 

PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.
MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested.

 

DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5/08 KIProj/Acc&Pres/ClRCIDateDue indd

 

CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION: THE POLITICS OF RURAL LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

By

Somadoda Fikeni

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Political Science

2008

ABSTRACT
CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION:

THE POLITICS OF RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN POST-APARTHEID

SOUTH AFRICA

By

Somadoda Fikeni
The point of departure in this dissertation is that traditional leadership remains an
important political force within the modern African states. Its role and form of
accommodation within the modern state has come into sharp focus in the context of
democratizing states. Post-apartheid South Africa, just like many post-colonial
Aﬁican countries, faces a challenge of accommodating traditional authority
particuhrly in its local government system The focus of this study is on the politics
of South African rural local government with particular attention on the relationship
between the traditional leaders, elected local councilors and local civic leaders.
The ﬁrst chapters of the study provide a context by looking at the literature on this
subject as well historical evolution of South African rural local government and

reactions of traditional leaders to liberation politics into the current conﬁguration of

rural loeal govermnent in post-apartheid democratic South Africa.

This comparative ease study looks at factors and variables that are associated with
conﬂict and cooperation between traditional leaders, elected local councilors and civic
leaders. The questions that this study seeks to answer are the following: What is the
composition, function and structure of rural loeal government in the post-apartheid

South Afriea? What sorts of relations have actually evolved between the traditional

leaders and the emergent political elite of elected councilors? What are the factors
that are associated with conﬂictual relations and cooperative or accommodative

relations between the traditional leaders and the elected councilors and civic leaders?

Nine South Aﬁ'ican rural communities in three provinces, namely KwaZulu-Natal,
Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga, are surveyed. A range of demographic and attitudinal
variables as well as leadership styles were assessed to examine if they had any
association with one form of relationship or another. The ﬁndings in this study and
analysis indicated that age, education, party afﬁliation, income, and employment
status are demographic variables that have inﬂuence on or are associated with rural
elite relations. More speciﬁcally, this study indicates that cooperation is associated
with communities where traditional elites and elected councilors or civic leaders share
most the aforementioned attributes and demographic features whereas conﬂict is
associated with instances where they have less in common. Leadership style also
proved to be an important factor in rural elite relations though more needs to be done
to understand the speciﬁc manner this variable impacts on the relationship. Overall,
this study reveals challenges of accommodating two distinct political systems within a
modern democratic arrangement, but also demonstrates that this arrangement does

not always end up in conﬂict.

Copyright by
SOMADODA FIKENI
2002

DEDICATION
I dedicate this work to my grandparents, the late Mkhwetsho Zephania Fikeni and the late
Madunjane “Jolakhe” Fikeni, as well as my parents, my late father, Mthuthuzeli Mathews

Fikeni, and my mother Nothembile Mandi “Mazibula” Fikeni.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Doctoral studies and the writing of a doctoral dissertation is a long process that involves
many people and institutions. Justice can not be done in exhaustively identifying and
thanking each and every one of the-people who made this work possible through their
direct and indirect support. There are, however, people and institutions that deserve
special mention. Firstly, I would like to express my deep sense of gratitude to my
supervisor, Professor Michael Bratton, who, ﬁ'om the very beginning of my doctoral
studies at Michigan State University, provided strict and insightful guidance which he
maintained to the very end of my programme. He always insisted on the highest standard
and quality of work, something students like me do not always appreciate at the time, and
this proved to be crucial in the successful completion of my programme and in building
my conﬁdence. I will always respect Professor Bratton’s mentoring role which has

contributed in my personal growth as an aspiring scholar.

A special word of appreciation for my parents. My late grandmother and father, my
mother, have always been the wind that made me sail through rough seas because of their
unconditional support, love and inspiration. My brothers and sisters were consistently
there to give words of encouragement and support. The whole community of relatives,
friends and colleagues back in South Africa as well as the community at Michigan State
University and in North America gave me love and support without which it is difficult to
imagine how I would have navigated the most diﬂicult and tragic moments of my life
during the course of this study. I will forever remember individuals who stretched their

hands and opened their hearts during the moments ofneed.

vi

I would like to thank my sponsors, the Africa-America Institute and the USAID, for the
ﬁnancial support which took me through most of my study. I can not even begin to
mention scores of people who facilitated my ﬁeld study in South Africa. The families that
allowed me to stay with them in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal as well as individuals
who agreed to be interviewed for this study deserve a special word of gratitude for their
kindness and selﬂessness. Words can never be sufﬁcient to express my deep sense of
gratitude to all the role payers and government ofﬁcials who shared some of their
documents and time to assist in my data gathering. A special word of thanks goes to
Siyanda Mnukwa who went out of his way to support me in his role as a research
assistant. The University of Transkei was generous enough to grant me a study leave
through its staff development programme and without this opportunity I would not have
completed my studies. This has been a long journey but it is heartening to know thatI
was never alone during the high and the low moments. This has been a transﬁguring
experience that, in a very profound manner, invokes the French proverb, “Gratitude is the

memory of the heart.”

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................... xii
LIST OF FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS ..................................................... xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................... xv
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ............................ 1 8
2.1 .Why bother? The signiﬁcance of rural local politics in understanding Aﬁica ................. 20
2.2. Salient themes and trends in African rural politics literature. . ...................................... 27
2.3. A review ofliterature on the rural politics in South Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........33
2.4. Key questions and hypotheses .................................................................. 38
2.5. A brief outline of selected theoretical perspectives .......................................... 39
2.5.1. Modernization perspective: Traditional versus modern elite ............................. 39

2.5.2. Structural approach: Social stratiﬁcation and class struggle..................... . . . . . . . ........51
2.5.3. Ethnic identity, politicization ofethnicity and ethnic conﬂicts. . . . . ..... . ............54

2.5.4. Party identity, political mobilization and local elite conﬂicts ............................. 59
2.5.5. Political agency and the elite factional rivalry ................................................ 61
2.6. A synthesis and integrated approach ............................................................ 64
CHAPTER THREE

METHOD AND DESIGN .............................................................................. 67
3.1. Key concepts... 68
3.1.1. Deﬁning the elite and identlfymg the rural elite 1n south Aﬁ'ica .......................... 69
3.1 ..2 Conﬂictual and accommodative elite relations” .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .....73
3.2. Sources and the nature of data ................................................................... 74
3.3. Population and sample ............................................................................... 76
3.4. Research instruments .............................................................................. 80
3.5. Data presentation, analysis and interpretation ................................................. 83
CHAPTER FOUR

SOUTH AFRICAN RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH TIME:
AHISTORICALOVERVIEW” 8.6
4.1. Indigenous political institutions and political processes in the pre-colomal era” ......88
4. 2. The colonial era and the new administrative laws for the African communities. ......... 96
4.3. The apartheid era ................................................................................... 101

4.4. African reactions to the colonial and apartheid laws in the rural areas. . . . . . . 104

viii

4.5. The politics ofcooption and exclusion within Bantustans. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

107

CHAPTER FIVE
CONTEMPORARY INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL FORCES IN RURAL
SOUTH AFRICA ............................................................................... 116
5.1. The last frontier: The politics of protest and liberation in the rural areas ........... 119
5.2. Chiefs and comrades: Traditional leaders’ reaction to protests and transition ......... 131
5.3. An open-ended solution: Political dynamics of constitutional engineering

and the emerging rural local government institutions ............................................... 144
5.3.1. The key players and their policy options ..................................................... 145
5.3.1 .1.The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa). . .. . . . . ...........145
5.3.1 .2. Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) ................................................................ 147
5.3.1.3. African National Congress (AN C) ......................................................... 147
5.3.1.4. South African National Civic Organization (SAN CO) .................................. 149
5.3.1.5. Otherinterestedparties ................................................................... 150
5.3.2. Constitutional and policy making process and its political dynamics ................ 150
5.3.3. Constitution, laws and emerging institutions .......................................... 152
5.4. Concluding remarks ......................................................................... 163
CHAPTER SD(
A PROFILE OF SELECTED COMMUNITIES ............................................. 165
6.1 .The Eastern Cape Province ................................................................... 166
6.1 .1 . Rode Administrative Area .................................................................. 167
6.1 .2.Mnceba Administrative Area ............................................................... 172
6.1.3. Nzongisa Administrative Area ......................................................... 176
6. 2. MpumalangaProvince... 178
6.2.1. Sokhulumi Administrative Area ........................................................ 181
6.2.2. Tweefontein Administrative Area ........................................................ 184
6.2.3. Vezolcuhle Administrative Area .......................................................... 186
6.3. KwaZulu-Natal Province ......................................................................... 188
6.3.1. Adams Mission Administrative Area ....................................................... 190
6.3.2. Mfume Administrative Area ............................................................. 194
6.3.3. Embo Administrative Area ................................................................... 196
6.4. Summary ...................................................................................... 198
CHAPTER SEVEN
SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL. . ......... 205
7.1. Age distribution in conﬂict and non conﬂict relations. . .. . . . . . ........ . .. . . .. . .......210
7.2. Education and elite relations ................................................................ 213
7.3. Ethnicity afﬁliation and elite relations in conﬂict and non-conﬂict communities. . .....217
7.4. Rural elite relations and party afﬁliation and identity .................................... 220
7.5. Social stratiﬁcation, class conﬂict and rural elite relations ............................. 225

7.6. Distribution of property in conﬂict and in conﬂict communities. . .. . . . . ...... .

ix

.226

7. 7. Employment status in conﬂict and in non-conﬂict communities. . . . . . . . . . . .

 

...228

7. 8. Monthlyaverage income and eliterelations“ . 230
7. 9. Policy preference proﬁle and support for traditional institutions .....234
7.10. Support for traditional values and customs in conﬂict and in
non-conﬂict relations. - ............................. 235

7.11 Support for traditional land tenure system ................................................. 237
7. 12. Elite attitudes toward payment of serVices in rural areas. . .. . . . . . ......240
7.13. Rural elite attitudes toward a New Municipal Demarcatiori Act (Law). . . . . ......243
7. 14. Other variables .......................................................................... 246
7.15. Summary ................................................................................ 247
CHAPTER EIGHT
SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY
LEVEL ...................................................................................................................... 249
8.1. Age distribution in provinces and within communities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 252
8.2. Education trends in the selected communities and provinces ..................... 256
8.3. Political afﬁliation and identity ........................................................ 261
8.4. Ethnicity and the politics of exclusion/inclusion in the provinces and

communities... .......268
8.5. Distribution of resources in the provinces and communities . ....271
8. 6. Policy preference proﬁles in the provinces and communities ..................... 272
8.7. Geopolitical factors and elite relations ............................................... 274
8.8. Summary ................................................................................. 276
CHAPTER NINE
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ................................ 278
9.1. Background and context .......................................................................... 280
9.2. Ethnicity and elite relations ...................................................................... 281
9.3. Distribution of resources and elite relations ......................................... 284
9.4. Age and generational cleavages ....................................................... 286
9.5. Education and elite relations .......................................................... 286
9.6. Party afﬁliation and identity ....................................................................... 287
9.7. Leadership style and dominant relations .............................................. 289
9.8. Policy preferences and attitudes toward local institutions ......................... 290
9.9. Conclusions on dominant trends. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
APPENDICES .......................................................................................................... 294
Appendix 1 ............................................................................................... 295
Appendix 2 .............................................................................................. 296
Appendix 3 ............................................................................................. 297
Appendix 4 ............................................................................................... 298
Appendix 5 .............................................................................................. 299
Appendix 6 .............................................................................................. 300

X

Appendix 7 .............................................................................................. 301

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................... 305
Books and Articles .................................................................................... 305
Periodicals: Newspapers and Magazines .......................................................... 321
Unpublished papers and studies ....................................................................... 328

Printedprimarysources33l

xi

 

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1. Distribution of council seats and municipalities in South African local

Government .......................................................................................................... 79
Table 6.1. Status ofa chiefand proximity to urban areas (city or town). . . . . .. . ......... . .......198
Table 6.2. Keyprotagonists in local elite relationship. . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . ......200
Table 6.3. Conﬂict and accommodation relationship typology ................................... 201
Table 6.4. Classiﬁcation of cases according to the dominant form of elite relations. . ........202
Table 6.5. Issues over which there are disputes ..................................................... 203
Table 7.1. Selected sectors ofrural elite andtype ofrelations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......207
Table 8.1. Range ofethnic composition ofthe selected communities. . . . . .. . . . . ...... . .. . ......269

xii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure7.l. Agedistributioninconﬂictcommunities................................................
Figure 7.2. Agedistributioninnon-conﬂictcommunities.......................
Figure 7.3. Levelsofeducationinconﬂictcommunities..................................
Figure 7.4 Levelsofeducationinnon-conﬂictcommunities....................................
Figure 7.5. EthnicAfﬁliationofeliteinconﬂictcommimities..................................
Figure 7.6. Ethnic identity ofelite in non-conﬂict communities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 7.7. Politicalpartyafﬁliationinconﬂictcommunities...................................
Figure 7.8. Political party afﬁliation innon-conﬂict communities. ..
Figure 7.9. Opposition to chiefs’ involvement in party politics ..................
Figure 7.10. Propertydistributioninconﬂictcommunities.......................................

Figure 7.1 1. Property distribution in non-conﬂict communities .................

.211

.211

.214

.215

.219

.220

.222

.223

225

.228

228

Figure 7.12. Employment status in conﬂict communities. . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . 230
Figure 7.13. Employment status in non-conﬂict communities. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230
Figure 7.14. Average monthly income distribution in conﬂict communities. . .. . . . . ............233
Figure 7.15. Average monthly income distribution in non-conﬂict Communities. . . .233
Figure 7.16. Support for traditional values and customs in conﬂict communities. . ............ 236

Figure 7.17. Support for traditional values and customs in non-conﬂict Communities ....... 237

xiii

Figure 7.18. Opinion on traditional land tenure in conﬂict communities. . ................. . . . . .239
Figure 7.19.0pinion on traditional land tenure in non-conﬂict Communities. . ..... . ..........239
Figure 7.20. Opposition to payment ofservices in rural areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242

Figure 7.21. Level of opposition to the New Municipal Demarcation Law. . . . . . ..243

Figure 8.1. Age distribution in KwaZulu-Natal ................................................. 253
Figure 8.2. Age distribution in Eastern Cape ...................................................... 254
Figure 8.3. Age distribution in Mpumalanga ..................................................... 255
Figure 8.4. Education in KwaZulu—Natal ............................................................ 258
Figure 8.5. Education in Eastern Cape .............................................................. 259
Figure 8.6. Education in Mpumalanga .............................................................. 260
Figure 8.7. Political Afﬁliation in KwaZulu-Natal ................................................ 262

Figure 8.8. PoliticalAfﬁliationinEastemCape....................................................264

Figure 8.9. Political Afﬁliation in Mpumalanga ................................................... 267

xiv

DESCRIPTION OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Amaphakathi - Members of the tribal or traditional council which is headed by the local
chief. This sometimes includes special advisors, usually one or some of the chief’s relatives
or a person appointed in that special capacity.

ANC - African National Congress

Bantustan - These were reserves designated as homelands for Africans under the apartheid
system. Some of these areas were given nominal independence by the apartheid governments.

CODESA - Convention for Democratic South Africa. This was established in July 1991 as a
negotiations forum in which all the major stakeholders or political formations were to
determine the future of South Africa.

Contralesa - Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa.

IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party

Imbizo/pitso - Public gathering of the community or a nation that is usually convened by a
chief or a king.

Irnbongi - A court poet who performs during the public events, and this is usually before and
aﬁer the traditional leader speaks.

Induna - Member of the traditional authority who head a sub-division, geographical area or
an age group or for a special role such as keeping law and order.

Inkosi/Ikosi - A chief in Xhosa, Zulu and Swazi and ikosi is a Ndebele term for the same
word. Kgosi in Sotho/Tswana

Mbokotho - A vigilante group that was established to crush opposition to the independence
of KwaNdebele homeland.

XV

NP - National Party

NNP - New National Party

PAC - Pan Aﬁican Congress

SANCO - South Aﬁ'ican National Civic Organization
UDF - United Democratic Front

UDM - United Democratic Movement

TLC - Transitional Local Council

TRC - Transitional Representative Council

xvi

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Elites of different backgrounds, favoring diverging policy positions, and often
pursuing a multiplicity of interests, have contended with each other to promote their
separate concerns and to protest against measures perceived as detrimental to their
well-being)

No process of socio-political transformation in Africa, be it democratization,
political liberalization or simply regime change, can be regarded as complete if no
consideration has been given to the question of traditional leadership. 2
Post-apartheid South Africa faces a challenge of building one nation by, among other
things, integrating modern and traditional institutions. This delicate process continues to
generate tension between proponents of continuity, in a form of traditional institutions,
and modernity, in a form of modern state institutions and civic organizations. The
challenge of integration is more pronounced in the current govemment’s attempt to
reform local government in the rural areas. This has put spotlight on the role of traditional
leaders in the new South African political dispensation, a policy and political issue that
has proven to be one of the most controversial topics in the transition process. In a move

to appease traditional leaders and those calling for elected local representatives, the South

African multi-party negotiation forum decided to recognize traditional authorities and

 

l Chazan, N. et al, Politics and Socim in Contemporary Africa. 1999. P.198

2 Osaghae, E. Traditional leadership in Southem Africa. 1997, p.5

elected local councils as primary institutions of rural local government. Even more
important is the fact that this recognition of dual institutions was vaguely framed in the
new South Aﬁican Constitution of 1996 and subsequent legislations and as a direct
consequence there is no clear or speciﬁc delineation of roles for traditional authorities

and elected rural local councils.

This ambiguity is a direct result of the politics of a negotiated transition that is marked by
compromise, trade-offs and deal making. This, I call politics of open-ended solutions in
which ambiguities and ad hoc arrangements as well as continuing negotiations, often
without resolution, are essential features that occur not by default but by design of the
key players. The key feature of the politics of open-ended solutions is to manage but not

_ necessarily resolve policy problems with the hope of consolidating ones position in the
event of the window of opportunity provided by a political adversary who may either run
out of steam or a controversial public policy issue that fades away from being a topical
agenda. Within its broad alliance, the AN C has a variety of ideological and class
formations that range from African nationalists to emerging black business class, to
communists, civic movement, to trade unionists and traditional leaders. Within the AN C-
led alliances, as to be expected in this range of interests and political ambitions, there are
strong supporters of the institution of traditional leadership and its radical opponents who
often call for its abolition. These coexisting forces have, over the years, sharpened and
honed ANC leadership’s skills of managing contradictions. This observation is reinforced
be AN C chairperson, Mosiuoa Lekota’s remarks as he addressed the South African
Communist Party(SACP) congress where he asserted that, “The art of managing

2

‘ " . ‘ " u. ‘ .
. 'r ' . ‘. ‘ - 4 - ~ .’ . ..
. '..'_ ‘_ ‘ .-I-o" ...," , , , w‘. ‘__ _ .. . . ‘ O, . v . .._ . -
f‘Wﬂat unite-#50,; 2%: 'm u. - " ' J." ‘-... . .- . ,~; - .-‘ f
' v , ' ‘I > ' - " ‘< . ‘ ' ~
...‘I '"ﬁ'ﬂ‘ﬁ J'."" p o . - .Vt‘. .' — . ' 1 O I".. m. . y .
l

«at. .

. .‘r'a a
o' ”3’. .< .

 

      
    

contradictions is what has carried this alliance to where it is today.”3

In his own analysis, Hein Marais concurs with these observations as he portrays AN C’s
balancing act and ideological ﬂexibility;
“It commandingly straddles both the centre and the left of the political spectrum,
while also serving as a convenient abode for many conservative Africans... the
ideological and strategic ﬂexibility it derived from these currents which co-
existed (especially in exile) under the mantle of stem discipline, equipping it with
built-in ambiguities that later cushion sharp policy turns. . . The key, of course, was

to fashion an ideology of struggle and ideals supple enough to accommodate and
entertain these contradictory impulses. At this, the AN C proved remarkably

adept,”
The politics of open-ended solutions can, to some extent, be attributed to this history and
current reality of competing political forces as well as ideological currents within the

ANC fold.

Scholars, just like public policymakers, in their attempts to grapple with this complex
reality responded in a variety of manners. This will become evident is the second chapter
of this study where a review and analysis of various studies on this subject is presented.
A majority of scholars became more preoccupied with the legal and constitutional
framework as they tried to identify a model that would best accommodate traditional
leaders within a new democratic dispensation. One group of studies focuses on a range of

African post-independence policies on traditional leadership particularly within the

 

3 “No problems with SACP, Says Mbeki” Daily Dispatch Online July 26, 2002
4 Marais, H. “Topping up the tank: The Reproduction of ANC powa' since 1994.” May 1999; pp.l-2
(Unpublished paper)

context of local govemment.5 Most of these studies were inspired by and also explicitly
trying to inﬂuence the South African debate on the future role of traditional leaders by
providing a range of African policy models and experiences that came with transitions to

the new local government systems across the African countries.

There are studies that share this preoccupation with legal and constitutional issues but
the only difference is that they exclusively focused on South Africa’s emerging legal and
constitutional framework. The emphasis of this work is also on the role of traditional
leaders within the new South African democracy. These studies include Houston's,
Ntsebeza 7 and Cloetes. Some ofthe studies look at how traditional leaders reacted and
adapted to these political and legal changes, and these include Adriaan9, Malokalo, and

Kessel and Oomen".

These studies have largely neglected the nature and implications of cohabitation or

coexistence of traditional authorities and elected local councils in the rural areas. In a

 

5Examples of this emphasis is found in the following: Keulder, C Traditional leaders and local
governmait in Africa: Lessons for South Africa 1998; d’Engelbronner-Koﬁ”, F., et al (eds) Traditional

authorig and democracy in Southern Africa 1998.; Osaghae, E. Traditional leadership in Southern
Aﬁ'ica 1997.

6 Houston, 6., et al, (eds) ispects of the debate on the draft of the w South African Constitution 1996.
7 Ntsebeza, L. “Land tenure reform, traditional authorities and rural local government in post-apartheid
South Africa” 1999

8 Cloete, F. Local government transformation in South Africa. 1995

9 Adriaan, E. et al, African chieflaincy in a new socio-political landscape 1999

10 Maloka, T. “Populism and politics of chieﬁaincy and nation-building in the new South Africa.” In
Journal of Contemporg African Studies 1996

ll Kessel, B., et al, “One chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid South
Africa.” African Affairs No.96 , 1997.

compelling argument, Sklar12 exposes and critiques this deﬁcit particularly among
political scientists who study Africa. Also ignored is the role of civic leaders in rural
communities and their interaction with both the traditional leaders and elected councilors.
If the constitutional reality is that both traditional authorities and elected councils have to
coexist in rural areas the focus, therefore, should shift and put spotlight on the nature of
relationship between these institutions. Equally important is the fact that civic leaders are
a political reality and a political force to reckon with in most of these communities. It is
therefore logical to factor in or add to this traditional leader-elected councilors’ equation
the civic leaders who form part of the political elite in these rural communities. In its
focus on the relations among the various sectors of the rural elite, this study is an attempt
to address the knowledge gap left by most studies as exempliﬁed by the ones listed

above.

The establishment of elected local councilors alongside traditional authorities and already
existing civic organizations created different centers of power in many rural

communities. It is, therefore, important to understand dominant trends of rural local elite
relations as they occur among the various sectors of the local elite, namely, traditional
leaders, elected councilors and civic leaders. Any attempt to understand the consolidation
of democracy, political participation of citizens, decentralization of power as well as local
development in the rural areas has to understand the dominant trends of elite relations

given their inﬂuence in their communities. Each dominant sector of the rural elite, as it

 

12 Sklar, R. “The Aﬁ'ican Frontier for Political Science” in Bates, R., et al, (eds) Africa and the
Disciplines: Contributions of ragga] in Africa to the social; science and humanities 1993.

5

will be demonstrated in this study, has the power to frustrate or facilitate local

development, administration or broad participation by citizens.

The primary focus of this study is on the political dynamics of rural local government in
the post-apartheid South Africa. In more speciﬁc terms, this study explores and analyzes
relations among the local elites that include traditional leaders, elected local councilors

and civic leaders.

The ultimate objective is to understand, in a comparative manner, the nature of conﬂict

between traditional leaders and elected councilors and or civic leaders in some

communities and their cooperation or accommodation in others. This study is organized

. around the following questions:

a) What is the composition, ﬁmction and structure of rural local government in the
post-apartheid South Africa?

b) What sorts of relations have actually evolved between the traditional leaders and
the emergent elite of elected councilors and civic leaders?

c) What are the factors that are associated with conﬂictual relations and cOOperative

relations between the different sectors of the rural elite?

Hypotheses are formulated in light of broad theoretical perspectives. In view of the
literature reviewed in chapter two and the questions posed above, it is hypothesized that:
a) A community, which is primarily dominated by elites, some of which have social

attributes that are traditional and others that have modern attributes, is often

6

associated with conﬂict. This is often the case where the traditionalists dominate
one institution, such as the tribal council, while the modernized elite dominate or
are grouped in the other alternative or parallel institutions such as the elected local
government structures or local civic organizations. Conversely, a diffused
membership in these institutions or homogeneity across groups is associated with
accommodation or cooperation between different sectors of the elite. This
diffusion of elite composition in various institutions may also take the form of
plurality, along the lines of Robert Dahl model four, in which membership and
competition to inﬂuence decision making is based on individuals organized
around their interest than the divide between the traditional and the modern elite.
This hypothesis is based on the modernization theory’s notion of traditional
versus modern elite due to their different or conﬂicting values and interests. The
study is mindful of the fact that modernization or being modern has too many
indicators that cannot be exhaustively dealt with within the conﬁnes of this study.
Consequently, the emphasis in this study is on education, often used as one of the
key indicators of modernity, and attitude toward traditional institutions such as
traditional land tenure system, and traditional values and customs. In view of this,
it is asked whether being well educated or not/ less educated makes a difference in
the relations of rural elite. In this case one would expect conﬂict if one sector of
local elite, for example traditional leadership, is less educated and the elected or
civic leadership in the same community is well educated. The differences in their
views regarding traditional institutions and values would be expected to cause
tension if there is a traditional/modem elite divide.

7

b)

d)

Social stratiﬁcation that puts one group of the local elite in one class that has
resource advantage while locating the other disadvantaged class is often
associated with conﬂict which will essentially be over the access to and control of
resources. In essence this is a classic case of class conﬂict, which is propagated by
structuralist theorists that are particularly Marxist-inclined scholars. It should be
stated from the onset that the author is aware of the complexity of African social
structures and the debates surrounding the deﬁnition or even the existence of
social classes, at least in a classical sense as they have come to be known in
industrialized societies, in Aﬁica I return to this point in greater detail in the
following chapter. The use of the term here is to be taken in its broadest possible
meaning of people with more resources and those with less or nothing. More
speciﬁcally, ownership of resources (livestock, farming land, residential plot,
business), employment status and income distribution are used in this study to

assess general distribution of resources across the sectors of rural elite.

Ethnic cleavages which are organized around the local institutions and
organizations are associated with conﬂict whereas ethnic homogeneity of the local

elite is associated with accommodation.

Party political affiliations of local elites play an important role in shaping their
relationship. Where the elite, drawn from different local institutions and
organizations, is prominently and actively involved in different political parties it

8

is more likely that there will be conﬂict.

e) The style and quality of leadership, particularly the one of the traditional leaders
who are already entrenched in the rural communities, has an important role in the
relationships among the local elite. For example, a leader who is effective in
mobilizing and 00-0ng key ﬁgures from different sections of the community is
more likely to avoid alienating other local leaders thus avoiding creating, often
unnecessary, political enemies. For example, a confrontational and exclusionist
leadership will alienate some sectors of the local elite and their attempt to
establish alternative centers of power will often develop into a conﬂict Similarly,
a leader who skillfully and timely uses a range of repertoire, traditional and
modem, is likely to appeal to a wide range of the population and, therefore,

consolidate his support and legitimacy.

At this juncture it should be pointed out that the inherent assumption in this work is that
institutional boundaries have a potential of reinforcing social, class, ethnic and political
cleavages or diﬁ‘erences. It is this assumption that inﬂuenced my choice of the members
of the three prominent local institutions, namely, traditional authority, elected local
councils and civic organizations. These institutional boundaries may be used as a
mobilizing platform, as tools to access and control resources as well as a context within

which common identities, therefore shared interests, are forged.

This is primarily a comparative case-oriented empirical study of the elite relations in nine

9

communities, namely, Adams Mission, Embo, Mfume, Mnceba, Nzongisa, Rode,
Tweefontein, Sokhulumi and Vezokuhle. These communities are drawn from the
following South African provinces; KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern and Mpumalanga.
Comparisons and analysis, in order to address the hypotheses outlined above, primarily
takes place at two levels:
a) Characteristics of respondents in conﬂict communities are compared with those of
respondents in non-conﬂict communities.
b) Characteristics of rural elite are compared across the elite sectors in order to
assess if there are trends or patterns suggesting variation. The ﬁled study part of

this research was conducted between April 5 and September 30 of the year 2000.

The following is a brief outline of chapters that form the rest of this dissertation. Chapter
two reviews literature in a manner that outlines dominant tends and themes while at the
same time pointing out gaps in the existing body of knowledge on rural politics in Africa.
Particular emphasis is on theories or perspectives that directly or indirectly relate to the
key questions and hypotheses in this study. Throughout this chapter differences between
this study and the existing literature are highlighted in a manner that demonstrate the way

this work builds upon this knowledge while trying to overcome some of its limitations.

In chapter three, research design and data collection are discussed. More speciﬁcally, this
chapter describes the population and the sample that was studied. The procedures that
were used in data collection as well as the tools for data analysis are also presented in this

section.

10

Chapter four presents a historical overview which primarily focuses on the evolution,
manipulation and mutation of indigenous political institutions or chieftaincy ﬁ'om the
pre-colonial period through colonial and apartheid era The rationale for focusing on
chieftaincy or traditional authority in this chapter is based on the understanding that it has

been, until recently, the primary institution of rural local government for the African

people.

Chapter ﬁve discusses the contemporary phase of rural politics in South Aﬁica, and this
is done by identifying and analyzing the emerging institutions and political forces in the
rural landscape. The following questions guide the ﬂow of discussion in this chapter;
what are the dominant political forces which shaped the agenda and therefore public
policy on rural local government? Which sectors of the elite emerged as key players and
stakeholders in rural local politics? How did traditional leaders react to and position
themselves within the new dispensation of liberation and democratic politics? What is the
composition, function and structure of rural local government in the post-apartheid South
Aﬁica? What sort of relations have actually evolved among the local elites in the context
of the new political dispensation? In this chapter, it is shown that the political changes in
the rural areas predate the formal establishment of the local councils after the 1995 and
1996 local government elections. It is argued that signiﬁcant political developments that
reconﬁgured elite politics in the rural areas can be traced back to the late 19805 at the

height of political mobilization by forces opposed to the apartheid regime.

In chapter six a proﬁle of selected communities or cases is presented in a form of a

ll

narrative that is mame constructed ﬁ'om the qualitative portion of the interviews and
focus group discussions with rural local elite. These narratives complement descriptive
summary statistics in many ways. For example, an account of each case provides some
information on the history and evolution of relationship among the key political players.
It gives voice to the participants while it also provides context to the relational dynamics
of each community. By giving voice to the key participants, this chapter also reveals, to a
great extent, rural elite’s perceptions and understanding of conﬂict and cooperation.

These dimensions cannot be easily represented in descriptive statistics.

The central focus of chapter seven is the presentation and analysis of survey and study
results. Trends that indicate relations between types of rural elite relations, hat is
conﬂictual and accommodative, and selected variables are identiﬁed and analyzed. These
results are primarily in quantitative form. Charts that show frequencies and distribution of
characteristics of the sectors of elites as well as inferential statistics are used to present
and analyze results. The presentation of these results in this case is arranged according to
the main hypotheses and theoretical perspectives. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁndings will
indicate age, ethnicity, education, party afﬁliation and identity, distribution of resources,
attitudes toward traditional values and traditional land tenure system are in any way
related to these forms of rural elite relations. Opinions on penalties imposed by traditional
courts, existence and non-existence of geopolitical factors in local conﬂicts, perception of
corruption as well as views on respondent’s inﬂuence on decision making processes are
also part of the data that analyze attitudes of rural elite. Policy preference proﬁle of
individuals in conﬂict communities will be compared to that of their counterparts in non-

12

conﬂict (accommodative/cooperative) communities. Attitudes towards payment of
services in rural areas, traditional land tenure and New Municipal Demarcation Law are

the component parts of assessment of attitudes towards policies affecting rural areas.

In order to achieve this task chapter seven utilizes demographic characteristics and
opinions/attitudes of 143 individual respondents who participated in the survey.
Individuals from conﬂict communities are compared with those of non-conﬂict
communities using the above-mentioned variables. It should be recalled that relations
between traditional authorities and elected councilors and or civic leaders is at the core of
this study. Analysis of individual attributes takes this into account by aggregating their

responses or characteristics and determining if there is a trend.

Key to chapter eight is the presentation and analysis of survey results at a provincial
level. In this case trends associated with the types of elite relations within and between
provinces, in individual communities as well as the attributes of key protagonists in the
elite sectors constitute the scope of this chapter. A distinction between chapter seven and
chapter eight is that the latter focuses on and compares trends within and between
provinces whereas the former compares aggregated individual attributes of those in

conﬂict relations with those in non-conﬂict relations.

The ninth and ﬁnal chapter of this study discusses and interprets the important trends that
emerge ﬁ'om analysis of results. It is in this section that conclusions are drawn as a direct
answer to the questions asked and hypotheses formulated in the opening chapters of this

13

study. The implications of the conclusions drawn from this study in the light of broader
literature on Africa form a closing part of this chapter. Also discussed in this chapter are
the policy implications of this study and these ﬁndings for South Africa and the African
countries that are grappling with the challenge of coexisting traditional and modem
political institutions especially in the context of emerging liberal multiparty democracies.
In all, chapters four and ﬁve provide a broad historical and contemporary context or rural
local politics, and in so doing they also take us through the evolution of local government
structures and competing political forces in South Africa. Chapters six, seven and eight
concentrate on presenting different aspects of the collected data. Chapter six focuses on
the case histories that are constructed ﬁom qualitative portion of the study, and chapters
seven and eight extensively utilize quantitative data on demographic and attitudinal
characteristics of the participants. The use of different methods in presenting and
analyzing data is meant to cover as many possible dimensions of the phenomenon of rural

elite relations as possible.

As a preview of the ﬁndings of this study, it should be stated that age, party aﬁiliation,
education, income, employment, views on respondent’s inﬂuence on decisions taken by
elected councils, opinion on municipal demarcation, and attitudes toward payment of
service fees show strong trend that suggests relationship with type of elite relations. In
addition, there are indications, tentative though they may be, that some aspects of
leadership style do make a difference in the relationship between different sectors of the
rural elite. Geopolitical factors as well as distribution of resources tended to be drawn
along the geographic lines. Another important ﬁnding that is closely associated with

14

KwaZulu-Natal province is the overriding inﬂuence of party political aﬂiliation on elite
relations. Elite conﬂict in this case is primarily between the members of the two

dominant parties in the province, namely, the AN C and the IFP.

On the other hand, ethnicity, distribution of resources and policy preferences do not
indicate a trend that is associated with conﬂict and or non-conﬂict relations. Instead,
preferences for and opposition against traditional land tenure, and opinion on traditional
values and customs reﬂect sectoral interests (traditional leaders, elected councilors and
civic leaders) than shedding light on why there are conﬂicts in certain communities and
no conﬂict in others. From the very onset a disclaimer that these results do not seek to
establish causal relationship between variables is necessary to offer in order to understand
the scope and nature of these results and the manner they are presented, analyzed and

interpreted.

By the time the reader has ﬁnished reading this work it is hoped that he/she shall have
accomplished the following regarding South Aﬁica’s rural local government and its
political dynamics:
a) A sense of historical evolution of rural local government and rural local politics in
general. The emphasis is mainly on the institution of traditional leadership that
was a dominant political force during the pre-colonial era, and managed to

survive, albeit with many modiﬁcations, the colonial and apartheid era.

b) An understanding of contemporary politics in the areas under the jurisdiction of

15

d)

traditional leaders. This includes the political forces, going back to the late 19805,
that produced resistance and liberation politics in these rural areas. The reader is
made to witness the emergence of political formations such as the civic
organizations, youth organizations, the labor unions as well as the local branches
of the major political organizations that begun to contest the powers and authority

of traditional leaders.

With the coming of the new democratic government in 1994, reform process that
led to the reconﬁguration of rural local government thus introducing new political
actors, redeﬁnition of roles 1 local administration and further erosion of traditional
authority. In all this, various reactions to these political developments by
traditional leaders are discussed in a manner that reveal them, not as docile and
rigid as often portrayed, but as astute political operators who understand and

adjust to the winds of change.

This study portrays the relations that have evolved between the sections of rural
political elite, particularly those who are drawn from traditional authority, the

elected councilors and the civic leaders.

At the heart of this comparative study is an identiﬁcation of factors that are
associated with individuals/elites in conﬂictual relations and those in non-
conﬂictual relations. This examination of trends regarding the type of rural elite
relations is examined from many angles including the provincial and community

16

dimensions as well as attributes of key protagonists.

This study will conclude by outlining the implications of the ﬁndings and this
study on the existing body of literature on rural politics in South Aﬁica and in
Africa. Similarly, the broad policy implications for South Aﬁica and Africa are
enlisted with particular reference to consolidation of democracy in rural areas and

local administration and development.

17

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Events have a way of upsetting theories about them. The best-
laid analyses, especially those claiming unmasked realities
hidden or disguised by powers that be (whether by design or
default), turn out, at best, to have only a moment of truth. As
that moment fades events and perspectives appear quite
differently, especially in retrospect (indeed if remembered at
all). As for theories that once aroused great political passion,
one tends to either look back in anger or (as with failed
religions) to wonder what the fuss was about. Africa— or,
more precisely, Sub-Saharan Africa— has been particularly
subject to such fluctuating truths and ﬂights of interpretive
fancy. This is not surprising. No other continent has been heir
to so many judgments about its very nature, ‘Africaness'.“’

“It is clear that there is no consensus among analysts on
how to probe the complex interconnections between
politics and society in Africa. Old certainties on the
relevance of legal, formal-institutional (legislatures,
executives, parties, judiciaries), psychocultural, and
purely historical frameworks have largely disappeared.
. . Thus, social scientists have little alternative but to
undertake a search for new conceptual frameworks that
would afford a fuller insight into dynamic processes
unfolding on the continent?"

 

’3 Apter, D and Rosberg, C. (eds) Political develoment and the new realism in Sub-Saharan
Africa 1994., p.1.

1"Chazan, N. et al., Politics and Sociey in Contemmrag Africa 1999; p.14.
18

“These back-to—back domains of authority are readily
identiﬁable as the realm of state sovereignty and the
realm of traditional government; both systems
effectively govern the same communities of citizen-
subjects. Although dualistic systems of political
authority can be found in other parts of the world, their
establishment by combinations of custom and law in
Africa is more comprehensive and systematic than
elsewhere. Hence the utility of ‘mixed government’ as a
concept that draws attention to the comparative
advantage of Africanist scholarship on a neglected
subject that could be of general interest to political
scientists?”

The above passages can be metaphorically depicted as double-edged swords that one
encounters in reviewing literature on the topic of rural local government and rural elite
political relations in Africa. Firstly, the problem, as indicated by the ﬁrst two statements,
is the one of ﬁnding a comprehensive and relevant theory that speaks directly to the
speciﬁc research questions of this study. However, this same problem presents an
opportunity to synthesize and integrate disparate perspectives. Secondly, there is a
general lack of relevant literature on rural local politics particularly pertaining to the
relations among the different sectors of the local elite. The same deﬁcit that is pointed
out by Sklar also provides a window of opportunity for one to close this knowledge gap
especially with regards to a new democracy like South Africa’s. This chapter takes these

limitations and opportunities into consideration.

 

15Sklar, R. “The African Frontier for Political Science” in Bates, R., Mudimbe, V., & O’Barr, J (eds)
Africa and the disciplines: Thgcontributions of research in Africa to the Social Sciences
and humanities 1993; p.87.

19

This chapter is divided into the following sections: The ﬁrst section focuses on the
signiﬁcance of this study in understanding Africa politics. This section is followed by an
outline of major trends in the existing literature on rural politics in Africa. A similar
analysis of South African literature on this subject is presented in the next section. Then
there is a brief outline of the key questions and hypotheses of this study. This paves way
for the section that identiﬁes and describes some theoretical perspectives that are used to
understand the phenomenon of rural elites relations in South Africa. It is within this

context that key concepts of this study are described.

2.1. Why bother? Signiﬁcance of rural local politics in understanding Africa.
Before embarking on this discussion it is important to explain the signiﬁcance of this
study in our understanding of African politics. Of the scholars who have indicated the
importance of studying the relationship between traditional and modern institutions, Sklar
presents a compelling and direct case. He conceptualizes this relationship as “dual
authority” or “mixed government”. In trying to emphasize the continued importance of
traditional authority, he frequently deploys the term “state-behind-the-state”. He
develops this point as he points toward the realities of African societies. He asserts that,

“. . .the practical importance of traditional authority, its real

signiﬁcance, does not depend on the manner of its interpretation by

social scientists. The kgotla, the Ala/re of Egbaland, and the

marabouts of Senegal exert power in their societies regardless of

one or another academic interpretation of their roles. Hence the

concept of mixed government differs from concepts, such as

statism, that refer to abstract objects of thought rather than

concrete realities. The signiﬁcance of the second state can be
explained, but its real impact on society cannot be explained

20

”16
away.

Sklar’s observation exposes a disjuncture between ideas and facts on the ground.
This, he argues, has even more direct bearing on political science than on any
other social science discipline. He observes that “Political scientists have
neglected to articulate the reality of this circumstance, although its manifestation

in contemporary Aﬁ'ica is pervasive.”l7

Throughout his argument, Sklar does not
just acknowledge this conspicuous neglect of an important reality but goes on to
identify this area as a potential niche for African and Africanist scholars as its

manifestation in Africa is more systematic and elaborate than anywhere else in the

world.

While Sklar puts his ﬁnger on the problem in his schematic outline, he, however,
falls short of taking any speciﬁc cases to comprehensively demonstrate how this
interaction between traditional institutions and the modern state play out. He is
not alone in acknowledging the resilience of traditional institutions in post-
colonial and contemporary Africa. Just more than two decades earlier, Norman
Miller reinforced the notion of political survival of traditional leadership in his
assertion that, although legally deposed by many independent African
governments, such leaders continue to exercise substantial inﬂuence, particularly

in" the building of local institutions in the rural areas. Some have been able to

 

16Sklar, op cit, p.94.
17Ibid, p.86.

21

 

move into party or administrative positions; others have been so strong that the
local authorities have been forced to deal with them as spokesmen of their area.
Other traditional rulers have no formal leadership position but through
manipulation of their past legitimacy, have continued to dictate local policies and
shape major decisions. Whatever the basis, the political survival of traditional
leaders is signiﬁcant because they provide the vital linkage between the
government and the people. They inﬂuence the success of speciﬁc modernization
schemes by serving as translators, interpreters, and mediators of government

goals.”18

In this observation Miller does not only point toward the resilience of traditional leaders
as he also raises the issue of their importance in nation-building process or put
diﬁ’erently, they regulate the manner of penetration of modern state in their respective
local rural areas. Proctor concurs with this view in his claim that,
“A major problem encountered by the builders of many of the new states in Aﬁica
has been that of deﬁning a satisfactory position for traditional tribal authorities in
a more integrated and democratic political system.”19
The above observations highlight the fact that one would have to take traditional leaders

into consideration when planning or executing local development programs or in

extending democratic institutions into the rural areas. It is not only scholars but also

 

1"Miller, N. “The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership” in Mﬂler, N (ed) Research in Rural ‘
Africa 1969; p.183.

19

Proctor, J. “The House of Chiefs and the Political Development of Botswana” in The Journal of
Modern African Studies Vol 6, No.1, 1968; p.59.

22

political leaders who are aware of the vital role that traditional leaders play as well as the
complexity of reconciling their role with modern institutions. Mandela’s observation is
one such example as he states that,

“Perhaps more difﬁcult than most, is to ﬁnd the best way in which our

elected structures of local government and traditional leaders can work

together for the good of their communities. This is crucial area of

reconstruction and development, and a resolution of outstanding

differences and conﬂictual matters is of greatest importance.”20
These observations which all point out the vital importance of traditional leaders in rural
local politics are not matched by similar academic interest on this subject particularly in

the contemporary Aﬁican studies. It is this yawning gap between realities of African

politics and existing ideas that this study seeks to address.

The 19905’ wave of democratic transitions in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia have also
led to attempts, though with varying degrees of success, to revive traditional leadership.
This was the case in Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Cambodia, and
Bulgaria. Gwynne Dyer writes states that “All the Balkan countries were monarchies
before 1945. And all of them are now trying to make a comeback”21 The outbreak of
ethno-nationalism in the wake of globalization and, in some instance, the collapse of
modern state systems has also led to the revival and reinvention of local traditional
institutions. This is certame the case in Somalia where the clan leaders have asserted
their role or more recently in Afghanistan where the tribal leaders and tribal council or

onijerga has assumed new importance. These point not just toward the survival of

 

2"Mall and Guardian, April 7-12, 1997.
1"Dyer, G. “Men who would be kings, again ." in Gag Times April 10, 1999.

23

traditional leaders but their increased role. This then challenges scholars not to view them
as a relic of the past on their way out but as a vibrant continuing phenomenon with a
capacity for adaptation that has to be understood in the context of the modern state
system, especially at local levels. It is equally possible that this reﬂects the weakness of
the civil society in those countries as expressed in the lack or weakness of associational
and political society in those countries. Some of the above-mentioned state range from
collapsed states to states that are struggling with transition from totalitarian regimes. The
point being made here is that there may be more than just one or two reasons that account

for continued existence of traditional political formations in these countries.

Much of the current reports on the resurgence of traditional authorities is reﬂected in the
media which tend to focus more on prominent public ceremonies such as weddings,
funerals and coronations rather than presenting an in-depth analysis of political processes

that characterize the interface of traditional and modern institutions.22

There is,
however, growing, though still relatively scanty, academic interest on the subject of
traditional leaders’ relationship with state as this discussion will show. There is a trickle

of academic essays on revival of traditional authority and their role within the current

African political systems. The works of Kessel and Oomenzs, Westz“, Houston & F ikeni25

 

22

The following articles are some of the examples of these journalistic reports which reﬂect the
renewed interest in the institutions of traditional rulership;

‘Wedding furore shows Ugandans updating monarchy isn't easy” in Gag Times July 20, 1999;
Kachiri, R. “The King’s choice” New African October 1999.; Shcumatoff, A. “The coronation of
King Ronnie” New African ?; “Royal Ashanti: Ghana’s Golden Heritage.” New African Life
December 1996.; McNeil, D. “(Male) Zimbabwe Tribal Elders’ Chief Complaint.” New Ygug Timg
January 12, 1999; Ofori-Atta, N. “T he mighty oak has fallen.” Africa Today May 1999.

23 Kessel, I. and 00mm, B. “One chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid

24

Osaghaez", Katorobor’, Oloka-Onyangozs, d’Engelbronner-Kolff and Sindano”,
Ntsebeza30 and Maloka31 and Adriaan32 are examples of studies which have begun to
acknowledge the reality of traditional leaders’ role within the contemporary African
states. For an example, Kayunga focuses on the role that traditional rulers can play in the
process of political decentralization”. He sees them as alternative centers of political
power to that of the state thus providing some checks and balances to what otherwise
would be a hegemonic state. He asserts that chiefs often play the same democratizing and
decentralizing role as political actors within the civil society. However, he decries the
fact that western scholars seem to be more interested in all other organs of civil society
such as the media, trade unions, student movement, voluntary associations and women's
organizations with no attention being given to traditional rulers or indigenous leaders
who oﬁen play the same political role of counter-balancing the overbearing political

weight of state power.

Jeffrey Herbst’s claims seem to underscore this new development as he claims that,

 

South Africa” in Aﬁign Affairs Vol.96, 1997

24 West, H. et al., “Betwixt and between: Traditional Authority and democratic decentralization in post-
war Mozambique.” In African Affairs Vol.98, 1999.

25 Houston, G. et al., A_spects of the debite on the draﬁ of the New South Aﬁi_cg_n Constitution 1996.

26 Osaghae, E. (ed) Traditional Leadership in Southern Africa 1997.

27 Katoboro, P. and Keulder, C. Traditional leaders and local government in Africa 1998.

28 Olok-Onyango, J. “The question of Buganda in contemporary Ugandan politics” Journal of
ContemporaLy Aﬂgn Studies Vol. 15,No.2., 1997.

29 d’Engelbronner-Kolff, and Sindano, J. (eds) Mtigngl authority a_nd democracy in Southern Africa
1998

30 Ntsebaa, L. Land Tenure reform traditional authoritieﬂnd rural local government Most-apartheid
South Africa: Case Studies from the Ea__stem Cm 1999.

31 Maloka, T. “Populism and the politics of chieﬁaincy and nation-building in the new South Africa.” In
Jornngl of Contemporgrv Aﬁ’ican Studies Vol. 14, No.2, 1996.

32 Adriaan, E. African Chieftaincy in a new socio-political landscape. 1999

3" Kayunga, S. 'Trad‘tional rulers and decentralization in Africa: An assessment" in Katoboro, P,
Brett, E. and Munene, J, (eds) Uganda: Landmarks in rebuilding a Nation 1998.

 

25

“Academic research has only begun to explore the relationship between

chiefs and states . . . However, whether or not they are legitimate in the

eyes of researchers, whether or not they were created by colonial ofﬁcials,

local rulers are an important factor in African politics that cannot be

ignored.”34
The post-apartheid South Africa is currently grappling with issues of nation-building and
democratization and this makes it an even more interesting case for the study of dominant
aspects of relations among rural local elites. In this respect, the work of Kessel and
Oomen35 and that of Maloka36 present a compelling portrayal of chiefs' reaction to
political changes in South Africa. In their account chiefs are presented as adaptive and
astute political actors who studied the political changes and appropriated the language of
liberation discourse upon realizing that apartheid regime was facing its demise. In these
two studies we begin to see a classic case of traditional leaders effectively using both
modern and traditional repertoire as one of many political arsenals to bargain for
inclusion within the emerging political dispensation in South Africa. A more detailed
account of these studies is presented in chapter ﬁve that is dealing with contemporary
issues of South African rural politics. The content of discussions of the other studies
cited above features prominently in chapters four and ﬁve. In view of the above
discussion, this study contributes to our understanding of political processes that affect
democratization and development in rural local areas. By targeting all sectors of rural

local elite this study seeks to avoid the mistake of exclusively focusing on traditional

leaders to the exclusion of the other sectors of the elite or vice versa.

 

:Herbst, J. States and Power In Africa: Commrative lessons In authoity and control 2000., p. 23.
35,Kessel B and Oomen, “One chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in post-

aspartheid South Africa.” African Affairs No.96,1997.
Maloka, T. "Populism and the politics of chieﬂaincy and nation-banding In the new South
Africa." Journal of Contemmrau African Studies Vol. 14.,No.2, 1996.

26

2.2. Salient themes and trends in African rural politics literature.

In this section a highlight of relevant literature is presented. An elaboration is only made
later in case of the literature which has speciﬁc relevance to theoretical issues that are
used for this study. As stated earlier, a focus on the relationship among the various
sectors of rural local elite in Africa is scanty and is often alluded to in studies whose

focus is on other subjects.

Of the identiﬁed sectors of rural local elite, chiefs have, in relative terms, received far
more attention. In the aftermath of the ﬁrst wave of African independence in the late
19605 and early 19705 there was a trickle of studies which focused on the role of
traditional leaders within the independent states and their reaction or adjustment to the
new dispensation. Miller’s essay, The political survival of traditional leadership” and
Whitaker’s The politics of tradition, continuity and change in Northern N igeria3 8 best
represent and largely inspired this ﬁrst wave of literature. Another important collection of
essays in presented in Lamarchand’s Aﬁ‘ican Kingships in perspective: Political change
and modernization in monarchical settings”. However, this work is generally conﬁned to
societies with monarchies and has a limited application to local chiefs and their

communities. The emphasis in this work is on kings and their interaction with the state.

 

37 Miller, N. “The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership.” In Mills, M. et al., Keiskammahoek rural
sm'vev 1952.

38 Whitaker’s The politics of tradition, continuitv and cha_nge in Northern Nigeria 1970.

39 Lamarchand, R. African Kingships in pagective: Political change and modernization in mongrghical
settings 1977.

 

27

More recently, Mahmood Marndani40 theorized about conﬂicts in the Great Lakes Region
of Africa by focusing on inbuilt tension between the native dwellers who are citizens and
immigrants or refugees who settle and become subjects without enjoying the hill rights of

V

citizenship.

The focus on the role of traditional rulership seems to have largely disappeared by the
late 19705 and the mention of their role was mainly alluded to in essays which otherwise
did not put them at the center of their analysis. This ﬁrst wave of literature can be
summarized as an attempt to explain the role of traditional leaders in the post-
independent Africa, with particular stress on their survival strategies and resourcefulness

in adjusting to the new political dispensation.

There is another trend of literature which focused on rural politics with a particular focus
on the peasantry which was regarded as the most common and numerically dominant
social class in African societies. This body of literature either stressed the different modes
of peasant resistance to the capitalist mode of production or their interactions with the
modern state system. This literature was largely, though not exclusively, inspired by the
Marxist structural approach which emphasized class analysis, class interests and conﬂict.
In this literature there is a strong emphasis on political economy. The works such as

Hyden’s Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and uncapturedpeasantry",

 

4O Mamdani, M. Citizens grid Subjects: Contemporgrv Africa a_nd the leggcv of lgte colonialism 1996.
41 Hyden, G. Bevond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment grid uncaptured peasantrv 1980

28

Isaacman’s Peasants and rural social protest in Aﬁ'ica”, Bratton’s The local politics of
rural development: Peasant and party-state in Zambia” , Ranger’s Peasant
consciousness and Guerilla war in Zimbabwe“ are some of the key works which
represent this trend. Hyden's work on the uncaptured peasantry examines the extent to
which peasants are integrated in the modern political economy. This work effectively
dispelled the notion that the peasants were helpless victims at a mercy of state and state
policies. Hyden's work reveal and analyze a range of strategies used by peasants to
resists state policies imposed on them especially those with detrimental effect on their
livelihood. He used the failure of the Tanzanian state policy, Ujamaa, failure as a
demonstrative case study. Along the same theme peasant resistance and active
participation in national politics, Terrence Ranger focuses on the peasant consciousness
and political in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Firstly, the core of his thesis is that
pmsants as a social class, have their political consciousness in the same manner as other
classes such as the industrial workers or the proletariat have. He outlines the ways the
peasants', particularly the spirit mediums, intervention in the Zimbabwean liberation
struggle was so crucial in the success of ZANU and in the formulation of its ideology.
The problem with Ranger's thesis is his failure to emphasize differentiation within the
peasantry as well as internal divisions in what is essentially a fracticious social unit. The
most telling and clinical exposition of these weaknesses in Ranger's work is launched by
Norma Kriger who highlight internal divisions within the Zimbabwean peasantry as well

as the use of coercive means by the ZANU liberation cadres to squeeze compliance from

 

42 Isaacrnan, A. “Peasants and rural social protest in Africa” in Aﬁﬂr Studies Review 1990
43 Bratton, M. The local politics oﬁural development: Peasant and piggy-state in Zambia 1980
44 Ranger, T. Peasant consciousiress gndGuerilla war in Zimbabwe 1985

29

rural peasantry."5

Allen Isaacman's essay takes a form stock-taking in a form of a general review of
literature on the African peasantry with emphasis on the ones that deal with peasant
resistance. This study, in the ﬁnal analysis, endorses the notion of peasantry's active
participation, mainly in a form of resistance, in political life especially when this aﬂ‘ects
their well-being. More important in this essay is an attempt to show that the peasantry is
not a homogenous unit nor does it often take a united approach or stance on policy
matters. Even though this literature put the spotlight on rural politics it rarely focused on
the individual sectors of the rural elite as it generally embraced the peasantry as a social

group with an aggregated interest or political outlook.

In the 1990s or in the aftermath of Africa’s wave of democratic transitions the literature
on decentralization and broad participation alluded to the role of traditional leaders in
local governance. Kayunga’s essay, Traditional rulers and decentralization in Africa: An
assessment“, and Wunsch’s Regime transformation from below: decentralization. Local
governance and democratic reform in Nigeria”, best represent this trend which was

short-lived.

 

‘5 Kriger, N. "The Zimbabwean War of Liberation: Struggles within struggles”. Journal of Southern
African Studies Vol. 14.,No. 2., January 1988.

