified in the same truism. Instead of simply stating that it is

impossible to construct knowledge in history that encompasses the whole human

population, localism appropriates narrativism to argue that history can construct the

knowledge that is only valid within the narrative structure producing the particular

historical explanation. Localism takes narrativism as an end, and thus it provides nothing

to bridge diverse historical explanations. Instead, localism validates knowledge through

elimination of all different historical explanations.[64]

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[63] Throughout the postwar period, Japan has been repenting the nation's past misdeeds that caused enormous casualties and destruction both in the nation and in the regions outside Japan. Immediately following the war's end, the Japanese people began to attribute the nation's war responsibility to "only those people who have committed unlawful acts to provoke the war." Nationalism, therefore, has carried an undertone of wartime militarism throughout postwar Japan; and thus, history education in postwar Japan has been generally antagonistic and/or skeptical of anything promoting stronger national identity. Furthermore, the rapid rise of international communism in postwar Japan pushed the Japanese to become in favor of history education that seeks transnational and international identities. However, rapid globalization has brought awareness that history education pushing for transnational and international identities has weakened national identity in Japan. Hence, the aforementioned association stresses the urgency of reinstating history education that frames past events in the localized framework of the nation-state.

[64] Historians generally disagree with the notion of history-as-narrative when such notion is used to provide a support to the total relativity to history's knowledge. However, we can find the notion of history-as-narrative emphasized frequently when there is intense historical controversy across political, social,

The knowledge embedded in a particular historical explanation, therefore, will continue to be invalid in the narrative structure of other historical explanations; and thus localism cannot promise anything to build knowledge that responds to the plurality of historical explanations. Emphasizing narrative structure of historical explanations thus became a convenient method to dodge difficult problems that emerged from the plurality of historical explanations. Through casually stressing the narrative structure, localism utilizes narrativism to validate the whole process of historians' subjective practice of selection (as well as non-selection and ignoring), of analysis, and of interpretation of past events. Thus the subjectivity in the study of history becomes a mere component of historical explanations that are not only fundamentally, but also ultimately, narratives.

Today narrative structure of historical explanation is often emphasized to project historical knowledge of specific issues in a particular localized context. We do not see narrative structure as mediating diverse historical explanations for the purpose of searching knowledge that gives coherence to the plurality of historical explanations and their narrative structures. In this respect, we can perhaps argue that history is monopolized within a localized framework of historical explanation, if not monopolized by those who can define and/or construct their own framework to promote their own historical explanations. Narrativism, when it is misappropriated, has transformed history into a captive practice within each localized explanation of what happened in the past.

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cultural and other groups over the different historical explanations about the same past event. The emphasis and/or affirmation of the history-as-narrative are, therefore, not active affirmation of the plurality of historical explanations but they are passive resistance to defend one's historical explanation from the criticisms and challenges brought by other historical explanations. For example, see Hiroshi Aoyagi, "Learning the History as Narrative," *The Technology in Education, Utsunomiya University Bulletin of the Center for Educational Research and Training* 20 (April 1997), 122-135; Hidenori Mashiko, *Ideorogii to shiteno nihon* (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2003); and Masako Watanabe, *Jojutsu no sutairu to rekishi kyoiku* (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2004).

Consequently, narrativism defines knowledge in history that allows the plurality of historical explanations. But each explanation of history exists independently as if there were a principle of non-intervention.

Memory as Knowledge of the Past

This chapter's discussion brings one substantial fact into view: neither past accounts nor present perspectives of the past, in themselves, construes the knowledge in history. The accumulation of diverse accounts of the past necessarily better represents what happened in the past. The substantive philosophy of history is true when it stresses the importance of empirical accumulation of past traces to show what really happened in the past. However, the analytical philosophy of history provides a meaningful challenge to historiography that faithfully stresses empirical accumulation of past accounts. Both knowledge in history and historical knowledge are different from records kept in the chronicle. Thus, the analytical philosophy of history stresses the use-value of the past by searching for the universal law that is timelessly true.

Then relativism provides a meaningful challenge to history and its knowledge. Relativism approaches history by questioning the positivism assumed in the scholarship of history. The accumulation of past accounts is not necessarily accumulation of past facts, because past accounts are not free from the subjectivities of both the past and the present. Furthermore, we can construct universal law only relative to our ability to access all the complexities of our present. Similarly, knowledge in history is timeless only relative to our ability to see the whole past and the whole future at the same time.

Relativism provides an approach to history that lends a sense of legitimacy to diverse historical explanations that have been silenced and/or hidden beneath the historical explanation that is dominant in the public sphere. However, relativism has lifted the dominant framework to define the truth as the knowledge in history. Relativism's approach to history has made the plurality of historical explanations into present reality, but it also has invited outright skepticism into the scholarship of history.

Both multiculturalism and localism approach history with contemporary attempts to substantiate knowledge in history, after the plurality of historical explanations has become reality. Multiculturalism challenges historical knowledge by questioning that construction of the knowledge encompassing the diverse understanding of the past would be simplifying past complexity, and it stresses that knowledge in history should be inclusive of diverse historical explanations. It assumes the universal framework that encompasses historical explanations of whole human populations, transcending cultural, social, political, and even individual frameworks. Yet, multiculturalism provides no means to construct a framework that encompasses the whole human populations. Therefore, multiculturalism offers a goal that is unimaginable as well as unreal. Localism, on the other hand, argues for the knowledge that responds only to a particular context that is fragmented from all other past contexts. It places historical knowledge within a localized context in order to secure the use-value of the knowledge within the particular context of the present.

These two contemporary approaches to history are in common when they do not provide any means to introduce constructive communication across different historical explanations. Multiculturalism pushes for a historical explanation that is universally

inclusive of whole human populations and their diverse historical explanations. However, while it emphasizes the knowledge that is inclusive, multiculturalism offers no means to respond to actual conflicts between diverse historical explanations within its universal framework. Multiculturalism stresses inclusiveness as the means to attain an end. However critical is that it has no end. In fact, when the future has infinite possibilities, it is conceptually problematic for multiculturalism to offer an endpoint to its process of inclusion. Similarly, localism approaches history by stressing diversity of historical knowledge in light of infinite possibilities of narrative structure, to build diverse causal explanations of what happened in the past.

Both multiculturalism and localism thus have no quarrel with the coexistence of diverse historical explanations. Multiculturalism introduces a universal framework of history that is inclusive of all historical explanations, and localism stresses narrative structure in order to argue for the sovereignty of building a historical explanation that authenticates the doing of history within a particular past context. These approaches are, however, quite successful in avoiding answering the most important question—what should knowledge in history be when the plurality of historical explanations is the present reality? This chapter thus argues that neither multiculturalism nor localism, in reality, provide any means to build knowledge that gives coherence to the present diversity of historical explanations. Instead, we can only see individual and collective memories replacing history's knowledge as the product of history study.

Recent emphasis on memory can be seen as the outcome of history's war against subjectivity. Memory is private property which embodies subjective remembering of what happened in the past. Collective memory (or collective remembrance) is often

emphasized in order to speak of localized knowledge within the narrative structure of a particular historical explanation. Similarly, memory is simply a paraphrase of historical knowledge embedded in each historical explanation that constitutes a part of the overarching historical explanation of multiculturalism. Therefore, memory study has gained popularity and it is now replacing history. History has also turned to emphasizing memory and collective memory as the product of history, instead of making efforts to construct knowledge in history that is responding to the present plurality of historical explanations. In other words, the recent emphasis on memory is the inevitable outcome of the assumption that knowledge in history has to be definitive in the present.

If knowledge in history needs to be definitive in the present, then conflicts and contradictions within the plurality of historical explanations cannot be rationalized without actively validating the subjective practice of history. The recent emphasis of memory, therefore, can be understood as the defeat of history. Memory (and even collective memory) may be a medium to construct historical knowledge, but it is not knowledge substantial across diverse historical explanations. Therefore when memory takes the place of knowledge in history, the study of history ironically becomes not only *ahistory* but also *anti* history.

Proposition: Concluding Discussion

The present visions and interests regarding a particular future influence how we identify and attach meanings to past events, and by thus doing, we make particular past event into the subject of history in order to construct what we call knowledge in history.

History produces an inverse projection of a particular vision of the future upon events that have happened. This inverse projection acts to select, highlight and map the sources and stories of events so as to support the construction of the desired future. However, the future is always in the making. Therefore, we can argue that the future is an entity of whose existence we have knowledge, but that it is also non-entity that has no physical attribution. If the present construction of historical explanation is inevitably linked to present subjectivity aimed at the construction of a desired future, then knowledge in history has to be the entity that has no physical attribution as well.

Therefore, history constructs the knowledge that is in the making so long as there is the future. Therefore, knowledge in history is incorporeal entity that is not made only of a definitive entity but of a ceaselessly transforming entity that existence is defined by the change itself. This is, in fact, an application of the argument of Gilles Deleuz on the notion of *becoming*.[65] Furthermore, when rejecting naturalism (or monological consciousness), Charles Taylor argues that the identity of human subjects is a dialogical construction through relationship with others.[66] Knowledge in history, as well as identity of human subjects, is always becoming, and thus it has no fixed entity—that is, it is something that has already finished becoming. Hence, knowledge in history cannot be substantiated on ground of materialistic presuppositions, because no one can claim the ownership of knowledge when it is ceaselessly becoming. It is only possible for us to claim ownership of dominating power to control the practice of history, or it is may be

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[65] Gilles Deleuz, *The Logic of Sense*, and also see Gilles Deleus, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

[66] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Boston, Harvard University Press, 1989).

possible to claim ownership of those that have stopped becoming. However, we often disagree with those who actively overpower our freedom to study the past and force their historical explanation upon us. In fact, what has already finished becoming is no longer knowledge in history, because it has seemed to become an entity that is physically attributed.

This chapter proposes knowledge in history has to incorporate the understanding that it is becoming. Through exploring the construction of historical explanations around a particular past event that is known around the world today, the following chapters will demonstrate the history of constructing the knowledge about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima at the end of the Second World War. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are known around the world, and they are particularly known in Japan as unforgettable landmark events of the past. However, the atomic bombings have not necessarily brought consistent meaning throughout postwar Japan, and there was a time the bomb was lost from the memories of the Japanese people. Therefore, the following chapters will explore the atomic bombing of Hiroshima to reveal the reality that knowledge in history needs to incorporate the understanding that is always becoming.

Taking on such a perspective to knowledge in history is a necessary approach to substantiate the plurality of historical explanations. Proposing knowledge that is an entity with no physical attribution—fixed knowledge—seems to be anti-knowledge. However, it is important to differentiate the argument regarding knowledge that is becoming, from those arguments that come from misappropriating the postmodern deconstruction of knowledge. Postmodern deconstruction, when misappropriated from the context of deconstruction, often negates all rationality and reduces everything to the exercise of

political power. The argument of this study is to provide constructive dialogue for building knowledge in history that is substantiating the plurality of historical explanation. In so doing, I propose history to consciously seek knowledge that is ceaselessly becoming. For history to incorporate such knowledge, we need to introduce a new notion of knowledge that is not a definitive entity like what we usually call a product of history. Instead, we will discuss knowledge as a fluid entity—fluid knowledge—that is ceaselessly constructing a dialogical condition in which the plurality of historical explanations can be a constructive and welcomed reality for the discipline of history.

Chapter 3

Testimonies and Memories of Historical Events

> In such occasion [atomic catastrophe in Hiroshima],
> no one can hold on to anything. People would run
> away leaving everything behind, even their parents
> and their child.
> —Toshi Maruki, *"Genbaku no zu no koto"*[1]

Hiroshima became the first target of the atomic bombings on August 6, 1945. Iri

and Toshi Maruki entered the city to search for their relatives only a few days later. Five

years after witnessing Hiroshima's catastrophe, they began painting the *Hiroshima*

Panels, depicting the horror they saw. The Marukis focused their efforts on art "because

we had seen Hiroshima, and we thought there had to be some record of what had

happened."[2] Like the Marukis, Miyoko Saito expressed in a *Chugoku shinbun* article on

the experiences of Hiroshima's survivors, that she had always wanted to tell her

experience to her grandchildren, but she was afraid of inadequately representing what

happened after the bomb.[3] She kept her memory to herself, but at the age of 69, an illness

almost took her life. After recovering, she began to write her story of surviving the bomb.

This narrative was written on only seven sheets of scratch paper, but it took Saito four

long years to complete.

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[1] Toshi Maruki, "Genbaku no zu no koto," *Asahi shinbun*, August 6, 1964. Throughout this chapter, I have translated all sources that are only available in Japanese language unless noted otherwise.

[2] Iri Maruki et al., *The Hiroshima Murals: The Art of Iri Maruki and Toshi Maruki* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1985), 125.

[3] Miyoko Saito, *Chugoku Shinbun*, June 19, 2005.

These testimonies are vital resources in learning how the survivors of the atomic bomb have dealt with what they experienced. While historians decipher the facts, testimony of living witnesses has been vital since the time Herodotus wrote the first historical account of the Persian Wars in the fifth century B.C. Today, personal memories, oral narratives, poetry and other literary accounts of living witnesses are frequently employed as a form of counter-history, a form of struggle against the dominant meta-narrative that is superimposed on the understanding of what happened in the past.[4] These two stories of Hiroshima's tragedy show that giving a testimony is neither a casual nor easy exercise of will. There are many examples of people feeling unable to speak of their past experiences. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims provide visitor comment books at the end of their exhibitions in order for people to leave their impressions. In these notebooks, many survivors have expressed that they see it as their duty to give testimony about the atomic bombing yet it is overwhelmingly difficult for them to talk about it. Behind each testimony, we can safely say, there is a struggle.

This chapter is not an attempt to present/represent a balanced view of Hiroshima's history by way of resurrecting alternative or silenced voices about the past catastrophe. Rather, this chapter aims to highlight the fact that metaphysical violence occurs when we uncritically demand and presume it possible to effect a 'balanced' representation of the past. Balancing how we represent past events is, in fact, an approach that is dismantling the notion of historical continuity and coherence that Foucault has challenged.[5] Yet,

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[4] See Michel Foucault's argument on this point in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977).

[5] See Michel Foucault, *Archeology of Knowledge* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

while translating the challenge put forth by Foucault into critical views of history

constitutes an end purpose in itself for contemporary practice of history, the strive to

ensure balanced representations of history and fairness to testimonies should be viewed

as a process of means to that desired purpose. In this respect, the process of 'balancing'

translates to acts that are essentially political in nature. Thus, the process of balancing

representations of history should be itself examined for its potential to endanger and even

suppress the very discourses (and testimonies) they hold as underrepresented and intend

to rescue.

In fact, there have been many efforts to build a transnational understanding of

history. In 2005, a joint Chinese-Japanese-Korean project for writing a common history-

textbook for the tri-country's past, for example, resulted in an alternative textbook, *Mirai*

wo hiraku rekishi (History to open up the future). Its preface stated: "Intellectuals,

teachers and citizens from three countries came together for this textbook project. In the

three-year project, there were at times conflicts over the difference of opinions. Through

dialogue and debate, we have reached a shared understanding of history, which we are

publishing in three countries."[6] A critical examination of this statement would reveal that

history, in contemporary thought, is no longer the domain reserved exclusively or

primarily for the historian's craft. History, instead, is under the contingency of popular

practices in the public domain, and has become a practice itself outside of the historian's

rigor and historiography. Popularising history that came with both theoretical

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[6] Nichi-Chu-Kan Sankoku Kyoutuu Rekishi Kyozai Iinkai, *Mirai wo hiraku rekishi* (Tokyo: Koubunken, 2005), Preface.

developments in traditional disciplines and societal changes, has, in fact, challenged

conventional historiography, and it has brought the "shift from *history* to histories."[7]

The popular practice of history has also brought an audience-centered approach

when history is represented in the public spheres.[8] The Enola Gay controversy of the

Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum provides here a pivotal example in which

public/popular practice of history and the discipline of history have collided. The

Smithsonian's controversy presents an actual case in which diverse representations of a

historical event were balanced out by political rather than historical acts in the public

sphere. In this process, testimonies given by atomic bomb survivors were invalidated as

they were silenced in a site where a certain public exercised influence over the history

represented.[9]

It is generally accepted that testimonies provide useful insights that offer more

balanced representations of the past. However, the political lens of the present often

evaluates the authenticity and validity of the testimonies made available in the public

[7] Louis A. Montrose, "Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of Culture," in *The New Historicism*, ed. H. A. Veeser (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 20.

[8] Museum studies have been more commonly approached than history about the public representation and practice of history as the subject. The studies of audience-centered approach in museum studies highlight the issues of museum's representing history's events in public spheres. For example, see John Kuo Wei Tchen, "Back to the Basics: Who Is Researching and Interpreting for Whom?," *Journal of American History* 81 (December 1994): 1004-10; Barbara Franco, "Doing History in Public: Balancing Historical Fact with Public Meaning," *Perspectives: American Historical Association Newsletter* 33 (May/June 1995), 5-8; and David Glassberg, "History and Memory: Public History and the Study of Memory," *Public Historian* 18, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 7-23.

[9] Enola Gay exhibition is not an isolated case where certain testimonies are invalidated. For example, Lisa Yoneyama, when exploring the politics of Hiroshima's remembrance in Japan, presents that testimonials of Hiroshima's atomic bombing have also been shaped to serve diverse actors and their own purposes. In the end, many survivors kept their experiences private. Kenzaburo Oe also exposed in *Hiroshima Notes* that the survivors of atomic bombing failed to relate their experiences to the testimonies presented in public spheres. See, Kenzaburo Oe, *Hiroshima Notes* (New York: Marion Boyars, 1995), and Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999).

sphere. Metaphysical violence is perpetuated at this point if testimonies are uncritically sorted out to serve particular interests and perspectives in contemporary society. The struggles behind each testimony are overlooked when we become indifferent to the process by which people's private experiences in the past are transported to a public domain. I submit that this violence is metaphysical in nature because no definitive subject who acts against those who have given their testimonies may be identified. Therefore, it is important to carefully study the miscommunication between different practices of history: political practice of history in public spheres and the disciplinary practice of history that is rigorously defined with historiography.

Political practice of history is the history seeking historical significance that is not quite historical in nature. The Enola Gay exhibition, for example, invited political controversies of whether a publicly funded museum should represent past events in a way that is critical to the national past or not. The controversy was, in fact, not necessarily on history even though history became the field of a political controversy. The knowledge is relative to ahistorical factors in the practice of history. Disciplinary practice of history is the history seeks the knowledge that is historical. It is assumed that the knowledge should be substantial. Therefore, the disciplinary practice of history stands contrary to the knowledge that is relative to the diverse political, social, cultural and other conditions of those and in which history is being practiced. To put this in a sentence, the difference between political and disciplinary practices of history comes from the different assumption we have about the nature of historical knowledge.

I begin with a brief investigation of the mechanism of how memories of individuals come to shape testimonies. This is to say that personal testimonies are the exposed

memory of individuals constructed from their experiences. In this respect, *memory* and *testimony* are different entities even though they both come from the same entity—an individual person. We need to make a conscious distinction between when memory and testimony are made. Memory is essentially a private property generated from personal involvement in past events; and it is an act of resistance against forgetting something that happened in the past. Testimony, on the other hand, is a communicative act to make some impact on others and inform their understanding of what happened in the past. Therefore, testimony is an exposed memory of a person; and thus it presumes an audience other than oneself.

Secondly, I argue that accepting testimony as raw and unadulterated accounts of history would result in overlooking the conditions in which individuals decided to share their memories in the public sphere as testimonies. These individual decisions should not be reduced to a matter of choice or desire independent from their political and historical conditions. To make these arguments, I examine literary presentations of individual experiences of wartime violence, as well as the conflict that testimonies presented in literary format pose against private memories. This analysis identifies testimonies as a medium through which private memory and collective remembrance are negotiated to alter historical consciousness over particular events in the past. This negotiation aims to reshape the presiding historical consciousness, and it consequentially alters our present perception of the past and the future at the same time.

Historiography for Peaceful Coexistence

Today, our global society is endangered by many conflicts that are sprouting across the planet. Intractable political and cultural clashes are threatening to dismantle the efforts for coalitions, as well as justify violence in the name of self-preservation of sectarian identities. The last decade has seen many coercive measures driven by military and economic powers, instead of the construction of a dialogue to resolve disagreements. In response to such measures, we have seen political activists, states, historians, and the media employ personal testimonies for the building of a counter-narrative to challenge those who support the perpetrator's historical, political, and moral righteousness.[10]

It is, however, commonly accepted today that historical consciousness is not globally invariable. Rather, it is the product of an ongoing complex process of synthesis and distillation of values, norms and historical contexts that are pedagogically promoted in the public sphere of a particular collectivity. In this respect, the emergence of a new global collectivity requires the concurrent construction of a new historical consciousness, which needs to embody a new set of pedagogies to entrust collective identity that is global. Such historical consciousness would likely cause conflict with the presiding ones and the values held within each nation or smaller collectivity. Historical controversy in

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[10] Economic globalization, which employs meta-narrative of free trade and prosperity to all, has faced challenging testimonies given by living-witnesses of exploited workers of sweatshops, as well as those who live at the bottom of the social economic ladder. Furthermore, in the current case of the global war on terrorism, military operations have faced challenges from innocent bystanders who were caught in the middle of unwanted violence. The media transmit the images of dead children, crying women and the destruction of cities to contradict the meta-narrative of this global terror war. For the first example, see Evelyn Hu-Dehart, "Globalization and Its Discontents: Exposing the Underside," *Frontiers*, 24 (2003): 244-60; Naila Kabeer and Simeen Mahmud, "Globalization, Gender and Poverty: Bangladeshi Women Workers in Export and Local Markets," *Journal of International Development* 16, no. 1 (2004): 93-109; Saadia Toor, "Child Labor in Pakistan: Coming of Age in the New World Order," *The ANNALS of American Academy of Political and Social Science* 575, no. 1 (2001): 194-224; and Bill Bigelow, "The Human Lives Behind the Labels: The Global Sweatshop, Nike, and the Race to the Bottom," *Phi Delta Kappan* 78 (1997): 112-20. For the latter example, please refer Robert L. Ivie, "Evil Enemy versus Agonistic Other: Rhetorical Construction of Terrorism," *The Review of Education, Pedagogy and Cultural Studies* 25, no. 3 (2003): 181-200; and Ehud Sprinzak, "The Lone Gunmen," *Foreign Policy* 172 (2001): 72-73.

East Asia, for example, has mounted to dangerous heights in the last decade. Yet, the actors of the controversy were not necessarily historians; instead, it was nonspecialists in political and public arenas.[11] In the case of controversy over conflictive historical consciousness, the differences are not merely on historical matters. Instead, the controversy is about the future prospects that may be generated from different historical consciousness kept in other collective groups.

It is critical to negotiate conflictive relationships at an international level when constructing a global community. Dialogue of tolerance, which pursues a peaceful coexistence of differences, is desired in order to ensure an ongoing process of synthesizing different values and ideas, their mergers and acquisitions for constructing fractioning collectivities based on the principle of mutually accepted multiplicity of differences.[12] This dialogue, however, requires that we transform our minds by renouncing our desire to uncritically subscribe to the pre-existing epistemological pattern. The study of history continues to be important. Yet, in order to respond to ongoing and emerging disputes in a globalizing society, this study argues that historical inquiry in itself is insufficient when building a consensus over conflicted understandings of past events since the conflicts are not necessarily historical in nature, but political.

Testimony as a Medium

Paul Ricoeur argues that, "there is no document without some question, nor some

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[11] See earlier discussion on the Chinese-Japanese-Korean history textbook project.

[12] Michael Walzer, *On Toleration* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997).

question without an explanatory project."[13] No testimony is independent from the historical consciousness on which it intends to impact, and no historical consciousness is independent from a testimony's bringing its explanation to the past and past happenings. Memories of individual persons entail both a desire to remember and a struggle not to forget certain meanings and emotions assigned to particular acts in the past. In this respect, memories constitute a document (evidence) for the study of history, and testimony is the medium that takes memory into the operation of historiography with its epistemological process to allow memories to be shared collectively in the public spheres.

Testimony, however, is a limited medium because memories are often an incomplete reflection of the past. Moreover, the dead did not leave testimony about their death and the present cannot access the memories of the deceased. Therefore, for survivors to speak of the past is to shoulder the responsibility of speaking for the dead, those who are unable to represent themselves or protest against what is being said about them in their absence. Furthermore, the dead might have not had any desire to be represented in the present. In such case, the survivors, when speaking of the dead, have to take the blame for *violating* the will of the dead. For survivors of war, to speak of their memories is a particularly difficult act. Too many have lost their lives in war; hence, the violence of inadequately representing the dead and their will is inevitable when giving their testimony.

Two poems of a Holocaust survivor, in fact, reflect very clearly about the enormous difficulties in the act of testifying. Primo Levi, one of three Italian Jews who survived

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[13] Paul Ricœur, *Memory, History, Forgetting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 182.

from Auschwitz, wrote:

> 'I came from very far away
> To bring bad news.
> I flew across the mountain,
> Pierced the low cloud,
> Mirrored m belly in the pond.
> I flew without resting,
> A hundred miles without resting,
> To find your window,
> To find your ear,
> To bring you the sad tidings,
> That taint your bread and wine,
> Lodge every evening in your heart.'
>> This is the way he sang, dancing, vicious,
>> Beyond the glass, upon the snow.
>> As he fell silent, he looked about, malign,
>> Marked a cross on the ground with his beak,
>> And opened his black wings wide.[14]

Levi wrote this poem, titled *The Crow's Song*, in 1946. In the poem, Levi traces himself into a vicious craw that brings bad news. In his testimony of what happened in Auschwitz, Levi writes: "No one must leave here [Auschwitz] and so carry to the world, together with the sign impressed on his skin, the evil tidings of what man's presumption made of man in Auschwitz."[15] Levi, however, survived from Auschwitz and came back to his home. His existence/survival itself thus became a medium that delivers bad news that remind all persons what a man can do to other human beings. *The Crow's Song* vividly exposes Levi's struggle: while he desires to testify his memory to keep the remembrance of Auschwitz, he does not want to become the vicious crow by bringing the sad tidings.

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[14] Primo Levi, *Collected Poems*, trans. Ruth Feldman and Brian Swann (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1992), 8.

[15] Primo Levi, *Survival in Auschwitz; and, the Reawakening: Two Memories*, trans. Stuart Woolf (New York: Summit Books, 1986), 61.

Levi also left a poem just a few years before his suicide under the title, *The Survivor*. The poem presents graphically Levi's burden to isolate his private experiences and memories from the meanings and judgements bestowed on him by the present readers of his testimonies:

> Once more he sees his companion's faces
> Livid in the first faint light,
> Gray with cement dust,
> Nebulous in the mist,
> Tinged with death in their uneasy sleep.
> At night, under the heavy burden
> Of tehir deams, their jaws move,
> Chewing a nonexistent turnip.
> 'Stand back, leave me alone, submerged people,
> Go away. I haven't dispossed anyone,
> Haven't usurped anyone's bread.
> No one died in my place. No one.
> Go back into your mist.
> It's not my fault if I live and breath,
> Eat, drink, sleep and put on clothes.[16]

Levi calls out his needs to speak of his memory and his experiences in this poem to satisfy the "submerged people" wholse lives were lost in Auschwitz. However, Levi seems to be haunted here not just by the dead, but also by the living who suspect Levi's survival as a result of Levi has "usurped [anyone's] bread" and "dispossed [anone]." Both Levi's lived memory of Auschwitz and what later became the remembrance of Auschwitz in the public sphere strangled him between the past memory and the present consciousness of what happened in the past. His past turns itself into a vicious crow knocking in his window, as well as in everyone's window. The submerged people of his past have never left him alone in his home that is far away from the past. The present casts its judgements on the vicious crow that brings bad news. The remembrance of the

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[16] Primo Levi, *Collected Poems*, 64.

past is never satisfactory, and the remembrance in the present does not recognize Levi's whole self, which includes both his present and his past, in its structure. Constrained in between of these two remembrances, Levi chose to terminate his own life perhaps to resolve his burden of not only his surviving the Auschwitz where many people like him died but also his living as a survivor of Auschwitz in the present.[17]

Indeed, testifying about the past entails the recognition of the heavy heritage whereby the survivors are compelled to undertake the memories of and for the dead. Testimony is thus not a pure reflection of the survivor's memory; instead, it is a dialogical product that reflects the survivor's relationship with the dead from the past and the living-contemporaries in the present. Consequently, memories are rarely exposed outside of a private realm because there are overwhelming fears of misrepresenting past events and the heavy burden of representing the past.

I argue, in the sense of Ernest Laclau, that the past itself is an empty signifier that is filled with meaning in several ways that interest this discussion: the frameworks of History, Public/Pedagogy, and Private/Emotion.[18] History (in the sense of academic and disciplinary exercise) assigns meanings to the past in a disciplinary frame. Rigor in history as a discipline is, according to nineteenth century historian Leopold von Ranke, "to show how it really was."[19] My argument here focuses on two other frames that signify the past and past understanding, and that are often juxtaposed to history as a discipline to

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[17] Some may argue what Levi suffered was the survivor's guilt. While I make no challenge to such argument, it is important to note that Levi committed suicide not only to escape from his past but also to escape his present, which sees him as Auschwitz survivor—a vicious crow.

[18] For the argument of Earnest Laclau mentioned here, please refer, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (New York: Verso Press, 1990).

[19] Cited in Edward Hewlett Carr, *What Is History?* (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1961), 5.

approach the past: Public/Pedagogy and Private/Emotional frameworks.

The framework of Public/Pedagogy outlines the past to construct or defend collective psychology. The ways that Japanese people in general situate Hiroshima's catastrophe are undoubtedly different from the ways that people in the United States frame it in their collective psychology about the past. Museums, media, schooling, commemoration, public memorials, and other public methods of remembrance are not accidental products, but are calculated exercises to strengthen and define the sense of collectivity. Therefore, historical controversy often occurs when two or more different collectivities begin transgressing each others' realm.[20]

The Private/Emotional framework often stands in conflict with other frameworks. However, such conflict is often overlooked because the past is outlined by a person's emotional involvement with an event in the past. Hence, it is insignificant historically and pedagogically outside the realm of the private. Memory is the past that has emotional significance to the individuals, and it is stored within the realm of the private. It is usually kept outside of history's interest, unless memory itself is the subject in history's study. For example, no one would really care about the memory of an unknown individual regarding an unknown event in the past, while the memory of Harry Truman about his decision to drop atomic bombs in Japan may become the subject of inquiry.

These three frameworks do not stand independently. Instead, they meet one another in the braid of our consciousness when constructing the past. The validity of what is being testified may be examined academically in the frame of history by comparing it to other traces from the past, such as documentary records and contextual balances. Yet,

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[20] This realm can be said of national one, as well as those of ethnic group, gender group, racial group and other categories of groups within a society.

when one's memory (raw material) becomes a testimony (evidence to be used in other frameworks), there is dialogical exercise across different frameworks and our historical consciousness is the product of this dialectic communication amongst historical, public and private frameworks.

Testimony is incumbent to historiography because it bridges the private/emotional framework and the public/pedagogical framework when constructing historical consciousness. There are many writings about the atomic bombings, and they would provide rich resources to provide critical look at testimonies that were significant in constructing the historical consciousness in post-war Japan. This chapter's inquiry into those testimonies ultimately aims to reinstate the dynamics of testimony as a dialogical medium to bring private experiences into the public sphere, and reshape historical consciousness to carry certain pedagogy in the public spheres from the past experiences. Therefore, testimonies selected for this study were not chosen for their literary qualities or popularity, nor do they offer a thorough survey of the literature of atomic bomb survivors. My enquiries focus only on those testimonies written or spoken by the survivors themselves. I used extensively the writings of Sadako Kurihara for two purposes. First, Kurihara experienced the tragedy first hand. Second, she was an activist in the anti-war and anti-nuclear armament movements throughout her life since the end of the last world war.

Testimony and Public Frameworks

Sankichi Toge was 28 years old when the atomic bomb hit Hiroshima. Although

he died very young in 1953, Toge published one of the earliest testimonies of the

catastrophe. *Poems of the Atomic Bomb* was first published two years before his death.

Because it was printed in mimeograph only to be distributed within a close circle, Toge's

intended not a specific audience outside of Hiroshima. His audience was mainly the

survivors of the bomb in Hiroshima. In fact, Toge dedicated this anthology to four

audiences: victims, survivors, witnesses, and those who abhor atomic bombs. "Dedicated

to those whose lives were taken by the atomic bombs dropped August 6, 1945 on

Hiroshima and August 9, 1945 on Nagasaki, to those who have continued down to the

present to be tormented by the terror of death and by pain, to those who as long as they

live have no way of extinguishing their agony and grief, and finally to those throughout

the world who abhor atomic bombs."[21]

Toge opened his anthology *Poems of the Atomic Bomb* with a very abstract yet

direct rage against the bomb that took away human beings, "Bring me back! Bring back

the human beings I had contact with!"[22] Toge, however, in all other poems in his

anthology, did not rage against the past event exclusively. Instead, he emphasized his

decision to shoulder the difficult responsibility of speaking of the catastrophe to appeal

for present and future peace. Following the prelude, Toge presented his poems in a

chronological order: "August 6", "Dying", "Flames", and so on to depict what he saw

from August 6, 1945 until 1950:

> The brilliant flash—who can forget it?

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[21] Richard H. Minear, ed., *Hiroshima: Three Witnesses* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 304.

[22] Minear, *Hiroshima*, 298.

> In a split second, 30,000 in the streets vanished;
> the screams of 50,000 pinned under in pitch black
> died away.[23]

The "brilliant flash" was then followed by the death and by his witnessing of the dying

people crying in "the lonely dark":

> Ah!
> Why?
> Why here
> by the side of the road
> cut off, dear, from you;
> why
> must
> I
> die
> ?[24]

The decreasing syllable count strikes those who read the poem because they can hear the

last breath of the dying person on a roadside. Death coming in a flash taking over their

regular summer morning—and to most eyewitnesses, not preceded by the vision of a

plane dropping the bomb—subscribed the event to the realm of human disaster rather

than a socio-political or historical act. Upon surveying the early writings of atomic bomb

survivors, one finds hardly any discussion on the historical contexts surrounding the

bomb.

Tamiki Hara, who survived the bomb by being merely 1.5 kilometres from the

hypo-centre, also left his testimony. He committed suicide in 1951, so his early

statements were also his last as with the case of Sankichi Toge. Hara wrote about what he

witnessed in a notebook as he ran for safety. His memo later became the foundation of

his published testimony, entitled *Summer Flowers*. In the notebook, Hara described the

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[23] Minear, *Hiroshima*, 306.

[24] Minear, *Hiroshima*, 310.

catastrophe with a very calm tone. The memo contains no words of condemnation towards those who dropped the bomb. In the opening sequence of *Summer Flowers*, Hara evenly described the event without making any accusations to either actors or the contexts that brought the catastrophe to him and Hiroshima.

John W. Treat, highlighting the dominance of poetry and poetry-like writing in early testimonies of the A-bombs accounts for the, "romance of poetry [that] would transcend the details of the experience and grant it a universal significance". Then he argues that testimonies often, "resist the moves to change the experience in any way and instead pretend to freeze it in a 'catalogue' of vivid and unmediated memories."[25] Treat suggests here that the survivors and witnesses of the A-bomb and its catastrophe *chose* poetry as an act to resist critically reflecting on the bomb outside their emotions.

Yet, Hara's personal memo shows the absence of his personal agony and emotions. In *Summer Flowers*, Hara wrote many phrases hinting to his incapacity of finding his lost emotion after the atomic annihilation. "It was an encounter too sad for tears",[26] "Every face was miserable beyond words",[27] and other similar phrases suggest the incapacity of having any type of emotional response after directly confronting the catastrophe. Hara jotted down that, "Miraculously I am not hurt; must be the Divine wish to keep me alive and to report the state of chaos. Hence my duty is enormous."[28]

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[25] John W. Treat, "Early Hiroshima Poetry," *The Journal of the Association of Teachers of Japanese* 20, no. 2 (November 1986): 227.

[26] Kenzaburo Oe and Shoichi Saeki, *The Catch and Other War Stories* (Tokyo and New York: Kodansha International, 1981), 132.

[27] Oe and Saeki, *The Catch and Other War Stories*, 136.

[28] Tamiki Hara, "*Genbaku shokei*" (1950; rprt., in *Nihon no genbaku bungaku 1*, Tokyo: Horubu, 1983), 340-1.

