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**CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION: THE POLITICS OF RURAL LOCAL  
GOVERNMENT IN THE POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA**

**By**

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**A DISSERTATION**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION: THE POLITICS OF RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA**

By

Somadoda Fikeni

The point of departure in this dissertation is that traditional leadership remains an important political force within the modern African states. Its role and form of accommodation within the modern state has come into sharp focus in the context of democratizing states. Post-apartheid South Africa, just like many post-colonial African countries, faces a challenge of accommodating traditional authority particularly in its local government system. The focus of this study is on the politics of South African rural local government with particular attention on the relationship between the traditional leaders, elected local councilors and local civic leaders. The first chapters of the study provide a context by looking at the literature on this subject as well historical evolution of South African rural local government and reactions of traditional leaders to liberation politics into the current configuration of rural local government in post-apartheid democratic South Africa.

This comparative case study looks at factors and variables that are associated with conflict and cooperation between traditional leaders, elected local councilors and civic leaders. The questions that this study seeks to answer are the following: What is the composition, function and structure of rural local government in the post-apartheid South Africa? What sorts of relations have actually evolved between the traditional

leaders and the emergent political elite of elected councilors? What are the factors that are associated with conflictual relations and cooperative or accommodative relations between the traditional leaders and the elected councilors and civic leaders?

Nine South African rural communities in three provinces, namely KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga, are surveyed. A range of demographic and attitudinal variables as well as leadership styles were assessed to examine if they had any association with one form of relationship or another. The findings in this study and analysis indicated that age, education, party affiliation, income, and employment status are demographic variables that have influence on or are associated with rural elite relations. More specifically, this study indicates that cooperation is associated with communities where traditional elites and elected councilors or civic leaders share most the aforementioned attributes and demographic features whereas conflict is associated with instances where they have less in common. Leadership style also proved to be an important factor in rural elite relations though more needs to be done to understand the specific manner this variable impacts on the relationship. Overall, this study reveals challenges of accommodating two distinct political systems within a modern democratic arrangement, but also demonstrates that this arrangement does not always end up in conflict.

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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my grandparents, the late Mkhwetsho Zephania Fikeni and the late Madunjane “Jolakhe” Fikeni, as well as my parents, my late father, Mthuthuzeli Mathews Fikeni, and my mother Nothembile Mandi “Mazibula” Fikeni.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	xii
LIST OF FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.....	xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	xv
CHAPTER ONE	
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER TWO	
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.....	18
2.1. Why bother? The significance of rural local politics in understanding Africa.....	20
2.2. Salient themes and trends in African rural politics literature.....	27
2.3. A review of literature on the rural politics in South Africa.....	33
2.4. Key questions and hypotheses.....	38
2.5. A brief outline of selected theoretical perspectives.....	39
2.5.1. Modernization perspective: Traditional versus modern elite.....	39
2.5.2. Structural approach: Social stratification and class struggle.....	51
2.5.3. Ethnic identity, politicization of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts.....	54
2.5.4. Party identity, political mobilization and local elite conflicts.....	59
2.5.5. Political agency and the elite factional rivalry.....	61
2.6. A synthesis and integrated approach.....	64
CHAPTER THREE	
METHOD AND DESIGN.....	67
3.1. Key concepts.....	68
3.1.1. Defining the elite and identifying the rural elite in South Africa.....	69
3.1.2. Conflictual and accommodative elite relations.....	73
3.2. Sources and the nature of data.....	74
3.3. Population and sample.....	76
3.4. Research instruments.....	80
3.5. Data presentation, analysis and interpretation.....	83
CHAPTER FOUR	
SOUTH AFRICAN RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH TIME:	
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW.....	86
4.1. Indigenous political institutions and political processes in the pre-colonial era.....	88
4.2. The colonial era and the new administrative laws for the African communities.....	96
4.3. The apartheid era.....	101
4.4. African reactions to the colonial and apartheid laws in the rural areas.....	104

4.5. The politics of cooption and exclusion within Bantustans.....	107
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## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONTEMPORARY INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL FORCES IN RURAL

SOUTH AFRICA.....	116
5.1. The last frontier: The politics of protest and liberation in the rural areas.....	119
5.2. Chiefs and comrades: Traditional leaders' reaction to protests and transition.....	131
5.3. An open-ended solution: Political dynamics of constitutional engineering and the emerging rural local government institutions.....	144
5.3.1. The key players and their policy options.....	145
5.3.1.1. The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa).....	145
5.3.1.2. Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).....	147
5.3.1.3. African National Congress (ANC).....	147
5.3.1.4. South African National Civic Organization (SANCO).....	149
5.3.1.5. Other interested parties.....	150
5.3.2. Constitutional and policy making process and its political dynamics.....	150
5.3.3. Constitution, laws and emerging institutions.....	152
5.4. Concluding remarks.....	163

## CHAPTER SIX

### A PROFILE OF SELECTED COMMUNITIES.....

6.1. The Eastern Cape Province.....	166
6.1.1. Rode Administrative Area.....	167
6.1.2. Mnceba Administrative Area.....	172
6.1.3. Nzongisa Administrative Area .....	176
6.2. Mpumalanga Province.....	178
6.2.1. Sokhulumu Administrative Area.....	181
6.2.2. Tweefontein Administrative Area.....	184
6.2.3. Vezokuhle Administrative Area.....	186
6.3. KwaZulu-Natal Province.....	188
6.3.1. Adams Mission Administrative Area.....	190
6.3.2. Mfume Administrative Area.....	194
6.3.3. Embo Administrative Area.....	196
6.4. Summary.....	198

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL.....

7.1. Age distribution in conflict and non conflict relations.....	210
7.2. Education and elite relations.....	213
7.3. Ethnicity affiliation and elite relations in conflict and non-conflict communities.....	217
7.4. Rural elite relations and party affiliation and identity.....	220
7.5. Social stratification, class conflict and rural elite relations.....	225
7.6. Distribution of property in conflict and in conflict communities.....	226



7.7. Employment status in conflict and in non-conflict communities.....	228
7.8. Monthly average income and elite relations.....	230
7.9. Policy preference profile and support for traditional institutions.....	234
7.10. Support for traditional values and customs in conflict and in non-conflict relations.....	235
7.11. Support for traditional land tenure system .....	237
7.12. Elite attitudes toward payment of services in rural areas .....	240
7.13. Rural elite attitudes toward a New Municipal Demarcation Act (Law).....	243
7.14. Other variables.....	246
7.15. Summary.....	247

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY

LEVEL.....	249
8.1. Age distribution in provinces and within communities.....	252
8.2. Education trends in the selected communities and provinces.....	256
8.3. Political affiliation and identity.....	261
8.4. Ethnicity and the politics of exclusion/inclusion in the provinces and communities.....	268
8.5. Distribution of resources in the provinces and communities.....	271
8.6. Policy preference profiles in the provinces and communities.....	272
8.7. Geopolitical factors and elite relations.....	274
8.8. Summary.....	276

## CHAPTER NINE

### DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.....

9.1. Background and context.....	280
9.2. Ethnicity and elite relations.....	281
9.3. Distribution of resources and elite relations.....	284
9.4. Age and generational cleavages.....	286
9.5. Education and elite relations.....	286
9.6. Party affiliation and identity.....	287
9.7. Leadership style and dominant relations.....	289
9.8. Policy preferences and attitudes toward local institutions.....	290
9.9. Conclusions on dominant trends.....	290

## APPENDICES.....

Appendix 1.....	295
Appendix 2.....	296
Appendix 3.....	297
Appendix 4.....	298
Appendix 5.....	299
Appendix 6.....	300

Appendix 7.....301

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....305

Books and Articles.....305

Periodicals: Newspapers and Magazines.....321

Unpublished papers and studies.....328

Printed primary sources.....331

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1. Distribution of council seats and municipalities in South African local Government.....	79
Table 6.1. Status of a chief and proximity to urban areas (city or town).....	198
Table 6.2. Key protagonists in local elite relationship.....	200
Table 6.3. Conflict and accommodation relationship typology.....	201
Table 6.4. Classification of cases according to the dominant form of elite relations.....	202
Table 6.5. Issues over which there are disputes.....	203
Table 7.1. Selected sectors of rural elite and type of relations.....	207
Table 8.1. Range of ethnic composition of the selected communities.....	269

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 7.1. Age distribution in conflict communities.....	211
Figure 7.2. Age distribution in non-conflict communities.....	211
Figure 7.3. Levels of education in conflict communities.....	214
Figure 7.4 Levels of education in non-conflict communities.....	215
Figure 7.5. Ethnic Affiliation of elite in conflict communities.....	219
Figure 7.6. Ethnic identity of elite in non-conflict communities.....	220
Figure 7.7. Political party affiliation in conflict communities.....	222
Figure 7.8. Political party affiliation in non-conflict communities.....	223
Figure 7.9. Opposition to chiefs' involvement in party politics.....	225
Figure 7.10. Property distribution in conflict communities.....	228
Figure 7.11. Property distribution in non-conflict communities.....	228
Figure 7.12. Employment status in conflict communities.....	230
Figure 7.13. Employment status in non-conflict communities.....	230
Figure 7.14. Average monthly income distribution in conflict communities.....	233
Figure 7.15. Average monthly income distribution in non-conflict Communities.....	233
Figure 7.16. Support for traditional values and customs in conflict communities.....	236
Figure 7.17. Support for traditional values and customs in non-conflict Communities.....	237

Figure 7.18. Opinion on traditional land tenure in conflict communities.....	239
Figure 7.19. Opinion on traditional land tenure in non-conflict Communities.....	239
Figure 7.20. Opposition to payment of services in rural areas.....	242
Figure 7.21. Level of opposition to the New Municipal Demarcation Law.....	243
Figure 8.1. Age distribution in KwaZulu-Natal.....	253
Figure 8.2. Age distribution in Eastern Cape.....	254
Figure 8.3. Age distribution in Mpumalanga.....	255
Figure 8.4. Education in KwaZulu-Natal.....	258
Figure 8.5. Education in Eastern Cape.....	259
Figure 8.6. Education in Mpumalanga.....	260
Figure 8.7. Political Affiliation in KwaZulu-Natal.....	262
Figure 8.8. Political Affiliation in Eastern Cape.....	264
Figure 8.9. Political Affiliation in Mpumalanga.....	267

## DESCRIPTION OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

**Amaphakathi** - Members of the tribal or traditional council which is headed by the local chief. This sometimes includes special advisors, usually one or some of the chief's relatives or a person appointed in that special capacity.

**ANC** - African National Congress

**Bantustan** - These were reserves designated as homelands for Africans under the apartheid system. Some of these areas were given nominal independence by the apartheid governments.

**CODESA** - Convention for Democratic South Africa. This was established in July 1991 as a negotiations forum in which all the major stakeholders or political formations were to determine the future of South Africa.

**Contralesa** - Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa.

**IFP** - Inkatha Freedom Party

**Imbizo/pitso** - Public gathering of the community or a nation that is usually convened by a chief or a king.

**Imbongi** - A court poet who performs during the public events, and this is usually before and after the traditional leader speaks.

**Induna** - Member of the traditional authority who head a sub-division, geographical area or an age group or for a special role such as keeping law and order.

**Inkosi/Ikosi** - A chief in Xhosa, Zulu and Swazi and ikosi is a Ndebele term for the same word. Kgosi in Sotho/Tswana

**Mbokotho** - A vigilante group that was established to crush opposition to the independence of KwaNdebele homeland.

NP - National Party

NNP - New National Party

PAC - Pan African Congress

SANCO - South African National Civic Organization

UDF - United Democratic Front

UDM - United Democratic Movement

TLC - Transitional Local Council

TRC - Transitional Representative Council

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

**Elites of different backgrounds, favoring diverging policy positions, and often pursuing a multiplicity of interests, have contended with each other to promote their separate concerns and to protest against measures perceived as detrimental to their well-being.<sup>1</sup>**

**No process of socio-political transformation in Africa, be it democratization, political liberalization or simply regime change, can be regarded as complete if no consideration has been given to the question of traditional leadership.<sup>2</sup>**

Post-apartheid South Africa faces a challenge of building one nation by, among other things, integrating modern and traditional institutions. This delicate process continues to generate tension between proponents of continuity, in a form of traditional institutions, and modernity, in a form of modern state institutions and civic organizations. The challenge of integration is more pronounced in the current government's attempt to reform local government in the rural areas. This has put spotlight on the role of traditional leaders in the new South African political dispensation, a policy and political issue that has proven to be one of the most controversial topics in the transition process. In a move to appease traditional leaders and those calling for elected local representatives, the South African multi-party negotiation forum decided to recognize traditional authorities and

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<sup>1</sup> Chazan, N. et al, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. 1999. P.198

<sup>2</sup> Osaghae, E. Traditional leadership in Southern Africa. 1997, p.5



elected local councils as primary institutions of rural local government. Even more important is the fact that this recognition of dual institutions was vaguely framed in the new South African Constitution of 1996 and subsequent legislations and as a direct consequence there is no clear or specific delineation of roles for traditional authorities and elected rural local councils.

This ambiguity is a direct result of the politics of a negotiated transition that is marked by compromise, trade-offs and deal making. This, I call *politics of open-ended solutions* in which ambiguities and ad hoc arrangements as well as continuing negotiations, often without resolution, are essential features that occur not by default but by design of the key players. The key feature of the *politics of open-ended solutions* is to manage but not necessarily resolve policy problems with the hope of consolidating ones position in the event of the window of opportunity provided by a political adversary who may either run out of steam or a controversial public policy issue that fades away from being a topical agenda. Within its broad alliance, the ANC has a variety of ideological and class formations that range from African nationalists to emerging black business class, to communists, civic movement, to trade unionists and traditional leaders. Within the ANC-led alliances, as to be expected in this range of interests and political ambitions, there are strong supporters of the institution of traditional leadership and its radical opponents who often call for its abolition. These coexisting forces have, over the years, sharpened and honed ANC leadership's skills of managing contradictions. This observation is reinforced by ANC chairperson, Mosiuoa Lekota's remarks as he addressed the South African Communist Party(SACP) congress where he asserted that, "The art of managing

contradictions is what has carried this alliance to where it is today.”<sup>3</sup>

In his own analysis, Hein Marais concurs with these observations as he portrays ANC’s balancing act and ideological flexibility;

“It commandingly straddles both the centre and the left of the political spectrum, while also serving as a convenient abode for many conservative Africans... the ideological and strategic flexibility it derived from these currents which co-existed (especially in exile) under the mantle of stern discipline, equipping it with built-in ambiguities that later cushion sharp policy turns... The key, of course, was to fashion an ideology of struggle and ideals supple enough to accommodate and entertain these contradictory impulses. At this, the ANC proved remarkably adept”<sup>4</sup>

The politics of open-ended solutions can, to some extent, be attributed to this history and current reality of competing political forces as well as ideological currents within the ANC fold.

Scholars, just like public policymakers, in their attempts to grapple with this complex reality responded in a variety of manners. This will become evident in the second chapter of this study where a review and analysis of various studies on this subject is presented.

A majority of scholars became more preoccupied with the legal and constitutional framework as they tried to identify a model that would best accommodate traditional leaders within a new democratic dispensation. One group of studies focuses on a range of African post-independence policies on traditional leadership particularly within the

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3 “No problems with SACP, Says Mbeki” Daily Dispatch Online July 26, 2002

4 Marais, H. “Topping up the tank: The Reproduction of ANC power since 1994.” May 1999; pp.1-2 (Unpublished paper)

context of local government.<sup>5</sup> Most of these studies were inspired by and also explicitly trying to influence the South African debate on the future role of traditional leaders by providing a range of African policy models and experiences that came with transitions to the new local government systems across the African countries.

There are studies that share this preoccupation with legal and constitutional issues but the only difference is that they exclusively focused on South Africa's emerging legal and constitutional framework. The emphasis of this work is also on the role of traditional leaders within the new South African democracy. These studies include Houston<sup>6</sup>, Ntsebeza<sup>7</sup> and Cloete<sup>8</sup>. Some of the studies look at how traditional leaders reacted and adapted to these political and legal changes, and these include Adriaan<sup>9</sup>, Maloka<sup>10</sup>, and Kessel and Oomen<sup>11</sup>.

These studies have largely neglected the nature and implications of cohabitation or coexistence of traditional authorities and elected local councils in the rural areas. In a

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<sup>5</sup>Examples of this emphasis is found in the following: Keulder, C Traditional leaders and local government in Africa: Lessons for South Africa 1998; d'Engelbronner-Koff, F., et al (eds) Traditional authority and democracy in Southern Africa 1998.; Osaghae, E. Traditional leadership in Southern Africa 1997.

6 Houston, G., et al, (eds) Aspects of the debate on the draft of the new South African Constitution 1996.

7 Ntsebeza, L. "Land tenure reform, traditional authorities and rural local government in post-apartheid South Africa." 1999

8 Cloete, F. Local government transformation in South Africa. 1995

9 Adriaan, E. et al, African chieftaincy in a new socio-political landscape 1999

10 Maloka, T. "Populism and politics of chieftaincy and nation-building in the new South Africa." In Journal of Contemporary African Studies 1996

11 Kessel, B., et al, "One chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid South Africa." African Affairs No.96, 1997.

compelling argument, Sklar<sup>12</sup> exposes and critiques this deficit particularly among political scientists who study Africa. Also ignored is the role of civic leaders in rural communities and their interaction with both the traditional leaders and elected councilors. If the constitutional reality is that both traditional authorities and elected councils have to coexist in rural areas the focus, therefore, should shift and put spotlight on the nature of relationship between these institutions. Equally important is the fact that civic leaders are a political reality and a political force to reckon with in most of these communities. It is therefore logical to factor in or add to this traditional leader-elected councilors' equation the civic leaders who form part of the political elite in these rural communities. In its focus on the relations among the various sectors of the rural elite, this study is an attempt to address the knowledge gap left by most studies as exemplified by the ones listed above.

The establishment of elected local councilors alongside traditional authorities and already existing civic organizations created different centers of power in many rural communities. It is, therefore, important to understand dominant trends of rural local elite relations as they occur among the various sectors of the local elite, namely, traditional leaders, elected councilors and civic leaders. Any attempt to understand the consolidation of democracy, political participation of citizens, decentralization of power as well as local development in the rural areas has to understand the dominant trends of elite relations given their influence in their communities. Each dominant sector of the rural elite, as it

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12 Sklar, R. "The African Frontier for Political Science" in Bates, R., et al, (eds) Africa and the Disciplines: Contributions of research in Africa to the social science and humanities 1993.

will be demonstrated in this study, has the power to frustrate or facilitate local development, administration or broad participation by citizens.

The primary focus of this study is on the political dynamics of rural local government in the post-apartheid South Africa. In more specific terms, this study explores and analyzes relations among the local elites that include traditional leaders, elected local councilors and civic leaders.

The ultimate objective is to understand, in a comparative manner, the nature of conflict between traditional leaders and elected councilors and or civic leaders in some communities and their cooperation or accommodation in others. This study is organized around the following questions:

- a) What is the composition, function and structure of rural local government in the post-apartheid South Africa?
- b) What sorts of relations have actually evolved between the traditional leaders and the emergent elite of elected councilors and civic leaders?
- c) What are the factors that are associated with conflictual relations and cooperative relations between the different sectors of the rural elite?

Hypotheses are formulated in light of broad theoretical perspectives. In view of the literature reviewed in chapter two and the questions posed above, it is hypothesized that:

- a) A community, which is primarily dominated by elites, some of which have social attributes that are traditional and others that have modern attributes, is often

associated with conflict. This is often the case where the traditionalists dominate one institution, such as the tribal council, while the modernized elite dominate or are grouped in the other alternative or parallel institutions such as the elected local government structures or local civic organizations. Conversely, a diffused membership in these institutions or homogeneity across groups is associated with accommodation or cooperation between different sectors of the elite. This diffusion of elite composition in various institutions may also take the form of plurality, along the lines of Robert Dahl model four, in which membership and competition to influence decision making is based on individuals organized around their interest than the divide between the traditional and the modern elite. This hypothesis is based on the modernization theory's notion of traditional versus modern elite due to their different or conflicting values and interests. The study is mindful of the fact that modernization or being modern has too many indicators that cannot be exhaustively dealt with within the confines of this study. Consequently, the emphasis in this study is on education, often used as one of the key indicators of modernity, and attitude toward traditional institutions such as traditional land tenure system, and traditional values and customs. In view of this, it is asked whether being well educated or not/less educated makes a difference in the relations of rural elite. In this case one would expect conflict if one sector of local elite, for example traditional leadership, is less educated and the elected or civic leadership in the same community is well educated. The differences in their views regarding traditional institutions and values would be expected to cause tension if there is a traditional/modern elite divide.

- b) Social stratification that puts one group of the local elite in one class that has resource advantage while locating the other disadvantaged class is often associated with conflict which will essentially be over the access to and control of resources. In essence this is a classic case of class conflict, which is propagated by structuralist theorists that are particularly Marxist-inclined scholars. It should be stated from the onset that the author is aware of the complexity of African social structures and the debates surrounding the definition or even the existence of social classes, at least in a classical sense as they have come to be known in industrialized societies, in Africa. I return to this point in greater detail in the following chapter. The use of the term here is to be taken in its broadest possible meaning of people with more resources and those with less or nothing. More specifically, ownership of resources (livestock, farming land, residential plot, business), employment status and income distribution are used in this study to assess general distribution of resources across the sectors of rural elite.
- c) Ethnic cleavages which are organized around the local institutions and organizations are associated with conflict whereas ethnic homogeneity of the local elite is associated with accommodation.
- d) Party political affiliations of local elites play an important role in shaping their relationship. Where the elite, drawn from different local institutions and organizations, is prominently and actively involved in different political parties it

is more likely that there will be conflict.

- e) The style and quality of leadership, particularly the one of the traditional leaders who are already entrenched in the rural communities, has an important role in the relationships among the local elite. For example, a leader who is effective in mobilizing and co-opting key figures from different sections of the community is more likely to avoid alienating other local leaders thus avoiding creating, often unnecessary, political enemies. For example, a confrontational and exclusionist leadership will alienate some sectors of the local elite and their attempt to establish alternative centers of power will often develop into a conflict. Similarly, a leader who skillfully and timely uses a range of repertoire, traditional and modern, is likely to appeal to a wide range of the population and, therefore, consolidate his support and legitimacy.

At this juncture it should be pointed out that the inherent assumption in this work is that institutional boundaries have a potential of reinforcing social, class, ethnic and political cleavages or differences. It is this assumption that influenced my choice of the members of the three prominent local institutions, namely, traditional authority, elected local councils and civic organizations. These institutional boundaries may be used as a mobilizing platform, as tools to access and control resources as well as a context within which common identities, therefore shared interests, are forged.

This is primarily a comparative case-oriented empirical study of the elite relations in nine



communities, namely, Adams Mission, Embo, Mfume, Mnceba, Nzongisa, Rode, Tweefontein, Sokhulumu and Vezokuhle. These communities are drawn from the following South African provinces; KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern and Mpumalanga. Comparisons and analysis, in order to address the hypotheses outlined above, primarily takes place at two levels:

- a) Characteristics of respondents in conflict communities are compared with those of respondents in non-conflict communities.
- b) Characteristics of rural elite are compared across the elite sectors in order to assess if there are trends or patterns suggesting variation. The field study part of this research was conducted between April 5 and September 30 of the year 2000.

The following is a brief outline of chapters that form the rest of this dissertation. Chapter two reviews literature in a manner that outlines dominant trends and themes while at the same time pointing out gaps in the existing body of knowledge on rural politics in Africa. Particular emphasis is on theories or perspectives that directly or indirectly relate to the key questions and hypotheses in this study. Throughout this chapter differences between this study and the existing literature are highlighted in a manner that demonstrate the way this work builds upon this knowledge while trying to overcome some of its limitations.

In chapter three, research design and data collection are discussed. More specifically, this chapter describes the population and the sample that was studied. The procedures that were used in data collection as well as the tools for data analysis are also presented in this section.

Chapter four presents a historical overview which primarily focuses on the evolution, manipulation and mutation of indigenous political institutions or chieftaincy from the pre-colonial period through colonial and apartheid era. The rationale for focusing on chieftaincy or traditional authority in this chapter is based on the understanding that it has been, until recently, the primary institution of rural local government for the African people.

Chapter five discusses the contemporary phase of rural politics in South Africa, and this is done by identifying and analyzing the emerging institutions and political forces in the rural landscape. The following questions guide the flow of discussion in this chapter; what are the dominant political forces which shaped the agenda and therefore public policy on rural local government? Which sectors of the elite emerged as key players and stakeholders in rural local politics? How did traditional leaders react to and position themselves within the new dispensation of liberation and democratic politics? What is the composition, function and structure of rural local government in the post-apartheid South Africa? What sort of relations have actually evolved among the local elites in the context of the new political dispensation? In this chapter, it is shown that the political changes in the rural areas predate the formal establishment of the local councils after the 1995 and 1996 local government elections. It is argued that significant political developments that reconfigured elite politics in the rural areas can be traced back to the late 1980s at the height of political mobilization by forces opposed to the apartheid regime.

In chapter six a profile of selected communities or cases is presented in a form of a

narrative that is mainly constructed from the qualitative portion of the interviews and focus group discussions with rural local elite. These narratives complement descriptive summary statistics in many ways. For example, an account of each case provides some information on the history and evolution of relationship among the key political players. It gives voice to the participants while it also provides context to the relational dynamics of each community. By giving voice to the key participants, this chapter also reveals, to a great extent, rural elite's perceptions and understanding of conflict and cooperation. These dimensions cannot be easily represented in descriptive statistics.

The central focus of chapter seven is the presentation and analysis of survey and study results. Trends that indicate relations between types of rural elite relations, that is conflictual and accommodative, and selected variables are identified and analyzed. These results are primarily in quantitative form. Charts that show frequencies and distribution of characteristics of the sectors of elites as well as inferential statistics are used to present and analyze results. The presentation of these results in this case is arranged according to the main hypotheses and theoretical perspectives. More specifically, the findings will indicate age, ethnicity, education, party affiliation and identity, distribution of resources, attitudes toward traditional values and traditional land tenure system are in any way related to these forms of rural elite relations. Opinions on penalties imposed by traditional courts, existence and non-existence of geopolitical factors in local conflicts, perception of corruption as well as views on respondent's influence on decision making processes are also part of the data that analyze attitudes of rural elite. Policy preference profile of individuals in conflict communities will be compared to that of their counterparts in non-

**conflict (accommodative/cooperative) communities. Attitudes towards payment of services in rural areas, traditional land tenure and New Municipal Demarcation Law are the component parts of assessment of attitudes towards policies affecting rural areas.**

**In order to achieve this task chapter seven utilizes demographic characteristics and opinions/attitudes of 143 individual respondents who participated in the survey.**

**Individuals from conflict communities are compared with those of non-conflict communities using the above-mentioned variables. It should be recalled that relations between traditional authorities and elected councilors and or civic leaders is at the core of this study. Analysis of individual attributes takes this into account by aggregating their responses or characteristics and determining if there is a trend.**

**Key to chapter eight is the presentation and analysis of survey results at a provincial level. In this case trends associated with the types of elite relations within and between provinces, in individual communities as well as the attributes of key protagonists in the elite sectors constitute the scope of this chapter. A distinction between chapter seven and chapter eight is that the latter focuses on and compares trends within and between provinces whereas the former compares aggregated individual attributes of those in conflict relations with those in non-conflict relations.**

**The ninth and final chapter of this study discusses and interprets the important trends that emerge from analysis of results. It is in this section that conclusions are drawn as a direct answer to the questions asked and hypotheses formulated in the opening chapters of this**

study. The implications of the conclusions drawn from this study in the light of broader literature on Africa form a closing part of this chapter. Also discussed in this chapter are the policy implications of this study and these findings for South Africa and the African countries that are grappling with the challenge of coexisting traditional and modern political institutions especially in the context of emerging liberal multiparty democracies. In all, chapters four and five provide a broad historical and contemporary context of rural local politics, and in so doing they also take us through the evolution of local government structures and competing political forces in South Africa. Chapters six, seven and eight concentrate on presenting different aspects of the collected data. Chapter six focuses on the case histories that are constructed from qualitative portion of the study, and chapters seven and eight extensively utilize quantitative data on demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the participants. The use of different methods in presenting and analyzing data is meant to cover as many possible dimensions of the phenomenon of rural elite relations as possible.

As a preview of the findings of this study, it should be stated that age, party affiliation, education, income, employment, views on respondent's influence on decisions taken by elected councils, opinion on municipal demarcation, and attitudes toward payment of service fees show strong trend that suggests relationship with type of elite relations. In addition, there are indications, tentative though they may be, that some aspects of leadership style do make a difference in the relationship between different sectors of the rural elite. Geopolitical factors as well as distribution of resources tended to be drawn along the geographic lines. Another important finding that is closely associated with

KwaZulu-Natal province is the overriding influence of party political affiliation on elite relations. Elite conflict in this case is primarily between the members of the two dominant parties in the province, namely, the ANC and the IFP.

On the other hand, ethnicity, distribution of resources and policy preferences do not indicate a trend that is associated with conflict and or non-conflict relations. Instead, preferences for and opposition against traditional land tenure, and opinion on traditional values and customs reflect sectoral interests (traditional leaders, elected councilors and civic leaders) than shedding light on why there are conflicts in certain communities and no conflict in others. From the very onset a disclaimer that these results do not seek to establish causal relationship between variables is necessary to offer in order to understand the scope and nature of these results and the manner they are presented, analyzed and interpreted.

By the time the reader has finished reading this work it is hoped that he/she shall have accomplished the following regarding South Africa's rural local government and its political dynamics:

- a) A sense of historical evolution of rural local government and rural local politics in general. The emphasis is mainly on the institution of traditional leadership that was a dominant political force during the pre-colonial era, and managed to survive, albeit with many modifications, the colonial and apartheid era.
- b) An understanding of contemporary politics in the areas under the jurisdiction of

traditional leaders. This includes the political forces, going back to the late 1980s, that produced resistance and liberation politics in these rural areas. The reader is made to witness the emergence of political formations such as the civic organizations, youth organizations, the labor unions as well as the local branches of the major political organizations that begun to contest the powers and authority of traditional leaders.

- c) With the coming of the new democratic government in 1994, reform process that led to the reconfiguration of rural local government thus introducing new political actors, redefinition of roles I local administration and further erosion of traditional authority. In all this, various reactions to these political developments by traditional leaders are discussed in a manner that reveal them, not as docile and rigid as often portrayed, but as astute political operators who understand and adjust to the winds of change.
- d) This study portrays the relations that have evolved between the sections of rural political elite, particularly those who are drawn from traditional authority, the elected councilors and the civic leaders.
- e) At the heart of this comparative study is an identification of factors that are associated with individuals/elites in conflictual relations and those in non-conflictual relations. This examination of trends regarding the type of rural elite relations is examined from many angles including the provincial and community

dimensions as well as attributes of key protagonists.

- f) This study will conclude by outlining the implications of the findings and this study on the existing body of literature on rural politics in South Africa and in Africa. Similarly, the broad policy implications for South Africa and Africa are enlisted with particular reference to consolidation of democracy in rural areas and local administration and development.



## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

**Events have a way of upsetting theories about them. The best-laid analyses, especially those claiming unmasked realities hidden or disguised by powers that be (whether by design or default), turn out, at best, to have only a moment of truth. As that moment fades events and perspectives appear quite differently, especially in retrospect (indeed if remembered at all). As for theories that once aroused great political passion, one tends to either look back in anger or (as with failed religions) to wonder what the fuss was about. Africa— or, more precisely, Sub-Saharan Africa— has been particularly subject to such fluctuating truths and flights of interpretive fancy. This is not surprising. No other continent has been heir to so many judgments about its very nature, 'Africaness'.<sup>13</sup>**

**"It is clear that there is no consensus among analysts on how to probe the complex interconnections between politics and society in Africa. Old certainties on the relevance of legal, formal-institutional (legislatures, executives, parties, judiciaries), psychocultural, and purely historical frameworks have largely disappeared. . . Thus, social scientists have little alternative but to undertake a search for new conceptual frameworks that would afford a fuller insight into dynamic processes unfolding on the continent."<sup>14</sup>**

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<sup>13</sup> Apter, D and Rosberg, C. (eds) Political development and the new realism in Sub-Saharan Africa 1994., p.1.

<sup>14</sup> Chazan, N. et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa 1999; p.14.

**“These back-to-back domains of authority are readily identifiable as the realm of state sovereignty and the realm of traditional government; both systems effectively govern the same communities of citizen-subjects. Although dualistic systems of political authority can be found in other parts of the world, their establishment by combinations of custom and law in Africa is more comprehensive and systematic than elsewhere. Hence the utility of ‘mixed government’ as a concept that draws attention to the comparative advantage of Africanist scholarship on a neglected subject that could be of general interest to political scientists.”<sup>15</sup>**

The above passages can be metaphorically depicted as double-edged swords that one encounters in reviewing literature on the topic of rural local government and rural elite political relations in Africa. Firstly, the problem, as indicated by the first two statements, is the one of finding a comprehensive and relevant theory that speaks directly to the specific research questions of this study. However, this same problem presents an opportunity to synthesize and integrate disparate perspectives. Secondly, there is a general lack of relevant literature on rural local politics particularly pertaining to the relations among the different sectors of the local elite. The same deficit that is pointed out by Sklar also provides a window of opportunity for one to close this knowledge gap especially with regards to a new democracy like South Africa's. This chapter takes these limitations and opportunities into consideration.

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<sup>15</sup>Sklar, R. “The African Frontier for Political Science” in Bates, R., Mudimbe, V., & O'Barr, J (eds) Africa and the disciplines: The contributions of research in Africa to the Social Sciences and humanities 1993; p.87.

This chapter is divided into the following sections: The first section focuses on the significance of this study in understanding Africa politics. This section is followed by an outline of major trends in the existing literature on rural politics in Africa. A similar analysis of South African literature on this subject is presented in the next section. Then there is a brief outline of the key questions and hypotheses of this study. This paves way for the section that identifies and describes some theoretical perspectives that are used to understand the phenomenon of rural elites relations in South Africa. It is within this context that key concepts of this study are described.

## **2.1. Why bother? Significance of rural local politics in understanding Africa.**

Before embarking on this discussion it is important to explain the significance of this study in our understanding of African politics. Of the scholars who have indicated the importance of studying the relationship between traditional and modern institutions, Sklar presents a compelling and direct case. He conceptualizes this relationship as “dual authority” or “mixed government”. In trying to emphasize the continued importance of traditional authority, he frequently deploys the term “state-behind-the-state”. He develops this point as he points toward the realities of African societies. He asserts that,

“...the practical importance of traditional authority, its real significance, does not depend on the manner of its interpretation by social scientists. The *kgotla*, the *Alake* of Egbaland, and the marabouts of Senegal exert power in their societies regardless of one or another academic interpretation of their roles. Hence the concept of mixed government differs from concepts, such as statism, that refer to abstract objects of thought rather than concrete realities. The significance of the second state can be explained, but its real impact on society cannot be explained

away.”<sup>16</sup>

Sklar’s observation exposes a disjuncture between ideas and facts on the ground. This, he argues, has even more direct bearing on political science than on any other social science discipline. He observes that “Political scientists have neglected to articulate the reality of this circumstance, although its manifestation in contemporary Africa is pervasive.”<sup>17</sup> Throughout his argument, Sklar does not just acknowledge this conspicuous neglect of an important reality but goes on to identify this area as a potential niche for African and Africanist scholars as its manifestation in Africa is more systematic and elaborate than anywhere else in the world.

While Sklar puts his finger on the problem in his schematic outline, he, however, falls short of taking any specific cases to comprehensively demonstrate how this interaction between traditional institutions and the modern state play out. He is not alone in acknowledging the resilience of traditional institutions in post-colonial and contemporary Africa. Just more than two decades earlier, Norman Miller reinforced the notion of political survival of traditional leadership in his assertion that, although legally deposed by many independent African governments, such leaders continue to exercise substantial influence, particularly in the building of local institutions in the rural areas. Some have been able to

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<sup>16</sup>Sklar, *op cit*, p.94.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid*, p.86.

move into party or administrative positions; others have been so strong that the local authorities have been forced to deal with them as spokesmen of their area. Other traditional rulers have no formal leadership position but through manipulation of their past legitimacy, have continued to dictate local policies and shape major decisions. Whatever the basis, the political survival of traditional leaders is significant because they provide the vital linkage between the government and the people. They influence the success of specific modernization schemes by serving as translators, interpreters, and mediators of government goals.”<sup>18</sup>

In this observation Miller does not only point toward the resilience of traditional leaders as he also raises the issue of their importance in nation-building process or put differently, they regulate the manner of penetration of modern state in their respective local rural areas. Proctor concurs with this view in his claim that,

“A major problem encountered by the builders of many of the new states in Africa has been that of defining a satisfactory position for traditional tribal authorities in a more integrated and democratic political system.”<sup>19</sup>

The above observations highlight the fact that one would have to take traditional leaders into consideration when planning or executing local development programs or in extending democratic institutions into the rural areas. It is not only scholars but also

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<sup>18</sup>Miller, N. “The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership” in Miller, N (ed) Research in Rural Africa 1969; p.183.

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Proctor, J. “The House of Chiefs and the Political Development of Botswana” in The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol 6, No.1, 1968; p.59.

political leaders who are aware of the vital role that traditional leaders play as well as the complexity of reconciling their role with modern institutions. Mandela's observation is one such example as he states that,

“Perhaps more difficult than most, is to find the best way in which our elected structures of local government and traditional leaders can work together for the good of their communities. This is crucial area of reconstruction and development, and a resolution of outstanding differences and conflictual matters is of greatest importance.”<sup>20</sup>

These observations which all point out the vital importance of traditional leaders in rural local politics are not matched by similar academic interest on this subject particularly in the contemporary African studies. It is this yawning gap between realities of African politics and existing ideas that this study seeks to address.

The 1990s' wave of democratic transitions in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia have also led to attempts, though with varying degrees of success, to revive traditional leadership. This was the case in Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Cambodia, and Bulgaria. Gwynne Dyer writes states that “All the Balkan countries were monarchies before 1945. And all of them are now trying to make a comeback.”<sup>21</sup> The outbreak of ethno-nationalism in the wake of globalization and, in some instance, the collapse of modern state systems has also led to the revival and reinvention of local traditional institutions. This is certainly the case in Somalia where the clan leaders have asserted their role or more recently in Afghanistan where the tribal leaders and tribal council or *loyi jerga* has assumed new importance. These point not just toward the survival of

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<sup>20</sup>Mail and Guardian, April 7-12, 1997.

<sup>21</sup>Dyer, G. “Men who would be kings, again.” in Cape Times April 10, 1999.

traditional leaders but their increased role. This then challenges scholars not to view them as a relic of the past on their way out but as a vibrant continuing phenomenon with a capacity for adaptation that has to be understood in the context of the modern state system, especially at local levels. It is equally possible that this reflects the weakness of the civil society in those countries as expressed in the lack or weakness of associational and political society in those countries. Some of the above-mentioned state range from collapsed states to states that are struggling with transition from totalitarian regimes. The point being made here is that there may be more than just one or two reasons that account for continued existence of traditional political formations in these countries.

Much of the current reports on the resurgence of traditional authorities is reflected in the media which tend to focus more on prominent public ceremonies such as weddings, funerals and coronations rather than presenting an in-depth analysis of political processes that characterize the interface of traditional and modern institutions.<sup>22</sup> There is, however, growing, though still relatively scanty, academic interest on the subject of traditional leaders' relationship with state as this discussion will show. There is a trickle of academic essays on revival of traditional authority and their role within the current African political systems. The works of Kessel and Oomen<sup>23</sup>, West<sup>24</sup>, Houston & Fikeni<sup>25</sup>

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The following articles are some of the examples of these journalistic reports which reflect the renewed interest in the institutions of traditional rulership; "Wedding furore shows Ugandans updating monarchy isn't easy" in Cape Times July 20, 1999; Kachiri, R. "The King's choice" New African October 1999.; Shoumatoff, A. "The coronation of King Ronnie" New African ?; "Royal Ashanti: Ghana's Golden Heritage." New African Life December 1996.; McNeil, D. "(Male) Zimbabwe Tribal Elders' Chief Complaint." New York Time January 12, 1999; Ofori-Atta, N. "The mighty oak has fallen." Africa Today May 1999.

23 Kessel, I. and Oomen, B. "One chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid

Osaghae<sup>26</sup>, Katorobo<sup>27</sup>, Oloka-Onyango<sup>28</sup>, d'Engelbronner-Kolff and Sindano<sup>29</sup>, Ntsebeza<sup>30</sup> and Maloka<sup>31</sup> and Adriaan<sup>32</sup> are examples of studies which have begun to acknowledge the reality of traditional leaders' role within the contemporary African states. For an example, Kayunga focuses on the role that traditional rulers can play in the process of political decentralization<sup>33</sup>. He sees them as alternative centers of political power to that of the state thus providing some checks and balances to what otherwise would be a hegemonic state. He asserts that chiefs often play the same democratizing and decentralizing role as political actors within the civil society. However, he decries the fact that western scholars seem to be more interested in all other organs of civil society such as the media, trade unions, student movement, voluntary associations and women's organizations with no attention being given to traditional rulers or indigenous leaders who often play the same political role of counter-balancing the overbearing political weight of state power.

Jeffrey Herbst's claims seem to underscore this new development as he claims that,

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South Africa" in African Affairs Vol.96, 1997

24 West, H. et al., "Betwixt and between: Traditional Authority and democratic decentralization in post-war Mozambique." In African Affairs Vol.98, 1999.

25 Houston, G. et al., Aspects of the debate on the draft of the New South African Constitution 1996.

26 Osaghae, E. (ed) Traditional Leadership in Southern Africa 1997.

27 Katoboro, P. and Keulder, C. Traditional leaders and local government in Africa 1998.

28 Olok-Onyango, J. "The question of Buganda in contemporary Ugandan politics" Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol. 15, No.2., 1997.

29 d'Engelbronner-Kolff, and Sindano, J. (eds) Traditional authority and democracy in Southern Africa 1998

30 Ntsebeza, L. Land Tenure reform, traditional authorities and rural local government in post-apartheid South Africa: Case Studies from the Eastern Cape 1999.

31 Maloka, T. "Populism and the politics of chieftaincy and nation-building in the new South Africa." In Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol. 14, No. 2, 1996.

32 Adriaan, E. African Chieftaincy in a new socio-political landscape. 1999

33 Kayunga, S. "Traditional rulers and decentralization in Africa: An assessment." in Katoboro, P, Brett, E. and Munene, J, (eds) Uganda: Landmarks in rebuilding a Nation 1998.



**“Academic research has only begun to explore the relationship between chiefs and states . . . However, whether or not they are legitimate in the eyes of researchers, whether or not they were created by colonial officials, local rulers are an important factor in African politics that cannot be ignored.”<sup>34</sup>**

The post-apartheid South Africa is currently grappling with issues of nation-building and democratization and this makes it an even more interesting case for the study of dominant aspects of relations among rural local elites. In this respect, the work of Kessel and Oomen<sup>35</sup> and that of Maloka<sup>36</sup> present a compelling portrayal of chiefs' reaction to political changes in South Africa. In their account chiefs are presented as adaptive and astute political actors who studied the political changes and appropriated the language of liberation discourse upon realizing that apartheid regime was facing its demise. In these two studies we begin to see a classic case of traditional leaders effectively using both modern and traditional repertoire as one of many political arsenals to bargain for inclusion within the emerging political dispensation in South Africa. A more detailed account of these studies is presented in chapter five that is dealing with contemporary issues of South African rural politics. The content of discussions of the other studies cited above features prominently in chapters four and five. In view of the above discussion, this study contributes to our understanding of political processes that affect democratization and development in rural local areas. By targeting all sectors of rural local elite this study seeks to avoid the mistake of exclusively focusing on traditional leaders to the exclusion of the other sectors of the elite or vice versa.

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<sup>34</sup> Herbst, J. States and Power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control 2000., p.23.

<sup>35</sup> Kessel, B and Oomen, “One chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid South Africa.” African Affairs No.96, 1997.

<sup>36</sup> Maloka, T. “Populism and the politics of chieftaincy and nation-building in the new South Africa.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol. 14., No. 2, 1996.

## **2.2. Salient themes and trends in African rural politics literature.**

In this section a highlight of relevant literature is presented. An elaboration is only made later in case of the literature which has specific relevance to theoretical issues that are used for this study. As stated earlier, a focus on the relationship among the various sectors of rural local elite in Africa is scanty and is often alluded to in studies whose focus is on other subjects.

Of the identified sectors of rural local elite, chiefs have, in relative terms, received far more attention. In the aftermath of the first wave of African independence in the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a trickle of studies which focused on the role of traditional leaders within the independent states and their reaction or adjustment to the new dispensation. Miller's essay, *The political survival of traditional leadership*<sup>37</sup> and Whitaker's *The politics of tradition, continuity and change in Northern Nigeria*<sup>38</sup> best represent and largely inspired this first wave of literature. Another important collection of essays is presented in Lamarchand's *African Kingships in perspective: Political change and modernization in monarchical settings*<sup>39</sup>. However, this work is generally confined to societies with monarchies and has a limited application to local chiefs and their communities. The emphasis in this work is on kings and their interaction with the state.

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37 Miller, N. "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership." In Mills, M. et al., Keiskammahoek rural survey 1952.

38 Whitaker's The politics of tradition, continuity and change in Northern Nigeria 1970.

39 Lamarchand, R. African Kingships in perspective: Political change and modernization in monarchical settings 1977.

More recently, Mahmood Mamdani<sup>40</sup> theorized about conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa by focusing on inbuilt tension between the native dwellers who are citizens and immigrants or refugees who settle and become subjects without enjoying the full rights of citizenship.

The focus on the role of traditional rulership seems to have largely disappeared by the late 1970s and the mention of their role was mainly alluded to in essays which otherwise did not put them at the center of their analysis. This first wave of literature can be summarized as an attempt to explain the role of traditional leaders in the post-independent Africa, with particular stress on their survival strategies and resourcefulness in adjusting to the new political dispensation.

There is another trend of literature which focused on rural politics with a particular focus on the peasantry which was regarded as the most common and numerically dominant social class in African societies. This body of literature either stressed the different modes of peasant resistance to the capitalist mode of production or their interactions with the modern state system. This literature was largely, though not exclusively, inspired by the Marxist structural approach which emphasized class analysis, class interests and conflict. In this literature there is a strong emphasis on political economy. The works such as Hyden's *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and uncaptured peasantry*<sup>41</sup>,

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40 Mamdani, M. Citizens and Subjects: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism 1996.