46 Kayunga’s essay, “Traditional rulers and decentralization in Africa: An assessment" in Kataboro, P., et
al, op cit. 1995

47 Wunsch’s Rgm e transformation from below: decentralization. Locaigovernance and democratic
reform in Nigeria 1996.

 

 

3O

In the late 19905 there is a new and increasing interest on the role of traditional leaders
and this has been triggered, to a large extent, by the debate and controversy surrounding
traditional leaders in the post-apartheid South Aﬁica. This literature tends to focus on the
constitutional role of traditional leaders in Africa and different cases of African countries
are presented with the ultimate aim of inﬂuencing or guiding the unfolding constitutional
or legal process in South Africa. The work is generally more descriptive and case-
oriented. Moreover, the main focus of this work is on the relationship between the
national governments and the chiefs with scanty regard for local elite dynamics in rural
communities under the jurisdiction of chiefs. D’Engelbronner-Kolff Traditional
Authority and Democracy in Southern Aﬁica‘s, Adriaan Aﬂican Chieftaincy in a new
socio-political landscape“), and Osaghae Traditional leadership in Southern A ﬁ'ica5 0 are
more recent important contributions on the role of traditional leaders in within African

countries.

Scholars interested in consolidation of democracy and broad participation within the
African states tended to conceptualize and problematize this subject in terms of the civil
society. This discourse tended to focus on the labor movement, media, voluntary
associations and student movement with very little, if at all, regard for the rural elite
particularly the role of traditional institutions. The civil society discourse generally has an

urban bias with only a passing reference to rural politics even though there is plenty of

 

48 D’Engelbronner-Kolﬁ, op cit 1998
49 Adrian, op cit 1999
50 Osaghae, op cit, 1997

31

evidence that any consolidation of democracy or broad participation would have to take

this sector into consideration.

A considerable amount of work has been done on political and collective violence in
Aﬁican societies and this work is often done by historians and anthropologist.51 But
these studies suffer from several deﬁciencies especially with regards to the subject of
rural elite relations that is at the heart of this study. The ﬁrst deﬁcit is pointed out in the
following observation by William Beinart;

“Explaining and understanding Aﬁican political violence as a response to

conquest dispossession, and authoritarian nature of colonial rule and

apartheid has not been particularly problematic for radical historians and

social scientists. More difficult has been the related issue which Fanon

raises: that violence within or between African communities. The ﬁrst step

in analysing internal violence has been to treat each incident or episode as

discrete and potentially having a different line of causation. Any notion of

intrinsic tendencies toward violence are thus dispensed with. Second, such

violence has been seen as a result of divisions caused by the nature of

colonial or settler rule.”52
While the above passage draws our attention to scanty focus on violence within the
community, an aspect of internal community relations that this study is interested in, it is
still limited to the focus of violence instead of a broad category of relations or conﬂict. It
should be remembered that violence is only one aspect or expression of conﬂict, a point
which is emphasized and discussed throughout this study. Secondly, the above

identiﬁcation of the limitation of studies that viewed violence/conﬂict as intrinsic or

unique episode is of great importance here as this study is based on comparative method

 

51 Beinart, W., 1992; Moodie, D., 1992, Bundy, C. and Beinart, W. 1987
SZBeinart, W. “Political and collective violence in Southern African Historiography” Journal of
Southem African Studies Vol.18, No.3., 1992., p.465.

32

that puts less importance on idiographic or unique causes in favor of monothetic or
general factors that inﬂuence events across societies. In any event, describing processes
or events in terms of unique internal features within each community has an inherent
problem of being trapped in a circular argument or line of reasoning where the society is
described in terms of features and features are described in terms of the societal features.
This general review of literature on broad topics related to the study of rural politics and
relations pave way for literature that is more speciﬁc to the concepts, theories and
empirical cases that are linked to the problem being examined in this study, that is the
relations between the various sectors of the rural elite. Speciﬁc references to some of the
literature cited above will be made in the subsequent discussion that deals with various

perspectives on rural elite relations.

2.3. A review of literature on the rural politics in South Africa.

A cursory observation of social science literature on South Africa reveals an urban bias
which is shown by the treatment of rural areas as a residual factor in many studies. This
tendency is evident across many disciplines and manifest itself in a variety of themes or
subjects which range from local government, labor movement, anti-apartheid resistance,
civil society, political economy and migrant labor system. There is, however, a
considerable body of literature which has gone against this trend in making rural areas
and their social and political dynamics the center of their focus. These studies are to be
found in both historical and contemporary works. Since a more detailed and speciﬁc
reference to most of this literature is in the next two chapters it suﬂices to brieﬂy
highlight dominant themes and trends in this section.

33

The literature that covers the colonial and an apartheid era tends to emphasize resistance
of rural communities in reaction to repressive laws and dispossession. Beinart and
Bundy’s Hidden struggles in rural South Aﬁica” and Mbeki’s South Africa: The Peasant
Revolt" are typical and prominent representation of this historical account of rural
resistance. Both of these works put emphasis on the local resistance against the imposed
colonial and apartheid laws. They both highlight instances where the rural communities
joined forces with the national struggles organized by the black nationalist movement. A
special mention of Hammond-Tooke’s Command and consensus: The development of
Transkeian local government” is warranted at this juncture This study stands out as the
only extensive account that looked into the internal dynamics and evolution of rural local
government It is, however, a descriptive, rather than analytical, account of the evolution
of rural local government and it alludes to some of the emerging relations among the
various sectors of the local elite. This work describes relations that occurred within
communities as well as struggles between members of the rural elite as they tried to
grapple with the manner in which relations with the colonial and apartheid government
were to be conducted. These local elite struggles were more about accessing state
resources while at the same time exercising inﬂuence over the local constituencies or
villages. This historical account is conﬁned to the case of Transkei thus limiting its cross-
sectional comparative potential. Despite these limitations this work has a considerable

amount of overlapping areas with this study and this will become obvious in subsequent

 

53 Beinart and Bundy, C. Hidden struggles in rural South Aﬁica 1987
54 Mbdci, G South Africa: The Peasant Revolt 1964
55 Harnmond-Tooke Command and consen_sus: The development of Transkeiarr local government 1975

34

discussions. Further reference to Mbeki, Bundy and Hammond-Tooke's works is in

chapter four.

As a prelude to a commentary on South African literature it is worth noting that an
overwhelming majority of studies on South African local government tend to exclusively
focus on urban areas”. Consequently, when the new South African government and
public policymakers were deliberating on restructuring local government, they had very
little in terms of academic studies to assist them when it came to designing models for
rural areas. As a result transitional arrangements were effected with relative ease in the

urban areas whereas confusion still lingers on in the rural areas.

Studies dealing with conﬂicts between different groups or political organizations in local
communities also suffer from this urban bias as most of the survey literature tended to
focus on township violence or political struggles with only a residual treatment of rural
communities. Even these studies tended to be broad in their assessment of conﬂict thus
glossing over some of political or relational dynamics occurring within individual

. . 7
communities.5

The post-apartheid controversy surrounding the role of traditional leaders within a new

democratic dispensation has, however, triggered media and academic interest on rural

 

5"Cloete (1995) Loeal government tra_n_sfonnation in South Africa is a prominent example of these
urban-focused studies of local government. And Bekker, S.(ed) Citizen articiggtion in local
government 1996.

This work is an example of these tendencies; Mayekiso, M W
for a new South Africa 1996 ;

local government and consequently projected a spotlight on some political dynamics
associated with it. Outside a series of media articles and statements by public oﬁicials on
this subject, there is a growing body of academic work. This tends to be a descriptive
work which focuses on constitutional and legal aspect of rural local government with
particular emphasis on the role of traditional leaders”. Some of these studies have even
gone to the extent of suggesting that legal and constitutional ambiguity regarding the role
of traditional leaders in the current dispensation is largely responsible for conﬂicts in
many communities”. Role confusion or deliberate exploitation of this confusion by local
elite trying to control local resources is seen as the cause of tension between the elected
councilors and chiefs. Due to the lack of theoretical speciﬁcity of these studies on the
issue of local elite relations their claims are generally suggestive than explicit Literature
which focuses on land reforms or developmental issues only represent a few articles.
There is another variant of literature that focuses on traditional rulers and this includes
Maloka60 and Kessel and Oomen" whose work largely focuses on traditional reactions
and mutation to the new dispensation and its accompanying reforms. In this account
traditional leaders’ use of liberation discourse as well as their appeal to or revival of
tradition or customs is explored with less emphasis on legalistic or constitutional matters.

In most of the current studies of South African transformation discussion of civil society

 

58Some of the examples of this work are: Spitz, R and Chaskalson, M The mlitics of transition: A
hidden history of South Africa’ s negotiated settlement 2000; Baekey, C “Politics of exclusion in
the new South Africa” in Discussion paper, Cummunity Law Center, Durban (September 1993);
and Munro, W. “Dilemmas of rural local government in KwaZulu-Natal” Indicator 89th Ania
Spring 1997.

59 See Houston, G, et al, op cit, 1996; Ntsebeza, L “Rural local government in post— apartheid
South Africa African Sociolggical Review 1998.

60 Maloka, op cit .,1996

61 Kessel and Oomen, op cit. 1997

36

and more speciﬁcally of civic movement exclusively focuses on urban areas”. In view of
this emerging and existing literature there is no study that has covered relations between
the various sectors of the rural local elite, especially at the present moment when the new
elected rural local councilors present a new power center which is trying to entrench itself
in a contested political landscape. The issue of land reform and land tenure has attracted

some scholars and their work yields some important information on rural politics.63

2.4. Key questions and hypotheses

In light of the stated objectives of this study one may ask these broad questions to provide
a context for questions that guided this empirical study: What is the nature of rural
polities in the contemporary South Africa? Who has power in rural communities? Who
rules and how is power acquired and exercised? What are the key institutions that are
used as tools to exercise power and inﬂuence? What is the nature of relations between

the key players?

Another broad theoretical question that has preoccupied many social scientists,
particularly political scientists, is whether structure or agency is the most useful

explanation of dominant trends of political behavior and political processes. In this

 

”See Mayekiso, op cit; Ndletyana, M. “The civic movement: A toothless watchdog?” Indicator
South AfricaVol.16,No.3; and Glaser, D. “South Afn'ea and the limits of civil society” Journal of

outhem African Studies Vol 23, No.1 , 1997

Ntsebeza, L _La_nd tenure refonnJaditionaLauthorities and rural Ioeal government in mat-
agartheid South Africa: Case studies from t_he Egstem Cm Research Report No.3 1999; Lipton,
M, et al (eds) Land labour and livelihoods—in rurgLSoujh Africa 1996.; Baber, A. and Nieuwoudt,
W. “The principles of justice and rural land reform in South Africa" The South African Journal of
Economics Vol 60, N02, 1992; and Ross, C. and Rutsch, P. “Losing the land: securing tenure in
tribal areas” Indicator South Africa Autumn 1995.

 

37

instance the same question can be asked with regard to rural elite relations: Is it structure
or agency that inﬂuences and shape the dominant trends of elite relations? If the answer
happens to be both or situational then one may ask: When does structure or agency
become an important factor in elite relations? Or when and how do they combine to have
a joint inﬂuence on these relations? Do these factors manifest themselves in the same

manner across communities or are there important variations across regions?

The same question can be broken down, so as to bring it closer to the level of empirical
analysis by the way of relating to each one of the selected perspectives and hypotheses.
Can local elite conﬂict be characterized as a struggle between social classes? Is ethnicity
associated with the prevailing relations between the sectors of the local elite? Can these
relations be best understood in terms of party affiliation? Can these relations be depicted
as a conﬂict between traditional and modern elite? Is the focus on interests of the elite,
political initiative and struggle to access or control resources central in understanding
dominant relations in various communities? These questions are obviously simpliﬁed
versions of a complex reality which, among other things, has to account for multiple

dimensions of each one of key variables identiﬁed above.

2.5. A brief outline of selected theoretical perspectives.

The lack of any speciﬁc theory or conceptual framework which speciﬁcally addresses the
phenomenon of rural local elite relations compels one to gather a variety of perspectives
that have a potential of relating to some aspects of this study. The eclectic approach
which is adopted in this study is well-suited for this challenge. In the following sections,

38

theories and empirical studies are outlined and brieﬂy evaluated with the aim of
formulating hypotheses for this empirical study. It should also be noted that most of these
theories were designed to address state or broad regional politics as they occur at a
national, provincial or sub-continental levels. For the purpose of this study they will be
adjusted to ﬁt the local level politics and more speciﬁcally to relate to the nature of
relations between the traditional authorities and elected local councilors or local civic
leaders. This discussion will culminate in an attempt to synthesize strands of the
identiﬁed perspectives into an integrated approach which has a better chance of

explaining various aspects of local elite relations.

2.5.1. Modernization perspective: Traditional versus modern elite.

A general survey of the literature immediately reveals that the modernization school is
the most enduring and pervasive approach in social sciences. It appears in virtually all the
various disciplines in social science and humanities. Any analysis can only ignore this
approach at its peril as it surfaces in almost all debates on social and political changes as
well as those on group relations. Even when some aspects of modernization are
discredited by successive paradigms, it has shown resilience and ability to reappear in
revised versions with each wave of paradigm shifts. At the same time, this school of
thought is very extensive, complex and contains a variety of strands within itself.
Consequently, the concept of modernity or identiﬁcation of a modern person often has an
expansive list or dimensions of indicators or variables such that it would be impossible to
come up with an exhaustive list within the conﬁnes of this study which is also
considering other variables that are thought to have a bearing on rural elite relations.

39

Directly related to the above features is the fact that any attempts to apprehend and

present a short and simpliﬁed version is ﬁaught with problems.

In view of all these complexities associated with analyzing modernization and essence of
modernity, this section and this study settles for a more modest task of emphasizing
formal education which is often identiﬁed as one of the key modes of inﬁrsing modern
values, attitudes, lifestyles and world view on traditional societies and individuals. This is
particularly the case in colonial and former colonial settings where formal education has
been a primary socializing agent and a tool used to penetrate, change and integrate
traditional societies to major colonial, often western, cultures. In this empirical study,
therefore, distribution of education qualiﬁcations between the traditional authorities,
elected and civic leaders is assessed with the view of establishing whether this is
associated with one form of dominant elite relations or not. Does it really matter if
traditional leaders are less educated than the elected or civic leaders? Would
discrepancies in educational qualiﬁcation lead to conﬂict? Let me hasten to say that I am
acutely aware of the fact that education per ser is not the only nor is it an automatic
license to modernity. A person with formal education may hold traditional views as much
as a person without much of formal education may have a modern outlook and approach
in life. The position taken here is that the likelihood of these happening is less as the
following discussion will indicate. As a supplement to an assessment of education as an
indicator of modernity, the survey also collected and analyzed data on rural elite views on
traditional institutions such as traditional land tenure system and traditional values and
customs. Having mapped out the position and approach adopted in this section, this

40

allows the discussion to return to the highlights of basic features of modernization
perspective. The task here is not to present an exhaustive analysis of modernization
discourse. What follows is an outline of some key assumptions of this school as well as

discussion of the literature that relates to education.

What is modernization? Who is a modern person? Who are the proponents of this school
of thought? What are its basic assumptions? What are some of the notable limitations?
How have modernization theorists dealt with these limitations as pointed out but its
critiques? How does education relate to modernity? Let it be noted that these broad
questions provide a guideline of the following discussion and they are not used as a

checklist to be intensively exhausted.

Modemization school has its towering foundational advocates such as Rostow 6", David
Apter 65, Mclleland , Alex Inkeles'56 and Parsons. From the late] 9505 Gabriel Almond ,
David Apter, and James Coleman rrrade extensive and pioneering contributions to the
concept of political modernization. This was given more impetus in the late sixties by the

work of Samuel Huntington“.

David Apter offers a simple and general deﬁnition of political modernization. He deﬁnes

it as “. . . a process of increasing complexity in human affairs within which a polity must

 

64 Rostow,.l. op cit,_1962

65 David Apter The Politics of Modernization 1965

54. Inkeles, A. Exploring individuglrmodemitv 1983; Inkeles, A. et al.(eds) Education and individual
modernitv in developing countries

67 Samuel Huntington , op cit, 1966.

41

act.”68 In this discussion he includes role differentiation occasioned by the establishment
of more complex organizational structures. Samuel Huntington’s deﬁnition of political
modernization is more elaborate as he identiﬁes three processes that deﬁne political
modernization. The ﬁrst is the replacement of traditional, religious, ethnic and familial
political authorities by a single, secular and national political authority or government.
The second involves the emergence of new politieal functions that are managed by the
new administrative hierarchies and these include legal, military, administrative and

scientiﬁc functions.

The new administrative hierarchies are constituted by the persons who are chosen on
basis of skills or achievements rather than ascribed qualities. The third and last point is
increased participation in politics by social groups or individuals throughout the given
society, and this takes place within new institutions such as political parties and interest

groups that are primary vehicles for participation.”

It is clear from this deﬁnition that traditional rulership or chieftaincy lacks in most of
these characteristics therefore present itselfas an opposite of a modern political
institution notwithstanding its many modiﬁcations by colonial and apartheid regimes. It
should be pointed out that modernization has many faces among which are political,
sociological and psychological. In its all-encompassing form, it has to do with

institutions, the way of organizing, the way of doing thinks as much as it is about ways of

 

6"’Apter, D. The mlities of modemizaticn 1965., p. 3.

slnkeles, A. and Smith, D. Becoming modern: Individual change in six develog’gg countries
1974., p.16.

42

thinking and feeling. This underscores the fact that no single quality or a few qualities
can comprehensively deﬁne a modem person nor can the same be done with a traditional
person. A binary version that pits a modern person with a traditional person is the most
common in the studies of changing societies. In this construct a traditional person is
presented as conservative and defending the status quo in contrast to the modem or
modernizing person who is for change and innovation. Since modernization is an
inherently dynamic process of change its agents often have a potential of being in conﬂict
with those who defend tradition and status quo. This is a pertinent point that speaks
directly to the elite relations in a village that is ruled by a chief and his tribal council
while at the same time there is elite which coexists as an elected part of local government
as well as the civic leaders. This is a perfect setting for traditionalists and modernizing

forces, if any at all.

At times, modernization theory’s theoretical construct is confronted with a situation
where a system or individual assumes some of the modern aspects whilst clinging to the
traditional ones. In this case it becomes difﬁcult to determine whether this is a
transitional or transient phase, as many modernization theorists assume, or it is simply a
mutation of two systems that fossilize or ossify in that hybrid state. Some individuals
seem to ﬂuctuate between the two especially when they instrumentally use elements of

both for their beneﬁt.

F ormal education, as stated earlier, is often used as one of the major indicators of
modernity. This is the case with most studies that seek to assess the extent of modernity

43

in a given society. One classic example is Inkeles and Smith’s studies which used levels
of literacy as one of the indicators as they measured modernity and individual changes in
six developing countries.70 A compelling case linking education in Aﬁica with political
modernity is offered by Mandi” and James Coleman”. More telling is the following
linkage between education and the political changes in Aﬁica,

“Western education has been the most revolutionary of all inﬂuences

operating in sub-Saharan Africa since the imposition of European rule. It

has been the instrument of creation of class indispensable to for imperial

rule, but one which invariably has taken the leadership in challenging and

displacing that rule.”73
From the above statement it is clear that education is presented as a socializing agent that

has in turn produced agents of change, and this change agent is presented as being in

conﬂict with traditional ways of doing things or the status quo.

The most compelling case for the linkage between education and modernity is advocated
by Inkeles and Holsinger74. They do not just think that education is linked to
modernization, they make a strong case that it is at the apex of all other indicators of
modernity. They reviewed a number of studies that proved education to have such a
central place in modernization process and in distinction between a modern person and

traditional person. These studies, they claim, have indicated that education has an

 

”Inkeles, A. and Smith, D. Becoming modern: Individual change in six develcg'ng countries
1974. Similar design of research that has literacy levels featuring prominently in testing modernity

is Inkeles, A. Exploring Individual modem‘gy 1983.
"Mazrui, A. Political values and the educated class in Africa 1978.

7"’Coleman, J. “The politics of Sub-Saharan Africa” in Almond, G. and Coleman, J. The Politics of
developing areas 1960.

lbid, p.278.
74 Inkeles, A., et al, (eds) Education and individual modernitv in developing countries 1974.

44

overriding inﬂuence even when tested along other factors such as mass media and work.
More telling is their assertion that;

“And consistent with the results which have been obtained with the

populations of the more developed countries, the studies in the less

developed nations showed education to be a major determinant of the

syndrome of attitudes, values, and behaviors which distinguish the more

modem from the more traditional man.”75
Totemeyor’s76 work is one such case of a study that deployed modernization theory in its
study of the relations among the various sectors of Namibian elite. In his study of the
Ovambo elite of Namibia, he makes a sharp distinction between what he classiﬁes as the
modern elite which was calling for change and the traditional elite which resisted change.
He often emphasizes both education and generational gap as the key attributes of these
contending groups. John Holm’s study of political participation in Botswana is another
example of a study that utilizes modernization theory”. Holm is more explicit in his
assertion that “In this model of political development, the essential stimulus for conﬂict is
socio-economic change which the modemizers and their supporters experience while
traditional elites, to a certain extent, their followers remain relatively unaffected”?8 In
specifying this model, Holm does not only draw a clear binary divide between the
modern and traditional sectors of the society but also, in a typical modernization

approach, make assumption about their conﬂict potential. With such a compelling case

establishing a link between modernization and education, at one level, and conﬂict

 

”Inkeles, A. and Holsinger, D. (eds) E eation a d' dividual modem' in de elo ' count 'e
1974., p.1.

76 Toterneyor, G. N__arnibia: Old agd New-Trgditionalgnﬁd modern leaders in Ovamboland 1978

77 Holm, J. Dimensions of ma_S§ involvement in Botswana politics: A test of alternative theories 1971
78Holm, J. ‘ nsio of I voIv ent In n Iiti : te lt ative the 'e
1983; p.7.

potential between the modern and traditional elite it can be hypothesized that conﬂict is
likely to occur in a village where there is a traditional ruling elite and coexisting modern
political elite. Also extracted from this hypothesis is the fact that the educated elite will

often have conﬂict with the less educated elite.

Some modernization scholars do make allusions to the fact that the modem elite tend to
be younger whereas the conservative traditional elite tend to be older thus setting the
stage for a generational conﬂict. In this case the young tend to be more educated, open to
changes and therefore modern and through the extension of the same logic the older
generation will tend to be more conservative thus more inclined to resist change. The
position taken in this study is that age and generational cleavages and conﬂicts can stand
as a variable that is independent of modernization or modernity. It is reasoned that an
older person may be modern as much as a younger person may hold conservative view.
While many successive studies by Inkeles have tended to include age differences as
variables that indicate modernity and did ﬁnd some association in many instances, this
may have been a proxy variable that indicated other factors such as education. It should
also be noted that radical scholarship also focus on youth activism in politics, therefore,
youth are not just an exclusive phenomenon studied under the modernization paradigm.
Theoretically speaking, there is only a limited amount of literature regarding age or
generational cleavages and their role in politics. This discrepancy is conspicuous when
compared to the preponderance of empirical evidence showing the critical role that youth
has played in political changes throughout history. History is punctuated with many
prominent examples of a leading role of youth in revolutions, protests, reforms and

46

regime changes: ﬁ'om the West European and North American youth radicalism in the
late 19605, to the youth in the 1979 Iranian revolution, from the student movement in
South Korea to the Chinese student movement in the late 19805 and early 19905. South
Aﬁica is no exception in this case as the youth, particularly in the late half of the 20'”
century, played a critical role in the politics of resistance against the colonial and the
apartheid regimes. The radicalizing impact of the ANC Youth League in the 19405, the
student role in the foundation of the Black Consciousness Movement in the late 19605
and early 19705, the student role in the 1976 student riots and the vanguard role of the
youth, often ealled the “young lions” in the South African struggle lexicon, during the
19805 mass resistance against apartheid. These are the concrete cases that make the role

of the youth political activism noticeable.

What remains a classic theoretical conceptualization or explanation of youth radicalism
in politics is provided and generally inspired by the seminal work of Karl Mannheim who
characterized generations in sociological rather than age, biological or chronological
terms”. In this conception, Mannheim was more concerned with distinct experiences and
a set of historical and social problems that confronted each generation thus developing
common identity and self-awareness or consciousness. This was conceived as similar to
ethnic, national or class consciousness. The tide of youth radicalism that swept across

westem Europe and North America in the late 605 revived interest in this classic work of

 

79Mannheim, K. Essays in the sociolggy of knowledge 1952.

47

Mannheim and largely embraced his basic sociological premises. Rintalaso and Moller’s81

work are the notable examples of these works.

Various studies of political conﬂict in South Aﬁica have tended to make allusions to the
notion of generational conﬂict without theoretically or conceptually elaborating. In fact, a
cursory survey of literature on South Aﬁican political struggle against apartheid suggests

that many writers take this fact as a given.

Kessel and Oomen’s study of traditional authority reveals this tendency as it is argued
that,

“Generational cleavages in the liberation movement, a well-known
feature of urban resistance, became even more pronounced in the rural
setting, where power was wielded by chiefs, teachers and elders.
Grievances against the authoritarian rule and frequent misappropriation by
the chief were by no means limited to youth, but the youth movements,
with few exceptions, did not succeed in building a broad alliance around
their campaigns against chieftaincy. Radicalized youth movements often
acted in isolation.”82

The alienation of youth from the institution of traditional rulership makes their
antagonistic attitude both logical and expected. This assumption is embraced by other
scholars such as Levin”, Peires“, Mare“. Levin echoes Kessel and Oomen’s position as

he states that “ . . . the rural struggle was largely spearheaded by the youth organized in

 

soRintala, M. “Political generation” in Interngtional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Vol.VI, 1968.
8'Moller, H. “Youth as a force in the modern world” Compilative Studies in History gnd Society Vol. 10.,
1967-68.

K:Kessel, I. and Oomen, B. “One chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid
South Aﬁica” in Aﬁicgp Affairs Vol.96, 1997; p.264.

83 Levin, op cit .,1996

84 Peires, J. op cit, 1997.

85 Mare, Op cit, 1992.

48

youth congress structures.”86 Kenthridge’s own assessment is at variance with the above
tendency which emphasizes generational cleavages. He challenges this assumption as he
charges that “This argument manages to combine the obvious and ignoring the blatantly
obvious. Poverty, unemployment and youth alienation are not speciﬁc to Natal, whereas
the political rivalry between Inkatha and UDF is.”87 Whilst this analysis is based on an
assessment of conﬂict that was rampant in urban areas or more speciﬁcally townships
around Pieterrnaritzburg, this observation is instructive as it appeals to comparative
reasoning and pointing out at the preeminence of political conﬂict organized along party
identities. Catherine Cambpbell’s empirical study of masculinity and conﬂict in
KwaZulu-Natal largely support the notion a generational conﬂict which sometimes takes
on a political duel between the older and more conservative IFP vigilantes and the

younger AN C/UDF comrades.“

Colin Bundy also puts generational link to politics in his study of the youth and students
in Cape Town during the 19805.1n this study he emphasize the sociological factors that
inﬂuence the marginalized youth to turn into radical politics. Citing factors such as
unemployment and unemployability of school leavers as well as poor conditions in black
schools, poverty in their homes and crime-ridden streets in the townships, Bundy makes a
logical conclusion that,

“By any stretch of sociological imagination, the recipe for marginalising
and alienating a generational unit is comprehensive enough. Take

 

”Levin, R.“ Politics and land reform in Northem Province: A case study of the Mojapelo land
claim” in Lipton, M., et al (eds) Land labour and livelihoods in rural South Africa 1996; p.370.

'37 Kenthridge, M. An unofﬁcial war: Inside the conﬂict in Pieterrnaritzburg 1990; p.216
”Campbell, C. “Learning to kill? Masculinity, the family and violence in Natal” Jounral of Southern
African Studies Vol. 18., No.3., September 1992.

 

49

politically rightless, socially subordinate, economically vulnerable youths:
educate them in numbers beyond their parents’ wildest dreams, but
grotesquely inadequate institutions; ensure that their awareness is shaped
by punitive social practices in the world beyond the schoolyard- then
dump them in large numbers on an economic scrap-heap.”89
Bundy’s comment is instructive in many ways as it points out economic
disadvantages, frustration of an educated cohort, and even more important the fact
that these sociological factors are shared by and in turn shape the consciousness
of a generational unit A rare historical study of Zulu youth and masculinity at the
turn of the 19'“ century is conducted by Benedict Carton.9o This study is short on
theory though thick in its description of changing economic and cultural

landscape that led to a generational conﬂict between the Zulu youth and the elders

in their communities.

This repeated reference to generational cleavages in studies on conﬂict makes it
imperative to consider this variable in evaluating data for this study. This is given more
weight when considering the fact that traditional authorities have a history of
marginalizing youth, thus making them drift to alternative political structures in search of
a political space in which to exercise power and inﬂuence, especially in the wake of their
prominent role in bringing down the apartheid regime. It can therefore be hypothesized
that concentration of the youth or the younger age group in one institution (say elected

councils and civic organization) in a community where the other institution is dominated

 

asBundy, C. “Street Sociology and pavement politics: Aspects of youth and student resistance in
Cape Town, 1985' in Journal of Southern African Studies Vol.13, No.3, April 1987., p.313.
90Carton, 8. “Men before their time: Youth power and Afriean generational conﬂict in South Africa,
1880-1906.

50

by the older generation (for example, traditional authority), one would expect a conﬂict

that is primarily a clash of generations.

2.5.2. Structural approach: Social stratification and class struggle

Marxist inclined political economy perspectives that rose to prominence in African
studies during the 19705 are considered as a candidate in understanding elite relations as
they makes explicit assumptions about group conﬂict. Proponents of this approach are
mainly drawn from Marxist, neo-Marxist and dependency schools, and the proponents
include John Saul, Colin Leys, Timothy Shaw, Claude Ake, Immanuel Wallerstein,
Irving Markovitz, Reginald Green, Claude Meillassoux and Samir Amin. Class analysis
and the emphasis of class relations as a determinant factor in understanding dominant
relations is at the core of this school of thought. Economic factors or the position of
groups or individuals to the means and forces of production are seen as the primary
determinant of group interests and by logical extension of their relations or struggles. In
essence, this perspective explains political conﬂicts, just as it accounts for group interests
and consciousness, in class terms. In industrial societies class formation and distinction
is clear but this is not the case in the less developed areas. The real challenge in the less
developed world, in Africa in this case, is establishing a clear delineation of social classes
in an environment where class formation remains incomplete. This is a fact that is
generally accepted by African and Aﬁicanist scholars, including the proponents of
Marxian perspective. What constitute a class then in an African setting? Chazan, Lewis,
Mortimer, Rothchild and Stedman argue that people acquire most of their resources
through their linkages with the organs of the state rather than in a classical sense of the

51

classical bourgeois. They assert that,

“In a class (non-birth-ascribed) system, group membership is determined

largely by relationship to the productive process and the relations of

classes to one another, although in independent Africa proximity to state

power has played a central role.” 9'
They also identify variables as income, education, occupation as indicators of aggregated
and potentially conﬂicting interests around which classes may develop. Petty bourgeois,
proletariat, peasant classes and bureaucratic bourgeois are often identiﬁed as the most
prominent classes though not as fully developed or internally homogenous. What further

complicate attempts to identify social classes in an African setting is the fact that social

stratiﬁcation often overlap with other variables, most important being ethnicity.

F raught with all these problems, neo-Marxist scholars still insist that social classes still
play an important role in as a unit around which group interests and consciousness is
organized. For instance Irving Markovitz who argues that,
“Although class consciousness may be absent, classes are ‘objectively’ in
conﬂict because of their ‘productive relations’. In essence, classes are
social conﬂict groups.”92
It is important to note that this perspective is premised on the assumption that material
conditions play a more important or even a determinant role up and above subjective

feelings and views of those who belong to a given class. This emphasis on material

economic conditions is quite different from ethnicity which becomes important when the

 

91Chazan, N., op cit, p.121.
92Markovitz, l. Power and Class in Africa: An igtroduclion to chagge and conﬂict in African gglitics
1977; p.99.

52

subjective aspect is considered by those who then become conscious of and act upon their
ethnic identity. Terrence Renger’s93 work on Zimbabwean peasant consciousness and
Goran Hyden’s94 case study of the Tanzanian peasantry are prominent examples of
works that have highlighted the importance of social classes in understanding their

participation in political processes.

In the case of the literature on South Aﬁica there is a considerable amount of literature
which has embraced Marxist political economy approach in all its different revisionist
shades. Scholars such as Bundy”, Southallg", Peires97, Lewis98 and Levin99 have adopted
analysis which put class at the center of their approach. The following assertion by Jack
Lewis is more revealing of this position as he argues;

“Class struggle and the consciousness of migrant workers in the

countryside cannot be limited to overt action and outbreak of hostilities

against, for example, the Colonial State or against headmen. It has to be

taken to include the entire range of ideologically inﬂuenced responses and

initiatives assumed by people in rural households towards the conditions

under which they lived and their perceptions of those agents which

inﬂuenced their conditions.”100
In the above passage it is clear that contradictions and struggles are conceived in terms of

class diﬂ’erences which are seen as a basis for a consciousness and ideological outlook.

An obvious limitation of this perspective is the fact that social classes in Africa tend to be

 

93 Ranger, T., op cit, 1982

94 Hyden, G., op cit, 1983.

95 Byundy, C., op cit., 1979.

96 Southall, R., op cit, 1982.

97 Peires, J. , op cit, 1997.

98 Lewis, op cit, 1985

99 Levin, op cit 1996

1”Lewis, J. “Rural contradictions and class consciousness: migrant labour in historical
perspective— The Ciskei in the 18805 and 905' Africa Seminar— Collected Pamrs Vol.5, 1985.

53

less developed or very weak and often overlap with other factors such as ethnicity and
institutional factors such as membership in political organizations or government. These
factors often combine to weaken the notion of automatic primacy of class or economic
factors. With all this in mind, class analysis is still an important variable to consider when
trying to understand group relations as is the case in this study. It should also be stated
that there are multiple indicators of class afﬁliation which go beyond a simplistic notion
of the “haves” and “have-nots”. In operational terms, education, occupation, income,
ownership of land and livestock are some of the important indicators. This categorization
of individuals or groups to classes is ﬁrrther compounded by the fact that there are
intermediate classes in a continuum which then seriously compromise any attempt to
come up with discrete categories. Furthermore, if classes are less-developed or weak in
Aﬁican societies, it can be expected that this situation is ampliﬁed in rural areas than in
the urban areas due to their differences in terms of the level of integration into the

modern economy.

2.5.3. Ethnic identity, politicization of ethnicity and ethnic conﬂicts.
Ethnic identity is one of the most ambiguous and complex social forces. It is, at the same
time one of the readily deployed concepts when social scientists explain societal
cleavages and conﬂicts especially in Africa. It is imperative to deﬁne ethnicity and
ethnic identities as a prelude to discussion in this section. Chazan and co-authors provide
a useful distinction between an ethnic group and ethnicity. The following is their
deﬁnition and distinction of these terms;

“Ethnicity refers to a subjective perception of common origins, historical

54

memories, ties and aspirations; ethnic group pertains to organized

activities by persons, linked by a consciousness of a special identity, who

jointly seek to maximize their corporate political, economic, and social

interests. Ethnicity, or a sense of peoplehood, has its foundations in

combined remembrances of past experience and in common inspirations,

values, norms, and expectations. The validity of these beliefs and

remembrances is of less signiﬁcance to an overarching sense of afﬁnity

than is their ability to symbolize a people’s closeness to one another.

Ethnicity as a subjective basis for collective consciousness gains

relevance to the political process when it spurs group formation and

underpins political organization.”101
In view of this deﬁnition it is to be expected those groups of people are inclined to deﬁne
their interests and organize on basis of their ethnicity. This, however, does not
automatically or always assume relevance in political processes as Chazan correctly
points out. It should also be pointed out that ethnic identity per se does not imply conﬂict
with or opposition to other groups which may be different from one’s own group. It is,
however, within the realm of ethnic identity that political belonging and political
exclusion seem to dominate. A claim to the entitlement of belonging is often articulated

in terms of claims of being indigenous or native versus perceived or real alien or

immigrants.

Within the context of politics, ethnicity is often associated with conﬂict or deep divisions
within or across societies. Donald Horowitz, a prominent political scientist, focuses on
ethnic conﬂicts. Much of his work specializes on studying ethnically divided societies.
He rationalizes his emphasis on ethnic conﬂict as he asserts that,

“The importance of ethnic conflict, as a force shaping human affairs, as a
phenomenon to be understood, as a threat to be controlled, can no longer be

 

1"'Chazan, N., et al., op cit; p.108.

UI
UI

denied . . . Ethnicity is at the center of politics in country after country, a potent
source of challenges to cohesion of states and of tension.”102
Horowitz is not alone in emphasizing the importance of ethnic conﬂict. Many scholars
who study Africa often focus on ethnicity in their bid to explain conﬂict or political
mobilization. This, in part, is often justiﬁed on basis of the general weakness of political
institutions across many countries as well as the lack of ﬁrlly developed classes which
would be used to aggregate group interests. Using the case of Africa, Herbst concurs
with Horowitz view of ethnic tensions as he states that,
“Ethnic fragmentation is arguably the single most important threat to many
African countries as widespread ethnic violence has been symptomatic of many of
Africa’s failing states and ethnic politics has paralyzed many others.”'°3
Close association between ethnicity and ethnic conﬂict is clearly evident in these
observations and it is not hard to ﬁnd empirical evidence that point towards these
negative consequences of ethnic-based conﬂicts. The case of perennial genocidal conﬂict
between the Tuts is and Hutus in the Great Lakes region of Africa stands out as a

monumental example of ethnic conﬂict.

South Africa is replete with examples of political organizations which have mobilized
around ethnicity. A considerable number of scholars do emphasize the role of ethnicity in
their study of South African politics. In his work, Horowitz emphasized constitutional

engineering that would take ethnicity into account if South Africa was to deal with the

 

102Horowitz, D. Ethnic groug in conﬂict 1985; p.xi
“Herbst, J. States and ggwer in Africa: Comggrative lessons in authomy' and control ; p.173.

56

potential threat of ethnic conﬂicts which had already deﬁned its past divisional“ In yet
another case, Gerhard Marc’s study of Inkatha Freedom Party and Buthelezi is in essence

105
Mare uses terms

a study of the role of ethnicity in political mobilization and conﬂict.
such as politicization or ideologization of ethnicity to describe Buthelezi and Inkatha’s

afﬁrmation of ethnicity as a mobilizing strategy.

It should be noted that much of the works cited above tend to focus on this phenomenon
of ethnic conﬂict on a wider scale such as regional or national level with little light being
shed on rural local areas which are under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities. One
would expect ethnicity to be of central focus on the part of those who study rural local
areas as chieftaincy itself is built around ethnicity. This point is reinforced by Mijere as
he claims that,
“The traditional leadership is at the center of the tribe. The paramount chief; the
sub-chief, the village headman or woman are primordial symbols of kinship.
Without traditional chieftaincy, no tribal consciousness.”106
This conceptualization brings the notion of ethnicity to the very center of traditional
authority in the rural local areas. More recently, Mamdani gave the debate on ethnicity in
Africa a new impetus with his theory which charges that ethnicity is embedded in and
perpetuated by institutions inherited from the colonial era. Mamdani captures the notion

of a bifurcated state in terms of citizen-subject with the natives who live under the

 

1o"Horowitz, D. e ' Afri nstitution ' ri iad" ' 1992.

“Mare has written extensively on this subject and the following works represent such literature
on ethnic conﬂict Mare, G. Ethnim' and mlitics in South Africa 1992; Mare, G. and Hamilton, G.
An a tite for power: Butthezi’s Inkatha and South Africg 1987.

“Mijere, N. “Traditional leadership: Colonial and post-colonial constructions of traditional
chieftaincy” in Osaghae, E. Traditional leadership in Southern Africa 1997; p.52.

57

traditional authorities operating as subjects under customary laws while Others or

aliens/settlers are only entitled to citizenship that is deﬁned by civil laws.

In a series of essays Mamdanim explains the ethnic conﬂicts that are rampant in many
parts of Africa as originating from this discrimination between the native and the aliens.
He argues that this bifurcation alienates those who are seen as outsiders and deny them
access to local resources. Although Mamdani’s work is theoretically rigorous, it is more
relevant to the areas which have large reﬁrgee or migrant population who settle in areas
which are controlled by other ethnic groups which would then exclude them from
customary deﬁned rights such as access to and ownership of land. In South Africa this
mass movement of populations into other areas was more common during the Mfencane
of the 19th century and also happened during the relocation of populations by colonial and
apartheid officials. None, however, has happened in the more recent times. To be sure,
there are communities where dominant ethnic groups live adjacent to one another as the

study by Deborah James show below.

To be sure, there are case studies that look at the role of ethnicity within South African

108

communities. To mention a few, Dunbar Moodie examines ethnic conﬂicts that occur

 

1("Some of Mamdani’s works on this subject of institutionally embedded ethnic polities of
exclusion and exclusion include; Mamdani, M. Citizen and subjects: Contemporam Africa and the
Legacy of late; colonialism. 1996; “ Why foreign invaders can't help Congo” Mail and Guardian
November 1, 1998; “When does a settler become a native? Mail and Guardian May 2, 1998.;
“Preliminary thoughts on Congo crisis” in Southern Africa Political Economy Montﬁhy December
1998. As one can tell from these examples in the Great Lakes of Africa, they involve massive
refugee settlements rather than individual families or clans which we see in the case of South
Africa.

108Moodie, D. “Ethnic violence on South African Gold Mines” Journal of Southem African Studies ,
Vol. 18., No.3., September 1992.

 

58

between the African ethnic groups in the mines of South Aﬁica. But in this case, Moodie
quite correctly identify as some causes the artiﬁcial conﬁnement and grouping of miners
according to their ethnic groups as well as the role of mine ofﬁcials on top of the poor
conditions in the mine compounds. Moreover, this is a study of migrant workers brought
from their various rural communities whereas this study is interested in the internal
community dynamics in the rural areas. Another case study that is rare for its focus on
ethnic tensions and relations within a rural South Aﬁican community is the one presented
by Deborah James who looks at the Ndebele community that lives in a Pedi village. She
concludes that disparities in material resources are at the core of tensions between these

two ethnic groups thus alluding to geopolitical factors as well.

The above discussion presents a compelling case for the inclusion of ethnicity in
understanding conﬂict and/or cooperation among the rural local elites. The concept of
ethnicity is only relevant in this study in as far as it deals with the politics of belonging
and exclusion in local administrative areas. Embedded in this are claims to the
entitlements of belonging to a certain ethnic group in a given community or ethnic group.
The interest is on how these factors manifest themselves in those areas which are under

the jurisdiction of traditional authority.

2.5.4. Party identity, political mobilization and local elite conflicts.

In a modern state system political mobilization is channeled by and through political
parties or other political organizations. It is no wonder that a considerable number of
political struggles are apparently fought by members of contending political

59

organizations. At face value political afﬁliation is an obvious factor around which
political identity is built, but the key question is when does this identity or membership
matter in the milieu of competing ethnic, class, kinship, regional and religious identities.
This question is more important in the Aﬁican setting where political parties are
relatively new and therefore not institutionalized or embedded as a channel of

aggregating interests.

An assumption that political identity or afﬁliation is a candidate in explaining the
relationship between sectors of the local elite is both intuitively appealing and logical.
Many studies that make reference to the role of political afﬁliation in political conﬂicts
tend to be more descriptive than theoretical. In the case of South Aﬁ'ica many observers
depicted the 19805 and early 19905 conﬂict in KwaZulu-Natal as being fought between
the United Democratic Front/Aﬁican National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party.
In many homelands the conﬂict was depicted as a battle between the supporters of ruling
political parties and the liberation organizations. Kenthridge’s argument is more explicit
in nullifying other factors in favor of party conﬂict. In reference to the 19805 conﬂict that
was raging in KwaZulu-Natal, He makes the following observation “Poverty,
unemployment and youth alienation are not speciﬁc to Natal, whereas the political rivalry

between Inkatha and UDF is.”109

Given this background, it is only logical to consider party identity or afﬁliation as

 

109Kenthridge, M. op cit, p216.

6O

shaping the relationship between the various sectors of rural elite. It is, however, worth
noting the conspicuous absence of theory-driven literature that speciﬁcally analyzes party
afﬁliation or partisan identity as a factor in political conﬂict or in shaping relationship
among the political elite. It is, therefore, imperative to ask: Does political identity or
party afﬁliation matter when it comes to the nature of relations between the sectors of the
elite? This study takes this variable into account in its analysis of factors that inﬂuence

rural elite relations.

2.5.5. Political agency and elite factional rivalry.

The perspectives outlined above share one common trait: the emphasis on primacy of
structural or institutional factors that underlie group or individual actions and the
resultant political processes. There is a growing tendency to embrace political agency. In
this approach, the initiatives taken by the actors are placed at the core of understanding
political actions and choices. This literature, however, does acknowledge the structural or
institutional conﬁnes within which these initiatives are taken. It is this last point which
gives this approach a relative edge or appeal as it will be argued in chapter eight. More
important is the fact that structures (institutions and social classes) have been presented
as being weak or less developed in Africa, thus somehow reducing to residual factors or
weak basis for organizing interests and political actions. This further strengthens agency

or individual political actor’s role within the given institutional boundaries.

While this theoretical position of emphasizing political agency and political contingency
factors gained currency in the early 19905, it should be pointed out that there are earlier

61

works which afﬁrrned basic assumptions of this approach. On the study of traditional
leadership survival within the modern post-colonial political systems in Africa, the work
of Norman Miller is one of those which pioneered this position of treating traditional
leaders as political agents. Miller’s conceptual ﬁamework is captured in the notion of
syncretistic political behavior in which a traditional leader has dual existence in which he
balances the demands from the modern state and those of his traditional constituency'm.
In this case the leader manipulates both systems and tries to gain most from both. It is
through this complex balancing act that traditional leaders survive. The emphasis on the
maneuvering of individuals within a given institutional environment is also evident in
Eugene Lewis’ Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a theory of bureaucratic political
power. Lewis’ deﬁnition of a public entrepreneur is more revealing of his thesis;

“A public entrepreneur may be deﬁned as a person who creates or

profoundly elaborates a public organization so as to alter greatly the

existing pattern of allocation of scarce resources. Such persons arise and

succeed in organizational and political milieus which contain

contradictory mixes of values received from the past. Public entrepreneurs

characteristically exploit such contradictions.”lll
Key to the above passage is the fact that individual political actors do ﬁnd a room to
maneuver and deploy strategies aimed at achieving some autonomy even within what
may appear to be rigid conﬁnes of bureaucratic structures which are often thought of as

routinized. In this sense, Lewis’ thesis is in line with and reinforces the notion of political

contingency which is highlighted in this section.

 

11"Miller, N. 'The political survival of traditional leadership” in Miller, N. (Ed) Research in rural
Africa 1968.

" 'Lewis,E., Public Entrepreneurshig: Toward a theory of bureaucratic gglitical ggwer 1980., p.9
62

Late in the 19805 and early 1990s South African scholars such as Spiegelm fully
embraced the notion of the instrumental use of tradition and modernity by the elite. This
position was largely inspired by Ranger and Hobsbawn’s113 concept of the invention of
tradition. At the core of this position is the notion that political actors self-consciously
use or manipulate the structures and institutions to their advantage. This ﬂexibility gives
them a range of repertoire to invoke or appeal to. A more comprehensive conception of
the notion of agency is provided by Jean-Francois Bayart in his book, The State in Aﬁica:
The politics of the be] ’4. In this work, the struggle for access to and control of scarce
resource is identiﬁed as the main driving force in elite political transaction. Elite
cleavages or factional rivalries and alliances are to be understood in pursuit of this goal
rather than along strictly class or ethnic lines. The elite is innovative and uses a range of
resources in this process. Bayart’s preoccupation in this conception is with the political
processes rather than structures. The spotlight is on the behavior of individuals rather
than their institutional roles. Bayart’s work is also a critique of conventional tendencies
such as modernization, dependency, Marxist and Weberian approaches which all

emphasize structural or institutional variables.

At the core of Bayart’s thesis is a repeated use of the metaphor of “the belly” to portray a
society which is not primarily driven by ethnic differences, class conﬂict nor external
manipulation. It is a situation which is dominated by power networks and elite cleavages

in which struggle for scarce resources is a driving force behind the elite’s interaction

 

112 Spiegel, A., et al., (eds) Tradition a_nd transition in Southern Africa 1991
113 Hobsbavm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds) The invention of tradition 1983
114 Bayart, J. The State in Aﬁica: The Politics of the Bellv 1993

63

within a given political landscape. This primarily patrimonial and prebendal nature of
politics is characterized by the quest for hegemony. Because there is no sufﬁciently
developed hegemonic bloc, alliances shift from time to time. In this power play, access to
and control of resources is at the center elite cleavages as much as is reciprocal
assimilation of elites. In this arrangement, Bayart argues, personal networks of the elites
are crucial in understanding political processes. He rejects the notion of hegemonic
alliances and emphasizes the ﬂuidity of these networks as elite assimilation is reversible

or coexist with the politics of cleavages and exclusion that lead to factional struggles.

Bayart’s thesis is important in the context of this work for two reasons. Firstly, it is one
of few studies which put the elite interaction and relations at the center of focus thus, in
broad terms, covering the same scope as this study. Secondly, it is presented as a
counterweight or alternative to the above-outlined perspectives, all of which put emphasis

on structural variables to explain political processes.

2.6. A synthesis and integrated approach.

A general overview of the above discussion suggests that outlined perspectives fall into
two broad classiﬁcations and these are structural factors and agency. Modernization,
class conﬂict, ethnicity and political afﬁliation stress structural factors in explaining
political behavior and processes whereas Bayart’s thesis embraces political agency. This
then can easily be construed as following the same contours that are evident in structure
versus agency argument in tackling fundamental or classic question: Is it environmental
factors or individual choices which matter in explaining things that people do or political

64

processes? Or alternatively, how much weight or emphasis ought to be given to each one

of these variables?

In political science and sociology new and revised institutionalism or what is generally
termed “new institutionalism” in all its variants has revisited this debate of structure

. . . 115
versus agency With no clear-cut or deﬁnrtrve answers.

Mahoney and Snyder’s review
of the arguments advanced in agency, or what they term voluntarist, versus structure
arguments compellingly expose the futility of any “either” “or” scenario that is inherent
in this rigid binary approachm5 Even though their study is conﬁned to the subject of
regime change it is generally applicable to many studies which are trying to understand

political behavior and processes or even choices that political actors make. In the ﬁnal

analysis they suggest eclectic strategies which result in an integrated approach.

This is the position that is generally endorsed in this study as I proceed to deploy
perspectives outlined above in analyzing and interpreting this study’s empirical data. The
embrace of this integrated approach is premised on the view that the important issue is
not whether agency or structure explains the relationships of the rural elite. The most

important question is how each one of these factors interact with others to produce a

 

11""To mention a few articles that review issues associated with “new institutionalism: Koeble, T.
‘The New lnstitutionalism in political science and sociology” Comparative Politics January 1995;
Hall, P. “Political Science and the three New Institutionalisms" Political Studies 1996; lmmergut,
E. “The theoretical core of New lnstitutionalism" Politics and Society Vol. 26, No.1, 1998; Guy, P.
‘Political institutions, old and new” in Goodin, R & Klingermann, H(eds) A New handbook of

mﬂtical science 1996;

"sMahoney, J and Snyder, R. ‘Rethinking agency and structure in the study of regime change"
Studies in Commrative lntemational Development Summer 1999.

65

certain pattern of elite relations. Alternatively, one may ask when do these factors,
combined or individually, impact on or inﬂuence relations between various sectors of the
elite. From the very onset, it is argued that structural factors may structure choices that
political agents make thus shaping the very political processes. This does not necessarily
limit the options of individual actors but it tends to organize and aggregate interests of
individuals who act within environmental constraints. It is therefore conceivable that
traditional leaders, elected councilors and civic leaders will make political choices but
they do so because they are mindful of or conﬁned by the political institutions from

which they operate.

The above argument and the stated preference for eclectic strategy or integrated approach
should not be taken to mean that all variables, structural or agency, are equally important
at all time. This stance is taken only to demonstrate ﬂexibility that is adopted in assessing
various perspectives presented in the foregoing discussion. In the end each research
question and the manner in which empirical data is analyzed and interpreted will tend to
sift through these variables, in the process it will discard others while elevating or
afﬁrming others. In more speciﬁc terms and as a way of concluding this section,
modernization, nee-Marxist class approach, ethnicity, political identity/afﬁliation as well
as Bayart’s political contingency perspective will be used to establish some correlations

that exist within each different form of elite relations.

66

CHAPTER THREE

METHOD AND DESIGN

“The problem is not to show which methodolog is best but to explore

alternative ways of establishing a meaningful dialogue between ideas

and evidence.”m
A simple question, “how was this study conducted?”, compels one to reveal how a leap
was made from theory to an empirical research. In other words, an answer to this
question reveals, to paraphrase Charles Ragin, a framework within which dialogue
between ideas and evidence is conducted. This question leads to a number of related but
speciﬁc questions: What are the key concepts in this study? How are these concepts
adapted to suit the speciﬁc context of this study? Who are the subjects and what is the
material used as source of data? What are the procedures used to collect data? What are
the methods, techniques and instruments used? What is the population being studied?
Which sampling procedures are utilized? How is the data analyzed and interpreted? The
task of this chapter is to address these questions in a manner that outlines the design of
the study as well as the method used. At the very onset, let it be stated that this study has
a strong bias toward a comparative method which seeks to account for variation between

the units and cases being studied by identifying similarities and contrasts. A disclaimer is

 

"7Ragin, C. The comparative method: Moving bevond qualitative and quantitative strategies Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989.; p.3

67

also proper at this juncture. This study is not designed to establish causal linkages in a
strict scientiﬁc sense. It is, however, aimed at identifying, in a comparative manner,

relations between or between selected variables and analyzing trends.

This chapter is organized into the following sections: The ﬁrst section focuses on the
description of key terms used in this study. This is followed by an identiﬁcation and
description of the sources and type of data used in this study. The third section deals with
the population, research sites, sampling procedures and the sample of cases that are being
studied. The fourth section then focuses on the instruments used with particular emphasis
on the survey instruments that were utilized during the ﬁeld research. The last part

describes the analysis and interpretation of both the qualitative and quantitative data.

3.1. Key concepts

It is recalled that this study is an attempt to comparatively understand and explain
relations among the sectors of rural local elites in contemporary South Africa. Conﬂict
and accommodation are the two forms of relations under consideration. It follows,
therefore, that the conceptual cornerstones of this work are the elite, conﬂictual
relations and accommodative relations. This section will describe these key terms and
adapt them for the purpose of this study. A range of other terms or variables (leadership,
education, etlmicity, distribution of resources and party affiliation and identity) that are
used to explain the different types of relations will only be operationally deﬁned in the
results chapter. Each variable will be deﬁned before the results are presented. In this way,
these deﬁnitions provide an immediate context to the results as thus availing them as a

68

quick reference to the readers.

3.1.1. Deﬁning the elite and identifying the rural elite in South Africa

Who are the elites? What constitutes rural local elite in the contemporary South Africa?
An understanding of what the elite is and who are the rural elite in South Africa today is
to understand the population which is at the core of this study. It is, therefore, imperative
to brieﬂy outline some of the deﬁnitions of the elite thus paving way for identifying the

rural elite that was sampled for this study.

In order to understand the basic motivation of many elite theorists one has to go back to
the key question that confronts any political scientist, ‘who rules?’ The following
passage by Robert Putnam apprehends the essence and magnitude of this concern among
political scientists;

“Who rules? Has a fair claim to be the central question of empirical
political science, just as its normative counterpart, ‘who should rule?’ is
perhaps the central question of political philosophy. Like any truly
fundamental question about social relations, ‘Who rules?’ has generated a
long history speculative answers and a rich store of common knowledge.
Sage commentators, from Plato and Aristotle to our nightly television
newscasters, tell us much about power and leadership, but their
profundities, when carefully examined, often turn out to be incomplete and
ambiguous.”118

 

11$Putnam, R. The comm'ative studv of political elites Englewood Cliﬁs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976., p 2.

69

This observation provides a context for the deﬁnition the political elite.
Putnam asserts that classical elite theorists, namely Mosca, Pareto, and Michels share the
principle that,

“Political power, like other social goods, is distributed unequally. . . Essentially,

people fall into only two groups: Those who have signiﬁcant political power and

those who have none.”119
Even though many scholars share the assumptions about the elite there is no consensus on
the deﬁnition. However, there is broad agreement on the strategies for identifying elites.
There are three main procedures and these are positional analysis/approach, the
reputational analysis and the decisional analysis.120 For positional analysis, scholars
assess formal institutions of government to identify those who occupy top positions. On
the other hand, reputational approach relies more on inﬂuence or power that individuals
exercise even if they are not in formal or governmental institutions. Lastly, decisional
analysis identiﬁes the elite in terms of their ability to inﬂuence decisions by the way of
setting agenda, initiating and vetoing decisions. When all these approaches are utilized,
they assist in identifying the elite in both formal and informal institutions thus
acknowledging the complexity of power relations. In view of these procedures of
identifying the political elite it can be asserted that the political elite refers to those
individuals who exercise political power in a manner that affect decision-making in their
communities. This power may be derived from the positions they occupy in formal

institutions of government or from their reputation outside the formal setting. It may also

 

119Ibid., pp.3-4.