Throughout his poems, Sankichi Toge also carefully controlled his emotions. In all

except the first, Toge did not openly expose his own emotions. Instead, Toge channelled

his poems towards describing the victims' pain to seek the emotional commitment to

build peace and rage against the atomic bomb. Toge depicted the disaster without

complex historical context, as Treat argues. However, his poems reveal that he

consciously resisted contextualizing his poems in order to change certain experiences of

his fellow survivors:

> Ah, that was no accident, no act of God.
> After precision planning, with insatiable ambition,
> humanity's first atomic bomb
> was dropped, a single flash,
> on the archipelago in the eastern sea,
> on the Japanese people;
> you were killed,
> one of 400,000 victims who died horrible deaths.[29]

In this verse, Toge emphasized the presence of those responsible. At a time when most

writings regarding the A-bomb depicted it as an accident or disaster, this statement is

notable. Furthermore, Toge employed the passive voice to appeal to the survivors and

witnesses to reflect without targeting of blaming specific actors or contexts.

Hara and Toge never once mentioned the United States, America, or Americans

when depicting the atomic annihilation. *Ex post facto* censorship was enforced even in

remote areas of Japan.[30] Both Hara and Toge carefully controlled their private emotions

in their narratives *partly* in response to the censorship and post-war political environment

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[29] Minear, *Hiroshima*, 362.

[30] Masami Nakagawa, *"Genbaku hodo to ken'etsu," 20seiki media kenkyuujo* 3 (2003): 42-47.

in Japan.[31] By keeping emotional aspects within the subtext of their narratives, they transcribed their memories into testimony that can be circulated in the post-war political context. Contrary to Treat's analysis, divorcing wartime contexts in early A-bomb narratives was not necessarily an uncritical act. Rather, it was a conscious act of pedagogically altering the historical consciousness on the A-bomb catastrophe held at the time when testimonies were given.[32]

Narrating one's memory is an intrinsic part of testimony. However, testimonies are inevitably contextualized in a present collectivity and its historical consciousness of an audience. When removed from the original context in which testimony was given, we are in danger of committing violence against those who have exposed their memory by approaching the testimony merely as one of many stories of the past. In this respect, it is difficult for survivors to give their testimony because (1) one's emotionally framed experiences have to be transplanted in the context of historical consciousness shared collectively in the public sphere; and (2) the members of a collectivity do not necessarily share the same emotional dispositions, which leaves the experience of the narrator solitary and isolated from the interest of a general public.

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[31] There might be other reasons other than censorship for their controlling their private emotions. However, when comparing the immediate increase of emotionally charged testimonies and other writings of Hiroshima after the lift of censorship suggests that the censorship was one of major factors controlling the survivors to publish their testimonies in early postwar Japan under the Allied Occupation.

[32] This phenomenon was not endemic to Japan. John Hersey gave a testimony of what he saw in Hiroshima for the *New Yorker* magazine, which became the first and most widespread account of its kind in the United States. Hersey began his narrative with a chapter titled, "A Noiseless Flash", which is followed by the testimonies of six people from Hiroshima who survived and witnessed the blast of the first atomic bomb. Yet, in his book, Hersey also dropped all critical factors that would cast light on the decision and act of dropping the bomb in Hiroshima. Furthermore, the testimonies of the six individuals Hersey selected for his book were descriptive rather than emotional accounts of their experiences. See John Hersey, *Hiroshima* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946).

Testimony and Its Contestation

Sadako Kurihara, also a survivor of the blast of the first atomic bomb in Hiroshima, once confessed the difficulties she had experienced in giving her testimony as a victim of the A-bomb:

> When we say "Hiroshima,"
> do people answer, gently,
> "Ah, Hiroshima"?
> Say "Hiroshima," and hear "Pearl Harbor."
> Say "Hiroshima," and hear "Rape of Nanjing."
> Say "Hiroshima," and hear of women and children in Manila
> thrown into trenches, doused with gasoline,
> and burned alive.
> Say "Hiroshima,"
> and hear echoes of blood and fire.[33]

Kurihara wrote this poem twenty-five years after the blast. While Sankichi Toge and Tamiki Hara died soon after publishing their first sets of testimonies, Kurihara had a long life and spent much time as an advocate for a nuclear-free world, using her poetry as a medium for delivering her testimony. Yet, because of this, Kurihara faced a unique challenge, one that many survivors have not openly faced, to resituate her testimonies in social and political contexts that have been transformed over time.[34]

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[33] Sadako Kurihara and Robert H. Miner, *When We Say 'Hiroshima': Selected Poems* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan, 1999), 20-21.

[34] There are testimonial stories that were financially successful and escaped challenges. For example, *Hadashi no Gen* [*Barefoot Gen*] is a very successful graphic novel series about the author's lived experiences of the atomic bomb, and there were films that featured the atomic bombings, such as *Nippon no ichiban nagai hi* [*Japan's Longest Day*] (1967) and *Nikudan* (1968). However, these testimonies have taken a form closely identified as fictional aspects with an image of reconstruction.

Ian Burma, through the analysis of the paintings of Hiroshima survivors, argues that they depict their experiences in isolation from everything in the world.[35] This isolation, Burma points out, transformed Hiroshima into a medium that indulges Japan's wartime guilt while emphasizing the enormous atomic annihilation without the historical contexts that brought it on Japan. Those who have experienced Japan's wartime aggressions are suspicious of Kurihara and her intention to give testimony simply as a victim without reference to her assailant face. Thus, the rhetoric in early testimonies has been thoroughly scrutinized and Kurihara lived long enough to respond to such scrutiny.

In fact, the remarkable recovery of Japan's social economic structure in the 1960s brought the world much closer. In 1964, 220,000 Japanese travelled abroad after the government deregulated overseas travel for the first time after the war. When Kurihara wrote the above poem in 1972, almost 1.4 million Japanese had travelled abroad, and 724,000 foreigners had visited Japan.[36] Japan then was experiencing people's increased mobility and frequent communication beyond its national boundary. This movement has brought very different historical consciousnesses into the nation's public spheres.

Kurihara sent the People's Republic of China, both to Mao Zedong and to the National Broadcasting House, a poem bemoaning the death of a young girl in the atomic catastrophe in protest to the PRC's nuclear testing. In reply, the PRC sent Kurihara a message, which said: "Production of A-bomb is the victorious event to all people in China. Our people will support making of A-bombs even if they have no trousers to

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[35] Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1994).

[36] Ministry of Transport, *Unyu hakusho* (Tokyo, 1964), http://www.milt.go.jp/hakusho/transport/shouwa29/ (accessed November 26, 2006); and Ministry of Transport, *Unyu hakusho* (Tokyo, 1973), http://www.milt.go.jp/hakusho/transport/shouwa48/ (accessed November 26, 2006).

wear."[37] Kurihara received severe responses to her testimony from Americans as well. In protest against the Vietnam War, Kurihara wrote her testimony to be printed as an op-ed in the *Washington Post* on April 3, 1964. While she received many supporting letters from the readers, Kurihara also received some letters belittling what she had undergone as an A-bomb victim. Kurihara wrote in the *Beheiren News*: "We thought our experiences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have easily been understood around the world. But, as seen in the reactions [from the United States], it [the rejection] is just so violent. Knowing this as a reality, we must do whatever we can do to bring a peace in Vietnam, to rescue Vietnam from the agony we have experienced before, and to prevent possible nuclear war in the future *by emphasizing our past experiences*."[38]

Facing such international realities and Japan's role in the Vietnam War as a supply base for the U.S. war efforts in Vietnam, Kurihara found herself no longer merely an innocent victim of the A-bomb. Instead, she found herself a part of a collectivity that plays (and has played) the role of assailant in the contexts outside of Japan. For Kurihara's testimony to be communicated to public spheres, she had to narrate her memory in a context transcending her own nation-state collectivity. Hence, in the same poem, Kurihara argues for the immediate need to re-transcribe her memory in a transcendental framework, one that recognizes all victims of war.

> Say "Hiroshima,"
> and we don't hear, gently,
> "Ah, Hiroshima."
> In chorus, Asia's dead and her voiceless masses
> spit out the anger
> of all those we made victims.

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[37] *Asahi shinbun*, August 4, 1965.

[38] *Beheiren nyuusu* (July 1967). Emphasis mine.

> That we may say "Hiroshima,"
> and hear in reply, gently,
> "Ah, Hiroshima,"
> we must in fact lay down
> the arms we were supposed to lay down.
> We must get rid of all foreign bases.
> Until that day Hiroshima
> will be a city of cruelty and bitter bad faith.
> And we will be pariahs
> burning with remnant radioactivity.[39]

Voices calling attention to the significance of Hiroshima reverted to the Japanese via the people in East and Southeast Asia. In the past, Japan had caused much suffering in Asia. At the time of her writing, Kurihara emphasized that Japan was still producing new victims by allowing the U.S. to hold military bases in Japan and sending troops from there to Vietnam. Through acknowledging all victims of war and wartime atrocities (both in the past and in the present), Kurihara sought to transform her narrative to be archived as a narrative of all war sufferers.

Kurihara once expounded in 1952, "As a survivor, I wish first of all to be a human being."[40] However, Kurihara, as a survivor, is only invited to give her testimony as a human being when her emotion is complementary to the historical consciousness endorsed in a particular collectivity. Her testimony, if it stands contrary to the historical consciousness, is minimized or even dismissed in the collectivity.

The Enola Gay controversies of 1994 and 2003 can perhaps elaborate how validity of testimonies were contextually defined. In 1994, the Smithsonian removed all reference to the nuclear atrocities from the plane exhibition, "to stop emotional

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[39] Kurihara and Minear, *When We Say 'Hiroshima'*, 20-21.

[40] Kurihara and Minear, *When We Say 'Hiroshima''*, 29.

manipulation."[41] Hirotomi Yamada, the director of the Nagasaki Council of A-bomb

Sufferers, commented furiously on NASM's calling off the original exhibition plan in

1995: "They [Americans] did something terrible that they can never speak to the world;

and thus they hid what they did. It is just like a psychology of criminals."[42] Furthermore,

in 2003, Terumi Tanaka, the director of the Japan Confederation of A-Bomb and H-

Bomb Sufferers Organization, bemoaned receiving a cold response from the

Smithsonian: "As victims of the A-bombs, we can't bear to have the Enola Gay, which

killed thousands of Hiroshima residents, on public display without including details of

the destruction it wrought."[43]

However, many in the US media undervalued such criticisms by arguing that Japan

places too much focus on painting a picture of their victimization by the A-bomb. In

2003, many US media organs published the editorial of Neil Steinberg, a columnist for

the *Chicago Sun-Times*, with the headline: "U.S. owes Japan no apology at Hiroshima

plane exhibit."[44] His article has been reprinted in many different newspapers around the

U.S., and it continues to be recited on the Internet. In the concluding paragraph, Steinberg

writes:

> The United States does indeed have things to be ashamed of. But World War
> II is not one of them. Shameful chapters—such as the internement of our own
> Japanese citizens—*must be compared to the unchecked brutality* in much of

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[41] The Air Force Association, *Memo to the Military Coalition and Associated Members on the Subject of Further Actions on Enola Gay Exhibit* (September 19, 1994), http://www.afa.org/media/enolagay/02-03.asp (accessed November 28, 2006).

[42] *Asahi shinbun* (January 21, 1995): 21.

[43] Associated Press, "Group to Protest New Smithsonian Exhibit" (December 2, 2003), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-87955740.html (accessed December 1, 2006).

[44] Neil Steinberg, "U.S. Owes Japan No Apology at Hiroshima Plane Exhibit," *Chicago Sun-Times* (December 5, 2003).

the world at the time. Before we honor the victimhood of others, we should honor our own. Before some group of A-bomb survivors guilts the Smithsonian into kneeling on a rail over the atomic bomb, I wish a delegation of Bataan Death March survivors or men maimed at Pearl Harbor would whisper their side... Harry Truman, a haberdasher from Missouri, perhaps the most ordinary American ever to serve in the presidency, was absolutely right to drop the bomb. The Japanese nation *earned* the Enola Gay's visit. The rest is just present day politics and the posturing of those not in any position to complain.[45]

In the article, Steinberg argues that history is an argument much like a war, and the Americans are losing because with "our standards and sensitivities, we paint a picture of ourselves that is extraordinarily bleak." The article concludes, "The Japanese nation earned the Enola Gay's visit. The rest is just present day politics and the posturing of those not in any position to complain."[46] Kurihara roared her fury against such voices justifying the use of atomic bombs: "If the dropping of A-bomb is an act of mercy so is the Imperial Army's massacring of 200,000 people in Nanjing and the Nazi's murdering of 6,000,000 in the gas chambers. All those were perhaps acts of mercy, too."[47]

Kurihara's long journey to give her testimony of her A-bomb memories met, once again, another dead end. Her testimony was again rejected because it would, "play on emotions,"[48] and its audience is, "likely to get a distorted understanding of history."[49] "We first must / wash the blood / off our own hands."[50] Kurihara has actively tried to

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[45] Ibid., italics mine.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Sadako Kurihara, "No Title", *Asahi shinbun* (November 19, 1994).

[48] John Correll, *Memo to Monroe Hatch on the Subject of Analysis of Air & Space Museum Script* (April 7, 1994), http://www.afa.org/media/enolagay/04-07-94.asp (accessed November 28, 2006).

[49] The Air Force Association, *Memo to the Publisher, Magazine Staff on the Subject of August 31 Revision of Enola Gay Script* (September 9, 1994), http://www.afa.org/media/enolagay/08-31-94.asp (accessed November 28, 2006).

[50] Kurihara and Minear, *When We Say 'Hiroshima'*, 20-21.

wash the blood from her hands by consciously standing against all wartime atrocities. For the victims, forgetting would mean to accept the rationale drawn by the collectivity of their aggressors. For the aggressors, acknowledging the emotionally signified meanings in testimonies of their victims would mean to give their victims authority to challenge forevermore the legitimacy of the frameworks of the collectivity. Although between individuals it is perhaps easy to accept emotion in a person's testimony, acknowledging the emotional baggage of a testimony, however, is problematic between different collectivities whose pedagogical frameworks sets contrary visions of history.

Yet, the survivors' memory is itself not conditional on the framework imposed by any collectivity. The memory of private individuals exudes the meaning out of their emotionally framed experiences. One's experience may be influenced by the historical consciousness and its pedagogy, but the memory, which one has attained through experience, in itself is inviolable by anyone so far as it is kept within one's private sphere. However, the state of facts today makes it possible to discuss the legitimacy and righteousness of one's testimony *only* in relation to the public/pedagogical framework imposed in each collectivity (and its pedagogical intent). When any specific collectivity is not identified, all testimonies should be as authentic as personal narratives are authentic to their narrator.

Kurihara had ceaselessly worked towards delivering her testimony until she died in her home on March 6, 2005. Facing continuous challenges to her testimonies and attempts to give testimonies, Kurihara, in her later years, shaped her words to have transcendental appeal:

Hiroshima, Auschwitz: we must not forget.

> Nagasaki, Auschwitz: we must not forget.
> Even if the first time was a mistake,
> The second time will be calculated malice.
> The vow we made to the dead: we must not forget.[51]

By tying it with Auschwitz—almost universally recognized as a wartime atrocity never to be repeated—Kurihara attempted to free Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the relativistic contextualization of the frameworks of multiple nation-state collectivities. The *truth* Kurihara held within her private memory, her lived experience of Hiroshima after the atomic explosion, came out into the collective sphere through multiple filters of historical consciousness endorsed in different collectivities. Her memory, when exposed in the public spheres as testimony, is already a negotiated product between Kurihara and the public spheres in which she speaks of lived experiences.

Testimony and Integrity

In the case of memory, its receptacle and actor (preserver) are one and the same entity: an individual person. A collectivity is the receptacle of historical consciousness. However, historical consciousness is not invariable because collectivities are fluid, with components and contexts always transforming. For example, 'Japan remembers the A-bombs' is a common phrase in public spheres. However, Japan as a nation-state collectivity is not in itself capable of performing the act of remembering. The actor remembering the atomic bomb is not 'Japan', but the people. Remembrance, as a private act of storing the person's experiences (memory) or a pedagogical act of commemorating the past to be shared in the public spheres (historical consciousness), is ultimately the act

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[51] Kurihara and Minear, *When We Say 'Hiroshima'*, 54.

of the people. If no Japanese talks about the bombs, they will soon be forgotten and

become oblivious in the historical consciousness of the nation-state collectivity and the

public spheres of Japan. In this respect, the historical consciousness of a collectivity is

permanently a product of the present communication about the past; and as such,

historical consciousness in itself reflects the image of the past as shared among the

present contemporaries, and not the actual past.

Yoshitaka Matsusaka was a medical student at the time of the bomb blast in

Hiroshima. Responding to Kenzaburo Oe, Nobel Prize-winning writer, who became

known of his advocating the voices of Hiroshima survivors, Matsusaka once talked about

the unwillingness of Hiroshima survivors to speak of their experiences. The people in

Hiroshima, Matsusaka said, do not want to do anything with people who might try to use

the A-bomb experiences to carry out their purposes in political circles. Many intellectuals

and writers had lectured Hiroshima's people about the unrighteousness of keeping silent;

but, Matsusaka continued, we have nothing but abhorrence against those who cannot

even comprehend the sentiments kept in silence.[52] In fact, those who give their

testimonies do not share the same perception with those who use their testimonies in the

present. To keep the integrity of their private experiences from being adulterated by

politicized contextualization in the public spheres, the survivors kept what they have

experienced and witnessed under Hiroshima's catastrophe deep inside of their memory.

Iri and Toshi Maruki entered Hiroshima soon after the atomic blast to help their

family. Toshi spoke for a newspaper article: "On such occasions [like the one in

Hiroshima], no one can hold on to anything. People would run away leaving everything

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[52] Translated and paraphrased from the article published in *Yomiuri shinbun* (August 6, 1965).

behind, even their parents and their child... We were put into hell where no humanity can stay alive."[53]

Hiroshi Mitsuda who publicized his tanka-poems on the A-bomb 38 years after the atomic blast wrote, "As I was walking on the corpses of boys and girls who were killed by the bomb, I instinctively chanted a prayer to the Buddha."[54] Mitsuda has long suffered the shame and guilt of having asked for his daughter's whereabouts of the people whose faces were swollen like blackened rubber balls near the hypocenter. Kuniyoshi Aikawa was 12 years old at the time of the bomb and gave his testimony 57 years later. He wrote with an illustration of his guilt of having left behind a woman asking for his help from under the wreck. He tried, but the physical strength of a 12-year-old boy was not enough to help her out on that day.

The feeling of shame and guilt comes from one's reflecting on one's private actions in the light of collective or moral virtues of the public space. Many survivors began telling their stories as their lives were drawing to a close. The survivors no longer feared facing criticisms and evaluation from contemporaries who never experienced what they went through. Recent testimonies show emotional struggles and deep agony from not having been able to help family members, neighbours and those who begged for their help from the roadsides where they were running to safety. We may note Maruki's phrase, "it was the hell where no humanity can stay alive; but many survivors have shown their pain of not being able to do humanly acts of saving others."[55] In this respect,

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[53] *Asahi shinbun* (August 6, 1964).

[54] Hiroshi Matsuda, *Sanga Dokoku* (year unknown), under "Sanga Dokoku", http://www.catv296.ne.jp/~cactus/sanga.pdf (accessed November 15, 2006).

[55] *Asahi shinbun* (August 6, 1964).

the survivors, instead of creating a dialogue, feared that their past acts would be castigated by present contemporaries when exposing their past experiences as testimonies.

A survivor visited the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall and left a message in its visitor notebook in 2003: "Wake up! You, *Hibakusha*[56] Our time is now scarce, yet you waste time complaining as victims. Get out and scold society; make some efforts for scolding society; brighten your life until you burnt out."[57] This survivor encourages living survivors to make an active commitment to carry out pedagogical projects in the public sphere, and scolds society for being still too far from making peace in the world. Yet, his statement also reflects the current reality that many survivors are still in fear of speaking out.

Many survivors still take their memories to their graves. Hajime Sueyama wrote about his private experience of the A-bomb in a notebook, but it was kept private until his son found it after he died of cancer in 1997. He wrote:

> I do not know why I thought of writing about the bomb. I have never spoken any word about it until this moment. I am now 63 years old, and it perhaps is because I feel somewhat loneliness in being forgotten gradually. I have experienced the bomb directly. As such, I will never forgive the statespersons [who politicize the bomb and talking about the bomb]. They have not experienced the bomb, but they praised themselves as the forerunner of Peace Movement. "I cannot forgive the A-bomb."

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[56] *Hibakusha* is in Japanese term to represent the persons (1) who were exposed to radiation and (2) who were the victims of atomic bombs.

[57] Translated from the comment left on Museum Visitor Notebook at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall. This visitor left his message on the notebook with his name and affiliation. While the Memorial Hall reserves the rights to publish whatever the comments left on the visitor notebooks, it says the Memorial Hall does so without disclosing the authorship of the comments. Thence, in this chapter cites this visitor's comment with anonymity by mentioning it a comment of "a survivor".

> Yet, those I cannot forgive more are the people who make their living
> from my opposition to the bomb.[58]

Sueyama is perhaps not in the minority. He feared that his testimony would end up

feeding the people who live off of the testimonies of survivors. Moreover, he was

anguished against those who politicize the discourses around the atomic bombings. The

survivors cannot just be human beings who have experienced tragedy; instead, they are

forced to submit their testimonies within the frame of a politicized discourse that now

situates the historical context for the atomic bombings. Sueyama expressed his fear that

his testimony would be appropriated to fulfil the political desire of his contemporaries.

His fear is valid since there is nothing to ensure the integrity of his memory as a private

and real experience.

Testimony, when archived in a historical consciousness and its public/pedagogical

framework, cannot be withdrawn or altered by the will of those who gave it. Moreover,

testimony does not reflect the whole memory that embodies people's emotions and the

complex contests surrounding the past and kept within the realm of the private. Today, in

response to the misappropriation of people's testimony in the public spheres, individuals

who gave their testimony have only two options. One is to continuously adjust their pasts

according to the shifting historical consciousness and its pedagogical framework. The

other is to persist with their views of past events in their memories despite the challenges

or criticisms from labile contemporaries and their historical consciousness.

Not having any other options would constitute metaphysical violence against those

who have testified of their experiences; and this sometimes results in actual violence

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[58] Hajime Sueyama, *Genbaku* (1997), http://www.remus.dti.ne.jp/~syapy/atomic%bomb.html
(accessed November 20, 2006).

without an actor. Tamiki Hara committed suicide by throwing himself in front of an incoming train in 1951. By killing himself, Hara ended the battle with transcribing his memory into a testimony. In his suicide note to his friend, Hara described explicitly how he wanted to see his own testimony: "Viewed from the platform of a ship leaving from the land, the land gradually appears like a dot. My literature, too, will become a dot in my eyes; and it eventually disappears in my eyes."[59]

No More Hiroshima is a phrase that became one of the most frequently copied lines throughout the world when calling for nuclear disarmament. However, Hara once stressed that he often said the phrase to himself. What *No More Hiroshima* meant to him was that he was fed up with Hiroshima. He was fed up thinking about and writing about the A-bomb.[60] To one of his acquaintances, Hara wrote before his suicide, "I hope *you* live joyfully."[61] In this phrase, Hara wrote with a tone hinting that he himself could not live joyfully, perhaps because of what became expected him. *A Song of Sadness* was the poem enclosed in his suicide note, and one verse reads: "a sad song is expected in me."[62]

The desire and vocation to testify about what happened in the past made the survivors into living symbols of the Hiroshima catastrophe in public/pedagogical frameworks. Hara could no longer write anything other than his A-bomb experiences. Others, afraid of being symbolized and politicized in the public spheres, or of being responsible to respond to the politicized discourses, kept their experiences as memories

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[59] Tamiki Hara, *Isho* (1978; rprt., Online: Aozora Bunko, http://www.aozora.gr.jp/, 2002).

[60] Tamiki Hara, *Nagasaki no Kane* (1949; rprt., Online: Aozora Bunko, http://www.aozora.gr.jp/, 1983).

[61] Tamiki Hara, *Isho*.

[62] Tamiki Hara, *Isho*.

within the realm of the private, occasionally opening up when near death. The present

contemporaries, though unintentionally, robbed Hara of his 'self', of him as a writer and

a person. As a result, Hara was forced to represent the very thing he wanted to forget,

clearly evidenced when he said "No More Hiroshima!"

Hara committed suicide. Kurihara was forced to keep responding to the changing

historical consciousness in public/pedagogical framework, and many other survivors are

fearful of consequences when speaking of what they experienced in the past. It is thus

important to learn the struggles and fears in exposing private memories in the public

sphere as testimonies. Being oblivious to the actual struggles experienced by the

survivors from the past is to permit our controlling the past through limiting certain

testimonies to appear in our public/pedagogical frameworks. It is, therefore, important to

acknowledge that testimony contrary to our historical consciousness would hardly come

out in the public spheres unless we make conscious efforts to challenge the metaphysical

violence imposed on the medium that brings memory into historical consciousness.

Discussion

In the field of history, oral history is now a part of important media through which

historians construct historical explanations. Oral accounts of what happened in the past,

therefore, are the constituent elements of historical explanations as much as the written

texts and other traces from the past, when historians explore the diverse experiences and

interstitial accounts of past events. Although there are some challenges over the ways

historians sustain testimony as evidence in the study of history, the importance of testimony in today's historical study cannot be disregarded lightly.

In *The Idea of History,* R. C. Collingwood argued that, "the past simply as past is wholly unknowable; it is the past as residually preserved in the present that is alone knowable."[63] However, when analyzing testimony as a medium that transmits personal memories to the public sphere and for having an impact on a presiding historical consciousness, it is no longer possible to uncritically assume testimony merely as an oral account of the past. History, Benedetto Croce emphasized, "consists essentially in seeing the past through the eyes of the present and in the lights of its problems."[64] However, those who give their testimony of an event in history have undergone the past event as the present. Memory keeps what they have experienced in the past, thus the survivors (of the past event) would have two sources (own memory and testimony of others) when resurrecting the past. In this respect, how survivors approach the past is distinctively different from the way history and other contemporaries would approach it.

It is important to acknowledge the critical challenge in substantiality that history as a discipline faces when history "enters popular circulation at the beginning of the twenty-first century."[65] In addition to historical accounts of past events, it is non-historical writings/texts (such as popular cultral media and mass-mediated representations of the past) that have shaped our contemporary understandings of the past and its meanings. Testimonies are not written or circulated as historical texts; they are made into

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[63] R. C. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 5.

[64] Benedetto Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty*, trans. Sylvia Sprigge. London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949, 19.

[65] Geoff Eley, "Finding the People's War: Film, British Collective Memory, and World War II," *The American Historical Review* 106, no. 3 (2001): 819.

constituent elements of our historical consciousness in the public sphere. This is not to question the methods of inquiry in presently accepted historiography. Rather, it is an imperative to critically examine the foundation of historical knowledge that transgresses the approach to multiple frameworks set in the discipline.

However, historical consciousness is not a fixed attribute of a particular collectivity, but rather has a dynamics of its own, the product of a complex process of synthesis and distillation of values and norms. We recognize that this process is supported by particular frameworks that reflect broader aspects of the present and that can encompass geopolitical, economic, diplomatic, environmental, human and ethnic factors. Such frameworks generate visions of the future and interests of the present, and, as we add with this analysis, leave the past open to reinterpretations in synch with the dynamics of the frameworks that generate the present. Historical evidence and discussions about the past, therefore, need to be grounded in the moment of present public/pedagogical frameworks prevalent in a collectivity. The consideration for the dynamics of these frameworks, their present state and the visions of future they support, is indispensable in order to construct a sensible dialogue to overcome or coexist with differences in historical consciousness.

This chapter's discussion thus alludes to the fact that we have not had substantial attainment of any comprehensible and coherent visions of the future. Therefore, we lack a systemic structure that factor in the dialogue for constructing the remembrance at the transnational or global level. By failing to build such ground, we run the risk that one overpowering collective might dominate and regulate discourse and consequently historical consciousness in other collectivities. At this point, our global society is

vulnerable to the dominant public/pedagogical framework that has greater access to the widespread of language, means of mass communication, media technology, political capital, economic capital, and military forces. Such framework has the ability to forcefully remove any challenge or contrary testimonies archived in other collectivities with different public/pedagogical frameworks. In fact, just recently, we had witnessed an enormous emphasis on the dichotomy perspectives over the conflicts in the Middle East, in East Asia, and other corners of the world. This dichotomy between good and evil, right and wrong, democratic and dictatorial, for example suggests the shortage and/or shortcomings of attempted dialogue of tolerance when building a new framework to serve the global collectivity.

In this respect, the currently ongoing controversy over history textbooks in Japan and their representation of different historical consciousnesses is, for example, a rare opportunity to co-construct a new global framework. Therefore, it is indispensable to have a dialogue that searches for shared visions of the future in order to constructively approach and overcome the ongoing disputes in East Asia about the past. It is of extreme importance today to make explicit that major visions of the future upheld within each collectivity come *in addition to*, not *in substitution of*, the ongoing debates over the epistemological truth about the past. The outcome of such efforts has the potential to create a vision of the future that ensures tolerance in a global society, and that endorses the peaceful coexistence of different histories, cultures, and identities.

Chapter 4

Rationalizing Catastrophe in Public Spheres[1]:
From Condolence to Commemoration

Apocalypse of 'Hiroshima'

Hiroshima, today, reminds us of troubling yet undeniable realities: (1) science and

technology can literally annihilate a whole city and its residents indiscriminately; and (2)

human rationality can substantiate the annihilation of humans, ironically, in the name of

humanity. When Harry Truman spoke to the Congress on October 3, 1945, he affirmed

the atomic bombs as "a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of world

peace instead of an instrument of destruction."[2] It is important to note that Truman's

statement reflects a troubling belief in progress in both science and technology and in

human rationality. Theodor W. Adorno's frequently cited proposition that "to write

poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric"[3] indeed marks the world entering a new era in which

we can no longer rejoice at the notion of progress without a criticism.

In fact, the report on Hiroshima's tragedy had mobilized an unprecedented level

of international and transnational collaborations. There were even discussions in many

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[1] This study takes an approach that there are multiple public spheres within a public sphere that is globally transcendent to all human populations. What we consider "public" differs by historical, cultural, ethnic, racial, gender, and other political conditions in which individual persons have a sense of belonging. Therefore, this chapter has the plural "public spheres" to indicate that this study is aware of the absence of the public sphere that is transcendental to all human populations today. Throughout this study, I use the singular "public sphere" to refer a particular public sphere that is geopolitically defined (such as Hiroshima, Japan, and the United States). I then use the plural "public spheres" to refer the public sphere in general.

[2] Harry Truman, Reported in *New York Times*, October 3, 1945.

[3] Theodor W. Adorno, Rolf Tiedmann, and Rodney Livingstone, *Can One Life after Auschwitz?: A Philosophical Reader*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 162.

levels of a society considering the possibility of launching a world government.[4] In the

United States, even a conservative magazine like *Reader's Digest* wrote in response to

Hiroshima's tragedy that "the atomic bomb has made political and economic nationalism

meaningless"; and thus, world government "has now become a hard-boiled, practical, and

urgent necessity."[5] Hiroshima's tragedy became a global medium that mobilizes

transnational awareness of the immense danger of nuclear armament threatening the

peace and survival of humanity at large. Yet, it is often overlooked that Hiroshima is an

organic body with a history and identity like Rome, Paris, Kyoto and so on. It was the

atomic bomb that generated 'Hiroshima' as a commemorative language signifying the

atomic bomb and the discourses that are derived from the city's atomic bomb experiences.

'Hiroshima' signifies the remembrance and discourse of the atomic bomb in public

spheres; and thus it is a product of an abstract collective consciousness, while Hiroshima,

the city, is bound by geopolitical specificities. 'Hiroshima' as a collective consciousness

is therefore negotiated out of diverse and historical experiences related to the events

around the world created by the release of the atomic bomb at the end of the Second

World War.

This chapter aims to investigate the process through which Hiroshima's tragedy

has shaped 'Hiroshima'—a commemorative language underlining the pedagogy for a

global peace. Through critically analyzing monuments built to commemorate and/or built

in remembrance of Hiroshima's atomic bomb tragedy, this chapter inquires into the

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[4] Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light* (New York: Pantheon, 1985).

[5] Quoted in "Hiroshima's Shock Wave Continues First Atomic Bomb Achieved Victory in World War, Anxiety for Generations," *U. S. News & World Report, Los Angeles Times Syndicate*, published in *Rocky Mountain News* (August 6, 1995).

implicit curriculum beneath the act of public commemoration of the tragedy. Taking

Eisner's argument on implicit curriculum, this chapter approaches what is not said in the

public spheres, that it "is not simply a neutral void; it has important effects on the kinds

of options one is able to consider, the alternatives that one can examine, and the

perspectives from which one can view a situation or problem."[6] Investigating the hidden

text beneath the public commemoration of Hiroshima's tragedy, we will be able to

explicate the construction of 'Hiroshima' and its pedagogy for world peace. This

explication is important for acknowledging the commemoration of the past event as

pedagogical act, and thus it is never an apolitical endeavor. Through explicating our

memory of the past as a political act, this chapter aims to set a ground for introducing a

political inquiry of our construction of historical consciousness of what happened in the

past.

'Hiroshima' and Amnesiac Particularities

It is perhaps useful to first elaborate the way Japanese language situates

Hiroshima. Like every other cities in Japan, Hiroshima is generally represented in

simplified kanji, which was adapted after the war. However, when representing

Hiroshima, letter-styles are carefully and intentionally selected according to the specific

subjects and the objectives of which each letter-style intends to denote. This

representational multiplicity and its denotative meanings of Hiroshima offer a useful

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[6] Elliot Eisner, *The Educational Imagination: On the Design and Evaluation of School Programs*, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan College Publishing, 1994), 97.

insight on how Hiroshima is positioned in contemporary commemorative space of atomic bomb.

Hiroshima, when written in simplified *kanji* (広島), simply represents the local administrative unit of Japan. In public announcements, bulletins, and official-leaflets, Hiroshima is also presented in *hiragana* letters (ひろしま). *Hiragana* originates in the writing developed and used by the women of the aristocracy more than a thousand years ago. *Hiragana* is also a phonogram; and thus it is the first alphabet-like letters people learn when learning to write in Japanese. In this respect, *hiragana* often procures an image of unadulterated purity since it embodies the image of maternal kindness and the innocence of small children. Hence, the city government and other bureaucratic units favor the use of *hiragana* in their publications in order to divert negative images often associated with bureaucracy of government and politics. Consciously choosing these two letter-styles to represent the city's name is a general exercise throughout Japan. These letter-styles are to represent the geopolitical framework and the identities in the *present* time.

However, Hiroshima, unlike most other cities in Japan, has two additional letter-styles to represent itself: traditional *kanji* (廣島) and *katakana* (ヒロシマ). When written in traditional *kanji*, Hiroshima resurrects the milieu of pre-modernity with the images of Japan's militarism and archaic political atmosphere with a trace of semi-feudalism.[7]

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[7] I use here "semi-feudalism" to characterize the political atmosphere of Japan under the Meiji Constitution. Japanese political environment, despite popular belief, did not take a form of fascism. In view of the political relationship between the central government and regional administration, regional administration and local district, local district and citizens, one can find the political atmosphere of the period somewhat a kin to feudalism. However, in many critical points, it was not at all feudalism. Therefore, in order to cultivate a sense of feudalistic political atmosphere in a political structure that is not feudalism, as well as to avoid unnecessary criticisms, this paper uses "semi-feudalism".

Traditional *kanji* also resurrects a sentimentalism of everyday life before the atomic

bomb. Hiroshima officially became a city in 1889 under the Imperial Order, and the city

had been the seat of the Fifth Division Army. The city's progress owed, at least partially,

to the Japan's militarism and its aggressions in East Asia. Hence, Hiroshima written in

traditional *kanji* inevitably carries negative connotations of the city's involvements in

militarism and aggressions in its *past*.

Hiroshima is represented in *katakana* in reference to the tragedy of the atomic

bomb. In *Summer Flowers*, one of the earliest literatures on Hiroshima's tragedy, Tamiki

Hara wrote Hiroshima with *katakana* letters to visualize the "urgency and intensity"[8] for

symbolizing Hiroshima and its tragedy of the atomic bomb. Furthermore, the "Spirit of

Hiroshima", phrasing the yearnings for a global commitment to build peace through

remembrance of Hiroshima's tragedy, is always written with *katakana* in all publications,

monuments, and messages. The significance of using *katakana*-letters to represent

Hiroshima becomes evident only when it is analyzed with the specifics of *katakana* in

Japanese writing system.