41 Hyden, G. Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and uncaptured peasantry 1980

Isaacman's *Peasants and rural social protest in Africa*<sup>42</sup>, Bratton's *The local politics of rural development: Peasant and party-state in Zambia*<sup>43</sup>, Ranger's *Peasant consciousness and Guerilla war in Zimbabwe*<sup>44</sup> are some of the key works which represent this trend. Hyden's work on the uncaptured peasantry examines the extent to which peasants are integrated in the modern political economy. This work effectively dispelled the notion that the peasants were helpless victims at a mercy of state and state policies. Hyden's work reveal and analyze a range of strategies used by peasants to resists state policies imposed on them especially those with detrimental effect on their livelihood. He used the failure of the Tanzanian state policy, Ujamaa, failure as a demonstrative case study. Along the same theme peasant resistance and active participation in national politics, Terrence Ranger focuses on the peasant consciousness and political in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Firstly, the core of his thesis is that peasants as a social class, have their political consciousness in the same manner as other classes such as the industrial workers or the proletariat have. He outlines the ways the peasants', particularly the spirit mediums, intervention in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was so crucial in the success of ZANU and in the formulation of its ideology. The problem with Ranger's thesis is his failure to emphasize differentiation within the peasantry as well as internal divisions in what is essentially a fracticious social unit. The most telling and clinical exposition of these weaknesses in Ranger's work is launched by Norma Kriger who highlight internal divisions within the Zimbabwean peasantry as well as the use of coercive means by the ZANU liberation cadres to squeeze compliance from

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42 Isaacman, A. "Peasants and rural social protest in Africa" in African Studies Review 1990

43 Bratton, M. The local politics of rural development: Peasant and party-state in Zambia 1980

44 Ranger, T. Peasant consciousness and Guerilla war in Zimbabwe. 1985

rural peasantry.<sup>45</sup>

Allen Isaacman's essay takes a form stock-taking in a form of a general review of literature on the African peasantry with emphasis on the ones that deal with peasant resistance. This study, in the final analysis, endorses the notion of peasantry's active participation, mainly in a form of resistance, in political life especially when this affects their well-being. More important in this essay is an attempt to show that the peasantry is not a homogenous unit nor does it often take a united approach or stance on policy matters. Even though this literature put the spotlight on rural politics it rarely focused on the individual sectors of the rural elite as it generally embraced the peasantry as a social group with an aggregated interest or political outlook.

In the 1990s or in the aftermath of Africa's wave of democratic transitions the literature on decentralization and broad participation alluded to the role of traditional leaders in local governance. Kayunga's essay, *Traditional rulers and decentralization in Africa: An assessment*<sup>46</sup>, and Wunsch's *Regime transformation from below: decentralization. Local governance and democratic reform in Nigeria*<sup>47</sup>, best represent this trend which was short-lived.

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<sup>45</sup> Kriger, N. "The Zimbabwean War of Liberation: Struggles within struggles". Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 14., No. 2., January 1988.

<sup>46</sup> Kayunga's essay, "Traditional rulers and decentralization in Africa: An assessment" in Kataboro, P., et al, op cit. 1995

<sup>47</sup> Wunsch's Regime transformation from below: decentralization. Local governance and democratic reform in Nigeria 1996.

In the late 1990s there is a new and increasing interest on the role of traditional leaders and this has been triggered, to a large extent, by the debate and controversy surrounding traditional leaders in the post-apartheid South Africa. This literature tends to focus on the constitutional role of traditional leaders in Africa and different cases of African countries are presented with the ultimate aim of influencing or guiding the unfolding constitutional or legal process in South Africa. The work is generally more descriptive and case-oriented. Moreover, the main focus of this work is on the relationship between the national governments and the chiefs with scanty regard for local elite dynamics in rural communities under the jurisdiction of chiefs. D'Engelbronner-Kolff *Traditional Authority and Democracy in Southern Africa*<sup>48</sup>, Adriaan *African Chieftaincy in a new socio-political landscape*<sup>49</sup>, and Osaghae *Traditional leadership in Southern Africa*<sup>50</sup> are more recent important contributions on the role of traditional leaders in within African countries.

Scholars interested in consolidation of democracy and broad participation within the African states tended to conceptualize and problematize this subject in terms of the civil society. This discourse tended to focus on the labor movement, media, voluntary associations and student movement with very little, if at all, regard for the rural elite particularly the role of traditional institutions. The civil society discourse generally has an urban bias with only a passing reference to rural politics even though there is plenty of

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48 D'Engelbronner-Kolff, op cit 1998

49 Adriaan., op cit 1999

50 Osaghae, op cit, 1997

evidence that any consolidation of democracy or broad participation would have to take this sector into consideration.

A considerable amount of work has been done on political and collective violence in African societies and this work is often done by historians and anthropologist.<sup>51</sup> But these studies suffer from several deficiencies especially with regards to the subject of rural elite relations that is at the heart of this study. The first deficit is pointed out in the following observation by William Beinart;

“Explaining and understanding African political violence as a response to conquest dispossession, and authoritarian nature of colonial rule and apartheid has not been particularly problematic for radical historians and social scientists. More difficult has been the related issue which Fanon raises: that violence within or between African communities. The first step in analysing internal violence has been to treat each incident or episode as discrete and potentially having a different line of causation. Any notion of intrinsic tendencies toward violence are thus dispensed with. Second, such violence has been seen as a result of divisions caused by the nature of colonial or settler rule.”<sup>52</sup>

While the above passage draws our attention to scanty focus on violence within the community, an aspect of internal community relations that this study is interested in, it is still limited to the focus of violence instead of a broad category of relations or conflict. It should be remembered that violence is only one aspect or expression of conflict, a point which is emphasized and discussed throughout this study. Secondly, the above identification of the limitation of studies that viewed violence/conflict as intrinsic or unique episode is of great importance here as this study is based on comparative method

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<sup>51</sup> Beinart, W., 1992; Moodie, D., 1992, Bundy, C. and Beinart, W. 1987

<sup>52</sup> Beinart, W. “Political and collective violence in Southern African Historiography” Journal of Southern African Studies Vol.18, No.3., 1992., p.465.

that puts less importance on idiographic or unique causes in favor of monothetic or general factors that influence events across societies. In any event, describing processes or events in terms of unique internal features within each community has an inherent problem of being trapped in a circular argument or line of reasoning where the society is described in terms of features and features are described in terms of the societal features. This general review of literature on broad topics related to the study of rural politics and relations pave way for literature that is more specific to the concepts, theories and empirical cases that are linked to the problem being examined in this study, that is the relations between the various sectors of the rural elite. Specific references to some of the literature cited above will be made in the subsequent discussion that deals with various perspectives on rural elite relations.

### **2.3. A review of literature on the rural politics in South Africa.**

A cursory observation of social science literature on South Africa reveals an urban bias which is shown by the treatment of rural areas as a residual factor in many studies. This tendency is evident across many disciplines and manifest itself in a variety of themes or subjects which range from local government, labor movement, anti-apartheid resistance, civil society, political economy and migrant labor system. There is, however, a considerable body of literature which has gone against this trend in making rural areas and their social and political dynamics the center of their focus. These studies are to be found in both historical and contemporary works. Since a more detailed and specific reference to most of this literature is in the next two chapters it suffices to briefly highlight dominant themes and trends in this section.



The literature that covers the colonial and an apartheid era tends to emphasize resistance of rural communities in reaction to repressive laws and dispossession. Beinart and Bundy's *Hidden struggles in rural South Africa*<sup>53</sup> and Mbeki's *South Africa: The Peasant Revolt*<sup>54</sup> are typical and prominent representation of this historical account of rural resistance. Both of these works put emphasis on the local resistance against the imposed colonial and apartheid laws. They both highlight instances where the rural communities joined forces with the national struggles organized by the black nationalist movement. A special mention of Hammond-Tooke's *Command and consensus: The development of Transkeian local government*<sup>55</sup> is warranted at this juncture. This study stands out as the only extensive account that looked into the internal dynamics and evolution of rural local government. It is, however, a descriptive, rather than analytical, account of the evolution of rural local government and it alludes to some of the emerging relations among the various sectors of the local elite. This work describes relations that occurred within communities as well as struggles between members of the rural elite as they tried to grapple with the manner in which relations with the colonial and apartheid government were to be conducted. These local elite struggles were more about accessing state resources while at the same time exercising influence over the local constituencies or villages. This historical account is confined to the case of Transkei thus limiting its cross-sectional comparative potential. Despite these limitations this work has a considerable amount of overlapping areas with this study and this will become obvious in subsequent

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53 Beinart and Bundy, C. Hidden struggles in rural South Africa 1987

54 Mbeki, G South Africa: The Peasant Revolt 1964

55 Hammond-Tooke Command and consensus: The development of Transkeian local government 1975

discussions. Further reference to Mbeki, Bundy and Hammond-Tooke's works is in chapter four.

As a prelude to a commentary on South African literature it is worth noting that an overwhelming majority of studies on South African local government tend to exclusively focus on urban areas<sup>56</sup>. Consequently, when the new South African government and public policymakers were deliberating on restructuring local government, they had very little in terms of academic studies to assist them when it came to designing models for rural areas. As a result transitional arrangements were effected with relative ease in the urban areas whereas confusion still lingers on in the rural areas.

Studies dealing with conflicts between different groups or political organizations in local communities also suffer from this urban bias as most of the survey literature tended to focus on township violence or political struggles with only a residual treatment of rural communities. Even these studies tended to be broad in their assessment of conflict thus glossing over some of political or relational dynamics occurring within individual communities.<sup>57</sup>

The post-apartheid controversy surrounding the role of traditional leaders within a new democratic dispensation has, however, triggered media and academic interest on rural

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<sup>56</sup>Cloete (1995) Local government transformation in South Africa is a prominent example of these urban-focused studies of local government. And Bekker, S.(ed) Citizen participation in local government 1996.

<sup>57</sup>This work is an example of these tendencies; Mayekiso, M Township politics: Civic Struggles for a new South Africa 1996 ;

local government and consequently projected a spotlight on some political dynamics associated with it. Outside a series of media articles and statements by public officials on this subject, there is a growing body of academic work. This tends to be a descriptive work which focuses on constitutional and legal aspect of rural local government with particular emphasis on the role of traditional leaders<sup>58</sup>. Some of these studies have even gone to the extent of suggesting that legal and constitutional ambiguity regarding the role of traditional leaders in the current dispensation is largely responsible for conflicts in many communities<sup>59</sup>. Role confusion or deliberate exploitation of this confusion by local elite trying to control local resources is seen as the cause of tension between the elected councilors and chiefs. Due to the lack of theoretical specificity of these studies on the issue of local elite relations their claims are generally suggestive than explicit. Literature which focuses on land reforms or developmental issues only represent a few articles. There is another variant of literature that focuses on traditional rulers and this includes Maloka<sup>60</sup> and Kessel and Oomen<sup>61</sup> whose work largely focuses on traditional reactions and mutation to the new dispensation and its accompanying reforms. In this account traditional leaders' use of liberation discourse as well as their appeal to or revival of tradition or customs is explored with less emphasis on legalistic or constitutional matters. In most of the current studies of South African transformation discussion of civil society

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<sup>58</sup> Some of the examples of this work are: Spitz, R and Chaskalson, M The politics of transition: A hidden history of South Africa's negotiated settlement 2000; Baeky, C "Politics of exclusion in the new South Africa" in Discussion paper, Community Law Center, Durban (September 1993); and Munro, W. "Dilemmas of rural local government in KwaZulu-Natal" Indicator South Africa Spring 1997.

<sup>59</sup> See Houston, G, et al, op cit, 1996; Ntsebeza, L "Rural local government in post- apartheid South Africa" African Sociological Review 1998.

<sup>60</sup> Maloka, op cit., 1996

<sup>61</sup> Kessel and Oomen., op cit. 1997

and more specifically of civic movement exclusively focuses on urban areas<sup>62</sup>. In view of this emerging and existing literature there is no study that has covered relations between the various sectors of the rural local elite, especially at the present moment when the new elected rural local councilors present a new power center which is trying to entrench itself in a contested political landscape. The issue of land reform and land tenure has attracted some scholars and their work yields some important information on rural politics.<sup>63</sup>

#### **2.4. Key questions and hypotheses**

In light of the stated objectives of this study one may ask these broad questions to provide a context for questions that guided this empirical study: What is the nature of rural politics in the contemporary South Africa? Who has power in rural communities? Who rules and how is power acquired and exercised? What are the key institutions that are used as tools to exercise power and influence? What is the nature of relations between the key players?

Another broad theoretical question that has preoccupied many social scientists, particularly political scientists, is whether structure or agency is the most useful explanation of dominant trends of political behavior and political processes. In this

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<sup>62</sup>See Mayekiso, op cit; Ndletyana, M. "The civic movement: A toothless watchdog?" Indicator South Africa Vol.16, No.3; and Glaser, D. "South Africa and the limits of civil society" Journal of Southern African Studies Vol 23, No.1, 1997

<sup>63</sup>Ntsebeza, L Land tenure reform, traditional authorities and rural local government in post-apartheid South Africa: Case studies from the Eastern Cape Research Report No.3 1999; Lipton, M, et al (eds) Land, labour and livelihoods in rural South Africa 1996.; Baber, A. and Nieuwoudt, W. "The principles of justice and rural land reform in South Africa" The South African Journal of Economics Vol 60, No.2, 1992; and Ross, C. and Rutsch, P. "Losing the land: securing tenure in tribal areas" Indicator South Africa Autumn 1995.

instance the same question can be asked with regard to rural elite relations: Is it structure or agency that influences and shape the dominant trends of elite relations? If the answer happens to be both or situational then one may ask: When does structure or agency become an important factor in elite relations? Or when and how do they combine to have a joint influence on these relations? Do these factors manifest themselves in the same manner across communities or are there important variations across regions?

The same question can be broken down, so as to bring it closer to the level of empirical analysis by the way of relating to each one of the selected perspectives and hypotheses. Can local elite conflict be characterized as a struggle between social classes? Is ethnicity associated with the prevailing relations between the sectors of the local elite? Can these relations be best understood in terms of party affiliation? Can these relations be depicted as a conflict between traditional and modern elite? Is the focus on interests of the elite, political initiative and struggle to access or control resources central in understanding dominant relations in various communities? These questions are obviously simplified versions of a complex reality which, among other things, has to account for multiple dimensions of each one of key variables identified above.

## **2.5. A brief outline of selected theoretical perspectives.**

The lack of any specific theory or conceptual framework which specifically addresses the phenomenon of rural local elite relations compels one to gather a variety of perspectives that have a potential of relating to some aspects of this study. The eclectic approach which is adopted in this study is well-suited for this challenge. In the following sections,

theories and empirical studies are outlined and briefly evaluated with the aim of formulating hypotheses for this empirical study. It should also be noted that most of these theories were designed to address state or broad regional politics as they occur at a national, provincial or sub-continental levels. For the purpose of this study they will be adjusted to fit the local level politics and more specifically to relate to the nature of relations between the traditional authorities and elected local councilors or local civic leaders. This discussion will culminate in an attempt to synthesize strands of the identified perspectives into an integrated approach which has a better chance of explaining various aspects of local elite relations.

#### **2.5.1. Modernization perspective: Traditional versus modern elite.**

A general survey of the literature immediately reveals that the modernization school is the most enduring and pervasive approach in social sciences. It appears in virtually all the various disciplines in social science and humanities. Any analysis can only ignore this approach at its peril as it surfaces in almost all debates on social and political changes as well as those on group relations. Even when some aspects of modernization are discredited by successive paradigms, it has shown resilience and ability to reappear in revised versions with each wave of paradigm shifts. At the same time, this school of thought is very extensive, complex and contains a variety of strands within itself. Consequently, the concept of modernity or identification of a modern person often has an expansive list or dimensions of indicators or variables such that it would be impossible to come up with an exhaustive list within the confines of this study which is also considering other variables that are thought to have a bearing on rural elite relations.

Directly related to the above features is the fact that any attempts to apprehend and present a short and simplified version is fraught with problems.

In view of all these complexities associated with analyzing modernization and essence of modernity, this section and this study settles for a more modest task of emphasizing formal education which is often identified as one of the key modes of infusing modern values, attitudes, lifestyles and world view on traditional societies and individuals. This is particularly the case in colonial and former colonial settings where formal education has been a primary socializing agent and a tool used to penetrate, change and integrate traditional societies to major colonial, often western, cultures. In this empirical study, therefore, distribution of education qualifications between the traditional authorities, elected and civic leaders is assessed with the view of establishing whether this is associated with one form of dominant elite relations or not. Does it really matter if traditional leaders are less educated than the elected or civic leaders? Would discrepancies in educational qualification lead to conflict? Let me hasten to say that I am acutely aware of the fact that education per se is not the only nor is it an automatic license to modernity. A person with formal education may hold traditional views as much as a person without much of formal education may have a modern outlook and approach in life. The position taken here is that the likelihood of these happening is less as the following discussion will indicate. As a supplement to an assessment of education as an indicator of modernity, the survey also collected and analyzed data on rural elite views on traditional institutions such as traditional land tenure system and traditional values and customs. Having mapped out the position and approach adopted in this section, this

allows the discussion to return to the highlights of basic features of modernization perspective. The task here is not to present an exhaustive analysis of modernization discourse. What follows is an outline of some key assumptions of this school as well as discussion of the literature that relates to education.

What is modernization? Who is a modern person? Who are the proponents of this school of thought? What are its basic assumptions? What are some of the notable limitations? How have modernization theorists dealt with these limitations as pointed out but its critiques? How does education relate to modernity? Let it be noted that these broad questions provide a guideline of the following discussion and they are not used as a checklist to be intensively exhausted.

Modernization school has its towering foundational advocates such as Rostow<sup>64</sup>, David Apter<sup>65</sup>, McLelland, Alex Inkeles<sup>66</sup> and Parsons. From the late 1950s Gabriel Almond, David Apter, and James Coleman made extensive and pioneering contributions to the concept of political modernization. This was given more impetus in the late sixties by the work of Samuel Huntington<sup>67</sup>.

David Apter offers a simple and general definition of political modernization. He defines it as "... a process of increasing complexity in human affairs within which a polity must

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64 Rostow, J. op cit, 1962

65 David Apter The Politics of Modernization 1965

54. Inkeles, A. Exploring individual modernity 1983; Inkeles, A. et al. (eds) Education and individual modernity in developing countries

67 Samuel Huntington, op cit, 1966.



act.”<sup>68</sup> In this discussion he includes role differentiation occasioned by the establishment of more complex organizational structures. Samuel Huntington’s definition of political modernization is more elaborate as he identifies three processes that define political modernization. The first is the replacement of traditional, religious, ethnic and familial political authorities by a single, secular and national political authority or government. The second involves the emergence of new political functions that are managed by the new administrative hierarchies and these include legal, military, administrative and scientific functions.

The new administrative hierarchies are constituted by the persons who are chosen on basis of skills or achievements rather than ascribed qualities. The third and last point is increased participation in politics by social groups or individuals throughout the given society, and this takes place within new institutions such as political parties and interest groups that are primary vehicles for participation.<sup>69</sup>

It is clear from this definition that traditional rulership or chieftaincy lacks in most of these characteristics therefore present itself as an opposite of a modern political institution notwithstanding its many modifications by colonial and apartheid regimes. It should be pointed out that modernization has many faces among which are political, sociological and psychological. In its all-encompassing form, it has to do with institutions, the way of organizing, the way of doing things as much as it is about ways of

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<sup>68</sup>Apter, D. The politics of modernization 1965., p. 3.

<sup>69</sup>Inkeles, A. and Smith, D. Becoming modern: Individual change in six developing countries 1974., p.16.

thinking and feeling. This underscores the fact that no single quality or a few qualities can comprehensively define a modern person nor can the same be done with a traditional person. A binary version that pits a modern person with a traditional person is the most common in the studies of changing societies. In this construct a traditional person is presented as conservative and defending the status quo in contrast to the modern or modernizing person who is for change and innovation. Since modernization is an inherently dynamic process of change its agents often have a potential of being in conflict with those who defend tradition and status quo. This is a pertinent point that speaks directly to the elite relations in a village that is ruled by a chief and his tribal council while at the same time there is elite which coexists as an elected part of local government as well as the civic leaders. This is a perfect setting for traditionalists and modernizing forces, if any at all.

At times, modernization theory's theoretical construct is confronted with a situation where a system or individual assumes some of the modern aspects whilst clinging to the traditional ones. In this case it becomes difficult to determine whether this is a transitional or transient phase, as many modernization theorists assume, or it is simply a mutation of two systems that fossilize or ossify in that hybrid state. Some individuals seem to fluctuate between the two especially when they instrumentally use elements of both for their benefit.

Formal education, as stated earlier, is often used as one of the major indicators of modernity. This is the case with most studies that seek to assess the extent of modernity

in a given society. One classic example is Inkeles and Smith's studies which used levels of literacy as one of the indicators as they measured modernity and individual changes in six developing countries.<sup>70</sup> A compelling case linking education in Africa with political modernity is offered by Mazrui<sup>71</sup> and James Coleman<sup>72</sup>. More telling is the following linkage between education and the political changes in Africa,

“Western education has been the most revolutionary of all influences operating in sub-Saharan Africa since the imposition of European rule. It has been the instrument of creation of class indispensable to for imperial rule, but one which invariably has taken the leadership in challenging and displacing that rule.”<sup>73</sup>

From the above statement it is clear that education is presented as a socializing agent that has in turn produced agents of change, and this change agent is presented as being in conflict with traditional ways of doing things or the status quo.

The most compelling case for the linkage between education and modernity is advocated by Inkeles and Holsinger<sup>74</sup>. They do not just think that education is linked to modernization, they make a strong case that it is at the apex of all other indicators of modernity. They reviewed a number of studies that proved education to have such a central place in modernization process and in distinction between a modern person and traditional person. These studies, they claim, have indicated that education has an

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<sup>70</sup>Inkeles, A. and Smith, D. Becoming modern: Individual change in six developing countries 1974. Similar design of research that has literacy levels featuring prominently in testing modernity is Inkeles, A. Exploring Individual modernity 1983.

<sup>71</sup>Mazrui, A. Political values and the educated class in Africa 1978.

<sup>72</sup>Coleman, J. “The politics of Sub-Saharan Africa” in Almond, G. and Coleman, J. The Politics of developing areas 1960.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid, p.278.

<sup>74</sup>Inkeles, A., et al, (eds) Education and individual modernity in developing countries 1974.

overriding influence even when tested along other factors such as mass media and work.

More telling is their assertion that;

“And consistent with the results which have been obtained with the populations of the more developed countries, the studies in the less developed nations showed education to be a major determinant of the syndrome of attitudes, values, and behaviors which distinguish the more modern from the more traditional man.”<sup>75</sup>

Totemeyor's<sup>76</sup> work is one such case of a study that deployed modernization theory in its study of the relations among the various sectors of Namibian elite. In his study of the Ovambo elite of Namibia, he makes a sharp distinction between what he classifies as the modern elite which was calling for change and the traditional elite which resisted change. He often emphasizes both education and generational gap as the key attributes of these contending groups. John Holm's study of political participation in Botswana is another example of a study that utilizes modernization theory<sup>77</sup>. Holm is more explicit in his assertion that “In this model of political development, the essential stimulus for conflict is socio-economic change which the modernizers and their supporters experience while traditional elites, to a certain extent, their followers remain relatively unaffected.”<sup>78</sup> In specifying this model, Holm does not only draw a clear binary divide between the modern and traditional sectors of the society but also, in a typical modernization approach, make assumption about their conflict potential. With such a compelling case establishing a link between modernization and education, at one level, and conflict

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<sup>75</sup>Inkeles, A. and Holsinger, D. (eds) Education and individual modernity in developing countries 1974., p.1.

<sup>76</sup>Totemeyor, G. Namibia: Old and New-Traditional and modern leaders in Ovamboland 1978

<sup>77</sup>Holm, J. Dimensions of mass involvement in Botswana politics: A test of alternative theories 1971

<sup>78</sup>Holm, J. Dimensions of mass involvement in Botswana politics: A test of alternative theories 1983; p.7.

potential between the modern and traditional elite it can be hypothesized that conflict is likely to occur in a village where there is a traditional ruling elite and coexisting modern political elite. Also extracted from this hypothesis is the fact that the educated elite will often have conflict with the less educated elite.

Some modernization scholars do make allusions to the fact that the modern elite tend to be younger whereas the conservative traditional elite tend to be older thus setting the stage for a generational conflict. In this case the young tend to be more educated, open to changes and therefore modern and through the extension of the same logic the older generation will tend to be more conservative thus more inclined to resist change. The position taken in this study is that age and generational cleavages and conflicts can stand as a variable that is independent of modernization or modernity. It is reasoned that an older person may be modern as much as a younger person may hold conservative view. While many successive studies by Inkeles have tended to include age differences as variables that indicate modernity and did find some association in many instances, this may have been a proxy variable that indicated other factors such as education. It should also be noted that radical scholarship also focus on youth activism in politics, therefore, youth are not just an exclusive phenomenon studied under the modernization paradigm. Theoretically speaking, there is only a limited amount of literature regarding age or generational cleavages and their role in politics. This discrepancy is conspicuous when compared to the preponderance of empirical evidence showing the critical role that youth has played in political changes throughout history. History is punctuated with many prominent examples of a leading role of youth in revolutions, protests, reforms and

regime changes: from the West European and North American youth radicalism in the late 1960s, to the youth in the 1979 Iranian revolution, from the student movement in South Korea to the Chinese student movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. South Africa is no exception in this case as the youth, particularly in the late half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, played a critical role in the politics of resistance against the colonial and the apartheid regimes. The radicalizing impact of the ANC Youth League in the 1940s, the student role in the foundation of the Black Consciousness Movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the student role in the 1976 student riots and the vanguard role of the youth, often called the “young lions” in the South African struggle lexicon, during the 1980s mass resistance against apartheid. These are the concrete cases that make the role of the youth political activism noticeable.

What remains a classic theoretical conceptualization or explanation of youth radicalism in politics is provided and generally inspired by the seminal work of Karl Mannheim who characterized generations in sociological rather than age, biological or chronological terms<sup>79</sup>. In this conception, Mannheim was more concerned with distinct experiences and a set of historical and social problems that confronted each generation thus developing common identity and self-awareness or consciousness. This was conceived as similar to ethnic, national or class consciousness. The tide of youth radicalism that swept across western Europe and North America in the late 60s revived interest in this classic work of

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<sup>79</sup>Mannheim, K. Essays in the sociology of knowledge 1952.

Mannheim and largely embraced his basic sociological premises. Rintala<sup>80</sup> and Moller's<sup>81</sup> work are the notable examples of these works.

Various studies of political conflict in South Africa have tended to make allusions to the notion of generational conflict without theoretically or conceptually elaborating. In fact, a cursory survey of literature on South African political struggle against apartheid suggests that many writers take this fact as a given.

Kessel and Oomen's study of traditional authority reveals this tendency as it is argued that,

“Generational cleavages in the liberation movement, a well-known feature of urban resistance, became even more pronounced in the rural setting, where power was wielded by chiefs, teachers and elders. Grievances against the authoritarian rule and frequent misappropriation by the chief were by no means limited to youth, but the youth movements, with few exceptions, did not succeed in building a broad alliance around their campaigns against chieftaincy. Radicalized youth movements often acted in isolation.”<sup>82</sup>

The alienation of youth from the institution of traditional rulership makes their antagonistic attitude both logical and expected. This assumption is embraced by other scholars such as Levin<sup>83</sup>, Peires<sup>84</sup>, Mare<sup>85</sup>. Levin echoes Kessel and Oomen's position as he states that “ . . . the rural struggle was largely spearheaded by the youth organized in

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<sup>80</sup>Rintala, M. “Political generation” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Vol.VI, 1968.

<sup>81</sup>Moller, H. “Youth as a force in the modern world” Comparative Studies in History and Society Vol.10., 1967-68.

<sup>82</sup>Kessel, I. and Oomen, B. “One chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid South Africa” in African Affairs Vol.96, 1997; p.264.

<sup>83</sup> Levin, op cit .,1996

<sup>84</sup> Peires, J. op cit, 1997.

<sup>85</sup> Mare, Op cit, 1992.

youth congress structures.”<sup>86</sup> Kentridge’s own assessment is at variance with the above tendency which emphasizes generational cleavages. He challenges this assumption as he charges that “This argument manages to combine the obvious and ignoring the blatantly obvious. Poverty, unemployment and youth alienation are not specific to Natal, whereas the political rivalry between Inkatha and UDF is.”<sup>87</sup> Whilst this analysis is based on an assessment of conflict that was rampant in urban areas or more specifically townships around Pietermaritzburg, this observation is instructive as it appeals to comparative reasoning and pointing out at the preeminence of political conflict organized along party identities. Catherine Campbell’s empirical study of masculinity and conflict in KwaZulu-Natal largely support the notion a generational conflict which sometimes takes on a political duel between the older and more conservative IFP vigilantes and the younger ANC/UDF comrades.<sup>88</sup>

Colin Bundy also puts generational link to politics in his study of the youth and students in Cape Town during the 1980s. In this study he emphasize the sociological factors that influence the marginalized youth to turn into radical politics. Citing factors such as unemployment and unemployability of school leavers as well as poor conditions in black schools, poverty in their homes and crime-ridden streets in the townships, Bundy makes a logical conclusion that,

“By any stretch of sociological imagination, the recipe for marginalising and alienating a generational unit is comprehensive enough. Take

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<sup>86</sup> Levin, R. “ Politics and land reform in Northern Province: A case study of the Mojaelo land claim” in Lipton, M., et al (eds) Land, labour and livelihoods in rural South Africa 1996; p.370.

<sup>87</sup> Kentridge, M. An unofficial war: Inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg 1990; p.216

<sup>88</sup> Campbell, C. “Learning to kill? Masculinity, the family and violence in Natal” Journal of Southern African Studies Vol. 18., No.3., September 1992.



politically rightless, socially subordinate, economically vulnerable youths: educate them in numbers beyond their parents' wildest dreams, but grotesquely inadequate institutions; ensure that their awareness is shaped by punitive social practices in the world beyond the schoolyard-- then dump them in large numbers on an economic scrap-heap."<sup>89</sup>

Bundy's comment is instructive in many ways as it points out economic disadvantages, frustration of an educated cohort, and even more important the fact that these sociological factors are shared by and in turn shape the consciousness of a generational unit. A rare historical study of Zulu youth and masculinity at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century is conducted by Benedict Carton.<sup>90</sup> This study is short on theory though thick in its description of changing economic and cultural landscape that led to a generational conflict between the Zulu youth and the elders in their communities.

This repeated reference to generational cleavages in studies on conflict makes it imperative to consider this variable in evaluating data for this study. This is given more weight when considering the fact that traditional authorities have a history of marginalizing youth, thus making them drift to alternative political structures in search of a political space in which to exercise power and influence, especially in the wake of their prominent role in bringing down the apartheid regime. It can therefore be hypothesized that concentration of the youth or the younger age group in one institution (say elected councils and civic organization) in a community where the other institution is dominated

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<sup>89</sup>Bundy, C. "Street Sociology and pavement politics: Aspects of youth and student resistance in Cape Town, 1985" in Journal of Southern African Studies Vol.13, No.3, April 1987., p.313.

<sup>90</sup>Carton, B. "Men before their time: Youth power and African generational conflict in South Africa, 1880-1906.

by the older generation (for example, traditional authority), one would expect a conflict that is primarily a clash of generations.

### **2.5.2. Structural approach: Social stratification and class struggle.**

Marxist inclined political economy perspectives that rose to prominence in African studies during the 1970s are considered as a candidate in understanding elite relations as they make explicit assumptions about group conflict. Proponents of this approach are mainly drawn from Marxist, neo-Marxist and dependency schools, and the proponents include John Saul, Colin Leys, Timothy Shaw, Claude Ake, Immanuel Wallerstein, Irving Markovitz, Reginald Green, Claude Meillassoux and Samir Amin. Class analysis and the emphasis of class relations as a determinant factor in understanding dominant relations is at the core of this school of thought. Economic factors or the position of groups or individuals to the means and forces of production are seen as the primary determinant of group interests and by logical extension of their relations or struggles. In essence, this perspective explains political conflicts, just as it accounts for group interests and consciousness, in class terms. In industrial societies class formation and distinction is clear but this is not the case in the less developed areas. The real challenge in the less developed world, in Africa in this case, is establishing a clear delineation of social classes in an environment where class formation remains incomplete. This is a fact that is generally accepted by African and Africanist scholars, including the proponents of Marxian perspective. What constitute a class then in an African setting? Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild and Stedman argue that people acquire most of their resources through their linkages with the organs of the state rather than in a classical sense of the

classical bourgeois. They assert that,

“In a class (non-birth-ascribed) system, group membership is determined largely by relationship to the productive process and the relations of classes to one another, although in independent Africa proximity to state power has played a central role.”<sup>91</sup>

They also identify variables as income, education, occupation as indicators of aggregated and potentially conflicting interests around which classes may develop. Petty bourgeois, proletariat, peasant classes and bureaucratic bourgeois are often identified as the most prominent classes though not as fully developed or internally homogenous. What further complicate attempts to identify social classes in an African setting is the fact that social stratification often overlap with other variables, most important being ethnicity.

Fraught with all these problems, neo-Marxist scholars still insist that social classes still play an important role in as a unit around which group interests and consciousness is organized. For instance Irving Markovitz who argues that,

“Although class consciousness may be absent, classes are ‘objectively’ in conflict because of their ‘productive relations’. In essence, classes are social conflict groups.”<sup>92</sup>

It is important to note that this perspective is premised on the assumption that material conditions play a more important or even a determinant role up and above subjective feelings and views of those who belong to a given class. This emphasis on material economic conditions is quite different from ethnicity which becomes important when the

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<sup>91</sup>Chazan, N., op cit, p.121.

<sup>92</sup>Markovitz, I. Power and Class in Africa: An introduction to change and conflict in African politics 1977; p.99.

subjective aspect is considered by those who then become conscious of and act upon their ethnic identity. Terrence Ranger's<sup>93</sup> work on Zimbabwean peasant consciousness and Goran Hyden's<sup>94</sup> case study of the Tanzanian peasantry are prominent examples of works that have highlighted the importance of social classes in understanding their participation in political processes.

In the case of the literature on South Africa there is a considerable amount of literature which has embraced Marxist political economy approach in all its different revisionist shades. Scholars such as Bundy<sup>95</sup>, Southall<sup>96</sup>, Peires<sup>97</sup>, Lewis<sup>98</sup> and Levin<sup>99</sup> have adopted analysis which put class at the center of their approach. The following assertion by Jack Lewis is more revealing of this position as he argues;

“Class struggle and the consciousness of migrant workers in the countryside cannot be limited to overt action and outbreak of hostilities against, for example, the Colonial State or against headmen. It has to be taken to include the entire range of ideologically influenced responses and initiatives assumed by people in rural households towards the conditions under which they lived and their perceptions of those agents which influenced their conditions.”<sup>100</sup>

In the above passage it is clear that contradictions and struggles are conceived in terms of class differences which are seen as a basis for a consciousness and ideological outlook.

An obvious limitation of this perspective is the fact that social classes in Africa tend to be

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93 Ranger, T., op cit, 1982

94 Hyden, G., op cit, 1983.

95 Bundy, C., op cit., 1979.

96 Southall, R., op cit, 1982.

97 Peires, J. , op cit, 1997.

98 Lewis, op cit, 1985

99 Levin, op cit. 1996

<sup>100</sup> Lewis, J. “Rural contradictions and class consciousness: migrant labour in historical perspective— The Ciskei in the 1880s and 90s” Africa Seminar— Collected Papers Vol.5, 1985.

less developed or very weak and often overlap with other factors such as ethnicity and institutional factors such as membership in political organizations or government. These factors often combine to weaken the notion of automatic primacy of class or economic factors. With all this in mind, class analysis is still an important variable to consider when trying to understand group relations as is the case in this study. It should also be stated that there are multiple indicators of class affiliation which go beyond a simplistic notion of the “haves” and “have-nots”. In operational terms, education, occupation, income, ownership of land and livestock are some of the important indicators. This categorization of individuals or groups to classes is further compounded by the fact that there are intermediate classes in a continuum which then seriously compromise any attempt to come up with discrete categories. Furthermore, if classes are less-developed or weak in African societies, it can be expected that this situation is amplified in rural areas than in the urban areas due to their differences in terms of the level of integration into the modern economy.

### **2.5.3. Ethnic identity, politicization of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts.**

Ethnic identity is one of the most ambiguous and complex social forces. It is, at the same time one of the readily deployed concepts when social scientists explain societal cleavages and conflicts especially in Africa. It is imperative to define ethnicity and ethnic identities as a prelude to discussion in this section. Chazan and co-authors provide a useful distinction between an ethnic group and ethnicity. The following is their definition and distinction of these terms;

“Ethnicity refers to a subjective perception of common origins, historical

memories, ties and aspirations; ethnic group pertains to organized activities by persons, linked by a consciousness of a special identity, who jointly seek to maximize their corporate political, economic, and social interests. Ethnicity, or a sense of peoplehood, has its foundations in combined remembrances of past experience and in common inspirations, values, norms, and expectations. The validity of these beliefs and remembrances is of less significance to an overarching sense of affinity than is their ability to symbolize a people's closeness to one another. Ethnicity as a subjective basis for collective consciousness gains relevance to the political process when it spurs group formation and underpins political organization."<sup>101</sup>

In view of this definition it is to be expected those groups of people are inclined to define their interests and organize on basis of their ethnicity. This, however, does not automatically or always assume relevance in political processes as Chazan correctly points out. It should also be pointed out that ethnic identity per se does not imply conflict with or opposition to other groups which may be different from one's own group. It is, however, within the realm of ethnic identity that political belonging and political exclusion seem to dominate. A claim to the entitlement of belonging is often articulated in terms of claims of being indigenous or native versus perceived or real alien or immigrants.

Within the context of politics, ethnicity is often associated with conflict or deep divisions within or across societies. Donald Horowitz, a prominent political scientist, focuses on ethnic conflicts. Much of his work specializes on studying ethnically divided societies.

He rationalizes his emphasis on ethnic conflict as he asserts that,

"The importance of ethnic conflict, as a force shaping human affairs, as a phenomenon to be understood, as a threat to be controlled, can no longer be

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<sup>101</sup>Chazan, N., et al., op cit.; p.108.

denied . . . Ethnicity is at the center of politics in country after country, a potent source of challenges to cohesion of states and of tension.”<sup>102</sup>

Horowitz is not alone in emphasizing the importance of ethnic conflict. Many scholars who study Africa often focus on ethnicity in their bid to explain conflict or political mobilization. This, in part, is often justified on basis of the general weakness of political institutions across many countries as well as the lack of fully developed classes which would be used to aggregate group interests. Using the case of Africa, Herbst concurs with Horowitz view of ethnic tensions as he states that,

“Ethnic fragmentation is arguably the single most important threat to many African countries as widespread ethnic violence has been symptomatic of many of Africa’s failing states and ethnic politics has paralyzed many others.”<sup>103</sup>

Close association between ethnicity and ethnic conflict is clearly evident in these observations and it is not hard to find empirical evidence that point towards these negative consequences of ethnic-based conflicts. The case of perennial genocidal conflict between the Tutsis and Hutus in the Great Lakes region of Africa stands out as a monumental example of ethnic conflict.

South Africa is replete with examples of political organizations which have mobilized around ethnicity. A considerable number of scholars do emphasize the role of ethnicity in their study of South African politics. In his work, Horowitz emphasized constitutional engineering that would take ethnicity into account if South Africa was to deal with the

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<sup>102</sup> Horowitz, D. Ethnic groups in conflict 1985; p.xi

<sup>103</sup> Herbst, J. States and power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control ; p.173.

potential threat of ethnic conflicts which had already defined its past divisions.<sup>104</sup> In yet another case, Gerhard Mare's study of Inkatha Freedom Party and Buthelezi is in essence a study of the role of ethnicity in political mobilization and conflict.<sup>105</sup> Mare uses terms such as politicization or ideologization of ethnicity to describe Buthelezi and Inkatha's affirmation of ethnicity as a mobilizing strategy.

It should be noted that much of the works cited above tend to focus on this phenomenon of ethnic conflict on a wider scale such as regional or national level with little light being shed on rural local areas which are under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities. One would expect ethnicity to be of central focus on the part of those who study rural local areas as chieftaincy itself is built around ethnicity. This point is reinforced by Mijere as he claims that,

“The traditional leadership is at the center of the tribe. The paramount chief, the sub-chief, the village headman or woman are primordial symbols of kinship. Without traditional chieftaincy, no tribal consciousness.”<sup>106</sup>

This conceptualization brings the notion of ethnicity to the very center of traditional authority in the rural local areas. More recently, Mamdani gave the debate on ethnicity in Africa a new impetus with his theory which charges that ethnicity is embedded in and perpetuated by institutions inherited from the colonial era. Mamdani captures the notion of a bifurcated state in terms of citizen-subject with the natives who live under the

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<sup>104</sup>Horowitz, D. A democratic South Africa? Constitutional engineering in a divided society 1992.

<sup>105</sup>Mare has written extensively on this subject and the following works represent such literature on ethnic conflict. Mare, G. Ethnicity and politics in South Africa 1992; Mare, G. and Hamilton, G. An appetite for power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa 1987.

<sup>106</sup>Mijere, N. “Traditional leadership: Colonial and post-colonial constructions of traditional chieftaincy” in Osaghae, E. Traditional leadership in Southern Africa 1997; p.52.



traditional authorities operating as subjects under customary laws while others or aliens/settlers are only entitled to citizenship that is defined by civil laws.

In a series of essays Mamdani<sup>107</sup> explains the ethnic conflicts that are rampant in many parts of Africa as originating from this discrimination between the native and the aliens. He argues that this bifurcation alienates those who are seen as outsiders and deny them access to local resources. Although Mamdani's work is theoretically rigorous, it is more relevant to the areas which have large refugee or migrant population who settle in areas which are controlled by other ethnic groups which would then exclude them from customary defined rights such as access to and ownership of land. In South Africa this mass movement of populations into other areas was more common during the Mfecane of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and also happened during the relocation of populations by colonial and apartheid officials. None, however, has happened in the more recent times. To be sure, there are communities where dominant ethnic groups live adjacent to one another as the study by Deborah James show below.

To be sure, there are case studies that look at the role of ethnicity within South African communities. To mention a few, Dunbar Moodie<sup>108</sup> examines ethnic conflicts that occur

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<sup>107</sup> Some of Mamdani's works on this subject of institutionally embedded ethnic politics of exclusion and exclusion include; Mamdani, M. Citizen and subjects: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. 1996; " Why foreign invaders can't help Congo" Mail and Guardian November 1, 1998; "When does a settler become a native?" Mail and Guardian May 2, 1998.; "Preliminary thoughts on Congo crisis" in Southern Africa Political Economy Monthly December 1998. As one can tell from these examples in the Great Lakes of Africa, they involve massive refugee settlements rather than individual families or clans which we see in the case of South Africa.

<sup>108</sup> Moodie, D. "Ethnic violence on South African Gold Mines" Journal of Southern African Studies , Vol. 18., No.3., September 1992.

between the African ethnic groups in the mines of South Africa. But in this case, Moodie quite correctly identify as some causes the artificial confinement and grouping of miners according to their ethnic groups as well as the role of mine officials on top of the poor conditions in the mine compounds. Moreover, this is a study of migrant workers brought from their various rural communities whereas this study is interested in the internal community dynamics in the rural areas. Another case study that is rare for its focus on ethnic tensions and relations within a rural South African community is the one presented by Deborah James who looks at the Ndebele community that lives in a Pedi village. She concludes that disparities in material resources are at the core of tensions between these two ethnic groups thus alluding to geopolitical factors as well.

The above discussion presents a compelling case for the inclusion of ethnicity in understanding conflict and/or cooperation among the rural local elites. The concept of ethnicity is only relevant in this study in as far as it deals with the politics of belonging and exclusion in local administrative areas. Embedded in this are claims to the entitlements of belonging to a certain ethnic group in a given community or ethnic group. The interest is on how these factors manifest themselves in those areas which are under the jurisdiction of traditional authority.

#### **2.5.4. Party identity, political mobilization and local elite conflicts.**

In a modern state system political mobilization is channeled by and through political parties or other political organizations. It is no wonder that a considerable number of political struggles are apparently fought by members of contending political

organizations. At face value political affiliation is an obvious factor around which political identity is built, but the key question is when does this identity or membership matter in the milieu of competing ethnic, class, kinship, regional and religious identities. This question is more important in the African setting where political parties are relatively new and therefore not institutionalized or embedded as a channel of aggregating interests.

An assumption that political identity or affiliation is a candidate in explaining the relationship between sectors of the local elite is both intuitively appealing and logical. Many studies that make reference to the role of political affiliation in political conflicts tend to be more descriptive than theoretical. In the case of South Africa many observers depicted the 1980s and early 1990s conflict in KwaZulu-Natal as being fought between the United Democratic Front/African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. In many homelands the conflict was depicted as a battle between the supporters of ruling political parties and the liberation organizations. Kentridge's argument is more explicit in nullifying other factors in favor of party conflict. In reference to the 1980s conflict that was raging in KwaZulu-Natal, He makes the following observation "Poverty, unemployment and youth alienation are not specific to Natal, whereas the political rivalry between Inkatha and UDF is."<sup>109</sup>

Given this background, it is only logical to consider party identity or affiliation as

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<sup>109</sup>Kentridge, M. op cit, p.216.

shaping the relationship between the various sectors of rural elite. It is, however, worth noting the conspicuous absence of theory-driven literature that specifically analyzes party affiliation or partisan identity as a factor in political conflict or in shaping relationship among the political elite. It is, therefore, imperative to ask: Does political identity or party affiliation matter when it comes to the nature of relations between the sectors of the elite? This study takes this variable into account in its analysis of factors that influence rural elite relations.

#### **2.5.5. Political agency and elite factional rivalry.**

The perspectives outlined above share one common trait: the emphasis on primacy of structural or institutional factors that underlie group or individual actions and the resultant political processes. There is a growing tendency to embrace political agency. In this approach, the initiatives taken by the actors are placed at the core of understanding political actions and choices. This literature, however, does acknowledge the structural or institutional confines within which these initiatives are taken. It is this last point which gives this approach a relative edge or appeal as it will be argued in chapter eight. More important is the fact that structures (institutions and social classes) have been presented as being weak or less developed in Africa, thus somehow reducing to residual factors or weak basis for organizing interests and political actions. This further strengthens agency or individual political actor's role within the given institutional boundaries.

While this theoretical position of emphasizing political agency and political contingency factors gained currency in the early 1990s, it should be pointed out that there are earlier

works which affirmed basic assumptions of this approach. On the study of traditional leadership survival within the modern post-colonial political systems in Africa, the work of Norman Miller is one of those which pioneered this position of treating traditional leaders as political agents. Miller's conceptual framework is captured in the notion of syncretistic political behavior in which a traditional leader has dual existence in which he balances the demands from the modern state and those of his traditional constituency<sup>110</sup>. In this case the leader manipulates both systems and tries to gain most from both. It is through this complex balancing act that traditional leaders survive. The emphasis on the maneuvering of individuals within a given institutional environment is also evident in Eugene Lewis' *Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a theory of bureaucratic political power*. Lewis' definition of a public entrepreneur is more revealing of his thesis;

“A public entrepreneur may be defined as a person who creates or profoundly elaborates a public organization so as to alter greatly the existing pattern of allocation of scarce resources. Such persons arise and succeed in organizational and political milieus which contain contradictory mixes of values received from the past. Public entrepreneurs characteristically exploit such contradictions.”<sup>111</sup>

Key to the above passage is the fact that individual political actors do find a room to maneuver and deploy strategies aimed at achieving some autonomy even within what may appear to be rigid confines of bureaucratic structures which are often thought of as routinized. In this sense, Lewis' thesis is in line with and reinforces the notion of political contingency which is highlighted in this section.