12C’Putnam, R., op cit, 1976 and Dreyer, L. The modern African elite of South Africa New York: St Martin’s
Press, 1989.

70

be a combination of both the formal and informal sources of power.

In the context of the present rural South Africa there are three major sectors of the elite,
namely, the traditional leaders/authorities, the elected local councilors and the civic
leaders. At the top of the traditional leadership hierarchy in a typical South African
village is a chief and below him are members of the traditional or tribal council/authority.
These may include a headmen, iinduna and ordinary council members who represent
their wards or sections of the village. Traditional authorities usually have an ofﬁce and a
secretary who is also counted as a member of traditional authority. In some cases the
members of traditional authorities have specialized roles whereas in some cases they are
just general members. The fact that traditional authority is a recognized local govemment
institution mean that its members can be identiﬁed using the positional approach. The
number of these traditional leaders varies from ﬁve to 15 in other administrative areas
and this is also determined by the size of the village under the jurisdiction of a chief as

well as the specialized roles that they perform.

The second sector of the local elite has members of the elected local councils who came
into existence after the 1995/96 local government election in South Africa Some
councilors were elected as ward representatives whereas some were elected on basis of
the proportional representation and their position in the party candidates’ lists. Again, the
number of representatives drawn from or representing rural communities varies from one
to as many as ten depending on the size and the type of local government structure. These
structures as well as the traditional authorities are discussed in greater detail in chapters

71

four and ﬁve. Elected councilors also form part of a formal government institution this
making the positional analysis the obvious procedure for identifying the elected local

elite.

The last category is the one of the civic leaders which largely represents the leaders of
community-based organizations and local party branches. The government commissioned
study of traditional leadership and institutions identiﬁed and listed the following
community organizations: sports committees, burial societies, water committees,
women’s committees, electricity committees, business committees, community health
forums, development committees, community welfare forums, church groups, cultural
organizations, widows forums, taxi associations, neighborhood watches, and statutory
bodies such as community police forums, school-goveming bodies, and political

parties.121

These various bodies demonstrate the vastness of the community-based organization
landscape from which civic leaders are drawn. In this study civic leaders refer to the
individuals who either occupy key leadership positions in these community organizations
or are identiﬁed as having a reputation of exercising inﬂuence over community activities
or decision-making processes and outcomes. Reputational approach, to some extent, suits
this sector as most of the elite operate outside the formal institutions. It is, however,

worth noting that most of the selected civic leaders also happened to occupy high

 

1”Department of Constitutional Development “Executive Summary of the Status Quo
Report on Traditional Leadership and Institutions”, August 1999. p.10.

72

positions in these community-based organizations thus making it possible to mix
positional and reputational as well as decision-making approach. The very nature and
vastness of community-based organization make any selection of civic leaders a
challenging exercise, and I will return to this point under the section that deals with
sampling procedures. In all, the positional approach, in a broad sense that extends to
leaders of non-formal institutions, was extensively used in identifying and selecting the
local elite from all the three sectors. This was largely necessitated by the fact that my
ﬁeld study did not extend over a long period to allow for an analysis of decision-making
processes or other complex forms of non-formal exercise of political power. This
procedure was, however, supplemented by the reputational analysis and this largely relied
on community members and leaders who were asked to identify inﬂuential individuals

within their respective communities.

Embedded in this work is the assumption that local political relations are generally
shaped by the elite relationship whether in mobilizing for conﬂict or cooperating for
speciﬁc projects. Elite factional cleavages and resultant struggles for control as well as
reciprocal assimilation generally deﬁne the nature and pattem of relationship, and this is,
to some extent, inﬂuenced by the institutional environment and the availability of

material resources.

3.1.2. Conflictual and accommodative elite relations
Conﬂictual and accommodative relations are the key variables this study is trying to
explain. It is, therefore, important to outline what conﬂictual and what

73

accommodative/cooperative relations entail in this context. Conﬂictual relations are
conceptualized in a general sense to include all forms of relationship where the elite
groups are working at a cross-purpose against each other in a manner that makes
cooperation impossible in all or most projects. This must be sustained or protracted state
over the years rather than a single event. Intensity may vary from time to time. The range
of conﬂict instances or checklist is from physical confrontation, physical intimidation,
legal disputes, protest actions/marches, blockades or prevention of the contending
group’s activities, organized boycotts of activities, to damage to property, organize public
rallies against opponents, deﬁance campaigns/activities. These range ﬁ'om tension

between the key protagonists and an open physical conﬁontation.

Accommodative relations include active and visible cooperation, working toward a
common purpose, having an established mechanism of resolving potential and actual
problems, difﬁrsed participation in activities organized by each structure, allowing and
even actively support each structure to organize its activities. These categories of conﬂict
and accommodation were created after extensively reviewing secondary and primary
literature regarding predominant local community relations and incidents of conﬂict and

reports of cooperation.

3.2. Sources and the nature of data

A wide range of secondary and primary sources of data were used. Secondary sources
included books, articles from academic journals, conference papers, discussion
documents or working papers and newspapers. The data collected from the secondary

74

sources forms the basis of literature review and theoretical background, a historical
overview of South Aﬁican rural local government as well as the chapter focusing on the
contemporary institutions and political processes in the South African rural areas. The
primary sources used include the individuals and groups interviewed during the ﬁled
survey, the government documents and policy position papers of the South African
interest groups and political parties. The data collected in my previous surveys on
traditional leadership and rural local politics is also used as a supplementary material to
this study. The survey covered traditional leaders, elected local government ofﬁcials,
civic leaders, government ofﬁcials and experts on the subject of traditional rulership and
local government. The ﬁeldwork part of this study was conducted between April 5'1. and
September 30“1 of 2000. The data collected from the ﬁeldwork, particularly the ﬁeld
survey, features prominently in chapter six which presents a proﬁle of the selected
communities as well as chapters seven and eight which focus on summarizing and

analyzing survey results.

Both qualitative and quantitative data was collected and is used in this study. Quantitative
data is mainly generated from the demographic section of the semi-structured interviews.
These include personal details such as age, ethnic afﬁliation, ownership of resources
(land, farm, business, and livestock), place of birth, party membership, and employment
status. The opinions, attitudes and views of the respondents form the qualitative part of
the survey data. Quantitative data form the basis of chapter seven and chapter eight which
summarize and analyze numerical data On the other hand, chapter six which focuses on
the history and narratives of respondents has a qualitative bias.

75

Discussion and interpretation of results in chapter nine show that qualitative and
quantitative data supplement and complement each other. For example, the qualitative
data as used in proﬁling selected communities provide some depth and capture
dimensions which are not easily apprehended when using quantitative or numeric data.
The narratives that are drawn from the qualitative portion of the interviews provide an
account of each community in a manner that reveals history and evolution of relationship
among the key players. It also gives voice to the participants and also provides context to
relational dynamics of each community. In this way one is able to see reality through the
eyes of participants as it is in this form that perceptions and rationalization of individual

actors’ actions.

3.3. Population and sample

The foregoing discussion has identiﬁed the rural local elite of South Africa as the target
population. The different sectors of the target population include the traditional leaders,
elected local councilors and the civic leaders. The ﬁndings of this study will ultimately be
generalized to this population in South Africa. These ﬁndings will also help to formulate
hypotheses in the future studies of rural local government politics in Africa. This will
indirectly help in evaluating some of the general assumptions about rural political

dynamics (institutions and political processes) in Africa.

In order to have a general sense of the numbers of elected councilors and traditional
leaders the following ﬁgures and comments are provided. In South Africa rural areas
constitute two broad categories. The ﬁrst category includes the village settlements which

76

are predominantly occupied by blacks. The second category covers predominantly white

commercial farms some of which have black tenants.

To cover communities with traditional leaders, elected councilors and civic leaders, this
study targeted the former or more speciﬁcally the rural areas which are under the
jurisdiction of traditional leaders or chiefs. Almost all these administrative units are
located in the former black Bantustans or homelands (See map] ). Today these areas are
part of South Aﬁica’s six provinces, and these are Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal,
Mpumalanga, Free State, Northwest and the Northern Province. Of South Africa’s new
nine provinces only three fall outside the scope of provinces with areas that fall under the
jurisdiction of chiefs and these exempted provinces are Gauteng, Western Cape and

Northem Cape (See Map 2).

The following ﬁgures, provided in 1996 by the Department of Constitutional
Development, give a sense of magnitude of the areas under the jurisdiction of traditional
leaders. About 17% of South Africa’s territory which is occupied by an estimated 40% of

the entire population or 17 million people falls under the rule oftraditional authorities.122

The sectors of the rural elite that are under consideration are traditional leaders, elected
local councilors and the civic leaders. The number of traditional leaders in South Africa

is estimated at 800 even though these ﬁgures are disputed and constantly change

 

l:zKessel, I. and Oomen, B “One chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in post-
apartheid South Africa.” in Aﬁican Affairs 96 (1997), p.561.

77

depending of how one deﬁnes traditional leaders. For instance, Kessel and Oomen stretch
this estimate to about 10,000123 but presumably are including iinduna or headmen and
members of traditional authority councils. Another study estimates that there are more
than 300 chiefs with KwaZulu-Natal having 300.124 Maloka gives the following
breakdown of traditional leaders in the present South Africa: 17 kings, paramount chiefs
and queens; 787 chiefs and 2210 headmen and iinduna. He also puts chieﬁs in KwaZulu-
Natal at more than 285. The Eastern Cape more paramount chiefs and deputy
paramount(at l 1) chiefs than any province and accounts for half the number of all the
headmen in South Africa125 Taken together, these ﬁgures underscore the complexity of
identifying the entire population of South Africa’s traditional leaders as well as the

vastness and regional variation of this population.

The overall number of South African elected councilors as constituted after the ﬁrst

democratic local government elections of 1995/96 is 11,118.126

 

123lhiti,p.5t51.

12‘Traditional Leaders Research Group, “Vol.VIII: Development management— The
administrative and legal position of traditional authorities in South Africa and their
Contribution to the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Program.
1996: p.64.

125Malolca, T. “Populism and the politics of chieﬁaincy and the nation-building in the New
South Africa”, Journgl of Contemporary Africgn Studies Vol.14, No.2, 1996: p.191.

”Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development “The White Paper on
Local Government”, March 1998; p.144.

78

The provincial breakdown is as follows.

Table: 3.1. Distribution of council seats and municipalities in SA local government

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Provinces Number of council seats Number of Municipalities
1.Eastem Cape 1935 177
2.Free State 1308 102
3.Gauteng 1043 38
4.KwaZulu-Natal 21 59 l 19
5.Mpumalanga 1 102 76
6.Limpompo/N. Province 81 1 68
7.Northern Cape 559 48
8.Northwest 755 50
9.Westem Cape 1446 1 13
Total 11,1 18 791

 

These ﬁgures include all local government structures in South Africa and this includes

the metropolitan city areas, towns and rural areas. Many rural areas before the second

loeal government elections of December 2000 had no municipal structure of their own.

These areas were represented in the district councils by councilors drawn from the rural

79

 

areas, oﬂen representing political parties.

When it comes to the civic leaders there are neither numbers nor even estimates. The
reason for this is that most of these leaders are drawn from non-statutory bodies or
community-based organizations. There is also no stability in terms of numbers as these
leaders may leave or die or their inﬂuence wanes without them being replaced. Some of
the community organizations rise to prominence when they mobilize around speciﬁc
issues and they fade away when the problem in question has been tackled. For an
example, many SAN CO structures collapsed in the Eastern Cape once the elections were
over or in some cases when land allocation process had been completed.127 Furthermore,
the number of recognized civic leaders varies from one community to another. All these

factors make it difficult to estimate the number of civic leaders in South Africa.

3.4. Research instruments

In this section procedures and techniques that were used to collect data are brieﬂy
outlined. Focus group meetings were held with a group of local leaders. A separate
meeting was organized for each sector of the local elite. More speciﬁcally, traditional
leaders, elected leaders and civic leaders were met as a group with the aim of having a
sense of what were the key issues to be considered in each community. In the case of
Rode the civic leaders were divided into those supporting the chief and were members of

UDM and those who were SAN CO/AN C members and most of whom were opposed to

 

127 Unpublished study conducted by the author in collaboration with G. Houston, November 1995-
January 1996.

80

the chief. Given the level of tension within the civic leadership, I anticipated problems if
they were to be called into the same meeting so I organized a separate meeting for each
group. At one stage the members of the opposing group would come to the community
hall where the focus group discussions were held, and they would peep through the
windows shouting at those I was conducting group discussions with. At times I would
hear words like, “don’t believe a thing they are telling you, they are liars, don’t listen to
them.” Notwithstanding all these tensions and diﬁiculties, I navigated through these and
this experience helped me to be better prepared by the time I met with similar situations
in KwaZulu-Natal where joint group meetings with both AN C and IFP local leaders were

virtually impossible given the level of a mutual animosity.

These focus group discussions were valuable in giving me a sense of what was important
in each community as well as the issues to be considered in the interview sessions.
Portions of narrative history of individual communities were also constructed from the
material obtained in these group discussions and supplemented with the secondary

material as earlier indicated in this chapter.

The instrument of choice was a social survey in a form of face-to—face or personal
interviews. The interview schedule was semi-structured to allow ﬂexibility that would
make it possible to extract both the qualitative and quantitative data. The ﬁrst portion of
each interview was designed to obtain information on demographic characteristics of
each respondent. These included age, gender, income level, ethnic afﬁliation, languages
spoken, marital status, birthplace, level of education, political afﬁliation, past political

81

history (afﬁliation and activism), ownership of livestock, ownership of farming ﬁelds,
and ownership of a plot of land on which to build a house. This part of the interview is

close-ended with speciﬁc choices or option for each respondent.

The qualitative part of the interviews provided critical information on the history of the
target communities, their past and present conﬂicts, attitudes, perceptions and opinions
on a wide range of issues including each participant’s policy preference and
understanding or interpretation of relations among the sectors of the local elite. In this
section respondents were asked to express their opinion on a wide range of issues such as
their view on chiefs’ open participation in party politics, land tenure policies,
transparency and representativeness of traditional authority and elected councils.
Perception of local relations (conﬂict and cooperation) among the local elite as well as
deﬁnition of roles of different sectors of the local elite also featured in these interview
guides. The actual questions used in this survey will feature in the data analysis chapter
(chapter seven). This qualitative portion of the interview tended to be open-ended thus
making it more challenging to code. The open-ended nature of these interview questions,
however, does not mean that participants were not subjected to the same set of questions
as reﬂected in the interview guide. This simply means that probing or follow-up
questions were asked for clariﬁcation or more detail. Most of the above variables are
measured at a nominal level in a form of categories and this inﬂuenced the choice of
statistical tools of analysis as it will be shown in the subsequent discussion below. I
personally conducted the interviews and most of them were recorded using a micro-
recorder whenever a participant granted me permission. These interviews took place in

82

the homes and ofﬁces of respondents, and this was based on the choice of respondents.
Furthermore, most of these interviews were conducted in vernacular languages and later
translated into English during transcription. Prior to each interview, I read out the letter
of consent to each participant. This letter introduces and identiﬁes the interviewer; it then
brieﬂy describes the aims and objectives of the study. It continues by describing the
voluntary nature of the study and provides assurances of anonymity and conﬁdentiality.
Each interview commenced once a participant agreed to participate upon their ﬁrll

understanding of the contents of the letter of consent.

3.5. Data presentation, analysis and interpretation
The foregoing discussion indicated that a wide range of data is used and this is reﬂected
in its presentation in various chapters. Brieﬂy, chapter two, four and ﬁve focuses more on

interpretive discourse analysis and description of political processes and institutions.

Chapters six, seven and eight draw extensively from the survey data In chapter six this
data is presented in a descriptive form of narratives that are drawn from the qualitative
aspects of the interviews and focus group discussions. Chapters six and seven are more
quantitative. A majority of these results are nominal variables with a remaining few given
at an ordinal level. As indicated earlier, the nominal level of measurement as well as the
categorical nature of data limited the options that are suitable for this kind of data. This is
the case with ordinal level variables as they are tested or compared with categorical data
thus having the same effect of limiting the range of statistical tests. As a consequence,
descriptive summary statistics are extensively used to provide, for a comparative purpose,

83

averages and trends of the data Tables and graphic comparison through charts are used
to present and compare these ﬁgures across cases and individuals. Once trends are
observed, the next step conducted are statistical tests to indicate whether these observed
frequencies and variations are statistically signiﬁcant or due to chance. Nonparametric
inferential statistical tests are used to establish this association or to test the hypotheses.
More speciﬁeally, Chi-Square is used to test association between two samples on each
one of the measured variables. It should be remembered that Chi-Square only tests the
existence or nonexistence of association between variables but does not test strength or
direction of relationship. To partially compensate for this limitation I utilized Crarner’s V
test which, in addition to testing association, indicates the strength of relationships
between given variables. Cross-tabulation is used to present the distribution of variables

across categories under consideration in the data set.

In chapter seven the emphasis is on identifying trends, using graphic illustrations of
scores on each variable (age, ethnicity, education, distribution of resources, views on
traditional land tenure, New Municipal Demarcation Law, opinion on traditional values
and customs, on corruption in traditional authority, perception of the role and inﬂuence
each elite has on local government institutions and opposition to payment of services in
rural areas). The assessment is aimed at ﬁnding out if there are trends associating
aggregated scores of individuals in conﬂict communities and those in non-conﬂict
communities. For example, if there is a huge and systematic discrepancy in terms of the
levels of education of traditional leaders and those of their key rivals or elected
councilors/civic leaders in conﬂict communities and this is not the case in non-conﬂict

84

communities then a relationship is conﬁrmed by identifying this trend. There is no clear
trend or aggregated scores in both types of relations are similar then it is concluded that
there is no relationship or pattern along the lines of type of relations. As indicated above,
the last step is to assess if these observed frequencies are statistically signiﬁcant by using
Chi-Square tests statistical tests with particular interpretation of the value of Pearson Chi-
square and Cramers V value and signiﬁcance level. In chapter eight a similar evaluation
is conducted but the diﬁ‘erence here is that the focus is on whether the statistically
signiﬁcant results have a regional dimension or, put differently, do regional factors

provide any further insights on the observed results.

In the ﬁnal chapter all the results of the study ﬁ'om chapters six, seven and eight are
considered in view of theoretical work reviewed in the literature as well as the hypotheses
outlined at the beginning of this study. This interpretive work is provided not just for the
variables that emerged as showing some relationship with the type of elite relations, this
is also extended to those that did not show relationship and plausible explanations are
provided. It is also in this ﬁnal chapter that I allude to some of the subtle indication that
leadership attributes may also be a factor in these local relations even though this variable
was not measured directly in this study. By a way of conclusion, it should be stated that

this work aims at afﬁrming some theories and hypotheses rather than testing them.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOUTH AFRICAN RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH
TIME: A HISTORICAL OVERIVIEW

“The present is the past rolled up for action, and the past is the present unrolled for
understanding”‘”

The current rural local government institutional arrangement, political processes and
prevailing relations among the local elites cannot be understood in a vacuum hence it is
imperative to lay out its pertinent historical context from the very onset. This chapter will
present a historical overview which will primarily focus on the evolution, manipulation
and mutation of indigenous political institutions or chieftaincy from the pre-colonial
period through colonial and apartheid era. The rationale for singling out traditional
authority or chieftaincy is based on the fact that it has been, until recently, the primary
institution of rural local government for the African people. Moreover, it has been a
predominant political entity thus making it a primary target of chiefs’ subjects, rival local
elites and the colonial/apartheid govemments. In addition, a general survey of literature
suggests that the institution of traditional authority is one of the most enduring features of
Aﬁican political life and history. It has survived from the pre-colonial period, through

colonial rule and apartheid, and it is still a prominent feature of the post-apartheid South

 

‘33 Durant, W and Durant, A The Lessons of Histcml968.
86

Africa

With regard to the African continent, there is a general consensus among the Aﬁican and
Africanist scholars about the political survival of traditional rulership even though there
are divergent views on the form and nature ofthese institutions particularly in the context
of post-independence politics.129 Understanding political relations among the various
sectors of rural elite is, in essence, to understand how the elected local ofﬁcials and civic
leaders relate with the traditional authority as it is an entrenched institution around and
against which local elite relations are formed. This, therefore, establishes a link with the
central theme of this study which is primarily concerned with types of relations between
traditional leaders and the elected local ofﬁcials and or civic leaders. In this particular
case the focus is on these relations as they occur in the rural communities during the post-

apartheid South Africa.

For the purpose of this work the evolution of rural local government in South Africa is
divided into four broad phases or eras and these are: Pre-colonial Era, Colonial Era,
Apartheid Era and the Post-apartheid Era. In this chapter I will focus on the ﬁrst three
phases which provide a historical context for the current phase which is discussed in
chapter four. Since the colonial phase, traditional authority has undergone reformation
and transformation as provided for by a series of laws. These laws, as this chapter shows,

did not only transform relations between the state and traditional leaders but also

 

129 Examples of these are the following works: Markovitz, op cit 1977; Miller, op cit,
1968; Sklar, op cit, 1993; Kataboro & Munene, op cit, 1994; Ntsebeza, op cit, 1999;
Maloka, op cit, 1996).

87

impacted on local relations between chiefs and their subjects. It is, however, important to
note that traditional leaders reacted in a variety of manners to these imposed laws, and
that was an important factor in determining relations between the traditional leaders and

their subject. This point is developed later in this chapter and in the subsequent chapters.

4.1. Indigenous political institutions and political processes in the Pre-colonial Era
Before embarking on a brief description of the pre-colonial period it is important to point
out some inherent problems in the literature that deals with this subject. There are three
general problems with this literature. Firstly, extensive use of oral narratives to
reconstruct the past is, to a considerable extent, prone to inaccuracies arising from the
fact that these accounts tend to weave together mythology, folklore, legends and
historical facts. Sometimes a romanticized ideal picture of harmony born out of a
consensus, which has little relation to the harsh political realities of the time, is projected
and uncritically embraced as a historical fact. For example, the generally accepted notion
of the consensus-based direct Aﬁican style of democracy in which the community
deliberated under a tree sits uncomfortably when juxtaposed with many accounts of
leadership factions, rivalries, plots and assassinations as well as the use of coercive
measures to force compliance. Secondly, the early documented eye-witness accounts by
white missionaries and explorers as well as colonial settlers also have two fundamental
ﬂaws. These initial encounters were seen through the prism of another culture thus
making it hard to understand or explain some of the subtle aspects and symbols that
deﬁned these indigenous entities. Even more important is the fact that these chroniclers

were not neutral dispassionate observers as they had a speciﬁc mission to conquer and
88

convert the indigenous peoples thus obviating any objective appreciation of what they
perceived to be “primitive” systems, and therefore objects of a civilizing mission.
Thirdly, indigenous political units varied widely, from a band of hunter-gather nomads to
settled agriculture-based or pastoralist chiefdoms as well as a few large kingdoms. Most
of these entities were in a state of becoming or work-in-progress as they were evolving
all the time and essentially ﬂuid in both size and form. The profound reconﬁguration of
Southern Africa’s political landscape during the Mfecane wars reinforces and ampliﬁes
this point. Out of these disparate units and against the backdrop of all the limitations
listed above, any generalization about the pre-colonial institutions is ﬁaught with

problems.

The above-stated problems do not, however, diminish the importance of indigenous
institutions and processes which later became an object of transformation and
manipulation by successive colonial and apartheid administrations. It is for this reason
that some reference will be made to some broad features of indigenous political

institutions which formed the foundational base of the present rural local government.

Different accounts identify chiefs, in some few instances kings, as central ﬁgures in many
pre-colonial African communitiesl 30. Chiefs had executive, administrative, judicial and
military powers vested in them thus allowing a classic case of patrimonial rule to prevail

in a setting where the person and the political entity were fused. At a religious level there

 

130 Hunter, op cit,l965; Hammond-Tooke, op cit, 1975; Beinart, op cit, 1982; Camaroff,
0p cit, 1970; Ayittey, op cit, 1991)
89

were many chief-centered communal rituals such as harvest-related ceremonies, the
strengthening of the army, treatment of crops and ritual performances aimed at
preventing bad weather or calamities. Another source of tribal cohesion that was built
around the chief was a common belief that he was a direct descendent of the founding
ancestor of the group. Hence people traced their history through the royal pedigree and
reference to people by the name of their chief or his ancestors. To illustrate this point
ﬁrrther, a considerable number of Southern Aﬁican ethnic and sub-ethnic groups carry

the name of their founder, and these would include Pondo, Pondomise, Xesibe, Swati or

Ngwane.

The following case of the Mpondomise is a typical example of many Xhosa chiefdoms’
political structure. In terms of the Mpondomise political hierarchy, there is a senior chief
or what was later renamed by colonial authorities as a paramount chief (Nkosr' enkulu).
Then there are chiefs or iinkosi who rule their own districts or large tracts of land made
up of a cluster of villages. These iinkosi were, in some instances still are, usually royal
princes who were brothers or sons of the reigning paramount chief. Below the chiefs
there were iziduna, later known as izibonda or headmen, who administered
wards/location or ilali. A location would be made up of a cluster of homesteads and the
male heads of these homesteads or lineage groups would then form a council to assist the
local headman. The headman was appointed by the ward council. In return the headman
would be part of a council advising the chief who was one level above them. The smallest
unit is an isithebe which is a section of a ward which is usually a kinship group within a

ward and each headed by the senior member according to that group’s lineage.
9O

In terms of succession, the chief was usually the eldest son of his father’s principal wife.
In genealogical terms he held a hereditary position by being the most senior member of
the most senior lineage and clan within the tribe. In the event where the heir was a minor,
a regent was designated and preferred regents were relatives especially brothers of the
heir’s father. It is, therefore, by birthright or ascription rather than election that chiefs
were chosen for the line of succession. Succession, however, was not always a smooth or
automatic process as Ayittey points out;

“The chiefs eldest son could be blocked from succession if he were found

to be unﬁt or mentally incompetent to govern. Other considerations

included his past cqlglduct, his mannerisms, his capacity to lead, his valour,

and his popularity .

In some instances succession struggles led to bloodbath, assassination and subsequent
breakaway of some claimants to the throne. This merely indicates that the unwritten rules
of succession were always open to interpretation and contestation which often led to
bitter and protracted power struggles or even worse, a breakaway from or break up of
chiefdom. To reinforce this point one can point at some of the prominent cases such as
the Zulu king Shaka’s assassination by his brothers and close advisors as well as the

break away of chieszilikazi from Shaka’s kingdom.132

Even though the chief or king was a central ﬁgure in these political units there is a

 

131Ayittey, op cit, 1991: p.43

132Omar-Cooper, J. The Zulu Aftermath 1966 and Omer-Cooper, J. Egon! of Southern Afric_a 1994

91

preponderance of evidence of checks and balances to counterbalance chieﬂy exercise of
power over his subjects and this primarily came in a form of amaphakathi/iinduna or
councillors and close advisors as well as imbr'zo or public meetings or general assemblies.
The nature and the extent of these checks and balances differ from one account to another

as well as across ethnic groups. John Camaroﬁ' recalls Schapera’s account of Tswana
chiefs;

“...the chief was the executive head of his political community: he had the sole
right to summon councils and public meetings to discuss legislation or
administrative matters; he presided over the highest court and had exclusive
authority over indigenous coercive agencies; and he was held accountable for the
mystical well-being of the tribe, an obligation which included a difﬁcult task of
ensuring abundant rainfall. In short, the chief was thought to exercise control over
all the affairs of government within his chiefdom. Tswana ofﬁce-holders are
generally characterized as having wielded considerable power, albeit limited by
the right of their senior advisors, councillors and close kinsmen to guide them and
to admonish them for injudicious or autocratic behaviour”.133

Maloka gives another version in which a chief had even more limitations in his exercise
of power;
“But chiefs were relatively weak, as their power was circumscribed by the
khoﬁrla (council of advisors recruited from homestead heads), and the
pitso/imbizo (an assembly of able-bodied men). Dissatisﬁed subjects could

always leave to attach themselves to another chief. Sometimes disputes

over succession could result in break-away of some members of the
chiefdom.”‘3‘

Both of these accounts demonstrate some form institutional framework allowing for

counter-balancing chiefs power as well as somewhat diffused locus of power within a

 

‘33 Camaroﬁ’,.J., op cit, 1970: p.37.
134 , . -
Maloka, T., op crt, 1993: p.37

92

political entity which was essentially hierarchical.

Rutsch135 and Zungu136 present an administrative hierarchy of the Zulu pre-colonial
political units. At the bottom of this hierarchy was a family, often an extended family,
otherwise known as a kraal in some parts of the country. The male head of this
homestead or umnumzane administered the family. Several families clustered within a
given location/ilaIi/zlsr‘godi were under the administration of an induna/isibonda who
collectively ruled in consultation with heads of homesteads. The iinduna represented their
areas in a tribal council which was led by a chief of a given tribe or ethnic group. Iinduna
were chiefs extensions in their various locations while at the same time representing the
interest of their subjects in a tribal authority. In most instances one of the iinduna,
especially a trusted friend of a chief, was appointed to be a special advisor to the chief
thus giving him a deputizing position. In his own ward, each induna had a duty of, among
other things, allocating land in consultation with the ward council of elders and heads of
homesteads. The position of an induna was often not hereditary as he was either
appointed by a chief from the elders and heads of homesteads of a given ward.
Hammond-Tooke’s workm, however, demonstrate that there were exceptions to this
trend as shown by many Pondo and Pondomise chiefs who tended to appoint their

brothers or sons ﬁ'om the royal family to play the role of headmanship or izibonda, a

 

13$Rutsch, P. “Traditional Trauma” in Indicator South Africa Vol.12, No.2.,l995, p.36.

136Zungu, S. in Diescho lgditionﬂ—mgd contemporgrv forms of local particrp' ation and self government

1996: p.32

137Hmnrnond-Tooke, W Command and Consensus: Development of Transkeian local government 1975.

93

Pondo equivalent of induna. These is yet another demonstration of how practice was and
is as important as the rules that are stipulated in the customs or the laws that guide each
chiefdom. Among the Nguni there were other specialized roles and portfolios of induna
such as induna yezintsizwa whose role was to mobilize and train the young warriors.
Some ethnic groups had a collection of different clans or sub-ethnic communities under
diﬁ‘erent chiefs with a king at the apex of that hierarchy. The Zulu kingdom is a classic
case of this structure. Since the primary level is at local units under chiefs the role and

functions of a king and a kingdom are beyond the scope of this work.

Hammond-Tooke138 and Hunter’s”9 work on the Cape Nguni or various Xhosa groups
indicate the existence of indigenous institutions which have many common features
though with some subtle variations. Hammond-Tooke asserts that “A basic dictum of
Cape Nguni political theory was that the chief should always defer to the general opinion
of his council.”140 In a more nuanced interpretation of the same dictum he elaborates
while at the same time pointing out some political dynamics around this ideal situation.

“Theoretically, then, a good chief need never involve himself in disputes

with his tribesmen. Ifhe conﬁnes his role to being a mere mouthpiece of

the court or moot any blame could be safely sidetracked onto his

councillors, who must have given him bad advice or made a wrong

decision. But there were always some chiefs who did assert their
authority— and this held potential for secession.”141

 

138rhitl

139Hunter, M. Reaction to Conquegt 1961.
14oI-Iarnmond-Tooke, op cit, 1975, p.36.
l“‘lhitl, p.36.

94

The above observation does illustrate a consensus-based indigenous political system with
checks and balances while at the same time indicating that there were some deviations
from this practice. On the notion of secession as a tool of protest or resistance to
autocratic chiefs it is important to note that pre-colonial tribal secession meant that a
breakaway group would migrate elsewhere. With the advent of colonial rule and the
modern state system there is no such ﬂexibility of boundaries or readily available land on
which to settle breakaway groups thus limiting this option as a viable political threat or
tool and consequently retaining cleavages that generate elite rivalries within a ﬁxed

community.

Perhaps the most salient aspect of this pre-colonial phase is the fact that traditional rulers’
source of legitimacy, support and resources was almost exclusively their subjects with the
exception of war compensations or forceful capture of resources especially livestock,
from other chiefdoms. The advent of colonialism and the modern state system had a
profound impact on the nature of the relationship between traditional rulers and their

subjects as the following discussion shows.

The pre-colonial phase of African autonomous chiefdoms ended abruptly and often
violently when colonial forces conquered one chiefdom/kingdom after another. As the
curtain fell on this era many traditional leaders were still enjoying popular support ﬁ'om
their subjects particularly because they led wars of resistance against the invading

colonial forces.

4.2. The colonial era and the new administrative laws for the African communities.
Even though the ﬁrst European (Dutch) settlers arrived in 1652, it was not until the latter
part of the 19th century that the colonial administration was ﬁnally imposed on all African
communities. Before the Union of South Africa came into existed in 1910 there were four
colonies, namely, the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal. The Cape and Natal
were British colonial provinces whereas the latter originally were autonomous republics
under the Boers or Dutch settlers who established themselves in the interior regions in a
bid to escape British rule. During this period there was no common and systematic
approach to native administration. Each colony or republic followed a different approach
but with one general objective of neutralizing and manipulating traditional authorities and
ultimately turning them into functionaries of the colonial administration without
necessarily micro-managing the everyday life of their communities. The following
observation by Beinart captures the essence of colonial motives in their dealing with
African chiefs;

“Rather than destroy the chiefs in the Transkei Territories, except for those

who had openly rebelled against the Colony, the administration sought to

deprive them of many of their independent powers, make them dependent

on the state, and use their remaining authority to ease the implementation

of colonial rule.”142
Just to give an example of some different provincial approaches, in the 18505 Natal

Administrator, Theophilus Shepstone, recognized administrative units under chiefs but

placed them under jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Govemor of the colony who could

 

142Beinartw. The Political economy of Pondoland 1860 to 1930 1982: p.104.

96

depose and impose chiefs. According to
Rutsch,

“In order to control the chiefs and residents of the reserves, Shepstone
made the governor the Supreme Chief over all Aﬁicans, with the power to
appoint, recognize and depose amaldrosr' and izinduna. He ruled that
indigenous law would only apply if it did not oﬁ’end the concepts of
civilized behaviour purporting to exist under Roman Dutch Law.””3

As a direct consequence of this law traditional leaders were transformed into servants and
functionaries of the colonial administration from being masters of their own ethnic
groups. This also led to the actual appointment by the governor of chiefs who had no
hereditary claim to chieﬁaincy. By the same token many legitimate chiefs were replaced
or deposed on suspicion of insubordination which simply meant that they were deemed as
not closely cooperating with colonial administration. The following directive of
Shepstone leaves no doubt on the real motives of the colonial administration in passing
this law,

“...inforrn the young chief and the old men of the tribe, that in this colony,
chieﬁainship does not depend on hereditary succession, but upon appointment by
the Supreme Chief...that the Supreme Chief is always willing to appoint sons of
deceased chiefs, where those sons are found ﬁt for the duties required of them,
and he is willing to do so in this instance, but the young man must be made to
understand clearly, that if, by his conduct he is found unﬁt for the position of
chief; the Supreme Chief will order his immediate deposition and appoint one
more trustworthy in his place. He must also be told that the pe0ple of whom he
has been allowed to take charge, are not his people, that they belong to and are
subjects of the government and that he is allowed to take charge of them on behalf
of the govemment.”144

 

143Rutsch, op cit,l995: p.36
‘“map%.

97

This directive clearly articulates Shepstone’s policy and it also indicates how he intended
to transform chiefs into civil servants in service of the colonial administration.
Chieftaincy whose foundation is based on heredity was about to be transformed into
selection by appointment where the chief were not fully collaborating with the
administration. Shepstone’s law was subsequently extended to all other South African

provinces with some modiﬁcations.

In the Cape Colony the Prime Minister, Cecil John Rhodes promoted and passed the Glen
Grey Act of 1894. This Act made provisions for the establishment of district councils in
the native areas of the Cape, and these were to be chaired by District Magistrates. The
Magistrate had the powers to appoint headmen in their districts and once appointed they
were answerable to him. Some of these appointed headmen were actually hereditary
chiefs and some of the chiefs who were deemed rebellious or insubordinate were
replaced. As a result of this law, many chiefs were supplanted by appointed headmen,
and the magistrates became administrators and legislators of areas once ruled by chiefs.
The duties of these appointed headmen included law and order as well as the welfare of
the location under their jurisdiction. In all, the position of hereditary chiefs had been
blunted as the headmen gained prominence, at least in eyes of the colonial administrators.
The other provision of this Act aimed at changing land tenure from the traditional
communal system to an individual land tenure based on surveyed plots. The effect of this
provision is that it would take away the powers of the chiefs who held the land in trust

thus meaning that no one could claim the land as an individual property.

98

In the Boer Republics the conquered chiefs and their communities were allowed to live as
tenants in the areas which had been designated as white ﬁrms. The African communities
continued to live under the rule of their chiefs who liaised with their white landlords who
did not necessarily extend a formal recognition of chiefs as such. In these Boer-controlled
territories there was not an attempt to develop systematic policy toward the
administration of the African communities and these communities were generally left to
the mercy of individual landlords. This is a sharp contrast to the British-administered
territories as the above discussion has shown. With their powers 'considerably reduced

and roles redeﬁned chieﬁaincy survived albeit in a different form.

The uniﬁcation of the four colonies into a Union of South Africa in 1910 ushered a new
era in which a standard policy to deal with what colonial administrators referred to as
“Native Problem” or “Native Question”. This was the beginning of attempts to
standardize and bureaucratize the traditional authority in South Aﬁica along the general
policy of Indirect Rule which Britain applied in most of its colonies. The ﬁrst landmark
policy which set the tone or foreshadowed the subsequent administrative and legal
developments was the 1913 Native Land Act. This law created reserves for Africans
which eﬁ‘ectively conﬁned them to 13% of the land and designating the rest to the white
minority. It will be recalled that all the areas targeted by this study fall within these black
reserves which later became bantustans under the apartheid regime. This also meant that
these communities were conﬁned in areas where they were crowded with scarce

resources particularly land for both ﬁrming and for building houses.

99

The other major legislation which had direct bearing on rural local government was the
Native Administration Act of 1927 which was essentially a synthesis of the Glen Grey
Act and the Natal Shepstonian policy. This Act extended the district council system to
other African reserves in the Union. In this instance the Govemor General of the Union
was proclaimed the “Supreme Chief’ of all Africans thus making him preside over the
traditional leaders and their communities. The other aspect of Native Administration Act
was to give powers to the Governor-General to extend recognition to existing chiefs or
appoint new chiefs where it was deemed necessary. This elevated some of these chiefs to
the same legal status as headmen who were already functioning in terms of the 1894 Glen
Grey Act. This policy also made provisions for the segregation of the administration of
justice with reserves generally subjected to the customary laws and courts. Hammond-
Tooke describes the role stipulated by the Native Administration Act as follows;

“Appointed chiefs were granted authority to exercise tribal government

and control and to perform the administrative functions prescribed by the

Government Notice, while recognized chiefs had no administrative

ﬁrnctions and merely accorded the rank and customary privileges of a

Native chief in or over any tribe or portion of a tribe, but without any

administrative or official authority on behalf of the Government over any

person or any land.”145
The above distinction can be seen as an attempt by the colonial administration to harness
long ignored chiefs into its orbit with a promise of appointment should they support its

goals or worked with the administration. It was also recognition of the de ﬁcto rulership

of many hereditary chiefs parallel to their appointed headmen. After all, many chiefs,

 

MSl-larrlmond-Tooke, op cit, 1975: p.92.

through traditional loyalties that surrounded their position, operated as alternative
structure to the colonial administration or their surrogate headmen so this move to extend
recognition was an acknowledgment of their continued importance outside the formal

institutions.

4.3. The Apartheid era
The apartheid government which came to power in 1948 changed the official policy
toward traditional leaders. The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act became a foundation for the
new policy with the ultimate goal of establishing separate self-goveming homelands
outside the areas designated for whites. This Act was promoted as an attempt to return to
traditional chiefdom as a core of African self-govemment so the new tribal authority was
purportedly based on chiefdoms. Govan Mbeki describes the extent to which the
government, or more speciﬁcally the Minister of Bantu Affairs, was going to control
these tribal authorities;

“He designated chiefs to head these authorities — and could at any time

depose them; he also ﬁxed the minimum and maximum number of

councillors to serve on each Authority. The Bantu Commissioner had the

right to veto any appointment. The system entirely excluded the elective

principle. The Minister and his ofﬁcials had strict control over

membership of the Authorities; and members of the general public could

be excluded from their meetings.”146
According to this Act the powers of chiefs were considerably strengthened while at the

same time their legitimacy was being eroded as they were compelled to introduce

unpopular government laws in their communities or risked losing their positions through

 

”6 Mbeki, o. The Peasant Revoltl982: p.39.

101

replacement. These laws included forceful resettlement of entire communities,
maintenance of law and order, reporting to the Bantu Commissioner any unrest, the
enforcement of all government laws and dispersal of unlawful gatherings formed the core
of duties imposed on chiefs and their tribal authorities. If anything, this Act potentially
put tribal leaders in direct conﬂict with their subjects because as civil servants they had to
enforce policies of apartheid. No longer were they leaders who once articulated the needs
of their communities. The targeting of many chiefs and their councilors by those who
were opposed to the implementation of some of the apartheid laws including the Bantu
Authorities Act has to be understood in terms of this new institutional and policy

framework which alienated traditional leaders from their communities.

The Bantu Administration Act of 1951 provided for a three-tier system of local
government in the reserves. These were Bantu authorities based on individual chiefs in
their administrative areas, regional authorities which were made up of chiefs and their
areas grouped according to regions, and territorial authorities who covered the entire
reserve or Bantustan. In some areas, such as the Transkei, another tier, District
Authorities, was introduced. In this effort to entrench the position of chiefs as an
administrative tool, some chiefs were appointed or created for areas which otherwise had
no chiefs or rightﬁrl heirs were bypassedm. Traditional leaders were now placed under
the magistrates who presided over Regional/Territorial Authorities which included chiefs

and govemment-appointed members.

 

147lvracrvlillan, H “Tradition, tribes, chiefs and change in Southern Africa” in Osaghae, E (ed) Traditional
Leadership in Southern Africa 1997: p.143.

102

In this hierarchy, the chiefs presided over their tribal authorities with members of the
tribal council constituted by the headmen of locations or people appointed by the chief or,
at least in theory, were elected by people from the wards. It should be noted that the
elections of ward representatives to the tribal authorities rarely involved broad
participation by the residents and chiefs often exercised veto against any person who they
happen not to ﬁvor.148 At a district level chiefs were ex ofﬁcio members of the district
council which also included eight other members, a portion of which was appointed by
the Bantu Commissioner while the other was elected by the taxpayers from the tribal
council members. The magistrate presided over the district authority. At a regional level,
the head is the paramount chief and other members were drawn ﬁom the chiefs, as ex
ofﬁcio members, in the region as well as members of district authorities. Other members
were appointed by the paramount chief and the Bantu Commissioner. All members of
the regional authorities combined different regional authorities to form a Territorial
Authority. In this case as well, the Minister of Bantu Affairs could veto any appointment

into the Territorial Authority.

The reinforcement of the position of traditional leaders included other measures such as
inﬂux control such as the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 which limited the right
of Africans to live permanently in the urban areas. This and a number of other laws

were meant to force Africans back to the reserves where they were to be under the

 

“Moan, op cit, 1982.

103

jurisdiction of designated chiefs. Southall summarizes the intended impact of these new
laws;

“The Bantu Authorities system was formulated as a device for utilizing the

indigenous chieﬂy elites as agents of political control in the reserves. By

restoring the traditional leadership and binding it to the state as the source

of its wealth and authority, the National Party sought to counter the

heightened political consciousness of the Aﬁican mass by dividing the

latter into its etlmic segments and subjecting it to a system of indirect

“116.” 149
In broad terms the new system was meant to guide chiefs in the exercise of local
government along the lines required by the apartheid government. The higher level of
these four tiers was supposed to supervise the one directly below it. This was one giant
step in preparing Africans to have their self-goveming Bantustans thus ﬁtting the grand
scheme of apartheid policy of divide and rule or what apartheid ﬁ'amers preferred to call

separate development.

4.4. African reactions to the colonial and apartheid laws in the rural areas

The imposition of colonial and apartheid laws on rural-based African communities was
not met with a passive response even though reactions varied, as much as it revealed local
elite cleavages and rivalries, and were sometimes ambiguous. The post-conquest reaction
to the changing rules and administration reﬂects the politics of exclusion, collaboration
and resistance as much as it reveals local elite cleavages and rivalries. These rural
reactions have, admittedly, not attracted as much attention as urban-based union and

nationalist opposition politics. There are, however, studies that have thrown some light

 

149 Southhall, R. South Africa’s Transkei: The Political Economv of gn independent Bantustan 1983.
p. 103
104

on rural resistance to colonial and apartheid rules and these include Govan Mbeki’s
South A ﬁrm: The Peasantle 50, Hammond-Tooke’s Command and Consensus: The
Development of T ransker'an Local Govemmentm, and Beinart and Bundy’s Hidden

Struggles in Rural Soudr Aﬁicam.

As indicated in this discussion earlier, The Glen Grey Act of 1894 tended to prefer
appointed headmen to the indigenous chiefs. Hammond-Tooke indicates that the local
government system introduced by this law was strongly resisted by chiefs who felt that
they were being bypassed by commoners who were merely appointees of the white
administration. This system was generally unpopular with the Aﬁican communities
because with it brought new taxes which were enforced by the headmen. On the other
hand, it is also indicated that the emerging group of educated Africans particularly
teachers saw an opportunity of being appointed as local administrators something which

had long eluded them under the strictly hereditary indigenous system.

As Beinart and Bundy put it;

“...some of the wealthiest ‘school’ families were quick to see in the
council system a possible avenue to local political power and
accumulation. This meant that it was possible for the state to ﬁnd
acquiescence in or support for some measures it introduced; it could enlist
some agents within the rural areas to operate some of the measures it
introduced.”153

 

150 Mbeki, G., op cit, 1960

151 Hammond-Tooke, op cit, 1975.

152 Beinart and Bundy, op cit, 1987.

‘53Beinart, w. and Bundy, c. Hidden struggles in Rural South Africa 1987: p.37.

105

In yet another revealing case study of a headman, Enoch Mamba, appointed in terms of
this provision of Glen Grey Act, Beinart and Bundy demonstrate the complex relations in
which some of the local elites were involved in. They describe a balancing act between
the pressures from the magistrate above, the popular pressures and demands from the
community as well as rivalry from the marginalized chiefs. In this particular case of
Mamba, they show an educated African who was appointed as a headman, rose into
prominence, and was replaced when he articulated some of his people’s needs. Upon
losing headmanship he wrote appealing letters to various govemment ofﬁcials and
administrators begging for reinstatement. More revealing are some of Marnba’s
correspondence and speeches that often emphasized that he was better qualiﬁed to be

headman as he was the most educated African in his region‘“.

The 1908-1916 outbreak of East Coast Fever in the livestock led to the state’s directive
that all cattle ﬁnners including Aﬁicans should dip their cattle and in some instances
slaughter the affected ones. The headmen were called upon to enforce cattle-dipping as
part of this campaign. There was popular resistance in many rural areas and this
campaign failed. Headmen became very unpopular and were often targets of this
resistance. A more widespread rebellion came in the 19505 and 19605 in Pondoland, in
Zululand and Sekhukhuniland as rural masses opposed the imposition of the Bantu
Authorities as well as the “Betterment Scheme” which was meant to relocate

communities into surveyed areas. Some of the collaborating chiefs and headman were

 

's‘lhid: p.88-97

106

killed or ﬂed and took refuge away from their communities.

All these incidents seriously eroded the legitimacy of rural local authorities. Rural
resistance outline above indicates, among other things, the structural, institutional factors
as well as the political contingency ﬁctors as shown by the key actors or agency in
shaping relations with the state, with the communities and among the rural elite. It also
indicates that social differentiation, be it based on education or wealth, was beginning too
deﬁned the sectional interests of the elite alliances and interest or conﬂicts. A general
observation of these rural-based struggles indicates that they were primarily focused on
and triggered by local conditions with very little connection to nationalist struggles and

they were not sustained over a long period.

4.5. The politics of cooption and exclusion within Bantustans

As stated above, the long term objective of the apartheid government was to grant a form
of self-government to black reserves thus, in this logic, foreclosing any future possibility
of dealing with the native problem within the political and geographical ﬁamework of a
“white South Africa”. Key to this program was the passing of the Promotion of Bantu
Self-Government Act of 1959. This Act created eight Bantu Homelands along the ethnic
lines and this was designed to keep these groups apart as separate units thus weakening
the nationalist opposition forces which were increasingly successful in mobilizing across

ethnic lines.

Of particular interest for the purpose of this chapter is the policy of these Bantustans
107

toward the traditional leaders who at this time had become the primary authority in the
rural areas. The relations that evolved within Bantustans will also be examined as part of
an assessment of the impact of black homeland system. A general survey of the literature
on traditional rulership within the Bantustan system reveals the ﬁct that at a lower level
of rural local government there was no signiﬁcant change ﬁom the then existing Bantu
Authorities system thus leaving this institutional ﬁ'arnework intact. However, there were
some considerable changes that took place at top level of the homeland government
legislative, bureaucratic and executive branches as each one of the homelands adopted a
mechanism of co-opting traditional leaders. This strategy occurred concurrently with
strenuous attempts to neutralize and marginalize those chiefs who were opposed to the
homeland policies and its proponents. A few cases of homeland strategies and policies

will be presented here in a bid to illustrate the above-stated assertion.

The apartheid regime ﬁrst identiﬁed, encouraged and promoted chiefs to lead most of
these Bantustans. Most of these chiefs were relatively junior even within their own etlmic
groups or clans but they were comparatively more educated. The emergence of the
following chiefs as key proponents of Bantustan policies and leaders of their
governments underscore this point Chief Kaizer Daliwonga Matanzima became the ﬁrst
prime minister and chief Botha Manzolwandle Sigcau became Transkei’s ﬁrst State
President; in KwaZulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was made the chief minister; in
Boputhatswana Mangophe was the president, Chief Lennox Sebe in the Ciskei, Chief
Mopeli in Qwaqwa and Chief Patrick Mphephu in Venda This strategy does not only

reﬂect apartheid’s preference for chiefs to lead its Bantustan institutions but also
108

indicates that the traditional elite would emerge as key players who would ﬁrrther
promote their interests within Bantustans. Consequently, each one of these chiefs who
assumed positions of leadership within the homeland govemments promoted themselves
into senior chiefs within their ethnic groups or clans thus rivaling legitimate and senior
chiefs. Jeff Peires articulate this point with some examples;

“Certainly, the chiefs who rose to prominence under the

homeland dispensation were not the great hereditary

aristocrats such as King Sabata Delindyebo of the Thembu,

but junior chieﬁ such as Kaiser Matanzima, Lucas

Mangophe and Gatsha Buthelezi, who depended on the
South African connection not only for money and power,

but even for their very status as chiefs. Lennox Sebe, who

was not born a chief but had a chieftainship manufactured

for him on the basis of fake genealogy, is an extreme

example of this process.”155
For example, in Transkei Chief Matanzima, one of many junior chiefs within the Thembu
group used his position as the homeland prime minister to elevate himself into a
paramount chief alongside Sabata who was customarily the legitimate paramount chief.
In order to do this Matanzima split the Thembu region into two, the Thembu proper under
Chief Sabata, and the Emigrant Thembu under himself. This led to a bitter rivalry
between Sabata and his supporters, on the one hand, and Matanzima on the other hand.
Matanzima used the state apparatus to neutralize his rival who had become one of the
ﬁerce critics of the Bantustan policy. In the end, Matanzima prevailed by banishing
Sabata, charging him of treason, imprisoning him, deposing him and ﬁnally driving him

into exile where he died as an AN C member. Similar experiences are repeated across

 

15’Peires, J. “The implosion of Transkei and Ciskei” in Africgn Affairs 1992: p. 384.

109

many Bantustans even though they had their own dynamics as dictated by local politics.

The second Bantustan strategy was to incorporate traditional leaders into homeland
government structures as a way of consolidating its control over their subjects. All the
indications indicate that this was designed and implemented in a manner that promoted
and entrenched the position of emergent Bantustan ruling elite than chieﬂaincy and this
often caused tension between some chiefs and homeland government leaders. Edwin
Ritchken’s observation of the KwaNdebele homeland is a clear indication of this strategy;

“With the establishment of the legislative assembly in 1979, tensions in

the agendas of some of the Ndzundza chiefs and their councillors began to

emerge. The legislative assembly involved a 46-member body with a six-

member cabinet appointed by the chief minister. All the 46 members, none

of whom were chiefs, were nominated by the four tribal authorities.

However, once nominated, a tribal authority could not recall the MP. Only

the assembly itself could remove an MP. The chief minister also had a

right to appoint or remove chiefs.”156
These tensions were compounded by the perception that homeland governments were
dominated by one sub-ethnic group thus sidelining others. This was the case in
KwaNdebele where the two major royalties, the Ndzundza and the Manala, vied for the
control of the homeland govemment. These struggles, as was the case with Transkei’s

Matanzima-Sabata debacle often pushed marginalized chiefs into alliance with the

liberation movements, particularly the AN C .

 

1" Ritchken, E in Glenn and Obery, op cit, 1990; p. 437.

110

In the case of Transkei constitution, all Paramount Chiefs became the ex ofﬁcio member
of the legislature together with 60 other chiefs with only 45 remaining seats open for

elections15 7

. After Transkei obtained its nominal independence in 1976, the State
President was appointed from the paramount chiefs. In this case as well, there was no
unity among the traditional leaders as some opposed the Bantustan policy and its ruling
elite. KwaZulu also adopted this formula for representation of chiefs as ex ofﬁcio
members of parliament. Even more important in this case was the emphasis on
maintenance of law and order as a function of traditional leaders at their rural localities.
Once enforced and activated, this proved to be a potent force in preventing Inkatha rivals
from mobilizing in rural areas. The following excerpts from the KwaZulu Chief and
Headman Act of 1974 combined with Mare’s remarks underscores this emphasis;

“The KwaZulu Act stipulated that a chief or headman ‘shall

be entitled to the loyalty, respect, support and obedience of

every resident of the area for which he has been appointed’.

It placed chiefs and their assistants as local representatives

of the KwaZulu government in control of law and order

enforcement, unrest, distribution of ‘undesirable literature’,

and prevention of ‘ unauthorised’ entry of any person into

his area” 158

There is nothing new about these powers as provided by successive
colonial and apartheid laws enlisted in the foregoing discussion. It should,
however, be noted that there was certainly more emphasis and explicitness
in the case of KwaZulu where anti-UDF/AN C vigilante groups were later

mobilized under chiefs and iindunas as “Zulu Regiments”, an apparent

 

”7 Haines & Tapscott, 1984; Southall, 1982

158 Mare, op cit 1993: p.88.

11]

reference and appeal to the pre-colonial warrior tradition common during
the inter-ethnic wars. While almost all other homeland governments relied
on their security forces, the Inkatha combined the police force and these
para-military regiments as a coercive tool. In all the homelands,
remuneration for traditional leaders was also in the hands of the homeland
government thus creating yet another tool for patronage. In most instances
local chiefs were given powers to collect levies from their subjects, and
this ranged from monies raised for speciﬁc projects such as fencing or
building of a community hall to standing annual tax paid by each
homestead as was the case with KwaNdebele’”. This, too, became a
common way of accumulation of resources by the traditional leaders. In
general terms, the duties of traditional authorities under the homeland
system could be listed as follows:

a) The preservation of law and order which, among other things, included the
settling of minor disputes and granting permission for meetings and dispersing
those deemed to be unlawful.

b) Allocation of land for building houses and for agriculture.

c) Facilitation of recruitment of workers by companies particularly the mining
industry.

(1) The screening of applications for old age pensions and other social beneﬁts for

 

15SInterviews conducted in all three provinces conﬁrms the raising of flmds by chiefs without much

accountability or transparency, and this became a source of tension in some communities such as
Mnceba and Rode. In case of Mpumalanga communities, chiefs used to get R48 as annual tax paid
by each homestead and they could use the fund at their diSCretion.

112

g)

h)

i)

the old and disabled.

Facilitate the building of schools and clinics which otherwise were funded by
relevant govemment departments.

Organization and promotion of agricultural activities such as the control of
grazing and harvest.

Helping the relevant government departments in the maintenance of roads, dams
and bridges.

Screening people who are coming to settle in areas under their jurisdiction as well
as grant recommendation and veriﬁcation for those planning to settle in other
communities.