Katakana phonetically transcribes words from foreign languages into the

Japanese writing system. For example, *katakana* transliterates gasoline to "*ga-so-ri-n*" in

order to enrich Japanese vocabulary without putting any effort necessary when translating

foreign words. More importantly, *katakana* enables onomatopoetic transliteration of

sounds, atmosphere, and actions. "*Ga-aan*", for instance, is an onomatopoetic

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The transition of Hiroshima in writing (from traditional kanji to katakana) is also mentioned in Nobuo Takahashi, "Hiroshima kara Hiroshima e," *Rekishi chiri kyoiku* 683 (April 2005): 78-81.

[8] John W. Treat, *Writing Ground Zero: Japanese Literature and the Atomic Bomb* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 149.

representation of shock and all emotional turmoil upon facing unfortunate or unexpected news. It phonetically describes the sound of a gong. In fact, onomatopoetic use of *katakana* codifies what is indescribable in ordinary command of language.

Taking these functions of *katakana* in Japanese writing system into account, representing Hiroshima in *katakana*-letters seems to embody a contradictory approach when commemorating Hiroshima's tragedy: (1) to codify Hiroshima's tragedy as universally shared human experience through (2) avoiding detailed codification of historical and political particularities behind it. The desire to codify Hiroshima's tragedy in global discourse colludes with the desire to shy away from detailed historical and political scrutiny on what is being codified. The use of *katakana* for 'Hiroshima' permits assigning signified emotional meaning to Hiroshima's tragedy with historical particularity and political universality.

In fact, no other language has a systematic differentiation to emphasize the connotative difference between Hiroshima's past and the present. My interview with a vice-director of Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall, a curator of Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and a librarian of Hiroshima City Library confirmed that there is no standard prescription to make a denotative differentiation when writing Hiroshima in any languages other than the Japanese. In this respect, Hiroshima is a proper noun with multiple connotative realities in local/national contexts. 'Hiroshima' however reflects what Lisa Yoneyama calls "nuclear universalism", which is the idea that "Hiroshima's disaster ought to be remembered from the transcendent and anonymous position of humanity, and that the remembering of Hiroshima's tragedy should invoke natural and

commonly shared human thoughts, sentiments, and moral attitudes not limited by cultural boundaries."[9]

The practice of differentiating 'Hiroshima' from other Hiroshimas perhaps suggests that Hiroshima's nuclear universalism is a product of *amnesiac elisions* of the whole Hiroshima (of its past, present, and the future) when commemorating 'Hiroshima' in public spheres of Japan. In this respect, 'Hiroshima' may have been serving as an ideology of nuclear universalism that endorses the divorce of historical and political particularities from the central commemorative subject; and, though contradictory and ironic, it is built upon the particularity of atomic bomb experience.

Today, sixty years after Hiroshima, the world is witnessing the reviving faith in the nuclear deterrent, as well as the failure of nuclear nonproliferation treaty. I say this with regret, but overwhelming evidences suggest 'Hiroshima' and its nuclear universalism have failed to produce a universal language to speak about the nuclear armament. Therefore, restructuring 'Hiroshima' through reexamination of its construction should be our priority in order to make it more responsive in today's global environment.

This Park Is Too Clean

The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and The Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Memorial Hall have notebooks in which visitors can freely write their thoughts, reflections and messages after visiting their exhibitions. Many visitors have left messages praying for peace, sharing their emotional pain in learning about the victims, expressing

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[9] Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 15.

their fear and fury against war, and so on. In one notebook, a visitor, who himself was a victim of the atomic bomb, left this comment: "This park is too clean. There is nothing here to remind me of how it really was on that day [when the atomic bomb was dropped]."[10]

An uncle of mine who was a banker in the city throughout its reconstruction until his recent retirement was telling of a 'Hiroshima' that used to be found everywhere in the lived memory of survivors and the actual traces left by the atomic bomb. Yet, the traces of the bomb have been cleared away one by one and replaced with monuments displaying art styles from classic to abstract contemporary. Taking me through the city's busy street, he pointed out that Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park reserved no trace of the barracks in which the atomic bomb victims once dominated the space; and the city-owned modern commercial building adjunct to Hiroshima Station removed all traces of black-market that once stood there in postwar years. Small marble monuments with photographs were erected throughout the city to present what the place was like shortly after the atomic explosion. Yet, they seem as if to pardon the actual amnesia (Figure 4:1). In the eyes of my uncle, Hiroshima's monuments and commemorative space are too clean to represent 'Hiroshima' he had lived with throughout his career.

For most visitors to Hiroshima, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park embodies 'Hiroshima'. The city has become a geopolitical and economic center in the region, and the park is surrounded by commercial, business, and residential spaces where everyday life is ongoing much like all other cities in Japan. In the geopolitical center of the city, however, there is Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, and it is adjunct to the epicenter of

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[10] An entry in museum visitor notebook placed at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, Hiroshima City, Japan.

the atomic bomb. It houses the Peace Memorial Museum, the Atomic Bomb Memorial

Hall, the International Conference Center, and many memorial monuments to the atomic

bomb, its victims and the prayer for world peace. The conference center regularly hosts

many peace related conferences: the World Conference of Mayors for Peace, Hiroshima

Conference for Peace, and other anti-war and anti-nuclear armament meetings.

Figure 4:1. Monument stone marks the epicenter of the atomic bomb explosion in Hiroshima. This monument can be found approximately fifty meters outside of **Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park.**

The park is also known as the site where the Mayor of Hiroshima delivers the

Peace Declaration to the world every August 6 to commemorate the tragedy of the atomic

bomb and pray for peace. It is indeed a very clean park with many monuments

commemorating the atomic bomb and delivering the message of peace to the world. The

park thus serves as the central medium and space of 'Hiroshima' today. The visitor's

comment left on the notebook and my uncle's story however reveal that 'Hiroshima'

became clean physically and rhetorically over time. In fact, it perhaps became too clean

to remind of the atrocities and horror that the atomic bomb has materialized in the city sixty years ago.

Hence, it is important to identify what has hindered people from keeping the original traces to represent 'Hiroshima' when they replaced them with a clean representation in the public sphere. Through the careful analysis of memorial monuments with the contexts in which the monuments were erected, it is perhaps meaningful to inquire into the process through which 'Hiroshima' became "clean" for the broad public as an embodiment of the remembrance of atomic bomb and the experiences derived from it.

Swollen Corpses

Nine days after the annihilation of Hiroshima (six days after Nagasaki and the Soviet Invasion of Japan), Japan accepted the defeat. Reconstruction of Hiroshima began alongside with the searching for the survivors and the bodies of deceased. The smell of decayed corpses was everywhere, and the smoke of burning corpses overwhelmed the city's sky for many days. The city's record office noted that the burning of corpses continued day and night for about four months after the atomic bomb.[11]

The pictorial narrative of Masayoshi Takamoto, for example, offers an insight to the traumas and emotional transitions of atomic bomb survivors (Figure 4:2). He recollects many corpses were floating and swelling like a balloon, and the tide carried them back and forth. For a period of a month, Takamoto was just watching the

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[11] City of Hiroshima, *Hiroshima shin shi: shiryou hen 2* (hukkou hen) (Hiroshima: the City of Hiroshima, 1982).

transformation of the corpse: it lost its head first, and then its arms and legs fell off. He regained a sense of pity for the last corpse of a female student floating around his boat over a month after the atomic bomb. He poked the swollen body to rid gas and buried her to the riverbed.[12] Many survivors have described the corpses with such words like rubber ball, sardines, chunk, log, and mannequin. This pictorial narrative reveals Takamoto was unable to reinstate an ordinary structure of relationship between the signifier (corpse) and the signified (the female student killed by the atomic bomb), for over a month. Takamoto concludes his narrative with an image of a burial he made for the student. This image metaphorically suggests that Hiroshima's postwar reconstruction had to begin with the recovery of human psychology.

Figure 4:2. The first of ten pictures Mr. Masayoshi Takamoto drew about his experience of Hiroshima's tragedy after the atomic bombing. He worked some distance away from the city center, and he gave this illustration to narrate what he saw the day after the bombing. Photographed at the Special Exhibit at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

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[12] NHK Hiroshima, "Genbaku no e: shimin ga nokosu Hiroshima no kiroku," *NHK Special* August 6, 2002.

Providing the memorial services for atomic bomb victims was thus a necessary

act to the city that lost so many of its citizens and framework altogether by the bomb.

Reviewing the local newspaper of Hiroshima, *Chugoku shinbun*, reveals that many

memorial services were held throughout the city by city offices, schools, neighborhoods,

and business offices during the first year after the atomic bomb (Table 4:1). By the end of

1945, citizens began to write a letter to local newspaper and city offices to stress the

urgency for organizing a memorial service as a whole city undergoing the reconstruction.

Haruhiko Mochizuki, for example, argued for erecting a memorial monument collectively

to comfort the souls and remains of the deceased persons in order to provide *emotional*

reconstruction prior to actual physical reconstruction of Hiroshima.[13]

Table 4:1. Memorial Services Held in 1945

Date	Name or Unit of Organizing Body
8.31	Hiroshima Correspondence Office
9.5	Japan Express, Hiroshima Branch Office
9.6	Hiroshima Prefecture Office
	Chugoku Region Surface Carrier Office
	Hiroshima Railway Office
	Elementary and Junior High Schools in Hiroshima City
9.9	Chugoku Region Coal Distribution Office
9.14	Hiroshima Association for Agriculture
9.16	Hiroshima City Junior High School
9.20	Hiroshima Post Office
	Hiroshima Women's High School
	Aki Women's High School
	Sanyo Junior/Commerce/Industrial/Women's High School
9.21	Chugoku Electric Co.
	Hiroshima Railway Co.
9.22	Mizuno Kumi, Ltd., Shipyard
	Hiroshima Prefecture Energy Distribution Association
	Toyo Industry Co.
	The City of Hiroshima
	Chugoku Region, Regional Administration Office Printing Co.

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[13] Haruhiko Mochizuki, letter to the editor, *Chugoku shinbun*, December 24, 1945.

Table 4:1. Continued

9.23	Japan Telephone Co., Chugoku Regional Office
	Tamonin Temple, Hiroshima
	Hiroshima Gas Co.
9.25	Hiroshima Prefecture Cargo/Track Co.
	Aburaya Industry Co., Hiroshima Factory
9.27	Hiroshima, Army Kaikosha Affiliated School
9.30	Hiroshima Ministry of Finance
11.6	Hiroshima Women's Teacher Preparation School
	Yamanaka Women's High School affiliated to Hiroshima Women's Teacher Preparation School
	Hiroshima Banker's Association
11.11	Chugoku Region Filming Industry Group
11.12	Hiroshima City Shipbuilding School
	Hiroshima City Credit Union
	Hiroshima City Shiratori Elementary School
11.13	Seicho-no-ie, Hiroshima Missionary Branch
	Hiroshima City Kanzaki Elementary School
11.15	Japan Red Cross, Hiroshima Branch
11.20	Hiroshima Prefecture, Steel Distribution Unit
11.30	Shima Hospital, Wakai Children's Section
12.6	Hiroshima City, Shimoyanagi Cho Neighbor Association
	Hiroshima Restaurant Tax Collector's Union
	Hiroshima Produce Distribution Co.
	Hiroshima City Ote Machi 3 Chome Neighbor Association
12.9	Former Chugoku 7161 Unit
	Koijo En Co.
12.10	Hiroshima High School
12.11	Shintoku Women's High School
12.13	Hiroshima City Kannon Elementary School
12.14	Hiroshima City Otemachi Elementary School
12.16	Morinaga Food Industory, Hiroshima Branch Office
12.17	Hiroshima Prefecture Hiroshima First Women's High School
12.20	Federation of Non-Life Insurance Agencies
	Hiroshima City, Hiratsuka Cho Neighbor Association
	Daitoa Food Co.
12.21	Hiroshima City, United Neighbor Associations in Otemachi School District
12.23	Hiroshima City, Honkawa Elementary School
12.25	Kansai Industrial Co.
12.26	Hiroshima Light Steel Co.
12.27	Hiroshima City, United Neighbor Associations in Otemachi School District

Note: Translated from the table prepared by Akira Ubuki in his book, *Heiwakinen shikiten no ayumi* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Heiwa Bunka Center, 1992), 5. The memorial events listed here were only those reported in Hiroshima's local newspaper, *Chugoku shinbun*.

Erected on May 1946, Atomic Bomb Memorial Mound is one of the earliest

monuments standing in Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. Located in the northwest corner

of the park, the Memorial Mound stores the ashes and remains of atomic bomb victims

who remained unidentified. The Society for Praying for the War Dead, an

interdenominational organization, built this Memorial Mound. This earliest collective

commemoration of atomic bomb aims primarily to provide a space to condone those

victims whose ashes were unidentified and who were literally evaporated by the intense

heat wave of atomic explosion reached to 300,000 degrees Celsius.

Nonetheless, it is notable that the Memorial Mound takes the style of an imperial

mausoleum of the Momoyama period (1573-1603), and symbolizes the atomic bomb

victims as the *casualties of war* or *war dead*. In Japanese, "*casualties* of war" refers to

the deceased combatants, and it is not the same as referring to the *sufferers* (victims) of

war. For example, the Tokyo (Air) Raid of March 10, 1945 claimed over one hundred

thousand lives and one million people lost their homes. During the war, Tokyo received

air raids over 100 times and the population of 6.8 million had dropped to 2.5 million at

the time of war's end.[14] Despite the size of the atrocity experienced by the people of

Tokyo, the victims of Tokyo Air Raids are marked as sufferers, never "casualties of war".

Furthermore, the fact that the Memorial Mound took the style of imperial mausoleum and

was built by the Society for Praying for the War Dead may suggest that the Memorial

Mound enshrined the atomic bomb victims as war casualties for Imperial Japan and its

reign.

However, the imperial reign had met its end by *defeat*, and what is more,

Hiroshima became a living witness of the enormous destructive power of the atomic

bomb. In this respect, it is too superficial to conclude that the Monument Mound

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[14] The Center for Documenting the Tokyo Raid and War Damages has collection of data and artifacts of Tokyo Air Raids.

enshrines the atomic bomb victims as war casualties for the Imperial reign by taking the style and language of the mound as the proof. The thunderous defeat of the Japanese Empire was not just hearsay, but an actual reality in the rubbles of Hiroshima. The perseverance and allegiance to the Empire and Imperial Order therefore would no longer provide rationality to the death and destruction the atomic bomb brought to the people.

In his letter, Mochizuki positioned the victims as honorable casualties who have reinstated the peace in the present as if to rationalize the death and destruction caused by the atomic bomb. He also argued to set August 6 as a memorial day for world peace, and asked the City of Hiroshima "to provide hope to the citizens to revive Hiroshima as a modern city of peace."[15] In this respect, the language of peace perhaps has taken the place of the Imperial reign's rhetoric to offer a rationale to comprehend the enormous loss of wartime in postwar Hiroshima. Emphasizing the atomic bomb as the end would situate the victims as the examples of defeated militarism in Japan's past. Therefore, when rationalizing the victims as honorable casualties whose sacred sacrifice brought the peace, atomic bomb had to be emphasized as a new *beginning* instead of the end or outcome of imperial reign and militarism. In fact, Hiroshima quickly mobilized the language of peace in its first anniversary event to commemorate the atomic bomb and its victims. Yet the styles and language of the Memorial Monument still suggest that the past that led to the fatal end of atomic bomb has escaped from critical examination in postwar Hiroshima.

However, the victims did not die with a conscious desire or awareness of their being the sacrifice to end the war. Japan was at war and as such they were inevitably

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[15] Haruhiko Mochizuki, letter to the editor, *Chugoku shinbun*, December 24, 1945.

participants in war in a broad sense. Still, who should become the victim of atomic bomb was a rather accidental than an inevitable choice. Having situated the atomic bomb as the beginning of the present peace process has been serving to give a rationale to the enormous death tolls of Hiroshima. Yet, such rationale was concurrent to the fact that critical examination on what brought the war and its end was both forgotten in the public sphere. No rationale of why *they* had to be the ones sacrificing their lives was offered just as no soldier would ever get his reason why *he* should be the one who should be killed in combat. Any critical examination of the past that led to so many death tolls was obscured through burying them under the symbolism of the imperial mausoleum and treating them as casualties for peace.

It is also evident that the peace emphasized in early Hiroshima indicates merely the absence of war. Through the amnesiac elision of the past which led to the enormous death tolls of the atomic bomb, Hiroshima failed to have a conscious dialogue on how we should *construct* the peace in the postwar world. The past was therefore not in the consciousness of Hiroshima undergoing the reconstruction; and commemorating the atomic bomb in the public spheres was strictly for the purpose of present reconstruction.

Latent Fury

Barefoot Gen[16] is an autobiographical pictorial narrative (*manga*) of Keiji Nakazawa who survived the atomic bomb as a child. Over ten million copies were sold in Japan, and most public and school libraries have a copy of the series on their shelves.

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[16] Keiji Nakazawa, *Hadashi no Gen* (Tokyo: Shobunsha, 1976).

Although the series was for children, the author's fury against the war and the atomic bomb is vividly presented with horror throughout the narrative. In particular, one scene in which Gen, the main character of the story, sold skulls of atomic bomb victims displays author's agony against those who dropped the bomb in Hiroshima. The skulls had inscriptions of "grudge" printed in kanji on the forehead; Gen sold them to American GIs searching souvenirs from Hiroshima (Figure 4:3). He sold the skull to send the vengeance of atomic bomb victims to the United States. This scene reveals the anger within the victims of atomic bomb, yet we hardly see such sentiment circulated in the public spheres when commemorating the atomic bomb today.

Figure 4:3. The skull has a *kanji* inscription that symbolizes "the grudge" on its forehead. The man characterizing an American GI says here: "Oh, nice design." From Nakazawa's *Hadashi no Gen* (*Barefoot Gen*).

The invisibility of unsettling feelings against one of the critical actors who brought the horror of atomic bomb is not an accidental product. Immediately after the war, the General Headquarters/Supreme Commander of the Allied Power (GHQ/SCAP)

put Japan under its command for the period of seven years. The U.S. Occupation Forces

made up the large part of GHQ/SCAP; and it introduced the Civil Censorship

Detachment (CCD) to administer censorship in occupied Japan. It was a thorough

censorship, which even prohibited making any reference to the GHQ/SCAP enforcement

of censorship. In fact, it was only in the 1980s that the researchers of postwar Japan

began investigating the details and impacts of censorship during the period of occupation.

CCD first banned *Domei Tsushin* from distributing news reports for 24-hours on

the day GHQ/SCAP enforced the censorship. A few days later, *Tokyo Asahi* was also

prohibited its operation for 48 hours. *Domei Tsushin* was the only news distributor at the

time, and *Tokyo Asahi* was one of the major nationally circulated newspaper. Specific

reason for suppression was never provided. Yet, *Domei Tsushin* had distributed an article

antagonistic against those who dropped the bomb just before its suppression. The article

said that only savages would ever have a capacity to release the destructive power of the

atomic bomb as a weapon against others. Furthermore, CCD banned the operation of

Tokyo Asahi when the paper had printed a statement of Ichiro Hatoyama, who argued

critically against the use of atomic bomb as an act against the principles of International

Law.[17] The suppression of two prominent news agencies sent a clear message from

GHQ/SCAP directly to the press and journalists throughout Japan about the censorship

and the consequences of violation.

Recent research on, and testimonials of CCD personnel however reveal that no

key-log was ever recorded within CCD to prohibit reporting on the atomic bombs and the

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[17] Monica Braw, *The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Occupied Japan* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1991).

atrocities experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[18] The censorship attained its purpose

when it *became* practiced as a voluntary subscription of Japanese journalists, fearful of

GHQ/SCAP suppressing their business operation. CCD did practice the censorship, but

the censorship was most effectively practiced through creating a fear of suppression in

Japan. It was too costly for any publishers and printers to risk suppression as papers and

other materials necessary for printing were scarce in the postwar Japan.[19] In fact, *Tokyo*

Asahi had quickly drafted an internal code to deal with the Press Code administered by

CCD.[20] Journalism's participation to the censorship attests to the fact that the postwar

journalism has suffered amnesia about their participation in war and wartime propaganda

under imperialism. Much like the Memorial Monument taking the form of the imperial

mausoleum and symbolizing the victims of atomic bomb as war casualties, the postwar

journalism has detached their past for the sake of immediate necessity (survival) in the

present.

More important here, however, is not the fact that the journalism had surrendered

to the censorship itself, but the fact that the censorship was highly successful in postwar

Japan. Without having an explicit guideline to prohibit reporting of the atomic bomb, the

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[18] Braw, *The Atomic Bomb Suppressed*, 1991.

[19] To study the CCD practice of censorship in the postwar Japan, we can access to Prange Collection at the University of Maryland. Gordon W. Prange Magazine Collection has the collection of print publications issues in Japan during 1945-1949. Prange worked in the Civil Censorship Division, and he was responsible for reviewing Japanese publications. He brought back those publications submitted to CCD, and now his collection is stored at the Gordon W. Prange Collection at the University of Maryland.

[20] Since the censorship itself was prohibited to become public knowledge, publishers had to fill the space of banned article with other articles. The cost and toll of reediting and reprinting were too high to risk their business operation, the censorship was effectively enforced the printing companies to voluntarily cooperate in the censorship. Critical examination on the journalism in occupied Japan is indeed necessary to highlight how the journalism had voluntarily cooperated to the censorship by way of prioritizing commercial interest over journalistic responsibility. See also Masami Nakagawa, "*Genbaku houdou to ken'etsu,*" *Intelligence* 3 (October 2003): 42-47.

censorship attained its goal through *self-censorship* in the public spheres. CCD administered the censorship in the public sphere of occupied Japan. However, it was the public sphere itself that fostered psychological condition in which the circulation of certain experiences and emotions of Hiroshima (and Nagasaki) was prohibited rigorously but voluntarily. In this respect, it is reasonable to argue that sociopolitical atmosphere in occupied Japan must have had a great impact on commemorating the atomic bomb and its victims in the public sphere.

Indeed, public commemoration of the atomic bomb and its victims during the period of occupation did not embody the actual voices of sorrow and begrudging from the survivors and the bereaved. In the parameter of Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, there are two monuments erected in the period of GHQ/SCAP administration: The Atomic Bomb Monument of Hiroshima Municipal Girl's High School (1948) and the Cenotaph for the A-Bomb Victims (1951-52). Both monuments make no explicit remark on the voices of the survivors and the bereaved. Nonetheless, detailed analysis of these two monuments reveals the undercurrent of survivors' voices beneath the innocent and neutral faces put up in the public commemoration of the atomic bomb victims.

Metaphorical Representation of Fury

The Atomic Bomb Monument of Hiroshima Municipal Girl's High School (Girl's Monument) was erected in 1948 within the parameter of the school campus, and was relocated in 1957 to the west end of the Peace Bridge. It is the place where all 544 students and 8 teachers lost their lives on August 6, 1945 (Figure 4:4). The Girl's

Figure 4:4. Relief on the Atomic Bomb Monument of Hiroshima Municipal Girl's High School. The student in the center wears the school uniform for mobilized student during the war. She has a corona and wings. She is also holding Einstein's Equation of Mass and Energy. Thence, the relief suggests this student was killed by the atomic bomb. The other students on both sides wear contemporary school uniform with skirt. They offer flower-band and dove representing memory and the peace without scribing it in writing.

Monument has three high school girls engraved on its surface. One schoolgirl in the

center wears the uniform worn under the war; and she has angel's wings and is holding

Einstein's formula for mass-energy. This formula clearly but implicitly represents the

atomic bomb; and the angel's wings and her school uniform tell us that she represents the

victims of the atomic bomb. Two other students wearing modern school uniforms protect

both sides of her: one student offers a flower wreath symbolizing the reverence for her

memory; and the other student holds a dove, which symbolizes the peace. On the back of

the monument, there is a poem written by the principal at the time of the bombing: "Rest in peace within this grassy hill / Protected by a wall of friends."[21]

This Girl's Monument is a peace monument to commemorate the students who lost their lives together at the same place. The inscription taking a form of poetry does not say anything more than what a gravestone would say. However, the student in the center looks at the eyes of the student who offers a flower wreath while turning her back to the dove that acknowledges peace. The flower wreath represents the reverence for the memory of the sacrificed. The student holding a dove, too, extends her hand to reach the wreath offered to the student in the center. We can safely assume the primary message of the Girl's Monument is in reverence for memory rather than peace. Erected by a school that had lost 552 of their students and teachers, this monument harbors the covert yearning for condolence and for commemorating the dead as victims of the atomic bomb.

The organizational body for erecting the Cenotaph for the A-Bomb Victims (the Cenotaph) was much more official and political than the Girl's Monument. The construction of the Cenotaph was a public project launched just a year before the reinstatement of sovereignty to Japan. Moreover, the planning of the Cenotaph took place against the background of the intensifying Cold War. The official name of the Cenotaph is Memorial Monument for Hiroshima, City of Peace: and it has no mention of the atomic bomb or its victims.

The Cenotaph has a stone-casket as its central piece, which contains the register of names of the persons who perished by the explosion and radiation of the atomic bomb (Figure 4:5). The casket has an inscription engraved only in Japanese, and the English

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[21] Yoshiteru Kosakai, *Hiroshima Peace Reader*, 12th ed. (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, 2002), 75.

translation of it is in the guiding post placed next to the Cenotaph: "Let all the souls here rest in peace; For we shall not repeat the evil."[22] The inscription does not have the nominative pronouns "we" when written in Japanese; and the absence of nominative pronouns has invited intense controversies over who proclaims not to repeat the evil to the victims of atomic bomb.[23] Those controversies over the inscription are the product of how inscription can be grammatically interpreted; and thus it is not the interest of this paper. However, studying how the wordings of the inscription came to be phrased is important to investigate how Hiroshima, as a representative body of the citizens, has negotiated against the sociopolitical atmosphere when commemorating the atomic bomb in the public spheres.

In Japanese language, dropping the nominative voice is a common practice since nominative voice is often determined from the context in which the sentence is presented. Nominative voice in Japanese language is fluid if there is no definitive context; and thus it is the context of an audience that dictates the ultimate meanings of a sentence. The original inscription has no nominative pronoun; thus the nominative pronoun "we" was assigned when translating the inscription into English. Hence, the context in which the inscription is being presented needs to be taken into consideration: the English inscription appears only in the guiding-panel of the Cenotaph, while the Japanese inscription is engraved on the casket in which victim's name is kept. In English, the nominative pronoun "we" determines the audience that is, the people who read the translated inscription in the guiding-panel. However, in Japanese, the victims, as well as those who

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[22] Inscription on the Cenotaph for the Atomic Bomb Victims, Hiroshima.

[23] Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces*,1999.

read the inscription, both constitute the subject, since the inscription is engraved on the casket.

Figure 4:5. The Cenotaph for the A-Bomb Victims. When facing the Cenotaph, the visitors can see the inscription on the stone chest with the Pond of Peace, the Peace Fire, and the Atomic Bomb Memorial on a single line.

Differentiating the nominative subject of the inscription becomes particularly important in the context of one additional translation glitch in the inscription. The translated inscription says "not to repeat the evil"; but this is not quite the accurate translation of the original message. The inscription says in Japanese not to repeat "過ち (*ayamachi*)." *Ayamachi* implies "a regretful mistake" and it has a connotative meaning of regretting certain act committed in the past. While "the evil" is transcendentally

negative value in all contexts and all time, *"ayamachi"* was merely one of many possible and reasonable actions that became regretful from the present perspectives. Hence, the Japanese inscription therefore says not to repeat *the regretful mistakes* that have caused the atomic annihilation of the city. The fact that inscription is on the casket places the victims of atomic bomb, as well as the survivors, as subjects who made them express, and now regret for the mistakes. At the same time, the inscription does not make any request for actual examination of what exactly were the mistakes and how the mistakes were made in the past.

The translated inscription however sets a different context for English speaking audiences. First, the Cenotaph made English-speaking visitors to read the inscription with the nominative pronoun: "we". Then, the inscription they read says: we shall not repeat "the evil". Very few foreign tourists had visited Hiroshima at the time the city erected the Cenotaph; and the most foreign visitors were American occupation personnel. It is thus reasonable to consider that this translated inscription intended Americans as its primary audience. The English "we" does not include the atomic bomb victims whose names are stored in the casket. Nothing substantial has ever suggested that the inscription makes a conscious differentiation of its audience to metaphorically express the latent fury against the atomic bomb and those who brought the atrocity to Hiroshima. Yet, reviewing the sociopolitical contexts in which the city has erected the Cenotaph reveals the lurking anger and the underlying desire for vengeance against the atomic bomb.

These undercurrents are however hardly visible in the public sphere. In 1947, Hiroshima organized the First Peace Festival with enthusiastic support from GHQ/SCAP. General Douglas MacArthur (SCAP) himself sent a message to the festival (second

festival received a message from Sir Horace Robertson, Lieutenant General and Commander of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan).[24] It was not an ordinary practice for MacArthur to send his message to a city-organized event; and thus his sending messages serves as a proof that GHQ/SCAP had its earnest interests in the festival. Having full support from GHQ/SCAP consequentially informs us that the Peace Festival, from its planning stage, was kept uncontroversial to GHQ/SCAP and the act (actors) of dropping the atomic bomb.

The festival was merely a public demonstration to the world showing the joy and happiness of Hiroshima with peace brought by the atomic bomb. *The New York Times* reported MacArthor's statement on August 6, 1947. MacArthor said: "The peace festival is to be held with the idea that Aug. 6 is the date which must be remembered as the day of *the arrival of peace* and the day on which the citizens of Hiroshima can renew their determination to contribute to the peace of the world."[25] Furthermore, *Time Magazine* described the Peace Festival:

> The Doves. Last week, on the second anniversary of The Bomb, the people of Hiroshima stood with bared heads bowed around a 43-ft. peace tower to hear a specially cast bell toll for Hiroshima's dead. Muffled sobs stopped when giant firecrackers began to slam like .50-caliber machine guns. Tiny parachutes bore peace festival streamers above the crowd. Thereafter, Hiroshima observed its day of disaster with singing, dancing and boating. Boys & girls pulled peace floats through unshaded streets.[26]

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[24] Detailed accounts of the reactions from GHQ/SCAP and Gen. MacArthur to Hiroshima's organizing the Peace Festival can be found in the memoir of the first Mayor of Hiroshima City after the war. See, Shinzo Hamai, *Genbaku shicho: Hiroshima to tomoni 20 nen* (Tokyo: Asahi shinbun sha, 1967).

[25] *New York Times*, August 6, 1947, [22; italics mine].

[26] *Time*, August 18, 1947.

The telegrams sent to the city were introduced as "congratulatory telegrams"[27], and there were fireworks, singing, dancing and boating that overwhelmed the sobs of condolence to the atomic bomb victims. Much as the press voluntarily participated in the censorship of the atomic bombs, the Peace Festival consequentially concealed the voices and emotions that were not "stressing construction and optimism"[28] through the peace brought by the atomic bomb.

The New York Times expressed sympathy for the victims of atomic bomb in its editorial: "The pitiful commemoration observances in Hiroshima and Nagasaki must move the hearts of all humane persons everywhere." However, the same editorial still affirmed a postulate that "The bomb put a quick end to a slaughter which would have been much greater without it and thereby justified its use."[29] President Truman expressed in 1949 that "he would not hesitate to use the atomic bomb again if it were necessary for the welfare of the United States and the democracies of the world."[30] The Soviet Union declared to the world that they possess atomic bombs on September of the same year; and the world entered into the era of nuclear armament race. In 1950, the Korean War materialized the Cold War in actual military conflict; and Truman once again stressed the possible use of atomic bomb in Korean War "to assure victory."[31] In such circumstances, GHQ/SCAP ordered Hiroshima to cancel its Peace Festival in 1950; and the festival on

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[27] *Chugoku shinbun*, August 7, 1947.

[28] *Time*, August 18, 1947.

[29] Editorial, *New York Times*, August 6, 1947.

[30] Anthony Leviro, "Atom Bomb Ready for Use If Needed, Truman Declares," *New York Times* (April 7, 1949), 1.

[31] Anthony Leviro, "Truman Gives Aim, 'Just, Peaceful World' Is Goal," *New York Times* (December 1, 1950), 1.

the following year was highly regulated. In fact, the Hiroshima Police Department stressed that they would arrest anyone who participated in any anti-Japan or anti-GHQ/SCAP activities during the Peace Festival. It is important that the police statement warned that anti-Japan/GHQ/SCAP activities would disguise themselves as peace events. In fear of being arrested, citizens found participation in the festival became difficult. In this respect, it proves that the sociopolitical atmosphere in which the Cenotaph was designed was thus highly sensitive to any activities and discourses that could be antagonistic to the United States, GHQ/SCAP, and the atomic bomb, which was used against Japan and which may have been used in the Korean War.

In both memorial monuments, peace served as an expedient to publicly endorse the remembrance of the atomic bomb itself under GHQ/SCAP administration. Emphasizing peace made it possible to commemorate the atomic bomb without naming those accountable for the atrocities brought by the atomic bomb. Although it seemed there was a consensus on the idea that the atomic bomb brought peace to Japan, the detailed examination of the memorial monuments demonstrates the underground resentment against such interpretation and the festivity of peace in the public sphere. GHQ/SCAP administration, as well as the voluntary participation of the Japanese to the censorship, kept the fury and actual voices of the victims invisible in the public sphere during the seven-year occupation. Indeed, the self-censorship enforced within, as well as the external censorship on commemorating the atomic bomb are also evident since the reinstatement of sovereignty has brought what was kept invisible into the public sphere when commemorating the atomic bomb.

End of Optimism with Peace

The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on September 1951, came into effect on

April 22, 1952. This treaty reinstated the sovereignty of Japan. A flood of first-hand

accounts of atomic bomb tragedy become available and were published soon after the

treaty.[32] *Asahi Graph*, a photographic journal printed the photographs of the atomic

annihilation of Hiroshima in its special issue on August 6, 1952. Those photographs were

the first image of the destruction of Hiroshima made available to the general population

in Japan after the war.

Notably, most publications from this period signified the destruction of the atomic

bomb as a *disaster*. *Kaizo*, for example, titled its featured issue on the atomic bomb as

"この原爆禍 (this a-bomb disaster)".[33] This letter "禍 (*ka*)" symbolizes the divine curse,

and it represents an unexpected disaster in Japanese. *Kaizo* took a rather antagonistic

editorial stance against the United States since its editorial team had Marxist/socialist

inclinations. Referencing the atomic bombs as a disaster (not a tragedy or damages)

perhaps suggests two conceptions in the shared ideas of the Japanese: (1) the atomic

destruction was a natural course of action they had invited to themselves (like a man-

made disaster); and (2) it was pointless to search for the liable party for the destruction of

atomic bombs. In this respect, the survivors, when giving their narratives about the

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[32] Shin Nagata, ed., *Genbaku no ko: Hiroshima no shounen shoujo no uttae* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1951), Iri Maruki and Toshiko Akamatsu, *Genbaku no zu* (Tokyo: Aoki, 1952), Sankichi Toge, *Genbaku shishu* (Tokyo: Aoki, 1952), Sankichi Toge, ed., *Shishu: genshi kumo no shita yori* (Tokyo: Aoki, 1952), Hyo Umino and Yoshihiro Tajima, *Genbaku dai ichi-go: Hiroshima no shashin kiroku* (Tokyo: Asahi, 1952), no author, *Hiroshima: senso to toshi* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1952), and others, for example.

[33] "Kono genbaku ka," *Kaizo* (November 1952), 208.

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atomic bomb, seem to have had no consciousness to learn a lesson from Hiroshima's tragedy.

In fact, most publications about the atomic bombs were geared toward adults when surveying the published work that came out in the public spheres in the period of few years since the return of sovereignty. One of earliest published work for children on the subject of the atomic bomb appears in a periodical, *King*, published by Kodansha in 1956. From the list of children's literature prepared by the Hiroshima City Children's Library, the earliest children's book identified is *Minami no Kaze no Monogatari* (the story of south wind), which was published in 1961.[34] The absence of narrative targeting the next generations suggests the speaking of the atomic bombs perhaps came from a therapeutic desire to archive the experiences than a sense of responsibility to *teach* something from their experiences for the future.

Signifying the atomic atrocity as a disaster is therefore important proof that there was no or very little desire/need to build pedagogy to prevent an atomic atrocity in the future. Peace was already an attained property in postwar Japan; and thus people felt safe from atomic atrocities so long as they lived in peace. The lyrics of *Hiroshima Song of Peace*, which is sung at the Peace Memorial Ceremony, reflects an optimistic vision of peace. *Hiroshima Song of Peace* sings primarily in praise of the peace and prosperity of modern Hiroshima, but it sings neither a condolence to the victims nor condemnation of atomic bomb itself. In this respect, we can suppose that there was a shared sentiment that no disaster like the atomic annihilation is possible in postwar Japan so long as the people sing in praise of peace.