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<sup>110</sup> Miller, N. "The political survival of traditional leadership" in Miller, N. (Ed) Research in rural Africa 1968.

<sup>111</sup> Lewis, E., Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a theory of bureaucratic political power 1980., p.9

Late in the 1980s and early 1990s South African scholars such as Spiegel<sup>112</sup> fully embraced the notion of the instrumental use of tradition and modernity by the elite. This position was largely inspired by Ranger and Hobsbawn's<sup>113</sup> concept of the invention of tradition. At the core of this position is the notion that political actors self-consciously use or manipulate the structures and institutions to their advantage. This flexibility gives them a range of repertoire to invoke or appeal to. A more comprehensive conception of the notion of agency is provided by Jean-Francois Bayart in his book, *The State in Africa: The politics of the belly*<sup>114</sup>. In this work, the struggle for access to and control of scarce resource is identified as the main driving force in elite political transaction. Elite cleavages or factional rivalries and alliances are to be understood in pursuit of this goal rather than along strictly class or ethnic lines. The elite is innovative and uses a range of resources in this process. Bayart's preoccupation in this conception is with the political processes rather than structures. The spotlight is on the behavior of individuals rather than their institutional roles. Bayart's work is also a critique of conventional tendencies such as modernization, dependency, Marxist and Weberian approaches which all emphasize structural or institutional variables.

At the core of Bayart's thesis is a repeated use of the metaphor of "the belly" to portray a society which is not primarily driven by ethnic differences, class conflict nor external manipulation. It is a situation which is dominated by power networks and elite cleavages in which struggle for scarce resources is a driving force behind the elite's interaction

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112 Spiegel, A., et al., (eds) Tradition and transition in Southern Africa 1991

113 Hobsbawn, E. and Ranger, T. (eds) The invention of tradition 1983

114 Bayart, J. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly 1993

within a given political landscape. This primarily patrimonial and prebendal nature of politics is characterized by the quest for hegemony. Because there is no sufficiently developed hegemonic bloc, alliances shift from time to time. In this power play, access to and control of resources is at the center elite cleavages as much as is reciprocal assimilation of elites. In this arrangement, Bayart argues, personal networks of the elites are crucial in understanding political processes. He rejects the notion of hegemonic alliances and emphasizes the fluidity of these networks as elite assimilation is reversible or coexist with the politics of cleavages and exclusion that lead to factional struggles.

Bayart's thesis is important in the context of this work for two reasons. Firstly, it is one of few studies which put the elite interaction and relations at the center of focus thus, in broad terms, covering the same scope as this study. Secondly, it is presented as a counterweight or alternative to the above-outlined perspectives, all of which put emphasis on structural variables to explain political processes.

## **2.6. A synthesis and integrated approach.**

A general overview of the above discussion suggests that outlined perspectives fall into two broad classifications and these are structural factors and agency. Modernization, class conflict, ethnicity and political affiliation stress structural factors in explaining political behavior and processes whereas Bayart's thesis embraces political agency. This then can easily be construed as following the same contours that are evident in structure versus agency argument in tackling fundamental or classic question: Is it environmental factors or individual choices which matter in explaining things that people do or political

processes? Or alternatively, how much weight or emphasis ought to be given to each one of these variables?

In political science and sociology new and revised institutionalism or what is generally termed “new institutionalism” in all its variants has revisited this debate of structure versus agency with no clear-cut or definitive answers.<sup>115</sup> Mahoney and Snyder’s review of the arguments advanced in agency, or what they term voluntarist, versus structure arguments compellingly expose the futility of any “either” “or” scenario that is inherent in this rigid binary approach.<sup>116</sup> Even though their study is confined to the subject of regime change it is generally applicable to many studies which are trying to understand political behavior and processes or even choices that political actors make. In the final analysis they suggest eclectic strategies which result in an integrated approach.

This is the position that is generally endorsed in this study as I proceed to deploy perspectives outlined above in analyzing and interpreting this study’s empirical data. The embrace of this integrated approach is premised on the view that the important issue is not whether agency or structure explains the relationships of the rural elite. The most important question is how each one of these factors interact with others to produce a

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<sup>115</sup>To mention a few articles that review issues associated with “new institutionalism: Koebler, T. “The New Institutionalism in political science and sociology” Comparative Politics January 1995; Hall, P. “Political Science and the three New Institutionalisms” Political Studies 1996; Immergut, E. “The theoretical core of New Institutionalism” Politics and Society Vol. 26, No.1, 1998; Guy, P. “Political institutions, old and new” in Goodin, R & Klingemann, H(eds) A New handbook of political science 1996;

<sup>116</sup>Mahoney, J and Snyder, R. “Rethinking agency and structure in the study of regime change” Studies in Comparative International Development Summer 1999.



certain pattern of elite relations. Alternatively, one may ask when do these factors, combined or individually, impact on or influence relations between various sectors of the elite. From the very onset, it is argued that structural factors may structure choices that political agents make thus shaping the very political processes. This does not necessarily limit the options of individual actors but it tends to organize and aggregate interests of individuals who act within environmental constraints. It is therefore conceivable that traditional leaders, elected councilors and civic leaders will make political choices but they do so because they are mindful of or confined by the political institutions from which they operate.

The above argument and the stated preference for eclectic strategy or integrated approach should not be taken to mean that all variables, structural or agency, are equally important at all time. This stance is taken only to demonstrate flexibility that is adopted in assessing various perspectives presented in the foregoing discussion. In the end each research question and the manner in which empirical data is analyzed and interpreted will tend to sift through these variables, in the process it will discard others while elevating or affirming others. In more specific terms and as a way of concluding this section, modernization, neo-Marxist class approach, ethnicity, political identity/affiliation as well as Bayart's political contingency perspective will be used to establish some correlations that exist within each different form of elite relations.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHOD AND DESIGN**

**“The problem is not to show which methodology is best but to explore alternative ways of establishing a meaningful dialogue between ideas and evidence.”<sup>117</sup>**

A simple question, “how was this study conducted?”, compels one to reveal how a leap was made from theory to an empirical research. In other words, an answer to this question reveals, to paraphrase Charles Ragin, a framework within which dialogue between ideas and evidence is conducted. This question leads to a number of related but specific questions: What are the key concepts in this study? How are these concepts adapted to suit the specific context of this study? Who are the subjects and what is the material used as source of data? What are the procedures used to collect data? What are the methods, techniques and instruments used? What is the population being studied? Which sampling procedures are utilized? How is the data analyzed and interpreted? The task of this chapter is to address these questions in a manner that outlines the design of the study as well as the method used. At the very onset, let it be stated that this study has a strong bias toward a comparative method which seeks to account for variation between the units and cases being studied by identifying similarities and contrasts. A disclaimer is

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<sup>117</sup>Ragin, C. The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.; p.3

also proper at this juncture. This study is not designed to establish causal linkages in a strict scientific sense. It is, however, aimed at identifying, in a comparative manner, relations between or between selected variables and analyzing trends.

This chapter is organized into the following sections: The first section focuses on the description of key terms used in this study. This is followed by an identification and description of the sources and type of data used in this study. The third section deals with the population, research sites, sampling procedures and the sample of cases that are being studied. The fourth section then focuses on the instruments used with particular emphasis on the survey instruments that were utilized during the field research. The last part describes the analysis and interpretation of both the qualitative and quantitative data.

### **3.1. Key concepts**

It is recalled that this study is an attempt to comparatively understand and explain relations among the sectors of **rural local elites** in contemporary South Africa. **Conflict** and **accommodation** are the two forms of relations under consideration. It follows, therefore, that the conceptual cornerstones of this work are **the elite, conflictual relations** and **accommodative relations**. This section will describe these key terms and adapt them for the purpose of this study. A range of other terms or variables (leadership, education, ethnicity, distribution of resources and party affiliation and identity) that are used to explain the different types of relations will only be operationally defined in the results chapter. Each variable will be defined before the results are presented. In this way, these definitions provide an immediate context to the results as thus availing them as a

quick reference to the readers.

### **3.1.1. Defining the elite and identifying the rural elite in South Africa**

Who are the elites? What constitutes rural local elite in the contemporary South Africa?

An understanding of what the elite is and who are the rural elite in South Africa today is to understand the population which is at the core of this study. It is, therefore, imperative to briefly outline some of the definitions of the elite thus paving way for identifying the rural elite that was sampled for this study.

In order to understand the basic motivation of many elite theorists one has to go back to the key question that confronts any political scientist, 'who rules?' The following passage by Robert Putnam apprehends the essence and magnitude of this concern among political scientists;

“Who rules? Has a fair claim to be the central question of empirical political science, just as its normative counterpart, 'who should rule?' is perhaps the central question of political philosophy. Like any truly fundamental question about social relations, 'Who rules?' has generated a long history speculative answers and a rich store of common knowledge. Sage commentators, from Plato and Aristotle to our nightly television newscasters, tell us much about power and leadership, but their profundities, when carefully examined, often turn out to be incomplete and ambiguous.”<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>118</sup>Putnam, R. The comparative study of political elites Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976., p 2.

This observation provides a context for the definition the political elite.

Putnam asserts that classical elite theorists, namely Mosca, Pareto, and Michels share the principle that,

“Political power, like other social goods, is distributed unequally. . . Essentially, people fall into only two groups: Those who have significant political power and those who have none.”<sup>119</sup>

Even though many scholars share the assumptions about the elite there is no consensus on the definition. However, there is broad agreement on the strategies for identifying elites.

There are three main procedures and these are positional analysis/approach, the reputational analysis and the decisional analysis.<sup>120</sup> For positional analysis, scholars assess formal institutions of government to identify those who occupy top positions. On the other hand, reputational approach relies more on influence or power that individuals exercise even if they are not in formal or governmental institutions. Lastly, decisional analysis identifies the elite in terms of their ability to influence decisions by the way of setting agenda, initiating and vetoing decisions. When all these approaches are utilized, they assist in identifying the elite in both formal and informal institutions thus acknowledging the complexity of power relations. In view of these procedures of identifying the political elite it can be asserted that the political elite refers to those individuals who exercise political power in a manner that affect decision-making in their communities. This power may be derived from the positions they occupy in formal institutions of government or from their reputation outside the formal setting. It may also

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<sup>119</sup>Ibid., pp.3-4.

<sup>120</sup>Putnam, R., op cit, 1976 and Dreyer, L. The modern African elite of South Africa New York: St Martin's Press, 1989.

be a combination of both the formal and informal sources of power.

In the context of the present rural South Africa there are three major sectors of the elite, namely, the traditional leaders/authorities, the elected local councilors and the civic leaders. At the top of the traditional leadership hierarchy in a typical South African village is a chief and below him are members of the traditional or tribal council/authority. These may include a headmen, iinduna and ordinary council members who represent their wards or sections of the village. Traditional authorities usually have an office and a secretary who is also counted as a member of traditional authority. In some cases the members of traditional authorities have specialized roles whereas in some cases they are just general members. The fact that traditional authority is a recognized local government institution mean that its members can be identified using the positional approach. The number of these traditional leaders varies from five to 15 in other administrative areas and this is also determined by the size of the village under the jurisdiction of a chief as well as the specialized roles that they perform.

The second sector of the local elite has members of the elected local councils who came into existence after the 1995/96 local government election in South Africa. Some councilors were elected as ward representatives whereas some were elected on basis of the proportional representation and their position in the party candidates' lists. Again, the number of representatives drawn from or representing rural communities varies from one to as many as ten depending on the size and the type of local government structure. These structures as well as the traditional authorities are discussed in greater detail in chapters

four and five. Elected councilors also form part of a formal government institution this making the positional analysis the obvious procedure for identifying the elected local elite.

The last category is the one of the civic leaders which largely represents the leaders of community-based organizations and local party branches. The government commissioned study of traditional leadership and institutions identified and listed the following community organizations: sports committees, burial societies, water committees, women's committees, electricity committees, business committees, community health forums, development committees, community welfare forums, church groups, cultural organizations, widows forums, taxi associations, neighborhood watches, and statutory bodies such as community police forums, school-governing bodies, and political parties.<sup>121</sup>

These various bodies demonstrate the vastness of the community-based organization landscape from which civic leaders are drawn. In this study civic leaders refer to the individuals who either occupy key leadership positions in these community organizations or are identified as having a reputation of exercising influence over community activities or decision-making processes and outcomes. Reputational approach, to some extent, suits this sector as most of the elite operate outside the formal institutions. It is, however, worth noting that most of the selected civic leaders also happened to occupy high

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<sup>121</sup>Department of Constitutional Development "Executive Summary of the Status Quo Report on Traditional Leadership and Institutions", August 1999. p.10.

positions in these community-based organizations thus making it possible to mix positional and reputational as well as decision-making approach. The very nature and vastness of community-based organization make any selection of civic leaders a challenging exercise, and I will return to this point under the section that deals with sampling procedures. In all, the positional approach, in a broad sense that extends to leaders of non-formal institutions, was extensively used in identifying and selecting the local elite from all the three sectors. This was largely necessitated by the fact that my field study did not extend over a long period to allow for an analysis of decision-making processes or other complex forms of non-formal exercise of political power. This procedure was, however, supplemented by the reputational analysis and this largely relied on community members and leaders who were asked to identify influential individuals within their respective communities.

Embedded in this work is the assumption that local political relations are generally shaped by the elite relationship whether in mobilizing for conflict or cooperating for specific projects. Elite factional cleavages and resultant struggles for control as well as reciprocal assimilation generally define the nature and pattern of relationship, and this is, to some extent, influenced by the institutional environment and the availability of material resources.

### **3.1.2. Conflictual and accommodative elite relations**

Conflictual and accommodative relations are the key variables this study is trying to explain. It is, therefore, important to outline what conflictual and what



accommodative/cooperative relations entail in this context. Conflictual relations are conceptualized in a general sense to include all forms of relationship where the elite groups are working at a cross-purpose against each other in a manner that makes cooperation impossible in all or most projects. This must be sustained or protracted state over the years rather than a single event. Intensity may vary from time to time. The range of conflict instances or checklist is from physical confrontation, physical intimidation, legal disputes, protest actions/marches, blockades or prevention of the contending group's activities, organized boycotts of activities, to damage to property, organize public rallies against opponents, defiance campaigns/activities. These range from tension between the key protagonists and an open physical confrontation.

Accommodative relations include active and visible cooperation, working toward a common purpose, having an established mechanism of resolving potential and actual problems, diffused participation in activities organized by each structure, allowing and even actively support each structure to organize its activities. These categories of conflict and accommodation were created after extensively reviewing secondary and primary literature regarding predominant local community relations and incidents of conflict and reports of cooperation.

### **3.2. Sources and the nature of data**

A wide range of secondary and primary sources of data were used. Secondary sources included books, articles from academic journals, conference papers, discussion documents or working papers and newspapers. The data collected from the secondary

sources forms the basis of literature review and theoretical background, a historical overview of South African rural local government as well as the chapter focusing on the contemporary institutions and political processes in the South African rural areas. The primary sources used include the individuals and groups interviewed during the filed survey, the government documents and policy position papers of the South African interest groups and political parties. The data collected in my previous surveys on traditional leadership and rural local politics is also used as a supplementary material to this study. The survey covered traditional leaders, elected local government officials, civic leaders, government officials and experts on the subject of traditional rulership and local government. The fieldwork part of this study was conducted between April 5<sup>th</sup> and September 30<sup>th</sup> of 2000. The data collected from the fieldwork, particularly the field survey, features prominently in chapter six which presents a profile of the selected communities as well as chapters seven and eight which focus on summarizing and analyzing survey results.

Both qualitative and quantitative data was collected and is used in this study. Quantitative data is mainly generated from the demographic section of the semi-structured interviews. These include personal details such as age, ethnic affiliation, ownership of resources (land, farm, business, and livestock), place of birth, party membership, and employment status. The opinions, attitudes and views of the respondents form the qualitative part of the survey data. Quantitative data form the basis of chapter seven and chapter eight which summarize and analyze numerical data. On the other hand, chapter six which focuses on the history and narratives of respondents has a qualitative bias.

Discussion and interpretation of results in chapter nine show that qualitative and quantitative data supplement and complement each other. For example, the qualitative data as used in profiling selected communities provide some depth and capture dimensions which are not easily apprehended when using quantitative or numeric data. The narratives that are drawn from the qualitative portion of the interviews provide an account of each community in a manner that reveals history and evolution of relationship among the key players. It also gives voice to the participants and also provides context to relational dynamics of each community. In this way one is able to see reality through the eyes of participants as it is in this form that perceptions and rationalization of individual actors' actions.

### **3.3. Population and sample**

The foregoing discussion has identified the rural local elite of South Africa as the target population. The different sectors of the target population include the traditional leaders, elected local councilors and the civic leaders. The findings of this study will ultimately be generalized to this population in South Africa. These findings will also help to formulate hypotheses in the future studies of rural local government politics in Africa. This will indirectly help in evaluating some of the general assumptions about rural political dynamics (institutions and political processes) in Africa.

In order to have a general sense of the numbers of elected councilors and traditional leaders the following figures and comments are provided. In South Africa rural areas constitute two broad categories. The first category includes the village settlements which

are predominantly occupied by blacks. The second category covers predominantly white commercial farms some of which have black tenants.

To cover communities with traditional leaders, elected councilors and civic leaders, this study targeted the former or more specifically the rural areas which are under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders or chiefs. Almost all these administrative units are located in the former black Bantustans or homelands (See map1). Today these areas are part of South Africa's six provinces, and these are Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Free State, Northwest and the Northern Province. Of South Africa's new nine provinces only three fall outside the scope of provinces with areas that fall under the jurisdiction of chiefs and these exempted provinces are Gauteng, Western Cape and Northern Cape (See Map 2).

The following figures, provided in 1996 by the Department of Constitutional Development, give a sense of magnitude of the areas under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders. About 17% of South Africa's territory which is occupied by an estimated 40% of the entire population or 17 million people falls under the rule of traditional authorities.<sup>122</sup>

The sectors of the rural elite that are under consideration are traditional leaders, elected local councilors and the civic leaders. The number of traditional leaders in South Africa is estimated at 800 even though these figures are disputed and constantly change

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<sup>122</sup>Kessel, I. and Oomen, B "One chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in apartheid South Africa." in African Affairs 96 (1997), p.561. post-

depending of how one defines traditional leaders. For instance, Kessel and Oomen stretch this estimate to about 10,000<sup>123</sup> but presumably are including *iinduna* or headmen and members of traditional authority councils. Another study estimates that there are more than 800 chiefs with KwaZulu-Natal having 300.<sup>124</sup> Maloka gives the following breakdown of traditional leaders in the present South Africa: 17 kings, paramount chiefs and queens; 787 chiefs and 2210 headmen and iinduna. He also puts chiefs in KwaZulu-Natal at more than 285. The Eastern Cape more paramount chiefs and deputy paramount(at 11) chiefs than any province and accounts for half the number of all the headmen in South Africa<sup>125</sup> Taken together, these figures underscore the complexity of identifying the entire population of South Africa's traditional leaders as well as the vastness and regional variation of this population.

The overall number of South African elected councilors as constituted after the first democratic local government elections of 1995/96 is 11,118.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>123</sup>Ibid, p.561.

<sup>124</sup>Traditional Leaders Research Group., "Vol.VIII: Development management— The administrative and legal position of traditional authorities in South Africa and their Contribution to the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Program. 1996: p.64.

<sup>125</sup>Maloka, T. "Populism and the politics of chieftaincy and the nation-building in the New South Africa", Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol.14, No.2, 1996: p.191.

<sup>126</sup>Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development. "The White Paper on Local Government", March 1998; p.144.

The provincial breakdown is as follows.

**Table: 3.1. Distribution of council seats and municipalities in SA local government**

<b>Provinces</b>	<b>Number of council seats</b>	<b>Number of Municipalities</b>
1.Eastern Cape	1935	177
2.Free State	1308	102
3.Gauteng	1043	38
4.KwaZulu-Natal	2159	119
5.Mpumalanga	1102	76
6.Limpompo/N. Province	811	68
7.Northern Cape	559	48
8.Northwest	755	50
9.Western Cape	1446	113
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,118</b>	<b>791</b>

These figures include all local government structures in South Africa and this includes the metropolitan city areas, towns and rural areas. Many rural areas before the second local government elections of December 2000 had no municipal structure of their own. These areas were represented in the district councils by councilors drawn from the rural

areas, often representing political parties.

When it comes to the civic leaders there are neither numbers nor even estimates. The reason for this is that most of these leaders are drawn from non-statutory bodies or community-based organizations. There is also no stability in terms of numbers as these leaders may leave or die or their influence wanes without them being replaced. Some of the community organizations rise to prominence when they mobilize around specific issues and they fade away when the problem in question has been tackled. For an example, many SANCO structures collapsed in the Eastern Cape once the elections were over or in some cases when land allocation process had been completed.<sup>127</sup> Furthermore, the number of recognized civic leaders varies from one community to another. All these factors make it difficult to estimate the number of civic leaders in South Africa.

### **3.4. Research instruments**

In this section procedures and techniques that were used to collect data are briefly outlined. Focus group meetings were held with a group of local leaders. A separate meeting was organized for each sector of the local elite. More specifically, traditional leaders, elected leaders and civic leaders were met as a group with the aim of having a sense of what were the key issues to be considered in each community. In the case of Rode the civic leaders were divided into those supporting the chief and were members of UDM and those who were SANCO/ANC members and most of whom were opposed to

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<sup>127</sup> Unpublished study conducted by the author in collaboration with G. Houston, November 1995-January 1996.

the chief. Given the level of tension within the civic leadership, I anticipated problems if they were to be called into the same meeting so I organized a separate meeting for each group. At one stage the members of the opposing group would come to the community hall where the focus group discussions were held, and they would peep through the windows shouting at those I was conducting group discussions with. At times I would hear words like, “don’t believe a thing they are telling you, they are liars, don’t listen to them.” Notwithstanding all these tensions and difficulties, I navigated through these and this experience helped me to be better prepared by the time I met with similar situations in KwaZulu-Natal where joint group meetings with both ANC and IFP local leaders were virtually impossible given the level of a mutual animosity.

These focus group discussions were valuable in giving me a sense of what was important in each community as well as the issues to be considered in the interview sessions.

Portions of narrative history of individual communities were also constructed from the material obtained in these group discussions and supplemented with the secondary material as earlier indicated in this chapter.

The instrument of choice was a social survey in a form of face-to-face or personal interviews. The interview schedule was semi-structured to allow flexibility that would make it possible to extract both the qualitative and quantitative data. The first portion of each interview was designed to obtain information on demographic characteristics of each respondent. These included age, gender, income level, ethnic affiliation, languages spoken, marital status, birthplace, level of education, political affiliation, past political



history (affiliation and activism), ownership of livestock, ownership of farming fields, and ownership of a plot of land on which to build a house. This part of the interview is close-ended with specific choices or option for each respondent.

The qualitative part of the interviews provided critical information on the history of the target communities, their past and present conflicts, attitudes, perceptions and opinions on a wide range of issues including each participant's policy preference and understanding or interpretation of relations among the sectors of the local elite. In this section respondents were asked to express their opinion on a wide range of issues such as their view on chiefs' open participation in party politics, land tenure policies, transparency and representativeness of traditional authority and elected councils. Perception of local relations (conflict and cooperation) among the local elite as well as definition of roles of different sectors of the local elite also featured in these interview guides. The actual questions used in this survey will feature in the data analysis chapter (chapter seven). This qualitative portion of the interview tended to be open-ended thus making it more challenging to code. The open-ended nature of these interview questions, however, does not mean that participants were not subjected to the same set of questions as reflected in the interview guide. This simply means that probing or follow-up questions were asked for clarification or more detail. Most of the above variables are measured at a nominal level in a form of categories and this influenced the choice of statistical tools of analysis as it will be shown in the subsequent discussion below. I personally conducted the interviews and most of them were recorded using a micro-recorder whenever a participant granted me permission. These interviews took place in

the homes and offices of respondents, and this was based on the choice of respondents. Furthermore, most of these interviews were conducted in vernacular languages and later translated into English during transcription. Prior to each interview, I read out the letter of consent to each participant. This letter introduces and identifies the interviewer; it then briefly describes the aims and objectives of the study. It continues by describing the voluntary nature of the study and provides assurances of anonymity and confidentiality. Each interview commenced once a participant agreed to participate upon their full understanding of the contents of the letter of consent.

### **3.5. Data presentation, analysis and interpretation**

The foregoing discussion indicated that a wide range of data is used and this is reflected in its presentation in various chapters. Briefly, chapter two, four and five focuses more on interpretive discourse analysis and description of political processes and institutions.

Chapters six, seven and eight draw extensively from the survey data. In chapter six this data is presented in a descriptive form of narratives that are drawn from the qualitative aspects of the interviews and focus group discussions. Chapters six and seven are more quantitative. A majority of these results are nominal variables with a remaining few given at an ordinal level. As indicated earlier, the nominal level of measurement as well as the categorical nature of data limited the options that are suitable for this kind of data. This is the case with ordinal level variables as they are tested or compared with categorical data thus having the same effect of limiting the range of statistical tests. As a consequence, descriptive summary statistics are extensively used to provide, for a comparative purpose,

averages and trends of the data. Tables and graphic comparison through charts are used to present and compare these figures across cases and individuals. Once trends are observed, the next step conducted are statistical tests to indicate whether these observed frequencies and variations are statistically significant or due to chance. Nonparametric inferential statistical tests are used to establish this association or to test the hypotheses. More specifically, Chi-Square is used to test association between two samples on each one of the measured variables. It should be remembered that Chi-Square only tests the existence or nonexistence of association between variables but does not test strength or direction of relationship. To partially compensate for this limitation I utilized Cramer's V test which, in addition to testing association, indicates the strength of relationships between given variables. Cross-tabulation is used to present the distribution of variables across categories under consideration in the data set.

In chapter seven the emphasis is on identifying trends, using graphic illustrations of scores on each variable (age, ethnicity, education, distribution of resources, views on traditional land tenure, New Municipal Demarcation Law, opinion on traditional values and customs, on corruption in traditional authority, perception of the role and influence each elite has on local government institutions and opposition to payment of services in rural areas). The assessment is aimed at finding out if there are trends associating aggregated scores of individuals in conflict communities and those in non-conflict communities. For example, if there is a huge and systematic discrepancy in terms of the levels of education of traditional leaders and those of their key rivals or elected councilors/civic leaders in conflict communities and this is not the case in non-conflict

communities then a relationship is confirmed by identifying this trend. There is no clear trend or aggregated scores in both types of relations are similar then it is concluded that there is no relationship or pattern along the lines of type of relations. As indicated above, the last step is to assess if these observed frequencies are statistically significant by using Chi-Square tests statistical tests with particular interpretation of the value of Pearson Chi-square and Cramers V value and significance level. In chapter eight a similar evaluation is conducted but the difference here is that the focus is on whether the statistically significant results have a regional dimension or, put differently, do regional factors provide any further insights on the observed results.

In the final chapter all the results of the study from chapters six, seven and eight are considered in view of theoretical work reviewed in the literature as well as the hypotheses outlined at the beginning of this study. This interpretive work is provided not just for the variables that emerged as showing some relationship with the type of elite relations, this is also extended to those that did not show relationship and plausible explanations are provided. It is also in this final chapter that I allude to some of the subtle indication that leadership attributes may also be a factor in these local relations even though this variable was not measured directly in this study. By a way of conclusion, it should be stated that this work aims at affirming some theories and hypotheses rather than testing them.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### SOUTH AFRICAN RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH TIME: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

**“The present is the past rolled up for action, and the past is the present unrolled for understanding”<sup>128</sup>**

The current rural local government institutional arrangement, political processes and prevailing relations among the local elites cannot be understood in a vacuum hence it is imperative to lay out its pertinent historical context from the very onset. This chapter will present a historical overview which will primarily focus on the evolution, manipulation and mutation of indigenous political institutions or chieftaincy from the pre-colonial period through colonial and apartheid era. The rationale for singling out traditional authority or chieftaincy is based on the fact that it has been, until recently, the primary institution of rural local government for the African people. Moreover, it has been a predominant political entity thus making it a primary target of chiefs’ subjects, rival local elites and the colonial/apartheid governments. In addition, a general survey of literature suggests that the institution of traditional authority is one of the most enduring features of African political life and history. It has survived from the pre-colonial period, through colonial rule and apartheid, and it is still a prominent feature of the post-apartheid South

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<sup>128</sup> Durant, W and Durant, A. The Lessons of History 1968.

## Africa.

With regard to the African continent, there is a general consensus among the African and Africanist scholars about the political survival of traditional rulership even though there are divergent views on the form and nature of these institutions particularly in the context of post-independence politics.<sup>129</sup> Understanding political relations among the various sectors of rural elite is, in essence, to understand how the elected local officials and civic leaders relate with the traditional authority as it is an entrenched institution around and against which local elite relations are formed. This, therefore, establishes a link with the central theme of this study which is primarily concerned with types of relations between traditional leaders and the elected local officials and or civic leaders. In this particular case the focus is on these relations as they occur in the rural communities during the post-apartheid South Africa.

For the purpose of this work the evolution of rural local government in South Africa is divided into four broad phases or eras and these are: Pre-colonial Era, Colonial Era, Apartheid Era and the Post-apartheid Era. In this chapter I will focus on the first three phases which provide a historical context for the current phase which is discussed in chapter four. Since the colonial phase, traditional authority has undergone reformation and transformation as provided for by a series of laws. These laws, as this chapter shows, did not only transform relations between the state and traditional leaders but also

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<sup>129</sup> Examples of these are the following works: Markovitz, op cit 1977; Miller, op cit, 1968; Sklar, op cit, 1993; Kataboro & Munene, op cit, 1994; Ntsebeza, op cit, 1999; Maloka, op cit, 1996).

impacted on local relations between chiefs and their subjects. It is, however, important to note that traditional leaders reacted in a variety of manners to these imposed laws, and that was an important factor in determining relations between the traditional leaders and their subject. This point is developed later in this chapter and in the subsequent chapters.

#### **4.1. Indigenous political institutions and political processes in the Pre-colonial Era**

Before embarking on a brief description of the pre-colonial period it is important to point out some inherent problems in the literature that deals with this subject. There are three general problems with this literature. Firstly, extensive use of oral narratives to reconstruct the past is, to a considerable extent, prone to inaccuracies arising from the fact that these accounts tend to weave together mythology, folklore, legends and historical facts. Sometimes a romanticized ideal picture of harmony born out of a consensus, which has little relation to the harsh political realities of the time, is projected and uncritically embraced as a historical fact. For example, the generally accepted notion of the consensus-based direct African style of democracy in which the community deliberated under a tree sits uncomfortably when juxtaposed with many accounts of leadership factions, rivalries, plots and assassinations as well as the use of coercive measures to force compliance. Secondly, the early documented eye-witness accounts by white missionaries and explorers as well as colonial settlers also have two fundamental flaws. These initial encounters were seen through the prism of another culture thus making it hard to understand or explain some of the subtle aspects and symbols that defined these indigenous entities. Even more important is the fact that these chroniclers were not neutral dispassionate observers as they had a specific mission to conquer and

convert the indigenous peoples thus obviating any objective appreciation of what they perceived to be “primitive” systems, and therefore objects of a civilizing mission.

Thirdly, indigenous political units varied widely, from a band of hunter-gather nomads to settled agriculture-based or pastoralist chiefdoms as well as a few large kingdoms. Most of these entities were in a state of becoming or work-in-progress as they were evolving all the time and essentially fluid in both size and form. The profound reconfiguration of Southern Africa’s political landscape during the *Mfecane* wars reinforces and amplifies this point. Out of these disparate units and against the backdrop of all the limitations listed above, any generalization about the pre-colonial institutions is fraught with problems.

The above-stated problems do not, however, diminish the importance of indigenous institutions and processes which later became an object of transformation and manipulation by successive colonial and apartheid administrations. It is for this reason that some reference will be made to some broad features of indigenous political institutions which formed the foundational base of the present rural local government.

Different accounts identify chiefs, in some few instances kings, as central figures in many pre-colonial African communities<sup>130</sup>. Chiefs had executive, administrative, judicial and military powers vested in them thus allowing a classic case of patrimonial rule to prevail in a setting where the person and the political entity were fused. At a religious level there

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<sup>130</sup> Hunter, op cit, 1965; Hammond-Tooke, op cit, 1975; Beinart, op cit, 1982; Camaroff, op cit, 1970; Ayittey, op cit, 1991)



were many chief-centered communal rituals such as harvest-related ceremonies, the strengthening of the army, treatment of crops and ritual performances aimed at preventing bad weather or calamities. Another source of tribal cohesion that was built around the chief was a common belief that he was a direct descendent of the founding ancestor of the group. Hence people traced their history through the royal pedigree and reference to people by the name of their chief or his ancestors. To illustrate this point further, a considerable number of Southern African ethnic and sub-ethnic groups carry the name of their founder, and these would include Pondo, Pondomise, Xesibe, Swati or Ngwane.

The following case of the Mpondomise is a typical example of many Xhosa chiefdoms' political structure. In terms of the Mpondomise political hierarchy, there is a senior chief or what was later renamed by colonial authorities as a paramount chief (*Nkosi enkulu*). Then there are chiefs or *iinkosi* who rule their own districts or large tracts of land made up of a cluster of villages. These *iinkosi* were, in some instances still are, usually royal princes who were brothers or sons of the reigning paramount chief. Below the chiefs there were *iziduna*, later known as *izibonda* or headmen, who administered wards/location or *ilali*. A location would be made up of a cluster of homesteads and the male heads of these homesteads or lineage groups would then form a council to assist the local headman. The headman was appointed by the ward council. In return the headman would be part of a council advising the chief who was one level above them. The smallest unit is an *isithebe* which is a section of a ward which is usually a kinship group within a ward and each headed by the senior member according to that group's lineage.

In terms of succession, the chief was usually the eldest son of his father's principal wife. In genealogical terms he held a hereditary position by being the most senior member of the most senior lineage and clan within the tribe. In the event where the heir was a minor, a regent was designated and preferred regents were relatives especially brothers of the heir's father. It is, therefore, by birthright or ascription rather than election that chiefs were chosen for the line of succession. Succession, however, was not always a smooth or automatic process as Ayittey points out;

“The chief's eldest son could be blocked from succession if he were found to be unfit or mentally incompetent to govern. Other considerations included his past conduct, his mannerisms, his capacity to lead, his valour, and his popularity”<sup>131</sup>.

In some instances succession struggles led to bloodbath, assassination and subsequent breakaway of some claimants to the throne. This merely indicates that the unwritten rules of succession were always open to interpretation and contestation which often led to bitter and protracted power struggles or even worse, a breakaway from or break up of chiefdom. To reinforce this point one can point at some of the prominent cases such as the Zulu king Shaka's assassination by his brothers and close advisors as well as the break away of chief Mzilikazi from Shaka's kingdom.<sup>132</sup>

Even though the chief or king was a central figure in these political units there is a

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<sup>131</sup>Ayittey, op cit, 1991: p.43

<sup>132</sup>Omer-Cooper, J. The Zulu Aftermath 1966 and Omer-Cooper, J. History of Southern Africa 1994

preponderance of evidence of checks and balances to counterbalance chiefly exercise of power over his subjects and this primarily came in a form of *amaphakathi/iinduna* or councillors and close advisors as well as *imbizo* or public meetings or general assemblies. The nature and the extent of these checks and balances differ from one account to another as well as across ethnic groups. John Camaroff recalls Schapera's account of Tswana chiefs;

“...the chief was the executive head of his political community: he had the sole right to summon councils and public meetings to discuss legislation or administrative matters; he presided over the highest court and had exclusive authority over indigenous coercive agencies; and he was held accountable for the mystical well-being of the tribe, an obligation which included a difficult task of ensuring abundant rainfall. In short, the chief was thought to exercise control over all the affairs of government within his chiefdom. Tswana office-holders are generally characterized as having wielded considerable power, albeit limited by the right of their senior advisors, councillors and close kinsmen to guide them and to admonish them for injudicious or autocratic behaviour”.<sup>133</sup>

Maloka gives another version in which a chief had even more limitations in his exercise of power;

“But chiefs were relatively weak, as their power was circumscribed by the *khothla* (council of advisors recruited from homestead heads), and the *pitso/imbizo* (an assembly of able-bodied men). Dissatisfied subjects could always leave to attach themselves to another chief. Sometimes disputes over succession could result in break-away of some members of the chiefdom.”<sup>134</sup>

Both of these accounts demonstrate some form institutional framework allowing for counter-balancing chief's power as well as somewhat diffused locus of power within a

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<sup>133</sup> Camaroff, J., op cit, 1970: p.37.

<sup>134</sup> Maloka, T., op cit, 1995: p.37

political entity which was essentially hierarchical.

Rutsch<sup>135</sup> and Zungu<sup>136</sup> present an administrative hierarchy of the Zulu pre-colonial political units. At the bottom of this hierarchy was a family, often an extended family, otherwise known as a kraal in some parts of the country. The male head of this homestead or *umnumzane* administered the family. Several families clustered within a given location/*ilali/isigodi* were under the administration of an *induna/isibonda* who collectively ruled in consultation with heads of homesteads. The *iinduna* represented their areas in a tribal council which was led by a chief of a given tribe or ethnic group. *Iinduna* were chief's extensions in their various locations while at the same time representing the interest of their subjects in a tribal authority. In most instances one of the *iinduna*, especially a trusted friend of a chief, was appointed to be a special advisor to the chief thus giving him a deputizing position. In his own ward, each *induna* had a duty of, among other things, allocating land in consultation with the ward council of elders and heads of homesteads. The position of an *induna* was often not hereditary as he was either appointed by a chief from the elders and heads of homesteads of a given ward. Hammond-Tooke's work<sup>137</sup>, however, demonstrate that there were exceptions to this trend as shown by many Pondo and Pondomise chiefs who tended to appoint their brothers or sons from the royal family to play the role of headmanship or *izibonda*, a

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<sup>135</sup>Rutsch, P. "Traditional Trauma" in Indicator South Africa Vol.12, No.2.,1995, p.36.

<sup>136</sup>Zungu, S. in Diescho Traditional and contemporary forms of local participation and self government 1996: p.32

<sup>137</sup>Hammond-Tooke, W Command and Consensus: Development of Transkeian local government 1975.

Pondo equivalent of *induna*. These is yet another demonstration of how practice was and is as important as the rules that are stipulated in the customs or the laws that guide each chiefdom. Among the *Nguni* there were other specialized roles and portfolios of *induna* such as *induna yezintsizwa* whose role was to mobilize and train the young warriors. Some ethnic groups had a collection of different clans or sub-ethnic communities under different chiefs with a king at the apex of that hierarchy. The Zulu kingdom is a classic case of this structure. Since the primary level is at local units under chiefs the role and functions of a king and a kingdom are beyond the scope of this work.

Hammond-Tooke<sup>138</sup> and Hunter's<sup>139</sup> work on the Cape Nguni or various Xhosa groups indicate the existence of indigenous institutions which have many common features though with some subtle variations. Hammond-Tooke asserts that "A basic dictum of Cape Nguni political theory was that the chief should always defer to the general opinion of his council."<sup>140</sup> In a more nuanced interpretation of the same dictum he elaborates while at the same time pointing out some political dynamics around this ideal situation.

"Theoretically, then, a good chief need never involve himself in disputes with his tribesmen. If he confines his role to being a mere mouthpiece of the court or moot any blame could be safely sidetracked onto his councillors, who must have given him bad advice or made a wrong decision. But there were always some chiefs who did assert their authority— and this held potential for secession."<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>138</sup>Ibid

<sup>139</sup>Hunter, M. Reaction to Conquest 1961.

<sup>140</sup>Hammond-Tooke, op cit, 1975, p.36.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid, p.36.

The above observation does illustrate a consensus-based indigenous political system with checks and balances while at the same time indicating that there were some deviations from this practice. On the notion of secession as a tool of protest or resistance to autocratic chiefs it is important to note that pre-colonial tribal secession meant that a breakaway group would migrate elsewhere. With the advent of colonial rule and the modern state system there is no such flexibility of boundaries or readily available land on which to settle breakaway groups thus limiting this option as a viable political threat or tool and consequently retaining cleavages that generate elite rivalries within a fixed community.

Perhaps the most salient aspect of this pre-colonial phase is the fact that traditional rulers' source of legitimacy, support and resources was almost exclusively their subjects with the exception of war compensations or forceful capture of resources especially livestock, from other chiefdoms. The advent of colonialism and the modern state system had a profound impact on the nature of the relationship between traditional rulers and their subjects as the following discussion shows.

The pre-colonial phase of African autonomous chiefdoms ended abruptly and often violently when colonial forces conquered one chiefdom/kingdom after another. As the curtain fell on this era many traditional leaders were still enjoying popular support from their subjects particularly because they led wars of resistance against the invading colonial forces.

#### **4.2. The colonial era and the new administrative laws for the African communities.**

Even though the first European (Dutch) settlers arrived in 1652, it was not until the latter part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century that the colonial administration was finally imposed on all African communities. Before the Union of South Africa came into existence in 1910 there were four colonies, namely, the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal. The Cape and Natal were British colonial provinces whereas the latter originally were autonomous republics under the Boers or Dutch settlers who established themselves in the interior regions in a bid to escape British rule. During this period there was no common and systematic approach to native administration. Each colony or republic followed a different approach but with one general objective of neutralizing and manipulating traditional authorities and ultimately turning them into functionaries of the colonial administration without necessarily micro-managing the everyday life of their communities. The following observation by Beinart captures the essence of colonial motives in their dealing with African chiefs;

“Rather than destroy the chiefs in the Transkei Territories, except for those who had openly rebelled against the Colony, the administration sought to deprive them of many of their independent powers, make them dependent on the state, and use their remaining authority to ease the implementation of colonial rule.”<sup>142</sup>

Just to give an example of some different provincial approaches, in the 1850s Natal Administrator, Theophilus Shepstone, recognized administrative units under chiefs but placed them under jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor of the colony who could

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<sup>142</sup>Beinart, W. The Political economy of Pondoland 1860 to 1930 1982: p.104.

depose and impose chiefs. According to

Rutsch,

“In order to control the chiefs and residents of the reserves, Shepstone made the governor the Supreme Chief over all Africans, with the power to appoint, recognize and depose *amakhosi* and *izinduna*. He ruled that indigenous law would only apply if it did not offend the concepts of civilized behaviour purporting to exist under Roman Dutch Law.”<sup>143</sup>

As a direct consequence of this law traditional leaders were transformed into servants and functionaries of the colonial administration from being masters of their own ethnic groups. This also led to the actual appointment by the governor of chiefs who had no hereditary claim to chieftaincy. By the same token many legitimate chiefs were replaced or deposed on suspicion of insubordination which simply meant that they were deemed as not closely cooperating with colonial administration. The following directive of Shepstone leaves no doubt on the real motives of the colonial administration in passing this law;

“...inform the young chief and the old men of the tribe, that in this colony, chieftainship does not depend on hereditary succession, but upon appointment by the Supreme Chief...that the Supreme Chief is always willing to appoint sons of deceased chiefs, where those sons are found fit for the duties required of them, and he is willing to do so in this instance, but the young man must be made to understand clearly, that if, by his conduct he is found unfit for the position of chief, the Supreme Chief will order his immediate deposition and appoint one more trustworthy in his place. He must also be told that the people of whom he has been allowed to take charge, are not his people, that they belong to and are subjects of the government and that he is allowed to take charge of them on behalf of the government.”<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>143</sup>Rutsch, op cit,1995: p.36

<sup>144</sup> Ibid, p. 36.



This directive clearly articulates Shepstone's policy and it also indicates how he intended to transform chiefs into civil servants in service of the colonial administration.

Chieftaincy whose foundation is based on heredity was about to be transformed into selection by appointment where the chief were not fully collaborating with the administration. Shepstone's law was subsequently extended to all other South African provinces with some modifications.

In the Cape Colony the Prime Minister, Cecil John Rhodes promoted and passed the Glen Grey Act of 1894. This Act made provisions for the establishment of district councils in the native areas of the Cape, and these were to be chaired by District Magistrates. The Magistrate had the powers to appoint headmen in their districts and once appointed they were answerable to him. Some of these appointed headmen were actually hereditary chiefs and some of the chiefs who were deemed rebellious or insubordinate were replaced. As a result of this law, many chiefs were supplanted by appointed headmen, and the magistrates became administrators and legislators of areas once ruled by chiefs. The duties of these appointed headmen included law and order as well as the welfare of the location under their jurisdiction. In all, the position of hereditary chiefs had been blunted as the headmen gained prominence, at least in eyes of the colonial administrators. The other provision of this Act aimed at changing land tenure from the traditional communal system to an individual land tenure based on surveyed plots. The effect of this provision is that it would take away the powers of the chiefs who held the land in trust thus meaning that no one could claim the land as an individual property.

In the Boer Republics the conquered chiefs and their communities were allowed to live as tenants in the areas which had been designated as white farms. The African communities continued to live under the rule of their chiefs who liaised with their white landlords who did not necessarily extend a formal recognition of chiefs as such. In these Boer-controlled territories there was not an attempt to develop systematic policy toward the administration of the African communities and these communities were generally left to the mercy of individual landlords. This is a sharp contrast to the British-administered territories as the above discussion has shown. With their powers considerably reduced and roles redefined chieftaincy survived albeit in a different form.

The unification of the four colonies into a Union of South Africa in 1910 ushered a new era in which a standard policy to deal with what colonial administrators referred to as “Native Problem” or “Native Question”. This was the beginning of attempts to standardize and bureaucratize the traditional authority in South Africa along the general policy of Indirect Rule which Britain applied in most of its colonies. The first landmark policy which set the tone or foreshadowed the subsequent administrative and legal developments was the 1913 Native Land Act. This law created reserves for Africans which effectively confined them to 13% of the land and designating the rest to the white minority. It will be recalled that all the areas targeted by this study fall within these black reserves which later became bantustans under the apartheid regime. This also meant that these communities were confined in areas where they were crowded with scarce resources particularly land for both farming and for building houses.

The other major legislation which had direct bearing on rural local government was the Native Administration Act of 1927 which was essentially a synthesis of the Glen Grey Act and the Natal Shepstonian policy. This Act extended the district council system to other African reserves in the Union. In this instance the Governor General of the Union was proclaimed the “Supreme Chief” of all Africans thus making him preside over the traditional leaders and their communities. The other aspect of Native Administration Act was to give powers to the Governor-General to extend recognition to existing chiefs or appoint new chiefs where it was deemed necessary. This elevated some of these chiefs to the same legal status as headmen who were already functioning in terms of the 1894 Glen Grey Act. This policy also made provisions for the segregation of the administration of justice with reserves generally subjected to the customary laws and courts. Hammond-Tooke describes the role stipulated by the Native Administration Act as follows;

“Appointed chiefs were granted authority to exercise tribal government and control and to perform the administrative functions prescribed by the Government Notice, while recognized chiefs had no administrative functions and merely accorded the rank and customary privileges of a Native chief in or over any tribe or portion of a tribe, but without any administrative or official authority on behalf of the Government over any person or any land.”<sup>145</sup>

The above distinction can be seen as an attempt by the colonial administration to harness long ignored chiefs into its orbit with a promise of appointment should they support its goals or worked with the administration. It was also recognition of the de facto rulership of many hereditary chiefs parallel to their appointed headmen. After all, many chiefs,

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<sup>145</sup>Hammond-Tooke, op cit, 1975: p.92.

through traditional loyalties that surrounded their position, operated as alternative structure to the colonial administration or their surrogate headmen so this move to extend recognition was an acknowledgment of their continued importance outside the formal institutions.