Assist in verifying the identity of his subjects who otherwise do not have proper
identity documents (citizenship identity documents or birth certiﬁcates).
Facilitate meetings with government ofﬁcials or any other outside persons

especially those coming to address the community.160

The importance of the above-listed duties lies in the ﬁct that the current relations in the
context of transition is primarily based on the interpretation of these roles by the various

local stakeholders including the traditional leaders, elected councillors and civic leaders.

4.6. Concluding remarks

A number of points stand out prominently in this chapter and these have a direct bearing

 

16" Manona, c. “Local Government” in De Wet, c and Bekker, S (eds) Rural development in South Africa:
A case of Amatola Basin in the Ciskei 1982

113

on the discussion that follows. Firstly, traditional leadership remained resilient, even as it
mutated into different institutional frameworks created by the colonial and apartheid
governments hence it is a force to reckon with in this transition to democracy. Secondly,
there was a shift ﬁom independent chiefdoms, which had their own system of
counterbalancing the powers of chiefs, into a situation where these political entities did
not only lose their sovereignty and independence under the successive colonial and
apartheid administrations but also transformed traditional leaders into intermediaries and
buffer between the rural masses and colonial rulers. This anangement created a new set
of relationships in which traditional leaders had to balance the demands of their subjects
while at the same time implementing the often unpopular directives from successive
governments. With a tremendous pressure ﬁ'om administrations above, threats of
replacement or demotion and state’s coercive apparatus at their disposal, traditional
leaders, in many instances, relied more and more on repressive measures to keep their
often disgruntled subjects in line thus creating what Mamdani161 refers to as
‘decentralized despotism’. Norman MillerJ62 coins the term syncretistic political behavior
or syncretistic leadership to describe the above phenomenon of a balancing act of
interrnediation. In general terms, he describes this leadership pattern as “...a synthesis and
reconciliation of opposing forces of traditionalism and modernism. The result is a form of
leadership which is neither modern nor traditional but incorporation of both.”163 This

observation and the relevance of this phenomenon of ﬂuidity and ﬂexible leadership are

 

161 Mamdani, M., op cit, 1996.
16.2 Miller, N., op cit, 1968
1c"’lvliller, N.(ed) Research in rural Africa 1969: p.184.

 

114

not just conﬁned to this period as it is a recurring theme today.

The above discussion has shown a range of rural Aﬁican responses to the entrenchment
of colonial and apartheid rule as well as ambiguities within them. Traditional leaders and
the local elite shifted from collaboration and compromise to resistance ﬁom area to area
ﬁ'om time to time. Perception of authority and value of alliances changed over time.
Social differentiation and diversiﬁcation of local elite also took place during this colonial
and apartheid era with traditional leaders, locally-based civil servants, local businessmen,
church leaders, student organizations, local party leaders and civic leaders emerging as
stakeholders in rural politics. How these stakeholders contested the terrain of a new post-
apartheid terrain will become evident in the following chapter which speciﬁcally focuses
on this subject. A general observation that emerges from the above discussion is that
colonial and apartheid laws seriously eroded, though they did not completely diminish,
the legitimacy of chieﬁaincy, thus strengthening the position of those who emerged as
alternative centers of local power in the post-apartheid South Aﬁica. Understandably, this
complicated traditional leaders’ effort to reposition and reasserting themselves within the

new democratic South Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONTEMPORARY INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL FORCES IN
RURAL SOUTH AFRICA

The institution of traditional leaders has existed for some time in South Africa. It
has survived colonialism, it has survived apartheid and has yet to survive the
challenges of a new order in post-apartheid society.“

Perhaps more difﬁcult than most, is to ﬁnd the best way in which our elected
structures of local government and traditional leaders can work together for the
good of their communities. This is a crucial area of Reconstruction and
Development, and a resolution of outstanding differences and conﬂictual matters is
of greatest importance.”

In the context of post-apartheid South Africa the issue of the role and place of
traditional leaders is arising once more. The trends in traditional communities today
show that allegiance to traditional institutions co-exists with overwhelming support
for democratic governance.“

The above statements capture the essence of a complex post-apartheid challenge of

political engineering that must take into account and try to harmonize continuities and

167

changes, tradition (understood in its broadest sense) and modernity. Furthermore, these

 

164 Chief Sibongile Zungu in Diescho, J et. al., 1996: p.31.

165 Nelson Mandela, South African President on the inauguration of the National Council of Traditional
Leaders (Mail & Guardian, April 18, 1997)

166 Sydney Mufamadi, South African Minister of Provincial and Local Government. (Sowetan, April 20,
2000).

1671a this case the term tradition is used to refer to the institution of traditional nrlership or those who often
justify their actions and choices on basis of tradition. This, however, does not necessarily mean that all
persons who invoke tradition are necessarily traditionalists. So this term as uwd here embrace both those

who use tradition instrumentally as well as those who uphold traditional values.
1 16

statements reﬂect a contested, and consequently ﬂuid, political landscape in a new
dispensation of institutional transformation and democratization. More Speciﬁcally,
attempts to deﬁne the role of traditional leaders within the context of a new democratic

system have proven to be very controversial and tricky.

The dominant and often contradictory political forces that emerged in the late 19805 that
culminated in the constitutional engineering process of the 19905 are examined in this
chapter. Only those political processes and institutions that are associated with rural
politics and rural local governance are of relevance here. The discussion is guided by the
following questions: What are the dominant political forces which shaped the agenda and
therefore public policy on rural local government? Which sectors of the elite emerged as
key players and stakeholders in rural local politics? How did traditional leaders react to
and position themselves within the new dispensation of liberation and democratic
politics? What is the composition, function and structure of rural local government in the
post-apartheid South Aﬁica? What sorts of relations have actually evolved among the
local elites in the context of the new political dispensation? At the very onset it should be
stated that this chapter will not offer exhaustive answers as other chapters also address

these questions.

It is important to note that the political changes in rural local government predate the

formal establishment of the new local councils after the 1995 and 1996168 local

 

168 South Aﬁican local government elections in South Africa were staggered with the rest of the provinces
holding theirs in 1995 and KwaZulu-Natal elections being held in 1996.
l 17

government elections. It will be shown in this chapter that signiﬁcant political
developments that reconﬁgured local elite relations in rural areas can be traced back to
the late 19805 at the height of political mobilization by forces opposed to the apartheid
government. This chapter is a logical step that follows the previous chapter which
presented a historical context of rural local government in South Africa by tracing its
evolution from the pie-colonial period to the apartheid era. The current era is, therefore,
regarded as the contemporary and fourth phase in the evolution of rural local government.
The previous chapter has also provided a canvas of diverse institutional environments of
different Bantustans which to a large extent helped to inﬂuence relations of the local elite

as the subsequent discussion will demonstrate.

This chapter is divided into three parts that are related but analytically distinct. Firstly,
protest politics of the late 19805 and early 19905 challenged, and in some cases redeﬁned,
the very foundation of the chieﬁaincy in rural areas. The various challenges, the
reactions and counter-reactions of the main protagonists are of particular interest in this
work. Secondly, constitutional and legal processes as well as outcomes which
restructured the current rural local govemment in its various forms in different provinces.
And thirdly, current and evolving relationships and struggles have emerged among the
various sectors of the local elite which include traditional leaders, elected councilors,
civic leaders and leaders of political parties. Regional differences will be pointed out as

well as common trends.

118

5.1. The last frontier: The politics of protest and liberation in the rural areas.
After the widespread rebellion of the 19505 and early 19608 rural areas remained
relatively quiet and this continued even after the installation of the Bantustan system.
What remained were isolated incidents of resistance which never amounted to the waves
of protests in the black urban areas. Most of these isolated incidents were triggered by
local conditions and were not linked to the nationalist struggle being waged by the main
liberation organizations. It was not until the late 19805 that the anti-apartheid struggle
spread to the rural areas on an unprecedented scale. Many observers often characterize
the South African liberation struggle as having been, to a large extent, urban-based. For
instance, Mamdani makes this observation and offers some explanation for South
Africa’s urban-rooted struggle against apartheid;

“The strength of urban forces and civil society-based movements in South

Africa meant that unlike in most African countries, the center of gravity of

popular struggle was in the townships and not against Native Authorities

in the countryside. The depth of resistance in South Aﬁica was rooted in

urban-based worker and student resistance, not in peasant revolt in the

countryside”’69

Mamdani offers the high level of urbanization and industrialization as the reason for the
evolution of this kind of resistance. Levin reinforces this view in his argument;

“The national democratic struggle was largely fought in urban areas,
where the liberation movement was most successful in building organs of
peoples’ power, although these proved to be unsustainable during the
transition to democracy. Rural organization was relatively weak, and
largely undertaken by youth congresses whose struggles centred on
generational and educational conﬂicts, and ﬁlled to link up with land
questions.”170

 

169Mamdani, op cit, 1996: p.29

170In Lipton, et al, op cit 1996: p.357.
119

In this observation, Levin identiﬁes successes in mobilizing in the townships as well as

the generational, or more speciﬁcally youthful, character of those pockets of protests in

rural areas.

Other scholars such as Peires, Ntsebeza and Mare171 have advanced the notion of crude
and ruthless repressive apparatus that afﬂicted the rural populations in the Bantustans as
one of the main reasons for the failure of several attempts to mobilize rural populations to
join the popular uprising often evident in the black townships. In addition to the
conventional reasons offered above, it is equally possible to postulate that the urban bias
on the part of liberation leaders also contributed to the successes in mobilizing the urban
areas. This point is explicitly supported by the following observation.

“Chiefs were on the margins of the UDF’s concerns. As with the ANC in

the preceding decades, most UDF campaigns were geared towards urban

areas. Its rural afﬁliates consisted of mainly youth organizations, led by

students at secondary and tertiary schools. Attempts to recruit migrant
workers were not pursued with much vigour.”172

 

171 Peires, op cit, 1997; Ntsebeza, op cit, 1999 and Mare, op cit, 1983
anessel and Oomen, op cit, 1997: p.565.

120

Whatever the strength or merits of the above reasons for the weakness of rural

I participation in the struggle against apartheid, there is a general agreement among
scholars that rural areas remained marginal in these political developments. But all
that changed in a profound way in the late 19805 as the struggle spread into the
countryside or Bantustans. It is primarily for this reason that this section is entitled
The Last Frontier as it literally and ﬁguratively presents the last geographic area to

which the protests and resistance politics of the liberation struggle spread.

The mid-19805 were marked by political mobilization and anti-apartheid resistance
unparalleled in South Africa’s history and the rural areas, particularly Bantustans,
were profoundly affected by this process. This resistance was spearheaded by a
multitude of organizations which found common ground under the umbrella of the
United Democratic Front (UDF) which generally functioned as an internal ally or arm
of the banned ANC. A number of factors such as apartheid regime’s increased
repression to the successes of mobilization strategies of the opposition forces account
for the cresting and radicalization of the resistance tide during this historical moment.
Among other things, it was also a response to ANC call to all opposition forces within
the country to render South Africa ungovernable and to create alternative ‘people’s
structures/power’. AS Mare puts it,

“Ungovernability and the creation of parallel structures rooted in the people or
the community informed much of the anti-apartheid struggles of the second
halfofthe l980s.”173

 

I73Mare, G. “Civil war regions and etlmic mobilization: Inkatha and Zulu nationalism in the
transition to South African democracy” in Rich,P. (Ed) Reaction and Renewal in South
Africa 1996: p.32

121

More speciﬁcally, in the black townships a call was made for the removal of township
councilors who were generally seen as government puppets. Some of the strategies
included boycotts of rate payments or payment of any utilities as demanded by the

councilors.

One may, at this stage be tempted to ask; what does this have to do with subsequent
political developments in the rural areas? The reason is the fact that the target of local
authorities and the boycott of rates as well as the creation of alternative power structures
were to be repeated in the rural areas even though they had their own dynamics as
dictated by the unique conditions of each region. The unbanning of the ANC and other
liberation organizations only helped to intensify the struggles and rivalries in the rural
areas. Predictably, traditional leaders, especially chiefs, who were central ﬁgures in rural

areas were the primary focus or targets of the emerging opposition movements.

Ritchken summarizes the scale and form of rural resistance that swept South Aﬁica in the

late 19805;

“KwaNdebele was wracked by bitter and violent struggle against
bantustan independence. KwaZulu has experienced the most sustained
violence in the country. Venda saw a week-long

Stayaway — the ﬁrst in the region’s history — against government
corruption. Kangwane was affected by education-related protests. In
Lebowa, a series of targets ranging ﬁom chiefs to farmers and witches
were attacked. A number of communities throughout the country opposed
either removal or incorporation into bantustan. Although the rural areas
were inﬂuenced by uprisings in the townships, their processes of
mobilization were structured by speciﬁc history and political context ﬁced
by each region. ”17’.

 

”4 In Moss & Obery: op cit, 1989, p.391.

Another observation which is more speciﬁc about the political developments that aﬁ’ected
traditional leaders is offered by Richard Levin;

“ By the 19805, the chiefs remained ﬁrmly entrenched, but the rise of the

UDF and the deve10pment of civic organs began to challenge the

legitimacy and the hegemony of the chieﬁaincy in rural areas. Chiefs were

often viewed as ‘puppets’ of the apartheid regime and agents of the

security forces, but because the rural struggle was largely spearheaded by

the youth organized in youth congress structures, the control which chiefs

exerted over land allocation was not seriously challenged?”5
Peires concurs with this observation in his remarks which are based on the Transkei
experience after 1990, “The unbanning of the liberation movements ﬁrst manifested itself
in the rural areas through challenges by the youth to the arbitrary powers of the chiefs.”176
Both Levin and Peires stress the role of the youth thus depicting the struggle in the rural
areas as largely, if not exclusively, an inter-generational conﬂict. This claim as well as
the variable of generation as a factor in the local elite relations is revisited in greater
details in both chapter seven and chapter eight. For now, sufﬁce it to say that these are
not the only scholars who assumed this position of generational conﬂict in rural areas
with little or no analysis of other factors which were, and still are, at play in
understanding relations among the local elites. In all, the above remarks indicate that the
era of traditional leaders’ monopoly of power in rural areas was over as the political

landscape changed the countryside into a contested terrain characterized by the struggle

for control of local economic and political resources. This changed the nature of the

 

175Lipton, op cit: p. 370.

176Peires, op cit, 1997: p.199.

struggle too, to a local one.

At this juncture, reference to some of regional dynamics during this period of intensiﬁed
resistance will be made. In many ways KwaZulu-Natal communities stands apart from
other black homelands because of peculiar political developments that took place in that

I region and this, it will be argued later, accounts for some of post-apartheid speciﬁc
institutional arrangements which evolved in KwaZulu-Natal. First, Inkatha, led by Chief
Buthelezi, seriously embarked on a project to establish mass following and the Zulu rural
constituency which had been largely neglected by liberation organization was its target of
mobilization. Traditional leaders (the King, chiefs and indunas) were the central core of
its mobilization as was the invocation of Zulu heritage and symbols. So important were
the traditional leaders that the Inkatha set up indunas to mobilize migrant workers who
were in the urban-based hostels or compounds and this gave Inkatha a foothold in the
urban areas. Unlike in other homelands, the Inkatha, using patronage, etlrnicized ideology
and coercion, managed to establish a solid rural constituency in KwaZulu homeland.
Right from the onset Inkatha never allowed even token opposition to emerge in KwaZulu
thus leaving it with virtual political monopoly. Furthermore, the mobilization strategy of
the Inkatha often involved busing of rural dwellers led by their chiefs and induna into its
rallies in towns and cities. Traditional regiments or the induna-led amabutho were
transported to the cities and townships to conﬁont Inkatha’s political opponents, the UDF
and the AN C or their allies in this instance. A Similar strategy was used in the rural areas
against people or even chiefs who were showing signs of breaking ranks and joining or

sympathizing with the AN C/UDF.

By the mid 19805 UDF was making serious inroads into the areas under Inkatha
administration particularly in the townships and towns. This led to the most violent
response from Inkatha. With the connivance of the South African security forces,
otherwise generally referred to as the “Third Force”177 in South Africa, and the help of
KwaZulu police, Inkatha supporters led by Amabutho clashed with UDF/AN C
supporters. In response to these attacks, AN C allied organizations formed Self Defense
Units (SDUs) and the Inkatha responded by establishing its own Self Protection Units
(SPU) and by arming chiefs and iindunas with ﬁrearms. This led to the proliferation of
para-military forces and the establishment of ‘no go areas’ or exclusive strongholds for
each organization. Thousands of people died in KwaZulu-Natal and thousands more ﬂed
from their areas thus creating a reﬁrgee problem. In some cases local leaders of the ANC
and the Inkatha Freedom Party(IFP) signed peace treaties but this only had limited
success as the war rage on in many areas. In the end, the ANC has had limited success in
mobilizing and establishing itself in the rural areas which remained IFP stronghold. In
turn, IFP’S control over a majority of traditional leaders, who are the key element in
keeping rural areas ﬁrmly in its control, remain strong as the patronage from KwaZulu
homeland has simply been replicated under the new IFP-controlled KwaZulu-Natal
Province. It is also important to note that unlike in all other provinces, the civic
movement never managed to establish itself in most of KwaZulu-Natal rural areas.

Therefore, rivalry is essentially between the IFP and the AN C.

 

17“’The concept of “Third Force” was coined to describe to covert role of the apartheid security forces
which in many instances assisted Inkatha militants and vigilante groups in their battles against the
UDF/AN C.

125

The developments in other homelands though generally different from the situation in
KwaZulu-Natal Show some variations from region to region. In KwaNdebele the
opposition forces were mobilized around their opposition to independence that Pretoria
threatened to grant this homeland. Predictably, the ruling elite within the homeland
government was pro-independence and in this they were backed by the Mahala branch of
the Ndebele Royal House. On the other hand, the opposition to independence was
spearheaded by Prince James Mahlangu and other members of the Ndzundza branch of
the Ndebele Royalty. The anti-independence movement was popularly supported by
various sectors within the homeland and also back by the liberation movements, notably
UDF and the ANC. Edwin Ritchken’s article has the following impression and
breakdown of the alliances within each one of the opposing camps.

“Unlikely alliances were established both among those who supported and

those who opposed independence. Students, youths, migrants, women,

bureaucrats, teachers, peasants and some chiefs formed the anti-

independence bloc, which found its leadership in the Ndzundza royal

family. The pro-independence bloc was formed by a grouping of shop-

owners, taxi drivers, tribal authority councillors, squatters, the Manala
royal family and certain chiefs, and was led by senior cabinet ministers in

the KwaNdebele legislative assembly.”178
If anything, the above observation indicates that chiefs did join or even lead in this case
the popular uprisings in some cases but the reasons for this tend to be context-speciﬁc.
For instance in this case of KwaNdebele, the traditional royal feud between the Manala

and the Ndzundza sections of the Ndebele royal house coupled with the persistent

 

1”Moss and Obery, op cit: p.426

126

marginalization of the Ndzundza throughout the KwaNdebele homeland experiment
combined to cause this ﬁssure. In these alliances there seem to be no clear class content
except for the general notion that those who felt alienated within the homeland structures
or having beneﬁted little or nothing from this entity would be expected to rise up against
the pro-independence group. In 1986 the conflict triggered by the events surrounding the
proposed independence intensiﬁed. The pro-independence forces organized Albokotho, a
vigilante group, which went around attacking the opponents of independence and they
were doing this with the help of security forces. The anti-independence forces responded
by burning and boycotting businesses belonging to the homeland leaders or the people
seen as their supporters. The scale of this conﬂict during 1986 is estimated to have left
160 people dead, many more went missing and about 70 percent of the bantustan

businesses were destroyed.179

In yet another case, the expression of protests in Lebowa had its own dimensions. High
school student protests demanding the acceptance of the elected student representative
councils instead of the monitors and prefects who were appointed by teachers; some
protests targeted chiefs and demanded their resignation while on the other hand these
developments were accompanied by the establishment of vigilante groups which went on
a killing spree eliminating people who were suspected to be witches. Police were also
targeted in these campaigns. Boycott of businesses belonging to the alleged collaborators

also became a common strategy. Tom Lodge portray some of the protests in the

 

”91bid: p. 426.

following manner,
“UDF members began to advocate the resignation of chiefs and members
of the Lebowa parliament in order to complement the urban offensive
against municipal councillors. In Driekop, a local chief and three indunas
(headmen) were hacked to death.”18°.
The case of Lebowa shows another ﬁce of these protests and in this case chief were part
of the targeted groups without exception thus making this a different case from the
KwaNdebele situation where some chiefs were prominently involved in the popular

struggles.

In cases like Transkei, Venda and Ciskei the intensifying protests received a boost when
the homeland leaders were toppled in military coups. The new military leaders quickly
and often opportunistically relaxed some of the repressive laws while uttering rhetoric
which was pro-AN C. This, however, did not stop the protests from targeting homeland

government ofﬁcials and those perceived to be collaborators.

In the Ciskei most of the headmen and some chiefs virtually collapsed after being
challenged by the civic organizations. There were similar challenges against Transkei

traditional leaders even though many of them remained relatively strong although shaken.

Jeff Peires paint the following picture of Transkei during this period;

“In Flagstaff, Comrade Nomazele Bala has challenged the authority of his
cousin, Chief Mwelo Nonkonyana, and told the people that they should
allocate land and cut wood just as they please. Elsewhere, particularly in

 

lsoLodgeI. 1992: p.120

128

Lusikisiki and Willowvale Districts, the right of chiefs to allocate land has
also been challenged, rural civics are in the process of taking over
meetings of the Tribal Authorities. Anti-stock theft movements provide
another vehicle for genuine popular sentiment.”181

The above account does indicate the focus on the control over land allocation as being
the center of Transkei rural protests and this concur with the case like Mnceba which has
been selected as part of this study. The foregoing discussion is a clear indication that the
politics of resistance ﬁnally reached the ﬁnal frontier or rural areas in all forms with all
different actors as dictated upon by local political cleavages with some cue ﬁom the
townships as well. Where a demand was made to remove the councilors in townships
there was a similar demand for chiefs to resign in some cases. In the case of KwaZulu-
Natal we have seen that an all-out ANC/UDF-IFP conﬂict broke out in the townships and
spread to the rural areas without seriously denting IFP’s hold on chiefs therefore on rural
areas. No civic organizations took root in the rural areas. But the consequence of this
protracted conﬂict in KwaZulu-Natal is that it has militarized the politics as we have seen
the rise and the political use of para-military formations such as amabutho or royal
regiments in the case of IFP. This has consequently led to the high level of intolerance

and rigid interpretation of spheres of inﬂuence as captured in the term “no go areas”.

As the UDF-led protests spread to the rural areas in the late 19805, this umbrella
organization had to take a stand on issues affecting these areas. UDF’s position is

summarized as follows;

 

181Pcreis, 1997: p. 200.

“The National Working Committee of the UDF resolved in 1986 that
‘tribal structures should be replaced with democratic organizations’. Other
UDF publications suggested that short-term alliances with chiefs could be
expedient in places where the chiefs still enjoyed popular support, but the
objective in the long run was generally summed up as ‘chiefs must go and

9 ”182

the people must run the villages .
This position had some sympathies within some sectors of AN C’s broad liberation
alliance even though there was still a considerable opinion from among the senior AN C
leaders(Mandela being the most prominent of these) which supported the continued
existence of traditional leaders within the conﬁnes post-apartheid democratic
institutions. In a manner that can be described as a symmetric strategic move, it will soon
be shown that the notion of strategic alliance with liberation forces, though for different
ends, was very much in the minds of many chiefs who were adept in shifting alliances.
On the other side of the symmetry is the ANC which also sought this alliance mainly for
electoral reasons in order to gain access to the rural areas and also carry the constituency

which is associated with and still has some respect for the chiefs.

By the early 19905, the protests against traditional authorities took on an organizational
and sustained form as the South African National Civic Organization (SAN CO) spread
from the townships and established itself in the rural areas. From this point onwards,
SAN CO became a major political actor in the rural political landscape. Youth and student
organizations in these areas were overtaken by SAN CO with many of its members tended
to join the ANC, SACP, PAC and SANCO. This transformation from sporadic protests

led by students and youth organizations into civic movement and liberation-led

 

‘82Kesscl, I & Oomen, B., op cit, 1997: p.568.

mobilization also led to generational reconﬁguration of the rural elite challenging the
hegemony of chiefs. As a consequence of this change, the rural—based leadership of the

ANC, PAC and SAN CO is typically a mix of elderly, middle-age and youth age groups.

This section generally concentrated on the forms of protests with particular emphasis on
the opposition forces. The next section will try to augment this by focusing on traditional

leaders’ reactions to protest politics and transition that followed soon thereafter.

5.2. Chiefs and comrades: Traditional Ieaders’ reactions to protests and transition.
The above discussion has Shown a range of anti-apartheid forces, whose members were
popularly known as “comrades,” which rose against institutions, organizations, groups
and individuals that were seen as directly or indirectly associated with the apartheid
system. In this wave of protest it has been indicated that chiefs and their councilors were
also common targets. In the case of KwaZulu-Naﬁl and KwaNdebele the discussion
alluded to some of the reactions of the besieged traditional leaders. This section is
dedicated to description and analysis of patterns of traditional leaders’ reaction to the
politics of protests and transition. These responses ranged ﬁom those of the IFP
traditional leaders who mobilized and confronted UDF/AN C comrades in protracted and
often violent conﬂicts to those of chiefs who joined or aligned themselves with the

liberation organizations. There were other politically less signiﬁcantm responses of

 

183The use of the phrase politically less significant in this instance indicates both the isolated nature of

these options as well as the lesser impact they had in the wider political developments in the country
especially during the time of a negotiated transition to democracy. Traditional leaders’ engagement in
pro and anti-liberation politics were the more prominent strategies.

131

chiefs who opted for a neutral role signiﬁed by their withdrawal from any partisan
politics as well as those who established vigilante groups which were not aligned to any

party but focused on local issues such as crime or stock theft

In the ﬁnal analysis it is argued that traditional leaders, in their various reactions,
demonstrated their adaptive ability in the same manner in which they had Shown during
the colonial and apartheid era but this time with more vigor and craﬂiness. In essence,
traditional leaders did not just react to these changes but they tried to reassert themselves
on a scale never seen before and this caught many in the liberation movement by surprise
as they had clearly underestimated the challenge that traditional rulers would pose. The
following are a variety of traditional leaders’ responses that demonstrate political acumen
or astuteness of the traditional elite. It is at the same time a classic case of instrumental
and interchangeable use of tradition, modernity, ethnicity and liberation discourse as
resources that could be effectively deployed in advancing group interests and most
importantly the survival and consolidation of chieftaincy within a new democratic

dispensation.

The following excerpt apprehends South Aﬁican traditional leaders’ responses to the
political changes;

“During the apartheid era, chiefs were maligned as puppets of bantustan
rule. In ANC-related circles, it was widely assumed that chieﬁaincy would
not survive in the post-apartheid era. But the institution of traditional
leadership has proved highly ﬂexible. Rather than being phased out as
relics of pre-modern times, chiefs are reasserting themselves in the new
South Africa. Chiefs have survived throughout this century with a strategy
of Shifting alliances. Towards the end of the 19805, chiefs were re-

132 .

orienting themselves towards the AN C, rightly perceived as the new ruling
party-in-waiting. Combining the resources of tradition with a discourse of
liberation politics and development, they were able to explain
constitutional and other legal guarantees for the position of traditional
leaders and their representatives in the local, provincial and national
administration. For its part, the ANC had an interest in wooing chiefs to its
side in order to prevent the emergence of a conservative alliance where
traditional leaders could join forces with the bantustan elites.”184
Of course, the above passage is an accurate account only in understanding the one of the
dominant strands of responses which encompassed an embrace of liberation discourse as
a resource. It, however, does not account for the IFP response which chose to confront

the comrades head-on when they made inroads into what it considered to be its Sphere of

inﬂuence.

Mindful of this deﬁcit, the following discussion covers both patterns of responses by
traditional leaders during the period that begun in the late 19805. The immediate focus is
on how chiefs embraced liberation discourse. The spotlight will then shift to the IF P

response.

In the wake of the 1986 riots against the granting of KwaNdebele nominal
independence, the chiefs who opposed independence grew closer to the UDF /AN C which
also Shared their position on this issue. These chiefs, backed by the ANC/UDF, launched
the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Aﬁica, otherwise commonly known by its

abbreviated version, Contralesa The general aims of Contralesa are captured in its

 

184Kessel, I & Oomen, B., op cit, 1997, p.561.

133

constitution as an eradication of the Bantustan system; educating traditional leaders about
the aims of South African liberation struggle and their role in it; to win back foreﬁthers’
land and share it among those who work it; and to ﬁght for a unitary, non-racial and
democratic South Africa(Contralesa Constitution, 1987). This is a clear indication of
traditional leaders’ ﬁrst signiﬁcant embrace of liberation discourse and it is even

unprecedented in the sense that it assumed a formal organizational form.

A large number of chiefs from different regions of South Africa, with the notable
exception of KwaZulu-Natal, joined Contralesa thus transforming it into a national
organization. Just to indicate its nationwide representation of chiefs, since its inception
Contralesa presidency has changed hands from Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, of
KwaZulu-Natal to Chief Phathekile Holomisa from the Eastern Cape. In February 1988,
a Contralesa delegation met the then exiled AN C in its headquarters in the Zambian
capital, Lusaka. From that moment until the mid-19905 the AN C regarded Contralesa as
its important strategic partner in the rural areas and Contralesa chiefs were then referred
to as ‘progressive chiefs’ or ‘comrade-chief’ in ANC alliance circles. At the very same
time, the ANC embraced SANCO, the arch-rival of chiefs, as part of its broad alliance.
The strategic alliances seen in this triangulated partnership demonstrates the politics of
expediency and convenience in which each actor was to reap as much ﬁom each other
during the uncertain and often contested period of transition to a new dispensation. Of
particular interest in this section is the manner in which traditional leaders use liberation
discourse within the context of these complex alliances in order to advance their group

interests which culminated in constitutional guarantees of their continued role in the new
134

democratic system.

At their disposal traditional leaders have somewhat a unique claim to an important
resource, tradition, which they have repeatedly and strategically evoked and deployed
while at the same time pointing at continuities between tradition and liberation discourse
as well as to democratic systems. More recently, President Thabo Mbeki’s introduction
of a revivalist African Renaissance as a broad vision that guide South Africa’s nation-
building and foreign policy has been interpreted by many leaders as a logical extension or
renewal of Aﬁican heritage(traditions, customs, indigenous systems, etc) therefore by
association of chieftaincy which is the ‘authentic’ custodian of that heritage. A
combination of these resources indicates chiefs who traverse the traditional and the
modem world by simply shifting emphasis or combining the two at opportune moments.
Some scholars such as Sandra Klopper185 have even extended the analysis of the hybrid
or ﬂexible nature of traditional leaders by focusing on their dress code which is observed
as shifting from traditional to modem or simply blend the two depending on an occasion.
This, if anything, demonstrate the complex nature of the political identity and ideology of
traditional leaders. A constant seems to be self-preservation as a group with shared
interests of continued control of resources in the areas under their jurisdiction as well as

projecting traditional leadership inﬂuence at provincial and national levels.

The following are some of the statements which illustrate the ﬂuid and resourcefulness of

traditional leaders in using the resources identiﬁed above. The following interview of

 

185 Klopper, S., op cit, 1998.
135

Contralesa president, chief Maphumulo expresses a concerted effort to extract suitable
components of monarchy and modern democracy;
“In August or September] am planning a trip to England to meet with
some of the parliamentarians there, taking the chiefs from all around South
Aﬁica with me. We will be studying diﬂ‘erent systems— how the monarch

and the democratic government work hand in glove. But we are interested
in comparisons right now. We don’t have a constitution in mind.”"“6

Some years later a more crystallized position of Contralesa on the relation between
chieﬂaincy and democracy emerged and was being echoed by many prominent traditional
leaders to rebut the notion that this institution was hereditary therefore inherently
undemocratic. Some seven years later after the above interview, one of Contralesa
leaders, Chief Mwelo Nonkonyana articulated the position of traditional leaders;

“Traditional leaders and their councils, as established by custom and

usage, are the cornerstone of any sound administration. The Congress of

Traditional Leaders of South Africa(Contralesa) has pointed out on

numerous occasions that — contrary to popular belief— traditional

leadership was, and still is, the most democratic institution, forming a

solid foundation for stability in all communities.”m
In another article with a more revealing title, Ubukhosi the Bedrock of African
Democracy, the current president of Contralesa, Chief Phathekile Holomisa, advances
this point further in a more nuanced approach as he asserts that;

“In the rural areas tribal or communal land is owned by the tribe as a

collective. Despite the fact that under apartheid laws the state is the legal

owner of tribal land, factually and morally the tribe own the land and,
unless one is spoiling for a ﬁght, no one can deal with it as he pleases.

 

186Ben, 1990: p.48.

18'INonltonyana, M. “The perspectives of traditional leaders and their role in the new South Africa” in
Osaghae, E (ed) Traditional leadership in Southern Aﬁ‘ica 1997: p.95.

136

Under the tribal law the custody of the land is entrusted in traditional

authority, that is, the head of the tribe and his counselors. As trustee of the

land the traditional authority is required to act at all times in the interests

and according to the wishes of the owners of the land, the people.”188
The above passages, in their various forms and emphasis, reveal a trend in which a
linkage and continuity is being made between the concept of democracy and chieﬂaincy.
Many traditional leaders often point at the idealized version of the pre-colonial era where
indigenous institutions had checks and balances with chieftaincy founded on a consensus
system of rule. In this linkage there is often very little, if at all, attempt to describe the
existing situation or system of governance in areas under the jurisdiction of chiefs. A
careful analysis of these statements reveals the fact that traditional leaders tend to
emphasize the ideal, often romanticized, past and promises of democratized traditional
rulership while avoiding any discussion of the cases of abuse of power by a considerable
number of chiefs. Through time we see in these statements an evolution of an uncertain
position of Contralesa as show in Chief Maphumulo’s delegation searching for aspects of
compatibility between the British monarchy and western liberal democracy to a more

deﬁnite position in which chiefs do not only assume this compatibility but declare that

traditional leadership is comparatively ‘the most democratic institution’.

Another common political strategy of traditional leaders is to selectively point out at
traditional leaders who fought against colonialism as well as those who later joined

liberation forces without dwelling on those who often collaborated with both the colonial

 

188Holomisa, “Ubukhosi the bedrock of African democracy” in Mail a Guardian February 1 1-17, 2000;
p.29.

137

and apartheid govenrments. In this way, continuities between traditional leadership and
liberation struggle is carefully constructed by deliberately overlooking some of these
historically obvious contradictions. The following position is often reiterated by
traditional leaders as evidence of these continuities;

“Our history proves conclusively that traditional leaders fought with the
people in defending their kingdoms. King Hintsa was brutally murdered
bu the British colonialist Richard Southey, while King Maqoma died on
Robben Island. Kings Langalibalele, Cetywayo, Dinizulu, Sekhukhuni,
Faku, Moshoeshoe, Ngungunyana, Ramabulana, Sekhonyela, Queen
Manthantisi, and many others fought against colonialism, oppression and
exploitation of their people— their spirits constitute a foundation for
liberation struggle. We therefore emphasise the point that traditional
leaders and their subjects were rulers of this country and thus cannot be
excluded in any level of government.”189

The linkage between the heroic past and the current liberation struggles is established in
the above passage. The speciﬁc aim is justifying continued recognition of traditional
leaders not just in their localized areas in the countryside but all level of government,
speciﬁcally at provincial and national level. The roll call of traditional leaders who
resisted colonial conquest and administration is factually correct but often selectively
identiﬁed without refening to the multitudes of traditional leaders who did the very
opposite by turning against their subjects. Contralesa President, Chief Holomisa, also
articulates the linkage between what he calls the ‘progressive’ chiefs and the liberation
movement;

“The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), a

body conceived in the womb of the liberation struggle, under the

leadership of the Aﬁican National Congress, an organisation itself

founded by traditional leaders among other, has been greatly aggrieve by
the reluctance on the part of the AN C, on the eve of liberation and as

 

189 Nonkonyana in Osaghae, Op cit: p. 95.

138

government afterwards, to embrace progressive traditional leaders in the
process leading to the adoption of both the interim and the ﬁnal
constitution.”19°.

In this passage one sees a careful invocation of a common history between traditional

leaders and the liberation movement, speciﬁcally AN C in this instance, as well as

identiﬁcation of some progressive chiefs as natural allies.

A brief outline of other responses of traditional leaders include, among other things,
chiefs joining and assuming important positions in political parties such as the ANC, the
PAC and more recently the UDM. Contralesa leaders such as chief Nonkonyana and
Chief Holomisa are AN C members of parliament while chief Gwadiso was the founder
and Member of Parliament for the UDM until recently when he defected to the AN C
which rewarded him with a diplomatic post as a High Commissioner in Ivory Coast. This
has left most of these chiefs with dual membership in both Contralesa and in their
respective political parties. At a given opportunity they use their position as
parliamentary representatives of these parties to advance the interests of traditional
leaders. Another preferred strategy of traditional leaders is to portray themselves as
natural and authentic agents to deliver African Renaissance. South Aﬁica’s National
Heritage Day which is recognized as a holiday often has state organized activities.
Traditional leaders often complain that they, being authentic custodians of Aﬁican
heritage, are marginalized by government ofﬁcials and ministers when they are supposed

to be at the very center. A similar complaint is heard when it comes to the planning and

 

190 Chief Holomisa, P. “Contralesa perspective on traditional leadership in South Aﬁica”, 2000: p.1

139

implementation of African Renaissance programs. In advancing their demands for more
powers and roles within the new AN C-led government, traditional leaders belonging to
Contralesa have joined forces with the IFP in protests as well as in delegations meeting
the government officials. It should also be pointed out that some traditional leaders from
the Eastern Cape region of Transkei who were initially not comfortable with Contralesa’s
close association with the AN C established an alternative organization, Transkei
Traditional Leaders Association(T'I‘LA). When AN CvContralesa relationship was

strained in the mid-19905 'ITLA agreed to dissolve and its members joined Contralesa.

The general reaction of KwaZulu-Natal province, who are overwhelmingly IFP
supporters, is unique in many ways. While a few chiefs such as Chief Maphumulo and
Chief Mlaba joined the AN C and Contralesa, an overwhelming majority has remained
with the IFP under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi and their actions can be better
understood by analyzing their party’s position. IFP’s reaction to protest politics of the
19805 and early 19905 had the following three elements: Firstly, IFP organized
Amabutho or traditional regiments into para-military formations that were used to
conﬁ'ont ANC and its allies or the comrades. Secondly, it politicizes ethnicity while
positioning or portraying itself as the sole and authentic representative or guarantor of
Zulu identity and heritage. IFP also used the past role of Zulu traditional leaders such as
former AN C president Chief Luthuli as well as Chief Buthelezi’s previous association
with the ANC as an indication that IFP was also part of the liberation struggle although

using non-violent strategies within the apartheid homeland system.

140

The following directive from the IFP leader, Chief Buthelezi clearly indicates his
preparedness to transform traditional structures into paramilitary forces to confront
organizations that were mobilizing in KwaZulu ;

“I think it is time for Inkatha to establish training camps where branches

and regions are schooled in the employment of anger in an orderly

fashion. We need to conduct meetings in the midst of chaos which other

people are trying to create. We need to tone up muscles so that the dove of

peace sits easily on the spear. I think we need to create well-disciplined

and regirnented impis in every Inkatha region which can be called out for

protection of that which is sacred to Inkatha and black South Africa.”191
In pursuit of the above strategy, the [PP which was also the sole and governing party in
KwaZulu homeland issued IFP-aligned chiefs and indunas with riﬂes while at the same
time forming regiments which later became known as Self Protection Unit (SPUs) to
which ANC responded by forming SelfDefense Units. The apartheid government also
helped in the arming and training of IFP paramilitary units as it also regarded AN C as a
common enemy to be confronted and weakened ahead of 1994 elections. This
militarization of partisan politics in KwaZulu—Natal led to violent conﬁ'ontations between
the AN C and the IFP supporters with each one establishing its stronghold often declared
a ‘no go area’ for the adversary. The legacy of this is the fact that local elite relations are
often confrontational with very little, if any, tolerance for opponents. The conﬂict is
primarily deﬁned along party lines. It is also important to note that the civic organization,

SAN CO, which had establish itself in virtually all the other provinces did not take root in

KwaZulu-Natal, thus leaving IFP and the AN C as the only key players in the rural areas.

 

191Mare in Rich, op cit, 1996: p. 28-29.

141

Perhaps the most potent mobilizing tool used by the IFP leadership was ethnicity or Zulu
identity in this instance. ANC, and UDF before ANC’s unbanning, was often depicted as
a Xhosa-led organization pitted against the IFP that represented Zulu identity and
interest. The IF P’s exclusive claims regarding Zulu constituency is not supported by facts
as almost all of the Zulu population supported the AN C. Buthelezi often conﬂated his
identity with that of the IFP and the Zulu nation in a bid to invoke ethnic sentiments
whenever the IFP or Buthelezi himself was being challenged. The following statement,
issued in response to ANC-led alliance’s call for the dismantling of bantustan systems
including KwaZulu, demonstrates this fact as Buthelezi declared:

“I hope the Zulu people whatever their political afﬁliations will realize

that the AN C campaign of viliﬁcation is no longer just against me and

Inkatha but also against the Zulu people as Zulu people . . . KwaZulu is

not a construct of apartheid and is known even by a primary school child

who knows the outline onulu history.”192
In KwaZulu-Natal the IFP remains the mouthpiece of many traditional leaders and in
retunr traditional leaders have been a vital element in IFP’s political support in the rural

areas. The militarized structures of rural traditional authority have thwarted AN C ’5

several attempts to mobilize in rural areas under the IFP chiefs.

The above section presented various reactions of traditional leaders to protest and
liberation politics. It has been shown that chiefs are quite resourceful in utilizing
tradition, liberation discourse and strategic, sometimes opportunistic, political alliances to

advance their interests. The case of KwaZulu-Natal presents a unique dimension as

 

1mMarc, G., Ethnicitvlnd politics in South Africal993: p.101.

142

politicization of ethnicity and use of paramilitary formations were dominant form of
reaction. These reactions reveal, among other things, the fact that tradition serves as a
constantly re-workable resource especially during the time of profound social and
political changes that affect traditional rulership. Andrew Spiegel’s remark underscores
the instrumental use as well as transformation of the past. He makes an assertion that
“The past can come to be part of the present in two ways. Firstly, people use the
past instrumentally. In such instances practices and institutions are pursued quite
self-consciously and are contrived as part of one or another political enterprise...
Secondly, certain social and cultural practices may persist merely because people
‘go on’ with their lives in familiar ways. They do not contrive to continue those
practices (sometimes described as habitual) nor do they contrive to change them.
Indeed, they accept them tacitly and without actually considering whether or not
they are necessary or appropriate, nor why they do them?”3
Of the two instances in which the past or tradition is brought to the present, the former
seems to apply in this speciﬁc situation of traditional leaders struggle to consolidate their
position within a new dispensation. The evidence presented in this discussion clearly

indicates an entrepreneurial political enterprise led by an educated elite group within the

ranks of traditional leaders.

The elite is quite conscious of its political role during this transition period and it
perceives itselfas one of the agents that ought to shape the transformation process thus

guaranteeing the future role and recognition of traditional leadership.

 

193Spiegel,A. in McAllister, 1997: p.12

143

The following statement by Chief Nonkonyana is indicative of this;
“Ideally, traditional leadership and politics are not suppose to mix. We would like
to see ourselves being above party politics, but we are still building and
transforming this country. There is no clear-cut role for traditional leaders in this
process.”19". ’
5.3. An open-ended solution: Political dynamics of constitutional engineering and
the emerging rural local government institutions.
This section focuses on the constitutional development process that paved the way for the
establishment of a new democracy. As to be expected, the constitutional development
process is broad and multifaceted. However, for the purpose of this discussion only those
aspects of this process which are related to rural local government and the role of
traditional leaders will be covered. The process of developing new institutions of rural
local government and redeﬁnition of the role of traditional leaders proved to be one of the
most controversial features of building a new democracy. This process, it will soon be
shown, was marked by compromise, deal-making and ambiguities. This, I call politics of
open—ended solutions in which ambiguities and ad hoc arrangements as well as
continuing negotiations, often without a resolution, are essential features which occur not
by default but by design of the dominant players. The deﬁning character of the politics of
open-ended solutions is to manage but not necessarily resolve policy problems with the
hope of consolidating one’s own position in the event of the window of opportunity
provided by an political opponent who has run out of steam. The following questions

will help to guide discussion in this section: Who were the major stakeholders and actors

 

‘94See Daily Dispatch, May 31, 1999

144

in the process of drafting the new constitution and related laws on rural local
government? What were the policy positions of various parties on the question of rural
local government and the role of traditional leaders in the new dispensation? What are the
new institutions that have emerged from this process? How have these developments
affected relations among stakeholders? The ultimate aim is to present an outline of
political dynamics that shaped the evolution of public policies on rural local government
while at the same time answering one of the key questions of this dissertation: What is
the composition, function and structure of rural local govemment in post-apartheid South

Aﬁica?

5.3.1. The key political players and their policy options.

The previous section portrayed the alliances, strategies and various reactions in response
to or pursuance of resistance politics and liberation struggle in the rural areas. This also
provided an opportunity to look at the key actors and stakeholders who later became an
important component in inﬂuencing constitutional development. As a prelude to
discussions a brief reference to and identiﬁcation of these key players and their policy
preferences proﬁles is presented in order to provide a context of some of the political

contestations and positions.

5.3.1.1. The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa(Contralesa).
As shown in the previous discussion, Contralesa emerged as the organization that
advanced and protected group interests of chiefs. Deal-making, forging political alliances

and protests became preferred strategies of traditional leaders as they fought for their
145

recognition in the interim and the new constitution.

The policy position of Contralesa can be summarized as follows: The representation of
traditional leaders at national and provincial levels. At the national level they proposed
the establishment of an upper house of parliament occupied by traditional leaders. The
National House of Traditional Leaders would perform the same functions normally done
by the Senate or the House of Lords in the speciﬁc case of Britain. This meant that they
would have direct inﬂuence on a legislative process and not just symbolic or advisory
function. I am mindful of the fact that there powers of senates and upper houses in any
given country differ with some having more powers than others but the point here is that
traditional leaders needed more powers to have a direct inﬂuence on legislative processes

than what the legislation stipulated.

A similar arrangement was advocated for the provinces in which the Provincial House of
Traditional Leaders would operate parallel the provincial legislatures. At the local level,
Contralesa suggested a model in which traditional authority would be the primary rural
local government structure responsible for administrative, judicial, service delivery and
developmental functions. This is in essence a call for the maintenance of the status quo in
which the chief is at the center with headmen/indunas and tribal councilors at the bottom
end of the hierarchy. Better remuneration of chiefs comparable to elected politicians has
always been Contralesa’s preoccupation. Contralesa members are mainly drawn from the
Eastern Cape, Free State, Northern Province, Northwest Province, Mpumalanga and a

few from KwaZulu-Natal.‘ The key leaders of Contralesa are relatively young and well-
146

educated chiefs, most of who have university education. To mention but a few,
Contralesa’s current president, Chief Phathekile Holomisa is an advocate with university
education and he is in his late thirties; Chief Mwelo Nonkonyane is also an advocate with
a university education and he was bom in 1957; Prince James Mahlangu and Chief
Gwadiso also have university education. The last two ﬁgures held senior ministerial
positions in their respective homeland govemments whereas Holomisa was a student

activist in the 19805.

5.3.1.2. Inkatha Freedom Party(IFP)

Just like Contralesa, the IFP has been a key advocate for the interests of chiefs but its
main focus and constituency is generally limited to KwaZulu-Natal. IFP advocated for
the establishment of Zulu Kingdom in a confederation. In this kingdom, the ﬁgurehead
would be the Zulu king with the House of Traditional Leaders operating parallel to the
parliament of a federal state. At a regional level there would be regional councils in
which all chiefs would be ex ofﬁcio members alongside the elected councillors. At a
local level chief, indunas and their councilors would remain as the only institution of
local government IFP leaders area mainly drawn from the former government ofﬁcial of
the Zululand homeland which was governed by the same party. There is a strong
representation of chiefs within the leadership of IF P and Chief Buthelezi has virtual

dominance over the party.

5.3.1.3. African National Congress (AN C)

ANC was the leading liberation organization and it became the ruling party after the 1994
147

elections. AN C is a broad nationalist organization which has accommodated a wide range
of political tendencies within its umbrella, and these range ﬁ'om communist, unionists,
women’s rights group, traditionalists, civics, student and youth interest groups. Within its
broad alliance and collective leadership, the AN C has the South Aﬁican Communist
Party(SACP), the Congress of South African Trade Unions(COSATU), and the South
Aﬁican National Civics Association. Within AN C structures there is the ANC Women’s
League and the Youth League. All of these organizations have a more militant stance
which calls for the abolition or serious limitation of the role of traditional leaders in a
democratic South Africa. The AN C Women’s League is obviously against the
marginalization of and discrimination against women that prevails in the institution of
traditional authority. The Youth League is also sensitive to the fact that rural youth are
alienated ﬁom this institution. The youth and women’s wing of the AN C combine with
other ANC allies such as COSATU, SACP and SANCO to form a pressure group

advocating the neutralization or profound change of traditional rulership.

On the question of the role of traditional leaders in a post-apartheid South Aﬁica has
maintained an ambivalent position which wanted to retain and recognize chiefs but with a
limited role. But this position was never articulated in any speciﬁc policy model for rural
local government. In broad terms, AN C wanted elected structures to take a leading role in
rural areas especially in the area of service delivery and development. AN C’s position
can be portrayed as the one of a pragmatic and yet ambivalent approach which is driven
by a need to woo chiefs and their rural subjects into its fold while at the same time not

alienating a democratic component of its constituency which advocated for representative
148

governance based on popular elections. A balancing act with no clear policy became

AN C’s strategy throughout transition process.

5.3.1.4. South African National Civic Organization (SAN CO)

This civic organization is the arch-rival of the institution of chieftaincy as indicated by
both its actions and pronouncements. As one civic leader put it, “In the new South Aﬁica,
chiefs will melt away like ice in the sun”l95. SAN CO has been the main force behind the
campaigns against chiefs and they have called for the abolition or at least severe
curtailing of the powers of chiefs including their removal from the key role of land
allocation. SAN CO wanted elected ofﬁcials to be the core of the rural local govemment.
SAN CO is mainly constituted by ordinary community members or civic leaders who had
borne the brunt of traditional authority or apartheid imposed local authorities in
townships. The general feeling of the members of SANCO is that they have been
disadvantaged and could not easily access resources and inﬂuence developments under
traditional rulership or old municipalities hence their opposition to these structures.

SAN CO, just like other AN C alliance organizations, entered into an electoral pact during
the 1994, 1995, 1999 and 2000 elections but over time this has generated tension and
caused ﬁllout in some areas as local member jostle for positions or inclusion in the party

list for elections.

 

195Mail a Guardian, April 7-12, 1995

149

5.3.1.5. Other interested parties.

Other political formations which have some inﬂuence and keen interest on the question
of rural local government and the role of rural local government are the Pan Aﬁicanist
Congress(PAC) and the United Democratic Movement(UDM). Both see their potential
constituency as the rural Africans who live under the jurisdiction of chiefs. These
organizations have, therefore, been more sympathetic to the position of chiefs as

articulated by Contralesa and the IFP.

5.3.2. Constitutional and policy making process and its political dynamics.
At this juncture, it is opportune to reﬂect on Steinmo and Thelen’s impression on
institutional choices and their dynamics in order to provide a context for discussion on
constitutional and policy making processes. Steinmo and Thelen point out that,
“Conﬂict over institutions lay bare interests and power relations, and their
outcomes not only reﬂect but magnify and reinforce the interest of the winners,
since broad policy trajectories can follow from institutional choices.”196
This observation captures the essence of the dynamics of a constitutional engineering and
public policymaking process that unfolded in South Africa’s transition from apartheid to
democracy. There is, however, one caveat in the speciﬁc case of South African
experience as the following section will show. The process of deﬁning the role of
traditional leaders and restructuring rural local government is still work-in-progress. This,
it will be argued, is both a function of strength of the contending forces as well as the art

of compromise which produced what I earlier referred to as an open-ended solution.

 

196Steinmo, s., K. Thelen, et al., Eds. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism
inComparative Analysis 1992: p.27.
150

In February 1990 liberation organizations such as the ANC, SACP, PAC, BCM, were
unbanned paving the way for a negotiated settlement or transition. In July 1991 the
Convention for Democratic South Africa(CODESA) was established as a multiparty
negotiating forum, and its mandate was to draw a blueprint for a democratic South
Africa There was a broad range of participants in this negotiation forum. These ranged
from the major liberation organization such as the AN C-led alliance and the PAC, to
political parties with representatives in an apartheid parliament such as the then
governing National Party and Democratic Party as well as the bantustan governments.
For the most part there were 18 political organizations represented at the negotiations. A
few fringe radical groups on the extreme left and right of the political spectrum boycotted
the whole process. In these negotiations there was a wide range of issues and all
indications show that the role of traditional leaders as well as rural local government was
at the bottom of many negotiators’ list. Initially, there was no representation of traditional

leaders in the negotiation forum.

The Inkatha Freedom Party, which had positioned itself as the vanguard of traditional
leaders, vehemently protested and threatened boycotts over the fact that traditional
leaders and the king of KwaZulu had no representation in the talk. Eventually it was
agreed that there should be a delegation of traditional leaders from each one of the four

provincesm which existed at the time. During the negotiations it became clear that the

 

19 7These provinces are Transvaal, Cape, Natal and Orange Free State thus covering all the black

reserve areas which had areas which were under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders.
151

major parties, the National Party and the AN C, had no clear policy positions, except for
vague pronouncements, on the role of traditional leaders in a democratic system as well
as new models of rural local govemment. In the case of the ANC this ambiguity had a
political function as much as it reﬂected AN C’s broad and diverse constituency which
could not reconcile its various positions on this matter. AN C leadership was careﬁrl not
to alienate chiefs or diﬁ’erent elements within its alliance. For Contralesa and the IFP the
recognition of traditional leaders and the preservation, if not enhancement, of their
powers was paramount in their submissions. Ifaccepted, this would create what Maloka
refers to as “a union of kingdoms.”m The issue of customary law which allows only
males to be heirs in chieftaincy was one of the controversial issues as it was seen by
many participants, particularly women’s delegations, as irreconcilable with the Human
Rights clause of equality‘”. A compromise was ﬁnally reached, though still in vague
terms, in which chieftaincy would still follow its customs subject to the relevant

legislation by the government.

5.3.3. Constitution, laws and emerging institutions
These negotiations produced the interim constitution, framework for the ﬁrst democratic
elections as well as new laws on a wide range of issues. What emerged from the

negotiations was a phased transition in which institutions would have interim structures

 

198 Maloka, T. “Populism and the politics of chieftaincy and nation-building in the new South Africa” in
Journal of Contemporarl Africa_n Studies, 1996: pl 85

199Cheryl walker(l 994) deals with the debate surrounding gender equality and customary laws at a greater
detail in her work.

152

that paved the way for the ﬁnal arrangement. These were the provisions of the
constitution which was ﬁamed into an interim constitution which was to be followed by
the ﬁnal constitution which was to be formulated by the elected constituent assembly. It
is, however, important to note that the core principles of the interim constitution were be
retained in the ﬁnal constitution. The interim constitution was adopted in 1993. The
position and role of traditional leadership at local, provincial and national levels were
recognized in terms stipulated in the Constitutional Principle )GJI. Section 181(1) of the
Interim Constitution stipulates that

“A Traditional authority which observes a system of indigenous law and is

recognised by law immediately before the commencement of the

Constitution, shall continue as such an authority and continue to exercise

and perform the powers and functions vested in it in accordance with the

applicable laws and customs, subject to any amendment or repeal of such

laws and customs by a competent authority.”1500
This is a clear guarantee of not only continued existence of chieftaincy but retention of
their powers and ﬁrnctions. In what is an apparent contradiction or ambiguity, the same
document also made provision for democratically elected local government structures
with administrative, service delivery and development functions thus overlapping with
the roles of traditional authorities in the rural areas. Many observers201 are of the opinion
that the constitutional provision for the establishment of elected municipalities was

designed with urban areas in mind even though it had wider implications. As part of

pseudo-federal provisions of the constitution, it was left to the provinces to repeal the old

 

2°°lntetitn Constitution, 1993. In Government Gazette of February 28, 1994: p.212.

201N8ebezaL., 1996; Houston, H. & Fikeni, s., 1996; McIntosh in Graham, 1995

153

rural local government laws in order to make way for the new institutions of local
government At a national level, the Council of Traditional Leaders was established
while The Houses of Traditional leaders were provided for each one of the six provinces

which have traditional leaders.