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[34] Hiroshima City Children's Library, *Kodomotachi e genbaku wo kataritsugu hon: soushu ban 2005* (June 2005), under http://www.library.city.hiroshima.jp/child/img/bomb.pdf (accessed March 14, 2008).

Hiroshima's optimism for the peace did not last long however. In March 1, 1954 on the Bikini Atoll of the Marshall Islands, fishermen of No.5 *Fukuryumaru* became victims of a nuclear (hydrogen) bomb. Exposed to the U.S. hydrogen bomb testing, the *Fukuryumaru* returned to Yaizu port on March 14, 1954 with severe radioactive contamination. Six-month later, Aikichi Kuboyama, one of 23 crew members, died of radiation sickness. Kuboyama's message became known to the public: he said just before dying, "after my death, please make no more victims of atomic and hydrogen bombs."[35] This incident was a wakeup call for many Japanese. The atomic bombs are no longer the disaster possible only in time of war, but instead, it is realistic threat to life even in the moment of peace.

'Hiroshima' as Pedagogy for the Future

The *Fukuryumaru* incident gave the Japanese people a global awareness with a realization of an ongoing nuclear armament race in the postwar world. The news media reported on the radioactive contamination of the fish brought back by the *Fukuryumaru*, as well as the fact that there were *many* fishing vessels operated within the same radius of *Fukuryumaru*. The fear of radioactive contamination of marine products has skyrocketed throughout Japan, and mothers have mobilized a grassroots movement to oppose nuclear

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[35] Statement was made in Japanese. For original quote, see Tokyo Prefectural Exhibition Hall for Daigo Fukuryumaru at Yumenoshima Park, Yumenoshima 3-2, Kotoku, Tokyo, Japan.

testing. The death of Kuboyama and his message then ignited the movement into a major

national outcry for anti-atomic and anti-hydrogen armament.[36]

This movement is in fact the milestone of an important development in the

discourse around atomic power: it marks the shift of discourse from the frame of war to

the frame of peace. In the frame of "war", the atomic bomb was a war strategy, and the

destruction produced was inscribed under the consequences of war involvement.

Therefore, the ultimate resolution to avoiding the atomic disaster is non-involvement in

war and the praise of peace. The answer to the atomic bomb and its consequences on

human life and society in the context of war is "peace" and applause of it. Therefore, we

do witness a push for the rhetoric of peace attainment coming to shape in the

commemoration of the atomic bomb in the context of war.

However, the *Fukuryumaru* incident shifted the context for the nuclear threat:

death happened from nuclear impact not times of war, but in times of peace. Furthermore,

the victims were not participants in a war, but were innocent bystanders caught by

radiation during the performing their everyday chores for living. Moreover, the radiation

proved capable of affecting the food chain and the living environment of peaceful people

and their unawareness of everyday life space. The radiation effect of the atomic bomb is

what *hibakushas* have long suspected, but it has not been in a clear awareness for most

Japanese as the atomic bombing and its radioactive impacts have been censored for many

years after the war. *Fukuryumaru* incident made the Japanese realize that not only had the

atomic threat become much more pervasive and invasive, but there was no longer a

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[36] See Chapter 5 for further discussion on Fukuryumaru incident and its impact on the public movements for the peace in Japan's national public sphere. Also see, the memoir of Matakichi Oyama, who was one of the crewmembers on Fukuryumaru. Matakichi Oyama, *Koredake wa tsutaete okitai bikini jiken no omote to ura* (Tokyo: Kamogawa Shuppan, 2007).

simple answer to the atomic threat that could make an effect with one political stroke:

like ending war involvement. In the context of peace, the affliction of atomic radiation

was no longer contained to a limited space that could be identified by means of strategic

criteria. Instead, the space that the radiation would affect is unidentifiable as it can hit

anywhere without criteria, and leaving people defenseless to a defused phenomenon that

once unleashed may have no clear borders or placement.

The awareness that anyone can fall victim to the atomic threat regardless of their

political allegiance, ideologies, philosophical positions and principles of any kind became

wheels of pedagogy that is to challenge the universal threat of nuclear armament for

ensuring the future survival. After the *Fukuryumaru* incident, memorial monuments

began emphasizing a pedagogical significance in commemorating the atomic bomb for

the future. The Children's Peace Monument, which was erected in 1958 in Hiroshima

Peace Memorial Park, offers a pivotal example of the pedagogical significance of the

commemoration of atomic bomb (Figure 4:6).

The Children's Peace Monument commemorates Sadako Sasaki who died of a

radiation sickness (leukemia) in Hiroshima Red Cross Hospital ten years after the end of

war on October 1955. Her story of fighting the radiation sickness is known around the

world today as the story of the thousand paper cranes; and the monument receives many

paper cranes sent from all over the world in memory and with wishes for peace. The

incident of *Fukuryumaru* brought awareness of the link between the atomic bomb and

radiation sickness, which was a long kept secret during the occupation period.[37]

Newspapers began reporting about the outbreak of radiation sickness in Hiroshima and

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[37] *Mainichi shinbun*, July 30, 1954.

Nagasaki; and it shocked people once again with the lingering effect of atomic bomb many years after the war's end. Her classmates were also the survivors of the atomic bomb, and their inability to do anything for Sadako led to the idea of erecting a monument to comfort Sadako's soul.

Figure 4:6. Children's Peace Memorial Monument.
Since many schools have the story of Sadako Sasaki in their reading list, it is the most popular memorial monument for students visiting the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. Many schools throughout the nation and abroad send paper cranes, and they are kept in the cases surrounding the monument.

In order to erect the memorial monument, the students began a campaign at the National Convention of School Principles. Backed by the heightened national outcry for a nuclear testing ban and fear of radiation, the campaign caught national attention and news

media began to follow through the campaign. More than 3,200 schools nationwide contributed to the fund to build the memorial monument. The Children's Peace Monument became the first memorial monument erected by the people's fund generated nationwide in order to commemorate the victims of the atomic bomb and to send wishes for the peace. The inscription of monument, which was written by a student, says: "This is our cry. This is our prayer. For building peace in the world."[38] The direct and explicit declaration of *building* the peace and the monument's embodying the collective *will* for the peace both suggest that the atomic bomb tragedy has formed the peace pedagogy in the public sphere through commemoration of it.

The monument emphasizes the innocence of a child who became the victim of the radiation sickness that claimed her life years after the war's end. The innocence of the victim was put in contrast to the political and strategic discourses legitimating the use and possession of atomic bombs for years to come. By 1953, newspapers were printing articles sympathetically projecting the moral dilemma experienced by Truman, as well as other personnel who had to make a decision to drop the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Featuring what might have gone on when Truman and his administration made a decision to use the atomic bombs against Japan, one newspaper printed the article's title with largest-font as: "Use of Atomic Bomb Necessary: Defense Is the Priority."[39] The article sympathetically presented the moral dilemma that Truman might have had before his making the decision to drop the bomb to save many lives that would otherwise have been lost without use of the atomic bombs.

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[38] Inscription on the Children's Peace Monument inside Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, Hiroshima-city, Japan.

[39] *Shakai Times*, August 7, 1953.

Yet, Truman, in his interview with Edward R. Murrow broadcasted on CBS television on February 1958, said that he "had no qualms" on the use of atomic bombs: and as long as one has the weapon with the power to win the war, it is "foolish" not to use it to win a war.[40] His statement expressing no remorse at the use of atomic bombs invited national outcry throughout Japan. The mayor of Hiroshima drafted a strong protest letter to Truman, claiming that his remarks were "undoubtedly a bold challenge to the common sense of man and a violation of international law." It then continued to express that the city hopes "Mr. Truman will reflect on his opinionated remarks that he felt no compunction after ordering the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki."[41] No newspaper in Japan defended Truman's statement. Many people throughout Japan sent letters to the newspapers in protest of Truman's remarks in the name of humanity and peace. For example, a man from Miyagi prefecture, which is over 500-mile northeast of Hiroshima, denounced Truman's remarks as a challenge to all humans, and emphasized that it is the responsibility of Japanese people to act for a nuclear-free world.[42]

Responses from the media and the public Truman's remarks show that Hiroshima had become a reminder of a new awareness throughout Japan. Peace is incompatible with nuclear armament and its justifications. Peace does not simply mean the absence of war within one's own environment. Instead, peace requires active commitment to remove the threats against all humans. In front of the death of a child who was innocent in the last

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[40] Harry Truman, interview by Edward R. Murrow, *See It Now*, CBS, February 2, 1958.

[41] *New York Times*, March 23, 1958.

[42] *Asahi shinbun*, February 8, 1958.

war, anyone legitimizing the atomic bombs in the framework of national politics and strategic reality would invite an outrage against humanity and peace. Hiroshima thus became a collective consciousness of the people as 'Hiroshima' throughout Japan. This consciousness is now a pedagogical product that positions the innocence of victims against nuclear weapons and everything that legitimizes the use of such technology against other people.

Discussion

Hiroshima became pedagogical under the stress of humanist ethical norms that were linked to the atomic bomb victims and their individual innocence. Yet, as demonstrated in this paper, commemorating Hiroshima's tragedy began as a therapeutic desire or subterfuge by way of archiving the experiences of survivors and the memory of the dead. A therapeutic approach to comprehending an unprecedented atrocity in human experience was necessary in Hiroshima and its public sphere to move forward with the reconstruction of ordinary life in postwar Japan. The amnesiac elisions worked as a strategy to remove from the public space of commemoration the malice and the smoldering thought of vengeance. Moreover, it enabled the oblivion to avoid facing unacceptable justifications or undesired explanations of why Hiroshima had received the visit of nuclear annihilation. Through reading monuments and other early commemorative exercises such as Peace Festivals and publications as text, it reveals that this oblivious attitude toward the past is a negotiated product of sociopolitical contexts. It has enabled the victims to move forward with present realities of reconstruction under the

occupied Japan, while it has disabled antagonistic sentiments against the occupied force to overgrow in public spheres. Remembrance of Hiroshima's tragedy in public spheres therefore began with amnesiac elisions of the past context for therapeutic intent.

However, both people and the city of Hiroshima were not oblivious to the unprecedented nuclear atrocity itself. When the mysterious deaths of atomic bomb survivors became known as radiation sickness and *Fukuryumaru* became the third victim of the nuclear bomb, the heightened awareness that anyone can fall victim of nuclear threat even in Peace times had shifted the context for the remembrance of atomic bomb in the public sphere. Radiation sickness claimed the innocent life of Sadako Sasaki more than a decade after the war's end, which marked the Era of a new form of social unrest related to the long-term effects of nuclear blasts. Her classmates' effort to erect a memorial monument differentiated Hiroshima from all other war destructions experienced throughout the nation. The post-war loss of life re-framed the discourse of Hiroshima's tragedy in the context of political stability and peace. Furthermore, the death of children who were not accountable to carry out the last war has generated a consciousness that nuclear weapon is the *absolute antonym* of innocence and people itself.

Heightened awareness of unsuspected aspects of nuclear threats became an influential pedagogy of humanity particularly in response to voices that attempt to legitimize nuclear annihilation on account of national or political interests. *Ahistorical* reconstruction of Hiroshima's experience in the aftermath of the nuclear disaster thus formed the 'Hiroshima' discourse with an emphasis on the importance of commemorating Hiroshima's tragedy as a means to learn that the nuclear threat is in fact

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transcendental of all humanity. 'Hiroshima' has come about as a discourse about the past with orientation toward the future progress. It emerged from the innocence of the victims of the atomic bomb and the long-term effects of radiation measuring the rhetoric of political and national interests and the progress of science and technology to develop, use, and justify nuclear armament.

Yet by reading the text of the events that construe the commemoration monuments, literature, press and public events, we note an underlining flow of voices and emotions that remained unresolved by the mere change in public rhetoric of commitments to political peace. These voices point to a hidden curriculum shadowing the new pedagogy of peace embodied in 'Hiroshima'. That is a pedagogy that, in its best intentions to uphold values of humanity, plays emotionally the discourse of peace at international, transcendental consciousness of mankind life preservation, nonetheless in this process silences voices, exercises regulatory control on the legitimacy of personal experience and even obscures the emotions of very population directly hit by the atomic disaster. In a study follow this, I will unfold a hidden curriculum of the 'Hiroshima' discourse and present the transformations that 'Hiroshima' undergoes in this day when taken into the frames of a Global Society.

Chapter 5

Postwar Obscurity and Commemoration of Catastrophe

August 15, 1945, the Emperor Shōwa gave a radio broadcast to announce that

Japan had accepted the terms of the surrender to the Allied Powers. Japan, unlike

Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, sustained the nation's political structures even

after the defeat.[1] The Emperor delivered the official declaration of the end of the nation's

war in the Imperial Diet that was convened only after half a month after the defeat.

Instead of defeat (*hai-sen*), the Emperor denoted the war's conclusion simply as an end of

war (*shū-sen*). Even today, Japan commemorates August 15th as the day of war's end

(*shū-sen kinenbi*), not the day of the nation's defeat (*hai-sen kinenbi*).

Symbolizing the war's conclusion without a denotation of the defeat suggests that

the Japanese situated the war's end as the new beginning rather than the defeated end.

Thus, there was merely minute attention to inquiry into the war and war responsibilities.

For example, the first postwar parliamentary session was convened on September 1945,

but there was no discussion on the war responsibility of the nation's political institutions.

Instead, the war responsibilities were put on the people who miscarried the Imperial

intent and brought the defeated end to the war.[2] In the Imperial Script, it was stressed that

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[1] In fact, Japan's Imperial Diet was convened five times after the nation's defeat until March 1947, when the new Constitution dismantled the Imperial Constitution on March 1947.

[2] The Prime Minister, Higashikuninomiya, delivered his statement to the Imperial Diet assembly. In his statement, Higashikuninomiya stressed that all Japanese people must accept their sin in response to the war's end. However, his statement said that the people should have a guilty conscience to the Emperor, and that the people failed to carry out the Imperial Order throughout the war. Hence, the people caused troubling of the Emperor, who took action to bring the war to the end in order to save the lives of the people. See, Higakushikuninomiya-Naruhikooh's statement in the Plenary Session of the House of Lord, No. 2, on September 5, 1945.

the Imperial Diet "should move forward to construct a nation of peace which contributes substantially toward world peace and advancement of human civilizations".[3] The Imperial Diet thus began debating the reconstruction of the nation, instead of spending time to examine the defeated war and war responsibilities. In fact, Japan began debate on war responsibilities only after the Allied Occupation Forces began making arrests of war criminals. Even then, the debates were mostly focusing on defining the acts that should be excluded from war crimes.

When exploring the ways Hiroshima's atomic tragedy has come to be remembered in the national public sphere, how Japan and the Japanese people have symbolized the war's conclusion carries notable impact. Hiroshima today symbolizes the world peace and the anti-nuclear movement, and its historical significance is recognized throughout the world. Yet, without needing to give so much justification, we can safely assume that such symbolisms are not built in a brief space of time. Newspaper articles of the 1960s reveal that Hiroshima's tragedy was kept alive mostly within localized remembrance of the war (we will discuss this point later in this chapter). People knew about the fact that an atomic bomb hit Hiroshima, but there was little knowledge of what really took place in Hiroshima after the atomic bomb hit the city. This absence of knowledge suggests that Hiroshima's tragedy was not a significant detail to build remembrance in the national public sphere until the 1960s.

Today, however, we put a great emphasis on highlighting in details about Hiroshima's tragedy when we speak about the atomic bombing, nuclear armament and wars. In Japan, all history textbooks, for example, note the atomic bombing of Hiroshima

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[3] Hirohito. September 4, 1945, Plenary Session on both Houses.

and the tragedy it brought to the people. More and more people in the world recognize the historical significance of Hiroshima's horrific experience as many countries are now including the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in their history textbooks.

Subsequently, this chapter will inquire how wartime experiences became significant subject to be remembered in the public sphere. More specifically, this chapter will explore the process through which we make otherwise elusive experiences of the past into a significant event in history. This chapter will also pay particular attention to the notion of peace, which is almost consistently set together with the discourse on war and war violence. By way of exploring the process of making war violence to be represented as a historically significant experience and identify the notion of peace in the public sphere, this chapter aims to elaborate both the process and the product of remembering the war and war violence as historically significant past in the public sphere. This inquiry intends to offer an insight into the historians' subjects that are themselves a historical product, and thus they could (or perhaps should) also be the subjects of historical inquiry.

Postwar Obscurity and Peace

When drafting a new Constitution in postwar Japan, Joji Matsumoto, the chairperson of the committee for drafting the Constitution, aimed to give the general public an exemption from war crimes. Matsumoto stated:

> Every citizen is asked to make a total commitment to the nation and its war efforts once there is a war's occurrence. The people who have sacrificed everything for the nation's war efforts, therefore, should not be held accountable for their roles in the war. It is only those people who have

committed unlawful acts to provoke the war who should hold war
responsibility.[4]

Matsumoto placed the war responsibility on the people who drove the nation into the war

by their unlawful conduct. However, he did not identify any individual persons who

acted unlawfully or any particular unlawful acts that led the nation into the war. A part of

Matsumoto's statement is often quoted to state Japan's active acknowledgement of war

responsibility. However, reading through the whole statement, it is clear that the

statement criticized the Japan's war, but it did so to avoid incrimination of any particular

individual persons for the war and its defeated end.

Indeed, there is substantial evidence to say that the general population of Japan

did not think of war responsibility as their own or personal issue. Yoshio Yasumaru

analyzed the early postwar sociopolitical atmosphere of Japan in 1970s. In his study,

Yasumaru identified that the Japanese comprehended the defeat and the postwar

circumstances by believing that they were the victims of deceit from military factions that

misled the people throughout the war.[5] From here, we can understand that the general

public also isolated war responsibility to abstract institutions like the military factions.[6]

John Dower, through inquiring cultural and social experiences of the Japanese of the

1940s, similarly characterized the human landscape of Japan under the Allied Occupation

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[4] Joji Matsumoto, November 30, 1945, the House of Lords, the Imperial Ordinance No. 542: 8.

[5] Yoshio Yasumaru, *Nihon nashonarizumu no zenya* (Tokyo: Asahi shinbun, 1977), 214.

[6] This is in fact similar to the way Matsumoto and other parliamentary members assigned the
responsibility to unidentified individuals who committed unlawful acts. For the examples of the statement
made by other parliamentary members, see Mitsuo Miyata, a parliamentary member, argued exactly along
the same lines in the Diet on November 29, 1945. Miyata stressed that the military factions took not only
Americans but also the Japanese people into the morass of war by their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. It
is suggested here that Miyata positioned the Japanese people as the war's victims as much as Americans
were the victims in the surprise attack of the Pearl Harbor. See, Mitsuo Miyama's statement in Plenary
Session No. 2 at the House of Lord on November 29, 1945.

by the title of his book, *Embracing Defeat*. The defeat indeed seemed to be embraced in the public sphere because it *liberated* the general public from the deception of the military factions. The defeat also saved the general public from the nightly air raids and possibility of dying in the war. This embracement, however, suggests that there was complete oblivion among the general public about the fact that they were active participants in materializing the war consequences.

The Tokyo Tribunal of War Crimes prosecuted war criminals in Japan, but it did not become a national experience in Japan's public sphere. The parliament kept the general population outside of the war responsibility, and the strong future-orientation in postwar Japan left the prosecution outside of Japan's postwar experience. Japan and its general public, thus, lost its opportunity to *systematically* reconcile its active involvement in the war. Instead, the population was positioned as victims of military factions that had been deceiving the people throughout the war. It is important to stress here that this obscuring of war responsibility came along with the strong future-orientation for peace in the public sphere of Japan in its early postwar years. Emphasis on peace in Japan's postwar public sphere, therefore, was conditioned by the oblivion to the need to inquire into the nation's wartime past and the people's active participation in the war.

Intangible Peace

Bypassing critical inquiry on war responsibility allowed Japan to make concerted efforts to reconstruct the nation. The annual economic growth rate of Japan marked almost eight percent in the 1950s. In fact, the 1956 Economic White Paper declared that

Japan had exited the postwar period by quoting the fact that the economic condition of the nation had recovered to the level of what it was just before the start of the war. The nation's economic recovery came with rapid industrialization and urbanization of the national landscape, but it also brought the social problems of pollution, housing shortages, labor exploitations and other unfavorable byproducts.[7] The 1950s, therefore, saw an increasing membership of reformist political parties and labor unions by absorbing social dissatisfactions from the people who were left behind in the nation's economic recovery.

Political tensions became more visible than ever in the public sphere when the San Francisco Peace Treaty (signed on September 8, 1951) reinstated national sovereignty to Japan.[8] The treaty was exchanged without the presence of the Communist Bloc Nations. Immediately after exchanging the Peace Treaty, the Japanese government also exchanged the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (TMCS) with the United States. TMCS was to permit the United States to keep its military forces in Japan even after Japan's reinstatement of its national sovereignty. These two treaties, in other words, defined Japan as a strategic outpost of the Western Bloc Nations in East Asia. The treaties, thus, drove Japan right into the midst of the rapidly developing Cold War structure as an active participant in the East Asian front.

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[7] Yutaka Kosai, *Kodo seicho no jidai* (Tokyo: Nihon hyoron sha, 1981), also see Hajime Shinohara and Akiko Wada, *Kodo seicho no hikari to kage* (Kawasaki, Japan: Kawasaki shimin academy, 2003).

[8] Reinstatement of national sovereignty lifted US censorship in Japan, and the voices suppressed under the censorship began surfacing in the public sphere. See Chapter 4 for further discussion about the postwar censorship in Japan.

The continuing presence of US military forces in Japan invited fear that the United States would take Japan into the war.[9] The Korean War, for example, continued to leave military and political tensions in the Korean Peninsula even after the ceasefire agreement on July 27, 1953. Furthermore, in the United States, there were discussions of using atomic bombs once again to win the war in the Korean Peninsula. Through stressing the fear that the United States would bring wars to Japan, the reformist parties accumulated even more political capital in the public sphere. For instance, the Japan Teachers' Union (JTU), one of the most vocal and influential unions, defined the United States as the militant force threatening the peace around the world. In parliamentary hearings, JTU repeatedly condemned the United States for bringing war to the whole world.[10]

In fact, Japan saw intensifying discord between the political canon and its opponents when the renewal of TMCS was approaching in 1960. The discord grew into a mass protest movement, which marked a pivotal point in Japan's social, political and cultural scenes.[11] The opinion poll taken in 1959 revealed that 21.5 percent of the

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[9] See, for example, the statement of Manzo Tanaka, a Chairperson for the Committee on Peace Treaty and TMCS, in his statement at the Plenary Session in Lower House, No. 8, on October 26, 1951.

[10] See, for example, the statement of Manji Yoshida in the Plenary Session No. 12 at Lower House on February 25, 1951.

[11] The major protest started on March 28, 1959, when the Socialist Party (SPJ), Sohyo (United Convention of Union Workers) and 132 other organizations called a protest to prevent the renewal of TMCS. The reformist party members barricaded the National Diet in order to prevent the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, which was the party in majority) to push the bill to renew TMCS. It was the first time after the war that 500 police personnel were brought into the Diet to remove protesting members with force. Without the presence of the opposition parties, the bill to renew TMCS went through the parliament on May 19, 1960. From this day to June 23 (the day the renewed TMCS went into effect), Japan saw mass protests throughout the nation demanding to overthrow the LDP-controlled government. 5,600,000 National Railway workers went on strike on June 10. 130,000 protesters besieged the National Diet Building on June 15. The number grew up to 330,000 in three days. More on this protest, see: Michitoshi Takahata, "Taishu undo no tayoka to henshitsu," in Nihon seiji gakkai, ed., 55nen taisei no keisei to hokai (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1979): 323-359.

respondents believed TMCS would ensure peace in Japan, while 44.5 percent said TMCS would bring war to Japan. The same opinion poll exposed an even smaller portion of the respondents (11.3 percent) willing to approve the renewal of TMCS. However, the same poll result also revealed that only 20.4 percent *openly* opposed the government's decision to renew TMCS. Reading this data suggests that the large majority of Japanese (68.3 percent) were ambivalent or lacking any substantial interest in the renewal of TMCS despite the massive protest movements ongoing in the public sphere. The mass protest movement brought a referendum election on November 20, 1960 in order to end political turbulence. The election result, however, confirmed the poll result. Despite the heightened political consciousness that brought the election, the voter turnout showed a decline of 3.48 percent from the previous election. Furthermore, the election brought the greatest triumph to LDP, which gained 63.4 percent of the Diet by winning nine additional seats.

The poll result and the election outcome both provide substantial ground to say that the general public was alienated from or indifferent to the political discord over how Japan should ensure its peace within the framework of the rapidly developing Cold War structure. More notably, the general public revealed its orientation toward maintaining the status quo through the election. This election asked the people how Japan should ensure its national security in respect to the Cold War—whether Japan should align with the United States or terminate alliance with the United States. However, we need to note that there was no substantial debate on how Japan should maintain its national security after removing the United States, or about how (or if) Japan should (or could) stay out of the indisputable reality of the Cold War.

It must be noted from what has been said above, there was a total lack of realism about the international contexts of the postwar world in Japan. Regarding the notion of peace, Japan can be said to have been purely introverted into own national space, and Japan's postwar peace was not relevant to both the political realities and the historical consequences of the postwar world.[12] Having no consciousness of how their present peace had been ensured, the peace emphasized in early postwar Japan was merely an intangible one in principle. The notion of peace assumed in Japan was, therefore, a product of *oblivion*, which permitted the Japanese to be ignorant of the postwar realism outside of their nation-state context.

Threshold of Intangible Peace

The heightened nuclear armament race was, however, an indisputable reality in the postwar world. The Soviet Union declared that it had successfully conducted its first atomic bomb test on August 29, 1949. However, Japan's antinuclear sentiments grew only after the U.S. hydrogen bomb testing killed another Japanese citizen in 1954. Japan's late response to ongoing nuclear armament race is another proof that Japan's general public thought they were free from nuclear threat so long as they stay out of wars.

When Japanese fishermen became victims of a nuclear bomb testing, a signature drive calling for a nuclear testing ban began spontaneously in Japan. This signature drive

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[12] The reformist parties negated the presence of the U.S. military forces in Japan. However, they also offered no debate on the issues mentioned in here. Newspapers and other publications of that period equally failed to cultivate any substantial debate in the public. This absence, therefore, suggests the total lack of consciousness in Japan and its public sphere of the United States' having provided the physical means to ensure Japan's national security throughout the postwar years. Reviewing many antiwar movements and other peace movements organized in Japan, we can even identify the consistency of the same lack of consciousness today.

accumulated over 32 million signatures throughout Japan, and over 670 million

signatures were sent from all over the world.[13] The number of signatures vividly reveals

the magnitude of the antinuclear sentiments when we consider the facts that Japan's total

population was only 89 million, and that the voting age population was only 51 million at

that time.[14] Initially, the Japanese government did not submit any protest statement to

U.S. nuclear bomb testing. Even when the fishermen became the latest Japanese victims

of the U.S. hydrogen bombing, the government made no protest statement.[15] The

signature drive, however, grew too enormous to be ignored in Japan's political scene.

Hence, on March 24, 1955, the Prime Minister, Ichiro Hatoyama, made an official

declaration firmly opposing the nuclear armament and its test for the first time after the

war.[16]

In the public sphere, the signature drive led to the establishment of the Japan

Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb (*Gensuikyo*). *Gensuikyo* became a leading

organization uniting the voices against ongoing nuclear armament testing of the United

States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union; *Gensuikyo* also organized The World

Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs annually to raise non-partisan voices

against the countries conducting tests to develop nuclear armaments. Furthermore, when

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[13] Akira Ubuki, "*Nihon ni okeru gensuibaku kinshi undo no shuppatsu* (The opening of the nationwide movement against atomic and hydrogen bombs in Japan: On the signature campaign against atomic and hydrogen bombs in 1954)," *Hiroshima Peace Science* 5, (1982): 199-223.

[14] Statistics Bureau, Japan. *Wagakuni no suikei jinko* (*Demographic Changes in Japan*), under *e-stat*: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/ (accessed April 6, 2008).

[15] For example, only two weeks after the Japanese fishermen became the victims of the U.S. hydrogen bomb test, Toru Nakagawa, the chief of Asian Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirmed before the Lower House that the U.S. nuclear testing was of benefit to Japan's national security. See, Committee on Transportation No. 28 in Lower House, March 27, 1954.

[16] Ichiro Hatoyama, Plenary Session No. 5, Lower House, March 24, 1955.

one of the fishermen died of radiation sickness six months after he was exposed to the radioactive ashes came from the testing of the bomb, newspapers began printing articles inquiring about radiation effects of nuclear bomb testing. It was at this moment that many Japanese newspapers began devoting pages to delivering the stories of Hiroshima survivors and their experiences of radiation sickness. From here, we can understand that it took more than a decade for Japan's public sphere to develop serious antinuclear sentiments, despite the tragedies experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It was in this social climate that the City of Hiroshima opened the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum on August 24, 1955. The nuclear armament race was still continuing. The public concern about the nuclear armament race was reflected in the number of museum visitors: during its inaugural year alone (in which the museum opened less than one half of a year), the museum received 115,369 visitors.[17] The fear of radioactive contaminants from the nuclear testing and the establishment of *Gensuikyo* gave Hiroshima impetus to symbolize an international discourse for opposing nuclear armament testing. Here, we can identify the development of *the ethos of Hiroshima as pedagogical discourse* to bring people together to oppose nuclear armament, in pursuit of world peace.

The Fourth World Conference of *Gensuikyo*, however, became a ground for political strife that was divided along the line of ideological discord. At the conference, the group affiliated to the Japan Communist Party (JCP) pushed an agendum to define the Western Bloc Nations as the *enemy of peace*. JCP and other reformist parties assumed a

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[17] The City of Hiroshima, "*Nendo betsu Hiroshima heiwa kinen shiryokan nyukansha su*" (April 17, 2007), under *Heiwa kinen shiryokan no nyuukannsha nado no gaikyo nit suite,* http://www.city.hiroshima.jp/ (accessed April 6, 2008).

position overlooking, if not supporting, the nuclear armament policies of the Communist

Bloc Nations. For example, Koichiro Ueda, an intellectual leader of JCP, justified the

nuclear armament of the Communist Bloc Nations as the force necessary to defend the

world peace. Ueda argued that, while the Communist Bloc Nations produced the

irreducible minimum level of nuclear armaments, the United States continued to pursue

nuclear armament *to the fullest of its ability*. From this viewpoint, Ueda and JCP

opposed the World Conference to challenge the nuclear policies of the Communist Bloc

Nations.[18]

Gensuikyo and its World Conference thus saw a breakdown when the delegates

from West Germany and the United Kingdom withdrew from the World Conference of

1959. A little before the conference, the People's Republic of China declared its plan to

develop its own nuclear program. The conference, led by JCP and other reformist parties,

refused to make any protest against China's declaration. Instead, the conference pushed

its attack against the Western Bloc Nations along the same line of JCP's perspective on

the nuclear policy. Furthermore, when the City of Hiroshima invited the Crown Prince to

participate in the city's peace ceremony August 6, 1960, *Gensuikyo* protested the city's

decision to invite the Imperial family and moved the World Conference from Hiroshima

to Tokyo. The Crown Prince's participation in the ceremony symbolizes that

Hiroshima's tragedy became the national experience. However, the removal of the

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[18] Koichiro Ueda, "*Hutatsu no heiwa taikai to shusei shugi riron*," *Marx shugi to heiwa undo* (1962; repr., Tokyo: Otsuki shoten, 1965) : 121-126. For JCP's perspectives on the United States, see the statement Sanzo Nosaka, who was the JCP Chairperson, brought in front of the Upper House on June 27, 1959. Nosaka stressed that the renewal of TMCS would incorporate Japan as part of the U.S. Empire and its nuclear strategies. In fact, many reformist parties spoke of U.S. imperialism as "the common enemy of humanity around the world" in the parliamentary sessions of the 1950a and early 1960s. Quoted text is from Nagatoshi Mukai, Plenary Session No. 14, Upper House (December 11, 1965), and Sanzo Nosaka, Plenary Session No. 5, Upper House (June 27, 1959).

World Conference from Hiroshima to Tokyo symbolizes the departure of the antinuclear discourse of *Gensuikyo* from Hiroshima's *empirical experiences* to Tokyo's *political/ideological discourse*. The relocation of the World Conference to Tokyo—Japan's political center, therefore, symbolically suggests that *Gensuikyo*'s antinuclear discourse became primarily a political one.

Moreover, it is perhaps useful to note that not only the political sphere but also the public sphere was oblivious to the actuality of ongoing global conflicts that were threatening peace. Taro Okamoto, one of the most renowned Japanese artists, became disheartened when he observed the visitors to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park:

> "Everyday, people visit the Cenotaph. Some come to pray, and some also take pictures of it. People seem content when they finish praying at the Cenotaph. 'Well, we saw what we came to see, and we prayed at the place where we came to pray.' There is an expression of mixed relief and slyness on their faces. The expression shows that they were just content to confirm that they were not the ones standing on the receiving end of the atomic bombs."[19]

Okamoto described Hiroshima's commemorating space as having turned into a tourist destination. By the mid-1960s, 2,000,000 Japanese and 70,000 foreigners visited Hiroshima annually. A. M. Rosenthal (1965) wrote an article for *The New York Times* describing Hiroshima in a manner similar to Okamoto's observation:

> "From early morning until long after dark, convoy after convoy of buses unloads Japanese at the museum, a long modern crackerbox on stilts, where the bits of seared clothing and the pictures of men roasted and children's faces without skin are preserved. They walk around the park, rather gaily, toll the great bronze Peace Bell, picnic on the scraggly lawns, line up for group pictures and then go home in their buses."[20]

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[19] Taro Okamoto, "*Amarinimo sanbunteki...Genbaku wo odaimoku ni sumai,*" *Asahi shinbun* (August 3, 1960).

[20] A. M. Rosenthal, "The Taste of Life in Hiroshima, Now, Twenty Years After," *New York Times* (August 1, 1965), SM4.

Rosenthal's description painted an image in which the site for commemorating Hiroshima's tragedy became one of many tourist destinations.

Throughout Hiroshima, the traces of atomic bombing could still be found. Some of those traces were in the process of being preserved to remind the people of the tragedy. However, both Okamoto and Rosenthal described that these traces had turned into tourist destinations at which the people confirmed their present peace in contrast to the tragedy of the past. From here, we can conclude that Hiroshima and the traces of atomic bombing did not work as a pedagogical medium to transmit the ethos of Hiroshima in Japan's public sphere. Instead, Hiroshima—including Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the monuments in Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park—became the site for tourism.

These observations give us substantial ground to conclude that the partisan politics had dismantled *the ethos of Hiroshima* and its pedagogy as early as the beginning of the 1960s. Millions of people visited Hiroshima annually, but their visits did not give them any connection with Hiroshima's empirical experiences of the past tragedy and their ongoing reality that was threatening peace. The political turmoil that led to the breakdown of *Gensuikyo*, in fact, suggests that the importance of peace emphasized in Japan's public sphere was merely a theme, and that there was no substantial discussion aimed at materializing peace in the world.

Fictional Pedagogy

The traces left by the atomic bombing reminded Hiroshima's survivors of their horrific experiences. Hence, many survivors expressed their mixed feelings over preserving the traces. Though they knew the importance of keeping such objects to tell their stories, they were also eager to get rid of any traces that would keep reminding them of the tragic experiences of the bomb. Yoshimi Kishida survived the bomb, but she lost three sisters in the blast. Her parents also died within a few days after the bomb. She found her husband dead when she roamed around in the ruins. Kishida recalled that Hiroshima's peace ceremony began spontaneously when the victims and the bereaved came together to share their stories of the loss. However, Kishida said to a journalist that she, as a survivor, no longer participated in the Peace Ceremony that is held annually on August 6 in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. The ceremony, Kishida stressed, "became a fiction—something that is not real"[21] to the survivors.

It is evident that Hiroshima became the site for both partisan politics and tourism when Hiroshima's survivors and their experiences were alienated from the commemoration. We note today that Hiroshima's tragedy was indeed a pivotal event in the Second World War. However, most cities and the people throughout Japan had experienced their own tragedies of air-raid attacks during the war's finale. The Ministry of Works has data stating that 215 cities throughout Japan were bombed during the war.[22] Moreover, the United States used firebombs in the air raid attacks, and those attacks against major cities claimed more lives during a single mission than the atomic bomb did

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[21] *Asahi shinbun* (August 5, 1965).