#### **4.3. The Apartheid era**

The apartheid government which came to power in 1948 changed the official policy toward traditional leaders. The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act became a foundation for the new policy with the ultimate goal of establishing separate self-governing homelands outside the areas designated for whites. This Act was promoted as an attempt to return to traditional chieftdom as a core of African self-government so the new tribal authority was purportedly based on chiefdoms. Govan Mbeki describes the extent to which the government, or more specifically the Minister of Bantu Affairs, was going to control these tribal authorities;

“He designated chiefs to head these authorities — and could at any time depose them; he also fixed the minimum and maximum number of councillors to serve on each Authority. The Bantu Commissioner had the right to veto any appointment. The system entirely excluded the elective principle. The Minister and his officials had strict control over membership of the Authorities; and members of the general public could be excluded from their meetings.”<sup>146</sup>

According to this Act the powers of chiefs were considerably strengthened while at the same time their legitimacy was being eroded as they were compelled to introduce unpopular government laws in their communities or risked losing their positions through

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<sup>146</sup> Mbeki, G. The Peasant Revolt 1982: p.39.

replacement. These laws included forceful resettlement of entire communities, maintenance of law and order, reporting to the Bantu Commissioner any unrest, the enforcement of all government laws and dispersal of unlawful gatherings formed the core of duties imposed on chiefs and their tribal authorities. If anything, this Act potentially put tribal leaders in direct conflict with their subjects because as civil servants they had to enforce policies of apartheid. No longer were they leaders who once articulated the needs of their communities. The targeting of many chiefs and their councilors by those who were opposed to the implementation of some of the apartheid laws including the Bantu Authorities Act has to be understood in terms of this new institutional and policy framework which alienated traditional leaders from their communities.

The Bantu Administration Act of 1951 provided for a three-tier system of local government in the reserves. These were Bantu authorities based on individual chiefs in their administrative areas, regional authorities which were made up of chiefs and their areas grouped according to regions, and territorial authorities who covered the entire reserve or Bantustan. In some areas, such as the Transkei, another tier, District Authorities, was introduced. In this effort to entrench the position of chiefs as an administrative tool, some chiefs were appointed or created for areas which otherwise had no chiefs or rightful heirs were bypassed<sup>147</sup>. Traditional leaders were now placed under the magistrates who presided over Regional/Territorial Authorities which included chiefs and government-appointed members.

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<sup>147</sup>MacMillan, H "Tradition, tribes, chiefs and change in Southern Africa" in Osaghae, E (ed) Traditional Leadership in Southern Africa 1997: p.143.

In this hierarchy, the chiefs presided over their tribal authorities with members of the tribal council constituted by the headmen of locations or people appointed by the chief or, at least in theory, were elected by people from the wards. It should be noted that the elections of ward representatives to the tribal authorities rarely involved broad participation by the residents and chiefs often exercised veto against any person who they happen not to favor.<sup>148</sup> At a district level chiefs were ex officio members of the district council which also included eight other members, a portion of which was appointed by the Bantu Commissioner while the other was elected by the taxpayers from the tribal council members. The magistrate presided over the district authority. At a regional level, the head is the paramount chief and other members were drawn from the chiefs, as ex officio members, in the region as well as members of district authorities. Other members were appointed by the paramount chief and the Bantu Commissioner. All members of the regional authorities combined different regional authorities to form a Territorial Authority. In this case as well, the Minister of Bantu Affairs could veto any appointment into the Territorial Authority.

The reinforcement of the position of traditional leaders included other measures such as influx control such as the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 which limited the right of Africans to live permanently in the urban areas. This and a number of other laws were meant to force Africans back to the reserves where they were to be under the

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<sup>148</sup>Mbeki, op cit, 1982.

jurisdiction of designated chiefs. Southall summarizes the intended impact of these new laws;

“The Bantu Authorities system was formulated as a device for utilizing the indigenous chiefly elites as agents of political control in the reserves. By restoring the traditional leadership and binding it to the state as the source of its wealth and authority, the National Party sought to counter the heightened political consciousness of the African mass by dividing the latter into its ethnic segments and subjecting it to a system of indirect rule.”<sup>149</sup>

In broad terms the new system was meant to guide chiefs in the exercise of local government along the lines required by the apartheid government. The higher level of these four tiers was supposed to supervise the one directly below it. This was one giant step in preparing Africans to have their self-governing Bantustans thus fitting the grand scheme of apartheid policy of divide and rule or what apartheid framers preferred to call separate development.

#### **4.4. African reactions to the colonial and apartheid laws in the rural areas**

The imposition of colonial and apartheid laws on rural-based African communities was not met with a passive response even though reactions varied, as much as it revealed local elite cleavages and rivalries, and were sometimes ambiguous. The post-conquest reaction to the changing rules and administration reflects the politics of exclusion, collaboration and resistance as much as it reveals local elite cleavages and rivalries. These rural reactions have, admittedly, not attracted as much attention as urban-based union and nationalist opposition politics. There are, however, studies that have thrown some light

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<sup>149</sup> Southall, R. South Africa's Transkei: The Political Economy of an independent Bantustan 1983. p.103

on rural resistance to colonial and apartheid rules and these include Govan Mbeki's *South Africa: The Peasant Revolt*<sup>150</sup>, Hammond-Tooke's *Command and Consensus: The Development of Transkeian Local Government*<sup>151</sup>, and Beinart and Bundy's *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa*<sup>152</sup>.

As indicated in this discussion earlier, The Glen Grey Act of 1894 tended to prefer appointed headmen to the indigenous chiefs. Hammond-Tooke indicates that the local government system introduced by this law was strongly resisted by chiefs who felt that they were being bypassed by commoners who were merely appointees of the white administration. This system was generally unpopular with the African communities because with it brought new taxes which were enforced by the headmen. On the other hand, it is also indicated that the emerging group of educated Africans particularly teachers saw an opportunity of being appointed as local administrators something which had long eluded them under the strictly hereditary indigenous system.

As Beinart and Bundy put it;

“...some of the wealthiest ‘school’ families were quick to see in the council system a possible avenue to local political power and accumulation. ... This meant that it was possible for the state to find acquiescence in or support for some measures it introduced; it could enlist some agents within the rural areas to operate some of the measures it introduced.”<sup>153</sup>

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150 Mbeki, G., op cit, 1960

151 Hammond-Tooke, op cit, 1975.

152 Beinart and Bundy, op cit, 1987.

<sup>153</sup> Beinart, W. and Bundy, C. Hidden struggles in Rural South Africa 1987: p.37.



In yet another revealing case study of a headman, Enoch Mamba, appointed in terms of this provision of Glen Grey Act, Beinart and Bundy demonstrate the complex relations in which some of the local elites were involved in. They describe a balancing act between the pressures from the magistrate above, the popular pressures and demands from the community as well as rivalry from the marginalized chiefs. In this particular case of Mamba, they show an educated African who was appointed as a headman, rose into prominence, and was replaced when he articulated some of his people's needs. Upon losing headmanship he wrote appealing letters to various government officials and administrators begging for reinstatement. More revealing are some of Mamba's correspondence and speeches that often emphasized that he was better qualified to be headman as he was the most educated African in his region<sup>154</sup>.

The 1908-1916 outbreak of East Coast Fever in the livestock led to the state's directive that all cattle farmers including Africans should dip their cattle and in some instances slaughter the affected ones. The headmen were called upon to enforce cattle-dipping as part of this campaign. There was popular resistance in many rural areas and this campaign failed. Headmen became very unpopular and were often targets of this resistance. A more widespread rebellion came in the 1950s and 1960s in Pondoland, in Zululand and Sekhukhuniland as rural masses opposed the imposition of the Bantu Authorities as well as the "Betterment Scheme" which was meant to relocate communities into surveyed areas. Some of the collaborating chiefs and headman were

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<sup>154</sup>Ibid: p.88-97

killed or fled and took refuge away from their communities.

All these incidents seriously eroded the legitimacy of rural local authorities. Rural resistance outline above indicates, among other things, the structural, institutional factors as well as the political contingency factors as shown by the key actors or agency in shaping relations with the state, with the communities and among the rural elite. It also indicates that social differentiation, be it based on education or wealth, was beginning too defined the sectional interests of the elite alliances and interest or conflicts. A general observation of these rural-based struggles indicates that they were primarily focused on and triggered by local conditions with very little connection to nationalist struggles and they were not sustained over a long period.

#### **4.5. The politics of cooption and exclusion within Bantustans**

As stated above, the long term objective of the apartheid government was to grant a form of self-government to black reserves thus, in this logic, foreclosing any future possibility of dealing with the native problem within the political and geographical framework of a “white South Africa”. Key to this program was the passing of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. This Act created eight Bantu Homelands along the ethnic lines and this was designed to keep these groups apart as separate units thus weakening the nationalist opposition forces which were increasingly successful in mobilizing across ethnic lines.

Of particular interest for the purpose of this chapter is the policy of these Bantustans

toward the traditional leaders who at this time had become the primary authority in the rural areas. The relations that evolved within Bantustans will also be examined as part of an assessment of the impact of black homeland system. A general survey of the literature on traditional rulership within the Bantustan system reveals the fact that at a lower level of rural local government there was no significant change from the then existing Bantu Authorities system thus leaving this institutional framework intact. However, there were some considerable changes that took place at top level of the homeland government legislative, bureaucratic and executive branches as each one of the homelands adopted a mechanism of co-opting traditional leaders. This strategy occurred concurrently with strenuous attempts to neutralize and marginalize those chiefs who were opposed to the homeland policies and its proponents. A few cases of homeland strategies and policies will be presented here in a bid to illustrate the above-stated assertion.

The apartheid regime first identified, encouraged and promoted chiefs to lead most of these Bantustans. Most of these chiefs were relatively junior even within their own ethnic groups or clans but they were comparatively more educated. The emergence of the following chiefs as key proponents of Bantustan policies and leaders of their governments underscore this point. Chief Kaizer Daliwonga Matanzima became the first prime minister and chief Botha Manzowandle Sigcau became Transkei's first State President; in KwaZulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was made the chief minister; in Boputhatswana Mangophe was the president, Chief Lennox Sebe in the Ciskei, Chief Mopeli in Qwaqwa and Chief Patrick Mphahlele in Venda. This strategy does not only reflect apartheid's preference for chiefs to lead its Bantustan institutions but also

indicates that the traditional elite would emerge as key players who would further promote their interests within Bantustans. Consequently, each one of these chiefs who assumed positions of leadership within the homeland governments promoted themselves into senior chiefs within their ethnic groups or clans thus rivaling legitimate and senior chiefs. Jeff Peires articulate this point with some examples;

“Certainly, the chiefs who rose to prominence under the homeland dispensation were not the great hereditary aristocrats such as King Sabata Delindyebo of the Thembu, but junior chiefs such as Kaiser Matanzima, Lucas Mangophe and Gatsha Buthelezi, who depended on the South African connection not only for money and power, but even for their very status as chiefs. Lennox Sebe, who was not born a chief but had a chieftainship manufactured for him on the basis of fake genealogy, is an extreme example of this process.”<sup>155</sup>

For example, in Transkei Chief Matanzima, one of many junior chiefs within the Thembu group used his position as the homeland prime minister to elevate himself into a paramount chief alongside Sabata who was customarily the legitimate paramount chief. In order to do this Matanzima split the Thembu region into two, the Thembu proper under Chief Sabata, and the Emigrant Thembu under himself. This led to a bitter rivalry between Sabata and his supporters, on the one hand, and Matanzima on the other hand. Matanzima used the state apparatus to neutralize his rival who had become one of the fierce critics of the Bantustan policy. In the end, Matanzima prevailed by banishing Sabata, charging him of treason, imprisoning him, deposing him and finally driving him into exile where he died as an ANC member. Similar experiences are repeated across

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<sup>155</sup>Peires, J. “The implosion of Transkei and Ciskei” in African Affairs 1992: p. 384.

many Bantustans even though they had their own dynamics as dictated by local politics.

The second Bantustan strategy was to incorporate traditional leaders into homeland government structures as a way of consolidating its control over their subjects. All the indications indicate that this was designed and implemented in a manner that promoted and entrenched the position of emergent Bantustan ruling elite than chieftaincy and this often caused tension between some chiefs and homeland government leaders. Edwin Ritchken's observation of the KwaNdebele homeland is a clear indication of this strategy;

“With the establishment of the legislative assembly in 1979, tensions in the agendas of some of the Ndzundza chiefs and their councillors began to emerge. The legislative assembly involved a 46-member body with a six-member cabinet appointed by the chief minister. All the 46 members, none of whom were chiefs, were nominated by the four tribal authorities. However, once nominated, a tribal authority could not recall the MP. Only the assembly itself could remove an MP. The chief minister also had a right to appoint or remove chiefs.”<sup>156</sup>

These tensions were compounded by the perception that homeland governments were dominated by one sub-ethnic group thus sidelining others. This was the case in KwaNdebele where the two major royalties, the Ndzundza and the Manala, vied for the control of the homeland government. These struggles, as was the case with Transkei's Matanzima-Sabata debacle often pushed marginalized chiefs into alliance with the liberation movements, particularly the ANC.

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<sup>156</sup> Ritchken, E in Glenn and Obery, op cit, 1990: p. 437.

In the case of Transkei constitution, all Paramount Chiefs became the ex officio member of the legislature together with 60 other chiefs with only 45 remaining seats open for elections<sup>157</sup>. After Transkei obtained its nominal independence in 1976, the State President was appointed from the paramount chiefs. In this case as well, there was no unity among the traditional leaders as some opposed the Bantustan policy and its ruling elite. KwaZulu also adopted this formula for representation of chiefs as ex officio members of parliament. Even more important in this case was the emphasis on maintenance of law and order as a function of traditional leaders at their rural localities. Once enforced and activated, this proved to be a potent force in preventing Inkatha rivals from mobilizing in rural areas. The following excerpts from the KwaZulu Chief and Headman Act of 1974 combined with Mare's remarks underscores this emphasis;

“The KwaZulu Act stipulated that a chief or headman ‘shall be entitled to the loyalty, respect, support and obedience of every resident of the area for which he has been appointed’. It placed chiefs and their assistants as local representatives of the KwaZulu government in control of law and order enforcement, unrest, distribution of ‘undesirable literature’, and prevention of ‘unauthorised’ entry of any person into his area”<sup>158</sup>.

There is nothing new about these powers as provided by successive colonial and apartheid laws enlisted in the foregoing discussion. It should, however, be noted that there was certainly more emphasis and explicitness in the case of KwaZulu where anti-UDF/ANC vigilante groups were later mobilized under chiefs and *iindunas* as “Zulu Regiments”, an apparent

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<sup>157</sup> Haines & Tapscott, 1984; Southall, 1982

<sup>158</sup> Mare, op cit 1993: p.88.

reference and appeal to the pre-colonial warrior tradition common during the inter-ethnic wars. While almost all other homeland governments relied on their security forces, the Inkatha combined the police force and these para-military regiments as a coercive tool. In all the homelands, remuneration for traditional leaders was also in the hands of the homeland government thus creating yet another tool for patronage. In most instances local chiefs were given powers to collect levies from their subjects, and this ranged from monies raised for specific projects such as fencing or building of a community hall to standing annual tax paid by each homestead as was the case with KwaNdebele<sup>159</sup>. This, too, became a common way of accumulation of resources by the traditional leaders. In general terms, the duties of traditional authorities under the homeland system could be listed as follows:

- a) The preservation of law and order which, among other things, included the settling of minor disputes and granting permission for meetings and dispersing those deemed to be unlawful.
- b) Allocation of land for building houses and for agriculture.
- c) Facilitation of recruitment of workers by companies particularly the mining industry.
- d) The screening of applications for old age pensions and other social benefits for

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<sup>159</sup>Interviews conducted in all three provinces confirms the raising of funds by chiefs without much accountability or transparency, and this became a source of tension in some communities such as Mnceba and Rode. In case of Mpumalanga communities, chiefs used to get R48 as annual tax paid by each homestead and they could use the fund at their discretion.

the old and disabled.

- e) Facilitate the building of schools and clinics which otherwise were funded by relevant government departments.
- f) Organization and promotion of agricultural activities such as the control of grazing and harvest.
- g) Helping the relevant government departments in the maintenance of roads, dams and bridges.
- h) Screening people who are coming to settle in areas under their jurisdiction as well as grant recommendation and verification for those planning to settle in other communities.
- i) Assist in verifying the identity of his subjects who otherwise do not have proper identity documents (citizenship identity documents or birth certificates).
- j) Facilitate meetings with government officials or any other outside persons especially those coming to address the community.<sup>160</sup>

The importance of the above-listed duties lies in the fact that the current relations in the context of transition is primarily based on the interpretation of these roles by the various local stakeholders including the traditional leaders, elected councillors and civic leaders.

#### **4.6. Concluding remarks**

A number of points stand out prominently in this chapter and these have a direct bearing

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<sup>160</sup> Manona, C. "Local Government" in De Wet, C and Bekker, S (eds) Rural development in South Africa: A case of Amatola Basin in the Ciskei 1982



on the discussion that follows. Firstly, traditional leadership remained resilient, even as it mutated into different institutional frameworks created by the colonial and apartheid governments hence it is a force to reckon with in this transition to democracy. Secondly, there was a shift from independent chiefdoms, which had their own system of counterbalancing the powers of chiefs, into a situation where these political entities did not only lose their sovereignty and independence under the successive colonial and apartheid administrations but also transformed traditional leaders into intermediaries and buffer between the rural masses and colonial rulers. This arrangement created a new set of relationships in which traditional leaders had to balance the demands of their subjects while at the same time implementing the often unpopular directives from successive governments. With a tremendous pressure from administrations above, threats of replacement or demotion and state's coercive apparatus at their disposal, traditional leaders, in many instances, relied more and more on repressive measures to keep their often disgruntled subjects in line thus creating what Mamdani<sup>161</sup> refers to as 'decentralized despotism'. Norman Miller<sup>162</sup> coins the term syncretistic political behavior or syncretistic leadership to describe the above phenomenon of a balancing act of intermediation. In general terms, he describes this leadership pattern as "...a synthesis and reconciliation of opposing forces of traditionalism and modernism. The result is a form of leadership which is neither modern nor traditional but incorporation of both."<sup>163</sup> This observation and the relevance of this phenomenon of fluidity and flexible leadership are

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161 Mamdani, M., op cit, 1996.

162 Miller, N., op cit, 1968

<sup>163</sup> Miller, N.(ed) Research in rural Africa 1969: p.184.

not just confined to this period as it is a recurring theme today.

The above discussion has shown a range of rural African responses to the entrenchment of colonial and apartheid rule as well as ambiguities within them. Traditional leaders and the local elite shifted from collaboration and compromise to resistance from area to area from time to time. Perception of authority and value of alliances changed over time.

Social differentiation and diversification of local elite also took place during this colonial and apartheid era with traditional leaders, locally-based civil servants, local businessmen, church leaders, student organizations, local party leaders and civic leaders emerging as stakeholders in rural politics. How these stakeholders contested the terrain of a new post-apartheid terrain will become evident in the following chapter which specifically focuses on this subject. A general observation that emerges from the above discussion is that colonial and apartheid laws seriously eroded, though they did not completely diminish, the legitimacy of chieftaincy, thus strengthening the position of those who emerged as alternative centers of local power in the post-apartheid South Africa. Understandably, this complicated traditional leaders' effort to reposition and reasserting themselves within the new democratic South Africa.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONTEMPORARY INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL FORCES IN RURAL SOUTH AFRICA**

**The institution of traditional leaders has existed for some time in South Africa. It has survived colonialism, it has survived apartheid and has yet to survive the challenges of a new order in post-apartheid society.<sup>164</sup>**

**Perhaps more difficult than most, is to find the best way in which our elected structures of local government and traditional leaders can work together for the good of their communities. This is a crucial area of Reconstruction and Development, and a resolution of outstanding differences and conflictual matters is of greatest importance.<sup>165</sup>**

**In the context of post-apartheid South Africa the issue of the role and place of traditional leaders is arising once more. The trends in traditional communities today show that allegiance to traditional institutions co-exists with overwhelming support for democratic governance.<sup>166</sup>**

The above statements capture the essence of a complex post-apartheid challenge of political engineering that must take into account and try to harmonize continuities and changes, tradition (understood in its broadest sense)<sup>167</sup> and modernity. Furthermore, these

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<sup>164</sup> Chief Sibongile Zungu in Diescho, J et. al., 1996: p.31.

<sup>165</sup> Nelson Mandela, South African President on the inauguration of the National Council of Traditional Leaders (Mail & Guardian, April 18, 1997)

<sup>166</sup> Sydney Mufamadi, South African Minister of Provincial and Local Government. (Sowetan, April 20, 2000).

<sup>167</sup> In this case the term tradition is used to refer to the institution of traditional rulership or those who often justify their actions and choices on basis of tradition. This, however, does not necessarily mean that all persons who invoke tradition are necessarily traditionalists. So this term as used here embrace both those who use tradition instrumentally as well as those who uphold traditional values.

statements reflect a contested, and consequently fluid, political landscape in a new dispensation of institutional transformation and democratization. More specifically, attempts to define the role of traditional leaders within the context of a new democratic system have proven to be very controversial and tricky.

The dominant and often contradictory political forces that emerged in the late 1980s that culminated in the constitutional engineering process of the 1990s are examined in this chapter. Only those political processes and institutions that are associated with rural politics and rural local governance are of relevance here. The discussion is guided by the following questions: What are the dominant political forces which shaped the agenda and therefore public policy on rural local government? Which sectors of the elite emerged as key players and stakeholders in rural local politics? How did traditional leaders react to and position themselves within the new dispensation of liberation and democratic politics? What is the composition, function and structure of rural local government in the post-apartheid South Africa? What sorts of relations have actually evolved among the local elites in the context of the new political dispensation? At the very onset it should be stated that this chapter will not offer exhaustive answers as other chapters also address these questions.

It is important to note that the political changes in rural local government predate the formal establishment of the new local councils after the 1995 and 1996<sup>168</sup> local

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<sup>168</sup> South African local government elections in South Africa were staggered with the rest of the provinces holding theirs in 1995 and KwaZulu-Natal elections being held in 1996.

government elections. It will be shown in this chapter that significant political developments that reconfigured local elite relations in rural areas can be traced back to the late 1980s at the height of political mobilization by forces opposed to the apartheid government. This chapter is a logical step that follows the previous chapter which presented a historical context of rural local government in South Africa by tracing its evolution from the pre-colonial period to the apartheid era. The current era is, therefore, regarded as the contemporary and fourth phase in the evolution of rural local government. The previous chapter has also provided a canvas of diverse institutional environments of different Bantustans which to a large extent helped to influence relations of the local elite as the subsequent discussion will demonstrate.

This chapter is divided into three parts that are related but analytically distinct. Firstly, protest politics of the late 1980s and early 1990s challenged, and in some cases redefined, the very foundation of the chieftaincy in rural areas. The various challenges, the reactions and counter-reactions of the main protagonists are of particular interest in this work. Secondly, constitutional and legal processes as well as outcomes which restructured the current rural local government in its various forms in different provinces. And thirdly, current and evolving relationships and struggles have emerged among the various sectors of the local elite which include traditional leaders, elected councilors, civic leaders and leaders of political parties. Regional differences will be pointed out as well as common trends.

### **5.1. The last frontier: The politics of protest and liberation in the rural areas.**

After the widespread rebellion of the 1950s and early 1960s rural areas remained relatively quiet and this continued even after the installation of the Bantustan system. What remained were isolated incidents of resistance which never amounted to the waves of protests in the black urban areas. Most of these isolated incidents were triggered by local conditions and were not linked to the nationalist struggle being waged by the main liberation organizations. It was not until the late 1980s that the anti-apartheid struggle spread to the rural areas on an unprecedented scale. Many observers often characterize the South African liberation struggle as having been, to a large extent, urban-based. For instance, Mamdani makes this observation and offers some explanation for South Africa's urban-rooted struggle against apartheid;

“The strength of urban forces and civil society-based movements in South Africa meant that unlike in most African countries, the center of gravity of popular struggle was in the townships and not against Native Authorities in the countryside. The depth of resistance in South Africa was rooted in urban-based worker and student resistance, not in peasant revolt in the countryside”<sup>169</sup>

Mamdani offers the high level of urbanization and industrialization as the reason for the evolution of this kind of resistance. Levin reinforces this view in his argument;

“The national democratic struggle was largely fought in urban areas, where the liberation movement was most successful in building organs of peoples' power, although these proved to be unsustainable during the transition to democracy. Rural organization was relatively weak, and largely undertaken by youth congresses whose struggles centred on generational and educational conflicts, and failed to link up with land questions.”<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Mamdani, op cit, 1996: p.29

<sup>170</sup> In Lipton, et al, op cit 1996: p.357.

In this observation, Levin identifies successes in mobilizing in the townships as well as the generational, or more specifically youthful, character of those pockets of protests in rural areas.

Other scholars such as Peires, Ntsebeza and Mare<sup>171</sup> have advanced the notion of crude and ruthless repressive apparatus that afflicted the rural populations in the Bantustans as one of the main reasons for the failure of several attempts to mobilize rural populations to join the popular uprising often evident in the black townships. In addition to the conventional reasons offered above, it is equally possible to postulate that the urban bias on the part of liberation leaders also contributed to the successes in mobilizing the urban areas. This point is explicitly supported by the following observation.

“Chiefs were on the margins of the UDF’s concerns. As with the ANC in the preceding decades, most UDF campaigns were geared towards urban areas. Its rural affiliates consisted of mainly youth organizations, led by students at secondary and tertiary schools. Attempts to recruit migrant workers were not pursued with much vigour.”<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> Peires, op cit, 1997; Ntsebeza, op cit, 1999 and Mare, op cit, 1983

<sup>172</sup> Kessel and Oomen, op cit, 1997: p.565.

Whatever the strength or merits of the above reasons for the weakness of rural participation in the struggle against apartheid, there is a general agreement among scholars that rural areas remained marginal in these political developments. But all that changed in a profound way in the late 1980s as the struggle spread into the countryside or Bantustans. It is primarily for this reason that this section is entitled *The Last Frontier* as it literally and figuratively presents the last geographic area to which the protests and resistance politics of the liberation struggle spread.

The mid-1980s were marked by political mobilization and anti-apartheid resistance unparalleled in South Africa's history and the rural areas, particularly Bantustans, were profoundly affected by this process. This resistance was spearheaded by a multitude of organizations which found common ground under the umbrella of the United Democratic Front (UDF) which generally functioned as an internal ally or arm of the banned ANC. A number of factors such as apartheid regime's increased repression to the successes of mobilization strategies of the opposition forces account for the cresting and radicalization of the resistance tide during this historical moment. Among other things, it was also a response to ANC call to all opposition forces within the country to render South Africa ungovernable and to create alternative 'people's structures/power'. As Mare puts it,

"Ungovernability and the creation of parallel structures rooted in the people or the community informed much of the anti-apartheid struggles of the second half of the 1980s."<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>173</sup>Mare, G. "Civil war regions and ethnic mobilization: Inkatha and Zulu nationalism in the transition to South African democracy" in Rich, P. (Ed) Reaction and Renewal in South Africa 1996: p.32



More specifically, in the black townships a call was made for the removal of township councilors who were generally seen as government puppets. Some of the strategies included boycotts of rate payments or payment of any utilities as demanded by the councilors.

One may, at this stage be tempted to ask; what does this have to do with subsequent political developments in the rural areas? The reason is the fact that the target of local authorities and the boycott of rates as well as the creation of alternative power structures were to be repeated in the rural areas even though they had their own dynamics as dictated by the unique conditions of each region. The unbanning of the ANC and other liberation organizations only helped to intensify the struggles and rivalries in the rural areas. Predictably, traditional leaders, especially chiefs, who were central figures in rural areas were the primary focus or targets of the emerging opposition movements.

Ritchken summarizes the scale and form of rural resistance that swept South Africa in the late 1980s;

“KwaNdebele was wracked by bitter and violent struggle against bantustan independence. KwaZulu has experienced the most sustained violence in the country. Venda saw a week-long Stayaway — the first in the region’s history — against government corruption. Kangwane was affected by education-related protests. In Lebowa, a series of targets ranging from chiefs to farmers and witches were attacked. A number of communities throughout the country opposed either removal or incorporation into bantustan. Although the rural areas were influenced by uprisings in the townships, their processes of mobilization were structured by specific history and political context faced by each region.”<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> In Moss & Obery: op cit, 1989, p.391.

Another observation which is more specific about the political developments that affected traditional leaders is offered by Richard Levin;

“ By the 1980s, the chiefs remained firmly entrenched, but the rise of the UDF and the development of civic organs began to challenge the legitimacy and the hegemony of the chieftaincy in rural areas. Chiefs were often viewed as ‘puppets’ of the apartheid regime and agents of the security forces, but because the rural struggle was largely spearheaded by the youth organized in youth congress structures, the control which chiefs exerted over land allocation was not seriously challenged.”<sup>175</sup>

Peires concurs with this observation in his remarks which are based on the Transkei experience after 1990, “The unbanning of the liberation movements first manifested itself in the rural areas through challenges by the youth to the arbitrary powers of the chiefs.”<sup>176</sup>

Both Levin and Peires stress the role of the youth thus depicting the struggle in the rural areas as largely, if not exclusively, an inter-generational conflict. This claim as well as the variable of generation as a factor in the local elite relations is revisited in greater details in both chapter seven and chapter eight. For now, suffice it to say that these are not the only scholars who assumed this position of generational conflict in rural areas with little or no analysis of other factors which were, and still are, at play in understanding relations among the local elites. In all, the above remarks indicate that the era of traditional leaders’ monopoly of power in rural areas was over as the political landscape changed the countryside into a contested terrain characterized by the struggle for control of local economic and political resources. This changed the nature of the

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<sup>175</sup>Lipton, op cit: p. 370.

<sup>176</sup>Peires, op cit, 1997: p.199.

struggle too, to a local one.

At this juncture, reference to some of regional dynamics during this period of intensified resistance will be made. In many ways KwaZulu-Natal communities stands apart from other black homelands because of peculiar political developments that took place in that region and this, it will be argued later, accounts for some of post-apartheid specific institutional arrangements which evolved in KwaZulu-Natal. First, Inkatha, led by Chief Buthelezi, seriously embarked on a project to establish mass following and the Zulu rural constituency which had been largely neglected by liberation organization was its target of mobilization. Traditional leaders (the King, chiefs and *indunas*) were the central core of its mobilization as was the invocation of Zulu heritage and symbols. So important were the traditional leaders that the Inkatha set up *indunas* to mobilize migrant workers who were in the urban-based hostels or compounds and this gave Inkatha a foothold in the urban areas. Unlike in other homelands, the Inkatha, using patronage, ethnicized ideology and coercion, managed to establish a solid rural constituency in KwaZulu homeland. Right from the onset Inkatha never allowed even token opposition to emerge in KwaZulu thus leaving it with virtual political monopoly. Furthermore, the mobilization strategy of the Inkatha often involved busing of rural dwellers led by their chiefs and *induna* into its rallies in towns and cities. Traditional regiments or the *induna*-led *amabutho* were transported to the cities and townships to confront Inkatha's political opponents, the UDF and the ANC or their allies in this instance. A similar strategy was used in the rural areas against people or even chiefs who were showing signs of breaking ranks and joining or sympathizing with the ANC/UDF.

By the mid 1980s UDF was making serious inroads into the areas under Inkatha administration particularly in the townships and towns. This led to the most violent response from Inkatha. With the connivance of the South African security forces, otherwise generally referred to as the “Third Force”<sup>177</sup> in South Africa, and the help of KwaZulu police, Inkatha supporters led by Amabutho clashed with UDF/ANC supporters. In response to these attacks, ANC allied organizations formed Self Defense Units (SDUs) and the Inkatha responded by establishing its own Self Protection Units (SPU) and by arming chiefs and iindunas with firearms. This led to the proliferation of para-military forces and the establishment of ‘no go areas’ or exclusive strongholds for each organization. Thousands of people died in KwaZulu-Natal and thousands more fled from their areas thus creating a refugee problem. In some cases local leaders of the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party(IFP) signed peace treaties but this only had limited success as the war raged on in many areas. In the end, the ANC has had limited success in mobilizing and establishing itself in the rural areas which remained IFP stronghold. In turn, IFP’s control over a majority of traditional leaders, who are the key element in keeping rural areas firmly in its control, remain strong as the patronage from KwaZulu homeland has simply been replicated under the new IFP-controlled KwaZulu-Natal Province. It is also important to note that unlike in all other provinces, the civic movement never managed to establish itself in most of KwaZulu-Natal rural areas. Therefore, rivalry is essentially between the IFP and the ANC.

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<sup>177</sup>The concept of “Third Force” was coined to describe the covert role of the apartheid security forces which in many instances assisted Inkatha militants and vigilante groups in their battles against the UDF/ANC.

The developments in other homelands though generally different from the situation in KwaZulu-Natal show some variations from region to region. In KwaNdebele the opposition forces were mobilized around their opposition to independence that Pretoria threatened to grant this homeland. Predictably, the ruling elite within the homeland government was pro-independence and in this they were backed by the Manala branch of the Ndebele Royal House. On the other hand, the opposition to independence was spearheaded by Prince James Mahlangu and other members of the Ndzundza branch of the Ndebele Royalty. The anti-independence movement was popularly supported by various sectors within the homeland and also back by the liberation movements, notably UDF and the ANC. Edwin Ritchken's article has the following impression and breakdown of the alliances within each one of the opposing camps.

“Unlikely alliances were established both among those who supported and those who opposed independence. Students, youths, migrants, women, bureaucrats, teachers, peasants and some chiefs formed the anti-independence bloc, which found its leadership in the Ndzundza royal family. The pro-independence bloc was formed by a grouping of shop-owners, taxi drivers, tribal authority councillors, squatters, the Manala royal family and certain chiefs, and was led by senior cabinet ministers in the KwaNdebele legislative assembly.”<sup>178</sup>

If anything, the above observation indicates that chiefs did join or even lead in this case the popular uprisings in some cases but the reasons for this tend to be context-specific. For instance in this case of KwaNdebele, the traditional royal feud between the Manala and the Ndzundza sections of the Ndebele royal house coupled with the persistent

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<sup>178</sup> Moss and Obery, op cit: p.426

marginalization of the Ndzundza throughout the KwaNdebele homeland experiment combined to cause this fissure. In these alliances there seem to be no clear class content except for the general notion that those who felt alienated within the homeland structures or having benefited little or nothing from this entity would be expected to rise up against the pro-independence group. In 1986 the conflict triggered by the events surrounding the proposed independence intensified. The pro-independence forces organized *Mbokotho*, a vigilante group, which went around attacking the opponents of independence and they were doing this with the help of security forces. The anti-independence forces responded by burning and boycotting businesses belonging to the homeland leaders or the people seen as their supporters. The scale of this conflict during 1986 is estimated to have left 160 people dead, many more went missing and about 70 percent of the bantustan businesses were destroyed.<sup>179</sup>

In yet another case, the expression of protests in Lebowa had its own dimensions. High school student protests demanding the acceptance of the elected student representative councils instead of the monitors and prefects who were appointed by teachers; some protests targeted chiefs and demanded their resignation while on the other hand these developments were accompanied by the establishment of vigilante groups which went on a killing spree eliminating people who were suspected to be witches. Police were also targeted in these campaigns. Boycott of businesses belonging to the alleged collaborators also became a common strategy. Tom Lodge portray some of the protests in the

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<sup>179</sup>Ibid: p. 426.

following manner;

“UDF members began to advocate the resignation of chiefs and members of the Lebowa parliament in order to complement the urban offensive against municipal councillors. In Driekop, a local chief and three *indunas* (headmen) were hacked to death.”<sup>180</sup>

The case of Lebowa shows another face of these protests and in this case chiefs were part of the targeted groups without exception thus making this a different case from the KwaNdebele situation where some chiefs were prominently involved in the popular struggles.

In cases like Transkei, Venda and Ciskei the intensifying protests received a boost when the homeland leaders were toppled in military coups. The new military leaders quickly and often opportunistically relaxed some of the repressive laws while uttering rhetoric which was pro-ANC. This, however, did not stop the protests from targeting homeland government officials and those perceived to be collaborators.

In the Ciskei most of the headmen and some chiefs virtually collapsed after being challenged by the civic organizations. There were similar challenges against Transkei traditional leaders even though many of them remained relatively strong although shaken.

Jeff Peires paint the following picture of Transkei during this period;

“In Flagstaff, Comrade Nomazele Bala has challenged the authority of his cousin, Chief Mwelo Nonkonyana, and told the people that they should allocate land and cut wood just as they please. Elsewhere, particularly in

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<sup>180</sup>Lodge, T. 1992: p.120

Lusikisiki and Willowvale Districts, the right of chiefs to allocate land has also been challenged, rural civics are in the process of taking over meetings of the Tribal Authorities. Anti-stock theft movements provide another vehicle for genuine popular sentiment.”<sup>181</sup>

The above account does indicate the focus on the control over land allocation as being the center of Transkei rural protests and this concur with the case like Mnceba which has been selected as part of this study. The foregoing discussion is a clear indication that the politics of resistance finally reached the final frontier or rural areas in all forms with all different actors as dictated upon by local political cleavages with some cue from the townships as well. Where a demand was made to remove the councilors in townships there was a similar demand for chiefs to resign in some cases. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal we have seen that an all-out ANC/UDF-IFP conflict broke out in the townships and spread to the rural areas without seriously denting IFP's hold on chiefs therefore on rural areas. No civic organizations took root in the rural areas. But the consequence of this protracted conflict in KwaZulu-Natal is that it has militarized the politics as we have seen the rise and the political use of para-military formations such as *amabutho* or royal regiments in the case of IFP. This has consequently led to the high level of intolerance and rigid interpretation of spheres of influence as captured in the term “no go areas”.

As the UDF-led protests spread to the rural areas in the late 1980s, this umbrella organization had to take a stand on issues affecting these areas. UDF's position is summarized as follows;

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<sup>181</sup>Percis, 1997: p. 200.



“The National Working Committee of the UDF resolved in 1986 that ‘tribal structures should be replaced with democratic organizations’. Other UDF publications suggested that short-term alliances with chiefs could be expedient in places where the chiefs still enjoyed popular support, but the objective in the long run was generally summed up as ‘chiefs must go and the people must run the villages’.”<sup>182</sup>

This position had some sympathies within some sectors of ANC’s broad liberation alliance even though there was still a considerable opinion from among the senior ANC leaders(Mandela being the most prominent of these) which supported the continued existence of traditional leaders within the confines post-apartheid democratic institutions. In a manner that can be described as a symmetric strategic move, it will soon be shown that the notion of strategic alliance with liberation forces, though for different ends, was very much in the minds of many chiefs who were adept in shifting alliances. On the other side of the symmetry is the ANC which also sought this alliance mainly for electoral reasons in order to gain access to the rural areas and also carry the constituency which is associated with and still has some respect for the chiefs.

By the early 1990s, the protests against traditional authorities took on an organizational and sustained form as the South African National Civic Organization (SANCO) spread from the townships and established itself in the rural areas. From this point onwards, SANCO became a major political actor in the rural political landscape. Youth and student organizations in these areas were overtaken by SANCO with many of its members tended to join the ANC, SACP, PAC and SANCO. This transformation from sporadic protests led by students and youth organizations into civic movement and liberation-led

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<sup>182</sup>Kessel, I & Oomen, B., op cit, 1997: p.568.

mobilization also led to generational reconfiguration of the rural elite challenging the hegemony of chiefs. As a consequence of this change, the rural-based leadership of the ANC, PAC and SANCO is typically a mix of elderly, middle-age and youth age groups.

This section generally concentrated on the forms of protests with particular emphasis on the opposition forces. The next section will try to augment this by focusing on traditional leaders' reactions to protest politics and transition that followed soon thereafter.

## **5.2. Chiefs and comrades: Traditional leaders' reactions to protests and transition.**

The above discussion has shown a range of anti-apartheid forces, whose members were popularly known as "comrades," which rose against institutions, organizations, groups and individuals that were seen as directly or indirectly associated with the apartheid system. In this wave of protest it has been indicated that chiefs and their councilors were also common targets. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal and KwaNdebele the discussion alluded to some of the reactions of the besieged traditional leaders. This section is dedicated to description and analysis of patterns of traditional leaders' reaction to the politics of protests and transition. These responses ranged from those of the IFP traditional leaders who mobilized and confronted UDF/ANC comrades in protracted and often violent conflicts to those of chiefs who joined or aligned themselves with the liberation organizations. There were other politically less significant<sup>183</sup> responses of

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<sup>183</sup>The use of the phrase *politically less significant* in this instance indicates both the isolated nature of these options as well as the lesser impact they had in the wider political developments in the country especially during the time of a negotiated transition to democracy. Traditional leaders' engagement in pro and anti-liberation politics were the more prominent strategies.

chiefs who opted for a neutral role signified by their withdrawal from any partisan politics as well as those who established vigilante groups which were not aligned to any party but focused on local issues such as crime or stock theft.

In the final analysis it is argued that traditional leaders, in their various reactions, demonstrated their adaptive ability in the same manner in which they had shown during the colonial and apartheid era but this time with more vigor and craftiness. In essence, traditional leaders did not just react to these changes but they tried to reassert themselves on a scale never seen before and this caught many in the liberation movement by surprise as they had clearly underestimated the challenge that traditional rulers would pose. The following are a variety of traditional leaders' responses that demonstrate political acumen or astuteness of the traditional elite. It is at the same time a classic case of instrumental and interchangeable use of tradition, modernity, ethnicity and liberation discourse as resources that could be effectively deployed in advancing group interests and most importantly the survival and consolidation of chieftaincy within a new democratic dispensation.

The following excerpt apprehends South African traditional leaders' responses to the political changes;

“During the apartheid era, chiefs were maligned as puppets of bantustan rule. In ANC-related circles, it was widely assumed that chieftaincy would not survive in the post-apartheid era. But the institution of traditional leadership has proved highly flexible. Rather than being phased out as relics of pre-modern times, chiefs are re-asserting themselves in the new South Africa. Chiefs have survived throughout this century with a strategy of shifting alliances. Towards the end of the 1980s, chiefs were re-

orienting themselves towards the ANC, rightly perceived as the new ruling party-in-waiting. Combining the resources of tradition with a discourse of liberation politics and development, they were able to explain constitutional and other legal guarantees for the position of traditional leaders and their representatives in the local, provincial and national administration. For its part, the ANC had an interest in wooing chiefs to its side in order to prevent the emergence of a conservative alliance where traditional leaders could join forces with the bantustan elites.”<sup>184</sup>

Of course, the above passage is an accurate account only in understanding the one of the dominant strands of responses which encompassed an embrace of liberation discourse as a resource. It, however, does not account for the IFP response which chose to confront the comrades head-on when they made inroads into what it considered to be its sphere of influence.

Mindful of this deficit, the following discussion covers both patterns of responses by traditional leaders during the period that begun in the late 1980s. The immediate focus is on how chiefs embraced liberation discourse. The spotlight will then shift to the IFP response.

In the wake of the 1986 riots against the granting of KwaNdebele nominal independence, the chiefs who opposed independence grew closer to the UDF/ANC which also shared their position on this issue. These chiefs, backed by the ANC/UDF, launched the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa, otherwise commonly known by its abbreviated version, Contralesa. The general aims of Contralesa are captured in its

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<sup>184</sup>Kessel, I & Oomen, B., op cit, 1997, p.561.

constitution as an eradication of the Bantustan system; educating traditional leaders about the aims of South African liberation struggle and their role in it; to win back forefathers' land and share it among those who work it; and to fight for a unitary, non-racial and democratic South Africa(Contralesa Constitution, 1987). This is a clear indication of traditional leaders' first significant embrace of liberation discourse and it is even unprecedented in the sense that it assumed a formal organizational form.

A large number of chiefs from different regions of South Africa, with the notable exception of KwaZulu-Natal, joined Contralesa thus transforming it into a national organization. Just to indicate its nationwide representation of chiefs, since its inception Contralesa presidency has changed hands from Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, of KwaZulu-Natal to Chief Phathekile Holomisa from the Eastern Cape. In February 1988, a Contralesa delegation met the then exiled ANC in its headquarters in the Zambian capital, Lusaka. From that moment until the mid-1990s the ANC regarded Contralesa as its important strategic partner in the rural areas and Contralesa chiefs were then referred to as 'progressive chiefs' or 'comrade-chief' in ANC alliance circles. At the very same time, the ANC embraced SANCO, the arch-rival of chiefs, as part of its broad alliance. The strategic alliances seen in this triangulated partnership demonstrates the politics of expediency and convenience in which each actor was to reap as much from each other during the uncertain and often contested period of transition to a new dispensation. Of particular interest in this section is the manner in which traditional leaders use liberation discourse within the context of these complex alliances in order to advance their group interests which culminated in constitutional guarantees of their continued role in the new

democratic system.

At their disposal traditional leaders have somewhat a unique claim to an important resource, tradition, which they have repeatedly and strategically evoked and deployed while at the same time pointing at continuities between tradition and liberation discourse as well as to democratic systems. More recently, President Thabo Mbeki's introduction of a revivalist African Renaissance as a broad vision that guide South Africa's nation-building and foreign policy has been interpreted by many leaders as a logical extension or renewal of African heritage(traditions, customs, indigenous systems, etc) therefore by association of chieftaincy which is the 'authentic' custodian of that heritage. A combination of these resources indicates chiefs who traverse the traditional and the modern world by simply shifting emphasis or combining the two at opportune moments. Some scholars such as Sandra Klopper<sup>185</sup> have even extended the analysis of the hybrid or flexible nature of traditional leaders by focusing on their dress code which is observed as shifting from traditional to modern or simply blend the two depending on an occasion. This, if anything, demonstrate the complex nature of the political identity and ideology of traditional leaders. A constant seems to be self-preservation as a group with shared interests of continued control of resources in the areas under their jurisdiction as well as projecting traditional leadership influence at provincial and national levels.

The following are some of the statements which illustrate the fluid and resourcefulness of traditional leaders in using the resources identified above. The following interview of

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185 Klopper, S., op cit, 1998.

Contralesa president, chief Maphumulo expresses a concerted effort to extract suitable components of monarchy and modern democracy;

“In August or September I am planning a trip to England to meet with some of the parliamentarians there, taking the chiefs from all around South Africa with me. We will be studying different systems— how the monarch and the democratic government work hand in glove. But we are interested in comparisons right now. We don’t have a constitution in mind.”<sup>186</sup>

Some years later a more crystallized position of Contralesa on the relation between chieftaincy and democracy emerged and was being echoed by many prominent traditional leaders to rebut the notion that this institution was hereditary therefore inherently undemocratic. Some seven years later after the above interview, one of Contralesa leaders, Chief Mwelo Nonkonyana articulated the position of traditional leaders;

“Traditional leaders and their councils, as established by custom and usage, are the cornerstone of any sound administration. The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa(Contralesa) has pointed out on numerous occasions that — contrary to popular belief— traditional leadership was, and still is, the most democratic institution, forming a solid foundation for stability in all communities.”<sup>187</sup>

In another article with a more revealing title, *Ubukhosi the Bedrock of African Democracy*, the current president of Contralesa, Chief Phathekile Holomisa, advances this point further in a more nuanced approach as he asserts that;

“In the rural areas tribal or communal land is owned by the tribe as a collective. Despite the fact that under apartheid laws the state is the legal owner of tribal land, factually and morally the tribe own the land and, unless one is spoiling for a fight, no one can deal with it as he pleases.