Of particular interest in this work are those models that were adopted for rural local
government at a local, district or regional level. The focus will now turn to those
institutions in a bid to show continuities and changes as well as provincial variations.
Alastair McIntosh’s observation demonstrates some of the limitations confronting the
restructuring of rural local government. He points out that;
“When local government negotiations ﬁrst occurred nationally, discussion
was dominated by urban issues such as uniting previously segregated
cities and overcoming the massive debt related to rent and services
boycotts. The result was that the model that was decided for local
government transition was more appropriate to the urban areas than rural
areas . . . The Local Government Act, which reﬂects this transition

process, did not prescribe the form of local govemment should take in
rural areas, but it left it to the provinces to decide?“02

This recurring theme of urban bias merely indicates that the urban bias of the liberation
struggle impacted on and inﬂuenced the trajectory of transition. The Local Government
Transitional Act was passed in 1993 and it sets out three stages in terms of which local
government was to be transformed. These are the pre-interim, interim and ﬁnal stages. In
terms of the provisions of this Act, the pre-interim phase was completed by 31 March

1995 while the interim stage begun on November 1995 or just after the ﬁrst local

 

20"Graham, op cit: p. 63

154

elections. The ﬁnal stage of this phase commenced after the second local elections of
December 2000. While this local government act was clear on the pre-interim phase
models in the urban areas203 it failed to propose any structure for the rural areas thus

living traditional authorities as the only locally governing institutions.

The interim phase that was effected after the ﬁrst local elections mark the beginning of
restructuring of rural local govemment even though it was still shrouded in conﬁrsion as
elected local councilors coexisted with traditional authorities often with overlapping
responsibilities. It is also in this phase that provincial variations of local government
emerged. Most of the provinces initially opted for two-tier system with a secondary and
primary level. At a local or primary level urban and rural local councils would be elected.
At a secondary level which existed at a regional or district level the regional or district
councils, covering large areas that included a number of towns and former bantustan
areas, would be elected. The local councils were envisaged as the primary providers of
services in local areas whereas the regional councils would be responsible for regional
development as well as assisting rural councils with ﬁnances. In this arrangement there
were urban municipalities, with the exception of large cities which had metropolitan
councils, generally known as the Transitional Local CouncileLCs). Alongside, there
were rural municipalities, otherwise known as Transitional Rural Councils(TRCs) which

covered the areas falling outside the TLC and Metropolitan councils’ jurisdiction. In

 

203The pro-interim provisions for the urban areas primarily focused on the mager of the statutory and
statutory bodies as the ﬁrst step of including those structures which were hitherto excluded from the
apartheid local government. These included local civic organizations and political organizations.

155

many provinces there were intermediary structures known as Transitional Representative
Councils which were demarcated on basis of magisterial districts and acted as an

interface in which both the rural councilors and urban TLC members are represented.

It is in the area of representation of traditional leaders in these elected councils or
municipalities that one begins to see sharp differences among provinces. In terms of the
government proclamation issued in August 1995 provinces could opt for one of the two
modes of traditional leaders’ representation in transitional local councils: The ﬁrst form
of representation makes provision for representation of chiefs as ex-oﬁ'lcio members
whereas the second stipulates that chiefs can be represented as one of the interest
groups(alongside women, farm-workers and farm owners) which should not exceed 10%
of council’s membership. Traditional leaders have vehemently opposed their
representation as a minority special interest group within these councils. Holomisa
statement echoes these sentiments and the logic behind them as he protests that “this will
put the position of traditional leaders in the hands of the very people who are so hostile to
us?”

As it will be shown, in other provinces, through default or deliberate protests by

chiefs, there was no representation of chiefs at all.

KwaZulu-Natal, under the IFP-led government, adopted a unique model of local
government and this was done primarily to preserve [PP and traditional leaders’

dominance in the local and regional structures. Transitional local government legislation

 

20‘ The Star, August 23, 1995.

156

in KwaZulu-Natal made no provision for rural local government structures at the primary
level but this is only provided for in the urban areas(see diagram). This left the rural areas
in the hand of traditional authorities which remained the primary local governing
structure. The only existing local structure is located at a regional level or is vested in
Regional Councils. KwaZulu—Natal is divided into seven regional councils which cover
large areas. Rural representation in these Regional Councils come in three different forms
which are the ex-oﬁicio membership of all chiefs, the party list proportional
representation and the special interest groups(with10% representation each). It is also
important to note that women’s representatives, as interest group, are drawn ﬁom party
list thus adding to party proportional representation. The dominance of chiefs in this local
government calculus is unmistakable as captured in the following statement:

.it is designed essentially around the Amakhosi. In the transitional

dispensation, every Inkosi has ex-ofﬁcio membership status, with the

number of Amakhosi in a particular RC area giving rise to the baseline

number of representatives in the RC. ...RCs are extremely large and

unwieldy. In order to balance out the inﬂuence of the Amakhosi, the

number of party-list representatives is huge. Add to this special

representatives, and you have RC’s with between 200 and 400

representatives. ”205
One such example is the Ilembe Regional Council ﬁom which some of the cases for this
study were selected. This particular RC had 249 members at the time of the ﬁeld
research. Each one of these RC5 is headed by an Executive Committee which deals with

day to day coordination and management and they are assisted by a variety of specialized

subcommittee. The party list representation without speciﬁc rural ward representation

 

205Munro & Barnes, 1997, p.77.

means that a particular community may not be directly represented in the RC or may

have fewer representatives than other areas.

The situation elsewhere in the country differs from provinces to province and in some
instances from region to region within a province but nowhere do traditional leaders
enjoys as much representation and political sway as in KwaZulu-Natal. In the Eastern
Cape there are no traditional leaders represented in local government structures. This is a
consequence of the fact that the bulk of the members of Transitional Representative
Councils were to consist of elected representatives with no guaranteed representation of
any of the interest groups, including chiefs, on the rural TRCsm. This non-
representation was also reinforced by the Contralesa’s call for traditional leaders to
boycott these councils as they deemed them as encroaching on their roles. In isolated
instances where chiefs became members of TRCs it was through their individual
initiatives and in their capacity as representatives of their political parties. This is

certainly the case with the chief of Nzongiseni who was interviewed for this study.

A general synopsis of different patterns of traditional leaders’ representation or exclusion
is provided by the Department of Constitutional Development. In this situation analysis
the following summary presents a diverse picture:

“Only two traditional leaders in the Free State have taken up positions in

the local government structures. Traditional leaders in Mpumalanga are

ex-ofﬁcio members of local government structures but do not participate.
In North West, traditional leaders are represented as an interest group in

 

206Houston, G. et al, op cit., 1996: p.64

158

the Transitional District Councils. Traditional leaders in the Eastern Cape,

Free State, Northern Province, Mpumalanga and North West do not

participate in discussions of local government structures (in most cases

they do not even attend). However, some traditional leaders in Free State

and Northern Province participate in T'LCs.”207
All these forms of representation took eﬁ’ect after the November 1995 local elections in
all other provinces excerpt KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape where these elections
were held in June 1996. Contralesa and the IFP did threaten to boycott local elections or
prevent them ﬁom taking place in their areas but this was averted after the government
promised to look into their grievances. 1F P enjoys massive dominance in the RC5 of
KwaZulu-Natal largely because of its solid rural support as well as the ex-ofﬁcio
representation of chiefs, a majority of whom are IFP supporters. The regional variations

of traditional leaders’ representation and structures of local government are bound to

make a difference in political and policy outcomes.

The ﬁnal phase of local government transformation took effect after the second local
elections which took place in December 2000. This phase provided for a series of
legislation, constitutional reforms, discussion documents and government blueprint

‘ documents. The ANC, emboldened by its solid electoral victory as well as its general
power entrenchment in different sectors of government, pushed for the establishment of
rural local government structures which clearly threatened traditional leaders control over
their areas of jurisdiction. The passing of the 1996 ﬁnal Constitution was one such step.

The 1996 Constitution stipulates that national legislation may establish the institution of

 

207 Dept of Constitutional Development, Status Quo Report, 1999: p. 16

159

traditional authority but the wording suggests that it is not an obligation but an option in a
non-committal mannerm. This is different from the interim constitution which had
indicated that national legislation shall establish this institution. This shift of emphasis
into a more tentative promise has been vehemently protested by traditional leaders who
are keenly aware of the fact that their future may not be guaranteed. Contralesa President,
Holomisa, is articulating a concern that is shared by many traditional leaders when he
protests that “Our role has become worse in the ﬁnal Constitution,”209 He later
proclaimed that
“ . . . the gains registered in the interim Constitution were vastly diminished in the
ﬁnal Constitution . . . the ﬁnal Constitution, while purporting to recognise it, does
not offer protection to the institution.”2 0
The change in the wording of the ﬁnal constitution was only preparing a way for more
legislation which would lead to a fall out between the ruling AN C and many sectors of

the traditional elite.

Perhaps, there is no other legislation that has drawn such a sharp reaction from traditional
leaders and their organizations than the New Municipal Structures Act The provisions of
this Act effectively strip traditional leaders of some of their powers such as local service
delivery and development and place it in new municipal councils. In terms of these

changes the municipal boundaries are drawn in such a manner that they divide certain

 

”8 See Chapter 12 of South African Constitution, 1996, p.119.
2‘” Mail a Guardian, October 3, 1997.
210 Chief Holomisa}. Op cit, April 14, 2000: p.4

160

areas which are under chiefs and combine them with urban areas in many instances.
Wards ﬁom which local representatives are to be elected are drawn in rural areas and
representation of chiefs in the elected councils is reduced to 10%. This has been recently
raised to 20% in a bid to silence protesting chiefs. This new law establishes a single tier
municipality for both rural and urban areas. The other general fear on the part of
individual chiefs I interviewed was that the introduction of municipalities in rural areas
would bring an urban lifestyle that, among other things, include payment of rates,
individual title deeds for the land as well as doing away with livestock grazing and
farming. Traditional leaders capitalized on this fear and confusion among a considerable
number of rural dwellers. One of many reasons the second local elections had to be
postponed from its original date was because of widespread protests and threats from
traditional leaders in rural areas, some of whom made it difﬁcult for their subjects to

2“. The December 2000 elections were conducted in terms of the

register for elections.
newly demarcated municipal wards with a mix of ward representatives, a tiny ﬁaction of
special interest groups including traditional leaders, and party representatives elected on

basis of proportional representation.

At this juncture it is appropriate to make a cursory reference to some of post-colonial
Africa’s policies regarding the role of traditional leaders. This will help to contextualize
the South Aﬁica’s more recent and unfolding process of reforming local government

while at the same time trying to ﬁnd the right formula for accommodation of traditional

 

2“ Dladla, 3. “One tribe, One Municipality" in Land and Rural Digest March/April 2000

161

rulers. Maloka identiﬁes three broad models that were developed to accommodate

traditional leaders in post-colonial Aﬁica. In the following passage he outlines them:
“Some countries established special houses and/or council of chiefs at
various levels of government for these leaders to participate in one way or
another in matters that affected their institution and customary law.
Others, like the West African examples... gave chiefs a percentage of the
seats in the national assembly and/or senate. In other countries— Lesotho
and Swaziland in particular— solutions were sought in establishing a
constitutional monarchy with executive and/or ceremonial powers.
However, with few exceptions, as the years progressed, the nationalists
elite tend to entrench its position vis-a-vis that of the chiefs. Chief ﬁnding

themselves in this situation, would try to build up royal image,
appropriating and creating new symbols.”212.

In its attempt to outline the predominant models of accommodating chiefs, the above
passage has aspects which are striking in their resemblance of the South African
experience described above. The initial ambiguity and tentativeness of the AN C elite in
its accommodation of chiefs and its progressive erosion of the role of traditional leaders,
with varying successes of course, is the case in point. A transition from the interim
Constitution of 1993 to the ﬁnal Constitution of 1996 as well as a replacement of interim
transitional local councils with the new Municipalities is a speciﬁc case which depicts the
political elites’ attempt to consolidate its hold. It should also be stated that a similar
attempt by elected local councilors to consolidate and entrench their power in rural areas
was observed during the ﬁeld study. It should also be mentioned that other post-colonial
governments opted for the more radical step of not recognizing traditional leaders. This

was generally the case in the socialist systems, Mozambique being one of such cases,

 

mlvralokar op cit, 1996: p.183.

162

which viewed the institution of chieftaincy as an antithetical archaic feudal system. Once
the Mozambican government abandoned socialism and upon realization that chiefs
became natural allies of their opposition or Renamo rebel forces, they embarked on a new

path of recognizing thus accommodating the institution of traditional leadership.

Some of the scholars such as Migija213 and Keulder214 have even gone beyond Aﬁica to
include models of accommodation of traditional authorities in nations like New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, Canada and United States. Currently, with the ongoing
crisis in a collapsed or deeply-fractured state of Afghanistan, there has been more talk of
tribal leaders and the traditional system of governance as one of possible ways of
resolving the chronic problems that afﬂict that state. This, if anything, is a testimony to
the resilience of some strands of traditional authority within the context of the modern

state system.

5.4. Concluding remarks

Discussion in this chapter has, among other things, revealed that traditional leaders have
been active agents in a bid to preserve and advance their interests in the context of
transition to democracy. This, it will be shown is the subsequent chapters, is not only
conﬁned to the high proﬁle traditional leaders who operate at the national or provincial

political terrain, it is evident in chiefs operating in their localities as their deal with

 

213Migija , op cit, 1998

214Keulder, C. Traditional leaders a‘nd local government in Aﬁica: Lessons for South Africa
1998.

163

emerging elite which is contesting their control of local resources. This discussion also
provides a changing institutional environment within which local political elite relations
are shaped. This is particularly the case with the local chiefs, elected councilors and the
civic leaders who have to utilize the existing institutional tools in their bid to control
resources in order to project their power. This chapter has, therefore, laid the canvas in a
form of institutional ﬁamework and policy preferences which are some of the crucial

aspects of understanding dominant trends in local elites’ relations.

164

CHAPTER SIX

A PROFILE OF SELECTED INDIVIDUAL COMMUNITIES

In this chapter a proﬁle of selected cases or communities is presented in a form of a
narrative that is mainly constructed from the qualitative portion of the interviews and
focus group discussions conducted with participants. These narratives complement
descriptive summary statistics in various ways. For instance, an account of each case
provides some information on history and evolution of relationship among the key
players. It gives voice to the participants while it also provides a context to the relational
dynamics of each community. By giving voice to the key participants, this chapter also
reveals, to a great extent, participants’ perceptions and understanding of cooperation and
conﬂict. All these dimensions could not be easily captured or deﬁnitively represented in

summary statistics.

The account of these cases also provides partial answers to some of the questions which
this study is addressing. The question of the current operation, structure and ﬁrnction of
rural local government as well as the evolution of actual relationships among the local
elites are covered by some aspects of these case accounts while the nature of relationship
among the local elites is partially addressed. Most of the narrative is drawn ﬁom the

open-ended interview accounts given by participants. This also helps the reader to see the
165

community dynamics through the eyes of the actors whose perceptions are an important
factor in the relationships they form. Each narrative is a collection and a reconstruction of
accounts given by the participants. Where the perceptions of one section of the elite diﬁ‘er
from those of the other, an attempt is made to point those discrepancies in order to
provide all possible angles from which the local reality is viewed or interpreted. The
following cases are arranged according to provinces in order to allow for a brief remark
on some general features and history of each province. In this manner a brief general
background and the setting of the selected provinces are provided before proﬁles of cases
drawn from each province are presented. It should be noted that the grouping of the cases
by provinces does not imply that they necessarily share the same attributes and this.

become clear in the following sections of this chapter and in the subsequent chapters.

6.1. The Eastern Cape Province:

Rode, Nzongisa and Mnceba are located in the district of Mount Ayliff which is part of
the former nominally independent black homeland of Transkei. Xhosa is the dominant
language in the Eastern Cape province even though there are several sub-ethnic African
groups with diverse histories, dialects and backgrounds, and these are Xesibe, Tembu,
Baca, Pondo, Pondomise, Hlubi, Gcaleka, Mbo, Mfengu and Rarabe. Sothos are also
scattered in communities along Lesotho and Free State borders. In this case, the
predominantly Xesibe(Nzongisa and Mnceba) and Hlubi (Rode) communities have been
selected. In late 1995 and early 1996, the author, in collaboration with Gregory Houston,
conducted research on traditional rulership in these communities and some of the details

are drawn from those studies. This explains the fact that in this narrative there is a thicker
166

description of the Eastern Cape communities compared to those of Mpumalanga and

KwaZulu-Natal.

These, historically, were politically inactive communities which experienced a
signiﬁcant wave of political mobilization in the early 19905 after the unbanning of
liberation organization and the unbanning of political prisoners. This mobilization
generally took two forms, the recruitment and setting of branches by the major political
organizations, AN C and the PAC in this case, and the establishment of civic
organizations, particularly SANCO, in this region. It is only in the latter part of the 19905
that other organizations, such as the UDM and the IFP, were established as signiﬁcant
actors in these communities. As it will soon be demonstrated, each community reacted
differently to these developments and had its own dynamics in the relations of the various
sectors of the local elite. In all these communities chiefs are acting on behalf of a person

who is either away or too young or sick to rule.

6.1.1. Rode Administrative Area.

Rode is a predominantly Hlubi community which is located in the Mount Ayliff District
of the Eastern Cape. Rode Administrative Area is further divided into the following
villages: Sikolweni, Magontsini, Voveni, Nyosini and Ndakeni. Each one of these
villages has at least one representative in the Traditional Authority Council which is
headed by a chief who is from the Radebe clan. Chief J ongintaba Nota who was a chief
of the Hlubi Tribal Authority left for exile and stayed in Botswana until his death in the

mid 19805.
167

During his years of political exile his younger brother, Kholisile Nota, assumed the
position of an acting chief. Chief Kholisile Nota became an active and a prominent
member of the Transkei homeland ruling political party. He held several cabinet posts in
successive Bantustan governments. During this period he accumulated a number of
businesses including a supermarket at Rode. For many years he was virtually the only
shopkeeper and the only owner of tractors and large farms in the local community. The
local post ofﬁce is also located in one of the roorrrs in his supermarket and his shop has
always been an old-age pension collection point. It is also important to note that chief
Nota’s home is located at Sikolweni which also has a number of local facilities which
other adjacent villages do not have, and these include a local Methodist mission, a junior
secondary as well as a high school, a clinic, a preschool as well as the Hlubi Tribal
Authority Ofﬁces and Hall. This makes Sikolweni village a center of activities in this
administrative area. Moreover, the only accessible and relatively well-maintained access
road is in this same area of Sikolweni. Interviews with some of the participants from the
Sikolweni location section of the village reveal their self-understanding and self-
deﬁnition as an enlightened section of the Rode village. A few even attributed
discrepancies in facilities or inﬁastructure to the fact that they were more enlightened

than other locations hence their relative development.

In the late 805 a young teacher wanted to open another shop in the Magontsini area and
Chief Nota refused him a permission and business plot or sites. It is also said that this

teacher also wanted to open a local mortuary and bottle store. When his several attempts
I68

to secure permission failed, he appealed to the magistrate and to the homeland
department responsible for business licenses. With all this pressure as well as the threat
of a legal suit, the chief grudgingly yielded and granted a business plot to the teacher who
became his business rival or competitor. The chief and the teacher have since become
bitter rivals on each and everything. When the teacher opened up another business215 , a
circumcision school, the chief also tried to shut down this venture on grounds that a

proper permission was never granted as the protocol and customs were violated.

With the new political dispensation in South Africa, political organizations were
unbanned and many communities formed branches of the ANC and the AN C-aligned
South African National Civic Organization(SANCO). Chief Nota remained very critical
of the AN C and its Alliances. Many AN C supporters in the community suspect that he
was a member of the ANC rival organization, the PAC. Sikolweni village formed its
ANC branch while other villages formed theirs. Sikolweni branch of the AN C tried to
register its branch as Rode branch but other villages objected to this as Rode was an
administrative area that included their areas. During this time tension existed between the
Sikolweni AN C branch leadership with that of Magontsini which was led by the teacher-
tumed businessman and this was aggravated by claims that Sikolweni branch leadership

was too close to the chief who was seen as an enemy of the ANC. The Magontsini AN C

 

2151 refer to this circumcision as business even though it is generally understood as a traditional rite of
passage and a custom in this community. The reason for refening to it as a business is because
more recently the people who start and run circumcision schools make the parents of the initiates
to pay some fee and pay for many other things inchrding grocery, the resomces of the coming out
ceremony, and all these materials are often purchased from or by the owner of the initiation
school. For this reason, circumcision schools have become lucrative business and this view is
shared by a number of community members and parents of former initiates.

169

leadership was also active in the District ANC/SANCO leadership structures and they
used their position to effectively ﬁustrate the operations of their rival Sikolweni AN C
branch The chief exploited these differences by providing resources and venue to the
Sikolweni branch of the ANC and this was primarily meant to keep the ANC factions
divided and weak while at the same time preventing his business rival from consolidating

his hold on the AN C and, therefore, over the area under his jurisdiction.

With the new dispensation there was also a proliferation of development projects and a
variety of committees as well as voluntary associations. In Rode these also sprung up in
all the villages often competing for the same resources and projects. When the
electriﬁcation program was started by the new government in partnership with ESKOM,
the local structures competed in their bid to control the project of electriﬁcation of Rode.
The Sikolweni village formed its committee and applied for the provision of electricity
while Magontsini elite vehemently fought for the inclusion in this committee in a bid to
ensure that electricity is provided in their areas as well. When the electricity application
was approved and the project of electriﬁcation started the chief moved in to control the
project much against the wish of the committees which had worked hard to bring this
project. It is also important to mention that the committee had its internal rivalries as the
elite from each village wanted to control the project thus controlling the employment of
workers in this public works program. The chief ﬁnally succeeded in controlling the
project and it was agreed that people from different villages were going to be employed
on equal basis as there was a fear that there would be bias in favor of the people ﬁom

Sikolweni. There were similar struggles when road maintenance works, water provision
I70

projects were brought into the village. There are claims and counterclaims as to who
brought these projects. The above nanative does not only show elite rivalry along

partisan lines as it also reveals geopolitical dynamics that cut across party aﬂiliation.

A peace committee was set up at the suggestion of some of the ANC/ SAN CO leaders and
it was constituted by members of both ﬁctions. But this committee also collapsed when
its initiators felt that the chief was hijacking the committee to serve his own interest. It is
also worth noting that the AN C/ SAN CO leadership had come under pressure from its

hardliners who felt that the committee was being used to blunt their demands for change.

When the rivalry between the chief and the former teacher became bitter, the latter started
to mobilize some members of the community to question the legitimacy of the chief who
he claimed was usurping a position of his brother who died in exile while he has sons
who are the legitimate claimants to the throne. He went further and contacted the sons,
who are now based in Botswana, and invited them to come and intervene by assuming

their position of chieftaincy.

In 1996 chief Nota joined Bantu Holomisa in forming the UDM and the recruitment drive
for UDM members became intense at Rode. This aggressive recruitment drive can be
interpreted as one of the strategies of Chief Nota’s attempt to boost his standing within
newly formed party by demonstrating that he had a strong constituency that would later
deliver the votes. The AN C complained about the use of Tribal Offices and Hall in

organizing UDM meetings when it was being prevented from utilizing these facilities.
171

The members of the Tribal Authority joined UDM en-masse and one member who
remained a staunch member of the AN C was forced to resign on grounds of
insubordination. The Tribal Court started to impose stiﬁ’ sentences on the AN C/SAN CO
members and their response was open deﬁance. AN C/SAN CO mainly from Magontsini
organized several demonstrations and had sit-ins in the Tribal Hall, police were called on
several occasions and the magistrate was called to intervene on numerous occasions. In
December 1999 chief Nota died after a short sickness and rumors spread that he was
bewitched by his political rivals. He had left acting chief who is still continuing his
battles with the AN C/SAN CO which is trying to unseat him. The younger brother of the
late chief Nota was appointed with the blessing of the exiled son of chief Jongintaba, the
rightful heir to the throne. But this appointment was still being disputed by the acting
chief and Kolisile’s group when the designated appointee died in December 2001.
Rumors also linked the opposing ﬁction to his death even though he was a sickly person.

These deaths and attacks have reinforced mutual suspicions between the rival factions.

6.1.2. Mnceba Administrative Area

This administrative area is made up of two main villages, namely, Mhluzini and
Sugarbush. The community is predominantly of the Xesibe sub-ethnic group which is
Xhosa-speaking. The chief of the village suffered long crippling sickness and as a
consequence his wife was appointed to act as a chief in the late 19805, a role she is still
holding two years after her husband died. The youth in this community has always had
grievances regarding the manner which the tribal authority handles the affairs of the

village as well as their marginalization.
172

When political organizations were allowed to operate legally, the local youth led by
teachers established a local branch of SANCO. Using SANCO, they mobilized people,
particularly the youth, young women and the edueated elite to challenge what they
perceived as corrupt, undemocratic and ineffective traditional authority. It is most
important to note that SAN CO members also tend to be AN C members but in this area
SAN CO was the most active and visible agent in challenging the traditional authority. It
was observed that some local leaders of the AN C tended to distance themselves ﬁom the
radical activities of their SAN CO comrades especially regarding their relentless

challenges against traditional authority.

The major disputes which brought the traditional authority and SAN CO leadership into
direct confrontation were over the allocation of land. In this allocation of land SANCO
leaders objected to the payment of money to the chief before one could qualify for a plot.
SAN CO leaders started drawing names of people who had paid as a condition for getting
a piece of land. They then marched to the chief‘s place and demanded that she gives back
the money, a sum of about R4000, to all the people who had paid. Their view is that
people need not pay for the land which after all is theirs and only held in trust by the
chief. It is said that the chief fainted when she was confronted by aneg toyi-toying
SANCO militants, and on that day she was only able to give SAN CO leaders an amount
of R2000 with the promise that she would pay the balance later. SAN CO leaders then
started allocating land themselves and they disregarded all restrictions which had

traditionally excluded single unmarried peOple from getting the land. The dispute over
173

the power to allocate land was taken by the chief to the district magistrate who ruled in
her ﬁvor while maintaining that she was not supposed to make people pay to get a piece
of land. It is important to note that members of the traditional authority tend to be older
men in their late ﬁfties and sixties and most of them are AN C members including the
acting chief. The acting chief is also a card-carrying member of the ANC even though
she is not active in AN C activities in the area. The ﬁct that she is also a member of the
AN C does not impress or change the attitude of most of her opponents. SAN CO leaders
express their views on this matter in many forms which range ﬁ'om charges that “she is
not a real comrade as her actions are not those of a comrade,” the other female SANCO
leader suggested that

“she is in desperate need of political education, and until then her

membership in the ANC remains meaningless. Ifshe was active in ANC

structures and attended workshop on the new dispensation she would not

be making such foolish mistakes which are in conﬂict with the new

democracy. She still lives in the past and no one is guiding her towards the

right path, and this makes this community suffer due to lack of

development. To be blunt, I can just say that she is an obstructionist as she

oppose any progressive programs in this community. This is why we

decided to do things without her involvement. She made herself

irrelevant.”216
On the other hand, the acting chief is particularly more critical of the youth and the
educated elite which she accuses of disrespecting traditional customs, values and
protocols. In return, the teachers, who also happen to be leaders of SAN CO, charge that

chief’s lack of education and understanding of the new democratic dispensation is a

drawback to their community development. They claim that they, particularly in the

 

Zlélnterview with a female SAN CO leader, September 10, 2000, Mnceba

174

Sugarbush area, no longer consult the chief about their development projects as she
routinely ﬁ'ustrates them. Most of the SANCO leadership has boycotted all the meetings

called by the chief or activities that are associated with the traditional authority.

This hostile attitude is mutual as the chief also has strong negative views on those “who
think they know better and have no respect for the customs, protocols or elders.”21 7 The
acting chief has a rigid interpretation of customs and traditions. For example, she claims
that a divorced woman with children cannot be given a plot to build a house as she may
decide to reconcile with the husband, and as a consequence she claims that such a woman
can only qualify after some years of waiting. One female civic leader puts this waiting
period at seven years which she thinks is very unreasonable or simply a raw deal for
divorced women. This rule does not apply in the other surveyed communities in the
Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. While most of the AN C leaders
sympathetic to SAN CO’s cause, it has, however, tried to distance itself from what it
claim to be excessive militancy of SANCO leaders in dealing with chiefs. This position is
mostly articulated by the AN C local councilor who has a difﬁcult task of relating with
both side of the conﬂict as he is charged with the task of seeking votes and bringing
services to the community. The bitterness of relationship between the acting chief and
SAN CO leaders has led to a complete breakdown of communication with each side
ignoring or boycotting the activities of the other. To mention but a few instances,

SAN CO leaders and followers no longer attend meetings that are organized by the chief,

and they actively called for a boycott of money collection which was meant to help in the

 

217 Chieftainess Nobandla Ngunga of Mnceba Village, 2000
175

burial of the acting chief's husband.218 On her side, the acting chief claims that SANCO
trouble-makers are a clear indication of youngsters of today who have no respect for
elders or authority as a consequence of lack of sound moral upbringing. She emphasized
moral decay as the cause of SANCO’s challenge to her authority. She also alluded to the
fact that some SAN CO leaders particularly those from Sugarbush think that they are
better than other community members because of their education hence their
insubordination. Unlike Rode, civic leaders in Mnceba have not tried to unseat the acting
chief who, after the death of her husband and on grounds that she does not have a son,
does not have an heir. This is largely due to the ﬁct that SAN CO leaders in this
community have largely disengaged from the affairs of traditional authority and there is
no obvious credible alternative to the current chief. The leading SAN CO leader
condemned the institution of traditional authority as irredeemably corrupt hence their

lack of interest in matters of chieftaincy.

6.1.3. Nzongisa Administrative Area

This is a predominantly Xesibe community in the Mount Ayliff district The current
acting chief was installed in 1994 after her husband died having ruled for almost 40
years. She is acting because her son, the designated chief, is still young to assume this
position. Before the acting chief assumed the position of chieftaincy there was a bitter
ﬁmily dispute regarding succession. This dispute was between the acting chief and the

younger brothers of the chief who felt that they were the rightful persons to assume the

 

mWhen a chief is getting married or is buried it is traditional for the community members or his srrbjects
to contribute material resources in a form of money or livestock as well as avail their services during the
ceremony.

176

acting position. It is important to note that the local elite and the key stakeholders in the
community did not join or exploit this family feud. Community leaders left the matter to
the chiefs extended ﬁmily to resolve the matter and they simply endorsed the chief 5

wife when she was presented to them as an acting chief.

This community has a wide range of community-based organizations, from youth cultural
organizations to a variety of deve10pment committees. The past and present chief has
generally allowed people to form organizations and even launch political parties without
interference. Most of these organizations have access to the Tribal Authority Hall for
their meetings and activities, and this, according to the local elites, is the testimony of
free association that is allowed or is a trademark of this community. It is also important
to note that SAN CO has never been launched in this community even at the time when

there was a wave of SAN CO branches being launched in neighboring villages.

There was, however, a brief period in 1991 when the local youth leader mobilized the
youth into an AN C Youth League and they tried to demonstrate against the prominent
local businessman and later against the chief. These protests were diffused after several
meetings between the community leaders and the youth. Since then, the youth has
conﬁned itself to cultural and sports activities. Another ﬁctor is that the chief protagonist
in these youth protests left for Johannesburg in search for employment and never returned
to the village since early 19905. The current acting chief is an active member of the AN C

and CONTRALESA and has forged extensive network with national and provincial

177

leaders of CONTRALESAM. She is currently an ANC representative in the District
Council, a local government structure, and also contested a seat as an ANC candidate
during the 2000 local government elections. She has actively canvassed for the ANC
around the district while at the same time allowing other contending political parties
such as the PAC, UDM and IF P to organize in areas under her jurisdiction. She is also
very much involved in the local women’s organizations and burial associations. In

I addition, she is also a member of the Taxi association on account of being an owner
of a taxi herself. Most of the interview participants from this area agree that penalties
imposed by the Tribal Court are usually open to negotiations just as it is the case with
acquisition of land where there is no rigid interpretation of custom to exclude
categories of people. Most of the people interviewed claim that the acting chief is an
effective speaker even though a considerable number doubt her organizational skills
or even claim that she has neglected her chieﬂy duties in pursuit of her political and
business ambitions. This, however, has not translated into any considerable opposition
against her. This can also be attributed to the fact that local leaders of voluntary
associations are often left to organize their activities with little, if any, interference or

hindrance.

6.2. Mpumalanga Province

Mpumalanga, another of South Africa’s nine provinces, is situated in the region that
used to be called Eastern Transvaal. In this province, Ndebeles and Swazis are the
dominant African ethnic groups with some scattered presence of Pedis, Tswanas and

Zulus in some

 

219In early April 2002 she has been elected into the provincial house oftraditional leaders which is
based in Bisho. This further enhances her proﬁle.

178

communities. The selected cases were part of the KwaNdebele homeland which was
formed in 1975. The town of KwaMhlanga was the seat of KwaNdebele government
Sokhulumi, Tweefontein and Vezokuhle are all made up of communities which were
resettled in the mid-19805 ﬁom the surrounding white ﬁrms. These communities had
existed under the leadership of their chiefs while they were tenants in white farms. When
they were resettled, they also found other people in the areas of their resettlement and
these residents did not necessarily recognize the rulership of new chiefs. The following
passage demonstrates the magnitude of this resettlement or forced removal of
communities in apartheid govemment’s attempt to establish an ethnically-deﬁned black
homeland while ridding areas designated for whites of its black communities.

“The population of KwaN debele grew from 50 779 in 1975, to 166 477 in

1980, to 261 875 in 1984. Fifty ﬁve percent of those who arrived in

KwaNdebele during the previous ﬁve years came from white ﬁrming

areas, 29% from Bophuthatswana and 5% ﬁom Lebowa.”220
The above passage also indicates that most of the KwaNdebele communities were
recently resettled and this is different ﬁom the long-established communities of the
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Some of these resettled communities were joined by
people from other locations or found settled residents in or near the areas of their
settlement This has important implications for the composition of the residents or
subjects of the chief as they had to live with the large numbers of people absorbed from
outside their original communities thus introducing the “insider-outsider” distinction

even though not in clearly deﬁned boundaries. The elders who were settled from the

 

2° Moss & Obery, op cit, 1990, p.435.

179

farms tend to have little or no formal education whereas the younger generation which
grew up in the homeland is relatively more educated as there was better access to
educational ﬁcilities and institutions than was the case in white ﬁrms. Consequently,
traditional authorities which are mainly composed of the elders on average tend to be less

educated than those which have incorporated the younger and better educated members.

KwaMhlanga is a small rural town and two of the selected communities, Vezokuhle and
Tweefontein, are in the outskirts of this town whereas Sokhulumi is geographically far
removed from the town, it is about 40 minutes drive ﬁom KwaMhlanga and
Bronkhorspruit. As a result, the arrangement of houses and zoning of streets in
Tweefontein and Vezokuhle is more along the line of a township whereas Sokhulumi
assumes a more traditional rural setting with its grazing ﬁelds, scattered dwellings and
agricultural ﬁelds. In political terms, KwaNdebele experienced political activism and
insurrection as early as 19805 and this was led by the UDF which spearheaded an anti-
independence revolt in the homeland. During this period the youth tended to be more
active in the anti-independence activism. But more signiﬁcant is the ﬁct that the
Ndzundza royal house(the Mahlangus) was prominent in the anti-independence move
while the Manala royal house (the Mabenas) generally supported the homeland
leadership’s bid to accept nominal independence status for the homeland. This Mahlangu
and Mabena alignment with opposing political forces is a continuation of old historical
rivalries between the Ndzundza and Manala royal families dating back to more than a
century. This, therefore, reveals a more complex political history which cannot be

understood in simplistic terms of youth versus the elders and traditionalist. This is
180

important as it reveals a situation which is more complex than generational cleavages.
The anti-independence insurrection and counter-reaction, homeland organized

vigilantism(Mbokotho) climaxed between 1987 and 1989.

The unbanning of the liberation organizations in 1990 provided the second wave of
political mobilization and activism. In this case, the major liberation organizations, the
AN C, the PAC and AZAPO tried to establish themselves while the KwaNdebele
homeland’s ruling party tried to survive the onslaught. The ANC-aligned Civic
organization, SAN CO, also spread throughout KwaNdebele and directly contested with

traditional authority specially in the area of distribution of land.

6.2.1. Sokhulumi Administrative Area

This Ndebele community was settled in the current location in the mid-19805 as part of
the apartheid program of forced removals in a bid to establish KwaNdebele homeland.
Most of its residents were drawn from white ﬁrms where they were scattered as tenants.
Sokhulunri is relatively isolated from the neighboring villages and towns. By all accounts
the local chief is an active person who is actively involved in community development
projects and cultural groups. He claims that he is politically neutral in a bid to maintain
his role as what he terms “a unifying ﬁgure and the father of his people.” He asserts that
he has allowed the members of his tribal council to join political organizations of their

choice.

Most of the people interviewed claim that the chief was demoted as he is supposed to be
181

a senior Ndebele king according to their history, and the chief endorses and even
encourages this view. Sokhulumi chief effectively uses traditional symbols. During the
interview he insisted that he wear a leopard skin as a symbol of his kingship. He claims
that before he speaks his praise poet, otherwise known as imbongi in local language,
sing his praises, and during our meeting he refused to shake my hand as he claimed that
his tradition would not allow a person of his position to shake hands with a commoner or
with a person who is not of royal blood. The chief appointed and retained a young man as
his imbongi after identifying his gift as a court/praise poet. Moreover, the chief founded a
local Ndebele traditional dancers’ group as well as an association of people who make
traditional Ndebele artiﬁcts. For his role in promoting traditional culture of the Ndebele,
he has gained national prominence and he led his cultural group when it performed in

Britain and in the Middle Eastern Countries.

The chief mobilized his people in a bid to break away from Mpumalanga province to join
Gauteng province which he claims was closer to them and oﬁ‘ered more in terms of their
development. A cursory observation of the different development committees established
by the chief immediately reveals his strategy of co-opting the local businessman and the
youth. The two elected councilors who represent Sokhulumi live in KwaMhlanga, which
is about 40 minutes drive ﬁom this community, as a result they do not feature
prominently in local politics. The chief, through his effective organizational skills has
effectively marginalized these elected councilors and they also feel powerless in ﬁce of
the community which is largely mobilized behind the chief. A majority of the local elite

complained that the elected councilors are out of touch as they have not come to the
182

community and the chief to be introduced properly. As the local businessman and civic

leader put it,

“The so-called elected local representatives are just confused youngsters
who are not even known in this community. They are ﬁr-removed from
this community and never consult or call meetings so how can they say
they are our representatives? What have they done for this community?
We are going up and down trying to raise funds for projects in this
community and we are doing these things with our chief and where are
these youngsters? This is a joke and I am not sure how the situation is in
other areas. In this community we are the ones who are delivering
services.”m

At the time of these interviews the chief and the key local elite were busy mobilizing the
community against the pre-local elections demarcation process and they used this to
renew their demand to be incorporated into the Gauteng province. In his own defense,
one of the elected local representatives refute the assertion that they are removed from the
community,

“The chief and these people have a secret agenda which we do not

understand and they have marginalized us. We tried to consult them but

they do not attend meetings. Perhaps they do not understand the new

constitution or they are against the AN C government. The reason we have

not been able to deliver is that they do not give us a chance, and this is

also complicated by the ﬁct that we have not been given resources to start
delivering goods to people.” 222

These accusations and counter-accusations between the traditional leaders and civic
leaders, on the one hand, and the elected local ofﬁcials, on the other, has not developed

into any serious conﬂict in Sokhulumi and it has not affected local projects as these are

 

2‘Sokhulllrni businessman and key civic leader interviewed at Sokhulurrri, September 1, 2000.
33An interview with Sokhulumi elected local representative, August 30, 2000.

183

still ﬁrmly in the hands of traditional authorities and civic leaders.

6.2.2. Tweefontein Administrative Area

Tweefontein is an ethnically diverse semi-urban community which is generally regarded
as one of the townships of the town of Kwamhlanga. The streets, street names, zoning,
water and electrical services as well as the absence of ﬁrming or grazing ﬁelds makes
this community a functionally urban unit. Most of the people here were settled in the
early 19805 and they were mainly drawn ﬁ'om the neighboring white ﬁrms. When the
Ndebele community was settled in Tweefontein there were already some scattered
residents in the area and they varied ethnically ﬁom Tswanas, Swazi, Pedis, Ndebele and

Zulus.

The local chief and his councilors claim that they have been stripped of all resources by
the new government and the elected councilors. The chief and his councilors have little or
no education and they demonstrated very little understanding of the new constitution and
laws regarding the role of chiefs and elected ofﬁcials. In fear of contradicting the laws of
the new government they have resigned into minimal engagement with their subjects.

The chief claims that he is not a member of any political organization as this neutrality is

crucial in not being seen by subjects as having any partisan bias.

On the other hand, an ethnically diverse elected council representing the area is generally
in charge. The elected councilors, who are all AN C members, have instructed the chief

and his councilors to suspend any activities related to allocation of plots. They have
184

effectively stopped community members ﬁom continuing to pay R58 annual tax to the
chief on grounds that this is unconstitutional. The elected councilors assert that traditional
authority, according to the new constitution, are conﬁned to customary issues such as
circumcision and customary cases. These councilors have effectively taken over the role
of allocating plots and business sites. They hold meetings in school and community halls
without informing or getting permission ﬁom the chief as they claim that holding a
meeting is ﬁ'eedom of association enshrined in the constitution. One of the elected
councilors even claimed that chiefs will soon disappear as they are an antithesis to a
democratic system. These councilors are critical of the chief 5 stated political neutrality
as they claim that he is hiding his true UDM identity. As one councilor put it “You can
never trust these chiefs, they are UDM by night while claiming to be neutral by day.”
They implore chiefs to join the people’s organization(ANC) in order to be in tune with
their people. It was observed that councilors generally view the members of the
traditional authorities with contemptuous and dismissive attitude for not being in tune
with the new South Aﬁica. Traditional authorities in this community are generally weak
to put up any strong front in ﬁce of councilors who all have an extensive history of
political activism. According to elected councilors, lack of education and the vestiges of
old Bantustan way of doing things is to blame for the traditional authorities lack of
appreciation of the new changes in South Africa. During the focus group discussion with
the elected councilors they kept mentioning the ﬁct that chiefs are not aware of
constitutional provisions regarding their new role. Pressed on this issue, it became clear
that some of the councilors themselves had only a vague understanding of what the

constitution says about the role of traditional leaders. This can also be attributed to the
185

ﬁct that South African constitution is not clear or speciﬁc when it comes to the role of
traditional authorities even though it proclaims that their recognition extends to the new

dispensation.

6.2.3. Vezokuhle Administrative Area

Vezokuhle was established in 1985 when its residents were relocated in their current
location just two kilometers ﬁ'om the KwaMhlanga town. They were under their chief,
Mabena, who had been their leader during their stay in the white farms. Within few
years of their settlement in Vezokuhle, they experienced political unrest and with their
youth drawn into political activism. Most of the elders claim that this was the turning
point as most of their authority was eroded by the militant youth who had little respect for
chieﬂy authority or customs and traditional values. When the civic organization,

SAN CO, was established in early 19905 there was further encroachment on the authority
of traditional rulers with land distribution and the administration of customary law being
hotly contested by civic and local party leaders. Orders from the chief were openly deﬁed

or challenged.

When the elected local councilors were installed in 1995 they pressurized the traditional
leaders to suspend land allocation while they assumed this role especially in allocating
business plots. The elected councilors also instructed residents to stop paying an annual
tax of R58 to the chief, a practice which has its origins in the KwaNdebele homeland
legislation. This call was largely heeded by residents who never supported this tax and

this boosted the position of elected ofﬁcials as they had lifted the tax burden. As a direct
186

consequence of this action, the traditional authority was weakened as it could no longer
pay members of the tribal council or generate resources for some community projects. To
further undermine chieﬂy power, the elected councilors administered the construction of
a community hall and road maintenance projects without informing or involving the
chief. The elected councilors who represent Vezokuhle in the Transitional Local Council
told the traditional leaders and resident that all these powers were conferred by the new
constitution and the new democratic dispensation. The traditional leaders who are
generally not aware of the provisions of the new constitution regarding their role and
confused about their place in the new dispensation have resigned into protesting in the
seclusion of their meetings. The chief s oldest son who has just ﬁnished high school is
not working so he spends most of his time working with the traditional authority, and his
prominence makes him a deﬁcto spokesperson for the traditional authority. His high
school education has given him a relative advantage as he claims to be the one who
understands the new dispensation, the constitution and the new laws. A young female
secretary and another member of the traditional authority who is in his late twenties also
have high school education and they demonstrated such a condescending attitude toward
the chief and the elders in the tribal authority. These young members of the traditional
authority claim that they are generally marginalized by their older counterparts and yet
they assert that they would be in a better position in ﬁcing up to the younger and more
educated elected councilors in meetings. They claim that the elders are prone to
manipulation and intimidation by the politically astute TLC members. Beside the chief
who claims that he is politically neutral, members of the traditional authority range from

the members of ANC to DP and Sindawonye Progressive Party. Also important is the
187

ﬁct that the TLC members are ethnically diverse ranging from Ndebele, Tswana to Zulu.
In this community it can be concluded that the elected councilors are relatively stronger

and seem to be in control in ﬁce of a very weak traditional leadership.

6.3. KwaZulu-Natal Province:

The selected communities in this province are all drawn ﬁom the Greater Mbumbulu
District which is about 40km south of the port city of Durban. There are about nine
administrative areas which are under diﬁ'erent chiefs in this district. Most of the working
people commute to the nearby town of Isipingo, Durban or the industrial areas in the
surrounding areas and this is largely a result of the geographic proximity of these areas to
these urban or industrial centers. The other major economic activity is a sugar plantation
in which local ﬁrmers supply the nearby sugar mills with their harvest. The local chiefs
and indunas have relatively larger sugar plantation ﬁelds thus giving them a signiﬁcant
source of income from their supply of sugar mills. Excerpt for Mfume Mission, there is

not much of the livestock ﬁrming in the Mbumbulu area.

It is also important to note that Embo and Adams Mission are in the outskirts of
KwaMashu Township and as a consequence the political situation in the township also

affects or spill over to these communities.

Chieftaincy in KwaZulu-Natal is still the strongest institution of local government and is
the most partisan in the sense that an overwhelming majority of chiefs and indunas are

Inkatha Freedom Party(fFP) member or sympathizers. Further, KwaZulu-Natal is the
188

only province where chiefs are ex-oﬁ'rcio members of the Regional Councils, which form
part of the new rural local government, but they are still in control or a dominant force in
the local government at a village or community level. In the three communities selected
for this study in this province there is no evidence of civic organizations taking root in the
rural communities. The primary political organizations that exist are political parties, and
more speciﬁcally the AN C and the IFP, which monopolize the political space in the rural
communities of KwaZulu-Natal. The conﬂict among the local elites is largely deﬁned by
or organized along the party lines. This is generally reﬂected in the literature on
KwaZulu-Natal as indicated in the previous chapters. A brief reference to the more recent
history of political fractiousness in these communities is necessary at this juncture.
Before the launch of the AN C-aligned United Democratic Movement in 1983 the IFP
was dominant political force among the blacks of KwaZulu-Natal. It was the only legal
party in the homeland of KwaZulu where it had virtual monopoly of power and patronage
especially in the rural areas. Chiefs or Amakhosi were civil servants in the payroll of IFP-
controlled self-government thus creating a patron-client relationship which, to a great
extent, explains IFP’s support ﬁ'om a maj ority of traditional leaders in the province. This

relationship has extended to the present provincial government which is IFP-dominated.

When the UDF embarked on an aggressive political mobilization and recruitment which
eroded IFP’s dominance the latter responded by organizing vigilante groups to ﬁght off
UDF’s expansion or to roll it back in places where it had established itself. This led into
South Aﬁica’s bloodiest political conﬂict in the latter part of the 19805 and the theater of

conﬂict was largely in the townships with a few isolated. rural areas being affected. When
189

the ANC was unbanned in 1990 the violence between the IFP and the ANC/UDF
escalated and spread into the rural areas. Adams Mission, Embo and Mfume were
affected by this violence and many of the AN C/UDF activists had to ﬂee their homes and
stay in the townships for their safety. Because of the IFP objections to, among other
things, the new constitutional provisions on devolution of power and the role of
Amakhosi, local government elections in KwaZulu-Natal were postponed. When the
elected local government structures were ﬁnally established after the 1996 local
government elections the conﬂict largely remained between the IFP aligned chiefs and
IFP elected councilors, on the one hand, and the AN C elected councilors on the other. In
these communities the local elite is ethnically homogenous irrespective of party
afﬁliation. It is important to note that provincial party leaders as well as the provincial
Peace and Conﬂict Resolution Committees got involved or are often invited when local

conﬂicts between the ANC and the IFP supporters or traditional leaders get out of hand.

6.3.1. Adams Mission Administrative Area

Adams Mission is under the Makanya chieftaincy of the Sobonakhona Tribal Authority.
All the Indunas and the secretary are male and women are marginal in the matters of
traditional authority. The current chief who is 47 years old is acting on behalf of his elder
brother’s son who is still too young to assume his position. The current chief was
appointed in the early 19905 after his brother, who was a chief, died. Note that it is rare,
though not unheard of, for women to act as chiefs in KwaZulu-Natal and this is different
ﬁ'om the Xhosas of the Eastern Cape or the Sothos and Tswanas of Free State and

Northwest respectively. The chief is also an ex-offrcio member of the Regional Council
190

which is known as Ilembe and he is also in its executive committee.

His bias against the AN C and his support of the IFP was clear throughout the interview.
He remembered with great nostalgia the days of KwaZulu homeland self government

before the new dispensation of the AN C-led government came into place. He claimed

that,

“There was order then, most of the things you see were delivered by the
IFP homeland government and there was no partisan bickering over who
brought what in terms of community projects. But right now AN C
councilors always want to undermine my chieftaincy and claim that they
are the ones who bring projects into this community. These tensions were
brought by the ANC national leaders who inﬂuence their local
membership. What the local leaders practise is what they copy from their
bosse‘sﬂ or take ﬁom the AN C leadership’s militant statements against the
[F P.”

This position is echoed by the indunas who are also IFP-aligned. One of the indunas
captures the sentiment that echoes throughout traditional leaders in this community when
he says,
“We no longer have respect in this community since the ANC came to this
community. People have lost their customs and despise Zulu traditions because
they are encouraged to do so by their provincial or national leaders. This is why I
have little regard for any person who is even remotely associated with the ANC.

AN C present a challenge to the very way we have always done things in this
community and that is why some of us just cannot compromise with these

people.”224

In the above discussion and statement one begin to see the importance of projects in

building political legitimacy and the ﬁct that key local political leaders are acutely aware

 

”An interview with Adams Mission chief Makanya, August 9. 2000-
:‘An inta'view with Adams Mission Induna, 10 August, 2000.

191

of this ﬁct. This echoes Chazan’s25 thesis that proximity to state or state resources is a
crucial ﬁctor in many African countries as this deﬁne not only the political leader’s

legitimacy but also their personal wealth and standing.

The IFP elected councilors all claim that they work well with Undabezitham in all
matters relating to their work or service delivery and they claim that AN C councilors
attitude and approach is the one which often annoys the chief or his indunas thus making
it diﬁ'rcult to cooperate. The issue of claiming ownership of or controlling development

projects along party lines came up again when the IFP councilors were interviewed.

On the other hand, the ANC councilors are mostly in their forties and one of them is the
younger brother of the chief. Most of them are drawn from the ranks of the union
movement and they were UDF activists before joining the AN C when it was unbanned.
They have had to ﬂee to the townships from time to time in fear for their lives especially
during the years 1990-1994. Some of them are still based in the townships or nearby
towns such as Isipingo. Most of them show a great respect for the Zulu customs which
include the chieftaincy. They are unanimous in their view that the chief and his indunas
should continue to distribute land and maintain law and order in the communities. They
point to the ﬁct that the IFP-aligned chiefs and indunas are always hostile to any ANC

member or often try to prevent or even disrupt AN C activities in the community. All of

 

23'5Chazan, N., et al., op cit, 1999.

:GNdabezitha is the nne used by the subjects to address their chief and it is also used for saluting the chief
when one approaches him or enter his courtyard Both AN C and IFP community members address their
chief in this manner without calling them by their name.

192

them claim that the chief often works well with the IFP elected councilors while he
frustrates every attempt they make to work with him on important projects. They also
claim that the Zulu custom has been debased or compromised by using chiefs and
indunas as IF P mobilizing tools. The threat of physical violence is real as demonstrated
by the narrow escape of chief” 5 brother when some people tried to assassinate him in
1999 when he was attending a wedding anniversary ceremony at a chief’s place. They
claim that they have tried to follow every protocol and custom in order to show respect
toward the traditional leaders but the mere ﬁct that they are AN C members has remained
as a major factor in the continued hostilities. They claim that disciplinary actions have
been taken by the chief or indunas against their members for organizing the AN C events

even though they often seek permission before holding any meeting.

The prominent community development activists often claim that they are politically
neutral as they claim that this is the only way of working in this community without
being associated with one group or another thus putting your life at risk or compromising
a project In ﬁct most of the selected community development activists were not
comfortable discussing any issue that they sensed was even remotely linked to partisan
politics. They claim that they lobby both parties when they need support for their projects
or when they need service delivery ﬁ'om the elected councilors. The traditional leaders
are strongly opposed to the demarcation process which is aimed at amalgamating urban
municipalities with rural local government. They view this as bringing township life to
rural areas which are ﬁrndamentally different. On the other hand, AN C councilors see

this as the only way of speeding up development and beneﬁting from the metropolitan
193

[CSOUI'CCS .

6.3.2. Mfume Administrative Area

The chief and his indunas are IFP supporters and a majority of elected councilors are also
IFP members. The traditional authority is exclusively male whereas the elected
councilors, both ANC and IFP combined, are roughly split into halfmale and half female.
Mfume is relatively far removed from the urban areas or the townships. It is largely a
ﬁrming community, with the sugar plantations being a dominant feature of local
agriculture. Mfume was spared of the AN C-IFP conﬂict of the early 19905 and it
remained an IFP stronghold. When this IFP dominance was challenged during ANC
election campaign of 1994 and the 1996 local government elections, the reaction from the
traditional leaders was swift and sometimes violent as they tried to suppress AN C

activities in their backyard.

The few AN C councilors in the community claim that the traditional authority’s hostility
toward the AN C members has remained since elections and it manifest itself at all levels.
For example, AN C councilors remember the time when they got permission from a local
induna to hold an AN C recruitment meeting in a local school hall. When they were about
to start the meeting another induna came with his group to disrupt the meeting. They
claimed that the chief was not aware of this meeting. They threatened the person who had
given them the school keys. They forced the people gathering to vacate the school
premises. The AN C organizers continued the meeting in the open under a tree and they

got a table from a nearby homestead. They claim that the people received threats for
194

attending AN C organized meetings. Another meeting in which the AN C provincial
Health Minister was to speak was disrupted by the IFP members who claimed that there
was not proper consultation with the chief and local indunas, a claim which is disputed by
the ANC organizers. ANC councilors claim that their work is often frustrated by the chief

whereas the IFP councilors always receive a ﬁvorable treatment

Councilors from both parties recount instances where they have had to ﬁght over
community projects such as ﬂood relief, building of schools, provision of water and
phones. Each side tried to control or claims the project and the AN C councilors claim that
the chief and IFP councilors have even managed to hijack the projects which they
initiated. One of the AN C councilors was physically attacked by a family member who is
an IFP and she claims that the reason was that she was disgracing the ﬁrnily by being an
AN C member in an IFP area. She has since been alternating her stay in KwaMashu
Township and Mfume. She recalls that each time she attends the meetings(imbizo) called
by the chief she is often humiliated in front of people. In one instance she claims that she
asked to speak in one of these gatherings and the chief asked “who are you, where are
you from, who are your parents, where were you born, are you married?” She asserts that
these kinds of demeaning questions are meant to humiliate her in public as the chief
knows her in person. She contrasts this treatment with a warm and positive attitude
displayed toward her IFP counterparts and she claims that these hostile acts can be

understood in terms of IFP/AN C struggle in the province.

195

6.3.3. Embo Administrative Area

Embo has an IFP-aligned chief and indunas and part of its elected councilors are also IFP
members alongside those elected as AN C members. Chieftaincy here is also a dominant
force in community afﬁirs. Land allocation is in the hands of the local chief and indunas,
so is the law and order and permission to hold gatherings even ﬁmily ceremonies. This
community has a well-organized net of indunas who are divided into special roles such as
the one who looks after the migrant workers who dwell in the major Durban townships,
the induna yezintsizwa, who is a commander of the youth and young male and
amaphoyisa enduna or the police of the induna who are responsible for law and order in
each and every gathering, be it a political, community or ceremonial. With this kind of
network and hierarchy, the institution of traditional rulership is well entrenched and is
power is relatively uncontested in many areas. The major complaint of AN C councilors is
that these structures are manipulated and used as an IFP political tool and indunas were
easily organized as warrior groups under the indunas-tumed-warlords during the

vigilante activities against people who were remotely suspected to be AN C members.