[22] For the data on the air-raid attacks to the Japanese cities, see the following resources and studies: Nichigai Associates Co. Ltd., *Taiheiyo senso tosho mokuroku* (Tokyo: Nichigai Associates, 2005): 446-7; Takahide Nakamura, ed., *Shiryo taiheiyo senso higai chousa hokoku* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1995): 255-381; Hitoshi Koyama, *Nihon kushu no zenyo: Beigun shiryo* (Tokyo: Toho shuppan, 1995); and no arthor, *Nihon no kushu 10* (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1981): 87-172.

in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To most Japanese people, the nation's defeat meant the end of their wartime reality, and they were freed from the fear of being killed by air-raids and other aggressive force from the enemies. In this respect, peace was conceptualized in postwar Japan simply as *a state* in which the people did not need to face the wartime reality of the past.

Hiroshima's survivors had different realities. Even after the war's end, both survivors and the bereaved who entered the city after the bomb kept dying. The defeat, in other words, did not mark a closure to the wartime realities in Hiroshima's public sphere. The defeat had indeed ended the physical destruction of the city. However, many people continued to fall sick and die for many years after the end of the war. Though we know today the cause of their sickness and death, no substantial explanation was made available to the victims for many years after the war.[23] The wartime realities, therefore, persisted as the present realities for Hiroshima's victims. Hiroshima's public sphere, therefore, commemorated the atomic bombing not merely as the tragedy of the past. Instead, the commemoration was to seek reconciliation to both the sudden loss in the past and the continuing loss in the present. In short, Hiroshima's commemoration was a way to comprehend the past and its persisting impacts in the present, in Hiroshima's public sphere.

Keisuke Hanada, for example, became a victim of the bomb about 2,000 meters away from the epicenter. Hanada said that everything he had experienced in the aftermath of the bomb became frozen like the images in photographs. No interpretations given to the bomb and the tragedies it wrought, he continued, could penetrate the images

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[23] See chapter 4 on U.S. censorship enforced on reporting of any details about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early postwar Japan.

that were frozen in his memory.[24] For Hanada and other survivors of Hiroshima, the bomb was not in their past because the bomb continued to pose a threat in their present. In Hiroshima, their past continued to leave unresolved problems in the present even after the war's end. Therefore, we can understand that Hiroshima's public sphere held the tragedy as *the subject of inquiry*, rather than *an object to be commemorated* in a ceremony.

In contrast, Hiroshima's tragedy was one of many localized wartime tragedies in Japan's national public sphere. Let us remind of the fact that Hiroshima's atomic bombing became a symbolic event in Japan when the Japanese fishermen became the newest victims of the U.S. hydrogen bomb test in 1954. The antinuclear sentiments grew enormously both in Japan and globally, in response to the world that was quickly moving into the Cold War. Hiroshima, as the first city that had experienced the destructive power of the atomic bomb, became a reminder to the present of what could happen in wars waged with nuclear weapons. In this respect, we can recognize that Japan's national public sphere responded primarily to the present threats of ongoing nuclear testing and the enhanced possibility of nuclear wars when commemorating Hiroshima's tragedy. Therefore, we can also understand that the national public sphere stressed almost nothing about understanding the tragedy in itself, when commemorating Hiroshima.

Hiroshima's public sphere, because the survivors continued to suffer the scars left by the bomb, sought peace as a goal in which the people would not be under the threat of war. Yet the national public sphere assumed peace as a condition in which they would not actively engaging war with anyone. No inquiry into war's context is required if we

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[24] Keisuke Hanada, "*Genbaku no kioku,*" *Asahi shinbun* (August 7, 1964).

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are simply negating all wars in general. Hence, ignoring the historical contexts of the

bomb has minimized the bomb merely as a necessary consequence of the nation's

involvement in war, in Japan's national public sphere.

The commemoration of Hiroshima's tragedy was intended to elicit the

remembrance of the event. Yet, the commemoration, although oblivious by its historical

context, merely offered a confirmation of the condition in which wartime reality, such as

Hiroshima's tragedy, is not the reality of the present. Therefore, there was no inquiry

into the past in which war was the reality, in which peace ceased to become reality, and

in which the rationality of war had dominated the public sphere. Hiroshima's tragedy,

therefore, gave only fictional pedagogy to Japan's national public sphere because it

pushed the people toward oblivion instead of building an understanding of the past and its

impacts upon the present realities.

From Fiction to Actual Pedagogy

Toshi Maruki painted the Hiroshima Panels, which are internationally known

paintings that depict Hiroshima's tragedy. Maruki has been a strong advocate of antiwar

and antinuclear discourse since the day she saw the tragedy with her own eyes. In her

article contributed to *Asahi Shinbun* in 1964, Maruki stressed the meaninglessness of

political ideologies, ethos, and all other discourses that have ever rationalized nuclear

armament and the use of nuclear arms. Maruki wrote:

> "August 6, 1945. The day of the atomic bombing, you have destroyed
> your honor, freedom, equality, philanthropy and justice with your own
> hands when you dropped the bomb. The Atomic Bomb robbed hundreds
> of thousands of human lives in a fraction of a second. No justice would

ever be able to prove its righteousness, once that rationality has permitted the use of such a weapon."[25]

Maruki disallowed any justifications that might be given to the use of nuclear armaments in the past or in future. Furthermore, Maruki stressed the meaninglessness of any discourse presuming to have superior moral virtues, because "the hand that pressed the button to release the bomb upon Hiroshima had also been educated with the ethos of freedom, equality and philanthropy".[26]

Exploring the newspaper articles printed in Japan during the 1960s, as we have seen, reveals that there was increasing criticism against making the atomic bomb site into a tourism resource. These criticisms challenged the rhetoric of JTU, JCP, and *Gensuikyo* that defended the nuclear armament of Communist Bloc Nations as a peaceful force. There contributed to be challenges to the political canon that hesitated to firmly oppose to the nuclear armament of Western Bloc Nations for many years. Newspapers began printing many articles arguing for the need to *depoliticize* Hiroshima's tragedy when *Gensuikyo* was split into two organizations—*Gensuikyo* and *Gensuikin*—along the line of partisan politics in 1965.[27]

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[25] Toshi Maruki, "*'Genbaku no zu' no koto: Gendai ni tsunagaru higeki*," *Asahi shinbun* (August 6, 1964).

[26] Maruki, Ibid. It is also notable here that this question on the moral virtues is parallel to the question on rationality posed by Theodor Adorno in his writing of 1944 in *Minima Moralia*.
> "The idea that after this war life will continue 'normally' or even that culture might be 'rebuilt'—as if the rebuilding of culture were not already its negation—is idiotic. Millions of Jews have been murdered, and this is to be seen as an interlude and not the catastrophe itself. What more is this culture waiting for?" Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (1951; rprt., London and New York:Verso, 2005), 55.

[27] The split of *Gensuikyo* carries significant meaning when analyzing Japan's peace movement around Hiroshima's tragedy. However, it would carry us too far away from the purpose of this paper is intended to introduce this issue in detail. In the interest of clarify in this chapter's argument, we may leave the details to other researches available in the field. For the details of sociopolitical atmosphere of this split, consult Kenzaburo Oe, *Hiroshima Note* (1965; rprt., New York: Grove Press, 1996).

When *Gensuikyo* moved its World Conference from Hiroshima to Tokyo in protest to Hiroshima's inviting the Crown Prince to its Peace Ceremony of 1960, Taro Okamoto ridiculed them, saying "Hiroshima has turned into a platform for a bizarre comedy in which people clown around in the name of the atomic bomb."[28] The party politics causing the split of the antinuclear movement called forth many criticisms. More notably, however, these criticisms brought a new awareness to the national public sphere, revealing that it had been both oblivious and ignorant of the tragedies experienced by Hiroshima's people.[29] This awareness became the ground to call the pedagogy for transmitting the ethos of Hiroshima to the national public sphere in the mid-1960s as an opposition to the politicized representation of Hiroshima's tragedy.

This opposition came from both Hiroshima's local public sphere and Japan's national public sphere. These different public spheres, simultaneously yet independently, generated pedagogy—a way to teach about Hiroshima and the city's experience of the atomic bombing—that aimed to push forward Hiroshima's ethos. For the moment, let us look closely into the pedagogy built in each public sphere before turning to the analysis of pedagogical representation of Hiroshima's tragedy as a historical event.

I: Hiroshima's Pedagogy: Exposition to Exhibition

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[28] Taro Okamoto, "*Hiroshima '63 (ge),*" *Asahi shinbun* (August 4, 1963).

[29] For example, in an editorial of *Asahi shinbun* on August 6, 1965 explicitly cautioned that the Japanese people had been both oblivious and ignorant of the atomic bombing. The editorial then argued that they (the Japanese people) must commit to serious self-criticism for having failed to understand the realities of Hiroshima's tragedy for two decades after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

There were 215 cities throughout Japan that had experienced air raid attacks by the end of the war. The nation's concerted war effort was turned immediately towards reconstructing the nation from war ruins, once the defeat concluded the war. Hiroshima, however, had implemented a plan to preserve the war devastation in order to make it into a tourism resource. Yet, like other cities in Japan, the people of Hiroshima were also in favor of removing war ruins to make way for reconstruction. The 1947 City in Brief of Hiroshima, for example, listed more than a dozen buildings and bridges as potential sites for preservation in order to memorialize the atomic bombing. The 1953 City in Brief, however, had only the ruins of Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Hall (later became known as the Atomic Dome) and Hiroshima Castle on its list. They were both on government property, and thus they escaped complete removal.

Today, the Atomic Dome stands as a symbol of Hiroshima's tragedy, and of global peace. However, we should note here that there were strong voices against preserving Hiroshima's ruins—including the Atomic Dome—throughout early postwar years. In particular, the Atomic Dome stands at the heart of the city. Therefore, there were voices characterizing the ruin as the giant gravestone constantly reminding the people of the tragic memories they wish to forget.[30] Like Japan's national public sphere, it seems Hiroshima's people were also in favor of forgetting the tragic memories of the past by way of emphasizing the present reconstruction and the future, in early postwar years.

Yet, Hiroshima's reconstruction was not easy because the bomb devastated the whole city. Hence, in 1949, the national government passed legislation to channel special

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[30] *"Chinmoku shitai hibakusha," Yomiuri shinbun* (August 6, 1965).

funding to reconstruct Hiroshima as "the City of Peace". The 1949 City in Brief openly

stated the plan to make the whole city into tourism resource. The City of Hiroshima,

upon receiving the special funding, thus drafted a blueprint to build "the Memorial

Monument for Hiroshima, City of Peace (the Cenotaph)" and what later became the

Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. The actual construction for both projects began in

1951, and the Cenotaph was completed the next year. The museum then opened its doors

in August 1955, and it exhibited "materials such as tiles and other items from the disaster

which had been subjected to intense heat rays and had important historical significance as

silent witnesses to what happened in Hiroshima."[31]

In his visit to Hiroshima to participate in the Ninth World Conference of

Gensuikyo in 1963, Kenzaburo Oe, later became a Novel Prize winner, witnessed the

detachment of Hiroshima's people from the Peace March and other ceremonies that were

to commemorate the tragedy. In *Hiroshima Note*, Oe quoted Hiroshima's Mayor, Shinzo

Hamai, who spoke of the need for a new peace movement that comes from Hiroshima's

experiences, as:

> "Whatever course is taken hereafter, there can be no peace movement that
> disregards the original spirit of Hiroshima. I think it is time to break off
> all relations with the Japan Council against A- and H-bombs and to begin a
> new peace movement."[32]

The mayor's statement suggests that both the people and the city of Hiroshima were fed

up with the failure to transmit the ethos of Hiroshima (the original spirit of Hiroshima)

into the people who had not experienced the bomb.

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[31] Yoshiteru Kosakai, *Hiroshima Peace Reader* (1980; rprt., Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, 2002), 52.

[32] Kenzaburo Oe, *Hiroshima Note*, 53.

The conscious desire to save Hiroshima from politicization has pushed the city to actively exhibit the memories of the bomb and the tragedy it brought, instead of simply exposing what the city has preserved. The ruin of Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Hall had been left standing on the bank of Motoyasu River, but the city assembly passed a resolution on July 11, 1966 to *actively* preserve the ruin as the Atomic Dome, to commemorate the bomb's destructive power. This resolution was particularly pivotal because it came with the Mayor's initiative to organize a *national* fund-raising campaign to make reinforcement work *to permanently preserve the ruin.* The permanent preservation of the ruin is notable transition in the way Hiroshima had come to deal with its memory, and the fundraising made the preservation efforts not only the work of Hiroshima but also national and international projects.[33]

In the 1967 Hiroshima Peace Declaration, Mayor Setsuo Yamada of Hiroshima stressed that the world should share the duty to remember Hiroshima's tragedy.[34] It was the first time the Peace Declaration emphasized the responsibility of remembering Hiroshima to the people around the world. He stressed in the statement, "Eloignment (removal) from sight begets oblivion."[35] Thus the City of Hiroshima and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum began organizing a traveling exhibition from this year to actively present the realities of the tragedy to the people residing outside of Hiroshima. The preservation of Hiroshima's tragedy was initially thought of as tourism resource,

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[33] The fundraising accumulated over 66,000,000 yen from all over Japan. Yet, there were donations sent also from the United States, the Soviet Union, France, India and England. The reinforcement was completed in 1967, and the long abandoned ruin became known as the Hiroshima Peace Memorial; better known today as Genbaku Dome (A-bomb Dome).

[34] Shinzo Hamai (The Mayor of Hiroshima), "Declaration for Peace" (Public Address, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, Hiroshima, Japan, August 6, 1967).

[35] Shinzo Hamai, Ibid., parenthesis mine.

because many soldiers and the people of the Occupation Force had been visiting

Hiroshima to see the city that had been destroyed by the atomic bomb.[36]

Sukeharu Morihito, the Director of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, said

after the traveling exhibit in Tokyo that he was astonished to learn that people in Tokyo

knew almost nothing about Hiroshima's tragedy.[37] The six-day traveling exhibit had over

50,000 visitors in Tokyo. A college student of Kawasaki wrote that the exhibit should

travel also to the nations that possess nuclear weapons. He stressed, "if the people

supporting nuclear armament saw [the traveling exhibition], there would be rekindled the

same kind of humanity and compassion that made them take a stand against the

Holocaust after the Second World War."[38]

In Hiroshima, it was not only the city but also the people who took active roles to

pass down their experiences of the bomb to the next generations. In the 1970s, teachers

who were survivors themselves of the atomic bomb began taking initiative to organize

Peace Education as a part of the school curriculum. In the national assembly of the 1969

Japan Teacher's Union in Kumamoto, teachers from Hiroshima warned that the memory

of atomic bombing was waning even among Hiroshima's school-age children.[39] Akira

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[36] The City of Hiroshima, for example, had issued a booklet with ten images of Hiroshima's ruins in 1947 as a way to attract visitors to the city. The booklet is titled "*Hibaku Jukkei* (ten sights of atomic bombing)", and the organizational body for planning the peace celemony (Heiwasai kyokai) published it. Heiwasai Kyokai, *Hibaku jukkei* (Hiroshima: Heiwasai Kyokai, 1947).

[37] "*Wakai sedai ni ikari to odoroki*," *Asahi shinbun* (September 11, 1967).

[38] ... Yazaki, "*Kaku motsu kuniguni nimo 'Genbakuten' wo*," *Asahi shinbun* (September 13, 1967).

[39] Teachers who had themselves experienced the atomic bombing organized "Heiwa kyoiku bunkakai (Subcommittee on Peace Education)" in Hiroshima Teacher's Union. This subcommittee emphasized the importance of preserving the memories of atomic bombing and other wartime experiences to prevent the occurrence of another war in Japan. In 1969, the subcommittee made a decision to put particular emphasis on their atomic bomb experiences to oppose the nuclear armaments and the international race to develop nuclear armaments. For further details, see: Takashi Hiraoka (former Mayor of Hiroshima), *Kibo no Hiroshima: Shicho wa uttaeru* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1996). Furthermore, the

Ishida, the director of the surviving teacher's association recalled, Hiroshima's peace education grew from the teachers explaining to their students about their *keloid* scar left permanent markers of their horrific experiences of the atomic bomb.

It is notable that both the people and the city of Hiroshima made concerted efforts to resurrect the experiences of the atomic bomb in the public sphere. We can understand from here that the memory of Hiroshima's tragedy began losing ground seriously within a mere quarter century after the atomic bombing. This attrition was serious enough even in Hiroshima's public sphere; and thus there were efforts to launch peace education as a way to prevent further loss of knowledge about their past. In response to this reality, Hiroshima has transformed its ruins into pedagogy to emphasize the importance of peace. Instead of being weary of war and/or simply negating wars in general, the negation of forgetting the war tragedies became the central discourse for peace pedagogy in Hiroshima's public sphere.

II. National Pedagogy: Turning Perspectives

a. Peace Movement and the Nation's Past

Let us now return to the point where we left off by exploring the political tension developed around TMCS in Japan. Many intellectuals were observing the protests against TMCS and its losing support. Keiichi Matsushita was a political scientist

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subcommittee's efforts to develop peace education created a textbook on peace education. This textbook was revised several times, but it became the ground for teaching Hiroshima's atomic bombing experiences in Japan until 1980s. See, Hiroshima heiwa kyoiku kyozai henshu iinkai, ed., *Hiroshima: Genbaku wo kangaeru* (Hiroshima: Hiroshime heiwa kyoiku shuppanbu, 1969).

observing both development and decline of the protest.[40] Matsushita then identified the primary cause of the protest's decline was the alienation of the populace to the partisan politics behind TMCS protests.[41]

The early 1960s, indeed, saw many civic movements emerging in Japan. These civic movements stayed well away from TMCS protests even though they were also pressing the contention for peace. The Japan "Peace for Vietnam!" Committee (*Beheiren*) was one of those civic movements. *Beheiren* grew into one of the centripetal civic organizations; it was perhaps the most pivotal movement for peace in Japan throughout the 1960s and the 1970s.[42] It is notable, however, that *Beheiren* had neither the organizational constitution nor the list of members. *Beheiren* was formed as such in negation to the partisan politics that alienated TMCS protests from their initial goal— desire for peace by opposing war and anything that poses threat of war. Therefore, *Beheiren* kept its organizational structure loose in order to bring together anyone, regardless of their political and national affiliations, so long as they opposed the war in Vietnam. In this respect, we can place *Beheiren* as a successor to the previous peace movements in Japan's national public sphere; and thus we will inquire more carefully

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[40] Keiichi Matsushita, *Shimin seiji iron no keisei* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1959); *Sengo Minshushugi no tenbo* (Tokyo: Nihon hyoron sha, 1965); and *Sengo seiji no rekishi to shiso* (Tokyo: Chikuma, 1994). There are also other scholars who were studying the TMCS protest in the midst of the protest movement. See, Takesaburo Ide, ed., *Anpo toso* (Tokyo: Sanichi shobo, 1960).

[41] For example, Momo Iida, who was ousted from the Japan Communist Party in 1965, openly condemned the partisan politics that had distorted the mass movements for peace. Momo Iida, "*Shiminteki minshushugi undou no ronri to rinri*," *Shiryo Beheiren undo II* (1965; rprt., Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1974), 24-35.

[42] *Beheiren* was a civic organization established immediately following the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. The organization inherited the fundamental principle of peace that was initially stressed in TMCS protests.

into *Beheiren* in order to discover the fundamental ideas of peace and the pedagogy to deliver peace embedded in and developed through the *Beheiren* movement.

Beheiren introduced its organizational principle in its very first public statement. Minoru Oda, one of the leading organizers of *Beheiren*, stressed in this statement:

> "We say only this: 'Peace in Vietnam!' This is not just our voice. This is the voice of the majority in the world. This is the voice of the human race... This voice may be small now, but the echo will be heard worldwide, even in the United States, China and of course in Vietnam."[43]

Beheiren created many publications, leaflets and appeals, and made a consistent statement similar to the one quoted here. Furthermore, *Beheiren* emphasized repeatedly that it was the organization and the movement of ordinary people and of ordinary citizens. The organizational principle of *Beheiren* emphasizing the movement for and of ordinary people was, however, not merely a statement to negate the partisan politics. In fact, we can see that it was also an embodiment of the belief in *Beheiren* that the human desire for peace "is transcendentally common to all people across different nationalities and ethnic groups."[44]

This transcendental humanism (or universal humanism) assumed in the *Beheiren* movement should not be taken lightly. It is neither important nor useful to raise a problem that no humanism has ever attained universal consensus. The primary issue here is the fact that peace was assumed to carry transcendental value to all humans in Japan's national public sphere, which was fully behind the war only fifteen years ago. It is also implied here that the nations (and people) waging wars are enemies of humanity when

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[43] Minoru Oda, "Yobikake," *Shiryo Beheiren undo II* (1965; rprt., Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1974), 5.

[44] Minoru Oda, "*Sekai e hiraku undo wo,*" *Shiryo Beheiren undo II* (1965; rprt., Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1974), 13.

they violate peace, which was supposed to be a universal value of humanity. From these points, we can see that there was an absolute negation to the nation's past war at the starting point of *Beheiren* movement in Japan.

However, Momo Iida stressed when he was ousted from Japan's Communist Party: "Japanese people have the advantage to elevate peace that comes from our tragic experiences of the atomic bombing."[45] Furthermore, in *Heikinteki jinrui no negai* (*Wishes of ordinary humankind*), a science fiction writer and an active supporter of *Beheiren*, Sakyo Komatsu, wrote of the meaninglessness of political and ideological explanations of war's rationality. Komatsu recalled the moment he felt both political and ideological slogans meant nothing, when he was standing in the middle of war ruins, as:

> "The fire showered down from the sky and houses were burned down.
> Skin burned and girders impaled children. Crops perished. People ran
> dodging the bombs. They were ourselves. They were our families. And
> they were our loved ones. They were our parents and grandparents who
> had crawled on the burning field trying to flee from the bombs."[46]

Komatsu wrote what is quoted here with mixed verb-tense (original in Japanese) as a technique to make the readers to juxtapose their parents who were bombed in the immediate past and the victims in Vietnam who were being bombed in the present. It is visible here that Komatsu intended in this statement to bring solidarity between war victims both in the past and the present, as well as the solidarity between war victims both in Japan and in Vietnam. The readers were asked to resurrect their past memories of the war to evoke the imagination of the people in Vietnam who were undergoing the same experiences of air raid attacks in the present.

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[45] Momo Iida, "*Shiminteki minshushugi undou no ronri to rinri*," 25.

[46] Sakyo Komatsu, *"Heikinteki jinrui no negai*," *Shiryo Beheiren undo II* (1966; rprt., Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1974), 135.

Both statements, instead of ignoring the nation's past war, resurrected the wartime memory to encourage transnational and trans-historical solidarity of the people against war. This solidarity was promoted on the grounds of war victims and their experiences in order to construct the people's opposition, across political, ideological and national solidarity against war. Hence, the antiwar pedagogy constructed in Japan's national public sphere made assumptions regarding the universality of humanism transcendental to any political, ideological and national frameworks. More importantly, this pedagogy for transcendental humanism for building antiwar solidarity was not a product of forgetting the past war. Instead, this antiwar pedagogy was built upon the memories of the wartime tragedies. Moreover, it also suggests that the wartime tragedies were not localized experience in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They were nationally shared experiences of the Second World War. However, this antiwar pedagogy and its absolute negation of all war suggest that the remembrance of the war was built mostly on the grounds of the people's personal wartime experiences as war victims. In other words, we can understand from the antiwar pedagogy and its emphasis on assumed universal humanism that Japan's national public sphere had consciousness of the war not as national experience but primarily as individual human experience.

b. Extending Universal Humanism

The universal humanism assumed in Japan's antiwar sentiment was the product of highlighting the remembrance of the past war and the tragedies it brought to the people. Emphasizing universal humanism was also a product of an active departure of Japan's peace movement from partisan politics, which had turned peace into a conditional goal

and divided the discourse for peace along the line of party politics. At the same time, we have seen that this assumed universal humanism for peace was built upon the experiences of individual war victims. Japan's antiwar pedagogy, as we discovered, defined war in general as the primary perpetrator of all wartime tragedies. This antiwar pedagogy in Japan's national public sphere is, at a glance, similar to the one in Hiroshima's public sphere. They both aimed to reinstate the remembrance of wartime tragedies—tragedies experienced throughout the nation and tragedies of atomic bombings—in order to bring forward absolute negation of wars and nuclear armament.

However, *Beheiren* and its movement made a pivotal development when the United States began bombing North Vietnam in March 1965. The Vietnam War gave opportunity to the Japanese to link their wartime experiences to the ongoing experiences of the Vietnamese. Responding to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, Minoru Oda drafted the Proposed Principle for Peace in 1966 in order to push the *Beheiren* movement forward to reify its opposition to the war in Vietnam. This proposed principle is a very long statement. However, it is useful to quote some portion of it here in order to illustrate the impacts of the Vietnam War in reshaping the notion of peace in Japan's public scene. This transformed notion of peace, I argue, made the most pivotal impact in framing the way the Japanese remembered Hiroshima's tragedy, and thus it is worthwhile to examine the notion of peace reified in the Proposed Principle for Peace.

The principle exposes a critical shift in the relationship between Japan's general populace and their war responsibility. It is clearly emphasized here that wars make individual citizens not only the victims but also the perpetrators of war violence.

> There are photographs of the cruel acts in Vietnam, and we see pitiful images of victims. Yet, my eyes also find the hands that are perpetrating

the cruel acts in the photographs... Those hands could perhaps be my hands... The state (nation-state) ordered us to fire bullets against our will. Having been unprepared to launch a firm opposition against such an order, I may end up shooting the bullets (by obeying the order of the state). Then, I will be violating my own fundamentals principles (to not kill other human beings). In this respect, I am a victim of the nation-state. However, in the eyes of the people who became victims of my bullets, I am nothing but a perpetrator. The Vietnam War exposed us to this complex mechanism (of war).[47]

It must be noted here that this statement deconstructs the dichotomized structure that categorizes individuals into victims and perpetrators when building a consciousness of war and war violence.

We should, however, notice here also that this deconstruction was limited to the dichotomy between individual victims and individual perpetrators of war and war violence. Through deconstructing the dichotomy, this statement made the nation-state institution into *the ultimate perpetrator* forcing its citizens to violate their own fundamental principles. The statement positioned the nation-states reserving war as a sovereign right are, in fact, also reserving the rights to force the citizens to bring war violence to other people. In this respect, we can recognize that a different dichotomy was emphasized when deconstructing the dichotomy between individual victims and individual perpetrators of war violence. Making the nation-state institution into the ultimate perpetrator, universal humanism is positioned as a counterpart that is fundamentally innocent and antagonistic to nation-state institutions.

From this antagonism to the nation-state institution, Oda emphasized civil disobedience as rational and righteous course of action to challenge the nation-state institution that violates the fundamental principles of individual citizens. The civil

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[47] Minoru Oda, "*Heiwa e no gutaiteki teigen*," *Shiryo Beheiren undo II* (August 1966; rprt., Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1974), 108-110.

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disobedience argued here was, however, transcendental beyond nation-state boundaries because it came from the antagonism to all nation-states that reserve the right of belligerence. In this respect, we can find that civil disobedience against wars assumes the global citizenship as the reality on grounds of the same assumed universal humanism against war. In the proposed principle for peace, Oda exemplified civil disobedience that goes beyond nation-state borders to take action to stop the Vietnam War, as:

> Japan may be a victim of the United States. The Japanese government thinks that they cannot say anything firmly to oppose the United States. As such, Japan is indeed a victim of the United States. However, Japan's inaction makes Japan a perpetrator against the people in Vietnam. Japanese citizens may be victims of their nation-state because individual persons have no choice but to take a part in what their state has decided to do (or not to do). However, because we take a part in our nation-state, we are, by association, perpetrators against the people in Vietnam.[48]

Individual persons are victims of their state when the state makes war and/or when the state does little to abolish all wars. Yet, as stated in the principle for peace, individual citizens are, so long as they are part of the nation that permits war as a sovereign rights and/or does nothing about ongoing wars, perpetrators against the people who are on the receiving end of war violence.

Japan, as a nation-state, was not a direct participant in the Vietnam War, but TMCS tied Japan to the presence of the United States in Asia. Therefore, TMCS made Japan indirect participant of the Vietnam War. The Japanese, who failed to make firm opposition to the ongoing war in Vietnam, were reminded that they were perpetrators by silently approving Japan's supporting the U.S. carrying out the war in Vietnam. Building upon this principle for peace, *Beheiren* pushed the idea that Japan and the Japanese

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[48] Minoru Oda, Ibid., 109-110.

people were guilty of the present war in Vietnam even though Japan was not directly

involved in the war.

In order to free us from being a perpetrator of war violence, *Beheiren* repeatedly

emphasized the need for the horizontal solidarity of individual citizens across nation-state

boundaries. The horizontal solidarity was thought necessary to make transnational

opposition against war and the nation-states that wage war because war makes individual

people into victims of their states. Many leading activists in *Beheiren* movement

followed Oda's proposed principle for peace. Yoshiyuki Tsutsumi, who was one of the

intellectual giants throughout the *Beheiren* movement, stressed that *Beheiren* was a

unique and significant movement because it succeeded in promoting civil disobedience in

pursuit peace beyond nation-state boundaries.[49]

From what has been discussed above, we can understand that the nation-states,

because they make war to resolve international conflicts, became the ultimate perpetrator

of all wars. Thus, we can again confirm here the rationale in which the nation-states

became a target of both criticism and antagonism in Japan's national public sphere.[50] In

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[49] Yoshiyuki Tsurumi, "*Nihon kokumin to shiteno dannen: 'Kokka' no kokuhuku wo ikani heiwa undo ni kesshuu suru ka,*" *Shiryo Beheiren undo II* (September 1967; rprt., Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1974), 242-253. In fact, the Beheiren movement also applied the deconstructed dichotomy between individual victims and individual perpetrators to the American soldiers in the Vietnam War. On grounds of universal humanism, Beheiren emphasized that individual American soldiers were also victims of their nation-state because they were forced to fight in the war between the nations and make violence against other human beings. Even though individual soldiers who were bombing Vietnam and who were thus immediate perpetrators against the Vietnamese people, the principle for peace recognized them also as victims of the war and their nation-state.

[50] We may briefly note here, in passing, that the Japan Technical Committee for Assistance to U.S. Anti-War Deserters (JATEC), which was a semi-underground organization affiliated with (or part of) the *Beheiren* movement. JATEC was similarly organized and functioned like the Underground Railroad of the American past. It had no substantial organizational structure, and it had no list of members. JATEC was made of ordinary citizens and very few members knew each other. And there was no person who knew of the whole organizational body of JATEC. JATEC members were the people who carried out an underground operation to help American soldiers abandon their military duties. JATEC did that to help American soldiers flee from their nation-state (the United States) that forced violence against the people in Vietnam. The war deserters became heroes, to some degree, in Japan's national public sphere because they

this respect, the antiwar movement constructed pedagogy that pushed individual Japanese

to accept their war responsibility in both past and present wars by way of highlighting

horizontal solidarity of human victims of war and the nation that makes war. However,

this deconstruction has led to strengthen universal humanism even more when the nation-

state institution has been presented as the ultimate perpetrator that brings violence to all

persons. In other words, Japan's antiwar pedagogy continued to *identify no real*

perpetrator of war and war violence. Instead, we began to see the abstract entity like the

nation-state institution become the target of criticism as the perpetrator of all wars and

war violence in Japan's national public sphere.

War Stories and the Abstract Perpetrator

Many war stories were published when *Beheiren* stressed peace and universal

humanism against war, to break away from partisan politics and its distortion of Japan's

peace movement. This period, in particular, saw many war stories published in the form

of manga (graphic novels). Children and youth were the primary audience of manga

media, and thus we can understand that war stories were published with some

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were the actors who stood against the nation-state oppression of their individual liberty not to kill. In fact, JATEC sent the U.S. war deserters as far as Northern European countries to avoid the prosecuting hand of the United States. Furthermore, at the time of the Vietnam War, Japan had a very small number of foreigners. JATEC and its underground operations were, therefore, only possible because there were substantial numbers of Japanese who volunteered to risk harboring American war deserters in their private homes.

JATEC itself is worth exploring in detail. However, its fuller study lies outside of what can be accomplished in this study. No substantial study is available in the English language to illuminate JATEC and its operation because of the organization's secrecy in operation. The organizational structure is still unknown, and there are very little publications to illustrate JATEC in details. For earlier testimonies and memoirs of JATEC participants, see, Shigeru Sekitani and Yoshie Sakamoto eds., *Tonari ni dasso hei ga ita jidai: Aru shimin undo no kiroku* (Tokyo: Shiso no kagaku sha, 1985); Taketomo Takahashi, *Watashitachi wa dasso amerika hei wo ekkyo saseta: Beheiren/JATEC saigo no mitsu shukkoku sakusen no kaisou* (Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2007).

pedagogical intent to transfer the wartime experiences to the generations who had not experienced the war first hand. War and wartime experiences depicted in manga, therefore, offer a substantial resource to understand what has been deemed important when narrating the war in the public sphere.

Figure 5:1. Tezuka Osamu depicting the air raid attacks.[51]

Osamu Tezuka, for example, is one of the most known manga-artists of all time. He survived the war, and much of his work has a consistent antiwar theme. Though small in number, some of Tezuka's work explicitly illustrates the Second World War. He gave the most vivid and direct depiction of the war in his short piece, *Canon*, which was first published in 1974. In this story, Tezuka reserved one fifth of the pages to capturing

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[51] Tezuka Osamu, "Canon," in *Canon* (1974; rprt., Tokyo: Daitosha, 1989), 15 and 18.

the air raid attack that killed a teacher and all classmates of the main character (Figure 5:1). We can notice that Tezuka illustrated the death brought by the air raid attacks as an abrupt interruption to ordinary life, and this interruption transformed human beings into inanimate objects. Through the voice of the main character, Tezuka described the teacher who was killed by machinegun fire as splattered watermelon.[52] Clearly, Tezuka illustrated the air raid attacks as the act of wanton cruelty against human beings in order to, in his short piece, press his strong opposition to war.

Figure 5:2. Depiction of the A-bomb victims in *Aru Wakusei no Higeki*[53]

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[52] Metaphorically describing the dead as inanimate objects is similarly found in the narratives of Hiroshima survivors describing the dead. See chapter 3 for details.

[53] Asaoka, Mitsushi (graphic) and Tatsuo Kusaka (story). *Aru wakusei no higeki: Zai Tokyo/Hiroshima ni okeru hibakusha no kiroku* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1969), 42-43.

There is, however, another point to observe here. Contrary to his vivid and explicit illustration of the war victims and the violence they experienced, Tezuka gave no clear illustration to depict the actors perpetrating the war violence. The fighter planes shooting machineguns at the students in schoolyard, as well as the bomber planes dropping the bombs, were illustrated only with a silhouette. Unlike comic books, manga has a distinctive narrative technique, which uses detailed graphical illustration to support storytelling. This technique is much like storyboarding in movie making, but manga authors give far more detailed illustrations. Hence, drawing the actors that brought war violence in silhouette should be understood as the manga author's conscious act to keep the identity of those who perpetrated war violence in abstraction.

Figure 5:3. Scenes from Barefoot Gen I
They are two different scenes depicting the victims of the atomic bomb[54]

Not only Tezuka but also most other manga-authors illustrated the actors of war violence without any details. Hiroshima's tragedy was also published as a manga-style

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[54] Keiji Nakazawa, *Hadashi no Gen: Aizoban* (1973; rprt., Tokyo: Shobunsha, 1988), vol. 2, 2 and 66.

narrative in the late 1960s to the 1970s. Koji Asaoka, for example, transcribed the testimony of a Hiroshima survivor into manga-style narrative in *Aru wakusei no higeki* (*A planet's tragedy*) in 1969 (Figure 5:2). Keiji Nakazawa illustrated his own experience of Hiroshima's atomic bombing and its aftermath in *Hadashi no Gen* (*Barefoot Gen*) in 1972. In their narratives, both authors gave intensely detailed descriptions of the victims of the atomic bombing and their experiences (Figure 5:3). However, similar to other war narratives published during this period in Japan, they described nothing about the actors who dropped the bomb on Hiroshima.

Figure 5:4. Scene from Hadashi no Gen II[55]
An individual hesitating to volunteer for Kamikaze mission is pressured to volunteer in this scene.