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<sup>186</sup> Bell, 1990: p.48.

<sup>187</sup> Nonkonyana, M. “The perspectives of traditional leaders and their role in the new South Africa” in Osaghae, E (ed) Traditional leadership in Southern Africa 1997: p.95.

Under the tribal law the custody of the land is entrusted in traditional authority, that is, the head of the tribe and his counselors. As trustee of the land the traditional authority is required to act at all times in the interests and according to the wishes of the owners of the land, the people.”<sup>188</sup>

The above passages, in their various forms and emphasis, reveal a trend in which a linkage and continuity is being made between the concept of democracy and chieftaincy. Many traditional leaders often point at the idealized version of the pre-colonial era where indigenous institutions had checks and balances with chieftaincy founded on a consensus system of rule. In this linkage there is often very little, if at all, attempt to describe the existing situation or system of governance in areas under the jurisdiction of chiefs. A careful analysis of these statements reveals the fact that traditional leaders tend to emphasize the ideal, often romanticized, past and promises of democratized traditional rulership while avoiding any discussion of the cases of abuse of power by a considerable number of chiefs. Through time we see in these statements an evolution of an uncertain position of Contralesa as show in Chief Maphumulo’s delegation searching for aspects of compatibility between the British monarchy and western liberal democracy to a more definite position in which chiefs do not only assume this compatibility but declare that traditional leadership is comparatively ‘the most democratic institution’.

Another common political strategy of traditional leaders is to selectively point out at traditional leaders who fought against colonialism as well as those who later joined liberation forces without dwelling on those who often collaborated with both the colonial

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<sup>188</sup>Holomisa, “Ubukhosi the bedrock of African democracy” in Mail & Guardian February 11-17, 2000: p.29.



and apartheid governments. In this way, continuities between traditional leadership and liberation struggle is carefully constructed by deliberately overlooking some of these historically obvious contradictions. The following position is often reiterated by traditional leaders as evidence of these continuities;

“Our history proves conclusively that traditional leaders fought with the people in defending their kingdoms. King Hintsa was brutally murdered by the British colonialist Richard Southey, while King Maqoma died on Robben Island. Kings Langalibalele, Cetywayo, Dinizulu, Sekhukhuni, Faku, Moshoeshoe, Ngungunyana, Ramabulana, Sekhonyela, Queen Manthantisi, and many others fought against colonialism, oppression and exploitation of their people—their spirits constitute a foundation for liberation struggle. We therefore emphasise the point that traditional leaders and their subjects were rulers of this country and thus cannot be excluded in any level of government.”<sup>189</sup>

The linkage between the heroic past and the current liberation struggles is established in the above passage. The specific aim is justifying continued recognition of traditional leaders not just in their localized areas in the countryside but all level of government, specifically at provincial and national level. The roll call of traditional leaders who resisted colonial conquest and administration is factually correct but often selectively identified without referring to the multitudes of traditional leaders who did the very opposite by turning against their subjects. Contralesa President, Chief Holomisa, also articulates the linkage between what he calls the ‘progressive’ chiefs and the liberation movement;

“The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), a body conceived in the womb of the liberation struggle, under the leadership of the African National Congress, an organisation itself founded by traditional leaders among other, has been greatly aggrieved by the reluctance on the part of the ANC, on the eve of liberation and as

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<sup>189</sup> Nonkonyana in Osaghae, Op cit: p. 95.

government afterwards, to embrace progressive traditional leaders in the process leading to the adoption of both the interim and the final constitution.”<sup>190</sup>

In this passage one sees a careful invocation of a common history between traditional leaders and the liberation movement, specifically ANC in this instance, as well as identification of some progressive chiefs as natural allies.

A brief outline of other responses of traditional leaders include, among other things, chiefs joining and assuming important positions in political parties such as the ANC, the PAC and more recently the UDM. Contralesa leaders such as chief Nonkonyana and Chief Holomisa are ANC members of parliament while chief Gwadiso was the founder and Member of Parliament for the UDM until recently when he defected to the ANC which rewarded him with a diplomatic post as a High Commissioner in Ivory Coast. This has left most of these chiefs with dual membership in both Contralesa and in their respective political parties. At a given opportunity they use their position as parliamentary representatives of these parties to advance the interests of traditional leaders. Another preferred strategy of traditional leaders is to portray themselves as natural and authentic agents to deliver African Renaissance. South Africa’s National Heritage Day which is recognized as a holiday often has state organized activities. Traditional leaders often complain that they, being authentic custodians of African heritage, are marginalized by government officials and ministers when they are supposed to be at the very center. A similar complaint is heard when it comes to the planning and

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<sup>190</sup> Chief Holomisa, P. “Contralesa perspective on traditional leadership in South Africa”, 2000: p.1

implementation of African Renaissance programs. In advancing their demands for more powers and roles within the new ANC-led government, traditional leaders belonging to Contralesa have joined forces with the IFP in protests as well as in delegations meeting the government officials. It should also be pointed out that some traditional leaders from the Eastern Cape region of Transkei who were initially not comfortable with Contralesa's close association with the ANC established an alternative organization, Transkei Traditional Leaders Association (TTLA). When ANC-Contralesa relationship was strained in the mid-1990s TTLA agreed to dissolve and its members joined Contralesa.

The general reaction of KwaZulu-Natal province, who are overwhelmingly IFP supporters, is unique in many ways. While a few chiefs such as Chief Maphumulo and Chief Mlaba joined the ANC and Contralesa, an overwhelming majority has remained with the IFP under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi and their actions can be better understood by analyzing their party's position. IFP's reaction to protest politics of the 1980s and early 1990s had the following three elements: Firstly, IFP organized Amabutho or traditional regiments into para-military formations that were used to confront ANC and its allies or the comrades. Secondly, it politicizes ethnicity while positioning or portraying itself as the sole and authentic representative or guarantor of Zulu identity and heritage. IFP also used the past role of Zulu traditional leaders such as former ANC president Chief Luthuli as well as Chief Buthelezi's previous association with the ANC as an indication that IFP was also part of the liberation struggle although using non-violent strategies within the apartheid homeland system.

The following directive from the IFP leader, Chief Buthelezi clearly indicates his preparedness to transform traditional structures into paramilitary forces to confront organizations that were mobilizing in KwaZulu ;

“I think it is time for Inkatha to establish training camps where branches and regions are schooled in the employment of anger in an orderly fashion. We need to conduct meetings in the midst of chaos which other people are trying to create. We need to tone up muscles so that the dove of peace sits easily on the spear. I think we need to create well-disciplined and regimented impis in every Inkatha region which can be called out for protection of that which is sacred to Inkatha and black South Africa.”<sup>191</sup>

In pursuit of the above strategy, the IFP which was also the sole and governing party in KwaZulu homeland issued IFP-aligned chiefs and indunas with rifles while at the same time forming regiments which later became known as Self Protection Unit (SPUs) to which ANC responded by forming Self Defense Units. The apartheid government also helped in the arming and training of IFP paramilitary units as it also regarded ANC as a common enemy to be confronted and weakened ahead of 1994 elections. This militarization of partisan politics in KwaZulu-Natal led to violent confrontations between the ANC and the IFP supporters with each one establishing its stronghold often declared a ‘no go area’ for the adversary. The legacy of this is the fact that local elite relations are often confrontational with very little, if any, tolerance for opponents. The conflict is primarily defined along party lines. It is also important to note that the civic organization, SANCO, which had establish itself in virtually all the other provinces did not take root in KwaZulu-Natal, thus leaving IFP and the ANC as the only key players in the rural areas.

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<sup>191</sup> Mare in Rich, op cit, 1996: p. 28-29.

Perhaps the most potent mobilizing tool used by the IFP leadership was ethnicity or Zulu identity in this instance. ANC, and UDF before ANC's unbanning, was often depicted as a Xhosa-led organization pitted against the IFP that represented Zulu identity and interest. The IFP's exclusive claims regarding Zulu constituency is not supported by facts as almost all of the Zulu population supported the ANC. Buthelezi often conflated his identity with that of the IFP and the Zulu nation in a bid to invoke ethnic sentiments whenever the IFP or Buthelezi himself was being challenged. The following statement, issued in response to ANC-led alliance's call for the dismantling of bantustan systems including KwaZulu, demonstrates this fact as Buthelezi declared:

"I hope the Zulu people whatever their political affiliations will realize that the ANC campaign of vilification is no longer just against me and Inkatha but also against the Zulu people as Zulu people . . . KwaZulu is not a construct of apartheid and is known even by a primary school child who knows the outline of Zulu history."<sup>192</sup>

In KwaZulu-Natal the IFP remains the mouthpiece of many traditional leaders and in return traditional leaders have been a vital element in IFP's political support in the rural areas. The militarized structures of rural traditional authority have thwarted ANC's several attempts to mobilize in rural areas under the IFP chiefs.

The above section presented various reactions of traditional leaders to protest and liberation politics. It has been shown that chiefs are quite resourceful in utilizing tradition, liberation discourse and strategic, sometimes opportunistic, political alliances to advance their interests. The case of KwaZulu-Natal presents a unique dimension as

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<sup>192</sup> Mare, G., Ethnicity and politics in South Africa 1993: p.101.

politicization of ethnicity and use of paramilitary formations were dominant form of reaction. These reactions reveal, among other things, the fact that tradition serves as a constantly re-workable resource especially during the time of profound social and political changes that affect traditional rulership. Andrew Spiegel's remark underscores the instrumental use as well as transformation of the past. He makes an assertion that

“The past can come to be part of the present in two ways. Firstly, people use the past instrumentally. In such instances practices and institutions are pursued quite self-consciously and are contrived as part of one or another political enterprise... Secondly, certain social and cultural practices may persist merely because people ‘go on’ with their lives in familiar ways. They do not contrive to continue those practices (sometimes described as habitual) nor do they contrive to change them. Indeed, they accept them tacitly and without actually considering whether or not they are necessary or appropriate, nor why they do them.”<sup>193</sup>

Of the two instances in which the past or tradition is brought to the present, the former seems to apply in this specific situation of traditional leaders struggle to consolidate their position within a new dispensation. The evidence presented in this discussion clearly indicates an entrepreneurial political enterprise led by an educated elite group within the ranks of traditional leaders.

The elite is quite conscious of its political role during this transition period and it perceives itself as one of the agents that ought to shape the transformation process thus guaranteeing the future role and recognition of traditional leadership.

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<sup>193</sup> Spiegel, A. in McAllister, 1997: p.12

The following statement by Chief Nonkonyana is indicative of this;

“Ideally, traditional leadership and politics are not suppose to mix. We would like to see ourselves being above party politics, but we are still building and transforming this country. There is no clear-cut role for traditional leaders in this process.”<sup>194</sup>

### **5.3. An open-ended solution: Political dynamics of constitutional engineering and the emerging rural local government institutions.**

This section focuses on the constitutional development process that paved the way for the establishment of a new democracy. As to be expected, the constitutional development process is broad and multifaceted. However, for the purpose of this discussion only those aspects of this process which are related to rural local government and the role of traditional leaders will be covered. The process of developing new institutions of rural local government and redefinition of the role of traditional leaders proved to be one of the most controversial features of building a new democracy. This process, it will soon be shown, was marked by compromise, deal-making and ambiguities. This, I call *politics of open-ended solutions* in which ambiguities and ad hoc arrangements as well as continuing negotiations, often without a resolution, are essential features which occur not by default but by design of the dominant players. The defining character of the politics of open-ended solutions is to manage but not necessarily resolve policy problems with the hope of consolidating one's own position in the event of the window of opportunity provided by an political opponent who has run out of steam. The following questions will help to guide discussion in this section: Who were the major stakeholders and actors

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<sup>194</sup>See Daily Dispatch, May 31, 1999

in the process of drafting the new constitution and related laws on rural local government? What were the policy positions of various parties on the question of rural local government and the role of traditional leaders in the new dispensation? What are the new institutions that have emerged from this process? How have these developments affected relations among stakeholders? The ultimate aim is to present an outline of political dynamics that shaped the evolution of public policies on rural local government while at the same time answering one of the key questions of this dissertation: What is the composition, function and structure of rural local government in post-apartheid South Africa?

### **5.3.1. The key political players and their policy options.**

The previous section portrayed the alliances, strategies and various reactions in response to or pursuance of resistance politics and liberation struggle in the rural areas. This also provided an opportunity to look at the key actors and stakeholders who later became an important component in influencing constitutional development. As a prelude to discussions a brief reference to and identification of these key players and their policy preferences profiles is presented in order to provide a context of some of the political contestations and positions.

#### **5.3.1.1. The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa(Contralesa).**

As shown in the previous discussion, Contralesa emerged as the organization that advanced and protected group interests of chiefs. Deal-making, forging political alliances and protests became preferred strategies of traditional leaders as they fought for their



recognition in the interim and the new constitution.

The policy position of Contralesa can be summarized as follows: The representation of traditional leaders at national and provincial levels. At the national level they proposed the establishment of an upper house of parliament occupied by traditional leaders. The National House of Traditional Leaders would perform the same functions normally done by the Senate or the House of Lords in the specific case of Britain. This meant that they would have direct influence on a legislative process and not just symbolic or advisory function. I am mindful of the fact that the powers of senates and upper houses in any given country differ with some having more powers than others but the point here is that traditional leaders needed more powers to have a direct influence on legislative processes than what the legislation stipulated.

A similar arrangement was advocated for the provinces in which the Provincial House of Traditional Leaders would operate parallel the provincial legislatures. At the local level, Contralesa suggested a model in which traditional authority would be the primary rural local government structure responsible for administrative, judicial, service delivery and developmental functions. This is in essence a call for the maintenance of the status quo in which the chief is at the center with headmen/indunas and tribal councilors at the bottom end of the hierarchy. Better remuneration of chiefs comparable to elected politicians has always been Contralesa's preoccupation. Contralesa members are mainly drawn from the Eastern Cape, Free State, Northern Province, Northwest Province, Mpumalanga and a few from KwaZulu-Natal. The key leaders of Contralesa are relatively young and well-

educated chiefs, most of who have university education. To mention but a few, Contralesa's current president, Chief Phathekile Holomisa is an advocate with university education and he is in his late thirties; Chief Mwelo Nonkonyane is also an advocate with a university education and he was born in 1957; Prince James Mahlangu and Chief Gwadiso also have university education. The last two figures held senior ministerial positions in their respective homeland governments whereas Holomisa was a student activist in the 1980s.

#### **5.3.1.2. Inkatha Freedom Party(IFP)**

Just like Contralesa, the IFP has been a key advocate for the interests of chiefs but its main focus and constituency is generally limited to KwaZulu-Natal. IFP advocated for the establishment of Zulu Kingdom in a confederation. In this kingdom, the figurehead would be the Zulu king with the House of Traditional Leaders operating parallel to the parliament of a federal state. At a regional level there would be regional councils in which all chiefs would be ex officio members alongside the elected councillors. At a local level chief, indunas and their councilors would remain as the only institution of local government. IFP leaders area mainly drawn from the former government official of the Zululand homeland which was governed by the same party. There is a strong representation of chiefs within the leadership of IFP and Chief Buthelezi has virtual dominance over the party.

#### **5.3.1.3. African National Congress (ANC)**

ANC was the leading liberation organization and it became the ruling party after the 1994

elections. ANC is a broad nationalist organization which has accommodated a wide range of political tendencies within its umbrella, and these range from communist, unionists, women's rights group, traditionalists, civics, student and youth interest groups. Within its broad alliance and collective leadership, the ANC has the South African Communist Party(SACP), the Congress of South African Trade Unions(COSATU), and the South African National Civics Association. Within ANC structures there is the ANC Women's League and the Youth League. All of these organizations have a more militant stance which calls for the abolition or serious limitation of the role of traditional leaders in a democratic South Africa. The ANC Women's League is obviously against the marginalization of and discrimination against women that prevails in the institution of traditional authority. The Youth League is also sensitive to the fact that rural youth are alienated from this institution. The youth and women's wing of the ANC combine with other ANC allies such as COSATU, SACP and SANCO to form a pressure group advocating the neutralization or profound change of traditional rulership.

On the question of the role of traditional leaders in a post-apartheid South Africa has maintained an ambivalent position which wanted to retain and recognize chiefs but with a limited role. But this position was never articulated in any specific policy model for rural local government. In broad terms, ANC wanted elected structures to take a leading role in rural areas especially in the area of service delivery and development. ANC's position can be portrayed as the one of a pragmatic and yet ambivalent approach which is driven by a need to woo chiefs and their rural subjects into its fold while at the same time not alienating a democratic component of its constituency which advocated for representative

governance based on popular elections. A balancing act with no clear policy became ANC's strategy throughout transition process.

#### **5.3.1.4. South African National Civic Organization (SANCO)**

This civic organization is the arch-rival of the institution of chieftaincy as indicated by both its actions and pronouncements. As one civic leader put it, "In the new South Africa, chiefs will melt away like ice in the sun"<sup>195</sup>. SANCO has been the main force behind the campaigns against chiefs and they have called for the abolition or at least severe curtailing of the powers of chiefs including their removal from the key role of land allocation. SANCO wanted elected officials to be the core of the rural local government. SANCO is mainly constituted by ordinary community members or civic leaders who had borne the brunt of traditional authority or apartheid imposed local authorities in townships. The general feeling of the members of SANCO is that they have been disadvantaged and could not easily access resources and influence developments under traditional rulership or old municipalities hence their opposition to these structures. SANCO, just like other ANC alliance organizations, entered into an electoral pact during the 1994, 1995, 1999 and 2000 elections but over time this has generated tension and caused fallout in some areas as local member jostle for positions or inclusion in the party list for elections.

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<sup>195</sup>Mail & Guardian, April 7-12, 1995

#### **5.3.1.5. Other interested parties.**

Other political formations which have some influence and keen interest on the question of rural local government and the role of rural local government are the Pan Africanist Congress(PAC) and the United Democratic Movement(UDM). Both see their potential constituency as the rural Africans who live under the jurisdiction of chiefs. These organizations have, therefore, been more sympathetic to the position of chiefs as articulated by Contralesa and the IFP.

#### **5.3.2. Constitutional and policy making process and its political dynamics.**

At this juncture, it is opportune to reflect on Steinmo and Thelen's impression on institutional choices and their dynamics in order to provide a context for discussion on constitutional and policy making processes. Steinmo and Thelen point out that,

“Conflict over institutions lay bare interests and power relations, and their outcomes not only reflect but magnify and reinforce the interest of the winners, since broad policy trajectories can follow from institutional choices.”<sup>196</sup>

This observation captures the essence of the dynamics of a constitutional engineering and public policymaking process that unfolded in South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy. There is, however, one caveat in the specific case of South African experience as the following section will show. The process of defining the role of traditional leaders and restructuring rural local government is still work-in-progress. This, it will be argued, is both a function of strength of the contending forces as well as the art of compromise which produced what I earlier referred to as an open-ended solution.

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<sup>196</sup>Steinmo, S., K. Thelen, et al., Eds. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis 1992: p.27.

In February 1990 liberation organizations such as the ANC, SACP, PAC, BCM, were unbanned paving the way for a negotiated settlement or transition. In July 1991 the Convention for Democratic South Africa(CODESA) was established as a multiparty negotiating forum, and its mandate was to draw a blueprint for a democratic South Africa. There was a broad range of participants in this negotiation forum. These ranged from the major liberation organization such as the ANC-led alliance and the PAC, to political parties with representatives in an apartheid parliament such as the then governing National Party and Democratic Party as well as the bantustan governments. For the most part there were 18 political organizations represented at the negotiations. A few fringe radical groups on the extreme left and right of the political spectrum boycotted the whole process. In these negotiations there was a wide range of issues and all indications show that the role of traditional leaders as well as rural local government was at the bottom of many negotiators' list. Initially, there was no representation of traditional leaders in the negotiation forum.

The Inkatha Freedom Party, which had positioned itself as the vanguard of traditional leaders, vehemently protested and threatened boycotts over the fact that traditional leaders and the king of KwaZulu had no representation in the talk. Eventually it was agreed that there should be a delegation of traditional leaders from each one of the four provinces<sup>197</sup> which existed at the time. During the negotiations it became clear that the

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<sup>197</sup>These provinces are Transvaal, Cape, Natal and Orange Free State thus covering all the black reserve areas which had areas which were under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders.

major parties, the National Party and the ANC, had no clear policy positions, except for vague pronouncements, on the role of traditional leaders in a democratic system as well as new models of rural local government. In the case of the ANC this ambiguity had a political function as much as it reflected ANC's broad and diverse constituency which could not reconcile its various positions on this matter. ANC leadership was careful not to alienate chiefs or different elements within its alliance. For Contralesa and the IFP the recognition of traditional leaders and the preservation, if not enhancement, of their powers was paramount in their submissions. If accepted, this would create what Maloka refers to as "a union of kingdoms."<sup>198</sup> The issue of customary law which allows only males to be heirs in chieftaincy was one of the controversial issues as it was seen by many participants, particularly women's delegations, as irreconcilable with the Human Rights clause of equality<sup>199</sup>. A compromise was finally reached, though still in vague terms, in which chieftaincy would still follow its customs subject to the relevant legislation by the government.

### **5.3.3. Constitution, laws and emerging institutions**

These negotiations produced the interim constitution, framework for the first democratic elections as well as new laws on a wide range of issues. What emerged from the negotiations was a phased transition in which institutions would have interim structures

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<sup>198</sup> Maloka, T. "Populism and the politics of chieftaincy and nation-building in the new South Africa" in Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 1996: p185

<sup>199</sup> Cheryl walker(1994) deals with the debate surrounding gender equality and customary laws at a greater detail in her work.

that paved the way for the final arrangement. These were the provisions of the constitution which was framed into an interim constitution which was to be followed by the final constitution which was to be formulated by the elected constituent assembly. It is, however, important to note that the core principles of the interim constitution were retained in the final constitution. The interim constitution was adopted in 1993. The position and role of traditional leadership at local, provincial and national levels were recognized in terms stipulated in the Constitutional Principle XIII. Section 181(1) of the Interim Constitution stipulates that

“A Traditional authority which observes a system of indigenous law and is recognised by law immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, shall continue as such an authority and continue to exercise and perform the powers and functions vested in it in accordance with the applicable laws and customs, subject to any amendment or repeal of such laws and customs by a competent authority.”<sup>200</sup>

This is a clear guarantee of not only continued existence of chieftaincy but retention of their powers and functions. In what is an apparent contradiction or ambiguity, the same document also made provision for democratically elected local government structures with administrative, service delivery and development functions thus overlapping with the roles of traditional authorities in the rural areas. Many observers<sup>201</sup> are of the opinion that the constitutional provision for the establishment of elected municipalities was designed with urban areas in mind even though it had wider implications. As part of pseudo-federal provisions of the constitution, it was left to the provinces to repeal the old

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<sup>200</sup>Interim Constitution, 1993. In Government Gazette of February 28, 1994: p.212.

<sup>201</sup>Ntsebeza, L., 1996; Houston, H. & Fikeni, S., 1996; McIntosh in Graham, 1995



rural local government laws in order to make way for the new institutions of local government. At a national level, the Council of Traditional Leaders was established while The Houses of Traditional leaders were provided for each one of the six provinces which have traditional leaders.

Of particular interest in this work are those models that were adopted for rural local government at a local, district or regional level. The focus will now turn to those institutions in a bid to show continuities and changes as well as provincial variations. Alastair McIntosh's observation demonstrates some of the limitations confronting the restructuring of rural local government. He points out that;

“When local government negotiations first occurred nationally, discussion was dominated by urban issues such as uniting previously segregated cities and overcoming the massive debt related to rent and services boycotts. The result was that the model that was decided for local government transition was more appropriate to the urban areas than rural areas . . . The Local Government Act, which reflects this transition process, did not prescribe the form of local government should take in rural areas, but it left it to the provinces to decide.”<sup>202</sup>

This recurring theme of urban bias merely indicates that the urban bias of the liberation struggle impacted on and influenced the trajectory of transition. The Local Government Transitional Act was passed in 1993 and it sets out three stages in terms of which local government was to be transformed. These are the pre-interim, interim and final stages. In terms of the provisions of this Act, the pre-interim phase was completed by 31 March 1995 while the interim stage begun on November 1995 or just after the first local

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<sup>202</sup> Graham, op cit: p. 63

elections. The final stage of this phase commenced after the second local elections of December 2000. While this local government act was clear on the pre-interim phase models in the urban areas<sup>203</sup> it failed to propose any structure for the rural areas thus living traditional authorities as the only locally governing institutions.

The interim phase that was effected after the first local elections mark the beginning of restructuring of rural local government even though it was still shrouded in confusion as elected local councilors coexisted with traditional authorities often with overlapping responsibilities. It is also in this phase that provincial variations of local government emerged. Most of the provinces initially opted for two-tier system with a secondary and primary level. At a local or primary level urban and rural local councils would be elected. At a secondary level which existed at a regional or district level the regional or district councils, covering large areas that included a number of towns and former bantustan areas, would be elected. The local councils were envisaged as the primary providers of services in local areas whereas the regional councils would be responsible for regional development as well as assisting rural councils with finances. In this arrangement there were urban municipalities, with the exception of large cities which had metropolitan councils, generally known as the Transitional Local Council(TLCs). Alongside, there were rural municipalities, otherwise known as Transitional Rural Councils(TRCs) which covered the areas falling outside the TLC and Metropolitan councils' jurisdiction. In

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<sup>203</sup>The pre-interim provisions for the urban areas primarily focused on the merger of the statutory and statutory bodies as the first step of including those structures which were hitherto excluded from the apartheid local government. These included local civic organizations and political organizations.

many provinces there were intermediary structures known as Transitional Representative Councils which were demarcated on basis of magisterial districts and acted as an interface in which both the rural councilors and urban TLC members are represented.

It is in the area of representation of traditional leaders in these elected councils or municipalities that one begins to see sharp differences among provinces. In terms of the government proclamation issued in August 1995 provinces could opt for one of the two modes of traditional leaders' representation in transitional local councils: The first form of representation makes provision for representation of chiefs as ex-officio members whereas the second stipulates that chiefs can be represented as one of the interest groups (alongside women, farm-workers and farm owners) which should not exceed 10% of council's membership. Traditional leaders have vehemently opposed their representation as a minority special interest group within these councils. Holomisa statement echoes these sentiments and the logic behind them as he protests that "this will put the position of traditional leaders in the hands of the very people who are so hostile to us."<sup>204</sup> As it will be shown, in other provinces, through default or deliberate protests by chiefs, there was no representation of chiefs at all.

KwaZulu-Natal, under the IFP-led government, adopted a unique model of local government and this was done primarily to preserve IFP and traditional leaders' dominance in the local and regional structures. Transitional local government legislation

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<sup>204</sup> The Star, August 23, 1995.

in KwaZulu-Natal made no provision for rural local government structures at the primary level but this is only provided for in the urban areas(see diagram). This left the rural areas in the hand of traditional authorities which remained the primary local governing structure. The only existing local structure is located at a regional level or is vested in Regional Councils. KwaZulu-Natal is divided into seven regional councils which cover large areas. Rural representation in these Regional Councils come in three different forms which are the ex-officio membership of all chiefs, the party list proportional representation and the special interest groups(with 10% representation each). It is also important to note that women's representatives, as interest group, are drawn from party list thus adding to party proportional representation. The dominance of chiefs in this local government calculus is unmistakable as captured in the following statement:

“...it is designed essentially around the *Amakhosi*. In the transitional dispensation, every *Inkosi* has ex-officio membership status, with the number of *Amakhosi* in a particular RC area giving rise to the baseline number of representatives in the RC. ...RCs are extremely large and unwieldy. In order to balance out the influence of the *Amakhosi*, the number of party-list representatives is huge. Add to this special representatives, and you have RC's with between 200 and 400 representatives.”<sup>205</sup>

One such example is the Ilembe Regional Council from which some of the cases for this study were selected. This particular RC had 249 members at the time of the field research. Each one of these RCs is headed by an Executive Committee which deals with day to day coordination and management and they are assisted by a variety of specialized subcommittee. The party list representation without specific rural ward representation

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<sup>205</sup> Munro & Barnes, 1997, p.77.

means that a particular community may not be directly represented in the RC or may have fewer representatives than other areas.

The situation elsewhere in the country differs from provinces to province and in some instances from region to region within a province but nowhere do traditional leaders enjoys as much representation and political sway as in KwaZulu-Natal. In the Eastern Cape there are no traditional leaders represented in local government structures. This is a consequence of the fact that the bulk of the members of Transitional Representative Councils were to consist of elected representatives with no guaranteed representation of any of the interest groups, including chiefs, on the rural TRCs<sup>206</sup>. This non-representation was also reinforced by the Contralesa's call for traditional leaders to boycott these councils as they deemed them as encroaching on their roles. In isolated instances where chiefs became members of TRCs it was through their individual initiatives and in their capacity as representatives of their political parties. This is certainly the case with the chief of Nzongiseni who was interviewed for this study.

A general synopsis of different patterns of traditional leaders' representation or exclusion is provided by the Department of Constitutional Development. In this situation analysis the following summary presents a diverse picture:

“Only two traditional leaders in the Free State have taken up positions in the local government structures. Traditional leaders in Mpumalanga are ex-officio members of local government structures but do not participate. In North West, traditional leaders are represented as an interest group in

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<sup>206</sup>Houston, G. et al, op cit., 1996: p.64

the Transitional District Councils. Traditional leaders in the Eastern Cape, Free State, Northern Province, Mpumalanga and North West do not participate in discussions of local government structures (in most cases they do not even attend). However, some traditional leaders in Free State and Northern Province participate in TLCs.”<sup>207</sup>

All these forms of representation took effect after the November 1995 local elections in all other provinces except KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape where these elections were held in June 1996. Contralesa and the IFP did threaten to boycott local elections or prevent them from taking place in their areas but this was averted after the government promised to look into their grievances. IFP enjoys massive dominance in the RCs of KwaZulu-Natal largely because of its solid rural support as well as the ex-officio representation of chiefs, a majority of whom are IFP supporters. The regional variations of traditional leaders’ representation and structures of local government are bound to make a difference in political and policy outcomes.

The final phase of local government transformation took effect after the second local elections which took place in December 2000. This phase provided for a series of legislation, constitutional reforms, discussion documents and government blueprint documents. The ANC, emboldened by its solid electoral victory as well as its general power entrenchment in different sectors of government, pushed for the establishment of rural local government structures which clearly threatened traditional leaders control over their areas of jurisdiction. The passing of the 1996 final Constitution was one such step. The 1996 Constitution stipulates that national legislation *may* establish the institution of

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<sup>207</sup> Dept of Constitutional Development, Status Quo Report, 1999: p.16

traditional authority but the wording suggests that it is not an obligation but an option in a non-committal manner<sup>208</sup>. This is different from the interim constitution which had indicated that national legislation *shall* establish this institution. This shift of emphasis into a more tentative promise has been vehemently protested by traditional leaders who are keenly aware of the fact that their future may not be guaranteed. Contralesa President, Holomisa, is articulating a concern that is shared by many traditional leaders when he protests that “Our role has become worse in the final Constitution,”<sup>209</sup> He later proclaimed that

“ . . . the gains registered in the interim Constitution were vastly diminished in the final Constitution . . . the final Constitution, while purporting to recognise it, does not offer protection to the institution.”<sup>210</sup>

The change in the wording of the final constitution was only preparing a way for more legislation which would lead to a fall out between the ruling ANC and many sectors of the traditional elite.

Perhaps, there is no other legislation that has drawn such a sharp reaction from traditional leaders and their organizations than the New Municipal Structures Act. The provisions of this Act effectively strip traditional leaders of some of their powers such as local service delivery and development and place it in new municipal councils. In terms of these changes the municipal boundaries are drawn in such a manner that they divide certain

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<sup>208</sup> See Chapter 12 of South African Constitution, 1996, p.119.

<sup>209</sup> Mail & Guardian, October 3, 1997.

<sup>210</sup> Chief Holomisa, P. Op cit., April 14, 2000: p.4

areas which are under chiefs and combine them with urban areas in many instances. Wards from which local representatives are to be elected are drawn in rural areas and representation of chiefs in the elected councils is reduced to 10%. This has been recently raised to 20% in a bid to silence protesting chiefs. This new law establishes a single tier municipality for both rural and urban areas. The other general fear on the part of individual chiefs I interviewed was that the introduction of municipalities in rural areas would bring an urban lifestyle that, among other things, include payment of rates, individual title deeds for the land as well as doing away with livestock grazing and farming. Traditional leaders capitalized on this fear and confusion among a considerable number of rural dwellers. One of many reasons the second local elections had to be postponed from its original date was because of widespread protests and threats from traditional leaders in rural areas, some of whom made it difficult for their subjects to register for elections.<sup>211</sup> The December 2000 elections were conducted in terms of the newly demarcated municipal wards with a mix of ward representatives, a tiny fraction of special interest groups including traditional leaders, and party representatives elected on basis of proportional representation.

At this juncture it is appropriate to make a cursory reference to some of post-colonial Africa's policies regarding the role of traditional leaders. This will help to contextualize the South Africa's more recent and unfolding process of reforming local government while at the same time trying to find the right formula for accommodation of traditional

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<sup>211</sup> Dladla, S. "One tribe, One Municipality" in Land and Rural Digest March/April 2000



rulers. Maloka identifies three broad models that were developed to accommodate traditional leaders in post-colonial Africa. In the following passage he outlines them:

“Some countries established special houses and/or council of chiefs at various levels of government for these leaders to participate in one way or another in matters that affected their institution and customary law. Others, like the West African examples... gave chiefs a percentage of the seats in the national assembly and/or senate. In other countries— Lesotho and Swaziland in particular— solutions were sought in establishing a constitutional monarchy with executive and/or ceremonial powers. However, with few exceptions, as the years progressed, the nationalists elite tend to entrench its position vis-a-vis that of the chiefs. Chief finding themselves in this situation, would try to build up royal image, appropriating and creating new symbols.”<sup>212</sup>.

In its attempt to outline the predominant models of accommodating chiefs, the above passage has aspects which are striking in their resemblance of the South African experience described above. The initial ambiguity and tentativeness of the ANC elite in its accommodation of chiefs and its progressive erosion of the role of traditional leaders, with varying successes of course, is the case in point. A transition from the interim Constitution of 1993 to the final Constitution of 1996 as well as a replacement of interim transitional local councils with the new Municipalities is a specific case which depicts the political elites’ attempt to consolidate its hold. It should also be stated that a similar attempt by elected local councilors to consolidate and entrench their power in rural areas was observed during the field study. It should also be mentioned that other post-colonial governments opted for the more radical step of not recognizing traditional leaders. This was generally the case in the socialist systems, Mozambique being one of such cases,

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<sup>212</sup>Maloka,T. Op cit, 1996: p.183.

which viewed the institution of chieftaincy as an antithetical archaic feudal system. Once the Mozambican government abandoned socialism and upon realization that chiefs became natural allies of their opposition or Renamo rebel forces, they embarked on a new path of recognizing thus accommodating the institution of traditional leadership.

Some of the scholars such as Migija<sup>213</sup> and Keulder<sup>214</sup> have even gone beyond Africa to include models of accommodation of traditional authorities in nations like New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, Canada and United States. Currently, with the ongoing crisis in a collapsed or deeply-fractured state of Afghanistan, there has been more talk of tribal leaders and the traditional system of governance as one of possible ways of resolving the chronic problems that afflict that state. This, if anything, is a testimony to the resilience of some strands of traditional authority within the context of the modern state system.

#### **5.4. Concluding remarks**

Discussion in this chapter has, among other things, revealed that traditional leaders have been active agents in a bid to preserve and advance their interests in the context of transition to democracy. This, it will be shown in the subsequent chapters, is not only confined to the high profile traditional leaders who operate at the national or provincial political terrain, it is evident in chiefs operating in their localities as they deal with

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<sup>213</sup>Migija, op cit, 1998

<sup>214</sup>Keulder, C. Traditional leaders and local government in Africa: Lessons for South Africa 1998.

emerging elite which is contesting their control of local resources. This discussion also provides a changing institutional environment within which local political elite relations are shaped. This is particularly the case with the local chiefs, elected councilors and the civic leaders who have to utilize the existing institutional tools in their bid to control resources in order to project their power. This chapter has, therefore, laid the canvas in a form of institutional framework and policy preferences which are some of the crucial aspects of understanding dominant trends in local elites' relations.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **A PROFILE OF SELECTED INDIVIDUAL COMMUNITIES**

In this chapter a profile of selected cases or communities is presented in a form of a narrative that is mainly constructed from the qualitative portion of the interviews and focus group discussions conducted with participants. These narratives complement descriptive summary statistics in various ways. For instance, an account of each case provides some information on history and evolution of relationship among the key players. It gives voice to the participants while it also provides a context to the relational dynamics of each community. By giving voice to the key participants, this chapter also reveals, to a great extent, participants' perceptions and understanding of cooperation and conflict. All these dimensions could not be easily captured or definitively represented in summary statistics.

The account of these cases also provides partial answers to some of the questions which this study is addressing. The question of the current operation, structure and function of rural local government as well as the evolution of actual relationships among the local elites are covered by some aspects of these case accounts while the nature of relationship among the local elites is partially addressed. Most of the narrative is drawn from the open-ended interview accounts given by participants. This also helps the reader to see the

community dynamics through the eyes of the actors whose perceptions are an important factor in the relationships they form. Each narrative is a collection and a reconstruction of accounts given by the participants. Where the perceptions of one section of the elite differ from those of the other, an attempt is made to point those discrepancies in order to provide all possible angles from which the local reality is viewed or interpreted. The following cases are arranged according to provinces in order to allow for a brief remark on some general features and history of each province. In this manner a brief general background and the setting of the selected provinces are provided before profiles of cases drawn from each province are presented. It should be noted that the grouping of the cases by provinces does not imply that they necessarily share the same attributes and this become clear in the following sections of this chapter and in the subsequent chapters.

### **6.1. The Eastern Cape Province:**

Rode, Nzongisa and Mnceba are located in the district of Mount Ayliiff which is part of the former nominally independent black homeland of Transkei. Xhosa is the dominant language in the Eastern Cape province even though there are several sub-ethnic African groups with diverse histories, dialects and backgrounds, and these are Xesibe, Tembu, Baca, Pondo, Pandomise, Hlubi, Gcaleka, Mbo, Mfengu and Rarabe. Sothos are also scattered in communities along Lesotho and Free State borders. In this case, the predominantly Xesibe(Nzongisa and Mnceba) and Hlubi (Rode) communities have been selected. In late 1995 and early 1996, the author, in collaboration with Gregory Houston, conducted research on traditional rulership in these communities and some of the details are drawn from those studies. This explains the fact that in this narrative there is a thicker

description of the Eastern Cape communities compared to those of Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal.

These, historically, were politically inactive communities which experienced a significant wave of political mobilization in the early 1990s after the unbanning of liberation organization and the unbanning of political prisoners. This mobilization generally took two forms, the recruitment and setting of branches by the major political organizations, ANC and the PAC in this case, and the establishment of civic organizations, particularly SANCO, in this region. It is only in the latter part of the 1990s that other organizations, such as the UDM and the IFP, were established as significant actors in these communities. As it will soon be demonstrated, each community reacted differently to these developments and had its own dynamics in the relations of the various sectors of the local elite. In all these communities chiefs are acting on behalf of a person who is either away or too young or sick to rule.

#### **6.1.1. Rode Administrative Area.**

Rode is a predominantly Hlubi community which is located in the Mount Aylyff District of the Eastern Cape. Rode Administrative Area is further divided into the following villages: Sikolweni, Magontsini, Voveni, Nyosini and Ndakeni. Each one of these villages has at least one representative in the Traditional Authority Council which is headed by a chief who is from the Radebe clan. Chief Jongintaba Nota who was a chief of the Hlubi Tribal Authority left for exile and stayed in Botswana until his death in the mid 1980s.

During his years of political exile his younger brother, Kholisile Nota, assumed the position of an acting chief. Chief Kholisile Nota became an active and a prominent member of the Transkei homeland ruling political party. He held several cabinet posts in successive Bantustan governments. During this period he accumulated a number of businesses including a supermarket at Rode. For many years he was virtually the only shopkeeper and the only owner of tractors and large farms in the local community. The local post office is also located in one of the rooms in his supermarket and his shop has always been an old-age pension collection point. It is also important to note that chief Nota's home is located at Sikolweni which also has a number of local facilities which other adjacent villages do not have, and these include a local Methodist mission, a junior secondary as well as a high school, a clinic, a preschool as well as the Hlubi Tribal Authority Offices and Hall. This makes Sikolweni village a center of activities in this administrative area. Moreover, the only accessible and relatively well-maintained access road is in this same area of Sikolweni. Interviews with some of the participants from the Sikolweni location section of the village reveal their self-understanding and self-definition as an enlightened section of the Rode village. A few even attributed discrepancies in facilities or infrastructure to the fact that they were more enlightened than other locations hence their relative development.

In the late 80s a young teacher wanted to open another shop in the Magontsini area and Chief Nota refused him a permission and business plot or sites. It is also said that this teacher also wanted to open a local mortuary and bottle store. When his several attempts

to secure permission failed, he appealed to the magistrate and to the homeland department responsible for business licenses. With all this pressure as well as the threat of a legal suit, the chief grudgingly yielded and granted a business plot to the teacher who became his business rival or competitor. The chief and the teacher have since become bitter rivals on each and everything. When the teacher opened up another business<sup>215</sup>, a circumcision school, the chief also tried to shut down this venture on grounds that a proper permission was never granted as the protocol and customs were violated.

With the new political dispensation in South Africa, political organizations were unbanned and many communities formed branches of the ANC and the ANC-aligned South African National Civic Organization(SANCO). Chief Nota remained very critical of the ANC and its Alliances. Many ANC supporters in the community suspect that he was a member of the ANC rival organization, the PAC. Sikolweni village formed its ANC branch while other villages formed theirs. Sikolweni branch of the ANC tried to register its branch as Rode branch but other villages objected to this as Rode was an administrative area that included their areas. During this time tension existed between the Sikolweni ANC branch leadership with that of Magontsini which was led by the teacher-turned businessman and this was aggravated by claims that Sikolweni branch leadership was too close to the chief who was seen as an enemy of the ANC. The Magontsini ANC

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<sup>215</sup>I refer to this circumcision as business even though it is generally understood as a traditional rite of passage and a custom in this community. The reason for referring to it as a business is because more recently the people who start and run circumcision schools make the parents of the initiates to pay some fee and pay for many other things including grocery, the resources of the coming out ceremony, and all these materials are often purchased from or by the owner of the initiation school. For this reason, circumcision schools have become lucrative business and this view is shared by a number of community members and parents of former initiates.



leadership was also active in the District ANC/SANCO leadership structures and they used their position to effectively frustrate the operations of their rival Sikolweni ANC branch. The chief exploited these differences by providing resources and venue to the Sikolweni branch of the ANC and this was primarily meant to keep the ANC factions divided and weak while at the same time preventing his business rival from consolidating his hold on the ANC and, therefore, over the area under his jurisdiction.

With the new dispensation there was also a proliferation of development projects and a variety of committees as well as voluntary associations. In Rode these also sprung up in all the villages often competing for the same resources and projects. When the electrification program was started by the new government in partnership with ESKOM, the local structures competed in their bid to control the project of electrification of Rode. The Sikolweni village formed its committee and applied for the provision of electricity while Magontsini elite vehemently fought for the inclusion in this committee in a bid to ensure that electricity is provided in their areas as well. When the electricity application was approved and the project of electrification started the chief moved in to control the project much against the wish of the committees which had worked hard to bring this project. It is also important to mention that the committee had its internal rivalries as the elite from each village wanted to control the project thus controlling the employment of workers in this public works program. The chief finally succeeded in controlling the project and it was agreed that people from different villages were going to be employed on equal basis as there was a fear that there would be bias in favor of the people from Sikolweni. There were similar struggles when road maintenance works, water provision

projects were brought into the village. There are claims and counterclaims as to who brought these projects. The above narrative does not only show elite rivalry along partisan lines as it also reveals geopolitical dynamics that cut across party affiliation.

A peace committee was set up at the suggestion of some of the ANC/SANCO leaders and it was constituted by members of both factions. But this committee also collapsed when its initiators felt that the chief was hijacking the committee to serve his own interest. It is also worth noting that the ANC/SANCO leadership had come under pressure from its hardliners who felt that the committee was being used to blunt their demands for change.

When the rivalry between the chief and the former teacher became bitter, the latter started to mobilize some members of the community to question the legitimacy of the chief who he claimed was usurping a position of his brother who died in exile while he has sons who are the legitimate claimants to the throne. He went further and contacted the sons, who are now based in Botswana, and invited them to come and intervene by assuming their position of chieftaincy.

In 1996 chief Nota joined Bantu Holomisa in forming the UDM and the recruitment drive for UDM members became intense at Rode. This aggressive recruitment drive can be interpreted as one of the strategies of Chief Nota's attempt to boost his standing within newly formed party by demonstrating that he had a strong constituency that would later deliver the votes. The ANC complained about the use of Tribal Offices and Hall in organizing UDM meetings when it was being prevented from utilizing these facilities.

The members of the Tribal Authority joined UDM en-masse and one member who remained a staunch member of the ANC was forced to resign on grounds of insubordination. The Tribal Court started to impose stiff sentences on the ANC/SANCO members and their response was open defiance. ANC/SANCO mainly from Magontsini organized several demonstrations and had sit-ins in the Tribal Hall, police were called on several occasions and the magistrate was called to intervene on numerous occasions. In December 1999 chief Nota died after a short sickness and rumors spread that he was bewitched by his political rivals. He had left acting chief who is still continuing his battles with the ANC/SANCO which is trying to unseat him. The younger brother of the late chief Nota was appointed with the blessing of the exiled son of chief Jongintaba, the rightful heir to the throne. But this appointment was still being disputed by the acting chief and Kolisile's group when the designated appointee died in December 2001. Rumors also linked the opposing faction to his death even though he was a sickly person. These deaths and attacks have reinforced mutual suspicions between the rival factions.

#### **6.1.2. Mnceba Administrative Area**

This administrative area is made up of two main villages, namely, Mhluzini and Sugarbush. The community is predominantly of the Xesibe sub-ethnic group which is Xhosa-speaking. The chief of the village suffered long crippling sickness and as a consequence his wife was appointed to act as a chief in the late 1980s, a role she is still holding two years after her husband died. The youth in this community has always had grievances regarding the manner which the tribal authority handles the affairs of the village as well as their marginalization.