All the councilors including those of the AN C always emphasize their respect for Zulu
customs and traditions as well as the primacy of the chief in local governance and in the
general hierarchy of the local communities. They claim that nothing can happen in the
community without his knowledge or blessing as he is the owner of the land and the
ﬁther of the community. On the issue of political involvement of the chiefs, most of IFP
supporters and sympathizers claim that this is necessary in order to counter AN C’s

attempts to undermine Zulu custom and chieftaincy. On why they seem to have a better
196

working relationship with the traditional leaders, the IFP councilors are generally of the
view that they understand and respect the Zulu customs and protocols better than their
ANC counterparts. This is disputed by the ANC councilors and the length to which they
go out to follow protocols in organizing meeting or in launching projects also indicate
that there is more than just a matter of respect for the customs and following of the
protocol. There seem to be a deep mutual suspicion between the members of the IFP and

the ANC.

An account on personal relationship between two AN C councilors and the chief of Embo
is more revealing of the dual and often contradictory nature of political and personal
relations. The two councilors talk of their close personal ﬁiendship with the local chief
which include, among other things, sharing of music tapes, giving each other lifts to the
nearby towns as well as gathering for social drinking on several occasions. They claim
that when it comes to holding AN C activities the chief becomes impossible and he has
revealed to them that the local IFP party ofﬁcials threaten or pressurize him to assume a
more rigid stance when it comes to political party matters. Sometimes, indunas simply
ovenide the chief when they perceive that IFP interests may be compromised by AN C
operation in the community. AN C councilors also give an account of their difficulties of
organizing meetings in the local community as they are not allowed to go ﬁom house to
house to inform people about a meeting as this is the task of indunas. When they ask
indunas to inform people about their meetings, they claim that they will do anything to
sabotage these meetings by simply not passing the information or actively discouraging

people from attending AN C meetings. They claim that they have since developed ways of
197

covertly informing people through their networks which operate in the villages. When
ANC councilors managed to come up with a project the local chief refused to give them a
piece of land as he asserted that they were trying to undermine his authority and that of
the IF P by giving an impression that they were the ones developing the area. The above
account of an elected councilor and a local chief who are friends at a social level and yet
a political opponent indicates that personal friendship does not necessarily translate to
political accommodation. This is one more indication of the intensity of partisan politics
in many parts of the province.

6.4. Summary

The key aspects of the above proﬁle of communities are highlighted and summarized in a
form of tables. These tables identify the essential characteristics that best represent each
community while at the same time grouping them in terms of their shared features. This
comparative context also laid foundation for the following chapter which analyze patterns
that emerged from the data.

Table 6.1.: Status of a chief and proximity to urban areas (city or town)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Female Chief Acting Chief Close proximity to
an urban area
Adams Yes Yes
Embo Yes
Mfume
Mnceba Yes Yes
Nzongisa Yes Yes
Rode Yes
Sokhulumi
Tweefontein Yes
Vezokuhle Yes

 

 

 

 

 

 

198

Table 6.1. is useful in understanding the presence of women chiefs is what is essentially a
male-dominated role. In both-Nzongisa and Mnceba the acting chiefs are women, in the
former she is acting on behalf of her son who is still young whereas in the latter she is
acting on behalf of her sick husband. The ﬁct that these acting women preside over
communities which have different set of relations, one conﬂictual and another
accommodative (see table 7.1. in chapter seven), does not tell us much about the effect of
being a woman at the head of a male-dominated institution of traditional rulership.
Another observation regarding the above table is that general observation of diﬁ'erent
accounts of participants suggested that the acting position of a chief was not a decisive
ﬁctor in understanding the predominant forms of local elite relations. Even in the case of
Rode where the issue of an acting position was raised from time to time, most accounts
indicate that it became an issue as a direct consequence of conﬂicts rather than being a

cause of such conﬂicts.

The geographical location of target communities in relation to the urban centers is
included here because it has bearing on a number of variables which are of interest in this
study. These geographic locations or proximity to the urban areas aﬁ‘ect both the ethnic
composition as well as the distribution of resources, particularly grazing land and
livestock, and this point is discussed in more detail in chapter eight. Firstly, in the case of
Mpumalanga and to some extent in KwaZulu-Natal the absence or presence of ﬁrming
ﬁelds as well as the ownership of livestock is determined by whether one is very close to
an urban area or not. Property ownership, which includes livestock and ﬁrming ﬁelds, is

one of the key dimensions of social stratiﬁcation or class as it is reﬂected in the data
199

analysis presented in chapter seven. Secondly, proximity to urban centers also mean that
an areas is functionally urban in the sense that provision of services such as water,
electricity, phones and transportation is more integrated or similar to that of urban
municipality. It will be shown later that rural areas which are away ﬁom the urban areas
tended to be negative toward the idea of paying rates for services and this is shared right
across the different sectors of the local elite. On the other hand, areas which are very
close to urban centers tended to be more open to or even embrace the notion of paying for
services as this idea was not as alien to them as they had lived in areas with such services
at some point. Thirdly, areas which are close to urban areas tend to have a considerable
number of its elite living in commuting daily to the urban areas. This, in return, tend to
remove them from daily issues and meetings called by traditional authorities thus opening
themselves to charges, mainly by traditional authorities, of being outsiders with little

grasp of local issues.

Table 6.2.: Key protagonists in local elite relationship

 

 

 

 

 

Key Players Administrative Areas Province
1.Traditional leaders v.5. Elected Vezokuhle, Mpumalanga
councilors Tweefontein
2. Traditional Leaders v.5. Civic leaders Mnceba, Rode Eastern Cape
3. Traditional leaders & Elected Adams, Embo, KwaZulu-Natal
councilors v.5. Elected councilors Mfume
4. Traditional leaders/Civic leaders Sokhulurrri Mpumalanga
4. Traditional leaders/elected Nzongisa Eastern Cape

 

 

 

 

councilors/civic leaders

 

This table reveals an uneven and varied landscape of key protagonists but in all areas

200

traditional leaders seem to be a common denominator. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have provided
the reasons for this as they portrayed the entrenched position of traditional leaders or
more speciﬁcally chiefs in the rural areas which are under their jurisdiction. The ﬁct that
an emerging competing and or alternative source of power have to deal with and come in
to terms with traditional leaders is to be understood in this context. In some areas, elected
councilors tend to play a marginal role in local politics as seen in the case of Sokhulurrri,
Mnceba and Rode. This is, in part, due to their small numbers which often range ﬁom
one to two councilors. More speciﬁcally, there is only one councilor per administrative
area in the Eastern Cape whereas Sokhulumi has two. This variation in the numbers of
councilors introduces regions or provinces as a variable given the ﬁct that these trends
are provincial as shown above.

Table 6.3.: Conflict/Accommodation relationship typology

Conﬂict
Accommodation

 

1. Physical confrontation Peaceful coexistence

 

2. Key sectors of elite work against each Key sectors of elite collaborate in most
other. projects.

 

3. Court litigations against each other No legal disputes.

 

4. Boycott gatherings/activities organized Attend each otlrer’s meetings and extend
by opponents. invitation to each other.

 

5. Actively prevent/frustrate opponent’s Free association allowed
meetings or mobilization.

 

6. Deep divisions among sectors of the General unity and overlapping interests
elite among the local elites

 

 

 

 

The above table presents and contrasts aspects of the dominant patterns of rural elite

201

relations which otherwise have been described in chapter 5. This table is presented here

to provide context for the following tables which classify these cases according to the

dominant patterns of relations.

Table 6.4.: Classification of cases according to the dominant form of elite relations

Conflictual

Cooperative

 

Eastern Cape:

. a) Mnceba

b) Rode

c) Nzongisa

 

KwaZqu-Natal

f (1) Adams
. e) Embo

f) Mfume

 

Mpumalanga

 

 

,  g) Tweefontein
- h) Vezokuhle

 

i) Sokhulumi

 

A point has to be made here that the ﬁct that all cases of KwaZulu-Natal are in the

category of conﬂictual relations does not mean that all areas in KwaZulu-Natal can be

classiﬁed as such. This only reﬂects the cases which this research was able to access.

Initially, Adams was identiﬁed and recommended to me as an area which has cooperative

relations among the various sectors of its elite but this proved not to be the case as I

gathered data. What emerged during the interviews was that Adams ﬁt a proﬁle of a

conﬂictual relations even though the provincial local govemment officials had suggested

otherwise.

to
O
to

 

In areas where relations between traditional leaders and elected councilors or civic
leaders are conﬂictual there is a range of issues which are disputed as reﬂected in the
following table.

Table 6.5.: Issues over which there are disputes

 

Adams Embo Mfume Mnceba Rode Tweefontel Vezokuhle
n

 

Land \/ \/ \/

allocation

 

Right to \/ \/ \/
hold

meetings

 

projects \/ \/

Control

 

chief’s
succession
disputed

 

K
KKKK

Corruption \/
of
traditional
leaders

 

Chief’s \/ \/ \/
partisan
bias

K

 

geographic
resource
allocation
bias

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In this table traditional authorities’ real or perceived partisan bias as well as corruption
stands out prominently in at least four cases. This is a common ﬁctor in all the selected

cases of KwaZulu-Natal thus suggesting a possible provincial trend. The case of Rode
203

does reveal the ﬁct that partisan bias is not limited to KwaZulu-Natal. In the case of
Mpumalanga and the Eastem Cape cases all the areas of disputes involve the alleged
corrupt practices of traditional authorities. Traditional leaders’ refusal to allow their
political opponents to hold meetings as well as the struggle for control of projects is
another area over which there are disputes as seen in the case of Rode, Mfume, Adams
and Embo. These tables have provided an overview of cases in a comparative sense
which set the stage for results analysis and interpretation of data which are presented in

the next two chapters.

204

CHAPTER SEVEN

SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY AND ANAYSIS

The central focus of this chapter is the analysis of political, social and economic
factors underlying rural elite relations. The ultimate aim is to identify trends that
indicate relations between types of rural elite relations (conﬂictual or accommodative)
and selected variables. In more speciﬁc terms and also as a way of capturing the
essence of the hypotheses stated earlier, we would expect greater differences of
measured or observed variables between the elite sectors in conﬂict communities
whereas there would be no such differences in non-conflict communities if the tested
variables have an inﬂuence on or are associated with the type of elite relations. The
analysis based on survey results is primarily in numeric or quantitative form thus

making the data readily analyzable utilizing statistical tests.

Sections of this chapter are organized around the theoretical issues and hypotheses
outlined in chapter two. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁndings will indicate whether age,
ethnicity, education, party afﬁliation and identity, distribution of resources, attitude
toward traditional values and traditional land tenure system are in any way related to

these forms of rural elite relations. Policy preference proﬁle of individuals in conﬂict

205

communities will be compared to that of their counterparts in non-conﬂict
(accommodative/cooperative) communities. Attitudes towards payment of services in
rural areas, traditional land tenure and New Municipal Demarcation Law are the
component part of assessment attitude toward policies pertaining rural areas. Also
included in this analysis are views of respondents on fairness or severity of penalties
imposed by traditional courts, on their inﬂuence on decision making in traditional
authority as well as in elected councils, existence or non-existence of geopolitical
factors, and their assessment of corruption in traditional authority. In broad terms the

assessed variables can be classiﬁed into demographic features and opinion/attitudes.

In order to achieve this task this chapter utilizes demographic characteristics and
opinions/attitudes of 143 individual respondents who participated in the survey.
Individuals from conﬂict communities are compared to those of non—conﬂict
communities using the above-mentioned variables. It should be recalled that relations
between traditional authorities and elected councilors and or civic leaders is at the
core of this study. Analysis of individual attributes takes this into account by

aggregating their responses or characteristics into these three sectors of the rural elite.

206

Table 7. 1. gives a breakdown of these sectors in order to provide a context for the

frequencies and percentages that will be used in demonstrating the trends.

 

Table 7.1. Selected Sectors of Rural Elite & type of relations

 

 

 

 

Traditional Elected Civic Leaders Row Total
Authorities Councilors
Conﬂict Cases 42 26 46 l 14
Non-conﬂict Cases 13 3 13 29
Column Total 55 29 59 143

 

 

 

 

 

The primary approach in this chapter is to develop general statements in which the

names of communities, individuals or regions are replaced with theoretical concepts.

In this case conﬂictual relations and accommodative or non-conﬂict relations are the

key concepts being examined. This approach is informed by Przeworski and Tuene's

conception of comparative social inquiry in which they convincingly argue that one of

the fundamental assumptions of comparative analysis is to replace names with

speciﬁc theoretical concepts and variables. The following statement captures the

essence of their argument:

"If we accept this residual nature of names of social systems, we can
then attempt to replace these names by variables. When we find that
societies differ with regard to a particular characteristic, we can ask
what it is about these societies that causes this difference . . . Therefore
the role of comparative research in the process of theory-building and
theory testing consists of replacing names of social systems by the

relevant-variables."2:28

 

m Przeworski, A.and Teune.H. The logic ofcomparative social inquiry New York: Wiley and Sons.

 

lnc..l970. pp. 29-30.

207

It should be noted that the emphasis on replacing names with variables or theoretical
concepts represents a notable change from the one adopted in chapters six and eight
where names of communities, regions and protagonists are extensively used. In the
ﬁnal analysis the adoption of both approaches is meant to be complementary and also
indicate different emphases where this is deemed necessary to explain or provide a

context for relational dynamics in the selected communities and individuals.

The tools used in this chapter include charts and tables, which show frequencies,
mainly in percentages, of observed scores of the aforementioned variables. Chi-square
tests are also used to establish association as a way of assessing the hypotheses used
in this study. Statistical analysis is done to establish whether the observed differences
in frequencies is statistically signiﬁcant or due to chance. As a preview, it should be
stated at this juncture that age, party afﬁliation, education, income and employment
show a strong trend that suggests that these demographic variables are linked or
associated with the type of elite relations. In opinion variables, views on whether
respondents have inﬂuence on decisions made by elected councils, on Municipal
Demarcation Law and on payment of service fees are also an important factor in
understanding the type of elite relations. This is evident in the observed frequency
charts, and even more importantly, it is reinforced by the statistical tests results
indicating whether the differences among elite sectors are statistically signiﬁcant.
Results indicate that each sector of the elite (traditional leaders, elected leaders, civic
leaders) tend to share views on the following: opinion on corruption of traditional
authorities, land tenure system, penalties imposed by traditional courts, and

on whether the respondents felt that they had an inﬂuence in the decisions taken by

traditional authorities. These views are shared by members of each sector irrespective

208

of whether they are in conﬂict or in non-conﬂict communities. This, however, does
not afﬁrm any of the hypotheses presented in this study, it simply indicates that

chiefs, councilors and civic leaders have similar views irrespective of whether they
are in communities experiencing conﬂict or not this conﬁrms what was said earlier
that institutional boundaries tend to organize and consolidate self-interests and self-

understanding of its constituent members.

On the other hand, ethnicity, and distribution of resources (with the exception of
income and employment status) does not indicate any statistically signiﬁcant trend
that is associated with conﬂict and/or non-conﬂict relations. Marital status, gender.
past political activism and perception of geopolitical factors also proved to have very
weak or no relationship with the type of elite relations. As we move to the section on
results presentation and analysis a disclaimer that these results do not seek to establish
causal relationship between variables is necessary to offer in order to understand the

scope and nature of these results.

It should also be noted that respondents were asked whether they thought there was
conﬂict or no conﬂict between the sectors of the elite in their respective communities.
This was then used as another level of classifying conﬂict in terms of their perception
in addition to my own classiﬁcation of what constitute conﬂict cases and non-conﬂict
cases. As a result of this dual classiﬁcation, all the statistical test results are reported
both in terms of respondents' classiﬁcation and those of researcher's judgment of the
existence and non-existence of conﬂict. It should also be reported at this juncture that
the differences between these two sets of classiﬁcations are not that much hence the

results tend to reﬂect similar trends with only a few exceptions. It was important to

209

introduce respondents' own perception of conﬂict as this helps to validate and
reinforce my own judgment of what constitute a conﬂict community or relationship

while making sure that the bias of researcher'sjudgment was not a factor.

7.1. Age distribution in conflict and non-conﬂict relations

15 conﬂict between the sectors of the rural elite a generational clash as some of the
literature suggested in the literature review and theory chapter? Can we explain the
dominant relation as a matter of old versus the young? Does age matter at all? In order
to ﬁnd out if age was a factor, respondents were asked to give their age or their date
of birth, whichever came ﬁrst or were easier to remember. I then grouped these
responses into three categories, namely, youth (20-35 years), middle age (36-55 years)
and senior (56 years old and above).229 Scores were entered into each category and
frequencies for each sector in conﬂict and non-conﬂict cases were generated. These
frequencies are then computed in a form of percentages. I am mindful of the fact that
percentages are often used in cases where there are large numbers but in this case they
are used in order to show proportions of each score on the selected variables. Figure

7.1. shows age distribution in conﬂict cases and ﬁgure 7.2. targets non-conﬂict cases

 

229 It should be noted that these categories are not universal standards. I simply took into account the
retirement age for average migrant workers, lifespan among rural dwellers as well as respondent's own
self-understanding of what constitute old age or youth.

2l0

Figure 7.1. Age distribution in COﬂﬂiCt communities

70% -

60%
60%» "

50%

50% ~
40% a 36° IYouth

30% « IMiddle age I

luSenior

20% <

10%! ‘ 5%

 

 

 

0% ~
Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civlc Leaders

Figure 7.2. Age distribution in non-conﬂict communities

80%

 

l
70% 67% i
62% l

60% ‘

    

50%; ‘ 46"!» 46%»
lYouth

I Middle ago 1

40% -

l

30% ‘ El Senior .

 

20% -

100A) ‘

 

 

0% -

Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

In ﬁgure 7.1. the concentration of traditional leaders in the senior category (60%)
compared to the strong representation of both elected leaders (50%) and civic leaders

(46%) in the middle age category stands out prominently. This suggests age disparity

21]

 

in which traditional leaders are older than both the elected and the civic leaders. By
contrast, ﬁgure 7.2. shows an even distribution of traditional leaders in both middle
age (46%) and senior age (46%)category. Elected ofﬁcials (67%) in this case are
highly concentrated in the middle age with virtually none in the senior age category.
More interesting in this case is the fact that in non-conﬂict communities civic leaders
tend to be older (62%) than their counterparts in the conﬂict cases (28%). It can be
said that a generally old traditional leadership in conﬂict cases has to deal with a
mostly middle aged civic and elected leadership whereas there is a considerable
concentration of elected and traditional leaders in the middle age category with the

exception of civic leaders.

Test of age differences were conducted between the sectors of the elite in areas that
the researcher classiﬁed as conﬂict and those with no conﬂict. I found a strong
relationship in conﬂict cases whereas there is a very weak relationship in non-conﬂict
areas. In addition, the differences of age in conﬂict areas are statistically

. . 0
Signiﬁcant.23

 

230 (a) Researcher's classiﬁcation or relationship: Pearson Chi-Square value for non-conﬂict is 7.866:
Cramer's V at .368 and the signiﬁcance level is .097. In conﬂict cases chi-square value is 24.453;
Cramer's V is .327 and highly signiﬁcant at .000. (b) In respondents' own perception of conﬂict and
non-conﬂict the results ofthe test are as follows: Chi-square is 9.263: Cramer's V is .290 at .055
signiﬁcance. In conﬂict cases chi-square is 20.3 l6 and Cramer's V is .340 at .000 signiﬁcance: degree
of freedom is 4. It should be noted that the value of chi square in conﬂict cases is often larger than that
of non-conﬂict cases and this is largely due to the fact that non-conﬂict cases are smaller than those of
conﬂict areas. This is a reﬂection of chi-square's sensitivity to the size of sample or number of cases.
and this is the case throughout the other tests being conducted here.

212

It can, therefore, be reported that the observed differences of age between the sectors
of the elite are not likely due to chance, and that there is an association between
conﬂict and age differences. In short, age is a factor in understanding the existence or

non-existence of conﬂict as the hypothesis suggested.

7.2. Education and elite relations

Does education matter in our understanding of conﬂictual relations and
accommodative relations? Is there any trend in these results that suggests that the
conﬂict is between the educated and less educated sectors of the elite? Education
often features prominently in the literature that tries to understanding relations
between political actors as indicated earlier in the literature. Education also kept
coming up during focus group discussions. Taking both the literature and focus group
discussions, education was included in the interviews. Individual respondents were
asked to indicate whether they had any formal education and in the event they had
formal education they were asked to indicate their highest level of education or
qualiﬁcation. I avoided using the number of years in school in the interviews as it
became clear that this was confusing given the fact that other people did not know
whether standard A (now called grade I) and B (grade 2) were to be counted as a
year of schooling. During the pre-testing of my questions on education, some were
not sure whether the number of years in school would include repeated (failed)
classes. This exercise was instructive in as far as understanding some shortcomings of
the usually deployed response categories in questionnaire/survey design. I resolved
these problems by simply asking people to give the highest qualiﬁcation or class they
attended, and then coded them into categories that are relevant for this study. In this

study I classify tertiary level and high school level education as well-educated

213

category, secondary level education is classiﬁed as somewhat educated and primary

education or no formal education is classiﬁed as little or no education.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

     

 

 

Figure 7.3. Levels of Education in conﬂict communities
70%
50% 1 57% 53%
50% <
40% <
IWell
Educated
30% — 24% lModum
20% 4
10% -
0% ‘
Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders
Figure 7.4. Levels of Education in non-conﬂict communities
120%
100%
100% -
80% 4
62%
60% 4 lYouth
lMiddo ago
40% 4 38% 38% DSonior
23%
200$ ‘
0% 0%
0°16 ‘ ﬂ
Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

Figure 7.3. and ﬁgure 7.4. below indicate distribution of education levels in conﬂict
and non-conﬂict cases respectively. A look at ﬁgure 7.3. clearly indicates the fact that

elected councilors are better educated with only 4% which has little or no education.

214

This is in sharp contrast to the traditional leaders who have more than half, at 57%, of
their members recorded as having little or no education at all. Considering the fact
that in 5 of seven cases of conﬂict communities the main conﬂict is between the
elected councilors and the traditional leaders, this disparity is an indication that
education is a factor when looking at the above chart. Even the civic leaders on have
22% of its members who are less educated. It can, therefore, be stated that traditional

leaders in conﬂict relations are less educated than their elected and civic counterparts.

In ﬁgure 7.4. the elected leaders in non-conﬂict relations are all well educated. On the
other hand, traditional leaders spread out from well educated to medium and less
educated. However, taking the well-educated and medium categories for the
traditional leaders it becomes clear that about 61% of them have some decent
education with the remaining being less educated. It can, therefore, be said that
disparity in the non-conﬂict cases between the elected and the traditional leaders is
not as wide as the one in conﬂict cases where more than half of traditional leaders are
less educated compared to only 4% of the elected category. Overall, it was observed
that elected leaders and civic leaders in both conﬂict and conﬂict cases tended to be
relatively more educated than the traditional leaders. But of primary interest in this

case, as stated earlier in the hypotheses and in the questions asked above, is the

215

disparity between the key sectors within each type of relationship (conﬂict and non-
conﬂict). The above charts do show such sharp disparity in conﬂict relations and this
is not the case in non-conﬂict relations. Education, given this trend, does have a
relation with these types of elite relations with conﬂict more evident in cases where
traditional leaders have less education than elected and civic leaders in their

communities.

Statistical tests of signiﬁcance and association between education and elite sectors in
both conﬂict and non—conﬂicts reveal that indeed education is associated with the type
of elite relations in both researcher's and respondents' classiﬁcations. The results are
showing high statistical signiﬁcance in conﬂict cases and association even though the
strength of this relationship is not particularly strong.23 ' In non-conﬂict the results
indicate that there are no sharper differences in the level of education between the
traditional leaders and other sectors of the local elite hence statistics show a weak
association between the sectors of the elite and education. This afﬁrms the hypotheses
that we would see greater variations in conﬂict areas whereas we expected little or no
such distinction in non-conﬂict areas. In all, education does have an inﬂuence on the
type of rural elite relationship as frequency charts and statistical results indicated

above.

7.3. Ethnic afﬁliation and elite relations in conﬂict and in non-conflict

communities

 

231 (a) Researcher's classiﬁcation: Conﬂict:- Chi-Square value=32.037; Cramer's V=.375 and
signiﬁcance level=.000

Non-conﬂict: chi-square value=lO.l60: Cramer's V=.4l9; Signiﬁcance level =.254. (b) Respondent's
classiﬁcation: Conﬂict:- chi-square=22.534; Cramer's V .358; and signiﬁcance level=.004. Non-
conﬂict:- chi-square=l6.73l: Cramer's V=.390; signiﬁcance Ievel= .033; degrees of freedom=8.

216

Does ethnic afﬁliation play a role in rural elite relations? Is the local conﬂict
inﬂuenced by ethnic afﬁliation? In trying to answer this question I approached the
notion of ethnic identity from various dimensions, which were deemed important by
the participants during focus group discussions, which preceded actual interviews. In
these discussions it became evident that the notion of "who belongs and who is an
outsider" was wider than just a simple question of identifying one's ethnic group. In
the politics of identity the notion of exclusion and inclusion ranged from the place of
birth to the place of residence. In the interview questions participants were asked to
identify whether they belonged to the dominant local ethnic group or not. The second
question was whether they were born locally (in the community or village being
studied) or elsewhere. The last question was the one that required respondents to
indicate if they were local residents or not. These questions produced three response
categories; (1) Same ethnicity as local, (2) Born locally and (3) local resident. It
should be recalled from the previous chapter that the dominant ethnic groups in the
targeted communities are Zulu (Adams, Mfume, Embo), Ndebele (Sokhulumi,
Tweefontein and Vezokuhle), Xesibe (Mnceba and Nzongisa) and Hlubi (Rode). In a

category , which is "same as local". it is referring to these respective ethnic groups.

In the charts 7.5. and 7.6. there is no clear disparity or difference between traditional
leaders and elected or civic leaders. All this data indicates is that there is a general
tendency of ethnic homogeneity among all the sectors of local elite. Those who were
born locally are slightly less than those who are local residents as well as with those

who are from the dominant ethnic group.

217

In ﬁgure 7.6. there is no clear trend that shows disparity between traditional leaders
and civic leaders whereas elected councilors are fewer in all the three categories. We
can therefore assert that there is more ethnic diversity in the category of elected
councilors than in the other categories. Taking the results from both tables, there is
no clear trend that can begin to give an answer to our questions. If there is generally
more ethnic homogeneity, surprisingly more so in conﬂict cases than in non-conﬂict
relations, it can be concluded, at least in view of these results, that there is no
important relationship between the type of relationship and ethnic divisions. This is
certainly not in line with a plethora of studies, which would put ethnic divisions and
ethnic cleavages in Africa. above all other variables given the weak social classes.
civil society and political institutions. I will return to this point in the discussion and

interpretation chapter (chapter nine).

218

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 7.5. Ethnic Afﬁliation of elite in conﬂict communities
120%
100%

100% -

80%

60% I Same as local ethnic group

I Local Resident
40% DBom localty
20%
0%
Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders
Figure 7.6. Ethnic identity of elite in non-conﬂict communities
120%
100%
85%85%
80%
60% lISame as local ethnic group
I Local Resident
40% 33%3305330/0 0 Born locally
20% I I
0%
Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

Statistical tests results conﬁrm that there is a very weak link between ethnicity and the

type of elite relationship.

232

These results indicate that respondents in both conﬂict

 

232 (a) Researcher's classiﬁcation: Conﬂict:- chi-square=l 1.576: Cramer's V=.225: and signiﬁcance

level = .021

219

and non-conﬂict communities generally share the same ethnic outlook. The results are
statistically signiﬁcant with weaker association and even weaker strength of
association. It can, therefore, be said that ethnicity has statistically signiﬁcant results,
though the level of signiﬁcance passes the threshold, it is not particularly high and
this is reinforced by weak association and strength of relationship. Ethnicity has a

weak association with the type of elite relationship.

7.4. Rural elite relations and Political party afﬁliation and identity

In virtually all the discussions in the previous chapters, the issue of political identity
and afﬁliation featured prominently especially in the case of studies trying to explain
political conﬂict in South African communities and provinces. It was logical,
therefore, to ask the respondents to identify their party political afﬁliation, if any
afﬁliation at all. Given the dominance of the African National Congress (ANC), the
Inkatha Freedom Party (IF P) and the United Democratic Movement (UDM), these
organizations are classiﬁed by their names whereas other organizations are grouped as
"other". For those who claimed neutrality or who said they did not belong to any
political party, the category "none" is provided. If the conﬂict between traditional
leaders and the elected leaders and or civic leaders was due to party political
afﬁliation we would expect a trend that shows the key protagonists belonging to

different political organizations.

 

Non-conﬂict: chi-square=10.906; Cramer's V=.434; Signiﬁcance level=.028 (b) Respondents'
classiﬁcation: conﬂict: Chi-square=l 1.362; Cramer's V=.254; Signiﬁcance level=.023. Non-conﬂict:-
chi-square=l4.064; Cramer's V=.254 and signiﬁcance level=.007 degrees of freedom=4

220

In ﬁgure 7.7. there is more diversity in terms of party political representation even
though ANC is clearly dominant in the category of elected leaders. This is in sharp
contrast with the non-conﬂict communities, show in ﬁgure 7.8. where ANC's
dominance is emphatic if not an indication of virtual monopoly when considering the
fact that of the remaining elite the majority is not aligned to any party. Taken
together, this suggests that there is more political diversity, therefore, potential for
political competition and clash in conﬂict communities compared to non-conﬂict
communities that enjoy some degree of homogeneity under the banner of the ANC.
Considering the narrative chapter as well as discussion in chapters two and ﬁve,
strong representation of ANC. IFP and UDM in conﬂict areas also means that these
political adversaries are expected to ﬁercely contest the political space and power thus
leading to an intense struggle for control of local areas and local development
projects. Given this trend and analysis, it can be stated that political affiliation does

show relationship with the type of elite relations.

221

 

Figure 7.7. Political party afﬁliation in conﬂict communities

 

 

   
  
  
   
  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    

 

  

80%
7096 . 67% IANC
60% j ale I
cum
50% DOTHER
l INONE
40% 1
30% 1
20% «
10% 4
0% .
Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders
Figure 7.8. Party afﬁlliation in non-conﬂict communities
1200/0
1000/0
100% -
80% -
61% “NC
60% _ IIFP
46% DUDM
40% . DOTHER
INONE
20% ‘ 15% 15%
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% - .

 

 

 

Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

Statistical tests results indicated that these observed differences between conﬂict cases
and non-conﬂict cases are statistically highly signiﬁcant with high measure of

association in the conﬂict areasm.

 

233 (a) Researcher's classiﬁcation: Conﬂictz- chi-square=27.150: Cramer's V=.345: and signiﬁcance
level = .001

222

This suggests that in conﬂict areas there are important differences in terms of political
alliances whereas this is not the case in non-conﬂict areas. This makes political
afﬁliation one of the variables with strong association with the type of elite

relationship, and this upholds the hypotheses stated earlier.

Another dimension of political identity was included to assess the attitude of the local
elite toward the involvement of chiefs in party politics. This issue often came up in all
the discussions with the participants and the government ofﬁcials. Some felt that
chiefs, as the traditional heads of their communities should not be involved in politics
as they are bound to be biased in favor of their political parties or actively use all
resources to oppose their political opponents. Some felt that chiefs needed to be in
politics if they were to ﬁght their marginalization in the new political dispensation. I
included the question: "What is you opinion on the involvement of chiefs in party

politics?"

Figure 7.9. shows the distribution of responses to this question and itjuxtaposes
responses from conﬂict and non-conﬂict communities. Overall there is a strong
opposition across these communities and in all the sectors of the rural local elite.
What stands out in this chart is a very strong opposition (92%) that comes from the

elected councilors in the conﬂict communities.

 

Non-conﬂict: chi-square=5.501: Cramer's V=.308; Signiﬁcance level=.48l (b) Respondents'
classiﬁcation: conﬂict: Chi-square=25.9l3: Cramer's V=.384; Signiﬁcance level=.001: Non-conﬂict:-
chi-square= 12.044; Cramer's V=.33 1: signiﬁcance level=. 149 degrees of freedom=8

223

This could be taken as either their ﬁ'ustration with chiefs who are biased against their

political parties, especially the ANC members who often raised this as one of the

problems they face. Intensity of this opposition may also be a barometer of these

political tensions as much as it may actually have the potential to cause them.

Overall, it is observed from this chart that there is a general opposition toward chiefs'

involvement in party politics and this cuts across types of relations as well as across

sectors of the elite.

 

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50“..
40%
30%
20%
10%

0%

 

Figure 7.9. Opposition to chiefs'involvement in party politics

 

92%

 

 

 

INon-conﬂict conﬂict
communities

I Conﬂict communiies

 

 

Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

Statistical tests reveal two important results. Firstly, the relationship between

opposition to chiefs' involvement in politics and type of elite relationship shows weak

association and strength of relationship.234

 

234 (a) Researcher's classiﬁcation or relationship: Pearson Chi-Square value for non-conﬂict is 1.907;
Cramer's V at .284 and the signiﬁcance level is .385. In conﬂict cases chi-square value is 18.374:
Cramer's V is .284 and signiﬁcant at .005. (b) In respondents' own perception ofconﬂict and non-
conﬂict the results of the test are as follows:Non-conﬂict:- Chi-square is 16.766; Cramer's V is .390 at
.010 signiﬁcance. In conﬂict cases chi-square is 6.607 and Cramer's V is .194 at .359 signiﬁcance.

224

 

In addition to that, results are not statistically signiﬁcant in conﬂict areas when using
respondent's classiﬁcation of conﬂict and non-conﬂict whereas it is when using
researcher's own classiﬁcation. Secondly, this is one of the few results that show
discrepancy between results when using respondents' classiﬁcation from those that are
produced when using researcher's classiﬁcation. In fact, these results are inverted
when taking conﬂict and non-conﬂict andjuxtaposing them in these two
classiﬁcations. It is, therefore, concluded that there is no clear trend suggesting
association or statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the views of different elite
sectors in conﬂict relations and those in non-conﬂict relations regarding the

involvement of chiefs in party politics.

7.5. Social stratiﬁcation, class conﬂict and rural elite relations

Could the rural elite conﬂict in South Africa be depicted as a class conﬂict between
the haves and the have-nots, as some Marxist scholars claim? If this is the case we
would expect to see a clear indication that one sector has resources whereas the
other(s) have little or none. In order to establish whether this was in fact the case or
not I included several dimensions which show the distribution of resources. These are
the ownership of property, status of employment and average monthly income for
each one of the 143 respondents. Each one of these dimensions of resources is further
classiﬁed into indicators or response categories. Ownership of property includes
ownership of livestock, farming land, residential plot and a business. Employment has
employed unemployed and retired categories. Distribution of income included Little

or no income for those earning R100 or less per month, low income for those earning

225

between R100 and R999, medium for those in the R 1000-R3999 range and high

income for those earning R4000 or more.

7.6. Distribution of property in conﬂict and in non-conﬂict communities
Considering results from ﬁgure 7.10. and 7.1 1. one notices that there is no clear trend
that would suggests sharp differences in the distribution of resources between the
individuals in the conﬂict relations and those in the non-conﬂict relations. Overall. it
can be said that traditional leaders are doing marginally better than both elected and
civic leaders. This would be expected in both conﬂict and non-conﬂict relations as
traditional authorities are the ones who distribute land for farming and for building a
house (residential plot). Moreover. they are generally older (see ﬁgure 7.]. & 7.2.)
thus making them, according to local customs. eligible for land allocation. Less
representation of elected councilors in these categories of property (land) may be a
reﬂection of eligibility due to age and marital status. Elected leaders in non-conﬂict
areas fair poorly compared to the traditional and civic leaders. This, therefore, does
not suggest any trend showing sharp disparities in the ownership of property in
conﬂict communities than those in non-conﬂict communities as would be expected if

this variable was a factor in conﬂict relations.

Statistical tests generally reinforce the above observations as they indicate that there is
neither statistically important relationship nor association between the type of elite
relation and the distribution of properties (livestock, farming land, residential plot and
business). These results were sustained even when number of properties per elite

sector was used in the tests.235

 

235 (a)Researcher's classiﬁcation:- conﬂict: chi-square=9.749: C ramer‘s V=.207: signiﬁcance
level=.283. Non-conﬂict: chi-square=l3.013: Cramer's V=.474 : Signiﬁcance level=.] l l. (b)

226

Figure 7.10 Property Distribution in Conflict communities

1 00%

 

90%

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
1 0%

 

0%
Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

Figure 7.11. Property distribution in non-conﬂict communities

100%

 

92%
90% < 85% 85°
80% . 77%77°
700$ “
60% ‘
50% ‘1

 

I Livestock
lFarming land

400A) 7 33omaob 31% DRQSidOnh-IIPIO'
30% - DBusiness
20% ‘ 15%
10% -

0% 0%
0% ‘ ﬁr

Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Respondents' classiﬁcations:- Conﬂict: Chi-square=7.075: Cramer‘s V=.201: Signiﬁcance level=.529.
Non-conﬂict: chi-square=25.l32: Cramer's V=.478; Signiﬁcance level=.001.

227

7.7. Employment status in conﬂict and in non-conﬂict communities

In ﬁgures 7.12 and ﬁgure 7.13 there is no clear trend suggesting sharp differences
between the conﬂict and non-conﬂict areas. In can be said that the elite in all
categories are doing relatively well given their high employment rate. This is more so
the case with the elected ofﬁcials who, by virtue of their status, are all employed as
councilors. If any category here stands out to be noticeable it is that of the elected
councilors who are all employed thus comparing favorably with their counterparts in
the other sectors of the elite. This though does not strongly suggest that this is related
with the type of elite relationship as differences, at least according to these charts, are
marginal. The considerably higher numbered of retired members of the civic
leadership in the non-conﬂict chart is a reﬂection of the concentration of old age as

seen in ﬁgure 7.2.

However, statistical tests reveal a strong association between the employment status
of the elite sectors in conﬂict and those in non-conﬂict areas. There is an important
association of these variables and this is highly signiﬁcant relationship in both the
respondents' and researcher's classiﬁcationsz36‘ This association in conﬂict cases
suggests that there are statistically signiﬁcant differences of employment status
between the sectors of the elite whereas such sharp differences are not evident in non-
conﬂict cases. It can be concluded from these results that relationship between the
elite relations and employment status is statistically signiﬁcant even though this was

not obvious in the ﬁequency charts.

 

236 (a)Researcher's classiﬁcation:- conﬂict: chi-square=23.322; Cramer's V=..320; significance
level=.000. Non-conﬂict: chi-square=3.235; Cramer's V=.236 : Signiﬁcance level=.519. (b)
Respondents' classiﬁcations:- Conﬂict: Chi-square=20.869: Cramer’s V=.226: Signiﬁcance level=.000.
Non-conﬂict: chi-square=5.624: Cramer's V=.226: Signiﬁcance level=.229: Degrees of freedom=4

228

The differences between the elite sectors in the conﬂict communities are largely due

to the higher number of civic leaders who are unemployed as the position of elected

leaders is the same (all employed) in both conﬂict and non-conﬂict areas.

 

60%

40%

120%

I 62%
26%
20% -
0% < .

 

 

Traditional Leaders

Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

70%
2%
7%
0% 0%

120%
Figure 7.12. Employment Status In conﬂict communities
100%
100% .
80% .

 

. I Employed
IUnomployed

D Retired

 

 

 

Figure 7.13 Empioyinent status in non-conﬂict-communities

 

60% -

40% -

20% .

100% ‘

80% -

62%

 

0%4

 

23%
15%

 
   
 

 

Traditional Leaders

100%
38%
1 5%
8%
0% 0%
Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

229

 

i I Errployed
. I Unemployed
D Retired

 

 

 

 

7.8. Monthly average income and elite relations

Figures 7.14 and 7.15 reﬂect the fact that elected councilors are doing better than the
other categories when considering the fact that none of them are in the little/none
category. This is simply a reﬂection of their full employment status reﬂected above.
Generally, in both conﬂict (69%) and in non—conﬂict (69%) traditional leaders are in
the bottom end (low to no income) of the income range. In all there is important
distinction between the elite sectors and what is not readily revealed is whether this is
statistically meaningful particularly when comparing disparities between the sectors

in both types of elite relations.

Just like the above results in the employment status, statistical tests reveal a highly
signiﬁcant relationship between the elite relations and average monthly income. This
is the case in both test obtained when using researcher's classiﬁcation and those of
respondents' classiﬁcation. There is a statistically important association, a relatively
strong relationship and high level of statistical signiﬁcance”. An observation can be
made that income and employment are the only variables out of all those indicating
distribution of resources or economic standing of the elite that seem to be associated
with the type of elite relationship. At one level this may be interpreted as an indication
that traditional forms of property such as livestock, farming land and residential plots
are generally owned by all the sectors of the rural elite in both conﬂict and non-

conﬂict communities.

 

237 (a)Researcher's classiﬁcationz- conﬂict: chi-square=36.019: Cramer's V=..397; signiﬁcance
level=.000. Non-conﬂict: chi-square=5.060: Cramer's V=.295 ; Signiﬁcance level=.536. (b)
Respondents' classiﬁcations:- Conﬂict: Chi-square=37.994; Cramer's V=.465; Signiﬁcance level=.000.
Non-conﬂict: chi-square=4.l65: Cramer's V=.l95; Signiﬁcance level=.654: Degrees of freedom=6

230

This, however. is not necessarily the case with the more modern indicators of
economic status such as education, income and employment which seem to vary
greatly among the sectors of the elite in conﬂict cases than in non-conﬂict cases.
These results are giving a hint that types of properties when studying the rural elite
need to be unbundled in a manner that distinguish between the traditional and modern
forms of economic status. The association between conﬂict relations with
employment and income can be interpreted in two ways: ﬁrstly, distribution of land
and livestock is fairly even among the local elite, and even in cases where this is not
the case it is largely due to the customary or widely applied conventional rules that
require one to be married or a parent to get land. In this case, a young person who
does not have land or livestock may understand this as a passing phase as they would
be given once they are married or old enough to fulﬁll the requirements. Secondly,
this may signal the growing importance of education, income and employment as
indicators of social status and wealth in a modern society. It is after all a good
education, income, and a good job that allows elite in the present day South Africa to
access symbols of success and wealth or highlife (a fancy car, cellular phone, a
beautiful house, fancy clothes and all other ﬂashy and trendy gadgets). A
simultaneous process of the devaluation of farming land and livestock is taking place.
For an example, I observed many ﬁelds that have been lying fallow or unutilized, and
this is a common scene across South African rural villages. Many owners of these
ﬁelds cite the lack of money as the key reason and this is followed by the fact that the
youth lacks interest in farming. Another indication of this decline is the fact that
traditional brides wealth payment transaction was through cows or livestock but in the

present era a cash payment is generally preferred.

231

All these taken together indicate general availability of land whereas income, good
employment and education that are highly valued are not readily available to all
sectors thus causing a sense of relative deprivation among those who do not compare

favorably in this sense.

7.14. Average monthly income distribution in conﬂict

 

     
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

communities
70% ﬂ
6007, ~ 57'”) 5804 ’
501%! ‘
40"“ - aLittle/None
33%33%
ILow
30% 1 DMedium
20%, _‘ DHIgh
10% i
0%
Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders
Fig 7.15 Average Monthly Income Distribution in non-conﬂict
communities
300., ____-___, - , ~ -————.
70% — 67% l
60% - 54% l
50% -
IlLittie/None
400/0 ' j IL
33% 31%31%31% 1 °‘”,
30% - 3% DMedlum
l CIHigh
20% - 15 l
10% _ 8% 8% l
1 0% 0% ,
0% r , . 1
Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

232

7.9. Policy preference proﬁle and support for traditional institutions

Assessment of attitudes and opinions of participants toward traditional institutions and
policies that impact on or shape rural local governance has two primary aims. Firstly,
this will establish if there is any trend that indicates differences of opinion between
the key actors within conﬂict communities and those in non-conﬂict communities. A
trend showing differences between individuals from these two types of relations will
then show that policy issues are also areas of disagreement or conﬂict, and will also
point out areas of agreement on policy matters. Secondly, attitudes towards traditional
institutions will also reveal, partially though, whether the conﬂict may be between
traditionalists who support traditional institutions, values and customs and those who
favor modern institutions. Ultimately, these results will reveal a proﬁle of preference
that distinguishes. if at all, individuals in conﬂict relations and those in
accommodative relations. Alternatively, these opinions may also reveal whether
differences of opinion reﬂects shared values and views among the members of the
same elite sector thus reﬂecting the aggregation of interests according to the

institutional boundaries.

233

This section presents results on the distribution and variation of opinions and attitudes
on the following areas: opinion on traditional values and customs, opinions on
traditional land tenure, opinion on the introduction of payment of services in rural
areas and on the New Municipal Demarcation Law that made provisions for
amalgamation of rural areas and urban areas into single municipal boundaries or
development zones for the purpose of service delivery and development. In addition
to the above-identiﬁed attitudinal/opinion variables, opinion on penalties imposed by
the traditional/customary courts, views on whether respondents feel they have an
inﬂuence on the decisions made by traditional authority and elected council in their
respective communities, and lastly, views on the existence or non-existence of
corruption in the traditional authority. It should be remembered that differences of
opinion that this study is interested in within both conﬂict and non-conﬂict relations
are between the contending sectors or key players in each set of relations. In this case
we will be looking at relations between the traditional leaders and those of civic

and/or elected leaders and these compared across the conﬂict and non-conﬂict areas.

234

7.10. Support for traditional values and customs in conﬂict and in non—conﬂict
relations

In both ﬁgures 7.16 and 7.17 traditional leaders show a very strong support for
traditional values and customs and this is to be expected as this is largely seen as
source of their power and legitimacy. More interesting results are those of both the
elected and civic leaders. They show more reservation or conditional support in non-
conﬂict communities than those in conﬂict. lntuitively, one would have expected to
have sharp differences of opinion between the sectors of individuals in conﬂict

relations but this is not the case in these results.

If one takes strong support and the support of some aspects of traditional values and
customs and put it against those who are opposed to it in both cases, it can be
concluded that there is a general support in both conﬂict and non-conﬂict relations. In
all, there is no important trend that links this support or opposition to one type of
relation as would have been the case if opinions on customs and values were a
decisive factor. These results weaken the assertion that these conﬂicts occur where

traditionalists are at loggerheads with supporters of modern institutions.

235

 

Figure 7.16. Support for traditional values and customs in
conﬂict communities

1 00%

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10% 7%

0% 0%

 

0%
Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

 

 

Figure 7.17. Support for traditional values and customs in
non-conflict communities

120%

 

1 00% 1 00%
1 00%

l

80% -

60% -

 

40% .

20% 1

 

 

 

 

0% 0% 0% 0%
0% i i

Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

236

Statistical tests reveal a statistically signiﬁcant relationship with almost identical

. , . 3
results in both conﬂict and non-conﬂict cases“38

. These results are interpreted as
suggesting that there is no important distinction between the conﬂict cases and non-
conﬂict cases instead one notices results that indicate distinction between the sectors
of the elite in both instances. This support the assertion made above that the results
reﬂects divergence of views between traditional leaders and elected councilors and
civic leaders. In terms of the hypotheses outlined earlier, the outcome helps us to

understand elite sector interests and views but does not give an insight on the question

of the existence or non-existence of conﬂict.

7.11. Support for traditional land tenure system.

Discussion in the previous chapters as well as in the surveyed literature indicates that
in most cases conﬂict between traditional leaders and elected or civic leaders is over
land allocation. Given this fact, one would expect sharp differences of opinion
between the contending sectors of the elite over traditional land tenure system. On the
one hand, it was shown that chiefs and their tribal councilors get most of their power
and inﬂuence through the traditional land tenure which grants those powers to allocate
land among their subjects as they are deemed as holding communal land in trust on
behalf of the community or given tribe. Not only do they exercise this power to
allocate land and beneﬁt from the patronage-clientage network it generates but also

regard everything, from political gatherings to development projects and services that

 

238 (a)Researcher's classiﬁcationz- conﬂict: chi—square=l 7.257: Cramer's V=..275: significance
level=.008. Non-conﬂict: chi-square=l 1.859; Cramer‘s V=.639: Signiﬁcance level=.003. (b)
Respondents' classiﬁcations:- Conﬂict: Chi-square=l3.922; Cramer's V=.28l Signiﬁcance level=.03l.
Non-conﬂict: chi-square=10.578; Cramer's V=.3IO; Signiﬁcance level=.032: Degrees of freedom=4

237

takes place on that piece of land as being under theirjurisdiction. On the other hand,
elected councilors and civic leaders are well aware that if they are to meaningfully
develop the area and deliver services promised to their constituencies during
elections, they need to have access to or even control over land allocation and
utilization. If anything, views on land allocation were expected to provide a decisive
trend that link the type of local elite relations to one form of support and opposition to

traditional land tenure.

 

Figure 7.18. Opinion on traditional land tenure in conﬂict
communities

1 20%

 

1 00%

1 00%

80% -

60% ‘

    
 

40% <

 

33% 33% 33%

20% -

 

 

0% -

Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

238

Figure 7.19. Opinion on traditional land tenure in non-conﬂict
communities i

 

120% A}
100% ‘
100% - l
30% .
60% -

40% .

20% -

 

 

 

0% .

Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

In view of the above statement, it is not surprising that all traditional leaders in both
conﬂict (see ﬁgure 7.18) and non-conﬂict (see ﬁgure 7.19) support traditional land
tenure. More interesting and unexpected ﬁndings are the ones that show a strong
support among elected councilors (69%) and civic leaders (85%) in conﬂict
communities. If one takes conditional support into account in these cases it can be
said that there is only a token opposition to traditional land tenure system. Adding to
this unexpected trend is the fact that more elected councilors in conﬂict communities
support traditional land tenure than their counterparts in the non-conﬂict
communities. About the same number of civic leaders in both cases expressed

support.

Just like in the case of support for traditional values and customs, there is a general

support for traditional land tenure in both types of elite relations, and this is more so if

239

conditional support is added to the equation. In this case it can be concluded that there
is no identiﬁable trend that separates the opinion of individuals in the conﬂict

relations from those in the accommodative relations.

Just as in the case of opinions on traditional values and customs, views on traditional
land tenure reﬂect sector interests than through a light on conﬂict or non-conﬂict
relations. Statistical results conﬁrm this observation as they show identical but

239. It can be

statistically signiﬁcant results for both conﬂict and non-conﬂict cases
said that in statistical terms opinion on traditional land tenure reveal sector interests

but does not seem to be related to the type of elite relationship as suggested in the

hypothesis.

7.12. Elite attitudes toward payment of services in rural areas

Are there any differences of opinion toward payment of services in the rural areas
between the elite in the conﬂict and those in the accommodative relations? If so, what
sectors of the elite are more incline to oppose the introduction of these payments? In
trying to answer this question, respondents were asked to register their opinion toward
the introduction of the payment for services such as water, electricity, telephone
services, road maintenance, construction or maintenance of community facilities such
as community halls. It should be stated that most of the respondents understood that

they had to pay to have electricity, water and telephones installed inside their homes

 

239 (a)Researcher's classiﬁcation:- conﬂict: chi-square=22.289: Cramer's V=..313; signiﬁcance
level=.001. Non-conﬂict: chi-square=l8.6l7; Cramer's V=.567 ; Signiﬁcance level=.001. (b)
Respondents' classiﬁcations:- Conﬂict: Chi-square=18.855: Cramer's V=.327; Signiﬁcance level=.004.
Non-conﬂict: chi-square=l3.356: Cramer's V=.348: Signiﬁcance level=.010; Degrees of freedom=4

240

but the question was aimed at provision of these services at a community levels where
the community had to share the cost. It should also be stated that those who expressed
opposition to the payment of these services felt that it was government's responsibility

to provide and pay for these services.

With this context in mind, let us consider levels of opposition to the introduction of
the payment of services in rural areas in both the conﬂict cases and non-conﬂict cases.
Figure 7.20, below, show a strong opposition from traditional leaders who seem to be
content with the status quo. Even more surprising is the fact that opposition from
traditional leaders in non-conﬂict communities (85%) seems to be stronger than that
of their counterparts in conﬂict relations (71%). There is also a strong Opposition
from the civic leaders, with 75% of those in non-conﬂict areas and about half or 46%

of those in conﬂict areas.

241

 

     

7.20. Oppostion to payment of services in rural
areas

90%
80%
70°11
60°».
50%
40,: I Conflict communities
30% 22“]. I Non-conflict communities
20% —
10% 0%

0%

Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Civrc Leaders

 

In sharp contrast to both the traditional and civic leaders, there is very little opposition
from the elected councilors. The 22% of elected leaders who opposed the
introduction of service payment in rural areas were drawn entirely from the IFP
councilors. It will be recalled from ﬁgure 7.7. that 33% of elected councilors are IFP
members from KwaZulu-Natal province and a majority of them expressed their strong
opposition to the payment of services in the rural areas. It is understandable that there
would be general support for payment of services from the mostly ANC elected
representatives as this would provide a source of revenue to help them with delivery
of services or to supplement government subsidy or support. Even more important, is
the fact that it is the policy of both ANC and national government to allow local
councils to generate their resource especially from within their communities as a way
of sustaining their services. It is also logical that elected councils with more resources
would undercut the powers of traditional authorities and have more projects to

demonstrate their effectiveness.

242

Overall, results from the above chart do not provide any trend that can be associated
with conﬂict or non-conﬂict relations. It simply reﬂects differences between sectors
of the elite instead of any distinction between the two types of relations, which are of

primary interest in this chapter.

I found strong and statistically signiﬁcant relationship that reveals that there are
differences between the opinions of the elite sectors in conﬂict and those in non-
conﬂict casesm. This suggests that unlike opinions on land tenure and traditional
values, there is a distinction that shows greater differences between the elites in
conﬂict areas than those in non-conﬂict communities. In short, opinions on payment
of services in rural areas are an important factor in understanding the type of

dominant elite relations in rural areas.

7.13. Rural elite Attitudes toward the New Municipal Demarcation Act (law)

In chapter ﬁve it was stated that government was ﬁnalizing, in time for December
2000 local government elections, the introduction of new municipal law that aimed at
integrating rural and urban areas into wards for the purpose of coordinating
development and delivery of service. Most traditional leaders perceived the
introduction of this law as an attempt to erode their power and inﬂuence whereas most
councilors welcomed it as a vehicle of development with municipal councils as agents

of delivery.

 

240 (a)Researcher's classiﬁcationz- conﬂict: chi-square=26.059; Cramer’s V=..338: signiﬁcance
level=.000. Non-conﬂict: chi-square=10.534: Cramer's V=.426; Signiﬁcance level=.032. (b)
Respondents' classiﬁcationsz- Conﬂict: Chi-square=28.435; Cramer's V=.402: Signiﬁcance level=.000.
Non-conﬂict: chi-square=8.933: Cramer's V=.285: Signiﬁcance level=.063; Degrees of freedom=4

243

For some chiefs, the drawing of municipal boundaries which either cut through their

areas of jurisdiction or integrated them to the "land of another chief“ was taken as

balkanization which had come to weaken and ultimately decimate the institution of

chieftaincy or traditional rulership. Since the government and the ruling party

championed this policy, ANC supporters and members generally supported this law

albeit with some reservations in some cases. Much of ANC supporters reservations

about this law were based on lack of consultation or information as well as what they

perceived to be an arbitrary drawing of municipal boundaries.

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

0%

 

Fig 7.21. Level of Opposition to the New Municipal

Dermacation Law

. 7 5%
69%

 

 

Traditional LeadersElected Councilors Civic Leaders

 

 

B Elite from conﬂict communities

I Elite from non-conﬂict
communities

 

Taking into account the above issues at stake and perceptions prevailing in each

sector, the results in ﬁgure 7.21. reinforces these trends. In both conﬂict (69%) and

non-conﬂict (75%) relations we observe a strong opposition to New Municipal

 

Demarcation Law from traditional leaders. It should be stated that the residual or
remaining number of traditional leaders in conﬂict communities who did not express
opposition to this new law did so on grounds of not having sufﬁcient information
about the law itself. This was largely the case in the Mpumalanga province especially
among those who had little or no education at all. I shall elaborate on provincial

trends in the next chapter.