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[55] Keiji Nakazawa, *Hadashi no Gen: Aizoban* (1973; rprt., Tokyo: Shobunsha, 1988), vol. 1, 150.

Identifying no real adversary forces in narrating war violence suggests that the narratives did not intend to push blame on any particular subjects for the war violence. This is not the same as saying that the Japanese thought of war violence as inevitable, as those caused by the nature. Instead, manga authors place blame for war violence on abstract subjects behind war, such as military factions, nation-state institutions, and the masses that have uncritically accepted the war. In *Hadashi no Gen*, for example, Nakazawa opened his narrative by describing the harassment the central character and his family experienced during the war because of his father's open war opposition. Nakazawa presented his open criticism of those people who were uncritical of the nation's war by illustrating their harassing the main character and his family, and by painting those people's faces with ugliness and slyness (Figure 5:4).

There are a small number of illustrations of the wartime enemy—Americans, in particular—in manga-style narratives of war violence. In Nakazawa's narrative, there is a scene in which the survivors of the atomic bomb are beating the corpse of an American P.O.W., who also died in the atomic bombing. Nakazawa illustrated the agony of A-bomb victims who were beating the corpse of the American soldier who was also the victim of the bomb. Yet, the main character could not join in beating the corpse even though he runs to the body intending to beating it. Through the voice of the main character, Nakazawa depicts the emptiness of blaming enemies because they were also made victims by their own nation's act of war.[56] Moreover, in his semi-autographical narrative, Tezuka similarly illustrated the scene in which the mob was beating an

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[56] There are many testimonies of Hiroshima's survivors mentioning this American P.O.W. Many of those testimonies are archived at The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims, which is located within the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, Hiroshima, Japan.

American pilot who died in a plane crash while bombing one of the cities in Japan.

Tezuka, through the main character in the story, runs to whack the pilot whose bomb

killed his classmates and burned his girlfriend's face. Yet, when he sees the pilot whose

face has been rendered grotesque by beating, Tezuka abandons his fury. Instead, he

becomes troubled about whom he should blame for the war and its violence (Figure 5:5).

Figure 5:5. A Scene from *Kamino Toride*[57]
The main character, Tezuka himself, was unable to strike the American pilot. Then, he
left the scene wondering whom to be blamed for the war.

We can notice here that manga authors highlighted **human suffering** when

constructing the awareness that war makes victims on both sides. On grounds of such

human suffering, the fury against enemies and perpetrators loses its impetus; instead, the

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[57] Osamu Tezuka, "Kami no toride," in *"Senso manga" kessakusen* (1974; rprt., Tokyo: Shoudensha, 2007), 41-42.

fury targets the war and the people who are uncritical of war. In Tezuka's narrative, he

depicts the people who were whacking the American pilot with ugliness and slyness, and

Nakazawa depicts the people who were uncritical of the war in the same manner.

Through introspectively narrating the war, they target their criticism of the war itself

because it transformed the people into uncritically perpetrators of violence against each

other.

Furthermore, they do not make wartime enemies into the target of reproach for

bringing war violence to the Japanese. Instead, Nakazawa and other manga-authors bring

their criticisms to the uncritical populace that, directly and indirectly, supported the

nation's war and its constructing of victims. The point to observe here is that Nakazawa,

Tezuka and other manga-authors illustrate the war from the perspective of victims while

their illustration does not point out enemies as the perpetrator of war violence. Instead,

the perpetrators were themselves—the general populace—who participated in the

nation's war whether they were active participants or not.

Through emphasizing their wartime experiences from the perspective of victims,

it is notable that manga-authors depicted their wartime experiences beyond the

dichotomy between victims and their perpetrators. There is absolute negation to war in

general, and the general populace being identified as the perpetrators of their own

experiences in the Second World War. Making absolute opposition to the war when

delivering the stories of war tragedies is common in both the nation's and Hiroshima's

pedagogy. These pedagogies aimed to prevent the loss of wartime experiences being able

to bring forward the absolute negation to war and atomic bombing. Yet, Japan's national

public sphere shaped its antiwar pedagogy that is actively identifying the populace not

only as war victims but also as war perpetrators. Emphasizing their own participation as war perpetrators is a pivotal shift of the antiwar pedagogy that teaches wartime experiences to the future generations.

This pedagogical shift brought the deconstruction of the dichotomy between victims and their perpetrators in Japan's national public sphere; and we need to note that behind this deconstruction was the universal humanism assumed in Japan's peace movement. The pedagogy, which stressed the remembrance of war violence, therefore, constructed in Japan's national public sphere active negation to (1) the people's uncritical participation to the nation's war in the past, (2) the people's uncritical inaction regarding the ongoing war in the present, and (3) the nation-state institution itself for its reserving war as a sovereign right.

Discussion

Throughout the chapter, we explored the variability of the meanings emphasized in the act of commemorating the past event—in particular, the atomic bomb and other war violence the Japanese have experienced in the Second World War. Instead of discussing the details represented in the commemoration of war violence, this chapter explored the process and the background in which the past event *became the subject of commemoration* in Japan and its postwar public sphere.

From what has been discussed in this chapter, it is evident that the Japanese commemorated the war and war violence to stress the postwar peace. It is also observed that, despite a consistent emphasis on the peace, the commemoration did not produce a

consistent meaning from what happened in the past. While the commemoration of the past events (namely war violence) has been ceaselessly practiced in postwar Japan, the meanings emphasized when the past event is commemorated in the public sphere have shown dynamic transformations over time. Through exploring the different meanings emphasized while consistently stressing peace, this chapter has explored the roles assigned to the public commemoration of past events. From this inquiry, one general point has become evident: that is, that public commemoration is *fundamentally pedagogical*, for it shapes a particular understanding of past happenings to align the past into the context of the present. To put this in other words, the public commemoration is pedagogical because it sorts out diverse and complex experiences of equally diverse and complex persons to shape a collective remembrance regarding what happened around the past event.

This chapter, in particular, traced the public commemoration of Hiroshima's tragedy and other war violence in Japan's postwar public sphere. Subsequently, as mentioned above, we have identified that, while the public commemoration consistently emphasized peace, the commemoration did not promote a consistent meaning of peace. In this respect, we can safely say that the notion of peace has never been concrete. In fact, this chapter demonstrates that peace has been a fluid notion in postwar Japan, and thus what constitutes peace has shifted repeatedly in response to how the Japanese have understood their *past* in respect to their *present* sociopolitical conditions.

The previous chapter illustrates that people have commemorated the atomic bomb tragedy in Hiroshima's local public sphere to bemoan their personal and instantaneous loss. The commemoration was to remember the past loss, and it was like many other

commemorations of natural disasters at first. In opposition to the nation's taking any future roles in war, Hiroshima's tragedy entered into Japan's national public sphere symbolizing what could happen in war. Hiroshima's tragedy served as one of the most effective reminders to the Japanese people of the war devastations brought about by the U.S., and it reflected the public fear of the nation's alliance with the United States and the U.S. military presence in Japan and Asia. This commemorating of Hiroshima's tragedy had its pedagogy of maintaining the postwar peace (or celebrating the condition in which they are not in war) at first when the commemoration entered the national public sphere. However, when the U.S. military presence became the present reality and the wartime realities became lost in the lights of Japan's rapid national reconstruction, the pedagogy began losing its impact.

Through exploring the public discourses in early postwar Japan, this chapter identifies that the Japanese people understood of the peace as an attained condition at first. The war had ended, and thus they were already in peace. Therefore, the commemoration's subject—war and war violence—became things of the past, and the details of wartime experiences were quickly forgotten in the present. This chapter thus demonstrates that the commemoration of Hiroshima's tragedy had quickly turned into a mere habitual exercise in Japan's national public sphere. The commemoration site became a tourist destination, and the commemoration's subject became a political tool for the present partisan politics. These phenomena expose the fact that Hiroshima's tragedy had once faced oblivion in spite of the magnitude of casualties and/or the ongoing practice of commemoration.

Therefore, when the City of Hiroshima aimed to resist the oblivion, in the public's mind, of the tragedy brought by the atomic bombing, and when *Beheiren* launched a new movement for peace, it began from reinstatement of pedagogy that would build active and collective remembrance of what happened in the past. Hiroshima's traveling exhibit, for example, sought to build active negation to nuclear armament and war by way of actively preserving the remembrance of war tragedies. *Beheiren*'s introducing the new notion of peace, transcending the dichotomy between victims and their perpetrators, has transformed the commemoration of Hiroshima's tragedy and other war violence to bring active negation to ongoing war outside of the people's immediate public sphere. However, each approach has shaped different meanings, and meanings that are different from how Hiroshima's tragedy had been commemorated at first in Hiroshima's local public sphere. From this inquiry, we can confirm that Hiroshima's tragedy had been understood differently even though the commemoration has consistently been practiced, to promote peace, at the same site since the end of the Second World War to the present.

This chapter also highlights the assumption of universal humanism in Japan's postwar peace movements. The earlier pedagogy, in commemorating the war tragedies, focused primarily on highlighting the war tragedies brought to the Japanese as a result of the Second World War. When evaluating war from the perspective of victims and their personal loss, and when being oblivious to their recent past in which they had actively supported the nation's war efforts, it seems reasonable that the Japanese came to assume that all persons ought to be inherently against war and war violence. This assumed universal humanism made it true that all persons are victims of a nation's war when highlighting the tragedies that were brought to the people as a consequence of the war

between nations. This new pedagogy, because war makes all persons into victims by the nation's war, pushed the deconstruction of the dichotomy dividing between war's victims and perpetrators. Thus, it also became true that all persons are perpetrators of war violence by their uncritical allegiance to the nations that make and/or permit wars.

The awareness of war responsibility of individual persons made the Japanese build collective remembrance about the past war in a critical light when they have commemorated war violence brought to Japan in the past. To put this in other words, the Japanese became more conscious of having their hands in the nation's war, which brought war tragedies back onto themselves. Thus, as discussed in this chapter, the commemoration of Hiroshima's tragedy has departed from solely emphasizing the remembrance of tragedies brought by the war. Instead, the commemoration called for active criticism against the people's uncritical allegiance to the nation-states and other institutional discourses that permit wars as a means to attain an end. According to this paradigm shift, all Japanese became responsible for war violence. Moreover, this shift made individual Japanese persons particularly responsible for the violence that Japan committed against people outside Japan's national public sphere.

There was a substantial change behind this shift in representing/speaking about what the past war brought to the Japanese in the public sphere. Those who had lived to experience war violence first hand were made responsible for having uncritically supported the nation's war in the past. Therefore, when the survivors of war violence speak of their personal experiences, there were criticisms against their speaking primarily from the perspective of victims. Discussed in details in chapter three, those criticisms accused the survivors testifying to their experiences as distorting the fact that they too

took a role as perpetrators in the war that brought war violence to other people outside Japan.

There were pedagogical differences between the national public sphere and the survivors when remembering Hiroshima's tragedy through commemorating the event in the public sphere. The pedagogical differences produced the violence, as has been discussed in detail in the chapter three. To take one example, Sadako Kurihara, a Hiroshima survivor, expressed her resentment when her narrative of the atomic bomb was met with criticism in the public sphere outside of Hiroshima. Kurihara, as a survivor of the bomb, began writing about her experiences as a victim soon after the bomb. However, just when the Vietnam War led to shape a new antiwar pedagogy in Japan, Kurihara began experiencing criticism that challenged her testimonies of Hiroshima's tragedy. Moreover, Kurihara's narrative also met severe challenges in the United States when she delivered her antiwar message to oppose the Vietnam War by reciting her experience as an atomic bomb victim. Many criticisms were thrown at Kurihara, challenging that she was a perpetrator against those who became victims of Japan's war violence, and asserted that she should recognize her own perpetration in the Second World War if she wanted her stories to be heard.

From what has been said above, it is evident that the past events constitute no historical consciousness by themselves, and no historical consciousness is ever removed from defining the meanings from what happened in the past. In this respect, we can perhaps come to an agreement with Herbert Luthy's argument that: "All history is history of the present, because the past cannot be experienced as past."[58] The central point of this

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[58] Herbert Luthy, "What's the Point of History?," *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 2 (April 1968), 21.

chapter, however, is not the reciting of such truisms about our historical consciousness. Instead, it is the purpose of this chapter to explicate the impacts the historical conditions make on our conceptualization of the present, and the impacts the present conceptualization makes on our historical consciousness of what happened in the past. If we borrow the phrase of Michel Foucault, this chapter's purpose is to ask how "a historical awareness of our present circumstance"[59] shapes the pedagogy, which defines the ways we understand what happened in the past. In other words, this chapter has questioned pedagogy that is building present consciousness on what happened in the past. Through chronologically exploring such pedagogy and its shifts, this chapter's discussion demonstrates the variable reality of the pedagogy shaping the present consciousness about historical reality.

Through making historical consciousness into the subject of inquiry, this chapter studies the history of historical awareness about Hiroshima's tragedy and other war violence that was brought to Japan during the Second World War. It becomes evident from this chapter's discussion that there has been consistent impact from present political circumstances on how the particular past event came to be commemorated in the public sphere. Furthermore, this chapter identifies the pedagogy in our historical consciousness, of what happened in the past. Inquiring of historical consciousness in the public sphere is to explicate why particular past events came to be commemorated in the public sphere. Yet, more importantly, it would also explicate the pedagogy for which the past events became conceptualized in the public sphere of the present.

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[59] Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, by Hubert L. Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, and Michel Foucault (London: Hervester Wheatsheaf, 1982), 209.

Chapter 6

National Museum and Global Responsibility:
Reconciliation of the Historical Controversies in Global Age

Museum, History and Monumentality

For the past two decades, we have seen many controversies over museums representing historical events. A museum must choose whose voice and which gaze to include in representing past events, and therefore frequently face challenges and invite controversies in our diverse and rapidly globalizing public sphere.[1] It is, therefore, more and more brought to awareness today that museums, particularly history museums in this discussion, are guilty of privileging some voices whilst quietly silencing other voices in the public sphere.[2] Furthermore, whether it is a conscious act or not, museums are sometimes guilty of endorsing what Henri Lefebvre has described as monumentality. Monumentality is a "singular spatial representation of collective identity."[3] Privileging a particular representation in constructing a monument often conceals the diversity of audiences and the diverse experiences of audiences within the monument's or museum's.

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[1] Walter Warner argues for the analytical concepts to interpret the authorship of texts: the eight concepts are, (1) representation, (2) the gaze, (3) voice, (4) intertextuality, (5) absence, (6) authority, (7) mediation, and (8) reflexivity. Warner draws these concepts from cultural studies. The analytical framework posed by Warner is applicable to read museum's exhibitions and their representation of past events as social texts. The purpose of this study, however, is not investigating in details about what is already being exhibited in the museum. Therefore, I will not apply Warner's analytical framework to inquire into what is being exhibited. However, it is worthwhile to mention here that Warner's framework gives an approach to investigate the museum and museum exhibition (as well as monument and monument's monumentalizing practice/subjects) as the texts that can be read and interpreted. For Warner's analytical framework, see Walter Warner, "Reading Authorship into Texts," *Theory and Research in Social Education* 28 no.2 (Spring 2000); 193-219.

[2] Steven C. Dubin, *Displays of Power: Memory and Amnesia in the American Museum* (New York: New York University Press, 1999).

[3] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford, UK and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 221.

Museums often participate involuntarily in constructing such monumentality not by what they represent, but rather by what they do not represent in their museum space.

When the state launches a new public history museum, it also crafts a new monumentality around the museum's subject. Museums may end up *crafting* monumentality to privilege certain personal/private voices by offering them official representation in museum's official space. Hiroshima Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims (Memorial Hall) was first opened its door to the public in 2002 as the first museum of the national status commemorating the atomic bomb victims. Memorial Hall, for example, approaches past events in a twofold way: it consecrates memorial space in a public monument and serves the function of an archive, researching, preserving, and exhibiting artifacts and first-hand accounts of the atomic bomb victims. In this respect, Memorial Hall's space endorses a singular and national monumental representation of atomic bomb victims. Furthermore, the Arizona Memorial Museum in Pearl Harbor, the Smithsonian's exhibition of the Enola Gay, the Anti-Japan War Memorial Museum in Beijing, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (established and managed by the City of Hiroshima), and many other museums are, one way or another, crafting a similar monumentality for events that took place during the Second World War.

Museum institutions have their origin in the nineteenth century mode of Enlightenment with its aim of storing and defining knowledge in order to educate the public. However, for the past two decades in particular, museums in most industrialized nations have faced a challenge to their long assumed role as Enlightenment institutions. Theoretical developments in social and cultural studies in later half of the twentieth century have challenged the Enlightenment and its traditions. In the past two decades, we

have seen the criticism of the Enlightenment extending to problematize the museum's

monumentality on grounds of being neither inclusive nor adequate in representing what

happened in the past. However, museums face a dilemma in that monumentalizing past

events can seldom be inclusive of all voices. It is because of this dilemma that the act of

determining representation involves a frame for evaluating what is to be represented in

museum space. Alternatively, if we assume museums can be inclusive of all voices,

museums would have to give up the idea of making adequate representation that satisfies

all because we have no value structure that define what constitutes the representation that

is globally adequate.

Under these circumstances, it is not useful to seek both an adequacy of

representation and an inclusive representation in museum spaces at the same time,

without responding to the tension between these two goals. In fact, seeking for a museum

space that has either an inclusive or a transcendently adequate representation of the past

events does not offer any fruitful discussion. Instead of approaching the analysis of

museum spaces as merely fixing representations of past events, this chapter proposes to

explore museum spaces as a contested zone, in which diverse voices and experiences in

fact struggle in the process of building monumentality in the public sphere.

Indeed, many criticisms brought to museum institutions have argued that the idea

of a monumental museum space fails to account for the social and cultural dynamics of

its users that are fluid and never fixed (or dead). Theodore Adorno offered a criticism of

museum institutions when he wrote "museum and mausoleum are connected by more

than phonetic association."[4] In the same paragraph, Adorno uses the German word,

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[4] Theodore W. Adorno, "Valery Proust Museum," in *Prisms*, translated by Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 175.

museal (museumlike), which "describes objects to which the observer no longer has a vital relationship and which are in the process of dying." The preservation of those objects is, therefore, submitting "more to historical respect than the needs of the present."[5] In Japanese, the world *museum* carries a similar connotation when people say something is *museum quality.* "Museum quality" often refers to assigning objects substantial value. However, it is much more commonly used to designate objects too archaic to have any real use in the present space, other than being exhibited in museums. The second connotation is similar to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's alignment of museum to "the historicity of death."[6] These analogies and popular connotation given to museums suggest museum space is the place between this world and *Hades.*

To swerve analysis away from stale points suggested by the above, perhaps a more constructive approach to museum is the analogy with what Michel Foucault calls the *heterotopias.*[7] Foucault first defined utopia as the placeless places that are to present the perfected from of a society. Heterotopias are, on the other hand, localizable places that comprise an "effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and

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[5] Ibid.

[6] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 73.

[7] Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," (1960), in *Foucault.info.* Translated by Jay Miskowiec. http://www.foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/ (last accessed on November 16, 2007)

inverted."[8] Foucault found museums as examples of "heterotopias of indefinitely

accumulating time."[9] He writes:

> [The] idea of accumulating everything, of establishing a sort of general
> archive, the will to enclose in one place all times, all epochs, all forms, all
> tastes, the idea of constituting a place of all times that is itself outside of
> time and inaccessible to its ravages, the project of organizing in this way a
> sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile place,
> this whole idea belongs to our modernity. The museum and the library are
> heterotopias that are proper to western culture in the nineteenth century.[10]

From here, we can find that Foucault's description of museum institutions leads us to

infer his critical description of the power embedded in an institution's built environment,

as in prisons and schools.[11]

Foucault's criticism of museums has called attention to the need for transforming

museums to be more accessible and available to the public. Increased attention to the

long overlooked relationship between museums and their audiences have also come along

with the theoretical developments in social and cultural studies that have challenged the

museum's role in defining knowledge by collecting, categorizing and exhibiting objects

within an institutionally controlled environment.[12] The push for pluralism has thus

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[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] For examples of the institution's built environment, see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), and Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in P. Rabinow ed., *The Foucault Reader*, 76-100, New York: Pantheon, 1984. Also see examples of applications and reframing of Foucault's argument in Janie Leatherman, ed., *Discipline and Punishment in Global Politics: Illusions of Control* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

[12] For further discussion on this point, see Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, *Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1992), and *Museums and the Interpretation of Visual Culture* (London: Routledge, 2000), Tony Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum* (London: Routledge, 1995), and Timothy W. Luke, *Museum Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).

become an important agendum of museums partly in response to such challenges. Yet, it is important to notice here that the framing of museum-space as a field or medium by which to materialize the idea of pluralism in a society, ironically affirms museums as Enlightenment institutions that bring certain ideas (or sometimes ideologies in the case, for instance, of the state controlled museums) to the public. Furthermore, the act of inclusion is inevitably concurrent to the act of exclusion, as inclusion presupposes those that are left *outside* by stating the need to *include* them in a space. Inclusion that is not conscious of perpetuating the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy, therefore, would support only a fetishism of diversity. It is this particular fetishism of diversity that sheds light on museums as *heterotopias* that accumulate everything in a space "itself outside of time" and its ravages. In this respect, Foucault's alignment of museums to heterotopias seems to lead us only to a view of museums as Enlightenment institutions.

Here, I want to call to attention to the cemetery, which is another example Foucault uses for heterotopias. The cemetery, as a heterotopia, is not an ordinary cultural living space. Yet, it is a localizable place *connected* with all other spaces in the present because "each individual, each family has relatives in the cemetery."[13] Foucault uses archaeological inquiry to identify that the cemetery was within the environment of living social space until the end of the eighteenth century. In Europe, we can sometimes find a cemetery or traces of a cemetery in the town-center, inside the place of worship or even within the courtyard. From here, he argues that the cemetery constituted a part of sacred and immortal space in western culture until the nineteenth century. He elaborated that the cemetery was a strange heterotopia where the dead serve as a cause of illness for the

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[13] Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," online.

living, and the presence of the dead within the proximity of the living "propagates death itself." In other words, the cemetery became a heterotopia representing Hades—the placeless place belonging only to the dead. Cemetery, therefore, was driven further from the proximity of the living, as it was perceived foremost as the gruesome space *that is ceaselessly accumulating the dead.*

We can see that Foucault's identification of heterotopias was not necessarily with the purpose of bringing criticism to them. Instead, Foucault proposed heterotopias to invite archaeological inquiry into institutional spaces that have deviated from, but still have a relationship to living, present spaces. Therefore, using the analogy of heterotopias to characterize museum-space helps situate us in an approach to museum-space not merely as an institutionally constructed environment, but also a space *that has a relationship to the present living.* Museums, then, became not simply a field or medium to represent an ideology of diverse experiences and perspectives. Similarly, museum institution became not merely a field or medium to give monumentality to particular experiences and perspectives.

This chapter identifies the Memorial Hall as one of the institutions that is consciously trying to do both: It is a memorial that is monumentalizing the atomic bomb victims; and it is a museum that aims to represent *all* voices from all around the world. Memorial Hall, therefore, aims to be a heterotopia by symbolizing the past while it aims to be ceaselessly inclusive of all voices to abandon the idea of fixing the past symbolized in its space. This chapter is, therefore, not going to inquire what Memorial Hall has accumulated in its memorial/museum space. Inquiring of *what* has been accumulated often leads us to assume that we can have an omniscient view of everything museum

should (but do not) accumulate in their space. It is pointless however to discuss today whether or not we can be outside or even above the subject represented in museums. There has been a great deal of such discussion since it was once fashionable to do so. However, we have so far seen few substantial strides from such discussions, other than re-confirming the significance of the original point, which challenged the assumed objectivity of what is being represented in museum-space. This chapter, therefore, takes no part in debating the objectivity of the museum's representation of the past.

Furthermore, focusing primarily on what has been accumulated in museum-space is often consistent with endorsing museums as heterotopias of accumulating everything.[14] "The most beautiful monuments", Henri Lefebvre writes, "are imposing in their durability."[15] Lefebvre argues here that the imperishable appearance of monuments suggests that they will be able to transcend the inevitable decay of human reality. It is here important to illuminate that a museum's monumentality does not only reside with the imperishable looks of the building itself, but also with museum's potential *for storing, preserving and assigning monumentality to what has been accumulated* in the museum-space. In this respect, monumentality is the product of a museum's potential in making artifacts imperishable, lasting beyond and against temporal reality of humans.

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[14] It is perhaps helpful to remind readers that Foucault did not condemn heterotopia itself (much like he did not condemn institution in itself). Foucault criticized museums as "heterotopias of accumulating everything" without connecting to the present living. In this sense, such heterotopias lose its quality as heterotopias because the present has no access to them. This is much like Lefebvre's critique of monumentality that assumed it is fixed (and thus never fluid). Monument gains monumentality on grounds of its imperishability—fixation—in the light of our perishable reality that is always fluid and never fixed. Foucault's argument is often used to merely condemn museums as cemetery in the US. However, in this study, I argue with Foucault by stressing that museum *should* be heterotopia that is not merely accumulating of everything but making its space available to the present for constant dialectic negotiations.

[15] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 221.

However, focusing on *what* is being represented in a museum-space will not give us any tool for discussing the ways museums can substantiate their roles in the present that is constantly fluid and permanently defers and eludes any attempts to fix its meanings. Museums could lose their monumentality when they push for the fixed meanings; and, in the face of an ever-changing present, such museums would not be able to maintain their monumentality in the public sphere of the present living. To respond to the times' challenge then, museums strive to reflect what Richard Handler called *the objectification of culture* by acquiring a plethora of artifacts as vastly heterogeneous as possible, each acquisition designated to signify awareness and respect of some cultural perspective.[16] Museums can lose their monumentality when their initial monumentality had fixed meanings that were relative to the contexts of time and place in which the museums constructed their monumentality. Thus, museums losing their monumentality are now in danger of losing their *raison d'être* and becoming what Foucault has identified as *the heterotopias of accumulating everything.*

Hence, as mentioned earlier, this chapter proposes to explore museum space as a contested zone. It is this chapter's purpose to seek a constructive end for the diverse voices in constant struggle to build and participate in monumentality in the public sphere. To this end, this chapter looks into one of the newest contestations museums institutions are facing today: that is, the relationship between museum institutions and their audiences.

Audience-Study

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[16] Richard Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

Recently, more and more museums have begun investing their efforts in investigating their audiences by systematically accessing the information about museum visitors and their interaction with the museum-space. Indeed, the past two decades have seen many attempts to study museum audiences and their behaviors in museum-space.[17] This shift to studying audience's experiences in the museum is counter to the museum's traditionally heavy reliance on the transmission model. In the latter model, museums sought primarily to maintain and control the effects of what they represent to their audiences. Instead, museums began to pay greater attention to the ways in which audiences make meanings through actively engaging with the exhibits.[18] Here, we can see that museum-spaces strive to shift from institutionally controlled environments to environments where audiences actively engage with the museum's subject.

There have been many approaches to studying museum audiences and their behaviors in museum-space. Audience-studies put emphasis on understanding the learning experiences of museum visitors. Indeed, the studies focusing on audience's learning have made substantial impacts on study of museums. The degree of learning for visitors, for example, is an important criterion when evaluating museums and their exhibitions.[19] This type of audience study features museums as institutional mediums that affect their audiences, seen as consumers of the museum experience. This approach to

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[17] Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, "Studying Visitors," in Susan Macdonald ed., *A Companion to Museum Studies* (New York: Blackwell, 2006).

[18] For museums attempting to control the effects on visitors, see Hooper-Greenhill, "Studying Visitors," and Will Brooker and Deborah Jermyn, eds., *The Audience Studies Reader* (London: Routledge, 2003).

[19] David Dean, *Museum Exhibition: Theory and Practice* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), and Ross Loomis, *Museum Visitor Evaluation: New Tool for Management* (Nashville, TN: American Association for State and Local History, 1987).

museum audiences has developed from a two-step transmission model proposal by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and his two-step flow of communication.[20] The inquiry of audience experiences thus became a method to study what museums can do to guide their audiences to have better learning experiences.[21]

It is important to utilize the audience-study for satisfying the *raison d'être* of museums as institutions meant to educate the public. Presuming museums as agents of educating the public, however, entails positioning museum-institution as "the educator" outside and apart from the public "to be educated." In fact, the role of educating the public that museum institutions assume becomes very complex considering that museums are at the same time the subject to be educated as an institution in the public sphere. In view of these complexities, this chapter considers museums as institutions within the public sphere because museums are vital to the dialectic *system/lifeworld*.[22] My inquiry into museum-spaces takes them as mediums where dialectic negotiations take place between the museums' assumed agency to educate the public, and their own condition of being themselves an organic part of the public. The system-lifeworld thus is closely related to the notion of heterotopia as it talks about the bridge between institutional space and the meanings generated through interactions with and to the visitors.

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[20] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *The People's Choice: How the Voter Make Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968[1944]). For more details about Lazarsfeld's two-step flow of communication, see Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: the Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955).

[21] For example, see Paulette M. McManus, "Oh Yes They Do! How Visitors Read Labels and Interact with Exhibit Texts," *Curator* 32 no. 3 (1989), 174-89.

[22] Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (New York: Beacon Press, 1989).

Memorial Hall, as the first national memorial museum to commemorate the atomic bomb victims, provides us with an ideal field for inquiring into such dialectics in museum-space. There was the institutional will to commemorate victims of the atomic bombing. There were also public concerns that the nation's monumentalizing of the victims would minimize its responsibility in causing war catastrophes for the people. This chapter, therefore, is going to inquire into the kind of relationships Memorial Hall has with its audiences in its museum-space. This is particularly because Memorial Hall, even before the first nail was struck, has been a contested zone, the subject of dialectic negotiations as a public museum/memorial representing and monumentalizing the past.

Accessing Audience Relationship to Museums

Museum visitor notebooks provide material for inquiring into the ways museum visitors have positioned themselves in relation to the Memorial Hall's efforts to monumentalize, archive, and memorialize atomic bomb survivors. Many museums offer visitor notebooks. In fact, the practice of keeping visitor notebooks or similar utilities is long standing and dates back to the dawn of museums. Furthermore, museum visitor notebooks are perhaps the only source where we probe museum audiences and inquire into their experiences of the museum's past exhibitions. Therefore, when we want to explore how museum visitors thought of the museum over time, visitor notebooks are the most crucial documentary source for us.

However, Tamar Katriel asserts that visitor notebooks make for a poor source for studying museum audience.[23] Katriel identified that, when museums display appreciating visitor comments, visitors often write similar responses to make themselves a part of a museum's exhibition. In this respect, it cannot be denied that museum could exercise some control over visitors' mindset when they think of what to write in visitor notebooks. Museum visitor notebooks thus often become a stage in which visitors fulfill their "role-performance or self-alignment"[24] to socially and culturally defined norms in relation to the subject matters represented in museums.

Questioning the sincerity of a visitor's comment in the notebook, however, is a fruitless task. More importantly, the lack of sincerity itself is irrelevant when studying the relationships between museums and museum audiences. In fact, we should be able to explore the kinds of performance museums are permitting to visitors through their visitor notebooks. For example, when visitor notebooks have comments that are all appreciative of the museum, we should be able to raise a concern that the museum is either not inviting visitors or not connecting to visitors to engage in the museum's subject. In fact, we can even suspect that visitor's unanimous appreciation came from the assumption that a museum should store what they hoped to keep in museum-space. This presumption points to a similarity of museums with cemeteries containing the dead—something irrelevant and outside of our living space.

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[23] Tamar Katriel, *Performing the Past: A Study of Israeli Settlement Museums* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997).

[24] Susan Emily Reid, "The Exhibition Art of Socialist Countries, Moscow 1958-9, and the Contemporary Style of Painting," in S. E. Reid and D. Crowley, eds., *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 122.

Furthermore, my reading of visitor notebooks in Hiroshima and Nagasaki suggests that many visitors wrote their comments assuming that audiences are other than museum curators. Many assumed as their audience fellow visitors to the museum, politicians and other influential people, children, and even the deceased. There were also many comments that responded to the comments previously left by other visitors. Museum visitor notebooks thus work somewhat like a comment space on the Internet: comments are chronologically aligned, and visitors often read other people's prior comments before writing their own. Another similarity is that visitors write their comments immediately after walking the museum-space as they would after reading a webpage. Hence, most visitors do not have abundant time to make substantial and complex reflections on what they have just experienced. Therefore, we can assume most comments are rather immediate and unadulterated reactions, rather than the product of sophisticated reflection upon what visitors have just experienced.

Therefore, it is neither fruitful nor useful to become an adherent of sincerity in what visitors wrote. It is also misleading to use visitor notebooks to measure the museum's ability to educate audiences. Therefore, this chapter, instead, uses the visitor notebooks of Memorial Hall to inquire into the kind of relationships Memorial Hall has *nurtured* with and also in its audience. This inquiry thus does not presume a dichotomous relationship between the museum and its audience. Instead, this inquiry aims to explore the relationship between museum and its audience that goes beyond the dichotomy between educating and educated, or to put in other words, system and lifeworld.

Background: Memorial Hall

Before turning to a closer examination of the relationship between museum and museum audience, let us briefly identify the tensions and challenges evoked in the construction of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims—the national institution to commemorate the atomic bomb victims. During the first half of the 1990s, there were many projects to commemorate the fiftieth anniversaries of the atomic bombings.[25] These projects, however, revealed the absence of a trans-nationally coherent consciousness of the atomic bombings even fifty years after the event. For example, the Smithsonian's decision to exhibit the Enola Gay with no explicit reference to Hiroshima's tragedy not only brought a protest from U.S. historians but also caused both resentment and disappointment toward the U.S. in Japan.

It was no coincidence that, shortly after the Smithsonian's decision on the Enola Gay exhibition, the National Diet of Japan passed Legislation 117 that, in its preamble, defined the atomic bombings as an important collective experience of the nation. Furthermore, concurrent with the Smithsonian's controversy, there was another dispute over the United States Postal Service's plan to issue an A-bomb stamp to commemorate the atomic bombs as responsible for bringing the end to the Second World War. The proceedings of the committee that discussed the details of the Legislation reveal that the committee members thought it necessary for Japan as a nation to respond to the evident differences in understanding on the atomic bombings between the United States and

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[25] See for example, Roy Rosenzweig, "The Best of Times, the Worst of Times," *Journal of Social History* 29 (1995), http://www.proquest.umi.com (accessed January 11, 2008); Jeffery P. Brown, "History in an Era of Change," *The Public Historian* 18 no. 3 (Summer 1996), 11-22; and Victoria A. Harden, "Museum Exhibit Standards: Do Historian Really Want Them?," *The Public Historian* 21 no. 3 (Summer 1999), 91-109.

Japan.[26] It was in such political and social atmosphere that the National Diet ratified the Legislation 117.

The Legislation's Article 41 compelled the national government to take a role in deepening public awareness of the tragedies brought by the atomic bombs, to pass down to future generations the knowledge about the bombings, and to develop a program for consoling the souls of the deceased victims. Memorial Hall thus opened its doors to the public in 2002 as the first museum to execute this Legislation. However, we can notice here that the opening of Memorial Hall took almost eight years from the passing of the Legislation. Even after the proclamation, there were two prominent discourses opposing the construction of Memorial Hall.

First, there was an opposition that claimed building yet another monument to commemorate the atomic bombings and the victims was a waster of public resources. In 1955, the City of Hiroshima opened the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, and it has been the flagship institution for preservation and exhibition of the remains from atomic bombing "as reminder of the past and contribution to a future of lasting peace."[27] The opposition to build the Memorial Hall almost adjacent to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum would have been reasonable if the Memorial Hall was to offer nothing substantially different.

Second, there was an opposition in building Memorial Hall as a *national* memorial/museum to commemorate the *victims* of the atomic bombings. In his study of social and cultural environments of postwar Japan, the Pulitzer Prize winning *Embracing*

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[26] For example, see the discussion in Upper House session no. 12 on December 9, 1994.

[27] Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, *Hiroshima Peace Site*, http://www.pcf.city. hiroshima.jp/index_e2.html (accessed April 20, 2008).

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Defeat, John Dower writes that the general public of Japan came to comprehend their defeat by way of understanding the war as an act of the nation-state detached from the acts of individual people.[28] Hence, a national institution that memorialized the victims was seen as an attempt to construct a monumentality that aligns Japan, as a state, with the victims. This alignment was seen as a threat to obscure a needed critical examination of the nation-state(s) that brought the catastrophe of nuclear weapons as a tragic but necessary consequence of the war.