When political organizations were allowed to operate legally, the local youth led by teachers established a local branch of SANCO. Using SANCO, they mobilized people, particularly the youth, young women and the educated elite to challenge what they perceived as corrupt, undemocratic and ineffective traditional authority. It is most important to note that SANCO members also tend to be ANC members but in this area SANCO was the most active and visible agent in challenging the traditional authority. It was observed that some local leaders of the ANC tended to distance themselves from the radical activities of their SANCO comrades especially regarding their relentless challenges against traditional authority.

The major disputes which brought the traditional authority and SANCO leadership into direct confrontation were over the allocation of land. In this allocation of land SANCO leaders objected to the payment of money to the chief before one could qualify for a plot. SANCO leaders started drawing names of people who had paid as a condition for getting a piece of land. They then marched to the chief's place and demanded that she gives back the money, a sum of about R4000, to all the people who had paid. Their view is that people need not pay for the land which after all is theirs and only held in trust by the chief. It is said that the chief fainted when she was confronted by angry toyi-toying SANCO militants, and on that day she was only able to give SANCO leaders an amount of R2000 with the promise that she would pay the balance later. SANCO leaders then started allocating land themselves and they disregarded all restrictions which had traditionally excluded single unmarried people from getting the land. The dispute over

the power to allocate land was taken by the chief to the district magistrate who ruled in her favor while maintaining that she was not supposed to make people pay to get a piece of land. It is important to note that members of the traditional authority tend to be older men in their late fifties and sixties and most of them are ANC members including the acting chief. The acting chief is also a card-carrying member of the ANC even though she is not active in ANC activities in the area. The fact that she is also a member of the ANC does not impress or change the attitude of most of her opponents. SANCO leaders express their views on this matter in many forms which range from charges that “she is not a real comrade as her actions are not those of a comrade,” the other female SANCO leader suggested that

“she is in desperate need of political education, and until then her membership in the ANC remains meaningless. If she was active in ANC structures and attended workshop on the new dispensation she would not be making such foolish mistakes which are in conflict with the new democracy. She still lives in the past and no one is guiding her towards the right path, and this makes this community suffer due to lack of development. To be blunt, I can just say that she is an obstructionist as she oppose any progressive programs in this community. This is why we decided to do things without her involvement. She made herself irrelevant.”<sup>216</sup>

On the other hand, the acting chief is particularly more critical of the youth and the educated elite which she accuses of disrespecting traditional customs, values and protocols. In return, the teachers, who also happen to be leaders of SANCO, charge that chief’s lack of education and understanding of the new democratic dispensation is a drawback to their community development. They claim that they, particularly in the

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<sup>216</sup>Interview with a female SANCO leader, September 10, 2000, Mnceba.

Sugarbush area, no longer consult the chief about their development projects as she routinely frustrates them. Most of the SANCO leadership has boycotted all the meetings called by the chief or activities that are associated with the traditional authority.

This hostile attitude is mutual as the chief also has strong negative views on those “who think they know better and have no respect for the customs, protocols or elders.”<sup>217</sup> The acting chief has a rigid interpretation of customs and traditions. For example, she claims that a divorced woman with children cannot be given a plot to build a house as she may decide to reconcile with the husband, and as a consequence she claims that such a woman can only qualify after some years of waiting. One female civic leader puts this waiting period at seven years which she thinks is very unreasonable or simply a raw deal for divorced women. This rule does not apply in the other surveyed communities in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. While most of the ANC leaders sympathetic to SANCO’s cause, it has, however, tried to distance itself from what it claim to be excessive militancy of SANCO leaders in dealing with chiefs. This position is mostly articulated by the ANC local councilor who has a difficult task of relating with both side of the conflict as he is charged with the task of seeking votes and bringing services to the community. The bitterness of relationship between the acting chief and SANCO leaders has led to a complete breakdown of communication with each side ignoring or boycotting the activities of the other. To mention but a few instances, SANCO leaders and followers no longer attend meetings that are organized by the chief, and they actively called for a boycott of money collection which was meant to help in the

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<sup>217</sup> Chieftainess Nobandla Ngunga of Mnceba Village, 2000

burial of the acting chief's husband.<sup>218</sup> On her side, the acting chief claims that SANCO trouble-makers are a clear indication of youngsters of today who have no respect for elders or authority as a consequence of lack of sound moral upbringing. She emphasized moral decay as the cause of SANCO's challenge to her authority. She also alluded to the fact that some SANCO leaders particularly those from Sugarbush think that they are better than other community members because of their education hence their insubordination. Unlike Rode, civic leaders in Mnceba have not tried to unseat the acting chief who, after the death of her husband and on grounds that she does not have a son, does not have an heir. This is largely due to the fact that SANCO leaders in this community have largely disengaged from the affairs of traditional authority and there is no obvious credible alternative to the current chief. The leading SANCO leader condemned the institution of traditional authority as irredeemably corrupt hence their lack of interest in matters of chieftaincy.

### **6.1.3. Nzongisa Administrative Area**

This is a predominantly Xesibe community in the Mount Ayliff district. The current acting chief was installed in 1994 after her husband died having ruled for almost 40 years. She is acting because her son, the designated chief, is still young to assume this position. Before the acting chief assumed the position of chieftaincy there was a bitter family dispute regarding succession. This dispute was between the acting chief and the younger brothers of the chief who felt that they were the rightful persons to assume the

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<sup>218</sup>When a chief is getting married or is buried it is traditional for the community members or his subjects to contribute material resources in a form of money or livestock as well as avail their services during the ceremony.

acting position. It is important to note that the local elite and the key stakeholders in the community did not join or exploit this family feud. Community leaders left the matter to the chief's extended family to resolve the matter and they simply endorsed the chief's wife when she was presented to them as an acting chief.

This community has a wide range of community-based organizations, from youth cultural organizations to a variety of development committees. The past and present chief has generally allowed people to form organizations and even launch political parties without interference. Most of these organizations have access to the Tribal Authority Hall for their meetings and activities, and this, according to the local elites, is the testimony of free association that is allowed or is a trademark of this community. It is also important to note that SANCO has never been launched in this community even at the time when there was a wave of SANCO branches being launched in neighboring villages.

There was, however, a brief period in 1991 when the local youth leader mobilized the youth into an ANC Youth League and they tried to demonstrate against the prominent local businessman and later against the chief. These protests were diffused after several meetings between the community leaders and the youth. Since then, the youth has confined itself to cultural and sports activities. Another factor is that the chief protagonist in these youth protests left for Johannesburg in search for employment and never returned to the village since early 1990s. The current acting chief is an active member of the ANC and CONTRALESA and has forged extensive network with national and provincial



leaders of CONTRALESA<sup>219</sup>. She is currently an ANC representative in the District Council, a local government structure, and also contested a seat as an ANC candidate during the 2000 local government elections. She has actively canvassed for the ANC around the district while at the same time allowing other contending political parties such as the PAC, UDM and IFP to organize in areas under her jurisdiction. She is also very much involved in the local women's organizations and burial associations. In addition, she is also a member of the Taxi association on account of being an owner of a taxi herself. Most of the interview participants from this area agree that penalties imposed by the Tribal Court are usually open to negotiations just as it is the case with acquisition of land where there is no rigid interpretation of custom to exclude categories of people. Most of the people interviewed claim that the acting chief is an effective speaker even though a considerable number doubt her organizational skills or even claim that she has neglected her chiefly duties in pursuit of her political and business ambitions. This, however, has not translated into any considerable opposition against her. This can also be attributed to the fact that local leaders of voluntary associations are often left to organize their activities with little, if any, interference or hindrance.

## **6.2. Mpumalanga Province**

Mpumalanga, another of South Africa's nine provinces, is situated in the region that used to be called Eastern Transvaal. In this province, Ndebeles and Swazis are the dominant African ethnic groups with some scattered presence of Pedis, Tswanas and Zulus in some

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<sup>219</sup> In early April 2002 she has been elected into the provincial house of traditional leaders which is based in Bisho. This further enhances her profile.

communities. The selected cases were part of the KwaNdebele homeland which was formed in 1975. The town of KwaMhlanga was the seat of KwaNdebele government. Sokhulum, Tweefontein and Vezokuhle are all made up of communities which were resettled in the mid-1980s from the surrounding white farms. These communities had existed under the leadership of their chiefs while they were tenants in white farms. When they were resettled, they also found other people in the areas of their resettlement and these residents did not necessarily recognize the rulership of new chiefs. The following passage demonstrates the magnitude of this resettlement or forced removal of communities in apartheid government's attempt to establish an ethnically-defined black homeland while ridding areas designated for whites of its black communities.

“The population of KwaNdebele grew from 50 779 in 1975, to 166 477 in 1980, to 261 875 in 1984. Fifty five percent of those who arrived in KwaNdebele during the previous five years came from white farming areas, 29% from Bophuthatswana and 5% from Lebowa.”<sup>220</sup>

The above passage also indicates that most of the KwaNdebele communities were recently resettled and this is different from the long-established communities of the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Some of these resettled communities were joined by people from other locations or found settled residents in or near the areas of their settlement. This has important implications for the composition of the residents or subjects of the chief as they had to live with the large numbers of people absorbed from outside their original communities thus introducing the “insider-outsider” distinction even though not in clearly defined boundaries. The elders who were settled from the

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<sup>220</sup> Moss & Obery, op cit, 1990, p.435.

farms tend to have little or no formal education whereas the younger generation which grew up in the homeland is relatively more educated as there was better access to educational facilities and institutions than was the case in white farms. Consequently, traditional authorities which are mainly composed of the elders on average tend to be less educated than those which have incorporated the younger and better educated members.

KwaMhlanga is a small rural town and two of the selected communities, Vezokuhle and Tweefontein, are in the outskirts of this town whereas Sokhulumu is geographically far removed from the town, it is about 40 minutes drive from KwaMhlanga and Bronkhorspruit. As a result, the arrangement of houses and zoning of streets in Tweefontein and Vezokuhle is more along the line of a township whereas Sokhulumu assumes a more traditional rural setting with its grazing fields, scattered dwellings and agricultural fields. In political terms, KwaNdebele experienced political activism and insurrection as early as 1980s and this was led by the UDF which spearheaded an anti-independence revolt in the homeland. During this period the youth tended to be more active in the anti-independence activism. But more significant is the fact that the Ndzundza royal house (the Mahlangus) was prominent in the anti-independence move while the Manala royal house (the Mabenas) generally supported the homeland leadership's bid to accept nominal independence status for the homeland. This Mahlangu and Mabena alignment with opposing political forces is a continuation of old historical rivalries between the Ndzundza and Manala royal families dating back to more than a century. This, therefore, reveals a more complex political history which cannot be understood in simplistic terms of youth versus the elders and traditionalist. This is

important as it reveals a situation which is more complex than generational cleavages. The anti-independence insurrection and counter-reaction, homeland organized vigilantism(Mbokotho) climaxed between 1987 and 1989.

The unbanning of the liberation organizations in 1990 provided the second wave of political mobilization and activism. In this case, the major liberation organizations, the ANC, the PAC and AZAPO tried to establish themselves while the KwaNdebele homeland's ruling party tried to survive the onslaught. The ANC-aligned Civic organization, SANCO, also spread throughout KwaNdebele and directly contested with traditional authority specially in the area of distribution of land.

#### **6.2.1. Sokhulumi Administrative Area**

This Ndebele community was settled in the current location in the mid-1980s as part of the apartheid program of forced removals in a bid to establish KwaNdebele homeland. Most of its residents were drawn from white farms where they were scattered as tenants. Sokhulumi is relatively isolated from the neighboring villages and towns. By all accounts the local chief is an active person who is actively involved in community development projects and cultural groups. He claims that he is politically neutral in a bid to maintain his role as what he terms "a unifying figure and the father of his people." He asserts that he has allowed the members of his tribal council to join political organizations of their choice.

Most of the people interviewed claim that the chief was demoted as he is supposed to be

a senior Ndebele king according to their history, and the chief endorses and even encourages this view. Sokhulumu chief effectively uses traditional symbols. During the interview he insisted that he wear a leopard skin as a symbol of his kingship. He claims that before he speaks his praise poet, otherwise known as *imbongi* in local language, sing his praises, and during our meeting he refused to shake my hand as he claimed that his tradition would not allow a person of his position to shake hands with a commoner or with a person who is not of royal blood. The chief appointed and retained a young man as his imbongi after identifying his gift as a court/praise poet. Moreover, the chief founded a local Ndebele traditional dancers' group as well as an association of people who make traditional Ndebele artifacts. For his role in promoting traditional culture of the Ndebele, he has gained national prominence and he led his cultural group when it performed in Britain and in the Middle Eastern Countries.

The chief mobilized his people in a bid to break away from Mpumalanga province to join Gauteng province which he claims was closer to them and offered more in terms of their development. A cursory observation of the different development committees established by the chief immediately reveals his strategy of co-opting the local businessman and the youth. The two elected councilors who represent Sokhulumu live in KwaMhlanga, which is about 40 minutes drive from this community, as a result they do not feature prominently in local politics. The chief, through his effective organizational skills has effectively marginalized these elected councilors and they also feel powerless in face of the community which is largely mobilized behind the chief. A majority of the local elite complained that the elected councilors are out of touch as they have not come to the

community and the chief to be introduced properly. As the local businessman and civic leader put it,

“The so-called elected local representatives are just confused youngsters who are not even known in this community. They are far-removed from this community and never consult or call meetings so how can they say they are our representatives? What have they done for this community? We are going up and down trying to raise funds for projects in this community and we are doing these things with our chief and where are these youngsters? This is a joke and I am not sure how the situation is in other areas. In this community we are the ones who are delivering services.”<sup>221</sup>

At the time of these interviews the chief and the key local elite were busy mobilizing the community against the pre-local elections demarcation process and they used this to renew their demand to be incorporated into the Gauteng province. In his own defense, one of the elected local representatives refute the assertion that they are removed from the community,

“The chief and these people have a secret agenda which we do not understand and they have marginalized us. We tried to consult them but they do not attend meetings. Perhaps they do not understand the new constitution or they are against the ANC government. The reason we have not been able to deliver is that they do not give us a chance, and this is also complicated by the fact that we have not been given resources to start delivering goods to people.”<sup>222</sup>

These accusations and counter-accusations between the traditional leaders and civic leaders, on the one hand, and the elected local officials, on the other, has not developed into any serious conflict in Sokhulumi and it has not affected local projects as these are

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<sup>221</sup>Sokhulumi businessman and key civic leader interviewed at Sokhulumi, September 1, 2000.

<sup>222</sup>An interview with Sokhulumi elected local representative, August 30, 2000.

still firmly in the hands of traditional authorities and civic leaders.

### **6.2.2. Tweefontein Administrative Area**

Tweefontein is an ethnically diverse semi-urban community which is generally regarded as one of the townships of the town of Kwamhlanga. The streets, street names, zoning, water and electrical services as well as the absence of farming or grazing fields makes this community a functionally urban unit. Most of the people here were settled in the early 1980s and they were mainly drawn from the neighboring white farms. When the Ndebele community was settled in Tweefontein there were already some scattered residents in the area and they varied ethnically from Tswanas, Swazi, Pedis, Ndebele and Zulus.

The local chief and his councilors claim that they have been stripped of all resources by the new government and the elected councilors. The chief and his councilors have little or no education and they demonstrated very little understanding of the new constitution and laws regarding the role of chiefs and elected officials. In fear of contradicting the laws of the new government they have resigned into minimal engagement with their subjects. The chief claims that he is not a member of any political organization as this neutrality is crucial in not being seen by subjects as having any partisan bias.

On the other hand, an ethnically diverse elected council representing the area is generally in charge. The elected councilors, who are all ANC members, have instructed the chief and his councilors to suspend any activities related to allocation of plots. They have

effectively stopped community members from continuing to pay R58 annual tax to the chief on grounds that this is unconstitutional. The elected councilors assert that traditional authority, according to the new constitution, are confined to customary issues such as circumcision and customary cases. These councilors have effectively taken over the role of allocating plots and business sites. They hold meetings in school and community halls without informing or getting permission from the chief as they claim that holding a meeting is freedom of association enshrined in the constitution. One of the elected councilors even claimed that chiefs will soon disappear as they are an antithesis to a democratic system. These councilors are critical of the chief's stated political neutrality as they claim that he is hiding his true UDM identity. As one councilor put it "You can never trust these chiefs, they are UDM by night while claiming to be neutral by day." They implore chiefs to join the people's organization(ANC) in order to be in tune with their people. It was observed that councilors generally view the members of the traditional authorities with contemptuous and dismissive attitude for not being in tune with the new South Africa. Traditional authorities in this community are generally weak to put up any strong front in face of councilors who all have an extensive history of political activism. According to elected councilors, lack of education and the vestiges of old Bantustan way of doing things is to blame for the traditional authorities lack of appreciation of the new changes in South Africa. During the focus group discussion with the elected councilors they kept mentioning the fact that chiefs are not aware of constitutional provisions regarding their new role. Pressed on this issue, it became clear that some of the councilors themselves had only a vague understanding of what the constitution says about the role of traditional leaders. This can also be attributed to the



fact that South African constitution is not clear or specific when it comes to the role of traditional authorities even though it proclaims that their recognition extends to the new dispensation.

### **6.2.3. Vezokuhle Administrative Area**

Vezokuhle was established in 1985 when its residents were relocated in their current location just two kilometers from the KwaMhlanga town. They were under their chief, Mabena, who had been their leader during their stay in the white farms. Within few years of their settlement in Vezokuhle, they experienced political unrest and with their youth drawn into political activism. Most of the elders claim that this was the turning point as most of their authority was eroded by the militant youth who had little respect for chiefly authority or customs and traditional values. When the civic organization, SANCO, was established in early 1990s there was further encroachment on the authority of traditional rulers with land distribution and the administration of customary law being hotly contested by civic and local party leaders. Orders from the chief were openly defied or challenged.

When the elected local councilors were installed in 1995 they pressurized the traditional leaders to suspend land allocation while they assumed this role especially in allocating business plots. The elected councilors also instructed residents to stop paying an annual tax of R58 to the chief, a practice which has its origins in the KwaNdebele homeland legislation. This call was largely heeded by residents who never supported this tax and this boosted the position of elected officials as they had lifted the tax burden. As a direct

consequence of this action, the traditional authority was weakened as it could no longer pay members of the tribal council or generate resources for some community projects. To further undermine chiefly power, the elected councilors administered the construction of a community hall and road maintenance projects without informing or involving the chief. The elected councilors who represent Vezokuhle in the Transitional Local Council told the traditional leaders and resident that all these powers were conferred by the new constitution and the new democratic dispensation. The traditional leaders who are generally not aware of the provisions of the new constitution regarding their role and confused about their place in the new dispensation have resigned into protesting in the seclusion of their meetings. The chief's oldest son who has just finished high school is not working so he spends most of his time working with the traditional authority, and his prominence makes him a defacto spokesperson for the traditional authority. His high school education has given him a relative advantage as he claims to be the one who understands the new dispensation, the constitution and the new laws. A young female secretary and another member of the traditional authority who is in his late twenties also have high school education and they demonstrated such a condescending attitude toward the chief and the elders in the tribal authority. These young members of the traditional authority claim that they are generally marginalized by their older counterparts and yet they assert that they would be in a better position in facing up to the younger and more educated elected councilors in meetings. They claim that the elders are prone to manipulation and intimidation by the politically astute TLC members. Beside the chief who claims that he is politically neutral, members of the traditional authority range from the members of ANC to DP and Sindawonye Progressive Party. Also important is the

fact that the TLC members are ethnically diverse ranging from Ndebele, Tswana to Zulu. In this community it can be concluded that the elected councilors are relatively stronger and seem to be in control in face of a very weak traditional leadership.

### **6.3. KwaZulu-Natal Province:**

The selected communities in this province are all drawn from the Greater Mbumbulu District which is about 40km south of the port city of Durban. There are about nine administrative areas which are under different chiefs in this district. Most of the working people commute to the nearby town of Isipingo, Durban or the industrial areas in the surrounding areas and this is largely a result of the geographic proximity of these areas to these urban or industrial centers. The other major economic activity is a sugar plantation in which local farmers supply the nearby sugar mills with their harvest. The local chiefs and indunas have relatively larger sugar plantation fields thus giving them a significant source of income from their supply of sugar mills. Except for Mfume Mission, there is not much of the livestock farming in the Mbumbulu area.

It is also important to note that Embo and Adams Mission are in the outskirts of KwaMashu Township and as a consequence the political situation in the township also affects or spill over to these communities.

Chieftaincy in KwaZulu-Natal is still the strongest institution of local government and is the most partisan in the sense that an overwhelming majority of chiefs and indunas are Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) member or sympathizers. Further, KwaZulu-Natal is the

only province where chiefs are ex-officio members of the Regional Councils, which form part of the new rural local government, but they are still in control or a dominant force in the local government at a village or community level. In the three communities selected for this study in this province there is no evidence of civic organizations taking root in the rural communities. The primary political organizations that exist are political parties, and more specifically the ANC and the IFP, which monopolize the political space in the rural communities of KwaZulu-Natal. The conflict among the local elites is largely defined by or organized along the party lines. This is generally reflected in the literature on KwaZulu-Natal as indicated in the previous chapters. A brief reference to the more recent history of political fractiousness in these communities is necessary at this juncture.

Before the launch of the ANC-aligned United Democratic Movement in 1983 the IFP was dominant political force among the blacks of KwaZulu-Natal. It was the only legal party in the homeland of KwaZulu where it had virtual monopoly of power and patronage especially in the rural areas. Chiefs or Amakhosi were civil servants in the payroll of IFP-controlled self-government thus creating a patron-client relationship which, to a great extent, explains IFP's support from a majority of traditional leaders in the province. This relationship has extended to the present provincial government which is IFP-dominated.

When the UDF embarked on an aggressive political mobilization and recruitment which eroded IFP's dominance the latter responded by organizing vigilante groups to fight off UDF's expansion or to roll it back in places where it had established itself. This led into South Africa's bloodiest political conflict in the latter part of the 1980s and the theater of conflict was largely in the townships with a few isolated rural areas being affected. When

the ANC was unbanned in 1990 the violence between the IFP and the ANC/UDF escalated and spread into the rural areas. Adams Mission, Embo and Mfume were affected by this violence and many of the ANC/UDF activists had to flee their homes and stay in the townships for their safety. Because of the IFP objections to, among other things, the new constitutional provisions on devolution of power and the role of Amakhosi, local government elections in KwaZulu-Natal were postponed. When the elected local government structures were finally established after the 1996 local government elections the conflict largely remained between the IFP aligned chiefs and IFP elected councilors, on the one hand, and the ANC elected councilors on the other. In these communities the local elite is ethnically homogenous irrespective of party affiliation. It is important to note that provincial party leaders as well as the provincial Peace and Conflict Resolution Committees got involved or are often invited when local conflicts between the ANC and the IFP supporters or traditional leaders get out of hand.

#### **6.3.1. Adams Mission Administrative Area**

Adams Mission is under the Makanya chieftaincy of the Sobonakhona Tribal Authority. All the Indunas and the secretary are male and women are marginal in the matters of traditional authority. The current chief who is 47 years old is acting on behalf of his elder brother's son who is still too young to assume his position. The current chief was appointed in the early 1990s after his brother, who was a chief, died. Note that it is rare, though not unheard of, for women to act as chiefs in KwaZulu-Natal and this is different from the Xhosas of the Eastern Cape or the Sothos and Tswanas of Free State and Northwest respectively. The chief is also an ex-officio member of the Regional Council

which is known as Ilembe and he is also in its executive committee.

His bias against the ANC and his support of the IFP was clear throughout the interview. He remembered with great nostalgia the days of KwaZulu homeland self government before the new dispensation of the ANC-led government came into place. He claimed that,

“There was order then, most of the things you see were delivered by the IFP homeland government and there was no partisan bickering over who brought what in terms of community projects. But right now ANC councilors always want to undermine my chieftaincy and claim that they are the ones who bring projects into this community. These tensions were brought by the ANC national leaders who influence their local membership. What the local leaders practise is what they copy from their bosses or take from the ANC leadership’s militant statements against the IFP.”<sup>223</sup>

This position is echoed by the indunas who are also IFP-aligned. One of the indunas captures the sentiment that echoes throughout traditional leaders in this community when he says,

“We no longer have respect in this community since the ANC came to this community. People have lost their customs and despise Zulu traditions because they are encouraged to do so by their provincial or national leaders. This is why I have little regard for any person who is even remotely associated with the ANC. ANC present a challenge to the very way we have always done things in this community and that is why some of us just cannot compromise with these people.”<sup>224</sup>

In the above discussion and statement one begin to see the importance of projects in building political legitimacy and the fact that key local political leaders are acutely aware

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<sup>223</sup>An interview with Adams Mission chief Makanya, August 9, 2000.

<sup>224</sup>An interview with Adams Mission Induna, 10 August, 2000.

of this fact. This echoes Chazan's<sup>225</sup> thesis that proximity to state or state resources is a crucial factor in many African countries as this define not only the political leader's legitimacy but also their personal wealth and standing.

The IFP elected councilors all claim that they work well with **Undabezitha**<sup>226</sup> in all matters relating to their work or service delivery and they claim that ANC councilors attitude and approach is the one which often annoys the chief or his indunas thus making it difficult to cooperate. The issue of claiming ownership of or controlling development projects along party lines came up again when the IFP councilors were interviewed.

On the other hand, the ANC councilors are mostly in their forties and one of them is the younger brother of the chief. Most of them are drawn from the ranks of the union movement and they were UDF activists before joining the ANC when it was unbanned. They have had to flee to the townships from time to time in fear for their lives especially during the years 1990-1994. Some of them are still based in the townships or nearby towns such as Isipingo. Most of them show a great respect for the Zulu customs which include the chieftaincy. They are unanimous in their view that the chief and his indunas should continue to distribute land and maintain law and order in the communities. They point to the fact that the IFP-aligned chiefs and indunas are always hostile to any ANC member or often try to prevent or even disrupt ANC activities in the community. All of

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<sup>225</sup>Chazan, N., et al., op cit, 1999.

<sup>226</sup>Ndabezitha is the name used by the subjects to address their chief and it is also used for saluting the chief when one approaches him or enter his courtyard. Both ANC and IFP community members address their chief in this manner without calling them by their name.

them claim that the chief often works well with the IFP elected councilors while he frustrates every attempt they make to work with him on important projects. They also claim that the Zulu custom has been debased or compromised by using chiefs and indunas as IFP mobilizing tools. The threat of physical violence is real as demonstrated by the narrow escape of chief's brother when some people tried to assassinate him in 1999 when he was attending a wedding anniversary ceremony at a chief's place. They claim that they have tried to follow every protocol and custom in order to show respect toward the traditional leaders but the mere fact that they are ANC members has remained as a major factor in the continued hostilities. They claim that disciplinary actions have been taken by the chief or indunas against their members for organizing the ANC events even though they often seek permission before holding any meeting.

The prominent community development activists often claim that they are politically neutral as they claim that this is the only way of working in this community without being associated with one group or another thus putting your life at risk or compromising a project. In fact most of the selected community development activists were not comfortable discussing any issue that they sensed was even remotely linked to partisan politics. They claim that they lobby both parties when they need support for their projects or when they need service delivery from the elected councilors. The traditional leaders are strongly opposed to the demarcation process which is aimed at amalgamating urban municipalities with rural local government. They view this as bringing township life to rural areas which are fundamentally different. On the other hand, ANC councilors see this as the only way of speeding up development and benefiting from the metropolitan



resources.

### **6.3.2. Mfume Administrative Area**

The chief and his indunas are IFP supporters and a majority of elected councilors are also IFP members. The traditional authority is exclusively male whereas the elected councilors, both ANC and IFP combined, are roughly split into half male and half female. Mfume is relatively far removed from the urban areas or the townships. It is largely a farming community, with the sugar plantations being a dominant feature of local agriculture. Mfume was spared of the ANC-IFP conflict of the early 1990s and it remained an IFP stronghold. When this IFP dominance was challenged during ANC election campaign of 1994 and the 1996 local government elections, the reaction from the traditional leaders was swift and sometimes violent as they tried to suppress ANC activities in their backyard.

The few ANC councilors in the community claim that the traditional authority's hostility toward the ANC members has remained since elections and it manifest itself at all levels. For example, ANC councilors remember the time when they got permission from a local induna to hold an ANC recruitment meeting in a local school hall. When they were about to start the meeting another induna came with his group to disrupt the meeting. They claimed that the chief was not aware of this meeting. They threatened the person who had given them the school keys. They forced the people gathering to vacate the school premises. The ANC organizers continued the meeting in the open under a tree and they got a table from a nearby homestead. They claim that the people received threats for

attending ANC organized meetings. Another meeting in which the ANC provincial Health Minister was to speak was disrupted by the IFP members who claimed that there was not proper consultation with the chief and local indunas, a claim which is disputed by the ANC organizers. ANC councilors claim that their work is often frustrated by the chief whereas the IFP councilors always receive a favorable treatment.

Councilors from both parties recount instances where they have had to fight over community projects such as flood relief, building of schools, provision of water and phones. Each side tried to control or claims the project and the ANC councilors claim that the chief and IFP councilors have even managed to hijack the projects which they initiated. One of the ANC councilors was physically attacked by a family member who is an IFP and she claims that the reason was that she was disgracing the family by being an ANC member in an IFP area. She has since been alternating her stay in KwaMashu Township and Mfume. She recalls that each time she attends the meetings(imbizo) called by the chief she is often humiliated in front of people. In one instance she claims that she asked to speak in one of these gatherings and the chief asked “who are you, where are you from, who are your parents, where were you born, are you married?” She asserts that these kinds of demeaning questions are meant to humiliate her in public as the chief knows her in person. She contrasts this treatment with a warm and positive attitude displayed toward her IFP counterparts and she claims that these hostile acts can be understood in terms of IFP/ANC struggle in the province.

### **6.3.3. Embo Administrative Area**

Embo has an IFP-aligned chief and indunas and part of its elected councilors are also IFP members alongside those elected as ANC members. Chieftaincy here is also a dominant force in community affairs. Land allocation is in the hands of the local chief and indunas, so is the law and order and permission to hold gatherings even family ceremonies. This community has a well-organized net of indunas who are divided into special roles such as the one who looks after the migrant workers who dwell in the major Durban townships, the **induna yezintsizwa**, who is a commander of the youth and young male and **amaphoyisa enduna** or the police of the induna who are responsible for law and order in each and every gathering, be it a political, community or ceremonial. With this kind of network and hierarchy, the institution of traditional rulership is well entrenched and is power is relatively uncontested in many areas. The major complaint of ANC councilors is that these structures are manipulated and used as an IFP political tool and indunas were easily organized as warrior groups under the **indunas**-turned-warlords during the vigilante activities against people who were remotely suspected to be ANC members.

All the councilors including those of the ANC always emphasize their respect for Zulu customs and traditions as well as the primacy of the chief in local governance and in the general hierarchy of the local communities. They claim that nothing can happen in the community without his knowledge or blessing as he is the owner of the land and the father of the community. On the issue of political involvement of the chiefs, most of IFP supporters and sympathizers claim that this is necessary in order to counter ANC's attempts to undermine Zulu custom and chieftaincy. On why they seem to have a better

working relationship with the traditional leaders, the IFP councilors are generally of the view that they understand and respect the Zulu customs and protocols better than their ANC counterparts. This is disputed by the ANC councilors and the length to which they go out to follow protocols in organizing meeting or in launching projects also indicate that there is more than just a matter of respect for the customs and following of the protocol. There seem to be a deep mutual suspicion between the members of the IFP and the ANC.

An account on personal relationship between two ANC councilors and the chief of Embo is more revealing of the dual and often contradictory nature of political and personal relations. The two councilors talk of their close personal friendship with the local chief which include, among other things, sharing of music tapes, giving each other lifts to the nearby towns as well as gathering for social drinking on several occasions. They claim that when it comes to holding ANC activities the chief becomes impossible and he has revealed to them that the local IFP party officials threaten or pressurize him to assume a more rigid stance when it comes to political party matters. Sometimes, indunas simply override the chief when they perceive that IFP interests may be compromised by ANC operation in the community. ANC councilors also give an account of their difficulties of organizing meetings in the local community as they are not allowed to go from house to house to inform people about a meeting as this is the task of indunas. When they ask indunas to inform people about their meetings, they claim that they will do anything to sabotage these meetings by simply not passing the information or actively discouraging people from attending ANC meetings. They claim that they have since developed ways of

covertly informing people through their networks which operate in the villages. When ANC councilors managed to come up with a project the local chief refused to give them a piece of land as he asserted that they were trying to undermine his authority and that of the IFP by giving an impression that they were the ones developing the area. The above account of an elected councilor and a local chief who are friends at a social level and yet a political opponent indicates that personal friendship does not necessarily translate to political accommodation. This is one more indication of the intensity of partisan politics in many parts of the province.

#### **6.4. Summary**

The key aspects of the above profile of communities are highlighted and summarized in a form of tables. These tables identify the essential characteristics that best represent each community while at the same time grouping them in terms of their shared features. This comparative context also laid foundation for the following chapter which analyze patterns that emerged from the data.

**Table 6.1.: Status of a chief and proximity to urban areas (city or town)**

	<b>Female Chief</b>	<b>Acting Chief</b>	<b>Close proximity to an urban area</b>
<b>Adams</b>		Yes	Yes
<b>Embo</b>			Yes
<b>Mfume</b>			
<b>Mnceba</b>	Yes	Yes	
<b>Nzongisa</b>	Yes	Yes	
<b>Rode</b>		Yes	
<b>Sokhulumi</b>			
<b>Tweefontein</b>			Yes
<b>Vezokuhle</b>			Yes

Table 6.1. is useful in understanding the presence of women chiefs is what is essentially a male-dominated role. In both Nzongisa and Mnceba the acting chiefs are women, in the former she is acting on behalf of her son who is still young whereas in the latter she is acting on behalf of her sick husband. The fact that these acting women preside over communities which have different set of relations, one conflictual and another accommodative (see table 7.1. in chapter seven), does not tell us much about the effect of being a woman at the head of a male-dominated institution of traditional rulership.

Another observation regarding the above table is that general observation of different accounts of participants suggested that the acting position of a chief was not a decisive factor in understanding the predominant forms of local elite relations. Even in the case of Rode where the issue of an acting position was raised from time to time, most accounts indicate that it became an issue as a direct consequence of conflicts rather than being a cause of such conflicts.

The geographical location of target communities in relation to the urban centers is included here because it has bearing on a number of variables which are of interest in this study. These geographic locations or proximity to the urban areas affect both the ethnic composition as well as the distribution of resources, particularly grazing land and livestock, and this point is discussed in more detail in chapter eight. Firstly, in the case of Mpumalanga and to some extent in KwaZulu-Natal the absence or presence of farming fields as well as the ownership of livestock is determined by whether one is very close to an urban area or not. Property ownership, which includes livestock and farming fields, is one of the key dimensions of social stratification or class as it is reflected in the data

analysis presented in chapter seven. Secondly, proximity to urban centers also mean that an areas is functionally urban in the sense that provision of services such as water, electricity, phones and transportation is more integrated or similar to that of urban municipality. It will be shown later that rural areas which are away from the urban areas tended to be negative toward the idea of paying rates for services and this is shared right across the different sectors of the local elite. On the other hand, areas which are very close to urban centers tended to be more open to or even embrace the notion of paying for services as this idea was not as alien to them as they had lived in areas with such services at some point. Thirdly, areas which are close to urban areas tend to have a considerable number of its elite living in commuting daily to the urban areas. This, in return, tend to remove them from daily issues and meetings called by traditional authorities thus opening themselves to charges, mainly by traditional authorities, of being outsiders with little grasp of local issues.

**Table 6.2.: Key protagonists in local elite relationship**

Key Players	Administrative Areas	Province
1.Traditional leaders v.s. Elected councilors	Vezokuhle, Tweefontein	Mpumalanga
2. Traditional Leaders v.s. Civic leaders	Mnceba, Rode	Eastern Cape
3. Traditional leaders & Elected councilors v.s. Elected councilors	Adams, Embo, Mfume	KwaZulu-Natal
4. Traditional leaders/Civic leaders	Sokhulumu	Mpumalanga
4. Traditional leaders/elected councilors/civic leaders	Nzongisa	Eastern Cape

This table reveals an uneven and varied landscape of key protagonists but in all areas

traditional leaders seem to be a common denominator. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have provided the reasons for this as they portrayed the entrenched position of traditional leaders or more specifically chiefs in the rural areas which are under their jurisdiction. The fact that an emerging competing and or alternative source of power have to deal with and come in to terms with traditional leaders is to be understood in this context. In some areas, elected councilors tend to play a marginal role in local politics as seen in the case of Sokhulum, Mnceba and Rode. This is, in part, due to their small numbers which often range from one to two councilors. More specifically, there is only one councilor per administrative area in the Eastern Cape whereas Sokhulum has two. This variation in the numbers of councilors introduces regions or provinces as a variable given the fact that these trends are provincial as shown above.

**Table 6.3.: Conflict/Accommodation relationship typology**

<b>Conflict</b>	<b>Accommodation</b>
1. Physical confrontation	Peaceful coexistence
2. Key sectors of elite work against each other.	Key sectors of elite collaborate in most projects.
3. Court litigations against each other	No legal disputes.
4. Boycott gatherings/activities organized by opponents.	Attend each other's meetings and extend invitation to each other.
5. Actively prevent/frustrate opponent's meetings or mobilization.	Free association allowed
6. Deep divisions among sectors of the elite	General unity and overlapping interests among the local elites

The above table presents and contrasts aspects of the dominant patterns of rural elite



relations which otherwise have been described in chapter 5. This table is presented here to provide context for the following tables which classify these cases according to the dominant patterns of relations.

**Table 6.4.: Classification of cases according to the dominant form of elite relations**  
**Conflictual** **Cooperative**

<i>Eastern Cape:</i>	a) Mnceba b) Rode	c) Nzongisa
<i>KwaZulu-Natal</i>	d) Adams e) Embo f) Mfume	
<i>Mpumalanga</i>	g) Tweefontein h) Vezokuhle	i) Sokhulumini

A point has to be made here that the fact that all cases of KwaZulu-Natal are in the category of conflictual relations does not mean that all areas in KwaZulu-Natal can be classified as such. This only reflects the cases which this research was able to access. Initially, Adams was identified and recommended to me as an area which has cooperative relations among the various sectors of its elite but this proved not to be the case as I gathered data. What emerged during the interviews was that Adams fit a profile of a conflictual relations even though the provincial local government officials had suggested otherwise.

In areas where relations between traditional leaders and elected councilors or civic leaders are conflictual there is a range of issues which are disputed as reflected in the following table.

**Table 6.5.: Issues over which there are disputes**

	<b>Adams</b>	<b>Embo</b>	<b>Mfume</b>	<b>Mnceba</b>	<b>Rode</b>	<b>Twefontei n</b>	<b>Vezokuhle</b>
<b>Land allocation</b>				✓		✓	✓
<b>Right to hold meetings</b>	✓	✓	✓		✓		
<b>projects Control</b>	✓	✓	✓		✓		
<b>chief's succession disputed</b>					✓		
<b>Corruption of traditional leaders</b>				✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Chief's partisan bias</b>	✓	✓	✓		✓		
<b>geographic resource allocation bias</b>					✓		

In this table traditional authorities' real or perceived partisan bias as well as corruption stands out prominently in at least four cases. This is a common factor in all the selected cases of KwaZulu-Natal thus suggesting a possible provincial trend. The case of Rode

does reveal the fact that partisan bias is not limited to KwaZulu-Natal. In the case of Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape cases all the areas of disputes involve the alleged corrupt practices of traditional authorities. Traditional leaders' refusal to allow their political opponents to hold meetings as well as the struggle for control of projects is another area over which there are disputes as seen in the case of Rode, Mfume, Adams and Embo. These tables have provided an overview of cases in a comparative sense which set the stage for results analysis and interpretation of data which are presented in the next two chapters.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS**

The central focus of this chapter is the analysis of political, social and economic factors underlying rural elite relations. The ultimate aim is to identify trends that indicate relations between types of rural elite relations (conflictual or accommodative) and selected variables. In more specific terms and also as a way of capturing the essence of the hypotheses stated earlier, we would expect greater differences of measured or observed variables between the elite sectors in conflict communities whereas there would be no such differences in non-conflict communities if the tested variables have an influence on or are associated with the type of elite relations. The analysis based on survey results is primarily in numeric or quantitative form thus making the data readily analyzable utilizing statistical tests.

Sections of this chapter are organized around the theoretical issues and hypotheses outlined in chapter two. More specifically, the findings will indicate whether age, ethnicity, education, party affiliation and identity, distribution of resources, attitude toward traditional values and traditional land tenure system are in any way related to these forms of rural elite relations. Policy preference profile of individuals in conflict

communities will be compared to that of their counterparts in non-conflict (accommodative/cooperative) communities. Attitudes towards payment of services in rural areas, traditional land tenure and New Municipal Demarcation Law are the component part of assessment attitude toward policies pertaining rural areas. Also included in this analysis are views of respondents on fairness or severity of penalties imposed by traditional courts, on their influence on decision making in traditional authority as well as in elected councils, existence or non-existence of geopolitical factors, and their assessment of corruption in traditional authority. In broad terms the assessed variables can be classified into demographic features and opinion/attitudes.

In order to achieve this task this chapter utilizes demographic characteristics and opinions/attitudes of 143 individual respondents who participated in the survey. Individuals from conflict communities are compared to those of non-conflict communities using the above-mentioned variables. It should be recalled that relations between traditional authorities and elected councilors and or civic leaders is at the core of this study. Analysis of individual attributes takes this into account by aggregating their responses or characteristics into these three sectors of the rural elite.

Table 7.1. gives a breakdown of these sectors in order to provide a context for the frequencies and percentages that will be used in demonstrating the trends.

**Table 7.1. Selected Sectors of Rural Elite & type of relations**

	Traditional Authorities	Elected Councilors	Civic Leaders	Row Total
Conflict Cases	42	26	46	114
Non-conflict Cases	13	3	13	29
Column Total	55	29	59	143

The primary approach in this chapter is to develop general statements in which the names of communities, individuals or regions are replaced with theoretical concepts. In this case conflictual relations and accommodative or non-conflict relations are the key concepts being examined. This approach is informed by Przeworski and Tuene's conception of comparative social inquiry in which they convincingly argue that one of the fundamental assumptions of comparative analysis is to replace names with specific theoretical concepts and variables. The following statement captures the essence of their argument:

"If we accept this residual nature of names of social systems, we can then attempt to replace these names by variables. When we find that societies differ with regard to a particular characteristic, we can ask what it is about these societies that causes this difference . . . Therefore the role of comparative research in the process of theory-building and theory testing consists of replacing names of social systems by the relevant-variables."<sup>228</sup>

<sup>228</sup> Przeworski, A. and Tuene, H. The logic of comparative social inquiry New York: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970. pp. 29-30.

It should be noted that the emphasis on replacing names with variables or theoretical concepts represents a notable change from the one adopted in chapters six and eight where names of communities, regions and protagonists are extensively used. In the final analysis the adoption of both approaches is meant to be complementary and also indicate different emphases where this is deemed necessary to explain or provide a context for relational dynamics in the selected communities and individuals.

The tools used in this chapter include charts and tables, which show frequencies, mainly in percentages, of observed scores of the aforementioned variables. Chi-square tests are also used to establish association as a way of assessing the hypotheses used in this study. Statistical analysis is done to establish whether the observed differences in frequencies is statistically significant or due to chance. As a preview, it should be stated at this juncture that age, party affiliation, education, income and employment show a strong trend that suggests that these demographic variables are linked or associated with the type of elite relations. In opinion variables, views on whether respondents have influence on decisions made by elected councils, on Municipal Demarcation Law and on payment of service fees are also an important factor in understanding the type of elite relations. This is evident in the observed frequency charts, and even more importantly, it is reinforced by the statistical tests results indicating whether the differences among elite sectors are statistically significant. Results indicate that each sector of the elite (traditional leaders, elected leaders, civic leaders) tend to share views on the following: opinion on corruption of traditional authorities, land tenure system, penalties imposed by traditional courts, and on whether the respondents felt that they had an influence in the decisions taken by traditional authorities. These views are shared by members of each sector irrespective

of whether they are in conflict or in non-conflict communities. This, however, does not affirm any of the hypotheses presented in this study, it simply indicates that chiefs, councilors and civic leaders have similar views irrespective of whether they are in communities experiencing conflict or not this confirms what was said earlier that institutional boundaries tend to organize and consolidate self-interests and self-understanding of its constituent members.

On the other hand, ethnicity, and distribution of resources (with the exception of income and employment status) does not indicate any statistically significant trend that is associated with conflict and/or non-conflict relations. Marital status, gender, past political activism and perception of geopolitical factors also proved to have very weak or no relationship with the type of elite relations. As we move to the section on results presentation and analysis a disclaimer that these results do not seek to establish causal relationship between variables is necessary to offer in order to understand the scope and nature of these results.

It should also be noted that respondents were asked whether they thought there was conflict or no conflict between the sectors of the elite in their respective communities. This was then used as another level of classifying conflict in terms of their perception in addition to my own classification of what constitute conflict cases and non-conflict cases. As a result of this dual classification, all the statistical test results are reported both in terms of respondents' classification and those of researcher's judgment of the existence and non-existence of conflict. It should also be reported at this juncture that the differences between these two sets of classifications are not that much hence the results tend to reflect similar trends with only a few exceptions. It was important to





introduce respondents' own perception of conflict as this helps to validate and reinforce my own judgment of what constitute a conflict community or relationship while making sure that the bias of researcher's judgment was not a factor.

### **7.1. Age distribution in conflict and non-conflict relations**

Is conflict between the sectors of the rural elite a generational clash as some of the literature suggested in the literature review and theory chapter? Can we explain the dominant relation as a matter of old versus the young? Does age matter at all? In order to find out if age was a factor, respondents were asked to give their age or their date of birth, whichever came first or were easier to remember. I then grouped these responses into three categories, namely, youth (20-35 years), middle age (36-55 years) and senior (56 years old and above).<sup>229</sup> Scores were entered into each category and frequencies for each sector in conflict and non-conflict cases were generated. These frequencies are then computed in a form of percentages. I am mindful of the fact that percentages are often used in cases where there are large numbers but in this case they are used in order to show proportions of each score on the selected variables. Figure 7.1. shows age distribution in conflict cases and figure 7.2. targets non-conflict cases

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<sup>229</sup> It should be noted that these categories are not universal standards. I simply took into account the retirement age for average migrant workers, lifespan among rural dwellers as well as respondent's own self-understanding of what constitute old age or youth.



In figure 7.1, the concentration of traditional leaders in the senior category (60%) compared to the strong representation of both elected leaders (50%) and civic leaders (46%) in the middle age category stands out prominently. This suggests age disparity

in which traditional leaders are older than both the elected and the civic leaders. By contrast, figure 7.2. shows an even distribution of traditional leaders in both middle age (46%) and senior age (46%)category. Elected officials (67%) in this case are highly concentrated in the middle age with virtually none in the senior age category. More interesting in this case is the fact that in non-conflict communities civic leaders tend to be older (62%) than their counterparts in the conflict cases (28%). It can be said that a generally old traditional leadership in conflict cases has to deal with a mostly middle aged civic and elected leadership whereas there is a considerable concentration of elected and traditional leaders in the middle age category with the exception of civic leaders.