There is less opposition to this law from the elected councilors, and a majority of
councilors who expressed support of this municipal demarcation law are the ANC
members. The IF P was vehemently opposed to this law and so were its members and
elected representatives who, it is argued, took their cue from their party. It is notable
that the results on elected councilors' opposition to this law mirror those of opposition
to payment of services in rural areas (see ﬁgure 7.20) and this opposition is drawn
almost entirely from the IFP representatives. Less than half of civic leaders in non-
conﬂict and just below one third of those in conﬂict areas opposed this municipal
demarcation law. Factoring those civic leaders who had no opinion or had no
sufﬁcient information on this law, then there is an almost an even split between those
who opposed and those who supported this new law. Overall, these trends, just like
the ones above, tell us more about the differences between the sectors of the elite,
especially sharp differences between elected and traditional leaders. Observed
differences of frequencies between cases and sectors in conﬂict and in non-conﬂict
areas also exists even though it is not as strong as indicated in the charts. It is,
therefore imperative in this case to establish whether these observed differences are

statistically signiﬁcant to suggest an association between this variable and the type of

245

elite relations or whether they are due to chance. Tests reveal that results are
statistically signiﬁcant with strong association in both the instances where
respondents' and researcher's classiﬁcations are used. This adds opinion on New
Municipal Demarcation into other variables that have proven to be statistically

signiﬁcant and therefore important factors in understanding the type of elite relations.

7.14. Other variables

Opinion on corruption within traditional authority”, on penalties imposed by
traditional courtsm, views on whether respondents think they have inﬂuence on
decisions made by traditional authoritiesm reﬂected little or no variation between the
conﬂict and non-conﬂict cases. However, the results indicated statistically signiﬁcant
relationship reﬂecting variations between the elite sectors within each type of
relationship. It should be recalled that opinions on traditional values and customs and
traditional land tenure also reﬂected similar trends. Views on inﬂuencing the
decisions of the elected councils are the only one among these that shows statistically

Signiﬁcant relationship showmg variation between conﬂict and non-conﬂict cases 44.

 

241 (a)Researcher's classification:- conﬂict: chi-square=4l.677; Cramer's V=..428; signiﬁcance
level=.000. Non-conﬂict: chi-square=l7.400: Cramer's V=.548; Signiﬁcance level=.002. (b)
Respondents' classiﬁcations:- Conﬂict: Chi-square=29.l75: Cramer's V=.407; Signiﬁcance level=.000.
Non-conﬂict: chi-square=26.076: Cramer's V=.487; Signiﬁcance level=.000; Degrees of freedom=4
242 (a)Researcher's classificationz- conflict: chi-square=3 1.527; Cramer's V=.3 72; signiﬁcance
level=.000. Non-conﬂict: chi-square=l3.655 Cramer's V=.485 ; Signiﬁcance level=.008. (b)
Respondents' classiﬁcations:- Conﬂict: Chi-square=25.87l; Cramer's V=.383; Signiﬁcance level=.000.
Non-conﬂict: chi-square=16.378; Cramer's V=.386; Signiﬁcance level=.003: Degrees of freedom=4
243 (a)Researcher's classiﬁcation:- conflict: chi-square=21.682: Cramer's V=..308; signiﬁcance
level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=8.976; Cramer's V=.556; Signiﬁcance level=.01 I. (b)
Respondents' classiﬁcations:- Conﬂict: Chi-square=23.753; Cramer's V=.367; Signiﬁcance level=.000.
Non-conﬂict: chi-square=l 1.982; Cramer's V=.467; Signiﬁcance level=.003: Degrees of freedom=2 for
no conﬂict and 4 for conﬂict.

244 (a)Researcher's classiﬁcation:- conﬂict: chi-square=l9.652: Cramer's V=..294: signiﬁcance
level=.001. Non-conﬂict: chi-square=6.640: Cramer's V=.338 ; Signiﬁcance level=.156. (b)
Respondents' classiﬁcations:- Conﬂict: Chi-square=l 8.871: Cramer's V=.327; Signiﬁcance level=.00l.
Non-conﬂict: chi-square=2.765: Cramer's V=.159: Signiﬁcance level=.598: Degrees of freedom=4

246

It can be said that this variable is a factor in understanding elite relationship as views
seem to vary more between the elite sectors in conﬂict areas than those in non-conﬂict

areas.

Past political involvement, gender, marital status, and opinions on whether
geopolitical factors played a role on local elite relations were also tested and all
proved to have neither statistically signiﬁcant relationship nor association with the

type of elite relationship.

7.15. Summary

The above discussion was a presentation and analysis of survey results. Its main
emphasis was an identiﬁcation of trends that indicated relationship between the
selected variables and the type of elite relations (conﬂict and accommodative/non-
conﬂict). The ﬁndings emerging from this presentation and analysis are that age, party
afﬁliation, education, income, employment are the demographic variables that are
related to the type of elite relationship as indicated by both the distribution charts and
statistical tests. Of the opinion variables, views on payment of service fees, on
respondents' perception of their inﬂuence on decision making in elected council and
views on the introduction of New Municipal Demarcation Law proved to be
associated with the type of elite relationship. The remaining opinion variables (on
land tenure, on traditional values and customs, on penalties by traditional courts and
views on inﬂuence on decisions by traditional authorities) reﬂected no clear
association with type of elite relation even though they reﬂected variation of views
reﬂecting the interests of each elite sector. Ethnicity has statistically signiﬁcant

relationship with type of elite relation even though it is a weak one. Past political

247

involvement, gender, marital status, and opinions on whether geopolitical factors
played a role on local elite relations were also tested and all proved to have neither

statistically signiﬁcant relationship nor association with the type of elite relationship.

248

CHAPTER EIGHT

SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY
AND PROVINCIAL LEVEL

Paramount in this chapter is the presentation and analysis of survey results. In this case
the emphasis is on trends associated with the types of elite relations within and between
provinces. Some observations are made regarding community features particularly those
related to differences between elite sectors. The following questions steer the ﬂow and
direction of the content of this chapter. Is there a regional dimension in understanding the
type of elite relations? What are the predominant trends within and between the
provinces? Are there any characteristic features in the selected communities that help in

understanding dynamics of elite relations?

How is this chapter different from the previous chapters (chapter six and seven) whose
focus was also a presentation and analyses of survey results? An answer to this question
also assists in delineating the scope of this chapter while drawing attention to its
complementary nature. Chapter six presented a proﬁle of selected communities in a form
of narratives that were mame constructed from the qualitative portion of the interviews
and focus group discussions. This provided history and evolution of relationships among

the key players. It also gave a voice to the key participants. These helped to provide a

249

context to the relational dynamics of each community. Chapter seven presented and
analyzed survey results. The emphasis in the previous chapter is an identiﬁcation of
trends that indicate relations between types of rural elite relations (conﬂictual and
accommodative) and the selected variables that include age, education, ethnicity,
distribution of resources, party affiliation and policy preference proﬁle as well as opinion
on corruption in the traditional authority, penalties imposed by traditional courts and
respondents' perception of their inﬂuence in the decisions taken by the institutions of
rural local government. In this case, aggregate scores on each variable for each sector of
the elite were compared within and across conﬂict and non-conﬂict relations. A key
feature of chapter seven was the replacement of names (communities, individuals,

provinces) with theoretical concepts, conﬂict versus non-conﬂict.

This chapter adds yet another dimension to the survey results. In this case, presentation
and analysis of results stresses demographic and attitudinal/opinion results or trends
within and across provinces and communities. There will also be a brief analysis of
ge0political factors that stood out prominently in elite relations. The format of
presentation is along the same lines as the one followed in the previous chapter where
themes are mainly organized according to key variables that are in turn based on theories
and hypotheses presented earlier in this study. The ﬁndings are presented on age,
education, ethnicity, party political afﬁliation and identity, distribution of resources
(property ownership, income, and employment status), policy preferences (land tenure,

opposition to New Municipal Demarcation Law, support for traditional values and

250

customs, opposition to payment of services in rural areas). In addition to these variables,
new additions in this chapter, as stated in the foregoing discussion and include
ge0political factors. Descriptive summary statistics in a form of frequency charts for each
sector in each province will be presented and emerging trends pointed out. Results drawn
from the statistical tests of signiﬁcance and association are used and they target mainly
those variables that were shown in chapter seven as having statistically signiﬁcant
relationship with the type of elite relations. This will also be supplemented with
interpretive analysis drawn from the qualitative portion of the survey, and this will draw
extensively from the narrative accounts and case histories already presented in chapter
six. Before embarking on the ﬁndings, it should be restated that the approach adopted in
this chapter is meant to highlight the aspects of the results which otherwise could not be
satisfactorily captured in chapters six and seven. In the ﬁnal analysis and interpretation of
results in chapter nine all these results are taken into account in a manner that appreciates

the complex nature of rural elite relations.

At this juncture it is appropriate to point out that stress of analysis in this chapter is more
on the elite sectors, which are key players in shaping the local relations or politics. More
speciﬁcally, table 6.2. of chapter six indicated that in Mnceba, Sokhulumi and Rode, the
key players are traditional leaders and the civic leaders. It will be recalled that of these
communities only Sokhulumi is classiﬁed as having non-conﬂict relations. In the next
classiﬁcation of key players, traditional leaders and elected leaders are prominent players

in Vezokuhle, Tweefontein, and in all the KwaZulu-Natal cases (Adams, Embo and

251

Mfume). All these are in conﬂict relations category. One caveat should be pointed out in
these cases, in the KwaZulu-Natal communities conﬂict is not a simple contention
between the AN C elected councilors and traditional leaders. In this case, elected
councilors are split between those who are IFP representatives and those who are ANC
representative whereas traditional leaders are predominantly IFP members. As the
foregoing discussion indicated, IFP aligned traditional leaders have good relations with
IFP elected councilors and conﬂictual relations with AN C councilors. Finally, Nzongisa,
which is classiﬁed as having accommodative relations, has all the sectors of the elite as

key players in community relations and politics.

8.1. Age distribution in the provinces and within communities

As stated in the literature reviewed in chapter two, age or generational conﬂict features
prominently as one of the explanation for political conﬂict in South Aﬁ’ica. The previous
chapter's ﬁndings also conﬁrmed that there is an association between age distribution and
the type of elite relations. To pursue this matter one may ask if age feature more
prominently in some provinces and communities than in others. This section will try to

answer this question.

The local leadership in KwaZulu-Natal tends to be older and this is the case in all sectors.
Given the overriding importance of political afﬁliation in this province it can be assumed
that local leaders are more ﬁxed in their positions with little ﬂexibilities, and that given

their age they may have participated in the previous clashes particularly during the

252

critical period of worse political clashes of the 19805 and early 19905. This would tend to
ossify old political feuds and rivalries. Only two respondents were classiﬁed as youth and
these were both from the sector of the elected councilors. Of the three chiefs only one is
classiﬁed as middle aged and the rest are in the senior age group. The chart below
indicates what is roughly an even distribution between middle aged elite and the senior
aged and this is the case across the sectors. It would then be asserted that in view of this
distribution, age is not as strong a factor in KwaZulu-Natal as the contending categories
seem to share the same age distribution. Political aﬁiliation, as the subsequent discussion

will show, still remains the strongest single factor in elite relations in KwaZulu-Natal

 

Figure 8.1 Age Distribution in Kwazulu-Natal

 

 

 

 

 

Traditional Leaders Elected Councilors Chic Leaders
Youth 0% 12% 0%
I Middle age 50% 47% 44%
El Senior 56% 41% 56%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Just like in the above province, there is only one Eastern Cape chief who is classiﬁed as

middle aged and the other remaining two are in the senior age category. More important

253

is the fact that both of these older chiefs are from Rode and Mnceba whose predominant
elite relations are conﬂictual. At a glance one can immediately notice greater variation of
age per elite category in the age distribution chart for the Eastern Cape and this is in
sharp contrast to the KwaZulu-Natal where it was evenly concentrated within the middle
and senior age groups. Also worth noting is the fact that all the elected councilors in the
Eastern Cape are middle aged. According to the results in this chart, traditional leaders
tend to be older compared to their middle age elected leaders, and civic leaders are
widely distributed across the age groupings. It is important to note that the age
discrepancy between the sectors of the elite is wider in both conﬂict communities

therefore they are the ones who contributed most to this variation in the provincial age

 

    

 

 

 

distribution.
Figure 8.2 Age distribution in the Eastern Cape
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0% . . _ .
Traditional Leaders Elected Councrlors Cmc Leaders
53 Youth 0% 0% 23%
I Middle age 11% 100% 38%
C] Senior 89% 0% 38%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In the case of Mpumalanga province it can be said that the proportion of the elite that is

younger or categorized as youth is the highest of all the provinces and this is the ease
across diﬁ‘erent sectors of the elite. The only exception is that of the civic leaders in the
Eastern Cape Province (23%). In terms of chiefs the trend is the same with two senior
chiefs and one middle-aged chief In comparative terms, the elected oﬁcials are younger
than the traditional authorities as they are mainly concentrated in the youth and middle
age category compared to traditional leaders who have strong presence in the middle and
senior age categories. This is an important trend, which is in line with the ﬁndings of the
previous chapter as the contending sectors, elected, and traditional leaders, show some
variation in their age distribution thus lending credence to the hypotheses that age may be

related with conﬂict.

 

Figure 8.3. Age distribution in Mpumalanga Province

 

 

 

 

Tradtional Leaders Elected Councrlors CIVIC Leaders
E3 Y outh 1 5% 44% 18%
I Elected Councillors 50% 44% 64%
E] Civil Leaders 35% 1 1% 18%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Having observed the frequencies in provinces now we consider the statistical test.

Statistical test assessing the provincial dimension to age reveals that signiﬁeant

255

relationship with association showing greater variation between the age and elite sectors
is in the communities in the Eastern Cape Province“' This is interpreted to mean that
greater age diﬂ‘erences between the diﬂ‘erent sectors of the elite is more evident in the

Eastern Cape than in other provinces.

The ﬁndings in this section can be summed as follows: Age distribution is associated
with the type of relations and this is well pronounced in the case of Mpumalanga
Province and the Eastern Cape when considering the distribution of age according to elite
sector in the charts. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal there is no clear trend to suggest that
age plays an important role. It is only the Eastern Cape that indicates statistically
signiﬁcant relationship. These regional diﬁ‘erences are important in the sense that they
spot variations that, otherwise, could not have been easily detected in the previous
chapter. More speciﬁcally, in these variations one can notice relative importance and
effects of these different variables whereas this is not readily obvious when all cases are

grouped together according to their type of relationship.

8.2. Education trends in the selected communities and provinces

Are elected councilors more educated than traditional leaders? Are civic leaders more
educated than traditional leaders? Is age more of an important factor in elite relations in
some communities and provinces than in others? Do local elites see education as a factor

in their relations? Figures 8.1 ., 8.2. and 8.3. present distribution of education levels in

 

244 Eastern Cape: Age and elite sector“. Chi-square value =77.442; Signiﬁcance level=.03; Cramer's V
.797.

256

KwaZulu-Natal, Eastem Cape and Mpumalanga respectively.

During the discussions and interviews with participants in KwaZulu-Natal education
never came up as a factor according to the perception of the respondents. They were, as is
the case with participants from Other provinces, were speciﬁcally asked if they thought
educational qualiﬁcation was an important factor or consideration in their dealings with
the members of the other sectors of the local elite. During the interviews they were asked
to give their educational qualiﬁcation in order to see if there were important variations
between sectors. The following table on KwaZulu-Natal indicates that elected councilors
are better educated than the members of the traditional authorities. Only 25% of
traditional authorities have high education compared to 53% of elected leaders who are in
both high school and tertiary education categories. But one notices that a considerable
number (31%) of these traditional leaders at least do have secondary education.
Generally, very few members of the local elite in this province have no formal education.
Even more important is the fact that chiefs in both Embo and Mfume had secondary
education and Adams chief had high school education. Considering the fact that chiefs
play a key role in all these cases, it can be said that educational differences between the
contending sectors of the elite in this province are not as sharp as is the case in

Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape.

257

 

Figure 8.4 Education in Kwazqu-Natal

        
 

Elected
Councilors

0%
1 2%
35%
24%
29%

Traditional
Leaders

6%
38%
31 %
25%
0%

  

  
  
  

   

Civic Leaders

  

0%

  
 

   

     
 

      
    

22%

 

   

      

 

 

 

Figure 8.2. below also follow the same trend as the one above with a majority of both the
elected leaders (67%) and the civic leaders (56%) qualifying as well-educated compared
to only 31% of the traditional leaders. This contrast is even sharper when looking at the
category of the less educated (no formal education and primary education). None of the
elected ofﬁcials belong to this category and only 23% of the civic leaders compared to

42% of the traditional leaders.

In this province, Mnceba accounted for most of less educated traditional leaders as three

of its four traditional leaders only have primary education, and this include the acting-

chief Contrast this with Rode and Nzongisa, and then you ﬁnd the chieﬁ with both

258

 

l Figure 8.5 Education in the Eastern Cape

    
   

80%

   
  

  

Elected
Councilors

0%
0%
33%
67%
0%

Traditional
Leaders

0%
42%
26%
26%
5%

  
       
  
  
   
  

Chic Leaders

5%

   

   

   

   

 

 

 

tertiary and high school education and their tribal councilors evenly spread between the
educated and less educated. In the case of Mnceba, respondents from both the traditional
leaders and civic leaders, the key sectors, often highlighted the fact that education was a
factor in their conﬂictual relations. Some key members of the civic leadership felt that
their misunderstanding and communication breakdown was due to the fact that the local
chief and many of the members of the tribal council were less educated thus making it
difﬁcult for them to understand the new democratic dispensation. As one respondent put
it, "perhaps our chief would have political education if she was an active member of
political organizations such as the AN C. What I see is lack of political education and
lack of basic education to understand local administration hence all these problems of
corruption". In this case education is not merely conceived in a narrow sense of formal

school education but it is understood in terms of political education or as a means to

259

political understanding. This adds another dimension to the concept of education.

It is also important to note that in the case of Rode, as case proﬁles indicated in chapter
six, both key rivals, the chief and civic leader, have tertiary education. There is no sharp
contrast in their constituencies as they are almost evenly spread out in the less educated

and well education levels.

 

Figure 8.6 Education in Mpumalanga Province

80%

60%

 

 

 

 

In the case of Mpumalanga, one notices the sharpest contrast between the education level
of the elected councilors and that of the traditional leaders. An overwhelming majority of
elected councilors (78%) is educated compared to a very few of traditional leaders (25%).
Taking the lower end, the concentration of traditional leaders (70%) in the category of
those with no forma education and those with only primary education stands out
prominently in contrast to elected leaders who are not in this category at all. This

diﬂ‘erence assume more importance when taking into account the fact that Vezokuhle

260

chief has no formal education at all and his counterpart from Tweefontein only has
primary education. Only Sokhulumi chief (non-conﬂict) has secondary edueation, and as
such he considers himself well educated and well traveled. He boasted the "Our
secondary education before the Bantu education is equivalent to high school or even
diploma of today's education." This self-understanding and conﬁdence does make a
difference when dealing with other educated elite. This is a direct opposite of Mnceba
chief who complained that civic leaders were undermining chiefs "because they thought
they were better educated and therefore know everything". In all, the overall results
conﬁrm the trend, which was shown in chapter seven, that elected leaders and to some
extent, civic leaders are relatively better, educated than traditional leaders. This is the

case, as the above charts show, right across provinces.

8.3. Political afﬁliation and identity

There are provincial as well as clear community trends when one considers political
parties that are dominant players. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal AN C and the IFP are
dominant parties, which monopolize the political landscape in the rural areas that have
African population. This fact is conﬁrmed by all the literature reviewed on this province
and it is also reinforced by both national and local election results. It will be recalled that
chapter four surveyed literature on the IFP-UDF political conﬂicts in the mid and late
19805, which then became IFP-ANC clashes once the ANC was unbanned in the 19905.
The chart below (ﬁgure 8.4.) conﬁrms these trends in the case of the selected

communities in KwaZulu-Natal. The AN C has strong presence among the elected leaders

261

but the traditional authority is strongly behind the IFP.

 

Figure 8.7. Political afﬁlliation in Kwazulu-Natal

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

 

 

 

The absence of other political parties is quite conspicuous as there are more people who
belong to no political party than those who belong to other parties other than the two
dominant ones. It comes as no surprise that virtually all the respondents identiﬁed
political divisions as the key aspect in deﬁning their relationships. This is clearly
demonstrated by the fact that all the IFP elected councilors stated that they had smooth
relations with IFP dominated traditional authorities whereas the opposite was the case
with the ANC councilors. There could be no clear demonstration of the fact that being an
elected councilor did not matter that much than party political afﬁliation. A similar
situation was observed with the civic leaders who were split according to their political
afﬁliation. Those who were ANC reported their frustration in dealing with the IFP chiefs

and iinduna and they attributed this to the fact that they belonged to rival political

organizations. Party political afﬁliation came out as the strongest factor in determining
lines along which local elite conﬂictual relations was organized. Virtually all the
respondents were acutely aware of this fact as they attributed many of their difﬁcult

relations to it.

This is not the case in the other two provinces, the Eastern and Mpumalanga. Perhaps
Rode is the closest example of conﬂict that has assumed political lines between the AN C
and UDM However, even in the case of Rode it will be recalled that the ensuing conﬂict
predates the emergence of UDM into the scene and sometimes it was even between

AN C's own factions. It can, therefore, be argued that both the perceptions of the local
elite and reported cases of disputes in KwaZulu-Natal put political afﬁliation and identity
as the strongest candidate explanation for conﬂictual relations between the sectors of the

elite.

263

 

Figure 8.8. Political aﬁilliation in the Eastern Province

   
   

100%

  
  

Traditional
Leaders

53%
0%
37%
0%
1 1%

Elected

Councilors
1 00%
0%
0%
0%
0%

  

  
      

Civic Leaders

  

59%
3%
26%
0%
1 3%

     
 

   

         
 

IFP
UDM

 

      

   

     
   

 

            
        

 

NONE

 

 

 

The above table indicates AN C's dominant position in the Eastem and its monopoly over
the elected positions in all the three communities. The only strong rival is the UDM,
which is almost entirely based at Rode. All the traditional leaders who are members of
the UDM are drawn from Rode where they dominate the traditional authority. This leaves
Mnceba and Nzongisa with an unchallenged ANC dominance in all the sectors of the
local elite. As we discuss leadership styles it will become obvious that political aﬂiliation
in a conventional sense of being a card-carrying member of a political party is not
sufficient in the eyes of rival sectors of the elite. In this case a low-proﬁle card carrying
chief of Mnceba was not necessarily welcome as a bona ﬁde ANC member as one civic
leader puts it "she is never seen in ANC events and has done nothing for the ANC so we
doubt her commitment and membership. As far as many of us are concerned she is not an
ANC member." I shall return to this other dimension of political identity, high or low

proﬁle involvement in politieal parties, when leadership style is discussed. Nzongisa,

which has accommodative relations, was the most diverse politically notwithstanding
ANC dominance. It had ANC, IFP and UDM members in its civic leadership, and this
can be taken as a result of the "open door stance" of the local chief who has allowed all
the parties to campaign and gather in her village while clearly stating her position as an

AN C member.

In the case of Mpumalanga one immediately notices two things that set it apart from the
other provinces. Firstly, AN C's dominance is strong and uncontested in all the sectors
with only a token presence of UDM and other parties. Secondly, the high number of
traditional leaders and civic leaders who identiﬁed themselves as belonging to no
political party or "neutral" is the highest of all the provinces. This, in part, is a
consequence of the former KwaNdebele homeland policy, which made traditional leaders
automatic members of their legislature thus making them targets of "comrades" when the
homeland system and apartheid structures collapsed. It seems many people then retreated
into a non-involvement mode. Many AN C members, however, view this, as a sinister
plan to recruit for UDM and DP under the cover of darkness or, as one ANC elected
councilor puts it "they are neutral by day and UDM members by night." This again raise
a question of whether a conventional notion of political afﬁliation, and non-afﬁliation in
this particular case, does capture the perceptions of contending political elites who
otherwise may have a different view of political identity. These questions raise an
important question for those who seek to understand political identity and its impact on

elite relations. A question that is not fully answered in this study is raised by these

265

perceptions: What then should be considered as political affiliation and identity? Is it
sufficient to merely record party membership? Does a high or low proﬁle involvement as
a party member matter to fellow members? When does one become a ‘ full' or bona ﬁde
member of a political party? The issues were raised by the elected councilors regarding
the political afﬁliation of chiefs in both Mnceba and Mpumalanga led the author into
thinking about and raising these questions. This helps one to think of various dimensions

of political identity in ﬁrture studies.

Statistical tests strongly conﬁrm the view that political afﬁliation is more of a factor, if
not the primary one, in KwaZulu-Natal than it is in other provinces especially in
communities with conﬂicts. By contrasting the obtained results between provinces one

immediately observe this trend.245

 

245 KwaZulu-Natal: Chi-Square value =18.221; Signiﬁcance level = .001; Crame's V =.466.
Eastern Cape: Chi-square value =5248; Signiﬁcance =.73 1; Cramer's V =.207.
Mpumalanga: Chi-square value =8.433; Signiﬁcance =.208; Cramer's V =.325.

266

 

Figure 8.9. Political Affiliation in Mpumalanga Province

 
       
         
         
         
  

100%

   
 

  

Tradtiond
Leaders

40%
0%
5%
15%
40%

Elected
Councilors

1 00%
0%
0%
0%
0%

   

Civic Leaders

55%
0%
0%
9%

   

 

 

 

To sum up some of the dominant provincial trends observed in the above charts and
discussions, it can be said that AN C has strong presence in all the three provinces but this
is ﬁercely contested by the AN C in KwaZulu-Natal where chiefs and iinduna are
predominantly IFP supporters. Only in the case of Rode in the Eastern Cape do we see a
similar situation where AN C's dominance is strongly contested by the UDM-dominated
traditional authority. In Mpumalanga, all the chiefs declared themselves politically
neutral even though the AN C members viewed this with suspicion. In all, KwaZulu-
Natal presence the clearest case of elite relations or conﬂict that is, even according to the
respondents, shaped by party affiliation. Statistical test emphatically conﬁrm this fact

especially when comparing KwaZulu-Natal with the other two provinces.

The other case, though not as clear-cut as the ones in KwaZulu-Natal, is Rode where the

267

political duel is largely between the AN C elected leader and civic leaders and the UDM-
dominated traditional authority. In the other cases the notion of political afﬁliation and
elite relations is more subtle and complex as one has to draw on other dimensions and
perceptions of political identity such as the proﬁle of traditional leaders and the
perception of others regarding their membership, in the case of Mnceba chief, or
neutrality, in the case of Tweefontein and Vezokuhle, or fairness in dealing with political

parties in the case of Nzongisa.

8.4. Ethnicity and the politics of exclusion/inclusion in the provinces and
communities

The accounts from the participant elite interviewees and literature on these communities I
classiﬁed these cases according to their ethnic compositions. In this case I am referring to
the ethnic composition of the general population or residents of selected communities.
This classiﬁcation ranges from those communities that are homogenous to those who are
medium range and in the other extreme there is a category of ethnically heterogeneous
communities. Homogenous refers to those communities whose members are almost all
drawn from the same etlmic group with only a negligible number of people from other
ethnic groups, and most of these "outsiders" have been absorbed through marriage or
were born in those communities, therefore naturalized and ﬂuently speak the local
language. In the medium range category, there are a tiny but signiﬁcant number of
members of the other ethnic groups who have come to settle in the community. This

minority of the "outsiders" is often big enough to constitute a kinship group such as a

268

clan within the dominant ethnic group. In heterogeneous communities there are
various members of other ethnic groups who are large enough to form a signiﬁcant
part of the community and they have largely maintained their language and customs.
Table 8.1. reﬂect the classiﬁcation of these communities, and this is done to present
an immediate context for discussion of ethnic trends among the provincial elite

SCCIOI’S.

Table 8.1. Range of ethnic composition of the selected communities

 

 

 

 

Largely Considerable Largely
Homogenous Ethnic Minorities Heterogeneous
in the communities
Conﬂictual Mfume Adams Tweefontein
communities Embo Vezokuhle
Mnceba
Rode
Accommodative Sokhulumi Nzongisa

communities

 

I observed that both of the communities that are classiﬁed as homogeneous were
geographically isolated from other neighboring communities and far removed from
the urban and or industrial areas. On the other hand, the communities classiﬁed as
medium range with a tiny but signiﬁcant minority of members of other ethnic groups
were either close to the major industrial centers, townships and cities (Adams and
Embo) or were bordering villages which had another dominant ethnic group. In the
case of Rode, villages with Bacas, Xesibe, and Pondos as well as scatterings of Sotho
' settlements surround the Hlubi peOple. Nzongisa and Mnceba is a neighbor of
communities with Pondo and the Hlubi people. In the case of Adams and Embo, they

are south of Durban

269

 

and near a string of industries thus attracting migrant workers as well as the squatter
camps with a signiﬁcant number of Pondos who had come to seek jobs. Lastly,
Tweefontein and Vezokuhle are very close to KwaMhlanga town, the former capital of
KwaNdebele homeland. These two communities are largely made of the Ndebele people
who were resettled from the white farms in the early and mid 19805. When they came to
settle in their respective areas there were already established Tswana people and people
from the neighboring Pretoria townships and Witbank were also drawn to this place thus

accounting for its ethnic diversity.

The above table gives an indication of a potential pool of recruitment into the elite or
local leadership positions in these communities. Whether this potential is realized by
having leadership that reﬂects etlmic composition of each community is yet another thing
as the following discussion and previous ﬁgures of ethnic composition in chapter seven
reﬂect. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal virtually all the members of the local elite are Zulu
thus suggesting ethnic homogeneity at leadership level. If ethnicity was a decisive factor
in elite relations one would expect no conﬂict between the various sectors of the local
elite in KwaZulu-Natal but this is not the case. With only a few exceptions, we also see a
strong ethnic homogeneity in the Eastern Cape and this is the case across all the sectors
of the local elite. In the case of elected leaders of Rode and Nzongisa, the representatives
are registered as members of the other etlmic group, and in both cases there are linked to
the community through conjugal ties or marriage. It should be noted that respondents in

all provinces indicated that people who join a community as married wives are not

270

regarded as belonging to the ethnic group they originated from. The act of marriage,
according to the local customs, naturalized these individuals thus obviating their original
ethnic affiliation. It is in the case of elected councilors of Tweefontein and Vezokuhle
that we see a considerable degree of etlmic diversity. Out of seven elected councilors
only three are from the dominant ethnic group. Overall it can be said that ethnicity is not
a big factor in elite relations and this is consistent with the ﬁndings of the previous
chapter. Table 8.1 . does not show any particular trend that suggests association between
communities with conﬂictual relations or those with accommodative relation with ethnic
composition of the communities and this holds true in the composition of the elite.
Statistical results indicate that there is a greater etlmic diversity between the elite sectors
in the case Mpumalanga communities than in other communities but even in this case

results show that this is not highly signiﬁcant and that this association is weak246.

8.4. Distribution of resources in the provinces and communities.

In all the three provinces the charts show that traditional leaders are relatively poor as
they are concentrated in the category of low and no income. This is particularly the case
in the Eastern Cape than in the other provinces. This may also be an indication of the fact
that there are greater differences among the elite sectors of the Eastern Cape in terms of
employment which is closely linked to income. Statistical tests indicate that these

differences are signiﬁcant in the Eastem Cape247 whereas they are not in other cases.

 

246 Eastern Cape: Chi-square value =3.252; Signiﬁcance =.517; Cramer’s V =. 163.

Mpumalanga: Chi-square value = 10.619; Signiﬁcance =.03l ; Cramer's V =.364. KwaZulu-Natal is highly
homogenous to show any meaningful variation statistically.

247 Eastern Cape & employment: Chi-square value = 13.745; Signiﬁcance =.OO8', Cramer's V =.336.

271

Across the provinces the elected councilors stand out prominently when employment is
measured. The position of traditional leaders improves signiﬁcantly once one brings in
property ownership, more especially farming land and plots for their homesteads as well
as livestock This seems to balance out the disparity in income distribution. In the ﬁnal
analysis there is no distinct trend to suggest sharp disparities of resources between the
contending sections of the local elite as would be expected if their conﬂict was a class

warfare.

In Mpumalanga province the number of the elite that owns livestock, farming land is very
low compared to those in both KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape and this is due to the
fact that the residents of Tweefontein and Vezokuhle are in a village that has a township
setting with no grazing nor farming land. Only Sokhulumi residents are spared as they are
in an isolated rural setting with plenty of land. Generally, there are no clear trends that
separate those in conﬂictual relations from those in non-conﬂict relations even when

provincial trends are taken into account.

8.5. Policy preference proﬁles in the provinces and communities

It will be recalled that opinions or attitudes toward traditional land tenure, traditional
values and customs, payment of services in the rural areas as well as views on the New
Municipal Demarcation Law were assessed in the survey. The previous chapter did not
show any important associations that indicated differences between communities that had

conﬂict and those that do not have conﬂict when opinion on traditional land tenure,

 

272

traditional values and customs, corruption in the traditional authority and penalties
imposed by traditional courts. Instead, what is clear is that elite sectors such as traditional
leaders seem to share views on many of these policies and institutions, and this was
irrespective of whether the community was having conﬂict or not. Support for traditional
values/customs and traditional land tenure is strong across elite sectors and predictably

even stronger among the traditional leaders.

Support for traditional land tenure system was stronger even in conﬂict communities, and
this was surprisingly the case even in Mnceba where the struggle was largely over land
use and allocation. It is in the case of elected leaders of Mpumalanga conﬂict
communities that we see a strong opposition to traditional land tenure, and this is back by
councilors own deﬁance of chiefs in allocating land and assigning plots for projects and
businesses. The strongest support for both the traditional land tenure and traditional
values came from KwaZulu-Natal. The conditional support or opposition to traditional
values in Mpumalanga conﬂict communities was the strongest from those who come
from other etlmic groups than the dominant Ndebele group suggesting that they are not
comfortable complying to traditions of other ethnic communities. But when this was
taken up with these local leaders they stated that this would in no way contribute to
conﬂict or tension. It is worth noting that Mpumalanga's elected leaders were the most
enthusiastic about the introduction of payment of services in their communities. They
said that preparations were at an advance stage to introduce such payment in the local

communities of the province.

273

With regard to opposition to the New Municipal Demarcation, in KwaZulu-Natal this
was strictly along party lines. IFP members, surely reﬂecting IFP's general stance on this
issue, were vehemently opposed to this new law, and this was the case for traditional
leaders as was with elected and civic leaders. AN C members are generally supportive of
this policy and this perhaps reﬂects the fact that it is national ANC government policy.
The strong opposition and campaign against this law in Sokhulumi (traditional leaders
and civic leaders), was mainly motivated by their hope to be integrated to Gauteng
municipalities or wards with the ultimate hope of being part of the province. As it was
the case in chapter seven, there are no clear trends, perhaps with the exception of
Mpumalnga, to suggest differences between the contending sectors of the elite with
regards to these policies. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal, all indications are that this is due
to differences in political identity and affiliation, which seem to emerge as the strongest

explanation for conﬂict in the communities.

8.6. Geopolitical factors and elite relations

It was during the course of the ﬁeld study that I observed the importance of geopolitical
dynamics even though these were only conﬁned to only two communities in the Eastern
Cape, namely, Rode and Mnceba. I have already alluded to some of these dynamics in
proﬁle of selected communities in chapter six. Statistical results in the previous chapter
showed that there is no statistieally signiﬁcant association between the type of elite

relations and opinions on the existence of geopolitical factors. I still felt that it is

274

important to explore this factor in this section as it has a potential to enrich our
understanding of the geopolitical context in some of the communities, particularly in the
Eastern Cape where this emerged as noticeable factor. Evidence here may appear to have
an anecdotal ﬂavor but this is useful for exploring geopolitical factors even if they are

conﬁned in only a few cases.

In the case of Rode the cleavages between the sectors of the elite had an important
geopolitical dimension. Those who live in Sikolweni village of the Rode Administrative
Area are well provided with many resources whereas Voveni, Magontsini, Mzinto and
Ndakeni villages were not well catered for. The chief is based in the Sikolweni area, so
are the key facilities such as the Methodist Church, Preschool, primary school, junior
secondary school and the high school. Tribal Authority Hall is in this area. Water,
electricity and road maintenance often started in the Sikolweni area and this is strongly
resented by the other villages, which compare unfavorably in all these services. Divisions
within the AN C and SAN CO members were also along these lines of other villages
against those in the Sikolweni area. It is important to note that the strongest support for
the chief came ﬁom Sikolweni whereas his chief rival has his base in the Magontsini area
where he is a resident The importance of geopolitical factors cannot be overstated but it
is an aspect of this community which even the elite is aware of. Even more important is
the fact that member of the same organization, the AN C in this instance, would be
divided along these geographical lines. Perhaps these geographic tendencies are

symptomatic of unfair distribution of resources, which provide the elite with a rallying

275

point in their struggle for control of resources.

To a lesser degree Mnceba is also experiencing some inﬂuence of geopolitical
tendencies. The chief and a majority of her councilors are based in the Greater Mnceba
area whereas Sugarbush is the hotbed of resistance against her rule and an AN C/ SANCO
stronghold. Some of the traditional leaders, including the chief, did mention the fact that
Sugarbush was hostile to their rule and a difﬁcult place to deal with. They attributed this
to the fact that most of Sugarbush people, particularly the youth, though they were more
educated than the rest of Mnceba, and therefore looked down upon anything traditional.
The key civic leaders and chief rivals of the chief stated that Sugarbush was more
enlightened and progressive. They protested that all the good projects that they brought to
their area were ﬁ'ustrated by the chief hence their decision to bypass traditional leaders.
In this instance it is the reverse of the Rode situation with Sugarbush, a base of anti-chief
resistance, being more developed with better services than the rest of the Mnceba
community including the area where the chief stays. All other areas did not have any
signiﬁcant geopolitical factors. Even though only geopolitical divisions aﬁlicted two of

the conﬂict cases, this is an area worth pursuing in the future research.

8.7. Summary
Results in this chapter largely conﬁrm those of chapter seven in which age, education and
political afﬁliation emerged as variables that are generally associated with conﬂictual and

accommodative relations. Regional dimensions, however, indicated where these factors

276

were more important as it is the case with political aﬁiliation that is a stronger factors in
elite relations than in the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga. Geopolitical factors, that were
not statistically linked to elite relations in the previous chapter, emerged as strong
candidates as well in the case of the conﬂict communities of the Eastern Cape but this did
not extend to other provinces. Political afﬁliation and identity is the strongest possible
explanation for the conﬂict in KwaZulu-Natal whereas in the case of Rode it looks as
though old conﬂicts and cleavages have embraced or assumed political character with
one faction aligning with UDM and the other embracing the AN C. In the other
remaining communities, the issue was more on the type of political engagement (low-
proﬁle membership of Mnceba chief or high-proﬁle membership of Nzongisa chief) and
form of political disengagement (non-party membership or neutrality of Tweefontein and
Vezokuhle chiefs). These forms of engagement or disengagement were questioned or
viewed with suspicion in the case where they were not serving the interest of the
dominant party, AN C in this case. This chapter has shown some regional variations of
the variables that are associated with type of elite relations. It was also shown that
variables that are not associated with the type of elite relation when all cases are taken

together appear to be stronger in some provinces or communities than in others.

277

CHAPTER NINE

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

What are the major ﬁndings of this study? How can these be interpreted in the light of the
research questions and hypotheses? What are the implications of these ﬁndings for the
existing literature on rural politics in Africa? What are the policy implications of this
study? What are its contributions and limitations? What conclusions can be drawn from
this study? As suggested in the above questions, the task of this chapter is to discuss the
ﬁndings, draw conclusions and summarize the major aspects of this study. To
accommodate issues raised in this study and to provide answers to questions asked above,
this chapter is divided into the following sections: The ﬁrst section outlines the
institutions, agents and relations that have emerged in the post-apartheid South Africa’s
rural political landscape. The next section interprets major ﬁndings on factors associated
with conﬂictual and cooperative or accommodative form of rural elite relations. This
section is arranged in terms of major variables that were evaluated and these include
ethnicity, distribution of resources, age, education, political afﬁliation and identity, policy
preferences, attitudes toward traditional authority and elected councils and geopolitical
factors. In addition to these variables a brief reﬂection on leadership style and attributes

is made. An outline of the broad implications of this study with regards to the existing

278

literature that was reviewed and public policy is given as a way of concluding this

chapter.

It should be recalled that the ﬁndings emerging ﬁ'om data analysis indicated that age,
education, party afﬁliation, income, and employment status are demographic variables
that have inﬂuence on and are associated with type of rural elite relations. Opinions
toward payment of service fees, Municipal Demarcation Act and perception of
respondents’ inﬂuence on elected councils are opinion variables that are related to the
type of elite relationship. On the other hand, weak or no clear link was established when
evaluating ethnicity, distribution of property (farming land, residential plot, business and
livestock), views on traditional values, on land tenure, penalties imposed by traditional
courts, and respondents’ perception of their inﬂuence on traditional authority. When
considering regional or a provincial dimension, it was established that geopolitical factors
played a role in conﬂict in the Eastem Cape where there were perceived and real
disparities in the distribution of resources in conﬂict areas. This, however, was not the
case in other provinces. Political affiliation also proved to be the single most important
cause of conﬂict in KwaZulu-Natal. Given these outcomes and trends, I will identify and

reﬂect on emerging themes that stand out in this study.

279

9.1. Background and context

This study has shown how South Aﬁican popular resistance against apartheid in the
19805 and early 19905 produced civic and local political leaders in rural communities.
These local leaders, in their bid to establish their political support base, found themselves,
in many instances, contesting the political monopoly of traditional leaders in the rural
communities. Scanty but signiﬁcant literature documented and analyzed traditional
leaders’ reaction to these political changes and challenges.” In these responses to
changes traditional leaders are depicted as resourceful and resilient as they appropriated
liberation discourse or invoked traditions or ethnic identities whenever they deemed this

to be a useful political tool.

The end of apartheid and the creation of a new democratic system was occasioned by,
among other things, the introduction of elected local representatives even in the areas that
were under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities. This created another agent of local
power alongside traditional leaders and civicleaders. The new South African constitution
recognizes this coexistence of traditional authority and elected rural local councils as two
primary institutions of rural local government It is in this political landscape that
dominant relations among the sectors of the local elite are examined. In table 6.4. Adams,
Mfume, Embo, Tweefontein, Vezokuhle and Mnceba are classiﬁed as having conﬂictual
relations between the chief protagonists or most dominant and active sectors of the local

elite. It is worth noting that in all these instances of conﬂict or cooperation, chiefs are

 

”Kessel & Oomen, op cit, 1997; Maloka, T., op cit, 1996; and Houston, (3. et al, op cit, 1996.

280

always a common factor whereas their opponents vary from civic leaders in some
communities to elected councilors in the others. Nzongisa and Sokhulumi are classiﬁed
as having accommodative relations. These classiﬁcations are based on the list of
instances of relationship as summarized in table 6.3. which is entitled
Conﬂict/Accommodation relationship typology. Table 6.5. list issues over which there is
a dispute in the conﬂictual cases. These include land allocation powers and procedures,
right to hold political meetings, control over development projects, and perceived

corruption of traditional authorities as well as the perceived partisan bias of a chief.

9.2. Ethnicity and rural elite relations
The result presented in the previous chapter begs the question; why ethnicity is not an
important factor in local elite relations? The general assumption that ethnicity is often a
factor in any political consideration in Africa is rampant among scholars, and the
following statements reveal this sweeping tendency as Horowitz was giving a prognosis
of the role of ethnicity in a new democratic South Aﬁica;

“Politics all over Aﬁica . . . has a strong ethnic component . . . what is true

of Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Zambia, Kenya, and Mauritania is also likely to be

true of South Africa” 2‘9

“Eliminate white domination, and the intra African differences will be
particularly important.”250

 

”Horowitz, 0., op cit, 1991, p. 41
””lbid, p.85.

281

It will be recalled that Mijere251 had also argued that a tribe is built around a chief who
then becomes their symbol of ethnic identity. Scholars like Mare, Mamdani put ethnicity
at the center of their studies of African politics. In view of these studies and the
statements above one would expect ethnicity to be a strong candidate in any attempt to
explain conﬂict. It is, however, argued here that the reason for this discrepancy between
these works and the result in this study is the fact that most of these studies focus on
national or regional level politics in which large ethnic communities live side by side
thus, sometimes, having potential for being mobilized into ethnic rivalry. The case of the
Hutus and the Tutsi, as extensively discussed in Marndarri’s book and articles is one such
example just as the etlmic mobilization by Inkatha Freedom Party in South Aﬁica is
presented by Marezsz. At a local village level in a given administrative area one would
expect a more ethnically homogenous unit with few people ﬁom other ethnic groups
settling in but remaining numerically insigniﬁcant. It is reasoned that this is the reason
why even local elites who happen to be of another ethnic identity would avoid using
ethnicity for mobilization precisely because he or she would be from a numerically
marginal group thus obviating any establishment of a viable etlmic challenge. Whereas
Robert Price253 go as far as to claim that intra-Aflican ethnicity is and will not be an
important factor in South Aﬁica because of its political past and etlmic composition. I

would not go that far to assert South African exceptionalism. But in this context I simply

 

a“See Osaghae, op cit, 1997.
252 Mare. 0p ciL (1987 & 1993)

2""‘Price, R “Civic versus ethnic: Ethnicity and political community in post-apartheid South
Africa” (year of the paper unknown)?

282

emphasize the level of analysis and the unit of analysis as the reason for this study’s
variance from the other studies of ethnicity in Aﬁica. This means that ethnicity may still
be an important political factor in Aﬁica and, to some degree, in South Aﬁica but this is
not the case at a village level as the results in this study reveal. In all, these results do not
necessarily disprove theories on the role of ethnicity in Aﬁican politics. What this study
does is to point out some instances where these theories, when applied in rural local
communities, do not seem to be an important factor in elite relations or, more
speciﬁcally, in elite conﬂicts and cooperation. These ﬁndings raise another important
question about ethnicity, etlmic composition and politicization of ethnicity. At one level
one can ask what would be the case if one targets villages or communities that have a
diverse etlmic composition or adjacent villages with different ethnic groups. Another
related question can be posed: When does ethnic identity turn into politicized identity or a
potential mobilizing tool for local political conﬂicts? This study also draws attention to
the other dimensions of ethnic identity as used by local elites for
exclusion(foreigner/outsider) and inclusion(a native! local person), and these are
residency (urban or rural, local or outside, full-time or a part-time resident), place of birth
as well as conjugal ties (naturalization through marriage). Pointing out these dimensions
is an important exercise emerging from respondents’ own views, and this is a

contribution worth considering when conceptualizing rural identities.

283

9.3. Distribution of resources

Earlier in this study it was hypothesized that if distribution of resources is connected to
elite relations we would expect conﬂict where one sector of the elite has more whereas its
counterpart has little or nothing. Results in this study reveal that there are Speciﬁc types
of resources that seem to have an inﬂuence or relationship to a type of relation. In other
words some resources seem to matter more and have more bearing on elite relationships
than others. More speciﬁcally in this instance, income and employment status turned out
to be associated with the dominant type of elite relations whereas distribution of farming
land, residential plots and livestock had no such linkage. This has many implications in
our understanding of the types of properties and their relative impact on elite relations.
This study highlights the importance of unbundling the modern indicators of wealth and
social status such as income, education and employment as distinct ﬁom the more
traditional forms of wealth such as farming land and livestock which, as indicated in
chapter seven, seem to be declining in their importance. This has a potential of being
used to indicate tension between modernity and tradition. This is not to be conﬁrsed or
conﬂated with being a member of a traditional institution such as traditional authority as
this does not preclude a chief from being modern in terms of values and wealth. On the
other hand, business ownership has no bearing on the type of elite relations even though
it is mainly a modern wealth symbol and status. The reason for this is most probably the
fact that only very few, sometimes one or two or three, persons have businesses such
shops or taxis in a given village thus making them an exception even within the ranks of

the local elite.

284

Bayart’5254 thesis that the struggle between the elite is simply a struggle for control of
more resources in a bid to establish hegemony rather than struggle for survival has some
partial relevance when considering land and livestock ownership as these properties are
widely available to the local elites as the results indicated. He discounts both ethnicity
and class as a primary factor thus elevating the role of a political agent in a form of an
elite. The struggle for the control of govemment-funded community development
projects is one indicator of a struggle for and conﬂict over access to local government
patronage. This line of reasoning is weakened by the results which indicate that income
and employment are important factors in elite conﬂicts. It may, therefore, be assumed
that struggle for control of government projects is one way of accessing money or
securing employment or even favors or kickbacks from the companies or agencies that

are invited to provide community services.

Another area of interest for future studies would be to examine the distribution of
resources within the various constituencies of the local elite. Could it be that some sectors
of the elite appeal to and galvanize the have-nots in order to conﬁont the haves? Ifthis is
the case, is it done out of commitment to redistribute resources or out of selﬁsh
considerations where the elite tries to establish a sphere of inﬂuence by all means or as a

way of accessing resources for themselves.

 

254 Bayart, F ., op cit, 1993.

285

9.4. Age and generational cleavage.

Analysis of results proved that age is one of the underlying factors in elite relations. This
conﬁrms studies on South African political conﬂicts that suggested that there is a
generational factor. In view of the discussion on the importance of modern wealth
symbols and status over the traditional forms as well as the impact of education, it can be
argued that age adds to these to suggest that these are attributes of a modern elite that is
emerging and making claims in a political environment that used to be dominated by the
more traditional elites. It should be emphasized that traditional leaders, as it has been

argued throughout, do transform into the modern elite.

9.5. Education and elite relations

In chapter two it was indicated that formal education is one of the important indicators of
modernization hence it is often used, together with other indicators of modernization, to
distinguish between the traditional and the modern elite. In this study, it is shown that
there is a relationship between education and elite relations. As stated earlier, education
alone cannot be taken as an indicator of conﬂict between traditional and modern elites
because for a person to be modem or traditional there is a whole range of indicators
which must be taken into account. There is, however, an emerging cluster of variables
such as income and employment combined with education which may suggest that these

are indications of modern symbols of economic and social status. This line of reasoning

286

can be stretched even further to include party political afﬁliation as yet another type of

modern political institutions that deﬁne one’s identity in a modern state system.

9.6. Party afﬁliation and identity
The survey results, and more importantly the respondents’ own interpretation, have
shown a strong connection between political affiliation and the type of elite relations. In
terms of conﬂict generated by membership of different political organizations KwaZulu-
Natal is an outstanding example and this is conﬁrmed by the participants as well as
literature on KwaZulu-Natal political conﬂicts. The role of IFP-supporting chiefs is
central in understanding the political conﬂicts with the ANC local leaders or ANC
elected councilors. The following statements reinforce this view.

“Chiefs are indeed central to the conﬂict. Their power to grant or withhold

political space for parties and movements to mobilize is crucial to the

question of political tolerance. Unpopular, reactionary or oppressive chiefs

ﬁgure prominently in AN C accounts of KwaZulu-Natal’s civil war. In the

IFP’s version, an anti-chief revolution led by young militants and

orchestrated ﬁrst by UDF and since 1990 by the AN C itself, has been the

main offensive front in a war to eliminate substantial opposition to the

liberation movement in the province”255
All account, as shown in the literature reviewed and in discourse analysis of chapters two

and four, strongly support the notion that conﬂict in this province can be understood in

terms of the political conﬂict between the IFP and the AN C members. Kentridge clearly

 

’55 l ' "The clash that had to come: African National Congress and the
problem of traditional authority. No.1 . March 1996. , p.12.

287

articulates this point as he reasons that “Poverty, unemployment and alimated youth are
not speciﬁc to Natal, whereas the political rivalry between Inkatha and UDF is.” ”6
Rode is yet another case where party alliances split UDM-supporting traditional

authorities from the ANC-aligned civic leaders.

Another indicator of political identity is not just alliance or membership of a given
political organization but the proﬁle of involvement or the perception of the local leaders
of dominant political organization. In the case of Mnceba, the chief is a member of the
AN C but her ANC-aligned adversaries claim that her membership of the ANC is
meaningless if she is not active or, even worse, is driven by opportunism with no real
commitment to the ANC. In the Mpumalanga province the problem seems to be the
interpretation of chief s declared political neutrality. In case of Tweefontein and
Vezokuhle the AN C councilors dismiss this claim of neutrality and say that they are
UDM or NNP by night and neutral by day. This cynical view may just be an indication
that their low proﬁle or failure to join the AN C are the reasons behind these charges or
simply that they have not articulated the reasons for their sudden neutrality when they
were actively part of the ruling party of KwaNdebele homeland. All these factors do

conﬁrm that political identity and afﬁliation does matter in shaping local elite relations.

 

”sKenthridge, M., op c't, 1993, p.217.

288

9.7. Leadership style and dominant relations.

Most of the scholars on leadership generally agree that this is a broad, elusive and
complex concept which does not easily lend itself to deﬁnitive analysis or studym. They
all agree that the role of leadership is the one that cannot be ignored for it has a profound
impact on the communities and organizations under these leaders. The literature reviewed
in this study as well as the evidence from the empirical study also suggests that leaders
play a critical role particularly in shaping relations between different sectors. It, however,
should be recalled that this study did not directly measure the various dimensions of
leadership styles but what it settled for was an analysis of individual instances which
suggested the role of leaders’ intervention. It is because of this limitation that the results
section of this study often used anecdotes to demonstrate the direct, and sometimes
indirect, role of the leaders in shaping relations between the sectors of the elite. The
proﬁle of leaders, speciﬁcally chiefs in this case, proved to be an important variable in all
the nine cases even though with different outcomes. For an example, Rode, Adams and
Nzongisa chiefs play important political roles well beyond their administrative areas and
yet only the latter has managed to keep cooperative relations with the leaders of local
community and political organizations. The previous chapter indicated that Rode and
Adams chiefs play an important party political by mobilizing against the AN C whereas
Nzongisa chief is on the side of the dominant political organization, AN C, in her area.
Bu it was also shown that it is not just political divide that separates these cases but also

ﬂexibility or rigidity of chiefs in dealing with their political opponents or in allowing

 

257The following are some of the prominent examples; Bums, J Leadership 1978; Paige, G. 113
'!'ﬂlI[!!°ll l

d i 1977; Bass, 8. Leadership am aﬂrmance beyond
eggggtgtion 1985 and Bradley, R. Charisma and social structure 1987

289

other leaders to organize in their respective communities. Another interesting case is the
one of Sokhulumi where the leader often reminds his subjects of his political neutrality as
a unifying ﬁgure of his people. As such he has managed to eam respect and support from
the inﬂuential members of his community, who he has co-opted into several community
programs. These are anecdotal cases which show various ways in which leadership
intervention makes a difference in the local relations. A more comprehensive study which
singles out all important aspect of leadership may go beyond the tentative and provisional

ﬁndings which are presented in this study.

9.8. Policy preferences and attitudes toward local institutions

Results indicated that opinion toward payment of services, traditional land tenure, New
Municipal Demarcation Act, and perception of penalties imposed by traditional
authorities show that each sector of the elite tend to have shared views. Difference in
these opinions is more related to the interests of each sector than on conﬂict or
accommodation. This indicates that institutional boundaries, especially in the case of
traditional authority and elected councils, helps to deﬁne common interests of those who

are members of a given institution.

9.9. Conclusions on dominant trends.
What emerges from this study is that demographic characteristics such as age, education,
political afﬁliation, income and employment are underlying ﬁctors in rural elite relations.

Taken together and also in view of the foregoing discussions, these may also imply that

290

they are characteristic features modern elite that is emerging in a political landscape that
is dominated by a traditional institution of traditional rulership. Views on payment of
services fees, introduction of new municipal demarcation and inﬂuence on an elected
council also proved to be associated with elite relations. These opinion variables can also
be interpreted indication of divergent views between those supporting and beneﬁting
from traditional institutions (traditional authority, traditional/customary courts) and those

who stand to beneﬁt form the new institutions of government such as elected councils.

What then are the implications of this study? This study clearly demonstrated the
resilience of traditional leaders and their ability to adjust in different and successive
political environments. This is not only limited to South Africa, as this discussion has
shown, it is the case in Aﬁican countries and even beyond Africa It is, therefore
imperative to formulate some policies that accommodate elected local officials and the
traditional leaders. Since it appears that traditional leaders’ prevention of their opponent’s
access to and mobilization of the community, it is important for the government to design
and implement a code of conduct especially for the period of election campaigns. Corrupt
practices also call for a guideline to prevent local leaders from exploiting their followers

and subject.

Assessment of leadership styles suggests that there are aspects or attributes of leaders that

positive and negatively affect relations among the sectors of the elite. More studies will

have to be conducted focusing on this concept of leadership, but this study demonstrated

291

the various ways leaders affect the well-being and development of their communities.
With regard to the literature and theories on ethnicity, there need to be more studies and
theories or models focusing at local levels as the focus on a national trend may not be
supported by local dynamics. This study, as the discussion above shows, does not mean
that ethnicity is not a factor nor that it does not have a conﬂict potential in South Aﬁica.
In fact, literature reviewed in chapter two shows that this is the case in some of the
communities. What is necessary is ﬁrrther research that will deliberately look for those
communities and villages that have two or more dominant ethnic groups to see how

ethnicity affects their relations.