We can understand that Memorial Hall, from its incipient planning, shouldered the responsibility to answer both existing and potential criticisms in order to authenticate its *raison d'être*. Furthermore, Memorial Hall also had to respond to the ongoing controversies brought from the United States. Ministry of Health, the ministry in charge of Memorial Hall, formed a preparatory committee that is independent from the government sectors to brainstorm what roles to be assigned to Memorial Hall. This committee drafted a recommendation in 1998. The recommendation defined the public mission of Memorial Hall as different than the existing Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

Let us thus explore the actual museum-space inside Memorial Hall in the following section of this chapter. Then, this chapter is going to inquire into the visitor notebooks to illustrate a kind of relationship Memorial Hall has constructed with its visitors.

Monumental & Discursive Space

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[28] John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton and New Press, 1999). Also see the chapter five for detailed discussion on this point.

Memorial Hall is a three-story building, most of which is underground. Walking toward the Atomic Dome from the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, visitors find a fleet of long steps drawing a slow curve down to the structure's entrance (Figure 6:1). As they walk towards the entrance, visitors face the epicenter (where the bomb was actually dropped, and this movement is made suggestively, according to the building's architect, to "slice out "the moment" that is otherwise flowing ceaselessly."[29] The building's roof—at eye-level before climbing down the stairs—frames a monumental icon surrounded by the ruins that were excavated when constructing the building (Figure 6:2). This icon symbolically represents the time the bomb exploded in Hiroshima's sky on August 6, 1945.


Figure 6:1. The entrance of Memorial Hall

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[29] In this statement, Tange intends to say his architectural design has an intention to bring the moment of the bomb's impact to the present as frozen moment. Kenzo Tange, "*Kokuritsu Hiroshima Genbaku Shibotsusha Tuitou Heiwa Kinenkan,*" *Kensetsukai* 77 no. 9 (2002), 131.

Figure 6:2. Monumental icon and surrounding ruins.

Indirect and Mute

Entering Memorial Hall, visitors walk down the slow spiral slope counterclockwise to the Hall of Remembrance. This pathway intends to lead visitors "to travel back in time from the present to the moment in which the atomic bomb struck Hiroshima."[30] The pathway is dimly illuminated with indirect lighting concealed behind exposed concrete walls. It has five panels with very little explanation about the atomic bombings (discussed later) (Figure 6:3). The Hall of Remembrance is at the end of the long slope, and visitors find a laver at the center of an orbicular room.

The laver is lit by the sunlight coming through the ceiling, and the sound of gently flowing water reminds those who enter the room to take notice of the silence dominating the space. Both the pathway and the Hall of Remembrance are of concrete walls and

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[30] Chugokuchihou Seibikyoku Eizenbu, "*Kokuritsu Hiroshima Genbaku Shibutsusha Tuitou Heiwa Kinenkan: Irei/koukyu heiwa heno inori to shimin no ikoi no ba,*" *Kensetsukai* 27 no. 3 (2002), 35

Figure 6:3. Hallway to the Hall of Remembrance, and one of five panels explaining about the atomic bombing.


Figure 6:4. Hall of Remembrance and panorama.

stone flooring--all cold materials. Indirect lighting keeps the hall dark. Yet the sunlight

on the laver and the white-oak benches placed around the room comprise a few warm

locales inside the space. This contrast between coldness and warmth constructs a sacred

atmosphere for remembering of the victims.[31] When entering the Hall of Remembrance,

visitors also face a panoramic image depicting Hiroshima after the strike of the atomic

bomb. The panorama covers the entire wall of the orbicular space (Figure 6:4). Visitors,

walking closer to the wall, would notice that the cyclorama is made of small ceramic tiles,

each one uniquely engraved to constitute a part of whole image (Figure 6:5). There are

140,000 ceramic tiles constituting one huge panoramic image, and each tile represents

one victim whose life was taken by the atomic bombing from the moment of its explosion

until the end of 1945.

The Hall of Remembrance is thought to offer a space to represent all victims of

Hiroshima's tragedy. Identifying the names of all victims, however, is an impossible task

even with today's technology, since the atomic explosion literally evaporated entire

families and their records near the epicenter. Furthermore, defining the victims to be

represented in the hall was another task because thousands of victims lost their lives years

after the day the bomb exploded on Hiroshima.[32] We should note that there still are

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[31] There is a similar space at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. The Hall of
Remembrance is placed at the end of exhibition at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in order to
provide a simple space for ceremonies and individual reflection. There is an eternal flame and visitors can
light memorial candles. However, visitors also find the space is conveniently utilized for school groups and
other visitors to get together before moving to their next destinations. The different ways visitors utilizing
and/or responding to memorial space is worth examining in details in respect to political, social and cultural
environments around the subjects being exhibited/commemorated in nationally funded institutions.
However, due to the space and time allocated for this study, I will leave this subject by just mentioning here
to indicate my intent for the future study.

[32] Exact number of the casualties of the atomic bombing is undetermined for three reasons: First,
the bomb devastated most of city's infrastructure, and there was no capability to estimate the number of
casualties and the size of destruction for some time after the bombing. Second, the atomic explosion
literally evaporated both people and towns near the epicenter. Therefore, it became impossible to estimate

people dying of radiation related sicknesses,[33] and there are second and even third

generation of victims who are suffering and who live in fear of radiation effects. In fact,

many survivors still hesitate to testify to their experiences in fear of having their children

become victims of the prejudice and discrimination. Survivors and their children are

sometimes socially stigmatized because of fears over radiation exposure and its genetic

impacts.[34] Because of this potential for discrimination, identifying who should be

represented and how was one of many challenges Memorial Hall had in its planning.

The panoramic picture of Hiroshima's ruin, comprised of 140,000 tiles is,

therefore, the way that Memorial Hall represents *all victims* in its space without exposing

individual identity and yet while recognizing the individuality of victims. Each one of the

ceramic tiles is unique and each piece represents an individual victim of the atomic

bombing. Thus, the museum represents the volume of casualties without exposing the

identity of those victims wishing to remain anonymous. Further, the many tiles show the

visitors the volume of casualties without transfiguring individual victims into mere

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the number of victims by body count or by records. Third, the censorship enforced in Japan during the Allied occupation period prevented the City of Hiroshima to make organized effort to measure the size of destructions caused by the atomic bomb until 1950s when the ABCC requested the national government to survey the number of casualties in a restricted district of Hiroshima (see chapter 4). The total survey of Hiroshima's 114 districts was done for the first time during the period between 1969 and 1976. The Peace Declaration of 2006 claimed the number of deceased (by the bomb's explosion and radiation affects) reached 247,787. For more details about the number of casualties in English language resource, see Martin Hawit, *An Exhibition Denied: Lobbying the History of Enola Gay* (New York: Copernicus, 1996).

[33] Impact of radiation brought by the atomic bombing is still examined today, sixty years after the bombing. For medical discussion, see Dale L. Preston, Yukiko Shimizu, Donald A. Pierce, et al., "Studies of Mortality of Atomic Bomb Survivors, Report 13: Solid Cancer and Noncancer Disease Mortality: 1950-1997," *Radiation Research* 160 no. 4 (October 2003), 381-407; Donald A. Pierce and Dale L. Preston, "Radiation-Related Cancer Risks at Low Doses among Atomic Bomb Survivors," *Radiation Research* 154 no. 2 (August 2000), 178-186.

[34] See the discussion in chapter three.

numbers.[35] As mentioned earlier, visitors entering the orbicular room first see the cyclorama representing the whole body of victims of the atomic bombing. Then, upon realizing that the cyclorama is made of many individually unique tiles and each of which is representing a deceased victim, visitors get a strong sense of the amplitude of loss of individual lives.

Figure 6:5. Ceramic tiles constituting the panorama.

Exiting the Hall of Remembrance, visitors are taken to a small connecting lobby in which there is a wall-sized screen made of twelve 42-inch monitors showing the portraits and names of victims (those who permitted Memorial Hall to present their

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[35] We can find similar representation of individual victims in Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C. where personal photographs of individuals are covering all walls as high as three stories, thousands of shoe occupying one corner of exhibition room reminding the visitors the size of casualties. These objects and photographs directly remind visitors of the size of victims. However, there are just too many of the same thing (shoe) or too many of random thing (snap photographs); and thus the anonymity of victims is maintained. The Hall of Remembrance is interestingly different here. The hall is presenting too many of different things (tiles) constituting one coherent picture—a catastrophic scene after the strike of the bomb—to represent the bomb and its victims.

individual identities). Memorial Hall has accumulated and identified the names and

photographs of 12,002 victims.[36] With the permission of victims and their families,

Memorial Hall exhibits the names and portraits of victims for thirty seconds at a time

(Figure 6:6). Thirty seconds, in fact, are long enough to allow visitors to draft an identity

from the anonymity of victims, and the exhibit speaks directly to the audiences about the

individual lives lost to the atomic bombs. Furthermore, there are four individual computer

monitors placed on the wall. When sliding their leaflet (which they receive, in their

language of choice, upon entering Memorial Hall) into the machine, visitors are

introduced to one victim with his/her name and portrait but no explanatory description

(Figure 6:7). Visitors can also search the names of victims here, and they can inquire into

the testimonies of victims in the archives.

Figure 6:6. Exiting the Hall of Remembrance

It is consistent here that Memorial Hall provides almost no description throughout its memorial/museum space. Instead, Memorial Hall situates the visitor as a subject who makes his or her own understanding of the images, portraits, and names emerging in the silence of the space.

Figure 6:7. Randomly projected portrait and the name of a victim.

Direct and Vocal

Visitors then take an escalator to what is called as "the Garden of Light". As visitors enter this space, the sunlight welcomes them and gives a sense of stepping out of the tomb—a memorial space—in which silence was kept to show respect to the deceased. The sunlit path leads to another lobby-like space with a very small number of physical artifacts. A computer-assisted book accompanies each artifact, and the book contains a survivor's testimony with some ties to the exhibited artifacts (Figure 6:8). When visitors turn the pages, the computer screen displays related information, such as photographs and maps, to assist visitors to get more information than just seeing the artifact or just reading

the testimony (Figure 6:9). Even though only a handful of artifacts are exhibited in the small space, visitors are able to access rich information (photos, maps, and testimonies) behind the artifacts by way of using an interactive technology. The main artifact here is the testimony of individual survivors providing their *personal account* of what happened in the past, and *physical artifacts* invite visitors to interactively engage to the testimony of survivors.

Figure 6:8. Exhibiting artifacts and testimonies linked to the artifacts.

In addition to such computer assisted artifacts and testimony, Memorial Hall offers a space to electronically browse and search over 100,000 testimonies given by the survivors of the atomic bombs. Photographs, films and video recordings of testimonies are made available to any visitors. Memorial Hall collects testimonies, and then those testimonies are continuously transcribed digitally to build an archive that gives easy access to the contents of all collected testimonies. Many surviving families have had no resource to investigate where and how their relatives lost their lives when the atomic

bomb hit the city. Through digitized testimonies and indexes of names and geographical

markers, Memorial Hall has offered a tool to map diverse experiences and perspectives of

what happened after the bomb hit the city.

Figure 6:9. Testimony is linked to the computer screen.

Through the Hall of Remembrance and the pathway leading up to it, Memorial

Hall silently emphasizes what happened in Hiroshima and to its survivors. However, in

contrast to this silence, the *museum/memorial* space introduces visitors to individual

victims and their testimonies, and they encounter much vocal and direct representation of

what happened after the bomb. However, Memorial Hall makes almost no direct attempt

to explicate *why* and *how* Japan became the target of the atomic bombs. Memorial Hall

provides its own description of the historical context of Hiroshima, but this description

constitutes only about 400 words and is was divided into five panels that are placed along

the pathway down to the Hall of Remembrance. However, these descriptions along the

pathway were in response to critics' challenges of Memorial Hall before its actual

construction (discussed earlier). In general, visitors hardly find that Memorial Hall, as an institution, puts forth any particular explanation of what brought the atomic bombings to Japan.

As introduced earlier, some scholars and civic groups feared Memorial Hall would transform the victims into an abstraction of noble sacrifice. They brought criticisms to the plan to build Memorial Hall because it would obscure the needs and efforts for critical inquiry into what led to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, visitor comments suggest the fact that Memorial Hall does not whitewash complex issues on representing the atomic bombings by way of painting an image of victims in its space. Let us recall that there had been numerous challenges and skepticisms thrown to Memorial Hall as a nationally initiated project for commemorating the atomic bomb victims even before its promulgation. However, since its opened the doors to the public, there were only 10 out of 2,502 visitor comments, which were recorded in the notebooks for a period of four years, are openly critical of Memorial Hall and what it exhibited in its memorial/museum space. This number is impressively small when considering the many criticisms thrown to Memorial Hall from its incipience to its actual construction.

Visitor Engagement

Now, let us turn our attention to what and how museum visitors wrote after visiting through Memorial Hall. From this inquiry, this chapter aims to focus more on how visitors thought after walking through Memorial Hall, instead of focusing on what visitors wrote about Memorial Hall and its representation.

Many visitors commented about their getting a feeling of reverence when they were taking the long pathway down to the Hall of Remembrance. A visitor noted that walking the dark pathway had given him/her a sense of walking inside the tomb where victims were put to rest (4-10).[37] Another visitor made the remark that the pathway gave him/her a deep and calm feeling that was very different from the way he/she felt in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (7-33). This visitor's comment is interesting because the visitor notebooks at Memorial Hall have far fewer comments that express fear (of the atomic bomb, of war, and of death) than those at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

Many visitors wrote about the Hall of Remembrance and its use of 140,000 ceramic tiles to represent casualties. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the Hall of Remembrance makes an intense emotional impact on those who enter the space. For example, a visitor wrote, "[the tiles] gave a visual and emotional realization about the size of the tragedy that was missed by a mere listening to the number for the first time ever" (7-6). Furthermore, another visitor wrote reflecting on the panoramic image: "the tragedy is not about the number as a total, but about each one life in that total" (6-30). It is not too far from the truth to say that the Hall of Remembrance works not merely as a memorial space, but also harbors a dialogical space in which visitors construct their knowledge about the destruction and the deceased victims through aural communication

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[37] Reference to the comments left in visitor notebooks is given in the following structure. The first number stands for the volume number of the notebook as assigned by the Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims. The second number after the hyphen indicates the page number of the notebook. Memorial Hall informs its visitors that Memorial Hall reserves its right to publish any comments left in the notebooks. However, it also states that it will keep the identity of those who wrote the comments anonymous. Many visitors left their comments with their name (and sometimes with their address and emails), but I removed any information that could violate their anonymity when quoting their comments. Lastly, I translated all comments from their original languages unless otherwise noted.

with the silent exhibition of the casualties. Indeed, many commented that they realize through the cyclorama in the Hall of Remembrance that expressing casualties by a mere rendition of a number often falls short from offering a better sense of the magnitude of destruction than simply hear or read the number of casualties.

Moreover visitor notebooks show that the digital projection of victim's names and portraits has given an opportunity to reflect upon the atomic bombings in a different way than the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the rest of Peace Memorial Park did. Some visitors developed a daunting sense of individual lives behind the abstraction of the screen. One student in particular found a victim who share his/her last name and went on to read the victim's testimony (6-47). Here, we can see that the Memorial Hall has constructed an opportunity for visitors to make a connection to the past through the medium of a testimony. The living and the dead are brought together into the same memorial/museum space in which visitors are actively constructing an understanding of what happened in the past through victim's experiences.

There are many comments hinting of visitors' thought processes and desire to know more about victims and their experiences. However, it is also important to note that many visitors provided no reference to the historical context behind the atomic bombings. In my interview with Memorial Hall's vice-director, he explained that Memorial Hall intends to cast no historical interpretation of its own. In visitor notebooks, there were very few comments questioning the Memorial Hall's lack of explicit reference that would lead to a particular historical interpretation. This is significant when we compare the notebooks with similar notebooks at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. There is no trouble finding comments that challenge or even negate the historical context in which

the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum positioned the atomic bombing. Ironically, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum has worked extensively to exhibit the atomic bombing as an important historical event through responding to many criticisms and demands to represent the event in an *appropriate* historical context.

Very small number of visitors wrote their comments expressing their dissatisfactions when not finding Memorial Hall making open apology or condemnation of Japan's wartime aggression. A visitor from the People's Republic of China remarked, "Why not regret Nanjing Massacre!" (3-38). Another visitor wrote in English, "There is no mention of the systematic wiping out of 550 villages in China using chemical and biological weapons between 1937 and 1944 by Japan killing somewhere between 3,000,000 and 10,000,000 civilians. Everyone has dark secrets" (4-73). One Japanese visitor also challenged Memorial Hall and wrote, "There would be no progress if the past aggression is not acknowledged" (3-23). These criticisms, we can notice, all bring up the concern that Memorial Hall obscures a crucial inquiry into the role of Japan, as a nation-state, in receiving the atomic bombing as a tragic consequence of its drive towards war. It is also notable that the same line of criticism is frequently found in the visitor notebooks of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. However, we must also notice here that, among those comments criticizing the fact that Memorial Hall does not make its historical interpretation, there was absolutely no comment argued Memorial Hall should exhibit its historical interpretation to challenge those who dropped the atomic bomb. In this respect, we can understand that it is widely assumed that Japan must castigate its own war aggression when Japan is to exhibit/speak anything about the Second World War.

However, an overwhelming number of comments say nothing about the Memorial Hall's lack of historical context. Instead, most visitor comments suggest that the Memorial Hall has made its audiences think about the past in reference to present issues the living face when constructing their futures. In fact, there are many comments that simply state the importance of peace and their disfavor of war. Yet, many visitors also provide reasons for leaving their note for peace. Some of them openly apologized for having no words to express what they thought after visiting Memorial Hall. One wrote in English, "I don't think any comments are necessary, nor can they do any justice to the tragedy" (6-70); another visitor also wrote in English, "we aren't sure what we can say" (6-72). Recognizing the individualities construing the generality of victims, visitors are situated to face past event as individual persons in the present somewhat outside of their present norms and conditions. It is well represented in what a visitor wrote in the notebook: "I cannot judge what is described here, and I cannot say to anybody 'you did bad', because who am I to judge anyone [here]" (8-8).

It is also notable that the visitor notebooks function here as the final space in which visitors reflect and communicate with Memorial Hall and its other visitors about the present and the future. Reading through the visitor notebooks, I found no visitors asking questions or making assertions on whom to be blamed on what happened in Hiroshima. Instead, those comments with questions are asking their contemporaries for the purpose of the future. Many visitors linked the tragedy of the atomic bombings to the victims of contemporary wars and conflicts, such as the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the war on

terrorism, and so on.[38] Then, these contemporary issues are frequently followed by such questions asking what needs to be done to prevent wars and tragedies like Hiroshima from happening again. In this respect, we can find that Memorial Hall does not serve as a sanctuary for merely accumulating the testimonies of the atomic bomb victims. Memorial Hall hardly designates a closure to the past by divorcing the past from the present visitors. Instead, the visitor notebooks suggest that a large portion of visitors to Memorial Hall left with complex issues in the space of the present living: that is, what needs to be done to construct the future with no wars or no nuclear weapons.

We can recognize here that the past is brought into the space of the living. Having connection between the past and the present living, the past is no longer detached from the present; and thus visitors—the present living—are looking at the past to think about the present issues for the future. In this respect, the past represented in Memorial Hall serves as a heterotopia: the past is a placeless place in the space of the present living, yet the past represented in Memorial Hall is a localizable place through which the present living became conscious of their present realities.

Discussion

Highly contested as a needless public expenditure at the time of the construction, Memorial Hall has defended its worth as a discursive space with a distinctive representation of the atomic bomb victims. Memorial Hall was born in the midst of

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[38] For example, in the year the United States and coalition forces began its attack against Iraq, the number of visitor comments mentioning about the war against terrorism jumped ten times more than the previous year.

historical controversies through which the Japanese people confronted the complex

consciousness and understanding of nuclear weapons outside of their national public. The

controversies around ways to represent the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

created tensions in the international political environment even fifty years after the war's

end. Memorial Hall, for example, has approximately 200,000 visitors every year.[39] There

is no data among which how many are foreign visitors, but there are approximately ten

percents of comments written in languages other than Japanese: there are English,

Chinese, Korean, Portuguese (in fact, quite many comments are written in Portuguese),

Spanish, Dutch, German, French, Greek, Russian, Thai, Tagalog, Arabic, and so on.

Needing to respond to these ongoing and even intensifying tensions, Memorial Hall

occasions a shift in the level of discourse, from a macro-political setting of an historical

event of global importance to the micro-psychological and personal dimension of the

event.

In fact, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum has been the only museum inside

the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park for many years. This museum has long received

criticisms for what it exhibits (also, what it does not exhibit) in its museum-space. This

may sound somewhat puzzling, but the museum has repeatedly become a target of intense

criticism because it gives substantial attention to the devastation brought by the atomic

bomb. Those criticisms were quite similar to what Sadako Kurihara and other survivors

of Hiroshima have experienced when testifying *their* experiences of the atomic bombing.

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[39] Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims, "Kokuritsu Hiroshima Genbaku Shibotsusha Tsuitouo Kinenkan no nyukansha nado no jokyo nit suite," *Press Release*, April 27, 2006.

[40] The museum was built by the City of Hiroshima to preserve and exhibit what was brought to Hiroshima by the atomic bombing, and the museum also became the target of criticisms because of its focusing on the atomic bomb and its destruction of the city.[41] The criticism said that, when the museum emphasizes the devastation of the bomb, it conveniently overshadows Japan's acts of war violence. The museum is, therefore, accused of perpetuating the discourse that overlooks the violence Japan had caused to others.

Even today, the ways to represent the atomic bombing and the devastation it brought are almost ceaselessly inviting conflicts and controversies around the museum. In 2007, for example, Steven Leeper, the Chief Director of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, said that there are substantial voices in Asian countries that the atomic bombings had liberated them from Japanese colonization. Leeper thus proposed the need to invite voices from those Asian countries to make exhibition more appealing to diverse people from all different countries.[42] In 2001, he also criticized both the Japanese and the City of Hiroshima for ineffectively spending money for the peace:

> ...the Japanese and Hiroshima city governments for spending huge sums on decorating the city through massive public works projects. They would gain far more benefits in the long run if they invest in projects to prevent violence, resolve conflicts and solve problems between rivaling parties in the international arena...[43]

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[40] See chapter three for details about the criticisms thrown toward the survivors who testified their experiences of atomic bombing.

[41] See chapter five for details why Hiroshima's focusing on exhibiting and speaking of the atomic bombing became the target of criticisms.

[42] *Chugoku Shinbun*, May 31, 2007.

[43] Kyodo News International, "Feature: 'Peace Industry' Key for Hiroshima to Achieve Peace," *Japan Policy & Politics* (August 13, 2001).

His statement, however, invited many criticisms to Leeper, as well as the Mayor who had appointed Leeper—an American—as the chief director. The primary criticism came from those who stressed the importance of remembering the atomic bombing and its aftermath. Hiroaki Hirano, a representative of Hiroshima city government, expresses his deep concern that Hiroshima became a discourse for peace without remembering or confronting the difficult reality of the atomic bombing and its aftermath. Peace is indeed more universal, but Hiroshima has responsibility to remember and work for those a-bomb victims who are living with restless fear of the long-term and genetic impacts of the bomb.[44] The criticisms thus came from concerns that Hiroshima's experience becomes an icon for peace with a price of losing serious inquiry and remembering of the details of what the atomic bombing brought to the city and its people.

In fact, how we represent past events is ultimately leading to the question of choice. It is a choice of what should be preserved and passed on to the present and future. It is from such choices that we construct a historical narrative as an embodiment of our rational understanding of the past and the meaning generated from the past. In this respect, history museums are shouldering the responsibility of making the *right* choice, while they have no means to dictate *what* should be the *right* choice. Furthermore, making any choice often invites controversies in the context where there is no transcendentally common or peremptory discourse to define what constitutes the right choice. Whether focusing on peace by actively including Japan's wartime aggressions and Asian victims or focusing on the atomic bombing by making exclusively discussing

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[44] Hiroaki Hirano, "Zenbei genbakuten kaisai no igi," *Watashi no omoi* 237 (March 21, 2008) online newsletter for political office, http://www.hirano-hiroaki.com/my_thinking/20080321.html (accessed July 1, 2008).

about the bomb and its impacts is the question of choice. It is not the question of empirical truth over the subjects being represented. Museums, history museums in this discussion, are, therefore, public institutions that embody conflicting ends when representing the past: it has to make a particular choice, yet it also is expected to be inclusive of all that constitutes the public.

Memorial Hall, however, seems to have made a unique choice. In response to intensifying political struggles of how we should represent the atomic bombings, Memorial Hall made an explicit decision to construct its presentation through testimonies of those who have experienced the bomb (thus, testimonies are not exclusively those of the victims). By this approach, Memorial Hall is not a memorial/museum space that is simply storing whatever of *their choosing*. There are diverse testimonies written from multiple different perspectives from Japan, Korea, China, U.S., Australia, and whoever have direct or indirect experience of the atomic bombing. Visitors are even invited to make their own contributions in visitor notebooks, and we can find the a-bomb survivor themselves wrote their testimonies on such visitor notebooks.

It is however important to note that Memorial Hall's attempting to make no choice of what it represents in its memorial/museum space does not mean that it aims to act (or pretends to be) *apolitical*. Instead, the emphasis here is that Memorial Hall was making a *political* decision to stay away from politics and a singular historical narrative that might create turmoil. In fact, when exhibiting testimonies as the centripetal artifacts in its space, Memorial Hall seems to construct the space that is similar to what historians of memory now call *the Realm of Memory*.[45]

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[45] Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

Lieux de mémoire—the Realm of Memory—comes from the genre that is commonly referred as *histoire des mentalités*. This emphasis on memory came out of French historians who sought to move out from the nineteenth century determinism and the linearity of Marxist historiography in history writings. Nora's Realm of Memory intends to map the vicissitudes of France and French national identity that are conceptualized in the relationship between history and memory. This was initially an attempt to actively recognize the polyphony and polysemy of memories generated in and around France as a nation and its past. The field of memory studies, indeed, generated many works of memories, such as the works by David Lowenthal, John Bodnar, Raphael Samuel, and Simon Schama to name but a few. Recently, however, the Realm of Memory seems to be positioned as a convenient frame to construct historical narrative in conjunction with collective memory and national identity. The past decade has seen many projects that have taken the Realm of Memory as a way to overlook the polyphony and polysemy of the past represented in memories. The Realm of Memory is, in fact, an active acknowledgement of the polyphony and polysemy of memory as the problem when representing the national past, yet it also seeks to be *a history* in multiple voices.

Memorial Hall has constructed a memorial space that embodies the polyphony and polysemy of memories from diverse people who have experienced the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. These people include not only the direct victims of the bomb, but also those individuals who have lost their relatives, who knew the victims, who became the victim of radiation by entering the city, and who have the desire to leave their stories of direct and indirect experience of the bomb. Furthermore, Memorial Hall stores and exhibits the testimonies from the diverse people who were, at the time of the bombing,

infants, children, students, adults, citizens, prisoners, laborers brought from Japanese occupied territories, soldiers and others. Moreover, Memorial Hall accumulated and is still accumulating testimonies directly from people, as well as narratives and stories printed/presented in multiple media, such as television programs, newspapers, community papers, diaries, letters, and of course visitor notebooks. Memorial Hall aims to construct a discourse for peace through indifferently encompassing testimonies on the atomic bombing; as such, its space can be seen as an embodiment of what Nora intended in *Lieux de mémoire.*

It is important to highlight here that the visitor notebooks function as a substantial space in themselves for constructing a dialogue across diverse memories and consciousness about the past. First, the notebook form manages a major breakthrough in bringing the living—the visitors—to think of the past event in great relevance to the present times. Second, the comments and reflections left on the visitor notebooks have equal authenticity when the notebooks become a space in which there is a dialogue among diverse visitors across different perspectives, experiences, and political positions on the atomic bombing.

I noted little earlier that the Realm of Memory became a convenient goal (product) for writing history by way of bypassing the polyphony and polysemy as the invincible reality of our present consciousness about the past. The visitor notebooks, however, permit the living—visitors in the present—to continuously hinder the completion of the Realm of Memory. In fact, the visitor notebooks allow representation of the present consciousness of past events in reflection to what people have narrated about what happened in the past through diverse testimonies kept and exhibited in

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Memorial Hall. The visitor notebooks are a part of the discursive space of Memorial Hall, and are open to other visitors. Hence, the memorial/museum space constructs and reconstructs the Realm of Memory through dialogue between the represented past and the consciousness of the present.

Memorial Hall, not taking on a vocal interpretation of its own choosing, exhibited the atomic bombings through the testimonies of personal experiences. The visitors, thus, find themselves at the receiving end of the emotional impact communicated directly through speech and imagery provided by the tragic testimonies of other humans. It follows that the history of atomic bombings is thus mediated through reflective interpretations at a personal and emotional level. This approach seems to contribute in offering the present living a sense of direct participation in the experience of the past event in which they have not directly lived through it. This is evidenced by the fact that many comments in visitor notebooks question the humanity that has capacity to materialize such tragedy.

Those comments in the visitor notebooks of Memorial Hall suggest that Memorial Hall, in fact, brings to the foreground a mode of experience circumvented by the approach taken in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum: that is, instead of playing up the historical/informative dimension, it builds upon the moral/humane dimension of a historical event. Through providing almost no explicit institutional interpretation of the past when representing the past event with diverse testimonies, history (existing historical consciousness) retired to a background of diverse experiences represented through those testimonies. It is here, people conversely internalize the fact (what happened in the past) represented with diverse perspectives and memories of those experienced the event.

Having exposed to the diversity of experiences, perspectives and memories reflected in testimonies, it seems visitors were made to aware of the fact that the victims, much like us present living, lived with diverse consciousness of their present. This awareness then brings another consciousness that we all may become victims, as well as those victimizing others, regardless of our individual moral/humane virtues. This consciousness, I argue, is a product of deconstruction of the dichotomy between victims and those who are not victims when approaching the past events. Furthermore, it is also a product of deconstructing the dichotomy between the past and present, which has long shouldered the present's detaching from the past by holding the latter as what has already happened and as what the present has already overcome. In fact, many visitors who left their comments in the visitor notebooks reflected on the atomic bomb victims and their testimonies in relation to the War on Terrorism, political/military conflicts, poverty and other major issues the world is facing at the time of their visiting the Memorial Hall.

We can reasonably assume here that the visitors to Memorial Hall, particularly those who spent a moment to jot down their comment in visitor notebooks, drafted a sense of responsibility from the past event toward their present. Memorial Hall offers itself as a site in which to reconsider the past in terms of the human beings itself, with its fragility and innocence caught in war and political conflicts concocted at structural levels beyond the reach of individuals. Indeed, the victims of the atomic bombings were the agents of the war themselves (and thus they were directly and indirectly responsible for what happened to them), as some of the criticisms have emphasized in historical controversies of defining the meanings of what happened in the past. However, such criticisms often purport another violence of contemporaries against the individuals in the

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past because the innocence of individual persons is stripped when they were projected onto the political context of Japan's participation in the war (see Chapter 3). The visitors' comments in Memorial Hall site the individual/private and innocent human statements to call back a sense of political responsibility on all human sufferings as a whole.

It is perhaps necessary to mention that the visitor notebooks accounted for some antagonistic reactions—albeit small in number but significant in substance—to Memorial Hall. Memorial Hall became the target of criticisms because of its privileging of the human suffering of atomic bomb victims was thought as an attempt to minimize the sufferings experienced by the victims of Japan's own war aggressions. The challenge brought to Memorial Hall incipient to its construction, as well as in the visitor notebooks, is a question of justice. This question is important yet it cannot be answered fully when recognizing the past event in which those victimizing and those victimized were not clear-cut in dichotomy.

In fact, when approaching to any event happened in the past, we can reasonably say that there are diverse perspectives to give a rational understanding of the event, that there is no transcendental perspective to understand the event, and that there is no way to re-experience what happened in the past. Without needing to recite postmodern criticisms on historiography, presenting the past in the present, since it is not possible to exhibit entire past, involves the act of framing—it is a choice on perspectives to understand the past. It can be seen that the visitors who wrote their comments along the line of such challenging dynamics engage direct dialogue to Memorial Hall by examining the legitimacy of the history surrounding atomic bombings and how Memorial Hall elicits the

event in its space. The visitor notebooks then became a space in which such engagement is also making a contribution to prevent the completion of the Realm of Memory.

It is important to call our attention that Memorial Hall is also asking the question of justice when it represents diverse voices and experiences of individual persons searching to understand the meanings of the event that took place in the past. The visitor notebooks, thus, function in Memorial Hall as a dialogical space in which the present living (visitors) makes their own inquiry not about what happened in the past but what the present living should comprehend from the past. Hence, instead of directly responding to the question of justice framed or framing the past event in a particular historical context, Memorial Hall seems to encourage its visitors to construct historical context centering on the particular event it exhibits in its space.

The visitor notebooks serve here as vehicles not only for reflections but also examination and challenge. Memorial Hall did not situate its visitors to be polite guests who are invited to provide "an audience-contributed gesture of closure, not really to provide well-balanced feedback on their museum experience"[46] to the visitor notebooks. Instead, the notebooks work as an open-ended and dialogical space where there are more questions than the statements to define a particular understanding of the past event.

In fact, Memorial Hall seems to make its visitor notebooks a kind of *heterotopia* of the present that seeks to construct the future through reflecting of the past event. The visitor notebooks became a placeless place that permits visitors to become individual persons outside of their political and historical constraints to view of the event that

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[46] Tamar Katriel, *Performing the Past: A Study of Israeli Settlement Museums* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), quoted in Sharon Macdonald, "Accessing Audiences: Visiting Visitor Books," *Museum and Society* 3, no. 3 (2005), 121.

happened in the past. Visitors were able to think about the past victims and their tragic experiences not merely political framework of history but also individual personal experiences of human beings. Furthermore, visitors of Memorial Hall make direct link between the past tragedy and the diverse issues in the present, from military conflicts to political responsibilities on poverty and so on. The fact visitors are actively constructing this link is noteworthy when considering that Memorial Hall makes no explicit attempt to bridge the issues in the present to the past events (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and other peace museums sprout throughout Japan do make such connection in their museum space).

Memorial Hall, having exposed almost no choice of its own when representing the past, became a heterotopia. It is an institutionally constructed placeless place where any political frameworks are not explicitly challenged and multiple political frameworks are equally confronted by the diverse voices of individual persons who became victims of the atomic bombings. The Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims is therefore an interesting site for further inquiry, because of its embodiment of multitudes of political frameworks (instead of constructing legitimacy around a particular political framework). Having no explicit challenge to any political frameworks and the presuppositions they carry, Memorial Hall shows possibilities and potentials to bring dialogical representation of history: that is, history that is inclusive of diverse experiences, yet this diversity is not supporting the fragmented understandings of the past. Diverse understandings of what happened in the past are dialogically substantiating toward a historical understanding that constantly aims substantiality yet transformative in a globalizing society.

Chapter 7

Knowledge as a Fluid Entity

> "A choice is always defined in terms
> of what it excludes, and a historical
> project is a logical substitution."
> —Gilles Deleuze[1]

In *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, Gilles Deleuze puts together the philosophical

contributions of David Hume and his projects for the creation of a science of humanity.

Deleuze, when identifying Hume's fundamental project, writes:

> A choice is always defined in terms of what it excludes, and a historical
> project is a logical substitution. Hume's project entails *the substitution of a
> psychology of the mind by a psychology of the mind's affections*. The
> constitution of a psychology of the mind is not at all possible, since this
> psychology cannot find in its object the required constancy or universality;
> only a psychology of affections will be capable of constituting the true
> science of humanity.[2]

The study of the human mind and the study of the human past are in common when the

subject of their inquiry is an entity that has no physical attribution. Psychology works

with the human mind, but it has no physical entity upon which to make an empirical

observation. Psychologists observe human behaviors and actions, but their objects of

observation are the reflections of the mind, not the mind itself. Historians study the past,

but their subject of inquiry is not the past itself, it is the traces of the past that are

reflecting the past in the present.[3] The past itself is similarly inaccessible because the past

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[1] Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 21, italics in original

[2] Ibid. Italics are in original text.