Test of age differences were conducted between the sectors of the elite in areas that the researcher classified as conflict and those with no conflict. I found a strong relationship in conflict cases whereas there is a very weak relationship in non-conflict areas. In addition, the differences of age in conflict areas are statistically significant.<sup>230</sup>

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230 (a) Researcher's classification or relationship: Pearson Chi-Square value for non-conflict is 7.866; Cramer's V at .368 and the significance level is .097. In conflict cases chi-square value is 24.453; Cramer's V is .327 and highly significant at .000. (b) In respondents' own perception of conflict and non-conflict the results of the test are as follows: Chi-square is 9.263; Cramer's V is .290 at .055 significance. In conflict cases chi-square is 20.316 and Cramer's V is .340 at .000 significance; degree of freedom is 4. It should be noted that the value of chi square in conflict cases is often larger than that of non-conflict cases and this is largely due to the fact that non-conflict cases are smaller than those of conflict areas. This is a reflection of chi-square's sensitivity to the size of sample or number of cases, and this is the case throughout the other tests being conducted here.

It can, therefore, be reported that the observed differences of age between the sectors of the elite are not likely due to chance, and that there is an association between conflict and age differences. In short, age is a factor in understanding the existence or non-existence of conflict as the hypothesis suggested.

## **7.2. Education and elite relations**

Does education matter in our understanding of conflictual relations and accommodative relations? Is there any trend in these results that suggests that the conflict is between the educated and less educated sectors of the elite? Education often features prominently in the literature that tries to understand relations between political actors as indicated earlier in the literature. Education also kept coming up during focus group discussions. Taking both the literature and focus group discussions, education was included in the interviews. Individual respondents were asked to indicate whether they had any formal education and in the event they had formal education they were asked to indicate their highest level of education or qualification. I avoided using the number of years in school in the interviews as it became clear that this was confusing given the fact that other people did not know whether standard A (now called grade 1) and B (grade 2) were to be counted as a year of schooling. During the pre-testing of my questions on education, some were not sure whether the number of years in school would include repeated (failed) classes. This exercise was instructive in as far as understanding some shortcomings of the usually deployed response categories in questionnaire/survey design. I resolved these problems by simply asking people to give the highest qualification or class they attended, and then coded them into categories that are relevant for this study. In this study I classify tertiary level and high school level education as well-educated

category, secondary level education is classified as somewhat educated and primary education or no formal education is classified as little or no education.





Figure 7.3. and figure 7.4. below indicate distribution of education levels in conflict and non-conflict cases respectively. A look at figure 7.3. clearly indicates the fact that elected councilors are better educated with only 4% which has little or no education.

This is in sharp contrast to the traditional leaders who have more than half, at 57%, of their members recorded as having little or no education at all. Considering the fact that in 5 of seven cases of conflict communities the main conflict is between the elected councilors and the traditional leaders, this disparity is an indication that education is a factor when looking at the above chart. Even the civic leaders on have 22% of its members who are less educated. It can, therefore, be stated that traditional leaders in conflict relations are less educated than their elected and civic counterparts.

In figure 7.4. the elected leaders in non-conflict relations are all well educated. On the other hand, traditional leaders spread out from well educated to medium and less educated. However, taking the well-educated and medium categories for the traditional leaders it becomes clear that about 61% of them have some decent education with the remaining being less educated. It can, therefore, be said that disparity in the non-conflict cases between the elected and the traditional leaders is not as wide as the one in conflict cases where more than half of traditional leaders are less educated compared to only 4% of the elected category. Overall, it was observed that elected leaders and civic leaders in both conflict and non-conflict cases tended to be relatively more educated than the traditional leaders. But of primary interest in this case, as stated earlier in the hypotheses and in the questions asked above, is the

disparity between the key sectors within each type of relationship (conflict and non-conflict). The above charts do show such sharp disparity in conflict relations and this is not the case in non-conflict relations. Education, given this trend, does have a relation with these types of elite relations with conflict more evident in cases where traditional leaders have less education than elected and civic leaders in their communities.

Statistical tests of significance and association between education and elite sectors in both conflict and non-conflicts reveal that indeed education is associated with the type of elite relations in both researcher's and respondents' classifications. The results are showing high statistical significance in conflict cases and association even though the strength of this relationship is not particularly strong.<sup>231</sup> In non-conflict the results indicate that there are no sharper differences in the level of education between the traditional leaders and other sectors of the local elite hence statistics show a weak association between the sectors of the elite and education. This affirms the hypotheses that we would see greater variations in conflict areas whereas we expected little or no such distinction in non-conflict areas. In all, education does have an influence on the type of rural elite relationship as frequency charts and statistical results indicated above.

### **7.3. Ethnic affiliation and elite relations in conflict and in non-conflict communities**

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231 (a) Researcher's classification: Conflict:- Chi-Square value=32.037; Cramer's V=.375 and significance level=.000  
Non-conflict: chi-square value=10.160; Cramer's V=.419; Significance level =.254. (b) Respondent's classification: Conflict:- chi-square=22.534; Cramer's V .358; and significance level=.004. Non-conflict:- chi-square=16.731; Cramer's V=.390; significance level= .033; degrees of freedom=8.


Does ethnic affiliation play a role in rural elite relations? Is the local conflict influenced by ethnic affiliation? In trying to answer this question I approached the notion of ethnic identity from various dimensions, which were deemed important by the participants during focus group discussions, which preceded actual interviews. In these discussions it became evident that the notion of "who belongs and who is an outsider" was wider than just a simple question of identifying one's ethnic group. In the politics of identity the notion of exclusion and inclusion ranged from the place of birth to the place of residence. In the interview questions participants were asked to identify whether they belonged to the dominant local ethnic group or not. The second question was whether they were born locally (in the community or village being studied) or elsewhere. The last question was the one that required respondents to indicate if they were local residents or not. These questions produced three response categories; (1) Same ethnicity as local, (2) Born locally and (3) local resident. It should be recalled from the previous chapter that the dominant ethnic groups in the targeted communities are Zulu (Adams, Mfume, Embo), Ndebele (Sokhulumi, Tweefontein and Vezokuhle), Xesibe (Mnceba and Nzongisa) and Hlubi (Rode). In a category , which is "same as local", it is referring to these respective ethnic groups.

In the charts 7.5. and 7.6. there is no clear disparity or difference between traditional leaders and elected or civic leaders. All this data indicates is that there is a general tendency of ethnic homogeneity among all the sectors of local elite. Those who were born locally are slightly less than those who are local residents as well as with those who are from the dominant ethnic group.




In figure 7.6. there is no clear trend that shows disparity between traditional leaders and civic leaders whereas elected councilors are fewer in all the three categories. We can therefore assert that there is more ethnic diversity in the category of elected councilors than in the other categories. Taking the results from both tables, there is no clear trend that can begin to give an answer to our questions. If there is generally more ethnic homogeneity, surprisingly more so in conflict cases than in non-conflict relations, it can be concluded, at least in view of these results, that there is no important relationship between the type of relationship and ethnic divisions. This is certainly not in line with a plethora of studies, which would put ethnic divisions and ethnic cleavages in Africa, above all other variables given the weak social classes, civil society and political institutions. I will return to this point in the discussion and interpretation chapter (chapter nine).

**Figure 7.5. Ethnic Affiliation of elite in conflict communities**



**Figure 7.6. Ethnic identity of elite in non-conflict communities**



Statistical tests results confirm that there is a very weak link between ethnicity and the type of elite relationship.<sup>232</sup> These results indicate that respondents in both conflict

232 (a) Researcher's classification: Conflict:- chi-square=11.576; Cramer's V=.225; and significance level = .021

and non-conflict communities generally share the same ethnic outlook. The results are statistically significant with weaker association and even weaker strength of association. It can, therefore, be said that ethnicity has statistically significant results, though the level of significance passes the threshold, it is not particularly high and this is reinforced by weak association and strength of relationship. Ethnicity has a weak association with the type of elite relationship.

#### **7.4. Rural elite relations and Political party affiliation and identity**


In virtually all the discussions in the previous chapters, the issue of political identity and affiliation featured prominently especially in the case of studies trying to explain political conflict in South African communities and provinces. It was logical, therefore, to ask the respondents to identify their party political affiliation, if any affiliation at all. Given the dominance of the African National Congress (ANC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the United Democratic Movement (UDM), these organizations are classified by their names whereas other organizations are grouped as "other". For those who claimed neutrality or who said they did not belong to any political party, the category "none" is provided. If the conflict between traditional leaders and the elected leaders and or civic leaders was due to party political affiliation we would expect a trend that shows the key protagonists belonging to different political organizations.

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
Non-conflict: chi-square=10.906; Cramer's V=.434; Significance level=.028 (b) Respondents' classification: conflict: Chi-square=11.362; Cramer's V=.254; Significance level=.023. Non-conflict: chi-square=14.064; Cramer's V=.254 and significance level=.007 degrees of freedom=4

In figure 7.7. there is more diversity in terms of party political representation even though ANC is clearly dominant in the category of elected leaders. This is in sharp contrast with the non-conflict communities, show in figure 7.8. where ANC's dominance is emphatic if not an indication of virtual monopoly when considering the fact that of the remaining elite the majority is not aligned to any party. Taken together, this suggests that there is more political diversity, therefore, potential for political competition and clash in conflict communities compared to non-conflict communities that enjoy some degree of homogeneity under the banner of the ANC. Considering the narrative chapter as well as discussion in chapters two and five, strong representation of ANC, IFP and UDM in conflict areas also means that these political adversaries are expected to fiercely contest the political space and power thus leading to an intense struggle for control of local areas and local development projects. Given this trend and analysis, it can be stated that political affiliation does show relationship with the type of elite relations.

**Figure 7.7. Political party affiliation in conflict communities**



**Figure 7.8. Party affiliation in non-conflict communities**



Statistical tests results indicated that these observed differences between conflict cases and non-conflict cases are statistically highly significant with high measure of association in the conflict areas<sup>233</sup>.

233 (a) Researcher's classification: Conflict:- chi-square=27.150; Cramer's V=.345; and significance level = .001

This suggests that in conflict areas there are important differences in terms of political alliances whereas this is not the case in non-conflict areas. This makes political affiliation one of the variables with strong association with the type of elite relationship, and this upholds the hypotheses stated earlier.

Another dimension of political identity was included to assess the attitude of the local elite toward the involvement of chiefs in party politics. This issue often came up in all the discussions with the participants and the government officials. Some felt that chiefs, as the traditional heads of their communities should not be involved in politics as they are bound to be biased in favor of their political parties or actively use all resources to oppose their political opponents. Some felt that chiefs needed to be in politics if they were to fight their marginalization in the new political dispensation. I included the question: "What is your opinion on the involvement of chiefs in party politics?"


Figure 7.9. shows the distribution of responses to this question and it juxtaposes responses from conflict and non-conflict communities. Overall there is a strong opposition across these communities and in all the sectors of the rural local elite. What stands out in this chart is a very strong opposition (92%) that comes from the elected councilors in the conflict communities.

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Non-conflict: chi-square=5.501; Cramer's V=.308; Significance level=.481 (b) Respondents' classification: conflict: Chi-square=25.913; Cramer's V=.384; Significance level=.001; Non-conflict: chi-square= 12.044; Cramer's V=.331; significance level=.149 degrees of freedom=8

This could be taken as either their frustration with chiefs who are biased against their political parties, especially the ANC members who often raised this as one of the problems they face. Intensity of this opposition may also be a barometer of these political tensions as much as it may actually have the potential to cause them.

Overall, it is observed from this chart that there is a general opposition toward chiefs' involvement in party politics and this cuts across types of relations as well as across sectors of the elite.



Statistical tests reveal two important results. Firstly, the relationship between opposition to chiefs' involvement in politics and type of elite relationship shows weak association and strength of relationship.<sup>234</sup>

234 (a) Researcher's classification or relationship: Pearson Chi-Square value for non-conflict is 1.907; Cramer's V is .284 and the significance level is .385. In conflict cases chi-square value is 18.374; Cramer's V is .284 and significant at .005. (b) In respondents' own perception of conflict and non-conflict the results of the test are as follows: Non-conflict: Chi-square is 16.766; Cramer's V is .390 at .010 significance. In conflict cases chi-square is 6.607 and Cramer's V is .194 at .359 significance.

In addition to that, results are not statistically significant in conflict areas when using respondent's classification of conflict and non-conflict whereas it is when using researcher's own classification. Secondly, this is one of the few results that show discrepancy between results when using respondents' classification from those that are produced when using researcher's classification. In fact, these results are inverted when taking conflict and non-conflict and juxtaposing them in these two classifications. It is, therefore, concluded that there is no clear trend suggesting association or statistically significant relationship between the views of different elite sectors in conflict relations and those in non-conflict relations regarding the involvement of chiefs in party politics.

#### **7.5. Social stratification, class conflict and rural elite relations**

Could the rural elite conflict in South Africa be depicted as a class conflict between the haves and the have-nots, as some Marxist scholars claim? If this is the case we would expect to see a clear indication that one sector has resources whereas the other(s) have little or none. In order to establish whether this was in fact the case or not I included several dimensions which show the distribution of resources. These are the ownership of property, status of employment and average monthly income for each one of the 143 respondents. Each one of these dimensions of resources is further classified into indicators or response categories. Ownership of property includes ownership of livestock, farming land, residential plot and a business. Employment has employed unemployed and retired categories. Distribution of income included Little or no income for those earning R100 or less per month, low income for those earning



between R100 and R999, medium for those in the R1000-R3999 range and high income for those earning R4000 or more.

#### **7.6. Distribution of property in conflict and in non-conflict communities**


Considering results from figure 7.10. and 7.11. one notices that there is no clear trend that would suggest sharp differences in the distribution of resources between the individuals in the conflict relations and those in the non-conflict relations. Overall, it can be said that traditional leaders are doing marginally better than both elected and civic leaders. This would be expected in both conflict and non-conflict relations as traditional authorities are the ones who distribute land for farming and for building a house (residential plot). Moreover, they are generally older (see figure 7.1. & 7.2.) thus making them, according to local customs, eligible for land allocation. Less representation of elected councilors in these categories of property (land) may be a reflection of eligibility due to age and marital status. Elected leaders in non-conflict areas fair poorly compared to the traditional and civic leaders. This, therefore, does not suggest any trend showing sharp disparities in the ownership of property in conflict communities than those in non-conflict communities as would be expected if this variable was a factor in conflict relations.

Statistical tests generally reinforce the above observations as they indicate that there is neither statistically important relationship nor association between the type of elite relation and the distribution of properties (livestock, farming land, residential plot and business). These results were sustained even when number of properties per elite sector was used in the tests.<sup>235</sup>


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235 (a) Researcher's classification:- conflict: chi-square=9.749; Cramer's V=.207; significance level=.283. Non-conflict: chi-square=13.013; Cramer's V=.474 ; Significance level=.111. (b)

**Figure 7.10 Property Distribution in Conflict communities**



**Figure 7.11. Property distribution in non-conflict communities**



Respondents' classifications:- Conflict: Chi-square=7.075; Cramer's V=.201; Significance level=.529.  
Non-conflict: chi-square=25.132; Cramer's V=.478; Significance level=.001.

### **7.7. Employment status in conflict and in non-conflict communities**



In figures 7.12 and figure 7.13 there is no clear trend suggesting sharp differences between the conflict and non-conflict areas. It can be said that the elite in all categories are doing relatively well given their high employment rate. This is more so the case with the elected officials who, by virtue of their status, are all employed as councilors. If any category here stands out to be noticeable it is that of the elected councilors who are all employed thus comparing favorably with their counterparts in the other sectors of the elite. This though does not strongly suggest that this is related with the type of elite relationship as differences, at least according to these charts, are marginal. The considerably higher number of retired members of the civic leadership in the non-conflict chart is a reflection of the concentration of old age as seen in figure 7.2.

However, statistical tests reveal a strong association between the employment status of the elite sectors in conflict and those in non-conflict areas. There is an important association of these variables and this is highly significant relationship in both the respondents' and researcher's classifications<sup>236</sup>. This association in conflict cases suggests that there are statistically significant differences of employment status between the sectors of the elite whereas such sharp differences are not evident in non-conflict cases. It can be concluded from these results that relationship between the elite relations and employment status is statistically significant even though this was not obvious in the frequency charts.

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236 (a) Researcher's classification:- conflict: chi-square=23.322; Cramer's V=.320; significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=3.235; Cramer's V=.236; Significance level=.519. (b) Respondents' classifications:- Conflict: Chi-square=20.869; Cramer's V=.226; Significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=5.624; Cramer's V=.226; Significance level=.229; Degrees of freedom=4

The differences between the elite sectors in the conflict communities are largely due to the higher number of civic leaders who are unemployed as the position of elected leaders is the same (all employed) in both conflict and non-conflict areas.



### 7.8. Monthly average income and elite relations

Figures 7.14 and 7.15 reflect the fact that elected councilors are doing better than the other categories when considering the fact that none of them are in the little/none category. This is simply a reflection of their full employment status reflected above. Generally, in both conflict (69%) and in non-conflict (69%) traditional leaders are in the bottom end (low to no income) of the income range. In all there is important distinction between the elite sectors and what is not readily revealed is whether this is statistically meaningful particularly when comparing disparities between the sectors in both types of elite relations.



Just like the above results in the employment status, statistical tests reveal a highly significant relationship between the elite relations and average monthly income. This is the case in both test obtained when using researcher's classification and those of respondents' classification. There is a statistically important association, a relatively strong relationship and high level of statistical significance<sup>237</sup>. An observation can be made that income and employment are the only variables out of all those indicating distribution of resources or economic standing of the elite that seem to be associated with the type of elite relationship. At one level this may be interpreted as an indication that traditional forms of property such as livestock, farming land and residential plots are generally owned by all the sectors of the rural elite in both conflict and non-conflict communities.

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237 (a) Researcher's classification:- conflict: chi-square=36.019; Cramer's V=.397; significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=5.060; Cramer's V=.295 ; Significance level=.536. (b) Respondents' classifications:- Conflict: Chi-square=37.994; Cramer's V=.465; Significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=4.165; Cramer's V=.195; Significance level=.654; Degrees of freedom=6

This, however, is not necessarily the case with the more modern indicators of economic status such as education, income and employment which seem to vary greatly among the sectors of the elite in conflict cases than in non-conflict cases. These results are giving a hint that types of properties when studying the rural elite need to be unbundled in a manner that distinguish between the traditional and modern forms of economic status. The association between conflict relations with employment and income can be interpreted in two ways: firstly, distribution of land and livestock is fairly even among the local elite, and even in cases where this is not the case it is largely due to the customary or widely applied conventional rules that require one to be married or a parent to get land. In this case, a young person who does not have land or livestock may understand this as a passing phase as they would be given once they are married or old enough to fulfill the requirements. Secondly, this may signal the growing importance of education, income and employment as indicators of social status and wealth in a modern society. It is after all a good education, income, and a good job that allows elite in the present day South Africa to access symbols of success and wealth or highlife (a fancy car, cellular phone, a beautiful house, fancy clothes and all other flashy and trendy gadgets). A simultaneous process of the devaluation of farming land and livestock is taking place. For an example, I observed many fields that have been lying fallow or unutilized, and this is a common scene across South African rural villages. Many owners of these fields cite the lack of money as the key reason and this is followed by the fact that the youth lacks interest in farming. Another indication of this decline is the fact that traditional brides wealth payment transaction was through cows or livestock but in the present era a cash payment is generally preferred.

All these taken together indicate general availability of land whereas income, good employment and education that are highly valued are not readily available to all sectors thus causing a sense of relative deprivation among those who do not compare favorably in this sense.



### **7.9. Policy preference profile and support for traditional institutions**

Assessment of attitudes and opinions of participants toward traditional institutions and policies that impact on or shape rural local governance has two primary aims. Firstly, this will establish if there is any trend that indicates differences of opinion between the key actors within conflict communities and those in non-conflict communities. A trend showing differences between individuals from these two types of relations will then show that policy issues are also areas of disagreement or conflict, and will also point out areas of agreement on policy matters. Secondly, attitudes towards traditional institutions will also reveal, partially though, whether the conflict may be between traditionalists who support traditional institutions, values and customs and those who favor modern institutions. Ultimately, these results will reveal a profile of preference that distinguishes, if at all, individuals in conflict relations and those in accommodative relations. Alternatively, these opinions may also reveal whether differences of opinion reflects shared values and views among the members of the same elite sector thus reflecting the aggregation of interests according to the institutional boundaries.




This section presents results on the distribution and variation of opinions and attitudes on the following areas: opinion on traditional values and customs, opinions on traditional land tenure, opinion on the introduction of payment of services in rural areas and on the New Municipal Demarcation Law that made provisions for amalgamation of rural areas and urban areas into single municipal boundaries or development zones for the purpose of service delivery and development. In addition to the above-identified attitudinal/opinion variables, opinion on penalties imposed by the traditional/customary courts, views on whether respondents feel they have an influence on the decisions made by traditional authority and elected council in their respective communities, and lastly, views on the existence or non-existence of corruption in the traditional authority. It should be remembered that differences of opinion that this study is interested in within both conflict and non-conflict relations are between the contending sectors or key players in each set of relations. In this case we will be looking at relations between the traditional leaders and those of civic and/or elected leaders and these compared across the conflict and non-conflict areas.

#### **7.10. Support for traditional values and customs in conflict and in non-conflict relations**


In both figures 7.16 and 7.17 traditional leaders show a very strong support for traditional values and customs and this is to be expected as this is largely seen as source of their power and legitimacy. More interesting results are those of both the elected and civic leaders. They show more reservation or conditional support in non-conflict communities than those in conflict. Intuitively, one would have expected to have sharp differences of opinion between the sectors of individuals in conflict relations but this is not the case in these results.

If one takes strong support and the support of some aspects of traditional values and customs and put it against those who are opposed to it in both cases, it can be concluded that there is a general support in both conflict and non-conflict relations. In all, there is no important trend that links this support or opposition to one type of relation as would have been the case if opinions on customs and values were a decisive factor. These results weaken the assertion that these conflicts occur where traditionalists are at loggerheads with supporters of modern institutions.

**Figure 7.16. Support for traditional values and customs in conflict communities**



**Figure 7.17. Support for traditional values and customs in non-conflict communities**



Statistical tests reveal a statistically significant relationship with almost identical results in both conflict and non-conflict cases<sup>238</sup>. These results are interpreted as suggesting that there is no important distinction between the conflict cases and non-conflict cases instead one notices results that indicate distinction between the sectors of the elite in both instances. This support the assertion made above that the results reflects divergence of views between traditional leaders and elected councilors and civic leaders. In terms of the hypotheses outlined earlier, the outcome helps us to understand elite sector interests and views but does not give an insight on the question of the existence or non-existence of conflict.


#### **7.11. Support for traditional land tenure system.**

Discussion in the previous chapters as well as in the surveyed literature indicates that in most cases conflict between traditional leaders and elected or civic leaders is over land allocation. Given this fact, one would expect sharp differences of opinion between the contending sectors of the elite over traditional land tenure system. On the one hand, it was shown that chiefs and their tribal councilors get most of their power and influence through the traditional land tenure which grants those powers to allocate land among their subjects as they are deemed as holding communal land in trust on behalf of the community or given tribe. Not only do they exercise this power to allocate land and benefit from the patronage-clientage network it generates but also regard everything, from political gatherings to development projects and services that


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238 (a) Researcher's classification:- conflict: chi-square=17.257; Cramer's V=.275; significance level=.008. Non-conflict: chi-square=11.859; Cramer's V=.639; Significance level=.003. (b) Respondents' classifications:- Conflict: Chi-square=13.922; Cramer's V=.281 Significance level=.031. Non-conflict: chi-square=10.578; Cramer's V=.310; Significance level=.032; Degrees of freedom=4

takes place on that piece of land as being under their jurisdiction. On the other hand, elected councilors and civic leaders are well aware that if they are to meaningfully develop the area and deliver services promised to their constituencies during elections, they need to have access to or even control over land allocation and utilization. If anything, views on land allocation were expected to provide a decisive trend that link the type of local elite relations to one form of support and opposition to traditional land tenure.



**Figure 7.19. Opinion on traditional land tenure in non-conflict communities**



In view of the above statement, it is not surprising that all traditional leaders in both conflict (see figure 7.18) and non-conflict (see figure 7.19) support traditional land tenure. More interesting and unexpected findings are the ones that show a strong support among elected councilors (69%) and civic leaders (85%) in conflict communities. If one takes conditional support into account in these cases it can be said that there is only a token opposition to traditional land tenure system. Adding to this unexpected trend is the fact that more elected councilors in conflict communities support traditional land tenure than their counterparts in the non-conflict communities. About the same number of civic leaders in both cases expressed support.

Just like in the case of support for traditional values and customs, there is a general support for traditional land tenure in both types of elite relations, and this is more so if

conditional support is added to the equation. In this case it can be concluded that there is no identifiable trend that separates the opinion of individuals in the conflict relations from those in the accommodative relations.

Just as in the case of opinions on traditional values and customs, views on traditional land tenure reflect sector interests than through a light on conflict or non-conflict relations. Statistical results confirm this observation as they show identical but statistically significant results for both conflict and non-conflict cases<sup>239</sup>. It can be said that in statistical terms opinion on traditional land tenure reveal sector interests but does not seem to be related to the type of elite relationship as suggested in the hypothesis.

#### **7.12. Elite attitudes toward payment of services in rural areas**

Are there any differences of opinion toward payment of services in the rural areas between the elite in the conflict and those in the accommodative relations? If so, what sectors of the elite are more incline to oppose the introduction of these payments? In trying to answer this question, respondents were asked to register their opinion toward the introduction of the payment for services such as water, electricity, telephone services, road maintenance, construction or maintenance of community facilities such as community halls. It should be stated that most of the respondents understood that they had to pay to have electricity, water and telephones installed inside their homes


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239 (a) Researcher's classification:- conflict: chi-square=22.289; Cramer's V=.313; significance level=.001. Non-conflict: chi-square=18.617; Cramer's V=.567; Significance level=.001. (b) Respondents' classifications:- Conflict: Chi-square=18.855; Cramer's V=.327; Significance level=.004. Non-conflict: chi-square=13.356; Cramer's V=.348; Significance level=.010; Degrees of freedom=4

but the question was aimed at provision of these services at a community levels where the community had to share the cost. It should also be stated that those who expressed opposition to the payment of these services felt that it was government's responsibility to provide and pay for these services.

With this context in mind, let us consider levels of opposition to the introduction of the payment of services in rural areas in both the conflict cases and non-conflict cases. Figure 7.20, below, show a strong opposition from traditional leaders who seem to be content with the status quo. Even more surprising is the fact that opposition from traditional leaders in non-conflict communities (85%) seems to be stronger than that of their counterparts in conflict relations (71%). There is also a strong opposition from the civic leaders, with 75% of those in non-conflict areas and about half or 46% of those in conflict areas.





In sharp contrast to both the traditional and civic leaders, there is very little opposition from the elected councilors. The 22% of elected leaders who opposed the introduction of service payment in rural areas were drawn entirely from the IFP councilors. It will be recalled from figure 7.7. that 33% of elected councilors are IFP members from KwaZulu-Natal province and a majority of them expressed their strong opposition to the payment of services in the rural areas. It is understandable that there would be general support for payment of services from the mostly ANC elected representatives as this would provide a source of revenue to help them with delivery of services or to supplement government subsidy or support. Even more important, is the fact that it is the policy of both ANC and national government to allow local councils to generate their resource especially from within their communities as a way of sustaining their services. It is also logical that elected councils with more resources would undercut the powers of traditional authorities and have more projects to demonstrate their effectiveness.

Overall, results from the above chart do not provide any trend that can be associated with conflict or non-conflict relations. It simply reflects differences between sectors of the elite instead of any distinction between the two types of relations, which are of primary interest in this chapter.

I found strong and statistically significant relationship that reveals that there are differences between the opinions of the elite sectors in conflict and those in non-conflict cases<sup>240</sup>. This suggests that unlike opinions on land tenure and traditional values, there is a distinction that shows greater differences between the elites in conflict areas than those in non-conflict communities. In short, opinions on payment of services in rural areas are an important factor in understanding the type of dominant elite relations in rural areas.


### **7.13. Rural elite Attitudes toward the New Municipal Demarcation Act (law)**

In chapter five it was stated that government was finalizing, in time for December 2000 local government elections, the introduction of new municipal law that aimed at integrating rural and urban areas into wards for the purpose of coordinating development and delivery of service. Most traditional leaders perceived the introduction of this law as an attempt to erode their power and influence whereas most councilors welcomed it as a vehicle of development with municipal councils as agents of delivery.

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240 (a) Researcher's classification:- conflict: chi-square=26.059; Cramer's V=.338; significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=10.534; Cramer's V=.426; Significance level=.032. (b) Respondents' classifications:- Conflict: Chi-square=28.435; Cramer's V=.402; Significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=8.933; Cramer's V=.285; Significance level=.063; Degrees of freedom=4

For some chiefs, the drawing of municipal boundaries which either cut through their areas of jurisdiction or integrated them to the "land of another chief" was taken as balkanization which had come to weaken and ultimately decimate the institution of chieftaincy or traditional rulership. Since the government and the ruling party championed this policy, ANC supporters and members generally supported this law albeit with some reservations in some cases. Much of ANC supporters reservations about this law were based on lack of consultation or information as well as what they perceived to be an arbitrary drawing of municipal boundaries.



Taking into account the above issues at stake and perceptions prevailing in each sector, the results in figure 7.21. reinforces these trends. In both conflict (69%) and non-conflict (75%) relations we observe a strong opposition to New Municipal

Demarcation Law from traditional leaders. It should be stated that the residual or remaining number of traditional leaders in conflict communities who did not express opposition to this new law did so on grounds of not having sufficient information about the law itself. This was largely the case in the Mpumalanga province especially among those who had little or no education at all. I shall elaborate on provincial trends in the next chapter.

There is less opposition to this law from the elected councilors, and a majority of councilors who expressed support of this municipal demarcation law are the ANC members. The IFP was vehemently opposed to this law and so were its members and elected representatives who, it is argued, took their cue from their party. It is notable that the results on elected councilors' opposition to this law mirror those of opposition to payment of services in rural areas (see figure 7.20) and this opposition is drawn almost entirely from the IFP representatives. Less than half of civic leaders in non-conflict and just below one third of those in conflict areas opposed this municipal demarcation law. Factoring those civic leaders who had no opinion or had no sufficient information on this law, then there is an almost an even split between those who opposed and those who supported this new law. Overall, these trends, just like the ones above, tell us more about the differences between the sectors of the elite, especially sharp differences between elected and traditional leaders. Observed differences of frequencies between cases and sectors in conflict and in non-conflict areas also exists even though it is not as strong as indicated in the charts. It is, therefore imperative in this case to establish whether these observed differences are statistically significant to suggest an association between this variable and the type of

elite relations or whether they are due to chance. Tests reveal that results are statistically significant with strong association in both the instances where respondents' and researcher's classifications are used. This adds opinion on New Municipal Demarcation into other variables that have proven to be statistically significant and therefore important factors in understanding the type of elite relations.

#### 7.14. Other variables

Opinion on corruption within traditional authority<sup>241</sup>, on penalties imposed by traditional courts<sup>242</sup>, views on whether respondents think they have influence on decisions made by traditional authorities<sup>243</sup> reflected little or no variation between the conflict and non-conflict cases. However, the results indicated statistically significant relationship reflecting variations between the elite sectors within each type of relationship. It should be recalled that opinions on traditional values and customs and traditional land tenure also reflected similar trends. Views on influencing the decisions of the elected councils are the only one among these that shows statistically significant relationship showing variation between conflict and non-conflict cases<sup>244</sup>.

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241 (a)Researcher's classification:- conflict: chi-square=41.677; Cramer's V=.428; significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=17.400; Cramer's V=.548; Significance level=.002. (b) Respondents' classifications:- Conflict: Chi-square=29.175; Cramer's V=.407; Significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=26.076; Cramer's V=.487; Significance level=.000; Degrees of freedom=4  
242 (a)Researcher's classification:- conflict: chi-square=31.527; Cramer's V=.372; significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=13.655 Cramer's V=.485 ; Significance level=.008. (b) Respondents' classifications:- Conflict: Chi-square=25.871; Cramer's V=.383; Significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=16.378; Cramer's V=.386; Significance level=.003; Degrees of freedom=4  
243 (a)Researcher's classification:- conflict: chi-square=21.682; Cramer's V=.308; significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=8.976; Cramer's V=.556; Significance level=.011. (b) Respondents' classifications:- Conflict: Chi-square=23.753; Cramer's V=.367; Significance level=.000. Non-conflict: chi-square=11.982; Cramer's V=.467; Significance level=.003; Degrees of freedom=2 for no conflict and 4 for conflict.  
244 (a)Researcher's classification:- conflict: chi-square=19.652; Cramer's V=.294; significance level=.001. Non-conflict: chi-square=6.640; Cramer's V=.338 ; Significance level=.156. (b) Respondents' classifications:- Conflict: Chi-square=18.871; Cramer's V=.327; Significance level=.001. Non-conflict: chi-square=2.765; Cramer's V=.159; Significance level=.598; Degrees of freedom=4

It can be said that this variable is a factor in understanding elite relationship as views seem to vary more between the elite sectors in conflict areas than those in non-conflict areas.

Past political involvement, gender, marital status, and opinions on whether geopolitical factors played a role on local elite relations were also tested and all proved to have neither statistically significant relationship nor association with the type of elite relationship.

#### **7.15. Summary**

The above discussion was a presentation and analysis of survey results. Its main emphasis was an identification of trends that indicated relationship between the selected variables and the type of elite relations (conflict and accommodative/non-conflict). The findings emerging from this presentation and analysis are that age, party affiliation, education, income, employment are the demographic variables that are related to the type of elite relationship as indicated by both the distribution charts and statistical tests. Of the opinion variables, views on payment of service fees, on respondents' perception of their influence on decision making in elected council and views on the introduction of New Municipal Demarcation Law proved to be associated with the type of elite relationship. The remaining opinion variables (on land tenure, on traditional values and customs, on penalties by traditional courts and views on influence on decisions by traditional authorities) reflected no clear association with type of elite relation even though they reflected variation of views reflecting the interests of each elite sector. Ethnicity has statistically significant relationship with type of elite relation even though it is a weak one. Past political

involvement, gender, marital status, and opinions on whether geopolitical factors played a role on local elite relations were also tested and all proved to have neither statistically significant relationship nor association with the type of elite relationship.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY AND PROVINCIAL LEVEL**

Paramount in this chapter is the presentation and analysis of survey results. In this case the emphasis is on trends associated with the types of elite relations within and between provinces. Some observations are made regarding community features particularly those related to differences between elite sectors. The following questions steer the flow and direction of the content of this chapter: Is there a regional dimension in understanding the type of elite relations? What are the predominant trends within and between the provinces? Are there any characteristic features in the selected communities that help in understanding dynamics of elite relations?

How is this chapter different from the previous chapters (chapter six and seven) whose focus was also a presentation and analyses of survey results? An answer to this question also assists in delineating the scope of this chapter while drawing attention to its complementary nature. Chapter six presented a profile of selected communities in a form of narratives that were mainly constructed from the qualitative portion of the interviews and focus group discussions. This provided history and evolution of relationships among the key players. It also gave a voice to the key participants. These helped to provide a



context to the relational dynamics of each community. Chapter seven presented and analyzed survey results. The emphasis in the previous chapter is an identification of trends that indicate relations between types of rural elite relations (conflictual and accommodative) and the selected variables that include age, education, ethnicity, distribution of resources, party affiliation and policy preference profile as well as opinion on corruption in the traditional authority, penalties imposed by traditional courts and respondents' perception of their influence in the decisions taken by the institutions of rural local government. In this case, aggregate scores on each variable for each sector of the elite were compared within and across conflict and non-conflict relations. A key feature of chapter seven was the replacement of names (communities, individuals, provinces) with theoretical concepts, conflict versus non-conflict.

This chapter adds yet another dimension to the survey results. In this case, presentation and analysis of results stresses demographic and attitudinal/opinion results or trends within and across provinces and communities. There will also be a brief analysis of geopolitical factors that stood out prominently in elite relations. The format of presentation is along the same lines as the one followed in the previous chapter where themes are mainly organized according to key variables that are in turn based on theories and hypotheses presented earlier in this study. The findings are presented on age, education, ethnicity, party political affiliation and identity, distribution of resources (property ownership, income, and employment status), policy preferences (land tenure, opposition to New Municipal Demarcation Law, support for traditional values and

customs, opposition to payment of services in rural areas). In addition to these variables, new additions in this chapter, as stated in the foregoing discussion and include geopolitical factors. Descriptive summary statistics in a form of frequency charts for each sector in each province will be presented and emerging trends pointed out. Results drawn from the statistical tests of significance and association are used and they target mainly those variables that were shown in chapter seven as having statistically significant relationship with the type of elite relations. This will also be supplemented with interpretive analysis drawn from the qualitative portion of the survey, and this will draw extensively from the narrative accounts and case histories already presented in chapter six. Before embarking on the findings, it should be restated that the approach adopted in this chapter is meant to highlight the aspects of the results which otherwise could not be satisfactorily captured in chapters six and seven. In the final analysis and interpretation of results in chapter nine all these results are taken into account in a manner that appreciates the complex nature of rural elite relations.

At this juncture it is appropriate to point out that stress of analysis in this chapter is more on the elite sectors, which are key players in shaping the local relations or politics. More specifically, table 6.2. of chapter six indicated that in Mnceba, Sokhulumi and Rode, the key players are traditional leaders and the civic leaders. It will be recalled that of these communities only Sokhulumi is classified as having non-conflict relations. In the next classification of key players, traditional leaders and elected leaders are prominent players in Vezokuhle, Tweefontein, and in all the KwaZulu-Natal cases (Adams, Embo and


Mfume). All these are in conflict relations category. One caveat should be pointed out in these cases, in the KwaZulu-Natal communities conflict is not a simple contention between the ANC elected councilors and traditional leaders. In this case, elected councilors are split between those who are IFP representatives and those who are ANC representative whereas traditional leaders are predominantly IFP members. As the foregoing discussion indicated, IFP aligned traditional leaders have good relations with IFP elected councilors and conflictual relations with ANC councilors. Finally, Nzongisa, which is classified as having accommodative relations, has all the sectors of the elite as key players in community relations and politics.

### **8.1. Age distribution in the provinces and within communities**

As stated in the literature reviewed in chapter two, age or generational conflict features prominently as one of the explanation for political conflict in South Africa. The previous chapter's findings also confirmed that there is an association between age distribution and the type of elite relations. To pursue this matter one may ask if age feature more prominently in some provinces and communities than in others. This section will try to answer this question.


The local leadership in KwaZulu-Natal tends to be older and this is the case in all sectors. Given the overriding importance of political affiliation in this province it can be assumed that local leaders are more fixed in their positions with little flexibilities, and that given their age they may have participated in the previous clashes particularly during the

critical period of worse political clashes of the 1980s and early 1990s. This would tend to ossify old political feuds and rivalries. Only two respondents were classified as youth and these were both from the sector of the elected councilors. Of the three chiefs only one is classified as middle aged and the rest are in the senior age group. The chart below indicates what is roughly an even distribution between middle aged elite and the senior aged and this is the case across the sectors. It would then be asserted that in view of this distribution, age is not as strong a factor in KwaZulu-Natal as the contending categories seem to share the same age distribution. Political affiliation, as the subsequent discussion will show, still remains the strongest single factor in elite relations in KwaZulu-Natal



Just like in the above province, there is only one Eastern Cape chief who is classified as middle aged and the other remaining two are in the senior age category. More important


is the fact that both of these older chiefs are from Rode and Mnceba whose predominant elite relations are conflictual. At a glance one can immediately notice greater variation of age per elite category in the age distribution chart for the Eastern Cape and this is in sharp contrast to the KwaZulu-Natal where it was evenly concentrated within the middle and senior age groups. Also worth noting is the fact that all the elected councilors in the Eastern Cape are middle aged. According to the results in this chart, traditional leaders tend to be older compared to their middle age elected leaders, and civic leaders are widely distributed across the age groupings. It is important to note that the age discrepancy between the sectors of the elite is wider in both conflict communities therefore they are the ones who contributed most to this variation in the provincial age distribution.



In the case of Mpumalanga province it can be said that the proportion of the elite that is

younger or categorized as youth is the highest of all the provinces and this is the case across different sectors of the elite. The only exception is that of the civic leaders in the Eastern Cape Province (23%). In terms of chiefs the trend is the same with two senior chiefs and one middle-aged chief. In comparative terms, the elected officials are younger than the traditional authorities as they are mainly concentrated in the youth and middle age category compared to traditional leaders who have strong presence in the middle and senior age categories. This is an important trend, which is in line with the findings of the previous chapter as the contending sectors, elected, and traditional leaders, show some variation in their age distribution thus lending credence to the hypotheses that age may be related with conflict.

**Figure 8.3. Age distribution in Mpumalanga Province**



Having observed the frequencies in provinces now we consider the statistical test. Statistical test assessing the provincial dimension to age reveals that significant

relationship with association showing greater variation between the age and elite sectors is in the communities in the Eastern Cape Province<sup>244</sup>. This is interpreted to mean that greater age differences between the different sectors of the elite is more evident in the Eastern Cape than in other provinces.

The findings in this section can be summed as follows: Age distribution is associated with the type of relations and this is well pronounced in the case of Mpumalanga Province and the Eastern Cape when considering the distribution of age according to elite sector in the charts. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal there is no clear trend to suggest that age plays an important role. It is only the Eastern Cape that indicates statistically significant relationship. These regional differences are important in the sense that they spot variations that, otherwise, could not have been easily detected in the previous chapter. More specifically, in these variations one can notice relative importance and effects of these different variables whereas this is not readily obvious when all cases are grouped together according to their type of relationship.

## **8.2. Education trends in the selected communities and provinces**

Are elected councilors more educated than traditional leaders? Are civic leaders more educated than traditional leaders? Is age more of an important factor in elite relations in some communities and provinces than in others? Do local elites see education as a factor in their relations? Figures 8.1., 8.2. and 8.3. present distribution of education levels in

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244 Eastern Cape: Age and elite sector: Chi-square value =77.442; Significance level=.03; Cramer's V .797.

KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga respectively.

During the discussions and interviews with participants in KwaZulu-Natal education never came up as a factor according to the perception of the respondents. They were, as is the case with participants from other provinces, were specifically asked if they thought educational qualification was an important factor or consideration in their dealings with the members of the other sectors of the local elite. During the interviews they were asked to give their educational qualification in order to see if there were important variations between sectors. The following table on KwaZulu-Natal indicates that elected councilors are better educated than the members of the traditional authorities. Only 25% of traditional authorities have high education compared to 53% of elected leaders who are in both high school and tertiary education categories. But one notices that a considerable number (31%) of these traditional leaders at least do have secondary education.

Generally, very few members of the local elite in this province have no formal education. Even more important is the fact that chiefs in both Embo and Mfume had secondary education and Adams chief had high school education. Considering the fact that chiefs play a key role in all these cases, it can be said that educational differences between the contending sectors of the elite in this province are not as sharp as is the case in Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape.



**Figure 8.4 Education in Kwazulu-Natal**





Figure 8.2. below also follow the same trend as the one above with a majority of both the elected leaders (67%) and the civic leaders (56%) qualifying as well-educated compared to only 31% of the traditional leaders. This contrast is even sharper when looking at the category of the less educated (no formal education and primary education). None of the elected officials belong to this category and only 23% of the civic leaders compared to 42% of the traditional leaders.

In this province, Mnceba accounted for most of less educated traditional leaders as three of its four traditional leaders only have primary education, and this include the acting-chief. Contrast this with Rode and Nzongisa, and then you find the chiefs with both

**Figure 8.5 Education in the Eastern Cape**




tertiary and high school education and their tribal councilors evenly spread between the educated and less educated. In the case of Mnceba, respondents from both the traditional leaders and civic leaders, the key sectors, often highlighted the fact that education was a factor in their conflictual relations. Some key members of the civic leadership felt that their misunderstanding and communication breakdown was due to the fact that the local chief and many of the members of the tribal council were less educated thus making it difficult for them to understand the new democratic dispensation. As one respondent put it, "perhaps our chief would have political education if she was an active member of political organizations such as the ANC. What I see is lack of political education and lack of basic education to understand local administration hence all these problems of corruption". In this case education is not merely conceived in a narrow sense of formal school education but it is understood in terms of political education or as a means to

political understanding. This adds another dimension to the concept of education.

It is also important to note that in the case of Rode, as case profiles indicated in chapter six, both key rivals, the chief and civic leader, have tertiary education. There is no sharp contrast in their constituencies as they are almost evenly spread out in the less educated and well education levels.

**Figure 8.6 Education in Mpumalanga Province**



In the case of Mpumalanga, one notices the sharpest contrast between the education level of the elected councilors and that of the traditional leaders. An overwhelming majority of elected councilors (78%) is educated compared to a very few of traditional leaders (25%). Taking the lower end, the concentration of traditional leaders (70%) in the category of those with no forma education and those with only primary education stands out prominently in contrast to elected leaders who are not in this category at all. This difference assume more importance when taking into account the fact that Vezokuhle


chief has no formal education at all and his counterpart from Tweefontein only has primary education. Only Sokhulumini chief (non-conflict) has secondary education, and as such he considers himself well educated and well traveled. He boasted the "Our secondary education before the Bantu education is equivalent to high school or even diploma of today's education." This self-understanding and confidence does make a difference when dealing with other educated elite. This is a direct opposite of Mnceba chief who complained that civic leaders were undermining chiefs "because they thought they were better educated and therefore know everything". In all, the overall results confirm the trend, which was shown in chapter seven, that elected leaders and to some extent, civic leaders are relatively better, educated than traditional leaders. This is the case, as the above charts show, right across provinces.

### **8.3. Political affiliation and identity**

There are provincial as well as clear community trends when one considers political parties that are dominant players. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal ANC and the IFP are dominant parties, which monopolize the political landscape in the rural areas that have African population. This fact is confirmed by all the literature reviewed on this province and it is also reinforced by both national and local election results. It will be recalled that chapter four surveyed literature on the IFP-UDF political conflicts in the mid and late 1980s, which then became IFP-ANC clashes once the ANC was unbanned in the 1990s. The chart below (figure 8.4.) confirms these trends in the case of the selected communities in KwaZulu-Natal. The ANC has strong presence among the elected leaders

but the traditional authority is strongly behind the IFP.

**Figure 8.7. Political affiliation in Kwazulu-Natal**




The absence of other political parties is quite conspicuous as there are more people who belong to no political party than those who belong to other parties other than the two dominant ones. It comes as no surprise that virtually all the respondents identified political divisions as the key aspect in defining their relationships. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that all the IFP elected councilors stated that they had smooth relations with IFP dominated traditional authorities whereas the opposite was the case with the ANC councilors. There could be no clear demonstration of the fact that being an elected councilor did not matter that much than party political affiliation. A similar situation was observed with the civic leaders who were split according to their political affiliation. Those who were ANC reported their frustration in dealing with the IFP chiefs and iinduna and they attributed this to the fact that they belonged to rival political

organizations. Party political affiliation came out as the strongest factor in determining lines along which local elite conflictual relations was organized. Virtually all the respondents were acutely aware of this fact as they attributed many of their difficult relations to it.