Signiﬁcance of this study can be summarized in the following manner.

a) This study puts rural politics that are often neglected back to the spotlight.

b) It highlights, in a comprehensive manner, the structure and political processes of
rural local government as it struggles to transform or grapple with challenges of
transformation in post-apartheid South Africa And this share some features with
post-independence transitions in Aﬁica.

c) This study avoided the mistake of many studies that have isolated either NGO’s
or chiefs in their study of rural local government and its political dynamics. This
study brings to the fore and analyzes all the major players who range ﬁ'om
traditional leaders to elected and civic leaders. By embracing all the sectors of the
local political elite one have all the pieces of the rural political puzzles that are

often missing or are glossed over in many studies.

292

d) Anyone who is interested in local administration and development in rural Aﬁica

can begin to appreciate political forces that can only be ignore at any policy
makers’ peril or that may determine success and failure of development projects.
This study makes one understand and appreciate the role of various political
stakeholders in villages. Ifone plans to implement projects in these areas they will
have to navigate through this political landscape fully aware of who has inﬂuence
and who has the power to frustrate or fhcilitate these projects.

People interested in conﬂict studies and conﬂict resolutions are given a list of
factors to consider when assessing the situation in rural areas that are under the
jurisdiction of chiefs.

Lastly and more important, South Aﬁican government and policy makers are still
grappling with the policy restructuring that will deﬁne the ﬁrture role of
traditional leaders within the new democratic dispensation. In other words,
policies on rural local government are still some work-in-progress thus making
the contribution of this work timely in the sense that it contributes to a continuing
discourse and policy debates at both provincial and national levels. In addition,
rural areas are at the bottom of the social and economic ladder, and their
development will be the ultimate measure of success for South Africa’s
reconstruction and development program. This cannot be done without
understanding those factors and agents that impact on the implementation of these
development policies in rural areas. This study makes a contribution in this

respect.

293

APPENDIX 1

South African Constitution, 1996
Chapter 12
TRADITIONAL LEADERS

Recognition

211 (1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary
law, are recognized, subject to the constitution.

(2) A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may function
subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which includes amendments to,
or repeal of, that legislation or customs.

(3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the
Constitution and any legislation that speciﬁcally deals with customary law.

Role of Traditional leaders

212 (1) National legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership as an
institution at local level on matters affecting local communities.

(2) To deal with matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional
leaders, customary law and the customs of communities observing a system of
customary law-

(a) National or provincial legislation may provide for the establishment of houses
of traditional leaders; and
(b) National legislation may establish a council of traditional leaders.

294

APPENDIX 2

South African Constitution, 1996
Chapter 7
LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Status of municipalities

151.(1) The sphere of government consists of municipalities, which must be established
for the whole of the territory of the Republic.

(2) The executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in Municipal

Council.

(3) A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government
affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as
provided for in the constitution.

(4) The national or a provincial government may not compromise or impede a
municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions.

Objects of local government

152. (l) The objects of local government are-

(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;
(b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;
(c) to promote social and economic development;
(d) to promote a safe and healthy environment; and
(e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organizations in
the matters of local government.

(2) A municipality must strive, within its ﬁnancial and administrative capacity, to
achieve the objects set out in subsection (1).

295

APPENDIX 3

 

2’.-
THE HOMELANDS

_ _—lnlernallonol boundary
.Fravlncnl boundary

0 5: MILES I,

ng Pretoria
7‘s?“ AM

_w BOTSWAN A

.Johamesbwg

  

30‘

;_

      
    
  

 

 

 

 

HOMELM
353' :7 Transkei mm anunhulu
- Clairol Xhosa Bophuthatswana
E KwaZulu Zulu arm. Become Ow Own
[:3 Lebowa Paar/N Ndebele - chzl
Vanda Venda s. Ndebele

 

PEOPLE
SWTsor-lw
Tswana
s. Sotho
Swazi
S Ndebele

 

 

Source: Butler, J., Rotberg, R. and Adams, J. The Black Homelands of South
Afrlca Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. p.1.

296

APPENDIX 4

 

 

mica N woS: >38: 3033mm

 

29.303 023

       

  

momma
0mg

 

5333 Omuo

  

moo o moo moo 3.03393
i

 

 

297

APPENDIX 5

“650 w" mac": 2.18: 32:63
<5? mmoooauon damn—Ego. 2.50128

 

S... ......e e 93 8: 5.93037.
“Ilium“

 

 

Pomona

m 3033mm <33 489203. 2:30:23

 

 

298

APPENDIX 6

39:0 A” $383... mzom .3 mmmnoS onto.
xEmNEFzmS. man Zucamﬁzmm

é/xiwxijw
7W:\A/1\xwﬁf%.®6mK/+Mém33mznm
A -..;
p w L ﬁrm u L.
A/ {Kl \W/MU
/\/M/\ \EMEBUCE

.kﬂ/V n >33
é}
F1W%\x\\ z

Nmo moo 583038 E ﬁ m

II. m

299

APPENDIX 7

 

Interviews

Date Name Province

5 May 2000 Chieftainess C.Ngunga Eastern Cape
5 May 2000 Mr C. Gxula Eastern Cape
6 May 2000 Mr. N. Magocoba Eastern Cape
6 May 2000 Mr. M. Magocoba Eastern Cape
8 May 2000 Mr. S. Myingwa Eastern Cape

9 May & 10 September 2000
9 May 2000

9 May 2000

9 May 2000

11 May 2000

13 May 2000

6 & 7 July 1995
15 May 2000
16 May 2000
16 May 2000
16 May 2000
17 May 2000
17 May 2000
17 May 2000
19 May 2000
19 May 2000
21 & 23 May 2000
21 May 2000
21 May 2000
22 May 2000
22 May 2000
22 & 23 May 2000
23 May 2000
23 May 2000
23 May 2000
23 May 2000
23 May 2000
25 May 2000
25 May 2000
25 May 2000
25 May 2000
25 May 2000
26 May 2000

Mr. M. quane
Ms N. Siswana
Mr. S. Boyce

Mr. M. Hokwana
Ms. N. Dandala
Mr. H.B. Mnukwa

Chief G.S.K. Nota
Acting Chief S. Mtsi
Mr. D. Kwebulana
Mr. M. Nota
Mr. C. Mbotshwa
Mr. G. Nomsuka
Mr. M. Gumenke
Mr. B. Mnukwa
Mrs N. Mazwi
Mrs O.Xinwa
Mr. S. Mnukwa
Mr. M. quli
Mr. K. Jojozi
Mr. S.Z. Mnukwa
Mr. M. Mnukwa
Mr. M. Mbizo
Mr M. Nota
Mr. E. Ngcwangu
Mr. M. Mfokazi
Ms. J. Njwambe
Mr M. Mxinwa
Mr M. Mzozo
Mr. M. Siyangaphi
Ms. 1. Xinwa
Mr. M. Ndzimeni
Ms K. Xinwa
Ms F. Xinwa

300

Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape

Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape

26 May 2000
26 May 2000
27 May 2000
29 May 2000
29 May 2000
30 May 2000
30 May 2000
30 May 2000
30 May 2000
3 June 2000
3 June 2000
3 June 2000
4 June 2000
4 June 2000
4 June 2000
4 June 2000

7 & 8 June 2000

9 June 2000

9 June 2000

9 June 2000

9 June 2000

11 June 2000
13 June 2000
13 June 2000
13 June 2000
14 June 2000
14 June 2000
15 June 2000
15 June 2000
15 June 2000
17 June 2000
17 June 2000

9 August 2000
9 August 2000
11 August 2000
11 August 2000
11 August 2000
12 August 2000
12 August 2000
12 August 2000
14 August 2000
17 August 2000
18 August 2000

Mr. Z. Makaula
Mr. L. Damane
Mr. M.S. quli
Ms M. Balasane
Mr. M. Gumenke
Ms. N. Damane
Ms. N. Mazwi
Mrs. M. quli
Mrs.N. Garane
Mr. M. Mtsi

Mr J. Radebe

Mrs. B. Mamadiba
Mrs. N. Mdutyana
Mr. L.Sogoni

Ms Y. Sogoni

Ms. N. Mvovo

Chieftainess N. Fikeni
Chief. X.Mgeyi
Mr.M. Canca

Mr. M. Bangani
Mr N. Bodlela

Mr. M. Mbangi
Mr. A.D. Fikeni
Mrs. M. Ntshobane
Mr. B. Jojo

Mr. M. Jojo

M. S. Jojo

Mr. K. Dlava

Mr. S. Lusawana
Mr. M. Dindo

Mrs N. Canca
Mrs. N. Mgugudo
Chief F. Makanya
Mr. T. Mthembu
Mr. T. Mngoma
Mr. M. Mngoma
Mr. S.B. Makanya
Mr. AB. Makanya
Mr. J. Mngoma
Mr. J. Makatini
Mr. V. Hlongwa
Mr. B. Makanya
Mrs. Z. Makanya

301

Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape

Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
Eastern Cape
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu—Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal

18 August 2000

20 August 2000
20 August 2000
21 August 2000
21 August 2000
21 August 2000
22 August 2000
22 August 2000
22 August 2000
23 August 2000
23 August 2000
23 August 2000
23 August 2000
23 August 2000
23 August 2000
23 August 2000

25 August 2000
26 August 2000
26 August 2000
26 August 2000
26 August 2000
28 August 2000
29 August 2000
29 August 2000
30 August 2000
30 August 2000
30 August 2000

2 September 2000
2 September 2000
2 September 2000
3 September 2000
3 September 2000
3 September 2000
5 September 2000
5 September 2000
5 September 2000
5 September 2000
5 September 2000
6 September 2000
6 September 2000
8 September 2000

Ms. N. Cele

Chief Hlengwa
Mr. M. Mzobe

Mr. B. Shabane
Mr. J. Ngidi

Mr K. Shezi

Mr. B.M. Hlengwa
Mr. T. Mfeka

Ms. Z. Mali

Ms. Barbara

Mr. N. Mthembu
Mrs. N. Maphumulo
Mr. T. Mzobe

Mr. M.Myeza

Mr. K. Mkhize
Mrs. M. Mzimela

Chief J .J . Mahlangu
Mr. M. Mahlangu
Mr. J. Mahlangu
Mr. P. Mngoma
Mr. S.J. Mahlangu
Mr. W.S. Skosana
Mr SK. Mhlangu
Ms. A. Babedi
Moses Mabena

Mr. J .M. Mahlangu
Mr. M.N. Mahlangu

Chief A.J. Mabena
Mr. J .S. Mashiyana
Mr. S. Mabena

Mr. D. Mahlangu
Ms. A. Moukua
Mr. S. Mnguni

Ms G. Seerene

Ms. S. Mbovu

Mr. S. Mmolotsi
Mr. S. Nkosi

Mr. Chicco Shabalala
Mr. L. Skosana
Mr. M.M. Mabena
Mr. G. Mabuza

302

KwaZulu-Natal

KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu—Natal
KwaZulu—Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal

Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga

Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga

8 September 2000

1 1 September 2000
11 September 2000
1 1 September 2000
11 September 2000
1 1 September 2000
12 September 2000
14 September 2000
14 September 2000
15 September 2000
18 September 2000
18 September 2000
19 September 2000

23 September 2000
23 September 2000
25 September 2000
25 September 2000

25 September 2000
26 September 2000
27 September 2000
27 September 2000

28 September 2000
28 September 2000
28 September 2000
28 September 2000

Mr. A. Mokoena

Chief Mabena
Mr. T. Mabena
Mr. A. Mahlangu
Mr. J. Skosana
Mr. S. Mguni

Mr. P. Makatu
Mr. S. Manamello
Mr. K. Mabena
Ms. N. Mabena
Mr. E. Mabena
Mr. V. Mahlangu
Ms. L. Mavimbela

Mr. M. Luthuli
Mr. J. Msomi
Mr. G. Zelemu
Mr. M.N. Ndlovu
Mr. J. Ngidi
Mr. T. Makatini
Mr. M. Conco
Ms. G. Mtetwa
Ms Mthembu
Ms. B.Khomo
Ms N. Luthuli
Mr. V. Ndlovu

Interviews with government ofﬁcials
Mr T. Gxarhisa, Assistant Magistrate at Mt Ayliff

Mr. N. Mzamo, Director of Traditional Affairs Eastern Cape
Chief N. Matanzima, Chairperson of Eastern Cape House of
Traditional Leaders

3 May 2000
4 May 2000
4 May 2000
4 May 2000
3 September 2000

5 September 2000

Prince Mavuso, Secretary of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional

Leaders

Mpumalanga

Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga
Mpumalanga

KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal
KwaZulu-Natal

King Mayitjha III, King of the Ndebele of Ndzundza in

Mpumalanga

Mr. E.V. Mahlangu, Deputy Director of Regional office of

Traditional Affairs in Mpumalanga.

303

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Articles

Aborisade,0(ed) Local government and the traditional rulers in Nigeria Ile-Ife:
University of Ife Press Ltd, 1985.

 

Adriaan, E., van Nieuwaal, B., and van Dijk, R. African chieftaincy in a new socio-
political landscape Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1999.

 

 

Alexander, J. “The local state in post-war Mozambique: Political practice and ideas about
authority.” Africa Vol.67., No.1., 1997.

Almond, G. and Verba, S. Civic Culture: Political attitudes and democracy in ﬁve
nations
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

 

 

Apter, D. The Politics of Modernization Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Apter. D. and Rosberg, C. (eds) Political development and the new realism in Sub—
Saharan Africa Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994.

Atkinson, D. and Reitzes, M. (Eds) From a tier to a sphere— local government in the new
South African constitutional order Sandton: Heinemann, 1998.

 

Attir, M; Holzner, B and Suda, Z. (Eds) Directions of change: Modernization theory,
research, and realities Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

 

Baber, R. and Nieuwoudt, W. “The principles of justice and rural land reform in South
Africa.” The South African Journal of Economics Vol.60., No.2. 1992.

 

Baekey,C and Gabriel, A. “Politics of exclusion in the ‘new’ South Africa” discussion
document, Community Law Center, University of Natal, September 11, 1993.

Baker, J. and Pederson, P. (Eds) The rural-urban interface in Africa: Expansion and
adaptation Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1992.

Barker, J. Local politics and national development: The case of rural district in Saloum
gion of Senegal Berkeley: University of California, Ph.D dissertation, 1967.

 

304

Barnes, J. and Morris, M. “KwaZulu-Natal’s rural institutional environment: Its impact
on local service delivery.” Development Southern Africa Vol.14,, No.2., April 1997.

Bass, B. Leadership and performance beyond expectations New York: The Free Press,
1985.

 

Bates, R., Mudimbe, V., and O’Barr.(eds) Africa and the Disciplines: The contributions

of research in Africa to the social sciences and humanities Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1993.

Bayart, J. The state in Africa: The politics of the belly London: Longman, 1993.
Beinart,W and Bundy, C. Hidden struggles in rural South Africa: politics and popular
movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape 1890-1930 London: James Currey, 1987.

Beinart, W. The political economy of Pondoland Johannesburg: Ravan Pressl982

Beinart, W. “Political and collective violence in Southern African historiography.”
Journal of Southern African Studies Vol. 18, No. 3, September 1992.

 

Bekker, S.(ed) Citizen participation in local government Pretoria: J .L. van Schaik, 1996.

 

Bierschenk, T. and de Sardan, J. “Local Powers and a distant state in rural Central
African Republic”. In Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 35, No.3, 1997.

Bhaduri, A and Rahman, M (eds) Studies in rural participation New Delhi: Oxford &
IBH Publishing Co., 1982.

 

Boone, C. “State building in the African countryside: Structure and politics at the
grassroots.” The Journal of Development Studies Vol.34., No.4., 1998.

Bowen, P. A longing for land: Tradition and change in a Swazi agricultural community
Aldershot: Avebury, 1993.

 

Braathen, E; Boas, M and Saether, G (eds) Ethnicity Kills? The politics of war, peace and
ethnicity in SubSaharan Africa London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000.

 

Bratton, M. Beyond community development: The political economy of rural economy of

rural administration in Zimbabwe London: Catholic Institute for lntemational Relations,
1 978

Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N. Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions
in comparative perspective Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

305

 

Bundy, C. “Street sociology and pavement politics: Aspects of youth and student
resistance in Cape Town, 1985.” Journal of Southern African Studies Vol. 13, No. 3,
April 1987.

 

Burns, J. M. Leadership New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978.

Butler, J ., Rotberg, R. and Adams, J. The black homelands of South Africa: The political
and economic development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1982.

Butler, M. “Participative democracy and rural local government in KwaZulu-Natal.”
Indicator South Africa Vol.15., No.3.

 

Camaroff, J. “ chiefship in a South African Homeland: A case of the Tshidi Chiefdom of
Bophuthatswana” in Journal of Southern African Studies May-June 1970.

 

Cantori, L. (Ed) Comparative political systems Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1974.

 

Charney, C. Vigilantes, clientelism and the South African state University of the
Witwatersrand: African Studies Institute seminar paper No.302, 30th September 1991

Chazan, N., Lewis, P., Mortimer, R., Rothchild, D and Stedman, S.J. Politics and society
in contemporary Africa, 3rd ed Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

 

Cheater, A. (Ed) The anthropology of power: Empowerment and disempowerment in
changing structures London: Routledge, 1999.

 

Cloete, F. Local government transformation in South Africa Pretoria: J .L. van Schaik
Publishers, 1995.

Coplan, D. and Quinlam, T. “A chief by the people: Nation versus state in Lesotho.”
Africa Vol.67., No.1. 1997.

Costa, A. “The Myth of customary law.” South African Journal of Human Rights Vol.14,
1998.

Cousins, B. “Debating communal land in Zimbabwe.” Journal of Contemporm African
Studies Vol.12., No.1., 1993.

Cowan, L. local government in West Africa new York: Columbia University Press, 1958.
Crehan, K. The fractured community: landscapes of power and gender in rural Zambia

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
306

Creswell, J. Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches London: Sage
Publications, 1994.

 

Crowder, M. and lmike, O. (Eds) West African chiefs: Their changing status under
colonial rule and indgpendence. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970.

 

Campbell, C. “Learning to kill? Masculinity, the family and violence in Natal.” Journal
of Southern African Studies Vol. 18, No. 3, September 1992.

 

Czada, R. and Windhoff-Heritier (eds) Political choice: Institutions, rules, and the limits
of rationality Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

 

Cuzzort, R. and Vrettos, J. The elementary forms of statistical reason New York: St
Martin’s Press, 1996.

 

Dahl, R. Who g0vems?: Democracy and power in an American city New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1961.

 

Datta, A. Conﬂict and Culture in Africa Gaborone: National Institute of Development
and Documentation, University of Botswana, 1996.

De Klerk, M. (Ed) A harvest of discontent: The land question in South Africa, Cape
Town: IDASA, 1991.

 

d’Engelbronner-Kolff, F ., Hinz, M. and Sindano, J .(eds) Traditional authorityand
democracy in Southern Africa Windhoek: New Namibia Books, 1998.

 

Department of Constitutional Development (South Africa), Status Quo Report on
Traditional leadership and Institutions Pretoria: August 1999.

De Wet, C. and Bekker, S. (Eds) Rural Development in South Africa: A case-study of the
Amatola Basin in the Ciskei Pieterrnaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1985.

 

De Wet, C. “The dynamics of political factionalism in a rural Ciskei village from 1880 to
1950.” African Studies Vol.46, No.1., 1987.

 

De Wet, C. “Land tenure, economic differentiation and social interaction in a Ciskei
settlement”. In Journal of Modern African Studies Vol.13, No.1., 1995.

Donalson, A, Segar, J ., and Southall, R. (Eds) “Undoing Independence: Regionalism and
reincorporation of Transkei to South Africa.” in Journal of Contemporary African Studies
Vol 11, No.2. (1992).

 

 

307

Dommen, E. “Paradigms of governance and exclusion.” The Journal of Modern African
Studies Vol.35., No.3., 1997.

 

Doom, R. and Gorus, J. (Eds) Politics of identity and economics of conﬂict in the Great
Lakes Region Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000.

 

Douwes-Dekker, L., Majola, A., Visser,P. & Bremner, D. Community Conﬂict: The
challenge facing South Africa Cape Town: Juta & Co. Ltd, 1995.

 

 

Dreyer, L. The Modern South African elite of South Africa New York: St. Martin Press,
1989.

 

Earle. T. (ed) Chiefdoms, power, and ideology New York: Cambridge University Press,
1991.

 

Edgecombe, D., Laband, J and Thompson, P. (Eds) Roots of conﬂict in Natal: A selection

of papers on violence in the colony and province Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal,
1994.

 

El-Karanshawy, S. “Class, Family, and Power in an Egyptian village”. In Cairo Papers in
Social Science Vol. 20, Monograph 1, Spring 1997.

 

 

Etherington, N. (Ed) Peace, politics and violence in the new South Africa London: Hans
Zell Publishers, 1992.

Everatt, D. and Sisulu, E. (Eds) Black youth in crisis: Facing the future Braamfontein:
Ravan Press, 1992.

 

Gengenbach, H. “I’ll bury you in the border!: women’s land struggles in the post-war
facazisse (Magude District), Mozambique.” Journal of Southern African Studies Vol.24.,
No.1., March 1998.

Gillet, S. “The survival of chieftaincy in Botswana.” African Affairs Vol.42., No.287

 

Glaser, D. “South Africa and the limits of civil society.” Journal of Southern African
Studies Vol.23., No.1. March 1997.

Glen, N. Cohort Analysis Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977.

 

308

Gould, J. Localizing modernity: Action, interests and association in rural Zambia
Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1997.

 

Graaf, J. (ed) Bophuthatswana Rural Development Papers Pretoria: Africa Institute of
South Africa, Seminar 16-18, February 1982.

 

Graham, P.(ed) Governing at local level: A resource for communitLleaders Cape Town:
IDASA, 1995.

Gray, L. and Kevane, M. “Women and land tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa.” in African
Studies Review Vol. 42, No. 2, 1999.

 

Gusﬁeld, J. (ed) “Tradition and Modernity: Conﬂict or congruence.” in The Journal of
Social Issues Vol. xxiv, No. 4., 1968.

 

Gustafsson, L., Redmond, A and Rambanasi, C Central authority blocks local autonomy:
An evaluation of Swedish support to local government development in Zimbabwe
Stockhom: Swedish lntemational Development Authority, 1990.

 

Gwala, N. “Political violence and the struggle for control in Pietermaritzburg.” Journal of
Southern African Studies Vol. 15, No. 3, April 1989.

 

Hammond-Tooke,W. Command and Consensus: The development of Transkeian local
government Cape Town: David Philip Publisher, 1975.

 

Hammond-Tooke,W The roots of Black South Africa Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball
Publishers, 1993.

 

Haines, R and Wood, G. (Eds) Africa after modernity: Alternative perspectives Port
Elizabeth: University of Port Elizabeth-Institute for Development Planning and Research,
1998.

Haines, R., Tapscott, C., Solinjani, S. And Tyali. P. “The silence of poverty: Networks
of control in rural Transkei.” Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in
Southern Africa Cape Town: Carnegie Conference Paper No.48., 13-19 April 1984.

 

Hemson, D. “ For sure you are going to die: Political participation and comrade
movement in Inanda, KwaZulu-Natal.” Social Dynamics Vol.22, No.2., 1996.

 

309

Herbst, J. State and power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986

Heymans, C. and Totemeyer, G. Government by the people Cape Town: J uta, 1988.

Hobsbawn, E. and Ranger, T. (Eds) The Invention of Tradition London: Cambridge
University Press, 1983.

 

Holbrook, G. “Shoring up hydraulic despotism: Class, race and ethnicity in irrigation
politics in the Eastern Cape Province, South Africa”. In Journal of Contemporary African
Studies Vol.16, No.1., 1998.

Holm, J. Dimensions of mass involvement in Botswana politics: A test of alternative
theories London: Sage Publications, 1971.

 

Houston, G., Spengler, F. and Fikeni,S. (eds) Aspects of the debate on the draft of the

new South African constitution dated 22 April 1996 Johannesburg: Konrad-Adeneur-
Stiftung, 1996.

 

Houston, G. “The politics of urban and rural transitional local government in the Transkei
region”. In Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1&2. , December
1996.

Houston, G. The National Liberation Struggle in South Africa: A case study of the United
Democratic Front, 1983-1987 Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999.

 

Hughes, H. “Violence in Inanda, August 1985.” Journal of Southern African Studies Vol.
13, No. 3, April 1987.

Hyden, G. and Bratton, M. (Eds) Governance and politics in Africa Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1992.

 

Inkeles, A. and Smith, D. Becoming Modern: Individual change in six developing
countries Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Inkeles, A. Exploring individual modernity New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

 

Inkeles, A. and Holsinger, D. (Eds) Education and individual modemig in developing
countries Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974.

Isaacman,A. “Peasants and rural social protest in Africa” in African Studies Review
Vol. 33,No.2, 1990.

310

 

Ismail, N., Bayat, S. and Meyer, I Local government management Johannesburg:
lntemational Thomson Publishing Ltd, 1997.

James, D. “ A question of ethnicity: Ndzundza Ndebele in a Lebowa village.” Journal of
Southern African Studies Vol. 16, No.1, March 1990.

Johnston, A. and Johnson, R. “The local elections in KwaZulu-Natal: 26 June 1996.”
African Affairs Vol.96, 1997.

Jung, W. and Krieger, S. (Eds) Culture and democracy in Africa south of the Sahara
Mainz: Hase and Koehler Verlag, 1994.

Kautsky, J. The Political consequences of Modernization New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1972.

 

Katorobo,P and Keulder, C. Traditional leaders and local government in Africa: Lessons
for South Africa Pretoria: Human Science Research Council, 1998.

 

Kay. S. Introduction to the Analysis of Political Data Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,
1991.

 

Keniston, K. Young Radicals: Notes on committed youth New York: Hartcourt, Brace &
World, Inc., 1968.

 

Kessel, B. and Oomen, “One Chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in
post-apartheid South Africa.” African Affairs

 

Kilson, M. Political change in a West African state: A study of the modernization process
in Sierra Leone Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.

Koyana, D.S. Customary law in a changing sociegty Cape Town: Juta & Co, LTD, 1980.

Kriger, N. “The Zimbabwean war of liberation: Struggles within the struggle.” Journal of
Southern African Studies Vol. 14, No. 2, January 1988.

Kuper, A. South Africa and the anthropologist London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987.

Labuschagne, J. Tradition, modernization and the Transkei constitution Lovedale: Fort
Hare University Press, 1975.

Lanegran, K. “South Africa’s Civic Association Movement: ANC’s Ally or Society’s
‘Watchdog’?, Shifting Social Movement-Political Party Relations.” in African Studies
Review Vol.3 8, No.2, 1995.

 

3ll

Lemarchand,R. African Kingships in perspective: Political change and modernization in
monarchical settings Forest Groove: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1977.

 

 

Leggett, T; Moller, V and Richards, R. (Eds) Mylife in the new South Africa: A youth
perspective Pretoria: Human Science Research Council, 1997.

 

Levin, R. and Weiner, D. (Eds) No more tears: Struggles for land in Mpumalanga. South
Africa Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 1997.

 

 

Levy Jr, M. Modernization and the structure of societies, Vol. 1 New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 1996.

Lewis, P. (Ed) Africa: Dilemmas of development and change Boulder: Westview Press,
1998.

Lipset, S. M. Consensus and Conﬂict: Essays in political sociology New Brunswick:
Transaction Books, 1985.

 

 

Lipset, S. Political Man: The social bases of politics Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1981.

 

Lipton, M., Ellis, F. and Lipton, M. (Eds) LancILIabour and livelihoods in rural South
Africa: Vol.2--KwaZulu-Nata1 and Northern Province Durban: Indicator Press, 1996.

 

Lodge, T. And Nasson, B. (Eds) All, here, and now: Black politics in South Africa in the
19905 London: Hurst & Company, 1991.

 

Lodge, T. “Social movements: Comparative perspectives and the South African
experience.” African Studies Vol.56., No.1., 1997.

 

Mackinnon, A. “Chieﬂy authority, Leapfrogging headmen and the political economy of
Zululand, South Africa, ca. 1930-1950.” Journal of Southern African Studies Vol.27.,
No.3. September 2001.

Madu, 0 Models of class domination in plural societies of Central Africa Washington
DC: University Press of America, 1978.

Mager,A. “Patriarchs, politics and ethnicity in the making of the Ciskei, 1945-1959" in
African Studies Vol.54, No.1, 1995.

Mager, A. “The people get fenced: Gender, rehabilitation and African nationalism in the
Ciskei and the Border Region, 1945-1955. Journal of Southern African Studies Vol.18.,
No.4., 1992.

 

312

Magid, A. Men in the Middle: Leadership and role conﬂict in a Nigerian society
Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1976.

Maharaj, B. “The politics of local government restructuring and apartheid transformation
in South Africa: The case of Durban.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol.15.,
No.2., 1997.

Maloka, T. “Populism and the politics of chieftaincy and nation-building in the new
South Africa.” in Journal of contemporary African Studies Vol.14, No.2, 1996.

 

Mamdani, M. Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late
colonialism Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

 

Manona,C. “Local Government” in De Wet, C and Bekker,S(eds). Rural development in
South Africa: A case study of Amatola basin in the Ciskei Rhodes university: Institute of
Social and Economic Research, 1982.

 

 

Mare, G & Hamilton, G. An appetite for power: Buthelezi‘s Inkatha and South Africa
Johannesburg: Ravan 1987.

 

Markovitz, 1. (Ed) African Politics and Society: Basic issues and problems of government
and development New York; The Free Press, 1970.

 

Markovitz, 1. Power and Class in Africa: An introduction to change and conﬂict in
African politics New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977.

 

Mawhood, P. (Ed) Local government in the Third World: The experiences of
decentralization in Tropical Africa Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Aﬁica, 1993.
Robinson, P. and Skinner, E. (Eds) Transformation and resiliency in Africa: As seen by
Afro-American Scholars Washington DC: Howard University Press, 1983.

 

 

 

Mayekiso, M. Township Politics: Civic Struggles for a new South Africa New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1996.

 

Mayer, P. (Ed) Black villagers in an industrial society Cape Town: Oxford University
Press, 1980.

Mazrui, A. Political values and the educated class of Africa London: Heinemann, 1978.

Mbeki, G. South Africa: The peasants’ revolt London: Penguin Africa Library, 1964

 

313

McIntosh, A. & Vaughan, A. Towards a system of rural local government for the
Northern Transvaal( Policy Working Paper No.34) Pretoria: Development Bank of
Southern Africa, August 1994.

 

 

Migija, F. The role of traditional leaders in a democratic dispensation: A selection of
international experiences National Democratic Institute, 1998.

 

Miller, N. (Ed) Research in Rural Africa East Lansing: African Studies Center, 1969.

 

Miller, N. “The political survival of traditional leadership”. In Mills, M. and Wilson, M.
Keiskammahoek rural survey: Land Tenure Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1952.

 

Minnaar, A. Conﬂict and violence in Natal/KwaZulu: Historical perspective Pretoria:
Human Science Research Council, 1991.

Minaar, A. (Ed) Patterns of violence: case studies of conﬂict in Natal Pretoria: Human
Science Research Council, 1982.

Minaar, A. and Hough, M. (Eds) Conﬂict, violence and conﬂict resolution: Where is
South Africa heading? Pretoria: Humans Science Research Council, 1997.

 

Moodie, D. “Ethnic violence on South African gold mines.” Journal of Southern African
Studies Vol. 18, No. 3, September 1992.

Moyo, S. “Land entitlements and growing poverty in Southern Africa.” Southern Africa
Political Economy Monthly March 1998.

 

Munene,E(eds) Uganda: landmarks of rebuilding a nation
Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995.

Munro, W. Citizenship, ethnicity and the politics of rural democratization in KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa African Studies Center, Boston University: Working Paper No.215,
1998.

Murray, M. “Moralising the agrarian question: Concealed Meanings and competing
master narratives in the construction of an imagined South African countryside.” Journal
of Contemporary African Studies Vol.14., No.1. 1996.

Naidoo, K. “ The politics of youth resistance in the 19805: Dilemmas of differentiated
Durban.” Journal of Southern African Studies Vol. 18, No. 1, March 1991.

 

3l4

Nauta, W. The Implications of Freedom: The changing role of land sector NGOs in a
transforming South Africa University of Amsterdam, 2001

 

Nas, P. and Silva, P. (Eds) Modernization, leadership and participation Leiden: Leiden
University Press, 1999.

Nkwi, P. “Rethinking the role of elites in rural development: A case study from
Cameroon”. In Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol.15, No. 1., 1997.

Nnoli, 0. (Ed) Ethnic conﬂicts in Africa Dakar: Codesria, 1998.

 

Norris, P(ed). Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999.

Ntsebeza, L. “The role of traditional leaders in the New South Africa: An Eastern Cape
perspective.” Institute for Multi-party Democracy News Vol. 5, No.2, October 1996.

Nyambara, P. “Immigrants, traditional leaders and the Rhodesian state: The power of
communal land acquisition in Gokwe, Zimbabwe, 1963-1979.” Journal of Southern
African Studies Vol. 27, No. 4, December 2001.

 

 

Nyquist, T. African Middle Class Elite Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic
Research at Rhodes University, Occasional Paper No.28, 1983.

O‘Laughlin, B. “Class and the customary: The ambiguous legacy of the indigenato in
Mozambique.” African Affairs Vol.99. 2000.

 

Oloka-Onyango, J. “The question of Buganda in contemporary Ugandan politics”. In
Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol. 15, No.2., 1997.

Osaghe, E. Ethnicity and its management in Africa: The democratization link Lagos:
Malthouse Press LTD., 1994

Osaghae, E. (Ed) Traditional leadership in Southern Africa Johannesburg: Konrad-
Adenuer-Stiftung, 1997.

 

Owusu, M. “Democracy and Africa— A view from the village”. The Journal of Modern
African Studies Vol. 30, No.3, 1992.

 

Paige, G. The scientiﬁc study of political leadership New York: The Free Press, 1977.

315

 

Palmer, M. and Stern, L. (Eds) Political development in chagging societies: An analysis
of modernization Lexington: Heath Lexington Books, 1971.

 

 

Parthasarathy, D. Collective violence in a provincial city Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1997.

 

Peil, M. Consensus and conﬂict in African societies: An introduction to sociology
London: Longman, 1977.

 

Peires, J. “The implosion of Transkei and Ciskei” in African Affairs Vol.91, 1992.

Peires, J. “Transkei on the verge of emancipation” in Journal of Humanities and social
sciences Vol. 8, N02, 1997.

 

Peters, P. “Bewitching land: The role of land disputes in converting kin to strangers and
in class formation in Malawi.” Journal of Southern African Studies Vol. 28, No. 1, 2002.

 

Preston, B. Chiefs: Traditional authority and democratic governance in Malawi A report
on NDI Program Activities with Malawian chiefs in preparation for the National
Constitutional Conference. February 1995.

 

Putnam, R. The comparative study of political elites Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
Inc, 1976.

 

Pyrczak, F. Writing empirical research reports: A basic guide for students of the social
and behavioral sciences 2nd ed., Los Angeles: 1998.

 

Ragin, C. The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative
strategies Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Ramutsindela, M. and Simon, D. “The politics of territory and place in Post-apartheid
South Africa: The disputed are of Bushbuckridge.” Journal of Southern African Studies
Vol.25, No.3., September 1999.

Robinson, P. and Skinner, E.(eds) Transformation and resiliency in Africa Washington:
Howard University Press, 1983.

 

Ross, M. The Culture of conﬂict: Interpretations and interests in comparative perspective
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.

 

Rothchild, D. (Ed) Strengthening African local initiative: Local self-govemance,
decentralization and accountability Hamburg: Hamburg African Studies, 1996.

316

 

 

 

Rule,S.(ed) Public opinion on national priority issues: Election ’99 Human Sciences
Research Council: Pretoria, 1999.

Schapera, 1. (Ed) The Bantu-speaking permle of South Africa: An ethnographic survey
London: Routledge and Sons, LTD, 1957.

Sigelman, L. Modernization and the political system: A critique and preliminﬂ
empirical analysis Beverly Hill: SAGE Publications, 1971.

Scarrit, J. Political change in a traditional African clan: A structural-functional analysis of
the Nsits of Nigeria Denver: University of Denver, 1965.

Sigelman, L. Modernization and the political system: A critique and preliminary analysis
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971.

Sitas, A. “The making of the comrades movement in Natal, 1985-1991.” Journal of
Southern African Studies Vol. 18, No. 3, September 1992.

Sklar,R. “The African Frontier for Political Science” in Bates. R, Mudimbe. V, and Barr.
J (eds) Africa and the disciplines: The contributions of research in Africa to the social
sciences and humanities. Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1993.

Smith, M. “Leadership on a crisis: Does it make a difference?” South African Journal of
Higher Education Vol.12, No.2, 1998.

 

 

Southall, R. South Africa’s Transkei: The political economy of an independent bantustan
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983.

Spiegel, A. “A trilogy of tyranny and tribulation: Village politics and administrative
intervention in Matatiele during te early 19805” in Donaldson, A, Segar, J and Southall,R.
Undoing independence: Regionalism and reincorporation of Transkei into South Africa
Rhodes University: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1992.

Spiegel, A. and McAllister (eds) Tradition and transition in Southern Africa London:
Transaction Publishers, 1 991 .

Spiegel, A. “Towards an understanding of tradition: Uses of tradition(al) in apartheid
South Africa” Critigue Anthropology Vol.9., No.1.

Steinmo, S., K. Thelen, et al., Eds. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press,l992.

317

Straker, G.(ed) Faces in the revolution: The psychological effects of violence on
township youth in South Africa Cape Town: David Philip, 1992.

Streek, B. and Wicksteed, R. Render unto Kaiser: A Transkei Dossier. Johannesburg:
Ravan Press, 1981.

 

Stultz, N. Transkei’s half loaf New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

Thornhill, C. Localgovernment: govemment closest to the people Pretoria: Human
Science Research Council, 1995.

 

Totemeyer, G. Namibia, Old and New: Traditional and Modern leaders in Ovamboland
London: C. Hurst and Company, 1978.

 

Vail. L. The creation of tribalism in Southern Africa Berkeley: University Press, 1991.

Vajpeyi, D. Modernization and social change in India New Delhi: Monohar, 1979.

 

Van den Berghe, P. South Africa: A study in conﬂict Westport: Greenwood Press, 1965.

 

 

Van Zyl Slabbert, F; Malan, C; Marais, H; Oliver, J and Riordan, R. Youth in the New
South Africa: Towards Policy Formulation Pretoria: Human Science Research Council,
1994.

Verba, S. , Nie, N and Kim, J. The modes of democratic participation: A cross-national
comparison Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971.

Verloren van Themaat Centre South Africa in transition: Local govemment— The
demandsythe law, the realities University of South Africa, 1985.

 

 

Vine, V. Political leadership in Africa: Post—independence generational conﬂict in Upper
VoltaLSenegal, Ni gerQahomey and the Central African Republic Stanford University:
The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967.

 

Walker, C. “Women, ‘tradition’ and reconstruction.” South Asia Bulletin: Comparative
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East VoI.XV, No.1., 1995.

 

Werbner, R (ed) Land reform in the making: Tradition, public policy and ideology in
Botswana London: Rex Collings, 1982.

West, H. and Kloeck-Jenson. “Betwixt and between: ‘Traditional authority’ and
democratic decentralization in post-war Mozambique”. In African Affairs Vol.98, 1999.

318

Westaway, A. “A critical look at the Green Paper: focus on tenure reform and
institutional arrangements’ in Land Update No.46, April 1996.

 

Whitaker, C. The politics of tradition: continuity and change in Northern Nigeria 1946-
1966 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Widner, J (ed) Economic change and political liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Wilson, M., Kaplan, S. , Maki, T. and Walton, E. Social structure: Keiskammahoek rural
survey, Vol III Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1952.

 

Wunsch, J. “Decentralization, local governance and the democratic transition in Southern
Africa: A comparative analysis”. In African Studies Quarterly Vol.2., 1997.

 

Xaba, T. “Masculinity in a transitional society: The rise and fall of ‘the young lions’.”
Colloquium-Masculinities in Southern Africa. Durban: University of Natal, 2-4 July
1997.

Zanman. W. (Ed) Collapsed states: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate

authority Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

319

Periodicals: Newspapers and Magazines

“Back to the Kraal: Disappointed by its showing in local government elections, Inkatha
has to decide whether it has a future as a national opposition party.” Africa Confidential
Vol.37., No.14., July 5, 1996.

 

Beckwith, C. and Fisher, A. “Royal Ashanti: Ghana’s Golden Heritage New African Life.
December 1996

 

Bulger, P. “Protection for king and chiefs tops IFP agenda.” Independent Online (The
Star) October 2, 1996.

 

Carter, C. “Chiefs welcome Holomisa’s party in E. Cape.” Daily Mail and Guardian
February 26, 1999.

 

“Chief gets five years for burning electricity poles.” Daily Dispatch March 4, 1998.

“Chiefs to consider protest action.” Dispatch Online August 30, 2001.

 

“Chiefs to hold talks on boycott of local govt.” Dispatch Online March 20, 2001.

 

“Chief blasts parties over Heritage Day.” Dispatch Online September 22, 2001

 

Cross, C. “Rural land tenure reform: Surrounded by hungry allocators.” Indicator South
Africa Vol.14., No.2., Winter 1997.

 

Dickson, P. “ANC loses SANCO support in Eastern Cape.” Daily Mail and Guardian
October 31, 2000.

 

Dickson, P. “Generous pay hike for E. Cape chiefs.” Dispatch Online April 1, 1999.

Dickson, P. “SANDF, chiefs to meet over T’kei crime.” Dispatch Online March 26,
1999.

 

Dladla, S. “One tribe, One Municipality.” Land and Rural Digest March/April 2000

 

Dladla, S. “Journey into the hinterland of anger.” Land and Rural Digest March/April
2000

Dladla, S. “Slow fall of the house of chiefs. . . .” Land and Rural Digest March/April
2000

Dladla, S. “A party ﬁt for kings.” Land and Rural Digest March/April 2000
320

 

Dladla, S. “A woman chief: Two steps ahead.” Land and Rural Digest March/April 2000
Libombo, A. “Mozambique’s bitter war between chiefs and liberation government.” Land
and Rural Digest March/April 2000

 

 

Dlamini, B. “King’s role in the appointing of Swazi chiefs in SA.” The Times of
Swaziland June 4, 2000.

 

“Eastern Cape chiefs seek Mbeki meeting on deadlock.” Dispatch Online May 17, 2001.

 

“EC chiefs await report clarifying future role.” Dispatch Online November 24, 2000.

 

Edmunds, M. “Who are the chiefs?” Weekly Mail October 6, I995.

 

Eveleth, A. “Rural development: Rhetoric and reality.” Indicator South Africa Vol.16.,
No.3.

 

F eni, L. “Xhosa Royals to meet Chinese delegation.” Dispatch Online August 12, 1999.

 

F eni, L. “Ghanaian, E. Cape chiefs in talks.” Dispatch Online November 5, 2001.

F reedberg, L. “Too little land, too late.” Daily Mail and Guardian June 15, 1999.

 

Gerardy, J. “Xhosa King urges people to take poll seriously.” Dispatch Online December
4, 2000.

 

Gevisser, M. “The Mark Gevisser Profile: That other Holomisa-Phathekile Holomisa,

President of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa.” Electronic Mail and
Guardian, September 13, 1996.

 

Govender, C. “Shifting the balance?: Local elections in KwaZulu-Natal.” Indicator South
Africa Vol.13., No.3., Winter 1996.

 

“Govt ‘doing everything’ to satisfy amakhosi.” News24 news24.co.za., November 9,
2000.

“Govt concedes to amakhosi.” Dispatch Online December 2, 2000.

 

“Govt plan for chiefs to be released soon.” Dispatch Online November 23, 2000

 

Hargreaves, S. Yose, C. and Khan, Z. “Make space for rural women’s rights.” Land and
Rural Digest March/April 2000

 

321

 

Harvey. E. “Chiefs make nonsense of democracy.” Daily Mail and Guardian October 20,
2000.

 

Hattingh, M. “Xhosa Royal Council wants to revive traditional culture.” Dispatch Online
March 27, 1999.

 

Hlongwa, W. “Amakhosi angry. IFP accused of politicking.” News 24 news24.co.za,
November 11, 2000.

Holomisa, P. “Ubukhosi the bedrock of African democracy”. In Mail & Guardian
February 11-17, 2000.

 

Holomisa. P. “Ubukhosi the bedrock of African democracy”. In Mail & Guardian
February 11-17, 2000.

 

“Legislature orders chiefs to get out of the way.” ANC Newswire November 25, 1997.

 

Keeton, C. “Mbeki supports request by chiefs.” Africa News Online May 26, 1999.

 

Kindra, J. “Disillusioned arnakhosi join Democratic Alliance.” Electronic Mail and
Guardian October 30, 2000.

 

Maloka, E. “Traditional leaders and the current transition.” The African Communist
Second Quarter 1995.

 

Mamaila, K. “Traditional leaders could have job descriptions, like all workers: African
cultural values are being challenged by democracy.” The Star April 18, 2000.

322

“IF P mayors may go to court over chiefs.” Dispatch Online May 22, 2001.

 

Mamdani, M. “Why foreign invaders can’t help Congo.” Electronic Mail and Guardian
November 2, 1998.

 

“Mandela says farewell to Zwelithini, praises traditional leaders.” ANC Newswire June
12, 1999.

 

Mati, L. “Chiefs want to help with IDs.” Dispatch Online November 21, 1998.

 

Mati, L. “Bittersweet outcome of chiefs audit foreseen.” Dispatch Online March 10,
2001.

 

Matlou. J. “Amakhosi stick to their guns.” Daily Mail and Guardian November 27, 2000.

 

Matlou, J. “ANC set to kill off SANC O.” Daily Mail and Guardian February 7, 2000.

“Mbeki criticized over chiefs policy.” News24 news24.co.za., March 31, 2001.

Mda, L. “Eastern Cape turns to Holomisa.” Electronic Mail & Guardian 2 June 1998.
Sechaba Ka’Nkosi. “ANC loses ground in rural KwaZulu-Natal.” Electronic Mail &
Guardian 1 September 1998.

 

 

Mbhele, W. “Betrayed chiefs cut ANC ties”. In Electronic Mail and Guardian October 3,
1997.

 

Mcgreal, C. “Virgin tests make a comeback.” Dailyg Mail and Guardian September 29,
1999.

 

McNeil, D. “(Male) Zimbwbwe Tribal Elders Complain.” The New York Times 1
December 1996.

 

Moloi, D. “Are you serious about us? Ask chiefs in the North.” Land and Rural Digest
March/April 2000

 

Moloi, D. and Tshabangu, A. “A day with his Royal highness.” Land and Rural Digest
May/June 1999.

323

Mtimkulu, P. “Traditional leaders and the new South African constitution” in the Web
Site lutpzf/www.southafrica.net/government”persp_cctive/html

 

Mzimba, S. “High Court hearing determines future of tribal courts.” Dispatch Online
March 19, 1999.

Mzimba, S. “Chief reports on study of traditional systems.” Dispatch Online November
30, 2000.

 

Mzimba, S. “Chiefs told to stay out of politics.” Dispatch Online March 2, 1998.
Xundu, X. “traditional rule, power and greed.” Business Day January 27, 2000.

Mufamadi, S. “Traditional leaders’ role.” Sowetan April 20, 2000.

Naidoo, S. (an interview with Naidoo). “Local government: Making sense of the
confusion.” The African Communist Third Quarter 1994.

 

Naki, E. “Alice ANC slams headmen’s salaries.” Dispatch Online June 17, 1998

Naki, E. “Delays angers Eastern Cape chiefs.” Weekly Mail December 2, 1994.

 

Nash, A. “Mandela’s democracy.” Monthly Review April 1999.

Ndetyana, M. “The civic movement: A toothless watchdog?” Indicator South Africa
Vol.16., No.3.

 

Ngani, P. “ANC to investigate claims of SANC O disruption.” Dispatch Online March
25, 1999.

Ngani, P. “Demarcation plan could lead to havoc, warns Xhosa Prince.” Dispatch Online
March 3, 2000.

Ngani, P. “PAC names Transkei chief as poll candidate.” Dispatch Online April 26, I999.

 

Ngani, P. “Local govt key to SA’s survival.” Digpatch Online May 6, 1999.

Ntsebeza, L. and Hendricks, F. “The Chieftaincy system is rooted in apartheid”. In
Electronic Mail and Guardian February 23, 2000.

Ntsebeza, L. “Indirect rule may well continue.” Land and Rural Digest March/April
2000

 

324

 

Piliso, S. “Tensions between leaders, councilors discussed”. In Daily Dispatch March 11,
1998.

 

“Rift between amakhosi and govt widens.” Dispatch Online November 7, 2000.

 

“Rural chiefs warn of demarcation protest.” Dispatch Online September 10, 2001.

Rutsch, P. “Traditional Trauma” in Indicator South Africa Vol.12, No.2., Autumn 1995.

 

Salayendwa, A. “Bill on chiefs gets mixed reception.” Dispatch Online November 28,
2001.

 

Sayagues, M. “Zim women want to throw out customary law discrimination.” Dispatch
Online June 10, 1999.

Swilling, M. “Creative vision for local government.” Electronic Mail and Guardian
March 2, 1998.

 

Sechaba ka Nkosi “Holomisa footsie-footsie with the Matanzimas.” Electronic Mail and
Guardian December 1, 1997.

 

Solomon, D. “Local government: Down but not out.” Electronic Mail and Guardian may
13, 1997.

 

Stephen, M. “Kings and Compromises” Southern Africa Report June 1997.

 

Streek, B. “New Law will revolutionise local government.” Daily Mail and Guardian
September 2, 1999.

 

Swilling, M. “Ripping the heart out of local power.” Electronic Mail and Guardian March
12, 1998.

 

Titi, M. “Traditional leaders cautious about trusting government.” Dispatch Online
December 15, 2000.

Titi, M. “Xhosa lineage a right royal puzzle.” Dispatch Online May 4, 2002.

 

Titi, M. “Traditional leaders happily cast votes.” Dispatch Online December 6, 2000.

 

Titi, M. “Chief wants new leadership laws.” Dispatch Online October 15, 1999.

 

Titi, M. “Sustainable rural local government.” Dispatch Online May 22, 1998.

 

325

 

“Traditional Leaders still unhappy with proposals.” Daily Dispatch November 6, 2000.

 

“Wedding furore shows Ugandans updating a monarchy isn’t easy.” Cape Times July 20,
1999.

“When we were kings.” Weekly Mail and Guardian April 23, 1999.

Williams, G. “Rural restructuring.” Indicator South Africa Vol.11., No.1. Summer 1993.

 

 

Xako, S. “SANCO opts to support ANC in 1999 poll.” Dispatch Online May 5, 1998.

Xako, S. “Government and chiefs iron out their differences.” Dispatch Online March 6,
1998.

 

Xako, S. “PAC vows to protect traditional leaders.” Dispatch Online February 23, 1998.

 

Xako, S. “Chiefs threaten court action to get perks.” Dispatch Online March 26, 1998.

 

Xundu, X. “Chiefs reject local government: Traditional leaders threaten to approach 1
Constitutional Court over a system they say ignores them.” Business Day March 6, 2000. ‘
|

Xundu, X. “The kingmakers in rural votes.” Dispatch Online May 31, 1999.
Zifo, M. “Chiefs, TRCs should interact.” Dispatch Online January 16, 1999.

 

 

Zifo. M. “Nonkonyana accepts ANC nomination.” Dispatch Online March 25, 1999.

 

 

326

Unpublished Papers and Studies

Botha,T “Traditional authorities in a new South Africa”, a paper presented in a
conference on Traditional Authorities: Role and Future, July 18, 1996, HSRC Conference
Centre, Pretoria.

Bratton, M. and Mattes, R. “Support for democracy in Aﬁica: Intrinsic or instrumental?”
Michigan State University Working Papers on Reform in Africa; Afrobarometer Paper
No.1., October 1999.

Carton, B. “Men before their time: Youth power and African generational conﬂict in
South Africa, 1880-1906.” Colloquium-Masculinities in Southern Africa. Durban:
University of Natal, 2-4, July 1997.

Fikeni, S. “The Eastern Cape Retrenched Migrant Workers and their Households:
Survival Strategies”, a paper presented at UNDP international conference on Rural
development in the Eastern Cape region of South Africa, September 27-29, 1995,
Umtata.

Fikeni,S. and Houston, G. “Suggestions on the role of traditional leaders in rural local
government”. A paper submitted to the South African Constituent Assembly, November
1, 1995.

F ikeni,S. and Houston,G. “South Africa’s interim constitution and the position of
traditional leaders” , a paper presented at an international conference on the New South
African Constitution, Umtata, April 24-26, 1996.

Hemson, D. “The embrace of comradeship: Masculinity and resistance in KwaZulu-
Natal.” Colloquium-Masculinities in Southern Africa. Durban: University of Natal, 2-4
July 1997.

Holomisa, P. “Envisaged role of traditional leaders in a new South Africa.” Paper
delivered at a workshop of the University Movement for Advancement of Political
Studies. University of Transkei. 29 September 1993.

Holomisa, P. “The institution of traditional leadership: A view from the progressive
constituency of traditional leaders.” A paper delivered at the ANC caucus workshop on
policy on the institution of traditional leadership. The rain Forest Room, Parliament,
Cape Town., 14-15 April 2000.

 

Houston, G and Fikeni, S. “The Struggle for people power: Case studies of confrontation
and accommodation in the rural areas of the Transkei.” Unpublished document. 1996.

Igbinosa, A. “Administrative alternatives in rural Africa” Unpublished Phd
dissertation, Miami university, 1982.
327

Koyana, D. “How Chapter 12 of the Constitution can best accommodate Traditional
Leaders?” Paper readapt a workshop of the House of Traditional Leaders, Pretoria, 15-16
May 2000.

Miller, D. “Ambiguities of popular participation in development: A South African case
study.” Paper presented at the 2nd ACDESS Workshop, J ohannesburg.. 24-27 January
1996.

Mamdani, M. “When does a settler become a native?: Reﬂections on the colonial roots of
citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa.” Paper presented as an inaugural lecture as
AC Jordan Professor of African Studies, University of Cape Town. May 13, 1998.

Naudascher, K. and Kgatlhanye, N. “Report of the regional conference on traditional
leadership.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. October 1997.

Ntsebeza, L. Land tenure reform, traditional authorities and rural local government in
post-apartheid South Africa: Case Studies from the Eastern Cape University of the
Western Cape: School of Government, Research Report No.3, 1999.

Ribot, J. “Decentralization. participation and accountability in Sahelian forestryzLegal
instruments of political-administrative control.” Unpublished paper, Center for
Population and Development Studies, Harvard University, 8 August 1998.

Selinyane, N. “Changing alliances: The patterns of cental govemment-chiefs relations on
independent Lesotho.” Paper presented at an lntemational conference on traditional
leadership in Southern Africa, University of Transkei., April 16-18, 1997.

Vilakazi, H. “Traditional leaders and modernity.” Unpublished paper, 1996.

Vol 11: Theoretical framework— The administrative and legal position of traditional
authorities in South Africa and their contribution to the implementation of the
Reconstruction and Development Programme: Research report by University of North,
University of Northwest, Potchefstroom University, University of Natal
(Pietermaritzburg), University of Zululand and University of Leiden, 1996

 

 

Vol X: Conference Documentation— The administrative and legal position of traditional
authorities in South Africa and their contribution to the implementation of the
Reconstruction and Development Programme: Research report by University of North,
University of Northwest, Potchefstroom Universig, University of Natal
(Pietermaritzburg), University of Zululand and University of Leiden, 1996

 

 

Vol VIII: Development Management— The administrative and legal position of
traditional authorities in South Africa and their contribution to the implementation of the
328

Printed Primary Sources

ANC Campaign Manual. “Local Government Elections 2000”, January 2000.

Department of Provincial and Local Government, South Africa. “A Draﬁ discussion
document toward a White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Institutions.” 11 April
2000

Department of Constitutional Development “Status Quo Report on Traditional
Leadership and Institutions.” August 1999.

Mufamadi, S.F. “Speech delivered by Minister S. F. Mufamadi at the workshop on
traditional leadership andinstitutions.” Midrand Eskom Center: August 17, 2000.

Ramatlodi, N. “Speech by the Premier of the Northern Cape Province of South Africa‘at
the opening of the Provincial House of Traditional Leaders. 29 February 2000.

Representation of Natal and other traditional leaders in the negotiations process, status of
KwaZulu-Natal government delegation and timeﬁ'ames for negotiations. Multiparty
Negotiations Forum Submission

Wittenberg, M and McIntosh, A. “Decentralization in South Africa: Regional power or
local development?” Report Compiled for Local Government Policy Project, University
of the Western Cape. 1997.

South African Constitution, 1996

330

 

 

 

Reconstruction and Development Progpamme: Research report by University of North,
University of Northwest, Potchefstroom Universig, University of Natal
(Pietermaritzburg), University of Zululand and University of Leiden, 1996

Xaba, T. “The rise andfall of the young lions: Masculinity in a transitional society.”

Colloquium on Masculinity in Southern Africa, University of Natal, Durban. J uly2-4,
1997.

329

           
  
 

 

111111111111 11111le

6

11611

25