[3] For example, Arthur C. Danto argues, "it is logically possible that the world was created just five minutes ago, intact with us and all our memories, and containing all those bits and pieces of things we take

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itself has no entity that can be observed in the present. Deleuze identifies that the

fundamental project of Hume is the shift from a psychology of the mind to a psychology

of the mind's affection. This study, similarly, proposes the substitution of a history of the

past itself by a history of historical explanations, which are the representations of how we

have understood past events, as one of the fundamental agents to establish knowledge in

history.[4]

The preceding chapters examined the constituent elements of our understanding

of what happened in the past. Memory is a private understanding of what happened in the

past and it is constituted with experiential remembrance of the past events. Testimony is

the memory made available in the public domain, and it is the constituent element of both

history and collective understanding of past events (chapter 3). The collective

remembrance of the past is not the product of nature, but it is the product of *active*

resistance to oblivion in the public sphere of past events. The collective remembrance

provides history both as the subject and the resource for inquiring into the past (chapter

4). However, the actors who are remembering the past event are ceaselessly transforming

in the present; and thus, our collective and individual remembrance belongs to the present

as a constituent element of historical explanations (chapter 5).

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as evidence for a much older world than we inhabit. The whole present complexion of the world might be just as it is, independently of when the world was created, and the world, as we now know it, is compatible with an astoundingly brief history of itself. But then, if it were created five minutes ago, there would have been nothing for statements purportedly about the past to refer to." George Orwell, in his popular novel, *1984*, writes differently to challenge documentary empiricism for understanding the past. In the Ministry of Truth, the main character of the story, Winston, was ceaselessly rewriting the documents from the past. "Day by day and almost minute by minute the past was brought up to day. In this way, every prediction made by the Party could be shown by documentary evidence to have been correct..." Historians in the present have no means to negate the cases hypothesized by Danto and Orwell, Hence, we can say historians do not study the past itself but the past traces in the present. Quotes are from, Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 30; and George Orwell, *1984* (New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1998), 40.

[4] See the preface to the English edition of Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, x-xi.

Viewed in light of the inquiries in the preceding chapters, historical explanations are fluid and never concrete. The significance assigned to a past event—the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, for example—is not the product of nature. In fact, there have been conscious efforts to make the atomic bombing of Hiroshima into the subject of history. Having no conscious effort made in assigning significance to past events, the events would be abandoned to our oblivion. Nothing becomes the subject of history without human consciousness to make past events into the subjects of historical inquiry. Therefore, it is the subjective element of our present that makes the past into the subject of history.

Knowledge in history thus inevitably includes subjective elements from those who made a particular past into the subject of history, and of those who subscribe to the existing historical explanations. It then follows that substantiating the knowledge that is embedded in each historical explanation cannot bridge the controversies across different historical understandings of what happened in the past. Consequently, if we assume knowledge in history is about the past itself, we will never be able to attain the kind of knowledge necessary for responding to the plurality of historical explanations as the present reality. This study, therefore, argues from the position that diversity does not and should not be applied to the knowledge. The plurality of historical explanations means that there are diverse historical explanations, and it does not mean the same to say that the knowledge in history is diverse. This study thus argues the knowledge is always in the making to negate the notion that claims the knowledge in history is diverse.

Memories of private persons are never consistent because memories are ceaselessly shaped and reshaped in light of the person's present conditions and

experiences. Memory is thus the entity that ceaselessly flows and is always in the making. The substance of testimony is such memories. However, it captures only a fraction of memory that is always in the making. The preceding chapters demonstrated that the collective consciousness of the past has also been ceaselessly in the making in respect to political and historical conditions of the present. The constituent elements of historical explanations are consequently just such substances that cannot be substantiated because they are the entities that are always in the making. History employs such substances that cannot be substantiated definitively. This leads us to a new level of understanding history and its knowledge: that is, it is not possible to substantiate history's knowledge by only substantiating the substances constructing historical explanations. Historical explanations are also substances that are constructing knowledge in history. Therefore, substantiating the substances constructing another substance would not be able to definitively substantiate history and its knowledge.

History has to substantiate its knowledge with constancy and universality in order to stand as a discipline. If history fails to substantiate its knowledge, the practice of history would have to be continuously fragile and it endangers history by turning it into a discipline without an end point. To differentiate historical explanations from myths and epics requires knowledge with constancy and universality. Historians thus seek rigorously to substantiate the substances constituting historical explanations. However, their substantiation has led the discipline of history into an ironic condition, which Arthur C. Danto reluctantly characterizes by saying:

> There has been, and perhaps there still are, parts of science which have not passed beyond the mere making of observations, the collecting of specimens, and the like. Ordinary history might be just such a science.[5]

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[5] Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 4.

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The postmodern approach to history has stressed the impossibility of constructing positivistic knowledge about the past. It is valid to argue that subjective interventions by present historians are inevitable in the process of selecting certain past events as the subject of history. Knowledge in history is thus defined by the context and the moment by which we give meanings to the past.

However, when we push postmodern critique on history and its knowledge construction to the extreme, we face a danger of making a relativistic localization of knowledge without making inquiry of diverse aspects and power structures that gave rise to meaning. The knowledge emphasized in the relativistic approach to history, for example, offers neither constancy nor universality. In fact, relativism defines knowledge by the context in which the past is interpreted. Relativism thus ends up offering no comprehensive means to bridge different knowledge constructed in different contexts. In this respect, relativism has turned history to push forward pseudo-knowledge by opening the avenue to the deconstruction of history's disciplinary framework. To apply relativism to explain the plurality of historical explanations would lead history to indefinitely ramify the context to authenticate the knowledge to the level of individuals, and thus it ends up constructing pseudo-knowledge if not anti-knowledge.

It is also important to note that, if we continue assuming knowledge in history to have a definitive property about what happened in the past, the knowledge has forever to be ramified because everyone has perspectives that are constructed in relation to their present historical conditions. Yet, it is perhaps more problematic to draft definitive meanings of the past, as history would require halting the continuous flow of time.

History, when it freezes the flow of time, can claim a body of knowledge that has a definitive value. However, the knowledge produced through stopping the flow of time would have to refuse further interpretations of the past because such knowledge is substantiated through active negation to the continuous flow of time. Therefore, when such knowledge to be open to further interpretations, it has to challenge what has given the knowledge a definitive body—the definitiveness of the knowledge came from freezing the flow of time, and being open to reinterpretation requires the active recognition of the flow of time. History, therefore, needs to embody a system that makes a constructive recognition of the possibilities of occurrence of future events that may change the meanings assigned to the past in the present moment.

The significations of what happened in the past are constantly made and remade in light of the future of the events that became the subject of history. This study, hence, has repeatedly stressed that knowledge in history is a ceaseless construction that has only a conceptual endpoint. If past events themselves have significations that have the required constancy and universality, to do history is to build a complete chronicle of what happened in the past. The significations of past events, however, are not the product of nature because the same past events often become an element for constructing historical explanations that are in conflict with each other. It follows from here that knowledge in history cannot be authenticated only through substantiation of the substances constituting historical explanations and their significations. Furthermore, if we assume history to construct a fixed entity with a definitive value, history would become the discipline that is forever trapped in the endless accumulation and substantiation of the substances in the

present that are constantly transforming.[6] History, then, is implicitly abandoning its

intellectual purposes that are necessary quality to make history into a discipline.

Narrative emphasis on history thus casts new light to define knowledge in history.

Narrativism focuses on the fact that historical explanations of what happened in the past

are necessarily built on a narrative structure.[7] Historical explanation is fundamentally a

narrative that makes a causal explanation from two or more events that occurred in

different moments of the past. History, in this respect, constructs the narrative structure

that gives meanings to the past through establishing a causal relationship between the

events happening in two different temporal moments of the time. Narrativism thus

provides legitimacy to the knowledge that is ceaselessly in the making and the remaking.

The past is what was once the present, and the future is what is going to be the present.

The present is thus the state that is always becoming. In this respect, the present, in

reality, is not a distinct state. Instead, the present is a substance that cannot be

substantiated outside of its relations with the context in which it is poised. In other words,

the present has substance only when the present is poised in particular contexts.

Therefore, it is not possible to substantiate knowledge in history as something with the

required constancy and universality *beyond time*. There is neither a rigid substance nor a

distinct state from which to construct definitive meanings of the past. In fact, the

substances constructing historical explanations are the constituent elements of what

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[6] The present is constantly transforming and thus it is never definitive. In short, the present is only a conjuncture between the past and the future, and it is only a moment in which the future becomes the past. Therefore, the signification of the past event may be established as definitive property in the present, and the property value is never definitive in light of what may become known to us in the future. See chapter two for the discussion on Aristotelian logic of time.

[7] For the narrative structure of historical explanation, see the discussion on historiography in Chapter 2.

Bergson often calls as the continued *melody* of the continuous flow of time and events.[8]

Melody is indivisible. Musical notes are the constituent elements of melody, but they themselves are not melody. Similarly, time is an indivisible flex, and thus history can only seize its knowledge through institutionalization of our understanding of what happened in the past.

It is important to call to our attention that knowledge about what happened in the past assumes time is a divisible unit to be treated much like physical science treats motion as divisible property. In fact, most history departments in universities habitually organize their programs by dividing the continuous flow of time. For example, a history department is often constituted of divisions dividing the past into time periods—Ancient, Romantic, Modern and Contemporary history. Furthermore, recent multicultural emphasis on history study has established many sub-divisions of history into gender, race, ethnicity, culture, sexuality and other categories, to approach the past. Today, history in liberal democratic societies seeks knowledge that is inclusive of diverse understandings of the past as an approach to make a fair representation of what happened in the past. However, we need to note that, behind the argument for inclusiveness of history, the past is already and uncritically assumed as a divisible property: the distinction being between the past that is included and the past that is excluded. History is thus thought to be much like solving a jigsaw puzzle that is made of diverse constituent elements that form a complete picture of what the past essentially was.

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[8] For Bergson's using metaphor of melody, see Susanne Gueriac, *Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), and James M. Curtis, "Bergson and Russian Formalism," *Comparative Literature Review* 28 no. 2 (spring 1976), 109-121.

In fact, knowledge that is inclusive of everything is, in principle, anti-knowledge. If inclusiveness is the primary requirement for constructing knowledge, we need to measure the substantiality of knowledge by empirically measuring the amount of substances constituting that particular knowledge. The substances representing past events are indeed critical constituent elements of historical explanations. However, the substances themselves are merely the constituent elements of chronicles if there is no narrative structure to assign a causal relationship between those substances.[9] Inclusiveness, in this respect, can constructively complicate history through authenticating the introduction of diverse readings and consciousnesses of the past. Nonetheless, inclusiveness does not answer how we should construct knowledge that encompasses not only the complexities of the past but also the present readings of the past. The plurality of historical explanations is thus a welcomed outcome of the inclusiveness of history's knowledge. Still, inclusiveness provides no solution to the conflicts between different historical explanations.

The narrative structure of historical explanations also makes it clear that the process of assigning significance to past events necessarily involves *selection*. Selection is fundamentally a choice that is "always defined in terms of what it excludes."[10] In fact, even those who argue for knowledge that is inclusive assume that a historical explanation is fundamentally a product of exclusion. To emphasize inclusiveness in doing history is in fact the same as recognizing the fact that currently held historical explanations are the products of exclusion. To practice history in the postmodern condition of the present,

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[9] See chapter 2 for detailed discussion on this point.

[10] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 21.

therefore, we face a serious dilemma. Knowledge in history, like knowledge in other disciplinary fields, is a product of selection that is defined by what it excludes. Yet, history is asked to be inclusive of all diverse understandings in the public domain of what happened in the past.

Chapter six, therefore, demonstrated this dilemma being materialized when constructing a public museum about a historical event. Public museums of history in general face the same dilemma when representing past events. Public museums, unlike their private counterparts, are asked to represent diverse voices and perspectives available in the public domain, as well as diverse experiences of the people who constitute the public. Furthermore, as publicly funded institutions, public museums need to demonstrate their *raison d'etre* by constructing a *definitive* representation of their exhibited subject to the whole public.[11] To construct knowledge that is inclusive of all diverse voices and experiences of the past is in fact a boastful project, because such a project requires that museums reconstruct the whole past, or exhibit the entire, chaotic perceptions of the past existing in the present.

It is also important to note that building a public museum about a past event is concurrent to endorsing a particular interpretation of the event as the dominant explanation in the public domain. Public museums, through imposing their imperishable appearances, often craft monumentality around the subjects that are represented in the

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[11] Recall the historical controversy occurred when the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum announced its original plan to exhibit the Enola Gay. One of primary subjects in the controversy stressed the role of public museums in constructing collective understanding of what happened in the past for the public, from whom the museums receive their funding. Furthermore, see the discussion on the relationship between history textbooks (and nation's representing the past events) and the construction of national identity, in chapter two.

museum-space.[12] This monumentality is the product of selection. The construction of public museums of past events, therefore, is a useful medium to inquire into the practice of making a logical substitution for building history's knowledge that would be substantive in the public sphere. The museum-space thus becomes a physically attributed field in which diverse perceptions of the present and their construction of the meanings of past events are scrutinized, pursuant to becoming constituent elements of the public representation of what happened in the past.[13] Hence, chapter six discussed the construction of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims to inquire into knowledge that encompasses a complex plurality of historical explanations on the atomic bombing and its meanings in history.

In 2003, just before the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims opened its doors to the public, the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum relocated its Enola Gay exhibition to the museum's new wing. The primary function of the new wing is to provide a physical space to exhibit the aircraft that cannot be physically stored in the Mall. From the contextual reading of how the Smithsonian shaped the exhibition, we can understand the Smithsonian's determination to avoid risking another controversy like the one in 1994. However, visitors to the museum would not likely learn much about anything than what is being exhibited in the museum-space.

The Smithsonian, by definitively limiting the exhibition to present the Enola Gay as a constituent element of the history of aviation technology, controls the significance to be derived from the Enola Gay. In other words, the Smithsonian isolated the Enola Gay

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[12] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford, UK and Cambridge: Balckwell, 1991).

[13] For elaboration of this point, see chapter six of this study and also Kenneth E. Foote, *Shadowed Ground: America's Landscapes of Violence and Tragedy* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1997).

within the narrative framework of aviation history when responding to controversies and conflicts in the present plurality of historical explanations. The exhibited artifact and the significance assigned to the artifact are, therefore, made into a definitive property by isolating the exhibition—the product—from any interpretations and reinterpretations of the present and the future.

Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims takes an almost contrary approach when exhibiting the subject, which has invited diverse and even conflicting interpretations. Memorial Hall exposes to the visitors the diversity of understandings and consciousnesses generated from empirical experiences of the atomic bombing. The complexity of the testimonies stored and exhibited in the museum-space provides no definitive explanation to the museum's subject. Memorial Hall, in other words, provides no definitive historical explanation that permits visitors to be a receptacle to passively subscribe to a simplified causal framework to comprehend the past. In this respect, visitors are pushed to become active agents confronting the past dynamics and their complexity, much like historians practicing the discipline of history.

Memorial Hall functions like an archive of testimonies, and visitors have access to all the diverse and complex testimonies—each of which makes a unique causal relationship to provide a historical explanation of the atomic bombing and its context. However, Memorial Hall is not an archive; the architecture of the museum, in fact, provides a particular framework to the visitors' entering the museum-space. This is to say that Memorial Hall, instead of building a framework to condition past substances (testimonies) to be exhibited in the museum-space, builds a condition for the visitors who are reading the past substances from the present time.

The architecture of the museum building suggests, for example, that entering the museum-space is much like going inside a mausoleum—the place belonging to the deceased. This architectural makeup provides a clear dichotomy between the deceased and the living, as well as between the past and the present. More importantly, this dichotomy does not draw a rigid and definitive line to simultaneously differentiate the past from the present. Instead, the dichotomy was *a necessary condition* to illuminate the ceaseless continuation between the past and the present. Memorial Hall therefore, introduces a particular kind of dichotomy when exhibiting diverse and complex testimonies of the past. While this dichotomy evidently differentiates between the past and the present, the differentiation exists only conceptually, and is without physical attribution. Through constructing the museum-space where the past and the present are coexisting in one place, Memorial Hall has created an imagined environment in which the deceased are speaking to the living.

The diverse and complex testimonies stored and exhibited in the museum-space therefore would not deconstruct the *raison d'etre* of Memorial Hall as a public museum. Even though Memorial Hall offers no definitive explanation to make visitors comply with a particular causal explanation of the atomic bombing, the visitors are made aware of the complexity and dynamics of past realities and the meanings generated from them. In fact, museums exhibiting a particular historical explanation would inevitably have an exhibit that is anachronistic. History works with time that is ceaselessly flowing. Hence, when a museum exhibition holds a particular historical explanation as the definitive one, the exhibition inevitably turns into an example of anachronism. It is because such an exhibition uncritically assumes the past itself has significance that is naturalistic and

transcendently timeless, and thus it denies the transforming realities of the present. Visitors to Memorial Hall instead face the plurality of historical explanations in diverse and complex testimonies; and more importantly, these visitors are made to realize that there is no definitive historical explanation, with the required constancy and universality.

Memorial Hall thus is a space where visitors engage with complex testimonies of individual persons. Each testimony is a causal explanation of the atomic bombing, and each testimony is the product of different historical conditions of individual persons who have exposed their memories to the public domain. In the eyes of present visitors, the museum-space is replicating the ultimate plurality of historical explanations, because testimonies are in themselves historical explanations drafted with the frameworks of individual persons. Visitors experience diverse and complex testimonies of individual persons, regarding the atomic bombing. It is important to recall that Memorial Hall has an architectural makeup that invites visitors to experience the testimonies with their own historical conditions from the present. The visitors consequently approach the testimonies not simply as narrative explanation about the past. More importantly, when there is no definitive narrative explanation to organize diverse testimonies, visitors are forced to be aware of the fact that they lack the means to make definitive explanation to deal with a difficult past.

Chapter six, in fact, showed visitors seeking to build coherence from complexity, in understanding the atomic bombing. The visitor notebooks revealed that visitors have dialogical interactions with the testimonies stored/exhibited in Memorial Hall. Many visitors have made direct reference to wars, incidents of terrorism, social unrest and to other problems that are ongoing in *their* present contexts, when writing their comments in

the notebooks. In this respect, we can affirm that the testimonies stored/exhibited in the museum-space are not made into a *property* by which the visitors can confirm or challenge their contemporary understanding of the atomic bombing. Instead, visitors employ the testimonies of the atomic bombing to generate meanings that are comprehensible and useful in understanding their present conditions and problems.

Thus we see that Memorial Hall, when exhibiting diverse testimonies without a definitive narrative framework to push forward a particular historical explanation, situates its visitors in a particular condition. The visitors are conditioned to understand that the diverse testimonies are "neither agents nor patients, but results of actions and passions."[14] The point is that Memorial Hall makes no logical substitution of diverse testimonies with a comprehensible historical explanation when constructing the museum-space for exhibiting the atomic bombing. Memorial Hall brings forward no defining framework that seeks to freeze the meanings of the past within a particular historical explanation that is definitive to a particular historical condition of a particular present context. Instead, Memorial Hall substitutes a representation of the past event itself with a representation of how the past event has been understood after the event's occurrence. In this respect, Memorial Hall exhibits in its museum-space not only past consciousnesses of the atomic bombing—as represented in testimonies—but also contemporary consciousness of the atomic bombing. Visitors are, therefore, the subjects who make active inquiry into constructing a comprehensive explanation of the atomic bombing. Then the contemporary construction of the comprehensive explanation of the atomic bombing becomes the object to be exhibited in the museum-space.

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[14] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 4-5.

We can argue that testimonies are the constituent elements of the present

construction of historical explanations, while they are also historical explanations given

in the past. Neither past substances nor historical explanations are themselves able to

constitute complete knowledge in history, because they are interdependently

substantiating themselves in the present context. History, therefore, is not about

identifying what the past essentially was, nor is it about making a comprehensive

explanation of the whole past. When the present moment is ceaselessly becoming the past

and the present is merely a temporal moment, we cannot make the present be the ground

for substantiating the past identified or explained in historical explanations. Present

reflections of past events are an incorporeal entity that is infinitely transforming, and thus

knowledge in history is substantial only when it is being shaped and reshaped.[15]

It is then necessary to consider how knowledge in history that is an incorporeal

and fluid entity approaches the plurality of historical explanations differently from the

relativistic approach to history. We need to note that to stress history's knowledge as an

incorporeal and fluid entity is not the same as arguing that history cannot construct its

knowledge. In fact, by asserting knowledge as a fluid entity, we attempt to reinstate

knowledge in history that does have the required constancy and universality, in respect to

the plurality of historical explanations. The relationship between past testimonies and

present visitors in Memorial Hall, for example, suggests that the fluidity of knowledge

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[15]Bergson uses the metaphor of melody to identify what is being discussed here. Similarly Deleuze uses a metaphor of the law of change of the water and its relationship to the permanence of the river to elaborate the notion of fluidity as repetitions. Deleuze writes, "The constants of one law are in turn variables of a more general law...So at each level, it is in relation to large, permanent natural objects that the subjet of a law experiences its own powerlessness to repeat and discovers that this powerlessness is already contained in the object, reflected in the permenet object wherein it sees itself condemned... In every respect, repetition is a transgression. It puts law into quiestion, it denounces its nominal or genral chanarter in favor of a more profound and more artistic reality." Quote is from Gilles Deleuze, *Difference Empiricism and Subjectivity*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 2-3.

can be institutionalized in the public sphere in which there is plurality of historical explanations. The institutionalized subject, however, is not the past substances or the narrative structures for substantiating a particular historical explanation about the past. In place of the past substances or narrative structures, the subject being institutionalized here *is* the present historical conditions themselves from which we make inquiries of the past.

The plurality of historical explanations poses problems to history if history is to construct a definitive explanation that is timelessly constant and universal. However, when historical explanations become incontrovertibly definitive, it is only because (1) the past being explained has no historical significance that is relevant to the present condition, or (2) the past being explained is controlled by something outside of history. If we assume knowledge in history to be a definitive property, history study would inevitably situate its inquiry to substantiate past substances or the framework to draft a definitive historical explanation.

Indeed, historians are able to employ textual analysis and even scientific examinations to substantiate past substances. However, as this study has repeatedly stressed, to substantiate past substances is merely to provide elements for constructing a complete chronicle. The atomic bombing, for example, is a significant event in itself, and it is incontrovertible that it happened in the past. However, as the preceding chapters demonstrated, the historical significance assigned to the atomic bombing had no constancy and universality in Japan throughout the postwar years. The historical significance assigned to the atomic bombing is, in fact, rooted in the present, and thus historical significance is not a property that is naturally inhibited in the past. Historical

explanations are, instead, the products of present reflections of what happened in the past. Consequently, historical explanations are either incorporeally fresh or anachronistically definitive. The plurality of historical explanations is thus a necessary condition where history works with the past that has significant impact in the present.

Plurality suggests that there is a definitive diversity in our historical conditions in the present. Historical conditions of our past made us experience the same event—the atomic bombing, for example—differently. Thus, past events impacted people differently, even if they experienced the same past. Having been impacted differently by the past, we come to have diverse historical conditions in the present. Therefore, we experience the past differently, and our historical conditions in the present situate us differently when we understand both the past and present realities. Historical conditions are always in the making, as in the famous saying in Latin, *Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis*—time changes, and we (and our historical conditions) change with time.

It is not possible to illustrate our present historical condition for the same reason that we cannot construct a definitive historical explanation of what happened in the past. However, it is feasible to investigate those historical conditions constructing historical explanations about what happened in the past. History, Gilles Deleuze writes, "studies the relations between motive and action in most circumstances, and it also exhibits the uniformity of the human passions."[16] The plurality of historical explanations, in other words, is the signifier of the fact that the past being explained is a significant subject for the present—*motive*—to do history—*action*. Knowledge in history is definitive only when it embodies a mechanism that is revising itself. Though it sounds contradictory,

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[16] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 22

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knowledge in history is definitive when it definitively affirms its fluidity by revising

itself in respect to the present. Previous chapters demonstrate that history would have no

knowledge that can be substantiated in the present if history continues to study only the

things happened in the past.[17] However, if we take fluid knowledge as knowledge in

history, we can move history beyond mere accumulation of past accounts. Instead, we

can make diverse historical explanations as the subject of historical inquiry to identify

non-historical elements constituting each historical explanation. These non-historical

elements then expose us how we have understood the past. More importantly, those non-

historical elements provide us insight into the problems around which we constructed

historical explanations to understand in our present time.

If we take as our point of departure that knowledge in history needs to be

substantiated in the present as a definitive property, we can position diverse historical

explanations as representations of present historical conditions and their interpretation of

the past. Interpretation is a necessary practice of history to procure the reason why and

how something has happened in the past. More importantly, however, interpretation of

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[17] Previous chapters in fact demonstrate just such history. Chapter three demonstrated the
relationship between the historical conditions and the testimonies (historical explanations) of individual
survivors of the atomic bombing. Survivors of the atomic bombing gave their testimonies, but their
testimonies became an embodiment of themselves in the public sphere. Hence, when their testimonies
became substantial substance to construct the historical condition of the public sphere, the survivors found
themselves petrified in the historical condition from which they made their testimony. Individual survivors
became the embodiment of their testimonies when the testimonies became substantial substances to
construct historical explanations in the public sphere. Yet, in the eyes of public, the survivors cannot have a
historical condition that is shifting and transforming according to their present; instead, their historical
condition is frozen in the past in which they made their testimonies.

Chapter four and five identified the relationship between political intentions and historical
conditions when constructing historical explanations in the public sphere. Through exploring chronological
developments of historical explanations in light of the political atmosphere and social movements that are
behind each historical explanation, those chapters illustrated that historical explanations are constituted not
only by elements of a historical nature, but also by those elements that are not from the past, and thus are
non-historical elements. Having non-historical elements to construct historical explanations makes it clear
that historical explanations cannot be substantiated by identifying or inquiring about the past itself.

the past provides meanings of the past in the present.[18] The survivors of Hiroshima's

atomic bombing offered their historical explanations as testimonies with diverse reasons

over time: First, many survivors approached the past to seek emotional compensation for

their loss by transliterating what they experienced and saw in the aftermath of the atomic

bombing. Then, we saw the survivors approach the past to seek public remembrance of

the atomic bombing, to exhibit the war's consequences. It then became emphasized in

order to display the horror of the human ability to destroy whole human populations. In

each moment, the survivors responded to a historical condition particular to the moment:

the survivors were responding, for example, to (1) the end of wartime reality, (2) postwar

oblivion, and (3) the Cold War and spread of nuclear armaments as imminent danger to

the present. To propose the history of historical explanations is to situate the plurality of

historical explanations as the representation of present interpretations of past events. It is

the purpose of such history study to inquire into the meanings of the past in the present.

Furthermore, through investigating past historical explanations, we will be able to

identify the construction of meanings of the past as well. The plurality of historical

explanations, then, is not a problematic reality that is preventing our constructing

knowledge that is definitive. Instead, plurality is a necessary condition for history to

construct knowledge that is a fluid entity, which is ceaselessly flowing toward a

conceptual endpoint.

Multiculturalism also affirms the plurality of historical explanations. However,

there is an important difference in the way multiculturalism affirms plurality.

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[18] See Chapter 2, and the same points have been made repeatedly in the past. See, for example, Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*; and Herodotus, *The Famous History of Herodotus* (New York: AMS Press, 1965).

Multiculturalism, for example, rationalizes plurality of historical explanations on the ground of active recognition of diverse historical and cultural conditions. However, multiculturalism has a severe conceptual deficiency in constructing history when the plurality of historical explanations in itself is implied as the product. Having implied plurality as an end in itself, multiculturalism has permitted infinitely multiplying historical explanations without providing a conceptual means to utilize the plurality constructed as a result. Multiculturalism thus ends up promoting the assumption that each socio-cultural group has (or owns) a historical explanation of its own. In consequence, history focuses on seeking hidden perspectives in order to add different interpretations of what happened in the past. Therefore, while there are infinitely diversifying historical explanations, we have rarely seen meaningful discussions that build knowledge that has the requisite constancy and universality. Multiculturalism thus provides a political reason to give legitimacy to the plurality of historical explanations as the present reality. In other words, it is assumed that the diversity of historical explanations is thought as *the way* to distribute the power of interpretation equally to all groups in a society. Multiculturalism approaches historical explanations as a property to which everyone may claim ownership.

The plurality of historical explanations, however, originates in our diverse and complex historical conditions from which we construct and read historical explanations. The historical condition is the incorporeal state that is defined by the past and our present consciousness of the past. It is incorporeal and fluid because the present is ceaselessly becoming the past, and also because the future is ceaselessly becoming the present. The plurality of historical explanations is not an endpoint of our historical inquiry. Instead,

plurality is the reality on which history has to practice its inquiry. Furthermore, plurality is the necessary outcome when we practice history to interpret what happened in the past.

The history of historical explanations is a necessary approach to comprehend the plurality of historical explanations as both a necessary condition and an inevitable product of history. In fact, the preceding discussions have repeatedly stressed the limitations in the existing approaches to history when constructing knowledge that encompasses the plurality of historical explanations. For example, Arthur C. Danto argues that history has two philosophical approaches to knowledge: the substantive philosophy of history and the analytical philosophy of history. These two philosophical approaches to history, however, are the same when they both inquire into the past to substantiate knowledge in history. The substantive philosophy of history seeks empirical traces showing what happened in the past. The analytical philosophy of history inquires of the past to identify the structural mechanism that can explain whole events that happened in the past. These two philosophies of history assume knowledge in history (whether empirical substances or structural mechanism) is primarily in the past. History thus studies the past that is free from the distortions and biases of the present. In consequence, when we stress that the scholarship of history is about the past, we are making a serious assumption: that is, they assume that a positivistic past truth is out there. The work of history, therefore, has been to claim, rescue, and accumulate them to build a substantive historical explanation.

Indeed, were history is to validate its knowledge on the grounds of past substances, history would have to focus on either identifying or representing past substances in the present. Present interpretations of the past, in this respect, are those

elements distorting past realities. However, as discussed in earlier chapters, history is not

a complete chronicle of the whole past, and thus history requires interpretations of past

meanings. The act of interpreting the past may constitute undesirable intervention of the

present into the past when we construct a complete chronicle of the whole past. However,

interpretation is a necessary practice of history in the present, to understand past

meanings in light of the impacts that the past has brought to the present. The point that

needs to be highlighted here is that present interpretations constitute an undesirable

intervention when we hold an uncritical dichotomy between the past and the present. It is

important to notice that the present can be perceived as the agent distorting the past when

we perceive that the past is completely disconnected from the present. The disconnection

of the past from the present is in fact a necessary presupposition when past substances are

assumed to be validating a particular historical explanation in the present. The past

becomes a material property with which the present constructs history's knowledge.

This study proposes the history of historical explanations to make conscious

negation of the disconnection of the past from the past. This study, however, does not

propose the deconstruction of the dichotomy between the past and the present; instead,

the history of historical explanations is an attempt to highlight the dialogue that is

ceaselessly ongoing across the dichotomized structure that divides history's subjects (the

past) and the subjects doing history (historians and the present contemporaries). In his

argument to seek a science of humanity, Hume proposes to substitute a psychology of the

mind with a psychology of the mind's affections.[19] The history of historical explanations

is a similar attempt to substitute a history of past meanings for a history of past events, in

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[19] Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 21

order to institutionalize knowledge of human actions and passions that are constructing our historical conditions.

The history of historical explanations seeks knowledge that is in the present. This knowledge, therefore, is incorporeal in regard to the future because the historical condition of the present will certainly be changing as we move toward the future. The plurality of historical explanations is thus the constituent element representing past meanings in the present. The primary purpose of proposing such history is (1) to bring a constructive challenge to the definitive dichotomy between the past and the present in the practice of history, and (2) to negate misappropriating of postmodern/post-structural critique of history that only celebrates locality of knowledge without inquiring into those aspects making those localized knowledge into the status of knowledge. The history of historical explanations aims to propose knowledge that is additional to the knowledge constructed through the substantive and the analytical philosophies of history. Knowledge pursued through the history of historical explanations, in other words, does not aim to challenge knowledge constructed through substantive and analytical philosophies of history. Instead, the history of historical explanations provides knowledge for history to better utilize preexisting approaches to the past.

It is not a constructive criticism to simply identify present impacts on our understanding of the past, because it is at best a negation of history and its disciplinary ability to construct knowledge. This study has introduced such criticism to history through relativism and the postmodern approach to history. Both relativism and postmodernism have contributed to history by challenging the positivism assumed when constructing knowledge in history. However, when responding to the plurality of

historical explanations, they have affirmed it as present reality by negating knowledge

that has the required constancy and universality. The negation of history's ability to

construct the knowledge, in fact, comes from the assumed dichotomy between the past

and the present, and thus we have seen the misappropriating of *both* relativism and

postmodern challenges to history.

Therefore, the history of historical explanations aims to remove the assumption

that the scholarship of history is to study the past. In fact, to study the history of historical

explanations is to build an active consciousness that the past has made substantial

impacts in constructing the historical conditions of the present. This consciousness also

brings us to awareness of the complex reality that: (1) the past had its own historical

conditions, that (2) past historical conditions brought diverse responses to the same event;

and that (3) the initial response to the past event would likely be different from the

responses made over time, because historical condition shifts in respect to what else

happened after the past event. In this respect, historical explanations are ceaselessly

diversifying so long as the subject being explained remains significant. Therefore, the

plurality of historical explanations is the necessary product of history, and thus history, to

substantiate past substances will not, by itself, provide an answer to the conflicts and

dilemmas that have originated in and from the plurality of historical explanations.

In order to constructively respond to the conflicts and dilemmas generated in/from

the plurality of historical explanations, we cannot just stress empathy to accept

coexistence of diverse historical explanations. Coexistence is possible when difference is

not threatening the authenticity, validity, and legitimacy of others. Emphasizing the moral

virtue of empathy perhaps works in the discourse of social justice. However, it is

problematic to relay moral virtue, for the application of the virtue is limited within what is already understood, accepted or recognized in the present. Therefore, that which is difficult to understand, accept or recognize cannot receive the attribution of moral virtue, as discussed earlier, regarding multiculturalism and its approach to history.

History requires a systematic approach to explicate its practice of excluding not only past truths but also the present diversity of historical conditions. History makes a selection through exclusion of the complexity of both the past and the present in favor of constructing a comprehensible understanding of past meanings in the present. It is valid to define past historical explanations of what happened in the past as past meanings constructed through exclusions, in the past. Past meanings here are the products that are as substantive as past substances constituting historical explanations. In short, I argue that to do history of historical explanations is to access the desires and the motivations that have kept particular past events historically significant.

In this respect, the history of historical explanations exposes two constituent elements of historical explanation. First, the history of historical explanations enables us to make inquiry about *the motives* that made and have been making a particular past event into the significant subject of history. This identifies the reasons why certain past events became the subject of history, and if the reasons for studying the particular past events have been constant and/or universal. Then, the history of historical explanations also exposes the presuppositions, political intentions, present historical conditions and other factors outside of history constituting the existing historical explanations. These elements are both implicit and often hidden when history constructs a historical explanation as a product of historical inquiries into the past. These elements are also what

the existing historiographies have challenged as biases and non-historical elements that distort historical explanations. However, if we aim to construct fluid knowledge that encompasses the plurality of historical explanations, it is necessary to position each historical explanation both as a product of history and as a constituent element for a new historical explanation. Then the plurality of historical explanations is made into the constituent elements for generating a historical explanation that is comprehensible for the historical condition of the present. The new historical explanation then becomes a constituent element for other historical explanations that are responding to the historical conditions constructing the future. This fluid knowledge is thus incorporeal and ceaselessly transforming, since it is knowledge about the past that is ceaselessly becoming a part of constituent elements for present historical conditions.

This study thus proposes the history of historical explanations to seek knowledge that is ceaselessly in the becoming, and proposes that this knowledge will enable history to study not only the past but also the present construction of past meanings as the subject of history. It is the intention of this study to open/reinstate comprehensive dialogue across conflicting historical explanations that have come from conflicting historical conditions of the past and the present. The historical explanation of a terrorist, for example, would be incommunicable with the historical explanations of the nation-states that have been threatened by terrorism. The historical explanations of wartime events have also invited many historical controversies over incommunicable differences in the meanings assigned to the past. These incommunicable differences can no longer be kept within the frameworks of each nation-state, ideology, culture, ethnicity and other diverse human categories.

This study has attempted to explicate the process through which Japan's contemporary historical explanation of Hiroshima's atomic bombing has been constructed, and what has been selected/excluded in favor of constructing particular meanings from the past for the present to understand. In consequence, the history of historical explanations enables us to comprehend that what seems the most rational and authentic historical explanation in the present is, in fact, a slice of what is otherwise an incorporeal and fluid entity. This consciousness of the fluidity of historical explanation, I argue, could introduce a platform for a constructive dialogue between people who have been unable to communicate with each other. Through seeking such possibility of dialogue, this study foresees the possibility for materializing the peaceful coexistence of people with different historical conditions by means other than stressing on the empathy and other moral virtues.

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