This is not the case in the other two provinces, the Eastern and Mpumalanga. Perhaps Rode is the closest example of conflict that has assumed political lines between the ANC and UDM. However, even in the case of Rode it will be recalled that the ensuing conflict predates the emergence of UDM into the scene and sometimes it was even between ANC's own factions. It can, therefore, be argued that both the perceptions of the local elite and reported cases of disputes in KwaZulu-Natal put political affiliation and identity as the strongest candidate explanation for conflictual relations between the sectors of the elite.

**Figure 8.8. Political affiliation in the Eastern Province**



The above table indicates ANC's dominant position in the Eastern and its monopoly over the elected positions in all the three communities. The only strong rival is the UDM, which is almost entirely based at Rode. All the traditional leaders who are members of the UDM are drawn from Rode where they dominate the traditional authority. This leaves Mnceba and Nzongisa with an unchallenged ANC dominance in all the sectors of the local elite. As we discuss leadership styles it will become obvious that political affiliation in a conventional sense of being a card-carrying member of a political party is not sufficient in the eyes of rival sectors of the elite. In this case a low-profile card carrying chief of Mnceba was not necessarily welcome as a bona fide ANC member as one civic leader puts it "she is never seen in ANC events and has done nothing for the ANC so we doubt her commitment and membership. As far as many of us are concerned she is not an ANC member." I shall return to this other dimension of political identity, high or low profile involvement in political parties, when leadership style is discussed. Nzongisa,

which has accommodative relations, was the most diverse politically notwithstanding ANC dominance. It had ANC, IFP and UDM members in its civic leadership, and this can be taken as a result of the "open door stance" of the local chief who has allowed all the parties to campaign and gather in her village while clearly stating her position as an ANC member.

In the case of Mpumalanga one immediately notices two things that set it apart from the other provinces. Firstly, ANC's dominance is strong and uncontested in all the sectors with only a token presence of UDM and other parties. Secondly, the high number of traditional leaders and civic leaders who identified themselves as belonging to no political party or "neutral" is the highest of all the provinces. This, in part, is a consequence of the former KwaNdebele homeland policy, which made traditional leaders automatic members of their legislature thus making them targets of "comrades" when the homeland system and apartheid structures collapsed. It seems many people then retreated into a non-involvement mode. Many ANC members, however, view this, as a sinister plan to recruit for UDM and DP under the cover of darkness or, as one ANC elected councilor puts it "they are neutral by day and UDM members by night." This again raise a question of whether a conventional notion of political affiliation, and non-affiliation in this particular case, does capture the perceptions of contending political elites who otherwise may have a different view of political identity. These questions raise an important question for those who seek to understand political identity and its impact on elite relations. A question that is not fully answered in this study is raised by these




perceptions: What then should be considered as political affiliation and identity? Is it sufficient to merely record party membership? Does a high or low profile involvement as a party member matter to fellow members? When does one become a 'full' or bona fide member of a political party? The issues were raised by the elected councilors regarding the political affiliation of chiefs in both Mnceba and Mpumalanga led the author into thinking about and raising these questions. This helps one to think of various dimensions of political identity in future studies.

Statistical tests strongly confirm the view that political affiliation is more of a factor, if not the primary one, in KwaZulu-Natal than it is in other provinces especially in communities with conflicts. By contrasting the obtained results between provinces one immediately observe this trend.<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> KwaZulu-Natal: Chi-Square value =18.221; Significance level = .001; Cramer's V =.466.  
Eastern Cape: Chi-square value =5.248; Significance =.731; Cramer's V =.207.  
Mpumalanga: Chi-square value =8.433; Significance =.208; Cramer's V =.325.

**Figure 8.9. Political Affiliation in Mpumalanga Province**



To sum up some of the dominant provincial trends observed in the above charts and discussions, it can be said that ANC has strong presence in all the three provinces but this is fiercely contested by the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal where chiefs and iinduna are predominantly IFP supporters. Only in the case of Rode in the Eastern Cape do we see a similar situation where ANC's dominance is strongly contested by the UDM-dominated traditional authority. In Mpumalanga, all the chiefs declared themselves politically neutral even though the ANC members viewed this with suspicion. In all, KwaZulu-Natal presence the clearest case of elite relations or conflict that is, even according to the respondents, shaped by party affiliation. Statistical test emphatically confirm this fact especially when comparing KwaZulu-Natal with the other two provinces.

The other case, though not as clear-cut as the ones in KwaZulu-Natal, is Rode where the

political duel is largely between the ANC elected leader and civic leaders and the UDM-dominated traditional authority. In the other cases the notion of political affiliation and elite relations is more subtle and complex as one has to draw on other dimensions and perceptions of political identity such as the profile of traditional leaders and the perception of others regarding their membership, in the case of Mnceba chief, or neutrality, in the case of Tweefontein and Vezokuhle, or fairness in dealing with political parties in the case of Nzongisa.

#### **8.4. Ethnicity and the politics of exclusion/inclusion in the provinces and communities**

The accounts from the participant elite interviewees and literature on these communities I classified these cases according to their ethnic compositions. In this case I am referring to the ethnic composition of the general population or residents of selected communities.

This classification ranges from those communities that are homogenous to those who are medium range and in the other extreme there is a category of ethnically heterogeneous communities. Homogenous refers to those communities whose members are almost all drawn from the same ethnic group with only a negligible number of people from other ethnic groups, and most of these "outsiders" have been absorbed through marriage or were born in those communities, therefore naturalized and fluently speak the local language. In the medium range category, there are a tiny but significant number of members of the other ethnic groups who have come to settle in the community. This minority of the "outsiders" is often big enough to constitute a kinship group such as a

clan within the dominant ethnic group. In heterogeneous communities there are various members of other ethnic groups who are large enough to form a significant part of the community and they have largely maintained their language and customs. Table 8.1. reflect the classification of these communities, and this is done to present an immediate context for discussion of ethnic trends among the provincial elite sectors.

**Table 8.1. Range of ethnic composition of the selected communities**

	<b>Largely Homogenous</b>	<b>Considerable Ethnic Minorities in the communities</b>	<b>Largely Heterogeneous</b>
<b>Conflictual communities</b>	Mfume	Adams Embo Mnceba Rode	Twefontein Vezokuhle
<b>Accommodative communities</b>	Sokhulumi	Nzongisa	

I observed that both of the communities that are classified as homogeneous were geographically isolated from other neighboring communities and far removed from the urban and or industrial areas. On the other hand, the communities classified as medium range with a tiny but significant minority of members of other ethnic groups were either close to the major industrial centers, townships and cities (Adams and Embo) or were bordering villages which had another dominant ethnic group. In the case of Rode, villages with Bacas, Xesibe, and Pondos as well as scatterings of Sotho settlements surround the Hlubi people. Nzongisa and Mnceba is a neighbor of communities with Pondo and the Hlubi people. In the case of Adams and Embo, they are south of Durban

and near a string of industries thus attracting migrant workers as well as the squatter camps with a significant number of Pondos who had come to seek jobs. Lastly, Tweefontein and Vezokuhle are very close to KwaMhlanga town, the former capital of KwaNdebele homeland. These two communities are largely made of the Ndebele people who were resettled from the white farms in the early and mid 1980s. When they came to settle in their respective areas there were already established Tswana people and people from the neighboring Pretoria townships and Witbank were also drawn to this place thus accounting for its ethnic diversity.

The above table gives an indication of a potential pool of recruitment into the elite or local leadership positions in these communities. Whether this potential is realized by having leadership that reflects ethnic composition of each community is yet another thing as the following discussion and previous figures of ethnic composition in chapter seven reflect. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal virtually all the members of the local elite are Zulu thus suggesting ethnic homogeneity at leadership level. If ethnicity was a decisive factor in elite relations one would expect no conflict between the various sectors of the local elite in KwaZulu-Natal but this is not the case. With only a few exceptions, we also see a strong ethnic homogeneity in the Eastern Cape and this is the case across all the sectors of the local elite. In the case of elected leaders of Rode and Nzongisa, the representatives are registered as members of the other ethnic group, and in both cases there are linked to the community through conjugal ties or marriage. It should be noted that respondents in all provinces indicated that people who join a community as married wives are not

regarded as belonging to the ethnic group they originated from. The act of marriage, according to the local customs, naturalized these individuals thus obviating their original ethnic affiliation. It is in the case of elected councilors of Tweefontein and Vezokuhle that we see a considerable degree of ethnic diversity. Out of seven elected councilors only three are from the dominant ethnic group. Overall it can be said that ethnicity is not a big factor in elite relations and this is consistent with the findings of the previous chapter. Table 8.1. does not show any particular trend that suggests association between communities with conflictual relations or those with accommodative relation with ethnic composition of the communities and this holds true in the composition of the elite. Statistical results indicate that there is a greater ethnic diversity between the elite sectors in the case Mpumalanga communities than in other communities but even in this case results show that this is not highly significant and that this association is weak<sup>246</sup>.

#### **8.4. Distribution of resources in the provinces and communities.**

In all the three provinces the charts show that traditional leaders are relatively poor as they are concentrated in the category of low and no income. This is particularly the case in the Eastern Cape than in the other provinces. This may also be an indication of the fact that there are greater differences among the elite sectors of the Eastern Cape in terms of employment which is closely linked to income. Statistical tests indicate that these differences are significant in the Eastern Cape<sup>247</sup> whereas they are not in other cases.

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<sup>246</sup> Eastern Cape: Chi-square value =3.252; Significance =.517; Cramer's V =.163.

Mpumalanga: Chi-square value =10.619; Significance =.031; Cramer's V =.364. KwaZulu-Natal is highly homogenous to show any meaningful variation statistically.

<sup>247</sup> Eastern Cape & employment: Chi-square value = 13.745; Significance =.008; Cramer's V =.336.

Across the provinces the elected councilors stand out prominently when employment is measured. The position of traditional leaders improves significantly once one brings in property ownership, more especially farming land and plots for their homesteads as well as livestock. This seems to balance out the disparity in income distribution. In the final analysis there is no distinct trend to suggest sharp disparities of resources between the contending sections of the local elite as would be expected if their conflict was a class warfare.

In Mpumalanga province the number of the elite that owns livestock, farming land is very low compared to those in both KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape and this is due to the fact that the residents of Tweefontein and Vezokuhle are in a village that has a township setting with no grazing nor farming land. Only Sokhulumini residents are spared as they are in an isolated rural setting with plenty of land. Generally, there are no clear trends that separate those in conflictual relations from those in non-conflict relations even when provincial trends are taken into account.

### **8.5. Policy preference profiles in the provinces and communities**

It will be recalled that opinions or attitudes toward traditional land tenure, traditional values and customs, payment of services in the rural areas as well as views on the New Municipal Demarcation Law were assessed in the survey. The previous chapter did not show any important associations that indicated differences between communities that had conflict and those that do not have conflict when opinion on traditional land tenure,

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traditional values and customs, corruption in the traditional authority and penalties imposed by traditional courts. Instead, what is clear is that elite sectors such as traditional leaders seem to share views on many of these policies and institutions, and this was irrespective of whether the community was having conflict or not. Support for traditional values/customs and traditional land tenure is strong across elite sectors and predictably even stronger among the traditional leaders.

Support for traditional land tenure system was stronger even in conflict communities, and this was surprisingly the case even in Mnceba where the struggle was largely over land use and allocation. It is in the case of elected leaders of Mpumalanga conflict communities that we see a strong opposition to traditional land tenure, and this is back by councilors own defiance of chiefs in allocating land and assigning plots for projects and businesses. The strongest support for both the traditional land tenure and traditional values came from KwaZulu-Natal. The conditional support or opposition to traditional values in Mpumalanga conflict communities was the strongest from those who come from other ethnic groups than the dominant Ndebele group suggesting that they are not comfortable complying to traditions of other ethnic communities. But when this was taken up with these local leaders they stated that this would in no way contribute to conflict or tension. It is worth noting that Mpumalanga's elected leaders were the most enthusiastic about the introduction of payment of services in their communities. They said that preparations were at an advance stage to introduce such payment in the local communities of the province.



With regard to opposition to the New Municipal Demarcation, in KwaZulu-Natal this was strictly along party lines. IFP members, surely reflecting IFP's general stance on this issue, were vehemently opposed to this new law, and this was the case for traditional leaders as was with elected and civic leaders. ANC members are generally supportive of this policy and this perhaps reflects the fact that it is national ANC government policy. The strong opposition and campaign against this law in Sokhulumini (traditional leaders and civic leaders), was mainly motivated by their hope to be integrated to Gauteng municipalities or wards with the ultimate hope of being part of the province. As it was the case in chapter seven, there are no clear trends, perhaps with the exception of Mpumalanga, to suggest differences between the contending sectors of the elite with regards to these policies. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal, all indications are that this is due to differences in political identity and affiliation, which seem to emerge as the strongest explanation for conflict in the communities.

#### **8.6. Geopolitical factors and elite relations**

It was during the course of the field study that I observed the importance of geopolitical dynamics even though these were only confined to only two communities in the Eastern Cape, namely, Rode and Mnceba. I have already alluded to some of these dynamics in profile of selected communities in chapter six. Statistical results in the previous chapter showed that there is no statistically significant association between the type of elite relations and opinions on the existence of geopolitical factors. I still felt that it is

important to explore this factor in this section as it has a potential to enrich our understanding of the geopolitical context in some of the communities, particularly in the Eastern Cape where this emerged as noticeable factor. Evidence here may appear to have an anecdotal flavor but this is useful for exploring geopolitical factors even if they are confined in only a few cases.

In the case of Rode the cleavages between the sectors of the elite had an important geopolitical dimension. Those who live in Sikolweni village of the Rode Administrative Area are well provided with many resources whereas Voveni, Magontsini, Mzinto and Ndakeni villages were not well catered for. The chief is based in the Sikolweni area, so are the key facilities such as the Methodist Church, Preschool, primary school, junior secondary school and the high school. Tribal Authority Hall is in this area. Water, electricity and road maintenance often started in the Sikolweni area and this is strongly resented by the other villages, which compare unfavorably in all these services. Divisions within the ANC and SANCO members were also along these lines of other villages against those in the Sikolweni area. It is important to note that the strongest support for the chief came from Sikolweni whereas his chief rival has his base in the Magontsini area where he is a resident. The importance of geopolitical factors cannot be overstated but it is an aspect of this community which even the elite is aware of. Even more important is the fact that member of the same organization, the ANC in this instance, would be divided along these geographical lines. Perhaps these geographic tendencies are symptomatic of unfair distribution of resources, which provide the elite with a rallying

point in their struggle for control of resources.

To a lesser degree Mnceba is also experiencing some influence of geopolitical tendencies. The chief and a majority of her councilors are based in the Greater Mnceba area whereas Sugarbush is the hotbed of resistance against her rule and an ANC/SANCO stronghold. Some of the traditional leaders, including the chief, did mention the fact that Sugarbush was hostile to their rule and a difficult place to deal with. They attributed this to the fact that most of Sugarbush people, particularly the youth, though they were more educated than the rest of Mnceba, and therefore looked down upon anything traditional. The key civic leaders and chief rivals of the chief stated that Sugarbush was more enlightened and progressive. They protested that all the good projects that they brought to their area were frustrated by the chief hence their decision to bypass traditional leaders. In this instance it is the reverse of the Rode situation with Sugarbush, a base of anti-chief resistance, being more developed with better services than the rest of the Mnceba community including the area where the chief stays. All other areas did not have any significant geopolitical factors. Even though only geopolitical divisions afflicted two of the conflict cases, this is an area worth pursuing in the future research.

### **8.7. Summary**

Results in this chapter largely confirm those of chapter seven in which age, education and political affiliation emerged as variables that are generally associated with conflictual and accommodative relations. Regional dimensions, however, indicated where these factors

were more important as it is the case with political affiliation that is a stronger factors in elite relations than in the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga. Geopolitical factors, that were not statistically linked to elite relations in the previous chapter, emerged as strong candidates as well in the case of the conflict communities of the Eastern Cape but this did not extend to other provinces. Political affiliation and identity is the strongest possible explanation for the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal whereas in the case of Rode it looks as though old conflicts and cleavages have embraced or assumed political character with one faction aligning with UDM and the other embracing the ANC. In the other remaining communities, the issue was more on the type of political engagement (low-profile membership of Mnceba chief or high-profile membership of Nzongisa chief) and form of political disengagement (non-party membership or neutrality of Tweefontein and Vezokuhle chiefs). These forms of engagement or disengagement were questioned or viewed with suspicion in the case where they were not serving the interest of the dominant party, ANC in this case. This chapter has shown some regional variations of the variables that are associated with type of elite relations. It was also shown that variables that are not associated with the type of elite relation when all cases are taken together appear to be stronger in some provinces or communities than in others.

## **CHAPTER NINE**

### **DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

What are the major findings of this study? How can these be interpreted in the light of the research questions and hypotheses? What are the implications of these findings for the existing literature on rural politics in Africa? What are the policy implications of this study? What are its contributions and limitations? What conclusions can be drawn from this study? As suggested in the above questions, the task of this chapter is to discuss the findings, draw conclusions and summarize the major aspects of this study. To accommodate issues raised in this study and to provide answers to questions asked above, this chapter is divided into the following sections: The first section outlines the institutions, agents and relations that have emerged in the post-apartheid South Africa's rural political landscape. The next section interprets major findings on factors associated with conflictual and cooperative or accommodative form of rural elite relations. This section is arranged in terms of major variables that were evaluated and these include ethnicity, distribution of resources, age, education, political affiliation and identity, policy preferences, attitudes toward traditional authority and elected councils and geopolitical factors. In addition to these variables a brief reflection on leadership style and attributes is made. An outline of the broad implications of this study with regards to the existing

literature that was reviewed and public policy is given as a way of concluding this chapter.

It should be recalled that the findings emerging from data analysis indicated that age, education, party affiliation, income, and employment status are demographic variables that have influence on and are associated with type of rural elite relations. Opinions toward payment of service fees, Municipal Demarcation Act and perception of respondents' influence on elected councils are opinion variables that are related to the type of elite relationship. On the other hand, weak or no clear link was established when evaluating ethnicity, distribution of property (farming land, residential plot, business and livestock), views on traditional values, on land tenure, penalties imposed by traditional courts, and respondents' perception of their influence on traditional authority. When considering regional or a provincial dimension, it was established that geopolitical factors played a role in conflict in the Eastern Cape where there were perceived and real disparities in the distribution of resources in conflict areas. This, however, was not the case in other provinces. Political affiliation also proved to be the single most important cause of conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. Given these outcomes and trends, I will identify and reflect on emerging themes that stand out in this study.

### **9.1. Background and context**

This study has shown how South African popular resistance against apartheid in the 1980s and early 1990s produced civic and local political leaders in rural communities. These local leaders, in their bid to establish their political support base, found themselves, in many instances, contesting the political monopoly of traditional leaders in the rural communities. Scanty but significant literature documented and analyzed traditional leaders' reaction to these political changes and challenges.<sup>248</sup> In these responses to changes traditional leaders are depicted as resourceful and resilient as they appropriated liberation discourse or invoked traditions or ethnic identities whenever they deemed this to be a useful political tool.

The end of apartheid and the creation of a new democratic system was occasioned by, among other things, the introduction of elected local representatives even in the areas that were under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities. This created another agent of local power alongside traditional leaders and civic leaders. The new South African constitution recognizes this coexistence of traditional authority and elected rural local councils as two primary institutions of rural local government. It is in this political landscape that dominant relations among the sectors of the local elite are examined. In table 6.4. Adams, Mfume, Embo, Tweefontein, Vezokuhle and Mnceba are classified as having conflictual relations between the chief protagonists or most dominant and active sectors of the local elite. It is worth noting that in all these instances of conflict or cooperation, chiefs are

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<sup>248</sup>Kessel & Oomen, op cit, 1997; Maloka, T., op cit, 1996; and Houston, G. et al, op cit, 1996.

always a common factor whereas their opponents vary from civic leaders in some communities to elected councilors in the others. Nzongisa and Sokhulumi are classified as having accommodative relations. These classifications are based on the list of instances of relationship as summarized in table 6.3. which is entitled Conflict/Accommodation relationship typology. Table 6.5. list issues over which there is a dispute in the conflictual cases. These include land allocation powers and procedures, right to hold political meetings, control over development projects, and perceived corruption of traditional authorities as well as the perceived partisan bias of a chief.

## **9.2. Ethnicity and rural elite relations**

The result presented in the previous chapter begs the question; why ethnicity is not an important factor in local elite relations? The general assumption that ethnicity is often a factor in any political consideration in Africa is rampant among scholars, and the following statements reveal this sweeping tendency as Horowitz was giving a prognosis of the role of ethnicity in a new democratic South Africa;

“Politics all over Africa . . . has a strong ethnic component . . . what is true of Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Zambia, Kenya, and Mauritania is also likely to be true of South Africa”<sup>249</sup>

“Eliminate white domination, and the intra African differences will be particularly important.”<sup>250</sup>

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<sup>249</sup>Horowitz, D., op cit., 1991, p. 41

<sup>250</sup>Ibid, p.85.



It will be recalled that Mijere<sup>251</sup> had also argued that a tribe is built around a chief who then becomes their symbol of ethnic identity. Scholars like Mare, Mamdani put ethnicity at the center of their studies of African politics. In view of these studies and the statements above one would expect ethnicity to be a strong candidate in any attempt to explain conflict. It is, however, argued here that the reason for this discrepancy between these works and the result in this study is the fact that most of these studies focus on national or regional level politics in which large ethnic communities live side by side thus, sometimes, having potential for being mobilized into ethnic rivalry. The case of the Hutus and the Tutsi, as extensively discussed in Mamdani's book and articles is one such example just as the ethnic mobilization by Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa is presented by Mare<sup>252</sup>. At a local village level in a given administrative area one would expect a more ethnically homogenous unit with few people from other ethnic groups settling in but remaining numerically insignificant. It is reasoned that this is the reason why even local elites who happen to be of another ethnic identity would avoid using ethnicity for mobilization precisely because he or she would be from a numerically marginal group thus obviating any establishment of a viable ethnic challenge. Whereas Robert Price<sup>253</sup> go as far as to claim that intra-African ethnicity is and will not be an important factor in South Africa because of its political past and ethnic composition. I would not go that far to assert South African exceptionalism. But in this context I simply

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<sup>251</sup>See Osaghae, op cit, 1997.

<sup>252</sup> Mare. op cit, (1987 & 1993)

<sup>253</sup>Price, R "Civic versus ethnic: Ethnicity and political community in post-apartheid South Africa" (year of the paper unknown)?

emphasize the level of analysis and the unit of analysis as the reason for this study's variance from the other studies of ethnicity in Africa. This means that ethnicity may still be an important political factor in Africa and, to some degree, in South Africa but this is not the case at a village level as the results in this study reveal. In all, these results do not necessarily disprove theories on the role of ethnicity in African politics. What this study does is to point out some instances where these theories, when applied in rural local communities, do not seem to be an important factor in elite relations or, more specifically, in elite conflicts and cooperation. These findings raise another important question about ethnicity, ethnic composition and politicization of ethnicity. At one level one can ask what would be the case if one targets villages or communities that have a diverse ethnic composition or adjacent villages with different ethnic groups. Another related question can be posed: When does ethnic identity turn into politicized identity or a potential mobilizing tool for local political conflicts? This study also draws attention to the other dimensions of ethnic identity as used by local elites for exclusion (foreigner/outsider) and inclusion (a native/local person), and these are residency (urban or rural, local or outside, full-time or a part-time resident), place of birth as well as conjugal ties (naturalization through marriage). Pointing out these dimensions is an important exercise emerging from respondents' own views, and this is a contribution worth considering when conceptualizing rural identities.

### **9.3. Distribution of resources**

Earlier in this study it was hypothesized that if distribution of resources is connected to elite relations we would expect conflict where one sector of the elite has more whereas its counterpart has little or nothing. Results in this study reveal that there are specific types of resources that seem to have an influence or relationship to a type of relation. In other words some resources seem to matter more and have more bearing on elite relationships than others. More specifically in this instance, income and employment status turned out to be associated with the dominant type of elite relations whereas distribution of farming land, residential plots and livestock had no such linkage. This has many implications in our understanding of the types of properties and their relative impact on elite relations. This study highlights the importance of unbundling the modern indicators of wealth and social status such as income, education and employment as distinct from the more traditional forms of wealth such as farming land and livestock which, as indicated in chapter seven, seem to be declining in their importance. This has a potential of being used to indicate tension between modernity and tradition. This is not to be confused or conflated with being a member of a traditional institution such as traditional authority as this does not preclude a chief from being modern in terms of values and wealth. On the other hand, business ownership has no bearing on the type of elite relations even though it is mainly a modern wealth symbol and status. The reason for this is most probably the fact that only very few, sometimes one or two or three, persons have businesses such shops or taxis in a given village thus making them an exception even within the ranks of the local elite.

Bayart's<sup>254</sup> thesis that the struggle between the elite is simply a struggle for control of more resources in a bid to establish hegemony rather than struggle for survival has some partial relevance when considering land and livestock ownership as these properties are widely available to the local elites as the results indicated. He discounts both ethnicity and class as a primary factor thus elevating the role of a political agent in a form of an elite. The struggle for the control of government-funded community development projects is one indicator of a struggle for and conflict over access to local government patronage. This line of reasoning is weakened by the results which indicate that income and employment are important factors in elite conflicts. It may, therefore, be assumed that struggle for control of government projects is one way of accessing money or securing employment or even favors or kickbacks from the companies or agencies that are invited to provide community services.

Another area of interest for future studies would be to examine the distribution of resources within the various constituencies of the local elite. Could it be that some sectors of the elite appeal to and galvanize the have-nots in order to confront the haves? If this is the case, is it done out of commitment to redistribute resources or out of selfish considerations where the elite tries to establish a sphere of influence by all means or as a way of accessing resources for themselves.

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<sup>254</sup> Bayart, F., op cit, 1993.

#### **9.4. Age and generational cleavage.**

Analysis of results proved that age is one of the underlying factors in elite relations. This confirms studies on South African political conflicts that suggested that there is a generational factor. In view of the discussion on the importance of modern wealth symbols and status over the traditional forms as well as the impact of education, it can be argued that age adds to these to suggest that these are attributes of a modern elite that is emerging and making claims in a political environment that used to be dominated by the more traditional elites. It should be emphasized that traditional leaders, as it has been argued throughout, do transform into the modern elite.

#### **9.5. Education and elite relations**

In chapter two it was indicated that formal education is one of the important indicators of modernization hence it is often used, together with other indicators of modernization, to distinguish between the traditional and the modern elite. In this study, it is shown that there is a relationship between education and elite relations. As stated earlier, education alone cannot be taken as an indicator of conflict between traditional and modern elites because for a person to be modern or traditional there is a whole range of indicators which must be taken into account. There is, however, an emerging cluster of variables such as income and employment combined with education which may suggest that these are indications of modern symbols of economic and social status. This line of reasoning

can be stretched even further to include party political affiliation as yet another type of modern political institutions that define one's identity in a modern state system.

#### **9.6. Party affiliation and identity**

The survey results, and more importantly the respondents' own interpretation, have shown a strong connection between political affiliation and the type of elite relations. In terms of conflict generated by membership of different political organizations KwaZulu-Natal is an outstanding example and this is confirmed by the participants as well as literature on KwaZulu-Natal political conflicts. The role of IFP-supporting chiefs is central in understanding the political conflicts with the ANC local leaders or ANC elected councilors. The following statements reinforce this view.

“Chiefs are indeed central to the conflict. Their power to grant or withhold political space for parties and movements to mobilize is crucial to the question of political tolerance. Unpopular, reactionary or oppressive chiefs figure prominently in ANC accounts of KwaZulu-Natal's civil war. In the IFP's version, an anti-chief revolution led by young militants and orchestrated first by UDF and since 1990 by the ANC itself, has been the main offensive front in a war to eliminate substantial opposition to the liberation movement in the province”<sup>255</sup>

All account, as shown in the literature reviewed and in discourse analysis of chapters two and four, strongly support the notion that conflict in this province can be understood in terms of the political conflict between the IFP and the ANC members. Kentridge clearly

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<sup>255</sup> **KwaZulu-Natal Briefing** “The clash that had to come: African National Congress and the problem of traditional authority. No.1. March 1996. , p.12.

articulates this point as he reasons that “Poverty, unemployment and alienated youth are not specific to Natal, whereas the political rivalry between Inkatha and UDF is.”<sup>256</sup>

Rode is yet another case where party alliances split UDM-supporting traditional authorities from the ANC-aligned civic leaders.

Another indicator of political identity is not just alliance or membership of a given political organization but the profile of involvement or the perception of the local leaders of dominant political organization. In the case of Mnceba, the chief is a member of the ANC but her ANC-aligned adversaries claim that her membership of the ANC is meaningless if she is not active or, even worse, is driven by opportunism with no real commitment to the ANC. In the Mpumalanga province the problem seems to be the interpretation of chief's declared political neutrality. In case of Tweefontein and Vezokuhle the ANC councilors dismiss this claim of neutrality and say that they are UDM or NNP by night and neutral by day. This cynical view may just be an indication that their low profile or failure to join the ANC are the reasons behind these charges or simply that they have not articulated the reasons for their sudden neutrality when they were actively part of the ruling party of KwaNdebele homeland. All these factors do confirm that political identity and affiliation does matter in shaping local elite relations.

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<sup>256</sup>Kentridge, M., op cit, 1993, p.217.

### **9.7. Leadership style and dominant relations.**

Most of the scholars on leadership generally agree that this is a broad, elusive and complex concept which does not easily lend itself to definitive analysis or study<sup>257</sup>. They all agree that the role of leadership is the one that cannot be ignored for it has a profound impact on the communities and organizations under these leaders. The literature reviewed in this study as well as the evidence from the empirical study also suggests that leaders play a critical role particularly in shaping relations between different sectors. It, however, should be recalled that this study did not directly measure the various dimensions of leadership styles but what it settled for was an analysis of individual instances which suggested the role of leaders' intervention. It is because of this limitation that the results section of this study often used anecdotes to demonstrate the direct, and sometimes indirect, role of the leaders in shaping relations between the sectors of the elite. The profile of leaders, specifically chiefs in this case, proved to be an important variable in all the nine cases even though with different outcomes. For an example, Rode, Adams and Nzongisa chiefs play important political roles well beyond their administrative areas and yet only the latter has managed to keep cooperative relations with the leaders of local community and political organizations. The previous chapter indicated that Rode and Adams chiefs play an important party political by mobilizing against the ANC whereas Nzongisa chief is on the side of the dominant political organization, ANC, in her area. Bu it was also shown that it is not just political divide that separates these cases but also flexibility or rigidity of chiefs in dealing with their political opponents or in allowing

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<sup>257</sup>The following are some of the prominent examples; Burns, J Leadership 1978; Paige, G. The scientific study of political leadership 1977; Bass, B. Leadership and performance beyond expectation 1985 and Bradley, R. Charisma and social structure 1987



other leaders to organize in their respective communities. Another interesting case is the one of Sokhulumi where the leader often reminds his subjects of his political neutrality as a unifying figure of his people. As such he has managed to earn respect and support from the influential members of his community, who he has co-opted into several community programs. These are anecdotal cases which show various ways in which leadership intervention makes a difference in the local relations. A more comprehensive study which singles out all important aspect of leadership may go beyond the tentative and provisional findings which are presented in this study.

#### **9.8. Policy preferences and attitudes toward local institutions**

Results indicated that opinion toward payment of services, traditional land tenure, New Municipal Demarcation Act, and perception of penalties imposed by traditional authorities show that each sector of the elite tend to have shared views. Difference in these opinions is more related to the interests of each sector than on conflict or accommodation. This indicates that institutional boundaries, especially in the case of traditional authority and elected councils, helps to define common interests of those who are members of a given institution.

#### **9.9. Conclusions on dominant trends.**

What emerges from this study is that demographic characteristics such as age, education, political affiliation, income and employment are underlying factors in rural elite relations. Taken together and also in view of the foregoing discussions, these may also imply that

they are characteristic features modern elite that is emerging in a political landscape that is dominated by a traditional institution of traditional rulership. Views on payment of services fees, introduction of new municipal demarcation and influence on an elected council also proved to be associated with elite relations. These opinion variables can also be interpreted indication of divergent views between those supporting and benefiting from traditional institutions (traditional authority, traditional/customary courts) and those who stand to benefit from the new institutions of government such as elected councils.

What then are the implications of this study? This study clearly demonstrated the resilience of traditional leaders and their ability to adjust in different and successive political environments. This is not only limited to South Africa, as this discussion has shown, it is the case in African countries and even beyond Africa. It is, therefore imperative to formulate some policies that accommodate elected local officials and the traditional leaders. Since it appears that traditional leaders' prevention of their opponent's access to and mobilization of the community, it is important for the government to design and implement a code of conduct especially for the period of election campaigns. Corrupt practices also call for a guideline to prevent local leaders from exploiting their followers and subject.

Assessment of leadership styles suggests that there are aspects or attributes of leaders that positive and negatively affect relations among the sectors of the elite. More studies will have to be conducted focusing on this concept of leadership, but this study demonstrated

the various ways leaders affect the well-being and development of their communities.

With regard to the literature and theories on ethnicity, there need to be more studies and theories or models focusing at local levels as the focus on a national trend may not be supported by local dynamics. This study, as the discussion above shows, does not mean that ethnicity is not a factor nor that it does not have a conflict potential in South Africa. In fact, literature reviewed in chapter two shows that this is the case in some of the communities. What is necessary is further research that will deliberately look for those communities and villages that have two or more dominant ethnic groups to see how ethnicity affects their relations.

Significance of this study can be summarized in the following manner:

- a) This study puts rural politics that are often neglected back to the spotlight.
- b) It highlights, in a comprehensive manner, the structure and political processes of rural local government as it struggles to transform or grapple with challenges of transformation in post-apartheid South Africa. And this share some features with post-independence transitions in Africa.
- c) This study avoided the mistake of many studies that have isolated either NGO's or chiefs in their study of rural local government and its political dynamics. This study brings to the fore and analyzes all the major players who range from traditional leaders to elected and civic leaders. By embracing all the sectors of the local political elite one have all the pieces of the rural political puzzles that are often missing or are glossed over in many studies.

- d) Anyone who is interested in local administration and development in rural Africa can begin to appreciate political forces that can only be ignored at any policy makers' peril or that may determine success and failure of development projects. This study makes one understand and appreciate the role of various political stakeholders in villages. If one plans to implement projects in these areas they will have to navigate through this political landscape fully aware of who has influence and who has the power to frustrate or facilitate these projects.
- e) People interested in conflict studies and conflict resolutions are given a list of factors to consider when assessing the situation in rural areas that are under the jurisdiction of chiefs.
- f) Lastly and more important, South African government and policy makers are still grappling with the policy restructuring that will define the future role of traditional leaders within the new democratic dispensation. In other words, policies on rural local government are still some work-in-progress thus making the contribution of this work timely in the sense that it contributes to a continuing discourse and policy debates at both provincial and national levels. In addition, rural areas are at the bottom of the social and economic ladder, and their development will be the ultimate measure of success for South Africa's reconstruction and development program. This cannot be done without understanding those factors and agents that impact on the implementation of these development policies in rural areas. This study makes a contribution in this respect.

## **APPENDIX 1**

### **South African Constitution, 1996 Chapter 12 TRADITIONAL LEADERS**

#### **Recognition**

211 (1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are recognized, subject to the constitution.

(2) A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may function subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or customs.

(3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.

#### **Role of Traditional leaders**

212 (1) National legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities.

(2) To deal with matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders, customary law and the customs of communities observing a system of customary law-

(a) National or provincial legislation may provide for the establishment of houses of traditional leaders; and

(b) National legislation may establish a council of traditional leaders.

## **APPENDIX 2**

### **South African Constitution, 1996 Chapter 7 LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

#### **Status of municipalities**

151.(1) The sphere of government consists of municipalities, which must be established for the whole of the territory of the Republic.

(2) The executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in Municipal Council.

(3) A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the constitution.

(4) The national or a provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions.

#### **Objects of local government**

152. (1) The objects of local government are-

(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;

(b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;


(c) to promote social and economic development;

(d) to promote a safe and healthy environment; and

(e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organizations in the matters of local government.

(2) A municipality must strive, within its financial and administrative capacity, to achieve the objects set out in subsection (1).

## APPENDIX 3




Source: Butler, J., Rotberg, R. and Adams, J. The Black Homelands of South Africa Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. p.1.






## APPENDIX 4

Figure 2 South African Provinces




## APPENDIX 5

**Figure 3: South African Provinces  
With Recognized Traditional Authorities**



## APPENDIX 6

**Figure 4: Research Sites in Eastern Cape,  
KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga**



## APPENDIX 7

### Interviews

Date	Name	Province
5 May 2000	Chieftainess C.Ngunga	Eastern Cape
5 May 2000	Mr C. Gxula	Eastern Cape
6 May 2000	Mr. N. Magocoba	Eastern Cape
6 May 2000	Mr. M. Magocoba	Eastern Cape
8 May 2000	Mr. S. Myingwa	Eastern Cape
9 May & 10 September 2000	Mr. M. Quvane	Eastern Cape
9 May 2000	Ms N. Siswana	Eastern Cape
9 May 2000	Mr. S. Boyce	Eastern Cape
9 May 2000	Mr. M. Hokwana	Eastern Cape
11 May 2000	Ms. N. Dandala	Eastern Cape
13 May 2000	Mr. H.B. Mnukwa	Eastern Cape
6 & 7 July 1995	Chief G.S.K. Nota	Eastern Cape
15 May 2000	Acting Chief S. Mtsi	Eastern Cape
16 May 2000	Mr. D. Kwebulana	Eastern Cape
16 May 2000	Mr. M. Nota	Eastern Cape
16 May 2000	Mr. C. Mbotshwa	Eastern Cape
17 May 2000	Mr. G. Nomsuka	Eastern Cape
17 May 2000	Mr. M. Gumenke	Eastern Cape
17 May 2000	Mr. B. Mnukwa	Eastern Cape
19 May 2000	Mrs N. Mazwi	Eastern Cape
19 May 2000	Mrs O.Xinwa	Eastern Cape
21 & 23 May 2000	Mr. S. Mnukwa	Eastern Cape
21 May 2000	Mr. M. Gqoli	Eastern Cape
21 May 2000	Mr. K. Jojozi	Eastern Cape
22 May 2000	Mr. S.Z. Mnukwa	Eastern Cape
22 May 2000	Mr. M. Mnukwa	Eastern Cape
22 & 23 May 2000	Mr. M. Mbizo	Eastern Cape
23 May 2000	Mr M. Nota	Eastern Cape
23 May 2000	Mr. E. Ngcwangu	Eastern Cape
23 May 2000	Mr. M. Mfokazi	Eastern Cape
23 May 2000	Ms. J. Njwambe	Eastern Cape
23 May 2000	Mr M. Mxinwa	Eastern Cape
25 May 2000	Mr M. Mzozo	Eastern Cape
25 May 2000	Mr. M. Siyangaphi	Eastern Cape
25 May 2000	Ms. I. Xinwa	Eastern Cape
25 May 2000	Mr. M. Ndzimeni	Eastern Cape
25 May 2000	Ms K. Xinwa	Eastern Cape
26 May 2000	Ms F. Xinwa	Eastern Cape

26 May 2000	Mr. Z. Makaula	Eastern Cape
26 May 2000	Mr. L. Damane	Eastern Cape
27 May 2000	Mr. M.S. Gqoli	Eastern Cape
29 May 2000	Ms M. Balasane	Eastern Cape
29 May 2000	Mr. M. Gumenke	Eastern Cape
30 May 2000	Ms. N. Damane	Eastern Cape
30 May 2000	Ms. N. Mazwi	Eastern Cape
30 May 2000	Mrs. M. Gqoli	Eastern Cape
30 May 2000	Mrs.N. Garane	Eastern Cape
3 June 2000	Mr. M. Mtsi	Eastern Cape
3 June 2000	Mr J. Radebe	Eastern Cape
3 June 2000	Mrs. B. Mamadiba	Eastern Cape
4 June 2000	Mrs. N. Mdutyana	Eastern Cape
4 June 2000	Mr. L.Sogoni	Eastern Cape
4 June 2000	Ms Y. Sogoni	Eastern Cape
4 June 2000	Ms. N. Mvovo	Eastern Cape
7 & 8 June 2000	Chieftainess N. Fikeni	Eastern Cape
9 June 2000	Chief. X.Mgeyi	Eastern Cape
9 June 2000	Mr.M. Canca	Eastern Cape
9 June 2000	Mr. M. Bangani	Eastern Cape
9 June 2000	Mr N. Bodlela	Eastern Cape
11 June 2000	Mr. M. Mbangi	Eastern Cape
13 June 2000	Mr. A.D. Fikeni	Eastern Cape
13 June 2000	Mrs. M. Ntshobane	Eastern Cape
13 June 2000	Mr. B. Jojo	Eastern Cape
14 June 2000	Mr. M. Jojo	Eastern Cape
14 June 2000	M. S. Jojo	Eastern Cape
15 June 2000	Mr. K. Dlava	Eastern Cape
15 June 2000	Mr. S. Lusawana	Eastern Cape
15 June 2000	Mr. M. Dindo	Eastern Cape
17 June 2000	Mrs N. Canca	Eastern Cape
17 June 2000	Mrs. N. Mgugudo	Eastern Cape
9 August 2000	Chief F. Makanya	KwaZulu-Natal
9 August 2000	Mr. T. Mthembu	KwaZulu-Natal
11 August 2000	Mr. T. Mngoma	KwaZulu-Natal
11 August 2000	Mr. M. Mngoma	KwaZulu-Natal
11 August 2000	Mr. S.B. Makanya	KwaZulu-Natal
12 August 2000	Mr. A.B. Makanya	KwaZulu-Natal
12 August 2000	Mr. J. Mngoma	KwaZulu-Natal
12 August 2000	Mr. J. Makatini	KwaZulu-Natal
14 August 2000	Mr. V. Hlongwa	KwaZulu-Natal
17 August 2000	Mr. B. Makanya	KwaZulu-Natal
18 August 2000	Mrs. Z. Makanya	KwaZulu-Natal

18 August 2000	Ms. N. Cele	KwaZulu-Natal
20 August 2000	Chief Hlengwa	KwaZulu-Natal
20 August 2000	Mr. M. Mzobe	KwaZulu-Natal
21 August 2000	Mr. B. Shabane	KwaZulu-Natal
21 August 2000	Mr. J. Ngidi	KwaZulu-Natal
21 August 2000	Mr K. Shezi	KwaZulu-Natal
22 August 2000	Mr. B.M. Hlengwa	KwaZulu-Natal
22 August 2000	Mr. T. Mfeka	KwaZulu-Natal
22 August 2000	Ms. Z. Mali	KwaZulu-Natal
23 August 2000	Ms. Barbara	KwaZulu-Natal
23 August 2000	Mr. N. Mthembu	KwaZulu-Natal
23 August 2000	Mrs. N. Maphumulo	KwaZulu-Natal
23 August 2000	Mr. T. Mzobe	KwaZulu-Natal
23 August 2000	Mr. M.Myeza	KwaZulu-Natal
23 August 2000	Mr. K. Mkhize	KwaZulu-Natal
23 August 2000	Mrs. M. Mzimela	KwaZulu-Natal
25 August 2000	Chief J.J. Mahlangu	Mpumalanga
26 August 2000	Mr. M. Mahlangu	Mpumalanga
26 August 2000	Mr. J. Mahlangu	Mpumalanga
26 August 2000	Mr. P. Mngoma	Mpumalanga
26 August 2000	Mr. S.J. Mahlangu	Mpumalanga
28 August 2000	Mr. W.S. Skosana	Mpumalanga
29 August 2000	Mr S.K. Mhlangu	Mpumalanga
29 August 2000	Ms. A. Babedi	Mpumalanga
30 August 2000	Moses Mabena	Mpumalanga
30 August 2000	Mr. J.M. Mahlangu	Mpumalanga
30 August 2000	Mr. M.N. Mahlangu	Mpumalanga
2 September 2000	Chief A.J. Mabena	Mpumalanga
2 September 2000	Mr. J.S. Mashiyana	Mpumalanga
2 September 2000	Mr. S. Mabena	Mpumalanga
3 September 2000	Mr. D. Mahlangu	Mpumalanga
3 September 2000	Ms. A. Moukua	Mpumalanga
3 September 2000	Mr. S. Mnguni	Mpumalanga
5 September 2000	Ms G. Seerene	Mpumalanga
5 September 2000	Ms. S. Mbovu	Mpumalanga
5 September 2000	Mr. S. Mmolotsi	Mpumalanga
5 September 2000	Mr. S. Nkosi	Mpumalanga
5 September 2000	Mr. Chicco Shabalala	Mpumalanga
6 September 2000	Mr. L. Skosana	Mpumalanga
6 September 2000	Mr. M.M. Mabena	Mpumalanga
8 September 2000	Mr. G. Mabuza	Mpumalanga

8 September 2000	Mr. A. Mokoena	Mpumalanga
11 September 2000	Chief Mabena	Mpumalanga
11 September 2000	Mr. T. Mabena	Mpumalanga
11 September 2000	Mr. A. Mahlangu	Mpumalanga
11 September 2000	Mr. J. Skosana	Mpumalanga
11 September 2000	Mr. S. Mguni	Mpumalanga
12 September 2000	Mr. P. Makatu	Mpumalanga
14 September 2000	Mr. S. Manamello	Mpumalanga
14 September 2000	Mr. K. Mabena	Mpumalanga
15 September 2000	Ms. N. Mabena	Mpumalanga
18 September 2000	Mr. E. Mabena	Mpumalanga
18 September 2000	Mr. V. Mahlangu	Mpumalanga
19 September 2000	Ms. L. Mavimbela	Mpumalanga
23 September 2000	Mr. M. Luthuli	KwaZulu-Natal
23 September 2000	Mr. J. Msomi	KwaZulu-Natal
25 September 2000	Mr. G. Zelemu	KwaZulu-Natal
25 September 2000	Mr. M.N. Ndlovu	KwaZulu-Natal
25 September 2000	Mr. J. Ngidi	KwaZulu-Natal
26 September 2000	Mr. T. Makatini	KwaZulu-Natal
27 September 2000	Mr. M. Conco	KwaZulu-Natal
27 September 2000	Ms. G. Mtetwa	KwaZulu-Natal
28 September 2000	Ms Mthembu	KwaZulu-Natal
28 September 2000	Ms. B.Khomo	KwaZulu-Natal
28 September 2000	Ms N. Luthuli	KwaZulu-Natal
28 September 2000	Mr. V. Ndlovu	KwaZulu-Natal

#### **Interviews with government officials**

3 May 2000	Mr T. Gxarhisa, Assistant Magistrate at Mt Ayliff
4 May 2000	Mr. N. Mzamo, Director of Traditional Affairs Eastern Cape
4 May 2000	Chief N. Matanzima, Chairperson of Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders
4 May 2000	Prince Mavuso, Secretary of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders
3 September 2000	King Mayitjha III, King of the Ndebele of Ndzundza in Mpumalanga
5 September 2000	Mr. E.V. Mahlangu, Deputy Director of Regional office of Traditional Affairs in Mpumalanga.

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